alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### David MONTIEL GARCIA, a/k/a David Montiel, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 990, Docket 92-2635.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Feb. 5, 1993.

Decided March 8, 1993.

Ivan S. Fisher, New York City (David Wikstrom, Kenneth M. Tuceillo, of counsel), for appellant.

Karen A. Popp, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, NY (Mary Jo White, U.S. Atty. and Peter A. Norling, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., of counsel), for appellee.

Before: MESKILL, Chief Judge, FEINBERG and WINTER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Rag-gi, *J.,*denying David Montiel Garcia’s (Montiel) petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Montiel claims that the district court erred in certifying his extradition because extraditing him would violate Article 6 of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico (the Treaty).

*154On April 15, 1991, Montiel was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of New York on charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), which prohibits transporting in interstate and foreign commerce visual depictions that involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Montiel and the United States negotiated a plea agreement. The government told Montiel that his plea would not bar any other proceedings that might be brought against him by other sovereigns or jurisdictions.

Prior to Montiel’s pleading guilty to the pending indictment, the United States Attorney’s Office received confirmation that the Government of Mexico was seeking extradition of Montiel for sexual assault. After Montiel pleaded guilty to the charges in the United States, Mexico submitted a formal request for extradition. Mexico alleges violations of Article 234 (carrying out a sexual act on a person of less than twelve years of age) and Article 179 (procuring, through sexual acts, the corruption of a minor) of the Mexican Penal Code. Montiel argued that his extradition is barred by Article 6, the *non bis in idem*clause of the Treaty. The district court disagreed and certified Montiel for extradition to Mexico. There is no appeal from a certification of extraditability under 18 U.S.C. § 3184; the only recourse for the extraditee is to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. *See Ahmad v. Wigen,*910 F.2d 1063, 1065 (2d Cir.1990). Therefore, Montiel brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the certification on substantially the same issues, namely, that Article 6 of the Treaty bars the extradition. The district court denied the petition for the writ of habeas corpus “for the same reasons as those stated in its Memorandum and Order dated July 30, 1992.”

The judgment of the district court is affirmed substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Raggi’s Order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus dated August 31, 1992 and her Memorandum and Order certifying that Montiel is extraditable dated July 30, 1992, 802 F.Supp. 773 (E.D.N.Y.1992).
**Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 2 February 2012 —
EI du Pont de Nemours and Others v Commission

(Case T‐76/08)**

Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Market for chloroprene rubber — Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement — Price-fixing — Market‐sharing — Imputability of the unlawful conduct — Joint venture — Guidelines on the method of setting fines — Mitigating circumstances — Cooperation

1.                     *Competition — European Union rules — Infringements — Attribution — Parent company and subsidiaries — Economic unit — Criteria
for assessment (Art. 81 EC; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2)) (see paras 58‐62)*

2.                     *Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Proof — Evidence adduced by the Commission — Assessment (Art. 81(1)
EC) (see para. 105)*

3.                     *Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Judicial review — Assessment of the duration of the infringement by progressive
six-month thresholds — Period longer than that of the actual participation in the infringement — Lawfulness — Conditions (Council
Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2); Commission Notice 2006/C 210/02) (see paras 127‐130)*

4.                     *Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Reduction in the amount of the fine for cooperation of the undertaking
concerned — Conditions — Discretion of the Commission (Commission Notice 2002/C 45/03) (see paras 138‐145, 148)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | APPLICATION for, first, annulment of Articles 1 and 2 of Commission Decision C(2007) 5910 final of 5 December 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38629 — Chloroprene Rubber), as amended by Commission Decision C(2008) 2974 final of 23 June 2008, in so far as they refer to EI du Pont de Nemours and Company and, second, a reduction in the amount of the fine imposed jointly and severally on the applicants by that decision. |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders EI du Pont de Nemours and Company, DuPont Performance Elastomers LLC and DuPont Performance Elastomers SA to pay the costs. |
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6223
KRISTOPHER S. KOLLYNS, a/k/a Johnnie W. Todd, a/k/a John Wayne Todd, a/k/a Kris Sarayn Kollyns, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus GARY MAYNARD, in official and personal capacities; PAULA WOODLEAF, in official and personal capacities, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CA-01-4380-3) Submitted: March 20, 2003 Decided: April 1, 2003 Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Kristopher S. Kollyns, Appellant Pro Se. Melvin Brice McKeown, Jr., SPRATT, MCKEOWN & MCCRAE, York, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Kristopher S. Kollyns appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Kollyns v. Maynard , No. CA-01-4380-3 (D.S.C. filed Jan. 21, 2003 & entered Jan. 22, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's consolidated financial statements for the year ended January 31, 1998
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1998
<CASH>                                       1,751,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                7,940,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (610,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  9,749,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            21,576,000
<PP&E>                                      17,491,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               7,199,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              40,581,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,234,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        68,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  22,366,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                40,581,000
<SALES>                                     56,821,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            58,645,000
<CGS>                                       25,542,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               56,631,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               312,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,561,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                141,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                    54,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             87,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    87,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.10)
        

</TABLE>
#### EDGE BROADCASTING COMPANY, t/a Power 94, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America; Federal Communications Commission, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 90-2668.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Aug. 26, 1993.

ORDER

In obedience to the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, — U.S. -S 113 S.Ct. 2696, 126 L.Ed.2d 346, this case is remanded to the district court for action consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court. With the concurrences of Judge Chapman and Judge Haden.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed June 22, 2016.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D15-889

Lower Tribunal No. 13-20429

________________

U.S. Bank National Association, etc.,

Appellant,

vs.

Richard Vair and Betty Vair, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jacqueline

Hogan Scola, Judge.

Burr & Forman, LLP, and Nicholas S. Agnello and Christine Irwin Parrish

(Fort Lauderdale); Burr & Forman, LLP, and Reid S. Manley (Birmingham,

Alabama), for appellant.

Richards Goldstein LLP, and Richard L. Richards and Jason Goldstein, for

appellees.

Before SHEPHERD, SALTER and SCALES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.
Relying on the original panel decision in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas

v. Beauvais, the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the defendants

below, Richard Vair and Betty Vair. In view of this Court’s recent en banc

decision in the Beauvais case, Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Beauvais, No.

3D14-575 (Fla. 3d DCA April 13, 2016) (withdrawing and replacing the original

panel decision), we reverse the final judgment.

Reversed and remanded.

2
##### 



Exhibit 31.1  Chief Executive Officer Certification (Section 302)
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 CERTIFICATION
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Playlogic Entertainment, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this quarterly report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this quarterly
report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a.
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us
by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;b.
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures
and presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; andc.
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and to
the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons fulfilling the
equivalent function):
 a.
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely
to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; andb.
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting.
  By: /s/ Willem M. SmitWillem M. SmitChief Executive Officer,
President and Director
EXHIBIT 13.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with this Annual Report of Canadian Zinc Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John Kearney, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:









(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and









(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: May 13, 2010
By:
/s/  John KearneyJohn Kearney

President and Chief Executive Officer





The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.










1
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 07-1209

___________ Randy Whitehead, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Lisa Vaughn, Individually and in her * Western District of Arkansas. capacity as Human Resource Manager * with PepsiAmericas, Inc.; Brett * [UNPUBLISHED] Dingler, Individually and in his * capacity as Regional Supervisor with * PepsiAmericas, Inc.; Delta Beverage * Group, Inc., doing business as * PepsiAmericas, Inc., * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: April 11, 2008 Filed: April 16, 2008

___________ Before BYE, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.1 The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. -2- Randy Whitehead appeals the district court’s 1 dismissal with prejudice of his action raising claims related to the termination of his employment. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that th e dismissal with prejudice was proper for the reasons stated by the district court. Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

__________________________
EXHIBIT 10.1
 The Incentive Stock Option Agreement
Pursuant to the
United Fuel & Energy Corporation
2005 Equity Incentive Plan
 Optionee:
    
    Joseph JulianoDate of Grant:
    
    November 12, 2008Number of Option Shares:
    
    150,000 sharesExercise Price:
    
    $0.80 per Option ShareExpiration Date:
    
    November 11, 2018
 Option Agreement Company Optionee Plan
 Grant of Option Option Option Shares Incentive Stock Option Non-Statutory Stock Option
 Option Term Section 5




---



##### 



Limited Transferability
 Dates of Vesting Section 5
 Cessation of Service Section 2
 Employment
Agreement
   Incentive Stock Option Provisions
 Change in Status of Optionee Employee
 2




---



##### 



Director Consultant Related Entity
 Disability of Optionee
 Death of Optionee Post-Termination Exercise Period
 Transferability of Option
 3




---



##### 



Immediate
Family
 Adjustment in Option Shares
 Shareholder Rights
 Manner of Exercising Option.
        4




---



##### 



Corporate Transactions
 Termination of Option Agreement to Extent Not Assumed in Corporate Transaction Section 10 Assumed Corporate Transaction
   5




---



##### 



Acceleration of Option Upon Corporate Transaction
 
  Compliance with Laws and Regulations
  6




---



##### 



Section 409A Limitation.
 Successors and Assigns.
 Notices
 Construction
 Governing Law; Venue
 7




---



##### 



Discretionary Plan; Employment
 Grant/Exercise Subject to Applicable Regulatory Approvals
 Electronic Signatures
 [Remainder of page intentionally left blank; signature page to follow]
 8




---



##### 



COMPANY:
 United Fuel & Energy Corporation
 By:
    
    /s/ William C. BousemaWilliam C. BousemaExecutive Vice President, Chief FinancialOfficer and Secretary
 OPTIONEE:
 /s/ JOSEPH M. JULIANOJOSEPH M. JULIANOAddress:
 9
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
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                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 1009 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases Special Emphasis Panel; NIDDK-Special Emphasis Panel.                    

*Date:*                         February 23, 2024.                    

*Time:*                         1:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate grant applications.                    

*Place:*                         National Institutes of Health, NIDDK, Democracy II, Suite 7000A, 6707 Democracy Boulevard, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual Meeting).                    

*Contact Person:*                         Xiaodu Guo, Ph.D., M.D., Scientific Review Officer, Review Branch, Division of Extramural Activities, NIDDK, National Institutes of Health, Room 7023, 6707 Democracy Boulevard, Bethesda, MD 20892-5452, (301) 594-4719,                         *guox@extra.niddk.nih.gov*.                    

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.847, Diabetes, Endocrinology and Metabolic Research; 93.848, Digestive Diseases and Nutrition Research; 93.849, Kidney Diseases, Urology and Hematology Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: December 22, 2023.

Miguelina Perez,

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2023-28679 Filed 12-27-23; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
#### Walter L. METCALF, d/b/a Beltone Hearing Service, Plaintiff in Error, v. J. E. BINGAMAN d/b/a Bingaman Motor Company, Defendant in Error.

No. 35768.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Feb. 28, 1956.

Renegar & Renegar, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Ryan Kerr, Altus, for defendant in error.

HALLEY, Justice.

Parties will be referred to according to their positions in the trial court.

On August 8, 1950, Thurman Dulaney was a salesman for the plaintiff. While driving an automobile on that date near Altus, Oklahoma, the car collided with a bridge abutment and was badly wrecked. In the automobile were certain articles of personal property belonging to the plaintiff. A short time after the collision between car and bridge, the automobile was being towed into Altus by the defendant. In some manner, it caught fire and plaintiff’s personal property was destroyed. Plaintiff filed suit seeking to recover from defendant the, loss he had sustained. The case was tried to a jury and a verdict returned for the defendant. From the overruling of a motion for new trial, the plaintiff has appealed.

 Three propositions are urged for reversing the judgment but boiled down the real contention of the plaintiff is that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain^ the verdict. With this we cannot agree. There was evidence offered by the defendant that he had exercised due care in the manner and method in towing the automobile and which fully described measures taken. This was clearly a case for the jury to determine whether the defendant was guilty of negligence. We have many times held that in a case of legal cognizance tried to a jury on conflicting evidence we will not disturb a judgment based on a jury’s verdict where there is competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict. Harmon v. Metcalfe, 204 Okl. 79, 226 P.2d 979; George v. Greer, 207 Okl. 494, 250 P.2d 858; Sisler v. Smith, Okl., 267 P.2d 1081.

*570The plaintiff tendered no requested instructions and no special instructions were given as to the duties of a bailee. Under Schulze v. Allison, 204 Okl. 147, 227 P.2d 658, an authority cited by the plaintiff, a bailee is only required to exercise due care to prevent loss of, or damage to bailed property.

The instructions given by the trial court fairly covered the case and no exception was taken by the plaintiff to any instruction given.

The judgment is affirmed.

JOHNSON, C. J., WILLIAMS, V. C. J., and DAVISON, BLACKBIRD, JACKSON and HUNT, JJ., concur.