FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

---o0o---

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID R. LANGDON, Defendant-Appellant

NO. CAAP-19-0000002

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

HONOLULU DIVISION

(CASE NO. 1DTI-18-149551)

JULY 24, 2020

GINOZA, CHIEF JUDGE, LEONARD and CHAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHAN, J.

Defendant-Appellant David R. Langdon (Langdon),

self-represented, appeals from the Notice of Entry of Judgment

and/or Order and Plea/Judgment, filed on December 19, 2018, in

the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division

(District Court).1 Langdon was found to have violated Hawaii

1 The Honorable Linda K. Luke presided.

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-19-0000002

24-JUL-2020

08:24 AM
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Revised Statutes (HRS) § 286-25 (Supp. 2017),2 Operation of a

vehicle or moped without a certificate of inspection, and HRS

§ 249-14.1 (Supp. 2017),3 Number plates for mopeds. On appeal,

2 HRS § 286-25 provides:

§286-25 Operation of a vehicle or moped without a

certificate of inspection. Whoever operates, permits the

operation of, causes to be operated, or parks any vehicle or

moped on a public highway without a current official

certificate of inspection, issued under section 286-26, shall

be fined not more than $100.

3 HRS § 249-14.1 provides:

§249-14.1 Number plates for mopeds; registration; fine.

(a) The director of finance shall cause to be produced number

plates and tags or emblems for the registration of mopeds

operated in the State.

(b) The director of finance shall number and register

the moped in the owner's name in a permanent record or book to

be kept by the director of finance for this purpose, and shall

furnish the owner thereof with a receipt showing upon its face

the license number issued for the moped. The registration of

mopeds shall occur on a staggered basis as agreed upon by the

counties' director of finance. The registration fee shall be

$27 per year. The director of finance shall also furnish the

owner, upon the original registration of the moped, one plate

with the registration number marked thereon. Upon the payment

of a registration fee for each year, a tag or emblem bearing a

serial number and the month and year of expiration shall be

provided to the owner. Transfer of current number plates,

tag, or emblem, except as authorized by this chapter, is

punishable by a fine of not more than $50 for each offense.

(c) Upon an original registration the director of

finance shall fix, and shall charge to the owner, a fee equal

to the cost of the number plate and tag or emblem plus the

administrative cost of furnishing the plate and tag or emblem

and effecting the registration. Upon the issuance of a new

series of number plates, the director of finance shall charge

the owner a fee equal to the costs of the number plate plus

the administrative cost of furnishing the plate. Upon issuing

a tag or emblem, the director of finance shall charge the

owner a fee of 50 cents. The owner shall securely fasten the

number plate on the rear of the moped at a location provided

by the manufacturer or in the absence of such a location upon

the fender of the moped and in conformance with section

291-31, in such a manner as to prevent the plate from

swinging. The number plate shall at all times be displayed

entirely unobscured and be kept reasonably clean.

(d) Upon the issuance of the tag or emblem, the owner

shall affix the tag or emblem to the top right portion of the

rear number plate.

(e) An owner who fails to comply with the registration

requirements of this section shall be subject to a fine not to

exceed $100 per violation.

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as he did below, Langdon challenges the legality of Act 200 of

the 2016 Session Laws of Hawai#i, which enacted HRS § 249-14.1

and amended HRS § 286-25. 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 200, §§ 1, 10

at 612, 615. As explained below, we affirm the District Court's

ruling that Langdon violated HRS § 286-25 and reverse the ruling

that Langdon violated HRS § 249-14.1.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 23, 2018, Langdon was issued a citation for

operating a moped without a certificate of inspection and a moped

license plate, in violation of HRS §§ 286-25 and 249-14.1. The

"Officer's Observations" section of the citation stated:

"Observed moped traveling W on Malia St approaching [ ] Kilauea

Ave - no license plate or safety decal on moped - only decal

[illegible] he didn't believe he should have to register moped

b/c he should be 'grandfathered in.'"

On August 9, 2018, Langdon filed a written statement

contesting the citation. Langdon admitted that he did not have a

new certificate of inspection or a new moped plate, but

challenged the legality of the underlying law as applied.

After the District Court initially entered judgment in

favor of the State and against Langdon for both violations,

Langdon filed a Request for Trial.

On December 19, 2018, the District Court held a trial

de novo and vacated the prior judgment. Langdon was "arraigned"

as follows:

[MS. PROSECUTOR:] As to Count 1, on or about

July 23rd, 2018, in the City and County of Honolulu, State

of Hawai#i, you, David Roy Langdon, operated, permitted the

operation of, caused the operation of, or parked a vehicle

or moped on a public highway without a current official

certificate of inspection, thereby violating section 286-25

of the Hawai#i Revised Statutes.

As to Count 2, on or about Sep -- July 23rd, 2018, in

the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawai#i, you,

David Roy Langdon, failed to securely fasten the number

plate on the rear of the moped at a location provided by the

manufacturer or in the absence of such a location upon the

bumper of the moped as in conformance with section 291-31 in

such a manner as to prevent the plate from swinging and

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defendant failed to display the number plate entirely

unobscured and be kept reasonably clean in violation of

section 249-14.1 of the Hawai#i Revised Statutes.

The State introduced Exhibit 1, a document by the City

and County of Honolulu, Department of Customer Service Motor

Vehicle Registration, certifying Langdon was the registered owner

of a moped with license plate Z26629. The exhibit was admitted

without objection.

After Langdon offered his own exhibit and commented on

it, the District Court apparently construed his comments and the

statements made in his document as a motion to dismiss. The

District Court denied the motion. Langdon's document was

admitted into evidence as Exhibit A. Exhibit A included a letter

dated July 25, 2018, in which Langdon asserted that Act 200 of

the 2016 Session Laws of Hawai#i was illegally applied because:

(1) it was a bill of attainder and/or ex post facto law and an

abridgment of constitutional protections; (2) it violated due

process because it requires mopeds to obtain a safety inspection;

(3) the City and County of Honolulu committed "fraud of issuance"

when it previously issued to Langdon a "permanent license"; and

(4) a proper interpretation of Act 200 reflects that it did not

invalidate all current permanent moped registrations. Exhibit A

also included a letter dated August 14, 2017, from the City and

County of Honolulu, Department of Customer Services, informing

Langdon that Act 200 required annual moped registration and

safety inspections and "will also invalidate all current

permanent moped registrations."

Officer Jenna Lynn Shimabuku (Officer Shimabuku)

testified that she is a police officer and was on duty on

July 23, 2018, when she cited Langdon for not having a license

plate and safety check for a moped. She observed him on Malia

Street, which is a public way, street, or highway in the City and

County of Honolulu. Langdon drew her attention because he did

not have a larger license plate that was supposed to be issued by

the end of 2017. When she informed Langdon of his violations,

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Langdon stated that he did not believe he should have to get a

license plate or safety check because he should be "grandfathered

in." The license decal on his moped was Z26629. The District

Court approved the State's request for the record to reflect that

Exhibit 1 was proof that Langdon's moped license was Z26629 and

that he was the registered owner.

During his testimony, Langdon stated his various

arguments challenging the legality of Act 200, as asserted in his

Exhibit A. However, Langdon again admitted he did not have a new

moped license plate or safety inspection.

The District Court ultimately concluded as to Count 1

that Langdon had no current safety check and as to Count 2 had

not secured a new moped registration as required. On

December 19, 2018, the District Court filed its Notice of Entry

of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment, finding that Langdon

violated HRS §§ 286-25 and 249-14.1.

II. POINTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Langdon reasserts his arguments below

challenging the legality of Act 200 of the 2016 Session Laws of

Hawai#i. 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 200, §§ 1, 10 at 612, 615.

Langdon argues that Act 200 was illegal as applied and violated

his rights because: (1) it was a bill of attainder and/or ex post

facto law and an abridgment of constitutional protections; (2) it

violated due process because it automatically deems mopeds

without a safety inspection sticker to be unsafe; (3) its

requirements rendered the City and County of Honolulu's previous

issuance of a "permanent license" to be "fraud of issuance"; and

(4) a proper interpretation of Act 200 reflects that it did not

invalidate all current permanent moped registrations.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"Statutory interpretation 'is a question of law

reviewable de novo.'" Citizens Against Reckless Dev. v. Zoning

Bd. of Appeals, 114 Hawai#i 184, 193, 159 P.3d 143, 152 (2007)

(quoting State v. Levi, 102 Hawai#i 282, 285, 75 P.3d 1173, 1176

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(2003)). When construing statutes, this court is governed by the

following rules:

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory

interpretation is the language of the statute itself.

Second, where the statutory language is plain and

unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain

and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of

statutory construction is our foremost obligation to

ascertain and give effect to the intention of the

legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the

language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when

there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness

or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an

ambiguity exists.

When there is ambiguity in a statute, "the meaning of

the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context,

with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may

be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning."

Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in

determining legislative intent, such as legislative history,

or the reason and spirit of the law.

Id. at 193-94, 159 P.3d at 152-53 (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Act 200 is not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.

Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States

Constitution states: "No State shall . . . pass any Bill of

Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of

Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." "A bill of attainder

is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial

trial." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323 (1886). "However

expansive the prohibition against bills of attainder, it surely

was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection

doctrine, invalidating every Act of Congress or the States that

legislatively burdens some persons or groups but not all other

plausible individuals." Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.

425, 471 (1977) (footnotes omitted).

With respect to the Ex Post Facto Clause, the United

States Supreme Court has stated:

By an ex post facto law is meant one which imposes a

punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time

it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that

then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which

less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than

was then required.

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Cummings, 71 U.S. at 325-26.

We must ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute

to establish civil proceedings. If the intention of the

legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry.

If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme

that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine

whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in

purpose or effect as to negate the State's intentions to

deem it civil.

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (citations, brackets, and

quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, the Hawai#i Supreme Court has stated:

The "intent-effects" test is applied to determine whether a

statute runs afoul of the federal ex post facto clause.

Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997).

That test questions whether (1) the legislature intended the

statute to be criminal or civil, and (2) the statute is "'so

punitive' in effect that it overcomes the nonpunitive

legislative intent." Id. at 1088. "The first part of the

test ('intent') looks solely to the declared purpose of the

legislature as well as the structure and design of the

statute." Id. at 1087. "The second part of the test

('effects') requires the party challenging the statute to

provide 'the clearest proof' that the statutory scheme is so

punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the

State's nonpunitive intent." Id.

State v. Guidry, 105 Hawai#i 222, 235, 96 P.3d 242, 255 (2004).

Violations of HRS §§ 249-14.1 and 286-25 are civil

"traffic infractions" because they relate to traffic movement and

control or equipment, and, therefore, cannot be criminal

offenses. HRS § 291D-2 (2007); HRS § 291D-3 (2007); see State v.

Rees, 107 Hawai#i 508, 518-19, 115 P.3d 687, 697-98 (App. 2005)

(holding that a violation of HRS § 286-25 is a civil traffic

infraction and not a criminal offense). A defendant may request

a hearing to either "deny commission of the infraction(s) or

admit commission of the infraction(s) but explain mitigating

circumstances." Hawai#i Civil Traffic Rules (HCTR) Rule 11(a)

(eff. 2006). "If the court determines that an infraction has

been committed, judgment shall be entered in favor of the State."

HCTR Rule 16(a) (eff. 2006). A defendant may then request a

trial, which shall be held pursuant to HRS § 291D-13, the Hawai#i

Rules of Penal Procedure, Rules of the District Court, and

Hawai#i Rules of Evidence. HCTR Rule 19(a), (c) (eff. 2009).

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Therefore, Act 200 of the 2016 Session Laws of Hawai#i, with

respect to its enactment of HRS § 249-14.1 and amendment of HRS

§ 286-25, is not a bill of attainder because it affords a

defendant the right to a trial.

The legislative intent of the relevant part of Act 200

was to establish "safety inspections and registration

requirements for mopeds, as well as the issuance and use of

number plates for mopeds, thereby increasing roadway safety in

Hawai[#]i." Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 158-16, in 2016 House Journal,

at 1416, 2016 Senate Journal, at 842. Regarding the first part

of the intent-effects test, the legislature deemed violations of

HRS §§ 249-14.1 and 286-25 as civil proceedings and stated its

intent to impose a regulatory scheme. As to the second part of

the intent-effects test, Langdon failed to present any proof that

the statutory scheme of either provision "is so punitive either

in purpose or effect as to negate the State's nonpunitive

intent." Guidry, 105 Hawai#i at 235, 96 P.3d at 255 (quoting

Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087). Therefore, the intent-effects test

was not satisfied and Act 200 is not an ex post facto law.

B. Act 200 does not violate due process, as claimed by Langdon.

Langdon argues that Act 200 improperly imposed a safety

inspection requirement upon his moped, in violation of due

process, because his moped had already been deemed safe to

operate without the safety inspection prior to Act 200.

Act 200 amended HRS § 286-25 to require mopeds to have

a current safety inspection when operated on a public highway.

2016 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 200, § 10 at 615. The regulation of

traffic upon public highways is unquestionably within the police

powers of the legislature and is a rightful subject of

legislation. Territory v. Tam, 36 Haw. 32, 36-37 (Haw. Terr.

1942). Contrary to Langdon's claim, no moped was deemed safe or

unsafe prior to amendment of HRS § 286-25 to require mopeds to

have a current safety inspection; mopeds were permitted to

operate on a public highway without any determination as to their

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operational fitness. Langdon's due process argument therefore

fails.

C. Langdon's "fraud of issuance" argument is improper.

Under his "fraud of issuance" argument, Langdon

contends that he purchased a moped and obtained a "permanent

license," pursuant to HRS § 249-14 (2001), prior to the enactment

of Act 200, which eliminated the applicability of HRS § 249-14 to

mopeds. Thus, he argues, if Act 200 invalidated his "permanent

license," the City and County of Honolulu was liable for fraud

for issuing the "permanent license." Langdon's argument is

essentially an improper attempt to raise an affirmative claim for

fraud against the City and County of Honolulu in his traffic

violation proceedings. We therefore need not address this point.

D. The District Court did not err in finding that Langdon

violated HRS § 286-25 for operating his moped without a

valid safety inspection but erred in finding that he

violated HRS § 249-14.1 for failing to have a new moped

license plate because there is no statutory authority for

the issuance of a license plate to previously registered

mopeds.

Langdon argues that Act 200 did not invalidate all

current permanent moped registrations and that section 13 of the

Act directed new plates be issued to him by December 31, 2017.

Langdon further claims that the District Court failed to

establish a clear record that he was guilty of not having the new

plate and not having a safety inspection sticker.

As to Langdon's assertion of a lack of a "clear

record," the record on appeal reflects that Langdon admitted at

trial that he did not have a new license plate or safety

inspection. Langdon also concedes on appeal that he "did freely

admit that he did not have a newly required Safety Inspection and

new License plate, though he had a Permanent Moped Sticker." On

this record, the District Court did not err in finding that

Langdon violated HRS § 286-25 for operating his moped without a

valid safety inspection. However, despite Langdon admitting that

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he did not have a license plate, we conclude that Langdon was not

required to have a license plate under HRS § 249-14.1, as

discussed infra.

Section 13 of Act 200 does not stand for the

proposition that Langdon seems to assert--that existing moped

owners should be "grandfathered in," should be provided a "free"

new license plate, and should not be subject to the new

requirements imposed by Act 200. Rather, section 13 simply

imposed a deadline for the issuance of license plates for

"current permanent registered mopeds." 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws Act

200, § 13 at 616 ("[T]he staggering of registration and issuance

of license plates for the current permanent registered mopeds

shall be completed by December 31, 2017."). One of the main

purposes of Act 200 was to create an annual registration

requirement for mopeds. S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 3061, in 2016

Senate Journal, at 1318; H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 932-16, in 2016

House Journal, at 1073; H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 548-16, in 2016

House Journal, at 950; H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 243-16, in 2016

House Journal, at 841. In the absence of any express language or

legislative intent to the contrary, owners of "current permanent

registered mopeds" are also subject to the new registration

requirements under HRS § 249-14.1. However, Act 200 did not

adopt any statutory authority for the issuance of license plates

for previously registered mopeds.

The August 14, 2017 letter from the City and County of

Honolulu, Department of Customer Services, provided Langdon with

instructions on the steps required to register his moped in

conformity with Act 200. The issuance of a new license plate was

explained in one of those steps, contingent on registration of

the moped and payment of a registration fee. Although Langdon

summarily states that he was not issued a license plate and

relies on section 13 of Act 200 to state that this was error,

there was no evidence that he took the steps necessary to receive

a plate.

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To the extent the August 14, 2017 letter addressed

issuance of a license plate for his moped, there was no statutory

authority to do so under Act 200. Prior to Act 200, HRS § 249-14

governed the registration of mopeds similar to bicycles and

contained no provision regarding issuance of license plates. HRS

§ 249-14.1 currently includes the phrase "upon the original

registration" when directing the director of finance to issue a

moped license plate. HRS chapter 249 does not contain a

definition of "original registration" applicable to mopeds.

"Under general principles of statutory construction,

courts give words their ordinary meaning unless something in the

statute requires a different interpretation." Priceline.com,

Inc. v. Dir. of Taxation, 144 Hawai#i 72, 87, 436 P.3d 1155, 1170

(2019) (quoting Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawai#i 1, 10, 889 P.2d

685, 694 (1995)). "Thus, the fundamental starting point of

statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself."

Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

State v. Alangcas, 134 Hawai#i 515, 525, 345 P.3d 181, 191

(2015)). "Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous,

our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious

meaning." Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Schmidt v. Bd. of

Dirs. of Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Marco Polo Apartments, 73

Haw. 526, 531-32, 836 P.2d 479, 482 (1992)).

[A] cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts

are bound, if rational and practicable, to give effect to

all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence, or

word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or

insignificant if a construction can legitimately be found

which would give force to and preserve all the words of the

statute[.]

Bragg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Hawai#i 302, 306, 916

P.2d 1203, 1207 (1996) (internal quotation marks, citation, and

original brackets omitted). However, "it is also true that, even

when strictly construing a statute, our primary duty in

interpreting and applying statutes is to ascertain and give

effect to the legislature's intention to the fullest degree."

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Id. (block quote format altered) (quoting Sato v. Tawata, 79

Hawai#i 14, 17, 897 P.2d 941, 944 (1995)). "The legislature is

presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be

construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction,

and illogicality." Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 98

Hawai#i 309, 316, 47 P.3d 1222, 1229 (2002) (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beneficial Hawai#i,

Inc. v. Kida, 96 Hawai#i 289, 309, 30 P.3d 895, 914-15 (2001)).

It is also "a canon of construction that statutes that

are in pari materia may be construed together." State v.

Kamana#o, 118 Hawai#i 210, 218, 188 P.3d 724, 732 (2008)

(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 806 (8th ed. 2004)). "Thus,

'[l]aws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter,

shall be construed with reference to each other. What is

clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain

what is doubtful in another.'" Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting Barnett v. State, 91 Hawai#i 20, 31, 979 P.2d 1046,

1057 (1999)); see also HRS § 1-16 (2009).

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Omiya, 142 Hawai#i 439, 450, 420 P.3d

370, 381 (2018).

The ordinary meaning of "original" means "Preceding all

others in time: First." Webster's II New College Dictionary 792

(3d ed. 2005). Applying the ordinary meaning of "original," HRS

§ 249-14.1 requires a license plate be issued when a moped is

first registered. This would not include subsequent payment of a

registration fee on an annual basis.

The legislative history of Act 200 does not support an

interpretation that previously registered mopeds are to be issued

a license plate. Act 200 enacted H.B. 1753 into law. As passed

by the House on its third reading, H.B. 1753, H.D. 3 proposed a

section to be added to HRS chapter 249 (County Vehicular Taxes)

that stated, in relevant part: "Each moped shall be issued a

number plate upon payment of the initial annual registration fee

pursuant to section 249-14." H.B. 1753, H.D. 3, 28th Leg., Reg.

Sess. (2016) (emphasis added).

However, in the Senate, the content of H.B. 1753, H.D.

3 was deleted and replaced with the content of S.B. 2736, S.D. 1,

"a substantially similar measure[.]" S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No.

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3061, in 2016 Senate Journal, at 1318. Notably, by replacing the

content, the Senate amended the bill to require the issuance of a

number plate for a moped "upon the original registration" rather

than "upon payment of the initial annual registration fee."

Compare H.B. 1753, H.D. 3, S.D. 1, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2016),

with H.B. 1753, H.D. 3, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2016). The

substitution of the language is significant because it made the

issuance of a license plate dependent upon the "original

registration" instead of an "initial annual registration fee."

The legislative history of S.B. 2736 provides no explanation for

the use of the phrase "upon the original registration."

However, the senate standing committee report on H.B. 1753, H.D.

3, S.D. 1 described one of the purposes of the measure as

"[r]equir[ing] the Director of Finance to issue moped number

plates upon payment of the initial moped and bicycle registration

fee[.]" S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 3061, in 2016 Senate Journal,

at 1318 (emphasis added). The senate standing committee report

for the next Senate draft described the same purpose as

"[r]equir[ing] the Director of Finance to issue a moped number

plate and tag or emblem upon payment of fees[.]" S. Stand. Comm.

Rep. No. 3599, in 2016 Senate Journal, at 1562 (emphasis added).

The Senate draft of the bill also proposed that the new moped

license plate requirement be created under HRS chapter 286

(Highway Safety). H.B. 1753, H.D. 3, S.D. 1, 28th Leg., Reg.

Sess. (2016).

The conference committee report for H.B. 1753, H.D. 3,

S.D. 2, C.D. 1 also did not provide an explanation for the phrase

"upon the original registration." See Conf. Comm. Rep. No.

158-16, in 2016 House Journal, at 1416-17, 2016 Senate Journal,

at 842. It described one of the measure's purposes as

"[r]equir[ing] the issuance of a moped number plate and tag or

emblem upon payment of fees[.]" Id. (emphasis added). The

conference committee also expressly proposed that HRS chapter 249

was the more appropriate chapter to which the moped license plate

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requirement section should be added. Id.

The legislative history does not provide an explanation

for the phrase "upon the original registration" with regards to

the issuance of a number plate and we must look to other sources

for guidance.

Although there is no statutory definition of "original

registration" with respect to mopeds, the phrase "original

registration" is used multiple times in HRS chapter 249 in

relation to vehicles. With respect to vehicles, HRS § 249-7

(2017) states:

§249-7 Number plates. (a) Upon receipt of the tax

the director of finance shall number and register the

vehicle in the owner's name in a permanent record or book to

be kept by the director for this purpose, and shall furnish

the owner thereof with a receipt showing upon its face the

license number issued for the vehicle and the fact that the

license tax has been paid thereon for the whole or the

remainder of the current year in which the receipt is

issued. The director of finance shall also furnish the

owner, upon the original registration of the vehicle, two

number plates for the vehicle or one plate in the case of

trailers, semitrailers, or motorcycles with the registration

number marked thereon. Upon the payment of the tax for each

year a tag or emblem bearing a serial number and the month

and year of expiration shall be provided to the owner.

Transfer of current number plates, tag, or emblem, except as

authorized by this chapter or by chapter 286, is punishable

by a fine of not more than $50 for each offense.

(b) Upon an original registration the director of

finance shall fix, and shall charge to the owner, a fee

equal to the cost of the number plate and tag or emblem plus

the administrative cost of furnishing the plate and tag or

emblem and effecting the registration. Upon the issuance of

a new series of number plates as determined by the directors

of finance of each county through majority consent, the

director of finance shall charge the owner a fee equal to

the costs of the number plate plus the administrative cost

of furnishing the plates. Upon issuing a tag or emblem, the

director of finance shall charge the owner a fee of 50

cents. The owner shall securely fasten the number plates on

the vehicle, one on the front and the other on the rear, at

a location provided by the manufacturer or in the absence of

such a location upon the bumpers of the vehicle and in

conformance with section 291-31, in such a manner as to

prevent the plates from swinging. Number plates shall at

all times be displayed entirely unobscured and be kept

reasonably clean. In the case of trailers, semitrailers, or

motorcycles, one plate shall be used and it shall be

fastened to the rear thereof at a location provided by the

manufacturer or in the absence of such a location at the

rear thereof, and in the case of motorcycles in conformance

with section 291-31.

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(c) Upon the issuance of the tag or emblem the owner

shall affix the tag or emblem to the top right portion of

the rear number plate, except that all vehicles owned by the

State, any county government, any board of water supply, and

official representatives of any foreign governments shall be

issued registrations which need be renewed only in the new

plate issue year.

(d) After the initial payment of the tax and the

original registration of a vehicle as herein specified, a

motor vehicle shall not be required to be reweighed in any

succeeding year unless it has been so altered or changed as

to increase or diminish its weight. No new number plates

shall, however, be issued to a new owner except as provided

in sections 249-7.5 and 249-8.

(e) If an owner of a vehicle registered in any

county, upon the disposition of the vehicle, requests that

the license plates furnished to the owner with respect to

the registration of the vehicle be assigned to another

vehicle subsequently acquired by the owner, the assignment

may be made by the director of finance at the director's

discretion. To defray additional administrative costs

incurred by acceding to those requests, the director of

finance shall charge a fee of $5 for each reassignment of

license plates, in addition to the fee for registration. 

The procedure for registering the vehicles shall otherwise

be identical with that provided by this section.

(Emphases added.)

The license plate requirements for vehicles in HRS

§ 249-7(a) and (b) are similar to the license plate requirement

for mopeds in HRS § 249-14.1. Given the legislature's purposeful

placement of the moped license plate requirement in HRS chapter

249, see Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 158-16, in 2016 House Journal, at

1416-17, 2016 Senate Journal, at 842, and the similarity of the

statutes included therein, we look to laws dealing with vehicles

to explain what is doubtful in HRS § 249-14.1.

Under HRS § 249-7.5 (2017),4 an "original registration"

4 HRS § 249-7.5 provides:

§249-7.5 New motor vehicle with a temporary number

plate. Any person who has purchased a new motor vehicle which

has attached a temporary number plate under section 286-53

shall register the new motor vehicle in accordance with this

chapter within thirty days after taking possession of the

motor vehicle. For the purposes of this chapter, the

registration of such a motor vehicle shall be considered an

original registration under section 249-7. Within thirty days

of the original registration of such a motor vehicle, the

director of finance shall furnish two number plates and the

valid tag or emblem appropriate for the year of registration,

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with respect to vehicles is the registration of a newly purchased

vehicle within thirty days of taking possession by the owner.

HRS § 249-7.5 also requires two number plates be issued within

thirty days of the "original registration."

Given the plain meaning of "original," the lack of a

statutory definition of "original registration" as applied to

mopeds, the lack of any discernible legislative intent about the

purpose of the phrase "upon the original registration" as applied

to mopeds in Act 200, and in consideration of laws in pari

materia with HRS § 249-14.1 (specifically, HRS §§ 249-7 and

249-7.5), we conclude that the phrase "upon the original

registration" in HRS § 249-14.1 is only applicable to newly

purchased and/or first time registration of a moped. The phrase

does not include previously registered mopeds that became subject

to an annual registration fee pursuant to Act 200. Since there

is no statutory authority for the issuance of a license plate to

previously registered mopeds, Langdon could not have properly

received a license plate even if he had paid an annual

registration fee. The legislature could not have intended the

absurd result of fining a moped owner for failing to secure a

license plate to the moped when no license plate was authorized

to be issued.

Because no license plate was authorized to be issued to

Langdon for his previously registered moped, he was not in

violation of HRS § 249-14.1 based on a failure to secure a

license plate to the rear of his moped.5

if any, which shall be attached to the motor vehicle as

provided under section 249-7. Upon attachment of the number

plates, the temporary number plate provided under section

286-53 shall be destroyed.

(Emphasis added.)

5 This court expresses no opinion on whether the permanent

registration fee for mopeds registered pursuant to HRS § 249-14 may be modified

by Act 200.

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V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Notice of Entry of Judgment

and/or Order and Plea/Judgment, filed on December 19, 2018, in

the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division, is

affirmed in part and reversed in part. Langdon's violation of

HRS § 286-25 is affirmed and his violation of HRS § 249-14.1 is

reversed.

On the briefs:

Sonja P. McCullen, /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

City and County of Honolulu,

for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Katherine G. Leonard

David R. Langdon,

Self-Represented, /s/ Derrick H. M. Chan

Defendant-Appellant.

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