MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-10-00078-CR

Christopher O. WOODRUFF,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CR-11181

Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 27, 2010

AFFIRMED

Christopher Woodruff challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his conviction. Woodruff contends the evidence is insufficient to establish that he 

“recklessly” injured his elderly seventy-three year old father. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all of the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 
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found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). As a reviewing court, we “defer to the jury’s credibility and weight 

determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to 

be given their testimony.” Brooks v. State, No. PD-010-09, 2010 WL 3894613, at *5 (Tex. 

Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2010). Although Woodruff also asserts a factual sufficiency challenge, the 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently held, “the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency 

standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the 

evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks, 2010 WL 3894613, at *1.

Woodruff was charged with recklessly causing injury to his father, Charles Woodruff, 

“by pushing Charles Woodruff with the hand of defendant.” Injury to an elderly individual is a 

result offense; therefore, the culpable mental state must apply to the result of appellant’s conduct. 

Kelly v. State, 748 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). A person acts recklessly with 

respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial 

and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(c) (West 2003). 

In considering whether Woodruff acted recklessly, we examine his conduct to determine 

whether: (1) the alleged act, viewed objectively at the time of its commission, created a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk of the type of harm that occurred; (2) the risk was of such a 

magnitude that disregard of it constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 

reasonable person would have exercised in the same situation, i.e. it involved an extreme degree 

of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; (3) the 

defendant was consciously aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk at the time of the 

conduct; and (4) the defendant consciously disregarded that risk. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 
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742, 755-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged 

constitutes proof of the culpability charged.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(e) (West Supp. 

2009).

“Establishment of culpable mental states is almost invariably grounded upon inferences 

to be drawn by the factfinder from the attendant circumstances.” Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 

787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). “The threshold of proof necessary to support a [trier of fact’s] 

finding of [a culpable mental state] is concomitantly low.” Id.

In Cano v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held the evidence was sufficient to 

support a finding that the appellant knowingly or intentionally caused bodily injury to the victim 

based on the seventy-seven year old victim’s testimony that the appellant “hit” or “pushed” her 

down to the pavement. 614 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In the incident, the 

victim’s mouth was so severely cut that she needed several sutures. Id.

Similarly, in Candaleria v. State, the appellate court held that the victim’s testimony was 

sufficient to establish that the appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim’s bodily 

injury. 776 S.W.2d 741, 743-44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref’d). In that case, the 

victim testified that the appellant “used his forearm and upper shoulder to push me into the 

door.” Id. at 743. After being pushed, the victim hit the back of his head on the door causing 

tremendous pain. Id.; see also Pounders v. State, No. 05-97-01469-CR, 1999 WL 47404, at *1-2 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 3, 1999, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient to support conviction of 

injury to an elderly person where victim testified that he was 93 years old and that appellant 

pushed him to the floor causing a severe cut on his head requiring three stitches) (not designated 

for publication).
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In this case, Officer Richard Pauley was dispatched to Woodruff’s house for a family 

violence call. When he arrived, he saw Woodruff’s father sitting outside and bleeding from a 

gash on the top of his forehead. Woodruff’s father told Officer Pauley that Woodruff had thrown 

him out of the house. Woodruff told Officer Pauley he grabbed or took his father by the hand 

and walked him to the front door. Woodruff told Officer Pauley that his father then slipped and 

fell once outside.

Woodruff’s father testified that he was seventy-three years old at the time of the incident. 

Woodruff’s father stated that Woodruff was angry at him for coming into the house and was 

yelling and screaming at him to get out. Woodruff then pushed him out of the door with his 

hand, and he fell and struck his forehead on the sidewalk. Woodruff’s father stated that the push 

was not a “light tap.” Instead, it was a “get out of here” push. Woodruff’s father said the push 

caused him to lose his balance and fall. Woodruff’s father identified photographs that depicted 

the cut on his forehead that required stitches. Woodruff’s father also identified the statement he 

gave police in which he stated Woodruff had shoved him. On cross-examination, defense 

counsel questioned Woodruff’s father extensively regarding how he hit the front of his head after 

falling backward. Woodruff’s father was adamant that he hit his head on the sidewalk and not 

the metal decorative awning around the porch.

Woodruff testified that his father pushed his way into the house. Woodruff tried to 

prevent his father from entering, but he did not slam the door because he did not want to hurt his 

father. Woodruff told his father to get out, but Woodruff’s father told him to get out of his way, 

pushed Woodruff back, and raised his coffee cup. Woodruff thought his father intended to hit 

him with the coffee cup. Woodruff put his father in a basket hold and led him out to the porch. 

Woodruff denied pushing or shoving his father. When Woodruff released his father, his father 
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jerked around and landed on all fours in the grass. Woodruff believed that when his father stood 

up, his father struck his head on a piece of metal sticking out from the porch railing or awning.

The testimony of Woodruff’s father and the inferences the trial court was entitled to draw 

from the testimony are sufficient to support a finding that Woodruff recklessly caused injury to 

his father. The trial court could have found that Woodruff pushed or shoved his seventy-three 

year old father out of the door in anger which created a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his 

father would fall and injure himself. The potential for Woodruff’s seventy-three year old father 

to fall as a result of being pushed or shoved out of the door constituted a gross deviation from the 

standard of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the same situation. The trial 

court as the trier of fact could infer that Woodruff was consciously aware of the risk that his 

father would fall as a result of being pushed or shoved out of the door and that Woodruff 

consciously disregarded that risk. Accordingly, we hold the evidence is legally sufficient to 

support Woodruff’s conviction.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH