FI LED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEV ENT H CI RCUI T J UNE 8, 2 010 J OHN LEY CLERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

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PRETKA, PAUL LITVAK, MIC HELLE LITVAK, PETER O'CONNELL, HARRIET DINARI, on be ha lf o f th em se lv es an d o th ers si m il arl y si tu at ed , Pl ai nt iff s- App el le es , ve rs us KOLTER CITY PLAZAII, INC., Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co urt fo r th e So uthe rnDis tri ctof F lo rid a

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ (Jun e 8 , 20 10 ) Befo re EDMONDSON, CARNES an d P RYOR, Ci rcu itJu dg es . CARNES, Ci rcu itJu dg e:The un de rlyin g d is pu te inth is cas e in vo lv es lu xu ry co nd om in iu m s i n West Pal m Beac h, Fl or id a. The p la in ti ffs en te redin to co nt ract s t o p ur ch as e uni ts in Two Ci ty Plaza , a ne w hi gh -ri se bu il di ng th atoff ers oc ean vi ews an d “ cru is e-l ik e am en it ie s” su ch as aZen Gar de n, M oo nl ig htThea tre , anda ro of to p re so rt p oo l an d s te am

roo m . The p la in ti ffs were ea ge r to en joy th os e am en it ie s, b utth ere was 1 tro ub le in pa rad is e, oringe tt in g p arad is e co ns tru ct ed . Exte ns iv e co ns tru ct io n de la y s (a ndm ay

be a do wnturn i n t he real est at e m ark et ) tu rn edth e p la in ti ffs ’ eag ern es s fo r th e p ro m is edco nd os in to eag ern es s t o g etou t o f th ei r co nt ract s. Afte r th e d ev el op er, Ko lt er Ci ty PlazaII, In c., refu se d t o l etth e p la in ti ffs ou t o f th e co nt ract s, the y

fil eda cl as s ac ti on laws ui t ag ai ns t Ko lt er i n F lo rid a st at e co urt, al le gi ng vi ol at io ns of t he Flo rid a Co nd om in iu m Act as well as b reac h o f co nt ract . Thi s ap pe al is no t ab ou t the m eri ts of the laws ui t b utab ou t wh ethe r itwil l be de ci de d i n s ta te or f

ed eral co urt. Itbri ng s u s i m po rta ntis su es of f

ed eral rem ov al juri sd ic ti on an d t he Cla ss Acti on Fai rn es s Act , th e d eci si on of wh ic h requi res th atwe tak e a cl os e lo okba ckat Lo wery v. Al ab am a Po wer Co ., 48 3 F .3d 11 84 (11 th Cir . 20 07 ). The d is tri ctco urt re li edon Lowery in g ran ti ng th e pl ai nt iff s’ m ot io n t o re m an d t hi s l aws ui t b ackto st at e co urt. We thi nkit See Two City

Plaza, Amenity

Tour, http://www.twocity plaza.com/amenityTour.php 1 (last visited May

11, 2010); Two City

Plaza, Building Amenities, http://www.twoc ity

plaza.com/amenity .php (last visited May 11, 2010). 2m is ap pl ie d o r ov erex te nd edth atde ci si on . As we wil l ex pl ai n, Lo wery was acas e th atin vo lv edth e rem ov al pro cedur es inth e se co ndpa rag rap h o f 28 U.S.C. § 14 46 (b ), an d t he de ci si on m us t b e rea d i n t ha t co nt ex t. Whil e so m e o f th e la ng ua ge of t he op in io n s weep s m or e b ro ad ly, itis di ct a in so far a s a § 14 46 (b ) fir stpa rag rap h c as e, li ke th is on e, is co nc ern ed . Whi le we m ay co ns id er d ic tafor it s p ers ua si ve va lu e, we are n otpe rs ua de d t o fo ll ow Lo wery ’s di ct a ab ou t the type of ev id en ce a d efen da ntth atrem ov es a cas e u nd er the fir stpa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) m ay us e inest ab li sh in g the requi si te am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y .

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On Ap ril 9, 2 00 9, An dr ew Pret ka , Pau l Li tv ak , andMi ch el e Lit va k fi le d a cl as s ac ti on co m

pl ai ntag ai ns t Ko lt er i n F lo rid a st at e co urt. Ko lt er was serve d with aco py of th e in it ia l co m pl ai nton th e sa m e d ay . On Apr il 27 , 20 09 , th os e th ree p la in ti ffs , join edby PeterO’ Co nn el l, Harr ie t Di na ri, B ru ce Fi sh er, an d Dan ie l D’Lou gh y , fil edanam en de d c om pl ai ntan d h aditserve d t wo d ay s l at er. The two co m

pl ai nt s ar e m at eri al ly ide nt ic al ex cep t tha t the am en de d c om pl ai nt was bro ug htby all s ev en , in st eadof ju stth ree, n am edpl ai nt iff s. (Fo r si m

pl ic it y , we wil l re fer t o t he am en de d, o pe rat iv e co m pl ai ntas “ th e co m

pl ai nt ” u nl es s ot he rwis e n ot ed .)

3Bas edon all eg edvi ol at io ns of t he Flo rid a Co nd om in iu m Act, as well as br each of c on tra ct , th e p la in ti ffs so ug htinth e co m pl ai nt“ to res ci ndth e p ur ch as e an d s al e co nt ract s an d o bt ai n t he return o f th ei r de po si ts an d t he return o f th e de po si ts forall si m il arl y

si tu at edde po si to rs .” Co m pl ai nt¶ 3. As forth e am ou nt in co nt ro ve rs y , th e que st io n a t the he artof t hi s ap pe al , th e co m pl ai ntis in de te rm in at e. It s ta te s t ha t the cas e “ is anact io n fo r m on et ary da m ag es inex ces s of $1 5,0 00 .00 , exc lu si ve of i nt eres t, co st s an d a tt orne y ’s fees .” Id . ¶ 4. The co m pl ai nt , ho wev er, d oe s co nt ai n s om e ad di ti on al in fo rm at io n o n t he am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y . Cop ie s o f th e n am edpl ai nt iff s’ con tra ct s ar e at ta ch edto th e co m pl ai nt . Tho se ex hi bi ts sh are “ id en ti cal co nt ractlan gu ag e” n oton ly w it h each ot he r, bu t al so with t he co nt ract s ex ecu te d b y un nam edpu ta ti ve cla ss m em be rs . Id. ¶ 2 2. On e p artof t ha t i de nt ic al co nt ractlan gu ag e is a li ne wher e 2 th e p art ie s t o e ach ag reem en t en te redth e “ In it ia l Dep os it ” p ai d t o t he esc ro w ag en t, the am ou ntof wh ic h was “ equa l t o 1 0% o f [the ] Pu rch as e Pri ce.” An ot he r pa rt o f th e co nt ractlan gu ag e sh aredby the ag reem en ts is anen try for the

“ Co ns tru ct io n P aym en t” pa idto th e se ll er, the am ou ntof wh ic h a ls o was “ equa l t o
The c omplaint ex plains that “as a matter of la

w, eve ry agree ment for the pur chase of a 2 unit in the subject condominium was require d to be identical in for m” and that Kolter

had to file the prospec tive form agree ment with the Fe dera l Office of Interstate L and Sales Regulation. Complaint ¶ 23; see also id. ¶ 47 (statingthat “all per sons who enter ed into the identical f orm purcha se and sa le agree ment as the Class Plaintiffs” will be included in the c lass). 410 % of t he Purch as e Pri ce.” Itis un di sp ut edth atth e su m of e ach pl ai nt iff’s

“ in it ia l d ep os it ” an d “ co ns tru ct io n p aym en t” co un t t owa rdth e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y ; the pl ai nt iff s wan t b ot h o f th os e d ep os it s re tu rn ed . The s ix ex hi bi ts 3 at ta ch edto th e co m

pl ai nt , onwhi ch th e requi redde po si t am ou nt s h av e b een writ te n, s ho w th atth e n am edpl ai nt iff s ag reedto m ak e in it ia l d ep os it s an d co ns tru ct io n p aym en ts to ta li ng $6 28 ,24 0; th e to ta l d ep os itpe r co nd om in iu m ran gi ng fro m

$7 3,7 80 to $1 21 ,60 0, wi th th e av erag e b ei ng $1 04 ,70 7. 4 The co m pl ai ntals o s ta te s t ha t “ [t]he cla ss is be li ev edto co ns is t o f ov er 3 00 m em be rs .” Id . ¶ 48 . The co m pl ai ntan d i ts att ach m en ts do no t i de nt ify all th e cl as s m em

be rs , bu t i t al le ge s t ha t the ir i de nt it y is “ a m at te r cap ab le of m in is te ria l de te rm in at io n” fro m

Kol te r’s reco rd s. Id . ¶ 55 (“ The on ly ind iv idua l, as op po se d to co m m on , is su e is th e id en ti fic at io n o f th e cl as s m em be rs who pro vi de d d ep os it s fo r co ns tru ct io n o f a co nd om in iu m un itto th e Defen da nt , a m atte r cap ab le of

The c omplaint seeks the re turn of “a ll sums deposit ed” by the plaintiffs, includingthe 3 so-ca lled construction pay ment. See Complaint ¶ 37 (“a ll sums deposit ed”) ; id. ¶ 53 (re fer ringto deposits “for the construction” of eac h condominium); id. ¶ 55 (ref erring to “ deposits for construction”) . Be cause one of the condominium units was purc hased jointly by named plaintiffs Paul 4 and Miche le L itvak, there are seven na med plaintiffs but only

six exhibi ts. Ex hibits A through F of the amended c omplaint show that: P retka agree d to make a deposit of $118,720; Paul and Michele L itvak agree d to make a deposit of $121,600; O’Connell agree d to make a deposit of $89,240; Dinari agree d to make a deposit of $103,620; Fisher a gree d to make a deposit of $73,780; and D’L oughy agree d to make a deposit of $121,280. 5m in is te ria l d et erm in at io n fr om Defen da nt ’s reco rd s.”) . The co m pl ai ntals o a ll eg es th atth e n am edpl ai nt iff

s’ cla im s ar e typi cal of t ho se of t he cla ss . Id. ¶ 4 9 (“ Pl ai nt iff

s’ cla im s ar e typi cal of t ho se of t he cla ss m em be rs . All c la im s ar e b as ed on th e sa m e fac tu al an d l eg al th eo rie s i nv ol vi ng th e sa m e Co nd om in iu m bu il di ng , th e sa m e fo rm

co ntract(requi redby law to be id en ti cal forall pu rch as ers ), th e sa m e d el in qu en t d ev el op er, the same bas is forres ci ss io n a nd/o r br each , andth e sa m e u lt im at e rel ie f—t he return o f th e p ur ch as ers ’ de po si ts .”). On M ay 8, 2 00 9, wh ic h was th e twe nt y -n in th da y aft er the in it ia l co m

pl ai nt was fil ed , Kol te r rem ov edth e cas e to th e So ut he rnDis tri ctof F lo rid a, pu rs ua ntto th e Cl as s Act io n F ai rn es s Actof 2 00 5 (“ CAFA”), Pub. L. No. 1 09 -2 , 11 9 S ta t. 4 (co di fie d i n s cat te redsec ti on s o f 28 U.S.C.). Kol te r’s no ti ce o f rem ov al st at edth at th e p ro po se d c la ss co ns is ts of m or e th an10 0 m em be rs , th atth e p art ie s ar e m in im al ly div ers e, an d t ha t the ag gr eg at e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y ex ceed s $ 5 m il li on , exc lu si ve of i nt eres t an d c os ts . Kol te r’s no ti ce o f rem ov al als o s ta te d t ha t CAF A’ s amoun t-i n- co nt ro ve rs y requi rem en t was m etbe cau se th e co m pa ny had“ co ll ect edpu rch as e d ep os it s fo r un it s atth e Two Ci ty Plazaco nd om in iu m to ta li ng inex ces s o f $5 m il li on .” Kol te r supp orte d t ha t fa ctua l as se rti on by atta ch in g t o t he no ti ce o f rem ov al a swo rn de cl arat io n b y

Mi ch ael Cla rk e, Ch ie f Fi na nc ia l Offi cer o f Kol te r’s pa ren t 6co m

pa ny. In h is de cl arat io n, Cl ark e st at es th atKol te r’s co rp or at e rec or ds are 5
m ai nt ai ne d u nd er h is “ supe rv is io n, d ire ct io n, an d c on tro l” an d t ha t h e h adpe rs on al kn owl ed ge of t he fact s t ha t h e was set ti ng forth . Clarke st at edth atTwo Ci ty Plaza co nt ai ns 46 8 l ux ury

un it s, an d t ha t “ m or e th an10 0 p ro sp ect iv e p ur ch as ers of co nd om in iu m

un it s atTwo Ci ty Plazaha ve ex ecu te d t he same purch as e an d s al e fo rm co ntract s as th os e at ta ch edas e xh ib it s t o t he Am en de d C om pl ai nt , sav e fo r cert ai n b uyer-s pe ci fic ad de nd a to th os e co ntract s.” He als o a tt es te d t ha t Ko lt er 6 ha d “ co ll ect edm or e th an$5 m il li on inco nd om in iu m un itpurch as e d ep os it s fr om pr os pe ct iv e p ur ch as ers of u ni ts at Two Cit y Pla za.” Onth atba si s, Ko lt er’s n ot ic e of rem ov al arg ue d t ha t “ itis cle ar fro m th e al le ga ti on s o f th e Am en de d C om pl ai nt as well as t he fact s s etforth in th is Not ic e o f Rem ov al th atth e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y

in th is cas e ex ceed s t he $5 ,00 0,0 00 m in im um requi redun de r 28 U.S.C. § 1 33 2( d) (2 ).”

A sworn de clar ation is leg ally the same a s an af

fidavit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746. 5 Clarke’ s statement that “more than 100” pr ospective pur chase rs ar e involved does not 6 contra dict the plaintiffs’ br oader alleg ation of “ove r 300” putative class member s. After all, “over 300” is “more than 100.” Clarke probably ref err ed to “more than 100” putative c lass members be cause that is all he nee ded to show in order for Kolter

to satisfy CAFA’ s numerosity require ment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (B )(i) (providingthat for a civil action to qualify

as a mass action under

CAFA, the casemust invol ve the “ monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons” ). 7The pl ai nt iff s fi le d am ot io n t o re m an d o n M ay 26 , 20 09 , arg ui ng th at Lowery requi redth e d is tri ctco urt t o i gn or e Cl ark e’s de cl arat io n b ecau se itwas n ot a d oc um en t re cei ve d fr om th e p la in ti ffs . 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 3– 15 (“ [U]nde r [2 8 U.S.C.] § 1 44 6( b) , inass es si ng th e p ro pr ie ty of rem ov al , th e co urt co ns id ers th e do cu m en t re cei ve d b y

th e d efen da ntfro m

th e p la in ti ff—

be itth e in it ia l co m

pl ai nt ora la te r rec ei ve d p ap er— an d d et erm in es whet he r th atdo cu m en t an d t he no ti ce o f rem ov al un am

bi gu ou sl y est ab li sh fed eral juri sd ic ti on .”). On J un e 1 2, 2 00 9, Ko lt er fi le d a n o pp os it io n t o re m an d m ak in g s ev eral co nt en ti on s. Fi rs t, i t co nt en de d t ha t the juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntis “read il y de du ci bl e” fr om

th e p la in ti ffs ’ co m

pl ai nt , eve n i f Cl ark e’s de cl arat io n wer e ig no red . See i d. at12 11 (“ If the juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntis eit he r st at edcle arl y on th e fac e o f th e d oc um en ts be fo re the co urt, o r rea di ly deduc ib le fro m th em , th en th e co urt h as juri sd ic ti on .”). Kol te r ba se d t ha t as se rti on on anex trapo la ti on fro m th e n am edpl ai nt iff

s’ dep os itam ou nt s t o a t l eas t 3 01 na m edan d u nn am edcla ss m em be rs . Seco nd , Kol te r co nt en de d t ha t Lo wery , a to rts cas e, do es no t ap pl y to a 7 co nt ract -rel at eddi sp ut e, su chas t hi s ca se , wher e th e d efen da ntha s u ni qu e

Kolter a rgued that the smallest “initial deposit” made by a name d plaintiff—not 7 including the “construc tion pay ment” that ea ch plaintiff a lso agree d to pay —was $36,890. That amount multipl ied by

301, the minimum number of putative class plaintiffs, is $11,103,890—more than twic e the thre shold require ment of CAFA . 8kn owl ed ge of t he va lu e o f th e p la in ti ffs ’ cl ai m s. See Lowery, 483 F.3dat 1 21 4

n.6 6 (“ A def

en da ntwou ldbe free to in tro du ce ev id en ce re ga rd in g d am ag es ari si ng fro m a so ur ce s uc h a s a c on tra ctpro vi si on whethe r orno t the de fen dantrece iv ed th e co nt ractfro m

th e p la in ti ff.”). Acco rd in gl y , Kol te r arg ue d t ha t i t co ul d re ly on Cl ark e’s de cl arat io n a s ev id en ce o f th e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y . Thir d, Ko lt er co nt en de d t ha t the di st ric t co urt co ul d a ndsh ou ldco ns id er the ev id en ce tha t i t h ad subm it te d wi th it s o pp os it io n t o re m an d. Th e b ul k o f th atpo st -rem ov al ev id en ce was th e fi rs t thr ee p ag es of e ve ry un na m edpl ai nt iff’s con tra ct —i .e., eve ry ag reem en t ex ecu te d b y

a pu rch as er wh os e d ep os it s Ko lt er h adno t re tu rn ed . Ano th er ex hi bi t at ta ch edto Kol te r’s op po si ti on to rem an d was a swo rnde cl arat io n fro m Fran ci ne Gut ie rrez , th e Co nt ractan d C lo si ng Man ag er fo r Kol te r’s pa ren t co m pa ny. Gut ie rrez att es te d t ha t s he ha d p ers on al ly revi ewedall of t he co nt ract s, as well as t he fin an ci al reco rd s fo r th e p ur ch as e d ep os it s t ha t Ko lt er s ti ll he ld . Bas edon he r rev ie w, Gut ie rrez swo re tha t Ko lt er p os se ss edco nd om in iu m pu rch as e d ep os it s t ot al in g $ 41 ,18 3,2 26 .08 . 8 The di stric t co urt h el d ahe ari ng onNov em be r 13 , 20 09 , to he ar ar gu m en t on whet he r th e am ou ntin co ntro ve rs y ex ceed s $ 5 m il li on . At th e h eari ng th e
Kolter a lso submit ted, with its opposit ion to remand, thre e dema nd letters that it had 8 rec eived f rom plaintiffs’ c ounsel. We will not address that evidenc e, howe ver, be causeKolter expressly stated in its reply

brief that it “is not asking this Court to consider any such letters.” 9pl ai nt iff

s ar gu edth atth ey

“ jus t d on ’t kn ow” th ei r po te nt ia l d am ag es “ atth is po in t in ti m e,” p rimaril y

be cau se th e num

be r of cla ss pl ai nt iff

s was un cert ai n. With res pe ctto th e d am ag e am ou ntforeach cla ss m em be r, ho wev er, the pl ai nt iff s adm it te d t ha t “ we lo okat, as th e Defen da nt s d idinth ei r an al y si s, the va rio us de po si t am ou nt s.” R el y in g o n the Lowery deci si on , th e p la in ti ffs arg ue d t ha t the di st ric t co urt, i n a ss es si ng th e am ou ntinco ntro ve rs y , was l im it edto th e “ fo ur co rn ers ” o f th e d oc um en ts th e p la in ti ffs ha d p ro vi de d t o t he de fen da nt s; th ey in si st edth atth e Cl ark e an d Gu ti erre z d ecl arat io ns , as wel l as th e u nn am ed pl ai nt iff s’ con tra ct s, were all “ ex tra ne ou s.” The di stric t co urt g ran te d the pl ai nt iff s’ m ot io n t o re m an d o n No ve m be r 30 , 20 09 , rul in g t ha t Ko lt er h adfai le d t o p ro ve , by a p rep on de ran ce o f ev id en ce, tha t th e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y ex ceed s $ 5 m il li on . See Pre tk a v . Kol te r Ci ty PlazaII, In c., No. 0 9- 80 70 6, 2 00 9 WL 45 47 04 2 (S .D. Fla. No v. 3 0, 2 00 9) . Spe ci fic al ly, th e d is tri ctco urt: (1) readLowery as b arri ng co ns id erat io n o f Cl ark e’s de cl arat io n, Gu ti erre z’s de cl arat io n, an d the un na m edpl ai nt iff s’ con tra ct s b ecau se no ne of the m

is “ a d oc um en t re cei ve d b y Defen da ntfro m

Pla in ti ffs ”; (2) read Lowery as r equi rin g i t t o re

ject Ko lt er’s “ im

pe rm is si bl e sp ecu la ti on ” o n the

“po te nt ia l d am ag e cl ai m

of p ut at iv e cl as s m em

be rs , as o pp os edto nam ed pl ai nt iff s” ; (3 ) an d re adLowery as b arri ng co ns id erat io n o f th e Gut ie rrez 10de cl arat io n a ndth e u nn am edpl ai nt iff s’ con tra ct s b ecau se Kol te r di d n otsubm it th em at t he ti m e o f it s n ot ic e o f rem ov al . Kol te r ap pl ie d t o thi s C ou rt f or pe rm is si on to ap pe al on Decem be r 9, 2 00 9, an d we g ran te d t he ap pl ic at io n o n Apr il 5, 2 00 9. 9 II. THE JURISDIC TIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REMOVAL W e rev ie w de n ov o t he di st ric t co urt’s d eci si on to rem an d aCAFA cas e to st at e co urt fo r la ckof s ub ject m at te r juri sd ic ti on . Lowery, 48 3 F .3dat 1 19 3; Mi ed em a v . Maytag Co rp ., 45 0 F .3d13 22 , 13 26 (11 th Cir . 20 06 ); s ee 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 53 (c)( 1) (cre at in g a n e xc ep ti on to 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 7( d) for CAFA cas es ). CAFA g iv es th e d is tri ctco urts subjec t m at te r juri sd ic ti on to en te rta in a

“ m as s ac ti on ” rem ov edfro m st at e co urt p ro vi de d t ha t atlea stfou r requi rem en ts are m et . “ The se requi rem en ts are: (1) anam ou ntinco ntro ve rs y requi rem en t o f an ag gr eg at e o f $5 ,00 0,0 00 in cla im s; (2) a di ve rs it y requi rem en t o f m in im al di ve rs it y ; (3 ) a num ero si ty requ ire m en t tha t the act io n i nv ol ve th e m on et ary cl ai m s of 10 0 o r m or e p la in ti ffs ; an d (4 ) a co m m on al it y requi rem en t tha t the pl ai nt iff s’ cl ai m s i nv ol ve co m

m on qu es ti on s o f la w or fa ct .” Lowery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 20 2– 03 ; The orde r grantingKolter’s a pplication beg an a sixty -day period within which this Court 9 must “complete a ll action on such appe al, includingrende ringjudgme nt,” 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2). See Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F .3d 1159, 1162–63 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the six ty -day

period be g ins when the c ourt of appe als grants lea ve to appe al). On Ma

y 27, 2010, we issued a

n order grantingthe cour

t, for g ood cause shown and in the intere sts of justice, a ten da y extension t o, and including , J une 14, 2010. See 28 U .S.C. § 1453(c)(3) (B ). 11se e 2 8 U.S.C. § 13 32 (d )(1 1) . The o nl y on e o f th os e requi rem en ts th atis co nt es te d in th is ap pe al is th e fi rs t o ne —wh ethe r th e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y ex ceed s $ 5 m il li on . A cou rt’s a na lysis of t he am ou nt -in -co nt ro ve rs y requi rem en t fo cu se s o n ho w m uc h i s i n c on tro ve rs y

at t he ti m e o f rem ov al , no t l at er. See Vegav. T-Mo bi le UNITED STAT ES, Inc ., 56 4 F .3d12 56 , 12 68 n.1 2 (1 1th C ir. 2 00 9) ; Mi ed em a, 45 0 F .3dat 1 33 2 n .9; Sie rm in sk i v . Trans ou th Fin . Cor p., 2 16 F.3d94 5, 94 6 (1 1th C ir. 2 00 0) (ho ld in g t ha t a c ou rt m ay co ns id er ev id en ce s ub m it te d a fte r th e rem ov al pe ti ti onis fil ed , “bu t o nl y to est ab li sh th e fac ts pre se ntat t he ti m e o f rem ov al ”). As t he Fir stCir cu itha s ex pl ai ne d, “ th e p la in ti ffs ’ li ke li ho odof s uc ces s on th e m eri ts is lar ge ly irrel ev an t t o t he co urt’s jur is di ct io n b ecau se th e p ert in en t qu es ti on is whatis in co nt ro ve rs y inth e cas e, no t h ow m

uc h t he pl ai nt iff

s ar e ul ti m at el y

li ke ly to re co ve r.” Am oc he v. Gu aran te e Tru stLife I ns . Co., 5 56 F.3d 41 , 51 (1s t Ci r. 20 09 ); s ee al so McPh ai l v . Deere & Co ., 52 9 F .3d94 7, 9 56 (10 th Ci r. 20 08 ) (“ The am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y is no t p ro of

of the am ou ntth e p la in ti ff wil l re co ve r. Rathe r, itis anest im at e o f th e am ou ntth atwil l b e p utat i ss ue inth e co ur se of t he li ti ga ti on .”); Bri ll v. Co un trywide Hom e Loans , Inc ., 42 7 F .3d44 6, 44 8 (7 thCir . 20 05 ).

12“ In de te rm in at e co m pl ai nt s p os e two in de pe nd en t an al yti cal pro bl em s, wh ic h sh ou ldno t b e, bu t s om et im es are, co nf us ed .” Ro bi ns on v. Qu al ity Ins . Co., 6 33 F. Supp . 57 2, 5 75 (S.D. Ala. 1 98 6) . The fi rs t p ro bl em is whet he r rem ov al is juri sd ic ti on al ly pro pe r. See 2 8 U.S.C. § 13 32 . The s eco ndpro bl em is whet he r rem ov al is ti m el y , whi chis no t a ju ris di ct io na l i ss ue . See 2 8 U.S.C. § § 1 44 6, 14 53 (b ); s ee al so In r e Uni ro y al Goo dr ic h Ti re Co ., 10 4 F .3d32 2, 3 24 (11 th Cir . 19 97 ) (“ The un ti m el in es s o f a rem ov al is a pr oc edur al , in st eadof ajuri sd ic ti on al , de fect .”); W eek s v . Fid . & Cas . Co. o f N.Y., 21 8 F .2d50 3, 5 04 (5t h C ir. 1 95 5) 1 0 (“ [T]he ti m e li m it at io n p res cri be d b y th e rem ov al st atut e wit hi n wh ic h ape ti ti on fo r rem ov al m ay

be fil edis no t juris di ct io na l, b utis m erel y m od al an d fo rm al . . . .”). W e wil l d is cu ss th e juri sd ic ti on al is su es he re an d t he pro cedur al is su es in PartIII.

A. The Bu rd enof P ers ua si on an d S ta nd ardof P ro of

“ CAFA d oe s n otch an ge th e tr ad it io na l ru le th atth e p arty see ki ng to rem ov e th e cas e to fed eral co urt b ears th e b ur de n o f es tabl is hi ng fed eral juri sd ic ti on .” Eva ns v. Walt er In du s., In c., 44 9 F .3d11 59 , 11 64 (11 th Cir . 20 06 ); s ee al so Lowery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 20 7– 08 ; M ie de m a, 45 0 F .3dat 1 32 8. “ Whe re, as he re, the

In Bonne r v. City

of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc), w e 1 0 adopted a s binding pre cede nt all decisions of the for mer F ifth Circuit handed down be fore October 1, 1981. 13pl ai nt iff

ha s n otpl eda sp eci fic am ou ntof d am ag es , th e rem ov in g d efen da ntm us t pr ov e b y a pr ep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce tha t the am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y ex ceed s th e juri sd ic ti on al requi rem en t.” Will ia m s v . Bes t Bu y Co ., Inc ., 26 9 F .3d13 16 , 13 19 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ); s ee al so Lowery, 483 F.3dat 1 20 8– 10 ; Tap sc ot t v . MS Deal er Se rv . Cor

p., 7 7 F .3d13 53 , 13 56 –5 7 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 6) (“ [W] e h ol d wh ere a pl ai nt iff ha s m ad e anun sp eci fie d d em an d fo r da m ag es inst at e co urt, a re m ov in g de fen da ntm

us t p ro ve by a prep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce tha t the am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y

m or e li ke ly tha n n otex ceed s t he [ap pl ic ab le ] juri sd ic ti on al requi rem en t.” ( em

ph as is ad de d) ), ov erru le d o n o th er g ro un ds by Coh env. Offi ce Dep ot , Inc ., 20 4 F .3d10 69 , 10 72 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ). W e co nc lu de d i n Lo wery th atitwou ldbe “ im

pe rm is si bl e sp ecu la ti on ” fo r a co urt t o h azar d agu es s o n the juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y “ witho utth e be ne fitof a ny evi de nc e [o n] th e v al ue of i nd iv idua l cl ai m s.” 4 83 F.3dat 1 22 0; see al so id . at 1 21 4– 15 (“ If [the de fen da nt ’s] ev id en ce i s i ns uf fic ie ntto est ab li sh th at rem ov al was p ro pe r orth atjuri sd ic ti on was p res en t, n ei th er the de fen da nt s n orth e co urt m ay sp ecu la te in anatt em

ptto m ak e up fo r th e n ot ic e’s fai li ng s. Th e ab se nc e o f fac tu al all eg at io ns pe rti ne ntto th e ex is te nc e o f juri sd ic ti on is di sp os it iv e an d, i n s uc h abs en ce, the ex is te nc e o f juri sd ic ti on sh ou ldno t b e di vi ne d b y

lo ok in g t o t he st ars .” (fo ot no te an d c it at io n o m it te d) ); M ie de m a, 45 0 14F.3 d a t 1 33 2. Be cau se th e p ro pe r in te rp ret at io n o f Lowery ’s “ im pe rm is si bl e sp ecu la ti on ” ru le is im

po rta nt , we wil l ex pl ai n i t i n g reat er d et ai l. InLowery the de fen dant , Alab am a Po wer, h adatt ach edto it s n ot ic e o f rem ov al co pi es of t he in it ia l co m pl ai ntan d the th irdam en de d c om pl ai nt , bu t no th in g e ls e. 48 3 F .3dat 1 18 9 & n.8 . Tho se pl ead in gs off eredno sp eci fic fact s on th e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y . See i d. at12 19 (“ [The th irdam en de d] co m pl ai nt co nt ai ns ne it he r anadda m nu m claus e in di cat in g t he am ou ntof d am ag es so ug ht , no r an y ot he r co nc ret e in fo rm at io n abo utth e v al ue of p la in ti ffs cla im s.” ( em ph as is ad de d) ); s ee al so Lowery v. Hon eywell Int ’l, Inc., 4 60 F. Sup p. 2 d 1 28 8, 1 29 1 (N.D. Ala. 2 00 6) (“ The re i s n ot hi ng inth e o rig in al co m pl ai ntto di st in gu is h be twee n apl ai nt iff

who m ay be cla im in g s ev ere l un g d is eas e fro m on e who m ay be cla im in g g ritin he r gr it s.”) . The no ti ce o f rem ov al in Lowery con ta in eda co nc lu so ry all eg at io n t ha t CAFA’s am ou nt -in -co nt ro ve rs y requi rem en t h adbe ensat is fie d, b utth atwas n ot en ou gh . See Will iam s, 2 69 F.3dat 1 32 0 (“ A con cl us ory all eg at io n i n the no ti ce o f rem ov al th atth e juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntis sat is fie d, wi th ou t s et ti ng forth th e un de rlyin g fa ct s s up po rti ng su chanass ert io n, i s i ns uf fic ie ntto m eetth e de fen da nt ’s bu rd en .”).

15Rec og ni zi ng th e sh ortc om in gs of Al ab am a Po wer’s n ot ic e o f rem ov al , th e

Lowery pl ai nt iff s fi le d am ot io n t o re m an d. In res po ns e, Alab am a Po wer fi le d a supp le m en t t o i ts no ti ce o f rem ov al , po in ti ng ou t tha t t o re ach CAFA’s $5 m il li on juri sd ic ti on al th res ho ld , eachof t he 40 0 p la in ti ffs ’ cl ai m s wo ul d n eedto pu t i n co nt ro ve rs y

on ly $12 ,50 0. Th e supp le m en t ar gu editwas e vi de ntm or e th an$5 m il li on was i n c on tro ve rs y be cau se pl ai nt iff

s i n re cen t m as s t ort ca se s i n Al ab am a ha d re cei ve d ju ry

ve rd ic ts or s et tl em en ts ex ceed in g t ha t am ou nt . Lowery, 48 3 F.3 d a t 1 18 9. Bu t the supp le m en t fa il edto ex pl ai n t he fact s o f th os e o th er t ort cas es or l in k t he m

to th e fac ts of t he Lowery case . See i d. at12 21 (“ Loo ki ng on ly to th is ev id en ce an d t he co m pl ai nt , th e fac ts reg ard in g o th er ca se s t el l u s n ot hi ng ab ou t the va lu e o f th e cl ai m s i n t hi s l aws ui t. Eve n wer e we to lo okto ev id en ce be y on d t ha t co nt ai ne d wi th inth e n ot ic e o f rem ov al , inth e p res en t d is pu te —wi th a reco rdbe reftof d et ai l—we can no t p os si bl y asc ert ai n h ow s im il ar the cu rren t act io n i s t o t ho se th e d efen da nt s ci te .”); Lowery, 460 F. Sup p. 2 d a t 1 29 9 (“ Defen da nt s’ ho pe fu l co njec tu re b as edon Alab am a jury verd ic ts incas es th at m ay ha ve so m e si m il ari ty to thi s ca se , bu t ar e n otclo se ly sim il ar, d o[ es ] no t su ffi ce . . . .”). W e co nc lu de d i n Lo wery th atAlab am a Po wer’s supp le m en t an d i ts ad di ti on al “ ‘evi de nc e’”—n ot e th e sc are quo te s— ab ou t o th er m as s t ort ca se s t ol d 16us “ no th in g abo utth e v al ue of t he cla im s” be cau se th e rec or d was “be reftof

de ta il ” ab ou t wh ethe r th e p la in ti ffs ’ co m pl ai ntwas s im il ar t o t ho se ot he r cas es . Lowery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 22 0– 21 ; s ee al so id . (“ Abs en t s pe ci fic de ta il ab ou t the pr es en t ac ti on , th e supp le m en t i n n o way clari fie s t he ag gr eg at e v al ue of t he cl ai m s h ere.” ). The re co rdin Lowery con ta in edon ly “na ke d p le ad in gs ”—n o sp eci fic factua l d et ai ls , no di sc ov ery, no affi da vi ts or d ecl arat io ns , no tes ti m on y , no in te rro ga to rie s, an d n o e xh ib it s o th er tha n t he co m pl ai nt s. We to okpa in s t o em ph as iz e th atfact . Over a ndov er. See id . at 1 18 9 n .8 (“ [A]lab am a Po wer ci te d no th in g fr om

su ch di sc ov ery in supp ort o f it s n ot ic e o f rem ov al or i n i ts subs eque ntarg um en t t o t he di st ric t co urt . . . .”); i d. at12 09 (“ na ke d p le ad in gs ”); id . at 1 21 0 (“ ba re p le ad in gs ”); id . (“ a rem ov al cas e—l ik e th is on e—wh ere t he re i s no ev id en ce t o re vi ew”); id . (di st in gu is hi ng Lowery from a cas e in whi chco un se l adm it te d c ert ai n ju ris di ct io na l fa ct s dur in g o ral arg um en t an d a no th er ca se in whi chth e d efen da nt ’s em pl oyee tes ti fie d dur in g apre tri al he ari ng ); i d. (“ na ke d pl ead in g c on te xt ”); id . (“ on ly the ba re p le ad in gs are av ai labl e”); id . at 1 21 0– 11 (“ W e h av e n o e vi de nc e b efo re u s b y whi ch to m ak e an y

in fo rm edass es sm en t o f th e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y .”); id . at 1 21 3 n .63 (“ba re p le ad in gs ”); id . at 1 21 7 (“ [A]lab am a Po wer . . . has ass ert edno factua l b as is to supp ort fe de ral juri sd ic ti on

17. . . . ”); id . at 1 22 0 (e m ph as iz in g t ha t we wer e “ witho utth e b en efi t o f an y ev id en ce [reg ard in g] th e v al ue of i nd iv idua l cl ai m s” ). W e st at edinLowery tha t “ [t]he ab se nc e o f fac tu al all eg at io ns pe rti ne ntto th e ex is te nc e o f juri sd ic ti on is di sp os it iv e an d, i n s uc h abs en ce, the ex is te nc e o f juri sd ic ti on sh ou ldno t b e d iv in edby loo ki ng to th e st ars .” Id . at 1 21 5 (e m ph as is ad de d) . On th atba si s we c on cl ud edth atth e Lowe ry de fen da nt s h adfai le d t o es tabl is h fe de ral juri sd ic ti on by a prep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce. See id . at 12 20 –2 1. Bu t Lo wery

di d n otsay, m

uc h l es s p ur

po rt t o h ol d, tha t the us e o f de du ct io n, i nf

eren ce, o r ot he r ex trapo la ti on of t he am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y is im pe rm is si bl e, as so m e d is tri ctco urts have th ou gh t. Tha t was no t the qu es ti on in Lowery . Ins te ad , th e que st io n was ho w to ap pl y th e p rep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce s ta nd ardin th e “ fact -fre e co nt ex t” of t ha t p art ic ul ar ca se . Id. at12 09 . The an swe r we g av e is th atwitho utfact s o r sp eci fic all eg at io ns , th e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y

co ul d b e “ di vi ne d [o nl y ] by loo ki ng at t he st ars ”—o nl y th ro ug h sp ecu la ti on—an d tha t i s i m pe rm is si bl e. See i d. at12 09 , 12 15 . A di ffer en t que st io n i s p res en te d, h owe ve r, whe n arem ov in g d efen da nt m ak es sp eci fic factua l al le ga ti on s es tabl is hi ng juri sd ic ti on an d c ansupp ort the m (if ch al le ng edby the pl ai nt iff or t he co urt) wi th ev id en ce co m bi ne d wi th reas on ab le de du ct io ns , reas on ab le in fere nc es , or o th er re as on ab le ex trapo la ti on s. 18Tha t k in d o f rea so ni ng is no t ak in to co njec tu re, s pe cu la ti on , or s tar ga zi ng . See

Northup Pro ps ., Inc . v. Ch es ap eak e App al ach ia , L.L. C., 56 7 F .3d76 7, 7 70 –7 1 (6 th Cir . 20 09 ) (co nc lu di ng th atth e d efen da nt ’s affi da vi ts were s pe ci fic en ou gh to pr ev en t the de te rm in at io n o f th e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y “ fro m be co m in g am at te r of jud ic ia l s ta r-g azi ng ”); Sie we v. Go nz al es , 48 0 F .3d16 0, 1 68 (2dCir . 20 07 ) (“ An i nf eren ce i s n ota su sp ic io n o r a g ue ss . It i s a r eas on ed , lo gi cal de ci si on to co nc lu de th ata di sp ut edfactex is ts on th e b as is of a no th er fa ctth atis kn ownto ex is t.” ( qu ot at io n a ndot he r m ark s o m it te d) ); c f. Mai z v . Viran i, 2 53 F.3d64 1, 6 64 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 1) (“ Su ffi ce i t t o s ay th atwhi le da m ag es m ay

no t b e d et erm in edby m ere s pe cu la ti on or g ue ss , itwil l b e en ou gh if the ev id en ce s ho ws the ex te ntof th e d am ag es as am atte r of jus t an d re as on ab le in fere nc e.” (quo ta ti on an d o th er m ark s o m it te d) ). The po in t i s t ha t a r em ov in g d efen da ntis no t re qu ire d t o p ro ve th e am ou nt in co nt ro ve rs y

be y on d a ll do ub t o r to bani sh all un cert ai nt y ab ou t i t. Co m

pa re Ro e v . Mic he li n N. Am ., Inc ., 63 7 F . Sup p. 2 d 9 95 , 99 9 (M .D. Ala. 20 09 ) (“ Whi le itwou ldbe sp ecu la ti ve to sp eci fy th e ex actdo ll ar am ou ntat i ss ue inth is cas e, itis no t s pe cu la ti ve to co nc lu de fro m th e eg reg io us co nduc t al le ge d t ha t the am ou nt , wha te ve r itis , far ex ceed s $ 75 ,00 0.” ), with M ie de m a, 45 0 F .3dat 1 33 2 (“ Giv en th e p art ic ul ar fa ct s an d c irc um st an ces of t he in st an t ca se , th e d is tri ctco urt d idno t 19err wh enitfou ndth at‘ gr eatun cert ai nt y ’ rem ai ne d abo utth e am ou ntin

co nt ro ve rs y

[an d] res ol ve d t ha t u nc ert ai nt y infav orof r em an d.” ). The l aw do es no t d em an d p erfe ctkn owl ed ge or d ep en d a ny les s o n re as on ab le in fere nc es an d de du ct io ns th anwe all do in ev eryday li fe. As J us ti ce Ho lm es ob se rv ed , “ al l l ife is anex pe riment. Ev ery y ear i f no t ev ery da y we have to wage r ou r sa lv at io n upo n so m e p ro ph ecy bas edup on im pe rfec t kno wled ge .” Abra m s v . Uni te d S ta te s, 2 50 U.S. 61 6, 6 30 , 40 S.Ct . 17 , 22 (19 19 ) (Ho lm es , J., di ss en ti ng ). B. The Types of Ev id en ce tha t M ay be Usedto Supp ort Re m ov al

“ Whe n t he co m

pl ai ntdo es no t cl ai m

a sp eci fic am ou ntof d am ag es , rem ov al fro m st at e co urt i s [ju ris di ct io na ll y ] pr op er i f itis faci al ly app aren t fr om th e co m pl ai ntth atth e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y ex ceed s t he juri sd ic ti on al requi rem en t.” W il li am s, 2 69 F.3dat 1 31 9. “ If the juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntis no t fa ci al ly app aren t fro m th e co m pl ai nt , th e co urt s ho ul d l oo k t o t he no ti ce o f rem ov al an d m ay requi re ev id en ce re le va ntto th e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y at the ti m e th e cas e was rem ov ed .” Id .; s ee al so , e.g., 1 6 J am es Wm . Mo or e etal., Mo or e’s Fed eral Prac ti ce § 10 7.1 4[ 2][g ], at 1 07 -8 6.4 to 10 7- 86 .5 (3 d e d. 2 01 0) (“ Whe n d et erm in in g i f th e de fen da ntha s s at is fie d t hi s b ur de n [t o e st ab li sh juri sd ic ti onby a prep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce], th e co urt wi ll co ns id er fi rs t wh ethe r itis faci al ly app aren t fr om th e co m pl ai ntth atth e juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntis inco nt ro ve rs y . If itis no t, the co urt 20m ay

co ns id er fa ct s al le ge d i n t he no ti ce o f rem ov al , jud ic ia l ad m is si on s m ad e b y th e p la in ti ffs , no n- swo rnlet te rs subm it te d t o the co urt, o r ot he r su m m ary jud gm en t type ev id en ce tha t m ay

rev eal th atth e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y requi rem en t i s sa ti sf ie d.” ). The subs ta nt iv e juri sd ic ti on al requi rem en ts of r em ov al do no t l im itth e types of ev id en ce tha t m ay

be us edto sat is fy

th e p rep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce st an da rd . Defen da nt s m ay in tro du ce the ir o wn af

fid av it s, d ecl arat io ns , or o th er do cu m en ta ti on—p ro vi de d o f co ur se th atrem ov al is pro cedur al ly pro pe r. See W il li am s, 2 69 F.3dat 1 31 9; Mi ed em a, 45 0 F .3dat 1 33 0; Sie rm in sk i, 2 16 F.3dat 94 9 (t he di st ric t co urt m ay “ requi re p art ie s t o s ub m itsu m m ary-j ud gm en t-t y

pe ev id en ce re le va ntto th e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y at the ti m e o f rem ov al ” (quo ta ti on m ark s o m it te d) ); F owl er v . Safec o In s. Co . of Am ., 91 5 F .2d61 6, 6 17 (11 th Cir . 19 90 ) (“ Defen da nt s h av e th e o pp ortu ni ty to s ub m itaffi da vi ts , dep os it io ns , or o th er ev id en ce t o s up po rt r em ov al .”); see als o De B us k v . Harv in , 21 2 F .2d14 3, 1 46 (5 th Cir . 19 54 ) (h ol di ng , ina cas e rem ov edun de r 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 2, tha t the di st ric t co urt h adpro pe rly den ie d t he pl ai nt iff’s m ot io n t o re m an d b as edon“ [t]he un co ntro ve rte d a ffi da vi ts of app el le es , att ach edas e xh ib it s t o t he am en de d p et it io n fo r rem ov al ”). W e d o n otreadLowery as h ol di ng to th e co nt rary. If we d id , th ere wou ldbe a se rio us pri orpa ne l p rece de ntpro bl em . See Un it edSta te s v . Ohayon , 2148 3 F .3d12 81 , 12 89 (11 th Cir . 20 07 ) (“ Whe n ade ci si on of t hi s C ou rt c on fli ct s

with a n e arl ie r de ci si on th atha s n otbe enov erturne d e n b an c, we are b ou ndby the earl ie r de ci si on .”); Uni te d S ta te s v . Horn ad ay , 39 2 F .3d13 06 , 13 16 (11 thCir . 20 04 ) (“ Whe re the re i s a c on fli ctbe twee n apri orpa ne l d eci si onan d t ho se th at cam e b efo re i t, we m

us t fo ll ow t he earl ie r on es .”). The ot he r ci rcu itco urts of app eal th atha ve ad dr es se d t he is su e ag ree wi th ou r ci rcu itlaw t ha t d efen da nt s m ay subm ita wid e ran ge of e vi de nc e inord er t o sa ti sf y th e juri sd ic ti on al requi rem en ts of r em ov al . See Dep ’t of Re crea ti on & Sp orts of P ue rto Ric o v . W or ldBo xi ng Ass ’n, 94 2 F .2d84 , 88 (1s t Ci r. 19 91 ) (“ [T]he p arty

see ki ng to in vo ke juri sd ic ti on . . . m ay m eet[it s] bu rd enby . . . subm it ti ng affi da vi ts .”); Dave np ort v . Pro ct er & Gam bl e Mfg . Co., 2 41 F.2d51 1, 51 4 (2 d C ir. 1 95 7) (“ The pe ti ti on forrem ov al all eg edth atm or e th an$3 ,00 0 was in vo lv ed , andth e aff

id av it s i n o pp os it io n t o t he m ot io n t o re m an d fu rn is h a m pl e supp ort fo r th e fi nd in g [t ha t the am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y requi rem en t was sa ti sf ie d].”); USX Cor

p. v . Adri at ic Ins . Co., 3 45 F.3d19 0, 2 06 n.1 2 (3 d C ir. 20 03 ) (h ol di ng th ata de fen da ntm ay est ab li sh juri sd ic ti on al fact s b y fil in g affi da vi ts in res po ns e to th e p la in ti ffs ’ m ot io n t o re m an d) ; St rawnv. AT&T Mo bi li ty L LC, 53 0 F .3d29 3, 2 99 (4t h C ir. 2 00 8) (fi nd in g t he de fen dant ’s affi da vi t su ffi ci en t t o e st ab li shth e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y un de r CAFA wh ere t he pl ai nt iff s 22ha d “ of

fere d n othi ng ” to ch al le ng e it s ac curacy); All env. R & H Oil & Gas C o., 63 F.3d13 26 , 13 35 (5t h C ir. 1 99 5) (“ If n ot[fac ia ll y ap pa ren t], a rem ov in g at to rn ey m ay supp ort fe de ral juri sd ic ti on by sett in g fo rth th e fac ts in co nt ro ve rs y

—p refe rab ly in the rem ov al pe ti ti on , bu t s om et im es by affid av it—tha t supp ort a f

in di ng of t he requi si te am ou nt .”); Nort hup P ro ps ., 56 7 F .3dat 7 70 –7 1 (co nc lu di ng th atth e d efen da nt ’s affi da vi ts ha d e st ab li sh edth e requi si te juri sd ic ti on al am ou nt ); M eri di anSec. In s. Co . v. Sad ows ki , 44 1 F .3d53 6, 5 41 –4 2 (7 th Cir . 20 06 ) (n ot in g t ha t a r em ov in g d efen da ntm ay est ab li sh th e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y

“by int ro du ci ng ev id en ce, i n t he form of a ffi da vi ts fro m

th e de fen da nt ’s em

pl oyees o r ex pe rts , abo utho w m uc h i t wo ul d c os t t o s at is fy th e pl ai nt iff’s dem an ds ”); Sin ge r v. St at e Farm Mu t. Au to . Ins . Co., 1 16 F.3d37 3, 3 77 (9 th Cir . 19 97 ) (“ The di st ric t co urt m ay co ns id er wh ethe r itis faci al ly app aren t fro m th e co m pl ai ntth atth e juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntis inco nt ro ve rs y . If no t, the co urt m ay co ns id er fa ct s i n t he rem ov al pe ti ti on , andm ay requi re p art ie s t o s ub m it su m m ary-j ud gm en t-t y

pe ev id en ce re le va ntto th e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y at t he ti m e o f rem ov al .” (quo ta ti on m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) ); M cPh ai l, 5 29 F.3dat 95 6 (“ [B]ey on d t he co m

pl ai ntit se lf, o th er d oc um en ta ti on canpro vi de th e b as is for de te rm in in g t he am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y —ei th er i nt erro ga to rie s o bt ai ne d i n s ta te co urt b efo re re m ov al was fi le d, o r affi da vi ts or o th er ev id en ce s ub m it te d i n fe de ral 23co urt af

te rward . This rou gh ly paral le ls a pl ai nt iff’s rig ht , un de r Fed .R.Ci v.P . 10 (c), t o m ak e ‘[a] co py of a wri tt enin st ru m en t tha t i s an ex hi bi t t o apl ead in g . . . a p artof the pl ead in g fo r al l p ur po se s.’” (ci ta ti on s o m it te d) ). No co urt o f ap pe al s de ci si on we co ul d fi ndho ld s t ha t a d efen da ntm ay no t s ub m itit s o wn ev id en ce i n or de r to sat is fy

th e juri sd ic ti on al requi rem en ts of r em ov al , andwe co nc lu de th at th e d efen da ntcan . W it h re ga rdto th e subs ta nt iv e juri sd ic ti on al requi rem en ts , whi ch all ow co ns id erat io n o f th e Cl ark e an d Gu ti erre z d ecl arat io ns an d t he un na m edpl ai nt iff s’ co nt ract s, Ko lt er es tabl is he d b y m or e th ana pr ep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce tha t th e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y ex ceed s $ 5 m il li on . The co m pl ai ntsee ks a refu ndof a ll of th e p la in ti ffs ’ de po si ts , andth e Gut ie rrez de cl arat io n b y it se lf e st ab li sh es th at th e p la in ti ffs ha ve de po si te d m or e th an$4 1 m il li on . Ind eed , th e p la in ti ffs co nc ed e th atKol te r’s ev id en ce, i f co ns id erat io n o f itis pro cedur al ly pro pe r, wou ld es tabl is h t he am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y by a prep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce. III. THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REM OVAL The subs ta nt iv e juri sd ic ti on al requi rem en ts , ho wev er, are no t the on ly hu rd le s t ha t a r em ov in g d efen dantm us t cl ear. Th ere a re al so pro cedur al requi rem en ts reg ard in g t he ti m el in es s o f rem ov al . See 2 8 U.S.C. § § 1 44 6, 14 53 (b ). It was on th e b as is of t ho se pro cedur al requi rem en ts th atth is Co urt i n 24Lowery

reject edev id en ce s ub m it te d b y th e d efen da nt , Alab am a Po wer. W e h el d th atAlab am a Po wer’s ev id en ce co ul d n otbe co ns id eredbe cau se itwas n ota do cu m en t re cei ve d fr om

th e p la in ti ffs . See Lo wery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 22 1 (“ [W] e n ot e th atth is ev id en ce re ga rd in g t he va lu e o f ot he r to rt c la im s was no t re cei ve d fr om th e p la in ti ffs , bu t ra th er was ga th eredfro m ou ts id e so ur ces . As su ch , th e ev id en ce is no t o f th e so rt c on te m

pl at edby [28 U.S.C.] § 1 44 6( b) .”); see als o i d. at12 13 & n.6 3. The sco pe of Lo wery ’s “ rece ip t fr om th e p la in ti ff” ru le is a cri ti cal is su e in th is cas e. The d is tri ctco urt h el d t ha t Lo wery ba rreditfro m

co ns id eri ng Kol te r’s de cl arat io ns an d t he un na m edpl ai nt iff s’ con tra ct s b ecau se no ne of tho se do cu m en ts was re cei ve d fr om th e p la in ti ffs . Kol te r co nt en ds th atLowery is di st in gu is habl e b ecau se itwas ato rts cas e, in st eadof aco nt ract -rel at eddi sp ut e, an d b ecau se Lowery andth is cas e were r em ov edun de r di ffer en t p arag rap hs of subs ect io n (b ) of

§ 1 44 6. Th e p la in ti ffs co nt en d t ha t the di st ric t co urt g otitrig ht an d t ha t ev id en ce p ro du cedby a defe nd an t ca nn otbe co ns id ered . To se tt le th is di sa gr eem en t we h av e to ex am in e in so m e d et ai l the pro cedur al requi rem en ts of th e rem ov al st atut e an d t he in te rp ret at io n o f th em inour Lowery

de ci si on .

25A. The Two Ty pe s o f Rem ov al CAFA’s rem ov al pro vi si on ex pr es sl y ad op ts th e p ro cedur es of t he ge ne ral rem ov al st atut e, 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 6. Lowery, 483 F.3dat 1 21 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1 1 14 53 (b ). Sect io n 1 44 6( b) , whi ch go ve rn s t he ti m el in es s o f rem ov al inciv il cas es , co nt ai ns two pa rag rap hs . The fi rs t p arag rap h d eal s wi th civ il act io ns th atare rem ov ab le at t he ti m e o f co m m en cem en t. Itpro vi de s: The no ti ce of rem ov al of a ci v i l act io n or pr oc eed in g sh al l be fil ed withi n th irt y da y s aft er th e rece ip t by th e de fen da nt , th ro ug h serv ic e or o t h e rw i s e, of a co py of th e in it ia l pl ead in g se tt in g fo rth th e cl ai m fo r rel ie f up on whi ch su ch ac ti on or pr oc eed in g is ba se d, or withi n th irty da y s aft er th e se rv ic e of su m m on s up on th e de fen da nt if su ch i ni ti al pl ead in g ha s th en be en fil ed in co urt an d is no t requi red to be se rv ed on th e d efen dant , whi ch ev er p eri odis sh orte r. 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 6( b) . The s eco ndpa rag rap h o f th e sa m e subs ect io n d eal s wi th ci vi l ac ti on s t ha t wer e n otrem ov ab le , or c ou ldno t h av e b een de te rm in edto be rem ov ab le , un ti l “ anam en de d p le ad in g, m ot io n, o rd er o r ot he r pape r” es tabl is he s th ei r rem ov ab il it y . Thatsec on d p arag rap h p ro vi de s: If th e cas e st at ed by th e in it ia l pl ead in g is no t rem ov ab le , a no ti ce of rem ov al m ay be fil ed withi n th irt y da y s aft er r e c ei pt by the de fen da nt , th ro ug h se rv ic e or ot he rwis e, of a co py of an am en de d pl ead in g, m ot io n,
Wit h one exception. Unlike other case s, CAFA c ases may

be re moved more tha

n one 1 1 year afte r their c ommenceme nt, if the other r equire ments for re moval are satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (“Aclass ac tion may be re moved to a district cour t of the United States in acc ordanc e with [28 U.S.C .] section 1446 (except that the 1-year limit ation under se ction 1446(b) sha ll not apply). . . .”) . 26or de r or ot he r pape r fro m whi ch it m ay fir st be as cert ai ne d th at th e cas e

is on e whi ch is or h as be co m e rem ov ab le . . . . Id .; s ee Am . Law Ins t., Fed eral Ju di ci al Co de Rev is io n P ro ject ( 20 04 ), rep rin te d i n 19 A Cha rle s Al anWrig htet a l., Fed eral Prac ti ce an d P ro cedur e 3 73 , 65 7 (4 th ed . 20 09 ); s ee al so Cat erp il lar In c. v. Lewi s, 5 19 U.S. 61 , 68 –6 9, 1 17 S.Ct . 46 7, 47 2– 73 (19 96 ). Im po rta nt ly, th e p res en t ca se an d t he Lowery case were re m ov edun de r di ffer en t p arag rap hs of § 14 46 (b ). Kol te r is no t re lying onth e se co ndpa rag rap h of th atsubs ect io n t o e st ab li sh th e ti m el in es s o f it s re m ov al bu t i ns te adon th e fi rs t on e, whi ch ap pl ie s b ecau se Kol te r fi le d i ts no ti ce o f rem ov al withi n t hi rty days of be in g s erv edwith t he su m m on s an d i ni ti al co m

pl ai nt . See § 14 46 (b ) (fi rs t

1 2 pa rag rap h) ; M ur

ph y Bro s., In c. v. M ic he tt i Pi pe Str in gi ng , Inc ., 52 6 U.S. 3 44 , 35 4, 11 9 S .Ct. 1 32 2, 1 32 8 (1 99 9) (“ [I]f th e su m m on s an d c om

pl ai ntare s erv ed to ge th er, the 30 -d ay

pe rio d fo r rem ov al run s aton ce.”) . Becau se Kol te r fi le d i ts no ti ce o f rem ov al withi n t he ti m e sp eci fie d i n t he fir stpa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) , it s rem ov al was t im el y . See Ba do n v . RJR Nabi sc o In c., 22 4 F .3d38 2, 3 90 (5t h C ir. 20 00 ). Kol te r “ do [es ] no t, an d d o[ es ] no t n eedto , in vo ke th e se co ndpa rag rap h’s ex te nd edfil in g p eri od .” Id . Kolter re ceive d the summons and initial complaint on April 9, 2009, and filed its notice 1 2 of re moval on May

8, 2009. 27By

co nt ras t, i n Lo wery

Alab am a Po wer rem ov edth e cas e u nd er the sec on d pa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) . The n ot ic e o f rem ov al cam e th ree years a fte r th e Lowe ry pl ai nt iff s h adfil edth ei r in it ia l co m pl ai nt—l on g a fte r th e cl os in g o f th e 3 0- da y rem ov al win do w supp li edby the fir stparag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) . See Lo wery , 48 3 F.3 d a t 1 18 8. The Lo wery op in io n i ts el f ackno wled ge s t ha t i t i s a s eco nd 1 3 pa rag rap h c as e. See i d. at12 13 n.6 3 (“ In. . . th e cas e b efo re u s, the de fen da nt. . . ne ed [s ] an‘ ot he r pape r’ to p ro vi de th e g ro un ds for rem ov al un de r th e se co nd pa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) .”). 1 4 B. Pro cedur al Lim it s o n t he Ty pe s o f Evi de nc e Use d t o S up po rt R em ov al W e n ow turn t o wh at , if an y , li m it s t he rem ov al st atut e p la ces on th e types of ev id en ce tha t m ay

be us edby a defe nd an t tha t re m ov es th e cas e wit hi n t he ti m e sp eci fie d b y

th e fi rs t p arag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) , a qu es ti on no t p res en te d b y th e fac ts

In fac t, removal unde r the fir st paragraph w as neve r an option for any defe ndant in the 1 3 L ower y case . When the initial complaint was filed in 2003—two year s befor e Congress e nacte d CAFA—the L ower

y case was not re movable bec ause c omplete diversity amongthe par

ties did not exi st. See L ower

y , 483 F.3d at 1193 n.24 (explaining the c omplete diversity require ment that applies to non-CAF A ca ses); id. at 1187 (notingthat all of the orig inal L ower y plaintiffs wer e Alabama residents); id. at 1190 ( noting that some of the L ower

y defe ndants wer e Alaba

ma corpor ations). There is another wa

y the L ower

y opinion acknowledg es that it was a se cond paragraph 1 4 case . The sec ond para graph of § 1446(b), but not the first, re fer s to a document fr om which remova bility may first be “ asce rtained,” see 28 U .S.C. § 1446(b), and the L ower y Court conclude d that it could not “asce rtain” the amount in controver sy , 483 F.3d at 1221. 28of

th e Lowe ry

cas e. W e wil l b eg in by loo ki ng at h ow t he law i n t hi s ar ea h as ev ol ve d. Bet ween18 75 , when lo wer fed eral co urts rece iv edge ne ral rem ov al juri sd ic ti on , and19 48 , when Co ng res s en act ed28 U.S.C. § 1 44 6, the Supr em e Co urt re pe at ed ly ackn owl ed ge d t ha t d efen dant s co ul d e st ab li shjuri sd ic ti on al fact s with t he ir o wn af

fid av it s o r ot he r ev id en ce. See , e.g., Ex pa rte Pa. Co ., 13 7 U.S. 45 1, 4 57 , 11 S.Ct . 14 1, 1 43 (18 90 ) (“ If the pe ti ti on forrem ov al st at es th e fac ts up on whi ch th e al le ga ti on is fou nd ed , andth atpe ti ti on be ve rif ie d b y affi davi t o f a pe rs on or p ers on s i n wh om th e co urt h as co nf

id en ce, thi s m ay

be reg ard edas pr im a fac ie pro of

su ffi ci en t t o s at is fy

th e co ns ci en ce o f th e co urt. If m or e sh ou ld be requi redby the co urt, m or e sh ou ldbe off ered .”). In de ed , itwas “ co m m on an d reco gn iz ed ” th ata rem ov in g d efen da ntco ul d re ly on a ffi da vi ts to de feata m ot io n to rem an d. Se e Cyclop ed iaof F ed eral Pro cedur e § 51 6, at54 3 (2 d e d. 1 94 3) (“ The us e o f affi da vi ts onth e h eari ng of a n app li cat io n t o re m an d i s co m m on an d reco gn iz ed , andth e p art ie s m ay be requi redto fil e aff

id av it s.”) , qu ot edby D og ge tt v. Hu nt , 93 F. Sup p. 4 26 , 43 0 (S .D. Ala. 19 50 ); s ee al so Landv. Do ll ar, 3 30 U.S. 73 1, 7 35 n.4 , 67 S.Ct . 10 09 , 10 11 n.4 (19 47 ) (“ [W] he n aqu es ti on of t he Dis tri ct Co urt’s jur is di ct io n i s ra is ed , eit he r by a part y or b y th e co urt o n i ts own m ot io n, th e co urt m ay

in qu ire by affid av it s o r ot he rwis e, in to th e fac ts as the y ex is t.” 29(in te rn al cit at io ns om it te d) ); M ech an ic al App li an ce Co . v. Cas tl em an , 21 5 U.S.

43 7, 4 45 , 30 S.Ct . 12 5, 1 29 (19 10 ) (“ The se affi da vi ts [fro m bo th th e p la in ti ff an d de fen da nt ] are m ad e p artof t he reco rdby a bil l o f ex cep ti on s an d we t hi nkth ey sh ou ldha ve be enco ns id eredup on th e que st io n o f [rem ov al ] juri sd ic ti on .”); Carr v. Fi fe, 1 56 U.S. 49 4, 4 97 , 15 S.Ct . 42 7, 4 28 (18 95 ) (s ta ti ng th atit“ ha s al way s be enhe ld ” th atth e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y m ay be “ sh ow[ n] by ex p art e affi da vi ts ”).

“ W e p res um e th atCo ng res s l eg is la te s ag ai ns t the ba ck dr op of e st ab li sh ed pr in ci pl es of s ta te an d fe de ral co m m on law, an d t ha t wh enitwis he s t o d ev ia te fro m de ep ly roo te d p rin ci pl es , itwil l s ay so .” Uni te d S ta te s v . Bax te r In t’l, In c., 34 5 F .3d86 6, 9 00 (11 th Cir . 20 03 ); s ee al so Ble ds oe v. Pa lm Beac h C ou nt y

So il & Water Co ns erv at io n Di st ., 13 3 F .3d81 6, 8 22 (11 th Cir . 19 98 ) (“ Co ng res s i s de em edto kn ow t he ex ecu ti ve an d ju di ci al gl os s g iv ento cert ai n l an gu ag e an d th us ad op ts th e ex is ti ng in te rp ret at io n u nl es s i t af firm at iv el y

act s t o c ha ng e th e m ean in g.” (qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d) ); Whi te v. Me rcu ry Mari ne , Div . of Bru ns wick , Inc ., 12 9 F .3d14 28 , 14 34 –3 5 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 7) (“ Co ng res s i s as su m ed to actwith t he kn owl ed ge of e xi st in g l aw an d i nt erp ret at io ns when itpa ss es ne w le gi sl at io n.” ). Ind eed , th e Supr em e Co urt h as ap pl ie d t ha t p res um pt io n wh en in te rp ret in g § 14 46 (b ). See M ur ph y Bro s., 5 26 U.S. 34 4, 1 19 S.Ct . 13 22 (rea di ng 30§ 1 44 6( b) in li gh t o f th e co m m on -la w pri nc ip le th atform al pro ces s i s re qu ire d be fo re an in di vi du al or e nt it y m ay be na m edas ade fen da nt , andfin di ng no in di cat io n tha t Co ng res s t rie d t o b reakaway fro m th e tr ad it io na l u nd ers ta nd in g) ; se e al so Newm an -Gree n, In c. v. Al fo nz o- Larrai n, 4 90 U.S. 82 6, 8 32 , 10 9 S .Ct. 22 18 , 22 22 n.4 (19 89 ) (“ [N]o ch an ge inlaw s ho ul d b e p res um edfro m th e 1 94 8 rev is io n o f th e Ju di ci al Co de un le ss anin te ntto m ak e su ch ch an ge s i s cl earl y ex pr es se d.” (qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d) ). W it h t ha t p res um

pt io n i n m in d, we d o n otbe li ev e th atCo ng res s, wh enit en act ed§ 1 44 6, al te redth e tr ad it io na l u nd ers ta nd in g t ha t d efen da nt s co ul d o ffer th ei r own affi da vi ts or o th er ev id en ce t o e st ab li sh fed eral rem ov al juri sd ic ti on . The ori gi na l v ers io n o f § 1 44 6( b) pro vi de d t ha t “ [t]he pe ti ti on forrem ov al of a ci vi l ac ti on or p ro ceed in g m ay be fil edwithi n t wen ty day s af te r co m m en cem en t o f th e act io n o r se rv ic e o f pr oc es s, wh ic he ve r is lat er.” Actof J un e 2 5, 1 94 8, ch . 64 6, Pub. L. No. 7 73 , 62 Sta t. 8 69 , 93 9 (a m en de d 1 94 9) ; s ee al so Mu rp hy Bros ., 52 6 U.S. at35 1, 1 19 S.Ct . at 1 32 7. Th atpro vi si on co nt ai ne d n o l im it at io n o n t he type o f ev id en ce tha t a d efen da ntco ul d o fferon ce i t t im el y fil eda no ti ce o f rem ov al . Cf. Mu rp hy Bros ., 52 6 U.S. at35 1, 1 19 S.Ct . at 1 32 7 (s ta ti ng th at Co ng res s en act ed§ 1 44 6( b) to “ gi ve ad equa te ti m e [fo r rem ov al ] an d o pe rat e un ifo rm ly thro ug ho utth e Fed eral juri sd ic ti on .” (quo ta ti on m ark s o m it te d) ); 1 4C 31Wrig htet a l., Fed eral Prac ti ce an d P ro cedur e § 37 31 , at 4 82 –8 5 (“ The go al is earl y

res ol ut io n o f th e co urt s y st em in whi ch th e cas e wil l b e h eard .”). Co ng res s amend ed§ 1 44 6( b) in19 49 , bu t the ch an ge s d idno t al te r th e tra di ti on al rul e al lo win g d efen dant s t o o fferth ei r own ev id en ce i n s up po rt o f rem ov al s atth e co m

m en cem en t o f th e cas e. The 1 94 9 a m en dm en ts m ad e two ch an ge s. Fi rs t, an d u nr el at edto th is cas e, Co ng res s en su redth atth e d efen dant wou ldha ve acce ss to th e co m pl ai ntbe fo re co m

m en cem en t o f th e rem ov al pe rio d. See i d. at35 1– 52 , 11 9 S .Ct. at13 27 . Seco nd , Con gr es s was co nc ern edth atth e rem ov al st atut e d idno t i nc or po rat e th e jud ic ia l ru le “pe rm it ti ng an d re qu iri ng th e de fen da ntto fil e a p et it io n fo r rem ov al as s oo n a s the act io n a ss um es th e sh ap e o f a rem ov ab le cas e in th e co urt i n wh ic h i t was bro ug ht .” Po wers v. Ch es ap eak e & Ohi o Ry . Co., 1 69 U.S. 92 , 10 1, 1 8 S .Ct. 2 64 , 26 7 (1 89 8) . Con gr es s t he refo re ad de d the sec on d p arag rap h t o § 14 46 (b ), whi ch ha s re m ai ne d e ss en ti al ly the same to th is day . See n ot es fol lo win g 2 8 U.S.C.A § 14 46 (Co m m en ta ry on 19 49 1 5 rev is io n) (“ The sec on d p arag rap h o f th e am en dm en t t o s ub se ct io n (b ) is in te nd ed Congr ess has made three chang es to the sec ond para graph of § 1446(b) since 1949. 1 5 First, the origina l version re fer red to the “petition for re moval,” but it now ref ers to the “ notice of remova l.” Second, the time pe riod for r emoval wa s expanded from twe nty to thirty day s. Third, in 1988 Congre ss added to the e nd of the sec ond para graph of § 1446(b) a

sentenc e providing that no case may

be re moved base d on diversity of citizenship “more than 1 year afte r commence ment of the a ction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); see Judicial Improvements and A cce ss to J ustice Ac t, Pub. L . No. 100-702, § 1016(b) , 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988). That provision, howeve r, does not apply

to CAFA c ases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b); supra n.11.

32to m ak e cl ear t ha t the rig htof r em ov al m ay be ex erci se d a t a l at er s ta ge of t he cas e if t he in it ia l p le ad in g d oe s n otst at e a rem ov ab le cas e b utit s re m ov ab il it y is subs eque nt ly dis cl os ed . This is de cl arat ory of t he ex is ti ng rul e la iddo wn b y th e de ci si on s.” ( ci ti ng Po wers , 16 9 U.S. at10 1, 1 8 S . Ct. at26 7) ). W e ag ree wi th th e Fi fth Cir cu itth at“ [i]t i s wh ol ly evi de ntth atth e p ur po se of t he sec on d p arag rap h i s to ex te ndth e ti m e fo r fi li ng no ti ce o f rem ov al un de r th e st at edcir cu m st an ce, an d no t t o i n a ny even t s ho rte n i t t o l es s t ha n i t wo ul d b e u nd er the fir stpa rag rap h.” Bad on , 22 4 F .3dat 3 90 . Altho ug h t he sec on d p arag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) off ers anad di ti on al av enue for rem ov al , th atroa d i s n otaneas y on e fo r de fen da nt s t o t rav el . As th e Po wers Co urt s ai d, the tra di ti on al un de rs ta nd in g was th atrem ov al was b ot h p erm it te d a nd requi red“ as so on as the act io n a ss um es th e sh ap e o f a rem ov ab le cas e.” Po wers , 16 9 U.S. at10 1, 1 8 S .Ct. at26 7. Othe rwis e a d efen da ntco ul d wai t an d s ee h ow i t fare d i n t he st at e co urt p ro ceed in gs be fo re d eci di ng whet he r to rem ov e. The se co ndpa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) co nt in ue s t he requi rem en t o f pr om pt ne ss . The ren ewedrem ov al win do w op en s, b uton ly for thi rty days, when th e d efen da nt rece iv es a do cu m en t “ fro m whi ch itm ay

fir stbe asc ert ai ne d t ha t the cas e is on e whi chis or h as be co m e rem ov ab le .” 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 6( b) (se co ndpa rag rap h) .

33Tha t l an gu ag e—e sp eci al ly the word“ as cert ai ne d” —i s d iff eren t fr om

th e la ng ua ge of th e fi rs t p arag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) . The Fi fth Cir cu itha s ex pl ai ne d t he di ffer en ce:

“ Set ti ng fo rth ,” th e ke y la ng ua ge of th e fir st pa rag rap h, en co m pa ss es a br oa de r ran ge of in fo rm at io n th at can tri gg er a ti m e li m it ba se d on no ti ce th an wou ld “ as cert ai ne d,” th e pi vo ta l te rm in th e se co nd pa rag rap h. To “ se t fo rth ” m ean s to “publ is h” or “ to gi ve an acco un t or st at em en t of .” “ Asc ert ai n” m ean s “ to m ak e cert ai n, ex act , or pr eci se ” or “ to fin d ou t or le a rn w i t h cert ai nt y .” The la tt er, in co nt ras t to th e fo rm er, se em s to requi re a gr eat er le ve l of cert ai nt y or th at th e fact s s up p o rti ng rem ov ab il it y

be st at edun equi vo cal ly. Bo sky v. Kro ge r Tex ., LP, 28 8 F .3d20 8, 2 11 (5t h C ir. 2 00 2) (fo ot no te s o m it te d) .

C. The Lo wery

Deci si on As we h av e al read y

po in te d o ut , Lowery is a s eco ndpa rag rap h c as e. See supr a Part II I.A. Its “ rece ip t fr om th e p la in ti ff” ru le is ba se d o n the sec on d pa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) , andth atrul e ap pl ie s i f “ th e cas e st at edby the in it ia l pl ead in g i s n otrem ov ab le ” b utth e cas e “ ha s b eco m e rem ov ab le ” due to ch an ge d ci rcu m st an ces . See 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 46 (b ) (s eco ndpa rag rap h) (em ph as is ad de d) . Und er the sec on d p arag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) , th e d efen dant ’s recei ptof ado cu m en t in di cat in g tha t the cas e “ ha s b eco m e rem ov ab le ” o pe ns a ne w 30 -d ay win do w for rem ov al . Id. (re ferr in g t o “ othe r pape r fro m whi ch itm ay

fir stbe asc ert ai ne d t ha t th e cas e is on e whi ch is or h as be co m e rem ov ab le ”). The trad it io na l ru le is th at 1 6 Removal may

also be timely

under the second pa

ragraph of

§ 1446(b) e ven though the 1 6 case has not “be come r emovable” due to cha ng ed cir cumstance s. The sec ond para graph of § 34on ly a vo lu nt ary actby the pl ai nt iff m ay co nv erta no n- rem ov ab le cas e in to a rem ov ab le on e. See In si ng a v . LaBel la , 84 5 F .2d24 9, 2 52 (11 th Cir . 19 88 ) (ex pl ai ni ng th e jud ic ia ll y crea te d “ vo lu nt ary-inv ol un ta ry ” ru le th atap pl ie s i n di ve rs it y cas es ); see als o Weem s v . Lou is Drey fu s C or p., 3 80 F.2d54 5, 5 47 (5t h 1 7 Ci r. 19 67 ). Thu s, a d efen da ntcan no t s ho w th ata pr ev io us ly non -rem ov ab le cas e

“ ha s b eco m e rem ov ab le ” as a res ul t o f a d oc um en t cr eat edby the de fen da nt . See 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 6( b) (se co ndparag rap h) . Ourpre de ces so r co urt ex pl ai ne d i n Gai to r v. Pe ni ns ul ar & Occ id en ta l St eam sh ip Co ., 28 7 F .2d25 2 (5 th Cir . 19 61 ), th atanin it ia ll y no n- rem ov ab le cas e

“ can no t b e co nv ert edin to a rem ov ab le on e b y ev id en ce o f th e d efen da ntor b y an or de r of th e co urt.” Id . at 2 54 (qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) (em ph as is

1446(b) pr ovides that “[i] f the c ase state d by the initial pleadingis not removable,”a notice of remova l may

be filed w ithin 30 day s after the def endant r ece ives “a

n amende d pleading , motion, order or other pa

per f rom which it may

first be a scer

tained that the c ase is one which is or has become remova

ble.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) ( emphasis adde d). “Thus, the statute expressly encompa sses the ca se in which the a ctual fa cts supportingfede ral jurisdiction rema in unaltere d from the initial pleading , but their exist ence has bee n manifested only by later pa pers, r evea ling the grounds for r emoval for the first time.” L overn v. G en. Motors Corp., 121 F .3d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1997). L ower

y did not address that pa

rticular ty pe of r emoval, and ne ither do we . In Insinga

we e x plained the voluntar y -involuntary

rule a s follows: “[I ]f the resident 1 7 defe ndant was dismissed from the c ase by the voluntary

act of the plaintiff, the c ase be came remova ble, but if the dismissal was the re sult of either the de fenda nt’s or the c ourt’s ac tion ag ainst the wish of the plaintiff, the case could not be re moved.” 845 F .2d at 252 (quotation marks omitted). 35ad de d) . That“ rece ip t fr om th e p la in ti ff” ru le pl ai nl y do es no t l im itth e type o f 1 8 ev id en ce a d efen da ntm ay us e to est ab li shth atth e p la in ti ff’s co m pl ai ntalr eady

is rem ov ab le —wi th ou t an y “ co nv ers io n.” See al so Add o v . Glo be Life & Acci de nt In s. Co ., 23 0 F .3d75 9, 7 62 (5t h C ir. 2 00 0) (“ [The ] ‘oth er p ap er’ m us t re su ltfro m th e v ol un ta ry

actof apl ai nt iff

whi ch gi ve s t he de fen dantno ti ce o f th e ch an ge d ci rcu m st an ces whi ch no w supp ort fe de ral juri sd ic ti on .”); S.W .S. Erect or s, In c. v. In fax , Inc ., 72 F.3d48 9, 4 94 (5t h C ir. 1 99 6) (ho ld in g t ha t an affi da vi t ex ecu te d b y th e d efen da nt ’s att orne y

di d n otco m

m en ce the ren ewedrem ov al pe rio d, u nd er the se co ndpa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) , bec au se th e aff id av itdi d n otari se fro m

a vo lu nt ary actby the pl ai nt iff

). In o th er wo rd s, Lo wery ’s “ rece ip t fr om th e p la in ti ff” ru le ha s no ap pl ic at io n t o c as es , li ke th is on e, whi ch are re m ov edun de r th e fi rs t p arag rap h of § 1 44 6( b) . 1 9
The Ga itor court quoted a fede ral que stion jurisdi ction case , Gre at Northe rn Railway 1 8 Company v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 281, 38 S.Ct. 237, 239 (1918), but stated that “the principle e nunciated the re is applica ble” in the c ontextof re moval case s based on diver sity jurisdiction. Gaitor, 287 F.2d at 254. We note that our dec ision in Thomas v. Bank of Americ a Corp., 570 F .3d 1280 (11th 1 9 Cir. 2009), did not ex tend L ower y ’s “r ece ipt from the plaintiff” r ule into the context of first para graph r emovals. In Thomas we a ffirme d the district court’s judgment that remova l was improper unde r CAFA . The c omplaint had sought partial re fund of f ees pa id for a c redit protec tion plan by

those consumer s who wer e inelig ible for the pla n’s bene fits. The def

endants appar ently

filed their notice of re moval within the time lim it provided by the first par agraph of

§ 1446(b). See id. at 1283 (statingthat “a de fenda nt may not simpl y

file a notice of re moval thirty day s after the filingof the c omplaint unless that document shows that the CAFA ’s jurisdictional require ments for a

n action to be de emed a

mass action ar e met” ( emphasis adde d)). That notice contained a

decla ration on the amount of all fee s paid by all consumers f

or the plan. 361. Th e Dic taAbo utFir stPara gr ap h R em ov al Cas es

The re ar e st at em en ts inth e Lowe ry op in io n t ha t ar e atlea starg uabl y in co ns is te ntwith o urco nc lu si on s i n t hi s ca se , bu t tho se st at em en ts are d ic ta . This is cru ci al be cau se , “ [w]hat ev er the ir o pi ni on s s ay , jud ic ia l d eci si on s cann otm ak e la w beyon d the fact s o f th e cas es inwhi ch th os e d eci si on s ar e an no un ced .” W atts v. Be ll So ut h Tel eco m

m s., In c., 31 6 F .3d12 03 , 12 07 (11 th Cir . 20 03 ); a cco rd Edwar ds v. Pri m e, In c., 60 2 F .3d12 76 , 12 98 (11 th Cir . 20 10 ) (“ W e h av e p oi nt ed ou t m an y ti m es th atreg ard le ss of wh ata co urt s ay s i n i ts op in io n, the de ci si on can ho ldno th in g b ey on d the fact s o f th atcas e.”); Uni te d S ta te s v . Agu il la rd , 21 7 F .3d 13 19 , 13 21 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ) (“ The ho ld in gs of apri orde ci si on canreac h o nl y as far a s t he fact s an d c irc um st an ces pre se nt edto th e Co urt i n the cas e whi ch pr oduc edth atde ci si on .” (quo ta ti onm ark s o m it te d) ). Sta te m en ts inanop in io n t ha t are n ot“ fit te d t o t he fact s,” F an in v. U.S. Dep ’t of Vet eran s Aff ai rs , 57 2 F .3d86 8, 87 3 (1 1th C ir. 2 00 9) , or t ha t ex te nd“ fu rth er tha n t he fact s o f th atcas e,” Ng uyen v .

In Thomas we did not re

ject the de fenda

nt’s decla ration out of hand be cause of its source. Instead, we agree d with the district court’s findingthat the contents of the decla ration “did not acc urate ly

identify the amount in controve rsy” bec ause the complaint “did not alleg e that all of the . . . customers w ere entitled to relief f or the e ntire amount of their . . . fee s.” I d. at 1282–83. The de clar ation did not fit the alleg ations in the complaint, and there was “ great uncer tainty reg ardingthe amount in controve rsy and the c lass siz e,” id. at 1283, so we had no ne ed to interpre t § 1446(b). Thomas stands f or the ba sic proposition that a fundame ntally flawe d decla ration, in combination with a complaint providing“no information” on the amount in controve rsy , id. at 1282–83, cannot e stablish jurisdiction by a prepondera

nce of the evidenc e. 37Uni te d S ta te s, 5 56 F.3d12 44 , 12 60 (11 th Cir . 20 09 ), or th atare “ no t n eces sa ry

to th e d eci si on of a n app eal gi ve n t he fact s an d c irc um st an ces of t he cas e,” Aro n v . Uni te d S ta te s, 2 91 F.3d70 8, 7 16 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ) (Ca rn es , J., co nc urrin g) (quo ta ti onm ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) , are d ic ta . W e are no t re qu ire d t o fo ll ow di ct a in ou r own pri orde ci si on s. Mc Nely v. Ocal a St ar-B anne r Co rp ., 99 F.3d 10 68 , 10 77 (11 th Cir . 19 96 ). Nor fo r th atm at te r is an y on e el se . Edward s, 6 02 F.3 d a t 1 29 8 (“ [D]ictais no t b in di ng onan y on e fo r an y pu rp os e.”). Whenwe en co un te r di ct a ab ou t a que st io n i n a n e arl ie r op in io n, we ar e al way s “ free to gi ve th atqu es ti on fres h c on si de rat io n.” Edward s, 6 02 F.3dat 1 29 8 (i nt ern al qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d) . The re ar e two st at em en ts inth e Lowe ry op in io n wi th whi chwe di sa gr ee an d th atare atlea starg uabl y

in co ns is te ntwith t he res ul t we re ach inth is cas e. The fir ston e is th atth e “ rece ip t fr om th e p la in ti ff” ru le is no t l im it edto rem ov al s m ad e un de r th e se co ndpa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) bu t ap pl ie s t o fi rs t p arag rap h re m ov al s as well . See Lo wery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 3 n .63 (“ Und er ei th er p arag rap h, the do cu m en ts rece iv edby the de fen da ntm us t co nt ai n a n u na m

bi gu ou s s ta te m en t tha t cl earl y es tabl is he s fe de ral juri sd ic ti on .”). Thatpa rt o f th e Lowe ry op in io n i s n ot“ fit te d t o th e fac ts ,” Fan in , 57 2 F .3dat 8 73 , itdo es ex te nd“ fu rth er tha n t he fact s o f th at cas e,” Ng uyen, 5 56 F.3dat 1 26 0, an d i t i s “ no t n eces sa ry to th e d eci si on ,” Aro n, 3829 1 F .3dat 7 16 . Becau se Lowery was n ota fi rs t p arag rap h re m ov al cas e,

an yth in g t he op in io n s ay s ab ou t the law ap pl ic ab le to cas es rem ov edun de r th e fir stpa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) is di ct a, an d we a re “ free to gi ve th atqu es ti on fres h co ns id erat io n.” Edward s, 6 02 F.3dat 1 29 8 (quo ta ti on m ark s o m it te d) . Dict a can , of c ou rs e, ha ve pe rs ua si ve va lu e. See New Po rt Lar go , Inc . v. Mo nr oe Co un ty, 98 5 F .2d14 88 , 15 00 n.7 (11 thCir . 19 93 ) (Edm on ds on , J., co nc urrin g) (“ W e are no t n eces sa ril y bo un d b y

th e wor ds of [ earl ie r pa ne l] op in io ns , altho ug h we m ay be pe rs ua de d b y

th em ev enif n otbo un d.” ). W e are no t, h owe ve r, pe rs ua de d b y th e d ic tainth e Lowe ry

ab ou t fi rs t p arag rap h rem ov al s. Fo r on e th in g, m uc h o f th e Lowe ry

op in io n’s re as on in g abo utth is m at te r is pe gg edto lan gu ag e in th e se co ndpa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) th atis no t i n th e fi rs t o ne . Thatsec on d p arag rap h l an gu ag e requi res th atrem ov al co m e withi n th irt y da y s “ aft er re cei ptby the de fen da nt. . . of a co py of anam en de d p le ad in g, m ot io n, o rd er o r ot he r pape r fro m whi ch itm ay

fir stbe asc ert ai ne d tha t the cas e is on e whi ch is or h as be co m e rem ov ab le .” 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 6( b) . The Lo wery op in io n re li es on th atlan gu ag e to supp ort i ts co nc lu si on th atrem ov al requi res th at th e d efen da ntha s re cei ve d—no t g en erat edor c om pi le d— a d oc um en t co nt ai ni ng an“ anun am

bi gu ou s s ta te m en t tha t cl earl y est ab li sh es fed eral juri sd ic ti on ” an d

39th atth e d efen dantha s re cei ve d i t fr om th e p la in ti ff o r th e co urt. See Lowery, 483 F.3 d a t 1 21 3 n .63 . In te rp ret in g t he lan gu ag e fro m th e se co ndpa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) ina cas e whe re the rem ov al was u nd er tha t p arag rap h i s o ne th in g. Im pl ic it ly readi ng th at la ng ua ge in to th e fi rs t p arag rap h o f th atsubs ect io n, wh ere i t d oe s n otex is t, i s an ot he r th in g e nt ire ly. The e nt ire pro ces s o f st atut ory in te rp ret at io n i s p rem is ed on th e p rin ci pl e th atst atut ory word s h av e m ean in g. WhenCo ng res s i nc lu de s la ng ua ge in on e st atut ory pro vi si on bu t n otinan ot he r rel at edpro vi si on th at , to o, ha s m ean in g. Se e Dean v. Un it edSta te s, 1 29 S.Ct . 18 49 , 18 54 (20 09 ) (“ Whe re Co ng res s i nc lu de s p art ic ul ar l an gu ag e inon e se ct io n o f a s ta tu te bu t o m it s i t i n an ot he r se ct io n o f th e sa m e Act , itis ge ne ral ly pres um edth atCo ng res s ac ts in te nt io na ll y

an d p ur po se ly in the di sp arat e in cl us io n o r ex cl us io n.” (qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d) ); F reem an vi ll e Water Sys., Inc ., v. Po arch Ban d o f Cre ekInd ia ns , P.C.I., 5 63 F.3d12 05 , 12 09 (11 th Cir . 20 09 ) (“ [W] he n C on gr es s u se s d iff eren t la ng ua ge in si m il ar s ect io ns , itin te nd s d iff eren t m ean in gs .” (quo ta ti on m ark s om it te d) ). W e are no t p ers ua de d t o c utan d p as te lan gu ag e fro m on e p artof § 14 46 (b ) in to an ot he r pa rt. The Lowery op in io n a ls o m is read s the two de ci si on s i t ci te s fo r it s s ta te m en t th at , “ [u ]nde r ei th er p arag rap h, the do cu m en ts rece iv edby the de fen da ntm us t 40co nt ai n a n u na m bi gu ou s s ta te m en t tha t cl earl y est ab li sh es fed eral juri sd ic ti on .” 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 3 n .63 (ci ti ng Bo sky , 28 8 F .3dat 2 11 ; Hu ffm anv. Saul Hol di ng s, LP, 19 4 F .3d10 72 , 10 78 (10 th Cir . 19 99 )). The Lowery op in io n app aren tl y vi ews th e Bo sky

an d Hu ffm ancas es as i nv ol vi ng fir stpa rag rap h re m ov al s, b utth atvi ew is mis ta ke n. Bo th of t ho se de ci si on s ac tu al ly addres se d c ha ll en ge s t o t he ti m el in es s o f rem ov al s m ad e und er the sec on d p arag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) . See Bo sky , 28 8 F .3dat 2 11 –1 2 (c on tra st in g t he fir stan d s eco ndpa rag rap hs of § 14 46 (b )); Huf fm an , 19 4 F .3dat 1 07 7 (n ot in g t ha t the sec on d p arag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) was i n pl ay “ [b ]ecaus e th e in it ia l p le ad in g d idno t p erm it[th e d efen dant ] to di sc ernth e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y ”). Tha t i s n otall . In Bo sky

th e Fi fth Cir cu itactua ll y st at edth atit s re qu ire m en t of an“un equi vo cal ly clearan d c ert ai n” ba si s fo r rem ov al is un ique to th e se co nd pa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) . See Bo sky , 28 8 F .3dat 2 11 (ho ld in g t ha t “ th e in fo rm at io n s up po rti ng rem ov al ina co py of anam en de d p le ad in g, m ot io n, o rd er orot he r pape r m

us t b e ‘un equi vo cal ly clearan d c ert ai n’ to st artth e ti m e li m it ru nn in g fo r a n ot ic e o f rem ov al un de r th e se co ndpa rag rap h o f se ct io n 1 44 6( b) .” (em ph as is ad de d) ). The B os ky deci si on was e xp li ci tl y bas edon th e d iff

eren ce be twee n the fir stan d s eco ndpa rag rap hs of § 14 46 (b ). See i d. at21 1– 12 .

412. Th e Dic taAbo utUnl iqui da te d Dam ag es Rem ov al Cas es

The sec on d s ta te m en t i n t he Lowery op in io n wi th whi ch we di sa gr ee an d th atis at l eas t ar gu ab ly inc on si st en t wi th th e res ul t we re ach he re i s t he su gg es ti on th atit s “ rece ip t fr om

th e p la in ti ff” ru le wou ldap pl y to an y cas e inwhi chth e co m pl ai ntsee ks un li qu id at edda m ag es . See 4 83 F.3dat 1 21 4 n .66 . In a fo ot no te , th e o pi ni on st at es th at“ [w]hena pl ai nt iff see ks un li qu id at edda m ag es an d d oe s n ot m ak e a s pe ci fic de m an d, . . . th e fac tu al in fo rm at io n e st ab li sh in g t he juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntm us t co m e fro m

th e p la in ti ff.” Id . In s up po rt o f th atass ert io n, the op in io n quo te s a s ni pp etfro m McNu ttv. Gen eral Mo to rs Accep ta nc e Co rp . of In di an a, 29 8 U.S. 1 78 , 18 2, 5 6 S .Ct. 7 80 , 78 2 (1 93 6) : “ Whe re the law g iv es no ru le [reg ard in g d am ag es ], th e d em an d o f th e p la in ti ff m us t fu rn is h o ne .” Lowery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 4 n .66 . The Lowery op in io n’s b ro adst at em en t ab ou t al l co m pl ai nt s s eek in g un li qu id at edda m ag es is di ct a b ecau se itis un ne ces sary to th e d eci si on inth at cas e. The s ta te m en t i s n otba se d o n o r ot he rwis e ti edto th e la ng ua ge of § 14 46 (b ) bu t i s b ro ad er tha n t ha t. Whenth e Lowe ry op in io n a ctua ll y

co nc lu de s t ha t the ev id en ce Al ab am a Po wer ref erre d t o i n s up po rt o f rem ov al wou ldno t d o, ho wev er, the reas on gi ve n i s n otth atth ere was a cl ai m forun li qu id at edda m ag es . In st ead , th e o pi ni onst at es th at“ th e ev id en ce i s n otof t he so rt c on te m pl at edby § 4214 46 (b )” an d c ha ract eri zes it s re as on in g a s “ [t]rack in g § 14 46 (b ).” Id . at 1 22 1

(em ph as is ad de d) . Thatpart o f th e o pi ni on do es no t m en ti on “un li qu id at ed da m ag es ” o r th e g en eral pri nc ip le of f ed eral juri sd ic ti onth atitsays is de riv ed fro m McNu tt . See i d. Be cau se itrel ie d o nl y on th e m or e n arro w, st atut ory ba si s fo r it s re su lt , th e Lowe ry

op in io n’s m

us in gs on un li qu id at edda m ag es are un ne ces sary

to it s d eci si on . They are d ic ta . See s up ra Pa rt I II.C.1 . W e are no t p ers ua de d b y

th is di ct a an d b el ie ve itis m is ta ke n. Th e o nl y supp ort o ffer edforitis th e sn ip pe t fr om McNu tt—tha t “ [w]here t he law g iv es no ru le [reg ard in g d am ag es ], th e d em an d o f th e p la in ti ff m us t fu rn is h o ne .” Lowery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 4 n .66 (qu ot in g M cNu tt , 29 8 U.S. at18 2, 5 6 S .Ct. at78 2) . That sn ip pe t, h owe ve r, was wri tt enin th e co nt ex t o f a p la in ti ff’s as se rti on of f ed eral juri sd ic ti on . See Mc Nut t, 2 98 U.S. at 1 82 –8 3, 5 6 S .Ct. at78 2; see als o Lo wery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 0 (r eco gn iz in g, i n a no th er p artof t he op in io n, tha t “ [t]he act io n i n McNu ttdi d n otari se fro m th e rem ov al co nt ex t, b utwas b ro ug htori gi na ll y in fed eral co urt” ). Of cou rs e th e p la in ti ff, who own s t he co m pl ai nt , m us t

“ fu rn is h” —p ro pe rly all eg e—the juri sd ic ti on al fact s wh enbri ng in g acas e in fed eral co urt. Bu t tha t t el ls us li tt le , if an yth in g, ab ou t re m ov al cas es li ke th is on e in whi chth e d efen da ntis ass ert in g t ha t fe de ral juri sd ic ti on ex is ts .

43Inan y ev en t, Mc Nut t d oe s n otsupp ort the Lowery op in io n’s s ta te m en t tha t juri sd ic ti on al fact s m

us t co m e fro m

th e p la in ti ff i n c as es see ki ng un li qu id at ed da m ag es . Ins te ad , whatth e Supr em e Co urt i ns tru ct edus inMcNu ttis th at juri sd ic ti on al fact s m ay

co m e fro m

whi ch ev er p arty

ass ert s fe de ral juri sd ic ti on : The pr erequi si te s to th e ex erci se of ju ris di ct io n . . . m us t b e m et by th e pa rty who se ek s th e ex erci se of juri sd ic ti on in hi s fav or . He m us t al le ge in hi s pl ead in g th e fact s es se nt ia l to sh ow juri sd ic ti on . I f h e f a il s to m ak e th e ne ces sa ry al le ga ti on s he h a s n o s t a nd in g. If he do es m ak e th em , an in qu iry in to th e ex is te nc e of juri sd ic ti on is ob vi ou sl y fo r th e pu rp os e of de te rm in in g whe th er th e fact s supp ort hi s al le ga ti on s. In th e na tu re of thi ng s, the au th or iz edin qu iry is p rimaril y di rect ed to th e on e who cl ai m s th at th e po wer of th e co urt s ho ul d b e ex ert edin hi s beh al f.

. . . If hi s al le ga ti on s of juri sd ic ti on al fact s are ch al le ng ed by hi s adve rs ary in an y ap pr op ria te m an ne r, he mu s t s up po rt th em by co m pe te ntpro of

. Andwher e th ey

are n ot so ch al le ng edth e co urt m ay st il l in si st th at th e juri sd ic ti on al fact s be es tabl is he d or th e cas e be d i sm is se d, an d fo r th at pu rp os e th e co urt m ay de m an d th at th e p a rt y a l l eg in g juri sd ic ti on jus ti fy hi s al le ga ti on s by a pr ep on de ran ce o f ev id en ce. McNu tt , 29 8 U.S. at18 9, 5 6 S .Ct. at78 5 (e m ph as is ad de d) . Tho se st at em en ts of th e Supr em e Co urt ru n d ire ct ly con tra ry to th e d ic tainth e Lowe ry op in io n t ha t i n ev ery un li qu id at edda m ag es cas e th e ev id en ce i n s up po rt o f juri sd ic ti on m us t co m e fro m

th e p la in ti ff— a p arty

no t s eek in g t o h av e th e p owe r of th e fed eral co urt ex ert edon hi s b eh al f. Mi ss in g fr om

th e Supr em e Co urt’s ex pl an at io n i n M cNu ttis an y res tri ct io n on th e so ur ce o f th e ev id en ce u se d t o e st ab li sh fed eral juri sd ic ti on , or e ve n t he hi nt 44of

on e. The M cNu ttop in io n i s t he fir stto lay do wn the “pr ep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce” s ta nd ardforrem ov al cas es . See Lo wery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 20 9. If t he Supr em e Co urt h adm ean t t o re st ric t the so ur ce o f ev id en ce tha t co ul d b e u se d t o es tabl is h ju ris di ct io n, i t ea si ly cou ldha ve do ne so , bu t i t d idno t. We are no t in cl in edto writ e in to th e k ey pa rt o f th e Mc Nut t d eci si on lan gu ag e th atth e Supr em e Co urt d idno t p utth ere. Be si de s, as on e co urt h as ob se rv ed , “ [i]t wo ul d be a st ran ge res ul t” if t he law “ fo rc[e d] a rem ov in g d efen da ntto pro ve juri sd ic ti on by a prep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce, ev enas i t ca te go ric al ly forec lo se d d efen da nt s fro m be in g abl e to pre se nt[th ei r own ] ob jecti ve ev id en ce s pe ci fic to th e p la in ti ff’s cl ai m s t o d em on st rat e th e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y .” Sp ot ts woo d v . Ste wartTit le Gua r. Co ., No. 10 -0 10 9, 2 01 0 WL 15 39 99 3, at*3 (S.D. Ala. Ap r. 16 , 20 10 ). Stran ge in de ed . W e are no t awa re o f an y

ot he r ap pe ll at e co urt tha t h as in te rp ret edMcNu ttin th e way th atth e Lowe ry

op in io n d oe s. As far as we cantel l, i t h as ne ve r be enth e juri sd ic ti on al rul e th ata de fen da ntm ay rem ov e a d iv ers it y

cas e se ek in g un li qu id at edda m ag es on ly whe n t he pl ai nt iff is th e so ur ce o f fac ts or e vi de nc e o n th e v al ue of t he cas e. See W.E . Shi pl ey , Ann ot at io n, Cr it eri a o f Ju ris di ct io na l 2 0
Our discussion is limi ted to remova l based on diver sity jurisdiction. By

contra st, a 2 0 defe ndant may

remove on the basis of fe dera l question jurisdiction onl y wher e that question appea rs on the fa ce of

the plaintiff’s c omplaint. See, e.g ., Kemp v. I nt’l Bus. Mac h. Corp., 109 45Am ou ntin TortActi on forUnl iqui da te d Dam ag es inFed eral Co urt, 4 7 A.L.R.2 d

65 1 (1 95 6) (“ Whe re the co m pl ai ntdo es no t d is cl os e th e am ou ntor v al ue of the m at te r in co ntro ve rs y , itha s b een he ld , inrem ov al pro ceed in gs , th atrefe ren ce m ay be m ad e to th e d efen dant ’s pet it io n fo r rem ov al inord er t o d et erm in e whe th er the juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntis in vo lv ed .”). The S up rem e Co urt l on g a go set tl edth atth e no ti ce o f rem ov al “pe rfo rm s t he off ic e o f [a] pl ead in g,” Lit tl e York Go ldW as hi ng & Water Co . v. Key es , 96 U.S. 19 9, 2 02 (18 77 ), th atit“be co m es a pa rt o f th e reco rd ,” an d t ha t “ [i]t s ho ul d s ta te fact s, wh ic h, t ak eninco nn ect io n wi th su ch as al read y ap pe ar, en ti tl e [the pe ti ti on er] to th e tr an sf er,” Ph oe ni x In s. Co . v. Pec hn er, 95 U.S. 18 3, 1 85 –8 6 (1 87 7) . Tho se Supr em e Co urt d eci si on s ar e in co ns is te nt with t he Lowery op in io n’s as se rti on th at“ th e d em an d o f th e p la in ti ff” m us t pr ov id e th e so ur ce o f fac ts on th e v al ue of u nl iqui da te d c la im s ev enwher e th e de fen da ntis th e p arty

ass ert in g fe de ral juri sd ic ti on . See al so Dave np ort v . Pro ct er & Gam bl e Mfg . Co., 2 41 F.2d51 1, 5 14 (2dCir . 19 57 ) (“ Rem ov ab il it y is de te rm in edby the all eg at io ns of t he co m pl ai ntif i t s et s up t he am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y , and , if i t d oe s n ot , th e co urt m ay lo okto th e p et it io n fo r rem ov al .”).

F.3d 708, 712 ( 11th Cir. 1997) (“B eca use a f eder al question must appear on the fa ce of

the plaintiff’s complaint to satisfy the well-ple aded c omplaint rule, a de fense which pre sents a fede ral que stion can not cre ate r emoval jurisdiction. Thus, a ca se may not be re moved to fede ral court on the ground of a

fede ral que stion defense alone, e ven if that de fenseis valid.”).

46The in te rp ret at io n o f McNu ttinth e Lowe ry di ct a wou ldals o u nd erm in e th e pu rp os e o f th e rem ov al pro ces s, wh ic h “ was crea te d b y Co ng res s t o p ro te ct de fen da nt s.” Leg g v . W

y eth, 4 28 F.3d13 17 , 13 25 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ). “ Co ng res s di d n otex te ndsu ch pro te ct io n wi th on e h an d, an d wi th th e o th er g iv e p la in ti ffs a ba g o f tr ic ks to ov erco m e it .” Id . (qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) . Whi le we co ns tru e rem ov al st atut es na rro wly, we do no t re writ e th em to ad d re st ric ti on s th atcan no t b e fo un d i n t he ir l an gu ag e an d t ha t wo ul d ru n c ou nt er t o the ir pu rp os es . See Ten n. Val le y Aut h. v . Whi tm an , 33 6 F .3d12 36 , 12 55 (11 th Cir . 20 03 ) (“ [N]o can on of s ta tu to ry in te rp ret at io n c antru m

p t he un am

bi gu ou s la ng ua ge of ast atut e.”). As t he Supr em e Co urt l on g a go adm on is he d, “ th e Fed eral co urts sh ou ldno t s an ct io n d ev ic es in te nd edto pre ve nta rem ov al to a Fed eral co urt wh ere o ne ha s tha t ri gh t, an d s ho ul d b e equa ll y vi gi la ntto pro te ctth e ri gh t t o pr oc eedinth e Fed eral co urt as to pe rm itth e st at e co urts , inpro pe r cas es , to ret ai n th ei r own juri sd ic ti on .” W eck er v . Nat’l Ena m el in g & Sta m pi ng Co ., 20 4 U.S. 17 6, 1 86 , 27 S.Ct . 18 4, 1 88 (19 07 ); s ee al so Legg , 42 8 F .3dat 1 32 5. The Lowery op in io n’s d ic tawou ldpro vi de pl ai nt iff s wi th a tr ic k b y

whi ch th ey co ul d m ak e fed eral juri sd ic ti on di sapp ear. A d iv ers e p la in ti ff co ul d d efea t fed eral juri sd ic ti on si m

pl y by draft in g h is pl ead in gs ina way th atdi d n otsp eci fy anap pr ox im at e v al ue of t he cla im s an d t he reaf te r pr ov id e th e d efen da ntwith n o 47de ta il s o n t he va lu e o f th e cl ai m . Thatwou ldsubjec t the de fen da nt ’s rig htto

rem ov e to th e cap ric e o f th e p la in ti ff, whi chth e Supr em e Co urt h as sai d i n a no th er co nt ex t tha t we s ho ul d n otdo . See St . Pau l M ercu ry Ind em . Co. v . RedCab Co ., 30 3 U.S. 2 83 , 29 4, 5 8 S .Ct. 5 86 , 59 3 (1 93 8) (“ If [af te r rem ov al ] th e p la in ti ff co ul d . . . redu ce the am ou ntof h is de m an d t o d efea t fe de ral juri sd ic ti on th e d efen da nt ’s supp os edst atut ory

rig htof r em ov al wou ldbe subjec t t o t he pl ai nt iff’s cap ric e.”); se e al so 14 B Wrigh t etal., Fe de ral Prac ti ce an d P ro cedur e § 37 21 , at 6 0 (“ [R]em ov al wil l b e uph el d wh en , by frau d, m is ta ke , in adve rte nc e, or art fu l pl ead in g t he pl ai nt iff

ha s co nc eal eda le gi ti m at e g ro un d o f rem ov al .”); S. Rep . No. 10 9- 14 , at 9 (20 05 ), rep rin te d i n 2 00 5 U.S.C.C .A.N. 3, 10 (“ The Co m m it te e n ot es th atth e p ur

po se of [ § 1 44 6( b) ] is to pre ve ntpl ai nt iff s fr om ev ad in g fe de ral juri sd ic ti on by hid in g t he tru e n atur e o f th ei r cas e.”). 2 1 The proble m of artf

ul pleadingin this contex t could not be much better illustrate d than 2 1 it was by the exchang e betwe en the district cour t and plaintiffs’ c ounsel at the he aringon the motion to remand in this case: M R . GELFAN D: . . . You have to look at what the Plaintiff offe rs. It’s real l y a unilatera l viewpoint acc ording to L o we ry an d its case law and its prog eny . It say s loo k at what the Plaintiff has provided in this case . You, Mr. Def endant, can’ t add any thing to that mix . . . . THE COURT: So if a plaintiff al leg es in the complaint, I am suing for in excess of $15,000 in damag es, I

reside in Palm B eac h County , Florida , the Def endant is XYZ Corporation, you don’t say any thing about its residents or citizensh i p , . . . t he Def endant [i s] . . . stuck with the complaint that doesn’t tell me any thing . . . . So how does a defe ndant, wher e the Plaintiff never g ives enough information in the complaint to cre ate jurisdiction on the fa ce, e ver g et a c ase r emoved? 48Adm it te dl y , a pl ai nt iff ’s “ art fu l p le ad in g” tri ckpro babl y wou ldno t fo ol th e jud ic ia l au di en ce fo rev er. At s om e p oi ntdu rin g t he pe rfo rm an ce— pe rh ap s dur in g di sc ov ery orev enat t ria l—th e p la in ti ff l ik el y wou ldha ve to pro vi de th e d efen da nt with s om e “ ot he r pape r” i nd ic at in g t he va lu e o f th e cl ai m s. Th e d efen da nt ’s rece ip t o f th atdo cu m en t m ig httri gg er a n ew th irt y -d ay pe rio d i n wh ic h re m ov al is ti m el y . See 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 46 (b ) (s eco ndparag rap h) . The res ul t i n m an y cas es wou ldbe th atth e Lowe ry op in io n’s d ic tawou ldde la y , bu t n otpe rm an en tl y ba r, rem ov al . 2 2 Eve n s o, i f th atdi ct a b ecame law itwou ldun de rm in e th e st atut ory sch em e, whi chwas d es ig ne d t o e nc ou rag e ex pe di ti ou s re m ov al s fr om st at e to fed eral co urt. Sect io n 1 44 6( b) is ba se d o n “ th e rec og ni zedpo li cy of t he fed eral co urts to requi re, as far as po ss ib le , pro m

ptact io n o n t he pa rt o f th os e se ek in g arem ov al so as t o av oi d t he ev il s o f th e d el ay ne ces sa ril y

att en da ntup on th e ch an ge of f orum .” 2 Cy cl op ed iaof F ed eral Pro cedur e § 3: 10 1, at52 1 (3 d e d., re v. 2 00 6) ; s ee al so , e.g.,
MR. GELFAN D: In those specific fac ts you g ave in that example, Your Honor, they don’t, bec ause it’s their bur den, not mine. In some circ umstances, howe ver, the L ower y opinion’s interpretation could effe ctively 2 2 bar r emoval. Non- CAFA c ases g enerally “may not be re moved . . . more tha n 1 year afte r commence ment of the a ction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (se cond par agraph) . Under the L ower

y opinion’s interpretation, a non-CAFAplaintiff might de lay sendingevidenc e of the jurisdictional amount to the defe ndant until after theone-year deadline pa sses. See id. B ut that particular problem ca

nnot arise in CAF A ca ses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (providingthat CAFA de fenda nts must follow all the removal proc edure s of § 1446 except for its one- year time limi tation). 49Add o, 2 30 F.3dat 7 62 (“ [T]he p ur po se of t he rem ov al st atut e [i s] to en co ur ag e pr om ptres ort t o fe de ral co urt wh ena de fen da ntfir stlea rn s t ha t the pl ai nt iff’s de m an d e xc eed s t he fed eral juri sd ic ti on al li m it .”); W il so n v . Int erco ll eg ia te (Bi g Ten ) Co nf

eren ce Athl et ic Ass ’n, 66 8 F .2d96 2, 9 65 (7t h C ir. 1 98 2) (no ti ng th at on e p ur po se of § 14 46 (b ) is “ to pre ve ntth e d el ay an d was te of r es ou rces in vo lv ed in st art in g acas e o ve r in a se co ndco urt af te r si gn ifi can t p ro ceed in gs , ext en di ng ov er m on th s o r ev eny ears , m ay ha ve tak enpl ace i n t he fir stco urt” ). To fo rce a de fen da ntto tarry

in st at e co urt wh enhe ha s ev id en ce es tabl is hi ng hi s ri gh t t o b e in fed eral co urt, an d t o fo rce s ta te co urts to wast e th ei r res ou rces on cas es th atwil l ev en tu al ly be d eci de d i n fe de ral co urt, ca nn otbe whatCo ng res s h adinm in d wh en iten act ed§ 1 44 6. 2 3 3. Su m m ary To s umm ari ze, Lo wery

is a cas e in whi ch th e rem ov al aro se un de r th e se co ndpa rag rap h o f 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 6( b) . Whi le so m e o f th e la ng ua ge inth e We need not dec ide, and do not purpor t to decide, whe ther a

defe ndant has a

duty to 2 3 investigate the nec essar

y jurisdictional fac ts within the first thirty day s of re ceivingan indeterminate complaint. District courts in our c ircuit are split on this issue. Compare, e.g ., Kuhn v. B runswick Corp., 871 F . Supp. 1444, 1446 (N.D. Ga . 1994); and Richman v. Z immer, Inc., 644 F . Supp. 540, 542 (S.D. Fla. 1986), w ith Essenson v. Coale, 848 F. Supp. 987, 989 (M.D. F la. 1994). This ca se does not conc ern that situation. I t conce rns a de fenda nt that can, within thirty

day s of re ceivingthe initial complaint, marshal enough evidenc e of the jurisdictional fac ts to support a notice of r emoval. It is enoug h to say , as we do, that nothing in § 1446(b) or

elsewhe re r equire s a def

endant in those c ircumstance s to wait until the plaintiff g ives it evidence establishing what it could alre ady establish. 50Lowery

op in io n s weep s m or e b ro ad ly tha n t he fact s o f th e cas e, th atdi ct a is no t bi nd in g. We hav e co ns id ereditforit s p ers ua si ve va lu e. Bu t we ar e n otpe rs ua de d by Lowery ’s di ct a th atit s “ rece ip t fr om th e p la in ti ff ” ru le sh ou ldap pl y to § 14 46 (b ) fi rs t p arag rap h re m ov al cas es , or b y it s d ic tath atth e ru le sh ou ldap pl y to an y cas e in whi ch th e co m

pl ai ntsee ks un li qu id at edda m ag es . Ins te ad , we co nc lu de in th is cas e, whi ch aro se un de r th e fi rs t p arag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) , th atth e ev id en ce the de fen da ntm ay us e to est ab li shth e juri sd ic ti on al fact s i s n otli m it ed to th atwhi chitrece iv edfro m th e p la in ti ff o r th e co urt. IV. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE W e n ow ap pl y

th e law we hav e d is cu ss edto th e fac ts of t hi s ca se . Kol te r of fere d t hr ee ty

pe s o f ev id en ce i n o rd er t o c arry its bu rd enof e st ab li sh in g, b y a pr ep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce, tha t the va lu e o f th e p la in ti ffs ’ cl ai m s, wh ic h i s t he am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y , exc eed s $ 5 m il li on : (1 ) th e fac e o f th e co m pl ai ntan d t he co nt ract s tha t the pl ai nt iff s at ta ch edto it ; (2 ) Cl ark e’s de cl arat io n, wh ic h was subm it te d wi th th e n ot ic e o f rem ov al ; an d (3 ) th e u nn am edpl ai nt iff s’ con tra ct s an d Gu ti erre z’s de cl arat io n, wh ic h wer e subm it te d wi th Kol te r’s op po si ti on to rem an d. Be cau se th os e types of e vi de nc e rai se di ffer en t i ss ue s, we wi ll di sc us s each on e se pa rat el y .

51A. The Co m pl ai ntan d t he Att ach m en ts to It The si x c on tra ct s o f th e se ve n n am edpl ai nt iff s wer e at ta ch edto th e co m pl ai ntan d i nc or

po rat edin to it . Tho se co nt ract s cl earl y id en ti fy $6 28 ,24 0 i n de po si ts th atth e n am edpl ai nt iff s ag reedto pa y

Kol te r. Ther e is no di sp ut e th at th os e d ep os it s co un t t owa rdth e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y . Sub tra ct in g $ 62 8,2 40 fro m CAFA’s $5 m il li on th res ho ldlea ve s $ 4,3 71 ,76 0. Ko lt er, the refo re, h as th e bu rd enof e st ab li sh in g t ha t the am ou ntof the un na m edpl ai nt iff s’ cla im s i s m or e li ke ly tha n n otto ex ceed$4 ,37 1,7 60 . See Tap sc ot t, 7 7 F .3dat 1 35 6– 57 . The co m pl ai ntit se lf s ta te s t ha t “ [t]he cla ss is be li ev edto co ns is t o f ov er 3 00 m em be rs .” Co m

pl ai nt¶ 48 . Thatall eg at io n, h owe ve r, do es no t i nd ic at e h ow m an y co nd om in iu m

un it s, an d t hu s h ow m an y co nd om in iu m

de po si ts , are atis su e. It m ay be th at30 1 (“ ov er 3 00 ”) i nd iv idua l cl as s m em be rs co nt ract edto pu rch as e 30 1 c on do m in iu m

un it s, o r itm ay

be th atth ey

co nt ract edto pu rch as e fewerth an th atbe cau se so m e o f th e cl as s m em be rs joi nt ly pur ch as eda un it . 2 4 W e d o n otha ve to sp ecu la te ab ou t tha t, h owe ve r, be cau se th e p la in ti ffs adm it te d dur in g ahe ari ng th atth e p ut at iv e cl as s l ik el y in vo lv es ov er 3 00 co nd om in iu m

un it s. No t o wne rs , bu t u ni ts . Andwe ha ve no pro bl em with t he We know, for e x ample, that two of the named plaintiffs bought one condominium unit. 2 4 Which is why

the seve n named plaintiffs se ek the r eturn of the deposits for only six units. S ee supra n.4. 52di st ric t co urt h av in g e li ci te d t ha t i nf orm at io n fr om

th e p la in ti ffs at ahe ari ng . See Lowery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 4 n .66 (“ [W] e d o n otm ean to su gg es t tha t the co urt d oe s no t h av e d is cret io n t o h ol d ahe ari ng on th e m ot io n t o re m an d a ndall ow t he pa rti es to be he ard .”); id . at 1 21 8 n .75 (ackno wled gi ng th ata di st ric t co urt m ay

“ qu es ti on [ ] a p la in ti ff’s co un se l i n o pe n c ou rt abo utth e v al ue of the pl ai nt iff’s cl ai m s” ). The p la in ti ffs ex pl ai ne d i n o pe n c ou rt, andKol te r do es no t d is pu te ,

2 5 th atat t he ti m e o f th ei r am en de d c om pl ai nt42 4 u ni ts at Two Cit y Pla za h adgo ne to co nt ract , and“ ap pr ox im at el y 10 0 a ndch an ge of t he m ” h adalr eady go ne to cl os in g. Th atlef

t m or e th an30 0 c on do m in iu m un it s wh os e p ur ch as ers are i n t he pu ta ti ve cla ss . The p la in ti ffs ’ cl ari fic at io n a t the he ari ng canbe us edto supp ort th e rem ov al ev enth ou ghitwas n otco nt ai ne d, an d c ou ldno t h av e b een co nt ai ne d, in th e p rev io us ly file d n ot ic e o f rem ov al . See Lo wery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 8 n .78 ; s ee al so W il li ng ham

v. Mo rg an , 39 5 U.S. 4 02 , 40 7 n .3, 8 9 S .Ct. 1 81 3, 1 81 6 n .3 (1 96 9) . After s ub tra ct in g t he 6 co nt ract s t ha t the na m edpl ai nt iff s s ig ne d fr om

th e 30 1 c on tra ct s i n t hi s co nt ro ve rs y (th e co m pl ai ntan d t he pl ai nt iff

s’ st at em en ts at

In dicta, the L ower

y opinion states that, although the district court may hold a hea

ring 2 5 on the motion to remand, “[s]uch a hearing w ould ordinarily be limited to arguments on the sufficie ncy

of the re moving doc uments.” 483 F .3d at 1214 n.66. That stateme nt is dicta beca use the L ower

y Court did not have bef

ore it a situation in which the district cour t had attempted to hear additional evidenc e fr om the defe ndant. See id. at 1190–91. The L ower y Court could not have c abined the district c ourt’s discre tion to do som ethingthe district court ha d not even trie d to do. See, e.g ., Edwar ds, 602 F.3d at 1298. 53th e h eari ng est ab li sh th atth e num be r of co nt ract s i s atlea stth atlar ge ), we are l eft with 2 95 co nt ract s o n wh ic h u nn am edcla ss m em be rs m ad e d ep os it s. Kno win g the nu m

be r of co nt ract s s ig ne d b y

un na m edcla ss m em

be rs , of co ur se , is no t en ou ghto cal cu la te th e am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y . W e al so ne edto kn ow t he am ou ntof the de po si t m ad e o r to be m ad e o n e ach co nt ractor t he av erag e am ou nt . Kol te r arg ue s t ha t we s ho ul d e xt rap ol at e th e av erag e d ep os itpe r co nt ractfro m

th e am ou nt s t ha t we kno w th e n am edpl ai nt iff s ag reedto de po si t. As we m en ti on edearl ie r, th e n am edpl ai nt iff s ag reedto pa y

a to ta l d ep os itpe r co nd om in iu m

th atran ge d fr om

$7 3,7 80 to $1 21 ,60 0, wi th anav erag e o f $1 04 ,70 7. Kol te r pr op os es tak in g t he lo wes t o f th os e fi gu res ($7 3,7 80 ) an d m ul ti pl y in g i t b y th e num be r of co nt ract s b y

un na m edcla ss m em

be rs (29 5) , whi ch wou ldpro du ce a to ta l ($ 21 ,76 5,1 00 ) th atfar ex ceed s C AFA’s $5 m il li on juri sd ic ti on al am ou nt . The di stric t co urt co nc lu de d, an d t he pl ai nt iff s co nt en d, tha t Ko lt er’s pr op os edex trapo la ti on wou ldbe “ im pe rm is si bl e sp ecu la ti on ” u nd er Lo wery . See s up ra Pa rt I I.A. Kol te r as su m es th atit s ex trapo la ti on is ap pr op ria te be cau se th e n am edpl ai nt iff

s’ cla im s ar e “ typic al ” o f th os e o f th e cl as s. See Co m pl ai nt¶ 49 . Butth e typi cal ity

ele m en t o f a cl as s ac ti on , by it se lf, d oe s n otall ow u s t o i nf er th atth e am ou nt s o f th e n am edpl ai nt iff s’ cla im s ar e si m il ar t o t ho se of o th er cl as s m em be rs . See Ko rnbe rg v. Ca rn iv al Cru is e Lin es , Inc ., 74 1 F .2d13 32 , 13 37 (11 th 54Ci r. 19 84 ) (“ Diff eren ces in th e am ou ntof d am ag es be twee n t he cla ss rep res en ta ti ve an d o th er cl as s m em be rs do [ ] no t af

fecttypic al it y .”). Kol te r m us t es tabl is h t ha t the cla im s ar e fac tu al ly, no t ju stleg al ly, si m il ar. Giv enth e al le ga ti on s i n t he co m pl ai nt , th e co nt ract s o f th e n am edpl ai nt iff s at ta ch edto it , andpl ai nt iff s’ st at em en t atth e h eari ng , Kol te r is lef t wi th th e b ur de n of pro vi ng th atth e v al ue of t he de po si ts for29 5 u ni ts purch as edby the un na m ed cl as s m em

be rs is m or e li ke ly tha n n otto ex ceed$4 ,37 1,7 60 ($5 ,00 0,0 00 – $6 28 ,24 0) . Thatis anav erag e o f $1 4,8 19 .53 ($4 ,37 1,7 60 ÷ 29 5) pe r co nd om in iu m

un it . In Lo wery

th e rem ov in g d efen da ntha d t o p ro ve on ly tha t $1 2,5 00 was i n c on tro ve rs y pe r pl ai nt iff

, whi ch was a“ rel at iv el y

lo w hurd le .” 48 3 F.3 d a t 1 22 0. St il l, Lo wery he ldth atth e d efen da ntha d n otcle aredth athu rd le be cau se itha d fa il edto pro vi de “ an y ev id en ce [o n] th e v al ue of i nd iv idua l cl ai m s.” Id . Kol te r arg ue s t ha t thi s ca se is di ffer en t, b ecau se he re we d o h av e ev id en ce o n th e v al ue of u nn am edpl ai nt iff s’ cla im s. We hav e th atev id en ce, Ko lt er s ay s, be cau se we kn ow t ha t Ko lt er re qu ire d e ach buy er t o p ay de po si ts of a t l eas t 2 0% of th e v al ue of t he co nd om in iu m un it(10 % as t he “ in it ia l d ep os it ” an d 1 0% m or e as th e “ co ns tru ct io n p aym en t” ), an d we kno w fro m th e co m pl ai ntit se lf t ha t al l the pu rch as e ag reem en ts ha ve “ id en ti cal co nt ractlan gu ag e” an d wer e requi redto be id en ti cal in form . Thatm ean s the y all co nt ai n the 20 % de po si t re qu ire m en t, wh ic h 55in tu rnm ean s t ha t the am ou nt -in -co nt ro ve rs y requi rem en t wo ul d b e m etif t he av erag e co stof an u nn am edcla ss m em be r’s co nd om in iu m s was $7 4,1 00 or m or e. 2 6 Altho ug h t he reco rddo es no t co nt ai n d at a o n t he purch as e p ric e o f eac h u ni t atTwo Ci ty Plaza , Kol te r as se rts th atitis ob vi ou s fr om fact s tha t ap pe ar i n, o r are

“ read il y de du ci bl e” fr om , th e am en de d c om pl ai ntan d t he nam edpl ai nt iff s’ co nt ract s at ta ch edto itth atth e av erag e co stof the un na m edcla ss m em be rs ’ co nd om in iu m

un it s i s m

uc h g reat er tha n t he requi si te am ou nt($7 4,1 00 ). See Lowery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 1 (“ If the juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntis eit he r st at edcle arl y on th e fac e o f th e d oc um en ts be fo re the co urt, o r rea di ly deduc ib le fro m th em , th en th e co urt h as juri sd ic ti on .” (em ph as is ad de d) ). Thi s ca se in vo lv es “ lu xu ry co nd om in iu m s” th atare al l l oc at edinth e sa m e b ui ld in g i n WestPal m Beac h, Fl or id a, an d the na m edpl ai nt iff s co nt ract edto sp en d b etween$3 68 ,90 0 a nd $6 08 ,00 0 fo r th ei r un it s i n t ha t b ui ld in g. Itm ig htbe arg ue d tha t i t wo ul d d efy co m m on sen se to be li ev e th atlu xu ry co nd om in iu m s p ric edas l ow as $7 4,1 00 were

I f the avera g e purc hase price we re $74,100, the require d 20% deposit would be 2 6 $14,820. The produc t of that amount and 295, the numbe r of units, is $4,371,900. That amount plus the $628,240 in deposits by the named pla intiffs yields a total amount in controver sy of $5,000,140. 56av ai labl e an y whe re i n WestPal m

Beac h fr om

20 04 to 20 06 , letalo ne ina bu il di ng th atco nt ai ne d u ni ts pri cedat m or e th an$6 00 ,00 0. It i s t ru e th at“ [n ]oth in g i n Lo wery says a d is tri ctco urt m

us t s us pe ndreal ity orsh el ve co m

m onsen se in de te rm in in g wh ethe r th e fac e o f a co m pl ai nt , or o th er do cu m en t, es tabl is he s t he juri sd ic ti on al am ou nt .” Ro e, 63 7 F . Sup p. 2 d a t 9 99 ; cf . Ash cro ft v . Iqb al , --- U.S. ---, 1 29 S.Ct . 19 37 , 19 50 (20 09 ) (“ Dete rm in in g wh ethe r a co m pl ai ntst at es a pl au si bl e cl ai m forrel ie f wil l . . . be aco nt ex t-s pe ci fic tas k th atrequi res th e rev ie win g c ou rt t o d raw o n i ts jud ic ia l ex pe rie nc e an d c omm on se ns e.”); James Neff Kra m pe r Fam il y

Farm P’shi p v . IBP, In c., 39 3 F .3d82 8, 83 1– 32 (8t h C ir. 2 00 5) (rel y in g o n re co rdev id en ce “ an d c omm on sen se ” to de te rm in e th atrem ov in g d efen da nt s h adfai le d t o s at is fy th e am ou nt -in
co nt ro ve rs y

requi rem en t). An d v ie win g fa ct s t hr ou gh th e le ns of c omm on sen se is no t s ta r ga zi ng . Non ethe le ss , we nee d n otlo okso le ly to the co m pl ai ntan d t he na m edpl ai nt iff

s’ con tra ct s t ha t ar e at ta ch edto it , andha ve no oc cas io n t o e xp res s an y vi ew on ho w we wou ldde ci de th is cas e if th atwere the on ly evi de nc e o f th e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y . It i s unn eces sary forus to an swe r th atqu es ti on , andwe im pl y no vi ew on it , bec au se th ere i s m or e ev id en ce i n t hi s ca se .

57B. Cla rk e’s Decl arat io n

Kol te r’s no ti ce o f rem ov al wentbe y on d t he co m pl ai ntan d t he att ach m en ts to it . The n ot ic e o f rem ov al in cl ud edth e d ecl arat io n o f Mi ch ael Cla rk e, th e CFO of Kol te r’s pa ren t co m

pa ny, tha t Ko lt er h ad“ co ll ect edm or e th an$5 m il li on in co nd om in iu m

un itpu rch as e d ep os it s fr om pro sp ect iv e p ur ch as ers of u ni ts at Two Ci ty Plaza .” The d is tri ctco urt re jecte d t ha t ev id en ce b ecau se “ itwas n ota do cu m en t re cei ve d b y

[Kol te r] from

Pla in ti ffs ” an d b ecau se it“ sp ecu la te s o n t he po te nt ia l d am ag e cl ai m

of p ut at iv e cl as s m em

be rs , as o pp os edto na m ed pl ai nt iff s.” Th e d is tri ctco urt erredinreject in g t ha t ev id en ce. As t o t he “ rece ip t fr om

th e p la in ti ff” ru le , th is cas e was rem ov edun de r th e fir stpa rag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) . As we h av e al read y ex pl ai ne d a t s om e le ng th , th at fir stpa rag rap h d oe s n otres tri ctth e type o f ev id en ce tha t a d efen da ntm ay us e to sa ti sf y th e juri sd ic ti on al requi rem en ts forrem ov al . See 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 46 (b ) (fi rs t pa rag rap h) . See s up ra Pa rt I II.B– C. Thi s i s n ota se co ndparag rap h re m ov al cas e, li ke Lowery, in wh ic h t he de fen da ntha d t o re ly on “ ot he r pape r” t o s ho w th ata no n- rem ov ab le cas e “ ha s b eco m e rem ov ab le ” due to a vo lunt ary actof t he pl ai nt iff . See 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 46 (b ) (s eco ndpa rag rap h) . As fo r th e im

pe rm is si bl e sp ecu la ti on part o f th e d is tri ctco urt’s re as on in g, do cu m en ts ge ne rat edby the de fen da ntdo no t n eces sa ril y in vo lv e im

pe rm is si bl e 58sp ecu la ti on . In Lo wery we st at edth at“ th e rem ov in g d efen da ntge ne ral ly w il l ha ve no di rectkn owl ed ge of t he va lu e o f th e p la in ti ff’s cl ai m s” an d tha t s uc h kn owl ed ge “ wil l g en eral ly com e fro m th e p la in ti ff h ers el f.” 4 83 F.3dat 1 21 3 n.6 3; see als o Th om as v. Ba nkof Am . Cor p., 5 70 F.3d12 80 , 12 83 (11 th Cir . 20 09 ) (s am e). Bu t “ ge ne ral ly” do es no t m ean in va riabl y . Som et im es th e de fen da ntwil l p os se ss ev id en ce tha t was no t re cei ve d fr om th e p la in ti ff b utwhi ch no ne th el es s s he ds li gh t o n t he va lu e o f th e p la in ti ff’s cl ai m s. See , e.g., Lo wery , 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 4 n .66 (“ A def en da ntwou ldbe free to in tro du ce ev id en ce reg ard in g d am ag es ari si ng fro m a so ur ce s uc h a s a c on tra ctpro vi si on whet he r or no t the de fen da ntrece iv edth e co nt ractfro m th e p la in ti ff.”); Sie rm in sk i, 2 16 F.3d at94 7 (e m

pl oym en t ca se in whi ch th e d efen da ntsubm it te d ade cl arat io n fr om it s Dire ct orof Hu m anRes ou rces in di cat in g t he pl ai nt iff’s sal ary an d b en efi ts in fo rm at io n) . Andso m et im es th e d efen da nt ’s evi de nc e o n t he va lu e o f th e cl ai m s wil l b e ev enbe tt er tha n the pl ai nt iff’s evi de nc e. The so ur ce o f th e ev id en ce m ay im pa ctit s p ers ua si ve ne ss , bu t tha t i s a di ffer en t m at te r an d o ne th atde pe nd s o n the fact s o f eac h c as e. See Lo wery , 48 3 F.3 d a t 1 21 4 n .66 ; Ev an s, 4 49 F.3dat 1 16 4 n .3 (“ Defen da nt s h av e b et te r acc es s t o in fo rm at io n abo utco nduc t b y th e d efen da nt s, b utpl ai nt iff s h av e b et te r acc es s t o in fo rm at io n abo utwhi ch pl ai nt iff s ar e in jure d a ndth ei r rel at io ns hi p t o v ari ou s 59de fen da nt s.”) ; s ee al so Am oc he , 55 6 F .3dat 5 1 (“ Mer el y lab el in g t he de fen da nt ’s sh owi ng [as to th e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y ] as ‘ sp ecu la ti ve ’ witho utdi sc red it in g t he fact s upo n wh ic h i t re st s i s i ns uf fic ie nt . In the co ur se of t ha t ev al ua ti on [of th e am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y ], a fed eral co urt m ay co ns id er wh ic h p arty

ha s b ette r acc es s to th e rel ev an t i nf

orm at io n.” (in te rn al cit at io n o m it te d) ); As oc ia ci on Naci on al de Pes cad or es a Peque naEsca laO Artes an al es de Co lo m bi a (ANPAC) v . Dow Qui m ic a d e Co lo m

bi a S.A., 98 8 F .2d55 9, 5 66 (5t h C ir. 1 99 3) (“ Rem ov al pe ti ti on s . . . are m or e li ke ly to b e p ers ua si ve incas es wher e th e cru ci al fact s s up po rti ng juri sd ic ti on are kno wn t o t he de fen da nt , esp eci al ly sui ts forin jun ct iv e o r de cl arat ory

rel ie f.”), ab ro ga te d o n o th er g ro un ds by Maratho n Oi l Co . v. Ru hr ga s, 14 5 F .3d21 1 (5 thCir . 19 98 ) (en ba nc ). Here, i t i s u nd is pu te d t ha t Ko lt er p os se ss es no n- sp ecu la ti ve kn owl ed ge of th e am ou ntof e ve ry

pu ta ti ve cla ss m em

be r’s cl ai m . The co m

pl ai ntit se lf a ll eg es a cl as s o f m or e th an30 0 p ro sp ect iv e p ur ch as ers an d t ha t a “ m in is te ria l de te rm in at io n” fro m

Kol te r’s reco rd s wo ul d re ve al th e id en ti ty of th os e who pr ov id edde po si ts . Havi ng acce ss to th os e rec or ds , Cla rk e p erfo rm edth e m in is te ria l d et erm in at io n t ha t the co m pl ai ntcal le d fo r. Afterdo in g s o, Cl ark e at te st edun de r pe na lty

of p erjury

an d b as edon hi s kno wled ge , in cl ud in g h is kn owl ed ge of t ho se reco rd s, tha t Ko lt er h ad“ co ll ect edm or e th an$5 m il li on ” in 60de po si ts . Wha te ve r th e la ng ua ge of t he sec on d p arag rap h o f § 1 44 6( b) an d 2 7 Lowery ’s in te rp ret at io n o f itm ay requi re, we are no t re qu ire d t o re adin to th e fi rs t pa rag rap h o f th atsubs ect io n the pro po si ti onth atth e p arty with t he be stacce ss to an d kno wled ge of the ke y ev id en ce ca nn otbri ng itforward . The di stric t co urt al so erre d a s a m at te r of law wh enitfau lt edClark e’s de cl arat io n fo r es ti m at in g “ th e p ot en ti al da m ag e cl ai m of p ut at iv e cl as s m em

be rs , as op po se d t o n am edpl ai nt iff s.” Un de r CAFA the cla im s o f “ th e in di vi du al cla ss m em be rs sh al l b e ag gr eg at ed ” fo r pu rp os es of d et erm in in g t he am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y . 28 U.S.C. § 1 33 2( d) (6 ). Sect io n 1 33 2( d) (1 )(D) p ro vi de s, i n turn, th at“ th e te rm

‘ cl as s m em

be rs ’ m ean s t he pe rs on s (n am edor u nn am ed ) who fal l withi n t he de fin it io n o f th e p ro po se d o r certi fie d c la ss ina cl as s ac ti on .” 28 U.S.C. § 1 33 2( d) (1 )(D) (e m ph as is ad de d) . The p os si bi li ty tha t the pu ta ti ve cla ss wil l n otbe cert ifi ed , or t ha t s om e o f th e u nn am edcla ss m em be rs wil l o ptou t, i s irr el ev an t t o t he juri sd ic ti on al de te rm in at io n, wh ic h i s b as edon ly on t he fact s as th ey ex is t atth e ti m e o f rem ov al . See, e.g ., Am oc he , 55 6 F .3dat 5 1; Vega , 56 4 F.3 d a t 1 26 8 n .12 ; M ie de m a, 45 0 F .3dat 1 33 2 n .9; Sie rm in sk i, 2 16 F.3dat 9 46 . Clarke’ s decla

ration stated that the r ecords were “maintained unde r my supervision, 2 7 direc tion, and control by

individuals who are r esponsible for r ecor ding a nd maintaining suc h information at or ne ar the time of the eve nts recor ded in these doc uments,” and that his statements wer e base d on his “persona l experience s as Chief F inancial Of fice r of [the pare nt company] and upon the corpor ate r ecor ds of [Kolter].” 61C. The P os t-R em ov al Evi de nc e

The re i s an othe r way

th atKol te r carr ie d i ts bu rd enof e st ab li sh in g fe de ral juri sd ic ti on by a prep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce. The un na m edpl ai nt iff s’ co nt ract s an d the Gut ie rrez de cl arat io n, wh ic h Ko lt er at ta ch edto it s o pp os it io n t o rem an d, ar e th em se lv es su ffi ci en t t o p ro ve th atth ere i s m or e th an$5 m il li on in co nt ro ve rs y . The d is tri ctco urt re adLowery as b arri ng itfro m co ns id eri ng th at po st -rem ov al ev id en ce, b utwe di sa gr ee. Acco rd in g t o t he di st ric t co urt, Lo wery requi res a rem ov in g d efen da ntto subm itall of i ts juri sd ic ti on -s up po rti ng ev id en ce b efo re the pl ai nt iff fil es a m ot io n to rem an d. Th atin te rp ret at io n i s b as edon th is lan gu ag e fro m Lowery: “ In as se ss in g wh ethe r rem ov al was p ro pe r in . . . a cas e [wh ere t he pl ai nt iff s fi le a ti m el y m ot io n t o re m an d], th e d is tri ctco urt h as be fo re i t o nl y th e li m it edun iv ers e of ev id en ce av ai labl e whe n t he m ot io n t o re m an d i s fi le d— i.e., the no ti ce o f rem ov al an d a cco m

panyin g d oc um en ts .” 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 3– 14 (em ph as is ad de d) . To the ex te ntth atLowery woul d b ar the co ns id erat io n o f ev id en ce subm it te d a fte r th e cas e is rem ov ed , itco nf li ct s wi th ou r de ci si on inSie rm in sk i v . Tran so uth F in an ci al Co rp ., 21 6 F .3d94 5 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 0) , whi ch cam e se ve n years be fo re the Lowery deci si on . And , of c ou rs e, whe re two o f ou r de ci si on s co nf li ct ,

62we m

us t fo ll ow t he earl ie r of

th em . See, e.g ., Ohayon, 4 83 F.3dat 1 28 9; Horna da y , 39 2 F .3dat 1 31 6. InSie rm in sk i thi s C ou rt a dd res se d t he qu es ti on “ whe th er i n d et erm in in g t he pr op rie ty of rem ov al , th e d is tri ctco urt m ay co ns id er ev id en ce s ub m it te d a fte r th e rem ov al pe ti ti on is fil ed .” 21 6 F .3dat 9 46 . The d efen da nt , aft er re m ov al bu t be fo re the di st ric t co urt’s ru li ng on th e m ot io n t o re m an d, h adpro vi de d a dd it io na l in fo rm at io n o n t he am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y to th e d is tri ctco urt. See id . at 9 47 (n ot in g t ha t the ad di ti on al ev id en ce i nc lu de d ade cl arat io n fr om on e o f th e de fen da nt ’s em

pl oyees a s wel l as ev id en ce tha t the pl ai nt iff ha d fa il edto res po nd to a reque stforadm is si on s) . The p la in ti ff’s o nl y juri sd ic ti on al co nt en ti on on ap pe al was t ha t the “ de fen da ntm us t s ub m itev id en ce d em on strat in g t he ex is te nc e of fed eral juri sd ic ti onat t he ti m e o f th e fi li ng of t he rem ov al pe ti ti on it se lf a nd can no t re ly on p os t-p et it io n e vi de nc e to supp ort juris di ct io n.” Id. at94 8. We squa rel y reject edth atarg um en t—th e sa m e arg um en t tha t the pl ai nt iff s m ak e in th is cas e. Whi le it is un do ub te dl y be st to in cl ud e al l rel e v a n t ev id en ce in th e pe ti ti on fo r rem ov al an d m ot io n to rem an d, th ere is no go od r e a s o n to ke ep a di st ric t co urt fro m el ic it in g or rev i e win g ev id en ce ou ts id e th e rem ov al pe ti ti on . W e . . . ad op t[ ] a m or e fle xi bl e ap pr oa ch , al lo win g th e d is tri ctco urt wh en ne ces sa ry to co ns id er po st -rem ov al ev id en ce i n as s e s s i n g rem ov al juri sd ic ti on . W e em ph as iz e . . . th at un de r an y m an ne r of pr oo f, th e juri sd ic ti o n a l f a c ts th at supp ort rem ov al m us t be 63jud ge d at th e ti m e of th e rem ov al , an d an y po st - p e t it io n affi davi ts are

al lo wab le on ly if rel ev an t t o t ha t p eri odof t im e. Id . at 9 49 (qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) ; s ee al so id . at 9 46 (“ W e h ol d th atth e Co urt m ay

co ns id er [p os t-r em ov al ] ev id en ce, b uton ly to es tabl is h t he fact s p res en t atth e ti m e o f rem ov al .”); W il li am s, 2 69 F.3dat 1 31 9 (d is cu ss in g Si erm in sk i). Th e fac ts of S ie rm in sk i ar e m at eri al ly ind is ti ng ui sh ab le fro m th is cas e in so far a s t he con si de rat io n o f po st -rem ov al ev id en ce i s co nc ern ed . The re i s n o a ctua l co nf

li ctbe twee n t he de ci si on inSie rm in sk i an d t he ho ld in gs of Lo wery , bec au se th e la ng ua ge inth e Lowe ry op in io n b arri ng th e u se of po st -rem ov al ev id en ce i s o nl y di ct a. Lowery didno t ac tu al ly bar o r refu se to co ns id er p os t-r em ov al ev id en ce wh enitcam e to de ci di ng th e cas e. See 4 83 F.3d at12 18 –2 1. Th e Co urt s ta te d i n p as si ng th atAlab am a Po wer h adsupp le m en te d it s n ot ic e o f rem ov al “ [f]ol lo win g t he pl ai nt iff s’ m ot io n t o re m an d.” Id. at12 20 ; se e al so id . at 1 18 9 (n ot in g t ha t Al ab am a Po wer fi le d asupp le m en t t o i ts no ti ce o f rem ov al on e d ay

aft er the pl ai nt iff

s h adfil edth ei r m ot io n t o re m an d) . Butth at was no t the ba si s o n wh ic h t he Lowery op in io n d ecl in edto co ns id er tha t ev id en ce. See i d. at12 20 –2 1 (r eject in g t he supp le m en ta l ev id en ce o n o th er g ro un ds ). 2 8 The L ower

y opinion does state that the district cour t must “review the propriety of 2 8 remova l on the basis of the re moving doc uments.” 483 F .3d at 1211 (e mphasis added) ; see a lso id. at 1214 n.66. In construingL ower y , we r ead the phrase “re moving doc uments” to include a ll the documents be fore the cour t when it revie ws the propriety of re moval—if, of cour se, those documents ar e re levant to the time of re moval, Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 949. See L ower y , 483 64Noton ly tha t b utth e Lowe ry op in io n e xp res sl y

reco gn iz es th ata de fen da nt m ay ad d p os t-r em ov al ev id en ce o f juri sd ic ti on to th e rec or d wh enth atev id en ce i s ot he rwis e ad m is si bl e. It s ay s t ha t “ a d efen da ntm ay effe ct iv el y

am en d ade fect iv e no ti ce o f rem ov al up on rece ip t o f ad di ti on al ev id en ce tha t s up pl em en ts th e earl ie r-fi le d n ot ic e.” Lowe ry , 48 3 F .3dat 1 21 4 n .66 ; s ee al so W il li ng ha m , 39 5 U.S. at 4 08 n.3 , 89 S.Ct . at 1 81 6 n .3 (“ Thi s m at eri al sh ou ldhave ap pe aredinth e pe ti ti on forrem ov al . Howev er, fo r pu rp os es of t hi s re vi ew itis pro pe r to tre atth e rem ov al pe ti ti on as i f itha d b een am en de d t o i nc lu de th e rel ev an t i nf orm at io n co nt ai ne d i n t he lat er-f

il edaffi da vi ts .”); Co hn v. Pe ts m art , Inc ., 28 1 F .3d83 7, 8 40 n.1 (9th C ir. 2 00 2) (“ The di st ric t co urt d idno t err in co ns tru in g [t he de fen da nt ’s] op po si ti on [to rem an d] as a n a m en dm en t t o i ts no ti ce o f rem ov al .”). 2 9 Fo r th es e rea so ns , th e juri sd ic ti on al ev id en ce tha t Ko lt er at ta ch edto it s op po si ti on to rem an d s ho ul d n otha ve be enex cl ud edm erel y be cau se itwas F.3d at 1211 (ref

erring to the “ documents bef ore the court” ); id. at 1194 (“What the district cour t had bef ore it in considering the propriety of re moval was limited to those documents provided by Alabama Power in see king r emoval.”) . In other wor ds, a def endant’ s opposition t o rema nd is a “re moving doc ument.” I f we are wrong in our interpre tation of the L ower y opinion, then it is inconsistent in this respe ct with the ea rlier Sierminski decision, which trumps it. We also note that § 1446(a) provides that a notice of re moval should contain only “a 2 9 short and plain stateme nt of the grounds for r emoval.” 28 U .S.C. § 1446(a). That pr ovision would make little sense if a defe ndant wer e categ orica lly barr ed from supplementing its “short and plain stateme nt” with additional evidenc e and e x planation. Cf. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189, 56 S.Ct . at 785 (“ I f [the jurisdiction-assertingparty ’s] alleg ations of jurisdictional fac ts are challeng ed by

his adversa

ry in any appropriate manne r, he must support them by competent proof.” ). 65subm it te d i n re sp on se to th e p la in ti ffs ’ m ot io n t o re m an d. Se e Si erm in sk i, 2 16

F.3 d a t 9 46 , 94 9; see als o Wil li ng ha m , 39 5 U.S. at40 8 n .3, 8 9 S .Ct. at18 16 n.3 . 3 0 Andth e p la in ti ffs co nc ed e th atif t hi s p os t-r em ov al ev id en ce i s co ns id ered , Kol te r ha s es tabl is he d t he am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y by a prep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce. V. The jud gm en t o f th e d is tri ctco urt i s R EVERSED, andth e cas e is REMANDED with i ns tru ct io ns to res ci ndth e o rd er re m an di ng th e cas e to st at e co urt.

Be cause we de cide this appe al on the grounds that we do, w e have no occa sion to

3 0 addre ss the nature and extent of the contra ct-lawexception to the “re ceipt fr om the plaintiff” r ule that the L ower

y opinion mentions. S ee L ower y , 483 F.3d at 1214 n.66 (“A de fenda nt would be fre e to introduce evidenc e re g arding damag es arising from a source such as a contra ct provision whether or not the def

endant r ece ived the contr act f rom the plaintiff. In such situations, the underlying substantive la w provides a

rule that a llows the court to deter mine the amount of damag es. F or example, in contrac t law, the def ault measureof dama g es is expectation damag es; a cour t may look to the contrac t and deter mine what those damag es would be.” ). 66PRYOR, Ci rcu itJu dg e, sp eci al ly con cu rri ng , inwhi ch CARNES, Ci rcu itJu dg e,

joi ns : I co nc urful ly in the pa ne l o pi ni on . I agr ee wi th th e p an el op in io n t ha t a de fen da ntwho rem ov es a cas e u nd er the fir stpa rag rap h o f subs ect io n (b ) of th e rem ov al st atut e, 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 6( b) , is en ti tl edto fil e ev id en ce t o p ro ve by a pr ep on de ran ce the am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y un de r th e Cl as s Act io n F ai rn es s Act . I writ e se pa rat el y

to ex pl ai n wh y

I do ub t the va li di ty of th e rel at edho ld in g o f Lowery v. Al ab am a Po wer Co . th atdi st ric t co urts m ay no t al so all ow p os t-r em ov al di sc ov ery reg ard in g the am ou ntin co nt ro ve rs y un de r th e Cl as s Act io n F ai rn es s Act. 4 83 F.3d11 84 , 12 15 –1 8 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 7) . Thatvi ew is in co ns is te ntwith Supr em e Co urt p rece de nt , th e p rece de ntof t hi s C ou rt, a ndho rnbo oklaw ab ou t fed eral pra ct ic e. The pre ced en ts of t he Supr em e Co urt an d t hi s C ou rt h av e fo r se ve ral de cad es grant eddi st ric t co urts wid e d is cret io n i n d et erm in in g h ow t o re so lv e qu es ti on s o f juri sd ic ti on . See U.S. Cat ho li c Co nf eren ce v . Abo rti on Rig ht s Mo bi li zat io n, In c., 48 7 U.S. 7 2, 7 9, 1 08 S. Ct. 2 26 8, 2 27 2 (1 98 8) ; Op pe nh ei m er Fu nd , Inc . v. San de rs , 43 7 U.S. 3 40 , 35 1 n .13 , 98 S. Ct. 2 38 0, 2 38 9 n .13 (19 78 ) (“ [W] he re i ss ue s ar is e as to juri sd ic ti on or v enue , di sc ov ery is av ai labl e to as cert ai n t he fact s b eari ng on su ch is su es .”); Gib bs v. Bu ck , 30 7 U.S. 6 6, 7 1– 72 ,
6759 S. Ct. 7 25 , 72 9 (1 93 9) (“ As the re i s n o s ta tu to ry di rect io n fo r pr oc edur e upo n anis su e o f juri sd ic ti on , th e m od e o f it s d et erm in at io n i s l eftto th e tr ia l co urt.”) ; Ope li kaNurs in g Ho m e, In c. v. Ri ch ard so n, 4 48 F.2d65 8, 6 66 –6 7 (5 th Cir . 19 71 ). Ourownpre ced en t h ol ds th ata pl ai nt iff who ch oo se s a f

ed eral forum

“ sh ou ldbe gi ve n t he op po rtu ni ty to d is co ve r fac ts th atwou ldsupp ort . . . all eg at io ns of juri sd ic ti on ” an d o rd eri ng “ di sm is sa l wi th ou t af fo rd in g t he pl ai nt iff

an y op po rtu ni ty to p ro ceedwith re as on ab le di sc ov ery [is ] pr em atur e an d a n abu se of th e co urt’s d is cret io n.” Majd- Po urv. Geo rg ia naCmty. Hos p., In c., 72 4 F .2d90 1, 90 3 (1 1th C ir. 1 98 4) . As on e o f th e le ad in g t reat is es on fed eral pra ct ic e ex pl ai ns ,

“ [I]t h as lo ng be encle ar tha t d is co ve ry on juri sd ic ti on al is su es is pro pe r.” 8 Ch arl es Alan Wrig ht , Arth urR. Mi ll er & R ic ha rdL. Marcu s, Fe de ral Prac ti ce an d Pro cedur e § 20 09 , at 1 24 & n .2 (2 d e d. 1 99 4) . Ourpre ced en ts ha ve tak enforgra nt edth ata de fen da ntwho rem ov es a ci vi l act io n h as th e sa m e ri gh t tha t a p la in ti ff en joy s t o c on du ctdi sc ov ery ab ou t juri sd ic ti on al fact s. See Mi ed em a v . Maytag Co rp ., 45 0 F .3d13 22 , 13 30 (11 th Ci r. 20 06 ); Wil li am s v . Bes t Bu y Co ., 26 9 F .3d13 16 , 13 19 –2 0 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 1) ; Si erm in sk i v . Trans ou thFin . Cor p., 2 16 F.3d94 5, 9 48 –4 9 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 0) ; s ee al so Kros ke v. U.S. Ban k C or p., 4 32 F.3d97 6, 9 80 (9t h C ir. 2 00 5) ; Gu il lo ry v. PPG In du s., In c., 43 4 F .3d30 3, 3 11 (5t h C ir. 2 00 5) . Thatass um pt io n i s co ns is te nt 68with t he well -es tabl is he d ru le th ata “ de fen da ntsee ki ng rem ov al canus ua ll y

de te rm in e anap pr op ria te ran ge of d am ag es th ro ug h d is co ve ry .” 16 James Wm . Mo or e etal., Mo or e’s Fed eral Prac ti ce § 10 7.1 4[ 2][g ][i][A] (3ded . 20 07 ); s ee al so id . § 1 07 .14 [2 ][g][v] (“ If the juri sd ic ti on al am ou ntis no t fa ci al ly app aren t, the co urt s ho ul d l oo k t o t he rem ov al no ti ce an d m ay requi re p os t-r em ov al ev id en ce rel ev an t t o t he am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y at t he ti m e o f rem ov al when de te rm in in g whe th er the cas e is rem ov ab le .”). Thi s ev en -h an de d t reat m en t, wh ic h p la ces pl ai nt iff s an d re m ov in g d efen da nt s “ on equa l fo ot in g i n s eek in g afed eral co urtro om ,” m ak es em in en t s en se . Gug li el m in o v . McKee Fo od s C or p., 5 06 F.3d 69 6, 7 03 –0 4 (9 th Cir . 20 07 ) (O’Scan nl ai n, J ., sp eci al ly con curri ng ) (d is cu ss in g t he bu rd enof p ro of

on juri sd ic ti on al fact s) . Any ot he r ru le ig no res th e fac t tha t rem ov in g d efen dant s, as m uc h a s p la in ti ffs , hav e a “ st atut ory rig ht ” to a fed eral fo ru m if t he y canpro ve th e rel ev an t fa ct s. Id . at 7 03 . The re i s n o re as onto su sp ectth atth e Cl as s Act io n F ai rn es s Act , whi ch “ is si le nton th e m at te r,” al te redan y of t he se well -es tabl is he d p ro cedur es . Mie de m a, 45 0 F .3dat 1 32 7– 30 (ho ld in g tha t b ecau se th e Actis si le ntas t o wh ic h p arty be ars th e b ur de n o f es tabl is hi ng fed eral juri sd ic ti on , th e “ well -es tabl is he d ru le ” th at de fen da nt s b ear t he bu rd enap pl ie s) . At le as t o ne of o ursi st er ci rcu it s h as as su m edth atdi st ric t co urts m ay pe rm itde fen da nt s t o c on du ctdi sc ov ery ab ou t 69juri sd ic ti on al fact s u nd er the Act, Ab reg o Ab reg o v . Dow Ch em . Co., 4 43 F.3d

67 6, 6 90 –9 2 (9 th Cir . 20 06 ); c f. Hartv. Fe dEx Grou ndPack ag e Sy s. In c., 45 7 F.3 d 6 75 , 68 2 (7 th Cir . 20 06 ) (“ [T]he p la in ti ffs ha ve th e ri gh t, thr ou gh ap pr op ria te di sc ov ery, to ex pl or e th e fac ts rel ev an t t o t he co urt’s jur is di ct io n a s t he cas e pr og res se s.”) , anddi st ric t co urts ha ve do ne so . See, e.g ., Rip pe e v . Bos to n M ark et Co rp ., 40 8 F . Sup p. 2 d 9 82 , 98 3 (S .D. Cal. 2 00 5) ; s ee al so S.I. Str on g, Ju ris di ct io na l Di sc ov ery in Uni te d S ta te s Fe de ral Co urts , 67 W as h. & Lee L. Rev . 48 9, 5 57 (20 10 ) (“ Ju ris di ct io na l d is co ve ry reg ard in g s ub

ject m atte r juri sd ic ti on m ig htals o b e so ug htincla ss act io n s ui ts purs ua ntto th e Cl as s Act io n F ai rn es s Act (CAFA).” ). The co nt rary hol di ng of Lo wery ha s n otbe enwell rece iv ed . One o f th e di st ric t co urts in th is Cir cu itha s ex pr es se d i ts un de rs ta nd ab le co nf us io n abo ut

“ [t]he ex te ntto whi ch an y po st -rem ov al di sc ov ery is pe rm is si bl e in a po st -Lowe ry wor ld ,” an d o bs erv edth at“ Lowery do es no t ac kn owl ed ge th e ex is te nc e o f Si erm in sk i,” wh ic h t he co urt fo un d e sp eci al ly relev an t. Woodv. Op ti on One Mo rtg ag e Co rp ., 58 0 F . Sup p. 2 d 1 24 8, 1 25 4– 55 & n .5 (N.D. Ala . 20 08 ). Oth ers ha ve off se t the sev eri ty of th e Lowe ry ho ld in g abo utdi sc ov ery by tak in g ana rro w vi ew of th e requi rem en t tha t the y no t en ga ge in“ ran k s pe cu la ti on ,” Lowery , 48 3 F.3 d a t 1 21 5 n .67 , whende te rm in in g t he am ou ntinco nt ro ve rs y . See Nel so n v . 70Whi rlp oo l Co rp ., 66 8 F . Sup p. 2 d 1 36 8, 1 37 5– 76 (S.D. Ala. 2 00 9) ; Ro e v .

Mi ch el in N. Am ., Inc ., 63 7 F . Sup p. 2 d 9 95 , 10 01 –0 2 (M .D. Ala. 20 09 ). The di sc ov ery ho ld in g o f Lowery ha s al so be encri ti ci zedinleg al sch ol ars hi p. Se e, e.g ., Tho m as M. By

rn e, Cl as s Act io ns , 59 Merc er L. Rev . 11 17 , 11 23 –2 6 (2 00 8) ; Lon ny S. Hoffm an , Burn Up th e Ch aff wi th Unque nc habl e Fi re: Wha t Two Doc tri na l In te rs ect io ns CanTeach Us Ab ou t J ud ic ia l Po wer o ve r Pl ead in gs , 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1 21 7, 1 24 9– 50 & n .19 3 (2 00 8) ; M ic ha el W . Lewis , Com edy or Trag edy : Th e Tal e o f Div ers ity Ju ris di ct io n R em ov al an d t he One- Year Bar, 62 SMU L. Rev . 20 1, 2 23 –2 5 (2 00 9) ; J aco b R . Karab el l, No te , The Im pl em en ta ti on of “ Bal an cedDiv ers it y ” Thr ou gh th e Cl as s Act io n F ai rn es s Act , 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev . 30 0, 3 21 –2 2 (2 00 9) . As on e co m m en ta to r st at ed , “ The ori gi ns of t he co urt’s ba r on juri sd ic ti on al di sc ov ery are i ns cru tabl e. The c ou rt r eferredto Fed eral Ru le s of Civ il Pro cedur e 8 (a) a nd11 in supp ort o f it s h ol di ng bu t ci te d n o p rece de ntfor a p ro hi bi ti on on juri sd ic ti on al di sc ov ery aft er re m ov al , andth ere i s p rece de ntto th e co nt rary.” By

rn e, supr a, at11 24 (fo ot no te s o m it te d) ; s ee al so id . at 1 12 6 (“ The co urt’s re fu sa l t o p erm itan y juri sd ic ti on al di sc ov ery an d i ts fou r-co rn ers -o fth e-p le ad in gs ap pr oa ch are an un welc om e rel ap se in to leg al form al is m .”).

71W e ev en tu al ly w il l h av e to rev is itth e h ol di ng of Lo wery th atjuri sd ic ti on al di sc ov ery is un av ai labl e to pro ve th e am ou ntinco ntro ve rs y . This ap pe al do es no t pr es en t tha t o pp ortu ni ty, bu t I d o n otdo ub t tha t the op po rtu ni ty w il l co m e.

72