SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0626-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

HUGUES FRANCOIS, a/k/a

JACKIE FRANCOIS, JACQUES

FRANCOIS, and JACK FRANCOIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________________

Submitted May 8, 2018 – Decided June 6, 2018

Before Judges Yannotti and Mawla.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 

08-10-1788.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Charles H. Landesman, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Dennis Calo, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Jenny X. Zhang, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0626-16T3

Defendant appeals from an order dated June 10, 2016, which 

denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an 

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I.

Defendant was charged under Bergen County Indictment No. 08-

10-1788 with first-degree murder of Thalia Stathis (Stathis), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2) (count one); second-degree 

disturbing or removing human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1(a)(1) 

(count two); third-degree forgery, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1(a)(2) and (3) 

(counts three and four); fourth-degree theft by deception, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4 (count five); third-degree hindering 

apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (count six); fourth-degree 

violation of sex offender registration requirements, N.J.S.A. 

2C:7-2(d) (count seven); and third-degree failure to register as 

a sex offender, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(3) (count eight). Counts seven 

and eight were severed for trial. Counts one through six were 

tried before a jury. 

At the trial, evidence was presented which indicated that 

Stathis met defendant in 2005, at her parents' diner where she 

worked as a waitress. They developed a relationship, and she worked 

six days a week while defendant did not have a steady job or 

income. Soon thereafter, Stathis moved out of her parents' house 
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and moved into an apartment. Her relationship with her parents 

also became strained. 

On September 7, 2007, Stathis told her mother she was going 

to end her relationship with defendant and that she wanted to come 

back home. On September 10, 2007, Stathis met her mother at a 

local restaurant and told her she had broken up with defendant and 

did not want to see him again. Stathis then returned to work. 

Stathis was last seen at work on September 13, 2007. That 

evening, she told two co-workers she was going to leave defendant. 

She also told one of her co-workers she intended to return to her 

apartment to pick up some clothes. Thereafter, Stathis went 

missing. When Stathis' co-workers realized she was absent from 

several shifts in a row, and no one could get in touch with her, 

they contacted the police. 

On September 26, 2007, Cliffside Park police officers went 

to Stathis' apartment to check on her. There, they spoke with 

defendant, who informed the police the apartment belonged to 

Stathis and he was living there. Defendant was arrested on charges 

unrelated to Stathis' disappearance. Defendant was transported to 

the Cliffside Park police station, where he signed a consent-tosearch form for his automobile.

Officer Marc Moschella conducted a search of defendant's 

vehicle. He testified the car was missing carpet padding on the 
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left side of the trunk and a plate that covers the spare tire. 

During the search, the police recovered two of Stathis'

prescriptions from an oral surgeon, her AT&T phone bill, and her 

ATM card.

Detective James Brazofsky of the homicide unit of the Bergen 

County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) examined defendant's vehicle on 

September 26, 2007. He noticed that the interior, passenger-side 

floor mat was missing. A small red stain, possibly blood, was 

located in the passenger-side rear section of the vehicle. The 

officers also found clothing and a bottle of window cleaner in the 

car. 

Brazofsky testified that the car's trunk liner was missing, 

and he noticed two separate reddish brown stains in the trunk,

which he suspected were blood. He noticed additional stains on the 

CD player in the trunk of the car, which he also suspected to be 

blood. 

Detective Mark Bendul of the BCPO interviewed defendant and 

searched the apartment defendant shared with Stathis. Three 

suspected blood stains were identified in the bathroom. After the 

stains were photographed, they were swabbed with distilled water 

so that samples could be collected. Bendul testified that tests 

indicated that the blood samples taken from the car matched 

Stathis' blood. 
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On July 9, 2008, Trooper Kevin Reppenhagen of the New York 

State Police received a call to investigate a suspicious bag on 

the Southern State Parkway. Reppenhagen located a plaid bag on the 

side of the highway. He believed the contents of the bag were

decaying and could contain body parts. The area was secured as a 

crime scene. The bag contained an entire human skeleton, situated 

in the fetal position and covered with maggots. 

The Nassau County Medical Examiner's Office performed an

autopsy of the body. The cause of death was determined to be blunt 

force trauma and breaking of the hyoid bone, a sign indicating 

strangulation. A forensic anthropologist indicated the body was 

female, white, between thirty to fifty years old, and approximately 

Stathis' height. 

A forensic odontologist examined the teeth of the corpse, and 

Stathis' dentist confirmed the body was Stathis' corpse. The 

investigation revealed defendant previously lived in Nassau 

County, New York, directly adjacent to the Southern State Parkway. 

DNA samples taken from the remains were matched to DNA samples 

provided by Stathis' parents, and the forensics analysis 

determined the DNA taken from the car and apartment bathroom was 

that of a female and also matched the DNA of Stathis' parents. 

 On count one, the jury found defendant not guilty of murder, 

but guilty of the lesser included offense of aggravated 
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manslaughter. The jury found defendant guilty on counts two through 

six. The court sentenced defendant on count one, (aggravated 

manslaughter), to a thirty-year custodial term, and required 

defendant to serve eighty-five percent of that sentence before 

becoming eligible for parole, pursuant to the No Early Release 

Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 

In addition, on count two (disturbing human remains), the 

court imposed a concurrent ten-year term, with five years of parole 

ineligibility. On count three (forgery), the court sentenced 

defendant to a consecutive five-year term, with two-and-one-half 

years of parole ineligibility. Moreover, on count six (hindering), 

the court imposed a consecutive five-year term, with two-and-onehalf years of parole ineligibility. 

Defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction dated 

October 28, 2010. We affirmed defendant's convictions and the 

sentences imposed. State v. Francois, No. A-0757-10 (App. Div. 

Oct. 4, 2012). Defendant then filed a petition for certification 

with the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, State v. 

Francois, 216 N.J. 366 (2013). 

On August 6, 2015, defendant filed a PCR petition in which 

he claimed he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. 

He claimed his attorney was deficient because counsel failed to: 

(1) file a motion to allow defendant to represent himself at trial; 
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(2) argue that the State failed to prove its case beyond a 

reasonable doubt; (3) object to inadmissible expert testimony; (4) 

object to the admission of certain "other crimes" evidence; (5) 

move for a severance of the charges against him; and (6) object 

to the testimony regarding a spare tire. In addition, defendant 

argued that the prosecutor's comments during summation were 

improper and so prejudicial that they denied him a fair trial. 

The PCR judge assigned counsel to represent defendant and 

counsel submitted a brief on defendant's behalf. On May 31, 2016, 

the PCR judge heard oral argument, and on June 10, 2016, the judge 

filed a written opinion, finding that defendant had not presented

a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and an 

evidentiary hearing was not required on the petition. The judge

entered an order dated June 10, 2016, denying PCR. This appeal 

followed.

II.

On appeal, defendant argues he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel because: (1) his trial attorney did not file 

and argue a motion for waiver of his right to counsel so that he 

could represent himself at trial; (2) trial counsel failed to 

argue in summation that the State had failed to prove he committed 

the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, and appellate 

counsel erred by failing to raise that issue on appeal; (3) trial 
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counsel failed to object to Detective Bendul's testimony regarding 

the blood sample taken from his vehicle because Bendul was not 

qualified as an expert; and (4) trial counsel failed to object to 

certain remarks by the prosecutor in summation. In addition, 

defendant argues that the PCR court erred by denying his request 

for an evidentiary hearing. 

A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a PCR 

petition if the defendant presents a prima facie case in support 

of PCR, the court determines there are material issues of fact 

that cannot be resolved based on the existing record, and the 

court finds that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the 

claims presented. R. 3:22-10(b); see also State v. Porter, 216 

N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)). 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee 

criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance of 

counsel. State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 610 (2014) (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); State v. Fritz, 

105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987)). To succeed on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, the defendant must meet the two-part test 

established by Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, and adopted by our 

Supreme Court in Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. 
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Under Strickland, a defendant first must show that his or her 

attorney made errors "so serious that counsel was not functioning 

as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Counsel's performance is deficient 

if it "[falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id.

at 688.

A defendant also must show that counsel's "deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. The defendant 

must establish that "there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different." Id. at 694. A "reasonable probability" 

is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome" of the proceeding. Ibid.

A. Motion for Self-Representation

Defendant argues his trial attorney was deficient because he 

did not file a motion to waive his right to counsel, after 

defendant said he no longer wanted the attorney to represent him 

at trial. Defendant contends the attorney should have urged the 

court to conduct a hearing so that the court could inform him of 

his right to self-representation, as explained in State v. DuBois, 

189 N.J. 454 (2007).

On direct appeal, defendant argued that his right under the 

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated 
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because the trial judge denied his request for selfrepresentation. We rejected that claim, noting that defendant had 

not sought permission to represent himself until the close of 

testimony on the second day of trial. Francois, No. A-0757-10, 

slip op. at 18–19. We held that under the circumstances, the judge 

did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's application. 

Id. at 23. 

Here, the PCR court found that defendant's claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel was barred by Rule 3:22-5 because 

the issue had been raised on direct appeal and we had determined 

that the judge did not abuse his discretion by denying defendant's 

request to proceed pro se. Even if defendant's claim was not barred 

by Rule 3:22-5, defendant failed to show that counsel was deficient 

in failing to file a motion to allow defendant to represent himself 

at trial. 

As noted, defendant's apparent dissatisfaction with his 

attorney first arose while the trial was underway. Indeed, on 

direct appeal, defendant argued that his dissatisfaction with his 

attorney was "unknown and unknowable" prior to trial. Francois, 

No. A-0757-10, slip op. at 23. When the trial judge told defendant 

he could not speak in front of the jury and he had to communicate 

through his attorney, he stated, "If that's the case, why don't 

you let me represent myself then?" Id. at 19. 
11 A-0626-16T3

Defendant made six further requests to represent himself, and 

the judge repeatedly instructed defendant on the rules of courtroom 

behavior. Ibid. He told defendant that his attorney was "extremely 

capable," but defendant disagreed and again requested permission 

to represent himself. Ibid. The trial judge found the application 

was untimely. Ibid.

Thus, the record shows that at trial defendant made a motion 

for self-representation, and he has not shown that the application 

would have been granted if it had been made by his attorney. In 

addition, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by 

counsel's failure to make the motion. The result would have been 

the same. The motion was untimely, and as we held in defendant's 

direct appeal, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by 

denying it. 

B. Trial Counsel's Summation

Next, defendant argues his trial attorney should have argued 

in summation that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he committed the charged offenses. The PCR court 

correctly found that this claim was barred by Rule 3:22-4 because 

it could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. However, 

the PCR court also addressed the claim on the merits and found 

that defendant had not met either prong of the Strickland test for 

ineffective assistance of counsel.
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The PCR court noted that in summation, defendant's attorney 

had criticized the State's case. Moreover, the trial judge had 

instructed the jury that the State had the burden of proving all 

elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

PCR court found that defendant had not shown his attorney was 

deficient in his summation, or that he had been prejudiced by 

counsel's summation. The record supports the PCR court's 

determination that defendant had not raised a prima facie claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to defense 

counsel's summation. For the same reasons, we reject defendant's 

claim that his appellate counsel was deficient for failing to 

raise the issue on direct appeal. Appellate counsel had no 

obligation to raise this meritless claim, and the result of the 

appeal would not have been different if the issue had been raised.

C. Detective Bendul's Testimony

Defendant further argues his trial attorney was deficient 

because he failed to object to Detective Bendul's testimony 

regarding the samples taken from stains in his vehicle, which

tested positive for blood and were determined to be Stathis' blood. 

Defendant contends Bendul's testimony was expert testimony and his 

attorney should have objected because Bendul had not been qualified 

as an expert. 
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The PCR court correctly found this claim was procedurally 

barred by Rule 3:22-4 because it could have been, but was not, 

raised on direct appeal. The court nevertheless addressed the 

merits of this claim, finding that counsel was not deficient in 

failing to object to Bendul's testimony because he was not 

testifying as an expert. 

The detective merely provided the jury with a summary of the 

results of the tests performed on the stains. The court noted that 

at trial, the State had also presented testimony from a forensic 

scientist at the New Jersey State Police lab, who confirmed that 

Stathis was the source of the bloodstains found in defendant's 

car. 

Thus, the PCR court correctly determined that defense counsel 

was not deficient in failing to object to Bendul's testimony 

regarding the results of the tests on the blood stains. Even if 

counsel erred by failing to object, defendant failed to show he 

was prejudiced by the error. Defendant failed to show the trial 

court would have barred Bendul from testifying about the facts if 

counsel had objected. Moreover, the State's forensic scientist 

testified that Stathis was the source of the bloodstains found in 

the car.
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D. The Prosecutor's Summation

Defendant also argues his trial attorney was deficient 

because he failed to object to the assistant prosecutor's statement 

in summation that the murder did not take place in the victim's 

bathroom or apartment. Defendant notes that in the opening 

statement, the prosecutor referred to red stains found in the 

bathroom, which were presumed to be blood. Defendant argues that 

the crime was not committed in the bathroom, and the blood stains 

found there were irrelevant. 

The PCR court correctly found that this claim was barred by 

Rule 3:22-4 because it could have been, but was not, raised on 

direct appeal. Nevertheless, the court addressed the issue and 

concluded that defendant had not shown he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the 

prosecutor's remarks. 

In its decision, the PCR court noted that in his closing, the 

prosecutor had argued that the blood evidence in the bathroom 

could support a finding that Stathis had been killed there, but 

it was more likely that she was killed in defendant's car. The PCR

court pointed out that the State did not have to prove where 

Stathis was killed. The State only had to prove that defendant 

murdered Stathis. The court found that the prosecutor's remarks 
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were not improper and defense counsel was not deficient in failing 

to object. 

We agree defendant's arguments on this point are without 

sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

E. Evidentiary Hearing

In addition, defendant argues that the PCR court erred by 

failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his petition. However, 

because defendant failed to raise a prima facie case for relief, 

and the existing record was sufficient to resolve defendant's 

claims, the court correctly found he was not entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing. Porter, 216 N.J. at 354 (citing R. 3:22-

10(b)).

Affirmed.