NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOPHIE RIDER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

JEANNIE FULLER; JENNIFER FULLER; 

BERNARD ANDERSON; ERIN 

BARDALES, AKA Erin Sooper, AKA Erin 

Valarde; DOES, 1 to 5, inclusive, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-56075

D.C. No. 2:22-cv-02913-SB-AFM

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 16, 2024**

Before: BENNETT, BADE, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Sophie Rider appeals from the district court’s dismissal 

of her complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see United States ex rel. 

Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (en 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as 

provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without 

oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

FILED

APR 16 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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banc), we affirm.

Rider’s operative second amended complaint asserts claims for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, slander, “false allegations” (alleging, in substance, 

trespass and theft), and false imprisonment. Named as Defendants, in one or more 

of these claims, are Rider’s next-door neighbor, Jeannie Fuller (who the complaint 

alleges is now a retired officer with the Torrance Police Department), as well as 

Fuller’s daughter and two other Torrance police officers. Rider’s sole asserted 

basis for invoking federal court jurisdiction is that one or more of these claims 

states a cause of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

In dismissing Rider’s previous complaints with leave to amend, the district 

court explained that § 1983 does not provide a remedy for state law torts and that

Rider would have to adequately plead sufficient facts to support a non-frivolous 

claim under § 1983. In particular, the court noted that the complaint failed to plead 

sufficient facts establishing either the state-action element of a § 1983 claim or any 

basis for concluding that Rider’s claims based on long-ago conduct were not 

barred by the statute of limitations. After affording Rider two opportunities to cure 

these deficiencies, the district court held that Rider’s effort to assert a § 1983 claim 

was so wholly insubstantial and frivolous that it did not even suffice to give rise to 

federal jurisdiction. See Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45–46 (2015) (citing 

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946)).
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We agree with the district court that Rider’s effort to invoke § 1983 is 

“wholly insubstantial and frivolous” and therefore fails to provide any basis for 

federal question jurisdiction. See Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–83. Nearly all of the 

conduct alleged in the complaint involves private disputes between Rider and 

Fuller, including disputes in state court concerning a restraining order that Fuller 

obtained, and sought to have extended, against Rider. The complaint fails to plead 

any facts that would support a non-frivolous claim that Fuller took the alleged

actions under color of state law, as required to state a § 1983 claim. See Schucker 

v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Invoking state legal 

procedures does not constitute ‘joint participation’ or ‘conspiracy’ with state 

officials sufficient to satisfy section 1983’s state action requirement.”). Although 

the complaint also alleges that Fuller conspired with the Defendant police officers 

to have Rider taken into civil custody on false pretenses, that alleged conduct 

occurred in 2014 and there is no non-frivolous basis for concluding that Rider’s 

reliance on such a theory raises a valid § 1983 claim. See Maldonado v. Harris, 

370 F.3d 945, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that § 1983 claims are governed by 

“the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state,” which in 

California is two years (citing CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 335.1)). Finally, although the 

complaint alleges that, at some unspecified time, Fuller called the police, who then 

drove by Rider’s house “slowly with intimidating stares,” any contention that such 
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conduct, without more, is actionable under § 1983 is wholly frivolous.

Because Rider’s effort to shoehorn her state law claims into the framework 

of § 1983 was wholly insubstantial and frivolous, the district court properly 

concluded that her complaint failed to invoke the district court’s federal question 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And because Rider and her next-door 

neighbor were obviously not of diverse citizenship, there was no basis for diversity 

jurisdiction. The court therefore properly dismissed this action for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED.