NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 21a0165n.06

Case No. 20-5422

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

WENDY HANCOCK, individually and 

as next friend for B.B.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEANDRA MILLER, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE MIDDLE

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

OPINION

BEFORE: BATCHELDER, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. 

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Wendy Hancock’s thirty-month dispute with 

the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) culminates in this appeal. 

Hancock sued seventeen defendants for violating her and her daughter’s rights while 

revoking Hancock’s custody of her children. The district court dismissed her 

complaint. Hancock appeals select claims, but finding no error, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Wendy Hancock lived in Tennessee with her teenage son and twelve-year-old 

“B.B.,” her daughter. August 2018 was an eventful month for the Hancock household. 

Hancock filed an unruly petition against her son in juvenile court. Meanwhile, he 

called the police to their home, and the officers found drug paraphernalia in his room. 
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The next day, the son left home after arguing with Hancock, and Hancock reported 

him missing to the police. Unbeknownst to Hancock, the son’s father delivered the 

son to DCS custody. While there, the son complained of verbal and physical 

mistreatment, stated he feared going home, showed evidence of abuse, and reported 

his mother’s drug and alcohol use.

The same day that her son lodged his complaints with DCS, police called 

Hancock and told her to come to the police station to find out about her son. When 

Hancock did not show up, the police obtained criminal warrants against Hancock for 

assault and contributing to a minor’s delinquency.

In the wake of these events, DCS worker Deandra Miller petitioned the 

Juvenile Court for an ex parte order against Hancock, alleging that Hancock dealt 

and abused drugs and physically abused her children. The initial Juvenile Court 

judge assigned to the petition, Judge Bratton Hale Cook, refused to address it because 

of his familiarity with Hancock. Under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s “Standing 

Order for the Designation of Substitute Judge,” the petition was referred to Judge 

Michael Collins. Judge Collins issued an ex parte order granting DCS immediate 

temporary custody of the children (“ex parte order” or “EPO”).

But Hancock and B.B. were missing. After two days, Detective James 

Cornelius retrieved images from Facebook and broadcast them on the national child 

alert system. He also “pinged” Hancock’s cell phone to determine her location. Police 

arrested Hancock the next day and took B.B. into DCS custody. Detective James 

Cornelius and Lieutenant Matthew Holmes and interrogated Hancock without 
No. 20-5422, Hancock v. Miller

3

reading Miranda warnings. Hancock alleges that the government used her 

statements from this interrogation against her in juvenile and criminal proceedings.

The government charged Hancock with assault and contributing to the 

delinquency of a minor. DCS placed Hancock’s son and B.B. in foster care and 

arranged for them to receive the HPV vaccine. Hancock entered a “best interest” 

guilty plea to the contributing to delinquency charge, and the state dismissed the 

assault charge. And in March 2019, after a three-day hearing, a judge found 

Hancock’s children dependent and neglected. Hancock elected for probation and a 

supervised parenting plan to regain custody of her children. DCS returned her 

children home in June.

Hancock sued seventeen defendants based on her belief that the state’s 

employees and the state court had violated her rights in taking custody of her 

children. She alleged state-law violations as well as federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. She sought damages and a declaratory judgment. The 

defendants moved to dismiss all of Hancock’s claims, which the district court did. It 

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Hancock’s federal claims arising from the 

ex parte order under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. And it dismissed the rest of the 

federal claims on substantive or immunity grounds. Having dismissed her federal 

claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 

Hancock now appeals the dismissal of some of her claims as to four of the defendants. 
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II. DISCUSSION

Hancock argues that the district court made several errors. First, she claims 

that the district court erred when it denied three motions to exclude and took judicial 

notice of two state court orders and a DCS document. Second, she argues that her 

constitutional claims challenging actions taken under the EPO are not barred by the 

Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Third, she asserts several claims against DCS worker 

Deandra Miller. And finally, she asserts Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against 

Detective Cornelius and Lieutenant Holmes for their interrogation without Miranda

warnings and for pinging her cell phone without a warrant. We address and reject 

each of her arguments below. 

We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, allowing Plaintiff’s claims to 

proceed only if they “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(internal quotation marks removed) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)). Claims have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint need not contain “detailed 

factual allegations,” but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” or 

“a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” will not suffice. Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Courser v. Allard, 969 F.3d 604, 615 (6th Cir. 2020).

A. Motions to Exclude

Hancock’s first argument is that the district court erred in denying three 

motions that she made to exclude various court records. She argues that judicial 
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notice of these documents was inappropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, 

which permits courts to take notice of certain facts even on a motion to dismiss. We 

reject her arguments because each of the documents qualified under FRE 201.

Rule 201 outlines the requirements for judicial notice of adjudicative facts. It 

permits courts to take notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute” 

because it either “is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” 

or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Under this rule and relevant case 

law, courts take notice of “developments in related proceedings in other courts of 

record.” Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland, 695 F.3d 548, 553 n.2 (6th Cir. 

2012) (cleaned up).1 “Specifically, on a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice 

of another court’s opinion not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the 

existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its 

authenticity.” Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 

2008) (citation omitted).

Hancock argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to exclude 

a juvenile court order, a “permanency plan” by the Department of Children’s Services 

that was filed with the juvenile court, and the Standing Order for the Designation of 

Substitute Judges by the Tennessee Supreme Court.

1 A juvenile court in Tennessee is a court of record. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(a); 

In re S.L.M., 207 S.W.3d 288, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
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The juvenile court order plainly meets the requirements of Rule 201. “Judicial 

records are a source of ‘reasonably indisputable accuracy’ when they record some 

judicial action such as dismissing an action, granting a motion, or finding a fact.” 

United States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826, 834 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting 21B Charles 

Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5106.4 (2d ed. 2005)). 

Hancock posits that the juvenile court order is not appropriate for judicial 

notice because it is not a “final order” and that the order “is of no force or effect” under 

Tennessee law because it was “negated by the de novo appeal.” (Appellant’s Br. at

16.) Her argument fails on its own terms. Tennessee law permits appeal only of a 

“final order or judgment.” § 37-1-159(a). And she did appeal, so the order must have 

been final.2 And in any event, she does not explain how the order not being “final” 

would affect how we would apply Rule 201. 

Hancock also argues that the order is not a “public record” because it is 

confidential, and she says that it is not central to her claims. These arguments do not 

address whether judicial notice was appropriate or whether the existence of the order

“can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Instead, Hancock’s arguments go to 

2 Hancock seems to believe that “final” means that the order is the final word in the matter. 

This colloquial sense of the term “final” differs from the legal term “final judgment” for appeal. 

See Hantz Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 664 F. App’x 452, 459 (6th Cir. 

2016) (“Accordingly, as a legal term of art, ‘final judgment’ virtually always designates the 

judgment by a court that determines all the rights and obligations of the parties in a case so that it 

can be appealed—not a judgment that has been resolved after appeal.”)
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whether admitting the order converted the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a summary 

judgment motion. This requires different analysis.

Considering the order was proper and did not convert the motion to dismiss 

into a motion for summary judgment. When deciding a motion to dismiss, a court 

ordinarily cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). If a 

party presents such evidence and the court does not exclude it, then the court must 

treat the motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion and allow appropriate 

discovery. Id. But a court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider “other materials 

that are integral to the complaint, are public records, or are otherwise appropriate 

for the taking of judicial notice.” Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 

553, 560 (6th Cir. 2005); see also McLaughlin v. CNX Gas Co., LLC, 639 F. App’x 296, 

298 (6th Cir. 2016) (“We may also consider documents that a defendant attaches to a 

motion if the documents ‘are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to 

her claims’ without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.”) (quoting 

Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997)). Because a juvenile court order 

is appropriate for judicial notice, the district court could consider it to demonstrate 

the adjudicative fact that the order was issued and what it said—though not for the 

truth of the facts asserted— without converting the 12(b)(6) into a summary 

judgment motion. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 467 (6th Cir. 

2014).

We look next to the permanency plan. Hancock repeats her argument that the 

document is not appropriate for judicial notice because it is not a public record or 
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central to her claims. Again, these arguments do not address judicial notice, but 

whether the document is evidence that converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment. And at any rate, Hancock identifies no support for the notion 

that confidential court filings are not public records. Indeed, she admits that “court 

filings in other cases” are appropriate for judicial notice. (Appellant’s Br. at 10.) 

Finally, we turn to the Standing Order. Hancock argues that the Standing 

Order is not appropriate for judicial notice because the fact that it provided Judge 

Collins with authority is subject to reasonable dispute. But this assertion does not 

contradict the fact that the Standing Order is a public record, as it is an order from 

the Supreme Court of Tennessee. See Ferguson, 681 F.3d at 834. So judicial notice 

was appropriate.3

B. Rooker–Feldman

Hancock challenged the EPO’s validity, and she alleged that those who acted 

under the EPO violated her rights. Because a lower federal court lacks jurisdiction to 

review a state court order, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of claims based on 

the EPO or its execution. “We review de novo a district court’s ruling that the Rooker–

Feldman doctrine deprives the district court of jurisdiction.” Kovacic v. Cuyahoga 

Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 2010).

Rooker stated a simple negative implication of 28 U.S.C. § 1257: lower federal 

courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decisions. Only the Supreme 

3 Hancock challenges the district court’s alleged assumption that the standing order was 

valid under state law. We need not address this issue since Rooker–Feldman applies to Judge 

Collins’ actions, and this allegation would only go to dispute his jurisdiction to issue the order. See 

infra, Section II.B.
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Court holds the power to declare a state court decision “null and void.” Rooker v. Fid. 

Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414–16 (1923). Later, the Court clarified that § 1257 does not 

prevent a party from challenging a state law in federal court. It merely prevents a 

party from challenging a state court ruling applying that law. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals 

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). It is “a doctrine with only limited application.” 

Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 309 (quoting Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 

2006)).

Rooker–Feldman invokes the same idea of respect for state courts as 

preclusion, collateral estoppel, and abstention. But the doctrines are not the same. In 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the Court held 

that Rooker–Feldman only applies to “state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id.

at 284. It does not “override or supplant preclusion doctrine” or otherwise impact 

existing doctrines on how federal courts defer to state courts. Id.

So we work with two important boundaries. First, Rooker–Feldman applies 

only to court orders. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 299 (6th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff 

may challenge a summons or a writ of garnishment that a clerk issues without 

violating Rooker–Feldman. See Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889,

892–93 (6th Cir. 2020). Second, the doctrine applies when plaintiffs challenge the 

state court decision, not state law generally. So “alleging error in a state court 

decision” rouses Rooker–Feldman. Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 2013) 
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(citation omitted). But challenging a state law or policy prospectively does not. See 

Brent v. Wayne Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 674 (6th Cir. 2018). The 

type of relief requested—whether retrospective or prospective—often reveals which 

type of claim it is. Berry, 688 F.3d at 299–300.

In winnowing would-be Rooker–Feldman cases, our Circuit uses the “source of 

the injury” standard. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). If 

the state court judgment is the source of the injury, then Rooker–Feldman applies. 

Id. But “[i]f there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then 

the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368–

69 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393). And just as the relief 

requested helps to classify the type of claim, the request for relief is also indispensable 

in determining the source of the injury. VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 

951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020). On this basis, we have repeatedly declined to apply 

Rooker–Feldman to cases alleging third-party misconduct, even when closely related 

to a state court proceeding.

But we also follow an important exception—that “if a third party’s actions are 

the product of a state court judgment,” then challenging the acts would be to 

challenge the judgment itself. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 394. For example, if election 

officials refuse to tally ballots because a court order commanded them to exclude the 

ballots, Rooker–Feldman would not allow a suit against the officials. Id. (citing 

Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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The district court dismissed all claims arising from the EPO as barred by the 

Rooker–Feldman doctrine. This included: 

(a) Fourth Amendment claims concerning the seizure of the children pursuant 

to the [EPO]; (b) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims 

concerning removing the children pursuant to the [EPO] and participating in 

hearings pursuant to the [EPO]; (c) Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 

process claims concerning removing and retaining the children pursuant to the 

[EPO], including a claim based upon the provision of the HPV vaccine to B.B. 

under the medical treatment provision of the [EPO].

(R. 122, PageID 1021–22.). Hancock challenges each of these holdings. 

Hancock argues that Rooker–Feldman should not apply to her claims because 

the EPO no longer has any effect, so she is not asking for relief from the EPO. But 

her Amended Complaint says otherwise. It states that she is “seeking declaratory 

judgment on the ex parte order and the actions of Judge Michael Collins as follows: 

That the ex parte order . . . violates the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [and] the Fourth 

Amendment . . .” (R. 34, PageID 253.) She also argues, “Declaratory relief is 

appropriate because the validity and enforceability of said order” is still at issue in 

her separate criminal proceedings. (Id. at 254. (emphasis added)). And she asks for a 

declaration that the EPO is “void.” (Id. at 253.) All her claims against Collins reside 

under the Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief, which requests the district court 

void the EPO. This is “inviting district court review and rejection of” a state-court 

order—something we may not do under Rooker–Feldman. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 

284. And her appellate briefing rests on the same claims barred by Rooker–Feldman. 

Because many of Hancock’s claims depend on declaring the EPO void, Rooker–

Feldman analysis is sufficient for resolving several issues. Rooker–Feldman

effectively blocks all claims against Judge Collins, and we need not address the issue 
No. 20-5422, Hancock v. Miller

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of judicial immunity or any of the remaining allegations against Judge Collins.

Hancock’s complaint also reveals that any claim against Miller, James, and Holmes 

based on the seizure of B.B., removal and retention of her children, and arrest for 

custodial interference also turn on the validity of the EPO. Hancock does not allege 

any constitutional injury independent of the EPO, instead alleging that the EPO was 

the “direct and proximate cause” of these alleged harms. (R. 34, PageID 253.) So these 

alleged harms were “the product of a state court judgment,” not independent thirdparty actions, and Rooker–Feldman bars review. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 394. 

Hancock also claims that Rooker–Feldman does not apply because the EPO 

was not a final order. But we have held that Rooker–Feldman applies to interlocutory 

orders. See Pieper v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2003). After Exxon 

Mobile, there has been some debate among circuit courts about whether Rooker–

Feldman reaches federal complaints filed before the state proceeding is fully 

complete.4 But even assuming completion of state court proceedings is the standard, 

4 For example, the Eleventh Circuit held in Nicholson v. Shafe that Rooker–Feldman did 

not apply if a state court appeal was still pending when the plaintiff filed the federal case. 558 F.3d 

1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). That court reasoned that Exxon Mobil’s emphasis on limiting Rooker–

Feldman requires federal courts to apply it in only factually identical situations, down to the detail 

that the state proceedings and opportunity to appeal in Rooker and Feldman had ended. Id. at 1274–

75. See also Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto 

Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 24–27 (1st Cir. 2005).

