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2024 IL App (5th) 230389-U 

NO. 5-23-0389 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Vermilion County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 19-MR-333 

 ) 

OTIS ARRINGTON, ) Honorable 

 ) Mark S. Goodwin, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Welch and Boie concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Where none of the interlocutory orders specified in defendant’s notice of appeal is

immediately appealable, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Otis Arrington, purports to appeal orders by the circuit court denying his 

motions for change of venue, change of judge, and appointment of counsel other than the public 

defender. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 We need summarize only briefly this case’s procedural history. In 1989, defendant entered 

a blind guilty plea to all 10 counts of an indictment that charged, inter alia, home invasion, 

aggravated criminal sexual assault, armed violence, and armed robbery. He was sentenced to an 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 03/11/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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aggregate term of 60 years’ imprisonment of which, under the law in effect at the time, he had to 

serve at least 30 years.

¶ 5 In 2019, shortly before defendant would have been eligible for release, the State petitioned 

to commit him as a sexually violent person. See 725 ILCS 207/5 (West 2018). The circuit court 

appointed an attorney from the public defender’s office to represent defendant and found probable 

cause to believe that defendant was a sexually violent person.

¶ 6 In the succeeding months, defendant filed numerous pro se motions, which the court 

disregarded because he was represented by counsel. Defendant then discharged the public 

defender, after which the court entertained his pro se motions and denied them.

¶ 7 Defendant continued to file motions, which the court denied. Shortly before trial was 

scheduled to begin, at defendant’s request, the court reappointed the public defender.

Approximately three months later, counsel moved to withdraw. Defendant expressed 

dissatisfaction with counsel’s representation and the court again discharged him. Despite advising 

against it, the court allowed defendant to proceed pro se. 

¶ 8 On August 12, 2022, defendant filed a motion for a change of venue from Vermilion 

County, a change of judge, and to dismiss the complaint. The court denied these motions.

Defendant filed a motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender, which the 

court also denied.

¶ 9 On November 9, 2022, defendant filed two documents denominated motions for 

interlocutory appeal. One referenced the denial of his motion for a change of judge and the other 

referenced the denial of his motion for new counsel. The former was apparently interpreted as a 

motion to reconsider and transferred to the chief judge who assigned it for hearing to a judge other 
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than the trial judge. Following that hearing, the motion was denied. The latter motion was stayed 

pending the outcome of the first.

¶ 10 The cause was transferred back to the original trial judge. Following additional delays, the 

court, at a May 2023 hearing, attempted to ascertain which interlocutory orders defendant wished 

to appeal. He specified the denial of his motion for a change of venue, his motion for a change of 

judge, and his motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender. The court ordered 

the clerk to prepare a notice of appeal specifying those orders and appointed counsel to represent 

defendant on appeal.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Even where no party raises the issue, a reviewing court must consider its jurisdiction and 

dismiss an appeal where jurisdiction is lacking. Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 

217, 251-52 (2010). With certain exceptions, the supreme court rules permit appeals only from 

final judgments and orders. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). “A 

final order is one that disposes of the rights of the parties either with respect to the entire 

controversy or some definite and separate portion thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

In re Estate of Pawlinski, 407 Ill. App. 3d 957, 962 (2011).

¶ 13 None of the orders of which defendant complains disposed of the parties’ rights with 

respect to the entire controversy or a discreet portion thereof. The only issue raised by the State’s 

petition was whether defendant should be civilly committed as a sexually violent person. None of 

the complained-of orders relates to that issue at all. Instead, the orders merely relate to ancillary 

procedural issues.

¶ 14 It is well established that the denial of a motion for change of judge is not a final order.

In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 30; People v. Harrison, 372 Ill. App. 3d 153, 154-
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55 (2007). No Illinois Supreme Court rule allows for the appeal of such an order. Arjmand, 2024 

IL 129155, ¶ 33. Similarly, an order denying a change of venue is not immediately appealable.

In re Marriage of Zannis, 114 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1037 (1983) (citing Stark v. Ralph F. Roussey & 

Associates, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 379, 382 (1970)). Our research has not uncovered a case

specifically deciding whether an order refusing to appoint different counsel is immediately

appealable but, like the others we have discussed, it does not finally decide the parties’ rights but 

is merely a procedural step leading to that decision.

¶ 15 We further note that none of the supreme court rules providing for interlocutory appeals

applies here. Rule 306 provides that a party may petition this court for the immediate appeal of 

certain specified orders. However, none of the orders of which defendant complains is listed in the 

rule and, in any event, he has not filed a petition in this court for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R.

306 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 307 provides for interlocutory appeal as of right from certain orders

but, again, none of those at issue is listed therein. Ill. S. Ct. R. 307 (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). 

¶ 16 Finally, Rule 308 allows for the answering of certified questions. It provides as follows:

“When the trial court, in making an interlocutory order not otherwise appealable, finds that 

the order involves a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference 

of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 

ultimate termination of the litigation, the court shall so state in writing, identifying the 

question of law involved. Such a statement may be made at the time of the entry of the 

order or thereafter on the court’s own motion or on motion of any party. The Appellate 

Court may thereupon in its discretion allow an appeal from the order.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) 

(eff. Oct. 1, 2019).
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¶ 17 The party wishing to appeal must then file with the appellate court an application for leave 

to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). Here, the circuit court did not make the required 

findings and defendant did not timely file an application with this court.

¶ 18 Defendant’s response discussed the merits of the issues but does not address the issue of 

appellate jurisdiction. As none of the orders from which defendant seeks review is the proper 

subject of an interlocutory appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

¶ 19 CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the reasons stated above, this appeal is dismissed due to the lack of jurisdiction. 

¶ 21 Appeal dismissed.