2024 IL App (1st) 231306-U

No. 1-23-1306 

Order filed June 12, 2024 

Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JAZMINE McDOUGALD,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

LEASING & MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., 

and MERCY HOUSING, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 21 M1 111235 

Honorable 

H. Yvonne Coleman, 

Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices D.B. Walker and Van Tine concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s entry of a directed finding where plaintiff’s brief does 

not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) and she has 

failed to provide a record on appeal sufficient for our review. 

¶ 2 Plaintiff Jazmine McDougald appeals pro se from the circuit court’s entry of a directed 

finding in favor of defendants Leasing and Management Company, Inc. and Mercy Housing, Inc., 

in this breach of contract and retaliation action. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in 
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entering a directed finding for defendants because the evidence she presented at trial supported her 

claims. We affirm as plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. 

Oct. 1, 2020) and she has failed to file a record on appeal sufficient for us to review the judgment. 

¶ 3 The record on appeal lacks a report of proceedings. The following facts are drawn from the 

common-law record.

¶ 4 On June 3, 2021, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against defendants for a breach of 

contract. She alleged that defendants violated her right to quiet enjoyment of her apartment. For 

approximately two years, the tenants who lived above plaintiff had made noises that sounded like 

slamming doors, stomping, and throwing objects on the floor. The noises often occurred at night 

when plaintiff and her son tried to sleep. Plaintiff had requested defendants resolve the disturbance 

but defendants had threatened to evict her for complaining and failed to make repairs in her 

apartment. She claimed they were negligent in failing to resolve the disturbances. Plaintiff claimed

$10,000 in damages and requested defendants make necessary repairs in her apartment, refund her 

security deposit and rent payments she had made since the noises began, and pay for her move 

when she was ready to do so. 

¶ 5 Plaintiff attached to her complaint an unattributed document titled “House Rules” which

states that residents are prohibited from committing “any nuisance” or other act “which may 

disturb the quiet enjoyment of any other resident,” and from making “[e]xcessive noise” between 

10 p.m. and 7 a.m. Each household was “responsible for not disturbing other residents by *** loud 

noises.” 

¶ 6 On January 26, 2022, defendants filed a motion under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022)) to strike and dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failing
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to state a cause of action. The court granted the motion and allowed plaintiff to file an amended 

complaint. 

¶ 7 On July 8, 2022, plaintiff filed a pro se amended complaint. Plaintiff claimed that, since 

2014, she had lived in an apartment building owned by Mercy Housing and managed by Leasing 

and Management Company. The noise disturbances began in spring 2019 and had “occurred 

continuously almost every single day” since. Plaintiff had made audio and video recordings of the 

noise. She had called and emailed several agents of defendants to request the disturbances be 

resolved, and called the police “on several occasions.” In fall 2020, agents of defendants threatened 

to evict plaintiff as her complaints were disturbing the tenant above her. 

¶ 8 Plaintiff raised three causes of action. First, that defendants committed a breach of contract 

by violating the provision in the House Rules stating that each household was responsible for not 

disturbing other residents by loud noises. Second, that defendants violated section 5-12-150 of the 

Chicago Municipal Code (Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-150 (amended Nov. 6, 1991)) by 

retaliating against her by threatening eviction and failing to repair her apartment. Third, that Mercy 

Housing had a policy forgoing security deposits for veterans but plaintiff was a veteran and paid a 

security deposit. Plaintiff requested (1) all prepaid rent since defendants’ agents were first notified 

of her complaints, (2) her security deposit and accrued interest, (3) costs and fees, and (4) 

“[p]unitive damages for pain and suffering, and emotional distress because of the noise disturbance 

and sleep deprivation” from defendants’ “negligence” in “not holding tenants causing the noise 

disturbance responsible.” 

¶ 9 Plaintiff attached to her amended complaint (1) her lease, including the House Rules 

addendum she had attached to her initial complaint, (2) emails between her and several individuals 
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in which she complained about noises and requested repairs to her apartment, (3) an August 16, 

2020, police report indicating officers responded to numerous noise complaints by plaintiff, and 

(4) a September 23, 2020, letter from the property manager stating that building security and police 

had investigated nearly 10 complaints by plaintiff and found all of them unfounded, and if plaintiff 

continued making unfounded complaints, management would pursue terminating her lease. 

¶ 10 On August 9, 2022, defendants filed an answer. The answer included an affirmative 

defense that defendants had valid non-retaliatory reasons for threatening to terminate plaintiff’s 

lease. Defendants claimed that plaintiff was “a nightmare tenant.” Defendants had investigated her 

noise complaints and could not hear any noises. Plaintiff started “banging” on her neighbor’s door, 

disturbing the neighbor and making her fear for her safety. Defendants therefore sent plaintiff a 

letter instructing her to cease banging on the neighbor’s door and making false allegations against 

her neighbor. Defendants offered to allow plaintiff out of her lease but plaintiff refused. 

¶ 11 On September 22, 2022, the court held a bench trial at which plaintiff and defendants were 

present. The trial call order reflects that the court entered judgment for defendants after granting 

defendants’ motion for a directed finding. The court wrote that it did not find a breach of contract 

or retaliation and plaintiff “failed to make a prima facie case.”

¶ 12 On October 20, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. She argued that the court erred 

in granting the motion for a directed finding and stated she wished to present new evidence of her 

claims. 

¶ 13 On June 21, 2023, the court denied the motion. In a written order, the court stated that it 

had held a bench trial and defendants moved for a directed finding at the close of plaintiff’s case. 

The court “weighed the quality of [plaintiff’s] testimony and the admissible evidence and 
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determined that there was insufficient evidence to support her claims.” Plaintiff therefore “failed 

to present a prima facie case on the issues of law and facts.” The court wrote that there was no 

breach of contract as the lease did not require defendants to compel other tenants to comply with 

noise rules and plaintiff admitted that defendants had investigated her complaints. Plaintiff further 

failed to present evidence supporting the essential elements of a breach of her right to quiet 

enjoyment, which requires an actual or constructive eviction. Plaintiff had not shown she 

undertook any activity that was protected under the Chicago Municipal Code. 

¶ 14 Plaintiff now appeals pro se. She argues that she presented evidence at trial to support her 

claims, including emails between herself and agents of defendants, a video she played for the court 

that the court noted included a “knocking” sound, and her son’s testimony corroborating her 

allegations. She disagrees that she admitted defendants investigated her noise complaints. She 

argues that she was not allowed to question any of the witnesses, “which would have significantly 

helped [her] case.” She further asserts that the court erred in denying her motion for a new trial as, 

after trial, she found a provision in the lease binding defendants and learned that her case should 

have been heard in federal court. She argues that the court “disregarded” her claim that defendants 

should return her security deposit because she is a veteran. 

¶ 15 Neither defendant has filed an appellee’s brief. We entered an order taking the case for 

consideration on the record and appellant’s brief only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. 

Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (case may be taken on appellant’s brief 

where issues are simple and can be decided without additional briefing). 

¶ 16 In a bench trial, a defendant may move at the close of the plaintiff’s case for a finding or 

judgment in his favor. 735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2022). In deciding whether to grant a directed 
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finding, the court must first determine as a matter of law whether the plaintiff presented a prima 

facie case, i.e., presented some evidence on every element of her case. In re Estate of Coffman, 

2023 IL 128867, ¶¶ 51-52. If she has, the court then considers and weighs all the evidence. Id.

¶ 53. If she has not, the court enters judgment for the defendant. Id. ¶ 52. In that scenario, as here, 

our review is de novo. Id.

¶ 17 In this case, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of a directed finding where plaintiff’s brief 

does not comport with Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) and she has not provided a 

record on appeal sufficient for us to review her claims of error. 

¶ 18 Supreme Court Rule 341(h) governs the content of an appellant’s brief. Plaintiff’s brief is 

deficient in multiple respects. For one, she does not provide the applicable standard of review for 

the issues she raises with citation to authorities. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(3) (“The appellant must 

include a concise statement of the applicable standard of review for each issue, with citation to 

authority.”). More significantly, the argument section in plaintiff’s brief is almost entirely devoid 

of citations to authority. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (argument section “shall contain the 

contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities *** relied 

on”). 

¶ 19 We are entitled to the benefit of clearly defined issues with citations to pertinent authority 

and a cohesive legal argument. People v. Battle, 2023 IL App (1st) 231838, ¶ 33. This court “is 

not a depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Id. However, plaintiff’s issues are not clearly defined. She makes many 

arguments but does not provide their basis in law or their elements, or discuss how the facts in this 

case apply to those elements. “The failure to elaborate on an argument, cite persuasive authority, 
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or present a well-reasoned theory violates Rule 341(h)(7) and results in forfeiture of the argument.” 

Trilisky v. City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st) 182189, ¶ 54; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (“Points 

not argued are forfeited.”). 

¶ 20 The supreme court rules governing briefs are mandatory. Battle v. Chicago Police 

Department, 2022 IL App (1st) 200083, ¶ 9. Plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse her from 

complying with them. Ellis v. Flannery, 2021 IL App (1st) 201096, ¶ 8. 

¶ 21 Our review is further hindered by an incomplete record on appeal. Any issue relating to a 

court’s factual findings and the basis for its legal conclusions cannot be reviewed absent a report 

or record of the proceeding. Pate v. Wiseman, 2019 IL App (1st) 190449, ¶ 17; see also King v. 

Find-A-Way Shipping, LLC, 2020 IL App (1st) 191307, ¶ 31 (reviewing court must have a record 

of the proceeding where an error was allegedly made to determine whether the error occurred). As 

the appellant, it is plaintiff’s burden to present a sufficiently complete record to support her claims 

of error. Pate, 2019 IL App (1st) 190449, ¶ 17. We must therefore resolve any doubts arising from 

the incompleteness of the record against her. Id. Further, when the record is incomplete, we must 

presume the trial court’s order conformed with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. Id.

¶ 22 The record on appeal should include “any report of proceedings prepared in accordance 

with Rule 323.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). In turn, the report of proceedings should 

include “all the evidence pertinent to the issues on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

If no verbatim transcript is available, the appellant may prepare a “Bystander’s Report” composed 

from “the best available sources, including recollection.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c). The appellant must 

serve the proposed report on all parties and present it to the trial court for approval and certification. 

Id. Only a certified report of proceedings may be included in the record on appeal, absent 
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stipulation by the parties. Id. Alternative to a bystander’s report, the parties may stipulate to an 

agreed statement of facts. Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(d). 

¶ 23 The circuit court here found for defendants following a bench trial. The court’s written 

order denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial indicates that the court considered plaintiff’s 

testimony and the “admissible evidence” at the bench trial before granting defendants’ motion for 

a directed finding. We, however, have no record of those proceedings. Plaintiff has not filed a 

certified report of proceedings or an agreed statement of facts regarding the bench trial. She did 

attach to her docketing statement a proposed bystander’s report of the trial, which details the 

proceedings at trial “based solely on [plaintiff’s] memory.” However, there is no indication that 

the trial court certified the report as required by Rule 323(c). Plaintiff also filed several motions to 

supplement the record or her docketing statement with a transcript of the hearing on her motion 

for a new trial, stating that she hired a private court reporter for that hearing. This court denied the 

motions, stating that any transcript needed to be certified by the circuit court. 

¶ 24 Without a certified transcript of the trial or an acceptable substitute, we are unable to review 

the circuit court’s decisions to grant defendants’ motion for a directed finding or deny plaintiff’s 

motion for a new trial. Pate, 2019 IL App (1st) 190449, ¶ 17 (issue relating to a court’s factual 

findings and basis for its legal conclusions cannot be reviewed absent report or record of the 

proceeding). Without that report or record, we cannot know the evidence the circuit court 

considered or the basis for its directed finding for defendants and subsequent denial of the motion 

to reconsider, let alone review whether the court erred in those judgments. 

¶ 25 We are mindful that transcripts are not always necessary when the issue on appeal is subject 

to de novo review, as is the court’s granting of a directed finding here. See Beck v. DayOne Pact, 
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2023 IL App (1st) 221120, ¶ 29. However, although whether a plaintiff made a prima facie case 

is a matter of law (Estate of Coffman, 2023 IL 128867, ¶ 52), the directed finding was premised 

on the circuit court’s determination that plaintiff failed to present sufficient facts at trial to make a 

prima facie case. Thus, the issue here is factual: whether plaintiff presented a prima facie case at 

trial by presenting evidence on every element of her claims. See id. (to make a prima facie case, 

plaintiff must offer evidence on every element essential to her cause of action). Without a transcript 

of the proceeding, we cannot review plaintiff’s testimony or confirm what other evidence the court 

admitted and considered, and we are unable to determine the basis for the court’s decision.1 We 

are therefore unable to meaningfully review the directed finding. See Pate, 2019 IL App (1st) 

190449, ¶ 17; In re Marriage of Abu-Hashim, 2014 IL App (1st) 122997, ¶ 15 (whether record 

suffices to review error turns on the particular error claimed). 

¶ 26 Accordingly, we must presume the trial court’s order conformed with the law and had 

sufficient factual basis, and affirm the court’s entry of a directed finding and subsequent denial of 

the motion for a new trial. See Pate, 2019 IL App (1st) 190449, ¶ 17. 

¶ 27 Further, plaintiff’s contentions that the circuit court should have granted a new trial for her 

to present new evidence and litigate the case in federal court are forfeited. Motions for new trial 

based on newly discovered evidence are disfavored, and plaintiff does not explain how the new 

evidence that she wishes to present satisfies the elements of such a motion. See City of Chicago v. 

Eychaner, 2020 IL App (1st) 191053, ¶¶ 37-38 (providing elements of motion for new trial based 

on newly discovered evidence); Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (“Points not argued are forfeited.”). The 

1 Plaintiff states in her brief that the court admitted all of the exhibits attached to her complaint 

besides the police report.
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record does not reflect that plaintiff moved to transfer venue or remove the case to federal court at 

any time prior to trial. See Cigna v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 2020 IL App (1st) 190620, 

¶ 22 (venue objection forfeited in absence of timely motion to transfer). 

¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 29 Affirmed.