Although pr o se, He nderson a sserts that he is, and ha s been, a member of

the Texas bar 1 since 1978. See “Plaintiff’s Reply to [ Ratner’ s] M otion to Dism iss – Second Response” ( “Surreply”) at 2. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

___________________________________ ) DAVID HENDERSON, ) ) P la in t if f, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 09-141 (EG S) ) JACQUELINE RATNER et al., ) ) De fend ant s. )

___________________________________ )
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Be fore the Court is defenda nt J acque line Ratner’ s motion t o dismiss and pro se plaintiff 1 David He nderson’ s “Response to the Or der of Dismissal” (“Reponse ”). The Response will be construed a s a motion to reconsider and/or to ame nd the complaint, and will be de nied as futile. Ratner’ s motion t o dismiss will be g rante d, and the c ase w ill be dismi ssed in its entirety
. BACK GR OUND Pla int if f D avid E. He nd e rs on , n owa

c iti zen of Te xas, wa s e mpl oye d w iththe State Depa rtment’s F oreign Service from 1969 to 1981, when he was involuntarily separ ated f

rom the Service
. SeeFe dera l Defe ndant’s Motion to Dismis s (“Ratne r’s Mot. to Dismiss”), Dec laration of Patricia N elson-Douve lis ¶ 5. In 1994, Hende rson applied to the State De partment for retroa ctive disability

retire ment benef

its. Id. ¶ 5 & Ta

b 2 . T he State De pa

rtme nt r e fu se d to consider H ender son’s application because it was untimely filed, and so infor

med Hende rson by letter in 1996. Id. ¶ 5 & Tab 3. He nderson did not file a g rieva nce in c onnection with his 1994Th e F SGB is “ an in de pe nd e nt a dju dic ator y bo dy wh os e fu nc tio n is to a dju dic ate 2 g rieva nces f iled by members of

the fore ign se rvice .” United States v. Paddac k, 825 F.2d 504, 508 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987). It is comprised of “f ive per sons, not employ ed by a for eig n aff

airs ag ency or the for eig n service ,” whose “func tion is t o adjudicate g rieva nces f iled by members of the fore ign se rvice ,” including , amongother thing s, “disputes involving sepa ration fr om employ ment, and denia l of a fina ncial bene fit to which the member claims entitlement . . . . Any party ag grieve d by

a B oard de cision may

obtain judicial revie w of that de cision in the United States District Court . . . .” Id. (alter ations, citations and interna l quotation marks in the orig inal omitted). Th e Exe c uti ve Se c re tary of the F SGB , tr a dit ion a lly

a me mbe r o f t

he F or e ign Se rv ic e , is 3 selec ted by

and answ ers to the F SGB Chairma n. The Executive Secr etar y direc ts a staff of

five persons a nd manag es an a

nnual budg et of $1.5 million. Ratner Mot. to Dismi ss, Ex . A.

- 2 - application or a s a re sult of the 1996 denial. See Ratner’ s Mot. to Dism iss, Declar ation of Joanne L ishman ¶ 4. In J une 2006, He nderson wr ote to the For eig n Service Grieva nce B oard ( “F SGB” ), 2 enclosinga copy

of his 1994 application, stating , incorre ctly , that the State Depa rtment “ne ver responde d” to him, and that “a fter 12 year s and four submissi ons Ican c onsider the a pplication denied.” Ratner’ s Mot. to Dism iss, Ex . B. ConstruingHende rson’s communication as an
a pp e a l, t he F SGB , thro ugh it s E xec uti ve Se c re tary , Jac qu e lin e Ratne r, se nt H e nd e rs on a le tte r i n 3 J u l y 2 0 0 6 , s t at i n g th at“[ u ] p o nre v i ew i n g th e d o cu m en t at i o nat t ac h edt o yo ur ap p ea l , th e F o re i gn Service Grieva

nce B oard ha s found that it does not have jurisdiction at this point in the gr ievanc e proce ss, as it appea

rs that you have not e x hausted a ll administ rative r emedies a vailable to you.” Ratner’ s Mot. to Dism iss, Ex . C. That letter a lso ex plained that “jur isdiction transfer s” to the FSGB only

upon appea l from either

an ag ency ’s final de cision or when the ag ency has not issued a fina l decision within 90 day s after a grieva nce is filed, that an appe al to the FSGB from a f inal ag ency decision must be filed within 60 day s of the dec ision, and that an appe al from anondecision must be filed within 150 day s after the administrative grieva nce w as orig inally

filed. Id.Ac c or din gto i ts i nte rn e t si te , th e Am e ri c an F or e ign Se rv ic e As so c iatio n is a du e s- 4 supported prof

essional association of 14,000 members re prese nting “ 28,000 active a nd retire d For eig n Service employ ees of the Depa rtment of State and A g ency for International Deve lopment (AI D), a s well as smaller groups in the For eig n Ag ricultural Ser vice ( FAS), U .S. & For eig n Commercial Servic e (F CS), and International Broa dcastingBur eau ( I BB ).” www. a fs a .o rg/whatis .c fm
. “AF SA is the ex clusive bar g ainingag ent for the For eig n Service e mpl oye e s o f t

he De pa rtme nt o f S tate , A I D, F AS, CS, a nd I B B
. . . . AF SA a lso re pr e se nts me mbe rs in f

or ma l g ri e va

nc e pr oc e e din g s, of

fi c e of se c ur ity a nd ins pe c tor g e ne ra l inve sti g atio ns , and EEO c ases, while pr oviding them infor mal assistance in dealingwith administrative problems.” Id. The Court does not know the e x act nature of H ender son’s reque st to AFSA, as it is not 5 inc lud e d in

the re c or d. As c ha

ra c te ri zed by Na land ’s re tur

n le tte r, He nd e rs on

wa s tr yingto “asc erta in whether

it would be possible to procee d with a claim for disability retire ment dating back to [his] separ ation from the se rvice in 1981.” Nala nd’s Mot. to Dismis s, Ex . B. - 3 - Hende rson ag ain wrote , pressingthe FSGB to “re g ister” his appe al. Id., Ex. D . B e c a us e Hende rson still had not established that he had e x hausted his ava ilable administrative re medies, a pre- requisite to the B oard’ s jurisdiction, the Boar d ref used to enter

tain his case. Id., Ex . E. In J une 2007, He nderson a ppare ntly asked the Americ an F oreign Service Association (“A FSA”) to repre sent him in pursuing a claim ag ainst the State Depa rtment for r etroa ctive 4 dis a bil ity be ne fi ts. In O c tob e r 2 00 7, the n- Pr e sid e nt o f A F SA, JohnNa land , s e nt a le tte r t o 5 Hende rson informinghim that after A FSA staff had re viewed the documentation He nderson ha d submitt ed, “w e find that the pr ovisions of the Fore ign Ser vice Ac t prec lude such a

claim.” Naland’ s Mot. to Dism iss, Ex . B. In Jan ua ry 20 09 , H e nd e rs on

fi le d th is l aws uit

a g a ins t Ratne r a

nd Na land , e a c h in

bo th the ir “ pe rs on a l and

pr of e ssi on a l c a

pa c iti e s, ” Com

pl. at 3, se e kin g$1 2 mi lli on in d ama g e s, trebled to $36 million under a theor y of a RI CO conspirac y , id. at 3- 4. Othe r t ha n h is b a ld ref ere nce to a

RI CO conspirac y , id. at 4, the on ly re c ogniza

ble c a us e of a c tio n H e nd e rs on

a sse rt s in t he c omp la int

is a n a lle g e d b re a c h o f “ c ontr a c tua l ob lig atio n” by Na land to r e pr e se nt h imThe ha ndwritingis not legible, but the Court c oncludes that “ parc els” may be the wor d 6 intended. L ocal Civil Rule 5.1(f) re quires that all pape rs submitted for filingbe “ty ped . . . or by 7 any . . . proce ss that produce s a cle ar bla ck imag e on opaque white pape r . . . . L CvR 5.1(f). - 4 - befor e the F SGB. See id. at 3. As to R atne r, the c omp la int me re ly state s th at sh e “ re fu se d to acknow ledg e any

of plaintiff’s le tters and [parc els ],” an alleg ation direc tly contra dicted by

the 6
rec ord evide nce, see Ratner’ s Mot. to Dism iss, Ex s. C & E, a nd that an unidentified staf f per son in Ratner’s of

fice said she “ha d not rea d any of [Hender son’s] grie vance decisions on re lated issues.” Id. at 2. Def endant Na land filed a

motion to di smiss for failure to state a c laim upon which re lief may be grante d, contendingthat Naland did not have any duty in any capa city to provide Hende rson with repr esentation in his belated c laim ag ainst the State Depa rtment. See Naland’ s Mo t. t o D ism iss at 2; see also id. Exs. A & B . T he Court iss ue d a n o rd e r d ir e c tin gHe nd e rs on to respond by

Marc h 31, 2009, or risk the motion beingg rante d as conc eded. SeeOrde r, F eb. 27, 2009. Although H ender son made a submissi on that was re ceive d on Marc h 10, 2009 (“ Op po sit ion ” ), the Court de nie d le ave to f

ile be c a us e it w a s il le g ibl e . Na land ’s mot ion to 7 dismiss was grante d as conc eded by Orde r issued April 9, 2009. He nderson then submitted a Response, re ceive d on April 16, 2009. Hende rson’s handwritten Response wa s almost as illegible a s was his Opposition; parts were so difficult to deciphe r that, despite numer ous attempts to understand the me ssag e, they rema ined unintelligible until very rec ently , and other parts ar e still il leg ible. As now under stood, the Response states that on “Ma rch 10” the Clerk of Court asked the Court to re fuse to allow the O pposition t o be the f iled beca use it was illeg ible,
e xpla ins that H e nd e rs on

ha d b e e n h os pit a lize d a

nd wa s d izzy , a

nd a sk s “ the c ourt

to a llo w thisWithhis Op po sit ion , H e nd e rs on fi le d “ Pla int if

f’ s O bje c tio n to De fe ns e Couns e l,” in 8 wh ic h h e re po rt s th at in

July 20 06 , h e c on su lte d w ithB e th S lov itz o f Jor da n Co y ne a bo ut h is retroa ctive re tirement cla im, and that “she sa id she could not help with plaintiff as she takes case s with the State Depa rtment For eig n Service Grieva nce B oard a

nd Ex ecutive Sec reta

ry J acque line Ratner, a

defe ndant. Since Slovitz ’s law f irm is defendingJ ohn Naland, . . . it appe ars there is an unethica l conflict of inter est.” Plaintiff’s Obje ction to Defe nse Counsel at 2-3. The Objection appe ars to be a n incomplete docume nt; it i s not presente d as a motion and it makes no reque st for a r emedy . Acc ording ly , the Court takes no a ction, as the fa cts provided by the pla int if f t e nd to s ho w that Slo vit z ac te d a pp ro pr iate ly

to a vo id a c on fl ic t of

int e re st b y

re fu sin gto repr esent the pla intiff. - 5 - case to proce ed on for

plaintiff to have a

preliminary

in person hea

ring ,” and to a llow the plaintiff to “file a n expanded complaint.” Response at 1-2. The Response did not include any rebuttal of the merits of Na land’s ar gument that he owe d Hende rson no duty , and that he ha d brea ched no duty . After

numerous re peate d attempts over se vera l months, t he Court has be en able to decipher enough of He nderson’ s Marc h 10, 2009 Opposition to glea n its import, and will permit the Opposition to be filed on the re cord a nd considere d alongwith the Response. 8 Def endant Ratne r has f

iled a motion to dism iss, as to which Hende rson has filed both a n op po sit ion

and a sur- re ply , th e latte r o f whic h w a s ty pe d. Ne ith e r o f H e nd e rs on ’s su bmi ssi on s in response to Ratner’s motion to dismi ss mention Ratner by name or position, or provide additional information about the unspe cified c laims Hender son means to make a g ainst her. DI SCU SSIO N On a motion to dismi ss, a pro se c omplaint is t o be libera lly construed in f

avor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerne r, 40 4 U .S. 51 9, 52 0 ( 19 72 ). In d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a c omp la int

fa ils to state a c laim upon which re lief may be grante d, a cour

t ge nera lly

“must acc ept as true all of the fac tual alleg ations contained in the c omplaint,” Erickson v . Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and “grant plaintiffs the be nefit of a ll inferenc es that ca n be der ived from the f

acts a lleg ed,” but ne ed- 6 -

no t a c c e pt e ith e r a

pla int if f’ s le g a l c on c lus ion s, or

inf e re nc e s d ra wn by the pla int if

f i f t ho se infere nces a

re unsuppor

ted by fac ts alleg ed in the complaint, Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F .3 d 1 27 1, 12 76 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 4) . “ To surv ive a mot ion to d ism iss , a

c omp la int

mus t
c onta in s uf

fi c ie nt f a c tua l matte r, a c c e pte d a s tr ue , to state a

c la im t o r e lie f t

hat is pla us ibl e on its fac e. . . . A c laim has fac ial plausibilit y when the pla intiff pleads fa ctual conte nt that allows the court to dra

w the re asonable infere nce that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduct alleg ed.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct . 1937, 1949 (2009) ( internal quotation marks a nd citations omitt ed). As the plaintiff ha s been pr eviously advised, see Orde r, F eb. 27, 2009; Orde r, May 7, 20 09 , whe n a

c ourt c on sid e rs matte rs outsi de the ple a din g s th at ha ve pr e se nte d w itha

mot ion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) , “the motion must be treate d as one f or summary

judgme nt under Rule 56.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). On a motion for summary judgme nt, “[t] he inquiry

perf ormed is the threshold inquiry

of dete rmining whether

there is a nee d for a

trial –– whethe r, in other words, ther e ar e any

g enuine f

actua l issues that properly can be resolved only

by a finde r of f

act beca use they may rea sonably

be re solved in favor

of either party .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Summary judgme nt “should be re ndere d if the plea dings, the discovery and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue
a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and the mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (c ); see Burk

e v. G ould, 28 6 F .3 d 5 13 , 5 17 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 2) . Amate ri a l f a c t is on e that is capa ble of a ffe ctingthe outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. A g enuine issue is one where the “e vidence is such that a re asonable jury could re turn a ve rdict for the nonmovingparty ,” id. , a s o pp os e d to e vid e nc e that “ is s o o ne -s ide d th at on e pa rt y mus t preva il as a matter of

law.” Id. at 252. A cour t consideringa motion for summary judgme nt- 7 -

must draw all “justifiable inf ere nces” from the e vidence in favor of the nonmovant. Id. at 255. Th e no nmo vin gpa

rt y , h ow e ve r, mus t do mor e tha n s imp ly “ sh owthat th e re is s ome metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 47 5 U .S. 57 4, 58 6 ( 19 86 ). Rathe r, the no nmo va nt m us t “ c ome fo rw ard

wi th ‘ sp e c if

ic fa c ts showingthat there is a g enuine issue f or trial.’” Id. at 587 (c iting F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (empha sis in original). I

n the end, “ the plain languag e of Rule 56( c) ma ndates the e ntry

of summary judgme nt . . . ag ainst a par ty who fa ils to m ake a

showingsufficie nt to establish the exis tence of an e lement essential to that par ty ' s case , and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Na land ’s Mo tio n to Di smi ss a nd Pla int if f’ s O pp os iti on

and Re sp on se Th e su bs tanc e of

He nd e rs on ’s Marc h 1 0, 20 09 Op po sit ion to N a land ’s mot ion

to d ism iss
c on sis ts o f t

he fo llo wi ngthr e e po int s. On e , th at te le ph on e re c or ds wi ll s ho w that he fi rs t contac ted AF SA in J une 2007 by telephone, not in the f

all of that year

as the a ffidavit of James H.S. Yorke, f

iled with Naland’ s motion t o dismiss , incorre ctly states. Opp’n at 2-3. Two, that Yorke told Naland that He nderson ha d bothere d him too much with his fre quent re quests for help. Id. at 4. Thre e , th at du ri nga te le ph on e c onve rs atio n w ithNa land in S e pte mbe r 2 00 7, in wh ic h H e nd e rs on

de ta ile d h is atte mpt s to ob ta in r e tr oa c tiv e re tir e me nt d isa bil ity fr om t he State Depa rtment, Nala

nd “esse ntially

told plaintiff he was a

liar and . . . [that he] had more pr essing AFSA business to attend to such a s g etting . . . be nefits for A FSA member s.” Id. at 5. Had the Court had the bene fit of this information befor e issuing its April 9, 2009 Or der dismissing the claims ag ainst Naland, the result would have been the same. Ac ceptingthese c ontentions as true, Hende rson has not stated a claim ag ainst Naland. H e has not a lleg ed fa cts that show that Nala nd- 8 -

owed a ny duty to Hender son, that Naland’ s conduct c onstitut ed a br eac h of any duty , or that Naland’ s conduct wa s a proximate cause of any injury to Hender son, let alone e ng ag ed in a RI CO conspirac y . Thus, even c onsideringHende rson’s Opposition, the complaint fails to state a claim ag ainst Naland upon which re lief may be grante d, and wa

rra nts beingdismiss ed. Hende rson’s Response, liber ally construed, w ill be analy

zed both as a motion made Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 59(e ) see king to a lter the judg ment, and as a motion made under F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 15 (a )( 2) se e kin gle ave to a me nd the c omp la int . Amot ion to
rec onsider under

Rule 59(e) “nee d not be g rante d unless the district court finds that ther e is an int e rv e nin gc ha

ng e of c ontr oll inglaw, the ava ila bil ity of ne w e vid e nc e , o r t

he ne e d to c or

re c t a clea r leg al er ror or preve nt manifest injustice.” Cirals ky v . Central Intelligence Age ncy, 355 F.3d 6 6 1 , 6 7 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Firestone v. Fire stone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 ( D.C. Cir. 1996)). Fur thermore , a “Rule 59( e) motion to rec onsider is not simply an opportunity

to rea rgue fa cts and theories upon whic h a cour t has alre ady

ruled,” New Y

ork v. U nited States, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995), or

a vehic le for pr esentingtheories or arguments that could have been a dvance d
ear lier. Kattan v. Distri ct of Columbia, 99 5 F .2 d 2 74 , 2 76 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 3) ; W .C. &A.N. Miller Cos. v. United States, 173 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D .D.C. 1997). A Rule 15(a )(2) motion for leave to file an amende d complaint should be fre ely g rante d except when ther e is sufficie nt rea son to deny the amendment, suc h as whe n the amendme nt would be futile. National Community Reinve

stment Coalit ion v. NovaStar Financial, 6 0 4 F. S u p p . 2 d 2 6 , 2 9 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Firestone , 76 F.3d at 1208). Hende rson’s Response of fer s no basis on which to premise a rec onsideration of the Orde r dismiss ing the suit ag ainst Naland. The Response off ers no substantive r ebuttal to the merits of- 9 -

Naland’ s motion t o dismiss , and — in the fa ce of the fa cts prese nted — the Court ca nnot
conce ive of a

ny such re buttal. The Response a lso does not reve al what would be in an “expanded” complaint if it were allowed, a nd thus does not identify

any basis on which to allow
an ame ndment to the complaint. Ag ain, the Court ca nnot conce ive of a

ny amendment to the complaint that would not be futile. The r ecor d befor e the Court does not e stablish or even sug g est that Nala

nd, in any capa city , had any

contra ctual or othe r duty to Hender son, or that Naland a cted in any

way that proxi mately

cause d any

injury to Hender son. Be cause Hende rson has not provided a

rea son upon which to base e ither a r econside ration or amendment, and the Court is aware of no re ason, the re quests in Hender son’s Response will be denie d as futile, and the Orde r issued April 9, 2009 dismissing all cla ims ag ainst Naland in a ny capa city will stand. Ratne r’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss The c omplaint purports to sue Ratner in her “prof essional” c apac ity . Compl. at 3. As an
e mpl oye e of

the Sta te Depa rtme nt s e rv inga s E xec uti ve Se c re tary to t he F SGB , a

su it a g a ins t Ratner in her

officia l capa city

is a suit ag ainst the United States. Kentucky v. Graham, 47 3 U .S. 159, 165-66 (1985) . The United States, a s sovere ign, is immune fr om suit ex cept whe re it has consente d to suit. FDIC v. M eye r, 5 1 0 U
. S
. 4 7 1 , 4 8 6 ( 1 9 9 4 )
. H e n d e r s o nd o e s n o ti d e n t i f y a rig ht of ac tion for any

claim ag ainst Ratner in her officia l capa city . Even if the c omplaint were construed, ve ry

liberally , to assert a

neg lige nce c laim ag ainst Ratner in her role a s Ex ecutive Secre tary , the claim fa ils. A neg lige nce c laim may be brought ag ainst an off icial of the United States only

under the Fe dera l Tort Claims Act (“F TCA”), 28 U .S.C. §§ 2671 et seq., which require s that any

such cla im first be exhausted in administrative proce eding s befor e this Court may exercise jurisdiction over the claim. See 28 U. S.C. § 2 67 5( a ) (pr ov idi ngthat f ili nga c la im- 10 -

with the ag ency

is a prer equisite to jurisdiction). Here , there is no evidence that the claim wa s
e xha us te d. F ur

the rm or e , it

c ann ot n owbe e xha

us te d a s it is t ime -b arr e d. Ratne r r e sp on de d to Hende rson on beha lf of the F SGB in 2006, see Ratne r’ s Mo t. t o D ism iss , E x. C, a nd any F TCA claim must be prese nted to an ag ency within two y ear s after

the date the claim ac crue d, see 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (spec ifying that a claim must be pre sented to the a g ency within two y ear s of the date it ac crue d). Ther efor e, the c laims ag ainst Ratner in her officia l capa city

must be dismis sed for lac k of subject matter

jurisdiction. The c omplaint also asserts unspec ified cla ims ag ainst Ratner in her persona l capa city
. Compl. at 3. Ratner, howeve r, has not bee n serve d in her pe rsonal ca pacity and, abse nt effe ctive service , this Court has no personal jurisdiction over he r. Ther efor e, the c omplaint ag ainst Ratner in her pe rsonal ca

pacity may be dismissed for wa

nt of persona l jurisdiction. Even if this defec t
wer e to be c ured, how ever , the claims ag ainst Ratner in her persona l capa city

must sti ll be dismiss ed. F irst, the complaint does not contain a ny fac tual alleg ation to support a claim that Ratner pa rticipated in a

RI CO conspirac y . Second, it is beyond dispute that whateve r conduc t Hende rson asser

ts as the basis for his unspec ified cla im ag ainst Ratner, it was c onduct in the pe rf or manc e of he r d uti e s a s st a ff

to t he F SGB . T he F SGB is a n a dju dic ator

y bo dy wh os e members e njoy

absolute immunity

from dama g es suits in their personal c apac ity for the B oard’ s adjudications. See B utz v. Economou, 43 8 U .S. 47 8, 51 1- 13 (1 97 8) (a pp lyinga bs olute immun ity to the members of

adjudicator

y bodies in fede ral a g encie s for de cisions made in the per formanc e of their a djudicatory

roles). A s Ex ecutive Sec reta ry , Ratner’ s relation to the F SGB is akin to that of a c le rk of c ourt ’s re latio n to a

c ourt . T hu s, lik e a

c ourt ’s a uxili ary sta ff , a bs olute immun ity from per sonal liability

extends to t he Executive Secr etar y of the F SGB for

actions take n in the- 11 -

perf ormanc e of he r duties. See Sindram v . Suda , 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 ( D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[I ]m munity

applies to all ac ts of auxil iary court pe rsonnel that ar e basic and integral pa rts of the jud ic ia l f

un c tio n . . . .” ) ( a lte ratio ns and int e rn a l qu ota

tio n ma rk s o mitte d) . T hu s, the RI CO conspirac y

claim and a

ny other intende d but unspecified c laims ag ainst Ratner in her persona l capa city must also be dismiss ed for lack of subject matter jur isdiction, if not lack of per sonal jurisdiction. In any case , the evidenc e in the re cord shows no misconduc t on the part of Ratner, a nd direc tly contra dicts the sole alleg ation in the complaint that she did not respond to He nderson’ s communication. See Ratner’ s Mot. to Dism iss, Ex s. C & E. The ref ore, e ven if the c laims were
no t di smi sse d f

or la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n, Ratne r w ou ld b e e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt o n th is
rec ord. See Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6), 12(d) , 56. CO NC LU SION Withthi s d e c isi on , n o c la im s ur viv e s a g a ins t any

de fe nd ant. Ac c or din g ly , th e a c tio n w ill be dismissed in its entirety . A sepa rate order acc ompanies this memorandum opinion.

/ s / EMMET G. SUL L IVAN Da t ed : De ce mb er

2 9 , 2 0 0 9 Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge