Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 2, 2024 / Notices 101 

Overview of This Information 

Collection 

1. Type of Information Collection: 

Extension of a currently approved 

collection. 

2. Title of the Form/Collection: SelfCertification, Training, and Logbooks for 

Regulated Sellers and Mail-Order 

Distributors of Scheduled Listed 

Chemical Products. 

3. Agency form number, if any, and 

the applicable component of the 

Department of Justice sponsoring the 

collection: DEA From 597. The 

applicable component within the 

Department of Justice is the Drug 

Enforcement Administration, Diversion 

Control Division. 

4. Affected public who will be asked 

or required to respond, as well as a brief 

abstract: 

Affected public (Primary): Private 

Sector—business or other for-profit. Affected public (Other): Not-for-profit 

institutions; Federal, State, local, and 

tribal governments. Abstract: The Combat 

Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 

2005 (CMEA), which is Title VII of the 

USA PATRIOT Improvement and 

Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Pub. L. 

109–177), requires that on and after 

September 30, 2006, a regulated seller 

must not sell at retail over-the-counter 

(non-prescription) products containing 

the List I chemicals ephedrine, 

pseudoephedrine, or 

phenylpropanolamine, unless it has 

self-certified to DEA, through DEA’s 

website. The Methamphetamine 

Production Prevention Act of 2008 

(MPPA) (Pub. L. 110–415) was enacted 

in 2008 to clarify the information entry 

and signature requirements for 

electronic logbook systems permitted for 

the retail sale of scheduled listed 

chemical products. 

5. Obligation to Respond: Mandatory 

21 CFR 1314. 

6. Total Estimated Number of 

Respondents: 20,467,641. 

7. Estimated Time per Respondent: 3 

minutes for Training Record, 15 minutes 

for Self-Certification, and 1 minute for 

Transaction Record (regulated seller) 

and Transaction Record (customer). 

8. Frequency: Training Record is 

13.200, Transaction Record (regulated 

seller) is 395.975, and Transaction 

record (customer) and Self-certification 

are 1.000. 

9. Total Estimated Annual Time 

Burden: 727,455 hours. 

10. Total Estimated Annual Other 

Costs Burden: $157,279. 

If additional information is required, 

contact: Darwin Arceo, Department 

Clearance Officer, Policy and Planning 

Staff, Justice Management Division, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Two Constitution Square, 145 N Street 

NE, 4W–218, Washington, DC 20530. 

Dated: December 27, 2023. 

Darwin Arceo, 

Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S. 

Department of Justice. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28818 Filed 12–29–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–255; NRC–2023–0200] 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC; 

Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has issued an 

exemption in response to a request from 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC (HDI), an indirect wholly owned 

subsidiary of Holtec International, that 

would allow HDI and Holtec Palisades, 

LLC, regarding certain emergency 

planning (EP) requirements. The 

exemption eliminates the requirements 

to maintain an offsite radiological 

emergency preparedness plan and 

reduce the scope of onsite EP activities 

at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, based on 

the reduced risks of accidents that could 

result in an offsite radiological release at 

a decommissioning nuclear power 

reactor. 

DATES: The exemption was issued on 

December 22, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2023–0200 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2023–0200. Address 

questions about Docket IDs in 

Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 

telephone: 301–415–0624; email: 

Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical 

questions, contact the individual listed 

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this document. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at 

301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS 

accession number for each document 

referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that it is 

mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you 

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time (ET), Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Tanya E. Hood, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–1387; email: Tanya.Hood@

nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of 

the exemption is attached. 

Dated: December 27, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Tanya E. Hood, 

Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning 

Branch, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

Attachment—Exemption 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Docket No. 50–255 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC; 

Palisades Nuclear Plant, Exemption 

I. Background 

By letter dated October 19, 2017 

(Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) 

Accession No. ML17292A032), Entergy 

Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENOI) 

certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC, or Commission) that 

it planned to permanently cease power 

operations at the Palisades Nuclear 

Plant (Palisades) no later than May 31, 

2022. On May 20, 2022, ENOI 

permanently ceased power operations at 

Palisades, and by letter dated June 13, 

2022 (ML22164A067), ENOI certified to 

the NRC that the fuel was permanently 

removed from the Palisades reactor 

vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool 

(SFP) on June 10, 2022. 

By application dated December 23, 

2020 (ML20358A075), as supplemented 


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by information provided in letters from 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC (HDI, the licensee) dated December 

23, 2020, and October 29, 2021 

(ML20358A232, ML20358A239, and 

ML21302A064), ENOI, Entergy Nuclear 

Palisades, LLC, Holtec International, 

and HDI submitted an ‘‘Application for 

Order Consenting to Transfers of 

Control of Licenses and Approving 

Conforming License Amendments’’ 

requesting transfer of the Palisades 

license to HDI. By letter dated December 

13, 2021 (ML21292A145), the NRC 

issued an order consenting to the 

license transfer and draft conforming 

administrative license amendments. The 

license transfer was executed on June 

28, 2022 (ML22173A173), coinciding 

with the transition of Palisades from an 

operational to a decommissioning 

status. 

Based on the docketing of the 

certifications for permanent cessation of 

operations and permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified 

in section 50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 

the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility 

operating license for Palisades no longer 

authorizes operation of the reactor or 

emplacement or retention of fuel in the 

reactor vessel. The facility is still 

authorized to possess and store 

irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. 

Palisades spent fuel is currently stored 

in the SFP and in dry cask storage at the 

independent spent fuel storage 

installation (ISFSI). 

Many of the accident scenarios 

postulated in the updated safety 

analysis reports (USARs) for operating 

nuclear power reactors involve failures 

or malfunctions of systems, which could 

affect the fuel in the reactor core and, in 

the most severe postulated accidents, 

would involve the release of some 

fission products. With the permanent 

cessation of power operations at 

Palisades and the permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessel, many 

accidents are no longer possible. The 

reactor, reactor coolant system, and 

supporting systems are no longer in 

operation and have no function related 

to the storage of the spent fuel. 

Therefore, the emergency planning (EP) 

provisions for postulated accidents 

involving failure or malfunction of the 

reactor, reactor coolant system, or 

supporting systems are no longer 

applicable. 

The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, 

‘‘Emergency plans,’’ and appendix E, 

‘‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness 

for Production and Utilization 

Facilities,’’ to 10 CFR part 50 continue 

to apply to nuclear power reactors that 

have provided certification that they 

have permanently ceased operations 

and have permanently removed all fuel 

from the reactor vessel. There are no 

explicit regulatory provisions 

distinguishing EP requirements for a 

power reactor that is permanently shut 

down and defueled from those for a 

reactor that is authorized to operate. To 

reduce or eliminate EP requirements 

that are no longer necessary due to the 

decommissioning status of the facility, 

the licensee must obtain exemptions 

from those EP regulations. Only then 

can HDI modify the Palisades 

emergency plan to reflect the reduced 

risk associated with the permanently 

shutdown and defueled condition of 

Palisades. 

II. Request/Action 

By letter dated July 11, 2022 

(ML22192A134), HDI requested 

exemptions from specific portions of the 

EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and 

appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 for 

Palisades. More specifically, HDI 

requested exemptions from certain 

planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) 

regarding onsite and offsite radiological 

emergency preparedness plans for 

nuclear power reactors; from certain 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) for 

establishment of plume exposure 

pathway and ingestion pathway 

emergency planning zones (EPZs) for 

nuclear power reactors; and from certain 

requirements in 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E, section IV, ‘‘Content of 

Emergency Plans.’’ 

The exemptions requested by HDI 

would eliminate the requirements to 

maintain formal offsite radiological 

emergency plans, reviewed by the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) under the requirements of 44 

CFR, ‘‘Emergency Management and 

Assistance,’’ Part 350, ‘‘Review and 

Approval of State and Local 

Radiological Emergency Plans and 

Preparedness,’’ and would reduce the 

scope of the onsite EP activities at 

Palisades. HDI stated that application of 

all the standards and requirements in 10 

CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 

CFR part 50, appendix E is not needed 

for adequate emergency response 

capability, based on the substantially 

lower onsite and offsite radiological 

consequences of accidents still possible 

at the permanently shutdown and 

defueled facility as compared to an 

operating facility. 

If offsite protective actions were 

needed for a highly unlikely beyond 

design-basis accidents (DBAs) that 

could challenge the safe storage of spent 

fuel at Palisades, provisions exist for 

offsite agencies to take protective 

actions using a comprehensive 

emergency management plan (CEMP) 

under the National Preparedness System 

to protect the health and safety of the 

public. A CEMP in this context, also 

referred to as an emergency operations 

plan, is addressed in FEMA’s 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 

101, ‘‘Developing and Maintaining 

Emergency Operations Plans,’’ which is 

publicly available at https://

www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/ 

npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. Comprehensive 

Preparedness Guide 101 is the 

foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, 

and local EP in the United States. It 

promotes a common understanding of 

the fundamentals of risk-informed 

planning and decision-making and 

helps planners at all levels of 

government in their efforts to develop 

and maintain viable, all-hazards, allthreats emergency plans. An emergency 

operations plan is flexible enough for 

use in all emergencies. It describes how 

people and property will be protected; 

details who is responsible for carrying 

out specific actions; identifies the 

personnel, equipment, facilities, 

supplies and other resources available; 

and outlines how all actions will be 

coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to 

as a synonym for ‘‘all-hazards 

planning.’’ 

III. Discussion 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, 

‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ the Commission 

may, upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50 when: (1) the exemptions 

are authorized by law, will not present 

an undue risk to public health or safety, 

and are consistent with the common 

defense and security; and (2) any of the 

special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2) are present. These special 

circumstances include, among other 

things, that the application of the 

regulation in the particular 

circumstances would not serve the 

underlying purpose of the rule or is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. 

As noted previously, the EP 

regulations contained in 10 CFR 

50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 

50 apply to both operating and 

shutdown power reactors. The NRC has 

consistently acknowledged that the risk 

of an offsite radiological release at a 

power reactor that has permanently 

ceased operations and permanently 

removed fuel from the reactor vessel is 

significantly lower, and the types of 

possible accidents are significantly 

fewer, than at an operating power 

reactor. However, current EP regulations 

do not recognize that once a power 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 2, 2024 / Notices 103 

reactor permanently ceases operation, 

the risk of a large radiological release 

from a credible emergency accident 

scenario is reduced. Due to the 

permanently defueled status of the 

reactor, no new spent fuel will be added 

to the Palisades SFP and the 

radionuclides in the current spent fuel 

will continue to decay as the spent fuel 

ages. The spent fuel will produce less 

heat due to radioactive decay, 

increasing the available time to mitigate 

a loss of water inventory from the SFP. 

The NRC’s NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety 

and Regulatory Assessment of Generic 

BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR 

[Pressurized Water Reactor] 

Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ dated August 1997 

(ML082260098), and the NRC’s 

NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical Study of 

Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ dated February 2001 

(ML010430066), confirmed that for 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactors that are bounded by the 

assumptions and conditions in the 

report, the risk of offsite radiological 

release is significantly less than for an 

operating nuclear power reactor. 

In the past, EP exemptions similar to 

those requested by HDI, have been 

granted to licensees of permanently 

shutdown and defueled power reactors. 

However, the exemptions did not 

relieve the licensees of all EP 

requirements. Rather, the exemptions 

allowed the licensees to modify their 

emergency plans commensurate with 

the credible site-specific risks that were 

consistent with a permanently 

shutdown and defueled status. 

Specifically, the NRC’s approval of 

these prior exemptions from certain EP 

requirements was based on the 

licensee’s demonstration that: (1) the 

radiological consequences of DBAs 

would not exceed the limits of the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency’s 

(EPA) Protective Action Guidelines 

(PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary, 

and (2) in the highly unlikely event of 

a beyond DBA resulting in a loss of all 

modes of cooling for the spent fuel 

stored in the SFP, there is sufficient 

time to initiate appropriate mitigating 

actions, and if needed, for offsite 

authorities to implement offsite 

protective actions using a CEMP 

approach to protect the health and 

safety of the public. In prior 

exemptions, sufficient time was 

demonstrated if the time exceeded 10 

hours from the loss of coolant until the 

fuel temperature would be expected to 

reach 900 degrees Celsius (°C), assuming 

no air cooling. In this exemption 

request, the licensee provided an 

analysis demonstrating that after the 

spent fuel has decayed for 12 months, 

for beyond-design-basis events where 

the SFP is drained and air cooling is not 

possible, at least 10 hours would be 

available from the time spent fuel 

cooling is lost until the hottest fuel 

assembly reaches a temperature of 

900 °C. This 10-hour minimum 

threshold provides sufficient time for 

the licensee to take mitigative actions, 

or if government officials deem 

warranted, for offsite protective actions 

to be initiated using a CEMP or ‘‘allhazards’’ approach. 

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s 

justification for the requested 

exemptions against the criteria in 10 

CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as 

described below, that the criteria in 10 

CFR 50.12(a) are met, and that the 

exemptions should be granted. An 

assessment of the HDI EP exemptions is 

described in SECY–23–0043, ‘‘Request 

by Holtec Decommissioning 

International, LLC for Exemptions from 

Certain Emergency Planning 

Requirements for Palisades Nuclear 

Plant,’’ dated May 30, 2023 

(ML23054A179). The Commission 

approved the NRC staff’s 

recommendation to grant the 

exemptions in the staff requirements 

memorandum to SECY–23–0043, dated 

December 7, 2023 (ML23341A181). The 

exemptions are conditioned to make it 

clear that the exemptions will terminate 

if the status of the Palisades reactor 

changes such that the certifications of 

permanent cessation of operations and 

permanent removal of fuel from the 

reactor vessel are no longer applicable. 

Descriptions of the specific exemptions 

requested by HDI and the NRC staff’s 

basis for granting each exemption are 

provided in SECY–23–0043. The staff’s 

detailed review and technical basis for 

the approval of the specific EP 

exemptions, requested by HDI, are 

provided in the NRC staff’s safety 

evaluation dated December 22, 2023 

(ML23263A977). 

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law 

The licensee has proposed 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E, section IV, which would 

allow HDI to revise the Palisades 

Emergency Plan to reflect the submittal 

of the certification of the permanently 

shutdown and defueled condition of the 

facility. As stated above, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission 

may, upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50. The NRC staff has 

determined that granting of the 

licensee’s proposed exemptions will not 

result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 

NRC’s regulations. Therefore, the 

exemptions are authorized by law. 

B. The Exemption Presents no Undue 

Risk to Public Health and Safety 

As stated previously, HDI provided 

analyses that show the radiological 

consequences of DBA will not exceed 

the limits of the EPA PAGs at the 

exclusion area boundary. Therefore, 

formal offsite radiological emergency 

plans required under 10 CFR part 50 are 

no longer needed for protection of the 

public beyond the exclusion area 

boundary, based on the radiological 

consequences of DBAs still possible at 

Palisades. 

Although highly unlikely, there is one 

postulated beyond DBA that might 

result in significant offsite radiological 

releases. However, NUREG–1738 

confirms that the risk of beyond DBAs 

is greatly reduced at permanently 

shutdown and defueled reactors. The 

NRC staff’s analyses in NUREG–1738 

concludes that the event sequences 

important to risk at permanently 

shutdown and defueled power reactors 

are limited to large earthquakes and 

cask drop events. For EP assessments, 

this is an important difference relative 

to the operating power reactors, where 

typically a large number of different 

sequences make significant 

contributions to risk. As described in 

NUREG–1738, relaxation of offsite EP 

requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a few 

months after shutdown resulted in only 

a small change in risk. The report 

further concludes that the change in risk 

due to relaxation of offsite EP 

requirements is small because the 

overall risk is low, and because even 

under current EP requirements for 

operating power reactors, EP was judged 

to have marginal impact on evacuation 

effectiveness in the severe earthquake 

event that dominates SFP risk. All other 

sequences including cask drops (for 

which offsite radiological emergency 

plans are expected to be more effective) 

are too low in likelihood to have a 

significant impact on risk. Therefore, 

granting exemptions to eliminate the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 to 

maintain offsite radiological emergency 

preparedness plans and to reduce the 

scope of onsite EP activities will not 

present an undue risk to the public 

health and safety. 


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C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the 

Common Defense and Security 

The requested exemptions by HDI 

only involve EP requirements under 10 

CFR part 50 and will allow HDI to revise 

the Palisades Emergency Plan to reflect 

the permanently shutdown and 

defueled condition of the facility. 

Physical security measures at Palisades 

are not affected by the requested EP 

exemptions. The discontinuation of 

formal offsite radiological emergency 

preparedness plans and the reduction in 

scope of the onsite EP activities at 

Palisades will not adversely affect the 

licensee’s ability to physically secure 

the site or protect special nuclear 

material. Therefore, the proposed 

exemptions are consistent with common 

defense and security. 

D. Special Circumstances 

Special circumstances, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present 

whenever application of the regulation 

in the particular circumstances is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The underlying 

purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 

50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E, section IV, is to provide 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

protective measures can and will be 

taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency, to establish plume exposure 

and ingestion pathway emergency 

planning zones for nuclear power 

plants, and to ensure that licensees 

maintain effective offsite and onsite 

radiological emergency preparedness 

plans. The standards and requirements 

in these regulations were developed by 

considering the risks associated with 

operation of a nuclear power reactor at 

its licensed full-power level. These risks 

include the potential for a reactor 

accident with offsite radiological dose 

consequences. 

As discussed previously in Section III, 

because Palisades is permanently shut 

down and defueled, there is no longer 

a risk of offsite radiological release from 

a DBA and the risk of a significant 

offsite radiological release from a 

beyond DBA is greatly reduced when 

compared to the risk at an operating 

power reactor. The NRC staff has 

confirmed the reduced risks at Palisades 

by comparing the generic risk 

assumptions in the analyses in NUREG– 

1738 to site-specific conditions at 

Palisades and determined that the risk 

values in NUREG–1738 bound the risks 

presented for Palisades. As indicated by 

the results of the research conducted for 

NUREG–1738, and more recently for 

NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence Study of a 

Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake 

Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. 

Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,’’ dated 

September 2014 (ML14255A365), while 

other consequences can be extensive, 

accidents from SFPs with significant 

decay time have little potential to cause 

offsite early fatalities, even if the formal 

offsite radiological EP requirements 

were relaxed. HDI’s analysis of a beyond 

DBA involving a complete loss of SFP 

water inventory, based on an adiabatic 

heatup analysis of the limiting fuel 

assembly for decay heat, shows that 12 

months after permanent cessation of 

power operations at Palisades, the time 

for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 

900 °C is at least 10 hours after the 

assemblies have been uncovered 

assuming a loss of all cooling means. 

The NRC staff has verified the 

licensee’s analyses and its calculations. 

The analyses provide reasonable 

assurance that in granting the requested 

exemptions to HDI, there is no DBA that 

will result in an offsite radiological 

release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the 

exclusion area boundary. In the highly 

unlikely event of a beyond DBA 

affecting the SFP that results in a 

complete loss of heat removal via all 

modes of heat transfer, there will be a 

minimum of 10 hours available before 

an offsite release might occur and, 

therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate 

appropriate mitigating actions to restore 

a means of heat removal to the spent 

fuel. If a radiological release were 

projected to occur under this highly 

unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 

hours is considered sufficient time for 

offsite authorities to implement 

protective actions using a CEMP 

approach to protect the health and 

safety of the public. 

Exemptions from the offsite EP 

requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 

previously been approved by the NRC 

when the site-specific analyses show 

that at least 10 hours is available 

following a loss of SFP coolant 

inventory with no air cooling (or other 

methods of removing decay heat) until 

cladding of the hottest fuel assembly 

reaches the rapid oxidation temperature. 

The NRC staff concluded in its 

previously granted exemptions, as it 

does with the licensee’s requested EP 

exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 

hours is available to initiate mitigative 

actions consistent with plant conditions 

or, if needed, for offsite authorities to 

implement protective actions using a 

CEMP approach, then formal offsite 

radiological emergency preparedness 

plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, 

are not necessary at permanently 

shutdown and defueled facilities. 

Additionally, in its letter to the NRC 

dated July 11, 2022, HDI described the 

SFP makeup strategies that could be 

used in the event of a catastrophic loss 

of SFP inventory. The multiple 

strategies for providing makeup water to 

the SFP include: using various existing 

plant systems for inventory makeup and 

an internal strategy that relies on the 

portable FLEX pump manifold, and 

having available two installed dieseldriven fire pumps and one motor-driven 

fire pump that can provide 1,500 gallons 

per minute makeup water from the 

facility intake via hard pipe or hose 

stations. In addition, HDI states that two 

onsite FLEX pumper units with a 

capacity of 1,000 gallons per minute 

each can provide makeup water from 

the facility intake or from Lake 

Michigan directly. Further, Palisades 

procedures specify that the installation 

of the SFP spray monitor nozzles and 

direct fill should be given priority over 

the hard pipe fill connection due to 

expected SFP area high radiation levels 

if the SFP water level cannot be 

maintained. These strategies will 

continue to be required as License 

Condition 6.b of Renewed Facility 

License No. DPR–20 for Palisades. 

Considering the very low probability of 

beyond DBAs affecting the SFP, these 

diverse strategies provide multiple 

methods to obtain additional makeup or 

spray to the SFP before the onset of any 

postulated offsite radiological release. 

For all of the reasons stated above, the 

NRC staff finds that the licensee’s 

requested exemptions meet the 

underlying purpose of all of the 

standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as 

the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) 

and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, and 

satisfy the special circumstances 

provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in 

view of the greatly reduced risk of 

offsite radiological consequences 

associated with the permanently 

shutdown and defueled state of the 

Palisades facility 12 months after the 

facility permanently ceases operation. 

The NRC staff further concludes that 

the exemptions granted by this action 

will maintain an acceptable level of 

emergency preparedness at Palisades 

and provide reasonable assurance that 

adequate offsite protective measures, if 

needed, can and will be taken by State 

and local government agencies using a 

CEMP approach, in the highly unlikely 

event of a radiological emergency at 

Palisades. Since the underlying 

purposes of the rules, as exempted, 

would continue to be achieved, even 

with the elimination of the requirements 

under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal 

offsite radiological emergency plans and 

the reduction in the scope of the onsite 

EP activities at Palisades, the special 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 2, 2024 / Notices 105 

circumstances required by 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist. 

E. Environmental Considerations 

In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), 

the Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment as discussed in the 

NRC staff’s Environmental Assessment 

and Finding of No Significant Impact 

published in the Federal Register (FR) 

on December 21, 2023 (88 FR 88664). 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12, the licensee’s request for 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E, section IV, and as 

summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY– 

23–0043, are authorized by law, will not 

present an undue risk to the public 

health and safety, and are consistent 

with the common defense and security. 

Also, special circumstances are present. 

Therefore, the Commission hereby 

grants HDI exemptions from certain EP 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E, section IV, as discussed and 

evaluated in detail in the NRC staff’s 

safety evaluation dated December 22, 

2023. The exemptions are effective 12 

months after permanent cessation of 

power operations, which was May 20, 

2023. Because this period had already 

elapsed, the exemption is effective upon 

issuance. These exemptions will 

terminate if the status of the Palisades 

reactor changes such that the 

certifications of permanent cessation of 

operations and permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessel are no 

longer applicable. 

Dated: this 22nd day of December 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Jane Marshall, 

Director, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28813 Filed 12–29–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–285; NRC–2022–0127] 

Omaha Public Power District; Fort 

Calhoun Station, Unit 1; Environmental 

Assessment and Finding of No 

Significant Impact 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing a finding 

of no significant impact (FONSI) and 

accompanying environmental 

assessment (EA) regarding the NRC’s 

consideration of a license amendment 

request by Omaha Public Power District 

(OPPD) to approve the License 

Termination Plan (LTP) for the Fort 

Calhoun Station, Unit 1 (FCS), located 

in Washington County, Nebraska. If 

approved, the amendment would add a 

license condition to the FCS license 

reflecting the NRC’s approval of its LTP 

and establishing criteria for determining 

when changes to the LTP require prior 

NRC approval. OPPD would use the LTP 

to meet the requirements for terminating 

the license and releasing the site for 

unrestricted use. Based on the EA, the 

NRC staff has concluded that there will 

be no significant impacts to 

environmental resources from the 

requested license amendment, and 

therefore, a FONSI is appropriate. 

DATES: The EA and FONSI referenced in 

this document is available on January 2, 

2024. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2022–0127 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2022–0127. Address 

questions about Docket IDs in 

Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 

telephone: 301–415–0624; email: 

Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical 

questions, contact the individual listed 

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at 

301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. For the 

convenience of the reader, instructions 

about obtaining materials referenced in 

this document are provided in the 

‘‘Availability of Documents’’ section of 

this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you 

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time (ET), Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Marla Morales, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–0715; email: Marla.Morales@

nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The NRC is considering issuance of a 

license amendment request to approve 

the LTP for the FCS, located in 

Washington County, Nebraska, as part of 

OPPD’s part 50 of title 10 of the Code 

of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 

‘‘Domestic Licensing of Production and 

Utilization Facilities,’’ Facility 

Operating License No. DPR–40. If 

granted, the license amendment would 

add a condition to FCS’s license 

reflecting the NRC’s approval of FCS’s 

LTP and establishing criteria for 

determining when changes to the LTP 

require prior NRC approval. As required 

by 10 CFR part 51, ‘‘Environmental 

Protection Regulations for Domestic 

Licensing and Related Regulatory 

Functions,’’ the NRC prepared an 

environmental assessment (EA). Based 

on the results of the EA, the NRC has 

determined not to prepare an 

environmental impact statement (EIS) 

for the license amendment request and 

is issuing a finding of no significant 

impact (FONSI). 

Construction of FCS began in 1968, 

and the NRC issued an operating license 

to the OPPD in 1973. The FCS began 

commercial operation in September 

1973. The OPPD submitted the 

Certification of Permanent Cessation of 

Power Operations in August 2016 in 

accordance with 10 CFR 50.82 (a)(1)(i) 

and shutdown on October 24, 2016. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), on 

November 13, 2016, the OPPD certified 

to the NRC that as of November 2016, 

all fuel had been removed from the FCS 

reactor vessel and placed into the FCS 

spent fuel pool. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(4)(i), the 

OPPD submitted its initial PostShutdown Decommissioning Activities 

Report (PSDAR) on March 30, 2017, and 

supplemented it by letter dated 

December 14, 2017. The PSDAR 

described OPPD’s selection of the 

SAFSTOR method for decommissioning 

the FCS. The FCS reactor remained in 

SAFSTOR until December 16, 2019. 


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