[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-11283

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-02567-VEH-JEO

DERRICK AVERHART, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

WARDEN, 

COMMISSIONER KIM THOMAS,

Individually and in official capacity, 

WARDEN HEADLEY,

Individually and in official capacity, 

SGT. MASON, 

Individually and in official capacity,

COI OFFICER KENDRICK, 

Individually and in official capacity,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

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(October 24, 2014)

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Before MARCUS, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Derrick Averhart, a state prisoner, was injured when stabbed by another 

prisoner. Averhart now proceeds pro se, to appeal the district court’s order 

dismissing defendants Warden Davenport, Assistant Warden Headley, 

Commissioner Thomas, and Sergeant Mason pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Averhart also appeals

the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant, Correctional 

Officer Antwan Kendrick, on Averhart’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action: one alleging an 

Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference. Averhart raises several

issues on appeal. First, he argues that his claims against the four supervisory 

defendants should not have been dismissed because his complaint alleged that each 

was legally responsible for his safety. Second, Averhart contends that Kendrick 

acted with deliberate indifference for Averhart’s safety by failing to comply with 

several rules promulgated by the Alabama Department of Corrections, failing to 

prevent another inmate from stabbing him, and failing to intervene immediately to 

stop the attack. Third, Averhart argues that Kendrick is not entitled to qualified 

immunity because he violated Averhart’s clearly established constitutional rights 

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when Kendrick failed to intervene immediately to protect Averhart. We see no 

reversible error, and we affirm.

I. 

Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Tannenbaum v. United States, 

148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). To survive a motion to dismiss, the 

plaintiff’s complaint must contain facts sufficient to support a plausible claim to 

relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 

868 (2009). Conclusory allegations and bare legal conclusions are insufficient to 

preclude dismissal. Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1983 requires proof of a causal link between a particular defendant’s 

acts and the alleged constitutional deprivation. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 

1538 (11th Cir. 1993). Section 1983 claims may not be brought against 

supervisory officials solely on the basis of vicarious liability or respondeat 

superior. Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). A

supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 if he personally participates in the 

alleged constitutional violation or if a causal connection exists between his acts 

and the constitutional infirmity. Id.

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Averhart’s complaint about the four supervisory defendants does not allege 

facts sufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because 

respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions, Averhart fails to state a 

claim simply by alleging that Davenport, Headley, Thomas, and Mason had 

supervisory authority over Kendrick. See id. Averhart’s complaint also fails to 

allege a causal link between the acts of the supervisory defendants and the alleged 

constitutional harm. None of these supervisory defendants are alleged to have 

known in advance of an inordinate risk of attack by an inmate on Averhart. 

Averhart’s contention that the four defendants are legally responsible for his safety 

is just a legal conclusion: it is not a meaningful factual allegation and, therefore, is 

insufficient to preclude dismissal. See Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd., 297 F.3d at 1188. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1), did not err in dismissing, for failure to state a claim, Averhart’s 

claims against Davenport, Headley, Thomas, and Mason.

II. 

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and apply

the same standard used by the district court. Burton v. Tampa Housing Auth., 271 

F.3d 1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate only 

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when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In reviewing the district 

court’s decision, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burton, 271 F.3d at 1277.

A claimant is entitled to relief under § 1983 if he can prove that a person 

acting under color of state law committed an act that deprived the claimant of some 

right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit 

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health or safety. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 

U.S. 730, 737-38, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2514, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). A prison official 

acts with deliberate indifference when he consciously disregards an excessive risk 

to a prisoner’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37, 114 

S.Ct. 1970, 1978-79, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Prison officers are not guarantors of 

prisoner safety. And mere negligence is insufficient to support a finding of 

deliberate indifference. Id. at 835. Because proving deliberate indifference 

requires inferring that a prison official consciously refused to prevent the harm, we 

require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the prison official possessed both 

knowledge of the danger and the means to cure it. LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1535-37. 

A prison official’s failure to prevent inmate-on-inmate violence may constitute 

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deliberate indifference, if the prison official knew there was a substantial risk of 

serious harm and then knowingly or recklessly disregarded that risk. Hale v. 

Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582-83 (11th Cir. 1995).

From the record, this case is a random-violence case, without an allegation 

that similar inmate-on-inmate violence resulting in serious harm occurred often. 

Averhart failed to present evidence that Kendrick knew or should have known that

a substantial risk existed of serious harm to Averhart from attack by another 

inmate. See Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582-83. In addition, even assuming Kendrick was 

negligent in carrying out some of his duties, mere negligence is insufficient to 

support a finding of deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S.Ct. 

at 1978. Besides, Kendrick’s decision to run for backup before confronting the 

attacker did not constitute knowing or reckless disregard of the risk to Averhart,

considering Kendrick was unarmed, unable to radio for backup, and facing an 

armed inmate, threatening with a knife. Accordingly, we conclude that the district 

court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Kendrick on Averhart’s 

Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim.

*

AFFIRMED.

 * The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Averhart’s Eighth Amendment 

claim; Kendrick is entitled to qualified immunity, if we are mistaken on the merits of the 

constitutional claim.

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