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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41161

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOHN (2013-14) DOE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2014 Opinion No. 65

Filed: August 20, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Richard S. Christensen, District Judge; Hon. Clark A. 

Peterson, Magistrate; Hon. James D. Stow, Magistrate.

Decision, on intermediate appeal, affirming order of commitment for malicious 

injury to property, affirmed.

John M. Adams, Kootenai County Public Defender; Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public 

Defender, Coeur d’Alene, for appellant. Jay Logsdon argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daphne J. Huang, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Daphne J. Huang argued.

________________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge

John Doe appeals from the decision of the district court on intermediate appeal affirming 

the magistrate’s order that Doe committed malicious injury to property, bringing him within the 

purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act (J.C.A.). He also challenges the district court’s

determination that mootness precluded review of Doe’s claim that his right to due process was 

violated by the magistrate’s failure to hold a hearing and make individualized findings regarding 

whether Doe must remain shackled during court proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, 

we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Doe was served with a petition and summons alleging he committed malicious injury to 

property, Idaho Code § 18-7001, bringing him within the purview of the J.C.A. Specifically, the 
2

petition alleged he damaged a refrigerator by tipping it over at the juvenile group home where he 

was residing.

After appearing before a magistrate several times, Doe was appointed counsel who filed a 

“Motion for Hearing to Remove Physical Restraints” and memorandum in support.1

 In the 

motion, Doe argued that routine shackling of juveniles without an individualized finding that 

shackles are necessary in a particular case “is in violation of Due Process, harms the integrity of 

the judiciary, and is not conducive to the juvenile system’s stated emphasis on rehabilitation.”

Therefore, he asserted, the magistrate was required to hold a hearing and then exercise its 

discretion as to whether Doe should continue to be shackled during court proceedings. Over a 

week later, Doe appeared with counsel in court for a pretrial conference. Doe was in “handcuffs 

attached to a belly chain and [had] shackles on.”2

 At the pretrial conference, the court took up 

Doe’s motion regarding shackling. After hearing argument from both sides, the magistrate stated 

it would also incorporate arguments that defense counsel had made earlier in the day regarding 

the use of shackles on a different juvenile in a different case (hereinafter Doe II) and the court’s 

denial of the motion in that case. The magistrate court denied Doe’s motion. 

Doe appeared before a different magistrate judge for the evidentiary hearing on the 

malicious injury to property charge. After the hearing commenced, the magistrate allowed Doe 

to be unshackled upon finding the State no longer had authority under the J.C.A. to detain Doe 

because the time limits for detention in the statute had been reached. The State presented its case 

through the testimony of a group home employee who witnessed the incident and the responding 

police officer. The employee testified that on the day of the incident, he was supervising Doe 

and three other juvenile residents who were cleaning in the dining room. The employee testified 

that some of the juveniles became upset, including Doe, and while the employee’s back was 

 

1 The record is unclear as to whether Doe was shackled during the appearances prior to 

being appointed counsel. This is a logical assumption, however, given that something must have 

prompted defense counsel to file the motion for a hearing on the continued use of physical 

restraints and defense counsel indicated at the commencement of the pretrial conference that Doe 

was “once again” handcuffed and shackled. 

2 Hereinafter we refer to physical restraints, including handcuffs and belly chains, 

generally as “shackles” or “restraints.” See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 625 (2005) (using 

the terms interchangeably).
3

turned, Doe overturned a large refrigerator. The employee testified that Doe told the employee 

he pushed over the refrigerator “out of rage.” A Coeur d’Alene police officer who had 

responded to the scene testified that Doe told him some of the other juveniles present had been 

teasing Doe, which caused Doe to become angry and push over the refrigerator. The officer 

testified that Doe admitted he knew what he did was wrong, but that he had been angry and “he 

thought it was better to push over the refrigerator than hurt somebody.” Doe testified that he 

merely tried to “move” the refrigerator out of the way and had not anticipated that it would fall 

over. He claimed to have told the responding officer that it was better to move the refrigerator 

out of his way than to engage in a physical conflict with another juvenile. The magistrate 

determined Doe committed malicious injury to property as charged by the petition.

Doe appealed to the district court, contending the magistrate erred by failing to hold a 

hearing and to make individualized findings regarding whether Doe must remain shackled during 

court proceedings. He also contended the magistrate erred by determining that he committed 

malicious injury to property, asserting the evidence did not support a finding that he had the 

requisite intent. The district court held a hearing, during which Doe was present in shackles. In 

a written decision, the district court determined the shackling issue was moot and that the State 

had presented sufficient evidence for the magistrate to find that Doe committed malicious injury 

to property. Doe now appeals to this Court. 

II.

ANALYSIS

Doe contends the district court erred by determining the shackling issue was moot 

because it falls within exceptions to the mootness doctrine. As to the merits of the issue, Doe 

argues his due process rights were violated by the magistrate’s failure to hold a hearing and make 

individualized findings that the use of shackles was necessary as to Doe specifically. Finally, he 

contends the district court erred by affirming the magistrate’s determination that he possessed the 

requisite intent for malicious injury to property. 

When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity, our 

standard of review is the same as expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 

whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s 

findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from 

those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
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therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm 

the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure.

Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.3d 214, 217-18 (2013) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 

153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012)). Thus, the appellate courts do not review the 

decision of the magistrate court. Bailey, 153 Idaho at 529, 284 P.3d at 973. Rather, we are 

procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court. State v. Korn, 148 

Idaho 413, 415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n.1 (2009).

A. Use of Shackles

At the pretrial conference, the parties briefly discussed the shackling issue with the 

magistrate, after which the magistrate indicated it was incorporating counsel’s argument and the 

magistrate’s holding from Doe II and “deny[ing] the request.”3

 The transcript of Doe II’s

hearing to which the magistrate referred is in the record. There, defense counsel argued that the 

restraints on Doe II (which, like in this case, were handcuffs attached to a belly chain and leg 

shackles) were a restriction of Doe II’s “freedom of movement” and “right to Due Process.”

Defense counsel recognized that the court had discretion to determine whether Doe II should 

remain shackled, but argued such a determination should be made “on the basis of personal 

characteristics of [the client] that would lead the Court to believe that he [presents] either a 

danger of [running away] or . . . causing some sort of disturbance in the courtroom.” The State 

responded:

Your Honor, it is at your discretion, obviously. I have several things that 

are--obviously, the charges[4] before the Court . . . raise concern. Based on these 

charges I would be concerned about violation.

There is also a very full courtroom with both . . . juveniles, parents, [and] 

family. And there is also limited court staff, bailiff and also staff from [the 

juvenile detention center]. So, I would have to defer to them regarding . . . their 

comfort level . . . and whether it poses a safety issue. But, again, it’s at your 

discretion, your Honor. 

 

3 It is not entirely clear from the transcript whether the magistrate intended to deny Doe’s 

request to hold a hearing on whether he must be shackled or denying a request, to the extent that 

it had been made, to remove Doe’s shackles. Resolution of this issue is not necessary given our 

disposition of the case. 

4 The record does not indicate the charges against Doe II. 
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The magistrate indicated it had read defense counsel’s “lengthy” motions and made the 

following ruling:

[I]n making a finding, I think I can just frankly deny this without additional order. 

There’s been a sufficient record, I think, before the Court.

But in any event, the juvenile’s not detained[5] because of security issues 

that are posed by the Courthouse.

The juvenile is not being detained as a result of limited staff, even though 

I know [the State] did mention that.

Essentially, the juvenile’s detention is based on individualized issues 

posed by his behavior and other factors. And with the input, of course, of the 

Juvenile Detention staff.

In making that ruling, I’m not conceding that I’m required to make such a 

ruling or that any further hearing need be had. But, nevertheless, I have addressed 

the motion.

I’ll deny the motion in both cases as to that issue.

But juveniles are not, in this County, routinely shackled. They’re only 

shackled when there’s a determination made for their detention and based on the 

input from the Detention staff that such is necessary for the security of the 

courtroom.

And not just that, for the security of the juvenile themselves, because 

when a juvenile has a conduct disruption or problem in court, or even if they 

attempt to flee or do things like that . . . [u]nlike an adult who is then apprehended 

by adult[] security staff, you have a juvenile who then has to be apprehended by 

adult security staff, which poses a risk and a danger of injury to the juvenile, in 

addition to the control issues that juveniles often don’t have that adults do have.

So, for all those many reasons and, frankly, I think I could just simply 

deny it as is, I’ll deny the request at this time.

Later during the hearing, defense counsel asked for a “point of clarification as to the 

shackles”:

[Defense counsel]: It sounded like the Court was stating that if a juvenile 

is found . . . to be detained by the Court . . . that decision would essentially 

encompass a decision that shackling . . . would be necessary in a courtroom as 

long as that--

[The Court]: No, I’m not saying that. I think . . . every juvenile--the 

decision with the input of correction staff--or Detention staff is an individualized 

decision based on the risk, history, behavior, et cetera, of that specific juvenile. 

So, that is, I think, the reason for the juvenile staff’s shackling. But that said . . . 

I’m not making policy determinations. 

 

5 We assume that in saying “detained” the magistrate meant “restrained” or “shackled.”
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Doe appealed the shackling issue to the district court, contending the magistrate did not 

hold the requisite hearing or make the requisite findings specific to Doe when ordering that Doe 

remain shackled at the pretrial conference. The district court heard oral argument from both 

parties, during which the following exchange occurred between the court and the prosecutor:

[The Court]: Let me ask, is there a policy of shackling all juveniles?

[Prosecutor]: I know [Magistrate] Judge Peterson stated it was not the 

county’s policy to do that. Whenever a juvenile does come before the Court, they 

are in shackles, but that is because at the detention hearing they have made certain 

rulings and it’s the policy of JDC to transport them in shackles. So whether or not

there’s an actual policy of routine shackling, I don’t know that I can answer that 

question.

[The Court]: [T]he Court will . . . note for the record that the juvenile is 

shackled today. Is there a reason why the juvenile’s shackled today?

[Prosecutor]: From my understanding, it is the policy of JDC to transport 

the juveniles in shackles for their own safety, also for the protection of the staff, 

and obviously to prevent escape.

[The Court]: But it’s my understanding that the motion that was brought 

by the juvenile’s counsel was not to have shackling at the hearing; is that correct?

[Prosecutor]: Yes.

[The Court]: Okay. When they appear in court. So it’s not an issue of 

transportation, right?

[Prosecutor]: No, that is the way they arrive. His issue is whether he 

should remain shackled in the courtroom itself for those hearings.

The district court and defense counsel further discussed the county policy as to the use of 

shackles:

[Defense counsel]: Well, your Honor, in terms of shackling, it is--or the 

time that I’ve practiced here, I’ve never seen a juvenile that wasn’t brought in in 

shackles. If they were currently being detained, the shackles remain on them the 

entire time they’re in the courthouse except on the few occasions when I’ve 

convinced the magistrate to remove them and then they were immediately placed 

back on--

[The Court]: And in this case, when the juvenile went to disposition or 

evidentiary hearing, the shackles were on, correct?[6]

[Defense counsel]: That is correct, your Honor, which seems to indicate 

that it probably wouldn’t have been the end of the world had they been removed 

during his pretrial conference hearing or any other hearing. But they were 

removed in that case because . . . his detention . . . was actually unlawful at the 

 

6 Given defense counsel’s answer to this question, it appears the district court either 

intended to ask, actually did ask, or counsel believed it asked whether, when Doe attended the 

evidentiary hearing, the shackles were not on. 
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time. He was serving more time in the detention facility than was allowed under 

the sentence he was serving, so that’s why they had to remove them.

[The Court]: Is it just the practice here? Does it vary between 

magistrates?

[Defense counsel]: It does. Three magistrates will hold a hearing as to 

whether or not the shackles are necessary and remove them. Judge Peterson will 

not have that hearing. And two magistrates have never heard a request to have 

such a hearing . . . .

The district court took the matter under advisement and made two determinations in its 

written opinion relevant to the issue. First, the court found the record indicated Doe “had both 

the ability and opportunity to be heard and was heard on his motion,” noting there was no 

indication the magistrate ignored Doe’s request for a hearing or denied Doe the opportunity to 

introduce evidence in support of his motion. Specifically, the district court noted that defense 

counsel “only presented oral argument and did not proffer any evidence but for a single affidavit 

of a clinical psychiatrist as to the effects of physically restraining juveniles” and when the 

magistrate indicated it would incorporate counsel’s argument and the magistrate’s findings from 

Doe II’s hearing, counsel acquiesced. 

The district court also found that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine were 

applicable in this case. Specifically, the court indicated there was a “paucity of evidence in the 

record that this is a recurring situation” and noted the magistrate had stated that “juveniles are 

not--in this County, routinely shackled.” The district court also stated it was not persuaded that 

this issue “raises substantial public interest,” indicating the record was devoid of such evidence. 

1. Mootness

Doe first contends the district court erred by determining that the issue whether a 

magistrate must hold a hearing and make individualized findings concerning shackling was moot

and no exceptions were applicable. An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and 

substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief. State v. Barclay, 

149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010). However, even where a question is moot, there are 

three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal 

consequences imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely 

to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue 

raises concerns of substantial public interest. Id. 
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Doe concedes that, unless saved by an exception, the issue presented is moot. Appellate 

counsel indicates Doe has served his term; thus, any judicial relief from this Court would simply 

create precedent for future cases and would have no effect on either party. Consequently, this 

issue pursued by Doe on appeal must fall within one of the exceptions listed above in order to be 

addressed by this Court. See id. Doe argues that the two latter exceptions apply; we only discuss 

the second--that the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review--because it is 

dispositive.

As Doe points out, pursuant to the J.C.A., most juvenile cases are of short duration. For 

example, Idaho Juvenile Rule 15 requires that a juvenile have an evidentiary hearing within 

ninety days of entering a denial or within forty-five days from his initial appearance if kept in 

continuous preadjudication detention. By contrast, the time to obtain adjudication of a claim on 

appeal is significantly longer. Thus, Doe contends, the issue of shackling during juvenile 

proceedings “is likely to evade review on appeal because the vast majority of juvenile cases 

simply do not last long enough for the issues to be decided on appeal if the courts are unwilling 

to apply an exception to mootness.” In other words, it is likely to be a rare instance where a 

juvenile continues to be subject to shackling in court proceedings related to the charge or charges 

at issue when his or her appeal is finally adjudicated. We agree that these circumstances satisfy 

the second mootness exception. Accord Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 368 

(Cal Ct. App. 2007) (addressing the same issue and noting that “given the relatively short 

duration of the proceedings, and the pace through which many minors move through the court 

and the wardship system, this issue may evade review for a significant period of time”).

2. Due process

Doe argues his due process rights were violated by the magistrate’s failure to hold the 

requisite hearing and make individualized findings as to whether Doe must remain in shackles at 

the pretrial conference. Specifically, Doe contends that for a juvenile to be shackled in any

juvenile court proceeding, due process requires that an adversarial hearing be conducted, after 

which a court must make individualized findings about the individual juvenile regarding whether 

the juvenile may continue to be shackled during subsequent court proceedings. This presents a 

question of constitutional law, over which we exercise free review. State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 

244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990); State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292-93, 955 P.2d 603, 607-

08 (Ct. App. 1997).
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The United States Supreme Court and Idaho courts clearly recognize the right of adult 

defendants to be free from visible physical restraints during criminal jury trials unless a court 

finds, in its discretion, that circumstances specific to the case warrant the use of such restraints. 

See State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478, 484, 283 P.3d 795, 801 (Ct. App. 2012). However, neither 

the United States Supreme Court nor Idaho appellate courts have yet addressed whether the 

prohibition against the routine shackling of adult defendants, that is, shackling without a hearing 

and individualized findings as to the defendant, applies with equal force to the shackling of 

juveniles. Thus, the extent to which a juvenile has a right to appear in juvenile court proceedings 

free from physical restraints is a question of first impression in Idaho. 

Because it is the starting point for our analysis, we first examine the constitutional law 

applicable to the shackling of adult defendants in Idaho during jury trial proceedings, which we 

summarized in Wright:

“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints 

visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its 

discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” 

Deck [v. Missouri], 544 U.S. [622,] 629, [2005]; see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 

U.S. 501, 505 (1976) (recognizing shackles should only be used when necessary 

to control a defendant); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970) (holding a 

defendant may be restrained to maintain the decorum in a courtroom). A criminal 

defendant may be restrained during trial only in the “presence of a special need.” 

Deck, 544 U.S. at 626. Interpreting this, the Idaho Supreme Court held the Due 

Process Clauses of both the United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit visibly 

restraining a criminal defendant at trial unless “overriding concerns for safety or 

judicial decorum predominate.” [State v.] Crawford, 99 Idaho [87,] 96, 577 P.2d 

[1135,] 1144 [(1978)]. Therefore, any use of restraints must be based upon a 

finding that they are necessary. Id. at 98, 577 P.2d at 1146; State v. Hyde, 127 

Idaho 140, 147, 898 P.2d 71, 78 (Ct. App. 1995). Using restraints on a defendant 

during trial is reversible error if the trial judge fails to make a finding that the 

restraints are necessary for physical security, to prevent escape, or to maintain 

courtroom decorum, unless the State can show the error was harmless. Deck, 544 

U.S. at 635 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); State v. 

Moen, 94 Idaho 477, 479, 491 P.2d 858, 860 (1971); Miller, 131 Idaho at 293, 

955 P.2d at 608.

Wright, 153 Idaho at 484, 283 P.3d at 801; see also I.C. § 19-108 (prohibiting “any more 

restraint than is necessary” in order to detain the defendant to answer his or her charges). 

Doe argues that regardless of the differences in juvenile and adult proceedings, the due 

process right recognized in the preceding authority should apply to all juvenile court 
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proceedings. The State disagrees, arguing that the concerns attending the use of restraints in 

adult jury trials do not apply to Doe’s pretrial conference, or any juvenile proceedings, because a 

jury was not, and is never, utilized in juvenile proceedings. The State also contends the 

magistrate made a valid determination that restraints were warranted for security purposes in 

Doe’s case. 

Several state courts have found that the constitutional prohibition of routine shackling of 

adult defendants in jury trials extends to juvenile adjudicatory proceedings,

7 regardless of the 

differences inherent in juvenile proceedings. In State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah Cnty. 

v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 859 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), the juvenile appellant contended the court’s 

refusal to unshackle him during the adjudicatory hearing violated his due process rights and 

interfered with his right to a fair trial. The issue arose when, at the commencement of the 

adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile’s counsel objected to the juvenile being forced to appear at the 

hearing in the leg chains routinely utilized by sheriff’s officers to transport juveniles from the 

detention center to the courthouse. Counsel argued that although inadequate staffing may 

explain the necessity of transporting juveniles in shackles, requiring that a juvenile be shackled 

during court proceedings implicated his client’s rights to due process and a fair trial. The trial 

court rejected the request, noting it was not a jury proceeding and that the juvenile’s appearance

in chains would not affect the court’s view of the evidence presented. Counsel replied that 

although it believed the court could “overlook” the chains, “it is more difficult for the juvenile to 

overlook that” and expressed his belief that shackling affects the juvenile and his participation in 

his trial. Id. 

The Millican court first noted that Oregon had long recognized the right of adult 

defendants to be free from physical restraints during criminal trials, a right derived from the 

common law, the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. Id. (citing State v. Smith, 8 P. 

343 (Or. 1883)). The court noted, “Although most often invoked as a safeguard against potential 

jury prejudice, the right to stand trial unshackled also ensures that defendants may face the court 

‘with the appearance, dignity and self-respect of a free and innocent [person].’” Id. (citations 

 

7 States use various names for the juvenile proceeding equivalent to the adult trial, at which 

evidence is presented and the court adjudicates the juvenile’s “guilt.” We refer to these types of 

hearings generally as adjudicatory hearings, but in regard to Idaho specifically, we utilize 

“evidentiary hearing,” the term contained in the Juvenile Corrections Act. I.C. § 20-519.
11

omitted). Further, the Court of Appeals of Oregon had previously recognized that shackles

“‘impinge on the presumption of innocence and the dignity of the judicial proceedings and may 

inhibit consultation with his attorney and his decision whether to take the stand as a witness.’” 

Id. (citation omitted). For these reasons, the Millican court indicated that juveniles have the 

same right as adult defendants to appear free from physical restraints absent a finding that such 

restraints are warranted as to the particular juvenile. Id. at 860. “‘Neither the Fourteenth 

Amendment nor the Bill of Rights,’” the court quoted, “‘is for adults alone.’” Id. (quoting In Re 

Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)). In coming to this conclusion, the Millican court specifically 

recognized that although some concerns underlying the rule applicable to adult defendants do not 

apply in the juvenile court context because there is no right to a jury trial in the latter, two factors 

warranted the extension of the right against physical restraints to juvenile proceedings:

First, the right to remain unshackled is based on considerations beyond the 

potential for jury prejudice, including inhibition of free consultation with counsel. 

That concern applies equally in the juvenile context.

Second, extending the right to remain unshackled during juvenile 

proceedings is consonant with the rehabilitative purposes of Oregon’s juvenile 

justice system. Allowing a young person who poses no security hazard to appear 

before the court unshackled, with the dignity of a free and innocent person, may 

foster respect for the judicial process.

Id. (citations omitted). 

Several years later, a California Court of Appeal followed suit in Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr.

3d at 375, determining that California’s long history of disallowing the indiscriminate shackling 

of adults extended to juveniles appearing in juvenile court proceedings.8

 The Tiffany A. court 

rejected the lower court’s holding that courtroom safety, standing alone, was sufficient 

justification to establish a general policy to shackle all minors appearing before the court in any 

proceeding. Id. To reach this conclusion, the court first examined California case law regarding 

the use of shackles on adult defendants. In People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322 (Cal. 1976), the 

California Supreme Court discussed the potential harms resulting from the shackling of adult 

defendants, including “possible prejudice in the minds of the jurors, the affront to human dignity, 

 

8 The holding in Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Cal Ct. App. 2007)

extended to all juvenile court proceedings which, as we discuss below, is broader than the rule 

we adopt today. 
12

the disrespect for the entire judicial system which is incident to unjustifiable use of physical 

restraints, as well as the effect such restraints have upon a defendant’s decision to take the 

stand.” Id. at 1327. The Duran Court also recognized the United States Supreme Court’s maxim 

that physical restraints should only be used as a last resort, not only because of the prejudice 

created in jury’s minds, but also because “‘the use of this technique is itself something of an 

affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to 

uphold.’” Id. (quoting Allen, 397 U.S. at 344). Thus, the Duran Court reaffirmed the rule that a 

defendant could not be subject to restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury’s 

presence unless there was a showing of “manifest need.” Id. 

The Tiffany A. court recognized that since Duran, California courts had held that the 

principles announced in Duran applied equally to court proceedings other than jury trials. 

Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 371. For example, in People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302, 1322 (Cal. 

1991), the California Supreme Court held there must be “some showing” of necessity for the use 

of shackles even at a preliminary hearing. The Fierro Court determined that routine shackling 

was disallowed even where a jury was not present, noting that the general rule applicable to jury 

proceedings “serves not merely to insulate the jury from prejudice, but to maintain the 

composure and dignity of the individual accused, and to preserve respect for the judicial system 

as a whole; these are paramount values to be preserved irrespective of whether a jury is present 

during the proceeding.” Id. In addition, the Fierro Court noted that shackles could impair the 

ability of the defendant to communicate effectively with counsel. Id. 

The Tiffany A. court rejected the People’s contention that the Duran-Fierro line of 

reasoning did not apply to juvenile proceedings. Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 375. Although 

recognizing that juveniles do not enjoy the same panoply of rights as adult criminal defendants, 

e.g., no right to a jury trial or bail, the court stated that nevertheless, all juvenile proceedings 

“must contain essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Id. The court continued, “[T]he 

constitutional presumption of innocence, the right to present and participate in the defense, the 

interest in maintaining human dignity and the respect for the entire judicial system, are among 

these essentials whether the accused is 41 or 14.” Id. The court also noted the unique nature of 

juvenile proceedings, including their rehabilitative purpose and that the use of shackles absent an 

individual showing of need was in direct contravention. Id. “Given the rehabilitative objectives 

of the juvenile justice system,” the court concluded, “a juvenile has the same right to an 
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individual determination of need for the use of shackles as enjoyed by an adult criminal 

defendant.” Id. 

The North Dakota Supreme Court made a similar finding, relying heavily on Deck, where 

the United States Supreme Court extended its prohibition of routine shackling of adults during 

the guilt phase of a trial to the penalty phase of a capital case. In In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326, 

328 (N.D. 2007), the juvenile appellant contended the court erred by denying his request to 

remove the handcuffs during his adjudicatory hearing for burglary, robbery, and disorderly 

conduct based on the court’s reasoning that it had been told by the “presiding judge of the 

district” that it was a security matter to be determined by the sheriff’s office. Specifically, the 

juvenile contended the court violated his constitutional rights by refusing to remove his 

handcuffs without making an independent decision as to the necessity of restraints in his case. 

Recognizing that North Dakota had yet to address the right of either adult defendants or juveniles 

to appear in court free from physical restraints, the R.W.S. court turned to federal precedent, 

namely Deck. R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d at 329 (citing Deck, 544 U.S. at 624). In Deck, the Supreme 

Court examined the reasons motivating the constitutional rule applicable to the guilt phase of 

trial and determined they apply with similar force at the penalty phase, even though “shackles do 

not undermine the jury’s effort to apply that presumption” of innocence because the defendant 

has already been convicted. Deck, 544 U.S. at 632. The Deck Court identified three main 

considerations militating against the routine use of visible physical restraints during a criminal 

trial: (1) “the criminal process presumes that the defendant is innocent until proved guilty,” and 

visible physical restraints undermine that presumption, suggesting “to the jury that the justice 

system itself sees a ‘need to separate a defendant from the community at large’”; (2) “the 

Constitution, in order to help the accused secure a meaningful defense, provides him with a right 

to counsel,” and “[s]hackles can interfere with the accused’s ‘ability to communicate’ with his 

lawyer”; and (3) “judges must seek to maintain a judicial process that is a dignified process” and 

that dignity “includes the respectful treatment of defendants,” and “reflects the importance of the 

matter at issue, guilt or innocence, and the gravity with which Americans consider any 

deprivation of an individual’s liberty through criminal punishment.” Id. at 631 (citations 

omitted). The Deck Court then applied these principles within the context of the penalty phase 

of a trial and concluded that the latter two considerations, securing a meaningful defense and 
14

maintaining dignified proceedings, militate against the routine use of visible physical restraints 

during the penalty phase of a criminal trial. Id. at 632-33.

After discussing Deck, the R.W.S. Court turned to its application to the issue of juvenile 

shackling. The Court first recognized that with respect to juvenile court proceedings, the 

concerns as to the effect of visible physical restraints on a jury do not apply; nevertheless, the 

Court indicated it agreed with other courts’ holdings that juveniles have the same rights as adult 

defendants to be free from physical restraints. R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d at 330. The Court 

specifically noted the United States Supreme Court’s edict in Gault that “‘neither the Fourteenth 

Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,’” R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d at 330 (quoting 

Gault, 387 U.S. at 13), and discussed the Millican court’s reasoning for extending the right 

against physical restraints to juveniles, which we discuss above. Accord N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B2402.1 (providing that a judge may subject a juvenile to physical restraint in the courtroom only 

when the judge “finds the restraint to be reasonably necessary to maintain order, prevent the 

juvenile’s escape, or provide for the safety of the courtroom”); In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 74 

(Ill. 1977) (extending to juveniles the right to remain free from restraints in nonjury proceedings 

absent a showing of clear necessity for restraints). 

The reasoning in the preceding cases is persuasive, and we are convinced that due 

process requires that juveniles in Idaho be afforded the same rights as adults to be free from 

physical restraints at trial, absent a finding of necessity on a case-by-case basis, in the equivalent 

juvenile proceeding in this State--the evidentiary hearing. Although we acknowledge that some 

of the concerns underlying the prohibition of routine adult shackling are not relevant in the 

juvenile context where there is no right to a jury, like the courts discussed above, we recognize 

there exists ample basis to find that the prohibition of routine shackling of adult defendants at 

trial, which the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically acknowledged, must extend to juveniles at 

the evidentiary hearing. For one, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in Deck, 

shackles may interfere with the accused’s ability to communicate with his lawyer, Deck, 544 

U.S. at 631, which is a consideration that is equal to, if not more, pressing in the case of 

juveniles. Accord Millican, 906 P.2d at 860. There is also widespread recognition, from the 

United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, that the use of shackles implicates a judge’s 

duty to “maintain a judicial process that is a dignified process” and which “includes the 

respectful treatment of defendants,” Deck, 544 U.S. at 631, a consideration that also applies with, 
15

at the very least, equal force to juveniles. See Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 375. An Illinois 

Supreme Court Justice further explored this concern:

[U]nnecessary shackling threatens the dignity of the court. . . . As a court loses its 

dignity, it loses credibility with the public . . . ; and I further would argue that it 

loses credibility with the respondent--to the possible detriment of his defense. To 

do his best at trial, the defendant must have confidence that he is making his case 

to a rational and impartial trier of fact who genuinely presumes he is innocent 

until the State proves him to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Unnecessary 

and unjustified shackling weakens that confidence; it jeopardizes the 

presumption’s value and protection. . . . The presumption of innocence is a noble 

ideal, but this ideal will inspire little hope if hard iron reminds the defendant, 

every moment of the trial, how things really are between him and the court--for, 

plainly, he is not stand[ing] trial with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a 

free and innocent man. . . . In addition to defending himself against the State’s 

evidence, a defendant should not have to struggle with a sense of futility, a 

disheartening suspicion that he is presumed guilty. Anyone who can sit in chains 

with no diminution of courage and confidence has a thicker hide than the common 

run of humanity.

In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d 227, 258 (Ill. 2011) (Freeman, J., dissenting) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted).

9

We also note that the indiscriminate, routine shackling of juveniles is largely antithetical 

to key objectives underlying Idaho’s juvenile justice system. The establishment of a separate 

juvenile justice system is based largely on a premise first recognized over one hundred years 

ago--that children are different than adults and should, therefore be treated differently. John 

Varin and Sharon Burke, The Unique Philosophy and History of Juvenile Courts, 46 THE 

ADVOCATE, OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR, Sept. 2003 at 22. The Idaho 

Supreme Court long ago discussed these unique purposes and objectives behind the juvenile 

system in In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 126-27, 96 P. 563, 564 (1908), where the appellant argued

that the juvenile justice act in effect at the time improperly denied him his constitutional right to, 

among other things, trial by jury: 

 

9 The point of contention in In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d 227 (Ill. 2011), that resulted 

in dissenting opinions being filed, was not whether juveniles may routinely be restrained. 

Illinois has long required that, as in adult cases, a juvenile may not be kept in restraints during 

court proceedings unless a court determines there is a manifest need for such restraints. In re 

Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 73-74 (Ill. 1977). 
16

[T]his statute is clearly not a criminal or penal statute in its nature. Its purpose is 

rather to prevent minors under the age of sixteen from prosecution and conviction 

on charges of misdemeanors, and in that respect to relieve them from the odium 

of criminal prosecutions and punishments. Its object is to confer a benefit both 

upon the child and the community in the way of surrounding the child with better 

and more elevating influences, and of educating and training him in the direction 

of good citizenship, and thereby saving him to society and adding a good and 

useful citizen to the community. This, too, is done for the minor at a time when 

he is not entitled, either by natural law or the laws of the land, to his absolute 

freedom,--but rather at a time when he is subject to the restraint and custody of 

either a natural guardian or a legally constituted and appointed guardian to whom 

he owes obedience and subjection. Under this law the state, for the time being, 

assumes to discharge the parental duty and to direct his custody and assume his 

restraint. 

The Court recognized that the legislature could not deny any citizen the constitutional right to 

trial by jury, but the fallacy in the appellant’s argument was that he had, in fact, been “tried by 

the court for any offense” when he was adjudicated pursuant to the juvenile justice system. Id. 

Even after the Idaho Legislature enacted the current J.C.A.10 in 1995 in response to 

concerns that the existing juvenile system was “too soft” on juvenile law violators, Idaho’s

juvenile courts continue to be structured differently than adult criminal courts. John Varin, The 

Juvenile Corrections Act: Its Birthday and Challenges, 48 THE ADVOCATE, OFFICIAL 

PUBLICATION OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR, Oct. 2005 at 15. For example, a delinquent juvenile is 

“adjudicated” of a crime, not “convicted.” I.C. § 20-502(13). The taking of a juvenile into 

custody is not deemed an arrest, I.C. § 20-516(2), and juveniles do not have the right to trial by 

jury, I.C. § 20-519, or to bail, I.C. § 20-516. The J.C.A. also provides for limited access to 

certain juvenile records and the closing of juvenile court proceedings to protect the juvenile 

 

10 The Juvenile Corrections Act prescribes a balanced approach, the primary purpose of 

which is “to provide a continuum of programs which emphasize the juvenile offender’s 

accountability for his actions while assisting him in the development of skills necessary to 

function effectively and positively in the community in a manner consistent with public safety.” 

Idaho Code § 20-501. The legislature further indicated that the services and programs utilized in 

juvenile corrections “will individualize treatment and control of the juvenile offender for the 

benefit of the juvenile offender and the protection of society” and indicated that a key guiding 

principle of the system is to “[s]trengthen opportunities for the juvenile offender’s development 

of competency and life skills by expanding the juvenile offender’s access to applicable programs 

and community resources.” Id. 
17

offender--differences that allow the juvenile the opportunity to leave the process without a 

criminal record. I.C. § 20-525. 

It is a strain to see how routine shackling of juveniles at the evidentiary hearing is 

compatible with the distinct characteristics of the juvenile justice system. On one hand, our 

Supreme Court has held that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial because they are not 

considered as being “tried” for a criminal offense, but yet, under our current practice, juveniles 

have lesser protections than adult criminal defendants in regard to the use of shackles merely on 

the basis that a jury is not present. In addition, the juvenile system utilizes modified procedures 

in furtherance of its objectives to, among other things, “relieve [juveniles] from the odium of 

criminal prosecutions and punishment,” Sharp, 15 Idaho at 126-27, 96 P. at 564, and “assist[]

him in the development of skills necessary to function effectively and positively in the 

community,” I.C. § 20-501; yet in Idaho, juveniles may apparently be subjected to the indignity 

of shackling without the need to show any justification. The Tiffany A. court pointed out a 

similar dichotomy in that state:

[T]he rationale of the California cases--that the Constitution does not require 

juveniles to have the full complement of rights afforded adult defendants because 

to do so would introduce a tone of criminality into juvenile proceedings--would 

not be served by requiring all juveniles, irrespective of the charges against them, 

or their conduct in custody, to wear shackles during all court proceedings. The 

use of shackles in a courtroom absent a case-by-case, individual showing of need 

creates the very tone of criminality juvenile proceedings were intended to avoid.

Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 375; accord Millican, 906 P.2d at 860 (“[E]xtending the right to 

remain unshackled during juvenile proceedings is consonant with the rehabilitative purposes of 

Oregon’s juvenile justice system.”); see also Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d at 263-64 (Burke, J., 

dissenting) (“[I]t is disingenuous for the majority to say that juvenile proceedings ‘are

administered in the spirit of humane concern’ [to support its conclusion that they are not 

tantamount to a criminal trial] and at the same time find that leaving a minor shackled throughout 

his trial does not constitute error.”). 

It is also noteworthy that in discussing the use of physical restraints on adult criminal 

defendants, Idaho courts have made clear the extraordinary nature of their use:

[A] decision whether to restrain a defendant requires close judicial scrutiny in 

weighing the State’s interest against the prejudice to the defendant. See Estelle, 

425 U.S. at 503-04. This imposes an initial burden on the court to determine both 

the facts supporting the use of restraints and whether the situation could be 
18

resolved in another manner, as the use of restraints should be exercised only as a 

last resort. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344; see also Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 900, 

902 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating “the court must pursue less restrictive alternatives 

before imposing physical restraints” and that “it is the duty of the trial court, not 

correctional officers, to make the affirmative determination.”). It is only in 

extreme and exceptional cases, where the safe custody of the prisoner and the 

peace of the tribunal imperatively demand, that restraints should be used. Deck, 

544 U.S. at 626-27.

Wright, 153 Idaho at 487, 283 P.3d at 804 (emphasis added). 

Given these considerations, we are convinced that, at the very least, juvenile defendants 

are entitled to the same protections against routine shackling as adult defendants in Idaho and so 

hold. This means that, as we outlined in Wright, the use of restraints in a juvenile evidentiary 

hearing constitutes error unless the trial court makes a finding that the restraints are necessary in 

the case of a specific juvenile for physical security, to prevent escape, or to maintain courtroom 

decorum. Id. at 484, 283 P.3d at 801. We discussed in Wright the requisite procedure in making 

this determination in the adult criminal context, which we now extend to juvenile evidentiary 

hearings:

A finding that restraints are necessary may be based on both formally 

offered evidence admitted at trial and knowledge gained from law enforcement 

officers or official records. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 105, 822 P.2d 998, 

1002 (Ct. App. 1991). “Although the sheriff has some initial responsibility for 

determining whether an accused should be handcuffed during a jury trial, the trial 

judge must, in fulfilling his duty to preside over the trial, decide the question for 

himself.” Moen, 94 Idaho at 479, 491 P.2d at 860. The information relied upon 

to support restraining a defendant should be shown on the record, outside the 

presence of the jury, and “the defendant should be afforded reasonable 

opportunity to meet that information.” Id. at 480, 491 P.2d at 861. Providing 

such a record allows an appellate court to determine whether the trial court 

properly exercised its discretion. Id. When determining whether physically 

restraining a defendant is necessary, it is preferred that a hearing is conducted, 

with sworn testimony and the defendant present, except in cases where the trial 

process is disrupted in the court’s presence. Id. at 479-80, 491 P.2d at 860–61; 

see also Crawford, 99 Idaho at 98, 577 P.2d at 1146 (holding the use of restraints 

after an ex parte hearing with the State violated the defendant’s due process rights 

to a fair trial). However, where a trial court fails to hold a hearing, or does not 

specifically state the reasons for placing a defendant in restraints, we will not find 

an abuse of discretion so long as the record sufficiently justifies the order to 

restrain the defendant in a manner that would not be prejudicial. Moen, 94 Idaho 

at 480, 491 P.2d at 861; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 106, 822 P.2d at 1003.
19

Wright, 153 Idaho at 484-85, 283 P.3d at 801-02.

 We take care to note that our decision does not extend to the length argued by Doe--that 

due process prohibits routine shackling of juveniles in any juvenile proceeding, including the 

preliminary hearing at issue in this case. Although we do not dispute the rationality of such an 

argument, and indeed, strongly suggest that inquiry into the propriety of such a practice, and the 

extent to which it occurs in Idaho, would be a worthy undertaking by the Juvenile Rules 

Advisory Committee of this State,11 we cannot say that such a prohibition is required by due 

process. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Idaho Supreme Court have held that 

due process prohibits routine shackling of adults in preliminary proceedings,

12 and thus, to adopt 

Doe’s argument in this regard would require us to forge entirely new ground without basis in the 

existing law of this State. As Doe notes, such a rule was adopted in Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

at 375, but a key distinction lies in the fact that the California Supreme Court had previously held 

that even as to preliminary hearings, there must be “some showing” of necessity for the use of 

shackles on adults, Fierro, 821 P.2d at 1322. No such precedent exists in Idaho; thus, our 

holding is limited to the evidentiary hearing context. 

 

11 One need not think long to realize the indignities inherent in the use of physical restraints 

on juveniles during any proceeding. Recently, an Illinois Supreme Court Justice summarized 

findings on the ill effects that, logically, would extend beyond the evidentiary hearing:

Scholars recognize that unnecessarily shackling children causes not only physical 

harm from restraints designed for adults, but also psychological harm. The 

routine and indiscriminate imposition of shackles on children may exacerbate 

feelings of isolation, hopelessness, and insecurity (Anita Nabha, Shuffling to 

Justice: Why Children Should Not Be Shackled in Court, 73 BROOK. L. REV.

1549, 1575-80 (2008)), and causes needless humiliation and trauma (Brian D. 

Gallagher & John C. Lore III, Shackling Children in Juvenile Court: The 

Growing Debate, Recent Trends and the Way to Protect Everyone’s Interest, 12 

U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 453, 460-62 (2008)). These enhanced 

psychological harms significantly burden shackled children in exercising their 

constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Bernard P. Perlmutter, “Unchain 

The Children”: Gault, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Shackling, 9 BARRY L.

REV. 1, 37 (2007).

Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d at 258-59 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 

12 In Deck, 544 U.S. at 624, the United States Supreme Court did expand the prohibition 

against routine shackling to a sentencing proceeding; however, this holding was in the context of 

a capital case, where a jury is utilized at sentencing. 
20

The State contends that even if we find error in regard to Doe’s shackling, it was 

harmless. See State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171, 667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App. 1983). We 

need not reach this issue, however, because not only were Doe’s shackles removed for his 

evidentiary hearing, but as he concedes, the shackling issue is moot since he has completed his 

sentence. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Doe also contends there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he had the 

requisite intent required under the malicious injury to property statute. Specifically, he contends 

the evidence indicates he had “cathartic intent” in overturning the refrigerator rather than 

malicious intent as the statute requires. 

Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt 

will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 

trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 

elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 796, 798, 172 P.3d 551, 

553 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 

1998); Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. We will not substitute our view for that of 

the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and 

the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Doe, 144 Idaho at 798, 172 P.3d at 

553; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 

303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution. Doe, 144 Idaho at 798, 172 P.3d at 553; Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 

P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 

The State alleged Doe violated the malicious injury to property statute, Idaho Code § 18-

7001, which provides, in relevant part that “every person who maliciously injures or destroys any 

real or personal property not his own . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.” As used in this section, 

“maliciously” means an intent to damage property without a lawful excuse for doing so. See 

State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 670, 862 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 

culpability for malicious injury to property exists when the defendant’s injurious conduct is 

accompanied by an intent to injure the property of another). 

Doe argues that his act of pushing over the refrigerator was a “provoked, cathartic 

redirection of aggression” and cites to a dissent in a Washington state case (discussing the 
21

cathartic nature of victim impact statements) for the proposition that the intent to commit a 

cathartic act necessarily means there was no intent to do wrong. The district court rejected this 

argument on intermediate appeal, noting that individuals who intend to do wrongful acts, 

whether cathartic or not, have violated section 18-7001. 

Both the district court and Doe misperceive the requisite intent. As we note above, the 

requisite intent is not an intent to do wrong, but an intent to damage the property of another

without a lawful excuse. Nonetheless, where a ruling in a criminal case is correct, though based 

upon an incorrect reason, it still may be sustained upon the proper legal theory. State v. Pierce, 

107 Idaho 96, 102, 685 P.2d 837, 843 (Ct. App. 1984). Here, even if we assume that Doe was 

indeed motivated by desire to avoid striking another person, there was substantial evidence 

presented upon which a reasonable jury could conclude he also intended to damage the 

refrigerator: the group home employee testified that Doe said he pushed over the refrigerator 

“out of rage” and the responding officer testified that Doe admitted to pushing over the 

refrigerator in anger and, although Doe admitted he knew what he did was wrong, “he thought it 

was better to push over the refrigerator than hurt somebody.” Doe cites no convincing authority 

(or indeed any authority on point) that an act undertaken for cathartic purposes may not also be 

ascribed malicious intent and/or that cathartic intent necessarily comprises a lawful excuse. 

Indeed, the negative consequences were we to adopt such a holding are not difficult to imagine. 

The district court did not err by determining there was sufficient evidence that Doe possessed the 

requisite malicious intent when overturning the refrigerator. 

III.

CONCLUSION

Because a mootness exception applies, we address the merits of Doe’s contention that his 

due process rights were violated by the magistrate’s failure to hold a hearing and make 

individualized findings regarding whether he must remain shackled at the preliminary hearing.

Upon examination of the issue, we determine that the prohibition of routine shackling of adults at 

trial, based on the Due Process Clauses of both the United States and Idaho Constitutions, 

extends to juveniles at the evidentiary hearing. However, because the shackling issue is moot as 

to Doe, and we affirm the district court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to 

support the magistrate’s finding that Doe had the requisite malicious intent in overturning the 
22

refrigerator, the district court’s decision affirming the magistrate’s order that Doe committed 

malicious injury to property, bringing him under the purview of the J.C.A., is affirmed. 

Judge LANSING CONCURS.

Judge MELANSON, DISSENTING IN PART

The majority opinion holds that the use of physical restraints during juvenile evidentiary 

hearings violates due process absent a case-by-case finding of necessity. I respectfully dissent 

from that part of the opinion. I do so with some reluctance because I believe that the reasons 

advanced by the majority in support of its ruling are sound as a matter of policy. I agree, for 

example, that prohibiting the routine use of physical restraints allows juvenile defendants to face 

the court with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent person. See State 

ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah Cnty. v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 859 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 

Further, I agree that restraints are something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of 

judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold. See People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322, 

1327 (Cal. 1976). I do not deny that the use of restraints is contrary to the rehabilitative 

objectives of the juvenile justice system. See Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 

375-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). I recognize that, in some cases, restraints might interfere with a 

defendant’s ability to communicate with counsel.1

 See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 631 

(2005). Finally, it cannot be denied that juveniles are different from adults and should be treated 

differently. See John Varin and Sharon Burke, The Unique Philosophy and History of Juvenile 

Courts, 46 THE ADVOCATE, OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR, Sept. 2003 at 22-

24. I think there are many good reasons to prohibit routine shackling of juveniles in evidentiary 

hearings but the Constitution is not one of them. In my view, the use of restraints without a caseby-case determination of necessity in juvenile cases does not amount to a violation of due 

process because there is nothing about the use of restraints in nonjury proceedings that deprives 

the defendant of a fair trial.

Except in the context of jury trials and the penalty phase in capital cases (jury 

proceedings), neither the Idaho Appellate Courts nor the United States Supreme Court have 

 

1 Apparently some kinds of restraints may interfere with a defendant’s ability to 

communicate with counsel. This implicates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment issues which 

would be alleviated by the use of restraints that do not impede the ability to communicate with 

counsel.
23

recognized a constitutional right to be free from restraints while appearing in court. See Deck, 

544 U.S. at 631; State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478, 484, 283 P.3d 795, 801 (Ct. App. 2012). 

Notably, those cases prohibit the routine use of visible restraints in jury proceedings. Plainly, the 

chief harm prevented by prohibiting visible restraints in jury cases is possible juror bias which 

would deprive the defendant of a fair trial--a due process violation. I respect the view of the 

majority and I concede that appellate courts in other states have found a due process violation in 

the use of restraints at juvenile evidentiary hearings and other nonjury hearings. We need not do 

so. By finding a constitutional right in this case, the majority needlessly opens the door to claims 

that the Constitution prohibits the routine use of restraints in all court appearances in adult and 

juvenile cases because many of the reasons cited by the majority in support of its ruling apply to 

all defendants in all proceedings. After all, it cannot be denied that adult and juvenile defendants 

at all stages of the proceedings (at least until a determination of guilt) should be entitled to face 

the court with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent person and, in 

every case, restraints are something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial 

proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold even when restraints are entirely justified. 

Furthermore, it is not too much of a stretch to say that the routine use of restraints may be 

contrary to the rehabilitative goals of both juvenile and adult proceedings. 

In my view, the Constitution does not prohibit the routine use of restraints in juvenile 

evidentiary hearings. The use of restraints in juvenile cases should be prohibited, but such 

should be accomplished by rule or statute. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I fully concur with 

the remainder of the majority opinion.