2118 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 9 / Friday, January 12, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

has assets and annual income in excess 

of the amounts that would qualify them 

as small entities. Therefore, System 

institutions are not ‘‘small entities’’ as 

defined in the Regulatory Flexibility 

Act. 

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 622 

Administrative practice and 

procedure, Crime, Investigations, 

Penalties. 

For the reasons stated in the 

preamble, part 622 of chapter VI, title 12 

of the Code of Federal Regulations is 

amended to read as follows: 

PART 622—RULES OF PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 622 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: Secs. 5.9, 5.10, 5.17, 5.25–5.37 

of the Farm Credit Act (12 U.S.C. 2243, 2244, 

2252, 2261–2273); 28 U.S.C. 2461 note; and 

42 U.S.C. 4012a(f). 

■ 2. Revise § 622.61 to read as follows: 

§ 622.61 Adjustment of civil money 

penalties by the rate of inflation under the 

Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment 

Act of 1990, as amended. 

(a) The maximum amount of each 

civil money penalty within FCA’s 

jurisdiction is adjusted in accordance 

with the Federal Civil Penalties 

Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as 

amended (28 U.S.C. 2461 note), as 

follows: 

(1) Amount of civil money penalty 

imposed under section 5.32 of the Act 

for violation of a final order issued 

under section 5.25 or 5.26 of the Act: 

The maximum daily amount is $2,830 

for violations that occur on or after 

January 15, 2024. 

(2) Amount of civil money penalty for 

violation of the Act or regulations: the 

maximum daily amount is $1,280 for 

each violation that occurs on or after 

January 15, 2024. 

(b) The maximum civil money penalty 

amount assessed under 42 U.S.C. 

4012a(f) is $2,661 for each violation that 

occurs on or after January 15, 2024, with 

no cap on the total amount of penalties 

that can be assessed against any single 

institution during any calendar year. 

Dated: January 9, 2024. 

Ashley Waldron, 

Secretary to the Board, Farm Credit 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2024–00595 Filed 1–11–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6705–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 21 

[Docket No. FAA–2022–1763] 

Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class 

Airworthiness Criteria for the Wing 

Aviation LLC; Hummingbird 

Unmanned Aircraft 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Issuance of final airworthiness 

criteria. 

SUMMARY: The FAA announces the 

special class airworthiness criteria for 

the Wing Aviation LLC (Wing) 

Hummingbird unmanned aircraft (UA). 

This document sets forth the 

airworthiness criteria that the FAA finds 

to be appropriate and applicable for the 

UA design. 

DATES: These airworthiness criteria are 

effective February 12, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mack A. Martinez, Product Policy 

Management—Emerging Aircraft 

Section, AIR–62B, Technical Policy 

Branch, Policy and Standards Division, 

Aircraft Certification Service, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 2300 East 

Devon Avenue, Room 335/339, Des 

Plaines, IL 60018, telephone (847) 294– 

7481. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Wing Aviation LLC (Wing) applied to 

the FAA on September 19, 2018, for a 

special class type certificate (TC) under 

14 CFR 21.17(b) for the Model 

Hummingbird UA. 

The Model Hummingbird consists of 

a fixed-wing airplane UA and its 

associated elements (AE) including 

communication links and components 

that control the UA. The Model 

Hummingbird UA has a maximum gross 

takeoff weight of approximately 15 

pounds. It is approximately 3.4 feet in 

width, 4.2 feet in length, and 9.4 inches 

in height. The Model Hummingbird UA 

is battery powered using electric motors 

for vertical takeoff, landing, and forward 

flight. The unmanned aircraft system 

(UAS) operations would rely on high 

levels of automation and may include 

multiple UA operated by a single pilot, 

up to a ratio of 20 UA to 1 pilot. Wing 

intends for the Model Hummingbird to 

be used to deliver packages. The 

proposed concept of operations 

(CONOPS) for the Model Hummingbird 

includes a maximum operating altitude 

of 400 feet above ground level, a 

maximum cruise speed of 68 knots, 

operations beyond visual line of sight 

(BVLOS), and operations over people 

(OOP). Wing has not requested approval 

for flight into known icing for the Model 

Hummingbird UA. 

Under § 21.17(c), an application for 

type certification is effective for 3 years. 

Section 21.17(d) provides that where a 

TC has not been issued within that 3- 

year time limit, the applicant may file 

for an extension and update the 

designated applicable regulations in the 

type certification basis. The effective 

date of the applicable airworthiness 

requirements for the updated type 

certification basis must not be earlier 

than 3 years before the date of issue of 

the TC. Since the project was not 

certificated within 3 years after the 

application date above, the FAA 

approved the applicant’s request to 

extend the application for type 

certification. As a result, the date of the 

updated type certification basis is 

September 26, 2022. 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

airworthiness criteria for the Wing 

Model Hummingbird UA, which 

published in the Federal Register on 

February 8, 2023 (88 FR 8333). 

Discussion of Comments 

The FAA received responses from 5 

commenters. The comments came from 

industry organizations such as the Air 

Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the 

Association for Uncrewed Vehicle 

Systems International (AUVSI), the 

Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 

Coalition, the Commercial Drone 

Alliance, and Wing Aviation LLC. 

Specific Issues Raised Within the Scope 

of the Notice 

D&R.100 UA Signal Monitoring and 

Transmission: The FAA proposed 

criteria on the minimum types of 

information the FAA finds are necessary 

for the UA to transmit to the AE for 

continued safe flight and operation. 

Comment Summary: ALPA is 

concerned with the possibility of cyber 

security breaches that could allow 

unauthorized individuals to take control 

of a UA, potentially leading to safety 

issues. As such, it is important to 

address these concerns and establish an 

acceptable envelope of tolerance for UA 

operation that ensures the security of 

the signal monitoring and transmission 

systems. 

FAA Response: These comments are 

outside the scope for D&R.100. The 

comments by ALPA on cyber security, 

D&R.115, are addressed in the following 

paragraph. 


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D&R.115 Cyber Security: The FAA 

proposed a requirement to address the 

risks to the UA associated with 

intentional unauthorized electronic 

interactions that may result in an 

adverse effect on the security or 

airworthiness of the UA. 

Comment Summary: ALPA is 

concerned with the safety and security 

of the Command and Control (C2) link 

and potential unauthorized intrusions 

that could result in the loss of full 

control over the aircraft. ALPA 

recommends that every UA model 

requesting operations in the National 

Airspace System (NAS) undergo testing 

and validation during the aircraft 

certification process to ensure the 

security of the C2 link is impenetrable 

and cannot be hacked. ALPA states that 

reports have shown that the loss of the 

C2 link and the inability to regain it has 

led to an uncontained flyaway. ALPA 

focuses on the most critical aspects of 

safe UA operations and recommends 

specific requirements to ensure the safe 

discontinuation of a flight after a failure 

of a critical part or system and/or 

unauthorized intrusion of the C2 link. 

Other recommendations include the 

ability of the pilot to re-route the UA 

safely and dynamically, the ability for 

the UA control station to allow the pilot 

to intervene in the management of the 

flight, an established parameter 

requirement for geo-fencing 

specifications, and a requirement for the 

UA to possess the capability to detect 

and avoid other aircraft and hazards that 

are human made/manufactured and 

natural. 

FAA Response: The proposed 

recommendations are too specific for 

this general airworthiness criteria 

language; the language already covers 

the general issues that ALPA’s specific 

recommendations seek to address. 

D&R.115 states that the UA equipment, 

systems, and networks must be assessed 

to identify and mitigate protections as 

necessary. The level of detail regarding 

the assessment of failures and the 

required protection level of equipment, 

systems, and networks will be 

addressed in the means of compliance 

(MOC) to these airworthiness criteria. 

The C2 link is addressed in the 

airworthiness criteria under D&R.120 

Contingency Planning for a C2 lost link 

or degradation of a C2 link, as well as 

performance requirements. The C2 link 

is considered part of the UA and will be 

assessed for cyber security under 

D&R.115 as part of equipment and 

systems. 

D&R.120 Contingency Planning: The 

FAA proposed a requirement to address 

the risks associated with loss of 

communication C2 link between the 

pilot and the UA. The proposed criteria 

requires that the UA be designed to 

automatically execute a predetermined 

action and include the predetermined 

action in the UA Flight Manual. The UA 

Flight Manual must also include the 

minimum performance requirements for 

the C2 data link defining when the C2 

link is degraded to a level where active 

control is no longer ensured. Takeoff 

when the C2 link is degraded below 

minimum performance requirements 

must be prevented by design or by an 

operating limitation to be included in 

the UA Flight Manual. 

Comment Summary: ALPA expressed 

several areas of concern related to UA 

contingency planning that the FAA 

should consider during the aircraft 

certification process. These concerns 

include addressing the risks associated 

with loss of communication, defining 

detailed preprogrammed algorithmic 

deliverables and corrective actions for 

each situation, and ensuring that the UA 

can automatically execute a safe 

predetermined flight, loiter landing, or 

termination in the event of any critical 

parts or systems failures. ALPA has 

several recommendations including to 

have the applicant ‘‘Develop a detailed 

narrative that outlines every possible 

action that the UA will execute when 

guidance/intrusion challenges arise after 

the first preterminal action is initiated 

with the flight of the aircraft until all 

maneuvering actions have been 

exhausted and no further options exist.’’ 

ALPA also recommends a test and 

validation of the effectiveness of the 

pre-determined executable actions to 

ensure proper design and definition of 

UA as intended. 

FAA Response: The FAA shares 

ALPA’s concerns and has determined 

that the current airworthiness criteria 

appropriately address these concerns. 

The airworthiness criteria within 

D&R.120(a) propose the automatic and 

immediate execution of a safe 

predetermined action, in the event of a 

loss of communications, be part of the 

UA design. Furthermore, D&R.120(b) 

proposes that established predetermined 

actions are included in the UA Flight 

Manual, thus ensuring the applicant 

outlines these predetermined 

maneuvering actions within their 

contingency planning. Test and 

validation methods, of the effectiveness 

of such pre-determined actions as part 

of mitigation planning by which the UA 

will meet these criteria are addressed by 

D&R.310(a) and will be outlined in the 

MOC. 

D&R.125 Lightning: The FAA 

proposed criteria to address the risks 

that would result from a lightning strike, 

accounting for the size and physical 

limitations of a UAS that could preclude 

traditional lightning protection features. 

The FAA further proposed that without 

lightning protection for the UA, the 

flight manual must include an operating 

limitation to prohibit flight into weather 

conditions with potential lightning. 

Comment Summary: ALPA 

commented that lightning can cause 

significant damage to aircraft and pose 

a safety risk to people and property on 

the ground if that aircraft were to lose 

control and crash. ALPA suggests 10 

specific recommendations for the FAA 

such as developing lightning protection 

standards and procedures; establishing a 

certification process for UA lightning 

protection and requiring all UA to 

comply with those standards; requiring 

regular inspections to identify damage 

caused by lightning strikes; and 

developing training programs for UA 

operators and maintenance personnel 

on lightning safety. 

FAA Response: The proposed 

recommendations are too specific for 

this general airworthiness criteria 

language. The UA, if designed with 

lightning mitigation features per 

D&R.125(a), would need to demonstrate 

protection of the UA from loss of flight 

or control due to lightning within the 

MOC. Otherwise, the operational 

limitations per D&R.125(b) would 

prohibit flight into weather conditions 

conducive to lightning activity. 

D&R.130 Adverse Weather 

Conditions: The FAA proposed criteria 

either requiring that design 

characteristics protect the UAS from 

adverse weather conditions or 

prohibiting flight into known adverse 

weather conditions. The criteria 

proposed to define adverse weather 

conditions as rain, snow, and icing. 

Comment Summary: ALPA 

recommends that the FAA develop and 

implement a policy that covers 

scenarios beyond ‘‘known conditions’’ 

when UAs inadvertently experience 

adverse weather conditions. ALPA 

suggests 30 specific recommendations 

including establishing training 

requirements for UA pilots and crew 

members on managing adverse weather 

conditions; requiring that UA operators 

have access to accurate and up-to-date 

weather information; requiring 

continuous monitoring of adverse 

weather conditions during flight 

operations; establishing strict icing 

requirements and tolerances to prevent 

the operation of the UA in icing 

conditions; establishing strict wind 

limitations and protocols; and that UA 

operators adapt air carrier icing 

standards or use them as a baseline to 

ensure safe operations. 


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FAA Response: Scenarios beyond 

‘‘known conditions’’ would be an 

anomalous situation that is beyond the 

scope of D&R.130. For adverse weather 

conditions for which the UA is not 

approved to operate, D&R.130 already 

contains requirements to detect adverse 

weather and minimize the likelihood of 

operating in those conditions. Testing of 

operations in these conditions is beyond 

the level of rigor needed for these 

aircraft. In addition, the effect of wind 

is addressed in D&R.300(b)(9), even 

though it is not included in D&R.130. 

D&R testing MOCs and test plans will 

ensure the UA is tested for adverse wind 

conditions. Design requirements related 

to operation in icing as a result of 

adverse weather are addressed in the 

CONOPS as stated within D&R.130(b). 

D&R.135 Flight Essential Parts: The 

FAA proposed criteria for critical parts 

that were substantively similar to those 

in the existing standards for normal 

category rotorcraft under 14 CFR 27.602, 

with changes to reflect UAS terminology 

and failure conditions. The criteria 

proposed to define a critical part as a 

part, the failure of which could result in 

a loss of flight or unrecoverable loss of 

control of the aircraft. 

Comment Summary: ALPA proposed 

several recommendations related to 

design and testing of the UA to consider 

the failure rates of associated systems 

and parts. ALPA recommends that a 

failure-rate threshold should be 

determined for critical components that 

are flight essential. ALPA recommends 

that the FAA establish stringent 

standards and guidelines for UA 

certification to ensure public safety. 

FAA Response: The specific 

numerical reliability of any specific part 

is more specific than would appear in 

airworthiness D&R criteria. D&R.135(b) 

already requires the applicant to define 

maintenance instructions or life limits 

on any essential parts. Life limits are 

determined based on the number of 

failure-free hours flown on the highest 

time conformed aircraft and the life 

limits are listed in the instructions for 

continued airworthiness (ICA). 

D&R.300 Durability and Reliability: 

The FAA proposed durability and 

reliability testing that would require the 

applicant to demonstrate safe flight of 

the UAS across the entire operational 

envelope and up to all operational 

limitations, for all phases of flight and 

all aircraft configurations described in 

the applicant’s CONOPS, with no 

failures that result in a loss of flight, loss 

of control, loss of containment, or 

emergency landing outside the 

operator’s recovery area. The FAA 

further proposed that UA would only be 

certificated for operations within the 

limitations, and for flight over areas no 

greater than the maximum population 

density, as described in the applicant’s 

CONOPS and demonstrated by test. 

Comment Summary: ALPA 

commented that it is crucial that UA 

operators understand the limitations 

and requirements for operating in visual 

line of sight (VLOS) and BVLOS 

environments, including recovery zone 

limitations. Additionally, proper 

maintenance and testing must be 

conducted to ensure the UA’s 

airworthiness certificate is valid and 

reliable for operation. ALPA suggests 10 

specific recommendations including 

requiring scheduled maintenance per 14 

CFR part 43; specific minimum testing; 

and requiring regular system checks 

before each flight to ensure the aircraft 

is in proper working condition. 

FAA Response: The D&R 

airworthiness criteria contain 

requirements related to the 

airworthiness of the aircraft itself, 

relying heavily on both flight testing 

and on maintenance in accordance with 

defined maintenance procedures. The 

comments on the operational 

environments are separate requirements 

or limitations and not part of the criteria 

for the aircraft itself. ALPA’s specific 

maintenance recommendations are 

already encompassed by the general 

language of D&R.300. 

Comment Summary: The Small UAV 

Coalition commented on the proposed 

D&R.300 requirement that no failures 

occur ‘‘that result in loss of flight, loss 

of control, loss of containment, or 

emergency landing outside the 

operator’s recovery area.’’ The Coalition 

recommends that a single failure during 

testing should not automatically restart 

counting the number of flight test 

operations set for a particular 

population density. Rather, if the 

applicant can identify the failure 

through root cause and fault tree 

analysis and provide a validated 

mitigation to prevent its recurrence, the 

number of consecutive failure-free 

operations and overall flight test hours 

allocation should be adjusted to be 

proportionate to the particular risk of 

that failure. 

The Small UAV Coalition also states, 

‘‘some UAS design elements could 

include an onboard health system that 

initiates a landing to lessen the potential 

of a loss of control event. In those cases, 

if the landings could be demonstrated to 

occur in safer locations that should not 

count as a failure.’’ The Coalition seeks 

confirmation that the text ‘‘operator’s 

recovery area’’ includes that sort of 

landing. Absent correction or 

clarification from the FAA on this 

language in D&R.300, the Coalition 

believes these requirements would 

present unnecessary and overly 

burdensome compliance challenges for 

the applicant to address. 

FAA Response: The intent of the 

testing criteria is for the applicant to 

demonstrate the aircraft’s durability and 

reliability through a successful 

accumulation of flight testing. The FAA 

does not expect analytical evaluation to 

be part of this process. It should be 

noted that D&R.300 is intended to 

demonstrate the reliability of the system 

and not the consequence of failure, 

which is addressed in D&R.305. Systems 

designed to allow for unscheduled 

landings at potentially safer sites which 

are not controlled by the operator may 

provide a safety benefit, but D&R.300 is 

evaluating the overall system reliability 

and any landing outside those sites 

predetermined and accepted by the FAA 

in the flight test plan will be considered 

a test point failure. Failures during 

flight testing may or may not require 

additional test hours, up to and 

including resetting of the accumulated 

flight hours to zero. This determination 

will be made by the FAA based on the 

extent of redesign necessary to 

minimize the likelihood the incident 

will recur. However, the applicant will 

comply with these testing criteria using 

an MOC, accepted by the FAA, through 

the issue paper process. The MOC will 

depend on the reliability level the 

applicant has proposed to meet. 

D&R.305 Probable Failures: The FAA 

proposed criteria to evaluate how the 

UAS functions after probable failures, 

including failures related to propulsion 

systems, C2 link, global positioning 

system (GPS), critical flight control 

components with a single point of 

failure, control station, and any other 

equipment identified by the applicant. 

Comment Summary: ALPA provided 

10 recommendations to ensure that the 

testing criteria effectively address 

probable failures and that any 

additional critical failures are also 

considered. Some of the 

recommendations include the FAA 

specifying which ‘‘certain failures’’ that 

UAs will be expected to demonstrate to 

prove that they can remain under 

control and contained; the UA should 

be tested to ensure it can safely return 

to a predetermined location or land 

safely in the event of a loss of power or 

propulsion system failure; and the 

applicant should test the UA’s ability to 

detect and avoid potential obstacles, 

such as other aircraft, buildings, or 

terrain, to ensure safe operations in all 

types of environments. 

FAA Response: ‘‘Probable failures’’ 

are addressed in D&R.305 and 

‘‘capabilities’’ are addressed within 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 9 / Friday, January 12, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 2121 

D&R.310. The intent of the testing 

criteria is for the applicant to 

demonstrate the aircraft’s durability and 

reliability through a successful 

accumulation of flight testing. The FAA 

does not expect analytical evaluation to 

be part of this process. However, the 

applicant will comply with these testing 

criteria using test plans developed to an 

MOC, accepted by the FAA through the 

issue paper process. The MOC will 

address each element of these 

airworthiness criteria and will be 

dependent on the reliability level the 

applicant has proposed to meet. 

D&R.310 Capabilities and Functions: 

The FAA proposed criteria to require 

the applicant to demonstrate, by test, 

the minimum capabilities and functions 

necessary for the design. UAS.310(a) 

proposed to require the applicant to 

demonstrate, by test, the capability of 

the UAS to regain command and control 

of the UA after a C2 link is lost, the 

sufficiency of the electrical system to 

carry all anticipated loads, and the 

ability of the pilot to override any preprogramming in order to resolve a 

potential unsafe operating condition in 

any phase of flight. UAS.310(b) 

proposed to require the applicant to 

demonstrate, by test, certain features if 

the applicant requests approval of those 

features (geo-fencing, external cargo, 

detect and avoid, etc.). UAS.310(c) 

proposed to require the design of the 

UAS to safeguard against an unintended 

discontinuation of flight or release of 

cargo, whether by human action or 

malfunction. 

Comment Summary: ALPA comments 

on assuring the security of the C2 link 

through testing and validation during 

the aircraft certification process for 

every UA model requesting operations 

in the NAS. An acceptable percentage 

for cyber intrusions and the ability to 

regain command and control of the UA 

after the C2 link is lost must be defined. 

ALPA also provided several 

recommendations on capabilities and 

functions required by D&R.310(a) or 

optional D&R.310(b), if requested for 

approval. 

FAA Response: D&R.120(a) requires 

contingency planning for C2 lost link 

and D&R.115 requires protections from 

cyber intrusions. Specific contingency 

plans and protections will be addressed 

in the MOC for those airworthiness 

criteria. D&R.310’s general 

airworthiness criteria language already 

covers the other issues ALPA’s specific 

recommendations seek to address. 

Comment Summary: The proposed 

airworthiness criteria discussion of 

D&R.310 ‘‘Capabilities and Functions’’ 

includes the sentence, ‘‘[i]n order to 

show that the UA does not create a 

hazard when landing, the UA must 

show by test that it has the ability to 

detect and avoid any potential hazards 

on the ground by demonstrating any 

such landing always stays well clear of 

all people and other obstacles.’’ 

Wing, AUVSI, The Commercial Drone 

Alliance and The Small UAV Coalition 

object to the FAA’s use of absolute 

terms such as ‘‘any’’ and ‘‘always’’ 

against undefined and/or ambiguous 

terms (such as ‘‘well clear’’ in the 

context of ground obstacles) outlined in 

the preamble discussion of the proposed 

airworthiness criteria. Absent correction 

or clarification by the FAA, the 

commenters state that this language sets 

an impossibly high standard beyond the 

capabilities of either human or machine. 

Such absolute and prescriptive MOC is 

inappropriate in the context of 

airworthiness criteria. Wing is 

concerned that this standard precludes 

the ability of Wing or other 

manufacturers to demonstrate 

compliance at any practical level of test 

or validation. The commenters note that 

this standard is not called for in the 

actual proposed text of D&R.310 itself. 

In finalizing the airworthiness criteria, 

the FAA should correct or clarify its 

preamble language to avoid any possible 

confusion. 

Wing is concerned that the absolute 

terms ‘‘any’’ and ‘‘always’’ create a bar 

that demonstration by test or other 

means cannot meet. In addition, the use 

of terms such as ‘‘potential’’ and ‘‘well 

clear’’ similarly creates substantial 

challenges to compliance demonstration 

by test or other means. Wing states that 

it would be exceptionally challenging to 

meet this standard and that it exceeds 

the expectations for crewed aircraft as 

written. Wing requests that the FAA 

allow for alternative means of 

demonstrating that the UA does ‘‘not 

create a hazard when landing’’ in 

accordance with D&R.310(a)(6) by 

prefacing this paragraph with the phrase 

‘‘for example;’’ remove the absolute 

terms ‘‘any,’’ ‘‘all,’’ and ‘‘always’’ to 

allow for the use of reasonable and 

achievable test methods; and remove the 

undefined and ambiguous terms ‘‘well 

clear,’’ ‘‘other obstacles,’’ and 

‘‘potential’’ when outlining test or 

demonstration criteria. 

FAA Response: The FAA’s use of 

absolute terms referenced in the 

comment summary above are of concern 

to Wing and others as in their view, ‘‘the 

language sets an impossibly high 

standard beyond the capabilities of 

either human or machine.’’ The subject 

language is based on the increased level 

of automation of Wing’s system, which 

relies on onboard automated decisionmaking rather than pilot action. To 

accept such a system, the UAS must 

exhibit highly automated features and 

functions to enhance the safety of UAS 

operations by replacing direct manual 

control of the UA with automation. The 

UAS’s automated flight envelope and 

path protection systems must be 

designed for controllability and 

maneuverability needed to detect and to 

maintain safe separation from hazards 

or obstacles on or near the ground while 

in normal, abnormal, and emergency 

operations. Some examples of abnormal 

or emergency scenarios include 

collision avoidance, aborted missions, 

power system failures, and forced 

landings. The UAS must also be 

equipped with capabilities and 

necessary features that will 

automatically contain or control the 

aircraft in the case of a loss of external 

services used in communicating, 

controlling, or providing system inputs 

to the UA. All foreseeable loss, 

degradation or non-availability of 

external services, systems, or signals 

must not put the UA in an uncontrolled, 

uncontained, or unsafe condition. 

D&R.310 is a testing requirement and 

sets the criteria which must be 

demonstrated by flight test as part of the 

type certification program. The language 

referenced by the commenters as 

preamble language does not appear in 

the final rule but is given in the 

discussion section of the NPRM as a tool 

for understanding why the requirement 

was drafted as it was and provides 

additional insight into the means by 

which the applicant will be able to 

show compliance with the testing 

requirements in D&R.310. The intent of 

the use of this language within the 

NPRM discussion is for the applicant to 

show compliance by demonstrating 

landings that do not adversely impact 

people or obstacles. Therefore, the FAA 

finds that an acceptable flight test 

outcome is one that would not result in 

an unsafe condition. Within the context 

of the certification testing performed 

under D&R.310, the FAA’s use of 

absolute terms such as ‘‘any’’ and 

‘‘always’’ only serve to emphasize 

acceptable examples of test boundaries 

which will be addressed in more detail 

in the MOC and test plans. Likewise, 

terms like ‘‘well clear’’ will be defined 

based on the appropriate near mid-air 

collision (NMAC) volume determined to 

be acceptable to the FAA for the D&R 

flight test campaign. 

D&R.320 Verification of Limits: The 

FAA proposed to require a 

demonstration of the UA’s performance, 

maneuverability, stability, and control 

with a factor of safety (5% over 

maximum gross weight with no loss of 

control or loss of flight). 


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Comment Summary: ALPA is 

concerned that the safety factor of 5% 

is too low. The Model Hummingbird UA 

weighs approximately 15 lbs., which 

means that 5% is approximately 0.75 

lbs. ALPA recommends increasing this 

number to a minimum of a double-digit 

percentage for current and future 

aircraft certification standards. 

FAA Response: The FAA determined 

that based on historical data, 5% is a 

minimum acceptable margin. 

Additional Airworthiness Criteria 

Identified by Commenters 

UA to Pilot Ratio: The Wing Model 

Hummingbird UAS operations would 

rely on high levels of automation and 

may include multiple UA operated by a 

single pilot, up to a ratio of 20 UA to 

1 pilot. 

Comment Summary: ALPA is 

concerned with the safe operation of 

multiple UAs operated by a single pilot 

as described within the proposed 

airworthiness criteria notice. ALPA 

recommends that the FAA research and 

better assess multiple UA operations by 

a single pilot to establish a baseline 

understanding of the feasibility of a 

single UA pilot flying multiple UAs 

before developing airworthiness 

certification criteria. The proposed 20 to 

1 UA to pilot ratio presents significant 

challenges to ensuring the safe 

operation of UAs and other NAS users, 

and the FAA should implement 

additional certification requirements for 

pilots operating multiple UAs, 

including specialized training and 

qualification standards. Additionally, 

the FAA should establish guidelines for 

the maximum number of UAs that a 

single pilot can operate to ensure safe 

and effective operations in the NAS. 

Furthermore, there should always be a 

backup failsafe and tertiary means of 

control for built-in redundancy where 

another human operator can intervene 

out of necessity for safety. The FAA 

should base its decision on facts and 

data and should clarify what qualitative 

and quantitative scientific instruments 

were utilized to assess the potential 

risks of the aircraft. 

FAA Response: These airworthiness 

criteria require the applicant to 

demonstrate the durability and 

reliability of the UA design by flight 

test, at the highest aircraft-to-pilot ratio, 

without exceptional piloting skill or 

alertness. In addition, D&R.305(c) 

requires the applicant to demonstrate 

probable failures by test at the highest 

aircraft-to-pilot ratio. The durability and 

reliability-based type certification 

process was developed for UAS that 

meet certain design criteria to include a 

maximum operating limitation of 20:1 

aircraft to pilot ratio. Any deviation 

from this limitation will require 

additional coordination and will add to 

the project timeline. 

Level of Automation: The Wing Model 

Hummingbird UA operations would 

rely on high levels of automation. 

Comment Summary: ALPA is 

concerned about the specificity of the 

Model Hummingbird UA’s automation 

level. ALPA states that the FAA should 

clarify the degree and level of 

automation in which the UA will 

operate. This includes defining whether 

the operation of the Model 

Hummingbird UA will be fully 

automated autonomous, partially 

automated autonomous, 

preprogrammed, or a combination of 

any of these options. Additionally, the 

FAA should determine the required 

minimal involvement or participation 

from the remote pilot(s) to assure flight 

safety. ALPA suggests that the FAA 

establish guidelines for aircraft onboard 

(organic) and/or offboard (inorganic) 

intelligence system(s) to deconflict other 

known and unknown (birds, floating 

objects/flying debris) air traffic and 

associated hazards. The FAA should 

ensure that these systems are tested, 

designed, and manufactured to a certain 

failure rate, such as a 10¥9 failure rate 

per flight hours or something less. 

FAA Response: D&R.100 requires UA 

specifications within the CONOPS. Data 

within the CONOPS are proprietary to 

the applicant. The D&R methodology is 

used as a framework to allow for an 

adequate balance of certification rigor 

with safety related outcomes. The FAA 

considered the size of aircraft, its 

maximum airspeed and altitude, and 

operational limitations to address the 

number of UA per operator (maximum 

of 20:1 aircraft to pilot ratio) and to 

address operations in which the aircraft 

would operate BVLOS of the pilot to 

assess the potential risk the aircraft 

could pose to other aircraft and to 

human beings on the ground. Using 

these parameters, the FAA developed 

proposed airworthiness criteria to 

address those potential risks to ensure 

the aircraft remains reliable, 

controllable, safe, and airworthy 

without the need for requiring a 

prescriptive failure rate. 

Hazardous Cargo Carriage Over 

Populated Areas 

Comment Summary: ALPA is 

concerned that the carriage of HAZMAT 

by UAs over populated areas poses a 

significant safety concern requiring the 

FAA’s action. The guidelines and 

regulations for the carriage of HAZMAT 

by UAs should consider the associated 

risks to public safety. UA operators 

should be required to provide 

information about the HAZMAT they 

are carrying. The FAA should also 

establish a system for monitoring and 

enforcing compliance, ensure that 

emergency responders are informed, 

properly trained, and equipped to 

handle nonconventional operational 

factors involving UA HAZMAT 

incidents, and require UA 

manufacturers to incorporate safeguards 

and emergency response mechanisms. 

By taking these and other recommended 

steps, the FAA can help ensure the safe 

operation of UAs in the NAS. 

FAA Response: The FAA 

acknowledges the concern by ALPA. 

However, the comment is not within the 

scope of the aircraft type certification 

for which this airworthiness criteria was 

developed. The carriage of HAZMAT is 

an operational function and if 

applicable to Wing’s operation for this 

aircraft, would be provided in the 

CONOPS. The CONOPS, if approved for 

HAZMAT, will contain operational 

limitations in the operating approval, as 

necessary. The CONOPS are proprietary 

to the applicant. 

BVLOS and OOP 

Comment Summary: ALPA is 

concerned that as the use of UAs for 

BVLOS operations and over people 

become increasingly common, it raises 

significant safety concerns that must be 

addressed in the certification process. 

ALPA is concerned about the potential 

risks associated with this type of 

operation involving the Model 

Hummingbird UA or any similar 

operator. In order to ensure safety, 

ALPA recommends that operators 

explain how they plan to mitigate their 

aerial footprint around and away from 

people and property, with detailed 

evasion and emergency set-down plans, 

processes, and parameters. 

Additionally, ALPA urges the FAA to 

consider the possibility of an aircraft 

performing BVLOS losing propulsion 

and being unable to maintain flight, 

requiring a recovery or crash mitigation 

strategy and emergency vertical 

arrestment system to prevent harm to 

persons or property. 

ALPA states that many manufacturers 

within the UA/drone and urban air 

mobility (UAM) and advanced air 

mobility (AAM) industry do not include 

an emergency vertical arrestment system 

to prevent loss of life and property in 

the event of an aircraft losing its engine 

or engines then becoming a falling 

object which is increasingly alarming if 

that aircraft has minimal to a zero-glide 

aspect ratio. ALPA recommends 

continuous collaboration between 

industry experts and the regulator to 


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develop safer aircraft design and 

certification standards for the best 

interests of the end-users, the flying 

public, and those affected by flight 

operations of UA/drone or UAM/AAM 

aircraft. When these types of aircraft 

operate in the same airspace as 

commercial aircraft, ALPA recommends 

that pilots have the ability to see them 

on the flightdeck or pilot display and air 

traffic controllers can view them on 

their displays to separate air traffic 

safely. These aircraft must also have 

active collision-avoidance technology, 

and ALPA opposes any integration that 

does not include aircraft collisionavoidance systems (ACAS) that are 

interoperable with commercial 

collision-avoidance systems. ALPA 

further opposes any proposed changes 

to 14 CFR 91.113 to enable BVLOS 

operational safety case(s) to transfer the 

responsibility of ‘‘see and avoid’’ to 

crewed aircraft under certain 

conditions. The responsibility of ‘‘see 

and avoid’’ must remain with the 

remote pilot, and any changes to this 

would be detrimental to the safe 

integration of UAs into the NAS. 

FAA Response: Discussion on 

proposed changes to general operating 

flight rule § 91.113 is not within the 

scope of this airworthiness criteria as it 

does not pertain to the type certification 

of the aircraft itself. Operational 

approval will be granted based on the 

maximum cumulative risk posed by the 

proposed operations, taking into 

account mitigating features, e.g., vertical 

arresting systems such as parachutes, if 

they are proposed as part of the design. 

However, the airworthiness criteria are 

developed to be high level and 

performance based, rather than relying 

on specific designs which may limit 

introduction of other novel safety 

enhancing features. 

Battery Standards 

Comment Summary: ALPA states that 

the use of batteries as an energy source 

for aircraft propulsion in the NAS is a 

substantial shift from traditional 

propulsion methods on which current 

safety margins are based and requires 

more regulator exploration to determine 

best safety practices. ALPA states that 

the FAA will need to analyze, qualify, 

and quantify the aircraft performance 

and operational environments to 

determine whether the safety baseline of 

this technological functionality can be 

performed reliably and repeatedly to an 

equivalent level of safety. ALPA 

recommends that the FAA and industry 

mutually agree upon the scientific data 

to confer consensus regarding 

acceptable safety margins. 

ALPA provided 20 specific 

recommendations regarding battery 

safety. Some of the recommendations 

are to develop standards; establish 

certification procedures for aircraft 

batteries; develop regulations for 

transporting lithium-ion batteries; 

define policies and procedures for 

flightcrews to promptly act with an 

abnormal battery anomaly; and several 

more recommendations on bestpractices for battery safety. 

FAA Response: The recommendations 

on battery standards by the commenter 

are noted as either being too specific or 

out of scope for this D&R airworthiness 

criteria. The overly specific 

recommendations address issues 

already encompassed by the general 

airworthiness criteria. D&R testing per 

D&R.300 should demonstrate reliability 

of the UAS as a whole and thus each 

system or component within the UAS 

has met a minimum acceptable 

reliability standard. Demonstration of 

the safe carriage of batteries and 

mitigations for known risks are 

addressed via flight test within 

D&R.305(a)(1) ‘‘Propulsion systems.’’ 

Out of Scope Comments 

The FAA received and reviewed 

several comments that were general, 

stated the commenter’s viewpoint or 

opposition without a suggestion specific 

to the proposed criteria, or did not make 

a request the FAA can act on. These 

comments are noted as beyond the 

scope of this document. 

Applicability 

These airworthiness criteria, 

established under the provisions of 

§ 21.17(b), are applicable to the Model 

Hummingbird UA. Should Wing 

Aviation LLC apply at a later date for a 

change to the TC to include another 

model, these airworthiness criteria 

would apply to that model as well, 

provided the FAA finds them 

appropriate in accordance with the 

requirements of subpart D to part 21. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only the 

airworthiness criteria for one model UA. 

It is not a standard of general 

applicability. 

Authority Citation 

The authority citation for these 

airworthiness criteria is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

Airworthiness Criteria 

Pursuant to the authority delegated to 

me by the Administrator, the following 

airworthiness criteria are issued as part 

of the type certification basis for the 

Wing Aviation LLC Model 

Hummingbird UA. The FAA finds that 

compliance with the following would 

mitigate the risks associated with the 

proposed design and CONOPS 

appropriately and would provide an 

equivalent level of safety to existing 

rules. 

General 

D&R.001 Concept of Operations 

The applicant must define and submit 

to the FAA a concept of operations 

(CONOPS) proposal describing the UAS 

operation in the National Airspace 

System for which UA type certification 

is requested. The CONOPS proposal 

must include, at a minimum, a 

description of the following information 

in sufficient detail to determine the 

parameters and extent of testing and 

operating limitations: 

(a) The intended type of operations; 

(b) UA specifications; 

(c) Meteorological conditions; 

(d) Operators, pilots, and personnel 

responsibilities; 

(e) Control station, support 

equipment, and other associated 

elements (AE) necessary to meet the 

airworthiness criteria; 

(f) Command, control, and 

communication functions; 

(g) Operational parameters (such as 

population density, geographic 

operating boundaries, airspace classes, 

launch and recovery area, congestion of 

proposed operating area, 

communications with air traffic control, 

line of sight, and aircraft separation); 

and 

(h) Collision avoidance equipment, 

whether onboard the UA or part of the 

AE, if requested. 

D&R.005 Definitions 

For purposes of these airworthiness 

criteria, the following definitions apply. 

(a) Loss of control: Loss of control 

means an unintended departure of an 

aircraft from controlled flight. It 

includes control reversal or an undue 

loss of longitudinal, lateral, and 

directional stability and control. It also 

includes an upset or entry into an 

unscheduled or uncommanded attitude 

with high potential for uncontrolled 

impact with terrain. A loss of control 

means a spin, loss of control authority, 

loss of aerodynamic stability, divergent 

flight characteristics, or similar 

occurrence, which could generally lead 

to a crash. 

(b) Loss of flight: Loss of flight means 

a UA’s inability to complete its flight as 

planned, up to and through its 

originally planned landing. It includes 


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scenarios where the UA experiences 

controlled flight into terrain, obstacles, 

or any other collision, or a loss of 

altitude that is severe or non-reversible. 

Loss of flight also includes deploying a 

parachute or ballistic recovery system 

that leads to an unplanned landing 

outside the operator’s designated 

recovery zone. 

Design and Construction 

D&R.100 UA Signal Monitoring and 

Transmission 

The UA must be designed to monitor 

and transmit to the AE all information 

required for continued safe flight and 

operation. This information includes, at 

a minimum, the following: 

(a) Status of all critical parameters for 

all energy storage systems; 

(b) Status of all critical parameters for 

all propulsion systems; 

(c) Flight and navigation information 

as appropriate, such as airspeed, 

heading, altitude, and location; and 

(d) Communication and navigation 

signal strength and quality, including 

contingency information or status. 

D&R.105 UAS AE Required for Safe 

UA Operations 

(a) The applicant must identify and 

submit to the FAA all AE and interface 

conditions of the UAS that affect the 

airworthiness of the UA or are otherwise 

necessary for the UA to meet these 

airworthiness criteria. As part of this 

requirement— 

(1) The applicant may identify either 

specific AE or minimum specifications 

for the AE. 

(i) If minimum specifications are 

identified, they must include the critical 

requirements of the AE, including 

performance, compatibility, function, 

reliability, interface, operator alerting, 

cyber security, and environmental 

requirements. 

(ii) Critical requirements are those 

that if not met would impact the ability 

to operate the UA safely and efficiently. 

(2) The applicant may use an interface 

control drawing, a requirements 

document, or other reference, titled so 

that it is clearly designated as AE 

interfaces to the UA. 

(b) The applicant must show the FAA 

that the AE or minimum specifications 

identified in paragraph (a) of this 

section meet the following: 

(1) The AE provide the functionality, 

performance, reliability, and 

information to assure UA airworthiness 

in conjunction with the rest of the 

design; 

(2) The AE are compatible with the 

UA capabilities and interfaces; 

(3) The AE must monitor and transmit 

to the operator all information required 

for safe flight and operation, including 

but not limited to those identified in 

D&R.100; and 

(4) The minimum specifications, if 

identified, are correct, complete, 

consistent, and verifiable to assure UA 

airworthiness. 

(c) The FAA will establish the 

approved AE or minimum specifications 

as operating limitations and include 

them in the UA type certificate data 

sheet and UA Flight Manual. 

(d) The applicant must develop any 

maintenance instructions necessary to 

address implications from the AE on the 

airworthiness of the UA. Those 

instructions will be included in the 

instructions for continued airworthiness 

(ICA) required by D&R.205. 

D&R.110 Software 

To minimize the existence of software 

errors, the applicant must: 

(a) Verify by test all software that may 

impact the safe operation of the UA; 

(b) Utilize a configuration 

management system that tracks, 

controls, and preserves changes made to 

software throughout the entire life cycle; 

and 

(c) Implement a problem reporting 

system that captures and records defects 

and modifications to the software. 

D&R.115 Cyber Security 

(a) UA equipment, systems, and 

networks, addressed separately and in 

relation to other systems, must be 

protected from intentional unauthorized 

electronic interactions that may result in 

an adverse effect on the security or 

airworthiness of the UA. Protection 

must be ensured by showing that the 

security risks have been identified, 

assessed, and mitigated as necessary. 

(b) When required by paragraph (a) of 

this section, procedures and 

instructions to ensure security 

protections are maintained must be 

included in the ICA. 

D&R.120 Contingency Planning 

(a) The UA must be designed so that, 

in the event of a loss of the command 

and control (C2) link, the UA will 

automatically and immediately execute 

a safe predetermined flight, loiter, 

landing, or termination. 

(b) The applicant must establish the 

predetermined action in the event of a 

loss of the C2 link and include it in the 

UA Flight Manual. 

(c) The UA Flight Manual must 

include the minimum performance 

requirements for the C2 data link, 

defining when the C2 link is degraded 

to a level where remote active control of 

the UA is no longer ensured. Takeoff 

when the C2 link is degraded below the 

minimum link performance 

requirements must be prevented by 

design or prohibited by an operating 

limitation in the UA Flight Manual. 

D&R.125 Lightning 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph 

(b) of this section, the UA must have 

design characteristics that will protect 

the UA from loss of flight or loss of 

control due to lightning. 

(b) If the UA has not been shown to 

protect against lightning, the UA Flight 

Manual must include an operating 

limitation to prohibit flight into weather 

conditions conducive to lightning 

activity. 

D&R.130 Adverse Weather Conditions 

(a) For purposes of this section, 

‘‘adverse weather conditions’’ means 

rain, snow, and icing. 

(b) Except as provided in paragraph 

(c) of this section, the UA must have 

design characteristics that will allow the 

UA to operate within the adverse 

weather conditions specified in the 

CONOPS without loss of flight or loss of 

control. 

(c) For adverse weather conditions for 

which the UA is not approved to 

operate, the applicant must develop 

operating limitations to prohibit flight 

into known adverse weather conditions 

and either: 

(1) Develop operating limitations to 

prevent inadvertent flight into adverse 

weather conditions; or 

(2) Provide a means to detect any 

adverse weather conditions for which 

the UA is not certificated to operate and 

show the UA’s ability to avoid or exit 

those conditions. 

D&R.135 Flight Essential Parts 

(a) A flight essential part is a part, the 

failure of which could result in a loss of 

flight or unrecoverable loss of UA 

control. 

(b) If the type design includes flight 

essential parts, the applicant must 

establish a flight essential parts list. The 

applicant must develop and define 

mandatory maintenance instructions or 

life limits, or a combination of both, to 

prevent failures of flight essential parts. 

Each of these mandatory actions must 

be included in the airworthiness 

limitations section of the ICA. 

Operating Limitations and Information 

D&R.200 UA Flight Manual 

The applicant must provide a UA 

Flight Manual with each UA. 

(a) The UA Flight Manual must 

contain the following information: 

(1) UA operating limitations; 

(2) UA operating procedures; 

(3) Performance information; 


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(4) Loading information; and 

(5) Other information that is necessary 

for safe operation because of design, 

operating, or handling characteristics. 

(b) Those portions of the UA Flight 

Manual containing the information 

specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this 

section must be approved by the FAA. 

D&R.205 ICA 

The applicant must prepare the ICA 

for the UA in accordance with appendix 

A to 14 CFR part 23, as appropriate, that 

are acceptable to the FAA. The ICA may 

be incomplete at type certification if a 

program exists to ensure their 

completion prior to delivery of the first 

UA or issuance of a standard 

airworthiness certificate, whichever 

occurs later. 

Testing 

D&R.300 Durability and Reliability 

The UA must be designed to be 

durable and reliable when operated 

under the limitations prescribed for its 

operating environment, as documented 

in its CONOPS, and included as 

operating limitations on the type 

certificate data sheet and in the UA 

Flight Manual. The durability and 

reliability must be demonstrated by 

flight test in accordance with the 

requirements of this section and 

completed with no failures that result in 

a loss of flight, loss of control, loss of 

containment, or emergency landing 

outside the operator’s recovery area. 

(a) Once a UA has begun testing to 

show compliance with this section, all 

flights for that UA must be included in 

the flight test report. 

(b) Tests must include an evaluation 

of the entire flight envelope across all 

phases of operation and must address, at 

a minimum, the following: 

(1) Flight distances; 

(2) Flight durations; 

(3) Route complexity; 

(4) Weight; 

(5) Center of gravity; 

(6) Density altitude; 

(7) Outside air temperature; 

(8) Airspeed; 

(9) Wind; 

(10) Weather; 

(11) Operation at night, if requested; 

(12) Energy storage system capacity; 

and 

(13) Aircraft to pilot ratio. 

(c) Tests must include the most 

adverse combinations of the conditions 

and configurations in paragraph (b) of 

this section. 

(d) Tests must show a distribution of 

the different flight profiles and routes 

representative of the type of operations 

identified in the CONOPS. 

(e) Tests must be conducted in 

conditions consistent with the expected 

environmental conditions identified in 

the CONOPS, including electromagnetic 

interference (EMI) and high intensity 

radiated fields (HIRF). 

(f) Tests must not require exceptional 

piloting skill or alertness. 

(g) Any UAS used for testing must be 

subject to the same worst-case ground 

handling, shipping, and transportation 

loads as those allowed in service. 

(h) Any UA used for testing must use 

AE that meet, but do not exceed, the 

minimum specifications identified 

under D&R.105. If multiple AE are 

identified, the applicant must 

demonstrate each configuration. 

(i) Any UAS used for testing must be 

maintained and operated in accordance 

with the ICA and UA Flight Manual. No 

maintenance beyond the intervals 

established in the ICA will be allowed 

to show compliance with this section. 

(j) If cargo operations or external-load 

operations are requested, tests must 

show, throughout the flight envelope 

and with the cargo or the external load 

at the most critical combinations of 

weight and center of gravity, that— 

(1) The UA is safely controllable and 

maneuverable; and 

(2) The cargo or the external load is 

retainable and transportable. 

D&R.305 Probable Failures 

The UA must be designed such that 

a probable failure will not result in a 

loss of containment or control of the 

UA. This must be demonstrated by test. 

(a) Probable failures related to the 

following equipment, at a minimum, 

must be addressed: 

(1) Propulsion systems; 

(2) C2 link; 

(3) Global positioning system (GPS); 

(4) Flight control components with a 

single point of failure; 

(5) Control station; and 

(6) Any other AE identified by the 

applicant. 

(b) Any UA used for testing must be 

operated in accordance with the UA 

Flight Manual. 

(c) Each test must occur at the critical 

phase and mode of flight, and at the 

highest aircraft-to-pilot ratio. 

D&R.310 Capabilities and Functions 

(a) All of the following required UAS 

capabilities and functions must be 

demonstrated by test: 

(1) Capability to regain command and 

control of the UA after the C2 link has 

been lost. 

(2) Capability of the electrical system 

to power all UA systems and payloads. 

(3) Ability for the pilot to safely 

discontinue the flight. 

(4) Capability of the UA to maintain 

its preplanned flight path within 

acceptable navigation accuracy. 

(5) Ability to safely abort a takeoff. 

(6) Ability to safely abort a landing 

and initiate a go-around unless the UA 

is shown not to create a hazard when 

landing. 

(b) The following UAS capabilities 

and functions, if requested for approval, 

must be demonstrated by test: 

(1) Continued flight after degradation 

of the propulsion system. 

(2) Geo-fencing that contains the UA 

within a designated area, in all 

operating conditions. 

(3) Positive transfer of the UA 

between control stations that ensures 

only one control station can control the 

UA at a time. 

(4) Capability to release an external 

cargo load to prevent loss of control of 

the UA. 

(5) Capability to detect and avoid 

other aircraft and obstacles. 

(c) The UA must be designed to 

safeguard against inadvertent 

discontinuation of the flight and 

inadvertent release of cargo or external 

load. 

D&R.315 Fatigue 

The structure of the UA must be 

shown to withstand the repeated loads 

expected during its service life without 

failure. A life limit for the airframe must 

be established, demonstrated by test, 

and included in the ICA. 

D&R.320 Verification of Limits 

The performance, maneuverability, 

stability, and control of the UA within 

the flight envelope described in the UA 

Flight Manual must be demonstrated at 

a minimum of 5% over maximum gross 

weight with no loss of control or loss of 

flight. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on January 8, 

2024. 

Ian Lucas, 

Manager, Certification Coordination Section, 

Policy and Standards Division, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2024–00549 Filed 1–11–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


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