JIM MAlTOX Attorney Generals

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nEqual Opporlunilyl Allirmatlve Action En-ploynr 

# TheAttorney General ofTexas

Novehber 30. 1984

Honorable BenryWade District Attorney Dallas County Condemnation Section Services Building Dallas, Texas 75202 Dear Hr. Wade: Opinion No. m-237 Re: Effect of Senate Bill No. 42. 68th Leg., 2nd Called Sessfon on jurisdictions of certain county courts at lawin Dallas County

You have requested our opinion regarding the effect of Senate Bill No. 42. Sixty-e:lghth Legislature, 2nd Called Session. ou the jurisdiction of Counl:yCourts of Dallas County at LawNos. 2, 3. 4, and5. Thebill provides Inpart:

Section 2. The County Court of Dallas County at LawNo. 1 has original and concurrent jurisdiction with district courts in all civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500. excluding interest, and does not exceed $20,000, excluding interest, mandatory damages and penalties, attorney's fees, andcosts. Section :i. The County Court of Dallas County at LawNo. 1 has original and concurrent jurisdiction wil:tl district courts in appeals of final rulings and decisions of the Industrial Accident Board, regardless of the amountin controversy. Acts 1984. 68th Leg., 2ndC.S...ch. 15, Il. at 208. 209. Specifically, !k!nate Bill No. 42 amended article 1970-3, V.T.C.S., and increased thejurisdiction of Dallas CountyCourt at Law No. 1so that its jurisdiction is original andconcurrent

vith distr:.ct courts in all civil cases in vhich the matter :Incontroversy exceeds $500. excluding interest, tlrlddoes not exceed $20,000, excluding interest, mandatory damages and penalties, attorney's fees. andcosts. Acts 1984. supra. at 209. In addition, the bill conferred

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original andconcurrmt jurisdiction with district courts in appeals of final rulings and decisions of the Industrial A:cident Board, regardless of the amountin controwrsy. Id. The legislature mayestatslish the jurisdiction and organization ofall county courts at law. Tex

. Coast., art. V. 51; Jordan v. Crudgington, 231 S.W.2d 641 (‘Tex. 1950); Attorney General Opinions M-1097 (1972); M-907 (1971). Thejurisdictions of the County Court of Dallas County at Law, Nos. 2. 3, 4, and 5 are ~1% out in articles 1970-16, 1970-18, 1970-31.1, and 1970-31.2, V.T.C.S. Articles 1970-16, 1970-31.1. and 1970-31.2 makereferences to ,:hejurisdiction of Court No. 1 before the enactment of Senate Bill :#I,. 42. Because we believe that these reference statutes are statuterI of general reference, weconclude that Senate Bill No. 42 increased t’w jurisdiction of Courts Nos. 2. 3. 4, and 5. The jurisdiction of Court No. 1 was originally established in 1907. Acts 1907, 30th Leg., ch. LII, I2, at p. 115. In 1917 the legislature created Court No. I!andprovided that it

shall have exclusive concurrent civil andcriminal jurisdiction of all g:ases, original andappellate, over which by the laws of the State of Texas, the existing County Cour,:of Dallas County at Law[No. 11, of Dallas count:r,, Texas, would have original andappellate jurlsd:Lction.

. . . V.T.C.S. art. 1970-16. Later, in 1963, the Fifty-eighth Legislature provided for the creation of Court Nos. 3 and 4 and provided that these courts

shall have exeLusive, concurrent civil jurisdiction of all :ases, original andappellate, over which by the 1~s of the State of Texas the existing County Cor.rt of Dallas County at Law Number1andCounty Court of Dallas County at Law Number 2 have original and appellate jurisdiction.

. . . V.T.C.S. art. 1970-31.1. 52. In 1971, tt:e legislature enacted article 197Oa. V.T.C.S., which inc::c!ased the jurisdictional amount in controversy for “all county courts at law.” Finally. in 1977. the legislature created Court No. 5andprovided that

[t]he court hereby created shall have exclusive, concurrent civil Jurisdiktion of all cases, original and appelkte. over which by the laws of the State of Texas the existing County Courts of

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Dallas County at Lin#Nos. 1, 2, 3. and 4 have original andappellate jurisdiction. V.T.C.S. art. 1970-31.2. $2. Asindicated above, Courts No. 3, 4. and 5 do not have criminal jurisdiction, because the acts creating those courts expressly provided for only civil jurisdiction. this series of statutes relating to the jurisdiction of the County Courts of Dallas County Nos. 2. 3, 4, and 5 are knovn as reference statutes. The rr.l,e of construction regarding general reference statutes is that ths,adopting statute includes not 

### onlythe laws in force at the time the!adopting statute became effective, but also subsequent legislation ,celatlng to those laws. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes 5370 (1953); 73Am.,J,lr. 2d Statutes 5028. 29 (1974); Annot. 168A.L.R. 627 (1947); 2ASu,:herland, Statutory Construction, 551.07 (4th Ed. 1973). This rule of construction should be compared with those adopting statutes which incorporate a particular provision of a statute by a “specific and descriptive reference” to the earlier statute. Specific reference statutes incorporate only the adopted statute In existence at the rime of the enactment anddo not Include subsequent modifications or additions unless there is legislative intent to the contrary. SSI?St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. --_ Billiot. 342S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1960, writ ref ’d); see also Trimmier v. Carlton. 2196S.W. 1070 (Tex. 1927). As outlined above, articzle 1970-16 contains the language “shall have exclusive concurrent civil and criminal jurisdiction of all cases, original and appellate” over which Court No. 1 has jurisdiction. Articles 197&31.1 and 1970-31.2 both contain the statutory language “shall have exclusive, concurrent civil jurisdiction of all cases, original and appellate” over which Court No. 1hasjurisdiction. See V.T.C.S. arts. 1970-31.1, 52; 1970-31.2. 52. This statutory language.cefers to thejurisdiction of Court No. 1 generally rather than incol,porating article 1970-3, V.T.C.S. s by specific or descriptive referssnce thereto. Unlike the language use<! in the adopting statutes In this case, in Trimmier v. Carlton. supra! at 1074, the adopting statute was held by the Texas SupremeCourt tc make“specific reference” to s previous statute. The question invcllved in Triaanier was whether certain amendmentsto the Canales AC):were applicable to the organization of reclamation and conservation districts. The Texas Supreme‘Court reasoned that the language in ,theadopting statute, vhich reads “shall be governed and controlled by the provisions of chapter 87. Acts of the Thirty-fifth Legislature [Canales Act] and amendmentsthereto,” wasstatutory language of specific reference. Thecase wasdecided lo favor of Incorporating subse’auent modification, however, because the lannuane “and amendmenttheret>” was Included in the adopting statute. Id.- a; 1074. Billiot, supra,Similarly, in St. Paul Mercury Insurance Companyv. the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the adopting statute contained language of specific reference. The adopting statute provided that,

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[uloless otherwise provided herein [the relevant section] of Article 8306 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended [is] hereby adopted and shall govern.
. . . (Emphasis added). V.T.C.S. art. 8309c. 56 (repeaLed 1973). Thus, webelieve that Texas courts require a specific and descriptive reference to the statute being incorporated in order to construe a statute as one of specific reference. Those adopting statutes that donot contain such statutory language, such as those involved herein, are statutes of general reference. The language used by rho legislature to establish the jurisdiction of Court Nos. 2, 3, 4. and 5 is similar to the language used in 10ReEeiman’s Will, 2P.2d 982 (N.M. 1931). 10that case, the New Mexico SupremeCourt held tha,: the adopting statute which contained the language

appeals from the judgment of the probate court shall be allowed to 1:t.edistrict court in the same manner, andsubject I:CI the samerestrictions as in case of appeals fros the district to the supreme court

was astatute of general referonce. Id. at 984. Similarly, in Reward v. State, 267 S.W.Zd 763, 764 (Ark. m), the Arkansas SupremeCourt held that whenan adopting statute contained the statutory language

“an appeal will lie

. . . as in cases of appeals from judgments of justices of the peace to circuit courts,” the statutory reference was to the general law relating to that subject. Thus, webelieve that the general statutory language, “shall have exclusive concurrent

. . . jurisdiction of all cases, ori@al andappellate,” relates to the law as it existed when articles 1’370-16, 1970-31.1. and 1970-31.2 were enacted and encompasses any subsequent amendmentof the jurisdiction of Court No. 1by Senate Bill Ho. 42. Because there is no express intent, or any intent, shownin any of the statutes involved to exclude any subsequent amendment of article 1970-3, we are of the opinion that articles 1970-16, 1970-31.1, and 1970-31.2. V.T.,:.S., are statutes which incorporate the jurisdiction of Court No. 1b7’making general reference to its jurlsdiction. 10 addition, weconc:lude that whenthe legislature enacted sections 2 and 3 of amended article 1970-3 with regard to the jurisdiction of Court No. 1, I:hejurisdiction of Courts No. 2. 3. 4. and 5 was increased as speciEied in sections 2 and 3 of amended article 1970-3. 2-U MHARY

Senate Bill No. ,i:!, Acts 1984, 68th Leg., 2nd C.S., -ch. 15, $1, i~t 208, which amendedarticle 1970-3. V.T.C.S., aod increased the jurisdiction

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of the County Court of Dallas County at LawNo. 1, also hadthe effect of increasing thejurisdiction of the County Court of Dallas County at LawNos. 2. 3, 4. and 5 SIYthat their jurisdiction is concurrent with district courts in all civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500, excluding interest, and does not exceed $20.000, excluding interest , mandatory damages and penalties, attorwy's fees, and costs. Additionally, Senal:e Bill No. 42 conferred on these courts original and concurrent jurisdiction with district courts in appeals of final rulings and decisions of the Industrial Accident Board, regardless of the amountin controversy.

JIM MATTOX Attorney General of Texas TOM GREEN First Assistant Attorney Gene::al DAVIDR. RICRARDS Executive Assistant Attorney General RICKGILPIN Chairman. Opinion Committee Prepared by TonyGuillory Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINIONCOMMITTEE Rick G~lplo. Chairman Colin Carl SusanGarrison TonyGuillory Jim Moellioger Jennifer Riggs NancySutton

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