NO. 5-01-0027

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)  Appeal from the

							)  Circuit Court of

     Plaintiff-Appellee,				)  Marion County.

							)

v.							)  No. 99-CF-239

							)

CHRISTOPHER FLETCHER,			)  Honorable

							)  Patrick J. Hitpas,

     Defendant-Appellant.				)  Judge, presiding.

________________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

	After a bench trial in the circuit court of Marion County, Christopher Fletcher

(defendant) was found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(i)

(West 1998)) and sentenced to 12 years in the Department of Corrections.  Defendant raises

the following issues on appeal: (1) whether defendant was denied his constitutional right to

confront witnesses (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8) and his constitutional

right to counsel (U.S. Const., amend. VI) when the trial court allowed the child victim to

testify via closed-circuit television without providing defendant a method of electronic

communication with his attorney, (2) whether defendant was denied a fair trial when his

statements, made without the benefit of Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)) to an investigator employed by the

Department of Children and Family Services (Department), were admitted into evidence, (3)

whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing testimony relating to a

polygraph test administered to defendant, and (4) whether the trial court violated defendant's

due process rights by comparing defendant's signature with a document not admitted into evidence.  We affirm.    

	I.  FACTS

	On October 14, 1999, defendant was charged by information with one count of

predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)).  On

the day of the trial, the State filed an amended information.  The first count of the amended

information charged defendant with aggravated criminal sexual assault.  The second count

charged defendant with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.  The charges stemmed

from the victim's allegations that defendant fondled her and placed his finger in her vagina. 

There were discrepancies about when the assault took place.  Information provided to the

State indicated that the offense could have occurred as early as 1996 or as late as 1999. 

Therefore, the first count alleged that the acts took place sometime between January 1996

and December 31, 1997.  The second count alleged that the acts took place between January

1998 and September 13, 1999.  The allegations in both counts were identical, with the

exception of the dates.  The State alleged in both counts as follows, "[Defendant], a person

17 years of age or older, knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration upon [the

victim], a person under 13 years of age, in that he placed his finger in the vagina of [the

victim]."  

	On May 11, 2000, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing pursuant to section 115-

10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 1998)) to

determine whether statements allegedly made by the victim to her mother and to a

Department caseworker were admissible.  The trial court ruled that the statements were

admissible.  On July 19, 2000, defendant waived his right to a jury trial.  A bench trial

followed on September 29, 2000.  

	The victim, age nine at the time of the trial, was the first witness to testify.  Prior to

her testimony, the State told the trial court, "[P]ursuant to our rights to[,] we'd like to call [the victim] by closed-circuit television."  The trial court inquired whether a television was

set up, and the prosecutor replied that he had taken the liberty of putting a television in the

jury room.  The trial court directed defendant to go to the jury room, and the court asked

defendant whether he had any trouble hearing.  Defendant replied that he was almost totally

deaf.  The trial court then informed defendant once again how it was going to proceed, and

the court told defendant that if for some reason he could not hear the victim's testimony, he

should notify the bailiff immediately.  The State's Attorney volunteered one of his employees

to perform a sound check.  Defense counsel noted that while he did not object to the sound

check, he was preserving his objection for the closed-circuit television in general.  The trial

court noted the objection but replied, "[T]he Supreme Court in Illinois says it's proper."  The

State's Attorney began by asking the victim some preliminary questions, whereupon the

State's Attorney's employee returned and reported that defendant could not hear.  Some

minor adjustments were made to the equipment, and then the employee reported that

defendant could hear.

	The victim testified that she was in fourth grade and that her aunt used to be married

to defendant.  She explained the difference between the truth and a lie.  She described a bad

touch as "somebody touching you in your privates when you don't want them to."  She  said

that defendant gave her bad touches.  She testified that this occurred at her cousin's

(defendant's son's) birthday party.  Defendant asked her to accompany him to the store. 

While they were in the car, defendant put his hand down her pants and touched the front of

her and put his fingers inside of her.

	The victim explained why she did not tell her parents immediately: "Because I was

scared I would get hurt and so would my family."  The victim finally told her mother about

the incident long after it occurred.  The victim was in the bathtub and started crying but did

not know why.  According to the victim, this event happened at her cousin's third or fourth birthday party.  She testified that her cousin was six or seven at the time of the trial.  The

victim was specifically asked whether this was the only time defendant touched her in this

manner.  The victim replied, "I don't remember, so it's probably the only time."  After the

victim was finished testifying, the trial court asked defendant whether he was able to hear

the victim's testimony, and defendant assured the trial court that he had heard everything. 

	The victim's mother (mother) testified that she and defendant's ex-wife are sisters. 

She first learned about the abuse in the summer of 1999.  According to the mother, the

victim was in the bathtub and started crying.  When she asked the victim what was wrong,

the victim was reluctant to discuss the matter but ultimately admitted that defendant touched

her private parts.  The victim told her that it happened at her cousin's birthday party.  The

mother told the victim's father (father), and they decided they would try to handle the matter

privately; however, two or three months later, the father reported the incident to the

Department's hotline. 

	The mother admitted that in the summer of 1999, defendant and his wife were going

through a divorce, but she denied that this was the reason she reported the alleged abuse. 

The mother explained that in September of 1999, the defendant's son, her nephew, was in

her backyard playing with a neighbor's child.  The neighbor came rushing over to her house

and told her that her nephew had "his pants down and was trying to perform sexual acts on

the little neighbor boy."  The mother went outside and grabbed her nephew and asked him

who had taught him to do that, and he replied that his father (defendant) had taught him. 

The mother then told the father that they needed to tell her sister and the Department about

the victim's abuse. 

	Dennis Smith, the polygraph training coordinator at the Southern Illinois Crime Lab,

testified that he met defendant on September 28, 1999.  Defense counsel then objected to

any testimony relating to a polygraph.  The trial court allowed the testimony for the limited purpose of showing that defendant changed his original statement.  

	According to Smith, he verbally admonished defendant that the procedure was

voluntary and that defendant could end the questioning at any time.  Smith also said that

defendant signed a waiver, but the record does not contain a waiver.  Smith testified that

when he first questioned defendant, defendant was aware of the general allegations made

by the victim.  Defendant initially denied that he ever touched the victim inappropriately;

however, during a second interview, defendant admitted that he touched the victim's private

parts.  According to defendant, the incident occurred in a bedroom.  He was talking with the

victim and asked her if it would be okay if he touched her.  According to defendant, the

victim said that it would be okay if he touched her, so he pulled down her underpants and

proceeded to rub her vagina for a few seconds.  He said that he did not insert his finger, but

he admitted that the tip of his finger may have entered the victim's vagina.  Mr. Smith then

left the room and notified the Department investigator, Mimi Rapp, about defendant's

admission.

	Mimi Rapp testified that she was assigned by the Department to investigate the

allegations of sexual abuse by defendant against the victim.  She interviewed the victim, who

told her that defendant touched her a "few times," including at defendant's house, in his car,

at the victim's house, and at the park.  The victim told her about an incident that occurred

at her cousin's birthday party.  The victim told Ms. Rapp that she was in defendant's car

when he reached down in her pants and touched her.  Defendant told her not to tell anyone. 

The victim explained how she felt after it happened: "I was so sad that when I got out of the

car, I dropped some sodas and got yelled at."  Ms. Rapp testified that she continued to

question the victim about other alleged incidents.  At one point, the victim began to cry, and

she said: "He said, 'It doesn't hurt,' but it did.  He said, 'No, it doesn't hurt.  Just let me do this

a little bit more.' "  The victim also told her: "His finger went in me.  It hurt."  

	After interviewing the victim, Ms. Rapp interviewed defendant.  She met him at his

residence and informed him of the victim's allegations.  Defendant denied touching or

fondling the victim or any other child.  Rapp asked defendant to take a polygraph

examination, and he agreed to do so.  Rapp drove defendant to the crime lab in Carbondale,

where a polygraph was administered.  The polygraph examiner called Ms. Rapp into the

room and said that defendant needed to talk to her.  Defendant admitted that he touched the

victim's privates and that his finger might have gone in her vagina, but only up to his

fingernail.  Rapp took the victim back to an office in Salem and wrote out a statement

reflecting defendant's earlier admission.  Defendant signed the statement.  The next morning,

Rapp realized that she had made an error in the statement about how the victim came to be

sitting on the bed where the abuse occurred.  Rapp called defendant at his house and told

him that the statement needed to be clarified.  She then drove to his residence, where she

rewrote the statement.  She went over the new statement with defendant.  Defendant signed

the statement.  Both statements were introduced into evidence.  Rapp testified that she did

not remember telling defendant that he did not need to call his lawyer.

	After the State rested, defendant called Donna Mattmiller, a friend of defendant.  She 

rode with defendant and Mimi Rapp to the crime lab in Carbondale in order to give

defendant "moral support."  Mattmiller testified that during the ride to the crime lab,

defendant asked Rapp whether he should have called his lawyer before he left home. 

According to Mattmiller, Rapp told him that it was not necessary for him to call his lawyer. 

Mattmiller further testified that she had left her grandchildren alone with defendant both

before and after the charges were filed against him.  Mattmiller admitted that she was

unaware that defendant had signed two statements admitting that he had molested his niece. 

	Defendant, age 33 at the time of the trial, testified that his marriage first started to

break down in August 1998 but that he did not move out of the marital home until January 1999, because he could not find a place to live.  According to defendant, his divorce was

still pending at the time of the trial.  Defendant testified that he graduated from high school

and went to technical college.  Defendant testified that in addition to being nearly deaf, he

is dyslexic and "can't read very well at all."  Defendant stated that he cannot read cursive

writing at all.  The two statements written by Rapp and allegedly signed by defendant were

written in cursive.

	Defendant denied ever inserting his finger into the victim's vagina or ever touching

her in an inappropriate manner.  He testified that he has never been alone with the victim in

a vehicle and that the incident at the birthday party never occurred.  The first time he became

aware of the victim's allegations was during his initial conversation with Mimi Rapp.  

	Defendant further testified that Dennis Smith told him that he could not leave until

he made a statement to Rapp.  Defendant told Smith that the victim had fallen and that he

checked to see if she was okay.  He ended up putting medicine on her while her sister was

in the room and even told her mother about the incident.  Smith then called Mimi Rapp into

the room.  Defendant testified, "[Smith refused to let me] speak any time that I was trying

to tell Mimi Rapp all this."  Defendant said he was unaware what was put in the statement

until he was in court and the statements were read to him.  Defendant denied that it was his

signature on the statements.  He agreed that Rapp read statements to him, but he asserted that

the statements read in court were not the statements she read to him.  Defendant stated,

"[The statements Rapp read to me] did not state anything about me inserting my finger into

a child or anything whatsoever."  Defendant alleged that the signature on his driver's license

would prove that the signatures on the statements are not his.  Defendant then introduced his

driver's license into evidence.  The license was issued on October 5, 1999. 

	The State called defendant's ex-wife in rebuttal.  She testified that she and defendant

were married for approximately seven years but that their divorce was final.  She also testified that she saw defendant read cursive writing on numerous occasions during the

course of their marriage, including notes she left for him.  She noted that defendant always

followed the directions she left in the notes written in cursive.  She was aware that as a child

he was dyslexic and that he has difficulty hearing.  She said that over the course of their

marriage, she had seen his signature on numerous occasions.  She went on to identify the

signatures on the two statements as defendant's signatures.           

	After hearing all the evidence, the trial court noted that it found the victim "quite

credible."  The trial court also pointed out that Dennis Smith and Mimi Rapp had no reason

to lie.  Furthermore, the trial court did not believe that the delay in reporting made the

allegations less credible.  Instead, the trial court noted that if the allegations were false, they

would have been brought up sooner rather than later.  The trial judge described his overall

opinion of defendant's testimony: "[A]bout as incredible as any testimony I have heard in

a long time."  The trial court found defendant guilty of count I.  As to count II, the trial court

was unsure whether predatory criminal sexual assault was a proper charge, and thus it

declined to enter a judgment on count II.  Defendant was sentenced to 12 years in the

Department of Corrections.  Defendant now appeals.

	II.  ANALYSIS

	A.  Closed-Circuit Television

	Defendant contends that allowing the victim to testify via closed-circuit television,

without providing defendant and his attorney a method of electronic communication,

violated defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation and counsel.  First, defendant

asserts that there was no finding pursuant to section 106B-5 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/106B-5 (West 1998)) that the victim would suffer

serious emotional distress if required to testify in the presence of defendant.  Defendant

argues that therefore the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify via closed-circuit television.  Second, defendant asserts that the use of closed-circuit television separated

defendant from his attorney during the most critical testimony of the trial.  Defendant insists

that he was prejudiced and that he is entitled to a new trial.  The State replies that any error

that occurred as a result of the trial court allowing the victim to testify via closed-circuit

television was harmless.  We agree with the State.

	Section 106B-5 of the Code provides in pertinent part as follows:

		"(a) In a proceeding in the prosecution of an offense of criminal sexual assault,

predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault,

criminal sexual abuse, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a court may order that the

testimony of a child victim under the age of 18 years be taken outside the courtroom

and shown in the courtroom by means of a closed circuit television if:

			***

			(2) the judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the

courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that

the child cannot reasonably communicate or that the child will suffer severe

emotional distress that is likely to cause the child to suffer severe adverse

effects.  

	* * *

		(f) The defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the persons in the

room where the child is testifying by any appropriate electronic method."  725 ILCS

5/106B-5(a)(2), (f) (West 1998).

	The procedures set forth in the statute have been found to meet constitutional

demands.  People v. Van Brocklin, 293 Ill. App. 3d 156, 687 N.E.2d 1119 (1997).  The statute requires that before a victim is allowed to testify via closed-circuit television, the trial

court must make a finding that "testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably

communicate or that the child will suffer severe emotional distress that is likely to cause the

child to suffer severe adverse effects."  725 ILCS 5/106B-5(a)(2) (West 1998).  The State's

interest in the physical and psychological well-being of a child abuse victim is sufficiently

important to outweigh, "at least in some cases," a defendant's right to face his accuser in

court.  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852-53, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 682-83, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167 (1990).  The Supreme Court in Craig considered the constitutionality of a Maryland statute and determined that the requisite finding of necessity must be case-specific,

meaning that the trial court must hear evidence and determine whether the use of the one-

way closed-circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular

child victim who seeks to testify.  Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 685, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.  However, our statute does not require a hearing to determine whether the best

interests of the child would be served by allowing the child to testify via closed-circuit

television.  We agree with our colleagues in the Fourth District that "[h]ad the legislature

intended to require a hearing, it would have so provided."  People v. Schmitt, 204 Ill. App. 3d 820, 825, 562 N.E.2d 377, 382 (1990).  Because our General Assembly did not impose

a hearing requirement, we will not impose one.  See Schmitt, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 825, 562 N.E.2d at 382.

	The State points out that the discussions concerning the use of closed-circuit

television took place off the record, because when the issue was raised at the trial before the

victim testified, defense counsel stated: "I'm preserving my objection for the record on the

closed circuit TV testimony.  I believe I previously objected."  The trial court replied that

defense counsel had indeed previously objected; nevertheless, the trial court believed that

the use of the closed-circuit television was proper in this case.  The trial court never invoked

the statutory language that the victim would suffer serious emotional distress such that she could not reasonably communicate or that the victim would suffer severe emotional distress

likely to cause the victim to suffer severe adverse effects.

	While the record before us is weak in terms of presenting a case-specific basis for

allowing the victim to testify by means of closed-circuit television, it can be presumed that

forcing the victim, age nine, to testify in front of defendant, who was her uncle, would cause

the victim trauma and emotional distress.  What we find most problematic in the instant case

is the fact that the trial court failed to fully follow the procedures outlined in the

statute–defendant was not provided a means of electronic communication with the persons

in the room where the victim was testifying, as required by the statute.  As a result,

defendant was denied access to counsel during the victim's testimony.  Under these

circumstances, the admission of the victim's testimony was in conflict with defendant's sixth

amendment right to counsel.  However, such a violation does not automatically entitle

defendant to a new trial.  	A defendant's conviction can be affirmed even if errors of a constitutional magnitude have occurred, but only if the errors are harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.  People v. Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40, 61, 740 N.E.2d 782, 794-95 (2000).  For the harmless error doctrine to apply, a reviewing court must find, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the errors did not contribute to the defendant's convictions.  People v. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d 95, 113-14, 522 N.E.2d 61, 68 (1988).  Errors may be harmless if (1) they did not

contribute to the defendant's conviction, (2) overwhelming evidence supports the defendant's

conviction, and (3) the evidence was cumulative or corroborative of other evidence properly

presented.  People v. Averhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 492, 507, 724 N.E.2d 154, 166 (1999). 

	Defendant asserts that the trial court placed much emphasis on the victim's testimony

and even noted that it found the victim quite credible.  What defendant fails to consider,

however, is that the State was armed with not one but two confessions made by defendant. 

While defendant denied making these statements, the trial court found defendant's testimony completely incredible.  The trial court pointed out that neither Dennis Smith, the polygraph

examiner, nor Mimi Rapp, the Department investigator, had any reason to lie about

defendant's confessions.  Both of these witnesses testified that defendant not only admitted 

touching the victim's genital area but also admitted that his finger might have penetrated the

victim's vagina.  The victim's mother testified that she first learned of the alleged sexual

contact when the victim was in the bathtub and started crying.  The mother asked the victim

what was wrong, and the victim told her that her uncle "touched her in places she didn't want

to be touched."  The victim explained to her mother that her uncle touched her "bottom

private parts."  Accordingly, the victim's testimony was cumulative because both the victim's

mother and Mimi Rapp testified concerning what the victim told them about the alleged

incident.  The State presented ample evidence of defendant's guilt beyond the testimony of

the victim, and therefore, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

	B.  Admissibility of Defendant's Statements

	Defendant next argues he was denied a fair trial when the statements he made to a

Department caseworker without the benefit of Miranda warnings were admitted into evidence.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).  Defendant insists that these statements should have been suppressed.  However, as the State

points out, defendant failed to file a motion to suppress, thereby waiving the issue on appeal. 

Even assuming, arguendo, that the issue was not waived, the situation here indicates that the statements in question did not require defendant to first be apprised of his Miranda rights, because defendant was not in custody at the time either of the statements was made.

	An interrogation is custodial if a person has been taken into custody or his freedom

is restricted in any significant way.  People v. Brown, 136 Ill. 2d 116, 124, 554 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1990).  If a defendant is not in custody or subject to custodial interrogation, Miranda is inapplicable.  People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 548 N.E.2d 1003 (1989).  Whether an interrogation is custodial is decided upon the totality of the circumstances and upon what

a reasonable person would perceive the situation to be.  People v. Foster, 195 Ill. App. 3d 926, 943, 552 N.E.2d 1112, 1125 (1990).  In determining whether a statement was made in

a custodial setting, the court must look to all of the circumstances surrounding the

questioning and then objectively determine whether a reasonable person, innocent of any

crime, would have believed he was free to leave or expressly or impliedly bound to remain. 

People v. Savory, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028, 435 N.E.2d 226, 230 (1982).  Circumstances to be considered include the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the interrogation, the

number of police officers present, the presence or absence of the family and friends of the

accused, any indicia of formal arrest, and the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the

accused.  Savory, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 1028, 435 N.E.2d at 230.   

	In the instant case, no police officers were present when defendant made the

statements in question.  Mimi Rapp notified defendant of the victim's allegations.  Defendant

voluntarily agreed to a polygraph examination and went with Rapp to the crime lab in

Carbondale.  Defendant was accompanied by his friend, Donna Mattmiller, who came along

for "moral support."  The fact that defendant asked if he needed an attorney does not mean

defendant believed he was in custody.  Defendant was not under arrest at the time.

	Moreover, there is not even any indication that defendant's freedom was restricted. 

Even though defendant testified that the polygraph examiner told him he could not leave

until he made a statement, the polygraph examiner, Dennis Smith, denied making such a

statement.  The trial court found Smith to be a much more credible witness than defendant. 

After defendant made an admission, he returned with Rapp to the Salem office, where he

signed the first statement.  Even after signing the statement, he was not arrested but was

permitted to go home.  The next morning, Rapp realized she had made a mistake in writing

down how the victim came to be sitting on the bed.  She called defendant at his house and told him the statement needed to be clarified.  Rapp then drove to defendant's residence,

where defendant signed a second statement.  Defendant was not charged with any offense

until a few weeks after he signed the statements.  Under these circumstances, Miranda warnings were not necessary because defendant was clearly not in custody when either statement was made.

	C.  Polygraph Evidence

	Defendant also contends that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing

testimony relating to the polygraph test administered to defendant.  Defendant insists that

the probative value of the evidence was minimal but the prejudicial effect was great and that,

thus, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony relating to the polygraph. 

We disagree.

	There is a firmly established rule in Illinois against the introduction of the details of

the results of polygraph examinations.  People v. Lewis, 269 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527, 646 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1995).  The rationale for the rule is that polygraph evidence does not have

sufficient reliability for admission, and as the Illinois Supreme Court has observed, if

admitted, it is likely to be taken not merely as reliable but as completely determinative of

guilt or innocence.  People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191, 201, 632 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (1994).  However, polygraph evidence is admissible if it is used to rebut a claim by the defendant that

his incriminating statement was improperly obtained.  People v. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d 486, 496, 705 N.E.2d 56, 61 (1998).  

	In the instant case, when the trial court allowed the State to present evidence that a

polygraph had been taken, defendant had not yet testified; however, in his opening

statement, defense counsel set forth that defendant denied signing the written confessions. 

Defense counsel stated as follows:

	"We submit he denies that he signed the written statement taken by Mimi Rapp.  He denies that he was able to read those statements and that different things were told

to him before those statements were written.  He will be testifying and denying these

allegations, Your Honor."

Defendant opened the door for the State to present evidence concerning the fact that a

polygraph test had been administered.  The polygraph evidence became admissible because

defendant chose to challenge the circumstances that caused him to make the statements.  See Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 497, 705 N.E.2d at 62.

	It is undeniable that the evidence regarding the polygraph suggested that defendant's

initial story, as well as his denial of guilt at the trial, was false and that defendant's signed

statements were true.  However, the trial court was well aware that the polygraph evidence

could be used only for a limited purpose.  The trial court stated: 

	"I think it would be admissible on the limited purpose of if there was a change in a

statement made.  If an exam was done, I don't want to know, and if, in fact, an exam

was done, I don't want to know the results, because I agree that was not admissible. 

But for the limited, very limited, purpose of explaining the status of what happened

on a certain day at a certain time, I'll allow the testimony that at least there was a

meeting regarding a polygraph."

	A trial judge is presumed to consider admissible evidence only and to consider

evidence introduced for a limited purpose for that purpose only.  People v. Lewis, 147 Ill. App. 3d 249, 258, 498 N.E.2d 1169, 1176 (1986).  Here, we have more than just a

presumption.  We have a record in which the trial judge assured all concerned that he would

not consider polygraph evidence in reaching a judgment.  The trial judge's statement

convinces us that he was well aware of the inherent weaknesses of polygraph testing and that

he did not consider the polygraph evidence in determining defendant's guilt.  Therefore,

even assuming, arguendo, that the polygraph evidence was improperly admitted, we find the resulting error harmless.

	D.  Comparison of Defendant's Signature

	Defendant's final contention on appeal is that the trial court violated his due process

rights by sua sponte comparing his signature on his alleged statements with the signature on his bail-bond form, which was not admitted into evidence.  The State replies that defendant

waived this issue by failing to object at the trial and by failing to raise the issue in his

posttrial motion.  The State contends that the issue can, therefore, only be reviewed under

the plain error doctrine and that under this doctrine, it is clear defendant did not suffer

prejudice requiring a reversal.  We agree with the State.

	"Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were

not brought to the attention of the trial court."  134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).  In order to invoke the 

plain error doctrine, it must be plainly apparent that an error so prejudicial has occurred so

that real justice has been denied or that the verdict may have resulted from error.  People v. Tucker, 317 Ill. App. 3d 233, 240-41, 738 N.E.2d 1023, 1029 (2000).

	In the present case, we do not agree that a serious injustice would occur or that the

judgment might have been different if the trial judge had not compared defendant's alleged

signature on the statements with defendant's signature on his bail-bond card.  Defendant's

ex-wife identified the signature on the statements as defendant's.  She testified that she and

defendant were married for seven years, during which time she became well-acquainted with

defendant's signature.  Furthermore, as we previously set forth, there was more than

sufficient evidence on which defendant could be found guilty.  The trial court found that

defendant lacked credibility for numerous reasons, not just because the signatures on the

statements and the bail-bond card matched.

	III.  CONCLUSION

	We have reviewed the record before us and find that even though defendant did not receive a perfect trial, he did receive a fair trial.  Neither a single error nor the cumulative

effect of errors warrants a new trial.  Defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.   

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Marion County is

hereby affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	HOPKINS and CHAPMAN, Melissa, JJ., concur.

                                     	NO. 5-01-0027

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

___________________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)  Appeal from the

							)  Circuit Court of

     Plaintiff-Appellee,				)  Marion County.

							)

v.							)  No. 99-CF-239

							)

CHRISTOPHER FLETCHER,			)  Honorable

							)  Patrick J. Hitpas,

     Defendant-Appellant.				)  Judge, presiding.

___________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion Filed:		March 27, 2002	

___________________________________________________________________________________

Justices:	Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.

	Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, J., and 

	Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,

	Concur

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Attorneys	Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Paige Clark Strawn, Assistant Defender, Office

for	of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, Route 15 East, P.O. Box

Appellant	2430, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864-0047

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Attorneys	Hon. James Creason, State's Attorney, Marion County Courthouse, P.O. Box 157,

for	Salem, IL 62881; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director,

Appellee	T. David Purcell, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor,

	Router 15 East, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

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