[Cite as State v. Cabrera, 2014-Ohio-3372.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

JERRY CABRERA 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 13CA010434 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 12CR085829 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: August 4, 2014 

 

WHITMORE, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant, Jerry Cabrera, appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County Court 

of Common Pleas. This Court affirms in part and reverses in part. 

I 

{¶2} While on patrol, Officer Kyle Gelenius, of the Lorain Police Department, 

performed a random check on the license plate of a Toyota Celica. Upon discovering that the 

plates had expired in April 2008 and were registered to a Buick, Officer Gelenius initiated a 

traffic stop. 

{¶3} Officer Gelenius approached the driver, later identified as Cabrera, and requested 

his driver’s license and proof of insurance. Cabrera admitted that his license was suspended, and 

Officer Gelenius requested he exit the car. Officer Gelenius immediately handcuffed Cabrera, 

with his hands behind his back, and walked him back to the police cruiser. According to Officer 

Gelenius, he then performed a field sobriety test, which Cabrera passed, and placed him in the 
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back, passenger side of the cruiser. Officer Gelenius then conducted an inventory of Cabrera’s 

car so that it could be towed. 

{¶4} After transporting Cabrera to jail, Officer Gelenius searched the back seat of his 

cruiser and discovered five white pills underneath the seat cushion near where Cabrera had been 

sitting. A laboratory test revealed that the pills contained hydrocodone, a controlled substance. 

Cabrera was indicted on: (1) tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a 

felony of the third degree; (2) possession of a controlled substance, in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree; and (3) driving under suspension, in violation of R.C. 

4510.11(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. After a bench trial, Cabrera was convicted of all 

charges. He now appeals and raises one assignment of error for our review. 

II 

Assignment of Error

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT 

OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶5} In his sole assignment of error, Cabrera argues that his convictions for possession 

of drugs and tampering with evidence are against the weight of the evidence. Specifically, 

Cabrera argues that the evidence does not support a finding that he placed the pills in the back of 

the police cruiser. 

{¶6} While Cabrera does not argue sufficiency, “a review of the weight of the evidence 

necessarily involves an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence in that, in order for this 

Court to weigh the evidence, there must be evidence to weigh.” State v. Tulk, 9th Dist. Lorain 

No. 12CA010310, 2013-Ohio-4279, ¶ 3, quoting State v. Frum, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0039, 

2013-Ohio-1096, ¶ 4.
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{¶7} “‘[S]ufficiency’ is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to 

determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to 

support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997), 

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th Ed.1990). “In essence, sufficiency is a test of 

adequacy.” Thompkins at 386. When reviewing a conviction for sufficiency, evidence must be 

viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. The pertinent question is whether “any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

{¶8} “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of 

law.” Thompkins at 386, citing State v. Robinson, 162 Ohio St. 486 (1955). This Court, 

therefore, reviews questions of sufficiency de novo. State v. Salupo, 177 Ohio App.3d 354, 

2008-Ohio-3721, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.).

Possession of Drugs

{¶9} Cabrera was indicted on possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). 

R.C. 2925.11(A) provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled 

substance or a controlled substance analog.” For an indictment on possession of drugs to be 

constitutionally sufficient, it must include either the specific name of the drug alleged to have 

been possessed or the schedule in which the drug appears. See State v. Jackson, 134 Ohio St.3d 

184, 2012-Ohio-5561, ¶ 19-21. The name of the drug or the schedule is an essential element of 

the offense. See State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 479 (1983) (“the type of controlled 

substance involved constitutes an essential element of the crime which must be included in the 

indictment”). See also Jackson at ¶ 21 (“[T]he General Assembly intended the schedule of drugs 

set forth in R.C. 3719.41, not the specific drug itself, to be an essential element of trafficking.”). 
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To support a criminal conviction, the State must prove all essential elements of an offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. R.C. 2901.05(A). 

{¶10} Cabrera’s indictment specifically stated that the drug involved was a schedule III, 

IV, or V drug. The State further alleged that Cabrera had a prior drug conviction, which elevated 

his possession charge to a felony of the fifth degree. 

{¶11} The pills found in the back of Officer Gelenius’ cruiser were submitted to the 

county’s crime laboratory for analysis. At trial, defense counsel stipulated to the authenticity and 

admissibility of the laboratory report, which identified the pills as hydrocodone, a schedule II 

drug. See R.C. 3719.41. The laboratory report was the only evidence of a controlled substance 

presented at trial. The State presented no evidence that Cabrera possessed a schedule III, IV, or 

V drug. Because Cabrera was indicted for possession of a schedule III, IV, or V drug, his 

conviction for possession is not supported by sufficient evidence and must be reversed.

Tampering with Evidence

{¶12} R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) provides that “[n]o person, knowing that an official 

proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall * * * 

[a]lter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its 

value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation[.]” “A conviction for 

tampering with evidence pursuant to R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant 

intended to impair the value or availability of evidence that related to an existing or likely 

official investigation or proceeding.” State v. Straley, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2139, 

syllabus. Cabrera argues that his conviction for tampering is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence because the evidence does not support a finding that he stuffed the pills into the back 

seat of the police cruiser.
5 

 

In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine 

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way 

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the 

inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of 

the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis sic.) Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting 

Black’s at 1594. “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and 

disagrees with the fact[-]finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387, 

quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). An appellate court should exercise the power 

to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional cases. 

Otten at 340. 

{¶13} Officer Gelenius testified that he initiated a traffic stop of a Toyota Celica 

because a random check on the license plate showed that the plates had expired in April 2008 

and were registered to a Buick. The traffic stop was recorded on Officer Gelenius’ dash-camera 

and a copy of the recording was admitted into evidence at trial. Officer Gelenius testified that he 

approached the driver, later identified as Cabrera, and requested his driver’s license and 

insurance information. Cabrera admitted that he did not have a valid driver’s license, and 

Officer Gelenius requested that he exit the car. Officer Gelenius then handcuffed Cabrera, with 

his hands behind his back, and walked him back to the side of the police cruiser. According to 

Officer Gelenius, he then conducted a field sobriety test, which Cabrera passed, patted Cabrera 

down for weapons, and placed Cabrera in the back, passenger side of the cruiser. These actions 

took place out of the view of the camera. Officer Gelenius then returned to Cabrera’s car to 
6 

 

conduct an inventory, pursuant to department policy, so that it could be towed. According to the 

dash-cam video, Officer Gelenius spent approximately three minutes and thirty seconds 

inventorying Cabrera’s car. During this time, the video does not show Cabrera, who was 

handcuffed in the back seat of the cruiser. 

{¶14} Once the inventory of the car was complete, Officer Gelenius returned to his 

cruiser to complete some paperwork. He then turned the camera to record Cabrera sitting in the 

back seat. The recording continues to show Cabrera until he exits the cruiser at the jail. The 

recording shows Cabrera making only a few, minor movements. Officer Gelenius testified that, 

immediately after he returned to his cruiser, he searched the back seat for any contraband, 

pursuant to “proper protocol,” and discovered five white pills underneath the seat where Cabrera 

was sitting. 

{¶15} Officer Gelenius testified that he has exclusive use of his assigned police cruiser. 

He explained that his cruiser is a “take-home unit” and that he is “meticulous” about keeping the 

back seat clean. Officer Gelenius stated that he was certain that he searched the back seat at the 

start of his shift, including lifting the back seat and looking underneath. Officer Gelenius 

testified that Cabrera was the first person he placed in the back of his cruiser on that shift. 

{¶16} Cabrera argues that the weight of the evidence does not support a conclusion that 

he put the pills underneath the seat. Cabrera asserts that he was handcuffed, with his hands 

behind his back, and was searched prior to being placed in the cruiser. However, Officer 

Gelenius testified that, in his pat down of Cabrera, he was searching for weapons, not pills. 

Officer Gelenius also testified that he did not know what Cabrera was doing while he was 

inventorying Cabrera’s car. Further, Officer Gelenius stated that he had searched underneath the 

back seat at the start of his shift, the pills were found immediately after transporting Cabrera to 
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jail, and Cabrera was the only person that had been in the back of the cruiser during the time in 

between the two searches. 

{¶17} While Cabrera was initially arrested for driving under suspension, he knew that 

he was going to jail when he was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of Officer Gelenius’ 

cruiser. Any illegal drugs possessed by Cabrera at the time he was admitted into the jail would 

likely have been discovered and investigated. Therefore, at the point that Cabrera was 

handcuffed and placed in the back of the police cruiser, the hydrocodone pills on his person were 

evidence of a “likely official investigation” and his actions of hiding them underneath the back 

seat was “intended to impair the value or availability of evidence related” to that likely 

investigation. See Straley, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2139, at syllabus. 

{¶18} After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, we cannot conclude that the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that Cabrera’s conviction for tampering must be reversed and a 

new trial ordered. See Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340. Accordingly, Cabrera’s assignment of 

error, as it relates to his conviction for tampering with evidence, is overruled. 

III 

{¶19} Cabrera’s sole assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. The 

judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 

the cause is remanded for the trial court to vacate Cabrera’s conviction for possession of a 

schedule III, IV, or V drug. 

Judgment affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

and cause remanded. 
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 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed equally to both parties. 

 

 BETH WHITMORE 

 FOR THE COURT 

HENSAL, P. J. 

CARR, J. 

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

KENNETH N. ORTNER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATASHA RUIZ GUERRIERI, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.