IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-11035

Tigist Ryals

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

American Airlines, Inc.

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:08-CV-460

Before KING, GARZA, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Tigist Ryals appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for

American Airlines in her employment discrimination case. Finding that the

district court correctly found that no genuine issue of material fact remained for

trial and that judgment was proper as a matter of law, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tigist Ryals filed an action for employment discrimination, on the basis of

race, national origin, sex and retaliation, against American Airlines (AA) in the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 27, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, on August 4, 2008, which was

within ninety days of receipt of her right to sue letter from the U.S. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 

Ryals became employed with AA in 1995. In January of 2001, she became

a junior aircraft mechanic at Alliance-Fort Worth (AFW), and at the time of her

lawsuit was working as an Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT). Ryals

alleged that, beginning in January of 2004, she had been harassed and

discriminated against by her supervisors and coworkers on the basis of her

Ethiopian origin, black race and female gender in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Ryals alleged

that she had been: given the most undesirable job assignments, including

cleaning the toilets; ostracized; subjected to unwarranted constant scrutiny;

denied overtime opportunities;threatened with unwarranted disciplinary action; 

subjected to racial slurs and ridicule; and physically assaulted on at least two

occasions, suffering serious bodily injury. Ryals alleged that, as a result of AA’s

actions, she had suffered financial damages, extreme emotional and mental

distress, fear of the workplace, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life.

On March 15, 2010, AA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting

that there was no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact in support

of Ryals’ claims and that AA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. AA

alleged that Ryals’ complaint was based on petty slights involving Ryals not

always getting the assignments she preferred and coworkers being mean. AA

further alleged that the physical assaults Ryals complained of were actually

workplace injuries for which she received workers’ compensation benefits. Also,

based on evidence presented by AA, Ryals received more overtime than 12 of the

14 people she identified as being treated more favorably and nearly as much as

the remaining two. Further, AA asserted that Ryals had never been disciplined,

demoted, transferred, denied a leave of absence, or suffered a pay cut. As a

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result, AA argued that Ryals had failed to present evidence of any

discrimination, retaliation or economic damages and that her claims were barred

by limitations because she waited too long to assert them.

On September 13, 2010, the district court granted AA’s motion for

summary judgment, finding that Ryals had not offered sufficient proof to create

a genuine issue of material fact. The district court further found that Ryals

failed to show that any alleged events occurring prior to May 31, 2006, were part

of a common scheme or related for purposes of the continuing-violation doctrine.

AA moved to strike Ryals’ entire summary judgment appendix because she

failed to specify which portions supported her claims. Ryals’ also moved to strike

AA’s summary judgment evidence. Ryals’ counsel conceded that some of the

documents in her response appendix were not properly authenticated and some

of the evidence was hearsay. Counsel also indicated that the death of her

husband led to her non-compliance with local rules regarding sequential page

numbering. The district court granted AA’s motion to strike in part and denied

Ryals’ motion to strike.

Subsequently, Ryals filed this appeal. The EEOC filed an Amicus brief in

support of Ryals in relation to the general standards applied by the district

court, but without taking a position on the other issues in this case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary

judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n,

586 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2009). This court will affirm the district court’s

decision if it finds that no genuine issue of material fact remained for trial and

that judgment was proper as a matter of law. Id. See also Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); and Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c).

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DISCUSSION1

I. Whether the district court erred in denying the application of the

continuing violation doctrine, thus excluding acts that occurred more

than 300 days before Appellant’s initial complaint to the EEOC?

II. Whether the admissible evidence establishes a genuine issue of

material fact from which a jury could conclude that Appellant suffered

a violation of the law?

2

Ryals filed a claim with the Texas Workforce Commission on March 27,

2007. On that same date, Ryals filed a claim with the EEOC. Therefore, based

on the applicable statutory 300-day limitations period, the district court found

that Ryals may seek to recover under Title VII for conduct that occurred after

May 31, 2006. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Ryals asserts that her hostile work environment claim is not limited to

filing suit only on events that fall within the statutory time period under the

continuing violation doctrine. Ryals cites Stewart as authority. In Stewart, this

court said:

A hostile work environment exists “when the workplace is

permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,

that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” 

National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116, 122

S.Ct. 2061, 2074, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). . . . Unlike in a case

alleging discrete violations, a hostile environment plaintiff is not

limited to filing suit on events that fall within this statutory time

period because her claim “is comprised of a series of separate acts

1 As these issues are intertwined, they are combined for discussion herein.

2 Ryals asserts that the district court erred in finding that her initial March 27, 2007,

statement to EEOC would be excluded as hearsay or irrelevant as offered at trial. However,

then she asserts that the district court did not actually exclude it and considered it in ruling

on the merits of the summary judgment motion. Ryals’ point with this is unclear, but the

issue of whether the evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact is discussed herein.

It is also discussed herein pursuant to the EEOC amicus brief.

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that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Id.

at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061.

 

Stewart, 586 F.3d at 328.

However, this continuing violation doctrine is limited as follows:

First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “separate acts” are

related, or else there is no single violation that encompasses the

earlier acts. Second, the violation must be continuing; intervening

action by the employer, among other things, will sever the acts that

preceded it from those subsequent to it, precluding liability for

preceding acts outside the filing window. Third, the continuing

violation doctrine is tempered by the court’s equitable powers, which

must be exercised to “honor Title VII’s remedial purpose ‘without

negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement.’”

Id. (Internal citations omitted).

The district court found that Ryals failed to provide evidence that there

was a continuing violation. Citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.

1994), the district court found that Ryals failed in her duty to “identify the

specific portions of her summary evidence and to articulate the precise manner

in which that evidence creates a genuine issue of fact on AA’s limitations defense

and her ability to recover on her hostile-work-environment claim under a

continuing-violation theory.” (Internal marks omitted). The district court’s

specific analysis bears repeating here:

In her response, Ryals states that “[t]he acts are related and

continuing because . . . she was systematically segregated from her

white, male co-workers . . . endured daily threats, both direct and

indirect, to her safety and well being[,] repeatedly has been assigned

to do jobs alone . . .[,] was purposefully assigned tasks that could not

be completed by one person in one shift[,] was repeatedly and

unjustifiably singled out for blame[, and was] deprive[d] of the same

learning experience[s] that her white, male [coworkers] enjoyed.” 

Ryals further insists that her coworkers refused or avoided working

with her, and that she was subjected to “virtually constant” mockery

and ridicule. But Ryals does not cite a single piece of evidence to

support these conclusory and largely legalistic claims. Nor does she

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provide any legal analysis of whether these claims, even taken as

true, would be sufficient to show a continuing violation. 

Specifically, she does not explain how these contentions show that

the events prior to May 31, 2006, are related to those occurring after

this date.

Instead, Ryals refers to the factual statement made at the

beginning of her brief, making the blanket assertion that her claims

are supported by that factual statement. That factual statement is

nineteen-pages long and replete with deficient citations to a large

appendix that does not comply with the local rules and in which

exhibits are not identified. “A litigant’s failure to provide legal or

factual analysis results in waiver” of the related claim or argument. 

Based on the foregoing shortcomings alone, summary judgment in

favor of AA on its limitations defense and on the applicability of the

continuing-violation doctrine is appropriate.

Even considering the facts recited in the factual statement of

Ryals’s response brief, there is no genuine issue on AA’s Title VII

limitations defense or her continuing-violation theory.

Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting

Defendant’s Motion to Strike in Part, and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike,

4:08-CV-460-Y at 13, 14 (Sept. 13, 2010) (Internal citations omitted and

emphasis added).

In Ryals’ brief on appeal, she has expanded her statement of facts to more

than thirty-seven pages of conclusory and often contradictory claims

unsupported by the record in this matter. Ryals claims numerous unsupported

instances of discrimination, but Ryals fails to prove any specific instances of

discrimination based on gender, race or national origin. Further, although some

of the evidence offered by Ryals was properly found to be inadmissible, it is

discussed herein because, just as the district court found, even with this

evidence summary judgment is required. As summary judgment would be

proper under either scenario, any claim regarding the admissibility of the

evidence is moot.

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In a nutshell, Ryals asserts that crew chief Tommy Toon harassed her by

interfering with her training, giving her the most undesirable jobs, making false

statements about her performance, and threatening her. However, she fails to

provide any proof of this other than her own conclusory statements, which fail

to establish any discrimination based on gender, race or national origin. Ryals

claims that she was given undesirable jobs related to “lavatory, toilets and

cleaning.” Yet, the record indicates, and Ryals conceded at oral argument, that

all mechanics performed these duties and she also speaks of her performance of

other jobs such as wing greasing, roto-peening, engine work, chair removal, etc. 

She claims that, in response to her reporting the harassment, Toon attempted

to run her over with a cart. However, the record indicates that Ryals had

previously stated that the person she claims attempted to run her over was

actually someone named Gary Dant. The first time Ryals apparently made this

claim against Toon was on appeal.

She makes numerous other claims of discrimination by various other

people, some of whom she attempts to relate back to Toon. She also claims that

she was ostracized by her coworkers and that they did not want to work with her

because of Toon. These claims are not supported by the record. Further, the

record, which includes statements from various coworkers, indicates that any

possible ostracization was directly attributable to Ryals and her behavior toward

others. 

Ryals claims that she was discriminated against because she was denied

the opportunity to advance and/or take certain tests. The record indicates that

Ryals repeatedly failed certain tests and never even took others necessary for

advancement. Further, the record indicates Ryals’ mechanical skills were

lacking and that it often took her longer than it should have to complete

assignments.

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Ryals claims that she was discriminated against for failing to be allowed

to work overtime on one occasion. However, as stated previously, AA offered

evidence that Ryals received more overtime than 12 of the 14 people she

identified as being treated more favorably and nearly as much as the remaining

two.

In her EEOC submission, Ryals made a general assertion that,

“[b]eginning in January 2004, I began working under a Crew Chief named

Tommy Toon.3 Mr. Toon routinely provided me with the most undesirable job

assignments, including work related to the lavatory, toilets, and cleaning.” 

However, Ryals made no specific claim of any harassment based on gender, race

or national origin during this period. She then stated, “[b]eginning in February

28, 2005, I began working under Crew Chief Tommy Toon again. He

continuously treated me in a discriminatory fashion, including: unfavorable

assignments, monitoring my work closely as a means of harassment, and

denying overtime resulting in lost wages, and recommending disciplinary action

against me without cause.”4

Ryals then indicated that on January 23, 2006, she received notice of a

shift rotation in which she would again be working under Toon. Ryals said that

she advised Supervisor Tammy Lance that such a change would be a

“nightmare” and that Lance authorized a change of shift for her. 

Notwithstanding that Ryals failed to even assert any instances of discrimination

based on gender, race or national origin prior to January 23, 2006, if she had,

this intervening action by Lance would “sever the acts that preceded it from

3 Yet, in a May 7, 2006, complaint to the HR Department, Ryals said, “I have been

dealing with this individual for approximately five years and it has continuously gotten

worse.”

4

In her deposition, Ryals claimed that she had been discriminated against at AA since

1996.

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those subsequent to it, precluding liability for preceding acts outside the filing

window.” Stewart, 586 F.3d at 328, 329.

Ryals said that then, in January of 2006, she began having difficulty with

a white, male coworker named Terry Buckler5, “who had previously told me that

my [white] husband should not have married me because I am black.”6 Ryals

failed to provide the date, time or context of this alleged statement. Ryals

asserts that her trouble with Buckler included him making “hostile, but nonracial, comments about her” and a “farting incident.” Again, Ryals failed to

provide the date, time or context of Buckler’s alleged statements, but she said

the “farting incident” occurred on March 21, 2006, in the break room. She

claimed that Buckler “came up to me in the break room, stuck his buttocks in my

face and farted.” In a letter to the union on June 1, 2006, Ryals said that she

told Buckler’s father, who apparently also worked for AA, of the “farting

incident.” She also said in the letter that Buckler was “very scarred [sic]” that

she was going to take him to HR, and that coworkers began to make fun of him,

“saying his father grounded him.” Ryals said that Buckler told others that she

was going to take him to HR and, as a result, “[w]hen I went to first shift on

March 27, 2006, that ruined my reputation and most of the guys did not want

to work with me. Some of them asked me, why did you not take him to HR? If

he ‘farted on me, I would take him to HR.’” Her claim that Buckler ruined her

reputation by telling others she was going to take him to HR is contradicted by

her statement that others asked why she did not take him to HR. It certainly

appears that she attempted to ruin his reputation by discussing the “farting

incident” with Buckler’s father and others, who in turn made fun of him. 

Further, Ryals fails to assert or establish that Buckler “farted” on her because

5 He is referred to as Terry Butler in Ryals’ deposition.

6 Ryals said that the slurs she heard were this alleged statement and then one time

when she overheard Gary Dant call her a “bitch.” 

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of her gender, race or national origin. Finally, Ryals fails to establish how her

claims regarding Buckler are related to any other claims discussed herein.

Ryals asserts that on April 27, 2006, she was assigned “dangerous rotopeen work” by Toon and suffered injury as a result.

In her EEOC submission, Ryals said:

On April 27, 2006, the harassment from Crew Chief Tommy

Toon reached a new height. My performance of assigned roto-peen

work was sabotaged by what could only be the deliberate disruption

of the power source. The additional work required was exhausting

and enormously frustrating. When the rest of my shift was going

home, I advised Crew Chief Toon that all that remained was some

touch up work. He insisted that I return to the site and complete

the job alone. Due to my exhaustion, and the proximity of one’s face

to the machine I was using, the rotating part of the machine

grabbed and ripped out a large chunk of hair off my scalp. I

screamed loudly, but nobody (including Mr. Toon) came to my

assistance. Despite my injury, I asked the Quality Assurance (QA)

representative John Grutznacher [sic] to confirm that my work had

been properly completed. He said it was good and expressed his

concern for my injury. I signed the paperwork and went home.

Ryals also indicated that she did not go to the doctor for this injury from the

hand-held roto-peen until May 10, 2006.

In her letter to the union on June 1, 2006, Ryals said that she was

assigned the roto-peen job by a crew chief named Ron Riley, not Toon as she

alleges in her brief.7 Further, in the letter, Ryals said the following occurred

after she completed the job:

Then I went to get a QA (Quality Acceptance) at 3:30. The QA

looked at it and said that the inboard and outboard was done. 

However, he wanted me to do a little touch-up to the link face. At

that time, (since it was 3:30), Alfredo [Melendez, who had assisted

as a timer at times on the job] and the other first-shift employees

left the dock to prepare for going home, and usually second shift is

suppose to take over at 3:30.

7 Ryals also said in her deposition that Riley assigned the job.

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Since I was exhausted and shift change had began, I went and

brought the second-shift Crew Chief, Tommy Toon, to my work area

and told him that the inboard and outboard was completed, but that

the link face required a little touch up. Then I asked him to explain

to QA. Tommy Toon said “So what, if it needs to be done, you have

to do it.” I was trying to tell him that it was time to go home, so I

asked him what time it is, and he looked at his watch and said you

have fourteen minutes, finish it. When he said that, Mr. John

Grutzmacher the QA was still there.

This upset me especially since he knew about all of the power

problems that I encountered (preventing me from finishing the job)

and since second shift was already there, (sitting down at that time). 

Therefore, I started the machine, and continued working. I was

trying to concentrate while touching up the link-face, which requires

you to get your face very close to the unit. Upon completion (at

3:55), I reached to turn off the motor and as I stretched for it with

my left hand, and since I was stressed and exhausted, my right

hand came closer to my face, and the rotating part grabbed and

ripped out a large chunk of my hair off my scalp.

This was very painful and I screamed very loud; and nobody

(including the crew chief) came to see if I was OK. Then I asked the

QA about the job, and he said that it was good. Then he said I am

worried about the accident, and that he had never seen one like this,

and I tried to cover up my head, and he helped me. I asked him not

to tell anybody, because I did not want the guys to make fun of me. 

Then I signed the paperwork, and all I wanted was to hide my

injury, and leave. Since it was past 4:00, I put up my tools, check in

the roto-peen machine to the tool room, and left.

In her deposition, Ryals gave a different account:

I was very stressed and very upset, I’m – he just told me to do

the job and all I want to do is do the touch-up and go, but I can’t

concentrate and I was shaking and I went up holding with – with

this hand and then trying to do that, the job, and then it will fall on

me, it was right – from the wing it kept coming to me, the machine. 

So I tried to stop it and I got it in my hair.

Ryals also indicated that her long hair was in a ponytail the day of the accident. 

She said it was “discriminatory, retaliatory” because Toon should have let her

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leave a few minutes early to go home and should have made someone else finish

the touch up. She also said that she considered the roto-peen incident to be a

physical assault because, “I was emotionally very stressed out and I shouldn’t

have been doing that job, I should go home.”

Ryals was assigned this job just after 10:30 a.m., but did not start on it

until after both her 11 a.m. lunch and 1 p.m. break. The record indicates that

there were some power issues after she had started working on the job. Ryals

attempted to blame this on someone intentionally cutting offthe power, however,

such an allegation is absolutely not supported by the record.

Ryals also said in her letter to the union that she did not ask to do the

roto-peen job, but that “three weeks ago Alfredo suggested to me that the guys

said that you were not working and if you want to get them off your back, you

need to do the roto-peen.” However, in her deposition, Ryals unequivocally said

she asked for the roto-peen job. In fact, Ryals said, “[y]eah, I had to fight for that

to do that. . . .”

Grutzmacher said that he was standing by Ryals as she performed the

touch-up, but had his back to her. He also said he was unable to approve the job

because it still needed additional work. Further, “[b]ased on my experience, Roto

Peen work is usually a one-person job because the machine is hand-held. On the

day that Ms. Ryals was injured, I had no reason to believe that the job she was

doing could not be handled by one person.”

Another “assault” that Ryals complains of involved an incident on October

3, 2006, when someone opened a closed access hatch as she stepped on top of it

while carrying something. Ryals claims in her brief that:

During the event, Ryals could see co-worker Mr. Jim Coultes, who

is a good friend of supervisor Toon and would frequently target her

with angry looks, just standing there watching her. Despite being

in position to know that Ryals’ [sic] was approaching the hatch

carrying heavy gear, Mr. Coultes opened the hatch knowing that

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Ryals’ [sic] would be on top of it. Mr. Coultes admits to opening the

hatch, but claims he could not see Ryals. Ryals’ [sic] asked Coultes

why he had done so, and he refused to answer. As a result, Ms.

Ryals was severely injured and suffered a concussion, fractured

shoulder, a deep cut to her left leg, and other injuries. Ms. Ryals

was unconscious for several minutes. Despite knowing that she was

badly injured, Coultes failed or refused to provide any aid and just

walked away from the scene despite supervisor Jerry Smith asking

for witnesses.

(Internal citations omitted). However, in her deposition, Ryals described her

injuries as follows:

So I noticed when I step on the latch, I feel the lift. And after

that I passed out for two minutes, because they told me I fell, my

head hit the lavatory, the first lavatory, and then since I was

carrying those two metals my hand got pulled, my hand hurt, which

I was very lucky it didn’t go to my face. And then since he just

opened it, the latch opened and then he closed it back, I had a cut on

my leg.

Ryals also said she did not know whether Coultes looked through the hole. 

Further, she filed a workers’ compensation claim and received benefits for

approximately three or four months, but was out of work for a year.

In her submission to the EEOC, Ryals said, “Mr. Coultes made no effort

to assist me as I lay unconscious, confirming his malice; I asked him why he

opened the hatch and he made no reply.” It would appear that if Ryals was

unconscious, she could neither observe Coultes’ efforts to assist her nor ask him

why he opened the hatch. In his statement, Coultes indicated that he did not see

Ryals, attempted to open the hatch carefully, and went to her aid after she fell.

Ryals claims the third “assault” occurred on April 28, 2008, shortly after

she returned to work from her previous injury. She was lying down and working

under a seat when a coworker, Robert “Boomer” Walvoord, walking down the

aisle stepped on her leg and injured her knee. Ryals said she believed Walvoord

stepped on her intentionally because he is a friend of Toon and “the thing is

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really, and he didn’t turn around and say, ‘oh, sorry,’ or anything else, he just

sneak out. If you make a mistake, you turn around and you apologize.” 

However, in a May 18, 2008, statement, Ryals said, as soon as Walvoord stepped

on her knee, “[l]oudly I said, because I was in pain, Boomer (nickname) you just

stepped on my knee and you are just leaving. Everybody heard what I said. He

turned around, I apologize, I apologize, and he left.”

The Injury on Duty Report completed by Supervisor Richard Bullard said:

After the accident I went into the first class area to look at the area

on the plane. I noticed that the area where the employee was

working was highly cluddered [sic] with air hoses and with a huge

air conditioning hose. Where the employee was working it would

have been easy for another person to miss seeing someone stretched

out on the floor half working under a seat. Boomer stated that he

did not see her and thought he was standing on the a/c hose when

it was actually the employee’s knee. Boomer is a large man about

5-10 and 260 pounds. I believe that the action was a mistake on

Boomer’s part and not done on purpose.

In his statement, Walvoord said, “”I was trying to see some co-workers at

the other end of the aircraft that I was coordinating with on a job assignment. 

In doing so, I stepped into the aisle and accidentally stepped on Tigist Ryals’

knee.” Walvoord said that the aircraft was cluttered and he did not see Ryals,

but, once he realized he had stepped on her, he apologized. He further said, “I

did not intentionally step on Ms. Ryals, nor did I intend to injure her.”

Ryals has failed to establish a hostile work environment in that she has

not shown that AA is “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and

insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions” of her

employment and “create an abusive working environment.” National R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2074, 153 L.Ed.2d

106 (2002). Further, Ryals has not established a continuing violation by showing

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that the separate acts of which she complains are related. Stewart, 586 F.3d

321. Instead, Ryals offers only her own conclusory statements.

Ryals’ reliance on Huckaby v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 1998) is

misplaced. Huckaby was continually subjected to racial harassment. Id. at 239. 

Huckaby consistently indicated, in both his affidavit and his deposition, that he

was “constantly ribbed and harassed for being white.” Id. at 240. Additionally,

Huckaby was required by his African-American supervisor to attend a meeting

that black employees were not required to attend and he was assigned to stand

in the rain while other employees were not. Id. Ryals offers no evidence of any

constant harassment of any sort. Instead, she offers only contradictory and 

“vague or conclusory allegations of discrimination or harassment” which “are not

enough to survive summary judgment.” Id. at 241.

Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant

The EEOC’s brief indicates that its factual recitation is based on Ryals

declaration, including the March 27, 2007, statement, and co-worker Elizabeth

Dracon’s8 declaration. Further the EEOC believes the district court erred in

excluding Ryals’ attachment as inadmissible hearsay. However, as stated

previously, Ryals is of the opinion that the district court considered the

statement. She is correct. The district court said:

AA objects to Ryals’s letter to the EEOC as hearsay. Ryals responds

that the letters are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,

but are instead offered to prove the facts of which AA was aware. 

But the letter is to the EEOC, not to AA, and Ryals cites the letter

in support of her factual assertions regarding the incident. In any

event, the Court discusses this evidence only to show that Ryals has

failed to specify evidence creating a fact issue on AA’s limitations

defense and that, even if the Court parses through Ryals’s evidence

on its own, there is no issue of fact on the defense or her continuingviolation theory. Were Ryals to offer this evidence at trial to prove

8 Dracon’s statement also established some of the offensive nicknames used for Ryals’

various coworkers, i.e., “Box of Rocks” and “Hitler.”

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 Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/27/2014
No. 10-11035

the facts of her claims, it would be excluded as hearsay; if offered to

prove the facts of which AA was aware, it would be excluded as

irrelevant.

Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting

Defendant’s Motion to Strike in Part, and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike,

4:08-CV-460-Y at 15, n. 1 (Sept. 13, 2010).

The EEOC correctly asserts the applicable law. However, we disagree

with the assertion that the district court applied incorrect legal standards in

excluding evidence of acts of harassment attested to by the plaintiff in

considering the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. As set out

throughout the summary judgment order, the district court clearly did consider

all of the evidence, even that which ultimately may have been excluded.

CONCLUSION

The record in this matter establishes that no genuine issue of material fact

remained for trial and that judgment was proper as a matter of law. Therefore,

we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for American

Airlines.

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 Case: 10-11035 Document: 00512512969 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/27/2014