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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re SM HOLLEY, Minor. October 27, 2015 

No. 324735 

Oakland Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 14-821795-NA 

 

In re SM HOLLEY, Minor. No. 324736 

Oakland Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 14-821795-NA 

 

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and JANSEN and OWENS, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from the order terminating 

their parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) (child has a guardian and the 

parent, despite having the ability to do so, fails to support or contact the child for a period of two 

years or more), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood 

child will be harmed if returned to parent’s home), and terminating respondent mother’s parental 

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) (imprisonment for more than two years). We affirm. 

I. ADJUDICATION 

 This case arises from the termination of respondents’ parental rights. Petitioners are 

respondent father’s brother and sister-in-law. They are also the minor child’s guardians. 

Respondent father first argues that the trial court erred because it failed to find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the statutory grounds for jurisdiction over the 

child under MCL 712A.2(b) was established. We disagree. 

 In order for the court to find that jurisdiction over a child is proper, the court must find by 

a preponderance of the evidence that at least one statutory ground for jurisdiction under MCL 

712A.2(b) exists. See MCR 3.972(C)(1). We review a trial court’s findings of fact in a 

termination of parental rights case for clear error. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 

NW2d 105 (2009). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ if, although there is evidence to support it, 

we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. 
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 “Child protective proceedings have long been divided into two distinct phases: the 

adjudicative phase and the dispositional phase.” In re AMAC, 269 Mich App 533, 536; 711 

NW2d 426 (2006). In the adjudicative phase, which occurs first, the trial court determines 

whether it may exercise jurisdiction over the child because the child comes within MCL 

712A.2(b). Id. “During the adjudicative phase, a trial may be held to determine whether any of 

the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.” Id. The rules of evidence apply, 

the respondent is entitled to have a jury determine the facts, and the standard of proof is a 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. “After the trial, ‘the verdict must be whether one or more of 

the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.’ ” Id., quoting MCR 3.972(E). 

During the dispositional phase, the court determines what action it will take on behalf of the 

child. AMAC, 269 Mich App at 537. The respondent is not entitled to a jury determination 

during the dispositional hearing, and the rules of evidence do not apply. Id. “If permanent 

termination of parental rights is sought, the petitioner bears the burden of proving the statutory 

basis for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. The dispositional hearing may be 

held immediately after trial, and the time interval between the trial and dispositional hearing is at 

the discretion of the court, though the interval may not be more than 28 days without good cause. 

See MCR 3.973(B) and (C). 

 In this case, the trial court ordered termination of respondents’ parental rights at the 

initial disposition hearing. In order for this to occur, several conditions must be met, including: 

 (1) the original, or amended, petition contains a request for termination; 

 (2) at the trial or plea proceedings, the trier of fact finds by a 

preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the grounds for assumption of 

jurisdiction over the child under MCL 712A.2(b) have been established; 

 (3) at the initial disposition hearing, the court finds on the basis of clear 

and convincing legally admissible evidence that had been introduced at the trial or 

plea proceedings, or that is introduced at the dispositional hearing, that one or 

more facts alleged in the petition: 

 (a) are true, and 

 (b) establish grounds for termination of parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (m), or (n); 

 (4) termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. [MCR 

3.977(E).] 

 Petitioners filed an initial petition to terminate respondents’ parental rights, alleging MCL 

712A.2(b)(5)1

 as one of the statutory grounds for jurisdiction. During the preliminary hearing, 

 

1

 The statutory ground that was formerly codified under MCL 712A.2(b)(5) is now codified 

under MCL 712A.2(b)(6). See 2014 PA 342. 
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the referee found that jurisdiction was appropriate under the statutory ground and stated that the 

petition should be authorized. The trial court discussed during pretrial that trial would occur 

over at two-day period. The trial court properly held a combined adjudicatory/dispositional trial. 

See MCR 3.973(B) and (C). During the combined trial, the trial court did not make specific 

findings of fact with regard to adjudication. Instead, the trial court made findings of fact with 

regard to the statutory grounds for termination and the best interests of the child. However, the 

statutory ground for jurisdiction, which is now codified under MCL 712A.2(b)(6), is identical to 

the statutory ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). MCL 712A.2(b)(6) provides 

that jurisdiction is appropriate under the following circumstances: 

 If the juvenile has a guardian under the estates and protected individuals 

code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.1101 to 700.8206, and the juvenile’s parent meets 

both of the following criteria: 

 (A) The parent, having the ability to support or assist in supporting the 

juvenile, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide regular and 

substantial support for the juvenile for 2 years or more before the filing of the 

petition or, if a support order has been entered, has failed to substantially comply 

with the order for 2 years or more before the filing of the petition. 

 (B) The parent, having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with 

the juvenile, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected, without good 

cause, to do so for 2 years or more before the filing of the petition. 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) provides that a trial court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if 

the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

[t]he child has a guardian under the estates and protected individuals code, 1998 

PA 386, MCL 700.1101 to 700.8206, and both of the following have occurred: 

 (i) The parent, having the ability to support or assist in supporting the 

minor, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide regular and 

substantial support for the minor for a period of 2 years or more before the filing 

of the petition or, if a support order has been entered, has failed to substantially 

comply with the order for a period of 2 years or more before the filing of the 

petition. 

 (ii) The parent, having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with 

the minor, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected, without good cause, 

to do so for a period of 2 years or more before the filing of the petition. 

Thus, the statutory ground for jurisdiction is identical to the statutory ground for termination. 

See MCL 712A.2(b)(6); MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). The only difference between statutory ground for 

jurisdiction and the statutory ground for termination is that the statutory ground for termination 

must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See MCL 712A.2(b)(6); MCL 

712A.19b(3)(f). 
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 The trial court made specific findings of fact with regard to MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) and 

determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was proper under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(f). As discussed in further detail below, the trial court properly found that the 

statutory ground in MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) was proven with regard to both respondents. 

Therefore, to the extent that the trial court erred in failing to articulate the statutory ground for 

jurisdiction on the record, the error was harmless since the court found that the same 

circumstances existed by a higher standard of proof. See MCR 3.972(E); In re Williams, 286 

Mich App 253, 273; 779 NW2d 286 (2009) (applying a harmless-error analysis in a termination 

case). In addition, the order terminating respondents’ parental rights stated, “An adjudication 

was held and the child(ren) was/were found to come within the jurisdiction of the court.” It is 

well settled that a trial court speaks through its written orders. In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 

677; 692 NW2d 708 (2005), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Hansen, 

285 Mich App 158, 163; 774 NW2d 698 (2009), vacated on other grounds 486 Mich 1037 

(2010). Therefore, the trial court substantially complied with the requirements in MCR 3.977(E) 

during the combined trial and through its written order. See MCR 3.977(E); AMAC, 269 Mich 

App at 537-538.2

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS 

 Respondents both argue that the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that statutory grounds existed to terminate their parental rights. We agree that the trial 

court erred in terminating respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) and 

respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j), but disagree that the court 

erred in terminating respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j) and 

in terminating the parental rights of both respondents under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). 

 We review the trial court’s findings of fact and ultimate decision regarding the statutory 

grounds for termination for clear error. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 

(2014). “The trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous if the evidence supports them, 

but we are definitely and firmly convinced that it made a mistake.” Id. at 709-710. 

A. MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) 

 The trial court terminated respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f), (g), 

and (j), and also terminated respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h). 

MCL 712A.19b(3) provides, in part: 

 

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 We note that respondent father does not explicitly argue that his constitutional rights were 

violated with regard to this issue. However, to the extent that respondent father implicitly argues 

that the trial court violated his due-process rights, respondent father’s argument fails since, as 

discussed above, there was an adjudication of his unfitness. See In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 

422; 852 NW2d 524 (2014) (noting that a parent must be adjudicated unfit before the state can 

infringe on his right to the care, custody, and control of the minor child). 
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 The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court 

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following: 

* * * 

 (f) The child has a guardian under the estates and protected individuals 

code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.1101 to 700.8102, and both of the following have 

occurred: 

 (i) The parent, having the ability to support or assist in supporting the 

minor, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide regular and 

substantial support for the minor for a period of 2 years or more before the filing 

of the petition or, if a support order has been entered, has failed to substantially 

comply with the order for a period of 2 years or more before the filing of the 

petition. 

 (ii) The parent, having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with 

the minor, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected, without good cause, 

to do so for a period of 2 years or more before the filing of the petition. 

 (g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or 

custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be 

able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the 

child’s age. 

 (h) The parent is imprisoned for such a period that the child will be 

deprived of a normal home for a period exceeding 2 years, and the parent has not 

provided for the child’s proper care and custody, and there is no reasonable 

expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within 

a reasonable time considering the child’s age. 

* * * 

 (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of 

the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the 

home of the parent. 

 The court properly found that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). 

During the two years preceding the petition to terminate parental rights, both parents failed, 

without good cause, to provide regular and substantial support to the child. Respondent father 

provided no support and respondent mother only sent $50 to the child before the termination 

proceedings. Respondent mother had a child support order requiring payments of $216 per 

month and an arrearage of over $6,000. Although respondent mother was incarcerated, an 

incarcerated parent retains the ability to comply with statutory requirements to support and 

contact the child. See In re Caldwell, 228 Mich App 116, 121; 576 NW2d 724 (1998) 

(construing MCL 710.51(6)). Respondent mother apparently did not challenge her support 
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order. Respondent father did not have good cause for why he failed to support the child. He had 

no physical or mental ailment preventing him from working longer hours. He worked 15 to 20 

hours a week, and chose not to send petitioners money because he thought they could afford to 

pay for the child’s care themselves. Therefore, there was clear and convincing evidence that 

both parents failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide regular and substantial support 

for the minor child for a period of two years. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(f)(i). 

 There was also clear and convincing evidence that both respondents failed, without good 

cause, to contact, visit, or communicate regularly with the child during the two years preceding 

the petition. Respondent mother was incarcerated for most of the time the child was in care, but 

retained the ability to send cards and letters and make telephone calls. She only sent one 

birthday card to the minor child after parenting time was suspended. Additionally, respondent 

mother only had four telephone conversations with the minor child during the guardianship. 

There was evidence that respondent mother did not call the child regularly and only began 

calling regularly after parenting time was suspended following the pretrial hearing. Therefore, 

the trial court properly found that respondent mother failed, without good cause, to communicate 

regularly with the child. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(f)(ii). 

 Further, respondent father had the ability to visit at all times, but saw his daughter only 

two times in the two years preceding the termination petition. Both visits were at a family 

Christmas party. Respondent father explained that he did not travel to petitioners’ home to visit 

the minor child because it is a 2 1⁄2 hour drive to petitioners’ home, and he would only be able to 

spend two hours with his daughter. Respondent father also failed to send the minor child gifts at 

petitioner’s house. There was also testimony that respondent father stopped attending family 

events that petitioners and the minor child attended. Respondent father also failed to attend 

counseling sessions despite the recommendation of the child’s psychologist. In spite of the fact 

that respondent father told petitioners that he would call the child every night and visit her every 

other weekend, respondent father failed to call the child on a regular basis, and the cellular phone 

records that were admitted into evidence indicated that respondent father called only twice 

during the guardianship. Therefore, MCL 712A.19b(3)(f)(ii) was established with regard to 

respondent father since respondent father had the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with 

the minor and regularly and substantially failed, without good cause, to do so for a period of two 

years before the filing of the petition. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(f)(ii). Thus, there was clear and 

convincing evidence that termination of both of respondents’ parental rights was proper under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). 

B. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) 

 The court properly determined that termination of respondent mother’s parental rights 

was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Respondent mother cared for the minor child for the 

first five years of the child’s life. There was evidence that the child was neglected and abused 

during the five years. Respondent father testified that the child smelled bad and was forced to 

drink sour milk in respondent mother’s care. There was evidence presented at the termination 

hearings that child received cigarette burns and experienced a sexual assault by a friend of one of 

her siblings while in respondent mother’s care. Thus, there was evidence in the record indicating 

that respondent mother failed to provide proper care and custody of the minor child while the 

minor child was in her care. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). 
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 In addition, respondent mother did not provide proper care and custody through relatives. 

Although respondent mother participated in the guardianship proceedings, she had already lost 

physical custody of the minor child before the guardianship was established. The child was 

placed in the care of respondent father, who discussed the issue with his relatives and initiated 

the guardianship proceedings. Respondent mother did not partake in establishing the proper care 

and custody through placement with a relative, and, instead, merely acquiesced to the 

guardianship during the guardianship proceeding. Therefore, there was clear and convincing 

evidence that respondent mother failed to provide proper care and custody of the minor child. 

See MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 161 n 11; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (noting 

that a parent may provide proper care and custody through a relative). In addition, there was no 

indication that respondent mother would be able to provide proper care within a reasonable time 

considering the child’s age. There was no indication in the record that respondent mother 

rectified the conditions that caused her to lose custody of the minor child or that she would do so 

within a reasonable time. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Therefore, the trial court properly found 

that MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was established with regard to respondent mother. See id. 

 Respondent father claims that the court made findings only with regard to respondent 

mother concerning MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). This claim is without merit. The court clearly spoke 

to both respondents concerning MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), stating that its findings were “for mom 

and dad.” The court found that respondent father waited three years to file for custody while 

being aware that the child was in a “really bad environment with mom.” But once respondent 

father obtained custody, he “dumped her off” and allowed her to spend two weeks at a time with 

her brothers’ foster family and then two weeks with respondent father’s mother. The court found 

that the child was “clearly neglected” when she came into petitioners’ life. Thus, the trial court’s 

findings were directed at respondent father with regard to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). 

 However, the court erred when it found that MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) applied with regard to 

respondent father since respondent father appointed petitioners as guardians for the minor child 

when it became clear that he could not adequately care for her himself. There is ample evidence 

in the record that petitioners provided proper care and custody of the minor child. Respondent 

father was permitted to achieve proper care and custody through placement with a relative. See 

Mason, 486 Mich at 161 n 11. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that MCL 

712A.19b(3)(g) applied with regard to respondent father. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); Mason, 486 

Mich at 161 n 11. Regardless, the error was harmless since only one statutory ground must be 

proven for each respondent. See In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009). 

Here, MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) was proven with regard to both respondents. Therefore, the error 

was harmless. See id. 

C. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) 

 There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that 

termination was proper with regard to respondent mother under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The court 

noted that respondent mother had a felony record and that the minor child received cigarette 

burns in her care. There was clear and convincing evidence that the child would be harmed if 

she lived with respondent mother upon respondent mother’s release from prison. See Mason, 

486 Mich at 165. Respondent mother abused Xanax before she went to prison and admitted at 

the hearing that she did not deal with her substance abuse issue in spite of the fact that she 
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engaged in substance abuse treatment programs. Additionally, there was evidence that the child 

received cigarette burns on her head and finger under respondent mother’s care. The child told 

her psychologist that she had experienced abuse and neglect while living with respondent 

mother. No indication exists that respondent mother rectified the conditions that led to the 

neglect or would rectify the conditions once she was released from prison. Therefore, there was 

a reasonable likelihood that the child would be harmed if returned to respondent mother’s care. 

See MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).3 

 However, the court erred in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) applied with regard to 

respondent father without making findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. The 

trial court must state on the record or in writing its findings of fact and its conclusions of law 

during a termination hearing. See MCL 712A.19b(1); MCR 3.977(I)(1). The trial court in this 

case erred because it failed to make findings of fact with regard to respondent father under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j). See MCL 712A.19b(1); MCR 3.977(I)(1). Furthermore, petitioners also failed 

to present clear and convincing that MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was satisfied with regard to respondent 

father. Respondent father maintained the same job for six to eight months and was able to pay 

his bills with the help of his fiancé. He paid rent on a home, which contained a bedroom for the 

minor child. There was no indication that respondent father had any problems relating to 

physical abuse or substance abuse. Respondent father did threaten to cut off all contact between 

the minor child and petitioners if the child were returned to him, but there was a lack of evidence 

at the terminating hearing regarding whether the child would suffer emotional harm if respondent 

father cut off contact with petitioners and their families once the minor child returned to the care 

of respondent father. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011) (finding 

that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would suffer emotional harm if returned 

to the respondent when the respondent had sexual intercourse with one of her minor children). 

Therefore, the trial court erred in terminating respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j). As noted above, however, the error was harmless since MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) 

applied with regard to respondent father. See Foster, 285 Mich App at 633. 

D. MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) 

 Regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(h), clear and convincing evidence did not support 

termination of respondent mother’s parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) requires that (1) the 

child will be deprived of a normal home for over two years, (2) the incarcerated parent has not 

provided for the child’s proper care and custody, and (3) there is no reasonable expectation that 

the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering 

the child’s age. Mason, 486 Mich at 160-161. Petitioners contend that MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) 

was satisfied because respondent mother probably will not be released within the two-year time 

frame. However, respondent mother testified that it was very likely that she will be released on 

March 9, 2016, which is less than two years after the termination hearing. She testified that she 

 

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 We note that the trial court did not consider respondent mother’s felony history alone as the 

justification for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). See Mason, 486 Mich at 165 (noting 

that a criminal history alone does not justify termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)). 
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was staying out of trouble and enrolling in all of the recommended programs. The two-year 

period under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) is prospective and is not to be computed from the time the 

child is removed. Mason, 486 Mich at 161 n 12 (noting that “the trial court must consider 

‘whether the imprisonment will deprive a child of a normal home for two years in the future, and 

not whether past incarceration has already deprived the child of a normal home.’ ”) (citation 

omitted). Furthermore, the Michigan Supreme Court in Mason clarified that a “normal home” 

can be with a relative, which is the case here. Id. at 160-161. Thus, MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) was 

not proven by clear and convincing evidence. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(h). However, the trial 

court’s error in terminating respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) was 

harmless since MCL 712A.19b(3)(f), (g), and (j) were proven with regard to respondent mother. 

See Foster, 285 Mich App at 633. Therefore, although the trial court made several errors with 

regard to the statutory grounds for termination, the errors were harmless. See id. 

III. BEST INTERESTS 

 Respondents next argue that the trial court erred in finding by a preponderance of the 

evidence that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the child. We 

disagree. 

 “The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if the [petitioner] has 

established a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from 

a preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termination is in the [child’s] best 

interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. We review a trial court’s determination regarding 

the best interests of the child for clear error. Id. 

 A trial court must weigh all of the evidence to determine whether termination is in the 

best interests of the child. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. “To determine whether 

termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, the court should consider a wide 

variety of factors that may include ‘the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, 

the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over 

the parent’s home.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history 

of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s 

visitation history with the child, the [child’s] well-being while in care, and the possibility of 

adoption.” Id. at 714. 

 The evidence supported the court’s finding that termination of both of respondents’ 

parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Although respondent father was renting a home 

and had the same job for eight months before the hearing, he lacked stable employment and 

housing for most of the child’s life. There was also evidence that respondent father’s plan to cut 

the child’s relatives out of her life would cause the child to suffer from depression and anxiety. 

Previously, the child was transferred from relative to relative while in her father’s care. 

Respondent father had not had enough of a presence in her life before or during the guardianship, 

and the child was sad when he did not come to visit her at a family gathering. When given the 

opportunity to become involved in her counseling, he refused. He also failed to visit with the 

child and talk with her on the telephone on a regular basis. 
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 As for respondent mother, she was incarcerated for most of all of the guardianship. 

Before that, she had substance abuse issues and a long criminal history. The child informed her 

psychologist when she first began therapy that she did not miss her mother. Although there was 

evidence that the child had a bond with respondent mother, respondent mother did not try to 

maintain the bond by sending cards or letters, and the court did not believe testimony from both 

respondents that petitioners prevented telephone contact with the child. Furthermore, respondent 

mother had not talked with the child on the phone since June 2013. 

 In contrast, the child was doing very well in care and had a strong bond with petitioners. 

The child’s behavior in school improved under the guardianship, and she was involved in several 

extracurricular activities. The child’s psychologist testified that the child made improvements 

during her guardianship. At first, the child suffered from anxiety and depression when she first 

began treatment in July 2012. She also had frequent nightmares. However, the child did not 

suffer from anxiety and depression at the time of the termination hearings. According to the 

child’s psychologist, the child was very happy. She loved petitioners’ daughter and was not 

jealous of her. The child thought of petitioners’ home as her home. The psychologist testified 

that it would be detrimental to the permanency and stability of the child if she were moved 

anywhere else. She emphasized that the child needs to stay with petitioners “for the permanency 

and her self-esteem, contentment.” According to the psychologist, a change in placement would 

result in “very strong depression, anxiety, probably acting out in school.” The psychologist 

opined that it was in the best interests of the child to remain with petitioners. Petitioners planned 

to adopt the child if respondents’ parental rights were terminated. Therefore, the child was doing 

well in care, and there were advantages of petitioner’s home. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 

713-714. Thus, the court did not err in finding that termination was in the best interests of the 

child. See id. 

 Respondent mother argues that the court did not consider relative placement as weighing 

against termination of her parental rights. The court is required to explicitly consider this factor 

and weigh it against termination. MCL 712A.19a(6); In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 

823 NW2d 144 (2012). Here, the trial judge stated, “I’m terminating your rights even though 

this is a relative placement. She’s been with your relatives, dad.” Later, the trial judge said, “So, 

it’s clear that it’s best interest [sic] it’s not even close even though she’s placed as [sic] the 

guardianship with your brother.” Thus, the court considered the fact that the child was placed 

with relatives and recognized that the placement with relatives weighs against termination when 

it noted that it was terminating respondents’ parental rights in spite of the fact that there was a 

relative placement. See Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43. Further, the court was speaking to 

both parents with regard to its first statement, which indicates that the court considered that the 

child was placed with relatives as weighing against termination of respondent mother’s parental 
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rights. See id. Thus, the record does not support respondent mother’s argument that the court 

followed Olive/Metts only with regard to respondent father. See id. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Donald S. Owens