alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit
      32.2**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION 906
      OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
        connection with the amended Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB/A of Blast
        Energy Services, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended September 30,
        2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
        (the “Report”), I, John O’Keefe, Co-Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial
        Officer and Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify pursuant
        to 18
        U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
        Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
      March 29, 2006




By:
            /s/    JOHNO’KEEFE**John
                O’Keefe****Co-Chief
                Executive Officer****Chief
                Financial Officer****Principal
                Accounting
                Officer**
#### In the Matter of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, Appellant, v Carlos M. Genao, Respondent.

— In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to stay arbitration, the petitioner, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (McCarthy, J.), dated November 30, 1989, as, upon reargument and renewal, adhered to a determination, made in an order of the same court entered September 12, 1989, dismissing the petition on the ground that service upon the respondent was improper.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the proceeding is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

On or about April 11, 1989, the respondent was involved in an accident allegedly caused by a hit-and-run driver. The respondent’s attorney served the petitioner with a notice of intention to arbitrate by certified mail, return receipt requested, pursuant to the uninsured motorist endorsement of the insurance policy applicable to the vehicle. The attorney’s name did not appear on the notice. In response, the petitioner *165served upon the respondent’s attorney a notice of petition to stay the arbitration on the ground that the respondent had not complied with the provision in the policy endorsement which required that the insured report a hit-and-run accident to the police within 24 hours or as soon as reasonably possible. In response to the petition for a stay of arbitration, the respondent alleged, *inter alia,*that the petitioner had advised him that it was not necessary to contact the police. He did not contest the propriety of service of the petition.

The court did not reach the substantive issues raised by the parties. It denied the petition on the ground that it was "jurisdictionally defective” under CPLR 7503 (c), since it was served upon the respondent’s attorney, and the attorney’s name did not appear on the notice of intention to arbitrate. Upon renewal and reargument, the court adhered to the original determination.

The issue of the propriety of the method of service used to commence the proceeding, raised *sua sponte*by the court, was waived by the respondent’s raising a defense on the merits in his responding papers without raising a jurisdictional objection *(see, Rider Ins. Co. v Marino,*84 AD2d 832; *Matter of Katz,*81 AD2d 145, 148-150, *affd*55 NY2d 904; *Matter of Standard Steel Section v Royal Guard Fence Co.,*62 AD2d 1040; *cf.,*CPLR 320 [a]). Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court for a determination of the merits of the disputed issues of fact raised by the respondent *(see, Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.],*51 NY2d 1). Bracken, J. P., Hooper, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
The Honorable Benigno R. FitialJuan A. Sablan Memorial Building

Capital Hill, Caller Box 10007

Saipan, Commonwealth ofNorthern Mariana Islands 96950

Dear Governor Fitial:

Thank you for your recommendations dated June 1, 2011 on air quality designations for the

Commonwealth ofNorthern Mariana Islands (CNMI) for the 2010 revision to the primary National

Ambient Air Quality Standard for sulfur dioxide (SO 2).Reducing levels of SO2pollution is an important

part ofthe U. S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) commitment to a clean, healthy

environment. Exposure to SO2can cause a range of adverse health effects, including narrowing ofthe

airways which can cause difficulty breathing and increased asthma symptoms. This letter is to notify you

ofthe EPA’s preliminary intentions regarding your recommended designations.

On June 3, 2010, the EPA strengthened the health-based or “primary” standard for SO2by establishing a

standard for 1-hour average SO2concentrations at a level of 75 parts per billion. The Clean Air Act

requires the EPA to complete the initial designations process within two years of promulgating a new orrevised standard. Ifthe Administrator has insufficient information to make these designations, the EPA

has the authority to extend the designation process by up to one year. On July 27, 2012, the EPA

announced that it had insufficient information to complete the designations for the 1-hour SO2standard

within two years and extended the designations deadline to June 3, 2013.

At this time the EPA is proceeding with designating as nonattainment most areas in locations where

existing monitoring data from 2009-20 1 1 indicate violations ofthe 1-hour SO2standard. The EPA

intends to address the designations for all other areas in separate future actions. With input from a

diverse group ofstakeholders, EPA has developed a comprehensive implementation strategy for thesefuture actions that focuses resources on identifying and addressing unhealthy levels of SO2. The

strategy is available at: www.epa.gov/airquality/sulfurdioxide/implement.html. The EPA will continue

to work closely with you and our other partners at the state, tribal and local levels to ensure healthprotective, common sense implementation ofthe 1-hour SO2standard.

The EPA’s review ofthe most recent monitored air quality data from 2009-2011 shows no violations of

the 2010 SO2standard in any areas in the CNMI. Consequently, the EPA is not yet prepared to propose

designation action in CNMI and is therefore currently deferring action to designate areas in CNMI. The

EPA expects to be able to proceed with designation action in CNMI once additional data are gathered

pursuant to our comprehensive implementation strategy. In a separate future action or actions the EPA

Printed on Recycled Paper
415

947

8715, or iordan.deborah@epa.gov.

Sincerely,

Jared Blumenfeld

cc: Frank Rabauliman, Director, CNMI Division ofEnvironmental Quality

Kate B. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, CNMI Division of Environmental QualityGina McCarthy, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation

Stephen D. Page, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
```

[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 6 (Tuesday, January 9, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 1097]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-00263]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2020-N-0026]

Issuance of Priority Review Voucher; Rare Pediatric Disease 
Product

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is announcing the 
issuance of a priority review voucher to the sponsor of a rare 
pediatric disease product application. The Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) authorizes FDA to award priority review 
vouchers to sponsors of approved rare pediatric disease product 
applications that meet certain criteria. FDA is required to publish 
notice of the award of the priority review voucher. FDA has determined 
that CASGEVY (exagamglogene autotemcel), manufactured by Vertex 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., meets the criteria for a priority review 
voucher.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Myrna Hanna, Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, 10903 New 
Hampshire Ave., Bldg. 71, Rm. 7301, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002, 240-
402-7911.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FDA is announcing the issuance of a priority 
review voucher to the sponsor of an approved rare pediatric disease 
product application. Under section 529 of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 
360ff), FDA will award priority review vouchers to sponsors of approved 
rare pediatric disease product applications that meet certain criteria. 
FDA has determined that CASGEVY (exagamglogene autotemcel), 
manufactured by Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., meets the criteria for a 
priority review voucher.
    CASGEVY (exagamglogene autotemcel) is indicated for treatment of 
sickle cell disease in patients 12 years of age and older with 
recurrent vaso-occlusive crises.
    For further information about the Rare Pediatric Disease Priority 
Review Voucher Program and for a link to the full text of section 529 
of the FD&C Act, go to https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-products-rare-diseases-conditions/rare-pediatric-disease-rpd-designation-and-voucher-programs. For further information about CASGEVY 
(exagamglogene autotemcel), go to the Center for Biologics Evaluation 
and Research's Approved Cellular and Gene Therapy Products website at 
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/cellular-gene-therapy-products/approved-cellular-and-gene-therapy-products.

    Dated: January 4, 2024.
Lauren K. Roth,
Associate Commissioner for Policy.
[FR Doc. 2024-00263 Filed 1-8-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4164-01-P
```
Collierville Subsection 8-304(16). Permits and Fees - Reporting Requirements.

(a) Except as provided below, each permitted stationary air pollution source 

must submit to the Department an annual report that establishes the amount 

of actual emissions of each regulated pollutant, including carbon monoxide, 

for that source. This report will be for the emissions of that source that 

occurred during the calendar year starting in 1991 and continuing for 

succeeding years thereafter. The Department may request, and the air 

pollution source shall provide, additional information on the emissions 

data submitted when the Department determines, the data previously provided 

is inadequate to establish the actual type or amount of emissions from the 

source subject to fees.

(b) Not including air toxics as they are defined in the Clean Air Act 

Amendments of 1990 and the amendments thereto, if the source emits fewer 

than twenty five (25) tons of actual emissions of pollutant during a year, 

it may at its option, use as the actual emissions figure, its permitted 

pollutant levels where available and known. If the source is a "major 

source" under the air toxics provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 

1990 it too must calculate its actual emission of regulated pollutants. 

Failure to provide, on a timely basis, any additional information requested 

shall be considered failure to pay the fees.

8-304(16), p. 1
#### Rellan Leon COOPER, Petitioner, v. R. R. RAINES, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent.

No. A-12984.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

March 1, 1961.

*1089Relian Leon Cooper, petitioner, pro se.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Owen J. Watts, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is an original proceedings by way of habeas corpus wherein petitioner attempts to secure his release from the Oklahoma State Penitentiary.

Petitioner’s sole contention is that he was sentenced to five (5) years in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary upon a plea of guilty to the charge of “contributing to the delinquency of a minor”. That said sentence was a denial of due process and void as the maximum sentence to be imposed upon such charge was three (3) years in the state penitentiary, or by a fine not exceeding $3,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Petitioner herein did not attach to his petition a copy of the information or judgment and sentence in the case upon which he is confined. However, the Attorney General filed in this cause a motion to dismiss and attached thereto a copy of judgment and sentence upon plea of guilty in two separate cases from the district court of Woodward County showing that the petitioner was sentenced in the two cases to 5 years in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary on each case, said sentences to run concurrently. The charge recited in said judgment and sentence is that of “furnishing and giving certain spirituous liquor to a minor” and not that of “contributing to the delinquency of a minor”.

 It is to be observed under Tit. 37 O.S.1951 § 5 that the punishment prescribed for bartering, selling, or giving to any minor any spirituous liquor is a maximum of five years in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary. Therefore it appears from the record before us that the court had jurisdiction of the person, the subject matter, and had authority under the law to pronounce the judgment and sentence.

We agree with the Attorney General that the petitioner raises no jurisdictional question supported by the record. The writ is therefore denied.
# C_2021310EN.01000502.xml

| 2.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 310/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 310/5

---

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 17 June 2021 — Czech Republic v European Commission, Republic of Poland

(Case C-862/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - European Social Fund (ESF) - European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) - Partial cancellation of assistance for operational programmes in the Czech Republic - Directive 2004/18/EC - Article 16(b) - Specific exclusion - Public service contracts relating to programme material intended for broadcasting)

(2021/C 310/05)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Appellant: Czech Republic (represented by: M. Smolek, O. Serdula, J. Vláčil and I. Gavrilová, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: P. Ondrůšek and P. Arenas, acting as Agents), Republic of Poland

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders the Czech Republic to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Czech Republic to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

---

(1)  OJ C 27, 27.1.2020.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Donnell Maddox, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Groh, J.), rendered March 10, 1989, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered. No questions of fact have been raised or considered.

The defendant argues that the court committed reversible error in failing to excuse a juror who stated that he would not be able to render a fair verdict. We agree.

During the voir dire, the prospective juror stated that he served in Vietnam and saw his friends and comrades "destroyed with drugs”. Although he stated that he would try to render an impartial verdict, this was insufficient to rehabilitate him, especially in light of his repeated assertions that he was not sure if he could be impartial *(see, People v Mentz,*170 AD2d 541; *People v Lawrence,*159 AD2d 518, 519). These remarks by the juror indicated that he had a state of mind "likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial” (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]; *see, People v Torpey,*63 NY2d 361).

The defendant’s challenge for cause was denied, necessitating that defense counsel use one of his peremptory challenges to have this juror excused. Because defense counsel exhausted all of his peremptory challenges before the selection of the jury was completed, this error may not be deemed harmless *(see, People v Torpey, supra; People v Mentz, supra).*

Furthermore, while the record supports the hearing court’s finding of probable cause to arrest the defendant, the prosecutor waited until the end of the pretrial hearing before providing the defendant with the Grand Jury testimony of the sole prosecution witness at the hearing. Since the court re*184fused to reopen the hearing, a de novo suppression hearing must be held *(see,*CPL 240.44; *People v Ranghelle,*69 NY2d 56; *People v Pringle,*154 AD2d 410; *People v Wright,*135 AD2d 594).

In light of our determination we need not reach the remaining issues raised on appeal. Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.
# Watauga - Appalachian Regional Commission

- High Country Food Hub: Investing in Storage Capacity Reaps Rewards Building Appalachia’s infrastructure has been an ARC investment priority for 58 years, especially the development and maintenance of basic infrastructure systems, highway and utility access, expanding broadband, and developing sites to attract new businesses. ARC’s Area Development Program invested $92.1&#160;million in community infrastructure Fiscal Year 2022. When thinking of those investments, however, many folks wouldn&#8217;t [&#8230;]The post High Country Food Hub: Investing in Storage Capacity Reaps Rewards appeared first on Appalachian Regional Commission.
- High Country Council of Governments Executive Director Julie Wiggins Email  jwiggi&#110;&#115;&#64;&#104;&#99;&#99;&#111;&#x67;&#x2e;&#x6f;&#x72;&#x67;The post High Country Council of Governments appeared first on Appalachian Regional Commission.
Exhibit 10-19-i

                                Endorsement No. 1
                               Agreement No. 8759
                                ENDORSEMENT NO. 2

                         Attached to and made a part of
                            AGREEMENT OF REINSURANCE
                                    NO. 8759
                                     between
                         PENN-AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY
                           PENN-STAR INSURANCE COMPANY
                                       and
                         GENERAL REINSURANCE CORPORATION


IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED that, effective at 12:01 A.M., September 1, 2001, this
Agreement and Exhibits A, B and C are terminated. As respects coverages written
on an occurrence basis, the Reinsurer shall not be liable for claims and losses
resulting from occurrences taking place at and after such time and date. As
respects coverages written on a claims-made basis, the Reinsurer shall not be
liable for claims received and recorded by the Company or the insured at and
after such time and date, unless such claim is received and recorded by the
Company or the insured during an extended reporting period in force at such time
and date.

The Reinsurer shall return to the Company the reinsurance premium unearned
calculated on the monthly pro rata basis as of such time and date, less the
commission previously allowed thereon.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Endorsement to be
executed in duplicate,

this               day of                                     , 200___,
     -------------        ------------------------------------

                                            PENN-AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY
                                            PENN-STAR INSURANCE COMPANY




Attest:
         -----------------------------------

and this           day of                                     , 200___.
         ---------        ------------------------------------

                                            GENERAL REINSURANCE CORPORATION



                                                                Vice President
Attest:
         -----------------------------------
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernest Eugene WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 76-1144

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 25, 1976.

*827Aaron A. Green, Gainesville, Fla. (CourtApptd.), for defendant-appellant.

Clinton Ashmore, U. S. Atty., Nickolas P. Geeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pensacola, Fla., Clifford L. Davis, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tallahassee, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before AINSWORTH, CLARK and RONEY, Circuit Judge.

*

Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see *Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al.,*5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:

Ernest Eugene Watkins was convicted by a jury of three counts of possession of sawed-off shotguns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). His only contention on appeal is that the District Court erred in admitting evidence that he sold a .357 magnum revolver to an undercover agent. Finding this contention to be without merit, we affirm.

Watkins’ indictment originally included a count charging him with unlawful possession of the revolver under 18 App. U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), which proscribes possession of firearms by persons previously convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. However, this count was dismissed prior to trial. Appellant’s claim is that introduction of testimony regarding the transaction involved in the revolver count prejudiced his right to a fair trial on the remaining sawed-off shotgun counts.

Initially, it should be noted that the testimony in question gave no indication that the revolver transaction was illegal. It was given by the undercover agent who. ultimately purchased the sawed-off shotguns involved in the indictment in the course of explaining how he initially came in contact with Watkins. *Cf. Nunez v. United States,*5 Cir., 1967, 370 F.2d 538, 539 (evidence that defendant was riding in a stolen automobile at time of his arrest held admissible because it was inevitably a part of the background facts surrounding the possession of a sawed-off shotgun violation with which he was charged). Moreover, at the time the testimony was given, the trial judge cautioned the jury to consider the evidence regarding the revolver only in its bearing on the defendant’s intent in connection with the crimes charged. The evidence was in any event admissible on the issue of predisposition to rebut the entrapment defense that Watkins’ counsel raised during his opening argument. *See United States v. Tyson,*1972, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 470 F.2d 381, 384; *cf. United States v. Fink,*5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1, *cert. denied,*421 U.S. 911, 95 S.Ct. 1562, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975) (reputation testimony); *United States v. Robinson,*5 Cir., 1971, 446 F.2d 562, *cert. denied,*404 U.S. 959, 92 S.Ct. 323, 30 L.Ed.2d 277 (same). We discern no abuse of discretion in the present case.

AFFIRMED.