IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Caine Pelzer, :

: No. 2050 C.D. 2015

Appellant : Submitted: April 22, 2016

:

v. :

:

Property Officer Pry, C01, :

Property Officer Jenkins, C01, :

John Doe 1, John Doe 2, :

John Doe 3 Security Officer, :

John Doe 4 Security SGT :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN FILED: August 12, 2016

Caine Pelzer appeals, pro se, from the September 28, 2015, order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County (trial court),

1 which dismissed Pelzer’s 

motion for summary judgment and granted the motion for summary judgment filed 

by Property Officer Pry C01, Property Officer Jenkins C01, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, 

John Doe 3 Security Officer, and John Doe 4 Security Sergeant (collectively, 

Defendants). We affirm.

 

1

Pelzer is presently serving an aggregate sentence of 22 to 44 years’ imprisonment, which 

the trial court imposed on April 15, 2002. (Trial Ct. Op. at 1 n.1.)
2

On July 5, 2011, Pelzer filed an action in replevin2and a writ of seizure

(Complaint) against Defendants, all of whom are employees of the State Correctional 

Institution (SCI) at Houtzdale, in their individual and official capacities. In his 

Complaint,3 Pelzer alleged the following:

10. Plaintiff, Caine Pelzer had his property pack[ed] by 

SCI-Somerset on November 14, 2010 to be transferred to 

SCI-Houtzdale[,] which property consisted of nine (9)

[b]oxes of property. Each box specifically had an 

individual inventory sheet documenting what was stored in 

each box[.] Each inventory sheet was signed by [Pelzer] 

and two (2) corrections officers at SCI-Somerset 

documenting its contents and the fact of it being in 

working/operable condition before being shipped to SCIHoutzdale.

11. [Officers] Pry and Jenkins received [Pelzer’s] property 

from the security department at SCI[-]Houtzdale on 

November 25, 2010[,] which consisted of 4 boxes of 

property, (specifically) one (1) footlocker and three (3) 

brown boxes of [Pelzer’s] property (one damaged television 

which seemed like the bottom was hammered out) and 8 

inventory slips missing.

12. [Officers] Pry and Jenkins inventoried [Pelzer’s] 4 

boxes of property and documented that the television was 

damaged and all but 1 inventory slip was present which did 

 

2

“Replevin is a possessory action in which the issues are [the] plaintiff’s title and right of 

possession.” Valley Gypsum Company v. Pennsylvania State Police, 581 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1990). “In order to maintain [an action in] replevin, the plaintiff must have a general or 

special property right in the thing taken or detained.” International Electronics Company v. N.S.T. 

Metal Products Company, 88 A.2d 40, 42 (Pa. 1952).

3 After this court issued its decision in Pelzer’s first appeal, Pelzer’s July 5, 2011, Complaint 

was lost. (Trial Ct. Order, 10/24/13, at 1.) Thus, Pelzer re-filed his Complaint in the trial court on 

May 30, 2013. (Id. at 2.) All references to Pelzer’s Complaint herein are to the May 30, 2013, 

Complaint.
3

not record all of [Pelzer’s] property. This was conducted on 

November 25, 2010.

13. On November 25, 2010, [Pelzer] filed grievance 

# 345383 documenting [Pelzer’s] lost lawsuits and caseload 

to case # 12727-2009 Luzerne Courthouse and [S]uperior 

Court # 1385 MDA 2010[] [a]s well as ([n]ine) law books 

. . . .[

4

]

14. On November 25, 2010, [Officers] Pry and Jenkins 

confiscated [Pelzer’s] property and took it somewhere off 

the housing unit (allegedly to security) and wrote a 

misconduct on [Pelzer] because he refuse[d] to throw away 

any property due to the fact [that] 5 boxes were missing.

15. On December 9th, 2010[,] John Doe 1, 2, 3, [and] 4 did

another inventory on [Pelzer’s] property with the same 4 

boxes as the November 25, 2010 inventory. No previous 

inventory slips were found, but this time [Pelzer] was told 

to take (2) boxes of property in his cell and that (2) boxes 

would be stored in property rooms located in this housing 

unit.

16. After it was discovered the other boxes would not be 

located, grievance No[.] 346908 was filed and a [t]elevision 

of lesser value was placed somewhere in [Pelzer’s] storage 

area. All law books and legal documents have been kept 

from [Pelzer] as well as all inventory sheets documenting 

said lost property.

17. Defendants involved acknowledge the fact that [Pelzer] 

was received at [SCI-H]outzdale with 9 boxes of property 

but has failed to protect [Pelzer’s] property knowing the 

record is clear showing such deprivation of property 

without due process of law.

 

4

Pelzer withdrew Grievance No. 345383 on December 9, 2010. (See Defs.’ Summ. Judg. 

Mot., Ex. H.) According to Pelzer, “due to the fact of the [television] being handled in accordance 

with [Department policy,] said Grievance No[.] 345383 was withdrawn as being partially resolved.” 

(Id., Ex. I.)
4

(Compl. ¶¶ 10-17.) Pelzer also alleged that Defendants negligently lost or destroyed

Pelzer’s property while acting in the course of their official duties as Department of 

Corrections (Department) employees. (Id. ¶ 19.) Pelzer further alleged that he does 

not know the whereabouts of his missing boxes. (Id. ¶ 21.)

On July 7, 2011, the trial court sua sponte dismissed Pelzer’s Complaint 

as frivolous for failure to state a claim under Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1). Pelzer

appealed to this court, which concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing

Pelzer’s Complaint because the Complaint stated prima facie claims for replevin and

negligence. Pelzer v. Pry, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 50 C.D. 2012, filed May 15, 2013), slip 

op. at 7, 11. Therefore, we vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for further 

proceedings.

Following remand, both Pelzer and Defendants moved for summary 

judgment. On September 28, 2015, the trial court dismissed Pelzer’s motion and 

granted Defendants’ motion. The trial court found that Pelzer’s Complaint, although 

couched as a civil action in replevin, was “merely [an] attempt[] to appeal the 

outcome of his misconduct hearing and grievance.” (Trial Ct. Op. at 5.) Therefore, 

the trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the outcomes of Pelzer’s 

misconduct and grievance, citing Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 

A.2d 357 (Pa. 1998). (Id. at 6-7.) Pelzer now appeals to this court.

5

 

5 Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary. County 

of Beaver v. Sainovich, 96 A.3d 421, 426 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 112 

A.3d 654 (Pa. 2015). We will reverse only where the trial court “committed an error of law or 

clearly abused its discretion.” Id.
5

On appeal, Pelzer asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that it 

lacked jurisdiction because Pelzer’s Complaint alleged a valid constitutional claim. 

We disagree.

In Bronson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Department 

decisions involving internal prison operations are beyond the scope of this court’s 

original and appellate jurisdiction. 721 A.2d at 358-59. The Bronson Court reasoned 

that “internal prison operations are more properly left to the legislative and executive 

branches, and . . . prison officials must be allowed to exercise their judgment in the 

execution of policies necessary to preserve order and maintain security free from 

judicial interference.” Id. at 358. An internal Department decision may be subject to 

appellate review only “if an inmate can identify a personal or property interest which 

is not limited by Department regulations and which is affected by a final decision of

the Department.” Lawson v. Department of Corrections, 539 A.2d 69, 71 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1988) (emphasis added); see Hill v. Department of Corrections, 64 A.3d 

1159, 1167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (noting that the exception to the general prohibition 

against judicial review of internal Department decisions is narrow).

Here, Pelzer failed to allege a personal or property interest that is not 

limited by Department regulations. Inmates do not have a right to possess whichever 

personal items they choose. See Bronson, 721 A.2d at 359 (“Prison inmates do not 

enjoy the same level of constitutional protections afforded to non-incarcerated 

citizens.”). Rather, Department directives specify both the quantity and the types of 

personal property that an inmate may possess. (See Defs.’ Summ. Judg. Mot., Exs. 

C-E.) Section 3(B)(9) of DC-ADM 815 provides that “[a]n inmate may not exceed 

the property limits established by the Department” and that any excess property “may 
6

be shipped out at the inmate’s expense or destroyed.” (Id., Ex. E.) Thus, because 

Department directives expressly limit an inmate’s possession of personal property, 

Pelzer cannot assert a constitutional claim based on the Department’s application of 

its internal policy. See Bronson, 721 A.2d at 359 (“Even if [Bronson] had invoked 

the court’s original jurisdiction by attempting to color the confiscation of his clothing 

as a violation of his protected constitutional property rights, his claim would fail.”).

Pelzer asserts that he properly raised a cognizable constitutional claim 

because the Complaint alleged that Defendants’ “loss and destruction of [Pelzer’s] 

property” violated his due process rights under the Pennsylvania and United States 

Constitutions. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19.) We cannot agree. Pelzer’s Grievance No. 346908 

proceeded through each level of the Department’s internal appeals process.6 In the

final administrative appeal, the Chief Grievance Officer determined that Pelzer had 

discarded five boxes of his property in order to comply with the Department’s

property limitation policy. (Defs.’ Summ. Judg. Mot., Ex. I.) Thus, although Pelzer 

baldly asserts a due process violation, he is actually contesting the factual findings 

resolved via the Department’s internal grievance process, which is beyond the scope 

of both this court’s and the trial court’s jurisdiction. See Bronson, 721 A.2d at 358-

59; Brown v. Department of Corrections, 913 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) 

 

6

 Our court has explained the prisoner grievance system as follows:

The Department maintains a prisoner grievance system[,] which allows prisoners to 

seek review of problems [that] they experience during their period of incarceration. 

[Under that] system, a prisoner files an initial grievance with the prison staff. He [or 

she] can then appeal that decision to the superintendent of the prison and, as a final 

appeal within the Department, a prisoner may appeal the grievance to the chief 

grievance officer of the Department.

Iseley v. Beard, 841 A.2d 168, 170 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
7

(stating that the jurisdictional limitations recognized in Bronson also apply to the 

courts of common pleas).

Accordingly, we affirm.

___________________________________

ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

Judge Cosgrove did not participate in the decision of this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Caine Pelzer, :

: No. 2050 C.D. 2015

Appellant : 

:

v. :

:

Property Officer Pry, C01, :

Property Officer Jenkins, C01, :

John Doe 1, John Doe 2, :

John Doe 3 Security Officer, :

John Doe 4 Security SGT :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 12th day of August, 2016, we hereby affirm the 

September 28, 2015, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County.

___________________________________

ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge