1

Filed 12/2/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re T.G., A Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL 

SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Natasha B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A144548

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. OJ14-023058)

In this dependency appeal, Natasha B. (mother) seeks relief from the juvenile 

court order terminating her parental rights with respect to her youngest daughter, T.G.

(born June 2013), pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

1 At 

the November 2014 dispositional hearing in this matter, mother was bypassed for 

reunification services in accordance with subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 

361.5. Pursuant to those statutes, reunification services need not be offered to a parent if 

the court has previously terminated reunification services or parental rights with respect 

to a sibling or half sibling of the child and the parent “has not subsequently made a 

reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half 

sibling . . . .” (§ 351.5, subd. (b)(10) & (11).) 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise 

specified.
2

Mother argues that bypassing her for reunification was improper because the 

orders terminating services and parental rights with respect to T.G.’s half siblings were 

on appeal at the time of T.G.’s dispositional hearing and therefore could not provide an 

appropriate basis for bypass. She further asserts that—since the juvenile court’s bypass 

decision was based on a patent legal error which violated her due process rights—she has 

not forfeited the issue, despite her failure to raise it in the juvenile court or timely pursue 

it in this court. Because we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in relying on

subdivision (b)(10) to bypass services for mother under the facts of this case, we need not 

consider mother’s other contentions and affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating 

parental rights.

I. BACKGROUND

T.G., the minor who is the subject of these proceedings, was detained by the 

Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) on June 10, 2014, when she was 

eleven months old. In its petition filed two days later, the Agency alleged that T.G. was 

at substantial risk of harm because Natasha B.’s numerous emotional, mental health, and 

substance abuse problems interfered with her ability to properly care for the minor. The 

petition referenced a number of recent examples of mother’s neglect. For instance, on 

May 29, 2014, mother called staff at the shelter where she was staying and asked them to 

pick her up at the BART station because she was unable to make her way home. When a 

staff member arrived, mother appeared quite intoxicated and was sitting on the curb with 

T.G. in a stroller next to her. The staff member had to help mother stand and navigate the 

stroller because mother was unable to push the baby. On June 2, 2014, mother, who 

again appeared intoxicated, reported to shelter staff that she had an altercation with a 

store owner while T.G. was in her care. According to mother, the store owner pulled her 

hair and she ripped his pants pocket, causing a wad of bills to fall out. Mother then stole 

the $900 and fled down the street with T.G. in the stroller. That same day, mother was 

observed yelling and cussing at the minor while doing her hair. On June 3, 2014, shelter 

staff had to intervene when mother, who admitted she was again intoxicated, vomited on 
3

herself and the minor. Finally, mother had a history of marijuana use, and, according to 

staff, she smelled of marijuana while caring for T.G. 

Sadly, mother was, herself, involved with the child welfare system as a minor, 

with 45 referrals involving the maternal grandmother’s substance abuse and mental 

health issues dating back to 1988. The family received services from March 1994 

through October 1996 and from April through August 1999. In 2007, when she was 16 

years old, mother was briefly taken into protective custody after a physical altercation 

with the maternal grandmother. Mother was reported to be difficult to manage and 

associated with older individuals who would buy her alcohol. She was threatening to 

people at school—breaking someone’s nose, almost breaking someone’s jaw, and 

breaking three of her teacher’s teeth. 

Mother also had a history of psychiatric hospitalizations, with seven admissions 

prior to 2006. She had been involuntarily detained pursuant to section 5150 three times, 

including once in 2007 after she threatened to hit a cousin with a carjack.2 At the time 

T.G’s petition was filed, however, mother was not engaged in mental health treatment. In 

addition, mother was reported to have neurological damage from a car accident when she 

was a child, which left her with significant cognitive delays. Mother had also been 

arrested on a number of occasions and, when T.G.’s petition was filed, was on probation 

for resisting a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)) and disturbing the peace (Pen.

Code, § 415), based on separate incidents occurring in 2009.

In March 2014, mother had been referred for voluntary services after it was 

reported that T.G. had three large scrapes on her bottom and that mother did not have 

stable housing. Although mother was referred for numerous services, including services 

 

2

Section 5150 provides in relevant part: “When a person, as a result of a mental health 

disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace 

officer . . . or professional person designated by the county may, upon probable cause, 

take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody for a period of up to 72 hours for 

assessment, evaluation, and crisis intervention, or placement for evaluation and treatment 

in a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment and approved by the 

State Department of Health Care Services.”
4

through the local Regional Center, she failed to follow through. Moreover, despite 

assistance from both the Agency social worker and her case manager from Through the 

Looking Glass, a resource center for parents with disabilities, mother had failed to secure 

stable housing. 

Also of significance to the disposition in this case, mother has two older 

daughters—C.B. (born March 2010) and J.M. (born February 2011)—who were removed 

from her care in March 2012 due to allegations of neglect. According to the operative 

petition in this sibling case, the two minors were at substantial risk of harm because 

mother’s criminality, housing instability, mental health issues, and substance abuse 

impacted her ability to adequately care for and protect them. For instance, in July 2011, 

mother had been arrested for child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), after 

riding with J.M. in a vehicle driven by an intoxicated person. Upon investigation, it was 

discovered that the infant’s car seat had not been attached to the vehicle. The petition 

further recounted mother’s history of housing instability, noting that the family was 

living with the maternal grandmother at the time of detention, “which presented a serious 

risk to the minors due to the grandmother’s serious mental health issues, substance abuse 

issues, and previous [child welfare] history with her own children.” Mother’s history of 

psychiatric hospitalizations and lack of current mental health treatment, despite her 

demonstration of behavior consistent with an ongoing mental illness, was also described. 

Finally, the petition detailed mother’s historic marijuana use and reported that C.B. had 

tested positive for marijuana at birth.

Mother was offered reunification services with respect to C.B. and J.M., but these 

services were terminated in June 2013—the same month that T.G. was born—due to her 

failure to reunify. On July 31, 2014, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental 

rights with respect to both C.B. and J.M. We recently issued an unpublished opinion 
5

upholding the juvenile court’s decision terminating parental rights. (In re C.B. et al. 

(Sept. 2, 2015, A142238 & A142718) [nonpub. opn.].)

3

As for T.G., she was formally detained in the home of her paternal grandmother 

on June 13, 2014.4Father supported placement with the paternal grandmother. He 

reported concerns about mother’s ability, but would not go into detail. According to the 

Agency, mother had shown “an inability to protect the minor when she engages in 

substance abuse, criminal activity, and/or her violent behaviors, all with the minor in her 

presence and care.” Moreover, in the Agency’s opinion, mother’s developmental delays 

impacted her ability to make appropriate decisions and properly parent T.G. 

While jurisdiction and disposition were pending, mother did complete an 

assessment with the local Regional Center, and her case manager planned to refer her to 

the Center’s Independent Living Program (ILP). Mother also entered a residential 

treatment program in July 2014, but left after two days. Staff reported that she was 

getting into arguments with other clients and was not willing to abide by the rules of the 

program. Thereafter, she claimed to be receiving counseling and substance abuse 

treatment through a local clinic, but failed to provide requested contact information so 

that this could be verified. In October 2014, mother’s ILP worker reported that mother 

had left her several messages in which she sounded intoxicated. When the social worker 

asked mother about this report, mother became angry, yelling and swearing. Further, 

when the social worker suggested that mother could clear up the matter through drug 

testing, mother declined. At that point, mother was living in a homeless shelter. She had 

not been participating in Regional Center services. 

 

3 On May 12, 2015, we granted—without any determination of relevance—mother’s 

May 11 request that we take judicial notice of the record and briefing filed with this court 

in the consolidated appeals of C.B. and J.M. As we discuss later, we have reviewed 

mother’s January 2014 petition filed pursuant to section 388 in the sibling case and the 

related hearing transcripts. We otherwise find these materials irrelevant to our decision 

and have therefore not considered them. 

4

T.G.’s biological father, also T.G. (father), has not appealed and is not involved in these 

proceedings. 
6

Although mother had originally contested both jurisdiction and disposition—and 

the proceedings were therefore continued repeatedly—when the hearing was actually 

held on November 4, 2014, mother withdrew her request for a contest and submitted both 

matters. The juvenile court therefore found the allegations in the petition, as amended in 

court, true and concluded that the minor was a person described by subdivisions (b) and 

(j) of section 300. Thereafter, noting that mother’s progress toward alleviating or 

mitigating the causes necessitating T.G.’s placement had been “minimal at best,” the 

juvenile court declared the minor to be a dependent child and denied both parents 

reunification services. A hearing was set for February 26, 2015, pursuant to section 

366.26 so that a permanent plan could be developed for T.G. Neither parent sought writ 

review of this setting order. 

In its report filed in advance of the permanency planning hearing, the Agency 

recommended that T.G. be adopted by the paternal grandmother. Father was apparently 

in favor of this outcome. Mother had been visiting T.G. irregularly in the home of the 

paternal grandmother, despite the Agency’s offer for assistance with transportation and a 

set visitation schedule. On December 7, 2014, mother showed up unexpectedly and, after 

the grandmother agreed to supervise a visit in front of the house, mother exclaimed: 

“ ‘You’re not going to take my child from me.’ ” She also screamed and cursed at the 

grandmother, threatening to have people come to the home. Although mother later called 

to apologize, mother’s supervised visitation was moved to a neutral setting. In the 

opinion of the Agency, mother continued to struggle with the same issues that led to 

T.G.’s removal and had a “years-long history of being unable to care for her children, 

even with many supportive services from the Agency and elsewhere.” 

At the permanency planning hearing on February 26, 2015, mother testified in 

opposition to the Agency’s recommendation. She indicated that she had been taking 

parenting classes and receiving drug and alcohol education. Mother also stated that she 

was attending N.A. meetings, participating in Regional Center services, and visiting with 

T.G. She continued to look for housing. Mother described her relationship and ongoing 

contact with T.G., and her attorney argued that mother’s parental rights should not be 
7

terminated based on the beneficial relationship exception to adoption—that is, that 

mother had consistently visited with the minor and the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) 

Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile 

court found T.G. adoptable, declined to apply the beneficial relationship exception to

block T.G.’s proposed adoption, and terminated the parental rights of both mother and 

father. In reaching this decision, the court noted that the case involving T.G.’s halfsiblings was on appeal and needed to be followed by all of the parties because the 

appellate decision “could have ramifications” in T.G.’s case that would need to be 

addressed. Mother’s timely notice of appeal brought the matter before this court. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Forfeiture Issues

Mother contends that reversal is required in this case due to multiple errors in the 

dependency proceedings involving T.G.’s half-siblings (C.B. and J.M.), matters which 

were pending before this court at the time she briefed the present appeal. Since we 

recently rejected all of these claims, upholding the juvenile court’s decision to terminate 

mother’s parental rights with respect to C.B. and J.M. (In re C.B., supra, A142238 & 

A142718 [nonpub. opn.]), these arguments are no longer available to mother. Thus, her 

sole remaining theory in this case is that the juvenile court erred as a legal matter when it 

bypassed her for reunification based on the orders terminating services and parental rights 

with respect to T.G.’s half siblings, because those orders were on appeal, and therefore 

not final, at the time of T.G.’s dispositional hearing. 

It is undisputed, however, that mother did not object in the juvenile court on this 

basis. Rather, she submitted the matter of T.G.’s disposition to the juvenile court for its 

determination. Generally, such a failure forfeits a parent’s right to pursue the issue on 

appeal. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 & fn. 2 (S.B.), superseded by statute on 

other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962; In re Dakota S. 

(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-

1339; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-413.) Indeed, although an 
8

appellate court has the discretion to excuse such forfeiture, it should do so “rarely and 

only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) 

This is especially true in juvenile dependency cases, which involve the well-being of 

children and in which “considerations such as permanency and stability are of paramount 

importance.” (Ibid.)

Moreover, in the present case, mother has arguably doubly forfeited the issue she 

is now attempting to raise because, not only did she fail to bring it to the juvenile court’s 

attention, she also neglected to seek timely appellate review of the matter in this court. 

Generally speaking, “an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and 

binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” (In re 

Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 (Meranda P.).) The purpose of this rule 

is to balance the parents’ interest in the care and custody of their children with the 

children’s interest in the expeditious resolution of their custody status. (In re M.F. (2008) 

161 Cal.App.4th 673, 681-682 (M.F.).) 

Here, the dispositional order bypassing mother for reunification services was part 

of an order setting a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. Since “[a]ll 

orders issued at a hearing in which a section 366.26 hearing is ordered are subject to 

section 366.26, subdivision (l) and must be reviewed by extraordinary writ” (In re 

Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 (Tabitha W.)), mother was required to seek 

writ review of the juvenile court’s bypass decision in order to preserve her right to 

appellate review. (See § 366.26, subd. (l)(2) [failure to file a petition for extraordinary 

writ review within the period specified by rule “shall preclude subsequent review by 

appeal” of a setting order (italics added)]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 

(e)(4)(A) [when a party is present at the setting hearing, notice of intent to file writ 

petition must be filed within seven days from the date of the setting order].) This she did 

not do.

Again, however, this forfeiture rule is not absolute. Rather, it must not be applied 

if “due process forbids it.” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208 (Janee J.).) 

Generally, the forfeiture rule does not infringe upon a parent’s due process rights because 
9

of the numerous safeguards built into the dependency system. (M.F., supra, 161 

Cal.App.4th at p. 682.) Thus, application of the rule has only been found inappropriate 

on due process grounds when an error so “fundamentally undermined the statutory 

scheme” that the parent was prevented from availing him or herself of its protections. 

(Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) Moreover, “defects must go beyond mere 

errors that might have been held reversible had they been properly and timely reviewed.” 

(Id. at p. 209.)

Mother, of course, argues that this is a case in which her procedural failures should 

be excused. Specifically, she contends that the error she complains of was legal in nature 

and was entirely fundamental to her case, depriving her of the many due process 

protections she would otherwise have enjoyed during the reunification period. We agree 

that bypassing a parent for reunification services is an extreme decision that has 

significant ramifications for both parent and child. (See Cheryl P. v. Superior Court

(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 98 (Cheryl P.) [“ ‘The failure of a parent to reunify with a 

prior child should never cause the court to reflexively deny that parent a meaningful 

chance to do so in a later case. To the contrary, the primary focus of the trial court must 

be to save troubled families, not merely to expedite the creation of what it might view as 

better ones.’ ”].) On the other hand, permitting a parent “to raise issues which go to the 

validity of a final earlier appealable order would directly undermine [the] dominant 

concerns of finality and reasonable expedition” underlying all juvenile dependency 

proceedings. (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1152.) Ultimately, however, we 

need not decide whether relaxation of the forfeiture rule is appropriate under the facts of 

this case. Rather, we conclude that the juvenile court’s order denying mother 

reunification services pursuant to subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 was not error, and 

thus affirm on that basis. 

B. Validity of Bypass Order Under Subdivision (b)(10)

As a general rule, when a child is removed from parental custody under the 

dependency laws, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to “the 

child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) 
10

The purpose of reunification efforts is to “eliminate the conditions leading to loss of 

custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal of 

preservation of family, whenever possible.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 

470, 478 (Baby Boy H.).) However, it is also the “intent of the Legislature, especially 

with regard to young children, . . . that the dependency process proceed with deliberate 

speed and without undue delay.” (Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 

1139, 1151.) Thus, the statutory scheme recognizes that there are cases in which the 

delay attributable to the provision of reunification services would be more detrimental to 

the minor than discounting the competing goal of family preservation. (See Ibid.) 

Specifically, section 361.5, subdivision (b), exempts from reunification services “ ‘those 

parents who are unlikely to benefit’ ” from such services or for whom reunification 

efforts are likely to be “fruitless.” (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 474; 

Baby Boy H., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 478.) Once the juvenile court concludes 

reunification efforts should not be made in a particular case, it “ ‘fast-tracks’ ” the 

dependent minor to permanency planning so that a permanent out-of-home placement can 

be developed. (In re Rebecca H. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 825, 838.)

The statutory sections authorizing denial of reunification services are sometimes 

referred to as “bypass” provisions. (Melissa R. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 

816, 821.) In the present case, the juvenile court denied reunification services to mother 

based on two such bypass provisions, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5.

Since only one valid ground is necessary to uphold the juvenile court’s bypass decision, 

we will focus here on subdivision (b)(10), under which reunification services need not be 

provided if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “the court ordered 

termination of reunification services for any siblings or half siblings of the child because 

the parent or guardian failed to reunify with the sibling or half sibling . . . and . . . , 

according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not subsequently made 

a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling 

of that child from that parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).) This statute 
11

“recognizes the problem of recidivism by the parent despite reunification efforts.” (Baby 

Boy H., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 478; see § 361.5, subd. (c).) 

We review an order denying reunification services under subdivision (b) of section 

361.5 for substantial evidence. (Cheryl P., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.) Under such 

circumstances, we do not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. (A.A. 

v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 237, 242.) Rather, we “review the entire 

record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings to determine if there is 

substantial evidence in the record to support those findings.” (Ibid.) Of course, to the 

extent our analysis involves statutory interpretation, this is a legal matter which is subject 

to our de novo review. (Robles v. Employment Development Dept. (2015) 236 

Cal.App.4th 530, 546.) 

As stated above, mother argues here that bypassing her for reunification was 

improper because the orders terminating services and parental rights with respect to 

T.G.’s half siblings were on appeal at the time of T.G.’s dispositional hearing and 

therefore could not provide an appropriate basis for bypass. However, pursuant to 

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), bypass is permissible whenever a court has “ordered 

termination of reunification services for any siblings or half siblings of the child because 

the parent . . . failed to reunify with the sibling or half sibling after the sibling or half 

sibling had been removed from that parent . . . .” As is relevant to this case, the juvenile 

court’s June 2013 order with respect to C.B. and J.M. (half siblings of T.G.) terminated 

reunification services for those minors because mother failed to reunify with them after 

they had been removed from her care. As such, the order appears to comply with the 

plain language of the bypass statute, irrespective of any possible pending appeals. 

Although it does not directly address the issue of finality, In re Harmony B. (2005) 

125 Cal.App.4th 831 (Harmony B.) is instructive. In that case, the juvenile court denied 

reunification services to the parents pursuant to subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 on 

the same day that it terminated services for two siblings, the predicate action for 

application of subdivision (b)(10). (Harmony B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 836, 

840.) Harmony’s father argued on appeal that the two-pronged test for denial of services 
12

under subdivision (b)(10)—prior termination of sibling services and no reasonable effort 

by the parent to treat the problem which led to that sibling’s removal— necessarily 

required the passage of time between the termination of services as to one child and the 

denial of services as to another child. (Harmony B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) 

The Harmony B. court disagreed, stating with respect to the first prong of the 

subdivision (b)(10) test: “[F]ather argues that the siblings’ dependency proceedings had 

not proceeded to the point where it could be determined whether he would reunify with 

them, and he claims that nothing in the record indicates that he failed to reunify with the 

siblings. Father’s argument overlooks the plain language of the statute. The statute 

provides that the court has previously ‘ordered termination of reunification services for 

any siblings of the child because the parent . . . failed to reunify with the sibling after the 

sibling had been removed from that parent.’ (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10), italics added.) It 

does not provide that court has ‘ordered termination of reunification services for any 

siblings of the child and the parent . . . failed to reunify with the sibling after the sibling 

had been removed from that parent.’ Thus, on its face, the statute does not require any 

lapse of time between the termination of services as to one sibling and the denial 

of services as to another sibling to satisfy the first prong of the test.” (Fn. omitted.) 

(Harmony B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) This analysis—focusing on the fact that 

the order terminating services had been made at the time bypass was sought for another 

sibling rather than on the ultimate outcome of the first sibling’s case—at the very least 

strongly implies that an order terminating services in a sibling case need not be final in 

order to support a bypass decision under subdivision (b)(10). (See Riverside County 

Dept. of Public Social Services v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 483, 491 [under 

subdivision (b)(10), the “only requirement” is that the predicate action “occurred” before 

the disposition hearing at which bypass is ordered].)5 

 

5 We note that this analysis applies only to the statutory language of subdivision (b)(10). 

A different conclusion might be reached under subdivision (b)(11) of section 361.5, 

which allows for bypass only when the parental rights of a sibling or half sibling of the 

child have been “permanently severed.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11).) Moreover, while 
13

Moreover, even were we to hold that finality was required in this case—or was 

simply preferable when analyzing T.G.’s best interests—we disagree with mother’s 

characterization of the order terminating reunification services as nonfinal at the time of 

T.G.’s November 2014 dispositional hearing. As explained above, an unappealed 

postdispositional order is “final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a 

later appealable order.” (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150.) Here, because 

the June 2013 order terminating services for C.B. and J.M. was made during a hearing at 

which a section 366.26 hearing was ordered, mother was required to seek writ review of 

that order shortly after the June 2013 hearing in order to preserve her right to appellate 

review. (Tabitha W., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 817; see § 366.26, subd. (l)(2); Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.450 (e)(4)(A).) Since mother did not seek such review, the order 

terminating services became “final and binding.” Indeed, mother acknowledges as much. 

She argues, however, that the finality of the juvenile court’s order terminating 

services was somehow undermined when she subsequently filed a petition under section 

388 seeking return of the minors and/or additional reunification services. Specifically, 

according to mother, since the denial of her section 388 petition was on appeal at the time 

of T.G.’s November 2014 disposition and the resolution of that appeal might impact the 

prior order terminating reunification services with respect to C.B. and J.M., that order 

was not sufficiently final to support bypass in T.G.’s case. We are not persuaded. 

First, we note that mother’s 388 petition sought renewed reunification efforts 

based on a change in circumstances—her demonstrated ability to successfully parent T.G. 

with supportive services from Through the Looking Glass—and the current best interests 

 

finality of the order terminating services does not appear to be statutorily required under 

subdivision (b)(10), there may be circumstances in which the lack of finality of an order 

terminating a first sibling’s services could lead the juvenile court to conclude that the 

provision of reunification services to the second sibling might nevertheless be in that 

minor’s best interests under section 361.5, subdivision (c). Factors that might be 

considered in such an event include: the age of the child; any detriment to the child from 

the provision of services; the estimated timeframe for resolution of any appellate issues; 

the likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; and the contemplated permanent 

plan for the second sibling. 
14

of the minors, C.B. and J.M. As such, it presented no argument which would undermine 

the validity of the juvenile court’s prior order terminating services. In particular, it was 

not an appropriate vehicle to attack the court’s prior reasonable services finding and, as a 

factual matter—despite mother’s appellate arguments to the contrary—it did not do so. 

(Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150 [an unappealed dispositional order may 

not be attacked in an appeal from a later appealable order].) 

Rather, under entirely different legal standards than those confronted by a juvenile 

court when terminating services, it sought to convince the juvenile court that further 

efforts at reunification were now in the best interests of C.B. and J.M. But, as the 

Harmony B. court recognized, whether mother ultimately reunified with C.B. and J.M. is 

simply irrelevant under the first prong of the subdivision (b)(10) test for bypass.6 (See 

Harmony B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) Instead, what was critical is that, as 

happened here, the sibling case had reached the procedural point where termination of 

services was ordered prior to the disposition in T.G.’s case. Under such circumstances, a 

pending appeal on a related petition under section 388 does nothing to undermine the 

finality of the prior order terminating services for purposes of subdivision (b)(10). 

Indeed, to conclude otherwise would be to ignore the Legislature’s clear intent, 

“especially with regard to young children, . . . that the dependency process proceed with 

deliberate speed and without undue delay.” (Marlene M., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1151.) 

 

6

In the appropriate case, however, later successful efforts at reunification might support 

an argument under the second prong of the subdivision (b)(10) test: that a parent had 

“subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the 

sibling or half sibling . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).)
15

We therefore conclude that the juvenile court’s bypass order under subdivision 

(b)(10) of section 361.5 was proper and amply supported by the evidence before the 

court.7 Given this determination, the juvenile court’s decision to bypass reunification 

services in this case provides no basis for reversal of the juvenile court’s subsequent 

order terminating mother’s parental rights with respect to T.G.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

REARDON, J.

We concur:

_________________________

RUVOLO, P. J.

_________________________

STREETER, J.

 

7 Mother does not argue on appeal that the juvenile court’s bypass order was improper 

under the second prong of subdivision (b)(10), which permits bypass only where a parent 

“has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal 

of the sibling or half sibling . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).) In this regard, we note only 

that T.G. was removed from mother based on the same mental health issues, substance 

abuse concerns, and neglectful parenting practices that initially placed C.B. and J.M. at 

risk. As the record more than adequately demonstrates, mother has not made a 

reasonable effort to treat these issues since the March 2012 removal of C.B. and J.M. 
16

Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Charles A. Smiley

Counsel for Defendant and Mary R. Williams

Appellant: First District Appellate Project

Counsel for Respondents: Melinda L. Capozzi

Miruni Soosaipillai

Office of County Counsel

In re T.G. A144548