The Honor able Da vid A. Katz, United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0032n.06 F iled: Janu ary 9, 2007 No. 05-6577 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. JOH N K . M ER RE LL, Defendan t-Appellant.

__________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL F RO M THE UN ITED STA TES DISTRICT COURT F OR THE WEST ERN DISTRICT OF TEN NE SSEE

BEFORE: CLAY and ROGERS, Circ uit Jud ges; and KATZ , District Judge. * KA TZ, Distr ict Judge. T h i s case involves a sentenc ing by the district court fr om which De fe nd ant a

pp e a ls. Af

te r t he ma tte r wa s ful ly br ie fe d o n a pp e a l, t he pa rt ie s w a ive d o ra l argume nt. T h i s C o urth e r e b y AF F IR M S the se nte nc e of the dis tr ic t c ourt

. BACK GR OUND On Marc h 27, 2003, the M emphis Police Depa rtment executed a

sear ch wa

rra nt at the 3848 Winwood, Memphis, Tennessee ( “Winwood”) re sidence of John K

. M err ell (“Me rre ll” or-2-

“De fenda nt”) in a r esidential neig hborhood. A video tape of the e nsuing se arc h showed the home , an att a c he d she d, and the ba c ky ard of the ho me , whe re the sh e d wa s loc a te d. Th e vid e o ta pe a lso sh ow e d s e ve ra l pe op le , inc lud ing a juv e nil e . Th e se arc h y ie lde d many ma te ri a ls c omm on ly us e d to manufa cture methamphetamine, inc luding Na phth a, ac etone, lithium battery parts, anhydrous ammonia, ammonia nitrate , Red Devil Ly e conta iners, ra g s and towels, g as masks, and a ventilation sy stem for the she d. J .A. 165-81, 198, 295-96. Th er e was a lso a swing set, toy s, and childre n’s medical e quipment. J .A. 147-55. On Marc h 19, 20 03 , Me rr e ll wa s indi c te d by a fe de ra l gr and jur y on se ve ra l c ounts . O n July 2, 2003, Merr ell pleade d g uilty to manufac turing methamp h et am i n e in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). On J anuar

y 22, 2004, the district c ourt deter mined that Merr ell’s sentenc ing r ang e under the SentencingGuidelines wa s 360 months to life, based on an offe nse level of 40 and a Criminal History Categ ory of I I I . Merr ell was sente nced to 240 months imprisonment, three y ear s supervised

re le a se , a nd a $1 00 sp e c ia l a sse ssm e nt. Th e 24 0 mont h sen te nc e wa s the ma ximum un de r 2 1 U .S. C. § 8 41 (a )( 1) . On J un e 14 , 200 5, thi s Cour t vac a te d the jud g me nt a

nd re mand e d th e c a se purs ua nt t o U.S. v. Book

er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). On September

23, 2005, the district court c onducted a re -sentenc ing he aring . The c ourt applied the f

actor s under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and found that the same Guide line rang e applied, 360 months to l ife. Mer

rell wa s ag ain sentenc ed to 240 mont h s , t h e maximum under 21 U .S.C. § 841(a) (1). Par

t of the off ense le vel was a 6-leve l enhanc ement to Merr ell’s g uideline under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)( 5)(C) f

or cr eatinga substantial risk of ha rm to a minor. DI SCU SSIO N I. Stand ard of Review-3-

This Court will review the fir st issue de novo and the se cond issue for rea sonablene ss. L eg al conclusions re g ardingapplication of the SentencingGuidelines (“ the Guidelines” ) ar e revie wed de novo, while f actua l findings a

re r eviewe d for c lear

err or. U.S. v. Hov er , 293 F.3d 930 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2)

. Whe the r an e nh anc e me nt wa s pro pe rl y a pp lie d is a mixe d que sti on of law a nd fa c t, which this Court reviews de novo. U.S. v. Layne , 324 F.3d 464, 468 ( 6th Cir. 2003). The fir st issue before this Court i s the application of section 2D1.1(b) (5) ( C) o f th e Se ntencing Guidelines, a mixed question of law and f act. This Court will reviewthe issue de novo. The sec ond issue is a cha lleng e to the district cour t’s s en t en ce. This Court reviews challeng es to the district c ourt’s sentenc ing de terminations for r easona bleness. Booke r , 543 U.S. at 26 1; United States v. W

ebb , 403 F .3 d 373 , 383 (6 th Cir . 2 00 5) . “ ‘[R]e vie w f or “ re a so na ble ne ss” is not limit ed to consideration of t he length of the sentenc e.’” W ebb , 4 0 3 F. 3 d

at 3 8 3 (c i t i n g United States v. Crosby , 397 F.3d 1 0 3 , 1 1 4 (2d Cir. 2005)). Courts must also consider “ the fa ctors

e v a lu a te d an d th e p r o c e d

u r e s e mp lo y e d

b y th e d is tr ic t c o u rt i nr e a c h in g it s s e n te n c ing deter mination.” Id. This Court will also consider “whethe r t he dis trict court a dequate ly considere d

and e xpre sse d it s a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he re le vant f

a c tor s li ste d in

18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ) t o p e rm it ‘mea ningf ul appellate r eview.’ ” Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 458 F.3d 505, 510 ( 6th Cir. 2006). The sec ond issue is a cha lleng e to the district cour t’s use of “ rea sonablene ss” lang uag e as opposed to “ sufficie nt but not gre ater than nec essar

y ” languag e in its oral sentenc ing, a n objection to the adequate consideration and ex pression of the di strict court’s sentence

. There fore , this Court will review the district court’s sente nce f or re asonable ness. II. Ana lys is A. The DistrictCourt P roperly Enhan ced De fend ant’s Sentence for P osing a-4-

Subst ant ialRi sk o f Har m to th e Liv e s o f Mi nor s. Merr ell appea ls the district court’s application of a si x -leve l enhanc ement to his sentence as

a re su lt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd in g t hat Me rr e ll’ s a c tiv ity c re a te d a su bs tanti a l r isk

of ha rm to minors under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1( b )( 5 )(C). F or the followingrea sons, this C ourt ag ree s with the district court’s finding that M er re ll’s conduct cr eate d a substantial risk of ha rm to minors and

war rants a six-level enha

nceme nt under the G uidelines. Th e Gu ide lin e s p ro vid e fo r t he fo llo wi nge nh anc e me nts : (B ) I f the off

ense ( i) involved the manufa cture o f a mp h e ta mine or methamphe tamine; and (ii) c reated a substantial risk of harm to (I ) human life othe r than a life desc ribed in subdivisi on (C); or (I I ) the e nviron m en t , i ncre ase by 3 levels. I f the re sulting offe nse leve l is less than level 27, incre ase to leve l 27. (C) I f the off

ense ( i) involved the manufa cture of amphe tamine or me th a mp h e ta mine; and (i i) c re a te d a

su bs tanti a l r isk

of ha rm to th e li fe o f a

min or or an in c omp e te nt, inc re a se by

6 le ve ls. I f the r e su lti ngof fe ns e le ve l is le ss t

ha n le ve l 30 , in c re a se to level 30. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5) (B )-( C) (20 0 2). The a ccompa ny ing a pplication note provides a list of nonexclusive fa ctors that a c ourt should consider whe n decidingwhether the def endant’ s methamphetamine a ctivity cre ated a

substantial risk of harm to the lives of individuals or the

e nv ir on me nt: (i) The qu an ti ty

o f a n y c h e mi c a ls o r

h a za r d o u s o r to xic s u b s ta n c e s f o u n d a t t he laboratory , and the manne r in which the c hemicals or substanc es we re store d. (ii) The ma

nner in whic h hazardous or toxic substances we re disp o s ed , and the lik e lih oo d o f r e le a se int o th e e nv ir on me nt o f h a zar do us or toxic su bs tanc e s. (iii) The duration of the offe nse, and the extent of the manufac turing operation. (iv) The location of the la boratory (e.g ., whethe r t h e labor atory is located in a residential ne ighbor

hood or a r emote ar ea) , and the number of human lives place d at substantial risk of harm. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 at cmt. n.20 (2002).-5-

This Court ag ree s with the district court’s conclusion that a bala ncing of these f

actor s shows that D e fe nd a nt’ s d

ru g manu fa c tur inga c tiv ity po se d a su bs tanti a l r isk

of ha rm to t he liv e s o f m ino rs . I n p art ic ula

r, the dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y c on c lud e d on

the ba sis of

the e vid e nc e be fo re it that mu lti ple children ha d acc ess t o and had been present a t the premises, a

nd that Def

endant’ s conduct ther eby

c re a te d a su bs tanti a l r isk

of ha rm to t he liv e s o f m ino rs . 1. F ac to r s (i) -( iii ): The Qua nt it y, Di spo sa l, and Ex te nt of Ha z ar dous M at e r ial s atth e P r e m ise s. When authorities sear ched Defe ndant’s W inwood residenc e, they discovere d vast quantities of ing redie nts, containers, a nd other mate rials used in the manuf actur e of methamphetamine. J.A. 174. Many

of these materials we re tox ic, flammable, or even e x plosive. J .A. 170, 174, 198. Among the dang erous mate rials was N aphtha, a highly explos ive s ubstance that Def endant use d as a solvent to make methamphe tamine, that was f ound in the house and in the attache d shed. J .A. 170, 198, 296. Authorities also found a c ontainer of ace tone, which is flammable and c an ca use burns, J.A. 161, and

remna nts of lithium batterie s, also used in me thamphetamine manufa cture , J .A. 295. I n the bac ky ard sh e d, of fi c e rs fo un d a

tw e nty -f ive g a llo n ta

nk of a nh y dr ou s ammo nia , J .A . 2 95 , a ba g of a mmo nia nitrate, J.A. 165, and numerous empty Red Devil L y e container s, J .A. 169. A sea rch of the bac ky ard shed also yielded “r ag s and . . . towels [that] ree ked of a mmonia,” J .A. 181, two g as masks, J.A. 169, and a c omplex ventilation sy stem to filter out of the shed the acid g as that posed a risk of burns a nd lung da mag e, J.A. 164, 168, evi d en ce that even D efe ndant knew how harmful the ha zardous materia ls he was using wer e. Authorities also found pseudoephe drine “pill soa k” jars in the house’s kitchen, J.A. 154. Many of t hese materials, i ncluding some of the Na phtha, lithium batteries, ly e, ammonia, and tra ces of

ephedr ine, wer e found throw n awa y in trash cans around the premises a nd-6-

in standard c ity

g arba ge ca

ns in the drivewa

y . J .A. 172-75, 295. F inally , upon interrog ation the office rs discover ed that De fenda nt had bee n manufa cturing methamphetamine f or a long time. F or

a t le a st t wo y e ars pr ior

to t he se arc h, De fe nd ant h a d n ot e ve n w or ke d, bu t r a the r h e e arn e d h is income by

making and selling methamphetamine. J.A. 234. T h e s e f a c ts s tr o n g ly s u

p p o rt th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s f in d in g th a t f

a c to r s ( i) , ( ii ) , an d ( iii) of the application note to § 2D1.1( b)(5) support the application of the sentenc e enhanc ement. The shee r volume and quantity

of the mate rials found, in a ddition to their dispersal acr oss the front, inside, and ba c k of the ho us e , as we ll as the sh e d, satis fy fa c tor (i ). F a c tor (i i) is me t by the la c k of a ny sp e c if ic

car e in disposing of the materia ls a nd substances w hich the De fenda nt knew to pose ha zardous risks to huma n health and the environment. F inally , the duration and extent of the drug activities to be considere d under f

actor (iii) are prese nt as well. Def endant Merr ell had ear

ned his sole income from methamphetamine ma

nufac ture for

at least two y ear s; he had c onstructed a n intricate ve ntila tion sy ste m in the ba c ky ard sh e d, ind ic a tin g a c e rt a in le ve l of pe rm ane nc e to the str uc tur e and

its us e s; and the pr esenc e of ma nufac turing materia ls throughout the pr emi s es i n d i cate d that the manufa cturing was an on-g oing proce ss that took plac e throug hout the house in addition to inside the shed. 2 . Fa ct o r ( i v ): T h e M i n o rs Pl a ce d a t R i s k o f H a rm. The main fa ctor at dispute within t his issue is whether minors’ lives were place d at risk of harm by the Def endant’ s methamphetamine- manufa cturing a c ti v it ie s . T h e f a c ts s tr o n g ly

s u g g est that pe op le , a nd in p art ic ula

r c hil dr e n, ha d th e ir

liv e s p ut at su

bs tanti a l r isk

of ha rm . A court must take into account “ [t ]he location of the labor atory (e.g ., whether

the laboratory is located in a r esidential neig hborhood or a remote area ), and the number of human lives place d at-7-

substantial risk of h ar m . ” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 at cmt. n.20. The fac t that a methamphetamine operation took place in a r esidential ar ea w eig hs in favor of applying a n enhanc ement. Layne , 324 F .3 d at 47 1; see also United States v

. Houchins , 364 F.3d 182, 189 ( 4th Cir. 2004). This Court has

re c og nize d th e da

ng e rs po se d b y

me tha mph e tamin e op e ra

tio ns : [M] ethampheta

mine can be made fro m re adily available and leg al che micals and sub s ta n c e s , an d

. . . it p o s e s s e r io u s d an g e r s to b o th h u ma n li f e an d to the environment . . . . [T]hese chemica ls a nd substances are utiliz ed in a manuf actur ing proce ss that is unstabl e, v o l at i l e, and hig hly combustible. Even small amounts of these c hemicals, whe n mix ed im proper ly , can cause explos ions and fires. For ever y on e po un d of me tha

mph e tamin e that is pr od

uc e d, a pp ro xima te ly

fi ve po un ds of

toxic and often lethal waste products may be left behind at the l aboratory site, or disposed of i n ri v er s , k itchen sinks, or sewa g e sy stems in an eff ort to conce al evidenc e of illega l manufac turing

. More disturbing is that most of these labor atories a re situated in residenc es, m otels, trailers, and vans, and often ti mes are operated i n the pre sence of childre n. Layne , 324 F.3d at 468-69. The Winwood addr ess is loc ated in a residential neig hborhood. J .A. 201. Severa l people, including minors, r esided at the Wi n wo od home. When the police c onducted their sear ch of the premises, they

found the De fenda

nt, a Ms. L inda Cooper, and a 16 y ear old boy , all of whom we re identified as r esidents of the Winwood hom e. J

. A. 1 4 7 -4 8, 155, 295. The off icer s also found evidenc e that other

minors lived in t h e h o u s e, a handic apped boy and a young g irl. The evide nce included a hospital bed and breathing equipment for a handic apped boy whom Ms. Cooper identified

as a r esident, J .A. 148, 175-76, equipment that had been prese nt sinc e at least Mar ch 2002, J.A. 225, 243. Authorities also found a c hild’s bed cove red w ith toy s beside the bed that Ms. Cooper said wa s hers. J.A. 149-50. The ba cky ard c ontained a sw ing se t and toy car , near t he shed w here the

me tha mph e tamin e wa s ma de a

nd the toxic g a s w a s v e nti la te d. J.A. 15 5. Th is e vid e nc e str on g ly

su g g e sts that the tr ia l c ourt wa s c or re c t in po int ing ou t that De fe nd ant’ s a c tiv iti e s ha d the ef fe c t,-8-

intentional or not, of putting minors a t se rious risk, and that Def endant there fore deser

ved an upw ard

a dju stm e nt in a c c or da

nc e wi th Se c tio n 2D 1. 1( b) (5 )( C)

. J.A. 28 0. De fe nd ant argue s, in his de fe ns e on this iss ue, that the tria l court’s f inding wa s too vag ue to support a se ntencingenhanc ement, and that there was no e vidence that the childre n lived or we re pr esent at the Winwood a d d ress at the same tim e De fe n d an t was ac tually making the drug s. Def.’ s Br . at 21-26. In its oral ruling , the district court noted that “ all of these c hildren had a cce ss to the premises and a ll of them were at one time or another

there .” J.A. 258. Defenda nt argues that “[t] his f

inding is va g ue and does not identify any specific temporal c onnection o f t h e ch i l d ren to the address, much le ss any period whe n the potentially

dang erous c hemicals we re be ing use d.” De f.’s B r. at 25. Def endant’ s argument contains two implicit presumptions with which thi s Court takes issue. First, De fenda

nt assumes that the Guidelines require residenc e by children to e stablish a risk of har m to minors. The re is no support for this rea soning in the te x t of the Guidelines, nor does De fenda

nt

su pp or t th is pr e su mpt ion

wi th c a se law. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo un d th a t c e rt a in m ino rs ha d a c c e ss t o the pre mises and wer e at one time or another prese n t at the pre mises. J .A. 258. A child nee d not live at a residenc e to be subj ect to the risk of ha rm ca used by the manufa cture of methamphe tamine. Ac c e ss a nd pr e se nc e is s uf

fi c ie nt, g ive n th e e xtra or din ary ri sk s inhe re nt in the dr ug -m a kin g pr oc e ss. See Layne , 324 F. 3d at 468-69. Def endant disputes that the minors disc ussed here in lived at the Winwood residence . There i s s t r o n g e v i d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g t h e t o ys , b e d s , an d h o s p i t a l e qu i p m e n td i s c u s s e d a b o v e , t o t h e c o n t r a r

y. Howeve r, even if the minors did not “ live” at the Winwood home, it is conce ded that they did have

acc ess t o the pre mises, that one of them e ven slept at the r esidenc e the nig ht before the sea rch, a nd that hazardous mater ials were located thr oug hout the premises. The ref ore, be cause minors did have-9-

acc ess to the pre mises and wer e prese nt at times, Defenda nt’s activities cre ated a

substantial risk of harm to the lives of those minors, e ven if they did not “live” at the Winwood home. Th e s e c o n d

p r e s u mp ti o nim

p li c it in D e f e n d an t’ s ar g u me n t i s th a t m an u f a c tur ing

me tha mph e tamin e on ly

c re a te s a ri sk of ha

rm to min or s who are pr e se nt on the pr e mis e s at th e same time the drug s are being manufa cture d. This is not t he case. This Court has re cog nized the risk of the mere prese nce of

the che mic als and wa stes around a premises, pa

rticularly around c hildren. Layne , 3 24 F .3 d at 47 0; see also United States v . Skelton , 101 Fe d. Appx. 89, 90-91 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Masse

y , 79 Fe d. Appx. 832, 834, 837 (6th C ir. 2003). As e sta bli sh e d in the a bo ve dis c us sio n o f t

he ma te ri a l f

ound aro un d th e ho us e , D e fe nd a nt d id not confine his proce ss me rely to an inacc essible shed. Ha zardous materia ls were found throug hout the p r e m i s e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e k i t c h e n , t h e t r a s h , an d i n a tu b n e ar t h e s w i n g s e t an d t o y c ar. Whil e De f e n d an t d e n ie d

h a v in g u s e d

th e p r e mi s e s f

o r ma jo r p h a s e s o f

ma n u f a c tu r in g th e dr

u g , th e trial court prope rly

cre dited the compe l l ing e vidence that drug s were made lar g ely at the Winwood pr e mis e s. J.A. 25 8; see Layne , 3 24 F .3 d at 47 0 ( “ [T]he inh e re nt da ng e r of the c he mic a ls f

ound in [De fe nd ant’ s] a

pa rtme nt m ili ta te s in

fa vo r o f a pp lying§ 2 D1 .1 (b )( 6) (A ) h e re .” ); United States v. Bivens , 129 Fe d.Appx. 159, 165 (6th C ir. 2005). De fenda nt need not have been ma nufac turing the drug s with minors present in order t o p o s e a ri s k o f har

m to them. Merre ll scattere d hazardous materia ls, poisonous g ases, and other chemica ls a nd materia ls throughout the inside of the home, the outside, and the ne ighbor ing she d i n t h e bac k y ard. It was this part of his ac tivity that cre ated the most direct risk of ha

rm to the lives of the minors who h ad ac ce s s to or wer e eve r pre sent at the premises. Tog ether , the balancing of t hese factor s favor s the application of a sentenc e enha nceme nt for c reating a

substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor.-10-

B. Defendan t’s Sentence Was Reasonable. Def endant a rg ues that the district cou rt er red by imposing what it believed to be a “re asonable ” sente nce, instead of what this C ircuit has re quired, “ a sente nce suf ficient, but not g reater than ne cessa

ry , to comply

with the purposes” of sec tion 3553(a)( 2). De f.’s B r. at 31. Th is Co u rt r e v ie w s c h a ll e n g e s to th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s s e n te n c in g d e te r mi n a ti o n s for

rea sonablene ss. Booke r , 54 3 U. S. a t 26 1; W ebb , 403 F .3 d at 38 3. I n d e te rm ini ngre a so na ble ne ss, thi s Co ur t r e vie ws the “ the fa c tor s e va luate d a nd the pr oc e dure s em pl oy ed by the dis tr ic t c ourt

in

rea ching its sente ncing deter mination.” Id. As discussed above , “[s] ection 3553(a ) instructs district courts to impose a sentenc e suff icient, but not gr eate r than ne cessa ry , to comply

with the purposes set forth in that sec tion.” United States v. Fore man , 436 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir.2006) (quotations omitted). Although no long er bound by the Guidelines, district cour ts are still require d to consider the applica

ble Guideline rang e along with the other statutory fac tors. Booke r , 543 U.S. at 245-46. “B oth district courts imposing sentenc es in the first instance as well as a ppellate c ourts revie wing sentenc es on appea l are to be guided by the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Jac kson , 408 F.3d 301, 304 (6th Cir.2005). Under this new scheme , “district cour ts are r equire d to consider the a

pplicable Guide lines sentenc ing rang e when arr iving at a defenda nt's sentence , . .

. but only as one fac tor of sever al laid out in § 3553(a).” Id . (in te rn a l citatio ns omi tte d) . A s su c h, thi s Court “may conclude that a sentence is unrea sonable when the di strict judge fails to ‘consider ’ the applicable Guidelines ra

ng e or ne g lects to ‘conside r’ the other fac tors listed in 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a) , and instead si m p ly

selec ts what the judg e dee ms an appropr iate sente nce w ithout such require d consideration.” W

ebb , 4 03 F .3 d at 38 3 (i nte rn a l qu otatio ns omi tte d) . M or e ov e r, thi s Co ur t w ill consider “ whether

the district court a dequate ly considere d and expressed its ap p lication of the-11-

rele vant fa ctors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to per mit ‘meaning ful appe llate re view.’” Da v is , 458 F.3d at 510. Def endant a rg ues that the c ourt should not have used the phrase “re asonable ,” but rather the “suff icient but not gr eate r than ne cessa ry ” languag e. Id

. Th is a

rgume nt c on sti tut e s a

c ha lle ng e to part of the proce dure by which the district c ourt rea ched its sente nce de termination, and ther efor e the cour t’s use of the “reasona

ble” standard is revie wed for reasonablene ss. W ebb , 403 F.3d at 383. Def endant is cor

rec t that the district court’s obligation i s to impose a sentenc e suff icient but not g reater than nece ssary to comply with the purposes of se ction 3553(a) , and the Circuit Court’s obligation is t o revie w a se ntence for “ rea sonablene ss” under Booke r . Foreman , 436 F.3d at 644 n.1. Howeve r, Def

e n d an t’ s ar g u me n t i s a

f o r ma li s ti c c o mp la in t t

h a t t h e d is tr ic t c o u rt u s e d

th e w r o ng words despite having applied the corr ect law. This Court has re jected suc h arguments. I n United States v. W

illiams , 436 F.3d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 2006) , this Court held that the trial cour t, despite not

us ingthe sp e c if

ic wo rd s r e qu ir e d b y

statut e, “ art ic ulate d it s r e a so nin g su ff ic ie ntl y to p e rm it

rea sonable a

ppellate r eview, spe cifying its re asons for se lecting a sentence . . . .” “[T]hi s [C ]ourt has

ne ve r r e qu ir e d th e ‘r itu a l in c antatio n’ of the factor s to a ff

ir m a se nte nc e ,” and

ne ith e r s ho uld

it require the ritual inca

ntation of lang uag e such a s that which Defenda nt urg es her e. Id. “[W ]e do not de mand that th e dis tr ic t court

re c ite any

ma g ic wo rd s to sh owus that it fu lf ill e d it s r e sp on sib ili ty

to be mindful of the fac tors that Congr ess has instructed it to conside r.” Un ite d Stat es v. C on tre ra sMartinez , 4 09 F .3 d 1 23 6, 12 42 (1 0th Cir . 2 00 5) ; W illiams , 4 36 F .3 d at 70 9; see also United States

v . S c ott , 426 F.3d 1 3 2 4 , 1 3 2 9 (11th Cir. 2005). I n other wor ds, this C ourt does not re quire the prec ise fo rm al i s m t h at Def endant would have it require . Rather, this Court will review the underlying substanc e of a sentenc ing to e nsure that the district court applied a rea sonable sente nce,-12-

considering the fac tors under the Guidelines. More over, in Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 458 F.3d at 510- 11, this Court held that the sa m e as s er t ed er ror by the district court (i.e ., purporting to choose a “re asonable ” sente nce r ather than a se ntence that was “ sufficie nt, but not g reater than ne cessa ry ”)

wa s n ot r e ve rs ibl e e rr or

be c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

c on sid e re d th e re le va

nt § 35 53 (a ) f

a c tor s. Her e, the district cour

t considere d eac h of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors in ca lculating the sentenc e. Th e c ourt , u

po n r e se nte nc ing , ma de the fo llo wi ngre mark s: Was that sentence rea sonable under 3553?

. . . This is one of the most serious cases Ihave e ver se en . . . not only beca use of the ong oing nature of the ac t i v i ty and the location of the a ctivity , but also the fac tors that led to the sentenc e enhanc ement for Gu ide lin e purp os e s. I t is an e xtre me ly se ri ou s ma tte r to pu t a larg e numbe r o f p e op le at risk . . . . Beca

use of that se riousness, it is absolutely imperative that the Court pr o m o t e r e s p e c t f

o r [t h e ] l aw an d d e t e r o t h e r s f r o m t h i s s o rt o f c o n d

u c t

. . . . I t is imperative that the Court pr otect the public from other crimes of this defenda nt[ , who] is i n Cr imi na l H ist or

y Ca te g or y I I I [fo r] an a ssa

ult wi th r e sis tin g of

fi c ia l, v and a lis m, and . . . anothe r assa

ult. [ His] s ever al enc ounters with the law .

. . appea r to be re lated to h is d ru g pr ob le ms. I t is po ssi ble , at le a st, that th e de fe nd ant w ould n’t repe at his crimes. B ut should he, the risk [to t he public] would be substantial .

. . . Ibelieve the defe ndant is in a place wher e he can g et treatment for his condition. The sente nce the Court im po sed p re vio us ly is .

. . c on sid e ra

bly be low the Gu ide lin e s. B ut i t is consistent with the statutory policy of the United St ates. B eca use of the statute, there is some disparity

betwee n wh er e t h i s defe ndant is and whe re othe rs might be , dependingupon the statute under which a f ellow def endant mig ht be charg ed . . . . But a low e r s e nte nc e tha

n th e Court

imp os e d w ou ld o nly

inc re a se that di sp ari ty , it wouldn’t reduc e it . . . . For all those rea sons, the Cour t conclude s that the orig inal sentenc e is a re asonable sentenc e. J .A. 281-83. The trial court did not use the “ sufficie nt but not gre at er than nec essar y ” languag e, instead opting for the “re asonable ness” lang uag e. Doing so, while perha ps making appellate revie w less straig htforwa

rd, see United St a t es v. Jo hnson , 403 F.3d 813, 816 ( 6th Cir. 2005), does not detra ct from the pr ocedur al re asonable ness of the se ntence

. Def endant’ s sentenc e is a lso substantively rea sonable. Ultimately , the district court sentenc ed De fenda

nt t o t h e s t at u tory

maxi mum, a fig ure one -third less than the low e nd of the-13-

Guidelines ra

ng e. The district judge neither “selec t[ ed] the sentence arbitra rily , bas[ed] t he sente nce

on imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s, fa il[e d] to c on sid e r p e rt ine nt § 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s, [nor

g a ve ] an un re a so na

ble amount of we ight to an y p er t i n ent fa ctor.” W ebb , 403 F.3d at 385. Accor dingly , Def endant’ s sentenc e is substantively

rea sonable. CO NC LU SION F or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , th is C ourt AF F IR M S the district court’s upw ard a djustment to Defe ndant’s sente nce be cause Def endant’ s conduct created a substantial risk of harm to the lives of minors, and AF F IR M S Merr ell’s sentenc e bec ause it wa s rea sonable.