NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KIM KERRIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

QUALSTAR CREDIT UNION; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-35174 

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01528-JCC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 12, 2018**

Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Kim Kerrigan appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 

action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Washington state law claims 

arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 29 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-35174 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th 

Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kerrigan’s quiet title claim because 

Kerrigan failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the statute of limitations bars 

any threatened foreclosure action. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.28.300 (providing for 

quiet title action by record owner of real estate where an action to foreclose on a 

mortgage or deed of trust on the real estate would be barred by the statute of 

limitations); Edmundson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 378 P.3d 272, 276-77 (Wash. Ct. 

App. 2016) (stating that “the deed of trust foreclosure remedy is subject to a sixyear statute of limitations” and “when recovery is sought on an obligation payable 

by installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment from the 

time it becomes due”); Bingham v. Lechner, 45 P.3d 562, 566-68 (Wash. Ct. App. 

2002) (holding that the commencement of a nonjudicial foreclosure tolls the statute 

of limitations).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kerrigan’s request 

for certification to the Washington Supreme Court because Kerrigan failed to show 

that Washington law regarding whether a nonjudicial foreclosure tolls the statute of 

limitations for reinstituting foreclosure “has not been clearly determined.” Wash. 

Rev. Code § 2.60.020; see Thompson, 547 F.3d at 1059 (standard of review); 

Bingham, 45 P.3d at 566-68.
3 17-35174 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kerrigan’s request 

for leave to amend the complaint because amendment would be futile. See 

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to 

amend is permitted when amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kerrigan’s Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) motion because Kerrigan did not establish 

any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 

F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds 

for relief under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)).

We reject as meritless Kerrigan’s contention that the district court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (granting 

jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal law).

AFFIRMED.