alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Cite as Kostra v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources , 2016-Ohio-798.]

{¶1} On September 14, 2015, Gloria Kostra (hereinafter “plaintiff”) filed a complaint in this Court against the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (hereinafter “ODNR”). A review of the pleadings and supporting documents reveals the following

facts: {¶2} The plaintiff owns property adjacent to the Portage Lakes State Park in Summit County. On August 6, 2015, a storm damaged a cherry tree on plaintiff’s property, which then fell into the Iron Channel of the Portage Lakes creating a hazardous condition for boaters in the area. To remedy the situation, plaintiff contacted Barberton Tree Service of Norton, Ohio to have them remove the tree. Barberton did so at a cost $1,800, which was billed to the plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to have ODNR pay the costs of the tree removal on the theory that since the tree landed on ODNR’s property, it is thus their responsibility to k eep the state waterways safe for marine travel, and not the legal obligation of a private citizen. {¶3} The plaintiff’s argument, while well-reasoned, is not consistent with the law. As the owner of the tree, she was solely responsible for the maintenance of the tree,

which would include the costs of the removal of the tree should it fall on another persons’ property. Merely because the property in this case belongs to ODNR, does not relieve the plaintiff from her responsibilit y under the law. Surely, if the tree fell onto the property of an adjoining homeowner, the plaintiff would not argue that the GLORIA J. KOSTRA

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Defendant Case No. 2015-00798-AD

Clerk Mark H. Reed

MEMORANDUM DECISIONIN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

homeowner would be responsible for the costs of removing her tree. The same law that would prevail in the case where the property owner is a private citizen applies here as

well. {¶4} Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed.IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

Having considered all the evidence in the claim file, and for the reasons set forth in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff.

MARK H. REED Clerk

cc:

Gloria J. Kostra 309 Guys Run Road Akron, Ohio 44319 Charles G. Rowan Ohio Department of Natural Resources 2045 Morse Road, D-3 Columbus, Ohio 43229-6693

Filed 1/22/16 Sent to S.C. Reporter 3/2/16 GLORIA J. KOSTRA

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Defendant Case No. 2015-00798-AD

Clerk Mark H. Reed

ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINIATION
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5048 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5048

 To amend the Food Security Act of 1985 with respect to eligibility to 
         become a third-party provider, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 15, 2018

  Mr. Bost (for himself and Mr. Soto) introduced the following bill; 
           which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Food Security Act of 1985 with respect to eligibility to 
         become a third-party provider, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nutrient Management Technical 
Service Provider Certification Act of 2018''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985.

    Section 1242(e) of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 
3842(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(4) Alternative certification.--
                    ``(A) In general.--In carrying out this subsection, 
                the Secretary shall approve any qualified certification 
                that the Secretary determines to meet or exceed to the 
                national criteria provided under paragraph (3)(B).
                    ``(B) Qualified certification.--In this paragraph, 
                the term `qualified certification' means a professional 
                certification that is established by the Secretary, an 
                agriculture-related retailer, a farmer cooperative, the 
                American Society of Agronomy, or the National Alliance 
                of Independent Crop Consultants, including 
                certification--
                            ``(i) as a Certified Crop Advisor by the 
                        American Society for Agronomy;
                            ``(ii) as a Certified Professional 
                        Agronomist by the American Society for 
                        Agronomy; and
                            ``(iii) as a Comprehensive Nutrient 
                        Management Plan Specialist by the Secretary.''.
                                 <all>
```
----

|   |   | /s/ Stephen D. Barnhill                                               |   |
|--------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Stephen D. Barnhill, M.D.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |   |
|   |   | Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |   |

|   |   | /s/ Thomas L. Gallagher                                             |   |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Thomas L. Gallagher                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |   |
|   |   | President, Chief Operating Officer andPrincipal Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |   |
Dismiss and Opinion Filed May 11, 2016.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-16-00023-CV

ETHEL LOCKHART AND/OR ALL OCCUPANTS OF 711 LENTISCO DRIVE 

LANCASTER, TEXAS 75146, Appellants

V.

SILVER BAY PROPERTY CORP. MANAGEMENT COMPANY FOR 2012-C 

PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-05335-B

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Myers, Stoddart, and Whitehill

Opinion by Justice Myers

Although cautioned that failure to file their brief by May 5, 2016 could result in dismissal 

of the appeal without further notice, appellants have yet to file a brief. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.8(a)(1); 42.3(b), (c). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See id. 

160023F.P05

/Lana Myers/

LANA MYERS

JUSTICE
Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

ETHEL LOCKHART AND/OR ALL 

OCCUPANTS OF 711 LENTISCO DRIVE 

LANCASTER, TEXAS 75146, Appellants

No. 05-16-00023-CV V.

SILVER BAY PROPERTY CORP. 

MANAGEMENT COMPANY FOR 2012-C 

PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 2, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-05335-B.

Opinion delivered by Justice Myers. Justices 

Stoddart and Whitehill participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal. 

We ORDER appellee Silver Bay Property Corp. Management Company for 2012-C 

Properly Holdings LLC recover its costs, if any, of the appeal from appellants Ethel Lockhart 

and or/all occupants of 711 Lentisco Drive Lancaster, Texas 75146.

Judgment entered 11th day of May, 2016.
EX-10.2A



          RESOLUTIONS DULY ADOPTED BY THE COMPANY'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS

RESOLVED, that, subject to the approval of the Corporation's  stockholders,  the
Plan be  modified  to  increase  the  number of shares  available  for  issuance
thereunder from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 and that this amendment be submitted to a
vote of the stockholders at the Annual General Stockholders Meeting
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 123 (Thursday, September 13, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H6000]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

           By Mr. POE of Texas:
       H.R. 6391.
       Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       Article I, Section 8, Clause 14
```
Order filed August 14 , 2014

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 14

- 00506

- CV

CRYSTAL R. DAVIS , Appellant

V.

LITTLE NELL APARTMEN TS , Appellee

On Appeal from the Co unty Civil C our t at Law No

. 4

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1047273



### ORDER
On July 16, 2014, appellant, who is appearing pro se, filed a timely motion in this court challenging the trial court’s July 8, 2014 , ruling sustaining a contest to her affidavit of indigence. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(j)(1), (2). When a motion to review the trial court’s ruling on indigence is filed, the trial court clerk and the court reporter must prepare, certify, and file the record of the hearing on the
contest to the claim of indigence within three days after the motion is filed. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(j)(3). The county clerk prepared a clerk’s record, but n o reporter’s record of the hearing has been filed.Under the unambiguous language of Rule 20.1(j), if the appellate court does

not deny a motion under Rule 20.1(j) within 10 days after the motion is filed, this motion is granted by operation of law. Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(j)(4). Even if the trial court clerk and the court reporter prepare, certify, and file the hearing record within three days after the mo tion is filed, the appellate court has less than a week to review the record and rule on the merits of the motion. If the court reporter do es not file the hearing record within 10 days after the filing of the motion, as in this case, this court has no abil ity to review the merits of the motion, and the motion is granted by operation of law regardless of whether the motion has merit. Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(j)(4). This new rule places a heavy burden on the trial court clerk and the court reporter to act expedit iously in preparing, certifying, and filing the hearing record. If they fail to do so, then under the applicable procedure, this court has no ability to review the merits of the motion.
More than 10 days have passed since the motion was filed and appella nt’s
motion was granted by operation of law. Accordingly, appellant may proceed on appeal without the advance payment of costs.

Therefore, we ORDER the Harris County Clerk and the official court reporter, Karen S. Bernhardt , to prepare, certify, and file the appellate record without the advance payment of costs. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(k ). The record will
be due in this court 30 days from the date of this order.

PER CURIAM
VIRGINIA: In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 14th day of November, 1997.

Thomas Franklin Hohman, Appellant, against Record No. 970464 Court of Appeals No. 0815-95-4 Commonwealth of Virginia, Appellee.

Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals of Virginia on the 31st day of December, 1996.

Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of counsel, the Court is of opinion that there is no error in the judgment appealed from. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, dated December 31, 1996, the judgment is affirmed. The appellant shall pay to the Commonwealth of Virginia thirty dollars damages. It is ordered that the Circuit Court of Stafford County allow counsel for the appellant a fee of $625 for services rendered the appellant on this appeal, in addition to counsel's costs and necessary direct out-of-pocket expenses. The Commonwealth shall recover of the appellant the amount paid court-appointed counsel to represent him in this proceeding, counsel's costs and necessary direct out-of-pocket expenses, and the fees and costs to be assessed by the clerk of this Court and

the clerk of the court below. Justice Koontz took no part in the consideration of this

case.________________________ JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, dissenting: I would hold that the language of Code § 19.2-237 is unambiguous and prohibits a trial court from enforcing a jail

sentence in a misdemeanor case in which the defendant has failed to appear and plead. The manifest purpose of this provision is to permit the court to hear and dispose of misdemeanor cases without impairing any defendant's liberty interests. If the trial court wishes to retain the discretion to impose a jail sentence on an absent defendant charged with a misdemeanor, the court may issue a capias for the defendant's arrest and have him brought before the court to enter a plea to the charge and be tried. In the present case, the trial court erred because it imposed a jail sentence on the defendant when he had not appeared for trial, had not entered a plea to the charge, and had not waived his right to trial by jury. The imposition of this sentence violated the clear statutory mandate that when a court tries an absent defendant charged with a misdemeanor "in the same manner as if [the defendant] had appeared, plead not guilty and waived trial by jury, . . . the court shall not in any such case enforce a jail sentence." Code § 19.2-237. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for imposition of a sentence that conforms with this statutory restriction.

This order shall be certified to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and to the Circuit Court of Stafford County and shall bepublished in the Virginia Reports. A Copy,

Teste:

David B. Beach, Clerk

Costs due the Commonwealth by appellant in Supreme Court of Virginia: Attorneys' fees: $925.00 plus their costs and expenses

Teste:

Clerk
Regulatory Evaluation 

Docket No. FAA- {).O I 5 -'--/f}OL{ 2otS"- N.M.-oo t-.ti-J) 

Directorate Identifier: -AD 

(lvuu make changes to the 1•a/ues in the table bdow. you must ensure the totals update accordingly. (l 

riley do not, click (or Tuh) i11to a11d then out <Jfrhe changed cell. 

Estimated Costs: 

Action 

Costs per Product (e.g., aircraft, engine, 

(e.g., Inspection, propeller, appliance) 

Work-hours Labor Parts Cost Total Costs Number of Total Cost replacement) (include cost (labor+ u.s. for U.S. Fleet Do not include oncondition costs here access, testing, (@$85/h parts) Registered 

and close-up) our) Products 

I nspection/modifica 14.0 $ 100 65 tion 

\ I ' I 

(il J ' (l• 

'I fl ,. ' 

,, t\t ) 1 o{l l 

' :- ._1 ll 

' I 

I ' I 

' \ 

' l '· 

I l• ' I 

' I ' . ' 

. I 

'; 

' I 

' \ 

The known number of products in compliance: 0 

Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $83,850 

Costs covered under warranty (if known) $0 

On-Condition Costs: • 

Action Work-hours Labor cost Parts Cost Cost per Product 

(e.g., Inspection, (include access, (@$85/hour) 

replacement) testing, and closeup) 

' 

I \ 

' 

Special considerations for Economic Analysis (Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated Costs table 

that was assumed or might not be obvious. This field can also be used to explain warranty costs): 
Executive Order 12866: 

Could the AD be considered a "significant regulatory action"? · 

YES* 0 NO IZJ 

*Explanation: 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures: 

Is the AD significant? -

YES* 0 NO IZJ 

*Explanation: 

Regulatory Flexibility Act: 

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Explain for 

either a Yes or No answer. ~ 

YES 0 NO IZJ 

Explanation: 

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska: 

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. [s it appropriate to include specific requirements for 

aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation? ; 

YES* 0 NO IZJ 

*Explanation:
#### In the Matter of Diane Simms, Appellant, v Emanuel P. Popolizio, as Chairman of the New York City Housing Au*63thority, et al., Respondents.

— Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Hansel McGee, J.), entered on or about April 2, 1990, which denied and dismissed a petition pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul respondents’ determination authorizing eviction proceedings against the petitioner, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner’s landlord, by letter, requested permission of the Housing Authority to regain possession of petitioner’s Section 8 apartment, setting forth the following:

"1. The premises are in a building not covered or controlled by rent stabilization or rent control under New York or Federal Law and as such, the landlord is entitled to regain possession.

"2. The market value rent for this apartment is $850.00 per month, which is in excess of the allowance that Section 8 New York City Housing Authority would pay.

"3. You have caused the landlord much frustration and expense by refusing reasonable access to your apartment for repairs or to service the building utilities, which are in part located within your apartment.

"4. The Section 8 New York City Housing Authority Lease has expired and the landlord no longer desires to participate in the Section 8 New York City Housing Authority Program.” Notice was given to petitioner tenant. The Housing Authority issued the landlord a letter of authorization to commence eviction proceedings, noting that the lease had expired. Read together, the two letters established valid reason for terminating the tenancy, and provided a rational basis for the Authority’s determination. Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Kupferman, Ross, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
nisc.alac. 3-H-/5 

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_____ ___„ ^ WyCoaK Y-Q^L 

### "^fflTOFCR^^^ £ALS
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 118 (Friday, August 3, 2012)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1436]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

             HONORING DOUGLAS CROPPER, MAINE STATE TROOPER

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. CHELLIE PINGREE

                                of maine

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, August 2, 2012

  Ms. PINGREE of Maine. Mr Speaker, I would like to recognize a Maine 
State Trooper in my district who literally put his life on the line to 
prevent what could have been a terrible tragedy.
  While performing a traffic stop on Interstate 295 in Portland on the 
afternoon of July 1, Trooper Douglas Cropper received a call that a 
motorist was driving northbound in the southbound lane of Maine's 
busiest highway. Seeing no other options to stop the wrong-way driver, 
Trooper Cropper raced ahead of the car and nosed his cruiser into the 
travel lane. The driver hit the cruiser and came to a stop just in time 
for oncoming motorists to avoid a collision. A dramatic dashboard video 
from the cruiser shows just how quickly the incident unfolded.
  No one was injured, and I'm extremely grateful that this scary moment 
didn't end up being a tragic one. But it's very likely that this would 
not have been the case without Trooper Cropper's quick thinking and 
outstanding bravery.
  Trooper Cropper says he was simply doing his job. But it's my belief 
that he went above and beyond to protect lives--and that he saved many 
in the process.
  I want to thank Trooper Douglas Cropper for his actions, and for what 
he and other Maine State Police officers do every day in Maine: putting 
their lives on the line to protect people of our state. We owe them all 
a debt of gratitude for keeping us safe.

                          ____________________
```
#### Ajax Club Liquor License Case.

Submitted October 25, 1943.

Before Keller, P. J., Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Rhodes, Hirt, Kenworthey and Reno, JJ.

*Witkin & Egan, for*appellant.

*J. Myron Shimer,*Special Deputy Attorney General, *Horace A. Segelbaum,*Deputy Attorney General, and *James H.*Duff, Attorney General, for appellee.

November 17, 1943:

Per Curiam,

This appellant club’s liquor license was revoked by the Liquor Control Board after a hearing at which violations of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act of November 29, 1933, P. L. (Special Session) 15, and its amendments, were proved to have been committed by those in charge of the sale of liquors. On appeal to the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County, *474the action of the board was susthined. At the hearing before that court counsel for appellant admitted that liquor had been sold to non-members, to minors, and to intoxicated persons, and that sales had been made at times and during hours not permitted by law. His contention was that the license should not be *revoked*on a first citation for violations of the act. That point was likewise presented to this court. There is no merit in it.

Section 410 (47 PS §744-410) provides: “Upon such hearing, if satisfied that any such violation has occurred, or for other sufficient cause, the board shall immediately suspend or revoke the license.”

In *Pacewicz Liquor License Case,*152 Pa. Superior Ct. 123, 31 A. 2d 361, the same contention was advanced by a restaurant liquor licensee and was denied by us. It is time that holders of liquor licenses understand that they violate the law at the peril of losing their licenses.

Whatever this club may have been in the past, as conducted just prior to the revocation of its license it was only a drinking place. Liquor was sold in open violation of the law, and almost anyone could be a “member” for a day or two, on payment of an insignificant sum, or even on credit. That is not the kind of a ‘club’ contemplated by the Liquor Control Act.

The appeal is dismissed and the order revoking the license is affirmed.