NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

ROY LEE DODD, III,

Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0433 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-109145-001

The Honorable Mark H. Brain, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Michael Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Jesse Finn Turner

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 7-11-2019
STATE v. DODD

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop

joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Roy Lee Dodd, III appeals his conviction and sentence for

possession of narcotic drugs, a Class 4 felony. He argues the Arizona 

Medical Marijuana Act ("AMMA") implicitly repealed the criminal code's 

distinction between marijuana and cannabis, so that he could not be 

convicted of possession of narcotic drugs when he possessed cannabis. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Dodd dropped a crumpled piece of paper containing 

cannabis as police were arresting him on an unrelated warrant. A grand 

jury then indicted him on a charge of possession of a narcotic drug in 

violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-3408 (2019).1

¶3 Dodd moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the AMMA 

implicitly repealed the criminal code's classification of cannabis as a 

narcotic drug. The superior court denied Dodd's motion, a jury found him

guilty and the court sentenced him as a repetitive offender to 10 years' 

imprisonment. We have jurisdiction over Dodd's appeal pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1) (2019), 13-4031 (2019) and -4033(A)(1) (2019).

DISCUSSION

¶4 Dodd does not have a medical-marijuana card and does not 

claim immunity under the AMMA. Instead, he argues that because the 

AMMA does not distinguish between marijuana and cannabis, that statute 

implicitly repealed the distinction the criminal code draws between the 

two. His argument presents a question of statutory interpretation, which 

 

1 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

the current version of a statute or rule.
STATE v. DODD

Decision of the Court

3

this court reviews de novo. See Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 237 Ariz. 119, 122, ¶ 

6 (2015).

¶5 "[I]mplicit repeal of statutes is not favored." UNUM Life Ins. 

Co. of Am. v. Craig, 200 Ariz. 327, 333, ¶ 28 (2001). "Rather, when two 

statutes appear to conflict, whenever possible, we adopt a construction that 

reconciles one with the other, giving force and meaning to all statutes 

involved." Id. But if "by reason of repugnancy, or inconsistency, . . . two 

conflicting statutes cannot operate contemporaneously," the more recent 

statute governs. Id. at ¶ 29.

¶6 In Craig, two persons – a named insured and a named 

beneficiary under a life insurance policy – were in a car that crashed; both 

perished, but the insured died before the named beneficiary. 200 Ariz. at 

328, ¶¶ 2-3. As the supreme court noted, two statutes governed

"distribution of insurance proceeds upon simultaneous or nearsimultaneous deaths." Id. at 333, ¶ 29. Under one statute, enacted in 1954, 

the proceeds of the policy would be payable to a named beneficiary who 

survived the named insured, even if only by a moment. Under the other 

statute, enacted in 1994, the named beneficiary would have to survive the 

insured by at least 120 hours. See id. at 330, 332-33, ¶¶ 15, 17, 23, 29

(addressing then-current versions of A.R.S. §§ 20-1127 and 14-2702). After 

reviewing the statutory history of each provision, the court concluded the 

statutes could not be harmonized and held that the more recent statute 

governed. Id. at 333, ¶ 29.

¶7 Turning to the statutes at issue here, the criminal code defines 

marijuana and cannabis separately:

"Cannabis" means the following substances under whatever 

names they may be designated:

(a) The resin extracted from any part of a plant of the genus 

cannabis, and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 

mixture or preparation of such plant, its seeds or its resin. . . .

(b) Every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture 

or preparation of such resin or tetrahydrocannabinol.

* * *

"Marijuana" means all parts of any plant of the genus 

cannabis, from which the resin has not been extracted.
STATE v. DODD

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A.R.S. § 13-3401(4), (19) (2019). See also State v. Bollander, 110 Ariz. 84, 87 

(1973) (recognizing that under the criminal code, marijuana's leaf and 

flower are distinct from its resin). Possession of less than two pounds of 

marijuana not for sale is a Class 6 felony. A.R.S. § 13-3405(B)(1) (2019). But 

cannabis is defined as a "narcotic drug" the possession of which is a Class 4 

felony. A.R.S. §§ 13-3401(20)(w), -3408(B)(1).

¶8 The starting point of Dodd's argument about implicit repeal 

is his assertion that the AMMA immunizes a cardholder's use of cannabis, 

even though the statute did not define cannabis. In State v. Jones, 246 Ariz. 

452, 457, ¶ 19 (2019), our supreme court agreed that the AMMA's definition 

of marijuana includes cannabis. Accordingly, under the AMMA, registered 

cardholders who comply with the act may claim immunity from 

prosecution for possession of marijuana or cannabis. Id. at 454-55, 457, ¶¶ 

5, 7, 19. 

¶9 But Dodd's argument falters because he cannot show that the 

AMMA is inconsistent with the criminal code's distinct treatment of 

possession of marijuana and possession of cannabis. To the contrary, and 

unlike the statutes in Craig, the statutes here operate in parallel without any 

conflict. Nothing in the AMMA states that its definitions are intended to 

apply to any other chapter; the definition section of the AMMA states that 

it is intended to apply only "[i]n this chapter," see A.R.S. § 36-2801 (2019), 

and the same is true for the definition section of the criminal code, A.R.S. § 

13-3401. For that reason, the AMMA's like treatment of possession of 

marijuana and possession of cannabis does not alter, interfere with or 

impede the criminal code's dissimilar treatment of possession of the two 

drugs. As the State contends, "[o]utside the immunities granted by the 

AMMA, the use of marijuana and cannabis remains illegal." Put simply, 

the AMMA governs whether and how a registered cardholder may be 

prosecuted for possession of cannabis but has nothing to say about how a 

non-cardholder may be prosecuted for possession of cannabis.

¶10 Dodd argues that a cardholder who possesses more cannabis 

than the AMMA allows would face a different punishment than a 

cardholder who possesses more marijuana than the AMMA allows. But 

because Dodd does not suggest he has a medical-marijuana card, the 

distinction is irrelevant to him. In any event, the legislature has the power 

to decide to punish illegal possession of one drug more severely than 

another. See State v. Floyd, 120 Ariz. 358, 360 (App. 1978).
STATE v. DODD

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Dodd's conviction and 

sentence.