NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0520n.06 No. 08-4004 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
PAU LKE EN E a

nd MA RY F EH SKENS, Pla int if fs -A pp e lle e s,
v. SUS AN T AV E Z EL MA

N a nd TH E O HI O B OA RD OF E DUCATI ON, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FR OM T HE UN I TE D STAT ES DI STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E SO UT HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

B EF OR E: ME RRI TT , G RI F F I N, and KE TH L ED GE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Def endants Ohio B oard of

Education and Susan Z elman, Ohio B oard of Education Sup e ri nte nd e nt a

nd Di re c tor , a

pp e a l a dis tr ic t c ourt

or de r g ra nti ngpla int if

fs ’ m oti on

fo r atto rn e y s’ fee s under the f

ee- shifting provision of t he Individuals with Disabilit ies Education Act (“I DEA” ). 20 U. S.C. § 1 41 5. We a ff ir m. I n d oin g so , w e ho ld t

hat no sp e c ia l c ir c ums tanc e s mi lit a te d a g a ins t the attorne y

fee awa rd, and the district court did not abuse its discre tion. I. The $81,093.62 fe e aw ard c ontested in this appeal stems from the settlement of a c lass action lawsuit filed by

plaintiffs Paul Kee ne and Dr. Mary Fe hskens on behalf of their son, “ S.K.,” claiming that the Westerville City Sc h o o l Di strict and def endants “ impos[ ed] unlawfully stringe nt andNo. 08-4004

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- 2 - technica l pleading require ments upon reque sts for adminis trative he aring s in special educ ation
c a se s. ” Al tho ug h o ur

jur isd ic tio n is lim ite d to our r e vie w o f t he fe e -a wa rd or de r, defe nd ants ’

“ sp e c ia l c ir c u

m s t a n c e s ” a r g u m e nt p r e s u m e s an und e rs tand ingof

the I DE A’ s d

ue pr oc e ss p ro c e dure s. F or thi s r e a so n, we pr ov ide the fo llo wi ngba c kg ro un d o f the I DE A’ s adm ini str a tiv e re vie w p ro c e ss. A. I n e xch ang e fo r fe de ra l fu

nd ing , the I DE A r e qu ir e s st a te s to ide nti fy , lo c a te , a nd e va luate “ a ll children w it

h d is a b il it ie s r e s id in g in th e St a te
. . . a n d w h o ar e in n e e d o f s p e c ia l e d u c a ti o nand related servic es . . . .” 20 U .S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (A). States must pr o v i de all such disable d children
a “ fr e e a pp ro pr iate pu

bli c e du c a tio n” (“ F APE ” ), 20 U. S.C. § 1 41 2( a )( 1) (a ), and sc ho ol d istri c ts
rec eiving I DEA funds must establish an individualized education prog ram (“I EP”) for e ach disa bled child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1). Under the I DEA, the I EP must contain a specific statement of the c hild’s curre nt perfor mance levels, the child’s short-term and long- term g oals, the propose d educational service s, and cr iteria for evaluating the c hild’s prog ress. The I DEA also require s the school district to revie w the I EP on an annual ba sis for any

nece ssary

adjustments or revisions. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). The I DEA provide s an administrative re view proc ess throug h which par ents who disag ree wi th t he a pp ro pr iate ne ss of an I EP ca n see k re lie f. 20 U. S.C. § 141 5( b)
. Th e pr oc e ss b e g ins wi th
a du e pr oc e ss c omp la int to the sc ho ol dis tr ic t, of te n te rm e d a

du e pr oc e ss h e ari ngre qu e st, wh ic h is followed by a d u e p ro ce s s hear ing, where the par ents ca n voice their

conce rns to an indepe ndent he ari ngof

fi c e r ( “ I HO ” ). 20 U. S.C. § 1 41 5( c )( 2) (A ). Any pa rt y may a pp e a l the I HO ’s de c isi on

toNo. 08-4004

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- 3 - a state- level re view off

icer (“SL RO”). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g )(2)
. Finally , any party ag g rieve d by

the SL RO’s dec ision can file a lawsuit in state or fe dera l court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). A d ue pr oc e ss c omp la int

mus t c on ta in t

he fo llo wi nginf

or matio n: (I ) the nam e o f

t h e c h i l d , t h e a d dr e s s o f t h e r e s i d e n c e o f

t h e c h i l d ( o r a v a i l a ble contac t information in the case of a home less child), and the name of the school the c hil d is a tte nd ing ; (I I ) i n the case of a homeless child or y outh . . . available c ontact information for the c hil d a nd the name of

the sc ho ol t

he c hil d is a tte nd ing ; (I I I ) a de scription of t he nature of the problem of t he child relating to such pr oposed initiation or chang e, including fac ts relating to such problem; and (I V) a proposed r esolution of the problem to the extent known a nd available to the party at the time. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)( A)(ii). B. I n Fe bruar

y 2006, plaintiffs wer e dissatisfied with Westerville’s I EP for their son, S.K., who
su ff e rs fr om a mixe d r e c e pti ve and

e xpre ssi ve langua g e dis or de r a nd su sp e c te d a

uti sm. Pla int if

fs ’
c on fl ic ts w ithWes te rv ill e be g an in Au g us t 20 02 , wh e n the y fi rs t a pp ro a c he d the sc ho ol d istri c t to d i s cu s s t h e t y

p e o f s p ec i al edu ca t i o ns erv i ce s av ai l ab l e t o S
. K. t o co u n t er ac t h i s s p ee ch an d l an gu age delay s. Westerville had pre viously reje cted S.K.’s phy sician’s I EP r ecommendations, determining that S.K. was inel i gi b l e t o receive spe cial educ ation service s if he enr olled in its ki nderg arte n prog ram. B ased on this dec ision, plainti ffs de cided to provide private spe ech and languag e ser vices to S.K. at their own expense.No. 08-4004

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- 4 - I n J anuar

y 2005, plaintiffs reque sted a mee ting with Westerville and p re s en t ed a sp e e c h- langua g e e va luatio n f ro m th e ir pr ivate sp e e c h th e ra

pis t and a se c on d e va luation f

ro m hi s phy sician. S.K.’s phy sician also re commended pla cing S.K. at the Marbur n Aca demy , a school
s p ec i al l y d es i gn edfo r c h i l dre nwi t h l ea rn i n g d i s ab i l i t i e s . F o l l o wi n g t h e J an u ary 2 0 0 5 m ee t i n g, Wes te rv ill e a g a in d eni ed S .K. s pe c ia l e du c a tio n s e rv ic e s. At that ti me , p la int if

fs se nt a no tic e to Westerville stati n g t h at they would unilatera lly

enroll S.K. at the Mar

burn Ac ademy

for the 2005-2006 ac ademic year . There afte r, W esterville refuse d plaintiffs’ request for public pa y ment of S.K.’s Marbur

n Aca demy

tuition. I n November

and De cembe r 2005, Westerville re verse d their prior asse ssments, proposing
an I EP that te rm inate d S. K. ’s a tte nd anc e a t th e Ma rbu rn Ac a de my

and of fe re d S. K. c omp ara

ble specia l education services at Westerville. Westerville’s I EP, how ever , was untimely beca use it was proposed a fter the first day of the a cade mic school y ear . 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)( A). Plaintiffs sent a three -pag e due proce ss c omplaint, pur suant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)( 6), to the Superintendent o f

th e We s te r

v il le Sc h o o l D is trict, Geor g e Tombaug h, reque sting a hear ing r eg arding Westerville’s proposed I EP and s ee k i ng , among other thing s, reimburseme nt for tuition paid at Marbur n and expenses re lated to S.K.’s private educa tional evaluations. I nit ia lly , p la int if

fs ’ r e qu e st f

or a du e pr oc e ss h e ar i n g

p r o c e e d e d

w i t ho ut i nc ide nt. De fe nd ants
se nt a le tte r to pla int if

fs ide nti fy ing thr e e po te nti a l I HO s to p re sid e ov e r t he ir he ari ng . T his pr oc e ss
w a s i n t e r r u p te d, h o w e v e r , w h e nW e s t e r v i l l e f a xe d a “ s u f f i c i e n c y c h a l l e n g e ” t o M a t t h e w J.No. 08-4004

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The I DEA provides that “[a] par ty may amend its due proce ss c omplaint notice [] if . . . the 1 other pa rty consents in writing to such amendme nt and i s gi v en the opportunity to resolve the c omp la int
. . . o r . . . the he ari ngof

fi c e r g ra nts pe rm iss ion , e xce pt t

hat th e he ari ngof

fi c e r m ay on ly g rant such pe rmission at any time n o t later than 5 da

y s befor e a due proce ss hear ing oc curs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2) (E)( i)(I )-( I I ). - 5 - Rohrbache r (a

n I HO unilater ally

selec ted by

Westerville), see king the dismiss al of plaintiffs’ due proce ss complaint beca

use it provided “insuff

icient notice” under 20 U .S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A )(ii). Plaintiffs f

