THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Appellant, 

v. 

Jason Skyler Israel Pogue, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-000890 

Appeal From Greenville County 

Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5720 

Submitted March 2, 2020 – Filed April 29, 2020 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 

Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, 

Jr., both of Columbia, for Appellant. 

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of 

Columbia, for Respondent. 

THOMAS, J.: The State appealed Jason Skylar Israel Pogue's sentence following 

his guilty plea to four counts of third degree sexual exploitation of a minor and one 

count of second degree exploitation of a minor.1 We reverse and remand for 

resentencing. 

1

 The only conviction relevant to this appeal is the one count of second degree 

exploitation of a minor. 
 

FACTS 

In 2015, Pogue was downloading and sharing child pornography. After an 

investigation and a forensic examination of his computer, investigators found fifty 

sexually-explicit videos and dozens of still photos, including videos and 

photographs of female children as young as four years old being orally and 

vaginally raped. 

At the time of sentencing, Pogue was thirty-three years old, had no prior record, 

and had suffered health issues for twelve years. On April 6, 2017, the circuit court 

sentenced Pogue to ten years' imprisonment, suspended to four years of home 

detention and five years of probation, and inpatient treatment at Overcomers, a 

treatment facility at Miracle Hill Ministries. The State objected, arguing the home 

detention program was not valid for a conviction of second-degree exploitation of 

a minor. The court overruled the objection. This appeal follows. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v. 

Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001). A sentence will not be 

overturned absent an abuse of discretion; an abuse of discretion occurs "when the 

ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion without evidentiary 

support." In re M.B.H., 387 S.C. 323, 326, 692 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2010). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

The State argues the circuit court erred in sentencing Pogue to home detention. 

We agree. 

Pogue pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor in the second 

degree under section 16-15-405 of the South Carolina Code. Section 16-15-405 

mandates in part: 

(D) A person who violates the provisions of this section 

is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be 

imprisoned not less than two years nor more than ten 

years. No part of the minimum sentence may be 
 

suspended nor is the individual convicted eligible for 

parole until he has served the minimum sentence. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-405 (2015) (emphasis added). Under South Carolina 

Code Section 16-1-60, second degree sexual exploitation of a minor is classified as 

a violent crime. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp. 2019). As to home detention, 

South Carolina Code Section 24-13-1530 states in relevant part: "Notwithstanding 

another provision of law which requires mandatory incarceration, electronic and 

nonelectronic home detention programs may be used as an alternative to 

incarceration for low risk, nonviolent adult and juvenile offenders as selected by 

the court if there is a home detention program available in the jurisdiction." S.C. 

Code Ann. § 24-13-1530(A) (2007) (emphasis added). In State v. Simpson, 429 

S.C. 83, 91-92, 837 S.E.2d 669, 673 (Ct. App. 2020), this court reversed the home 

detention sentence of a defendant who pled guilty to four counts of second degree 

sexual exploitation of a minor, finding the statutory scheme did not authorize home 

detention for offenses classified as "violent."2 

 

Under Simpson and the statutory scheme, we find the home detention program 

applies only to nonviolent offenders and second degree sexual exploitation of a 

minor is defined as a violent crime by statute. Compare § 16-1-60 (defining 

violent crimes) with § 16-1-70 (2015) (defining nonviolent crimes as "all offenses 

not specifically enumerated in Section 16-1-60"). Accordingly, we reverse and 

remand for a new sentencing hearing. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.3 

HUFF and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 

2

 Unlike in Simpson, Pogue has not yet completed the home detention portion of 

his sentence; thus, we need not address mootness. Simpson, 429 S.C. at 89, 837 

S.E.2d at 672 (finding "the question of Simpson's own sentence moot due to his 

completion of the determinate home detention portion of the sentence"). 

3

 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.