alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Raymond Leon BELLE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 76-1232.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 24, 1976.

Decided July 14, 1976.

Raymond Leon Belle, pro se.

Barry A. Short, U. S. Atty. and Frank A. Bussmann, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.

Before BRIGHT, STEPHENSON and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Belle in this pro se appeal seeks reversal of the district court’s order denying his motion for section 2255 relief from his conviction for causing the interstate transportation of a “falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited security,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. His conviction was affirmed in *United States v. Belle,*516 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1975). He now contends that (1) the paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 under which he was indicted1 does not encompass the act of causing transportation but only transportation itself and (2) the interstate transportation of a “forged endorsement” does not fall within the ambit of section 2314. We affirm.

The facts are adequately summarized in *United States v. Belle, supra,*and need not be repeated here.

Appellant’s contention that the paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 under which he was indicted fails to encompass the causing of interstate transportation has been thoroughly rejected. *United States of Buckles,*495 F.2d 1377, 1379 (8th Cir. 1974). *980
      *See also Pereira*v. *United States,*347 U.S. 1, 8, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954).

Appellant further contends that section 2314 does not encompass a mere “forged endorsement.” This contention overlooks, of course, the government’s proof that both the endorsement and the authorizing signature were forged. In any event, appellant’s contention is devoid of merit. We have held that proof of either a forged security or a falsely made security suffices for conviction under section 2314. *Hall v. United States,*372 F.2d 603, 611 (8th Cir. 1967). The words “falsely made” and “forged” as used in section 2314 are substantially synonymous. *United States v. Johnson,*504 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1974).

Affirmed.

. Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited * * *

* * * * * *

Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
<PAGE>

                                                                 EXHIBIT 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Huntington Preferred
Capital Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending June 30, 2002,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, John D. Van Fleet, Vice President of the Company (principal
financial officer), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


                                        /s/ John D. Van Fleet
                                       ----------------------------------
                                                John D. Van Fleet
                                                Vice President
                                         (principal financial officer)
                                                August 19, 2002
1 

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 14-475V 

Filed: March 11, 2015

(Not to be published) 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MARLON SPORER * 

 * 

 Petitioner, * Attorneys’ Fees & Cost; Stipulation 

v. * 

 * 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH * 

AND HUMAN SERVICES, * 

 * 

 Respondent. * 

* 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Gerard K. Ryan, Kelner & Kelner, New York, NY for petitioner. 

Julia W. McInerny, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC for respondent. 

DECISION ON ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS1

Gowen, Special Master: 

 In this case under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,2

 I issued a 

decision adopting the parties’ Proffer and awarding damages on February 23, 2015. On 

March 10, 2015, the parties filed a Stipulation of Fact concerning attorneys’ fees and 

costs [Fee Stip.]. Fee Stip., filed Mar. 10, 2015. Additionally, pursuant to General Order 

#9, petitioners’ counsel asserted that petitioner did not personally incur litigation costs in 

this matter. Id. at para. 4. 

 

1

 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I intend to post this 

decision on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 

Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2006)). In 

accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to delete medical or other 

information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree 

that the identified material fits within this definition, I will delete such material from public access. 

2

 The applicable statutory provisions defining the program are found at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 et seq. (2006). 
2 

 The parties’ stipulation indicates that respondent does not object to the amended 

amount of $16,416.12 that petitioner is requesting for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

 I find that this petition was brought in good faith and that there existed a 

reasonable basis for the claim. Therefore, an award for fees and costs is appropriate, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-15(b) and (e)(1). Further, the proposed amount seems 

reasonable and appropriate. Accordingly, I hereby award: 

 a lump sum of $16,416.12 in the form of a check payable jointly to 

petitioner and petitioner’s attorney, Gerard Ryan, for petitioner’s 

attorneys’ fees and costs. 

The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in accordance herewith.3

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/ Thomas L. Gowen 

 Thomas L. Gowen 

 Special Master 

 

3

 Entry of judgment can be expedited by each party’s filing of a notice renouncing the right to seek review. See 

Vaccine Rule 11(a).
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 127 (Wednesday, September 19, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H6073]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                                 PRAYER

  The Chaplain, the Reverend Patrick J. Conroy, offered the following 
prayer:
  Loving God, we give You thanks for giving us another day.
  We pray this day, O Lord, for peace in our world, that freedom will 
flourish and righteousness will be done.
  The attention of our Nation is drawn toward an impending election, 
but there is work yet to be done.
  Send Your spirit upon the Members of this people's House that they 
might judiciously balance seemingly irreconcilable interests. Help them 
to execute their consciences and judgments with clarity and purity of 
heart so that all might stand before You honestly and trust that You 
can bring forth righteous fruits from their labors.
  Bless this day and every day, and may all that is done be for Your 
greater honor and glory.
  Amen.

                          ____________________
```
# Cleburne - Appalachian Regional Commission

- East Alabama Regional Planning and Development Commission Executive Director Lori Hodge Sokol Email &#108;&#111;&#x72;&#x69;&#46;&#115;&#x6f;&#x6b;&#111;&#108;&#x40;&#x65;&#97;&#114;&#x70;&#x64;&#99;&#46;&#x6f;&#x72;&#103;The post East Alabama Regional Planning and Development Commission appeared first on Appalachian Regional Commission.
Map Created: October 2009.

Data Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, LAUS, 2005-2007;

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, REIS, 2006;

U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census, SF3.

County Economic Status in Appalachia, Fiscal Year 2010

(Effective October 1, 2009 through September 30, 2010)

The Appalachian Regional Commission uses an index-based county 

economic classification system to identify and monitor the economic 

status of Appalachian counties. See the reverse side for a description of 

each economic level.

0 50 100 

Miles 

GEORGIA 

ALABAMA 

MISSISSIPPI 

SOUTH 

CAROLINA 

NORTH CAROLINA 

VIRGINIA 

WEST 

VIRGINIA 

KENTUCKY 

OHIO ILLINOIS INDIANA 

WISCONSIN 

MICHIGAN 

DE 

NJ PENNSYLVANIA 

MARYLAND 

NEW YORK 

TENNESSEE

Distressed (82)

At-Risk (79)

Transitional (229)

Competitive (24)

County Economic Levels

Attainment (6)
County Economic Status Classification System, FY 2010

The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) uses an index-based county economic classification system to 

identify and monitor the economic status of Appalachian counties. The system involves the creation of a 

national index of county economic status through a comparison of each county’s averages for three economic 

indicators—three-year average unemployment rate, per capita market income, and poverty rate—with national 

averages. The resulting values are summed and averaged to create a composite index value for each county. 

Each county in the nation is then ranked, based on its composite index value, with higher values indicating 

higher levels of distress.

County Economic Levels

Each Appalachian county is classified into one of five economic status designations, based on its position in the 

national ranking. 

Distressed

Distressed counties are the most economically depressed counties. They rank in the worst 10 percent of the 

nation’s counties.

At-Risk

At-Risk counties are those at risk of becoming economically distressed. They rank between the worst 10 percent 

and 25 percent of the nation’s counties.

Transitional

Transitional counties are those transitioning between strong and weak economies. They make up the largest 

economic status designation. Transitional counties rank between the worst 25 percent and the best 25 percent of 

the nation’s counties.

Competitive

Competitive counties are those that are able to compete in the national economy but are not in the highest 10 

percent of the nation’s counties. Counties ranking between the best 10 percent and 25 percent of the nation’s 

counties are classified competitive.

Attainment

Attainment counties are the economically strongest counties. Counties ranking in the best 10 percent of the 

nation’s counties are classified attainment.

Attainment 

Counties

Best 10% of 

U.S. Counties

Competitive 

Counties

Best 10+ to 25% of 

U.S. Counties

At-Risk 

Counties

Worst 10+ to 25% 

of U.S. Counties

Distressed 

Counties

Worst 10%

 of U.S. 

Counties

ARC County Economic Status Designation by National Index Value Rank

Ranked Index Values 

of U.S. Counties

Transitional Counties

Higher Index Values Lower Index Values
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, John R. Weale, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 of IPC Holdings, Ltd. (this Amendment No. 1); and

2. Based on my knowledge, this Amendment No. 1 does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

Date: April 30, 2009



/s/ John R. WealeJohn R. Weale Chief Financial Officer
ELECTRONIC RECORD

COA # 06-13-00046-CR

Remanded

from CCA

to COA

Clister Ray Thomas v. The State of

STYLE: Texas COUNTY: Gregg

OFFENSE: 62.1

in-zr

Reversed and

COA DISPOSITION: Remanded TRIAL COURT: 188th District Court

DATE: 12/30/14 Publish: YES TC CASE #: 41776-A

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Clister Ray Thomas v. The State of

STYLE: Texas CCA#: 1\fm #5

SR/t7S Petition

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS:

CCA Disposition:

DATE:

JUDGE:

date: /4g>rM 2°i 2&/f

JUDGE: /°<^

SIGNED: PC:

PUBLISH: DNP:

MOTION FOR

REHEARING IN CCA IS:

JUDGE:

ELECTRONIC RECORD
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Mascolo, Jr., Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Lange, J.), rendered February 4, 1985, convicting him of driving while intoxicated and operating a motorcycle without a reflectorized helmet, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the verdict returned by the jury was repugnant in that it found him guilty of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) while acquitting him of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3). We disagree.

The jury could have reasonably concluded, based on the testimony adduced from the police officer who administered the test and that of the People’s expert witness, that the breathalyzer results were reliable and that the alcohol content of defendant’s blood reached the statutory level, but that based on the testimony of the defense witnesses, the defendant did not appear to be intoxicated at the time of his arrest *(see,*
      *813
      *e.g.y People v Farmer,*36 NY2d 386, 393; *see also, People v Whelan,*165 AD2d 313).

This court has already rejected the claim posited by the defendant that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) is void for vagueness and has held this statute to be constitutional *(see, People v Gates,*122 AD2d 159; *People v Perez, 73*AD2d 677).

Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

We have reviewed the defendant’s remaining contentions and find that they are without merit. Kunzeman, J. P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.
Map Created: August 2019

Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, LAUS, 2017

Unemployment Rates in Appalachia, 2017

(County Rates)

An unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons as 

a percentage of the civilian labor force. The map uses natural 

breaks in the distribution to organize the data into groups of 

common values. 

0 50 100

Miles

GEORGIA

ALABAMA

MISSISSIPPI

SOUTH

CAROLINA

NORTH CAROLINA

VIRGINIA

WEST

VIRGINIA

KENTUCKY

OHIO ILLINOIS INDIANA

WISCONSIN

MICHIGAN

DE

NJ PENNSYLVANIA

MARYLAND

NEW YORK

TENNESSEE

8.0% - 15.7%

6.3% - 7.9%

4.9% - 6.2%

3.1% - 4.8%

Unemployment Rate

U.S. average = 4.4%

Appalachian average = 4.8%

(Natural Breaks Classification)
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Commerce

###### International Trade Administration

          - [Application No. 05-2A001]

# ACTION:

Notice of relinquishment of the Export Trade Certificate of Review for Central America Poultry Export Quota, Inc. (“CA-PEQ”), Application No. 05-2A001.

# SUMMARY:

The Secretary of Commerce, through the Office of Trade and Economic Analysis (“OTEA”) of the International Trade Administration, has received notice of the relinquishing of an Export Trade Certificate of Review (“Certificate”).

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Joseph Flynn, Director, OTEA, International Trade Administration, (202) 482-5131 (this is not a toll-free number) or email at                         *etca@trade.gov.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Title III of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (15 U.S.C. 4011-21) authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to issue Export Trade Certificates of Review. An Export Trade Certificate of Review protects the holder and the members identified in the Certificate from State and Federal government antitrust actions and from private treble damage antitrust actions for the export conduct specified in the Certificate and carried out in compliance with its terms and conditions. The regulations implementing Title III are found at 15 CFR part 325. Pursuant to 15 CFR 325.15, a Certificate holder may relinquish a Certificate at any time through written notice to the Secretary. The Certificate will cease to be effective on the day the Secretary receives the notice.

## Summary of Action

On December 5, 2023, CA-PEQ relinquished its Certificate (Application No. 05-2A001) pursuant to 15 CFR 325.15. This publication serves as public notice that the Certificate was relinquished and ceased to be effective on December 5, 2023.

Dated: January 3, 2024.

Joseph Flynn,

Director, Office of Trade and Economic Analysis, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.

[FR Doc. 2024-00140 Filed 1-5-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DR-P
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 119 (Tuesday, August 7, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5728]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

           By Mr. TIERNEY:
       H.R. 6360:
       Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       Article I, Section 8, Clause 18
       The Congress shall have Power * * * To make all Laws which 
     shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
     foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by the 
     Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
     any Department or Officer thereof.

                          ____________________
```
================================================================================

                                  Exhibit 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Pacific Spirit,  Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the  Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  the undersigned,  in
the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:



1.     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
       of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.     The information  contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
       respects,  the financial condition and results of operations of the
       Company.



Date:  June 22, 2005

                                                /s/ Peter Sotola
                                                ----------------------------
                                                Peter Sotola
                                                President, C.E.O. and Director
                                                (Principal Executive Officer)
REGULATORY EVALUATION

Directorate Identifier: __2012________-NM-___074______-AD

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific 

requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of 

transportation?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation byreference in the Registration Statements on Forms S-8 (No. 333-42533, No. 333-86001, No. 333-62734, No. 333-100011, and No. 333-138673, pertaining, respectively, to the 1995 Stock Option Plan, as amended and restated; the 1998 Stock OptionPlan; the 1998 Stock Option Plan, as amended; the 2001 Non-Qualified Employee Stock Option Plan and the 2002 Stock Option Plan; and the Amended and Restated 2002 Stock Option Plan), and Forms S-3 (No. 333-42367, No. 333-75821,No. 88701, No. 333- 33710, No. 333-51250, No. 333-53538, No. 112513, No. 115281, No. 333-140518 and No. 148757 No.) of Titan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and subsidiaries of our reports dated March 7, 2008, relatingto the consolidated financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Titan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and subsidiaries, included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007.

/s/    ODENBERG ULLAKKO MURANISHI & CO. LLP 

San Francisco, California 

March 7, 2008