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The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-1527

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* On Appeal from the United

v. * States District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Jordan Robert Lee Strickland, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: December 14, 2009

Filed: February 17, 2010

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Before BYE, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Jordan Robert Lee Strickland appeals from the sentence imposed following a

guilty plea to a firearm charge. He specifically challenges the district court's1

application of a four-level enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines

(U.S.S.G.) § 2K2.1(b)(6), for being a felon in possession of a firearm in connection

with another felony. We affirm. 
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I. BACKGROUND

Officer Hiller of the Marshalltown, Iowa, Police Department arrested Strickland

on an active warrant. At the time of the arrest, Hiller requested that Strickland exit the

vehicle in which he was a passenger and questioned Strickland about items Strickland

held in his hand. Strickland attempted to conceal a baggie by dropping it on the

ground. Strickland admitted the baggie contained methamphetamine. When tested,

a lab confirmed it contained less than a gram of methamphetamine, which is a user

quantity. 

While Strickland was being fingerprinted at the jail, a loaded Ruger .22 caliber

revolver fell from Strickland's pants. Strickland was charged with numerous state

crimes including possession of a controlled substance (the "other felony" for purposes

of the enhancement), but all state charges were ultimately dismissed. Only the federal

firearm charge remained. Strickland told the officer that he carried the gun because

he was afraid of being robbed. At the sentencing hearing, Strickland's defense counsel

questioned the officer as to whether Strickland had mentioned a recent in-home

invasion as a reason for carrying the gun. But the officer did not recall such an

explanation by Strickland. The district court applied the sentencing enhancement

based upon this evidence.

II. DISCUSSION

 The district court's determination that the defendant possessed a firearm in

connection with another felony is a factual finding that we review for clear error.

United States v. Bates, 561 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 2009). Here, Strickland claims

that the district court failed to make the requisite finding that Strickland's firearm

possession "facilitated" his minor drug possession offense. We disagree. 
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If, when charged with a firearm offense, the district court finds that the firearm

is possessed "in connection with another felony offense," the guidelines advise a fourlevel enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6). More specifically, when the "other felony

offense" in question is simple drug possession rather than drug trafficking, as in this

case, "the district court may still apply the [§ 2K2.1(b)(6)] adjustment, but only after

making a finding that the firearm facilitated the drug offense." United States v.

Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Because guns are

common in drug trafficking ("tools of the trade . . . present to protect large quantities

of drugs and money"), mere proximity of the two supports an enhancement under §

2K2.1(b)(6) when the underlying felony is drug trafficking. United States v. Dalton,

557 F.3d 586, 589 (8th Cir. 2009); U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) cmt. n.14(B). But when

the felony offense is simple possession, the purpose for the firearm is not always

clear–its presence could be accident or coincidence. Dalton, 557 F.3d at 589. Given

the facts before us as they relate to Strickland, our inquiry is whether the district court

affirmatively made a finding that the gun found on Strickland's person facilitated or

had the potential to facilitate his drug-possession offense. Id. 

At sentencing, after acknowledging that this was a "user amount" possession

case, which is critical for the instant analysis, the district court stated: 

The Eighth Circuit does recognize that frequently it can be characterized

that the presence of a firearm in the presence of drugs is to protect the

drugs. It's difficult on this record to know whether or not your statement,

Mr. Strickland, that you were afraid of being robbed related to some

prior home invasion or whether it was related to protection of what you

had with you, and the record seems to suggest that the only thing that

you had with you that was of any value would have been the

methamphetamine itself. But the presence of the methamphetamine on

your person, the presence of the firearm on your person and the fact that

the presence of a firearm can be to protect against someone taking the

drugs away from you, I think based upon the fact that I only have to
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make these conclusions based upon a preponderance of the evidence, I

think it supports the enhancement.

Sent. Tr. 20.

Thus, based upon our review of the sentencing transcript, we find that the

district court accurately discerned the distinction this court has made regarding the

mere presence of firearms and drugs in trafficking and possession cases. The district

court generally stated a truism that often firearms are used to protect drugs, generally

acknowledging that firearms and drugs are often related, notwithstanding the context

in which they are found. Then, to connect the two in this case and arrive at the

requisite finding that this particular firearm facilitated, or had the potential to

facilitate, Strickland's possession offense, the district court referenced Strickland's

statement that he was afraid of being robbed, and concluded that the context in which

Strickland's fear arose was unclear based upon the evidence presented. The district

court went on, however, to expressly note that the only thing of value on Strickland

at the time of his arrest was drugs, supporting the proposition that Strickland carried

the gun to protect the drugs. Given the court's purposeful choice in making this

finding, it is clear the district court knew it had to articulate a finding in order to apply

the enhancement, and that the court did not apply the enhancement in this possession

case based upon mere proximity and spacial nexus as Strickland argues, but rather

because Strickland possessed this gun to protect the drugs. Accordingly, there was

no clear error.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the district court affirmatively found that Strickland's firearm

facilitated his drug offense before applying the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement, we affirm

its imposition.

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