[Cite as State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-762.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HARRISON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BROOKE E. JONES, 

Defendant-Appellant.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 19 HA 0003 

 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Court of Common Pleas of Harrison County, Ohio 

Case No. CRI 2015-0067 

BEFORE: 

David A. D’Apolito, Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Vacated and Remanded. 

Atty. T. Owen Beetham, Harrison County Prosecutor and Atty. Jeffrey J. Bruzzese, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Harrison County Prosecutor’s Office, 111 W. Warren 

Street, P.O. Box 248, Cadiz, Ohio 43907 for Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Atty. Travis Collins, 105 Jamison Avenue, Cadis, Ohio 43907, for Defendant- Appellant. 

 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

Dated: February 26, 2020 

 

D’APOLITO, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Brooke E. Jones appeals her two-year sentence imposed by the 

Harrison County Court of Common Pleas for a community control violation, because the 

sentence (originally suspended) was imposed to be served consecutively to the sentence 

for her felony conviction in Jefferson County. Appellant’s Jefferson County conviction, 

which occurred while Appellant was on community control in Harrison County, provided 

the substance of the community control violation. 

{¶2} Appellant contends that the trial court was prohibited as a matter of law from 

imposing the sentence to be served consecutively to the Jefferson County sentence for 

three reasons. First, she argues that a trial court cannot impose a sentence to run 

consecutively to the sentence of another court. Next, she argues that the sentence is 

unlawful because she was not notified at her original sentencing hearing, when the 

sentence was suspended, that it could be imposed to run consecutively to a sentence for 

a future crime. Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to make the requisite 

statutory findings to impose consecutive sentences. 

{¶3} We find that the trial court had the statutory authority to impose the two-year 

sentence to run consecutively to the Jefferson County sentence, and that the trial court 

was not obliged to notify Appellant that the sentence for a community control violation 

could be imposed to be served consecutively to a future sentence. However, we agree 

with Appellant that the sentence is contrary to law insofar as the trial court erred in not 

making the findings set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), which are required for the imposition 

of consecutive sentences. Accordingly, Appellant’s sentence is vacated and this matter 

is remanded for resentencing consistent with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶4} At the original plea/sentencing hearing on October 16, 2016, Appellant 

pleaded to and was convicted and sentenced for one count of endangering children, in 

violation of R.C. 2919.22(A), a felony of the third degree. Prior to imposing sentence, the 

trial court read portions of the written plea agreement into the record. 
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{¶5} Although Appellant was not under a community control sanction at the time, 

the trial court read aloud, “I understand if I am * * *under community control sanction * * * 

this plea may result in revocation proceedings and any new sentence could be imposed 

consecutively.” (10/24/16 Hrg. Tr., p. 8; 10/25/16 Plea Agreement, p. 2.) The trial court 

further read: 

“[t]his Court is not required by law to impose a prison sanction. It may 

impose community control sanction or non-prison sanction [sic] upon me. I 

understand if I violate the terms and conditions of a community control 

sanction this Court may extend the time for which I’m subject to the 

sanctions up to a maximum of five years, impose a more restrictive 

sanction, or imprison me for the maximum term stated allowed for the 

offense as set out above.” 

(Id. p. 9; Plea Agreement, p. 3.) 

{¶6} The trial court imposed the following sentence: 

The Court is going to sentence you to two years in the appropriate penal 

institution, five year community control [sic]. Court is suspending your two 

year sentence. Court placing you under the probation department’s control 

and you are to successfully complete the program at EOCC. 

(Id., p. 11.) 

{¶7} The sentencing entry reads, in pertinent part: 

THEREFORE, IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE of this Court that 

Defendant be and hereby is placed on Community Controls for a period of 

five (5) years administered by the Community Controls Program of this 

Court. 

* * * 
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In addition, the Community Controls shall specifically include the following 

“Defendant shall serve two (2) years in an Ohio penal institution; two 

(2) years is hereby suspended.” 

(Emphasis in original)(11/4/16 J.E., p. 4.) 

{¶8} After setting forth the conditions of community control, which included the 

completion of certain therapeutic programs and to “abide by all laws,” the sentencing entry 

reads, “[t]he Court may modify this order, consistent with [R.C. 2929.15 – the community 

control sanctions statute], as needed to protect the public and may punish violations of 

this order by imposing a longer period of supervision, a more restrictive community control 

sanction, or a prison term of two (2) years.” (Id., p. 5.) 

{¶9} Although the trial court provided the admonition regarding the possibility of 

consecutive sentences if Appellant was currently under a community control sanction at 

the original plea/sentencing hearing (she was not), the trial court did not provide the same 

admonition should Appellant commit a community control violation in the future. 

{¶10} On February 14, 2018, the state filed a motion to revoke the communitybased control sanction due to Appellant’s termination from a therapeutic program. On 

May 2, 2018, Appellant admitted to the violation and the trial court imposed a jail sentence 

of thirty days. 

{¶11} On July 24, 2018, the state filed a second motion to revoke the community 

control sanction based on three violations: (1) Appellant was charged with one count of 

complicity to commit aggravated robbery and one count of robbery; (2) Appellant was 

associating with known felons; and (3) Appellant was located in Jefferson County, Ohio 

without prior consent from her Community Control Officer. On December 11, 2018, 

Appellant entered a guilty plea in the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas and was 

convicted of one count of robbery, in violation of 2911.02(A)(3) and (B), a felony of the 

third degree. She was sentenced to thirty-six months, which is the maximum term of 

incarceration for a third-degree felony. 

{¶12} Pursuant to negotiations with the Jefferson County prosecutor’s office, the 

state filed a motion to withdraw the motion to revoke community control on January 9, 

2019. However, the trial court overruled the motion because the state “recommended that 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

[Appellant] be placed on the Zero Tolerance Policy established by the Community 

Correction’s Office of the Court as a part of her Community Based Control Sanctions.” 

(1/14/19 J.E., p. 1.) At the community control violation hearing on March 11, 2019, 

Appellant admitted the violation. The trial court revoked the community control sanction 

and imposed the reserved sentence of twenty-four months, with credit for jail time served, 

to be served consecutively to the Jefferson County sentence. (3/11/19 J.E., p. 4.) This 

timely appeal followed. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT BROOKE 

JONES, TO SERVE A RESERVED PRISON SENTENCE CONSECUTIVE 

TO A NEW SENTENCE SUBSEQUENTLY IMPOSED BY A DIFFERENT 

COURT WHEN REVOKING APPELLANT’S COMMUNITY CONTROL 

SANCTIONS. 

{¶13} “An appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only 

if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial 

court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” 

State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1. R.C. 

5145.01, captioned “Duration of sentences,” reads, in pertinent part, “If a prisoner is 

sentenced for two or more separate felonies, the prisoner’s term of imprisonment shall 

run as a concurrent sentence, except if the consecutive sentence provisions of sections 

2929.14 and 2929.41 of the Revised Code apply.” 

{¶14} As an initial matter, we recognize that Appellant’s original sentence was 

contrary to law. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B), community control sanctions and prison 

terms are mutually exclusive and cannot be imposed at the same time on the same count 

of conviction. State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, 35 N.E.3d 512, 

¶ 21-23. However, Appellant waived any challenge to the lawfulness of her original 

sentence because she did not file a timely appeal. State v. Vlad, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 02 

AP 0775, 2003-Ohio-2930, ¶ 6 (“Such errors in actually imposing the prison term must be 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

immediately appealed even if the trial court then ‘suspends’ the felony prison sentence 

and further orders probation or community control sanctions.”) 

{¶15} According to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), separate prison terms for multiple 

offenses may be ordered to be served consecutively if the court finds it is “necessary to 

protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive 

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to 

the danger the offender poses to the public,” and if the court also finds any of the factors 

in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) are present: 

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the 

offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed 

pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or 

was under post-release control for a prior offense. 

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or 

more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the 

multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses 

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct. 

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender. 

“[T]o impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the 

findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its 

findings into its sentencing entry.” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 

16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37. 

{¶16} Although Appellant advances a single assignment of error, her statutory 

argument is divided in three parts. First, she asserts that “the plain language of R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) prohibited the trial court from imposing a consecutive sentence in this 

matter because, unlike R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)-(3), R.C.2929.14(C)(4) does not reference 

imposing a consecutive prison term to any other prison term previously or subsequently 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

imposed upon the offender.” (Appellant’s Brf., p. 4). Appellee counters generally that “it 

is clear that a sentencing court may impose consecutive sentences upon making the 

appropriate findings.” (Appellee’s Brf., p. 3.) 

{¶17} R.C. 2929.14(C)(1) requires certain offenders to serve their mandatory 

prison sentences consecutive to prison terms “previously or subsequently” imposed on 

the offender. R.C. 2929.14(C)(2) requires offenders who commit a felony while 

incarcerated to serve the sentence imposed for the new felony consecutive to any prison 

term “previously or subsequently” imposed. R.C. 2929.14(C)(3) requires an offender who 

steals a firearm or flees from the police in a motor vehicle to serve the sentence for that 

offense consecutive to any prison term “previously or subsequently” imposed on the 

offender. Because R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) does not read that the court may order sentences 

to run consecutive to those previously or subsequently imposed, Appellant argues the 

trial court was prohibited from imposing the sentence at issue here consecutively to the 

Jefferson County sentence. 

{¶18} In State v. Gillman, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-662, 2001-Ohio-3968, the 

Tenth District considered the forgoing argument. In Gillman, the defendant was under a 

community control sanction when he committed two armed robberies. After a twenty-two 

year term of imprisonment was imposed for the armed robbery convictions, Gillman 

stipulated to the community control violation and the same trial court imposed a two-year 

sentence to be served consecutively to the sentences for the armed robberies. Gillman 

challenged the trial court’s authority to impose a consecutive sentence for the community 

control violation. The Tenth District opined: 

Subsections (1), (2), and (3) pertain to circumstances when there are 

multiple sentences and one of the sentences was for one of three specific 

types of conduct. Subsection (4) applies to all other situations when there 

exists multiple sentences. In subsections (1), (2), and (3), the legislature 

made it mandatory that sentences for gun specifications, crimes in a 

detention facility, and certain acts against a law enforcement officer be 

served consecutively to all other sentences imposed previously or 

subsequently. The legislature undoubtedly made consecutive sentences 

mandatory for such crimes to underscore the serious nature of those 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

offenses. Subsection (4) then gives the trial court the discretion to determine 

whether sentences for multiple offenses that do not fit into subsections (1), 

(2), or (3) should be served consecutively. As subsections (1), (2), and (3) 

require sentences to be served consecutively to other sentences imposed 

previously or subsequently when the offense was of an especially serious 

nature, we read subsection (4) to give the trial court the discretion to order 

a sentence to be served consecutively to any previous or subsequent 

sentence when the court makes the required findings indicating that the 

prison terms should be served consecutively. While we agree R.C. 

2929.14(E)(4) is not a model of clarity, we do not believe the legislature 

intended that the trial court would not have this type of discretion in 

sentencing. 

Id. at *3. 

{¶19} The Tenth District concluded that Gillman’s sentence for two counts of 

aggravated robbery and his subsequent sentence for the probation violation “constituted 

‘multiple prison terms * * * imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses’ 

within the meaning of R.C. 2929.14(E)(4), so as to permit consecutive sentences.” Id. 

{¶20} We adopted the Tenth District’s reasoning in Gillman in State v. Love, 7th 

Dist. Mahoning No. 00 CA 255, 2002-Ohio-7178. In that case, the defendant was 

sentenced to a three-year community control sanction, as well as a potential five-year 

prison sentence for any violation of the terms of his community control. One year later, 

Love pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and other crimes in Licking County. A motion 

to revoke community control sanctions was filed in Mahoning County, Love admitted the 

violation, and the trial court imposed a five-year prison term, to be served consecutively 

to the Licking County sentence. On appeal, Love challenged the trial court’s alleged 

failure to make the requisite statutory findings. 

{¶21} Although Love did not argue that the trial court lacked the authority to 

impose a consecutive sentence for the community control violation, we observed that 

“[a]lthough the consecutive sentence at issue was not for multiple convictions within a 

single criminal case, but rather, was for multiple convictions in totally distinct and separate 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

criminal proceedings, the statute has been interpreted to apply in this situation.” Id. at ¶ 

35, citing Gilman, supra. We further found that “[u]nder the revised sentencing laws, 

effective since 1996 with the enactment of Am. S.B. 2, imposing a prison term after a 

community control violation is not a mere reinstatement of a previous sentence,” and, as 

a consequence, the sentencing court must comply with the requirements of R.C. 2929.14. 

Accordingly, we find that the first part of Appellant’s sole assignment of error based on 

the text of R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)-(3) has no merit. 

{¶22} In State v. Thompson, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 01CA62, 2002-Ohio-4717, the 

Fifth District raised the issue articulated in the second part of Appellant’s argument, that 

is, “[t]he plain language of R.C. 2929.15(B)(3) precluded the trial court from imposing a 

consecutive sentence because the trial court did not advise [Appellant] that the reserved 

sentence could be ordered to be served consecutively to a subsequent sentence imposed 

by a different court in the original sentencing entry.” (Appellant’s Brf., p. 8.) R.C. 

2929.15, captioned “Community control sanctions,” reads, in relevant part, “The prison 

term, if any, imposed upon a violator pursuant to this division and division (B)(1) of this 

section shall be within the range of prison terms described in this division and shall not 

exceed the prison term specified in the notice provided to the offender at the sentencing 

hearing pursuant to division (B)(2) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 

2929.15(B)(3). 

{¶23} In Thompson, a Fairfield County trial court imposed concurrent nine-month 

suspended sentences for two felony convictions, and placed the defendant on community 

control for five years. Roughly eleven months later, the prosecutor filed a motion to 

revoke community control based on Thompson’s conviction for a second degree felony 

in Franklin County. The Franklin County trial court imposed a five-year sentence on the 

substantive crime, as well as a one-year sentence, to run consecutively, for a probation 

violation in an earlier case. At the community control violation hearing in Fairfield County, 

the trial court reimposed the nine-month concurrent sentences to be served consecutively 

to the five-year sentence imposed in Franklin County. 

{¶24} In vacating the consecutive nature of the sentence imposed by Fairfield 

County, the Fifth District relied, in part, on the defendant’s statutory right to serve no 

greater sentence than the sentence originally imposed. The Thompson panel wrote, 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

“While we understand appellant’s sentence was reimposed as a result of a probation 

violation, the court did not, indeed, could not indicate appellant’s original sentence would 

be served consecutively to any other subsequent offense in the original sentencing entry.” 

Id. at ¶ 31. 

{¶25} The Second District articulated the same reasoning in State v. Ashworth, 

2nd Dist. Champaign No. 2011 CA 1, 2012-Ohio-108. Ashworth was previously 

sentenced in Franklin County to five years of community control, with a prison sentence 

of five years to be served for a community control violation. Two years later, Ashworth 

was convicted of felony and misdemeanor charges in Champaign County. The 

Champaign County trial court imposed three concurrent prison terms, but ordered 

Ashworth to serve a fourth prison term consecutive to any penalty that the Franklin County 

court would later issue as a consequence for the violation of that court’s community 

control sanctions. 

{¶26} In affirming the imposition of consecutive sentences by the Champaign 

County trial court, the Ashworth Court opined that the Franklin County trial court was likely 

without authority to impose the community control violation sentence to be served 

consecutively to the Champaign County sentence: 

The community-control statute prevents a court from imposing a sentence 

longer than the one it originally announced: “The prison term, if any, 

imposed upon a violator pursuant to this division * * * shall not exceed the 

prison term specified in the notice provided to the offender at the sentencing 

hearing pursuant to division (B)(2) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code. 

* * * ” R.C. 2929.15(B)(2). We have not found any court that has addressed 

whether a prison term that is equal to or less than the specified term 

nevertheless exceeds the specified prison term if it runs consecutive to a 

prison term imposed in another county and the sum of the terms exceeds 

the specified term. But, given [S.B. 2’s] underlying idea of truth-insentencing, as well as the requirements of due process, we think that, 

directly confronted with the issue, this Court, and others, would hold that 

R.C. 2929.15(B)(2) is violated in this situation. Moreover in a plea situation, 

a defendant whose penalty for violation of community control is ordered to 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

be consecutive to a sentence for subsequent conduct would likely raise the 

issue that his original plea was not knowingly entered because the 

consequence of making the sentence consecutive to a penalty for

subsequent conduct, which had not yet occurred, could not be adequately 

explained at the time of the plea. For all these reasons, we believe it is 

likely that the Franklin County court would determine it could not have 

ordered Ashworth to serve its five-year prison sentence consecutive to the 

Champaign County court’s sentence because that would exceed the fiveyear prison term specified originally by the court. 

Id. at ¶19. 

{¶27} Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, effective on July 1, 1996, significantly changed felony 

sentencing law in Ohio. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 has been labeled a “truth in sentencing” 

measure because it provides for definite sentences while eliminating “good time,” parole 

releases, and caps on consecutive terms. For instance, the Eighth District has 

recognized that “truth in sentencing” is a dominant purpose of the current sentencing 

procedures, “‘which aims to eliminate indefinite sentences in favor of specific terms, to 

increase certainty and predictability in sentencing.’” State v. Porter, 8th Dist. No. 103185, 

2016-Ohio-5832, 70 N.E.3d 1208, ¶ 19-20, quoting State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 

2003-Ohio-4165, 793 N.E.2d 473. The Second District Court of Appeals has similarly 

observed that “the time sentenced [under S.B. 2] will be the time served.” State v. Brown, 

2nd Dist. Clark No. 96 CA 92, 1997 WL 216580, *1. 

{¶28} Contrary to the opinions of the Fifth and Second Districts, we find that the 

imposition of a consecutive sentence in this case does not run afoul of the statutory 

language in R.C. 2929.15(3)(b) or the spirit of S.B. 2. Appellant was informed at the 

original plea/sentencing hearing that a two-year prison sentence may be imposed in the 

event that she violated the terms of her community control sanction. Appellant was on 

notice that any violation of the terms of her community control, regardless of whether the 

underlying violation resulted in a separate term of imprisonment, could result in a twoyear term of imprisonment. 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

{¶29} In accordance with R.C. 2929.15(B)(3), the two-year sentence at issue in 

this appeal was within the range of prison terms described in the statute and did not 

exceed the prison term specified in the notice provided to Appellant at the plea/sentencing 

hearing. Similarly, the sentence is not at odds with S.B. 2’s goal of “truth in sentencing,” 

because the “time sentenced” in this case – two years – is the “time served” for the 

community control violation. Brown, supra. 

{¶30} In State v. Richter, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2014-06-040, 2014-Ohio5396, the defendant challenged the validity of a 155-day jail term for the violation of a 

misdemeanor community control sanction, which was imposed to be served 

consecutively to a prison sentence for a felony committed while Richter was on 

community control. The Twelfth District recognized the trial court’s authority to impose 

the consecutive sentence, as well as the sufficiency of the notice provided during 

Richter’s sentencing hearing, writing: 

Admittedly, this case presents a unique situation [because it involves a 

consecutive sentence for a community control violation and the crime that 

constitutes the substance of the violation – rather than two substantive 

convictions]. However, as the record firmly establishes, Richter’s 155-day 

jail term imposed by the municipal court resulting from his admitted violation 

of his community control sanctions was within the statutory range for a firstdegree misdemeanor OVI offense. See R.C. 2929.24(A)(1). Therefore, we 

find the municipal court’s decision to sentence Richter to serve his 155-day 

jail term consecutive to the 16-month prison sentence he received in the 

common pleas court was proper. To hold otherwise would effectively 

eliminate any penalty for his admitted violation of his community control 

sanctions through the commission of a new felony offense. That is clearly 

not the General Assembly’s intent behind the provisions found in [the 

misdemeanor community control statute]. Such a decision is further 

supported by the fact that Richter was explicitly informed by the municipal 

court at his original sentencing hearing that he would be “facing the 

revocation of [his] community control and all of the outstanding jail time that 

has not been imposed” if he were to violate his community control sanctions.
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

(Emphasis added) Id. at 11. 

{¶31} Because Appellant was on notice that any violation of the terms of her 

community control would result in the imposition of a two-year prison sentence, the 

consecutive sentence imposed in this case does not violate R.C. 2929.15(B)(3) or S.B. 

2’s goal of “truth in sentencing.” Therefore, we find that the second part of Appellant’s 

sole assignment of error is meritless. 

{¶32} Appellant contends in the final portion of her argument that “[t]he trial court 

committed reversible error by not making any of the requisite findings required by R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) prior to ordering Appellant to serve a consecutive sentence.” (Appellant’s 

Brf., p. 10.) Appellant cites Bonnell, supra, for the position that “[w]hen imposing 

consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required findings as part of the 

sentencing hearing, and by doing so it affords notice to the offender and to defense 

counsel.” Id. at ¶ 29, citing Crim. R. 32(A)(4). The state concedes a Bonnell violation 

but contends that we can conclude nonetheless that consecutive sentences were 

appropriate based on the record. 

{¶33} We previously held in Love, supra, that a trial court may impose a sentence 

for a community control violation in one county to be served consecutively to the 

underlying sentence imposed in another county, but must fulfill its statutory obligation 

under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Contrary to the state’s argument, fact-finding by the trial court 

is mandated by Bonnell. Because the trial court did not make any of the findings set forth 

in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a fact conceded by the state, Appellant’s sentence must be 

vacated and this matter remanded for resentencing, in order for the trial court to make the 

required statutory findings at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry pursuant 

to Bonnell, supra. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶34} In summary, we find that the trial court had the authority to impose the 

sentence for the community control violation to be served consecutively to the sentence 

imposed in Jefferson County, and was under no obligation to notify Appellant that the 

sentence for her community control violation could be imposed consecutively to any 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

sentence for a future crime. However, Appellant correctly argues that the trial court did 

not comply with statutory requirements for the imposition of consecutive sentences. 

Therefore, the sentence is vacated and this matter remanded for resentencing in order to 

allow the trial court to engage in the required statutory analysis. 

Donofrio, J., dissents with attached dissenting opinion. 

Waite, P.J., concurs. 

 
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Case No. 19 HA 0003

Donofrio, J., dissenting opinion. 

{¶35} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. For the following reasons, I 

would reverse the trial court’s judgment and order appellant’s sentence for violating 

community control to be served concurrently to her Jefferson County sentence. 

{¶36} The majority cites State v. Thompson, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 01CA62, 2002-

Ohio-4717, but does not apply it. Yet, Thompson has facts that are very similar to this 

case. In Thompson, Thompson was originally sentenced by the Fairfield County 

Common Pleas Court to a suspended prison term and five years of community control. 

Id. at ¶ 3. Thompson was not advised during sentencing that any sentence he received 

as a result of violating community control could be served consecutively to any other 

sentence. Id. at ¶ 31. Thompson was later convicted in the Franklin County Common 

Pleas Court for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and sentenced to a six-year prison 

term. Id. at ¶ 4. After Thompson’s conviction in Franklin County, the Fairfield County 

Common Pleas Court revoked Thompson’s community control and sentenced him to a 

nine-month prison term to be served consecutive to his Franklin County sentence. Id. at 

¶ 7. 

{¶37} The Fifth District held that the Fairfield County Common Pleas Court’s 

imposition of the nine-month consecutive sentence for violating community control was 

error for two reasons. First, Thompson was not informed at his original sentencing 

hearing that any sentence for violating community control could be served consecutively 

to any other sentence. Id. at ¶ 31. Second, the Fifth District presumed that the Franklin 

County Common Pleas Court took appellant’s criminal history, including his status as a 

probationer at the time, into account when it sentenced him to a six-year prison term. Id.

at ¶ 32. 

{¶38} Later, in State v. Campbell, 162 Ohio App.3d 413, 2005-Ohio-3980, 833 

N.E.2d 802 (5th Dist.), the Fifth District held that, pursuant to State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio 

St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 814 N.E.2d 837, “a trial court sentencing an offender to 

community-control sanctions must, at the time of the sentencing, notify the offender of the 

specific prison term it may impose for violations of the conditions of the sanction as a 

prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent violation of the 

conditions.” Campbell at ¶ 5 citing Brooks. 
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{¶39} In this case, appellant was not notified at her original sentencing hearing 

that any sentence for violating community control could be served consecutively to any 

other sentence she received. This fact makes Thompson the more applicable case. 

Moreover, pursuant to Campbell and Brooks, appellant was not properly notified of the 

specific term the trial court could impose for violations of community control because the 

trial court did not advise appellant that any sentence for violating community control could 

be imposed consecutively to any other sentence. 

{¶40} I also find State v. Richter, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2014-06-040, 2014-

Ohio-5396, which the majority relies upon, to be distinguishable. Richter is based in large 

part on R.C. 2929.25 which concerns misdemeanor community control sanctions. In this 

case, appellant was not on community control for a misdemeanor, she was on community 

control for a felony. 

{¶41} I would find that because the trial court did not advise appellant at her 

original sentencing hearing that any sentence she received for violating community 

control could be served consecutively to any other sentence, the trial court did not have 

the authority to impose appellant’s sentence for her community control violation 

consecutively to her sentence in Jefferson County. Thus, I would reverse the trial court’s 

judgment on the consecutive sentence and would order appellant’s sentence in this case 

to be served concurrent to her Jefferson County sentence. 

 
[Cite as State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-762.]

 

 

Appellant correctly argues that the trial court did not comply with statutory 

requirements for the imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, the sentence is 

vacated and this matter remanded for resentencing in order to allow the trial court to 

engage in the required statutory analysis. Costs to be taxed against the Appellee. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.