Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Aaron T. Craft

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

David W. Stone IV

Stone Law Office & Legal Research

Anderson, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Tyson Timbs and a 2012 Land 

Rover LR2,

Appellees-Defendants.

October 20, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

27A04-1511-MI-1976

Appeal from the Grant Superior 

Court 1

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Todd, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

27D01-1308-MI-92

Mathias, Judge.

[1] The State of Indiana filed a complaint for forfeiture in Grant Superior Court 

seeking to obtain a 2012 Land Rover LR2 owned by Tyson Timbs (“Timbs”).

The trial court ruled in favor of Timbs, and the State appeals, presenting one 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 2 of 13

issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred in concluding that 

forfeiture of Timbs’s vehicle would constitute a constitutionally excessive fine. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In January 2013, Timbs purchased a Land Rover LR2 (“Land Rover”) for the 

sum of $42,058.30 from a dealer in Indianapolis. Timbs paid for the Land 

Rover with life insurance policy proceeds that he received following the death 

of his father. Thereafter, Timbs began to use this vehicle to drive from Marion, 

Indiana to Richmond, Indiana for the purposes of purchasing heroin. Timbs 

also used the Land Rover to transport the heroin back to Richmond. 

[4] In May 2013, a confidential informant (“CI”) told a member of the Joint Effort 

Against Narcotics (“JEAN”) team1 that he could purchase heroin from Timbs. 

The police then set up a controlled buy, and on May 6, 2013, an undercover 

detective and the CI met Timbs at an apartment.2 The detective gave the CI the 

purchase money, and the CI went inside the apartment with Timbs and 

returned with two grams of heroin that he had purchased for the previously 

agreed-to price of $275. 

 

1 The JEAN team is composed of members from the Grant County Sheriff’s Department, the Grant County 

Prosecutor’s Office, and the Marion Police Department. 

2 This apartment was apparently not Timbs’s residence. See Tr. pp. 27-28. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 3 of 13

[5] The police set up another controlled buy on May 22, 2013, to take place at a 

local gas station. This time, the undercover detective purchased two grams of 

heroin from Timbs for a price of $260. After this transaction, the detective 

spoke with Timbs about arranging yet another purchase of heroin. However, on 

the day this controlled buy was set to take place, the police instead apprehended 

Timbs during a traffic stop. 

[6] On June 5, 2013, the State charged Timbs with two counts of Class B felony 

dealing in a controlled substance and one count of Class D felony conspiracy to 

commit theft. On August 5, 2013, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture, 

seeking to obtain Timbs’s Land Rover. 

[7] On April 12, 2015, Timbs entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby 

he agreed to plead guilty to one count of Class B felony dealing in a controlled 

substance and Class D felony theft in exchange for the State dismissing the 

remaining charges. The following day, the trial court accepted the plea and 

sentenced Timbs pursuant to the agreement to six years, with one year executed 

in community corrections and five years suspended to probation. Pursuant to 

the plea agreement, Timbs also agreed to reimburse the JEAN team $385 for 

the cost of the investigation and pay a drug abuse, prosecution, and interdiction 

fee of $200; court costs of $168; a bond fee of $50; and a $400 certified court 

program fee after undergoing a drug and alcohol assessment with the probation 

department. The complaint for forfeiture remained pending. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 4 of 13

[8] On July 15, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the forfeiture complaint. At 

the hearing, Timbs argued that forfeiture of his Land Rover, which he claimed 

was worth over $40,000, constituted an excessive fine, given that he had only 

dealt drugs twice, that he was only convicted for one count of dealing, and that 

the maximum statutory fine for his crime was $10,000. The trial court took the 

matter under advisement and, on August 28, 2015, entered an order in favor of 

Timbs, which provided in relevant part: 

7. The State now seeks a judgment against the Defendant for 

forfeiture of the Land Rover; a vehicle that just five (5) months 

before it was seized had a fair market value of almost four (4) 

times the maximum monetary fine of $10,000. 

8. The Court finds that the judgment of forfeiture sought by 

the State violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution. The amount of 

the forfeiture sought is excessive and is grossly disproportional to 

the gravity of the Defendant’s offense. 

9. While the negative impact on our society of trafficking in 

illegal drugs is substantial, a forfeiture of approximately four (4) 

times the maximum monetary fine is disproportional to the 

Defendant’s illegal conduct. 

Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the 

State. The Land Rover LR2, at issue, is ordered released to the 

Defendant immediately. 

Appellant’s App. pp. 15-16. The State filed a motion to correct error on 

September 14, 2015, claiming for the first time that the trial court should have 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 5 of 13

ordered a sale of the Land Rover from which a non-excessive fine could be 

deducted.3 The trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to correct error 

on October 14, 2015, and entered an order denying the State’s motion on 

October 21, 2015. The State now appeals. 

Standard of Review

[9] At trial, the State bore the burden of establishing the requirements of forfeiture. 

See Ind. Code § 34-24-1-4(a). Thus, the State is appealing from a negative 

judgment. See Merrillville 2548, Inc. v. BMO Harris Bank N.A., 39 N.E.3d 382, 

390-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), reh’g denied, trans. denied. On appeal, we will not 

reverse a negative judgment unless it is contrary to law. Id. Here, the State 

argues that the trial court erred in determining that the forfeiture of the Land 

Rover constituted an excessive fine. This court has held that forfeitures are 

subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. $100 and a Black Cadillac v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1001, 1011 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 

609-10 (1993)).4 We review the trial court’s conclusion regarding the 

 

3 The State does not reiterate this claim on appeal, and even if it did, it is well settled that an issue may not be 

presented for the first time in a motion to correct error. Van Winkle v. Nash, 761 N.E.2d 856, 859 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002). 

4 The State claims that there is a question as to whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 

Amendment is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has 

yet to hold that the Excessive Fines Clause is applicable to the States. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco 

Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989) (“We shall not decide whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 

on excessive fines applies to the several States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”). But this court held in 

$100 and a Black Cadillac that the Excessive Fines Clause did apply to Indiana’s forfeiture statutes. 822 N.E.2d 

at 1011. We see no reason to disagree with our prior opinion. We also note that the Indiana Constitution 

contains its own provision against excessive fines. See Ind. Const. art. 1, sec. 16 (“Excessive fines shall not be 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 6 of 13

excessiveness of a fine de novo. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 

(1998). 

Discussion and Decision

In rem forfeiture is an ancient concept under which courts 

obtained jurisdiction over property when it was virtually 

impossible to seek justice against property owners guilty of 

violating maritime law because they were overseas. Civil 

forfeiture traces to ancient Roman and medieval English law; 

both made objects used to violate the law subject to forfeiture to 

the sovereign. Civil forfeiture is no longer tethered to difficulties 

in obtaining personal jurisdiction over an individual. It now 

serves as one of the most potent weapons in the judicial 

armamentarium[.] Civil forfeiture is a leading method for 

imposing economic sanctions against narcotics traffickers.

Today, all states have statutory provisions for some form of asset 

forfeiture, and there are more than four hundred federal forfeiture 

statutes relating to various federal crimes. An important feature 

of many of these statutes is characterization of the process as civil 

forfeiture under which (by contrast to criminal forfeiture) a 

property owner need not be found guilty of a crime—or even 

charged—to lose permanently their cash, car, home or other 

property. The relative ease of effecting such forfeiture and the 

disposition of the assets have become a matter of public note.

Serrano v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted). 

[10] The Eighth Amendment provides, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. 

 

imposed). Because neither side addresses the Indiana Constitution, we base our opinion on the federal 

Excessive Fines Clause.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 7 of 13

Const. amend. VIII. At the time the Constitution was adopted, “the word ‘fine’ 

was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some 

offense.” $100 and a Black Cadillac, 822 N.E.2d at 1011 (quoting Bajakajian, 524 

U.S. at 327). Accordingly, the Excessive Fines clause of the Eighth Amendment 

“limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as 

punishment for some offense.” Id. (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328)

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted above, this 

court has already held that forfeitures in Indiana are subject to the Excessive

Fines Clause. Id. (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 622). 

[11] To determine whether a fine or forfeiture is “excessive,” for purposes of the 

Excessive Fines Clause, we consider whether the amount of the forfeiture bears 

“some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” Id. 

(quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334). A punitive forfeiture violates the 

Excessive Fines Clause “if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a 

defendant’s offense.” Id. (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334).5 

[12] Here, there is no question that the nature of Timbs’s offense was serious. He 

committed a Class B felony. However, our General Assembly has determined 

that a Class B felony should be punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000. 

Here, the evidence before the trial court was that Timbs’s vehicle was worth 

 

5

 The State claims that the Supreme Court in Bajakajian “allow[ed] a forfeiture three times the applicable 

fine” of $5,000. This is incorrect. The Supreme Court was abundantly clear that the only question before it 

was whether forfeiture of the entire amount of cash at issue, $357,144, was proper. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 

339 n.11. 
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approximately four times the amount of the maximum fine. Although we do not 

suggest that forfeiture of any asset valued over the maximum fine is 

automatically a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause, it is instructive to our 

analysis that the value of the asset sought by the State is well in excess of the 

maximum fine. Moreover, it is undisputed that the Land Rover was not 

purchased with the proceeds of any criminal behavior; it was purchased with 

life insurance proceeds. 

[13] The State notes that an asset may be forfeited even if the State does not convict 

the owner of the criminal charge. See Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Ind. 

1995) (noting that a conviction on the underlying criminal activity is not a

prerequisite for forfeiture). Thus, the State argues, it could have sought 

forfeiture of the Land Rover even if Timbs had not been convicted. However,

this does not negate the fact that our General Assembly has set the maximum 

fine for the crime for which Timbs was convicted at $10,000, whereas the value 

of the Land Rover was upwards of $40,000. 

[14] We also note that financial burdens had already been imposed on Timbs when 

he pleaded guilty. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Timbs agreed to reimburse 

the JEAN team $385 for the cost of the investigation and pay a drug abuse, 

prosecution, and interdiction fee of $200; court costs of $168; a bond fee of $50;

and a $400 certified court program fee. Notably, the trial court imposing the 

sentence found no need to impose any fine, much less the maximum fine of 

$10,000. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 9 of 13

[15] The State also argues that the evidence before the trial court was that Timbs 

committed criminal acts other than the one for which he was convicted. This 

may be true. However, the complaint for forfeiture referred only to May 31, 

2013.6 If the State wished to seek forfeiture of the Land Rover based on Timbs’s 

other criminal acts, it should have done so more clearly in its forfeiture 

complaint. Moreover, even considering these other acts, we note that the only 

evidence before the trial court was that Timbs sold heroin twice, both times as a 

result of controlled buys. The remaining times he transported heroin, it was 

apparently for his own use. The trial court was free to consider these 

circumstances in making its determination. 

[16] We also find the State’s citation to United States v. Aleff, 772 F.3d 508 (8th Cir. 

2014), to be unpersuasive. In Aleff, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy 

to defraud the federal government and ordered to pay almost $304,000 in 

restitution. Thereafter, the federal government brought suit against the 

 

6

 The complaint set forth in relevant part: 

1. On or about May 31, 2013, officers of the Plaintiff, J.E.A.N. Team Drug Task Force, 

seized from the Defendant, TYSON TIMBS, One (1) 2012 Land Rover LR2 . . . in Grant 

County, Indiana.

2. On said date and at said place, the Defendant, TYSON TIMBS, had in his possession, 

the above described vehicle, said vehicle had been furnished or intended to be furnished by 

Defendant, TYSON TIMBS, in exchange for an act that is in violation of a criminal statute, 

or used to facilitate any violation of a criminal statute or is traceable as proceeds of the 

violation of a criminal statute under Indiana Law, as provided in I.C. 34-24-1-1.

3. The Defendant, TYSON TIMBS, is the owner of the vehicle.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs demand judgment against the Defendant for forfeiture of

vehicle, for the delivery of said vehicle upon forfeiture as provided for in I.C. 34-24-1-1, for

reimbursement of law enforcement costs as provided by statute, and for all other relief just 

and proper in the premises.

Appellant’s App. p. 14. 
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defendants under the False Claims Act, and the District Court awarded the 

government treble damages and statutory penalties of over $1,300,000. On 

appeal, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals held that this was not grossly 

disproportionate under the Excessive Fines Clause. Aleff, 772 F.3d at 512-13. In 

so holding, the court noted that the defendants’ scheme to defraud the 

government was extensive and took more than six years. Id. at 513. The 

defendants “received $303,890 from the public fisc to which they were not 

entitled,” and the government “suffered damage to the integrity of one of its 

programs.” Id. More importantly, the damages recovered by the government 

were within the limits of damages allowed by the False Claims Act. Id. 

[17] The present case is readily distinguishable from Aleff. Timbs did not engage in a 

years-long scheme to defraud the State, nor did the State here seek to recover 

treble damages under a false claims statute. It instead sought to forfeit a vehicle 

that was not purchased with the proceeds of Timbs’s crimes. Here, the value of 

the asset subject to potential forfeiture was well over the statutory maximum 

fine, whereas in Aleff, the damages were more than the actual damages but still 

within the statutory maximum allowed under the False Claims Act.7 

 

7 The same holds true for the State’s citation to United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2003), which 

was also brought under the False Claims Act. The total damages awarded in that case were within the 

statutory limits and the government was directly defrauded. Id. at 1018. Although the amount awarded, 

$729,455, was much greater than the $58,151 sought by the government, the defendants had filed fraudulent 

Medicare claims for which they received payment of $331,078. Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 11 of 13

Conclusion

[18] Forfeiture of the Land Rover, which was worth approximately four times the 

maximum permissible statutory fine, was grossly disproportionate to the gravity 

of Timbs’s offense. We therefore affirm the trial court’s conclusion that 

forfeiture of the Land Rover violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 

Amendment. 

[19] Affirmed. 

Vaidik, C.J., concurs. 

Barnes, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 12 of 13

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Tyson Timbs and a 2012 Land 

Rover LR2,

Appellees-Defendants.

Court of Appeals Case No. 

27A04-1511-MI-1976

Barnes, Judge, dissenting.

[20] I respectfully dissent. I realize that my colleagues point to the allegedly 

“disproportionate” nature of the forfeiture sought by the State here. I 

understand their concern. I would simply say as follows:

[21] Forfeitures are constitutional and, although some have been found to be 

excessive, are a useful law enforcement tool. See U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 

290, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2148 (1996).

[22] We have ruled that, in limited situations, the Excessive Fines Clause of the 

Eighth Amendment may come into play in a forfeiture case. See $100 and a 

Black Cadillac, 822 N.E.2d at 1011-12.

[23] However, it is clear and without conflict in the evidence that the vehicle here 

was Timbs’s and was used to facilitate crime, i.e., to transport Timbs to the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 27A04-1511-MI-1976 | October 20, 2016 Page 13 of 13

place of an arranged heroin buy. The vehicle did not have only a tangential 

relationship to the crime or to the defendant. It should not matter that Timbs 

committed the crime using an expensive new Land Rover rather than an old, 

inexpensive “beater.”

[24] The majority correctly points out that the record reflects Timbs “only” sold 

heroin twice. I simply posit that Timbs was arrested before the third buy could 

take place, and we are left to wonder how much heroin he had access to.

[25] I am keenly aware of the overreach some law enforcement agencies have 

exercised in some of these cases. Entire family farms are sometimes forfeited 

based on one family member’s conduct, or exorbitant amounts of money are 

seized. However, it seems to me that one who deals heroin, and there is no 

doubt from the record we are talking about a dealer, must and should suffer the 

legal consequences to which he exposes himself.

[26] Timbs dealt heroin and got caught. I vote to reverse the trial court’s denial of 

the State’s forfeiture request.