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*********************************************** 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF

WATERBURY v. WATERBURY TEACHERS

ASSOCIATION, CEA-NEA

(AC 41981)

Lavine, Prescott and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff board sought to vacate an arbitration award issued in connection with a grievance filed by the defendant union on behalf of a class

of teachers, some of whom were assigned to the T school, alleging that

the board had violated the parties’ collective bargaining agreement by

depriving certain teachers of their bargained for weekly preparation

periods. Following arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator found that

twenty-two teachers at the T school had been routinely deprived of

preparation periods as a result of being required to substitute for absent

teachers. In his award, the arbitrator ordered that the affected teachers

be awarded compensatory damages and that the board cease and desist

from depriving the teachers at the T school of their preparation periods.

The trial court granted the board’s application to vacate the award,

denied the union’s application to confirm the award and rendered judgment thereon, from which the union appealed to this court. Held:

1. The trial court improperly vacated the arbitration award, pursuant to the

applicable statute (§ 52-418 (a) (4)), on the ground that the arbitrator

exceeded or so imperfectly executed his powers that a mutual, final

and definite award on the subject matter submitted was not made, as

the award conformed to the arbitration submission: the unrestricted

submission required a determination of whether teachers at the T school

were deprived of their preparation periods and, if so, the nature and

extent of their remedy, and the award determined that only twenty-two

teachers at the T school had been deprived of their preparation periods,

awarded the affected teachers compensatory damages and ordered the

board to cease and desist from depriving the teachers at the T school

of their preparation periods, and, therefore, the award plainly conformed

to the submission because it was directly responsive to, and did not

exceed the scope of, the submission; moreover, there was no merit to

the board’s argument that the award was not mutual, final and definite

because the award did not offer any guidance that could be used in

similar situations arising in the future, and the board’s argument that

the award failed to provide a basis for why the application of the cease

and desist order applied only to the teachers at the T school and not

to others misapprehended the award.

2. The trial court improperly determined that the arbitration award violated

the public policy set forth in the Teacher Negotiation Act (§ 10-153a et

seq.): the relevant public policy of the act, that parties must negotiate

salaries and other conditions of employment through the collective

bargaining process, was not contravened by the execution of the award

because the act applies to arbitrations of collective bargaining agreements and does not apply to grievance arbitrations, the parties in fact

abided by the act and negotiated various terms of employment in their

agreement, including salary and compensation, the award did not constitute compensation, salary or remuneration because compensatory damages are not synonymous with compensation, the award did not add to

or modify the provisions of the agreement, and, most important, the

arbitrator awarded compensatory damages, which was within his authority as provided in the terms of the agreement; moreover, the award was

not inconsistently limited to a group within a collective bargaining unit,

as it was properly limited to the aggrieved teachers at the T school who

had presented evidence of their deprivation at the arbitration proceedings.

Argued November 12, 2019—officially released March 17, 2020

Procedural History
Application to vacate an arbitration award, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,

where the defendant filed an application to confirm the

award; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, M.

Taylor, J.; judgment granting the application to vacate

and denying the application to confirm, from which the

defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment

directed.

Adrienne R. DeLucca, with whom, on the brief, was

Martin A. Gould, for the appellant (defendant).

Tara L. Shaw, with whom, on the brief, were Connor

P. McNamara and Anne Murdica, for the appellee

(plaintiff).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The defendant, the Waterbury Teachers

Association, CEA-NEA (union), appeals from the judgment of the trial court vacating an arbitration award in

favor of the plaintiff, the Board of Education of the City

of Waterbury (board). On appeal, the union claims that

the trial court erred in concluding that (1) the arbitrator

so imperfectly executed his powers that a mutual, final,

and definite award on the subject matter submitted was

not made, and (2) the arbitration award violates public

policy. We agree with both of the union’s claims and,

accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the arbitrator, are

germane to this appeal. In January, 2017, the union filed

a grievance on behalf of a class of teachers, some of

whom were assigned to Tinker Elementary School (Tinker school), alleging that the board had violated the

collective bargaining agreement between the union and

the board (agreement) by depriving certain teachers of

their bargained for weekly preparation periods. Specifically, the grievance stated: ‘‘Preparation [p]eriods. The

[union] alleges that the [board] is in violation of the

2016–2019 [agreement] at Tinker [school] and other

elementary schools as a result of multiple teachers failing to receive the [bargained for] preparation period.’’

The union requested that the board cease and desist

from such violations and that it pay all affected teachers

who could quantify the loss at their per diem hourly

rate. The board unanimously upheld the grievance and

stated that the administration would make ‘‘every effort

to provide [teachers with] the required five preparation

periods per week.’’ The board, however, denied the

monetary award sought by the union.

The union then filed for arbitration, which was held

before Attorney Emanuel N. Psarakis (arbitrator) in

September, 2017. The parties were unable to agree on

an arbitration submission and, therefore, allowed the

arbitrator to fashion it. The board did not object to the

submission as framed by the arbitrator. The submission

stated: ‘‘Has the [board] violated the requirement that

Waterbury [kindergarten through fifth grade] teachers

at the Tinker school receive five weekly preparation

periods, and that each preparation period must be no

less than [thirty] minutes in duration with no less than

three hours of preparation time per week? If so, what

shall the remedy be?’’1

Following the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator

found that twenty-two teachers at the Tinker school

during the 2016–2017 school year were routinely

deprived of one or more of their bargained for weekly

preparation periods as a result of being required to

substitute for other, absent teachers.2 The arbitrator

found, and the parties agreed, that the agreement had

been violated by the board. The remaining issue for
the arbitrator to decide was ‘‘whether or not monetary

damages [were] appropriate for the admitted deprivation of preparation time authorized for teachers under

the [agreement].’’

The board took the position that its initial offer, to

make ‘‘every effort’’ thereafter to comply with the contract, was reasonable. The board further argued that

the agreement does not authorize damages for such

violations and that the agreement does not provide compensation for missed preparation periods.3 Accordingly,

the board argued that an award of compensatory damages would exceed the authority of the arbitrator

because it would modify and add to the agreement. The

arbitrator rejected the board’s arguments and concluded that a compensatory award to the aggrieved

teachers was appropriate because the agreement

expressly authorized the awarding of compensatory

damages by an arbitrator, the agreement did not

expressly limit compensatory damages for the deprivation of preparation periods, and a monetary award

would place the affected parties essentially in the same

position in which they would be had there been no

violation. The arbitrator further reasoned that ‘‘the remedy announced by the board to make ‘every effort’ to

provide the required preparation periods is not a viable

or reasonable one. It provides no consequences for

ongoing violations, and allowed the board to continue

violations with impunity.’’ The arbitrator also noted that

the board negotiated the provisions of the agreement,

and, therefore, it was ‘‘not impossible to foresee that

absences on account of authorized leave would impact

upon the number of teachers available to teach on

any day.’’

The arbitrator issued the following arbitration award

(award): ‘‘Compensatory damages to each affected

teacher as set forth [herein]; [a]n [o]rder that the [b]oard

[c]ease and [d]esist from refusing to provide contract[ual] preparation periods to teachers at the Tinker

[s]chool; [and] [f]ailing compliance with such [c]ease

and [d]esist [o]rder, the [b]oard will become liable for

and obligated to pay appropriate compensatory damages to affected teachers consistent with the formula

discussed [herein]. It thereby will become responsible

for compensatory damages to teachers for any preparation periods that continue to be denied [them] after the

date of this decision.’’

After the award was issued, the union wrote to the

arbitrator and requested the following clarification:

‘‘Does the [c]ease and [d]esist [o]rder requiring prospective compensatory liability for the denial of preparation

periods during the remainder of the current [agreement]

apply only to Tinker [school] teachers, all elementary

school teachers in the bargaining unit or all teachers

within the bargaining unit?’’ Over the board’s objection,

the arbitrator responded to the union’s request for clari-
fication. He stated in part: ‘‘Consequently, to the extent

that clarification may be necessary, any further monetary liability under this [award] for subsequent denial of

preparation periods during the remainder of the current

[agreement] applies only to the affected teachers at the

Tinker school for which compensatory damages were

awarded.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The union filed in the trial court an application to

confirm the award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-

417, and the board filed an application to vacate the

award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418. In support

of its application, the board argued that, pursuant to

§ 52-418 (a) (4), the award must be vacated because

the arbitrator exceeded his powers under the agreement

and the award was not final and definite and was, therefore, unenforceable.4 The board also argued that the

award was contrary to law in that it disregarded the

doctrines of impossibility and/or impracticality,5 and

that the award violated public policy.

The court granted the board’s application to vacate

the award and issued a memorandum of decision, in

which it stated that the award ‘‘created an inconsistency

in the application of the [agreement] to members of the

union,’’ despite an agreement provision to the contrary,

because it ‘‘limit[ed] remuneration to Tinker’s teachers’’

and that ‘‘parties are statutorily required to collectively

bargain over the terms and conditions of employment,

which includes salaries.’’ The court decided that the

‘‘award was imperfectly executed, in that a mutual, final

and definite award upon the subject matter submitted

was not made, as it may be inconsistently applied to

teachers in the district and, moreover, without following the mandatory provisions of the [Teacher Negotiation Act, General Statutes § 10-153a et seq.], applicable

to the entire bargaining unit.’’ The court concluded that

the award violates public policy. Accordingly, the court

granted the board’s application to vacate the award

and denied the union’s application to confirm it. This

appeal followed.

I

The union claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the arbitrator so imperfectly executed his

powers that a mutual, final, and definite award on the

subject matter submitted was not made. We agree with

the union.

The standard that governs our review of arbitration

awards that are challenged pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4)

is as follows. ‘‘The scope of judicial review of arbitration

awards is very narrow. Our courts favor arbitration as

a means of settling differences and uphold the finality

of arbitration awards except where an award clearly

falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 . . . . Subsection (a) (4) of . . . § 52-418 . . . provides in part that

an award is invalid if the arbitrators have exceeded
their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a

mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter

submitted was not made. Generally, any challenge to

an award pursuant to . . . § 52-418 (a) (4) on the

ground that the arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly

performed their powers is properly limited to a comparison of the award with the submission. . . . If the award

conforms to the submission, the arbitrators have not

exceeded their powers.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Exley v. Connecticut Yankee Greyhound Racing, Inc., 59 Conn. App. 224, 228, 755 A.2d 990, cert.

denied, 254 Conn. 939, 761 A.2d 760 (2000). ‘‘In deciding

whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers,

this court, as a general rule, examines only the award

to determine whether it is in conformity with the submission. The memorandum of the arbitrator is irrelevant.’’ Board of Education v. AFSCME, 195 Conn. 266,

271, 487 A.2d 553 (1985).

‘‘Where the submission does not otherwise state, the

arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal

questions and an award cannot be vacated on the

grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or

the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators

was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor,

where the submission is unrestricted, will they review

the arbitrators’ decision of the legal questions involved.

. . . The party challenging the award bears the burden

of producing evidence sufficient to demonstrate a violation of § 52-418.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford

Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 258 Conn. 101, 115,

779 A.2d 737 (2001). The trial court’s determination of

whether the award conforms to the submission is a

legal conclusion and is, therefore, subject to our plenary

review. See, e.g., Tuxis-Ohr’s, Inc. v. Gherlone, 76 Conn.

App. 34, 39, 818 A.2d 799, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 907,

826 A.2d 179 (2003).

The trial court concluded that a final and definite

award was not made because it ‘‘may be inconsistently

applied to the teachers in the district . . . .’’ The union

argues on appeal that there is no support for the trial

court’s conclusion that a grievance award to an affected

grievant is not mutual, final, and definite because it

applies only to the particular employee who is affected.

The board argues in response that the award will result

in an inconsistent application to teachers in the district

because the underlying grievance was expressly filed

on behalf of a broader set of teachers than those

assigned to the Tinker school;6

the union requested

clarification as to whether the award applied to other

district schools, despite not having presented evidence

of those schools; the award did not offer any guidance

that could be used in similar situations arising in the

future; and the award failed to provide a basis for why

the application of the cease and desist order applied

only to the Tinker school and not to others. We are not
persuaded by the board’s arguments.

Our review of whether the arbitrator imperfectly executed his powers is limited to a determination of

whether the award conforms to the submission.7 As

stated previously, the submission stated: ‘‘Has the

[board] violated the requirement that Waterbury [kindergarten through fifth grade] teachers at the Tinker

school receive five weekly preparation periods, and that

each preparation period must be no less than [thirty]

minutes in duration with no less than three hours of

preparation time per week? If so, what shall the remedy

be?’’ (Emphasis added.) The award stated: ‘‘Compensatory damages to each affected teacher as set forth

[herein]; [a]n [o]rder that the [b]oard [c]ease and

[d]esist from refusing to provide contract[ual] preparation periods to teachers at the Tinker [s]chool; [and]

[f]ailing compliance with such [c]ease and [d]esist

[o]rder, the [b]oard will become liable for and obligated

to pay appropriate compensatory damages to affected

teachers consistent with the formula discussed [herein].

It thereby will become responsible for compensatory

damages to teachers for any preparation periods that

continue to be denied after the date of this decision.’’

The arbitrator clarified the award insofar as he stated

that ‘‘any further monetary liability under this [award]

for subsequent denial of preparation periods during the

remainder of the current [agreement] applies only to

the affected teachers at the Tinker school for which

compensatory damages were awarded.’’ (Emphasis

added.)

The parties agree that the submission was

unrestricted.8 The submission was whether teachers at

the Tinker school were deprived of their preparation

periods and, if so, the nature and extent of their remedy.

The award determined that only twenty-two teachers

at the Tinker school had proven that they had been

deprived of their preparation periods and, as such,

awarded compensatory damages to those teachers.

Moreover, the award ordered the board to cease and

desist from refusing to provide preparation periods to

the affected teachers at the Tinker school who had been

awarded the compensatory damages. The award plainly

conforms to the submission because the award is

directly responsive to, and does not exceed the scope

of, the submission.

We reject the board’s argument that the award was

not mutual, final, and definite because the award did

not offer any guidance that could be used in similar

situations arising in the future. If the award had been

so broad, it arguably would have exceeded the scope

of the submission and would not have been mutual,

final, and definite. Additionally, ‘‘an arbitration award

is not considered conclusive or binding in subsequent

cases involving the same contract language but different

incidents or grievances.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 248 Conn. 108, 118, 728 A.2d

1063 (1999). It is, therefore, of little consequence that

the award did not offer guidance to be used in similar

cases arising in the future.

The board cited Bridgeport City Supervisors’ Assn.

v. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. App. 717, 952 A.2d 1248, cert.

denied, 289 Conn. 937, 958 A.2d 1244 (2008), to illustrate

a case in which an award was not definite and, therefore, properly vacated by the trial court. In that case,

the court held that an arbitrator’s award was not definite

because it awarded the grievant alternative relief, insofar as she was to be reinstated either to one position

or to another position, and, therefore, the award did

not definitively fix the rights and obligations of the

parties. Id., 728–29. The court decided that the award

‘‘le[ft] open the possibility of disagreement and litigation as to [the grievant’s] ultimate placement.’’ Id., 729.

In the present case, the arbitrator did not grant alternative relief to the aggrieved teachers and, therefore,

Bridgeport City Supervisors’ Assn. does not change

our conclusion.

Furthermore, we reject the board’s argument that the

award failed to provide a basis for why the application

of the cease and desist order applied only to the teachers at the Tinker school and not to others. This argument

misapprehends the award. The award applied only to

the twenty-two affected teachers at the Tinker school,

not all teachers at the Tinker school. Because the award

applied only to those teachers who had proven that

they had been deprived of their preparation periods,

the basis was clear as to why the application of the cease

and desist order applied only to those affected teachers.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the

trial court improperly vacated the arbitration award on

the basis that the arbitrator exceeded or imperfectly

executed his powers pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4).9

II

The union also claims that the trial court erred in

finding that the award violates the public policy of the

Teacher Negotiation Act (act); see General Statutes

§ 10-153a et seq.; because the parties’ agreement was

modified without consideration of the statutory factors

set forth in the act.10 We agree with the union.

‘‘A court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award

. . . because it is contrary to public policy is a specific

application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the

common law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy. . . . This rule

is an exception to the general rule restricting judicial

review of arbitral awards. . . . The public policy

exception applies only when the award is clearly illegal

or clearly violative of a strong public policy. . . . A

challenge that an award is in contravention of public
policy is premised on the fact that the parties cannot

expect an arbitration award approving conduct which

is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial

endorsement any more than parties can expect a court

to enforce such a contract between them. . . . When

a challenge to the arbitrator’s authority is made on

public policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator’s decision

but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award. . . .

Accordingly, the public policy exception to arbitral

authority should be narrowly construed and [a] court’s

refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s [award] is limited to

situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and

dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the

laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. . . .

‘‘The party challenging the award bears the burden

of proving that illegality or conflict with public policy

is clearly demonstrated. . . . Therefore, given the narrow scope of the public policy limitation on arbitral

authority, [a party] can prevail . . . only if it demonstrates that the [arbitrator’s] award clearly violates an

established public policy mandate. . . . [W]hen a challenge to a voluntary arbitration award rendered pursuant to an unrestricted submission raises a legitimate

and colorable claim of violation of public policy, the

question of whether the award violates public policy

requires de novo judicial review.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

DeRose v. Jason Robert’s, Inc., 191 Conn. App. 781,

803–804, 216 A.3d 699, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 934, 218

A.3d 593 (2019).

In its memorandum of decision, the court first stated

that provisions of the act represent a clear and dominant

public policy of Connecticut and, further, that pursuant

to West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy,

162 Conn. 566, 586–87, 295 A.2d 526 (1972), questions

of conditions of employment, including compensation,

are mandatory subjects of negotiation. The court determined that, in the present case, ‘‘arguably noncompensable terms and conditions of employment became

compensable through grievance arbitration, brought by

a subgroup of a bargaining unit, and were thereby inconsistently limited to one of many elementary schools in

the district.’’

On appeal, the parties agree that the act sets forth

public policy with respect to the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. The union argues, however,

that the award does not violate the public policy set

forth in the act because the act applies to arbitrations

of collective bargaining agreements, not to grievance

arbitrations. Furthermore, it argues that the parties bargained for the following terms within the agreement:

that every teacher would be given five preparation peri-
ods per week and that an arbitrator of a grievance would

have the authority to fashion a compensatory award.

In response, the board asserts that enforcing the

award would violate the public policy set forth in the

act insofar as salaries and working conditions must be

negotiated pursuant to the procedures set forth in the

act.11 The board further argues that the award ‘‘purports

to compensate a group of elementary school teachers

for missing preparation periods where the [agreement]

included specific language prohibiting such compensation, and the board had never compensated for missed

preparation periods in the past.’’ Finally, the board contends that the award lacks clarity and direction with

respect to elementary teachers at other district schools

who similarly miss preparation periods and, therefore,

provide substitute services during those periods.

We conclude that the public policy of the act at issue

in this appeal—that parties must negotiate salaries and

other conditions of employment through the collective

bargaining process—is not contravened by the execution of the award for the following reasons: (1) the act

applies to arbitrations of collective bargaining agreements and does not apply to grievance arbitrations; see

Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 234 Conn. 704, 714, 663 A.2d 349

(1995) (Arbitrations under the act arise out of ‘‘failure

to reach agreement in ordinary collective bargaining

. . . . The [act] establishes a sequence of increasingly

formal collective bargaining procedures to ensure the

existence of a teacher contract by the beginning of the

town’s fiscal year.’’); (2) the parties, in fact, abided by

the act and negotiated various terms of employment in

their agreement, including salary and compensation;

(3) the award did not constitute compensation, salary,

or remuneration because compensatory damages are

not synonymous with compensation;12 (4) the award

did not add to or modify the provisions of the agreement; and, most importantly, (5) the arbitrator awarded

compensatory damages, which was within his authority

per the terms of the agreement.13 That is, the award

provided compensatory damages to those teachers who

had been deprived of the benefit of preparation periods,

which they had negotiated for through the collective

bargaining process. On the basis of the foregoing, we

also reject the claim that the award was inconsistently

limited to a group within a collective bargaining unit; the

award was properly limited to the aggrieved teachers

at the Tinker school who presented evidence of their

deprivation at the arbitration proceedings. In fact, it

was the board that inconsistently provided teachers

with their contractual right to preparation periods,

which had been negotiated for through the collective

bargaining process.

If we were to agree with the board and to conclude

that the award violates the public policy of the act,
teachers would be unable to enforce their contractual

right to preparation periods. Moreover, the authority

for arbitrators to award compensatory damages pursuant to the agreement, in the face of empty gestures like

the board’s promise to ‘‘make every effort’’ to provide

the bargained for preparation periods, would be rendered meaningless. Accordingly, we conclude that the

board’s challenge to the award does not raise a legitimate and colorable claim of a violation of public policy.

The trial court, therefore, improperly vacated the

award.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to render judgment denying the application to vacate the award and granting the application

to confirm the award.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 We note that there was evidence before the arbitrator that there were

approximately twenty-two [kindergarten through fifth grade] teachers at the

Tinker school.

2 The evidence presented by the union at the arbitration proceedings

specifically related to those twenty-two teachers at the Tinker school.

3

In support of this argument, the board asserted that the agreement

language that ‘‘teachers may be required to perform substitute services . . .

without remuneration or other remedy’’ in the event of teacher absences

precluded compensating teachers for missed preparation periods. The arbitrator explicitly rejected this argument on the basis that the ‘‘provision

relating to the performing of substitute services without compensation does

not implicate the [agreement] requirement to provide five nonteaching preparation periods per week.’’

4 General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court . . . shall make an

order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects . . . (4) if

the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them

that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted

was not made.’’

5 With respect to the impossibility and/or impracticality argument, the

arbitrator stated: ‘‘I conclude and find that the [b]oard has not proven it

was legally impossible to comply with the contract[ual] requirements of

preparation periods. The [agreement] is replete with teacher rights to sick

leave, personal leave, religious leave, compensatory leave, family sick leaves,

bereavement leave, child rearing and childbearing leave among others, and

the [agreement] has provisions clearly providing authorized leave benefits

to teachers with and without pay.

‘‘However, I conclude the existence of the contractual requirements to

provide various leave benefits cannot support a claim that it is impossible

to provide them or provide authorized preparation time. The use of authorized leave under this [agreement] was reasonably foreseeable by the [b]oard,

since it is party to and had negotiated the [agreement] provisions providing

these benefits to teachers. It was not impossible to foresee that absences

on account of authorized leave would impact upon the number of teachers

available to teach on any day.

‘‘I conclude that as the [agreement] provides for certain leave benefits

which are then used as authorized, this circumstance does not rise to the level

of creating an impossibility of complying with contract[ual] requirements

providing teachers the requisite preparation time or their use of authorized

leave benefits.’’

6 The grievance stated: ‘‘The [union] alleges that the [board] is in violation

of the 2016–2019 [agreement] at Tinker [school] and other elementary

schools as a result of multiple teachers failing to receive the [bargained for]

preparation period.’’ (Emphasis added.)

7 Because our inquiry is limited to the submission and the award, we do

not consider the board’s arguments with respect to the underlying grievance

and the fact that the union requested clarification of the award.

8

‘‘A submission is unrestricted when . . . the parties’ arbitration agreement contains no language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit
rights, or conditioning the award on court review.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Bridgeport City Supervisors’ Assn. v. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. App.

717, 724 n.2, 952 A.2d 1248, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 937, 958 A.2d 1244 (2008).

9 We also are unpersuaded by the trial court’s reasoning that a final and

definite award was not made because it did not follow the mandatory

provisions of the Teacher Negotiation Act. Those considerations go beyond

our limited scope of review of this claim. The scope of review for arbitration

awards is exceedingly narrow because ‘‘[a]rbitration is a favored method

to prevent litigation, promote tranquility and expedite the equitable settlement of disputes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Benistar Employer

Services Trust Co. v. Benincasa, 189 Conn. App. 304, 309, 207 A.3d 67, cert.

denied, 331 Conn. 932, 208 A.3d 280 (2019).

10 ‘‘The [act] is essentially patterned on the National Labor Relations Act

[29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.]. . . .’’ Hartford Principals’ & Supervisors’ Assn.

v. Shedd, 202 Conn. 492, 503, 522 A.2d 264 (1987); see generally American

Ship Building Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 380 U.S. 300, 317,

85 S. Ct. 955, 13 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1965) (‘‘[t]he central purpose of [the National

Labor Relations Act] was to protect employee self-organization and the

process of collective bargaining from disruptive interferences by

employers’’).

‘‘By enacting the [act] the legislature gave teachers the right to bargain

collectively and imposed upon school boards the duty to negotiate with the

representatives of the teachers. In so doing the legislature expressed the

view that by requiring that disputes between the parties be submitted ‘to

the mediating influence of negotiation it was eliminating any need for resort

to illegal and disruptive tactics, and that disputes between school boards

and teachers were ‘more likely’ of resolution and agreement by negotiation

than by strike or otherwise.’’ Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations

v. Board of Education, 177 Conn. 68, 71–72, 411 A.2d 28 (1979).

The act provides in relevant part: ‘‘Members of the teaching profession

shall have and shall be protected in the exercise of the right to form, join

or assist, any organization for professional or economic improvement and

to negotiate in good faith through representatives of their own choosing

with respect to salaries, hours and other conditions of employment . . . .’’

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 10-153a (a).

11 More specifically, the board argues that missed preparation periods are

‘‘a part of ‘teacher [work]load’ and compensation for such constitute ‘salary’

and, as such, must be negotiated under the [act].’’ Accordingly, the board

argues that the award fails to analyze the board’s ability to pay, consistent

with the act, ‘‘which must be considered and applied when evaluating proposed contract changes in the context of a binding interest arbitration.’’

The board, however, failed to argue that its ability to pay must be considered

and applied when evaluating awards in grievance arbitrations.

12 Compensation is defined as ‘‘[r]emuneration and other benefits received

in return for services rendered; esp., salary or wages,’’ and compensatory

damages are defined as ‘‘[d]amages sufficient in amount to indemnify the

injured person for the loss suffered.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009)

p. 354.

We also reject the board’s assertion that the damages were intended as

remuneration for substitute services rendered because the substitute services rendered were merely the cause of the teacher’s deprivation of their

preparation periods. The arbitrator also explicitly rejected this assertion on

the basis of its factual findings. See footnote 3 of this opinion. ‘‘A court

does not sit to review the factual findings of an arbitrator.’’ AFSCME, Council

4, Local 2663 v. Dept. of Children & Families, 317 Conn. 238, 257, 117 A.3d

470 (2015).

13 The agreement does not specify a remedy for a violation of this preparation periods provision. The agreement, instead, explicitly provides that an

arbitrator ‘‘shall have the power to make an award, including appropriate

compensatory awards.’’