2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-24-2011

Sara Baldwin v. Camden Housing Authority

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-1451

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Recommended Citation

"Sara Baldwin v. Camden Housing Authority" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 639.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-1451

___________

SARA BALDWIN,

Appellant

v.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF CAMDEN

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-06583)

District Judge: Honorable Joseph E. Irenas

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

August 19, 2011

Before: JORDAN, GARTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed August 24, 2011)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Sara Baldwin, proceeding pro se, appeals from the order of the District Court 

entering final judgment in favor of the defendant. For the following reasons, we will 

affirm.
2

I.

In December 2009, Sara Baldwin filed a pro se complaint in the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey against the Housing Authority of the City of 

Camden (“Housing Authority”) 1 alleging that her due process rights were violated when 

the Housing Authority terminated her Section 82housing. She claims that the Housing 

Authority deprived her of her property without first informing her of the evidence it 

considered when making the decision to terminate her assistance.

To keep her housing assistance, Baldwin was required to recertify her eligibility 

annually, which included submitting information about her income and family 

composition. She did not attend a scheduled recertification meeting on April 2, 2009, 

because, she alleges, a granddaughter in her care was ill. She asserts that when she 

contacted the case worker to reschedule the meeting and hand over the required 

documents, the case worker refused to accept them. She further alleges that she attended 

a rescheduled appointment with Tracie Herrick, Assistant Director of Public Housing, 

and that Herrick also refused to accept her documents. Baldwin also alleges that Herrick 

stated that “the case worker had failed to do her job correctly.” In May 2009, she 

received a letter from Herrick informing her that her assistance would be terminated as of 

June 30, 2009 for failure to comply with the annual recertification requirements. 

 

1 Baldwin’s brief before the District Court included as a defendant Tracie Herrick, 

Director of Public Housing. Baldwin has not included Herrick on her brief to this 

Court, and the case docket reflects the Housing Authority as the only defendant.

2

Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
3

Baldwin appealed; after a hearing, the Housing Authority’s decision was upheld. 

Baldwin then filed her complaint in the District Court.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Baldwin’s motion 

reiterated the allegations in her complaint. The Housing Authority’s motion refuted all of

Baldwin’s allegations.

3

 It denied that the meeting was rescheduled, and pointed out that 

Baldwin gave no indication about when it was rescheduled. The Housing Authority also 

refuted Baldwin’s claim that Herrick made any statement regarding a case manager’s job 

performance. Finally, the Housing Authority noted that the May 2009 letter does explain 

the reasons for the recertification denial and that Baldwin’s own allegations demonstrate 

that the alleged denial of her appeal specifically referenced her failure to comply with the 

recertification requirements. 

The District Court found that no reasonable factfinder could find that the letters 

failed to identify the evidence upon which the Housing Authority’s decision was based, 

and granted summary judgment in favor of the Housing Authority. Baldwin filed a 

timely appeal.

In reviewing a District Court’s grant of summary judgment, we exercise plenary 

review and apply the same standard that the District Court should have applied. Regents 

 

3

The Housing Authority noted that Baldwin’s claims about her granddaughter’s 

illness were unsubstantiated. Baldwin submitted a note from a prescription pad, 

dated four months after the scheduled April 2009 meeting, stating only that the 

granddaughter suffered from reflux and that she no longer takes medication. In 

addition, her other evidence—notes from a “resident contact log”—merely 

confirm that she failed to appear at the hearing with all adult members of her 

household, as required.
4

of Mercersburg Coll. v. Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2006); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all inferences in that party’s 

favor, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Saldana 

v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party 

opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . 

. pleading,” but “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.” Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (internal citations omitted).

Baldwin claims that the Housing Authority violated her due process rights when it 

terminated her benefits and denied her appeal. Due process in this context requires a 

decision maker to state the reasons for his or her decision and indicate the evidence he or 

she relied on. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). Likewise, the 

Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulations governing housing

assistance termination provide that “[t]he person who conducts the hearing must issue a 

written decision, stating briefly the reasons for that decision.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(3)(6). 

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the Housing Authority’s letters 

denying recertification and Baldwin’s appeal each identified the basis for the Housing 

Authority’s decision—namely, Baldwin’s failure to comply with the recertification 

process. Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 

the Housing Authority.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.