Reversed and Remanded and Per Curiam Opinion filed July 28, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00899-CV

NO. 14-14-00932-CV

MAYOR ANNISE PARKER AND CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellants

V.

JACK PIDGEON AND LARRY HICKS, Appellees

On Appeal from the 310th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2014-61812

PER CURIAM OPINION

Appellees Jack Pidgeon and Larry Hicks (collectively, Appellees) sued to 

enjoin Mayor Annise Parker and the City of Houston (collectively, the City) from

providing employee benefits to the same-sex spouses of employees legally married 

in another state. Appellees relied on provisions of the Texas Constitution and 

Family Code banning recognition of same-sex marriage in Texas, declaring same-
2

sex marriages against public policy and void, and prohibiting political subdivisions 

from giving effect to same-sex marriages from other states. See Tex. Const. art. I, 

§ 32; Tex. Fam. Code § 6.204. The trial court signed a temporary injunction 

requested by the Appellees,

1 determining that:

4. Spending funds in that manner will recognize a union between two 

people of the same sex as a status identical to the Texas Constitution’s 

definition of marriage. That expenditure is thus barred by the Texas 

Constitution.

5. Spending funds in that manner recognizes and validates a marriage 

between persons of the same sex. That expenditure is thus barred by 

the Family Code.

6. Spending funds in that manner gives effect to a right or claim to 

benefits asserted as the result of a marriage between persons of the 

same sex. That expenditure is thus barred by the Family Code.

7. Spending funds in that manner will furnish employment benefits to 

persons who are not an employee’s legal spouse or dependent 

children. That expenditure is thus barred by the City’s charter.

Thus, the trial court concluded that “[t]he City is prohibited from furnishing 

benefits to persons who are married in other jurisdictions to City employees of the 

same sex.”

In light of recent decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,2 we conclude that we must 

reverse the trial court’s injunction. In Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court 

determined that “same sex couples may exercise their fundamental right to marry 

 1 The City challenged Appellees’ standing to sue. Appellees’ pleading that they are 

residents of Houston, Texas, Harris County, and “taxpayer[s] . . . residing within the boundaries 

of the City of Houston and Defendants are expending significant public funds on an illegal 

activity,” construed liberally, supports Appellees’ standing to sue as taxpayers without showing a 

particularized injury. See Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coal. of Tex. (IRCOT), 418 

S.W.3d 263, 267–68, 274 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).

2 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); DeLeon v. Abbott, No. 14-50196, —

F.3d—, 2015 WL 4032161 (5th Cir. July 1, 2015). 
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in all States.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05, 2607 (2015). The United 

States Supreme Court held that “there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to 

recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of 

its same-sex character.” Id. at 2607–08. Further, in DeLeon, a federal district 

court found that article I, section 32 of the Texas Constitution and Texas Family 

Code section 6.204 are unconstitutional and enjoined the State of Texas from 

enforcing them; the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed 

the trial court’s determination in light of Obergefell. DeLeon, No. 14-50196, —

F.3d—, 2015 WL 4032161, at **1–2 (5th Cir. July 1, 2015). 

Because of the substantial change in the law regarding same-sex marriage 

since the temporary injunction was signed,3 we reverse the trial court’s temporary 

injunction and remand for proceedings consistent with Obergefell and DeLeon.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, McCally, and Donovan.

 3 We have broad discretion to remand a case in the interest of justice after reversing the 

trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.3(b); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190, 196 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Chrismon v. Brown, 246 S.W.3d 102, 116 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). We may exercise our discretion to remand as 

long as there is a probability that the case, for any reason, has not been fully developed. See 

Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d at 196.