SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0137-22 

SAMMERAH TUTT, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

PARKER 149 LLC, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________ 

Submitted November 14, 2023 – Decided December 5, 2023 

Before Judges Haas and Natali. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-0059-21. 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, attorneys for

appellant (Colin P. Hackett, of counsel and on the 

briefs). 

John J. Pisano, attorney for respondent. 

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Parker 149, LLC, appeals from an August 8, 2022 Law 

Division order confirming an arbitration award and denying as untimely its 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0137-22

request for a trial de novo. Because we conclude Rules 4:21A-5 and -6(b)(1) 

must be read together such that the thirty-day period in which a party must

demand a trial de novo commences only when the court provides a copy of the 

award to the parties, we reverse and remand. 

I.

 While a tenant in a Newark residence owned by defendant, plaintiff 

alleges she slipped and fell on ice or snow, causing her "severe and permanent 

injuries." She subsequently filed a complaint asserting defendant was negligent 

in failing to remove the ice and snow, to warn plaintiff of the dangerous 

condition, or to "exercise that degree of care and caution required to keep the . . . 

premises in a safe condition." In its answer, defendant denied liability and 

asserted various defenses. 

 Both parties participated in non-binding arbitration by phone on June 14, 

2022, as required by Rule 4:21A-1.1 The arbitrator found plaintiff twenty-five 

percent liable and defendant seventy-five percent liable and, based on gross 

damages of $50,000, awarded plaintiff $37,500. Both parties' counsel 

"authorized the arbitrator to sign [thei]r names to the report of the arbitration 

1

 Rule 4:21A-1(a)(2) provides in relevant part, "all actions for personal injury 

not arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile 

shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with these rules." 
3 A-0137-22

award," which was filed with the court the same day, June 14, 2022. Defendant's 

counsel received an email from the eCourts system the next morning, June 15, 

2022, advising all parties the award had been filed the previous day. Consistent 

with that email, the case summary from eCourts reflects a "filed date" of June 

14, 2022 and an "entry date" of June 15, 2022. 

 Defendant moved for a trial de novo pursuant to Rule 4:21A-6 on July 15, 

2022.2 Initially, the Law Division clerk refused to accept defendant's trial de 

novo demand, deeming it untimely because the thirty-day period set forth in the 

Rule expired the day before, on July 14, 2022. Defendant then filed, the same 

day, another motion requesting its demand for a trial de novo be processed. In 

response, plaintiff moved to confirm the arbitration award. 

The court heard oral arguments on both plaintiff's and defendant's 

motions. Defendant noted it did not receive the filed arbitration award from the 

eCourts system until June 15, 2022, and therefore, under America's Pride 

Construction v. Farry, 175 N.J. 60 (2002), in which the Supreme Court held "the 

time periods set out in Rule 4:21A-6(b) do not begin to run until the arbitrator 

2

 Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1) states "[a]n order shall be entered dismissing the action 

following the filing of the arbitrator's award unless: (1) within [thirty] days after 

filing of the arbitration award, a party thereto files . . . and serves on all other 

parties a notice of rejection of the award and demand for a trial de novo . . . ." 
4 A-0137-22

has filed the written award with the [court] and the parties," id. at 65, it argued 

the thirty-day period for requesting a trial de novo did not commence until it 

received notice of the award on June 15, 2022. Defendant also relied on Farrell 

v. TCI of North N.J., 378 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div. 2005), in which we referred 

to America's Pride when interpreting the one-year period applicable to a motion 

seeking relief from judgment under Rule 4:50-1(a), id. at 346, 348-51. 

On August 8, 2022, the court issued a written order granting plaintiff's 

application and denying defendant's. The court found defendant's request for a 

trial de novo, filed on July 15, 2022, was "one-day out of time" because the 

current version of "[Rule] 4:21A-6(b) eliminate[d] the mailing or notice 

requirement and [required] the trial de novo request . . . be made 'within [thirty] 

days after the filing of the arbitration award.'" The arbitration award here, the 

court noted, was "docketed on eCourts on June 14, 2022." 

In a rider to its written order, the court determined the Court's holding in 

America's Pride was abrogated by the change to Rule 4:21A-5(a) and, in support, 

relied on SWH Funding Corp. v. Walden Printing Co., 399 N.J. Super. 1 (App. 

Div. 2008), in which we found the amendment of Rules 4:21A-4 and -5 "signaled 

the Court's clear intention to depart from the scenario addressed in America's 

Pride," id. at 17. Therefore, it concluded, defendant's reliance on America's 
5 A-0137-22

Pride, 175 N.J. at 65, and Farrell, 378 N.J. Super. at 348-51, was misplaced as 

each relied upon language in Rule 4:21A-5(a), which was later modified and 

thus inapplicable to the facts before the court. 

Finally, the court determined there were no extraordinary circumstances 

warranting a tolling of the thirty-day period, as required under Hartsfield v. 

Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 618 (1997) (holding "courts must determine that 

'extraordinary circumstances' exist [to relax the thirty-day rule in Rule 4:21A6(b)] and that those circumstances did not arise from an attorney's 'mere 

carelessness' or 'lack of proper diligence.'" (quoting In re T., 95 N.J. Super. 228, 

235 (App. Div. 1967))). The court also found Rule 1:1-2, which permits 

relaxation of other rules, was not applicable here as it "was not meant as a 'cureall' . . . [and] should be sparingly resorted to," the court added, citing Romagnola 

v. Gillespie, Inc., 194 N.J. 596, 606 (2008) and Robertelli v. Office of Attorney 

Ethics, 224 N.J. 470, 483 (2016). This appeal followed. 

II. 

Before us, defendant argues the court erred in denying its request for a 

trial de novo. In support, it reprises its argument the thirty-day period under 

Rule 4:21A-6 should not have commenced until the court provided it with a copy 
6 A-0137-22

of the arbitration award, on June 15, 2022. Accordingly, it asserts its request 

filed on July 15, 2022 was timely. 

Defendant again relies on America's Pride as well as an unpublished 

opinion from our court, to support its position the thirty-day period in the Rule 

does not commence "until the court provides the parties a copy of the award." 

Defendant stresses neither we, nor our Supreme Court, have deemed America's 

Pride "no longer good law," contrary to the court's determination. Further, it 

contends strictly construing the time period to begin upon filing is illogical, 

because it would unreasonably shorten the time period if the award were filed 

but not served on the parties until days or weeks later. Finally, defendant asserts 

Rule 1:1-2, which informs that our Rules "shall be construed to secure a just 

determination, simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the 

elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay," fully supports its argument the 

court erred in interpreting Rule 4:21A-6.

In requesting we affirm, plaintiff notes defendant's demand for a trial de 

novo was not filed until thirty-one days after the arbitration award was filed on 

June 14, 2022, and therefore, the demand was untimely under the clear language 
7 A-0137-22

of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-263 and its implementing rule, Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1). 

Plaintiff asserts the "plain and unambiguous terms of Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1) and 

N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26 provide a limitations period for the filing of a demand for 

a trial de novo that is thirty . . . days from the 'filing' of the arbitration award." 

In contrast, she argues, the language used in other Rules clearly states when a 

limitations period is calculated according to the date of notice or service. 

As an example, plaintiff points to Rules 2:4-1(b), permitting appeals from 

administrative agencies within forty-five days "from the date of service of the 

decision"; 2:5-6(a), providing a motion seeking leave to appeal an interlocutory 

order shall be made within twenty days "after the date of service of such order"; 

and 4:49-2, requiring motions to reconsider or amend final judgments be made 

within twenty days "after service of the judgment or order upon all parties." 

Thus, plaintiff concludes, the language of Rule 4:21A-6 demonstrates the thirtyday period was intended to begin "to run upon the filing of the arbitration award" 

and not upon service. We disagree with all these arguments. 

3

 N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26 provides "[t]he court shall, upon motion of any of the 

parties, confirm the arbitration decision . . . unless one of the parties petitions 

the court within [thirty] days of the filing of the arbitration decision for a trial 

de novo . . . ." 
8 A-0137-22

We first identify the standard of review governing our analysis. An 

interpretation of court Rules governing mandatory arbitration involves a 

question of law which is reviewed de novo. Vanderslice v. Stewart, 220 N.J. 

385, 389 (2015). Under this standard, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law 

and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to 

any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of 

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). 

We apply "ordinary principles of statutory construction" when 

interpreting court rules. State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 66 (2017). "We look 

first to the plain language of the Rules and give the words their ordinary 

meaning." Robertelli, 224 N.J. at 484. Additionally, we must read the language 

used "in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the [court Rules] 

as a whole." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 

587, 592 (2006)). "If a . . . rule is ambiguous, courts may ascertain the intent of 

the drafters by looking to extrinsic sources such as the . . . rule's underlying 

purpose and history." First Resol. Inv. Corp. v. Seker, 171 N.J. 502, 512 (2002). 

As our Supreme Court noted, "[t]he general intent of [a] statute [or Rule] 

controls the interpretation of its component parts." Ibid. (alterations in original) 
9 A-0137-22

(quoting Nat'l Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Middlesex Cnty. Improvement Auth., 

150 N.J. 209, 223 (1997)). "If . . . a literal interpretation of a provision would 

lead to an absurd result or would be inconsistent with the [Rule]'s overall 

purpose, 'that interpretation should be rejected' and 'the spirit of the [Rule] 

should control.'" Pfannenstein v. Surrey, 475 N.J. Super. 83, 95 (App. Div. 

2023) (quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-93 (2001)). 

With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes and Rules at issue. 

The Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 

through -30, was enacted "'to provide a speedier and less expensive process for 

resolution of disputes than traditional civil litigation' . . . [and] to provide 'a 

formal method of resolving disputes with predictable rules, procedures, and 

results.'" N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Ctr. of New Brunswick, 458 

N.J. Super. 63, 69 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs. v. Mt. Hope 

Waterpower Project, L.P., 154 N.J. 141, 145 (1998)). 

Both N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26 and Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1) fix the deadline to 

demand a trial de novo as within thirty days of the filing of the arbitration award. 

"Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1) 'set[s] a short deadline for filing a [trial] de novo demand' 

to 'ensure[] that the court will promptly schedule trials in cases that cannot be 

resolved by arbitration.'" Vanderslice, 220 N.J. at 392 (alterations in original) 
10 A-0137-22

(quoting Nascimento v. King, 381 N.J. Super. 593, 597 (App. Div. 2005)). The 

thirty-day period is "intended . . . to be strictly enforced" and may be extended 

by the court only upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." Hartsfield, 

149 N.J. at 616-17 (quoting Hart v. Prop. Mgmt. Sys., 280 N.J. Super. 145, 147 

(App. Div. 1995)). This policy "furthers the stated aims of the compulsory 

arbitration program, which is to bring about inexpensive, speedy adjudications 

of disputes and to ease the caseload of state courts." Id. at 619 (quoting Behm 

v. Ferreira, 286 N.J. Super. 566, 574 (App. Div. 1996)). 

First, we are not persuaded by the court's conclusion America's Pride has 

effectively been abrogated by changes to Rule 4:21A-5(a). The issue in 

America's Pride was "whether the arbitrator's failure to provide the [defendants] 

with a copy of the arbitration award as prescribed by Rule 4:21A-5(a) is a 

sufficient basis to toll the filing deadlines set forth in Rule 4:21A-6(b)." 175 

N.J. at 63. Under the version of Rule 4:21A-5(a) in effect at the time, the 

arbitrator was required to "mail a copy [of the award] to each of the parties." Id. 

at 64. The Court concluded, "[r]eading Rules 4:21A-5(a) and -6(b) together, . . . 

the time periods set out in Rule 4:21A-6(b) do not begin to run until the arbitrator 

has filed the written award with the civil division manager and the parties." Ibid. 

(emphasis added). It explained its "interpretation of the mailing requirement 
11 A-0137-22

under Rule 4:21A-5(a) is consonant with other [c]ourt Rules that condition a 

filing deadline on the receipt of notice that a judgment, order, or decision has 

been entered against a party." Ibid. 

Rule 4:21A-5(a) was altered as part of the Best Practices Rule 

amendments in 2000, replacing the word "mail" with "provide" and shifting 

responsibility for providing a copy of the award from the arbitrator to the court. 

Contrary to the court's interpretation, this change did not remove the principle 

upon which America's Pride grounded its decision, but merely modified the 

manner by which any award is transmitted to the parties. Instead of the arbitrator 

providing a copy of the award, the court is now obligated to do so. R. 4:21A5.4

 

In essence, we fundamentally disagree with plaintiff's interpretation of 

Rules 4:21A-5 and -6 as well as the court's conclusion that from the minor 

change in the Rule, the holding in America's Pride was abrogated. As noted, the 

Court's holding was not dependent on the arbitrator serving the award, but rather 

the underlying "purpose of a notice requirement . . . to apprise a party of some 

4

 We note our conclusion is supported by the March 1, 2000 Supplemental 

Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice recommending the 

change to Rule 4:21A-5(a) which characterized it as merely a "housekeeping 

amendment." 2000 Sup. Ct. Civ. Prac. Comm. Suppl. Rep. § I(A), at 5. 
12 A-0137-22

fact that he or she has a right to know and that the communicating party has a 

duty to communicate." America's Pride, 175 N.J. at 63-64. That principle 

survives the housekeeping amendment to Rule 4:21A-5. Although we 

acknowledge in America's Pride, one of the parties failed to appear for the 

arbitration, contrary to the circumstances here, we find the Court's interpretation 

of Rules 4:21A-5 and -6 equally applicable to the facts before us we discuss at 

pp. 13-16, infra. 

We also find the court's reliance on SWH Funding to be misplaced. That 

case involved an order denying a motion to vacate an arbitration award entered 

by default under Rule 4:21A-4(f). 399 N.J. Super. at 17. Paragraph (f), added 

in 2000, provides, in part: 

If a party defending against a claim of damages does 

not appear, that party's pleading shall be stricken, the 

arbitration shall proceed and the non-appearing party 

shall be deemed to have waived the right to demand a 

trial de novo . . . . Relief from any order entered 

pursuant to this rule shall be granted only on motion 

showing good cause . . . . 

[R. 4:21A-4(f).] 

In SWH Funding, we noted the modifications to Rules 4:21A-4 and 

4:21A-5 "denied the non-appearing party the right to file for a trial de novo." 

399 N.J. Super. at 17. The primary issue in SWH Funding was whether 
13 A-0137-22

defendant's failure to appear at the arbitration hearing constituted "good cause" 

to grant relief from an arbitration award entered by default under Rule 4:21A4(f). Ibid. In America's Pride, defendants also failed to appear at the arbitration 

hearing, 175 N.J. at 62, but were permitted to move for a trial de novo because 

Rule 4:21A-4(f) had not yet been enacted. This is the "scenario addressed in 

America's Pride" from which SWH Funding found the amendment of Rules 

4:21A-4 and -5 "signaled the Court's clear intention to depart." 399 N.J. Super. 

at 17. Indeed, SWH Funding did not consider Rule 4:21A-6 at all, aside from 

noting that its thirty-day requirement did not apply to a motion seeking relief 

under Rule 4:21A-4(f). Id. at 11. 

We are also unpersuaded by plaintiff's arguments comparing Rule 4:21A6 to Rules 2:4-1(b), 2:5-6(a), and 4:49-2. While we agree each of these 

references the applicable time period by the date of service or notice, and not 

the date of filing, we cannot separate Rule 4:21A-6 from its context. As the 

Court advised in America's Pride, that Rule must be read together with Rule 

4:21A-5 and thus, it follows the time periods set forth in Rule 4:21A-6(b) do not 

begin to run until the parties receive a copy of the arbitration award from the 

court. 175 N.J. at 64. In fact, the Court referred specifically to Rules 2:4-1(b) 

and 4:49-2 in utilizing the mailing requirement in Rule 4:21A-5 to inform the 
14 A-0137-22

thirty-day period in Rule 4:21A-6(b), finding its interpretation "consonant with 

other [c]ourt Rules that condition a filing deadline on the receipt of notice that 

a judgment, order, or decision has been entered against a party." Id. at 64. As 

noted, we are obligated to read the Rules "in context with related provisions so 

as to give sense to the [court rules] as a whole," Robertelli, 224 N.J. at 484 

(alteration in original) (quoting Wiese, 188 N.J. at 592), and to avoid "absurd" 

results and inconsistency with the Rule's overall purpose, Pfannenstein, 475 N.J. 

Super. at 95. 

Further, nothing in our decision or interpretation of Rule 4:21A-6(b) or 

N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26 is inconsistent with their purpose, "to provide 'a formal 

method of resolving disputes with predictable rules, procedures, and results,'"

N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 458 N.J. Super. at 69 (quoting Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs., 154 

N.J. at 145), and to "ensure[] that the court will promptly schedule trials in cases 

that cannot be resolved by arbitration," Vanderslice, 220 N.J. at 392 (alteration 

in original) (quoting Nascimento, 381 N.J. Super. at 597). Particularly where, 

as here, the parties attended arbitration by phone and did not receive a copy of 

the written arbitration award before it was filed, it would be unfair to start the 

thirty-day clock before the parties had an opportunity to review the award. 

Although the parties do not dispute the arbitrator stated his decision the day of 
15 A-0137-22

the hearing, it is not inconceivable a written award could diverge from an oral 

decision, whether accidentally or otherwise. 

Therefore, for the reasons detailed, we agree with defendant that the 

thirty-day period within which it could seek a trial de novo began on June 15, 

2022, when it received a copy of the arbitrator's award from the court, and its 

July 15, 2022 filing was therefore timely. Because we determine the filing was 

timely, we need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether defendant has 

demonstrated extraordinary circumstances to extend the thirty-day period under 

Hartsfield, 149 N.J. at 618. 

In reaching our decision, we acknowledge defendant was aware of the 

arbitrator's award on June 14, 2022, when the arbitrator made an oral decision 

and the parties consented to the arbitrator placing their signatures on the award.5 

We are nevertheless satisfied these facts do not warrant deviation from the 

principles we have discussed, as our interpretation of the Rules confirms a party

seeking a trial de novo should base their decision on the actual award filed with

5

 Although the award includes a provision advising "[p]arties desiring to reject 

this award and obtain a trial de novo must file with the division manager a trial 

de novo request . . . within thirty (30) days of today" and "unless otherwise 

expressly indicated this award will be filed today," it is undisputed the arbitrator 

did not provide a copy of the award directly to the parties on June 14, 2022. 
16 A-0137-22

the court, not an arbitrator's oral representations prior to filing the written award. 

As noted, a variety of circumstances could lead to differences between the two. 

Further, our decision ensures the applicable time period is no less than 

thirty days, even when there is a delay between an arbitrator's filing and the 

court's provision of the award, as a contrary interpretation would unfairly 

truncate the brief period to demand a trial de novo. For example, if we were to 

adopt plaintiff's interpretation, a party that did not receive a copy of an award 

from the court until twenty-nine days after its filing would have only one day to 

review the written award for accuracy and demand a trial de novo. We find such 

an interpretation contrary to America's Pride, Rules 4:21A-5 and -6, and 

inconsistent with the "fairness in administration" our Rules are intended to 

secure. R. 1:1-2. 

Reversed.