United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 2, 2018

Decided July 9, 2019

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18-1334

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HECTOR MEADOWS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Indianapolis Division.

No. 16-cr-00099-JMS-DML

Jane E. Magnus-Stinson,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

As a result of two Florida convictions from 1995 for attempted sexual battery, 

Hector Meadows had to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration

and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20913. It is a federal crime for anyone under a 

registration obligation to travel interstate and fail to register or update a registration.

18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Meadows moved to Indiana in 2015, failed to register, and was 

charged with violating this law. After the district court denied his motion to dismiss the 

indictment (in which he argued that the law did not apply to him), Meadows pleaded 

guilty and waived his right to appeal all issues except the denial of his motion to 

dismiss. The district court later denied Meadows’s oral motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea and his motion for new counsel. Meadows has appealed, but his appointed 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18-1334 Page 2

appellate counsel argues that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Meadows opposes counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). 

We deferred decision in this case while the Supreme Court considered Gundy 

v. United States, 17–6086, which presented the question whether the Act violates the 

nondelegation doctrine. The Court’s decision, issued on June 20, holds that the Act, 

which directs the Attorney General to oversee the application of registration obligations 

to pre-Act offenders, does not violate the doctrine. This eliminates any appellate 

contention related to the nondelegation doctrine. We thus limit the remainder of our 

review to the subjects that counsel has discussed and the issues that Meadows believes 

have merit. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

Although counsel asserts that she “has consulted with Mr. Meadows regarding 

his intention on the appeal of this case,” she has not said whether Meadows wants his 

guilty plea (and thus appeal waiver) set aside on appeal. She should have. 

See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 

287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). But the omission is harmless because the transcript 

of the plea colloquy shows that the district judge complied with the requirements of 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, rendering pointless a challenge to the guilty 

plea and appeal waiver. See Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349; United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 

686, 688 (7th Cir. 2003). The judge properly informed Meadows of the nature of the 

charge, the statutory maximum penalties, the trial rights that he was giving up, the role 

of the sentencing guidelines, and the consequences of his appeal waiver. FED. R. CRIM. P.

11(b)(1). She also properly determined that the plea was voluntary, FED. R. CRIM. P.

11(b)(2), and that it had a factual basis, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3). 

The sole issue preserved by the plea agreement is whether the district court erred 

when it denied Meadows’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Counsel considers two 

arguments. First, she asks whether Meadows was relieved of his federal registration 

obligation if he was not required to register under Indiana law. She observes that the 

Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that Indiana’s registration requirement does not 

apply retroactively and therefore might not apply to Meadows. But counsel rightly

concludes that an appellate challenge to his indictment on this ground would be 

frivolous. The federal law on which his indictment is based “imposes a federal 

obligation on all sex offenders to register in each jurisdiction where he resides, works, 

and goes to school.” United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 2011), abrogated on

other grounds by Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016). Under the Supremacy 

Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, Indiana’s registration requirements, even if less 

stringent than the federal counterpart, cannot relieve Meadows of his federal obligation. 
No. 18-1334 Page 3

See Leach, 639 F.3d at 772. Indiana courts have themselves recognized that federal law 

may require registration even if Indiana law does not. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 

978 N.E.2d 494, 502–03 (Ind. App. 2012). It would be frivolous to argue that limits on 

Indiana’s registration requirements limit federal registration obligations.

Second, counsel considers and rejects the argument that the federal registration 

obligation is unconstitutional retroactive punishment. See Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. 

CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The obligation to register is a civil burden, not additional 

punishment for the underlying sex offense, Leach, 639 F.3d at 773 (citing Smith v. Doe, 

538 U.S. 84 (2003)). And a violation of the registration obligation is a new criminal

offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), not a retroactive one, Leach, 639 F.3d at 772–73, because the 

criminal statute targets only an offender’s current conduct—his failure to register. 

Meadows failed to register in 2015, long after the registration requirement became law. 

Thus a constitutional challenge based on retroactivity would be frivolous.

We conclude by addressing Meadows’s Rule 51(b) response, in which he raises 

three arguments. He first argues that his 1995 convictions were not sufficient to trigger 

an obligation to register under the Act. But Meadows pleaded guilty, conceding in his

plea agreement each element of the crime of failing to register, and waived his right to 

appeal this question. Second, he argues that he attempted to register in Indiana (but 

was presumably turned away). Meadows does not point to evidence of this in the 

record, but even if he did, it would be evidence only of a defense to the crime charged, 

and by pleading guilty Meadows waived that defense. Finally, Meadows complains 

about his representation before the district court. But claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are best heard on collateral review. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05

(2003).

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.