IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. JACOB NELSON HOLLAR, Appellant. DIVISION ONE No. 71812-6-1 UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: April 20, 2015 fO f -3 C C^3 —fc cjn ^t> ** ?&> m " " "G r* J~"^4

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### Dwyer, J. —Jacob Hollarpleaded guilty to one count of theft in the third 

### degree and one count ofassault in the second degree. As part of his plea 

### agreement, Hollar agreed to payrestitution to the victim of hiscrimes, Michael Johnson. However, at the restitution hearing, Hollarobjected to Johnson's 

### valuation of the personal property that was stolen. On appeal, Hollar maintains that the trial court violated his due process rights when itordered him to pay 

### restitution forJohnson's stolen personal property. We disagree and, therefore, affirm. I 

### On June 20, 2013, just before midnight, Johnson was beaten and robbed 

### byHollar andtwo other menwhile walking on SecondAvenue in Seattle. Hollar struck Johnson in the back ofthe head with a skateboard. When Johnson fell to 

### the ground, Johnson was punched andkicked by the othertwo assailants. OneNo. 71812-6-1/2 ofthe assailants took Johnson's purse, and all three fled the scene on foot. Johnson was treated at Harborview Medical Center for injuries sustained in the attack, including a scalp laceration that required several staples to close. After Hollarwas apprehended, Johnson identified Hollar as the initial 

### assailant. Hollaradmitted to assaulting Johnson. Hollarstated that Johnson had 

### been flirting with him and he had decided to "take care of the problem." Hollar denied taking Johnson's purse. 

### Thereafter, Hollarwas charged by second amended information with one 

### count of theft in the third degree pursuantto RCW 9A.56.050 and one count of assault in the second degree pursuantto RCW9A.36.021. Hollar pleaded guilty to both counts. In doing so, he signed a plea agreement requiring him to pay restitution in full—in an amount to be determined—for all losses sustained by Johnson. 

### Arestitution hearing was held. The State presented medical bills for treatment ofJohnson's injuries caused by the attack, as well as a victim loss statement signed by Johnson under penalty ofperjury. In this statement, Johnson listed several items ofpersonal property taken during the attack, 

### including a cell phone ($100.00), an identification card ($16.00), a Coach purse ($250.00), and makeup ($20.00). 

### While Hollar's counsel did not object to restitution forJohnson's medical 

### expenses, she did object torestitution for the personalproperty included in Johnson's victim loss statement. 

### Thetrialjudgeoverruled thisobjection. The judge stated that she could -2-No. 71812-6-1/3 

### takejudicial notice ofwhat a Coach purse was worth, given that she owned such
a purse. Thejudge found, [Johnson's] not asking for an excessive amount here. Iknow that Coach purses are expensive. Makeup is—seems pretty reasonable. The ID card is probablyjust a replacement cost. And 

### then the cell phone, boy, cell phones can go from—anywhere from 50 to a couple hundred. Idon't see anything untoward here. 

### Hollar's counsel responded, "My concern is just that we don't know if 

### [Johnson] had a used Coach purse or something . . . boughtfrom a consignment store."

### The judge shared this concern. However, given the State's "fairly low" burden ofproof—preponderance of the evidence—thejudgeconcluded that the victim loss statementwas sufficient to support the State's request for restitution 

### regarding Johnson's missing personal items. The total amount of restitution was $1,396.39. Ofthat, $908.82 was for 

### Johnson's medicalbills paidfor by the Crime Victim's Compensation Program. The remainder, $487.57, was forJohnson's missing personal property and one medical bill that the Compensation Program did not cover. Hollar appeals. II Hollar contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering 

### restitution for Johnson'spersonal property in theamount of$386.00.1 Hollar 

### argues thattheState failed tomeet its burden ofproofas todamages, which 1Hollardid not challenge thetrial court's ruling as tothemedical bill thatwasnotcovered by the Compensation Program.No. 71812-6-1/4 resulted in a violation of his due process rights. We disagree. "Restitution shall be ordered whenever the offender is convicted of an offense which results in . . . damage to or loss of property." RCW 9.94A.753(5). Moreover, where the prosecution recommends itand the offender agrees, the offender must also pay restitution to a victim of an offense that is not prosecuted pursuant to a plea agreement. RCW 9.94A.753(5). The trial court has discretion to determine the amount of restitution. State v. Davison. 116 Wn.2d 917, 919, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991). Such a determination 

### will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion. Davison, 116 Wn.2d at 919. The court abuses its discretion when the restitution decision is "'manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'" State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679-80, 974 P.2d 828 (1999) (internal 

### quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Cunningham, 96 Wn.2d 31, 34, 633 P.2d 886 (1981)). 

### "Ifa defendant disputes the restitution amount, the State must prove the 

### damages by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Griffith, 164Wn.2d 960, 965, 195 P.3d 506 (2008). The amount of restitution must be based on "easily 

### ascertainable damages." RCW9.94A.753(3). While certainty ofdamages need not be proved with specific accuracy, the evidence must be sufficient to provide a reasonable basis for estimating loss. State v. Pollard, 66 Wn. App. 779, 785, 834 P.2d 51 (1992). Evidence that subjects the trier of fact to speculation or conjecture is insufficient. Pollard, 66 Wn. App. at 785. 

### The rules ofevidence do not apply at restitution hearings. State v. Kisor, -4-No. 71812-6-1/5 68 Wn. App. 610, 620, 844 P.2d 1038 (1993). Nevertheless, due process requires that the defendant have an opportunity to refute the evidence presented and that the evidence be reasonably reliable. Pollard, 66 Wn. App. at 785. "When the evidence is comprised of hearsay statements, the degree of corroboration required by due process is not proofofthe truth ofthe hearsay statements 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' but rather, proofwhich gives the defendant a sufficient basis for rebuttal." Kisor, 68 Wn. App. at 620. 

### Washington courts follow the prevailing rule that "the owner of a chattel 

### may testify as to its market value without being qualifiedas an expert in this regard." McCurdvv. Union Pac. R. Co., 68 Wn.2d 457, 468, 413 P.2d 617 (1966): accord State v. Hammond, 6 Wn. App. 459, 461, 493 P.2d 1249 (1972). Inthis matter, Johnson, the owner ofthe stolen chattel, submitted a sworn 

### declarationlisting each item ofproperty that was stolen and the corresponding value of each item. As the owner, Johnson was competent to testify to the 

### market value of the commonplace items ofpersonal property that had been stolen without being qualified as an expert witness. 

### However, Hollarcontends that Johnson's declaration did not constitute 

### sufficient evidence to satisfy the State's burden of proofas to damages, owing to the absence of "documentation supporting the value estimates." Appellant's Br. 

### at 4. In support of his contention, Hollar relies on Kisor. His reliance on that decision is misplaced. 

### In Kisor, the defendant was ordered to pay $17,380 in restitution to the 

### State after he killed a police dog. 68Wn. App. at 613-14. The restitution award -5-No. 71812-6-1/6

was based entirely on a hearsay affidavit submitted by a Clark County employee, whosejob title was "risk manager." Kisor, 68 Wn. App. 613-14. The court observed that the affidavit was not credible, owing to the affiant's failure, for the most part, to indicate where she had "obtained the figures as to the cost of purchasing the animal and training itand the dog's handler." Kisor, 68 Wn. App. at 620. The affiant's credibility was further undermined by her reliance on an advertisementfrom the "WestVirginia Canine College," which contained "nothing

. . . that supports the figures advanced by [the affiant]." Kisor, 68 Wn. App. at 620. The court concluded that the "affidavit is not substantial credible evidence 

### of the restitution figure set by the court." Kisor, 68 Wn. App. at 620 (emphasis added). 

### Contrary to Hollar's contention, Kisor does not require that a declaration submitted by an owner of stolen property be corroborated by "documentation supporting the value estimates" in order to constitute sufficient evidence as to 

### proofofdamages. Instead, Kisor stands for the unremarkableproposition that an award of restitution, when based entirely on an incredible valuation given by someone other than the rightful owner of the property at issue, cannot be sustained. 

### Here, Johnson was the owner of the missing chattel and, thus, qualified 

### and competentto testify as to the value of the chattel based on personal 

### knowledge. Moreover, unlike the affiantin Kisor, Johnson's credibility has not been undermined. The State needed only to adduce evidence sufficient to 

### provide a reasonable basisfor estimating loss. Johnson's declaration satisfied -6-No. 71812-6-1/7 this requirement.2 Affirmed.

We concur: 

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2Owing to ourconclusion, we neednot consider Hollar's contention thatthetrialjudge erred in taking judicial notice of the value of a Coach purse.