### The Honorable R. E. Longstaff, United States District Judge 1 

### for the Southern District of Iowa. ___________ No. 96-1608

___________ Sandra S. Comegys, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * Southern District of Iowa of the Social Security * Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: December 20, 1996 Filed: January 8, 1997

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________
PER CURIAM.

Sandr a S. Comegys appeals from the final judgment of the Distric t Court for the Southern District of Iowa affirming the decision of th e

1 Commissioner to deny Comegys disability insurance and Supplemental Securit y Income (SSI) benefits. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Comegys, born October 11, 1946, applied for disability insuranc e benefits and SSI, alleging she was disabled as of December 1992, due t o thoraci c outlet syndrome, cubital tunnel and carpal tunnel syndromes , severe headaches, and neck pain. Her

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insured status expires on December 31, 1996. Her application was denied initia lly and upon reconsideration. Comegys requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

At the No vember 1993 hearing Comegys was represented by counsel and a vocational expert testified that there were a significant number of jobs in the national and local economies which Comegys could perform despite he r impair ments. The ALJ concluded that the combination of Comegys' s impairments was severe, but did not meet or equal the criteria of any of the Listed Impairments. The ALJ pointed to evidence in the record which showed that Comegys had worked after she had bee n diagnosed with right and left carpal tunnel and thoracic outlet syndromes ; that she received relief fromthe transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation (TENS) unit; that a consultative orthoped ic surgeon noted that all of her subjective symptoms did not correlate with objective clinical findings and she showed som e fabrication of sympto ms; and that her treating osteopath made it clear in his summary of Comegy s's symptoms that he was reporting what Comegys told himrather than describing his clinical findings and as such the ALJ was not b ound to consider them. In determining whether Comegys's pain an d disc omfort resulted in functional limitations sufficient to be legall y disabling, the ALJ reviewed the Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 132 2 (8th Cir. 1984), factors and found that Comegys's daily activities were no t consistent with and did not support a finding of total disability, that he r assertion of functional limitations was not conf irmed by clinical findings and thus was not credible, and that she reported only minimal side effects of medication. The ALJ concluded that Comegys could not return to her pas t relevant work. Shifting the burden to the Commi ssioner and relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that there were othe r jobs in the national economy which she could perform. Thus, Comegys was not disabled.

### -3- The Appeals Council denied further r eview, and upon judicial review, the district court co ncluded that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supported the Commissioner's decision.

On appeal, Comegys argues that the Commissioner's decision i s incorrect, and asserts she was diagnosed with Dupuytren's contracture in March 1996; she had Bell's Palsy in July 1995; and she had a right kne e replacement in Septem ber 1994. She also argues that in May 1996, she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia, which had been included as one of her treatin g osteopath's diagnoses, but had not been properly developed.

Our review of an administrative decision to deny Social Securit y benefits is limited and is deferential to the agency. See Ostronski v. Chater , 94 F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir. 1996). If substantial evidence in the record a s a whole supports the administrative decision, it must b e affirmed. Id. We may not "merely parse the record for substantia l evid ence supporting the Secretary's decision," but must also "conside r evide nce in the record that detracts from the weight of the decision. " Robinson v. Sullivan , 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992).

The issue before us is whether substantial evidence supports tha t Comegys was not disabled during the period for w hich benefits were denied, in this case December 1992 through April 5, 1994, the date of the ALJ' s decision

. See Williams v. Sullivan , 905 F.2d 214, 216 & n.6 (8th Cir

. 1990) (where Appeals Council declines to review case, the date o f Commissioner's final decision is the date ALJ decision was issued; ne w evidence submitted to Appeals Council must be ne w, material, and relate to period on or before date of ALJ's decision).
Although the record for the period ending April 1994 contains s everal inconsistent medical findings and diagnoses, inc onsistencies in the record and the weight accorded to evidence

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are f or the Commissioner to resolve, "within broad limits." Onstad v

. Shalala , 999 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1993). In making his credibility determinations, we conclude the ALJ analyzed the factors consistent with Polas ki v. Heckler , 739 F.2d at 1322, noting that Comegys's dail y activities did not suggest she was in disabling pain, that the clinica l finding s did not correlate with the extent of Comegys's complaints o f alleged pain, and that many of her complaints we re not credible. The ALJ properly shifted the burden to the Commissioner to show that jobs existed which Comegys could perform, and the vocational expert's testimon y supported that there were such jobs in the local and national economy.

Even if t his court might have weighed the evidence differently, the Commissioner's decision must be upheld when there is evidence to support either outcome. See Browning v. Sullivan , 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir

. 1992). Considering the deference accorded to the Commissioner's decision and this court's limited review, and having care fully reviewed the record,
we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision.

Comegys su ggests in her reply brief that the ALJ may not hav e adequately developed the record with respect to her May 1996 diagnosis of fibromyal gia. See Boyd v. Sullivan , 960 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1992)

. We find no error in t he ALJ's failure to develop the record further as to this impairment.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.