2021 IL App (1st) 180921-U

No. 1-18-0921 

Order filed January 19, 2021 

Second Division 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

AMOS CHAIRS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 97 CR 25090 

Honorable Thomas J. Hennelly, 

Judge presiding. 

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Lavin and Cobbs concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Circuit court’s denial of defendant’s pro se motion for postconviction DNA testing 

affirmed where he failed to show that such testing had the potential to produce new 

evidence materially relevant to his claim of actual innocence. 

¶ 2 Defendant Amos Chairs appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying 

his pro se motion for DNA testing pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(Code) (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2018)). Defendant requested DNA testing of a pair of shoelaces 

tied together believed to be the murder weapon used to strangle the two victims. On appeal, 

defendant contends the court erred in denying his motion because the testing could have the 
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scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to his claim of 

actual innocence by definitively revealing the murderer’s identity. We affirm.

¶ 3 Defendant and codefendant Traye Booker were jointly indicted on multiple counts of firstdegree murder, robbery, and unlawful restraint for the August 1997 robbery and strangulation 

deaths of Kevin Martin and Julio Meza. Following simultaneous but separate jury trials in March 

1999, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 

1996)) and one count of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 1996)). Booker was acquitted. 

Another codefendant, Tommy Clark, was separately charged, tried by a jury in July and August 

1999, and convicted of the two murders and robbery. 

¶ 4 The facts of defendant’s trial were initially presented in this court’s prior order affirming 

his convictions on direct appeal. People v. Chairs, No. 1-00-0094 (2001) (unpublished order under 

Supreme Court Rule 23). We discuss the evidence presented at trial as necessary for consideration 

of the issue in this appeal.

¶ 5 At trial, Chicago police detective Edward Winstead testified that about 11 a.m. on August 

22, 1997, he investigated a double homicide in a tavern, John’s Place, in the 7000 block of South 

Western Avenue. In the rear of the tavern was a washroom, a kitchen, and a bedroom. Inside the 

bedroom where the bodies of Martin and Meza. Martin was lying face-down on the bed with a gag 

in his mouth. He was “hog-tied” with his hands bound behind his back and tied to his feet with a 

blue electrical cord. There was a deep ligature mark on Martin’s neck. Meza was lying face-down 

at the foot of the bed with a gag in his mouth that was tied around his neck. His hands were bound 

behind his back with an electrical cord and his feet were bound with a piece of cloth. Meza’s 

pockets were turned inside-out. There were no ligatures around either man’s neck. About a month 
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after the murders, Meza’s vehicle was found two blocks from the tavern. The vehicle had been 

stripped. Police recovered a pair of shoelaces tied together from the floor of the vehicle. In court, 

the prosecutor handed Winstead the shoelaces and asked him to hold them up for everyone to see. 

Winstead identified the laces as those recovered from Meza’s vehicle.

¶ 6 Deputy medical examiner Scott Denton testified that he performed autopsies on Martin and 

Meza. The men had nearly identical thin red horizontal ligature marks encircling their necks. The 

marks were about one-tenth of an inch and abraded or “rubbing” ligature marks. Denton opined 

that both men died from ligature strangulation, i.e., strangulation from a cord or rope held around 

their necks. The pair of tied-together shoelaces was consistent with the strangulation marks on 

both men. 

¶ 7 Tanya Robinson, a barmaid at the tavern, testified that when she arrived at the tavern about 

9:30 p.m. on August 21, 1997, the door was locked. She looked through a window and saw Martin 

walking towards the back of the tavern. She knocked on the door and he let her in. Defendant, 

Booker, and Clark were sitting at the end of the bar. Robinson knew all three men. No one else 

was there. The three men rose from their bar stools and walked towards the bedroom in the back 

of the bar. Martin put money in the jukebox and turned up the volume. He then walked to the 

bedroom. Robinson sat at the bar alone, drinking a beer and listening to the music. 

¶ 8 Shortly thereafter, Robinson used the washroom, which was directly across from the 

bedroom. When she exited the washroom, Robinson heard defendant repeatedly ask in a very 

angry voice, “where’s the stuff at, where’s the shit at?” An unfamiliar voice with a Hispanic accent 

responded, “I don’t know where the rest of the shit is, please don’t do this, please don’t do this.”
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A third voice stated, “he knows where the shit is, he knows.” Martin stated, “tell them what they 

want to know, tell them what they want to know.” 

¶ 9 Robinson walked quietly to the front of the tavern, sat at the end of the bar, and listened to 

the last song on the jukebox. She heard the back door close. Booker emerged from the rear of the 

tavern and approached Robinson. He put his hands on her shoulder and placed a ring in her hand. 

Booker looked her straight in the eye and told her that if the ring got to the police, “they’ll know” 

she told, and if she told anyone “what they ha[d] done” he would kill her. Booker ran out the back 

door. 

¶ 10 Robinson realized the bar had become very quiet. She repeatedly called Martin’s name 

with no reply. Robinson walked to the back of the tavern, pushed the bedroom door open, and 

observed Martin lying on the bed, tied up with a cord around his neck. A second man whom she 

did not know was lying on the floor. He was also tied up and had an electrical cord around his 

neck. Robinson fled through the front door and ran home. 

¶ 11 The next day, the police interviewed Robinson, but she did not tell them what she heard or 

saw because she was afraid Booker would kill her. Instead, she told police she last saw Martin the 

night before the murders, they had sex, and she stole his ring. On August 29, the police interviewed 

Robinson and she again lied to them. Later that night, she told the police what happened. On 

September 1, Robinson identified defendant and Booker in a lineup, and identified Clark in a photo 

array. Robinson acknowledged that around the time of the murders, she used heroin and cocaine a 

few times a month, but denied using drugs on the day of the murders. 

¶ 12 Stacy Lynn Jones testified that at the time of the murders, defendant was her boyfriend. 

She knew him by the name “Billy Clyde” and the nickname “Gov” because he was a governor in 
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the Gangster Disciples. Jones knew Clark, defendant’s assistant governor in the Gangster 

Disciples, by his nickname “Fruit.” In August 1997, defendant and Jones were supposed to buy 

the tavern from Martin. During the first week of August 1997, Jones overheard defendant tell Clark

that Martin was going to introduce defendant to a “Mexican” who had 50 pounds of marijuana. 

Defendant stated he was going to purchase the marijuana and sell it to his gang members for $800 

per pound. 

¶ 13 In mid-August, Jones, defendant, and Clark drove to a tavern on 59th Street where Martin 

was supposed to introduce defendant to “the Mexican.” Defendant entered the bar alone and 

returned to the car 10 minutes later. Martin was not there, but defendant met “the Mexican” who 

told defendant he had a kilo of cocaine upstairs. Defendant suggested to Clark that they go inside 

and take the cocaine, but ultimately decided against it and drove home.

¶ 14 About noon on August 21, Jones, defendant, and Clark were riding in a vehicle when 

defendant told Clark that they were getting ready to take the marijuana from Martin and “the 

Mexican.” Defendant dropped off Jones at 74th Street and Parnell Avenue. About 6 p.m., 

defendant picked up Jones from the same address. Jones asked defendant what happened. 

Defendant replied, “mother f*** wouldn’t give it up.” Defendant stated that he “and the folks took 

care of it.” Defendant told Jones to stay out of it and to get rid of her cell phone because he had 

called Martin from her phone. Defendant also stated that he had to get rid of one of his pagers 

because Martin knew that number. 

¶ 15 On August 23, defendant and Jones drove to 79th Street and Vincennes Avenue where 

defendant exited the vehicle and spoke with one of his “folks.” The man asked defendant if he 

committed the murders on 71st and Western where two men were found duct-taped in a garbage 
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can. Defendant replied that he had nothing to do with those murders. When defendant returned to 

the vehicle, Jones asked him if he committed the murders. He said he had nothing to do with it. 

Jones warned defendant that fingerprints could be recovered from duct tape. Defendant told Jones 

“they didn’t use no duct tape and they wasn’t in no garbage can.” Defendant also told Jones that if 

anyone asked her if he had gone to see Martin that day, she should say defendant was with her. 

Jones told defendant he was not with her at that time. He replied, “just tell them you was with me 

and everything will be cool. Just say you was with me. I was with you.” 

¶ 16 About 2:45 a.m. on September 1, police came to the motel room where defendant and Jones 

were staying and arrested defendant. Jones voluntarily went with police to the police station and 

gave a statement consistent with her trial testimony.

¶ 17 Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Patrick Kelly testified that about 11:30 p.m. on 

September 1, he met with defendant, Detective James Cassidy, and ASA Tom Bilyk at the police 

station. Kelly advised defendant of his Miranda rights and questioned him about the murders. 

Defendant initially stated that he was with Jones all day on August 21. When asked if he was near 

the tavern and if he knew Martin and Meza, defendant admitted he had talked with Martin on the 

sidewalk outside the bar that afternoon. He claimed he did not enter the tavern that day. Defendant 

further admitted he knew Meza and said Martin and Meza had been trying to “set up a deal” to sell 

the tavern to defendant. Kelly pointed out to defendant that he had stated he was at the tavern on 

the day of the murders and he knew Martin and Meza. Defendant replied, “you know what, I was 

with Stacy Jones all that day and evening, that’s it.” 

¶ 18 Kelly left the interview room but returned 30 minutes later when Cassidy notified him that 

defendant wanted to speak with him again. Kelly again advised defendant of his Miranda rights, 
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then confronted him with statements made by Jones. Defendant stated that he was sitting at the bar

inside the tavern on the night of August 21, drinking a beer and talking with Martin and Meza 

about buying the tavern. Three men whom defendant knew as “Fruity,” “Big Robin,” and “Ant,” 

entered the tavern. Fruity told defendant they were there to rob Martin. Fruity ordered Martin and 

Meza into the back room of the tavern. As Fruity walked past defendant, he told defendant to leave 

the tavern. Defendant stated that he went outside and stood on the sidewalk in front of the tavern 

for about 30 minutes, at which time Fruity, Big Robin and Ant exited the tavern carrying “some 

kind of a bundle.” Fruity told defendant, “we killed them.” Kelly confronted defendant with other 

information he had. Defendant replied, “f*** this, I was with my girlfriend all day and night on 

the 21st and if she says anything different she’s lying.”

¶ 19 Zulina Mason Stewart testified about a prior offense committed by defendant on August 

15, 1977. Defendant and Stewart went to the home of Luther Price. Price propositioned Stewart 

for sex. Stewart told defendant about the proposition, and they devised a plan to rob Price by 

physically restraining him. Defendant and Stewart left Price’s house. Stewart returned to the house 

alone and Price let her in. Stewart deceived Price into believing defendant had left and that she 

and Price could have sex for money. Stewart let defendant into Price’s house. Defendant and Price 

immediately began arguing and went upstairs. Stewart heard the men fighting and struggling with 

each other in the bedroom. She went upstairs and observed defendant strangling Price with a cord. 

Defendant told Stewart to take Price’s money. She reached into Price’s pocket and did so. 

Defendant directed Stewart to put the money inside his pocket, and she did. 

¶ 20 As defendant continued strangling Price, Stewart attempted unsuccessfully to tie Price’s 

hands with a sweater. Defendant grabbed an electrical cord from the floor and tied Price’s hands. 
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Defendant stuffed something inside Price’s mouth and tied Price’s mouth tightly with a towel. 

Stewart went downstairs and collected a few items she thought could be sold. She wiped 

fingerprints from any surfaces she and defendant had touched. Stewart returned upstairs and saw 

Price tied up with an electrical cord “going from the hands down and around the feet.” Stewart and 

defendant left the house and drove away in Price’s vehicle. She later learned Price had died.

Stewart was convicted of Price’s murder and robbery.

¶ 21 During deliberations, all the exhibits, including the shoelaces, were sent to the jury. The 

State provided the jury with latex gloves in case the jurors wanted to handle “the cords.” The jury 

found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and robbery. The trial court sentenced 

defendant to consecutive life sentences for the murders and a concurrent sentence of seven years’

imprisonment for robbery. 

¶ 22 The record shows that the State used the shoelaces as an exhibit in Clark’s subsequent jury 

trial. Thereafter, the shoelaces were impounded with all the other trial exhibits by the clerk of the 

circuit court.

¶ 23 On direct appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his other crime, evidence 

of his gang membership, and statements he made to Kelly. This court rejected those arguments 

and affirmed defendant’s convictions. People v. Chairs, No. 1-00-0094 (2001) (unpublished order 

under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 24 In August 2002, defendant filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction 

Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)) which the circuit court summarily dismissed. 

On appeal, this court allowed the State’s confession of error and modified defendant’s life 
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sentences to run concurrent rather than consecutive. People v. Chairs, No. 1-02-3094 (2003) 

(dispositional order).

¶ 25 On January 22, 2018, defendant filed the instant pro se motion for postconviction DNA 

testing pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code. Defendant stated that “[s]amples” from which DNA 

could be obtained were collected, and that “none of the material collected was subjected to the test 

requested.” The remainder of defendant’s motion alleged, in toto, as follows:

“There was a shoe string that was told to the jury it was the murder weapon. It was never 

tested and it was put up against a blowen up picture of the victum [sic] neck where the 

abrasion was told to the jury that it fit. Thats why this shoe string need to be tested, along 

with everything else!

Identity was the issue at the trial which resulted in this conviction.

The DNA technology available today was not available at the time of the trial.

To the best of my belief, the material collected is in the possession of the proper authorities 

and has not been tampered with replaced, or altered in any material aspect.

Test results are relevant to an assertion of actual innocence.

Requested testing uses generally accepted scientific methods.”

Defendant requested the circuit court appoint him counsel and order the DNA testing. 

¶ 26 On February 23, 2018, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion sua sponte. The court 

stated, in toto, “He’s asking to have DNA testing done. It’s a ’99 conviction. Motion for DNA 

testing is considered and denied.”

¶ 27 On appeal, defendant contends the circuit court erred in denying his motion for DNA 

testing because testing the shoelaces could have the scientific potential to produce new, 
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noncumulative evidence materially relevant to his claim of actual innocence by definitively 

revealing the murderer’s identity. Defendant asserts that the killer’s DNA is likely on the laces, 

and would have to match either him, Booker, or Clark. Defendant claims that if another person’s 

DNA is on the laces, the State’s theory of the case and Robinson’s testimony falls apart. Defendant 

points out that no forensic evidence connected him to the murders or crime scene, and argues that 

it is “far from inconceivable” that testing the laces could result in advancing his claim of innocence.

¶ 28 The State responds that defendant failed to show that the laces were subject to a sufficient 

chain of custody to establish that they had not been substituted or altered in any material aspect 

where they were sent to the jury during deliberations and there is no indication whether the jurors 

wore the latex gloves while handling the laces. The State further argues that testing would not 

advance a claim of innocence where defendant was convicted under a theory of accountability. 

The State asserts that whether defendant touched the laces or strangled the victims would not be 

exculpatory, and therefore, is not relevant. 

¶ 29 Section 116-3 of the Code provides, in relevant part, that a defendant may make a motion 

in the circuit court for forensic DNA testing “on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial” 

that resulted in his conviction, and at the time of trial, that evidence was not subject to the requested 

testing. 725 ILCS 5/116-3(a)(1) (West 2018). Defendant’s motion must present a prima facie case 

that: (1) identity was the issue in the trial that resulted in his conviction, and “(2) the evidence to 

be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been 

substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect.” 725 ILCS 5/116-3(b) (West 

2018). 
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¶ 30 After defendant has established a prima facie case, the trial court shall allow the requested 

testing if it determines that: “(1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, 

noncumulative evidence” that is “materially relevant to the defendant’s assertion of actual 

innocence *** even though the results may not completely exonerate the defendant”; and (2) the 

requested testing “employs a scientific method generally accepted within the relevant scientific 

community.” 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c) (West 2018). Evidence is “materially relevant” to a claim of 

actual innocence if it tends to significantly advance such a claim even if it does not, standing alone, 

exonerate the defendant. People v. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 33. To determine whether DNA 

evidence would significantly advance an actual innocence claim, the court must evaluate the 

evidence presented at trial as well as the evidence defendant wants tested. Id. 

¶ 31 The circuit court may deny a section 116-3 motion sua sponte when the defendant clearly

is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. People v. O’Connell, 227 Ill. 2d 31, 38 (2007). We 

review the circuit court’s denial of a motion for forensic DNA testing de novo. Stoecker, 2014 IL 

115756, ¶ 21. On review, this court may affirm the circuit court’s judgment on any basis in the 

record. People v. English, 2013 IL App (4th) 120044, ¶ 14. 

¶ 32 As a threshold matter, we find the State’s challenge to the sufficiency of the chain of 

custody unpersuasive. Without citing any authority for its proposition, the State argues defendant 

failed to establish a chain of custody because he has not established that the shoelaces were not 

substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect while in the jury room during 

deliberations. Defendant cannot be expected to present such proof where neither he, nor anyone 

else, would have knowledge of what occurred during the jury’s deliberations. The State asserts

that the jurors may have touched the laces, which could have altered any DNA on them. That is 
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possible. The record shows that the prosecutor and Winstead also handled the laces during trial, 

and there is no indication either of them were wearing gloves. However, whether defendant’s 

motion sufficiently established the chain of custody, and whether the shoelaces contain any DNA 

evidentiary value are two separate questions.

¶ 33 Here, the chain of custody has not been broken. The State presented the shoelaces as 

evidence at trial. Winstead testified that police recovered the laces from the floor of Meza’s 

stripped vehicle, which was found two blocks from the tavern a month after the murders. All the 

exhibits, including the shoelaces, were sent to the jury during deliberations. The State provided 

the jury with latex gloves in case the jurors wanted to handle “the cords” while examining the 

evidence. The record shows that the State subsequently presented the shoelaces as an exhibit in 

Clark’s trial four months after defendant’s trial. Thereafter, the laces were impounded by the clerk 

of the circuit court pending further order of the court. The record thereby shows that the shoelaces 

have remained in the custody of the State and the circuit court clerk since trial.

¶ 34 Defendant alleged in his motion, “To the best of my belief, the material collected is in the 

possession of the proper authorities and has not been tampered with replaced, or altered in any 

material aspect.” Although defendant’s assertion is conclusory, this court has previously found 

that an allegation that the evidence to be tested has been in the possession of the police or a state 

authority is facially sufficient to satisfy the chain of custody requirement of section 116-3 because 

a defendant cannot be expected to prove a proper chain of custody at the outset where the evidence 

has undoubtedly been in the custody of the State and the court. People v. Kines, 2015 IL App (2d) 

140518, ¶ 29 (citing People v. Johnson, 205 Ill. 2d 381, 393 (2002)); People v. Bailey, 386 Ill. 
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App. 3d 68, 74-75 (2008) (and cases cited therein). Accordingly, defendant satisfied the chain of 

custody requirement of section 116-3(b)(2). 

¶ 35 Nevertheless, we find that defendant’s motion failed to demonstrate that DNA testing of 

the shoelaces could produce evidence that is materially relevant to his assertion of actual innocence

as required by section 116-3(c)(1). Defendant’s motion merely alleged “[t]est results are relevant 

to an assertion of actual innocence.” Defendant’s conclusory allegation makes no assertion as to 

what probative value the results of DNA testing of the shoelaces would reveal or how such 

evidence would be materially relevant to his claim of actual innocence. 

¶ 36 Section 116-3 of the Code does not provide a defendant with a general means to discover 

evidence. People v. Barrow, 2011 IL App (3d) 100086, ¶ 30. Here, defendant’s motion is nothing 

more than a generic request to test the shoelaces for DNA.

¶ 37 Whether or not the shoelaces contain the DNA of any of the three defendants, either victim, 

or an unidentified party would have no impact on the State’s evidence that sustained defendant’s 

conviction, which this court found sufficient on direct appeal. Robinson, who knew all three 

defendants, testified that defendant was one of the three men who was in the bedroom with Martin, 

and she heard defendant demanding to know “where’s the stuff at.” She heard a Hispanic man 

begging “please don’t do this,” and heard Martin say, “tell them what they want to know.” Booker 

emerged from the bedroom, gave Robinson Martin’s ring, and told her he would kill her if she told 

anyone “what they ha[d] done.” Robinson then observed the lifeless bodies of Martin and Meza, 

gagged and tied up with electrical cords in the bedroom. Jones testified to defendant’s motive, his 

tacit admission of wrongdoing after the murders, and his attempt to establish a false alibi. Kelly 

testified to defendant’s inconsistent accounts of his whereabouts on the night of the murders, and 
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his admission that he was at the tavern when the murders occurred. Stewart testified to defendant’s 

earlier murder of Price, establishing defendant’s modus operandi. As the State points out, 

defendant was convicted on a theory of accountability. In light of the strong evidence presented 

against defendant at trial, a lack of his DNA on the shoelaces would not significantly advance his 

claim of actual innocence. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 33; English, 2013 IL App (4th) 120044, ¶ 

23. 

¶ 38 Similarly, whether any DNA evidence found on the shoelaces matches or does not match 

the victims would have no impact on the jury’s verdict that defendant was guilty of the murders 

on a theory of accountability. DNA testing results would not undermine the State’s evidence, 

detailed above, that defendant was accountable for the murders of Martin and Meza. DNA 

evidence was not at issue in this case. Therefore, the DNA testing would be collateral to the 

evidence presented at trial, and thus, not materially relevant because it would not significantly 

advance a claim of innocence. People v. Gecht, 386 Ill. App. 3d 578, 582 (2008). 

¶ 39 Moreover, the shoelaces were not recovered with the bodies at the murder scene, but 

instead, were found a month later when Meza’s stripped vehicle was discovered two blocks from 

the tavern. The laces were handled at trial by the prosecutor and Winstead, and possibly by the 

jurors during deliberations. The laces were subsequently introduced into evidence at Clark’s trial 

four months later. Consequently, the existence of another person’s DNA on the shoelaces is quite 

possible and would not significantly advance defendant’s claim of actual innocence. Stoecker, 

2014 IL 115756, ¶ 33; English, 2013 IL App (4th) 120044, ¶ 24. 

¶ 40 We conclude that DNA testing of the shoelaces would not be materially relevant to 

defendant’s claim of actual innocence. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for section 116-3 testing 
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is insufficient as a matter of law, and the circuit court’s sua sponte denial of the motion was proper. 

O’Connell, 227 Ill. 2d at 31. 

¶ 41 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 42 Affirmed.