UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ JASON BROOKS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; RICK RAEMISCH, CDOC Executive Director; TERESA REYNOLDS, CDOC Legal access program and litigati on manager; LEEANN PUGA, FCF Law Libra rian, and DOES 1- 50; YVETTE BROWN, FCF Law Librarian; RICK RAEMISCH, Executive Director; JOEL STRICKLER, Hearings Officer and Lieutenan t; MS. PRIETO, FCF Hearings Officer and Lieutenant; JAY HUDSON, Major at the FCF and ADA Inmate Coordinator; LEWIS T. BABCOCK, United States District Judge for the District of Colorado; GORDON P. GALLAGHER, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Colorado; DOES 11-50, Defendants - Appellees. No. 18-1266 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-02190-CMA) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, howev er, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 5, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 ________________ _________________ Before McHUGH , BALDOCK , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Jason Brooks, a state p risoner proceeding pro se, filed this ac tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the Colorado Department of Correction s (CDOC) and various State and CDOC officials violat ed his constitutional rights by obstructing his access to the courts and taking other ac tions against him. The district court dismissed his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) as le gally frivolous and Brooks appea led. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we agree with the di strict court’s conclusion and dismiss this appeal as frivol ous. Because the appeal is fr ivolous, we also deny Brooks’ motion to proceed in form a pauperis (IFP) on appeal andassess a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
BACKGROUND Brooks was a prisoner at the CDOC ’s Fremont Correctional Facili ty (FCF) when he brought this action. He is an active pro se litigator who also assists fellow inmates with legal work. This is his ninth appeal to this cour t and his second appeal in this action. Brooks filed this action in Sep tember 2017, alleging in a four- page complaint that the CDOC, its executive dir ector and legal access coordina tor, an FCF law librarian, and 50 unidentified “J ohn Does” were violating his a nd a fellow inmate’s First Amendment rights by obstruc ting their access to the court s and were retaliating3 against Brooks for engaging in protected litigation activities. 1 In a simultaneously filed motion for preliminary inj unction, Brooks described the a lleged obstruction and retaliation, asserted the FCF di d not provide inmates with adeq uate access to the law library, and sought to enjoin e nforcement of CDOC legal access and assistance policies he claimed were obstruc ting inmates’ constitutional ri ght to access the

courts. 2 Brooks also requested that the district court order the defen dants to vacate the discipline he received for viola ting CDOC polic y by performing legal work for a fellow inmate without that inmate being present with him in the law li brary and to restore files the FCF librarian had deleted fro m his digital folder on the la w library computer based on the challenged policies. The dis trict court denied Brooks’ mot ion, initially and on reconsideration. Brooks appeal ed this denial, and we affirmed. See Brooks v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr. , 730 F. App’x 628 (10th Cir. 2018). While Brooks’ motion for preliminary injunction was pending, t he district court ordered Brooks to cure deficie ncies in his complaint. It also granted Broo ks’ request to proceed IFP, that is, without prep ayment of the district court’ s filing fees, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

1 The complaint also identified Jamie Valdiviezo-Perea, an inma te Brooks was helping on a legal matter, as a co-plaintiff, but the district court dismissed him from the suit shortly after it was f iled for failing to respond to t he court’s orders. For ease of reference, we refer to Brooks as the plainti ff in this actio n from its inception.

2 According to Brooks, the challe nged policies require inmates to be present in the law library together if they wish to collaborate on legal w ork, require them to consent to have librarians read their leg al documents if they wish to u se the library’s word-processing software, and pla ce restrictions on the type an d length of documents inmates can copy or print in the law library.4 After receiving several extension s of time, Brooks filed a 30-p age amended complaint that named a dozen additional defendants, including two state court judges, but was incomplete on its face becaus e, among other things, it did not include any claims for relief. In a simultaneously file d second motion for preliminar y injunction, Brooks explained his amended complaint was incomplete because FCF libr ary staff, per CDOC policy, had only permitted him to print 30 pages of his 70-page complaint. 3 He requested that the district court order the CDOC to allow him to print an d file his complete amended complaint, and detailed the twelve claims it included. After reviewing the incomplete a mended complaint and Brooks’ in tended claims as set forth in his preliminary injunction motion, the district court ordered Brooks to file a second amended complaint that c omplied with federal pleading re quirements, was on the proper court-approved form and, p er the court’s instructions on that form, was no longer than 30 pages in length. It als o denied Brooks’ preliminary in junction motion and overruled his subsequent objecti on to the 30-page limit on his complaint. Brooks filed a second am ended complaint that complied with the 30-page requirement. In it, he asserted e ight claims relating to legal access issues against the CDOC, eight individual State, C DOC, and FCF officials (collecti vely, “individual State defendants”), and John Does , as well as a claim against t he federal magistrate and district court j udges alleging they ha d unconstitutionally deprived him of court access and equal protection by lim iting the length of his compl aint. Brooks sought

3 Brooks later reported his inte nded complaint was 72 pages.5 compensatory and punitive damages and declaratory and injunctiv e relief on his claims. Because it had granted Brooks IF P status, the district court re viewed Brooks’ complaint to determine if it wa s frivolous or otherwise require d dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Based on this review, the district court dismissed Brooks’ seven federal claims because the y were legally frivolous and, i n some cases, were also barred by Eleventh Amendmen t immunity. It further decline d to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Br ooks’ two state law conspiracy claims and therefore dismissed his complaint. The dis trict court also denied Brooks leave to proceed IFP on appeal and certified under § 19 15(a)(3) that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Brooks timely appealed and also seeks leave to proceed IFP on appeal. 4
DISCUSSION On appeal, Brooks challenges the district court’s orders limiti ng his second amended complaint to 30 pages and its dismissal of certain of h is claims. We address each issue in turn.
A. Page Limitation Brooks argues the district cour t improperly enforced CDOC’s 30- page printing limitation against him and violat ed his constitutional right to access the courts when it directed him to file a second amended compla int of no more than 30 pages. He asserts

4 Because the district court dism issed Brooks’ se cond amended c omplaint before it was served, the defe ndants did not participate in the district court proceedings and are not par ticipants in this appeal.6 there is no rule or authority s upporting a page limit on a comp laint and that he was prejudiced because the court-orde red page limit forced him to d rop several of his intended claims and omit allegati ons that would have prevented the court from dismissing his remaining claims. We review a court-ordered page limitation for abuse of discreti on, see Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 483 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 20 07), and conclude the distri ct court acted well within its discreti on in ordering Brooks to limit hi s second amended complaint to 30 pages. The basis for its o rder was the court’s local rul es governing the format and length of complaints filed by unr epresented prisoners asserting claims under § 1983. See D. Colo. Civ. R. 5.1(c ) (ordering unrepresen ted prisoners to us e “the procedures, forms, and instructions posted on the court’s website” in formatting a nd filing pleadings). As the district court advised Brooks, see R. Vol. I at 43, the instructions to the form complaint on the district court’ s website provide that “[a]bsen t prior order of the court, the total length of the Prisone r Complaint, including the form and all additional pages, may not exceed thirty pages.” In formation and Instructions for Filing a Prisoner Complaint, http://www.cod.uscourts .gov/CourtOperations/RulesPro cedures/Forms.aspx# PrisonerDetainee (link to “Pris oner Complaint 1983 Instructions ”) (last visited February 1, 2019). The district court further found Brooks had failed to demonstra te good cause for an exception to the 30-page lim itation. The district court bas ed this conclusion on its findings that: (1) Brooks’ detaile d statement of his intended claims in his preliminary injunction motion did not satisfyRule 8’s requirement that he provide a short and plain7 statement of each claim show ing he was entitled to relief, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); and (2) these claims, which addresse d such disparate subjects as pr ison law library policies and procedures, prison disciplin ary proceedings, state court po stconviction proceedings, medical care, and a prison job assignment, were not properly jo ined in a single lawsuit against all of the named defendants, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (limiting circumstances in which multiple defendants can be joined in a single action). Based on our review of Brooks’ intended claims, we find no abuse of discretion in this determination and the district court’s consequent ord er requiring Brooks to comply wi th the 30-page limitation per the court’s local rules. We also reject Brooks’ constitutio nal challenge to the 30-page limitation ordered by the district court. First, Brooks cites no authority for th e proposition that this page limit violated his constitutional rights and we are aware of no ne. Second, we are not persuaded by Brooks’ argument th at the page limitation violated his right to access the courts because it prevented him from alleging specific facts su fficient to show that his claims stated a claim. Brooks’ 30-page second amended complain t still contains many repetitive and/or unnecessary alle gations that c ould have been omitted to make room for other, more relevant factual a llegations. Further, Brooks fail s to identify the specific allegations he would have inclu ded but for the 30-page limit an d how they would have cured the deficiencies that led the district court to dismiss h is complaint. And, as discussed in more detail below, B rooks must show he was prejudi ced by the 30-page limitation to demonstrate a vio lation of his right to access th e courts. He has not done so.8 Accordingly, Brooks’ constitutiona l challenge to the district c ourt’s page limitation is meritless.
B. Dismissal under § 1915(e) Brooks argues the district court erred in dismissing his claims that the defendants violated his constitu tional right to access the cour ts and retaliated against him for engaging in p rotected activities. 5 The district court dism issed these claims as legally frivolous for a variety of reasons, including that Broo ks failed to allege essential elements of some claim s, asserted non-existent rights in others, and in some instances asserted claims barre d by Eleventh Amendment immunity

. A claim is frivolous “where it la cks an arguable basis either i n law or in facts.” Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Thi s standard is met where the plaintiff asserts facts that do not support an arguable claim, asserts the violation of a legal interest that clearly doe s not exist, or asserts claims a gainst which the defendants are clearly immune from suit. See id. at 327-28. We review dismissals for frivolousness for abuse of discret ion, but where, as here, the district court’s frivolousness

5 Brooks does not offer argument challenging the district court ’s dismissal of Claim Four, a Fourteenth Amendmen t failure to train and supervi se claim against certain individual Stat e defendants and unidentified John Does, and Claim Eight, in which he alleged the magistrate judge and district court judge violated his constitutional rights. He also did not challenge the district court’s decision declining to exercise supplemental jurisd iction over the conspiracy claim s asserted in Claims Six and Seven. Accordingly, Bro oks has forfeited appellate rev iew of the district court’s dismissal of these claims. See Bronson v. Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he omission of an issue in an opening bri ef generally forfeits appellate consideration of that issue.”).9 determinations turn on legal i ssues, we review those decisions de novo. See Conkle v.
Potter , 352 F.3d 1333, 1335 n .4 (10th Cir. 2003); see also El Encanto, Inc. v. Hatch Chile Co. , 825 F.3d 1161, 1162 (10th Cir. 2 016) (“[A] district court alw ays abuses its discretion when it errs on a le gal question, and we decide the presence or absence of legal error de novo.”). We construe Bro oks’ filings liberally in our review because he is acting pro se, but we will not act as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
1. Eleventh Amendment immunity Brooks disputes the district c ourt’s holding that some of his c laims are barred by the Eleventh Amendme nt, which grants the States and their agenc ies immunity from suit in federal courts unless the Stat e has waived this immunity or Congress has abrogated it. See Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr. , 163 F.3d 1186, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 1998). This immunity extends to damage claim s asserted against state offici als acting in their official capacity. See id. at 1196. Brooks’ second amended co mplaint names eight individu al State defendants, all of whom ar e sued in their official capaci ty, with six sued in their individual capacities as well. Brooks seeks damages in the eig ht claims he asserts against all or some of these defendants. The district court dismissed Br ooks’ claims for damages against the CDOC and the individual State defendant s in their official capacities on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity, as it has done in other § 1983 actions brou ght by Brooks. See,

e.g. , Brooks v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr. , No. 13-CV-02894-CBS, 2014 WL 5315000, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 20 14). Although Brooks ch allenges this deci sion, he offers no10 supporting argument other than to declare that Eleventh Amendme nt immunity may be waived by a state or abrogated b y Congress. But Colorado has n ot waived its immunity from prisoner civil rights actions, see Griess v. Colorado , 841 F.2d 1042, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 1988) (per c uriam), and Congress did not abrogate st ates’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting § 1983, see Ellis , 163 F.3d at 1196. Brooks also declares he did not sue the indi vidual State defendants for dam ages in their official capacities, but his complaint is not so limited. The district court properly determined the damages claims against the CDOC and individual State defendants in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and legall y frivolous.
2. Dismissal of court acce ss and retaliation claims The district court concluded th e remainder of Brooks’ court acc ess and retaliation claims were legally fri volous and therefore s ubject to dismissa l for a number of reasons. To affirm dismissal of these claim s, we need only consider one of these reasons: the district court’s finding that Bro oks failed to assert facts tha t state an arguable claim either because he failed to include esse ntial allegations or asserted constitutional rights that do not exist.

a. Standard of review In reviewing whether Brooks state d an arguable claim for denial of court access or retaliation we consider whether h e has alleged facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” taking all of Brooks’ well-plea ded facts, but not conclusory11 allegations, as true and construi ng them in the light most favo rable to him. 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (interna l quotation marks omitted); Acosta v. Jani-King of Okla., Inc. , 905 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 2 018). “A claim has facial pl ausibility when the plaintiff pleads factua l content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant i s liable for the misconduct alleg ed.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. A failure to state a claim is l egally frivolous if the claim la cks an arguable basis in law.
See Neitzke , 490 U.S. at 328. Brooks begins his challenge to th e district court’s dismissal o f these claims by arguing that the court improperly held him to a heightened plea ding standard, pointing to the court’s direction that he needed to “make clear exactly who is alleged to have done
what to whom , . . . as distinguished from coll ective allegations” for his § 1983 claims to pass muster. R. Vol. 1 at 45 (quoting Pahls v. Thomas , 718 F.3d 1210, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2013) (inter nal quotation marks omitted)). Brooks c ontends this is a summary judgment standard but in fact it is the standard by which we re view complaints asserting § 1983 claims against multiple def endants, based on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See, e.g. , Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins , 656 F.3d 1210, 12 15 (10th Cir. 2011); Robbins v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of

6 Brooks asserts that our recita tion of this standard of review in other appeals in which we reviewed Brooks’ pl eadings indicates that we believ e his complaints are well-pleaded and that he has mast ered the federal pleading rule s. Opening Br. at 17. He is mistaken. This is the sta ndard of review we apply to det ermine the sufficiency of all pleadings and our stateme nt of it does not connote that the pleadings in question are sufficient and othe rwise comply with the federal r ules.12 Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10th Ci r. 2008). The district court d id not err in advising Brooks of this standardor applying it to his claims.
b. Court access claims Brooks asserted four claims in whi ch he alleged all or some of the defendants violated his constitutional right t o access the courts in vario us ways. In the first and broadest of these claims, Brooks alleges CDOC’s legal access po licies violate his First Amendment right to access the cour ts because they allow FCF to maintain an inadequate law library, limit inmate access to the library and to word pro cessing, printing and copying equipment there, allow li brary staff to review inmate d ocuments, and do not provide inmates with a reasonabl e means of helping each other w ith legal work. But as Brooks knows from our decision in h is previous appeal in this c ase, see Brooks , 730 F. App’x at 631-32, to stat e a claim for denial of the cons titutional right of access to the courts he was required to a llege more than that the prison library or legal access policies are “subpar in some theoretical sense.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). To state this claim Brooks was required to allege “actual injur y” to his right to access the courts, that is, to a llege facts showing how the all egedly deficient law library and challenged CDOC polic ies impaired his ability to pu rsue a nonfrivolous claim. Id. at 349, 351, 353 & n.3 (requiring that “the alleged shortcomings” actually hinder a prisoner’s “efforts to p ursue a legal claim” that is n ot frivolous) ; Trujillo v. Williams , 465 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner must “ show that any denial or delay of access to the c ourt prejudiced him in pursui ng litigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).13 Brooks did not sufficiently alleg e actual injury. His general allegations that he failed to prevail in h is collateral attacks on his conviction a nd restitution order as a result of the challenged policie s and their implementation by F CF staff are too vague and conclusory to state an argua ble claim. He further suggeste d in his complaint that CDOC’s policies prevented him from timely challenging his crimi nal conviction, but not only did he fail to explain how the policies interfered wit h his ability to timely bring such claims, our review i ndicates that his federal habeas actions were actually denied on the merits or because Brooks failed to exhaust his re medies in state court. See, e.g., Brooks v. Archuleta , 621 F. App’x 921, 925 -28 (10th Cir. 2015); Brooks v.
Archuleta , 681 F. App’x 705, 706 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 132 (2017)

. 7 Brooks’ allegation that he was unable to file “at least three d ifferent U.S. Supreme Court Certiorari briefs,” R. Vol . I at 54, also fails to allege actual injury because he again did not explain how the c hallenged policies and actions p revented him from filing these briefs or that the c laims he wished to bring befor e the Supreme Court were nonfrivolous. See McBride v. Deer , 240 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding plaintiff failed to allege actual injury on similar gr ounds). Brooks contends the required specific allegations wer e included in his 72-page amen ded complaint, but we

7 To the extent Brooks is asserti ng that CDOC’s legal access poli cies prevented him from exhausting his claims in state court, he fai ls to explain in his second amended complaint or his o ther filings in the district c ourt how this is so. We also observe, as we did in affirm ing the district court’s denia l of Brooks’ motion for preliminary injunction, see Brooks , 730 F. App’x at 632 , that the challenged CDOC policies have not prevented Bro oks from presenting this court a nd the district court with lengthy and detailed argumen ts on the issues presented.14 see the same failings in the inco mplete version of his first am ended complaint and the detailed account of the omitted po rtion of this complaint he pr ovided in his second preliminary injunction motion. For these reasons, the district court properly found Brooks’ first court access claim was legally frivolous. Brooks also included two claims in his second amended complaint in which he alleged various defendants viol ated his First Amendment rights because FCF law librarians allegedly read legal d ocuments he created and stored on FCF’s law library computers and deleted or required Brooks to delete some of thes e documents. The district court construed these claims as alleging interference with Brooks’ right to access the courts, and held they were frivolous because he again faile d to allege specific facts describing any nonfrivolous legal claim he was unable to pursue as a result of the named defendants’ alleged actions. We agree. 8
Brooks’ final court access claim alleges certain defendants int erfered with his constitutional right to work as a “jailhouse lawyer” for other inmates. The district court properly dismissed this claim as legally frivolous because our precedent establishes that Brooks has no such constitutional right. See Smith v. Maschner , 899 F.2d 940, 950 (10th Cir. 1990); cf. Shaw v. Murphy , 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001) (d eclining “to cloak the provision of legal assistance [ by prisoners] with any First Ame ndment protection above

8 Brooks also asserted in one of t hese claims that the libraria ns’ actions violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed this claim for failure to state a claim, holding that prisoners d o not have a reasonable expectat ion of privacy in files contained on a prison library c omputer and hence cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable se arches and seizures. Brooks does not challenge this decision on appeal and hence we do not address it. See Bronson , 500 F.3d at 1104.15 and beyond the protection normallyaccorded prisoners’ speech” because “it is indisputable that inmate law cle rks are sometimes a menace to p rison discipline” (internal quotations omitted)). 9 Brooks also cites several Suprem e Court decisions in support of his alleged constitutional right to provide l egal assistance to other inmat es but his reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Johnson v. Avery , 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the Supreme Court did not address whether an inmate has a constitutional right to provide legal assistance to other inmates but rather whether a pris on could absolutely bar inmate s from providing this assistance. See id. at 490 (holding a prison may pl ace reasonable restrictions on jailhouse lawyering but may not prevent a n inmate from receiving assistan ce from other inmates in preparing petitions for post-conv iction relief unless it provid es reasonable alternatives to assist them). Similarly, in Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the C ourt held only that a prison must assist inmates in the preparation and filing of m eaningful legal papers in order not to infringe on each inm ate’s constitutional right of access to the courts, while also recognizing that this assi stance may tak e many forms. See id. at 828, 830-32. The Court expanded on the limited nature of this holding in Lewis , 518 U.S. at 350-51, leading us to inform B rooks in his previous appeal in this acti on: The right to access the courts does not . . . guarantee inmates “the right to a law library or to legal assistance ,” but merely to “the means f or ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity t o present claimed violations o f fundamental constitutional righ ts to the courts.” . . . The rig ht “guarantees no particular methodology but rath er the conferral of a capabil ity—the

9 To the extent Scott v. Coughlin , 344 F.3d 282, 288 (2d Cir. 2003), cited by Brooks, supports this propositi on, it is contrary to the govern ing law in this circuit. See Smith , 899 F.2d at 950.16 capability of bringing contemplatedchallenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Brooks , 730 F. App’x at 631 (quoting Lewis , 518 U.S. at 350-51, 356 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nothing in the se decisions suggests a jailhou se lawyer such as Brooks has a constitutional right to pr ovide the assistance these case s describe.

c. Retaliation claim Brooks asserts the named defend ants retaliated against him for acting as a jailhouse lawyer on behalf of ano ther inmate, in violation of t he First and Fourteenth Amendments. 10 To state such a claim, Brooks was required to allege, among o ther things, that the defendants reta liated against him for engaging in a constitutionally protected activity. See Shero v. City of Grove , 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007). Brooks failed to state an arguabl e retaliation claim because, a s just described, acting as a jailhouse lawyer is not a constitutionally protected activity. See Smith , 899 F.2d at 950.
CONCLUSION We conclude the district court properly dismissed Brooks’ clai ms as frivolous and as a result this dismissal count s as a “strike ” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Jennings v. Natrona Cty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson , 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015). We further conclude Brooks’ appe al is frivolous under § 1915(e) (2)(B)(i) and therefore dismiss this appeal and assess another strike. We remind Brook s that if he accrues

10 In his brief, Brooks also alle ges the defendants retaliated a gainst him for bringing this action, but this is not what he alleged in his co mplaint.17 three strikes, he ma y not proceed IFP in civil actions before f ederal courts unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Because his appeal is frivolous, w e also deny Brooks’ motion to proceed IFP on appeal. See DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). Brooks is directed to make immediate payme nt of the unpaid balance of his filing fee. Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge