RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2430-15T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.R.P.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted May 10, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Manahan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, 

Indictment No. 10-09-1016.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (John V. Molitor, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Erin Smith Wisloff, 

Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, on the 

brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

July 18, 2017
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Defendant M.R.P. appeals the November 12, 2015 order denying 

his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm for the 

reasons stated by Judge Stuart A. Minkowitz in his detailed written 

decision. We add some brief comments.

We denied defendant's direct appeal in State v. M.R.P., No. 

A-2982-11 (App. Div. Sept. 5, 2014). His petition for 

certification to the Supreme Court was also denied. State v. 

M.R.P., 220 N.J. 575 (2015). Defendant was convicted by a jury 

of multiple counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a); second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A.

2C:14-2(b); second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); and third-degree aggravated criminal sexual 

contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a). The two victims were his nieces, 

B.P. and A.P. Defendant was sentenced on December 16, 2011, to 

an aggregate term of forty years imprisonment, subject to the No 

Early Release Act's eighty-five percent parole ineligibility. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

Defendant's sexual abuse of B.P. began in 1998, when she was 

eight years old, and was sent by family from El Salvador to live 

here. A.P., her younger sister, was abused when she visited B.P. 

in defendant's home years later. The sexual assaults on B.P. 

continued until her adolescence, when A.P. disclosed defendant's 

conduct to the family. They came to this country to remove B.P. 
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from defendant's care. The criminal charges were filed at that 

time. 

M.R.P. raised nineteen separate arguments for post-conviction 

relief in his petitions. On appeal, his counseled brief raises 

two:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 

RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT 

HE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL 

REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO TAKE INTO 

ACCOUNT THE PROPOSED TESTIMONY OF R.P. IN 

MAKING ITS DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

Defendant's uncounseled brief raises eight points of error 

as follows:

POINT I

THE COURT VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WHEN 

IT DENIED HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT 

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

PETITION.

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MEDICAL 

EVIDENCE WAS IRRELEVANT DESPITE ITS CLEAR 

EXCULPATORY VALUE AND DESPITE LONGESTABLISHED LEGAL PRECEDEN[TS].

POINT III

THE COURT ERRED AND CONTRADICTED ITSELF WHEN 

IT RULED THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD RECEIVED 

ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE WHILE AT THE SAME 
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TIME RULING HIS ARGUMENTS INVALID BECAUSE THEY 

WERE NOT RAISED EARLIER.

POINT IV

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ADDRESS THE 

LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT'S 

RESIDENCE.

POINT V

THE COURT SHOWED GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND 

DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE WHEN IT FAILED TO 

EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROSECUTORIAL 

VINDICTIVENESS.

POINT VI

THE COURT DOUBLE-COUNTED ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME 

TO SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF AGGRAVATING 

FACTOR 1 DURING SENTENCING.

POINT VII

THE COURT INCORRECTLY DISMISSED CRITICAL NEWLY 

UNCOVERED EVIDENCE.

POINT VIII

THE IMPOSITION BY THE COURT OF A SPECIAL 

SENTENCE OF PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE 

VIOLATED THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSES OF THE 

UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS 

RENDERING THE SENTENCE ILLEGAL.

We first address the points raised in the counseled brief. 

In point one, defendant attacks the court's failure to fully 

explore the claim that the eighteen-year plea offer was not 

conveyed to him. However, the judge, although he mentioned the 

possibility of finding additional corroboration of the information

presented to him at the time of the PCR argument, considered the 

information he had sufficient to rule. That information was 

dispositive —— a letter defendant wrote to the court prior to 
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trial about the plea bargaining process. In that June 26, 2009 

letter, written two years before the trial, defendant complained 

to the judge that the prosecutor had changed the plea offer from 

fifteen to eighteen years "for the sole reason that, as [the 

prosecutor] put it, I 'should not be rewarded' for not accepting 

before." The claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on the alleged failure to communicate the eighteen-year plea 

offer was completely refuted by the letter defendant wrote to the 

judge complaining about it. The judge's denial of relief on that 

basis is unassailable. 

The second point in the counselled brief goes to the trial 

court's alleged failure to take into account the information 

defendant characterized as new evidence. Defendant's brother

wrote a letter in which he said B.P. and A.P. acknowledged to him

that their accusations against defendant were false, and in which 

he ascribed improper motives to the allegedly false accusations. 

The letter was undated and uncertified. As the judge noted, the 

letter also said that defendant's brother conveyed this 

information to defendant's attorney in 2008 or 2009, years before 

the trial. The contents of the letter cannot be considered newly 

discovered evidence. Defendant's brother was not called to testify 

at trial. 
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Furthermore, A.P. and B.P. were both extensively crossexamined, including questions about the factual allegations made 

in the letter. In other words, although the letter was not 

identified as the source, the same issues the letter raised were 

covered in the trial. Hence, we are satisfied that judge correctly 

declined to find that the undated and uncertified letter had any 

evidentiary value. 

Most of the points defendant raises in the uncounseled brief 

are barred by Rule 3:22-4. Subsection (a) of the rule states that 

a ground for relief not previously raised is barred from PCR

consideration if it could have been addressed on direct appeal. 

The rule allows for certain exceptions —— none of which applied 

here. Therefore, the judge properly refused to consider issues 

that fell within that category.

In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel as

the basis for post-conviction relief, a defendant must meet two 

requirements –— that the objected-to representation fell outside 

the range of competent professional assistance, and ultimate 

prejudice to the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). In 

reviewing such claims, there is a strong presumption that counsel's 

performance fell within the range of reasonable representation. 

State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 147 (2011). Objectively reasonable, 
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although ultimately unsuccessful, decisions regarding strategy 

made by counsel fall within the range of adequate representation. 

State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 319 (2005). 

We address only one point in defendant's uncounseled brief 

—— the allegation that trial counsel was ineffective because he 

did not obtain B.P.'s records. Judge Minkowitz concluded that

even if B.P.'s medical records did not include complaints about, 

or physical manifestations of, sexual abuse, they would likely not 

have affected the outcome. The strength of B.P. and A.P.'s 

testimony was bolstered by DNA evidence that established

intercourse between B.P. and defendant. There is no reason in 

this case to conclude that had those records been made available, 

that they would have been anything other than neutral. 

In sum, defendant fell woefully short of even approximating 

a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel such as 

would have warranted a plenary hearing. Viewing the facts in the 

light most favorable to him, it is nonetheless clear none of his 

claims require additional proceedings. See State v. Jones, 219 

N.J. 298, 311 (2014); State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). 

Affirmed.