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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39285

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL 

RIGHTS OF JANE (2011-17) DOE.

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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 

WELFARE,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE (2011-17) DOE,

Respondent-Appellant.

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2012 Opinion No. 24

Filed: April 25, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia

County. Hon. Mick Hodges, Magistrate. 

Order terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Clayne S. Zollinger, Jr., Rupert, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; James T. Baird, Deputy Attorney 

General, Twin Falls, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Jane Doe (Mother) appeals from the magistrate’s order terminating her parental rights to 

her child. We affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

When Mother gave birth to her child on April 6, 2010, Mother admitted to using 

methamphetamine, both intravenously and by smoking, during the pregnancy. Because it was 

suspected the child would test positive for methamphetamine, a child protective case was filed 

on the date of birth. After showing positive test results for methamphetamine, the child was 
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removed to foster care and Mother was charged with felony injury to child. Mother later pled 

guilty to the charge and was placed on probation. 

A shelter care hearing was held on April 8, 2010, at which time the child was formally 

placed into protective custody under the Child Protective Act (CPA). The magistrate held an 

adjudicatory hearing on April 28, 2010, and issued a decree two weeks later, finding the court 

had jurisdiction under the CPA and ordering that legal custody be vested with the Idaho 

Department of Health and Welfare (Department). A case plan was prepared and filed on 

May 27, 2010, for both Mother and the child’s father. As to Mother, the case plan included 

provisions, among others, that Mother would (1) address her substance abuse issues, (2) address 

her possible mental health issues, (3) gain full-time employment, and (4) obtain adequate 

housing before reunification with the child would occur. 

Mother initially obtained funding and started outpatient treatment at a family services 

organization. However, Mother reported being uncomfortable at that organization and was 

discharged from the treatment program for failing to attend. Shortly thereafter, she admitted to 

the Department social worker that she had used methamphetamine. An assessment of Mother, 

completed around that time, also reported on Mother’s continued use of methamphetamine--she 

even went to the assessment while high--despite the child having tested positive for 

methamphetamine at birth, an open child protective case, and other negative consequences 

associated with her drug use. The assessment suggested an intensive inpatient treatment 

program, as well as coordinating services with the justice system. Similarly, the child’s guardian 

ad litem indicated concerns about Mother’s failure to adhere to her case plan in any manner 

whatsoever in the four months since the child’s birth and Mother’s constant stream of excuses as 

to why she was not following recommendations in the case plan. Thereafter, Mother started 

treatment at a different substance abuse center in September 2010 and successfully completed 

the center’s inpatient program. 

At the six-month review in October 2010, the child’s parents stipulated that the child 

would remain in the State’s custody. A Department social worker assigned to Mother’s case 

expressed that the prognosis for reunifying Mother with the child in this case was poor because 

of Mother’s limited efforts to meet the requirements of her case plan and continued drug use. 

After Mother was released from the inpatient drug treatment facility, the guardian ad litem also 

reported Mother continued to use methamphetamine and had only limited participation in any 
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other substance abuse treatment. For example, Mother had missed over half of the scheduled 

sessions with the second outpatient treatment center from which she was supposedly receiving 

help. While Mother was making some progress in the sessions she did attend, she seemed 

ambivalent about her substance abuse recovery and made numerous excuses for missing other 

scheduled sessions. Additionally, Mother had been coming to visitations with the child while 

high. In fact, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines in November

2010. Not long afterwards, Mother was arrested and remained incarcerated from December 27, 

2010, to January 15, 2011, for failing to appear at a court date with the drug court. After her 

arrest, Mother was also terminated from the second outpatient treatment center for failing to 

attend. 

A review hearing was held on February 23, 2011. As a result of the magistrate’s order 

following that hearing, reunification efforts were ceased and the State began focusing on 

termination of both the father and Mother’s parental rights. On March 29, 2011, Mother was 

again arrested for probation violations after admitting to methamphetamine use just two to three 

weeks prior. On April 12, 2011, while Mother was still incarcerated, the Department filed a 

motion to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and the child’s father. Mother was 

released from custody on July 28, 2011, and the termination hearing was held on August 13, 

2011. The father consented to the termination of his parental rights; Mother contested the 

termination and went to trial. 

At Mother’s trial on September 1, 2011, evidence was presented that Mother, during her 

four-month incarceration, attended bi-weekly Narcotics Anonymous classes, participated in a 

daily outpatient therapy program, and regularly attended church meetings. She also completed a 

twelve-week course in anger management. In the roughly one month between her release and 

the trial, Mother continued to participate in the outpatient therapy program, was in a second 

anger management course, and attended general education classes to work towards her high 

school diploma. She also reported she was participating in personal and group counseling. 

Though not yet employed, Mother had been accepted by a rehabilitation facility and was 

planning to attend job training and mental awareness training to help her gain employment. 

Mother had also submitted to drug tests three times per week since her release from jail and had 

clean results during that time frame. The magistrate acknowledged Mother’s latest efforts to

meet her case plan, but determined that terminating the Mother’s parental rights was in the best 
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interests of the child. An order terminating Mother’s parental rights was entered on 

September 29, 2011. Mother timely appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The United States Supreme Court has held that a parent’s interest in maintaining a 

relationship with his or her child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); 

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978). See also In re Doe, 146 Idaho 759, 761, 203 

P.3d 689, 691 (2009). Concordantly, the Idaho Legislature has, in the CPA, directed that “the 

state of Idaho shall, to the fullest extent possible, seek to preserve, protect, enhance and reunite 

the family relationship.” Idaho Code § 16-1601. Likewise, the Termination of Parent and Child 

Relationship Act states, “Implicit in this chapter is the philosophy that wherever possible family 

life should be strengthened and preserved . . . .” I.C. § 16-2001(2). 

Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has 

determined that a court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is 

supported by “clear and convincing evidence.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768-69. See also I.C. § 

16-2009; Doe, 146 Idaho at 761-62, 203 P.3d at 691-92; State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 

P.3d 649, 652 (2006). On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court 

examines whether the decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means 

such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.1

 Doe v. 

Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge 

all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that 

parental rights be terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also stated, however, that the 

substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court 

 1 Here, our review rests on reports and examinations relevant to Mother and the child only 

to the extent those records were admitted as exhibits into evidence and on facts established 

through witness testimony at trial. Although the district court gave a blanket judicial notice to all 

records and files pertinent to this case, the request by counsel was insufficient to meet the 

requirements of Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 because the general request failed to identify 

specific documents and the parties did not stipulate to have the child protection case documents 

admitted in accordance with Idaho Juvenile Rule 48. See also I.C. § 16-2009 (providing a 

court’s finding in a termination of parental rights case must be based on clear and convincing 

evidence under rules applicable to the trial of civil causes).
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finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, than in cases where a mere 

preponderance is required. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and 

convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved 

is highly probable or reasonably certain. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 

(2006). Further, the magistrate’s decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. 

In re Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Grounds for Termination

A court may terminate a person’s parental right if it finds (1) a statutory ground exists for 

termination; and (2) termination is in the best interests of the child. I.C. § 16-2005; Doe v. Roe, 

133 Idaho 805, 810, 992 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1999). One statutory ground for termination is 

finding the child is neglected. I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b). A neglected child is defined, in relevant 

part, as a child: 

(a) Who is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or 

other care or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or 

omission of his parents, guardian or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to 

provide them; . . . or

(b) Whose parents, guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their 

responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child 

lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety or well-being;

I.C. § 16-1602(25). Neglect may also occur where “[t]he parent(s) has failed to comply with the 

court’s orders in a child protective act case or the case plan, and reunification of the child with 

his or her parent(s) has not occurred within the time standards set forth in section 16-1629(9), 

Idaho Code.” I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). The time standard as defined in Idaho Code § 16-1629(9) 

states, in relevant part: 

There shall be a rebuttable presumption that if a child is placed in the custody of 

the department and was also placed in out of the home care for a period not less 

than fifteen (15) out of the last twenty-two (22) months from the date the child 

entered shelter care, the department shall initiate a petition for termination of 

parental rights. This presumption may be rebutted by a finding of the court that 

the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights would not be in the best 

interest of the child or reasonable efforts have not been provided to reunite the 

child with his family, or the child is placed permanently with a relative.
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A court may also consider the events resulting in the child being placed in foster care when 

determining whether there was neglect. In re Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199

(2008). 

The presumption in favor of the Department initiating a termination petition set out in

Idaho Code § 16-1629(9) does not create a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child 

to terminate parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 474, 479, 235 

P.3d 1195, 1200 (2010). A finding that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental 

rights must still be made upon objective grounds, supported by substantial and competent 

evidence. See id. at 481, 235 P.3d at 1202. 

B. The Magistrate’s Decision to Terminate

On appeal, Mother argues the magistrate’s decision to terminate her parental rights was 

premature because of the changes she had made in her life, so that she would be better able to 

care for the child. The State responds that the magistrate’s decision to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence of both a statutory ground for 

termination and that termination was in the child’s best interests. 

1. Statutory grounds

In this case, the social workers, along with Mother, determined that there were four 

primary areas that needed to be addressed before the child could be returned to Mother’s care: 

(1) her substance abuse issues; (2) her possible mental health issues; (3) the need for full-time 

employment; and (4) the need for adequate housing. Each of these was incorporated into 

Mother’s case plan. 

As to the issue of Mother’s substance abuse, the evidence shows she continued to use 

methamphetamine largely throughout the pendency of the child protection case. She admitted to 

using methamphetamine on April 16, 2010, just over one week after the child’s birth. She began 

outpatient treatment at a family services organization, but was quickly terminated from the 

program for failing to attend sessions. Mother admitted to the Department social worker that she 

had “had a setback” and used methamphetamine during this time. She started an outpatient 

program at a different treatment facility, but attended only half of the scheduled sessions before 

being accepted into an inpatient program. Although Mother did successfully complete the 

inpatient program, she relapsed into drug use within weeks of being released from the inpatient 

program. In the months between the inpatient program and her incarceration for failing to attend
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a drug court date, she had attended less than half of the scheduled sessions in a second outpatient 

program and again tested positive for methamphetamine. After the short incarceration in 

December 2010 and January 2011, she missed scheduled drug tests, and when she was tested, 

tested positive. Mother was terminated from the second outpatient treatment center in January

2011. The discharge summary stated Mother failed to complete even the first goal of learning to 

accept how her addiction had created negative consequences in her life. The summary found 

Mother was not invested in the recovery process nor was she willing to make changes in her life 

that would support recovery efforts. By that time, Mother had attended only fourteen of the 

forty-four scheduled appointments, which included many individual sessions where she was to 

help develop her treatment plan. The summary also indicated Mother was not personally 

motivated to address her substance abuse, but rather was motivated by external factors. Even the 

threats of jail and losing her child did not motivate her to quit abusing drugs. It was only after 

the filing of the termination action and being incarcerated for four months that Mother made 

efforts to address her substance abuse by participating in an outpatient treatment program and 

submitting to weekly drug tests. 

In terms of addressing her possible mental health issues, Mother submitted to a mental 

health evaluation that suggested she seek one-on-one counseling, but that she should begin with 

substance abuse counseling and treatment and then move on to addressing other issues. An 

assessment from the outpatient treatment center found alcohol and substance dependency, 

depression, anxiety, and conduct problems that needed to be addressed. There were also 

numerous references in the evidence to Mother’s failure to take responsibility for her actions, her 

treatment, and the fact the child was in the State’s custody. Instead, a visitation supervisor

indicated that at visitations with the child, Mother did not use her time appropriately to bond 

with the child, but rather, spent the time blaming the Department for the child being under the 

State’s care. The visitation supervisor further testified that Mother was not easily redirected to 

caring for and nurturing the child. Mother also struggled with parenting during her visitations 

because of either being under the influence of methamphetamine or because she was

experiencing withdrawal symptoms, and she failed to bring appropriate supplies to the visitations 

for the child, such as diapers and wipes. There were further concerns about her commitment to 

addressing mental and behavioral problems, as exhibited by twenty years of substance abuse, 

past failures in outpatient treatment programs, a long history of relationships with abusive men, 
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and a failure to acknowledge any responsibility. While Mother at first seemed cooperative in 

addressing some of her issues, Mother became increasingly uncooperative with case workers and 

other Department employees up until the time of her arrest in March 2011--refusing to meet 

monthly, refusing to speak with persons about her case, and verbally assaulting case workers. 

In addition to the severe noncompliance with the case plan in the areas of substance 

abuse and addressing her mental health issues, Mother at no time during the pendency of the 

child protection case provided verification of full-time employment or adequate housing. At 

times, Mother stated it was too hard to have a job because of all the meetings and court sessions 

she had to attend. At a later time, she claimed she was employed part-time but never provided 

information to confirm her employment or any income. Mother also claimed, at one point, that 

she was getting an apartment at a particular complex, but the claim was never verified. Mother 

contributed little, if any, towards supporting the child in the seventeen months the case was 

pending. Even by the time of her trial, Mother testified she did have housing, but she still had no 

employment, was not in a position to care for the child at that time, and was completely 

supported by her parents. 

There was abundant evidence that Mother failed to comply with the court’s orders in the 

child protective case and case plan, establishing a ground of neglect. Moreover, by the time of 

the termination hearing in September, the child had been in the custody of the State for seventeen 

months, meeting the time limit in Idaho Code § 16-1629(9). Additionally, the magistrate may 

consider both past and current conduct when determining whether grounds exist for terminating 

a person’s parental rights. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 843, 172 P.3d 1114, 1118 (2007). 

Where the magistrate takes into account all the evidence, this Court will not reweigh the 

evidence. Id. at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117. Here, the magistrate also considered that Mother had 

attended narcotics anonymous classes during incarceration, participated in an outpatient therapy 

program, took anger management courses both in and out of jail, was taking a few educational 

courses, and was attending group and personal counseling. Still, he determined a statutory 

ground for termination existed through evidence establishing neglect. 

We conclude, in light of all the evidence, there is substantial and competent evidence 

supporting the magistrate’s finding that Mother had neglected the child due to her “inability to 

discharge any parental responsibility” and that the inability presented “a serious risk to the 
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child’s health, safety and well-being.”2 See In re Doe, 149 Idaho 401, 406-07, 234 P.3d 725, 

730-31 (2010) (concluding father neglected child because of evidence showing a failure to 

maintain housing, employment, or abstinence from controlled substances, which impaired his 

ability to provide proper parental care); Doe, 149 Idaho at 479-81, 235 P.3d at 1200-02 (finding 

substantial and competent evidence that termination was in the best interests of the children on 

the basis of neglect where parents repeatedly failed to comply with case plan, continued to use 

illegal drugs, missed required drug testing, and demonstrated an inability to provide proper 

parental care); Doe, 144 Idaho at 843-44, 172 P.3d at 1118-19 (finding neglect was established 

where mother made minimal efforts at reunification, continued to engage in illegal activity 

resulting in reincarceration, and did not demonstrate she had incorporated what she learned into 

her life after participating in programs while in prison). 

2. Best interests of the child

In addition to finding the statutory basis of neglect, the magistrate also determined it was 

in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The evidence before the 

magistrate showed Mother failed to demonstrate an ability to safely parent the child, failed to

follow through the case plan, continued to use drugs, failed to obtain employment or adequate 

housing, failed numerous drug tests she had submitted to from the time the child was placed in 

foster care up to the point of her incarceration spanning a course of eleven months, returned to 

drug use just weeks after the inpatient treatment program, and demonstrated little or no 

motivation to maintain sobriety voluntarily for any length of time. Further, the child had 

developed a bond with the foster care provider and needed permanency. Mother had not shown,

during the pendency of the action, any ability to discharge parental responsibilities. 

At the trial, Mother admitted she had not done anything in her case plan until after the 

termination action was filed. The guardian ad litem testified that the case plan was not 

unattainable for Mother, but after working with Mother and witnessing her attend visitations with 

the child while high on methamphetamine, opined that termination was in the best interests of the 

child. Both social workers who had been assigned to the case also recommended that 

termination was in the best interests of the child, explaining the child’s need for stability to grow 

 2 The court also found abuse existed as a statutory ground, based on the fact that Mother 

had exposed the child to methamphetamine in utero. 
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and progress. Mother also testified to a twenty-year history of drug use and that she understood 

prognosis for recovery after such lengthy use was poor. 

The magistrate found that Mother’s efforts during and after her four-month incarceration

were de minimus and did not appear to be sincere. Moreover, Mother was still on probation for 

injury to child, and any violation of the probation terms subjected Mother to the possibility of 

one to seven years in prison. The magistrate reflected on the fact that Mother had lost custody of 

four other children to their father precisely because of drug use and associated incarcerations. 

The magistrate’s finding that termination was in the best interests of the child is supported by 

substantial and competent evidence. 

C. Whether the decision to terminate was premature

Lastly, we address Mother’s argument that, in light of all the efforts she made in the few 

months prior to termination, the termination was premature. To support her argument that 

termination was premature, Mother primarily relies on Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe,

150 Idaho 752, 250 P.3d 803 (Ct. App. 2011), where this Court held a magistrate’s order to 

terminate was erroneous given the substantial progress the father had made towards completing 

his case plan and his earnest efforts to be reunited with his children. We concluded that, having 

been requested by the father to have three or four additional months to complete the case plan 

before proceeding with termination, the magistrate erred in refusing the request, particularly in 

light of the evidence of his progress. Id. at 758, 250 P.3d at 809. The evidence before the 

magistrate demonstrated that the father, though he had one relapse into alcohol use, had 

otherwise complied with probation terms, submitted to alcohol tests with successful results, 

attended alcohol treatment sessions regularly, and accepted responsibility for his addiction and 

the negative consequences resulting therefrom. Furthermore, he had made all of his scheduled 

visitations with his children, acknowledged his poor treatment of them in the past and apologized 

to them for his behavior, engaged his children in activities and helped with homework during the 

visitations, and petitioned for and was granted continuing visitation with his children even after

he knew termination was being sought. Id. at 754-55, 758-59, 250 P.3d at 805-06, 809-10. Both 

treatment providers and the children’s guardian ad litem gave positive reviews of the father, his 

efforts towards rehabilitation, and his strides in building a better relationship with his children. 

Id. at 758-59, 250 P.3d at 809-10. By the time of termination, the father had maintained 

full-time employment for quite some time and simply asked for a few more months to finish 
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paying off some debts, reinstate his driver’s license and obtain adequate housing, which he 

already was in the process of doing. Therefore, we concluded the magistrate erred in failing to 

take into account the practicalities of the father’s situation and in denying the request for more 

time before terminating parental rights. Id. at 762-63, 250 P.3d at 813-14.

The facts of the above case are vastly different than those presented in this case. Unlike 

the parent at issue in Doe, 150 Idaho 752, 250 P.3d 803, Mother had not just one relapse, but 

continued to use drugs for over eleven months into the pendency of this case. Mother also 

missed several visitations with her child (attending only five of twelve scheduled visitations after 

her incarceration in December 2010 and January 2011 and before she was again arrested) and did 

not engage in appropriate parenting behavior during those visitations. Moreover, after visitations 

ceased, Mother did not call or petition for more visitations until shortly before her trial. It had 

been a few years since Mother was employed full-time and she at no time during the pendency of 

this case could verify that she had even part-time employment. Her attendance at outpatient 

sessions was sporadic up until just weeks prior to the trial, and her prognosis for full recovery, 

based on her length of drug use and denying responsibility for the consequences of her drug 

abuse, was poor. Also of note, Mother did not make a direct request for more time to complete 

the case plan and she testified that she would need an unknown amount of additional time to be 

ready to parent without help. The statutory time had passed for initiating termination of 

Mother’s parental rights and the magistrate was under no obligation to wait an unknown amount 

of additional time before granting termination and moving towards a permanency goal for the 

child. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

We conclude the magistrate’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights, on the basis 

of neglect and because it was in the child’s best interests, was supported by substantial and 

competent evidence. Additionally, we conclude that the magistrate did not prematurely order 

termination. Therefore, we affirm the order terminating parental rights. 

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LANSING CONCUR.