IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

PAMELA A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA REGISTRAR OF CONTRACTORS, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0266

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. LC2015-000452-001

The Honorable Crane McClennen, Retired Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Porter Law Firm, Phoenix

By Robert S. Porter, Ryan P. Dyches

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By John R. Tellier, Thomas C. Raine

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
JOHNSON v. AZROC

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Pamela A. Johnson, Plaintiff/Appellant, appeals the superior 

court’s order dismissing her “appeal” from a final administrative decision 

of the Arizona Registrar of Contractors, Defendant/Appellee. Johnson 

argues that because Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-904(A)

(2016) does not state where an appealing party must file a notice of appeal 

from a final administrative decision, she was entitled to file her notice of 

appeal with the Registrar, instead of with the superior court. We reject this 

argument and affirm the superior court’s order dismissing her appeal as 

untimely.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2010, homeowners hired Forsythe and Sons Construction, 

Inc. (“Forsythe”) to complete roofing work on their house. In 2012, the 

homeowners sold the house to Johnson. After Johnson obtained possession 

of the house, she discovered that the roof leaked. Subsequently, she filed a 

complaint against Forsythe with the Registrar. An investigator for the 

Registrar investigated her complaint and issued a “Corrective Work Order” 

giving Forsythe 15 days to correct the deficient work. Forsythe failed to 

correct the work and ultimately the Registrar issued a finite suspension of 

Forsythe’s license.

¶3 On October 7, 2014, Johnson filed a recovery fund claim with 

the Registrar.1 The Registrar denied her claim and Johnson requested a 

hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) of the Office of 

Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) to challenge the Registrar’s denial. After

conducting a hearing, the ALJ ruled the Registrar had appropriately denied 

Johnson’s claim. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(B) (2013) (director may 

 

1The Residential Contractors’ Recovery Fund is a fund that 

allows the Registrar to award “any person injured by an act, representation, 

transaction or conduct of a residential contractor” an award not to exceed 

$30,000 “for damages sustained by the act, representation, transaction or 

conduct.” A.R.S. § 32-1132(A) (2016). 
JOHNSON v. AZROC

Opinion of the Court

3

accept, reject, or modify ALJ’s decision), the Registrar accepted the ALJ’s 

decision and the Registrar’s decision became the final administrative 

decision in the case on September 15, 2015 (“September 15 Registrar 

Decision”).

¶4 On October 14, 2015, Johnson attempted to appeal the 

September 15 Registrar Decision by filing a document entitled 

“Complainant’s Notice of Appeal” with the Registrar (the “Registrar 

NOA”). That document listed Forsythe, but not the Registrar, as the

“Respondent.” Johnson did not file the Registrar NOA in the superior court. 

On October 21, 2015, Johnson delivered to the Registrar and the OAH a 

document entitled “Complainant’s A.R.S. § 12-904B Notice.” Johnson did 

not file that document in the superior court either. Finally, on October 27, 

2015, Johnson filed a document entitled “Notice of Appeal from and 

Request for Review of Final Administrative Decision” in the superior court, 

listing Maricopa County as “Appellee” (the “Superior Court NOA”). That 

document did not list the Registrar as a party, however.

¶5 The Registrar moved to dismiss, arguing Johnson’s Superior 

Court NOA was untimely under A.R.S. § 12-904(A), a statute that sets forth 

the procedure and deadlines for filing an action to review a final 

administrative decision. While that motion was pending, Johnson moved 

to amend the caption to substitute the Registrar and Forsythe as appellees.

Although the superior court granted that motion, the superior court

nevertheless granted the Registrar’s motion to dismiss, finding Johnson’s

Superior Court NOA untimely under A.R.S. § 12-904(A).

DISCUSSION

¶6 On appeal, Johnson does not dispute that she did not file her 

Superior Court NOA within the deadline established by A.R.S. § 12-904(A).2

Instead, Johnson argues A.R.S. § 12-904(A) fails to state where an appealing 

 

2Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, service under 

A.R.S. § 12-904(A) is complete when the decision is personally delivered to 

the “party affected” or five days after the date the decision is mailed to the 

party’s last known address. A.R.S. § 12-904(A). Here, the Registrar mailed 

the September 15 Registrar Decision to Johnson on September 15, 2015. 

Service was complete five days later on September 20, 2015. Because the 

35th day fell on a Sunday, Johnson was required to file a notice of appeal 

from the September 15 Registrar Decision on or before October 26, 2015. 

Although Johnson filed the Registrar NOA with the Registrar on October 

15, 2015, she did not file the Superior Court NOA in the superior court until 

October 27, 2015, one day after the appeal deadline.
JOHNSON v. AZROC

Opinion of the Court

4

party must file a notice of appeal from a final administrative decision and, 

therefore, the superior court should not have dismissed her appeal because 

she filed the Registrar NOA with the Registrar before the statutory appeal 

deadline expired. Exercising de novo review on this issue, we disagree. See 

Doty-Perez v. Doty-Perez, 241 Ariz. 372, 375, ¶ 17, 388 P.3d 9, 12 (App. 2016) 

(appellate court interprets statutes de novo) (citation omitted); M-11 Ltd. 

P’ship v. Gommard, 235 Ariz. 166, 168, ¶ 6, 330 P.3d 356, 358 (App. 2014) 

(appellate court reviews motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction de novo).

¶7 The process for judicial review of final administrative 

decisions is set out in title 12, chapter 7, article 6, A.R.S. §§ 12-901 to -914

(2016). Under A.R.S. § 12-904(A), “[a]n action to review a final 

administrative decision shall be commenced by filing a notice of appeal 

within thirty-five days from the date when a copy of the decision sought to 

be reviewed is served upon the party affected.” The deadline for filing an 

administrative appeal is jurisdictional. Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections 

Comm’n, 212 Ariz. 407, 413, ¶ 25, 132 P.3d 1187, 1193 (2006) (citation 

omitted). An untimely filing deprives the court of subject matter 

jurisdiction, and the appealing party forfeits the right to seek judicial 

review. M-11 Ltd. P’ship, 235 Ariz. at 168, ¶ 2, 330 P.3d at 358; see also A.R.S. 

§ 12-902(B) (“Unless review is sought of an administrative decision within 

the time and in the manner provided in this article, the parties to the 

proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining 

judicial review of the decision.”).

¶8 Although Johnson argues A.R.S. § 12-904(A) is silent on 

where an appealing party must file a notice of appeal, it is not, in fact, silent. 

To obtain judicial review of a final administrative decision, A.R.S. § 12-

904(A) directs the appealing party to “commence” an “action” by filing a 

notice of appeal. By statute, an “action” is “any matter or proceeding in a 

court, civil or criminal.” A.R.S. § 1-215(1) (Supp. 2016); Semple v. Tri-City 

Drywall, Inc., 172 Ariz. 608, 611, 838 P.2d 1369, 1372 (App. 1992) (proceeding 

before the Registrar of Contractors was not an “action” for purposes of 

A.R.S. § 12-341.01 because it was not “a proceeding before a court of law”); 

Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (action is “[a] civil or criminal 

judicial proceeding”); see also Mona Baskin and Mary DeLaat Williams, 

Registrar of Contractors, 3 Arizona Appellate Handbook § 34.3.6.2.1 (4th ed. 

2014) (“An action for judicial review of a registrar’s decision must be 

commenced by the filing of a Notice of Appeal for Judicial Review of an 

Administrative Decision in [the] superior court.”). Therefore, A.R.S. § 12-

904(A) directs an appealing party to file his or her notice of appeal with the 
JOHNSON v. AZROC

Opinion of the Court

5

superior court, which commences the action to review a final 

administrative decision.

¶9 The Arizona Rules of Procedure for Judicial Review of 

Administrative Decisions (“JRAD”), which apply to actions under title 12, 

chapter 7, article 6, underscore A.R.S. § 12-904(A)’s directive. JRAD 1(b) 

incorporates the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. Arizona Rule of Civil 

Procedure 3, in turn, states, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a 

complaint with the court.” (Emphasis added.)

¶10 Even if A.R.S. § 12-904(A) was silent on where an appealing 

party is to file a notice of appeal, the statutory scheme for judicial review of 

administrative decisions makes clear Johnson was required to file her notice 

of appeal with the superior court, not with the Registrar. “We construe 

statutes to give effect to an entire statutory scheme.” Backus v. State, 220 

Ariz. 101, 104, ¶ 10, 203 P.3d 499, 502 (2009) (citation omitted). For example,

A.R.S. § 12-905(B) provides “an action to review a final administrative 

decision may be commenced in the superior court of any county” that meets 

certain specified conditions. A.R.S. § 12-905(B) (emphasis added). Further, 

other provisions of title 12, chapter 7, article 6 require the appealing party 

to file certain documents with the agency, and these provisions would be 

meaningless if an appealing party could file his or her notice of appeal with 

the agency. See Patches v. Indus. Comm’n, 220 Ariz. 179, 182, ¶ 10, 204 P.3d 

437, 440 (App. 2009) (“[C]ourts must, where possible, avoid construing 

statutes in such a manner as to produce absurd or unconstitutional 

results.”). 

¶11 For example, A.R.S. § 12-904(B) requires an appealing party 

to file a “notice of the action” with the OAH or the agency that conducted 

the hearing within ten days after filing a notice of appeal. If the appealing 

party could commence the action by filing the notice of appeal with the 

agency, no purpose would be served by filing the “notice of the action” with 

the agency as it already would have had notice of the action. Similarly, 

A.R.S. § 12-906 requires the appealing party to serve the notice of appeal on 

the administrative agency. This requirement would be superfluous if an 

appealing party could initiate an appeal by filing the notice of appeal with 

the agency itself. Finally, A.R.S. § 12-907 requires the agency responding to 

an appeal to file a notice of appearance in response to the notice of appeal. 

If A.R.S. § 12-904(A) permitted an appealing party to file a notice of appeal 

with the agency, there would be no need for the agency to then file a notice 

of appearance with itself.

¶12 Outside the context of title 12, chapter 7, article 6, A.R.S. § 12-

284(A) (2016), which governs fees for civil proceedings, requires an 
JOHNSON v. AZROC

Opinion of the Court

6

appealing party to pay the clerk of the superior court for filing of a notice 

of appeal under A.R.S. § 12-904. It would make little sense for an appealing 

party to pay fees to the superior court if that party could initiate an appeal 

with the agency directly.

¶13 Despite the foregoing, Johnson argues that because other 

appeal rights require the appealing party to initiate the appeal in the court 

from which the appeal is taken, we should construe the statutory scheme 

as allowing a party to file a notice of appeal from a final administrative 

decision with the agency rather than the superior court. Johnson points out 

that judgments rendered in a justice court are appealed to the superior court 

by filing a notice of appeal in the justice court, Ariz. R. Super. Ct. App. P. 

Civ. 3(a), and judgments rendered in the superior court are appealed to the 

court of appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the superior 

court, Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 8(a). Johnson 

also points out a party may obtain a hearing on an “appealable agency 

action or contested case” by filing a notice of appeal or request for a hearing 

with the agency. A.R.S. § 41-1092.03(B) (2013).

¶14 Johnson’s argument, however, ignores these appeal rights are 

grounded on statutes or rules expressly requiring the appealing party to

initiate the appeal by filing a notice of appeal with the entity that rendered 

the decision. No such statute or rule supports Johnson’s argument that 

filing a notice of appeal with the Registrar is timely for purposes of A.R.S. 

§ 12-904(A). “Courts will not read into a statute something that is not within 

the manifest intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself . . . .” 

Cicoria v. Cole, 222 Ariz. 428, 431, ¶ 15, 215 P.3d 402, 405 (App. 2009) (citation 

omitted). And, Johnson’s argument ignores that the Arizona Rules of Civil 

Procedure, which require an appealing party to file a complaint in the 

superior court, are incorporated into JRAD. See supra ¶ 9.

¶15 The Legislature’s 2012 amendment of A.R.S. § 12-904(A) does 

not, as Johnson also argues, evidence the Legislature’s intent to allow an 

appealing party to initiate an appeal by filing the notice of appeal with the 

agency itself. Before 2012, A.R.S. § 12-904(A) required an appealing party 

to commence an appeal by filing a “complaint,” tracking the language of 

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 3. In contrast, the current version requires 

an appealing party to file a “notice of appeal.” A.R.S. § 12-904(A). The 

amendment, among other things, changed certain terminology, such as 

changing plaintiff and defendant to appellant and appellee, and removed 

the requirement that an appellee file an answer. The amendment did not, 

however, change where an appealing party is required to file the notice of 

appeal. The legislative history of the 2012 amendment, H.R. Bill Summary

(April 23, 2012), S.B. 1193, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012), does not 
JOHNSON v. AZROC

Opinion of the Court

7

state or suggest that an appealing party may file the notice of appeal with 

the agency. 

¶16 Finally, Johnson argues that even if she misfiled her notice of 

appeal in the “wrong forum,” it was nevertheless timely filed in a forum 

and should be considered timely. We disagree. 

¶17 In making this argument, Johnson relies on Wilkinson v. Fabry, 

177 Ariz. 506, 869 P.2d 182 (App. 1992), and Martinez v. Indus. Comm’n, 213 

Ariz. 531, 144 P.3d 1260 (App. 2006), both of which relied on the then in 

effect version of ARCAP 4(a). In Wilkinson, the appealing party filed his 

notice of appeal with the clerk of the court of appeals instead of the clerk of 

the superior court. Wilkinson, 177 Ariz. at 506, 869 P.2d at 182. Pursuant to 

ARCAP 4(a), we held the appealing party’s notice of appeal was timely. Id. 

ARCAP 4(a) then provided: 

No papers received by the clerk within the time 

fixed for filing which if untimely filed would 

render the case, appeal or petition subject to 

dismissal by the appellate court for 

jurisdictional reasons, shall be refused by the 

clerk solely for the reason that they were not 

tendered for filing in the proper court or 

division. Rather, such papers shall be 

transmitted to the proper court or division and 

shall be deemed timely filed.

Id. at 507, 869 P.2d at 183 (quoting ARCAP 4(a)). Because the rule required 

the clerk of the court to transmit the notice of appeal to the proper court,

the appealing party’s notice of appeal filed with the clerk of the court of 

appeals was timely, even though it should have been filed in the superior 

court. Id.

¶18 Here, as discussed, see supra ¶ 9, the Arizona Rules of Civil 

Procedure, not ARCAP, apply to Johnson’s claims. As discussed above, 

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 3 states, “A civil action is commenced by 

filing a complaint with the court.” Therefore, the reasoning of Wilkinson and

ARCAP 4(a) is inapplicable.

¶19 In Martinez, the appealing party filed his petition for special 

action from an Industrial Commission award with the Industrial 

Commission instead of with the court of appeals. Martinez, 213 Ariz. at 531-
JOHNSON v. AZROC

Opinion of the Court

8

32, ¶ 1, 144 P.3d at 1260-61. In addition to examining ARCAP 4(a), the court 

also considered A.R.S. § 12-120.22(B) (2016),

3 which provides:

No case, appeal or petition for a writ brought in 

the supreme court or court of appeals shall be 

dismissed for the reason only that it was not 

brought in the proper court or division, but it 

shall be transferred to the proper court or 

division.

Id. at 532, ¶ 6, 144 P.3d at 1261.

¶20 Because the Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions 

incorporated ARCAP, and the Industrial Commission acts as a “quasijudicial body,” we concluded that under ARCAP 4(a) and A.R.S. § 12-

120.22(B), the misfiled petition for special action was timely. Id. at 533, ¶ 8, 

144 P.3d at 1262.

¶21 Here, as discussed, see supra ¶ 18, former ARCAP 4(a) is 

inapplicable. Further, A.R.S. § 12-120.22(B) addresses appeals “brought in 

the supreme court or court of appeals.” Johnson’s appeal did not involve 

an appeal brought in either the supreme court or the court of appeals. 

Instead, the superior court sits as an appellate court in its review of the 

Registrar’s final decision. See A.R.S. § 12-911 (outlining powers of superior 

court in reviewing agency’s final decision). Finally, as discussed, see supra 

¶ 8, on its face, A.R.S. § 12-904(A) requires an appealing party to file the

notice of appeal with the superior court. Therefore, A.R.S. § 12-120.22(B) is 

inapplicable.

CONCLUSION

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the superior court 

that Johnson did not timely appeal the September 15 Registrar Decision. 

Therefore, we affirm the superior court’s order dismissing her appeal.

 

3This statute has not been amended since its adoption, we 

therefore cite the current version.