SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0226-22 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

JEAN BIEN-AIME-NICOLAS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

__________________________

Submitted March 5, 2024 – Decided March 18, 2024 

Before Judges Rose and Perez Friscia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 15-05-0952.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief). 

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Hannah Faye Kurt, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0226-22

Defendant Jean Bien-Aime-Nicolas appeals from the June 28, 2022 Law 

Division order, which denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) 

without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant contends a remand for an evidentiary 

hearing is mandated because he made a prima facie showing of ineffective 

assistance of counsel (IAC) by demonstrating plea counsel incorrectly advised 

him of deportation consequences and PCR counsel failed to present his selfrepresented motion to withdraw his plea. We reverse and remand for an 

evidentiary hearing. 

I.

Defendant, a non-citizen, was born in France and began residing in the 

United States in 2007. After defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing 

a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), and was sentenced in 2017, he was deported. 

Defendant has two children residing in the United States. 

On May 5, 2015, defendant was charged in an Essex County grand jury 

indictment with: first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) (count one); 

second-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b) (count two); second-degree 

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count 

three); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count four); fourth-degree possession of a prohibited 
3 A-0226-22

weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d) (count five); third-degree terroristic threats, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b) (count six); third-degree endangering the welfare of 

children, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (count seven); and third-degree resisting arrest, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a) (count eight). 

Defendant entered a negotiated plea agreement. On June 2, 2017, 

defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun 

after completing plea forms with plea counsel. In response to question 

seventeen, defendant indicated he was not a United States citizen. He also 

indicated he understood that his "guilty plea may result in [his] removal from 

the United States" and he had the "right to seek individualized advice from an 

attorney." Defendant, however, did not answer question seventeen's remaining 

sub-parts regarding potential immigration consequences. Specifically, he failed 

to respond to whether he had "discussed . . . the potential immigration 

consequences" of his plea with an attorney, and "[w]ould like the opportunity to 

do so." Additionally, he failed to answer whether he "still wish[ed] to plead 

guilty" after being advised of the possible immigration consequences. 

During the plea hearing, the judge comprehensively asked several 

questions confirming that defendant understood the possibility of deportation, 

had discussed deportation consequences with counsel, and still wished to plead 
4 A-0226-22

guilty though deportation was likely. Defendant responded in the affirmative to 

the judge's specific question, "without knowing for sure, let us assume that you 

will be deported, do you still wish to plead guilty?" The following exchange 

occurred regarding defendant's citizenship status and deportation: 

THE COURT: Having been advised of the possible 

immigration consequences resulting from your guilty

plea, do you still wish to plead guilty? 

DEFENDANT: Yes. 

. . . . 

THE COURT: [Plea counsel], are you satisfied the plea 

should be entered and it's entirely voluntary on your 

client's behalf? 

PLEA COUNSEL: Yes, Judge. I would just like to 

add, for purposes if the matter is ever revisited in the 

immigration context, that I have been in contact for 

some time, repeated contact, with the immigration 

attorney, with the Office of the Public Defender in our 

Camden office, who has indicated that the plea here

today to the second-degree possession of a gun and 

possession of a gun only is not a crime of moral 

turpitude and is not an aggravated felony. . . . What I'm 

placing on the record now is what I have been advised 

and what I have advised my client . . . it is not a

mandatory deportation event. However, should 

[defendant] leave the country, in all probability, if not 

certainty, he will be barred from re-entry. And should 

he wish to apply for U[nited] S[tates] citizenship, he 

will have to wait at least five years to re-establish good 

conduct. 
5 A-0226-22

PLEA COUNSEL: [Defendant], is that accurate? Is 

that what you and I have discussed? 

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

. . . . 

PLEA COUNSEL: Judge, before we close the record, 

and, again, relative to any immigration consequences, I 

was advised that the original plea tendered to 

[defendant] was a five-year maximum with a forty-twomonth minimum. That five-year top number would, in

fact, trigger immigration consequences. . . . [A]fter 

speaking to Mr. Imhoff over lunch today, the forty-twomonth maximum with a forty-two-month minimum 

should avoid that problem. 

[(Emphasis added).]

Further, after confirming his ability to read and write English, defendant 

acknowledged reviewing and answering the plea forms. The judge did not 

address defendant's failure to respond to all the plea form deportation questions. 

On July 17, 2017, pursuant to the plea agreement, the judge sentenced 

defendant to a forty-two-month term of imprisonment with a forty-two-month 

period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), 

and dismissed the remaining counts. At sentencing, the judge noted defendant 

had an "[Immigration and Customs Enforcement] detainer" and stated, 

"presumably, when his sentence is through here, he will be deported." 
6 A-0226-22

Defendant contends he filed a self-represented PCR petition, an 

accompanying brief, and a motion to withdraw his plea. He also filed multiple 

certifications and amendments dated between December 2020 and January 2021. 

It is unclear whether all the documents provided on appeal were submitted to 

the judge. Defendant maintains he was unaware he was subject "to mandatory 

deportation" and not informed of "the immigration consequences of" his guilty 

plea. In a supplemental certification, defendant asserted plea counsel "assured" 

him he "would not be deported" and that "there was no chance or risk of any 

deportation." He further averred "he would never have accepted the plea deal" 

if he knew deportation were possible. PCR counsel filed a supplemental PCR 

brief, incorporating defendant's self-represented arguments. In pertinent part, 

PCR counsel argued: plea counsel provided ineffective assistance because 

defendant was not advised he was subject to mandatory deportation; and genuine 

issues of material fact required a hearing. 

On June 28, 2022, after argument, the PCR judge rendered an oral decision 

and memorializing order denying defendant's PCR petition. The judge found 

plea counsel "alert[ed] . . . defendant of the deportation risk associated with the 

plea." The judge concluded "the totality of circumstances" indicated "defendant 

was not misle[d] by [plea] counsel." He reasoned that counsel "had inquired of 
7 A-0226-22

immigration counsel" regarding "what the plea would mean in terms of the

prospect or possibility of deportation," defendant "was made aware of that 

possibility," and defendant nonetheless "decided he wanted a plea deal . . . even 

assuming it meant deportation for him." The judge did not address defendant's 

self-represented motion to withdraw his plea. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following points: 

POINT ONE 

[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT 

[PLEA] COUNSEL RENDERED [IAC] BY FAILING 

TO INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION 

CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA. 

POINT TWO 

[DEFENDANT]'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 

PLEA MUST BE REMANDED FOR A NEW PCR 

COUNSEL OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FINDINGS 

OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY A PCR 

COURT. 

II. 

In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, we review de novo the factual 

inferences drawn from the record by the PCR judge as well as the judge's legal 

conclusions. State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338-39 (App. Div. 2020). 

"We are not bound by, and owe no deference to, the trial court's legal 
8 A-0226-22

conclusions." State v. Alvarez, 473 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div. 2022) 

(citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415 (2004)). A petitioner must establish 

entitlement "to PCR by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. O'Donnell, 

435 N.J. Super. 351, 370 (App. Div. 2014). 

To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the 

test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), as adopted 

by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). "First, the 

defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient." Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687. This requires demonstrating that "counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment." Ibid. The United States Constitution requires "reasonably

effective assistance." Ibid. An attorney's performance will not be deemed 

deficient if counsel acted "within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases." Ibid. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 

759, 771 (1970)). Therefore, "[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the 

ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-

88. A petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing by simply 

raising a PCR claim. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 
9 A-0226-22

1999). When assessing the first Strickland prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of 

counsel's performance must be highly deferential," and "every effort [must] be 

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." 466 U.S. at 689. 

Under the second prong, "the defendant must show that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. This means "counsel's errors 

were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show the errors "had some 

conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693. 

In the context of a PCR petition challenging a guilty plea based on an IAC 

claim, the second prong is established when the defendant demonstrates a 

"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not 

have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Nuñez 

Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)). However, a defendant also must show "a 

decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 

circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010). 

Our Supreme Court, in State v. Gaitan, addressed deportation advice of 

counsel, establishing that "an attorney must tell a client when removal is 

mandatory when consequences are certain." 209 N.J. 339, 380-81 (2012). 
10 A-0226-22

Defendants can establish IAC if their attorney provided false or inaccurate 

advice that the plea would not result in deportation. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. at 

141-42. The United States Supreme Court has clarified that counsel's duty is 

not limited to avoiding false or misleading information, but also includes an 

affirmative duty to inform a defendant entering a guilty plea of the relevant law 

pertaining to mandatory deportation. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 

369 (2010). When deportation is a clear consequence of a guilty plea, the 

defendant's counsel has an affirmative duty to address the subject and give 

correct advice. See id. at 369. Conversely,"[w]hen the law is not succinct and 

straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a 

noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 

immigration consequences." State v. Chau, 473 N.J. Super. 430, 443-44 (App. 

Div. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369). Counsel's 

"failure to advise a noncitizen client that a guilty plea will lead to mandatory 

deportation deprives the client of the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed 

by the Sixth Amendment." State v. Barros, 425 N.J. Super. 329, 331 (App. Div. 

2012) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369).
11 A-0226-22

A.

Defendant argues the PCR judge erred in failing to hold an evidentiary 

hearing because he demonstrated a prima facie showing that he would not have 

pleaded guilty, and would have gone to trial, had he known his deportation was 

mandatory. We agree. The judge denied the petition without an evidentiary 

hearing, finding that defendant was aware of the deportation consequences of 

his plea; however, the plea forms and colloquy indicate otherwise. 

Relevantly, when defendant pleaded guilty, section 237(a) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a), provided that an 

alien "shall . . . be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following 

classes," including "[c]ertain firearm offenses." Section 237(a)(2)(C) of the 

INA stated: 

Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted 

under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, 

exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or 

of attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for 

sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, any 

weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or 

destructive device (as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 921(a)]) 

in violation of any law is deportable. 

[8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).]

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A) defines a firearm as "any weapon (including a starter 

gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a 
12 A-0226-22

projectile by the action of an explosive." Thus, defendant's conviction for 

possession of a handgun without a permit mandated deportation under the INA. 

It is undisputed defendant's agreement to plead guilty contemplated 

potential deportation consequences resulting from his conviction. In negotiating 

the plea agreement with the State, defendant's plea counsel asked immigration 

counsel regarding mandatory deportation for a possession of a handgun 

conviction with a forty-two-month term of imprisonment sentence. During the

plea colloquy, plea counsel clarified that "relative to any immigration 

consequences, [he] was advised that . . . the forty-two-month maximum with a 

forty-two-month minimum should avoid" deportation. On the record, plea 

counsel asserted that he explained to defendant the handgun conviction was "not 

a mandatory deportation event." Plea counsel's basis for advising defendant that 

the conviction was not a mandatory deportation class offense under the INA was 

based on his consultation with an immigration attorney. There is no further 

information in the record indicating plea counsel's reasons for concluding that 

defendant's sentencing term in a third-degree range would avoid mandatory 

deportation. 

We further observe at the plea hearing, the judge did not address 

defendant's failure to respond to the plea form questions regarding whether he 
13 A-0226-22

had previously discussed with plea counsel the potential immigration 

consequences and whether he wanted to pursue "the right to seek individualized 

legal advice" on immigration issues. Nor is there any indication in the record 

that defendant was afforded an opportunity to speak with the immigration 

attorney referenced by his attorney during the plea hearing. For these reasons, 

we part ways with the PCR judge's finding that the record demonstrates 

defendant "was not misled to believe that he would[] [not] be deported." 

We conclude defendant has sufficiently established a prima facie showing 

that plea counsel misinformed defendant regarding the immigration 

consequences of his guilty plea. When the deportation consequence after a 

conviction is clear, "an attorney must tell a client when removal is mandatory." 

See Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 380. It is clear an evidentiary hearing is warranted when, 

as here, "[w]e cannot discern from [the] record whether . . . plea counsel could 

have easily determined with 'only very basic legal research' that these plea[]

would render defendant deportable." See Chau, 473 N.J. Super. at 446-47. 

Defendant demonstrated material issues of fact regarding the reasonable 

probability that but for plea counsel's alleged IAC as to the immigration 

consequences, he would have gone to trial and not pleaded guilty. See R. 3:22-

10(b) (noting entitlement to an evidentiary hearing requires "a prima facie case 
14 A-0226-22

in support of [PCR], [and] . . . material issues of disputed fact that cannot be 

resolved by reference to the existing record"). "Because plea counsel's 

understanding of the law and h[is] advice to defendant . . . about the [mandatory] 

immigration consequences of his plea lie outside the record, . . . an evidentiary 

hearing is" required to address defendant's assertions of IAC and any resulting 

prejudice. Chau, 473 N.J. Super. at 446-47. 

B.

We briefly address defendant's arguments that a remand is mandated 

because PCR counsel failed to present defendant's self-represented motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, thereby requiring appointment of a new PCR counsel, 

and the PCR judge failed to address the motion. 

In New Jersey, the right to the effective assistance of counsel extends to 

PCR counsel. See State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 18-19 (2002). PCR counsel "should 

advance all of the legitimate arguments requested by the defendant that the 

record will support." R. 3:22-6(d). Thus, "PCR counsel must communicate with 

the client, investigate the claims urged by the client, and determine whether 

there are additional claims that should be brought forward." State v. Webster, 

187 N.J. 254, 257 (2006). However, PCR counsel is not required to bolster 

claims raised by a defendant that are without foundation. Ibid. 
15 A-0226-22

In the present matter, defendant limits his contentions to the adequacy of 

the factual basis for his guilty plea. We recognize the PCR judge did not address 

defendant's contentions. See R. 3:22-11 (requiring the court to "state separately 

its findings of fact and conclusions of law" in its disposition of a PCR petition). 

However, it is unclear from the record provided on appeal that defendant filed 

the motion for the judge's consideration. The remand hearing, therefore, should 

also encompass defendant's motion. PCR counsel should ensure defendant's 

multiple petitions and certifications are provided to the judge. However, we 

discern no reason for appointment of new PCR counsel. 

In summary, the matter is remanded for an evidentiary hearing on 

defendant's IAC claims and consideration of his self-represented motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, limited solely to the adequacy of the factual basis 

underscoring his guilty plea. We express no view on the merits of any of 

defendant's contentions. 

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.