NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REYNA ISABEL ORTIZ ELIAS, AKA 

Reyna Ortiz Elias, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 16-70332 

Agency No. A200-696-589 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 9, 2020**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Reyna Isabel Ortiz Elias, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal 

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial 

evidence the agency’s factual findings, including determinations regarding social 

distinction. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We 

review de novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is 

cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation 

of the governing statutes and regulations. Id. We deny in part and dismiss in part 

the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Ortiz Elias

failed to establish her proposed social group is socially distinct. See id. at 1243

(substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that petitioner’s 

proposed social group was not cognizable because of the absence of societyspecific evidence of social distinction). Thus, the BIA did not err in concluding 

that Ortiz Elias did not establish membership in a cognizable particular social 

group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to 

demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant must 

‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common 

immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct 

within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 

237 (BIA 2014))).

To the extent Ortiz Elias fears harm based on general conditions of violence 
3 

and civil unrest, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that she

failed to establish a nexus to a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 

1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by 

criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus 

to a protected ground”). 

We lack jurisdiction to consider the new particular social group raised in 

Ortiz Elias’ opening brief. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 

2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency).

Thus, Ortiz Elias’ asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because 

Ortiz Elias failed to show it is more likely than not she would be tortured by or 

with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. See 

Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). We lack jurisdiction to 

consider Ortiz Elias’ contention that the IJ erred in analyzing her CAT claim. See 

Barron, 358 F.3d at 677-78.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.