[Cite as In re T.A.H., 2017-Ohio-7143.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

IN THE MATTER OF : T.A.H. 

 

JUDGES: 

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case 

No. 2012-DEP-00156 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 4, 2017 

APPEARANCES: 

For Appellant/Father For Appellee 

DAVID WATSON SERENA M. COPPULA 

3 North Main St., Suite 702 Richland County Children Services Board 

Mansfield, Ohio 44902 731 Scholl Road 

 Mansfield, Ohio 44907 

For Appellant/Mother 

JOHN C. O’DONNELL, III 

10 West Newlon Place 

Mansfield, Ohio 44902 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 2

Hoffman, J. 

{¶1} In Richland App. No. 2017 CA 011, Appellant Todd Hout (“Father”) appeals 

the February 8, 2017 Opinion and Judgment Entry entered by the Richland County Court 

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which terminated his parental rights, privileges, and 

responsibilities with respect to his minor child, and granted permanent custody of the child 

to Appellee Richland County Children Services Board (“RCCS”). In Richland App. No. 

2017 CA 0012, Appellant Trisha Hout (“Mother”) appeals the same with respect to the 

trial court's termination of her parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 

{¶2} Mother and Father are the biological parents of the child. Mother gave birth 

prematurely to the child on November 2, 2012. The child, who was unresponsive at birth, 

was in a medically fragile state and faced acute health and developmental issues. Seven 

days after the child’s birth on November 9, 2012, the trial court issued an ex parte order, 

placing the child into the emergency shelter care custody of RCCS. 

{¶3} The trial court found the child to be a dependent child at an adjudicatory 

hearing on January 29, 2013, and placed the child in the temporary custody of RCCS. On 

October 15, 2014, RCCS filed a motion for permanent custody. The trial court conducted 

a four day hearing. Via Memorandum Opinion and Judgment Entry filed March 11, 2015, 

the trial court overruled the motion, finding Parents had not, at that point, been afforded 

“every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.” The child remained in the 

temporary custody of RCCS. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 3

{¶4} RCCS filed its second motion for permanent custody on April 20, 2016. The 

trial court conducted a four day hearing on the motion, commencing January 9, 2017. 

The parties stipulated the child had been in the temporary custody of RCCS for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period, and had also been in the 

temporary custody of RCCS for two years or longer. 

{¶5} The child was medically fragile at birth and faced acute health and 

developmental issues. Because of aspiration, a feeding tube was inserted into the child’s 

stomach in the spring of 2013. Later that year, the child underwent a second surgery due 

to reflux. The child had severe dysphagia and significant delays in oral feeding. She also 

had significant fine motor, gross motor and developmental issues. She attended, and 

continues to attend, weekly occupational, physical, and speech therapy sessions. Her 

health had significantly improved over the course of the proceedings. Although the 

feeding tube remained, the child’s swallowing ability had greatly improved and she did 

not use the feeding tube. Despite the improvements to her health, the child continues to 

need proactive, engaged, and competent caregiving. 

{¶6} Since her birth, the child had had at least one hundred medical and/or 

hospital appointments, including 20 or more visits to Akron Children’s Hospital. The foster 

parents transported the child to/from and attended all of the appointments. Parents 

regularly failed to attend the child’s appointments, including routine well-child visits which 

occurred in Mansfield, Ohio, where they resided. Parents only attended approximately 

six appointments at Akron Children’s Hospital notwithstanding regular notice and being 

provided transportation. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 4

{¶7} The child suffers from asthma, which requires close monitoring and often 

requires an immediate medical response. Parents smoke, and neither have considered 

quitting even with the knowledge of the child’s condition and the effect of smoking on her 

asthma. Overall, Parents did not show an interest or concern regarding the child’s health 

and well-being. 

{¶8} The case plan required Parents to attend parenting classes; complete 

psychological evaluations and follow all recommendations; maintain a clean and safe 

home; obtain stable sources of income; and attend the child’s medical appointments. 

{¶9} Parents attended cooking classes through Parent Aide. Parents also 

engaged in 20 parent educations sessions through Parent Aide. Laurie Daugherty, the 

parent educator, testified Parents needed more time to develop the nuances of parenting, 

which she believed to be a critical component to successful parenting. Daugherty 

observed Mother parenting without taking into consideration the child’s developmental 

needs. 

{¶10} During the four years the child was in the temporary custody of RCCS, 

Parents were afforded regular visitation, generally several times per week. The visits 

remained supervised throughout the case. RCCS workers used the visits to educate and 

train Parents to improve their basic parenting skills and to teach them how to meet the 

child’s medical needs, including the proper use the feeding tube. Although Mother 

demonstrated a genuine emotional attachment to the child as well as limited nurturing 

abilities, at times, she did not respond to the child appropriately, demonstrating an 

incorrect or inadequate understanding of the child’s needs. Mother did not always 

appropriately discipline the child. Father’s interactions with the child were mainly passive 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 5

in nature. There was relatively little proactive interpersonal engagement with the child by 

Parents. 

{¶11} The conditions of Parents’ home was a concern throughout the 

proceedings. Parents struggled to consistently maintain a clean and safe home. RCCS 

workers observed bug infestation, including cockroaches, fleas, and bed bugs. The 

workers also noted strong odors of garbage, urine, and feces. The home was cluttered 

and dirty. At one point, the health department had to address the insect infestation. 

Episodes of bug infestation occurred periodically throughout the case. 

{¶12} On September 15, 2013, Parents completed psychological evaluations at 

Northeast Ohio Behavioral Health. The results of the testing revealed Parents have 

cognitive deficits and mental health diagnoses which significantly impact their ability to 

effectively parent or otherwise adequately care for the child, especially in light of the 

child’s ongoing medical needs. Father’s IQ score placed him in the mild to moderate 

range of mental retardation. The evaluator opined the level of Father’s intellectual ability 

will affect his reasoning, judgment, and ability to interpret situations. Father is likely to 

experience moderate difficulty with comprehending parenting instruction and integrating 

information. Further, Father’s test results suggested he may have some degree of Bipolar 

Disorder. Mother has a below average IQ. The intellectual testing suggested Mother “is 

likely to encounter some difficulties understanding and retaining parenting instruction”, 

and would require “a highly structured approach to parenting skill training, with active 

modeling and re-checking to ensure comprehension and transfer of learning.” Like 

Father, Mother’s intellectual ability will affect her reasoning, judgment, and ability to 

interpret situations. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 6

{¶13} On May 18, 2015, Parents each completed a second psychological 

evaluation with Dr. Aaron Becker, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Becker, likewise, found 

Parents each have significant cognitive deficits. He opined Mother and Father would 

likely have difficulty parenting due to their cognitive deficits, and would need assistance 

to care for the child on a daily basis. Dr. Becker Father’s IQ score was slightly higher on 

the test performed by Dr. Becker, however, Father still fell “at the extreme low end of the 

Borderline range of the population.” Mother’s IQ score was 60, which placed her in the 

extremely low range of the population. The test results showed Mother’s adaptive 

behavior functioning, or social, skills, was extremely low. Further, the test results for selfcare, leisure, functional academics, health and safety, and community use suggested 

Mother does not have the cognitive ability to adequately provide for her own personal 

hygiene and daily functioning, such as bathing and grooming; completing forms or 

applications; making a schedule; following safety rules; planning meals; and exchanging 

money accurately. Dr. Becker determined each parent to be “mildly mentally retarded.” 

{¶14} During the best interest portion of the hearing, the testimony revealed the 

child is very bonded with her foster parents, with whom she has lived for over four years. 

The child is fully assimilated into their family. The foster parents are fully committed to 

the child and attend to all of her needs – physical, emotional, and medical. 

{¶15} The child has a relatively comfortable relationship with Parents. However, 

she had, on several occasions, resisted visiting Parents. Parents overall interpersonal 

relationship with the child was minimal and passive. The child resisted Mother’s attempts 

to engage in a more active manner. The child’s play therapist provided Parents with 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 7

techniques to utilize in their interactions with the child. Parents were less than willing to 

accept and apply those methods. 

{¶16} Via Opinion and Judgment Entry filed February 8, 2017, the trial court 

terminated Father and Mother's parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities with 

respect to the child, and granted permanent custody of the child to RCCS. The trial court 

issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the same day, which the trial court 

incorporated into its Judgment Entry. 

{¶17} It is from this judgment entry Parents appeal. 

{¶18} In Richland App. No. 17 CA 11, Father assigns the following as error: 

 I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT 

CUSTODY TO RICHLAND COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES (RCCS) 

BECAUSE RCCS FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY ADOPTION CASE PLAN AS 

REQUIRED BY ORC 2151.413(E). 

 II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT IT IS IN THE 

CHILD’S BEST INTEREST THAT SHE BE PLACED IN THE PERMANENT 

CUSTODY OF RCCS AS THE AGENCY FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN 

OF PROF [SIC] AND THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION WAS AGAINST 

THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

 III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT 

CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO RCCS AS FATHER HAD SUBSTANTIALLY 

REMEDIED THE CONDITIONS THAT CAUSED THE CHILD’S REMOVAL. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 8

 IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 

GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO RCCS WHEN 

THE AGENCY DID NOT USE REASONABLE CASE PLANNING AND 

DILIGENT EFFORTS FOR REUNIFICATION WITH FATHER. 

 V. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED FATHER’S FUNDAMENTAL 

RIGHT TO RAISE HIS CHILD WHEN THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED 

PERMANENT CUSTODY TO RCCS. 

{¶19} In Richland App. No. 17 CA 12, Mother raises the following assignments of 

error: 

 I. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION GRANTING PERMANENT 

CUSTODY TO CHILDREN SERVICES WAS CONTRARY TO LAW. 

 II. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS WAS [SIC] NOT BASED UPON 

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 

{¶20} This case comes to us on the expedited calendar and shall be considered 

in compliance with App. R. 11.2(C). 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 9

FATHER 

17 CA 11 

I 

{¶21} In his first assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred in granting 

permanent custody of the child to RCCS as the Agency failed to file a timely adoption 

case plan as required by R.C. 2151.413(E). 

{¶22} Father acknowledges the Ohio Supreme Court in In re: T.R.,120 Ohio St.3d 

136, 2008-Ohio-5219, held, although R.C. 2151.413(E) “requires a children-services 

agency seeking permanent custody of a child to update the child's case plan to include 

adoption plans,” the statute “does not require the agency to perform this action before the 

juvenile court rules on the motion for permanent custody.” Id. at para. 8. However, Father 

refers this Court to Justice Lundberg Stratton’s concurring opinion in In re: T.R., in support 

of his position a public agency should include a plan for adoption in the child's case plan 

prior to the permanent custody hearing. (Emphasis added). Justice Lundberg Stratton 

noted her belief “the statutory scheme and the public policy underlying the 1997 federal 

amendments, in response to which Ohio amended its laws, support an inference that the 

General Assembly intended to require an agency to amend the child's case plan to include 

a specific plan for seeking adoption prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent 

custody.” Id. at para. 18. 

{¶23} Based upon the clear holding in In re: T.R., we disagree with Father and 

find the trial court did not err in granting permanent custody of the child to RCCS before 

the Agency filed a case plan outlining the adoption plans. 

{¶24} Father’s first assignment of error is overruled. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 10

FATHER 

17 CA 11 

II, III, V 

MOTHER 

17 CA 12 

I, II 

{¶25} We elect to address Father’s second, third, and fifth assignments of error, 

and Mother's assignments of error together. 

{¶26} As an appellate court, we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the 

credibility of the witnesses. Our role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent 

and credible evidence upon which the fact finder could base its judgment. Cross Truck v. 

Jeffries (Feb. 10, 1982), Stark App. No. CA5758. Accordingly, judgments supported by 

some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not 

be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. 

Foley Constr. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279. 

{¶27} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the guidelines a trial court must follow when 

deciding a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court 

schedule a hearing and provide notice upon the filing of a motion for permanent custody 

of a child by a public children services agency or private child placing agency that has 

temporary custody of the child or has placed the child in long-term foster care. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 11

{¶28} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B) authorizes the juvenile court to 

grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court 

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant 

permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply: (a) the child is not 

abandoned or orphaned, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents 

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents; (b) the child is 

abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are able 

to take permanent custody; or (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or 

more public children services agencies or private child placement agencies for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 

1999. 

{¶29} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing, 

R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, 

but not limited to, the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with 

the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any 

other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as 

expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard 

for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; and (4) the child's need 

for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be 

achieved without a grant of permanent custody. 

{¶30} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial 

court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial 

court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 12

2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding 

the best interest of the child. 

{¶31} If the child is not abandoned or orphaned, the focus turns to whether the 

child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not 

be placed with the parents. Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all 

relevant evidence before making this determination. The trial court is required to enter 

such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the 

factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the 

child's parents. 

{¶32} Parents argue the trial court's decision to terminate their parental rights and 

grant permanent custody of their child to RCCS was based solely on their limited cognitive 

abilities, which the Ohio Supreme Court prohibited in In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007–

Ohio–1105. 

{¶33} It is well established that a parent has a fundamental right to raise and care 

for his or her child. In re C .F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007–Ohio–1104, ¶ 28; In re K.H., 119 

Ohio St.3d 538, 2008–Ohio–4825, ¶ 40. However, that right is not absolute. In re K.H. at 

¶ 40. Government children's services agencies have broad authority to intervene when 

necessary for a child's welfare. In re C.F. at ¶ 28. “All children have the right, if possible, 

to parenting from either natural or adoptive parents which provides support, care, 

discipline, protection and motivation.” In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 2013–

Ohio–1704, ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock (1996), 120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102. When 

parental rights are terminated, the goal is to create “a more stable life” for dependent 

children and to “facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.” In re N.B., 8th Dist. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 13

Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015–Ohio–314, ¶ 67, citing In re Howard (Aug. 1, 1986), 5th 

Dist. Tuscarawas No. 85 A10–077, (Aug. 1, 1986). We recognize, however, that 

termination of parental rights is “the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal 

case.” In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002–Ohio–5368, ¶ 14 

{¶34} In addressing this issue, the Ohio Supreme Court in In re D.A., supra, held, 

“when determining the best interest of a child under R.C. 2151.414(D) at a permanentcustody hearing, a trial court may not base its decision solely on the limited cognitive 

abilities of the parents.” Id. at para 36. The High Court reasoned: 

 The trial court stated that D.A.'s future could be ‘seriously 

jeopardized’ if he remained with his parents. But there was no evidence that 

they have harmed D.A. either physically, emotionally, or mentally. D.A. has 

done well in school, and his behavior is appropriate. At this point, it is 

speculation to say that he may not reach his full potential if he remains with 

his parents. * * * 

 We do not mean to minimize the trial court's concern about 

appellants' ability to parent their son. R.C. 2151.414, however, does not 

permit a parent's fundamental right to raise his or her child to be terminated 

based on mental retardation alone. In other cases in which the parental 

rights of mentally retarded persons have been terminated pursuant to R.C. 

2151.414(E)(1) or (2), objective evidence existed to show that the statute 

was satisfied. See, e.g., In re C.E., Butler App. Nos. CA2006–01–015 and 

CA2006–02–024, 2006–Ohio–4827, 2006 WL 2663464 (the mother needed 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 14

constant supervision and prompting to meet child's basic needs and had 

inadequate housing); In re King, Fairfield App. No. 05 CA 77, 2006–Ohio–

781, 2006 WL 401598 (the mother consistently relied on others to meet 

many of her basic needs and lost her housing). Id. at ¶ 36–37. 

{¶35} In the present case, the trial court did not rely solely on Parents' cognitive 

abilities in granting permanent custody to RCCS. Rather, the evidence in this case 

illustrates a link between Parents’ limited cognitive abilities and their abilities to remedy 

the problems identified by RCCS and to provide an adequate permanent home for the 

child. The evidence established Parents failed to regularly attend medical appointments 

for a child with extensive medical issues and failed to maintain a clean and appropriate 

home. They either did not comprehend the importance of their involvement in the child’s 

medical care, or simply lacked motivation to be involved. Father did not have his own 

source of income either through employment or through social security disability income. 

In addition, the evidence revealed the child is bonded with the foster family with whom 

she has lived since her birth. 

{¶36} Assuming, arguendo, the trial court based its decision solely on Parents’ 

limited cognitive abilities, we find such error does not require reversal of the permanent 

custody determination under the two-issue rule. The trial court found an alternate, 

independent ground for terminating parental rights, i.e., the child had been in the 

temporary custody of RCCS for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two 

month period. 

{¶37} Father’s second, third, and fifth assignment of error are overruled. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 15

{¶38} Mother’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. 

FATHER 

17 CA 11 

IV 

{¶39} In his fourth assignment of error, Father contends the trial court erred in 

granting permanent custody to RCCS as the Agency failed to use reasonable efforts to 

reunite the child with him. 

{¶40} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.419, the agency which removed the child from the 

home must have made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the 

child's home, eliminate the continued removal of the child from the home, or make it 

possible for the child to return home safely. The statute assigns the burden of proof to the 

agency to demonstrate it has made reasonable efforts. 

{¶41} RCCS implemented a comprehensive reunification plan to assist Father in 

remedying the problems which caused the child to be removed. 

{¶42} When a trial court is considering whether the agency made reasonable 

efforts to prevent the removal, the issue is not whether the agency could have done more, 

but whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard under the statute. In re 

Brewer (Feb. 12, 1996), Belmont App. No. 94–B–28, 1996 WL 65939, at 3; In re 

Davidson–Rush, 5th Dist. No.2006 CA 00121, 2006–Ohio–4873 at ¶ 50. “In determining 

whether reasonable efforts were made, the child's health and safety shall be paramount.” 

R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 16

{¶43} We have reviewed the record, and find substantial evidence to establish 

Father did not make significant progress toward alleviating RCCS's core concerns for the 

child despite the Agency’s reasonable efforts to reunify the family. 

{¶44} Father’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶45} The judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile 

Division, is affirmed. 

By: Hoffman, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Baldwin, J. concur 

 

 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA11, 17CA12 17