IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 2000 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES THOMAS JEFFERSON

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 92-C-1372 Walter C. Kurtz, Judge

No. M1997-00115-SC-R11-PC - Filed August 25, 2000

This case is before us upon a jury’s resentencing of the defendant, James Thomas Jefferson, on his

conviction for premeditated first degree murder. In the original appeal, the Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded the matter to the trial court for

resentencing. On remand, the defendant requested a new jury trial on the merits in addition to the

already-ordered resentencing. The trial court denied the request for a new trial. After a new hearing,

the jury fixed a sentence of life imprisonment. The defendant appealed of right, challenging the trial

court’s overruling of his motion for a new trial on the merits. Relying on the “law of the case”

doctrine, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. We granted the

defendant’s application for permission to appeal and now hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals

properly determined that the law of the case doctrine barred the trial court from granting Jefferson’s

motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals

Affirmed

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH,JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J.,

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III,JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

Jeffrey A. DeVasher, Nashville, Tennessee for the appellant, James Thomas Jefferson.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Kathy

Morante, Deputy Attorney General, Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney, and Roger Moore,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
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This case is before the Court upon the jury’s resentencing of the defendant to life

imprisonment for first degree premeditated murder. The defendant contends that the trial court erred

in overruling his motion for a new trial on guilt or innocence before considering resentencing. For

the reasons stated below, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling the defendant’s

motion.

We begin with a summary of the proceedings. The homicide that led to this prosecution

occurred June 15, 1968, in Nashville. The defendant was first tried in 1969; this ended in a mistrial.

In the second trial, held in January 1971, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and was

sentenced to ninety-nine years in the penitentiary. After lengthy post-trial litigation in both the state

and federal courts, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted

habeas corpus relief and vacated the conviction. The defendant was subsequently re-indicted on July

24, 1992.

Trial began in August 1993, and at the conclusion of the State’s proof, the trial court

dismissed the felony murder (robbery) count on the ground that it was duplicitous of the felony

murder (larceny) count. At the appropriate point, the trial court instructed the jury, stating the

elements for each of the four first degree murder counts (three felony murder counts and one

premeditated murder count). Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser-included

offense of second degree murder. The trial court informed the jury that if it found the defendant

guilty of first degree murder, sentencing was to be accomplished “by setting his sentence at life or

a specific term of years of from twenty years to life.” The jury returned a verdict finding the

defendant guilty of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced him to forty years imprisonment.

Because the sentencing statute had been declared unconstitutional, the only legal sentence

on a conviction for first degree murder was life imprisonment. Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 765

(Tenn. 1979). Accordingly, on August 20, 1993, the day following the trial, the State moved to

correct the judgment. In its motion, the State contended that the only sentence possible for first

degree murder was a life sentence, so that the forty-year sentence imposed by the jury was, therefore,

invalid. The State asked the trial court to correct the judgment by entering a sentence of life

imprisonment. In response, the defendant moved for an order compelling the State to submit a

sentencing judgment form reciting the forty-year sentence imposed by the jury. The trial court

granted the State’s motion and modified the sentence by imposing a term of life imprisonment.

The defendant appealed the conviction and sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected

the challenges to the conviction but found the original sentence of forty years to be illegal and

therefore void. It recognized that once a jury is discharged its verdict cannot be amended or

corrected by the trial court as to the grade of the offense or the sentence imposed. The Court of

Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court did not have the authority to change the jury's verdict

from forty years to life imprisonment.

The Court of Criminal Appeals’s opinion specifically held as follows:
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Since the jury found the appellant guilty of premeditated murder and

the evidence contained in the record supports the verdict, the verdict

of the jury finding the appellant guilty of premeditated murder is

affirmed. However, this case must be remanded to the trial court for

a new sentencing hearing.

State v. Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d 1, 3-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The defendant’s application for

permission to appeal to this Court was denied.

On remand to the trial court, the defendant filed a motion to impanel a jury for the purpose

of determining his guilt or innocence. Following a hearing, the trial court denied this motion. On

July 14, 1997, a jury was impaneled for the sentencing hearing. The jury sentenced the defendant

to life imprisonment.

On appeal from this sentencing hearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s denial of a jury trial as to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Relying upon the “law of the

case” doctrine, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court was bound by the intermediate

court’s previous decision affirming the conviction and remanding the case solely for resentencing.

InMemphis Publ’g Co. v. Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d

303 (Tenn. 1998), we addressed the “law of the case” doctrine. The following principles quoted

from Memphis Publ’g Co. govern the outcome in the pending case:

The phrase “law of the case” refers to a legal doctrine which

generally prohibits reconsideration of issues that have already been

decided in a prior appeal of the same case. In other words, under the

law of the case doctrine, an appellate court's decision on an issue of

law is binding in later trials and appeals of the same case if the facts

on the second trial or appeal are substantially the same as the facts in

the first trial or appeal. The doctrine applies to issues that were

actually before the appellate court in the first appeal and to issues that

were necessarily decided by implication. The doctrine does not apply

to dicta. 

The law of the case doctrine is not a constitutional mandate

nor a limitation on the power of a court. Rather, it is a longstanding

discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based on the common

sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a

court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited. This

rule promotes the finality and efficiency of the judicial process,

avoids indefinite relitigation of the same issue, fosters consistent

results in the same litigation, and assures the obedience of lower

courts to the decisions of appellate courts. 
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Therefore, when an initial appeal results in a remand to the

trial court, the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of

the case which generally must be followed upon remand by the trial

court, and by an appellate court if a second appeal is taken from the

judgment of the trial court entered after remand. There are limited

circumstances which may justify reconsideration of an issue which

was [an] issue decided in a prior appeal: (1) the evidence offered at

a trial or hearing after remand was substantially different from the

evidence in the initial proceeding; (2) the prior ruling was clearly

erroneous and would result in a manifest injustice if allowed to stand;

or (3) the prior decision is contrary to a change in the controlling law

which has occurred between the first and second appeal. 

Memphis Publ’g Co., 975 S.W.2d at 306 (internal citations omitted).

Jefferson’s case falls under neither the first nor the third exception to the law of the case

doctrine. The only possible exception in which Jefferson’s case could fall is the second exception;

that is, whether “the prior ruling was clearly erroneous and would result in a manifest injustice if

allowed to stand.” Id. (emphasis added). This exception requires a two part showing. First, a

defendant must show that the prior decision was clearly erroneous. If the defendant succeeds, he or

she must then prove that the clearly erroneous decision “would result in a manifest injustice if

allowed to stand.” Thus, to prevail under this exception Jefferson must show that the Court of

Criminal Appeals’s ruling was both clearly erroneous and would lead to manifest injustice. We must

first decide, therefore, if the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision was “clearly erroneous.” In

answering this question we turn to the precedent of this Court. We find the issue resolved by our

decision in State v. Cook, 816 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1991).

In Cook, the trial court, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b), now repealed,

instructed the jury as to the defendant’s possible sentences as a Range I offender when the court

should have instructed the jury as to the defendant’s possible sentences as a Range II offender. We

held that such an error was prejudicial, and we remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial.

In this case, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury under a statute already found to be

unconstitutional. Such a situation is analogous to Cook. Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeals

should have relied on Cook and remanded the case for a new trial. We find, therefore, that the Court

of Criminal Appeals’s decision was clearly erroneous because the court failed to follow the

precedent of this Court.

Having determined that the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision was clearly erroneous, we

must next determine if the decision would result in manifest injustice if allowed to stand. Although

Jefferson does not specifically address this issue, he contends that if the jury had been given the

proper instruction as to the sentence for first degree murder, it is possible that the jury would have

convicted him of the lesser included offense of second degree murder.
1

As previously no ted, Jefferson was tried and convicted of first degree murder in 1971. His conviction was

subsequently vacated by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.

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We find Jefferson’s contention without merit, for at no time during the 1993 trial did

Jefferson suggest to the jury that the killing could have constituted second degree murder. The trial

judge, nonetheless, instructed the jury as to the elements of second degree murder, and we conclude

that the jury had, indeed, the opportunity to convict Jefferson of second degree murder. 

Moreover, after reviewing the record, we find that the evidence adduced at trial

overwhelmingly supports Jefferson’s conviction for first degree murder. Indeed, in the long history

of this case, Jefferson has been twice convicted by a jury for first degree murder.1 Accordingly, we

find that no rational jury could have found Jefferson guilty of second degree murder. 

For these reasons, we find that the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision did not result in

manifest injustice. This case, therefore, does not fall under the second exception to the law of the

case doctrine, and the Court of Criminal Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s denial of

Jefferson’s motion for a new trial.

For the reasons articulated above, the Court of Criminal Appeals properly affirmed the trial

court’s denial of Jefferson’s motion for a new trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore,

affirmed.

The costs of this appeal are taxed to the defendant, James Thomas Jefferson, for which

execution may issue.

___________________________________ 

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JUSTICE