[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-14868

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00118-SCB-SPF-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 versus

CARL GOLDEN, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(August 26, 2019)

Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Carl Golden appeals his 180-month enhanced sentence under the Armed 

Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for being a felon in possession of a firearm in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). While he recognizes that his 

arguments are foreclosed by our precedent, Golden nevertheless asserts (1) that his 

prior convictions for robbery under Florida Statute § 812.13 and aggravated assault 

under Florida Statute § 784.021 don’t constitute “violent felonies” under the 

ACCA, and (2) that his convictions for delivery and sale of controlled substances 

under Florida Statute § 893.13 don’t constitute “serious drug offenses” under the 

ACCA. After careful review, we affirm. 

I

As to his “violent felony” convictions, Golden contends (1) that the Florida 

robbery statute at the time of his conviction—which was prior to the Florida 

Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997)

(holding that robbery required resistance and overpowering of a victim)—doesn’t 

meet the minimal amount of force required to constitute a “violent felony” under 

the ACCA, and (2) that the Florida aggravated-assault statute allows for a lesser

mens rea—i.e., recklessness—than is required under the ACCA. 

We review de novo whether a prior conviction is a violent felony under the 

ACCA. United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1338 (11th Cir. 2016). 

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Unfortunately for Golden, both of his “violent felony” arguments are 

directly foreclosed by our precedent. We have held that a pre-Robinson felony

conviction for robbery under Florida Statute § 812.13(1) constitutes a “violent 

felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause. United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 

941 (11th Cir. 2016). As the Fritts Court explained, rather than announcing a new 

rule of law, Robinson simply stated what the statute “always meant”—i.e., that the 

Florida robbery statute never included a theft by mere snatching, but rather had 

always required the use of force. Id. at 942–43. The Supreme Court’s decision in 

Stokeling v. United States—which considered pre- and post-Robinson periods

together in concluding that Florida robbery qualifies as a “violent felony”—

supports this conclusion. 139 S. Ct. 544, 550–55 (2019).

We have also held that an aggravated assault conviction under Florida

Statute § 784.021 constitutes a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements 

clause. Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium), 709 F.3d 1328, 1337–39 (11th 

Cir. 2013). Moreover, we have specifically rejected the argument that Florida’s 

aggravated assault statute fails as a predicate offense under the ACCA because it 

could be accomplished with a mens rea of recklessness. United States v. 

Deshazior, 882 F.3d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1255 

(2019) (citing Turner, 709 F.3d at 1337–38). 

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So in short, the district court correctly followed our precedent in 

concluding that Golden’s Florida robbery and aggravated-assault convictions

constitute “violent felonies” under the ACCA. Fritts, 841 F.3d at 944;

Turner, 709 F.3d at 1341. 

II

As to his convictions for delivery and sale of a controlled substance under 

Florida Statute § 893.13, Golden asserts that they don’t constitute “serious drug 

offenses” under the ACCA because (1) these offenses were presumably committed 

through mere purchase, and (2) they lack the necessary renumeration element to 

qualify under the ACCA. 

Although we generally review de novo the question whether a prior 

conviction is a predicate offense under the ACCA, Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 

at 1338, we review objections or arguments not raised in the district court 

for plain error. United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 

2013) (per curiam). To prevail under the plainerror standard, an appellant 

must show, among other things, that an error occurred and that the error was 

plain. United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 822 (11th Cir. 2014). 

If a statute fails to specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error 

without precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it. 

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United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (per 

curiam).

Again, Golden’s arguments are squarely foreclosed by our precedent. We 

have held that violations of Florida Statute § 893.13(1) constitute “serious 

drug offenses” under the ACCA, even in the absence of a mens rea

requirement. United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Furthermore, Golden’s remuneration argument isn’t supported by a 

plain reading of the statutory language. Although the Supreme Court held in 

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 193–94 (2013), that a conviction under 

a Georgia statute prohibiting possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute—and that doesn’t require remuneration—isn’t necessarily an 

“aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the 

ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” differs from the INA’s 

definition of “aggravated felony” in that the ACCA requires only “an 

offense under State law,” punishable by at least 10 years in prison, involving 

the “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or 

distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Florida’s 

delivery-of-cocaine statute, under which Golden was convicted, satisfies this 

definition as a state offense punishable by up to 15 years that prohibits the 

sale, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to sell, manufacture, or 

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deliver cocaine. See Fla. Stat. §§ 893.03, 893.13(1)(a) (2019). And in any 

event, even if Golden could prove that the district court’s decision was in 

error, he couldn’t demonstrate plain error because there is no binding

precedent from this Court contradicting the district court’s conclusion. See 

Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d at 822; Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d at 1291. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, Golden’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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