I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4747 

To prohibit the Government from using or contracting with an entity that 

uses certain telecommunications services or equipment, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 9, 2018 

Mr. CONAWAY (for himself and Ms. CHENEY) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Government from using or contracting with 

an entity that uses certain telecommunications services 

or equipment, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Defending U.S. Gov5 ernment Communications Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 The Congress finds the following: 

8 (1) In its 2011 ‘‘Annual Report to Congress on 

9 Military and Security Developments Involving the 


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1 People’s Republic of China’’, the Department of De2 fense stated that, ‘‘China’s defense industry has ben3 efited from integration with a rapidly expanding ci4 vilian economy and science and technology sector, 

5 particularly elements that have access to foreign 

6 technology. Progress within individual defense sec7 tors appears linked to the relative integration of 

8 each, through China’s civilian economy, into the 

9 global production and R&D chain . . . Information 

10 technology companies in particular, including 

11 Huawei, Datang, and Zhongxing, maintain close ties 

12 to the PLA.’’. 

13 (2) In a 2011 report titled ‘‘The National Secu14 rity Implications of Investments and Products from 

15 the People’s Republic of China in the Telecommuni16 cations Sector’’, the United States China Commis17 sion stated that ‘‘[n]ational security concerns have 

18 accompanied the dramatic growth of China’s telecom 

19 sector. . . . Additionally, large Chinese companies – 

20 particularly those ‘national champions’ prominent in 

21 China’s ‘going out’ strategy of overseas expansion – 

22 are directly subject to direction by the Chinese Com23 munist Party, to include support for PRC state poli24 cies and goals.’’. 


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1 (3) The Commission further stated in its report 

2 that ‘‘[f]rom this point of view, the clear economic 

3 benefits of foreign investment in the U.S. must be 

4 weighed against the potential security concerns re5 lated to infrastructure components coming under the 

6 control of foreign entities. This seems particularly 

7 applicable in the telecommunications industry, as 

8 Chinese companies continue systematically to ac9 quire significant holdings in prominent global and 

10 U.S. telecommunications and information technology 

11 companies.’’. 

12 (4) In its 2011 Annual Report to Congress, the 

13 United States China Commission stated that ‘‘[t]he 

14 extent of the state’s control of the Chinese economy 

15 is difficult to quantify . . . There is also a category 

16 of companies that, though claiming to be private, are 

17 subject to state influence. Such companies are often 

18 in new markets with no established SOE leaders and 

19 enjoy favorable government policies that support 

20 their development while posing obstacles to foreign 

21 competition. Examples include Chinese telecoms 

22 giant Huawei and such automotive companies as 

23 battery maker BYD and vehicle manufacturers 

24 Geely and Chery.’’. 


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1 (5) General Michael Hayden, who served as Di2 rector of the Central Intelligence Agency and Direc3 tor of the National Security Agency, stated in July 

4 2013 that Huawei had ‘‘shared with the Chinese 

5 state intimate and extensive knowledge of foreign 

6 telecommunications systems it is involved with.’’. 

7 (6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a 

8 February 2015 Counterintelligence Strategy Part9 nership Intelligence Note stated that, ‘‘[w]ith the ex10 panded use of Huawei Technologies Inc. equipment 

11 and services in U.S. telecommunications service pro12 vider networks, the Chinese Government’s potential 

13 access to U.S. business communications is dramati14 cally increasing. Chinese Government-supported tele15 communications equipment on U.S. networks may be 

16 exploited through Chinese cyber activity, with Chi17 na’s intelligence services operating as an advanced 

18 persistent threat to U.S. networks.’’. 

19 (7) The FBI further stated in its February 

20 2015 counterintelligence note that, ‘‘China makes no 

21 secret that its cyber warfare strategy is predicated 

22 on controlling global communications network infra23 structure.’’. 

24 (8) At a hearing before the Committee on 

25 Armed Services of the House of Representatives on 


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1 September 30, 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense 

2 Robert Work, responding to a question about the 

3 use of Huawei telecommunications equipment, stat4 ed, ‘‘In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, abso5 lutely not. And I know of no other—I don’t believe 

6 we operate in the Pentagon, any [Huawei] systems 

7 in the Pentagon.’’. 

8 (9) At such hearing, the Commander of the 

9 United States Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rog10 ers, responding to a question about why such 

11 Huawei telecommunications equipment is not used, 

12 stated, ‘‘as we look at supply chain and we look at 

13 potential vulnerabilities within the system, that it is 

14 a risk we felt was unacceptable.’’. 

15 (10) In March 2017, ZTE Corporation pled 

16 guilty to conspiring to violate the International 

17 Emergency Economic Powers Act by illegally ship18 ping U.S.-origin items to Iran, paying the United 

19 States Government a penalty of $892,360,064 dol20 lars for activity between January 2010 and January 

21 2016. 

22 (11) The Treasury Department’s Office of For23 eign Assets Control issued a subpoena to Huawei as 

24 part of a Federal investigation of alleged violations 


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1 of trade restrictions on Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and 

2 Syria. 

3 (12) In the bipartisan House Permanent Select 

4 Committee on Intelligence ‘‘Investigative Report on 

5 the United States National Security Issues Posed by 

6 Chinese Telecommunication Companies Huawei and 

7 ZTE’’ released in 2012, it was recommended that 

8 ‘‘U.S. government systems, particularly sensitive 

9 systems, should not include Huawei or ZTE equip10 ment, including in component parts. Similarly, gov11 ernment contractors – particularly those working on 

12 contracts for sensitive U.S. programs – should ex13 clude ZTE or Huawei equipment in their systems.’’. 

14 SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 

15 SERVICES OR EQUIPMENT. 

16 (a) PROHIBITION ON AGENCY USE OR PROCURE17 MENT.—The head of an agency may not procure or obtain, 

18 may not extend or renew a contract to procure or obtain, 

19 and may not enter into a contract (or extend or renew 

20 a contract) with an entity that uses any equipment, sys21 tem, or service that uses covered telecommunications 

22 equipment or services as a substantial or essential compo23 nent of any system, or as critical technology as part of 

24 any system. 

25 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 


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1 (1) AGENCY.—The term ‘‘agency’’ has the 

2 meaning given that term in section 551 of title 5, 

3 United States Code. 

4 (2) COVERED FOREIGN COUNTRY.—The term 

5 ‘‘covered foreign country’’ means the People’s Re6 public of China. 

7 (3) COVERED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIP8 MENT OR SERVICES.—The term ‘‘covered tele9 communications equipment or services’’ means any 

10 of the following: 

11 (A) Telecommunications equipment pro12 duced by Huawei Technologies Company or 

13 ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate 

14 of such entities). 

15 (B) Telecommunications services provided 

16 by such entities or using such equipment. 

17 (C) Telecommunications equipment or 

18 services produced or provided by an entity that 

19 the head of the relevant agency reasonably be20 lieves to be an entity owned or controlled by, or 

21 otherwise connected to, the government of a 

22 covered foreign country. 

Æ 


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