UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

WOLFE, SALUSSOLIA, and ALDYKIEWICZ 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Specialist TALAN S. GARNER 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20180135 

Headquarters, United States Army Alaska 

Scott A. Oravec, Military Judge 

Colonel Roseanne M. Bennett, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Major Todd W. Simpson, JA; Major William M. Grady, JA. 

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Eric K. Stafford, JA. 

19 December 2018 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per Curiam: 

This case is at this court for review under Article 66(c), Uniform Code of 

Military Justice [UCMJ]. Appellant submitted the case for our consideration 

without any assignments of error. With regard to certain specifications and 

specified legal issues, appellant (both personally and through counsel) stated that he 

waived certain legal errors.1

 However, appellant has not waived or withdrawn our 

appellate review. See UCMJ arts. 61, 66. 

A knowing and voluntary waiver extinguishes any legal error. See, e.g., 

United States v. Gladue, 67 M.J. 311, 313-14 (C.A.A.F. 2009). Thus, a record 

containing a legal error will nonetheless be “correct in law” if the error was properly 

waived. Thus, for all issues for which appellant’s waiver is applicable, the record is 

correct in law. 

 

1

 The government does not oppose the error. 
GARNER—ARMY 20180135 

2

But, just because an appellant has waived an issue, does not mean that the 

duty of this court is at an end. This court must still conduct a review of the entire 

record under Article 66(c), UCMJ. Our duty to determine whether a finding “should 

be approved” includes a determination as to whether we should grant relief for 

waived legal errors. When a legal error has been waived, our review under Article 

66(c), UCMJ, includes a determination as to whether we should “notice” (i.e. set 

aside) the waiver. 

Having completed our review of the entire record under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 

we accept appellant’s waiver. The waiver in this case was tailored and given with 

the advice of appellate counsel. Were we to notice the waiver we would be granting 

appellant “relief” that he has not requested and has specifically disclaimed. While 

appellant did not (and in this case need not) explain the basis of the waiver, nothing 

in the record gives us pause as to why we should not let the waiver stand.2

 

Appellant’s waiver in this case is atypical, but we see nothing that prohibits 

it. The waiver was not made as part of a pretrial agreement under Rule for CourtsMartial [R.C.M.] 705(c)(1)(B), nor has appellant received any inducement for the 

waiver. See R.C.M. 1110(c). Indeed, a knowing and voluntary waiver on appeal, 

especially when done in concert with the advice of appellate counsel, will often 

serve the purposes of judicial economy. 

CONCLUSION 

On consideration of the entire record, the findings and sentence are 

AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

 

2

 It is enough for us to determine that there are objectively reasonable reasons why 

an appellant may elect to waive certain issues on appeal. For example, an appellant 

may desire a quick end to the appellate proceedings in order to receive a discharge, 

or to terminate the Army’s personal jurisdiction over him. Or, an appellant on 

excess leave, and who has moved on to the next stage of his life, may not want to 

risk the chance of a rehearing where he will be required to report back to the Army. 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: