### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 10-11035

Tigist Ryals Plaintiff-Appellant
v. American Airlines, Inc. Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:08-CV-460

Before KING, GARZA, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Tigist Ryals appeals the district c o u rt’s grant of summary judgment for American Airlines in h er employment discrimination case. Finding that the district court correctly f ound that no genuine issue of material fact remained for trial and that judgment was proper as a matter of law, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Tigist Ryals filed an action for employment discrimination, on the basis of
race, national origin, sex and retaliation, against American Airlines (AA) in the U n i t e d S t a te s C o u rt o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D January27, 2014 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has determ ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/27/2014No. 10-11035

Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, on August 4, 2008, which was

w i t h i n ninety days of receipt of her right to sue letter from the U.S. Equa l Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Ryals became employed with AA in 1995. In January of 2001, she became

a junior aircraft mechanic at Alliance-Fort Worth (AFW), a nd at the time of her lawsuit w as working a s an Aviation Maintenance T echnician ( AMT). Ryals all e g e d t hat, beginning in January of 2004, she had been harassed and discriminated a g a i n s t b y her supervisors and coworkers o n the basis of her Ethiopian origin, black race a n d f emale gender in violation o f Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., and 42 U .S.C. § 1 981. Ryals alleged that s he had b een: giv e n t he most undesirable job assignments, including cleaning the toilets; ostracized; subjected to unwarranted constan t scrutiny; denied overtim e o p p o rtu niti e s ; thr e at e n e d with u nw arr a nt e d di s c i p li n ary action;

s u bj e c t e d to racial slurs and ridicule; and p hysically assaulted on at least two occasions, suffering s erious bodily injury. Ryals alleged that, as a result of AA’s

a c tions, she had suffered financial damages, extreme emotional and m e n t a l distress, fear of the workplace, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life. On M arch 15, 2010, AA filed a motion for summary judgment a sserting that there was no e vidence creating a genuine issue of material fact in support of Ryals’ claims and that AA was entitled t o judgment as a matter of law. AA alleged that Ryals’ complaint was based on petty s lights involving Ryals not always getting the assignments she preferred and coworkers be i n g m e a n
. AA further alleged that the physical a s s a u l ts Ryals complained of were actually workplace injuries for which she received workers’ compensation benefits. Also, based on evidence p resented b y AA, Ryals received more o vertime than 12 of the 14 people she identified as being treated more f avorably and nearly as much as the remaining two. Further, A A asserted that Ryals had never been disciplined, demot e d, t ransferred, denied a l eave of absence, or suffered a pay cut. As a

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result , AA argued that Ryals had failed to present evidence of any discrimination, re t ali ati o n o r e c o n o m i c d a mages and that her claims were barred by limitations because she waited too long to assert them. On September 13, 2010, the district court granted AA’s motion for
summary judgment, finding that Ryals h ad not offered sufficient proof to create

a genuine issue of material fac t

. The district court further found that Ryals failed to show that any alleged events occurring prior to May 31, 2006, were part of a common scheme or related for purposes of the continuing-violation doctrine. AA m ov e d t o s trik e Ry al s ’ entire summary judgment appendix because she failed t o specify which portions supported her claims. Ryals’ also m oved to strike AA’s summary judgment evidence. Ryals’ counsel c o n c e d ed that some of the documents in her response a ppendix were not properly authenticated and some of the evidence was he a r s a y
. C o unsel also i ndicated that the d eath of her husband led to her non-compliance with lo c a l r u l es regarding s equential page numbering. The district court granted AA’s motion t o strike in p a rt and denied Ryals’ motion to strike. Subsequently, Ryals f

iled this a p peal. The EEOC filed an Amicus brief in

s u p p o rt of Ryals in r elation to the general standards applied by the dis t r i c t court, but without taking a position on the other issues in this case. STANDARD OF REVIEW This court re v i e w s d e novo a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue o f material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Stewart v
. M i ss. T ransp. Comm’n , 586 F.3d 32 1 , 327 (5th Cir. 2009). This court w ill affirm the district court’s decision if it finds that no genuine issue of material fact remained for trial and that j udgm e n t was proper as a matter of law. Id

. See also C elotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

3 Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/27/2014No. 10-11035 DISCUSSION 1 I. Whether the district c ourt erred i n denying the application of the continuing violation doctrine, thus excluding acts that occurred more than 300 days before Appellant’s initial complaint to the EEOC?
II. Whether the admissib l e evidence establishes a genuine issue of material f

act from w h ich a jury could c onclude that Appellant suffered a violation of the law ? 2 Ryals filed a c laim w ith the T exas W o r k force Commission on March 27, 2007. On that s ame date, Ryals filed a claim with the EEOC. Therefore, based on the applicable statutory 300-day limitations period, the district court found that Ryals m a y s e e k t o recover under Title VI I for conduct that occurred after May 31, 2006. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Ryals asserts that h er hostile work environment claim is not limited to filing s uit only on events th at fall within the statutory time period under the continuing violation doctrine. Ryals cites Stewart as authority. In Stewart , this court said: A hostile work environment exists “when t he workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and i nsult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of th e victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” National R

. R

. P

assenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 116, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2074, 153 L .Ed.2d 1 06 (2002).

. . . U n l i ke i n a case alleging discrete violations, a hostile environment plaintiff is n ot limited to filing suit on events that fall within t h i s s tatutory time p e r i o d b ecause her c laim “is comprised o f a series of separate acts

1 As thes e is s ues are intertw ined , they are com binedf or d is cus s ion herein.

2 Ryals as s erts that the d is trict court erred in f ind ing that her initial M arch 27, 2007,
s tatem ent to EEO C w ould be exclud ed as hears ay or irrelevant as of f ered at trial. H ow ever, then s he as s erts that the d is trict court d id not actually exclud e it and cons id ered it in ruling
on the m erits of the s um m ary jud gm ent m otion. Ryals ’ point w ith this is u n c l e a r , but the is sue of w hether the evid ence es tablis hes a genuine is s ue of m aterial f act is d is cus s ed herein. It is als o d is cus sed herein p urs uant to the EEO C am icus brief

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that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Id

. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061.
Stewart , 586 F.3d at 328. However, this continuing violation doctrine is limited as follows: First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “separate a c t s” a re related, or else there i s n o single violation that encompasses th e earlier a cts. Second, the violation must be c o ntinuing; intervening action by the employer, among other things, will sever the a cts that preceded it from those subsequent to it, precluding liability for preceding acts outside the filing windo w. Third, the continuing vi o l atio n do c tri n e is tempered b y the court’s equitable powers, which must be exercised to “honor Title VII’s remedial purpos e ‘ w i t hout negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement.’”
Id . (Internal citations omitted). The distri ct court found that Ryals failed to provide e vidence that there

was a continuing violation. Citing Forsyth v. Barr , 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 ( 5th Cir. 1 9 9 4 ), the district c ourt found that Ryals failed in her duty to “i dentify t h e specific portions o f her summary evidence and to a rticulate the precise manner in which that evidence c reates a g enuine issue of f act on AA’s limitations defense and her ability to r e cover on her hostile-work-environment claim u nder a continuing-violation theory.” (Internal marks o mitted). The district c o urt’s specific analysis bears repeating here: In her response, Ryals states th at “[t]he acts are re l a t e d and continuing because

. . . she was systematically segregated from her
w h ite, male co-workers

. . . endured d aily threats, both direct and indirect, to h e r s afety and well being[,] repeatedly has been a ssigned to do jobs alone

. . .[,] was purposefully assigned tasks that could n ot be completed by one p erson i n one shift[,] was repeatedly and unjustifiably s ingled o ut for blame[, a nd was] deprive[d] of the same learning e xperience[s] that her white, m ale [coworkers] enjoyed.” Ryals f urther insists that her coworkers refused o r avoided working with her, and that s he was subjected to “virtually constant” mockery
a n d r idicule. But Ryals does n ot c ite a single piece of eviden c e t o support these conclusory and largely legalistic claims. N or d oes she

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p r ovide any legal analysis of whether these c l aims, even taken as true, would b e sufficient to show a continuin g violation. Specifically, she does not explain how these contentions show that the events p rior to M ay 31, 2006, are related to those occurring after this date. I n s t e a d, Ryals refers to the factual statement made at th e beginning of her b rief, making the b lanket assertion that her c laims
are supported by that f a ctual statement. That factual statement is nineteen-pages long a nd replete with deficien t citations to a large appendix that d o es not comply w ith the local rules and in which exhib i t s a re not identified. “A litigant’s failure to provide legal or factual analysis r esults in waiver” of the related claim or a rgument. Based on the foregoing shortcomings alone, s ummary judgment in favor of AA on its limitations defense and on the a pplicability of th e continuing-violation doctrine is appropriate. Even c onsidering the facts recited in the factual statement of Ryals’ s r esponse brief, there i s no genuine issue on AA’s Title VII limitations defense or her continuing-violation theory.
Or d er Granting Defendant’s Motion for S ummary Judgment, G ranting Defendant’s Motion to S t rike in Part, and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, 4:08-CV-460-Y at 13, 14 (Sept. 13, 2010) (Internal citations o m i t t e d and emphasis added). In Ryals’ brief on appeal, she has expanded her statement o f f acts to more than thirty-seven pages of c onclusory and often contr a d i ctory claims unsupported b y the record in this matter. Ryals claims n umerous u nsupported i n s t a n ces of discrimination, but Ryals fails to p rove any s pecific instances o f discrimination based o n gender, race or national origin. Further, although some of the evidence offered by Ryals was p roperly found t o b e i n a d missible, it is discussed herei n b e c a u s e , just as the district court found, even with this evidence summary judgment is required. As summary judgmen t w o u l d be
proper under either scenario, an y c l a i m regarding the admissibility of the evidence is moot.

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In a nutshell, Ryals asserts that c rew chief Tommy Toon harassed her by interfering with her training, giving her the most undesirable jobs, making false statements about h er p erformance, and threatening her. However, she fails to provide any proof of this other than her own conclusory statements, which f ail to establish any discrimination based o n gender, r a ce or national o rigin. Ryals claims that s h e w a s gi v e n undesirable jobs related to “lavatory, toilets and cleaning.” Yet, the record indicates, a nd Ryals conceded at oral argument, that all mechanics performed these duties and she also speaks of her performance of other jobs such as wing greasing, roto-peening, engine work, c hair r e moval, etc. She claims that, in response to her reporting the harassment, Toon attempted to ru n h e r o ver with a cart. However, the record indicates that Ryals had previously stated that the person she c laims attem p t e d t o run her over was actually someone named Gary Dant. The f irst t i me Ryals apparently made this claim against Toon was on appeal. She makes n umerous other c l aims of discrimination by various other people, some of whom she attempts to relate back to T oon. She also c l aims that she was ostracized by her c oworkers and that they did not want to work with her b e c a u s e of Toon. These claims are not s upported by the record. Further , t h e record, which includes statements from various coworkers, i ndicates that any possible ostracization was directly attributable to Ryals and h e r b e h avi o r t o ward others. Ryals claims that s he was discriminated against b ecause she was denied the o pportunity to advance and/or take c ertain t ests. The record i ndicates that Ryal s r e p eatedly failed certain tests and never even took others n ecessary for advancement. Further, the record i ndicates Ryals’ mechan ical skills were lacking and that it often took h e r longer than it s hould h ave to c omplete assignments.

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Ryals c laims that she was discriminated against for failing to be allowed t o work overtime on o n e occasion. However, as stated previously, A A offere d evidence that Ryals received more overtime than 12 o f the 1 4 people she identified as being treated more favorably and nearly as m uch as the remaining two. In her EEOC s ubmission, Ryals made a general assertion that, “[b]eginning i n January 2 004, I began w o r k i n g under a Crew Chief named Tommy T oon. 3 Mr

. T o o n r o utinely provided me with the most undesirable job assignments, including work related t o the lavatory, t oilets, and cleaning.” However, Ryals made n o specific claim o f any harassment based on gender, race

or national origin during this period. She then s tated, “[b]eginning in February 28, 2005, I b egan working under C rew Chief Tommy Toon again. He

c o n t i nuously t reated me in a discriminatory f ashion, including: unfavorable assignments, monitoring my work closely as a means of harassment, and denying overtime resulting in lost w ages, and recommending disciplinary action against me without cause.” 4 Ryals then indicated that on January 23, 2006, she received n otice of a shift rotation i n which she would again b e working under Toon. Ryals said that she advis e d S u p e rvisor Tammy Lance that such a change would be a “nightmare” and that Lance authorized a change of s hift for her. Notwithstanding that Ryals failed to even a ssert any instances of discrimination based on gender, r ace or national origin p rior to J anuary 23, 2006, if s he had, this intervening action by Lance wo u l d “ sever the a cts that preceded it from

3 Y e t, in a M ay 7, 2006, com p laint to the H R D ep artm ent, Ryals s aid , “I have b e e n d ealing w ith this ind i vi d u a l f o r ap p roxim ately five years and it has continuous ly gotten
w ors e. ”

4 In her d ep os ition, Ryals claim ed that she had been d is crim inated agains t at AA since 1996. 8 Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/27/2014No. 10-11035

those subsequent to it, precluding liability f or preceding acts outside the filing window.” Stewart , 586 F.3d at 328, 329. Ryals s aid that th en, in January of 2 006, she began having difficulty with

a white, male coworker named Terry Buckler 5 , “who had p reviously t old me that
my [white] husband should not h a v e married me because I am b lack.” 6 Ryals failed to provide the d ate, time or context of this alleged st a t e m e n t

. Ryals asserts that her t r ouble with Buckler included him making “hostile, but nonracial, comments about her” and a “farting incident.” Again, Ry a ls failed to provide the date, time or conte x t of Buckler’s alleged statements, b ut she said the “farting incident” occurred o n M a r c h 2 1 , 2006, in the break room. She claimed that B uckler “came up to me in the break room, stuck his b uttocks in my face and farted. ” I n a l e t t e r to the union on June 1 , 2006, Ryals said that she t o l d Buckler’s father, who a pparently also worked for AA, of the “fartin g incident.” She also said in the letter that Buckler w as “very s carred [sic]” that she was going to t ake him to HR, a nd that coworkers began to make fun of him, “saying his father grounded him.” Ryals said that B uckler told others that she

was going to take him to HR and, as a result, “[w]hen I w e n t t o first shift on March 27, 2006, th at ruined my reputation and most of the guys did not want to work with me. S ome o f them asked me, why did you not take him to HR? If h e ‘ f a r t e d on me, I would take him to HR.’” H er claim that Buckler ruined he r reputation by telling o thers she was going to take him t o HR is contradicted by h e r s t a t e ment that others asked why s he did not take him to HR. I t c ertainly
appears that she attempted to ruin h i s r e p u t ation by discussing the “farting incident” with Buc k l e r ’ s father and others, who in turn made fun of him. Further, Ryals fails to assert or establish that Buckler “farted” on her because

5 H e is ref

erred to as Terry Butler in Ryals ’ d ep os ition.

6 Ryals s aid that the s lurs s he heard w ere this alleged s tatem ent and then one tim e w hen s he overheard Gary Dant call her a “bitch. ” 9 Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/27/2014No. 10-11035

of her gender, race or national origin. Finally, Ryals fails to establish how her claims regarding Buckler are related to any other claims discussed herein. Ryals ass e r t s that on April 27, 2006, she was assigned “dangerous rotopeen work” by Toon and suffered injury as a result. In her EEOC submission, Ryals said: On April 27, 2006, the harassment from C rew Chief Tommy Toon reached a new height. My performance o f assigned roto-peen work w as sabotaged by what could only b e the deliberate disruption of the power source. The additional work required was exhausting and enormously frustrating. When the r e s t of m y s hift was going home, I advised Crew C hief Toon that all that remained was some t o u ch up work. H e insisted that I r eturn to the site and c omplete the j ob alone. Due to my exhaustion, and the proximity of one’s face to the machine I was usin g , t h e rotating part of the machine grabbed and ripped out a large ch u n k o f hair o ff my s calp. I screamed l oudly, but n obody (including M r. Toon) c a m e t o my assistance. D espite my injury, I asked the Q uality Assurance (QA) representative John Grutznacher [sic] to confirm that my w ork had been properly c ompleted. He s aid it was good and e xpressed his concern for my injury. I signed the paperwork and went home. Ryals also indicated that she did not g o t o the doctor for this injury from the hand-held roto-peen until May 10, 2006. In her letter to the u nion on June 1, 2006, Ryals said t h at she was assigned the roto-peen j ob by a crew chief named Ron Riley, not T o o n a s she alleges in her brief. 7 Further, in the letter, Ryals s aid the following occurred after she completed the job:

Then I went to get a QA ( Quality Acceptance) at 3:30. The QA looked at it and said that the i nb o ard and outboard was done. However, he wanted m e to do a little touch-up t o the link face. At that time, (since it was 3:30), Alfredo [Melendez, who had assisted
as a timer at times on the job] and t he other first-shift employees left the dock to prepare for going home, and usually second shift is suppose to take over at 3:30.

7 Ryals als o s aid in her d ep os ition that Riley as s igned the job. 10 Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/27/2014No. 10-11035 Since I was exhausted and shift change had began, I went and brought the second-shift Crew C h ief, Tommy T oon, to my work area and t old him that the inboard a nd outboard w as completed, but that the link face required a little touch up. Then I asked him to explain to QA. Tommy Toon said “So what, if it needs to be done, you have to do it.” I was t rying t o tel l h im that it was time to go home, so I asked him what time it is, and he looked at his watch and said you have fourteen minutes, finish it. When h e said th at, Mr. John Grutzmacher the QA was still there. This upset me especially since he knew about all of the power problems that I encountered (preventing me f rom f inishing the j ob) and since second s hift was already there, (sitting down at that time). Therefore, I started the machine, and continued working. I was tryi n g t o concentrate while touching up the link-face, which r e quir e s you to get your face very close to the unit. Upon c o m p l e t i o n (at 3:55), I reached to turn off the motor and a s I stretched for it with my left hand, and s ince I was st r e ssed and exhausted, m y right hand came c loser to my face, a nd the r o t ating part grabbed and ripped out a large chunk of my hair off my scalp. This was very painful and I screamed v ery loud; and nobody (including the crew chief) came to see if I was OK. Then I asked th e QA about the job, and he said that it was good. Then he said I am worried about the accident, and that he had never seen one like this, and I tried to cover up my head, and he h elped me. I asked him n ot to tell anybody, because I did not w ant the guys to make fun o f me. Then I signed the paperwork, and all I wanted was t o h i d e my injury, a nd leave. Since it was past 4:00, I put u p my tools, check in the roto-peen machine to the tool room, and left. In her deposition, Ryals gave a different account:
I was very stressed and very upset, I’m – he just told me to do t h e job and all I want to do is do the touch-up a nd go, but I c a n ’ t concentrate a nd I was s h a k i n g a nd I went up holding with – with this hand and then trying to do that, the job, and then it w ill fall o n me, it w as right

– from the wing i t kept c oming to me, the machine. So I tried to stop it and I got it in my hair. Ryals a lso indicated that her long hair was in a ponytail the day o f the a ccident. She said it was “discrimi n a t o r y , retaliatory” because Toon should h ave let her

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leave a f ew m inutes early to go home and should h ave made someone else finish the touch u p. She a l s o s a i d that she considered the roto-peen i ncident to be a physical assault because, “I was emotionally very s tressed out and I should n ’ t have been doing that job, I should go home.” Ryals was assigned this job j u s t after 10:30 a.m., b ut did not start on it until after both her 11 a.m. lunch and 1 p.m. break. The record indicates that there were some power i ssues after she had started working on th e job. Ryals attempted to blame this on someone intentio n ally c u tti n g o f f th e power, h owever, such an allegation is absolutely not supported by the record. R y a l s also said in her letter to the u nion that she did not ask to do the roto-peen job, but that “three weeks ago Alfredo suggested to me that the guys

s aid that you were n ot working and if you want to get them off you r b a c k , y o u need to do the roto-peen.” However, in her deposition, Ryals u nequivocally said she asked f

or the roto-peen job. In fact, Ryals said, “[y]eah, I had t o fight for that to do that. . . .” Grutzma c h e r s aid that he w as standing by Ryals as she performed the touch-up, but had h is back to her. He also said he was u n able to approve the job because it still needed a d diti o n al w ork. Further, “ [b]ased on my experience, Roto Peen work is usually a one-person job because the m achine is hand-held. On the day that Ms. Ryals w as injured, I had no reason t o believe that the job she was doing could not be handled by one person.” Another “assault” that Ryals complains of involved an incident on October 3, 2006, when someone opened a closed access hatch as she s tepped on top of it while carrying something. Ryals claims in her brief that: During the event, Ryals could see co-worker Mr. Jim Coultes, who is a good friend of s upervisor Toon and would frequently target her with angry looks, just standing there watching her. Despite being in position to know that Ryals’ [sic] was a p p r o a c hing the hatch carrying h eavy gear, Mr. Cou l tes opened the hatch knowing that

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Ryals’ [sic] would b e on top of it. Mr. Coultes a dmits to opening th e hatch, but claims he could not s ee Ryals. Ryals’ [sic] asked Coultes
w h y he had done so, and he refused to a nswer. As a resul t , M s
. Ryals was severely injured a nd suffered a concussion, fractu r ed shoulder, a deep cut to her left l e g , a n d o t h er injuries. M s. Ryals
was unconscious for several minutes. Despite knowing th at s he was badly i njured, Coultes failed or refused to provide any aid a nd just walked a way from the scene despite supervisor Jerry Smith a sking for witnesses. (Internal citations o mitted). However, in h e r d e position, Ryals described her injuries as follows:

So I noticed when I step on the latch, I feel the lift. And after t h a t I passed out for two minutes, b ecause they told me I fell, my head hit the lavatory, the first l a v a tory, and then since I was carrying those two metals my hand got pulled, my h and hurt, which I was very lucky it didn’t go to my face. And th e n s i n c e he just opened it, the latch opened and then he closed it back, I had a cut o n my leg. Ryals also said s he d i d not know whether Coultes looked through the hole. Further, s h e f

i l e d a workers’ compensation claim and received b enefits for approximately three or four months, but was out of work for a year. I n her submission to the EEOC, Ryals s aid, “Mr. Coultes made no e f f o r t to assist me as I lay u n c o n s cious, confirming his malice; I asked h im why he opened the hatch and h e made no reply.” It w o u l d appear that if Ryals was unconscious, she could neither observe Coultes’ efforts to assist her nor ask him why he opened the hatch. I n his statement, Coultes indicated that he did not see Ryals, attempted to open the hatch carefully, and went to her aid after she fell. Ryals claims the third “assault” occurred o n April 28, 2008, shortly after she returned t o work from her previous injury. S he was lying down and working under a seat when a coworker, Robert “Boome r” Walvoord, w alking down the aisle stepped on her leg a nd injured her k nee. Ryals said she believed Walvoord stepp e d on her intentionally because he is a friend o f Toon and “the thing is

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really, and he didn’t turn aro u n d a n d say, ‘oh, sorry,’ o r anything else, he just sneak out. If you make a mistake, you turn aroun d a n d y ou apologize.” However, in a May 18, 2 008, statement, Ryals s aid, as soon as Walvoord stepped

on her knee, “[l]oudly I said, because I was in pain, Boomer (nickname) you just stepped on my knee and you are just leaving. Everybody heard what I said. He turned around, I apologize, I apologize, and he left.” The Injury on Duty Report completed by Supervisor Richard Bullard said:
After the accident I w ent into the first class area to look at the area on t h e p l a n e. I n oticed that the area where the employee was working was highly cluddered [sic] with air hoses and with a huge air conditioning hose. Where t he employee was working i t would have been easy for another person t o miss seeing someone stretched
o ut on the floor half working under a seat. B o omer stated t h a t h e did not see her and thought he was standing o n the a/c hose wh e n it w as actually th e employee’s knee. Boomer is a l a rge man about 5-10 and 260 pounds. I believe that the acti o n was a m istake o n Boomer’s part and not done on purpose.
In his statement, Walvoord said, “” I w as trying to see some co-workers at the other end of the aircraft that I was coordinating with on a job assignment. In doing so, I stepped i nto the aisle and accide n t a l l y stepped on Tigist Ryals’ knee.” Walvoord said that the aircraft was cluttered and he did not see Ryals, but, once he realized he had stepped on her, he apologized. He further said, “I did not intentionally step on Ms. Ryals, nor did I intend to injure her.” R y a l s has failed to establish a hostile work environment in that she h a s

n o t s h o w n th at A

A i s “p ermeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, a n d insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to a l t e r t h e conditions” of her employment and “create an abusive working environment.” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 116, 1 22 S.Ct. 2061, 2074, 1 53 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). Further, Ryals has not established a c o ntinui n g vi o l at i on by showing

14 Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/27/2014No. 10-11035

that the separate a c t s o f w h i ch she c omplains a re r elated. S tewart , 586 F.3d 321. Instead, Ryals offers only her own conclusory statements. Ryals’ reliance o n Huckaby v
. Moore , 142 F.3d 233 ( 5th C ir. 1998) is misplaced. H uckaby was continually subjected to racial harassment. Id

. at 239. Huckaby consistently indicated, in b oth his affidavit and his deposition, that he

was “constantly ribbed and harassed for being white.” Id. at 2 40. Additionally, Huckaby was required by h is African-American supervisor to attend a meeting that black employees were not required to a ttend and he was assigned to stand in the rain while other employees were not. Id

. Ryals offers no e vidence of any constant harassment of any sort. Instead, she offers only c ontradictory and “vague or conclusory allegations of discrimination or harassment” whi c h “ ar e n o t enough to survive summary judgment.” I d . at 241. Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant The EEOC’s brief indicates that its f a c t u al r e citation is b ased on Ryals declaration, including the March 27, 2 007, statement, a nd c o-worker Elizabeth Drac o n’s 8 declaration. Further the EEOC believes the district court erred in excluding Ryals’ attachment as inadmissib l e hearsay. However, as stated previously, Ryals i s of the opinion that the district court considered the statement. She is correct. The district court said: AA objects to Ryals’s letter to the EEOC as h earsay. Ryals responds that the l etters are n ot offered f or the truth of the m atter asserted, but a re instead offered to prove the facts of w h i c h AA was a ware. But the letter is to the EEOC, n ot to AA, and Ryals cites the letter in support of her factual assertions regarding the incident. In any event, the Court discusses this evidence only to s how that Ryals has failed to s pecify evidence creating a f a c t issue on AA’s limitations defense and that, even if the Court parses through Ryals’s evidence
on its own, there is no issue of fact on the defense or her c ontinuingviolation theory. Were Ryals to offer this evidence at t rial to prove

8 D racon’s statem ent als o es tablis hed s om e of the of fens ive nick nam es us ed f or Ryals ’ various cow ork ers , i. e. , “Box of Rock s ” and“H itler. ” 15 Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/27/2014No. 10-11035

the facts o f her claims, i t would be excluded as h e arsay; if offered to prove the facts of w h i c h A A was aware, it would be excluded as irrelevant.
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion f or Summary Judg m ent, G ranting Defendant’s Motion to S t rike in Part, and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, 4:08-CV-460-Y at 15, n. 1 (Sept. 13, 2010). The EEOC correctly asserts the a pplicable l a w
. However, we disagree with the a s s e r t ion that the district court a pplied incorrect legal standards in

e x c l u d ing evidence of acts of harassment attested to by the p laintiff in considering the defendant’s motion for s ummary judgment. As set out throughout the summary judgment order, the district court clearly did consider all of the evidence, even that which ultimately may have been excluded. CONCLUSION The record in this matter establishes that no genuine issue of m aterial fact remained for trial and that j udgment was proper as a matter of law. Therefore,

we AFFIRM the district c o u r t ’ s grant o f summary judgment for American Airlines.

16 Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/27/2014