## UNITED STATES ARMY COUR T OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before WOLFE, SALUSSOLIA, and ALDYKIEWICZ Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v. Specialist TALAN S. GARNER United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20180135

Headquarters, United States Army Alaska Scott A. Oravec, Military Judge

Colonel Roseanne M. Bennett, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Major Todd W. Sim pson, JA; Major William M. Gra dy, JA.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Col onel Eric K. Stafford, JA.

19 December 2018

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION

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Per Curiam:

This case is at this court for review under Article 66(c), Unif orm Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. Appella nt submitted the case for our consideration without any assignmen ts of error. With reg ard to certain speci fications and specified legal issues, appellant (both personall y and through counsel) stated that he waived certain legal errors. 1 However, appella nt has not waived or withdrawn our appellate review. See UCMJ arts. 61, 66.

A knowing and voluntary waiver extinguishes any legal error. See, e.g.,

United States v. Gladue , 67 M.J. 311, 313- 14 (C.A.A.F. 2009). Thus, a record containing a legal erro r will nonetheless b e “correct in law” i f the error was properly waived. Thus, for all issues for which appellant’s waiver is a pplicable, the record is

correct in law.

1 The government does no t oppose the error.GARNER—ARMY 20180135

2 But, just because an appellant has waived an issue, does not me an that the duty of this court is a t an end. This cour t must still conduct a review of the entire record under Article 66(c), UCMJ. Our duty to determine whethe r a finding “should be approved” includes a determin ation as to whether we should g rant relief for waived legal errors. When a legal error ha s been waived, our r eview under Article 66(c), UCMJ, includes a determination as t o whether we should “ notice” (i.e. set aside) the waiver.

Having completed our review of the entire record under Article 66(c), UCMJ, we accept appellant’s waiver. The waiver i n this case was tail ored and given with the advice of appellat e counsel. Were we to notice the waiver we would be granting appellant “relief” tha t he has not requeste d and has specifical ly disclaimed. While appellant did not (and in this ca se need not) explain the basis of the waiver, nothing in the record gives us pause as t o why we should n ot let the wa iver stand. 2

Appellant’s waiver i n this case is atypi cal, but we see nothing that prohibits it. The waiver was not made as part of a pretrial agreement un der Rule for CourtsMartial [R.C.M.] 705(c)(1)(B), nor has appellant received any i nducement for the

waiver. See R.C.M. 1110(c). Inde ed, a knowing and voluntary w aiver on app eal, especially when done i n concert with the advice of appellate co unsel, will often serve the purp oses of judic ial economy.

CONCLUSION

On consideration of the entire r ecord, the findings a nd sentenc e are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court

2 It is enough for u s to determine that th ere are objectively re asonable reasons why an appellant may ele ct to waive certain i ssues on appeal. For example, an appellant may desire a quick end t o the appellate proc eedings in order to receive a discharge, or to terminate the Army’s perso nal jurisdictio n over him. Or, an appellant on excess leave, and who h as moved on to the n ext stage of his lif e, may not want to
risk the chance of a r ehearing where he will be required to rep ort back to the Army. MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court FOR THE COURT: