NO. 95-059 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1995 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsGREG PRICE, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Robert G. McCarthy; Hennessey, Joyce, McCarthy 

& Wing, Butte, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Patricia 

J. Jordan, Ass't Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: May 25, 1995 

Decided: June 20, 1995 
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Greg Price (Price) appeals from an order of the Eighth 

Judicial District Court, Cascade County, dismissing his appeal from 

City Court. We reverse and remand. 

On July 29, 1994, a jury in the City Court of Great Falls 

convicted Greg Price of the offenses of driving under the influence 

of alcohol and resisting arrest. He was sentenced on the same 

date. 

Price filed a notice of appeal in City Court on August 12, 

1994, and the file subsequently was transferred to the District 

Court. The City of Great Falls moved for dismissal of the notice 

of appeal on the basis that the appeal was not timely filed and, 

absent a timely appeal, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over 

the case. After briefing by the parties, the District Court 

entered its order dismissing the appeal. Price appeals from that 

order. 

Did the District Court err in dismissing Price's appeal? 

Section 46-17-311(2), MCA, requires that appeals from a city 

court to a district court for a trial de nova be undertaken "by 

filing written notice of intention to appeal within 10 days after 

a judgment is rendered following trial." Price's notice of appeal 

was filed 14 days after he was convicted and sentenced. 

The District Court relied on State v. Hartford (1987), 228 

Mont. 254, 741 P.2d 1337, in dismissing Price's appeal. In 

Hartford, we stated that the right to appeal from a court of 

limited jurisdiction to a district court is purely statutory and 

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that a district court does not acquire jurisdiction absent timely 

compliance with 5 46-17-311, MCA. Hartford, 741 P.Zd at 1338. 

There, the notice of appeal was not given within the statutory loday period and, as a result, we affirmed the district court's 

dismissal of the appeal. Hartford, 741 P.2d at 1338. We 

reaffirmed the Hartford approach in State v. Arthur (1988), 234 

Mont. 75, 761 P.2d 806. 

Subsequent to the court's order dismissing Price's appeal, 

however, we decided State v. Schindler (Mont. 1994), 886 P.2d 978, 

51 St.Rep. 1421. Schindler is controlling and dispositive here. 

The issue in Schindler was whether the notice of appeal from 

justice court to district court was timely. We observed that both 

the Montana Justice and City Court Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules 

of Civil Procedure) and the Montana Uniform Rules for Justice and 

City Courts (Uniform Rules) had been adopted since Arthur. 

Schindler, 886 P.2d at 979. Rule 21 of the Uniform Rules provides 

that time is to be computed under Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil 

Procedure; Rule 6 provides that intermediate weekend days and legal 

holidays are excluded in computing time periods prescribed by 

statute. Schindler, 886 P.2d at 979-980. Applying those Rules to 

Schindler's notice of appeal, we concluded that the notice of 

appeal was timely filed. Schindler, 886 P.2d at 980. 

We reach the same result here. Price had 10 days after July 

29, 1994, within which to file his notice of appeal pursuant to § 

46-17-311(2), MCA. Excluding four intervening weekend days, the 

tenth day was August 12, 1994. That is the day on which Price 

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filed his notice of appeal. 

We conclude that Price's notice of appeal was timely filed. 

We hold, therefore, that the District Court erred in dismissing the 

appeal. 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 

We concur: 

Chief Justice 

Justices / 

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