* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge, Un ited States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designat ion.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/22/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BOBBY DANDERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-5237 (D.C. No. 94-C-423-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO, BRIGHT, ** and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral-2-

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Bobby Danderson alleges disability due to back and leg pain. His application for supplemental security income benefi ts was denied initially by the Social Security Administration and on review before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The Appeals Council remanded the ALJ’s firs t decision for reconsideration. Upon reconsideration, the ALJ aga in determined Mr. Danderson to be not disabled, a decision left undisturbed by the Appeals Council. Mr. Danderson then sought review in the federal distric t court where the administrative actions were upheld. Mr. Danderson appeals from the district court’s adverse ruling. We exercise jurisdiction u nder 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and affirm. Mr. Danderson injured his back while working as a p lumber, and eventually had back surgery to remove a ruptured disc. Althou gh he improved initially, Mr. Danderson began experiencing more back pain approxi mately six weeks after the surgery. It was later determined that Mr. Danderso n had a further ruptured disc. Mr. Danderson was treated conservatively the secondtime, with heat, bed rest, prescription medications, and steroid injections. Mr. Danderson did not have additional surgery nor was a surgical procedure eve r recommended for him. At-3-

the time of the second administrative hearing in Au gust 1993, he had not seen a doctor for treatment since June 1991 and was taking no medication of any sort. Mr. Danderson lodges three basic objections to the decision of the ALJ: improper treatment of the medical evidence; error i n finding Mr. Danderson to have transferrable skills; and improper use of the grids. With respect to the medical evidence, Mr. Danderson argues that the ALJ relied on a 1992 consultative exam to determine that he is not disab led. This is correct. The ALJ did rely on the 1992 consultative exam; but he also relied on all of the other medical evidence in the record, including the fact that other doctors had determined Mr. Danderson to be capable of light work, and that no doctor had limited his ability to walk, stand, or sit. The me dical evidence of a possible second ruptured disc is unaccompanied by any relate d functional limitation. By August of 1992, the consultative physician could fi nd no upper or lower extremity movement restrictions and “no restriction in the mo vement of the cervical dorsal and lumbar spine of any significant degree.” App. Vol. II at 249. Further, this exam revealed negative straight leg raising bilater ally and “no neurological changes of the upper or lower extremities.” Id. Mr. Danderson objects to the ALJ’s characterizationof two doctors’ reports as misleading and insufficient to support a conclus ion that he can do light work. Dr. Voelkers, the back surgeon, in a letter dated t hree months after Mr.1 Dr. Rahimifar’s notation that Mr. Danderson “has be en released to a light

duty job, but he has some difficulty doing that,” App. Vol. II at 237, is properly seen as part of patient’s reported history, and notDr. Rahimifar’s medical conclusion. -4- Danderson’s surgery, noted that “Mr. Danderson has been released to return to light duty at this time, as a letter from his emplo yer states that he can be assigned basically bench work with light-weight material.” Id. at 199. Mr. Danderson argues that this is not a conclusion that he can do light work, because most bench work is sedentary. While a strictly sedentary job may not be appropriate for Mr. Danderson because of his need to change positions, the reference to bench work by Dr. Voelkers does not rule out an ability to do light work. Dr. Voelkers’ release allowing light duty with light-weight mater ials clearly refers to lifting and weight bearing restrictions. The postural restrict ions attendant with light work were taken into account when the ALJ solicited evid ence that significant numbers of light jobs permitting alternate sitting and stan ding exist. This evidence, coupled with substantial evidence in the record that plaintiff can lift up to twentyfive pounds and has never been restricted by any physician in his ability to stand, walk or sit, is substantial evidence of Mr. Danders on’s ability to do light work. 1
The ALJ did not overlook Mr. Danderson’s failed att empt to do light work. The ALJ specifically noted the discrepancy between Mr. Danderson’s testimony that he worked only two to three weeks after surgery and the medical notation by-5-

the surgeon on April 1, 1991, some four months afte r surgery, that Mr. Danderson was “working full time in a light-duty capacity, an d he tells me that he is getting along fairly well.” Id. at 198. Mr. Danderson’s failed attempt to do ligh t work is not conclusive evidence that he was disabled for a continuous twelve months during the relevant period. Contrary to Mr. Danderson’s argument, the ALJ prope rly analyzed his paincaused limitations and took pain into account in ar riving at an appropriate residual functional capacity assessment for claiman t. The balance of Mr. Danderson’s arguments relative to the medical evide nce essentially ask us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appea l. See Decker v. Chater , 86 F.3d 953, 954 (10th Cir. 1996). Mr. Danderson’s arguments regarding the transferabi lity of his skills and the ALJ’s reliance on the guidelines were ably addr essed and disposed of by the magistrate judge. The judgment of the United State s District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge