Filed 6/23/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

TYSON THEODORE MAYFIELD,

 Defendant and Respondent.

 G057970

 (Super. Ct. No. 18NF2623)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Roger 

B. Robbins, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Elizabeth Molfetta, Deputy District 

Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Respondent. 
2

The members of this panel have enjoyed long careers in the practice of law. 

We’ve seen enough to make it difficult to shock us. But not, as it turns out, impossible.

Respondent Tyson Theodore Mayfield has an extensive criminal record that 

includes multiple acts of violence against racial minorities. In this case, he threatened to 

make a pregnant African-American woman “drop” her unborn baby while she was 

waiting at a bus station. As a third-strike defendant, respondent was facing a mandatory 

prison sentence of 25 years to life. However, the trial court dismissed one of his prior 

strike convictions in the interest of justice under Penal Code section 1385 and sentenced 

him to five years in prison. 

The district attorney contends the dismissal constitutes an abuse of 

discretion, and we agree. Completely. Everything about respondent’s crime and his 

record shouts for application of the Three Strikes law. There is nothing about his 

criminal history or personal character that suggests he somehow falls outside the spirit of 

the Three Strikes law. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter for 

further proceedings. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jasmine C. is an African-American woman who was eight months pregnant 

in September of 2018. That day, she was waiting at the Fullerton bus station for her 

boyfriend to pick her up when she heard respondent talking nearby. He was telling his 

two male companions how he hates “niggers” like Jasmine and “gets his kicks” by 

hurting pregnant black women. He also asked his cohorts if they wanted to see him go 

over to Jasmine and make her “drop her baby.” 

Jasmine became frightened. Her anxiety increased even more when 

respondent walked over to her and said, “I don’t like pregnant niggers like you,” “I’m 

going to make sure you drop your baby.” Jasmine told respondent to stay away from her, 

but he continued to hurl racial epithets at her. Fearing for her safety, and the safety of her 

unborn baby, Jasmine took out her pepper spray and sprayed respondent with it.
3

 In response, respondent grabbed Jasmine’s backpack and left the scene 

momentarily. He then came running back toward her with his fists balled up and told her, 

“You’re going to pay now, you nigger, I’m going to make sure you really drop this 

baby.” By now, Jasmine was so terrified her body was shaking uncontrollably. She 

somehow managed to run to a nearby café and call the police before respondent was able 

to carry out his threat. Officers arrived a short time later and took him into custody.

He was charged with committing a hate crime by threatening Jasmine for 

the purpose of violating her constitutional rights and with the present ability to commit a 

violent injury or cause actual physical injury. (Pen. Code, § 422.7, subd. (a).)1 The 

complaint also alleged one count each of making a criminal threat and petty theft. (§§

422, 484/488.) And it included a sentence enhancement allegation that the criminal 

threat constituted a hate crime. (§ 422.75, subd. (a).) In addition, the complaint alleged

two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)), two prior 

serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. 

(b)). Those six recidivist enhancements were based on respondent’s convictions for 

assault with a deadly weapon in 2005 and mayhem in 2008.

All told, respondent was facing a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life in 

prison under the Three Strikes law, plus 13 years for the remaining enhancements. At his 

arraignment he pleaded not guilty, and over the course of the next several months, his 

preliminary hearing was continued several times to facilitate a plea bargain. During that 

period, respondent was unable to reach a plea agreement with the district attorney. 

However, the trial judge indicated he would be willing to strike one of respondent’s prior 

strike convictions and sentence him as a second-strike offender to five years in prison if 

he pleaded guilty to the charges.

1

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4

The prosecution vehemently opposed this proposed disposition. On March 

15, 2019, it filed a lengthy sentencing brief arguing the interests of justice did not support 

the trial judge’s indicated sentence. According to the brief, respondent was convicted of 

18 offenses during the 20-year period leading up his current crimes in 2018.

2

 Eighteen –

a remarkable number considering how much of those 20 years he spent in custody.

Most of these earlier convictions were for misdemeanors. However, in 

2003, respondent was convicted of felony battery on a police officer, and in 2005, he 

suffered his first strike conviction for stabbing a man outside a liquor store. Respondent 

had no prior relationship with the man he stabbed. He just walked up to him, accused 

him of being a child rapist/murderer and slashed his face with a knife. Respondent 

received a two-year prison sentence for the attack. However, following his release from 

prison, he soon reoffended. 

In 2006, respondent and a companion contacted a nonwhite couple at a gas 

station and asked them if they had any spare change. When the woman said no, 

respondent began making racist statements to her. Then he began punching the man in 

the face and did not relent until a bystander intervened. In the end, the man suffered a 

lacerated lip that required eight stitches and for a time hindered his ability to speak and 

eat. Respondent was convicted of battery with serious bodily injury and mayhem – his 

second strike conviction – and sentenced to nine years in prison.

2

Here is a list of those convictions by date: 

1997: Driving under the influence;

2000: Driving with a suspended license;

2003: Battering a police office, resisting arrest and using illegal drugs;

2004: Petty theft and disorderly conduct;

2005: Assault with a deadly weapon;

2006: Failure to appear in court;

2007: Assault and battery;

2008: Mayhem and battery with serious bodily injury;

2016: Driving under the influence;

2017: Hate crime, assault, battery, and driving under the influence.
5

That was in 2008. Following his release from prison, respondent was 

quickly convicted for drunk driving. And in 2017, one year before the instant case arose,

he reoffended yet again. The victim in that case was a Turkish man with dark skin and 

dreadlocks. Respondent approached him outside a liquor store and asked for a light. 

When the man said he didn’t smoke, respondent called him a “fucking nigger” and began 

pounding him with his fists. The incident led to respondent being convicted of a felony 

hate crime, but the trial court inexplicably reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor 

pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b) and sentenced him to a year in jail. 

In addition to providing this information about respondent’s prior cases, the 

prosecution’s sentencing brief noted respondent has consistently violated the terms of his 

probation and parole throughout the years. The brief also reminded the court respondent 

presently had four misdemeanor cases pending against him that were unrelated to the 

present case. One of those cases was for punching a fellow inmate at the Orange County 

jail without provocation. Respondent boasted to jail authorities that he was not going to 

cease his violent behavior while in custody so long as he was forced to have contact with 

other inmates. 

Given respondent’s violent and racist conduct over the past two decades,

including his actions in the present case, the prosecution’s brief argued he was a threat to 

public safety and deserved to be incarcerated for an indeterminate life term pursuant to 

the Three Strikes law. Nevertheless, the trial judge stood by his indicated sentence of 

five years, which predictably prompted respondent to change his plea to guilty. 

At the change of plea/sentencing hearing, the judge did not receive any 

information from the probation department because respondent had waived his right to a 

presentence report. However, the judge did confirm he had read the prosecution’s 

sentencing brief, which was filed two months before the hearing. In addition, the judge 

heard from Jasmine C., who read her victim impact statement into the record. 
6

Jasmine described how respondent accosted her at the bus station on the 

day in question, as set forth above. She said that when respondent called her a nigger and 

threatened to make her drop her baby, she was physically and emotionally traumatized

and that, ultimately, she had to “run for [her] life” in order to get away from him. She 

also said the incident exacerbated her PTSD, and she was extremely worried that if 

respondent only received a five-year sentence, he would try to track her down and hurt 

her when he is released. In light of the tremendous anguish and anxiety respondent 

caused her, she believed he should be imprisoned for “a very long time,” much longer 

than just five years. 

 Arguing on behalf of the People, Orange County District Attorney Todd 

Spitzer3described respondent as an “evil” and “dangerous” person whose history of racist 

behavior and actions toward Jasmine were “beyond alarming.” Like Jasmine, the district 

attorney said he was very concerned that a five-year sentence for respondent would be 

insufficient to protect society and deter him from committing additional hate crimes 

against more innocent victims in the future. 

For his part, defense counsel did not present any new facts or information 

for the court to consider, nor did he dispute any factual aspect of the prosecution’s 

sentencing brief or Jasmine’s victim impact statement. He simply did not believe the 

circumstances of respondent’s present offense warranted an indeterminate life term. 

The trial judge exercised his discretion under section 1385, and struck 

respondent’s 2005 strike conviction in the interest of justice for the following reasons: 1) 

the circumstances surrounding the current offense “do not indicate a greater degree of 

danger to society[,]” 2) “[t]here was no injury to any person[,]” 3) “[t]here was no 

3

It is not typical in this county of three million for the district attorney to argue a sentencing. He 

usually leaves that to one of his 306 deputies. He thought this important enough to do himself. 
7

weapon used[,]” 4) respondent’s prior strike conviction is “14 years old and now remote 

in time,” and 5) respondent was pleading guilty at an early stage of the proceedings.4 

The judge sentenced respondent to a prison term of five years, representing 

the requisite double the two-year midterm on the criminal threats count, plus one year for 

the hate crime enhancement attendant to that count. In so doing, the judge not only 

struck respondent’s 2005 conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law, he also struck 

all of the prior serious felony and prior prison term enhancements. Sentencing on the 

remaining two counts was stayed pending the completion of respondent’s five-year term. 

So a defendant with 38 years’ exposure who had been sentenced to 9 years for his 

previous felony, got 5 years for this one.

DISCUSSION

The district attorney contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

dismissing respondent’s 2005 strike conviction. We agree. 

As a preliminary matter, we address a procedural point raised by 

respondent. He contends the information in the district attorney’s appellate brief 

regarding the underlying facts of the case and respondent’s criminal history is “distorted 

and one-sided” because it was derived entirely from the sentencing brief the prosecution 

filed in the trial court. Respondent claims the information in the sentencing brief cannot 

be trusted as a basis to impugn the trial court’s ruling because there is no indication

where it came from or whether it is reliable. 

However, in addition to including information from the prosecution’s 

sentencing brief, the district attorney’s appellate brief also contains a full two-page 

description of Jasmine’s victim impact statement. That statement, which provides a 

detailed account of what respondent did to Jasmine at the bus station, was filed with the 

4

As an additional justification for his decision, the judge stated, “The current offense is not a 

violent or serious felony[.]” However, after the district attorney pointed out that making a criminal threat is a 

serious felony (see § 1192.7, subd. (c)(38)), the judge retracted that statement. 
8

trial court and read out loud by Jasmine at the sentencing hearing without objection from 

respondent. The trial court properly considered it, and so may we. (§ 1191.1; People v. 

Jones (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574.)

As for the information in the district attorney’s appellate brief pertaining to 

respondent’s criminal record and the circumstances surrounding his prior offenses, 

respondent is correct in saying that information came exclusively from the prosecution’s 

sentencing brief. However, while respondent assails that information as inaccurate and 

biased, he did not object to it below, nor did he file his own sentencing brief in the trial 

court, despite having over two months to do so from the time the People filed their brief

until the time the sentencing hearing was conducted. Nor does he identify any specific 

inaccuracies. In light of these circumstances, and given the fact respondent expressly 

waived his right to a presentence probation report, he is in no position to complain about 

the accuracy of the information contained in the district attorney’s filings. (See generally 

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 [the forfeiture rule – which is designed to encourage 

prompt detection and correction of error, and to reduce the number of unnecessary 

appellate claims – precludes the parties from raising procedural sentencing issues for the 

first time on appeal].) 

Respondent also faults the district attorney for failing to supply the trial 

court, and by extension this court, with any facts about his personal background, 

prospects or character. But as the party seeking section 1385 relief in the trial court, it 

was respondent’s duty to provide this information to the court. (Daire v. Lattimore (9th 

Cir. 2016) 818 F.3d 454, 464: People v. Thimmes (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1213.) 

He offered nothing. There was thus nothing before the trial judge to suggest he should 

exercise his discretion in favor of the respondent. Character and prospects cannot be 

evaluated by looking at people, and that’s all the trial judge had to go on here. The 

record shows the prosecution addressed respondent’s character and prospects in its 

sentencing brief, describing them as “poor” and “not good” respectively, and there is 
9

nothing in the record to contradict this assessment. Indeed, we think his character speaks 

for itself. For all of these reasons, we do not believe there is any basis for disregarding 

the information contained in the prosecution’s sentencing brief or the district attorney’s 

statement of facts on appeal. 

We now turn to the merits of the trial court’s decision to dismiss 

respondent’s prior strike conviction. We do so fully cognizant of the discretion vested in 

trial courts in the area of criminal sentencing. We are always loath to reject the exercise 

of such discretion. But this is not a close call. 

In reviewing this decision, we must keep in mind the Three Strikes law is 

designed to “punish repeat criminal offenders severely” and “drastically curtail a 

sentencing court’s ability to reduce the severity of a sentence by eliminating alternatives 

to prison incarceration[.]” (People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 641.) To that end, 

the law mandates the imposition of a 25-year-to-life prison sentence in cases – such as 

this one – where the defendant is convicted of a serious or violent felony and has 

previously been convicted of two such felonies. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C), 1170.12, subd. 

(c)(2)(C).) In other words, “If, after having suffered two qualifying felony convictions, 

an offender commits a third qualifying felony, the Three Strikes law presumes he or she 

is incorrigible and requires a life sentence.” (People v. Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 

638.) 

That doesn’t mean trial courts are powerless to deviate from the Three 

Strikes law. Under section 1385, the trial court is empowered to strike a prior strike 

conviction “in the furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (b); People v. Superior Court 

(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530.) However, that great power should only be 

used in “extraordinary” circumstances, when the ends of justice demand it. (People v. 

Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378; People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 337–

338.) 
10

In determining whether such circumstances exist in a given case, the trial 

court must balance society’s legitimate interest in imposing longer sentences for repeat 

offenders and the defendant’s constitutional right against disproportionate punishment. 

(People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 530–531.) It must also 

consider the nature of the defendant’s present felonies and prior strike convictions, as 

well as his background, character and prospects. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 

148, 161 (Williams).) And, of course, the court must remember the Three Strikes law is 

not discretionary in nature. Rather, the law must be applied when the defendant has two

or more prior strikes, unless the court concludes an exception to the law should be made 

because, for articulable reasons that can withstand scrutiny for abuse, the defendant lies 

outside the spirit of the law such that he should be treated as though he had not 

previously been convicted of one or more strikes. (Ibid.; People v. Carmony, supra, 33 

Cal.4th at p. 376.) 

In this case, the trial court’s stated reasons for striking respondent’s prior 

strike conviction do not withstand scrutiny. Although the abuse-of-discretion standard of 

review is deferential, it is not sycophantic. And here we deal with a statute passed 

specifically to limit the court’s discretion. Reversal is required here because the trial 

judge’s stated reasons reflect an unreasonable application of the sentencing principles 

discussed above to the facts of the case before him. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 

161.) 

In striking respondent’s prior strike conviction, the trial judge focused 

primarily on the nature of his current crimes against Jasmine. The judge did not believe 

those offenses posed a great degree of danger to society as compared to other crimes 

because respondent did not use a weapon or cause Jasmine injury. It is true respondent 

did not use a tangible weapon, such as a knife or a gun, during his encounter with 

Jasmine. However, he was so aggressive and hateful toward her, so frighteningly intense, 

she resorted to pepper spray to protect herself. And even that did not deter respondent;
11

instead of backing off after being sprayed, he ran toward Jasmine brandishing his fists 

and threatening her, “Now you’re going to pay, nigger. Now I’m going to make sure you 

really drop your baby.”

The result was an eight-month pregnant woman running for her life – and 

the life of her unborn child – from declarations of overt and despicable intent. Surely the 

language used here – “Now you’re going to pay, nigger” – addressed to a pregnant 

woman demonstrates a danger to society as clearly as displaying a knife or a screwdriver. 

Indeed, respondent’s prior offenses demonstrate the dangerous import of 

his threats. Even though respondent was not armed with a physical weapon when he 

attacked his victims in 2006 and 2017, he was able to make them “pay” with his bare 

hands. Indeed, in both of those cases, respondent repeatedly beat his victim about the 

head and face without any provocation whatsoever. And as a result of the 2006 attack, 

his victim needed eight stiches to his lacerated lip and could not eat or talk without 

considerable difficulty. 

What’s more, defendant had already gotten a pass on his first formally 

charged hate crime in 2017. This was not an isolated instance of uncontrolled 

detestability. He had a history of such conduct – including an attack on a law 

enforcement officer.

Jasmine did not suffer similar physical injury. But when she addressed the 

court at sentencing, she said the incident with respondent affected her both “emotionally 

and physically” and that it put a lot of stress on her and her unborn baby. She described 

how her heart began to race and her legs began to shake when respondent confronted her. 

And how she had to “run for [her] life” when respondent came running toward her. She 

also said the incident worsened her PTSD and that she continues to live with the fear
12

respondent will track her down and hurt her after he is released from prison, simply 

because of the color of her skin.5 

In that regard, Jasmine made it clear respondent’s actions toward her were 

particularly painful because they were racially degrading and motivated by bigotry. 

Having been the victim of a hate crime, Jasmine said she will never forget what 

respondent put her through that day. The incident served as a grim reminder to her that

“the world is full of hate” and how difficult it is to deal with racial violence and hatred on 

a personal level. 

The trial judge did not mention the race issue in granting respondent 

leniency. However, this is not the first time respondent has laced his criminal behavior 

with racist statements. As he did to Jasmine in this case, he called his Turkish victim a 

“nigger” when he attacked him a year earlier. He also made racist comments toward the 

couple he confronted at a gas station in 2006 before going off on the man for no apparent 

reason. As our nation’s highest court has recognized, the defendant’s motive for

offending is an important factor in the sentencing equation. (Wisconsin v. Mitchell

(1993) 508 U.S. 476, 485.) When the defendant’s criminal behavior is driven by racist 

attitudes, greater punishment is generally deemed warranted on the basis such conduct 

inflicts unique harm to both the individual victim and society as a whole. (Id. at pp. 487-

488; accord, In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 726 [“hate crimes injure members of the 

protected class and society more severely than do random crimes”].) 

What the Supreme Court did not say but we find considerable here is that 

racism and misanthropy are motives that are not likely to diminish or disappear. A 

defendant who boasts about his fights with other inmates and has a long and depressing 

history of random violence is not likely to emerge from whatever portion of five years his 

sentence requires him to serve with a thoughtful and pacific approach to his fellow man.

5

A not unreasonable concern given his history.
13

Suffice it to say, we do not believe the nature of respondent’s current 

offenses is in any way mitigating, let alone a sufficient basis for striking his prior strike 

conviction. The offenses were not as serious as some crimes, to be sure, but considered 

in light of respondent’s criminal history – and with a complete and utter absence of any

mitigating “character and prospects” evidence – they represent the continuation of 

respondent’s disturbing penchant for victimizing innocent minorities in our community. 

By virtue of his prior offenses, respondent has shown he is fully willing and able to inflict

great physical harm on his victims, and there is nothing to suggest he would not have 

done so again in this case, had Jasmine not been able to flee the scene and summon help 

from the police. 

In dismissing respondent’s prior strike conviction, the trial judge also relied 

on the fact the conviction was 14 years old at the time of sentencing. The judge felt this 

circumstance rendered the conviction too remote to use it against respondent at this stage 

of his criminal career, but as our Supreme Court’s decision in Williams illustrates, older 

strike convictions do not deserve judicial forgiveness unless the defendant has used them

as a pivot point for reforming his ways. 

In Williams, the defendant had suffered two prior strikes and served three

prison terms by the time he committed his third strike offense by driving under the 

influence of PCP. As part of an indicated sentence, the trial judge struck one of his 

strikes under section 1385 and sentenced him as a second-strike offender to nine years in 

prison after he pleaded guilty to the charges. The judge felt that result was justified 

because the prior strike was 13 years old and the defendant’s record since that time had 

not been sufficiently egregious to warrant an indeterminate life term. However, the 

Supreme Court did not see it that way. 

On review, the Williams court found the striking decision constituted an 

abuse of discretion given the length and severity of the defendant’s criminal record. 

While the court recognized 13 years passed between the time of the defendant’s strike 
14

convictions, it found that mattered little because he did not refrain from criminal activity 

during that interim period. To the contrary, he committed multiple misdemeanor and

felony offenses, including one involving actual violence, and he performed poorly on 

probation and parole. The Williams court saw this as proof the defendant had not 

changed from the time of his prior offenses and was thus undeserving of leniency under 

section 1385. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s striking decision and 

remanded the matter to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. (Williams, 

supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 163-165.) 

Like the defendant in Williams, respondent failed to reform his behavior 

during the decade-plus that elapsed between his first strike conviction and his third strike 

conviction. Instead, he continued to do the same thing he has been doing since 1997: 

break the law on a remarkably regular basis and with reckless abandon. Following his 

first strike conviction in 2005 for slashing a man’s face with a knife, he went on to 

commit over a dozen more offenses, including his present crimes in 2018. As detailed 

above, many of those offenses involved actual violence and were utterly unprovoked. 

What’s even more astonishing is that the 13-year period respondent wants 

to rely on was one in which he spent over 10 years in jail or prison. Despite spending 

more time in custody between strikes than the defendant in Williams, respondent 

managed to rack up just about the same number of convictions. 

Respondent was also given a tremendous break in 2017 when the court 

reduced his felony hate crime to a misdemeanor. This enabled him to avoid the 

imposition of a lengthy prison sentence at that time.

6

 Yet, before the dust settled on that 

case, he went out and committed another hate crime, against Jasmine. His unrelenting 

criminal behavior since suffering his first strike conviction in 2005 demonstrates him to 

be an unchanged man, with a stubborn character and no discernible prospects for reform. 

6

The record does not reflect how in the world that happened.
15

We therefore do not believe his first strike conviction was what the law considers 

cognizably remote for purposes of the Three Strikes law. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 

pp. 162-164; People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [reversing order 

dismissing 20-year-old strike conviction because the defendant led “a continuous life of 

crime” after that conviction]; People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 321 [“the 

remoteness in time of the (defendant’s 17-year-old) strike priors is not significant in light 

of (his) continuous crime spree, which has substantially spanned his entire adult life”]; 

compare People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1245 [upholding the dismissal of two 

prior strike convictions that were 17 to 20 years old where the defendant’s criminal 

activity since those convictions was limited to a handful of minor offenses].) 

That brings us to the final factor the trial court cited to justify its sentencing 

decision in this case, namely, that respondent pleaded guilty at an early stage of the 

proceedings. While this circumstance is relevant to our analysis, Williams teaches the 

mere presence of some mitigating circumstances cannot insulate a trial court’s decision to 

strike a prior strike conviction against a charge of abuse of discretion. (See Williams, 

supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 163 [finding an abuse of discretion despite evidence the defendant 

had a stable living arrangement, was a caring father, and was still loved and supported by 

his family].) Respondent may have saved the state some expense by pleading guilty early 

on in this case, but his extensive criminal record proves he is “an exemplar of the 

‘revolving door’ career criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is addressed.” (People v. 

Stone (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 707, 717.) Any expense saved the state by his plea would 

likely be re-incurred with interest if he gets out in five years and there are still bus stops. 

All of this convinces us the trial court abused its discretion in offering him 

a reduced sentence. Wisely anticipating we might reach this conclusion, respondent’s 

counsel asks that we remand the matter to permit him to file a sentencing brief or other 

documentation that might somehow justify the trial court’s sentencing decision. 

However, respondent had every opportunity to do so prior to his sentencing hearing; he is 
16

not entitled to another bite at the apple. The Williams decision makes clear that when, as 

here, the defendant’s guilty plea was motivated by the court’s indicated willingness to 

strike a prior strike conviction, the proper remedy is to reverse the judgment and remand 

the matter to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed without that 

willingness complicating his decisions. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 164.) Given 

this remedy, we decline respondent’s invitation to simply remand the matter for the 

presentation of further evidence. All charges and enhancements will be reinstated and the 

case returned to status quo ante the court’s offer.

We also find it unnecessary to consider the district attorney’s claim that, 

not only did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking respondent’s prior strike 

conviction, it abused its discretion by striking his prior serious felony convictions and his 

prior prison terms. Whether respondent deserves to have one or more of those 

enhancements stricken is something the trial court can revisit should it be in a position to 

resentence him in the future. While we do not rule out the possibility such relief may be 

warranted if respondent is ultimately convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison 

under the Three Strikes law, we express no opinion on that issue at this stage of the 

proceedings. 
17

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to permit respondent 

to withdraw his guilty plea and plead anew. 

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FYBEL, J. 

THOMPSON, J.