UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ MARIO RAMOS-HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 15-9524 (Petition for Review)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , GORSUCH , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Mario Ramos-Hernandez is a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States illegally in 2014. In an effort to avoid re moval, he applied for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and the Conven tion Against Torture. An immigration judge and later the BIA denied Mr. Ramo s-Hernandez’s applic ation because (among other things) they found his account of past persecution in Guatem ala not credible.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 15, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Mr. Ramos-Hernandez seeks relief from this ruling, arguing that we should find it wanting for two reasons: (1) he ne ver received an ade quate opportunity to explain the inconsistencies in his testim ony; and (2) the ruling is premised on a factual mistake. This court is precluded by law from considering the first argument. Before bringing an argument to court, an alien seeking relief under th e immigration laws must first “present the same specific legal theory to the BIA.” Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder , 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010). This Mr. Ramos-Hernandez failed to do with respect to his fi rst theory for relief. Mr. Ramos-Hernandez did exhaust his se cond argument so we may proceed to consider its merits. Befo re the immigration judge Mr. Ramos-Hernandez claimed that he would be persecuted if returned to Guatemala because of his past participation in demonstrations against th e policies of government agen cies responsible for energy distribution. The immigration judge fou nd this claim not cr edible because Mr. Ramos-Hernandez was himself “employe d by government-funded electrical agencies” in Guatemala at the time of his past activism. Befo re this court, Mr. Ramos-Hernandez contends that this credibility determination is legally unsustainable because it was premised on a factual mistake: Mr. Ramos-Hernandez worked for private companies, not a “gove rnment-funded agency.” And it’s certainly true that to be sustaine d credibility findings “may not be based on speculation, conjecture, or unsupported personal opini on . . . [but] must be supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Uanreroro v. Gonzales , 443 F.3d 1197, 12053 (10th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation mark omitted). The problem Mr. RamosHernandez faces is that, accord ing to his own testimony, the companies for whom he worked were “hired by” and “vertically integrated” with and operated “under the purview of” the government. And given this testimony, it’s diffic ult to see how the immigration judge’s factual finding about the nature of his former employer might be characterized as based on speculation or c onjecture rather than substantial record evidence. Having found the adverse credibility determ ination in this case sustainable, and given that this determination by itsel f supplies a legally su fficient basis to support the BIA’s decision, the petition for review is denied.

Entered for the Court

Neil M. Gorsuch Circuit Judge