alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

 ** The Honorable Joan H. Lefkow, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID J. CONCHA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 04-75337

Agency No. A073-959-672

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted May 3, 2010 

Pasadena, California

Before: O’SCANNLAIN and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and LEFKOW, ** 

District Judge.

FILED

MAY 21 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

David J. Concha petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(“BIA”) decision affirming without opinion an immigration judge’s denial of his

untimely motion to reopen deportation proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review. 

We GRANT the request for judicial notice of the 2007 approval of the Form

I-130 Petition for Alien Relative filed on Concha’s behalf by his mother, a

naturalized U.S. citizen. However, our review of agency action is generally limited

to issues first raised in administrative proceedings below. See Barron v. Ashcroft,

358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004). The I-130 was approved several years after the

BIA issued its decision, and is, therefore, not relevant to our review of the denial of

the motion to reopen.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. 

Reyes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 2004). The BIA did not abuse its

discretion in denying Concha’s motion to reopen for failure to comply with the

requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988),

where Concha failed to provide an affidavit describing his agreement with counsel

and failed to file a state bar complaint or explain why such a complaint was not

filed. See Reyes, 358 F.3d at 596 (quoting Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th

Cir. 2000)). Nor was ineffective assistance of counsel plain on the face of the
3

record, excusing compliance with Matter of Lozada. See id. at 597–98. An

unfortunate result is insufficient to demonstrate “obvious and undisputed”

ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 597. Concha has consistently failed to

point to any evidence in the record supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel at his original immigration hearing in 1996. Therefore, the petition for

review is DENIED without prejudice to Concha’s ability to pursue any remedies

that may now be available due to the approval of the I-130.

Attorney Serena Siew’s motion to withdraw as counsel is DENIED without

prejudice to its renewal when substitute counsel is identified and appears to replace

her.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 127 (Wednesday, September 19, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H6151]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

           By Mr. STARK:
       H.R. 6435.
       Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       Article I, Section 8
```
----

            COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1457/2006

of 29 September 2006         

fixing the refunds applicable to cereal and rice sector products supplied as Community and national food aid

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of the market in cereals (1) and in particular Article 13(3) thereof,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1785/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of the market in rice (2) and in particular Article 14(3) thereof,

Whereas:

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For Community and national food aid operations under international agreements or other supplementary programmes, and other Community free supply measures, the refunds applicable to cereals and rice sector products shall be as set out in the Annex.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 October 2006.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 29 September 2006.

For the Commission

Jean-Luc DEMARTY            

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

----

(1)OJ L 270, 21.10.2003, p. 78. Regulation as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1154/2005 (OJ L 187, 19.7.2005, p. 11).

(2)OJ L 270, 21.10.2003, p. 96. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 797/2006 (OJ L 144, 31.5.2006, p. 1).

(3)OJ L 288, 25.10.1974, p. 1.

----

ANNEX

to the Commission Regulation of 29 September 2006 fixing the refunds applicable to cereal and rice sector products supplied as Comunity and national food aid

----
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

SHAUN W. BRIDGES, a.k.a. Number13, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10590

D.C. No. 3:15-cr-00319-RS-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 7, 2017** 

Before: HUG, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

Shaun W. Bridges appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges

his 71-month sentence for money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, and

obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512. Pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Bridges’s counsel has filed a brief stating that

FILED

APR 11 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of

record. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed. 

Bridges has waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Because

the record discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the appeal waiver, we

dismiss the appeal. See United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir.

2009).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

2
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5006 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a child tax credit 

for pregnant moms. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 13, 2018 

Mr. MEADOWS (for himself, Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS, Mr. LAMBORN, Mr. 

MESSER, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. BRAT, Mr. ROTHFUS, Mr. BANKS

of Indiana, Mr. PEARCE, Mr. FARENTHOLD, Mr. MARSHALL, and Mr. 

BIGGS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 

a child tax credit for pregnant moms. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Child Tax Credit for 

5 Pregnant Moms Act of 2018’’. 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5006 IH

1 SEC. 2. CHILD TAX CREDIT ALLOWED WITH RESPECT TO 

2 UNBORN CHILDREN. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 24 of the 

4 Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at 

5 the end the following new paragraph: 

6 ‘‘(3) CREDIT ALLOWED WITH RESPECT TO UN7 BORN CHILDREN.— 

8 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘qualifying 

9 child’ includes an unborn child for any taxable 

10 year if such child is born and issued a social se11 curity number before the due date for the re12 turn of tax (without regard to extensions) for 

13 the taxable year. For purposes of the preceding 

14 sentence, the term ‘social security number’ 

15 means a social security number issued to an in16 dividual by the Social Security Administration, 

17 but only if the social security number is issued 

18 to a citizen of the United States or is issued 

19 pursuant to subclause (I) (or that portion of 

20 subclause (III) that relates to subclause (I)) of 

21 section 205(c)(2)(B)(i) of the Social Security 

22 Act. 

23 ‘‘(B) DOUBLE CREDIT IN CASE OF CHIL24 DREN UNABLE TO CLAIM CREDIT.—In the case 

25 of any child who is not taken into account 

26 under subparagraph (A) for the taxable year 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 5006 IH

1 immediately preceding the taxable year in which 

2 the child is born, the amount of the credit de3 termined under this section with respect to such 

4 child for the taxable year of the child’s birth 

5 shall be increased by 100 percent. 

6 ‘‘(C) UNBORN CHILD.—For purposes of 

7 this paragraph— 

8 ‘‘(i) UNBORN CHILD.—The term ‘un9 born child’ means a child in utero. 

10 ‘‘(ii) CHILD IN UTERO.—The term 

11 ‘child in utero’ means a member of the 

12 species homo sapiens, at any stage of de13 velopment, who is carried in the womb.’’. 

14 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

15 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

16 December 31, 2017. 

Æ 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with BILLS
## NO. 12-08-00271-CV IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

JOSUE MAR ES S EPADA A ND TRI MAC T RAN SPO RTA TI ON

, I NC
. (f/k/a LIQUID TRANSPORTERS , INC.), § APPEAL F ROM THE 159TH APPELLANTS
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF MIC HAEL EARL BARN

ES, APP ELL EE § AN GE LI NA CO UN TY

, T EXAS
MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION PER CU RIAM The pa rties filed a

joint mot ion in which they re p re s en t ed that the under lying disput e has been r e s o lv e d

. I n th e ir mo ti o n , th e y r e q u e s te d th a t th is a p p e a l b e d is mi s s e d w it h p r e ju d ic e upon
no tif ic a tio n fr om the pa

rt ie s tha t the a c tio ns ne c e ssa ry to the ir se ttl e me nt ha ve oc c ur red. In th eir subsequent notifica tion, they reque st that we direc t t h e t ri al court to unconditionally release the

su pe rs e de a s b on d a nd “ e xti ng uis h” the jud gme nt. An in t er m ed i ate court of appe als is authorize d to vaca te the trial c ourt’s judgment and d ismiss the under lying case. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 4 3

. 2 ( e )

. M o r e o v e r , w e ma y a ls o d is p o s e o f an appea l pursuant to an agr eeme nt of the par ties. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.1(a) (2). Ac cordingly, we gr a nt t he pa

rt ie s’ mot ion

. As a gr e e d by the pa rt ie s, wi tho ut co ns ide ra tio n of the me ri ts, we va c a te the trial cour t’s judgment dated Apr il 1, 2008 and dismiss the ca se. The District Clerk of Ange lina County is ordered to re lease the s u p er s ed ea s b o nd filed in conne ction with this appeal. Costs are ta xe d a ga ins t th e pa

rt ie s w ho inc ur

re d th e m. Opinion delivere d May 29, 2009. P an el consi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(PUBLISH)
#### Application of Darrell E. HALL, #60093 for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

No. A-12879.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Sept. 28, 1960.

Darrell E. Hall, petitioner, pro se.

*1071Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Lewis A. Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

POWELL, Presiding Judge.

Petitioner, Darrell E. Hall, #60093, seeks release from the State Penitentiary at Mc-Alester, where he is imprisoned by reason of a judgment and sentence entered in the district court of Tulsa County on a charge of robbery with firearms, after former conviction of a felony. He was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. Petitioner was received at the institution November 16, 1957. The maximum date of his discharge appears from the record to be November 15, 1987, and the minimum date for release to be tentatively fixed for November 20, 1971.

In support of his petition for release, petitioner states that he was arrested out of the State of Oklahoma and at Sacramento, California, and was subsequently transported against his will to Tulsa, Oklahoma by the sheriff’s department of Tulsa County without benefit of- extradition proceedings.

The question presented then, is, do such facts, if true, entitle defendant to release? The warden of the penitentiary, through the Attorney General, has filed a response in the nature of a demurrer denying that the matters alleged, if true, entitle defendant to release by writ of habeas corpus.

No claim is made that the sentencing court in Tulsa County did not have jurisdiction of the crime charged and jurisdiction to pronounce judgment.

The question raised has been treated by this Court many times. Two recent cases are re Application of Anderson, Okl.Cr., 344 P.2d 674, and Ray v. Raines, Warden, Okl.Cr., 347 P.2d 659, 660. In the syllabus by the Court in the latter case, it is said:

> “Where a person accused of crime is held under valid process in proper form, such detention is not rendered invalid because of the illegality of the events which preceded it, or which made the detention physically possible. His wrong against the State is not to be condoned because of illegality of the means employed in obtaining custody. The means used to bring him into the State will not be a subject of inquiry.”

The cases cited in the Ray case may be read for further reasoning supporting the rule. We may caution that we do not approve of officers transporting prisoners into the State of Oklahoma without giving them the opportunity of seeking release and the validity of an arrest by way of writ of habeas corpus. Extradition proceedings constitute the proper manner to obtain custody of a prisoner in a sister state, and to ignore this may violate the laws of a state. We must and do deny the writ.

NIX and BRETT, JJ., concur.
Law Office of 

Michael S. Truesdale, PLLC 

Michael S. Truesdale mike@truesdalelaw.com

Board Certified • Civil Appellate Law

Texas Board of Legal Specialization

801 West Avenue, Suite 201 Austin, Texas 78701

512.482.8671 (ofc) • 866.847.8719 (fax) • www.truesdalelaw.com

September 16, 2015

Honorable Jeffrey D. Kyle,

Clerk of the Third District Court of Appeals

P.O. Box 12547

Austin, TX 78711-2547

RE: No. 03-15-00447-CV, Austin Capital Collision, LLC v. Barbara Pampalone: 

Appellant’s Designation of Lead Counsel on Appeal

Dear Mr. Kyle:

Please accept this letter as the designation by Appellant/Cross-Appellee Austin 

Capital Collision, LLC, of Michael S. Truesdale as its lead counsel on appeal.

Adam Pugh was trial counsel below, and will remain as additional counsel on this 

appeal. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1(c), Austin Capital 

Collision, LLC designates Michael S. Truesdale as lead counsel for this appeal. His 

information is as follows:

LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL S. TRUESDALE, PLLC

Michael S. Truesdale

State Bar No. 00791825

801 West Avenue, Suite 201

Austin, TX 78701

512-482-8671

866-847-8719 (fax)

mike@truesdalelaw.com

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michael S. Truesdale

Michael S. Truesdale

SBN 00791825

Designated Lead Counsel for Austin Collision Center

/s/ Adam Pugh

Adam Pugh

SBN 24044341

Counsel for Austin Collision Center

cc: 

Nelia Robbi (nrobbi@mcginnislaw.com)

Joe E. Lea Jr (jlea@mcginnislaw.com)

ACCEPTED

03-15-00447-CV

6959539

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

9/16/2015 4:13:08 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 9/16/2015 4:13:08 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
#### SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND et al. v. FELLOWS et al.

No. 35589.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Oct. 6, 1953.

*900Mont R. Powell, Sam Hill, William R. Saied, Oklahoma City, for petitioner.

Claud Briggs, Oklahoma City, Foy Edwards, Shawnee, Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

ARNOLD, Justice.

On competent evidence introduced in support of claimant’s claim for compensation from the Special Indemnity Fund as a physically impaired person the Commission found that prior to claimant’s accidental injury of January 9, 1952, he sustained an injury to his head and right eye lid; that although he had sixty-five per cent vision in his right eye this vision was not usable because the eye lid was permanently drooped over the pupil of the eye so' as to obscure the vision that, he had, resulting in total industrial loss of vision of the right eye; that at the time of the accident of January 9, 1952, he was a physically impaired person as defined by the Workmen’s Compensation Law, and that by reason of the combination of claimant’s ninety per cent permanent partial disability to his right arm sustained by reason of the accidental injury of January 9, 1952, and his prior disability to his right eye his permanent partial disability to the body as a whole had been materially increased over that which would have resulted from the last injury alone; that as a result of the combination of the old injury to the eye and the new injury to the right arm claimant is now permanently and totally unable to perform ordinary manual labor for which he is entitled to be compensated by his employer in the sum of 11 weeks temporary total disability, 90 per cent permanent partial disability to the arm, being 225 weeks, and 264 weeks against the fund, all at $25 per week and made an appropriate order against the employer and the Special Indemnity Fund.

The employer paid the award assessed against it and is not involved in this appeal. The Special Indemnity Fund seeks review of the award made against it. The only error asserted here is that since there did not exist a complete loss of vision claimant was not a physically impaired person under the law.

Permanent loss of use of an eye constitutes loss of an eye. 85 O.S.1951 § 22; Special Indemnity Fund v. Smith, 206 Okl. 185, 242 P.2d 159. A physically impaired person is defined as “a person who as a result of accident, disease, birth, military action, or any other cause, has suffered the loss of the sight of one eye * * * 85 O.S.1951 § 171. An employee who has sustained permanent total industrial blindness in one eye is a physically impaired person within the meaning of the Special Indemnity Fund Act, supra.

The finding of the Commission that claimant at the time of his last injury was a physically impaired person and as a result of both injuries is now permanently and totally disabled is sustained by the evidence and its order based thereon will not be disturbed.

Award sustained.
#### William W. BRYDGES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Samuel A. LEWIS, Director, Defendant, and D. Gonzales, Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 92-17077.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*652Submitted May 25, 1993 *.

Memorandum June 8, 1993.

Order and Opinion March 9, 1994.

William W. Brydges, pro se, Goodyear, Arizona, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Bruce L. Skolnik, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Arizona, for the defendants-appellees.

Before: HUG, WIGGINS and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4.

ORDER

The memorandum disposition filed in this matter on June 8, 1993, 995 F.2d 230, is redesignated as a per curiam opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

William W. Brydges, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s order granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment. *Hopkins v. Andaya,*958 F.2d 881, 884 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam). A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment simply because the non-moving party does not file opposing material, even if the failure to oppose violates a local rule. *Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc.,*983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir.1993) (“[a] local rule that requires the entry of summary judgment simply because no papers opposing the motion are filed or served, and without regard to whether genuine issues of material fact exist, would be inconsistent with [Fed. R.Civ.P.] 56, hence impermissible under [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 83.”). However, when the local rule does not require, but merely permits the court to grant a motion for summary judgment, the district court has discretion to determine whether noncompliance should be deemed consent to the motion. *Id.*

Here, the district court warned Brydges that failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment “shall constitute a *653consent on the part of [Brydges] to the granting of the defendants’ motion pursuant to Local Rule ll(i).”1 Local Rule ll(i) permits, but does not require, the district court to grant the motion for summary judgment when the nonmoving party fails to file a response. *See*D.Ariz.R. ll(i).

We conclude that because Brydges was warned of the consequence of his failure to respond to the appellees’ summary judgment motion, the district court did not err by deeming his failure to respond a consent to the motion for summary judgment. *See Gill,*983 F.2d at 950.

Upon due consideration, appellees’ motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is denied.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Local Rule 11(1) of the District of Arizona provides that "if the opposing party does not serve and file the required answering memoranda ... such noncompliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the court may dispose of the motion summarily.” D.Ariz.R. ll(i).
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5106 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5106

  To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers to 
  disclose in an annual report any substantial financial relationship 
       with any manufacturer or dealer of firearms or ammunition.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 27, 2018

  Mr. Meeks introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers to 
  disclose in an annual report any substantial financial relationship 
       with any manufacturer or dealer of firearms or ammunition.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Investor Choice Against Gun 
Proliferation Act''.

SEC. 2. DISCLOSURE OF SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY 
              MANUFACTURER OR DEALER OF FIREARMS OR AMMUNITION.

    Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(s) Disclosure of Substantial Financial Relationship With 
Manufacturer or Dealer of Firearms or Ammunition.--Each issuer required 
to file an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall 
annually disclose in such a report any substantial financial 
relationship such issuer has with any manufacturer or dealer of 
firearms or ammunition.''.
                                 <all>
```