IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs at Knoxville March 26, 2014

GEORGE SCOTT MASON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County

No. 17445 Honorable Robert G. Crigler, Judge

No. M2013-01170-CCA-R3-PC - Filed April 23, 2014

The Petitioner, George Scott Mason, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief for

his conviction of possession of a Schedule II substance for resale. On appeal, the Petitioner

argues that the post-conviction court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact and

conclusions of law and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we

affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS

and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.

James Ronald Tucker,Jr., Shelbyville, Tennessee, for the Defendant-Appellant, George Scott

Mason.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Tracy L. Alcock, Assistant Attorney

General; Robert Carter, District Attorney General; and Michael D. Randles, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On February 20, 2011, the Petitioner was arrested on an outstanding warrant after a

traffic stop. After arresting the Petitioner, the police officers searched the vehicle and found

marijuana and crack cocaine weighing 1.5 grams. The Petitioner was subsequently indicted

by the Bedford County Grand Jury for possession of a Schedule II substance for resale,

possession of a Schedule IV substance for delivery, simple possession of a Schedule IV
substance, and introduction of contraband into a penal institution. On January 23, 2012, the

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Petitioner entered a negotiated guilty plea to possession of a Schedule IIsubstance for resale.

He received a sentence of 12 years in confinement as a multiple offender to be served at 35

percent. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the remaining charges were dismissed. On July 5,

2012, the Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. He was

subsequently appointed counsel, and three amended petitions were filed alleging, inter alia,

ineffective assistance of counsel.

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At the February 27, 2013 evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner testified that counsel was

appointed to represent him at trial, and soon after his appointment, counsel filed a motion to

withdraw based on a conflict of interest. At the hearing on the motion, counsel informed the

court that his office previously represented a Drug Task Force confidential informant who

had attempted to set the Petitioner up for a drug sale but was unsuccessful. The court denied

the motion to withdraw, noting that the former client was not on the State’s witness list and

had nothing to do with the instant case. The Petitioner believed that counsel should have

looked further into withdrawing despite the trial court’s ruling.

The Petitioner acknowledged that counsel provided discovery to him, but claimed that

he was “denied access” to the arrest report of his traffic stop. He testified that he asked

counsel to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle but that

counsel laughed and told him that he could not file a motion to suppress without his

supervisor’s permission. He further claimed that counsel told him that “he would preserve

th[e] right to file an appeal [on the legality of the search],” which was the reason that he

accepted the plea.

The Petitioner testified that he informed counsel that he and the assistant district

attorney prosecuting the case (“the ADA”) had a “small history” because he sued the ADA

along with 15 to 20 other government officials in 2007. He acknowledged that a federal

court granted the ADA summary judgment relief and that the two never met in court. He

further agreed that his suit was ultimately dismissed as to all parties. Nevertheless, he

maintained that he did not get a “fair shake” in the instant case because of his history with

the ADA. He testified that he asked counsel if he could have a “moment of [the ADA’s]

time to conduct [his] own plea agreement” but that the ADA told counsel that “since [the

Petitioner] sued him[,] he wouldn’t be available for [the Petitioner] and pick a number

between 12 [years] and 20 [years].”

The Petitioner did not include the indictments in the record on appeal. 

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The second amended petition was filed by the Petitioner, pro se. 

2

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On cross-examination, the Petitioner agreed that the ADA had “no obligation to speak

with [the Petitioner]” and acknowledged that the ADA agreed to allow him to plead to the

minimum sentence of 12 years for his Class B felony. He further acknowledged that during

his guilty plea hearing, he testified that no one had promised him anything to get him to plead

guilty or coerced him to accept the plea deal. He maintained, however, that he believed

counsel was going to file a certified question of law to appeal the legality of the search.

Counsel testified that he was appointed to represent the Petitioner and handled his

case after it was indicted in circuit court. He requested discovery from the State and

conducted his “normal investigation,” including interviewing police officers and reviewing

the video recordings of the incident. He discussed the evidence with the Petitioner, and the

Petitioner shared his “side of the case” with counsel. Counsel believed he had an adequate

understanding of the evidence the State had against the Petitioner as well as the Petitioner’s

version of events.

Counsel testified that he filed a motion to withdraw “out of an abundance of caution”

because his office had represented an individual who had tried to make a controlled buy from

the Petitioner. Counsel presented all of the information about the former client to the court

and the State informed the court and counsel that it did not intend to call the former client in

the instant case. The court concluded that there was no conflict and denied the motion to

withdraw. Counsel believed he could zealously represent the Petitioner and pursue his

defense notwithstanding the motion to withdraw.

Counsel recalled that he and the Petitioner discussed filing a motion to suppress, but

after reviewing all of the evidence Counsel told the Petitioner that there was no legal basis

to support the motion. Counsel denied the Petitioner’s claim that he needed permission from

his supervisor to file a motion to suppress, and he maintained that he does not “have to get

permission from [his supervisor] to do anything.” He asserted that if the facts had warranted

a motion to suppress he would have filed it. He also denied telling the Petitioner he would

reserve a certified question of law regarding the legality of the search. He agreed that the

State and trial court would have had to agree to the condition in order to reserve a certified

question for appeal, and he confirmed that there was no mention of such a condition during

the guilty plea hearing.

The Petitioner informed counsel of his “issues” with the ADA and made it “obvious

that [he] didn’t care for [the ADA].” Counsel recalled that the Petitioner requested to speak

to the ADA but that the ADA did not agree to speak to the Petitioner. However, he did not

believe that the ADA disliked the Petitioner or that there was “any vindictive prosecution

involved” in the Petitioner’s case. He noted that the ADA offered a minimum sentence for

the Petitioner’s Class B felony and dismissed his other charges.

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Following the hearing, the post-conviction court made extensive oral findings

regarding the Petitioner’s claims. In relevant part, the court found as follows:

First off, as to the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel for not

filing a motion to suppress, if you look at Exhibit 1, the transcript of the plea

acceptance hearing . . . . [w]hen [the State] gave the factual basis . . . . I asked

[the Petitioner] if he heard what [the State] said happened in the case and he

said yes, sir.

I said is that what happened and he said yes, sir.

I recall that there was an outstanding warrant against [the Petitioner] so

I have to accredit [counsel]’s testimony that there would be no good faith basis

for a suppression motion in the case.

The Petitioner has not shown in this hearing that he would have

prevailed had there been a suppression hearing. The burden of proof in this

particular case is on the Petitioner.

As to the alleged conflict [counsel’s office] had . . . . Counsel filed the

motion. So if there was any error in that, in me not granting the motion, it was

on me and not on [counsel]. All he can do is file the motion.

Even if there was error for me not to grant that motion, I don’t think the

[P]etitioner has proven that affected the outcome in the case and I certainly

don’t think it had anything to do with it.

Nor do I think the fact that he sued [the ADA] before had any affect on

the case . . . . His settlement was the minimum sentence on just for that charge

alone. The [other charges] were both dismissed.

There is certainly no evidence of being vindictive on [the ADA’s] part.

I believe that [the ADA] said I don’t want to talk to [the Petitioner] . .

. [b]ut personally[,] I think it is a very poor practice for a prosecutor to talk to

the defendant. Certainly can’t do it without the defendant’s attorney being

present but even when the defendant instigates it, wants to talk to the

prosecutor with his attorney present, still a pretty poor idea. Certainly after

having been sued I can think it would be reasonable that he would not want to

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speak to [the Petitioner] with [counsel] present least [sic] he open himself up

for a subsequent lawsuit.

The court denied relief in a written order dated March 26, 2013. The Petitioner filed a timely

notice of appeal to this court on April 25, 2013.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in failing to make

specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and maintains that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel. Additionally, he asserts that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors

deprived him of the right to a fair trial and competent representation and, therefore, entitles

him to relief. The State responds that the post-conviction court’s failure to make written

findings of fact and conclusions of law is harmless error and that the Petitioner failed to

establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the State maintains that the postconviction court properly denied relief. Upon review, we agree with the State.

Post-conviction relief is only warranted when a petitioner establishes that his or her

conviction is void or voidable because of an abridgement of a constitutional right. T.C.A.

§ 40-30-103 (2006). The Tennessee Supreme Court has held:

A post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal

unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. When reviewing factual issues,

the appellate court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence; moreover,

factual questions involving the credibility of witnesses or the weight of their

testimony are matters for the trial court to resolve. The appellate court’s

review of a legal issue, or of a mixed question of law or fact such as a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, is de novo with no presumption of

correctness.

Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006) (internal quotation and citations

omitted). “The petitioner bears the burden of proving factual allegations in the petition for

post-conviction relief by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (citing T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f);

Wiley v. State, 183 S.W.3d 317, 325 (Tenn. 2006)). Evidence is considered clear and

convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt about the accuracy of the

conclusions drawn from it. Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

(citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992)).

I. Written Findings and Conclusions. The Petitioner first asserts that the postconviction court committed reversible error because it failed to make specific written

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findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Petitioner correctly asserts that the postconviction court is required to set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law in a final

written order with regard to each ground raised. See T.C.A. § 40-30-111(b) (requiring the

court to enter an order containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law for each ground

raised by the petitioner); Tenn. R. S. Ct. 28, § 9(A) (stating that the order must contain

specific findings of fact and conclusions of law for each issue raised by the petitioner). The

purpose of this requirement, however, is to aid in appellate review; thus, the failure to meet

the requirement does not require reversal where the record is sufficient to effectuate a

meaningful appellate review. See State v. Swanson, 680 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1984); George v. State, 533 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975). Where the postconviction court includes adequate oral findings on the record, the failure to include written

findings of fact and conclusions of law may be deemed harmless error. See Ralph E.

Thompson, Jr. v. State, No. E2001-0003-CCA-R3-PC, 2002 WL 392820, at *7 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Mar. 14, 2002) (citing State v. Higgins, 729 S.W.2d 288, 290-91 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1987); Swanson, 680 S.W.2d at 489).

Here, the post-conviction court issued a written order denying relief, stating only that

the Petitioner failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice arising therefrom. As

correctly noted by the Petitioner, the order fails to include specific findings of fact with

regard to each ground and thus fails to meet the statutory requirement. However, the court

made extensive oral findings at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, and the record on

appeal includes the transcripts from the motion to withdraw hearing and guilty plea hearing.

Therefore, we conclude that the record on appeal is adequate for appellate review and that

any error by the trial court is harmless.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The Petitioner next asserts that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. To support his contention, he maintains that counsel was

ineffective by (1) failing to file a motion to suppress; (2) failing to seek further review

following the denial of the motion to withdraw; (3) failing to “deal honestly” with the

Petitioner by misleading him as to the terms of the guilty plea agreement; and (4) failing to

seek the disqualification of the prosecutor.

We begin by repeating the well-settled principles applicable to claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel:

The right of a person accused of a crime to representation by counsel

is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and article I, section 9, of the Tennessee Constitution. Both the United States

Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that this right to representation

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encompasses the right to reasonably effective assistance, that is, within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Vaughn, 202 S.W.3d at 116 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must

establish that (1) his lawyer’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);

Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). “[A] failure to prove either deficiency

or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim.

Indeed, a court need not address the components in any particular order or even address both

if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing of one component.” Goad v. State, 938

S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

A petitioner successfully demonstrates deficient performance when the clear and

convincing evidence proves that his attorney’s conduct fell below “an objective standard of

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688; Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936). Prejudice arising therefrom is demonstrated once the

petitioner establishes “‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. at 370 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement in the context

of a guilty plea, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see Serrano v. State, 133 S.W.3d 599, 605 (Tenn.

2004).

In the instant case, the Petitioner first asserts that counsel was ineffective because he

failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of the Petitioner’s

vehicle. In that regard, we note that “[i]n evaluating an attorney’s performance, a reviewing

court must be highly deferential and should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” State v. Burns,

6 S.W.3d 453, 462 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, “[n]o

particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the

variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions

regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.

However, we note that this “‘deference to matters of strategy and tactical choices applies

only if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.’” House v. State, 44

S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369).

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Here, the post-conviction court accredited the testimony of counsel that he believed

there was no legal basis to file a motion to suppress and further concluded that the Petitioner

failed to establish that he would have been successful had counsel filed such a motion. Upon

review, we conclude that the record supports the post-conviction court’s findings and

conclusions. The Petitioner put forth no evidence that counsel’s decision not to file a motion

to suppress was based upon inadequate preparation such that it should not be afforded proper

deference. To the contrary, the record establishes that counsel met with the arresting police

officers, reviewed the State’s evidence, and met with the Petitioner to discuss the case. At

the post-conviction hearing, counsel testified that he informed the Petitioner that he believed

there were no grounds upon which to file a motion to suppress, and opined that it would have

been frivolous to file the motion. At the Petitioner’s guilty plea hearing, the Petitioner

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assured the court that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation. When the court asked

whether there was anything more counsel could have done to investigate or work on the

Petitioner’s case, the Petitioner answered “[n]o, sir.” Thus, without any showing otherwise

by the Petitioner, deference is given to counsel’s decision not to file a motion to suppress.

See House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (citing Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369); see also, Titus Miller v.

State, No. W2012-01105-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 1908705, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7,

2013) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress

where counsel opined that the motion would not be successful). Accordingly, the Petitioner

has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that counsel was deficient.

Similarly, the Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek further

review after the denial of the motion to withdraw. The post-conviction court noted that

counsel filed the motion to withdraw and presented the facts of the possible conflict to the

court, which is “[a]ll he can do[.]” Like the post-conviction court, we fail to see what more

counsel should have done. In any event, the post-conviction court concluded, and we agree,

that the Petitioner failed to establish prejudice. At the post-conviction hearing, counsel

testified that he filed the motion out of an abundance of caution, but after the court denied

the motion he did not have “any problem zealously representing [the Petitioner].” Further,

at the hearing on the motion to withdraw, the State clarified that counsel’s former client had

nothing to do with the Petitioner’s current case and would not be called as a witness.

Although the Petitioner testified that he believed counsel should have further pursued the

motion to withdraw, there is no evidence in the record to confirm an actual conflict of

We need not determine whether the search of the vehicle violated the Petitioner’s constitutional

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rights because his guilty plea waived any such complaint. See, e.g., State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 543

(Tenn. 1999) (“[T]he voluntary entry of an informed and counseled guilty plea . . . waives all nonjurisdictional defects and constitutional irregularities which may have existed prior to the entry of the guilty

plea.” (citing Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tenn. 1997)). Our analysis turns on the conduct of

counsel and whether his decision to not file a motion to suppress “falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. 

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interest or establish that counsel’s performance was impeded by the possible conflict.

Rather, counsel successfully negotiated a plea agreement for the minimum sentence on the

Petitioner’s Class B felony and all other charges were dismissed. In other words, the

Petitioner failed to establish that, but for counsel’s failure to withdraw, the Petitioner would

have not pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he was prejudiced

in any way by counsel’s performance.

Next, the Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective by failing to “deal honestly”

with the Petitioner. He asserts that counsel “enticed” the Petitioner to accept the plea bargain

by assuring the Petitioner that he would reserve a certified question of law regarding the

legality of the search of his vehicle. We note that the post-conviction court failed to

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specifically address this ground in either its oral findings or the written order denying relief.

Nevertheless, as discussed above, the lack of such findings does not always require reversal

of the trial court’s judgment. See Swanson, 680 S.W.2d at 489. Here, after reviewing the

record, which includes the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, testimony and evidence

presented at the post-conviction hearing, and the post-conviction court’s final holding that

the Petitioner failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that the record

is sufficient for appellate review. See Claude F. Garrett v. State, No. M2011-00333-CCAR3-PC, 2012 WL 3834898, at *24 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2012) (holding that the postconviction court’s failure to make specific findings on a particular ground did not require

reversal where the transcript of the trial and post-conviction court’s conclusion that the

petitioner failed to establish ineffective counsel provided a record sufficient for appellate

review). Thus, we will consider the substance of the Petitioner’s claim.

At the guilty plea hearing, the Petitioner agreed with the facts as presented by the State

and informed the court he was guilty of count 1, possession of a Schedule II substance for

resale. The State explained that per the agreement the Petitioner “will receive a sentence of

12 years at 35 percent as a Range II offender[.]” The court and the Petitioner then had the

following colloquy:

COURT: [Petitioner], did you hear what [the ADA] just said?

PETITIONER: Yes, sir.

COURT: Is that what you have agreed to?

We note that the Petitioner’s claim is solely one of ineffective assistance of counsel. Interestingly, 4

he does not contest the validity of his guilty plea or assert that it was involuntary or unknowing. 

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PETITIONER: Yes, sir.

COURT: Did [counsel] negotiate that agreement for you and explain it to

you before you signed the Petition to Plead Guilty we talked

about?

PETITIONER: Yes, sir.

COURT: Do you want me to accept your plea of guilty pursuant to that

agreement?

PETITIONER: Yes, sir.

. . . .

COURT: Has anybody promised you anything to get you to plea[d] guilty

that has not [been] stated out loud in court today.

PETITIONER: No, sir.

. . . .

COURT: Do you understand that by pleading guilty there would be no

further trial of any kind so that by pleading guilty you are

waiving your right to trial, to jury trial and to appeal?

PETITIONER: Yes, sir.

. . . .

COURT: Is anything [counsel] could have done to research or investigate

or otherwise work on the case that you can think of that

[counsel] has not done?

PETITIONER: No, sir.

COURT: Do you have any questions about anything that has been said or

done in court today?

PETITIONER: No, sir.

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At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner testified that he only pleaded guilty

because counsel assured him that he would reserve a question of law to appeal regarding the

legality of the search of his vehicle. He acknowledged, however, that neither the State nor

his counsel mentioned a certified question of law as a condition of the agreement at the guilty

plea hearing, and agreed that he did not tell the court of such a condition. Counsel, on the

other hand, testified that he “never” told the Petitioner he would reserve a certified question

of law for appeal and he noted that such a condition would have to be made part of the

agreement and stated out loud at the guilty plea hearing. He confirmed that there was no

mention of the certified question during the guilty plea hearing and reiterated that he never

discussed an appeal with the Petitioner.

Notwithstanding the Petitioner’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing, we are

unpersuaded that counsel “enticed” the Petitioner to plead guilty by falsely assuring the

Petitioner he would reserve a certified question of law. We note that a petitioner’s testimony

at a guilty plea hearing “constitute[s] a formidable barrier” in any subsequent collateral

proceeding because “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of

verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). Here, the Petitioner heard the terms

of the agreement read out loud in court at the guilty plea hearing and assured the court that

there were no additional promises made to him that were not stated in the agreement.

Nothing in the record dispels the reliability of the Petitioner’s testimony at the guilty plea

hearing. Further, although the post-conviction court failed to make a specific finding as to

this claim, it is evident from its findings on related issues that it accredited the testimony of

counsel over that of the Petitioner. In stark contrast to the Petitioner’s testimony at the postconviction hearing, counsel testified that he never discussed an appeal with the Petitioner and

confirmed that it was not part of the plea agreement. Based on the record, we conclude that

the Petitioner has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.

Finally, the Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective by failing to seek

disqualification of the prosecutor. Disqualification of a prosecutor in a criminal case is

required where there is “an actual conflict of interest, which includes any circumstances in

which an attorney cannot exercise his or her independent professional judgment free of

compromising interests or loyalties.” State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tenn. 2000).

Where there is no actual conflict of interest, disqualification may be required where “conduct

has created an appearance of impropriety.” Id. at 312-13. In the instant case, the Petitioner

asserts that counsel knew of the history between the ADA and the Petitioner yet failed to

make the trial court aware of “alleged grudge and litigation[,]” which he maintains

establishes ineffective assistance of counsel and “calls into question the reliability of the

outcome of the underlying proceedings.”

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At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner emphasized the fact that the ADA

refused to meet with him and told him to pick a number between 12 years and 20 years. In

contrast, counsel testified that he did not believe that the ADA disliked the Petitioner or that

there was “any vindictive prosecution involved” in the Petitioner’s case. He noted that the

ADA agreed to a minimum sentence for the Petitioner’s offense and dismissed the remaining

charges. The post-conviction court implicitly accredited the testimony of counsel over that

of the Petitioner and found “no evidence of being vindictive on [the ADA’s] part.” The court

noted that it is “very poor practice for a prosecutor to talk to the defendant” and opined that

in this particularly case it was “reasonable that [the ADA] would not want to speak to [the

Petitioner]” to avoid a subsequent lawsuit. Further, the court reasoned that there was no

prejudice to the Defendant as evidenced by the fact that he received the minimum sentence

for the Class B felony. The record does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s

findings, and supports its conclusion that counsel was not ineffective in this regard. The

Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

III. Cumulative Effect. Lastly, the Petitioner asserts that the cumulative effect of

counsel’s alleged errors deprived him of the right to a fair trial and competent representation

and, therefore, warrants reversal. The cumulative error doctrine recognizes that in some

cases there may be multiple errors committed during the trial proceedings, which standing

alone constitute harmless error; however, considered in the aggregate, these errors

undermined the fairness of the trial and require a reversal. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 76

(Tenn. 2010). However, the cumulative error doctrine properly applies only where there has

been more than one actual error. Id.; see also, Leonard v. State, No. M2006-0654-CCA-R3-

PC, 2007 WL 1946662, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2007) (“[A] Petitioner who has

failed to show that he received constitutionally deficient representation on any single issue

may not successfully claim that his constitutional right to counsel was violated by the

cumulative effect of such counsel’s errors.”). Because the Petitioner has failed to prove

deficient representation on any issue, he cannot successfully claim that the cumulative effect

of counsel’s performance violated his constitutional rights. The Petitioner is not entitled to

relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and analysis, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

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CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE

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