90202 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 249 / Friday, December 29, 2023 / Notices 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 

SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

[NOTICE: (23–127)] 

National Environmental Policy Act; 

Agency Master Plan 

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA). 

ACTION: Notice of availability of the 

Agency Master Plan Final Programmatic 

Environmental Assessment (PEA) and 

the resulting Finding of No Significant 

Impact (FONSI). 

SUMMARY: NASA announces its decision 

to implement the Agency Master Plan. 

NASA’s decision is supported by the 

detailed analysis found in the Final 

PEA, as summarized in the agency’s 

FONSI, the availability of which is 

located under ADDRESSES. 

ADDRESSES: The complete text of the 

PEA and the FONSI for the Agency 

Master Plan are at https://

www.nasa.gov/emd/nepa-publicreviews/. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

Tina Norwood, NASA NEPA Manager, 

Environmental Management Division, 

NASA Headquarters Office of Strategic 

Infrastructure 300 E. Street SW, 

Washington DC 20546, 202–358–7324 or 

Email: tinanorwood@nasa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As early 

as 2011, NASA began integrating and 

optimizing operations across centers 

and mission support facilities (i.e., 

technical capability facilities) to reduce 

costs and revitalize the capabilities 

required to enable NASA’s portfolio of 

missions (NASA 2011, 26). In 2015, the 

Executive Office of the President 

distributed Management Procedures 

Memorandum No. 2015–01, tasking 

federal agencies to ‘‘move aggressively 

to dispose of surplus properties held by 

the federal government, make more 

efficient use of the government’s real 

property assets, and reduce the total 

square footage of their domestic office 

and warehouse inventory relative to an 

established baseline.’’ This directive set 

agency planning goals that were 

disseminated to centers. 

To better achieve its infrastructure 

reduction targets, NASA proposes to 

implement a centralized and 

standardized Agency Master Plan 

administrative process. This Proposed 

Action will help ensure program 

management and planning efforts are 

aligned across all mission areas and 

geographically separate centers and 

facilities, as well as implement a 

consistent and cost-effective set of 

processes, systems, and tools for 

enterprise-wide master planning. The 

Proposed Action is supported by 

NASA’s 2018 Strategic Plan, which 

recommended NASA develop an 

Agency Master Plan that identifies 

agency facility priorities over a 20-year 

timeframe (NASA 2018a). The 

implementation of an Agency Master 

Plan provides a framework upon which 

each NASA center is to develop its own 

Center Master Plan (CMP) tied to 

Agency-wide requirements, thereby 

allowing the agency to meet its overall 

infrastructure management targets and 

more efficiently (i.e., cost-effectively) 

achieve its mission as well as 

sustainment and infrastructure 

reduction goals. 

Joel Carney, 

Assistant Administrator, Office of Strategic 

Infrastructure. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28780 Filed 12–28–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7510–13–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50–286; 

NRC–2023–0180] 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian 

Point Energy Center; Exemption 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has issued an 

exemption in response to a request from 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC that would permit it, Holtec Indian 

Point 2, LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, 

LLC, to reduce the required level of 

primary offsite liability insurance from 

$450 million to $100 million and to 

eliminate the requirement to carry 

secondary financial protection for the 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 

Nos. 1, 2, and 3, collectively referred to 

as the Indian Point Energy Center 

(IPEC). 

DATES: The exemption was issued on 

November 16, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2023–0180 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2023–0180. Address 

questions about Docket IDs in 

Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 

telephone: 301–415–0624; email: 

Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical 

questions, contact the individual listed 

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at 

301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS 

accession number for each document 

referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that it is 

mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time (ET), Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl 

Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415– 

8534, email: Karl.Sturzebecher@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of 

the exemption is attached. 

Dated: December 26, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Marlayna V. Doell, 

Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning 

Branch, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

Attachment—Exemption 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50– 

286 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC Indian Point 

Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 

3; Exemption 

I. Background

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit

No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased 

generation on October 31, 1974, and all 

fuel was removed from the IP1 reactor 

vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, 

the Commission) issued an order 

approving the safe-storage condition of 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 249 / Friday, December 29, 2023 / Notices 90203 

IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued 

Amendment No. 52 to IP1’s provisional 

operating license, which changed the 

expiration date of the provisional 

license to be consistent with that of the 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 

No. 2 (IP2) facility license at that time. 

Pursuant to title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section 

50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer 

authorizes operation of the reactor or 

emplacement or retention of fuel into 

the reactor vessel. There is no IP1 spent 

fuel in wet storage at the Indian Point 

Energy Center (IPEC) site; IP1 spent fuel 

is stored onsite in dry cask storage at the 

independent spent fuel storage 

installation (ISFSI). 

By letter dated February 8, 2017 

(Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System Accession No. 

ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear Indian 

Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear 

Indian Point 3, LLC (the IPEC licensees 

at that time, collectively, Entergy) 

certified to the NRC that they planned 

to permanently cease power operations 

at IP2 and Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 

2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. 

By letters dated May 12, 2020, and May 

11, 2021 (ML20113J902 and 

ML21131A157), Entergy certified to the 

NRC that power operations permanently 

ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30, 2020, 

and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the 

same letters, Entergy certified to the 

NRC that the fuel was permanently 

removed from the IP2 and IP3 reactor 

vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 

spent fuel pools (SFPs) as of May 12, 

2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively. 

Based on the docketing of these 

certifications for permanent cessation of 

operations and permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessels, as 

specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 

CFR part 50 renewed facility licenses for 

IP2 and IP3 (Nos. DPR–26 and DPR–64, 

respectively) no longer authorize 

operation of the reactors or 

emplacement or retention of fuel in the 

reactor vessels. The facility is still 

authorized to possess, and store 

irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. At 

the time of the exemption request 

described below, spent fuel was stored 

onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the 

SFPs and in a dry cask ISFSI. 

II. Request/Action 

By letter dated March 25, 2022 

(ML22084A103), Holtec 

Decommissioning International, LLC 

(HDI), one of the licensees of IPEC and 

an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of 

Holtec International (Holtec), requested 

an exemption on behalf of Holtec Indian 

Point 2, LLC (a licensee of IP1 and IP2, 

referred to as Holtec IP2) and Holtec 

Indian Point 3, LLC (a licensee of IP3, 

referred to as Holtec IP3), from the 

requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 

concerning offsite primary and 

secondary liability insurance. 

HDI, Holtec IP2, and Holtec IP3 are 

hereafter collectively referred to as the 

licensee. The exemption from 10 CFR 

140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee 

to reduce the required level of primary 

offsite liability insurance from $450 

million to $100 million and to eliminate 

the requirement to carry secondary 

financial protection for IPEC. 

The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 

requires licensees to have and maintain 

primary financial protection in an 

amount of $450 million. In addition, 

licensees are required to participate in 

an industry retrospective rating plan 

(secondary financial protection) that 

commits licensees to pay into an 

insurance pool to be used for damages 

that may exceed primary insurance 

coverage. Participation in the industry 

retrospective rating plan will subject the 

licensee to deferred premium charges 

up to a maximum total deferred 

premium of $131,056,000 with respect 

to any nuclear incident at any operating 

nuclear power plant and up to a 

maximum annual deferred premium of 

$20,496,000 per incident. 

Many of the accident scenarios 

postulated in the updated safety 

analysis reports for operating power 

reactors involve failures or malfunctions 

of systems, which could affect the fuel 

in the reactor core and, in the most 

severe postulated accidents, would 

involve the release of large quantities of 

fission products. With the permanent 

cessation of power operations at IPEC 

and the permanent removal of the fuel 

from the reactor vessel, many accidents 

are no longer possible. Similarly, the 

associated risk of offsite liability 

damages that would require insurance 

or indemnification is commensurately 

lower for such plants. Therefore, the 

licensee requested an exemption from 

10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to permit a 

reduction in primary offsite liability 

insurance and to withdraw from 

participation in the industry 

retrospective rating plan. 

III. Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ‘‘Specific 

exemptions,’’ the Commission may, 

upon application of any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

such exemptions from the requirements 

of the regulations in 10 CFR part 140 

when the exemptions are authorized by 

law and are otherwise in the public 

interest. The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s request for an exemption from 

10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) and has concluded 

that the requested exemption is 

authorized by law and is otherwise in 

the public interest. 

The Price Anderson Act of 1957 

(PAA) requires that nuclear power 

reactor licensees have insurance to 

compensate the public for damages 

arising from a nuclear incident. 

Specifically, the PAA requires licensees 

of facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of 

100,000 electrical kilowatts or more’’ to 

maintain the maximum amount of 

primary offsite liability insurance 

commercially available (currently $450 

million) and a specified amount of 

secondary insurance coverage (currently 

up to $131,056,000 per reactor). In the 

event of an accident causing offsite 

damages in excess of $450 million, each 

licensee would be assessed a prorated 

share of the excess damages, up to 

$131,056,000 per reactor, for a total of 

approximately $13 billion per nuclear 

incident. The NRC’s regulations at 10 

CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA 

insurance requirements and set forth the 

amount of primary and secondary 

insurance each power reactor licensee 

must have. 

As noted above, the PAA 

requirements with respect to primary 

and secondary insurance and the 

implementing regulations at 10 CFR 

140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of 

facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of 

100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.’’ In 

accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 

license for a power reactor no longer 

authorizes operation of the reactor or 

emplacement or retention of fuel into 

the reactor vessel upon the docketing of 

the certifications for permanent 

cessation of operations and permanent 

removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. 

Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to 

generate power. 

Accordingly, a reactor that is 

undergoing decommissioning has no 

‘‘rated capacity.’’ Thus, the NRC may 

take the reactor licensee out of the 

category of reactor licensees that are 

required to maintain the maximum 

available insurance and to participate in 

the secondary retrospective insurance 

pool. 

The financial protection limits of 10 

CFR 140.11(a)(4) were established to 

require licensees to maintain sufficient 

insurance, as specified under the PAA, 

to satisfy liability claims by members of 

the public for personal injury, property 

damage, and the legal cost associated 

with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear 

accident at an operating reactor with a 

rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts 

electric or greater. Thus, the insurance 

levels established by this regulation, as 

required by the PAA, were associated 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
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with the risks and potential 

consequences of an accident at an 

operating reactor with a rated capacity 

of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater. 

The legal and associated technical 

basis for granting exemptions from 10 

CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY–93– 

127, ‘‘Financial Protection Required of 

Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants 

During Decommissioning,’’ dated May 

10, 1993 (ML12257A628). The legal 

analysis underlying SECY–93–127 

concluded that, upon a technical 

finding that lesser potential hazards 

exist after permanent cessation of power 

operations (and the reactor having no 

‘‘rated capacity’’), the Commission has 

the discretion under the PAA to reduce 

the amount of insurance required of a 

licensee undergoing decommissioning. 

As a technical matter, the fact that a 

reactor has permanently ceased power 

operations is not itself determinative as 

to whether a licensee may cease 

providing the offsite liability coverage 

required by the PAA and 10 CFR 

140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of 

freshly discharged irradiated fuel in the 

SFP at a recently shutdown reactor, the 

potential for an offsite radiological 

release from a zirconium fire with 

consequences comparable in some 

respects to an operating reactor accident 

remains. That risk is very low at the 

time of reactor shutdown because of 

design provisions that prevent a 

significant reduction in coolant 

inventory in the SFP under normal and 

accident conditions and becomes no 

longer credible once the continual 

reduction in decay heat provides ample 

time to restore coolant inventory and 

permits air cooling in a drained SFP. 

After that time, the probability of a large 

offsite radiological release from a 

zirconium fire is negligible for 

permanently shutdown reactors, but the 

SFP is still operational, and an 

inventory of radioactive materials still 

exists onsite. Therefore, an evaluation of 

the potential for offsite damage is 

necessary to determine the appropriate 

level of offsite insurance post shutdown, 

in accordance with the Commission’s 

discretionary authority under the PAA 

to establish an appropriate level of 

required financial protection for such 

permanently shutdown facilities. 

The NRC staff has conducted an 

evaluation and concluded that, aside 

from the handling, storage, and 

transportation of spent fuel and 

radioactive materials for a permanently 

shutdown and defueled reactor, no 

reasonably conceivable potential 

accident exists that could cause 

significant offsite damage. During 

normal power reactor operations, the 

forced flow of water through the reactor 

coolant system (RCS) removes heat 

generated by the reactor. The RCS 

transfers this heat away from the reactor 

core by converting reactor feedwater to 

steam, which then flows to the main 

turbine generator to produce electricity. 

Most of the accident scenarios 

postulated for operating power reactors 

involve failures or malfunctions of 

systems that could affect the fuel in the 

reactor core, which in the most severe 

postulated accidents would involve the 

release of large quantities of fission 

products. With the permanent cessation 

of reactor operations at IPEC and the 

permanent removal of the fuel from the 

reactor core, such accidents are no 

longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and 

supporting systems no longer operate 

and have no function related to the 

storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, 

postulated accidents involving failure or 

malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or 

supporting systems are no longer 

applicable. 

During reactor decommissioning, the 

principal radiological risks are 

associated with the storage of spent fuel 

onsite. On a case-by-case basis, 

licensees undergoing decommissioning 

have been granted permission to reduce 

the required amount of primary offsite 

liability insurance coverage from $450 

million to $100 million and to withdraw 

from the secondary insurance pool. One 

of the technical criteria for granting the 

exemption is that the possibility of a 

design-basis event that could cause 

significant offsite damage has been 

significantly reduced. 

The NRC staff performed an 

evaluation of the design-basis accidents 

for IPEC when permanently defueled as 

part of SECY–22–0102, ‘‘Request by 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC For Exemptions from Certain 

Emergency Planning Requirements for 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 

Nos. 1, 2, and 3,’’ dated November 18, 

2022 (ML22231A155). Based on its 

configuration and licensing basis, with 

no spent fuel stored in the IP1 SFP and 

a prohibition against storing any fuel in 

the pool in the future, there are no 

postulated Design Basis Accidents 

(DBAs) that remain applicable to IP1. 

The IP1 SFP is no longer in use because 

all spent fuel and other material has 

been removed, and the IP1 SFP has been 

drained. At the time of the exemption 

request, spent fuel was stored onsite in 

the IP2 and IP3 SFPs, with plans to 

move all spent fuel to dry cask storage 

at the onsite ISFSI in accordance with 

the licensee’s Post-Shutdown 

Decommissioning Activities Report 

dated December 19, 2019 

(ML19354A698). 

HDI has stated, and the NRC staff 

agrees, that while spent fuel remains in 

the SFPs, the only postulated designbasis accidents that would remain 

applicable to IPEC in the permanently 

defueled condition that could contribute 

a significant dose would be: (1) a fuel 

handling accident (FHA) in the fuel 

storage buildings; (2) an accidental 

release of waste gas; and (3) an 

accidental release-recycle of waste 

liquid. For completeness, the NRC staff 

also evaluated the applicability of other 

design-basis accidents documented in 

the IPEC Updated Final Safety Analysis 

Report (UFSAR) for IP2 and IP3 

(ML20259A199 and ML19282B159), 

respectively to ensure that these 

accidents would not have consequences 

that could potentially exceed the 10 

CFR 50.67 dose limits and Regulatory 

Guide 1.183, ‘‘Alternative Radiological 

Source Terms for Evaluating Design 

Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power 

Reactors’’ (ML003716792), dose 

acceptance criteria or approach the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

early phase protective action guides 

(PAGs) (ML17044A073). 

In the IPEC UFSAR, the licensee 

determined that after a decay time of at 

least 720 hours (30 days) following 

permanent cessation of power 

operations of each unit, the FHA doses 

would decrease to a level that would not 

warrant protective actions under the 

EPA early phase PAG framework, 

notwithstanding meeting the dose limit 

requirements under 10 CFR 50.67 and 

dose acceptance criteria under 

Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC staff 

notes that the doses from an FHA are 

dominated by relatively short-lived 

isotopes such as Iodine-131. Based on 

the permanent shutdown of IP3 on April 

30, 2021, after over two years of decay, 

the thyroid dose from an FHA would be 

negligible. The only isotope remaining 

in significant amounts, among those 

postulated to be released in a DBA FHA, 

would be Krypton-85. Because Krypton85 primarily decays by beta emission, 

the calculated skin dose from an FHA 

release would make an insignificant 

contribution to the total effective dose 

equivalent, which is the parameter of 

interest in the determination of the EPA 

early phase PAGs for sheltering or 

evacuation. Therefore, the NRC staff 

concludes that the dose consequence 

from an FHA for the permanently 

shutdown IPEC facility would not 

approach the EPA early phase PAGs. 

As part of the supporting 

documentation for an application for 

exemptions from various emergency 

planning requirements, HDI performed 

an analysis that includes the 

determination of the dose consequences 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 249 / Friday, December 29, 2023 / Notices 90205 

for a waste gas decay tank rupture 

accident. In that analysis, HDI 

reevaluated the dose from an accidental 

release of waste gas to reflect the 

removal of the waste gas decay tank(s) 

from operation and to reevaluate the 

dose at 15 months after the shutdown of 

IP3. Based on the revised analysis, the 

radiological consequences of a 

postulated waste gas decay tank rupture 

were determined to be negligible 

because the tanks are removed from 

operation, and depressurized and 

vented to atmosphere. 

Section 6.4, ‘‘Accidental ReleaseRecycle of Waste Liquid,’’ of the IP2 and 

IP3 Defueled Safety Analysis Reports 

(DSARs) (ML20259A199 and 

ML21270A059, respectively) addresses 

the accidental release of waste liquid 

and states that the hazard from these 

releases is derived only from any 

volatized components. The volatilized 

components are what comprise the 

waste gas accident. Thus, the accidental 

release of liquid waste is evaluated in 

the analysis for an accidental release of 

waste gas. 

The NRC staff reviewed the 

consequences of an FHA, waste gas 

release accident, and liquid tank failure 

accident in detail during the review of 

previously approved license 

amendment requests and exemptions for 

IPEC and found them to be acceptable. 

Since this technical information has not 

changed in relation to this exemption 

request, the NRC staff relied on these 

previous conclusions to conduct 

portions of the review for this 

exemption request. The NRC staff notes 

that while HDI continues to rely on the 

information from previously approved 

licensing actions, the calculated doses 

would be expected to be lower when 

this exemption is implemented due to 

additional decay time beyond the time 

assumed in the previously approved 

actions. Any offsite consequence from a 

design-basis radiological release is 

highly unlikely and, thus, a significant 

amount of offsite liability insurance 

coverage is not required. 

The licensee also analyzed the 

bounding radiological consequences of a 

postulated complete loss of SFP water 

from either the IP2 and IP3 SFPs (i.e., 

a pool draindown event), which 

NUREG–0586, ‘‘Final Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement on 

Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities,’’ 

Supplement 1 (ML023470327 and 

ML023500228), section 4.3.9, identifies 

is a beyond design-basis event. The HDI 

analysis considered the distances from 

both SFPs to both control rooms and the 

site boundary, as well as a combination 

of IP3 fuel in the IP2 SFP, to bound the 

analysis for both units. The analysis 

considered that the SFP water and the 

concrete SFP structures serve as 

radiation shielding. Therefore, a loss of 

water shielding above the fuel could 

increase the offsite radiation levels 

because of the gamma rays streaming 

out of the SFP and being scattered back 

to a receptor at the site boundary. The 

analysis determined that the limiting 

dose rate in the IP2 and IP3 control 

rooms at one year after permanent 

shutdown are less than 0.0259 millirem 

per hour (mrem/hr) and the dose rate to 

a receptor at the site boundary is less 

than 11.55 mrem/hr. Therefore, the NRC 

staff concludes that the dose 

consequence from a SFP draindown for 

the permanently shutdown IPEC facility 

would not approach the EPA early 

phase PAGs. 

The only beyond design-basis event 

that has the potential to lead to a 

significant radiological release at a 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

reactor is a zirconium fire in the SFP. 

The zirconium fire scenario is a 

postulated, but highly unlikely, accident 

scenario that involves the loss of water 

inventory from the SFP resulting in a 

significant heatup of the spent fuel and 

culminating in substantial zirconium 

cladding oxidation and fuel damage. 

The probability of a zirconium fire 

scenario is related to the decay heat of 

the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. 

Therefore, the risks from a zirconium 

fire scenario continue to decrease as a 

function of the time that IPEC has been 

permanently shut down. 

In SECY–93–127 the NRC staff 

concluded that there was a low 

likelihood and reduced short-term 

public health consequences of a 

zirconium fire once a decommissioning 

plant’s spent fuel has sufficiently 

decayed. In its Staff Requirements 

Memorandum, ‘‘Financial Protection 

Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear 

Power Plants during Decommissioning,’’ 

dated July 13, 1993 (ML003760936), the 

Commission approved a policy that 

authorized, through the exemption 

process, withdrawal from participation 

in the secondary insurance layer and a 

reduction in commercial liability 

insurance coverage to $100 million 

when a licensee is able to demonstrate 

that the spent fuel could be air-cooled 

if the SFP was drained of water. 

The NRC staff has used this technical 

criterion to grant similar exemptions to 

other decommissioning reactors (e.g., 

Duane Arnold Energy Center, published 

in the Federal Register on May 18, 2021 

(86 FR 26961)). Additional discussions 

of other decommissioning reactor 

licensees that have received exemptions 

to reduce their primary insurance level 

to $100 million are provided in SECY– 

96–256, ‘‘Changes to the Financial 

Protection Requirements for 

Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 

Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 

140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996 

(ML15062A483). These prior 

exemptions were based on the licensee 

demonstrating that the SFP could be aircooled consistent with the technical 

criterion discussed above. 

In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated 

Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 

Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28, 

2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy 

Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, 

and Emergency Preparedness 

Regulations at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in 

Spent Fuel Pools,’’ dated June 4, 2001 

(ML003721626 and ML011450420, 

respectively), the NRC staff discussed 

additional information concerning SFP 

zirconium fire risks at decommissioning 

reactors and associated implications for 

offsite insurance. Analyzing when the 

spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable 

of adequate air-cooling is one measure 

that demonstrates when the probability 

of a zirconium fire would be 

exceedingly low. 

The NRC staff evaluated the issue of 

zirconium fires and presented 

independent evaluations of SFP 

accident risk in NUREG–1738, 

‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool 

Accident Risk at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants’’ (ML010430066); 

NUREG/CR- 6451, ‘‘A Safety and 

Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR 

[Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR 

[Pressurized Water Reactor] 

Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 

Plants’’ (ML082260098); and NUREG/ 

CR–6441, ‘‘Analysis of Spent Fuel 

Heatup Following Loss of Water in a 

Spent Fuel Pool’’ (ML021050336). These 

documents describe the considerations 

surrounding a seismic event with the 

potential to result in a loss of SFP 

coolant that uncovers fuel and discuss 

the parameters under which the fuel is 

able to be air cooled in such a scenario. 

The NRC staff compared the IPEC 

facility with the reference plant in 

NUREG- 6451 and confirmed that the 

fuel assembly and spent fuel rack 

parameters for IP2 and IP3 are 

consistent with those assumed in 

NUREG–6451, or are conservative when 

compared to the generic values. 

Therefore, the NRC staff has high 

confidence that the stored fuel in the 

IPEC SFPs will remain in a coolable 

configuration following a beyond design 

basis seismic event. Additionally, the 

NRC staff compared the site-specific 

conditions at IPEC with the generic risk 

assumptions in NUREG–1738 and 

determined that the risk values in 


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NUREG–1738 bound the risks presented 

by IPEC. Based on IPEC’s conformance 

with the analysis in NUREG–6451 and 

NUREG–1738, the NRC finds there is 

reasonable assurance that the fuel stored 

in IPEC SFPs is air coolable 15 months 

after permanent shutdown of the 

reactor. 

In addition, the licensee performed a 

bounding analysis for the IP2 and IP3 

SFPs demonstrating that after the spent 

fuel has decayed for 15 months, with a 

complete loss of SFP water inventory 

with no heat loss or credit for aircooling (i.e., adiabatic heat-up), a 

minimum of 10 hours would be 

available before any fuel cladding 

temperature reaches 900 degrees Celsius 

(°C) from the time all cooling is lost. The 

10-hour criterion, conservatively, does 

not consider the time to uncover the 

fuel and assumes instantaneous loss of 

cooling to the fuel. The 10-hour time 

period is also not intended to represent 

the time that it would take to repair all 

key safety systems or to repair a large 

SFP breach. The 10-hour criterion is a 

conservative period of time in which 

pre-planned mitigation measures to 

provide makeup water or spray to the 

SFP can be reliably implemented before 

the onset of a zirconium cladding 

ignition. In addition, in the unlikely 

event that a release is projected to occur, 

10 hours would provide sufficient time 

for offsite agencies, if deemed 

warranted, to take appropriate action to 

protect the health and safety of the 

public. 

Given the permanent shutdown date 

of IP3 of April 30, 2021, the period in 

which the spent fuel could heat up to 

clad ignition temperature within 10 

hours under adiabatic conditions ended 

on August 1, 2022, after 15 months of 

fuel decay time. This analysis, ‘‘Holtec 

Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Calculation 

Methodology Topical Report, Revision 

2,’’ dated December 22, 2021 

(ML21357A005 [non-public]), was 

submitted by HDI in support of a 

request for exemptions from certain 

emergency planning requirements, 

dated December 22, 2021 

(ML21356B693). HDI provided further 

information in Enclosure 1, ‘‘Indian 

Point Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool 

Heat Up Calculations,’’ to HDI’s 

supplemental letter dated February 1, 

2022 (ML22032A117). 

In the NRC staff’s evaluation 

contained in SECY–22–0102, the NRC 

staff assessed the HDI accident analyses 

associated with the radiological risks 

from a zirconium fire at a permanently 

shutdown and defueled IPEC after 15 

months of fuel decay. For the highly 

unlikely beyond design-basis accident 

scenario where the SFP coolant 

inventory is lost in such a manner that 

all methods of heat removal from the 

spent fuel are no longer available, the 

NRC staff found that there will be a 

minimum of 10 hours from the 

initiation of the accident until the 

cladding reaches a temperature where 

offsite radiological release might occur. 

The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is 

sufficient time to support deployment of 

mitigation equipment, consistent with 

plant conditions, to prevent the 

zirconium cladding from reaching a 

point of rapid oxidation. As a result, the 

likelihood that such a scenario would 

progress to a zirconium fire is deemed 

not credible. 

Based on the above considerations, 

the NRC staff has determined that the 

licensee’s proposed reduction in 

primary offsite liability coverage to a 

level of $100 million and the licensee’s 

proposed withdrawal from participation 

in the secondary insurance pool for 

offsite financial protection are 

consistent with the policy established in 

SECY–93–127 and subsequent 

insurance considerations resulting from 

zirconium fire risks, as discussed in 

SECY–00–0145 and SECY–01–0100. 

The NRC has previously determined in 

SECY–00–0145 that the minimum 

offsite financial protection requirement 

may be reduced to $100 million and that 

secondary insurance is not required 

once it is determined that the spent fuel 

in the SFP is no longer thermalhydraulically capable of sustaining a 

zirconium fire based on a plant-specific 

analysis. In addition, the NRC staff 

notes that similar exemptions from 

these insurance requirements have been 

granted to other permanently shutdown 

and defueled power reactors upon 

satisfactory demonstration that the 

zirconium fire risk from the irradiated 

fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible 

concern. 

A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law 

The PAA and its implementing 

regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 

require licensees of nuclear reactors that 

have a rated capacity of 100,000 

kilowatts electric or more to have and 

maintain $450 million in primary 

financial protection and to participate in 

a secondary retrospective insurance 

pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, 

the Commission may grant exemptions 

from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140 

as the Commission determines are 

authorized by law. The legal and 

associated technical basis for granting 

exemptions from 10 CFR part 140 are set 

forth in SECY–93–127. The legal 

analysis underlying SECY–93–127 

concluded that, upon a technical 

finding that lesser potential hazards 

exist after permanent cessation of 

operations, the Commission has the 

discretion under the PAA to reduce the 

amount of insurance required of a 

licensee undergoing decommissioning. 

Based on its review of the exemption 

request, the NRC staff concludes that the 

technical criteria for relieving the 

licensee from its existing primary and 

secondary insurance obligations have 

been met. As explained above, the NRC 

staff found that no reasonably 

conceivable design-basis accident exists 

that could cause an offsite release 

greater than the EPA PAGs and, 

therefore, that any offsite consequence 

from a design- basis radiological release 

is highly unlikely and the need for a 

significant amount of offsite liability 

insurance coverage is unwarranted. 

Additionally, the NRC staff determined 

that, after 15 months decay, the fuel 

stored in the IPEC SFPs will be capable 

of being adequately cooled by air in the 

highly unlikely event of pool drainage. 

Moreover, in the highly unlikely beyond 

design-basis accident scenario where 

the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such 

a manner that all methods of heat 

removal from the spent fuel are no 

longer available, the NRC staff has 

determined that at least 10 hours would 

be available and is sufficient time to 

support deployment of mitigation 

equipment, consistent with plant 

conditions, to prevent the zirconium 

cladding from reaching a point of rapid 

oxidation. Thus, the NRC staff 

concludes that the fuel stored in the 

IPEC SFP will have decayed sufficiently 

by the requested effective date for the 

exemption of 15 months after 

permanent cessation of power 

operations to support a reduction in the 

required offsite insurance consistent 

with SECY–00–0145. 

The NRC staff has determined that 

granting the licensee’s proposed 

exemption will not result in a violation 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

section 170, or other laws, as amended, 

which require licensees to maintain 

adequate financial protection. 

Accordingly, consistent with the legal 

standard presented in SECY–93–127, 

under which decommissioning reactor 

licensees may be relieved of the 

requirements to carry the maximum 

amount of insurance available and to 

participate in the secondary 

retrospective premium pool where there 

is sufficient technical justification, the 

NRC staff concludes that the requested 

exemption is authorized by law. 

B. The Exemption is Otherwise in the 

Public Interest 

The financial protection limits of 10 

CFR 140.11 were established to require 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 249 / Friday, December 29, 2023 / Notices 90207 

licensees to maintain sufficient offsite 

liability insurance to ensure adequate 

funding for offsite liability claims 

following an accident at an operating 

reactor. However, the regulation does 

not consider the reduced potential for 

and consequence of nuclear incidents at 

permanently shutdown and 

decommissioning reactors. 

The basis provided in SECY–93–127, 

SECY–00–0145, and SECY–01–0100 

allows licensees of decommissioning 

plants to reduce their primary offsite 

liability insurance and to withdraw 

from participation in the retrospective 

rating pool for deferred premium 

charges. As discussed in these 

documents, once the zirconium fire 

concern is determined to be negligible, 

possible accident scenario risks at 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

reactors are greatly reduced when 

compared to the risks at operating 

reactors, and the associated potential for 

offsite financial liabilities from an 

accident are commensurately less. The 

licensee analyzed and the NRC staff 

confirmed that the risks of accidents 

that could result in an offsite 

radiological release are minimal, 

thereby justifying the proposed 

reductions in offsite primary liability 

insurance and withdrawal from 

participation in the secondary 

retrospective rating pool for deferred 

premium charges. 

Additionally, participation in the 

secondary retrospective rating pool 

could potentially have adverse 

consequences on the safe and timely 

completion of decommissioning. If a 

nuclear incident sufficient to trigger the 

secondary insurance layer occurred at 

another nuclear power plant, the 

licensee could incur financial liability 

of up to $131,056,000. However, 

because IPEC is permanently shut 

down, it cannot produce revenue from 

electricity generation sales to cover such 

a liability. Therefore, such liability if 

subsequently incurred could 

significantly affect the ability of the 

facility to conduct and complete timely 

radiological decontamination and 

decommissioning activities. In addition, 

as SECY–93–127 concluded, the shared 

financial risk exposure to the licensee is 

greatly disproportionate to the 

radiological risk posed by IPEC when 

compared to operating reactors. 

The reduced overall risk to the public 

at decommissioning power plants does 

not warrant that the licensee be required 

to carry full operating reactor insurance 

coverage after the requisite spent fuel 

cooling period has elapsed following 

final reactor shutdown. The licensee’s 

proposed financial protection limits will 

maintain a level of liability insurance 

coverage commensurate with the risk to 

the public. These changes are consistent 

with previous NRC policy as discussed 

in SECY–00–0145 and exemptions 

approved for other decommissioning 

reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose 

of the regulations will not be adversely 

affected by the reductions in insurance 

coverage. Accordingly, an exemption 

from participation in the secondary 

insurance pool and a reduction in the 

primary insurance to $100 million, a 

value more in line with the potential 

consequences of accidents, would be in 

the public interest in that this ensures 

that there will be adequate funds to 

address any of those consequences and 

helps to ensure the safe and timely 

decommissioning of the reactors. 

Therefore, the NRC staff has 

concluded that an exemption from 10 

CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit 

the licensee to lower the IPEC primary 

insurance levels and to withdraw from 

the secondary retrospective premium 

pool at the requested effective date of 15 

months after the permanent cessation of 

power operations, is in the public 

interest. 

C. Environmental Considerations 

The NRC’s approval of an exemption 

from insurance or indemnity 

requirements belongs to a category of 

actions that the Commission, by rule or 

regulation, has declared to be a 

categorical exclusion after first finding 

that the category of actions does not 

individually or cumulatively have a 

significant effect on the human 

environment. Specifically, the 

exemption is categorically excluded 

from the requirement to prepare an 

environmental assessment or 

environmental impact statement in 

accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25). 

Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting 

of an exemption from the requirements 

of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR 

is a categorical exclusion provided that: 

(i) there is no significant hazards 

consideration; (ii) there is no significant 

change in the types or significant 

increase in the amounts of any effluents 

that may be released offsite; (iii) there is 

no significant increase in individual or 

cumulative public or occupational 

radiation exposure; (iv) there is no 

significant construction impact; (v) 

there is no significant increase in the 

potential for or consequences from 

radiological accidents; and (vi) the 

requirements from which an exemption 

is sought involve surety, insurance, or 

indemnity requirements. 

As the Director of the Division of 

Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, 

and Waste Programs in the NRC’s Office 

of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards, I have determined that 

approval of the exemption request 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 

50.92, because reducing the licensee’s 

offsite liability requirements for IPEC 

does not: (1) involve a significant 

increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a 

new or different kind of accident from 

any accident previously evaluated; or 

(3) involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. The exempted 

financial protection regulation is 

unrelated to the operation of IPEC or 

site activities. Accordingly, there is no 

significant change in the types or 

significant increase in the amounts of 

any effluents that may be released 

offsite and no significant increase in 

individual or cumulative public or 

occupational radiation exposure. The 

exempted regulation is not associated 

with construction so there is no 

significant construction impact. The 

exempted regulation does not concern 

the source term (i.e., potential amount 

of radiation in an accident) or any 

activities conducted at the site. 

Therefore, there is no significant 

increase in the potential for, or 

consequences of, a radiological 

accident. In addition, there would be no 

significant impacts to biota, water 

resources, historic properties, cultural 

resources, or socioeconomic conditions 

in the region resulting from issuance of 

the requested exemption. The 

requirement for offsite liability 

insurance involves surety, insurance, or 

indemnity matters only. 

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 

environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

approval of this exemption request. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

140.8, the exemption is authorized by 

law and is otherwise in the public 

interest. Therefore, the Commission 

hereby grants the licensee an exemption 

from the requirements of 10 CFR 

140.11(a)(4) for IPEC. IPEC permanently 

ceased power operations on October 31, 

1974, April 30, 2020, and April 30, 

2021, for IP1, IP2 and IP3, respectively. 

The exemption from 10 CFR 

140.11(a)(4) permits IPEC to reduce the 

required level of primary financial 

protection from $450 million to $100 

million and to withdraw from 

participation in the secondary layer of 

financial protection 15 months after 

permanent cessation of power 


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90208 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 249 / Friday, December 29, 2023 / Notices 

operations, which was August 1, 2022. 

Because this period has already elapsed, 

the exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated: November 16, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Jane Marshall, 

Director, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28776 Filed 12–28–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50–286; 

NRC–2023–0175] 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian 

Point Energy Center; Exemption 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has issued an 

exemption in response to a request from 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC that would permit it, Holtec Indian 

Point 2, LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, 

LLC, to reduce the minimum coverage 

limit for onsite property damage 

insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 

million for the Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, 

collectively referred to as the Indian 

Point Energy Center (IPEC). 

DATES: The exemption was issued on 

November 14, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2023–0175 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2023–0175. Address 

questions about Docket IDs in 

Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 

telephone: 301–415–0624; email: 

Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical 

questions, contact the individual listed 

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at 

301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS 

accession number for each document 

referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that it is 

mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you 

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time (ET), Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl 

Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415– 

8534, email: Karl.Sturzebecher@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of 

the exemption is attached. 

Dated: December 26, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Marlayna V. Doell, 

Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning 

Branch, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

Attachment—Exemption 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50– 

286 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian 

Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 

2, and 3; Exemption 

I. Background 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 

No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased 

generation on October 31, 1974, and all 

fuel was removed from the IP1 reactor 

vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, 

the Commission) issued an order 

approving the safe-storage condition of 

IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued 

Amendment No. 52 to IP1’s provisional 

operating license, which changed the 

expiration date of the provisional 

license to be consistent with that of the 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 

No. 2 (IP2) facility license at that time. 

Pursuant to title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section 

50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer 

authorizes operation of the reactor or 

emplacement or retention of fuel into 

the reactor vessel. There is no IP1 spent 

fuel in wet storage at the Indian Point 

Energy Center (IPEC) site; IP1 spent fuel 

is stored onsite in dry cask storage at the 

independent spent fuel storage 

installation (ISFSI). 

By letter dated February 8, 2017 

(Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System Accession No. 

ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear Indian 

Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear 

Indian Point 3, LLC (the IPEC licensees 

at that time, collectively, Entergy) 

certified to the NRC that they planned 

to permanently cease power operations 

at IP2 and Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 

2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. 

By letters dated May 12, 2020, and May 

11, 2021 (ML20133J902 and 

ML21131A157), Entergy certified to the 

NRC that power operations permanently 

ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30, 2020, 

and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the 

same letters, Entergy certified to the 

NRC that the fuel was permanently 

removed from the IP2 and IP3 reactor 

vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 

spent fuel pools (SFPs) as of May 12, 

2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively. 

Based on the docketing of these 

certifications for permanent cessation of 

operations and permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessels, as 

specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 

CFR part 50 renewed facility licenses for 

IP2 and IP3 (Nos. DPR–26 and DPR–64, 

respectively) no longer authorize 

operation of the reactors or 

emplacement or retention of fuel in the 

reactor vessels. The facility is still 

authorized to possess and store 

irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. At 

the time of the exemption request 

described below, spent fuel was stored 

onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the 

SFPs and in a dry cask ISFSI. 

II. Request/Action 

By letter dated March 18, 2022 

(ML22077A132), Holtec 

Decommissioning International, LLC 

(HDI), one of the licensees of IPEC and 

an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of 

Holtec International (Holtec), requested 

an exemption on behalf of Holtec Indian 

Point 2, LLC (a licensee of IP1 and IP2, 

referred to as Holtec IP2) and Holtec 

Indian Point 3, LLC (a licensee of IP3, 

and referred to as Holtec IP3), from the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

concerning onsite liability insurance. 

HDI, Holtec IP2, and Holtec IP3 are 

hereafter collectively referred to as the 

licensee. The exemption from 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) would permit the licensee to 

reduce the required level of onsite 


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