FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 FEBRUARY 4, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 07-12874

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 04-00026-CV-4-MMP-AK

ANDREW NGUYEN, MD, an individual,

ANDREW NGUYEN, MD PA, A Florida

Professional Association

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee. 

_____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

_________________________

On Reconsideration

________________________

(February 4, 2009)
Before CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLEW, District Judge. *

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Although neither party has petitioned for rehearing, we rescind our earlier

opinion in this case, Nguyen v. United States, 545 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2008), and

substitute this one for it. 

This appeal brings us the question of whether the waiver of sovereign

immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), extends to claims

of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution arising from the acts

or omissions of federal investigative or law enforcement officers. See id. §

2680(h). The facts of this case show why Congress has chosen to waive the

sovereign immunity of the United States in some circumstances, and the plaintiff’s

story illustrates the value of living in a country where a citizen may pursue claims

against the government in those circumstances. 

I.

Andrew Nguyen overcame a lot of obstacles on his way to becoming a

citizen of the United States of America entitled to the full protection of its laws. 

He was born in Hanoi in 1938. When the communists took control of North

 Honorable Susan C. Bucklew, United States District Judge for the Middle District of *

Florida, sitting by designation.

2
Vietnam, he moved south at age sixteen. At age twenty-five, Nguyen completed a

pre-medical education program at a college in Saigon. Later he earned a medical

degree from a school in Saigon that was accredited by the American Medical

Association. During the Vietnam War, Dr. Nguyen served as a combat physician

in the South Vietnamese army for three years, eventually earning the rank of

captain. He was injured in combat. 

After the communists took over South Vietnam, Dr. Nguyen was arrested at

the temporary hospital where he worked. Falsely accused of being a spy left

behind by the CIA, he was imprisoned for a year. In prison he was forced to do

hard labor that injured his back. When Dr. Nguyen was finally released from

prison, he went to work at a private, 600-bed Chinese hospital in Saigon, serving

as chief of the emergency room for two years and then as chief of internal

medicine for another two years. 

Dr. Nguyen attempted to escape from Vietnam more than once. In 1978

after his first escape attempt failed, the forty-year-old Dr. Nguyen was put in jail

again, this time for nine months. After he got out, Dr. Nguyen began planning

another escape, one that eventually included eighty-one people desperate to flee

communist rule. Through a perilous, four-day sea voyage in an old boat burning

gasoline that had been bought one gallon at a time on the black market, the group

3
managed to escape to the seashore of Thailand. They spent months in a refugee

camp there. 

With the help of some relatives in this country, Dr. Nguyen then made his

way to America. He was required to pass three examinations to get his American

medical license. In the meantime he worked at a newspaper as a translator and

also served at a VA hospital as a volunteer physician. He ultimately obtained two

state medical licenses, one from Florida and the other from Massachusetts. 

A friend of his put Dr. Nguyen in contact with a physician in Trenton,

Florida who was selling his medical practice. When Dr. Nguyen bought the

practice in 1984, he was the only licensed medical doctor in Trenton, which had a

population of less than 1,500. See United States Bureau of the Census, United

States Census of Population: 1990 General Population Characteristics, Florida 1-

11-9, Table 1; id. 1980 Number of Inhabitants, Florida 1-11-22, Table 5. He

eventually received hospital privileges at Shands Teaching Hospital and at North

Florida Medical Center, both of which are located in a neighboring county. 

The year 1986 was an important one for Dr. Nguyen. He became a citizen

of the United States of America. 

On March 23, 2000, Dr. Nguyen was sixty-two years old and had been

practicing medicine in Trenton for sixteen years. The day started out like any

4
other for him. He was in his office treating patients. A deputy from the Gilchrist

County Sheriff’s Office came into Dr. Nguyen’s office and arrested him without

warning or explanation. The deputy was accompanied by Robert Yakubec, an

agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency, who removed from the wall a certificate

that authorized Dr. Nguyen to prescribe controlled substances for his patients. 

The officers did not give the doctor a chance to explain whatever they thought he

had done wrong. They told him that he had no choice but to go to jail. Dr.

Nguyen informed his wife, who worked at the front desk, that he was being carried

to jail. He got into the back of the police car and was taken there. 

The two officers who photographed and fingerprinted Dr. Nguyen at the jail

were patients of his. They took all of his personal belongings and issued him an

inmate uniform. He was held in jail for about five hours. When he was released at

the end of the day, Dr. Nguyen still did not know why he had been arrested. 

Dr. Nguyen later learned that he had been arrested for six counts of delivery

of a controlled substance in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a), which makes it a

crime to deliver a controlled substance “[e]xcept as authorized by this chapter.” 

That chapter of the Florida Code authorizes medical doctors to dispense or

prescribe controlled substances “in good faith and in the course of his or her

professional practice only.” Fla. Stat. § 893.05(1). The crime alleged in a six5
count arrest warrant was that Dr. Nguyen had delivered Lortab and Valium, which

contain the controlled substances hydrocodone and diazepam, “to a confidential

source by use of a written order for said drug[s] not issued in good faith and in the

course of his professional practice, contrary to section 893.13(1)(a)(2).” The not

in good faith and not in medical practice elements were more specifically

described in the affidavit underlying the warrant. It accused Dr. Nguyen of

issuing prescriptions for those two controlled substances to a confidential

informant “without any type of physical examination or medical need.” From the

warrant and affidavit it is clear that if the drugs were prescribed after physical

examinations and in the course of Dr. Nguyen’s medical practice, there was no

crime. The parties agree about that.

 Dr. Nguyen returned to work the day after his arrest hoping to practice

medicine as he had done before, but he couldn’t. A pharmacy informed him that

he could no longer prescribe anything—not even cough syrup. His arrest was

headline news in the local media. Patients began calling to ask if he was a

criminal. 

The charges against Dr. Nguyen were nol prossed on May 17, 2000, 55 days

after the arrest, because of “insufficient evidence as to this defendant.” That

action did not undo the harmful domino effect the arrest had on his medical

6
practice. Health insurance companies, whose payments had been fifty to sixty

percent of his professional income, cancelled their contracts with him. That

caused him to lose patients who paid with health insurance. The loss of those

patients caused a financial strain on his practice, making it difficult for him to

retain employees and to purchase equipment and supplies. As a result, he had to

let one of his three employees go. Even after Dr. Nguyen got his prescription

privileges back several months later, no health insurance provider would agree to

contract with him again. 

What happened to Dr. Nguyen’s practice is what happens to the established

professional practices of medical doctors who are caught committing crimes

involving controlled substances. If the record before us is to be believed, 

however, Dr. Nguyen committed no crime. It is not just that the charges against

him were dismissed on insufficient evidence grounds. It is more than that. The

record, as it now exists, indicates that Dr. Nguyen’s arrest was not based on any

evidence of wrongdoing at all. All of the evidence that law enforcement officers

had then, as well as now, showed that he was guilty of no crime. They arrested

1

 We emphasize that our statements are based on the record before us and the record as it 1

now exists. The United States was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds before trial, and

for that reason we take the allegations of the complaint as true. Dr. Nguyen’s claims against the

sheriff and deputy sheriff, whom he also named as defendants, went to trial, and the jury found

the two of them liable on various claims. Although this appeal involves only the defendant

United States, we have drawn some of the facts from the trial. Those facts are entirely consistent

7
him anyway. 

Dr. Nguyen’s arrest grew out of a three-month investigation led by DEA

Agent Robert Yakubec, who was the head of a controlled substances task force

targeting several physicians in the area. Three times during the investigation Dr.

Nguyen prescribed Lortab and Valium, which contain controlled substances, to a

patient who was also a confidential informant for the task force. On each of those

occasions Dr. Nguyen or a member of his staff had first conducted a physical

examination of the informant patient. All of the evidence the task force obtained

during the investigation showed that those examinations had been performed each

time. The task force even had tape recordings of that informant patient’s office

visits with Dr. Nguyen proving that a physical examination was conducted on each

of the three visits. After every visit the task force had the informant patient sign

an affidavit describing what had happened while she was in Dr. Nguyen’s office,

and in those affidavits she described the physical examinations that had been

conducted before she got the prescriptions. Records in Dr. Nguyen’s office not

only showed that the patient had been examined but also that she was there with

with the amended complaint and provide background information for present purposes. On

remand, however, the actual facts will have to be developed or re-developed in summary

judgment proceedings or at a trial in which the United States has an opportunity to defend its

interests on grounds other than sovereign immunity. 

8
complaints about “nervousness,” “insomnia,” and “pain,” which she told the

doctor she had been experiencing for “months.” Those records, which were

consistent with the covert tapes and the informant patient’s affidavits, indicated

that the drugs were prescribed by Dr. Nguyen in good faith during the course of

his medical practice, but none of the officers asked for those records before

charging him with a crime. 

Deputy Carlisle of the Gilchrist County Sheriff’s Office was the actual

arresting officer. He died before trial but had given a deposition which was read

into evidence. In that deposition Carlisle described how the DEA had targeted

several physicians in the area for dispensing controlled substances without giving

patients a physical examination. It was all a DEA operation and the Sheriff’s

Office was “just there to assist them.” Robert Yakubec was the DEA agent in

charge. 

Deputy Carlisle was told by the DEA agents that a confidential informant

had gone to Dr. Nguyen’s office and had gotten a prescription without being given

a physical examination. Carlisle was the one who wrote out the affidavit used to

secure a warrant to arrest Dr. Nguyen. Carlisle testified, however, that he had

never spoken with the confidential informant about whether she had received a

physical examination. He also conceded that he did not know what physical

9
conditions justified a prescription for Lortab or Valium. 

Deputy Carlisle did not receive any evidence from the investigation until

after Dr. Nguyen had been arrested. His only information about the case and the

alleged absence of a physical examination of the confidential informant came from

the DEA. He explained that the DEA “took control of all the evidence. They had

it all. All we were there for is to work with them because it was in our

jurisdiction.” Specifically, he noted that the DEA took control of all the

recordings and the taped statements. 

When asked why a physician or pharmacist was not consulted before he

signed the arrest affidavit, Deputy Carlisle responded that the “DEA, Mr. Bob

[Yakubec] and them was running the show and they were doing it the way they

seen fit.” He testified that if he had known that a physical examination had been

conducted, he never would have included a statement to the contrary in the arrest

affidavit. When asked whether he made “any attempt to confirm that statement

independently” or whether he relied “totally on the statements of Agent Yakubec,”

he replied: “Totally on DEA.” According to Carlisle, Yakubec sat in the room

while Carlisle typed up the arrest affidavit. He showed it to Yakubec, among

others in the room, and all agreed that what it described—controlled substances

being distributed without a physical examination—was what had taken place. The

10
problem is that was not true. There had been a physical examination each time

before medication was prescribed. The affidavit and arrest warrant were based on

a false statement. 

II.

When he was wrongly jailed by the government of Vietnam and its agents,

Dr. Nguyen had no remedy but to flee from the country. As an American citizen,

though, he has a better remedy for that kind of abuse of governmental power. He

sued. By the time a third amended complaint had been filed in the district court,

Dr. Nguyen, his medical practice (suing as a professional association), and his

wife (suing solely as a co-owner of the professional association) were asserting a

number of claims against Deputy Carlisle, the Sheriff of Gilchrist County, and the

United States as the employer of DEA Agent Yakubec. After the district court

granted the United States’ motion to dismiss it on sovereign immunity grounds,

the claims against the Sheriff and (the estate of) Deputy Carlisle went to trial. A

jury found for Dr. Nguyen and his medical practice on their malicious prosecution

and false arrest claims against Deputy Carlisle and the Sheriff, and it also found

for them against Deputy Carlisle on their Fourth Amendment claim (called a “civil

rights claim” in the jury instructions and verdict form). The jury assessed damages

in the total amount of $1,836,100. After the district court entered judgment

11
against the deputy and sheriff in that amount, they appealed. While their appeal

was pending, they and Dr. Nguyen settled. 

All that remains of the lawsuit at this point is the appeal by Dr. Nguyen and

his medical practice from the district court’s dismissal of their claims against the

United States as Agent Yakubec’s employer. Those claims are for false arrest,

false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed the

claims against the United States for lack of jurisdiction solely on sovereign

immunity grounds. The validity of that dismissal turns on whether the United

States waived its sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 

III.

When interpreting a statute, we always begin with its plain language. See,

e.g., Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972–73 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); In re

Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389, 1393 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v. Steele,

147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Section 1346 of the FTCA

provides in part that:

[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil

actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . .

for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by

the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government while acting within the scope of his office or

employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a

private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the

12
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). That paragraph is a general waiver of sovereign

immunity, but some of the waiver is taken back in the “Exceptions” section of the

FTCA, which provides, among other things, that the waiver in § 1346(b) “shall not

apply to”: 

Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the

Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or

regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based

upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform

a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an

employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved

be abused.

Id. § 2680(a). That subsection, which often is referred to as the discretionary

function exception, generally shields the government from tort liability based on

the acts or omissions of federal agencies and employees when they are exercising

or performing a discretionary function. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499

2

 The test to determine whether a federal employee was exercising a “discretionary”

2

function that would invoke sovereign immunity is as follows:

The Supreme Court in [United States v.] Gaubert [, 499 U.S. 315, 111 S. Ct. 1267

(1991),] developed a two-step test to determine whether the government’s conduct

meets the discretionary function exception. We consider first whether the conduct

involves an element of judgment or choice, which will be the case unless a federal

statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action embodying

a fixed or readily ascertainable standard. The conduct need not be confined to the

policy or planning level.

We then ask whether the judgment or choice is grounded in considerations of

public policy, because the purpose of the discretionary function exception is to

13
U.S. 315, 322–23, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 1273–74 (1991) (explaining that “the purpose

of the [discretionary function] exception is to prevent judicial second-guessing of

legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and

political policy through the medium of an action in tort, [and] when properly

construed, the exception protects only governmental actions and decisions based

on considerations of public policy” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). The

subsection shields the government from liability by taking claims that arise from

discretionary functions out of the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in §

1346(b). 

Before 1974 there was also a provision in § 2680 that unequivocally barred

(by excepting from the waiver of sovereign immunity): “Any claim arising out of

assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of

process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract

prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions

grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an

action in tort. When established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by

statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a government agent to exercise

discretion, it must be presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when

exercising that discretion. Our inquiry does not focus either on the subjective

intent of the government agent, or on whether the agent actually weighed policy

considerations, but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are

susceptible to policy analysis. 

Cranford v. United States, 466 F.3d 955, 958 (11th Cir. 2006) (alterations, citations, and

quotation marks omitted). 

14
rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970). Whether a particular claim that was barred

because it arose out of one of the torts specified in § 2680(h) was also barred by §

2680(a) because it resulted from a discretionary function did not matter. Once

barred was enough. Sovereign immunity would bar “any claim” arising out of the

causes of action listed in subsection (h) regardless of whether the conduct of the

government agency or official was “discretionary” within the meaning of

subsection (a). See, e.g., Blitz v. Boog, 328 F.2d 596, 599 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding

that because subsection (h) barred plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, the court

did “not have to pass upon the government’s claim that the action is barred

because the acts complained of were within the ‘discretionary function’ provision

of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a)”). That was the statutory situation until Congress

changed it in 1974. 

 That year Congress amended the statute by adding an important proviso to

§ 2680(h), which turned that subsection around as to specified claims against

federal investigative and law enforcement officers. See Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2,

88 Stat. 50, 50 (1974). Instead of excepting those claims from the waiver of

sovereign immunity, as the subsection originally had, the proviso included them

within the waiver. The specified claims are “any claim arising . . . out of assault,

battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious

15
prosecution” based on acts “of investigative or law enforcement officers of the

United States . . . .” Id. As amended, § 2680(h) now reads in its entirety:

The provision of this chapter and section 1346(b) [the general waiver

of sovereign immunity] of this title shall not apply to—

* * *

(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false

arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,

misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights:

Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or

law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the

provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply

to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this

proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse

of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this

subsection, “investigative or law enforcement officer” means any

officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute

searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of

Federal law.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The “date of the enactment of this proviso” was March 16,

1974. See § 2, 88 Stat. at 50.

The straightforward meaning of subsection (h) as it now reads is that the

United States has expressly waived its sovereign immunity for the claims listed in

the proviso, which includes the claims made in this case. We must determine,

however, how that subsection interacts with subsection (a). See Wachovia Bank,

N.A. v. United States, 455 F.3d 1261, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n order to

16
determine the plain meaning of the statute we must consider both the particular

statutory language at issue and the language and design of the statute as a whole.” 

(quotation marks omitted)). The government’s position would mean that the

waiver of sovereign immunity in the § 2680(h) proviso is taken away by

subsection (a) which effectively reasserts sovereign immunity for claims based on

discretionary functions. The question is whether the waiver of sovereign

immunity in § 1346(b), which is un-waived to some extent by § 2680(a), is rewaived for the claims specified in § 2680(h)’s proviso. 

As one court has recognized, the relationship between § 2680(a) and(h) has

posed some interpretive problems:

Federal courts have struggled somewhat in deciding (1) the types of

conduct the § 2680(a) discretionary function exception protects; and

(2) whether and how to apply the exception in cases brought under

the intentional tort proviso found in § 2680(h). The Supreme Court

has provided guidance in unraveling the former mystery; the latter

question, on the other hand, remains unsettled.

Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 2001). Much of the problem

is that the “any” in subsection (a) battles the “any” in subsection (h). Section

2680(a) covers “[a]ny claim” involving a discretionary function, and § 2680(h)

covers “any claim” arising from the torts that are listed in that subsection. We all

know that “any” is all-embracing and means nothing less than all. See, e.g., Ali v.

17
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. ___,128 S. Ct. 831, 835–36 (2008); United

States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S. Ct. 1032, 1035 (1997); Laperriere v.

Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 526 F.3d 715, 726 (11th Cir. 2008); Price v. Time, Inc.,

416 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2005). But what happens when two “anys” face

off so that they cannot both be all-embracing? Which one must yield?

Two fundamental canons of statutory construction, as well as the clear

Congressional purpose behind the § 2680(h) proviso, provide the answer, which is

that to the extent of any overlap and conflict between that proviso and subsection

(a), the proviso wins. First, the § 2680(h) proviso, which applies only to six

specified claims arising from acts of two specified types of government officers, is

more specific than the discretionary function exception in § 2680(a), which

applies generally to claims arising from discretionary functions or duties of 

federal agencies or employees. The canon is that a specific statutory provision

trumps a general one. See ConArt, Inc. v. Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum, Inc.,

504 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen presented with a potential overlap

between the broadly sweeping terms of a statute of general application that appear

to apply to an entire class, and the narrow but specific terms of a statute that apply

to only a subgroup of that class, we avoid conflict between the two by reading the

specific as an exception to the general.”); Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United States, 273

18
F.3d 936, 949 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Second, the § 2680(h) proviso was brought about through an amendment

enacted in 1974, while the (a) subsection has been part of the statute since 1946. 

When subsections battle, the contest goes to the younger one; the canon is that a

later enacted provision controls to the extent of any conflict with an earlier one. 

See ConArt, 504 F.3d at 1210 (“[W]here two statutory provisions would otherwise

conflict, the earlier enacted one yields to the later one to the extent necessary to

prevent the conflict.”); Tug Allie-B, 273 F.3d at 948–49. 

These canons of statutory construction that we apply to § 2680(a) and (h)

are an expression of common sense applied to textual interpretation. Consider an

analogy. A big, burly doorman guarding the entrance to an exclusive club shouts

to a large crowd of people wanting to get in that none of them may enter. Later he

speaks specifically to a few people in the crowd and tells them to go on in. No

one would doubt that while the general group has been barred a privileged few

have been given permission to enter. So it is with § 2680. The later and more

specific statement in subsection (h) permitting the listed claims trumps the earlier

and more general one in subsection (a) barring a broader class of claims. In that

manner the “any” in the proviso to § 2680(h) wins the face off with the “any” in

subsection (a). 

19
The result we reach by application of the canons of statutory construction is

also required by the Congressional purpose behind the proviso to § 2680(h), which

could not be clearer. In enacting that proviso in 1974, Congress made a major

change in the law regarding sovereign immunity for certain types of claims arising

from intentional torts by particular types of officers. Up until that time subsection

(h), which had been enacted in 1946 without the proviso, left sovereign immunity

in place as far as eleven listed intentional torts were concerned. The Third Circuit

has summed up the legislative intent behind subsection (h) as originally

enacted—before the proviso was added:

Section 2680(h) addresses itself primarily to intentional torts for

which Congress was unwilling to assume liability. “This section [28

U.S.C. § 2680] specifies types of claims which would not be covered

by this title. They include . . . deliberate torts such as assault and

battery; and others. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) S.Rep. No. 1400, 79th

Cong., 2d Sess., at 33 (1946); Jayson, Handling Federal Tort Claims,

Vol. 2, Sec. 260.01 n. 1.

In the hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of

Representatives, the following colloquy occurred with respect to this

exception: “MR. ROBSION. On that point of deliberate assault that is

where some agent of the Government gets in a fight with some

fellow? MR. SHEA. Yes. MR. ROBSION. And socks him? MR.

SHEA. That is right. MR. CRAVENS. Assume a C.C.C. automobile

runs into a man and damages him then under the common law, where

that still prevails, is not that considered an assault and is not the

action based on assault and battery? MR. SHEA. I should think not. I

should think under old common law rather that would be trespass on

20
the case. MR. CRAVENS. Trespass on the case? MR. SHEA. Yes. 

MR. CRAVENS. I do not remember those things very well, but it

seems to me there are some cases predicated on assault and battery

even though they were personal injury cases. MR. SHEA. No; I think

under common-law pleading you have the same writ, but it makes a

distinction between an assault and negligence. MR. CRAVENS. This

refers to a deliberate assault? MR. SHEA. That is right. MR.

CRAVENS. If he hit someone deliberately? MR. SHEA. That is

right. MR. CRAVENS. It is not intended to exclude negligent

assaults? MR. SHEA. No. An injury caused by negligence could be

considered under the bill.” (Emphasis supplied.) Hearings on H.R.

5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Committee of the Judiciary,

77th Cong., 2nd Sess., ser. 13, at 33, 34 (1942).

Does the injury sustained by [the plaintiff] arise out of an assault and

battery? Assault and battery by definition are intentional acts. 

Intention is the very essence of the tortious act. Congress intended to

exclude liability for injuries caused by intentional misconduct and not

for negligence. This is consistent with the strong public policy

expressed in the statute to waive immunity for injuries caused by

negligence of employees and to except claims arising out of assault or

battery.

Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1395–96 (3d Cir. 1972) (some brackets

added and footnote numbering omitted). That was the way things stood for nearly

thirty years.

Then came two highly-publicized raids by federal narcotics agents on the

homes of innocent families in Collinsville, Illinois. See S. Rep. No. 93-588

(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2789, 2790. Both raids were conducted

without warrants, both were based on mistaken information, and both occurred on

21
the same night in the same town. Id. 3

In the first of the Collinsville raids federal agents smashed in the door of the

Giglotto family’s home, brandished pistols, threw Mr. Giglotto down and

handcuffed him, interrogated him at gunpoint, pointed a pistol at Mrs. Giglotto as

she pleaded for her husband’s life, and ransacked the house. See 119 Cong. Rec.

23246 (1973). Only later did the agents realize that they were at the wrong

address and leave. Id. In their wake, they left a smashed television, a broken

camera, scattered books and clothes, scratched furniture, a shattered antique

dragon, and two distraught people. Id.; see also id. at 14084. 

 Later that evening federal narcotics agents led twenty-five members of the

same strike force to the home of the Askew family who lived nearby. Id. at 14085. 

An agent forced his way in as Mr. Askew tried to close the door. Id. His wife

fainted. Id. The officers searched the home and interrogated Mr. Askew at

gunpoint. Id. at 14085, 23243. After the officers realized that they were at the

wrong house, they left. Id.

 The Collinsville raids were widely reported by news media. See, e.g., In the Name of 3

the Law, Time, May 14, 1973, at 38; Law Enforcement: The Collinsville Reich, Newsweek, May

14, 1973, at 45; Andrew H. Malcolm, Drug Raids Terrorize 2 Families–by Mistake, N.Y. Times,

Apr. 29, 1973, at 1, 43. In discussing the need for an amendment to FTCA § 2680(h), several

senators introduced into the Congressional Record news accounts of the raids. In the next two

paragraphs of the text of this opinion we draw facts from that part of the record to show

Congress’ understanding about what had happened during the raids. 

22
Under § 2680(h) of the FTCA, as it was then written, sovereign immunity

barred the innocent victims of the Collinsville raids from recovering damages from

the government. See 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2790. (“There is no effective legal

remedy against the Federal Government for the actual physical damage, much less

the pain, suffering and humiliation to which the Collinsville families have been

subjected.”) Congress added the proviso to § 2680(h) to ensure that future victims

of these kinds of torts inflicted by federal law enforcement officers or agents

would have a damages remedy against the United States. 

The Senate Report reinforces our understanding of the purpose of the

proviso-adding amendment:

During the course of these hearings several incidents were brought to

the Committee’s attention in which Federal narcotics agents engaged

in abusive, illegal and unconstitutional ‘no-knock’ raids. The

Committee’s amendment is designed to prevent future abuses of the

Federal ‘no-knock’ statute (21 U.S.C. 879). . . .

