United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-60502

Summary Calendar

____________

Rosa Del Carmen Guerrero Castillo; Oroncio 

Gutierrez Guerrero; Tadeo Manuel Gutierrez 

Guerrero; Oracio Juventino Gutierrez Guerrero, 

Petitioners,

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent.

______________________________

Petition for Review from an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency Nos. A098 499 688, 

A215 817 300, A215 817 301, 

A215 817 302

______________________________

Before Barksdale, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Rosa Del Carmen Guerrero Castillo, her husband, and their minor 

children are natives and citizens of Mexico. They petition for review of the 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 25, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of their appeal from an 

immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of: asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). (Although 

Guerrero and her husband both filed applications for asylum and both listed 

their children as derivatives, Guerrero was designated lead applicant by the 

IJ and BIA.)

Our court reviews the BIA’s decision and consider the IJ’s ruling only 

to the extent it influenced the BIA. E.g., Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 

511, 517 (5th Cir. 2012). Review of legal conclusions is de novo. E.g., id. 

Findings of fact, including an applicant’s ineligibility for asylum, withholding 

of removal, and CAT relief, are reviewed under the substantial-evidence 

standard. E.g., Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006). “Under 

the substantial evidence standard, reversal is improper unless we decide not 

only that the evidence supports a contrary conclusion, but also that the 

evidence compels it.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 

To establish eligibility for asylum, Guerrero was required to show, 

inter alia, membership in her proposed particular social group (PSG) was or 

would be “at least one central reason for persecuting” her. Gonzales-Veliz v. 

Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). 

The BIA found Guerrero did not show she would be targeted because of her 

membership in the proposed PSGs of “avocado grower or growers in 

Mexico” and “landowners in Mexico”. The IJ and BIA found neither 

Guerrero nor her husband owns land in Mexico. The BIA refused to consider 

whether she was persecuted on account of imputed land ownership because 

she did not present that contention to the IJ. 

Guerrero does not challenge the BIA’s refusal to consider the 

contention. She asserts only that she established the requisite nexus between 

the persecution and her imputed landowner status. Guerrero has therefore 

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forfeited any challenge to the cognizability of her imputed land ownership, 

which is dispositive of her asylum claim. See Chambers v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 

445, 448 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining unbriefed issues are abandoned); 

Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 224 (outlining required asylum showing). 

Because Guerrero fails to demonstrate her eligibility for asylum, she 

also fails to satisfy her higher burden for withholding of removal. See, e.g.,

Munoz-Granados v. Barr, 958 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[O]ne who fails 

to show entitlement to asylum fails to show entitlement to withholding of 

removal”.).

For CAT relief, Guerrero must show she, more likely than not, would 

be tortured with governmental acquiescence if repatriated. E.g., Morales v. 

Sessions, 860 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2017). The BIA found, inter alia, that 

Guerrero did not show the Mexican government acquiesced to her 

kidnapping and assault. Guerrero does not present the requisite evidence 

compelling a contrary conclusion. See Chen, 470 F.3d at 1134 (outlining 

substantial-evidence standard); Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 540 (5th Cir. 

2009) (explaining, when considering issue under substantial-evidence 

standard, “[w]hile we might have viewed the evidence differently, we cannot 

say that no reasonable factfinder could come to the same conclusion as the 

IJ”); Qorane v. Barr, 919 F.3d 904, 911 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Generalized country 

evidence tells us little about the likelihood state actors will torture any 

particular person, including [the petitioner].”). 

DENIED. 

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