alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.2



 





EXHIBIT 10.2




March 30, 2005




Mr. John A. Ciccarelli

9621 Cypress Hammock Circle, #201

Bonita Springs, FL 34135



Dear Chic:


This letter will serve as an Agreement under which the Board of Directors of Dayton Superior
Corporation (“DSC”) is appointing you as Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of DSC.
Following are the terms of this arrangement:





	 	1.  	Effective March 8, 2005, you shall serve as Interim President and Chief Executive
Officer of DSC until such time as the Board of Directors of DSC gives you written notice
that it no longer wishes you to serve in such capacity. As Interim President and Chief
Executive Officer, you shall carry out and have the customary responsibilities, duties and
authority consistent with a chief executive officer position and/or as otherwise assigned
to you by the Board of Directors. While serving in such capacity, you shall devote
substantially all of your working time and efforts to the business of DSC.
	 
	 	2.  	While serving in your position as Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of DSC,
you shall be paid an annual base salary of $375,000, payable through normal Company payroll
practices.
	 
	 	3.  	Unless otherwise determined by the Board of Directors of DSC, you shall receive no
other Company benefits (such as benefits under the Company’s medical, dental, vision,
disability, life insurance, bonus, stock option, 401(k) or retirement plans) during the
period in which you are serving as Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of DSC.
	 
	 	4.  	The Company shall provide you with a furnished apartment and related utilities in the
Dayton, Ohio area during the period in which you are serving in such position up to a
maximum of $2,000 per month. The Company shall also reimburse you, per normal Company
procedures, for all reasonable and customary business and travel expenses incurred by you
in your capacity as Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of DSC.
	 
	 	5.  	You may resign as Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of DSC at any time, for
any reason, by giving written notice to the Board of Directors of DSC, at




 








 






Mr. John A. Ciccarelli

Page 2

March 30, 2005





which time this Agreement shall immediately cease to be effective. Conversely, the Board of
Directors of DSC may request that you immediately relinquish this position, or relieve you
of the duties and responsibilities of this position at any time, for any reason, by giving
written notice to you, at which time this Agreement shall immediately cease to be effective.


If the terms of this Letter Agreement are acceptable to you, please indicate your acceptance by
signing below. We are pleased to have you serve as Dayton Superior’s Interim President and Chief
Executive Officer.




Sincerely,



/s/ Stephen Berger



Stephen Berger



AGREED:



/s/ John A. Ciccarelli



John A. Ciccarelli
*,11 ii*st * .

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 19-0269

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

KENNETH LEROY WHITLOW,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

FILED

MAR 1 0 2020

Bovven G ree n wood

Clerk of Suprerne Court

State of Montana

This Court granted Appellant a motion for extension of time until December 23,

2019, to file the opening brief in this matter. Nothing further was filed, and the brief

became overdue. On January 3, 2020, the Court ordered Appellant to file his opening brief

within thirty days or the case would be dismissed. Nothing further has been filed. It has

also come to the Court's attention that Appellant died on February 14, 2020, rendering the

issues in this appeal moot.

THEREF ORE,

IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this Order to all counsel of record.

41=,

DATED this ) b day of March, 2020.

Chief Justice

03/10/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0269
Justices

2
First Amendment to Employment Agreement between Wynn Las Vegas and Arthur Nathan



 Exhibit 10.35 
  
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO 
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
  
 This FIRST AMENDMENT TO
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is entered into as of August 28, 2003, by and between Wynn Las Vegas, LLC (“Employer”) and Arthur Nathan (“Employee”). Capitalized terms that are not defined
herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement (as defined below). 
  
 RECITALS 
  
 WHEREAS,
Employer and Employee have entered into that certain Employment Agreement, dated as of December 11, 2002 (the “Agreement”); and 
  
 WHEREAS, Employer and Employee desire to change the termination provisions of the Agreement on the terms and pursuant to the conditions set forth herein;

  
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the
respective representations, warranties, covenants and agreements set forth in this Amendment, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
  
 1. Amendment. 
  
 (a) Subsection 7(c) of the Agreement is hereby amended to read as follows: 
  
 “(c) “the giving of written notice by Employer to Employee of the termination of this
Agreement upon the discharge of Employee for any reason, with or without Cause;” 
  
 (b) Subsection 7(e) of the Agreement is hereby deleted. 
  
 2. Other Provisions of Agreement. The parties acknowledge that the Agreement is being modified only as stated herein,
and agree that nothing else in the Agreement shall be affected by this Amendment. 
  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be executed as of the date first written above. 
  

					
	WYNN LAS VEGAS, LLC	 	EMPLOYEE
			
	By:	 	 /s/ Marc Schorr

	 	 /s/ Arthur Nathan


	 	 	Marc D. Schorr	 	Arthur Nathan
	 	 	Chief Executive Officer and	 	 
	 	 	President
NUMBERS 13-08-00060-CR & 13-08-00061-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

_______________________________________________________

JAMES PORIS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

_______________________________________________________

On appeal from the 347th and 319th District Courts 

of Nueces County, Texas.

_______________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Vela

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, James Poris, attempts to appeal his convictions for aggravated assault

and escape. The trial court has certified that each appeal “is a plea-bargain case, and the

defendant has NO right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).

On January 25, 2008, this Court notified appellant’s counsel of the trial court’s

certification and ordered counsel to: (1) review the record; (2) determine whether appellant
2

has a right to appeal; and (3) forward to this Court, by letter, counsel’s findings as to

whether appellant has a right to appeal, or, alternatively, advise this Court as to the

existence of any amended certification.

On April 4, 2008, counsel filed a letter brief with this Court. Counsel’s response

does not establish that the certification currently on file with this Court is incorrect or that

appellant otherwise has a right to appeal. 

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appeal must be dismissed

if the trial court’s certification does not show that the defendant has the right of appeal.

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 37.1, 44.3, 44.4. Accordingly, these

appeals are DISMISSED. Any pending motions are denied as moot.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Memorandum Opinion delivered and 

filed this the 12th day of June, 2008.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                          42,786
<SECURITIES>                                    31,276
<RECEIVABLES>                                   13,962
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     25,233
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               117,670
<PP&E>                                          11,878
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,212
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 127,099
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21,690
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            16
<OTHER-SE>                                     105,394
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   127,100
<SALES>                                         40,511
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                40,511
<CGS>                                           21,472
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   21,472
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 9,707
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (765)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,097
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,875
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,222
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,222
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.09


</TABLE>
**Exhibit 15.1**

August 4, 2009 

The Board of Directors and Shareholders 

MCG Capital Corporation 

We are aware of the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-137565) pertaining tothe Amended and Restated 2006 Employee Restricted Stock Plan of MCG Capital Corporation and the 2006 Non-Employee Director Restricted Stock Plan of MCG Capital Corporation of our report dated August 4, 2009 relating to the unauditedconsolidated interim financial statements and schedules of MCG Capital Corporation that are included in its Form 10-Q for the three- and six-month periods ended June 30, 2009 and 2008.
ex10a.htm
















Exhibit (10)(a)

















Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm












We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in Post-Effective Amendment No. 31 to the 1933 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-141754) and Amendment No. 306 to the 1940 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 811-08441), and to the use therein of our reports dated (a) March 31, 2016, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln Life & Annuity Company of New York and (b) April 12, 2016, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln Life & Annuity Variable Annuity Account H for the interests in a separate account under individual flexible payment deferred variable annuity contracts.








 


/s/ Ernst & Young LLP


 


Philadelphia, Pennsylvania


December 27, 2016
1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-24-00194-CV

__________________

IN RE 1097 WATER SPORTS, INC.

__________________________________________________________________

Original Proceeding

284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 23-05-07371-CV

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In a petition for a writ of mandamus, 1097 Water Sports, Inc. argues that the 

trial court abused its discretion by failing to state the reasons it granted the plaintiff’s 

motion for new trial after previously signing a final, take-nothing judgment based 

on 1097 Water Sports’ motion for summary judgment. 

The references to cases that 1097 Water Sports relies on in its petition are 

inapt. In those cases, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that extraordinary relief 

was necessary to protect the rights of the respective relators in those cases because 

in each case, the trial court set aside the jury’s verdict by granting a motion for new 
2

trial without an explanation despite Article 1, section 15 of the Constitution’s 

guarantee of the right to a trial by jury on all issues of fact.1

The judgment that the trial court set aside when awarding the new trial at issue 

here is based on a ruling granting a motion for summary judgment—a proceeding 

that, under our rules of procedure, is a motion presented to the court and not to a 

jury.2 For that reason, the trial court’s decision to set aside the judgment it rendered 

on the defendant’s motion doesn’t implicate the defendant’s right to a trial by jury.

Additionally, it’s clear that when the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment, it relied on the fact the plaintiff had failed to file a timely 

response. The trial court then chose to set aside its take-nothing judgment, after the 

plaintiff filed a motion for new trial asserting that his failure to file a timely response 

to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment resulted from either his 

inadvertence or mistake. Under the circumstances, the relator has not shown that an 

abuse of discretion occurred.

1See In re Davenport, 522 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tex. 2017)(original proceeding);

In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Tex. 2016) (original proceeding); In re 

Whataburger Rests. LP, 429 S.W.3d 597, 598 (Tex. 2014) (original proceeding);In 

re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 756-57 (Tex. 2013) (original 

proceeding); In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 687-88 (Tex. 2012) 

(original proceeding); In re Cook, 356 S.W.3d 493, 495 (Tex. 2011) (original 

proceeding); In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex.

2009) (original proceeding). 2Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
3

For all these reasons, the relator’s petition for relief is denied.3

PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on June 12, 2024

Opinion Delivered June 13, 2024

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

3See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4630-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2023-0001]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration for the Commonwealth of Kentucky (FEMA-4630-DR), dated December 12, 2021, and related determinations.

# DATES:

This change occurred on December 15, 2023.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dean Webster, Office of Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Administrator, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, E. Craig Levy, Sr., of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this disaster.

This action terminates the appointment of John E. Brogan as Federal Coordinating Officer for this disaster.

The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

Deanne Criswell,

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 2024-00234 Filed 1-8-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the quarterly report of GammaCan International Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, Limor Zur-Stoller, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| |     |                                                                                                                                                        
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) | The Report
  fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
  Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and                          
| |     |                                                                                                                                                        
| | (2) | The
  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
  respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

|                     |                                              
|-------------------- | ---------------------------------------------
|Date: May
  14, 2008 | By: /s/ Limor Zur-Stoller                    
|                     | Limor
  Zur-Stoller
  Chief Financial Officer

29

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Troy Reid, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Carey, J.), rendered December 18, 1989, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (four counts), robbery in the second degree (four counts), grand larceny in the fourth degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal *816possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts), and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence, certain statements he made to law enforcement officials, and identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that certain physical evidence was seized unlawfully. We disagree and find that the police officer’s stop of the vehicle in which the defendant was traveling was not improper *(see, People v De Bour,*40 NY2d 210, 215; *People v Basket,*159 AD2d 711; *see also, People v Chestnut,*51 NY2d 14, 21, *cert denied*449 US 1018; *cf., People v Yiu C. Choy,*173 AD2d 883). We further find that since the officer was in a lawful position to observe the handgun, three quarters of which was lying in plain view on the floor of the vehicle, the evidence was properly seized *(see, People v Price,*54 NY2d 557, 562). It was at that point that the defendant was placed under arrest. There was nothing improper in the officer’s action of shining his flashlight into the vehicle *(see, People v Price, supra,*at 563; *People v Pena,*158 AD2d 480).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the hearing court properly declined to suppress the in-court identification testimony of the complaining witnesses. Although a showup identification conducted by the police was impermissibly suggestive, it is well settled that even in a case in which " 'a suggestive identification procedure [was] employed by police, a witness will nonetheless be permitted to identify the defendant in court if that identification is based on an independent source’ ” *(People v Greer,*173 AD2d 557; *see, People v Johnson,*129 AD2d 739, 740; *People v Smalls,*112 AD2d 173). Where, as here, one of the complaining witnesses observed the defendant for 10 minutes and the other for 30 minutes while they were held captive by him and where, as here, both witnesses were able to provide accurate descriptions of the defendant to the police prior to viewing him after his arrest, they had an independent source for the in-court identifications *(see, People v Greer; supra, People v Burris,*171 AD2d 668).

Finally, there is no merit to the defendant’s claim that the statements he made to the police, after he requested to speak with them just 10 minutes after his arrest and after he signed a *Miranda*card, were anything but voluntarily and knowingly made *(see, e.g., People v Sirno,*76 NY2d 967). Kunzeman, J. P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-7421

CLAUDE SLOAN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GENE JOHNSON, Director of VA. Prisons,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior

District Judge. (7:06-cv-00385-jlk-mf)

Submitted: February 5, 2007 Decided: February 13, 2007

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Claude Sloan, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Claude Sloan seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order

is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Sloan has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED