UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4323

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ANGELO ECKLIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-4324

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KHALLID MUHUMMED CARTER, a/k/a Khallid Muhamad Carter,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior 

District Judge. (2:11-cr-00139-RGD-DEM-1; 2:11-cr-00139-RGDDEM-2)

Argued: March 20, 2013 Decided: June 14, 2013

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, WYNN, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.
2

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, 

in which Chief Judge Traxler and Senior Judge Hamilton 

concurred.

ARGUED: Kim Michelle Crump, Norfolk, Virginia; Paul Granville 

Watson, PAUL G. WATSON IV, PC, Eastville, Virginia, for 

Appellants. Benjamin L. Hatch, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Cameron 

M. Rountree, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

After a joint jury trial, Defendants Michael Ecklin and 

Khallid Carter each were convicted of possession of a firearm by 

a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At trial, 

neither defendant disputed that Ecklin fired an AK-47, that 

Carter gave him the loaded weapon, or that both defendants were 

convicted felons. Instead, each defendant contended that his 

gun possession was justified in response to an armed third 

person.

On appeal, Defendants argue that the district court erred 

by improperly interfering with their trial and by imposing 

obstruction of justice sentencing enhancements. Further, Ecklin 

separately contends that the government knowingly offered false 

testimony and that the district court erred by admitting certain 

evidence. Carter separately argues that the government’s 

remarks during closing argument prejudiced him and that there 

was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. For the 

reasons addressed below, we disagree and affirm Defendants’ 

convictions.

I.

On March 13, 2011, Ecklin had an altercation with Tiara 

Faulcon. Faulcon reported the fight to her mother, Shannel 

Bonds, who responded by confronting Ecklin in the parking lot of 
4

London Oaks apartment complex in Portsmouth, Virginia. Faulcon 

and her cousin, Drean Wallace, accompanied Bonds.

At some point during the dispute, Carter gave Ecklin a 

loaded AK-47. The incident eventually escalated into a shootout between Wallace and Ecklin. The shooting resulted in 

extensive property damage, but no one was physically injured. 

Subsequently, Ecklin and Carter each were charged with 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and with aiding and 

abetting each other’s possession of a firearm.

The cases were jointly tried before a jury in December 2011

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Virginia. At trial, Defendants did not dispute that Ecklin 

fired an AK-47 while at London Oaks. Nor did they dispute that 

Carter handed Ecklin the loaded weapon. Rather, each defendant 

relied on a justification defense-that Ecklin and Carter 

possessed the gun only in response to Wallace’s threatening 

Ecklin with a gun. 

At trial, the government presented testimony from three 

eyewitnesses: Bonds, Faulcon, and Wallace. Bonds and Wallace 

testified that Ecklin had a gun before Wallace and that Ecklin 

began shooting before Wallace got his gun out of his car. Bonds 

and Wallace also testified that they saw Carter give the gun to 

Ecklin. Faulcon testified that she did not see Wallace with a 
5

gun. Faulcon did, however, see Ecklin with a gun, and she ran

when Ecklin began shooting. 

The government also presented testimony from Dyron James, a 

federal prisoner. James stated that while in jail with Ecklin, 

he told Ecklin about the “necessity law” that allows a convicted 

felon to possess a firearm when his life is in danger or when 

another person is in danger. J.A. 481. 

Defendants countered with eyewitness testimony. Tymetria 

Smith and Katina Tucker each testified that they ran after 

seeing Wallace with a gun, but neither saw Ecklin with a gun. 

Eric Jones stated that he saw Wallace pull out a gun and point 

it at Ecklin and that Ecklin was not holding a weapon at that 

time. Aquelah Moore testified that she saw Wallace and another 

individual-Dequan-struggling over a gun, but that she did not 

see Ecklin with a weapon.

Additionally, both Ecklin and Carter testified at trial. 

Ecklin stated that after Wallace pointed a gun at his face and 

threatened to kill him, Dequan, a friend of Ecklin’s, tussled

with Wallace while Ecklin backed up. Carter then handed Ecklin 

a gun, and Ecklin started shooting it in the air. Ecklin 

explained that once Wallace began shooting back, Ecklin “fired a 

lot of rounds real fast” in Wallace’s direction. J.A. 448. 

Carter similarly testified that when he saw Wallace tussling 

with Dequan and pointing a gun at Ecklin, he picked up a gun 
6

that was lying on the ground under a stairwell and gave it to 

Ecklin.

At the close of the government’s case and also at the close 

of all the evidence, Defendants’ counsel made Rule 29 motions 

for judgment of acquittal based, in part, on sufficiency of the 

evidence. The district court denied these motions with respect 

to the gun possession charges. 

The jury found Ecklin and Carter guilty of possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon.1

 Consistent with each defendant’s 

Presentence Investigation Report, the district court imposed a 

two-level obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement for 

giving false testimony. Specifically, as to Ecklin, the 

district court increased Ecklin’s offense level from 26 to 28 

based upon its finding that Ecklin’s testimony that he fired in 

self-defense conflicted with the jury’s guilty verdict. The 

district court, however, announced that it would have given 

Ecklin the same sentence even without the obstruction of justice

enhancement. As to Carter, the district court increased 

Carter’s offense level from 22 to 24 based upon its finding that 

Carter falsely testified that he found the gun lying on the 

 1 The jury also found Ecklin guilty of aiding and abetting

Carter’s weapon possession, but the district court subsequently 

granted Ecklin’s motion for acquittal on that charge. And 

before the jury retired, the district court dismissed the aiding 

and abetting charge against Carter.
7

ground. The district court sentenced both Ecklin and Carter to 

120 months’ imprisonment. 

II.

On appeal, Ecklin and Carter contend that the district 

judge deprived them of a fair trial by improperly interfering in 

their trial and that the district court’s findings of fact did 

not support an obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement. 

Ecklin separately contends that the government knowingly offered 

false testimony and that the district court erred by admitting 

certain evidence. Carter separately argues that the 

government’s remarks during closing argument prejudiced him and 

that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 

We address each issue in turn.

A.

With their primary argument on appeal, Ecklin and Carter

both contend that the district judge’s repeated interruptions 

and extensive involvement in the questioning and impeachment of 

witnesses deprived them of a fair trial. When a defendant 

raises a timely objection to judicial interference, we review 

for harmless error. United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 673

(4th Cir. 2001). But when a defendant fails to object at trial, 

we review only for plain error. Id. Under plain error review, 
8

a defendant must show that “the error affects substantial 

rights, actually changing the outcome of the trial proceedings.” 

Id. at 672 (citation omitted).

Both Ecklin and Carter cite numerous instances of the 

district judge’s interference and questioning. Yet, with the 

exception of one objection by Ecklin, neither Ecklin nor Carter 

objected to the district judge’s participation at trial. See

Fed. R. Evid. 614(c). Thus, we review the incident Ecklin 

challenged below for harmless error and the remaining instances 

of alleged interference for plain error. Godwin, 272 F.3d at 

672-73.

A trial judge possesses broad authority to interrogate 

witnesses. Fed. R. Evid. 614(b); Godwin, 272 F.3d at 672. 

Trial judges have the right, and often the obligation, to 

“interrupt the presentations of counsel in order to clarify 

misunderstandings.” United States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 332 

(4th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also

Fed. R. Evid. 611(a). Further, trial judges may “intercede 

[with questions] because of seeming inadequacy of examination or 

cross-examination by counsel, or to draw more information from 

reluctant witnesses . . . who are inarticulate or less than 

candid.” United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th 

Cir. 1970) (citation omitted).
9

Despite this broad discretion, a trial judge occupies a 

position of preeminence and special persuasiveness in the eyes 

of the jury and must thus ensure that “his participation during 

trial—whether it takes the form of interrogating witnesses, 

addressing counsel, or some other conduct—never reaches the 

point at which it appears clear to the jury that the court 

believes the accused is guilty.” United States v. Parodi, 703 

F.2d 768, 775 (4th Cir. 1983) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). For example, “when a judge cross-examines a defendant 

and his witnesses extensively and vigorously, he may present to 

others an appearance of partisanship and, in the minds of 

jurors, so identify his high office with the prosecution as to 

impair the [jury’s] impartiality[.]” Wallace v. United States, 

281 F.2d 656, 666 (4th Cir. 1960) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “[A] judge’s apparent disbelief of a witness is 

potentially fatal to the witness’s credibility. And the 

credibility of a testifying defendant is often of crucial 

importance in a criminal trial.” Godwin, 272 F.3d at 678.

1.

Ecklin noted one objection to the district judge’s 

questioning during Ecklin’s cross-examination:

THE WITNESS: . . . At first I wasn’t shooting at 

[Wallace][.] I was shooting in the air, and he 

started shooting at me. 
10

. . .

THE COURT: So that’s how all the shots got in the 

automobile which he had, correct?

. . .

THE WITNESS: I wouldn’t say so. I would think that 

he shot his own car.

. . .

THE COURT: . . . You’re saying [Wallace] shot up his 

own car while you were shooting at him, correct?

THE WITNESS: I wouldn’t know how he shot his car, but,

yes, he shot it.

THE COURT: . . . [Wallace] shot up his own car while 

you were shooting at him. Is that correct?

THE WITNESS: No.

. . .

THE COURT: He shot up his own car when?

THE WITNESS: I don’t . . . I know he had to shoot his 

own car. Like I couldn’t do that.

THE COURT: All I asked you is when.

THE WITNESS: I don’t know.

J.A. 456-57. At that point, Ecklin’s counsel objected, and the 

court overruled the objection. 

The district judge’s questions highlighted the apparent 

implausibility of Ecklin’s response about how bullet holes got 

into Wallace’s car. But even if the district judge’s inquiry 

was sharper and more extensive than necessary, any error was 
11

harmless. The district judge’s initial questions for Ecklin

were meant to clarify an apparently confusing factual situation 

about who first fired a weapon. And the court’s questions were 

not so hostile as to indicate prejudgment of guilt. Cf.

Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d at 877-79. Moreover, Ecklin admitted 

shooting into the air and towards Wallace. Whether Ecklin 

caused the bullet holes in Wallace’s car does not bear on 

whether Ecklin acted in self-defense. 

2.

Notwithstanding their failure to object at trial to any 

other alleged interference by the district judge, Ecklin and 

Carter argue that the district judge’s extensive involvement 

indicated a disbelief of their defense. In support of their 

allegation, Defendants point to several exchanges between the 

district judge and certain witnesses. Defendants contend, among 

other things, that the district judge interfered with crossexamination of government witnesses and rehabilitated them, 

cross-examined defense witnesses at length-most importantly 

Ecklin and Carter-and impeached them, and generally showed 

favoritism to the government. 

Our review of the trial transcript shows that both parties

exhibited some difficulty with proper cross-examination and 

focusing on the relevant issues. The district judge was 
12

therefore understandably frustrated, and he properly intervened 

to instruct both sides. See, e.g., J.A. 178-82, 233-35, 271;

see also Smith, 452 F.3d at 333 (“[E]ven a stern and shorttempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration do 

not establish bias or partiality. . . . A tart remark or two 

might be what is needed to keep a lengthy trial on track.”)

(quotation marks omitted)). And at other points during the 

trial, the district judge properly questioned witnesses to 

clarify confusing factual issues or misunderstandings. See, 

e.g., J.A. 190, 227-29, 351, 365-71, 376-78, 459-61; see also

Smith, 452 F.3d at 332-33.

Some of the district judge’s questions, however, seem to 

undermine the substance and credibility of Ecklin’s and Carter’s 

testimonies. For example, during direct examination of Ecklin, 

the district judge questioned him extensively about what he did 

with the gun after the shooting. After Ecklin said that he 

threw the gun away, the judge asked, “So you just – you came 

back and threw this gun away? Do you know how much it’s worth?”

J.A. 455. When Ecklin responded that he would not care how much 

the gun was worth, the district judge asked how much Ecklin paid 

before for a different firearm and whether the gun he “shot up 

in the air was an automatic[.]” J.A. 455. 

The district judge also asked some problematic questions

during Carter’s testimony. For example, when Carter testified 
13

that he picked the gun up “[f]rom under the stairway, off the 

ground[,]” J.A. 463, the judge responded, “Off the ground? . . . 

It was just laying [sic] there? . . . You mean there was a – do 

you know what kind of gun it was?” J.A. 463. When Carter 

stated that he did not know the gun type, the district judge 

repeated, “You don’t know what kind of gun it was?” and asked if 

the gun looked like the photographs shown during trial. J.A. 

463. Later, the district judge again asked Carter if the gun 

was lying on the ground, how Carter knew it was under the 

stairway, and if a child could have picked it up. 

Additionally, when Carter testified that he did not 

remember stating that he was a member of the Bloods gang, the 

judge acknowledged Carter’s lack of memory, but then asked 

Carter, “Was the statement true or not true?” J.A. 467. 

Finally, Carter testified that he had been convicted of gang 

participation in a criminal act. The judge subsequently 

inquired if “the gang that you were convicted of, does it have 

guns?” J.A. 473.

These questions can be construed to reflect the court’s 

skepticism or disbelief of Ecklin and Carter-sentiments that 

should not have been expressed to the jury. See Godwin, 272 

F.3d at 678. But, to succeed on plain error review, “‘the trial 

judge’s comments [must be] so prejudicial as to deny a party an 

opportunity for a fair and impartial trial.’” Id. (citation 
14

omitted). Thus, Ecklin and Carter must establish that the jury 

actually convicted them based upon the trial court’s error. See

id. at 680. 

Given the evidence presented in this case, we are convinced 

that, had the district court’s problematic questioning not 

occurred, any reasonable jury still would have rejected Ecklin’s

and Carter’s justification defense. The government presented 

three eyewitnesses, all of whom were directly involved in the 

confrontation with Ecklin. Bonds and Wallace testified that 

Ecklin fired the gun before Wallace retrieved his gun from his 

car. Faulcon testified that she did not see Wallace approach 

Ecklin with a gun or point a gun at Ecklin. The government also 

called James, who testified that he told Ecklin about the 

“necessity law.” J.A. 481. 

Although the defense presented evidence to counter the 

government’s case, Ecklin and Carter’s justification defense was 

fated to fail given the inconsistencies in, and implausibility 

of, their evidence. At trial, the defense called several 

eyewitnesses, all of whom testified that they saw Wallace, but 

not Ecklin, with a gun. By contrast, both Ecklin and Carter 

testified that Ecklin had a gun. Moreover, Ecklin and Carter

gave several patently incredible responses to the government’s 

questions. For example, when asked what he did with the gun 

after the shooting, Ecklin testified that he “threw it[.]” J.A. 
15

454. And when the government asked Carter where he found the 

firearm and when he first saw it, Carter testified that he found 

the weapon “[u]nder the stairway” and first saw it as he walked 

“through the hallway[.]” J.A. 468-69. Carter explained that he

then saw the altercation involving Ecklin and ran back to get 

the firearm that he had just seen.

Moreover, the district court took steps to mitigate any 

possible prejudice that may have resulted from its problematic 

questioning. After the district judge interrogated a witness, 

he gave the parties a chance to address any newly raised issues. 

See, e.g., J.A. 229, 371, 378, 461, 473. And the judge 

instructed the jury that

[d]uring the course of the trial I occasionally asked 

questions of witnesses in order to bring out facts on 

issues that may have to be determined by me or to 

bring forth information that I feel had not been fully 

covered in the testimony. Do not assume that I hold 

any opinion on the matters to which my questions may 

have related. Whatever you think my opinion is or may 

be is not to be considered by you. It’s not my 

province to judge the guilt or innocence of the 

defendant, it’s yours.

J.A. 554; see Smith, 452 F.3d at 333-34 (finding no plain error 

when the judge gave a similar jury instruction).

In sum, based on the record before us, we cannot conclude 

that the trial judge’s comments were so prejudicial as to deny 

Ecklin or Carter an opportunity for a fair and impartial trial. 

See Godwin, 272 F.3d at 679. Nor can we conclude that the jury 
16

actually convicted Ecklin or Carter based upon the trial court’s

error. Id. at 680.2

B.

Ecklin and Carter next contend that the district court 

erred by imposing an obstruction of justice sentencing 

enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1. 

Appellate courts conduct a reasonableness inquiry coupled 

with an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to determine 

whether a district court properly imposed a sentence. United 

States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations

 2 As part of his judicial interference argument, Ecklin 

asserts that the district judge interfered during jury 

instructions by commenting to the jury about the unusual nature 

of the justification defense and by failing to give a requested 

reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence, and burden of proof 

instruction. Ecklin, however, does not challenge these jury 

instructions as a separate issue on appeal. Nor does he 

specifically argue that the district court erred in its jury 

instructions. This issue is therefore not properly before us. 

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). 

Even if it were, we are not convinced that the district 

court erred, much less committed plain error, in its jury 

instructions. First, the district court repeatedly instructed 

the jury that the government had the burden to prove guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court further 

instructed the jury that “[t]he defendants are presumed to be 

innocent of the crimes charged.” Transcript of Jury Charge at

135. And the district court’s comments about the unusual nature 

of the justification defense are consistent with the law. See

Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 586 (4th Cir. 2011) (jury 

instructions must be correct); United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 

397, 406 (4th Cir. 2007) (justification defense applies in the 

“rarest of occasions”).
17

omitted). We first determine whether the district court 

committed a procedural error in sentencing. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If the district court’s 

sentencing decision is procedurally sound, we then consider the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. 

To impose a two-level enhancement for obstruction of 

justice based on the defendant’s perjurious testimony, “the 

sentencing court must find that the defendant (1) gave false 

testimony; (2) concerning a material matter; (3) with willful 

intent to deceive.” Perez, 661 F.3d at 192 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The 

sentencing court must “specifically identify the perjurious 

statements and make a finding either as to each element of 

perjury or that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a 

finding of perjury.” United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 

205 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see 

also United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993). 

Carter maintains that the district court failed to make 

sufficient findings to establish that he obstructed justice. At 

the sentencing hearing, the district court found that Carter 

falsely testified that he found the gun lying on the ground. 

Further, the district court explained to Carter that “[t]his 

offense didn’t really involve you except that you got the 
18

weapon. I don’t know where the weapon was hidden, but it wasn’t 

under the stairs. You know it; I know it. It didn’t just 

appear and then disappear.” J.A. 691. We conclude that these 

findings establish that Carter’s false testimony was both 

material to his firearm possession charge and made with willful 

intent to deceive. See Perez, 661 F.3d at 193 (noting that with 

respect to willfulness, it would be enough for the court to say, 

“The defendant knew that his testimony was false when he gave 

it”); United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 681 (4th Cir. 2004)

(concluding that the defendant’s false testimony was material 

because it concerned the essential facts of the crimes charged).

Ecklin similarly contends that the district court failed to 

make sufficient findings to establish that he obstructed 

justice. In sentencing Ecklin, however, the district court 

announced that even without the obstruction of justice 

enhancement, “the sentence this Court would impose would be 

exactly the same.” J.A. 671. Further, the sentence the 

district court imposed was reasonable, even if the enhancement 

issue were decided in Ecklin’s favor. 

In United States v. Savillon-Matute, we affirmed a sentence 

based on an “assumed error harmlessness inquiry” consisting of 

(1) “knowledge that the district court would have reached the 

same result even if it had decided the guidelines issue the 

other way,” and (2) “a determination that the sentence would be 
19

reasonable even if the guidelines issue had been decided in the 

defendant’s favor.” 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). Because the district court 

plainly stated that Ecklin’s sentence would be the same and 

because we conclude that the sentence imposed was reasonable, 

even if the district court failed to make sufficient findings to 

support the enhancement, any error was harmless. See id.

C.

With his final argument on appeal, Ecklin contends that he 

did not receive a fair trial because the government knowingly 

offered false testimony from James and because the district 

court admitted evidence of Ecklin’s prior concealed weapon 

conviction and gang affiliation. We review a district court’s 

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and will vacate a 

conviction only if the district court acted arbitrarily or 

irrationally in admitting evidence. United States v. Basham, 

561 F.3d 302, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2009).

Citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), Ecklin 

first contends that the government knew that James’s trial 

testimony differed from his prior statement to the police, and 

yet allowed him to testify falsely. Giglio held that “[a] new 

trial is required if the false testimony could in any reasonable 
20

likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.” Id. at 154

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

Ecklin’s argument is unavailing because James’s allegedly 

false testimony could not have reasonably affected the jury’s 

judgment. See id. During an interview with a police detective 

and a government attorney in December 2011, James reported that 

Ecklin told him about his criminal charges and that James then

told Ecklin about the necessity defense. At trial, James 

reversed the order of those events, testifying that he told 

Ecklin about the necessity defense before Ecklin told him about 

Ecklin’s charges. Because the chronological order of James’s

conversation with Ecklin is wholly irrelevant to Ecklin’s 

justification defense and could not have reasonably affected the 

jury’s judgment, we reject Ecklin’s argument that he did not 

receive a fair trial on this basis. 

Ecklin also contends that he did not receive a fair trial 

because the district court admitted evidence of his prior 

concealed weapon conviction. Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a 

crime is not admissible to prove a person’s character, but may 

be admitted to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 

accident.” Fed. R. Evid. Rule 404(b). The district court 

admitted evidence of Ecklin’s prior concealed weapons conviction 

to show Ecklin’s “plan to conceal weapons, his knowledge of the 
21

apartment complex, . . . the locations for concealment, [and] 

his intent and his modus operandi in situations in which he 

conceals weapons up until and after he brandishes them.” J.A. 

327. The district court did not abuse its discretion by 

admitting Ecklin’s prior conviction for these purposes.

Finally, Ecklin contends that he was denied a fair trial 

because the district court admitted “improper evidence of gang 

affiliation which was not substantiated.” Ecklin Br. at 29. 

Other than one citation to the Joint Appendix, Ecklin does not 

develop this argument. Based on his single citation, Ecklin

appears to argue that the government improperly asked him if he

is in a gang and why his nickname is “Blood.” J.A. 450. In 

response to the government’s questions, Ecklin denied any gang 

membership. This innocuous inquiry clearly did not deny Ecklin 

a fair trial. 

D.

Carter also raises several separate arguments on appeal. 

Carter first challenges the government’s statement during 

closing argument that the jury should believe its witnesses 

because they had little or no criminal record.
22

Because Carter did not object to this statement at the time 

it was made,3 we must review only for plain error. See United 

States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776, 780 (4th Cir. 1995). To reverse 

for plain error, we must find that an error occurred, that the 

error was plain, that the error affected substantial rights, and 

that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. With regard

to his prosecutorial misconduct claim, Carter must show that the 

government’s remarks were improper and so prejudiced his

substantial rights that he was denied a fair trial. See United 

States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 913 (4th Cir. 1995). Several 

factors are relevant to the prejudice determination, including:

(1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have 

a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the 

accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or 

extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of 

competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of 

the accused; and (4) whether the comments were 

deliberately placed before the jury to divert 

attention to extraneous matters.

Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Carter’s claim fails under both the plain error and 

prosecutorial misconduct standards. Even if the government

improperly stated that “Ms. Bonds, Ms. Faulcon, [and] Mr. 

 3 Carter’s counsel did not object to the statement during 

the government’s closing argument. Instead, counsel requested a 

sidebar following the government’s closing argument to object.
23

Wallace . . . have minimal or no criminal history[,]” J.A. 527, 

this comment did not affect the fundamental fairness and 

integrity of the proceedings. The government’s comment was 

isolated, unlikely to mislead the jury—particularly given 

Wallace’s testimony that he was not a convicted felon—and did 

not divert the jury’s attention to extraneous matters. 

Furthermore, even without the comment, there was substantial 

evidence from which the jury could determine witness 

credibility.

E.

With his last argument on appeal, Carter maintains that 

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 

Carter essentially argues that because eyewitness testimony 

supported his justification defense, no reasonable jury could 

have rejected that defense. We review the denial of a Rule 29 

motion de novo, construing the evidence and any inferences 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the government. United 

States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 571 (4th Cir. 2011). And 

we must sustain the jury’s verdict if any reasonable trier of 

fact could have found Carter guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See id.

Carter argues that “[o]nly Wallace was unequivocal” that 

Ecklin was armed first, Carter Br. at 17, whereas the remaining 
24

eyewitnesses directly stated, or at least suggested, that Ecklin 

and Carter possessed a gun only in response to Wallace’s gun 

possession and threat. Carter, however, mischaracterizes 

Faulcon’s and Bonds’s testimony. In fact, their testimony

contradicted the defense’s theory that Wallace threatened Ecklin 

with a gun before Ecklin acquired a gun. And, in reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we must assume that the jury 

resolved all contradictions in the government’s favor. Id. at 

572. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support 

Carter’s conviction.

III.

In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in 

its various rulings and therefore affirm. 

AFFIRMED