[Cite as Banks v. Banks, 2023-Ohio-3229.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

JOCELYN BANKS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 VS.

KENNETH RAY BANKS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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APPEAL NO. C-230006

TRIAL NO. DR-2101477

 O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 13, 2023

James J. Whitfield, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Tibbs Law Office and Sarah E. Michel, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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BERGERON, Judge.

{¶1} The parties here decided to part ways after over a decade of marriage.

While they reached a settlement agreement that resolved nearly all issues, they could 

not come to terms on the equity in a residence located at 787 Cedarhill Drive. The trial 

court sorted through the history of the Cedarhill property, determined that it 

constituted the sole property of plaintiff-appellee Jocelyn Whitfield (formerly Banks), 

and issued a divorce decree accordingly. Defendant-appellant Kenneth Ray Banks 

appeals that judgment, maintaining that the trial court erred in its valuation and 

characterization of the Cedarhill property. Based on a review of the record before us, 

however, we agree with the trial court’s decision and affirm its judgment. 

I.

{¶2} The parties married in 2009 and came before the domestic relations 

court seeking a divorce about 12 years later. In August 2008, prior to the parties’ 

marriage, Ms. Whitfield purchased the Cedarhill property. At a hearing on the division 

of property, she testified that she maintained the Cedarhill property as her separate 

property—paying the mortgage and all expenses—for 15 months. The parties agree 

that, for a period after they were married, they paid the monthly mortgage payments 

and renovation costs jointly and that Mr. Banks assisted, at least minimally, with some 

renovations to the home. In 2012, the parties refinanced the property, and Mr. Banks 

signed a quitclaim deed, conveying his interest in the property to Ms. Whitfield. The 

record is silent on Mr. Banks’s motivation behind the quitclaim deed.

{¶3} In September 2021, Ms. Whitfield filed a complaint for divorce. 

Eventually, after the parties focused their dispute on the Cedarhill property, the 

magistrate issued a decision finding that Mr. Banks did not have any equity in the 
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property. Mr. Banks objected to the magistrate’s order, but the trial court overruled

his objection, determining “the quitclaim deed relinquished any rights or interests 

[Mr. Banks] had in the property.” Based on that determination, the trial court issued 

a final decree of divorce in December 2022. Mr. Banks now appeals.

II.

{¶4} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Banks insists that the trial court

erred and abused its discretion in failing to award him any equity in the Cedarhill 

property. In a divorce proceeding, the trial court “determine[s] what constitutes 

marital property and what constitutes separate property” and then “divide[s] the 

marital and separate property equitably between the spouses.” R.C. 3105.171(B). 

{¶5} We review a trial court’s “ ‘equitable division of property for an abuse of 

discretion.’ ” Boolchand v. Boolchand, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-200111 and C200120, 2020-Ohio-6951, ¶ 9, quoting McKenna v. McKenna, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-180475, 2019-Ohio-3807, ¶ 9. “An abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere 

error of judgment; rather, ‘it implies that the court’s attitude is arbitrary, 

unreasonable, or unconscionable.’ ” Hayes v. Durrani, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C190617, 2021-Ohio-725, ¶ 8, quoting Boolchand at ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion occurs 

when “a court exercis[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter 

over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 

2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

{¶6} Based on our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in declining to award Mr. Banks equity in the Cedarhill property. 

The evidence is undisputed that he transferred his interest in the Cedarhill property 

by executing the quitclaim deed. Nevertheless, he insists this transfer should not have 
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any bearing on the classification of the property as separate or marital. Generally, the

party challenging the effectiveness of a deed, however, must prove that the deed was 

not intended to effectuate a complete transfer of his or her interest in the property. 

See, e.g., Pettry v. Pettry, 81 Ohio App.3d 30, 34, 610 N.E.2d 443 (10th Dist.1991) 

(“[T]he burden is upon the person challenging the effectiveness of a deed executed in 

accordance with statutory requirements to accomplish the conveyance set forth 

therein.”); Galloway v. Galloway, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-21-043, 2023-Ohio-29, ¶ 15 

(“[T]he burden of challenging the effectiveness of a deed executed in accordance with 

statutory requirements rests with the person making the challenge.”); Maulis v. 

Maulis, 11th Dist. Portage No. 96-P-0190, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3111, 6 (July 18, 

1997) (“On appeal, the challenging party * * * has the burden of demonstrating that 

the lower court abused its discretion in finding that the quitclaim deed was intended 

to accomplish a conveyance of legal interests * * * to the transferee.”). Therefore, Mr. 

Banks bore the burden to prove that “in some fashion the deed was not intended as an 

outright complete transfer of all of [his] interest in the property.” Pettry at 34.

{¶7} As the record confirms, he failed to offer sufficient evidence 

demonstrating that the deed was not intended as a full transfer of his interest in the 

Cedarhill property. He did not present any alternative motivation behind the transfer 

of his interest in the property. Nor did he question the validity of the deed at any point 

during the proceedings.

{¶8} Notwithstanding that absence of evidence, Mr. Banks maintains that he 

is entitled to equity in the property because he contributed to mortgage payments and 

renovation costs and labor during a portion of the parties’ marriage. In this regard, he 

points to several cases generally indicating that equity interest gained throughout the 
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course of a marriage is marital property. See, e.g., Kotch v. Kotch, 178 Ohio App.3d 

358, 2008-Ohio-5084, 897 N.E.2d 1191 (5th Dist.); Middendorf v. Middendorf, 82 

Ohio St.3d 397, 696 N.E.2d 575 (1998); Worthington v. Worthington, 21 Ohio St.3d 

73, 488 N.E.2d 150 (1986). But these cases did not involve a transfer of the property 

during the marriage. Unlike the parties in these cases, Mr. Banks relinquished any 

interest he may have had by conveying the property to Ms. Whitfield by quitclaim 

deed.

{¶9} He further argues that, because “the form of title is relevant to, but not 

conclusive of, the classification of property,” Barkley v. Barkley, 119 Ohio App.3d 155, 

161, 694 N.E.2d 989 (4th Dist.1997), the quitclaim deed did not terminate his right to 

marital equity in the property. Barkley, however, involved the purchase of property 

by joint deed during a marriage, not the transfer of property between spouses. Id. at 

160. And regardless, based on the factual context, a trial court may determine 

property should be classified consistent with its title. See id. at 161.

{¶10} Because Mr. Banks transferred his property interest and failed to 

challenge the substance or effect of the transfer, we cannot find an abuse of discretion 

on this record.

* * *

{¶11} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule Mr. Banks’s assignment 

of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.