NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 180602-U

Order filed November 17, 2022

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022 

STEVEN ALAN CREIGHTON, )

 ) 

 Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS; ) 

THE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE; and THE ) 

OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY ) 

GENERAL, ) 

 ) 

 Respondents ) 

 ) 

(The Illinois State Police and The Office of the ) 

Illinois Attorney General, ) 

 ) 

Respondents-Appellants). )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Peoria County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-18-0602 

Circuit No. 18-MR-162 

The Honorable

Katherine S. Gorman, 

Judge, presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE DAUGHERITY delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Hauptman and Hettel concurred in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s order finding that the registration requirement under the 

Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et. seq. (West 2018)) was 

unconstitutional as applied to the petitioner was insufficient to comply with the 

procedural requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006) for 

such a finding.
2 

¶ 2 Petitioner, Steven Alan Creighton, filed a petition for the removal of his name from the 

Illinois Sex Offender Registry. The circuit court granted the petition, finding the mandate for 

Creighton to register as a sexual predator in Illinois under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration 

Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2018)) was unconstitutional as applied to Creighton. 

The State appealed, arguing this court should vacate the circuit court’s order because: (1) the 

circuit court’s order failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006); 

and (b) the circuit court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make factual findings in 

relation to Creighton’s as-applied constitutional challenge. We vacate the circuit court’s orders at 

issue and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On September 21, 2000, in the State of Louisiana, Creighton pled no contest to the charge 

of “indecent behavior with a juvenile,” with the victim purportedly being his minor daughter. 

Creighton was sentenced to five years of unsupervised probation and a five-year suspended 

sentence. A few weeks later, after moving to Illinois, Creighton registered with the Illinois State 

Police (ISP) in conformity with the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 

150/1 et seq. (West 2000)). 

¶ 5 On April 3, 2018, Creighton filed a “Petition for Removal of Sexual Predator 

Designation” and filed an amended petition the same day, naming the State of Illinois as the 

respondent. In the amended petition, Creighton alleged that: he was born on February 7, 1953; he 

was registered as a “sexual predator” in Illinois due to his conviction in Louisiana on September 

21, 2000, for “Indecent Behavior with a Juvenile”; on or about October 30, 2000, he established

residency in Illinois and registered on the Illinois sex offender registry as required pursuant to

SORA (730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2018)); he was deemed a sexual “predator” in Illinois and was
3 

required to remain on the Illinois sex offender registry for the duration of his natural life (730 

ILCS 150/7 (West 2018)) 1; on July 2, 2001, he relocated to Florida and registered there as a 

sexual “offender”; in 2001 Creighton moved to Thailand, where he has since continuously 

resided, is married, has a newborn daughter and two other minor children, and owns a restaurant 

business; he has not had any legal issues since residing in Thailand; in October 2017, 

Creighton’s mother became ill and Creighton and two of his minor children flew from Thailand 

to Chicago, Illinois, to be with her; Creighton and his minor children were scheduled to return 

home to Thailand on November 7, 2017; on November 6, 2017, the United States Department of 

Homeland Security informed the Thai Immigration Bureau that Creighton was scheduled to 

arrive in Thailand the following day and that Creighton was a registered sex offender in the 

United States based on his 2000 conviction for “Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse/Victim<13, 

or a substantially similar Louisiana state offense”; upon arriving in Thailand, Creighton and his

two minor children were apprehended by Thailand immigration officials and immediately

returned to the United States; Creighton has no business or personal ties to, or within, the United 

States, other than his ailing and elderly Mother; due to his categorization in Illinois as a “sexual 

predator,” he is prohibited from returning to Thailand and cannot be reunited with his spouse, 

children, and residence, and cannot resume his restaurant business; and Creighton was “situated 

outside of the United States” and did not intend to, or have any reason to, return to the United

States or the State of Illinois. 

¶ 6 In the amended petition, Creighton argued that his continued placement on the Illinois 

sex offender registry was unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United 

1 Under SORA, “sexual predators are subject to a lifetime registration term while sex offenders must 

register for 10 years.” People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 209 (2009) (citing 730 ILCS 150/7 (West 

2004)). 
4 

States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the 

Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) as applied to him. Creighton contended that his 

continued placement on the Illinois sex offender registry, among other punitive effects,

precluded him from entering Thailand, where “he [had] lived without incident for over 16 years.” 

Creighton requested the circuit court order that his name be removed from the Illinois sex 

offender registry. 

¶ 7 On June 15, 2018, a hearing took place on Creighton’s amended petition. An attorney 

from the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) indicated to the circuit court that the Illinois 

State Police (ISP) was the proper respondent in this matter and that she would be entering a 

limited appearance to argue that service had not been effectuated on the ISP. Creighton did not 

appear at the hearing but was represented by two attorneys (hereinafter “Creighton’s counsel”). 

Creighton’s counsel indicated that Creighton was seeking to have SORA declared 

unconstitutional as it applied to him “under this particular circumstance,” noting that Creighton 

was “last a resident of the State of Illinois approximately 17 or 18 years ago for a very brief 

period” and that Louisiana had designated Creighton to be sexual “offender” while the State of 

Illinois deemed him to be a sexual “predator.” Creighton’s counsel also noted that in Florida

Creighton had been categorized as a sexual offender. 

¶ 8 The circuit court asked whether Creighton’s designation as a “sexual predator” had been 

a mistake. Creighton’s counsel stated:

 “[t]he conviction of aggravated criminal sexual abuse is a predatory 

lifetime registration scheme violation. And what differentiates *** aggravated 

versus non-aggravated is simply the fact that one of the subsections in the 

aggravated statute is if the victim is a family member. *** I’m not sure any 
5 

formal investigation was ever made when they designated him *** in Illinois. *** 

I believe that the victim in this case was, in fact, Mr. Creighton’s daughter, and 

that’s where we get to the aggravated aspect of the conviction and its equivalent 

in Illinois.” 

¶ 9 Creighton’s counsel argued that Creighton was essentially displaced in that he was unable 

to return to his home in Thailand where he had a young family and a business. Creighton’s 

counsel also indicated that Creighton was waiting outside the United States to return to Thailand

and, if Creighton returned to Thailand, he would not be coming back to Illinois or the United 

States. Creighton’s counsel contended that in Louisiana Creighton had a 10-year “registration 

requirement” that would have already expired. Creighton’s counsel also noted that Creighton’s 

conviction was classified in Illinois as “aggravated criminal sexual abuse,” which was a Class 2 

felony punishable by three to seven years of imprisonment. Creighton’s counsel indicated that in 

Louisiana “it was up to seven years as well,” but Creighton had only been sentenced to five years 

of unsupervised probation, which Creighton had “successfully completed.” Creighton’s counsel 

argued, “this kind of sentence in relation to the statutory penalties” showed that Creighton was

not considered to be dangerous. Creighton’s counsel also noted that Creighton had no other 

criminal offenses (other than minor traffic tickets) and that Creighton had essentially a zero risk 

of recidivism because “17 years have gone by.” Creighton’s counsel contended that SORA’s 

requirement of lifetime registration (for “sexual predators”) was grossly disproportionate to 

Creighton’s crime and, as applied to Creighton, violated the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate 

penalties clause and the United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment. 

¶ 10 First, the circuit court noted that Creighton was now 65 years old. The circuit court then 

asked whether the victim of the underlying crime was Creighton’s daughter or stepdaughter.
6 

Creighton’s counsel stated, “I don't want to go to reopening the case, Judge.” Creighton’s 

counsel then indicated that there was “a lot of paperwork that the whole thing never happened” 

and that it had been “drummed up,” noting there were “affidavits to that effect.” It appears from 

the record that Creighton’s counsel showed the circuit court some paperwork but did not present 

any evidence. In relation to the underlying conviction, Creighton’s counsel contended that “there 

was no penetration” and the underlying conduct was something “along the lines of when the little 

girl was taking a bath *** there was some form of improper touching with a bar of soap.” 

Creighton’s counsel further contended that the victim’s mother (Creighton’s former wife) 

“ruined” Creighton’s life and there was “all sorts of communications that it was done to try and 

basically ruin him for financial reasons.” No evidence was introduced by Creighton’s counsel in 

support of those contentions. 

¶ 11 The circuit court noted the amount of time that had elapsed since the offense and that

Creighton would have only had to register for 10 years in Louisiana “and that would have been 

the end of it.” The circuit court indicated that Creighton was “now in no man’s land.” The circuit 

court further stated: 

“[t]his appears to the Court to be to—as it’s applied to Mr. Creighton hugely 

inequitable given his conviction, the punishment in Louisiana, and he has not reoffended, more serious crimes would allow for him to perhaps cut through this 

bureaucratic red tape and accomplish what he’s trying to accomplish, and if he is 

going to register if he comes back to Illinois, I just don’t see where there’s really 

any harm in allowing this gentleman, who appears to have paid his dues and has 

done what he’s supposed to do right on down the line, why this still should be 

interfering with his life to the extent that it is. So I’m going to grant the relief 
7 

requested, and I would like you to include in the Order that if he does come back 

to Illinois, he will re-register and we can sort it out from there.” 

¶ 12 The attorney for the OAG asked whether Creighton would be required to register as a 

“sexual predator” if he returned to Illinois. The Circuit Court stated, “I’m not going to say one 

way or the other” and indicated Creighton would have to “let them know what occurred in 

Louisiana” and then he would be “designated according to the statute.” 

¶ 13 The circuit court granted Creighton’s amended petition. In its written order, the circuit 

court indicated: (1) Creighton “ha[d] been duly punished and fulfilled his societal requirements”; 

(2) Creighton “ha[d] suffered hugely inequitable consequences by Illinois maintaining his name 

on [its] Sex Offender Registry”; (3) given Creighton’s age (65 years old) and lack of subsequent 

criminal behavior in any jurisdiction, “he [was] not likely to reoffend”; (4) the People of the 

State of Illinois were not jeopardized by the circuit court granting the relief requested; and (5) 

Illinois’ “continuing registration” of Creighton was “interfering with him having contact with his 

family and with his livelihood.” The circuit court ordered that Creighton “shall be removed from 

the Illinois Sex Offender Registration” and that “the State of Illinois shall effect th[e] order 

instanter.” The circuit court also indicated in the order that if Creighton relocated to Illinois, he 

“must report to local police authority for purposes of registering and comply with all applicable 

statutes and regulations.”

¶ 14 After more than 30 days, on or about July 30, 2018, Creighton’s counsel contacted the 

ISP to request that Creighton’s name be removed from the registry. In light of the ISP’s 

failure/refusal to do so, on August 24, 2018, Creighton’s counsel filed a verified petition for rule 

to show cause against the ISP. On August 28, 2018, the circuit court issued a rule to show cause 

against the ISP and set a hearing date of September 24, 2018. 
8 

¶ 15 On September 21, 2018, the ISP and the OAG filed a petition to quash service and for 

relief from the court’s order of June 15, 2018, for lack of personal jurisdiction. At the hearing on 

September 24, 2018, the attorney for the OAG argued the circuit court did not have jurisdiction 

over the ISP and that the ISP would have to be made a defendant, noting the ISP could then 

conduct discovery regarding Creighton’s underlying conviction. The OAG’s attorney argued that

without jurisdiction over the ISP, the circuit court did not have the authority to order the ISP to 

remove Creighton from the registry. The same day, Creighton filed a second amended petition 

for removal of sexual predator designation, which contained the same substantive allegations as 

the prior amended petition but additionally named the ISP and OAG as respondents. The ISP and 

OAG were served with the second amended petition the following day. 

¶ 16 On September 26, 2018, the ISP and the OAG filed a motion to dismiss Creighton’s 

second amended petition, arguing that Creighton’s claim was barred by sovereign immunity, 

Creighton lacked standing to bring the petition because he had not suffered an injury as the result 

of his registration on the Illinois Sex Offender Registry, and SORA’s lifetime registration 

requirement was not unconstitutional as applied to Creighton. The State respondents additionally 

argued, in the alternative, that an as-applied constitutional challenge required an evidentiary 

hearing and findings of fact and, therefore, requested the opportunity to conduct discovery and 

an evidentiary hearing. The State respondents also argued that the OAG should be dismissed 

because it was not a proper party.

¶ 17 At a hearing on September 28, 2018, the State respondents argued, among other things, 

there had been no evidence presented to support the claims Creighton had asserted in his second 

amended petition and there had been no discovery. The circuit court acknowledged that there 

was “no mechanism contained within the statute to have [Creighton’s] name removed” from the 
9 

registry. The circuit court additionally noted that, in pursuing this action, the Peoria County 

State’s Attorney Office had been served with the initial amended petition and Creighton’s 

counsel was advised that an attorney with the OAG would be their representative and 

Creighton’s counsel had sent the amended petition to that attorney. The circuit court indicated 

that on June 15, 2018, “by way of proffer and exhibits, the Court had decided to proceed [despite 

the ISP not being a party at that time] and had ultimately determined that [Creighton] had 

suffered disproportionate consequences as a result of the commission of the crime back in 

Louisiana, his contact with the State of Illinois and then being designated a predator when *** 

the crime had not been committed in Illinois.” The circuit court indicated that it had found that 

Creighton was not likely to reoffend based upon Creighton not having any further criminal 

behavior and that Creighton had an ongoing obligation to register if he came back to Illinois. The 

circuit court indicated that the reason Creighton needed to be removed from the Illinois registry 

was because “he is caught in a bureaucratic black hole that is disproportionate to the crime that 

he committed” and, as applied to Creighton’s specific circumstances, “it was unconstitutional.” 

¶ 18 Furthermore, the circuit court found “the [OAG] most certainly had notice” of the hearing 

of June 15, 2018, and the ISP had now been served with a summons (and second amended 

petition). The circuit court also noted that an attorney from the OAG was present at the hearing

on June 15, 2018, and had requested that certain language be included in the order. The circuit 

court stated, “this is just a bureaucratic black hole that he has been sucked into, and the Court is 

attempting to correct this unconstitutional wrong in a very, very limited fashion.” The circuit 

court denied the motion to dismiss in part, indicating its order of June 15, 2018, remained in 

effect, and granted the motion in part in that it dismissed the OAG as a party. The circuit court 
10 

ordered the ISP to remove Creighton from the Sex Offender Registry on or before October 12, 

2018. 

¶ 19 The ISP and OAG appealed the orders of June 15, and September 28, 2018, wherein the 

circuit court, among other things, ordered the ISP to remove Creighton’s name from the Sex 

Offender Registry. 

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 On appeal, the ISP and OAG (the State respondents) argue that this court should vacate 

the orders at issue, wherein the circuit court ordered that Creighton be removed from the Illinois 

Sex Offender Registry, and remand this matter for further proceedings because: (1) the orders 

failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006); and (b) the circuit 

court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make factual findings in relation to 

Creighton’s as-applied constitutional challenge to SORA (730 ILCS 150/1 et. seq. (West 2018)). 

¶ 22 Creighton argues that this court should affirm the trial court’s orders, arguing there was a 

“more than sufficient record made” and there was compliance with Rule 18. He contends that it 

is apparent from the circuit court’s order of June 15, 2018, the continuing registration 

requirement of SORA “is the particular issue that is unconstitutional as applied to him.” 

Creighton also contends that the record before the trial court was “sufficiently clear and 

undisputed such that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing in this matter.” He additionally 

argues that, even if he had been able to “present before the trial court,” the testimony and 

evidence would have had “specifically mirrored the uncontested statements presented and 

established to the trial court.” Creighton claims the record, therefore, was sufficient to support 

the trial court’s finding that “the statute” was unconstitutional as applied to him. 
11 

¶ 23 In Illinois, convicted sex offenders and sexual predators are subject to the registration 

requirement of SORA. 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2018). Under SORA, sex offenders and sexual 

predators include those individuals that have been convicted of certain sex offenses under the 

laws of other states. Id. § 2. Pursuant to SORA, a “sexual predator shall register for the period of 

his or her natural life.” Id. § 7. Creighton does not dispute his designation as a “sexual predator” 

or allege facts indicating that the designation was erroneous. Rather, as discussed above, 

Creighton challenged the requirement that he be required to register as a sex offender for life, 

contending that the mandate is unconstitutional as applied to him in violation of the prohibition 

against cruel and unusual punishment and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois 

Constitution. 

¶ 24 “Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality.” Vasquez Gonzalez v. Union 

Health Service, Inc., 2018 IL 123025, ¶ 19. “Constitutional challenges carry the heavy burden of 

successfully rebutting the strong judicial presumption that statutes are constitutional.” People v. 

Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 90. To overcome the presumption of a statute’s constitutionality, 

the challenging party must clearly establish that it violates the constitution. People v. Rizzo, 2016 

IL 118599, ¶ 23. “Courts have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute whenever 

reasonably possible, resolving any doubts in favor of the statute’s validity.” Id. The 

determination of a statute’s constitutionality is a matter of law that is reviewed de novo. Id. 

¶ 25 In this case, Creighton raised an as-applied constitutional challenge. An as-applied 

challenge requires a showing that the statute violates the constitution as it applies to the facts and 

circumstances of the challenging party. Id. A court cannot make an as-applied determination of 

unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings of fact. Id. ¶ 26 

(citing People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 47). “By definition, an as-applied constitutional 
12 

challenge is dependent on the particular circumstances and facts of the individual defendant or 

petitioner.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37. 

¶ 26 First, we agree with the State respondents that the circuit court’s order failed to comply 

with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). Our supreme court has “formulated a 

set of requirements circuit courts must follow before declaring a statute unconstitutional,” which 

are set forth in Rule 18. Vasquez Gonzalez, 2018 IL 123025, ¶ 20. Rule 18 ensures that courts do 

not “ ‘ “lightly or cavalierly declare unconstitutional that which the representatives of the people 

have seen fit to enact.” ’ ” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 190 (2004) 

(quoting People v. Conlan, 189 Ill. 2d 286, 291-292 (2000))). 

¶ 27 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 18 provides: 

“A court shall not find unconstitutional a statute, ordinance, regulation or other 

law, unless: 

(a) the court makes the finding in a written order or opinion, or in an oral 

statement on the record that is transcribed;

(b) such order or opinion clearly identifies what portion(s) of the statute, 

ordinance, regulation or other law is being held unconstitutional;

(c) such order or opinion clearly sets forth the specific ground(s) for the 

finding of unconstitutionality, including: 

 (1) the constitutional provision(s) upon which the finding of 

unconstitutionality is based;

(2) whether the statute, ordinance, regulation or other law is being 

found unconstitutional on its face, as applied to the case sub judice, or 

both; 
13 

 (3) that the statute, ordinance, regulation or other law being held 

 unconstitutional cannot reasonably be construed in a manner that would 

preserve its validity;

(4) that the finding of unconstitutionality is necessary to the 

decision or judgment rendered, and that such decision or judgment cannot 

rest upon an alternative ground; and

(5) that the notice required by Rule 19[

2

] has been served, and that 

those served with such notice have been given adequate time and 

opportunity under the circumstances to defend the statute, ordinance, 

regulation or other law challenged.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). 

¶ 28 The circuit court orders at issue failed to, among other things, clearly identify the 

portion(s) of SORA that were being held unconstitutional as applied to Creighton. See Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 18(b) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). The circuit court’s orders also failed to clearly set forth the 

constitutional provision(s) upon which the finding of unconstitutionality was based and failed to 

clearly set forth that the finding of unconstitutionality was necessary to its decision and that such 

decision could not rest upon an alternative ground. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 18(c) (Sept. 1, 2006). Any 

circuit court judgment that fails to comply with Rule 18 may be summarily vacated and 

remanded. Vasquez Gonzalez, 2018 IL 123025, ¶ 22. 

2

 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006) provides: 

“(a) Notice Required. In any cause or proceeding in which the constitutionality *** of a statute, 

ordinance, administrative regulation, or other law affecting the public interest is raised, and to which 

action or proceeding the State or the political subdivision, agency, or officer affected is not already a 

party, the litigant raising the constitutional or preemption issue shall serve an appropriate notice thereof 

on the Attorney General, State’s Attorney, municipal counsel or agency attorney, as the case may be. 

 
14 

¶ 29 Additionally, as argued by the State respondents, no evidentiary hearing took place in

regard to Creighton’s as-applied constitutional challenge so the circuit court could not properly 

conclude SORA was unconstitutional as applied to Creighton. Our supreme court has stated: 

“[B]ecause as-applied constitutional challenges are necessarily dependent on the 

specific facts and circumstances of the case, a court is not capable of making an 

as-applied determination of unconstitutionality when there has been no 

evidentiary hearing and no findings of fact. Absent a sufficient evidentiary record, 

any finding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied is premature.” Id. ¶ 24. 

¶ 30 In this case, there was no evidentiary hearing and no evidence presented. The only 

indication of Creighton’s specific circumstances and the circumstances of the underlying offense 

was made by way of the unverified allegations of the second amended petition and the assertions 

of Creighton’s counsel. Thus, the circuit court’s finding of unconstitutionality as applied to 

Creighton was premature. See id. 

¶ 31 We, therefore, vacate the circuit court’s order of June 15, 2018, partially vacate its order 

of September 28, 2018 (excepting from vacatur the portion of that order dismissing the Attorney 

General as a party), and remand for further proceedings. We note the State respondents have not 

raised an issue regarding, and we do not address, the merits of the circuit court’s finding of 

unconstitutionality. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011) (“[a]ppeals from final judgments 

of circuit courts shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court *** in cases in which a statute of 

the United States or of this state has been held invalid”); People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 9-10 

(1999) (a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court is permitted when a law is held 

unconstitutional as applied).
15 

¶ 32 For purposes of remand, we note the following as indicated by our supreme court: “[O]ne 

who challenges the constitutionality of a statutorily mandated ‘penalty’ has the burden of clearly 

establishing that the challenged provision is in excess of the general constitutional limitations on 

the legislature’s authority.” (Emphases in original.) Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 48 (citing People v. 

Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005)). “The challenger cannot shift the burden of proof and 

research to the circuit court.” Id. “For its part, a circuit court contemplating the invalidation of a 

law enacted by the representatives of the people should proceed with the utmost caution before 

following an attorney’s ill-defined path to a finding of unconstitutionality.” Id. “Rule 18 requires 

the court to set forth specific grounds for the finding of unconstitutionality.” Id. “At a minimum, 

that should include an adequate discussion of relevant case law and should sufficiently 

differentiate the various constitutional bases that might bear upon its finding.” Id. 

¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is vacated in accordance with this 

order and this cause is remanded for further proceedings. 

¶ 35 Vacated and remanded.