## RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A - 2430
- 15T3 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff
- Respondent,

v. M.R.P., Defendant
- Appellant.
Submitted May 10, 2017

– Decided Before Judges Alvarez and Manahan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 10
- 09
- 1016. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (John V. Molitor, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Erin Smi th Wisloff, Supervis ing Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court . " A lthough it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R .1:36
- 3.

July 18, 20172 A - 2430
- 15T3

Defendant M.R.P. appeals the November 12, 2015 order denying his petition for post
- conviction relief (PCR). We affirm f or the

reasons s tated by Judge Stuart A. Minkowitz in his detailed written decision . W e a dd some brief comment s . We denied defendant's direct appeal in State v. M.R.P. , No.
A - 2982
- 11 (App. Div. Sep t . 5, 2014). His petition for certification to the Supreme Court was als o denied. State v.
M.R.P. , 220 N.J. 575 (2015). Defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of first
- degree aggravated sexual assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14
- 2(a); second
- degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:14
- 2(b); second
- degree endangering the welfare of a child,
N.J.S.A. 2C:24
- 4(a); and third
- degree aggravated criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14
- 3(a). The two victims were his nieces, B.P. and A.P. Defendant was sentenced on December 16, 2011 , to an aggregate term of forty years imprisonment, subj ect to the No Early Release Act's eighty
- five percent parole ineligibility.
N.J.S.A. 2C:43
- 7.2. Defendant's sexual abuse of B.P. began in 1998, when she was eight years old, and was sent by family from El Salvador to live
here . A.P. , her younger sister, was abused when she visited B.P. in defendant's home years later . The sexual assaults on B.P. continued until her adolescence, when A.P. disclosed defendant's
conduct to the family . They came to this country to remove B.P.3 A - 2430
- 15T3

from defendant's care . T he criminal charges were filed at that time. M.R.P. raised nineteen separate arguments for post
- conviction relief in his petitions. On appeal, his counseled brief raises
two:
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST - CO NVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL.
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PROPOSED TESTIMONY OF R.P. IN MAKING ITS DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. Defendant's uncounseled brief raises eight points of error
as follows:

POINT I THE COURT VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT S WHEN IT DENIED HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SU PPORT HIS POST - CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION.
POINT II THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE WAS IRRELEVANT DESPITE ITS CLEAR EXCULPATORY VALUE AND DESPITE LONG ESTABLISHED LEGAL PRECEDEN [TS] . POINT III THE COURT ERRED AND CONTRADICTED ITS ELF WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD RECEIVED ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE WHILE AT THE SAME4 A - 2430
- 15T3 TIME RULING HIS ARGUMENTS INVALID BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT RAISED EARLIER.
POINT IV THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUS ED TO ADDRESS THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH OF THE APP ELLANT'S RESIDENCE.
POINT V THE COURT SHOWED GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE WHEN IT FAILED TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS.
POINT VI THE COURT DOUBLE - COUNTED ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME TO SUPPORT THE APPLICATI ON OF AGGRAVATING FACTOR 1 DURING SENTENCING.
POINT VII THE COURT INCORRECTLY DISMISSED CRITICAL NEWLY UNCOVERED EVIDENCE.
POINT VIII THE IMPOSITION BY THE COURT OF A SPECIAL SENTENCE OF PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE VIOLATED THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS RENDERING THE SENTENCE ILLEGAL. We first address the points raised in the counseled brief. In point one, defendant attacks the court's failure to fully explore the claim that the eighteen
- year plea offer was not conveyed to him. However, t he judge, although he mentioned the possibility of finding additional corroboration of the information
pres ented to him at the time of the PCR argument, considered the information he ha d sufficient to rule. T hat information wa s dispositive

—— a letter defendant wrote to the court prior to5 A - 2430
- 15T3

trial about the plea bargaining process. In that June 26, 2009
letter , written two years b efore the trial, defendant complained to the judge that the prosecutor had changed the plea offer from fifteen to eighteen years "for the sole reason that, as [the prosecutor] put it, I 'should not be rewarded' for not accepting
before. " T he claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel based on the alleged failure to communicate the eighteen
- year plea offer was completely refuted by the letter defendant wrote to the judge complaining about it. The judge's denial of relief on that
b a s i s i s unassailable.
The second point in the counselled brief goes to the trial court's alleged failure to take into account the information
defendant characterized as new evidence . Defendant's brother
wrote a letter in which he said B.P. and A.P. acknowledged to him that their accusations against defendant wer e false, and in which
he ascribed improper motives to the allegedly false accusations.
T he letter was undated and uncertified. As the judge noted, the
letter also said that defendant's broth er conveyed this information to defendant's attorney in 2008 or 2009 , years before the trial . Th e content s of the letter cannot be considered newly discovered evidence. Defendant's brother was not called to testify at trial.6 A - 2430
- 15T3

Furthermore , A.P. and B.P. were both extensively cross
examined , including questions about the factual allegation s made in the letter. In other words, although the letter was not identified as the source, the same issues the letter raised were covered in the trial. Hence, w e are s atisfied that judge correctly declined to find that the undated and uncertified letter had any evidentiary value.
M ost of the points defendant raises in the uncounseled brief are barred by Rule 3:22
- 4. Subsection (a) of the rule states that a ground for relief not previously raised is barred from PCR consideration if i t c ould have been a dd r ess ed on direct appeal.
T he rule allows for certain exceptions

—— none of which applied here. Therefore, the judge properly refus ed to consider issues that fell withi n that category. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel as the basis for post
- conviction relief, a defendant must meet two requirements

–

— that the objected
- to representation fell outside the range of competent professional assistance, and ultimate prejudice to the outcome . Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). In reviewing such claims, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the range of reasonabl e representation.
State v. Hess , 207 N.J. 123, 147 (2011). Objectively reasonable,7 A - 2430
- 15T3

although ultimately unsuccessful , decisions regarding strategy made by counsel fall within the range of adequate representation.
State v. Arthur , 184 N.J. 307, 319 (2005) . We address only one point in defendant's uncounseled brief

—— the allegation that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not obtain B.P.'s records. Judge Minkowitz concluded that even if B.P.'s medical records did not include complaints about, or physical manifestations of, sexual abuse , they would likely not have affected the outcome. The strength of B.P. and A.P. 's testimony was bolstered by DNA evidence th at estab lish ed intercourse between B.P. and defendant. There is no reason in this case to conclude that had those records been made available, that they would have been anything other than neutral. In sum, defendant fell woefully short of even approximating a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel such as
would have warrant ed a plenary hearing. V iewing the facts in the light most favorable to him, it is nonetheless clear none of his claims require additional proceedings. See State v. Jones , 219
N.J. 298, 311 (2014); State v. Marshall , 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). Affirmed.