UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4144

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JEROMEY KEITH MITCHELL, a/k/a Kaos,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Greenville. James C. Dever III,

Chief District Judge. (4:13-cr-00023-D-1)

Submitted: September 10, 2014 Decided: September 23, 2014

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jeromey Keith Mitchell appeals his sentence after 

pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with 

intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base, six 

counts of distributing cocaine base, and one count of possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine base. On appeal, he contends 

his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using 

an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. McManus, 734 

F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). We first consider whether the district 

court committed a significant procedural error, such as 

improperly calculating the Guidelines range or inadequately 

explaining the sentence imposed. United States v. Allmendinger, 

706 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2747 

(2013). If the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then 

consider whether it is substantively reasonable, taking into 

account the totality of the circumstances and giving due 

deference to the district court’s decision. Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51. We presume that a sentence within or below a properly 

calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United 

States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).

In sentencing, the district court must first correctly 

calculate the defendant’s Guidelines range. Allmendinger, 706 
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F.3d at 340. The court is next required to give the parties an 

opportunity to argue for what they believe is an appropriate 

sentence, and the court must consider those arguments in light 

of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). Id. 

When imposing a sentence, the court must make and place on the 

record an individualized assessment based on the particular 

facts of the case. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328, 

330 (4th Cir. 2009). While a court must consider the statutory 

factors and explain its sentence, it need not explicitly 

reference § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the record. 

United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). 

The court “should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate 

court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a 

reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking 

authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).

On appeal, Mitchell does not challenge the procedural 

reasonableness of his sentence but contends that his 264-month 

prison sentence is substantively unreasonable. We disagree. 

The district court correctly calculated that his Guidelines 

range was 292 to 365 months and reasonably determined that a 

sentence of 264 months, 28 months below the low end of the 

range, was appropriate based on its thorough, individualized 

assessment of Mitchell’s case in light of his arguments and the 

§ 3553(a) factors. Based on a totality of the circumstances, we 
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conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, 

and we accord deference to its sentencing decisions. See United 

States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 106 (4th Cir. 2012).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED