PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT 

LLOYD'S LONDON; GLOBAL 

AEROSPACE UNDERWRITING 

MANAGERS LIMITED; MITSUI 

SUMITOMO INSURANCE COMPANY 

(EUROPE) LTD; TOKIO MARINE 

EUROPE INSURANCE LIMITED; 

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 

INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE 

LIMITED; GREAT LAKES 

REINSURANCE (UK) PLC; 

WURTTEMBERGISCHE 

VERSICHERUNG AG; SWISS RE 

INTERNATIONAL SE UK BRANCH; 

ALLIANZ GLOBAL RISKS US 

INSURANCE COMPANY; NATIONAL 

FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

Plaintiffs – Appellees, 

v. 

GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

 Defendant, 

and 

No. 13-3310 

HENRY P. BARTLE, 

Defendant – Appellant. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 27, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 2:11-CV-02426 EFM) 

Gregory L. Anderson of Dwyer, Daly, Brotzen & Bruno, LLP, Los Angeles, California 

(Christopher Carpenter and Tracy M. Hayes of Sanders Warren & Russell LLP, Overland 

Park, Kansas, with him on the brief), for Defendant–Appellant.

 

Jill A. O’Donovan of Walker Wilcox Matousek LLP, Chicago, Illinois (John W. Cowden 

and Eric A. Cunningham III of Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice, LLC, Kansas City, 

Missouri, with her on the brief), for Plaintiffs–Appellees. 

Before BACHARACH, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

 This case involves a dispute over insurance coverage following a private airplane 

crash. Garmin International, Inc., purchased an insurance policy from Appellees. In 

2008, while the insurance policy was in effect, Appellant Henry Bartle, an individual who 

had some dealings with Garmin, crashed while piloting his malfunctioning personal 

aircraft, injuring himself and his passengers. Mr. Bartle then sought coverage under 

Garmin’s insurance policy for indemnification from claims brought against Mr. Bartle by 

his injured passengers. Appellees, the insurers, brought suit in the United States District 

Court for the District of Kansas seeking a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that Mr. Bartle does not qualify as an “Insured” under Garmin’s 

insurance policy. 

Mr. Bartle submitted evidence to the district court to demonstrate he was indeed 
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an “Insured”, but the district court refused to consider much of the evidence because the 

evidence failed to conform to district court rules regarding proper citation. Without 

considering this evidence, the district court granted summary judgment to the insurers, 

finding that Mr. Bartle was not an “Insured” under the policy. Mr. Bartle appealed both 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurers and its refusal to consider 

the excluded evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s 

decision. 

BACKGROUND 

In 2006, Garmin International, Inc. sought to test a new product, the G900X, in 

experimental, home-built aircraft.1

 The G900X replaces an aircraft cockpit’s traditional 

analog navigational display with a computerized display and requires extensive 

installation to connect the product to various aircraft systems. Garmin desired data and 

diagrams from the installation of the G900X system in experimental aircraft to aid in 

creating a G900X installation manual. 

Mr. Bartle owned a Lancair IV-P aircraft—the sort of home-built, experimental 

aircraft sought by Garmin for collection of this installation data. Chris Shulte, a Garmin 

manager and friend of Mr. Bartle, approached Mr. Bartle about installing the new system 

in his Lancair IV-P. Mr. Shulte agreed to provide the G900X to Mr. Bartle at a 

discounted price. In exchange, Mr. Bartle was to provide Mr. Shulte and other Garmin 

employees access to his aircraft in order to obtain installation data. 

 1

 The facts in this appeal are stated in the light most favorable to Mr. Bartle as the 

party opposing summary judgment. We note that many of these facts remain disputed. 
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Mr. Shulte purchased the G900X using his employee discount and resold it to Mr. 

Bartle at the discounted price. The two then worked on installing the G900X in Mr. 

Bartle’s aircraft primarily on weekends in Mr. Bartle’s private hangar in Oregon. During 

the course of the installation, Mr. Shulte directed one Garmin employee to install part of 

the wiring in Mr. Bartle’s aircraft, and another employee went to Mr. Bartle’s hangar to 

obtain data from the aircraft in order to create technical drawings and gather other data 

for the G900X manual. 

Installing the G900X into the Lancair IV-P aircraft requires an aircraft-specific 

bracket to hold one component of the G900X system in place. Mr. Bartle, who possessed 

a background in composite fabrication, designed his own bracket for that purpose. 

