i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 48 7- CR J o n a t h anR ay DEP UE , Appellant
v . T h e STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the 227th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2006-CR-10950B Honora ble Phili p A. Kazen, Jr., J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Marialy

n Ba rnar d, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Dece mber 30, 2009 AFF I RMED J o n a t h anR ay D e p u e w a s c h ar g e d w i t h c a p i t a l m u r d e r , an d

t h e S t a t e s o u g h tt h e d e a t h p e n a l t y. A jury found De pue guilty , but at punishment answer ed the third specia l issue “no,” resulting in a lif e se nte nc e wi tho ut p os sib ili ty of pa role. Dep ue app e a ls, c on te nd ing(1 ) t he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in ref using his r equest for a re nunciation def ense instruc tion in the jury char g e, (2) the jury

char g e wa s fu nd a me nta lly

fl awe d be c a

us e it pe rm itt e d the jur

y to c on vic t hi m on

pr oo f d if fe re nt f ro m, a nd le ss04

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- 2- than, that re quired to prove the alleg ation in the indictment, and (3) he was denied the rig ht to a unanimous verdict be caus e t h e ch arg e allowe d the jury to convict on two sepa

rate and distinct theories. We af

firm the trial c ourt’s judg ment. B ACKG ROUND On September

29, 2006, Al et a R hodes left he r fr iend Susan Roy ston’s house ar ound 9:30 p.m. Ms. Rhodes was supposed to ca ll Ms. R oy ston when she g ot home. When Ms. Roy ston failed to hear from Ms. Rhodes and c ould not reac h her by phone, she went over to Ms. Rhodes’s house, le tti nghe rse lf in wi th a set of ke y s sh e ha d b e e n g ive n b y Ms. Rho de s. Ms. Roy sto n f ound Ms. Rho de s, surr ound e d b y

blo od , o n th e fl oo r o f t

he kit c he n. Ms. Roy sto n w e nt to a ne ig hb or ’s ho us e and ca lled 911. EMS and office rs from the San Antonio Police Depa rtment arr ived at Ms. Rhodes’s house. One of the offic ers notice d the bac k g lass door of the hous e had be en shatter ed and the house wa s in a state of dis arr a y . T he of fi c e r c a lle d h e r s e rgeant , ev ide nc e te c hn ic ians , a nd nig ht d e te c tiv e s. Detec tive J ohn Doyle came to the house and was told Ms. Rhodes was de ad and the house appe are d to have be en burg larized. Doyle noticed a computer was missing, a nd it appear ed as if some one had
a tte mpt e d to pu ll a

fl a t- sc re e n te le vis ion

fr om t he w all
. Ev ide nc e te c hn ic ians we re a ble to o bta in
a p r i n tf r o m t h e f l a t
- s c r e e nt e l e v i s i o nt h a tw a s l a t e r f o u n d t o m a t c h a kn o w n p r i n t f r o m D e p u e . It was late r dete rmined Ms. Rhodes died fr om a g unshot wound to the head. At trial, Depue ’s brother

Eric testified f

or the State. Er ic, a c onv i ct ed felon at the ag e of fi ft e e n, and

on pa ro le a t the tim e of the e ve nts that are the su bje c t of thi s a

pp e a l, s tr uc k a de a l w ith the State by

which he a g ree d to plead gu i l t y t o the ag g ravated robbe ry of Ms. Rhodes and testify ag ainst his br other. I n exchang e, the State a g ree d that possible punishment for Eric w ould be ca pped04

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- 3- at life imprisonment, m ea n i n g Eric would r ece ive a se ntence any wher e fr om fifteen y ear s to life. Eric testified that on September 29, 2009, he was living at his a unt’s house alongwith Depue a nd t wo co u s i n s , J o s ep h an d Da n i el M o n t o y a. T h e fo u r m en b o rr o we d a c ar an d Da n i el wa s ca rryi n g a handg un. The men de cided to commit a burg lary , and Er ic drove to an alley near Ms. Rhodes’s house. Eric and De pue knew Ms. Rhodes beca use they used to live next door to her and did odd jobs fo r h e r o n oc c a sio n. Er ic dr op pe d the oth e r thr e e me n off , an d d ro ve aro un d unti l Jose phc a lle d h im to come bac k to the alley to pick t hem up. Acc ording to Eric, whe n he g ot to the alley , the three
wer e jumping over a fenc e. Eric testified Depue had the g un, and when a sked what happene d, Depue
sa id “ he jus t sh ot. ” L a te r, De pu e tol d E ri c that Dani el had han ded him the g un a ft e r t e lli nghim
someone was coming , and thereaf ter he “just shot” when he hear d a nois e. When he g ot to the car , Daniel had a laptop computer with him and put it i n the trunk. The me n also had seve ral rif les and put those into the trunk as well. Eric then drove back to his aunt’s house and unloade d the rifles a nd the computer

from the trunk. L ater , Eric sold the laptop for $200.00 and drug s, and sold the rifles for $400.00- $500.00. Er ic state d the men fou nd ou t th e po lic e we re loo kin g fo r D anie l. T he y pla nn e d to ra ise
mon e y and le a ve town. Ho we ve r, Er ic wa s arr e ste d fo r a pa ro le vio latio n. Whil e in c us tod y , E ri c g ave a statement about the e vents at the Rhodes house. Depue also testified at trial. He corr oborate d Eric’ s testimony that Eric was the dr iver of the
c ar, Er ic dr op pe d th e other men off in th e a lle y , a nd the pla n w a s to br e a k in to a

ho us e to o bta in money . Depue also admitted he kne w Danie l took a handgun i n t o t h e h ouse. In his videotaped state me nt t o p oli c e , w hic h w a s a dmi tte d duri ng tr ia l, D e pu e a dmi tte d h e wa s at th e sc e ne to c omm it a burg lary and knew

about the handgun. Howeve r, in his statement he said he lef t the house bef

ore04

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- 4- the murder

beca use he did not wa

nt to commit a burg lary

at Ms. Rhodes’s home. D I S CUS S I ON I n three po in ts o f

e r r o r , D e p u e r a is e s c la im s o f c h ar g e e r

r o r . M o r e s p e c if

ic a ll y , D epue
c on te nd s: ( 1) the tr ia l court e rr e d in re fu sin g his re qu e st f or an in str uc tio n o n th e a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e of re nunciation, (2) the char g e permitted his c onviction on proof differ ent from, and less than, that require d to p r o v e th e a ll e g a ti o nin th e in d ic tm e n t, an d

( 3 ) h e w a s d e n ie d

h is r ig h t t o a

u n animous verdic t beca

use of c harg e er

ror. Renun ciation Depue first contends the trial court err ed when it r efuse d his r equest for a de fensive instruction on renunc iation. A trial court is re quired to g ive a jury instruction on ever

y defe nsive theory raised by the evidence whether it is strong , fee ble, impeac hed, or c ontradicte d, and eve n if the trial court believes t he testi mony is not cre dible. Br own v . S tate , 9 55 S.W. 2d

27 6, 27 9 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1997). A char g e on a def ensive issue is re quired if the a ccuse d prese nts affirmative evidenc e that would constitute a def ense to the c rime cha

rg ed and a

ju ry char g e is proper ly

reque sted. Mc Ga rit yv . S tate , 5 S
. W
. 3 d 2 23, 226 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). I f the de fenda nt produce s evidenc e on eac h element of a r equeste d defe nse, he is entitled to an instruction. Id. ; see T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 2.04(c) (Ve rnon 2003) (stating that issue of exis tence of affirmative d e f e n s e is n o t s u

b mi tt e d to ju

r y u n le s s e v id e n c e is a dmi tt e d to s u p p ort it). I n fa ct , a cha

rg e on a defe nsive issue is require d if it is raised by the def endant’ s testimony

alone or otherwise. Mc Ga rit

y , 5 S. W.3 d at 22 6. Th e re fu sa l to su bmi t a re qu e ste d de fe ns ive ins tr uc tio n is re vie we d un de r t he a bu se of discre tion standard. Id. When the defe ndant fa ils to present ev i d en ce on eac h element of the reque sted defe nsive issue, there is no error in refusingto submit the def ensive issue. Id. at 227.04

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- 5- I f the a ppellate c ourt deter

mines the trial cour

t erre d reg ardingthe jury

char g e, it must then evaluate t he harm cause d by the er ror. Se e Al

ma nz a v . S

tate , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) I f there was no objec tion in the trial court and the a lleg ed er ror is ra ised for the first time on appea l, the appellant must show egr eg ious harm to obtain relief
. Id. I f err or is prese rved in the tria l court, the a

ppellant nee d only s h o w s o m e h arm. Id. Har m is determined by

revie wing the entire char g e, the state of the e vidence , arguments of counse l, and any other re levant information shown by the re cord. Id. Depue conce des re nunciation does not apply to of fense s outside of Chapter 15 of the Texas Penal Code. Se e W

esb ro ok v . S

tate , 2 9 S. W.3 d 1 03 , 1 22 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 15.04(b ) (s t ating renunc iation is affirmative de fense to prosecution for conspirac y

and criminal solicitation). And, admit tedly he was char g ed was capital murder under Chapter 19 of

the Pe na l Co de . H e argue s, ho we ve r, he wa s n e ve rt he le ss en tit le d to a

re nunc iatio n in str

uc tio n b e c a

us e the jury char g e included a d efinition of conspira cy from sec tion 15.02 of the Penal Code, and the
a pp lic a tio n p or

tio n o f t he c ha rg e state s: Or, if you find from the e vidence bey ond a re asonable doubt that J onathan D e p u e e n te r e d in to a

c o n s p ir a c y

w it h E r ic D e p u e , Jo s e p h M o n to y a , Je s s e M arti n e z, J r., and/or Rube n Montoy a to c ommit the felony offe nse of bur g lary and that on or a bo ut t he 29 th d ay

of Se pte mbe r, 20 06 , in

B e xar C ou nt y , Te xas, in a n atte mpt to car ry out this conspiracy

to co m mit burgla

ry , J onathan De pue intentionally cause d the death of an individual, namely : Aleta Rhodes, by shooting Aleta Rhodes with a d ea d ly wea pon, namely : a fire arm, a nd J onathan De pue wa s in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offe ns e of burg lary of a ha bitation upon Aleta Rhod es, and that such offe nse wa s committed in furthera nce of the unlawf

ul purpose to commit burg lary and was an offe nse that should ha ve bee n anticipated a s a r e s u l to f c ar r yi n g o u tt h e c o n s p i r a c y t o c o m m i tb u r g l ar y; Then you will find the defe ndant guilty of ca pital murder a s char g ed in the indictment.04

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- 6- T h e S t at e c o u n t er s b y

ci t i n g W esbrook, and arguing Depue was indicted f or ca pital murder, not conspirac y , and ther efor e De pue wa s not entitled to a renunc iation instruction. The State argues alternatively

that even if

renunc iation was l eg ally available to Depue , he was not entitled to have the defe nse submitted beca

use he did not submit evidence entitling him to the defe nse. Assuming without deciding that the def ense of renunc iation was leg ally

available to Depue
un de r t he c ir c ums tanc es of th is c a se , w e mus t de te rm ine if he pr e se nte d e vid e nc e e nti tli nghim to the submission. To determ i n e i f t he def ensive issue of r enunciation was raise d, we view the evidenc e in light of

the statutory

provision. Mc Ga rit

y , 5 S.W .3d at 227. T h e T ex as P en al Code pr ov ide s th a t w ith

re g ard to conspi ra c y , th e de fe ns e of re nunc iatio n is a va ila

ble wh e n th e re is evidenc e to show the de fenda nt voluntarily

and complete ly

renunc iated h i s cr iminal objective by
w it h dr aw in g f

r o m t h e c o n s p ir a c y

“ b e f o r e c o mm is s io no f

th e o b je c t o f f e n s e an d to o k further aff irmative ac tion that prevente d the commission of the object offe nse.” T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 15.04(b). Contrary to Depue’ s assertion, the jury char g e re fer s to a conspira cy to commit burgla

ry , not capital murder. Acc ording ly for purposes of re nunciation, burg lary is the criminal objective f rom which De pue mus t have withdra wn and take n aff

irmative ac tion to prevent. See id. To establish he p r e s e n te d e v id e n c e to s u

p p o rt t h e s u b mi s s io no f

r e nu n c iati o n , D e p u e p o in ts to th e v ide otaped statement he g ave to police , which was a dmitted as State’s exhibi t thirteen. We have revie wed the vid e ota pe d s tate me nt, and

De pu e ma de the fo llo wi nga dmi ssi on s: 1. He wa s p art of a g ro up of me n wh o a g re e d to burg lari ze a ho us e to “ make so me fast ca sh.” 2. The g roup drov e ar o u n d , s aw a house that looked empty , and picke d it for the04

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- 7- burg lary . Depue denied they picked the house beca

use he knew Ms. Rhodes wa s an elder ly woman living a lone. 3. Three of the men, inc luding De pue, we re dr opped off d o wn t h e s tree t from the Rhodes house, ente red the alley behind the house, jumped th e fence into the backyard, a

nd broke the g lass door at the ba ck of the house to g ain entry
. 4. Al tho ug h h e ini tia lly de nie d k

no wi ng anyon e ha d a

g un , D e pu e ult imate ly admitted h e k n ew Da n i el M ontoy a had the g un when they wer e in the ca

r and sa w Daniel take the g un inside the house. 5. All three me n enter ed the house . Depue “touche d stuff,” “g rabbe d stuff her e and there ,” and move d the bed. 6. He g ot sc are d and left. He said he could not go thr oug h with it. He claimed he left bef ore Ms. Rhodes c ame home. Th e iss ue be fo re thi s cou

rt is not wh e the r De pu e ’s te sti mony is tru e , but rathe r whe the r, if the testimony

is believed, a

n issue of re nunciation has be en ra ised. Se e Dy so n v . S tate , 672 S.W .2d 460, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Depue ’s statement, e ven if take n as true, does not raise evidenc e entitling him to renunc iation with reg ard to the burg lary
. “B urg lary” is de fined in the Penal Code
a s e n t e r i n g a h a

b i t a t i o n o r b u i l d i n g w i t h o u t t h e o w n e r ’ s c o n s e n t w i t h t h e i n t e n tt o c o m m i ta f e l o n y, theft, or a ssault. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 30.02. Ba sed on Depue ’s statement, by the time he “g ot
scar ed” a nd left the Rhodes home, the burg lary was c omplete. See id. Thus, his statement does not show renunc iation with reg ard to burg lary or conspira cy

to commit burgla

ry . Ev e n if we a c c e pt De pu e ’s c on te nti on that the ob je c t off e ns e wa s the mur de r as op po se d to the burg lary , th e re is n oth ingin D e pu e ’s state me nt t o s ho w h e too k a ff ir mativ e a c tio n to pr e ve nt i ts commission – by

his own admissi o n , he mer ely left the sce ne, nothing more. See W esbrook, 29 S.W. 3d a t 122; T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 15.04(b). Ac cording ly , we ove rrule D epue’ s first point of er ror.04

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1 ... A pe rs o n co m m i t s t he o f f ense of m urder as def

i n e d b y s e c tio n 19
. 0 2 (b)(1) o f t he P enal C o d e i f

he
“ i nt ent i onal l y o r knowi ng l y caus es t he deat h of an i ndi vi dual
. ” T EX . P E N A L C O D E A NN . § 1 9
. 0 2 (b)(1) (V ernon 2 0 0 3 ).

- 8- Conv ic tio n of

Pr oo f D if fe re nt Fr om, an d L ess T han, Tha t Re qui

re d b y Ind ic tment I n h is s e c on d p oin t, D e pu e c la ims the tr ia l c ourt ’s c ha rg e was “ fata lly

and fu nd a me nta lly flawe d” bec ause it allowe d the jury to convict him on proof diffe rent fr om, an d l es s than, that authorized by

the indictment. This argument, as the one asser ted in his first point, r elates to the trial court’s inc lusion of conspirac y lang uag e in the jury

char g e. Th e ind ic tme nt, by

wh ic h D e pu e wa s c ha

rg e d w ithc a

pit a l murd e r, state d: [O] n or about the 29th Da y of September, 2006, J ONATH AN DEPUE, her einaf ter r e f e r r e d t o a s d e f e n d an t , d i d

i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a

u s e t h e d e a t h o f ani n d i v i d u a l , n a m e l y: Aleta Rhodes, by

SHOOTI NG AL ETA RHODES WI TH A DEADL Y WEAPON, NAMEL Y: A FI REARM, an d t h e d efe ndant was in the c ourse of committing and a tte mpt ingto c omm it the of fe ns e of B UR GLAR

Y O F A HA B I TA TI ONup on Al e ta Rhodes[.] See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 19.03(a) (2) ( Ver non Supp. 2009). Capital murder, in the c ontext of thi s c a se , is de fi ne d a s f

oll ow s: (a) A per son commi t s an offe nse if he c ommits murder a s defined unde r Section 19.02(b)( 1) 1 an d : * * * (2) the pe rson intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or a tte mpt ingto c omm it k idn a pp ing , b ur g lary , r ob be ry , a g g ra vate d s e x ua l a ssa

ult , arson, obstruc tion or retaliation, or te rror istic threat . . . Id. The a

pplication para g raph of the j ury char g e for the g uilt/i nnocenc e phase of the trial state d: Now, if you find from the e vidence bey ond a re aso n able doubt that on or04

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- 9- a bo ut the 29 th da

y of Se pte mbe r, 20 06 , in B e xar County , Te xas, the defe nd ant, J onathan De pue, either acting alone or toge ther with E ric De pue, Joseph Montoy a, J esse Ma rtinez, J r., and/or Rube n Montoy a as a party , d i d i n t en tionally

cause the death of an individual, namely : Alet a R h odes, by shooting Ale ta Rhodes with a deadly wea pon, namely : a firear m , and Jonathan Depue , either a cting alone or toge ther with Eric Depue , J o s ep h Montoy a, Jesse Martinez, J r., and/or Rube n Montoy a as a

party , wa s i n the cour se of c ommitt ing or attempting to c ommit t he of fe ns e of burg lary of a ha bit a tio n u po n A le ta Rho de s; Or, if you find from the e vidence bey ond a re asonable doubt that J onathan D e p u e e n te r e d

in to a c o n s p ir a c y

w it h E r ic D e p u e , Jo s e p h M o n to y a , Je s s e M arti n e z, J r., and/or Rube n Montoy a to commit the felony offe nse of burg lary and that on or a bo ut t he 29 th d ay

of Se pte mbe r, 20 06 , in

B e xar Cou nty , T ex as, in an atte mpt to car ry out t h i s conspirac y

to commit burgla

ry , J onathan De pue intentionally cause d the death of an individual, namely : Aleta Rhodes, by shooting Ale ta Rhodes with a deadly wea

p o n , n a me ly : a

f ir e ar m, an d Jo n a th anD e p u e w a s in th e c o u r s e of committing or attempting to commit the offe nse of bur gl ary of a ha bitation upon Aleta Rhodes, a

nd that such off

ense w as commi t t ed in furthe ranc e of the unlawful purpose to commit burg lary and wa s an offense that should have been a nticipated as a re su lt o f t

he c arr y ingou t of

the c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it b ur g lary ; Then yo u will find the defe ndant g uilty of ca pital murder a s char g ed in the ind ic tme nt. I f y ou do no t so fi nd be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, or if y ou

have a re a so na ble d o u b t t h e r e o f , y o uw il l f

in d the def

e n d an t n o t gu il ty

o f c a p it a l m u r d e r an d n e xt consider whether

he is g uilty

of the lesse r included of

fense of murder
. Ba sed on the languag e in the indi ctment, s ection 19.03(a)(2) , and the application para g raph, Depue argues that althoug h the application para g raph corr ectly contained information c o n cerning De pu e ’s a c tio ns a s a

pa rt y to t he c ha rg e d o ff e ns e purs ua

nt to se c tio n 7. 01 of the Pe na l Co de , it a lso contained imprope r conspira cy lang uag e, allowin g

th e ju r y to c o nv ic t D epue f

or ca pital murder ba sed on the offe nse of c onspiracy as def ined in section 15.02 of the Penal Code, a c rime for which he w as not indicted. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE A NN . § 7. 01 (V e rn on 20 03 ) ( statin g pe rs on

is c ri min a lly responsible a s party

to offense if offe nse is committed by his ow n conduct, c onduct of a nother for04

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- 10- which he is criminally responsible, or both) . Depue rec og nizes that under sec tion 7.02 of the Penal Cod e , a pe rs on c an b e c ri min a lly

re sp on sib le fo r t

he c on du c t of

ano the r, bu t c on te nd s th e c ha rg e in this c ase went bey ond that and improper ly char g ed a se parate offe nse, i.e., c onspiracy under se ction 15 .0 2 o f t he Pe na l Co de , w hic h a llo we d th e jur y to c on vic t De pu e on pr oo f dif fe re nt fr om, and

le ss tha n, that a uth or ize d b y

the in dic tme nt. De pu e c on te nd s th a t by de fi nin g “ c on sp ir a c y ” a s it is de fi ne d in sect io n 15 .02, the tr ia l c ourt we nt b e y on d a

me re pa rt ie s c ha rg e . We ho ld D e pu e is incorre ct. Section 7.02 of the P enal Code is entitl ed “Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of A nother.” See id. § 7 .0 2. Sub se c tio n ( b) of se c tio n 7 .0 2 p ro vid e s: I f, in t he a tte mpt

to c arr y ou t a c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it o ne fe lony , a

no the r f e lony is c omm itt e d b y

on e of the c on sp ir a tor s, a ll co ns pir a tor s ar e g uil ty of the fe lony a c tua lly c omm itt e d, tho ug h h a vin g no int e nt t o c omm it it, if the of fe ns e wa s c omm itt e d in further ance of the unlawful purpose and wa s one that should have be en anticipated as a r esult of ca

rry ing out the c onspiracy
. Id . § 7.02(b). The S tate arg ued, in response to Depue’ s objection to the conspira cy lang uag e in the application par ag raph of

the cha rg e, that the languag e wa s proper beca use it tracke d section 7.02(b) and wa s a prope r par

ties char g e. The State makes the same ar g ument here
. Mo nto y a v . S tate is disposi tive of this point. 810 S.W .2d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc)
. I n that case , the indictment alleg ed Montoy a and a nother man “ unlawfully , intentionally , and k nowing ly

cause [d] the death of J ohn E. Kilheff er, the dece ased, by

stabbing the dec ease d with a knife, . . . and the said defenda nts were then and ther e in the cour se of c ommitt ing a nd attempting to commit the offe nse of r obbery of John E. Kil heff

er, . . .” Id . at 164. The indictment said nothing about a c onspiracy
. See id. Neve rtheless, the application portion of the c ourt’s jury char g e tra cked the languag e of se ction 7.02(b) a nd contained the definition of conspira cy from sec tion 15.02 of the04

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- 11- Penal Code. Id . After

he wa s convicted of

capital m u rd er , M ontoy a asse rted the same ar g ument made by Depue in this case – “the inclusion of t he theory of conspiracy in the court’s char g e over his objection constituted fundamenta l err or because the offe nse of conspiracy had not bee n alleg ed in the indictment.” Id. at 165. On petition for discre tionary revie w, the cour

t of cri m i n al ap p eals he ld Montoy a wa s mistaken in his arg ument beca use the c harg e did no t i n s t ru ct the jury to consider whe ther he was g uilty of t he separate offe nse of c riminal conspirac y found in section 15.02 of the Penal Code. Id
. Rather, the c harg e “me rely contained a

n alternative ‘par

ties’ cha rg e” a s provided in sec tion 7.02(b). Id . The c ourt held it wa s “we ll a cce pted” that the law of parties c an be a pplied to a ca se eve n if there is no alleg ation in t h e i n d i ctment re g ardingparties. Id
. (c i t i n g En gli sh v . S tate , 592 S.W .2d 949 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 80 ); Pi tts v . S tate , 569 S.W .2d 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). T his rule applies to the law of pa rt i es as f ound in section 7.02(a) and 7.02(b) of the Pena l Code. Montoya , 810 S.W .2d at 165. The c ourt then noted that the e vidence as demons t ra t ed by Montoy a’s c onfession supported a c harg e on cr iminal responsibil it y a s s et forth in sec tion 7.02(b), and ove rruled Montoy a’s point of err or. Id
. Th e ind ic tme nt a

nd a pp lic a tio n c ha

rg e are ne arl y ide nti c a l to that dis c us se d by the c ourt in Montoya . Depue , like Montoya , w a s in dic te d f or c a pit a l murd e r. Al tho ug h D e pu e ’s ind ic tme nt s a id
n o t h i ng about a c onspiracy , the application portion of the char g e included a parties c harg e fr om section 7.02(b) of the Pena l Code and a definition of criminal conspirac y from sec tion 15.02 of the Pe na l Co de , ju st a s Montoya did. See id. at 164-65. More over, D epue’ s statement, which wa s introduced into evide nce by the State, supported the submission of a c harg e on cr iminal responsibility
. Depue admitted that he and the others ag ree d to bur g larize a home, jumped a fenc e04

- 08

- 00 48 7- CR

- 12- to enter the backyard of Rhodes’s home, and enter ed her home by brea king in. He admitted he saw Daniel with the gun in the car , and admitted Da niel had the gun in his hand when they enter ed the house. This was suff

icient to authorize a 7.02(b) parties charg e. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule D epue’ s second point of e rror . Unanim ous V erdict L astly , Depue contends the c o urt’s cha rg e allowe d the jury

to “re nder a

g ener al ver dict on capital murde r without unanimously ag ree ing to whic h act the de fenda nt was g uilty

of committing.” Depue ’s ar g ument is based on the fac t that the indictment contained a g ener al par

ties char g e under
se c tio n 7 .0 2( a ) a

nd a c on sp ir a c y

pa rt ie s c ha rg e un de r s e c tio n 7 .0 2( b) . D e pu e c on te nd s that be c a us e the jury was c harg ed this way , it was improperly permi tted to find the defe ndant g uilty of ca pital murder a s char g ed in the indictment, or guilty of conspira cy

to commit capital murder, which was not char g ed in the indictment. Unanimity

is r equire d under the Texas Consti tution in felony case s and under

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e in all cr iminal cases. J e f f e r s o n v . S t a te , 18 9 S .W .3 d 305 , 3 11 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p . 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Ngo v . S tate , 17 5 S.W. 3d 73 8, 74 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 )); se e als o T EX . C O N ST . ar t. V , § 13 ; T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . arts. 36.29(a) , 37.02, 37.03, 45.034-.036 (Ve rnon 2006 & Supp. 2009). In this contex t, unanimit y m ea n s “e ac h and eve ry juror ag ree s that the defe ndant committed the same, sing le, spec ific cr iminal act.” Ngo , 1 7 5 S
. W
. 3 d a t7 4 5
. In de te rm ini ngun anim ity , th e qu e sti on is w he the r t

h e j u r y c h a r g e s u b m i tt e d dif fe re nt o ff e ns e s o r s imp ly alternate methods of committing the same off ense. Se e Hu

ffm an v . S

tate , 2 6 7 S. W. 3 d

9 0 2 , 9 0 5 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2008). To answe r this quest i o n , the cour t of criminal appe als has advise d that we deter mine the foc us or g rava

men of the of

fense
. Id. at 907.04

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- 00 48 7- CR

- 13- I n this case , Depue was c harg ed with the off ense of capital murde r. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 19.03(a) (2). The g rava men or focus of the offe nse was the murder of Ms. Rhodes during the commission of a burg lary
. See H uffman , 267 S.W .3d at 907. The jury char g e simply

authorized the jury to f ind D epue g uilty of this sing le offe nse either persona lly or as a party u n d er s ec t ions 7.02(a) (2) a

nd 7.02(b). Se e Ga rza Ve ga v . S tate , 267 S.W .3d 912, 915-16 (Te x . Crim. App. 2008) (noting that hy

pothetically corr ect jury char g e authorized jury to convict def

endant of capital murde r as part y u n d er s ection 7.02(a)(2) or sec tion 7.02(b)). Thus, the c harg e per mitted the jury

to find alternative t h eo ri es of par ty liability for the c ommissi on of the sing le cr iminal offense of ca pital murder. T he jury

char g e did not autho ri z e o r p er m i t the jury to return a

ny thing less than a unanimous verdict. We ther efor e over rule De pue’s third point of er ror. C ONCL US I ON Ba sed on the for eg oing, w e hold Depue ’s points of err o r ar e without merit, and aff irm the trial court’ s judgme nt.
Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Do No t Pu

bli sh