UNITED STATE S DISTRICT COURT FO R T HE DI ST RI CT OF CO LU MB IA

___________________________________ ) CITIZENS FOR

RESPON SIBILITY ) AND ETH ICS IN WASHINGTO N, ) ) Plaintiff, )

) ) Civ. Action No. 08-1468 (EGS) v . ) ) U.S. DEPA RTMENT OF JUSTICE, ) ) De fe nd ant. )

___________________________________ ) ME MOR

AN DU M OP IN ION Pl aintif f C iti zen s f

or R esp on sib ili ty and

Ethic s in W ash ing ton

(“C RE W ”) b rin gs thi s action underthe Freedom of Inform ation Act (“ FOIA”), seeking rec ords that wer e create d by the Fe de ral Bu

rea u o f I nv est igatio n (“ FB I”) in c on jun cti on wi th S pe cia l C ouns el P atr ick Fi tzg era ld’ s (“Fitzger ald” or the “Special Counsel ”) interview of form er Vice Presi dent Richard Cheney. Defendant, the Department of Justice ( “DOJ” or the “agency” ), identi fied sixty-se ven pages of
rec ord s d oc um entin g th e inter vie w, wh ich

was co nd

uc ted as p art of the Sp eci al C ouns el’ s inv est igatio n into who expo sed Va ler ie P lam e W ils on

as a co ve rt o pe rat ive fo r th e C entra l Int ell ige nc e A ge nc y (“ CI A” ). T he ag en cywi thh eld the rec ord s o f t

he int erv iewin t

he ir e nti rety
on the ba sis that di scl os ure of the do cum ents c ou ld r eas on ab ly b e expe cte d to int erf ere wi th l aw enforcement proceedings. Se e 5 U .S .C . § 55 2(b )(7 )(A ). I n a dditi on , D OJide nti fi ed lim ite d categori es of information within the documents that, acc ording to the agency, were exempt from dis clo sure und er o the r F OI A e xe m pti on s.2

Now pending before the Court are the parti es’ cross -motions for summary judgm ent. Up on car ef ul c on sid eratio n o f t

he m oti on s, res po ns es and rep lie s th ere to, the su

pp lem ental briefing submitted by the parties, ora l argument during the motions heari ngs held on June 18, 2009 and July 21, 2009, the appl icable l aw, and the entir e record, the Court concludes that the ag en cyha s f

ail ed to m eet its burde n o f d em on str ati ngthat th e re qu est ed do cum ents w ere properly withheld in thei r entir ety under any FOIA exemption protect ing law enforcement int ere sts . L im ite d p ort ion s o f t ho se d oc um ents, ho we ve r, w ere pro pe rlywi thh eld un de r
ex em pti on s d esi gn ed

to p rot ect

inf orm ati on that is pri vil eg ed

or t hat co uld im pin ge on pe rso na l pri va cyor t

hre ate n n ati on al s ecu

rity. Ac co rdi ng ly, an d f

or t he rea so ns stated

he rei n, the Co urt GRANTS IN P ART AN D DENIE S IN PART both parti es’ motions and direct s the go ve rnm ent to pro du ce t

he rec ord s w ithap pro pri ate red act ion s to wi thh old the inf orm ati on that falls within the properly i nvoked exemptions identified i n this Memorandum Opinion. I. Background A. Factual Background Pl am e’s ide nti ty a s a c ov ert op erativ e f

or t he CI A w as p ub lic ly r ev eal ed sh ort ly a ft er h er hu sb an d, Am

ba ssa do r Jo sep h W ils on , wrot e a Ne w Y or k T im es ed ito ria l in

wh ich he argue d th at the Bu shadm ini str ati on

ha d m an ipu lat ed

int ell ige nc e to su

pp ort Pr esi de nt B us h’s statem ent in the 2003 State of the Union a ddress thatIraq had purc hased uranium from Niger. Se e Robert D. Novak, Column, Missio n to Ni ge r , W ash. Post, July 14, 2003, atA21; Joseph C. Wilson IV, Opinion, Wha t I D idn ’t F ind in A fri ca , N .Y . T im es, Ju ly 6 , 2 00 3, § 4 , at 9. An inv est igatio n into the leak of Plame’s identi ty was comm enced by the FBI, which eventually led t o the appointment of Fitzgerald as Special Counsel. As part of this invest igation, a number of senior White House officials, i ncluding but notlimited to Preside nt Bush, Vice Preside nt Cheney, and3

Vice PresidentCheney’s Chief of Staff, I. Lewis Libby, were intervi ewed by the FBI. Compl. ¶ 19 ; Ans we r ¶ 1 9. Li bb y w as s ub seq ue ntl y in dic ted

an d, af ter a jury t ria l, c onvic ted

on ch arg es of pe rjury, ob str

uc tio n o f j us tic e, an d m ak ingfa lse statem ents, allof wh ich aro se f rom his conduct during the investi gation. Se e Tr . o f M ot. Hr ’g at 9 ( June 18 , 2 00 9) ( “F irs t Mo t. Hr’g Tr.”). Following the convicti on, Libby was sentenced t o 30 months of im prisonment. The sentence was subs equently comm uted by Preside nt Bush on July 2, 2007. Se e Order, Un ite d States v. Libby , No. 05-394 (D.D.C. July 3, 2007) (citi ng Grant of Executive Clemency). No other cri minal cases were brought a s a resultof the Special Counsel’ s investi gation. The House of Representative s Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (the “Committee”) conducted a n independent i nvestigat ion into the leak of Plame’s CIA identity, during which itsought to obtai n relevantdocuments from DOJ. Com

pl. ¶ 22. As part of the Co mm itt ee’ s inve sti gatio n, DO J m ad e av ail ab le r ed act ed rep ort s o f F BI int erv iew s w ithWhit e House personnel for Comm ittee s taff to review. Answer ¶ 22. DOJ, however, refused to pr ovide the report s of the intervi ews with eitherPresident Bush orVice PresidentCheney to the Co mm itt ee. Pl .’s St ate m ent of Mat eri al F act s N ot i n D isp ute ¶ 4. In Jun e 2 00 8, the Co mm itt ee iss ue d a su bp oe na see kin g th e p rod

uc tio n o f d oc um ents, “f

or whic h th e f

orm er S pe cia l C ouns el ha s n ot d ete rm ine d th at d isc los ure wo uld be barre d b y F ed era l R

ule of Cr im ina l P roc ed

ure 6(e ) governing grand j ury secrec y,” relat ing to inte rviews with the President, Vic e President , and other seni or White House officials. Se e Subpoena, attache d as Ex. A to Decl. of Steven G. Bradbury (“Def.’s Ex. A”). Specifica lly, the Comm ittee de manded unredacted versions of “tr an scr ipt s, rep ort s, no tes , a nd oth er d oc um ents r elatin g to any inter vie ws outsi de the pre sen ceT h e p o rtion o f th e su b p o e n a se e k in g re c o rd s o f in te rv ie w s w ith P re sid e n t B u sh w a s s u b se q u e n tly w ithd ra w n . See 1 D e c l. o f S te v e n G . B ra d b u ry ¶ 3 ; L e tter fro m M ic h a e l B . M u k a se y , A ttorn e y G e n ., t o P re sid e n t G e o rg e W . B u sh a t 1 n .1 (Ju l y 15 , 2 0 0 8 ), att ac h ed as E x . B t o D ec l
. o f Stev en G
. B rad b u ry (“D ef.’ s E x . B ”). 4 of the grand

jur y” of the Pr esi de nt and

the Vi ce P res ide nt. De f. ’s E x. A. Th e C om m itt ee a lso 1
so ug ht “ [u ]nred act ed

ve rsi on s o f F BI 30 2 inter vie w r ep ort s” f

rom int erv iew s w ithLi bb y, Karl Rove, Condoleezza Rice, ScottMcClellan, a nd Cathie Mart in. Def.’s Ex. A. Af ter DO J’s Of

fi ce o f L eg al C ouns el ( “O LC ”) a sse m ble d and rev iew ed the do cum ents
res po ns ive to t

he Co mm itt ee’ s su

bp oe na , Atto rne y G en era l Mi ch aelMuka sey wr ote a le tte r to President Bush “r equest[ing] that [the Pres ident] assertexecutive pr ivilege with respect t o” the do cum ents s ub po en aed

bythe Co mm itt ee. Le tte r f rom Mic ha el B . M uk ase y, Attor ne y G en ., to Pr esi de nt G eo rge W . B us h at 1 ( Ju ly 1 5, 20 08 ), atta ch ed as E x. B t o D ecl . o f S tev enG. Br ad bury (“D ef .’s Ex . B ”); see Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Sum m. J. (“Def.’s Mem .”) at 2. Accordi ng to the Attorney General , [m ]any of the subpoenaed materials re flect frank and candid de liberat ions among sen ior pre sid entia l ad

vis ers , . . . [and ] c on cer

n a num be r of sen sit ive iss ue s, including the preparat ion of [the President’ s] January 2003 State of the Union Address, possibl e responses t o public asse rtions cha llenging the accuracy of a statement in the addr ess, and the dec ision to se nd Ms. Plame’s husband, Am ba ssa do r Jo sep h W ils on , to Ni ge r in 20 02 to i nv est igate I raq i ef fo rts to acq uir e y ell ow cak e uran ium . S om e o f t he su bp oe na ed do cum ents a lso co nta in inf orm ati on ab out co mm

un icatio ns be tw een

[t he Pr esi de nt] an d s en ior

Whit e House officials. Def.’s Ex. B at 1. In a letter dated Ju ly 1 6, 20 08 , D OJno tif ied the Co mm itt ee t

hat P res ide nt B us h h ad granted the Attorney General ’s requestand assert ed executive privile ge with respec t to the subpoenaed documents. Se e Le tte r f rom Ke ithB. Ne lso n, Pr inc ipa l D ep uty As sis tant Atto rne y Ge n. , to the Ho no rab le H enry A . W axm an , C ha irm an , C om m . o n O ve rsi ght & G ov ’t R ef orm at5

1 (July 16, 2008), at tached as Ex. C to Decl. of Steven G. Bradbury (“Def.’s Ex. C”). Relying on the legal analysis s et forth in the Attorney General ’s lett er to the Pr esident, DOJ took the position that the documents reveal ed “comm unications that li e at the abs olute core of executive privile ge.” Def.’s Ex. C at 1. Moreover, DOJ asse rted thatthe Comm ittee’ s demand for the do cum ents rai ses a se rio us ad dit ion al s ep aratio n o f p ow ers co nc ern rel ati ngto t

he int eg rity and effectiveness of future law enforcement invest igations by the Department. W ere future Pres idents, Vice Pr esidents a nd senior White House staff to percei ve that provi ding voluntary intervi ews in the cours e of Justice Depart ment inv est igatio ns wo uld

cre ate rec ord s th at w ou ld l ike ly b e m ad e av ail ab le t o Congress (and the n possibly dis closed publi cly outside of judicial pr oceedings su chas a tri al) , th ere wo uld

be anun acc ep tab le r isk

that su chkn ow led ge co uld adve rse ly i m

pa ct the ir w ill ing ne ss t o c oo pe rat e f ull y and can did ly i n v olu

ntary int erv iew s. Th eym ight in sis t, a lte rnativ ely , o n d isc los inginf orm ati on on ly pursuant to gr and jury subpoenas in order t o ensure the s ecrecy prot ections of Ru le 6 (e) of

the Fe de ral Ru les of

Cr im ina l P roc ed

ure . S uc h a

res ult wo uld significantl y impair the Department’s abil ity to conductfuture law enforcement inv est igatio ns wh ere su chinv est igatio ns wo uld be ne fi t f rom fu ll and vo luntar y White House cooper ation. De f. ’s E x. C at 1- 2. On

Ju ly 1 7, 20 08 , th e C om

m itt ee ann ou

nc ed that th e P res ide nt h ad

inv ok ed executive pr ivilege i n response to the subpoena. Compl. ¶ 24. B. Procedural Background On the same day the Committee announced that Pr esident Bush had as serted exe cutive privile ge to withhold the subpoenaed documents, CREW sent a FOIA requestto DOJ requesting records “r elating t o any intervi ew outside the pr esence of the grand j ury of Vice President Richard B. Cheney that ar e part of Special Counsel Patric k Fitzgeral d’s invest igation i nto the leak of the ident ity of Valerie Pl ame W ilson, a covert CIA officer.” Com pl. ¶ 25. CREW explained that its r equest was coext ensive with the Committee’s subpoena, and soughtboth a
wa ive r of fe es and expe dit ed

pro ces sin g o f i ts F OI A r eq ue st “ in v iewof

the parti cu lar

urg en cytoA t t h at t i m e, B rad b u ry w as t h e h ea d of O L C an d su p erv i se d i t s o p era t i o n s, i n clu d i n g t h e o ff i ce ’s r es p o n se t o F O IA 2 re q u e sts . D e c l. o f S te v e n G . B ra d b u ry ¶ 1 . A c c o rd in g to B ra d b u ry , O IP c o n d u c te d a n in iti a l se a rc h in re sp o n se to C R E W ’s re q u e st, b u t d e te rm in e d th a t t h e d o c u m e n ts w e re h e ld b y th e O L C , w h ic h h a n d le s its o w n F O IA re q u e sts
. D ef
. ’ s M em . at 2. O n Sept em ber 4, 2008, O I P r ef er r ed C R EW ’ s r eques t t o O LC , w hi ch l ocat ed t hr ee r ecor ds re sp o n siv e to C R E W ’s re q u e st. D e f.’s M e m . at 2
. 6 inf orm the pu bli c ab out th e ro le V ice Pr esi de nt C he ne y p lay ed in t he leak o f M s. W ils on ’s c ov ert ide nti ty and

the ba sis fo r th e d eci sio n n ot t o p ros ecute [ him ]. ” C om pl. ¶¶ 2 5, 27 . B y le tte r dated Ju ly 2 4, 20 08 , th e C hie f o f S taf f o f D OJ ’s O ff

ice of Inf orm ati on an d P riv acy

(“O IP ”) ack no wl ed ge d re ceipt o f t

he FO IAreq

ue st and inf orm ed CREW that it s expe dit ed

req ue st h ad been granted by the Directorof Public Affairs. Com pl. ¶ 29. On Au gu st 2 5, 20 08 , C RE W fi led a co m pla int all eg ingthat D OJha d f

ail ed to e ith er produce, withhold, “ or otherwise account[] for any responsive documents.” Compl. ¶ 32. CREW fu rth er c lai m ed

that D OJha d f

ail ed to e xp ed ite the pro ces sin g o f i ts r eq ue st, ex cee de d the “genera lly appli cable twenty- day deadline for the processi ng of anyFOIA request,” and “wron gf ull y w ithhe ld” the req

ue ste d d oc um ents f

rom CREW . C om

pl. ¶¶ 3 3, 35 . A s a r esu lt, CREW sought declar atory and inj unctive re lief “with res pect to the expedited r elease and disclosur e of the requeste d records.” Compl. ¶ 40. On August 28, 2008, CREW filed a motion for a preliminary injunc tion, seeki ng an order re quiring DOJ to “proc ess and discl ose the req ue ste d re co rds imm ed iat ely .” Mem . P . & A . S up p. Pl .’s Mo t. P rel im . In j. at 2. Sh ort ly thereafter , however, the part ies agree d to a stipul ation for the pr ocessing of CREW ’s request
. Se e Stipulati on and Order (Sept. 8, 2008)
. On September 18, 2008, DOJ responded to CREW ’s requestby submitting the declarat ion of Steven Bradbury (“Bra dbury declar ation”), the then Princi pal Deputy Assist ant Attorney General for OLC. Th at s ub m iss ion inc lud ed a num be r of att achm ents, on e o f whic h is 2
a Vaughn ind ex(co lle cti ve ly “ ori gin al Vaughn submission”). Se e Ex. F to Decl. of Steven G.7

Br ad bury ( “D ef

.’s Ex . F ”). Ac co rdi ngto t he ori gin al Vaughn submission, the records responsive to C RE W ’s r eq

ue st c on sis t of

(1) anFB I 30 2 re po rt s um m ari zin g F itz ge ral d’s int erv iewwi th Vice PresidentCheney, and (2) two set s of contemporaneous notes taken by FBI agent s during the course of the i nterview. Se eDecl. of Steven G. Bradbury ¶ 7; Def.’s Ex. F. Collect ively, the requested r ecords tot al sixty- seven pages. Def.’s Mem. at 3. DO J w ithhe ld a ll r esp on siv e re co rds on the ba sis that th eywe re e xe m pt f rom dis clo sure
un de r vario us FO IAex em pti on s. Sp eci fi cal ly, OL C c on clu de d th at the rec ord s w ere pro pe rly wi thh eld in t he ir e nti rety und er E xe m

pti on 7(A ) an d E xe m

pti on 5 b eca us e o f t he ir p ote nti al t o interfere with law enforcement proceedings. In a ddition, OLC found that porti ons of the documents could be withheld underExemptions 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7(C). DOJ filed an answer to the complaint on September 26, 2008, and a motion for summary judgm ent on October 10, 2008. CREW ’s cross- motion for summary judgm ent was filed on October30, 2008. Following a hearing on the motions held on June 18, 2009, the Court or dered DOJ to (1) pr oduce the rec ords fo r in c am era ins pe cti on , and (2) fi le s up ple m entalde clarat ion s “f rom ap pro pri ate de clarants explaining with specificity the preci se information contained i n the recor ds that is exempt from dis clo sure und er F OI A, wh ich ex em pti on s ap ply

to whic h p ort ion s o f t

he rec ord s, an d whysu ch
ex em pti on s ap ply .” Min

ute Or de r (Jun e 2 0, 20 09 ). T he Co urt als o d ire cte d th e p art ies to s ub m it
su pp lem ental bri ef

ingad dre ssi ng“(1 ) any k no wn ins tan ces in whic h h igh

lev el W hit e H ou se officials have engaged i n intervi ews with law enforcement officials outside the contextof a grand jury subpoe na, and (2) what, i f anything, such officials have done to protec t againstthe
co nte nt o f t

ho se i nte rvi ew s f

rom be co m ingpu

bli c. ” Id. As part o f i ts s up ple m ental fi lin g, DO J su bm itt ed de clarat ion s f

rom (1) Lanny A . B reu er, the Assista nt Attorney Gener al of the Criminal Division of DOJ (“Breuer de clarat ion”); ( 2)C R EW addr es se s t hes e ne w cl ai m s i n a f oot not e t o i t s suppl em ent al br i ef , and i t i s not ent i r el y cl ear t o w hat ext ent 3

– if at a ll

– th e w ithh o ld in g u n d e r th e se e x e m p tion s is in fa c t co n te ste d . C R E W ’s lac k o f p re c isio n is e n tirely u n d e rs ta n d a b le in su c h a c a se , w h e re th e in fo rm a tion a sy m m e try n e c e ss a rily o p e ra te s to th e d e trim e n t o f th e p a rty se e k in g d isc lo su re . See K i ng v. U

. S. D ep’ tof Jus t i ce , 830 F. 2d 210, 218 ( D
. C
. C i r . 1987) ( not i ng t hat t he pur pose of a g e n c y a ffid a v its is to c o rre c t “th e a sy m m e trica l d istrib u tion o f k n o w le d g e th a t ch a ra c te riz e s F O IA li tiga tion ” ). N e v e rth e le ss , b a se d o n th e B a rro n d e c la ra tion a n d a fte r c a re fu l i n ca m era r eview , t he C ou r t con cl ud es t hat t hese exempt i ons have been pr oper l y i nvoked. Ther ef or e, t hi s M em or andum O pi ni on w i l l not addr es s t hes e c l ai m s any furthe r. 8 David J. Barron, the Act ing AssistantAttorney General for OLC (“Barron declarat ion”); and ( 3) Ralph S. DiMaio, the I nform ation Review Officer for the Nationa l Clandesti ne Service of the CI A ( “D iMa io d ecl aratio n” ). T he Barro n d ecl aratio n, in c on jun cti on wi th D OJ ’s s up ple m ental
mem orandum, claims the applicabili ty of an additional exemption (Exemption 2) because of administrative i nform ation “such a s FBI file numbers” contained in the documents. Se e Decl. of David J. Barro n ¶ 1 2; D ef

.’s Su pp lem entalMem . S up p. Mo t. S um m . J . (“ De f. ’s S up ple m ental Mem .” ) at

5 n .3 . In ad dit ion , D OJass ert s th at the outli ne the Sp eci al C ouns el c reated in pre parat ion

fo r hi s inter

vie w o f V ice Pr esi de nt C he ne y and rep rod uc ed as p art of the wi thh eld documents is exempt from disclosur e under Exemption 5 because of the work-pr oduct privi lege. Se e Decl. of David J. Barron ¶ 9; Def.’s Supple mental Mem. at 5 n.3. 3 Th e C ourt h eld

an oth er h ear ingon

the m oti on s o n July

21 , 2 00 9, an d th e m oti on s ar e now ripe for decisi on. II. Le ga l F ra mew or k A. Rule 56 Pursu ant to Fe de ral Ru le o f C ivi l P roc ed ure 56 , s um

m ary jud gm ent sh ou ld b e g ranted if the moving party has shown that there are no ge nuine issues of m ateria l fact and thatthe moving party is e ntitle d to judgment as a matter of law. Se e Fe d. R. Ci v. P. 56 ; Ce lotex C or p. v. Ca tre tt , 47 7 U .S . 3 17 , 3 25 (19 86 ); Waterh ou se v . D ist ric t of Co lum bia , 2 98 F. 3d

98 9, 99 1 (D .C . C ir.9

20 02 ). I n d ete rm ini ngwh eth er a ge nu ine iss ue of

m ate ria l f

act ex ist s, the co urt

m us t vi ewall facts in the l ight most favorable to the non- moving party. Se e Ma tsush ita Elec. Ind us . C o. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Likewise, in ruling on cross -motions for
summ ary jud gm ent, t

he co urt sh all grant s um

m ary jud gm ent on ly i f o ne of

the m ov ingparti es i s entitl ed to judgment as a matter of law upon material facts tha t are not ge nuinely disput ed. Se e Rhoads v. McFerran , 5 17 F. 2d 66 , 6 7 (2 d C ir. 19 75 ). B. FO IA “‘P ub lic acc ess to g ov ernm ent do cum ents’ is t he ‘f un dam entalpri nc ipl e’ that an im ate s FO IA .” Ct

r. for Na t’l Se c. Stu die

s v. U. S. De

p’t of J us tic e , 331 F.3d 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp. , 4 93 U. S. 14 6, 15 1 (1 98 9)) ; seeCo as tal Sta tes Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy , 617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he strong policy of the FO IA[i s] that th e p ub lic is e nti tle d to kn owwh at i ts g ov ernm ent is do ingan d why .” ). A s a result, FOIA requi res thatagencies of the federa l government release requested r ecords to the public unles s the documents fall within one ormore of nine specific statutory exemptions. 5 U. S. C. § 5 52 . “ Gi ve n th e F OI A’ s b roa d d isc los urepo lic y, the Un ite d S tat es S up rem e C ourt h as ‘co ns ist entlystated

that F OI A e xe m

pti on s ar e to be narro wl y c on str ue d. ’” Wol

f v. CI A , 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justi ce v. Julian , 4 86 U. S. 1, 8 (1 98 8))
. The Court has juri sdiction t o enjoin an agenc y from withholding re cords and orderthe production of recor ds that itconcludes were i mproperly withheld. § 552(a) (4)(B). “I n such a
cas e th e co urt

sh all de ter

m ine the m att er d e n ov o, an d m ayex am ine the co nte nts of su chag en cy
rec ord s in cam era to d ete rm ine wh eth er” anex em pti on ap pli es t o “ su chrec ord s o r any p art the reo f. ” Id. The burden lies with the agency t o justify nondiscl osure of responsive records. Id. Th is b urd enpro vid es t

he on ly p rot ect ion

to t he req ue sti ngparty , who “f

ace s an ‘as ym m etr ica l10

distri bution of knowledge’ where the agency alone pos sesses, re views, disclos es, and withholds the su bje ct m att er o f t

he req ue st. ” Judicial W

atch, Inc. v. FDA , 4 49 F. 3d 14 1, 14 6 (D .C . C ir. 2006) (quoting Ki ng

v. U. S. De

p’t of J us tic e , 830 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The government m ay satisfy it s burden of establi shing its r ight to withhol d information from the public by s ubmitting appropriat e declara tions and, where ne cessary, an i ndex of the information withheld. Se e V au gh n v . R os en , 484 F.2d 820, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). To be
entit led to s um m ary jud gm ent, t

he go ve rnm ent’s su

bm iss ion “m us t ad eq uatel y d esc rib e ea ch wi thh eld do cum ent or

de let ion fr om a re lea sed

do cum ent, and

m us t st ate the ex em

pti on cla im ed fo r ea chde let ion

or w ithhe ld d oc um ent, and expla in whythe ex em

pti on is r ele vant. ” Su mm ers
v. De p’t of J us tic e , 1 40 F. 3d

10 77 , 1 08 0 (D .C . C ir. 19 98 ) (i nte rna l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed); see als o N at’ l In st. of M

ili tar y Justi ce v . U

.S . D ep ’t o f D efe ns e , 404 F. Supp. 2d 325, 331 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[A] court may rely on affidavits provided by a n agency in grant ing summ ary judgment ‘if the af fi davit s d esc rib e th e d oc um ents and the jus tif icatio ns fo r no nd isc los ure wi th r eas on ab ly sp eci fi c d eta il, de m on str ate that th e in fo rm ati on wi thh eld log ica llyfa lls wi thi n th e cl aim ed exemption, and are not contr overted by ei ther contr ary evidence in the rec ord nor by evidenc e of agency bad faith.’” (quoting Mil ita ry A ud it Pro jec t v. Ca sey , 6 56 F. 2d

72 4, 73 8 (D .C . C ir. 1981))). III. Discussion A. Exemption 7(A) DO J’s pri nc ipa l le ga l ar gum ent is that th e re co rds req ue ste d b y C RE W

we re p rop erl y wi thh eld in t he ir e nti rety und er E xe m

pti on 7(A ). E xe m

pti on 7(A ) pe rm its anag en cyto w ithho ld
rec ord s f rom dis clo sure i f t

he rec ord s w ere “co m

pil ed fo r law e nf

orc em ent pu

rpo ses , b ut o nly

to the ex tent th at the pro du cti on of su chlawen fo rce m ent re co rds or i nf orm ati on . . . c ou ld11

reasonably be expected to i nterfere with e nforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)( A). CREW co nc ed es t

he thr esh old

iss ue un de r E xe m

pti on 7(A ) – t hat th e re qu est ed

do cum ents w ere compiled for law enforcement purposes. Se e Mem. P. & A. O pp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ . J. & Su pp . P l.’ s C ros s-M ot. Summ . J . (“ Pl .’s Mem ./O pp ’n” ) at 8. Ac co rdi ng ly, the qu est ion in t his
cas e is wh eth er p rod

uc tio n o f t

he do cum ents “ co uld

rea so na bly be expe cte d to int erf

ere wi th
en fo rce m ent pr oc eed ing s. ” D OJco nte nd s th at i t ha s m ad e su cha sh ow ing , b eca us e (1 ) th ere are lik ely to b e f utu re l awen fo rce m ent inve sti gatio ns req uir ingthe parti cip ati on

of sen ior Whit e House officials, and (2) di sclosure of Vice Pre sident Cheney’s intervi ew could have a chil ling effect and deter such official s from voluntarily cooperat ing in those i nvestigat ions. See, e.g. , Def.’s Mem. at 8-9; Decl. of Steven G. Bradbury ¶ 9; Fir st Mot. Hr’g Tr . at 11, 17, 19. CREW str enuo us ly d isa gre es, arguin g th at D OJha s f ail ed as a m att er o f l awto d em on str ate that Exemption 7(A) applies to shi eld discl osure of the reques ted recor ds because (1) there ar e no
on go ingor r eas on ab ly anti cip ate d law e nf orc em ent pr oc eed ing s, an d (2 ) D OJ ’s argum ent th at disclosur e might chill White House officials is spec ulative a nd unsupported by his torical fact. See, e.g. , Pl .’s Mem ./O pp ’n at 9- 10 ; T r. o f M ot. Hr ’g at 55 -57 (Ju ly 2 1, 20 09 ) (“ Se co nd Mo t. Hr’g Tr.”). As a preliminary matter, DOJ notes thatCongress “rel axed” the la nguage of Exem ption 7(A ) in 19 86 , re pla cin g th e p hra se t hat pe rm itt ed

wi thh old ingof

inf orm ati on that “ wo uld int erf ere wi th e nf

orc em ent pr oc eed ing s” w iththe bro ad er “ co uld reaso na bly

beexp ected

to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” Def.’s Mem. at 7. According to DOJ, court s have “repeate dly recogniz ed that thi s change in the statutory language subst antiall y broadens the
sco pe ” o f E xe m

pti on 7(A ). D ef

.’s Mem . at 7 ( cit ingcas es) . C RE W do es n ot d isp ute thi s asserti on, but contends that DOJ’s withholdi ng in this ca se does not meet that “r elaxed”12

stand ard . P l.’ s Me m ./O pp ’n at 8. Ne ve rth ele ss, the parti es a gre e th at the ap pli cab le s tan dard i s
on e o f “ rea so na

ble ne ss, wh ich

tak es i nto acc ount t

he lac k o f c ert ainty i n atte m pti ngto p red ict harm wh ile pro vid inganob

jec tiv e te st. ” Sp an na us v. U. S. De p’t of J us tic e , 813 F.2d 1285, 1288 (4t h C ir. 19 87 ) (i nte rna l qu otatio n m ark s o m itted). To de ter m ine wh eth er D OJha s m et i ts b urd enof sh ow ingthat E xe m

pti on 7(A ) ap pli es, this Court must considerwhether discl osure of the reques ted recor ds “(1) coul d reasonably be
expe cte d to int erf

ere wi th ( 2) e nf

orc em ent pr oc eed ing s th at are ( 3) p en din g o r reaso na bly
an tic ipa ted .” Map oth er v . D ep ’t o f Justi ce , 3 F. 3d

15 33 , 1 54 0 (D .C . C ir. 19 93 ) (e m ph asi s in ori gin al) ; see also Kay v. FCC , 976 F. Supp. 23, 37 (D.D.C. 1997) (“The applicabil ity of Ex em pti on 7(A ) invo lve s a t

wo -st ep an aly sis : (1 ) whe the r a l awen fo rce m ent pr oc eed ingis pending or prospe ctive; a nd (2) whether r elease of information about itcould reasonably be expected to c ause some articulabl e harm.”). These issues wil l be address ed in turn.

1. Pending or Reasonably Anticipated Enforcem ent Proceedings DOJ concedes that there is nei ther a pendi ng enforcement proceeding with which the dis clo sure o f t

he rec ord s co uld

int erf ere , n or an o ng oin g inve sti gatio n th at i s li ke ly t o le ad to such proceedi ngs. Se e Fi rst Mo t. H r’gTr . at 9, 54 -55 ; S eco nd Mo t. Hr’gTr . at 4. Th e ag en cy
ne ve rth ele ss argu es t

hat inve sti gatio ns ne ces sit ati ngthe co op eratio n o f s en ior Whit e H ou se of fi cia ls are l ike ly t o b e in sti tut ed in t he futur e, an d th e re ali sti c p rob ab ili ty t hat su chof

fi cia ls may be called upon to parti cipate i n such an invest igation i s sufficient to fall unde r the definit ion of a “r eas on ab ly anti cip ate d” en fo rce m ent pr oc eed ingart icu lat ed bythe D. C. Ci rcu it i n Map oth er , 3 F.3d 1533. Se e Def.’s Mem. at 8-9; Def.’s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Sum m. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Cross- Mot. Summ . J. (“Def.’s Opp’n/Reply”) at 4-6; Fir st Mot. Hr’g Tr . at 42-43A s C R E W no t es , D O J’s q u o t ati o n of C ent er f or Nat i onalSec uri t

y St udi es fo r th is p ro p o sitio n is h ig h ly se le c tive
. 4 Ind ee d , t h e c o u rt qu ali fi ed t h at st atem en t i n t h e v ery ne x t sen t en ce by ad d i n g , “it i s su ff i cien t t h at t h e g o v ern m en t ’s ongoi ng Sept em ber 11 t er r or i sm i nves t i gat i on i s l i kel y t o l ead t o s uch pr ocee di ngs. ” 331 F. 3d at 926. 13 (“[W ]hen you look back over the l ast 30 years I believe every administrat ion except for thi s one wh ich is s til l on ly a

fe w m onths old

ha s h ad a cr im ina l inve sti gatio n re lat ed to t he Whit e H ou se in s om e w ay . . . . It’ s re aso na bly antic ipated

that th ere wi ll b e an

inv est igatio n th at w ill req uir e senior White House cooperat ion.”); Fir st Mot. Hr’g Tr . at 60. DOJ also emphasizes the D.C. Circuit’ s explici t recognit ion that “Exemption 7(A) does notrequire apresentl y pending ‘enforcement proceeding.’” Def.’s Mem. at 8 (quoting Ct r. for Na t’l Se c. Stu die

s , 3 31 F. 3d

at 92 6). 4 CREW

res po nd s th at the “f

ata l f law ” in DO J’s po sit ion

is t hat “[ c] ourts have co ns ist ently interpr eted the exe mption to require the existence of an ongoing investiga tion or enforcement proceeding.” Pl .’s Mem./Opp’n at 8 (emphasis in origi nal) (ci ting Ju arez v . D ep ’t o f Justi ce , 51 8 F .3 d 5 4, 58 -59 (D .C . C ir. 20 08 )); Pl .’s Re ply Mem . S up p. Cr os s-M ot. Summ . J . (“ Pl .’s Re ply ”) at 3. Th ere fo re, acc ord ingto C RE W , E xe m pti on 7(A ) re qu ire s th at D OJdo m ore than point to an abs tract futur e investi gation or enforce ment proceeding that wil l requir e the cooperati on of White House officials. Se e Fi rst Mo t. Hr’gTr . at 29 . C RE W als o d isp ute s D OJ ’s fa ctu al a sse rti on

that Whit e H ou se i nv olv em ent in lawen fo rce m ent inve sti gatio ns is “ fr eq ue nt, ” Pl .’s Re ply

at 3 , and urg es t he Co urt to c on clu de that E xe m

pti on 7(A ) do es n ot a

pp ly b eca us e,
un lik e th e ca ses rel ied

up on byDO J, wh ere “th e g ov ernm ent po int ed to c on cre te and

sp eci fi c
en fo rce m ent pr oc eed ing s th at c ou ld b e h am pe red bydis clo sure o f t

he dis puted

rec ord s, ” in

thi s case all DOJ can point to is “ some vague future” investigat ion involving White House officials. Pl .’s Mem ./O pp ’n at 10 (inter na l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed).14

Whe n p res sed

at o ral argum ent to ide nti fy cas es i n whic h E xe m

pti on 7(A ) ha s b een applied in the absence of “invest igation orenforcement proceedings actually concr etely pendi ng
or anti cip ate d, ” co un selfo r D OJco nc ed ed that Map oth er is the only s uch case upon which the agency reli es. First M ot. Hr’g Tr. at 9, 53- 55. Map oth er did indeed re cognize thatExemption 7(A ) m ayap ply

wh ere law

en fo rce m ent pr oc eed ing s ar e “r eas on ab ly anti cip ate d” rathe r th an act ive ly p en din g. But as the dis cu ssi on be low de m on str ate s, the po sit ion advanc ed

byDO J in this case would expand Exemption 7(A) far beyond both its applicati on by the court i n Map oth er and Congress’s st ated inte nt. Map oth er aro se o ut o f a

req ue st f or d oc um ents r elatin g to anord er i ssu ed bythe Attor

ne y General barr ing Kurt Waldheim – the form er Secret ary General of the Unit ed Nations and fo rm er P res ide nt o f Aus tri a who m DO J b eli ev ed

ha d p art icipated

in N azi war cr im es a s an officer in the German army – f rom entering the United St ates. 3 F.3d at 1535. I n advance of the Attor ne y G en era l’s ord er, the Of fi ce o f S pe cia l Inve sti gatio ns (a u nit wi thi n D OJ ’s C rim ina l Di vis ion ) ha d c om

pil ed a 2 04 -pa ge rep ort

de tai lin g W ald

he im ’s w art im e ac tiv iti es. Tw o p riv ate ind ivi du als su

bs eq ue ntl y f ile d F OI A r eq

ue sts see kin g a cce ss t o th e re po rt, so urc e d oc um ents, and other material s relie d on in prepari ng the report , in additi on to any summ aries orindices of the file. Id. at 1535-36. DOJ withheld the material cit ing, inter a lia , Exemption 7(A). Upon cross-motions for summ ary judgment, the distr ict courtordered tha t most of the records be release d. Id. at 1536. The issue on appeal was confined to whether the source material s and summ aries or indices of the r eport were pr operly withhel d. See id. at 1 53 7. Ad dre ssi ngthe ag en cy ’s c lai m under Exemption 7(A), the courtrecognized that Exemption 7(A) is avail able only15

wh ere en fo rce m ent pr oc eed ing s ar e “p en din g o r co nte m plated .” Co as tal

Sta tes Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy , 617 F.2d 854, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The word “contemplated,” as used i n Co as tal Sta tes , s pe ak s to the en fo rci ngag en cy ’s int entio ns . F or t

his , w e h av e su

bs tit ute d “ rea so na

bly antic ipated ,” a p hra se t

hat may be applied equally to c ases in which the agency has the initiative in br inging anen fo rce m ent ac tio n and tho se, su chas t

his on e, in whic h it

m us t be pre pared

to res po nd to a thi rd p arty’s ch all en ge . 3 F .3 d at 15 40 . T he Map oth er co urt expla ine d th at “ thi s m ore ge ne ralstand ard ” w as n ece ssary because although in that ca se there wer e no reasonabl y anticipa ted enforcement proceedings wi thi n D OJ ’s c ontro l, t

he re was a “r eas on ab le l ike lih oo d” that ch all en ge s w ou ld b e b rou ght “i n the run of cas es i nv olv ingpe rso ns ex clu de d f rom the Un ite d S tat es” be cau se o f t he ir a lle ge d partici pation in Nazi war crimes. Id. at 1542. Moreover , as the courtobserved, the i ndex to the rep ort co m pil ed in W ald he im ’s c ase wo uld

“p rov ide the an sw er” to t he qu est ion

of wh at
ev ide nc e D OJha d re gardi ngNa zi w ar c rim es, an d w ou ld t he ref ore be of gre at i nte res t to oth er similarly situated indivi duals. Id. at 1543. For thatreason, the c ourt held that the inde x of the go ve rnm ent’s ev ide nc e re lat ingto W ald he im ’s e xc lus ion

wa s p rop erl y w ithhe ld u

nd er Exemption 7(A). Id. at 1542-43. In r eac hin g th is c on clu sio n, the Map oth er court rel ied specifica lly on Un ite d S tates De pa rtm en t of

Ju sti ce v . R ep or ter

s C om mi tteefor

Freed om of t hePress , 4 89 U. S. 74 9 (1 98 9), and Na tio na l L ab or

Re lat ion s B oa rd

v. Robbins Tir e & Rubber Co. , 4 37 U. S. 21 4 (1 97 8), wh ere the Supreme Court approved the use of “generic” or “ categori cal” dete rminations in decidi ng whether a FOIA exemption applies. Se e 48 9 U .S . at 77 6, 78 0 (e nd ors ingthe cat eg ori cal ap pro ach in t he co nte xt o f E xe m

pti on 7(C ), whic h e xe m

pts fr om dis clo sure i nf

orm ati on that would yield an unwarr anted invasi on of privacy, and holding that, “as a ca tegorica l matter,” FBI rap sh eet s w ere ex em

pt f rom dis clo sure t o th ird

pa rti es) ; 43 7 U .S . at 23 6 (h old ingcat eg ori cal ly that “w itn ess statem ents i n p en din g unf air lab or p rac tic e p roc eed ing s ar e ex em pt f rom FO IA16

dis clo sure [ un de r E xe m

pti on 7(A )] at l eas t until co m

ple tio n o f t

he Bo ard ’s h ear ing ”). Th e co urt in Map oth er thus noted the Supreme Court’s observati on in Re po rte rs C om mi tte ethat “Robbins and other cas es ‘provide support for the pr oposition that categor ical deci sions may be appropriat e and individua l circumstances di sregarded when a c ase fits int o a genus in which the balance char acteri stical ly tips i n one direct ion.’ ” 3 F.3d at 1542 (quoti ng Re po rte rs C om mi tte e , 48 9 U .S . at 77 6). Under DOJ’s reading of Map oth er , th e “c rit ica l qu est ion fa cin g th is C ourt i s n ot, as pla int if f c onten ds , whe the r th ere is an ‘o ng oin g inve sti gatio n, ’ but whe the r ‘i n th e ru n o f c ase s’ going forward ‘ther e is a rea sonable li kelihood’ that DOJ will requi re the volunt ary cooperat ion of the White House.” Def.’s Opp’n/Reply a t 6. CREW counters that this i nterpret ation of Map oth er is o ve rlybro ad , argu ingthat th e ty pe s o f p ote nti al e nf

orc em ent pr oc eed ing s id entif ied by DOJ (i.e., any proceedi ng involving White House officials) ar e distingui shable from the
co nc ret e, lim ite d p roc eed ing s d esc rib ed bythe Map oth er

court (i .e., proceedings involving ind ivi du als ex clu de d f

rom the Un ite d S tat es b eca

us e o f t he ir a lle ge d p art icipatio n in Na zi w ar crimes). Se e Pl .’s Mem ./O pp ’n at 10 ; P l.’ s R ep ly at 4. Put di ff ere ntl y, CREW

argue s th at, ev en assuming the factual premise of DOJ’s argument (that the hi story of past inve stigati ons inv olv ingthe Whit e H ou se m ak es s im ilar inve sti gatio ns rea so na bly lik ely to o ccu r in the futur e), DO J h as f

ail ed as a m att er o f l awto d em on str ate that su chinv est igatio ns fa ll und er the Map oth er
co urt ’s a pp lic ati on

of Ex em pti on 7(A ). T his Cou

rt a gre es. The most problematic aspect of DOJ’s position i s the clea r disti nction between the category of procee dings recogni zed in Map oth er an d th e categ ory

art icu lat ed

bythe ag en cyin this case . Although the proce edings in Map oth er ha d n ot y et b een co mm en ced , th e co urt

co uld
rea dil y id entif

y and art icu lat e th e sc op e an d n ature o f t ho se p roc eed ing s, in a dd iti on to t he fo rmIn th is s e n se , t h e c a te g o ry o f p ro c e e d in g s th a t D O J a sk s th is C o u rt t o c o n c lu d e a re “re a so n a b ly a n ticip a te d ” c o u ld 5 enc om pass any la w e n fo rc e m e n t i n v e stig a tion d u rin g w h ic h law e n fo rc e m e n t m ig h t w ish to in te rv ie w se n io r W h ite H ouse of

f i ci al s. Such pr ocee di ngs m i ght i ncl ude a n i nves t i gat i on i nt o al l eged cr i m i nal ac t i vi t y t hat phys i cal l y t ook pl ace i n t he W hi t e H ouse ; f i nanci al w r ongdoi ng by a W hi t e H ouse of f i ci al t hat t ook pl ace bef or e or dur i ng hi s or her te n u re in th e e x e c u tive b ra n c h ; m isc o n d u c t rela ting to o ffic ia l res p o n sib ili ties , su c h a s th e b re a c h o f n a tion a l se c u rity p ro to c o l t h a t fo rm e d th e b a sis o f th e P la m e in v e stig a tion ; o r e v e n a n e v e n t o c c u rrin g o u tsid e th e W h ite H o u se w ith onl y t angent i al conne ct i on t o one or m or e W hi t e H ouse of f i ci al s. Thus c oncei ved, i t bec om es cl ear t hat t he s cope of t he pr ocee di ngs des cr i bed by D O J i s br eat ht aki ngl y br oad. 17 that th eywo uld

tak e an d th e p ote nti al h arm that di scl os ure co uld

cau se t o th os e f

utu re proceedings. Se e 3 F.3d at 1543 (concludi ng that ther e was a reasonabl e likeli hood that ali ens “ex clu de d f

rom entryint o th e Unit ed

St ate s b eca

us e o f [ the ir] all eg ed

parti cip ati on

in N azi persecuti ons or genocide” would challenge the government’s exclusi on determination). By contrast , DOJ has not – and cannot – desc ribe with any r easonable degr ee of particul arity the subject matter of the hypothetical proceedings, the partie s involved, when such pr oceedings
m ight oc cur, o r ho w the inf orm ati on wi thh eld he re m ight be us ed

bythe se hyp oth eti calparti es t o int erf ere wi th t he se hyp oth eti calpro cee din gs . DO J m aybe co rre ct that th e p rec ise sco pe of an 5 investiga tion or the statute under which a proce eding is li kely to be broughtneed not be dis cer ne d in ord er t o c on clu de that a p roc eed ingis “ rea so na bly antic ipated ” und er Map oth er ’s reasoning. Under this Court’s r eading of the statute and the r elevant ca selaw, however, the category of procee dings must be m ore narrowly de fined than simply any investi gation thatmight be ne fi t f rom the co op eratio n o f s om e se nio r Whit e H ou se o ff ici al at so m e und ete rm ine d f utu re po int reg ard ingso m e und ef

ine d s ub jec t. DOJ’s proffered reading of Map oth er als o d isr eg ard s an im po rtant f act ua l pr ed icate
un de rpi nn ingthe co urt ’s c on clu sio n th at the pro sp ect ive -pr oc eed ingreq uir em ent ha d b een

m et in that ca se: namely, the nexus thatexisted between the information withheld and the proceedings that were ongoing oranticipa ted. In Map oth er , th e re aso na bly antic ipatedThe phr as e “ concr et e l aw enf or cement pr ocee di ng” or i gi nat es i n t he l egi sl at i ve hi st or y of Exem pt i on 7( A ) , dur i ng 6 S e n a to r P h ili p H a rt’s in tro d u c tion o f th e 1 9 7 4 a m e n d m e n t t o th a t ex e m p tion
. See R ob bi ns Ti re , 4 3 7 U .S . at 2 3 0 -3 1
. A s des cr i bed by t he C our t i n R ob bi ns Ti re , t he pur pose of t he a m endm ent w as t o r ever se cour t dec i si ons t hat had “g o n e b ey o n d ” the origina l co n g ress i o n al i n t en t of the ex em p t i o n , w h i ch “‘w as t o pre v en t ha rm t o t h e G o v ern m en t ’s c a se in c o u rt b y n o t allo w in g a n o p p o sin g li tiga n t ea rlier o r g re a te r a c c e ss to in v e stig a to ry fil e s th a n h e w o u ld ot her w i se have
. ’ ” I

d. at 227 ( quot i ng 1975 Sour ce B ook 332)
. A s t he Robbi ns Ti re C our t expl ai ned: The t enor of

t hi s des cr i pt i on of

t he s t at ut or y l anguage cl ear l y s ugges t s t hat t he r el eas e of i nf or m at i on i n i nves t i gat or y f i l es pr i or t o t he c om pl et i on of an a ct ual , cont em pl at ed e nf or cement pr ocee di ng w as pr eci se l y t he ki nd of i nt er f er ence t hat C ongr es s cont i nued t o w ant t o pr ot ect agai nst
. I ndeed, Senat or H ar t s t at ed s peci f i cal l y t hat Exem pt i on 7( A ) w oul d appl y “ w heneve r t he G over nm ent ’ s cas e i n cour t – a concr et e pr ospe ct i ve l aw enf or cement pr ocee di ng – w oul d be har m ed by t he pr em at ur e r el eas e of evi dence or i nf

or m at i on . . . . ” I d. at 231 ( qu ot i ng 197 5 S ou r ce B oo k 33 3). Th i s hi st ory und ers cores t he n arr ow scope of proceed i ng s t hat C on gress i n t en d ed t o be co v ere d un d er E x em p t i o n 7(A ). I n an a t t em pt t o di sc ount t he a bove- quot ed l anguage of Senat or H ar t , D O J r el i es on t he f act t hat Exem pt i on 7 (A ) w a s a g a in a m e n d e d in 1 9 8 6
. See D ef.’ s R es p . t o P l .’ s S u p p l em en t al M em . at 6 n .6. T h i s arg u m en t , h o w ev er, i s unper sua si ve w hen vi ew ed i n l i ght of t he numer ous cas es i n t hi s C i r cui t t hat have ci t ed Sena t or H ar t ’ s l anguage appr ovi ngl y s i nce t he 1986 a m endm ent w ent i nt o ef f ect
. I ndeed, al t hough t he 1986 a m endm ent undoubt edl y r el axed t he st and ard r equ i r ed t o sho w a l i keli ho od of i nt erf erence w i t h an enfor cem ent proceed i ng , D O J ci t es no ca se 18 proceedings that the court identi fied were those in whic h accused Nazis might seek t o use the withheld information to str engthen the cha llenge to their excl usion from the United States. Se e 3 F. 3d at 1 54 3. He re, the lac k o f a ne xu s b etw een

the inf orm ati on DO J se ek s to wi thh old

in t his case and the uns pecified and undefined future pr oceedings under scores the expansiveness of the
rea din g o f E xe m

pti on 7(A ) ad vo cat ed byDO J. Su ch

anint erp ret ati on

of the statut e is parti cu lar ly i na

pp rop riate i n v iewof

the Su pre m e C ourt’ s re pe ate d a ck no wl ed gm ent th at F OI A exemptions are to be construed narrowly. See FBI v. Abramson , 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982) (reit erating “ the oft-repea ted caveatthat FOIA exemptions are to be na rrowly construed” (cit ing De p’t of A ir F orce v . R os e , 4 25 U. S. 35 2, 36 1 (1 97 6)) ). Th e C ourt’ s co nc lus ion

that th e hyp oth eti calpro cee din gs de scr ibe d b y D OJdo no t m eet the standar d for withholding pursua nt to Exemption 7(A) is furtherbolstere d by the long li ne of
cas es – bo th p rio r to an d s inc e Map oth er – that have r ecognized the necessity of identifying a “concrete prospecti ve law enforcement proceeding.” See, e.g. , Ju arez , 518 F.3d at 58-59 6suppor t i ng t he pr oposi t i on t hat t he ba si c pur pose of Exem pt i on 7( A ) has cha nged. To t he c ont r ar y, t hat pur pose , as evi dence d by C ongr es s’ s r ecogni t i on “ t hat l aw enf or cement age nci es had l egi t i m at e ne eds t o kee p ce r t ai n r ecor ds c o n fid e n tial, les t t h e a g e n c ie s b e h in d e re d in th e ir i n v e stig a tion s o r p la c e d a t a d isa d v a n ta g e w h e n it c a m e ti m e to pr es ent t hei r ca se , ” R ob bi ns Ti re , 4 3 7 U .S . at 2 2 5 , co n tinu e s to e n d u re . See, e. g. , C t r. f or Nat ’ lSec

. St udi es , 331 F. 3d at 926 ( quot i ng R ob bi ns Ti re i n conne ct i on w i t h a di sc uss i on of Exem pt i on 7( A ) ’ s pur pose )
. The 1986 am endm ent i n f

act had not hi ng t o do w i t h Exem pt i on 7( A ) ’ s r ef er ence t o “ enf

or cement pr ocee di ngs, ” t he por t i on of th e sta tu te to w h ic h “c o n c re te p ro sp e c tive e n fo rc e m e n t p ro c e e d in g s” m a k e s re fe re n c e . 19 (applying exe mption where records conta ined i nform ation rel ated to ongoing drug inv est igatio n); Bo

yd v. Cr im ina l D iv. of t

heU. S. De

p’t of J us tic e , 4 75 F. 3d

38 1, 38 6 (D .C . C ir. 2007) (applyi ng exemption where records cont ained information about tar gets of ongoing inv est igatio ns ); Be vis v. De p’t of S tate , 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying exemption where records r elated t o potential prosecuti ons of m urders of Americans that took pla ce i n E l S alv ad or and

the inv est igatio n o f a dd iti on al s us pe cts rem ain ed act ive ); Carson v. U.S. De p’t of J us tic e , 631 F.2d 1008, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concludi ng that the a gency’s decl aration
wa s to o c on clu so ry a

nd lac kin g in

sp eci fi city to de ter

m ine wh eth er the wi thh eld rec ord s in

fa ct relate d to an invest igation orproceeding that was ongoing). Such a r equirement is consis tent with the pri ncipal purpos e of the exemption, which is “to pre vent discl osures which might pre m atu rel y re ve al the go ve rnm ent’s cas es i n c ourt, its ev ide nc e an d s trateg ies , o r th e n ature,
sco pe , d ire cti on , and

fo cu s o f i ts i nv est igatio ns , a nd the reb y e na

ble su sp ect s to est ab lis h d ef en ses or f rau du lent al ibi s o r to de str oyor a lte r ev ide nc e. ” May da k v. U. S. De p’t of J us tic e , 218 F.3d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cit ing Ro bb ins Ti re , 437 U.S. at 241-42). Adopting the vague category of hypothet ical proc eedings urged by DOJ in this case would notonly be inconsi stent with that purpose, but would also be in directcontravent ion of “the basic pol icy” of FOIA itself. Se e R os e , 4 25 U. S. at 3 61 (em ph asi zin g th at the “li m ite d [ statut ory ] e xe m pti on s d o n ot o bs cure the basic pol icy that di sclosure, notsecrecy, i s the dominant objecti ve of the Act”). Indee d, the dram ati c an d f

ar- rea ch ingex ten sio n to the curre nt r eac h o f E xe m pti on 7(A ) th at D OJurg es t

hisThi s “pr edi ct i ve j udgm ent , ” C t r. f or Nat ’ lSec

. St udi es , 331 F. 3d at 928, di sc uss ed pr i m ar i l y i n t he B r euer 7 d e c la ra tion , h a s a c e rta in in tu iti v e lo g ic w h e n c o n sid e re d in th e a b stra c t. T h e B re u e r d e c la ra tion p e rs u a siv e ly expl ai ns w hy vol unt ar y, non- publ i c i nt er vi ew s w i t h s eni or W hi t e H ouse of f i ci al s cons t i t ut e a “ pow er f ul i nv est i gator y t oo l ” t hat perm i t l aw enfor cem ent t o ga t her i nfor m at i on outsi de t he co nfi nes of t he g r and j ury process, and di sc uss es a va r i et y of det r i m ent al cons equenc es t hat coul d be e xpect ed t o occ ur i f t he a gency w er e pr event ed f r om or hamper ed i n conduc t i ng s uch i nt er vi ew s. D ecl
. of Lanny A
. B r euer ¶ 4. B ut eve n as sumi ng t he re a so n a b le n e ss o f su c h p re d ic tion s, id e n tifyin g o r p re d ic ting th e h a rm o f d isc lo su re w ith a n y sp e c ificity is nece ss ar i l y pr em i se d on f i r st i dent i f

yi ng t he r equi si t e pr ocee di ngs. B eca use D O J has f ai l ed t o do s o, t he B r euer decl ar at i on – eve n i f

cr edi t ed i n i t s ent i r et y – i s i nsuf f i ci ent t o over com e t hi s def ect i nher ent i n D O J’ s l egal a rg u m e n t. 20 Co urt to a do pt i s m ore pro pe rlydir ect ed to C on gre ss t o c on sid er and , in its dis cre tio n, to e na ct i f it sees fit . This Court, however, is bound by the law in it s currentstate, which doe s not sancti on such an expansive reading of the st atute. Fo r th e re aso ns dis cu sse d a bo ve , th e C ourt c on clu de s th at D OJha s f ail ed to s uf fi cie ntl y identify a cla ss of concrete, pr ospective, orotherwise r easonably ant icipate d enforcement proceedings r equired by Exemption 7(A). Se e N ati on Mag

az inev. U. S. Custo ms Se rv. , 71 F.3d 885, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“There a re limits . . . to when cat egorical rules may be employed. On ly whe n th e rang e o f c irc um stanc es i nc lud ed in t he cat eg ory

ch ara cte ris tic all y s up po rts an inference thatthe statutory requi rements for exemption are satisfied i s such a rule appropriat e.” (al ter ati on

an d inter na l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed)). 2. Li keli ho od of I nt erf ere nc e Based on the prece ding discussi on, the Court is notin a positi on to assess the reasonable ness of DOJ’s asserti on that the di sclosure of the r equested re cords may discourage senior White House officials from engaging in voluntary intervi ews with law enforcement of fi cia ls. In t

he ab sen ce o f an id entif

iab le c ate go ry o f e nf

orc em ent pr oc eed ing s, the Co urt 7 sim ply canno t de ter

m ine wh eth er d isc los ure of the inf orm ati on “co uld rea so na bly be expe cte d to int erf ere wi th e nf

orc em ent pr oc eed ing s. ” 5 U. S. C. § 5 52 (b) (7) (A ). A s d isc us sed at l en gth ab ov e, the cla ss o f p roc eed ing s id entif ied byDO J is too bro ad

an d hyp oth eti calto q

ua lif y a sA l t hough D O J i s car ef ul t o di st i ngui sh bet w een eac h of t hes e s peci f

i c c l ai m s of

pr i vi l ege, al l of

t he c l ai m ed 8 p riv ileg e s in h e re u n iq u e ly to th e e x e c u tive b ra n c h . A s th e D .C . C irc u it e x p la in e d , “‘e x e c u tive p riv ileg e ’ is g e n e ra lly use d t o r ef

er t o a w i de va r i et y of

evi dent i ar y and s ubst ant i ve pr i vi l eges t hat cour t s acc or d t he e xecut i ve br anch. ” In re Sea l ed C ase , 1 2 1 F .3 d 7 2 9 , 7 3 5 n .2 (D .C . C ir. 19 9 7 ); se e i d. at 736 ( “Si nce t he be gi nni ngs of our nat i on, exec ut i ve of

f i ci al s have cl ai m ed a var i et y of pr i vi l eges t o r es i st di sc l osur e of i nf or m at i on t he c onf

i dent i al i t y of w hi ch t hey f

el t w as cr uci al t o f

ul f i l l m ent of

t he uni que r ol e a nd r es ponsi bi l i t i es of t he e xecut i ve br anch of our g o v e rn m e n t.”). 21 “en fo rce m ent pr oc eed ing s” u nd er E xe m

pti on 7(A ). Anyatt em

pt t o p red ict

the harm that dis clo sure o f t

he se r eco rds co uld

have on su chpro cee din gs is the ref ore inh ere ntl y, inc ura

bly speculati ve. Accordingly, the Court concludes that DOJ has failed t o meet its burden of demonstrating that the records wer e properly withheld in thei r entir ety under Exemption 7(A). The Court will now procee d to considerDOJ’s other exemption clai ms. B. Exemption 5 DOJ also claims that the r equested re cords were prope rly withhel d under Exemption 5, wh ich pe rm its anag en cyto w ithho ld d oc um ents s uc h a s “i nte r-a ge nc y o r intra -ag en cy
m em orand

um s o r le tte rs whic h w ou ld n ot b e av ail ab le b y law t o a partyoth er than an a ge nc y in lit igatio n w iththe ag en cy .” 5 U .S .C . § 55 2(b )(5 ); see Schill er v. NLRB , 964 F.2d 1205, 1208 (D .C . C ir. 19 92 ) (“ Ex em

pti on 5 e ns ure s th at m em

be rs o f t he pu bli c cann ot o bta in t

hro ug h F OI A what they could notordinari ly obtain through discovery undertaken i n a lawsuit aga inst the ag en cy .” ). S pe cif

ica lly , D OJcla im s th at the rec ord s w ere pro pe rlywi thh eld in t he ir e nti rety ba sed on the lawen fo rce m ent pr ivi leg e, an d th at p ort ion s o f t he do cum ents w ere ap pro pri ate ly wi thh eld pursu ant to the de lib erativ e p roc ess an d p res ide nti al c om m un icatio ns pri vil eg es. 8 Def.’s Mem. at 9-14. CREW responds that(1) the l aw enforcement privilege has ne ver been rec ognized in the
co nte xt o f E xe m

pti on 5, an d anycla im

of thi s n ature i s m ore pro pe rlyad dre sse d und er Exemption 7(A); (2) DOJ has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the deliber ative22

pro ces s an d p res ide nti al c om m un icatio ns pri vil eg es a

pp ly; an d (3 ) any le git im ate cla im s b ase d on the delibe rative pr ocess and pres idential comm unications privile ges have been waived. Se e Pl.’s Mem./Opp’n at 11-20. Each of these i ssues will be addressed i n turn.

1. Mer its of D OJ’ s P riv ile ge Cl aim s i. LawEnforcement Privi lege DO J ar gu es t

hat th e law e nf

orc em ent pr ivi leg e sh iel ds the entir ety of the req ue ste d
rec ord s f rom dis clo sure, be cau se r ele ase of the do cum ents “ co uld

im pa ir a cla ss o f l aw
en fo rce m ent inve sti gatio ns , n am ely inv est igatio ns inv olv ingthe co nd uc t of Whit e H ou se of fi cia ls. ” D ef

.’s Mem . at 10 . A cco rdi ngto D OJ , th e law e nf orc em ent pr ivi leg e is un iqu ely applicabl e in this c ase because “ the Attorney Gener al has dete rmined that a significa nt and specific inst itutiona l law enforcement interes t would be undermined by the rel ease of the documents at issue.” Def.’s Opp’n/Reply a t 7. CREW counters that “[n]o court has everrecognized [the l aw enforcement] privilege wi thi n th e co nte xt o f E xe m pti on 5, an d th e o nly

co urt that ap pe ars to h av e co ns ide red it
expre ssl y re

jec ted the no tio n. ” P l.’ s Me m ./O pp ’n at 13 ; seeDe an v. FD IC, 389 F. Supp. 2d 780, 79 2 (E .D . K

y. 20 05 ). I nd eed , C RE W co rre ctl y n ote s th at D OJcit es n o c ase in whic h th e law
en fo rce m ent pr ivi leg e h as b een rec og niz ed

un de r E xe m

pti on 5, an d th at n o c ourt h as e ve r act ua llyap pli ed

the pri vil eg e in

the Ex em

pti on 5 c ontext. O n th e o the r ha nd , D OJco rre ctl y notes – and CREW

does not disput e – that courts in thi s Circuit ha ve consiste ntly recogni zed a law enforcement privilege i n civil di scovery, and the agency argues that from this recogniti on of
su cha p riv ile ge in t

he dis co ve ry c ontext, “ it n ece ssaril y f oll ow s th at E xe m

pti on 5 in co rpo rat es the law enforcement privil ege.” Def.’s Opp’n/Reply at 7.S u b sta n tially fo r th e re a so n s a rticu la te d b y C R E W , i f th is C o u rt w er e t o cons i der w het her t o r ecogni ze a l aw 9 enforcem ent pri vi l ege und er E xem pt i on 5, i t w ou l d no t be i ncli ned t o do so. I n pa r t i cular , t he fact t hat E xem pt i on s 6 and 7 a l r eady pr ot ectt he l aw enf or cement i nt er es t s t hat ar e t r adi t i onal l y of conc er n i n t he c i vi l l i t i gat i on cont ext w e ig h s h e a v ily a g a in st re c o g n iz in g th e law e n fo rc e m e n t p riv ileg e u n d e r E x e m p tion 5
. C f. C ol o. Nurs es Ass ’ n v. Fed. Labor Rel at i ons Aut h. , 8 5 1 F .2d 14 8 6 , 1 4 9 2 (D .C
. C i r. 19 8 8 ) ( reit era t i n g t h e “b as i c p ri n cip l e o f st atu t o ry cons t r uct i on t hat a s t at ut e de al i ng w i t h a na r r ow , pr eci se , and s peci f i c s ubj ect i s not s ubm er ged by a l at er ena ct ed sta tu te c o v e rin g a m o re g e n e ra lize d sp e c tru m ” (in te rn a l q u o ta tion m a rk s o m itt e d )); Abram son , 456 U
. S. at 630 (“F O IA e x e m p tion s a re to b e n a rro w ly c o n stru e d [.]” ). I n C R E W ’ s i ni t i al opp osi t i on t o D O J’ s m ot i on f or s um m ary j ud gm ent, i t ar gu ed t hat t he ag enc y’s Vaughn 10 submi ss i on di d not pr ovi de s uf f i ci ent i nf or m at i on f

or C R EW or t he C our t t o as se ss t he c l ai m s t hat por t i ons of t he docum ent s ar e pr ot ect ed unde r t he de l i ber at i ve pr oces s or pr es i dent i al comm uni cat i ons pr i vi l ege, but t hat i n any 23 At the he ari nghe ld o n July

21 , 2 00 9, the C ourt a sk ed co un selfo r D OJto arti cu lat e a meaningful distinction between the scope of Exemption 7(A) and the law enforcement privi lege that DOJ assert s should be rec ognized under Exemption 5. Counsel for DOJ repeate d the ag en cy ’s p os iti on

– in iti all y arti cu lat ed

in i ts m oti on

fo r summ ary

jud gm ent – t

hat in thi s ca se, the tw o are “ co -exten siv e. ” S eco nd Mo t. Hr’gTr . at 26 , 2 8; see Second Mot. Hr’g Tr. at31 (conceding that there should not be a “meaningful difference” between the applic ation of Exemption 7(A) and the law enforcement privile ge under Exemption 5); Def.’s Mem. at 10 (ci tin g it s b rie fi ngreg ard ingEx em pti on 7(A ) in a o ne -se nte nc e ar gum ent th at the law enforcement privilege appl ies); Decl . of Steven G. Bradbury ¶ 12 (“The re asons supporti ng the applicabi lity to these documents of Exem ption Five by virtue of the law enforcement privil ege are the sa me reasons that are s et forth above . . . to support the applicabi lity of Exemption Se ve n. ”). In v iewof

thi s co nc ess ion , th e C ourt n eed no t re ach the qu est ion

of wh eth er a

law
en fo rce m ent pr ivi leg e sh ou ld b e re co gn ize d und er E xe m pti on 5. Ev enif

thi s C ourt w ere to agree with DOJ as a gene ral matter thatsuch a privi lege should be r ecognized underExemption 5, fo r th e re aso ns dis cu sse d at le ng th i n S ect ion III .Aab ov e, the Co urt

co nc lud es t

hat D OJha s 9
no t m et i ts b urd enof

de m on str ati ngthat th e re co rds are sh iel de d f rom dis clo sure o n th is b asi s. ii. Deliberative Process Privil ege 10ev en t no po rt i o n of the reco rds pro p erly fall s w i t h i n t h o se privil eg es . T h e B arron de clarati o n pro v i d es a m o re

d e ta iled , p re c ise d e sc rip tion o f th e in fo rm a tion th a t D O J h a s w ithh e ld a s e x e m p t fro m d isc lo su re . See D ecl
. of D a v id J. B a rro n ¶ 6 (a )-(g ). C R E W a p p e a rs to c o n c e d e th a t t h e a g e n c y ’s su b m iss io n is n o w a d e q u a te to p e rm it ju d ic ia l rev ie w , b u t ap p a re n tly m a in ta in s its p o sitio n th a t t h e d e libe ra tive p ro c e ss p riv ileg e is in a p p lica b le h e re . 24 “The purpose of the deli berative process pri vilege is to ensure open c omm unication be tw een su bo rdi nates an d s up eri ors , to pre ve nt p rem ature d isc los ure of po lic ies be fo re f

ina l ad op tio n, an d to av oid

pu bli c co nf us ion if gro un ds fo r po lic ies that w ere no t part o f t he fi na l ad op ted ag en cypo lic y h ap pe ne d to be expo sed to t he pu bli c. ” Na t’l

Ins t. o f Mi lit ar y Justi ce v . U. S. De p’t of D efe ns e , 4 04 F. Su

pp . 2 d 3 25 , 3 46 (D .D .C . 2 00 5). To qu ali fy fo r pr ote cti on

un de r the pri vil eg e, the wi thh eld inf orm ati on m us t be bo th “ pre de cis ion al” an d “ de lib erativ e. ” Na t’l Ass’n of Home Builders v . Norton , 3 09 F. 3d 26 , 3 9 (D .C . C ir. 20 02 ). T he de lib erativ e p roc ess privile ge thus prote cts from disclosure “advi sory opinions, r ecomm endations and de liberat ions
co m pri sin g p art

of a p roc ess bywh ich

go ve rnm entalde cis ion s an d p oli cie s ar e f orm ulated .” Id. (inter na l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed ). M ore ov er, the pri vil eg e “d oe s n ot s hie ld d oc um ents that sim ply state o r expla in a

de cis ion the go ve rnm ent ha s al rea dym ad e o r pr ote ct m ate ria l th at i s purely factual , unless the materia l is so ine xtricabl y intertwined with the del iberati ve sections of do cum ents that it s d isc los ure wo uld ine vit ab ly r ev ealthe go ve rnm ent’s de lib eratio ns .” In re Se ale d C as e , 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citi ng NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 421 U.S. 132, 150-54 (1975)). CREW contends thatthe withheld i nform ation (1) relate s to decisi ons that had al ready been made when the interview was conducted, and i s therefore not pre de cis ion al; (2) co nta ins “p ure ly f act ua l” i nf orm ati on ; an d (3 ) is alr ead y ava ila ble in t he pu bli c domain. Se e Pl.’s Mem./Opp’n at 15-16. W ith respe ct to whetherthe withheld i nform ation is pr edecisiona l, courts ha ve
co ns ist entlyhe ld t

hat th e d eli be rat ive pro ces s p riv ile ge “p rot ect s o nly co mm un icatio ns . . . th at25

are act ua llyantec ed ent to the ad op tio n o f an a ge nc y p oli cy .” Jo rd an v. U. S. De

p’t of J us tic e , 59 1 F .2 d 7 53 , 7 74 (D .C . C ir. 19 78 ); seeals o A cce ss R ep or ts v . D ep ’t o

f Justi ce , 926 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noti ng that the pr edecisiona l requir ement “focuses attention on the rol e o f t he [i nf orm ati on ] i n th e d eci sio nm ak ingpro ces s”) . In de ed , in the lea din g S up rem e C ourt case on the del iberati ve process pr ivilege, Sears, Roebuck & Co. , th e C ourt n ote d th at it is di fficult to see how the qual ity of a decisi on will be affected by co mm un icatio ns wi th r esp ect

to t he de cis ion

oc curri ngaf

ter the de cis ion

is f ina lly rea ch ed ; an d th ere fo re e qu all y d if fi cu lt t o s ee h owthe qu ali ty o f t he de cis ion

wi ll be affected by forced disclos ure of such comm unications , as long as pri or comm unications and the ingre dients of the deci sionmaking process are not disclosed. 421 U.S. at 151. DOJ acknowledges that “a n ‘after-the-fact explana tion of a decisi on’ will gener ally not be pro tec ted

bythe de lib erativ e p roc ess pri vil eg e. ” D ef .’s Op p’n /R ep ly at 9 ( qu oti ngPl .’s Op p’n at 1 6). Th e ag en cy , h ow ev er, co nte nd s th at “ wh at i s at iss ue he re i s n ot an a ft er- the -f act
explanatio n, but a r eco untin g o f t he pre de cis ion al d eli be rat ive pro ces s it sel f. ” D ef .’s Opp’n/Reply at 9. On this score, DOJ cites to North Dartmouth Properties, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Devel opment , 9 84 F. Su pp . 6 5 (D . M ass . 1 99 7), a w ell

rea so ne d d eci sio n in

wh ich the co urt rec og niz ed

that po st- de cis ion al d oc um ents c anfa ll und er the privi lege where the y recount or r eflect predec isional de liberat ions. See id. at 68 (holding, af ter in camera review, thata post-deci sional email that“relat e[d] to and essential ly re-st ate[d] discussions ” had during the agency’s pre decisional delibera tions was proper ly withheld on the ba sis of the de lib erativ e p roc ess pri vil eg e); seeals o Elec. Privacy I nfo. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ho me lan d S

ec. , No. 04-1625, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94615, at *22-*24 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2006)C R EW uns ucce ss f ul l y at t em pt s t o di st i ngui sh Nort h D art m out h Proper t i es on t he ba si s t hat ( 1) t he e m ai l s at i ss ue 11 i n t hat ca se w er e w r i t t en s hor t l y af t er t he de ci si on w as m ade, and ( 2) t he c our t ac know l edged t hat t he a ut hor of t he e m a il m a y n o t h a v e e v e n k n o w n o f th e a g e n c y ’s d e c isio n a t t h e ti m e h e w ro te th e e m a il. See Pl
. ’ s R epl y at 8- 9. B ut t he c our t ’ s r eas oni ng i n t hat ca se w as not depe ndent on ei t her of t hes e f act s, and CR EW f

ai l s t o expl ai n w hy t he pr i nci pl es ar t i cul at ed i n t hat dec i si on ar e i nappl i cabl e he r e. 26 (relyi ng on No rth Da rtm ou th Pro pe rti es in concluding that an email recounti ng
rec om m en datio ns an d e va luatio ns wa s p red eci sio na l). In reachi ng the conclusi on that the pos t-decis ional emails were prot ected by the de lib erativ e p roc ess pri vil eg e, the No rth Da rtm ou th Pro pe rti es co urt p oi nt edto th e S up re me Court’s rec ognition in Sears, Roebuck & Co. that “the future quality of an agency’s decis ions could be affected if ‘the i ngredients of the decisionmaking process a re . . . discl osed.’ Clearl y, the Court’s de cision re flects a concern for the chill ing effects that suc h disclosur e would have on future agency deli berations .” 984 F. Supp. at 68 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 4 21 U. S. at 151). The court i n No rth Da rtm ou th Prop ert ies thu s co nc lud ed that po st- de cis ion al e m ail s de scr ibi ngan d re lat ingpre de cis ion al d isc us sio ns qu ali fi ed as “ pre de cis ion al” in n ature and we re protecte d by the delibe rative pr ocess privi lege. Id. Th e No rth Da rtm ou th Pro pe rti es court’s r easoning appli es with equal force in the pres ent
cas e. Bo th t

he de clarat ion s su

bm itt ed bythe ag en cyan d th is C ourt’ s in camera review of the records make clear that the information withhel d by DOJ recounts the “i ngredients of the de cis ionm ak ingpro ces s, ” an d f or t hat re aso n th e in fo rm ati on wi thh eld qu ali fi es a s p red eci sio na l – despite the fact that the intervi ew in which the information was discl osed took place after the de cis ion s w ere m ad e. 11 CREW ’s c ontentio n th at the pri vil eg e d oe s n ot a pp ly b eca us e th e m ate ria l co nta ine d in the interviews is “pure ly factual” i s also unpers uasive. Se e Pl.’s Mem./Opp’n at 17 (quoti ng Ju dic ial Watch , In c. v. De

p’t of J us tic e , 365 F.3d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). This argument27

is based on the observati on that the i nform ation at i ssue was “develope d during a fact-findi ng process,” i .e., Fitzgera ld’s inves tigati on, and therefore “i t is obvious that the vastbulk, if not the
entir ety , o f t

he wi thh eld

m ate ria l is ‘pu

rel y f act ua l.’ ” P l.’ s Me m ./O pp ’n at 17 . B ut a s n ote d ab ov e, the wi thh eld

rec ord s co nta in s tat em ents d ire ctl y re lat ingco mm un icatio ns that to ok

pla ce as part of the del iberati ve process. DOJ corr ectly note s that the Bradbury and Barron de clarat ion s d esc rib e in fo rm ati on that “i s n ot o nly

int ertwi ne d w iththe de cis ion m ak ingpro ces s, it is the deliber ative proc ess.” Def.’s Opp’n/Reply at11. Accordingly, the withheld information is both prede cisional and deliber ative. In i ts s up ple m ental m em orand um , C RE W

ass ert s th at –

ba sed on the ad dit ion al d eta il provided by DOJ’s supple mental declarati ons – it has i dentified subst antial i nform ation in the withheld rec ords that ha s already be en publicly di sclosed. Se e Pl.’s Supplemental Mem. Supp. Cr os s-M ot. Summ . J . (“ Pl .’s Su pp lem entalMem .” ) at

14 n. 11 . C RE W

ad dit ion all y in clu de s a de clarat ion

fr om on e o f i ts r ese arc h a sso ciates de scr ibi ngan d atta ch ingpu bli cly av ail ab le information that CREW

claims is relat ed to the information descr ibed in the Barron declar ation. In r esp on se, DO J ci tes In re S ea led Case , 121 F.3d at 740-41, for the propos ition tha t the de lib erativ e p roc ess pri vil eg e is no t ba sed on su bje ct m att er, so that ev enif the re i s an

ov erl ap between the withhe ld information and publicly a vailable information, the withheld information “remains privile ged.” Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Supple mental Mem. at 8. This Court agrees. Fi rst , a rev iewof

CREW ’s d ecl aratio n and att achm ents i n c on

jun cti on wi th D OJ ’s in
ca me ra submission demonstrates that none of the withheld recor ds has been publi cly rele ased; nor has information identi cal to the information contained in those documents been made public. More fundamentally, however, CREW ’s argument ignores the purpose of the deli berative process pri vilege, which i s designed to pr otect the decisionmaking process i tself. Regardles s of28

wh eth er c ert ain

fa ctu al i nf

orm ati on is p ub lic ly ava ila

ble , th e in fo rm ati on

in t he wi thh eld do cum ents i s p rot ect ed

pre cis ely be cau se i t m ight co m

pro m ise wh at i nf

orm ati on wa s co ns ide red and what role i t played in the deliber ative proc ess. Se e In re S ea led Ca se , 121 F.3d at 741 (“[R]elease of a document only waives [executive] privi leges for the document or information specificall y release d, and not for relat ed materials. This l imited approach to waiverin the
ex ecutiv e p riv ile ge co nte xt i s d esi gn ed to e ns ure that ag en cie s d o n ot f ore go vo luntar ily dis clo sin g s om e p riv ile ge d m ate ria l out of the f ear that by do ingso the y are e xp os ingoth er,
m ore sen sit ive [i nf

orm ati on ]. ” (i nte rna l ci tat ion s o m itt ed)). Fo r th ese rea so ns , th e C ourt concludes tha t DOJ has demonstrated that the portions of the r ecords ident ified in the Barr on de clarat ion

are pro tec ted

bythe de lib erativ e p roc ess pri vil eg e. iii. Presidential Communications Privilege DOJ’s final Exemption 5 claim is based on the pres idential comm unications privile ge. The Supreme Court recognized thi s privil ege in United States v. Nixon , 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974), and the D.C. Circui t has ident ified the pri vilege as one that falls unde r Exemption 5. Se e Ju dic ial Watch , 3 65 F. 3d

at 1 11 3. Th e p urp os e o f t he pre sid entia l co mm

un icatio ns pri vil eg e is to “guarant ee the candorof presidentia l adviser s and to provide ‘[a] President and thos e who assist hi m . . . [ with] free[dom ] to explore alt ernative s in the proc ess of shaping polic ies and
m ak ingde cis ion s an d to do so in a way m any w ou ld b e unw ill ingto e xp res s ex cep t pr ivatel y. ’” In re S ea led Ca se , 121 F.3d at 743 (quoting Nixon , 418 U.S. at 708). Most of CREW ’s init ial chal lenge to DOJ’s ass ertion of the pr esidenti al comm unications pri vil eg e re lat ed

to t he de arth o f s pe cif

ici ty and jus tif icatio n p rov ide d in

the Br ad bury declarat ion. Se e Pl .’s Mem ./O pp ’n at 18 -20 . T he Barro n d ecl aratio n, ho we ve r, s ub stanti all yThe dec l ar at i on pr ovi ded by CR EW and di sc uss ed i n Sect i on I I I
. B
. 1. i i above al so r ef er ence s i nf

or m at i on 12 r egar di ng pr es i dent i al comm uni cat i ons t hat i s publ i cl y ava i l abl e. For t he s am e r eas ons di sc uss ed i n t hat s ect i on, C R EW ’ s decl ar at i on and a t t achment s f ai l t o demonst r at e t hat a w ai ver of t he pr es i dent i al comm uni cat i ons pr i vi l ege has bee n ef

f ect ed a s t o t he w i t hhel d i nf or m at i on. 29 narro ws the sco pe of

DO J’s ori gin al c lai m , n oti ngthat “O LC is o nly att est ingthat m ate ria l th at inv olv es d ire ct c om

m un icatio ns wi th t

he Pr esi de nt i s p rot ect ed

bythe pri vil eg e. ” D ecl . o f D av id J. Barro n ¶ 8 n. 2; see id. (stati ng that the pr ivilege i n fact protect s additiona l categor ies of
co mm un icatio ns , b ut t

hat be cau se o f t

he tim e co ns tra int s o f t

he su pp lem entalbri ef

ingsch ed ule
any re m ain ingcla im s w ou ld n o lo ng er b e ad vanc ed). T his m ate ria l co ns tit ute s ap pro xim ate ly two sentences of the withheld recor ds, and accordi ng to the Barron de clarat ion, the information is comprised of “direct c onfidential communications between the Vice President a nd the President [that ] fall within the cor e of the privil ege.” Decl. of David J. Barron ¶8. Based on the briefing by the parties, itis unclearto the Court whethe r CREW actuall y contests the withholding of this i nform ation. Assuming, however, that such withholding is i n fact conteste d, the Co urt ne ve rth ele ss c on clu de s th at this narro w c las s o f i nf orm ati on fa lls un de r th e p res ide nti al
co mm un icatio ns pri vil eg e. 12 2. Wa ive r CREW urges the Courtto conclude that any legi timate delibera tive proce ss and pre sid entia l co mm

un icatio ns pri vil eg es w ere wa ive d whe n V ice Pr esi de nt C he ne y “ vo luntar ily
rev eal ed ” th e in fo rm ati on at i ssu e to the Sp eci al C ouns el, a “t hir d p art [y ] o uts ide the Whit e House.” Pl.’s Mem./Opp’n at 12 (quoti ng In re S ea led Ca se , 1 21 F. 3d

at 7 42 ); see also Second Mo t. H r’gTr . at 52 (as ser tin g th at “ thi s w as an a dv ers e – po tentia llyadve rsaria l si tuatio n, so dis clo sure c learlywo uld

co ns tit ute a w aiv er t o th at thir d p arty b eca us e th e F BI in t

hat cir cum stanc e sh ou ld p rop erl y b e se enas a thi rd p arty” ). D OJres po nd s th at C RE W ’s p os iti on isI n i t s br i ef , C R EW al so r el i es on an ol der ca se , w hi ch a l so bear s t he na m e I n r e Se al ed C ase . See 676 F. 2d 793 13 ( D
. C
. C i r . 1982)
. That ca se , al t hough i t di sc uss ed t he e f f ect of di sc l osur e t o t hi r d par t i es on a par t y’ s subs equent c la im o f p riv ileg e , rela te d o n ly to th e a ttorn e y -c lien t p riv ileg e . S e e id

. at 809. The at t or ney- cl i ent pr i vi l ege, h o w e v e r, is d e sig n e d to p ro te c t d iffe re n t i n te re sts th a n th e p riv ileg e c la im s a ss e rte d in th e in sta n t ca se . C ompare i d. at 808 ( di sc uss i ng t he pur pose s of t he a t t or ney- cl i ent and w or k- pr oduct pr i vi l eges , and r ecogni zi ng t hat “ bot h have t he s am e ba si c pur pose : t o pr om ot e br oad publ i c i nt er es t s i n t he obs er vance of l aw and t he a dm i ni st r at i on of j ust i ce” (a ltera tion s a n d in te rn a l q u o ta tion m a rk s o m itt e d )), w ith I n re Sea l ed C ase , 121 F.3d at 737 ( no t i ng t hat t he p urpose o f th e d e libe ra tive p ro c e ss p riv ileg e is to p ro te c t t h e in te g rity o f a g e n c y d e c isio n s) , and Judi ci alW at ch , 365 F. 3d at 1115 ( expl ai ni ng t hat t he pur pose of t he pr es i dent i al comm uni cat i ons pr i vi l ege i s t o pr ot ect pr es i dent i al d e c isio n m a k in g b y e n su rin g th a t t h e P re sid e n t co n tinu e s to re c e iv e c a n d id a d v ic e ). T h a t ca se , t h e re fo re , i s i nappos i t e. C R EW ’ s r el i ance on I n r e Li ndse

y , 1 4 8 F .3 d 1 1 0 0 (D .C . C ir. 19 9 8 ), is m isp la c e d fo r th e sa m e re a so n . See i d. at 1103 ( not i ng t hat al t hough exe cut i ve pr i vi l ege cl ai m s had be en r ai se d bel ow , t he di st r i ct cour t ’ s r ul i ng on th o se c la im s h a d n o t b e e n a p p e a le d ; an d p ro c e e d in g to a d d re ss o n ly a ttorn e y -c lien t p riv ileg e c la im s)
. 30 “b ase les s, ” ar gu ingthat ex ecutiv e p riv ile ge s ar e n ot w aiv ed wh ere inf

orm ati on is s hared be tw een go ve rnm ent ag en cie s, an d th at n o s uc h w aiv er o ccu rs i n th e ab sen ce o f a

dis clo sure t o th e p ub lic or a privat e party. Def.’s Opp’n/Reply a t 8 (descr ibing the i nterview between Vice President Ch en eyan d F itz ge ral d a s th e “v olu ntary, no n-p ub lic sh ari ngof inf orm ati on be tw een anof fi cia l
ex erc isi ngex ecutiv e f

un cti on s an d e xe cutiv e b ran chinv est igator s”)
. Both parties rely pri marily on In re S ea led Ca se , 1 21 F. 3d

72 9, in s up po rt o f t

he ir respecti ve positions . In parti cular, CREW cites this case for the propositi on that a waiverof privile ge occurs unle ss there i s a “comm onality of inte rests” be tween the pers on divulging the information and the person re ceiving the information. Second Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 52. But the
comm onality- of-intereststandard advoc ated by CREW appears nowhere i n the rele vant casel aw, and this Court doe s not read In re S ea led Ca seto r eq

uir e su cha sh ow ing
. Rathe r, t his Co urt 13 ag ree s w iththe ag en cythat th e p rin cip les art icu lat ed bythe In re S

ea led Ca secourt lea d to the
co nc lus ion

that no wa ive r of

pri vil eg es o ccu

rre d h ere . In re S ea led Ca searose from a grand jury invest igation of Alphonso Mic hael Espy, fo rm er S ecr etary o f A gri cu lture, reg ard ingall eg ati on s th at E sp y h ad im pro pe rlyacc ep ted

gif ts fr om ind ivi du als an d o rganiz ati on s. 12 1 F .3 d at 73 4. Th e sam e al leg ati on s th at f orm ed the ba sis31

of the grand

jur y’s inv est igatio n le d th e Whit e H ou se C ouns el t o inve sti gate E sp y, an d th at office’s investi gation eventually led t o the public r elease of a report on Espy. Id. at 735. Af ter the rel eas e o f t

he rep ort , th e g ran d ju

ry i ssu ed a su bp oe na duces tecum for all documents relat ing to t he rep ort , in

res po ns e to wh ich

the Whit e H ou se C ouns el’ s o ff ice pro du ced

so m e d oc um ents and withheld othe rs on the basi s of the deliber ative proc ess and att orney-cli ent privi leges. Id. Th e O ff ice of the Ind ep en de nt C ouns el ( “O IC ”) m ov ed to c om pe l pe rf orm an ce o f t

he su bp oe na , and the motion was subsequently de nied by the dis trictcourt. Id. at 735-36. On appeal, the D.C. Ci rcu it c on sid ere d and

rej ect ed OI C’ s ar gum ent th at the Whit e H ou se’ s p riv ile ge cla im s v is a vis the request ed documents were waived by, inter a lia , the White House’s public di sclosure of the report and the failure to formally invoke pr ivilege unt il after OIC filed a motion to compel. Se e id. at 7 40 . T he In re S

ea led Ca secourt held that the White House “waived it s claims of privilege [only] in regard to the specific documents that i t voluntar ily revea led to thi rd parti es outside the Whit e H ou se. ” Id. at 741-42. Specifica lly, the court concluded that the White House’s pri vilege had been waived as t o (1) the final report i tself, which had been di sseminated to the publi c; and (2) a document that had bee n sent to Espy’s privatel y retaine d attorney. Id. at 742. Contrary to CREW’s suggestion, the court in In re S ea led Ca se did no t cr eat e a pe r se rul e th at a

dis clo sure t o anythi rd p arty c on sti tut es a wa ive r of

any and allpri vil eg e cl aim s. Rathe r, t he co urt sim ply co nc lud ed

ba sed on the fa cts in t

hat ca se t hat th e d eli be rat ive pro ces s privile ge could not be as serted as to documents that had alr eady been revea led to the publ ic and to a privat e, non-government attorne y. The present ca se, by contras t, involves the disclosur e of inf orm ati on ga ine d b y V ice Pr esi de nt C he ne y in his of fi cia l ca pa city and

dis clo sed to F itz ge ral d in his official capacity as alaw enforcement officer. In re S ea led Ca se , quite simply, does not ad dre ss t he iss ue be fo re the Co urt – whe the r th e in fo rm ati on giv enbyVi ce P res ide nt C he ne y to32

the Sp eci al C ouns el c on sti tut ed a p rot ect ed

int er- ag en cyco mm

un icatio n o r a p ub lic dis clo sure t o a th ird party . N ev erthe les s, an d n otw ith stand ingthe un iqu e ro le o f t he Sp eci al C ouns el a s b oth part of and independentfrom the executi ve branch, thi s Court agrees with DOJ that the discussion be tween Fitzger ald and Vice Pres ident Cheney is more appropri ately consi dered a protecte d inter- agency discl osure. Cf

. Ro ckw ell

Int ’l C or p. v. U. S. De

p’t of J us tic e , 235 F.3d 598, 604-05 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (concl uding that Exemption 5 protec tion was not waived for do cum ents that w ere cre ate d a s p art of ag en cyde lib eratio ns rel ati ngto an e nv iro nm ental inv est igatio n and

pro sec uti on , and

wh ich we re s ub seq

ue ntl y s ent f

rom DO J to Co ng res s as part of an independent congre ssional i nvestigat ion into the agency’s pros ecution of the act ion). Indeed, in the absence of any authori ty dealing with an analogous re lationshi p, this concl usion fi nd s f urt he r su pp ort in t he In re S ea led Ca se co urt ’s r eco gn iti on that be cau se t

he pri vil eg es at issue in this case “e xist[] to aid the governmental decisionmaking process, a waive r should not be lig htl y in fe rre d. ” 7 21 F. 3d at 7 41 (inter

na l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed). The Court is als o unpersuaded by CREW’s reliance on the Spec ial Counsel’ s statement to the Comm ittee that there were no “agreements, condit ions and underst andings between the Office of Special Counsel or the Feder al Bureau of Investi gation and . . . the . . . Vice President reg ard ingthe co nd

uc t an d u se o f t

he int erv iew .” Le tte r f

rom Patri ck Fi tzg era ld, Sp eci al Co un sel , to the Ho no rab le H enry A . W ax m an , C ha irm an , C om m . o n O ve rsi ght & G ov ’t R ef orm at 2 (Ju ly 3 , 2 00 8), att ach ed as E x. A t o P l.’ s C ros s-M ot. Summ . J ; see Pl.’s Mem./Opp’n at 13. DO J h as n eithe r co ntr ov ert ed thi s st ate m ent no r argu ed that V ice Pr esi de nt C he ne y d id i n f act
see k to en sure that hi s st ate m ents w ou ld b e k ep t co nf ide nti al. But su chanag ree m ent – o r la ck the reo f – is n ot d isp os iti ve . T o th e co ntr ary , b eca us e V ice Pr esi de nt C he ne y’s statem ents qu ali fi ed as an inter -ag en cydis clo sure, his fa ilure t o f orm all y invo ke any e xe cutiv e p riv ile ge s33

did not precl ude the White House’s future rel iance on those privile ges. Se e In re S ea led Case , 121 F.3d at 741 (concludi ng that becaus e OIC’s motion was “the first eventwhich could have fo rce d d isc los ure of

the do cum ents, ” th e Whit e H ou se d id n ot “ have anob lig ati on to f orm all y invoke its pr ivileges in advance of the motion”). Therefore, the Court concludes that the de lib erativ e p roc ess an d p res ide nti al c om m un icatio ns pri vil eg es h av e n ot b een wa ive d, an d th at Ex em pti on 5 s hie lds fr om

dis clo sure a ll p ort ion s o f t he req ue ste d re co rds to whic h th e p riv ile ge s apply. C. Exemptions 6 and 7(C) DO J h as i de nti fi ed

po rti on s o f t

he req ue ste d re co rds that it

cla im s w ere pro pe rlywi thh eld be cau se t he y c ontai n p ers on al i nf

orm ati on that is ex em

pt u nd er E xe m

pti on s 6 an d 7 (C ). D ef

.’s Mem . at 14 -17 ; s ee 5 U .S .C . § 55 2(b )(6 ) (e xe m pti ngfr om

dis clo sure “ pe rso nn el and m ed ica l files and similar files the discl osure of which would constitute a clea rly unwarrant ed invasion of pe rso na l pr iva cy ”); id. § 552(b)(7)( C) (exempting from disclosur e “records or information
co m pil ed fo r law e nf

orc em ent pu

rpo ses . . . th at .
. . co uld

rea so na bly be expe cte d to co ns tit

ute an unwarranted i nvasion of personal pr ivacy”). I n particul ar, DOJ contends thatthe recor ds contain the “names of third party non-government em ployees, law enforcement personnel , and low lev el g ov ernm ent em

plo ye es n ot u

nd er i nv est igatio n a s w ellas p ers on al i nf orm ati on su chas
so cia l se curity num

be rs” that ar e sh iel de d f

rom dis clo sure. De f. ’s M em . at 14 . In its supplemental mem orandum, CREW notes that– in view of the additi onal declar ations from DOJ – it “does notseek the dis closure of” Vice Pre sident Cheney’s Social Securi ty number, the
nam es o f t

he FB I ag ents who parti cip ate d in the int erv iew , o r th e n am es o f C IAbri ef ers ref err ed to during the intervi ew. Pl.’s Supplemental Mem. at 15 n.11. Because this doe s not cover theI n par t i cul ar , C R EW di d not di sc l ai m any i nt er es t i n w hat t he B ar r on dec l ar at i on des cr i bes as t he “ [ n] am es of 14 no n-gov ernm ent t hi r d-part i es and det ai l s of t heir ext r ane ou s i nt eract i on s w i t h t he V i ce P r esi den t
. ” D ecl
. of D avid J. B ar r on ¶ 11. b. 34 entir ety of the inf orm ati on wi thh eld un de r E xe m

pti on s 6 an d 7 (C ), ho we ve r, t he Co urt wi ll 14 pro cee d to ad dre ss t

he ap pli cab ili ty o f t

he se e xe m

pti on s. Both Exemptions 6 and 7(C) require the Court to bala nce privacy i nterest s against the public’s i nterestin relea se of the request ed information, keeping in mind that discl osure of pe rso na l in fo rm ati on

do es n ot n ece ssaril y c ontri bute t o F OI A’ s ce ntr al p urp os e o f f os ter ingan understandi ng of the government’s activi ties and conduc t. See, e.g. , U. S. De p’t of D efe ns e v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. , 5 10 U. S. 48 7, 49 5-9 6 (1 99 4); Re po rte rs C om mi tte e , 4 89 U. S. at 77 3-7 4; Da vis v. De

p’t of J us tic e , 9 68 F. 2d

12 76 , 1 28 1-8 2 (D .C . C ir. 19 92 ); Reed v. NLRB , 927 F. 2d 12 49 , 1 25 1 (D .C . C ir. 19 91 ). H ere , D OJargue s th at C RE W ha s f ail ed to s ho w anypu

bli c int ere st i n d isc los ure of

pe rso na l in fo rm ati on

of thi rd p art ies , m

uc h le ss a pu bli c inter est

that
wo uld outw eig h th e p res um

pti ve pri va cyint ere st t

hat attac he s to pe rso na l in fo rm ati on un de r Ex em pti on s 6 an d 7 (C ). C RE W ack no wl ed ge s th at p ers on al i nf orm ati on is p res um

pti ve ly wi thh old ab le und er the se e xe m pti on s, but di sp ute s th e ag en cy ’s “ co nc lus ory ass ert ion ” th at the re is no legit imate public inter est in the information. Pl.’s Mem./Opp’n at 20. Specificall y, CREW po int s o ut t

hat th e in fo rm ati on

at i ssu e re lat es t o an inve sti gatio n th at d eal t w ithill eg al a cti vit y wi thi n th e Whit e H ou se and that ul tim ate ly r esul ted

in t he co nv ict ion

of Vi ce P res ide nt C he ne y’s fo rm er c hie f o f s taf

f. Pl .’s Mem ./O pp ’n at 21 . C RE W thu s ar gu es t

hat th e p ub lic int ere st i n disclosur e is str onger than in most other c ases, and thatDOJ’s failure to expl ain why there i s no pu bli c inter est

in t he inf orm ati on is i ns uf fi cie nt “ in t

he fa ce o f u

nd isp ute d il leg al a cti vit

y th at gave rise t o the underlyi ng FBI intervie w.” Pl.’s Mem./Opp’n at 21.35

In contras t to most of the FOIA fram ework, the government’s burden of just ifying nondisclosur e is much lower where personal identifying information is conc erned. See, e.g. , Sc hreck er v . U .S . D ep ’t o f Justi ce , 349 F.3d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that the D.C. Circuit has “adopted a cat egorical rule permitting a n agency to withhol d information identifying pri vate c iti zen s m entio ne d in lawen fo rce m ent re co rds , unle ss d isc los ure is ‘ ne ces sar y in ord er t o confirm or refute compelling evidence thatthe agency is engaged in il legal act ivity’” (quoting Safecard Servs . Inc. v. SEC , 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). CREW ’s argument that the all eg ed ill eg al a cti vit

y g ivi ngris e to the FB I inter vie w w eig hs in f

av or o f d isc los ure is
un pe rsu asi ve pri m ari ly f

or t he rea so n a dv an ced

byDO J –

lawen fo rce m ent re co rds wi ll a lm os t by definition be gene rated as aresult of il legal or pos sibly il legal act ivity. Inde ed, protect ing individual s against the stigma of being m entioned in the context of a law enforcement inv est igatio n is the pre cis e p urp os e o f E xe m pti on 7(C ). C RE W

po int s to no ev ide nc e th at dis clo sure o f t

he pe rso na l in fo rm ati on

co nta ine d in

the rec ord s w ou ld s he d li ght on ill eg al activity by DOJ or White House officials, a nd has thus failed t o demonstrate that the “in cre m ental pu

bli c inter est

in s uc h in fo rm ati on ” is su ff ici ent to outw eig h th e p riv acy int ere sts at stake. Se e S

afe ca rd Se rvs . In c. , 9 26 F. 2d

at 1 20 6. Ac co rdi ng ly, thi s C ourt c on clu de s th at Exemptions 6 and 7(C) have been proper ly invoked. D. Exemptions 1 and 3 Fi na lly , D OJcla im s th at p ort ion s o f t he req ue ste d re co rds are ex em

pt p urs uant t o Ex em pti on 1 b eca us e o f t he cla ssi fi ed

natur e o f t

he m ate ria l an d, rel ate dly , p urs uant t o Ex em pti on 3 b eca us e th e N ati on al S ecu

rity A ct s pe cif

ica llyex em

pts po rti on s o f t

he rec ord s th at
co nta in i nte lli ge nc e so urc es and m eth od s. De f. ’s M em . at 17 -20 ; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (ex em pti ngm ate ria l th at i s b oth “sp eci fi cal ly a

uth ori zed un de r cr ite ria

est ab lis he d b y anThe Supr em e C our t has r ecogni zed t hat t he N at i onal Secur i t y A ct qual i f i es as a w i t hhol di ng s t at ut e unde r 15 E x e m p tion 3
. S e e CI

A v . S i ms , 4 7 1 U .S. 15 9 , 1 6 7 (19 8 5 ). 36 Ex ecutiv e o rde r to be ke pt s ecr et i n th e inter est of natio na l de fe ns e o r f

ore ign po lic y” an d th at i s “in fa ct p rop erl y c las sif

ied pursu ant to su chEx ecutiv e o rde r”) ; id. § 552(b)(3) ( exempting
m ate ria l th at i s “s pe cif

ica llyex em

pte d f rom dis clo sure b y s tat

ute ”). Pursu ant to thi s C ourt’ s

15 Order requir ing the agency t o submit supplemental declarat ions to supportits vari ous exemption claims, DOJ subm itted the DiMaio decl aration t o address the classified portions of the documents and justify the agency’ s withholding underExemptions 1 and 3. In view of this supple mental declarati on, CREW now disclaims any intere st in the dis clo sure o f c las sif

ied inf orm ati on “to the ex tent it

do es n ot i nc lud e V ale rie Pl am e W ils on ’s identity as a covertCIA agent and does not i nclude information alrea dy made public through the Libby trial , W ilson lawsui t, or otherdisclosur es.” Pl.’s Supple mental Mem. at 15 n.11. The Co urt , h ow ev er, is i n n o p os iti on to e va luate whe the r any o f t he wi thh eld

inf orm ati on ha s b een publicly di sclosed. Rather , this Court’ s role is to consider– with the deference due to the
ex ecutiv e b ran chon

m att ers inv olv ingnatio na l se curity – wh eth er the Di Mai o d ecl aratio n is detaile d and specific enough t o justify withholdi ng under the exemptions. Se e Gar de ls v . C IA , 68 9 F .2 d 1 10 0, 11 04 (D .C . C ir. 19 82 ) (h old ingthat in fo rm ati on rel ate d to the CI A’ s co ve rt
co nta cts wi th i nd ivi du als at univ ers iti es a cro ss t he Un ite d S tat es w as p rop erl y w ithhe ld b eca us e the ag en cy ’s p os iti on

wa s “d eta ile d in

af fi davit s an d d ep os iti on s, is s pe cif ic and fl esh ed out as much as it can be done publicl y, and is far from being m erely concl usory”). A revi ew of the DiMaio decla ration, i n addition t o an in c am era review of the documents, has persuade d the Court that the agency has met its burde n in this ca se. See id. at 1 10 5 (“ Th e te st i s n ot whe the r the co urt pe rso na llyag ree s in

fu ll w iththe CI A’ s ev alu ati on of the dang er –

rathe r, t he iss ue is37

whether on the whole r ecord the Agency’ s judgment object ively survi ves the tes t of
rea so na ble ne ss, go od

fa ith , s pe cif

ici ty, an d p lau sib ili ty i n th is f iel d o f f ore ign int ell ige nc e in wh ich the CI A i s expe rt and

giv enbyCo ng res s a s pe cia l ro le. ”). Th ese po rti on s o f t he req ue ste d records were therefore prope rly withhel d under Exemptions 1 and 3. IV. Conclusion For the reas ons stated above, the Court concl udes that the agency has met its burde n of de m on str ati ngthat ce rta in l im ite d in fo rm ati on wa s ap pro pri ate ly w ithhe ld f rom dis clo sure t o pro tec t th e w ell -re co gn ize d d eli be rat ive pro ces s an d p res ide nti al c om m un icatio ns pri vil eg es
un de r E xe m

pti on 5, pe rso na l pr iva cyun de r E xe m pti on s 6 an d 7 (C ), and

natio na l se curity int ere sts un de r E xe m

pti on s 1 an d 3 . T he Co urt canno t, h ow ev er, pe rm it the go ve rnm ent to withhold the r ecords in their enti rety under Exemption 7(A) on the basis thatdisclosur e might interfere with some unidentifiable and unspeci fied future law enforcement proceedings. The purpo se o f E xe m

pti on 7(A ) is to p rot ect

sp eci fi c o ng oin g o r re aso na bly antic ipated

law
en fo rce m ent pr oc eed ing s. Th ere are no su chpro cee din gs at i ssu e h ere . N eithe r co ng res sio na l intent norwell-est ablished pr ecedent supports the appl ication of the e xemption under the circumstances in this case, and the Court decli nes the government’s invi tation t o create anew, pe r seFO IAex em

pti on fo r any and

all lawen fo rce m ent inter vie ws inv olv inghigh le ve l Whit e Ho us e o ff ici als . A cco rdi ng ly, the Co urt GRANTS IN P ART AN D DENIE S IN PART the parti es’ cro ss- m oti on s f

or s um m ary jud gm ent. An a

pp rop riate O rde r ac co m

panie s th is Memorandum

Opinion. Signed: Emmet G. Sull ivan

United States Dist rict Judge October 1, 2009