As a general principle under present law, if a Federal agent violates

someone’s constitutional rights—for instance, Fourth Amendment

rights against illegal search and seizure—there is no remedy against

the Federal Government. This ancient doctrine—sovereign

immunity—stands as a bar. 

Only recently was there even a right of action against the offending

officers themselves. In the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal

Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court held that

the Fourth Amendment and elementary justice require that there b[e]

a right of action against the Federal agents for illegal searches

23
conducted in bad faith or without probable cause. Of course, Federal

agents are usually judgment proof so this is a rather hollow remedy. 

For years scholars and commentators have contended that the Federal

Government should be liable for the tortious acts of its law

enforcement officers when they act in bad faith or without legal

justification. However, the Federal Torts Claims Act (28 U.S.C.

2671-2680) the embodiment of sovereign immunity in the United

States Code, protects the Federal Government from liability where its

agents commit intentional torts such as assault and battery. The

injustice of thi[s] provision should be manifest—for under the Federal

Torts Claims Act a Federal mail truck driver creates direct federal

liability if he negligently runs down a citizen on the street but the

Federal Government is held harmless if a federal narcotics agent

intentionally assaults that same citizen in the course of an illegal

‘no-knock’ raid. . . .

The Committee amendment to the bill, contained in a new section 2

thereof, would add a proviso at the end of the intentional torts

exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. 2680(h)). The

effect of this provision is to deprive the Federal Government of the

defense of sovereign immunity in cases in which Federal law

enforcement agents, acting within the scope of their employment, or

under color of Federal law, commit any of the following torts: assault,

battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, or

abuse of process. Thus, after the date of enactment of this measure,

innocent individuals who are subjected to raids of the type conducted

in Collinsville, Illinois, will have a cause of action against the

individual Federal agents and the Federal Government. Furthermore,

this provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case

and its progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign

immunity so as to make the Government independently liable in

damages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred

in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the

individual Government officials involved). . . .

This whole matter was brought to the attention of the Committee in

24
the context of the Collinsville raids, where the law enforcement

abuses involved Fourth Amendment constitutional torts. Therefore,

the Committee amendment would submit the Government to liability

whenever its agents act under color of law so as to injure the public

through search and seizures that are conducted without warrants or

with warrants issued without probable cause. However, the

Committee’s amendment should not be viewed as limited to

constitutional tort situations but would apply to any case in which a

Federal law enforcement agent committed the tort while acting within

the scope of his employment or under color of Federal law. 

Id. at 2789–91. 

Taking the allegations of the complaint in this case as true, as we must at

this stage of the proceedings, Agent Yakubec was not acting with probable cause

when he arrested Dr. Nguyen, and proceeding against the doctor was malicious

prosecution. This is precisely the kind of factual situation for which Congress has

expressly and specifically waived sovereign immunity under § 2680(h). It is what

the Committee Report meant when it said: “The effect of this provision is to

deprive the Federal Government of the defense of sovereign immunity in cases in

which Federal law enforcement agents, acting within the scope of their

employment, or under color of Federal law, commit any of the following torts:

assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, or abuse

of process.” Id. at 2791.

To hold in this case that the discretionary function exception in subsection

25
(a) trumps the specific proviso in subsection (h) would defeat what we know to be

the clear purpose of the 1974 amendment. See Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d

1289, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding that “if the law enforcement proviso is to

be more than an illusory—now you see it, now you don’t—remedy, the

discretionary function exception cannot be an absolute bar which one must clear to

proceed under § 2680(h)”). It would also modify the statute by either removing

the proviso to § 2680(h), which Congress put there, or by rewriting the words “any

claim” in the proviso to mean only claims based on the performance of nondiscretionary functions. We are not authorized to rewrite, revise, modify, or

amend statutory language in the guise of interpreting it, Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 841;

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 10, 121 S. Ct. 361, 365 (2000); In re Hedrick, 524

F.3d 1175, 1187–88 (11th Cir. 2008); Albritton v. Cagle’s, Inc., 508 F.3d 1012,

1017 (11th Cir. 2007); Harris, 216 F.3d at 976, especially when doing so would

defeat the clear purpose behind the provision. We would give effect to the plain

meaning and clear purpose of the statutory language by concluding that sovereign

immunity does not bar a claim that falls within the proviso to subsection (h),

regardless of whether the acts giving rise to it involve a discretionary function.

IV.

Although the Fifth Circuit agrees with our reconciliation of § 2680(a) with

26
(h), see Sutton, 819 F.2d at 1297, five other circuits have taken a different

approach about how the two subsections interact. They have concluded that even

claims listed in the proviso to § 2680(h) are barred if they are based on the

performance of discretionary functions within the meaning of § 2680(a). See, e.g.,

Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 224–26 (4th Cir. 2001); Gasho v. United

States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806,

809 (9th Cir. 1987); Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 871–72 (3d Cir. 1986);

Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Caban v. United States, 671

F.2d 1230, 1234–35 (2d Cir. 1982). 

Some of those decisions have tried to avoid making the subsection (h)

proviso meaningless by defining “discretionary” in subsection (a) so narrowly 

that it excludes most of the actions of rank and file federal law enforcement

officers that lead to subsection (h) proviso claims. See Garcia, 826 F.2d at 809

(“While law enforcement involves exercise of a certain amount of discretion on

the part of individual officers, such decisions do not involve the sort of

generalized social, economic and political policy choices that Congress intended

to exempt from tort liability.”); Pooler, 787 F.2d at 872 (“Reading the intentional

tort proviso as limited to activities in the course of a search, a seizure or an arrest

as a practical matter largely eliminates the likelihood of any overlap between

27
section 2680(a) and section 2680(h).”); Gray, 712 F.2d at 508 (“[I]f the

‘investigative or law enforcement officer’ limitation in section 2680(h) is read to

include primarily persons (such as police officers) whose jobs do not typically

include discretionary functions, it will be rare that a suit permissible under the

proviso to section 2680(h) is barred by section 2680(a)”); Caban, 671 F.2d at

1234–35 (holding that INS officers’ decisions about whether to detain an alien did

not constitute a discretionary function under the FTCA and that sovereign

immunity did not bar the lawsuit). We recognize that every one of those decisions

would reach the same result that we do in this case because Dr. Nguyen’s claims

arise from acts or omissions of Agent Yakubec that those other circuits would

define as non-discretionary. 

Still, we are not persuaded to follow their approach. None of those other

decisions addresses the war between the “anys” in § 2680 (a) and (h). None of

them applies the canons of statutory construction under which a more specific and

more recently enacted provision trumps a more general and earlier one. None of

them comes to grips with the clear congressional purpose behind the enactment of

the proviso to subsection (h). None of them persuades us to abandon our

conclusion that if a claim is one of those listed in the proviso to subsection (h),

there is no need to determine if the acts giving rise to it involve a discretionary

28
function; sovereign immunity is waived in any event.

V.

Having laid out the law as we would decide it if we were writing on a clean

slate, we turn now to whether there is anything on the precedential slate

preventing us from making our conclusion a holding. There are no Supreme Court

decisions instructing us about the relationship between § 2680(a) and the proviso

to subsection (h). We are, of course, bound to follow prior panel precedent that is

on point. There are only two decisions of our Court that arguably address the

issue of sovereign immunity for any claim listed in the proviso to subsection (h)

stemming from acts or omissions of federal investigative or law enforcement

officers. Neither reached a holding contrary to our conclusion. 

4

The first of those two decisions is Brown v. United States, 653 F.2d 196

(5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). It did involve a claim, malicious prosecution, that is 5

 Seibert v. Baptist, 594 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1979), is not such a decision because the 4

claims in that case arose two years before the effective date of the § 2680(h) proviso, and it

involved § 2680(c). Id. at 425–28. Nor is Mesa v. United States, 123 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir.

1997), which involved only negligence claims and in which we specifically refused to speculate

about what might have happened if the plaintiffs had pursued claims based on the causes of

action set forth in § 2680(h). Id. at 1437 n.3, 1439 n.5. Nor is Mid-South Holding Co. v. United

States, 225 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2000), which involved a claim about negligence in carrying out

a search instead of any of the intentional tort claims listed in the § 2680(h) proviso. Id. at 1202,

1205.

 In our en banc decision Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 5

1981), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to October 1, 1981. The preexisting Fifth Circuit precedent that the Bonner decision

29
listed in the § 2680(h) proviso, but we had no occasion to decide anything about

the interaction of the proviso and subsection (a) in Brown because sovereign

immunity applied regardless. It applied regardless of subsections (a) and (h)

because § 1346(b) itself provides that sovereign immunity is waived only “under

circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the

claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission

occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The pivotal fact in Brown was that there was

no malice and as a result the malicious prosecution claim was not valid under the

law of Texas, which is the place where the acts occurred. 653 F.2d at 199–201. 

There was, therefore, no occasion to decide what effect § 2680(a) or (h) would

have had if there were a valid malicious prosecution claim. See id. at 201–02

(“We leave for another day the question of whether . . . a constitutional tort action

‘arising out of’ one of Section 2680(h)’s six enumerated torts is viable under the

Act if sanctioned by ‘the law of the place.’”).

The other post-proviso decision of our Court addressing the issue of

sovereign immunity in a lawsuit asserting some of the six claims listed in the

proviso to § 2680(h) is Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990). That

adopted as binding precedent in this circuit includes all Unit A panel decisions issued before

October 1, 1981. United States v. Todd, 108 F.3d 1329, 1333 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997). 

30
case involved allegations that INS officials had unlawfully detained black Haitian

refugees and discriminated against them on the grounds of national origin and

race. Id. at 1553. The plaintiffs, who were excludable aliens, brought a large

6

number of claims under the FTCA including ones for abuse of process and false

imprisonment, which are two of the claims listed in the § 2680(h) proviso. Id. at

1555. We held that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity because they

“ar[o]se from the exercise or the performance of a discretionary function on the

part of the government and its agents and . . . the defendants are shielded from

liability by the provisions of Section 2680(a).” Id. 

Under the facts of the Adras case, and specifically in the context of

immigration and the rights of excludable aliens, we reasoned that the claims were

a direct attack on a discretionary decision by the Attorney General because he had

weighed policy considerations in deciding to withhold parole for excludable

aliens. Id. at 1556 (“[T]he Attorney General is under no obligation to parole

excludable aliens—he may do so in his discretion.” (emphasis and quotation

marks omitted)). We explained that:

Excludable aliens cannot challenge the decisions of executive

officials with regard to their applications for admission, asylum, or

 “[E]xcludable aliens are those who seek admission into the United States but have not 6

achieved entry.” Adras, 917 F.2d at 1555.

31
parole on the basis of the rights guaranteed by the United States

Constitution. They do have rights, however, to whatever process

Congress—and through its regulations and established policies, the

Executive Branch—have extended them. 

Id. at 1554. 

The § 2680(h) proviso was not even mentioned in the Adras decision. The

reason probably is that the lawsuit does not appear to have been brought because

of “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United

States,” and if it was not brought because of acts or omissions of those specific

types of officers, the proviso did not apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The term

“investigative or law enforcement officer” is defined in the proviso to mean “any

officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize

evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” Id. The Adras lawsuit

was brought against officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service

responsible for the policy that resulted in detention of the excludable alien

plaintiffs and apparently not against rank and file investigative and law

enforcement officers. See 917 F.2d at 1553. According to the docket sheet in the

Adras case the following INS officials were listed as defendants: Alan C. Nelson,

Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service; Doris Meissner, former

Acting Commissioner, INS; David Crosland, former General Counsel and former

32
Acting Commissioner, INS; Hugh J. Brien, former Acting Associate

Commissioner of INS for Enforcement; Joe Howerton, former District Director

District VI, INS; Leonard Rowland, Assistant District Director, Detention and

Deportation; District VI, INS; the United States; the INS; and John Does I–XXV.7

See Adras v. Nelson, No. 85-0197-CIV-Scott (S.D. Fla. March 14, 1989). 

Even if some of the John Doe defendants in the Adras case had been

working investigative or law enforcement officers—and there is no indication that

they were—the decision in that case would not control this one. Regardless of

who the defendants were and how the claims were cast in that case, the plaintiffs’

grievances were not with the agents who had ministerially carried out the Attorney

General’s detention policy but with the Attorney General and other high ranking

officials who were responsible for the existence of that policy. Cf. Jean v. Nelson,

727 F.2d 957, 967 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A]s a result of the existence of inherent

executive power over immigration and the broad delegations of discretionary

authority in the INA, the separation-of-powers doctrine places few restrictions on

executive officials in dealing with aliens who come to this country in search of

admission or asylum.”). The district court explained that the allegations in the

 We take judicial notice of the docket sheet in Adras in order to determine the identity of 7

the defendants in that case. See United States v. Glover, 179 F.3d 1300, 1302 n.5 (11th Cir.

1999) (“A court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of inferior courts.”).

33
plaintiffs’ complaint were based “on Defendants’ initiating, planning, supervising,

coordinating, and preparing the detention policy and subsequent detention of

Plaintiffs.” See No. 85-0197-CIV-Scott at 6. The Attorney General, not any local

INS agent, was the source of the policy about which the plaintiffs complained. 

See Adras, 917 F.2d at 1556 (“The district court noted that ‘[p]laintiffs were

detained as a result of the Attorney General’s order requiring INS officials to hold

without parole all aliens unable to establish a prima facie case for admission.’”

(citations omitted)). 

Even if the Attorney General does fit within the definition of “investigative

or law enforcement officer” contained in the last sentence of the § 2680(h)

proviso, the Adras decision extends no further than the facts of that case. See 8

Watts v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 316 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“[J]udicial decisions cannot make law beyond the facts of the cases in which

those decisions are announced.”). The central fact that defines the Adras decision

and limits its scope is that the claims arose not from an investigative or law

enforcement officer’s decision to search or arrest or charge in a particular case but

 The Attorney General has very broad authority and is empowered to perform all the 8

functions that anyone in the Department of Justice is authorized to perform except for three

specifically listed functions that have no application here. See 28 U.S.C. § 509 (providing that

“[a]ll functions of other officers of the Department of Justice and all functions of agencies and

employees of the Department of Justice are vested in the Attorney General” except three listed

functions).

34
from a general policy decision made in the exercise of his discretion by a high

official in the Executive branch. See 917 F.2d at 1556.

At least where the special circumstances present in the Adras case do not

exist, and the § 2680(h) proviso applies to waive sovereign immunity, the

exception to waiver contained in § 2680(a) is of no effect. To the extent of any

conflict, the later enacted and more specific subsection (h) proviso trumps the

earlier and more general subsection (a), as Congress clearly intended that it would.

VI.

Dr. Nguyen has brought claims for false imprisonment, false arrest, and

malicious prosecution arising out of the acts or omissions of Agent Yakubec. At

the time of the acts in question, Agent Yakubec was a federal investigative or law

enforcement officer, defined in the statute as one “empowered by law to execute

searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” See

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Under the facts and circumstances as alleged, Dr. Nguyen’s

claims against the United States are expressly permitted by the plain language of

the proviso to § 2680(h). Therefore, the district court should not have granted the

United States’ motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. 

 REVERSED.

35