No. 86-157 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

GEORGE R. HANGAS, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

JANE H. HANGAS, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Snavely and Phillips; Robert J. Phillips, Missoula, 

Montana 

For Respondent : 

Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind; David B. Cotner, 

Missoula, Montana 

Filed: 

- - 

Submitted on Briefs: August 14, 1986 

Decided: October 2, 1986 

131, 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Petitioner George Hangas appeals orders of the Fourth 

Judicial District Court denying petitioner's motion to set 

aside the parties' marital and property settlement agreement 

and granting attorney's fees to respondent Jane Hanqas. We 

affirm the District Court. 

The parties were married on December 16, 1967, in 

Billings, Montana. One child, Tyler, was born of the 

marriage on August 7, 1969. Jane was graduated from the 

University of Montana in 1968 with a teaching certificate. 

George also attended the university but withdrew prior to his 

graduation to manage a gas station. George and Jane 

determined that it would be best for Tyler if Jane devoted 

all her time to rearing Tyler thereby foregoing employment 

outside the home. 

The Hangas family moved to Missoula in 1971. George and 

Jane purchased a home near Missoula from George's father in 

1974. The purchase price was $48,000, with $8,000 down. 

At approximately the same time, the parties began 

operating a business known as "Tanzer Kennels", which 

provided boarding for dogs and cats. George constructed the 

kennels with the construction costs covered in part by a 

mortgage and with $9,000 contributed by Jane from an 

inheritance. 

The kennel business was operated primarily by Jane and 

had a monthly net income of about $490 through September, 

1984. During the parties' marriage, George held numerous 

jobs including store manager, insurance salesman, and car 

salesman. In 1983, George ventured into the cattle business 

and sustained a loss of approximately $17,000. A loan was 
taken out in that amount from Security State Bank in Polson, 

Montana, to cover the loss. 

George filed a petition for dissolution October 12, 

1983. The parties' marriage was dissolved by a decree 

entered March 19, 1984, with all issues but dissolution 

reserved for a later hearing. Subsequently, the parties 

attempted to negotiate a property settlement. Contrary to 

his attorney's advice, George decided to deed the parties' 

real property and kennel business to Jane, in order to secure 

a quick settlement. 

A hearing was scheduled September 24, 1984, to determine 

temporary maintenance, child support, and payment of the 

parties' debt obligations. Shortly before the hearing was 

scheduled the parties met in the courthouse and reached a 

verbal agreement which was to be reduced to writing by Jane's 

attorney. A copy of the marital and property settlement 

agreement was prepared and sent to George on October 1, 1984. 

George consulted with his attorney and requested that three 

items in the agreement be amended. The parties reached 

agreement concerning the amendments and the amended marital 

and property settlement agreement was signed by George on 

October 18, 1984. The following month George informed his 

attorney he was not satisfied with the settlement agreement. 

The amended marital and property settlement agreement 

was incorporated into the supplementary decree of dissolution 

entered by the district judge on January 4, 1985. George 

filed a motion to amend judgment on February 8, 1985, 

alleging the agreement to be unconscionable. Following a 

hearing on February 28, 1985, the district judge set aside 

the supplemental decree of dissolution. The judge determined 

that George had knowingly entered the agreement but he could 
not determine if it was unconscionable without taking 

evidence regarding the parties' economic circumstances. 

A hearing was held January 14, 1986, and evidence 

submitted to the court concerning the parties' financial 

condition. On January 20, 1986, the district judge entered 

an order finding the settlement agreement to be valid; the 

agreement was incorporated into the supplementary decree of 

dissolution entered February 10, 1986. Finally, on March 13, 

1986, the district judge ruled that Jane was entitled to 

attorney's fees pursuant to the settlement agreement. George 

appeals and raises the following issues: 

1. Did the District Court err in ruling that the 

parties' marital and property settlement agreement was not 

unconscionable? 

2. Did the District Court err in finding that the 

Petitioner had knowingly entered into the parties' marital 

and property settlement agreement? 

3. Did the District Court err in ruling that Jane H. 

Hangas, Respondent and Respondent on appeal, was entitled to 

an award of attorney's fees? 

George contends that the property settlement agreement 

is unconscionable because the equities awarded to Jane 

amounted to $37,980, while the liabilities assumed by George 

exceed the value of his assets by $12,900. Further, Jane 

received the income producing kennel business while George is 

required to pay $200 monthly child support. The record shows 

that George's gross yearly income was $32,000 at the time he 

signed the agreement. At present, Jane is not qualified to 

hold a position which would pay greater than minimum wage. 

Further college education would be required to update her 

teacher's certificate. 
The District Court found that the disproportionate 

distribution of property in favor of Jane is not 

unconscionable because it operates in lieu of maintenance, 

provides Jane with a reasonable way to earn a living, and the 

property distribution was proposed by George. We agree with 

the District Court. While the disparity of $50,000 in the 

property distribution may appear inequitable on its face, the 

record reveals substantial credible evidence supporting the 

distribution. The debt of $16,000 assigned to George arose 

out of his cattle venture. George initially suggested deeding 

the parties' real property to Jane, and in fact, George 

purchased a new residence for himself and his new wife a 

month prior to signing the agreement. 

The monthly expenses for the minor child were found to 

be $605. The court ordered George to pay $200 monthly child 

support, after taking into consideration the factors listed 

under § 40-4-204, MCA. We find no abuse of discretion by the 

District Court in determining the child support award. 

George takes issue with the valuation placed on certain 

items of property, particularly the real property, awarded 

under the agreement. In In Re Marriage of Rolfe (Mont. 

1985), 699 P.2d 79, 42 St.Rep. 623, this Court held that when 

conflicting evidence is presented concerning the valuation of 

property, the trial court must indicate the basis for the 

values adopted. 

In the present case, the trial court placed a value of 

$84,130 on the parties' real property. The property ' s 

appraisal was $89,500. A deduction was made for commission. 

The court's finding is supported by the record. 

George also disputes the $5,750 valuation for furniture, 

dogs, and household goods adopted by the District Court, and 

contends those items are worth $10,000. The failure of the 
On February 8, 1985, George filed a motion to alter or 

amend judgment, asserting a mistake of fact and that he did 

not knowingly approve the final version of the property 

settlement agreement. This contention raised the question of 

enforcement of the agreement. Hearings held on February 25 

and 28, 1985, addressed this issue. The District Court ruled 

that George made a knowing and voluntary execution of the 

agreement. 

George temporarily prevailed in setting aside the 

agreement because a hearing had not been held on values. 

However, he ultimately failed in attacking the agreement and 

fees are awarded to the party who is ultimately successful. 

Jordan v. Elizabeth Manor (1979), 181 Mont. 424, 593 P.2d 

1049. The District Court did not err in awarding attorney's 

fees to Jane. 

Judgment of the District Cour 

We Concur: 
District Court to identify the basis for adopting the $5,750 

figure is harmless error in this instance. The pertinent 

issue addressed by the District Court was whether the 

property settlement agreement was unconscionable. The 

$4,250 discrepancy in the parties' valuation of these items 

does not affect conscionability. 

The next issue raised by George is whether he knowingly 

entered into the parties' marital and property settlement 

agreement. George asserts he signed the agreement believing 

that it was merely a step in the negotiation process, and 

that at the time he signed it he left a list of changes he 

wanted made, but his attorney never incorporated these 

changes according to his wishes. 

The District Court found that George was under stress a-t 

the time he executed the agreement yet not such as to deprive 

him of his ability to act intelligently, and that he was 

fully advised by his attorney including a recommendation that 

George not approve the property settlement agreement. There 

is substantial credible evidence in the record supporting 

these findings. George was competently represented by an 

attorney with twelve years experience. The settlement 

agreement was revised twice, once upon demand by George, 

before the final document was executed. The language in the 

agreement is quite clear that the document is a final 

determination of the marital property distribution. 

Finally, George contends the District Court erred in 

awarding attorney's fees to Jane. The court made the award 

pursuant to the following provision in the property 

settlement agreement: "Should any action be commenced to 

enforce, modify or interpret any provision contained herein, 

the court, as a cost of suit, shall award a reasonable 

attorney's fee to the successful party."