E C 0 F YS C L I M AT E _ --- 

ANALYTICS P I K 

sustainable energyfor everyone 

Below 2°C or 1.5°C depends on rapid action 

from both Annex I and Non-Annex I countries 

Climate Action Tracker 

Policy BrieF 

4 June 2014 

Revised 7 June 2014 

Bill Hare , Michiel Schaeffer, Marie Lindberg, Niklas Hohne, 

Hanna Fekete, Louise Jeffery, Johannes Gutschow, Fabio Sferra, Marcia Rocha 

Summary: Next decade critical to keep warming below 2°C or 1.5°C 

• The UNFCCC climate talks in June 2014 are aimed at increasing emissions reduction 

actions in the pre-2020 period, as well as substantially improving mitigation ambition 

for the post 2020 period in the new climate agreement to be concluded nextyear. 

• In order to prevent dangerous climate change and limit warming to betow 2°C or 1.5 °C, 

both Annex I and Non-Annex I countries need to both significantly increase the tevet of 

current action to reduce emissions ahead of 2020 and commit to deeper cuts in 

emissions than currently pledged post 2020. 

In this update the Climate Action Tracker has conducted a new anatysis of the IPCC AR5 

emissions database to evaluate the required level of global and regional action for 

2020, 2025 and 2030 to limit warming to below 2°C or 1.5°C with a likely (66%) and 

high (85%) probability. A likely pathway for timiting warming below 2 °C still has a one 

in three chance of exceeding this tevel, and possibly higher when uncertainties in the 

climate sensitivity and carbon cycle not included in the climate models are considered. 

A higher probability set of emission pathways then gives much greater security that 

investments in limiting warming below 2°C will be successfut. The high probability 2°C 

pathways in general atso limit warming to 1.5 °C or betow by 2100. 

• Limiting warming below 2°C with a high chance of success means that total GHG 

emissions would need to be zero between 2060 and 2080, and likely negative 

thereafter. COz emiissions from fossil fuel combustion and industry would need to 

be zero between as earty as 2045 and no tater than 2065, and be negative 

thereafter. 

• Required emission reductions for Annex I and Non-Annex I groups depend on the 

economic and equity assumptions applied. For Annex I(developed) countries an equity 

approach based on capability to mitigate would require reductions of 25-55% betow 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

1990 levels by 2025 and 35-55% below 1990' levels by 2030 for a likely 2°C pathway. 

Other equity approaches would require even deeper reductions. 

• For Non-Annex I(developing countries) an equity approach based on capabitity to 

mitigate would require an emissions allocation limited to 0-95% above 1990 levels by 

2025 For the likely 2° scenarios, and an emissions allocation limited to 5-90% above 

19902 levels by 2030. Other equity approaches would allow higher emissions 

allocations. In 2010 Non-Annex I emissions were about 75-80% above 1990 levels, 

hence in overalt terms during the 2020s these emissions under this equity approach 

would need to be, at their highest, close to present levels or, more likely, significantly 

below present levels. 

• Rapid and deep emissions reductions are not only necessary to limit warming below 2° 

(or 1.5 0C), but are feasibte at a modest cost. However, the window oF opportunity to 

limit warming below 2°C could be closed by end of the 2020s unless action is 

accelerated. 

• The IPCC AR5 estimates that currently implemented policies put the world on track to 

a 3.7 to 4.8°C warming by 2100, confirming earlier projections carried out by the 

Climate Action Tracker. 

• One of the main causes of the recent global increase in emissions growth is the post2000 reversat of historic decarbonisation trends, driven in large part by the growth of 

coal combustion. In all of the studies assessed in the IPCC ARS consistent with limiting 

warming below 2°C with a high probability the energy sector needs to decarbonise 

rapidty and reduce to zero emissions as early as 2045 but no later than 2065. 

• One of the major challenges For Ministers at the UNFCCC meeting in Bonn is to take 

concrete steps to arrest and reverse this adverse trend in decarbonisation. 

USA "Clean Power Ptan" emissions reductions and decarbonisation rates far from those 

needed for 2•C 

• In light of this need for decarbonisation of the industry and energy sectors, the CAT has 

also analysed the US Government's "Clean Power Plan" proposed rule leading to a 30% 

cut (from 2005 levels) in emissions from power plants. 

• While the proposal is wetcome, it is insufficient by itself to meet the USA ptedge of a 

17% reduction of all greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. In 2030, we project the US 

economy-wide emissions would be around 5% above 1990 levels (or 10 % below 2005 

levels), far above levels required For a tikely 2°C pathway. 

• The US "Clean Power Plan" implies an economy-wide decarbonisation rate of about 

0.9% per annum over the next 15 years, significantly lower than the 1.4% p.a. achieved 

in the last decade. This is not as fast as is needed for a 2°C decarbonisation pathway. 

' 26-48% below 2010 levels 

Z 41% below to 8% above 2010 levels 

page 2 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

Emissions levels compatible with 

2°C and 1.5°C 

The Climate Action Tracker has 

conducted a new analysis oF the 

mitigation scenarios assessed by IPCC 

AR5 WGIII, to evaluate the global 

emissions pathways compatible with 

holding warming below 2°C and 

returning to below 1.5°C warming by 

2100. The emissions pathways were 

selected on the basis that: 

• These emission scenarios Fall 

within historical limits up to 2010. 

This excludes some studies whose 

emissions diverge signiFicantly 

below historic emissions beFore 

2010. 

• They limit warming to below 2°C 

with a likely (66%) or high (greater 

than 85%) probability. The latter 

pathways also return to, or below, 

1.5°C by 2100. 

