UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4091

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DUPRE DISHAWN JENKINS, a/k/a Dupree Dishawn Jenkins,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00145-WO-1)

Submitted: September 9, 2015 Decided: September 11, 2015

Before SHEDD, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Craig M. Cooley, COOLEY LAW OFFICE, Cary, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant United States

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Dupre Dishawn Jenkins pled guilty, pursuant to a written 

plea agreement, to two counts of interference with commerce by 

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2 (2012). The 

district court sentenced Jenkins to concurrent 108-month terms 

of imprisonment, within the 100- to 125-month advisory 

Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, counsel has filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but 

questioning whether Jenkins was denied effective assistance of 

counsel. Jenkins was advised of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief, but has not filed one. The Government 

declined to file a brief.

Because Jenkins did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, we review the guilty plea hearing for 

plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th 

Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Jenkins] must show that 

an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error 

affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad, 

478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Jenkins satisfies 

these requirements, “correction of the error remains within our 

discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error 

seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 
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citation omitted). Our review of the record leads us to 

conclude that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting Jenkins’ guilty 

plea, which Jenkins entered knowingly and voluntarily. 

Next, we review Jenkins’ sentence for procedural and 

substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse of 

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). We must first ensure that the district court did not 

commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing to 

properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to 

consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors, or 

failing to adequately explain the sentence. Id. If we find the 

sentence procedurally reasonable, we then consider its 

substantive reasonableness. Id. at 328. We presume on appeal 

that a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range 

is substantively reasonable. United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 

162, 176 (4th Cir. 2014). Such a presumption is rebutted only 

when the defendant shows “that the sentence is unreasonable when 

measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. 

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006). 

Upon review, we discern no procedural or substantive 

sentencing error by the district court. The district court 

correctly calculated Jenkins’ advisory Guidelines range, heard 

argument from counsel, provided Jenkins an opportunity to 
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allocute, and considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. We 

have reviewed the record and conclude that Jenkins’ withinGuidelines sentence is both procedurally and substantively 

reasonable.

Turning to Jenkins’ ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims, unless an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively 

appears on the face of the record, such claims are not generally 

addressed on direct appeal, United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 

424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008), but rather should be raised in a 

motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to 

permit sufficient development of the record. United States v. 

Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Because the 

record does not conclusively establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel, we conclude that these claims should be raised, if at 

all, in a § 2255 motion.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this 

case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. This 

court requires that counsel inform Jenkins, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Jenkins requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Jenkins.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED