UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4551

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

LUIS ANGEL GONZALES, a/k/a Luis Angel Gonzales Sanchez, 

a/k/a Angel Gonzales, a/k/a Juis Angel Gonzales-Sanchez,

a/k/a Luis Angelgo Sanchez, a/k/a Luis Angel Sanchez,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., 

Senior District Judge. (2:09-cr-00178-HCM-FBS-1)

Submitted: February 15, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011

Before SHEDD and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished 

per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Richard J. 

Colgan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, 

Research and Writing Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. 

Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Randy Stoker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for 

Appellee.
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Luis Angel Gonzales pled guilty to a one-count 

indictment charging him with illegal reentry into the United 

States following deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) 

(2006), and was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment and one 

year of supervised release, with the condition that “his period 

of supervised release shall not commence until he surrenders to 

the probation officer to begin serving that period, which is to 

say, he’s not going to be serving supervised release while he’s 

deported and outside of the United States.” The court further 

ordered that upon completion of the term of imprisonment, 

Gonzales is to be surrendered to immigration authorities for 

deportation. On appeal, Gonzales argues that the district court 

lacked the authority to delay the start of his supervised 

release. We agree and, accordingly, affirm Gonzales’ 

conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand the case for further 

proceedings.*

Supervised release is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583 

(2006), which provides that a court, “in imposing a sentence 

. . . may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that 

the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after 

imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). A court imposing a term of 

 * Gonzales does not challenge his conviction on appeal.
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supervised release is directed to examine specified sentencing 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) in determining 

the length of the term. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). Courts are also

permitted to impose conditions on supervised release, including 

the condition that the defendant not commit any crimes during 

the term of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Section 

3583(d) further permits a sentencing court to impose “any 

condition” as “a further condition to supervised release,” so 

long as the condition meets certain criteria, including that the 

condition is “reasonably related” to the specified § 3553(a) 

factors, involves “no greater deprivation of liberty than is 

reasonably necessary,” and is consistent with the Sentencing 

Commission’s policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(3). 

Section 3583(d) also provides that “[i]f an alien defendant is 

subject to deportation, the court may provide, as a condition of 

supervised release, that he be deported and remain outside the 

United States, and may order that he be delivered to a duly 

authorized immigration official for such deportation.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(d).

In addition to § 3583, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (2006) 

supplies the statutory definition for when a term of supervised 

release begins: “The term of supervised release commences on the 

day the person is released from imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3624(e). The statute provides for the tolling of supervised 
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release in a single circumstance—when the defendant is 

imprisoned on an unrelated crime for more than thirty days. Id.

On appeal, Gonzales argues that, under the plain language of 

§ 3624(e), the district court lacked the authority to delay the 

start of his supervised release in the event he is deported 

following his incarceration. Gonzales notes that his position 

has the support of the five circuit courts that have addressed 

the issue. See United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 

2009); United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 491 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 

2007) (en banc); United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 

2004); United States v. Juan-Manuel, 222 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 

2000); United States v. Balogun, 146 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1998). 

The Government agrees with Gonzales that the district court 

lacked the authority to delay the start of his supervised 

release. 

This appeal raises a question of statutory 

interpretation. “When interpreting statutes we start with the 

plain language.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, 377 

F.3d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 2004). In interpreting the plain 

language of a statute, we give the terms their “ordinary, 

contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication Congress 

intended it to bear some different import.” North Carolina ex 

rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 515 F.3d 344, 351 (4th Cir. 

2008) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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In this case, the plain language of § 3624(e) clearly 

provides that supervised release starts “on the day” the 

defendant is released from prison. The statute provides for 

tolling only when the defendant is otherwise incarcerated, and 

“the fact that Congress explicitly allows for tolling only when 

a defendant is imprisoned indicates that Congress does not 

intend for district courts to toll the period of supervised 

release under any other circumstance.” Ossa-Gallegos, 491 F.3d 

at 543. In contrast, in the case of probation, Congress has 

provided for tolling mechanisms. See 18 U.S.C. § 3564(a) (“A 

term of probation commences on the day that the sentence of 

probation is imposed, unless otherwise ordered by the court.”).

In addition, we note that an opposite position would 

result in certain inconsistencies. As the Third Circuit 

explained, “a defendant charged with illegal reentry . . . may 

be ordered to leave and stay outside of the United States as a 

condition of his supervised release. If a defendant is removed 

and ordered excluded from the United States as a condition of 

supervised release, how can it be that the period of supervised 

release is tolled during that period?” Cole, 567 F.3d at 115 

(citations omitted).

Finally, while § 3583 does permit the district court 

to impose conditions on supervised release, “‘tolling’ is not a 

‘condition’ in the sense in which the term is used in 
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§ 3583(d).” Ossa-Gallegos, 491 F.3d at 542. “[C]onditions” 

within § 3583 “are contingencies upon which the right to 

continue on supervised release depends,” and “the continuation 

of supervised release is not contingent on tolling; rather, 

tolling describes the existing state of supervised release—that 

is, whether or not the period of supervised release is running.” 

Id.

We conclude that the district court’s order runs afoul 

of § 3624(e) because Gonzales’ supervised release will not 

necessarily “commence on the day” his term of imprisonment ends.

Accordingly, although we affirm Gonzales’ conviction, we vacate 

his sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED