alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ralph PONDER, Plaintiff in Error, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A-12095.

Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 12, 1955.

*378Frank Thomas, Ardmore, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

BRETT, Judge.

Plaintiff in error Ralph Ponder, defendant below, was charged by information in the county court of Carter county, Oklahoma, with the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor in that on April 24, 1951 he had in his possession tax paid intoxicating liquors as follows, to-wit, 31 1⁄2 pints-of whiskey, 12 pints of whiskey, 1 3⁄8 quarts of gin, 2 pints of gin, 5 3⁄8 quarts of whiskey, 1 *%*quarts of wine and 5 pints of wine. He was tried by a jury, convicted, his punishment fixed at a $500 fine and 30 days in jail;, judgment and sentence was entered accordingly, from which this appeal has been perfected.

It appears from the petition in error that there are two grounds which might be of substantial merit alleged as grounds for reversal. First, he contends-that the court erred in not sustaining his-motion to suppress the evidence. This contention is based upon the proposition that the search warrant described a certain one-story white frame store building unpainted' and one aluminum painted trailer house located on the north side of Highway 70' in the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section 20, township 4 south, range 2 east in Carter county, Oklahoma,, and all outbuildings located on said premises. The defendant contends that there were other houses located on the premises. The record discloses that the officers had no difficulty whatsoever in locating the-aluminum painted trailer house and the frame store building. He testified he located the houses from the description in the warrant; that he searched the aluminum painted trailer house and found therein the quantity of liquors as hereinbefore set forth, and made no search of any other premises. The search warrant named Ralph Ponder as the occupant of the premises searched. The evidence shows that he lived on the premises but at the time of the search was in the hospital.

This court has repeatedly held that a description of a house to be searched, which names the occupants, together with the legal description set forth in the search warrant should be read together, and if suffi*379cient to enable the officer to locate the premises to be searched without the aid of any other information the warrant is sufficient. LeBlanc v. State, Okl.Cr., 245 P.2d 134. The record herein conclusively shows that the search warrant was sufficient.

The evidence herein is entirely sufficient to sustain the allegation of the information. The information is sufficient, instructions are not prejudicial, the judgment is proper, and while some incompetent evidence was admitted in the record it is not of such character to deprive the defendant of any substantial right. For all the above and foregoing reasons the judgment and sentence herein is accordingly affirmed.

POWELL, P. J., and JONES, J., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

ALBERTO MONTELONGO,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-16-00001-CR

Appeal from the

243rd District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 20150D02224)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the Appellant’s fifth motion for extension of time within which to 

file the brief until June 13, 2022. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO 

FILE THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT. 

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Joe A. Spencer, Jr., the Appellant’s attorney, prepare 

the Appellant’s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before June 13, 2022.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of April, 2022.

PER CURIAM

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON



### O RDER 

### W ITHDRAWING 

### M EDIATION 

### O RDER

Court of Appeals N umber: 01

- 21

- 00144

- CV

Style: Baldomero Ortiz v. Adenrele Olandapo

- Jimoh & The Law Firm of

Jimoh, P.C.

Trial Court Case Number: 2020

- 00394

Trial Court: 234th District Court of Harris County

Type of Motion: Objection to Mediation

Party Filing Motion: Appellee



### Appellee has objected to mediation. The Court’s m ediation o rder dated April 7,

2021 is withdrawn.

Judge's signature: /s/ Peter Kelly

Acting individually

Date: April 13, 2021

* Absent emergency or a statement that the motion is unopposed, must wait ten days before acting on motion except for

motion to extend time to file a brief. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 10.3(a).

Note : Single justice may grant or deny any request for relief properly sought by motion, except in a civil case a single justice

should not: (1) act on a petition for an extraordinary writ or (2) dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or a motion for

rehearing. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 10.4(a).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          28,599
<SECURITIES>                                   124,913
<RECEIVABLES>                                  150,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               303,512
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 303,512
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,714,171
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,411,659)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   303,512
<SALES>                                        246,860
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               246,860
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               239,569
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             239,592
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (232,301)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (232,301)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (2.323)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (2.323)
        

</TABLE>
Map Created: August 2019

Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 

American Community Survey, 2013–2017

High School Completion Rates in Appalachia, 2013–2017

(County Rates)

A high school completion rate is the percentage of persons ages 

25 and over with a high school diploma or more. The map uses 

natural breaks in the distribution to organize the data into groups 

of common values. 

0 50 100

Miles

GEORGIA

ALABAMA

MISSISSIPPI

SOUTH

CAROLINA

NORTH CAROLINA

VIRGINIA

WEST

VIRGINIA

KENTUCKY

OHIO ILLINOIS INDIANA

WISCONSIN

MICHIGAN

DE

NJ PENNSYLVANIA

MARYLAND

NEW YORK

TENNESSEE

58.2% - 75.4%

75.5% - 81.6%

81.7% - 86.9%

87.0% - 94.5%

Completion Rate

U.S. average = 87.3%

Appalachian average = 86.4%

(Natural Breaks Classification)
# C_2008247EN.01002102.xml

| 27.9.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 247/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.9.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 247/21

---

Action brought on 6 August 2008 — Laura Ashley v OHIM — Tiziana Bucci (LAURA ASHLEY)

(Case T-301/08)

(2008/C 247/42)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Laura Ashley Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: J. Guise, Solicitor)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Tiziana Bucci (Viareggio, Italy)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 28 May 2008 in case R 1237/2007-1 and reject the opposition; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 28 May 2008 in case R 1237/2007-1 and reject the opposition; and

| — | Order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for the Community trade mark: The applicant

Applicant for the Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: The word mark ‘LAURA ASHLEY’ for various goods in classes 3, 18, 24 and 25

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited: International trade mark registration No 311 675 of the figurative mark ‘Ashley's’ for goods in class 25; Italian trade mark registration No 517 151 of the figurative mark ‘Ashley's’ for goods in class 3, 18, 24 and 25; international trade mark registration No 646 926 of the figurative mark ‘Ashley's il primo Cashmere Italiano’ for goods in class 25

Mark or sign cited:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Upheld the opposition in its entirety

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissal of the appeal

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 8(5) of Council Regulation No 40/94 as the Board of Appeal failed to establish whether the applicant was using the Community trade mark applied for without due cause.

Pleas in law:

---
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 123 (Thursday, September 13, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5925]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

             H O U S E  O F  R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S

Vol. 158

WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2012

No. 123
```
#### State v. Rodriguez

20072

7/23/97

Vacated and Remanded
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 117 (Thursday, August 2, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5710]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

            By Mr. REHBERG:
        H.R. 6346.
        Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
```
Map Created: October 2009.

Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census, SF3.

Relative College Completion Rates in Appalachia, 2000

(County Rates as a Percentage of the U.S. Average)

A college completion rate is the percentage of adults, 25 years 

and over, completing 4 years of college or more. The percent of 

the U.S. average is computed by dividing the county college 

completion rate by the national average and multiplying by 100. 

The map uses critical breaks such as the national average to 

organize the data into groups of common values. 

0 50 100 

Miles 

GEORGIA 

ALABAMA 

MISSISSIPPI 

SOUTH 

CAROLINA 

NORTH CAROLINA 

VIRGINIA 

WEST 

VIRGINIA 

KENTUCKY 

OHIO ILLINOIS INDIANA 

WISCONSIN 

MICHIGAN 

DE 

NJ PENNSYLVANIA 

MARYLAND 

NEW YORK 

TENNESSEE

20.2% - 49.9% 

50.0% - 74.9% 

75.0% - 99.9% 

100.0% - 194.5% 

Percent of the U.S. Average 

U.S. average = 24.4%

Appalachian average = 17.6%

(Critical Breaks Classification)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES EDWARD BOWELL,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

T. SMITH,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 13-16530

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00603-JAMEFB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 13, 2014** 

Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner James Edward Bowell appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force by a prison official. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Albino v. Baca, 747

FILED

AUG 22 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that Bowell failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies because Bowell did not exhaust his grievance to the final

level of review or demonstrate that administrative remedies were effectively

unavailable to him. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85, 93-95 (2006) (holding

that “proper exhaustion” is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative

procedural rules); Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2010) (for

administrative remedies to be effectively unavailable, “the inmate must establish

(1) that he actually filed a grievance or grievances that, if pursued through all

levels of administrative appeals, would have sufficed to exhaust the claim that he

seeks to pursue in federal court, and (2) that prison officials screened his grievance

or grievances for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable

regulations”). 

Bowell’s request for publication, filed on January 31, 2014, is denied.

Bowell’s request for appellate counsel, set forth in his opening brief, is

denied. 

Appellee’s motion to strike Bowell’s “Supplemental Clarification” is

granted. 

AFFIRMED.

2 13-16530
Bowell v. Smith, No. 13-16530

THOMAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

3 13-16530
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 117 (Thursday, August 2, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5709]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

           By Mr. FATTAH:
       H.R. 6314.
       Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       This bill is enacted pursuant to the power granted to 
     Congress under Article I Section 8 Clause 3 of the United 
     States Constitution, which states the United States Congress 
     shall have power ``To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
     and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes''.
```
## ELECTRONIC RECORD 

# COA# 06-13-00046-CR Remanded from CCA to COA 

### Clister RayThomas v. The State of 

## STYLE: Texas COUNTY: Gregg OFFENSE: 62.1 

# in-zr

Reversed and COA DISPOSITION: Remanded TRIAL COURT: 188th District Court DATE: 12/30/14 Publish: YES TC CASE #: 41776-A



### IN THE COURTOF CRIMINALAPPEALS Clister RayThomas v. The State of STYLE: Texas 

# CCA#: 1\fm #5 SR/t7S Petition FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS: 

### CCA Disposition: DATE: JUDGE: 

# date: /4g>rM 2°i 2&/f JUDGE: /°<^ SIGNED: PC: PUBLISH: DNP:
MOTION FOR REHEARING IN CCA IS: JUDGE: ELECTRONIC RECORD
**Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 15 December 2009 – Trubion Pharmaceuticals v OHIM – Merck (TRUBION)**

**(Case T-412/08)**

Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the Community word mark TRUBION – Earlier Community figurative mark TriBion Harmonis – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services
– Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 28, 56-58)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 3 July 2008 (Case R 1605/2007-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Trubion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Merck KGaA. |

**Information relating to the case**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Applicant for the Community trade mark: | Trubion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. |
| Community trade mark sought: | Word mark TRUBION for goods and services in Classes 5 and 42 |
| Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: | Merck KGaA |
| Mark or sign cited in opposition: | Community trade mark registration No 72884 of the word mark BION registered for various goods; Community trade mark registration No 3282936 of the figurative mark TriBion Harmonis registered for various goods |
| Decision of the Opposition Division: | Opposition upheld in respect of the goods in Class 5 and dismissed in respect of the remaining services in Class 42 |
| Decision of the Board of Appeal: | Appeal dismissed |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders Trubion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to pay the costs. |
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement of
Philadelphia Consolidated Holding Corp. on Forms S-8 (File Nos. 33-96604,
333-29643, and 333-29647) of our reports dated February 6, 1998 on our audits of
the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of
Philadelphia Consolidated Holding Corp. and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 1997
and 1996 and for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 1997,
which report is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.




/S/ COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.
----------------------------
    COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.



2400 Eleven Penn Center
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
March 10, 1998
#### BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TULSA COUNTY, Oklahoma, Petitioner, v. Bella Dixon HORNE and the State Industrial Commission, Respondents.

No. 36357.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Oct. 4, 1955.

J. Howard Edmondson, County Atty., Donald D. Cameron, Asst. County Atty., Tulsa, for petitioner.

Elmore A. Page, Tulsa, Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

DAVISON, Justice.

This is a proceeding brought by the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County, employer, to review an award made by the State Industrial Commission under the Death Benefit Provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, 85 O.S.1951 § 1 et seq., to the widow of Eugene Richard Horne.

It was stipulated that Eugene Richard Horne was an employee of Tulsa County at the time of his death; that he received an accidental injury in the course of his employment on the 13th day of November, 1953, which resulted in his death approxi*407mately five hours subsequent to the time of the injury.

At the time of the accidental injury resulting in his death he had been employed for approximately 20 months as a truck driver for the highway department in Tulsa County. For approximately 12 days prior to the accident he was shifted to a garage or repair shop maintained by the highway department in Tulsa County to take the place of the regular employee who was on vacation. He received the injury while working in the latter employment.

Ben Cook, the superintendent of Highway District No. 2 of Tulsa County testified that in connection with the operation of the trucks engaged in highway construction Tulsa County maintained in District No. 2 a repair shop garage or workshop out of which 40 trucks operated. This repair shop or garage was maintained for servicing and repairing all trucks and equipment incident thereto and a number of mechanics, mechanics’ helpers and service men worked therein. In the garage was an electric welder, a drill press, a grinder and buffer and a trip hammer to beat out metal. All of these instruments were operated by electricity. One and one-half hours per day was consumed by Eugene Richard Horne in placing gasoline in the trucks. The rest of the time was spent in the repair shop doing odd jobs. The accident occurred when he was placing gasoline in one of the trucks at the repair shop.

It is not disputed that the accidental injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The dependence of claimant is not disputed.

Employment in the garage or repair shop of the Highway Department of Tulsa County under the facts herein was employment in a workshop under the provisions of 85 O.S.1951 §§ 2 and 3. Gooldy v. Lawson, 155 Okl. 259, 9 P.2d 22; Lee Way Stage Lines v. Simmons, 166 Okl. 203, 26 P.2d 905.

There was no error in the award of the State Industrial Commission finding that Eugene Richard Horne sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and that at the time of said accidental injury he was employed in hazardous employment within the meaning and definition of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

Award sustained.

JOHNSON, C. J., WILLIAMS, V. C. J., and CORN, HALLEY, BLACKBIRD and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
# C_2009055EN.01003102.xml

| 7.3.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 55/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.3.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 55/31

---

Action brought on 12 December 2008 — X-Technology Swiss v OHIM (representation of a sock)

(Case T-547/08)

(2009/C 55/58)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: X-Technology Swiss GmbH (represented by A. Herbertz and R. Jung, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 6 October 2008 in Case R 846/2008-4; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 6 October 2008 in Case R 846/2008-4;

| — | order OHIM to bear its own costs and pay those of the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

—

order OHIM to bear its own costs and pay those of the applicant.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Community trade mark concerned: Figurative trade mark as ‘other mark — positional mark’ of the colour ‘orange (Pantone 16-1359 TPX)’ for goods in Class 25 (application No 5 658 117).

Community trade mark concerned:

Decision of the Examiner: Registration refused.

Decision of the Examiner:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Appeal dismissed.

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94, (1) since the trade mark applied for fulfils the minimum requirement as to distinctive character.

Pleas in law:

1

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).

1

---