Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 45A03-1410-JT-361 | March 27, 2015 Page 1 of 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Deidre L. Monroe

Gary, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Donald W. Wruck

Wruck Paupore, PC

Dyer, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re Matter of:

Ta.A., Tr.A., and A.M. (Minor 

Children):

R.A.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of Child 

Services and Lake County Court 

Appointed Special Advocate,

Appellees-Petitioners.

March 27, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A03-1410-JT-361

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Thomas P. 

Stefaniak, Jr., Judge.

Cause Nos. 45D06-1307-JT-150, 

45D06-1307-JT-160, & 45D06-1307-

JT-161
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Riley, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, R.A. (Mother), appeals the trial court’s Order

terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Ta.A., Tr.A., and A.M.

(collectively, Children).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Mother raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the 

Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) presented sufficient evidence to 

support the termination of her parental rights.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Mother and T.J. are the biological parents of Ta.A, born May 5, 2005; Mother 

and T.H. are the biological parents of Tr.A., born October 14, 2006; and 

Mother and R.M. are the biological parents of A.M., born October 30, 2008.1 

In addition, Mother has three older children: R.A., born December 23, 1995; 

W.A., born August 14, 1998; and L.A., born June 6, 2002.2

 

1

 Throughout these proceedings, the whereabouts of T.J. and T.H. were unknown, so their paternity was 

never conclusively established. Nevertheless, on September 18, 2014, the parental rights of T.J., T.H., and 

R.M. were terminated. None of the fathers are party to this appeal.

2

 Although DCS removed R.A., W.A., and L.A. from Mother’s custody concurrent with the other three 

Children, their wardship cases have proceeded separately. R.A., W.A., and L.A. are not part of this appeal, 

but facts pertaining to them will be provided as necessary.
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[5] On July 6, 2011, the DCS office in Lake County, Indiana, received a request for 

assistance from the Gary Police Department regarding a twenty-nine-year-old 

Mother and her six children. The report indicated that Mother was being 

evicted because the home she shared with her mother, C.G. (Grandmother), 

had been condemned. Mother stated to the police officer that she wanted to 

“give up” four of the children because she could no longer take care of them. 

(DCS Exh. A). DCS arrived a short time later, but Mother’s sister and a family 

friend had already agreed to each take three of the children while Mother 

moved into a new house. DCS scheduled an appointment to inspect the new 

home once the children had returned to Mother’s custody.

[6] Before DCS could inspect the new house, on July 20, 2011, Mother contacted 

DCS and reiterated that she was unable to care for her children. Per Mother’s 

request, DCS took the children into custody and placed them in foster care. 

DCS learned that all six children had been sharing a bedroom with Mother; 

that Grandmother smokes crack cocaine and forced the children to “hustle” the 

money to pay for her drugs; and that Grandmother would hit the children with 

a broomstick and was verbally abusive. (Tr. p. 18). Mother also admitted to 

DCS that she used marijuana. The next day, DCS filed a petition alleging each 

of the Children to be a child in need of services, and the trial court subsequently 

adjudicated them as such.

[7] At the dispositional hearing on August 17, 2011, the trial court ordered Mother 

to participate in the services recommended by DCS and to have supervised 

visitation with the Children. As part of its plan to reunify Mother and the 
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Children, DCS referred Mother for a substance abuse assessment and 

counseling, random drug screens, and both individual and family counseling. 

DCS also provided home based case management services to assist Mother with 

securing appropriate housing and employment and to ensure that Mother had 

transportation for visitation and other appointments. Initially, Mother fully 

cooperated with her case plan. She completed parenting classes, and by the 

beginning of 2012, Mother had moved into her own apartment. Thereafter, 

Mother received unsupervised visitation privileges with the Children.

[8] Despite her early progress, on April 17, 2012, Mother tested positive for 

cocaine. As a result of the failed drug screen, DCS requested that her visitation 

with the Children be supervised. The next month, Mother passed all of her 

drug screens, so DCS restored unsupervised visitation at the beginning of June 

2012. Less than three months later, Mother was evicted from her apartment. 

She moved back into Grandmother’s home, but it was not long before 

Grandmother also kicked her out. On September 18, 2012, Mother informed 

DCS that she had relocated to Indianapolis, Indiana. However, Mother 

returned to Lake County the following month and resumed her services with 

DCS. On October 26, November 14, and November 27, 2012, Mother’s drug 

screens yielded positive results for marijuana. In addition, Mother was again 

living with Grandmother and had not made any progress in finding her own

housing. Thus, on December 19, 2012, the trial court changed the permanency 

plan from reunification to termination of Mother’s parental rights.
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[9] Between their removal in July of 2011 and February of 2013, DCS kept the 

Children placed together. This resulted in the Children being shuffled to 

numerous foster homes because of the aggressive and disturbing behaviors they 

exhibited. In addition to physically fighting with each other, attacking their 

foster parents, destroying property, and misbehaving in school, the Children 

engaged in inappropriate behavior of a sexual nature. On February 8, 2013, the 

Children were individually placed with separate foster families. The Children 

still visit with each other twice per month, but since their separation, they have

made drastic improvements behaviorally, emotionally, and academically. The

Children are currently placed with foster parents who intend to adopt them. 

[10] Following the change in her permanency plan from reunification to 

termination, Mother began encouraging the Children to disobey their foster 

parents. As a result, on March 14, 2013, DCS requested that all of Mother’s 

services, including visitation, be discontinued, which the trial court granted on

April 10, 2013. After her services were terminated, Mother did not maintain

contact with DCS. Two years after the Children’s removal, on July 17, 2013, 

DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s rights. On September 17, 2014, the 

trial court held a termination hearing. On September 18, 2014, the trial court 

issued its Order, stating that “[i]t is in the best interest of the [Children] and 

their health, welfare and future that the parent-child relationship between the 

[Children] and their parents be forever fully and absolutely terminated.” 

(Appellant’s App. p. 3).

[11] Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[12] Mother claims that DCS presented insufficient evidence to support the 

termination of her parental rights.3It is well established that “[a] parent’s 

interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the 

oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 

(Ind. 2009) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)), reh’g denied. 

Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

safeguards “the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their 

children” against undue government interference. Id. However, when a parent 

is “unable or unwilling to meet” his or her parental duties, it may become 

necessary for a court to terminate his or her rights to the child. Id. at 1259-60.

[13] The involuntary termination of a parent’s rights “is the most extreme sanction a 

court can impose” because it permanently severs the parent-child relationship. 

S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

Nevertheless, the ultimate purpose of termination is to protect the children 

involved—not to punish the parents. Id. Therefore, the termination of parental 

rights is meant to be a last resort, available only after “all other reasonable 

efforts have failed.” Id.

 

3

 As noted by the State, Mother’s argument is devoid of any citations to the record and contains insufficient 

citations to authority pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Waiver notwithstanding, because of 

the significant interests at stake in a termination of parental rights, we will address the merits of this case.
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I. Standard of Review

[14] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, our court does not reweigh 

evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 

989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). We will consider only the evidence and 

any inferences which may reasonably be derived therefrom that are most 

favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id. Where, as here, a trial court enters 

specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we will “not set aside the 

findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 

the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. 

Trial Rule 52(A). To evaluate whether the trial court’s decision to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights is clearly erroneous, we must consider “whether the 

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly 

and convincingly support the judgment.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229-30. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[15] In order to support the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights, DCS was 

obligated to prove, in pertinent part, 

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

 (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of 

the parents will not be remedied.

 (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

 (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated 

a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.
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[16] Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must establish each of these elements by 

clear and convincing evidence. In re M.W., 943 N.E.2d 848, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2011), trans. denied. “Clear and convincing evidence need not reveal that the 

continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the child’s very 

survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by the 

respondent parent’s custody.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230.

A. Conditions Resulting in Removal Not Remedied

[17] First, Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

resulting in the Children’s removal and placement in foster care will not be 

remedied. In making this determination, a trial court should assess the 

“parent’s fitness to care for his children at the time of the termination hearing, 

taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” In re J.T., 742 

N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. This entails an evaluation 

of “the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of 

future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. The trial court “may properly 

consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, 

history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and 

employment[,]” as well as the parent’s response to any services offered by DCS. 

McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2003). 
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[18] In this case, DCS removed the Children from Mother’s care due to her unstable 

housing, substance abuse, and admitted inability to provide adequate care and 

supervision. Mother now contends that the trial court erroneously concluded 

that there is a reasonable probability that these conditions will not be remedied 

because she “complied in totality with her case plan.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 10). 

We disagree.

[19] In its Order terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court acknowledged 

that the Children “were to begin transitioning home in early 2012” based on 

Mother’s initial compliance with her DCS services. (Appellant’s App. p. 2). 

The trial court also found that Mother subsequently tested positive for cocaine 

and marijuana, lost her housing, and

[s]ince that time, [M]other stopped complying with any of the services. 

Mother was having inappropriate contact with the [C]hildren. Mother 

was encouraging the [C]hildren to act out in their foster homes. 

Mother violated the rules and actually slipped [L.A.] a cell phone and 

was encouraging the child to call [M]other’s boyfriend. Mother 

became verbally abusive to the service providers. Mother was again 

unstable and not participating in the services offered. All services were 

stopped for [M]other in April 2013, after two years of attempted 

services. Mother did not progress in her services and continues to this 

day to lack stability. Mother still does not have appropriate housing.

(Appellant’s App. p. 2). Mother argues that several of the court’s findings are 

unsupported by the evidence “under the requisite evidentiary standards.” 

(Appellant’s Br. p. 9).

[20] First, Mother asserts that the trial court erroneously “failed to give any weight 

to [her] honesty, and although she had been submitting to random drug screens 
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for two (2) years she only tested once admittedly for marijuana, and a disputed 

positive cocaine test.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 9). Our deference for the trial court’s 

determinations of evidentiary weight and witness credibility is long settled; 

thus, to the extent that Mother’s argument is a request that we reweigh evidence 

in her favor, we decline. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008), trans. denied. Considering the evidence most favorable to the judgment, it 

is clear that Mother tested positive for cocaine in April of 2012, and for 

marijuana on October 26, November 14, and November 27, 2012. Mother 

conceded that she smoked marijuana but disputed the validity of the cocaine 

result. Notwithstanding that it was a hair follicle drug screen that yielded the 

positive cocaine result, she speculated that her urine sample must have been 

switched because she had “never used drugs a day in [her] life.” (Tr. p. 51). As

the trial court clearly disbelieved Mother, we find that the evidence sufficiently 

establishes that she did not remedy her substance abuse problem.

[21] Second, as to the trial court’s finding that Mother had inappropriate contact 

with the Children and was verbally abusive to service providers, Mother asserts 

that the trial court “failed to take into consideration the stress [she] was under 

with the constant involvement of the DCS without any progress being made in 

the returning of her [C]hildren.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 9-10). We find little merit 

in Mother’s attempt to use stress as an excuse to sabotage the Children’s 

progress in foster care and to shout obscenities at service providers. Our court 

has previously found that “[a] pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting 

problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction 
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with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable 

probability that the conditions will change.” In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 18. Here, 

DCS’ ongoing involvement and the lack of progress were the direct result of 

Mother’s non-compliance with her case plan.

[22] Lastly, regarding Mother’s inadequate housing, she asserts that the trial court 

“ignored the testimony by [M]other and the case manager regarding the money 

she receives from Social Security, and her inability to pay rent and utilities, 

especially without having the custody of her [C]hildren.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 

10). At the termination hearing, Mother testified that she lost her apartment 

because her rent exceeded her Social Security disability benefits, which is her 

sole source of income. In turn, DCS explained that Mother’s

main issue was unstable housing. And when we put in the home 

based case management, they help with all of those things. With the 

transportation, . . . they take you to the different housing places that 

work with you according to your income, so even though if she is on a 

fixed income of social security benefits from disability, there are 

housing options out there for you, because they base your rent off of 

what your income is. So, the home based services put in place were 

designed specifically to address her main issue which was not being 

able to provide housing for herself or her [Children].

(Tr. pp. 63-64).

[23] Ultimately, the trial court found that DCS’ goal

was to obtain stability for the [M]other. Mother was given rental 

assistance and still [M]other could not maintain stable housing. . . . 

Home based services were put into place to help [M]other obtain 

housing and stability. Mother questioned the need for any of the 
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services. Mother often times would refuse services. Numerous 

attempts were made to get [M]other vested in the services.

(Appellant’s App. p. 2). The evidence establishes that at the time of the 

termination hearing, Mother was living with Grandmother. Mother testified 

that Grandmother is “not on drugs no more and we gets (sic) along fine now.” 

(Tr. p. 109). However, the trial court specifically found no credibility in 

Mother’s assertion that she and Grandmother have improved their relationship. 

Furthermore, DCS stated that Mother’s current housing would not be an 

appropriate placement for the Children “[b]ecause of the [G]randmother’s past 

cocaine/crack abuse and the allegations of the [C]hildren with her physically 

and emotionally abusing them while living in her home.” (Tr. p. 74). 

[24] While the fact “of low or inconsistent income” does not, by itself, demonstrate 

unfitness, it is not an excuse to neglect a child or expose a child to a dangerous 

home environment. In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 202-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 

Mother testified that she “can’t get a job” because she receives Social Security 

disability, but it is Mother’s responsibility to supplement her income in order to 

support her Children. (Tr. p. 48). She cannot reasonably expect that DCS will 

financially support her and the Children for the rest of their lives. Moreover, 

we are unpersuaded by Mother’s attempt to shift the blame for her instability, 

arguing that DCS “set [her] up for failure by putting her into a rental unit that 

exceeded her only income.” (Tr. p. 78). “[T]he law concerning termination of 

parental rights does not require [DCS] to offer services to the parent to correct 

the deficiencies in childcare.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d at 201. DCS offered to 
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help Mother find suitable housing, but it was ultimately Mother’s duty to 

ensure that she could maintain a stable environment for the Children.

[25] Despite her initial compliance, and despite a multitude of services offered to 

Mother over a twenty-month span, Mother did not comply “in totality with her 

case plan” because she did not have stable housing for the Children, she had 

not pursued any other means for supplementing her income; and she did not 

achieve sobriety. (Appellant’s Br. p. 10). Therefore, we find that the evidence 

sufficiently supports the trial court’s determination that the conditions resulting 

in the Children’s removal from Mother’s custody are unlikely to be remedied.4

B. Best Interests of the Children

[26] Next, Mother contends that DCS failed to prove that termination of her 

parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. In evaluating a child’s 

best interests, the trial court must consider the totality of the evidence,

“look[ing] beyond the factors identified by [DCS].” In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 22. 

The trial court need not postpone termination of the parent-child relationship 

until after a child has been irreversibly harmed, “such that the child’s physical, 

mental and social development is permanently impaired.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 

at 1235. “When assessing the child’s physical, emotional and mental well-

 

4

 Having found that DCS met its burden to prove that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal will 

not be remedied, we need not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat 

to the Children’s well-being. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii)). 

Additionally, Mother concedes that DCS has established a satisfactory plan for the Children’s care and 

treatment. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D).
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being, the trial court may consider a myriad of factors. We acknowledge that 

among those factors contemplated, ‘[p]ermanency is a central consideration in 

determining the [child’s] best interests. . . .’” Id. (alterations in original) 

(quoting In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1265).

[27] During the termination hearing, both the DCS case manager and the Children’s 

therapist recommended that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the 

Children’s best interests because of their need for structure and stability. 

Specifically, DCS described that 

[Tr.A.] has been in seven different foster homes. [Ta.A.] has been in 

seven different foster homes. [A.M.] has been in six. And these 

[C]hildren are nine, seven and five years old. They are all in preadoptive homes who have . . . gotten them kind of stabilized. The 

[C]hildren’s behaviors have diminished tremendously, if not 

completely, in the homes that they are in and they need to be in homes 

where they could have a permanent, stable home environment for 

them to grow into mature and productive adults.

(Tr. p. 69). The trial court agreed, further finding:

None of the parents are providing any emotional or financial support 

for the [C]hildren. . . . Mother continues with her instability and is in 

no position to properly parent these [C]hildren. The [C]hildren have 

been in placement since July 2011 and have never been returned to 

parental care or custody. The [C]hildren are bonded and thriving in 

their placements.

. . . Additionally, the [C]hildren deserve a loving, caring, safe, stable 

and drug free home.

(Appellant’s App. p. 3). Mother’s basis for error on appeal is that “the trial 

court failed to address the pain and suffering that the [C]hildren will have to 
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suffer when they realize[] that they will not have any further contact with . . . 

[M]other.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11).

[28] This court is ever mindful “that children should not be compelled to suffer 

emotional injury, psychological adjustments, and instability to preserve parental 

rights.” In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; cert. 

denied, 534 U.S. 1161 (2002). What Mother fails to recognize is the pain and 

suffering that the Children have already endured because of her actions. In 

particular, the trial court found that

[t]he [C]hildren have a lot of behavior[al] issues that are currently 

being addressed. The [C]hildren cannot be placed together due to the 

extreme behaviors of the [C]hildren. The [C]hildren have sexual abuse 

issues and physical abuse issues. The [C]hildren cannot be placed 

together due to the sexual abuse issues the [C]hildren have portrayed.

(Appellant’s App. p. 2). A review of the record reveals that “the [C]hildren 

reported to their therapist at one point[] that they had been subjected to sexual 

abuse and physical abuse while in the home with their [M]other . . . . And also 

that they had been witness to sexual acts between their [M]other and different 

male visitors.” (Tr. pp. 72-73). The Children’s therapist, who observed the 

Children acting out “sexualized behaviors” and making sexually inappropriate 

comments, opined that they were exhibiting symptoms of past abuse and 

neglect. (Tr. p. 94). Although Mother denied the allegations, postulating that

“it probably happened [when] they got into foster care[,]” the trial court was 

free to discredit her testimony. (Tr. p. 117). 
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[29] Between July of 2012 and October of 2013, the Children met individually with 

a therapist on a weekly basis in order to address their anger and other issues.

The therapist reported that the Children “didn’t have a lot of structure, they 

didn’t recognize boundaries, and they were a little defiant and sometimes they 

could be disrespectful.” (Tr. p. 91). However, by the time of the termination 

hearing, they “had more initiative, wanted to try to do better in school and get 

along with others.” (Tr. p. 96). Ta.A. “indicated that she would be willing to 

stay long term” with her foster parent. (Tr. p. 70). Tr.A.’s grades and behavior 

had improved, “and he has developed a nurturing and loving bond with [his 

foster parent]. And he intends to stay there, if you ask [Tr.A.]. He’s happy 

where he’s at.” (Tr. pp. 70-71). As for A.M., she is happy and thriving and 

“has a great bond with [her foster] parents.” (Tr. p. 71).

[30] In addition to the Children’s need for permanency and structure, the record 

reflects that Mother exposed the Children to dangerous and inappropriate 

situations, which “detrimentally impacted [their] psychological, emotional, and 

physical development.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. The therapist expressed 

concern that if the Children “go back to a life where there’s no structure, they 

don’t know where their next meal, or where they are going to lie their head, 

then I believe their behaviors will increase. And they will go back to doing the 

things that they were doing before.” (Tr. p. 97) She noted that they would be 

subject to “an increased risk of getting into criminal activities, possible early 

pregnancies, it could just hinder their emotional stability.” (Tr. p. 97). 
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Accordingly, we find that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that termination of Mother’s rights is in the Children’s best interests.

[31] As a final note, we must address Mother’s diatribe that

DCS’[] objective should not be to cause measurable pain and suffering 

on young children. These young [C]hildren should be afforded the 

opportunity to be raised or at least have a relationship with their 

natural [M]other. Moreover, [Mother] has older children and may 

have other children. The siblings should have the fundamental right to 

have a relationship with their older siblings. The [c]ourt must make a 

stance in ruling that parents have fundamental rights that are protected 

by the U.S. Constitution. The continued destruction of the family 

structure should not be tolerated by this [c]ourt. This [M]other has a 

right to raise her [C]hildren. . . . The [c]ourt must stop the direct 

assault on the rights of parents in the State of Indiana.

(Appellant’s Br. p. 11). Our holding in this case does not undermine the fact 

that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children. 

Nonetheless, parental rights must be subordinated to the State’s interest in 

protecting a child’s welfare. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259.

Here, Mother was afforded with three years and ample assistance from DCS to 

achieve stability, but she selfishly refused to make the needs of her Children a 

priority. Instead of accepting responsibility for her own actions, Mother has 

placed the blame everywhere except for where it truly lies, which is with her.

We are unsympathetic to Mother’s portrayal of herself as the victim because it 

is the Children who have paid the price for her poor choices. Mother—not DCS 

or the courts—is responsible for the destruction of her family.
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CONCLUSION

[32] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing 

evidence to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children.

[33] Affirmed.

[34] Vaidik, C. J. and Baker, J. concur