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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41158

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSE GUADALUPE PEREZ-JUNGO,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2014 Opinion No. 43

Filed: May 20, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Jerome County. Hon. John K. Butler, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly E. Smith, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge

Jose Guadalupe Perez-Jungo appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance. Specifically, he alleges that the district court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress based on the extension of the duration of an investigative detention. For the reasons 

set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The following facts were adduced through testimony at the motion hearing and were set 

forth in the district court’s order denying Perez-Jungo’s motion to suppress. An officer came 

upon Perez-Jungo’s vehicle parked to the side of a rural gravel road at approximately 1:36 a.m. 

As the officer approached Perez-Jungo’s vehicle, the officer activated his patrol vehicle’s

overhead emergency lights. The officer testified that his initial reasons for approaching the 

vehicle were his concern that the vehicle was abandoned, the vehicle was stolen, the driver was
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in need of assistance, or the driver may have been involved in recent vandalisms of cell towers in 

the area. After pointing his spotlight at the driver’s side mirror, the officer observed an 

individual in the vehicle. The officer approached the vehicle and asked Perez-Jungo what he was 

doing. Perez-Jungo responded that he was waiting for a friend and that someone had told him 

there was a potential job site nearby. The officer noted that Perez-Jungo’s eyes were bloodshot 

and glassy. He asked Perez-Jungo if he had been drinking and Perez-Jungo said he had not. The 

officer also noticed a Santa Muerte statuette on the dashboard of Perez-Jungo’s vehicle, which 

the officer testified was the patron saint of drug traffickers.1 The officer then requested PerezJungo’s driver’s license and information, returned to his patrol vehicle and ran a status check for 

active warrants, which came back negative. He was also able to determine that the vehicle was 

not stolen. The officer requested backup, which arrived approximately ten minutes later, and a 

canine unit, which never arrived. Perez-Jungo was told to exit his vehicle and was questioned. 

During questioning, other officers shined flashlights into the vehicle’s windows. The officers 

eventually saw what appeared to be drug paraphernalia and a controlled substance, leading to a 

search of the vehicle. The items tested presumptively positive for controlled substances.

Perez-Jungo was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), 

I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A(1). The state 

subsequently amended the information to charge Perez-Jungo with possession of 

methamphetamine instead of cocaine. 

Perez-Jungo filed a motion to suppress evidence resulting from what he alleged to be an 

unlawful detention. Specifically, Perez-Jungo asserted that the officer had unlawfully extended 

the duration of the stop without reasonable suspicion and that he was subjected to a custodial 

interrogation prior to being advised of his Miranda rights.2

 The district court granted 

Perez-Jungo’s motion with regard to the Miranda issue and denied the motion with regard to the 

 

1 Perez-Jungo attempts to introduce new evidence on appeal regarding Santa Muerte. This 

information is not contained in the record and was not provided to the district court for 

consideration. Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments that 

were presented below. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 670, 227 P.3d 918, 924 (2010); State v. 

Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993). As a result, the 

introduction of this information on appeal is improper and will be disregarded.

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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alleged unlawful extension of the stop.3 The district court ruled that the officer lawfully 

extended the investigative detention based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that Perez-Jungo 

either had been or was about to be involved in illegal drug activity or impaired driving. 

Specifically, the district court found that the totality of the circumstances--the remote location, 

the late hour, Perez-Jungo’s questionable explanation for why he was there, his bloodshot and 

glassy eyes, the Santa Muerte statuette, and the officer’s training and experience in recognizing 

the significance of the statuette--provided reasonable suspicion to support further investigation.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Perez-Jungo pled guilty to possession of 

methamphetamine, the state dismissed the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, and 

Perez-Jungo preserved his right to appeal the partial denial of his motion to suppress. The 

district court sentenced Perez-Jungo to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of 

confinement of two years, but suspended the sentence and placed Perez-Jungo on probation for 

three years. Perez-Jungo appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 

motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Perez-Jungo concedes that his initial contact with the officer and the temporary detention 

while the officer performed a status check on Perez-Jungo’s driver’s license were lawful based 

on the officer’s community caretaking function. He contends, however, that this initially lawful 

detention was unlawfully prolonged after the initial purposes for the stop were resolved and any 

 

3 The state does not challenge the district court’s ruling on the Miranda issue on appeal.
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initial suspicion dispelled.4 He also asserts that the scope of the investigation was not reasonably 

related to one of the subsequent justifications for his detention. Consequently, he contends, the 

open-view discovery of the controlled substance occurred during an unlawful detention and the 

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress that evidence.

A. Reasonable Suspicion

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and its counterpart, Article I, 

Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee the right of every citizen to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. The determination of whether an investigative detention is 

reasonable requires a dual inquiry--whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and 

whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference 

in the first place. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. 

Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000).5 An investigative detention is 

permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify reasonable suspicion that 

the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 

2003). 

 

4 Although Perez-Jungo argues that the officer was not justified in extending the initial 

investigative detention based on the officer’s community caretaking function, the state does not 

assert this as a basis for finding the continued detention lawful. Accordingly, we address only 

the arguments concerning whether reasonable suspicion was present to justify extension of the 

initially lawful investigative detention.

5 The district court found that Perez-Jungo’s initial detention occurred when the officer 

activated the overhead emergency lights on his patrol vehicle after parking behind Perez-Jungo’s 

vehicle. See State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding 

that an officer effectuated a seizure of the occupants of a vehicle when he activated the overhead 

emergency lights of his patrol vehicle); State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 694, 991 P.2d 878, 880

(Ct. App. 1999) (finding that use of emergency lights created a de facto detention based on 

I.C. § 49-625 and I.C. § 49-1404); but see State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 487, 211 P.3d 91, 

96 (2009) (distinguishing Mireles and holding that the use of overhead emergency lights is a 

significant factor when considering the totality of the circumstances, but declining to hold that it 

constitutes a de facto seizure resulting from I.C. §§ 49-625 and 49-1404 when the driver is 

already stopped before activation of the lights). The state does not dispute this finding, so for the 

purposes of our analysis, we assume--without deciding--that Perez-Jungo was detained upon the 

officer’s activation of his patrol vehicle’s overhead emergency lights. 
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We agree with Perez-Jungo’s assertion that the officer’s initial purposes for approaching 

and detaining Perez-Jungo were quickly dispelled. Indeed, once the officer shined his spotlight

on the vehicle and was able to see that there was an occupant inside, there was no longer a 

concern that the vehicle was abandoned. After making contact with Perez-Jungo, the officer was 

quickly able to determine that Perez-Jungo was not in need of assistance; moreover, there was no 

indication that Perez-Jungo had been involved in the recent vandalisms in the area. Following 

the check of Perez-Jungo’s license and registration, the officer was able to determine that the 

vehicle was not stolen. 

However, this is not dispositive. The purpose of a stop is not fixed at the time the stop is 

initiated. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362, 17 P.3d at 306. Any routine investigative detention

might turn up suspicious circumstances which could justify an officer asking questions unrelated 

to the initial purpose for the stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. 

App. 1990). Such unrelated inquiries, if brief, do not necessarily exceed the scope of the initial 

detention and violate a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362, 17 

P.3d at 306. Moreover, an officer’s observations and general inquiries, and the events 

succeeding the stop, may--and often do--give rise to legitimate reasons for particularized lines of 

inquiry and further investigation by an officer. Myers, 118 Idaho at 613, 798 P.2d at 458. 

Indeed, a detention initiated for one investigative purpose may disclose suspicious circumstances 

that justify expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 

913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001). Thus, the length and scope of the initial 

investigatory detention may be lawfully expanded if there exist objective and specific articulable 

facts that justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to engage 

in criminal activity. State v. Gomez, 144 Idaho 865, 869, 172 P.3d 1140, 1144 (Ct. App. 2007).

Accordingly, our inquiry is directed at determining whether the officer had reasonable 

suspicion, upon resolution of the initial justifications for the stop, to continue the detention to 

investigate other possible crimes.6

 The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon 

 

6 For purposes of this inquiry, we agree with the district court’s determination that 

reasonable suspicion must have existed prior to the arrival of additional officers and the initial 

officer’s request that Perez-Jungo exit the vehicle. Indeed, all of the officer’s justifications for 

the initial stop were dispelled after contacting Perez-Jungo and upon verification from dispatch 

that Perez-Jungo’s license was valid, he had no active warrants, and the vehicle was not stolen. 
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the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 

417-18 (1981); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009); State v. 

Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion 

standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part 

of the officer. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210; State v. 

Grigg, 149 Idaho 361, 363, 233 P.3d 1283, 1285 (Ct. App. 2010). An officer may draw 

reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession to support reasonable suspicion, and 

those inferences may be drawn from the officer’s experience and law enforcement training. 

State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). 

Here, although the officer’s initial reasons for making contact with Perez-Jungo were 

quickly resolved, the officer became aware of objective facts during the course of his initial 

investigation that caused him to subsequently suspect Perez-Jungo of involvement in either 

impaired driving or illegal drug activity. Perez-Jungo argues that the extension of his detention 

could only be justified by reasonable suspicion that a specific crime had been committed. In 

other words, he contends that there must have been objective facts that provided reasonable 

suspicion of at least one of the specific crimes the officer suspected Perez-Jungo of having 

committed. As a result, he argues at length that the facts of this case were not sufficient to 

provide reasonable suspicion of impaired driving or illegal drug activity separately, meaning that 

the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the duration of the initially lawful 

detention. 

Perez-Jungo misapprehends the applicable standard. Just as with probable cause to 

search a vehicle, reasonable suspicion does not require a belief that any specific criminal activity 

is afoot to justify an investigative detention; instead, all that is required is a showing of objective 

and specific articulable facts giving reason to believe that the individual has been or is about to 

be involved in some criminal activity. Cf. State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 600-01, 237 P.3d 

1222, 1226-27 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting this standard for probable cause); see also United States 

v. Guardado, 699 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that direct evidence of a specific, 

particular crime is unnecessary for an investigatory stop); United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 

 

This occurred approximately five minutes before the second officer arrived. As a result, any 

observations made thereafter cannot contribute to the totality of the circumstances.
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357 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that officers need not observe the equivalent of direct evidence of a 

particular specific crime in order to detain a lawfully stopped individual to investigate further so 

long as there is reasonable suspicion of some criminal activity). This analysis is based on the 

totality of the circumstances, meaning that we look at the whole picture, including those facts 

that may support suspicion of one crime but not another. Even if there is not sufficient 

reasonable suspicion of any specific crime, there may still be reasonable suspicion that some

criminal activity is afoot, which is all that is required to extend an investigative detention. See, 

e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (noting that the Fourth Amendment is 

satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be 

afoot); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (noting that an officer must have reasonable

suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity).

The circumstances known to the officer here provided reasonable suspicion to believe 

that some criminal activity was afoot. The officer testified that, after the concerns justifying his 

initial contact with Perez-Jungo had been resolved, he suspected that Perez-Jungo might be 

involved in impaired driving or illegal drug activity. Specifically, the officer came upon PerezJungo’s vehicle parked on a gravel road in a remote area late at night. Although this was 

insufficient alone to create reasonable suspicion, officers are not required to ignore the 

suspicious nature of relevant surrounding circumstances, such as location or time. See, e.g.,

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (noting that police may consider location, even 

when not in a high-crime area, when determining if reasonable suspicion exists); State v. 

McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1010, 783 P.2d 874, 877 (Ct. App. 1989) (agreeing that “unusual 

activities at unusual hours” can contribute to establish reasonable suspicion, but noting that 

citizens do not become prospective detainees because they lawfully drive and park late at night). 

The officer also observed that Perez-Jungo had bloodshot, glassy eyes. Again, the presence of 

bloodshot and glassy eyes is not alone sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion. Grigg, 149 

Idaho at 364, 233 P.3d at 1286. However, it nonetheless supports suspicion of both intoxication 

and illegal drug activity. See State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 985, 88 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct. App. 

2003) (noting that glassy, bloodshot eyes not caused by alcohol consumption can contribute to 

reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity). 

Indeed, few additional facts are needed beyond bloodshot and glassy eyes to provide 

reasonable suspicion of impaired driving or illegal drug activity. See Grigg, 149 Idaho at 364, 
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233 P.3d at 1286 (finding reasonable suspicion to support an extended detention where defendant 

had bloodshot and glassy eyes, reddening of the conjunctiva of his eyes, and eyelid tremors). 

Although Perez-Jungo denied having consumed alcohol or drugs recently, it was reasonable for 

the officer to believe Perez-Jungo was being untruthful, especially in light of the questionable 

explanation Perez-Jungo provided for what he was doing. He asserted that he was waiting to 

meet with a friend and look into possible employment in the area. However, as noted by the 

district court, Perez-Jungo was in a remote area with no businesses or residences nearby and it 

was late at night, making his explanation unlikely. Finally, the officer observed a Santa Muerte 

statuette on the dashboard of Perez-Jungo’s vehicle. The officer testified that, based on his 

training and experience, Santa Muerte is a patron saint for drug traffickers.7

Based on the totality of these circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to 

detain Perez-Jungo for further investigation. Taken individually, none of these facts would be 

sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that Perez-Jungo was, had been, or was about to be 

involved in criminal activity. However, when taken together and viewed as a whole picture, 

these facts support extension of the initially lawful detention to further investigate potential 

crimes involving impaired driving and illegal drug activity. See Brumfield, 136 Idaho at 917, 42 

P.3d at 710 (noting that facts susceptible to innocent explanations separately may still warrant 

further investigation when taken together). The district court did not err in finding that the 

extension of Perez-Jungo’s detention was supported by reasonable suspicion.

B. Scope of the Investigation

Perez-Jungo also asserts that the scope of the investigation was not reasonably related to 

one of the alleged justifications for his prolonged detention. An investigative detention must be 

temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Roe, 140 

Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931; State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 

2002). Where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully tailored to its 

underlying justification. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 

P.3d at 305. In this regard, we must focus on the intensity of the detention, as well as its 

 

7 Perez-Jungo attempts to argue for the first time on appeal that the Santa Muerte statuette 

cannot be used to support reasonable suspicion. Generally, issues not raised below may not be 

considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 

(1992). Accordingly, we do not address this issue. 
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duration. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary 

to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Id.; Parkinson, 135 

Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305.

Perez-Jungo argues only that the officer failed to perform field sobriety tests or otherwise 

investigate him for impaired driving, and thus the officer did not use the least intrusive means to 

investigate whether Perez-Jungo was driving under the influence. See State v. Ferreira, 133 

Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding field sobriety tests to be the least 

intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel an officer’s suspicion in a short period of 

time that a driver is driving under the influence). Although we look at the intensity of the 

investigative measures used, the primary factor that may render a detention unreasonable is its 

duration. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989); State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 646, 

181 P.3d 1249, 1254 (Ct. App. 2008). Indeed, the reasonableness of an officer’s extended 

detention of a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11. Such a rule would require courts to indulge in “unrealistic secondguessing” and would unduly hamper responsive investigative decision making. Id.; United 

States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). Thus, our statement in Ferreira did not mean that 

the only permissible means for investigating impaired driving was through field sobriety tests. 

Instead, we simply held that field sobriety tests would not render an investigative detention on 

suspicion of impaired driving unreasonable. See Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483, 988 P.2d at 709. 

Other investigative techniques are permissible if reasonable under the circumstances. See id.

(noting that the “least intrusive means reasonably available” should be used); State v. Martinez, 

129 Idaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding that “the use of the drugdetection dog was one of the least intrusive means available) (emphasis added). However, 

Perez-Jungo does not argue that the techniques used--continued questioning and inspecting his 

vehicle with flashlights--were unreasonable under the circumstances.

Moreover, there is no requirement that the officer pursue to conclusion investigation of 

each crime he suspected Perez-Jungo of having committed. The officer developed reasonable 

suspicion that Perez-Jungo was involved in either impaired driving or illegal drug activity, and it 

was entirely reasonable for the officer to limit or abandon the impaired driving investigation to 

pursue the investigation of illegal drug activity, as the circumstances supported reasonable 

suspicion of either crime. Perez-Jungo does not assert that the scope of the investigation was not 
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reasonably related to suspicion of illegal drug activity. As a result, the scope of the investigation 

did not render his extended detention unreasonable. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Perez-Jungo has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress based on its finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify extending the 

duration of his investigative detention. Moreover, the scope of the investigation was not 

unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm Perez-Jungo’s judgment of conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance. 

Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge LANSING, CONCUR.