No. 81-503 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1982 

TAYLOR RENTAL CORPORATION, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

VS. 

TED GODWIN LEASING, INC., 

FIRST BANK BILLINGS, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone 

Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Calton & Hamman, Billinqs, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Robert P. Ryan, Billings, Montana 

Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, Billings, 

llon tana 

Submitted on briefs: Lnlarch 5, 1982 

Decided: July 28, 1982 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Taylor Rental Corporation appeals an order of the 

Yellowstone County District Court granting summary judgment 

in favor of defendant Ted Godwin Leasing, Inc. Taylor 

Rental raises several issues but, in looking through the 

record, we find that only a partial summary judgment was 

entered, and even though the case was certified under Rule 

54(b), M.R.Civ.P., the certification is wholly inadequate. 

For this reason, we decline to hear this appeal, we will not 

accept another certification, and the appeal is dismissed 

without prejudice. 

The trial court granted summary judgment for Ted Godwin 

Leasing, Inc. (Godwin Leasing) the effect of which was to 

give Godwin Leasing the right to possession or to the proceeds 

of the sale of certain equipment which is the subject of 

this lawsuit. The trial court, however, failed to rule on 

the counterclaim of Godwin Leasing. In the counterclaim 

Godwin alleged that Taylor Rental Corporation had agreed to 

assume the debts of Taylor Rental Center, a franchisee of 

Taylor Rental Corporation, and that therefore Taylor Rental 

Corporation owed an unspecified amount of rent on the equipment. 

After the trial court had granted Godwin Leasing's 

motion for partial summary judgment, the attorney for Taylor 

Rental Corporation wrote a letter to the trial court and 

asked the court to certify a partial summary judgment in 

favor of Godwin Leasing as being "final and subject to 

appeal." The letter stated: 

". . . in the interest of judicial economy 

and administration of justice, we respectfully 

request that you certify your order of July 

7, 1981 as being final and subject to appeal 

and to complete the records, we would also 

request you enter an order denying our motion 

for summary judgment." 
The trial court complied, and, in certifying the cause 

under Rule 54, merely stated: "That the undersigned [judge] 

hereby certifies that there is no just reason for delay in 

the entry of such final judgment in this matter." That is 

the entire certification order. In Roy v. Neibauer (1980), 

- Mont. - , 610 P.2d 1185, 37 St.Rep. 897, because we 

were concerned with partial summary judgments coming to this 

Court either uncertified, or improperly certified, we set 

out in no uncertain terms what must be done to certify a 

partial summary judgment or partial judgment for appeal. We 

need not repeat those requirements here except to state that 

none of them were followed. See also, Reidy v. AnacondaDeer Lodge County (1981), - Mont . - , 637 P.2d 1196, 38 

St.Rep. 2188, where, in holding that we would strictly adhere 

to the standards in Neibauer, we dismissed an appeal as improperly 

certified even though the trial court did attempt to comply 

with Rule 54 requirements. 

If parties insist in not complying with the rules and 

our decisions, we again will be compelled to resort to Rule 

32, M.R.App.Civ.P., to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals. 

Here, the appeal, because it is premature, is obviously 

frivolous. If improper certifications appear before this 

Court again, especially where there is no genuine attempt to 

comply with the rules, we shall treat them as frivolous 

appeals and impose sanctions. 

We dismiss this appeal, without prejudice. 
FJe Concur: