alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

BRANDON M. CARRIGAN

,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee. §

§

§ No. 19 , 2019

§

§ Court Below

— Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§

§ Cr. ID No s

. 1109008434 &

§ 1503000827 (N)

§

§

Submitted: May 13, 2019

Decided: July 19 , 2019

Before STRINE

, Chief Justice ; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR

, Justices.

ORDER

A fter careful consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s

motion to affirm, and the record on appeal

, we conclude that the Superior Court ’s

order, dated December 13, 2018

, adopting the Commissioner’s report and

recommendation, dated August 21, 2018, and summarily dismissing the second

motion for postconviction relief should be affirmed

. 1 Carrigan was not convicted

after trial , he did not satisfy the requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule

61(d)(2)

, 2 and his claims were meritless. The Su perior Court did not err in denying

1 State v. Carrigan

, 2018 WL 6601174 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2018)

. 2 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2) ( providing that a second or subsequent Rule 61 motion “shall

be summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion” pleads with

particularity new evidence creating a strong inference that the movant was actually innocent or a

new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review ).2

Carrigan’s motion for appointment of counsel and in s ummarily dismissing the

postconviction motion

.

NOW, T HEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7110

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus DALE LEWIS GIBSON, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge. (CR-98-249-4, CA-01-77-1) Submitted: November 8, 2001 Decided: November 16, 2001 Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Dale Lewis Gibson, Appellant Pro Se. Jerry Wayne Miller, United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Dale Lewis Gibson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2001). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny Gibson’s motion to hold this appeal in abeyance pending the district court’s action on his motion for a certificate of appealability, deny acertificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Gibson , Nos. CR-98-249-4; CA-01-77-1 (W.D.N.C. May 15, 2001). We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10115

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

TERRENCE EUGENE PRIESTLEY

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:06-CR-10-ALL

Before KING, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Having pleaded guilty, Terrence Eugene Priestley appeals his conviction

and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Priestley argues that

the district court plainly erred by enhancing his sentence under

U.S.S.G.§ 2K2.1(b)(6) based on the finding that he used or possessed the firearm

in connection with another felony offense. Priestley does not dispute that,

contemporaneously with his possession of the prohibited firearm, he committed

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 12, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-10115

2

the state jail felony of evading arrest. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a),

(b)(1) (Vernon 2001). He argues, however, that the § 2K2.1(b)(6) sentence

enhancement is plain error because he did not use or brandish the firearm in

connection with his attemptto evade arrest. As the presence of a loaded firearm

in Priestley’s car during his flightfrom police had the potential of facilitating his

attempt to evade arrest, the district court did not plainly err by enhancing his

offense level. See § 2K2.1, comment. (n. 14)(A); United States v. Armstead,

114 F.3d 504, 510-13 (5th Cir. 1997).

Priestly further argues that the district court plainly erred in finding that

the facts stipulated in connection with his plea established that he possessed the

weapon “in or affecting interstate commerce” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)

or that he knowingly committed the offense; however, he correctly concedes that

his argument is foreclosed by this court’s precedent. See United States v.

Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d

77, 81 (5th Cir. 1988). Priestley also challenges as plain error the district court’s

order that he serve his federal sentence consecutively to a pending state

sentence for burglary of a habitation, but he properly concedes that this issue

has been resolved against him. See United States v. Candia, 454 F.3d 468, 474-

74 (5th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.
#### Frances S. RYAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America.

No. 11214.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 15, 1939.

Price W. Wickersham, of Kansas City, Mo., and Bruce Barnett, of Joplin, Mo., for appellant.

Maurice M. Milligan, U. S. Atty., and Randall Wilson, Sam C. Blair, R. K. Phelps, and Thomas A. Costolow, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Kansas City, Mo.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed on motion of appellant; defendant below ordered to surren-' der to custody, etc.
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
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```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 129 (Friday, September 21, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H6258]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                     WE WILL NOT SUPPORT RADICALISM

  (Mr. BURTON of Indiana asked and was given permission to address the 
House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, recently we passed a continuing 
resolution to take care of the funding of the government until next 
March. And one of the things that concerned a lot of us was: Is any of 
that money in that continuing resolution going to go to help the 
Government of Egypt or Libya or any of the other countries where we see 
all that civil unrest and all the horrible acts of murder taking place?
  And I never did get an answer, so I would just like to say to my 
colleagues who are going to be here--I'm retiring at the end of this 
year--we should not give one dime, not one penny, to any country that 
tries to undermine the United States' interests around the world, and 
we should not give one penny to anybody that constantly tries to spread 
radical fundamentalist Muslim beliefs in this world.
  Shari'a law is something we can't live with, and we need to let them 
know very clearly that if they want to work with the United States, 
fine, but they're not getting any money from us if this continues.
  This world is in a terrible state because of these radicals, and we 
must not let them win this battle.

                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Reed). The Chair would remind Members to 
refrain from trafficking the well while a Member is under recognition.

                          ____________________
```
Exhibit 99.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18  U.S.C. §1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Lawson Software, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended November 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert G. Barbieri, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| |  | /s/ ROBERT G. BARBIERIRobert G. Barbieri Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
| |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | January 8, 2003                                                                              

---

QuickLinks
#### State *v.*Moulton.

The provisions of section 22, chapter 209 General Statutes, are not to be applied to criminal trials.

Appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, on a complaint for an assault and.battery on Nathaniel B. Keniston.

It appeared that the defendant’s wife wras present at the time and place when and where the alleged assault and battery was alleged to have been committed. The defendant offered her as a witness, to which the State objected. The court ruled against her admission as a witness, to which the defendant excepted. The jury returned a verdict of guilty.

The questions arising on the case were reserved.

*Fay, Solicitor,*and *Ladd,*for State.

*Fletcher & Haywood*and *Burns*for respondent.

*486Sargent J.

Were the provisions of section 22, chapter 209 General Statutes, intended for application to criminal cases or to thé trial of civil causes only?

It was held in *State*v. Flanders, 38 N. H. 324, and in *State*v. *Connell,*38 N. H. 81, that although the language in the statute of 1858 was broad enough in terms, in connection with the law_ of 1857, making parties witnesses, to include criminal as well as civil cases, yet that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to have made so broad an application, and the law is construed as having reference only to civil causes.

The provisions of chapter 209 from section 13 to section 23 inclusive, relate to the qualification of witnesses. Section 13 is confined in terms to “ any civil cause.” Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the same chapter were evidently never intended to apply save to civil causes. Section 20 is limited in its application to four distinct classes of cases, all of which are and must be civil causes. Section 21 contains a limitation upon the provisions of section 20. And when it is said in section 22 that the wife may testify for the husband, or the husband for the wife, in any case wThere it appears to the court that their examination as witnesses upon the points to which their testimony is offered would not lead to the violation of marital confidence, we must understand the expression ‘ ‘ in any case” to mean in any of the cases treated of in the preceding sections, which are all civil causes.

We cannot suppose that the legislature intended to give the husband or the wife the privilege of swearing for each other in any and all criminal cases, until they should give the respondent the right and privilege of testifying for himself, if he so elect, which had not been done when these General Statutes were passed.

This being the conclusion upon this point, it becomes unnecessary to consider the other point raised in the argument, viz : as to whether the examination of the wife in this case would lead to any violation of marital confidence.

*Judgment on the verdict.*
August 14 , 20 1 3

Brooke C h apman A ssoc iate Director 

### FORT COLLINS • LOVELAND 

## A**IRP()J~T'**

Small Commun ity Air Serv i ce De ve lopment Grant Program 1 2 00 New Jersey Ave , SE Washington D C 2 0590

Dear Ms. C hapman ,
The Fort Co llin s- Lo ve land A irp ort wo uld like to r e qu es t the 2 01 3 app li cation for th e Sma ll Co mmunity Air Service Deve l opment Pro g ram G rant be w ithdra w n. We b e li eve that thi s remo va l from conside rat ion thi s year wi ll se r ve the current be s t interes t of our a irp ort. We co ntinu e to v alu e our relation s hi p w ith th e Department ofTran s por1ation , and look forward to working wit h y ou and y our departm e nt in the future.

R es pectfull y,

# /!-~-- A irp or1 Dir ector Fo rt Co llin s - Lo ve land A ir po r t

Fort Co llin s - L ove l and Airport 4900 E ar h art Road L

ove la nd, CO 80538 Phone: (9 7 0)962 -2 850 / Fax : (970)962-28 55 www.fo rtlo veai r.com
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4835 

To extend the pilot program on off-base transition training for veterans 

and spouses. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Ms. ESTY of Connecticut (for herself and Mr. POE of Texas) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 

and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be 

subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 

of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To extend the pilot program on off-base transition training 

for veterans and spouses. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Job Training through 

5 Off-Base Opportunities and Local Support for Veterans 

6 Act’’ or the ‘‘Job TOOLS for Veterans Act’’. 


SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4835 IH

1 SEC. 2. PILOT PROGRAM FOR OFF-BASE TRANSITION 

2 TRAINING FOR VETERANS AND SPOUSES. 

3 (a) EXTENSION OF PILOT PROGRAM.—Subsection 

4 (a) of section 301 of the Dignified Burial and Other Vet5 erans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 2012 (Public Law 

6 112–260; 10 U.S.C. 1144 note) is amended— 

7 (1) by striking ‘‘During the two-year period be8 ginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, 

9 the’’ and inserting ‘‘During the five-year period be10 ginning on the date of the enactment of the Job 

11 TOOLS for Veterans Act, the’’; and 

12 (2) by striking ‘‘to assess the feasibility and ad13 visability of providing such program to eligible indi14 viduals at locations other than military installa15 tions’’. 

16 (b) LOCATIONS.—Subsection (c) of such section is 

17 amended— 

18 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘not less than 

19 three and not more than five States’’ and inserting 

20 ‘‘not less than 50 locations in States (as defined in 

21 section 101(20) of title 38, United States Code)’’; 

22 and 

23 (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘at least two’’ 

24 and inserting ‘‘at least 20’’. 


SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 4835 IH

1 (c) CONFORMING REPEAL.—Subsection (f) of such 

2 section is repealed. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS
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This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Swift Energy
Oprating Partners 1993-B, Ltd's balance sheet and statement of operations
contained in its Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1999 and is qualified
in it entirety by reference to such financial statements.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

KENNETT CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL
DISTRICT

v.

CHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, CHESTER COUNTY, PA

PETITION OF: PROPERTY OWNER
AUTOZONE DEVELOPMENT CORP. :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 150 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal
from the Order of the
Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 3rd day of November, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is GRANTED

. The issues, as stated by Petitioner, are:

(1) Did the School District violate the requirements of the Uniformity Clause by subdividing real estate in the District based [upon] the money value [of] the property and imposing unequal tax burdens on properties with actual market value of
more than $1,000,000?

(2) Did the School District violate the requirements of the Uniformity Clause by implementing an assessment appeal
selection system which subjected only commercial properties

to disparate treatment in operation and effect?

(3) Did the Commonwealth Court err by shifting the burden of proof and holding taxpayers to an impossible standard that[ 150 MAL 2020 ]

- 2 this Court has specifically rejected, namely by requiring taxpayers to prove that the School District intended to discriminate against a sub-class of taxpayers?
Befor e th e U.S
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Division , AGC-30 0 Offic e o f th e Chie f Counse l Federa l Aviatio nAdministratio n 80 0 Independenc e Avenue , S.W
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