In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

TYJUAN ANDERSON, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

CITY OF ROCKFORD, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. 

Nos. 3:15-cv-50065 & 3:15-cv-50064 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 14, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 25, 2019 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Nowhere does the Constitution’s 

promise of due process mean more than in a criminal trial. 

This promise translates into an obligation when police and 

prosecutors find themselves in possession of information that 

exculpates a criminal defendant. That is the cornerstone of the 

Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, and this 

case presents serious and unresolved questions whether certain detectives in Rockford, Illinois, failed to adhere to their 
2 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

Brady obligations when prosecuting three men for the murder 

of eight-year-old Demarcus Hanson on April 14, 2002. One of 

those detectives has since admitted—under oath no less—to 

engaging in serious misconduct during the investigation. 

In 2013 an Illinois court found a Brady violation as part of 

vacating the murder convictions of Tyjuan Anderson, Lumont 

Johnson, and Anthony Ross after each man served more than 

a decade in prison. The case entered federal court when Anderson, Johnson, and Ross then brought claims for money 

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City 

of Rockford and a score of individual defendants. The district 

court granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of all 

defendants. We reverse. While the case entails many complexities, Anderson, Johnson, and Ross have brought forth sufficient evidence to move forward against particular defendants 

on particular aspects of their alleged due process violations. 

I 

Demarcus Hanson was killed by shots fired into his grandmother’s Rockford home. The State successfully prosecuted 

Tyjuan Anderson, Lumont Johnson, and Anthony Ross for the 

murder and each received a 50-year sentence. The men spent 

more than a decade in prison before an Illinois court ordered 

a new trial based on the delayed disclosure of Brady material—specifically, the recorded jail calls of the prosecution’s 

key witness in which he contradicted his trial testimony. Anderson, Johnson, and Ross were retried and acquitted. They 

then turned to federal court by filing this lawsuit against the 

City of Rockford and multiple Rockford police officers alleging that the defendant officers violated their rights under the 

U.S. Constitution and Illinois law by not only withholding the 

recorded jail calls and other exculpatory information, but also 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 3

by fabricating evidence leading to their convictions for a 

crime they insist they did not commit. 

A. The Murder and Investigation 

At approximately 2:51 a.m. on April 14, 2002, someone 

fired shots into Estelle Dowthard’s home. One of the bullets 

struck and killed her eight-year-old grandson Demarcus Hanson as he was sleeping in his bed. Responding officers from 

the Rockford Police Department soon learned that Estelle’s 

son, Alex Dowthard, was likely the shooter’s intended target. 

Dowthard would come to play a substantial role in the investigation and, ultimately, the plaintiffs’ trials and convictions. 

Detectives Doug Palmer and Joseph Stevens—both defendants in this case—led the investigation. Within hours of 

the shooting, Palmer and another detective, defendant James 

Randall, interviewed Dowthard, who denied any knowledge 

about his nephew’s murder. Dowthard told the detectives 

that, in the hours before the murder, he had a verbal altercation with Anderson, Johnson, and Ross near the M+M Market 

in Rockford and he shot at the trio as they drove in a white 

Suburban. Dowthard explained that he then drove to his 

mother’s home and hid his gun under a car parked outside. 

He insisted, however, that he was not present when shots 

were later fired at his mother’s house and therefore did not 

know who killed his nephew. 

The police used Dowthard’s admission that he possessed 

a gun (and shot at the plaintiffs) to detain him on a parole violation. A few weeks later, on May 2, Detectives Palmer and 

Stevens again sought to speak with Dowthard, this time at Big 

Muddy River Correctional Center, where he was incarcerated 

on the parole violation. And Dowthard again denied any 
4 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

knowledge about his nephew’s murder. During this visit, Detective Stevens also requested copies of Dowthard’s jail calls 

to assist with the investigation. Less than two weeks later, undoubtedly to increase the pressure on Dowthard to cooperate, 

the State resurrected an old set of forgery allegations (dating 

to February 2002) that had gone uncharged. The new charges 

provided a second basis to revoke Dowthard’s parole. 

Rockford police met with Dowthard a third time on May 

31, 2002. This time Dowthard, who was still incarcerated for 

the parole violation, agreed to talk, but only if detectives 

agreed to inform the parole board of his cooperation. He then 

provided Sergeant Gregory Lindmark and defendant Detective Theo Glover a written statement claiming, for the first 

time, that he was present when his nephew was shot. Despite 

his initial denials, Dowthard now claimed he saw three individuals—Anderson, Johnson, and Ross—exit a red car with 

guns and then, as he was fleeing, heard shots fired toward his 

mother’s house. He told the police that he initially denied seeing the shooters because he thought he could handle the matter himself. Later that summer, Dowthard repeated this story 

before the grand jury, and on July 31, the State dismissed his 

forgery charge. 

Detectives Stevens and Palmer also interviewed Lataurean 

Brown, who was with Dowthard in the hours before the murder. While Brown would eventually become an important 

prosecution witness, during his initial interview on April 24, 

he denied knowing who shot at the Dowthard home. But he 

admitted to seeing Alex Dowthard fire shots at the plaintiffs’ 

Suburban earlier that night. He also told police that he drove 

Dowthard to his mother’s house, where Dowthard hid his 

gun under a car. The two men then drove to the Concord 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 5

Commons, where Brown saw and spoke to his cousin 

Rickedda Young. A few weeks later, Detectives Stevens and 

Palmer interviewed Brown a second time. By the end of the 

ten-hour interview, Brown changed his account and signed a 

written statement claiming Anderson, Johnson, and Ross 

were responsible for Hanson’s death. 

In April 2002, and following up on the information provided by Brown, the police spoke with Rickedda Young. 

Young told Detectives Stevens and Scott Mastroinanni (also a 

defendant in this case) that she saw and spoke to Brown and 

Dowthard at the Concord Commons during the early morning hours of April 14. She stated that Dowthard and Brown 

told her that someone had just fired shots at them as they fled 

Dowthard’s mother’s house, but they did not know who. Neither Stevens nor Mastroinanni documented or disclosed this 

fact—that immediately after the shooting, the State’s key witnesses told a family member they did not see the shooter—in 

the subsequent prosecution of Anderson, Johnson, and Ross. 

The Rockford police also investigated but ultimately excluded two other possible suspects, Kefentse Taylor and Casel 

Montgomery, before arresting the three plaintiffs (Anderson, 

Johnson, and Ross) for Demarcus Hanson’s murder. 

B. Criminal Trials 

Anderson and Johnson proceeded to trial in October 2002. 

The Thursday before trial was to begin, the prosecution received more than 40 hours of Alex Dowthard’s recorded jail 

calls from the Rockford police. The tapes, which were made 

available to the plaintiffs’ then-defense attorneys the following afternoon, included Dowthard’s conversations with fam-
6 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

ily and friends while he was incarcerated for the parole violation in May 2002. The conversations predated Dowthard’s 

May 31 written statement in which he first implicated the 

plaintiffs. Given the length and poor quality of the recordings, 

the attorneys for the plaintiffs (then defendants) requested a 

continuance for more time to listen to all of them and to determine whether they contained exculpatory or otherwise 

useful defense evidence. The trial court denied the request 

and proceeded with jury selection, affording the attorneys for 

Anderson and Johnson only a couple of days to review the 

recordings. 

With no physical or forensic evidence connecting the 

plaintiffs to the crime, the prosecution’s case rested on the testimony of Alex Dowthard and Lautaurean Brown. Dowthard 

testified consistent with his May 31 written statement implicating the plaintiffs, though he offered a different explanation 

for his evolving account of the murder. Recall that in his written statement Dowthard claimed that he initially lied to the 

police (by denying knowledge of who shot Hanson) because 

he thought he could handle the situation himself. At trial, 

however, Dowthard testified that during his first two interviews he told detectives he did not witness the murder because he was on parole and telling the police the true and full 

account of what happened during the early morning hours of 

April 14 would mean admitting that he had a gun and thus 

admitting to a parole violation. (This explanation made little 

sense because Dowthard admitted to possessing a gun during 

his first interview with police just hours after the murder, 

which resulted in a parole violation.) 

Dowthard further testified that he eventually cooperated 

with police without receiving anything in return. During 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 7

cross-examination, however, he conceded that following his 

testimony in the grand jury, the State dropped his unrelated 

forgery charge, sent a letter to the parole board relaying this 

information, and decided not to charge him for the shots he 

fired at the plaintiffs just before Hanson’s murder. Neither 

party introduced or otherwise used any aspect of Dowthard’s 

jail calls at Anderson and Johnson’s trial. 

Lautaurean Brown also testified for the prosecution and, 

like Dowthard, pointed the finger at the plaintiffs, though he 

denied seeing anyone carrying a gun. 

As for the defense case, Anderson and Johnson presented 

alibi witnesses and argued that two other individuals, Kefentse Taylor and Casel Montgomery, were the actual shooters. 

The jury found Anderson and Johnson guilty of murder, and 

the trial court later sentenced each of them to 50 years’ imprisonment. 

The third plaintiff, Anthony Ross, proceeded to trial in 

2004. Brown and Dowthard again testified for the prosecution 

and echoed the accounts provided in the trial of Johnson and 

Anderson. The jury also heard from Ross’s cousin, Sonya 

White, who claimed she was with Ross when he tossed the 

murder weapon into a lake and confessed to killing Hanson. 

Ross then testified in his own defense and denied any involvement in the murder while also presenting an alibi witness. 

The jury returned a guilty verdict, and, as with Johnson and 

Anderson, Ross received a sentence of 50 years. 

C. Post-conviction Proceedings 

Following unsuccessful direct appeals, all three plaintiffs 

filed petitions for post-conviction relief in which they asserted 

their innocence and alleged, as they do here, that the officers 
8 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

investigating Demarcus Hanson’s murder committed numerous Brady violations. They also alleged that the defendant officers engaged in misconduct by coercing witnesses and fabricating evidence. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit by Detective Palmer—the lead investigator—in which Palmer admitted that he threatened witnesses, 

falsified witness statements, neutralized exculpatory evidence, and instructed witnesses to offer testimony he believed 

was false. 

The trial court reacted to Detective Palmer’s admissions of 

misconduct by holding an evidentiary hearing on the plaintiffs’ petitions for post-conviction relief. The court heard testimony from Palmer and approximately 34 other witnesses. 

Palmer’s testimony focused on three topics: the circumstances 

surrounding his resignation from the Rockford Police Department in 2004, his own wrongdoing during the Hanson murder investigation, and his belief that Anderson, Johnson, and 

Ross did not commit the murder. We need focus only on the 

testimony regarding police misconduct. 

Palmer admitted at length and in substantial detail that he 

threatened and coerced witnesses to give statements and encouraged witnesses to provide false testimony during the 

plaintiffs’ criminal trials. He described, for example, how he 

had instructed the two key prosecution witnesses—

Dowthard and Brown—to testify consistently with their written statements implicating the plaintiffs even though he believed those statements were false. He also explained how he 

falsified a statement from a man named Bryce Croft and then 

compelled Croft to sign the statement. 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 9

The details matter. According to Palmer, in the summer of 

2002 and before the plaintiffs’ trials, Bryce Croft, then an inmate at Winnebago County Jail, requested to see him and, 

during the meeting that followed, provided detailed information implicating an alternative suspect, Casel Montgomery, in Hanson’s murder. Palmer testified that instead of pursuing this lead against Montgomery, he took a deliberate step 

to prevent Croft’s statement from being of any use to the 

plaintiffs during their criminal trials. He told the court that he 

did so at the direction of his supervisor, testifying that “Sergeant Lindmark told me to make a liar out of Bryce Croft.” 

Palmer explained that, upon receiving this instruction, he met 

a second time with Croft and, during that meeting, forced 

Croft to sign a pre-written and false statement recanting his 

original statement. The plaintiffs went to trial knowing none 

of the circumstances surrounding Croft’s second statement or 

that his recantation was false. 

Croft, too, testified at the evidentiary hearing and corroborated much of Detective Palmer’s account. He explained that 

he met with Palmer in July 2002 to provide information about 

Casel Montgomery’s role in the murder. After doing so, 

though, Palmer returned a few months later and, as Croft recounted, threatened him with perjury charges if he did not 

recant his original statement implicating Montgomery. Croft 

recalled that Palmer brought with him a pre-written statement and, as part of leveling a threat of prosecution, demanded Croft sign it. Croft explained that he signed the second statement—even though he knew it was false—because 

of Palmer’s threats. 
10 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

The plaintiffs also called Alex Dowthard as a witness, but 

he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and did not testify. 

As part of assessing the plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the trial 

court also considered statements Dowthard made during telephone calls from jail in May 2002. It was undisputed that 

these recorded conversations, which totaled approximately 

40 hours, were not made available to the attorneys for Anderson, Johnson, and Ross until Friday, October 18, and Anderson and Johnson’s joint trial was to begin the following Monday, October 21. 

Contrary to his testimony at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials, 

during several conversations with family, Dowthard denied 

being present when his nephew was shot and killed. These 

conversations took place shortly after Dowthard’s incarceration for the parole violation and, importantly, at the time the 

police were visiting him and pressing for information on the 

Hanson murder. On May 2, for example, the same day Detectives Palmer and Stevens visited Dowthard at Big Muddy, 

Dowthard told his mother that “he told them the truth,” a 

clear reference to telling the police that he did not know who 

shot the young boy. And again, on May 11, Dowthard told his 

cousin Antowan Lambert that, at the time of the murder, he 

“wasn’t no mother f* * * ing where around, you know what 

I’m saying.” 

The jail calls further revealed that Lambert, who officers 

were also pressing for information about Hanson’s murder, 

coached Dowthard on what to tell the police about the murder and fed him information about what Lautaurean Brown 

had told the police—all in an effort to enable Dowthard to 

align his account with Brown’s. For example, on May 16, two 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 11

weeks before Dowthard gave police a statement incriminating 

the plaintiffs, Lambert told Dowthard to memorize what he 

was telling him so that Dowthard’s statement “w[ould] coincide” with what Brown had already told police. 

In other calls from jail, Dowthard told friends and family 

that the police were pressuring him to cooperate. In early 

May, for instance, he told his mother that “[the police] talkin’ 

about bringin’ me up on some federal charges or whatever.” 

On May 13, Dowthard learned he was being charged with an 

unrelated forgery that would impact his parole status. On 

May 20, Dowthard told someone named Maria that the police 

were “playin’ with me, hurtin’ me until I’m damn near at the 

point man, you just don’t know.” In this same call, Dowthard 

added “[Detective] Palmer man got—hittin’ me all upside my 

head and everything, man tellin’ my sister what to—put his 

hands on me.” 

Following the hearing, the court rejected any claims of police misconduct, emphasizing that it did not find Detective 

Palmer’s testimony credible. While recognizing the extraordinary nature of Palmer’s admissions, the court concluded that 

“through his words, actions and timing of his ‘disclosures,’” 

the former detective had “cast a pall over the credibility of his 

latter day revelations.” Our review of the record suggests that 

the court’s credibility finding may have been driven in large 

part by the circumstances surrounding Palmer’s resignation 

from the Rockford Police Department. Those circumstances 

are not relevant here. 

Turning to the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding 

Dowthard’s jail calls, the court awarded each plaintiff a new 

trial, concluding that the State impermissibly delayed disclosure of the recordings. The calls, the court explained, included 
12 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

“outright denials of knowledge about the facts of the case” as 

well as “potential coaching” and “potential incentive” to implicate the plaintiffs—and without timely access to the recordings, the plaintiffs were “denied an essential tool in testing the 

credibility of Alex Dowthard.” The delayed disclosure was 

particularly concerning, the court emphasized, because this 

was “essentially a one-eyewitness case,” and the key impeachment material was turned over “on the virtual eve of 

trial,” making it impossible for the attorneys to “meaningfully 

listen to [the tapes] and evaluate them.” Due process demanded a new trial, the court concluded, because it could not 

be sufficiently assured that the outcome of the trial would 

have been the same had Dowthard been cross-examined with 

his statements on the tapes. 

The State unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s award 

of post-conviction relief. See People v. Johnson, 2014 IL App 

(2d) 130368-U. The Illinois appellate court did not upset the 

trial court’s finding that Anderson and Johnson established 

a Brady violation. But the court reached a different conclusion 

as to Ross. Because Ross’s trial took place in 2004—more than 

a year after the prosecution turned over the Dowthard 

tapes—the court determined that he was not prejudiced by 

the delayed disclosure of the recordings. Instead, the court affirmed the grant of post-conviction relief as to Ross on alternative grounds, holding that Ross’s counsel was ineffective 

for failing to impeach Dowthard with the statements from his 

recorded jail calls. 

D. Criminal Retrial 

In 2015 the defendants were retried for the Hanson murder in a bench trial. This time Alex Dowthard invoked his 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 13

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. Lautaurean Brown initially did the same but 

then ultimately took the stand and stated that he “couldn’t see 

[the shooting] ‘cause I pulled off.” Finally, Sonya White, who 

testified at Ross’s original trial that Ross confessed to the murder, recanted her prior testimony and stated that she did not 

know who was responsible for Hanson’s death. 

The court acquitted all three men of murder. 

E. Civil Litigation 

In March 2015 the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, raising 

many of the same issues that formed the basis of their state 

post-conviction petitions. In two separate complaints, the 

plaintiffs asserted nine claims against the City of Rockford 

and multiple Rockford police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983: violation of their due process right to a fair trial under 

the Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy to deprive them of a 

right to a fair trial, failure to intervene, supervisory liability, 

and malicious prosecution. Each claim alleged that the defendant officers engaged in gross misconduct while investigating Demarcus Hanson’s murder. The plaintiffs further alleged that the officers’ misconduct was undertaken pursuant 

to a policy and practice of the Rockford Police Department. 

They also advanced four separate claims under Illinois law: 

malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, respondeat superior, and indemnification based on the 

same underlying conduct as alleged in their federal claims. 

The case proceeded to discovery. What is most relevant for 

purposes of appeal is that during the depositions of Detective 

Palmer and Alex Dowthard, both individuals invoked their 
14 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

protection under the Fifth Amendment and declined to testify. 

The district court entered summary judgment for all defendants on all claims. Beginning with the plaintiffs’ § 1983 

due process claim, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to 

identify sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any of the defendant police officers committed any of the alleged Brady violations or instances of evidence fabrication. Because each of 

the remaining claims allege the same underlying conduct, this 

conclusion led directly to the entry of summary judgment in 

the defendants’ favor on every other claim. 

The plaintiffs now appeal. 

II 

We begin with the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant 

police officers deprived them of a fair trial in violation of their 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause. The plaintiffs root their claim in two different theories: the defendant officers both withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of their Brady obligations and fabricated 

false witness statements. While we agree that summary judgment was proper on the fabrication allegations (with one limited exception), we conclude that the plaintiffs presented 

enough evidence to move forward on four particular grounds 

supporting their due process claim based on alleged Brady violations. 

A. Due Process Claim: Brady Violations 

The district court concluded that the record showed no 

genuine dispute as to whether the defendant police officers 

suppressed exculpatory evidence. In reaching this conclusion, 

however, the court failed to view the evidence in the light 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 15

most favorable to the plaintiffs and adhere to the fundamental 

principle that “at the summary judgment stage the judgeʹs 

function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine 

the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 249 (1986). 

The teachings of Brady are clear. In Brady itself the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of 

evidence favorable to an accused...violates due process 

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Subsequent decisions make 

plain that this precept translates into an affirmative duty to 

disclose to defendants all potentially exculpatory evidence, 

including impeachment evidence. See United States v. Bagley, 

473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Because Brady material also “encompasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not 

to the prosecutor,’” prosecutors have an affirmative duty “to 

learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on 

the governmentʹs behalf in [a] case, including the police.” 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (quoting Kyles v. 

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995)). This “Brady rule,” the 

Court has explained, is not intended “to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675. 

“While most commonly viewed as a prosecutor’s duty to 

disclose to the defense,” it is settled that the duty imposed by 

Brady “extends to the police and requires that they similarly 

turn over exculpatory/impeaching evidence to the prosecutor.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2008); 
16 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

see also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 349 (7th 

Cir. 2019). 

To prevail on a civil Brady-based due process claim against 

a police officer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence 

in question was favorable to him, the police “suppressed” the 

favorable evidence, and prejudice ensued because the suppressed evidence was material. See Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 566–

67; see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 832 & n.2 (7th Cir. 

2016). Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes if the “prosecution failed to disclose evidence that it or law enforcement 

was aware of before it was too late for the defendant to make 

use of the evidence” and “the evidence was not otherwise 

available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable 

diligence.” Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). 

To satisfy Brady’s prejudice prong, a civil plaintiff must 

demonstrate that the withheld evidence was material, meaning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the result would 

have been different had the suppressed evidence been put before the jury.” Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir. 

2019) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422). The Supreme Court has 

made clear that Brady’s “reasonable probability” standard is 

less onerous than the traditional preponderance standard. See 

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Indeed, “[t]he question is not whether 

the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he 

received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict 

worthy of confidence.” Id. To make this determination, courts 

must assess the cumulative effect of all the suppressed evidence “in the context of the entire record.” United States v. 

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 460. 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 17

Turning to the merits, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant officers failed to adhere to Brady’s mandate—and violated 

their due process rights—by: 

 Failing to disclose impeachment evidence offered by Rickedda Young; 

 Failing to disclose the circumstances surrounding Bryce Croft’s second statement; 

 Failing to disclose the improper police tactics 

that produced Lautaurean Brown’s May 9, 2002 

statement; 

 Failing to disclose the improper police tactics 

that produced Alex Dowthard’s May 31, 2002 

statement and, relatedly, failing to timely disclose Dowthard’s jail calls; and 

 Failing to disclose the circumstances surrounding Sonya White’s statement implicating Ross in 

the murder. 

With the exception of the allegations involving Sonya 

White, which lack support in the record, and the allegations 

involving the improper police tactics used on Dowthard, 

which lack admissible evidence in the record, we conclude 

that the plaintiffs have come forward with enough evidence 

to move forward with each of their alleged Brady violations 

against particular defendants. 

Rickedda Young Testimony. The plaintiffs contend that 

two of the defendants, Detectives Joseph Stevens and Scott

Mastroianni, committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose that Rickedda Young informed them that she saw Brown 

and Dowthard immediately following the murder and they 
18 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

told her they did not see who shot at Dowthard’s mother’s 

house and killed Hanson. For purposes of summary judgment, the defendants do not dispute that this evidence was 

favorable to the plaintiffs and that Stevens and Mastroianni 

suppressed it by not including it in their police reports or otherwise disclosing it to the prosecutors or plaintiffs. The defendants nonetheless urge us to view the evidence as falling 

short of Brady’s materiality threshold. Because the evidence 

allows a contrary inference, we decline this invitation. 

