UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

TOZZI, CELTNIEKS, and BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Staff Sergeant RANDAL C. RUCKER 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140845 

Headquarters, Eighth Army 

Mark A. Bridges, Military Judge 

Colonel Craig A. Meredith, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial & addendum) 

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Narramore, Acting Staff Judge Advocate (recommendation) 

For Appellant: Mr. Guy L. Womack, Esquire (argued); Captain Cody D. Cheek, JA; 

Mr. Guy L. Womack, Esquire (on brief). 

For Appellee: Captain Jennifer A. Donahue, JA (argued); Lieutenant Colonel A.G. 

Courie III, JA; Major Melissa Dasgupta Smith, JA; Captain Jennifer A. Donahue, JA 

(on brief). 

8 March 2017 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per Curiam: 

A panel of officers and enlisted members sitting as a general court-martial 

convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of maltreating a 

subordinate, four specifications of abusive sexual contact, and one specification of 

assault consummated by battery in violation of Articles 93, 120, and 128, Uniform 

Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 893, 920, 928 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The 

panel sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for one year, and 

reduction to E-1. The military judge credited appellant with 30 days of confinement 

credit. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged, including the 

confinement credit. 
RUCKER—ARMY 20140845 

2

This case is before us for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellate defense 

counsel assigns three errors to this court, and appellant personally raises matters 

pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). After due 

consideration, we find the assigned errors are without merit, as are all but one of the 

matters raised under Grostefon. Specifically, appellant asks this court to provide 

appropriate relief to remedy the dilatory post-trial processing of his case. We agree 

relief is appropriate and reduce the approved sentence to confinement by thirty days in 

our decretal paragraph. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

The convening authority took action 378 days after the sentence was adjudged; 

351 days are attributable to the government. The record in this case consists of four 

volumes, and the trial transcript is 533 pages. Although we find no due process 

violation in the post-trial processing of appellant’s case, we must still review the 

appropriateness of the sentence in light of the unjustified dilatory post-trial 

processing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 (C.A.A.F. 

2002) (“[Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service courts are] required to determine 

what findings and sentence ‘should be approved,’ based on all the facts and 

circumstances reflected in the record, including the unexplained and unreasonable 

post-trial delay.”). See generally United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362-63 

(C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Ney, 68 M.J. 613, 617 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2010); 

United States v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 721, 727 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2000). 

The government took 103 days to transcribe the record of trial and serve it on 

appellant’s defense counsel for authentication. The military judge, however, did not 

receive the record of trial for authentication until 297 days after the sentence was 

adjudged. Appellant submitted no requests for speedy post-trial processing, and did 

not allege the delay constituted legal error in his post-trial submission pursuant to 

Rules for Courts-Martial 1105 and 1106. The government did not mention the delay 

in its post-trial submissions, and the convening authority approved the sentence as 

adjudged per the recommendation of the staff judge advocate. Finally, there are no 

memorandums in the record explaining this delay. Under the circumstances, we find 

relief in this case is appropriate because the delay between announcement of sentence 

and action could “adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity 

of the military justice system . . . .” Ney, 68 M.J. at 617. 
RUCKER—ARMY 20140845 

3

CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the entire record, the findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. 

Given the dilatory post-trial processing, however, we affirm only so much of the 

sentence as provides for a dishonorable discharge, confinement for eleven months, and 

reduction to E-1. All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant has been 

deprived by virtue of that portion of his sentence set aside by this decision, are 

ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58a(b), 58b(c), 75(a). 

FOR THE COURT: 

SHELLEY GOODWIN-MATHERS 

Acting Clerk of Court 

SHELLEY GOODWIN-MATHERS 

Acting Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: