In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-1409

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ramona Vega,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 97 Cr 756-1--Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

Argued August 9, 2000--Decided March 2, 2001

 Before Posner, Ripple, and Williams, Circuit Judges.

 Per Curiam. Ramona Vega pleaded guilty to

distributing cocaine pursuant to a plea agreement

in which she "knowingly waive[d] the right to

appeal any sentence within the maximum provided

in the statute(s) of conviction . . . on any

ground whatever." The district court granted

Vega’s motion for a two-level minor-role

reduction and entered a judgment sentencing her

to 56 months’ imprisonment on December 24, 1998.

On December 29, the government moved for

reconsideration of the sentence, arguing, as it

had at the sentencing hearing, that no minor role

reduction was warranted because Vega was held

accountable only for the quantity of drugs she

personally delivered. See, e.g., United States v.

Isienyi, 207 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.

denied, 121 S. Ct. 622 (2000). The district court

agreed, and on February 5, 1999, issued an

amended judgment increasing Vega’s sentence to 70

months. Vega appealed from this judgment, which

was entered on February 10.

 18 U.S.C. sec. 3582(c)(1)(B) prohibits courts

from increasing a term of imprisonment after its

imposition other than as authorized by Rule 35 of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the

relevant provision of Rule 35 permits sentencing

courts to "correct" a sentence within seven days

of its imposition. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c).

The seven-day limit is jurisdictional, e.g.,
United States v. Austin, 217 F.3d 595, 597 (8th

Cir. 2000); United States v. Morrison, 204 F.3d

1091, 1093 (11th Cir. 2000), and the government

concedes that the district court’s order

purporting to amend Vega’s sentence was entered

outside the seven-day limit and thus without

legal authority.

 The government insists, however, that Vega

waived her right to appeal the jurisdictional

issue by waiving her right to appeal her

sentence. But the government does not explain how

the term "sentence," as used in the plea

agreement, encompasses the district court’s

February 10 judgment. The terms of a plea

agreement are interpreted according to the

parties’ reasonable expectations at the time they

entered it, see United States v. Lezine, 166 F.3d

895, 901 (7th Cir. 1999), and here it seems clear

that the parties expected the term "sentence" to

include only the events of the January 24

sentencing hearing, during which the court had

jurisdiction to sentence Vega, and not any later

attempt by the court to amend Vega’s sentence

absent jurisdiction.

 Moreover, any attempt to waive this

jurisdictional issue in a plea agreement would

have been ineffectual because a defendant cannot

confer jurisdiction on a court by way of plea

agreement. See United States v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d

1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1997) (appeal based on

absence of jurisdiction not barred by waiver

because defendant could not confer jurisdiction

on district court); see also, e.g., Floyd v.

Thompson, 227 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 2000)

(subject matter jurisdiction can neither be

stipulated nor waived). 

 Because Vega’s appeal is outside the scope of

her appeal waiver, the district court’s judgment

is VACATED and the case REMANDED for re-imposition of

the original sentence.