COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00065-CR

CHARLES JAMES SNYDER APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 8 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1295355

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ON REHEARING

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I. Introduction

After reviewing the State’s motion for rehearing, we deny the motion. We 

withdraw our October 2, 2014, opinion and judgment and substitute the following.

In two issues, Appellant Charles James Snyder appeals the denial of his 

motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

for failure to identify, arguing that there was no lawful detention. We reverse the 

trial court’s judgment and render a judgment of acquittal.

II. Sufficiency

In his second issue, which we will address first, Snyder argues that the 

evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict because the State failed to 

prove that officers lawfully detained him. 

A. Factual Background

At trial, Sergeant Leach testified that on August 27, 2012, he was on his 

daily patrol in a high-crime area at around 4:15 p.m. when he saw a bike tire in 

some bushes. He drove past the area and saw someone lying on the ground in 

the bushes; he made eye contact with that person and thought that the person 

might be trying to hide from him. By the time Sergeant Leach turned his vehicle 

around, he could not find the person he had seen in the bushes. A few minutes 

later, Sergeant Leach stopped a man on a bicycle, questioned him, and then let 

that man go. Sergeant Leach then drove back past the bushes—three additional 

police officers in squad cars joined him—and found Snyder still in the bushes.

Sergeant Leach exited his car with his gun drawn and told Snyder several 

times to show him his hands. Officers warned Snyder that they would tase him

and shoot him if he tried to escape. When Sergeant Leach pulled Snyder from 

the bushes, he detained him in handcuffs because Snyder would not show his 

hands, and Sergeant Leach thought Snyder’s location and actions were 

suspicious. Police found no weapons or any other illegal items on Snyder.
3

Sergeant Leach asked Snyder why he had been hiding. When Snyder 

responded that he had not been hiding, Sergeant Leach responded by asking, 

“[W]hat games are you F-ing playing out here?” Snyder told him that he was not 

playing games. Sergeant Leach then asked Snyder what he was doing out 

there, and Snyder replied, “I don’t know.” Sergeant Leach asked Snyder if he 

was drunk or a pervert, and Snyder said, “Neither.”

Sergeant Leach asked Snyder for his name, and Snyder replied, “Jim 

Morgan.” Sergeant Leach asked Snyder his middle name; Snyder responded, 

“James.” Sergeant Leach then asked Snyder for his date of birth, and Snyder 

said, “January 7th, 1957.” Snyder gave the officers the same name, same date 

of birth, and same social security number each time he was asked. When 

Sergeant Leach asked Snyder if he had a driver’s license or state identification, 

Snyder told him that he had a Michigan identification. Sergeant Leach said that if 

this had been true, he would have been able to find him in the computer system, 

but when he checked for driver’s licenses under Jim Morgan in Michigan, he did 

not get any returns.

Sergeant Leach then asked Snyder if he had identification in any other 

states. Snyder said Ohio, but when Sergeant Leach tried to find Jim Morgan in 

the computer with an Ohio identification, he did not find anyone. Sergeant Leach

testified that because he could not locate a record of “Jim James Morgan” and 

because “Jim” was a nickname for “James”, he suspected Snyder was being 

dishonest and that he was giving false identifying information. Based on this
4

information, he decided to take Snyder to the Tarrant County Jail to further 

attempt to identify him.2

Following the direct examination of Sergeant Leach, the jury watched 

State’s Exhibit 1, the dashboard camera video-recording of the incident.3

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to 

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

A person commits the offense of failure to identify if he intentionally gives a 

false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who 

has lawfully arrested or detained him. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b)(1), (2)

(West 2011). 

 

2Using the Tarrant County jail’s iris scan, police identified Snyder in less 

than a minute with his real name and real date of birth, which were not the ones

he had given to Sergeant Leach. The proper identification revealed that Snyder

had an active warrant for his arrest on a probation violation.

3

The dashboard camera video shows that when Sergeant Leach arrived at 

the scene, two patrol cars were already parked on the street a few feet from 

where they had detained Snyder. Once Sergeant Leach arrived, one officer 

pulled his vehicle closer, and a few seconds later, another officer arrived, totaling 

four patrol cars. The officers yelled at Snyder to show his hands, threatened to 

tase him, and then threatened to shoot him in the side if he ran.
5

C. Analysis

Snyder argues that the evidence is insufficient for a rational trier of fact to 

determine that Officer Leach had reasonable suspicion that Snyder had

committed any crime and therefore that the detention was lawful. Snyder asserts 

that the only information known to Sergeant Leach before he detained Snyder 

was that Snyder was on the side of the road under a bush.

The State argues that concealment in a high-crime area is sufficient to 

establish reasonable suspicion and relies on federal cases that are 

distinguishable from the facts of this case.4In the first case, United States v. 

Sims, officers reported to a shots-fired call. 296 F.3d 284, 285 (4th Cir. 2002). 

When they arrived at the scene, they had the suspect’s description, the 

defendant was the only person there and matched the suspect’s description, and 

the defendant was located not far from where the shots had been fired a few 

minutes before the call. Id. at 287. The court stated that an officer could have 

reasonably concluded that the defendant was evading the officers, stating that 

the “[defendant’s] behavior, while apparently evasive, was well short of ‘headlong 

flight’ and might not have given rise to reasonable suspicion in a different 

 

4

The State equates flight with concealment, but while flight and hiding may 

both indicate consciousness of guilt, see, e.g., Jordan v. State, Nos. 02-12-

00470-CR, 02-12-00471-CR, 02-12-00472-CR, 2014 WL 1663404, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth Apr. 24, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication), Sergeant Leach’s subjective opinion that Snyder was trying to hide 

is not dispositive, see Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App.

2001).
6

context.” Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, Sergeant Leach was not responding 

to any calls and did not have a description of a suspect because he was not 

looking for a suspect, and there were people other than Snyder in the area.

In the second federal case, United States v. Peterson, plain-clothes 

officers were patrolling a high-crime area when they saw three men standing on 

the sidewalk. 100 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1996). The men ducked behind a car when 

they saw the officers. Id. This made the officers suspicious, and they 

approached the men. Id. at 10. The court concluded that this was a consensual 

encounter because two of the men left without hindrance; because the initial 

encounter was consensual, the court did not determine whether the fact that the 

men had ducked behind a car, by itself, was sufficient to support reasonable 

suspicion. Id. at 9–11. In contrast, Sergeant Leach immediately detained 

Snyder during their initial contact by pulling his weapon and ordering Snyder out 

of the bushes. Cf. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007) (stating that absent reasonable suspicion, officers may conduct only 

consensual questioning).

Sergeant Leach saw Snyder at 4:30 p.m. in a high-crime area where no 

crime had been reported, and the basis for the stop by Sergeant Leach and three

other police officers was that Sergeant Leach thought Snyder was hiding from 

him. See Domingo v. State, 82 S.W.3d 617, 618 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no 

pet.) (holding no reasonable suspicion existed to support detention when 

defendant’s conversation with officer occurred at 9:00 p.m. in high-crime area,
7

defendant was part of a group that was lawfully socializing and drinking alcohol 

without engaging in disruptive or illegal activities, and the officer was not 

responding to or investigating reports of criminal activity);5 Scott v. State, 549 

S.W.2d 170, 172–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that no reasonable 

suspicion existed when officer patrolling a high crime area was aware of recent 

thefts and saw defendant drive a sparsely traveled street at 1:30 a.m. with 

“sheeting material” in his car’s back seat). Compare Jones v. State, 926 S.W.2d 

386, 389 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d) (holding no reasonable 

suspicion existed when officers saw defendant’s truck emerge at 10:25 p.m. from 

public park that had previously been used by people to smoke marijuana, have 

sex, abandon stolen vehicles, and conceal minors drinking alcohol and that was 

located across from some recently burglarized homes), with Balentine v. State, 

71 S.W.3d 763, 766–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (concluding that officer reporting 

to a shots-fired call had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant when it was 

2:26 a.m. in a residential, low-traffic area, and the officer saw the defendant 

across the street from the scene before defendant walked briskly away and 

appeared nervous, constantly looking over his shoulder at the officer). 

 

5

In Domingo, after the police officer detected a strong odor of alcohol on 

the defendant’s breath, he detained him for further investigation. 82 S.W.3d at 

619. Once detained, the defendant gave a false name and date of birth to the 

officer. Id. When the officer was unable to locate the defendant in the system, 

he suspected that he had been given a false name and took the defendant to the 

police station for further identification. Id. At the police station, he confirmed that 

the defendant had given him a false name and that the defendant had 

outstanding warrants. Id.
8

Other than Snyder’s location in the bushes in a high-crime area, no other 

facts support an inference that criminal activity had or would be occurring. See 

Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that “level of 

criminal activity in an area . . . [is not] suspicious in and of [itself]”); see also 

Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (stating that the 

high-crime reputation of the area where the detainees were seen is not enough 

by itself to support an investigative stop); cf. Williams v. State, No. 01-93-00874, 

1994 WL 400292, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 4, 1994, pet. ref’d, 

untimely filed) (not designated for publication) (holding that officer had 

reasonable suspicion to detain appellant when driver of stolen car had fled scene 

of accident, bystanders pointed out the direction in which he had fled, and officer 

found appellant hiding under some bushes).

The State asserts that because Snyder refused to show his hands, it was 

reasonable for Officer Leach to detain him for officer safety by pulling his weapon 

and handcuffing him. In support of this argument, the State cites Rodriguez v 

State, No. 01-02-00174-CR, 2003 WL 360632 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

Feb. 20, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). However, 

there are some very important differences between the case cited by the State 

and this case. 

In Rodriguez, two officers responded to a possible vehicle burglary. Id.

at *1. As they approached the area, they spotted the defendant leaving the 

area. Id. When officers approached the defendant to ask him some questions, 
9

the defendant placed his hands behind his back and began backing away from 

the officers. Id. Officers asked to see the defendant’s hands three times; when 

the defendant failed to comply after the third request, officers drew their weapons 

and gave the order again. Id. The defendant refused again. Id. Officers then 

approached the defendant with their weapons drawn and gave the order again; 

the defendant complied, and officers conducted a pat-down but found no 

weapons. Id. Officers did not handcuff the defendant, and they withdrew their 

weapons once the defendant complied. Id. However, perhaps most importantly, 

the court in Rodriguez determined that the officers’ interaction with the defendant 

began as an encounter and therefore no reasonable suspicion was necessary. 

Id.

By contrast, here, the evidence shows that (1) the officers were not 

responding to any call, (2) Snyder was not attempting to flee from the officers, 

and (3) officers detained Snyder from the moment they exited their cars and saw 

him; thus, the officers needed reasonable suspicion at the inception of the stop in 

order for the detention to be lawful. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21; 88 S. Ct. 

1868, 1880 (explaining that for an officer’s initial action to be justified, the officer 

must be able to “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 

rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion”). 

Snyder’s detention began the moment the three officers pulled their weapons;

therefore, it is at this point the officers needed reasonable suspicion.
10

An officer may use force as is reasonably necessary to effect the goal of 

the stop: investigation, maintenance of the status quo, or officer safety. See 

Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see also

Campbell v. State, 325 S.W.3d 223, 234 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.)

(holding that handcuffing a suspect does not always constitute an arrest). Here, 

the degree of incapacitation was more than necessary to simply safeguard the 

officers and assure the suspect’s presence during the period of investigation. 

Compare State v. Moore, 25 S.W.3d 383, 387 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) 

(holding that while officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate the 

defendant, handcuffing transformed the detention into an arrest for which there 

was no probable cause),

6 with Mays v. State, 726 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1986) (holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to handcuff and detain 

two men, on the grounds of officer safety, after he responded to a burglary call 

alone and both men were larger than he and were suspected of burglary);

Chambers v. State, 397 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, 

pet. ref’d) (explaining that while an officer used a weapon and handcuffs to detain 

 

6

In Moore, two officers responded to a call at a convenience store at 10:10 

p.m. in response to a reported forgery. 25 S.W.3d at 384. Officers found a 

concealed handgun permit on the defendant and handcuffed him for “safety.” Id.

at 385. The court held that because forgery was not a crime commonly 

associated with violence, officers were in a brightly lit store and not a dark street 

or vacant lot, the defendant was compliant, officers did not find a weapon, and 

the officers outnumbered the defendant two to one, “there [was] simply no 

evidence that the officers had reason to fear for their safety or any other 

justification for handcuffing [the defendant] while pursuing their investigation.” Id. 

at 387.
11

the defendant, the amount of force was reasonable under the circumstances: 

(1) there were multiple suspects, (2) the officer’s partner was dealing with 

another suspect, (3) it was after 2:00 a.m., and (4) they were in a high-crime area 

where the officer had previously experienced several incidents involving 

narcotics, weapons, and fighting, including one shooting).

Although the area may have been a high-crime area, it was 4:30 in the 

afternoon, there were no reports of criminal activity, and the officers 

outnumbered Snyder four to one. Furthermore, after removed from the bushes

Snyder cooperated fully, and the officers found no weapons on Snyder. Cf.

Salazar v. State, 805 S.W.2d 538, 539–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, pet. 

ref’d) (holding that given the circumstances, officers had reasonable suspicion to 

detain a defendant that appeared to be hiding from police in a car: (1) there was 

a robbery in progress, (2) there were multiple suspects, (3) a suspect had shot at 

an officer, (4) defendant was located near where the crime was taking place, 

(5) defendant appeared to be reaching for something inside the car, and 

(6) defendant tried to leave).

Based on our review of the case law and the totality of the circumstances, 

we conclude that there is no evidence of specific, articulable facts showing 

reasonable suspicion to detain Snyder. Therefore, there is no evidence from 

which a rational jury could determine that Snyder’s detention was lawful. We 
12

sustain Snyder’s second issue. See St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 726; see also

Domingo, 82 S.W.3d at 618.7

III. Conclusion

Because the evidence is insufficient to support Snyder’s guilt, we reverse 

the trial court’s judgment and render a judgment of acquittal.8 See Tex. R. App. 

P. 43.2(c), 51.2(d); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24–25, 98 S. Ct. 2151, 

2154–55 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16–18, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 

2150–51 (1978); Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

/s/ Bob McCoy

BOB MCCOY

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MCCOY and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: November 20, 2014

 

7As in Domingo, before he was taken to jail for identification, Snyder had 

provided the same name, date of birth, and social security number each time 

Sergeant Leach asked him for his identification. See 82 S.W.3d at 619.

Sergeant Leach testified that he thought Snyder was being dishonest about who 

he was and took him to jail for identification because he could not locate “Jim 

James Morgan” in the system, Jim and James were similar names, and Jim is a 

nickname for James.

8Because Snyder’s second issue affords him the greatest relief and is 

dispositive of the appeal, we need not address the motion to suppress. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 43.3, 47.1; Sinor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1981).