[Cite as State v. Chuppa, 2022-Ohio-4461.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ASHTABULA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- vs -

LINDA CHUPPA,

Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. 2022-A-0044

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas

Trial Court No. 2020 CR 00473

O P I N I O N

Decided: December 7, 2022

Judgment: Affirmed

Colleen M. O’Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Jessica Fross, Assistant 

Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Eric D. Hall, P.O. Box 232, Medina, OH 44258 (For Defendant-Appellant).

FREDERICK D. NELSON, J., Ret., Tenth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Linda Chuppa, appeals from the nine-month 

sentence of incarceration imposed by the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas after

her conviction for the third-degree felony of aggravated possession of drugs. She does 

not argue that her sentence was contrary to law, nor more specifically does she contest 

the order that (despite the statutory presumption of prison) she serve that time in the local 

jail. (The state doesn't quarrel with those points either. But compare R.C. 2929.34(B)(2), 

which with its cross-reference to R.C. 5120.161 does not appear to include third-degree 

felonies as among those for which prison time might potentially be served in local jail.) 
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Rather, she contends only that the factual record in the case fails to support the findings 

that the trial court made in justifying a term of nine-months’ duration. Because that 

particular proposition is without merit, and with Ms. Chuppa’s term of confinement about 

to expire, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

{¶2} The trial court, after a bench trial, found Ms. Chuppa guilty of violating R.C. 

2925.11(A) in combination with R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(b) as a third-degree felony given her 

possession of methamphetamine in bulk amount. “[T]here is a presumption for a prison 

term for [that] offense,” R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(b), and the potential range for such 

incarceration runs between specified periods of time ranging from nine to thirty-six 

months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b).

{¶3} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report for Ms. Chuppa, see April 26, 2022 Tr. at 5, and heard 

defense counsel’s arguments that after having displayed what the report indicated was 

(in defense counsel’s words) “a poor attitude and behavior that wouldn’t be in accordance 

with probation,” Ms. Chuppa "finally opened up to the daily methamphetamine use,” id. at 

7; the defense requested community control with credit for jail time served. Id. at 8. See 

also id. at 9 (defense counsel acknowledged that Ms. Chuppa had “squandered” an 

opportunity for treatment in lieu of conviction, and urged that “she’s thinking more clearly 

now because she hasn’t been able to use [methamphetamines] while in jail”).

{¶4} The trial court observed without contradiction that “[t]o say that [Ms.Chuppa] 

has been uncooperative and/or has failed to accept responsibility for her conduct would 

be an understatement.” Id. at 11. The presentence investigation report reflected Ms. 

Chuppa’s bad attitude, the trial court found, including her unwillingness to submit to drug 
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screens while supervised and her “refusals to otherwise cooperate.” Id. at 11-12. The 

drug issue was serious: She had been found in possession of “ten different substances 

containing methamphetamine” when she was arrested. Id. at 12. Unfortunately, the 

probation department did not “feel there's anything they can offer her”; it found her not 

amenable to supervision and recommended straight incarceration “because she has 

demonstrated such a complete unwillingness to cooperate, receive the help that’s been 

made available to her, and to in any manner accept responsibility.” Id. at 13, 12.

{¶5} The trial court agreed with the probation department’s assessment. Having 

considered the record and the purposes of felony sentencing while using the minimum 

sanctions to accomplish those purposes without imposing undue governmental burdens, 

the trial court said, id. at 13, it was tempted to impose the maximum, 36-month prison 

sentence and declined to do so only because Ms. Chuppa had a “limited criminal history.”

Id. at 14. The trial court sentenced her to nine months in jail despite the “limited 

programming available there.” Id. The trial court did not explain why local jail rather than 

state prison was the appropriate place for incarceration.

{¶6} In its May 2, 2022 Judgment Entry of Sentence, the trial court recorded that 

it had considered “the purposes and principles of sentencing under RC 2929.11, [and] the 

seriousness and recidivism factors * * * pursuant to RC 2929.12.” That entry recited that 

Ms. Chuppa “is not amenable to an available combination of community control sanctions

because of [her] poor attitude; [she] was uncooperative with Adult Probation to obtain a 

presentence investigation; [she] failed to appear for a prior sentencing hearing [in this 

matter].” The entry further specified “that a jail sentence is consistent with the purposes 

and principles of sentencing under RC 2929.11 because a jail sentence is commensurate
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with the seriousness of the offender’s conduct * * * * [,]js reasonably necessary to deter 

the offender in order to protect the public from future crime, and * * * would not place an 

unnecessary burden on governmental resources.” The entry granted Ms. Chuppa credit 

for 31-days time served against her nine-month sentence to the Astabula County Jail. Id.

{¶7} On appeal, Ms. Chuppa advances a single assignment of error: “The trial 

court erred when it sentenced appellant to nine months incarceration when clearly and 

convincingly the record fai[l]ed to support its findings.” Appellant’s brief at 3. Her entire 

argument in support of that assignment is found in two sentences: “Although Appellant's 

offense was serious, nothing in the record demonstrates that Appellant would commit 

similar offenses after being released from incarceration. The record in this case clearly 

fails to support the trial court’s decision to impose a nine month sentence of incarceration.”

Id. The state responds, urging that we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Appellee’s Brief 

at 5.

{¶8} We read Ms. Chuppa’s argument, with its reference to what she sees as a

dearth of evidence regarding a potential for recidivism, to be that the record does not

support the trial court’s recidivism finding under R.C. 2929.12. Compare R.C. 2929.12(D)

and (E) (specifying recidivism factors). But the Supreme Court of Ohio has been clear

that a court of appeals is without statutory warrant “to modify or vacate a sentence based

on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 242, ¶ 39.

{¶9} “Although a court imposing a felony sentence must consider the purposes 

of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12, 

‘neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires [the] court to make any specific factual 
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findings on the record.’” State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶20, 

quoting Jones, at ¶20. Here, Ms. Chuppa does not argue that the trial court failed to 

consider the required sentencing factors or to state its findings on the record: She urges 

only that the trial court lacked sufficient facts of record to reach the conclusions it did “to 

impose a nine month sentence of incarceration.” Appellant’s brief at 3. Even were we

inclined to agree, it would not be our province here to reweigh the facts and “substitute 

[our] judgment for that of the trial court regarding the appropriate sentence[] * * * under 

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones at ¶41; see also id. at ¶32 (explaining that “an 

appellate court’s determination that the record does not support a sentence does not 

equate to a determination that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is 

used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)”). Yet that is all that Ms. Chuppa asks us to do.

{¶10} Ms. Chuppa does not elect to argue that the findings the trial court made do 

not support the sentence it imposed or that the sentence itself was contrary to law. Under 

these circumstances, we overrule Ms. Chuppa’s lone and very limited assignment of 

error. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.