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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

ROBIN E. WALLACE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, 

LLC 

Defendant. 

Civil Action No. 14-203 (CKK) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

(June 1, 2015) 

Plaintiff Robin E. Wallace filed suit on February 12, 2014, against her employer Defendant 

AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC, alleging discrimination and retaliation on the basis of race, 

gender, and protected activity in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Defendant filed an Answer and the Court issued a 

Scheduling Order setting May 8, 2014, as the date by which Plaintiff was required to file any 

amended pleadings and August 8, 2014, as the date for completing discovery. The parties 

subsequently filed two joint motions for extension of time to complete discovery which the Court 

granted, extending the deadline for completing discovery to October 10, 2014. See ECF Nos. [19] 

& [21]. Two months after the completion of discovery and seven months after the deadline for 

amending pleadings, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. See ECF 

No [28]. Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. [29], and Plaintiff filed a 

Reply, ECF No. [30]. As Plaintiff raised several new arguments in her Reply, the Court ordered 

Defendant to file a sur-reply, ECF No. [34], addressing several specific issues. Having received 

all of the parties’ briefing, Plaintiff’s Motion is now ripe for review. 
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I. LEGAL STANDARD 

Plaintiff moves for leave to file an Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15, which provides that leave to amend should be freely granted “when justice so 

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, since Plaintiff sought to amend her Complaint seven 

months after the Court-ordered deadline for filing amended pleadings, the more stringent Rule 16 

“good cause” standard governs the Court’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s Motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

16(b); Lurie v. Mid–Atlantic Permanente Medical Grp., P.C., 589 F.Supp.2d 21, 23 (D.D.C. 2008) 

(relying on decisions from numerous circuit courts holding that Rule 16 applies to motions for 

leave to amend a pleading after a scheduling order deadline has passed); Robinson v. The Detroit 

News, Inc., 211 F. Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Because the plaintiff filed her proposed 

motion to amend after the date specified in the court’s order, the court applies the more rigorous 

for ‘good cause’ Rule 16 standard to the plaintiff’s amendment.”). “To hold otherwise would allow 

Rule 16’s standards to be ‘short circuited’ by those of Rule 15 and would allow for parties to 

disregard scheduling orders, which would ‘undermine the court’s ability to control its docket, 

disrupt the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier.’ ” Lurie, 

589 F.Supp.2d at 23 (quoting Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 906 (6th Cir. 2003)). To show 

“good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, “the moving party must show both 

diligence and a lack of prejudice to the opposing parties.” In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG 

Litigation, 762 F.Supp.2d 56, 59 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Robinson, 211 F.Supp.2d at 114 (motion 

to amend denied due to undue delay); Leary, 349 F.3d at 906 (to determine whether good cause

has been shown, a court must consider the issue of prejudice); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 

F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000) (“This standard ‘primarily considers the diligence of the party 
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seeking the amendment.’ ” (quoting Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–

09 (9th Cir. 1992))). 

II. DISCUSSION 

In her original Complaint, Plaintiff brought four causes of action: race and sex 

discrimination in violation of Title VII (Count I) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III), and retaliation 

in violation of Title VII (Count II) and § 1981 (Count IV). Plaintiff’s race and sex discrimination 

claims arose out of Plaintiff’s alleged demotion from her District Manager position in April 2013. 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims arose out of the hostile work environment Plaintiff alleges she and her 

spouse were subjected to following Plaintiff’s complaint to Defendant in May 2013 that “her rights 

under the Civil Rights Act had been violated.” Compl. ¶ 15. 

Plaintiff now seeks to amend her Complaint to include additional claims of racial 

discrimination and retaliation under § 1981 and racial and gender discrimination, as well as 

retaliation, under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) for defendant’s failure 

to promote her to the position of District Manager for the Northern Virginia Region in April 2014 

and for her spouse’s termination on October 31, 2014, and her own termination on November 17, 

2014. The Court will evaluate each new claim in turn to determine whether there is good cause to 

allow Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint to include the claim. 

a. April 2014 Non-Promotion 

Plaintiff seeks to amend her Complaint to include an additional claim of race and sex 

discrimination based on her non-selection for the position of District Manager for the Northern 

Virginia Region in 2014. While it is not precisely clear on what date Plaintiff learned that she had 

not been selected for the District Manager position, it is clear that Plaintiff was aware of her nonselection at least seven months before seeking to amend her Complaint and potentially before the 
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deadline for amending pleadings. On April 16, 2014, Plaintiff received an email stating that she 

was not selected for the District Manager position, however, Defendant explains in its Sur-Reply 

that the email was sent to all applicants in error. Def.’s Sur-Reply, at 2; see also Pl.’s Reply, at 3 

(explaining that after receiving the email, “Defendant assured Ms. Wallace that her candidacy was 

still under consideration . . . .”). Shortly after April 16, Plaintiff had an initial interview for the 

