COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

August 17, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP590-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2015CF3553

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

GREGORY L. ROLLINS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: FREDERICK C. ROSA and MICHELLE ACKERMAN 

HAVAS, Judges. Affirmed. 

Before Brash, C.J., Donald, P.J., and White, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2020AP590-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Gregory L. Rollins appeals a judgment of 

conviction and an order denying his postconviction motion.

1

 On appeal, Rollins 

argues that his two convictions for first-degree recklessly endangering safety are 

multiplicitous because he only committed one reckless act—he fired a single

bullet in the direction of two people. We disagree, and affirm. First, we conclude 

that the two convictions are not multiplicitous because Rollins’ conduct 

endangered two different people. Second, we conclude that Rollins has failed to 

rebut the presumption that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 It is undisputed that on August 4, 2015, while running from police, 

Rollins fired a single bullet in the direction of an officer, R.D., and a prosecutor, 

Z.W., who was sitting in a squad car. 

¶3 Rollins was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide

while armed relating to R.D., first-degree recklessly endangering safety while 

armed relating to Z.W., and felon in possession of a firearm. An amended 

information added possession with intent to deliver cocaine while armed as a 

second and subsequent offense and as a repeater. 

¶4 Rollins entered a plea to the felon in possession of a firearm charge, 

and went to trial on the other counts. The jury acquitted Rollins of attempted firstdegree intentional homicide of R.D. while armed, but found him guilty of a lesserincluded offense of first-degree recklessly endangering safety while armed. The 

 

1

 The Honorable Frederick C. Rosa presided over the jury trial and sentenced Rollins. 

The Honorable Michelle Ackerman Havas denied the postconviction motion. We refer to 

Judge Rosa as the trial court and Judge Havas as the postconviction court. 
No. 2020AP590-CR

3

jury also found Rollins guilty of first-degree recklessly endangering safety while 

armed relating to Z.W.

2

 Rollins was acquitted of possession with intent to deliver 

cocaine. 

¶5 The trial court imposed a global sentence of fifteen years of initial 

confinement followed by ten years of extended supervision. Because Rollins had 

only fired one shot, the trial court ran the sentences on the two recklessly 

endangering safety counts concurrent to each other. 

¶6 Rollins filed a postconviction motion alleging that his two 

convictions for first-degree recklessly endangering safety were multiplicitous 

because he only “fired one bullet from his gun” and the legislature did not intend 

multiple punishments “when a defendant committed only one reckless act.” 

Rollins also argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a 

multiplicity objection.

3

 

¶7 After additional briefing, a hearing was held. The postconviction

court addressed the motion on the merits and found that the two convictions for 

first-degree recklessly endangering safety were not multiplicitous because Rollins’

conduct endangered two separate people, R.D. and Z.W. Thus, the court 

 

2

 At trial, the jury was instructed that the attempted first-degree intentional homicide 

count and the lesser-included offense of first-degree recklessly endangering safety count related 

to R.D., and the other first-degree recklessly endangering safety count related to Z.W. In 

addition, in closing argument, both the State and the defense distinguished the counts between 

R.D. and Z.W. 

3

 Rollins’ postconviction motion also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to “present witnesses who would have supported his defense” and failing to request “an 

instruction on the lesser-included offense of second-degree recklessly endangering safety on both 

counts he was convicted of.” Rollins withdrew these arguments in the circuit court and does not 

pursue them on appeal. 
No. 2020AP590-CR

4

concluded trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a multiplicity 

challenge. 

DISCUSSION

¶8 On appeal, Rollins renews his argument that his two convictions for 

first-degree recklessly endangering safety were multiplicitous. As discussed 

below, we reject Rollins’ argument.4

¶9 “Multiplicity arises where the defendant is charged in more than one 

count for a single offense.” State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 61, 291 N.W.2d 809 

(1980). “[M]ultiplicitous charges are impermissible because they violate the 

double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions.” Id. Whether 

two charges are multiplicitous is a question of law subject to de novo review. 

State v. Brantner, 2020 WI 21, ¶8, 390 Wis. 2d 494, 939 N.W.2d 546.

¶10 When reviewing a multiplicity claim, a two-step methodology is 

used. State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶¶42-45, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1. 

First, we examine whether the offenses are identical in law and fact. Id., ¶43. 

Next, we examine whether the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments. 

Id., ¶45. Below, we address each step in turn. 

 

4

 The State argues that Rollins’ multiplicity claim was forfeited and should be analyzed 

as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). Because we conclude that Rollins’ claim fails on the merits, any ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim would also fail. State v. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, ¶21, 320 Wis. 2d 209, 769 

N.W.2d 110 (holding that counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless motion). 
No. 2020AP590-CR

5

I. Whether the offenses are identical in law and fact

¶11 In this case, the State concedes, and we agree, that the two recklessly 

endangering safety convictions are identical in law. The parties disagree, 

however, on whether the convictions are different in fact. 

¶12 Rollins argues that the convictions are identical in fact because he 

only “fired ... one bullet from his gun, which traveled in the direction of 

Officer R.D. and Z.W.” Thus, his “conduct consisted of only one reckless act[.]” 

¶13 The State responds that the convictions are different in fact because 

“the jury had to separately determine whether Rollins’ conduct endangered R.D. 

and endangered Z.W.” 

¶14 We agree with the State. “[W]here the crime is against persons 

rather than property, there are, as a general rule, as many offenses as individuals 

affected.” See Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 66-68 (upholding four counts of homicide by 

intoxicated use of a vehicle when a single negligent act caused the death of four 

people); State v. Pal, 2017 WI 44, ¶¶3-4, 20, 374 Wis. 2d 759, 893 N.W.2d 848 

(upholding two hit and run convictions when there was a single act and two 

victims).

¶15 Although Rollins only fired one shot, it is undisputed that the bullet 

traveled in the direction of two people, R.D. and Z.W. Accordingly, convicting 

Rollins of two separate counts of recklessly endangering safety does not violate

double jeopardy because Rollins’ conduct endangered two different individuals. 

Each conviction required proof of an “additional fact”—proof that Rollins 

endangered a specific person. See Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 66.
No. 2020AP590-CR

6

¶16 Rollins acknowledges the general rule that there are “as many 

offenses ... as there are victims,” but argues that recklessly endangering safety 

offenses are “inherently different.” According to Rollins, recklessly endangering 

safety offenses “do not require proof of a particular victim.” 

¶17 Rollins’ argument, however, is contradicted by the plain language of 

the recklessly endangering safety statute, WIS. STAT. § 941.30(1) (2019-20).

5

 

Section 941.30(1) provides that “[w]hoever recklessly endangers another’s safety

under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a 

Class F felony” (emphasis added). The use of “another’s safety” requires the State 

to prove a specific person has been endangered. It would not be sufficient for the 

State to simply prove that the defendant acted recklessly. 

¶18 Moreover, because WIS. STAT. § 941.30(1) includes the term 

“recklessly,” “criminal recklessness” is an element of the crime. See WIS. STAT.

§ 939.24(2); WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1345. “Criminal recklessness” means that “the 

actor creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to 

another human being and the actor is aware of that risk[.]” Sec. 939.24(1) 

(emphasis added). The use of “another human being” further supports that a 

defendant’s conduct must endanger a specific person. 

¶19 In addition, to support his argument, Rollins points to State v. 

Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998). In Lechner, the defendant 

argued that two counts of second-degree recklessly endangering safety were 

multiplicitous. Id. at 413. The court rejected this argument because the defendant 

 

5

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted. 
No. 2020AP590-CR

7

had committed “at least two separate and distinct criminal acts[.]” Id. at 416. The 

court observed that “[o]n at least two separate occasions, the defendant drove his 

vehicle across the double yellow centerline of the highway, accelerated, and 

passed a different vehicle” and “[o]n at least two separate occasions, the defendant 

abruptly reentered the ... traffic lane, forcing the driver of the vehicle he had just 

passed to take evasive action to avoid a collision.” Id. at 415. The court further 

stated that:

It is significant that the defendant here did more 

than pass at one time a continuous line of cars, putting each 

successive driver at risk as he passed him or her.... Each 

time he pulled his vehicle out and passed a different 

vehicle, the defendant commenced a separate, conscious 

decision to act. Each time the defendant exited and 

reentered the traffic lane, he completed a separate, distinct 

act of criminally reckless conduct.

Id. at 416. 

¶20 Based on Lechner’s language that “[i]t is significant that the 

defendant here did more than pass at one time a continuous line of cars,” see id., 

Rollins argues that the number of recklessly endangering safety counts that can be 

charged is limited to the number of acts committed, not the number of victims 

affected. We disagree. 

¶21 As the State observes, Lechner involved a situation where the 

defendant committed multiple distinct acts. Lechner did not address a situation 

where a single reckless act endangered multiple victims. Moreover, when 

examining legislative intent, the court repeated the general rule that “where 

different victims are involved, the legislature intends to allow a corresponding 

number of punishable crimes.” Id. at 417 (citing Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 67-68; 

Austin v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 213, 223, 271 N.W.2d 668 (1978)). The court did not 
No. 2020AP590-CR

8

indicate disproval of this rule or state that it was overruling it. Accordingly,

Lechner does not prohibit multiple convictions when a single act endangers 

multiple victims. 

¶22 Therefore, in sum, because each conviction here related to a 

different victim, the convictions are not identical in fact.

II. Legislative intent

¶23 Because we conclude that the offenses are not identical in fact, we 

presume that the legislature intended to permit cumulative punishments and it is 

the defendant’s burden to prove otherwise. See State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶74, 

342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238. 

¶24 To determine legislative intent, we look at four factors: “(1) all 

applicable statutory language; (2) the legislative history and context of the statute; 

(3) the nature of the proscribed conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of multiple 

punishment[s] for the conduct.” Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶50. 

¶25 Rollins argues that the placement of the recklessly endangering 

safety statute in WIS. STAT. ch. 941, which concerns “crimes against public health 

and safety,” demonstrates the legislature’s intent to punish a defendant for an act 

that “puts a person in the public at risk as opposed to punishing a defendant for 

each particular person his singular reckless act puts at risk.” 

¶26 We disagree. First, as discussed above, WIS. STAT. §§ 941.30(1)

and 939.24 provide that the State must prove that the defendant endangered

“another’s safety” and the defendant created an unreasonable and substantial risk 

of death or great bodily harm to “another human being.” The statutes do not state 
No. 2020AP590-CR

9

that the defendant endangered “the public” or that the defendant created a risk to 

“the public.” 

¶27 Second, “[t]he legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of 

existing case law when it enacts a statute.” Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶28,

279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296. As the State observes, and Rollins does not 

dispute, when the legislature revised WIS. STAT. §§ 941.30 and 939.24, it was 

presumably aware of the preexisting case law authorizing a separate penalty for 

each victim. See 1987 Wis. Act 399; Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48 (decided in 1980). If 

the legislature intended to prohibit the imposition of a separate punishment for 

each victim endangered, it would have included language saying so. 

¶28 Finally, “the nature of the proscribed conduct” and “the

appropriateness of multiple punishments” factors do not support Rollins’ 

argument. Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶50. We do not see anything inappropriate 

about convicting and punishing a defendant for each person endangered. See Pal, 

374 Wis. 2d 759, ¶27. Under Rollins’ view of the recklessly endangering safety 

statute, a defendant who endangered multiple people would be exposed to the 

same punishment as a defendant who endangered one person. Such a result would 

undermine the objectives of punishment and deterrence. See Davison, 263 

Wis. 2d 145, ¶104. Therefore, we are not persuaded that when a single act 

endangers multiple people that the legislature intended to limit the punishment to 

one conviction. 

¶29 In sum, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that Rollins’ two 

convictions for first-degree recklessly endangering safety are not multiplicitous 

and that Rollins has failed to rebut the presumption that the legislature intended to 

allow multiple punishments.
No. 2020AP590-CR

10

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.