NO. 95-059 IN THESUPREME

COURTOFTHESTATEOFMONTANA 1995

STATEOFMONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsGREGPRICE,

Defendant andAppellant.

APPEALFROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Cascade, TheHonorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding.

COUNSELOFRECORD:

For Appellant: Robert G. McCarthy; Hennessey, Joyce, McCarthy &Wing, Butte, Montana
For Respondent: Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Patricia J. Jordan, Ass't Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Filed: Submitted on Briefs: May25, 1995 Decided: June 20, 1995Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Greg Price (Price) appeals from an order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, CascadeCounty, dismissing his appeal from City Court. Wereverse and remand. OnJuly 29, 1994, a jury in the City Court of Great Falls convicted Greg Price of the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol and resisting arrest. Hewas sentenced on the same date. Price filed a notice of appeal in City Court onAugust 12, 1994, and the file subsequently was transferred to the District Court. The City of Great Falls movedfor dismissal of the notice of appeal on the basis that the appeal was not timely filed and, absent atimely appeal, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the case. After briefing by the parties, the District Court entered its order dismissing the appeal. Price appeals from that order.Did the District Court err in dismissing Price's appeal? Section 46-17-311(2), MCA,requires that appeals from acity court to adistrict court for a trial de nova be undertaken "by filing written notice of intention to appeal within 10days after
ajudgment is rendered following trial." Price's notice of appeal
was filed 14days after hewasconvicted and sentenced. The District Court relied on State v. Hartford (1987), 228 Mont. 254, 741 P.2d 1337, in dismissing Price's appeal. In Hartford, we stated that the right to appeal from a court of limited jurisdiction to adistrict court is purely statutory and 2that adistrict court does not acquire jurisdiction absent timely

compliance with 5 46-17-311, MCA. Hartford, 741 P.Zd at 1338. There, the notice of appeal wasnot given within the statutory loday period and, as a result, we affirmed the district court's dismissal of the appeal. Hartford, 741 P.2d at 1338. We reaffirmed the Hartford approach in State v. Arthur (1988), 234 Mont. 75, 761 P.2d 806. Subsequent to the court's order dismissing Price's appeal, however, wedecided State v. Schindler (Mont. 1994), 886P.2d 978, 51 St.Rep. 1421. Schindler is controlling anddispositive here. The issue in Schindler waswhether the notice of appeal from justice court to district court wastimely. Weobserved that both the Montana Justice andCity Court Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Civil Procedure) and the Montana Uniform Rules for Justice and City Courts (Uniform Rules) had been adopted since Arthur. Schindler, 886P.2d at 979. Rule 21of the Uniform Rules provides that time is to be computed under Rule 6of the Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 6provides that intermediate weekenddays andlegal holidays are excluded in computing time periods prescribed by statute. Schindler, 886P.2d at 979-980. Applying those Rules to Schindler's notice of appeal, we concluded that the notice of appeal wastimely filed. Schindler, 886 P.2d at 980. Wereach the sameresult here. Price had 10days after July 29, 1994, within which to file his notice of appeal pursuant to § 46-17-311(2), MCA. Excluding four intervening weekend days, the tenth day was August 12, 1994. That is the day on which Price
3filed his notice of appeal.

Weconclude that Price's notice of appeal was timely filed. Wehold, therefore, that the District Court erred in dismissing the appeal. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Weconcur:

Chief Justice

Justices /

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