• We diFFerentiated between 

"overall teast-cost" mitigation 

scenarios, which reach long-term 

targets by reducing emissions at 

any time over the 21 5t century to 

minimise costs, and those that 

involved a "deliberate" delay in 

mitigation action. We Focussed on 

the Former. 

.1; 

A 

N 50 

O 

V 

~ 

~ 40 

O 

Ln 

~ 30 

v 

= 20 

~ 

0 10 

~ 

76 

O 0 

2020 pledges (CAT) Current policy projections for 2020 (CAT) 

_ ~ ♦ 

Higher-cost"deliberate"delay 2°C scenario 

~ 

,. 4 ♦ \~ 

storical emissions ♦ 

(CAT) ~ ~ 

♦ 

\ ♦ Likely (>66%) 2°C pathways 

♦ 

♦ 

:♦ , ~_ 

~ ` \ 

~ 

Global aggregate levels in 2025 and 2030 

implied by literature on effort sharing 

EI Capability 

Globalleast-cost 

ti High probability 2°C pathways with return to 1.5'C by 2100 

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 

Figure 1: Timeline for global emissions (in Gt COZ-equivalents per year) to peak and decline towards zero for 2°C and 1.5°C 

long-term temperature limits. The dashed line indicates the medium of the few scenarios from IPCC AR5 WGIII that reach 

emission levels in 2020 close to those implied by the Cancun pledges, while still reaching later-century deep reductions 

sufficient to hold warming below 2°C. Source: Climate Action Tracker calculations based on IPCC database (10-90% range of 

ARS WGIII emissions scenarios that are not deliberately forced to reach 2020 emission levels comparable to those implied 

by the Cancun pledges and do hold warming below 2°C in >66% of climate-model runs) and scenarios that hold warming 

below 1.5°C by 2100 in >50% of climate-model runs. 

page 3 
C(imate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

Stay below 2°C during 21 s` century with likely (more than 66%) probability 

Total GHG 25 to 25% above 20% above to 20 to 60% 75 to 105% 

below 10% to 5% 25% below 1990 below below 1990 

above below 1990 

1990 

1990 1990 

GtCOZe/yr 40 to 47 35 to 46 28 to 45 16 to 31 2090 or -3 to 10 

after 

COZ emissions 26 to 35 21 to 34 16 to 33 3 to 19 2060 of after -15 to 2 

from fossil fuel 

and industry 

Stay below 2°C with at least 85% probability — return to below 1.5°C by 2100 with at least 50% probability 

Below 25% 10% above 10-30% below 65-90% 110-125% 

1990 

above to to 15% below below 

5% below 

below 

GtCOze/yr 36 to 47 31 to 40 26 to 33 4 to 14 2060-2080 -10 to -5 

CO2 emissions 21 to 31 17 to 26 13 to 20 -8 to 4 2045-2065 -17 to -9 

from fossil fuel 

and industry 

Table 1: Global emissions pathway to 2°C and 1.5°C for 2020, 2025, 2030, 2050 and 2100 Source: Climate Action 

Tracker; calculations based on the scenarios assessed by IPCC Working Group 3 in ARS. Range represent 30-90% range 

for AR5 WGIII "no delay" emission scenarios, i.e. those for which the energy-economic models are not deliberately 

forced to reach 2020 emission levels comparable to those implied by the Cancun pledges. Likely 2°C scenarios hold 

warming below 2°C with over 66% probability over the whole of the 21st century. 1.5°C scenarios hold warming below 

1.5°C by 2100 with over 509'o probability and hold warming below 2°C with over 85% probability over the whole of the 

21st century. Probabilities refer to the percentage of climate model runs within a large ensemble of runs, with varying 

sensitivity and carbon-cycle characteristics, that hold warming below 2 or 1.5°C. 

The motivation to examine high 

probability 2°C pathways stems from 

that a likely pathway For limiting still 

has a one in three chance of 

exceeding 2°C. The chance oF 

exceeding 2°C is possibly higher than 

this when uncertainties in the ctimate 

sensitivity and carbon cycle not 

included in the climate models are 

considered. A higher probability set 

oF emission pathways would then give 

a much greater security that 

investments in limiting warming 

below 2°C will be successFul. The high 

probability 2°C pathways in general 

also limit warming to 1.5oC or below 

by 2100. 

As a consequence oF these selection 

criteria, the detailed results diFfer 

from those presented in the IPCC AR5 

WGIII Summary for Policy Makers. We 

conFirm the broad findings oF WGIII: 

that limiting warming to 2°C implies 

halving gtobal GHG emissions in 

2010 (49 GtCO2eq) by 2050 and 

reaching very tow or even negative 

levels by 2100. 

However, For CO2 emissions from the 

industry and energy sector, emissions 

page 4 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

must reach zero much sooner, from 

around 2045. In this report we have 

generally compared emissions to 

1990 levels to enable easy crosscomparison with previous 

assessments. The emissions levels 

consistent with 2°C and 1.5°C 

pathways are displayed in Table 1 and 

Figure 1. 

The lowest of the AR5 scenarios 

(RCP2.6) indicates global warming can 

be limited to close to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. Negative emissions 

play a larger role than in the 2°C 

scenarios. It is as likely as not that 

sustained globally negative emissions 

after 2050 will be required to achieve 

the reductions in atmospheric CO2 in 

RCP2.6 (AR5, WG1). 

The global GHG emissions compatible 

with below 2°C or 1.5°C follow a steep 

declining pathway for the period 

2020 through 2050. During the 

2020s and early 2030s the 1.5°C 

emissions pathways overlap with the 

lower part of the 2°C emission ranges, 

before diverging: 

In 2020, global emissions should 

have peaked and dropped below 

47 GtCO2 (25% above 1990 

emissions; just below 2010 

emissions) and safer, as low as 40 

GtCO2: 10% above 1990 emissions 

levels and 15% below 2010 levels 

By 2025, emissions should have 

returned to 35-46 GtCO2eq (5% 

below to 25% above 1990 

emission levels; 5-30% below 

2010) for 2°C pathways and 31-40 

GtCO2eq (10% above to 15°!0 

below 1990 emission levels; 15-35 

below 2010) for 1.5°C pathways 

By 2030, emissions should have 

returned to 28-45 GtCO2eq (20% 

above to 25% below 1990 

emissions levels; 5-40% below 

2010) for 2°C pathways and 26-33 

GtCO2eq (10-30% below 1990 

emissions levels; 35-45% below 

2010) for 1.5°C pathways. 

• In 2050, emissions should be 16- 

31 GtCO2eq (20-60% below 1990 

emissions levels; 35-65% below 

2010) for 2°C pathways and 4-14 

GLCO2eq (65-90% below 1990 

emission levels; 70-90% below 

2010) for 1.5°C pathways 

Limiting warming below 2°C with a 

likely probability implies that total 

GHG emissions eventually have to 

decline towards zero by 2100 and CO2 

emissions from fossil fuel and 

industry would need to be zero as 

soon as the late 2050s. This 

contrasts with the high probability 

2°C pathways where total GHG 

emissions reach zero between 2060 

and 2080. In the case of CO2 

emissions from fossil fuel and 

industry the high probability require 

zero emissions about ten years earlier 

than in the likely pathways. 

Bringing warming back to 1.5°C 

implies faster emission reductions 

and an earlier approach to zero GHG 

and CO2 emissions: total GHG 

emissions would need to be zero 

between 2060 and 2080. 

CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and 

industry would need to be zero by the 

2040s and no later than 2070, and 

negative thereafter. 

page 5 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

~

40 ~ ` igher-cost"deliberate"delay2°Cscenario 

2-1 30 ~ 

a, 

E N Historical emissions ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 O 20 (CDIAC) ` ♦ 

"- U ♦ ~ Likely (>66%) 2°C pathways 

o 

0 

 10 ♦ ♦ '~ 

~ LA ~. 

, _ ♦ _ 

._ 

E ~ - ----- 

O ~ 0 

v ~ 

n -10 High probability 2°C pathways 

o with return to 1.5°C by 2100 

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 

Figure 2: Total global CO Zemissions from energy and industry 2005 — 2100 compatible with a 2°C pathway. Source: Own 

calculations based on IPCC database (10-90% range of AR5 WGIII emission scenarios that are not deliberately forced to 

reach 2020 emission levels comparable to those implied by the Cancun pledges and do hold warming below 2°C in >669'0 

of climate-model runs) and scenarios that hold warming below 2°C in >66% and return to below 1.5°C by 2300 in >50% of 

climate-model runs. 

These emissions reductions would 

ensure a high chance (>85%) oF 

limiting warming below 2°C, 

signiFicantly better than the "likely" 

2°C pathway described above. 

Comparing Figure 2 below with 

Figure 1 illustrates that for CO2 

emissions, the picture looks quite 

difFerent than is the case For alt 

greenhouse gases. 

A high probabitity 2°C pathway 

requires a full decarbonisation oF the 

energy sector by as early as 2045, 

when CO2 emissions from industry 

and energy use reach zero in the low 

emission scenarios. 

For such low emission scenarios, IPCC 

WGIII notes that global CO2 emissions 

From the energy supply sector are 

projected to decline over the coming 

decades and are characterised by 

reductions oF 90% or more below 

2010 levels between 2040 and 2070. 

Emissions in many oF these scenarios 

are projected to decline to below 

zero thereaFter (IPCC AR5, WGIII, 

SPM). 

The IPCC AR5 warns: "Delays in 

mitigation through 2030 or beyond 

could substantially increase mitigation 

costs in the decades that follow and 

the second-half of the centurjl' (IPCC 

AR5, WGIII, SPM). 

Delayed action also implies increased 

use oF technologies that can provide 

`negative emissions,' primarily bioenergy combined with carbon capture 

and storage (BECCS). 

Mitigation scenarios without BECCS 

are found in the lower halF of the 

emission ranges around 2020-2030 

and at the upper end by the end oF 

the 21 St century. 

page 6 
Cfimate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

70 

6o 

~ 

eT 

N 50 

O 

u 

~ 

t7 40 

~ 

0 

v, 30 

.~ 

~ 

v 

~ io 

x 

~ 

rd io 

.~ 

F 

2020 global emissions 

range consistent with 2°C 

(40-47 GtCOieq/yr) 

• 2020 global emissions 

range consistent with a°C 

(44 GtCO2eq/yr, UNEP Gap Report) 

® AnnexI 

Non-Annex I 

■ Bunker emissions 

2020 current 2020 current Annex 1, Annex 1, 

202o BAU pledges pledges 4o96 below 1990 40% below i990 

(low ambition) (high ambition) Non-Annex I, Non-Annex 1, 

currentpledges currentpledges 

(low ambition) (high ambition) 

Figure 3: Effect of Annex I increasing mitigation efforts to 40% reduction below 1990 level in relation to 2020 global 

emissions level consistent 2 and 1.5°C. The emissions gap is the result of total global emissions (top of the bar) and 

the 44GtCO2eq level, depicted by the grey dotted line. 

Att Governments need to commit to 

deeper emissions reductions. 

The results from the scientific 

research clearty show that 

internationat cooperation is a 

prerequisite for effective mitigation 

action. The endeavour to stay below 

2°C wilt not be achieved if individual 

agents advance their own interests 

independently. 

The numbers show that further action 

is needed by both Annex I and nonAnnex I Governments to close the 

2020 'emissions gap.' 

Some parties to the UNFCCC have 

argued that if Annex I countries were 

to reduce emissions by 40%, this 

would be sufficient to close the socalled emissions gap in 2020. Figure 3 

above shows the contribution oF 

Annex I and Non Annex I Parties to 

2020 levels of emissions. Even if 

Annex I Parties reduced emissions by 

40% below 1990 levels, there would 

still be an emissions gap in 2020 that 

the major emitters in the Non-Annex I 

group would need to close through 

additional efforts . 

Mitigation costs keeping warming 

below 2°C are modest 

The costs of keeping warming levels 

below 2C by the end of this century 

are modest. Estimates of average 

global macro-economic costs over the 

century show that loss in total global 

consumption is limited compared to 

overall expected economic growth. It 

is important to note that these cost 

estimates do not take co-benefits oF 

climate action into account. 

Under a cost-effective approach, 

assuming a global and unique carbon 

price, macro-economic costs equal an 

average annual reduction of 

consumption of about 0.04-0.14 % 

per. year.

page 7 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

Given that the models project a 

baseline increase oF consumption 

over the 21 st century oF 1.6-3% per 

year, this means that annual 

economic growth in 2030 would be 

1.4%-3.0% instead oF 1.6-3.0%. 

In 2050, growth rates would be 1.5%- 

2.9% instead oF 1.6-3% and, in 2100, 

the annual growth rate with 

mitigation action consistent with the 

2C pathway is 1.5%-3.0% instead oF 

1.6-3.0% (IPCC AR5, WGIII, Chapter 6, 

P• 8) 

This means that with mitigation 

action, GDP would grow by 43-107% 

in 2030 in relation to 2005, instead oF 

49-109% without mitigation action. In 

2050, world GDP is projected to be 

92-271 % larger than in 2005 with 

implemented climate policy, against 

104%-278°lo in the baseline scenario. 

In 2100, the economy is projected to 

grow by 302-1508% instead oF 352- 

1558%, compared to 2005 levels. The 

diFFerences in Final global 

consumption oF goods are marginal 

as displayed in Figure 4 below. 

Regional distribution oF emissions 

reductions on a below 2°C pathway 

The overall emissions pathways to 

stay below 2°C in 2025 span a range 

oF 35Gt — 46 GtCOZ e/yr, which 

reduces to 28-45 GtCO2e/yr by 2030. 

This translates into global emissions 

cuts of approximately 5% below 1990 

to 25% above 1990 by 2025 and 25% 

below 1990 to 20% above 1990 by 

2030. 3 It should be noted the Feasible 

emissions pathways cannot be at the 

top oF both the 2025 and 2030 

ranges. The task now is to share this 

Final Consumption of Goods 

(2005=100) 

- 2C scenarios 

~ - -------- --------- 

0 8aU scenarios 

2030 2050 2100 

2005 = 100 

Fixed global emissions level amongst 

all countries. 

This condition could be met, For 

example, iF all individual Governments 

were to reduce their emissions by the 

same percentage, say, 30% below 

today's level in 2030. 

This is highly unlikely since the basic 

principle oF the United Nations 

Framework Convention on Climate 

Change is that "Parties should protect 

the climate system [ ... ] on the basis oF 

equity and in accordance with their 

common but diFFerentiated 

responsibilities and respective 

capabilities." 

This means that, depending on each 

government's responsibility and 

capability, countries' emissions cuts 

would diverge from the global 

average. 

1800 

1600 

1400 

1200 

1000 

800 

600 -- 

400 ~ 

200 ~~ ----- ~

--.... 

~ ® o ~ 

Figure 4: Final total global consumption of goods in 2030, 2050 

and 2100, with and without mitigation action required to stay 

below 2°C. 5ource: Own elaboration based on IPCC numbers. 

3 5-30% below 2010 by 2025 and 5-40% below 2010 by 2030 

page 8 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

Option Annex I 

Total OECD90 

Global -33% to -40% -30% to -35% 

least cost 

Average 

Equal 

cumulative 

per capita 

Capability 

Non-Annex I 

EIT Total LAM MAF ASIA 

Relative to 2010 

-39% to -53% 3% to -325'0 -23% to -75% 21% to -22% 2% to -26% 

-2895 to -73% -32% to -79% -20% to -59% 15% to -28% -12% to -54% -10% to 26% 17% to -28% 

-75% to -85% -769'o to -84% -72% to -85% 4% to -12% -15% to -71% n.a. 129'o to -13% 

-20% to -50% -19°% to -52% -23% to -44% 10`Yo to -42% -16% to -66% -9% to 47% 3% to -48% 

Relative to 1990 

-39% to -46% -26% to -31% -60% to -69% 21% to 81% -11% to -71% 62% to 37% to 90% 

1529'0 

-35% to -76% -27% to -78% -47% to -72% 28% to 104`Yo 1% to -47% 89% to 34% to 119% 

164% 

-77% to -86% -74% to -83% -82% to -90% 55% to 83% -3% to -67% n.a. 63% to 109% 

Global 

least cost 

Average 

Equal 

cumulative 

per capita 

Capability -27% to -54% -14% to -49% -48% to -63% 2`Yo to 94% -3% to -61% 91% to -3% to 93% 

207% 

Table 2: 2025 Regional distribution of emission reductions for illustrative cases (relative difference to 1990 and 2010 emissions 

in 2025) staying within atmospheric GHG concentrations keeping temperature increase below 2°C above preindustrial levels. 

The same exercise could be done for 1.5'C, however data for sharing efforts under these scenarios are less available. 

Source: Own analysis based on supplemental data from H6hne et al. 2013 

If some governments manage to assume they would need to happen 

reduce more than 30%, others can where they are the cheapest. Global 

reduce less or even increase their models provide such scenarios where 

emissions. Developed countries total global costs are minimised. 

currently emit two thirds oF the total Results For such a case depend on the 

greenhouse gas emissions of all model used and the assumptions on 

developing countries. As a rule oF costs. Illustrative results oF such 

thumb, three percentage points scenarios are provided in Table 2 and 

additional reduction to 30% by all Table 3 as Option "global least cost." 

developed countries would give room Reductions For developing countries 

For two percentage o points less as a whole would be less stringent 

reduction below 30% for all than a 30% Flat rate, because these developing countries, iF the same calculations take into account 

global total is to be reached. consumption growth in the 

One way to diFFerentiate between developing world. For Latin America, 

country reductions would be to however, it would be more than 30%, 

page 9 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

Option Annex I Non-Annex I 

Total OECD90 EIT Total LAM MAF ASIA 

Relative to 2010 

Global -33% to -41% -30% to -3S% -39% to -57% 2% to -32°i(i -25% to -75% 21°fo to -22% 2% to -27% 

least cost 

Average -36% to -65% -39% to -69% -28% to -54% -28% to 11% -18% to -51% -7% to 38% 7% to -31% 

Equal -81% to -85% -82% to -85% -80% to -85% 1% to -12% -35% to -75% n.a. 10% to -15% 

cumulative 

per capita 

Capability -26% to -48% -28% to -49% -23% to -47% 8% to -41% -15% to -58% -7% to 48% -1% to -49% 

Relative to 1990 

Global -39% to -47% -26% to -31% -60% to -71% 20% to 80% -14% to -71% 62% to 152% 37% to 90% 

least cost 

Average -42% to -68% -35% to -67% -52% to -69% 26% to 95% -6% to -44% 93% to 189% 29% to 100% 

Equal -83% to -86% -81% to -84% -86% to -90% 56% to 78% -25% to -71% n.a. 58% to 105% 

cumulative 

per capita 

Capability -33% to -23% to -46% -48% to -65% 4% to 90% -2% to -S2% 94% to 210% -4% to 85% 

-53% 

Table 3: 2030 Regional distribution of emission reductions for illustrative cases (relative difference to 1990 and 2010 emissions in 

2030) staying within atmospheric GHG concentrations keeping temperature increase below 2°C above preindustrial levels. As there is 

no data for MAF, we use the same reduction as in the second option for this region when adding up the total non-Annex I. The same 

exercise could be done for 1.5°C, however data for sharing efforts under these scenarios are less available. 

Source: Own elaboration based on data from H6hne et al. 2013 

because some models assume there is 

a large potential to reduce emissions 

From deForestation at relatively low 

costs. 

A second way to look at it is to 

distribute diFFerentiated reductions 

across countries based on their 

responsibitity and/or capability, 

building on the Convention principles. 

Below we show several options For 

how emission reductions can be 

distributed among difFerent groups 

oF countries or regions. We draw 

upon the summary oF these studies in 

the IPCC AR5, 4 which is based on 

4IPCC AR5, working group III, Figure 6.28 and 6.29, 

www.mitiqation2014.org 

Hohne et al. 2013. 5 They Find a large 

variation across diFFerent options, 

reFlecting that there are many ways 

to share emission reductions. 

Taking a broad average over all 

possible ways oF sharing the 

reductions based on the principles, 

emission reduction targets For 

OECD1990 countries would be 

roughly half oF current emissions by 

2030. 

Targets For Economies in Transition 

(EIT) would be approximately two 

5Niktas Hohne, Michel den Elzen & Donovan Escalante 

(2014) Regional GHG reduction targets based on effort 

sharing: a comparison of studies, Climate Policy, 14:1, 

122-147, D01:10.1 080/1 469 3062.2014.849452 

page10 
C(imate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

thirds oF current levels. Emissions 

reduction targets in Asia would be 

similar to current levels; for the 

Middle East and Africa (MAF), slightly 

above the 2010 level and, in Latin 

America (LAM), well below the 2010 

level (Option "Average"). Compared 

to the "global least cost" option, 

developing countries as a group 

would have to reduce less: their 

mitigation potential is larger than 

their responsibility and capability. 

To cover the extremes of the 

spectrum, we also show the results 

for two categories of approaches to 

share reductions. One extreme 

approach is "equal cumulative per 

capita emissions", i.e. equal carbon 

budgets for countries. In this case, 

developed countries would have to 

reduce significantly more, because 

they have already used most oF their 

per capita carbon budget in the past. 

Another extreme approach is sharing 

emissions reductions according to 

capability, defined as equal mitigation 

costs per GDP. In this case, developed 

countries would have to reduce a lot 

less, but still more than the 30% we 

started from. 

When the regions are added up in 

groups oF Annex I and non-Annex I 

countries, Annex I countries will need 

to reduce emissions beyond the 30% 

average under all options. Some 

approaches suggest substantial 

additional reductions (Table 3). 

A related question is where 

international Financial flows should 

support mitigation actions. Trading of 

emission allowances may be 

necessary as expected developed 

country emission reductions go 

beyond mitigation potentials. 

Changing the negative trend: 

reversal of recarbonisation is both 

critical - and possible 

From 2000-2010, the energy sector 

saw a reversal of the decarbonisation 

trend that took place over the 

preceding 30 years (1970 — 2000). 

This is a critical observation when 

considering the fact that global CO2 

emissions from energy and industry 

will have to decrease to zero around 

2060 to keep warming below 2°C as 

shown in Figure 2 above. 

The IPCC's interpretation of this 

development is that economic 

growth and population continue to 

be the most important drivers of the 

increase in CO2 emissions from fossil 

Fuel combustion. 

While it is true that population and 

GDP are responsible For the largest 

absolute changes in decadal CO2 

emissions, both these parameters 

cannot be "improved" like carbon 

intensity and energy intensity can. 

On the one hand, population is an 

exogenous driver to the models that 

calculate the emission scenarios. On 

the other hand, the goal oF these 

models is to maximise consumption 

of Final goods per capita, which is 

directly linked to GDP growth. 

ThereFore reducing GDP growth in 

order to meet a climate target is an 

option of last resort For these models. 

The only parameters that can actually 

be changed are therefore carbon 

intensity and energy intensity. 

Achieving the 2°C targets hence 

page11 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

requires substantial eFforts in these 

two areas. 

Carbon intensity 

Figure 5 illustrates how carbon 

intensity has increased over the past 

ten years. The Figure shows historical 

development of carbon intensity 

From 1970 to 2010. It also draws the 

line For the continued trend From 

1970 — 2000 to 2010, to show the 

significant deviation From the 

previous trend. 

CAT's assessment Finds that about 

80% of the accelerated increase in 

CO2 emissions in the period 2000 — 

2010 is due to a reversal of the 

historical decarbonisation trend.6 

carbon intensity i.e. the amount oF 

carbon emissions to energy use. 

Figure 6 describes what values are 

required For carbon intensity From 

now until 2050 in order to stay below 

the 2°C pathway with 66% 

probability. It becomes clear that 

carbon intensity rates will have to 

decrease rapidly in the coming 

decades: increasing to 3% annually by 

2030 and close to this level through 

the 2040s, beFore gradually reducing 

to 1.6% annually in the 2050s. 

The energy sector is decarbonised at 

the point when global carbon 

intensity, i.e. total CO2 emissions From 

energy and industry related to global 

energy consumption, approach zero. 7 

2.6 

2.55 

2.5 

Carbon 2.45 

Intensity 2.4 

tCO2/toe 2.35 

2.3 

2.25 

2.2 

Carbon intensity 

Actual Carbon Intensity 

2001-2010 

Carbon Intensity Trend 

1970-2000 continued until 

2010 

--1970-2000 Carbon 

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Intensity 

Figure 5: Carbon intensity over the period 1970-2010, actual and corrected to fit the historical trend from 1970-2000. 

Source: Own calculation based on IEA numbers. 

Increasing emissions reductions in the 

energy sector means reducing the 

6 These 80% are the share of additional increase in 

emissions from 2000 — 2010 compared to the emissions 

trend from 1970 — 2000 that can be explained by the 

reversal of in carbon intensity. 83% of this additional 

increase, i.e. the increase above the trend from 1970- 

2000, is explained by carbon intensity, not population 

growth or GDP. 

' With the Kaya identity, a decomposition method aimed 

at analysing emission scenarios for CO Z emissions from 

energy and industry, we can investigate what the 

required pathways for energy intensity and carbon 

intensity should be in order to stay below 2°C (and 1.5°C). 

GDP and population are here considered as external 

drivers for reasons explained above. 

page12 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

70.000 

60.000 

50.000 

~ 40.000 

O 

V 

~ 30.000 

20.000 

10.000 

Carbon Intensity 

~ — 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

• Historical - 2000-2011 

—o- Median Values 

5th Percentile 

95th Percentile 

— Linear (Hfstorical - 2000-2011) 

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 

Figure 6: Carbon intensity 2000 — 2050, historicat and projected. The solid line shows the trend for 2000-2010 if 

continued up to 2050. The dotted line shows carbon intensity compatible with 2°C. Source: Own estimates based on IEA 

Rapid shifts are possible 

Examples From the past show that 

transFormative processes can move 

faster than initially expected. 

Increase in renewable energy: Costs 

oF renewable energy have declined 

dramatically over the last years and 

much Faster than previously 

expected. One exceptional example is 

the decline oF costs For solar 

photovoltaic. Some renewable energy 

technologies have achieved market 

competitiveness. 

In 2012, renewables made up just 

over half oF total net additions to 

electric generating capacity From atl 

sources in 2012 8 . This couid be the 

start oF a new positive trend paving 

the way to a Full decarbonisation oF 

the energy sector. 

A low-carbon world requires 100% oF 

net additions From carbon-neutral 

technologies and phase-out oF Fossil 

8http://www.ipcc-wg3.de/assessment-reports/fifthassessment-report 

fuel-based power plants. This 

transition has been much Faster than 

expected. The International Energy 

Agency has constantly 

underestimated the growth oF 

renewable energy: since 2006, every 

version oF the World Energy Outlook 

has had to increase its renewable 

capacity projections to reFlect real 

developments. 

EFFicient lighting: the transition to 

very eFFicient lighting was also Faster 

than predicted: 55 countries have 

agreed to phase out ineFFicient 

lighting by 2016 under the initiative 

En.lighten and are implementing 

concrete actions to meet this target. 9 

The IPCC expects very eFFicient LEDs 

to become the most widely-used light 

source in the Future. 10 Some global 

lighting technology providers have 

switched entirely to very eFFicient 

LEDs. 

9http://www.enlighten-initiative.org 

10http://www.ipcc-wg3.de/assessment-reports/fifthassessment-report 

page13 
Climate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

8,000 - - 

- 

- -- 

—Historic emissions, excl. LULUCF 

7,000 1. - 

r2013 Current Policy projections (CAT N 6,000 -- _-----__ _ -- - - ____ ___ __ _ _ _-_ __ assessment) 

O 

$4 5,000 —Updated Current Policy projections including 

y US Clean Power Plan (CAT assessment) 

c 

0 4,000 - - - --- - - -- -- - N Pledge pathway (CAT assessment) 

aGi 3,000 -- - - 

t7 

x 

w 2,000 

m 

0 

F' 1,000 ----- - ---- 

0 

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 

Figure 7: GHG emissions of the USA under different scenarios. Source: Own calculations and CAT update 2013. 

Car standards/electro mobility: 

Various countries have now put in 

place or intend to instigate — 

increased efFiciency or emissions 

standards for cars. Important 

examples are the US, the EU, Japan 

and China. 

The EU has the globally strongest 

standard — and is overachieving it. The 

Global Fuel Economy Initiative, 

founded in 2009, promotes the 

improvement of the energy efficiency 

of vehicles globally to 50% of current 

energy intensity. 11An electric car is 

now in the palette of every large car 

manufacturer, unthinkable a few 

years ago. They expect this 

technology to be the future. 

US action on existing power plants 

an important but, taken alone, is 

insufficient to meet its pledge 

The US Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) announced on 2 June 

2014 a new regulation that will 

reduce GHG emissions from the 

electricity sector by 30°10 below 

2005 levels by 2030. 

This is the first time US authorities 

are regulating CO2 emissions from 

the electricity sector on a federal 

level. Until now, comprehensive 

policies that reduce GHG emissions 

from power plants have only been 

implemented at the state level. 

However, the new rule is insufficient 

to meet the US pledge of a 17% 

reduction from 2005 emissions 12of 

all greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 

(equivalent to about 4% below 1990 

levels) and is inconsistent with the 

long-term target of 83% below 2005 

levels by 2050 (equivalent to about 

80% below 1990 levels by 

2050)(Figure 7). 

" http://www.globalfue (economy.org 12 US 2005 emissions were 16% above 1990 levels. 

pagel4 
4.0 

3.5 

3.0 

a 2.5 

O 

~ 

~ 

0 2.0 

U 

~ 1.5 

1,0 

0.5 

0.0 

Carbon Intensity (CO2 / Energy) 

—Historical Emissions 

"'0"'°2013 Current Policy projections 

(CAT assessment) 

—Updated Current Policy 

projections including US Clean 

Power Plan (CAT assessment) 

• • • • Likely 2°C pathway for 

decarbonization 

• • • •High probablility 2.0°C 

decarbonization pathway/ 1.5°C 

by 2100 

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 

Figure 8: Carbon intensity for the USA historically and under different scenario projections, including the estimated effects 

of the recently announced Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule. 

Based on the CAT assessment, US 

2030 economy-wide emissions would 

be around 5% above 1990 levels (or 

10 % below 2005 levels). These levels 

are Far above those required For a 2C 

pathway. The CAT has calculated 

From the IPCC AR5 scenarios that 

reductions For Annex I countries in 

2025 and 2030 should be 25-55% and 

35-65% below 1990 levels 

respectively For an equity scenario 

based on relative capability to 

mitigate. 

The EPA's Clean Power Plan 

addresses emissions From the 

electricity sector only, which is a 

major contributor to the USA's total 

GHG emissions. 

In 2012, around one third oF the USA's 

total emissions oF 6488 MtCO2eq 

originated From the power sector. 13 

13In severat anatyses of the EPA ptan a share of 

38% was used. This figure arises when including 

The new proposed regulation For 

emissions of electric power plants in 

the USA will bring GHG emissions 

down by around 200 MtCO2e/a in 

2020 compared to trends without this 

regulation. 

This will help the USA to implement 

its pledge, but will not be sufficient to 

close the Full gap oF around 700 

MtCO2e between recent trends and 

the pledge From earlier assessments 14 

oF the Climate Action Tracker. 

Under the Copenhagen Accord, the 

USA has announced a long-term 

target of reducing total GHG 

emissions: 83% below 2005 in 2050. 

This target would be just within the 

range oF the USA's emissions 

carbon removals from forestry into the US total 

emissions. 

' Q http://climateactiontracker.org/publications/publ 

ication/154/Anatysis-of-current-greenhouse-gasemission-trends.htmt 

page15 
C(imate Action Tracker Update 4 June 2014 

compatible with 2 0C. 15 In order to be 

on track to meet their long-term 

target, the US GHG emissions in 2030 

would have to be about 39% below 

2005 levels (equivalent to 29% below 

1990 levels). 

Linearly extrapolating the proposed 

target For emissions From the 

electricity sector (30% below 2005 in 

2030) into the future would mean 

that emissions reach minus 54% in 

2050 and zero by 2090. This would be 

too late to reach the long-term 

pledge oF the USA oF -83% oF all 

greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. 

We calculate a reduction below BAU 

of approximately 0.5 GLCO2e in 2030 

and a decrease oF 726MtCO2e/a From 

2491 MLCO2e/a in 2005. Assuming a 

linear decrease From today onwards, 

this would mean emissions oF 1950 

MtCO2e/a in 2020, in comparison to 

2120 MtCO2e/a in the most recent 

projections oF the USA. 16 

The Clean Power Plan is part oF 

President Obama's Climate Action 

Plan and covers the complete 

electricity sector, suggesting 

measures in the areas of eFficiency on 

the supply and demand side, 

renewable energy, and other lowcarbon technologies. It will provide 

options For states to meet the 

reduction goals in a "Flexible 

manner. "17 

Clean Power Plan decarbonisation 

rates far from those needed for 2*C 

Over the past ten years, there has 

been a substantial decline in CO 2 

emissions in the US energy sector. 

The decline corresponds to a 15% 

decrease in carbon intensity from 

2002 to 2012 (about 1.4% per annum 

improvement), primarily as a result of 

a Fuel switch From coal to gas. 

The new policy implies an economywide decarbonisation rate oF about 

0.9% per annum, signiFicantly lower 

than that achieved in the last decade. 

This is not as Fast as is needed For a 

2°C decarbonisation pathway, and 

could therefore mean an actuat 

deterioration of the current 

decarbonisation rate, illustrated by 

the 'historical emissions' in Figure 8. 

The CAT team has calculated the 

required global carbon intensity 

pathways For the period 2020 — 2100 

consistent with a 2°C pathway. 

15 According to H6hne et al. (2013) 'North 

America's' fair share For 2050 is at minimum an 

80% reduction relative to 2010. The USA's 83% 

reduction below 2005 pledge is equivalent to an 

82% reduction below 2010 (evels. The 2050 

pledge is therefore just within the range of effortsharing proposals. If all regions only meet the top 

end oF the range, we will not reach the 2 degree 

goal. 

16 http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf 

" http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014- 

05/d ocu m e n ts/20140602 fs-ove rvi ew. p d f 

page16 
ECO FYS C L I MAT E _. --~ 

ANALYTICS P I K sustainable energy for everyone 

Background on the Climate Action Tracker 

The "Climate Action Tracker", www.climateactiontracker.org , is a science-based assessment by EcoFys, Climate 

Analytics and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) that provides regularly updated 

inFormation on countries' reduction proposals. 

The Climate Action Tracker' $ reflects the latest status of the progress being made at international climate 

negotiations. The team that perFormed the analyses followed peer-reviewed scientiFic methods (see 

publications in Nature and otherjournals) 19 and signiFicantly contributed to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 20 . 

The Climate Action Tracker enables the public to track the emission commitments and actions oF countries. 

The website provides an up-to-date assessment of individual country pledges about greenhouse gas emission 

reductions. It also plots the consequences For the global climate oF commitments and actions made ahead oF 

and during the Copenhagen Climate Summit. 

The Climate Action Tracker shows that much greater transparency is needed when it comes to targets and 

actions proposed by countries. In the case oF developed countries, accounting For Forests and land-use change 

signiFicantly degrades the overall stringency of the targets. For developing countries, climate plans often lack 

calculations of the resulting impact on emissions. 

Contacts 

Dr. Niklas H6hne (n.hoehne@~ecoFys.com_ )- Director of Energy and Climate Policy at Ecofys and lead author at 

the IPCC developed, together with Dr. Michel den Elzen From MNP, the table in the IPCC report that is the 

basis for the reduction range of -25% to -40% below 1990 levels by 2020 that is currently being discussed for 

Annex I countries. 

Dr. h.c. Bill Hare (bill.hare@climateanalytics.org) (PIK and Climate Analytics) was a lead author oF the IPCC 

Fourth Assessment Report, is guest scientist at PIK and CEO at Climate Analytics. 

Marie Lindberg (marie.lindberg@climateanalytics.org ) leads the CAT project team at Climate Analytics 

18www.climateactiontracker.org 

19e.g. http://www.nature.com/nature/journa(/v464/n7292/Ful(/4641126a.html and 

httP:Hiopscience.iop.org/l 7 48-9 3 2 6/5/3/0 3401 3/Futltex t 
E C 0 F YS CLIMATE —no 

ANALYTICS P I K 

sustainable energy for everyone 

Ecofys — experts in energy 

Established in 1984 with the mission oF achieving "sustainable energy for everyone", Ecofys has become the 

leading expert in renewable energy, energy & carbon efficiency, energy systems & markets as well as energy & 

climate policy. The unique synergy between those areas of expertise is the key to its success. Ecofys creates 

smart, effective, practical and sustainable solutions for and with public and corporate clients all over the world. 

With offices in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, China and the US, Ecofys employs 

over 250 experts dedicated to solving energy and climate challenges. 

www.ecorvs.com 

Climate Analytics 

CLIMATE ANALYTICS is a non-profit organization based in Potsdam, Germany. It has been established to 

synthesize climate science and policy research that is relevant for international climate policy negotiations. It 

aims to provide scientiFic, policy and analytical support for Smalt Isiand States (SIDS) and the least developed 

country group (LDCs) negotiators, as well as non-governmental organisations and other stakeholders in the 

'post-2012' negotiations. Furthermore, it assists in building in-house capacity within SIDS and LDCs. 

www.ciimateanalytics.org 

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) 

The PIK conducts research into global climate change and issues of sustainable development. Set up in 1992, 

the Institute is regarded as a pioneer in interdisciplinary research and as one of the world's leading 

establishments in this field. Scientists, economists and social scientists work together, investigating how the 

earth is changing as a system, studying the ecotogical, economic and social consequences of climate change, 

and assessing which strategies are appropriate for sustainable development. 

www.pik-potsdam.de