But the Fifth Circuit noted that the emphasis on “ended” proceedings “is found not 

in Exxon’s holding but in its description of the Rooker and Feldman cases.” Houston v. Venneta 

Queen, 606 F. App’x 725, 732 (5th Cir. 2015). Exxon’s actual holding requires only that the 

judgment challenged be “rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Exxon 

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. And later Supreme Court precedent emphasized not the ending of all state 

court proceedings, but effectual “appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal 

court.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006). Our circuit has not decided this question postExxon. In Quality Associates, a panel touched on the question in a footnote, noting that it believed 
No. 20-5422, Hancock v. Miller

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Rooker–Feldman still applies here. The state court dismissed Hancock’s case almost 

two months before she filed her suit in federal court. Because Hancock challenged a 

state court order and actions that flowed directly from its mandate, the district court 

had no jurisdiction over these claims.

C. Claims Against Deandra Miller

Hancock argues that Miller violated her substantive due process rights 

through her “bad faith investigation which resulted in false statements in order to 

obtain a removal order.” (Appellant’s Br. at 56.) She also claims that Miller made 

false statements in her petition for the EPO, that she started the removal proceedings 

as retaliation for protected speech and use of an activist attorney, and that she 

withheld exculpatory evidence when advancing the petition for the EPO.5 We reject 

most of these arguments on absolute immunity grounds and one argument for 

insufficient pleading.

Pieper had been displaced by Exxon, and citing Nicholson approvingly. Quality Assocs., Inc. v. 

The Procter & Gamble Distrib. LLC, 949 F.3d 283, 290 n.5 (6th Cir. 2020). But it ultimately found 

Rooker–Feldman inapplicable on different grounds—the state court order at issue was not 

rendered until after the district court case had commenced, running afoul of Exxon’s requirement 

that the judgment challenged be “rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced.” Exxon-Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.

Our leading post-Exxon case, which pre-dated Quality Associates, considered applying 

Rooker–Feldman appropriate when the proceedings on the relevant order had “ended,” though the 

case as a whole had three years of proceedings yet to come. See McCormick, 451 F.3d at 391, 395; 

McCormick v. McCormick, No. 84-422014-DO (Wayne County Circuit Court). Requiring finality 

of only the order being effectively appealed may better align with the Supreme Courts guidance 

and the Rooker–Feldman rationale. But we leave that decision for another day.

5 Hancock also alleged that Miller failed to communicate with Hancock’s lawyer when 

launching the petition and setting a hearing. But Hancock has not alleged that Miller personally

had a legal duty to contact Hancock’s lawyer. Indeed, in her brief, she diffuses responsibility 

among different defendants and DCS.
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Like prosecutors, social workers have absolute immunity for conduct 

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Kovacic v. 

Cuyahoga Cty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 724 F.3d 687, 694 (6th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 724 

(6th Cir. 2011)). This includes work as a legal advocate, such as filing legal papers 

with the courts, appointing guardians ad litem, and testifying. Id.; Rippy ex rel. Rippy 

v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs cannot skirt this bar by 

alleging malice, corruption, or error. Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 694. The immunity is 

complete.

But administrative duties, investigations, and agency decisions do not fall 

under the immunity. Id. That is, the immunity follows the actions, not the person. 

Rippy, 270 F.3d at 422. In determining whether the action is immune at the dismissal 

stage, the pleadings are important. Regardless of other possibly viable allegations, 

the district court must look only at the facts alleged. See id. at 423 n.2.

Absolute immunity blocks the claims of bad-faith investigation, false 

statements, and retaliation because Hancock did not allege that the investigation 

caused her harm independent of the EPO. In other words, the true harm she alleged

was the eventual entry of the EPO, not any particular investigative acts. A plaintiff 

complaining about a social worker’s legal advocacy cannot skirt immunity by 

presenting her claims as based on the investigation. See Rippy, 270 F.3d at 421 

(rejecting a claim for improper investigation when the claim really centered on false 

statements in the petition). And because social workers have absolute immunity for 
No. 20-5422, Hancock v. Miller

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filing petitions with the court—even ones with false statements or ones filed for 

improper reasons—the other two claims fail.6 To the extent Hancock asserts a claim 

based on Miller’s execution of the judicial order—which would be protected by 

qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity—such a claim is, as discussed 

earlier, barred by Rooker–Feldman. Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 695.

As for the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, Hancock does not detail any 

legal duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in a removal proceeding. But if there were 

such a duty, Miller would be immune just like any prosecutor violating Brady

disclosure requirements. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).7

Hancock’s brief also mentions B.B.’s claims. Her procedural due process claim 

echoes the arguments we have already addressed. Her Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment claims focusing on obtaining and executing the EPO fail for the same 

reasons we have explained.

The only remaining claim against Miller that is not covered by absolute 

immunity is the due process claim for conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But 

Hancock did not bring a § 1983 conspiracy claim in her amended complaint. She only 

6 Hancock also argues that Miller violated her procedural due process rights “by seeking 

and obtaining a [sic] ex parte order where there were no exigent circumstances.” (Appellant’s Br. 

at 50.) To be sure, a parent may prevail on a procedural due process claim for failure to provide a 

pre-deprivation hearing before interfering with their family integrity. See, e.g., Schulkers v. 

Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 545–46 (6th Cir. 2020). But Hancock only alleges that Miller wrongfully 

sought the EPO. This also falls under the absolute immunity for legal advocacy.

7

See Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Just as we stated above, 

Jones and Imbler make clear that absolute immunity protects a prosecutor from civil liability for 

the non-disclosure of material exculpatory evidence at trial.”)
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brought a § 1985 conspiracy claim, which she did not raise on appeal. So we affirm 

the district court’s dismissal of this claim.

D. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims Against Detective Cornelius and 

Lieutenant Holmes

Hancock alleged that Holmes and Cornelius violated her Fifth Amendment 

rights by interrogating her without reciting her Miranda rights to elicit statements 

that the government later used in a criminal proceeding. She also alleged that 

Detective Cornelius violated her Fourth Amendment right when he “pinged” her cell 

phone location without a warrant. We reject the first argument for insufficient 

pleading and the second because Cornelius is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers can be liable in § 1983 lawsuits for Fifth Amendment violations. See 

McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 437 (6th Cir. 2005). The government

violates the Fifth Amendment when it uses incriminating statements that it obtained 

illegally. So when the government does not use the statements in a criminal 

proceeding, “the plaintiff may not sue because he has not suffered the injury against 

which the Fifth Amendment protects.” McKinley, 404 F.3d at 438.

Hancock’s Fifth Amendment claim fails for insufficient pleading. She never 

explains what incriminating statements she made. And she does not allege any 

particular criminal proceeding in which the government used the statements. She 

simply claims that her statements “are now being used against his [sic] in criminal 

court.” (Appellant’s Br. at 62.) But “[l]egal conclusions that are masquerading as 

factual allegations” are not enough to carry Hancock’s claims. Heyne v. Metro. 
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Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

For the Fourth Amendment claim, the district court ruled that Cornelius was 

entitled to qualified immunity for pinging Hancock’s cell phone. Because he 

reasonably believed that the circumstances were exigent, he did not violate her 

clearly established constitutional right. In reply, Hancock argues that excluding the 

documents that she moved to exclude would remove any justification for pinging her 

cell phone. Because we affirm the district court in denying the motions to exclude, we 

reject this claim.

Hancock also asserts that the district court’s exigency finding relied on the 

truth of the statements in the juvenile court order. But the district court only 

addressed the exigent circumstances based on Cornelius’ view of the situation. Since 

the actual truth of the statements in the court documents would not impact Cornelius’ 

justified reliance, the district court did not need to assume the accuracy of the 

statements.

Finally, Hancock argues that exigency is a question of fact for a jury, which 

would preclude a 12(b)(6) dismissal. But her only argument against exigency is that 

the court should have excluded the document establishing the exigent circumstances. 

Since that boils down to a legal question of evidence exclusion, there is no question 

for the jury.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.