### (&aurt ofAppeals 3Ttf tif Btstrtrt at (E*xas at Ballas JUDGMENT 

### JOSE IZAGUIRRE, a/k/a DANNY Appeal from the Criminal District Court 

### CORTEZ, Appellant No. 2 ofDallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. F91-66455-KHI). No. 05-92-02034-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Morris, Justices Chapman and Hankinson THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating. Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered February 26, 1997.



### , y^^/f^^v^Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 26, 1997

In The 

## Qfourt ofAppeals mtttfItstrtrt 0fOkxas at Ballas
No. 05-92-02034-CR JOSE IZAGUIRRE, a/k/a DANNY CORTEZ, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F91-66455-KHI
OPINION Before Justices Chapman, Morris, and Hankinson Opinion by Justice Morris Jose Izaguirre, a/k/a Danny Cortez, appeals his conviction forburglary of a vehicle. 

### In one point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when cumulating his sentence. Concluding that the trial court's cumulation order was sufficient, we overrule 

### appellant's point of error and affirm the trial court'sjudgment. On June 19, 1992, in the Criminal District Court No. 2 of Dallas County, Texas, 

### before the Honorable LarryBaraka, Judge, appellant entered an open plea ofguilty. Judge

### Barakaassessedpunishmentatconfinementinthe statepenitentiaryfortenyears and afine of$1,000. Judge Baraka also stated that appellant's sentence would not start until he "completed and discharged" his sentence in "F-90-45742-I." 

### Inone point oferror, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not ordering his sentence to start on the date sentence was pronounced. Appellantattacks the trial judge's oralpronouncement of sentence, not the trial court'swrittenjudgment.1 Appellant argues that the trial court's use of the words "completed and discharged" in its oral pronouncement did not conform with the terminology of article 42.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which uses the words "ceased to operate." See Act of May 29, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 785, § 4.11, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3471, 3495, amended byAct of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 5.03, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3745 (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08 (Vernon Supp. 1997)). Appellant also maintains that the trial court's reference to only a cause number was insufficient. See Young v. State, 579 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Appellant concludes that the trial court's cumulation order is invalid. An order of cumulation should contain the correct name of the court in which the defendant was earlier convicted. Id. at 10. It should also contain the trial court cause

The trial court's judgment provides: Said[judgment], sentence, and term ofpunishment in thiscause shallcommence and run when thesentence in Cause No.F90-45742-I, a previous conviction of the defendantfor the offenseofROBBERY, in the CDC # 2 DistrictCourt of DallasCounty,Texas,has[been]servedand hasceased to operate. Thesentence in said priorcause was imposed on6-19, 1992, and was foraterm ofconfinement in theInst. Div. ofTex. Dept. of Crim. Just, for 20 YRS TDC.number, the date, the term of years, and the nature of the earlier conviction. Id. Courts have upheld cumulation orders containing less than all the recommended elements. Id. A 

### cumulation order must be sufficiently specific so that both the defendant and the prison authorities know with which earlier conviction the instant sentence is cumulated. See 

### Williams v. State, 675 S.W.2d 754, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh'g). Appellate courts may takejudicial notice of their own records in the same or related proceedings involving the same or nearly the same parties. Turner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). We take judicial notice oilzaguirre v.State, No. 05-92-01836- CR (Tex. App.--Dallas, Febr. 26, 1997, n.p.h.) (not designated for publication), which at trial was before the Criminal District Court No. 2 of Dallas County, Texas. The trial court
cause number was F90-45742-WQI. In that case, on June 19, 1992, before Judge Baraka, 

### appellant pled true to the allegations in the State'smotion to proceed to an adjudication of guilt, and Judge Baraka found appellant guilty of robbery and assessed punishment at confinement in the state penitentiary for twenty years and a fine of$500. If the trial court intends to cumulate a sentence, it must do so when it orally 

### pronounces sentence. Exparte Vasquez, 712 S.W.2d 754, 754-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Precise compliance with the terminology ofarticle 42.08 is not required. See Williams, 675 S.W.2d at 762 ("stacked" is synonymous with "cumulative" or "consecutive"); Fair v. State, 710 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no pet.) (when earlier sentence 

### "completed"). At the June 19, 1992 hearing, appellant asked the judge to have his 

### punishments forthis offense andthe robberyrunconcurrently. Although thetrialjudge did

### not use the precise terminology ofarticle 42.08, he nevertheless informed appellant that he was rejecting thatrequest and was cumulating his sentence. Thejudge's comment did not mislead appellant. See Fair, 710 S.W.2d at 190. Reference to only a cause number is sufficient if the earlier conviction was from the 

### same court. Williams, 675 S.W.2d at 764; Exparte Davis, 506 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Ex parte Lewis, 414 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). The earlier sentence in this case was from the same court, the same judge, and the same date. We conclude the judge's reference to the cause number was sufficient. Id. We overrule appellant's point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 90 922034F.U05

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