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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 123,324

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

LISA MARIE BUCHANAN,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Atchison District Court; ROBERT J. BEDNAR, judge. Opinion filed July 2, 2021. 

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Submitted by the parties for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6820(g) 

and (h).

Before MALONE, P.J., POWELL and WARNER,JJ.

PER CURIAM: After Lisa Buchanan violated the terms of her probation on multiple 

occasions between 2018 and 2020, the district court concluded she was not amenable to 

probation. The court therefore revoked Buchanan's probation and ordered her to serve the 

underlying prison sentence for her convictions. Buchanan now appeals, arguing the 

district court erred when it revoked her probation—particularly given the strides she was 

making in her personal life during the weeks before the hearing on her violations. 

This court previously granted Buchanan's request for summary disposition under 

Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 48). After reviewing the record before 

us, we find the district court's decision did not comply with Kansas' statutory framework 
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governing sanctions for probation violations. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c). We thus

reverse the district court's order and remand for a new dispositional hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Buchanan pleaded guilty to possession of heroin, driving while suspended, and 

driving without a taillight on her vehicle, all arising in February 2018. As a result of these 

convictions, the district court sentenced Buchanan to 15 months in prison followed by 

6 months in jail. The court then suspended those sentences and imposed 18 months of 

probation. 

As part of her probation, Buchanan was required to comply with several 

conditions, including that she successfully complete drug treatment; pay all court fees;

report to her intensive supervision officer (ISO) as directed; remain in Atchison County 

unless granted permission to leave; perform 40 hours of community service; refrain from 

purchasing, possessing, or consuming drugs or alcohol; and pay the assessment fee and 

10% of the costs to complete the drug treatment program. Buchanan violated several of 

these conditions on numerous occasions over the next two years:

• Four months after sentencing, Buchanan admitted to violating the terms of 

probation by using methamphetamine, and the district court imposed a three-day 

jail sanction while Buchanan remained on probation. 

• During the following year, Buchanan continued to violate the conditions of her 

probation by failing to pay costs, perform the mandated community service, report 

to her ISO, and attend scheduled treatment appointments. After Buchanan 

admitted to these violations, the district court imposed a 60-day jail sanction and 

extended her probation for 12 months. 
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• Less than six months later, the State moved to revoke Buchanan's probation,

alleging that she again failed to pay court fees, report as directed, remain in 

Atchison County, complete any community service hours, and complete her drug 

treatment program (and pay the associated program costs). Buchanan denied these 

allegations, and the district court held a hearing on the State's motion. 

At the hearing, Buchanan's ISO testified that Buchanan never reported to her after 

she served her 60-day sanction, stating, "[W]hen she got out of jail . . . , we were in the 

midst of all the COVID stuff and she never reported to the office. She went on to 

Missouri to live." The ISO testified that Buchanan did call to let the ISO know she was 

staying with a friend in Missouri because she had nowhere else to go. Buchanan did not 

return to Kansas until a couple of weeks before the hearing. During that time, the ISO

only had a few phone calls with Buchanan. The ISO also indicated that when the State 

originally moved to revoke Buchanan's probation, she had not performed any of her 

community-service hours, but Buchanan had completed some of those hours while 

awaiting the hearing. The ISO also testified that Buchanan completed her treatment 

program but had not yet paid the treatment fees. 

The district court confirmed for the record that Buchanan had paid $500 of her 

outstanding court fees. Buchanan testified at the hearing, noting that she did the best she 

could to communicate with her ISO under the circumstances. She explained that she had 

saved enough money to move back to Atchison County, and she intended to stay and 

complete the necessary probation conditions. Buchanan also presented testimony from 

her current employer and her boyfriend; both indicated that Buchanan had turned a corner 

and was doing well with work and finances. 

After considering the evidence presented, the district court found that Buchanan 

had violated the terms of her probation. The State renewed its revocation request, 

asserting that Buchanan had not demonstrated she was "amenable to probation." The 
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district court agreed, finding that the court had given Buchanan "two chances prior"—the 

3-day sanction and the 60-day sanction. Based on this assessment, the court revoked 

Buchanan's probation and ordered her to serve her controlling 21-month sentence. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Buchanan argues that the district court erred in imposing her 

underlying sentence and not reinstating probation, pointing to her recent probation 

compliance and the improvements she had made in her personal life and at work. After 

reviewing the record, we agree that the district court erred when it revoked her probation, 

but for a more fundamental reason: The court failed to follow Kansas' mandatory 

statutory framework governing probation violations.

If an appellant admits to a probation violation, the decision whether to revoke 

probation "rests within the sound discretion of the district court." State v. McFeeters, 52 

Kan. App. 2d 45, 47, 362 P.3d 603 (2015). The degree of discretion a district court may 

exercise, however, varies based on the contours of the question before it. For example, a 

district court does not have discretion to commit an error of law or disregard statutory 

limitations or legal standards. See State v. Marshall, 303 Kan. 438, 445, 362 P.3d 587 

(2015); State v. Ardry, 295 Kan. 733, 736, 286 P.3d 207 (2012). In particular, the Kansas 

Legislature may define the contours of the court's discretion through statute. 

Historically, Kansas district courts exercised broad discretion in determining the 

appropriate action when faced with a probation violation. See State v. Clapp, 308 Kan. 

976, 990, 425 P.3d 605 (2018). But in 2013, the Kansas Legislature amended the statute 

governing probation revocation to limit the court's previous latitude. 308 Kan. at 982-84. 

The framework in place at the time of Buchanan's conviction is found in K.S.A. 2017

Supp. 22-3716(c)(1)(B) through (E). These statutory sections were discussed by our 

Supreme Court at length in Clapp, 308 Kan. at 982-85, and establish a series of graduated 
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sanctions—ranging from modifying probation conditions to intermediate sanctions of 120 

to 180 days in prison—that a district court must consider before revoking probation 

outright. Clapp opined that "[p]ermitting the district court to skip steps in the graduated 

intermediate sanctions scheme would defeat the purpose of the legislation." 308 Kan. at 

986. 

The statutory framework permits a district court judge to bypass these sanctions 

and impose the underlying sentence in limited situations. 308 Kan. at 978. The court may 

bypass the graduated sanctions if the offender commits a new felony or misdemeanor,

absconds from supervision, or if the original grant of probation was the result of a

dispositional departure. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(8)(A), (c)(8)(B), and (c)(9)(B). 

No one alleges—and the district court did not find—that any of these provisions are 

applicable to Buchanan's case.

The district court may also revoke an offender's probation if "[t]he court finds and 

sets forth with particularity the reasons for finding that the safety of members of the 

public will be jeopardized or that the welfare of the offender will not be served by such 

sanction." K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(9)(A). A court's particularized findings under 

this section must explicitly state why the public's safety would be jeopardized or how the 

offender's welfare would not be served by the intermediate sanction—not by probation 

generally. See State v. Duran, 56 Kan. App. 2d 1268, 1274-76, 445 P.3d 761 (2019), rev. 

denied 312 Kan. 895 (2020); McFeeters, 52 Kan. App. 2d at 49. Findings are sufficiently 

particularized when they are "'distinct rather than general, with exactitude of detail, 

especially in description or stated with attention to or concern with details.'" State v. 

Dooley, 308 Kan. 641, 652, 423 P.3d 469 (2018) (quoting State v. Miller, 32 Kan. App.

2d 1099, 1102, 95 P.3d 127 [2004]). 

The district court never imposed an intermediate sanction for Buchanan's 

probation violations. Nor did it make any particularized findings regarding the impact of 
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a 120- or 180-day sanction on Buchanan or the public. Instead, the court's remarks 

focused exclusively on Buchanan's past violations and her general amenability to 

probation, a factor not included in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(9)(A). See McFeeters, 

52 Kan. App. 2d at 49 (remarks relating to the violator's amenability to probation do not 

explain how the public would be jeopardized or how the violator's welfare would not be 

served by imposing intermediate sanctions). 

We understand the district court's frustration with Buchanan's repeated violations 

of her probation conditions. But merely reciting a person's history of probational 

noncompliance—as the district court did here—does not comply with K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 

22-3716(c)(9)(A). See Clapp, 308 Kan. at 988-90; Duran, 56 Kan. App. 2d at 1274-77. 

Instead, the district court was required to analyze the impact of the presumptive 

intermediate sanction, not probation generally, on public safety or Buchanan's welfare. It 

did not do so.

The district court's discretion in considering the State's probation revocation in this 

case was controlled by the language of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716. Failing to make 

particularized findings as to the effect of the applicable intermediate sanctions constitutes 

an abuse of that discretion requiring reversal. Clapp, 308 Kan. at 991; Duran, 56 Kan. 

App. 2d at 1276-77. We therefore reverse the district court's revocation of Buchanan's 

probation and remand for a new dispositional hearing in compliance with K.S.A. 2017

Supp. 22-3716(c). 

Reversed and remanded with directions.