In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-2208 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JOSHUA C. BOLIN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division. 

No. 17-cr-00018 — Richard L. Young, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 31, 2018 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 7, 2018 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Joshua Bolin 

pleaded guilty to possessing sexually explicit material involving minors, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). After 

Bolin signed a plea agreement, the district court sentenced 

Bolin to 120 months of imprisonment and a supervised release 

term of 15 years. The district court did not impose a fine, but 

it ordered Bolin to pay the mandatory special assessment and 

the additional special assessment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3013 and 
2 No. 18-2208 

3014. Bolin argues that the district court erred in imposing the 

$5,000 additional special assessment under § 3014 because he 

is indigent. The government argues Bolin has waived this 

claim. We agree, and we affirm. 

I. Background 

On May 31, 2017, the government charged Bolin with possession of sexually explicit material involving minors, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2252(b)(2). At his initial 

appearance, Bolin submitted a financial affidavit. The court 

approved it and appointed him counsel under the Criminal 

Justice Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. 

Bolin and the government jointly filed a “Petition to Enter 

Guilty Plea and Plea Agreement” on February 21, 2018 informing the court that Bolin had agreed to plead guilty. The 

plea agreement included a section titled “Waiver of Right to 

Appeal,” which, relevant here, had a paragraph that addressed “Direct Appeal.” That paragraph stated: 

The defendant understands that the defendant 

has a statutory right to appeal the conviction 

and sentence imposed and the manner in which 

the sentence was determined. Acknowledging 

this right, and in exchange for the concessions 

made by the Government in this Plea Agreement, the defendant expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal the conviction imposed in this case on any ground, including the 

right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742.... 

This blanket waiver of appeal specifically includes all provisions of the guilty plea and sentence imposed, including the length and 
No. 18-2208 3

conditions [of] supervised release and the 

amount of any fine. 

At the change of plea hearing on March 14, 2018, the district 

court determined that Bolin was competent and capable of entering into an informed plea, and the district court adjudged 

Bolin guilty. 

The U.S. Probation Office filed a Presentence Investigation 

Report (“PSR”). The PSR explained that under the relevant 

statutes, Bolin faced a $250,000 fine, and under the Guidelines, he faced a $20,000 to $200,000 fine. Nevertheless, the 

Probation Office recommended that the court not impose any 

fine on Bolin. Additionally, in accordance with the statutes, 

the Guidelines, and the plea agreement, the Probation Office 

recommended that the district court impose $100 for the mandatory special assessment and $5,000 for the additional special assessment, but it did not elaborate as to its reasoning for 

those recommendations. 

At the sentencing hearing on May 15, 2018, the district 

court described Bolin as a “relatively intelligent young man,” 

who graduated “close to the top ten in his high school class,” 

and who is “interested in electronics.” When the district court 

asked Bolin about his post-release plans, Bolin said he hoped 

to use the education he received from the Bureau of Prisons 

to work and have a normal life. In turn, the district court said 

Bolin “should take advantage of education [and] vocational 

training opportunities while he’s at the Bureau, so when he 

does come out of the Bureau of Prisons, he’ll be able to seek 

employment and become a productive member of society and 

be able to support himself.” 
4 No. 18-2208 

Ultimately, the district court sentenced Bolin to 120 

months of imprisonment and a supervised release term of 15 

years. The district court did not impose a fine given Bolin’s 

“current financial resources and future ability to pay,” but it 

ordered Bolin to pay a mandatory special assessment of $100 

and an additional special assessment of $5,000. The district 

court did not explicitly state its reasoning for ordering Bolin 

to pay both assessments. 

The district court entered judgment on May 16, 2018. This 

appeal followed. 

II. Discussion 

“As a general rule, a defendant may waive the right to appeal his conviction and sentence ....” United States v. Cole, 569 

F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(1)(N)). When a waiver of appellate rights is knowing 

and voluntary, it “must be enforced.” United States v. Perillo, 

897 F.3d 878, 882 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2011)). But such waivers 

should only be enforced to the extent the subject of the appeal 

falls within the scope of the waiver. United States v. Shah, 665 

F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011). We review the scope of a waiver 

de novo. Perillo, 897 F.3d at 882. 

Bolin appeals the court’s imposition of the additional special assessment because the district court found him to be indigent when it appointed him counsel and when it decided 

he was unable to pay a fine under the Guidelines. The parties 

dispute whether Bolin’s claim falls within the scope of the 

waiver provision in his plea agreement. The government emphasizes that Bolin agreed to a “blanket waiver of appeal,” 
No. 18-2208 5

including “all provisions” of his sentence and “any fine.” We 

agree. 

Our decision in Perillo is instructive here. In that case, the 

appellant argued that she had not waived her right to appeal 

the restitution order of her sentence because the waiver did 

not refer to restitution. Perillo, 897 F.3d at 883. But because the 

waiver applied to “all provisions of the ... sentence imposed,” 

we held: “[t]he fact that other specific terms of the sentence 

were mentioned and restitution was not does not take restitution out from under the ‘all provisions’ umbrella.” Id. (citing 

United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2011)). 

The waiver provision in Bolin’s plea agreement similarly 

referred to “all provisions” of his sentence. And additional 

special assessments are part of the sentencing “package.” Cf. 

United States v. Mobley, 833 F.3d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 2016). Thus, 

Bolin’s waiver provision did not need to expressly reference 

the additional special assessment in order for the waiver provision to apply to that aspect of Bolin’s sentence. The waiver 

provision had sufficient breadth to encompass Bolin’s right to 

raise a claim involving the additional special assessment on 

appeal. 

Bolin relies on Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018), 

to argue that certain challenges are eligible for appellate review, notwithstanding a plea agreement that waives a defendant’s appellate rights. Bolin contends that, like the defendant in Class, he does not wish to deny that he engaged in 

any of the conduct to which he already admitted. Rather, 

Bolin seeks to argue that § 3014 does not apply to him because 

he is indigent. As such, Bolin says he is only raising a claim 

that “judged on its face” would remove the government’s 
6 No. 18-2208 

power to “constitutionally prosecute” him if his claim proves 

successful. See id. at 806. 

In Class, the Supreme Court considered whether a guilty 

plea prevents a defendant from appealing his conviction on 

the theory that the statute of conviction is unconstitutional. Id.

at 801–02. The defendant’s written plea agreement included 

express waivers, such as the right to appeal a sentence at or 

below the Guidelines. Id. at 802. However, it also enumerated 

categories of claims that the defendant could raise on appeal, 

such as claims based on certain statutes providing for sentence reductions. Id. Notably, the plea agreement did not contain an express waiver of the defendant’s right to challenge 

the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. Id. 

The Court held that the defendant did not waive the right 

to appeal the constitutionality of the statute of conviction by 

signing the plea agreement. Id. at 803. Drawing on its holdings 

“stretch[ing] back nearly 150 years,” the Court explained that 

“a guilty plea does not bar a claim on appeal ‘where on the 

face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.’” Id. at 804 (quoting United States 

v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989)). By contrast, where defendants cannot prove their claim “without contradicting [their] 

indictments,” the Court reiterated that their claims are “foreclosed by the admissions inherent in their guilty pleas.” Id.

(quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 576). 

Class is inapposite. Bolin’s claim on appeal does not challenge the constitutionality of § 3014, nor does his claim implicate the power of the government to prosecute him. Additionally, unlike in Class, Bolin’s claim on appeal contradicts the 

terms of the plea agreement. 
No. 18-2208 7

Absent any evidence to suggest that Bolin’s waiver was invalid, it follows that the waiver contained in the plea agreement is enforceable. Consequently, our review of Bolin’s 

claim is foreclosed. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court.