UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) SARA DISCEPOLO, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 16-cv-2351 (DLF/GMH) ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Strike the declarations submitt ed in support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in th is Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) case. For the reasons discussed on pages 13–18 in the Report and Recommendation [Dkt. 33] issued contemporaneously with this Order, t he motion is denied. In short, Plaintiff first argues that Defendant should be deeme d to have admitted that records responsive to her FOIA reque sts exist because Defendant (1 ) failed to respond to Requests for Admission and (2) improperly asserted in its Answer that it lacked sufficient information to admit or deny whether such records exist. She contends that, t herefore, the declarations affirming that no such documents exist must be stricken. [Dkt. 20-1 at 2 –8]. The first argument ignores the fact that Judge Sullivan previously ruled that Defendant was no t required to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. Minute Order dated Apr. 6, 2017. As to th e second, “courts generally resort to the sanction of deeming an allegation as admitted where ther e is bad faith or evasive pleading.” Clay v. District of Columbia , 831 F. Supp. 2d 36, 47 (D.D.C. 2011). Plaintiff has shown ne ither here. [Dkt. 33 at 13–14].2 Plaintiff challenges the appropr iateness of Defe ndant’s declara nts because they are not “supervisory employees of searches” and therefore do not have pers onal knowledge of the facts asserted in those declarations. [Dkt. 20-1 at 8–12]. But it is appropriate in a FOIA case to submit a declaration from a person who conducted the search or from a person who supervised the search. See, e.g. , Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 812 v. Broad. Bd. of Governors , 711 F. Supp. 139, 149–50 (D.D.C. 2010). Moreover, e ach declarant here asserts th at she performed searches, supervised searches, or both. [Dkt . 16-2, ¶¶ 13–15 (declarant Elish a L. Biega personally searched files and sought additional information from other employees); Dkt. 1 6-3, ¶¶ 3, 13–29 (declarant Susanne Husted supervised searches and personally performed searc hes)]. Each is therefore an appropriate declarant . [Dkt. 33 at 14–16]. Finally, Plaintiff complains that one of the declarants affirme d the accuracy of her declaration based on “knowledge and beli ef,” rather than on knowledg e alone. [Dkt. 20-1 at 13; Dkt. 16-3 at 7]. In a FOIA case, a declaration based on “knowledge and belief” is appropriate. See,

e.g. , Climate Investigations Center v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy , No. 16-cv-124, 2017 WL 4004417, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2017) (rejec ting challenge to declaration made on knowledge and belief in FOIA case because such evidence may be based “‘partly [on] seco nd-hand’ information” (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. S.E.C. , 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991))); Hainey v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior , 925 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (D.D.C. 20 13) (rejecting challenge to declaration in FOIA case made on knowledge and belief). [Dkt. 33 at 17]. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [Dkt. 20] is DENIED

. SO ORDERED. Date: January 19, 2018 ___________________________________ G. MICHAEL HARVEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE J UDGE