J-A10033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

FRANKLIN D. NICOLOUDAKIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1441 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-09-SA-0000584-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 5, 2023

Appellant Franklin D. Nicoloudakis (“Appellant”) files this pro se appeal 

from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of 

Bucks County imposing a $25.00 fine as well as costs and penalties after the 

trial court convicted Appellant of a summary violation pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3309 (disregarding traffic lane). After careful review, we affirm.

On August 26, 2021, at 9:28 p.m., Officer Joshua Kowalski of the Upper 

Makefield Police Department was on patrol on Woodhill Road when he noticed 

a silver Chevy Prizm in front of him that failed to remain in its traffic lane. 

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 4/22/22, at 16-18. Officer Kowalski indicated that 

the vehicle was traveling eastbound on a two-lane road in which the opposing 

lanes were separated by a double yellow line in the middle. Id. at 18-19.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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While traveling on Woodhill Road, Officer Kowalski observed the vehicle 

leave its lane of travel and cross over the center double yellow line into the 

westbound lane on three occasions. Id. After the vehicle turned onto 

Taylorsville Road and traveled southbound, Officer Kowalski saw the vehicle 

cross a fourth time into the opposing lane of travel, at which time there was 

traffic coming northbound. Id.

At that point, Officer Kowalski deemed the driver was driving 

dangerously and initiated a traffic stop. Id. After Appellant performed field 

sobriety testing and admitted to having been prescribed oxycodone, Officer 

Kowalski placed Appellant under arrest for suspicion of DUI. Affidavit of 

Probable Cause, 8/27/21, at 1-2. Appellant voluntarily submitted to a blood 

test at a local hospital. Id.

Initially, Appellant was charged with a summary offense of disregarding 

traffic lane (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1)) and DUI (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2)), 

but the Commonwealth subsequently withdrew the DUI charge at Appellant’s 

preliminary hearing. On November 8, 2021, Appellant pled guilty to the 

Section 3309 summary charge in the magisterial district court. On December 

8, 2021, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the summary conviction and 

was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

The trial court scheduled a trial de novo for February 4, 2022. Appellant 

made a demand for discovery from the Bucks County District Attorney’s Office 

and requested a continuance. On February 2, 2022, the trial court rescheduled 

Appellant’s trial for March 11, 2022.
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Appellant filed a second request for a continuance indicating he had not 

yet received a response from the Commonwealth to his demand for discovery. 

The trial court rescheduled the trial for April 22, 2022.

On April 14, 2022, Appellant filed a third request for a continuance, 

acknowledging that he had received the requested discovery on April 9, 2022, 

but needed additional time so that he could “review, analyze, and conduct 

legal research [to] compose a first class legal brief.” The trial court took no 

action on this continuance request.

On April 22, 2022, Appellant appeared before the court on the day of 

his scheduled trial where he renewed his request for a continuance based his 

allegation that he needed additional time to prepare a brief. N.T. at 5. While 

Appellant acknowledged that the Commonwealth provided him with lab 

reports, the complaint, incident report, and a CD containing videos that 

recorded Appellant’s entire encounter with police, Appellant claimed he could 

not find “something on the outside to play [the CD]” and only saw the footage 

that morning when the Commonwealth played it for him. Id. at 8, 10.

In addition, on the day of trial, Appellant referenced the fact that it was 

Orthodox Holy Friday and claimed he should not have to be occupied with legal 

matters on that date. Id. at 5. In response to questioning by the trial court, 

Appellant admitted that he had never referenced this holiday as a basis for a 

continuance in any of his written requests. Id. at 7.
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The trial court subsequently denied Appellant’s request for a 

continuance and proceeded with the trial on the Section 3309 charge.

1 The 

Commonwealth called Officer Kowalski to testify and admitted dashcam videos 

which corroborated Officer Kowalski’s testimony that Appellant’s vehicle 

crossed the center double yellow line four times. The video also showed that 

on the final time Appellant crossed the double yellow line, there was a vehicle 

coming in the opposing lane.

At the conclusion of trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of a violation 

of Section 3309 and sentenced Appellant to a fine of $25.00 along with court 

costs and penalties. After Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, the trial 

court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and noted that “[a]ny issue not properly 

included in the statement timely filed and served pursuant to Rule 1925(b) 

shall be deemed waived.” Order, 6/15/22, at 1. 

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Does a pro se litigant have a constitutional right to access the 

same information that a defense lawyer can?

2. Does the denial of that same information available to a lawyer 

but deliberately withheld a pro se litigant impinge on the right 

to self-representation prior to the preliminary hearing?

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1 Appellant was not represented by counsel and his continuance request was 

not based on his desire to retain counsel. Further, Appellant did not request 

that counsel be appointed. See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 122 (providing that counsel 

shall be appointed in “all summary cases, for all defendants who are without 

financial resources or who are otherwise unable to employ counsel when there 

is a likelihood that imprisonment will be imposed”)(emphasis added).
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3. Is the preliminary hearing a crucial state of the prosecution?

4. Does the denial of D.U.I. lab report [by NMS Lab in Horsham, 

PA as well as the Upper Makefield P.D.] regarding the blood 

sample taken on the night in question constitute an abuse of 

discretion?

5. Did the denial of that lab report and the video cam of the motor 

vehicle stop and arrest by the Upper Makefield P.D. prior to 

[and after] the preliminary hearing incapacitate the 

defendant’s ability to prepare a motion to suppress all the 

evidence?

6. How is the Court declining to grant an adjournment of trial to 

a pro se defendant to observe his solemn religious rite 

[Orthodox Holy Friday], secure authentication of medical 

documents and prepare adequately his defense strategy 

comport with fundamental fairness?

7. Was the Court’s restriction on cross-examination of the D.U.I. 

sobriety walk, interrogation, and arrest an abuse of discretion 

given the Affidavit of Probable Cause [revolving around the 

erroneous belief of intoxication] is fused into the entire case?

8. Does the trial court prohibiting the scope of cross-examination 

as the base for the D.U.I. arrest violate fundamental fairness 

as well as established case law?

9. Given all that appellant suffered from the arrest and being 

falsely accused of a crime, how is the Court justified in ignoring 

altogether the motion to dismiss the traffic violation on de 

minimis grounds?

10. Was the arresting officer’s failure to give weight to 

appellant’s dislocated ankle, handicapped symbol on his 

vehicle, explanation that he was fatigued when forcing the 

sobriety walk a clear-cut example of his eagerness or 

overzealousness to make an arrest?

Appellant’s Brief, at iv-v (brackets in original, suggested answers omitted).

We initially note that Appellant’s brief fails to comply with our rules of 

appellate procedure. Although Appellant’s statement of the questions 

presented raises the aforementioned ten issues, the argument section of his 
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appellate brief contains a disjointed, rambling discussion of numerous 

arguments Appellant wishes to raise. Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (“[t]he argument shall 

be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued”).

Nevertheless, as we can discern Appellant’s claims for relief, we will not 

quash the appeal and will limit our discussion to the claims set forth in 

Appellant’s statement of questions involved.2 See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“[n]o 

question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions 

involved or fairly suggested thereby”). 

In the first five issues, Appellant suggests that he was denied 

appropriate discovery from the prosecution in that he did not have the 

opportunity before his preliminary hearing to review the lab report relative to 

his blood draw or the dashcam video of his entire encounter with police.

This claim is meritless as Appellant was not entitled to discovery of these 

materials prior to his preliminary hearing. It is well-established that “[t]here 

is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.” 

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 425 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa. 1981) (quoting 

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)). Our Court has 

interpreted Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573, which governs 

pretrial discovery, to find that “pre-trial discovery is generally not available to

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2 Although Appellant asks this Court to “liberally construe and modify the rules 

of appellate procedure” to excuse errors or omissions in his pro se brief “in 

the interest of justice,” our courts have “long recognized that we must demand 

that pro se litigants substantially comply with our rules of procedure.” 

Commonwealth v. Spuck, 86 A.3d 870, 874 (Pa.Super. 2014).
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an accused at the preliminary hearing stage of criminal proceedings.”

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 785 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa.Super. 2001) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Sanders, 489 A.2d 207 (Pa.Super. 1985)). Further, we 

note that the pretrial discovery rules in Rule 573 are not generally applicable 

to summary offenses. Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 960 

(Pa.Super. 2002).

Our review of the record shows that the Commonwealth provided 

Appellant with all of the discovery materials he requested as a matter of 

courtesy. While Appellant claims that the delay in receiving the discovery 

materials prevented him from filing a suppression motion, Appellant has not 

articulated any argument that he would have raised in this purported 

suppression motion. As a result, we decline to review this claim further.

In his sixth claim, Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his 

third motion for continuance of his trial date which fell on Orthodox Holy Friday

as Appellant needed to secure authentication of his medical documents and 

prepare his defense strategy.

[I]t is well-settled that the decision to grant or deny a request for 

a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Commonwealth v. Pries, 861 A.2d 951, 953 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

Discretion is abused when “the law is overridden or misapplied, or 

the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result 

of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence 

or the record....” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. 370, 

685 A.2d 96, 104 (1996) (quotation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 588 (Pa.Super. 2022).
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With respect to Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing 

to grant his continuance request as he should not be occupied with legal 

matters on Holy Friday, Appellant failed to raise this specific claim in his courtordered Rule 1925(b) statement.

It is well-established that any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b) 

statement will be deemed waived for appellate review. See

Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306, 309 ([Pa.] 

1998). Further, an appellant's concise statement must identify the 

errors with sufficient specificity for the trial court to identify and 

address the issues the appellant wishes to raise on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement to 

“concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends 

to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for 

the judge”). 

Commonwealth v. Arnold, 284 A.3d 1262, 1278–79 (Pa.Super. 2022) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 

2020)). As Appellant did not specifically claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement 

that the trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance so that he could 

observe the Good Friday holiday, it is waived on appeal.3

In addition, Appellant’s third request for a continuance of trial was based 

on his contention that he needed additional time to prepare a brief, although 

the trial court had not requested that the parties file any briefs. We again note 

that the Commonwealth provided Appellant with the discovery materials, 

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3 Appellant concedes that he did not ask the trial court for a continuance on 

this basis in his written requests but waited to raise this claim orally on the 

day of trial on April 22, 2022, which fell on Good Friday. Moreover, Appellant 

never claimed before the lower court that he desired to continue the trial from 

Good Friday for the purposes of religious observance, but merely claimed he 

did not wish to be “occupied with legal matters” on that date.
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although not required to do so, with sufficient time for Appellant to review 

them before trial.

While Appellant asserts that he was unable to review the dashcam 

videos on the CD in the discovery packet until the morning of trial, the trial 

court found this claim was not credible given that it would not have taken 

much effort to locate equipment to view the recording. Rather, the trial court 

determined that Appellant chose not to review the discovery materials before 

trial and viewed Appellant’s excuses as a pretext for requesting a third 

continuance of his trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Appellant’s third request for a continuance.4

In its seventh and eighth issues, Appellant argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of Officer Kowalski with 

respect to Appellant’s sobriety testing, interrogation, and arrest. We agree 

with the trial court’s assessment that this line of questioning was irrelevant in 

Appellant’s trial on the Section 3309 offense (disregarding traffic lane).

Our rules of evidence provide that “[e]vidence that is not relevant is not 

admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. Evident is “relevant” when it “has any tendency to 

make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and

the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401.

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4 To the extent that Appellant argues that he should have been granted a 

continuance to authenticate the exhibits he intended to admit at trial, 

Appellant did not raise this claim before the trial court as a basis for requesting 

a continuance before trial. “Issues not raised in the lower court are waived 

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
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During cross-examination, Appellant focused his inquiry on events that 

occurred after he was subjected to the vehicle stop. Appellant asked Officer 

Kowalski why he directed Appellant to step out of the vehicle, why he did not 

consider Appellant’s handicap sticker or injured ankle in assessing whether 

Appellant passed field sobriety testing, and whether he took Appellant to the 

hospital for a blood test.

However, Appellant was being prosecuted solely for a violation of 

Section 3309 and Officer Kowalski had testified that he determined that 

Appellant had violated this provision based on his observations of Appellant’s 

conduct before he pulled Appellant’s vehicle over. As noted above, Officer 

Kowalski saw Appellant’s vehicle cross the center double yellow line on four 

occasions, including one time in which a vehicle was traveling in the opposite 

direction. Appellant does not challenge these assertions or the dashcam video 

recordings that corroborate Officer Kowalski’s testimony.5

When asked for an offer of proof to justify why his questioning was 

material to the crime at issue, Appellant suggested Officer Kowalski had 

improper motives for arresting him for DUI. Appellant took offense to the fact

that Officer Kowalski suspected that Appellant was intoxicated while driving.

Given that the DUI charge was withdrawn at Appellant’s preliminary 

hearing, Appellant’s trial was solely based on the Section 3309 charge, and 

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5 Appellant has neither argued that Officer Kowalski lacked the requisite 

suspicion to stop his vehicle nor that there was insufficient evidence to support 

his conviction under Section 3309.
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Officer Kowalski determined that Appellant had violated Section 3309 before 

he initiated the traffic stop, the trial court correctly determined that 

Appellant’s lines of questioning regarding Officer Kowalski’s motives for 

charging him with DUI were irrelevant to Appellant’s defense. As such, the 

trial court properly limited Appellant’s cross-examination of Officer Kowalski.

In the ninth issue for review, Appellant contends that the trial court 

should have dismissed the violation under Section 3309 on de minimis 

grounds as he did not injure anyone or cause any property damage when his 

vehicle crossed over the center double yellow line of the roadway.

In support of this argument, Appellant cites to Section 312 of the Crimes 

Code, which states in relevant part:

§ 312. De minimis infractions

(a) General rule.-The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having 

regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an 

offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds 

that the conduct of the defendant:

(1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither 

expressly negatived by the person whose interest was 

infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law 

defining the offense;

(2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil 

sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or 

did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the 

condemnation of conviction; or

(3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot 

reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the General 

Assembly or other authority in forbidding the offense.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 312(a).
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Appellant concedes that his vehicle crossed the center double line 

dividing opposing lanes four times. However, Appellant focuses on the 

language in Section 312(a)(2) in asserting he was entitled to leniency on his 

Section 3309 charge as he did not cause any harm and his offense was trivial. 

Appellant claims “[t]here are motor vehicle offenses far more odious than 

someone crossing the middle line of a two lane road – especially where there 

was no speeding, [and] no attempt to elude the police when the [patrol car] 

lights were activated.” Appellant’s Brief, at 16.

There is no authority to support Appellant’s suggestion that a driver 

must cause an accident in order to be convicted of a Vehicle Code violation. 

Rather, the evil that Section 3309 is meant to protect against is the potential 

harm to other drivers, pedestrians, and property when a vehicle fails to 

maintain its traffic lane. It is well-established that “[t]he primary purpose of 

the Motor Vehicle Code and its amendments is to protect and promote public 

safety and property within the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v.

DeFusco, 549 A.2d 140, 142 (Pa.Super.1988).

We do acknowledge that technical violations of the Vehicle Code may be 

dismissed when a driver acted reasonably under the circumstances. In 

Commonwealth v. Slattery, 139 A.3d 221, 225 n.8 (Pa.Super. 2016), this 

Court found a defendant’s delay in activating his left turn signal to change 

lanes was a de minimis infraction where it was reasonable for the defendant 

wait to signal to avoid compromising the safety of the vehicles behind him. 

However, Appellant offers no argument or legitimate reason to show that it 
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was reasonable for Appellant to cross the center double yellow line dividing 

opposing lanes on multiple occasions, especially when oncoming traffic was 

approaching. 

In his tenth issue for review, Appellant suggests that his Section 3309 

conviction should be vacated as he alleges that Officer Kowalski was an 

“overzealous small-town cop” who was overly eager to make an arrest for 

DUI. Appellant argues that Officer Kowalski arrested him on suspicion of DUI 

without considering Appellant’s physical disabilities. Further, Appellant claims 

the trial court should have dismissed his Section 3309 conviction as he 

suffered mental anxiety from being “falsely accused” and arrested for DUI and 

experienced physical pain from being handcuffed and sitting in a police car.

There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that he was entitled to an acquittal 

of the Section 3309 offense based on sympathy. See e.g. Commonwealth 

v. Pope, 14 A.2d 139, 144 (Pa.Super. 2011) (rejecting the argument that a 

jury should return a verdict “based on mercy rather than fact”). 

Further, Appellant fails to include offer any legal authority to support his 

claim that he is entitled to an acquittal on the Section 3309 charge, which he 

clearly committed, simply because the DUI charge was withdrawn. See 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa.Super. 2014) (when 

the appellant fails to cite to legal authority and does not develop any 

meaningful analysis in support of a claim, we may find an issue waived for 

lack of development).
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Lastly, to the extent that Appellant believes that Officer Kowalski 

improperly arrested him for suspicion of DUI, this was not the appropriate 

forum to seek relief.6 The sole matter before this Court is the appeal of

Appellant’s summary conviction under Section 3309. It is undisputed that the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove that Appellant violated 

Section 3309 when the testimony of the arresting officer and video recordings 

confirm that Appellant’s vehicle crossed the center double yellow line four 

times. Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/5/2023

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6 Nevertheless, we acknowledge that Trooper Kowalski based his suspicion 

that Appellant was driving under the influence of a controlled substance after 

he observed Appellant swerving into the opposing lane of traffic four times 

and Appellant admitted to taking Oxycodone.