Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; Remanded; and Memorandum Opinion 

filed December 17, 2019.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00677-CV

PATRICIA A. GRANT, PH.D., Appellant 

V.

TEXAS STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, OPEN GOVERNMENT 

RECORDS DIVISION; AND TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

DEPARTMENT OF AGING AND DISABILITY SERVICES – OFFICE OF 

THE LONG-TERM CARE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM OPEN RECORDS 

DIVISION, Appellees 

On Appeal from the 53rd District Court 

Travis County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-18-002178 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Plaintiff Patricia A. Grant appeals from the district court’s order granting the 

plea to the jurisdiction and the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants the Office 

of the Attorney General of Texas (“the OAG”) and the Texas Health and Human 
2

Services Commission (“HHSC”; collectively, “the Agencies”).1 We agree with 

Grant that the Texas Public Information Act grants her standing to pursue, and 

waives the Agencies’ sovereign immunity from, her claims for declaratory and 

injunctive relief for the Act’s violation. We therefore reverse the dismissal of Grant’s 

requests for declaratory and injunctive relief for the Agencies’ alleged violations of 

the Texas Public Information Act. Grant has not challenged the portion of the 

judgment granting the motion to dismiss as it pertains to her claims that the Agencies 

are complicit in elder abuse and in civil-rights violations; thus, we leave that part of 

the judgment intact. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, and 

we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND

 Appellant Patricia A. Grant sued the Agencies based on their failure to 

produce certain documents in response to her open-records requests under the Texas 

Public Information Act (“the Act”). She also pleaded that the Agencies’ alleged 

violations of the Act make them complicit in elder abuse and “family advocate civil 

rights law violations.” Pursuant to the Act, she pleaded for unspecified injunctive 

relief, for a declaration that the Agencies have violated the Act, and for a writ of 

mandamus compelling the Agencies to produce certain documents. Grant further 

pleaded for various other declarations of her rights under unidentified provisions of 

the state’s constitution and laws. In addition, she asked the trial court to intervene to 

remedy or prevent elder abuse, “hostile nursing facility environments,” manipulation 

and coercion of elderly residents of nursing homes, medical negligence, “elderly fear 

of police involvement,” “failed ombudsman nursing facility residency civil rights 

 

1

 Despite the style of the case, the defendants are the OAG and HHSC, not specific 

departments, offices, or divisions within those agencies. 
3

protection,” and continuing endangerment of a nursing-facility resident’s health and 

well-being. 

 Of the claims Grant pleaded in the trial court, she challenges on appeal only 

the dismissal of her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for the Agencies’ 

alleged violation of the Act. We therefore describe her factual allegations only as to 

those claims. 

A. Grant’s Claims Against the OAG 

 Grant alleges that she requested information from the Department of Family 

& Protective Services (“DFPS”) related to certain elder-abuse complaints, which she 

identified by complaint number, case number, or by the identity of the alleged victim 

or perpetrator. Her records request was denied. According to Grant, the OAG 

unconstitutionally granted DFPS “a waiver of plaintiff’s release of information 

waiver request” and failed to reply to her “rebuttal letter.” She contends that the 

OAG’s failure to revoke the waiver violates the Act. 

B. Grant’s Claims Against HHSC 

 Grant similarly alleges that HHSC violated the Act. She alleges that she made 

open-records requests to HHSC’s predecessor2 in June and September of 2015, but 

she does not identify the documents she requested. She asserts that HHSC finally 

responded on March 16, 2016, “without [an OAG] waiver, requested documents, or 

cost quotes.” She seeks an order compelling HHSC to produce “all 61 pages as 

handwritten on an envelope enclosed with defendant’s March 16, 2016 letter.” She 

 

2

 Grant directed these requests to the Department of Aging and Disability Services, but 

before this suit was filed, the legislature transferred that department’s functions to the Health and 

Human Services Commission and abolished the Department. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 

§§ 531.02001–.0207. As the Department’s successor, HHSC answered the claims that might 

otherwise have been directed to DADS. To avoid confusion, we include the former Department of 

Aging and Disability Services in our references to HHSC. 
4

also asked the trial court to require HHSC to produce to Grant “any [and] all 

Ombudsman information,” including investigations, incident reports, and 

complaints, together with “any and all other court admissible information not listed, 

as the information pertain[s] directly or indirectly to” a particular nursing-home 

resident. 

C. The Agencies’ Response 

 The Agencies filed a plea to the jurisdiction combined with a motion to 

dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. They argued in their plea to the 

jurisdiction that (1) Grant lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of a third party, 

(2) the Agencies have sovereign immunity from suit and from monetary damages,3

(3) Grant’s requests for information under the Texas Public Information Act are 

considered withdrawn as a matter of law, and (4) a claim under the Uniform 

Declaratory Judgments Act does not confer jurisdiction on the trial court. The 

Agencies moved to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a on the grounds 

that (1) they have sovereign immunity from suit; and (2) Grant alleged “complicit 

ongoing elder abuse and advocate civil rights violations” but “allege[d] too few facts 

to demonstrate a viable, legally cognizable right to relief.” The trial court granted 

both the plea and the motion and dismissed Grant’s claims with prejudice. 

 In her first two issues, Grant contends that she has standing to sue under the 

Texas Public Information Act, which also waives the Agencies’ immunity from suit 

for declaratory and injunctive relief for violating the Act. Grant’s five remaining 

issues concern matters that are not properly before us. 

II. GRANT HAS NOT ABANDONED HER APPEAL

 

3

 Grant did not plead for monetary damages, but in her response to the Agencies’ plea to 

the jurisdiction, she asserted that she is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages. 
5

 As a threshold issue, the Agencies assert that Grant has abandoned her appeal 

by failing to address the grounds on which the district court dismissed her claims. 

According to the Agencies, these grounds are that (1) Grant lacks standing, (2) the 

Agencies have sovereign immunity from suit, and (3) the records sought are 

confidential. 

 The Agencies are mistaken. Grant addresses standing and sovereign immunity 

in her appellate brief, and the allegedly confidential nature of the records she seeks 

are not at issue in this appeal for two reasons. 

 First, confidentiality of the records is not jurisdictional. The Agencies 

themselves characterize confidentiality as a “defense” to the failure to disclose.4

Confidentiality is relevant to the merits of Grant’s claims that the Agencies have 

violated the Texas Public Information Act, and because “[t]he purpose of a plea to 

the jurisdiction is to ‘defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims 

asserted have merit,’”5the Agencies appropriately did not raise this merits argument 

in their plea to the jurisdiction. 

 

4

 More accurately, confidentiality is a reason to withhold information from the general 

public. Nevertheless, some confidential information is available to certain requestors based on the 

procedural history of the request or the requestor’s connection to the information sought. See, e.g.,

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.§ 552.302 (absent a timely request for an OAG opinion that the requested 

information may be withheld, the information is presumed to be public and must be released absent 

a compelling reason to withhold it); id. § 552.023(a) (a person has a special right of access to 

information related to that person, even though laws intended to protect that person’s privacy 

interests protect the information from public disclosure); id. § 552.307 (if the person has a special 

right of access, the governmental body must either release the information within ten business days 

or request an OAG opinion that the information is exempt from disclosure); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 705.7107(1)(A), (3), (4) (after appropriate redactions, certain Adult Protective Services case 

records requested in writing must be made available to specific requestors, which may include a 

living adult APS client, a person interviewed as part of an APS investigation, or an alleged or 

designated perpetrator of abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an APS client).

5 Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tex. 2019) 

(quoting Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000)).
6

 Second, although certain merits arguments could be addressed through a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 91a, the Agencies did not move for dismissal on the 

grounds that Grant sought confidential records. To the contrary, they challenged 

Grant’s claims under the Act only on the jurisdictional ground of sovereign 

immunity. The remainder of the Agencies’ motion to dismiss was directed to Grant’s 

claims of “complicit ongoing elder abuse and advocate civil rights violations,” and 

the Agencies challenged those claims on the ground that Grant “alleges too few facts 

to demonstrate a viable, legally cognizable right to relief.” Confidentiality was never 

mentioned, and the Agencies could not raise a new ground at the hearing. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 91a.2 (“A motion to dismiss . . . must state specifically the reasons the 

cause of action has no basis in law, no basis in fact, or both.”). Further, the trial 

court’s judgment indicates that it did not consider the Agencies’ assertions at the 

hearing that the records requested from DFPS are confidential.6

 The trial court 

instead stated in the judgment, “After due consideration of the law and the filings of 

parties, the Court finds said motion meritorious.” The record therefore does not show 

that the trial court erroneously treated the confidentiality argument as jurisdictional 

or considered arguments raised for the first time at the hearing on the motion to 

dismiss. 

III. GRANT’S APPEAL AS TO HHSC IS NOT MOOT

The Agencies also imply that Grant’s appeal of the dismissal of her claims 

against HHSC under the Act are moot. See Kessling v. Friendswood Indep. Sch. 

Dist., 302 S.W.3d 373, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) 

(claims regarding fulfilled record requests are moot). They state that “from [Grant’s] 

 

6

 The Agencies did not contend that the records requested from HHSC—which were not 

described—are confidential. 
7

argument it seems she received the documents requested from HHSC . . . . To the 

extent she is requesting documents, it appears she already has them.” 

 There is no support for this inference. Grant refers in her brief to the 

government records that she “diligent[ly] and persistently seeks” and to her 

“continuously denied government records requests.” Although we are free to 

consider evidence outside the record showing that we lack jurisdiction over this part 

of the appeal due to mootness,7

 HHSC has offered none. We therefore consider 

Grant’s appeal on the merits. 

IV. THE PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

 We review de novo the trial court’s grant of a plea to the jurisdiction. See 

Chambers-Liberty Ctys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Tex. 2019). 

We first look to the pleadings to determine if the pleader has alleged facts that 

affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause. See Tex. Dep’t 

of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We construe the 

pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept 

as true the factual allegations in the pleadings. Id. If the issue is one of pleading 

sufficiency, the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend unless the 

pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction. Id. at 227. 

 The Agencies challenged only Grant’s pleadings, arguing in their plea to the 

jurisdiction that (a) Grant lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of another, (b) the 

Agencies have sovereign immunity from suit and for claims for monetary damages, 

(c) Grant’s requests for information under the Act are considered withdrawn as a 

matter of law, and (d) a claim under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does 

not confer jurisdiction on the trial court. We address each ground in turn. 

 

7

See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.220(c). 
8

A. Grant Has Standing to Assert Statutory Claims Under the Act. 

To sufficiently plead standing, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the plaintiff has 

suffered a personal injury, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s 

unlawful conduct, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. 

See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012). The Agencies 

argue that Grant’s tort claims lack either the first or second element of standing, and 

thus, her claims also are not redressable.

 Regarding Grant’s tort claims, the Agencies are correct. To meet the injury 

requirement, the plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that the plaintiff, rather 

than a third party or the public at large, suffered the injury. Id. at 155 (citing S. Tex. 

Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam)). As the 

Agencies point out, Grant lacks standing to bring claims of elder abuse, because she 

alleges the abuse was suffered by a third party. Regarding the element of traceability, 

the Agencies contend that Grant’s claims of retaliation are not fairly traceable to her 

records requests. We agree with both of those arguments. We further agree that 

because Grant cannot establish that she personally suffered elder abuse or retaliation 

as a result of the Agencies’ denial of her record requests, those claims are not likely 

to be redressed by the declaratory and injunctive relief Grant requests. Grant does 

not contend otherwise. 

 But, as Grant correctly points out, the same is not true of her claims under the 

Texas Public Information Act. Her claims that the Agencies violated the Act by 

failing to make the information she requested available are claims that she, as the 

person requesting the information, is the injured party. Her claimed injury is lack of 

access to the information she seeks, and that injury is fairly traceable to the 

Agencies’ alleged violation of the Act. Finally, that injury is redressable. See TEX.
9

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.3215 (declaratory and injunctive relief available to a person 

claiming to be the victim of the Act’s violation). 

 Because Grant has standing to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief for the 

Agencies’ alleged violations of the Act, we sustain her first issue as to those claims. 

B. The Legislature Waived the Agencies’ Immunity from Suits for 

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under the Act.

 Unless waived, sovereign immunity protects the State of Texas and its 

agencies from suit and liability. Chambers-Liberty Ctys. Navigation Dist., 575 

S.W.3d at 344. Because sovereign immunity implicates jurisdiction, it can be 

asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at 345. 

 The legislature has waived certain governmental bodies’ sovereign and 

governmental immunity from suits for declaratory and injunctive relief for violations 

of the Texas Public Information Act. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.3215; see 

also Travis v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 03-14-00314-CV, 2016 WL 4429931, 

*2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 18, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (suit for declaratory 

relief challenging an OAG ruling on an open-records request). In her petition, Grant 

specifically pleaded, “Pursuant to GOV’T 5 Sec. 552.3215,8 plaintiff seeks 

declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.” Neither at trial nor on appeal have the 

Agencies disputed that section 552.3215 waives their immunity from suit for this 

relief. 

 We sustain Grant’s second issue as to her requests for declaratory and 

injunctive relief for the Agencies’ alleged violations of the Act. 

 

8

 Grant defined “GOV’T” to mean “Texas Government Code Title.” Section 552.3215 is 

found in Title 5 of the Texas Government Code.
10

C. Grant Did Not Withdraw Her Records Requests.

 In their plea to the jurisdiction, the Agencies asserted that Grant’s openrecords requests must be deemed withdrawn as a matter of law because she “does 

not elaborate on the status of the requests.” As support for this assertion, the 

Agencies cited Texas Government Code section 552.2615(b). 

 Section 552.2615 provides that if a person requesting a copy of public 

information will be charged more than $40, the responding agency must provide the 

requestor with a written itemized statement of the estimated charges. Subsection (b) 

states that the request is considered withdrawn if the requestor does not respond in 

writing to the itemized statement within ten business days. Id. 

Although the parties have not explicitly briefed this ground on appeal, we 

must treat appellate issues “as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly 

included,”9

 and on appeal, Grant characterizes her records requests as “continuously 

denied.” Grant similarly stated in her pleading that she sought “legal relief 

from . . . denials of formal [open-records] requests.” This necessarily implies that 

the Agencies did not provide her with an itemized statement of the charges for 

granting the requests. Regarding HHSC, Grant further pleaded that HHSC responded 

without “requested documents, or cost quotes.” 

 By such statements, Grant sufficiently alleged that the Agencies denied her 

records requests, and these uncontroverted factual allegations must be treated as true. 

Because the Agencies produced no evidence that Grant failed to timely respond to 

an itemized statement of costs, the trial court could not properly have granted the 

Agencies’ plea to the jurisdiction on the ground that Grant’s records requests are 

deemed withdrawn under Texas Government Code section 552.2615(b). 

 

9 TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g). 
11

D. We Need Not Address Jurisdiction Under the UDJA. 

 In its last jurisdictional argument in the trial court, the Agencies asserted that 

the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”)10 does not confer jurisdiction on 

the trial court.11 Because Grant has successfully established that the trial court has 

jurisdiction over her claims for declaratory relief under section 552.3215, it is 

unnecessary to consider whether another statute independently confers the same 

jurisdiction.

V. THE RULE 91A MOTION TO DISMISS

 Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, “a party may move to dismiss a 

cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 

91a.1. As specified in the rule, a cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, 

taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle 

the claimant to the relief sought. Id. A cause of action has no basis in fact if “no 

reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.” Id. We review the ruling on a 

Rule 91a motion de novo. AC Interests, L.P. v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 543 

S.W.3d 703, 706 (Tex. 2018). The Agencies moved for dismissal under Rule 91a on 

only two grounds. 

 First, the Agencies asserted sovereign immunity from suit on all of Grant’s 

claims. For the reasons previously addressed, we reject that argument as to Grant’s 

claims for a declaratory and injunctive relief under the Act. 

 

10 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001–.011. 

11 But see Kessling, 302 S.W.3d at 382–83 (a person seeking information under the Texas 

Public Information Act “could seek relief from a governmental entity’s refusal to produce 

information by directly filing a declaratory judgment action under the UDJA against the entity” 

(citing City of Garland v. Dall. Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 357–58 (Tex. 2000) and 

Dominguez v. Gilbert, 48 S.W.3d 789, 796 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.))).
12

 Second, the Agencies stated that, as to Grant’s claims that they are complicit 

in ongoing elder abuse and civil rights violations, Grant “allege[d] too few facts to 

demonstrate a viable, legally cognizable right to relief.” Grant does not challenge 

the portion of the trial court’s judgment dismissing her claims of elder abuse and 

civil rights violations. 

 We accordingly reverse the portion of the judgment granting the Agencies’ 

motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity as to Grant’s claims for 

declaratory and injunctive relief under the Act, and we leave intact the unchallenged 

portion of the judgment granting the motion to dismiss Grant’s claims of complicity 

in elder abuse and in civil-rights violations. 

VI. GRANT’S REMAINING ISSUES

Grant’s remaining issues concern matters over which we have no jurisdiction 

or that have been waived.

 Her third and fourth issues concern claims Grant raised in federal lawsuits 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).12 She identifies her third issue 

as “Whether Code 552 State and State Agencies have Sovereign Immunity, under 

the American Disability Act (‘ADA’),”13 and her fourth issue as “Whether 

Individuals Covered Under ADA are Denied Abuse Reporting in Texas and Texas 

State Agencies.” There are no ADA claims in this case; those complaints instead 

 

12 See Grant v. Seabron, Civil No. SA-15-CA-964-RP689, 2015 WL 13546621 (W.D. Tex. 

Nov. 10, 2015) (magistrate judge’s report and recommendation), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2016 WL 9455621 (Jan. 25, 2016), aff’d, Fed. Appx. 288 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); 

Grant v. Alperovich, 703 Fed. Appx. 556, 557 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 179, 202 L. 

Ed. 2d 110 (2018); Grant v. White, 703 Fed. Appx. 523 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 

164, 202 L. Ed. 2d 101 (2018). 

13 The Texas Public Information Act is codified as Chapter 552 of the Texas Government 

Code. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 552.001–.353. Grant refers to the Act as “Chapter 552” or 

“Code 552.”
13

were raised in one or more of Grant’s federal suits. Although those proceedings have 

no bearing on this case, the Agencies attached to their combined plea/motion to 

dismiss a copy of the magistrate’s report from one of those federal cases, and the 

report referred to Grant’s two other federal lawsuits.

14 Grant mistakenly concluded 

that by attaching the report to the plea, the Agencies had “expand[ed] the scope of 

this lawsuit” to incorporate her “Federal Mental and Behavioral Health American 

Disability Act (‘ADA’) Grant v. Seabron, et.al. rulings.” The federal courts have 

ruled on Grant’s ADA claims, and we lack jurisdiction to review those rulings. We 

therefore dismiss Grant’s third and fourth issues for want of jurisdiction.

 In her fifth issue, Grant asks, “Whether a culture of In Forma Pauperis and/or 

pro se litigant Confirmation Biasness and/or Systemic Discrimination is part of the 

judicial culture of the state Attorney General’s Office, Travis and Judge’s rulings.” 

This is a request for an advisory opinion which we lack jurisdiction to render. See 

Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) 

(citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1). We accordingly dismiss this issue as well.

 Grant phrases her sixth issue, “Whether conflict of interest, abuse of 

discretion, and other actions between the Appellees, and district court warrant fines 

and sanctions.” She similarly asks in her seventh issue, “Whether Sanctions 

Warranted for Overt Abuse of Authority and Questions of Unethical Procedural and 

Judicial Practices.” No rulings reviewable for abuse of discretion have been 

challenged on appeal, and none of Grant’s remaining complaints were preserved in 

the trial court. See TEX.R. APP. P. 33.1(a), 38.1(i). Thus, her sixth and seventh issues 

are waived. 

 

14 See Seabron, 2015 WL 13546621, at *1 n.4.
14

VII. CONCLUSION

 Grant sufficiently alleged facts showing that she has standing to sue for 

declaratory and injunctive relief for the Agencies’ alleged violations of the Texas 

Public Information Act. Because the legislature waived the Agencies’ sovereign 

immunity as to these claims, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment 

dismissing these claims. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(b). We leave intact the 

unchallenged portion of the judgment granting the motion to dismiss as it pertains 

to Grant’s claims that the Agencies are complicit in elder abuse and in civil-rights 

violations. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment, and we remand the 

case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 

 /s/ Tracy Christopher 

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Spain, and Poissant.