As the district court saw it, Young’s statement was immaterial—and therefore its omission did not prejudice the plaintiffs—because “it merely echoed the fact that [Alex] 

Dowthard and [Lautaurean] Brown had initially indicated 

that they did not know who [fired] shot[s] [at] Dowthard’s 

mother’s house.” The district court, in short, saw Young’s 

statement as cumulative of information the jury heard and 

knew. 

But this perspective reflects too narrow a view of the evidence, divorced from favorable and indeed exculpatory inferences available to the plaintiffs on these facts. The district 

court correctly observed that the jurors learned that both 

Brown and Dowthard initially told police they did not see the 

shooters—in direct contradiction to their ultimate trial testimony. What the court did not account for, though, was the 

testimony explaining these inconsistencies. Dowthard, for example, testified that he told police he did not know who killed 

his nephew because he was on parole and was not supposed 

to have a gun. Young’s statement—that immediately after the 

shooting, Brown and Dowthard told her, a family member, 

that they did not know who had just shot at them—would 

have directly impeached Dowthard’s explanation for why his 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 19

story changed. And the impeachment was on a point of substantial significance. Had the trial testimony included 

Young’s statement, the jury could have concluded that 

Dowthard in fact did not see who fired the shots into his 

mother’s house. Put differently, the jury could have concluded that Dowthard’s and Brown’s statements to Young immediately following the murder were true—that, in fact, they 

did not know who shot into Dowthard’s mother’s house—

and that their trial testimony (and Dowthard’s explanation of 

his original statement to police) was false. 

Suppressed impeachment evidence “may not be material 

if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). But 

suppressed evidence takes on particular significance—and is 

“plainly material”—where the prosecution’s case rests solely 

on the credibility of an eyewitness. Id. 

That is the case here. No physical or forensic evidence 

linked the plaintiffs to the Hanson murder. Rather, the State’s 

case hinged on the reliability of what the prosecution insisted 

was eyewitness testimony from Brown and Dowthard. 

Rickedda Young’s suppressed evidence would have directly 

impeached Brown and Dowthard’s testimony that they saw 

the plaintiffs commit the murder—the central issue at trial. 

Young’s statement also would have lent credibility to the 

plaintiffs’ argument that Dowthard, the State’s key witness, 

initially told the police the truth (that he did not see the shooting) but later lied during his trial testimony to garner personal 

favor with the State. Based on these inferences, reasonably 

available from the record, the plaintiffs came forward with 

enough evidence to survive summary judgement on their the-
20 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

ory that the defendant officers (in particular, Detectives Stevens and Mastroianni) violated Brady by withholding Young’s 

statement. The district court erred in concluding otherwise. 

Bryce Croft Evidence. What the record shows regarding 

Bryce Croft is most troubling. In the summer of 2002—before 

the plaintiffs’ criminal trials—Croft provided Detective 

Palmer with firsthand information that someone other than 

the plaintiffs committed the murder. This development, 

Palmer has admitted, later led him to prepare a false statement on behalf of Bryce Croft, which he then forced Croft to 

sign. The statement was significant because it recanted the information Croft previously provided police about the alternative suspect (Casel Montgomery). Palmer did so—he has 

stated under oath—not only knowing the statement was false, 

but also for the sole purpose of neutralizing a witness who 

had a meaningful chance of undermining the prosecution’s 

case against the plaintiffs. 

The district court accepted that the plaintiffs knew nothing 

of Detective Palmer’s misconduct before their criminal trials 

or that Croft’s recantation was false. But it nonetheless concluded that “the concealment of the coercion and fabrication 

of Croft’s second statement did not prevent plaintiffs from 

calling him as a witness at their trials” because “[e]ither side 

could have called Croft and allowed the adversarial trial process to flesh out the truth.” 

This conclusion too discounts the evidence, especially at 

summary judgment. Nothing we see in the record shows that, 

at the time of their criminal trials, the plaintiffs had any idea 

that Croft’s recantation was the product of police coercion or 

fabrication. And, without Detective Palmer’s admission, the 

plaintiffs had no way to prove the recantation was false. 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 21

Due process entitled the plaintiffs to learn before their trial 

what went on with Bryce Croft. See Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 

847 F.3d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the right to a 

fair trial is implicated if the State fails to disclose “facts about 

the coercive tactics used to obtain” a witness’s statement). Remember that Croft was not a fringe player for the plaintiffs’ 

defense. To the contrary, he was a witness the plaintiffs very 

well may have called to assign responsibility for the Hanson 

murder to someone else. Croft had given an initial statement 

to the police saying that he had firsthand knowledge that Casel Montgomery—not the plaintiffs—was responsible for the 

murder. But there was no way the plaintiffs would have run 

the risk of calling Croft as a witness at their criminal trials in 

the wake of his statement recanting that Montgomery was responsible for the murder. And that simple observation—as 

Detective Palmer has since admitted—is precisely why he falsified the recantation and then forced Croft to sign it. The 

whole point was to neutralize Croft without the plaintiffs ever 

knowing that Croft’s about-face was the fruit of police misconduct. The plaintiffs have brought forth plenty here to 

move forward on this alleged Brady violation. 

Lautaurean Brown’s Statement. We next consider the 

plaintiffs’ contention that Detectives Palmer and Stevens violated Brady by failing to disclose the coercive tactics used to 

extract Lautaurean Brown’s statement implicating them in 

Hanson’s murder. The district court accepted that, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence showed that Brown’s May 9, 2002 statement (and his 

corresponding trial testimony) implicating the plaintiffs was 

the product of Palmer’s threat that he would go to jail if he 

did not give a written statement incriminating the plaintiffs. 

But from there the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to 
22 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

identify adequate evidence to satisfy Brady’s prejudice element because, during the plaintiffs’ retrial in 2015, Brown testified that the threat did not impact the accuracy of his statement. We cannot agree. 

The district court’s reasoning effectively required the 

plaintiffs to accept that Brown’s testimony in 2002 and 2004 

was true because he later said so. The proper Brady analysis 

works a different way. Regardless of whether Brown’s statement (and resulting testimony) was true or false, Brady imposed a disclosure obligation: due process required disclosure to the plaintiffs of the coercive tactics used to obtain 

Brown’s statement. See Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Armed with 

that information, the plaintiffs could have contended, in their 

cross examinations of Brown and during closing arguments, 

that Brown’s testimony implicating the plaintiffs in the Hanson murder was false—the fruit of police coercion. Put most 

simply, a criminal defendant has a due process right to information that may materially impeach the testimony of a state’s 

witness. Indeed, that is the very promise—the essential protection—of Brady. Because it is undisputed that the defendants failed to disclose the coercive tactics used to obtain 

Brown’s statement, the district court erred by granting summary judgment on this alleged Brady violation. 

Alex Dowthard’s Jail Calls. Finally, the district court compounded these errors by rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention 

that an interrelated Brady violation occurred with the delayed 

disclosure of the recordings of Alex Dowthard’s telephone 

calls from Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Recall that 

the tapes contain 40 hours of conversations Dowthard had 

with his family and friends in May 2002, following his incarceration on a parole violation. In the recorded conversations, 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 23

Dowthard told his family and friends that he was not present 

when his nephew was shot; he was threatened with additional charges if he failed to cooperate; he was physically 

threatened by police; and he was coached on what to say to 

police. Without question this evidence is both favorable and 

material to the plaintiffs. The only issue, then, is whether the 

tapes were suppressed within the meaning of Brady. The 

plaintiffs have come forward with enough at summary judgment showing the answer may well be yes. 

To establish that the tapes were suppressed, the plaintiffs 

must show that the State “failed to disclose known evidence 

before it was too late for [them] to make use of the evidence” 

at their criminal trials. Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 850 (7th 

Cir. 2002). “The relevant inquiry,” we have emphasized, “is 

not whether the [State] disclosed the potentially exculpatory 

information at all, but whether [the criminal defendant] had 

sufficient time to use any exculpatory information revealed to 

him during trial.” Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 423 (7th 

Cir. 2014). 

The record shows that the prosecution received the 

Dowthard recordings from Rockford police on October 17, 

2002—the Thursday before Anderson and Johnson’s trial. The 

State produced the tapes to the plaintiffs’ (then defendants’) 

attorneys the next day, a period that two Illinois courts concluded was insufficient to allow for meaningful review and 

use of the tapes at trial. The plaintiffs contend, however, that 

Detective Stevens—not the prosecutors—suppressed the 

tapes by willfully withholding them from the prosecution until the eve of trial. 

In most circumstances “a police officer’s Brady obligations 

are discharged by disclosing material exculpatory evidence to 
24 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

the prosecutor, [because] it is the prosecutor’s responsibility 

to turn the evidence over to defense counsel.” Beaman v. 

Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 512 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, though, the 

facts as they presently stand permit a different conclusion. 

The record shows that Detective Stevens requested 

Dowthard’s jail calls on May 2, 2002. He testified that the jail 

sent him the recorded calls piecemeal on 20 different tapes, 

and he then listened to each of them. Though we are unable 

to discern with precision when Stevens actually received or 

listened to each of the tapes, there are indications in the record 

that he received them in May and June. In a supplemental police report dated September 9, 2002, for example, Stevens described his work on the Hanson case in May 2002, noting that 

“[w]hile Dowthard was in prison, [Stevens] received packages of cassette tapes which had recorded phone calls Alex 

Dowthard made while incarcerated at Big Muddy River Correctional Center.” Dowthard testified that he was released 

from custody at the end of June 2002, permitting the inference 

that Detective Stevens possessed the jail tapes for at least three 

months before Anderson and Johnson’s criminal trial yet 

waited to disclose them until the Thursday before trial, while 

also assuring the lead prosecutor that the calls contained 

nothing relevant to the Hanson case. 

When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiffs—as we must on summary judgment—the record allows the inference that, after receiving the tapes in May 

and June 2002, Detective Stevens withheld the calls, waited 

until the eve of trial to turn them over (when it was already 

too late for the plaintiffs to use them), and may well have compounded the delay by inaccurately describing their content 

and significance when he eventually turned them over to the 

prosecution. On this record, we conclude that there is enough 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 25

here to infer that Stevens suppressed the Dowthard tapes 

within the meaning of Brady. Of course, the ultimate facts may 

come out differently at trial and fully absolve Detective Stevens. Our conclusion is limited to observing that the record, 

as it now stands, allows the plaintiffs to survive summary 

judgment on this alleged Brady violation. 

For the sake of completeness, we briefly address an evidentiary matter the parties have raised with respect to the 

Dowthard tapes. The parties devote considerable attention to 

the admissibility of the recordings. The district court concluded that Dowthard’s calls could not be used as evidence in 

opposition to summary judgment because they contain inadmissible hearsay. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th 

Cir. 2009) (“[A] court may consider only admissible evidence 

in assessing a motion for summary judgment.”). To the extent 

that the plaintiffs seek to admit Dowthard’s statements on the 

calls for their truth, we agree. 

But observing that the statements made on the recorded 

calls may not be admissible for their truth under one or another exception to the hearsay rule does not mean the evidence is not relevant and admissible for another purpose. The 

alternative purpose here is to establish the existence of a Brady 

violation based on Detectives Stevens’s failure to disclose the 

impeachment material contained on the tapes. To succeed on 

this aspect of their due process claim, Anderson and Johnson 

must show not that Dowthard was telling the truth during his 

phone conversations with family and friends, but rather that 

the plaintiffs could have used his statements for impeachment 

purposes during their criminal trial—to undermine the credibility of testimony offered by Dowthard. See 28 Wright & 

Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6206 at 593 (2012) 
26 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

(“Where a prior inconsistent statement is offered only to impeach, it is not hearsay since it merely shows the witness is 

unreliable and says nothing about the truth of the facts asserted in the statement.”). 

To the extent that the parties debate the authenticity of the 

Dowthard tapes, we note only that, as best we can tell, no one 

questions whether the tapes came from the State and reflect 

Dowthard’s voice and telephone discussions while incarcerated at Big Muddy. And what we see in the summary judgment record are certified transcripts of the recorded calls (just 

as a deposition transcript would be certified), and there too 

nobody seems to say the certification is false. We have no reason, in short, to question that the plaintiffs have sufficiently 

authenticated the tapes and transcripts to allow us to consider 

their impeachment value for purposes of assessing this aspect 

of their Brady claim. 

B. Due Process Claim: Fabricated Evidence 

In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that 

the officers fabricated a laundry list of evidence. Those allegations extend to Alex Dowthard’s and Lautaurean Brown’s 

statements (and subsequent trial testimony) implicating the 

plaintiffs in Hanson’s murder as well as Bryce Croft’s recantation. While we agree that the plaintiffs brought forward evidence of coercion, we see no error with the district court disallowing the due process claim to go forward on a theory of 

fabricated evidence with one limited exception as it pertains 

to Detective Palmer. 

It is well-established that “a police officer who manufactures false evidence against a criminal defendant violates due 

process if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 27

of [his] liberty in some way.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 

F.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). To establish such a violation, the 

plaintiffs must demonstrate not only that the defendant officers “created evidence that they knew to be false,” Petty, 754 

F.3d at 423, but also that the evidence was used “in some way” 

to deprive them of liberty, Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580. 

The plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the defendant officers coerced the prosecution’s two key witnesses, Dowthard 

and Brown, to give statements implicating the plaintiffs that 

the defendants knew were false, with the statements then being used to convict the plaintiffs of the Hanson murder. Beginning with Brown, the plaintiffs assert that Detectives 

Palmer and Stevens secured a false statement blaming Anderson, Johnson, and Ross for Hanson’s murder by threatening 

Brown with jail time if he failed to cooperate and detaining 

him for more than ten hours. They also contend that Palmer 

and Stevens, along with Detective Theo Glover, coerced 

Dowthard into falsely implicating the plaintiffs, this time 

through physical force and by threatening him with additional charges if he failed to cooperate. And, with respective 

to both Dowthard and Brown, the plaintiffs maintain that Detective Palmer instructed both witnesses to testify consistently 

with their statements, even though he knew those statements 

were false. 

As a threshold matter, we agree that the record shows a 

genuine and unresolved dispute about whether the police coerced Brown and Dowthard to provide statements blaming 

the plaintiffs for Hanson’s murder. But coercion and fabrication are not synonyms, and we have stressed that “[an allegation] that an officer coerced a witness to give incriminating 

evidence does not, at least standing alone, violate the wrongly 
28 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

convicted person’s due-process rights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. 

Even more specifically, we have drawn a line between coerced 

testimony—“testimony that a witness is forced by improper 

means to give... [it] may be true or false”—and fabricated testimony—which is “invariably false.” Fields v. Wharrie, 740 

F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). Only the latter supports a due 

process claim, and even then, only if the record shows that the 

officers “created evidence they knew to be false.” Avery, 847 

F.3d at 439; see also Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 584 (explaining that 

“[c]oercively interrogating witnesses, paying witnesses for 

testimony, and witness-shopping may be deplorable, and 

these tactics may contribute to wrongful convictions, but they 

do not necessarily add up to a constitutional violation even 

when their fruits are introduced at trial” because “[e]vidence 

collected with these kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsified evidence and perjured testimony, may turn out to be 

true”). 

The plaintiffs have not brought forth enough evidence to 

create a genuine material dispute as to whether Detectives 

Stevens or Glover knew that Brown and Dowthard’s statements implicating the plaintiffs were false as required to 

maintain a due process claim premised on a theory of evidence fabrication. But we reach a different conclusion with respect to Detective Palmer. 

The plaintiffs insist that the record shows more than mere 

coercion because Detective Palmer admitted that he knew that 

Brown and Dowthard’s statements were false and nonetheless instructed them to testify consistent with these false statements at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials. See Fields, 740 F.3d at 

1112 (explaining that investigators fabricated evidence when 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 29

they “told witnesses what to say knowing that what the [witness] was telling them was false”). Indeed during the state 

post-conviction proceedings, Palmer repeatedly shared his 

belief that Anderson, Johnson, and Ross did not shoot Demarcus Hanson—and that Dowthard’s claim that he witnessed 

the plaintiffs shoot at his mother’s house was not true. And, 

perhaps most critical to our analysis, Palmer testified that, despite this belief, he instructed Dowthard and Brown to testify 

consistent with their written statements implicating the plaintiffs. Against the backdrop of Palmer’s admissions of wrongdoing—not an everyday occurrence—it is very difficult to 

conclude that the plaintiffs have not done enough to survive 

summary judgment on this dimension of their due process 

claim. 

This conclusion finds additional support in the record. 

