2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-7-2010

Feesers Inc v. Michael Foods Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 09-2548

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1

PRECEDENTIAL

 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

Nos. 09-2548, 09-2952, 09-2993

 

Feesers, Inc.,

 Appellant in No. 09-2993

v.

Michael Foods, Inc.; Sodexho, Inc.,

Appellants in Nos. 09-2548 and 09-2952

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 04-cv-00576

District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

 

Argued October 29, 2009

Before: SMITH, FISHER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
2

(Filed: January 7, 2010)

Lisa M. Card, Esq.

John F. Collins, Esq.

Jeffrey L. Kessler, Esq. (Argued)

George E. Mastoris, Esq.

Eamon O’Kelly, Esq.

Susannah P. Torpey, Esq.

DEWEY & LEBOEUF

1301 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019-0000

Steven M. Williams, Esq.

COHEN, SEGLIAS, PALLAS, GREENHALL & FURMAN

240 North Third Street

7th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17101-0000

Counsel for Feesers, Inc.

James S. Ballenger, Esq.

Jennifer L. Giordano, Esq.

Maureen E. Mahoney, Esq.

Eric J. McCarthy, Esq.

Margaret M. Zwisler, Esq.

LATHAM & WATKINS

555 11th Street, N.W.

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004-0000
3

David A. Applebaum, Esq.

Robert L. DeMay, Esq.

David G. Parry, Esq.

LEONARD, STREET & DEINARD

150 South Fifth Street

Suite 2300

Minneapolis, MN 02300-0000

Roy T. Englert, Jr., Esq. (Argued)

ROBBINS, RUSSELL, ENGLERT, ORSECK & UNTEREINER

1801 K Street, N.W.

Suite 411

Washington, DC 20006-0000

Bridget E. Montgomery, Esq.

ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN & MELLOTT

213 Market Street

8th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17101-0000

Alfred C. Pfeiffer, Esq.

LATHAM & WATKINS

505 Montgomery Street

Suite 1900

San Francisco, CA 94111-0000

Counsel for Michael Foods, Inc.

Scott P. Fink, Esq.

Jennifer B. Furey, Esq.

Martin F. Gaynor, III, Esq.

COOLEY, MANION & JONES

21 Custom House Street

Boston, MA 02110-0000
4

Thomas Demitrack, Esq.

JONES DAY

901 Lakeside Avenue

North Point

Cleveland, OH 44114-0000

Hashim M. Mooppan, Esq.

Glen D. Nager, Esq. (Argued)

JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20001-0000

Matthew M. Haar, Esq.

SAUL EWING

Two North Second Street

Penn National Insurance Tower, 7th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17101-0000

Counsel for Sodexho, Inc.

 

OPINION

 

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

This appeal by Feesers, Inc. (“Feesers”), a food distributor,

arises out of a Robinson-Patman Act claim for unlawful price

discrimination, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (the “RPA”), against Michael Foods,
 Sodexho, Inc. changed its name to Sodexo, Inc. during 1

the course of this litigation. We will refer to the company by its

new name.

 Section 2(a) of the RPA, in relevant part, states that: 2

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in

commerce, in the course of such commerce, either

directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price

between different purchasers of commodities of

like grade and quality, where either or any of the

purchases involved in such discrimination are in

commerce, where such commodities are sold for

use, consumption, or resale within the United

States or any Territory thereof or the District of

Columbia or any insular possession or other place

under the jurisdiction of the United States, and

where the effect of such discrimination may be

substantially to lessen competition or tend to

create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to

5

Inc. (“Michaels”), a food manufacturer, and Sodexo, Inc. (“Sodexo”),1

a food service management company. Feesers claims that Sodexo was

able to purchase egg and potato products from Michaels at a

discounted price that was unavailable to Feesers. Following a bench

trial, the District Court entered judgment for Feesers. We will vacate

that judgment and instruct the District Court to enter judgment as a

matter of law for Michaels and Sodexo. Feesers and Sodexo were not

competing purchasers, and, therefore, Feesers cannot satisfy the

competitive injury requirement of a prima facie case of price

discrimination under § 2(a) of the RPA. In doing so, 2
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any

person who either grants or knowingly receives

the benefit of such discrimination, or with

customers of either of them: Provided, That

nothing herein contained shall prevent

differentials which make only due allowance for

differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or

delivery resulting from the differing methods or

quantities in which such commodities are to such

purchasers sold or delivered[.] . . . . And provided

further, That nothing herein contained shall

prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares,

or merchandise in commerce from selecting their

own customers in bona fide transactions and not

in restraint of trade: And provided further, That

nothing herein contained shall prevent price

changes from time to time where in response to

changing conditions affecting the market for or

the marketability of the goods concerned, such as

but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration

of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal

goods, distress sales under court process, or sales

in good faith in discontinuance of business in the

goods concerned.

15 U.S.C. § 13(a).

6

we hold that, in a secondary-line price discrimination case, parties

competing in a bid market cannot be competing purchasers where the

competition for sales to prospective customers occurs before the sale

of the product for which the RPA violation is alleged. 
 Three of the four requirements of a § 2(a) Robinson- 3

Patman claim have already been established by Feesers and are

not contested in this appeal. Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 208.

Feesers has shown “that sales were made to two different

purchasers[, Feesers and Sodexo,] in interstate commerce; that

the product sold was of the same grade and quality; and that

[Michaels] discriminated in price as between the two

purchasers.” Id. at 211. What remains for resolution by this

Court is the fourth requirement, a showing “that the

discrimination had a prohibited effect on competition.” Id. at

212. 

7

When reviewing a judgment entered after a bench trial, we

exercise “plenary review over [the] [D]istrict [C]ourt’s conclusions of

law” and its “choice and interpretation of legal precepts.” Am. Soc’y

for Testing & Materials v. Corrpro Cos., 478 F.3d 557, 566 (3d Cir.

2007) (internal quotations omitted). Findings of fact are reviewed for

clear error. Id. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over

this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we exercise appellate

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Michaels and Sodexo raise a host of issues in this appeal, but

in light of this Court’s decision in Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc.

v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008), and the Supreme

Court’s decision in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco

GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006), we need address only the issue of

whether Sodexo and Feesers were “competing purchasers” for

purposes of the RPA. Feesers, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., 498 F.3d

206, 213 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage,

460 U.S. 428, 435 (1983)).3
8

I.

The following facts were found by the District Court after a

bench trial. Feesers, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 414,

418 (M.D. Pa. 2009).

Structure of the Food Service Industry

The food service industry consists of a three-tier distribution

system: manufacturers sell products to distributors, who resell those

products to operators, including self-operators (“self-ops”) and food

service management companies. Id. at 420-21. Self-ops are

institutions that perform all dining services internally. Food service

management companies perform institutions’ dining services for a fee,

id., and primarily target schools, hospitals, and nursing homes.

Sometimes operators negotiate with manufacturers for discounted

prices, known as “deviated prices.” Id. at 432. In those instances, the

distributor purchases the product at list price from the manufacturer,

sells the product to the operator at the deviated price, and receives the

difference between the list price and the deviated price from the

manufacturer. Id. An operator may also seek discounts from

manufacturers by joining a Group Purchasing Organization (“GPO”).

A GPO is a collection of operators who negotiate food prices

collectively to achieve greater bargaining power against manufacturers

and distributors. Id. at 421. “GPOs generally bargain for a lower

price, but do not actually purchase the food for resale to institutions.”

Id.

The Parties in this Appeal
9

Michaels is a manufacturer of egg and potato products that sells

in bulk, nationwide. Id. It is the largest producer of liquid eggs in the

United States. Id. Feesers is a regional distributor that distributes

Michaels’s products, and others, to operators within a 200-mile radius

of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Id. Sodexo is a multinational food

service management company that serves institutions around the

world. Id. Its services include planning menus, ordering food,

preparing and serving meals, and overseeing labor issues. It is the

largest private purchaser of food in the world. Id. Sodexo owns

Entegra, a GPO. Id. at 427.

Michaels’s Pricing of Food Products

Michaels sells sixty percent of its products at deviated prices.

Id. at 432. It has offered deviated pricing to self-ops since the mid1990s and to food service management companies, like Sodexo, since

at least 1999. “[O]n average from 2000 until 2004, Feesers paid

$9.56, or 59% more than [Sodexo] for [Michaels’s] eleven top selling

products.” Id. at 434. This pricing difference was described as

“stunning” by Feesers’s expert witness. Id. The deviated pricing

Sodexo received from Michaels was not institution-specific, so Sodexo

could “use its low deviated price . . . to win new accounts and to keep

current customers.” Id. at 432.

Competition between Feesers and Sodexo

Feesers sells food to self-op institutions and food service
 The District Court found that Feesers sold only to self-op 4

institutions, Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 421-22. This

finding was clearly erroneous. The District Court’s own fact

finding describing Feesers’s business explains that Feesers

distributed food for Wood, a food service management

company. Compare id. (“Feesers only sells food to self-op

institutions[.]”), with id. at 421 n.3 (“Feesers was the primary

distributor for the Wood Company,” a food service management

company.).

 The Jewish Home of Greater Harrisburg and St. Mary’s 5

Catholic School both switched from Feesers to Sodexo.

Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 422. The Meadows switched

from Sodexo to Feesers. Id.

10

management companies. Id. at 421-22. Sodexo sells food in 4

conjunction with its food service management services. Id. at 422.

Institutional customers “regularly switch [between] self-op [and]

management,” and at least three institutions have switched between

Feesers and Sodexo. Id. Both companies regularly seek self-op 5

business. Id. Feesers tries to distribute for self-ops while Sodexo tries

to convert self-ops to food service management.

When a self-op switches to Sodexo, it relies on Sodexo to

handle all dining services functions, such as procurement and

distribution of food. Id. Sodexo itself is not a distributor, but it

decides which distributors its customers will use. Id. Thus, when an

institution switches from self-op to Sodexo, the incumbent distributor

who distributed for the self-op may be replaced. Id. Because Feesers

could be displaced by Sodexo’s chosen distributor if Sodexo wins a

self-op’s business, the two companies compete “when a customer

considers switching from self-op to food service management, or vice
 We regard this inferred fact as highly questionable, but 6

the finding does not rise to the level of clear error. In our view,

assuming that Sodexo replaced Feesers with another distributor,

Feesers’s competitor would be the other distributor, not Sodexo.

 Food service management companies compete with 7

each other through a formal RFP process to win institutions’

business. Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 428. The RFP

process is usually limited to food service management

companies. Id.

 The District Court also identified other evidence 8

showing competition between Feesers and Sodexo, including

Sodexo’s SEC filings, Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 422, and

its internal strategic documents, id. at 423. None of this

11

versa.” Id. at 430. Accordingly, Feesers and Sodexo “compete[d] for 6

the same portion of an institution’s food service budget.” Id. at 420.

Competition between Feesers and Sodexo occurred informally

prior to the request for proposal (“RFP”) process ordinarily required

by large institutions. Id. at 428. To grow its client base, Sodexo 7

identifies institutions that meet its client profile and then builds

relationships with those institutions. Id. at 428-29. During informal

contacts with a prospective institutional customer, Sodexo “gauges the

institution’s interest in management and determines whether there are

any particular problems to be solved.” Id. at 428. If the institution is

interested in management, it will then put out a RFP and Sodexo will

follow through in that process. Id. Aside from seeking new clients,

Sodexo also touts its access to discounted foods to its existing

customers that utilize it for preparation and ordering of food, but not

for distribution. Id. at 429. This is done, in part, to encourage those

customers to switch to Sodexo’s chosen distributor. Id.8
evidence stated that Sodexo regarded any distributor as a

competitor. Id. at 422-23 (noting that Sodexo’s SEC filings

identified lower overall costs of food service management as a

means of promoting itself over self operation); id. at 425

(“Sodex[o]’s strategic planning documents do not specifically

mention distributors as competitors[.]”).

 We reversed in a 2-1 decision. The dissent concluded 9

that Sodexo and Feesers were not in actual competition because

they “d[id] not sell the same products.” Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d

at 220 (Jordan, J., dissenting). In reaching that conclusion, the

dissent explained that Feesers “res[old] . . . unprepared foods to

itsinstitutional clients,” whereas Sodexo “prepare[d] meals, and

12

Procedural History

On March 17, 2004, Feesers sought a declaratory judgment

stating that (1) Michaels unlawfully discriminated in price under § 2(a)

of the RPA by selling egg and potato products to Sodexo at

significantly lower prices than it did to Feesers and (2) Sodexo

violated § 2(f) of the RPA by knowingly inducing those discriminatory

sales. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) and (f). Feesers also sought permanent

injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 26. On

May 4, 2006, the District Court granted summary judgment for the

defendants, concluding that Feesers had satisfied the first three

elements of a prima facie case of price discrimination, but not the

fourth element, competitive injury. “The District Court was concerned

that [Sodexo] and Feesers [we]re not at the same ‘functional level’ and

[we]re therefore not in ‘actual competition’ in the same market.”

Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 214. 

Feesers appealed and this Court reversed. We held that the 9
s[old] the prepared meals to individual customers.” Id. at 218.

(Jordan, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed, noting that “a

factfinder could conclude that Sodex[o] s[old] unprepared food

to its customers” because some of Sodexo’s agreements with

institutional clients did not charge for “‘prepared meals,’ but

rather for the cost of unprepared food and supplies, the cost of

labor, and a management fee.” Id. at 215.

The prior decision is explained in Section IV(A), infra.

10

13

District Court had applied the wrong standard in concluding that

Feesers and Sodexo were not in competition. Id. at 208. The panel

explained the proper standard and remanded the case to the District

Court for further proceedings.10

On remand, after a bench trial, the District Court entered

judgment for Feesers and enjoined Michaels from engaging in

unlawful price discrimination. Michaels then suspended all sales to

Feesers. In response, Feesers sought an order of contempt and a

permanent injunction forbidding Michaels from refusing to deal with

Feesers. On May 26, 2009, the District Court held Michaels in

contempt and enjoined it from refusing to “sell its products to Feesers

on the same terms as they are sold to [Sodexo], so long as Feesers

otherwise meets its standards as a customer.” Michaels and Sodexo

now appeal the District Court’s judgment and the permanent

injunction.

II.

“‘Competitive injury’ [under § 2(a) of the RPA] is established

. . . by proof of ‘a substantial price discrimination between competing

purchasers over time.’” Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 213 (quoting Falls
 Because Feesers cannot satisfy the first element 11

required to show competitive injury, we need not discuss

14

City Indus., 460 U.S. at 435) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

“Feesers does not need to prove that [Michaels’s] price discrimination

actually harmed competition, i.e., that the discriminatory pricing

caused Feesers to lose customers to Sodex[o]. Rather, Feesers need

prove only that (a) it competed with Sodex[o] to sell food and (b)

[that] there was price discrimination over time by [Michaels].”

Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 213 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in

original). 

To determine whether Feesers competed with Sodexo to sell

food, “the relevant question is whether [the] two companies ‘[we]re in

economic reality acting on the same distribution level.’” Id. at 214

(quoting Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 63 F.3d

1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1995)). Recognizing that the phrase “economic

reality” provides little guidance in how to approach the competition

inquiry, this Court, in the prior appeal in this case, explained that two

parties are in competition only where, after a “careful analysis of each

party’s customers,” we determine that the parties are “each directly

after the same dollar.” Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 214 (quoting M.C.

Mfg. Co. v. Tex. Foundries, Inc., 517 F.2d 1059, 1068 n.20 (5th Cir.

1975)). We refer to this dollar-for-dollar analysis as the competing

purchaser requirement. The Supreme Court’s guidance in Volvo

Trucks, 546 U.S. at 179-80, and this Court’s precedent in Toledo

Mack, 530 F.3d at 226-29, compel us to conclude that Feesers and

Sodexo were not competing purchasers. Thus, Feesers cannot satisfy

the first element required to show competitive injury, and its RPA

claims must fail as a matter of law.11
whether it experienced price discrimination over time.

15

A.

In application, the competing purchaser requirement will vary

based on the nature of the market and the timing of the competition.

In a bid market, if the competition between the favored and disfavored

purchaser occurs before the purchase of the goods from the seller, then

the disfavored purchaser cannot show that it and the favored purchaser

were competing purchasers. Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 178-79. This

rule prevents the application of the RPA to markets where the

“allegedly favored purchasers [bear] little resemblance to [the] large

independent department stores or chain operations” that the RPA was

intended to target, id. at 181, and helps “construe the [RPA]

‘consistently with the broader policies of the antitrust laws,’” id.

(quoting Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509

U.S. 209, 220 (1993)). 

In practice, the rule, like other restrictions on the reach of the

RPA, prevents the unprincipled application of the statute. Indeed,

because the RPA often has “anticompetitive” effects that “promote

rather than . . . prevent monopolistic pricing practices,” Small Business

and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings before the Special

Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the

House Select Committee on Small Business, 91st Cong. 146-47 (1969)

(testimony of Richard A. Posner), the Supreme Court, in seeking to

construe the statute consistently with the broader policies of the

antitrust laws, has repeatedly limited its reach by: 

• Expanding the means through which RPA defendants
 Accord Falls City Indus., 460 U.S. at 451-52 (vacating 12

judgment that defendant did not have a meeting competition

16

can attack the “competition” element of a prima facie

case of price discrimination, Texaco v. Hasbrouck, 496

U.S. 543, 561 (1990) (“A supplier need not satisfy the

rigorous requirements of the cost justification defense in

order to prove that a particular functional discount is

reasonable and accordingly did not cause any substantial

lessening of competition between a wholesaler’s

customers and the supplier’s direct customers.”)

(footnote omitted);

• Focusing the competition inquiry on “interbrand

competition,” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 180;

• Explaining that the RPA does not “ban all price

differences charged to different purchasers of

commodities of like grade and quality,” id. at 176

(quoting Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 220);

• “[R]esist[ing] interpretation[s] [of the RPA] geared

more to the protection of existing competitors than to

the stimulation of competition,” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S.

at 181 (emphasis omitted); and,

• “[R]ecogni[zing] [that] the right of a seller to meet a

lower competitive price in good faith may be the

primary means of reconciling the [RPA] with the more

general purposes of the antitrust laws,” Great Atl. &

Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 82 n.16 (1979)

(interpreting RPA to provide robust meeting

competition defense). 

12
defense); Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory

State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 487 (1989) (“Courts should

narrowly construe statutes that serve no plausible public

purpose, and amount merely to interest-group transfers . . . .

Th[is] idea helps explain a number of decisions in areas of

economic regulation, such as . . . the courts’ approach to the

Robinson-Patman Act.”) (citing Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust

Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 409-10 (1978)).

17

This Court has dutifully followed the Supreme Court’s lead by

narrowly construing the RPA. In Toledo Mack, we explained that we

will “narrowly interpret” the RPA, even if doing so will result in

“elevat[ing] form over substance.” Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228

n.17. 

While the competing purchaser requirement has its roots in FTC

v. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. 37, 46-51 (1948), the most recent decisions

discussing that requirement are Volvo Trucks and Toledo Mack. Both

decisions emphasized that proving “substantial price discrimination

between competing purchasers over time,” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at

179 (quoting Falls City Indus., 460 U.S. at 435) (emphasis omitted),

requires accounting for the timing of the alleged competition and the

nature of the market. Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 178-79; see Toledo

Mack, 530 F.3d at 228.

In Volvo Trucks, the Supreme Court rejected an inference of

competitive injury where the plaintiff, Reeder-Simco (“Reeder”),

could not show that it was a competing purchaser. Volvo Trucks, 546

U.S. at 179-80. Reeder was a Volvo dealer who competed with other

dealers (both Volvo brand and others) through a customer-specific

bidding process for sales to individuals seeking custom-built trucks.
18

Id. at 169. Reeder alleged that Volvo sold trucks to other Volvo

dealers at unlawfully discriminatory prices, giving those other dealers

an unfair advantage in selling to prospective customers. The

customer-specific bidding process began with the customer stating its

specifications and inviting bids from dealers it had selected. Id. at

170. The selected dealers would submit bids to the customer and the

dealer that won the bid would arrange for the manufacturer, in this

case, Volvo, to build the truck for the customer. Id. Like the deviated

pricing system of food manufacturers, it was common for truck

manufacturers to offer “customer-specific discounts to their dealers.”

Id. Prior to submitting a bid to a customer, a Volvo dealer would ask

Volvo if it could get a discount for the customer. Id. Volvo would

then decide on a case-by-case basis what discount it would grant a

particular customer based on factors like industry-wide demand and

whether the customer had previously purchased from Volvo. Id.

While the discount varied based on many factors, the dealers always

knew what discounts they could offer a customer before submitting

their bids to the customer. See id.

The specific question presented in the case was whether “a

manufacturer offering its dealers different wholesale prices may be

held liable for price discriminations proscribed by Robinson-Patman,

absent a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers

contemporaneously competing to resell to the same retail customer.”

Id. at 169. In deciding that question in the negative, the Supreme

Court concluded that Reeder could not establish an inference of

competitive injury based on the timing of the competition between the

dealers and the nature of the market, Reeder’s evidence of competitive

injury, and the goals of the RPA.
 The first type, evidence of head-to-head comparisons 13

between Reeder and other Volvo dealers, is not relevant in the

instant case. Reeder’s evidence showed only “two instances

over [a] five year course” where it bid against other Volvo

dealers, so called head-to-head comparisons: One instance

where it and another Volvo dealer received the same discount

and Reeder lost to the other dealer because the customer had

19

The timing of the competition between the dealers and the

nature of the market were critical to the Supreme Court’s reasoning.

At the initial stage of competition in the bid market, where dealers

were competing to win the right to submit a bid to a customer,

“competition [wa]s not affected by differential pricing [because] a

dealer in the competitive bidding process approach[ed] Volvo for a

price concession . . . only after it ha[d] been selected by a retail

customer to submit a bid.” Id. at 178-79. Prospective customers chose

which dealers could submit bids based on a variety of factors

“including the existence vel non of a relationship between the potential

bidder and the [prospective] customer, geography, and reputation.” Id.

at 179. After the prospective customer chose who could submit bids,

the relevant market narrowed to the few dealers who were chosen:

“Once a retail customer has chosen the particular dealers from which

it will solicit bids, ‘the relevant market becomes limited to the needs

and demands of a particular end user, with only a handful of dealers

competing for the ultimate sale.’” Id. (quoting Reeder-Simco GMC,

Inc. v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., 374 F.3d 701, 719 (8th Cir.

2004) (Hansen, J., dissenting)).

The Supreme Court was also unimpressed with Reeder’s

evidence purporting to show competitive injury. Reeder produced

three types of evidence to support its allegations. The two types of 13
previously bought from the other dealer, and one instance where

it and the opposing Volvo dealer received matching discounts

from Volvo and neither won the bid. Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at

172. On this evidence, the Supreme Court noted that Reeder

showed the “loss of only one sale” and that “Reeder and the

other dealer received the same concession” in that instance. Id.

at 180. In the other instance of head-to-head competition, both

Volvo dealers received the same concession and neither won the

bid. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that “if price

discrimination between two purchasers existed at all, [a sale that

would have resulted in $30,000 more in gross profits for

Reeder] was not of such magnitude as to affect substantially

competition between Reeder and the ‘favored’ Volvo dealer.”

Id. 

 Notably, in this case, Feesers produced evidence 14

showing that Michaels consistently favored Sodexo. Feesers,

Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 434. This type of evidence was not

20

evidence relevant to the instant case were Reeder’s “comparisons of

[discounts] [it] received for four successful bids against non-Volvo

dealers, with larger [discounts] other successful Volvo dealers

received for different sales on which [it] did not bid (purchase-topurchase comparisons),” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 177 (emphasis in

original), and “comparisons of [discounts] offered to [it] in connection

with several unsuccessful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with greater

concessions accorded other Volvo dealers who competed successfully

for different sales on which [it] did not bid (offer-to-purchase

comparisons),” id. at 177-78 (emphasis in original). These two types

of evidence did not create an inference of competitive injury because

(1) the alleged price discrimination did not occur for the same

customer and (2) Reeder did not attempt to show that other Volvo

dealers were consistently favored. Id. at 178.14
produced in Volvo Trucks, so the Supreme Court never

explained whether both or only one of its reasons for rejecting

the inference of competitive injury need be rectified in order to

infer competitive injury. 546 U.S. at 179 n.3. As we later

explain, this Court, in Toledo Mack, rejected the argument that

evidence showing that a certain purchaser was consistently

favored was sufficient to infer competitive injury in a bid market

where the competition occurred prior to the actual sale. Toledo

Mack, 530 F.3d at 228-29.

21

The Supreme Court also signaled that it was uninterested in

permitting innovative applications of the RPA and would resist

“interpretation[s] geared more to the protection of existing competitors

than to the stimulation of competition.” Id. at 181 (emphasis in

original). It also noted that the custom truck market bore “little

resemblance to [the] large independent department stores or chain

operations” that the RPA originally intended to target. Id.

This Court used similar reasoning in Toledo Mack. 530 F.3d at

226-29. That case had facts similar to Volvo Trucks—Toledo, a Mack

truck dealer, would submit bids to prospective customers who wished

to purchase customized Mack trucks. Id. at 209. In creating a bid,

Toledo would seek out a “transaction-specific discount [from Mack]

known as ‘sales assistance.’” Id. “The amount of sales assistance

[Mack offered] varie[d] according to the nature of the relationship

between the dealer and the customer, the number of trucks ordered,

potential competition, and other factors.” Id. Toledo sued Mack under

the RPA, claiming that it consistently received less sales assistance

than other Mack dealers.

In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
22

the defendant, Mack, on the RPA claim, this Court explained that the

timing of competition and the nature of the market are critical factors

to consider when determining whether the plaintiff can show that it

was a competing purchaser of a favored purchaser. We concluded that

because the competition between Mack dealers occurred during the

bidding process, and not at the time of the actual sale, Toledo could

not satisfy the competing purchaser requirement or the two purchaser

requirement:

Because no sale takes place until a customer accepts a

dealer’s bid, the amount of sales assistance Mack is

willing to provide to a particular dealer is part of an

offer by Mack to sell, not a sale. Regardless of any

competition between the dealers during the bidding

process, only a dealer whose bid is accepted by a

customer will actually buy a truck from Mack.

Therefore, only one sale, not two, actually results.

Id. at 228. 

Toledo, unlike the plaintiff in Volvo Trucks, did not offer

evidence of head-to-head competition between it and other Mack

dealers. Id. at 215. But it did provide expert testimony regarding “the

average amounts of sales assistance Mack offered to Toledo as

compared with the average amount of sales assistance Mack offered

to other [Mack] dealers,” i.e., evidence showing that Mack

consistently favored other dealers as compared to Toledo. Id. That

evidence was rejected by this Court as irrelevant because even if the

“amount of sales assistance Mack offer[ed] to each dealer . . .

determine[d] whether a customer cho[se] to accept a bid from one

Mack dealer or another, Mack does not sell a truck to the dealer until
23

the customer actually selects a dealer’s bid.” Id. at 228. Thus, only

one sale, not two, resulted from the competition. Id. This was true in

part because the sale was divorced from the competition and Toledo

could not show that it was a competing purchaser vis-à-vis other Mack

dealers. See id.

Finally, the Toledo Mack Court noted that, like Volvo Trucks,

“the alleged price discrimination d[id] not implicate the original

purpose of the RPA because ‘the allegedly favored purchasers [we]re

dealers with little resemblance to large independent department stores

or chain operations.’” Id. at 227 (quoting Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at

181).

B.

While this Court’s conclusion in Toledo Mack undoubtedly

turned on the fact that “one sale, not two, actually result[ed],” Toledo

Mack, 530 F.3d at 228, it was not reached by a simple application of

the RPA’s two purchaser requirement. It was reached through the

combined effect of the RPA’s two purchaser and competitive injury

requirements—i.e., the competing purchaser requirement. Id.; see

Falls City Indus., 460 U.S. at 435 (explaining competing purchaser

requirement); Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 179 (same). 

In Toledo Mack we held that because the competition among

dealers for prospective customer business occurred before the

purchase of the truck to be sold to the customer by the winning dealer,

the relevant market for the sale to the customer was already limited to

one at the time the manufacturer sold the dealer the truck. See Toledo

Mack, 530 F.3d at 228. Because the relevant market was only one
24

dealer making one purchase from the manufacturer for resale to one

customer, the two purchaser requirement could not be satisfied. See

id. Thus, this Court rejected Toledo’s RPA claim for lack of two

purchasers, which was based on the lack of a competitive market, i.e.

the lack of a competing purchaser. See id. This conclusion comports

with M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1065, the decision relied upon by this

Court in Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228, and in this Court’s prior

decision in this case, Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 214 (instructing the

District Court to apply the Fifth Circuit’s test to “determine whether

Sodex[o] and Feesers compete to resell food products to the same

group of customers”) (citing M.C. Mfg. Co., 517 F.2d at 1068 n.20).

In addition, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Volvo Trucks further

confirms our understanding of the competing purchaser requirement.

In M.C. Mfg., two companies, Universal and H/R, manufactured

lifting plugs for sales to the government. M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1061.

Both companies purchased “unfinished plug castings” from Texas

Foundries and those castings were used to create the lifting plugs. Id.

Both companies would purchase castings after they had won a contract

with the government. Id. at 1067. In its complaint, Universal alleged

that H/R and Texas Foundries violated the RPA because (1) Texas

Foundries quoted a lower price to H/R than Universal for their

respective bids for a government contract and H/R won that contract

(the “1971 Contract”), id. at 1061-62, 1066-67, and (2) Texas

Foundries sold unfinished plug castings to Universal at a higher price

in a separate contract (the “1970 Contract Extension”). Id. at 1065-66.

Universal argued that the prices it received in the 1970 Contract

Extension were unlawfully discriminatory as compared to the prices

H/R received in the 1971 Contract. In doing so, Universal’s

allegations appeared to satisfy the two purchaser requirement because
 See M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1066 (“Even if the sales at 15

different prices are contemporaneous, involve goods of like

grade and quality, the price distinction is not justified by good

business cause, and it causes injury to the disadvantage[d]

purchaser, recovery under the Act is precluded absent proof that

the price variance detrimentally affected competition.”).

25

the two companies were both purchasing the same type of unfinished

plug casting from Texas Foundries. This appearance, however, was

misleading because the contracts from which Universal’s purported

injuries flowed were distinct markets open only to a single producer.

See id. at 1067. H/R and Universal were not competing purchasers

because the 1970 Contract Extension and the 1971 Contract each

“represented a separate, distinct market open only to a single

producer.” Id. “The very nature of th[o]se mutually exclusive

commitments in the respective contracts meant that Universal and H/R

could not have been ‘in competition’ with respect to their separate

purchases from Texas Foundries pursuant to the government

contracts.” Id. “Therefore, while the price discrepancy between

[Texas Foundries’s sales to H/R under the 1971 Contract and to

Universal under the 1970 Contract Extension] could have affected

Universal’s profits under the [1970 Contract Extension], this

discrimination in no way diminished Universal’s competitive ability

in that plug market.” Id. Thus, even though “Universal and H/R were

competitive bidders on the 1971 [C]ontract[, t]hey could not be . . .

competitive purchasers as required by the Act either under their

respective separate contracts or under both.” Id.15

Similar reasoning was also invoked in Volvo Trucks. 546 U.S.

at 178. There, the Supreme Court discounted the purchase-to-purchase

and offer-to-purchase evidence offered by Reeder in part because that
26

evidence did not show that Reeder competed “with beneficiaries of the

alleged discrimination for the same customer.” Id. (emphasis in

original). “That Volvo dealers may bid for sales in the same

geographic area” was of no import to the Supreme Court because that

fact was not relevant to whether two dealers “compet[ed] for the same

customer-tailored sales.” Id. at 179. “Once a retail customer has

chosen the particular dealers from which it will solicit bids, ‘the

relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands of a

particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing for the

ultimate sale.’” Id. (quoting Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 374 F.3d at 719

(Hansen, J., dissenting)).

Accordingly, we reject the argument that Toledo Mack was a

simple application of the two purchaser requirement. Implicit in the

Toledo Mack Court’s holding was the conclusion that Toledo could not

show it was a competing purchaser of other Mack truck dealers. In

other words, the two purchaser requirement could not be satisfied

because the relevant market of competition was limited to one dealer,

one customer, and one truck manufacturer at the time of the sale of the

truck, i.e., there were no competing purchasers. Toledo Mack, 530

F.3d at 228.

C.

Applying the teachings of Volvo Trucks and Toledo Mack to the

instant case, it is clear that Feesers never experienced a competitive

injury from Sodexo’s purchases and sales of Michaels’s products

because Feesers and Sodexo were not competing purchasers. See

Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 179. The competition between Feesers and

Sodexo for institutions’ business occurred prior to Michaels’s sales of
27

food products to Feesers and Sodexo, “when a customer consider[ed]

switching from self-op to food service management, or vice versa.”

Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 430. At that time, Sodexo would not

yet have secured any products from Michaels for resale to the

prospective customer because the customer would only be deciding

whether it wished to begin the RFP process or, if it had already chosen

to engage in the RFP process, whether to invite Sodexo to participate

in that process. Once the customer has chosen whether to self-operate

or contract with a food service management company, “the relevant

market becomes limited to the needs and demands of a particular end

user, with only a handful of [distributors or food service management

companies] competing for the ultimate sale.” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S.

at 179; Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228. Thus, Feesers and Sodexo’s

competition at that early stage was irrelevant to the sales made by

Michaels after that competition was complete. If an institution chose

to self-operate, Sodexo would be eliminated from the competition, and

if an institution chose to contract with a food service management

company, Feesers would be eliminated from the competition. After

making that initial decision, the customer then has to choose which

distributor or food service management company it will hire. Only

after that process is complete would the customer then actually

purchase food from Michaels through the winning distributor or food

service management company.

At all events, assuming Feesers and Sodexo engaged in head-tohead competition, and the discounts granted by Michaels to the two

companies determined from which company an institution would

purchase Michaels’s products, the competing purchaser requirement

would still not be satisfied because Michaels does not make a sale until

the institution chooses a particular distributor or food service
The discount schemes in Volvo Trucks and Toledo 16

Mack were largely indistinguishable from the deviated pricing

system used in the food manufacturer industry. See Toledo

Mack, 530 F.3d at 209-10 (explaining that requests for sales

assistance to Mack occurred prior to submission of bid to

customer); Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 170-71 (same). Food

service management companies, self-ops, and GPOs, like the

truck dealers in Toledo Mack and Volvo Trucks dealing with

manufacturers, availed themselves of deviated pricing

arrangements with food manufacturers. In general, these entities

know the discount they will receive before they purchase

products from manufacturers. Food service management

companies can adjust their bid to a prospective customer to

incorporate these deviated pricing arrangements.

28

management company and then begins purchasing Michaels’s products

through that company. See Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228. The

relevant market at the time of the sale of Michaels’s products will have

already been narrowed to one—the company that won the institution’s

business. See id.

While the timing of the competition and the nature of the

market compel us to conclude that Feesers and Sodexo were not

competing purchasers, it is also relevant that the evidence produced by

Feesers was the same type of average discount evidence produced in

Toledo Mack. Compare Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 215 (plaintiff 16

producing evidence comparing “the average amount of sales

assistance” received by the plaintiff as compared to other Mack truck

dealers), with Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 434 (plaintiff producing

evidence showing that Sodexo consistently received “stunning” price

discounts that amounted to a 59% difference in prices between Feesers
29

and Sodexo over four years). The Toledo Mack Court rejected such

evidence as insufficient to prove injury to competition in part because

“merely offering lower prices to a customer does not give rise to a

price discrimination claim.” Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 227-28 (citing

Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc.,

159 F.3d 129, 142 (3d Cir. 1998)). A plaintiff must also show that the

effect of the lower prices was to injure competition. Toledo Mack, 530

F.3d at 228 (citing Crossroads Cogeneration Corp., 159 F.3d at 142);

Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 181. Yet that showing is impossible where,

as here, the case involves sales via a bidding process and the

competition occurs before the bidding process even begins. See

Toledo Mack, 546 U.S. at 228.

In addition, the Supreme Court’s directive to narrowly construe

the RPA to address the basic purposes of the statute further informs

our conclusion that Feesers was not a competing purchaser of Sodexo.

Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 180-81; see Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 227.

The price discrimination identified by Feesers bears “little

resemblance to [the] large independent department stores and chain

operations” the statute was originally intended to target. Toledo Mack,

530 F.3d at 227 (quoting Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 181). Here, like

in Volvo Trucks, there is a myriad of differences between retail stores

and food service management companies and food distributors.

First, in many respects, Sodexo and Feesers do not compete.

Sodexo prepares and sells meals and handles all dining service

functions for its customers. Feesers only distributes food. Competing

retail stores, in contrast, generally compete to sell fungible goods to

the same group of customers. Second, Sodexo operates in a bid

market with other food service management companies, and competes
30

with Feesers only in a preliminary stage where a prospective customer

is deciding whether to self-operate or hire a food service management

company. Retail stores compete over prospective customers every

time a customer decides to purchase a product, and those purchases are

not made in a bid market. Third, Sodexo competes for customers with

Feesers prior to purchasing food from Michaels. Retail stores

generally purchase products from manufacturers and then compete

with other retailers based on pricing. 

In sum, because any competition between Feesers and Sodexo

occurred at the time an institution was deciding whether to self-operate

or hire a food service management company, and any resulting sale of

Michaels’s products would have to occur after that competition,

Feesers cannot show that it was a competing purchaser of Sodexo.

The evidence produced by Feesers only further confirms the futility of

its RPA claims, because such evidence—evidence showing consistent

favoring of another purchaser over the plaintiff over time by a

manufacturer in a bid market—was rejected in Toledo Mack. Such

evidence cannot support an inference of competitive injury in a bid

market. Finally, the Supreme Court’s instructions to narrowly

construe the RPA also compel us to reject Feesers’s RPA claims.

III.

The District Court, after thoughtful consideration of the Volvo

Trucks and Toledo Mack decisions, determined that those decisions

were not controlling for three reasons: (1) Volvo Trucks involved only

formal competition whereas the instant case involves formal and

informal competition; (2) application of Toledo Mack to the instant

case would misconstrue that decision’s holding by imposing a new
31

requirement under the RPA, divorced from the statutory text, that the

manufacturer’s sale of the commodity to two different sellers occur

prior to the competition for the resale of those goods; and (3) a logical

reading of Toledo Mack limits that decision’s applicability to custommanufactured goods. We reject each of these reasons in turn.

The District Court reasoned that because “[f]ood service

management companies, distributors, and GPOs all compete formally

and informally for the sale of food to institutions,” the instant case was

distinguishable from Volvo Trucks, which it believed involved only a

formal bidding process. Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 431.

Contrary to the District Court’s belief, the market in Volvo Trucks

involved both formal and informal competition. In that case, a

customer’s decision to request a bid from a particular dealer was based

on informal competitive factors such as “an existing relationship, . . .

reputation, and cold calling or other marketing strategies initiated by

individual dealers.” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 170 (internal quotation

omitted) (emphasis added). Sodexo’s actions were indistinguishable

from the actions of truck dealers in Volvo Trucks. Sodexo competed

for institutions’ business through the formal RFP process, and through

“informal contacts with targeted institutions.” Feesers, Inc., 632 F.

Supp. 2d at 428.

The District Court’s second reason, that construing Toledo

Mack to apply to the instant case would require imposing a new

requirement under the RPA that the sale of the commodity by the

manufacturer to two different sellers occur prior to the competition for

resale of those goods, is a misunderstanding of the competing
 That being said, the District Court’s desire to avoid 17

misapplying our precedent in this complicated area of law is

commendable. Indeed, this is not the first time the RPA has

flummoxed the federal courts, nor, barring a repeal of the law,

will it be the last. Compare, e.g., Van Dyk Research Corp. v.

Xerox Corp., 631 F.2d 251, 255 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980) (asserting in

dicta that failure to prove the “fact of injury” can conclusively

bar injunctive relief) (citing Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler

Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 668 n.2, 670 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), with

Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 213 (explaining that plaintiff need not

prove actual harm to competition to receive injunctive relief)

(citing Falls City Indus., 460 U.S. at 435). The RPA places the

federal courts in an inescapable Catch-22. We are asked to

apply the RPA, a statute that “is fundamentally inconsistent with

the antitrust laws,” Antitrust Modernization Commission,

Report and Recommendations 312 (2007), in a fashion that is

“consistent[] with the broader policies of the antitrust laws.”

Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 181 (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S.

at 220). This conundrum is bound to create confusion for judges

called upon to apply the RPA in a host of settings.

32

purchaser requirement. The rule the District Court describes is not 17

new—it is simply the product of the competing purchaser requirement,

which considers the relevant market, a bid market, and the timing of

the competition, before the sale to the manufacturer. The M.C. Mfg.

Court explained that there is a “competitive purchaser” requirement

inherent in the “two purchaser” and “competitive injury” elements.

M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1067; see Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 179;

Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228. In Feesers’s prior appeal, we embraced

that approach to the competing purchaser requirement by stating that

Sodexo and Feesers compete only if “they are each directly after the

same dollar.” Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 214 (quoting M.C. Mfg., 517
 Notably, we do not hold that the sales of products by 18

the manufacturer to two purchasers must always occur prior to

the competition between the two purchasers. Our holding is

limited to bid markets that closely resemble the markets in this

case, Volvo Trucks, and Toledo Mack.

33

F.2d at 1068 n.20). We now hold that, simply put, Feesers and Sodexo

cannot compete for the same dollar because their resales of Michaels’s

products to institutions, by their “very nature[, were] mutually

exclusive commitments.” M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1067. The RPA 18

does not ordinarily protect competition where “a product subject to

special order is sold through a customer-specific bidding process.”

Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 170 (contrasting such competition with

“competition between different purchasers for resale of [a] purchased

product”). In other words, the RPA was not meant to cover the type

of competition present in the instant case.

