IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA16-420

Filed: 20 December 2016

North Carolina Industrial Commission, I.C. No. X07855

JEFFREY EUGENE BEAL, Employee, and LAWRENCE CRAIGE, Guardian of the 

Estate of JEFFREY EUGENE BEAL, Plaintiffs

v.

COASTAL CARRIERS, INC., (Alleged) Employer, and ZURICH AMERICAN 

INSURANCE COMPANY, (Alleged Carrier); Defendants; and THE 

WAREHOUSING COMPANY, LLC, (Alleged) Employer and KEY RISK 

INSURANCE COMPANY, (Alleged) Carrier, Defendants.

Appeal by defendant-appellant Key Risk Insurance Company from opinion and 

award entered 15 December 2015 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 October 2016.

Stiles, Byrum & Horne, L.L.P., by Henry C. Byrum, Jr., and B. Jeanette Byrum, 

for defendants-appellees Coastal Carriers, Inc. and Zurich American Insurance 

Company.

Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by Erica B. Lewis, Shelley W. 

Coleman, and M. Duane Jones, for defendant-appellant Key Risk Insurance 

Company.

DAVIS, Judge.

This workers’ compensation insurance coverage dispute arises from a 

workplace accident that occurred in Florida and injured an employee who lived in 

North Carolina and had been lent to an employer based in South Carolina. Key Risk 

Insurance Company (“Key Risk”) appeals from an opinion and award of the North 

Carolina Industrial Commission ordering Key Risk to (1) pay temporary total 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

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disability compensation to Jeffrey Eugene Beal (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to the North 

Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act; and (2) pay all indemnity benefits owed on 

Plaintiff’s claim. After careful review, we reverse and remand.

Factual Background

The facts giving rise to this case involve two furniture moving and installation 

companies — Coastal Carriers, Inc. (“Coastal”) and The Warehousing Company, LLC 

(“TWC”). On 20 July 2010, TWC — a company based in South Carolina — entered 

into an agreement with Winter Park Construction Company (“Winter Park”) to 

provide furniture, fixtures, and electronics installation services at Plantation Beach 

Club Condominiums in Stuart, Florida (the “Florida Project”). Because TWC did not 

have enough manpower to perform the job, TWC’s owner, Sidney Baird, contacted 

Gordon Ray — Baird’s longtime friend who was the president of Coastal — to see 

about the possibility of TWC hiring four of Coastal’s employees to temporarily work 

for TWC on the Florida Project.

In 2010, Plaintiff was working for Coastal, which was based in North Carolina. 

At a safety meeting of Coastal employees, Ray shared with them the information 

regarding the Florida Project. Upon learning of the employment opportunity from 

Ray, Plaintiff and three other Coastal employees — Michael Porter, Anthony Brown, 

and Randy Wallace — contacted Baird to inform him of their interest in working on 

the Florida Project. Baird offered each of the four employees the job — which they 
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Opinion of the Court

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each accepted — and told all of them that upon completion of the job, they would be 

paid by TWC.

Plaintiff worked on the Florida Project under the on-site supervision of his 

fellow Coastal employee, Porter, and a TWC employee named David Fleener. Baird 

kept in contact with Porter and Fleener on a daily basis from his home in South 

Carolina.

On 26 September 2010, while working at the Florida job site, Plaintiff was 

injured when he fell while lifting furniture to the second floor of the building where 

the TWC crew was working. As a result of the fall, he sustained multiple injuries.

On 22 October 2010, Plaintiff filed a Form 18 “Notice of Accident” with the 

Industrial Commission, seeking compensation for his injuries from Coastal’s workers’ 

compensation insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”), due 

to his need for medical care for which TWC’s insurance carrier, Key Risk, had refused 

to pay. Zurich paid Plaintiff’s medical compensation of $350,799.25 and disability 

compensation of $44,068.85.

On 16 September 2011, Coastal filed a motion to add TWC as a defendant to 

Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation action. The motion was granted on 27 October 

2011. On 2 January 2013, Coastal filed a Form 33 “Request That Claim be Assigned 

for Hearing” requesting that “[TWC] and its workers’ compensation carrier [Key Risk]

pay benefits pursuant to the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act.” On 25 
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February 2013, Key Risk filed a Form 33R “Response to Request That Claim Be 

Assigned for Hearing” contending that Key Risk was not a party and “would be 

prejudiced if added into this claim as a party” more than two years after it was 

removed from a hearing docket.

On 9 July 2013, a hearing was held before Deputy Commissioner Melanie 

Wade Goodwin. Deputy Commissioner Goodwin issued an opinion and award

providing that Coastal, Zurich, and TWC were jointly liable for indemnity and 

medical benefits paid by Zurich and ordering that Key Risk be dismissed with 

prejudice as a party-defendant in the matter. Coastal and Zurich filed a notice of 

appeal from the deputy commissioner’s dismissal of Key Risk on 18 June 2014.

On 15 December 2015, the Full Commission issued an opinion and award

containing the following pertinent findings of fact:

1. On September 26, 2010, Jeffrey Eugene Beal 

(hereinafter, “Jeffrey Beal” or “Mr. Beal” or “Plaintiff’) was 

injured when he fell approximately 10-20 feet from a piece 

of equipment called a lull which was being used to lift 

furniture to the second floor of the building where The 

Warehousing Company, LLC (hereinafter, “TWC”) crew 

was working. As a result of his fall, Mr. Beal sustained 

multiple injuries, including fractures of the left sphenoid 

wing, left lateral orbital wall, left maxillary sinus, and left 

zygomatic arch; a comminuted right distal radius and ulna 

fracture; a left elbow comminuted intra-articular olecranon 

fracture; multiple left rib fractures; a ruptured spleen and 

a mild subarachnoid hemorrhage.

2. On October 22, 2010, Jeffrey Beal filed a Form 18 

Notice of Accident with the North Carolina Industrial 
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Commission seeking compensation for his injuries. The 

named Defendant was Coastal Carriers, Inc. (hereinafter, 

“Coastal”). Plaintiff’s claim was accepted and paid by 

Coastal and Zurich American Insurance Company 

(hereinafter “Zurich”) due to the emergent need for medical 

care which Key Risk Insurance Company (hereinafter, 

“Key Risk”), the workers’ compensation carrier for TWC, 

would not address.

. . . .

5. On September 16, 2011, Defendant Coastal filed a 

Motion to Add Party-Defendant, seeking to add TWC, as a 

party Defendant. This Motion was granted by the 

Executive Secretary on October 27, 2011.

6. On September 26, 2010, Gordon Wayne Ray, Jr. 

(hereinafter Mr. Ray) was the President of Coastal, which 

was located in Wilmington, North Carolina. Coastal was a 

mover of household goods regulated by state and federal 

tariffs.

7. On September 26, 2010, Sidney “Skip” Baird 

(hereinafter, “Mr. Baird”) was the owner of TWC located at 

122 Watergate Drive, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. 

TWC’s business included the warehousing of and the 

installation of furniture, fixtures, and electronics at resort 

properties, installing furniture, fixtures, and electronics 

which was commercial work which was not regulated by 

state and federal tariffs.

. . . .

11. On July 20, 2010, TWC (through Mr. Baird) entered 

into a “Subcontract Agreement” with Winter Park 

Construction Company (hereinafter; “Winter Park”) to 

provide furniture, fixture and electronics installation 

services at Plantation Beach Club Condominiums in 

Stuart, Florida. This contract was negotiated entirely by

Mr. Baird on behalf of TWC and did not involve Mr. Ray or 
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Opinion of the Court

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Coastal in any way.

12. Under the terms of the contract, TWC had eight days 

to complete the installation of furniture, fixtures and 

electronics in thirty-two units. At the time in question, 

TWC had multiple projects underway in various parts of 

the United States and did not have the manpower to 

complete all of these jobs. Mr. Baird’s situation was further 

complicated by the fact that he was awaiting the birth of 

his daughter, which required him to remain in Myrtle 

Beach, South Carolina. Mr. Baird contacted Mr. Ray 

indicating he was “in a jam” and that he wanted to hire four 

of Mr. Ray’s employees to work for TWC on a Florida job 

where all of the furniture, fixture and electronics 

installation had to be completed in eight days.

13. Sometime prior to September 19, 2010, Mr. Ray 

announced at a safety meeting of Coastal employees that

Mr. Baird wanted to hire workers for a Florida project and 

since the work for his company was in a slow period, he 

instructed any of his interested workers to contact Mr. 

Baird directly. Mr. Ray did not select or designate any of 

his workers for the Florida job. His workers were free to 

accept or reject the offer of employment.

. . . .

15. Following this meeting, which occurred in North 

Carolina, four Coastal employees -- Michael Porter, 

Anthony Brown, Randy Wallace and Jeffrey Beal --

arranged with Mr. Baird to go to Florida to work for TWC. 

Prior to these workers leaving North Carolina, Mr. Baird 

spoke by telephone with each of these four men -- Michael 

Porter, Anthony Brown, Randy Wallace and Jeffrey Beal -

- to give a “pep talk[”] and discuss payment or wages at the 

completion of the job in Florida. Mr. Baird informed them 

they would be paid by TWC. Each one of these four men 

accepted Mr. Baird’s offer of employment while still in 

North Carolina.
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16. Plaintiff testified that he agreed to work the Florida

job while he was in North Carolina.

17. The four individuals who agreed to work on the 

Florida project did not have reliable transportation. When 

informed of their transportation problems, Mr. Ray loaned 

the men a Coastal sales van to drive and gave them a gas 

card to purchase fuel. He expected to be reimbursed by 

TWC for these expenses.

. . . .

19. When the four individuals hired by TWC -- Michael 

Porter, Anthony Brown, Randy Wallace and Jeffrey Beal 

-- arrived in Florida, they went to a motel room that was 

paid for by Mr. Baird. Mr. Porter supervised the work for 

the first couple of days until David Fleener, an employee of 

TWC arrived on the site. Mr. Fleener then instructed the 

workers on what to do. Mr. Baird communicated with TWC 

workers multiple times on a daily basis while they were in 

Florida and personally supervised them through Michael 

Porter and David Fleener. This included setting working 

hours and monitoring progress on the job. Mr. Ray never 

supervised the work of the TWC crew.

20. Prior to September 26, 2010, Mr. Ray had a conference 

in West Palm Beach and he decided to stop by the Florida 

jobsite for a visit on his way to the conference. During the 

period of about thirty minutes when he was at the site, he 

cautioned the TWC workers to “be careful” but did not offer 

supervision or instruct them on their work. While Mr. Ray 

was present, he was approached by Mr. Porter about 

loaning Mr. Brown, Mr. Wallace, Mr. Beal and him money 

for food. Mr. Baird had promised to send the TWC crew 

money, but had failed to do so. Mr. Ray loaned each man 

$100.00 out of his personal funds.

21. When TWC’s project in Florida was completed, Mr. 

Baird paid Michael Porter, Anthony Brown, Randy Wallace 

and Jeffrey Beal for the work they did for TWC in Florida. 
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Opinion of the Court

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These workers (other than Plaintiff) collected their money 

in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The offices for TWC 

remained in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina the entire time 

the company was in existence.

22. Plaintiff was performing the work of TWC when his 

accident occurred.

23. Anthony Brown gave a statement under oath on 

February 17, 2012, which was included in the record, 

stating he was one of four individuals who traveled from 

North Carolina to Florida to work for TWC and was 

working on the project for a man named “Skip.” Mr. Porter 

was the contact person with Mr. Baird, and the two were 

constantly talking. Mr. Brown considered himself to be an 

employee of TWC. When the job was completed, the TWC 

employees drove to Mr. Baird’s apartment in Myrtle Beach, 

South Carolina where they collected their checks for the 

project.

24. Plaintiff testified by deposition on October 9, 2012 in 

a civil action he filed in Florida as a result of the September 

26, 2010 accident. Plaintiff testified that he received 

$100.00 from Mr. Ray so he would have food when Mr. Ray 

visited the Florida jobsite with his wife and took a “tour 

through the motel.” Plaintiff testified that he took orders 

from Michael Porter on the job and that Mr. Porter kept his 

hours. He was paid by Skip Baird for the work he 

performed in Florida. Mr. Ray never directed his work on 

the project.

. . . .

26. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view 

of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Jeffrey 

Beal was not an independent contractor for TWC. He was 

expressly hired pursuant to an oral contract to leave North 

Carolina and go to work in Florida for a job that was to be 

completed in eight days. He did not possess any special 

skills in performing the type of work done by TWC. He did 
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Opinion of the Court

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not have control over any aspects of the work that he 

performed for TWC. Mr. Beal obtained his work directions 

from persons designated by Mr. Baird to be onsite 

supervisors. He had no power to hire or fire anyone. The 

work he did was part of the trade or business of TWC. He 

was paid wages and trip expenses by TWC.

27. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view 

of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Jeffrey 

Beal was an employee of TWC at the time of his injury. Mr. 

Baird, owner of TWC, expressly made a contract of hire 

with Plaintiff. The work Mr. Beal did for TWC was entirely 

the work of Mr. Baird and TWC and benefitted TWC and 

not Coastal. Mr. Baird and TWC had the right, and did in 

fact, control the details of the work done by Mr. Beal during 

the period he worked for TWC, including the date of his 

injury by accident. During the period Mr. Beal was hired to 

work for TWC, he did not do any work for Coastal and the 

work that he did for TWC was not part of the trade or 

business of Coastal. Mr. Beal and Mr. Baird on behalf of 

TWC agreed upon the employment terms. Coastal was not 

involved in the employment contract agreement, Mr. Ray 

did not assign employees to TWC; he only announced the 

availability of a temporary job with TWC and left the 

decision of whether to seek the job entirely up to any of his 

interested employees.

. . . .

32. The Full Commission finds that both Coastal and 

TWC are liable for all of the compensable consequences of 

Plaintiff’s September 26, 2010 injury by accident in 

proportion to the wage liability of each employer.

33. At the time of Plaintiff’s injury on September 26, 2010, 

TWC was insured by Key Risk. There is a dispute, however, 

over whether the policy of insurance between Key Risk and 

TWC covered Plaintiff’s claim herein.

34. Mr. Baird arranged workers’ compensation insurance 
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for the Florida project on behalf of TWC through Associated 

Insurors (hereinafter “Associated”) in Myrtle Beach, South 

Carolina. In doing so, he explained to the agent the nature 

of his business and that TWC worked outside South 

Carolina. At the time of Plaintiff’s injury, TWC had more 

projects outside South Carolina than within the State. It 

was Mr. Baird’s understanding that TWC had workers’

compensation coverage for each jobsite, including the 

jobsite in Florida where Plaintiff was injured.

35. As part of its Subcontract Agreement with Winter 

Park for the project in Stuart, Florida, TWC had to provide 

proof of workers’ compensation insurance. Mr. Baird 

arranged for his insurance agent (Associated) to contact 

Winter Park to verify the required coverage. After that 

contact occurred, Associated sent Winter Park a certificate 

of insurance verifying workers’ compensation insurance for 

TWC. The “Certificate Holder” was listed as Winter Park 

Construction, 221 Circle Drive, Maitland, Florida. After 

that contact occurred, Winter Park sent TWC the 

Subcontract Agreement to execute, and TWC went to work.

. . . .

61. Key Risk contends that the language of TWC’s 

insurance policy provides for workers’ compensation 

insurance coverage in South Carolina only, with additional 

coverage only if Plaintiff was hired in South Carolina or 

principally employed in South Carolina.

62. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence of record, 

the Full Commission finds that Plaintiff’s employment was 

located in South Carolina because it is the only state in 

which he had any “base of operation.” The only place of 

business ever maintained by TWC was located in Myrtle 

Beach, South Carolina. Plaintiff was hired from TWC’s 

office in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Mr. Baird provided 

work assignments to the employees, including Plaintiff, 

working on the Winter Park project from his place of 

business in South Carolina and Plaintiff was paid out of 
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South Carolina for the work he performed in Florida. The 

other three lent employees from Coastal -- Michael Porter, 

Anthony Brown and Randy Wallace -- traveled to Myrtle 

Beach, South Carolina to receive payment from TWC for 

the work they performed (along with Plaintiff) in Stuart, 

Florida upon completion of the job.

63. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view 

of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that 

Plaintiff’s claim for compensation is covered under the Key 

Risk policy issued to TWC.

64. Coastal and TWC are jointly liable for medical 

payments made consequent of Plaintiff’s September 26, 

2010 injury. Since Coastal had no “wage liability” to 

Plaintiff for the Florida project, TWC owes all of Plaintiff’s 

indemnity compensation. As a result of Plaintiff’s injuries, 

Zurich has paid as carrier for Coastal, medical 

compensation in the amount of $350,799.25 and indemnity 

compensation in the amount of $44,068.85. TWC’s carrier, 

Key Risk, has paid nothing. TWC and Key Risk are 

obligated to reimburse Zurich for TWC’s and Key Risk’s 

(50%) share of the joint amount of the medical 

compensation due as a result of Plaintiff’s claim. TWC and 

Key Risk are obligated to reimburse Zurich for all the 

indemnity compensation due Plaintiff that Zurich has paid. 

Since the matter in controversy before the Full 

Commission is between the Defendants, the amount of 

Plaintiff’s average weekly wage is not being determined.

Based on these findings of fact, the Commission made the following pertinent 

conclusions of law:

1. On September 26, 2010, Plaintiff, Jeffrey Beal, 

sustained a compensable injury by accident due to a fall 

which arose out of and in the course of his employment with 

TWC and involved the interruption of his work routine and 

the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to 

result in unexpected consequences. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-
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Opinion of the Court

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2(5); 97-2(6).

2. At the time of Plaintiff’s injury on September 26, 2010, 

four employees, Michael Porter, Anthony Brown, Randy 

Wallace and Plaintiff, were employees of TWC who had 

been lent by Coastal to TWC. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2; S.C. 

Code Ann. § 42-1-360(2).

3. The Full Commission concludes that the North 

Carolina Industrial Commission has jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s claim. . . .

. . . .

6. The Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff was an 

employee of TWC, not an independent contractor, at the 

time of his injury on September 26, 2010. . . .

. . . .

9. The Full Commission concludes, based upon a 

preponderance of the evidence of record, that the 

employment relationship Plaintiff had with TWC met all 

three of the conditions to establish a “special employer”

relationship . . . . The preponderance of the evidence of 

record establishes that Plaintiff made a contract of hire 

with TWC; the work Plaintiff was doing for TWC on the 

Florida project was work involving furniture, fixture and 

electronics installations that TWC subcontracted with 

Winter Park to perform and was different from the type of 

work Plaintiff did for Coastal, a household moving 

company; Coastal had no part in negotiating the 

subcontract agreement that TWC made with Winter Park 

and there was no agreement between TWC and Coastal for 

Coastal to share the profits from the project; the work being 

done by Plaintiff was essentially that of TWC, the special 

employer; and TWC, the special employer, had the right to 

control, and did control, the details of the work that 

Plaintiff did on the Florida project. Anderson v. Demolition 

Dynamics, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 603, 607, 525 S.E.2d 471, 
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473 (2000).

10. The Full Commission concludes that Coastal 

remained Plaintiff’s general employer while he was 

working for TWC since the preponderance of the evidence 

and the reasonable inferences therefrom, indicate that 

Coastal was the general employer of Plaintiff while he was 

working for TWC, as Plaintiff and the three other workers 

Coastal lent to TWC had an expectation of returning to 

work with Coastal when the job with TWC was completed. 

Therefore, the legal presumption that the general 

employment with Coastal continued is not rebutted by a 

“clear demonstration.” Collins v. James Paul Edwards, 

Inc., 21 N.C. App. 455, 204 S.E.2d 873 (1974); Anderson v. 

Demolition Dynamics, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 603, 607, 525 

S.E.2d 471, 473 (2000).

11. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence of record, 

the Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff was lent by 

Coastal to TWC and that at the time of his injury on 

September 26, 2010, he was jointly employed by both TWC 

and Coastal and both employers are jointly liable for 

Plaintiff’s injuries. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-51; Collins v. 

James Paul Edwards, Inc., 21 N.C. App. 455, 204 S.E.2d 

873 (1974); Anderson v. Demolition Dynamics, Inc., 136 

N.C. App. 603, 607, 525 S.E.2d 471, 473 (2000).

. . . .

14. The Commission has the inherent power in this case 

to order TWC and Key Risk to reimburse Coastal and 

Zurich for benefits paid or to be paid on Plaintiff[’]s 

claim. . . .

. . . .

17. Key Risk further contends that Key Risk’s obligation 

under a policy must be defined by the terms of the policy 

itself and that in construing policy language, basic contract

rules apply. If the terms of a contract are unambiguous, the 
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Opinion of the Court

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contract must be enforced. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. 

White, 301 S.C. 133, 390 S.E.2d 471 (1990). Key Risk 

argues that coverage cannot be extended to Plaintiff under 

the “Other State Insurance” portion of the policy because

Plaintiff’s claim does not meet the following conditions of 

the policy: “The employee claiming benefits was either 

hired under a contract of employment made in a state listed 

in Item 3.A. of the Information Page or was, at the time of 

the injury, principally employed in a state listed in Item 

3.A. of the Information Page. . . .”

18. It is undisputed that the substantive law of South 

Carolina applies to this case. . . .

. . . .

21. Coastal relies on the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 42-

[1]5-10, which state: “Any employee covered by the 

provisions of this Title is authorized to file his claim under 

the laws of the state where he is hired, the state where he 

is injured, or the state where his employment is located.[”]

S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-10 does not specifically use the term 

“principally employed,” and instead refers to where an 

employee’s employment is “located.” S.C. Code Ann. § 42-

15-10.

22. Key Risk contends, however, that Plaintiff must first 

show that his claim comes under the jurisdiction of the 

South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act before South 

Carolina statutory law can be applied to Plaintiff’s claim.

23. The Full Commission concludes that South Carolina 

could have exercised jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim had 

he chosen to file his claim in South Carolina because South 

Carolina is the state where Plaintiff’s employment was 

located. To determine where a worker’s employment is 

located, South Carolina follows the “base of operation rule.”

Hill v. Eagle Motor Lines, 373 S.C. 422, 429-30, 645 S.E.2d 

424, 427 (2007) (quoting Holman v. Bulldog Trucking Co., 

311 S.C. 341, 346, 428 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1993)). Under this 
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Opinion of the Court

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rule, “the worker’s employment is located at the employer’s 

place of business to which he reports, from which he 

receives his work assignments, and from which he starts 

his road trips, regardless of where the work is performed.”

Id. at 373 S.C. [sic] at 429, 373 S.E.2d at 432. Where the 

work is performed is irrelevant on the issue of where an 

employee’s employment is located. Id. In the present case, 

the only place of business ever maintained by TWC was 

located in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Plaintiff was 

hired from TWC’s office in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.

Mr. Baird (TWC) provided detailed and specific work 

assignments to the employees, including Plaintiff, working 

on the Winter Park project from his place of business in 

South Carolina and Plaintiff was paid out of South 

Carolina for the work he performed in Florida. The other 

three lent employees from Coastal -- Michael Porter, 

Anthony Brown and Randy Wallace -- traveled to Myrtle 

Beach, South Carolina to receive payment from TWC for 

the work they performed in Stuart, Florida upon 

completion of the job. S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-10; Hill v. 

Eagle Motor Lines, 373 S.C. 422, 429-30, 645 S.E.2d 424, 

427 (2007). The Court of Appeals of South Carolina in Voss 

v. Ramco, Inc., 325 S.C. 560, 482 S.E.2d 582 (1997), held 

that the legislature did not intend to exclude all transient 

employment that did not fit neatly within the base of 

operations test set out in Holman. Id. The concept of “base 

of operation” rule presupposes that all employees have a 

fixed base of operation [to] which jurisdiction over a 

workers’ compensation claim will attach. Id. The Court of 

Appeals in Voss ultimately held that South Carolina was 

the state where the employee’s employment was located, 

given the amount of control exerted over the employee by 

his employer, who operated out of South Carolina, even 

though the employee received his daily assignments from 

wherever his employer was located that day and he started 

his road trips from wherever the group was located, but 

never from South Carolina. Voss v. Ramco, Inc., 325 S.C. 

560, 482 S.E.2d 582 (1997). The Supreme Court of South 

Carolina agreeing with the Court of Appeals’ analysis in 

Voss, held in Oxendine v. Davis, 373 S.C. 438, 646 S.E.2d 
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143 (2007), that the base of operations rule is to “determine 

the location of nomadic employment based on the 

employer’s place of business,” and used other factors 

outside of those defined in Holman, such as the employee 

reporting to the employer’s business in South Carolina to 

be paid, to determine the employee’s location of 

employment. Id. The Supreme Court in Oxendine

ultimately held that an employer’s base of operations was 

in South Carolina when the employer clearly operated his 

business in South Carolina. Id. at 445, [646] S.E.2d at 150. 

Thus, even if the facts of the present case do [not] have all 

of the factors under the base of operations test set out in 

Holman, following the analysis of Oxendine and Voss, 

Plaintiff’s employment would still be located in South 

Carolina, given the amount of the control exerted over 

Plaintiff by Mr. Baird (TWC), who clearly operated his 

business out of South Carolina. Oxendine v. Davis, 373 S.C. 

438, 646 S.E.2d 143 (2007); Voss v. Ramco, Inc., 325 S.C. 

560, 482 S.E.2d 582 (1997).

24. Applying the applicable provisions of the South 

Carolina law to the current claim, the Full Commission 

finds that the Key Risk policy provided coverage for 

Plaintiff’s claim filed in North Carolina. Pursuant to S.C. 

Code Ann. § 42-5-60, “Every policy for the insurance of the 

compensation provided in this Title or against liability 

therefore shall be deemed to be made subject to provisions 

of this Title . . . .” Therefore, the statutory provisions of the 

South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Code are a 

required part of the Key Risk policy for workers’

compensation insurance issued to TWC. Also, S.C. Code 

Ann. § 42-5-70 provides that jurisdiction of the insured for 

the purpose of this Title shall be jurisdiction of the insurer 

and S.C. Code Ann. § 42-5-60 requires that the Key Risk 

policy conform to South Carolina law. These statutory 

requirements are reflected in the language of the Key Risk 

workers’ compensation insurance policy issued to TWC. 

The policy states, “Jurisdiction over you is jurisdiction over 

us for purposes of workers’ compensation law. We are 

bound by decisions against you under the law, subject to 
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Opinion of the Court

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the provisions of this policy that are not in conflict with the 

law.” The policy also provided that, “Terms of this 

insurance that conflict with the workers’ compensation law 

are changed by this statement to conform to that law.” S.C. 

Code Ann. § 42-5-70. Key Risk, in issuing its workers’

compensation policies, has submitted to the jurisdiction of 

South Carolina and its statutory provisions governing 

workers’ compensation claims. Based upon the “base of 

operation” analysis above, the employment for the other 

three lent employees from Coastal was also located in 

South Carolina. Therefore, TWC had four or more 

employees in South Carolina for the purposes of 

jurisdiction under South Carolina Workers’ Compensation 

Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-360(2).

25. The Full Commission concludes that the 

preponderance of the evidence of record establishes that 

South Carolina has jurisdiction over TWC, the insured, and 

that the workers’ compensation insurance policy issued by 

Key Risk to TWC covered Plaintiff’s injury, requiring Key 

Risk to reimburse Coastal and Zurich pursuant to N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 97-86.1(d). . . .

Key Risk filed written notice of appeal from the Commission’s 15 December 

2015 Opinion and Award.

1

Analysis

Appellate review of an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission is 

“limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission’s 

findings of fact and whether the findings support the Commission’s conclusions of 

law.” Philbeck v. Univ. of Mich., 235 N.C. App. 124, 127, 761 S.E.2d 668, 671 (2014) 

 

1 The appellees in this appeal are Coastal and Zurich. At times in this opinion, we refer to 

them jointly as “Coastal.”
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 18 -

(citation and quotation marks omitted). “The findings of fact made by the 

Commission are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence even if there 

is also evidence that would support a contrary finding. The Commission’s conclusions 

of law, however, are reviewed de novo.” Morgan v. Morgan Motor Co. of Albemarle,

231 N.C. App. 377, 380, 752 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013) (internal citations omitted), aff’d 

per curiam, 368 N.C. 69, 772 S.E.2d 238 (2015).

Before addressing Key Risk’s arguments, we must first determine whether the 

Commission had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. North 

Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Where an accident happens while the employee is 

employed elsewhere than in this State and the accident is 

one which would entitle him or his dependents or next of 

kin to compensation if it had happened in this State, then 

the employee or his dependents or next of kin shall be 

entitled to compensation (i) if the contract of employment 

was made in this State, (ii) if the employer’s principal place 

of business is in this State, or (iii) if the employee’s 

principal place of employment is within this State; 

provided, however, that if an employee or his dependents 

or next of kin shall receive compensation or damages under 

the laws of any other state nothing herein contained shall 

be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the 

same injury greater than is provided for in this Article.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-36 (2015) (emphasis added).

In order to determine where a contract of employment was made, we apply the 

“last act” test. Murray v. Ahlstrom Indus. Holdings, Inc., 131 N.C. App. 294, 296, 506 

S.E.2d 724, 726 (1998). “For a contract to be made in North Carolina, the final act 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 19 -

necessary to make it a binding obligation must be done here.” Id. (citation, quotation 

marks, and brackets omitted).

Here, the Commission found that the last act making the employment 

arrangement between Plaintiff and TWC “a binding obligation” was Plaintiff’s 

agreement during his telephone conversation with Baird to work on the Florida 

Project for TWC. Because Plaintiff was physically present in North Carolina during 

this conversation, the contract of employment was made in North Carolina.

“To be entitled to maintain a proceeding for workers’ compensation, the 

claimant must be, in fact and in law, an employee of the party from whom 

compensation is claimed.” Youngblood v. N. State Ford Truck Sales, 321 N.C. 380, 

383, 364 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1988) (citations omitted). If no employer-employee 

relationship exists, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim. See Lucas v. 

Li’l Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976) (citations omitted). 

“The issue of whether the employer-employee relationship exists is a jurisdictional 

one.” Youngblood, 321 N.C. at 383, 364 S.E.2d at 437.

Here, the parties do not contest the Commission’s finding that an employeremployee relationship existed between Plaintiff and TWC at the time of the 26 

September 2010 accident. The record establishes that — as the Commission found 

— TWC was a “special employer,” Plaintiff was a “borrowed employee,” and Coastal 

remained Plaintiff’s “general employer.”
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 20 -

“The North Carolina Supreme Court has determined that the Industrial 

Commission has jurisdiction to . . . hear and determine questions of fact and law 

respecting the existence of insurance coverage and liability of the insurance carrier.” 

Smith v. First Choice Servs., 158 N.C. App. 244, 248, 580 S.E.2d 743, 747 (2003)

(citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Harrison v. Tobacco Transp., Inc., 

139 N.C. App. 561, 564-65, 533 S.E.2d 871, 873-74 (2000) (determining that 

Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to determine whether Kentucky’s workers’

compensation statutes expanded insurance policy’s coverage so as to provide benefits 

to employee of Kentucky employer).

Having determined that the Commission had jurisdiction to hear this matter, 

we next turn to Key Risk’s argument that its policy does not provide coverage for

Plaintiff’s injuries. Specifically, Key Risk argues that (1) Plaintiff was not 

“principally employed” in South Carolina, and therefore, no coverage for his injuries 

exists under the terms of the policy it issued to TWC; and (2) South Carolina’s 

Workers’ Compensation Act does not require that such coverage be provided under 

Key Risk’s policy.

The Information Page of Key Risk’s policy states, in pertinent part, as follows:

3.A. Workers’ Compensation Insurance: Part One of the 

policy applies to the Workers’ Compensation Law of the 

states listed here:

SC
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 21 -

. . . .

C. Other States Insurance: Part Three of the policy applies 

to the states, if any, listed here:

[none listed]

The policy also contained a Residual Market Limited Other States Insurance 

Endorsement (the “Endorsement”), the relevant language of which provides as 

follows:

“Part Three-Other States Insurance” of the policy is 

replaced by the following:

PART THREE OTHER STATE INSURANCE

A. How This Insurance Applies:

1. We will pay promptly when due the benefits required of 

you by the workers’ compensation law of any state not 

listed in Item 3.A. of the Information Page if all of the 

following conditions are met:

a. The employee claiming benefits was either hired under 

a contract of employment made in a state listed in Item 3.A. 

of the Information Page or was, at the time of injury, 

principally employed in a state listed in Item 3.A. of the 

Information Page[.]

. . . .

IMPORTANT NOTICE!

If you hire any employees outside those states listed in 

Item 3.A. on the Information Page or begin operations in 

any such state, you should do whatever may be required 

under that state’s law, as this endorsement does not satisfy 

the requirements of that state’s workers’ compensation 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 22 -

law.

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, when the Endorsement is read in conjunction with Item 3.A. of the 

Information Page, the policy provides that Key Risk will pay benefits required by the

workers’ compensation law of a state other than South Carolina only if the employee 

claiming benefits was either (1) hired under a contract of employment made in South 

Carolina; or (2) principally employed in South Carolina at the time of injury. Neither 

party contends that Plaintiff was hired under a contract of employment made in 

South Carolina. However, the parties disagree as to whether Plaintiff was 

“principally employed” in South Carolina at the time of his injury.

Key Risk contends that Plaintiff was principally employed in Florida — rather 

than South Carolina — because his work on the project took place exclusively in 

Florida. Coastal, conversely, contends that South Carolina was the state in which 

Plaintiff was principally employed because TWC was based in South Carolina and 

exercised control from South Carolina over the Florida Project.

“With insurance contracts the principle of lex loci contractus mandates that the 

substantive law of the state where the last act to make a binding contract occurred, 

usually delivery of the policy, controls the interpretation of the contract.” Harrison, 

139 N.C. App. at 565, 533 S.E.2d at 874 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, 

Baird, a resident of South Carolina, sought workers’ compensation coverage for TWC, 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 23 -

a South Carolina business, through an agent in South Carolina. He received coverage 

through a policy issued by Key Risk, and the policy was delivered to him at his South 

Carolina address. Thus, the last act to make a binding insurance contract between 

Key Risk and TWC occurred in South Carolina. As such, the Commission correctly 

determined that South Carolina’s substantive law governs the interpretation of Key 

Risk’s policy.

Under South Carolina law,

[i]nsurance policies are subject to the general rules of 

contract construction. This Court must give policy 

language its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. When 

a contract is unambiguous, clear, and explicit, it must be 

construed according to the terms the parties have used.

B.L.G. Enters. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 334 S.C. 529, 535, 514 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1999) 

(internal citations omitted).

In the present case, the Commission held — and the parties agree — that the 

term “principally employed” in the Endorsement cannot be read in isolation but 

instead must be construed in conjunction with South Carolina’s Workers’

Compensation Act. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-5-60 (2015) (“Every policy for the 

insurance of the compensation provided in this title or against liability therefor shall 

be deemed to be made subject to provisions of this title. No corporation, association,

or organization shall enter into any such policy of insurance unless its form shall have 

been approved by the Director of the Department of Insurance.”).
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 24 -

Coastal argues that § 42-15-10 of South Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act 

“extended jurisdiction over South Carolina employers beyond state lines by 

specifically authorizing employees to assert claims against employers domiciled in 

South Carolina in any state where the employee was hired, injured or his employment 

was located.” Even assuming arguendo that this is correct, however, we conclude

that the Commission erred in determining that Key Risk’s policy provided coverage

for Plaintiff’s accident.

S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-10 states as follows: 

Any employee covered by the provisions of this title is 

authorized to file his claim under the laws of the state 

where he is hired, the state where he is injured, or the state 

where his employment is located. If an employee shall 

receive compensation or damages under the laws of any 

other state, nothing contained in this section shall be 

construed to permit a total compensation for the same 

injury greater than that provided in this title.

S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-10 (2015) (emphasis added).

Based on this statute, Coastal contends that the phrase “principally employed”

as used in Key Risk’s policy must be interpreted as having the same meaning as the 

phrase “where . . . employment is located” as contained in the statute. For this reason, 

Coastal asserts that it is appropriate to examine South Carolina caselaw interpreting

this language in § 42-15-10.

In determining where a worker’s employment is located for purposes of § 42-

15-10, South Carolina courts apply the “base of operation” rule, a doctrine originating 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 25 -

from the decision by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Holman v. Bulldog 

Trucking Co., 311 S.C. 341, 428 S.E.2d 889 (Ct. App. 1993). Under this rule, “the 

worker’s employment is located at the employer’s place of business to which he 

reports, from which he receives his work assignments and from which he starts his 

road trips, regardless of where the work is performed.” Id. at 346, 428 S.E.2d at 892. 

South Carolina’s appellate courts have made clear that “the location of employment 

can only be in one state.” Voss v. Ramco, Inc., 325 S.C. 560, 572, 482 S.E.2d 582, 588

(Ct. App. 1997).

In the present case, the Commission made the following finding of fact, which 

Key Risk challenges in this appeal:

62. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence of record, 

the Full Commission finds that Plaintiff’s employment was 

located in South Carolina because it is the only state in 

which he had any “base of operation.” The only place of 

business ever maintained by TWC was located in Myrtle 

Beach, South Carolina. Plaintiff was hired from TWC’s 

office in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Mr. Baird provided 

work assignments to the employees, including Plaintiff, 

working on the Winter Park project from his place of 

business in South Carolina and Plaintiff was paid out of

South Carolina for the work he performed in Florida. The 

other three lent employees from Coastal -- Michael Porter, 

Anthony Brown and Randy Wallace -- traveled to Myrtle 

Beach, South Carolina to receive payment from TWC for 

the work they performed (along with Plaintiff) in Stuart, 

Florida upon completion of the job.

The Commission then purported to apply the principles set forth in Holman

and Voss as well as in two other South Carolina cases — Oxendine v. Davis, 373 S.C. 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 26 -

438, 646 S.E.2d 143 (2007), and Hill v. Eagle Motor Lines, 373 S.C. 422, 645 S.E.2d 

424 (2007). Because of the significant amount of attention that the Commission and

the parties give these four cases, we address each of them in turn.

In Holman, the employee, a truck driver, lived in South Carolina, but he would 

report to Georgia for his assignments. Holman, 311 S.C. at 343, 428 S.E.2d at 891. 

While driving his truck in Georgia, the employee was killed in an accident on the 

highway. The employee’s mother filed for benefits under South Carolina’s Workers’

Compensation Act. Her claim was denied, and she appealed the decision to the South 

Carolina Court of Appeals. Id. at 344, 428 S.E.2d at 891.

The court held that in order to determine whether the truck driver’s 

employment was located in South Carolina for purposes of § 42-15-10, an application 

of the “base of operation” test was required. Id. at 346, 428 S.E.2d at 892. In applying 

this test, the court relied on the fact that although the employee lived in South 

Carolina, he had reported to Georgia for duty, picked up and returned his company 

truck in Georgia, received his work assignments from Georgia, and made calls to his 

employer in Georgia. Therefore, the court concluded that his “base of operation” was 

in Georgia, meaning that his “employment was located” in Georgia for purposes of 

§ 42-15-10 such that his workers’ compensation claim had been correctly denied. Id.

at 346-47, 428 S.E.2d at 893.
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 27 -

In Voss, the South Carolina Court of Appeals revisited this issue. In that case,

a company called Ramco, Inc. that manufactured small industrial equipment was 

located in South Carolina. Voss, 325 S.C. at 563, 482 S.E.2d at 583. Another 

company, NATCO, which sold Ramco’s equipment, was also located in South 

Carolina. Id. NATCO’s owner hired the plaintiff — who lived in Texas — to sell 

Ramco’s equipment across the country. The plaintiff would travel from city to city 

selling Ramco equipment by the truckload. Id. at 563, 482 S.E.2d at 583-84. The

agreement between Ramco and NATCO provided that Ramco would deliver its 

equipment to the city in which the group of salesmen — including the plaintiff —

were selling the equipment, and NATCO’s owner would then supervise the sales team 

in each city to which the team traveled. Id.

The plaintiff was injured selling Ramco equipment while in the state of 

Washington. Id. at 570, 482 S.E.2d at 587. During the time in which he worked for 

Ramco, he never sold equipment in South Carolina and made only one trip to South 

Carolina to pick up equipment. Id. at 565, 482 S.E.2d at 584. He filed a workers’

compensation claim in South Carolina, but Ramco denied the claim, asserting that 

the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 563, 482 S.E.2d at 583. The commission 

ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and its decision was ultimately affirmed by the circuit

court. Ramco appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. Id.
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 28 -

The court invoked the “base of operation” test set out in Holman to determine 

whether South Carolina had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim, noting that “all 

types of transient employment . . . do not fit neatly within the employment ritual of 

the employee truck driver in [Holman].” Id. at 571, 482 S.E.2d at 588. The court

observed that a traveling salesman would not have the same work routine as a truck 

driver, stating the following:

[I]t was not this Court’s intention [in Holman] to hold that 

a class of transient employees could never have a “base of 

operation” and therefore be limited under section 42-15-10 

to the benefits available in two states (the state where the 

employee [was] hired and the state where the employee 

was injured), while other transient employees could choose 

the most advantageous of three states.

Id.

The court reiterated its previous statement in Holman that “the location of 

employment can only be in one state” and that, logically, “the location of employment 

must be in some state.” Id. at 572, 482 S.E.2d at 588. The court proceeded to hold 

that although the plaintiff lived in Texas and was injured in Washington, his 

employment was located in South Carolina. Id. The court ruled that regardless of 

the fact that the plaintiff received work assignments from a supervisor who was often 

physically present in multiple states, the plaintiff’s employer was Ramco, and Ramco

was permanently located in South Carolina. Id.

The court reasoned that
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 29 -

although Voss started his road trips from wherever the 

group was located, but never from South Carolina, he 

nevertheless is principally employed in South Carolina 

because it is the only state in which he has any “base of 

operation.” . . . [A]s a practical matter, South Carolina is 

the state where Voss was employed, given the amount of 

control exerted over Voss by [his employers], both of whom 

operated out of South Carolina.

Id.

In 2007, the Supreme Court of South Carolina issued two decisions applying 

the “base of operation” test. In Oxendine, the plaintiff was a construction worker 

living in North Carolina who did seasonal work for a construction company that was 

based in South Carolina. Oxendine, 373 S.C. at 440, 646 S.E.2d at 144. His employer 

hired him to work at a jobsite in North Carolina on a project that lasted for six weeks. 

The plaintiff had previously performed work for the employer in South Carolina and 

had regularly traveled to South Carolina to receive his payment. Id.

During the six-week period prior to his injury, the plaintiff worked solely at

the jobsite in North Carolina. Id. At one point, the plaintiff visited his employer’s 

home in South Carolina for social purposes and fixed the employer’s water pump —

a task for which he was not paid. Id. He also traveled to the employer’s home in 

South Carolina to receive payment at least once during the time he worked on the 

North Carolina project. Id.

The plaintiff was injured in an accident while working on the North Carolina

jobsite. Id. He filed a workers’ compensation claim in North Carolina, which was 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 30 -

denied. Id. He then filed a claim under South Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation 

Act, and the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission determined that it 

had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 440-41, 646 S.E.2d at 144. The 

employer ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Id.

The court held that South Carolina was the plaintiff’s “base of operation.” Id. 

at 445, 646 S.E.2d at 146. In making this determination, the court relied on multiple 

factors, noting that while none was “individually determinative, they all lend support 

to the conclusion[.]” Id. at 444, 646 S.E.2d at 146.

(1) Respondent regularly worked for Employer in South 

Carolina during warm months for a number of years; (2) 

Respondent went to Employer’s home/office in South 

Carolina on occasions to be paid, including at least once 

during the last interval of his work; (3) Respondent often 

met co-workers at the place of employment to go to jobs; 

and (4) Respondent performed work at Employer’s home

immediately before his injury.

Id.

The court then stated the following:

In reaching this conclusion, we look not only at 

Respondent’s six-week employment term, but also at his 

broad employment history with Employer. Respondent’s 

regular and recurring employment with Employer for 

several years prior to his injury was nearly entirely based 

in South Carolina. The fact that Respondent was working 

in North Carolina on this particular occasion does not 

transport the Employer’s base of operations from South 

Carolina to North Carolina.

Id.
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 31 -

The court further noted that “[t]his conclusion is underscored by the amount 

of control exerted over Respondent by Employer who was located in South Carolina.” 

Id. In explaining its ruling, the court clarified the principles it drew from Holman

and Voss:

Appellants also argue that if the base of operations rule 

applies, the relevant base of operation was North Carolina 

because it is the employee’s base, and not the employer’s 

base, that should be considered. Appellants’ reasoning 

directly contradicts both Voss and Holman[,] cases which 

apply the base of operations rule to determine the location 

of nomadic employment based on the employer’s place of 

business, “regardless of where work is performed.”

Id. at 445, 646 S.E.2d at 146.

Hill concerned a plaintiff truck driver who lived in South Carolina and was

injured while driving through Virginia. Hill, 373 S.C. at 427, 645 S.E.2d at 426. The 

plaintiff’s employer was based in Alabama. After his accident, the plaintiff 

successfully filed a claim under South Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act. His 

employer appealed the decision in favor of the plaintiff to the Supreme Court of South 

Carolina. Id. at 427-28, 645 S.E.2d at 426.

Because the plaintiff had been hired in South Carolina, the court held that

South Carolina had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 430, 645 S.E.2d at 

428. However, the court also ruled that in addition to being the state where the 

plaintiff was hired, South Carolina was likewise the state where plaintiff’s 

employment was “located” for purposes of § 42-15-10. The court determined that the 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 32 -

plaintiff’s “base of operation” was in South Carolina because the plaintiff began his 

road trips from South Carolina, kept his truck at his South Carolina home on the 

weekends, and received his paycheck at his home in South Carolina. Id. at 432-33, 

645 S.E.2d at 429. The court further noted that although the plaintiff called the 

Alabama office at the end of each delivery to find out where to pick up his next load, 

he was not required to report to the Alabama office for duty or return to Alabama 

after completing his assignments. Id. at 432, 645 S.E.2d at 429. Nor was the

plaintiff’s truck licensed in Alabama. Id.

Holman, Voss, Oxendine, and Hill demonstrate the fact-specific nature of the 

“base of operation” test’s application and the difficulty of determining where a 

worker’s employment is “located” when his employment is nomadic in nature. In such 

cases, the employee works on multiple jobs for a particular employer in more than 

one state, making it difficult to pinpoint one specific state as the location of his 

employment.

In the present case, conversely, Plaintiff’s employment was not nomadic. He 

worked at one location for his employer during the entire period of his employment.

He had no prior history of working on jobs — in South Carolina, Florida, or anywhere 

else — for TWC, and the record is devoid of any indication that he was likely to work 

on future projects for TWC. He was not a traveling salesman or a truck driver whose 

job duties for his employer required him to travel to multiple states. Nor was he akin 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 33 -

to the worker in Oxendine who performed multiple jobs for his employer in one state 

prior to being dispatched by the employer to perform a job in another state.

Instead, Plaintiff was a lent employee who was hired by TWC to perform one 

specific job in one specific place. TWC required that he perform all of his work in 

Florida, and he lived in Florida for the entire duration of the job, commuting from a 

motel in Florida to the Florida jobsite throughout the duration of his employment 

with TWC. Plaintiff reported to work each day in Florida and received assignments 

from on-site supervisors in Florida.

Standing in stark contrast to his numerous connections with Florida during 

his employment with TWC is the utter lack of contacts Plaintiff had with South 

Carolina. Plaintiff never reported to South Carolina for duty either before the project 

began or after it was completed. Indeed, the record is devoid of any indication that 

Plaintiff visited South Carolina for any purpose — except when he drove through that 

state as a matter of geographical necessity between North Carolina and Florida.

For these reasons, the present case requires nothing more than a commonsense 

application of the “base of operation” test to conclude that Plaintiff’s employment with 

TWC was “located” in Florida. The courts in Holman, Voss, Oxendine, and Hill were 

required to balance competing factors in applying this test given that each of those 

cases involved employees who performed work for a single employer in multiple 

states. The facts of this case simply do not require us to do so here.
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 34 -

We are unpersuaded by Coastal’s argument that Plaintiff’s job assignments 

actually came from Baird in South Carolina. The record shows only two instances of 

direct contact between Baird and Plaintiff — the telephone call during which Baird 

offered him the job and a subsequent call in which he gave Plaintiff a “pep talk.” Both 

of these telephone calls occurred while Plaintiff was still in North Carolina and before 

he had left the state to start work on the Florida Project.

Plaintiff had on-site supervisors at the Florida jobsite — initially Porter and 

later Fleener — who gave him his work assignments and instructions for the work to 

be performed. The record clearly indicates that these supervisors were both in 

Florida when they instructed Plaintiff as to his duties on the Florida Project. While 

Coastal argues that these on-site supervisors were relaying orders that had been 

given to them by Baird from South Carolina, we do not believe that any such indirect 

control over Plaintiff’s work by Baird serves as a sufficient substitute for direct 

connections between Plaintiff and South Carolina given the circumstances of 

Plaintiff’s employment with TWC.

Therefore, we conclude that throughout Plaintiff’s employment with TWC, his 

“base of operation” was Florida. Accordingly, he was neither “principally employed”

(for purposes of the Endorsement) in South Carolina nor was South Carolina the state 

“where his employment [was] located” (for purposes of § 42-15-10). Thus, the 
BEAL V. COASTAL CARRIERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 35 -

Commission erred in determining that Key Risk’s policy provided coverage for 

Plaintiff’s workplace accident.

2

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the Commission’s Opinion and Award

to the extent it determined that Key Risk’s policy provides any coverage for the 26 

September 2010 accident and remand this matter for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judges INMAN and ENOCHS concur.

 

2 On appeal, Key Risk also raises as an alternative argument that the Commission erred in 

ordering Key Risk to pay all indemnity benefits owed on Plaintiff’s claim as a result of his injury based 

on the theory that “the proportion of the responsibility of [Plaintiff’s] wages [was] equal between 

Coastal and [TWC].” However, in light of our holding that Key Risk’s policy does not provide any 

coverage regarding Plaintiff’s accident, we need not address this issue.