Filed 11/26/13 P. v. Mejias CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RUBEN ALBERTO MEJIAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H039365

 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. 

 Nos. C1066707 and C1094466)

I. INTRODUCTION

After no contest pleas, defendant Ruben Alberto Mejias was convicted of 

carjacking, forgery, and first degree burglary. Defendant also admitted having two prior 

convictions qualifying both as strikes and as serious felonies and a third prior felony 

conviction for which he served a prison sentence. Following the granting in part of 

defendant’s motion to dismiss the strike conviction allegations, the trial court sentenced 

defendant to 33 years in prison. Defendant filed a notice of appeal with a certificate of 

probable cause claiming that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because 

his attorney failed to inform him of certain defenses.

By letter dated June 19, 2013, this court notified defendant that his appellate 

counsel filed a brief identifying no arguable issues on appeal and invited defendant to 

submit any argument on his own behalf. Defendant responded with a handwritten 11-

point list of issues. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the entire record to determine whether appointed counsel has correctly 

determined that there are no arguable appellate issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25

Cal.3d 436, 441.) In performing our review, we are required to give a brief description of 

the facts, the procedural history, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and 

the punishment imposed, and to address any contentions personally raised by the 

defendant. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 124.) 

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Defendant was charged by a first amended complaint in docket No. C1066707 

with carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215)1, selling or aiding in selling stolen property (§ 496, 

subd. (a)), and forgery (§ 470, subd. (a)), all felony offenses occurring on or about 

January 15, 2010. The complaint alleged two prior convictions qualifying both as strikes 

and as serious felonies (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12; 667, subd. (a)) and a third prior 

felony conviction for which defendant served a prison sentence (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). At 

the request of defendant’s attorney, in March 2010 the trial court ordered a psychiatric 

evaluation to assess defendant’s mental capacity and competency. Based on the courtordered evaluation, the court found defendant not competent to stand trial and, in August

2010, committed defendant to the State Department of Mental Health for evaluation and 

treatment to restore competency. Based on a December 2011 Department of Mental 

Health psychiatric report containing a bipolar disorder diagnosis and a treatment plan 

involving psychiatric medications, in January 2011 the court found defendant’s 

competency to have been restored and reinstated criminal proceedings. 

After the trial court denied defendant’s February 2011 motion to relieve counsel 

pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, defendant was held to answer on the 

 

1

 Unspecified section references are to the Penal Code.
carjacking and forgery offenses2

in docket No. C1066707. On April 15, 2011, defendant 

pleaded no contest to the carjacking and forgery changes and admitted the prior 

convictions alleged in docket No. C1066707. Defendant also pleaded no contest to 

residential burglary3in docket No. C1094466, and admitted the same prior felony 

convictions in that case as alleged in docket No. C1066707.

In September 2011, defendant moved in both cases to strike prior felony 

convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. 

Before the hearing on the Romero motion, through conflict counsel defendant filed a 

motion to withdraw his plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant filed a 

declaration with his reply to the motion to withdraw his plea stating that he was not 

informed by his attorney of mental health defenses in the burglary case or the significant 

factual discrepancies in the carjacking case between the victim’s written statement to the 

police and his testimony at the preliminary hearing. In his declaration defendant waived 

the attorney-client privilege as to his mental health defense but not his other defenses. At 

the time set to hear the motion to withdraw his plea, defendant made an oral motion that 

his conflict counsel be relieved pursuant to Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118. The court 

denied the Marsden motion and a week later denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his 

plea. 

 

2

The victim testified at the preliminary hearing that he left his car unoccupied 

with the engine running on January 15, 2010 at about 7:15 a.m. when he ran to his 

apartment for his cell phone. While attempting to get back into his car, defendant pushed 

the victim out of the way, entered the car and drove away. After police located his car, 

the victim found a handwritten bill of sale in the car with his signature forged. According 

to the probation report, defendant admitted to drafting the document. He planned to sell 

the car for $400. 

3 According to the probation report, on June 22, 2009 defendant entered the 

victim’s apartment through an open window. When the victim returned home, defendant 

was in her bedroom and fled through a window. The victim’s roommate reported his 

Bulova watch and a fraternity pin missing.
In January 2013 the court granted defendant’s Romero motion in part, striking one 

of defendant’s two prior strike convictions. The court found that defendant “was not 

receiving sufficient treatment for his mental [bipolar] illness at the time he committed the 

strike priors, and . . . that mental illness was a significant contributor to the commission 

of those offenses.” The court noted further: “Those strike priors occurred over a short 

period of time . . . the defendant did not engage in actual violence, despite the fact . . . on 

one occasion there was an individual present in a different room of the house. And . . .

both strikes were sentenced together.” 

Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 29 years and 4 months in docket No. 

C1066707 and a consecutive 44-month term in docket No. C1094466, for a total prison 

term of 33 years. He filed a timely notice of appeal in both cases with an order granting 

his request for a certificate of probable cause. His probable cause request asserts that his 

plea was not made knowingly and intelligently because his attorney did not advise him of 

mental state defenses. 

IV. DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS

A. CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Defendant identifies five issues which we consider encompassed by the trial 

court’s certificate of probable cause: (1) Defendant was not informed of his mental state 

defenses, (2) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) defendant was 

unable to withdraw his plea, (4) defendant was coerced into pleading no contest and 

filing a Romero motion, and (5) defendant should have gone to trial. On this record we 

find no merit to defendant’s claims. 

At his change of plea hearing, the trial judge asked defendant to listen very 

carefully to the questions he was going to ask and to interrupt the proceeding if he did not 

understand something. Defendant responded that he would do so. Defendant answered 

“yes” when asked whether he was pleading freely and voluntarily and on the advice of 

his counsel. He also responded “yes” when asked if he understood that he was giving up 
his right to either a jury or court trial. After explaining that it is “almost impossible” to 

take back a plea, the judge asked defendant whether he had enough time to talk with his 

attorney about all aspects of his case, including possible defenses. Defendant responded 

“yes.” Defendant’s attorney also responded “yes” when asked whether he had had 

enough time to discuss defendant’s case with him and whether he was satisfied that 

defendant was intelligently giving up his rights and pleading no contest. On its face, the 

hearing transcript shows no coercion, ineffective assistance of counsel, or failure on the 

part of defendant’s counsel to inform defendant of his defenses. 

The record also fails to show that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his plea was an abuse of discretion. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 

585; People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) Section 1018 allows a trial court 

to grant a defendant’s application to withdraw his or her plea of guilty or no contest 

“before judgment . . . for a good cause shown.” While “[m]istake, ignorance, or any 

other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a 

guilty plea, . . . good cause must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.” (People v.

Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) 

Although defendant asserted in his declaration supporting the motion that his 

attorney did not inform him “about any possible mental health defenses . . . on the 

burglary case,” he insisted on submitting the motion on his declaration without testifying. 

After reviewing the moving papers, defendant’s declaration, the People’s opposition, and 

the reporter’s transcript of the change of plea hearing, the court concluded that defendant 

failed to meet his burden. 

We also note that defendant submitted his motion to withdraw the plea on the 

papers after unsuccessfully moving to withdraw the motion, that the request to withdraw 

the motion was denied because defendant had previously withdrawn the motion, and that 

counsel who represented defendant at his change of plea hearing was present and 

prepared to testify on behalf of the People. Under these facts, we find no deficiency in 
counsel’s decision to submit the motion to withdraw the plea on the papers and without 

testimony. (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211 [ineffective assistance of 

counsel established by showing counsel’s representation was both deficient and 

prejudicial].) 

In sum, on this record we find no error in the court’s entry of defendant’s pleas or 

in the denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw the pleas. 

B. DEFENDANT’S OTHER ARGUMENTS

1. Non-Reviewable Issues

Aside from the competency issue addressed below, defendant’s remaining claims 

are not cognizable on appeal because they are neither encompassed by the certificate of 

probable cause nor otherwise reviewable. These claims are: (1) the carjacking victim lied 

at the preliminary hearing, (2) the carjacking victim lied about being pushed by 

defendant, (3) the one-person lineup in the carjacking case was tainted, (4) someone else 

was driving the stolen car when defendant was arrested in the carjacking case, and (5) “I 

cannot understand my sentence.” 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4), has codified precedent authorizing 

appeals after pleas of guilty and no contest without a certificate in only two situations: 

when the appeal is based on either “(A) The denial of a motion to suppress evidence 

under Penal Code section 1538.5; or [¶] (B) Grounds that arose after entry of the plea and 

do not affect the plea’s validity.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4); People v. Lloyd

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 658, 663-664.) Defendant’s remaining claims do not come within 

either exception. (See People v. Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364 [issues 

concerning a defendant’s guilt or innocence are not cognizable on appeal from a guilty or 

no contest plea].) 

2. Competency Challenge

To the extent defendant’s final argument -that he is “still” incompetent to stand 

trial -is a challenge to the lawfulness of proceedings occurring after entry of defendant’s 
plea, it is reviewable without a certificate of probable cause. (People v. Oglesby (2008) 

158 Cal.App.4th 818 [certificate of probable cause not needed to challenge court’s failure 

to sua sponte to hold mental competency hearing before sentencing].) The court’s duty to 

conduct a competency hearing arises when substantial evidence of incompetence is 

presented at any time “prior to judgment.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 542, 

citing Pen. Code, § 1368.) When a defendant has been found competent earlier in the 

criminal proceedings, a trial court need not conduct another competency hearing “ ‘unless 

it “is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence” casting 

a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.’ [Citations.]” (Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at 

pp. 542-543.) 

Based on the December 8, 2010 opinion and recommendation of state 

psychiatrists, in January 2011 the court found that defendant had been restored to 

competency. The record presented no new evidence of incompetency or evidence of 

changed circumstances. (Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 542-543.) To the contrary, in 

January 2013, three weeks before defendant was sentenced, the court heard extensive 

testimony from Dr. Greene, an expert in forensic psychiatry retained by defendant. In 

support of defendant’s Romero motion, Dr. Greene, who met with defendant three times 

in 2011, opined that defendant suffered from bipolar disorder and that he was being 

properly medicated consistent with his discharge instructions from the state mental 

hospital a year earlier. And at defendant’s sentencing hearing, defendant’s attorney 

indicated that there was no legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. In sum, we 

find no error in the trial court not making further competency inquiries after defendant 

entered his no contest pleas. 

Our review of the entire record has revealed no arguable issues on appeal.

V. DISPOSITION

The judgments in docket Nos. C1066707 and C1094466 are affirmed.
____________________________________

Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________

Manoukian, Acting P.J. 

____________________________

Márquez, J.