[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 16, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2503-2514]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-00428]



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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 4

[PS Docket Nos. 23-5, 15-80; WC Docket No. 18-336; FCC 23-57; FR ID 
195997]


Ensuring the Reliability and Resiliency of the 988 Suicide & 
Crisis Lifeline; Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications; 
Implementation of the National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of 2018

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission) requires covered 988 service providers (a new category of 
service provider) and cable, satellite, wireless, wireline, and 
interconnected voice over internet protocol (VoIP) providers 
(originating service providers) to report outages that potentially 
affect the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline in the Commission's Network 
Outage Reporting System (NORS). The rules also require these entities 
to directly notify Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and 
the 988 Lifeline administrator about outages that potentially affect a 
988 special facility, and exercise special diligence to maintain 
accurate, up-to-date contact information for 988 special facilities, 
just as the Commission's rules require for 911 special facilities. The 
rules also allow SAMHSA and the VA to have direct read-only access to 
NORS consistent with the Commission's existing NORS outage information 
sharing procedures. These rules are adopted with the goal of ensuring 
that the Commission and those parties that provide life-saving crisis 
intervention services to people calling the 988 Lifeline receive timely 
and actionable information about 988 service outages that potentially 
affect those services' ability to meet the immediate health needs of 
people in suicidal crisis and mental health distress.

DATES: Effective February 15, 2024, except for the amendments to 47 CFR 
4.9 (amendatory instruction 4), which are delayed indefinitely. The 
Commission will publish a document in the Federal Register announcing 
the effective dates of these amendments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Shabbir Hamid, Cybersecurity and 
Communications Reliability Division, Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau, (202) 418-2328, or by email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#75261d1417171c075b3d14181c11351316165b121a03"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="70231811121219025e38111d1914301613135e171f06">[email protected]</span></a>. 
For additional information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act 
information collection requirements contained in this document, contact 
Nicole Ongele, Office of Managing Director, Performance and Program 
Management, 202-418-2991, or by email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#560604171630353578313920"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0f5f5d4e4f696c6c21686079">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order, PS Docket No. 23-5; PS Docket No. 15-80; WC Docket No. 18-
336; FCC 23-57, adopted July 20, 2023, and released July 21, 2023. The 
full text of this document is available by downloading the text from 
the Commission's website at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-57A1.pdf. When the FCC Headquarters reopens to the public, the 
full text of this document will also be available for public inspection 
and copying during regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center, 
45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. To request this document in 
accessible formats for people with disabilities (e.g., Braille, large 
print, electronica files, audio format, etc.) or to request reasonable 
accommodations (e.g., accessible format documents, sign language 
interpreters, CART, etc.), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#feb8bdbdcbcecabe989d9dd0999188"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3d7b7e7e080d097d5b5e5e135a524b">[email protected]</span></a> or call the 
FCC's Consumer and Government Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), 
(202) 418-0432 (TTY).

Congressional Review Act

    The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 
concurs, that this rule is non-major under the Congressional Review 
Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of the Order to 
Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 
801(a)(1)(A).

I. Synopsis

    1. In the Report and Order, the Commission requires cable, 
satellite, wireless, wireline, interconnected VoIP providers 
(originating service providers), and a new category of ``covered 988 
service providers'' to report outages that potentially affect the 988 
Lifeline to the Commission's Network Outage Reporting System (NORS), 
similar to the Commission's existing rules that require the reporting 
of outages that potentially affect 911. The Report and Order defines 
``outages that potentially affect a 988 special facility'' as events 
that result in the loss of the ability of the 988 Lifeline to receive, 
process, or forward calls, potentially affecting at least 900,000 user-
minutes and lasting at least 30 minutes duration.
    2. The Report and Order also requires that these providers provide 
notice to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (the VA), and the 988 
Lifeline administrator when an outage that potentially affects a 988 
special facility occurs. For outages lasting longer than 2 hours, the 
providers would follow-up with subsequent notifications of material 
information as soon as possible after discovery of the new material 
information, and continue providing additional material information 
until the outage is completely repaired and service is fully restored. 
These service providers would also be required to maintain up to date 
contact information for those individuals identified by SAMHSA, the VA, 
and the 988 Lifeline administrator to receive outage notifications.

A. Reporting 988 Outages in NORS

    3. In the 988 Outage notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),\1\ the 
Commission proposed to require entities that provide the 988 Lifeline 
with capabilities such as the ability to receive, process, or forward 
calls to report outages that potentially affect the 988 special 
facilities to the Commission's NORS. The Report and Order adopts this 
proposal, which is overwhelmingly supported by commenters. The 
Commission believes this outage reporting requirement will both improve 
the resiliency of the 988 Lifeline system, and through the Commission's 
NORS information sharing rules, ensure that SAMHSA, the VA, and the 
Lifeline administrator have timely outage information so they can 
provide the public with alternative ways to access the Lifeline. The 
Commission agrees with the Boulder Regional Emergency Telephone Service 
Authority that requiring the reporting of 988 outages will enable the 
tracking of outage trends, the identification of best practices to help 
preemptively address the common causes of outages, and the ability to 
anticipate and plan for future outages. The Commission also agrees with 
Mental Health America that in helping promote timely access to the 988 
Lifeline, these requirements will promote equity for at-risk 
populations.
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    \1\ Ensuring the Reliability and Resiliency of the 988 Suicide & 
Crisis Lifeline; Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications; 
Implementation of the National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of 
2018, 88 FR 20790 (Apr. 7, 2023).
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    4. The Commission observes that a person in suicidal crisis or 
emotional distress who cannot successfully reach

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a crisis center due to an outage continues to be at risk, regardless of 
whether the outage occurs before or after a call reaches the 988 
Lifeline. This includes outages that prevent calls from being routed to 
the intended local crisis center or the Veterans Crisis Line. The 
Commission agrees with commenters that it is appropriate to require 
covered 988 service providers to report outages in NORS because the 
services they offer, which ensure that calls are routed to the correct 
destination after they reach the 988 Lifeline, are essential to the 
Lifeline's availability. Vibrant, the 988 Lifeline administrator, has 
indicated that it can use outage information to quickly update routing 
tables used by covered 988 service providers in order to avoid routing 
calls to crisis centers that are experiencing an outage. Because this 
outage information would be used to increase the availability and 
resiliency of 988 services, the Commission therefore disagrees with 
CX360 that it is not necessary for the Commission to adopt rules to 
provide the Commission and the parties responsible for operation of the 
988 Lifeline with timely and actionable information about outages that 
occur after those communications reach the Lifeline. While CX360 argues 
that ``SAMHSA and the 988 Lifeline Administrator already are capable of 
operating the 988 Lifeline effectively'' without such reporting, the 
Commission notes that SAMHSA and Vibrant both support the reporting 
requirement. The Commission also rejects CX360's argument that 
reporting requirements are not necessary because SAMHSA and the VA 
already have visibility into outages that occur after calls reach the 
988 Lifeline. Because CX360 offers no supporting details as to what 
information SAMHSA and the VA are receiving and whether its substance 
and timing is comparable to the requirements adopted in the Report and 
Order, the Commission is not persuaded that this visibility, if it 
exists, undercuts the justification for the rules adopted in the Report 
and Order.
    5. The Report and Order defines ``covered 988 service providers'' 
as those providers that provide the 988 Lifeline with capabilities such 
as the ability to receive, process, or forward calls. See Ensuring the 
Reliability and Resiliency of the 988 Suicide &Crisis Lifeline; 
Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions 
to Communications; Implementation of the National Suicide Hotline 
Improvement Act of 2018, PS Docket Nos. 23-5 and 15-80, WC Docket No. 
18-336, at 9, paragraph 15, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), FCC 
23-7 (Jan. 27, 2023), 88 FR 20790 (Apr. 7, 2023) (988 Outage NPRM) 
(proposing to define ``covered 988 service providers'' as those 
providers that provide the 988 Lifeline with capabilities such as the 
ability to receive, process, or forward calls). The Commission responds 
to commenters that question the scope of the new rules by clarifying 
that, consistent with longstanding practice in the 911 context, the new 
paragraph (f) of Sec.  4.5 does require outage reporting from those 
entities that provide a communications network or service that 
facilitates the receipt, processing, or forwarding of the call, 
including from the 988 Lifeline to the local 988 crisis center. See New 
Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to 
Communications, Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 16830, 16873-76, 
paragraphs 76 through 81 (2004), 69 FR 70316 (Dec. 3, 2004). The 
Commission finds that the scope of this definition is appropriately 
limited in that it covers only those providers that are essential to 
the capabilities of the 988 Lifeline. The Commission agrees with SAMHSA 
that ``covered 988 service providers'' should not include 988 crisis 
centers themselves nor the Veterans Crisis Line. Crisis centers do not 
receive, process, or forward calls and lack the expertise and access to 
information that would be necessary to make such reports. In addition, 
a requirement for crisis centers to make such reports would place 
significant additional burdens on them during outages, which would run 
contrary to the goals of this proceeding. The Commission also finds 
that covered 988 service providers should not include originating 
service providers that originate 988 calls and deliver calls to the 988 
Lifeline but otherwise do not provide services for the Lifeline. 
Commenters point out that originating service providers do not 
generally provide the 988 Lifeline with capabilities such as receiving, 
processing, or forwarding calls, while the service providers that do 
offer these capabilities will likely do so through direct contractual 
arrangements. The Commission agrees with USTelecom that ``defining 
`covered service provider' in this way is consistent with the 
Commission's definition in the 911 context, and keeping definitions of 
key terms consistent across these public safety contexts will prevent 
confusion and facilitate regulatory certainty.'' Finally, the 
Commission agrees with Voice on the Net Coalition that covered 988 
service providers should not include providers of capabilities that are 
provided directly to local crisis centers, as those are not services 
that are provided directly to the 988 Lifeline.
    6. Although the Commission is excluding them from the definition of 
covered 988 service providers, the Commission also finds that 
originating service providers are critical in providing 988 service and 
thus require cable, satellite, wireless, wireline, and interconnected 
VoIP providers to report in NORS outages that potentially affect the 
988 special facilities. The Commission agrees with Mental Health 
America that these originating service providers, like covered 988 
service providers, ``have a role to play in ensuring that people get 
their responses when they need crisis counseling,'' and agree with 
Vibrant that ``having the same requirements for covered service 
providers and OSPs [originating service providers] ensures the delivery 
of timely, actionable information while also reducing the burden of 
reporting by streamlining requirements.'' The Commission also agrees 
with the Washington State Department of Health and Health Care 
Authority that reporting requirements ``should not be different for 
originating service providers that deliver calls to the 988 Lifeline in 
the first instance versus the covered 988 service provider that handles 
the call thereafter.'' As the Commission states in the Report and 
Order, a person in suicidal crisis or emotional distress who cannot 
successfully reach a crisis center due to an outage continues to be at 
risk, regardless of whether the outage occurs before or after the call 
reaches the 988 Lifeline. For that reason, the reporting of outages 
that occur in originating service providers' networks are essential to 
improving the resiliency of the 988 Lifeline and ensure that SAMHSA, 
the VA, and the Lifeline administrator have timely outage information 
so they can provide the public with alternative ways to access the 
Lifeline. The Commission also finds find, consistent with the views of 
the National Alliance on Mental Illness, that ``having more sources of 
data regarding outages will enhance the ability of the FCC and the 988 
administrator to identify what is needed to create a more reliable 
network.''
    7. The Commission disagrees with those commenters that argue that 
it is premature for the Commission to consider the adoption of 988 
outage reporting requirements. The record reflects the serious impact 
of the December 2022 covered 988 service provider outage, and nothing 
in that record indicates that such an outage could not happen again, or 
that

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originating service provider outages do not affect the delivery of 988 
calls. The Commission also disagrees with Southern Linc, which argues 
that originating service providers should not be required to report 988 
outages because they do not have visibility into the delivery of 988 
communications after those communications leave their networks. 
Originating service providers nonetheless have visibility into whether 
988 calls are disrupted due to outages in their own network or the 
networks of third parties with which they contract for service before 
being delivered to Lifeline. See Amendments to Part 4 of the 
Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications, Improving 
911 Reliability, New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning 
Disruptions to Communications, PS Docket Nos. 15-80, 13-75, 04-35, 
Second Report and Order, FCC 22-88 at 7, paragraph 20 (Nov. 18, 2022), 
88 FR 9756 (March 17, 2023) (explaining that reliance upon a third-
party service provider to manage, route, or otherwise contribute to 911 
call processing does not relieve a service provider of its 
obligations--even if the discovery is first made by the third party). 
The Commission therefore believes that originating service providers 
should be required to report those outages for the reasons explained 
above.
    8. The record informs the Commission that originating service 
providers currently lack the capability to distinguish outages that 
prevent the completion of a 988 call from outages on their network that 
prevent the completion of other calls. For the purposes of the rules 
the Report and Order adopts, this is immaterial because outages that 
prevent the completion of all calls are necessarily outages that 
potentially affect 988 special facilities. The Commission finds that 
reports about service-wide outages, like reports that are specific to 
988 Lifeline outages, provide insight into 988's reliability and can 
provide information to SAMHSA, the VA, and the Lifeline administrator 
that would allow them to effectively respond to outages (e.g., notify 
the public of alternate ways to contact the 988 Lifeline). The 
Commission also believes that this approach acknowledges the current 
capabilities of existing networks, gives service providers flexibility 
as to how they can satisfy the requirements, and potentially reduces 
compliance costs by leveraging providers' existing technical 
capabilities and systems. The Commission notes that originating service 
providers are already required to report voice service outages in NORS, 
regardless of a call's destination. As a consequence, The Commission 
finds that providers complying with this existing outage reporting 
requirement will only need to take nominal action to report voice 
telephony outages that potentially affect the 988 Lifeline to the 
Commission. As recommended by the Alliance for Telecommunications 
Industry Solutions (ATIS) and NCTA--The Internet & Television 
Association (NCTA), the Commission will add a checkbox to NORS so that 
reporting providers can clearly indicate whether a reported outage 
potentially affects a 988 special facility. The Commission believes 
this field will improve the ability of the Commission and the agencies 
with which it shares NORS data to quickly recognize and more 
effectively analyze the effects of reported outages.
    9. The Report and Order defines ``outages that potentially affect a 
988 special facility'' as events that result in the loss of the ability 
of the 988 Lifeline to receive, process, or forward calls, potentially 
affecting at least 900,000 user-minutes and lasting at least 30 minutes 
duration. The Report and Order notes that ``loss of the ability of the 
988 Lifeline to receive . . . calls'' includes outages in originating 
service providers' networks that prevent successful transmission of 
calls to the Lifeline. The majority of commenters support using the 
same outage reporting thresholds for 988 as those previously adopted 
for 911 outages. The Commission agrees with USTelecom that 
``[s]tandardizing the threshold across [988 and 911] will facilitate 
efficient, timely compliance, and is consistent with the Notice's 
objective of imposing `only minor changes to existing procedures' by 
`closely align[ing]' them with rules for 911-related outages.'' The 
Commission acknowledges the concerns of the Veterans Crisis Line, which 
argues that outages shorter than 30 minutes in duration should be 
reported because, statistically, as many as three deaths by suicide may 
occur within 30 minutes. However, the Commission believes that the 
benefits of awareness and opportunities for action that arise from the 
reporting of outages must be balanced against the burden of reporting 
those outages. Based on the record before us, the Commission is unable 
to determine whether reducing the minimum or user-minute durations of 
reportable outages would improve upon that balance. At this time, it is 
unclear to what extent reduced thresholds would increase the number of 
988 outage reports received, the extent to which additional reporting 
would contribute to public safety and the reliability of the 988 
Lifeline, and whether those benefits would outweigh the burdens 
associated with increased reporting. For these reasons, the Commission 
believes it is sensible to adopt 988 outage reporting requirements that 
are consistent with existing 911 outage reporting requirements and 
providers' existing reporting procedures. As noted by Association of 
Public-Safety Communications Officials International, Inc. (APCO), the 
Commission has recently directed the Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau (Bureau) to gather information on the volume of 911 
outages that may go unreported under the Commission's existing outage 
notification thresholds and have sought additional comment on possible 
alternative outage reporting thresholds. The Commission directs the 
Bureau to add 988 Lifeline outages to its examination.
    10. The Report and Order clarifies, as requested by SAMHSA, that 
outages that potentially affect the 988 Lifeline include partial 
service disruptions, as well as outages with a duration of more than 30 
minutes. The Commission notes that Sec.  4.5(a) of its rules defines an 
outage as ``a significant degradation in the ability of an end user to 
establish and maintain a channel of communications as a result of 
failure or degradation in the performance of a communications 
provider's network.'' For example, any circumstances in which the 
ability of the 988 Lifeline to receive, process, or forward calls is 
significantly degraded for at least 30 minutes and potentially affects 
at least 900,000 user-minutes must be reported in NORS. This includes 
circumstances in which the degradation lasts longer than 30 minutes and 
circumstances in which 988 calls are received by a call-taker despite 
the degradation. The Commission disagrees with USTelecom's view that 
partial outages and service disruptions should not be subject to 988 
outage reporting and notification requirements, which it argues would 
complicate the outage reporting process and result in over-
notification. Because the Commission's existing outage reporting and 
notification rules already define ``outages'' to include partial 
service disruptions, exempting partial service disruptions from 988 
reporting and notification requirements would make our rules more 
complicated, not less complicated. The Commission also finds little 
evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that the reporting of 
partial outages would result in too many notifications, particularly 
since SAMHSA and Vibrant, which are

[[Page 2506]]

two of the three of the entities who would receive notifications under 
the rules adopted in the Report and Order, are specifically requesting 
notifications about partial outages.
    11. The Report and Order requires 988 outage reports be filed with 
the Commission in NORS, consistent with the Commission's current 
requirements for outage report filing processes and timing. No 
commenter objected to the use of NORS for this purpose. The Commission 
agrees with ATIS that ``industry is already familiar with NORS and 
believes that the use of NORS will reduce implementation costs 
associated with 988 outage reporting and would be significantly less 
costly and burdensome than the implementation of a new or different 
reporting system.'' The Commission further agree with USTelecom that 
reporting in NORS ``will streamline the reporting process and allow 
providers to devote maximum attention to addressing the outage itself 
and getting service back up and running, rather than diverting time and 
resources to more complex or cumbersome reporting requirements.''
    12. The Commission declines to allow alternatives to NORS 
reporting, such as reporting by email, as requested by CX360. The 
Commission does not agree that alternatives would reduce administrative 
burdens on providers. NORS is a well-established system that 
facilitates the filing of outage reports in a streamlined and uniform 
manner with all information required by our rules. NORS supports the 
filing of outage data through Application Program Interfaces (API), 
which can facilitate the automated filing of outage reports. Submission 
of outage reports via email would create opportunities for 
inconsistently styled filings with incomplete or confusing information, 
which would lead to Commission staff taking up providers' time with 
numerous calls and questions about their filings. The submission of 
reports by email would also greatly diminish the Commission's ability 
to record historic outage data, analyze outage trends, and share outage 
information with Federal, State, Tribal, and territorial agencies. For 
these reasons, both efficiency and effectiveness weigh in favor of 
requiring all outage reports to be filed in NORS.
    13. The Report and Order allows direct read-only access to NORS 
data by SAMHSA and the VA, consistent with our existing NORS outage 
information sharing procedures. In the 988 Outage NPRM, the Commission 
stated its belief that improving situational awareness of significant 
network outage issues affecting 988 Lifeline services would not only 
provide the Commission with critical insight into the availability and 
reliability of a vital public health service, but would also provide 
that insight to the other Federal, State, Tribal, and territorial 
agencies with whom NORS data is shared. The Commission agrees with 
SAMHSA that having access to outage reports and related analysis on 
network reliability will better enable these stakeholders to prepare 
and respond to network disruptions and better ensure the 988 Lifeline's 
availability. The Commission also agrees with the Washington State 
Department of Health and Health Care Authority that these 988 
stakeholders would benefit from having access to outage reports that 
indicate whether 988 calls affected by an outage are being rerouted to 
other crisis centers. The Commission further agrees with the Boulder 
Regional Emergency Telephone Service Authority (BRETSA) that improving 
the availability of information about 988 network reliability would 
empower 988 stakeholders to take additional steps to make the 988 
Lifeline even more reliable. For these reasons, the Report and Order 
clarifies that the Commission considers the lifesaving services offered 
by the 988 Lifeline to be emergency management and first responder 
support functions. The Report and Order notes that the national suicide 
prevention mental health crisis hotline system operates through the 
National Suicide Prevention Lifeline maintained by the Assistant 
Secretary for Mental Health and Substance Use, section 520E-3 of the 
Public Health Service Act, National Suicide Prevention Lifeline 
Program, 42 U.S.C. 290bb-36c, and through the Veterans Crisis Line 
maintained by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under the Comprehensive 
Program for Suicide Prevention Among Veterans and Members of the 
Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, 38 U.S.C. 1720F(h). See also 
National Suicide Hotline Designation Act of 2020 (Congress deemed 
``life-saving resources'' such as crisis lines ``essential'' and 
recognized the need for a 3-digit phone number for such services to be 
readily available in emergency situations.). See NORS/Disaster 
Information Reporting System (DIRS) Information Sharing Report and 
Order (R&O), 36 FCC Rcd 6136 at 6146-47, paragraphs 32 through 39 
(2021), 86 FR 22796 (April 29, 2021) (describing the ``need to know'' 
requirement for eligibility). Accordingly, in order for SAMHSA and the 
VA to mitigate the impacts service outages may have on access to the 
988 Lifeline and VA Crisis Line, and ensure these services remain 
available to support the safety of the general public seeking crisis 
support and to prevent suicide among veterans, the Commission finds 
that both SAMHSA and the VA have a ``need to know'' and are eligible to 
apply for direct access to the Commission's outage reports. While the 
988 Lifeline administrator is not itself eligible for direct access to 
these reports because it is not a government agency, the Commission 
observes that the Commission's outage information sharing rules would 
allow SAMHSA and the VA to share information with them about specific 
outages, subject to certain confidentiality requirements and other 
safeguards.

B. Providing 988 Special Facilities With Notice of Outages

    14. The Report and Order requires covered 988 service providers to 
directly notify 988 special facilities about outages that potentially 
affect those facilities. Commenters generally support the adoption of 
such a requirement. The Commission agrees with USTelecom that this 
requirement ``strike[s] the right balance of getting relevant, 
actionable information to the proposed 988 special facilities'' that 
will allow them to take steps to maintain the public's access to crisis 
intervention services ``without overloading them.'' The Commission 
agrees with BRETSA that 988 outage notifications can help provide 
information that will allow 988 special facilities to route calls to 
alternative crisis centers and to help those centers make necessary 
staffing adjustments. As Vibrant highlights, it can use information 
about outages in its capacity as the 988 Lifeline administrator to 
quickly update routing tables to avoid routing calls to crisis centers 
that are experiencing an outage. Notifications would also allow 988 
callers to receive assistance faster, as they would help ensure that 
those individuals timely connect to a crisis counselor by reducing the 
amount of time they would have to wait for assistance as a result of 
having calls fail to be received by a crisis center. The 988 Lifeline 
administrator is also able to ``effectively and quickly inform all 
centers in the network of an outage that may impact service and lead to 
an increase in volume for centers in the areas that are not impacted by 
the outage. This insight allows time for those unaffected centers to 
quickly scale to the needed capacity in order to handle the anticipated 
increased volume that needs to be re-routed.'' The Commission also 
continues to believe that timely notice of a 988 Lifeline outage will 
assist SAMHSA, the VA,

[[Page 2507]]

and the 988 Lifeline administrator to quickly inform the public of 
alternative ways of contacting the Lifeline while one type of 
communication is unavailable, such as texting or using the online chat 
function if calls are not getting through. The Commission disagrees 
with CX360, who implies that 988 outage notifications should be handled 
through contracts between the 988 Lifeline administrator and its 
service providers rather than by rule. The Commission finds that it is 
more efficient and better serves the public interest to establish a 
single, uniform rule for 988 outage notifications that will apply to 
all service providers with which the Lifeline administrator may 
contract in the future rather than make the occurrence, frequency, and 
content of those notifications a repeated subject of negotiation. The 
Commission further believes that it will not serve the public interest 
to make 988 outage notifications dependent on the 988 Lifeline 
administrator's renegotiation of contracts that are in place today, 
which would have an uncertain result and likely require considerable 
time to complete. The notification requirements adopted in the Report 
and Order are similar to the notification requirements the Commission 
has adopted for covered 911 service providers, which the Commission has 
found to be effective.
    15. The Commission finds that reliance upon a third-party service 
provider to manage, route, or otherwise contribute to 988 call 
processing does not relieve providers of the obligation to provide 
outage notification to 988 special facilities. The Commission agrees 
with National Emergency Number Association (NENA) that ``the fact that 
a third party service may specialize in supporting outage 
notifications, and may have a business relationship with a provider, 
should not change any reporting requirements for the provider.'' The 
Commission disagrees with CX360's view that covered 988 service 
providers should only be responsible for reporting outages on 
facilities over which they have direct control. In this regard, ``[t]he 
Commission has long held that licensees and other regulatees are 
responsible for the acts and omissions of their employees and 
independent contractors,'' and has recognized that ``under long 
established principles of common law, statutory duties are 
nondelegable.'' The Commission notes that this approach mirrors the 
requirements it has adopted for outages that potentially affect 911 
special facilities, which should promote consistency in how 
notifications are made by service providers.
    16. The Report and Order designates SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 
Lifeline administrator as the 988 special facilities that must receive 
notifications of 988 outages. Commenters agree that it is appropriate 
for these three entities to receive outage notifications. The 
Commission agrees with USTelecom that this requirement will ``assist 
these entities, which oversee and administer the 988 Lifeline, in 
quickly informing the public of alternative ways to contact the 988 
Lifeline as needed.'' The Commission also notes, as highlighted by 
SAMHSA, that such an approach to outage notification will allow the 988 
Lifeline administrator to identify and inform the appropriate crisis 
centers about outages, as it will have the most updated routing tables 
and patterns on any given day.
    17. At this time, the Commission finds that 988 special facilities 
that are required to receive 988 outage notifications should not 
include the local crisis centers to which some 988 calls are routed. 
The record establishes that the 988 Lifeline's current approach of 
routing calls based on the area code associated with the user's device 
makes effective notification of this type extremely challenging. As 
commenters explain, many users' mobile devices have an area code that 
is different from the area code in which they are located, which would 
mean that outages limited to a specific geographic region could 
nonetheless potentially affect every single local crisis center across 
the country. The Commission agrees with those commenters that argue 
that notifications provided to local crisis centers under these 
circumstances are likely to be overbroad, too frequent, or not provide 
information that the local crisis center would be capable of acting on.
    18. Based on the record before us, the Commission finds that 
regardless of the scope of an outage, SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 
Lifeline administrator are in the best position to identify what 
information about a specific outage may be relevant to local crisis 
centers (including changes in local crisis center routing) and use 
existing points of contact to convey that information. As Vibrant 
explains, crisis centers will be notified about outages by the 988 
Lifeline administrator irrespective of contact by a covered 988 service 
provider or originating service provider. While several commenters 
support notification of local crisis centers in some or all situations, 
the record does not offer a convincing explanation of how local crisis 
centers would be able to effectively act upon 988 outage notifications 
to ensure that 988 callers receive assistance. The record also does not 
provide clarity on how any benefits arising from those challenges 
should be weighed against the challenges to providers arising from the 
need to maintain updated contact information for those centers. While 
BRETSA argues that outage notifications could assist local crisis 
centers in making decisions about appropriate staffing levels, the 
Commission believes that direct notification by service providers would 
not supply sufficient information for this purpose because, in addition 
to the geographic routing challenges discussed above, the notifications 
would not offer any visibility into any related routing changes made by 
the 988 Lifeline administrator that would ultimately affect call volume 
to those centers. BRETSA also argues that notifications can assist 
local crisis centers with making long-term network reliability 
decisions, but the Commission observes that outage notifications are 
intended to support imminent action during outages rather than long-
term decision-making.
    19. The Commission also requires originating service providers, 
that is, cable, satellite, wireless, wireline, and interconnected VoIP 
providers, to notify 988 special facilities about outages that 
potentially affect those facilities. As discussed above, a person in 
suicidal crisis or emotional distress that cannot successfully reach a 
crisis center due to an outage continues to be at risk, regardless of 
whether the outage occurs before or after the call reaches the 988 
Lifeline. For that reason, outage notifications are essential to 
ensuring that SAMHSA, the VA, and the Lifeline administrator have 
timely outage information so they effectively respond to outages. The 
Commission therefore agrees with those commenters that argue that 
originating service providers should be required to provide 
notifications of 988 outages.
    20. The Commission disagrees with Southern Linc's opinion that the 
area code-based routing of 988 makes it ``highly doubtful that OSPs 
would be able to provide any actionable outage information to 988 
special facilities.'' As discussed above, the 988 Lifeline 
administrator can use outage notifications to update routing tables to 
avoid routing calls to crisis centers that are themselves experiencing 
outages, as well as inform crisis centers about increases or decreases 
of incoming calls so they can appropriately scale capacity. If needed, 
SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator could also use 
information about an outage to inform the public of alternative ways of

[[Page 2508]]

contacting the Lifeline while a means of communication is unavailable. 
These actions are available regardless of whether an outage occurs 
within the network of a covered 988 service provider or an originating 
service provider. The Commission also disagrees with T-Mobile's 
argument that 988 special facilities should not receive notifications, 
but should instead obtain outage information from NORS data. NORS data 
is generally received two hours after the discovery of an outage and 
would have to be actively checked throughout the day by 988 special 
facilities to stay aware of outages. The Commission finds that this 
approach is far less likely to be effective at providing timely 
information than the direct notifications adopted in the Report and 
Order, which must be delivered within 30 minutes and are provided 
directly to the affected special facilities. This approach is also 
consistent with the existing requirement that originating service 
providers must notify 911 special facilities, which will help minimize 
costs, promote efficiency, and avoid confusion among providers.
    21. The Commission acknowledges concerns that a 988 outage 
notification requirement for originating service providers could result 
in SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator receiving ``tens 
of thousands'' of outage notifications annually, which could be 
overwhelming and could undermine effective outage response. As Verizon 
notes, hundreds of outages occur on originating service providers' 
networks every day, and notifications for those outages are split 
across thousands of public safety answering points (PSAPs) across the 
country. If every one of those outage notifications were sent to 
SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator by phone and email 
daily, then they presumably would need significant, dedicated resources 
to receive and act on those notifications. However, the record supports 
the conclusion that 988 special facilities have such resources in place 
and will be able to handle the volume of notifications. SAMHSA and 
Vibrant state that despite the high volume, Vibrant has access to 
continuous monitoring tools and can develop the necessary capabilities 
to be able to ingest these notifications. The Commission urges service 
providers to collaborate with 988 special facilities to ensure that 988 
notifications are provided in a format that best facilitates rapid 
analysis and action.
    22. The Commission declines to require covered 988 service 
providers to notify originating service providers about 988 Lifeline 
outages and decline to require originating service providers to notify 
covered 988 service providers about 988 Lifeline outages. As some 
commenters note, covered 988 service providers often compete with 
originating service providers or provide services to their competitors. 
As a consequence, a notification requirement would mandate the sharing 
of competitively sensitive information. The Commission shares this 
concern, as well as the concern that the risk of sharing sensitive 
information directly with competitors and other individuals 
unnecessarily may slow down providers' notification processes or lead 
to the removal of information from outage reports that might otherwise 
be beneficial to a 988 special facility. The Commission notes that the 
Washington State Department of Health and Health Care Authority 
supports a requirement that originating service providers provide 
notice to covered 988 service providers of 988 outages as ``these 
notices would provide for increased coordination between the carriers 
for remedying the outage and coordinating workarounds.'' CX360 argues 
that originating service providers should be required to notify covered 
988 service providers about outages because the latter ``lack[s] 
independent insight into the operations on OSPs' networks'' and 
notifications will allow it to ``better understand what is happening 
upstream so it can react quickly and ensure its service is working 
correctly,'' and ``troubleshoot any issues without needing to contact a 
provider earlier in the call path, leading to a more efficient 
resolution of any problems.'' The Commission disagrees, as the 
Commission finds it unlikely that these actions will help ensure the 
availability of the 988 Lifeline. If an outage occurs in an originating 
service provider's network, the Commission does not see how it would be 
beneficial for a covered 988 service provider to begin 
``troubleshooting issues'' within its own separate, downstream network, 
nor is it clear how those actions would help resolve the originating 
provider's outage or otherwise help 988 callers successfully reach the 
Lifeline. In any event, the Commission believes the potential negative 
impacts on the effectiveness of outage notifications outweigh these 
possible benefits.
    23. The Commission also declines to require that PSAPs be notified 
about 988 outages. While some commenters argue that 988 outage 
notifications would prepare PSAPs for potential call volume increases 
and give them the necessary situational awareness to handle those calls 
in an appropriate manner, our rules already require PSAPs to be 
notified about outages that potentially affect 911 special facilities, 
including general network outages. In addition, these notifications 
will not provide PSAPs with situational awareness about any routing 
decisions made by the 988 Lifeline administrator to address the outage. 
To the extent that an outage might occur in the network of a covered 
988 service provider, it is unclear that the benefit of preparing PSAPs 
for potential call volume increases related to an outage would outweigh 
the burden of requiring the provider to maintain contact information 
and then notify thousands of PSAPs nationwide. Moreover, because call 
routing for 988 is currently based on area code of the caller, rather 
than geographic location, the ability to identify the appropriate PSAP 
for such notice may not be logistically feasible in all instances. The 
Commission also declines to adopt the approach supported by APCO, which 
would only require 988 outage notifications be made to those PSAPs that 
opt-in to receiving them. The Commission believes it would be too 
administratively burdensome for each service provider to continuously 
track and update the list of PSAPs across the country that have opted-
in to receiving 988 outage notifications, particularly in light of the 
limited benefits.
    24. The Report and Order requires covered 988 service providers and 
originating service providers to notify 988 special facilities with the 
same content, by the same means, with the same timing, and with the 
same frequency as our rules require for 911 outage notifications. Most 
commenters agree that harmonizing these requirements will have the 
effect of minimizing the cost and other impacts of the new notification 
requirements on service providers by allowing them to make 
notifications by efficiently using existing systems and processes. The 
Commission further notes that here, as in the 911 context, parties may 
mutually agree to alternate means of notification.
    25. The Commission declines to require certain modifications to 
these requirements proposed by commenters. The Commission rejects 
CX360's proposal that it adopt a ``safe harbor'' or otherwise modify 
the content of outage notifications to allow providers to merely notify 
988 facilities within 30 minutes that ``an issue has been identified 
and is being actively investigated, with additional information to be 
provided later.'' This approach would greatly reduce the amount of 
actionable information available to 988 special facilities and 
therefore would not serve as an effective

[[Page 2509]]

notification. The Commission also declines to require notifications to 
include contact information for those callers that failed to connect to 
the 988 Lifeline since the outage began. The Commission agrees with 
commenters that it is important for those individuals to receive the 
support they need, but believe more study is needed to determine 
whether it is technically feasible to require service providers to 
obtain and share that information as part of the outage notification 
process, as well as to understand any costs that might be attendant in 
obtaining and sharing such information. The Commission acknowledges, as 
CTIA--The Wireless Association (CTIA) asserts, that wireless network 
equipment affected by an outage often will not be able to identify 
devices that cannot connect to the network, which could make compliance 
with such a requirement challenging. While several commenters also 
argue that the phone numbers of individuals who try, but fail to reach 
988 is not currently available to providers, the Commission suspects 
that it may be technically feasible for providers to develop these 
capabilities, so it plans to continue to explore the matter.
    26. The Commission disagrees with those commenters that argue that 
a 30-minute timeframe to provide 988 outage notifications is too fast, 
as well as those that argue that it is too slow. The Commission finds, 
as it previously found for 911 outage notifications, that a 30-minute 
timeframe strikes a balance between the need for timely and actionable 
988 outage information and the accuracy of that information. The 
Commission believes the comments of the Veterans Crisis Line, which 
highlights that statistically as many as three deaths by suicide occur 
within thirty minutes, and the comments of the Competitive Carriers 
Association (CCA), which argues that 30-minute notifications may result 
in rushed analysis and inaccurate reporting, illustrate why a balance 
must be struck between speed and accuracy. The Commission agrees with 
those commenters who argue that 30 minutes is the best way to strike 
that balance.
    27. The Commission disagrees with CCA that a 30-minute notification 
timeframe would be unreasonable and unrealistic, particularly for 
originating service providers utilizing vendors for 988 solutions. 
Thirty minutes has already proven to be a realistic timeframe for 
covered 911 service providers to gather clear and useful information 
about network outages to include in a notification, even though such 
providers also frequently contract for services from vendors. The 
Commission also finds that originating service providers serving fewer 
customers will have to experience longer outages to reach the threshold 
required for notification, which effectively provides more time for 
those providers to investigate the outage. The Commission therefore 
sees no reason why it would be overly burdensome for originating 
service providers to provide accurate notifications within a similar 
timeframe for 988 outages. To the extent that service providers find 
that their own vendors' coordination failures are causing them to 
violate the Commission's outage notification requirements the 
Commission believes that is a matter to be resolved between those 
parties and does not change the service provider's obligation to comply 
with the Report and Order's notification requirements.
    28. As an alternative to the requirement adopted in the Report and 
Order, CCA proposes that the Commission adopt at minimum an approach 
that sets 988 outage notification deadlines based on the time when 
actual originating service providers are notified about outages by 
their vendors or underlying providers. This alternative is incompatible 
with the goal of providing 988 special facilities with timely outage 
notifications because it would excuse originating service providers 
from reporting outages that their vendors fail to disclose to them. The 
Commission believes this approach would disincentivize originating 
service providers from learning about outages on their vendors' 
networks, eliminate consistency as to when 988 special facilities can 
expect to receive outage reports, and delay 988 special facilities' 
receipt of outage reports, which would in turn delay any actions they 
may take to ensure the 988 Lifeline's availability. Moreover, the 
Commission finds it does not serve the public interest to create a 
means for providers to ``contract away'' their obligations by allowing 
the use of a vendor to alleviate a regulatory obligation. As stated 
above, the Commission has long held that licensees and other regulatees 
are responsible for the acts and omissions of their contractors, and 
the Commission declines to adopt an approach to 988 outage notification 
that would disturb that holding. The findings the Commission makes in 
the Report and Order are limited to the 988 outage notification 
requirements made in the order. The Commission reserves judgment on the 
Petition for Reconsideration filed by CCA regarding the Commission's 
November 2022 Report and Order, 88 FR 9756 (March 17, 2023), 
harmonizing 911 existing outage notification requirements. See CCA 
Petition for Reconsideration, PS Docket Nos. 15-80 and 13-75, ET Docket 
No. 4-35 (filed Mar. 17, 2023), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/filing/1031746539270. The Commission also rejects CX360's 
proposal that follow-up notifications not be due until seven to 
fourteen days after an initial notification is provided, as delaying 
critical details about an outage for an entire week, which is likely 
long after the outage has been resolved, clearly does not serve the 
goals of improving 988 special facilities' awareness and ability to 
address outages.
    29. The Report and Order requires covered 988 service providers and 
originating service providers to exercise special diligence to maintain 
accurate, up-to-date contact information for 988 special facilities, 
just as our rules require for 911 special facilities. ``Special 
diligence'' is the diligence expected from a person practicing in a 
particular field of specialty. The Commission has imposed this higher 
level of care in circumstances where a failure to take sufficient care 
can lead to particularly serious public harms. In these circumstances, 
special diligence would require, for example, actively seeking to 
confirm the accuracy of contact information and not relying on the 
absence of a response. Once providers have a 988 special facility 
contact list in place, special diligence would require them to annually 
verify the accuracy of their contact list to ensure it is up-to-date. 
As it has found in the 911 context, the Commission found that for 988 
outage reporting that requiring a higher level of care than reaching 
out to the prior contact is imperative to ensure public safety, and 
requiring this higher level of care will incentivize providers to 
ascertain and update such contact information. The Commission also 
finds that this requirement is significantly less burdensome than the 
similar requirement pertaining to 911 special facility contact 
information because the Report and Order only designates three 988 
special facilities for which contact information must be maintained. 
The Commission disagrees with ATIS's view that it would be extremely 
difficult to apply special diligence to the maintenance of 988 contact 
information because ``there are no subject matter experts practicing in 
the field of 988 routing or 988 contact information maintenance.'' The 
diligence our rules

[[Page 2510]]

require is that of a communications provider that, through their 
experience in offering the services that emergency communications 
depend on, understands that failure to provide effective notifications 
about outages could result in harm to life and property. Accordingly, 
the Commission expects that 988 service providers and originating 
service providers would take the steps necessary to ensure that the 
contact information they maintain for 988 special facilities is 
accurate and effective as the failure to provide effective notice to 
the appropriate contact could result in harm to life and property.
    30. The Commission declines at this time to require covered 988 
service providers or originating service providers to file 988 
reliability certifications to ensure the network supporting the 988 
Lifeline remains resilient and robust. The Commission agrees with ATIS 
that 988 is different from 911 in structure and organization; therefore 
the Commission's existing 911 network reliability certification 
requirements could not easily be applied to 988 reliability. The 
Commission believes additional study of threats to the 988 Lifeline is 
necessary to determine what next steps should be taken, if any, to 
promote reliability. The Commission expects that the 988 outage 
reporting requirements adopted in the Report and Order will give it 
additional insight to 988 reliability trends and inform future action.
    31. The Commission notes that some commenters made recommendations 
that they argue would improve the general effectiveness and reliability 
of the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline. While these recommendations are 
outside of the scope of the 988 network outage reporting and 
notification requirements adopted in the Report and Order, the 
Commission will keep these issues in mind as it continues to support 
the 988 Lifeline.
C. Assessing the Benefits and Costs
    32. The Commission determined that the rules adopted in the Report 
and Order concerning the reporting in NORS of outages that potentially 
affect 988 special facilities and the notifying of 988 special 
facilities about outages will result in an industry-wide one-time 
compliance cost of $56,000 and an annual recurring cost of $1,355,000. 
The Commission sought comment on cost estimates in the 988 Outage NPRM 
and received no persuasive objections and only one comment offering an 
alternative calculation in response, which is addressed in context 
below.
    33. For the reporting of 988 outages in NORS, the Report and Order 
finds that outages that potentially affect 988 special facilities fall 
into two categories: outages experienced by the covered 988 service 
providers that are responsible for providing the 988 Lifeline with the 
capability to receive, process, or forward 988 calls, and outages 
experienced by originating service providers that deliver calls to the 
Lifeline. Consistent with the estimate stated in the 988 Outage NPRM, 
which no commenter challenged, the Commission assumes that one covered 
988 service provider experiences a maximum of one reportable outage per 
month and estimates an annual compliance cost for that one covered 988 
service provider of $1,000. See 988 Outage NPRM at 15, paragraph 37, 
n.80 (estimating a maximum of two hours total time to submit all 
required reports at a cost of $43 per hour for a total cost estimate of 
$1000 ~ $43/hr x 2 hrs x one reportable outage per month x 12 months). 
The Commission finds that originating service providers already submit 
outage reports to the Commission related to outages that affect voice 
telephony, which would be largely or entirely identical to the new 
reporting requirements, so initial compliance costs would be 
negligible.
    34. With regard to the requirements to maintain updated contact 
information for 988 special facilities and to notify those facilities 
about outages that affect them, the Commission estimates that the costs 
of compliance will also be relatively low when compared to the benefits 
to the public. It estimates a one-time industry-wide cost of $56,000 to 
create an e-mail survey to biannually solicit 988 special facility 
contact information. The Commission does not expect more than 
incidental costs arising from the creation or updating of outage 
notification templates, as the 988 outage notification requirements 
that adopted in the Report and Order share the same content and timing 
as the 911 outage notification requirements with which service 
providers already comply. The Commission estimates maximum annually 
recurring costs of $1,354,000, which consist of $1,326,000 for 
notifying 988 special facilities of outages that potentially affect 
them pursuant to the requirements adopted in the Report and Order and 
$28,000 for soliciting appropriate contact information for outage 
notification from 988 special facilities. The Commission expects that 
no costs will be incurred related to identifying the 988 special 
facilities that could potentially be affected by an outage, as the 
Commission has required that the same three special facilities (SAMHSA, 
the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator) be notified regardless of 
the geographic area affected by the outage.
    35. The Commission finds that the benefits of the 988 outage 
reporting and notification requirements adopted in the Report and Order 
outweigh their associated costs. The Commission recognizes that it is 
difficult to quantify the value of ensuring the continuity of access to 
988 Lifeline services, which includes its capacity to save lives and 
mitigate and prevent injuries. However, the Commission believes the 
considerable public safety value of the requirements adopted in the 
Report and Order as described above will exceed the limited costs of 
implementation. As discussed by commenters and in the 988 Outage NPRM, 
the 988 Lifeline directly benefits people in crisis and saves lives. 
When the 988 Lifeline is interrupted, people's lives are put into 
jeopardy. In May 2023, the 988 Lifeline answered 235,292 calls, which 
is an average of over 7,500 answered calls per day. The Commission 
finds that the outage reporting requirements would improve public 
safety by providing the Commission and other impacted entities with 
situational awareness of 988 outages, including the magnitude and 
causes of those outages, and allow for the identification of network 
reliability trends that can help identify best practices that could 
improve network reliability by helping to mitigate future outages. The 
Report and Order's notice and contact information retention 
requirements are intended to ensure that when 988 calling is disrupted, 
parties responsible for the varying aspects of the 988 call pathway 
notify 988 special facilities, share critical information in a timely 
and standardized manner, and hasten the timely restoration of 988 
Lifeline services. The Commission describes in the Report and Order how 
even a very small increase in the speed of restoration of access to 988 
Lifeline services could provide benefits that outweigh the costs of 
adopting the requirements.
    36. The benefits of reducing suicide via 988 are driven by the 
staggering societal costs of deaths by suicide. In 2021, there were 
over 48,000 deaths by suicide in the United States, which, as noted 
above, averages out to approximately one death every 11 minutes. For 
every suicide death, there were 3 hospitalizations for suicide 
attempts, 8 suicide-related emergency department visits, and 38 self-
reported suicide attempts. Suicides and suicide attempts annually 
impose billions of dollars in medical, first-responder,

[[Page 2511]]

productivity-loss, and lost-quality-of-life costs on society. In 
addition to lives saved and injuries avoided, time-saving network 
outage protocols will also alleviate the devastating emotional toll 
wrought by suicide on victims' families, friends, and communities.
    37. Notifying SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator of 
the disruption of access to 988 Lifeline services will allow these 
parties to manage the impact of outages on their operations, quickly 
notify the public of the 988 service outage, and promote alternative 
ways for people to access 988 Lifeline services during the outage, 
which may include notifying the public of alternative call numbers, or 
encouraging people to text to 988 or use the https://988lifeline.org/ 
link to chat with a crisis management counselor. This, in turn, will 
enhance the 988 Lifeline's ability to direct scarce resources toward 
mitigating outages rather than seeking out information as to whether an 
outage is occurring, the scope of such an outage, or its impact. One of 
the benefits of implementing short dialing for calls and text messages 
to the Lifeline was to reduce the burdens on 911 and other emergency 
services arising from calls related to mental health and suicide. The 
Commission believes that the rules adopted in the Report and Order will 
further reduce the burden on 911 and other emergency services by 
promoting 988 reliability so that 988 calls go through when individuals 
need 988 service the most.
    38. The Commission disagrees with Southern Linc's argument that the 
rules adopted in the Report and Order place unnecessary regulatory 
burdens on smaller non-nationwide providers, which they assert will be 
strained due to the same personnel being responsible for both reporting 
and responding to outages, as well as complying with other regulatory 
requirements. As explained above, the Commission finds that the 
significant public safety benefits arising from the requirements 
adopted in the Report and Order outweigh their associated burdens, 
particularly since the cost of these requirements is likely to be 
relatively low due to commonalities with existing outage reporting 
requirements. The Commission again notes that the outages experienced 
by smaller providers with fewer subscribers would generally take longer 
to meet the required reporting thresholds, which would effectively 
provide more time to investigate an outage before it is required to be 
reported. Southern Linc further accuses the Commission of ``assuming 
that all employees of a provider's affiliates--no matter how distant--
should be considered `available resources' to support the provider's 
compliance efforts, regardless of whether the employees of those 
affiliates have any responsibility to support wireless network 
operations.'' The Commission does not make this assumption. If the 
Commission were to assume that service providers already had available 
staff to implement the requirements adopted in the Report and Order, 
then the costs to service providers would be estimated to be zero. To 
the contrary, the cost estimates that the Commission makes in the 
Report and Order are grounded in the additional labor hours and wages 
needed to comply with the Report and Order's adopted rules.
D. Legal Authority
    39. In the 988 Outage NPRM, the Commission sought comment on 
potential sources of legal authority under titles II and III and 
section 4(i) of the Communications Act and section 104 of the Twenty-
First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act (CVAA) for 
Commission action to promote the reliability and resiliency of the 988 
Lifeline. The Commission noted that Congress amended section 251 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 to specify 988 as the universal telephone 
number for the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline and that the 
proposed rules were intended to ensure that the Lifeline remains 
operational in accordance with the policies identified by Congress in 
that 2020 legislation and that any outages are quickly identified and 
reported, thus promoting the safety of life and property. The 
Commission now finds that section 4 and section 251 provide ample 
authority for the reporting and notice obligations adopted in the 
Report and Order.
    40. Title II of the Communications Act gives the Commission clear 
authority over service providers, including covered 988 service 
providers, to the extent that they provide interstate common carrier 
service. The statute provides that ``practices'' for and in connection 
with interstate common carrier services must be ``just and 
reasonable,'' and that a common carrier must ``provide itself with 
adequate facilities for the expeditious and efficient performance of 
its service as a common carrier.'' The Commission is also authorized to 
``inquire into the management of the business of all carriers and 
obtain from them full and complete information necessary to enable the 
Commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it 
was created.''
    41. The Commission further notes that the Communications Act 
directs that ``[f]or the purpose of obtaining maximum effectiveness 
from the use of radio and wire communications in connection with safety 
of life and property,'' the Commission ``shall investigate and study 
all phases of the problem and the best methods of obtaining the 
cooperation and coordination of these systems.'' Both originating 
service providers and covered 988 service providers play critical roles 
in ensuring the cooperation and coordination of the 988 system, and the 
Commission has previously relied on section 4(n) as providing authority 
to require reporting of interconnected VoIP outages, and to require 
emergency alerting plans to allow the Commission and other stakeholders 
``to more easily review and identify gaps'' in emergency alerting 
architecture, ``detect problems, and take measures to address these 
shortcomings.'' By requiring reporting of outages affecting access to 
988 by both originating service providers and covered 988 service 
providers the Commission is enabling the Commission's ongoing review of 
sources of disruption to this critical emergency service, which in turn 
will contribute to greater reliability going forward. The Commission 
concludes that these sources provide it with sufficient authority for 
the 988 outage reporting requirements adopted in the Report and Order.
    42. Additionally, the Commission finds that imposing outage 
reporting requirements on covered 988 service providers is reasonably 
ancillary to our responsibility to ensuring that the 988 Lifeline 
service operates effectively. To exercise ancillary authority ``two 
conditions [must be] satisfied: (1) the Commission's general 
jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the Communications Act] covers 
the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary 
to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated 
responsibilities.'' The functions at issue here involve communications 
by wire or radio in that they either take the form of such transmission 
or involve the use of equipment for purposes of facilitating 
transmission by wire or radio. The Commission concludes that these 
reporting requirements are necessary to carry out our responsibility 
for the proper functioning of the 988 Lifeline service under section 
251(e)(4). Obtaining outage information from covered 988 service 
providers is necessary because only the covered 988 service provider 
has visibility into

[[Page 2512]]

outages that occur at the point where the covered 988 service provider 
processes and forwards the call. Adopting outage reporting and notice 
requirements for entities that have the ability to receive, process, or 
forward calls to the 988 Lifeline furthers the Commission's goals to 
strengthen the 988 Lifeline's reliability and help save the lives of 
those who may be experiencing a suicidal crisis or mental health-
related distress.
    43. The Commission disagrees with CX360, a company that contracts 
with the 988 Lifeline administrator to provide voice and SMS-based 
services for communications after they reach the 988 Lifeline, that the 
Commission lacks authority to require the reporting of outages by 
entities that provide the 988 Lifeline with the capability to receive, 
process, or forward calls. As outlined above, the Commission clearly 
has authority to impose these reporting and notice requirements on 
CX360, on any entities that offer to the public for a fee 
``transmission between points specified by the user, of information of 
the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the 
information as sent and received,'' and on entities that route calls 
from the 988 Lifeline to the appropriate crisis center(s), following 
routing instructions provided by the 988 Lifeline administrator. Even 
though the responsibilities of an originating service provider may 
conclude once a call reaches the 988 Lifeline, this does not mean that 
the services offered by other communications providers within the 988 
call path that are necessary to connect the caller to their local 
crisis center, the Veterans Crisis Line, or other call taker, a service 
which CX360 states that it provides, cannot be regulated by the 
Commission.
    44. The Commission specifically rejects CX360's argument that 
entities that ``process'' calls for the 988 Lifeline cannot be 
regulated by the Commission. The Commission finds that the processing 
of 988 calls--that is to say, conducting the necessary technical steps 
to prepare the call for forwarding to a crisis center or the Veterans 
Crisis Line and then transmitting those calls to that crisis center--
falls within our authority to regulate via the reporting and notice 
requirements adopted in the Report and Order. To the extent that an 
entity uses an interactive voice response system to support these 
capabilities, the Commission acknowledges that such an offering may 
acquire, store, or process information related to how the call should 
be routed. But the Commission concludes that it has authority to 
require outage reporting and notice under the specific circumstances 
here from entities performing functions like CX360.
E. Timelines for Compliance
    45. The Report and Order adopts deadlines for originating service 
providers to comply with the Report and Order's revisions to Sec.  4.9 
as the latest of (1) 30 days after the Commission issues a Public 
Notice announcing that OMB has completed review of any new information 
collection requirements associated with the adopted Report and Order; 
(2) 90 days after the publication of the summary of the Report and 
Order in the Federal Register, or (3) the date the Commission's updated 
911 outage reporting and notification rules go into effect. Consistent 
with the Commission's proposal in the 988 Outage NPRM, the Commission 
agrees with Vibrant that the first two elements of this timeline 
provide sufficient time for compliance, as the Commission finds that 
the revisions constitute only minor changes to existing notice and 
reporting requirements for 911 network outages, and it will take a 
modest amount of time for originating service providers to adjust their 
processes to satisfy the proposed rules. The Commission also agrees 
with USTelecom that it is sensible to harmonize the compliance timeline 
for the rules adopted in the Report and Order with the compliance 
timeline for the 911 outage notification requirements adopted in 
November 2022 given the similarities between them.
    46. The Commission is persuaded by CX360 that some covered 988 
service providers may not have existing NORS filing or outage 
notification obligations and would need additional time to develop the 
capabilities and processes necessary to comply with the rules adopted 
in the Report and Order. Accordingly, the Commission agrees with CX360 
that covered 988 service providers should be granted six additional 
months to come into compliance. The Report and Order adopts deadlines 
for covered 988 service providers to comply with the Report and Order's 
rules as the latest of (1) 30 days after the Commission issues a Public 
Notice announcing that OMB has completed review of any new information 
collection requirements associated with the adopted Report and Order; 
(2) nine months after the publication of the summary of the Report and 
Order in the Federal Register; or (3) the date the Commission's updated 
911 outage reporting and notification rules go into effect.

II. Procedural Matters

    47. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis. This document 
requires covered 988 service providers and originating service 
providers to adopt 988 reporting and notice procedures which represent 
new and modified information collection requirements subject to the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. The document 
will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for 
review under section 3507(d) of the PRA and, with the exception of the 
revision to 47 CFR 4.9(e)(1)(iv), will not take effect until approved 
by OMB. OMB, the general public, and other Federal agencies will be 
invited to comment on the new or modified information collection 
requirements contain in this proceeding. This document will be 
submitted to OMB for review under section 3507(d) of the PRA. In 
addition, the Commission notes that, pursuant to the Small Business 
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(4), the Commission previously sought, but did not receive, 
specific comment on how the Commission might further reduce the 
information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer 
than 25 employees. The Commission does not believe that the new or 
modified information collection requirements adopted in the Report and 
Order will be unduly burdensome on small businesses.
    48. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis. The Regulatory Flexibility 
Act of 1980, as amended (RFA) requires that an agency prepare a 
regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and comment rulemakings, 
unless the agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated, 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.'' As required by the RFA, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the 988 Outage NPRM adopted January 
26, 2023 (88 FR 20790 (Apr. 7, 2023)). The Commission sought written 
public comment on the proposals in the 988 Outage NPRM, including 
comment on the IRFA. No comments were filed addressing the IRFA. The 
Commission prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) 
concerning the potential impact of the rule and policy changes adopted 
in the Report and Order on small entities. The FRFA is set forth in 
Appendix B of the Report and Order.

III. Ordering Clauses

    49. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to the authority 
contained in

[[Page 2513]]

sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(n), 201(b), 214, 218, 251(e)(3), 251(e)(4), 
301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 332, and 403, of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and sections 3(b) and 6 of the 
Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j) 154(n), 201(b), 214, 218, 251(e)(3), 
251(e)(4), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 332, 403, 615, 
615a-1, the National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of 2018, Public 
Law 115-233, 132 Stat. 2424 (2018), and the National Suicide Hotline 
Designation Act of 2020, Public Law 116-172 (2020), the Report and 
Order IS hereby adopted.
    50. It is further ordered that the amendments of the Commission's 
Rules as set forth in Appendix A of the Report and Order are adopted, 
effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register, except for 
the amendments to 47 CFR 4.9. The amendments to 47 CFR 4.9 will not 
become effective until OMB completes any review that the Public Safety 
and Homeland Security Bureau determines is required under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act and the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau 
announces an effective date consistent with section III.E of the Report 
and Order by subsequent Public Notice.
    51. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of the Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration.
    52. It is further ordered that the Office of the Managing Director, 
Performance and Program Management, shall send a copy of the Report and 
Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government 
Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, 5 
U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 4

    Communications common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Telecommunications.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 4 as follows:

PART 4--DISRUPTIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 4 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. 34-39, 151, 154, 155, 157, 201, 251, 307, 
316, 615a-1, 1302(a), and 1302(b); 5 U.S.C. 301, and Executive Order 
no. 10530.


0
2. Section 4.3 is amended by:
0
a. Removing the heading from paragraph (i); and
0
b. Adding paragraph (j).
    The addition reads as follows:


Sec.  4.3  Communications providers covered by the requirements of this 
part.

* * * * *
    (j) Covered 988 service providers are providers that provide the 
988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline with capabilities such as the ability to 
receive, process, or forward calls. ``Covered 988 service provider'' 
shall not include any entity that constitutes a crisis center that 
participates in the 988 Lifeline, or any entity that offers the 
capability to originate 988 calls where another service provider 
delivers those calls to the appropriate crisis center.

0
3. Section 4.5 is amended by revising the section heading and adding 
paragraph (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  4.5  Definitions of outage, special offices and facilities, 911 
special facilities, and 988 special facilities.

* * * * *
    (f) An outage that potentially affects a 988 special facility 
occurs whenever there is a loss of the ability of the 988 Suicide & 
Crisis Lifeline to receive, process, or forward calls, potentially 
affecting at least 900,000 user-minutes and lasting at least 30 minutes 
duration.

0
4. Delayed indefinitely, Sec.  4.9 is amended by revising paragraphs 
(a)(4), (c)(2)(iv), (e)(1)(v), (f)(4), and (g)(1)(i) and adding 
paragraph (i) to read as follows:


Sec.  4.9  Outage reporting requirements--threshold criteria.

    (a) * * *
    (4) Potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in Sec.  
4.5(e)) or potentially affects a 988 special facility (as defined in 
Sec.  4.5(f)), in which case they also shall notify the affected 
facility in the manner described in paragraph (h) or (i) of this 
section, respectively. Not later than 72 hours after discovering the 
outage, the provider shall submit electronically an Initial 
Communications Outage Report to the Commission. Not later than 30 days 
after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit electronically 
a Final Communications Outage Report to the Commission. The 
notification and the initial and final reports shall comply with all of 
the requirements of Sec.  4.11.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (iv) Potentially affecting a 911 special facility (as defined in 
Sec.  4.5(e)) or potentially affecting a 988 special facility (as 
defined in Sec.  4.5(f)), in which case the affected facility shall be 
notified in the manner described in paragraph (h) or (i) of this 
section, respectively.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (v) That potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in 
Sec.  4.5(e)) or potentially affects a 988 special facility (as defined 
in Sec.  4.5(f)), in which case they also shall notify the affected 
facility in the manner described in paragraph (h) or (i) of this 
section, respectively.
* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (4) Potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in Sec.  
4.5(e)) or potentially affects a 988 special facility (as defined in 
Sec.  4.5(f)), in which case they also shall notify the affected 
facility in the manner described in paragraph (h) or (i) of this 
section, respectively. Not later than 72 hours after discovering the 
outage, the provider shall submit electronically an Initial 
Communications Outage Report to the Commission. Not later than 30 days 
after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit electronically 
a Final Communications Outage Report to the Commission. The 
Notification and the Initial and Final reports shall comply with all of 
the requirements of Sec.  4.11.
    (g) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) Within 240 minutes of discovering that they have experienced on 
any facilities that they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, an 
outage of at least 30 minutes duration that potentially affects a 911 
special facility (as defined in Sec.  4.5(e)) or potentially affects a 
988 special facility (as defined in Sec.  4.5(f)), in which case they 
also shall notify the affected facility in the manner described in 
paragraph (h) or (i) of this section, respectively; or
* * * * *
    (i) 988 Special facility outage notification. All cable, satellite, 
wireless, wireline, interconnected VoIP, and covered 988 service 
providers shall notify any official at a 988 special facility who has 
been designated by the affected 988 special facility as the

[[Page 2514]]

provider's contact person(s) for communications outages at the facility 
of any outage that potentially affects that 988 special facility (as 
defined in Sec.  4.5(f)) in the following manner:
    (1) Appropriate contact information. To ensure prompt delivery of 
outage notifications to 988 special facilities, covered 988 service 
providers shall exercise special diligence to identify, maintain, and, 
on an annual basis, confirm current contact information appropriate for 
outage notification for each 988 special facility that serves areas 
that the service provider serves.
    (2) Content of notification. Covered 988 service providers' outage 
notifications must convey all available material information about the 
outage. For the purpose of this paragraph (i), ``material information'' 
includes the following, where available:
    (i) An identifier unique to each outage;
    (ii) The name, telephone number, and email address at which the 
notifying 988 service provider can be reached for follow up;
    (iii) The name of the covered 988 service provider experiencing the 
outage;
    (iv) The date and time when the incident began (including a 
notation of the relevant time zone);
    (v) The types of communications service(s) affected;
    (vi) The geographic area affected by the outage;
    (vii) A statement of the notifying covered 988 service provider's 
expectations for how the outage potentially affects the special 
facility (e.g., dropped calls or missing metadata);
    (viii) Expected date and time of restoration, including a notation 
of the relevant time zone;
    (ix) The best-known cause of the outage; and
    (x) A statement of whether the message is the notifying covered 988 
service provider's initial notification to the special facility, an 
update to an initial notification, or a message intended to be the 
service provider's final assessment of the outage.
    (3) Means of notification. Covered 988 service providers' outage 
notifications must be transmitted by telephone and in writing via 
electronic means in the absence of another method mutually agreed upon 
in writing in advance by the special facility and the service provider.
    (4) Timing of initial notification. Covered 988 service providers 
shall provide an outage notification to a potentially affected 988 
special facility as soon as possible, but no later than within 30 
minutes of discovering that they have experienced on any facilities 
that they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, an outage that 
potentially affects a 988 special facility (as defined in Sec.  
4.5(f)).
    (5) Follow-up notification. Covered 988 service providers shall 
communicate additional material information to potentially affected 988 
special facilities in notifications subsequent to the initial 
notification as soon as possible after that information becomes 
available, but providers shall send the first follow-up notification to 
potentially affected 988 special facilities no later than two hours 
after the initial contact. After that, covered 988 service providers 
are required to continue to provide material information to the special 
facilities as soon as possible after discovery of the new material 
information until the outage is completely repaired and service is 
fully restored.

 [FR Doc. 2024-00428 Filed 1-12-24; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6712-01-P


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