07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of A ppellate Proc edure 43(c) (2), Attorne y Gene ral Er ic H. * Holder, Jr., Secre tary

J anet A. N apolitano, and Ac ting De puty Direc tor Michae l Ay

tes are a u t o m at i c a l l y

s u b s t i tu t e d a s th e d e f

e n d an t - a p p e l l e e s i nth i s c a s e . D e f e n d an t - a p p e l l e e A n dr e a

J. Quar antillo is t he Ne w York D istrict Direc tor of the U.S. Citiz enship and Immigration Service s, not the New Y ork F ield Offic e Dire ctor a s indicated in the orig inal caption. The Clerk of Court is directe d to amend the of ficial c aption to conform to the listing a bove. 1 1 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS 2 F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T

3 August Term, 2008 4 (Argued: April 16, 2009 Dec ided: Dec ember 3, 2009)

5 Docke t No. 07-5638-c v

6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 7 Rajko L

jutica, 8 Plaintif f-Appellant , 9 v

. 10 U.S. Attorney

Gene ral Eric H. Holder , J r., Secr etar y J anet A. N apolitano, Depa rtment of 11 Homeland Sec urity , ActingDeputy Direc tor Michae l Ay

tes, U.S. Citi zenship and I mmigration 12 Service s, New Y ork District Dire ctor Andr ea J. Quara ntillo, U.S . Citi zenship and Immigration 13 Se rv ic e s, * 14 Defendant- Appellee s . 15 16 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X 17 18 1907 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

2 1 Be fore : J ACOBS, Chief Judge , L EVAL , and SACK, Circuit Judges

. 2 Appea l from an or der of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w 3 York (Rakoff, J. ) grantingsummary judgme nt in favor of

the Gover

nment and af

firmingthe 4 denial by

the U.S. Citi zenship and I mmigration Services (“ CI S”) of Plaintiff’s a pplication for 5 United States citizenship. C I S denied Plaintiff’s application on the gr ound that Plaintiff was 6 statutorily

barr ed fr om qualifying f

or natura liz ation beca

use he w as convic ted of a n “ag g ravated 7 fe lony” a s d e fi ne d in 8 U .S. C. § § 1 10 1( a )( 43 )( M) (i ). On a pp e a l, P la int if

f a rg ue s th at hi s 8 conviction of attempted bank fr aud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 does not qualify as an a g g ravated 9 felony

under the immigration statute and that res judicata applies a s a re sult of ear lier depor tation 10 proce eding s. Findingno merit to Plainti ff’ s arguments, the Court of Appea ls (L eval, J. ) af firms. 11 WAL TE R D RO B EN KO , D ro be nk o & As so c iate s, 12 P.C., Astoria, New Yor k, for Appellant

. 13 PATRI CI A L . BU CHANAN, A ssistant United 14 States Attorney (Sara h S. Normand, Assistant 15 United States Attorney , on the brief ) , f o r M i c h a e l J. 16 Gar cia, United States A ttorney for the Souther

n 17 District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, New Y ork, for 18 Appellee s . 19 L EVAL , Circuit Judge : 20 Plaintiff appea ls from an orde r of the United States District Court for the Southern 21 District of Ne w York ( Rakoff, J. ) g rantingsummary judgme nt in favor of

the Gover

nment. 22 Plaintiff contended in his suit that, in denying him citizenship, the U.S. Cit izenship and 23 Immigration Services (“ CI S”) re lied on a leg ally err oneous g round. CI S denied Plaintiff’s 24 a pp lic atio n o n th e g ro un d th at Pla int if f’ s c onvic tio n und e r 1 8 U .S. C. § 13 44 fo r a tte mpt ingto 25 execute a f

raudule nt scheme to obtain money from a ba

nk constitutes an “a g g ravated fe lony ” as 26 define d in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43) (M)(i) and that convic tion for an a g g ravated fe lony makes one07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

3 1 ineligible f

or natura liz ation under 8 U .S.C. §§ 1101(f)(8), 1427( a)( 3). On de novo revie w, the 2 district court af

firmed, f inding that Plaintiff is an a g g ravated fe lon as define d in Subsections 3 (M )( i) and

(U ). On a pp e a l, P la int if

f a rgue s p ri mari ly

that th e statut or

y ba r i s in a pp lic a ble to h is 4 crime be cause he wa s convicted of bank fr aud rather than attempted bank fr aud (r ender ing 5 Subsection (U) ina pplicable) and bec ause the bank suff ere d no actua l loss, as he was c aug ht 6 befor e he c ould withdraw the mone y (re nderingSubsection (M)(i) ina pplicable) . We find 7 Pla int if

f’ s argume nts to b e wi tho ut m e ri t. 8 BACK GR OUND 9 Pla int if

f i s a c iti zen of the Re pu bli c of Mo nte ne g ro wh o e nte re d th e Un ite d St ate s a s a 10 visitor in October 1987 a nd adjusted his status to that of permane nt resident in Novembe r 1988. 11 In Dec ember

1993, Plaintiff was convic ted of violating18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2 upon his plea of 12 guil ty

to atte mpt ingto e xec ute a fr a ud ule nt s c he me to o bta in $ 47 5, 02 5. 25 fr om S e c ur ity Pa c if ic 13 National Trust Company (“Sec urity

Pacific” ). The sc heme wa s detec ted af ter the mone y

was 14 wi re d f

ro m Se c ur ity

Pa c if ic to P la int if

f’ s a c c ount at ano the r b ank , b ut b e fo re Pla int if f c ou ld 15 withdraw it fr om that acc ount. Plainti ff wa s sentence d to 16 months i mprisonment and two y ear s 16 of super

vised rele ase. 17 As a re sult of the conviction, the Immigration and Natura liz ation Service (“I NS”) c harg ed 18 Plaintiff with deportability under § 241( a)( 2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“ I NA”) , 19 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (A) ( rec odified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2)( A)), a s an alien who had bee n 20 convicted of

a cr ime involving mora l turpitude, committed within five y ear s of entry , and07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

4 1 sentenc ed to imprisonment for one year or more. O n April 29, 1996, Plaintiff was g rante d a 2 waiver

of depor tation under § 212(c ) of the I NA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (re peale d 1996). 3 In Marc h 2005, Plaintiff applied to CI S to become a naturalized citiz en of the United 4 States. CI S denied Plaintiff’s application on the gr ound that Plaintiff’s conviction was f or an 5 ag g ravated fe lony

as def ined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (M)(i) and ther efor e statutorily prec luded 6 h i mf

r o md e m o n s tr at i n g“ g o o d m o r a l c h ar a c t e r . ” O na

p p e a l , D e f

e n d an t - Ap p e l l e e A n dr e a

J. 7 Quar antillo, CI S’s New Yor k District Direc tor, aff

irmed the de nial. 8 Plaintiff filed a c omplaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 9 Ne w Y o rks ee k i n g de novo revie w of his application, arguing that his conviction was not an 10 ag g ravated fe lony within the meaningof the re levant statute a nd that res judicata der iving f rom 11 his prior deportation procee dings a nd § 212(c) waiver

established his g ood moral cha rac ter. 12 Plaintiff and the Gove rnment moved for summary judgme nt. 13 The district cour t denied Plaintiff’s motion and g rante d the Gover nment’s motion for 14 summary

judgme nt. Ljuti ca v. M

ukasey , No. 07 Civ. 6129 (J SR), 2007 W L4145275, at *1 15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2007) . After revie wingthe re cord of

Plaintiff’s plea a

nd conviction, the 16 c ourt

c on c lud e d th at, b a se d o n “ the un dis pute d f a c ts a nd c le ar l aw, L

jut ic a is s tatut or ily

ine lig ibl e 17 for naturalization because he is an a g g ravated fe lon and thus barr ed by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) fr om 18 establishing the g ood moral cha rac ter re quired for

natura liz ation.” Id. at *2. 19 This appea l followed. 20 DI SCU SSIO N07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

5 1 We r e vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt o f a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo

. Scott v. 2 Cou

gh lin , 344 F.3d 282, 287 ( 2d Cir. 2003). Summary judgme nt should be g rante d when “ there 3 is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and . . . the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter 4 of law. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). In d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t he re are g e nu ine iss ue s o f m ate ri a l f a c t, 5 we “ re so lve a ll ambi guit ie s and dr aw a ll p e rm iss ibl e fa c tua l in fe re nc e s in fa vo r o f t he pa rt y 6 ag ainst whom summary judgme nt is sought.” Te rry v . A sh c ro ft , 336 F.3d 128, 137 ( 2d Cir. 7 2003) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). 8 Pla int if

f r a ise s tw o is su e s o n a

pp e a l. F ir st, he argue s th at hi s c onvic tio n und e r 1 8 U .S. C. 9 § 1344 does not constitute an ag g ravated fe lony as def ined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (M)(i) and 10 (U). Sec ond, he ar gues that his prior depor tation proce edingand the r esulting § 212( c) w aiver 11 prec lude the Gove rnment fr om assertingthat he lac ked g ood moral cha rac ter. 12 I. Ag gr av at e d F e lon y 13 Th e I

NApr ov ide s th at no pe rs on sh a ll b e natur a lize d unle ss h e “ ha s b e e n a nd sti ll i s a 14 person of

g ood moral cha

rac ter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) . CI S is precluded f rom finding“g ood 15 mor a l c ha

ra c te r” if the a pp lic ant “ ha s b e e n c onvic te d o f a n a g g ra vate d f e lony (a s d e fi ne d in 16 su

bs e c tio n ( a )( 43 ) .

. . ). ” 8 U .S. C. § 11 01 (f )( 8) ; se e als o 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)( 1)(ii) (“ An 17 applicant sha ll be found to lack g ood moral cha rac ter, if the a

pplicant has be en . . . [c]onvicted of 18 an a g g ra

vate d f e lony . . . o n o r a ft e r N ov e mbe r 2 9, 19 90 .” ); Puello v. Bure au of Cit izenship & 19 Im mi

grati on Se rv

s. , 511 F.3d 324, 325 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (“Under the 1990 amendments to the I NA, 20 if a pe rson is ‘convicte d’ of a n ag g ravated fe lony

afte r the date of e nactment of the statute,07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

6 1 November

29, 1990, that person is statutorily prec luded from e stablishing the ‘ g ood moral 2 char acte r’ r equire d for naturalization.”). 3 Section 1101(a) (43) pr ovides in Subsections (A) through (U) a list of offense s that 4 constitute ag g ravated fe lonies. Subsection (M)(i) spe cifies a n offe nse that “involves f raud or 5 dece it in which the loss to the victim or victim s exceeds $10,000.” 8 U .S.C. § 6 11 01 (a )( 43 )( M) (i ). Sub se c tio n ( U) pr ov ide s th at “ an atte mpt or c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it a

n o ff e ns e 7 descr ibed in [S ubsections (A) throug h (T)]” is an a g g ravated fe lony . 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (U). 8 Ac c or din g ly , a

n atte mpt to c omm it a

c ri me that invo lve s f

ra ud or de c e it, wh ic h, if

su c c e ssf ul, 9 would have r esulted in a loss to the victim ex cee ding $10,000, is a n ag g ravated fe lony

under the 10 I NA. 11 Plaintiff claims that he wa s not convicted of attempted bank fr aud under 18 U.S.C. § 12 1344, but was instead c onvicted of ba nk fra ud, and thus Subsection (U) is inapplica ble. He 13 further

argues that bec ause he was una ble to withdraw the money wired to his ac count, all of 14 wh ic h w a s r e tur

ne d to the vic timof

the fr a ud , th e re wa s n o p e rm ane nt “ los s to the vic tim ,” so 15 that Subsection (M)(i) is inapplica ble. We reje ct his arguments. 16 A. At te m pt e d Ban k F r aud 17 18 U.S.C. § 1344 applies to any one who “ knowing ly executes, or

atte mp ts to e

x e c ute , a 18 sc he me or

art if ic e – ( 1) to d e fr a

ud a fi na nc ia l in sti tut ion ; or

(2 ) t o o bta in a

ny of the mon e y s, 19 funds, cr edits, assets, sec urities, or other pr operty owned by , or under

the custody

or control of

, a 20 fi na

nc ia l in sti tut ion , b y

me ans of fa lse or fr a ud ule nt p re te ns e s, re pr e se ntatio ns , o r p ro mis e s”07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

In Dulal-W

hiteway v. U.S. D ep’t of Home land Sec. , 501 F.3d 116 ( 2d Cir. 2007), 1 abrogated on other grounds by Nijhawan v. Holder , 1 29 S. Ct . 2 29 4, 22 98 , 2 30 2 ( 20 09 ), we he ld that the Gover

nment must meet its burden of proof in establishing that a

conviction is for a

n ag g ravated fe lony

based on the “re cord of

conviction,” whic h includes “a char g ing doc ument (such a s an indictment), a signed plea ag ree ment, a ver dict or judg ment of convic tion, a rec ord of the sentenc e[,] a plea

colloquy transcr ipt, and jury

instructions.” Id. at 128-29. 18 U.S.C. § 1344, which defines the crimes of both bank fra

ud and attempted ba

nk 2 fra ud, is entitled “Ba

nk fra ud.” The fac t that the J udg ment of Conviction describe s the offe nse of conviction usingthe words “ Ba nk Fr aud” doe s not alter that Plaintiff was c harg ed with, pleade d to, and was c onvicted of attempted bank fr aud. 7 1 (empha sis added). It is clear that an attempt to defr aud a ba nk can be the basis for a

conviction 2 under 18 U .S.C. § 1344. 3 The re cord of Plaintiff’s conviction indicates that he was c onvicted of attempted bank 1 4 fr a ud . Co unt T wo of

the Ind ic tme nt a lle g e s th at Pla int if f “ un lawf ull y , w ill fu lly , a

nd kn ow ing ly 5 did

atte mp t to execute a sc heme a nd artifice to obtain money , funds, cr edits, assets, sec urities and 6 oth e r p ro pe rt

y un de r t he c us tod y of a fi na nc ia l in sti tut ion , n ame ly , Se c ur ity Pa c if ic Natio na l T ru st 7 Company

. . . by means of f

alse a nd fra udulent prete nses” ( emphasis adde d). The Plea Ag ree ment 8 indicates that Plaintiff would plea d guilty to Count Two of the Indictment, and states that “ the 9 ‘l os s’ fi gur e . . . is $4 75 ,0 25 .2 5, the amou nt t he de fe nd ants wo uld

have re a lize d h a d th e sc he me 10 char g ed in Count Two been suc cessf ul.” The Judgment of

Conviction states that Pl aintiff wa s 11 c onvic te d o n h is p le a of guil ty to C ount T wo . A s a

de fe nd ant who ple a ds guil ty “ a dmi ts a ll 12 elements of the formal c harg e,” United States v. Lasaga , 328 F.3d 61, 63 ( 2d Cir. 2003), Plaintiff 13 pleade d guilty

to attempted bank f

raud. 2 14 Relying on United States v. Kilkenny , 493 F.3d 122 ( 2d Cir. 2007), Plaintiff argues that07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

8 1 beca

use the money

from Secur ity

Pacific w as wire d to his account, the c rime wa s completed a nd 2 not merely

attempted. In Kilkenny , we he ld that the defe ndant’s bank f raud sc heme wa s 3 “executed no later than when he r ece ived the funds f rom his fraudule nt loan application,” a nd 4 there fore found er ror in the district cour

t’s treatment of a subseque nt failure to r epay the loan as 5 conduct that wa s part of the offe nse for purposes of de terminingwhich ver sion of the Sentencing 6 Guidelines to apply

. Kilkenny , 493 F.3d at 130. 7 There is no merit to Pl aintiff’s a rgument. Be cause an attempt to commit a substantive 8 crime is a le sser include d offe nse of that substantive c rime, se e Un ite d S tates v . M ar in , 513 F.2d 9 97 4, 97 6 ( 2d

Cir . 1 97 5) , th e fa c ts that su pp or t a c onvic tio n f

or the c omp le te d c ri me a lso su pp or t a 10 conviction for attempt. Rega rdless of whe ther Plaintiff mig ht have be en convic ted of c ompleted 11 fra

ud, he wa s char g ed with, and plea ded to, and wa s convicted of , attempted bank f

raud. 12 Plaintiff also argues that bec ause he was sente nced unde r United States Sentenc ing 13 Guidelines § 2F 1.1, rathe r than § 2X1.1, which cove rs attempt offe nses, he must have been 14 convicted of

completed ba

nk fra ud rathe r than a

n attempt. He is mistaken. While § 2X1.1(b)( 1) 15 provides a thr ee- level re duction for “ attempt,” it expli citly excludes attempts in circumstance s 16 wher e “the defe ndant completed a ll the acts the de fenda nt believed ne cessa

ry for suc cessf

ul 17 completion of the substantive off ense or the circ umstances de monstrate that the de fenda nt was 18 about to complete a ll such acts but for a pprehe nsion or interruption by some similar event be y ond 19 the def

endant’ s control.” U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b) (1). 20 Finally , Plaintiff argues that Subsection (U) is void for vagueness, or , in the alternative,07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

9 1 that it is ambiguous and the r ule of lenity

should apply

in interpretingit. These ar guments are 2 without merit. Outside the First Amendme nt context, we assess statutes for va gueness only as 3 applied. United States v. Ry bicki , 3 5 4 F

. 3 d 1 2 4 , 1 2 9

- 3 0 ( 2 d

C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) ( e nb an c )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, 4 we must deter

mine whether

an ordina ry person would unde rstand that a c onviction for an attempt 5 to execute a sc heme to def raud a bank under

18 U.S.C. § 1344 would qualify under Subsec tion 6 (U) a s an “attempt” and whe ther Subsection (U ) could be applied consistently to such convictions 7 by CI S. See id. We see no re ason why an ordina ry person or CI S official would not under stand 8 that a convic tion for “attempt” under § 1344 qua lifies as a c onviction for an “ attempt” under 9 Sub se c tio n ( U) . We se e no ambi guit y . A s f or the ru le of

le nit y , f ur the rm or e , “ it c ann ot o ve rc ome 10 a re asonable [Board of Immigration Appeals] interpretation entitled to Chevron defe renc e.” 11 Mizrahi v. Gonzales , 492 F.3d 156, 174- 75 (2d Cir. 2007). In Su i v . I NS , 250 F.3d 105 ( 2d Cir. 12 20 01 ), we de te rm ine d th at th e B oa rd of Immi g ratio n App e a ls ( “ B IA” ) w a s e nti tle d to 13 Chevron de fe re nc e fo r i ts r e a so na ble int e rp re tatio n o f S ub se c tio n ( U) to i nc or po ra te the we ll14 established common law de finition of “attempt,” namely , the pre sence of cr iminal intent and 15 completion of a substantial step towa rd committing the c rime. Id. at 115. The r ule of lenity

has 16 no application her e. 17 B. L os s A m ount 18 Pla int if

f a lso argue s th at Su

bs e c tio n ( M) (i ) d oe s n ot a pp ly to h is c onvic tio n b e c a

us e 19 Security

Pacific suf

fer ed no ac tual loss, and there fore the re quirement of Subsec tion (M)(i) that 20 the loss to the victim ex cee d $10,000 was not met. B eca use Plaintiff was c onvicted of attempted07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

10 1 bank fr aud and is a n ag g ravated fe lon pursuant to Subsection (U) be cause of an attempt, the 2 am o un to f

a c tu a l l o s s t o th e b an k

i s i r r e l e v an t– a l l th atm at t e r s i s th e i n t e n d e d l o s s . A s th e B IA 3 wrote in a

compar able c ase, 4 We disag ree with the responde nt’s contention that sec tion 5 101(a) (43)( U) of the Act re quires that the victim suffe r an a ctual 6 loss which exceeds $10,000. B y its very nature , an attempt involves 7 an unsucc essful ef fort to commit a cr ime. Her e, the of fense for 8 wh ic h th e re sp on de nt w a s c onvic te d invo lve d a n atte mpt to o bta in 9 $15,000 from the insura nce c ompany

throug h fra

ud and dec eit. . . . 10 The fa ct that the re spondent failed to obtain the mone y is of no 11 conseque nce unde r sec tion 101(a)( 43)(U) of the Ac t, which 12 presc ribes depor tability as an a g g ravated fe lon for aliens c onvicted 13 of an atte mpt

or c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it a

n o ff e ns e de sc ri be d in 14 se c tio n 1 01 (a )( 43 ) o f t he Ac t. 15 In re Ony ido , 22 I . & N . Dec . 552, 554 (B .I .A. 1999) (c itations omi tted). 16 The amount of intended loss is determined by ref ere nce to the spe cific c ircumstance s 17 surroundingthe offe nse at issue, a nd need not be an ele ment of the off ense itself. See Nijhawan , 18 12 9 S. Ct. at 23 00 -0 2. Pla int if f’ s r e c or d o f c onvic tio n s ho ws that he int e nd e d to de fr a ud Se c ur ity 19 Pacific of

well over $10,000. Count Two of the Indictment, to which he plea ded guilty , char g es 20 Pla int if

f’ s a c c omp lic e wi th “ ini tiatin ga fr a ud ule nt w ir e tr ans fe r d ir e c tin g[Sec ur ity Pa c if ic ] to 21 transfe r appr ox imately $475,025.25 from an a ccount not owne d by [P laintiff or his ac complice] 22 int o a

n a c c ount m a int a ine d a

nd c ontr oll e d b y

[Pla int if f] at ano the r f

ina nc ia l in sti tut ion .” Th is 23 char g e is repe ated in the Plea A g ree ment, which also stipulates to a “ ‘loss’ figure” of 24 $4 75 ,0 25 .2 5, c or re sp on din gto “ the amou

nt [Pl a int if

f] w ou ld h ave re a lize d h a d th e sc he me 25 char g ed in Count Two been suc cessf ul.” See Nijhawan , 1 2 9 S. Ct

. at 2 3 0 3 ( h o ld in gin th e c o n te xt07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

11 1 of a de portation proce edingthat a stipulated loss amount for sente ncingpurposes supporte d a 2 findingthat the Subsection (M)( i) loss amount was g reater than $10,000) . Finally , duringthe plea 3 colloquy , Plaintiff stated: “On Apr il 24, 1990, Iwent to Manufa cture s [s ic] Hanover a nd 4 atte mpt e d to wi thd ra w $ 37 5, 00 0 f

ro m an a c c ount whic h c onta ine d $ 47 5, 00 0 .

. . . I kn e w that th is 5 money

had bee n fra

udulently transfe rre d to the acc ount.” In short, the re cord shows that the 6 amou

nt P la int if

f i nte nd e d to ob ta in t

hr ou g h h is f

ra ud wa s w e ll a

bo ve the Sub se c tio n ( M) (i ) 7 threshold. 8 II. Res Judicata 9 Finally , Plaintiff asserts that re s judicata for eclose s a dete rmination that he does not 10 possess g ood moral cha rac ter be cause the Gover

nment did not argue that he w as an a g g ravated 11 felon duringhis earlier deportation procee dings, a nd beca use his § 212(c) waiver

included a 12 deter

mination that he does have g ood moral cha rac ter. 13 Th e do c tr ine of re s ju dic ata

“ pr ov ide s th at a

fi na l ju dg me nt o n th e me ri ts b ars a 14 subsequent ac tion between the same pa rties over the same c ause of

action.” Channer v. De

p’t of 15 Homeland Se c. , 5 27 F .3 d 2 75 , 2 79 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ); se e als o S au d v . B an k

of N e w York, 929 F.2d 16 916, 918 (2d Cir. 1991) (“ [A] final judg ment on the merits of a n action pre cludes the pa

rties or 17 their privies fr om relitigating issues that we re or could have been r aised in that ac tion.” (interna l 18 qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ). Al tho ug h th e B IA h a s d e te rm ine d th at pr e c lus ion pr inc ipl e s a

pp ly in 19 immigration procee dings, see M atter of Fedorenk

o , 19 I . & N . Dec . 57, 61-64 (B .I .A. 1984), we 20 have not yet answe red whether res judicata bar s the Gover nment from asse rting , in a sec ond07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

12 1 immigration procee ding, grounds it could have a sserted but did not in a prior pr ocee ding, see 2 Channer , 527 F.3d at 280. Even if princ iples of re s judicata do a pply g ener ally in such 3 circ umstances, howe ver, the y do not apply

here

. 4 Th e Go ve rnme nt could not have argue d th at Pla int if f w a s a n a g g ra vate d f e lon at th e tim e 5 of his deportation procee ding. Subsec tion (M)(i) wa s first enac ted on Octobe r 25, 1994. See 6 Immigration and Nationality Tec hnical Corre ctions Act of 1994 ( “IANTCA”) , Pub. L . No. 103- 7 41 6, § 2 22 (a ), 10 8 St at. 4 30 5, 43 20 -2 2 ( 19 94 ). At the tim e of

its e na c tme nt, Sub se c tio n ( M) (i ) 8 applied only

to “convictions ente red on or afte r the date of e nactment of this Act.” Id. § 222(b). 9 I t was not until S eptember 30, 1996 that Subsection (M)(i) w as ame nded to apply retroa ctively

. 10 SeeIl l e g a l Im m i g r at i o nR e f o r man d Im m i g r an tR e s p o n s i b i l i ty A c to f 1 9 9 6 ( “ IIR IR

A ” ) , P u b

. L. 11 No. 104-208, Div. C., § 321(b), 110 Stat. 3009-628 ( 1996) (“Notwithstanding a ny other provision 12 of law ( including a ny eff ective da te), the te rm applies re g ardle ss of whethe r the c onviction was 13 enter ed bef

ore, on, or

afte r the date of e nactment of this paragraph.” ). 14 Pla int if

f w a s c onvic te d in

De c e mbe r 1 99 3, be fo re the e na c tme nt o f IAN TCA . T hu s, 15 Subsection (M)(i) a s enac ted in IANTCA did not apply to his prior conviction. His deportation 16 proce eding s were completed on Apr il 29, 1996, when he wa s g rante d a § 212(c ) wa iver, be fore 17 the ena ctment of I I RI RA. Thus, I I RI RA’s retr oactive a pplication of Subsection (M)( i) did not 18 apply

duringhis deportation proc eeding s. Under the principles of r es judicata , “while a previous 19 judgme nt may

prec lude litigation of c laims that arose ‘ prior to its entry , it cannot be g iven the 20 eff

ect of exti nguishing c laims which did not even then e x ist and which could not possibly have07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

13 1 been sue d upon in the previous ca se.’” St. Pierre v. D yer , 208 F.3d 394, 400 ( 2d Cir. 2000) 2 (qu o t i n g Lawl or v. Nat’l Scree n Serv. Corp. , 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955)). B eca use the Gove rnment 3 could not have a

rgued that Plaintiff was a n ag g ravated fe lon based on his 1993 conviction during 4 h is d e p o rtati o np r o c e e d in g s , r e s ju d ic ata w o u ld n o t p r e c lu d e it s ta

k in gth at p o s it io nh e r e . We 5 there fore leave open the que stion whether r es judicata bars the G overnme nt from asser ting, in a 6 second immig ration proc eeding , an ar gument it could have a sserted, but did not, in a prior 7 p ro ce ed i n g. 8 Plaintiff’s argument that his good mora l char acte r wa s determined by his § 212(c) w aiver 9 also fails. As we observe d in Chan v. Gantner , 464 F.3d 289 ( 2d Cir. 2006), “a findingof ‘g ood 10 moral cha

rac ter[] ’ wa s not a statutory prer equisite or nec essar ily a conside ration for

relief under 11 section 212(c ).” Id. at 295. “Good mor al cha rac ter” is a define d term under the I NA, see 8 12 U.S.C. § 1101(f) , and invoked in other sections, but not in § 212(c). Plaintiff cor rec tly points out 13 that one of the fac tors identified by the B IA to guide the Attorne y Gene ral’s discr etion in gr anting 14 § 2 12 (c ) w a ive rs is “ oth e r e vid e nc e atte sti ngto a re sp on de nt’ s g oo d c ha

ra c te r ( e .g ., a ff

ida vit s 15 from fa

mily , friends, a

nd responsible c ommunity repr esentatives).” Ma tte r o f M ar in , 16 I . & N

. 16 Dec . 581, 585 (B .I .A. 1978). How ever , even if a findingof “g ood char acte r” w as implicit in t he 17 decision g rantingPlaintiff a § 212(c ) wa iver, “ g ood moral cha rac ter” under § 1101( f) is def ined 18 differ ently

from “g ood char acte r” in re fer ence to a § 212(c ) wa iver. Plaintiff’s c onviction of 19 atte mpt e d b ank

fr a ud wa s n ot i nc on sis te nt w itha fi nd ingof

“ g oo d c ha

ra c te r” fo r p ur

po se s o f h is § 20 212(c) waiver . By virtue of § 1101( f)( 8) and Subsec tions (M)(i) and ( U), howe ver, the conviction07 - 56 38 - cv

L j uti ca v. H ol der

14 1 did prec lude a f

inding of “g ood moral cha

rac ter” for pur

poses of his application for citizenship. 2 CO NC LU SION 3 For

the fore g oing r easons, we AFF I RM the judgment of the district court.