When deposed in this matter, for example, Detective Palmer 

exercised his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when asked whether he told Brown and Dowthard to testify consistent with their statements “even though [he] believe[d] their statements [were] not truthful.” The Fifth 

Amendment permits an adverse inference against parties in 

civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence against them. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 

308, 318 (1976). Based on the record before us, and upon combining the weight of Palmer’s admissions during the state 

post-conviction proceedings with this adverse factual inference, we conclude that the plaintiffs have carried their summary judgment burden on their allegation that Detective 

Palmer fabricated Brown and Dowthard’s statements. Palmer 

did so by coercing the witnesses to give statements he believed were false—and this evidence was used to deprive the 

plaintiffs of their liberty when Palmer then instructed Brown 
30 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

and Dowthard to testify consistent with these allegedly false 

statements. 

We turn next to the allegations involving Bryce Croft. 

Again, the plaintiffs maintain that Detective Palmer drafted a 

statement for Croft to sign which falsely recanted the information he previously provided about Casel Montgomery’s 

involvement in the murder. Palmer’s actions, the plaintiffs 

contend, prohibited them from presenting evidence of an alternate suspect through Croft because, if called as a witness, 

he would have been impeached by his false recantation. 

While this description of events finds support in the record, 

the plaintiffs cannot show that the prosecution used Croft’s 

second statement (the one prepared by Palmer) to convict any 

of the plaintiffs. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropriate as it pertains to the plaintiffs’ evidence fabrication theory. 

III 

The plaintiffs’ amended complaints are expansive—naming nine defendants and advancing nine separate claims. On 

appeal, their arguments are equally sprawling, advancing numerous claims against numerous parties and raising multiple 

legal issues. Based upon our thorough review of the record 

and the parties’ briefs, we have focused only on those issues 

we believe warrant discussion and on those aspects of the 

plaintiffs’ claims that survive summary judgment. We have 

done so in part to aid and sharpen the focus of the proceedings as the case returns to the district court. 

In furtherance of this effort, we conclude by recapping 

which of the plaintiffs’ claims (or aspects of claims) may proceed against which defendants on remand. 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 31

Beginning with Count I, we affirm the entry of summary 

judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ evidence fabrication allegations with respect to all defendants except Detective Doug Palmer, and only then as it pertains to the testimony of Brown and Dowthard. On this same count, the plaintiffs may proceed with a due process claim rooted in each of 

following alleged Brady violations: 

 Failure to disclose impeachment evidence offered by Rickedda Young: defendants Joseph 

Stevens and Scott Mastroianni; 

 Failure to disclose the circumstances surrounding Bryce Croft’s statement: defendant Doug 

Palmer; 

 Failure to disclose the improper police tactics 

that produced Lautaurean Brown’s statement: 

defendants Joseph Stevens and Doug Palmer; 

and 

 Failure to timely disclose the recordings of Alex 

Dowthard’s jailhouse telephone calls: defendant Joseph Stevens. 

As for the remaining defendants named in Count I (on either theory), we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants Theo Glover, Dominic Iasparro, James Randall, and Torrey Regez because the plaintiffs have failed to set 

forth any arguments or identify any evidence that any of these 

officers engaged in any of the alleged due process violations. 

Turning to Count II (failure to intervene), Count III (conspiracy), and Count VII (supervisor liability), the district court 

concluded that the defendants necessarily were entitled to 

summary judgment owing to its determination that plaintiffs 
32 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 

failed to bring forth enough evidence to support their Brady

and fabrication allegations. In these circumstances, and especially given the expanse and complexity of the factual record, 

remand is appropriate to allow the district court to consider 

each of these claims in the first instance—and to determine 

whether they may proceed and, if so, against which defendants. 

The district court also granted summary judgment on 

Count VIII (§ 1983 malicious prosecution) and Count IX (Illinois malicious prosecution). We affirm this aspect of the district court’s judgment. Beginning with the § 1983 claim, the 

plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that the defendant officers violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments by improperly subjecting them to judicial proceedings without probable cause. But “[t]here is no such thing 

as a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 903 F.3d 667, 670 

(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593 (7th 

Cir. 2013)). There is, however, “a constitutional right not to be 

held in custody without probable cause,” id., and the Supreme 

Court has “ma[de] clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the 

Due Process Clause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial detention,” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 

2019) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 137 S. Ct. 911 

(2017)). 

The plaintiffs do not assert they were subjected to pretrial 

detention (though evidence in the record suggests they 

were)—but even if they had, their claim would still fail because it hinges upon showing the absence of probable cause 

to support their arrests and confinement. The record supports 
Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 33

the district court’s conclusion that at least some of the defendant officers reasonably believed that the plaintiffs were guilty 

of murder based on the accounts given by Dowthard and 

Brown. And it cannot reasonably be disputed that the written 

statements of Dowthard and Brown provided probable cause 

to support the arrests. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropriate on the plaintiffs’ federal claim. Because an Illinois 

claim for malicious prosecution likewise requires the absence 

of probable cause, the district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim as well. See Johnson v. Saville, 575 

F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (identifying the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under Illinois law). 

Finally, the district court concluded that the City of Rockford was entitled to summary judgment on Count XI (respondeat superior) and Count XII (indemnification) because 

the plaintiffs failed to maintain a claim against any defendant 

police officer. In light of our conclusion regarding the potential liability of certain individual officers, the entry of summary judgment on these claims was likewise premature. We 

leave it to the district court to evaluate these claims on the 

merits in the first instance on remand. For the sake of completeness, however, we note that the district court rejected the 

plaintiffs’ claims against the City premised on a Monell theory 

of liability. Because the plaintiffs failed to challenge this aspect of the district court’s ruling, we consider this argument 

waived and the plaintiffs may not seek to revive this aspect of 

their claims on remand. 

For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in 

part, and REMAND for further proceedings.