Green v. Md. Comm’n on Judicial Disabilities, No. 3467 & No. 2799, September 

Term 2018, Opinion by Graeff, J.

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT – STANDING – DUE PROCESS INTEREST

The purpose of the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities is “to maintain 

public confidence in the integrity, independence, and impartiality of judges and the judicial 

system.” Maryland Rule 18-401(b)(1). Because the purpose of the judicial disciplinary 

system is to protect the public and maintain public confidence in the judiciary, not to 

vindicate any individual person’s interest, a person who files a complaint with the 

Commission has no standing to seek judicial review of the Commission’s resolution of the 

complaint.
REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Nos. 3467 & 2799

September Term, 2018

______________________________________

CARLTON M. GREEN

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND COMMISSION ON 

JUDICIAL DISABILITIES

______________________________________

Fader, C.J.,

Graeff,

Nazarian,

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Graeff, J.

______________________________________

Filed: September 30, 2020

*Reed, J., did not participate in the decision to 

report this opinion pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1. 
Carlton Green, appellant, filed a complaint with the Maryland Commission on 

Judicial Disabilities (“the Commission”), against a judge. Several months later, the 

Commission notified Mr. Green that it was dismissing his complaint based on its 

conclusion that the evidence failed to show that the judge committed sanctionable conduct.

Mr. Green then filed two complaints in the circuit court. The first complaint sought

judicial review of the Commission’s decision. The second complaint sought a declaratory 

judgment, requesting the court to: (a) declare that his constitutional due process rights were 

denied by the Commission’s procedures; and (b) order that the matter be remanded to the 

Commission with directions to conduct a complete and thorough investigation of the 

complaint, including interviewing Mr. Green and allowing him to present evidence. The 

circuit court dismissed both complaints. 

On appeal, Mr. Green presents multiple issues for this Court’s review.

1

 In case No. 

2799, the appeal relating to the complaint seeking judicial review, Mr. Green presents the 

following questions, which we have rephrased slightly, as follows:

1. Is a complainant who files a complaint with the Commission entitled 

to seek administrative mandamus pursuant to Maryland Rule 7-401 

when the Commission dismisses the complaint?

2. Is the Commission an administrative agency under Md. Rule 7-401?

3. Does the circuit court have subject matter jurisdiction when the 

procedure of the Commission is alleged to be unconstitutional?

4. Does a complainant to the Commission have any due process rights, 

and if so, were such rights denied by the circuit court in this case?

1 On June 19, 2019, this Court consolidated for oral argument the appeals in both 

cases.
2

In case No. 3467, the appeal relating to the complaint seeking a declaratory

judgment, Mr. Green presents the following questions, which we have rephrased

slightly, as follows:

1. Did the circuit court have jurisdiction over Mr. Green’s complaint for 

declaratory judgment against the Commission?

2. Did Mr. Green have standing to bring a claim for declaratory 

judgment against the Commission and did the court err in failing to 

allow an amendment of the complaint to allege facts demonstrating 

standing?

3. Did the Commission have the power to summarily dismiss Mr. 

Green’s complaint?

4. Does sovereign immunity apply to the Commission in the declaratory 

judgment action?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND BACKGROUND

I.

Commission on Judicial Disabilities

Before discussing the facts of this case, we discuss briefly the role and procedures 

of the Commission. The Commission was “established as an independent body pursuant 

to Article IV of the Maryland Constitution.” Matter of Reese for Howard Cty., Tenth 

Judicial Circuit, 461 Md. 421, 436 (2018); see Md. Const. art. IV, § 4A. The Commission 

is comprised of eleven people, appointed by the Governor of Maryland with “the advice 

and consent of the Senate.” Md. Const. art. IV, § 4A(a). These members consist of three 

Maryland judges, three Maryland lawyers who are not judges, and five members of the 

public who are not admitted to practice law in Maryland. Id. at 4A(c). The Commission’s 
3

function is “merely an inquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer the aim of which is the 

maintenance of the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the proper administration.” 

Reese, 461 Md. at 439 (quoting In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 670 (1973)).

Pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, the Commission has the power to:

“Investigate complaints against any judge of the Court of Appeals, any intermediate courts 

of appeal, the circuit courts, the District Court of Maryland, or the orphans’ court.” Md. 

Const. art. IV, § 4B(a)(1)(i). The Commission has the authority to hold hearings and 

compel witnesses and the production of evidence, id. at § 4B(a)(1)(ii), and to issue a 

reprimand or “recommend to the Court of Appeals the removal, censure, or other 

appropriate disciplining of a judge or, in an appropriate case, retirement,” id. at § 4B(a)(2). 

After receiving a recommendation from the Commission, the Court of Appeals may 

discipline the judge as it deems appropriate. Id. at § 4B(b)(1). All proceedings before the 

Commission shall be “confidential and privileged” unless the case is filed with the Court 

of Appeals. Id. at § 4B(a)(3). 

The Constitution provides that the Court of Appeals “shall prescribe by rule the 

means to implement and enforce the powers of the Commission and the practice and 

procedure before the Commission.” Id. at § 4B(a)(5). Based on that authority, the Court 

of Appeals has adopted rules to govern the Commission’s process, which currently are 

codified in Md. Rules 18-401 through 18-442. The Court of Appeals gave an overview of 

these procedures in Matter of White, 451 Md. 630, 636–37 (2017), as follows:

Upon receiving a complaint alleging . . . misconduct by a judge, the 

Commission’s Investigative Counsel may conduct a preliminary 

investigation. Maryland Rule 18–404. The Judicial Inquiry Board, also 
4

created by the rules, monitors the investigation, receives a report from the 

Investigative Counsel, and makes a recommendation to the Commission 

about what, if any, further action to take on a complaint. Maryland Rules 18–

403, 18–404. If the matter is not resolved at an earlier stage of the 

investigation or during the Judicial Inquiry Board process, and if the 

Commission finds probable cause to believe that the judge has committed 

sanctionable conduct, the Commission may direct the Investigative Counsel 

to file charges against the judge with the Commission. Maryland Rule 18–

407(a). Those charges, and the judge's response to them, become the subject 

of an evidentiary hearing before the Commission. Id.

The rules provide a judge accused of misconduct with various 

procedural rights in connection with the Commission’s hearing on the 

charges. Maryland Rule 18–407(b)–(i). Among other things, the rules 

provide for notice to the judge of the charges and allow the judge to submit 

a written response. Maryland Rule 18–407(b)–(c). The judge has a right to 

be represented by counsel, to have subpoenas issued for testimony by 

witnesses and the production of evidence, to examine the Commission 

record, and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Maryland Rule 18–407(f). 

The pre-hearing exchange of information between the judge and 

Investigative Counsel is governed by the discovery rules applicable to civil 

actions in the circuit courts; the Chair of the Commission is authorized to 

carry out the function of a circuit court judge in limiting discovery, issuing 

protective orders, and otherwise resolving discovery disputes. Maryland 

Rule 18–407(g)(3). The hearing before the Commission on the charges is to 

be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence and is to be 

stenographically recorded. Maryland Rule 18–407(i).

The Commission is to make findings of fact under a clear and 

convincing standard of proof and either dismiss the charges, reprimand the 

judge, or refer the matter to the Court of Appeals for other discipline. 

Maryland Rule 18–407(j). If the matter is referred to this Court, the 

Commission is to create a record of its proceedings, including a transcript. 

Maryland Rule 18–407(k).[2]

The rules do not provide, as they do for an accused judge, procedural rights for a

complainant. 

2

 There were subsequent revisions to the rules governing the Commission’s process, 

which will be discussed as relevant to our analysis of the issues in this case.
5

II.

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 2, 2017, Mr. Green filed a complaint with the Commission. Although 

the Commission’s confidential records are not included in the record on appeal in this 

Court, Mr. Green asserts that his filing with the Commission included a statement of facts, 

under oath, alleging sanctionable conduct or disability by a judge. 

On May 2, 2018, the Commission sent Mr. Green a letter, notifying him that his 

complaint had been reviewed and considered by the Judicial Inquiry Board and the 

Commission. The letter advised that, after reviewing the materials that Mr. Green

submitted, and the other materials gathered during the investigation, “the Commission 

concluded that the evidence failed to show that the judge committed sanctionable 

conduct.”3 Accordingly, the letter stated that the Commission had dismissed the complaint,

“as required by 18-406(a)(1).”

4

3

In 2018, when the Commission sent Mr. Green this letter, Md. Rule 18-401(k) 

stated, in part, that “‘[s]anctionable conduct’ means misconduct while in office, the 

persistent failure by a judge to perform the duties of the judge’s office, or conduct 

prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.” Effective July 1, 2019, this provision 

became Md. Rule 18-402(m).

4

In 2018, Md. Rule 18-406(a)(1) provided:

The Commission shall dismiss a complaint if, after an investigation, it 

concludes that the evidence fails to show that the judge has a disability or has 

committed sanctionable conduct. The Commission shall notify the judge and 

each complainant of the dismissal.

Effective July 1, 2019, this rule became Md. Rule 18-425. The new rule still provides that 

the Commission shall dismiss a complaint if “the evidence fails to show that the judge” has 
6

On May 29, 2018, Mr. Green filed two complaints in the circuit court. One sought

judicial review of the Commission’s dismissal of his complaint, alleging that Mr. Green 

“was a party to the agency decision.” The other sought a declaratory judgment

[d]eclaring and adjudicating the due process rights of the Complainant in 

Judicial disciplinary Case Number 2017-220; that the Court declare the 

constitutional due process rights of the Complainant were denied 

Complainant in such proceeding and in order that the matter be remanded to 

the Defendant State of Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities with 

direction to conduct a complete and thorough investigation of the Complaint; 

to interview the Complainant and to afford Complainant an opportunity to be 

heard and present evidence to the Defendant Commission, following such 

hearing to be informed of the finding of facts and conclusion of law of such 

Defendant Commission; to further declare the rights of Complainant to 

appeal any decision of Defendant Commission; and for such other and further 

relief as is appropriate.

The Commission filed responses to both complaints. In its Corrected/Amended 

Motion to Dismiss Action for Judicial Review, the Commission set forth three reasons why 

the complaint should be dismissed. First, the Commission argued that the circuit court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the actions of the Commission. It asserted that 

“the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to oversee the activities of the Commission 

and the judicial disciplinary process,” and therefore, “the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to

hear Mr. Green’s action for judicial review.”

Second, the Commission argued that judicial review of its investigation of 

complaints of judicial misconduct was not authorized by any statute or rule. It asserted 

that the Commission is not akin to an administrative agency subject to judicial review.

“committed sanctionable conduct,” but it provides that, in an appropriate circumstance, the 

Commission may accompany a dismissal with a letter of cautionary advice.
7

Third, the Commission argued that Mr. Green lacked standing to bring his 

complaints. It asserted that Mr. Green was “not an aggrieved party to the Commission’s 

action, investigation and dismissal” of the complaint.

On September 14, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss 

the complaint for judicial review. The court stated that it was in “uncharted territory.” The 

Commission reiterated the arguments in its motion, and counsel for Mr. Green argued that 

he had the right to request administrative mandamus.

The court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss. It stated that the reasons given 

by the Commission warranted dismissal. 

The Commission also filed a motion to dismiss with respect to Mr. Green’s 

complaint for declaratory relief. It argued that the complaint should be dismissed because:

(1) the claim was barred by sovereign immunity; (2) the circuit court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction; and (3) Mr. Green lacked standing because there was no justiciable 

controversy between him and the Commission. Alternatively, the Commission argued that, 

if the court declined to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, it should “issue a 

declaration in favor of the Commission declaring that complainants have no 

constitutionally protected interest in the investigation and resolution of judicial disability 

complaints and, therefore, no entitlement to procedural due process.”

Mr. Green opposed the Commission’s motion. He asserted that the Court of 

Appeals did not have exclusive jurisdiction to overrule the decision of the Commission, 

and the circuit court had jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action. He further

argued that, because he was asking only for a declaration of rights, and not a monetary 
8

award, the Commission was not entitled to sovereign immunity. Finally, Mr. Green argued 

that he had standing because he was “affected by the lack of procedural due process for 

him as a complainant,” and he was “entitled to have his rights declared under the Maryland 

Declaratory Judgment Act where the current Maryland Rules fail to adhere to procedural 

due process and are thus unconstitutional.”

On November 8, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on the Commission’s 

motion.5 On January 22, 2019, the circuit court issued an order granting the Commission’s 

motion to dismiss. The court noted that “[a] claim may be dismissed when the alleged facts 

and reasonable inferences, even if proven, would still fail to afford relief to the plaintiff.” 

The court stated:

[Mr. Green] requests a declaratory judgement because he believes his 

constitutional rights were violated by not being granted the opportunity to 

take part in any hearing regarding his complaint filed with the Commission, 

and because he was given no opportunity to appeal the decision. The 

Declaratory Judgement Act Provides a mechanism to “settle and afford relief 

from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal 

actions.” Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. §3-402 (2018). Any person 

“whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute ... may 

have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... 

statute, ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations 

under it.” Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. §3-403.

While [Mr. Green] may have no further legal recourse to find a way 

to address his grievances with the Commission’s actions, appealing to the 

Circuit Court is not a remedy available to him. He has not proven the 

required loss of life, liberty, or property interest to challenge the 

Commission’s decision based on a violation of his Due Process rights. To 

achieve the goal he is seeking, [Mr. Green] needs to proffer to the Maryland 

Legislature proposed changes to the Maryland Rules and Maryland 

Constitution. The Circuit Court need not consider whether it has subject 

5 Appellant did not provide a copy of the transcript of this hearing in the record on 

appeal.
9

matter jurisdiction over judicial discipline or if the State has waived its 

sovereign immunity because [Mr. Green] lacks standing to bring this suit.

Mr. Green appealed the circuit court’s decisions in both cases. As indicated, the 

cases were consolidated for oral argument.6

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the circuit court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Lamson v. 

Montgomery County, 460 Md. 349, 360 (2018). We also review determinations of standing 

de novo. Ibru v. Ibru, 239 Md. App. 17, 32–33 (2018), cert. denied, 462 Md. 570 (2019).

DISCUSSION

We begin our analysis by addressing whether Mr. Green has standing to bring his 

complaints for judicial review and declaratory judgment. Standing “is a threshold issue.” 

State v. Phillips, 210 Md. App. 239, 257 (2013) (quoting Norman v. Borison, 192 Md. App. 

405, 420 (2010)). It “refers to whether the plaintiff has shown that he or she is entitled to 

invoke the judicial process.” Pizza di Joey, LLC v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 41 Sept. Term, 

2019, 2020 WL 4745777, at *13 (Md. Aug. 17, 2020) (quoting State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington 

Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 502 (2014)). As the Court of Appeals recently 

explained:

The requirement of standing “is designed to ensure that a party seeking relief 

has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome so as to present a court 

with a dispute that is capable of judicial resolution.” Kendall v. Howard Cty., 

431 Md. 590, 603, 66 A.3d 684 (2013) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted)). “Under Maryland common law, standing to bring a 

judicial action generally depends on whether one is aggrieved, which means 

whether a plaintiff has an interest such that he or she is personally and 

6 Mr. Green also petitioned for certiorari in both cases. The Court of Appeals denied 

certiorari on January 18, 2019.
10

specifically affected in a way different from the public 

generally.” Id. (cleaned up).

Id. Accord Phillips, 210 Md. App. at 257 (“[T]o have standing, a party must demonstrate

an ‘injury-in-fact,’ or ‘an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated.’”) (quoting

Norman v. Borison, 192 Md. App. at 420).

7

Mr. Green contends that he “has standing and a duty as a member of the Bar” to 

challenge procedures of the Commission that are in violation of the Constitution. With 

respect to the requirement that he demonstrate that he was injured or aggrieved by the 

Commission’s decision to dismiss his complaint, appellant has set forth several theories. 

At one point, he argued that he was aggrieved by the decision because the judge involved 

should have recused from his case. It is clear, however, that the judicial disciplinary system 

is not a remedy for any claim in this regard. The proper remedy for such an allegation 

would be an appeal of the court’s decision, not the filing of a complaint with the 

Commission. See, e.g., Sharp v. Howard County, 327 Md. 17, 23, 26 (1992) (appeal of

judge’s decision to not recuse himself).

The Commission is not tasked with remedying a wrong to a complainant. Rather, 

as set forth in Rule 18-401(b)(1), the Commission was created “to maintain public 

confidence in the integrity, independence, and impartiality of judges and the judicial 

7

“Standing to bring a declaratory judgment is the same as for other cases; there 

must be a ‘legal interest’ such as ‘one of property, one arising out of a contract, one 

protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.’” 

Howard v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Md. App. 549, 556 (quoting Comm. for 

Responsible Dev. on 25th Street v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 137 Md. App. 

60, 72 (2001), cert. denied, 372 Md. 431 (2002).
11

system.” The Court of Appeals has explained that “[j]udicial discipline is ‘not for purposes 

of vengeance or retribution, but to instruct the public and all judges . . . of the importance 

of the function performed by judges in a free society.’” In re Lamdin, 404 Md. 631, 653 

(2008) (quoting In re White, 651 N.W.2d 551, 566 (Neb. 2002)). Accord Reese, 461 Md. 

at 439 (aim of judicial disciplinary proceedings is “the maintenance of the honor and 

dignity of the judiciary”) (quoting In re Diener, 268 Md. at 670).

Other courts that have considered the issue of standing with respect to a complainant

challenging the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding have noted the public purpose of 

disciplinary proceedings. For example, in Petition of Lath, 154 A.3d 1240 (N.H. 2017), 

the petitioners challenged the decision of the Attorney Discipline Office to dismiss the 

grievance they filed against an attorney. The court noted that “the purposes of attorney 

discipline include the protection of the public and the maintenance of public confidence in 

the bar.” Id. at 1244. The “complainant is not a party to the disciplinary proceeding” and 

does not participate in the proceedings to enforce his or her rights, and therefore, “no 

personal rights or remedies of the grievant are adjudicated in, or directly affected by, a 

disciplinary proceeding.” Id. at 1244–45. The only one to suffer an injury as a result of 

the disciplinary proceeding is the lawyer involved, and any benefit conveyed “is bestowed 

upon the public at large. Id. at 1245. Accordingly, a complainant “does not have standing 

to challenge the disciplinary authority’s disposition of a grievance.” Id. 

Similarly, in Boyce v. North Carolina State Bar, 814 S.E.2d 127, 133–35 (N.C. Ct. 

App. 2018), the court held that a lawyer did not have standing to seek a declaratory 

judgment against the State Bar for refusing to discipline a candidate for Attorney General
12

for a political advertisement. The court noted that the State Bar disciplinary process was 

intended “to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession.” Id. at 134 (quoting 

N.C. State Bar v. Rogers, 596 S.E.2d 337, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)). Pursuant to the 

disciplinary procedures set up,

the complainant has no control over when, how, or whether the State Bar 

pursues his grievance. After reporting the alleged attorney misconduct to the 

Bar, the complainant’s interest in the case going forward is the same as all 

other members of the public—to see a state agency protect the public from 

attorney misconduct by pursuing discipline for unethical behavior[.]

Id. at 134. The court held that, because the purpose of government investigations of 

wrongdoers is to vindicate public, not private, interests, those aggrieved by alleged 

wrongdoing have no standing to ask courts to intervene in those investigations. Id. at 134–

35. 

In In re Faignant, 212 A.3d 623 (Vt. 2010), petitioner sought judicial review of Bar 

Counsel’s dismissal of the complaint he made against his attorney. The court dismissed 

the complaint, concluding that petitioner failed to allege an injury that conveys standing. 

Id. at 626. The court noted that the attorney-discipline system serves to protect the public 

and maintain public confidence in the bar, and the process does not provide “a means of 

redress for one claiming to have been personally wronged by an attorney.” Id. (quoting 

Cotton v. Steele, 587 N.W.2d 693, 699 (Neb. 1999)). Accord Cotton, 587 N.W.2d at 699

(Failure to discipline an attorney “poses a risk of injury to the general public, not to a 

particular individual,” and a person who files a disciplinary complaint against an attorney 

has no legally cognizable stake in the outcome to confer standing to challenge the 

disposition of his or her complaint.); Operation Clean Gov’t v. R. I. Comm’n on Jud.
13

Tenure & Discipline, 741 A.2d 257, 262 (R.I. 1999) (Citizens group had no standing to 

challenge the action of the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline dismissing 

charge against four judges; it had “no legal right to demand that the Commission perform 

an investigation in any particular manner.”). 

Here, the disciplinary system for judges in Maryland similarly serves to protect the 

public and maintain public confidence in the judiciary. It is not designed to remedy alleged 

wrongs to the complainant. Accordingly, consistent with the analysis set forth in other 

jurisdictions, Mr. Green has not shown that he was injured or aggrieved by the 

Commission’s decision dismissing his complaint.

Mr. Green argues, however, that he was aggrieved, as the complainant to the 

Commission, by “the lack of procedural due process afforded” to him. This contention has 

no merit.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state 

shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of the law.” U.S. 

Const. amend. XIV.8 Thus, as Mr. Green recognizes in his brief, due process protections 

apply only when a government seeks to deprive a person of “life, liberty, or property.” 

8 Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: “That no man ought to 

be . . . deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the 

Law of the land.” Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 24. This provision and the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have been viewed as “complementary provisions

that protect the same rights.” Roberts v. Total Health Care, Inc. 109 Md. App. 635, 643 

(1996).
14

The only person who is subject to such deprivation by proceedings with the 

Commission is a judge, who is potentially subject to discipline or the loss of a job. The 

Commission, therefore, is required to provide judges with procedural due process. White, 

451 Md. 648. An accused judge is entitled, before being subject to discipline, to “notice, 

an opportunity to respond, [and] a fair hearing.” Id.

A person who files a complaint against a judge, however, does not have a life, 

liberty, or property interest at stake when the Commission decides whether to pursue 

judicial discipline. Thus, a person filing a complaint with the Commission has no due 

process rights. Mr. Green was not entitled to due process, and his argument that he failed 

to receive it, therefore, is not a sufficient ground to find that he was aggrieved or suffered 

an injury.

We hold that, because the purpose of the judicial disciplinary system is to protect 

the public and maintain public confidence in the judiciary, not to vindicate any individual 

person’s interest, a person who files a complaint with the Commission has no standing to 

seek judicial review of the Commission’s resolution of the complaint. The circuit court 

properly dismissed both of Mr. Green’s complaints for lack of standing. 

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

APPELLANT.