[Cite as Beck v. Beck, 2017-Ohio-1106.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LAKE COUNTY, OHIO 

STEVEN J. BECK, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 CASE NO. 2016-L-054

 - vs - : 

JOY L. BECK, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, 

Case No. 2012 DR 000349. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Gary D. Zeid, Sternberg & Zeid Co., L.P.A., 7547 Mentor Avenue, #301, Mentor, OH 

44060 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Joy L. Beck, pro se, 20230 Pienza Lane, Porter Ranch, CA 91326 (DefendantAppellant). 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Joy L. Beck, pro se (“wife”), appeals the divorce decree of the 

Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. At issue is whether 

the trial court abused its discretion or erred in making certain rulings in favor of 

appellee, Steven J. Beck (“husband”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
 2

{¶2} The parties were married in 1990. In 1996, they had twin daughters, V.B 

and S.B. They were 18 years old on August 18, 2014, and graduated from high school 

in June 2015. 

{¶3} Husband filed his complaint for divorce on May 30, 2012. Wife filed her 

answer and counterclaim for divorce. Husband filed an answer to the counterclaim. 

Wife also filed a motion for temporary spousal and child support. At the time, the 

children were 15 years old. 

{¶4} The case was protracted due to wife’s geographical distance from the 

court because, in early 2012, she moved to California with her daughters. The case 

was complicated by the multitude of motions filed by the parties, which necessitated 

multiple trial dates. Further, wife was represented by five different attorneys during the 

course of the proceedings. At trial, both parties were represented by counsel. 

{¶5} On August 23, 2012, the magistrate issued an order designating both 

parents as temporary residential parents and establishing temporary child and spousal 

support. The parties filed objections to the temporary support order, which the 

magistrate passed for trial. 

{¶6} Subsequently, husband filed an amended complaint. Wife filed an 

amended counterclaim and request for a distributive award. She also filed a motion to 

extend husband’s child support obligation for V.B., alleging she was disabled. 

{¶7} By the time of trial, the parties had resolved several contested issues by 

stipulation, including custody of the children, the amount of support, and the division of 

certain marital assets. The issues that remained unresolved included the starting date 
 3

of temporary support, the division of the children’s school-related expenses, and wife’s 

request for a distributive award. 

{¶8} The trial was held by the magistrate on October 28, 2013; October 30, 

2013; November 15, 2013; and December 23, 2013. After the trial, wife continued to file 

pro se motions, such as multiple motions to show cause against husband and a motion 

for Civ.R. 11 sanctions against husband’s counsel, each of which was denied. The 

parties filed their written closing arguments in November 2014. The magistrate filed her 

67-page decision on the trial and pending motions on June 26, 2015. Mother filed 

objections to the magistrate’s decision, which the court denied on February 25, 2016. 

{¶9} On April 29, 2016, the trial court issued the divorce decree resolving all 

remaining issues. Wife appeals the divorce decree, asserting seven assignments of 

error. For her first, she alleges: 

{¶10} “The trial court abused its discretion in designating the payment process 

for facials when it was already established to be medically necessary.” 

{¶11} Before addressing this issue, we note that wife has failed to cite the record 

even once to support any of the alleged facts on which she relies to support this 

assigned error, in violation of App.R. 16(A)(7). It is not the role of this court to comb the 

record in search of evidence to support an appellant’s argument. Id. Failure to comply 

with this rule is potentially fatal to the argument. Kremer v. Cox, 114 Ohio App.3d 41, 

60 (9th Dist.1996). For this reason alone, this assignment of error lacks merit. 

{¶12} In any event, it is unclear what wife means when she says that it was 

“already established” that the monthly facials S.B. receives for her acne were medically 

necessary because the court did not make such ruling. 
 4

{¶13} At trial, husband argued that the medical insurer should determine if the 

treatment was medically necessary and, if it was, insurance would cover the cost. He 

argued that if the insurer determined the procedure was not medically necessary, he 

should not be required to share the cost of the bill. 

