(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

PATEL ET AL. v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 20–979. Argued December 6, 2021—Decided May 16, 2022 

In 2007, Pankajkumar Patel, who had entered the United States illegally

with his wife Jyotsnaben in the 1990s, applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for discretionary adjustment of status under 8 U. S. C. §1255, which would have made Patel 

and his wife lawful permanent residents. Because USCIS was aware 

that Patel had previously checked a box on a Georgia driver’s license 

application falsely stating that he was a United States citizen, it denied Patel’s application for failure to satisfy the threshold requirement 

that the noncitizen be statutorily admissible for permanent residence.

§1255(i)(2)(A); see also §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (rendering inadmissible a 

noncitizen “who falsely represents . . . himself or herself to be a citizen 

of the United States for any purpose or benefit under” state or federal 

law).

Years later, the Government initiated removal proceedings against

Patel and his wife due to their illegal entry. Patel sought relief from

removal by renewing his adjustment of status request. Patel argued 

before an Immigration Judge that he had mistakenly checked the “citizen” box on the state application and thus lacked the subjective intent 

necessary to violate the federal statute. The Immigration Judge disagreed, denied Patel’s application for adjustment of status, and ordered 

that Patel and his wife be removed from the country. The Board of 

Immigration Appeals dismissed Patel’s appeal. 

Patel petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, where a panel of 

that court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claim. Federal law prohibits judicial review of “any judgment regarding the 

granting of relief” under §1255. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But see 

§1252(a)(2)(D) (exception where the judgment concerns “constitutional 

claims” or “questions of law”). The panel reasoned that the factual 
 

 

 

2 PATEL v. GARLAND 

Syllabus 

determinations of which Patel sought review—whether he had testified credibly and whether he had subjectively intended to misrepresent

himself as a citizen—each qualified as an unreviewable judgment. On 

rehearing, the en banc court agreed with the panel. This Court 

granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict as to the scope of 

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i). 

Held: Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of discretionary-relief proceedings under §1255 and the other provisions 

enumerated in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Pp. 6–17.

(a) This case largely turns on the scope of the word “judgment” as 

used in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). In support of the judgment below, Courtappointed amicus defines it as any authoritative decision—encompassing any and all decisions relating to the granting or denying of discretionary relief. By contrast, the Government argues that it refers exclusively to a decision requiring the use of discretion, which the factual 

findings in this case are not. Patel agrees that “judgment” implies an 

exercise of discretion but interprets the qualifying phrase “regarding 

the granting of relief” as focusing the jurisdictional bar on only the

Immigration Judge’s ultimate decision whether to grant relief. Everything else, he says, is reviewable. Pp. 6–14. 

(1) Only amicus’ definition fits the text and context of 

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i). “ [T]he word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning.” Babb 

v. Wilkie, 589 U. S. ___, ___, n. 2 (some internal quotation marks omitted). As applied here, “any” means a judgment “ ‘of whatever kind’ ” 

under §1255 and the other enumerated provisions. United States v. 

Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5. The word “regarding” has a similarly “broadening effect.” Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. ___, 

___. Thus, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) encompasses not just “the granting of relief” but also any judgment relating to the granting of relief. Amicus’ 

reading is reinforced by Congress’ later addition of §1252(a)(2)(D), 

which preserves review of legal and constitutional questions but

makes no mention of preserving review of questions of fact. Moreover, 

this Court has already relied on subparagraph (D) to all but settle that

judicial review of factfinding is unavailable. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. 

Barr, 589 U. S. ___; Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___ (2020). Pp. 8–10. 

(2) The Government’s and Patel’s interpretations read like elaborate efforts to avoid the text’s most natural meaning. The Government 

cites dictionary definitions such as “the mental or intellectual process 

of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing” as 

indicating that “judgment” refers exclusively to a discretionary decision, which it describes as one that is “subjective or evaluative.” Brief 

for Respondent 12. The factual findings in this case, it says, do not fit 

that description. The Government is wrong about both text and context. A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discretion, nor does 
 

 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Syllabus 

context indicate that only discretionary judgments are covered by 

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Rather than delineating a special category of discretionary determinations, the cited definitions—none of which expressly 

references discretion—simply describe the decisionmaking process, 

which might involve a matter that the Government treats as “subjective” or one that it deems “objective.” Using the word “judgment” to 

describe the fact determinations at issue in this case is perfectly natural. See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 

U. S. 318, 327. To succeed, the Government must show that in context, 

the kind of judgment to which §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) refers is discretionary.

But the text of that provision applies to “any judgment.” Had Congress

intended to limit the jurisdictional bar to “discretionary judgments,” it

could easily have used that language, as it did elsewhere in the immigration code. The Government’s reliance on Kucana v. Holder, 558 

U. S. 233, is inapposite. That case said or implied nothing about review of nondiscretionary decisions. Pp. 10–13.

(3) Neither does Patel’s interpretation square with the text or context of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). He claims that the phrase “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” refers only to the ultimate grant or denial of relief, leaving all eligibility determinations reviewable. Patel’s 

interpretation reads “regarding” out of the statute entirely. Patel also 

fails to explain why subparagraph (B)’s bar should be read differently 

from subparagraph (C)’s prohibition on reviewing final orders of removal for certain criminal offenses. Given the similarities of those two 

provisions—each precludes judicial review in the same way and bears

the same relationship to subparagraph (D)—there is no reason to think

that subparagraph (B) would allow a court to review the factual underpinnings of a decision when subparagraph (C) prohibits just that. 

Pp. 13–14. 

(b) Patel and the Government object that this Court’s interpretation

would arbitrarily prohibit review of some factual determinations made

in the discretionary-relief context that would be reviewable if made 

elsewhere in removal proceedings. But the distinction simply reflects 

Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief. And while this Court does not decide what effect, if any, 

its decision has on review of discretionary-relief determinations made 

outside of removal proceedings, the Court rejects Patel’s and the Government’s contention that the risk of foreclosing such review should

change its interpretation here. As the Court has emphasized many

times before, policy concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of 

the statutory text. Pp. 15–17. 

(c) As a last resort, Patel and the Government argue that the statute

is ambiguous enough to trigger the presumption that Congress did not

intend to foreclose judicial review. Here, however, the text and context 
 

4 PATEL v. GARLAND 

Syllabus 

of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) clearly indicate that judicial review of fact determinations is precluded in the discretionary-relief context, and the Court

has no reason to resort to the presumption of reviewability. P. 17. 

971 F. 3d 1258, affirmed. 

BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., 

filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., 

joined. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–979 

PANKAJKUMAR S. PATEL, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[May 16, 2022] 

JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Congress has comprehensively detailed the rules by

which noncitizens may enter and live in the United States. 

When noncitizens violate those rules, Congress has provided procedures for their removal. At the same time, there 

is room for mercy: Congress has given the Attorney General

power to grant relief from removal in certain circumstances. 

Federal courts have a very limited role to play in this process. With an exception for legal and constitutional questions, Congress has barred judicial review of the Attorney

General’s decisions denying discretionary relief from removal. We must decide how far this bar extends—specifically, whether it precludes judicial review of factual findings that underlie a denial of relief. It does. 

I 

A 

A noncitizen who enters the United States illegally or 

who otherwise violates its laws may be removed from the 

country. 8 U. S. C. §§1182, 1227, 1229a. Removal proceedings are conducted by immigration judges in the United 
 

2 PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

States Department of Justice who exercise the authority of

the Attorney General. §1229a(a)(1); 8 CFR §§1240.1(a)(1),

1245.2(a)(1)(i) (2021). If an immigration judge decides that 

a noncitizen is removable, the judge is authorized to order 

the removal of the noncitizen from the United States. 8 

U. S. C. §1229a(c)(5).

Being found removable is not always the end of the story, 

though, because Congress has authorized relief from removal in certain contexts. For example, the Attorney General has discretion to adjust the status of an eligible noncitizen who entered the United States illegally to that of 

lawful permanent resident, forgiving the illegal entry and 

protecting the noncitizen from removal on that ground. See 

§1255(i). (As with authority over removal generally, the Attorney General has delegated to immigration judges the 

ability to grant relief from removal. 8 CFR 

§1240.1(a)(1)(ii).) To be eligible for such relief, a noncitizen

must show that he satisfies various threshold requirements

established by Congress. Yet eligibility only gets a noncitizen so far. Because relief from removal is always “‘a matter 

of grace,’” even an eligible noncitizen must persuade the

immigration judge that he merits a favorable exercise of 

discretion. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 308 (2001). And 

if the judge decides that denial would be appropriate regardless of eligibility, the judge need not address eligibility 

at all. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U. S. 24, 25–26 (1976) 

(per curiam).

Congress has sharply circumscribed judicial review of the 

discretionary-relief process. Title 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(B) 

provides: 

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28,

or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 

and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in sub-
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

paragraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review—

“(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of 

this title.” 

This bar has an important qualification: “Nothing in subparagraph (B) . . . shall be construed as precluding review

of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a 

petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” §1252(a)(2)(D). Notably, this qualification does not preserve review of questions of fact. 

B 

Pankajkumar Patel and his wife Jyotsnaben entered the

United States illegally in the 1990s. In 2007, Patel applied 

to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(USCIS) (a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) for adjustment of status under §1255(i). See 

8 CFR §245.2(a)(1) (giving USCIS authority over applications for adjustment of status made outside of removal proceedings). If granted, this adjustment would have excused 

Patel’s illegal entry and made him a lawful permanent resident. (Patel’s wife, the other petitioner in this case, applied 

for derivative adjustment of status based on Patel’s application.) While his request to USCIS was pending, Patel

also applied for a Georgia driver’s license. On that application, he checked a box falsely stating that he was a United 

States citizen. 

USCIS denied Patel’s application for adjustment of status because of that misrepresentation. One of the eligibility 

requirements for adjustment is that the noncitizen be statutorily admissible for permanent residence. 8 U. S. C. 

§1255(i)(2)(A). USCIS decided that Patel failed to satisfy 
 

 

4 PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

this requirement. Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) renders inadmissible an “alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United 

States for any purpose or benefit under” state or federal 

law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has interpreted this provision to apply when a noncitizen (1) makes

a false representation of citizenship (2) that is material to a 

purpose or benefit under the law (3) with the subjective intent of obtaining the purpose or benefit. Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 786–787 (2016). Applying this 

test, USCIS concluded that Patel had violated 

§1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) and was therefore ineligible for status

adjustment.

Several years later, DHS initiated removal proceedings

against the Patels because they were present in the United

States without having been admitted—the same illegal entry that Patel had sought to remedy in his initial application for adjustment of status. See §1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Patel 

conceded that he was removable on that ground but sought

relief from removal by repeating his request for discretionary adjustment to lawful permanent resident status.

Now before an Immigration Judge, Patel’s request for relief raised the same question that had been at issue in his 

application before USCIS: whether the misrepresentation

of citizenship on his driver’s license application rendered 

him ineligible for discretionary adjustment. He conceded 

that he had checked the “citizen” box on that application.

But he argued that he had done so by accident—and therefore without the subjective intent that the BIA has interpreted §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to require.

The Immigration Judge concluded otherwise. The judge

explained that Patel was evasive when asked exactly how 

he had made a mistake. And though Patel testified that he

had provided his alien registration number on his application, which would have identified him as a noncitizen, the 

actual application showed that he had not. The judge also 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

noted that Patel had falsely represented his manner of entry into the United States on an application for asylum. 

Based on this evidence, the judge found that Patel’s testimony was not credible and that he had intentionally represented that he was a citizen. The judge accordingly denied

Patel’s application for adjustment of status and ordered 

that he and his wife be removed from the United States. 

Patel appealed the decision to the BIA, which determined 

that the judge’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous

and dismissed the appeal. 

Patel petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, arguing

that any reasonable judge would have been “compelled to

conclude” that his testimony was credible and that he had 

made an honest mistake on the form. See §1252(b)(4)(B) 

(“[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 

the contrary”). A panel of that court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Patel’s claim because federal law prohibits judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief ” under §1255, the adjustment-of-status

provision. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). And the factual determinations of which Patel sought review—whether he had testified credibly and whether he had subjectively intended to

misrepresent himself as a citizen—each qualified, in the

panel’s view, as a “judgment regarding the granting of relief.” See Patel v. United States Atty. Gen., 917 F. 3d 1319, 

1327 (2019).

On rehearing en banc, both Patel and the Government 

argued that the panel had erred. Patel contended that the 

bar on judicial review applied only to the ultimate decision 

to grant or deny adjustment of status—not to any subsidiary decisions regarding an applicant’s eligibility to be considered for relief. The Government argued that the bar applied not only to the ultimate decision to grant or deny relief 

but also to any discretionary determinations made at the 
 

 

 

6 PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

eligibility stage. And in the Government’s view, the Immigration Judge’s factual findings were “nondiscretionary” 

determinations to which the bar did not apply.

A majority of the full Eleventh Circuit agreed with the 

panel decision and held that all factual determinations

made as part of considering a request for discretionary relief fall within §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s prohibition on judicial review. Patel v. United States Atty. Gen., 971 F. 3d 1258, 

1272–1273 (2020). In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit deepened a split among the courts of appeals 

as to the scope of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).1 

We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 594 U. S. 

___ (2021). Because the Government has continued to take 

the position that §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not prohibit review 

of the fact determinations at issue, we invited Taylor A. R.

Meehan to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in 

support of the judgment below. 594 U. S. ___ (2021). She 

has ably discharged her responsibilities. 

II 

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief ” under 

§1255. The outcome of this case largely turns on the scope 

of the word “judgment,” an issue on which the parties and 

—————— 1The Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear to interpret §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

the way that the Eleventh Circuit does. See Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F. 3d 

475, 480 (CA4 2006); Cevilla v. Gonzales, 446 F. 3d 658, 660–661 (CA7 

2006). Other Courts of Appeals distinguish between discretionary and 

nondiscretionary judgments but do so in a way that seems to preclude all

review of fact questions. See Castro v. Holder, 727 F. 3d 125, 128–129 

(CA1 2013); Rosario v. Holder, 627 F. 3d 58, 61 (CA2 2010); ArambulaMedina v. Holder, 572 F. 3d 824, 828 (CA10 2009). The remainder to 

weigh in on the question take the Government’s position. See MendezMoranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F. 3d 176, 178–179 (CA3 2003); GarciaMelendez v. Ashcroft, 351 F. 3d 657, 661 (CA5 2003); Santana-Albarran 

v. Ashcroft, 393 F. 3d 699, 703 (CA6 2005); Ortiz-Cornejo v. Gonzales, 400 

F. 3d 610, 612 (CA8 2005); Mamigonian v. Biggs, 710 F. 3d 936, 943–946 

(CA9 2013). 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

amicus have three competing views. 

Amicus maintains that “judgment” means any authoritative decision. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1223 (1993) (“a formal utterance or pronouncing of 

an authoritative opinion after judging,” or “an opinion so 

pronounced”); 8 Oxford English Dictionary 294 (2d ed. 

1989) (“[t]he pronouncing of a deliberate opinion upon a 

person or thing, or the opinion pronounced”). Under this 

broad definition, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s prohibition “encompasses any and all decisions relating to the granting or

denying” of discretionary relief. Brief for Court-Appointed 

Amicus Curiae 22–23. Factual findings fall within this category, amicus says, so the courts lack jurisdiction to review 

them. 

The Government argues that, at least when used outside 

the context of a final judgment of a court, “judgment” does

not refer to just any decision. According to the Government,

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s use of “judgment” refers exclusively to a

decision that requires the use of discretion. Brief for Respondent 16–18. On this approach, some eligibility determinations are reviewable and others are not. For example, 

the determination that a noncitizen’s removal would not result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for a 

spouse, parent, or child involves discretion (which makes it

an unreviewable “judgment”), but the decision that an applicant has fewer than 10 years of continuous presence in

the United States does not (which makes it reviewable). 

See id., at 42 (citing 971 F. 3d, at 1296 (Martin, J., dissenting)); but see Trejo v. Garland, 3 F. 4th 760 (CA5 2021) 

(concluding to the contrary that hardship is nondiscretionary and so reviewable); Singh v. Rosen, 984 F. 3d 1142 (CA6 

2021) (same). The Government classifies the factual findings at issue in this case—the Immigration Judge’s conclusions that Patel’s testimony was not credible and that he

had lied on the form—as nondiscretionary and therefore 
 

 

 

8 PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

outside the jurisdictional bar.2 

Patel agrees with the Government that “judgment” implies an exercise of discretion, but unlike the Government,

he would not sift through eligibility determinations to classify them as discretionary or nondiscretionary. Instead, Patel reads the phrase “regarding the granting of relief ” to focus the jurisdictional bar narrowly on a single discretionary 

judgment: the immigration judge’s decision whether to 

grant relief to an applicant eligible to receive it. Everything 

else, Patel says, is reviewable. JUSTICE GORSUCH adopts

Patel’s approach, rejecting the Government’s interpretation

as well as amicus’. See post, at 8 (dissenting opinion). 

A 

Amicus’ interpretation is the only one that fits 

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text and context. The provision does not 

restrict itself to certain kinds of decisions. Rather, it prohibits review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under §1255 and the other enumerated provisions. As 

this Court has “repeatedly explained,” “‘“the word ‘any’ has 

an expansive meaning.”’” Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U. S. ___, 

___, n. 2 (2020) (slip op., at 5, n. 2); see also Webster’s Third 

New International Dictionary, at 97 (defining “any” as “one 

or some indiscriminately of whatever kind”). Here, “any”

means that the provision applies to judgments “‘of whatever kind’” under §1255, not just discretionary judgments

or the last-in-time judgment. See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997). Similarly, the use of “regarding” 

—————— 2Prior to 2001, the Government took the position that amicus now defends. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52–53. It adopted its current understanding as a

matter of constitutional avoidance following this Court’s decision in INS 

v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289 (2001). Tr. of Oral Arg. 53–54. Though the 

Government says that Congress’ subsequent amendments to other parts 

of §1252, see infra, at 9, “ameliorat[ed] the constitutional concerns,” it 

has not reverted to its original interpretation of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 54. 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

“in a legal context generally has a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject 

but also matters relating to that subject.” Lamar, Archer & 

Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., 

at 7); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 1911 (defining “regarding” as “with respect to” or

“concerning”). Thus, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) encompasses not just

“the granting of relief ” but also any judgment relating to 

the granting of relief. That plainly includes factual findings.

Section 1252(a)(2)(D), which preserves review of constitutional claims and questions of law, reinforces that conclusion. Congress added this subparagraph after we suggested 

in St. Cyr that barring review of all legal questions in removal cases could raise a constitutional concern. See 533 

U. S., at 300, 314. The amendment is precise. While Congress could have responded to St. Cyr by lifting §1252’s prohibitions on judicial review altogether, it instead excised 

only the legal and constitutional questions that implicated 

our concern. See §1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in subparagraph

(B) or (C)” or other similar provisions “shall be construed as 

precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of 

law”); §§1252(a)(2)(B), (C) (continuing to prohibit review 

“except as provided in subparagraph (D)”). And if Congress 

made such questions an exception, it must have left something within the rule. The major remaining category is 

questions of fact.

No surprise, then, that we have already relied on subparagraph (D) to all but settle that judicial review of factfinding is unavailable. In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 

___ (2020), we had to decide whether subparagraph (C)—

which bars review of “any final order of removal against an

alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain criminal offenses—prohibits review of how a legal 

standard applies to undisputed facts. Our answer turned 

on whether such an application counts as a question of law 
10 PATEL v. GARLAND 

 

Opinion of the Court

for purposes of subparagraph (D). Id., at ___–___ (slip op., 

at 3–4). In holding that it does, we explained that subparagraph (D) “will still forbid appeals of factual determinations” themselves under subparagraph (C). Id., at ___–___ 

(slip op., at 12–13). Had we thought otherwise, we would 

simply have said that questions of fact, like questions of 

law, are reviewable—end of story. 

Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___ (2020), addresses Patel’s 

situation even more directly. There, we held that a court 

has jurisdiction to review a factual challenge to an order 

denying relief under the Convention Against Torture, because that order falls outside of subparagraph (C)’s prohibition on reviewing final orders of removal. In reaching 

that conclusion, we emphasized that our decision would 

have “no effect” on those orders that do fall within a jurisdiction-stripping provision—including “orders denying discretionary relief” under §1252(a)(2)(B). Id., at ___ (slip op., 

at 12). And so, we explained, a noncitizen “may not bring a 

factual challenge to orders denying discretionary relief, including . . . adjustment of status.” Ibid. We adhere to that 

view today. 

B 

 In contrast to amicus’ straightforward interpretation, 

both the Government’s and Patel’s arguments read like 

elaborate efforts to avoid the most natural meaning of the 

text. 

1 

 We begin with the Government’s argument that “judgment” refers exclusively to a “discretionary” decision, which 

the Government describes as a decision that is “subjective 

or evaluative.” Brief for Respondent 12. According to the 

Government, this requirement is evident in definitions like 

this one: “‘the mental or intellectual process of forming an 

opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing,’” or 
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

“‘an opinion or estimate so formed.’” Id., at 16–17 (quoting

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 1223).

The Government’s argument is subtle, to say the least,

given that none of the definitions it cites expressly references discretion. Evidently, the nature of the decisionmaking process does the work: If the process occurs as the definitions describe, then the decision it yields is discretionary

and counts as a judgment. And the Government says that 

the factual findings in this case do not fit that description. 

We do not see how the Government’s cited definitions 

narrow the field in the way that the Government claims.

Rather than delineating a special category of discretionary

determinations, they simply describe the decisionmaking 

process. That process might involve a matter that the Government treats as “subjective” or one that it deems “objective.” Either counts as a judgment, even under the definitions that the Government offers. 

Take the credibility determination at issue in this case. 

It is easily described as an “opinion or evaluation” formed 

“by discerning and comparing” the evidence presented. The 

Immigration Judge weighed Patel’s testimony, reviewed

documents, and considered Patel’s history to conclude that

he was an evasive and untrustworthy witness. Using the

word “judgment” to describe that kind of credibility determination is perfectly natural—in fact, we have used it this

way ourselves. See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 

v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U. S. 318, 327 (2015) (discussing “‘credibility judgments’” about a witness). It is just as natural in 

other factfinding contexts, like the Immigration Judge’s determination that Patel lied on his driver’s license application. Finding that fact involved the same exercise of evaluating conflicting evidence to make a judgment about what

happened.

So to succeed, the Government must do more than point 

to the word “judgment.” It must show that in context, the 
 

12 PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

kind of judgment to which §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) refers is discretionary. But the text of the provision stops that argument

in its tracks because the bar on review applies to “any judgment.” Had Congress intended instead to limit the jurisdictional bar to “discretionary judgments,” it could easily have 

used that language—as it did elsewhere in the immigration

code. See, e.g., §1226(e) (“The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section 

shall not be subject to review” (emphasis added));

§1252(b)(4)(D) (“[T]he Attorney General’s discretionary 

judgment whether to grant relief under section 1158(a) of 

this title shall be conclusive unless manifestly contrary to

the law and an abuse of discretion” (emphasis added)). We 

express no view about what “discretionary judgment” 

means in those provisions—the point is simply that the absence of any reference to discretion in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) undercuts the Government’s efforts to read it in. 

The Government claims that Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 

233 (2010), which interpreted neighboring provision

§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), supports its argument. That provision

bars review of 

“any other decision or action of the Attorney General or 

the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for 

which is specified under this subchapter to be in the 

discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of

Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief

under section 1158(a) of this title.” 

We explained in Kucana that “[t]he proximity of clauses (i) 

and (ii), and the words linking them—‘any other decision’—

sugges[t] that Congress had in mind decisions of the same 

genre, i.e., those made discretionary by legislation.” Id., at 

246–247. “Read harmoniously,” we said, “both clauses convey that Congress barred court review of discretionary decisions only when Congress itself set out the Attorney General’s discretionary authority in the statute.” Id., at 247. 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

This reference to barring review of discretionary decisions, 

the Government says, implies that review of nondiscretionary decisions is allowed. 

Kucana’s discussion is inapposite. That opinion addressed whether the Attorney General could unilaterally

proscribe review of decisions “declared discretionary by the 

Attorney General himself through regulation.” Id., at 237. 

In drawing the comparison between clauses (i) and (ii), we 

thus focused on the fact that each form of relief identified 

in clause (i) was entrusted to the Attorney General’s discretion by statute. Id., at 246. We neither said nor implied 

anything about review of eligibility decisions made in the 

course of exercising that statutory discretion. 

In short, the Government is wrong about both text and 

context. A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discretion, nor does context indicate that only discretionary judgments are covered by §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). 

2 

Unlike the Government, Patel interprets 

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to prohibit review of only the ultimate

grant or denial of relief, leaving all eligibility determinations reviewable. That, Patel says, is because the provision

specifies the kind of judgment to which the bar applies: “any

judgment regarding the granting of relief.” Eligibility determinations—which Patel characterizes as “first-step decisions”—are not judgments regarding the granting of relief 

because eligibility is a necessary but insufficient condition 

for relief. The only judgment that can actually grant relief 

is what Patel describes as the “second-step decision” 

whether to grant the applicant the “‘“grace” ’” of relief from 

removal. Brief for Petitioners 20 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U. S., 

at 308). So, Patel argues, that is the sole judgment to which 

the bar applies.

Like the Government, Patel cannot square his interpretation with the text of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). He claims that his 
 

14 PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

is the only interpretation that makes sense of “regarding

the granting of relief ”; as he sees it, “any judgment regarding the granting of relief ” must narrow the meaning of

“judgment” to include only the decision “whether to grant

relief.” Brief for Petitioners 22–25, 37–39. To be sure, the 

reference to “the granting of relief ” appears to constrain the 

provision from sweeping in judgments that have nothing to 

do with that subject. But as even the Government acknowledges, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not stop at just the grant or

denial of relief; it extends to any judgment “regarding” that

ultimate decision. See Brief for Respondent 18–20. Patel’s 

interpretation to the contrary reads “regarding” out of the 

statute entirely.

Context further undermines Patel’s position. He cannot 

explain why the bar in subparagraph (B) should be read differently from subparagraph (C)’s prohibition on reviewing

final orders of removal for certain criminal offenses. Patel 

acknowledges that this bar on review of a “final order” also

precludes review of its factual support, including the very

kind of factfinding at issue in this case. Reply Brief for Petitioners 7; Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at ___–___ (slip 

op., at 12–13). But if Congress had wanted to achieve that

effect in subparagraph (B), he argues, it could have used 

“final order” there too, rather than “judgment.” Reply Brief 

for Petitioners 7. Yet Patel ignores a simple explanation for 

the shift in terminology. Subparagraph (B) bars review of

only one facet of the removal process (consideration of discretionary relief) whereas subparagraph (C) prohibits review of the entire proceeding (removal based on a criminal 

offense). Each statutory label describes its target, but otherwise, the provisions preclude judicial review in the same

way and bear the same relationship to subparagraph (D). 

Given those similarities, we see no reason to think that subparagraph (B) would allow a court to review the factual underpinnings of a decision when subparagraph (C) prohibits

just that. 
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

C 

Patel and the Government object that our interpretation

of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) would arbitrarily prohibit review of 

some factual determinations made in the discretionary-relief context that would be reviewable if made elsewhere in 

removal proceedings. In this case, for example, the question whether Patel intended to falsely claim to be a citizen 

on his driver’s license application relates to whether he is

statutorily inadmissible, which is both an obstacle to discretionary relief and an independent ground for removal.

Presumably because Patel openly acknowledged that he

was removable for entering the country illegally, the Government did not premise his removal on the contested claim 

that he had intentionally misrepresented his citizenship.

But if the Government had taken that route, the Immigration Judge’s determinations would have been reviewable in

the ordinary course.

That distinction is not arbitrary. It reflects Congress’ 

choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief, the granting of which is “‘not a matter of 

right under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a 

matter of grace.’” St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 308. That reduced 

protection is reflected in the burden of proof too: The Government bears the burden of proving removability by clear 

and convincing evidence, while an applicant bears the burden of establishing eligibility for discretionary relief. Compare §1229a(c)(3)(A) with §1229a(c)(4)(A). For both judicial 

review and the burden of proof, the context in which a fact 

is found explains the difference in protection afforded. 

Patel and the Government also briefly suggest that interpreting §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) as we do will have the unintended

consequence of precluding all review of USCIS denials of 

discretionary relief. Those decisions are made outside of 

the removal context, and subparagraph (D) preserves review of legal and constitutional questions only when raised 

in a petition for review of a final order of removal. If the 
 

16 PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

jurisdictional bar is broad and subparagraph (D) is inapplicable, Patel and the Government say, USCIS decisions will 

be wholly insulated from judicial review.

The reviewability of such decisions is not before us, and 

we do not decide it. But it is possible that Congress did, in 

fact, intend to close that door.3 The post-St. Cyr amendments expressly extended the jurisdictional bar to judgments made outside of removal proceedings at the same 

time that they preserved review of legal and constitutional 

questions made within removal proceedings. See 

§§1252(a)(2)(B), (D). And foreclosing judicial review unless

and until removal proceedings are initiated would be consistent with Congress’ choice to reduce procedural protections in the context of discretionary relief. See Lee v. 

USCIS, 592 F. 3d 612, 620 (CA4 2010) (“To the extent Congress decided to permit judicial review of a constitutional or 

legal issue bearing upon the denial of adjustment of status,

it intended for the issue to be raised to the court of appeals 

during removal proceedings”). So it would be difficult to 

maintain that this consequence conflicts with the statutory

structure, and neither Patel nor the Government goes so 

far. Instead, they urge us to interpret §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to 

avoid the risk of this result. Yet we inevitably swerve out 

of our lane when we put policy considerations in the driver’s 

seat. As we have emphasized many times before, policy 

concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the statutory text. See, e.g., Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. ___, 

___ (2021) (slip op., at 15); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 357 

—————— 3The parties do not address the independent question whether a 

USCIS denial of adjustment of status made before the initiation of removal proceedings satisfies threshold finality and exhaustion requirements for review. There appears to be disagreement on this question in 

the courts of appeals. Compare Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F. 3d 512, 517–518 

(CA5 2000); McBrearty v. Perryman, 212 F. 3d 985, 987 (CA7 2000), with 

Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F. 3d 193, 200–202 (CA3 2005); Cabaccang v. 

USCIS, 627 F. 3d 1313, 1317 (CA9 2010). 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

(1956). 

D 

As a last resort, Patel and the Government insist that the 

statute is ambiguous enough to trigger the presumption

that Congress did not intend to foreclose judicial review. 

We disagree.

Because “‘executive determinations generally are subject 

to judicial review,’” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at ___ 

(slip op., at 6), we presume that review is available when a 

statute is silent. See Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 

509 U. S. 43, 56 (1993). But that presumption “may be overcome by specific language” in a provision or evidence 

“drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.” Block v. 

Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349 (1984).

And as we have explained in detail, the text and context of

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)—which is, after all, a jurisdiction-stripping statute—clearly indicate that judicial review of fact determinations is precluded in the discretionary-relief context. The plain meaning of that provision, not any 

interpretative presumption, drives our conclusion today. 

Because the statute is clear, we have no reason to resort to 

the presumption of reviewability. 

* * * 

Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as

part of discretionary-relief proceedings under §1255 and

the other provisions enumerated in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We 

therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

It is so ordered. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–979 

PANKAJKUMAR S. PATEL, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[May 16, 2022] 

JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE 

SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

It is no secret that when processing applications, licenses,

and permits the government sometimes makes mistakes. 

Often, they are small ones—a misspelled name, a misplaced 

application. But sometimes a bureaucratic mistake can 

have life-changing consequences. Our case is such a case. 

An immigrant to this country applied for legal residency. 

The government rejected his application. Allegedly, the 

government did so based on a glaring factual error. In circumstances like that, our law has long permitted individuals to petition a court to consider the question and correct

any mistake.

Not anymore. Today, the Court holds that a federal bureaucracy can make an obvious factual error, one that will 

result in an individual’s removal from this country, and 

nothing can be done about it. No court may even hear the 

case. It is a bold claim promising dire consequences for 

countless lawful immigrants. And it is such an unlikely assertion of raw administrative power that not even the

agency that allegedly erred, nor any other arm of the Executive Branch, endorses it. Today’s majority acts on its own

to shield the government from the embarrassment of having to correct even its most obvious errors. Respectfully, I

dissent. 
 

 

2 PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

I 

A 

Pankajkumar Patel has lived in the United States for 

nearly 30 years. He and his wife Jyotsnaben Patel currently reside in Georgia. They have three sons—one who is

already a U. S. citizen, and two who are lawful permanent 

residents and spouses of U. S. citizens. As a young man, 

Mr. Patel entered the country illegally. But in 2007, he 

tried to make things right by applying for an adjustment of 

his immigration status to a lawful permanent resident (also 

known as a green card).

Mr. Patel had at least some reason to hope. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) expressly authorizes the

Attorney General to grant relief in cases like his. The statute sets forth a two-step process. At the first step, the government must determine if an individual is statutorily eligible for an adjustment of status. Various circumstances 

specified by law, including prior criminal convictions, may 

render an applicant ineligible for relief. See 8 U. S. C. 

§§ 1255(i)(2)(A), 1182. At the second step, once an individual has established his statutory eligibility for relief, the

Attorney General or his designee is entitled to grant or deny

an adjustment of status “in his discretion.” §§ 1255(a),

(i)(2); see also 8 CFR § 1240.1(a) (2021) (delegating this authority to immigration judges). Because this second step is

discretionary, “mere eligibility” for relief does not “automatically result in a grant of the application.” Matter of Arai, 

13 I. & N. Dec. 494, 495 (BIA 1970). Instead, “the actual 

granting of relief . . . is in all cases a matter of grace.” INS 

v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 308 (2001) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

Seeking relief under this scheme, Mr. Patel filed an application with the necessary paperwork. Soon, the government responded by returning a document allowing Mr. Patel to continue to work and remain in the country while it 

processed his application. So far, so good. 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

But then a problem emerged. Several months after filing 

his application, Mr. Patel sought to renew his Georgia

driver’s license. When filling out the renewal form, Mr. Patel answered the question “Are you a U. S. citizen?” by 

checking a box that said “yes.” After discovering Mr. Patel’s 

erroneous checkmark, Georgia authorities charged him

with willfully falsifying his driver’s license application. 

Later, however, the State dropped its prosecution after concluding it lacked sufficient evidence to prove a crime. Not 

only has Mr. Patel consistently claimed that he intended to

deceive no one and that he simply ticked the wrong box by 

mistake. Under Georgia law, Mr. Patel was eligible to receive a license without being a citizen because he had a 

pending application seeking lawful permanent residence

and a valid employment authorization document. See Ga. 

Comp. Rules & Regs., Rules 375–3–1.02(3)(e), (7) (2022). 

Apparently, the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) saw things differently. Operating through United

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the 

agency denied Mr. Patel’s application for adjustment of status, citing his faulty driver’s license application. According

to USCIS, Mr. Patel’s conduct rendered him statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under a provision that excludes any alien who “falsely represents . . . himself . . . to 

be a citizen of the United States” to obtain a “benefit under 

. . . State law.” 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), 

1255(i)(2)(A). On USCIS’s view, Mr. Patel’s application for 

adjustment of status failed at the first step—and the Attorney General was wholly without discretion to afford him relief at the second. 

B 

Some months later, the government elected to bring removal proceedings against Mr. Patel. As a defense to removal, Mr. Patel renewed his application for adjustment of 

status consistent with regulations permitting him to do so. 
 

4 PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

See 8 CFR § 245.2(a)(5)(ii). At his removal hearing, Mr. Patel repeated points he had made to state officials, insisting

that he had harbored no intent to deceive anyone, and submitting that he remained statutorily eligible for relief. See 

Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 784 (BIA 2016)

(inadmissibility is triggered when a misrepresentation is

made “with the subjective intent of obtaining . . . benefits” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

None of this moved the immigration judge. Relevant 

here, the immigration judge rested his decision on a factual 

finding. He said he did not believe Mr. Patel’s testimony

that he checked the wrong box mistakenly. Instead, the immigration judge found, Mr. Patel intentionally represented

himself falsely to obtain a benefit under state law. According to the immigration judge, Mr. Patel had a strong incentive to deceive state officials because he could not have obtained a Georgia driver’s license if he had disclosed he was

“neither a citizen [n]or a lawful permanent resident.” And 

because intentionally deceiving state officials to obtain a 

benefit is enough to render an applicant statutorily ineligible for relief at step one, the immigration judge concluded, 

there was no need to reach the second-step question 

whether Mr. Patel warranted a favorable exercise of discretion. 

Mr. Patel appealed the immigration judge’s ruling to the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In his appeal, Mr. Patel argued that the immigration judge’s finding that he had 

an incentive to deceive state officials was simply wrong—

under Georgia law he was entitled to a driver’s license without being a citizen or a lawful permanent resident given his

pending application for adjustment of status and permission to work. Mr. Patel submitted, too, that all the record 

evidence pointed to the conclusion he simply checked the

wrong box by mistake; even state officials agreed they had 

no case to bring against him for deception. In the end, however, a divided panel of the BIA rejected the appeal by a 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

vote of 2 to 1. 

Mr. Patel next petitioned for review in the Eleventh Circuit. There, he argued that the BIA’s finding that he intentionally sought to deceive state officials was wholly unreasonable given the evidence before the agency. In response, 

the federal government agreed that the Eleventh Circuit

had the power to hear Mr. Patel’s case but asked the court

to affirm the BIA’s decision on the merits. Instead, a panel 

of the Eleventh Circuit charted its own path, holding that

it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s factual findings no 

matter how wrong they might be. See Patel v. United States 

Atty. Gen., 917 F. 3d 1319, 1324 (2019). Eventually, the full

court agreed to rehear the case and, by a vote of 9 to 5,

reached the same conclusion. See Patel v. United States 

Atty. Gen., 971 F. 3d 1258 (2020). In doing so, the court 

acknowledged that it had to overrule “numerous” circuit 

precedents holding that it possessed the power to review

cases like Mr. Patel’s. Id., at 1262. It acknowledged, too, 

that its new ruling conflicted with the holdings of most 

other courts of appeals. Id., at 1277, and n. 22. 

II 

As it comes to us, this case poses the question: Does a 

federal court have statutory authority to review and correct

a BIA decision holding an individual ineligible for relief 

when that decision rests on a glaring factual error? Today, 

the majority insists the answer is no. It does not matter if 

the BIA and immigration judge in Mr. Patel’s case erred 

badly when they found he harbored an intent to deceive

state officials. It does not matter if the BIA declares other 

individuals ineligible for relief based on even more obvious 

factual errors. On the majority’s telling, courts are powerless to correct bureaucratic mistakes like these no matter 

how grave they may be.

It is an eye-catching conclusion. Normally in this country, federal courts shoulder the responsibility of reviewing 
 

 

 

6 PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

agency decisions to ensure they are at least supported by 

“substantial evidence.” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(E). A similar, if 

surely more deferential, principle finds voice in the INA. As 

relevant here, that statute endows federal courts of appeals

with the power to review “all questions of law and fact . . . 

arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States.” 8 U. S. C. 

§ 1252(b)(9). And the law further provides that a court may

reject the agency’s factual findings underlying an order of

removal if it concludes that no “reasonable adjudicator”

could adopt them. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Garland v. Ming 

Dai, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 7). 

That is exactly the sort of argument Mr. Patel seeks to 

pursue. He hopes to persuade a court of law that the BIA’s

factual errors in his case are so obvious no reasonable factfinder could adopt them. It is a claim expressly permitted 

by statute. Tellingly, in the proceedings before us the government has continued to maintain that, however his case 

is finally resolved, Mr. Patel is entitled to his day in court.

Nor is this some new position. For at least 20 years the 

government has taken the view that the law permits judicial review in cases like these. Yet even in the face of all 

this, the majority balks. It holds that no court may entertain Mr. Patel’s challenge. And its reasoning promises that 

countless future immigrants will be left with no avenue to 

correct even more egregious agency errors. 

A 

How does the majority manage to reach such an unlikely 

conclusion? It depends on a Court-appointed amicus who 

offers arguments for the government that even the government refuses to advance on its own behalf. It turns out, too, 

that all of those arguments hinge on a narrow exception to

the usual rule of judicial review—one found in 8 U. S. C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). As relevant here, that exception reads: 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

“Denials of discretionary relief 

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . and 

regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action 

is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review— (i) any judgment regarding the

granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title.” 

This language does not begin to do the work the majority 

demands of it. Recall that requests for adjustment of status

involve a two-step process. First, the Attorney General, acting through the BIA, must determine whether an individual is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status. See 

8 U. S. C. §§ 1255(a), (i). If so, the Attorney General may 

proceed to the second step and decide whether to grant an

adjustment request “in his discretion.” §§ 1255(a), (i)(2)(A). 

Undoubtedly, the exception in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) creates a 

special rule insulating from judicial review the second and 

purely discretionary decision. But nothing in it disturbs the

general rule that courts may entertain challenges to the 

BIA’s factual findings and legal analysis associated with its 

first-step eligibility determination.

This much follows directly from the statute’s terms. Subparagraph (B)(i) renders unreviewable only those judgments “regarding the granting of relief.” That phrase has a

well-understood meaning. To “grant relief ” is to supply “redress or benefit.” United States v. Denedo, 556 U. S. 904, 

909 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). And where, 

as here, the BIA issues a judgment only at step one, it never 

reaches the question whether to grant relief or supply some 

redress or benefit. Instead, the agency resolves only the antecedent question whether an individual is statutorily eligible to petition for relief, redress, or a benefit. As the BIA 

has explained, a judgment at step one can never “result in

a grant of the application.” Arai, 13 I. & N., at 495. Any 

“judgment regarding the granting of relief ” comes only at 
 

 

8 PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

step two where the INA expressly vests the Attorney General with substantial discretion. See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 

307 (noting the traditional and longstanding “distinction

between eligibility for discretionary relief, on the one hand, 

and the favorable exercise of discretion, on the other hand” 

(emphasis added)).

All of which leads us back to Mr. Patel’s case. Before the 

Eleventh Circuit, Mr. Patel sought to challenge the BIA’s 

step-one determination that he was statutorily ineligible

for adjustment of status, arguing that no reasonable adjudicator could have found the facts as the agency did. The 

INA expressly authorizes courts to hear claims like his. 

8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Unprompted, however, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) effectively undoes 

this arrangement. That court’s self-directed legal analysis 

was mistaken. Subparagraph (B)(i) only deprives courts of

jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s step-two discretionary decision to grant or deny relief, not the BIA’s 

step-one judgments regarding whether an individual is eligible to be considered for such relief. 

B 

The majority, of course, offers a different view. Following

the Eleventh Circuit’s lead, the majority contends that subparagraph (B)(i)’s phrase “any judgment regarding the

granting of relief under § 1255” sweeps more broadly. On 

its account, the statute denies courts the power to correct 

all agency decisions with respect to an adjustment-of-status

application under § 1255—both the agency’s step-one eligibility decisions and its step-two discretionary decisions. 

Ante, at 8–9. As a result, no court may correct even the 

agency’s most egregious factual mistakes about an individual’s statutory eligibility for relief. It is a novel reading of 

a 25-year-old statute. One at odds with background law 

permitting judicial review. And one even the government 

disavows. 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

It is easy to see why. We do not normally suppose that 

Congress blithely includes words in its laws that perform

no work. See, e.g., Liu v. SEC, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip 

op., at 16) (noting the “‘cardinal principle of interpretation

that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and 

word of a statute’”). Yet that is exactly what the majority’s

interpretation requires of us. If subparagraph (B)(i) operated as the majority imagines, Congress would have had no

need to deny courts jurisdiction over “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1255.” Instead, Congress could have simply omitted the italicized words and 

denied jurisdiction over “any judgment under section 1255.” 

Plainly, all those additional words must do something. And 

the work they perform is clear—the phrase directs us to the 

Attorney General’s second-step discretionary judgment to 

grant relief. That alone is a judgment “regarding the granting of relief.” And under the statute’s terms, that judgment 

alone is shielded from judicial review. 

The majority’s attempt to resolve its surplusage problem

only underscores the gravity of its error. First, the majority

tells us that, as used in subparagraph (B)(i), the words “any 

judgment” mean “any authoritative decision.” Ante, at 7, 8. 

Then the majority tells us that the phrase “regarding the 

granting of relief ” expands the universe of covered judgments further, because the word “regarding” “‘generally 

has a broadening effect.’” Ante, at 8–9. But how could that 

be? Under the majority’s reading of the word “judgment,” 

the statute already precludes judicial review of any authoritative decision “under section 1255.” There is no further 

corner of the universe left to explore. Once more, the words 

regarding the granting of relief are left without work to perform. Rather than sort out its surplusage problem, the majority’s answer only highlights its bind. 

What is more, the majority’s argument rests on a faulty 

premise. The majority insists that the word “regarding” 
 

 

10 PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

has “a broadening effect.” Ibid. It even suggests that failing to give the term that effect would be to read it “out of 

the statute entirely.” Ante, at 14. But in truth, the word 

can have either a broadening or narrowing effect depending 

on context. Cf. Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 537 

(2015) (plurality opinion) (“In law as in life . . . the same 

words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different things”). And in subparagraph (B)(i), “regarding” is 

much more likely to serve a narrowing function, focusing

our attention on a specific subset of judgments—namely,

those step-two discretionary judgments “regarding the 

granting of relief.”

To appreciate the point, consider a hypothetical. Imagine

I said: “Please bring me any book regarding the history of 

the American West from that shelf of history books.” In this 

sentence, the phrase “regarding the history of the American

West” does not broaden the referenced set. Instead, it directs you to a narrow subset of books: those regarding the 

history of the American West. Any other interpretation

misses the point and leaves me with a pile of unwanted volumes. 

What is true of this hypothetical is true of subparagraph

(B)(i). The phrase “regarding the granting of relief ” does 

not expand the set—again, the sentence already speaks of 

“any judgment . . . under section . . . 1255.” Instead, it functions as “limiting language” that narrows the kind of judgments under § 1255 the command means to cover. iTech 

U. S., Inc. v. Renaud, 5 F. 4th 59, 65 (CADC 2021). And 

here that means limiting our attention to the agency’s steptwo decision, the only place where it can issue a “judgment 

regarding the granting of relief.” Any other reading renders 

the statute a garble.1 

—————— 1Perhaps sensing that its textual arguments cannot bear the weight it

seeks to place on them, the majority suggests that, right or wrong, existing precedent commands its reading, pointing us to Guerrero-Lasprilla 

v. Barr, 589 U. S. ___ (2020), and Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___ (2020). 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

III 

A 

To the extent doubt remains about the proper construction of subparagraph (B)(i), it dissipates quickly with a look 

to the larger statutory context. Here the clues are many—

yet the majority pauses to consider almost none of them.

Take first a neighboring statutory provision. After denying courts the power to review “any judgment regarding the 

granting of relief ” in subparagraph (B)(i), Congress proceeded in the very next clause to deny courts jurisdiction to

entertain another category of cases: “any other decision . . . 

the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion 

of the Attorney General.” § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis 

added). That phrasing has a clear implication: “The proximity of clauses (i) and (ii), and the words linking them—

‘any other decision’—suggests that Congress had in mind

decisions of the same genre, i.e., those made discretionary 

by legislation.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 246–247 

(2010). And as we have seen, the only judgment under

§ 1255 that fits that description is the Attorney General’s 

second-step decision to grant or deny adjustment of status

“in his discretion.” §§ 1255(a), (i)(2); see also St. Cyr, 533 

U. S., at 308 (noting that second-step decisions to grant relief are “a matter of grace”). 

Next, consider the other statutes subparagraph (B)(i) addresses. It doesn’t just bar review of “judgments regarding 

—————— 

Ante, at 9–10. But neither case speaks to, much less resolves, the question before us. Guerrero-Lasprilla does not even discuss subparagraph 

(B)(i). As for Nasrallah’s passing observation that an individual “may

not bring a factual challenge to orders denying discretionary relief, including . . . adjustment of status,” 590 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12), nothing about that statement conflicts with a correct reading of subparagraph

(B)(i). By its terms, Nasrallah’s observation is explicitly limited to “determinations made discretionary by statute”—that is, step-two judgments “regarding the granting of relief,” not judgments regarding statutory eligibility. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Once more, the 

majority’s arguments fold quickly under pressure. 
 

 

 

12 PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

the granting of relief ” under § 1255 for adjustment of status. Subparagraph (B)(i) also bars review of “judgment[s] 

regarding the granting of relief under section[s] 1182(h),

1182(i), 1229b, [and] 1229c.” § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). These provisions bear many differences. But they all have one thing 

in common: a two-step structure in which the Attorney

General makes a statutory determination, followed by a 

step-two discretionary decision whether to grant relief.2 

That hardly seems a coincidence. More likely, it is further

indication that subparagraph (B)(i) focuses on step-two discretionary determinations, not threshold judgments about 

eligibility. Here, too, subparagraph (B)(i) reflects our law’s

longstanding distinction between “eligibility [determinations under] specific statutory standards” and subsequent 

decisions about whether to grant “ultimate relief ” through 

an “exercise of discretion.” Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 353– 

354 (1956).

Still other clues confirm that subparagraph (B)(i) targets 

second-step discretionary decisions. Take the title Congress chose in § 1252(a)(2)(B). It labeled this provision “Denials of discretionary relief.” In doing so, Congress left little

doubt that subparagraph (B) and its accompanying clauses

(i) and (ii) are designed to bar review of only those decisions 

invested to the Attorney General’s discretion, not antecedent statutory eligibility determinations.

Consider as well the statute’s history. When Congress

borrows words from an established legal context, it “presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were

attached” to them. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 

—————— 2Section 1229b says the Attorney General “may, in his discretion” cancel removal, but only where an alien satisfies certain statutory criteria. 

§§ 1229b(a), (b). Section 1229c says the Attorney General “may permit”

voluntary departure, but only if an alien meets certain legal requirements. §§ 1229c(a), (b). Likewise, §§ 1182(h) and 1182(i) say the Attorney General “may, in his discretion,” waive certain forms of inadmissibility, but only for those aliens who satisfy the specified criteria. 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

246, 263 (1952). And that’s exactly what happened here. 

Before Congress enacted subparagraph (B)(i), courts reviewed both first-step “eligibility” determinations and 

second-step “discretionary” determinations. Foti v. INS, 

375 U. S. 217, 228–230, and n. 15 (1963) (holding secondstep judgments reviewable “for arbitrariness and abuse of 

discretion”). By adding subparagraph (B)(i) in 1996, Congress clearly altered that regime. Yet Congress did so carefully. In precluding review of judgments “regarding the

granting of relief,” Congress used language very similar to 

the language this Court had long used to describe secondstep discretionary determinations. See, e.g., INS v. 

Doherty, 502 U. S. 314, 323 (1992) (distinguishing “the discretionary grant of relief ” from prima facie eligibility); id., 

at 333 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing “the Attorney General’s 

power to grant . . . relief ” from judgments of “statutory ineligibility”); INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S. 94, 105 (1988) (distinguishing “the ultimate grant of relief ” from prima facie eligibility in adjustment-of-status cases specifically); INS v. 

Bagamasbad, 429 U. S. 24, 26 (1976) (per curiam) (statute

authorized “the Attorney General in his discretion to grant

relief,” but only “if certain eligibility requirements are

met”). All of which provides still one more strong indication 

that Congress used the phrase “regarding the granting of

relief ” to target step-two discretionary decisions alone. 

B 

Not only does the majority ignore most of these contextual clues. Its own arguments from statutory context do 

more to hurt than help its cause. The majority first directs 

us to § 1252(a)(2)(D). That provision says that “[n]othing in

subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of this

chapter . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall

be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims 

or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed 
 

14 PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

with an appropriate court of appeals.” According to the majority, this language would make no sense and do no work 

unless we read subparagraph (B)(i) to bar judicial review of 

any decision under § 1255. As the majority puts it, subparagraph (D)’s directive preserving judicial review for constitutional claims and questions of law necessarily implies

that “something” must remain unamenable to judicial review under subparagraph (B)(i). Ante, at 9. And the only 

“remaining category” that could be immune from judicial

review is subparagraph (B)(i) cases involving “questions of

fact” like Mr. Patel’s. Ibid. 

This argument falters almost immediately. Everyone

agrees that, at the very least, subparagraph (B)(i) precludes 

judicial review of the Attorney General’s second-step discretionary judgments “regarding the granting of relief.” And 

everyone agrees that subparagraph (D) restores judicial review of these discretionary judgments only to the extent a 

legal question or constitutional claim is in play. So, for example, if the Attorney General sought to exercise his discretion to discriminate against an applicant on the basis of 

race, subparagraph (D) would allow judicial review despite

the terms of subparagraph (B)(i). But if no legal or constitutional defect is alleged, judicial review would be impermissible. It is hardly necessary to adopt the majority’s interpretation to fit these two provisions together and give 

each real work to do. 

Even more fundamentally, the majority’s argument proceeds on a mistaken assumption. On its view, subparagraph (D) must leave something unreviewable under subparagraph (B)(i) for the former to make any sense as an 

exception. But that takes far too blinkered a view of the 

statutory scheme; it is not as if these are the only two provisions in our Nation’s immigration laws. By its terms, subparagraph (D) operates across a whole chapter of the U. S. 

Code. And in fact, subparagraph (D) undoubtedly performs 

real work as an exception with respect to other provisions 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

besides subparagraph (B)(i). To take just one example, this

Court has already decided a case discussing subparagraph 

(D)’s implications for cases arising under subparagraph (C). 

See, e.g., Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2020) (slip op., at 12) (explaining subparagraph (D)’s impact on § 1252(a)(2)(C)).

The majority’s argument fails for still another reason. It 

overlooks the “basic principle of statutory construction that 

a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a

more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross 

& Co., 426 U. S. 148, 153 (1976). Congress enacted subparagraph (B)(i) in 1996 to address the narrow question of judicial review over administrative “denials of discretionary

relief.” Meanwhile, as the majority acknowledges, Congress adopted subparagraph (D) nearly a decade later and 

did so to address a much larger problem—the potential that 

many statutes in the INA foreclosing judicial review might 

be unconstitutional in certain applications. Ante, at 9. Congress responded to this potential problem by allowing legal 

and constitutional challenges under “any other provision of 

[an entire] chapter” of the U. S. Code. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In 

doing so, subparagraph (D)’s later-in-time and more general reference to “constitutional claims or questions of law” 

across a full chapter of the U. S. Code did nothing to disturb

subparagraph (B)(i)’s targeted application to judgments

“regarding the granting of relief ” under § 1255. Instead, 

the statutes work in tandem. The majority’s approach ignores this conclusion, and along with it subparagraph 

(B)(i)’s specific language.3 

—————— 3There’s at least one more problem here yet. The majority says subparagraph (D) preserves constitutional and legal questions for judicial

review, and the majority further assumes that Mr. Patel’s petition poses

only a factual question. Ante, at 9. But the question Mr. Patel seeks to 

pose in court is whether the agency’s factual determinations are ones no

“reasonable adjudicator” could have adopted given the record before it. 
 

16 PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Perhaps sensing the weakness of its main contextual argument, the majority tries another. It insists that Mr. Patel 

“cannot explain” why subparagraph (B)(i) should be read to

allow courts to review the BIA’s factual findings when subparagraph (C) prohibits courts from doing so. Ante, at 14. 

But there is no incongruity here. The two subparagraphs

use different language and perform different work. Subparagraph (B)(i) only disallows judicial review of judgments

“regarding the granting of relief” and covers the mine run

of cases. Subparagraph (C) speaks more broadly, precluding review of “any final order of removal,” and addresses 

specifically those aliens who are removable because of past

criminal offenses. And it is hardly surprising that Congress

might wish to use different language allowing greater judicial review in cases involving noncriminal aliens than in

cases involving aliens who have been convicted of criminal

offenses in this country.

Tellingly too, the majority’s contextual arguments yield 

an inexplicable anomaly. On its view, subparagraph (B)(i) 

precludes judicial review of all adjustment-of-status applications, whether an individual seeks to challenge the 

agency’s step-one eligibility determination or its step-two 

discretionary judgment. Subparagraph (D) then sweeps in

to restore judicial review for legal and constitutional questions. But by its terms, subparagraph (D) applies only to

“petition[s] for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.”

This feature of the law has profound consequences under 

—————— 

8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see supra, at 6. The majority never explains

why that question is something other than a question of law that subparagraph (D) expressly preserves for judicial review. But why wouldn’t 

it be? Cf. Colorado Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U. S. 23, 25 (1938)

(“It is settled law that a finding of fact [made by an agency] will not be 

disturbed on review if it is supported by substantial evidence. But 

whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding is a question

of law”). 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 17 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

the majority’s reading of the INA. Yes, on its account, those 

like Mr. Patel who are subject to removal orders can still

challenge at least the agency’s legal and constitutional errors by petitioning for review in a federal court of appeals. 

But individuals frequently seek to adjust their status and

secure a green card outside the removal context. And when 

the government rejects an application for adjustment of status in these cases, individuals routinely seek judicial review

in district court. See Brief for Respondent 39; see also 

Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., 

at 3) (reviewing one such challenge). There, subparagraph

(D) does not apply to preserve review of legal and constitutional questions. So under the majority’s construction of

subparagraph (B)(i), individuals who could once secure judicial review to correct administrative errors at step one in 

district court are now, after its decision, likely left with no

avenue for judicial relief of any kind. An agency may err 

about the facts, the law, or even the Constitution and nothing can be done about it. 

Nor is this some small sideshow. As the government, Mr.

Patel, and amici stress, thousands of individuals seek to obtain a green card every year outside the removal context—

the student hoping to remain in the country, the foreigner 

who marries a U. S. citizen, the skilled worker sponsored 

by her employer. In the last three months of 2021 alone, 

USCIS denied more than 13,000 green-card applications,

with nearly 790,000 still pending.4 The agency issues decisions on those applications in unpublished and terse letters,

which appear to receive little or no administrative review 

within DHS. See Brief for National Immigration Litigation 

—————— 4See USCIS, Number of I–485 Applications to Register Permanent 

Residence or Adjust Status by Category, Case Status, and USCIS Field

Office of Service Center Location, October 1, 2021–December 31, 2021, 

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/I485_performance

data_fy2022_qtr1.pdf (May 6, 2022). 
 

 

18 PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae 25. With so many applications receiving such abbreviated treatment, who can be surprised that DHS sometimes makes serious errors, or may 

even be tempted to take shortcuts inconsistent with the

law? See id., at 23–27 (documenting DHS errors). Until 

today, courts could correct mistakes like these. But the majority’s construction of subparagraph (B)(i) will almost

surely end all that and foreclose judicial review for countless law-abiding individuals whose lives may be upended by

bureaucratic misfeasance. 

The majority’s response is hardly satisfying. The majority does not try to explain how its interpretation fits with 

the usual presumption of judicial reviewability of administrative actions—a presumption it claims to endorse and no

party before us questions. Ante, at 17. Instead, the majority muses that denying green-card applicants any ability to

seek judicial review might be “consistent with Congress’ 

choice to reduce procedural protections in the context of discretionary relief.” Ante, at 16. But a hunch about unexpressed legislative intentions is no response to our usual 

presumption of judicial review. Nor is it any answer to the 

mountain of textual and contextual evidence suggesting 

that Congress limited judicial review only with respect to

second-step discretionary decisions, not decisions about 

statutory eligibility. 

Just look, too, at all the guesswork lurking behind the 

majority’s hunch. The majority’s argument first depends 

on a hypothesis that Congress intentionally designed a

scheme that encourages individuals who receive erroneous

rulings on their green-card applications to overstay their 

visas and remain in this country unlawfully. Next, it depends on a second-level hypothesis that Congress replaced 

a presumptive promise of judicial review with a scheme in

which judicial review depends on the happenstance of a governmental decision to seek removal. Finally, the majority’s

position relies on a third supposition—that Congress might 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 19 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

have withdrawn judicial review for thousands upon thousands of lawfully present persons annually, and done so

without expressly discussing the question. Often this Court 

rejects as implausible statutory interpretations that seek to 

squeeze elephants into mouseholes. See, e.g., Whitman v. 

American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001). 

Today’s interpretation seeks to cram a veritable legislative

zoo into one clause of one subparagraph of one subsection 

of our Nation’s vast immigration laws. 

* 

The majority concludes that courts are powerless to correct an agency decision holding an individual ineligible for 

relief from removal based on a factual error, no matter how 

egregious the error might be. The majority’s interpretation 

has the further consequence of denying any chance to correct agency errors in processing green-card applications 

outside the removal context. Even the government cannot

bring itself to endorse the majority’s arresting conclusions. 

For good reason. Those conclusions are at war with all the 

evidence before us. They read language out of the statute 

and collapse the law’s clear two-step framework. They disregard the lessons of neighboring provisions and even ignore the statute’s very title. They make no sense of the

statute’s history. Altogether, the majority’s novel expansion of a narrow statutory exception winds up swallowing 

the law’s general rule guaranteeing individuals the chance 

to seek judicial review to correct obvious bureaucratic missteps. It is a conclusion that turns an agency once accountable to the rule of law into an authority unto itself. Perhaps

some would welcome a world like that. But it is hardly the

world Congress ordained.