NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 

revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 

volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical 

error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 

Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-

1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-13498

OAK-HEE KIM vs. NEWTON HOUSING AUTHORITY.

February 23, 2024.

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.

The petitioner, Oak-hee Kim, appeals from the judgment of a 

single justice of this court denying her petition for relief in 

the nature of mandamus pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 5. We 

affirm.

Kim failed to appear for trial in a summary process action 

in the District Court, and judgment entered against her. She 

then appealed from the judgment to the Appellate Division of the 

District Court Department, which scheduled an oral argument. 

Kim apparently moved to dismiss her appeal, and she did not 

appear for oral argument. The Appellate Division dismissed 

Kim's appeal, and a new execution issued.1 While her appeal was 

pending, Kim petitioned the single justice of this court for 

relief in the nature of mandamus. The single justice denied 

Kim's petition without a hearing, finding no reason to grant 

extraordinary relief. 

Kim now appeals from the judgment of the single justice. 

She has filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 

2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Rule 2:21 applies 

"[w]hen a single justice denies relief from a challenged 

interlocutory ruling in the trial court." Id. In her 

1 Kim brought motions to stay the new execution, which were 

denied by the Newton Division of the District Court Department 

and the Appellate Division. Kim also filed such a motion in 

this case, and the motion was denied.
2

memorandum, however, Kim states that she seeks vacatur of the 

September 20, 2023, order of execution.2 Rule 2:21 therefore

does not apply, as Kim's challenge arises not from an 

interlocutory order but rather from the District Court's final 

judgment. See Costello v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 480 Mass. 

1027, 1027-1028 (2018); Bishay v. District Court Dep't of the 

Trial Court, 477 Mass. 1030, 1030 (2017); Durakowski v. 

Commonwealth, 450 Mass. 1005, 1005 (2007). Cf. Bishay v. 

Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 480 Mass. 1028, 1028-1029 (2018) 

(questioning whether rule 2:21 applies to order of execution). 

Regardless of whether the rule applies, Kim must establish 

the absence of adequate alternative relief. Rule 2:21 expressly

requires a petitioner to "set forth the reasons why review of 

the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal 

from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other 

available means." If, as we hold here, the rule does not apply, 

then Kim may proceed to appeal from the single justice's denial 

of her petition, but in that event, "relief is available only 

[if she] demonstrates the absence of an adequate and effective 

alternative remedy." Wallace v. PNC Bank, N.A., 478 Mass. 1020, 

1020 (2018). See Kim v. Rosenthal, 473 Mass. 1029, 1030 (2016). 

Kim cannot meet this standard because adequate and effective 

relief was available to her in the ordinary appellate process. 

See Wallace, supra at 1021; Matter of an Appeal Bond (No. 2), 

428 Mass. 1022, 1022 (1999) ("If the petition is read as one 

seeking restoration of the petitioner's occupation and use of 

the premises, we construe it as a challenge to the judgment of 

the Housing Court, as subject to the regular appellate process

. . ."). Specifically, Kim could have pursued her appeal before 

the Appellate Division. Further, she could have appealed from 

the Appellate Division's order of dismissal to the Appeals 

Court. See G. L. c. 231, § 109; Kim, supra.

2 Kim does not seek a stay of execution but challenges the 

validity of the order of execution and therefore the final 

judgment. The occurrence of the eviction consequently did not 

render this appeal moot. See Wallace v. PNC Bank, N.A., 478 

Mass. 1020, 1021 (2018); Petrillo-Aufiero v. Petrillo, 436 Mass. 

1002, 1002 (2002); Matter of an Appeal Bond (No. 2), 428 Mass. 

1022, 1022 (1999).
3

We therefore conclude that the single justice neither erred 

nor abused his discretion in denying relief, and we affirm the 

judgment.3

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 

a memorandum of law.

Oak-hee Kim, pro se.

3 Kim has also filed with this court a document entitled 

"Petition for Accommodations," requesting that this matter be 

decided on the papers and that counsel be appointed for her. 

The first request is moot given our resolution of the appeal 

absent a hearing. The request for appointment of counsel is 

denied in light of our conclusion that affirmance is dictated by 

the availability of alternative avenues for relief.