### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT J AC KS ON A s s i gne d on B r i e f

s N ove m be r 6, 2007 S T A T E O F T E N N E S S E E v . C H A R L E S V A N T IL B U R G , III Ap pe al f ro m th e C rim in al C ou rt f or Sh elb y C ou nt y No. 00-12715 Lee V. Coffee, Judge

No. W2006-02475-CCA-R3-CD - Filed February 12, 2008

The defendant, Charles Vanti lburg III , was original ly convicte d of second degree m urder in 2002 an d s en ten ced

to 2 0 y ear s’ i nc arc eration. O n d ire ct a pp eal , th is c ourt r ev ers ed the de fe nd ant’s conviction a nd remanded the case for a new tri al on the ba sis of the trial court ’s giving an e rroneous de fi nit ion o f the ter m “k no wi ng ly. ” Se e Sta te v. Ch ar les Va nti lbu rg , No. W 2002-01480-CCA-R3- CD (T en n. C ri m . Ap p . , J a c k s o n , J an . 1 3 , 2 0 0 4 ). A f te r as e c o n d

tri a l, th e d e f

e n d an t w as a ga in co nv ict ed of sec on d d eg ree m

urd er, an d th e tr ial co urt

im po sed a 2 2-y ear senten ce. In t

his ap pe al, the def en dant as ser

ts th at (1 ) the evid en ce is insu ff ici ent to su

pp ort his co nv ict ion , (2) the tri al c ourt erred by admitting into evidence a “memorandum of understanding” si gned by the part ies, (3) t he trial court err ed by permitting the st ate to pla y a videotape of the recovery of the victim’s body, (4) the tri al c ourt e rre d b y in str uc tin g th e jur

y on fli gh t, and

(5) the senten ce i s ex ces siv e. Th e se nte nc e is modified to 20 years; othe rwise, the j udgment of the trial courtis affirmed. Te nn . R . A pp . P . 3 ; Ju dg men t of th e C rim in al C ou rt A ffi rme d a s Mo di fie d J A M ES C URWOOD W I TT , J R ., J., deliver ed the opinion of the court , in which T H O M A S T. W OOD ALL and J.C. M C L IN , JJ., joined. Le sli e I. Ba lli n, Mem

ph is, Te nn ess ee, fo r th e app ell ant, C harle s V antil burg I II. Ro be rt E

. C o o p e r, J r. , A tt o rn e yG e n e ra l an d R e p o rt e r; J e nn if

e r L

. S m it

h , A s s is tan t A tt orn ey General; and Thomas Henderson and Karen Cook, As si stant Dist rict Att orneys General , for the ap pe lle e, St ate of

Te nn ess ee. OP IN ION The defendant w as convicted of second degree murder for the shoot ing homicide of the vic tim , T ob y G ibs on , in June 20 00 . O n Jun e 2 2, 20 00 , th e v ict im ’s m oth er, T err i T ibb s, tri ed to r eac h h im

b y tel ep ho ne b ut wa s un ab le to do s o. S he lat er s po ke to h is r oo mm ate , who tol d h er that the vi ctim had not been home that day and had missed a softball game that eveni ng. The next day, Ms. Ti bb s an d th e v ict im ’s g irl fr ien d, Br an dySh anno n, w ent t o the B art lett F ire De partm ent, where both the vi ctim and the defendant worked, and spoke t o th e defendant. The defendant ad mit te d t o M s. Ti bb s t ha t h e w as th e l as t p er so n kno wn t o h av e s ee n t he vi ct im.-2- Bartl e tt A s s is tan t F ir e C h ie f

T e rr yW ig g in s w a s c u tt in g g ra s s a t a b a s e b a ll f

iel d loc ate d a cro ss t

he roa d f rom the de fe nd ant’s ho us e o n Jun e 2 2, 20 00 , whe n h e h ear d a guns ho t at approximately 4:00 p.m. Mr. W iggins sta ted that ne ither he norhis son, who was helping with the grass, was able so see any source for the gunshot. Laterthat same day, the vict im f ailed to s how up for a softball game, which was very unus ual. When the victim also failed to a rrive as scheduled for work the following m orning, Mr. W iggins spoke with other f irefighter s on the shift, including t he defendant. The defendant volunte ered thatthe victi m had been at t he defendant’s house dur ing the tim e th at M r. W igg ins an d h is s on we re c utt inggra ss. Af ter learni ng that th e d ef

en dant w as th e las t per so n to s ee t he vic tim ali ve , B art lett Polic e De part ment Detective Kevin Thompson interviewed the de fendant, who told him that the victim had come to his house to collecta debt. The defendant also claimed that the victi m then went to Wolf C hase M all to “buy some steroids from someone.” The defendant told Detective Thompson that th e v ict im

ha d a sk ed

him to f oll owhim

to t he m all “to b e his b ack

up .” Th e de fe nd ant ag ree d an d a sk ed his fr ien d R ao ul L ag un a to tak e h im to t he m all . A cco rdi ng to the def en dant, he w ent to the fo od co urt are a, purch ase d a

bo ttl e of wat er, and

whe n he did no t see the vi cti m , he tel ep ho ne d La guna to pic k him

up . B art lett F ire De partm ent L ieuten ant T rac y B arn ett co nf irm ed that th e v ict im tol d h im that he wa s g oin g to the de fe nd ant’s ho us e to co lle ct a de bt. Raoul Laguna, who worked for the defendant renovating houses, confirmed that the defendant telephone d him and asked him to pick him up at Wol f Chase Mall on June 22, 2000. Several days l ater, the defendant again te lephoned Mr. L ag una and as ked him to give him a ride from Mr. Laguna’s mother’s house. When Mr. Laguna arrived a t his mother’s house, he not iced the work van that the defendant used in his r enovating work par ked in the dri veway. Later, Mr. Laguna noti ced a foul odor emanating from the van and flies swarming around the back of it. When the defendant came to retrie ve the van, Mr. Laguna attempted to fol lo w h im bu t eventuall y lost sight of h im. Durin g a

search of the d ef en dant’ s res ide nc e an d pro pe rty , Sh elb y Co unty S he rif f’ s Department Reserve Deputy Barney Gardner discovered a shel l ca sing a nd an area of discolor ation on the floor of a “trac tor garage .” Other officers loca ted the defendant’ s work van in t he parking lot of Advance Auto P arts, “cut off the padlocks on the back[,] and opened the doors.” According to Memphis Police Officer Shan Tracy, the i nside of the van “smelled li ke som ething was dead” and was covered in swar ming f lies. Officer Tracy al so observed “some paint tar ps on the floor [of the van] , and . . . a liquid su

bs tan ce t hat w as d ryi ng . W e f

elt it w as p rob ab ly b loo d. ” B art lett P oli ce Li euten an t D ou g B ail eyco nf irm ed th at “[ u] po n ste pp ing o nto the parki ng lot yo u c ou ld s m ell a v ery foul stench around t he van.” Lieutena nt Bailey st ated thatthere were “ dark reddis h stains” on a wh ite tar p and “o n th e f loo r of the int eri or o f t

he van. ” On June 2 5, 2 00 0, th e de fe nd ant turne d h im sel f i n to the Bartl ett Po lic e D ep artm ent. Tw o d ay s later , th e d ef

en dant, in t

he pre sen ce o f his atto rne y, ag ree d to giv e a s tat em ent to po lic e. Li e u te n an t B a il e yr e a d

i n to e v id e n c e a

“ m e m o ran d

um o f un d e rs tan d in g ” s ig n e d

b yth e p art ies wh ere in t he de fe nd ant ag ree d to rev eal the lo cat ion o f the v ict im ’s bo dyin

e xc hang e fo r t

he St ate ’s pro m ise no t to pro sec ute him fo r any c rim e m ore ser iou s th ansec on d d eg ree m urd er. In h is-3-

statem en t to po lic e, the de fe nd ant cl aim ed that th e v ict im

be cam e enr ag ed

whe n the de fe nd ant w as una bl e to p ay h im the entire amount of m oney he owed. According to t he defendant, he gave the vic tim $1 00 an d o ff

ere d to go to t

he bank for mo re m on ey , but the vict im wa s n ot s ati sf

ied wi th h is ef fo rts . T he de fe nd ant cl aim ed that th e vic tim

pu sh ed him “p retty h ard ,” cau sin g h im to “ ste p b ack a couple of steps.” At t hat point he r eached for his gun and sa id, “Now, Toby, just, you know, stop. That’s enough. I’ll get yourmoney.” The defendant st ated thathe “wasn’t going t o shoot him” but the v ict im

p us he d him

and th entu rne d aro un d an d that “ the g un w ent o ff .” He re cal led

th at the vic tim “f ell up ag ain st the sid e o f t he wa ll and

it’ s li ke he fe ll str aig ht do wn .” Of his ne xt a cti on s, the defendant sai d:

I mean it was just crazy. . . . I mean, hell he’s my friend. You know?

. . . . I g o o utof t he ba rn an d I lo ok to wa rd s my h ou se an d I se e my son looking thr ough t he window at the pati o door and the two dogs an d I st ill ain’ t fo un d my da ug hte r. Anyw ay , so I, I don ’t kn owwh at to d o. . . . I k

no w n owI sh ou ld o f c all ed an d rep ort ed

it , b ut I jus t saw everyt hi ng I h ad just going a way, but I went in my little storage building and gota tarp out t ha t wa s in t here. It was a blue tarp a nd uh , th ere ’s a

big fu zzy rugthi ng that w e u sed

to ke ep on

our be d th at my d au gh ter camped out in the ba ck ya rd .

. . an d s he ha d u sed

it a s a . . . mattress underneat h her sleepi ng ba g. Anyway, that was out there on the back patio and i t was all nas ty. . . . I got that and I got the tarp and I wentback over and st ill I di dn’t call. . . . I wrapped him up and I . . . tri ed to get some of t he blood that was on the gr ound. . . . I tol d [ my d au gh ter

an d m y s on ] t o s tay

in the hou se. . . . I m ad e a couple of ph on e ca lls the n. . . . T he re w as a glo ve [o n th e k itc he n counter] and I got t he glove and I gota uh, dish t owel tha t was on the co unter . I’ m

sw eat ingpre ttygo od . I’ m ge tti ng na

us eated. I can ’t thi nk

. . . . I co uld

n’t thi nk of wh at t o d o th enan d s o anyw ay , I go t in his ve hic le and

I dr ov e o ut t

hro ug h E lle nd ale

. . . . I c all ed a g uythat wor ks for me, Ra[ o]u l, and. . . . I t ol d h im .

. . I n ee de d h im t o c ome pic k m e u

p. . . . S o he sai d, “OK, Chief .”

. . . . I dr ive ov er t o W olf ch ase . . . . I parke d the tr

uc k an d I g ot out and

I w ipe d th e sw eat

. . . and tears, I don’ t know which, off the . . . st[ee]ring wheel a nd the seat. . . . I went to the Food Court .

. . . I bought a bottle of water a nd uh, downed it. . . . Ra[o]ul pulled up in his gr een van and I got in and uh , h e sa id, “What’s goin g on ?” I sai d, “No thi ng , Y ou do n’t want t o kn ow .”

. . . W e g et b ack

to t he ho us e an d I s til l got a prob lem . M y go od fr ien d’s de ad . I k ill ed

him . I d idn ’t m ean

to.

. . . [ B] ut h e’s dead and he’s in the backyard and I got rid of the truck, but I still got his body. Th e d ef en dant s tat ed

that he the n p ut his c hil dre n int o his v eh icl e an d d rov e th em to So nic to g et s om eth ingto e at. Fr om the re, the de fe nd ant m ad e tw o s top s lo ok ing fo r peroxide t o clean up the bl ood in the s hed. When he returned t o his house, he sentthe childr en inside wit h theB ecaus e M r . A l ber son w as m edi cal l y unava i l abl e t o t es t i f y at t he de f

endant ’ s se cond t r i al , t he t r ans cr i pt of 1 t he t es t i m ony he pr ovi ded a t t he f i r st t r i al w as r ead i nt o evi dence

.

-4- fo od , and af ter m ak ingane xc us e ab out s erv ici ng o ne o f h is r ental ho us es, the de fe nd ant go t in his yellow va n and drove toward the shed. He st ated thathe believed i t was “too lat e” to repor t the cri m e, an d in ste ad

ch os e to pla ce t

he vic tim ’s bo dyin the van . He th endro ve the van to the ho us e sh are d b y M r. L ag un a’s sis ter an d m oth er and

loc ke d it insi de a fe nc e b eh ind

the ho us e. He ret

urn ed home and went to work the following morning.

Tw o d ay s later , M r. L ag un a ca lle d an d ask ed the de fe nd ant to co m e an d g et the van because “[t]here’s [sic] flies and the van st inks.” The defendant went to pick up the van and made the decisi on “to dump” the victim. H e then drove to a rural a rea and “droppe d” the vict im’s body on the si de of th e roa d. Af

ter leavin g th e v anin a

parki ng lot

an d b orr ow ing$2 0 f

rom Mr. La guna , the defendant drove a round “a ll that night and the ne xt morning and half the day” before deci ding to t urn him sel f i n. At the c on clu sio n o f t he int erv iew , th e d ef

en dant a dd ed , “ I kn owy’a ll are charging me with murder, but it wasn’t murder. I can’t even sa y I think, . . . hell , it wasn’t e ven selfdefense. It was an acc ident . . . .”

Te nn ess ee B ure au

of Inv est igatio n Fi rearm s Ex am ine r S tev e S co tt t est ed the Gl oc k 9 mm belon gin g to the d ef

en dant an d fo un d the h an dg un to b e “in p rop er wo rki ng o rde r.” A gent Sc ott tes tif ied that th e w eap on

ha d three pro pe rlyfu

nc tio nin g s af

eti es and sev enp ound s o f t

rig ge r pu ll. Ag en t S co tt e xp lai ne d th at a “h air tri gg er” ref

ers to a we ap on wi th o ne po un d or le ss of tri gg er pull. Agent Scottconfirmed that the shell casing found in the defendant’s she d had been fired from th e G lo ck9 mm.

Shelby County Medical Examiner Doctor O’Brian C leary Smith was present during the recover y of the victim’s body, which was “wrapped i n [a] sheepskin blanket i n blue tarp [and] tied w ithm

ult ipl e wr ap s, ” res tin g at the b ott om o f a ste ep c ulv ert

in ru ral D eso to County, Mississipp i. T he vic tim

su ff ere d a sin gle guns ho t w ound

to t he ba ck of the ne ck , ju st t o th e ri ght of the midline. “T he bu lle t w ent throu ghthe sk in and the su bc utane ou s ti ssu es u

nd ern eat h. It fractured the right la teral orright si de of the first cer vical ver teb ra wit h intrusi on of the bone fragments into the spinal canal and la cerati on of the spinal cord.” According to DoctorSm ith, the gunshot would have been “s ufficient to cause i nstantaneous incapacitat ion which means the per son wo uld be un co ns cio us , p ara lyz ed , and it w ou ld j us t t

he n be a m att er of m inutes b ef

ore the bra in d ied an d th enth e org an s lik e the h ear t an d s uc h w ou ld f

oll ow .” Durin g c ros s-e xam inatio n, Do cto r S m ith acknowledged thatthe defendant’s de scripti on of the shooting as ac cidental “would be consist ent with the anatom ic findings that were present at autopsy” but clarified that an intenti on al gu nshot wo uld als o b e co ns ist ent w ithhis f ind ing s. Do cto r Sm ithalso ob ser ve d th at e ve n im

m ed iat e m ed ica l int erv en tio n w ou ld n ot h av e save d th e v ict im ’s l if e. Rand all Eugene A lbe rso n, Sr ., a d riv er w iththe Bartl ett

Fi re D ep artm ent, t est if

ied that af ter le arn ingth at the d ef

en dant ha d be enarre ste d fo r t he vic tim ’s m

urd er, he we nt t o th e ja il to visitthe defendant and “t o hear

. . . what reall y happened.” Mr. Alberson r ecalled t hat the 1 de fe nd an t “c rie d f

or m os t of

the time he w as t alk ing ” an d g av e a d esc rip tio n o f t he ev ents-5-

surrounding t he victim’s death that was near ly i dentical to that he had provided to pol ice. According to M r. A lberson, the de fen dant t old him “p oint bl ank, ” “Y es, I m eant to sh oo t [ the vic tim ], but I didn’t mean to kill hi m. I loved him like a brot her.” At the co nc lus ion

of the tri al, the jury convict ed the de fe nd ant of

sec on d d eg ree m urd er. Later , th e tr ial co urt im po sed a 22-y ear sent en ce. In t

his ap pe al, the de fe nd ant ch all en ge s the su ff ici en cyof

the ev ide nc e, the adm iss ion of cer tai n e vid en ce, the pro pri ety of the jur y ins tru cti on

on fl ight, and

the len gth

of the senten ce. I. S uff ici en cy o f th e E vid en ce The defendant assert s that the evidence is insufficient to suppo rt his c onviction. Whe n an a ccu sed

ch all en ge s th e su ff

ici en cyo f t

he ev ide nc e, anap pe llate c ourt’ s st an dard o f r ev iew is whe the r, a ft er co ns ide rin g th e ev ide nc e in the lig ht m os t f

av ora ble to t he pro sec uti on , anyrat ion al trierof fact could ha ve found t he ess ential elements of t he cr ime beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. Ap p. P. 13 (e) ; Ja cks on v. Vi rg ini a , 44 3 U. S. 307 , 32 4, 99 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 79 1-9 2 (1 97 9); Sta te v

. Win ter s , 1 37 S. W .3 d 6 41 , 6 54 (T enn. C rim

. Ap p. 2 00 3). Th e rul e ap pli es to fi nd ing s of g uil t ba sed up on dir ect evide nc e, cir cum stanti al e vid en ce, or a co m bin ati on of dir ect an d c irc um stanti al evidence. Win ter

s , 137 S.W .3d at 654. In determining the sufficienc y of the evidence, thi s cour t should neither re-wei gh the evidence nor s ubstitut e its infere nces for those dra wn by the trierof fact. Id. a t 65 5. Questions co nc ern ing the cre dib ili ty o f t he wi tne sse s, the weight an d v alu e o f t he ev ide nc e, as w ell as a ll factual issues raised by the evidence ar e resolved by t he trierof fact. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 83 2, 83 5 (T enn. 19 78 ). S ign if icantl y, thi s cour

t m us t af fo rd t he St ate of

Te nn ess ee t

he str on ge st leg iti m ate vie w o f t

he ev ide nc e co nta ine d in the rec ord

as well as al l re aso na

ble an d le git im ate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Id.

Second degree m

urder is the “knowing killing of another.” T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (1997). “A person ac ts knowingly with r espect to a resul t of the person’s conduct when the per son is aware t hat th e co nd

uc t is rea so na

bly c ert ain to c au se the re su lt. ” T .C .A

. § 3 9-1 1-3 02 (b) (19 97 ). In this case, the evi dence establ ished thatthe victi m w as kille d by a single gunshot wo un d to the ba ck

of th e nec k that cau sed

inst antan eo us inca

pa cit ati on , fo llo we d s ho rtl y b y b rai n de ath an d s ys tem

wi de orga n f

ail ure . A lth ou ghthe de fe nd ant cl aim ed that th e sh oo tin g w as an accident, he did not call to repor t it t o th e authorit ies. Inst ead, he wrapped the vi ctim’s body and hid it in a van. Over the ensui ng days, the defendant t ook great pains to hide the vi ctim’s body and de fl ect su sp ici on

fr om him sel f. He adm itt ed

lyi ng to police and to the vic tim ’s f am ilyab out hi s m eet ing wi th t

he vic tim . M ore ov er, the de fe nd ant ad m itt ed to M r. A lbe rso n th at, altho ug h h e h ad no t m eant to kil l th e v ict im , he h ad inten de d to s ho ot him

d uri ng th eir

a lte rcatio n. Th e jury, as w as its prer og ati ve , rej ect ed

the de fe nd ant’s the ory

of the sh oo tin g and

fo un d th at h e k

no wi ng ly k ill ed the vic tim . T he ev ide nc e ad du ced at tria l f ull y s up po rts that ve rdi ct. II. Ad mi ssi on of E vid en ceT h e tri a l j u d g e fro m th e d e fe n d a n t’s first trial h a d re tired a t t h e ti m e o f th e se c o n d tri a l. 2 -6- Th e q ue sti on s pre sented

by thi s def

en dant co nc ern ingthe ad

m iss ibi lity o f e vid en ce res t w ith in t

he so un d d isc ret ion

of the tri al c ourt an d thi s cou rt wi ll no t int erf

ere with the e xe rci se of this discre tion in the a bs en ce o f a c le ar abuse appea ring on the face of the r ecord. Se e S tate v. DuBo se , 9 53 S. W .2 d 6 49 , 6 52 (T enn. 19 97 ); State v. Van Tran , 86 4 S. W .2 d 46 5, 47 7 (T enn. 19 93 ); Sta te v . H arris , 8 39 S. W .2 d 5 4, 73 (T enn. 199 2). An ab us e o f d isc ret ion

oc curs whe n th e tr ial co urt applies an i ncorrectlegal st andar d or reaches a conclusion t hat is “i llogical or unreasonabl e and causes an in

jus tic e to the partyco m

pla ini ng .” Sta te v . R uiz , 2 04 S. W .3 d 7 72 , 7 78 (T enn. 2006) (citi ng Ho we ll v . S

tate , 1 85 S. W .3 d 3 19 , 3 37 (T enn. 20 06 )); seeals o S tate v. Sh irley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 24 7 (T enn. 19 99 ). A. “Memorandum of Understanding”

The defendant contends that the “mem orandum of understanding” should not have been admitted into evi dence because i t was irre levant and bec ause “i t occurred dur ing a Charge Agreement.” Re lev ant ev id e n c e is e v id e n c e “ h av in g anyte n d e n c yto m ak e th e ex ist en ce o f anyfa ct that is of co ns eq uen ce t o th e d ete rm inatio n o f t he act ion m ore pro ba

ble or l ess pro ba

ble than it would be without the e vidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. “All relevant evidence i s admissible except as provided by the Constituti on of t he United State s, the Constitution of Tennessee, the se rules, or other rul es or laws of general applica tion in the courts of Tennessee. Evide nce which is not r elevant is not adm iss ibl e. ” Id

. at 4 0 2

. H o w e v e r, “ [ a ] lt h o u g hr e le v an t, e v id e n c e m ayb e e x c lu de d if its probative va lue is subst antiall y outweighed by the dange r of unfair prejudic e, confusion of the iss ue s, or m isl ead ingthe jur y, or b y c on sid eratio ns of un due delay, wa ste of

tim e, or n eed les s pre sentat ion

of cum ulativ e ev ide nc e. ” Id . at 403. Here, the tr ial courtindicate d that itwould defer to the ruling of the tria l court i n the de fe nd an t’s fi rst

tri al b eca us e th e d ef

en dant h ad

no t of fe red any n ewre aso n that t

he ev ide nc e sh ou ld be ex clu de d. Th at co urt

rule d that the me m orand

um of un de rst an din g w as r ele vant and adm iss ibl e. 2 On dir ect ap pe al f rom the fi rst tri al, thi s co urt

ru led th at “ [t ]h e st ate m ent w as r ele vant t o s ho w that the de fendant did not di vulge t he loc ation of the body and weapon out of remorse. It was rel evant to let t he jury know that his m otives were notpurely alt ruisti c.” The State as serts t hat we are bound bythe “law o f t

he cas e” d oc tri ne to a dh ere to t his pre vio us rul ing . W e ag ree . Our su pre m e co urt

ad dre sse d th e “l aw of the case ” d oc tri ne in g reat de tai l in Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petrol eum Underground Storage Tank Bd. , 975 S.W .2d 303 (Tenn. 19 98 ): The phrase “la w of the c ase” refers to a l egal doctr ine

which generall y prohi bits reconsider ation of issues that have alrea dy be ende cid ed

in a pri or a pp eal of the sam e cas e. In othe r w ord s,-7- un de r th e law o f t

he cas e d oc tri ne , an a

pp ell ate co urt ’s d eci sio n o n an iss ue of lawis bi nd ingin late r tria ls an d a pp eal s o f t

he sam e ca se i f the fa cts on

the sec on d tr ial or a

pp eal are substantially the sam e as the fa cts in t

he fi rst tri al o r ap pe al. T he do ctr ine ap pli es t o is su es t hat we re a ctu all y b ef

ore the ap pe llate c ourt i n th e f irs t ap pe al and

to issu es t hat were neces sarily de cided by implication. The doc trine do es n ot a

pp ly t o d ict a. Th e lawo f the c ase d oc tri ne is n ot a const itutio na l m an date n or a limitation on th e p ow er o f a co urt . R ath er, it i s a longstanding di screti onary rule of judi cial pra ctice which i s based on the comm on sense recogni tion thatissues pre viou sly lit igated and decided by a cour t o f c ompe tent jur isdicti on ordinari ly need not be revisit ed. This rule pr omotes the finality and efficiency o f the jud ici al p roc ess, avoids i nd ef ini te r eli tig ati on

of the sam e is su e, fosters consis tent res ult s in the same litiga tion, and assur es the ob ed ien ce o f l ow er c ourts to t he de cis ion s o f a

pp ell ate co urt s. Therefore, when an init ial appeal results in a r emand to the tr ial court , the decisi on of the appellat e court establ ishes the law of t he c ase which genera lly must be followed upon remand by the tri al court, an d b y an a pp ell ate co urt

if a se co nd ap pe al i s take n fr om the jud gm ent of

the tri al co urt

ente red aft er re m an d. The re are limited ci rcumstances which may justify reconsiderat ion of an issue wh ich wa s is su e d eci de d in

a p rio r ap pe al: (1) the ev ide nc e o ff ere d at a tri al or hear ing after remand was substanti ally different from the ev ide nc e in the in iti al pro cee din g; (2) th e pri or rul ing was cl ear ly erroneous and would r esult in a m anifest injus tice if all owed to stand; or ( 3) t he pri or de cis ion

is c ontrary to a ch an ge in th e co ntr oll ing law wh ich ha s o ccu rre d b etw een

the fi rst an d s eco nd

ap pe al. Id. at 3 06 . In this ca se, no ne of the thr ee e xc ep tio ns to t

he do ctr ine are ap pli cab le. Th e ev ide nc e offered at the defendant’s second t rial was near ly i dentical to that offered at the fir st, the pri or ruling wa s n ot “ cle arl y err on eo us ,” and ther e h as b een

no ch an ge in t

he co ntr oll inglaw . In

co ns eq ue nc e, the law of the case doctri ne requires that we adhere to our previ ous ruling t hat the mem orandum of un de rst an din g w as r ele vant and adm iss ibl e. As to t he de fe nd ant’s co nte nti on that th e me m orand

um of un de rst an din g w as inadmissible be cause it was partof a “charge agree ment,” we agree with the Stat e that the mem orandum was not governed by the provis ions for the admissibili ty of statements made during ple a n eg oti ati on s. At

the tim e he enter ed

into the m em orand

um of un de rst an din g, the d ef

en dant h ad not yet been cha rged with any cr ime. Accordingly, the prote ctions offered by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 410 and Tennessee Rule of C riminal Procedure 11( 6)(e), pr oviding thatstatements made during plea ne gotiati ons are not admissible , are not avai lable to t he defendant. Se e Sta te v. Bu tle r ,-8-

42 S. W .3 d 1 13 , 12 1 (T enn. 200 0) (h old ingthat stat em ents m ad e bya def en dant b ef

ore he is c harge d are no t gov ern ed

by the rule s reg ard ingple a n eg oti ati on s). Mo reo ve r, t he re w as n o e vid en ce t

hat the defendant “exhi bited an actual subject ive expecta tion to negot iate a pl ea at t he time of the dis cu ssi on

an d whe the r the expectatio n w as r eas on ab le. ” See id. at 122 (cit ing Un ite d S tates v . Robertson , 58 2 F. 2d

135 6, 136 6 (5t

h Ci r. 19 78 )). Thus , the de fe nd ant is no t entit led to r eli ef on thi s iss ue . B. Videotape of Recove ry of Victi m’s Body

The defendant also cont ends that t he trial c ou rt err ed by permitting a videot ape rec ord ing of

the rec ov ery

of the vic tim ’s b od

y to be sh own to the jur

y becaus e th e ev ide nc e w as m ore pre jud ici al than p rob ati ve . T he St ate ass ert s th at th e “r eco ve ry v ide o” wa s “h igh ly p rob ati ve ” because it“showed the lengt hs to which [the defendant] resor ted to concea l” the vic tim’s body.

“T he adm iss ibi lity o f a

uth entic , re lev ant vi de ota pe s o f t he cri m e sc en e o r vi cti m

is wi thi n th e so un d d isc ret ion of the tri al j ud ge , and

his rul ing on

the adm iss ibi lityof

su chev ide nc e wi ll n ot b e o ve rturne d w ith out a c lear sh ow ingof ab us e o f d isc ret ion .” Van Tran , 8 64 S. W .2 d at 477 (citi ng State v. Teague , 645 S.W.2d3 92 , 397 (Tenn. 1983) ). Where the probative va lue of ph oto gra ph ic evi de nc e o utw eig hs the dang er f or u nf air pre jud ice , th e ev ide nc e is adm iss ibl e if relevant

. Sta te v . B an ks , 5 64 S.W .2 d 94 7, 94 9 (T enn. 19 78 ); Sta te v . B ra de n , 867 S.W .2d 750, 758 (T enn. Cr im . App . 1 99 3).

He re, th e vid eo tap e wa s rel ev ant t o sh owth e m anne r i n wh ich th e defendant had dis po sed of the vic tim ’s b od

y and documents the de fe nd ant’s ef fo rts at c on cea lin g th e cr im e. Mo re ov er , t he vi de ot ap e, al th ou gh ce rt ai nl y unpl ea sa nt , is nei th ergru es ome n orin fl ammat ory. We cannot say tha t its pr obative val ue is outweighed by t he danger of unfair prejudice. The de fendant is n ot e nti tle d to rel ief

on thi s is su e. III. Jury Instruct ion on Flight The defendant contends t hat the tr ial courterred by instruc ting the j ury on flight and the inf ere nc e of guil t that m aybe jus tif

ied fro m such fli gh t. H e co nte nd s th at the ins tru cti on low ere d the St ate ’s s tan dard o f p roo f b eca us e it all ow ed the jur y to i nf er g uil t f rom fl ight. T he St ate arg ue s that th e in str

uc tio n w as p rop er. Th e tr ial co urt

ha s a d uty “to giv e a co m

ple te ch arg e of

the lawap pli cab le t o th e f act s of a ca se. ” State v. Harbison , 7 04 S. W .2 d 314, 31 9 (T enn. 19 86 ); see Tenn. R. Crim. P . 30. To pro pe rlych arg e th e ju

ry o n f lig ht a s an

inf erence of guilt, the re m

us t be su ff

ici ent ev ide nc e to support such i nstructi on. Sta te v . B err y , 14 1 S. W .3 d 54 9, 5 88 (T enn. 2 00 4). Su ff ici ent evi de nc e support in g su ch inst ruction r equires “‘ both a leavi ng the scene of the di fficulty and a subsequent hiding out, e va sio n, or c on cea lm ent in the co mm

un ity .’” State v. Payton , 78 2 S. W .2 d 49 0, 498 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (quoting Roge rs v . S tate , 455 S.W .2d 182, 187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (citi ng 22A C.J.S. Cr imi na l La w § 625))). Our supreme court has he ld that “[a] flight ins tructi on-9-

is not prohi bited when ther e are multiple motives for flight” and that “[a] defendant’s specific inte nt fo r f lee ing a sc en e is a jury q

ue sti on .” Be rry , 141 S.W .3d at 589. The evidence in t his case supports the gi ving of the fli ght i nstructi on. The defendant dum pe d the v ict im ’s bo dyinto a cu lve rt an d the n dro ve arou nd f or a day an d a half by his own adm iss ion . W e f

ail to s ee, an d th e d ef

en dant h as no t e xp lai ne d, h owthe fl ight in str uc tio n lo we red the standar d of proof. The single citat ion to Sta te v. Sh ep he rd, 8 62 S. W.2d55 7, 56 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1992), provides li ttle gui dance as thatcase does not a ddress the pr opriety of the flight ins tru cti on . T he de fe nd ant is no t entit led to r eli ef on thi s is su e. IV. Sentencing As his fi na l co m

pla int , th e d ef

en dant c ha lle ng es t

he le ngth of

his senten ce. Whe n a defendant chall enges the le ngth of a sentence, t his court ge nerally c onducts a de novo r eview of the recor d with a presumption that t he determinations made by the tri al court a re corre ct. T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d) ( 2003). This presumption, however, is conditioned upon t he affirmative showing in the rec ord that t he trial court consi de re d the sentenc ing princi ples and all relevantfacts and circumstances. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The burden of showing that the se ntenc e is improper is upon the appellant

. Id

. If th e r e v ie wr e f

le c ts th e tri a l c o urt

pro pe rly co ns ide red

all rel ev ant fa cto rs an d its fin din gs of fa ct are a de qu ate ly s up po rte d b y th e re co rd, thi s co urt m us t af fi rm the sentence, “even if

we wo uld

have pre fe rre d a

dif fe rent re su lt. ” Sta te v

. Fletc he r , 8 05 S. W .2 d 7 85 , 7 89 (T enn. Cr im . App . 1 99 1). In t he ev ent th e re co rd f

ail s to de m on str ate the req

uir ed con sid eratio n bythe tri al co urt , ap pe llate re vie w of the senten ce i s p ure ly de novo. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

In making its sentenci ng det er min ati on in the pres ent case, t he trial court, at t he conc lusion of the sent encing heari ng, was obliged to det ermine the propriet y of sentencing alterna tives by consi dering (1) the evidence , if any, received a t the trial and sentencing heari ngs, (2) the pre senten ce r ep ort , (3 ) th e p rin cip les of se nte nc ing and arg um ents a s to senten cin g a lte rnativ es, (4) the nat ure and chara cteris tics of the cr iminal conduct involved, ( 5) evidence a nd information offered by the partie s on the enhancement and mitigating factors, (6) any st atements the defendant made in his behalf about sentenc ing, and (7) t he pote ntial for rehabi litat ion ortr eatment. T.C.A. §§ 40 -35 -21 0(a ), ( b); -10 3(5 ); State v. Holland , 8 60 S. W .2 d 5 3, 60 (T enn. Cr im . App . 1 99 3).

In arri ving at the de fendant’s sente nce of 22 years, the trial court obse rved that t he State had indicate d thatno enhance ment factors were applicabl e and did not, the refore, apply any of the statutory enhancem ent factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114. The tri al c ourt d id, ho wever, find in m iti gatio n th at the m urd er w as c om

m itt ed “und er s uc h unu su al cir cum stanc es t

hat it is unli ke ly t

hat a s us tai ne d intent to vi olate the lawm oti vated the cri m ina l co nd uc t,” see T.C.A. § 40-35-113(11), and that the def endant had no prior cr iminal history, see id. § 4 0-3 5-1 13 (13 ). N ev erthe les s, rel yin g e xc lus ive ly o n th e “n ature and ch ara c te ri s ti c s o f

th e c ri m in al co nd uc t invo lve d, ” th e tr ial co urt inc rea sed the senten ce f

rom the pre sum

pti ve mi dp oint of

20 y ear s to 2 2 y ear s.-10- The trial court’s de cision to e nhance the sent ence by two years wit hout applying any statut ory enhanceme nt f

act ors wa s er

ror . A lth ou ghthe tri al c ourt c orr ect ly o bs erv ed that it wa s required t o cons id erthe na ture and ci rcumstances of the offense when setting the sentence, t he version of the Sente ncing Act governi ng the imposition of the sentence in t his case pr ovided that t he senten ce m ayo nly

b e inc rea sed

u po n a fi nd ingo f on e or m ore o f the e nh an cem ent f act ors f ound in Tennessee Code Annotated s ection 40-35- 114. Se e T.C.A. § 40-35-210 (1997). Specifical ly, the Act provided tha t “[s]hould there be mitigati ng but no enhance ment factors for a Class A felony, the n the co urt

sh all set the senten ce at or

be low the m idp oint of

the ran ge .” Id. § 4 0-3 5-2 10 (d)

. Because the tr ial courterred by inc reasing t he sentence i n the absence of enhancement factors, our rev iewof the senten ce i s p ure ly d e n ov o w ith n o p res um pti on of co rre ctn ess . Be fo re c on sid eri ng de nov o th e p rop rie ty o f t he 22 -ye ar s enten ce, we wi ll c on sid er the de fe nd ant’s cla im

that th e tr ial co urt ’s u se o f the p re- 20 05 v ers ion o f the Se nte nc ing Ac t vi olated the expo st f

act o pro vis ion s of

the St ate an d F ed era l C on sti tut ion s. As the St ate co rre ctl y p oints o ut, be cau se the d ef

en dant wa s no t s enten ced p urs uant to pro vis ion s en act ed a ft er he c om

m itted t he murder, there a re n o ex postfacto concerns. The defendantwas properly se ntenced under t he ve rsi on of the Se nte nc ingAc t in

ef fe ct at th e ti m e o f h is c rim e. Ha d th e d ef en dant d esi red sentencing unde r the 2005 amendm ent to the Sentencing Act, he could have exec uted a waiver of his ex post f

acto protecti ons. Se e T. C. A. § 4 0-3 5-1 14 (S up p. 20 05 ), c om pil er’ s n ote s; seeals o Sta te v. Rob ert La mo nt M

os s, Jr. , No. M2006-00890-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 5 n.1 (Tenn. Crim . App., Na sh vil le, De c. 4, 20 07 ). N o waiverappears in the rec ord ; thus , th e se nte nc e in thi s ca se w as go ve rne d b y th e p re- 20 05 am en dm ents.

Turni ng to th e pro pri ety

o f the le ng th of

th e senten ce, w e rem ain

m ind fu l t

hat the sentence i mposed upon our de novo review must be com pliant wit h the stri ctures i mpose d by Blakely v. W

ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004), Cu nn ing ha m v . C ali for nia , 54 9 U. S. _

__ , 12 7 S . C t. 85 6 (2 00 7), and State v. G om ez , ___ S.W .3d ___, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD (Tenn., Oct. 9, 20 07 ). T he St ate co nte nd s th at f act ors pe rm itt ing enhanc em ent on th e bas is of the de fe nd ant’s us e of a firearm to commit the offense, seeT.C.A. § 40-35-114(9) (1997), and on t he basis tha t the victim’s body was treat ed with excep ti on al c ruelty, see id. at (5), were admitted by the defendant an d s up po rte d b y th e ev ide nc e.

Although a sentenc ing court may appl y a st atutory enha ncement factor when the factual basis for doing so is admitted by the de fendant, seeBlak ely , 54 2 U. S. at 303 , the reco rd i n this case does not establi sh thatthe defendant made a judicial admission of the factual basis for eit he r enh an cem ent fa cto r. Th e def en dant di d adm it inhis st ate m ent to po lic e that he sh ot th e v ict im with a 9 mm handgun. In our view, however, t his extra judicial statement does not sat isfy the requirements of Blak

ely

. Similar ly, altho ug h th e d ef en dant a ck

no wl ed ge d to po lic e th at h e h ad wrapped the vict im ’s bo dyin b lanke ts an d tar

p an d sta sh ed

it in h is wo rk van be fo re dri vin g to a remote location and dumping it i n a culvert, these statements wer e made outside the confines of any jud ici al p roc eed ingan d th us do no t qu ali fy

as a dm iss ion s f

or p urp os es o f t

he Si xth Am en dm ent. Because the defendant ha d no prior convi ctions and bec ause no other e nhancement fa cto rs are appl ica

ble un de r a Blakely-Cunningham analysis, t he defendant’s sent ence cannot be-11-

enhanced past the pr esumptive sente nce, which is t he midpoint within t he range. As indic ated, the tri al c ourt a

pp lie d tw o m iti gatin g fa cto rs but did not gi ve eith er gr eat

wei gh t. W e ag ree wi th t

he tri al court thatneither t he defendant’ s la ck of a cri minal history nor the fact thatthe crime indicat ed no su sta ine d intent to violate the l awis s uf fi cie nt t o w arr ant a s enten ce b elo w the m idp oint se nte nc e of 20 ye ars . In

co ns eq ue nc e, we m od if

y th e se nte nc e to 20 ye ars . CO NC LU SI ON Th e ev ide nc e is su ff

ici ent to support the de fe nd ant’s co nv ict ion fo r se co nd

de gre e murder. Because the tri al court di d not err i n the admission o f e it he r the mem orandum of un de rst an din g o r the vide ota pe of th e rec ov ery

of th e v ict im ’s b od

y, the de fe nd ant is no t entit led to rel ief on the se ev ide nti ary

is su es. Th e ins tru cti on

o n fl ight an d th e in fe ren ce o f g uil t it pro vid es w as fully supported by t he evidence and di d not lessen t he S ta te ’s burden of proof. Finall y, upon de novo review of the sentence, we find that the sentence must be m odified to 20 years based upon the holdings in Blak

ely and its proge ny. Otherwise, the j udgment of the trial courtis affirmed.

___________________________________ JAMES CURW OOD W ITT, JR. JUDGE