Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 10 / Tuesday, January 16, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 2503 

1Ensuring the Reliability and Resiliency of the 

988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline; Rules Concerning 

Disruptions to Communications; Implementation of 

the National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of 

2018, 88 FR 20790 (Apr. 7, 2023). 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 4 

[PS Docket Nos. 23–5, 15–80; WC Docket 

No. 18–336; FCC 23–57; FR ID 195997] 

Ensuring the Reliability and Resiliency 

of the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline; 

Rules Concerning Disruptions to 

Communications; Implementation of 

the National Suicide Hotline 

Improvement Act of 2018 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal 

Communications Commission 

(Commission) requires covered 988 

service providers (a new category of 

service provider) and cable, satellite, 

wireless, wireline, and interconnected 

voice over internet protocol (VoIP) 

providers (originating service providers) 

to report outages that potentially affect 

the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline in 

the Commission’s Network Outage 

Reporting System (NORS). The rules 

also require these entities to directly 

notify Substance Abuse and Mental 

Health Services Administration 

(SAMHSA), the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA), and the 988 Lifeline 

administrator about outages that 

potentially affect a 988 special facility, 

and exercise special diligence to 

maintain accurate, up-to-date contact 

information for 988 special facilities, 

just as the Commission’s rules require 

for 911 special facilities. The rules also 

allow SAMHSA and the VA to have 

direct read-only access to NORS 

consistent with the Commission’s 

existing NORS outage information 

sharing procedures. These rules are 

adopted with the goal of ensuring that 

the Commission and those parties that 

provide life-saving crisis intervention 

services to people calling the 988 

Lifeline receive timely and actionable 

information about 988 service outages 

that potentially affect those services’ 

ability to meet the immediate health 

needs of people in suicidal crisis and 

mental health distress. 

DATES: Effective February 15, 2024, 

except for the amendments to 47 CFR 

4.9 (amendatory instruction 4), which 

are delayed indefinitely. The 

Commission will publish a document in 

the Federal Register announcing the 

effective dates of these amendments. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shabbir Hamid, Cybersecurity and 

Communications Reliability Division, 

Public Safety and Homeland Security 

Bureau, (202) 418–2328, or by email to 

Shabbir.Hamid@fcc.gov. For additional 

information concerning the Paperwork 

Reduction Act information collection 

requirements contained in this 

document, contact Nicole Ongele, Office 

of Managing Director, Performance and 

Program Management, 202–418–2991, 

or by email to PRA@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s Report 

and Order, PS Docket No. 23–5; PS 

Docket No. 15–80; WC Docket No. 18– 

336; FCC 23–57, adopted July 20, 2023, 

and released July 21, 2023. The full text 

of this document is available by 

downloading the text from the 

Commission’s website at: https:// 

docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC23-57A1.pdf. When the FCC 

Headquarters reopens to the public, the 

full text of this document will also be 

available for public inspection and 

copying during regular business hours 

in the FCC Reference Center, 45 L Street 

NE, Washington, DC 20554. To request 

this document in accessible formats for 

people with disabilities (e.g., Braille, 

large print, electronica files, audio 

format, etc.) or to request reasonable 

accommodations (e.g., accessible format 

documents, sign language interpreters, 

CART, etc.), send an email to 

FCC504@fcc.gov or call the FCC’s 

Consumer and Government Affairs 

Bureau at (202) 418–0530 (voice), (202) 

418–0432 (TTY). 

Congressional Review Act 

The Commission has determined, and 

the Administrator of the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Office of Management and Budget, 

concurs, that this rule is non-major 

under the Congressional Review Act, 5 

U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will 

send a copy of the Order to Congress 

and the Government Accountability 

Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). 

I. Synopsis 

1. In the Report and Order, the 

Commission requires cable, satellite, 

wireless, wireline, interconnected VoIP 

providers (originating service 

providers), and a new category of 

‘‘covered 988 service providers’’ to 

report outages that potentially affect the 

988 Lifeline to the Commission’s 

Network Outage Reporting System 

(NORS), similar to the Commission’s 

existing rules that require the reporting 

of outages that potentially affect 911. 

The Report and Order defines ‘‘outages 

that potentially affect a 988 special 

facility’’ as events that result in the loss 

of the ability of the 988 Lifeline to 

receive, process, or forward calls, 

potentially affecting at least 900,000 

user-minutes and lasting at least 30 

minutes duration. 

2. The Report and Order also requires 

that these providers provide notice to 

the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 

Services Administration (SAMHSA), the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (the VA), 

and the 988 Lifeline administrator when 

an outage that potentially affects a 988 

special facility occurs. For outages 

lasting longer than 2 hours, the 

providers would follow-up with 

subsequent notifications of material 

information as soon as possible after 

discovery of the new material 

information, and continue providing 

additional material information until 

the outage is completely repaired and 

service is fully restored. These service 

providers would also be required to 

maintain up to date contact information 

for those individuals identified by 

SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline 

administrator to receive outage 

notifications. 

A. Reporting 988 Outages in NORS 

3. In the 988 Outage notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM),1 the 

Commission proposed to require entities 

that provide the 988 Lifeline with 

capabilities such as the ability to 

receive, process, or forward calls to 

report outages that potentially affect the 

988 special facilities to the 

Commission’s NORS. The Report and 

Order adopts this proposal, which is 

overwhelmingly supported by 

commenters. The Commission believes 

this outage reporting requirement will 

both improve the resiliency of the 988 

Lifeline system, and through the 

Commission’s NORS information 

sharing rules, ensure that SAMHSA, the 

VA, and the Lifeline administrator have 

timely outage information so they can 

provide the public with alternative ways 

to access the Lifeline. The Commission 

agrees with the Boulder Regional 

Emergency Telephone Service Authority 

that requiring the reporting of 988 

outages will enable the tracking of 

outage trends, the identification of best 

practices to help preemptively address 

the common causes of outages, and the 

ability to anticipate and plan for future 

outages. The Commission also agrees 

with Mental Health America that in 

helping promote timely access to the 

988 Lifeline, these requirements will 

promote equity for at-risk populations. 

4. The Commission observes that a 

person in suicidal crisis or emotional 

distress who cannot successfully reach 


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2504 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 10 / Tuesday, January 16, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

a crisis center due to an outage 

continues to be at risk, regardless of 

whether the outage occurs before or 

after a call reaches the 988 Lifeline. This 

includes outages that prevent calls from 

being routed to the intended local crisis 

center or the Veterans Crisis Line. The 

Commission agrees with commenters 

that it is appropriate to require covered 

988 service providers to report outages 

in NORS because the services they offer, 

which ensure that calls are routed to the 

correct destination after they reach the 

988 Lifeline, are essential to the 

Lifeline’s availability. Vibrant, the 988 

Lifeline administrator, has indicated 

that it can use outage information to 

quickly update routing tables used by 

covered 988 service providers in order 

to avoid routing calls to crisis centers 

that are experiencing an outage. Because 

this outage information would be used 

to increase the availability and 

resiliency of 988 services, the 

Commission therefore disagrees with 

CX360 that it is not necessary for the 

Commission to adopt rules to provide 

the Commission and the parties 

responsible for operation of the 988 

Lifeline with timely and actionable 

information about outages that occur 

after those communications reach the 

Lifeline. While CX360 argues that 

‘‘SAMHSA and the 988 Lifeline 

Administrator already are capable of 

operating the 988 Lifeline effectively’’ 

without such reporting, the Commission 

notes that SAMHSA and Vibrant both 

support the reporting requirement. The 

Commission also rejects CX360’s 

argument that reporting requirements 

are not necessary because SAMHSA and 

the VA already have visibility into 

outages that occur after calls reach the 

988 Lifeline. Because CX360 offers no 

supporting details as to what 

information SAMHSA and the VA are 

receiving and whether its substance and 

timing is comparable to the 

requirements adopted in the Report and 

Order, the Commission is not persuaded 

that this visibility, if it exists, undercuts 

the justification for the rules adopted in 

the Report and Order. 

5. The Report and Order defines 

‘‘covered 988 service providers’’ as 

those providers that provide the 988 

Lifeline with capabilities such as the 

ability to receive, process, or forward 

calls. See Ensuring the Reliability and 

Resiliency of the 988 Suicide &Crisis 

Lifeline; Amendments to Part 4 of the 

Commission’s Rules Concerning 

Disruptions to Communications; 

Implementation of the National Suicide 

Hotline Improvement Act of 2018, PS 

Docket Nos. 23–5 and 15–80, WC 

Docket No. 18–336, at 9, paragraph 15, 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM), FCC 23–7 (Jan. 27, 2023), 88 

FR 20790 (Apr. 7, 2023) (988 Outage 

NPRM) (proposing to define ‘‘covered 

988 service providers’’ as those 

providers that provide the 988 Lifeline 

with capabilities such as the ability to 

receive, process, or forward calls). The 

Commission responds to commenters 

that question the scope of the new rules 

by clarifying that, consistent with 

longstanding practice in the 911 

context, the new paragraph (f) of § 4.5 

does require outage reporting from those 

entities that provide a communications 

network or service that facilitates the 

receipt, processing, or forwarding of the 

call, including from the 988 Lifeline to 

the local 988 crisis center. See New Part 

4 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning 

Disruptions to Communications, Report 

and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 16830, 16873– 

76, paragraphs 76 through 81 (2004), 69 

FR 70316 (Dec. 3, 2004). The 

Commission finds that the scope of this 

definition is appropriately limited in 

that it covers only those providers that 

are essential to the capabilities of the 

988 Lifeline. The Commission agrees 

with SAMHSA that ‘‘covered 988 

service providers’’ should not include 

988 crisis centers themselves nor the 

Veterans Crisis Line. Crisis centers do 

not receive, process, or forward calls 

and lack the expertise and access to 

information that would be necessary to 

make such reports. In addition, a 

requirement for crisis centers to make 

such reports would place significant 

additional burdens on them during 

outages, which would run contrary to 

the goals of this proceeding. The 

Commission also finds that covered 988 

service providers should not include 

originating service providers that 

originate 988 calls and deliver calls to 

the 988 Lifeline but otherwise do not 

provide services for the Lifeline. 

Commenters point out that originating 

service providers do not generally 

provide the 988 Lifeline with 

capabilities such as receiving, 

processing, or forwarding calls, while 

the service providers that do offer these 

capabilities will likely do so through 

direct contractual arrangements. The 

Commission agrees with USTelecom 

that ‘‘defining ‘covered service provider’ 

in this way is consistent with the 

Commission’s definition in the 911 

context, and keeping definitions of key 

terms consistent across these public 

safety contexts will prevent confusion 

and facilitate regulatory certainty.’’ 

Finally, the Commission agrees with 

Voice on the Net Coalition that covered 

988 service providers should not 

include providers of capabilities that are 

provided directly to local crisis centers, 

as those are not services that are 

provided directly to the 988 Lifeline. 

6. Although the Commission is 

excluding them from the definition of 

covered 988 service providers, the 

Commission also finds that originating 

service providers are critical in 

providing 988 service and thus require 

cable, satellite, wireless, wireline, and 

interconnected VoIP providers to report 

in NORS outages that potentially affect 

the 988 special facilities. The 

Commission agrees with Mental Health 

America that these originating service 

providers, like covered 988 service 

providers, ‘‘have a role to play in 

ensuring that people get their responses 

when they need crisis counseling,’’ and 

agree with Vibrant that ‘‘having the 

same requirements for covered service 

providers and OSPs [originating service 

providers] ensures the delivery of 

timely, actionable information while 

also reducing the burden of reporting by 

streamlining requirements.’’ The 

Commission also agrees with the 

Washington State Department of Health 

and Health Care Authority that 

reporting requirements ‘‘should not be 

different for originating service 

providers that deliver calls to the 988 

Lifeline in the first instance versus the 

covered 988 service provider that 

handles the call thereafter.’’ As the 

Commission states in the Report and 

Order, a person in suicidal crisis or 

emotional distress who cannot 

successfully reach a crisis center due to 

an outage continues to be at risk, 

regardless of whether the outage occurs 

before or after the call reaches the 988 

Lifeline. For that reason, the reporting of 

outages that occur in originating service 

providers’ networks are essential to 

improving the resiliency of the 988 

Lifeline and ensure that SAMHSA, the 

VA, and the Lifeline administrator have 

timely outage information so they can 

provide the public with alternative ways 

to access the Lifeline. The Commission 

also finds find, consistent with the 

views of the National Alliance on 

Mental Illness, that ‘‘having more 

sources of data regarding outages will 

enhance the ability of the FCC and the 

988 administrator to identify what is 

needed to create a more reliable 

network.’’ 

7. The Commission disagrees with 

those commenters that argue that it is 

premature for the Commission to 

consider the adoption of 988 outage 

reporting requirements. The record 

reflects the serious impact of the 

December 2022 covered 988 service 

provider outage, and nothing in that 

record indicates that such an outage 

could not happen again, or that 


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originating service provider outages do 

not affect the delivery of 988 calls. The 

Commission also disagrees with 

Southern Linc, which argues that 

originating service providers should not 

be required to report 988 outages 

because they do not have visibility into 

the delivery of 988 communications 

after those communications leave their 

networks. Originating service providers 

nonetheless have visibility into whether 

988 calls are disrupted due to outages in 

their own network or the networks of 

third parties with which they contract 

for service before being delivered to 

Lifeline. See Amendments to Part 4 of 

the Commission’s Rules Concerning 

Disruptions to Communications, 

Improving 911 Reliability, New Part 4 of 

the Commission’s Rules Concerning 

Disruptions to Communications, PS 

Docket Nos. 15–80, 13–75, 04–35, 

Second Report and Order, FCC 22–88 at 

7, paragraph 20 (Nov. 18, 2022), 88 FR 

9756 (March 17, 2023) (explaining that 

reliance upon a third-party service 

provider to manage, route, or otherwise 

contribute to 911 call processing does 

not relieve a service provider of its 

obligations—even if the discovery is 

first made by the third party). The 

Commission therefore believes that 

originating service providers should be 

required to report those outages for the 

reasons explained above. 

8. The record informs the Commission 

that originating service providers 

currently lack the capability to 

distinguish outages that prevent the 

completion of a 988 call from outages on 

their network that prevent the 

completion of other calls. For the 

purposes of the rules the Report and 

Order adopts, this is immaterial because 

outages that prevent the completion of 

all calls are necessarily outages that 

potentially affect 988 special facilities. 

The Commission finds that reports 

about service-wide outages, like reports 

that are specific to 988 Lifeline outages, 

provide insight into 988’s reliability and 

can provide information to SAMHSA, 

the VA, and the Lifeline administrator 

that would allow them to effectively 

respond to outages (e.g., notify the 

public of alternate ways to contact the 

988 Lifeline). The Commission also 

believes that this approach 

acknowledges the current capabilities of 

existing networks, gives service 

providers flexibility as to how they can 

satisfy the requirements, and potentially 

reduces compliance costs by leveraging 

providers’ existing technical capabilities 

and systems. The Commission notes 

that originating service providers are 

already required to report voice service 

outages in NORS, regardless of a call’s 

destination. As a consequence, The 

Commission finds that providers 

complying with this existing outage 

reporting requirement will only need to 

take nominal action to report voice 

telephony outages that potentially affect 

the 988 Lifeline to the Commission. As 

recommended by the Alliance for 

Telecommunications Industry Solutions 

(ATIS) and NCTA—The Internet & 

Television Association (NCTA), the 

Commission will add a checkbox to 

NORS so that reporting providers can 

clearly indicate whether a reported 

outage potentially affects a 988 special 

facility. The Commission believes this 

field will improve the ability of the 

Commission and the agencies with 

which it shares NORS data to quickly 

recognize and more effectively analyze 

the effects of reported outages. 

9. The Report and Order defines 

‘‘outages that potentially affect a 988 

special facility’’ as events that result in 

the loss of the ability of the 988 Lifeline 

to receive, process, or forward calls, 

potentially affecting at least 900,000 

user-minutes and lasting at least 30 

minutes duration. The Report and Order 

notes that ‘‘loss of the ability of the 988 

Lifeline to receive . . . calls’’ includes 

outages in originating service providers’ 

networks that prevent successful 

transmission of calls to the Lifeline. The 

majority of commenters support using 

the same outage reporting thresholds for 

988 as those previously adopted for 911 

outages. The Commission agrees with 

USTelecom that ‘‘[s]tandardizing the 

threshold across [988 and 911] will 

facilitate efficient, timely compliance, 

and is consistent with the Notice’s 

objective of imposing ‘only minor 

changes to existing procedures’ by 

‘closely align[ing]’ them with rules for 

911-related outages.’’ The Commission 

acknowledges the concerns of the 

Veterans Crisis Line, which argues that 

outages shorter than 30 minutes in 

duration should be reported because, 

statistically, as many as three deaths by 

suicide may occur within 30 minutes. 

However, the Commission believes that 

the benefits of awareness and 

opportunities for action that arise from 

the reporting of outages must be 

balanced against the burden of reporting 

those outages. Based on the record 

before us, the Commission is unable to 

determine whether reducing the 

minimum or user-minute durations of 

reportable outages would improve upon 

that balance. At this time, it is unclear 

to what extent reduced thresholds 

would increase the number of 988 

outage reports received, the extent to 

which additional reporting would 

contribute to public safety and the 

reliability of the 988 Lifeline, and 

whether those benefits would outweigh 

the burdens associated with increased 

reporting. For these reasons, the 

Commission believes it is sensible to 

adopt 988 outage reporting requirements 

that are consistent with existing 911 

outage reporting requirements and 

providers’ existing reporting 

procedures. As noted by Association of 

Public-Safety Communications Officials 

International, Inc. (APCO), the 

Commission has recently directed the 

Public Safety and Homeland Security 

Bureau (Bureau) to gather information 

on the volume of 911 outages that may 

go unreported under the Commission’s 

existing outage notification thresholds 

and have sought additional comment on 

possible alternative outage reporting 

thresholds. The Commission directs the 

Bureau to add 988 Lifeline outages to its 

examination. 

10. The Report and Order clarifies, as 

requested by SAMHSA, that outages 

that potentially affect the 988 Lifeline 

include partial service disruptions, as 

well as outages with a duration of more 

than 30 minutes. The Commission notes 

that § 4.5(a) of its rules defines an 

outage as ‘‘a significant degradation in 

the ability of an end user to establish 

and maintain a channel of 

communications as a result of failure or 

degradation in the performance of a 

communications provider’s network.’’ 

For example, any circumstances in 

which the ability of the 988 Lifeline to 

receive, process, or forward calls is 

significantly degraded for at least 30 

minutes and potentially affects at least 

900,000 user-minutes must be reported 

in NORS. This includes circumstances 

in which the degradation lasts longer 

than 30 minutes and circumstances in 

which 988 calls are received by a calltaker despite the degradation. The 

Commission disagrees with 

USTelecom’s view that partial outages 

and service disruptions should not be 

subject to 988 outage reporting and 

notification requirements, which it 

argues would complicate the outage 

reporting process and result in overnotification. Because the Commission’s 

existing outage reporting and 

notification rules already define 

‘‘outages’’ to include partial service 

disruptions, exempting partial service 

disruptions from 988 reporting and 

notification requirements would make 

our rules more complicated, not less 

complicated. The Commission also 

finds little evidence in the record 

supporting the conclusion that the 

reporting of partial outages would result 

in too many notifications, particularly 

since SAMHSA and Vibrant, which are 


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2506 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 10 / Tuesday, January 16, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

two of the three of the entities who 

would receive notifications under the 

rules adopted in the Report and Order, 

are specifically requesting notifications 

about partial outages. 

11. The Report and Order requires 988 

outage reports be filed with the 

Commission in NORS, consistent with 

the Commission’s current requirements 

for outage report filing processes and 

timing. No commenter objected to the 

use of NORS for this purpose. The 

Commission agrees with ATIS that 

‘‘industry is already familiar with NORS 

and believes that the use of NORS will 

reduce implementation costs associated 

with 988 outage reporting and would be 

significantly less costly and burdensome 

than the implementation of a new or 

different reporting system.’’ The 

Commission further agree with 

USTelecom that reporting in NORS 

‘‘will streamline the reporting process 

and allow providers to devote maximum 

attention to addressing the outage itself 

and getting service back up and 

running, rather than diverting time and 

resources to more complex or 

cumbersome reporting requirements.’’ 

12. The Commission declines to allow 

alternatives to NORS reporting, such as 

reporting by email, as requested by 

CX360. The Commission does not agree 

that alternatives would reduce 

administrative burdens on providers. 

NORS is a well-established system that 

facilitates the filing of outage reports in 

a streamlined and uniform manner with 

all information required by our rules. 

NORS supports the filing of outage data 

through Application Program Interfaces 

(API), which can facilitate the 

automated filing of outage reports. 

Submission of outage reports via email 

would create opportunities for 

inconsistently styled filings with 

incomplete or confusing information, 

which would lead to Commission staff 

taking up providers’ time with 

numerous calls and questions about 

their filings. The submission of reports 

by email would also greatly diminish 

the Commission’s ability to record 

historic outage data, analyze outage 

trends, and share outage information 

with Federal, State, Tribal, and 

territorial agencies. For these reasons, 

both efficiency and effectiveness weigh 

in favor of requiring all outage reports 

to be filed in NORS. 

13. The Report and Order allows 

direct read-only access to NORS data by 

SAMHSA and the VA, consistent with 

our existing NORS outage information 

sharing procedures. In the 988 Outage 

NPRM, the Commission stated its belief 

that improving situational awareness of 

significant network outage issues 

affecting 988 Lifeline services would not 

only provide the Commission with 

critical insight into the availability and 

reliability of a vital public health 

service, but would also provide that 

insight to the other Federal, State, 

Tribal, and territorial agencies with 

whom NORS data is shared. The 

Commission agrees with SAMHSA that 

having access to outage reports and 

related analysis on network reliability 

will better enable these stakeholders to 

prepare and respond to network 

disruptions and better ensure the 988 

Lifeline’s availability. The Commission 

also agrees with the Washington State 

Department of Health and Health Care 

Authority that these 988 stakeholders 

would benefit from having access to 

outage reports that indicate whether 988 

calls affected by an outage are being 

rerouted to other crisis centers. The 

Commission further agrees with the 

Boulder Regional Emergency Telephone 

Service Authority (BRETSA) that 

improving the availability of 

information about 988 network 

reliability would empower 988 

stakeholders to take additional steps to 

make the 988 Lifeline even more 

reliable. For these reasons, the Report 

and Order clarifies that the Commission 

considers the lifesaving services offered 

by the 988 Lifeline to be emergency 

management and first responder support 

functions. The Report and Order notes 

that the national suicide prevention 

mental health crisis hotline system 

operates through the National Suicide 

Prevention Lifeline maintained by the 

Assistant Secretary for Mental Health 

and Substance Use, section 520E–3 of 

the Public Health Service Act, National 

Suicide Prevention Lifeline Program, 42 

U.S.C. 290bb–36c, and through the 

Veterans Crisis Line maintained by the 

Secretary of Veterans Affairs under the 

Comprehensive Program for Suicide 

Prevention Among Veterans and 

Members of the Reserve Components of 

the Armed Forces, 38 U.S.C. 1720F(h). 

See also National Suicide Hotline 

Designation Act of 2020 (Congress 

deemed ‘‘life-saving resources’’ such as 

crisis lines ‘‘essential’’ and recognized 

the need for a 3-digit phone number for 

such services to be readily available in 

emergency situations.). See NORS/ 

Disaster Information Reporting System 

(DIRS) Information Sharing Report and 

Order (R&O), 36 FCC Rcd 6136 at 6146– 

47, paragraphs 32 through 39 (2021), 86 

FR 22796 (April 29, 2021) (describing 

the ‘‘need to know’’ requirement for 

eligibility). Accordingly, in order for 

SAMHSA and the VA to mitigate the 

impacts service outages may have on 

access to the 988 Lifeline and VA Crisis 

Line, and ensure these services remain 

available to support the safety of the 

general public seeking crisis support 

and to prevent suicide among veterans, 

the Commission finds that both 

SAMHSA and the VA have a ‘‘need to 

know’’ and are eligible to apply for 

direct access to the Commission’s 

outage reports. While the 988 Lifeline 

administrator is not itself eligible for 

direct access to these reports because it 

is not a government agency, the 

Commission observes that the 

Commission’s outage information 

sharing rules would allow SAMHSA 

and the VA to share information with 

them about specific outages, subject to 

certain confidentiality requirements and 

other safeguards. 

B. Providing 988 Special Facilities With 

Notice of Outages 

14. The Report and Order requires 

covered 988 service providers to 

directly notify 988 special facilities 

about outages that potentially affect 

those facilities. Commenters generally 

support the adoption of such a 

requirement. The Commission agrees 

with USTelecom that this requirement 

‘‘strike[s] the right balance of getting 

relevant, actionable information to the 

proposed 988 special facilities’’ that will 

allow them to take steps to maintain the 

public’s access to crisis intervention 

services ‘‘without overloading them.’’ 

The Commission agrees with BRETSA 

that 988 outage notifications can help 

provide information that will allow 988 

special facilities to route calls to 

alternative crisis centers and to help 

those centers make necessary staffing 

adjustments. As Vibrant highlights, it 

can use information about outages in its 

capacity as the 988 Lifeline 

administrator to quickly update routing 

tables to avoid routing calls to crisis 

centers that are experiencing an outage. 

Notifications would also allow 988 

callers to receive assistance faster, as 

they would help ensure that those 

individuals timely connect to a crisis 

counselor by reducing the amount of 

time they would have to wait for 

assistance as a result of having calls fail 

to be received by a crisis center. The 988 

Lifeline administrator is also able to 

‘‘effectively and quickly inform all 

centers in the network of an outage that 

may impact service and lead to an 

increase in volume for centers in the 

areas that are not impacted by the 

outage. This insight allows time for 

those unaffected centers to quickly scale 

to the needed capacity in order to 

handle the anticipated increased 

volume that needs to be re-routed.’’ The 

Commission also continues to believe 

that timely notice of a 988 Lifeline 

outage will assist SAMHSA, the VA, 


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and the 988 Lifeline administrator to 

quickly inform the public of alternative 

ways of contacting the Lifeline while 

one type of communication is 

unavailable, such as texting or using the 

online chat function if calls are not 

getting through. The Commission 

disagrees with CX360, who implies that 

988 outage notifications should be 

handled through contracts between the 

988 Lifeline administrator and its 

service providers rather than by rule. 

The Commission finds that it is more 

efficient and better serves the public 

interest to establish a single, uniform 

rule for 988 outage notifications that 

will apply to all service providers with 

which the Lifeline administrator may 

contract in the future rather than make 

the occurrence, frequency, and content 

of those notifications a repeated subject 

of negotiation. The Commission further 

believes that it will not serve the public 

interest to make 988 outage notifications 

dependent on the 988 Lifeline 

administrator’s renegotiation of 

contracts that are in place today, which 

would have an uncertain result and 

likely require considerable time to 

complete. The notification requirements 

adopted in the Report and Order are 

similar to the notification requirements 

the Commission has adopted for 

covered 911 service providers, which 

the Commission has found to be 

effective. 

15. The Commission finds that 

reliance upon a third-party service 

provider to manage, route, or otherwise 

contribute to 988 call processing does 

not relieve providers of the obligation to 

provide outage notification to 988 

special facilities. The Commission 

agrees with National Emergency 

Number Association (NENA) that ‘‘the 

fact that a third party service may 

specialize in supporting outage 

notifications, and may have a business 

relationship with a provider, should not 

change any reporting requirements for 

the provider.’’ The Commission 

disagrees with CX360’s view that 

covered 988 service providers should 

only be responsible for reporting 

outages on facilities over which they 

have direct control. In this regard, ‘‘[t]he 

Commission has long held that licensees 

and other regulatees are responsible for 

the acts and omissions of their 

employees and independent 

contractors,’’ and has recognized that 

‘‘under long established principles of 

common law, statutory duties are 

nondelegable.’’ The Commission notes 

that this approach mirrors the 

requirements it has adopted for outages 

that potentially affect 911 special 

facilities, which should promote 

consistency in how notifications are 

made by service providers. 

16. The Report and Order designates 

SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline 

administrator as the 988 special 

facilities that must receive notifications 

of 988 outages. Commenters agree that 

it is appropriate for these three entities 

to receive outage notifications. The 

Commission agrees with USTelecom 

that this requirement will ‘‘assist these 

entities, which oversee and administer 

the 988 Lifeline, in quickly informing 

the public of alternative ways to contact 

the 988 Lifeline as needed.’’ The 

Commission also notes, as highlighted 

by SAMHSA, that such an approach to 

outage notification will allow the 988 

Lifeline administrator to identify and 

inform the appropriate crisis centers 

about outages, as it will have the most 

updated routing tables and patterns on 

any given day. 

17. At this time, the Commission 

finds that 988 special facilities that are 

required to receive 988 outage 

notifications should not include the 

local crisis centers to which some 988 

calls are routed. The record establishes 

that the 988 Lifeline’s current approach 

of routing calls based on the area code 

associated with the user’s device makes 

effective notification of this type 

extremely challenging. As commenters 

explain, many users’ mobile devices 

have an area code that is different from 

the area code in which they are located, 

which would mean that outages limited 

to a specific geographic region could 

nonetheless potentially affect every 

single local crisis center across the 

country. The Commission agrees with 

those commenters that argue that 

notifications provided to local crisis 

centers under these circumstances are 

likely to be overbroad, too frequent, or 

not provide information that the local 

crisis center would be capable of acting 

on. 

18. Based on the record before us, the 

Commission finds that regardless of the 

scope of an outage, SAMHSA, the VA, 

and the 988 Lifeline administrator are in 

the best position to identify what 

information about a specific outage may 

be relevant to local crisis centers 

(including changes in local crisis center 

routing) and use existing points of 

contact to convey that information. As 

Vibrant explains, crisis centers will be 

notified about outages by the 988 

Lifeline administrator irrespective of 

contact by a covered 988 service 

provider or originating service provider. 

While several commenters support 

notification of local crisis centers in 

some or all situations, the record does 

not offer a convincing explanation of 

how local crisis centers would be able 

to effectively act upon 988 outage 

notifications to ensure that 988 callers 

receive assistance. The record also does 

not provide clarity on how any benefits 

arising from those challenges should be 

weighed against the challenges to 

providers arising from the need to 

maintain updated contact information 

for those centers. While BRETSA argues 

that outage notifications could assist 

local crisis centers in making decisions 

about appropriate staffing levels, the 

Commission believes that direct 

notification by service providers would 

not supply sufficient information for 

this purpose because, in addition to the 

geographic routing challenges discussed 

above, the notifications would not offer 

any visibility into any related routing 

changes made by the 988 Lifeline 

administrator that would ultimately 

affect call volume to those centers. 

BRETSA also argues that notifications 

can assist local crisis centers with 

making long-term network reliability 

decisions, but the Commission observes 

that outage notifications are intended to 

support imminent action during outages 

rather than long-term decision-making. 

19. The Commission also requires 

originating service providers, that is, 

cable, satellite, wireless, wireline, and 

interconnected VoIP providers, to notify 

988 special facilities about outages that 

potentially affect those facilities. As 

discussed above, a person in suicidal 

crisis or emotional distress that cannot 

successfully reach a crisis center due to 

an outage continues to be at risk, 

regardless of whether the outage occurs 

before or after the call reaches the 988 

Lifeline. For that reason, outage 

notifications are essential to ensuring 

that SAMHSA, the VA, and the Lifeline 

administrator have timely outage 

information so they effectively respond 

to outages. The Commission therefore 

agrees with those commenters that argue 

that originating service providers should 

be required to provide notifications of 

988 outages. 

20. The Commission disagrees with 

Southern Linc’s opinion that the area 

code-based routing of 988 makes it 

‘‘highly doubtful that OSPs would be 

able to provide any actionable outage 

information to 988 special facilities.’’ As 

discussed above, the 988 Lifeline 

administrator can use outage 

notifications to update routing tables to 

avoid routing calls to crisis centers that 

are themselves experiencing outages, as 

well as inform crisis centers about 

increases or decreases of incoming calls 

so they can appropriately scale capacity. 

If needed, SAMHSA, the VA, and the 

988 Lifeline administrator could also 

use information about an outage to 

inform the public of alternative ways of 


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contacting the Lifeline while a means of 

communication is unavailable. These 

actions are available regardless of 

whether an outage occurs within the 

network of a covered 988 service 

provider or an originating service 

provider. The Commission also 

disagrees with T-Mobile’s argument that 

988 special facilities should not receive 

notifications, but should instead obtain 

outage information from NORS data. 

NORS data is generally received two 

hours after the discovery of an outage 

and would have to be actively checked 

throughout the day by 988 special 

facilities to stay aware of outages. The 

Commission finds that this approach is 

far less likely to be effective at providing 

timely information than the direct 

notifications adopted in the Report and 

Order, which must be delivered within 

30 minutes and are provided directly to 

the affected special facilities. This 

approach is also consistent with the 

existing requirement that originating 

service providers must notify 911 

special facilities, which will help 

minimize costs, promote efficiency, and 

avoid confusion among providers. 

21. The Commission acknowledges 

concerns that a 988 outage notification 

requirement for originating service 

providers could result in SAMHSA, the 

VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator 

receiving ‘‘tens of thousands’’ of outage 

notifications annually, which could be 

overwhelming and could undermine 

effective outage response. As Verizon 

notes, hundreds of outages occur on 

originating service providers’ networks 

every day, and notifications for those 

outages are split across thousands of 

public safety answering points (PSAPs) 

across the country. If every one of those 

outage notifications were sent to 

SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline 

administrator by phone and email daily, 

then they presumably would need 

significant, dedicated resources to 

receive and act on those notifications. 

However, the record supports the 

conclusion that 988 special facilities 

have such resources in place and will be 

able to handle the volume of 

notifications. SAMHSA and Vibrant 

state that despite the high volume, 

Vibrant has access to continuous 

monitoring tools and can develop the 

necessary capabilities to be able to 

ingest these notifications. The 

Commission urges service providers to 

collaborate with 988 special facilities to 

ensure that 988 notifications are 

provided in a format that best facilitates 

rapid analysis and action. 

22. The Commission declines to 

require covered 988 service providers to 

notify originating service providers 

about 988 Lifeline outages and decline 

to require originating service providers 

to notify covered 988 service providers 

about 988 Lifeline outages. As some 

commenters note, covered 988 service 

providers often compete with 

originating service providers or provide 

services to their competitors. As a 

consequence, a notification requirement 

would mandate the sharing of 

competitively sensitive information. 

The Commission shares this concern, as 

well as the concern that the risk of 

sharing sensitive information directly 

with competitors and other individuals 

unnecessarily may slow down 

providers’ notification processes or lead 

to the removal of information from 

outage reports that might otherwise be 

beneficial to a 988 special facility. The 

Commission notes that the Washington 

State Department of Health and Health 

Care Authority supports a requirement 

that originating service providers 

provide notice to covered 988 service 

providers of 988 outages as ‘‘these 

notices would provide for increased 

coordination between the carriers for 

remedying the outage and coordinating 

workarounds.’’ CX360 argues that 

originating service providers should be 

required to notify covered 988 service 

providers about outages because the 

latter ‘‘lack[s] independent insight into 

the operations on OSPs’ networks’’ and 

notifications will allow it to ‘‘better 

understand what is happening upstream 

so it can react quickly and ensure its 

service is working correctly,’’ and 

‘‘troubleshoot any issues without 

needing to contact a provider earlier in 

the call path, leading to a more efficient 

resolution of any problems.’’ The 

Commission disagrees, as the 

Commission finds it unlikely that these 

actions will help ensure the availability 

of the 988 Lifeline. If an outage occurs 

in an originating service provider’s 

network, the Commission does not see 

how it would be beneficial for a covered 

988 service provider to begin 

‘‘troubleshooting issues’’ within its own 

separate, downstream network, nor is it 

clear how those actions would help 

resolve the originating provider’s outage 

or otherwise help 988 callers 

successfully reach the Lifeline. In any 

event, the Commission believes the 

potential negative impacts on the 

effectiveness of outage notifications 

outweigh these possible benefits. 

23. The Commission also declines to 

require that PSAPs be notified about 988 

outages. While some commenters argue 

that 988 outage notifications would 

prepare PSAPs for potential call volume 

increases and give them the necessary 

situational awareness to handle those 

calls in an appropriate manner, our 

rules already require PSAPs to be 

notified about outages that potentially 

affect 911 special facilities, including 

general network outages. In addition, 

these notifications will not provide 

PSAPs with situational awareness about 

any routing decisions made by the 988 

Lifeline administrator to address the 

outage. To the extent that an outage 

might occur in the network of a covered 

988 service provider, it is unclear that 

the benefit of preparing PSAPs for 

potential call volume increases related 

to an outage would outweigh the burden 

of requiring the provider to maintain 

contact information and then notify 

thousands of PSAPs nationwide. 

Moreover, because call routing for 988 

is currently based on area code of the 

caller, rather than geographic location, 

the ability to identify the appropriate 

PSAP for such notice may not be 

logistically feasible in all instances. The 

Commission also declines to adopt the 

approach supported by APCO, which 

would only require 988 outage 

notifications be made to those PSAPs 

that opt-in to receiving them. The 

Commission believes it would be too 

administratively burdensome for each 

service provider to continuously track 

and update the list of PSAPs across the 

country that have opted-in to receiving 

988 outage notifications, particularly in 

light of the limited benefits. 

24. The Report and Order requires 

covered 988 service providers and 

originating service providers to notify 

988 special facilities with the same 

content, by the same means, with the 

same timing, and with the same 

frequency as our rules require for 911 

outage notifications. Most commenters 

agree that harmonizing these 

requirements will have the effect of 

minimizing the cost and other impacts 

of the new notification requirements on 

service providers by allowing them to 

make notifications by efficiently using 

existing systems and processes. The 

Commission further notes that here, as 

in the 911 context, parties may mutually 

agree to alternate means of notification. 

25. The Commission declines to 

require certain modifications to these 

requirements proposed by commenters. 

The Commission rejects CX360’s 

proposal that it adopt a ‘‘safe harbor’’ or 

otherwise modify the content of outage 

notifications to allow providers to 

merely notify 988 facilities within 30 

minutes that ‘‘an issue has been 

identified and is being actively 

investigated, with additional 

information to be provided later.’’ This 

approach would greatly reduce the 

amount of actionable information 

available to 988 special facilities and 

therefore would not serve as an effective 


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notification. The Commission also 

declines to require notifications to 

include contact information for those 

callers that failed to connect to the 988 

Lifeline since the outage began. The 

Commission agrees with commenters 

that it is important for those individuals 

to receive the support they need, but 

believe more study is needed to 

determine whether it is technically 

feasible to require service providers to 

obtain and share that information as 

part of the outage notification process, 

as well as to understand any costs that 

might be attendant in obtaining and 

sharing such information. The 

Commission acknowledges, as CTIA— 

The Wireless Association (CTIA) asserts, 

that wireless network equipment 

affected by an outage often will not be 

able to identify devices that cannot 

connect to the network, which could 

make compliance with such a 

requirement challenging. While several 

commenters also argue that the phone 

numbers of individuals who try, but fail 

to reach 988 is not currently available to 

providers, the Commission suspects that 

it may be technically feasible for 

providers to develop these capabilities, 

so it plans to continue to explore the 

matter. 

26. The Commission disagrees with 

those commenters that argue that a 30- 

minute timeframe to provide 988 outage 

notifications is too fast, as well as those 

that argue that it is too slow. The 

Commission finds, as it previously 

found for 911 outage notifications, that 

a 30-minute timeframe strikes a balance 

between the need for timely and 

actionable 988 outage information and 

the accuracy of that information. The 

Commission believes the comments of 

the Veterans Crisis Line, which 

highlights that statistically as many as 

three deaths by suicide occur within 

thirty minutes, and the comments of the 

Competitive Carriers Association (CCA), 

which argues that 30-minute 

notifications may result in rushed 

analysis and inaccurate reporting, 

illustrate why a balance must be struck 

between speed and accuracy. The 

Commission agrees with those 

commenters who argue that 30 minutes 

is the best way to strike that balance. 

27. The Commission disagrees with 

CCA that a 30-minute notification 

timeframe would be unreasonable and 

unrealistic, particularly for originating 

service providers utilizing vendors for 

988 solutions. Thirty minutes has 

already proven to be a realistic 

timeframe for covered 911 service 

providers to gather clear and useful 

information about network outages to 

include in a notification, even though 

such providers also frequently contract 

for services from vendors. The 

Commission also finds that originating 

service providers serving fewer 

customers will have to experience 

longer outages to reach the threshold 

required for notification, which 

effectively provides more time for those 

providers to investigate the outage. The 

Commission therefore sees no reason 

why it would be overly burdensome for 

originating service providers to provide 

accurate notifications within a similar 

timeframe for 988 outages. To the extent 

that service providers find that their 

own vendors’ coordination failures are 

causing them to violate the 

Commission’s outage notification 

requirements the Commission believes 

that is a matter to be resolved between 

those parties and does not change the 

service provider’s obligation to comply 

with the Report and Order’s notification 

requirements. 

28. As an alternative to the 

requirement adopted in the Report and 

Order, CCA proposes that the 

Commission adopt at minimum an 

approach that sets 988 outage 

notification deadlines based on the time 

when actual originating service 

providers are notified about outages by 

their vendors or underlying providers. 

This alternative is incompatible with 

the goal of providing 988 special 

facilities with timely outage 

notifications because it would excuse 

originating service providers from 

reporting outages that their vendors fail 

to disclose to them. The Commission 

believes this approach would 

disincentivize originating service 

providers from learning about outages 

on their vendors’ networks, eliminate 

consistency as to when 988 special 

facilities can expect to receive outage 

reports, and delay 988 special facilities’ 

receipt of outage reports, which would 

in turn delay any actions they may take 

to ensure the 988 Lifeline’s availability. 

Moreover, the Commission finds it does 

not serve the public interest to create a 

means for providers to ‘‘contract away’’ 

their obligations by allowing the use of 

a vendor to alleviate a regulatory 

obligation. As stated above, the 

Commission has long held that licensees 

and other regulatees are responsible for 

the acts and omissions of their 

contractors, and the Commission 

declines to adopt an approach to 988 

outage notification that would disturb 

that holding. The findings the 

Commission makes in the Report and 

Order are limited to the 988 outage 

notification requirements made in the 

order. The Commission reserves 

judgment on the Petition for 

Reconsideration filed by CCA regarding 

the Commission’s November 2022 

Report and Order, 88 FR 9756 (March 

17, 2023), harmonizing 911 existing 

outage notification requirements. See 

CCA Petition for Reconsideration, PS 

Docket Nos. 15–80 and 13–75, ET 

Docket No. 4–35 (filed Mar. 17, 2023), 

https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/searchfilings/filing/1031746539270. The 

Commission also rejects CX360’s 

proposal that follow-up notifications not 

be due until seven to fourteen days after 

an initial notification is provided, as 

delaying critical details about an outage 

for an entire week, which is likely long 

after the outage has been resolved, 

clearly does not serve the goals of 

improving 988 special facilities’ 

awareness and ability to address 

outages. 

29. The Report and Order requires 

covered 988 service providers and 

originating service providers to exercise 

special diligence to maintain accurate, 

up-to-date contact information for 988 

special facilities, just as our rules 

require for 911 special facilities. 

‘‘Special diligence’’ is the diligence 

expected from a person practicing in a 

particular field of specialty. The 

Commission has imposed this higher 

level of care in circumstances where a 

failure to take sufficient care can lead to 

particularly serious public harms. In 

these circumstances, special diligence 

would require, for example, actively 

seeking to confirm the accuracy of 

contact information and not relying on 

the absence of a response. Once 

providers have a 988 special facility 

contact list in place, special diligence 

would require them to annually verify 

the accuracy of their contact list to 

ensure it is up-to-date. As it has found 

in the 911 context, the Commission 

found that for 988 outage reporting that 

requiring a higher level of care than 

reaching out to the prior contact is 

imperative to ensure public safety, and 

requiring this higher level of care will 

incentivize providers to ascertain and 

update such contact information. The 

Commission also finds that this 

requirement is significantly less 

burdensome than the similar 

requirement pertaining to 911 special 

facility contact information because the 

Report and Order only designates three 

988 special facilities for which contact 

information must be maintained. The 

Commission disagrees with ATIS’s view 

that it would be extremely difficult to 

apply special diligence to the 

maintenance of 988 contact information 

because ‘‘there are no subject matter 

experts practicing in the field of 988 

routing or 988 contact information 

maintenance.’’ The diligence our rules 


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require is that of a communications 

provider that, through their experience 

in offering the services that emergency 

communications depend on, 

understands that failure to provide 

effective notifications about outages 

could result in harm to life and 

property. Accordingly, the Commission 

expects that 988 service providers and 

originating service providers would take 

the steps necessary to ensure that the 

contact information they maintain for 

988 special facilities is accurate and 

effective as the failure to provide 

effective notice to the appropriate 

contact could result in harm to life and 

property. 

30. The Commission declines at this 

time to require covered 988 service 

providers or originating service 

providers to file 988 reliability 

certifications to ensure the network 

supporting the 988 Lifeline remains 

resilient and robust. The Commission 

agrees with ATIS that 988 is different 

from 911 in structure and organization; 

therefore the Commission’s existing 911 

network reliability certification 

requirements could not easily be 

applied to 988 reliability. The 

Commission believes additional study 

of threats to the 988 Lifeline is 

necessary to determine what next steps 

should be taken, if any, to promote 

reliability. The Commission expects that 

the 988 outage reporting requirements 

adopted in the Report and Order will 

give it additional insight to 988 

reliability trends and inform future 

action. 

31. The Commission notes that some 

commenters made recommendations 

that they argue would improve the 

general effectiveness and reliability of 

the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline. While 

these recommendations are outside of 

the scope of the 988 network outage 

reporting and notification requirements 

adopted in the Report and Order, the 

Commission will keep these issues in 

mind as it continues to support the 988 

Lifeline. 

C. Assessing the Benefits and Costs 

32. The Commission determined that 

the rules adopted in the Report and 

Order concerning the reporting in NORS 

of outages that potentially affect 988 

special facilities and the notifying of 

988 special facilities about outages will 

result in an industry-wide one-time 

compliance cost of $56,000 and an 

annual recurring cost of $1,355,000. The 

Commission sought comment on cost 

estimates in the 988 Outage NPRM and 

received no persuasive objections and 

only one comment offering an 

alternative calculation in response, 

which is addressed in context below. 

33. For the reporting of 988 outages in 

NORS, the Report and Order finds that 

outages that potentially affect 988 

special facilities fall into two categories: 

outages experienced by the covered 988 

service providers that are responsible 

for providing the 988 Lifeline with the 

capability to receive, process, or forward 

988 calls, and outages experienced by 

originating service providers that 

deliver calls to the Lifeline. Consistent 

with the estimate stated in the 988 

Outage NPRM, which no commenter 

challenged, the Commission assumes 

that one covered 988 service provider 

experiences a maximum of one 

reportable outage per month and 

estimates an annual compliance cost for 

that one covered 988 service provider of 

$1,000. See 988 Outage NPRM at 15, 

paragraph 37, n.80 (estimating a 

maximum of two hours total time to 

submit all required reports at a cost of 

$43 per hour for a total cost estimate of 

$1000 ∼ $43/hr × 2 hrs × one reportable 

outage per month × 12 months). The 

Commission finds that originating 

service providers already submit outage 

reports to the Commission related to 

outages that affect voice telephony, 

which would be largely or entirely 

identical to the new reporting 

requirements, so initial compliance 

costs would be negligible. 

34. With regard to the requirements to 

maintain updated contact information 

for 988 special facilities and to notify 

those facilities about outages that affect 

them, the Commission estimates that the 

costs of compliance will also be 

relatively low when compared to the 

benefits to the public. It estimates a onetime industry-wide cost of $56,000 to 

create an e-mail survey to biannually 

solicit 988 special facility contact 

information. The Commission does not 

expect more than incidental costs 

arising from the creation or updating of 

outage notification templates, as the 988 

outage notification requirements that 

adopted in the Report and Order share 

the same content and timing as the 911 

outage notification requirements with 

which service providers already 

comply. The Commission estimates 

maximum annually recurring costs of 

$1,354,000, which consist of $1,326,000 

for notifying 988 special facilities of 

outages that potentially affect them 

pursuant to the requirements adopted in 

the Report and Order and $28,000 for 

soliciting appropriate contact 

information for outage notification from 

988 special facilities. The Commission 

expects that no costs will be incurred 

related to identifying the 988 special 

facilities that could potentially be 

affected by an outage, as the 

Commission has required that the same 

three special facilities (SAMHSA, the 

VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator) 

be notified regardless of the geographic 

area affected by the outage. 

35. The Commission finds that the 

benefits of the 988 outage reporting and 

notification requirements adopted in the 

Report and Order outweigh their 

associated costs. The Commission 

recognizes that it is difficult to quantify 

the value of ensuring the continuity of 

access to 988 Lifeline services, which 

includes its capacity to save lives and 

mitigate and prevent injuries. However, 

the Commission believes the 

considerable public safety value of the 

requirements adopted in the Report and 

Order as described above will exceed 

the limited costs of implementation. As 

discussed by commenters and in the 988 

Outage NPRM, the 988 Lifeline directly 

benefits people in crisis and saves lives. 

When the 988 Lifeline is interrupted, 

people’s lives are put into jeopardy. In 

May 2023, the 988 Lifeline answered 

235,292 calls, which is an average of 

over 7,500 answered calls per day. The 

Commission finds that the outage 

reporting requirements would improve 

public safety by providing the 

Commission and other impacted entities 

with situational awareness of 988 

outages, including the magnitude and 

causes of those outages, and allow for 

the identification of network reliability 

trends that can help identify best 

practices that could improve network 

reliability by helping to mitigate future 

outages. The Report and Order’s notice 

and contact information retention 

requirements are intended to ensure that 

when 988 calling is disrupted, parties 

responsible for the varying aspects of 

the 988 call pathway notify 988 special 

facilities, share critical information in a 

timely and standardized manner, and 

hasten the timely restoration of 988 

Lifeline services. The Commission 

describes in the Report and Order how 

even a very small increase in the speed 

of restoration of access to 988 Lifeline 

services could provide benefits that 

outweigh the costs of adopting the 

requirements. 

36. The benefits of reducing suicide 

via 988 are driven by the staggering 

societal costs of deaths by suicide. In 

2021, there were over 48,000 deaths by 

suicide in the United States, which, as 

noted above, averages out to 

approximately one death every 11 

minutes. For every suicide death, there 

were 3 hospitalizations for suicide 

attempts, 8 suicide-related emergency 

department visits, and 38 self-reported 

suicide attempts. Suicides and suicide 

attempts annually impose billions of 

dollars in medical, first-responder, 


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productivity-loss, and lost-quality-of-life 

costs on society. In addition to lives 

saved and injuries avoided, time-saving 

network outage protocols will also 

alleviate the devastating emotional toll 

wrought by suicide on victims’ families, 

friends, and communities. 

37. Notifying SAMHSA, the VA, and 

the 988 Lifeline administrator of the 

disruption of access to 988 Lifeline 

services will allow these parties to 

manage the impact of outages on their 

operations, quickly notify the public of 

the 988 service outage, and promote 

alternative ways for people to access 

988 Lifeline services during the outage, 

which may include notifying the public 

of alternative call numbers, or 

encouraging people to text to 988 or use 

the https://988lifeline.org/ link to chat 

with a crisis management counselor. 

This, in turn, will enhance the 988 

Lifeline’s ability to direct scarce 

resources toward mitigating outages 

rather than seeking out information as to 

whether an outage is occurring, the 

scope of such an outage, or its impact. 

One of the benefits of implementing 

short dialing for calls and text messages 

to the Lifeline was to reduce the 

burdens on 911 and other emergency 

services arising from calls related to 

mental health and suicide. The 

Commission believes that the rules 

adopted in the Report and Order will 

further reduce the burden on 911 and 

other emergency services by promoting 

988 reliability so that 988 calls go 

through when individuals need 988 

service the most. 

38. The Commission disagrees with 

Southern Linc’s argument that the rules 

adopted in the Report and Order place 

unnecessary regulatory burdens on 

smaller non-nationwide providers, 

which they assert will be strained due 

to the same personnel being responsible 

for both reporting and responding to 

outages, as well as complying with other 

regulatory requirements. As explained 

above, the Commission finds that the 

significant public safety benefits arising 

from the requirements adopted in the 

Report and Order outweigh their 

associated burdens, particularly since 

the cost of these requirements is likely 

to be relatively low due to 

commonalities with existing outage 

reporting requirements. The 

Commission again notes that the outages 

experienced by smaller providers with 

fewer subscribers would generally take 

longer to meet the required reporting 

thresholds, which would effectively 

provide more time to investigate an 

outage before it is required to be 

reported. Southern Linc further accuses 

the Commission of ‘‘assuming that all 

employees of a provider’s affiliates—no 

matter how distant—should be 

considered ‘available resources’ to 

support the provider’s compliance 

efforts, regardless of whether the 

employees of those affiliates have any 

responsibility to support wireless 

network operations.’’ The Commission 

does not make this assumption. If the 

Commission were to assume that service 

providers already had available staff to 

implement the requirements adopted in 

the Report and Order, then the costs to 

service providers would be estimated to 

be zero. To the contrary, the cost 

estimates that the Commission makes in 

the Report and Order are grounded in 

the additional labor hours and wages 

needed to comply with the Report and 

Order’s adopted rules. 

D. Legal Authority 

39. In the 988 Outage NPRM, the 

Commission sought comment on 

potential sources of legal authority 

under titles II and III and section 4(i) of 

the Communications Act and section 

104 of the Twenty-First Century 

Communications and Video 

Accessibility Act (CVAA) for 

Commission action to promote the 

reliability and resiliency of the 988 

Lifeline. The Commission noted that 

Congress amended section 251 of the 

Communications Act of 1934 to specify 

988 as the universal telephone number 

for the National Suicide Prevention 

Lifeline and that the proposed rules 

were intended to ensure that the 

Lifeline remains operational in 

accordance with the policies identified 

by Congress in that 2020 legislation and 

that any outages are quickly identified 

and reported, thus promoting the safety 

of life and property. The Commission 

now finds that section 4 and section 251 

provide ample authority for the 

reporting and notice obligations adopted 

in the Report and Order. 

40. Title II of the Communications Act 

gives the Commission clear authority 

over service providers, including 

covered 988 service providers, to the 

extent that they provide interstate 

common carrier service. The statute 

provides that ‘‘practices’’ for and in 

connection with interstate common 

carrier services must be ‘‘just and 

reasonable,’’ and that a common carrier 

must ‘‘provide itself with adequate 

facilities for the expeditious and 

efficient performance of its service as a 

common carrier.’’ The Commission is 

also authorized to ‘‘inquire into the 

management of the business of all 

carriers and obtain from them full and 

complete information necessary to 

enable the Commission to perform the 

duties and carry out the objects for 

which it was created.’’ 

41. The Commission further notes that 

the Communications Act directs that 

‘‘[f]or the purpose of obtaining 

maximum effectiveness from the use of 

radio and wire communications in 

connection with safety of life and 

property,’’ the Commission ‘‘shall 

investigate and study all phases of the 

problem and the best methods of 

obtaining the cooperation and 

coordination of these systems.’’ Both 

originating service providers and 

covered 988 service providers play 

critical roles in ensuring the cooperation 

and coordination of the 988 system, and 

the Commission has previously relied 

on section 4(n) as providing authority to 

require reporting of interconnected VoIP 

outages, and to require emergency 

alerting plans to allow the Commission 

and other stakeholders ‘‘to more easily 

review and identify gaps’’ in emergency 

alerting architecture, ‘‘detect problems, 

and take measures to address these 

shortcomings.’’ By requiring reporting of 

outages affecting access to 988 by both 

originating service providers and 

covered 988 service providers the 

Commission is enabling the 

Commission’s ongoing review of sources 

of disruption to this critical emergency 

service, which in turn will contribute to 

greater reliability going forward. The 

Commission concludes that these 

sources provide it with sufficient 

authority for the 988 outage reporting 

requirements adopted in the Report and 

Order. 

42. Additionally, the Commission 

finds that imposing outage reporting 

requirements on covered 988 service 

providers is reasonably ancillary to our 

responsibility to ensuring that the 988 

Lifeline service operates effectively. To 

exercise ancillary authority ‘‘two 

conditions [must be] satisfied: (1) the 

Commission’s general jurisdictional 

grant under Title I [of the 

Communications Act] covers the 

regulated subject and (2) the regulations 

are reasonably ancillary to the 

Commission’s effective performance of 

its statutorily mandated 

responsibilities.’’ The functions at issue 

here involve communications by wire or 

radio in that they either take the form 

of such transmission or involve the use 

of equipment for purposes of facilitating 

transmission by wire or radio. The 

Commission concludes that these 

reporting requirements are necessary to 

carry out our responsibility for the 

proper functioning of the 988 Lifeline 

service under section 251(e)(4). 

Obtaining outage information from 

covered 988 service providers is 

necessary because only the covered 988 

service provider has visibility into 


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2512 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 10 / Tuesday, January 16, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

outages that occur at the point where 

the covered 988 service provider 

processes and forwards the call. 

Adopting outage reporting and notice 

requirements for entities that have the 

ability to receive, process, or forward 

calls to the 988 Lifeline furthers the 

Commission’s goals to strengthen the 

988 Lifeline’s reliability and help save 

the lives of those who may be 

experiencing a suicidal crisis or mental 

health-related distress. 

43. The Commission disagrees with 

CX360, a company that contracts with 

the 988 Lifeline administrator to 

provide voice and SMS-based services 

for communications after they reach the 

988 Lifeline, that the Commission lacks 

authority to require the reporting of 

outages by entities that provide the 988 

Lifeline with the capability to receive, 

process, or forward calls. As outlined 

above, the Commission clearly has 

authority to impose these reporting and 

notice requirements on CX360, on any 

entities that offer to the public for a fee 

‘‘transmission between points specified 

by the user, of information of the user’s 

choosing, without change in the form or 

content of the information as sent and 

received,’’ and on entities that route 

calls from the 988 Lifeline to the 

appropriate crisis center(s), following 

routing instructions provided by the 988 

Lifeline administrator. Even though the 

responsibilities of an originating service 

provider may conclude once a call 

reaches the 988 Lifeline, this does not 

mean that the services offered by other 

communications providers within the 

988 call path that are necessary to 

connect the caller to their local crisis 

center, the Veterans Crisis Line, or other 

call taker, a service which CX360 states 

that it provides, cannot be regulated by 

the Commission. 

44. The Commission specifically 

rejects CX360’s argument that entities 

that ‘‘process’’ calls for the 988 Lifeline 

cannot be regulated by the Commission. 

The Commission finds that the 

processing of 988 calls—that is to say, 

conducting the necessary technical 

steps to prepare the call for forwarding 

to a crisis center or the Veterans Crisis 

Line and then transmitting those calls to 

that crisis center—falls within our 

authority to regulate via the reporting 

and notice requirements adopted in the 

Report and Order. To the extent that an 

entity uses an interactive voice response 

system to support these capabilities, the 

Commission acknowledges that such an 

offering may acquire, store, or process 

information related to how the call 

should be routed. But the Commission 

concludes that it has authority to 

require outage reporting and notice 

under the specific circumstances here 

from entities performing functions like 

CX360. 

E. Timelines for Compliance 

45. The Report and Order adopts 

deadlines for originating service 

providers to comply with the Report 

and Order’s revisions to § 4.9 as the 

latest of (1) 30 days after the 

Commission issues a Public Notice 

announcing that OMB has completed 

review of any new information 

collection requirements associated with 

the adopted Report and Order; (2) 90 

days after the publication of the 

summary of the Report and Order in the 

Federal Register, or (3) the date the 

Commission’s updated 911 outage 

reporting and notification rules go into 

effect. Consistent with the 

Commission’s proposal in the 988 

Outage NPRM, the Commission agrees 

with Vibrant that the first two elements 

of this timeline provide sufficient time 

for compliance, as the Commission 

finds that the revisions constitute only 

minor changes to existing notice and 

reporting requirements for 911 network 

outages, and it will take a modest 

amount of time for originating service 

providers to adjust their processes to 

satisfy the proposed rules. The 

Commission also agrees with 

USTelecom that it is sensible to 

harmonize the compliance timeline for 

the rules adopted in the Report and 

Order with the compliance timeline for 

the 911 outage notification requirements 

adopted in November 2022 given the 

similarities between them. 

46. The Commission is persuaded by 

CX360 that some covered 988 service 

providers may not have existing NORS 

filing or outage notification obligations 

and would need additional time to 

develop the capabilities and processes 

necessary to comply with the rules 

adopted in the Report and Order. 

Accordingly, the Commission agrees 

with CX360 that covered 988 service 

providers should be granted six 

additional months to come into 

compliance. The Report and Order 

adopts deadlines for covered 988 service 

providers to comply with the Report 

and Order’s rules as the latest of (1) 30 

days after the Commission issues a 

Public Notice announcing that OMB has 

completed review of any new 

information collection requirements 

associated with the adopted Report and 

Order; (2) nine months after the 

publication of the summary of the 

Report and Order in the Federal 

Register; or (3) the date the 

Commission’s updated 911 outage 

reporting and notification rules go into 

effect. 

II. Procedural Matters 

47. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

Analysis. This document requires 

covered 988 service providers and 

originating service providers to adopt 

988 reporting and notice procedures 

which represent new and modified 

information collection requirements 

subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act 

of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104–13. The 

document will be submitted to the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review under section 3507(d) 

of the PRA and, with the exception of 

the revision to 47 CFR 4.9(e)(1)(iv), will 

not take effect until approved by OMB. 

OMB, the general public, and other 

Federal agencies will be invited to 

comment on the new or modified 

information collection requirements 

contain in this proceeding. This 

document will be submitted to OMB for 

review under section 3507(d) of the 

PRA. In addition, the Commission notes 

that, pursuant to the Small Business 

Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public 

Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), 

the Commission previously sought, but 

did not receive, specific comment on 

how the Commission might further 

reduce the information collection 

burden for small business concerns with 

fewer than 25 employees. The 

Commission does not believe that the 

new or modified information collection 

requirements adopted in the Report and 

Order will be unduly burdensome on 

small businesses. 

48. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

Analysis. The Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980, as amended (RFA) requires that 

an agency prepare a regulatory 

flexibility analysis for notice and 

comment rulemakings, unless the 

agency certifies that ‘‘the rule will not, 

if promulgated, have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities.’’ As required 

by the RFA, an Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 

incorporated in the 988 Outage NPRM 

adopted January 26, 2023 (88 FR 20790 

(Apr. 7, 2023)). The Commission sought 

written public comment on the 

proposals in the 988 Outage NPRM, 

including comment on the IRFA. No 

comments were filed addressing the 

IRFA. The Commission prepared a Final 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) 

concerning the potential impact of the 

rule and policy changes adopted in the 

Report and Order on small entities. The 

FRFA is set forth in Appendix B of the 

Report and Order. 

III. Ordering Clauses 

49. Accordingly, it is ordered that, 

pursuant to the authority contained in 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 10 / Tuesday, January 16, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 2513 

sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(n), 201(b), 214, 

218, 251(e)(3), 251(e)(4), 301, 303(b), 

303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 332, and 403, 

of the Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended, and sections 3(b) and 6 of the 

Wireless Communications and Public 

Safety Act of 1999, as amended, 47 

U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j) 154(n), 201(b), 

214, 218, 251(e)(3), 251(e)(4), 301, 

303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 332, 

403, 615, 615a–1, the National Suicide 

Hotline Improvement Act of 2018, 

Public Law 115–233, 132 Stat. 2424 

(2018), and the National Suicide Hotline 

Designation Act of 2020, Public Law 

116–172 (2020), the Report and Order IS 

hereby adopted. 

50. It is further ordered that the 

amendments of the Commission’s Rules 

as set forth in Appendix A of the Report 

and Order are adopted, effective 30 days 

after publication in the Federal 

Register, except for the amendments to 

47 CFR 4.9. The amendments to 47 CFR 

4.9 will not become effective until OMB 

completes any review that the Public 

Safety and Homeland Security Bureau 

determines is required under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act and the 

Public Safety and Homeland Security 

Bureau announces an effective date 

consistent with section III.E of the 

Report and Order by subsequent Public 

Notice. 

51. It is further ordered that the 

Commission’s Consumer and 

Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference 

Information Center, shall send a copy of 

the Report and Order, including the 

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to 

the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 

Small Business Administration. 

52. It is further ordered that the Office 

of the Managing Director, Performance 

and Program Management, shall send a 

copy of the Report and Order in a report 

to be sent to Congress and the 

Government Accountability Office 

pursuant to the Congressional Review 

Act, 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). 

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 4 

Communications common carriers, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Telecommunications. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene Dortch, 

Secretary. 

Final Rules 

For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, the Federal Communications 

Commission amends 47 CFR part 4 as 

follows: 

PART 4—DISRUPTIONS TO 

COMMUNICATIONS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 4 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 34–39, 151, 154, 155, 

157, 201, 251, 307, 316, 615a–1, 1302(a), and 

1302(b); 5 U.S.C. 301, and Executive Order 

no. 10530. 

■ 2. Section 4.3 is amended by: 

■ a. Removing the heading from 

paragraph (i); and 

■ b. Adding paragraph (j). 

The addition reads as follows: 

§ 4.3 Communications providers covered 

by the requirements of this part. 

* * * * * 

(j) Covered 988 service providers are 

providers that provide the 988 Suicide 

& Crisis Lifeline with capabilities such 

as the ability to receive, process, or 

forward calls. ‘‘Covered 988 service 

provider’’ shall not include any entity 

that constitutes a crisis center that 

participates in the 988 Lifeline, or any 

entity that offers the capability to 

originate 988 calls where another 

service provider delivers those calls to 

the appropriate crisis center. 

■ 3. Section 4.5 is amended by revising 

the section heading and adding 

paragraph (f) to read as follows: 

§ 4.5 Definitions of outage, special offices 

and facilities, 911 special facilities, and 988 

special facilities. 

* * * * * 

(f) An outage that potentially affects a 

988 special facility occurs whenever 

there is a loss of the ability of the 988 

Suicide & Crisis Lifeline to receive, 

process, or forward calls, potentially 

affecting at least 900,000 user-minutes 

and lasting at least 30 minutes duration. 

■ 4. Delayed indefinitely, § 4.9 is 

amended by revising paragraphs (a)(4), 

(c)(2)(iv), (e)(1)(v), (f)(4), and (g)(1)(i) 

and adding paragraph (i) to read as 

follows: 

§ 4.9 Outage reporting requirements— 

threshold criteria. 

(a) * * * 

(4) Potentially affects a 911 special 

facility (as defined in § 4.5(e)) or 

potentially affects a 988 special facility 

(as defined in § 4.5(f)), in which case 

they also shall notify the affected 

facility in the manner described in 

paragraph (h) or (i) of this section, 

respectively. Not later than 72 hours 

after discovering the outage, the 

provider shall submit electronically an 

Initial Communications Outage Report 

to the Commission. Not later than 30 

days after discovering the outage, the 

provider shall submit electronically a 

Final Communications Outage Report to 

the Commission. The notification and 

the initial and final reports shall comply 

with all of the requirements of § 4.11. 

* * * * * 

(c) * * * 

(2) * * * 

(iv) Potentially affecting a 911 special 

facility (as defined in § 4.5(e)) or 

potentially affecting a 988 special 

facility (as defined in § 4.5(f)), in which 

case the affected facility shall be 

notified in the manner described in 

paragraph (h) or (i) of this section, 

respectively. 

* * * * * 

(e) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(v) That potentially affects a 911 

special facility (as defined in § 4.5(e)) or 

potentially affects a 988 special facility 

(as defined in § 4.5(f)), in which case 

they also shall notify the affected 

facility in the manner described in 

paragraph (h) or (i) of this section, 

respectively. 

* * * * * 

(f) * * * 

(4) Potentially affects a 911 special 

facility (as defined in § 4.5(e)) or 

potentially affects a 988 special facility 

(as defined in § 4.5(f)), in which case 

they also shall notify the affected 

facility in the manner described in 

paragraph (h) or (i) of this section, 

respectively. Not later than 72 hours 

after discovering the outage, the 

provider shall submit electronically an 

Initial Communications Outage Report 

to the Commission. Not later than 30 

days after discovering the outage, the 

provider shall submit electronically a 

Final Communications Outage Report to 

the Commission. The Notification and 

the Initial and Final reports shall 

comply with all of the requirements of 

§ 4.11. 

(g) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(i) Within 240 minutes of discovering 

that they have experienced on any 

facilities that they own, operate, lease, 

or otherwise utilize, an outage of at least 

30 minutes duration that potentially 

affects a 911 special facility (as defined 

in § 4.5(e)) or potentially affects a 988 

special facility (as defined in § 4.5(f)), in 

which case they also shall notify the 

affected facility in the manner described 

in paragraph (h) or (i) of this section, 

respectively; or 

* * * * * 

(i) 988 Special facility outage 

notification. All cable, satellite, 

wireless, wireline, interconnected VoIP, 

and covered 988 service providers shall 

notify any official at a 988 special 

facility who has been designated by the 

affected 988 special facility as the 


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2514 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 10 / Tuesday, January 16, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

provider’s contact person(s) for 

communications outages at the facility 

of any outage that potentially affects 

that 988 special facility (as defined in 

§ 4.5(f)) in the following manner: 

(1) Appropriate contact information. 

To ensure prompt delivery of outage 

notifications to 988 special facilities, 

covered 988 service providers shall 

exercise special diligence to identify, 

maintain, and, on an annual basis, 

confirm current contact information 

appropriate for outage notification for 

each 988 special facility that serves 

areas that the service provider serves. 

(2) Content of notification. Covered 

988 service providers’ outage 

notifications must convey all available 

material information about the outage. 

For the purpose of this paragraph (i), 

‘‘material information’’ includes the 

following, where available: 

(i) An identifier unique to each 

outage; 

(ii) The name, telephone number, and 

email address at which the notifying 

988 service provider can be reached for 

follow up; 

(iii) The name of the covered 988 

service provider experiencing the 

outage; 

(iv) The date and time when the 

incident began (including a notation of 

the relevant time zone); 

(v) The types of communications 

service(s) affected; 

(vi) The geographic area affected by 

the outage; 

(vii) A statement of the notifying 

covered 988 service provider’s 

expectations for how the outage 

potentially affects the special facility 

(e.g., dropped calls or missing 

metadata); 

(viii) Expected date and time of 

restoration, including a notation of the 

relevant time zone; 

(ix) The best-known cause of the 

outage; and 

(x) A statement of whether the 

message is the notifying covered 988 

service provider’s initial notification to 

the special facility, an update to an 

initial notification, or a message 

intended to be the service provider’s 

final assessment of the outage. 

(3) Means of notification. Covered 988 

service providers’ outage notifications 

must be transmitted by telephone and in 

writing via electronic means in the 

absence of another method mutually 

agreed upon in writing in advance by 

the special facility and the service 

provider. 

(4) Timing of initial notification. 

Covered 988 service providers shall 

provide an outage notification to a 

potentially affected 988 special facility 

as soon as possible, but no later than 

within 30 minutes of discovering that 

they have experienced on any facilities 

that they own, operate, lease, or 

otherwise utilize, an outage that 

potentially affects a 988 special facility 

(as defined in § 4.5(f)). 

(5) Follow-up notification. Covered 

988 service providers shall 

communicate additional material 

information to potentially affected 988 

special facilities in notifications 

subsequent to the initial notification as 

soon as possible after that information 

becomes available, but providers shall 

send the first follow-up notification to 

potentially affected 988 special facilities 

no later than two hours after the initial 

contact. After that, covered 988 service 

providers are required to continue to 

provide material information to the 

special facilities as soon as possible 

after discovery of the new material 

information until the outage is 

completely repaired and service is fully 

restored. 

[FR Doc. 2024–00428 Filed 1–12–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 64 

[WC Docket No. 12–375; FCC 22–76; FR 

ID 193391] 

Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling 

Services; Correction 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule; announcement of 

effective date; correction and 

establishment of applicability. 

SUMMARY: The Federal Communications 

Commission (Commission) published a 

document in the Federal Register of 

January 3, 2024, announcing that the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) had approved, for a period of 

three years, an information collection 

associated with the Commission’s 2022 

ICS Order, FCC 22–76 (September 30, 

2022). The document incorrectly 

announced an effective date for an 

amendment published on December 9, 

2022, which triggered its codification 

into the CFR on December 21, 2023. 

This document establishes the 

applicability of OMB’s approval, 

published on January 3, 2024. 

DATES: As of January 16, 2024, the final 

rule announcing the effective date for 47 

CFR 64.6040(c), published January 3, 

2024, at 89 FR 269, is corrected to 

provide an applicability date of January 

16, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William Kehoe, Pricing Policy Division, 

at (202) 418–7122, or email: 

William.Kehoe@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

December 9, 2022, at 87 FR 75496, the 

Commission published a final rule 

amending 47 CFR 64.6040, effective 

January 9, 2023, by adding paragraph 

(c). The addition of paragraph (c) to 

§ 64.6040 (amendatory instruction 11) 

was delayed indefinitely. 

On December 21, 2023, at 88 FR 

88257, the Commission announced the 

effective date of December 21, 2023 

(with an implied applicability date of 

December 21, 2023), for § 64.6040(c) and 

other amendments in the December 

2022 rule. That effective date for 

§ 64.6040(c) in the December 21, 2023 

document was established in error, but 

that error went undetected until the 

publication of the second effective date 

announcement on January 3, 2024, 

which contained a second incorrect 

effective date (with implied 

applicability date) of January 9, 2023. 

Therefore, the announcement of 

effective date, published January 3, 

2024, at 89 FR 269, is corrected as 

follows: 

Correction 

In FR Doc. 2023–28765, published in 

the Federal Register of January 3, 2024 

(89 FR 269), on page 269, in the second 

column, correct the DATES section to 

read: 

DATES: As of December 21, 2023, the 

applicability of 47 CFR 64.6040(c) is 

delayed until January 16, 2024. 

Federal Communications Commission 

Katura Jackson, 

Federal Register Liaison Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2024–00350 Filed 1–12–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 


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