United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued March 3, 2015

Decided March 11, 2015

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 14-2456

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AGUSTIN RODRIGUEZ-SÁNCHEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 10-CR-262

C.N. Clevert, Jr.,

Judge.

O R D E R

Agustin Rodriguez-Sánchez, a Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to unlawfully 

possessing a firearm as an illegal alien, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). He was sentenced to 

time served plus three years’ supervised release. After he committed three Grade C 

violations, however, the district court revoked his supervised release and imposed an 

above-guidelines sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 

Rodriguez-Sánchez appeals, arguing that the court did not adequately explain its 

reason for sentencing him above the guidelines. Because the court’s explanation was 

sufficient, we affirm. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14-2456 Page 2

Milwaukee police learned from a confidential informant that Rodriguez-Sánchez, 

an illegal immigrant, kept a sawed-off shotgun at his home. After obtaining a state

search warrant, the police recovered a 12-gauge shotgun and a box of cartridges. 

Rodriguez-Sánchez was charged with possessing a firearm as an illegal alien, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(5)(A), and possessing a firearm that was not registered to him, 26 U.S.C. 

§ 5861(d). 

By the time Rodriguez-Sánchez was arrested for those offenses in November 

2010, the Department of Homeland Security already had discovered his illegal status 

(through an earlier arrest) and had scheduled a court date for removal proceedings. So 

the government and Rodriguez-Sánchez negotiated a plea agreement designed to 

expedite his removal from the United States. The parties asked to proceed without a 

presentence investigation report. Rodriguez-Sánchez agreed to plead guilty to the 

§ 922(g) charge and to be removed from the country following removal proceedings. In 

exchange the government agreed to dismiss the registration charge. The parties further 

agreed to ask the court to impose a sentence of time served (about 6 months)—well 

below his guidelines range of 21 to 27 months—followed by 3 years’ supervised release. 

The district court accepted Rodriguez-Sánchez’s plea and the parties’ sentencing 

recommendation and sentenced him to time served.

But Rodriguez-Sánchez did not leave the country as expected. Following 

sentencing in June 2011, Rodriguez-Sánchez immediately began serving his term of 

supervised release but promptly was turned over to the custody of the U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement. For reasons unknown to the parties (and 

otherwise unreflected in the record), ICE allowed Rodriguez-Sánchez to post bond a 

couple months later. A probation officer conducted an unscheduled home visit in 

November 2012, and could not locate Rodriguez-Sánchez. The officer told RodriguezSánchez’s father, at whose house he resided, to tell his son to report to the probation 

office the next day. Rodriguez-Sánchez did not do so, making that missed appointment 

his fourth. 

Rodriguez-Sánchez’s whereabouts went unknown for the next year and a half, 

until he was arrested in Grand Forks, North Dakota, in April 2014. After the arrest, 

Rodriguez-Sánchez was transferred to the Eastern District of Wisconsin, where he faced 

charges for three Grade C violations of his supervised release: failing to report (four 

times) to the probation office and absconding; twice failing to submit monthly 

supervision reports; and a citation for marijuana possession. 

At his supervised release revocation hearing, the government and RodriguezSánchez disputed whether the district judge should impose a prison sentence within or 
No. 14-2456 Page 3

above the guidelines recommendation. The guidelines recommended a term of 4 to 10 

months imprisonment based on Rodriguez-Sánchez’s Grace C violations and criminal 

history category II. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). The government asked for the 2-year 

statutory maximum sentence, highlighting an ongoing pattern of involvement with 

firearms (he had a prior firearms offense and was involved in a shooting while on 

supervised release), the need to deter him from committing future crimes because he 

continues to engage in criminal conduct, and the seriousness of his flight from 

authorities. The government pointed to U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 application note 4, which 

suggests that an above-guidelines sentence may be warranted in resentencing a 

defendant like Rodriguez-Sánchez who initially received a downward variance.

Rodriguez-Sánchez’s lawyer, in seeking a within-guidelines sentence, characterized the 

defendant’s behavior while on supervised release as insubstantial, noting that he had 

not engaged in any serious criminal activity and that avoiding removal a second time

was unlikely. 

The district court rejected both parties’ sentencing recommendations and 

sentenced Rodriguez-Sánchez to 18 months’ imprisonment, an above-guidelines 

sentence that still was below the statutory maximum. The judge characterized 

Rodriguez-Sánchez’s initial sentence of time served as a “cream puff” sentence, and 

stressed that he “got an incredible, almost unbelievable break, and in the wake of that 

break it is difficult to follow a suggestion that [the defendant] be handled with kid 

gloves.” And despite the court’s expectation that the original sentence would facilitate 

the defendant’s swift removal from this country, Rodriguez-Sánchez not only stayed 

but absconded. Lastly, the judge recounted Rodriguez-Sánchez’s history involving 

violence, weapons, and drugs, the need to protect the public, and duty to deter others 

from committing similar violations. 

On appeal Rodriguez-Sánchez argues that the district court did not sufficiently 

explain why it sentenced him eight months beyond the high end of the guidelines 

range. The sentence, in his view, was imposed only to compensate for the lenient 

sentence (merely time served) set at his initial sentencing, instead of being based on the 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Considering each of the § 3553(a) factors, 

Rodriguez-Sánchez insists, is “something the district court did not do.” 

But the court said enough. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the district court 

discussed several of the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Carter, 408 F.3d 852, 854 

(7th Cir. 2005). We have repeatedly stated that the court need not discuss each factor in 

checklist form. See, e.g., United States v. Pollock, 757 F.3d 582, 590–91 (7th Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Washington, 739 F.3d 1080, 1081 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hodge, 729 

F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 2013). And though the discussion was brief, it was adequate to 
No. 14-2456 Page 4

justify the upward variance. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46–47 (2007); United 

States v. Snyder, 635 F.3d 956, 960–61 (7th Cir. 2011). The court explained that 

Rodriguez-Sánchez’s absconding was particularly egregious, given its intention that the 

earlier lenient sentence of time served would expedite his removal. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1). The court also noted that the sentence was necessary to protect the public 

in light of the defendant’s history involving violence, weapons, and drugs, see id. 

§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C), and to deter others from committing similar violations of 

supervised release, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). And the court considered the kind of 

sentences available when it explained why it rejected Rodriguez-Sánchez’s request for a 

guidelines sentence and the government’s request for the statutory maximum. See id. at 

§ 3553(a)(3), (a)(4).

Moreover, the commentary to policy statement U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 , which sets forth 

the prison range applicable upon revocation in the guidelines, suggests that an 

above-guidelines sentence may be warranted when the original sentence resulted from 

a downward variance. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 app. n.4; see United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106, 

1109 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299, 313 n.14 (3d Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Hergott, 562 F.3d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 

F.3d 122, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2008); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3) (directing district court to 

impose term of reimprisonment consistent with policy statements). Although the 

district court did not refer to this policy statement when explaining RodriguezSánchez’s sentence, its many references to the defendant’s initial lenient sentence echo 

§ 7B1.4’s rationale. 

AFFIRMED.