{¶14} The magistrate stated in her June 26, 2015 decision following the trial that 

the issue was difficult because, while the facials involved here are more intensive than a 

typical cosmetic facial, the insurance carrier had determined the procedure was not 

medically necessary. In an effort to reach a fair compromise, the trial court in the 

divorce decree concluded that “so long as [S.B.’s] medical providers verify their 

determination, in writing, that her facials are medically necessary, [husband] shall share 

in the responsibility for their payment.” (Emphasis added.) The court also set forth the 

percentage of each party’s obligation. 

{¶15} In support of her assigned error, wife argues husband should be required 

to share the cost of these procedures without wife being required to present monthly 

verification from S.B.’s doctor as to their medical necessity. However, contrary to wife’s 

argument, while she is required to present proof of the continuing medical necessity for 

the procedures, she is not required to present such verification each time S.B. has one. 

The order did not specify the frequency of such verification; only that verification of 

medical necessity must be provided before husband is required to share the expense. 

Thus, e.g., wife could provide a doctor’s verification monthly, every six months, or on 

some other schedule, as long as verification is provided. 
 5

{¶16} Upon review of the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining the procedure by which the costs associated with these 

treatments would be apportioned. 

{¶17} For her second assignment of error, wife alleges: 

{¶18} “The trial court erred in establishing August 23, 2012 for temporary 

support is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence presented and ignores the 

case law on the matter of status quo.” (Sic throughout.) 

{¶19} “‘There is no set formula under R.C. 3105.18 to guide courts to arrive at 

an appropriate amount of temporary support. The only explicit limitation in R.C. 

3105.18(B) is that the award must be “reasonable.” Courts are given discretion in 

deciding what is reasonable support because that determination is dependent on the 

unique facts and circumstances of each case.’” Keating v. Keating, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 90611, 2008-Ohio-5345, ¶35, quoting Cangemi v. Cangemi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

86670, 2006-Ohio-2879, ¶15. Thus, this court will not reverse such determination 

absent a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. 

{¶20} On August 23, 2012, the magistrate ordered child support and spousal 

support would be retroactive to July 1, 2012. Both parties filed objections to this order. 

Thereafter, the magistrate, in her June 26, 2015 decision following the trial, ordered 

temporary support would not be retroactive, but, rather, would be effective August 23, 

2012. Wife objected to this finding, and the trial court overruled the objection. 

Subsequently, the trial court addressed this issue in the divorce decree and issued the 

identical order as the magistrate. Wife argues the temporary support order should have 
 6

been retroactive to June 16, 2012. Thus, she argues she was entitled to two more 

months of temporary support from June to August, 2012. 

{¶21} Wife argues that on June 16, 2012, husband cut off all financial 

assistance, including credit cards, checks, and cash, and she was forced to live on 

loans given to her by her mother. To support her argument, wife lists the expenses she 

allegedly paid prior to August 23, 2012 with those loans; however, she fails to reference 

the record in support of any of these alleged payments. 

{¶22} The magistrate, in her June 26, 2015 decision denying retroactive support, 

found wife’s testimony on this issue was not credible, as follows: 

{¶23} Wife’s statements do not indicate payments made after her mother 

allegedly gave her money to pay her bills. The amounts the wife 

testified to above are in the neighborhood of $16,000. Wife 

presented no reliable testimony and no evidence whatsoever from 

her mother, that these supposed amounts were loans to the wife. 

Finally, the wife’s use of [marital] credit cards belie her previous 

statement the husband cut off her access to family funds as of June 

16, 2012. 

{¶24} Thereafter, the trial court overruled wife’s objections to the magistrate’s 

decision in a February 25, 2016 judgment, in which the court stated: 

{¶25} [Wife] is correct the transcript shows [husband] closed the Discover 

card in June 2012. Nonetheless, both parties’ testimony shows the 

Discover card was used almost exclusively during the marriage by 

[wife]. The evidence also shows after he closed the account, 

[husband] paid the card balance of approximately $10,000 charged 

by [wife]. * * * 

{¶26} [Wife] argues she chose not to reside in the marital residence. Said 

testimony * * * is not a legal basis for an increased spousal support. 

The evidence shows, when analyzed in totality, [wife] left Ohio with 

the parties’ two daughters without any apparent concern as to 

finances. * * * [Wife] left Ohio even before the Magistrate issued 

her order as to temporary child and spousal support on August 23, 

2012. [Wife’s] argument that [husband] was the sole financial 

provider during the marriage is correct. After the separation, [wife] 
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resided in the marital residence with the girls for a few months until 

they left for California. After [husband] left the marital residence in 

March, [2012,] he lived at Value Place hotel in Avon at his expense. 

He continued to make the [rental] payments on the marital 

residence until the lease’s end in September 2012, along with the 

lease payments for [wife’s] Lexus. 

{¶27} Subsequently, the trial court in the divorce decree found that “as 

[husband] was paying household expenses, all the family’s expenses, including [wife’s] 

car payment, the temporary support order herein shall not be retroactive. The 

temporary child and spousal support orders shall commence on August 23, 2012 * * *.” 

{¶28} Wife argues the trial court erred in making this finding because, according 

to her, there is no proof that husband paid all of the family’s expenses. However, the 

court relied on husband’s Exhibit 14, which was a packet of the family’s bills paid by 

husband. The magistrate stated in her June 26, 2015 decision that this exhibit showed 

the “considerable family expenses the husband paid out-of-pocket during this time 

period. He paid for the Ohio residence (as the wife and children were temporarily in 

California as had been their past practice) as well as credit card bills, and the children’s 

medical expenses in an approximate amount of $36,000 for a five-month period: midJune through mid-November, 2012. Husband thus paid approximately $7,000 on the 

family’s expenses, many of which were those for the wife and children, each month. 

These expenditures were in addition to the support he, in effect, began paying in midAugust.” 

{¶29} Significantly, wife concedes husband paid many of the family’s expenses 

between June and August 2012, including rent for the marital residence and the 

children’s medical bills. 
 8

{¶30} Since the trial court based its decision on evidence in the record, its 

decision that the award of temporary support would not be retroactive was not an abuse 

of discretion. 

{¶31} For her third assignment of error, wife contends: 

{¶32} “The trial court erred in denying wife’s request for a distributive award 

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” 

{¶33} This court recently outlined the law with respect to a spouse’s entitlement 

to a distributive award in Calkins v. Calkins, 11th Dist. Geauga Nos. 2014-G-3203 and 

2014-G-3218, 2016-Ohio-1297, as follows: 

{¶34} “If a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including, but not 

limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, nondisclosure, 

or fraudulent disposition of assets, the court may compensate the 

offended spouse with a distributive award or with a greater award of 

marital property.” R.C. 3105.171(E)(4). “[W]hile R.C. 

3105.171(E)(3) does not set forth an exclusive listing of acts 

constituting financial misconduct, those acts that are listed * * * all 

contain some element requiring wrongful scienter. Typically, the 

offending spouse will either profit from the misconduct or 

intentionally defeat the other spouse’s distribution of marital 

assets.” Hammond v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67268, 1995 

WL 546903, *3 (Sept. 14, 1995) * * *. The burden of proving 

financial misconduct is on the complaining party. Smith v. Emery–

Smith, 190 Ohio App.3d 335, 2010-Ohio-5302, ¶50 (11th Dist.). 

{¶35} * * * 

{¶36} * * * While a trial court enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether 

to compensate one spouse for the financial misconduct of the 

other, the initial finding of financial misconduct must be supported 

by the manifest weight of the evidence. Davis v. Davis, 11th Dist. 

Geauga No. 2011-G-3018, 2013-Ohio-211, ¶77; Emery–Smith, 

supra, at ¶50. Under this standard, the reviewing court must 

consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences, 

and the credibility of the witnesses to determine whether the trier of 

fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of 

justice that the decision must be reversed. State v. Thompkins, 78 

Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997); Smith v. Smith, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 
 9

2013–G–3126, 2013-Ohio-4101, ¶42. Calkins, supra, at ¶15-17. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶37} Wife argues husband was hiding marital assets. However, the magistrate 

in her June 26, 2015 decision found that wife failed to prove husband engaged in 

financial misconduct and denied wife’s request for a distributive award. In illustrating 

this failure of proof, the magistrate stated that, during wife’s cross-examination of 

husband, he “was * * * shown a series of irrelevant and unhelpful exhibits. These are 

included as examples of the wife’s inability to present cogent documents and/or proof of 

her allegations of the husband’s alleged misuse of marital funds * * *.” 

{¶38} At trial, wife presented the testimony of James Ibrahim, a computer expert, 

who reviewed husband’s computer. Wife attempted to elicit testimony that husband 

removed financial records from his computer, thus proving his misconduct. However, 

Mr. Ibrahim testified that one of wife’s former attorneys had retained him to determine if 

any information had been erased from husband’s hard drive. Mr. Ibrahim said he found 

nothing of substance that was deleted. Thus, he said he was unable to find anything 

akin to what wife’s former attorney was looking for. 

{¶39} In the magistrate’s June 26, 2015 decision, the magistrate stated that 

“[s]umming up the wife’s Closing Argument will be difficult. Her argument is very 

theatrical and quite disappointing in that it is not thoughtful, is filled with unsound 

reasoning, and is occupied with innuendo lacking factual foundation as to her 

assertions, especially as to the husband’s misuse of funds * * *.” Further, the 

magistrate said she finds “this argument [that] the husband secreted away marital 

funds, to be unpersuasive. A review of these exhibits demonstrates nothing of the kind; 

these are hand-written notes, not documented withdrawals from marital funds. 
 10

{¶40} In denying wife’s objection to this finding, the trial court in its February 25, 

2016 judgment stated that wife makes allegations of suspicious financial activity, but 

she presented no “credible evidence to substantiate her assertions.” 

{¶41} In the divorce decree, the trial court found that wife failed to prove 

husband concealed marital assets and, thus, she was not entitled to a distributive 

award. 

{¶42} The trial court’s finding that wife failed to prove husband’s alleged financial 

misconduct is supported by the record. In ruling in favor of husband, the trial court 

obviously found his testimony was more credible than wife’s. As the trier of fact, the 

court was entitled to make this call, and we discern nothing in the record from which we 

could reasonably conclude the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the decision must be reversed. We therefore hold 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying wife’s request for a distributive 

award. 

{¶43} For her fourth assigned error, wife alleges: 

{¶44} “The trial court erred in determining the division of school expenses is 

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence presented and was an abuse of 

discretion by this court.” (Sic throughout.) 

{¶45} The November 8, 2013 magistrate’s order set forth the parties’ stipulation 

that “[e]ach party shall pay one-half of the high school tuition and related school 

expenses for the children to attend their current private high school.” Wife interpreted 

this to mean that husband should pay one-half of all school-related expenses, including 
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extra-curricular items, such as proms, prom dress alterations, dance tickets, 

homecomings, and hair for homecoming. 

{¶46} However, in the magistrate’s June 26, 2015 decision, the magistrate found 

that “tuition and school-related expenses means that the husband would [share] the 

mandatory expenses related to school, such as tuition and required expenses.” 

(Emphasis added.) A trial court has inherent authority to interpret its own prior orders 

and judgments. Knapp v. Knapp, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 05CA2, 2005-Ohio-7105, ¶40. 

{¶47} The magistrate noted that wife’s request for reimbursement for items such 

as a mechanical pencil for an art project would actually be “double-dipping,” as the 

husband had already paid child support toward such items. The magistrate stated that, 

based on the evidence presented, items like tuition, tutoring, uniform expenses, field 

trips, and books are mandatory school-related expenses and thus subject to division, 

but extra-curricular activities and items such as retreats, proms, homecomings, dances, 

yearbooks, and class rings are not. Applying this test, the magistrate found that several 

specific items totaling $2,787 were mandatory and thus subject to division. As a result, 

the trial court in the divorce decree found that husband was responsible for $1,393 for 

his share of the mandatory school-related expenses. 

{¶48} The trial court’s findings regarding those items that were mandatory 

school-related costs were supported by competent, credible evidence, and the court’s 

division of the cost of such expenses was not an abuse of discretion. 

{¶49} Wife alleges the following for her fifth assignment of error: 

{¶50} “The trial court erred in denying wife reimbursement for Christmas travel is 

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence presented.” (Sic.) 
 12

{¶51} The November 8, 2013 magistrate’s order provided: “In 2013 the children 

will be in Ohio during Christmas vacation and the Husband shall have parenting time for 

one week during said vacation.” Wife argues that because husband did not see the 

children during that trip, she was entitled to reimbursement for the cost of flying the 

children to Ohio. 

{¶52} Husband told wife he could not visit with the children during the Christmas 

holiday because his brother died a few weeks earlier and he had to spend the holiday 

with his mother in Michigan. Wife testified that she would have left the girls in California 

when she returned to Ohio for trial in December 2013, and that the only reason she 

brought them to Ohio was because of the visitation order. However, the magistrate 

found wife planned to bring them to Ohio regardless of that order. In denying wife’s 

request for reimbursement, the magistrate stated in her June 26, 2015 decision: 

{¶53} Wife’s testimony she would not have brought the girls [to Ohio] for 

Christmas vacation and that they only spent time with two friends, 

did not go * * * to parties or events and * * * only spent time with 

their maternal grandmother, was all unconvincing. She changed 

her testimony related to this visit by first stating they were going to 

stay with a family friend in California and then stating she was 

going to fly her mother out [to California] to stay with the children. 

This inconsistency in her testimony is particularly telling. 

{¶54} In overruling wife’s objection to this finding on February 25, 2016, the trial 

court stated: 

{¶55} The crux of this [issue] is the November 8, 2013 Magistrate’s order 

which reads as follows * * * “In 2013 the children will be in Ohio 

during Christmas vacation and the Husband shall have parenting 

time for one week during said vacation.” Said order resulted from 

the stipulations of the parties and their attorneys on October 29 and 

October 30, 2012. The language read upon the record in the 

transcript of the October 30th hearing shows a trip to Ohio for the 

holidays had already been planned. * * * [Wife] is looking to twist 

the October 30, 2013 stipulations to help herself financially. 
 13

{¶56} Finally, the trial court in the divorce decree likewise denied wife’s request 

for reimbursement. 

{¶57} The trial court’s judgment denying wife’s request for reimbursement was 

based on competent, credible evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. 

{¶58} For her sixth assignment of error, wife alleges: 

{¶59} “The trial court erred in not finding the minor child a dependant under the 

Castle Doctrine contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence presented.” 

{¶60} In Castle v. Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d 279 (1984), the Supreme Court of Ohio 

stated that ordinarily, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, the duty of 

the parent to support a child ends when the child reaches the age of majority. Id. at 

281. However, the Court further said that the “duty imposed on parents to support their 

minor children may be found by a court of domestic relations * * * to continue beyond 

the age of majority if the children are unable to support themselves because of mental 

or physical disabilities which existed before attaining the age of majority.” Id. 

{¶61} Further, R.C. 3119.86(A)(1)(a) provides that the duty to support a child 

shall continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday where the child is mentally or 

physically disabled and is incapable of supporting or maintaining himself or herself. 

{¶62} Wife argues the trial court erred in denying her request that V.B.’s child 

support continue past her emancipation in light of wife’s testimony that V.B. will not be 

able to support herself later in life as she suffers from anxiety and OCD. However, the 

magistrate found that wife failed to present any “reliable medical testimony” to support 

her opinion. The magistrate noted the only medical “evidence” wife presented was an 

unsworn, one-paragraph letter prepared by V.B.’s pediatrician, in which she said it was 
 14

her opinion that, as of the date of her letter, due to V.B.’s frustration over the parties’ 

divorce, she could not hold a job. However, the doctor said she “[could] not comment 

on [V.B.’s] ability to hold a job in the future or after she turns eighteen.” The magistrate 

noted the letter had little weight since “husband had no opportunity to cross-examine” it. 

{¶63} The magistrate also found wife’s testimony that V.B. is failing classes and 

has missed school due to anxiety lacked credibility in light of wife’s failure to provide any 

school records in support, although, the magistrate noted, such records were readily 

available from the girls’ school. Further, the magistrate found that wife was not truthful 

when pushed to state V.B.’s grade point average. At first, she said she did not know 

her GPA because the school computers were “frozen.” Then, after being asked several 

times, wife finally admitted V.B. had a 3.4 GPA last year. 

{¶64} Moreover, wife admitted that V.B. enjoys school; that she is able to get 

herself to her classes (which are located in several different buildings); that she is 

succeeding in school; that she participates in extra-curricular activities (including drama, 

dance, and guitar); that she was planning to go to college: that she has no physical 

disabilities; and that she is able to care for her own hygiene and make-up and to make 

meals for herself. The magistrate found wife’s testimony that V.B. will not be able to 

support herself in the future was not even supported by the pediatrician’s letter. The 

magistrate also found that, based on wife’s testimony, V.B. is not on medications that 

would indicate she has any disability that would preclude her from working. Thus, the 

trial court found wife’s evidence was “woefully inadequate” to prove V.B. is a Castle

child. 
 15

{¶65} Wife also argues that, although she moved for an in-camera interview of 

the girls and the magistrate granted the motion, the girls were not interviewed. 

However, the motion was filed when custody was still being litigated. The motion said it 

was made so the girls could state their “wishes and concerns.” However, once the 

parties settled custody, the interview request became moot. This would explain why, 

during the four-day trial, wife’s counsel never asked for an in-camera interview. In any 

event, wife could have had the girls testify if that was her wish, particularly since they 

were 18 years old at the time of trial. 

{¶66} Based on our review of the record, the trial court’s findings were supported 

by competent, credible evidence and the court did not err in denying mother’s request. 

{¶67} For her seventh and last assigned error, wife contends: 

{¶68} “The trial court erred in denying wife’s motion to clarify contrary to the 

manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to the agreement and stipulations reached 

by the parties.” 

{¶69} The magistrate’s November 8, 2013 order set forth the parties’ stipulation 

that “[e]ach party shall claim one child as a dependent for income tax purposes unless 

the tax deduction used by Husband results in there being a benefit of less than 42% of 

the normal tax benefit, in which case the Wife shall claim both children as a dependent 

for income tax purposes for that year.” Wife argues the stipulation is not valid because 

the parties themselves did not agree to the stipulation on the record. 

{¶70} It is undisputed that wife did not timely, i.e., within 10 days, move to set 

aside the magistrate’s order, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(b). In fact, wife did not 

raise this issue until she filed her motion to clarify on October 14, 2014, nearly one year 
 16

after the magistrate’s November 8, 2013 order. In any event, even if wife had timely 

filed a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order, such motion would have lacked merit. 

The magistrate, in her June 26, 2015 decision denying wife’s motion to clarify, stated 

that, although the parties did not agree to the stipulation on the record, the stipulation 

was agreed to by the parties’ attorneys and was a valid stipulation. The magistrate 

noted that wife was present while the stipulations were being negotiated and agreed 

each party should receive one child for tax dependency purposes. The magistrate said 

this is simply a case where one party wants to change her mind about a stipulation to 

which she previously agreed. 

{¶71} We therefore hold the trial court did not err in finding wife agreed to the 

subject stipulation and the court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting wife to 

change her mind. 

{¶72} For the reasons stated in this opinion, the assignments of error are 

overruled. It is the order and judgment of this court that the judgment of the Lake 

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed. 

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J., concurs, 

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concurs in judgment only.