UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4196

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

COREY FLEAMON TOWNSEND,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00147-WO-1)

Submitted: October 27, 2011 Decided: November 14, 2011

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr., 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Corey Fleamon 

Townsend pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after having 

previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of 

imprisonment exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006). The district court found Townsend 

qualified for sentencing pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal 

Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and sentenced him to 225 

months’ imprisonment. Counsel for Townsend has filed this 

appeal pursuant Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

averring that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, but 

asking this court to review the armed career criminal 

designation. In his pro se supplemental brief, Townsend asserts 

that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective 

representation. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Although counsel raises the issue of whether Townsend 

was properly designated an armed career criminal, he concludes 

the district court committed no error in this regard. We agree. 

This court “review[s] de novo whether a defendant’s previous 

conviction was for a predicate offense under the ACCA.” United 

States v. Harcum, 587 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2009). Under 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e), if a defendant violates § 922(g) after 

sustaining three prior convictions for violent felonies or 

serious drug offenses, the statutory mandatory minimum term of 
3

imprisonment is fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A 

violent felony is defined as a crime, punishable by a term 

exceeding one year of imprisonment, that (a) “has as an element 

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against” another person; or (b) is burglary, arson, or 

extortion; involves explosives; “or otherwise involves conduct 

that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 

the district court properly determined that Townsend’s three 

prior North Carolina convictions for felony breaking and 

entering, felony assault with a deadly weapon with intent to 

kill inflicting serious injury, and felony robbery with a 

dangerous weapon, qualified as ACCA predicates. Furthermore, 

there is no temporal restriction on prior felony offenses for 

purposes of the ACCA. See United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 

69-70 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4 

cmt. n.1 (2010). Thus, the fact that the felony breaking and 

entering conviction was more than fifteen years old at the time 

of Townsend’s sentencing is of no legal significance. 

In his pro se supplemental brief, Townsend asserts his 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

obtain the state court records relevant to his prior 

convictions. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
4

not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record conclusively 

establishes that counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Townsend’s claim is not ripe for review because the record 

contains no conclusive evidence that counsel was ineffective.

In accordance with the requirements of Anders, we have 

examined the entire record for any meritorious issues and found 

none. The district court complied with the mandates of Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Townsend’s guilty 

plea, and the within-Guidelines sentence the court imposed was 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that 

counsel inform Townsend, in writing, of the right to petition 

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 

Townsend requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on 

Townsend. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED