United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued July 5, 2018

Decided August 14, 2018

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 17-2878

JOHN G. BARRETT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Western Division.

No. 16 CV 50257

Iain D. Johnston,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

John Barrett applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income based on limitations from bipolar disorder and alcohol addiction. If an 

administrative law judge (ALJ) had found him disabled, then Barrett would shoulder

the burden of showing that his alcoholism was not material to his disability. An ALJ

found that he was not disabled, however, even when considering his alcohol addiction, 

and denied him benefits. The district court agreed, and we affirm. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 17-2878 Page 2

I

Barrett started drinking alcohol as a teenager, and he began to drink heavily 

when he was 19 years old, near the time his brother committed suicide. At age 27, he 

was hospitalized and reported depression and suicidal ideation; at this time, he was 

drinking one to two 6-packs per day, four to five days per week. He stopped working as 

an assistant manager at Walgreens in January 2009. 

From then on, Barrett’s condition worsened, and initial treatment proved 

ineffective. In April 2010, he reported to his primary care physician, Dr. Paul Reith, that 

he was having problems with alcohol and anxiety. Dr. Reith prescribed medications to 

help Barrett manage his mental health issues. He went to Rosecrance, a detoxification 

and rehabilitation facility, where he was diagnosed with alcohol dependence. Soon after 

leaving Rosecrance, he began treatment with Raymond Garcia, a psychiatrist. Within 

months, though, Barrett was anxious and drinking excessively again. Barrett was 

admitted to the emergency room in October, intoxicated and depressed, and then 

returned to Rosecrance, where staff diagnosed him with alcohol dependence, anxiety, 

and bipolar disorder. When he left Rosecrance, he relapsed immediately and had to 

return for a third round of treatment for the same diagnoses. He kept drinking 

excessively through 2011, leading to another hospitalization. 

For some time when he was not hospitalized or in rehab in 2010 and 2011, Barrett 

worked at his father’s law practice, summarizing depositions and medical records, and 

engaging in “logic-related” activities. His father fired him, however, after he caught 

Barrett drinking liquor in the office. He also took the Law School Admissions Test 

(LSAT) in 2010, and he received a below-average score.

Barrett turned his life around in December 2011 when he entered the 13-month 

Men’s Recovery Program at the Las Vegas Rescue Mission, a rehabilitation facility. 

Barrett’s case manager said that Barrett had a “profound alcohol problem” and that 

obtaining treatment “is absolutely necessary and should be prioritized.” Barrett

attended individual therapy and group therapy for alcoholics. He also spent up to 

eight hours per day in “work therapy.” He started this therapy by watching the security 

gate and later progressed to maintaining class attendance records for 100 residents. 

After only about a month, his case manager recorded that Barrett “feels good mentally 

and physically” and “all in all he is doing well.” While the environment at the Mission 

was structured and Barrett had supervision there, Barrett largely functioned 

independently during his stay. Since leaving the Mission in January 2013, Barrett has 
No. 17-2878 Page 3

finished law school. In addition, he remains sober and stable, without the use of 

medication. 

Reflecting on Barrett’s alcohol addiction, Dr. Garcia opined that he had a 

“primary psychiatric condition with a secondary substance use disorder,” and that 

“[u]nresolved grief and post-traumatic stress over his brother’s suicide fueled his mood 

disorder and alcohol abuse.” Dr. Garcia also concluded that Barrett was disabled and 

could not work before completing the program at the Mission. 

Barrett applied for disability benefits for the period of September 1, 2009 through 

January 7, 2013 (the date he left the Mission), and an ALJ found that he was not 

disabled. The ALJ applied the five-step analysis required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). 

She said that Barret did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the closed 

period (step one) and that his alcohol dependence, bipolar disorder, and posttraumatic 

stress disorder were severe impairments (step two). 

Most important for this appeal, the ALJ found at step three that Barrett’s 

impairments were not presumptively disabling. In particular, she found that Barrett did 

not meet the “Paragraph C” criteria of listing 12.04. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1

(2015). At the time of the ALJ’s ruling, Paragraph C was satisfied if, in relevant part, the 

claimant had “repeated episodes of decompensation” of extended duration—that is, in 

one year, the claimant had the equivalent of three, two-week increases in symptoms 

with a loss of adaptive functioning. Id. An episode of decompensation can be inferred 

from “the need for a more structured psychological support system” or from a showing 

of “1 or more years’ inability to function outside a highly supportive living 

arrangement, with an indication of continued need for such an arrangement.” Id.

Regarding Paragraph C, the ALJ wrote that all of Barrett’s conditions taken 

together “posed no more than moderate limitations” on his ability to work. Each of his

episodes of decompensation, she continued, “was predicated by a relapse of alcohol,” 

and Barrett was “primarily treated for alcoholism” when hospitalized. This conclusion

is significant because the Social Security Act bars a claimant from receiving benefits if 

his alcoholism is “material” to his disability, i.e., that he would not be disabled but for 

his alcohol addiction. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C), 1382c(a)(3)(J); Kangail v. Barnhart, 

454 F.3d 627, 628 (7th Cir. 2006). She gave no weight to Dr. Garcia’s opinion on Barrett’s 

conditions because she found that his opinion was inconsistent with the record. 

The ALJ then found that, even when considering impairments from his 

alcoholism in conjunction with the others, Barrett had the residual functional capacity 
No. 17-2878 Page 4

during the closed period to perform simple, repetitive, unskilled work in two-hour 

increments, with occasional changes to his environment and occasional decision 

making. In making her assessment, she emphasized that Barrett had worked in a small 

law firm and while at the Mission. 

Finally, based on hearing testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded 

that Barrett could have performed his past work of a housekeeper (step four) or work as 

a dishwasher or janitor (step five), during the alleged closed period of disability.

The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final word of 

the Commissioner. See Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017).

A magistrate judge, presiding by consent, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), affirmed that decision, 

concluding that the ALJ “essentially” found that Barrett’s alcohol use was material to 

his disability, and that substantial evidence supported the implicit finding.

II

On appeal Barrett argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s 

conclusion that his alcoholism was material to his disability. See Kangail, 454 F.3d 

at 628–29. The ALJ, however, concluded that Barrett was not disabled considering all 

his impairments, so any error regarding her materiality analysis is harmless. In fact, 

because she determined that Barrett was never disabled even with his alcohol addiction, 

she need not even have considered whether his alcoholism was material to his 

limitations. See Sizemore v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 72, 81 (4th Cir. 2017). An ALJ must 

determine if a claimant’s drug or alcohol addiction is material to his or her disability 

only if the ALJ first finds that the claimant is disabled. Soc. Sec. Ruling, SSR 13–2p; 

Titles II & XVI: Evaluating Cases Involving Drug Addiction & Alcoholism (DAA), 

78 Fed. Reg. 11939, 11941–42 (Feb. 20, 2013). Here, the ALJ determined that Barrett’s 

impairments, including his alcoholism, taken together were at most moderately 

limiting, and she concluded that he could have sustained full-time employment. That 

conclusion is supported by substantial evidence: Barrett performed in workplace-like

settings tasks such as summarizing depositions and medical records and maintaining 

attendance records of 100 people. He also sat for the LSAT—though the ALJ 

emphasized his “above-average” score when it was in fact below average, the fact that 

he sat for the test and achieved the score he did was consistent with someone capable of 

working.

Barrett interprets the ALJ’s decision differently and argues that the ALJ erred 

when she effectively determined that Barrett’s alcoholism was material before 
No. 17-2878 Page 5

concluding that Barrett was disabled considering all his impairments. He reads the 

ALJ’s statement that Barrett’s alcohol use “predicated” his episodes of decompensation 

as implicit findings both that Barrett satisfied the Paragraph C criteria and that 

alcoholism was material to his disability. Even based on his interpretation, though, he 

was not prejudiced by the ALJ’s shortcut because, in assessing materiality, the ALJ 

accepted that Barrett suffered episodes of decompensation and assumed he was 

disabled. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Continuing with his reading, Barrett next disagrees with the ALJ’s determination 

that his alcoholism “predicated” his episodes of decompensation, but he did not carry

his burden of showing that his alcohol addiction was immaterial to his purported

disability. See SSR 13–2p at 11941; Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 

2012) (citing Parra, 481 F.3d at 748; Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003); 

Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 

497–99 (5th Cir.1999)). Barrett relies on Dr. Garcia’s opinion that his alcoholism was a 

“secondary” condition, “fueled” by his “psychiatric” conditions. Dr. Garcia did not 

explain the basis for his conclusion, however, and a treating physician’s unsupported 

conclusion is not controlling. See Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2010). True,

bipolar disorder can precipitate substance abuse, see Kangail, 454 F.3d at 629, but 

without more than Dr. Garcia’s cursory opinion, which the ALJ reasonably discredited

based on the record including the notes from the Mission, Barrett did not show that to

be his case. See Parra, 481 F.3d at 748–49. 

Moreover, even if the ALJ did implicitly conclude that Barrett was disabled when 

considering his alcoholism, the record contains substantial evidence that Barrett’s 

alcoholism was in fact material to his disability. Evidence of improvement, including 

positive evaluations during a period of abstinence, is the “best evidence” that a 

claimant’s drug or alcohol addiction is material. SSR 13–2p at 11943; Cage, 692 F.3d at

127. After a month of maintaining sobriety at the Mission, (before any notes of therapy 

appear in the record), Barrett’s case manager recorded that Barrett “fe[lt] good mentally 

and physically.” Barrett did not report symptoms of bipolar disorder or posttraumatic 

stress disorder. He attended all his classes and performed “excellent[ly]” in work 

therapy. Since leaving the Mission in 2013, Barrett continues to attend group therapy for 

alcoholism and he meets quarterly with Dr. Garcia to help him stay sober and off any 

mental health medication. He obtained his law degree and is now practicing law. His 

positive achievements since 2013 suggests that his alcoholism was material during the 

closed period. As for his episodes of decompensation, he was hospitalized during the 

closed period for alcohol intoxication; his primary diagnosis after each of his three stays 
No. 17-2878 Page 6

at Rosecrance was for alcohol dependence; and the Mission “prioritized” treatment for 

his “profound alcohol problem.” Perhaps Barrett summarized it best himself in his 

application for benefits: “I am an alcoholic. My addiction impairs my ability to obtain a 

job, keep a job, attend work consistently, get to work on time, perform my work 

appropriately ....” If the ALJ implicitly concluded that alcoholism “predicated” his 

episodes of decompensation, she had substantial evidence for that finding.

Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.