[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 

re D.M., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3628.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3628 

IN RE D.M., A MINOR CHILD. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 

it may be cited as In re D.M., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3628.] 

Juv.R. 24 applies in bindover hearings—It is an abuse of discretion for a juvenile 

court not to perform an in camera inspection of documents a party claims 

are privileged or otherwise not discoverable prior to ordering the party to 

turn the documents over to the opposing party. 

(No. 2013-0579—Submitted March 12, 2014—Decided August 28, 2014.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-120794, 

2013-Ohio-668. 

____________________ 

 O’NEILL, J. 

Introduction 

{¶ 1} In this case we are asked to clarify what evidence a juvenile is 

entitled to in discovery prior to a bindover hearing. 

{¶ 2} In answering, we hold that Juv.R. 24 applies in bindover hearings. 

We also point out that a prosecuting attorney is under a duty imposed by the Due 
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Process Clauses of the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution and 

by Juv.R. 24(A)(6) to disclose to a juvenile respondent all evidence in the state’s 

possession that is favorable to the juvenile and material either to guilt, innocence, 

or punishment. State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. We further hold that it is an abuse of discretion for 

a juvenile court to dismiss a case for a prosecuting attorney’s failure to comply 

with a discovery order without first performing an in camera inspection of the 

withheld evidence to determine whether the evidence is discoverable under Juv.R. 

24. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 3} On October 15, 2012, a Cincinnati police officer filed a complaint 

against D.M. alleging that he was a delinquent child in that he committed a theft 

offense with a deadly weapon. The complaint alleged that D.M. had committed 

an act that if committed by an adult would constitute aggravated robbery in 

violation of R.C. 2911.01, a category-two offense as specified in R.C. 

2152.02(CC). The complaint also alleged two firearm specifications. The first 

was a firearm-facilitation specification, meaning he brandished or used a firearm 

to facilitate the offense. The second was a firearm-possession specification, 

meaning he had a firearm in his possession while committing the offense. D.M. 

was 16 years old at the time. 

{¶ 4} On October 16, 2012, the state filed a motion asking the juvenile 

court to relinquish jurisdiction and to have D.M. bound over to the general 

division of the court of common pleas for prosecution as an adult. On October 

17, 2012, D.M. filed a request for discovery pursuant to Juv.R. 24 and Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (due process 

entitles an accused, upon request, to evidence known to the state that is favorable 

to the accused and is material to either guilt or punishment). The state responded 

to D.M.’s discovery request by disclosing the names of the victim and two police 
January Term, 2014 

3 

officers that the prosecuting attorney intended to call to testify at the bindover 

hearing regarding the investigation of the crime. The state’s response also 

included an attachment containing D.M.’s signed waiver-of-rights form and oral 

statements made by D.M. and two codefendants. 

{¶ 5} On October 25, 2012, the same day on which the bindover hearing 

was to take place, D.M. filed a motion to compel discovery requesting that the 

juvenile court order the state to turn over additional evidence, including policereport forms 301 and 527B, relating to D.M.’s case. The court held a hearing on 

the motion to compel, and counsel for D.M. asserted that D.M. was entitled to full 

Juv.R. 24 discovery, which she asserted included the 301 and 527B police reports. 

The state asserted that it had disclosed all the evidence that it was required to 

disclose under the law for a bindover hearing. On November 8, the court again 

heard arguments on D.M.’s motion to compel, and afterward, the court ordered 

the state to turn over the 301 and 527B police reports. 

{¶ 6} Despite the court order, the state did not turn over the 301 and 

527B reports. On November 19, 2012, the court again heard the parties’ 

arguments on the issue of the discoverability of the 301 and 527B reports. The 

state maintained that it had disclosed all the evidence that it was required to 

disclose and that the police reports at issue were not discoverable for two reasons: 

one, because a bindover hearing is not an adjudicatory proceeding, so Juv.R. 24 

does not apply, and two, the reports are privileged work product. D.M. moved for 

dismissal of the charges based on the state’s failure to comply with the court’s 

discovery order. The juvenile court noted that the state had not requested that the 

court limit the information it had to disclose from the police reports. The court 

stated that because the documents were prepared in the ordinary course of police 

work, rather than in anticipation of litigation, they should have been turned over 

to the defense. And because the state had failed to obey the court’s order to turn 

over the documents, the juvenile court dismissed the case without prejudice. 
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4 

{¶ 7} The state appealed. Relying in part on the authority of Iacona, 93 

Ohio St.3d 83, 752 N.E.2d 937, the First District reversed the juvenile court’s 

judgment and held that prior to a bindover hearing, the only evidence that the 

state must provide to a juvenile, upon request, is (1) Brady materials in its 

possession and (2) evidence that it intends to use at the bindover hearing. The 

court vacated the juvenile court’s judgment and remanded the cause. 

{¶ 8} D.M. appealed to this court and urges this court to adopt the 

proposition that a juvenile is entitled to full Juv.R. 24 discovery prior to a 

bindover hearing held pursuant to R.C. 2152.12. At oral argument, the state asked 

this court to clarify what information due process requires to be turned over in 

discovery to juveniles prior to a bindover hearing. 

Analysis 

{¶ 9} The standard of review of a trial court’s decision in a discovery 

matter is whether the court abused its discretion. State ex rel. Denton v. 

Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 2003-Ohio-861, 784 N.E.2d 99, ¶ 31. 

{¶ 10} In order to establish probable cause to believe that a juvenile 

committed an offense, the state must provide credible evidence that “raises more 

than a mere suspicion of guilt, but need not provide evidence proving guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d at 93, 752 N.E.2d 937. The 

juvenile court has the duty to assess the credibility of the evidence and to 

determine whether the state has presented credible evidence going to each 

element of the charged offense, but it is not permitted to exceed the limited scope 

of the bindover hearing or to assume the role of the fact-finder at trial. In re 

A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 44. 

{¶ 11} Regardless of the limited scope of bindover proceedings, the 

Supreme Court of the United States has held that the bindover hearing is a 

“critically important proceeding” and that the hearing “must measure up to the 

essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Id., quoting Kent v. United States, 
January Term, 2014 

5 

383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), citing Pee v. United 

States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 50, 274 F.2d 556 (1959). 

{¶ 12} We cited this holding in Iacona in determining that Brady, 373 

U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, and Juv.R. 24(A)(6) apply to mandatorybindover hearings in Ohio. Id., 93 Ohio St.3d at 92, 752 N.E.2d 937. Although 

we did not explicitly hold in Iacona that Juv.R. 24 applies in its entirety to 

bindover hearings, we certainly implied that it does. Nevertheless, we make clear 

today that it does. Upon written request, and to the extent not privileged, Juv.R. 

24(A) requires the following information to be produced prior to a mandatory or 

discretionary bindover hearing: 

(1) The names and last known addresses of each witness to 

the occurrence that forms the basis of the charge or defense; 

(2) Copies of any written statements made by any party or 

witness; 

(3) Transcriptions, recordings, and summaries of any oral 

statements of any party or witness, except the work product of 

counsel; 

(4) Any scientific or other reports that a party intends to 

introduce at the hearing or that pertain to physical evidence that a 

party intends to introduce; 

(5) Photographs and any physical evidence which a party 

intends to introduce at the hearing; 

(6) * * * all evidence, known or that may become known to 

the prosecuting attorney, favorable to the respondent and material 

either to guilt or punishment. 
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6 

{¶ 13} Here, the juvenile court was faced with a standoff between the 

state and the defense regarding whether D.M. was entitled to certain police 

reports. The state argued (1) that these reports are work product and are thus not 

discoverable and (2) that even if they were discoverable, D.M. would not be 

entitled to them prior to a bindover hearing because he is not entitled to full 

Juv.R. 24 discovery at that stage. D.M. argued that he was entitled to full Juv.R. 

24 discovery and that even if he were not, he would clearly be entitled, under 

Brady and Iacona, to any information in the police reports that is material to guilt 

or punishment that would be favorable to him. At the second hearing on this 

matter, it was clear that the parties could not resolve this issue on their own. It 

was then that the discoverability of these reports for purposes of D.M.’s bindover 

hearing became a question of law for the juvenile court to resolve. The court 

ruled in D.M.’s favor and ordered the state to turn over the police reports. 

{¶ 14} We hold that the court should not have ordered the state to turn 

over the police reports without first asking the prosecuting attorney to turn the 

documents over to the court for an in camera inspection to determine whether 

they contained discoverable material under Juv.R. 24. If the judge determined 

that they did contain discoverable material, she was then required to determine 

whether they also contained nondiscoverable material, such as work product, that 

the prosecuting attorney could redact prior to turning the documents over to 

D.M.’s counsel. Performing an in camera review of the documents to ascertain 

whether they contained privileged information would have ensured a fair 

proceeding and the protection of privileged information. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 

480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). 

{¶ 15} Juvenile courts are under an obligation to see that the procedural 

and substantive due-process rights of juveniles are upheld, but they must also 

allow the state to pursue its objectives of rehabilitating juvenile offenders and 

protecting society. We note that the juvenile court continued this case twice prior 
January Term, 2014 

7 

to dismissing it without prejudice. It is certainly understandable why the juvenile 

court judge was frustrated with the state’s conduct, but prior to dismissing the 

case for failure to comply with the discovery order the juvenile court should have 

ordered the state to turn over these police reports to the court for an in camera 

inspection. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court 

to dismiss D.M.’s case without performing such an inspection. This court has 

consistently ruled that when imposing a discovery sanction, the court must impose 

the least severe sanction that is consistent with the purpose of the rules of 

discovery. See, e.g., Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138 

(1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. And as we held in State v. Darmond, 135 

Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, syllabus, this rule applies 

equally to discovery violations committed by the state and to discovery violations 

committed by a criminal defendant. 

{¶ 16} In conclusion, we hold that Juv.R. 24 applies in bindover hearings. 

A prosecuting attorney is under a duty imposed by Juv.R. 24(A)(6) and the Due 

Process Clauses of the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution to 

disclose to a juvenile respondent all evidence in the state’s possession that is 

favorable to the juvenile and material to either guilt, innocence, or punishment. 

We further hold that when the state or the juvenile claims that documents are 

privileged or otherwise not discoverable, it is an abuse of discretion for the 

juvenile court not to perform an in camera inspection of the documents to 

determine whether they contain discoverable evidence prior to ordering the party 

to turn over the documents to the opposing party or sanctioning the party for 

failing to comply with a discovery order. 

{¶ 17} Based on these holdings, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment 

reversing and vacating the juvenile court’s dismissal of D.M.’s case. We stress, 

however, that we do not adopt the court of appeals’ holding that the scope of 

discovery for a bindover hearing is less than that provided for under Juv.R. 24. 
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Thus, we remand the cause to the juvenile court for further proceedings, which 

shall include an in camera inspection of the withheld documents to determine 

whether they contain evidence discoverable under Juv.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., 

concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 

____________________ 

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Gordon C. 

Magella, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant, D.M. 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. 

Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee, the state of Ohio. 

Kim Tandy, urging reversal for amicus curiae Children’s Law Center, Inc. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Brook Burns, Assistant Public 

Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender. 

Nadia Natasha Seeratan, urging reversal for amicus curiae National 

Juvenile Defender Center. 

_________________________