___________

No. 95-3027

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United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Neeley Hawkins Long, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: February 14, 1996

 Filed: February 23, 1996

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Before McMILLIAN, LAY and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Neeley Hawkins Long was arrested along with Vontrell Williams

at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport after Long

attempted to discard approximately ten ounces of crack cocaine she

had carried with Williams on a flight from Chicago. Long carried

a cellular telephone, a pager, and a health insurance card bearing

the name of her husband, Eddie Long. Williams, who was posing as

Long's husband, carried an identical health insurance card.

Williams lied to police and the magistrate judge about his

identity, and Long did not correct his statements. Long claims she

was under substantial pressure to assist Williams in this crime.

Nonetheless, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Long eventually

pled guilty to a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court

sentenced Long to the mandatory minimum of 120 months imprisonment.
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If Long obtains relief from the statutory 120-month

minimum, on remand the district court would be able to sentence

her to the lower end of the sentencing range, 108 months. In

addition, Long sought a downward departure from the guidelines

range because, she alleges, her involvement resulted from

"serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not

amounting to a complete defense." See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12. Long

also sought a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 for other

mitigating factors.

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On appeal, Long challenges the application of the mandatory

ten-year minimum sentence for "cocaine base" under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A) on two grounds.1 First, Long argues "cocaine base"

is chemically indistinguishable from "cocaine," creating an

ambiguity in the statute that should be resolved in her favor under

the rule of lenity. See United States v. Davis, 864 F. Supp. 1303

(N.D. Ga. 1994) (finding statute ambiguous and applying powder

cocaine minima under the rule of lenity). We need not address this

argument, however, because Long stipulated in her plea agreement

that her sentence would be governed by the applicable guidelines

for "150 to 500 grams of cocaine base" under U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(c)(3), see Plea Agreement at 3, and Long does not seek to

withdraw from the plea agreement. See United States v. Nguyen, 46

F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995). Moreover, we reject Long's argument

on the merits under United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213 (8th

Cir. 1995), pet. for cert. filed, No. 95-7438 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1996).

In Jackson, this court found "practical, real-world differences"

between powder and crack cocaine, such as the "cost, method of

production, availability to the urban poor," and the rate of

addiction, undermined the significance of the similarity in

"molecular structure" between the two types of cocaine. Id. at

1219-20. Further, Jackson noted the defendant did not contend he

"was unaware of the differences, or unable to distinguish, between

crack and other forms of cocaine," and thus held the statute was

not ambiguous and the rule of lenity inapplicable. Id. at 1220.

Like the defendant in Jackson, Long has made no argument she was

unaware she was dealing in crack or could not distinguish between
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the two, and thus Jackson is controlling here.

Second, Long argues she was entitled to relief under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f), which removes the statutory minima for certain crimes,

including violations of 21 U.S.C. § 846, if the defendant meets

certain conditions. See also U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (reproducing the

criteria of eligibility from § 3553(f) verbatim). The parties do

not dispute that Long qualified for relief under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f)(1)-(4). They disagree, however, whether Long complied

with the terms of § 3553(f)(5), under which a defendant is eligible

for relief if the district court has found that:

not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the

defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all

information and evidence the defendant has concerning the

offense or offenses that were part of the same course of

conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that

the defendant has no relevant or useful other information

to provide or that the Government is already aware of the

information shall not preclude a determination by the

court that the defendant has complied with this

requirement.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(5).

After Long pled guilty, the United States attorney and two

government agents interviewed Long, in the presence of Long's

attorney, about her criminal conduct to enable Long to comply with

§ 3553(f)(5). When asked why Williams had her husband's

identification, Long, who is an airline employee, told the

government Williams had asked her to obtain employee non-revenue

airline tickets for him, which are available for the family members

of airline employees, but she had never done so. The government

subsequently obtained several non-revenue tickets purchased by Long

for travel by "Eddie Long" between Chicago and Minneapolis. The

government offered these tickets as exhibits at Long's sentencing

hearing. Long then admitted on cross-examination that she had

provided Williams with non-revenue tickets on at least four
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occasions and had lied about this fact at the government interview,

explaining that she concealed the fact from the government for fear

of retribution by her employer. On the basis of her misstatement

to the government, the district court found Long ineligible for

relief under § 3553(f).

Long argues she provided all truthful information "not later

than the time of the sentencing hearing" under § 3553(f)(5) because

she admitted she provided Williams with non-revenue tickets at the

sentencing hearing. Under Long's reading, defendants could

deliberately mislead the government about material facts, yet

retain eligibility for relief under § 3553(f) by "curing" their

misstatement at the sentencing hearing. Although this would serve

a sentencing court's interest in full disclosure for purposes of

sentencing, we think Long overlooks the government's interest in

full truthful disclosure when it interviews defendants. This

interest is reflected in the text of § 3553(f)(5) in the clause

requiring the defendant's information be "truthfully provided to

the Government." Only if Long had provided truthful information

could the government have avoided the further investigation

required to discover the airline ticket receipts which showed Long

had provided Williams with non-revenue tickets to the MinneapolisSt. Paul airport.

Long next argues, notwithstanding her lie at the government

interview, that she provided all truthful information "concerning

the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of

conduct or of a common scheme or plan." Long contends

§ 3553(f)(5), unlike the substantial assistance provision of

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, only requires disclosure of information relating

to the defendant's "offense of conviction and all relevant

conduct." U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, comment. (n.3). Thus, Long contends,

she was only required to disclose information if it was relevant to

her offense and sentencing.
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We think the provision of airline tickets to a co-conspirator

to the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport is clearly relevant to "the

same course of conduct or . . . a common scheme or plan" of drug

trafficking when the defendant was apprehended carrying drugs, in

the presence of her co-conspirator, after their arrival at the

Minneapolis-St. Paul airport. To the extent that Long criticizes

the government for failing to provide sufficient "context" and

"notice" of why it wanted the information, we find that the

circumstances of her arrest provide all the context the government

was required to provide. The government was justified in asking

the question about other tickets and deserved an honest answer if

§ 3553(f)(5) was to apply. We also think that if such questioning

was beyond the scope of the relevant criminal conduct, it was

incumbent upon the defendant or defense counsel to object to the

question. If Long thought she was not required to answer the

question under § 3553(f)(5), she could have declined to answer, but

she was not allowed to mislead the government. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f)(5) ("[T]he fact that the defendant has no relevant or

useful other information to provide . . . shall not preclude a

determination by the court that the defendant has complied with

this requirement."); cf. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (providing obstruction of

justice enhancement for any "defendant [who] willfully obstruct[s]

or impede[s] . . . the administration of justice during the

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense").

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.