axed a response to Rohrbache r ar g uing, inte r a lia , that their due pr ocess c omplaint satisfied § 1415(b) (7)( A)(ii) a nd Westerville’s suffic iency challeng e fa iled to ad d re s s any pivotal iss ue s c on c e rn ingS.K .’ s I EP. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, Rohrb a c he r d ism iss e d p la int if fs ’ d ue pr oc e ss complaint beca

use it alleg edly

failed to identify t h e I E P ’s fl aws, a s require d under 20 U .S.C. § 1 4 1 5 ( b ) ( 7 ) ( A ) ( ii ) ( I I I )
. Up o n r e c e iv in g th e d is mi s s a l n o ti c e , We s te r v il le c an c e ll e d p la in ti f

f s ’ due proce ss hear ing. Two day s later, defenda

nts sent a letter to plaintiffs stating that they wer e closingtheir “c ase” and that “no f

urther a ction would be take n.” In this letter, defe ndants informed pla intiffs that they could file a

new c omplai n t, but failed to disclose their r ight to see k leave to amend it befor e W es t erv i l l e c an ce l l edt h ei r h ea ri n g. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2) (E). 1 Pla int if fs fi le d a no tic e of a

pp e a l w ithan SL RO . T he SL RO , h ow e ve r, dis mis se d p la int if fs ’
a pp e a l a s pr e matur e , c on c lud ing that the re wa s “ no fi na l de c isi on ” to r e vie w b e c a us e the ir re qu e st for a due proc ess hea

ring had bee n dismiss ed for “lac k of spec ificity .” I n May 2006, plaintiffs filed a ten-c ount class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on behalf of S.K., alleg ing, inte r a lia , that Westerville andNo. 08-4004

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Pla int if fs ne g oti a te d a

se pa rate se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt w iththe Wes te rv ill e de fe nd ants
. 2 - 6 - the state -a g e nc y

de fe nd ants un lawf

ull y dis mis se d th e ir du e pr oc e ss co mpl a int , ille g a lly c los e d th e ir
case , an d cre ated a

nd perpe trated policie s and proc edure s that cause d widespre ad, unlawf ul dismiss als of d ue proc ess complaints throug hout the state of Ohio. Plaintiffs also alleg ed that defe ndants instructed the I HO assig ned to their c ase “ to do nothing” f or the fir st thirty

day s (other than to schedule a hea

ring ) and to bill for no more than one hour of time. P l aint iffs’ c omplaint soug ht declar atory

and injunctive relief

, as well as compensatory damag es re lated to S.K.’s tuition and spec ial educa

tion services. I n April 2007, eleve n months after f iling their complaint, plaintiffs enter ed into a settlement ag ree ment with defe ndants. I n it, “[t] he S tate Defenda nts ag ree [d] that Plaintiffs [ wer e] prevailing 2 parties with re spect to sy stemic issues related to sufficie ncy ch al l en g es in the . . . litigation. The Part ie s [a lso ] re se rv e [d] a ll r ig hts wi th re sp e c t to the iss ue of a tto rn e y ’s [sic ] fe e s . . . .” De fe nd ants also ag ree d to insti tu

te chang es to their due pr ocess pr ocedur es, including retra ining their I HOs about employing the proper

standard of revie w under 20 U .S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A )(ii) whe n evaluating the sufficie ncy

of due pr ocess c omplaints. Following the settlement, plaintiffs moved f or attorne y s’ fe es under

20 U
. S.C. § 1415(i). The district court g rante d plaintiffs’ motion, but ex cluded c laimed attorne y s’ fee s g ener ated dur ing the administrative proc ess. Def endants timely appea l the $81,093.62 attorney fee awa rd, arguing that the district court
err ed in re jecting their cla im that “specia l circumstanc es” w arr anted the de nial of plaintiffs’ motion.No. 08-4004

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- 7 - II. Section 1415(i) of the I DEA provides, in pe rtinent part, that “the court, in its discre tion, may
awa rd re asonable attorney s’ fe es as pa rt of the c osts . .
. to a prevailing party who i s the par ent of
a c hil d w itha

dis a bil ity .” 20 U. S.C. § 14 15 (i )( 3) (B )( i)
. A “ pr e va ili ng pa rt y ” is on e wh o “ su c c e e d[s] on any signific ant issue in litigation which achie ves some of the bene fit the parties soug ht in bringing suit.” Tompkins v. Troy Sch. Dist., 199 F. App’ x 463, 465 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) ( quoting He ns le yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). “An a war d of costs t o a pre vailing pa rty . . . is considere d under a n abuse of

discretion
s t an d ard.” Deal v. H

amilton Count

y Bd. of Educ. , 3 9 2 F
. 3 d 8 4 0 , 8 5 0 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 4 ) ( c iting J e ffe rso n v . J

e ffe rso n Co un ty

Pu b. Sc h. Sy

s. , 3 60 F .3 d 583 , 591 (6 th Cir . 200 4) . “ A c le ar e xamp le of an a buse of discr etion exis ts w here the trial court fails to c onsider the a pplicable leg al standar d or the fa cts upon which the ex erc ise of i ts discretionary judgme nt is based.” Days Inns W orldwide, Inc. v. Patel , 4 4 5 F. 3 d

8 9 9 , 9 0 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g In re W alter , 282 F.3d 434, 440 ( 6th Cir. 2002)). In I DEA l aw s u its, we have “require[d] . . . district court[s] [t o] award attorney fee s to a preva iling par

ty wher e no spec ial circ umstances mil itate[d] ag ainst such an a war d.” Tompkins, 199 F. App’x at 466 (emphasis adde d) (q u o t i n g W ikol v. Birmingham Pub. Sc h. Bd. of Educ. , 360 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2004)). “[L ]i ttle guida

nce has been provided by

the Supreme Court a s to precise ly what constitutes a spec ial circ umstance that would defe at a f ee a war d, and [this court] ha[s] recentl y opted for a
case -by -ca se approach rather than adopting a pre deter

mined formula.” Deja Vu v . Metro. Gov ’t ofNo. 08-4004

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- 8 - Nas hv ill e , 421 F
. 3 d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted) (discussing uncer tainty of “spe cial circ umstances” that would war rant denying attorney s’ fee s in a civil r ights a ction broug ht under § 1988). In a ca se-by -ca se inquiry , “the bur den is on the non-prevailing party to make a strong showing that ‘spec ial circ umstances wa rra nt a denial of

fee s.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Mo rsc ott , I nc . v . Ci ty of Cleveland , 936 F.3d 271, 273 ( 6th Cir. 1991)). “F irst, while there are no brig ht line rules re g ardingspecia l circumstanc es, the c ourts have
m ad e clear that special c ircumstance s should not be easily found.” Cle v e lan d v . I

brah im , 12 1 F. Ap p ’x 8 8 , 9 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( u np u b l i s h ed ) ( ci t i n g W

ikol , 360 F.3d at 611). “Sec ond, there is no support for the pr oposition t hat the close ness or difficulty of a case constitutes a specia l circumstanc e under which a district c ourt may deny attorney ’s fee s . . . .” Id. “F inally , we must consider that the p u rp o s e o f t h e f

ee -s h i ft i n g p ro v i s i o n i s t o m ak e i t ea s i er fo r a p l ai n t i ff o f l i m i t edm ea n s t o b ri n g a
me r it o r io u s s u it , b y o f

f e r in g s o me in c e n ti v e f

o r att o r n e y s to ta

k e s u c h c a s e s.” Id. (c i t i n g N

. Y. Gaslight Cl ub, Inc. v . Carey , 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980)). Def endants a s s er t the exist ence of three specia l circumstanc es: 1) they did not have the ability to addre ss the administrative dec isions prompti ng plaintiffs’ lawsuit; 2) they acte d to corre ct the disputed administrative dec isions as soon as prac ticable; and 3) the W esterville sc hool district
wa s th e c ulp a

ble pa rt y , a nd it a lon e sh ou ld b e ar t

he lit ig a tio n c os ts a sso c iate d w ithpla int if fs ’ l aws uit
. S peci fi cally , d e fe nd ants c on te nd that 20 U. S.C. § 1 41 5( i) (1 )( A) pr e ve nte d th e ir a bil ity to addre ss the dismiss al of plaintiffs’ due proce ss c omplaint be cause the I DEA mandates that all dueNo. 08-4004

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- 9 - p r o c e s s d e c i s i o n s ar e f

i n a l , u n l e s s o r

u n t i l t h e s e d e c i s i o n s ar e o v e rtu r n e d b y anS L R O
. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, § 1 41 5( i) (1 )( A) state s: A d e c isi on

ma de in a

[due pr oc e ss] h e ari ng. . . sha ll be fi na l, e xce pt t hat any pa rt y involved in such hea

ring may appea l s u c h

decision under

the provisions of subsection (g ) of this section and pa

rag raph ( 2). Id. Contrary to de fenda

nts’ contention, § 1415(i)(1) (A) is w holly inapposite. Section 1415(i)(1) (A) involves an I HO rulingmade pursuant to a due proce ss he aring
. As defe ndants are awa re, pla intiffs
never rec eived a

due proc ess hea

ring in the prese nt case
. I n W ikol v. Birmingham Pub. Sc h. Bd. of Educ. , 360 F.3d at 611, we held that a party ’s
s u b mi s s io n o f “ f a ls e and misleading[attorney ] bi lling” w as not a spec ial circ umstance that warr anted the denial of attorne y s’ fe es. In Morscott, Inc. v . City of Cl eve land , 936 F.3d at 273, we conc luded that the district court a

bused its discretion bec ause it did not iden t i fy a s p ec ial circ umstance that jus tif ie d it s d e nia l of

an a wa rd . In d oin g so , w e state d th a t:
we must a

rticulate rea sons f

or any depar

ture from the g ener al rule that p re v ai l ing parties are to be awarde d fee s, identifying a ny specia l circumstanc es and e x plaining why they rende r an a

war d unjust. The defe ndant has the burde n of showing specia l circ umstances wa

rra nt a denial of

fee s, and the defe ndant’s showing must be a strong one. Mo rsc ott , 9 3 6 F. 2 d at 2 7 3 ( q u o t i n g Herrington v. County of Sonoma , 883 F.2d 739, 744 ( 9th Cir. 1989)). He re, the district c ourt car efully analy zed and re jected e ach of

defe ndants’ asse rted spec ial circ umstances. More over, w e have y et to reve rse a district court’s orde r aw ar d i n g attorney s’ fe es
un de r 2 0 U .S. C. § 14 15 (i ) f or an a bu se of dis c re tio n w he re it r

ule d th a t a

pa rt y fa ile d to me e t it s burden of demonstrating specia l circumstanc es.No. 08-4004

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- 10 - De fe nd ants ’ s e c on d a

nd thi rd a lle g e d s pe c ia l c ir c ums tanc e s a re e qu a lly

wi tho ut m e ri t. Def endants asser

t that the y acte d to c orre ct the disputed administrative decision as soon as they had the a bil ity to do so. Th e re c or d be lie s this argume nt. As a pr e lim ina

ry matte r, a pa rt y ’s g oo d f

a ith is not a special circ umstance that justi fies the de nial of attorne y ’s fe es. Morscott, 936 F.2d at 273. I n addition, de fenda

nts’ first opportunity to addre ss the premature dismissal of plaintiff’s c omplaint was duringthe SL RO appea l proce ss. At that time, defenda nts electe d to aff

irm the complaint’s dismiss al without substantively addre ssing plaintiffs’ arguments under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)( 7)(A) (ii). Finally , the district court prope rly reje cted de fenda

nts’ argument that Westerville wa s the
on ly c ulp a ble pa rt y . A s it no te d in its or de r: [t ]he claims a g ainst the Westerville defe ndants involve primarily the decision of the Westerville defe ndants to ref use to pay

for t h e p lace ment of plaintiff S.K. in a suita b l e s ch o ol. The cla ims ag ainst the state def endants involve the a lleg ed de fi c ie nc ie s in

the pr oc e dure s f

or lit ig a tin g du e pr oc e ss no tic e s. Th e state de fe nd ants c ann ot b e c ha

ra c te ri zed a s bei ngle ss c ulp a ble tha n th e Wes te rv ill e de fe nd ants in t his case . Simpl y put, plaintiffs’ lawsuit was ba sed, in part, upon de fenda nts’ duty to “establish” proce dures that “ ens u re t h at children w ith disabili ties and their pa rents ar e guara

nteed pr ocedur al
sa fe g ua rd s . . . wi th r e sp e c t to a

fr e e a pp ro pr iate pu

bli c e du c a tio n. ” Oh io R e v. Cod e § 3 32 3. 05 ; see als o 20 U. S.C. § 1 41 2( a )( 11 )( A) (i ). A p are nt’ s r ig ht t o a du e pr oc e ss hea ri ng pro vi des t he on ly
ve hic le to p re se rv e tho se sa fe g ua rd s. 20 U. S.C. § 14 15 (b) -( f) . D e fe nd ants we re no t bl a me le ss reg ardingplaintiffs’ claims because they wer e cha rg ed with establishing the due pr ocess pr ocedur es that provided the impetus for plaintiffs’ lawsuit.No. 08-4004

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- 11 - III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m th e or de r o f the dis tr ic t c ourt . In a dd iti on , w e re mand thi s c a se to t he dis tr ic t c ourt

fo r its de te rm inatio n of an a pp ro pr iate awa

rd of pla int if fs ’ a pp e llate a tto rn e y s’ fee s under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).