District Manager position and was invited to return for a panel interview which was tentatively 

scheduled for May 8, 2014. Def.’s Sur-Reply, at 2. Plaintiff’s panel interview never took place, 

however, because prior to that date Defendant decided not to fill the position. Id. Defendant 

claims that it informed Plaintiff that she had not been selected for the position “on or before May 

8, 2014,” id., but Plaintiff contends that as of May 8, 2014, the day amended pleadings were due, 

she still believed she was a candidate for the District Manager position, Pl.’s Reply, at 3. In either 

event, the Court finds that Plaintiff would have made an inquiry about her panel interview and 

application, especially if the interview was tentatively scheduled for May 8, 2014, sometime in the 

month of May and thereby learned that Defendant was no longer hiring for the District Manager 

position. Indeed, Plaintiff had already filed the present lawsuit at the point she was interviewing 

for the District Manager position and thus would have been aware that such hiring decisions should 

be diligently evaluated due to their potential connection to the pending lawsuit. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s decision to wait seven months before filing an Amended Complaint to include this nonpromotion as a basis for her discrimination claims constitutes an undue delay. Robinson, 211 

F.Supp.2d at 114 (striking plaintiff’s amendment “filed eight months after the date specified in the 

scheduling order because of undue delay”); Lurie, 589 F.Supp.2d at 24 (“The plaintiff’s inadequate 

explanation, combined with the fact that the motion for leave to file an amended complaint was 

filed almost a year after the Court’s deadline, two years after the defendant’s answer, and two 
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weeks after the close of discovery, leads the Court to conclude that the plaintiff cannot amend his 

complaint under the Rule 16(b) “good cause” standard.”). 

Plaintiff appears to argue that her delay was justified because she did not learn of the 

potential discriminatory nature, and thus relevance, of her non-promotion to her discrimination 

case until depositions were conducted in October 2014. Pl.’s Reply, at 4. However, the excerpt 

from Plaintiff’s deposition that Plaintiff attaches to her Reply belies this contention. The excerpt 

comes from a deposition of Plaintiff conducted in mid-August 2014 and shows that, as of that date, 

at least, Plaintiff was aware of her non-promotion and already considering it to be a discriminatory 

act. Nevertheless, Plaintiff waited at least four months before amending her Complaint to include 

this non-promotion as a basis for her discrimination claim. Even accepting the version of the facts 

presented in Plaintiff’s briefing, Plaintiff still waited two months—and two months following the 

close of discovery—to amend her Complaint. Although Plaintiff had previously sought to extend 

the discovery deadline, Plaintiff did not seek to extend the deadline after allegedly learning of the 

discriminatory nature of her non-promotion in October. Accordingly, the Court still finds that 

Plaintiff was not diligent in seeking to amend her Complaint to add this claim. See Monolithic 

Power Sys., Inc. v. 02 Micro Internat’l Ltd., Civ. No. 08–4567, 2009 WL 3353306, *2 (N.D.Cal. 

Oct. 16, 2009) (finding that 02 Micro was not diligent because it had the new relevant information 

three months before it filed its motion to amend its infringement contentions). 

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant would not be prejudiced by the addition of this nonpromotion claim because “[t]he parties have conducted extensive discovery on the issues 

surrounding her failure to promote claim during the discovery period, and . . . no additional 

discovery will be necessary for that claim.” Pl.’s Mot. at 4. Plaintiff explains that the parties’ 

discovery “included issues related to the non-promotion on plaintiff’s theory that discovery on the 
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non-promotion was potentially relevant to the issue of credibility, bias and pretext, as opposed to 

a discrete issue of discrimination.” Pl.’s Reply, at 3. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant “had 

a full and fair opportunity to depose Ms. Wallace in August 2014 on the non-promotion” when 

Plaintiff suggested the non-promotion was motivated by discrimination in her deposition. Id. 

However, Defendant did not conduct depositions with the knowledge that this non-promotion 

would be an independent claim worthy of fully fleshing out the facts surrounding the nonpromotion. Plaintiff’s brief reference to the 2014 non-promotion was insufficient to put Defendant 

on notice that substantial discovery should be conducted relating to the non-promotion. Plaintiff 

also notes that she requested and received from Defendant documents related to the District 

Manager vacancy in Virginia. Id. But again, this does not show that Defendant requested any 

such discovery or was on notice that any such discovery would be relevant to its defense of this 

case. Defendant also explains in its Sur-Reply that Plaintiff never provided it with any discovery 

related to the 2014 non-promotion. Def.’s Sur-Reply, at 4. As Plaintiff’s newly proposed nonpromotion claim would require additional discovery in order for Defendant to properly prepare its 

defense, the Court finds that Defendant is prejudiced by Plaintiff’s delay in amending her 

Complaint to include this claim. See Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1295 (denying motion to amend 

complaint in part because “the request to amend the complaint would likely have required 

reopening discovery so that [defendant] could develop its evidence to prepare its defenses to this 

theory”). 

b. October and November 2014 Terminations 

Plaintiff next seeks to amend her Complaint to include discrimination and retaliation claims 

based on her termination in mid-November 2014 and her spouse’s termination in late October 

2014. Plaintiff argues that she has not unduly delayed seeking to add these claims because the 
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terminations were imposed in late October and mid-November 2014 after the close of discovery, 

and Plaintiff “moved swiftly” to amend her complaint in December 2014 based on these events. 

Pl.’s Mot., at 4. Nevertheless, Plaintiff acknowledges that the addition of these claims “will require 

additional discovery into the events leading to her and her spouse’s termination.” Id. Although 

Plaintiff acted relatively promptly to amend her Complaint to include these termination claims, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant will not be prejudiced by this amendment 

and, thus, cannot establish “good cause” to amend the Complaint. Plaintiff acknowledges that 

amending the Complaint to include these termination claims would require the parties to reopen 

discovery, which had already been closed for two months at the time Plaintiff filed her Motion to 

amend the Complaint. As the termination claims constitute entirely new claims based on entirely 

new facts, Defendant would need to conduct depositions of new witnesses and new depositions of 

old witnesses, produce new interrogatories and requests for documentation, and research new 

comparator information. Def.’s Opp’n, at 10-11. This entirely new discovery will delay the 

adjudication of the claims in Plaintiff’s current Complaint. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s protest of prejudice is made in bad faith because 

Defendant filed a civil claim in the Eastern District of Virginia shortly after the filing of Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint and that civil claim is based on Plaintiff’s and 

Plaintiff’s spouse’s termination. Pl.’s Reply, at 5. Plaintiff argues that this civil litigation will 

already subject Defendant to the discovery and litigation costs that it is seeking to avoid in 

opposing Plaintiff’s Motion to amend the Complaint. The Court asked Defendant to address the 

impact of this civil litigation on discovery in this matter in its Sur-Reply. In its Sur-Reply, 

Defendant explained that the lawsuit in the Eastern District of Virginia was dismissed without 

prejudice and the parties did not respond to any discovery. Def.’s Sur-Reply, at 5. As a result, 
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Defendant explains, none of the additional discovery costs that Defendant argued it would have to 

incur if Plaintiff were allowed to amend her Complaint were reduced by the lawsuit filed by 

Defendant in the Eastern District of Virginia. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not 

shown that there is “good cause” to amend her Complaint to include these additional termination 

claims. See In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Litigation, 762 F.Supp.2d at 59 (explaining 

that to show “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, “the moving party must show 

both diligence and a lack of prejudice to the opposing parties.” (emphasis added)). As Plaintiff 

could bring these new termination claims in an entirely new case, the Court shall DENY 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint to include 

these claims. 

c. District of Columbia Human Rights Act Claims 

Finally, Plaintiff seeks to amend her Complaint to include the DCHRA as a source of relief 

for all of her claims. Plaintiff does not provide any indication in her briefing as to why she did not 

bring her claims under the DCHRA originally. The Court sees no reason why Plaintiff could not 

have initially brought her claims under the DCHRA. Moreover, Plaintiff provides no explanation 

as to why she is now seeking to amend her Complaint to include a DCHRA cause of action—seven 

months after the Court’s deadline for filing amended pleadings and two months after the close of 

discovery. Without any explanation for why Plaintiff is seeking to add DCHRA claims and at this 

late stage, the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot amend her Complaint under the Rule 16(b) 

“good cause” standard.1

 See Lurie, 589 F.Supp.2d at 24 (“The plaintiff’s inadequate explanation, 

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 Defendant contends that it will be prejudiced by the addition of DCHRA claims and 

exposed to more expansive damages because the DCHRA has no cap on damages. Def.’s Opp’n, 

at 12. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint already includes claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which also 

has no damages cap. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b). Thus, Defendant was already on notice that it 

was defending against a claim with no damages cap. Nevertheless, it is unclear to the Court why 
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combined with the fact that the motion for leave to file an amended complaint was filed almost a 

year after the Court’s deadline, two years after the defendant’s answer, and two weeks after the 

close of discovery, leads the Court to conclude that the plaintiff cannot amend his complaint under 

the Rule 16(b) “good cause” standard.” (emphasis added)). 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to show that there is 

“good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) to amend her Complaint to include any 

of the additional claims discussed above. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First 

Amended Complaint is DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s/

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY 

United States District Judge 

 

Plaintiff is now seeking to amend her Complaint to include DCHRA claims because the elements 

of a DCHRA and a § 1981 claim are also the same. See Lemmons v. Georgetown University Hosp., 

431 F.Supp.2d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2006); Hunter v. Ark Restaurants Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d 9, 20 n.8 

(D.D.C. 1998).