2024 IL App (1st) 200456-U 

No. 1-20-0456

Order filed June 5, 2024 

 THIRD DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in 

the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) 

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

DWRIGHT DOTY, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County. 

No. 16 CR 08715 (02)

Honorable 

Thaddeus L. Wilson

Judge, Presiding

JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment. 

 ORDER 

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for 

 continuance, in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial, or in determining 

 defendant’s sentence.

¶ 2 Defendant Dwright Doty appeals his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder. 

Defendant was charged, along with co-defendants Corey Morgan (Corey) and Kevin 

Edwards (Edwards), with first-degree murder for the November 2, 2015 murder of nine-yearold Tyshawn Lee. Edwards pleaded guilty and defendant and Corey proceeded to joint, but 
No. 1-20-0456 

2 

severed, jury trials. Following his jury trial, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 90 

years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying one 

of his motions for continuance and in denying his motion for a mistrial after a discovery 

violation on the part of the State. Further, defendant argues that the circuit court considered 

improper factors in sentencing and relied improperly on its own private knowledge in 

determining his sentence. We affirm the circuit court’s decision and sentence. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On November 2, 2015, nine-year-old Tyshawn Lee was shot to death in an alley adjacent 

to Dawes Park, near the intersection of S. Damen Avenue and W. 80th Place. The State 

sought to establish that defendant was the shooter. 

¶ 5 A. Motion for Continuance

¶ 6 Defendant was charged in June 2016 and appointed counsel. A number of different public 

defenders worked on defendant’s case between June 2016 and the start of trial. The attorney 

who took the lead at trial, Public Defender Danita Ivory, filed her first appearance in the case 

on July 18, 2018. She argued numerous motions on defendant’s behalf prior to trial. The first 

trial date of April 22, 2019 was set on December 12, 2018. On March 8, 2019, the start date 

for the trial was moved to September 9, 2019. 

¶ 7 The final pre-trial conference was held August 26, 2019. At the start of that conference, 

Ivory notified the court that her client had, that morning, expressed a wish to proceed pro se. 

Defendant stated that he had no problem with the attorneys representing him, but he thought 

it was in his best interest to represent himself. The circuit court questioned defendant as to 

his educational background and his understanding of the law. The circuit court verified with 

defendant that he knew that his decision to represent himself would not delay the trial and 
No. 1-20-0456 

3 

they would still proceed on the planned trial date. In the process of describing the potential 

concerns around self-representation to defendant at length, the circuit court engaged in the 

following exchange with him:

“COURT: A defendant representing himself will receive no extra time for 

preparation. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: No.

* * * 

COURT: We’re going to trial. We’re going to start on the same schedule we have. 

There will be no delay. I know some defendants in jail think they’re going to get a 

delay. Not going to happen. There is no delay. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

COURT: A defendant representing himself will receive no extra or greater library 

time if in jail or prison. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

COURT: Whatever the schedule the jail has for you, that’s the schedule. You’ll get 

no extra time. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”

¶ 8 Following that exchange, the court found that defendant had not made a voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and that the request was a “ploy for a 

delay.” The court stated that even though defendant was fit to stand trial, it did not believe 

that he was “capable of representing [himself] in a trial of this magnitude without significant 

and substantial delay.” Defense counsel asserted that the standard for self-representation was 

no higher than that of competency to stand trial, so he had the right regardless of whether he 
No. 1-20-0456 

4 

would serve as a competent attorney. The circuit court reiterated that it found his request to 

be a delay tactic and that the request was denied.

¶ 9 The circuit court held a hearing on August 30, 2019 for the expressed purpose of further 

addressing defendant’s wish to represent himself. The court again reiterated that there would 

be no delay and admonished defendant regarding the difficulty of being prepared for a 

month-long trial in such a short time, in addition to continuing to be ready day after day for 

what the court expected to be a month-long trial. Defendant confirmed that he understood 

there would be no more continuances and that he still wished to represent himself. The court 

granted his request to proceed pro se and appointed his defense counsel as standby counsel

over Ivory’s objection. 

¶ 10 After some discussion of what would be involved in tendering discovery to defendant, as 

well as the difficulties in doing so in a timely fashion in the week or so before trial, the State 

asserted that it would be impossible for defendant to go through the voluminous discovery 

prior to trial. The State proposed that if defendant was ready for trial, there was no need to 

tender discovery; however, if defendant was not ready for trial, the circuit court should deny 

the motion to proceed pro se, as he could not be ready in time for trial. The circuit court

noted that the decision to allow defendant to proceed pro se was not final and, if it became 

evident that defendant was not ready, the court could reappoint counsel. The circuit court

then had the following dialogue with defendant:

“COURT: [Defendant], you’re ready for trial, is that correct?

DEFENDANT: I got to look through my discovery, Your Honor.

COURT: What does that mean?
No. 1-20-0456 

5 

DEFENDANT: He’s saying he can’t. You’re trying to make him – force him to get 

what he can. I need all my discovery. I don’t need just what he can.

COURT: No, you said you’re ready for trial. See, remember I went through all that 

stuff in that book and process on that sheet? It’s a reason. Because the Supreme Court 

says I need to do these steps and make sure I get all these things to make sure it’s 

clear that you know that on the eve of trial you asked to represent yourself, you’re 

going to trial, you’re saying that you’re ready as is, and so if you are ready you’re 

ready with whatever you have.

Now, I’m going to put it on the State to try to get as much as they can extra and 

Defense with those matters that are not redacted who are standby to work with you 

but there will be no delay, and so if you are not ready then it is clear to me that it’s for 

the purpose of delay and you will not be able to represent yourself. So which is it? 

You’re ready or you’re not? Are you ready for trial?

DEFENDANT: Like I told you Monday, I’m going to try my best to be ready. As 

soon as they get the discovery to me as soon as I can prep myself to be ready for trial. 

COURT: Are you ready for trial?

DEFENDANT: I can’t say I’m ready right now, no. I ain’t seen none of my 

discovery. 

COURT: Well then, you can’t represent yourself.

DEFENDANT: How come I can’t?

COURT: Because you’re not ready. We’re on the eve of trial. As the case law says 

the Court is not obligated to give you a continuance for a request to represent yourself 

pro se on the eve of trial nor am I required to give you additional time to prepare. 
No. 1-20-0456 

6 

You want to represent yourself on the eve of trial then you’re saying you’re ready. 

That’s the law. So you ready for trial as is?”

¶ 11 The circuit court noted that defendant had four years of incarceration to decide how to go 

about his defense and the State interjected that there had been 50 previous court appearances 

prior to the day defendant decided to request to represent himself. The circuit court

emphasized that despite those facts, he waited until within two weeks of trial to request to 

represent himself. The following exchange then occurred:

“COURT: I’ll pass this matter momentarily for defendant to consider— 

DEFENDANT: I’m ready.

COURT: So you’re ready for trial?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: As is. Whatever you have and whatever they can get to you we will 

endeavor, but you’re ready.

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

*** 

COURT: He’s ready for trial. We’ll endeavor to get him whatever we can.”

¶ 12 At the following court date on September 3, 2019, defendant reaffirmed that he still 

wished to represent himself. When asked if he was aware that co-defendant Edwards had 

pled guilty, defendant replied: “Yes, sir.” The court reiterated that trial was to begin 

September 10, 2019, and this exchange followed:

“COURT: Are you ready for trial?

DEFENDANT: I’m getting ready now.

COURT: Alright. Give me one second.
No. 1-20-0456 

7 

(A brief pause.)

COURT: You should really reconsider this decision. You represent yourself now so if 

you wish to discuss with the State the possibility of a plea offer, then you need to alert 

them let them know.”

¶ 13 At a hearing on the following day, September 4, 2019, the circuit court moved the date 

for selecting the jury to September 13, 2019 to give defendant a few extra days to prepare, 

with opening statements and testimony to start on September 17, 2019. Defendant twice 

reaffirmed his wish to continue representing himself at the next hearing on September 9, 

2019. During that hearing, the following exchange occurred: 

“COURT: Are you ready for trial?

DEFENDANT: No, sir, Your Honor.

COURT: You’re not going to be ready for trial?

DEFENDANT: I ain’t ready as of this moment but – 

COURT: What does that mean? We’re going to be picking your jury on Friday.

* * * 

DEFENDANT: I will be able to let you know for sure. He just tendered over some 

more evidence. So I ain’t got a chance to look through that yet.

COURT: I told you there would be no delays. So if you’re not ready then I will have 

the Public Defenders back on the case to represent you.” 

Discussion then turned to discovery matters and never returned to the issue of whether 

defendant was ready for trial. 
No. 1-20-0456 

8 

¶ 14 On September 10, 2019, defendant again confirmed that he wished to continue 

representing himself and the State requested that the court inquire as to his readiness. The 

following discussion ensued:

“COURT: Are you ready for trial?

DEFENDANT: No sir, I ain’t – no, I ain’t ready. No, I ain’t ready. I don’t even know 

no proper way to pick my jury yet. I’ve been going over this, looking at the jury 

thing. I’m just – 

COURT: Well, then I’ll appoint the team back – the public defender team back, to 

take over representation on this case. I’ll wait until tomorrow to deal with that. 

Counsel, you should probably have your team on the ready to take back over this

[sic], because there will be no delay.

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”

¶ 15 On the following day, September 11, 2019, defendant again asserted that he wished to 

continue to represent himself. The court gave defendant further instruction on the process of 

picking a jury. On September 12, 2019, defendant yet again reiterated that he wished to 

proceed pro se and asked for a continuance for the purpose of reviewing discovery. The 

following exchange occurred:

“COURT: Well, you were advised of that, that there would be no delays. You’re the 

one who decided on the eve of trial you wanted to represent yourself. This matter had 

even been set for trial months ago, when the court continued the matter for everyone 

to [be] prepared to do other pretrial motions. Additionally, we went through all of the 

discovery with your attorneys in preparation for this trial, before you decided to go 

pro se. Your oral motion for a continuance is denied.
No. 1-20-0456 

9 

DEFENDANT: I’m not ready to pick a jury tomorrow for trial. So how we gonna go 

about it?

COURT: Well, you’ll have to figure that out. You’ll have the assistance of standby 

counsel to assist you with that, if you choose to utilize their services, but we will be 

picking a jury tomorrow morning. I have given you the process sheet for how that’s 

done, and I warned you of this when you decided to go pro se.”

After other issues were discussed, defendant returned to the subject:

“DEFENDANT: I’m saying, like, basically you gonna force me to trial without 

learning all my discovery and without tendering everything to me. Can you appoint 

my lawyer back then? Cause it’s no way possible I can be ready by tomorrow, with 

them giving me discovery today, too, and tomorrow.

COURT: The public defender is re-appointed.” 

¶ 16 Upon reappointment, defense counsel moved for a continuance. Defense counsel 

explained that defendant had been persistent in his desire to represent himself, had opposed 

the appointment of standby counsel, and had not made any requests of his standby counsel or 

met with his standby counsel at all as attorney and client during the three weeks that he had 

been representing himself. Defense counsel stated that some defense witnesses had not been 

located because the investigators stopped looking once defendant began representing himself. 

Further, defense counsel had planned to have an expert witness present, but it would be very 

unlikely that they would be able to have them present on such short notice after being 

reappointed the day before jury selection was to begin. Lastly, two non-lead members of the 

four-member defense team would not be able to be present. Defense counsel requested a 

continuance to September 30, 2019. The State declined to take a position because, it stated, it 
No. 1-20-0456 

10 

thought that was “the Court’s bailiwick,” but it did note that it had incurred significant effort 

and expense arranging for out of state witnesses and one international witness to be present 

for trial as scheduled. The circuit court denied the motion. The court stated: “The defendant 

orchestrated this situation and, as far as the Court is concerned, it was orchestrated for the 

intended or attempted purpose of delay.”

¶ 17 On the day of jury selection, September 13, 2019, defense counsel renewed defendant’s 

motion for continuance and answered not ready for trial. Defense counsel noted that the State 

had made available one of the three witnesses counsel was still attempting to contact. After 

some discussion, it was ascertained that the State could bring both of the remaining witnesses 

sought by defendant to court on the following date to be made available to the defense. At 

that point, the defense reiterated the remaining issue and the court ruled:

“DEFENSE COUNSEL: If those witnesses are made available prior to opening 

statements, that cures one issue. We still have the issue of the delay between when 

[defendant] goes pro se and when our office, on the eve of trial, is reappointed.

COURT: I reviewed the motion, heard the arguments, reviewed the case law. The 

defendant created and, as I said, orchestrated this situation.

As I said originally, I thought that the purpose was for delay, and while I 

ultimately had felt duty bound to relent and allow him to represent himself, even 

though I was thoroughly convinced the purpose was to create some delay or appellate 

issues, the defendant created this situation. The defendant orchestrated this situation.

Counsel were here every day. We had them available to him, and the motion and 

the renewed motion to continue trial is denied.”
No. 1-20-0456 

11 

¶ 18 Defendant’s written renewed motion for continuance echoed the same arguments 

expressed in court and additionally argued that if the court refused to grant a continuance, 

defendant would be denied his constitutional right to a fair trial, as he needed more time to 

discuss trial strategies and locate and interview witnesses.

¶ 19 B. Trial Testimony

¶ 20 The State sought and was granted leave to present gang evidence to contextualize their 

case against defendant. Officer Matthew Kennedy, an expert on the gangs of the southwest 

side of Chicago, testified that at the time of the shooting, there was an ongoing feud between 

the Killa Ward (KW) gang, which was a faction of the Gangster Disciples, and the Terror 

Dome/Bang Bang Gang (TD/BBG), which was a faction of the Black P Stones. On October 

13, 2015, Tracey Morgan and his mother were shot. Tracey was a well-known member of 

TD/BBG and was co-defendant Corey Morgan’s brother. Tracey died. His mother survived. 

Two members of KW were charged with his murder. Officer Kennedy explained that one of 

the common rules among gangs in the area was that “violence shouldn’t be brought upon 

innocent victims of family members.” 

¶ 21 Officer Kennedy expected TD/BBG would retaliate because Morgan’s mother’s shooting 

broke that rule. Officer Kennedy requested that the FBI conduct an investigation of the social 

media posts of both TD/BBG and KW. Among the photos Officer Kennedy received from 

this investigation were photos of defendant and his co-defendant Corey Morgan displaying 

the gang sign of TD/BBG. Also among the photos were images of Pierre Stokes, who is the 

father of the victim, displaying the gang sign of KW alongside two men who were charged 

with Tracey Morgan’s murder sometime after the victim’s murder. 
No. 1-20-0456 

12 

¶ 22 Multiple witnesses testified that the victim, Tyshawn Lee, lived near Dawes Park and that 

he was in the park just before the shooting. Three men in their twenties, who were notably 

older than the high-schoolers present in the park that afternoon, were seen in the park, as well 

as entering and exiting a black SUV parked next to the park. One of the men, who a witness 

identified as defendant, was described as an African American man no more than six feet tall 

with a little bit of facial hair, wearing a red and blue striped jacket and Rock Revival brand 

jeans. Other witnesses, who knew defendant, stated that defendant wore Rock Revival jeans 

every day. Defendant stayed in the park while the other two men returned to the SUV. 

Defendant then approached the victim, who had set down a basketball to play on a climbing 

apparatus. Defendant picked up and dribbled the ball while speaking to the victim. Defendant 

then walked out of the park, with the victim, to a nearby alley. Multiple gunshots were heard 

from the alley, the black SUV was seen driving away from the scene of the shooting, and the 

victim was discovered shot to death.

¶ 23 Two witnesses described the individual alleged to be defendant similarly, but the only 

witness to identify him in a photo array, Jaylen Anderson, failed to appear when subpoenaed

and testified while in custody. Anderson testified that he was not a gang member at the time 

of the shooting, but had since become a member of the Gangster Disciples. Three other 

witnesses described one or more of the three men in less detail.

¶ 24 Two other witnesses, Devontay Gary and Moesha Walker, were both siblings of codefendant Edwards and lived with him during a period of time including October and 

November 2015. Both testified that defendant and his co-defendants were close friends and 

would frequently be present in the house. Walker further testified that on October 14, 2015, 

during the conversation with Corey and Edwards in which she learned that Tracey had been 
No. 1-20-0456 

13 

killed and his mother shot, Corey said “n***s tweak. Everybody must die, grandmamas, kids, 

and all,” which Walker understood to mean that he intended retaliation. Corey and Edwards 

agreed that KW was responsible for the shooting. 

¶ 25 Both Gary and Walker testified that Edwards began driving a black SUV a month or so 

before the shooting and that he ceased driving it shortly after the shooting. The black SUV 

matched the description of the vehicle seen fleeing the scene of the shooting. Additional 

testimony established that a black SUV with a license plate matching the SUV driven by 

Edwards had been missing from the lot of the rental company that owned it during the time 

Edwards was driving it; that the vehicle was driven from the home of Robin Mathews, 

Corey’s girlfriend at the time, who was also known as Millie, to the scene of the shooting and 

was present in the area at the time of the shooting, after which it was driven back to Millie’s 

home; and that the vehicle was abandoned in Dolton, Illinois after the shooting. Antwan 

Davis, who lived with Corey’s girlfriend at the time of the shooting, testified as to defendant 

and his co-defendants being present in the home on the morning of the shooting, leaving 

before lunch, and returning around dusk. Davis described the three as wearing clothes that 

day that matched other witnesses’ descriptions of the individuals in the park. Davis 

recognized the recovered black SUV as the one that was driven by Edwards during the time 

Davis was living with Corey’s girlfriend.

¶ 26 Collected DNA samples returned results showing mixed DNA, but strongly indicated that 

defendant contributed to the profile collected from the front driver’s door, steering wheel, 

and rear passenger overhead assist handle of the black Ford Edge. The collected samples also 

“strongly” and “very strongly” indicated that he contributed to a sample from the basketball 

recovered from the site of the shooting. Per the expert witness, Dr. John Buckleton, the DNA 
No. 1-20-0456 

14 

evidence collected that was least strongly connected to defendant was still one trillion times 

more likely to have been left behind in a scenario where defendant contributed his DNA to 

the sample than in a scenario in which he had not.

¶ 27 Detective Jeff Rodenberg testified that on November 16, 2015, an anonymous tip 

prompted him to set up surveillance on the Hilton Hotel in Oak Lawn. Detective Rodenberg 

observed defendant leaving the hotel with Corey. Corey was carrying a duffel bag. Defendant 

and Corey got in a Chrysler and exited the hotel parking lot. Rodenberg and his partner 

stopped and searched the car. Rodenberg found a loaded handgun in the duffel bag. 

Defendant and Corey were both taken into custody, but were not yet charged in relation to 

the victim’s killing.

¶ 28 Detective Timothy Murphy testified that, in January 2016, he learned from Investigator 

Domma at the Cook County Jail that an inmate named Demetrius Murry had information 

related to the shooting. In an interview with Detective Murphy and an assistant state’s 

attorney, Murry signed a cooperation agreement and agreed to wear a recording device 

during conversations with defendant, who had been jailed on an unrelated matter. Murry was 

provided with a “thumb drive recording device” that he could activate and hide on his person. 

Murry recorded conversations between himself and defendant. After sending the recordings 

to have background noise removed, Detective Murphy listened to the recordings with Murry 

and asked him for context on the conversations and for explanations of what he understood to 

be meant by certain statements. 

¶ 29 Murry testified that he was, at the time of trial, serving a ten and a half year sentence for 

aggravated discharge of a firearm and a three year sentence for unlawful use of a weapon by 

a felon. In November 2015, Murry was awaiting trial in Cook County Jail for the 
No. 1-20-0456 

15 

aforementioned charges. Around this time, he met defendant and began to talk to him 

“[a]lmost like every day.” Murry was the number two ranking member of the Sircon City 

faction of the Gangster Disciples gang and became aware that defendant was a Black P 

Stone, but he testified that there were no issues between their respective groups. During the 

time when Murry was getting to know defendant, defendant was talking “every day all day” 

about a case on the news in which he said he was the culprit for whom the police were 

looking. Defendant told Murry that he shot the victim in retaliation because his “brother” had 

been killed and his “mother” shot. Murry stated that defendant performed a rap song about 

the victim’s shooting while Murry was recording. 

¶ 30 Murry attributed his decision to speak with Investigator Domma to a combination of selfinterest and distaste for defendant’s actions. Murry confirmed that he recorded conversations, 

turned over the device for downloading, and listened to selected portions of the discussions 

with Detective Murphy while reading through the transcript for those recordings. Murry 

testified at length about his interpretations of various statements made by defendant in the 

recordings, most notably that defendant stated that he had gone to the park with his 

codefendants, that he had shot and killed the victim, and that they had used a “2015 Ford 

truck” to get to and from the scene of the crime. Defendant also made reference in the 

recordings to getting on the expressway after the shooting and calling Millie.

¶ 31 Officer Eulalio Rodriguez testified that on the night of April 21, 2017, he and two other 

officers came across what appeared to be a music video being recorded in a vacant lot 

between 71st St. and 70th St. off of Wolcott St. The vacant lot had about 30 to 50 people 

gathered in and around it, who scattered upon seeing the unmarked police SUV that Officer 

Rodriguez was driving. Officer Hyma, who was also in the car, got out and Officer 
No. 1-20-0456 

16 

Rodriguez lost track of her as he made a three-point turn to go back down the alley he was in. 

After looping around to the Wolcott St. side of the lot, Officer Rodriguez found Officer 

Hyma with two individuals whom she had stopped. 

¶ 32 The two individuals were patted down and detained on the street and then in another 

police vehicle that responded to the scene. Officer Rodriguez and the third officer on the 

scene, Officer Soto, were tasked with completing an investigative stop report (ISR) for each 

of the two individuals. The ISRs included the individuals’ names, addresses, demographics, 

and a description of their clothing. Neither individual was charged and both were released. 

The ISRs described one of the individuals, Leron Nelson, as a 20-year-old black male, 5’10”, 

175 pounds, with a short hairstyle. The other individual, Qumonta Austin, was an 18-yearold black male, 5’9”, 150 pounds, with a short hairstyle. Officer Rodriguez did not note in his 

subsequent general offense report that the two individuals had been stopped or that ISRs had 

been generated, because he did not believe that there was any connection between the 

individuals and the below-described firearms.

¶ 33 Officer Rodriguez searched the vacant lot with other officers and they located five 

firearms throughout the lot. Importantly, Officer Hyma found a black semiautomatic pistol 

with a serial number matching a Smith & Wesson .40 caliber handgun which, according to 

testimony from an ATF agent, was purchased by an out of state buyer and mailed to Anthony 

Morgan, another of Corey’s brothers. Detective Murphy testified that he authored a report 

about the recovery of this firearm and the match between the weapon and the casings found 

near the victim’s body. 

¶ 34 Officer Rodriguez testified that in preparation for defendant’s trial, he went to meet with 

an assistant state’s attorney on multiple occasions, but did not, until the day before his 
No. 1-20-0456 

17 

testimony, recall generating the ISRs. On cross-examination, Officer Rodriguez confirmed 

that he had included in his report a description of a man with long black dreadlocks fleeing 

the scene of the music video recording, but stated that he had never seen the man himself and 

had received that description from one of the other officers on the scene.

¶ 35 After he was located subsequent to the disclosure of the ISRs, Nelson, the subject of one 

of the ISRs, was called before the court outside the view of the jury to be questioned by the 

parties. Nelson stated that on the night that he was stopped by Officer Hyma, he was walking 

with his friend, Austin, in the area of 70th and Wolcott and saw a music video recording 

underway in a vacant lot with about 15-20 people present. He and Austin stopped and 

“spectated for about two, three minutes.” Nelson stated that he did not see anyone with 

firearms that night. When the police arrived, Nelson and Austin ran about a block before they 

were stopped by police. 

¶ 36 Austin, the subject of the other ISR, was also questioned outside the presence of the jury. 

Austin’s account largely aligned with Nelson’s, but not entirely: Austin confirmed that he 

saw “a couple [of] people” pull out three different guns and wave them at the camera that 

was filming. He described the men waving guns as African-American men with dreadlocks 

and black clothing. Austin also testified that he and Nelson watched from across the street 

rather than on the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the lot. 

¶ 37 Immediately after questioning Nelson and Austin, the court heard defense counsel’s 

motion for a mistrial based on the State’s discovery violation with regard to the ISRs. 

Defendant’s argument focused largely on the fact that Nelson and Austin very generally 

matched the descriptions witnesses had given, which is to say they were black males, whose 

hair may have been in styles that matched the general descriptions given regarding the crime 
No. 1-20-0456 

18 

years earlier. Defendant argued that that physical similarity, in combination with their being 

stopped near the time and place where the murder weapon was recovered, made them 

possible alternative suspects about whom defense counsel had not had the opportunity to 

investigate or question other, already-called witnesses. The circuit court noted that all 

witnesses who had been called could be recalled and defense counsel still had approximately 

a week to investigate. The circuit court denied the motion without prejudice. Defendant 

raised the motion again two days later and the circuit court again denied the motion, opining:

“Obviously, this situation is not ideal to say the least. It is problematic.

*** 

And while, as a court, I can certainly appreciate the defense frustration and 

concern, I still have to look at that under at least my understanding of the law and 

given the totality of the circumstances with everything that’s available to me now, 

despite this messy blob dropped in the middle of this trial. On balance, the court 

cannot say that what was not timely disclosed was favorable material to the accused 

to the point that it would warrant a mistrial.

*** 

The court believes that mistrial is not the appropriate sanction. *** Whether or 

not certain other instructions to the jury might be appropriate will need to wait until 

we get to that point once the court has heard all the evidence and defenses to 

determine what, if any, other instructions, sanction may be necessary and warranted.”

¶ 38 The circuit court provided an instruction to the jury informing them that they were 

allowed, but not required to assume that evidence in the possession of one party and not 

timely disclosed would be adverse to that party. After deliberation, the jury found defendant 
No. 1-20-0456 

19 

guilty of first-degree murder and found that it was proven that defendant personally 

discharged a firearm that proximately caused death to another person, and that the victim was 

under 12 years of age.

¶ 39 C. Sentencing

¶ 40 Immediately after giving defendant an opportunity to speak on his own behalf, the circuit 

court prefaced its sentencing for defendant and his co-defendant, Corey, with a lengthy 

soliloquy: 

“The tragic loss of a good friend and brother and the galling injury to your mother 

is painful to say the least, but vengeance is not yours, nor will the law tolerate 

retaliation and vigilante justice.

Like sands through the hourglass, the days of our lives are like a speck of dust 

slipping away in front of us, falling through the fingers of [F]ather [T]ime. The sands 

of life run through the hourglass without stopping, letting us know that our end is 

near. Unlike a clock with its endless sweeping cycles, the hourglass of life has a 

definite end, and we can ill afford to allow lawless and brazen shootings, murders and 

back and forth retaliation to needlessly snuff out a life before our created time to 

shuffle off this mortal coil.

We have gun-toting adults and children indiscriminately shooting and taking out 

innocent lives in the process. Many couldn’t shoot the side of a barn from two feet 

away, yet they have a gun. We see individuals in the name of a gang taking up roles 

in furtherance of criminal activity, and no matter their role, they are responsible.”
No. 1-20-0456 

20 

¶ 41 The circuit court spoke at some length about the theory of accountability, under which 

Corey was charged, and the breadth of roles an individual might play and find themselves 

accountable for a murder, even if that murder was not planned. The circuit court then stated:

“During pretrial proceedings I received a large binder detailing shootings and 

murders between various gang members and factions in this area of the city. The 

ruthless cycle of gang shootings and murders, the tit for tat retaliations covered a 

period from May of 2012 through October of 2015 with the murder of Briana Jenkins 

and the November 2015 murder of Tyshawn Lee and the March 2016 shooting of 

Robin Matthews. It was a disheartening and terrifying reading to say the least.

Our communities have turned into virtual war zones with indiscriminate shootings 

and senseless retaliations. Innocent citizens are caught in the crossfire. People can’t 

freely walk around and enjoy their neighborhood or play in the park. School kids 

need safe passage workers to line the streets just to get home from school. Now 

people shut themselves in their homes to avoid the violence outside yet still fall 

victim to bullets intended for someone on the street flying through the walls of their 

homes. Our communities are not fair game in the spoils and pillaging and vicissitudes 

of gang war.

We constantly hear that someone going about their business, trying to do good, 

excel in school, or just make a better life for themselves and their families are struck 

down by untargeted violence. Invariably someone says they were in the wrong place 

at the wrong time.

No. They were in the right place at the right time, down the right path of life 

doing the things they rightly should be doing. They were not in the wrong place and 
No. 1-20-0456 

21 

the wrong time, and if we let that saying continue to prevail, there will be no place 

left to retreat.

Already, you can’t retreat into the safety of your home. You can’t leave the 

neighborhood and retreat to downtown. You can’t retreat from downtown to the 

suburbs. Now we all have to deal with it.

Where does this stop? Where does this mind-numbing, debilitating, senseless 

violence stop? It stops with grandmas, mamas and innocent children simply trying to 

play at a park. Grandmas, mamas, kids all matter. They all matter. Grandmas, mamas, 

kids and all are not fair game, and they matter to us. Whether they have been in this 

world only eight seconds, eight minutes, or eighty years, they matter.

With respect to both defendants, for purposes of sentencing, the Court has 

considered the evidence at trial, the gravity of the offense, the Presentence 

Investigation Report, the financial impact of incarceration, all evidence, information 

and testimony in aggravation and mitigation, any substance abuse issues and 

treatment, the potential for rehabilitation, the possibility of sentencing alternatives, 

and with respect to [defendant], the fact that he was under the age of 25 at the time of 

the offense, the victim panel statements and all hearsay presented and deemed 

relevant and reliable.”

¶ 42 The circuit court sentenced defendant to 90 years in the Illinois Department of 

Corrections, plus three years of mandatory supervised release. Defendant filed a timely 

notice of appeal and this appeal follows.
No. 1-20-0456 

22 

¶ 43 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 44 Defendant asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for continuance, in 

denying his motion for a mistrial based on the State’s failure to timely disclose the ISRs from 

Nelson and Austin, and that the circuit court considered inappropriate factors in determining 

defendant’s sentence. We disagree with regard to all three arguments and affirm the decision 

of the circuit court.

¶ 45 A. Motion for Continuance

¶ 46 Defendant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the motion for 

continuance submitted by trial counsel after defendant had counsel reappointed on the eve of 

trial rather than proceeding to trial pro se. More specifically, defendant argues that the circuit 

court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a continuance violated defendant’s right to a fair trial 

and effective counsel, and that the circuit court failed to consider the factors enumerated in 

People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113 (2009), before denying the motion, or else the circuit 

court’s weighing of those factors was so inappropriate as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 47 “It is well settled that the granting or denial of a continuance is a matter resting in the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not interfere with that decision 

absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. at 125. “However, where it appears that the refusal of 

additional time in some manner embarrassed the accused in preparation of his defense and 

thereby prejudiced his rights, a resulting conviction will be reversed.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Id. “An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling 

is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view 

adopted by the trial court.” People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000).
No. 1-20-0456 

23 

¶ 48 “Whether there has been an abuse of discretion depends upon the facts and circumstances 

in each case, and there is no mechanical test for determining the point at which the denial of 

a continuance in order to accelerate the judicial proceedings violates the substantive right of 

the accused to properly defend.” Walker, 232 Ill. 2d at 125. “Factors a court may consider in 

determining whether to grant a continuance request by a defendant in a criminal case include 

the movant’s diligence, the defendant’s right to a speedy, fair and impartial trial and the 

interests of justice.” Id. “Other relevant factors include whether counsel for defendant was 

unable to prepare for trial because he or she had been held to trial in another cause, the

history of the case, the complexity of the matter, the seriousness of the charges, as well as 

docket management, judicial economy and inconvenience to the parties and witnesses.” 

(Internal citations omitted.) Id. at 125-26. 

¶ 49 In Walker, when the case was called for trial, defense counsel immediately informed the 

court that she had mistakenly recorded the trial day incorrectly on her calendar and had only 

discovered her mistake the night before trial, when defendant contacted her. Id. at 126. 

Defense counsel had also been on trial into the evening hours on the prior two nights. Id. As 

a result, she told the court, she was not ready to go to trial. Id. The circuit court replied:

“ ‘This has been set. I am sorry. We will pass this case for trial.’ ” Id. at 126-27. When 

defense counsel again insisted she was not ready for trial, the circuit court cut her off before 

she could even specify how long of a continuance she needed. Id. at 127. The court stated

“ ‘it is irrelevant’ ” and “in no uncertain terms, indicated that the matter was closed.” Id. 

Here, defense counsel was present throughout the entire span of the case, even if some of that 

time was as standby counsel. Additionally, defense counsel had another two days of warning 

and made no mention of being held to trial on other matters in the time since the defense 
No. 1-20-0456 

24 

team had been alerted that it should be ready to take things over again. Lastly, but 

importantly, here, the circuit court allowed defense counsel to explain the situation at length.

¶ 50 In reversing the lower court’s decision, our supreme court in Walker noted that the lower 

court did not obtain the information necessary to make a considered decision on the motion, 

notably the length of the requested continuance. Id. The Walker court further noted that some 

of the relevant factors weighed in favor of granting the continuance, as well as the fact that 

the circuit court evinced significant hostility toward defense counsel without an apparent 

basis in the record. Id. at 127-28. Here, the circuit court showed no such hostility, and the 

record demonstrates no similar lack of relevant information. Based on the above, the case at 

bar is dissimilar to the facts of Walker, which our supreme court repeatedly reiterated to be 

“unique” and “specific.” Id. at 130-31. 

¶ 51 There is a notable difference between the curt, arbitrary, and dismissive tone and actions 

of the circuit court in Walker and the stolid insistence on schedule from the circuit court in 

this case. In this case, the circuit court reiterated again and again, from at least the time of 

defendant’s initial request to proceed pro se, that “there will be no delay.” The circuit court’s 

actions demonstrate that this assertion was not without due consideration, as the trial had 

initially been set for months prior to the eventual trial date and was delayed to handle pretrial matters, and because the start of trial was again moved from September 9 to September 

13 to give defendant more time to prepare. Accordingly, at a minimum, the record does not 

indicate that the circuit court was arbitrarily insistent on a given date without any 

consideration of defendant’s circumstances. 

¶ 52 Defendant cites a number of inapposite cases, including the so-called Scottsboro Boys 

trial, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), that present scenarios of clear prejudice to the 
No. 1-20-0456 

25 

defendant’s case. In some cases, unlike this one, counsel was either never appointed or first 

appointed at the eleventh hour. Id., People v. Kunowski, 360 Ill. 416, 418 (1935) (defense 

counsel was retained the morning of trial). We need not address this argument as the facts do 

not support the contention that defendant was deprived of counsel at any stage. To compare 

this case to cases like Powell, in which counsel was appointed for the first time on the eve of 

trial, is disingenuous at best. At all relevant stages, for years leading up to trial, defendant 

was represented by counsel. In the approximately one and half years between Ivory’s 

appointment and the start of trial, he was represented by the same counsel that ultimately 

represented him at trial, with a three-week period of self-representation immediately before 

trial. Defense counsel cited defendant’s refusal to communicate with her as standby counsel 

during his period of self-representation as one of the reasons for her unreadiness to proceed 

to trial. Even if his decision to self-represent and reject the assistance of standby counsel was 

to his detriment or to the detriment of defense counsel, that does not represent an 

infringement of defendant’s right to counsel, but rather, at worst, a foolhardy invocation of 

his rights. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 235 (1996) (“Although a court may consider the 

decision unwise, a defendant’s knowing and intelligent election to represent himself must be 

honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”). Defense 

counsel had been working on this case for well over a year and had three days’ warning from 

the court that he would be reinstating counsel. We cannot say that defense counsel did not 

have adequate time to prepare a defense.

¶ 53 In other cases cited by defendant, counsel was timely appointed, but a refusal to grant 

additional time clearly prejudiced the defendant. People v. Goff, 299 Ill. App. 3d 944 (1998) 

(circuit court refused to reopen the case to allow for key testimony from a witness not 
No. 1-20-0456 

26 

previously available), People v. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d 555, 561 (2009) (circuit court

prevented an alibi witness from testifying by insisting upon a planned end date for trial). The 

circumstances surrounding the circuit court’s denial of the motion to continue in this case do 

not present the same sort of obvious and dire consequences, and defendant does not indicate 

that such consequences actually resulted. 

¶ 54 In fact, defendant indicates no specific way in which the lack of a continuance 

“embarrassed the accused in preparation of his defense and thereby prejudiced his rights.” 

Walker, 232 Ill. 2d at 125. Defendant notes that defense counsel was reappointed the day 

before jury selection was to commence, that co-defendant Edwards had recently pleaded 

guilty, that there were defense witnesses who had not been served, and that only lead counsel 

and one of the three other members of the defense team would be able to be present for jury 

selection. However, defendant does not highlight any specific consequence, nor do we see 

any evident prejudice, with regard to any of these less than ideal circumstances. As we have 

already established, the same defense counsel represented defendant for well over a year 

prior to trial and subsequently served as standby counsel when defendant was representing 

himself, so the last-minute reappointment is not obviously prejudicial. The circuit court had 

previously suggested that trial would proceed with either a triple jury or a double jury with 

defendant’s jury separate in either scenario, so Edwards’ guilty plea had no clear effect on 

defendant’s jury selection strategy. The circuit court ordered that the prosecution put defense 

counsel in contact with the unserved witnesses and defense counsel stated on the record that 

the court’s order resolved that issue. Lastly, there is no indication in the record that any 

member of defense counsel was ever unprepared to represent defendant due to only half of 
No. 1-20-0456 

27 

the team being present at jury selection. Accordingly, we cannot find that defendant was 

prejudiced by the circuit court’s denial of his motion for a continuance. 

¶ 55 Defendant also argues that the circuit court failed to consider the relevant Walker factors 

in denying defendant’s motion for a continuance. Defendant asserts that no serious argument 

can be made that the circuit court “engaged in thoughtful analysis” regarding the Walker

factors, but defendant mistakenly focuses only on the moment of defense counsel’s 

reappointment. The record reflects that the circuit court had been considering the possibility 

of a motion for continuance for some time before the motion was made. Additionally, 

moments before trial counsel’s motion for a continuance, defendant himself had similarly 

moved for a continuance. Although the circuit court did not recite the factors it considered, 

the circuit court “is presumed to know the law and apply it properly, absent an affirmative 

showing to the contrary in the record.” In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 345 (2000). Given the 

prolonged time period over which the possibility of a continuance was considered and that 

the circuit court allowed defense counsel to lay out her arguments for a continuance at length 

before making its decision, we see nothing about the briefness of the court’s comments on 

the matter that evinces a complete lack of consideration of appropriate factors, nor 

consideration of inappropriate factors.

¶ 56 As such, all that remains on this issue is defendant’s argument that the circuit court

incorrectly weighed the factors. In Walker, our supreme court enumerated eight factors that a 

court may consider, so we will review each in considering whether the circuit court’s 

decision rises to the level of an abuse of discretion. These factors consist of three loftier, 

constitutionally-minded factors and five more practical factors concerned with the nuts and 

bolts of trial preparation and procedure.
No. 1-20-0456 

28 

¶ 57 First, we must consider the movant’s diligence. Defendant asserts that “[i]t is unclear 

how [defendant’s] attorneys could have been any more diligent.” However, our concern is 

not only defense counsel’s diligence, but defendant’s diligence during his period of selfrepresentation. In many circumstances, the line between a party’s actions and the actions of 

the counsel representing that party are blurred, since counsel is acting as the party’s 

representative. Here, however, the distinction is key: it would have been reasonable for the 

circuit court to weigh this factor against defendant, as his decision to represent himself and, 

while representing himself, falsely hold himself forth as ready for trial to encourage the 

circuit court to afford him that opportunity on the eve of trial, only to later admit that he was 

not, after all, ready for trial, could be fairly seen as an egregious lack of diligence. Once 

again, we reiterate that it is defendant’s rights that we are concerned with, not defense 

counsel’s; whatever frustration defense counsel may have felt with the situation, it was 

defendant’s own assertion of his right to represent himself that led to counsel’s last-minute 

reappointment. 

¶ 58 Second, we must consider defendant’s right to a speedy, fair and impartial trial. 

Defendant asserts that there was no danger to defendant’s right to a speedy trial even if the 

motion had been granted, and we agree. Defendant argues, however, that defendant’s right to 

a fair and impartial trial was violated by the denial of the motion for continuance. Here, 

defendant cites People v. Jefferson, 35 Ill. App. 3d 424 (1976), a case in which the defendant 

was arraigned, counsel was appointed, and trial commenced all in a single day. Once again, it 

is disingenuous at best to compare the case at bar to one in which counsel was first appointed 

on the day or eve of trial. Defendant’s argument elides the vast practical and factual 

difference between the scenarios presented in cases such as Jefferson and the case at bar. In 
No. 1-20-0456 

29 

Jefferson, Powell, and cases of their ilk, a defendant was forced to trial with no counsel or 

just-appointed counsel with no opportunity to prepare for that trial, whereas here defense 

counsel had over a year of experience with the case and had been deeply involved in pretrial 

litigation and served as standby counsel for a three-week period before being reappointed. 

The argument for similarity is stretched not just thin, but to the point of breaking. To 

compare such egregious travesties of justice to the facts of this case is frankly wrong.

Defendant makes no other, more cognizable argument regarding this factor and we see no 

threat to defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial in the circuit court’s denial of the 

motion for continuance in these particular circumstances.

¶ 59 Third, we must consider the interests of justice. Defendant’s argument on this factor cites 

Jefferson at even greater length and is little different except insofar as it insists that defense 

counsel was not attempting to somehow thwart justice by requesting a continuance. Given 

the circumstances, in which defense counsel was present throughout all relevant proceedings 

and the court successfully curing the significant matter of the unserved defense witnesses, we 

see no threat to justice in the circuit court’s denial of the motion for continuance.

¶ 60 Fourth, we must consider whether counsel for defendant was unable to prepare for trial 

because she had been held to trial in another cause. There is no indication that this was the 

case. Although continuing with the trial as rescheduled during the time defendant was 

representing himself meant that two of the four members of his defense team were not 

present for jury selection, his lead counsel was nonetheless present and defendant makes no 

mention of any prejudice to his case resulting from the absence of those two members of the 

defense team, nor even whether they held particular roles within the defense team that made 

their presence necessary or important.
No. 1-20-0456 

30 

¶ 61 Fifth, we must consider the history of the case. Defendant argues that Edwards pleading 

guilty during defendant’s period of self-representation and the change that could have meant 

for whether the case would be a triple jury or a double jury, tilts this factor in favor of 

granting the motion for continuance. In every instance in which split juries were discussed in 

the record, the plan presented was for defendant to have a separate jury, whether or not 

Edwards and Corey shared a single jury or had separate juries for their trials. It is unclear 

how a change in the already-separate jury arrangements for co-defendants would require 

additional preparation from defense counsel. The circuit court expressed some concern about 

defendant’s ability to navigate considering whether to plead guilty in the wake of Edwards’ 

plea, but defendant insisted that he had no interest in a guilty plea and the prosecution added 

that there were no plans to offer him a plea deal. While defense counsel argued in her motion 

for continuance that she had no opportunity to discuss trial strategy with defendant since 

Edwards’ guilty plea, there is no contention on appeal that such lack of discussion had any 

impact on defendant’s representation or ability to present his defense. Nor, for that matter, is 

there any suggestion in the record or upon appeal that defense counsel was not able to have 

that discussion subsequently. With regard to the history of the case, it is notable that defense 

counsel had years to prepare this case before the three weeks during which defendant 

represented himself, and Ivory herself had a year and a half. As such, we cannot say this 

factor favors granting the continuance.

¶ 62 Sixth, we must consider the complexity of the matter. Defendant argues that the complex 

nature of the case, with multiple co-defendants, numerous witnesses, and novel scientific 

evidence, favored granting the continuance. Defense counsel, however, had been familiar 

with all of those matters for some time, and was the attorney present representing defendant 
No. 1-20-0456 

31 

during the Frye hearing regarding the expert witness who was to present that novel scientific 

evidence. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). It would seem this factor is 

relevant for those instances in which it would be difficult for a recently-appointed attorney to 

become exactly as well-versed in the complex matters underlying a case as Ivory herself was 

in this case. While we agree that this case was complex, we see no indication that defense 

counsel needed more time to grapple with that complexity.

¶ 63 Seventh, we must consider the seriousness of the charges. The charges in this case are 

dire indeed, but we see nothing about the gravity of the charges that made a motion for 

continuance more necessary in these circumstances. Defendant and his counsel had been 

aware of these very serious charges in this very high-profile case for some time, which is all 

the more reason to find questionable the suggestion that defense counsel was so unprepared 

for trial that the lack of a continuance prejudiced defendant.

¶ 64 Eighth, we must consider docket management, judicial economy, and the inconvenience 

to the parties and witnesses. Defendant notes that the State did not object to the continuance 

and, while it noted potential inconvenience to out of state and international witnesses and the 

costs associated with those witnesses, it “demurred to the court.” Whether the other party 

objected to the continuance is not one of the Walker factors. The inconvenience noted by the 

State in the process of declining to object, on the other hand, is one of the relevant factors. 

Defendant argues that the circuit court was required by Walker to make a record regarding 

factors it found relevant, but that is a misreading of Walker. The Walker court made no such 

pronouncement that explicit articulation of factors was mandatory; rather, that the circuit 

court’s failure to comment on these matters, along with the interests of justice, the 

complexity of the case, and the severity of the charges, was merely an additional factor in its 
No. 1-20-0456 

32 

finding that the circuit court abused its discretion. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d at 127. We read Walker

to be focused significantly on the circuit court’s hostile demeanor and refusal to allow 

counsel to even explain how much of a continuance she needed and for what purposes. In 

that context, a failure to explicitly mention the relevant factors makes it clearer still that the 

court was not engaging in the necessary analysis. No such context exists here and so we 

cannot say the circuit court erred by failing to explicitly articulate the factors it was 

considering. 

¶ 65 After reviewing all of the Walker factors, we cannot say that the circuit court’s decision 

constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the 

motion for continuance. 

¶ 66 B. Brady Violation

¶ 67 Defendant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s 

motion for a mistrial based upon the State’s failure to disclose two ISRs generated when 

police stopped two individuals near the vacant lot where the murder weapon was recovered. 

The ISRs in question were allegedly remembered and found two weeks after the start of 

defendant’s trial and were provided to defendant as soon as the prosecution became aware of 

them. Defendant asserts that this failure to disclose the ISRs, whether intentional or not, 

constituted a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights under Brady, under 

which “the prosecution must disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused and ‘material 

either to guilt or to punishment’ ” People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 311 (2002) (citing Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); U.S. Const., amend. XIV. 

¶ 68 “To succeed on a Brady violation claim, a defendant must establish (1) the undisclosed 

evidence is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the 
No. 1-20-0456 

33 

evidence was suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the accused 

was prejudiced because the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) People v. Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 82. “Evidence is material if there is a 

reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 311. The examination is not 

concerned with the sufficiency of the evidence; “[r]ather, a defendant must show that the 

favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light 

as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 311-12. 

“The Brady rule extends to favorable evidence known only to police investigators and not to 

the prosecutor trying the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Montanez, 2023 IL 

128740, ¶ 82.

¶ 69 It is undisputed that the State failed to timely disclose the ISRs, so the only questions 

before us are favorability, materiality, and prejudice. Defendant contends that the evidence 

was material, but his argument to that end is unclear. In his brief, defendant describes at 

length the standard to be applied in determining whether evidence was material, and asserts 

that this case is factually comparable to People v. Carballido, 2015 IL App (2d) 140760, but 

makes little attempt to apply the law of Carballido to the facts of this case.

¶ 70 In Carballido, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder under a theory of 

accountability. Id. ¶ 5. The defendant in Carballido admitted in a written statement that he 

was aware that the shooter had a firearm with him when defendant drove him to the scene of 

the crime, but defendant asserted that the statement regarding the gun was false and coerced. 

Id. ¶ 87. It was proven that at least one of the few details included in that written statement 

was false. Id. The only other evidence establishing defendant’s knowledge of the firearm, 
No. 1-20-0456 

34 

which was key to the theory of accountability, consisted of statements from defendant’s 

sister. Id. ¶ 80. Although the defendant’s sister testified that defendant had not told her he 

was aware of the firearm, a police detective testified that she had told him as much and said 

detective provided a written report detailing as much. Id. The State failed to timely disclose 

the field notes written by that officer that did not include the statement from the defendant’s 

sister and therefore contradicted his testimony that the written report he provided was based 

on his field notes. Id. ¶ 68-69. The Carballido court concluded that, without the discovery 

violation the defendant would have been able to impeach that key piece of testimony, so it 

was reasonably probable that the jury would have considered the case in a different light. Id. 

¶ 89. 

¶ 71 Defendant states that “[n]o serious debate can be had as to the high relevance of 

[defendant] being informed in the summer of 2017 (versus on September 24, 2019, two 

weeks into his high-profile jury trial) that two men, matching the general descriptions of the 

potential offenders in Lee’s murder, were seized by police moments before the weapon used 

to murder Lee was found.” Defendant states that even if Austin and Nelson, the two 

individuals in question, could not be linked to the murder weapon or the offense, defendant 

would have had more time to investigate based on Austin and Nelson’s fresher recollections 

of the night they were stopped by police and to plan a trial strategy based upon the results of 

such investigation. We interpret this as an argument as to the materiality of the ISR evidence, 

even though that prong of the analysis is not clearly invoked. 

¶ 72 We see little similarity between Carballido, where the undisclosed evidence held 

significant impeachment material on a matter of fact that was absolutely crucial to the legal 

theory of the case and where other paths to the same end were either extremely flawed (the 
No. 1-20-0456 

35 

defendant’s possibly coerced and at least in part false written confession) or completely 

unsuccessful (the defendant’s sister’s unexpected testimony that defendant had not in fact 

told her about the firearm). Defendant has cited a case with compelling facts, but has in no 

way demonstrated that those facts are comparable to this case. Defendant makes much of the 

Carballido court finding the withheld evidence in that case to be material in the context of 

“(1) the high relevance of the suppressed evidence; (2) additional errors stemming from and 

surrounding the discovery violation * * *; and (3) a significant dispute over the reliability of 

other key evidence against defendant.” Id. ¶ 79. However, the “relevance,” which defendant 

seems to use as equivalent to materiality, of the withheld evidence in this case does not 

compare to the withheld evidence in Carballido. 

¶ 73 Here, the evidence that defendant suggests could have been gleaned from more time to 

interview Nelson and Austin is purely speculative. The only information elicited from the 

two when they were subjected to questioning before the court that defendant suggests could 

be meaningful is Austin’s statement that a black man with dreadlocks was waving a firearm 

in the lot just prior to the discovery of the murder weapon. Defendant was already aware that 

a man by that description was seen fleeing from the scene before hearing from Nelson and 

Austin. Defendant argues that with more time to investigate and with Nelson and Austin’s 

memories fresher and more recent, information on an alternative suspect could have been 

available to the defense and that information could have been used as the basis for 

defendant’s trial strategy. Both Nelson and Austin stated that they did not know anyone else 

present at the vacant lot that night. Accordingly, at best, what Nelson and Austin could have 

provided is a clearer description of one of dozens of unknown individuals in the lot, who had 

contact with one of several firearms recovered from the scene. This suggestion is sufficiently 
No. 1-20-0456 

36 

speculative such that we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that timely 

divulgence of the ISRs would have changed the result of the trial. Defendant has not 

demonstrated that the withheld evidence was material. Accordingly, we cannot find that the 

court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the withholding of the 

ISRs and instead offer a jury instruction on the matter was erroneous, much less an abuse of 

discretion. 

¶ 74 C. Sentencing

¶ 75 Defendant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it “repeatedly and at 

length considered factors in aggravation not supported by the evidence and relied on its own 

personal beliefs and experiences.” Defendant asserts that the circuit court spent “the vast 

majority” of its explanation for defendant’s sentence on voicing what defendant calls 

“frustration with generalized violence in Chicago and its suburbs.” 

¶ 76 Defendant acknowledges that this alleged error was not preserved at trial and asks that we 

review the error as plain error or, alternatively, review trial counsel’s failure to raise it as 

ineffective assistance of counsel. “To preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a 

contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing motion raising the issue are 

required.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010). However, a “narrow and limited 

exception” exists where an appellant can demonstrate plain error. Id. at 545. The first step of 

establishing plain error is to “show that a clear or obvious error occurred.” Id. In the case of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation “fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s shortcomings were so 

serious as to ‘deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’ ” People v. 
No. 1-20-0456 

37 

Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 (1984) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 

(1984)). 

¶ 77 “It has long been established that the trial court has broad discretionary powers in 

choosing the appropriate sentence a defendant should receive.” People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 

367, 373 (1995). “Where the sentence chosen by the trial court is within the statutory range 

permissible for the pertinent criminal offense for which the defendant has been tried and 

charged, a reviewing court has the power to disturb the sentence only if the trial court abused 

its discretion in the sentence it imposed.” Id. at 373-74. “In rendering a sentence, a trial judge 

is presumed to have relied upon only competent and reliable evidence. Additionally, it is 

defendant’s burden to overcome this presumption.” People v. Griffith, 158 Ill. 2d 476, 497 

(1994). 

¶ 78 Defendant cites to People v. Dameron, in which our supreme court opined: “A 

determination made by the trial judge based upon a private investigation by the court or 

based upon private knowledge of the court, untested by cross-examination, or any of the rules 

of evidence constitutes a denial of due process of law.” 196 Ill. 2d 156, 171-72 (2001). The 

judge in Dameron “spoke at length about social science statistics and vague generalizations 

about crime he uncovered through his own investigation” and “[a]n excerpt from the *** 

book recited by the judge also conflict[ed] with evidence in the case.” Id. at 176. There is no 

evidence that the circuit court conducted any such private investigation in the case at bar, so 

Dameron is factually inapposite.

¶ 79 Defendant’s further citations in support of the proposition that a judge cannot consider 

private knowledge similarly present scenarios that are inapplicable to this case. People v. 

Cunningham has no factual relevance at all and merely recites this statement of law. 2012 IL 
No. 1-20-0456 

38 

App (3d) 100013, ¶ 14. In People v. Jackson, 409 Ill. App. 3d 631, 649-50 (2011), the circuit 

court made a statement about how a medication is used without that information being 

introduced by the relevant expert witness, the circuit court stopped the expert witness from 

testifying as to a simple factual matter with an assertion that it was already familiar with the 

matter, and the circuit court relied upon its own opinions about IQ testing in disregarding 

expert testimony that stated that IQ testing was relevant to his analysis. In the case at bar,

defendant has not shown that the circuit court allowed evidence generated from its personal 

knowledge to supplant the evidence presented at trial. 

¶ 80 In People v. Rivers, 410 Ill. 410, 415-16 (1951), the court similarly generally decried 

violence in the area before rendering its sentence. However, the Rivers court stated that “[t]he 

courts must put an end to these vicious killings by imposing suitable punishment upon these 

youngsters for their crimes” and cited statistics, which were not in the record, about the 

number of unregistered guns in the city. Id. In the case at bar, the record evinces neither that 

the circuit court referred to specific facts outside of the record, nor that the circuit court based 

its decision on any such private knowledge. Though the case at bar did not concern a stray 

bullet or the larger issue of fear of gang violence, the circuit court’s commentary made use of 

nothing more than evidence in the record and general knowledge of which any resident of 

Chicago would be aware.

¶ 81 Defendant cites to People v. Rosa, 206 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1084 (1990), in which the 

circuit court spoke broadly about the defendant being the result of “the lack of a father” and 

the “stupidity and slutliness of women.” That court called the defendant “slovenly” and 

“stupid,” and spoke generally about the “cowardice” of street gang members.” Id. The circuit 

court’s commentary in the case at bar is about the issue of gang violence, which is not so far 
No. 1-20-0456 

39 

afield as the circuit court’s broad social commentary in Rosa. While we acknowledge that the 

murder in the case at bar was targeted and not an accidental killing, we do not believe the 

circuit court’s comments on the larger issue suggest as much, nor that it treated this killing as 

indiscriminate in determining the sentence. 

¶ 82 Here, it is notable that none of the language referenced by defendant was framed by the 

circuit court as the reasoning behind its sentence, but rather appears to have been a soliloquy 

designed to make a statement about a larger issue, especially considering that the case 

garnered significant press attention and was, as one attorney called it on the record, “the most 

sensational murder trial that this county [had] seen in 10 years.” The circuit court concluded 

its soliloquy by asking where this larger issue of gang violence stops and by referring to the 

specific language from the case at bar in his answer: “It stops with grandmas, mamas and 

innocent children simply trying to play at a park.” By laying out the larger issue of gang 

violence and then making reference to the particular language in this case, the circuit court

emphasized the particular depravity of the intentional killing of a 9-year-old child, which was 

explicitly a relevant factor in delivering an extended-term sentence. 730 ILCS 

5/5-5-3.2(b)(3)(i) (West 2018) (allowing courts to impose an extended-term sentence where a 

felony is committed against a person under 12 years of age).

¶ 83 Immediately after the circuit court’s soliloquy, it stated the factors that it considered, 

which included the relevant and required statutory considerations, 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a) (West 

2018), with the addition only of “the seriousness of the offense,” which our supreme court 

has noted as a relevant factor to be weighed. People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 261 (1995). 

However, “personal comments or observations are generally of no consequence where the 

record shows the court otherwise considered proper sentencing factors.” (internal quotation 
No. 1-20-0456 

40 

marks omitted.) People v. Walker, 2012 IL App (1st) 083655, ¶ 33. As the State points out, 

the sentence defendant received was arguably near the low end of the applicable sentence

range when an extended sentence is considered, which, as aforementioned, was justified by 

the age of the victim alone. Under section 5-4.5-20(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, a 

sentence for first degree murder is to be not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years, 

but an extended sentence is to be not less than 60 years and not more than 100 years. 730 

ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2018). Under section 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) of the Unified Code of 

Corrections, where, as here, it is found that “during the commission of the offense, the person 

personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent 

disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of 

natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.” 730 ILCS 

5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2018). Accordingly, the permissible range was 45 years to life, but 

with the option to impose an extended sentence of 85 years to life. 

¶ 84 Even where a court may rely on an improper aggravating factor in sentencing, “where it 

can be determined from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered 

aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence, remandment 

is not required.” People v. Bourke, 96 Ill. 2d 327 (1983). There is no indication in the record 

that the decision to impose an extended sentence was the result of a general distaste for gang 

violence rather than the fact that the victim was a 9-year-old child. The circuit court’s focus 

on “grandmas, mamas, and innocent children” indicates the importance the circuit court was 

placing on the age of the victim. In that context, even if we accept that an improper factor 

was considered, we cannot say that a sentence of 90 years was significantly affected by such 

consideration where the extended sentence range was 85 years to life imprisonment.
No. 1-20-0456 

41 

Accordingly, because we find no clear or obvious error to support a claim of plain error, we 

need proceed no further in the plain error analysis, and we find that the issue is forfeited on 

appeal. With regard to the alternative theory of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant 

has not shown that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness as we see no error warranting an objection, and so we affirm the sentence of 

the circuit court. 

¶ 85 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 86 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s orders on defendant’s motion for 

continuance and motion for mistrial, and we affirm the circuit court’s sentence.

¶ 87 Affirmed.