SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0137- 22 SAMMERAH TUTT, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. PARKER 149 LLC, Defendant-Appellant.

_____ ____________________

Submitted November 14, 2023

– Decided December 5, 2023 Before Judges Haas and Natali. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-0059-21. Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Colin P. Hackett, of counsel and on the briefs). John J. Pisano, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM Defendant Parker 149, LLC, appeals from an August 8 , 2022 Law Division order confirming an arbitration award and denying as unti mely its NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on t he internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 0137

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request for a trial de novo. Because we conclude Rules 4:21A-5 and -6(b)(1) must be read together such that the thirty-day peri od in which a party m ust demand a trial de novo commences only when the cour t provides a copy of the award to the parties , we reverse and remand.
I. While a tenant in a Newark residence owned by defendant, plaintiff alleges she slipped and fell on ice or snow, causin g her "severe and permanent injuries." She subsequently filed a complaint asserting defenda nt was negligent in failing to remove the ice and snow, to warn plai ntiff of the dangerous condition, or to "exercise that degree of care and caution required to keep the . . . premises in a safe condition." In its answer, defendant denied liability and

assert ed various defenses. Both parties participated in non- binding arbitration by phone on June 14, 2022, as required by R ule 4:21A

- 1. 1 The arbitrator found plaintiff twenty-five percent liable and defendant seventy-five percent l iable and, based on gross damages of $50,000, awarded plaintiff $37,500. Bot h parties' counsel "authorized the arbitrator to sign [thei]r names to the report of the arbitration

1 Rule 4:21A -1(a)(2) provides in relevant part, "all actions fo r personal injury not arising out of the operation, ownership, mainte nance or use of an automobile shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance wit h these rules."3 A- 0137

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award," which was filed with the court the same day , June 14, 2022. Defendant' s counsel received an email from the eCourts system t he next morning, June 15, 2022, advising al l parties the award had been filed the previous day. Consi stent with th at email, the case summary from eCourts reflects a "f iled date" of June 14, 2022 and an "entry date" of June 15, 2022. Defendant moved for a trial de novo pursuant to Ru le 4:21A -6 on July 15,
2022. 2 Initially, the Law Division clerk refused to accept defendant's trial de

novo demand, deeming it untimely because the thirty-day peri od set forth in the Rule expired the day before, on July 14, 2022. Defendant then filed, the same day, another motion requesting its demand for a tri al de novo be processed. In response, plaintiff moved to confirm the arbitratio n award. The court heard oral arguments on both plaintiff's and defendant' s motions. Defendant noted it did not receive the fi led arbitration award from the eCourts system until June 15, 2022, and therefore, under America's Pride Construction v. Farry, 175 N.J. 60 (2002), in which the Supreme Court held "the time periods set out in Rule 4:21A -6(b) do not begin to run until the arbitrator

2 Rule 4:21A -6(b)(1) states "[a]n order shall be entered dismis sing the action following the filing of the arbitrator's award unle ss: (1) within [thirty] days after filing of the arbitration award, a party thereto fi les . . . and serves on all other parties a notice of rejection of the award and dema nd for a trial de novo . . . ."4 A- 0137

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has filed the written award with the [court] and th e parties," id. at 65, it argued the thirty-day period for requesting a trial de nov o did not commence until it received notice of the award on June 15, 2022. Def endant also relied on Farrell v. TCI of North N.J., 378 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div . 2005), in which we referred

to America's Pride when interpreting the one-year period ap plicable to a motion seeking relief from judgment under Rule 4:50 -1(a) , id. at 346, 348- 51

. On August 8, 2022, the court issued a written order granting plaintiff's application and denying defendant's. The court fou nd defendant' s request for a trial de novo, filed on July 15, 2022, was " one -day out of time" because the current version of "[Rule] 4:21A-6(b) eliminate[d] the mailing or notice requirement and [required] the trial de novo request . . . be made ' within [thirty] days after the filing of the arbitration award. '" The arbitration award here, the court noted, was "docketed on eCourts on June 14, 2 022." In a rider to its written order, the court determin ed the Court's holding in America's Pride was abrogated by the change to Rule 4:21A -5(a) and, in support, relied on SWH Funding Corp. v. Walden Printing Co., 399 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2008), in which we found the amendment of Rule s 4:21A -4 and -5 "signaled the Court's clear intention to depart from the scen ario addressed in America' s Pride," id. at 17. Therefore, it concluded, defendant's reliance on Am erica' s5 A- 0137

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Pride , 175 N.J. at 65, and Farrell, 378 N.J. Super. at 348 -51, was misplaced as each relied upon language in Rule 4:21A-5(a), which was later modified and thus inapplicable to the facts before the court. Finally, the court determined there were no extraor dinary circumstances warranting a tolling of the thirty-day period, as r equired under Hartsfield v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 618 (1997) (holding "courts must determine that 'extraordinary circumstances' exist [to relax the t hirty-day rule in Rule 4:21A

6(b)] and that those circumstances did not arise fr om an attorney's 'mere carelessness' or 'lack of proper diligence. '" (quoting In re T., 95 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 1967))). The court also found Rule 1:1 -2, which permits relaxation of other rules, was not applicable here a s it "was not meant as a 'cureall' . . . [and] should be sparingly resorted to," the court added, citing Romagnola v. Gillespie, Inc., 194 N.J. 596, 606 (2008) and Ro bertelli v. Offi ce of Attorne y Ethics, 224 N.J. 470, 483 (2016). This appeal followed.
II. Before us, defendant argues the court erred in deny ing its request for a trial de novo. In support, it reprises its argumen t the thirty-day period under Rule 4:21A

- 6 should not have commenced until the court provided it with a copy6 A- 0137

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of the arbitration award, on June 15, 2022. Accordingly, it asserts its request filed on July 15, 2022 was timely. Defendant again relies on America's Pride as well a s an unpublished opinion from our court , to support its position the thirty-day period in th e Rule does not commence "until the court provides the par ties a copy of the award." Defendant stresses neither we , nor our Supreme Court, have deeme d America' s Pride "no longer good law," contrary to the court's determination. Further, it contend s strictly construing the time period to begin upon f iling is il logical, because it would unreasonably shorten the time peri od if the award were filed but not served on the parties until days or weeks l ater. Finally, defendant asserts Rule 1:1 -2, which informs that our Rules "shall be construe d to secure a just determination, simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay ," fully supports its argument the court erred in interpreting Rule 4:21A

- 6. In requesting we affirm, plaintiff notes defendant' s demand for a trial de novo was not filed until thirty-one days after the arbitration award was filed on June 14, 2022, and therefore, the demand was untime ly under the clear language7 A- 0137

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of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A- 26 3 and its implementing rule, Rule 4:21A -6(b)(1). Plaintiff asserts the "plain and unambiguous terms of Rule 4:21A -6(b)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26 provide a limitations period for the filing of a demand for a trial de novo that is thirty . . . days from the 'filing' of the arbitration award." In contrast, she argues, the language used in other Rules clearly states when a limitations period is calculated according to the d ate of notice or service. As an example, plaintiff points to Rules 2:4 -1(b), permitting appeals from administrative agencies within forty-five days "fro m the date of service of the decision"; 2:5 -6(a), providing a motion seeking leave to appeal a n interlocutory order shall be made within twenty days "after the date of ser vice of such order"; and 4:49-2 , requiring motions to reconsider or amend final judg ments be made within twenty days "after service of the judgment o r order upon all parties." Thus, plaintiff concludes, the language of Rule 4:21A -6 demonstrates the thirtyday period was intended to begin "to run upon the f iling of the arbitration award" and not upon service. We disagree with all these a rguments.

3 N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26 provides "[t]he court shall, u pon motion of any of the parties, confirm the arbitration decision . . . unl ess one of the parties petitions the court within [thirty] days of the filing of the arbitration decision for a trial de novo . . . ."8 A- 0137

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We first identify the standard of review governing our analysis. An interpretation of court Rules governing mandatory a rbitration involves a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Vanders lice v. Stewart, 220 N.J. 385, 389 (2015). Under this standard, "[a] trial c ourt's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from establish ed facts are not entitled to any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019 ) (alteration in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). We apply "ordinary principles of statutory construc tion" when interpret ing court rules. State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 66 ( 2017). "We look first to the plain language of the Rules and give t he words their ordinary meaning." Robertelli, 224 N.J. at 484. Additional ly, we must read the language used "in context with related provisions so as to g ive sense to the [court Rules ] as a whole." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoti ng Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587, 592 (2006)). "If a . . . rule is ambiguous, courts may ascertain the i ntent of the drafters by looking to extrinsic sources such a s the . . . rule's underlying purpose and history." First Resol. Inv. Corp. v. Seker, 171 N.J. 502, 512 (2002). As our Supreme Court noted, "[t]he general intent o f [a] statute [or R ule ] controls the interpretation of its component parts. " Ibid. (alterations in original)9 A- 0137

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(quoting Nat'l Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Middlesex C nty. Improvement Auth. , 150 N.J. 209, 223 (1997)). "If . . . a literal int erpretation of a provision would lead to an absurd result or would be inconsistent w ith the [Rule]'s overall purpose, 'that interpretation should be rejected' a nd 'the spirit of the [Rule] should control. '" Pfannenstein v. Surrey, 475 N.J. Super. 83, 95 (A pp. Div. 2023) (quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-9 3 (2001)). With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes and Rules at issue. The Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Ac t, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A- 1 through -30, was enact ed "' to provide a speedier and less expensive process fo r resolution of disputes than traditional civil litig ation' . . . [and] to provide 'a formal method of resolving disputes with predictabl e rules, procedures, and results. '" N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Ctr. of N ew Brunswick, 458 N.J. Super. 63, 69 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Mt. Ho pe Dev. Assocs. v. Mt. Hope Waterpower Project, L.P., 154 N.J. 141, 145 (1998))

. Both N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26 and Rule 4:21A -6(b)(1) fix the deadline to demand a trial de novo as within thirty days of the filing of the arbitration award. "Rule 4:21A -6(b)(1) 'set[s] a short deadline for filing a [tri al] de novo demand' to 'ensure[] that the court will promptly schedule trials in cases that cannot be resolved by arbitration. '" Vanderslice, 220 N.J. at 392 (alterations in origin al)10 A- 0137

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(quoting Nascimento v. King, 381 N.J. Super. 593, 5 97 (App. Div. 2005) ). The thirty-day period is "intended . . . to be strictly enforced" and may be extended by the court only upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." Hartsfield , 149 N.J. at 616-17 (quoting Hart v. Prop. Mgmt. Sys ., 280 N.J. Super. 145, 147 (App. Div. 1995)). This policy "furthers the state d aims of the compulsory arbitration program, which is to bring about inexpe nsive, speedy adjudications of disputes and to ease the caseload of state court s." Id. at 619 (quoting Behm v. Ferreira, 286 N.J. Super. 566, 574 (App. Div. 19 96)). First, we are not persuaded by the court's conclusi on America's Pride has effectively been abrogated by changes to Rule 4:21A -5(a). The issue in America's Pride was "whether the arbitrator's failu re to provide the [defendants] with a copy of the arbitration award as prescribed by Rule 4:21A -5(a) is a sufficient basis to toll the filing deadlines set f orth in Rule 4:21A -6(b)." 175 N.J. at 63. Under the version of Rule 4:21A -5(a) in effect at the time, the arbitrator was required to "mail a copy [of the awa rd] to each of the parties." Id. at 64. The Court concluded , "[r]eading Rules 4:21A -5(a) and -6(b) together, . . . the time periods set out in Rule 4:21A -6(b) do not begin to run until the arbitrator has filed the written award with the civil division manager and the parties." Ibid. (emphasis added). It explained its "interpretation of the mailing requirement11 A- 0137

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under Rule 4:21A -5(a) is consonant with other [c]ourt Rules that co ndition a filing deadline on the receipt of notice that a jud gment, order, or decision has been entered against a party." Ibid. Rule 4:21A -5(a) was altered as part of the Best Practices Rul e amendments in 2000, replacing the word "mail" with "provide" and shifting responsibility for providing a copy of the award fr om the arbitrator to the court. Contrary to the court's interpretation, this change did not remove the principle
upon which America's Pride grounded its decision, but m erely modified the manner by which any award is transmitted to the par ties. Instead of the arbitrator providing a copy of the award, the court is now obligated to do so. R. 4:21A

5. 4 In essence, w e fundamentally disagree with plaintiff's interpretat ion of Rules 4:21A -5 and - 6 as well as the court' s conclusion that from the minor change in the Rule, the holding in America's Pride wa s abrogated. As noted, the Court's holding was not dependent on the arbitrator serving the award, but rather the underlying "purpose of a notice requirement . . . to apprise a party of some

4 We note our conclusion is supported by the March 1, 2000 Supplemental Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Civil Prac tice recommending the change to Rule 4:21A -5(a) which characterized it as merely a "housekeep ing amendment." 2000 Sup. Ct. Civ. Prac. Comm. Suppl. Rep. § I(A), at 5.12 A- 0137

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fact that he or she has a right to know and that th e communicating party has a duty to communicate." America's Pride, 175 N.J. at 63-64. That principle survives the housekeeping amendment to Rule 4:21A -5. Although we acknowledge in America's Pride, one of the parties failed to appe ar for the arbitration, contrary to the circumstances here, we find the Court's interpretation of Rules 4:21A -5 and -6 equally applicable to the facts before us we discuss at pp. 13-16, infra. We also find the court's reliance on SWH Funding to be misplaced. That case involved an order denying a motion to vacate a n arbitration award entered by default under Rule 4:21A -4(f). 399 N.J. Super. at 17. Paragraph (f), adde d in 2000, provides, in part:

If a party defending against a claim of damages doe s not appear, that party's pleading shall be stricken , the arbitration shall proceed and the non-appearing par ty shall be deemed to have waived the right to demand a trial de novo . . . . Relief from any order entere d pursuant to this rule shall be granted only on moti on showing good cause . . .

. [ R. 4:21A -4(f).] In SWH Funding, we noted the modifications to Rules 4:21A -4 and
4:21A

- 5 "denied the non-appearing party the right to file f or a trial de novo." 399 N.J. Super. at 17. The primary issue in SWH Fu nding was whether13 A- 0137

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defendant's failure to appear at the arbitration he aring constituted "good cause" to grant relief from an arbitration award entered b y default under Rule 4:21A

4(f). Ibid. In America's Pride, defendants also failed to appea r at the arbitrati on hearing, 175 N.J. at 62, but were permitted to move for a trial de novo because Rule 4:21A -4(f) had not yet been enacted. This is the "scena rio addressed in America's Pride" from which SWH Funding found the a mendment of Rules
4:21A -4 and - 5 "signaled the Court's clear intention to depart." 399 N.J. Super. at 17. Indeed, SWH Funding did not consider Rule 4:21A

- 6 at all, aside from noting that its thirty-day requirement did not appl y to a motion seeking relief under Rule 4:21A -4(f). Id. at 11. We are also un persuaded by plaintiff's arguments comparing Rule 4:21A

6 to Rules 2:4 -1(b), 2:5-6(a), and 4:49-2. While we agree each o f these references the applicable time period by the date o f service or notice, and not the date of filing, we cannot separate Rule 4:21A

- 6 from its context. As the Court advised in America's Pride , that Rule must be read together with Rule
4:21A -5 and thus, it follows the time periods set forth in Rule 4:21A -6(b) do not begin to run until the parties receive a copy of th e arbitration award from the court. 175 N.J. at 64. In fact, the Court referre d specifically to Rules 2:4 -1(b) and 4:49-2 in uti lizing the mailing requirement in Rule 4:21A-5 to inform the14 A- 0137

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thirty-day period in Rule 4:21A -6(b), finding its interpretation "consonant with other [c] ourt Rules that condition a filing deadline on the receipt of notice that a judgment, order, or decision has been entered aga inst a party." Id. at 64. As noted, we are obligated to read the Rules "in conte xt with related provisions so as to give sense to the [court rules] as a whole," Robertelli, 224 N.J. at 484 (alteration in original) (quoting Wiese, 188 N.J. a t 592), and to avoid "absurd" results and inconsistency with the Rule's overall p urpose, Pfannenstein, 475 N.J. Super. at 95

. Further, nothing in our decision or interpretation of Rule 4:21A -6(b) or
N.J.S.A. 2A:23A- 26 is inconsistent with the ir purpose, " to provide 'a formal method of resolving disputes with predictable rules , procedures, and results, '" N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 458 N.J. Super. at 69 (quoting Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs., 154
N.J. at 145) , and to "ensure[] that the court will promptly sch edule trials in cases that cannot be resolved by arbitration," Vanderslic e, 220 N.J. at 392 (alteration in original) (quoting Nascimento , 381 N.J. Super. at 597 ). Particularly where, as here, the parties attended arbitration by phone and did not receive a copy of the written arbitration award before it was filed, it would be unfair to start the thirty-day clock before the parties had an opportun ity to review the award. Although the parties do not dispute the arbitrator stated hi s decision the day of15 A- 0137

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the hearing, it is not inconceivable a written awar d could diverge from an oral decision, whether accidentally or otherwise. Therefore, for the reasons detailed, we agree with defendant that the thirty-day period within which it could seek a tria l de novo began on June 15, 2022, when it received a copy of the arbitrator's a ward from the court, and its July 15, 2022 filing was therefore timely. Because we determine the filing was timely, we need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether d efendant has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances to extend the thirty-day period under Hartsfield , 149 N.J. at 618. In reaching our decision, we acknowledge defendant was aware of the arbitrator's award on June 14, 2022, when the arbit rator made an oral decision and the parties consented to the arbitrator placing their signatures on the award. 5
We are nevertheless satisfied these facts do not wa rrant deviation from the principles we have discu ss ed , as our interpretation of the Rules confirms a party seeking a trial de novo should base their decision on the actual award filed with

5 Although the award includes a provision advising "[p]arties desiring to reject this award and obtain a trial de novo must file wit h the division manager a trial de novo request . . . within thirty (30) days of to day" and "unless otherwise expressly indicated this award will be filed today, " it is undisputed th e arbitrator did not provide a copy of the award directly to the parties on June 14, 2022.16 A- 0137

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the court, not an arbitrator' s oral representations prior to filing the written aw ard

. As noted, a variety of circumstances could lead to differences between the two. Further, our decision ensures the applicable time p eriod is no less than thirty days, even when there is a delay between an arbitrator's filing and the court's provision of the award, as a contrary inter pretation would unfairly truncate the brief period to demand a trial de novo

. For example, if we were to adopt plaintiff's interpretation, a party that did not receive a copy of an award from the court until twenty-nine days after its filing would have only one day to review the written award for accuracy and demand a trial de novo. We find such an interpretation contrary to America' s Pride , Rules 4:21A-5 and -6, and inconsistent with the "fairness in administration" our Rules are intended to

secure. R. 1:1

- 2. Reversed.