Garmin received permission to use diagrams of Mr. Bartle’s bracket in the G900X 

installation manual and listed Mr. Bartle’s company, the Ultimate Group as the supplier 

for that bracket in the manual. At the time of discovery in this case, the Ultimate Group 

had sold approximately ten brackets for use with the G900X as a result of the listing in 

Garmin’s installation manual. 

Mr. Bartle and Mr. Shulte completed installation of the G900X and in November 

2007, Mr. Bartle received a certificate of registration for the aircraft listing Mr. Bartle 

and his wife as the registered owners. Throughout the process of installing the G900X in 

the Lancair IV-P aircraft, Garmin and Mr. Bartle never entered into a written agreement, 

signed any releases, or discussed insurance. Garmin provided no written instructions or 

parameters for any work on the aircraft. 

In February 2008, Mr. Bartle took his step-daughter, her friend, and her friend’s 
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daughter sightseeing in his aircraft. The aircraft engine lost power during the flight and 

the plane crash-landed short of the runway. All of the passengers were injured in the 

crash. Mr. Bartle’s passengers and their spouses filed suit in California state court, 

raising claims of strict product liability, negligence, breach of express and implied 

warranties, and loss of consortium. The negligence claim alleged that Mr. Bartle 

specifically “breached his duty to Plaintiffs by negligently operating the airplane such 

that the airplane crashed to the ground thereby injuring Plaintiffs.” (R. at 106.) The 

California complaint also alleged that the defendants—among them Mr. Bartle—were 

negligent in the building and fabrication of the aircraft and that Mr. Bartle and Garmin 

were acting as “agents, servants, employees and/or joint venturers” of one another and 

were at all times “acting within the course, scope, and authority of said agency, 

employment and/or venture.” (R. at 103.) 

Mr. Bartle, facing potential liability for his part in the plane crash, asserted that the 

aircraft was built in a joint venture with Garmin and that Garmin’s insurance policy 

includes coverage for all such joint ventures. Garmin denied any business relationship 

existed with Mr. Bartle, and further denied that Mr. Bartle qualified as an “Insured” 

under Garmin’s insurance policy. 

Garmin’s insurance provider subsequently brought an action in the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas2

 under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2201(a), which states that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . 

 2

 Garmin’s insurance policy contains a forum selection clause designating the 

Insured’s primary place of business (in this case Kansas) as the jurisdiction whose law 

governs the policy. (R. at 69.) 
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any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the 

rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.” 

Specifically, the insurers sought a declaration that Mr. Bartle falls outside the definition 

of “Insured” under Garmin’s insurance policy. 

Mr. Bartle submitted over 700 pages of evidence and exhibits to the district court 

supporting his contention that he and Garmin were engaged in a joint venture or other 

business relationship entitling him to coverage under Garmin’s insurance policy. 

However, the district court found that a majority of the exhibits relied on by Mr. Bartle to 

demonstrate the existence of such a relationship failed to conform to District of Kansas 

Rule 56.1, which requires that each fact in dispute be numbered by paragraph and that a 

party must refer with particularity to portions of the record that support its assertions. 

The district court disregarded all of Mr. Bartle’s exhibits not cited to in accordance with 

this rule. 

Without considering Mr. Bartle’s disregarded evidence, the district court then 

granted summary judgment to Garmin, finding that Mr. Bartle was not covered under 

Garmin’s insurance policy. The district court denied Mr. Bartle’s motion for 

reconsideration of its decision, in which Mr. Bartle argued the court incorrectly set aside 

his evidence under District of Kansas Rule 56.1. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION 

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment and apply the 

same legal standard used by the district court under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 
-7- 

1241 (10th Cir.1990). Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In applying this standard, we view all facts and any reasonable 

inferences that might be drawn from them in the light most favorable to Mr. Bartle. See

Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). However, in 

reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we do not consider materials not before the 

district court. See Myers v. Okla. Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th 

Cir. 1998). 

In this case, the district court disregarded hundreds of pages of evidence which 

were not referred to in accordance with the local rules—evidence we will not now 

consider on appeal unless we find the district court abused its discretion in applying those 

rules. See Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We review a district 

court’s application of its local rules for abuse of discretion.”); see also Fye v. Okla. Corp. 

Comm'n, 516 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining to consider evidence not considered 

by the district court). 

District of Kansas Rule 56.1 states in relevant part that: 

A memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary 

judgment must begin with a section containing a concise 

statement of material facts as to which the party contends a 

genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute must be numbered 

by paragraph, refer with particularity to those portions of the 

record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if 

applicable, state the number of movant's fact that is disputed. 

If the party opposing summary judgment relies on any facts 

not contained in movant’s memorandum, that party must set 

forth each additional fact in a separately numbered paragraph 

in the [same manner]. 
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D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b). 

The district court, in rejecting Mr. Bartle’s submission of over 700 pages of 

exhibits, found that Mr. Bartle failed to cite to specific page numbers or facts within these 

exhibits. For instance, to support his contentions regarding the alleged Bartle/Garmin 

business relationship, Mr. Bartle appeared to cite generally to over 400 pages of exhibits 

without specifically referring to any page number or fact within the massive number of 

submitted documents. The court, in its order granting summary judgment to the insurers, 

stated: 

The Court will not sift through the record in an attempt to 

find a genuine issue of material fact or locate arguments for 

Bartle. It is his responsibility to tie the facts to his legal 

contention. Without a specific reference, the Court will not 

search the record in an effort to determine whether there 

exists dormant evidence which might require submission of 

the case to a jury. 

(R. at 1767 (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and brackets omitted).) 

Mr. Bartle, in his motion for reconsideration of the district court’s decision, stated 

that “[w]hile the exhibits themselves are fairly straightforward, when they were filed 

using the Court’s electronic filing system, they clearly lost some of the organization 

required to make them user-friendly.” (R. at 1786.) Mr. Bartle explained that the court’s 

e-filing system limits the sizes of exhibits and assigns new document and page numbers 

to electronically filed exhibits. This made the citations in his brief incorrect, because he 

had cited to the exhibits as he arranged them prior to e-filing them, and without taking 

into account how the e-filing system would change the exhibit designations. Moreover, 
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because page numbers are assigned by the e-filing system, Mr. Bartle was unable “to 

direct the court to a particular page/line assigned by the system.” (R. at 1787). 

On appeal, Mr. Bartle similarly admits that his submission of evidence through the 

district court’s e-filing system made the citations difficult to follow. At oral argument, 

Mr. Bartle’s attorney told this court that “[t]he [district] court, in refusing to look at the 

evidence, exhibited a great deal of frustration . . . . Certainly the way that it was e-filed 

[made it] very difficult for the trial judge to use.” (Oral Argument at 3:40-4:06). 

Nevertheless, Mr. Bartle asks us on appeal to find that the district court abused its 

discretion in refusing to sift through the voluminous exhibits in order to match the 

assertions in Mr. Bartle’s motions to his supporting documentation. We are mindful that 

increasingly computerized court submission and filing methods may present challenges 

for court staff, judges, and attorneys alike. However, the district court acted well within 

its discretion in setting aside the unwieldy mass of data that Mr. Bartle attempted to rely 

on without providing correct, specific references in accordance with the local rules. 

Mr. Bartle admits his failure to correctly utilize the district court’s e-filing system 

made the information very difficult to use and the documentation supporting his 

assertions difficult to track down. The district court, in keeping with its longstanding 

practice, disregarded Mr. Bartle’s factual support for his summary judgment pleadings to 

the extent his filings failed to conform to the procedural rules. Cf. Litton v. Maverick 

Paper Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 & n.1 (D. Kan. 2005) (noting the court ordinarily 

disregards those portions of an affidavit which are not shown to be based upon personal 

knowledge or otherwise do not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); further noting that the 
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court will only consider those facts of the responding party that comply with D. Kan. 

Rule 56.1(b)); Biglow v. Boeing Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039 n.2 (D. Kan. 2001) 

(stating that the court will disregard any factual assertions made in violation of D. Kan. 

Rule 56.1(b)). The burden rests with the lawyers desiring to practice before a court to 

submit evidence in conformity with the rules of that court, as here with District of Kansas 

Rule 56.1. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to 

consider only that evidence which was properly cited to in accordance with this rule. 

We turn then to the merits of the case, which we evaluate based on the evidence 

properly cited to by the parties and considered by the district court in its order granting 

summary judgment. 

Our resolution of this case turns on the definition of “Insured” in the insurance 

policy issued to Garmin. Under the policy, the “insured” is defined to be: 

GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC., GARMIN USA, INC., 

GARMIN LTD, GARMIN CORPORATION, GARMIN 

EUROPE LIMITED, PRONAV CORPORATION, PRONAV 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., GARMIN AT, INC., GARMIN 

B.V., GARMIN N.V., MOTIONBASED and any subsidiary 

corporation or subsidiary thereof now existing or hereinafter 

created. Subsidiary corporation shall mean any entity that is 

under the ownership or management control of Garmin 

International, Inc., Garmin Corporation, Garmin Europe 

Limited, Pronav Corporation and Pronav International, Inc. 

and/or subsidiary companies and/or affiliated companies 

and/or associated companies for their respective rights and 

interests. 

The policy’s amended definitions further provide: 

The word ‘Insured’ shall mean the Insureds named above and 

all subsidiaries, affiliated, associated or allied companies, 

corporation, foundations, firms, joint ventures, partnerships, 
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or any entities entered into, acquired, or formed, now 

existing, which may have existed, or hereafter be constituted 

after the effective date of this policy by any such Insured and

over which such Insured has any ownership interest, or exerts 

financial control, or has assumed or exercised management 

control, or for which the Insured has obligation to provide 

insurance. (R. at 53) (emphasis added). 

Thus, according to the plain language of the policy, Mr. Bartle and Garmin needed 

more than to be a joint venture, partnership, or other entity in order to qualify as an 

“Insured”. Mr. Bartle needed to create one of the specified business entities with Garmin 

(e.g., a joint venture or partnership) and, in addition, Garmin must have had an ownership 

interest in the entity, been obliged to provide insurance, or have exerted financial or 

managerial control over this entity. Neither the district court below—nor we, reviewing 

those facts properly before the district court—find any evidence of an ownership interest, 

insurance obligation, or any financial or managerial control by Garmin over Mr. Bartle or 

the business entity they allegedly entered into. 

There is no evidence showing Mr. Bartle was ever paid a salary by Garmin or 

received any financial backing from Garmin in his construction of the plane and use of 

the G900X. Mr. Bartle had no written contract with Garmin, and Garmin never provided 

Mr. Bartle any sort of instruction or restrictions as he worked on incorporating the 

G900X into his Lancair IV-P aircraft. Garmin did list Mr. Bartle’s Ultimate Group as the 

supplier for the bracket he developed in the G900X installation manual for the Lancair 

IV-P aircraft. However, even this, which Mr. Bartle says reveals the existence of 

financial cooperation and a business partnership, does not qualify Mr. Bartle as an 

“Insured” because Garmin still exerted no financial or management control in the 
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development or sale of this bracket simply by listing the Ultimate Group as its supplier. 

Nor is there any evidence Garmin had any ownership interest in the plane, the bracket, or 

the alleged joint venture revolving around Mr. Bartle’s use of the G900X. Similarly, Mr. 

Bartle points to no evidence Garmin had any obligation to provide insurance to Mr. 

Bartle or the alleged joint venture. 

Mr. Bartle does refer to other exhibits he submitted to the district court which he 

says further demonstrate the existence of an “Insured” relationship between Mr. Bartle 

and Garmin, but none, so far as this court can tell, he properly cited to in compliance with 

District of Kansas Rule 56.1. Mr. Bartle argues that “[t]hrowing Bartle out of court 

without having considered his evidence runs counter to the well-known policy of the 

courts to decide matters on the merits rather than on the process.” (Appellant’s Br. at 

27.) However, this case does not present a problem of failing to follow the sort of 

procedural nicety or technicality we have been willing to ignore in the past. See, e.g., 

Queenan v. Mays, 90 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1937) (refusing to dismiss an appeal on the 

basis that an insolvent bank was not named with its receiver on the petition for appeal). 

The district court concluded, and Mr. Bartle acknowledged, that the exhibits 

submitted could not be feasibly used by the district court without great difficulty. The 

district court cannot be expected to review evidence, evaluate arguments, or arrive at 

reasoned conclusions without usable citations. In this case the merits cannot be separated 

from the process, and ultimately Mr. Bartle bore the responsibility to present evidence 

that would allow a rational trier of fact to find in his favor. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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CONCLUSION 

Based on the information properly submitted to the district court, we hold that Mr. 

Bartle does not qualify as an “Insured” under the policy. We therefore AFFIRM the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment to Appellees.