United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 11-2151

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota.

Calvin Ray Washington, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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Submitted: February 13, 2012

Filed: May 2, 2012

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Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Calvin Ray Washington violated the terms of his supervised release and was

sentenced to twenty-one months’ imprisonment, with no supervised release to follow. 

He appeals, arguing that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. We

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affirm. 

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of 1

Minnesota.
I.

In July 2009, Washington pleaded guilty to possession of stolen mail, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. He was sentenced to fourteen months’ imprisonment,

followed by three years’ supervised release. Washington was released from custody

on January 27, 2010, and began his term of supervision. The mandatory conditions 2

of his release included that “[t]he defendant shall not commit another federal, state,

or local crime.” Designated R. 8 (terms ofsupervised release). As a special condition

of supervision, Washington was also required to report for urinalysis testing.

On July 26, 2010, probation officer Joi Kvern petitioned the district court to

revoke Washington’s supervised release, asserting thatWashington had been arrested

in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the offense of burglary of a business. Kvern later

filed two amended petitions: the first stated that Washington had failed to report for

urinalysis testing appointments, and the second alleged that Washington had been

arrested in St. Paul, Minnesota, for possession of theft tools. The district court held 2

a final revocation hearing on May 12, 2011. Washington admitted that he failed to

report for urinalysis testing, but denied that he committed burglary of a business. 

At the final revocation hearing, Kvern testified regarding her supervision of

Washington, the petitions she had filed, and certain special conditions of

Washington’s release, including cognitive behavioral training and mental health

treatment. Minneapolis police officer Adam Chard testified regarding Washington’s

arrest for burglary of a business. On July 14, 2010, Chard responded to a dispatch

Washington pleaded guilty in the District of South Dakota. Following his 2

release, supervision was transferred to the District of Minnesota. 

Because of the recency of the arrest for possession of theft tools, the

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government did not offer evidence regarding that offense to prove a supervised

release violation.

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notification of an alarm sounding at a business on Hennepin Avenue. As Chard

approached the businessin his patrol car, he saw two men attempting to shove a large

safe into the front passenger seat of a Toyota Camry. Chard stopped his vehicle,

exited, drew his gun, and ordered the two men to the ground. Washington complied. 

Despite the heat of the July evening, Washington was wearing black gloves, a black

sweatsuit, and black shoes. Scuff marks led fromthe business’s back door, acrossthe

alley, to the Camry, where a large safe was partially loaded into the car. Chard found

tools and additional black clothing when he searched the car. 

The district court found that Washington had committed a state crime and that

the government had met its burden of proof that Washington violated a mandatory

condition ofsupervised release. Before imposing Washington’s sentence, the district

court stated:

[T]he Court does consider the policy statements in Chapter 7 of the

sentencing guidelines regarding violations of conditions of supervision

and the petition and the files in the matter, and pursuant to Guideline

Section 7B1.4(a) the Court has determined that . . . [t]he grade of

violation is an A with a criminal history category of III might lead to a

term of imprisonment of 18 to 24 months. 

Hr’g. Tr. 48. Defense counsel argued that a sentence of eighteen to twenty-four

months’ imprisonment was excessive, given thatWashington had complied withmost

of the requirements of his release. Recognizing that “the important part here is new

criminal behavior[,]” defense counsel explained that Washington “came to be at this

place by accident essentially” and that Washington was being paid to help an

acquaintance move. Id. at 49. Although defense counsel found Washington’s

recount of the facts “a bit too convenient,” he stated that Washington was “adamant

in the truth of his—what’s happened here.” Id. at 50. Defense counsel requested that

Washington be sentenced to nine to twelve months’ imprisonment, with no

supervision to follow. 

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In response to the district court’s inquiry whether Washington would like to

speak, Washington stated that he was trying to be a law abiding citizen, to better his

social skills, and to learn how to deal with people. He spoke regarding his

supervision and explained that he thought he “did what [he] needed to do to stay in

society.” Id. at 54.

The district court then sentenced Washington to twenty-one months’

imprisonment, stating that it had “considered the nature and circumstances of the

defendant’s offense and his history and characteristics and finds that the sentence

imposed reflects the seriousness of the offense, does promote respect for the law, and

provides just punishment for the supervised release violation.” Id. at 59. 

II.

“We review a district court’s sentence on revocation of supervised release

for . . . substantive reasonableness under the same reasonableness standard that

applies to initial sentencing proceedings.” United States v. Growden, 663 F.3d 982,

984 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quotations and citations omitted). We review the

substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), and we presume that a

sentence imposed within the advisory guideline range is substantively reasonable,

United States v. Petreikis, 551 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2009). “A district court abuses

its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence when it fails to consider a

relevant and significant factor, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper

factor, or considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in

weighing those factors.” Growden, 663 F.3d at 984 (quotations and citations

omitted). 

Washington argues that his sentence is unreasonable because it is longer than

necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. Specifically, he argues that “the

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district court gave insufficient weight to the particular difficulties engendered by his

efforts to reintegrate himself into society” and argues that the court failed to

“meaningfully weigh Mr. Washington’s consistent and persistent efforts to comply

with all of the conditions of his release.” Appellant’s Br. 10. The district court,

however, has substantial discretion in determining how to weigh the relevant factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (listing the § 3553(a)

factors to consider when revoking a term of supervised release). As set forth above,

the district court heard probation officer Kvern’s testimony regarding certain special

conditions ofWashington’s supervised release, as well as defense counsel’s argument

that Washington had substantially complied with the conditions of his release. It also

heard Washington’s explanation of his effortsto reintegrate into society. The district

court was thus cognizant of Washington’s efforts to meet his obligations. 

Washington further contends that the district court did not adequately address

its reasons for imposing the sentence. “But whether the court adequately explained

the sentence is a matter of proceduralsoundness, not substantive reasonableness, and

in any event, ‘not every reasonable argument advanced by a defendant requires a

specific rejoinder by the judge.’” United States v. Morais, 670 F.3d 889, 893 (8th

Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2008)). We

are satisfied that the record adequately supportsthe court’s guidelines-range sentence.

See Gray, 533 F.3d at 944 (“Where a sentencing judge imposes a sentence within the

advisory guideline range, ‘[c]ircumstances may well make clear’ that the judge

believed the case was typical, and ‘rest[ed] his decision upon the Commission’s own

reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence.’” (quoting Rita v. United

States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007)).

III.

The sentence is affirmed. 

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