Filed 11/20/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re K.M., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES 

AGENCY,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.O. et al.,

 Defendants and Appellants.

 G051656

 (Super. Ct. No. DP024561)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Craig E. 

Arthur, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant B.O.

Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant W.M.
2

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and Karen L. Christensen, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for the Minor.

* * *

B.O. (Mother) and W.M. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court‟s order 

terminating their parental rights to their three-year-old daughter K.M. The sole issue 

raised on appeal concerns Orange County Social Services‟ (SSA) lack of inquiry 

regarding K.M.‟s American Indian heritage as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act 

(ICWA). SSA admits it failed to comply with the ICWA requirements. Rather than 

stipulating to a limited reversal and having the matter returned to the trial court for 

further proceedings, SSA sought an immediate do-over in the trial court while the matter 

was still pending on appeal. 

With its briefing on appeal, SSA filed a motion asking us to consider 

evidence of that hearing and the juvenile court‟s order concerning SSA‟s ICWA 

investigation and remedial efforts at notification. SSA contends we must dismiss this 

appeal because Mother and Father‟s issues on appeal were rendered moot by the 

postjudgment activities. We disagree. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the 

ICWA issue following its termination of parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, 

subd. (i)(1).)

1

 Because the juvenile court‟s postjudgment ICWA order is void, this appeal 

is not moot. And due to the undisputed ICWA violations, we order a limited reversal of 

the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings. 

I

A. ICWA Violation

SSA concedes that at Mother‟s first court appearance in March 2014, she 

informed the juvenile court she may have American Indian heritage through her maternal 

 

1

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, 

unless otherwise indicated.
3

grandmother, Marlene W. The court ordered SSA to investigate the matter. It failed to 

do so. 

In SSA‟s subsequent reports dated May 20, 2014, and September 23, 2014, 

the social worker stated ICWA “may apply” but also noted Mother denied American 

Indian heritage in prior child abuse investigations. In December 2014, after the section 

366.26 hearing (hereafter .26 hearing) was scheduled, SSA prepared a report stating 

ICWA did not apply. In a status review report prepared one month before the 

.26 hearing, in February 2015, the social worker again noted ICWA did not apply. At the 

.26 hearing held on March 18, 2015, the juvenile court did not mention ICWA in its 

minute order terminating parental rights. 

Mother and Father filed separate notices of appeal, and their opening briefs 

filed in early June 2015 raised the issue of inadequate notice and violations of ICWA. In 

its briefing, SSA concedes there was inadequate notice and violations of ICWA. Indeed, 

the record reflects there was no notice or investigation before judgment was entered. 

Accordingly, the juvenile court‟s order terminating parental rights is reversed and the

matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order SSA to provide the 

appropriate tribes with proper notice of the proceedings under ICWA. If, after receiving 

notice under ICWA, no tribe indicates K.M. is an Indian child within the meaning of the 

statutory scheme, then the juvenile court shall reinstate the order terminating parental 

rights. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

B. Motions

On September 11, 2015, SSA filed its respondent‟s brief, making extensive 

references to the information contained in its concurrently filed motion to augment the 

record and take additional evidence, and dismiss the appeal as moot. For reasons we now 

explain, we grant the Code of Civil Procedure section 909 motion to take additional 

evidence (hereafter 909 motion), deny the motion to augment, and deny the motion to 

dismiss the appeal. 
4

In its motions, SSA asserted it now possessed documentation and reports 

that resolved the parents‟ ICWA concerns and, thus, rendered the appeal moot. SSA 

explained it “reinitiated ICWA inquiry and notice efforts” in July 2015 (after Mother and 

Father filed their opening briefs in this appeal) and the trial court reappointed counsel for 

both parents for the limited purpose of ICWA notices and findings. On August 31, 2015, 

SSA filed the ICWA documentation it sent to several tribes along with copies of the 

return receipts. It supplied response letters from several Cherokee tribes declining K.M. 

for tribal membership. 

SSA attached several supporting documents to its motion. First SSA 

provided a copy of the juvenile court‟s minute order, dated July 10, 2015, containing the 

following statements: (1) the court read, considered, and signed a “third page stipulation 

submitted this date”; (2) the court makes orders and findings pursuant to the stipulation; 

(3) “Due to inadvertence, ICWA findings were not properly made in this matter”; (4) the 

court schedules a ICWA compliance and findings hearing for July 16, 2015; and (5) the 

court reappoints counsel to represent the parents. A copy of the stipulation referred to in 

the order is not attached as an exhibit to SSA‟s 909 motion.

Second, SSA provided a copy of the juvenile court‟s minute order dated 

August 31, 2015. The minute order stated that at “first call” the court noted ICWA was 

not previously addressed, documentation had been filed, and notice was given to all 

appropriate tribes. The court determined ICWA did not apply. The minute order next 

indicated Mother‟s counsel requested a “second call” of the matter. During the second 

call Mother‟s counsel requested the court “vacate” the previous order regarding ICWA 

and continue the matter one day because the matter was “currently under appeal.” The 

court agreed to suspend the order ICWA did not apply and trailed the hearing to the 

following day. 

The minute order dated September 1, 2015, stated the juvenile court 

considered argument. The order added, “counsel for Mother objects to the court making 
5

any further orders regarding ICWA [pursuant to section] 366.26[, subdivision] (i)(1), as 

stated on the record.” Father‟s counsel joined in the objections. The minute order stated

the court heard argument from minor‟s counsel and county counsel “as stated on the 

record.” The court lifted the temporary suspension of the ICWA orders and restated its 

finding ICWA does not apply. SSA did not provide a copy of the reporter‟s transcript 

describing the exact nature of the arguments, objections, and discussions made at either 

postjudgment hearing. 

Finally, in support of the motion, county counsel, Mark Sanchez, submitted 

a declaration stating he represented SSA in the trial court and parents did not challenge 

“the sufficiency or content of SSA‟s renewed notice efforts” but focused their arguments 

on the nature of the proceedings. Sanchez declared the parents objected to the ICWA 

findings on the grounds the ruling was improperly made after termination of parental 

rights and while an appeal was pending. 

The parents filed separate motions opposing SSA‟s motions. Mother‟s 

counsel asserted postjudgment evidence is generally rejected by a reviewing court. (In re 

Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) In addition, Mother maintained SSA‟s ICWA 

evidence is insufficient to prove the appeal is moot: “It is alarming that missing from the 

[postjudgment] evidence were the reporter‟s transcripts” for the August 31 and 

September 1 hearings. Counsel maintains the legal arguments made on the record both 

days should have been disclosed. 

Mother‟s counsel speculates, “What is also apparent is that [SSA] is 

attempting to do anything it can to avoid a reversal by this [c]ourt. [SSA] concedes 

ICWA notice was not sent as required by law. . . . If [SSA] wanted to remedy this issue in 

the fastest most efficient manner, [SSA] should have stipulated to a limited ICWA 

reversal, and an expedited remittitur. The solution attempted by [SSA] deprives the 

parents and child of due process because they will be deprived [of] oversight or review 

by this [c]ourt as to the adequacy of the new ICWA investigations and notices. SSA 
6

already got it wrong at least one time in this case.” Counsel argued the ICWA notices 

were missing important information and were inadequate. Counsel explained this court 

cannot review the objections or argument made at the hearing because no reporter‟s 

transcripts were provided. Finally, counsel asserted the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction 

to hear the ICWA issue while it was on appeal. Father‟s counsel raised the same 

objections and added it would be improper for this court to take judicial notice or accept 

the new evidence. 

The first issue we must decide is whether the new evidence can be reviewed 

by this court and by what mechanism. SSA seeks to augment the record with events 

occurring six months after the termination order, creating a new record rather than 

completing the appellate record is this case. The request to augment with a new record is 

inappropriate. “Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials 

not before the trial court. [Citations.] [R]ather, normally „when reviewing the 

correctness of a trial court‟s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters 

which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.‟ [Citation.]” (Vons 

Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 (Vons).) The

augmentation procedure cannot be used to bring up matters occurring during the 

pendency of the appeal because those matters are outside the superior court record. (See 

also Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 

2015) ¶ 5:134, p. 5-45.) 

Similarly, taking judicial notice is not a viable solution. Reviewing courts 

generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court absent 

exceptional circumstances. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 444, fn.3.) Moreover, judicial 

notice may be taken of the existence of court documents but not the truth of factual 

findings made in other court rulings. (See Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 

192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768.) 
7

Code of Civil Procedure section 909 permits appellate courts to make 

independent factual findings and take additional evidence on appeal.

2

 Postjudgment 

evidence may also be used to show that the appeal, or an issue involved, is moot. 

(See also Eisenberg et al., supra, ¶ 5:184.5, p. 5-68.) We recognize our Supreme Court in 

In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413, held a reviewing court could not consider new 

postjudgment evidence for the purpose of reversing an order terminating parental rights. 

However, our case is distinguishable because SSA is not seeking to introduce evidence to 

overturn the order terminating parental rights. Rather, SSA believes the evidence proves

the appeal is moot. “[T]he beneficial consequence of motions to dismiss, where granted, 

will be to „expedit[e] the proceedings and promot[e] the finality of the juvenile court‟s 

orders and judgment‟ [citation]—precisely the policy advanced by our ruling in Zeth S.”

(In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676.) We therefore grant the motion, and 

consider the new evidence, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 909.

But this is a hollow victory for SSA. We conclude SSA‟s new evidence of 

an ICWA ruling does not render the appeal moot because the juvenile court lacked 

jurisdiction to rule on any collateral dispute of the termination order. Under section 

366.26, subdivision (i)(1), “a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to modify or revoke an 

order terminating parental rights once it has become final.” (In re Jerred H. (2004) 

 

2

That section provides the following: “In all cases where trial by jury is not a 

matter of right . . . the reviewing court may make factual determinations contrary to or in 

addition to those made by the trial court. The factual determinations may be based on the 

evidence adduced before the trial court either with or without the taking of evidence by 

the reviewing court. The reviewing court may for the purpose of making the factual 

determinations or for any other purpose in the interests of justice, take additional 

evidence of or concerning facts occurring at any time prior to the decision of the appeal, 

and may give or direct the entry of any judgment or order and may make any further or 

other order as the case may require. This section shall be liberally construed to the end 

among others that, where feasible, causes may be finally disposed of by a single appeal 

and without further proceedings in the trial court except where in the interests of justice a 

new trial is required on some or all of the issues.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 909.)
8

121 Cal.App.4th 793, 796 [juvenile court could not grant child‟s petition to reinstate 

parental rights or declare child‟s stepfather his presumed father because the rights of all 

possible parents were terminated].) The statute mandates, “Any order of the court 

permanently terminating parental rights under this section shall be conclusive and 

binding upon the child, upon the parent or parents and upon all other persons who have 

been served with citation by publication or otherwise as provided in this chapter. After 

making the order, the juvenile court shall have no power to set aside, change, or modify 

it, . . . but nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the right to appeal the order.”

Thus, the Legislature has expressly prohibited the collateral dispute of a termination 

order, and the order may be reviewed only by direct appeal. (See e.g. In re Jacob E. 

(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 909, 925 [court lacks jurisdiction to make visitation order 

following termination of mother‟s parental rights because having failed to appeal 

termination order, mother‟s attempt to obtain visitation was “in substance a collateral 

attack on the termination of her parental rights”]; In re Rachel M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 

1289, 1297 [writ of error coram vobis not proper mechanism to overturn termination of 

parental rights order absent evidence of extrinsic fraud].) 

As explained in In re Ronald V. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1803, 1806-1807

(Ronald V.), if the juvenile court considers a collateral dispute of a termination order, any 

resulting action will be deemed void as an act in excess of the court‟s jurisdiction. In that 

case, the mother agreed to the termination of her parental rights on the understanding the 

prospective adoptive father would permit the mother to continue her relationship with the 

child. After the adoptive father died, the mother filed a petition for modification of the 

order terminating her parental rights. (Id. at p. 1805.) The juvenile court denied the 

petition. (Ibid.) The appellate court held former section 366.26, subdivision (h), now 

section 366.26, subdivision (i), precludes modification of an order terminating parental 

rights. “Having failed to appeal from the termination order, [the mother‟s] petition to 

modify the permanency planning order was in substance a collateral attack on the 
9

termination of her parental rights. She was asking the court to give her de facto parent

status and visitation rights, in addition to changing the plan for [the minor] from adoption 

to long-term foster care or guardianship. She was, in short, asking the juvenile court to 

do what it no longer had the jurisdiction to do—namely to undo the termination of her 

parental rights and reinstate her now as a de facto parent to [the minor]. [Former] 

[s]ubdivision (h) of section 366.26 specifically states that once the termination order 

issues the court has „no power‟ to „modify it.‟ The lower court had no jurisdiction to hear 

the section 388 motion, because in this instance the motion was nothing more than a 

collateral attack, made after the time to appeal had elapsed, on the order terminating 

parental rights.” (Ronald V., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1806.) 

In its disposition of the appeal in Ronald V., the court held the juvenile 

court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition and declared the order denying the 

petition void. (Ronald V., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1807.) However, it did not dismiss 

the appeal because it determined the void order was appealable as on order after 

judgment. (Id. at p. 1807, fn. 2.) We apply the same reasoning here.

In the case before us, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to consider SSA 

belated remedial ICWA efforts because it was in substance a collateral attack on the 

termination order. Compliance with ICWA is required before terminating parental rights. 

(In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, 1424 [“failure to provide the required 

notice requires remand”].) Moreover, if the new evidence revealed K.M. was an Indian 

child, as defined by ICWA, the juvenile court would have been required to invalidate 

prior orders taken in violation of ICWA, i.e., reverse the termination of parental rights. 

(In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 476.) Section 366.26, subdivision (i),

clearly states juvenile courts lack jurisdiction to modify or revoke an order terminating 

parental rights. Accordingly, the court‟s ICWA order is void.

As aptly noted by one treatise, Seiser and Kumli, California Juvenile Court 

Practice and Procedure (2015) section 2.125[2][b], page 2-380, “The single most 
10

common reason for reversal in dependency cases involving children who may be of 

Indian heritage is the failure of the social services department and the juvenile court to 

follow the California requirements for inquiry and notice to Indian tribes . . . .” In other 

words, ICWA notice deficiencies are not a new issue for SSA. The most expeditious and 

efficient way to solve this problem is for the parties to stipulate to a limited reversal and 

an expedited remittitur.

3

III

We conclude the juvenile court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in 

revisiting the termination order while the matter was being reviewed on appeal pursuant 

to section 366.26, subdivision (i). SSA‟s new evidence and the juvenile court‟s 

postjudgment order have no relevance to the subject of this appeal, i.e., review of the 

termination order. Accordingly, the juvenile court‟s judgment terminating parental rights 

is reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order SSA 

to provide the appropriate tribes with proper notice of the proceedings under ICWA. If, 

after receiving notice under ICWA, no tribe indicates K.M. is an Indian child within the 

meaning of the statutory scheme, then the juvenile court shall reinstate the order 

terminating parental rights. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Mother‟s and 

SSA‟s requests we take judicial notice are granted. SSA‟s request we take additional 

 

3 We grant Mother‟s and SSA‟s requests to take judicial notice of a new 

notice of appeal Mother filed challenging the court‟s postjudgment ICWA order. In light 

of our holding reversing and remanding the matter for a new hearing, it appears Mother‟s 

new appeal will be rendered moot. 
11

evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909 is granted. All other motions are 

denied.

O‟LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FYBEL, J.

IKOLA, J.