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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

January 13, 2015 

v No. 317508 

Isabella Circuit Court 

CURTIS RICHARD LEACHMAN, LC No. 2012-002187-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: TALBOT, C.J., and CAVANAGH and M. J. KELLY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Curtis Richard Leachman appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of second-degree 

murder1 and carrying a weapon with unlawful intent.2 Leachman was sentenced as a fourth 

habitual offender3 to concurrent terms of 45 to 80 years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction 

and 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the weapons conviction, with 236 days’ credit for both 

convictions. We affirm. 

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS4

A. BACKGROUND 

 On November 9, 2012, Leachman, then 25 years old, moved into a two-bedroom 

apartment in Isabella County that was leased by Valerie Sprague. The building that housed the 

apartment had retail space on the first floor and two apartments on the second floor. The 

apartments were labeled apartment A and apartment B;5

 Leachman lived in apartment A.6 

 

1

 MCL 750.317. 

2

 MCL 750.226. 

3

 MCL 769.12. 

4

 The facts contained in this opinion were obtained from the trial transcripts. The trial took place 

between May 13, 2013 and May 23, 2013. 

5

 The length of the hallway between apartment B and the edge of the stairwell near apartment A 

is 24-1/2 feet. 
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Leachman was permitted to rent the spare bedroom in that apartment because Sprague was 

injured and was temporarily unable to live there. Sprague instructed Leachman to keep the 

apartment clean, not to have any parties, and to stay out of her bedroom. Leachman, however, 

allowed his then-close friend, Brandon Harner, to live in the apartment with him and sleep in 

Sprague’s bedroom.7

B. NOVEMBER 23-24, 2012 

 On November 23, 2012, Harner arrived home in the early evening after spending time 

with a woman who he had been dating. Harner encountered Leachman outside, near the 

apartment. The two men returned to the apartment together and talked for about 25 minutes. 

Leachman told Harner about his plans for the evening, which included seeing a woman who 

Leachman had been dating. After they finished talking, Leachman left the apartment and did not 

return for several hours. 

Once Leachman returned home, he and Harner remained in the apartment for some time. 

At approximately 10:00 p.m., Leachman and Harner heard a bang on the wall outside of his 

apartment. When Leachman checked to see what caused the noise, the hallway was empty, but a 

hole had been made in the wall to the left of the apartment’s front door. Leachman grabbed a 

bucket of drywall from his apartment, walked down to apartment B, and asked its occupant, 

Reyes Hinojosa Jr., who was going to fix the hole. Hinojosa appeared intoxicated. The 

conversation between Leachman and Hinojosa started off calm, but then escalated. There was an 

exchange of words, which included obscenities, and Leachman threw down the bucket of 

drywall. Leachman then picked up the bucket, and returned to his apartment. The interaction 

with Hinojosa lasted about two minutes. 

Sometime after midnight on November 24, 2012, someone pounded on the door of 

Leachman’s apartment. Leachman answered the door, seemingly upset about the banging. 

Hinojosa, Tyrone Stanley, and Chino Alaniz were in the hallway.8

 Taylor Gepford and Alsina 

Waboose were behind them. Harner remained inside of the apartment, a couple of feet from the 

door. The conversation between Leachman and the three men started off calm. Leachman and 

Stanley then began arguing. Stanley threatened to beat up Leachman, and the two men discussed 

where Harner’s loyalty would lie if Leachman and Stanley fought. It was Harner’s impression 

that because Leachman allowed Harner to live in the apartment, Leachman wanted Harner to 

side with him. Harner, however, told Stanley and Leachman that he would not choose sides 

because he was friends with both of them. Gepford encouraged Leachman and Stanley to fight.9 

6

 Apartment A has a steel front door on a wood frame with both a lock and deadbolt. The doors 

of both bedrooms and the bathroom in that apartment have operable locks. There is also a fire 

ladder that when deployed from the window of the apartment reaches far enough for a person to 

get within two to six feet from the ground. Apartment A’s walls were adorned with graffiti. The 

owner of the building, Norman Curtiss, testified that he was not certain who placed the graffiti 

on the walls, but he believed it was the tenant. 

7

 At that time, Harner had known Leachman for approximately six years. 

8

 At that time, Harner and Stanley had been close friends for approximately four years. 

9

 Gepford videotaped this encounter. 
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The conversation lasted less than five minutes and ended without a physical altercation. After 

Leachman closed the door, he purportedly overheard Hinojosa, Stanley, and Alaniz discussing 

the need to get additional people to come to the building.10 Leachman told Harner that he was 

not a good friend because he would not fight for him. At that time, it was obvious to Harner that 

Leachman wanted to fight. 

