[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 249 (Friday, December 29, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 90212-90216]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28778]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286; NRC-2022-0223]


Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, 
LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Nuclear Energy 
Center; Exemption

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued 
exemptions in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning 
International, LLC that would permit it, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, 
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC, to reduce certain emergency planning 
(EP) requirements. The exemptions eliminate the requirements to 
maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness plan and reduce 
the scope of onsite EP activities at the Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, collectively referred to as the 
Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC), based on the reduced risks of 
accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a 
decommissioning nuclear power reactor.

DATES: The exemption was issued on November 1, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2022-0223 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2022-0223. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2073544143590e734348554d414e4e604e52430e474f56"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="63301702001a4d30000b160e020d0d230d11004d040c15">[email protected]</span></a>. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information 
Contact section of this document.
    <bullet> NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, 
or by email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7e2e3a2c502c1b0d110b0c1d1b3e100c1d50191108"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="560612047804332539232435331638243578313920">[email protected]</span></a>. The ADAMS accession number for 
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the 
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
    <bullet> NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an 
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#68382c3a463a0d1b071d1a0b0d28061a0b460f071e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="7b2b3f2955291e08140e09181e3b150918551c140d">[email protected]</span></a> or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8 
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-8534; email: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#fbb09a8997d5a88f8e89819e999e98939e89bb958998d59c948d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a3e8c2d1cf8df0d7d6d1d9c6c1c6c0cbc6d1e3cdd1c08dc4ccd5">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:  The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated: December 26, 2023.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of 
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of 
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, 
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 
Nos. 1, 2, and 3; Exemption

I. Background

    Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) Units 1, 2, and 3, are 
decommissioning power reactors located on approximately 239 acres of 
land on the east bank of the Hudson River at the Village of Buchanan in 
upper Westchester County, New York. The

[[Page 90213]]

licensee, Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), is the 
holder of IPEC Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-5, DPR-26, and DFP-
64. The licenses provide, among other things, that the facility is 
subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or 
hereafter in effect.
    Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased 
generation on October 31, 1974, and all fuel was removed from the IP1 
reactor vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the NRC issued an order 
approving the safe-storage condition of IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued 
Amendment No. 52 to IP1's provisional operating license that changed 
the license's expiration date to be consistent with that of the Indian 
Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2) license at that time. 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer authorizes 
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the 
reactor vessel. HDI states that there is no IP1 spent fuel in wet 
storage at the IPEC site; IP1 spent fuel is stored onsite in dry cask 
storage in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
    By letter dated February 8, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17044A004), 
Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 
3, LLC (the IPEC licensees at that time, collectively, ``Entergy'') 
certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power 
operations at IP2 and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) 
by April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. By letters dated 
May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021 (ML20113J902 and ML21131A157, 
respectively), Entergy certified to the NRC that power operations 
permanently ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30, 2020, and April 30, 
2021, respectively. In the same letters, Entergy certified to the NRC 
that the fuel was permanently removed from the IP2 and IP3 reactor 
vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 spent fuel pools (SFPs) as of May 
12, 2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively.
    Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent 
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor 
vessel, as specified in title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating 
license for IPEC (Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64) no longer authorizes 
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the 
reactor vessel. The facility is still authorized to possess, and store 
irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored 
onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the SFPs and in a dry cask 
ISFSI.
    Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety 
analysis reports (USARs) for operating power reactors involve failures 
or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the reactor 
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the 
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent 
cessation of power operations at IPEC and the permanent removal of the 
fuel from the reactor vessels, many accidents are no longer possible. 
The reactors, reactor coolant system (RCS), and supporting systems are 
no longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of 
the irradiated fuel. Therefore, the emergency planning (EP) provisions 
for postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the 
reactors, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear 
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have 
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no 
explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a 
power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for 
a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP 
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning 
status of the facility, HDI must obtain exemptions from those EP 
regulations. Only then can HDI modify the IPEC Emergency Plan to 
reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and 
defueled condition of IPEC.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated December 22, 2021 (ML21356B693), revised February 
1, 2022 (ML22033A348), HDI requested exemptions from certain EP 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 for IPEC. Specifically, HDI requested 
exemptions from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding 
onsite and offsite radiological emergency plans for nuclear power 
reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require 
establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway EP zones for 
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, section IV, which establish the elements that comprise 
the content of emergency plans. In a letter dated February 1, 2022 
(ML22032A017), HDI provided responses to the NRC staff's requests for 
additional information (RAI) concerning the proposed exemptions.
    The information provided by HDI included justifications for each 
exemption requested. The exemptions requested by HDI would eliminate 
the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency 
plans, reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under 
the requirements of 44 CFR, ``Emergency Management and Assistance,'' 
part 350, ``Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological 
Emergency Plans and Preparedness,'' and reduce the scope of onsite EP 
activities at IPEC. HDI stated that application of all the standards 
and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E are not needed for adequate emergency response 
capability, based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite 
radiological consequences of accidents still possible at the 
permanently shutdown and defueled facility, as compared to an operating 
facility. If offsite protective actions were needed for a highly 
unlikely beyond-design-basis accident that could challenge the safe 
storage of spent fuel at IPEC, provisions exist for offsite agencies to 
take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan 
(CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to protect the health and 
safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an 
emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in FEMA's Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and Maintaining Emergency 
Operations Plans.'' Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the 
foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United 
States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-
informed planning and decision-making and helps planners at all levels 
of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-
hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use 
in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be 
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific 
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and 
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be 
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards 
planning.

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50 when: (1) the exemptions

[[Page 90214]]

are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health 
or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are 
present. These special circumstances include, among other things, that 
the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would 
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to 
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
    As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the 
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has 
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the 
reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible 
accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. 
However, current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power 
reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological 
release from credible emergency accident scenarios is significantly 
reduced. The reduced risk is largely the result of the low frequency of 
credible events that could challenge the SFP structure, and the reduced 
decay heat and reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory due to decay. 
The NRC's NUREG/CR- 6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of 
Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated 
August 31, 1997 (ML082260098) and NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of 
Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' dated February 28, 2001 (ML010430066), confirmed that for 
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors bounded by the 
assumptions and conditions in the reports, the risk of offsite 
radiological release is significantly less than that for an operating 
power reactor.
    In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by HDI, have 
been granted to licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power 
reactors. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all 
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify 
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific 
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled 
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions from 
certain EP requirements was based on the licensee's demonstration that: 
(1) the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents would not 
exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 
Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary, and 
(2) in the unlikely event of a beyond- design-basis accident resulting 
in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the 
SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating 
actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities to implement offsite 
protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and 
safety of the public. Based on prior exemption requests, the NRC has 
generally approved such exemptions when the site-specific analysis 
demonstrates that there is sufficient time following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory until the onset of fuel damage to implement onsite 
mitigation of the loss of SFP coolant inventory and if necessary, to 
implement offsite protective actions. In prior exemptions, sufficient 
time was demonstrated if the time exceeded 10 hours from the loss of 
coolant until the fuel temperature would be expected to reach 900 
degrees Celsius ([deg]C), assuming no air cooling.
    With respect to design-basis-accidents at IPEC, the licensee 
provided analysis demonstrating that 15 months following permanent 
cessation of power operations, the radiological consequences of the 
only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite 
radiological release (a fuel handling accident in the Reactor Building, 
where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at 
the exclusion area boundary. With respect to beyond-design-basis 
accidents at IPEC, HDI analyzed a beyond-design-basis accident 
involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, where adequate fuel 
handling building air exchange with the environment and air cooling of 
the stored fuel was available. HDI's analysis demonstrated that, as of 
10 hours, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to 
keep the fuel within safe temperature range, indefinitely, without fuel 
cladding damage or offsite radiological release.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the 
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and 
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) 
will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment 
of the HDI EP exemptions is described in SECY-22-0102 dated November 
18, 2022 (ML22231A160). The Commission approved the NRC staff's 
recommendation to grant the exemptions in the staff requirements 
memorandum to SECY-22-0102, dated October 24, 2023 (ML23297A027). 
Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by HDI and the NRC 
staff's basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-22-0102. 
The staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the 
specific EP exemptions requested by HDI are provided in the NRC staff's 
safety evaluation dated November 1, 2023 (ML23067A082)

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, 
section IV, which would allow HDI to revise the IPEC Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's 
proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the 
exemptions are authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety

    As stated previously, HDI provided analyses that show the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the 
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, 
formal offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR part 
50 will no longer be needed for protection of the public beyond the 
exclusion area boundary, based on the radiological consequences of 
design-basis accidents still possible at IPEC.
    Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological 
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 concludes that the 
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. 
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to the 
operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different 
sequences make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG-1738, 
relaxation of offsite EP requirements, under 10 CFR part 50, a few 
months after shutdown resulted in

[[Page 90215]]

only a small change in risk. The report further concludes that the 
change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small 
because the overall risk is low, and because even under current EP 
requirements for operating power reactors, EP was judged to have 
marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the severe earthquake 
event that dominates SFP risk. All other sequences including cask drops 
(for which offsite radiological emergency plans are expected to be more 
effective) are too low in likelihood to have a significant impact on 
risk.
    Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10 
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and to 
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present an undue risk 
to the public health and safety.

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The requested exemptions by HDI only involve EP requirements under 
10 CFR part 50 and will allow HDI to revise the IPEC Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. Physical security measures at IPEC are not affected by the 
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite 
radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite 
EP activities at IPEC will not adversely affect HDI's ability to 
physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. 
Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common 
defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, is to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway EP zones for nuclear power plants, and to ensure that 
licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite radiological emergency 
plans. The standards and requirements in these regulations were 
developed by considering the risks associated with operation of a 
nuclear power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These risks 
include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite radiological 
dose consequences.
    As discussed previously in Section Ill of this document, because 
IPEC Units 1, 2, and 3 are permanently shutdown and defueled, there 
will no longer be a risk of a significant offsite radiological release 
from a design-basis accident exceeding early phase PAGs at the 
exclusion area boundary, and the risk of a significant offsite 
radiological release from a beyond-design-basis accident is greatly 
reduced when compared to the risk at an operating power reactor. In a 
letter dated December 22, 2021 (ML21356B693), revised February 1, 2022 
(ML22033A348), the licensee provided analyses to demonstrate that the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents at IPEC will not 
exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. The 
NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at IPEC by comparing the 
generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific 
conditions at IPEC; and has determined that the risk values in NUREG-
1738 bound the risks presented by IPEC.
    In addition, the significant decay of short-lived radionuclides 
that has occurred since shutdown of IPEC provides assurance in other 
ways. As indicated by the results of research conducted for NUREG-1738 
and more recently, for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-
Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I 
Boiling Water Reactor'' (ML14255A365), while other consequences can be 
extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have little 
potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite 
radiological EP requirements were relaxed. HDI's analysis of a beyond-
design-basis accident involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, 
where adequate fuel handling building air exchange with the environment 
and air cooling of the stored fuel is available, shows that as of 10 
hours, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to keep 
the fuel within safe temperature range, indefinitely, without fuel 
cladding damage or offsite radiological release.
    The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that 
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might 
occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such 
a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be 
unavailable, which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heat up of 
the spent fuel. HDI's analysis of this beyond-design-basis accident 
shows that 15 months after shutdown, a minimum of 10 hours would be 
available between the time the fuel is initially uncovered (at which 
time adiabatic heat up is conservatively assumed to begin), until the 
fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 1652 degrees Fahrenheit ([deg]F) 
(900[deg]C), which is the temperature associated with rapid cladding 
oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release. 
This analysis conservatively does not include the period of time from 
the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all 
cooling means are lost.
    The NRC staff has verified HDI's analyses and its calculations. The 
analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested 
exemptions to HDI, there is no design- basis accident that will result 
in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the 
exclusion area boundary. In the highly unlikely event of a beyond-
design-basis accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss 
of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer, because all Units at 
IPEC have been shutdown for well over 15 months, there will be a 
minimum of 10 hours available before an offsite release might occur 
and, therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating 
actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a 
radiological release were projected to occur under this unlikely 
scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP 
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours are available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of 
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly 
reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff 
concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the 
HDI-requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours are 
available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant 
conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement 
protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite 
radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not 
necessary at permanently shut down and defueled power reactors.
    Additionally, in HDI's letters to the NRC dated December 22, 2021, 
and February 2, 2022, HDI described the SFP makeup strategies that 
could be used in

[[Page 90216]]

the event of a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple 
strategies for providing makeup water to the SFP include: using 
existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy 
between IP2 and IP3 that relies on installed Primary Water Storage 
Tank, fire water inside the SFP buildings, and fire water using a 
temporary diesel pump from outside of the SFP buildings; or an external 
strategy that uses portable pumps to initiate makeup flow into the SFPs 
through a standpipe and standard fire hoses routed to the SFPs or to a 
spray nozzle. These strategies will continue to be required as License 
Condition 2(N), ``Mitigation Strategy License Condition'' and 2(AC), 
``Mitigation Strategy License Condition'' for Units 2 and 3 
respectively. Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-
basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide 
multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or spray water to the SFP 
before the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release. 
Because of the length of time, it would take for the fuel to heat up, 
there are 10 hours available to respond to any draindown event that 
might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup or 
providing spray to the IP2 or IP3 SFPs.
    For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that HDI's 
requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of the 
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as the requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, and satisfies the special 
circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly reduced 
risk of offsite radiological consequences associated with the 
permanently shutdown and defueled state of the IPEC facility. The staff 
further concludes that the exemptions granted by this action will 
maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at IPEC and 
provide reasonable assurance that adequate offsite protective measures, 
if needed, can and will be taken by State and local government agencies 
using a CEMP approach, in the highly unlikely event of a radiological 
emergency at the IPEC facility. Since the underlying purposes of the 
rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the 
elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal 
offsite radiological emergency plans and the reduction in the scope of 
the onsite EP activities at IPEC, the special circumstances required by 
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the granting of these exemptions will not have a significant 
effect on the quality of the human environment, as discussed in the NRC 
staff's Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact 
published on October 31, 2023 (88 FR 74536).

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), that HDI's request for exemptions from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
22-0102, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense 
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants HDI exemptions from certain EP requirements of 
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, 
section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the staff's safety 
evaluation dated November 1, 2023 (ML23067A082). The exemptions are 
effective upon issuance.

    Dated: November 1, 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jane Marshall, Director,

Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety, and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 2023-28778 Filed 12-28-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


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