Filed 8/27/24 In re Bryan D. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re BRYAN D., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B327818

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP03476B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

DOUGLAS C.,

Defendant and Respondent;

MARCO A.,

Objector and Appellant;

BRYAN D.,

Minor and Respondent.
2

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner. 

Affirmed.

Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Appellant Marco A.

Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Respondent Douglas C.

Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for minor Respondent Bryan D.

________________________

INTRODUCTION

Minor Bryan D. (born 2013) is the child of mother Sara D. 

and has two presumed fathers as determined by the juvenile

court: (1) his biological father, appellant Marco A., and 

(2) respondent Douglas C., Sara’s partner since 2019 and the 

biological father of Bryan’s half-sister Halsey (born 2020).1 

Marco appeals from the court’s order at the jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing finding Douglas to be Bryan’s second 

presumed father, a finding which would make Douglas eligible 

for visitation and reunification services. We conclude substantial 

evidence supports the court’s findings and affirm.

1 The record refers to Marco A. as “Marcos A.,” but counsel 

for Marco confirmed his correct name in its supplemental 

briefing, and we use Marco in this opinion.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Family and Household Background 

Bryan lived with his biological parents Sara and Marco

from his birth in 2013 until they separated in either 2018 or

2019, residing first in California then in Nebraska.

2

Sara began a relationship with Douglas sometime between 

2017 and 2019, and moved to California with Bryan. Bryan lived 

with Sara and Douglas in California starting in 2019, along with 

his older half-sister Alisson (Sara’s daughter, born 2008).3 

Bryan’s half-sister Halsey was born to Sara and Douglas in 2020.

After Sara and Marco separated, Marco remained living in 

Nebraska but maintained weekly phone and video contact with 

Bryan and provided intermittent financial support and clothing

to Sara for Bryan’s care.

B. The Referral and Dependency Petition

In July 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of Child 

and Family Services (Department) received a referral alleging 

Douglas was arrested after purportedly grabbing Sara around the 

2 Sara reported she and Marco separated in “about 

2018/2019” and they lived together until 2019. Marco reported he 

lived with Sara “from about 2012 to 2019” or until “about 2018,” 

and that they terminated their relationship “in 2018/2019.”

3 Sara reported to the Department that she and Douglas 

began their relationship and cohabitation in 2019. Douglas 

declared on his statement of parentage that Bryan and Alisson 

began living with him in 2017; but otherwise reported 2019 as 

the year his relationship and cohabitation with Sara and the 

children began.
4

neck and pushing her against a wall while he was intoxicated.

Halsey was in the room. The superior court granted an 

emergency protective order protecting Sara from Douglas, which 

was subsequently terminated and the criminal case against 

Douglas was dropped on August 5, 2022.

On September 6, 2022, the Department filed a dependency 

petition on behalf of Bryan (then nine years old), Halsey, and 

Alisson alleging under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), that Sara and Douglas had a history 

of violent altercations in the presence of the children.4 The 

petition also alleged under subdivision (b)(1) that Douglas had a 

history of substance abuse and was a current abuser of alcohol.

C. The Children Are Detained from Douglas and the Court 

Grants Him Visitation; Douglas Requests Presumed Father 

Status

In September 2022, the juvenile court held its initial 

hearing in this case and found Marco was Bryan’s presumed 

father, over Douglas’s objection. The court detained all three 

children from Douglas and released them to Sara, with nine 

hours of weekly monitored visitation with all three children for 

Douglas. Marco’s whereabouts were unknown at the time, and 

the court ordered Bryan detained from Marco with monitored 

visits, with discretion to the Department to liberalize once it was 

in contact with Marco.

Douglas requested he also be found to be Bryan and 

Alisson’s presumed father, and the juvenile court set a motion 

4 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code.
5

hearing for the request. Douglas filed a JV-505 Statement 

Regarding Parentage on September 20, 2022, requesting a 

judgment of parentage. Douglas stated Bryan and Alisson had 

lived with him since 2017, he had “helped raise Alisson and 

Bryan since 2017 as my own children,” he told “[e]veryone” they 

were his children, he had participated in “[a]ll age appropriate 

activities,” and provided them “[a]ll necessities” and “support and 

guidance in all categories.”

In October 2022, Bryan and Alisson’s counsel joined in the 

request that Douglas be found a presumed parent for both 

children. Bryan filed a declaration stating that he wanted “both 

my dad Marco and my dad Douglas to continue being my dads. If 

I could not have visits with Marco or Douglas anymore, I would 

be sad.” Bryan declared he sometimes called Douglas “‘pa’” and 

called Douglas’s parents “‘abuelita’” or “‘grandma’” and “‘abuelo’” 

or “‘grandpa,’” and that he considered Douglas his dad and would 

want visits with him if Sara and Douglas broke up. He declared 

he introduced Douglas as his “‘step-dad’” but Douglas introduced 

himself to Bryan’s friends as “‘Bryan’s dad,’” and Bryan did not

correct him. Bryan declared that before this dependency case he 

lived with Douglas and saw him every day, and they played 

soccer, went to the park, and got ice cream together.

At a hearing on October 27, 2022, Sara also joined in 

Douglas’s request for presumed father status for Bryan and 

Alisson. The juvenile court granted presumed father status to 

Douglas as to Alisson. Bryan’s counsel argued Bryan considered 

both Marco and Douglas his fathers, and it would be detrimental 

to Bryan not to have Douglas as his presumed father because it 

would set him apart from his siblings and longtime family unit. 

Marco objected to Douglas having presumed father status for 
6

Bryan, and the juvenile court ordered Marco’s counsel to file a 

written response and continued the hearing as to Bryan’s 

parentage. The court released Bryan to Sara and Marco, with 

primary residence with Sara.

In November 2022, the Department reported that Marco

was in the process of moving from Nebraska to Los Angeles. The 

Department reported that “[w]ith respect to the paternity issue, 

[Marco] stated that although he appreciated [Douglas] helping to 

provide for his son Bryan during the past 2-3 years,” Marco

opposed Douglas being named as a second presumed father. The 

Department reported that Bryan stated he considered both Marco

and Douglas “to be like fathers” but he saw Marco as his “real 

father” and Douglas as his “step-father.” The Department also 

reported that Sara and Douglas both expressed their intentions 

were to resume a relationship with each other if allowed to do so.

In February 2023, the Department reported Marco was 

living in Los Angeles and having weekly visits with Bryan. The 

Department reported Douglas was not able to visit the children 

three times weekly due to his unpredictable work schedule, which 

involved travel to another county, but Douglas spoke to Bryan by 

telephone or video chat almost daily for between 15 minutes and 

one hour. Bryan enjoyed the visits and never declined or 

demonstrated apprehension when speaking with Douglas. 

During a visit in November 2022, the monitor reported Douglas 

was “attentive and responsive towards the children,” engaged

with them and demonstrated affection, including hugging them 

and bringing them food. At other visits in November 2022 and 

January and February 2023, the Department noted “minimal 

interaction” between the two older children and Douglas because 
7

Douglas focused his attention on Halsey more than on Alisson 

and Bryan.

D. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing and Douglas’s 

Presumed Father Determination

On March 3, 2023, the court held the jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing, as well as the hearing on Douglas’s request 

for presumed father status as to Bryan. Sara, Douglas, Marco, 

Alisson, and Bryan were present at the hearing.

Bryan testified he had one mom and two dads. He called 

Douglas “‘dad’” when they lived together, and they also did things 

like go to the park and play soccer. Douglas made sure he was 

safe and that the children would not go out alone at night. Bryan 

testified he called Douglas’s parents “‘grandma’” and “‘grandpa,’” 

he wanted both Douglas and Marco to continue being his dads, 

and he wanted to keep having visits and living with Douglas, 

even if Douglas and Sara broke up. He testified he would feel 

“sad” if Douglas was not his dad anymore because Douglas “was 

there for me” and would cheer him up when he got hurt. Bryan 

testified he would be “mad” if his sisters got to see Douglas and 

he did not, he had no fear of Douglas at all, and he was sad when 

Douglas missed visits with him.

Bryan’s counsel argued it would be detrimental for Bryan 

to not have both Douglas and Marco as presumed fathers because 

Bryan had lived with Douglas, was having visits with Douglas, 

and Douglas and Bryan would lose all rights to have contact 

through visitation or custody orders if the case closed without a 

finding that Douglas was Bryan’s presumed parent. His counsel 

also argued it would set Bryan apart from his two siblings, for 

whom Douglas had presumed father status, with the concomitant 
8

rights to visitation. Douglas’s counsel joined in Bryan’s counsel’s 

arguments “in whole” and submitted on Douglas’s motion for a 

statement of parentage.

Marco’s counsel argued that while Douglas “does care for 

Bryan and Bryan is bonded to him,” Douglas had missed visits 

because of work and “[had] not been prioritizing the children”

while under court supervision. He also argued it was 

inappropriate for a father who has exposed children to domestic 

violence to be granted “special status.” His counsel further 

argued Marco was “in the picture” and caring for Bryan, and

there was no indication Douglas would continue to take on 

ongoing parental responsibilities for Bryan if Douglas remained 

separated from Sara.

The Department stated it had no position on whether both 

Douglas and Marco should have presumed father status.

The juvenile court concluded that Douglas had a “strong 

relationship” with Bryan and satisfied the requirements of 

Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), for presumed parent 

status. The court stated that, “I do find that the evidence before 

the court is such that [Douglas] should be found presumed,” and 

that it “fully adopt[ed] the arguments of [Bryan’s counsel]” in 

granting Douglas’s motion to be deemed a presumed father.

The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the 

section 300 petition, and ordered Bryan be removed from Douglas 

and remain released to Sara and Marco with family maintenance

services. The court ordered family enhancement services and 

monitored visitation for Douglas a minimum of nine hours 

weekly, with discretion to the Department to liberalize visits.

Marco timely appealed, challenging the court’s finding 

Douglas was Bryan’s presumed father. Counsel for Douglas and 
9

Bryan each filed respondent’s briefs, joining in each other’s 

arguments. The Department filed a letter stating it took no 

position on the matter and would not be filing a respondent’s 

brief.

DISCUSSION

A. Mootness

On January 18, 2024, while this appeal was pending, the 

juvenile court terminated jurisdiction as to Bryan, awarded joint 

legal and physical custody of Bryan to Sara and Marco, with 

primary residence with Sara, and ordered monitored visitation 

for Douglas. The court reiterated its parentage findings and 

judgment that Marco and Douglas were both presumed fathers of 

Bryan. Marco timely appealed from these orders pursuant to 

In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156. We granted Marco’s 

motion for judicial notice of the January 18, 2024 orders in this 

case and his appeal therefrom under Evidence Code sections 452, 

subdivision (d), and 459, and invited the parties to submit letter 

briefs addressing whether this appeal is moot.

Bryan’s counsel argued the appeal is moot and should be 

dismissed because there is no effective relief the court can 

provide to Marco, and further argued we should not exercise 

discretionary review to reach the merits. (See In re D.P. (2023) 

14 Cal.5th 266, 276 [“The critical factor in considering whether a 

dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can 

provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.”]; In re 

Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 163 [“An order 

terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an 

appeal from an earlier order moot.”].)
10

Marco argued his appeal is not moot because he also 

appealed from the January 18, 2024 exit order and termination of 

jurisdiction, and his challenge is to a parentage determination 

that continues to impact his parental rights. 

We conclude Marco’s protective appeal from the exit orders 

and termination of jurisdiction in the underlying dependency case 

means this case is not moot because we may provide effective 

relief. Under section 362.4, when a juvenile court terminates 

jurisdiction over a case, it may “issue an order ‘determining the 

custody of, or visitation with, the child,’” which “may be enforced 

or modified by the family court.” (In re Ryan K. (2012) 

207 Cal.App.4th 591, 594, fn. 5.) Such orders are “sometimes 

referred to as ‘family law’ orders or ‘exit’ orders.” (Ibid.) As this 

court explained in In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 

“termination of dependency jurisdiction does not necessarily moot 

an appeal from a jurisdiction finding that directly results in an 

adverse juvenile custody order. But in most cases . . . for this 

court to be able to provide effective relief, the parent must appeal 

not only from the jurisdiction finding and disposition order but 

also from the orders terminating jurisdiction and modifying the 

parent’s prior custody status. Without the second appeal, we 

cannot correct the continuing adverse consequences of the 

allegedly erroneous jurisdiction finding.” (Id. at p. 159.) Marco 

followed this procedure by appealing from the exit orders and 

termination of jurisdiction.

Marco also seeks relief that may have an impact on the 

harm he complains of: the determination that Bryan has a 

second presumed father. “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two 

requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of 

an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or 
11

capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” 

(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) The high court explained 

that “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible 

impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status,’” requiring “some 

effect on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being 

redressed by a favorable court decision.” (Id. at p. 277.) 

“[S]peculative future harm” is insufficient to avoid mootness. (Id.

at p. 278.) But “when a parent has demonstrated a specific legal 

or practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the 

case is not moot, and merits review is required.” (Id. at p. 283.) 

Here, Marco has identified a determination that affects his legal 

rights in an ongoing way: the juvenile court’s grant of presumed 

parent status to Douglas, rendering Douglas eligible for visitation 

and reunification services with Bryan. Reversal of the court’s 

parentage determination would avert this consequence and 

return Marco to the legal position of sole presumed father, 

without the prospect of shared custody, decision-making, or 

visitation with Douglas.

5

B. Governing Law and Standard of Review 

Dependency law recognizes “‘presumed,’” “‘biological,’” and

“‘alleged’” fathers. (In re Jovanni B. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 

1482, 1488; In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120.) 

Presumed father status ranks highest, and only a presumed 

father is entitled to reunification services, custody absent a 

finding of detriment, and appointed counsel. (See In re J.H.

5 Because we conclude Marco’s appeal is not moot, we do not 

address the factors for determining whether to exercise our 

discretion to reach the merits of a moot appeal. (See In re D.P., 

supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 282-286.)
12

(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 635, 644; In re T.R. (2005) 

132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209; In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 

793, 801.) A presumed father is one who meets one or more of 

the statutory criteria for presumed parent status specified in 

Family Code section 7611. (See Martinez v. Vaziri (2016) 

246 Cal.App.4th 373 (Martinez); In re J.H., at p. 644.) “A 

biological or natural father is one whose biological paternity has 

been established, but who has not achieved presumed father” 

status. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15.) A 

man who may be the child’s father, but who has not achieved 

presumed father status and whose biological paternity has not 

been established is an alleged father. (See ibid.) 

Here, the juvenile court found Douglas to be a presumed 

father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), under 

which a person may qualify for presumed parent status if the 

person “‘receives the child into [their] home and openly holds out 

the child as [their] natural child.’” “[T]here is no requirement in 

section 7611, subdivision (d) the presumed father be the 

biological father” (In re Jerry P., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 816), 

“[n]or is it necessary for the person seeking presumed parent 

status to have entered into the familial relationship from the 

time of conception or birth” (Jason P. v. Danielle S. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 167, 177). A person requesting presumed parent 

status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), must 

have a “fully developed parental relationship” with the child

(R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 776 (R.M.)) and must 

demonstrate “‘a full commitment to [parental] responsibilities—

emotional, financial, and otherwise’” (In re Jerry P., at pp. 801-

802.) “‘“[T]he premise behind the category of presumed [parent] 

is that an individual . . . has demonstrated a commitment to the
13

child and the child’s welfare.”’” (Martinez, supra,

246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384-385; see In re M.R. (2017) 

7 Cal.App.5th 886, 898 [“[T]he core issues are the person’s 

established relationship with and demonstrated commitment to 

the child.”].) 

In most cases there is only one presumed father. (See In re 

Donovan L. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1086.) However, under 

Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c), “In an appropriate 

action, a court may find that more than two persons with a claim 

to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds 

that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the 

child.” Thus, the Legislature has established a mechanism for 

additional parents to be recognized in those “‘rare cases’ in which 

a child ‘truly has more than two parents’ who are parents ‘in

every way.’” (In re Donovan L., at p.1090; accord, Martinez, 

supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 387; see Stats. 2013, ch. 564, § 1(a), 

(d).)

“In determining detriment to the child, the court shall 

consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the 

harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a 

parent who has fulfilled the child’s physical needs and the child’s 

psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed 

that role for a substantial period of time. A finding of detriment 

to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any of the 

parents or persons with a claim to parentage.” (Fam. Code, 

§ 7612, subd. (c).) An “appropriate action” for purposes of Family 

Code section 7612, subdivision (c), includes “one in which a court 

finds an existing, rather than potential, relationship between a 

child and a putative third parent, such that ‘recognizing only two 

parents would be detrimental to the child.’” (In re Donovan L., 
14

supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1089-1090; see In re L.L. (2017) 

13 Cal.App.5th 1302, 1315-1316 [court erred in recognizing 

biological father as a third parent where the child did not “have a 

strong relationship with” or any “existing relationship” with the 

biological father].) “It is this familial relationship with a parent 

who has fulfilled the child’s needs for care and affection for a 

considerable amount of time, that modifies the phrase ‘stable 

placement’ and that provides the context for the trial court’s

evaluation of detriment under section 7612, subdivision (c).” 

(Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 385.)

“[W]e review factual findings regarding parentage under 

either section 7611 or section 7612 for substantial evidence.”

(In re M.Z. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 53, 64, 66.) “‘We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, giving it the 

benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in 

support of the judgment. [Citation.] We defer to the trial court’s 

credibility resolutions and do not reweigh the evidence. 

[Citation.] If there is substantial evidence to support the ruling, 

it will not be disturbed on appeal even if the record can also 

support a different ruling.’” (Ibid.; accord, R.M., supra, 

233 Cal.App.4th at p. 780.)

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s 

Findings that Douglas Is a Presumed Father and That It 

Would be Detrimental to Bryan Not To Recognize Both 

Fathers

On appeal, Marco concedes that Douglas’s “‘demonstrated 

commitment’ to [Bryan] likely satisfied the requirements of 

Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d).” We agree. Douglas 

lived with Bryan for a period of three or more years, cared for 
15

Bryan, referred to himself as “Bryan’s dad” to others, and 

provided Bryan with emotional and financial support and 

supervision. This constitutes substantial evidence that Douglas

“receive[d] [Bryan] into [his] home and openly holds out [Bryan] 

as [his] natural child” (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d)), and that 

Douglas demonstrated “a full commitment to [parental] 

responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise.” (In re 

Jerry P., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 801-802.)

Marco argues that Douglas nevertheless failed to satisfy 

Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c), i.e., that Douglas failed 

to demonstrate it would be detrimental to Bryan if Douglas were 

not recognized as Bryan’s second presumed father. Marco

contends that although “the record showed Bryan did have some 

emotional attachment with Douglas and generally liked living 

with him as his son or stepson,” Douglas’s alleged domestic 

violence against Sara, his lack of stable housing at the time of the 

hearing, and his “minimal” interaction with Bryan during visits

prevent Douglas from establishing he provided Bryan with a

“stable placement” with “a parent who has fulfilled the child’s

physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for care and

affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period

of time.” (Fam. Code, § 7612, subd. (c).) 

We conclude there was substantial evidence before the 

juvenile court that Bryan and Douglas had an existing parentchild relationship and that not recognizing Douglas as Bryan’s 

presumed father would be detrimental to Bryan. As noted, there 

was evidence before the juvenile court that Douglas took on the 

role of Bryan’s father since at least 2019 and as early as 2017, 

resulting in a stable, “fully developed parental relationship”

(R.M., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 776) for “a substantial period 
16

of time” (Fam. Code, § 7612, subd. (c)). Bryan’s testimony also 

established that he considered Douglas his dad, that Douglas had 

fulfilled Bryan’s physical needs and his psychological needs for 

care and affection, and that Bryan would be “sad” and “mad” if he 

was not able to maintain a parent-child relationship with 

Douglas. The evidence thus demonstrates “‘an existing familial 

relationship with [Bryan],’ a bond the likes of which ‘“should not 

be lightly dissolved.’”” (Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 385; In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 554.) The 

Legislature intended the provision for more than one presumed 

parent “to prevent the disruption of established emotional bonds 

between a child and his or her caretakers.” (In re Alexander P.

(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 497.) Here, Bryan was clear that he 

had two fathers, and that he would be upset if the juvenile court 

did not find Douglas his presumed father. 

That Douglas was observed paying more attention to infant 

Halsey during visits than to Bryan and Alisson does not establish

a failure to meet Bryan’s physical and psychological needs, given 

other evidence that Douglas spoke with Bryan almost daily and 

that Bryan was positive about their contact. Further, it is 

generally the case that domestic violence does not disqualify an 

individual from obtaining presumed parent status, but rather it 

is a factor the juvenile court may consider in weighing a request 

for presumed parent status. (See, e.g., In re Alexander P., supra,

4 Cal.App.5th at p. 496 [noting step-father’s domestic violence 

was not directed toward the minor, so the court was unwilling to 

find it disqualifying].) The juvenile court considered Marco’s 

arguments that Douglas should not get “special status” as a 

presumed parent due to domestic violence, and that Douglas had 

taken on a parental role for only “the most recent three years” of 
17

Bryan’s life, and nonetheless concluded the evidence supported a 

finding of detriment, which we do not reweigh on appeal.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s findings and parentage order finding 

Douglas to be a second presumed father of Bryan are affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

STONE, J.