Approximately 15 minutes later, Leachman told Harner that he wanted to go to Michael 

and Jacob Partie’s house to see Leachman’s brothers, Ethan and Andrew. Leachman and Harner 

walked to the Parties’s house, which was five minutes away, but Ethan and Andrew were not 

there. Leachman then attempted to recruit people to come back to his apartment because he 

believed that he was going to get “jumped”11.

12 Joe Babosh agreed to return to Leachman’s 

apartment, so Leachman, Harner, and Babosh walked back. 

Harner wanted to remove himself and Babosh from the situation and discourage 

Leachman from pursuing a fight. As such, once they returned to the apartment, Harner lied to 

Babosh and told him that there were eight people interested in fighting Leachman.13 Around 

4:00 a.m., Babosh heard yelling and banging on the walls outside of Leachman’s apartment. As 

a result, Babosh called Caleb Donley to pick him and Harner up. Donley arrived at Leachman’s 

apartment shortly thereafter with Nicole Coan, Karena Tucker, and Stephanie Alwood. Donley 

and Alwood entered apartment A, and greeted Leachman, Harner, and Babosh. Alwood then 

went and spoke with Stanley who was standing outside of the door to apartment B. Donley 

stayed in apartment A and teased Leachman, Harner, and Babosh for hiding in the apartment.14 

Donley then joined Coan, Tucker, and Alwood, outside of apartment B and spoke with Stanley. 

Donley had been concerned that Leachman was going to get “jumped,” but Stanley told him that 

he intended to fight Leachman one-on-one. 

Over the course of the evening, people became aware of the possibility that Stanley and 

Leachman may fight, so there were many people congregating in the hallway between 

 

10 Other people associated with apartment B included Georgia Ramirez and Janae Hunt. 

11 According to the trial testimony, when a person is “jumped” it means that he or she is 

outnumbered by his or her opponents. 

12 Leachman told law enforcement that he returned to his apartment from the Parties’s house on 

that occasion in order to protect Sprague’s property. 

13 At 3:07 a.m., Leachman called Levi Doolittle and reported that seven or eight men were 

pounding on his door and wanted to fight him. Leachman asked Doolittle to come help because 

Leachman only had a couple of “girls” to help protect him. Doolittle suggested that Leachman 

call the police, but Leachman told him that was not an option. 

14 Donley testified that when he greeted Leachman, Leachman was wearing gloves. Kahlil 

Richardson testified that the week before the incident Leachman referred to black baseball 

gloves that he was wearing as his “assassin” gloves. Testimony was elicited at trial that the 

gloves that Leachman was wearing on the night of the incident were similar in appearance to the 

gloves described by Richardson. 
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apartments A and B. Leachman eventually exited his apartment and he and Stanley began 

exchanging words from opposite ends of the hall. The situation began to escalate, so Harner 

briefly went to speak with Stanley, who was near apartment B, in an effort to alleviate the 

tension. The exchange of negative words continued between Leachman and Stanley; Stanley 

being more verbal than Leachman. According to Leachman, Stanley then removed a gun that he 

had in his waistband and handed it to Hinojosa, who pointed it at Leachman.15 Stanley joked 

with Alaniz that he needed a belt to use on Leachman, so Alaniz handed Stanley his belt.16 

Leachman then went inside of apartment A, purportedly to retrieve a knife for his protection. It 

was the impression of several witnesses that the confrontation was over at that time. 

Within a minute, Leachman exited apartment A, passed the stairwell, and headed toward 

Stanley, who was by the door of apartment B. Leachman stopped approximately eight feet from 

Stanley and continued arguing with him. Stanley then approached Leachman and they continued 

to exchange words. Then Stanley (with a belt in hand), and Leachman (holding a knife) 

simultaneously advanced toward each other. Leachman then stabbed Stanley in his left armpit 

region, and also inflicted minor knife wounds to Stanley’s left shoulder and left cheek.17 

Leachman reported to law enforcement that he only used light force when he stabbed Stanley in 

the armpit and believed that he penetrated Stanley’s skin an inch to an inch and a quarter. 

However, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy testified that the wound to 

Stanley’s armpit was over four inches deep. 

After the stabbing, Leachman returned to apartment A with the bloody knife in hand. 

Stanley returned to apartment B and collapsed outside of the bathroom. Waboose called 911 at 

approximately 4:21 a.m. about 10 minutes after the stabbing.18 Alaniz and Gepford applied 

pressure to Stanley’s wound until Stanley stopped breathing, which was shortly before the 

ambulance arrived at 4:38 a.m.19 The knife that killed Stanley was identified as a decorative 

knife belonging to Sprague that was one of a pair of knives that fit together and were kept on a 

stand in Sprague’s bedroom. 

 

15 While there was testimony that Stanley had possessed an air soft gun in the past and an air soft 

gun was recovered from the scene, none of the witnesses corroborated Leachman’s statement to 

law enforcement that a gun was pointed at him on the day of the incident before Stanley was 

stabbed. 

16 A belt belonging to Alaniz was recovered by police from the floor of Hinojosa’s apartment 

with blood on it. Alaniz testified that he was wearing the belt the last that he recalled. 

17 Leachman reported to law enforcement that he intended to stab Stanley in the hip or thigh, but 

missed because Stanley “crouched over.” Testimony was elicited at trial that Stanley was in a 

fighting stance, but not that he was “crouched over.” 

18 Defense counsel did not object to the admission of the 911 tape at trial. 

19 An autopsy revealed that at the time of his death, Stanley had a blood alcohol content between 

.08 and .09. There was also THC and nicotine in his system. 
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Harner, Babosh, Alwood, Coan, Tucker, and Donley immediately left the building, and 

Donley drove them all to the Parties’s house. Leachman arrived at the Parties’s house shortly 

thereafter looking for Harner. Many of those at the Parties’s house had become aware of the 

stabbing, and Leachman was told that Harner did not want to speak with him. Tucker overheard 

Leachman say “Where are the witnesses at? I’m going to stab them.” Tucker responded by 

shouting to no particular person that Leachman was going to kill them. Leachman was escorted 

out of the house, at which time he told Jacob Partie that Stanley was hitting him with a belt, and 

he did not know what else to do. 

C. INVESTIGATION 

 After leaving the Parties’s house, Leachman returned to his apartment building. The 

police were present. Leachman was detained without incident in a patrol car for questioning, and 

was transported to the police department. Leachman did not identify himself as the person who 

stabbed Stanley, but rather was detained because he lived in the building. While being 

questioned regarding what happened that evening, Leachman recommended to Officers Nathan 

Koutz and Dale Hawks, two of the investigating officers, that they look for a gun in apartment B. 

Police recovered parts of a plastic air soft gun from inside and around the building where 

Leachman lived. The gun had been separated into four parts and did not have an orange tip, 

which would alert the public that it was not a real firearm. After the incident, law enforcement 

also recovered a pair of gloves in front of 510 Main Street, which is situated between 

Leachman’s apartment and the Parties’s house.20

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE21

 Leachman argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions. We disagree. “We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence.”22 “In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction, this 

Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and considers whether 

there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.”23 “In reviewing a sufficiency argument, this Court must not interfere with the jury’s role 

of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.”24

 

20 The investigation also revealed that Leachman had two cell phones on the day of the incident 

and both were found in his apartment. One of the phones, which was a Motorola, was unable to 

make telephone calls because it was not connected to a service provider. The other phone, a 

Samsung, was a pre-paid cell phone that was connected to a service provider and could make 

telephone calls. 

21 Leachman also seemingly makes an argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in his 

Standard 4 Brief, which we also considered. 

22 People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 142; 854 NW2d 114 (2014). 

23 People v Harris, 495 Mich 120, 126; 845 NW2d 477 (2014). 

24 People v Stiller, 242 Mich App 38, 42; 617 NW2d 697 (2000). 
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 Leachman was convicted of second-degree murder.25 “The elements of second-degree 

murder are: (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without 

justification or excuse.”26 “Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily 

harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and willful[l] disregard of the likelihood that the 

natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.”27 “[T]he mens rea for 

second-degree murder does not mandate a finding of specific intent to harm or kill. The intent to 

do an act in obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences is a malicious intent.”28

The evidence in the instant case shows that Stanley was killed by Leachman after being 

purposefully stabbed with a knife, which shows both “the intent to cause great bodily harm” and 

“the intent to do an act in wanton and willful[l] disregard of the likelihood that the natural 

tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.”29 Thus, the first three 

elements of second-degree murder are satisfied. Leachman, however, asserts that the killing 

occurred in self-defense. “[T]he prosecution bears the burden of disproving the common law 

defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”30 As a result, “once the defendant injects 

the issue of self-defense and satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence from which 

a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of selfdefense exist, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to exclude the possibility that the killing 

was done in self-defense . . . .”31

[T]he killing of another person is justifiable homicide if, under all the 

circumstances, the defendant honestly and reasonably believes that he is in 

imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that it is necessary for him to 

exercise deadly force. As part and parcel of the “necessity” requirement that 

inheres in every claim of lawful self-defense, evidence that a defendant could 

have safely avoided using deadly force is normally relevant in determining 

whether it was reasonably necessary for him to kill his assailant.[32] 

“[O]ne who is within his dwelling [is permitted] to exercise deadly force even if an avenue of 

safe retreat is available, as long as it is otherwise reasonably necessary to exercise deadly 

force.”33 “[T]he duty to retreat before using deadly force is [also] not required if an individual is 

 

25 MCL 750.317. 

26 People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 463-464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). 

27 Id. at 464. 

28 Id. at 466 (citations omitted). 

29 Id. at 464. 

30 People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 709; 788 NW2d 399 (2010). 

31 Id. at 709-710 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

32 People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 142; 649 NW2d 30 (2002) (emphasis omitted). 

33 Id. 
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. . . within the curtilage of that dwelling.”34 Curtilage in the instant case was defined as “a space 

necessary and convenient and habitually used for family purposes.” 

Here, based on the trial testimony, before the stabbing, there was a hole made in the wall 

outside Leachman’s apartment by an unknown individual; Stanley came to Leachman’s house 

and indicated that he wanted to fight him; and there were subsequent instances of banging on the 

wall outside of Leachman’s apartment. While there was also testimony elicited at trial that 

Leachman reported to law enforcement after the incident that Stanley threatened to beat 

Leachman to death with a belt and also pointed a gun at him before the stabbing occurred, that 

information was not corroborated by any of the lay witnesses who testified. Rather, the lay 

witnesses testified that before the stabbing and after seeing Stanley with a belt, Leachman 

returned to the safety of his apartment. Instead of choosing to call the police or exit the building 

using either the fire ladder in his apartment or the stairs, which were unobstructed, Leachman 

retrieved a knife, exited his apartment, and approached Stanley in the hallway between 

apartments A and B. This Court will not “interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight 

of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.”35 Therefore, there was sufficient evidence for 

the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Leachman did not honestly and reasonably 

believe that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm warranting his use of 

deadly force, and was instead guilty of second-degree murder.36

Leachman also argues that he had no duty to retreat. While a person has no duty to 

retreat from his home or the curtilage of such home,37 the record evidence supports that 

Leachman left his home and arguably the curtilage of that home in order to stab Stanley. 

Therefore, even considering that Leachman had no duty to retreat, sufficient evidence still exists 

to support his conviction of second-degree murder. 

 Leachman was also convicted of carrying a weapon with unlawful intent,38 which 

requires that the prosecution prove that Leachman was “(1) carrying a firearm or dangerous 

weapon, (2) with the intent to unlawfully use the weapon against another person.”39 It is 

undisputed that the knife used to kill Stanley was a dangerous weapon. Additionally, as 

explained above, the evidence also supports that Leachman carried the knife with the intent to 

commit second-degree murder. Accordingly, reversal of Leachman’s convictions is not 

warranted. 

 

34 People v Richardson, 490 Mich 115, 132; 803 NW2d 302 (2011), quoting MCL 768.21c 

(quotations and emphasis omitted). 

35 Stiller, 242 Mich App at 42. 

36 Goecke, 457 Mich at 463-464; Riddle, 467 Mich at 142. 

37 Riddle, 467 Mich at 142; Richardson, 490 Mich at 132. 

38 MCL 750.226. 

39 People v Mitchell, 301 Mich App 282, 292; 835 NW2d 615 (2013) (citation, quotations, and 

emphasis omitted). 
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III. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Leachman next contends that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. 

We disagree. This issue is preserved.40 As such, “[w]e review for an abuse of discretion a trial 

court’s grant or denial of a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the great weight 

of the evidence.”41

A trial court may grant a motion for a new trial based on the great weight 

of the evidence only if the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict 

that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand. Conflicting 

testimony and questions of witness credibility are generally insufficient grounds 

for granting a new trial. Absent exceptional circumstances, issues of witness 

credibility are for the trier of fact. The hurdle that a judge must clear in order to 

overrule a jury and grant a new trial “is unquestionably among the highest in our 

law.”[42]

 After reviewing the record evidence, we cannot say that the evidence in the instant case 

“preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the 

verdict to stand.”43 Therefore, Leachman’s convictions were not against the great weight of the 

evidence, and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Leachman’s motion 

for a new trial on this ground. 

IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 

 Leachman also claims that he was denied a fair trial because the jury was improperly 

instructed. We disagree. This Court reviews claims “of instructional error involving a question 

of law de novo, but we review the trial court’s determination that a jury instruction applies to the 

facts of the case for an abuse of discretion.”44 Here, Leachman “bears the burden of establishing 

that the asserted instructional error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”45

 Leachman argues that the jury was improperly instructed regarding the definition of 

curtilage. Specifically, Leachman claims that his definition of curtilage should have been used in 

the jury instructions because whether a certain area is curtilage is a question of law.46 People v 

 

40 People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 232; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). 

41 Id. 

42 Id. (citations omitted). 

43 Id. 

44 Dupree, 486 Mich at 702. 

45 Id. 

46 Leachman requested that the court instruct the jury that, “For purposes of this case, the 

hallway outside the defendant’s apartment is to be considered part of his home.” 
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Killebrew,

47 which is cited by Leachman, does not specifically discuss curtilage. Rather, the 

Killebrew Court notes that occupants of two apartments sharing a hallway, “entry to which was 

limited by right to the occupants,” have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that hallway.48 

Thus, seizure of evidence from the hallway “was not justified by the plain view doctrine.”49 

Even assuming arguendo that Killebrew was attempting to define curtilage, entry to the hallway 

in the instant case was not limited by right to the occupants of apartments A and B. Therefore, 

Killebrew is inapplicable to this case. As Leachman has failed to demonstrate that whether an 

area is curtilage is a question of law, we find that the trial court defining curtilage in a way that 

could encompass the hallway outside of Leachman’s apartment did not constitute instructional 

error. 

V. OPINION TESTIMONY 

 Leachman claims that the trial court prevented him from raising a defense when it ruled 

that if Leachman admitted evidence of the aggressive nature of Stanley, then the prosecution 

could admit evidence of the aggressive nature of Leachman. We disagree. “A trial court’s 

decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”50 “The trial court 

abuses its discretion when its outcome falls outside the range of principled outcomes.”51

The trial court relied on its interpretation of MRE 404 and MRE 405 in making the 

challenged ruling. MRE 404 states in pertinent part: 

(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of 

character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 

therewith on a particular occasion, except: 

(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 

accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; or if evidence of a trait of 

character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted 

under subdivision (a)(2), evidence of a trait of character for aggression of the 

accused offered by the prosecution; 

(2) Character of alleged victim of homicide. When self-defense is an issue in a 

charge of homicide, evidence of a trait of character for aggression of the alleged 

victim of the crime offered by an accused, or evidence offered by the prosecution 

to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged 

 

47 76 Mich App 215, 218; 256 NW2d 581 (1977). 

48 Id. 

49 Id. 

50 People v Werner, 254 Mich App 528, 538; 659 NW2d 688 (2002). 

51 People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230, 239; 851 NW2d 856 (2014). 
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victim offered by the prosecution in a charge of homicide to rebut evidence that 

the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 

MRE 405 further states in relevant part: 

(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of 

character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to 

reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, 

inquiry is allowable into reports of relevant specific instances of conduct. 

This Court’s reading of the applicable evidentiary rules52 supports the trial court’s finding that 

when self-defense is an issue in a homicide case, if evidence of a trait of aggressiveness of the 

alleged victim of the crime is offered by the defendant, then evidence of a trait of aggressiveness 

of the defendant can be offered by the prosecution. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion by the 

trial court. 

 Additionally, even if the trial court’s ruling was incorrect, “[t]he victim’s character is not 

an essential element of defendant’s self-defense claim.”53 Thus, Leachman’s argument that he 

was prevented from raising a defense must fail. 

VI. EXPERTS 

Leachman next claims that he was prevented from raising a defense when the trial court 

refused to allow funds for a psychological expert and a mechanical engineer. We disagree. 

“This Court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision whether to grant an indigent 

defendant’s motion for the appointment of an expert witness.”54

Payment for an expert witness is authorized, 

provided that an indigent defendant is able to show “that there is a material 

witness in his favor within the jurisdiction of the court, without whose testimony 

he cannot safely proceed to trial . . . .” If the defendant makes this showing, the 

judge, “in his discretion,” may grant funds for the retention of an expert witness. 

A trial court is not compelled to provide funds for the appointment of an expert on 

demand. 

 To obtain appointment of an expert, an indigent defendant must

demonstrate a nexus between the facts of the case and the need for an expert. It is 

not enough for the defendant to show a mere possibility of assistance from the 

requested expert. Without an indication that expert testimony would likely 

 

52 MRE 404 and 405. 

53 People v Orlewicz, 293 Mich App 96, 104; 809 NW2d 194 (2011). 

54 People v Carnicom, 272 Mich App 614, 616; 727 NW2d 399 (2006). 
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benefit the defense, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a 

defendant’s motion for appointment of an expert witness.[55]

Leachman requested funds for a psychological expert to provide an opinion regarding the 

stress that he was under on the day of the incident and what a reasonable person would do under 

the circumstances of this case. The trial court found that pursuant to People v Shadideh,

56 it was 

necessary for Leachman to first file a notice of insanity, regardless of whether an insanity 

defense was actually asserted, so that a forensic examination could be conducted. The court 

indicated that an examination by an independent psychological expert could then be requested. 

Leachman also requested funds for a mechanical engineer to testify regarding the amount of 

force necessary to break down the door of Leachman’s apartment, and whether Stanley and his 

friends could have done so. The court requested that the factual record be developed more in this 

regard at the preliminary examination and advised defense counsel that the issue could then be 

revisited. 

Here, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Leachman’s request 

for funds for either expert because Leachman failed to show “that there [was] a material witness 

in his favor within the jurisdiction of the court, without whose testimony he [could not] safely 

proceed to trial . . . .”57 Also, Leachman failed to make the requests for experts for a second time 

after forensic or preliminary examinations were completed, which we find constitutes a waiver of 

the issue on appeal.58 That notwithstanding, the record evidence demonstrates that Leachman 

was able to raise the issue of self-defense. As such, his argument that he was prevented from 

presenting a defense must fail. 

VII. MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR A NEW TRIAL 

 Because we have found that the above arguments do not warrant reversal, Leachman’s 

assertion that the same grounds support a finding that the trial court erred in denying his motions 

for a directed verdict and for a new trial lack merit. 

VIII. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

 Leachman claims that several instances of prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair 

trial. We are not persuaded by any of Leachman’s claims. “Unpreserved claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct . . . are reviewed for plain error.”59 “In order to avoid forfeiture of an unpreserved 

claim, the defendant must demonstrate plain error that was outcome determinative. ‘No error 

 

55 Id. at 617 (citations omitted). 

56 482 Mich 1156; 758 NW2d 536 (2008). 

57 Carnicom, 272 Mich App at 617. 

58 People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (“Waiver has been defined as the 

intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”). 

59 People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). 
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requiring reversal will be found if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s comments could have 

been cured by a timely instruction.’ ”60

 Leachman asserts that many comments by the prosecution were irrelevant and highly 

prejudicial. Leachman challenges the following actions of the prosecution: (1) a hypothetical 

question to a prospective juror during voir dire regarding how the juror would respond to law 

enforcement if the juror was accused of a crime; (2) the admission of the 911 call; (3) 

information from Sprague that Leachman was not permitted to go into her bedroom or know the 

decorative knife that killed Stanley was a knife unless he inappropriately inspected it; (4) some 

of the questions asked of Deputy Todd Graham regarding whether Leachman gave him certain 

information; (5) using a hypothetical about a mutual fight; and (6) asking Officer Koutz whether 

Leachman mentioned certain things during a brief statement made to the officer. We find that all 

of the above statements were relevant to the prosecution’s theory of the case or Leachman’s 

claim of self-defense and were not unduly prejudicial.61 Even assuming for the sake of argument 

that the above are irrelevant, Leachman has failed to demonstrate that the above comments made 

by the prosecution, either individually or cumulatively, affected the outcome of the proceedings. 

Additionally, Leachman failed to object to the admission of the 911 tape. “Failure to object at 

trial to the admission of evidence constitutes a waiver of the appellate challenge to the 

evidence.”62 Thus, there was no error by the prosecution. 

 Leachman also asserts that the prosecution argued facts not in evidence when it indicated 

that the air soft gun that was recovered from the scene weighed between three and five pounds, 

and thus could not have been held up by Stanley’s clothing. As aptly noted by the prosecution, 

the four parts of the air soft gun were admitted as evidence at trial and each of the jurors were 

permitted to examine such evidence. As a result, information regarding the weight of the gun 

was in evidence, and Leachman has not shown that the prosecution’s estimate regarding the 

weight of the gun was inaccurate. Leachman further claims that the prosecution argued facts not 

in evidence when it noted that not all photographs from the scene were introduced at trial and 

while defense counsel could have admitted them, he did not. Read in context, the prosecution’s 

argument made during rebuttal was seemingly in response to defense counsel implying during 

his closing argument that the prosecution withheld photographic evidence. Thus, the statement 

was proper.63

 Leachman further challenges several statements made by the prosecution during its 

opening statement and claims that the prosecution misstated the law. The jury was instructed 

that the opening statements of the attorneys were not evidence. Additionally, the jurors were 

 

60 People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001) (citation omitted). 

61 See MRE 402 and 403. 

62 People v McMaster, 154 Mich App 564, 567; 398 NW2d 469 (1986). 

63 See Watson, 245 Mich App at 593. 
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appropriately instructed on the law. As “[j]urors are presumed to follow their instructions, and 

instructions are presumed to cure most errors,”64 reversal is not warranted.65

IX. STANDARD 4 BRIEF 

 Leachman also raises issues of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of 

counsel in a brief filed pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2006-4, Standard 4 (“Standard 4 

Brief”). We find that none of these arguments have merit. 

A. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

 Most of Leachman’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct made in his Standard 4 Brief are 

unpreserved. Unpreserved issues of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for plain error 

affecting Leachman’s substantial rights.66 However, “[w]here issues of prosecutorial misconduct 

are preserved, we review them de novo to determine if the defendant was denied a fair and 

impartial trial.”67

 First, Leachman claims that the prosecution made numerous improper remarks during 

questioning, which argued facts not in evidence. Leachman challenges the following questions 

by the prosecution: (1) the question to Officer Brandon Talty regarding whether the officer knew 

if the air soft gun was recovered from the scene because “somebody who is fearful of retaliation 

from Native Americans” carried and dropped it; (2) the question to Officer Jonathan Straus 

regarding how easy it is to dismantle an air soft gun and whether it could be accomplished 

quickly; (3) the question to Officer Jeff Browne regarding how Leachman would expect the 

officer to have located the gun if Leachman did not know where the gun was; and (4) the 

prosecution asking one of the witnesses whether they saw a gun “Be it real, toy, imaginary or, 

well, you wouldn’t see an imaginary one, but fake?” Leachman further asserts that many 

statements made by the prosecution during his closing argument also argued facts not in 

evidence. “Although a prosecutor may not argue facts not in evidence or mischaracterize the 

evidence presented, the prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences from the evidence.”68 A 

review of the record evidence reveals, that the above challenged questions and statements did not 

argue facts not in evidence. Rather, they properly addressed the reasonable inferences arising 

from the evidence previously admitted at trial. 

 

64 People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). 

65 Leachman also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecution’s alleged improper statements. Since we found that none of the statements made by 

the prosecution constituted error, and trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a 

meritless objection, this argument must fail. Matuszak, 263 Mich App at 58. 

66 Id. at 48. 

67 People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 453; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). 

68 Watson, 245 Mich App at 588. 
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 Second, Leachman claims that the prosecution elicited irrelevant and prejudicial 

information. The prosecution’s question to various witnesses regarding whether Leachman 

warned Stanley that he had a knife, as well as eliciting testimony that Leachman referred to his 

gloves as his “assassin gloves” were relevant to the prosecution’s theory of the case and 

Leachman’s assertion of self-defense. Moreover, outside of the testimony being unfavorable to 

Leachman’s position at trial, Leachman has failed to demonstrate how such questions were more 

prejudicial than probative. “It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a 

position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis 

for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority 

either to sustain or reject his position.”69 Leachman also challenges as irrelevant the prosecution 

noting during its opening statement that Leachman advised Doolittle that he did not want to call 

the police because he was a criminal. The prosecution’s statement, however, was a proper 

representation of the evidence later presented at trial.70 Finally, regarding the photographic 

evidence of the graffiti on the walls of Leachman’s apartment, pictures of the layout of 

Leachman’s apartment were relevant to Leachman’s claim of self-defense. Accordingly, relief is 

not warranted. 

 Third, Leachman asserts that the prosecution improperly expressed an opinion regarding 

Babosh’s credibility. “[A] prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of his witnesses by 

implying that he has some special knowledge of their truthfulness.”71 Here, the prosecution did 

not imply that it had special knowledge of Babosh’s credibility. Rather, the prosecution asserted 

that based on the fact that Babosh was an uncooperative witness and his trial testimony 

conflicted in part with information that he provided to law enforcement, it is unclear whether his 

testimony was truthful. Therefore, there was no error. 

 Finally, Leachman argues that the prosecution’s rebuttal argument inappropriately went 

outside of the scope of the defense’s closing argument when it mentioned Doolittle.72 The 

prosecution admitted during its rebuttal that it did not originally mention Doolittle in its closing 

argument. The prosecution’s comments, however, did not exceed the scope of defense counsel’s 

closing argument as the prosecution was responding to defense counsel’s assertion that 

Leachman was acting in self-defense by highlighting that it was suggested to Leachman before 

the stabbing that he had the option of calling the police. Based on the above, there was no 

prosecutorial misconduct.73

 

69 People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 679; 780 NW2d 321 (2009) (citation and quotations 

omitted). 

