*

After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 4, 2007*

Decided June 25, 2007

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 06-3130

TRAVIS J. HEFLEY,

Plaintiff-Apellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF CALUMET PARK and

MARK DAVIS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 04 C 8032

Blanche M. Manning, 

Judge.

O R D E R

After he was fired from his job as a part-time police officer for the Village of

Calumet Park, Travis Hefley sued the Village and Mark Davis, the chief of police,

claiming that he was the victim of “reverse” racial discrimination. The district

court dismissed the claim against Davis and granted summary judgment for the

Village. Hefley appeals, but his arguments are frivolous. We affirm. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-3130 Page 2

On January 13, 2004, Susan Rockett, the assistant chief of police, sent a

memorandum to all police officers advising them that mandatory annual firearms

testing would begin on January 21 and that all officers must pass by March 17. By

March 5, Hefley had not qualified, nor had he attended any of the sessions held by

Sergeant Gregory Jones, the department’s firearms instructor, at which Jones

trained officers in the use of their weapons and administered the test. Hefley

received a written reminder from Rockett stating that part-time officers who did not

qualify by the deadline would be removed from the schedule. Still, Hefley missed

the next training session. On March 17, Hefley attended the final session along

with Curtis Smith, another part-time officer who had not qualified. Neither Hefley,

who is white, nor Smith, who is black, achieved a passing score of 76. 

Jones advised Rockett that neither officer had qualified and asked her to give

them one more opportunity. Rockett agreed and notified Hefley and Smith that

they could test for the final time on March 24. She reminded them that they could

not perform patrol duties if they failed. On that date, Hefley and Smith once again

failed to qualify. Hefley’s top score was 60 and Smith’s was 74. Both men were

fired later that day. 

The following week, Hefley attempted to contact Chief Davis to request

another chance to qualify. He was directed to Rockett, who informed him that he

would be given no further opportunities. In May, Smith reapplied for employment

as a part-time police officer. The following month, he passed the firearms

qualification and was rehired. Hefley did not reapply for a job with the Village. 

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Hefley sued the Village and

Chief Davis, claiming that he had been fired because of his race in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights

Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. After somewhat protracted proceedings, the parties

moved for summary judgment. The district court denied Hefley’s and granted the

defendants’. The court applied the modified burden-shifting approach for proving

reverse discrimination that we articulated in Mills v. HealthCare Servs. Corp., 171

F.3d 450, 455-57 (7th Cir. 1999), and Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679 (7th

Cir. 2003), and concluded that Hefley did not make out a prima facie case of

discrimination. The court reasoned that Hefley did not demonstrate that he was

meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations or that different standards were

used to evaluate white and non-white employees.

Hefley, who is pro se, purports to raise nine separate arguments on appeal,

but we find it necessary to discuss only his contention that the district court

erroneously granted summary judgment for the defendants. The meat of Hefley’s

argument is that he was unfairly subjected to the “strict” punishment of
No. 06-3130 Page 3

termination for failing firearms testing, while Smith was given additional

opportunities to qualify. 

 We evaluate a claim of reverse discrimination under the same standard

applicable to any other action under Title VII; however, the type of evidence from

which we can infer discrimination under the familiar McDonnell Douglas approach

differs slightly when the plaintiff is white. See Phelan, 347 F.3d at 685. At the first

step, instead of showing that he is member of a protected class, the plaintiff must

establish the existence of “background circumstances” that support “an inference

that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who discriminates against the

majority,” Mills, 171 F.3d at 455; see Gore v. Ind. Univ., 416 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir.

2006). The remaining steps are the same: the plaintiff must show that he was

meeting his employer’s legitimate performance expectations, that he suffered an

adverse employment action, and that he was treated less favorably than similarly

situated employees of a different race. See Ballance v. City of Springfield, 424 F.3d

614, 617 (7th Cir. 2005). 

We agree with the district court that Hefley did not make out a prima facie

case of racial discrimination. First, Hefley cannot show that he was meeting his

employer’s legitimate expectations because he does not dispute that annual

firearms certification was mandatory, that Rockett informed him he could not work

without it, and that he failed to qualify. See Brummett v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 284

F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that employee without driver’s license and

favorable driving record at time of his termination was not meeting legitimate

expectations of employer that required both). Moreover, despite Hefley’s suggestion

that his supervisors did not do enough to help him qualify, an employer is not

required to “bend over backwards to assist its employees with their job-related

difficulties,” id. Hefley also asserts that the positive performance reviews he

received earlier in his tenure establish that he was meeting legitimate expectations. 

But he must prove he was doing so at the time of the discharge. Johal v. Little

Lady Foods, Inc., 434 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 2006); see Brummet, 284 F.3d at 745. 

Furthermore, Hefley has not pointed to any similarly situated non-white

employee who was treated more favorably than he. He compares himself to Curtis

Smith, but Smith was fired on the same day as Hefley, and for the same reason, so

Hefley cannot demonstrate that Smith was treated any better with respect to the

consequences of failing to achieve firearms certification. The Village’s decision to

rehire Curtis months later says nothing of whether Hefley’s firing was

discriminatory. Because Hefley never reapplied, he and Curtis were not similarly

situated with respect to employment decisions made after they were fired. See

Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., 461 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that

“similarly situated” means directly comparable to plaintiff in all material respects). 
No. 06-3130 Page 4

Because Hefley did not make out a prima facie case of discrimination, we do

not address his contention that the reason given for his termination is pretextual. 

His remaining arguments, to the extent they are independent of his challenge to the

grant of summary judgment for the defendants, have been considered and rejected. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.