Third, the District Court reasoned that a logical reading of

Toledo Mack limited that decision’s applicability to custommanufactured goods. This conclusion is refuted by the Toledo Mack

Court’s reliance on the M.C. Mfg. decision, Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at

228 (citing M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1065 (manufacturing generic

product)), and this Court’s explicit guidance to apply the principles of

M.C. Mfg. to this action. Feesers, 498 F.3d at 214 (citing M.C. Mfg.,

517 F.3d at 1068 n.20). Moreover, there is no reason to limit the reach

of the Toledo Mack decision to customized goods because the

underlying principles, pertaining to the timing of the competition and

the nature of the market, remain the same whether applied to generic

goods or customized goods. This Court’s directive to “narrowly

interpret the oft-questioned RPA” also supports rejection of the

District Court’s view. Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228 n.17. A narrow
 For example, in a proposal to the Beth Sholom House 19

of Eastern Virginia, Sodexo urged the institution to utilize its

food procurement program to “take full advantage of [Sodexo’s]

kosher vendors.” Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 429. The

proposal states that using Sodexo’s kosher vendors would

“streamline the ordering process [and] substantially reduce

pricing” for the institution. Id. Kosher food purchasing is an

institution-specific requirement and thus is a customized

offering. The same would be true for hospitals, which utilize

lengthy RFP processes to confirm that all the special needs of

the hospital are met by the food service management company.

In fact, the foods ordered for any particular institution would

depend on the “size and type of institution” and may include

“bids on a wide range of services.” Id. at 428. Sodexo also

enters into profit and loss contracts where “[it] offers a financial

guarantee that the dining services will not lose money, and the

institution shares in a certain percentage of the profits.” Id. at

442. 

34

interpretation, one that limits the applicability of the Act, calls for

taking an expansive view of Toledo Mack’s holding and not limiting

it to customized goods. See id. Finally, even if the Toledo Mack

decision was limited to customized goods, Sodexo offers Michaels’s

food products as part of a customized service to customers. Feesers,

Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 428 (finding that Sodexo sometimes

“determines whether there are any particular problems to be solved [at

an institution]”). Presumably, problems vary across institutions so 19

the proposed solutions for any given institution would be tailored to

that institution’s needs. In fact, the mere existence of a formal RFP

process shows that institutions require customized contracts to serve

their specific needs. 
35

IV.

Having determined that Feesers and Sodexo were not

competitors, three outstanding issues remain. First, whether this

Court’s holding is barred by the law of the case. Second, how this

Court’s holding will affect the existing permanent injunction ordered

by the District Court. Third, the effect of concluding that Feesers

cannot prove a § 2(a) claim against Michaels on the § 2(f) claim

against Sodexo. We discuss each of the issues in turn.

A.

The “law of the case . . . doctrine posits that when a court

decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the

same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Arizona v.

California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). The “doctrine does not restrict

a court’s power but rather governs its exercise of discretion.” Pub.

Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d

111, 116 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). “A court has the power to

revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any

circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the

absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial

decision was clearly erroneous and would make a manifest injustice.”

Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988)

(citing Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8).

Feesers argues that this Court held, in its prior opinion, that the

evidence of price discrimination in the record was sufficient to apply

an inference of competitive injury. If this argument were true, it

would be difficult for us now to conclude that Feesers cannot show
36

that it was a competing purchaser, as being a competing purchaser is

a prerequisite to the application of the inference. Feesers’s argument,

however, fails for several reasons.

First, this Court’s prior opinion did not hold as Feesers now

claims. This Court reversed the District Court’s summary judgment

for the defendants explaining that the District Court used the wrong

standard in concluding that Feesers and Sodexo were not in actual

competition. Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 208. In doing so, we noted

that “if substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers

over time is established, then the inference of competitive injury

arises.” Id. at 216 (emphasis added). At that early stage of the

litigation, this Court believed only that “Feesers ha[d] proffered

sufficient evidence of competition between itself and Sodex[o] . . . to

allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that [they] [we]re in actual

competition.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). This Court then

remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Id. at 216. Nowhere in the prior opinion did this Court hold that

Feesers and Sodexo were competing purchasers or, more generally,

that Feesers had established an inference of competitive injury. Thus,

the law of the case does not prevent us from holding that Feesers and

Sodexo were not competing purchasers under the RPA.

Second, our present review of this case is conducted with the

benefit of a full record established at trial. That record was not

available to this Court when we decided Feesers’s appeal from

summary judgment. We now know that Feesers cannot show that it

and Sodexo were competing purchasers based on the timing of their

competition and the nature of the market—issues that were never

discussed in the prior opinion, presumably, because a complete record
37

had not been established. Finally, even if this Court had previously

held otherwise, our holding in this case would be a permissible

reevaluation of precedent in light of intervening authority, Toledo

Mack. See Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, 564 F.3d 242, 276

n.50 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858

(3d Cir. 1996)).

B.

The permanent injunction issued by the District Court states:

“[Michaels] is enjoined from refusing to sell its products to Feesers on

the same terms as they are sold to Sode[x]o, so long as Feesers

otherwise meets its standards as a customer.” This injunction was

issued under Section 16 of the Clayton Act (1) as a remedy for

contempt and (2) to prevent future competitive injury to Feesers.

Because we are reversing the District Court’s judgment as a matter of

law, neither of its reasons for the injunction survive. An injunction

issued based on civil contempt cannot stand where the underlying

order on which it is based is invalid. See Universal Athletic Sales Co.

v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 909-10 (3d Cir. 1975). Our holding today

renders the need to protect Feesers from further injury non-existent,

because Feesers, as a matter of law, is not a competing purchaser visà-vis Sodexo.

C.

Feesers’s claim against Sodexo arises under § 2(f) of the RPA.

That provision states: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in

commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or

receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section.”
38

15 U.S.C. § 13(f). Because a prima facie case of price discrimination

under § 2(a) of the RPA cannot be established against Michaels,

Sodexo cannot be held liable for inducement. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea

Co., 440 U.S. at 76 (“[A] buyer cannot be liable if a prima facie case

could not be established against a seller.”).

V.

Feesers cannot show that it and Sodexo were competing

purchasers, and therefore, cannot show that it suffered competitive

injury under the Robinson-Patman Act. Accordingly, we will reverse

the District Court’s judgment for Feesers and instruct the District

Court to enter judgment as a matter of law for Michaels and Sodexo.