70 See People v Moss, 70 Mich App 18, 32; 245 NW2d 389 (1976). 

71 Thomas, 260 Mich App at 455. 

72 This issue is preserved. 

73 Leachman again claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecution’s alleged improper statements. Since we found that none of the statements made by 
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B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

 Leachman made some of the arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in his 

motion for a new trial. Thus, we will treat this issue as preserved. “However, because the trial 

court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review is limited to the facts on the record.”74 To 

establish a claim of ineffective assistance, Leachman must show: 

(1) that counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective 

standard of professional reasonableness and (2) that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for 

counsel’s performance. There is a presumption of effective assistance of counsel, 

and the burden is on defendant to prove otherwise. An appellate court should 

neither substitute [its] judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor 

 . . . use the benefit of hindsight when assessing counsel’s competence.[75]

 Leachman argues that trial counsel ineffectively cross-examined Alaniz when he failed to 

show him and question him regarding pictures of the air soft gun found at the scene. Leachman 

claims that if Alaniz had seen the pictures of the gun and testified that it was similar to Stanley’s, 

then it would have corroborated Leachman’s statement that Stanley had a gun on the day of the 

incident. The presence of the air soft gun in general, however, corroborated Leachman’s 

statement. Additionally, Leachman has not demonstrated how Alaniz possibly identifying the 

gun as one similar to Stanley’s, while also testifying that he did not see Stanley with a gun the 

day of the incident, would have resulted in his acquittal. 

 Leachman also claims that trial counsel should have recalled Lieutenant Scott Hrcka to 

testify after Detective Don Sytsema to show that Detective Sytsema was not as knowledgeable 

about fingerprinting as he claimed to be. Leachman further asserts that trial counsel should have 

asked additional questions of Lieutenant Hrcka, Detective Sytsema, Officer Hawks, Officer 

Talty, and Hinojosa on cross-examination. The order of witnesses and what questions to ask 

them are matters of trial strategy, and we will not “use the benefit of hindsight when assessing 

counsel’s competence.”76

 Leachman next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain 

“damaging” evidence. Leachman, however, fails to state on what grounds such evidence should 

have been objected to. “It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a 

position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis 

the prosecution warrant reversal, and trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless 

objection, this argument must fail. Matuszak, 263 Mich App at 58. 

74 People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000). 

75 People v Roscoe, 303 Mich App 633, 643-644; 846 NW2d 402 (2014) (citations and

quotations omitted). 

76 Id. at 644. 
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for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority 

either to sustain or reject his position.”77

 Leachman also argues that an intact air soft gun of the same model as the one recovered 

from the scene should have been entered into evidence by trial counsel. Leachman again has not 

shown how admission of such evidence would have resulted in his acquittal. 

 Finally, Leachman states that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel admitted that 

he was ineffective. Trial counsel indicated at the hearing on Leachman’s motion for a new trial 

and sentencing on July 19, 2013, that he was ineffective for not revisiting his request for a 

mechanical engineer after the preliminary examination. Based on the record evidence, at the 

time Stanley was stabbed, Leachman had left the safety of his apartment and approached Stanley 

in the hallway. Thus, Leachman is unable to “demonstrate a nexus between the facts of the case 

and the need for an expert” to testify regarding whether Leachman’s apartment door could have 

been broken down by Stanley and his friends.78 At the hearing on Leachman’s motion for a new 

trial, the court implied that based on the above evidence elicited at trial, a second request for 

funding for a mechanical engineer would have been denied. As counsel is not ineffective for 

failing to advance a meritless position, relief is not warranted.79

 Trial counsel also indicated at the hearing on Leachman’s motion for a new trial that he 

was ineffective for failing to retain a psychological expert. Leachman claims that a 

psychological expert could have testified regarding how a reasonable person would have 

responded under the circumstances of this case. “In general, the failure to call a witness can 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only when it ‘deprives the defendant of a substantial 

defense.’ ”80 Here, Leachman pursued a self-defense theory. Additionally, Leachman has failed 

to show that a psychological expert being called would have resulted in his acquittal. 

Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

 

77 Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 679 (citation and quotations omitted). 

78 Carnicom, 272 Mich App at 617. 

79 People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). 

80 People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009) (citation omitted).