### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs M

ay 25, 2001 STATE OF TEN

NESSEE, DEP

ARTMENT OF

CHILDREN'S S

ERVICES v. ANGELA KNOWLES HUFFMAN
Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Sullivan County No. J22,417 James H. Beeler, Special Judge FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2001

No. E2000-03176-COA-R3-CV

Angela Knowles Huffman appeals a judgment of the Juvenile Court for Sulliva n Cou nty which terminatedher parental rights as to her son, L.T.H. and her daughter, R.E.T. She contends on appeal that the evidence sought to justify termination does not meet the clear and c onvinc ing test. We affirm. Tenn.R.App.P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgmen

t of the Juvenile Co

urt affirmed; Cause Remanded

H OUSTON M. G ODDARD , P.J., delivered th e opinion of the co

urt, in which H ERSCHEL P. F RANKS and Charles D. Susano, Jr., JJ., joined. Jonathan M. Holcomb, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Angela Knowles Huffman

Paul G. Summers, Att

orney General and Reporter, and Elizabeth C. Driver, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellee , State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services
OPINION Angela Knowles Huffman

, an inmate in

the Penal System of t

his State, appeals

a judgment of the Juvenile Court for Sullivan County, entered on November 4, 2000, w hich terminated her parental rights as to her son, L.T.H. (D.O.B. 9/17/96) and her daughter, R.E.T. (D.O.B. 12/8/97).

Her single issue on appeal contends that the proof justifying termination does not meet the statutory standards which requires “clear and convincing evidence.”

In non-jury cases our review is de novo upon th e record of the proceedings below. That record, however, comes to us with the presumption that the trial court’s findings of facts –which in this case, as already noted, mu st be by clear and convincing evide

nce–is correct

. Tenn.R.App.P.1 We doubt the Trial C ourt’s finding of a g round for term ination in Ms. Huffman’s alleged “substant ial noncompliance by the Respondent , Angela Huffman, wi

th the st atement of r

esponsibi

liti es in the Plan of Care. ” She testifi ed thatduring the pe

riod between he

r convicti

on and the revoca

tion of her

probation,

she had completed 99 per cent of her parenting plan. Si nce we find clear

and con vincing evidenc e of other ground s for term ination, ou r doubt w ith respect to one ground is not material to our j udgment in this case.

-2- 13(d). We must honor the presumption unless we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial cou rt’s factual finding as to the clear and convincing standard. The Trial Court’s conclusion of law, however, are not accorded the same deference, Campbell v. FloridaSteel Corp. , 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996). By order entered on June 10, 1998, the Juvenile Court placed the custody of the two children withthe State

because of the severe physical abuse inflicted upon the son by the daughter’s father, who was Ms. Huffman’s live-in boyfriend. This occurred when Ms. Huffmanwas absent from the residence. Ho wever , notwithstanding her absence she was subsequently convicted of permitting child abuse and given a penitentiary sentence from which she sought and received probation.

Her parole was later revoked when she failed a drug screening and, as already noted, is now incarcerated.

The Trial Court found–and we concur in his finding–a number of statutory grounds for termination–one of which we concede may be questionable 1 –which, beyond peradventure, meet the clear and convincing test. They are:

That the petition filed by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services, is well

taken and should be sustained and relief granted thereunder for th e causes as stated therein in that under the provisions of T.C.A. § 36-1-11 3 (g)(3)(A), that on the basis of clear and convincing ev

idence that termi

nation is in the children’s best interest in that the children have been

removed from the

home of the parent or

guardian by order of a Court for a period of six (6) months and: (i) The conditions which led to the children’s removal or other conditions which in all reasonable p

robability would cause the children to be subjected to further abuse or neglect and which, therefore, prevent the children’s safe return to the care of the parent(s) or

guardian(s) still

persist; (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so tha t the children ca

n be safely returned to the parent or guardian in the near future; and (iii) The continuation of the parent or guard

ian and child

relation ship greatly diminishes the children’s chances of early integra tion into a sa

fe, stabl e and permanent home. That pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2) , there has been substantial noncompliance by the Respondent, Angel

a Huffman, with th

e statement of re

sponsi biliti es in the Plan of Care pursuant to T .C. A. § 37-2-403. That pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1- 113(g)(4) , the parent

or guardian has been found to have committed severe child abuse as defined in T.C.A. § 37-1-102 , under any prior order of a court or is found-3-

by the cour t hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition for adoption, to have committed severe child abuse ag ainst the child who is the subject of the petition or a

gainst any sibling or half-sibling of such child, or any othe r child residing temporarily or permanently in the home of such parent or gua rdian. That pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(5) , the parent or guardian ha s been sentenced to

more than two (2) years imprisonment for conduct against the child who is the subject of the

petition or for co

nduct against

any sibling or halfsibling of the child

or any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the homeof such parent or guardian, which has been found under any prior order of
a court or which is found by the court hearing the petition to be severe chil d abuse, as defined in T.C.A. § 37-1-102(b)(19)

. Ms. Huffman argues, however, that even if the grounds for termination exists, the proof does not show by clear

and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children that her parental rights be terminated. We disagree.

The children were removed from the home on Febr uary 12, 1 998, and their temporary custody placed with the De partment of Childr

en’s Services. A

t that time the son wa

s 17 months old and the daughter two months old. They were placed in a foster home and ha

ve been with the sa

me foster parents–who have expressed a desire to adopt them–since the removal. Given the fact that it is highly unlikely either child remembers the mother (almos t certai nly not the daughte r), Ms. Huffman has conceded that the children have bonded with their foster parents, and Ms. Huffman’s history of not protecting t he son, we find tha

t the proof is

clear and convincing that termination of the Mother’s par

ental rights is in the

children’s best in

terest.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed and the cause remanded for such further pro

ceedings, if any, as may be neces sary. Costs of appe al are adjudged

against Angela Knowles Huffman.

_________________________________________ HOUSTON M. GODDARD, PRESIDING JUDGE