IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0741

Filed September 25, 2019

IN THE INTEREST OF D.P.,

Minor Child,

J.P., Father,

Appellant,

J.P., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Audubon County, Amy L. Zacharias, 

Judge.

A mother and father each appeal the juvenile court order terminating their 

parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Christine Sand of Wild, Baxter & Sand, PC, Guthrie Center, for appellant 

father.

Donna Bothwell of Bothwell Law Office, Logan, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anna T. Stoeffler (until withdrawal) 

and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.

William Early, Harlan, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Greer, J., and Mahan, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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MAHAN, Senior Judge.

A mother and father each appeal the juvenile court order terminating their 

parental rights. As to the mother, we find there is clear and convincing evidence 

in the record to support termination of her parental rights, the State made 

reasonable efforts to reunite her with the child, and termination is in the child’s best 

interests. For the father, we find there is sufficient evidence to warrant termination 

of his parental rights and the juvenile court properly declined to apply any 

exceptions to termination. We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

J.P., mother, and J.P., father, are the parents of D.P., who was born in 2017. 

The parents have a history of substance abuse, mental-health problems, domestic 

violence, and criminal behavior. The child was removed from their care on April 

26, 2018, due to concerns the parents were using methamphetamine. The child 

was placed with the paternal grandparents. On June 23, 2018, the child was 

adjudicated to be in need of assistance (CINA), under Iowa Code section 

232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (n) (2018).

Both parents tested positive for methamphetamine in June 2018. Neither 

parent completed a substance-abuse treatment program. They also failed to 

participate in drug testing. The parents were not consistent in attending visitation. 

In a January 2019 permanency review order, the juvenile court noted, the parents

“have struggled over this last review period. Neither parent has made any 

progress towards sobriety except that which has been forced because they were 

incarcerated.” The court stated, “They continue to have an on again, off again 

relationship that is toxic.”
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On February 8, 2019, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate the 

parents’ rights. At the time of the termination hearing, held on April 12, 2019, the 

parents were not in a position to have the child returned to their care. The mother 

had just started a new substance-abuse treatment program and the father was in 

prison. The mother failed to come to the hearing, stating she did not have a means 

of transportation. The mother asked for more time to work on reunification. The 

father asked to have the child placed in a guardianship with his parents.

The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2019) and the father’s parental rights pursuant to 

section 232.116(1)(e), (h), and (j). The court stated:

The reality is that neither parent has shown any interest in parenting 

[the child] but simply showing up for visits and interacting with him 

for a short time. In this case, both parents remained at a fully

supervised level for visits because sobriety has not been achieved 

and the safety of [the child] cannot be guaranteed while he is in their 

care. The parents in this case are far more about their bond with 

each other rather than their bond with their child. Repeatedly, they 

chose methamphetamine and each other over [the child]. Both 

parents had to admit that they cannot have [the child] returned to 

either of their care at this time.

The court found the State made reasonable efforts to return the child to the 

parents. The court concluded termination of the parents’ rights was in the child’s 

best interests and the exceptions in section 232.116(3) should not be applied. The 

mother and father each appealed the juvenile court decision.

II. Standard of Review

Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 

764, 773 (Iowa 2012). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means there are no 

serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn 
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from the evidence.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted). 

Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 

40 (Iowa 2014).

III. Mother

A. The mother claims there is not sufficient evidence in the record to 

support termination of her parental rights. “When the juvenile court orders 

termination of parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find 

grounds to terminate on one of the sections to affirm.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 

435 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). We will consider the termination of the mother’s parental 

rights under section 232.116(1)(h).

The mother disputes only the fourth element of section 232.116(1)(h), 

concerning whether the child could be safely returned to her care. She states the 

child could be placed in her care within one month, as she had begun a new 

substance-abuse treatment program. The mother was hoping to get a job and 

then obtain an apartment.

We determine there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to show 

the child could not be safely returned to the mother’s care at the time of the 

termination hearing. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018) (noting 

evidence of whether a child could be returned to a parent “at the time of the 

termination hearing”). When asked if the child could be returned to her care on the 

day of the termination hearing, she stated, “Not specifically today.” Furthermore, 

the mother had not sufficiently addressed her problems with substance abuse. 

She had only been to a substance-abuse evaluation and one group session in the 
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substance-abuse treatment program. We conclude the mother’s parental rights 

were properly terminated under section 232.116(1)(h).

B. The mother claims the State did not engage in reasonable efforts to 

reunite her with the child. She states there was a lack of communication from DHS 

about available services. “The State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its 

ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” In re 

L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017). “[W]hat constitutes reasonable services 

varies based upon the requirements of each individual case.” In re C.H., 652 

N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002). “[DHS] has an obligation to make reasonable efforts 

toward reunification, but a parent has an equal obligation to demand other, 

different, or additional services prior to a permanency or termination hearing.” In 

re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005).

The record does not show the mother requested additional or different 

services before the termination hearing. We conclude her complaints about 

reasonable efforts are untimely and the issue has not been properly raised for our 

review. See In re M.T., 613 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).

C. The mother asserts termination of her parental rights is not in the 

child’s best interests. She states she has a bond with the child. The mother asks 

for additional time to work on reunification. In considering the best interests of 

children, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement 

for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, 

mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 

33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). “It is well-settled law that 

we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for 
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termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be 

a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41.

We find termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best 

interests. We agree with the juvenile court’s statements, “The parents in this case 

are far more about their bond with each other rather than their bond with their child. 

Repeatedly, they chose methamphetamine and each other over [the child].” We 

further find it is not in the child’s best interests to give the mother additional time. 

As this court stated in In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998), “There 

is nothing to reasonably suggest [the mother] will overcome her addiction if the 

termination is delayed.” The child needs a permanent and stable home and it 

would not be in the child’s best interests to further delay matters. See In re C.K., 

558 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997) (“Patience with parents can soon translate into 

intolerable hardship for a child.”).

IV. Father

A. The father claims there is not clear and convincing evidence in the 

record to support termination of his parental rights. Like the mother, we will 

analyze the termination of the father’s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h). 

See T.S., 868 N.W.2d at 435 (finding we need to consider only one ground for 

termination of parental rights, even when the juvenile court has relied upon multiple 

grounds).

The father was not in a position to have the child returned to his care at the 

time of the termination hearing because he was in prison. The father testified he 

might be released in one year, although it could be longer. Even after he is 

released, the father needs to work on sobriety and anger management. We 
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conclude the child could not be safely returned to the father’s care and the juvenile 

court properly terminated his parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h).

B. The father asserts the juvenile court should have declined to 

terminate his parental rights because termination would be detrimental to the child 

based on the closeness of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(3)(c). “[T]he factors weighing against termination in section 232.116(3) 

are permissive, not mandatory.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016). 

“[T]he parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an exception to 

termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3).” A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476.

We find the father has not met his burden to show the juvenile court should 

have found termination inappropriate based on the bond between the parent and 

child. The court found the parents had a greater bond with each other than they 

did with the child and they chose to continue their lifestyle, which included 

substance abuse and domestic abuse, rather than put the needs of the child first.

We conclude the juvenile court properly terminated the parental rights of the 

mother and the father. We affirm the decision of the court.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Greer, J., concurs; Potterfield, P.J., concurs specially.
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge (concurring specially).

I agree with the opinion of the majority terminating the rights of both parents. 

As to the incarcerated father, we need not address the best interests of the child 

since it was not raised. See In re Q.G., 911 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Iowa 2018).