alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In the Matter of the Marriage of Sandra E. Fountain and Samuel B. Fountain

No. 06

- 24

- 00020

- CV Appeal from the 62nd District Court of Hopkins County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No.
FM20134 )

. Panel consists of Chief Justice
Stevens and Justices van Cleef and Rambin. Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice
Rambin

.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed

for want of prosecu tion . Therefo re, we dismiss the appeal.

We further order that t he appellant pay all costs incurred by reason of this appeal.

RENDERED JULY 2, 2024 BY ORDER OF THE COURT SCOTT E. STEVENS CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey , Clerk
A college completion rate is the percentage of persons ages 25 

and over with a bachelor’s degree or more. The map uses natural 

breaks in the distribution to organize the data into groups of 

common values. 

College Completion Rates in Appalachia, 2007–2011

(County Rates)

Map Created: October 2013

Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 

American Community Survey, 2007–2011

0 50 100 

Miles 

GEORGIA 

ALABAMA 

MISSISSIPPI 

SOUTH 

CAROLINA 

NORTH CAROLINA 

VIRGINIA 

WEST 

VIRGINIA 

KENTUCKY 

OHIO ILLINOIS INDIANA 

WISCONSIN 

MICHIGAN 

DE 

NJ PENNSYLVANIA 

MARYLAND 

NEW YORK 

TENNESSEE

5.7% - 13.0%

13.1% - 19.6%

19.7% - 30.3%

30.4% - 49.8%

U.S. average = 28.2%

Appalachian average = 21.0%

Completion Rate 

(Natural Breaks Classification)
**Exhibit 31.1**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, James P. Bryce, certify that:
1.     I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of IPC Holdings, Ltd.;
2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement ofa material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4.     The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
(a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;
(b)  [Omitted in accordance with the guidance of SEC Release No. 33-8238]
(c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and
(d)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5.     The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
(a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and
(b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.
Date: February 27, 2004   /s/ James P. Bryce
# C_2010301EN.01002603.xml

| 6.11.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 301/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.11.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 301/26

---

Order of the General Court of 13 September 2010 — Abbott Laboratories v OHIM — aRigen (Sorvir)

(Case T-149/08) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for Community word mark Sorvir - Earlier Community word mark NORVIR - Relative ground for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009))

2010/C 301/43

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Abbott Laboratories (Abbott Park, Illinois, United States) (represented by: S. Schäffler, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo and A. Folliard-Monguiral, Agents)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: aRigen, Inc. (Tokyo, Japan)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 6 February 2008 (Case R 809/2007-2) relating to opposition proceedings between Abbott Laboratories and aRigen, Inc.

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

The General Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 6 February 2008 (Case R 809/2007-2); |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 6 February 2008 (Case R 809/2007-2);

| 2. | Orders OHIM to bear its own costs and to pay those of Abbott Laboratories. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders OHIM to bear its own costs and to pay those of Abbott Laboratories.

---

(1)  OJ C 142, 7.6.2008.

1

---
================================================================================

                                  Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Pacific Spirit Inc. (the "Company")
on Form  10-QSB  for the  period  ended  September  30,  2003 as filed  with the
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof (the  "Report"),  the
undersigned,  in the  capacities  and  on  the  dates  indicated  below,  hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15
         (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents,in all material
         respects, the financial condition and results of  operations of the
         Company.


Date:  June 8, 2004


/s/  Peter Sotola
------------------------------
Peter Sotola
Secretary, Treasurer & C.F.O.
(Principal Financial Officer
and Principal Accounting Officer)
### JUDGMENT 

## Court of Appeals First District of Texas

NO. 01

- 13

- 01023

- CV

LAVENA V. HIGHTOWER , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee
Appeal from the 182nd District Court of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 1270245 ).

After due consideration, the Court grants appellant Lavena V. Hightower’s motion to dismiss the appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the appeal.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observance.

Judgment rendered January 29 , 2015.

Per curiam opinion delivered by panel consisting of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Lloyd.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 16, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-30447 Summary Calendar

KATHERINE EVERETT, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP.; FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 02-CV-141

-------------------- Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Katherine Everett filed this suit pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to challenge the defendants’ (FedEx’s) determination that she was not totally disabled and thus no longer eligible for disability benefits. The district court granted FedEx’s motion for summary judgment, and Everett appeals this judgment. This court reviews a district court’sNo. 03-30447 -2- grant of summary judgment de novo

. Threadgill v. Prudential Sec. Group, Inc. , 145 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1998). Everett first argues that the district court erred in determining that the “sliding scale” standard of review did not apply to her claim. Everett has not shown that FedEx had a conflict of interest such that the sliding scale standard should apply. See Vega v. Nat. Life Ins. Servs., Inc. , 188 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 1999) ( en banc ). She thus has not shown that the district court erred in declining to apply this standard. Everett next argues that the district court erred in rejecting her argument that FedEx legally erred when it applied the wrong definition of “significant objective findings” to analyze her claim of disability. Everett has not established that there are inconsistencies between the definitions of that term found in the benefits plan and the summary plan description at issue in this case. See Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. , 986 F.2d 929, 939 (5th Cir. 1993). She thus has not shown that the district court erred in rejecting this argument. Everett’s final contention is that the district court erred in determining that FedEx had not abused its discretion in determining that she was not totally disabled and rejecting her claim for continued benefits. The record contains substantial evidence to support FedEx’s rejection of her claim. See Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems. Inc. , 168 F.3dNo. 03-30447 -3- 211, 213-15 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Everett has not shown that the district court erred in rejecting this claim. Everett has not shown that the district court erred in granting FedEx’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing her suit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Nathaniel Lee, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Egitto, J.) rendered October 6, 1989, convicting him of grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal mischief in the third degree, unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, and reckless endangerment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Since no objection was taken with respect to what the defendant now claims was the trial court’s excessive involvement in the proceedings during the trial and no motion for a mistrial was made on this basis, this claim of error is unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Charleston,*56 NY2d 886; CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, the defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly injected itself into the proceedings is belied by the record. "The role of the Trial Judge is neither that of automaton nor advocate” *(People v Yut Wai Tom,*53 NY2d 44, 56) and his or her function is to clarify the issues and to facilitate the orderly and expeditious progress of the proceedings *(see, People v Yut Wai Tom, supra).*This function includes the obligation to encourage clarity in the development of the proof *(see, People v Yut Wai Tom, supra,*at 56; *People v De Jesus,*42 NY2d 519; *People v Robinson,*137 AD2d 564). Mangano, P. J., Kooper, Rosenblatt and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This Financial Data Schedule represents Consolidated Marcus Cable Company, L.P.
and Subsidiaries as reflected in the Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
1996.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>     0000910629
<NAME>    MARCUS CABLE COMPANY, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           6,034
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   18,943
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,900)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                25,509
<PP&E>                                         710,093
<DEPRECIATION>                               (131,586)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,687,550
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          101,888
<BONDS>                                      1,396,652
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     189,256
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,687,550
<SALES>                                        432,172
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               434,507
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  396,643
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (6,747)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             144,681
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (100,070)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (100,070)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (100,070)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Each of the undersigned hereby certifies,  for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, in his capacity as an officer of the BFA Liquidation  Trust (the "TRUST"),
that, to his knowledge:

     (a)  the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of the Trust for the three  months
          ended  March  31,  2004 as filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange
          Commission  (the  "REPORT"),  fully complies with the  requirements of
          Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (b)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Trust.

Date: May 12, 2004                By:      /s/ CLIFTON R. JESSUP, JR.
                                           -------------------------------------
                                  Name:    Clifton R. Jessup, Jr.
                                  Title:   Liquidating Trustee

Date: May 12, 2004                By:      /s/ MARK A. ROBERTS
                                           -------------------------------------
                                  Name:    Mark A. Roberts
                                  Title:   Assistant to the Liquidating Trustee

This certification is not deemed to be "filed" for purposes of section 18 of the
Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, or otherwise  subject to the liability of that
section.  This  certification is not deemed to be incorporated by reference into
any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,
except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.


                                      -17-
# Jefferson - Appalachian Regional Commission

- East Tennessee Development District Executive Director Rick Yakubic Email &#114;&#121;&#x61;k&#117;&#x62;&#x69;c&#64;&#x65;&#x74;d&#100;&#x2e;o&#114;&#x67;The post East Tennessee Development District appeared first on Appalachian Regional Commission.
ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fourth Chamber)

9 September 2008

Case T-143/08

**Luigi Marcuccio**

**v**

**Commission of the European Communities**

(Civil service – Social security – Refusal of the application for reimbursement of 100% of certain medical expenses incurred by the applicant)

**Application:**for, in particular, annulment of the decisions of the office responsible for settling claims of the Joint Sickness Insurance
Scheme of the European Communities refusing to pay 100% of certain medical expenses incurred by the applicant or to reimburse
the expenses for a medical visit in accordance with the rules applicable to consultations of medical experts, and an application
that the Commission be ordered to pay certain medical expenses for the applicant.

**Held:**The action is dismissed as inadmissible. The parties are to bear their own costs.

**Summary**

*Officials – Social security – Sickness insurance – Medical expenses – Serious illness – Reimbursement at 100% – Conditions*

*(Staff Regulations, Art. 72(1); Rules on Sickness Insurance, Art. 28 and Annex I, Section IV)*

The reimbursement of medical expenses at 100% under Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations presupposes that the illness concerned
is regarded as one of the illnesses expressly referred to in that provision, or that the appointing authority recognises the
illness as being of a comparable seriousness to the illnesses referred to in that provision. To that end, it is manifestly
for the official concerned to state which is the illness in question and to produce supporting documents. Under Article 28
of the Rules on Sickness Insurance for Officials of the European Communities applications for reimbursement of expenses must
be accompanied by original supporting documents, and according to Section IV of Annex I to those Rules applications to have
an illness recognised as of a comparable seriousness to the four illnesses referred to in Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations
must be accompanied by a report from the doctor treating the official concerned.

Where an application does not contain any new factor justifying the reimbursement at 100% of the medical expenses incurred
by the official in question, the administration’s silence following that application does not in any way alter his legal situation
resulting from the implied decision rejecting an earlier application in which he made that claim known to the administration,
and therefore does not constitute an act adversely affecting him within the meaning of Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations.

(see paras 37, 39, 41)
EXPERT CONSENT
 I, J. Morton Shannon, do hereby consent to (i) the filing of the written disclosure regarding the technical report entitled “Prairie Creek Property Northwest Territories, Canada Technical Report for Canadian Zinc Corporation” with an effective date of June 15, 2012 and other mineral resource and reserve information pertaining to the Prairie Creek Property in the Annual Information Form (the “AIF”) for the year ended December 31, 2012 of Canadian Zinc Corporation (the “Company”) and in the Management Discussion & Analysis for the year ended December 31, 2012 of the Company, and (ii) the use of my name in the AIF, the MD&A and the Annual Report on Form 40-F of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2012 and any amendments thereto incorporating by reference the Company’s AIF, MD&A and the Annual Report on Form 40-F.
 Dated this 19th day of March, 2013.
 /s/J. Morton Shannon
   Name: J. Morton Shannon, P. Geo.
 
   1
#### NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

No. 433 Orig.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 23, 1939.

Charles Fahey, Gen. Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Ralph H. Kimball, of New York City, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent ordered to cease and desist from doing certain things, etc., and to take certain affirmative action, etc., on petition for enforcement of order of Labor Board.
Order entered October 3, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01064-CV

IN RE JAMES D. DONDERO AND NEXBANK SSB, Relators

Original Proceeding from the 193rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-04666

ORDER

Before Justices Whitehill, Partida-Kipness, and Pedersen, III

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DENY relators’ September 3, 2019 petition 

for writ of mandamus. We LIFT our September 10, 2019 order staying the trial court’s August 

12, 2019 “Order Granting Motion to Compel Deposition of James D. Dondero.”

/s/ BILL PEDERSEN, III

JUSTICE

Whitehill, J., dissenting without opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JEFFREY CARTER,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 537 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of April, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
* The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 99-3419

___________ Kathy L. Loeckle, * * Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Northern * District of Iowa. State Farm Mutual Automobile * Insurance Company; State Farm Fire & * [UNPUBLISHED] Casualty Company, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: April 10, 2000 Filed: April 25, 2000

___________ Before McMILLIAN and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and ROSENBAUM, * District Judge.

___________ PER CURIAM. Kathy L. Loeckle appeals the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment onLoeckle's disability and age-based employment discrimination lawsuit. Loeckle contends on appeal that the district court applied the wrong standard in determining Loeckle was an employee of State Farm Fire & Casualty Company and was not an-2-

employee of State Farm Automobile Insurance Company. Even assuming the district court did not apply the appropriate standard, we see no reversible error because the undisputedevidence presented at summary judgment establishes that Loeckle was an employee only of State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. Because the parties' materials show they are thoroughly familiar with the issues before the court, we also conclude that an extensive discussion is unnecessary. Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties' submissions, we believe the district court correctly granted summary judgment. We thus affirm without further discussion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.