IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 25, 2001 

STATE OF TENNESSEE, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES v.

ANGELA KNOWLES HUFFMAN

 Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Sullivan County

No. J22,417 James H. Beeler, Special Judge

FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2001

No. E2000-03176-COA-R3-CV

Angela Knowles Huffman appeals a judgment of the Juvenile Court for Sullivan County which

terminated her parental rights as to her son, L.T.H. and her daughter, R.E.T. She contends on appeal

that the evidence sought to justify termination does not meet the clear and convincing test. We

affirm.

Tenn.R.App.P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court affirmed;

Cause Remanded

HOUSTON M.GODDARD, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HERSCHEL P.FRANKS and

Charles D. Susano, Jr., JJ., joined.

Jonathan M. Holcomb, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Angela Knowles Huffman

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and Elizabeth C. Driver, Assistant Attorney

General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee, Department of Children's

Services

OPINION

Angela Knowles Huffman, an inmate in the Penal System of this State, appeals a judgment

of the Juvenile Court for Sullivan County, entered on November 4, 2000, which terminated her

parental rights as to her son, L.T.H. (D.O.B. 9/17/96) and her daughter, R.E.T. (D.O.B. 12/8/97). 

Her single issue on appeal contends that the proof justifying termination does not meet the

statutory standards which requires “clear and convincing evidence.” 

In non-jury cases our review is de novo upon the record of the proceedings below. That

record, however, comes to us with the presumption that the trial court’s findings of facts–which in

this case, as already noted, must be by clear and convincing evidence–is correct. Tenn.R.App.P.
1 We doubt the Trial Court’s finding of a g round for term ination in Ms. Huffman’s alleged “substantial

noncompliance by the Respondent, Angela Huffman, with the statement of responsibilities in the Plan of Care.” She

testified that during the period between her conviction and the revocation of her probation, she had completed 99 percent

of her parenting plan. Since we find clear and con vincing evidenc e of other ground s for termination, ou r doubt w ith

respect to one ground is not material to our judgment in this case.

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13(d). We must honor the presumption unless we find that the evidence preponderates against the

trial court’s factual finding as to the clear and convincing standard. The Trial Court’s conclusion

of law, however, are not accorded the same deference, Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d

26, 35 (Tenn. 1996).

By order entered on June 10, 1998, the Juvenile Court placed the custody of the two children

with the State because of the severe physical abuse inflicted upon the son by the daughter’s father,

who was Ms. Huffman’s live-in boyfriend. This occurred when Ms. Huffman was absent from the

residence. However, notwithstanding her absence she was subsequently convicted of permitting

child abuse and given a penitentiary sentence from which she sought and received probation.

Her parole was later revoked when she failed a drug screening and, as already noted, is now

incarcerated.

The Trial Court found–and we concur in his finding–a number of statutory grounds for

termination–one of which we concede may be questionable1–which, beyond peradventure, meet the

clear and convincing test. They are:

That the petition filed by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s

Services, is well taken and should be sustained and relief granted thereunder for

the causes as stated therein in that under the provisions of T.C.A. § 36-1-113

(g)(3)(A), that on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that termination is in

the children’s best interest in that the children have been removed from the home

of the parent or guardian by order of a Court for a period of six (6) months and:

(i) The conditions which led to the children’s removal or other conditions which

in all reasonable probability would cause the children to be subjected to further

abuse or neglect and which, therefore, prevent the children’s safe return to the care

of the parent(s) or guardian(s) still persist; (ii) There is little likelihood that these

conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the children can be safely

returned to the parent or guardian in the near future; and (iii) The continuation of

the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly diminishes the children’s

chances of early integration into a safe, stable and permanent home. That

pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2), there has been substantial noncompliance by

the Respondent, Angela Huffman, with the statement of responsibilities in the

Plan of Care pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-2-403. That pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-

113(g)(4), the parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child

abuse as defined in T.C.A. § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found
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by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition for

adoption, to have committed severe child abuse against the child who is the

subject of the petition or against any sibling or half-sibling of such child, or any

other child residing temporarily or permanently in the home of such parent or

guardian. That pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(5), the parent or guardian has

been sentenced to more than two (2) years imprisonment for conduct against the

child who is the subject of the petition or for conduct against any sibling or halfsibling of the child or any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the

home of such parent or guardian, which has been found under any prior order of

a court or which is found by the court hearing the petition to be severe child

abuse, as defined in T.C.A. § 37-1-102(b)(19). 

Ms. Huffman argues, however, that even if the grounds for termination exists, the proof does

not show by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children that her

parental rights be terminated. We disagree.

The children were removed from the home on February 12, 1998, and their temporary

custody placed with the Department of Children’s Services. At that time the son was 17 months old

and the daughter two months old. They were placed in a foster home and have been with the same

foster parents–who have expressed a desire to adopt them–since the removal. Given the fact that it

is highly unlikely either child remembers the mother (almost certainly not the daughter), Ms.

Huffman has conceded that the children have bonded with their foster parents, and Ms. Huffman’s

history of not protecting the son, we find that the proof is clear and convincing that termination of

the Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed and the cause remanded

for such further proceedings, if any, as may be necessary. Costs of appeal are adjudged against

Angela Knowles Huffman.

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HOUSTON M. GODDARD, PRESIDING JUDGE