[Cite as State ex rel. Crilley v. Lowellville Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-3333.]

Atty. Robert T. McDowall, Jr., 415 Wyndcliff Place, Youngstown, Ohio 44515, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants and 

Atty. Thomas C. Holmes, Holmes Legal Services, 34194 Aurora Road, Suite 295, 

Solon, Ohio 44139, for Defendant-Appellee. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MAHONING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. CHRISTOPHER CRILLEY ET AL., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

LOWELLVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 

Defendant-Appellee.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 20 MA 0128 

 

Civil Appeal from the 

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 2020 CV 1363 

BEFORE: 

David A. D’Apolito, Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Moot in part. Reversed and Remanded in part. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0128

Dated: September 17, 2021 

 

D’Apolito, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiffs-Appellants Christopher and Gina Crilley appeal the judgment entry 

of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas following a bench trial. The trial court 

found that Defendant-Appellee Lowellville Board of Education violated the Open Meetings 

Act, R.C. 121.22 (“OMA”), by failing to provide the requisite statutory notice of a special 

meeting of the Board on August 10, 2020. In the judgment entry, the trial court issued an 

injunction ordering the Board to “formulate, adopt, and abide by a rule consistent with 

R.C. 121.22(F) whereby any person may determine the time and place of all regularly 

scheduled meetings,” and awarded a civil forfeiture in the amount of $500.00, plus costs 

to Appellants. 

{¶2} Despite the trial court’s conclusion that an OMA violation occurred, the trial 

court denied Appellants’ request for statutory attorney’s fees and declaratory relief. 

Specifically, the trial court declined to invalidate and declare null and void a resolution by 

the Board adopting an amended school reopening plan at the special meeting on August 

10, 2020. The trial court reasoned that a prior resolution of the Board, which adopted the 

Superintendent’s original reopening plan on July 27, 2020, vested complete discretion in 

the Superintendent to alter or amend the original reopening plan at any time prior to or 

during the 2020-2021 school year. 

{¶3} Appellants advance two assignments of error. First, Appellants contend 

that the trial court erred in failing to void the Board’s adoption of the amended reopening 

plan at the August 10, 2020 meeting. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in 

concluding that the original reopening plan vested complete discretion in the 

Superintendent to alter or amend the original plan. Assuming arguendo that the 

Superintendent was vested with such authority, Appellants argue, in the alternative, that 

his decision to alter or amend the original plan outside the boundaries of a properlynoticed special meeting of the Board constituted a violation of the OMA, although the 

foregoing argument was not advanced in the complaint. Appellants further argue that the 

July 27, 2020 meeting, in which the Board vested complete discretion in the 
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Superintendent, was conducted in violation of the OMA, despite the fact that no OMA 

challenge to the July 27, 2020 special meeting was alleged in the complaint. In their 

second assignment of error, Appellants allege that the trial court erred when it failed to 

articulate any rationale to support the decision to deny attorney’s fees to Appellants. 

{¶4} For the following reasons, we find that the appeal of the trial court’s refusal 

to void the Board’s adoption of the amended school reopening plan for the 2020-2021 

school year at the August 10, 2020 special meeting is moot. Further, we reverse the trial 

court’s denial of Appellant’s request for attorney’s fees, and remand this matter in order 

for the trial court to provide an analysis applying the two-part statutory test in R.C. 

121.22(I)(2)(a). 

FACTS 

{¶5} In March of 2020, Governor Michael DeWine closed public schools in Ohio 

in favor of remote learning due to the COVID-19 outbreak. On June 19, 2020, H.B. 164 

was enacted and required school districts in Ohio to provide certain plan information to 

the Department of Education (“ODE”) should the school district plan to utilize remote 

learning during any part of the 2020-2021 school year. 

{¶6} The ODE provided guidance to local school boards regarding the 

requirements in H.B. 164 in a publication captioned “Planning for Blended or Remote 

Learning,” which was admitted into evidence at the bench trial. The final inquiry under 

the caption, “Frequently Asked Questions,” reads, in its entirety: 

ARE SCHOOLS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD 

APPROVAL FOR REOPENING PLANS OR REVISIONS TO REOPENING 

PLANS? 

Obtaining local school board approval for reopening plans is not a statutory 

requirement, although doing so is advisable and would be considered by 

the [ODE] to be the best practice. 

{¶7} On July 27, 2020, the Board held a special meeting in order to review, 

approve, and adopt a comprehensive school reopening plan. Approximately 100 people 
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were in attendance. The presentation of the proposed plan was made almost exclusively 

by the Superintendent and he conducted an interactive question-and-answer session with 

both the Board and the public. 

{¶8} The plan, which was adopted by the Board at the July 27, 2020 special 

meeting, included an option for either in-person attendance or remote learning for the 

entirety of the rapidly-approaching school year. A deadline of August 10, 2020 was set 

for parents to select either the in-school or online modality for their child or children. 

{¶9} However, the reopening plan adopted at the July 27, 2020 special meeting 

reads, in pertinent part: 

This is a working document. Any and all future changes will be made in 

accordance to changing health recommendations, state guidelines, or 

district needs as determined by Superintendent of Schools. Also, these 

guidelines were developed today and knowingly, at any given date and/or 

time, let alone four weeks out, an increased outbreak and/or spike in 

numbers and/or local infection(s) can change the opening of the 2020-2021 

school year. PLEASE, read the plan regularly for changes and feel free to 

call the Superintendent * * * if you have any questions. 

(Emphasis added). 

{¶10} The reopening plan was submitted on an ODE Form, dated July 22, 2020, 

and was admitted into evidence. The form language reads, in pertinent part: 

NOTE: As the school year proceeds and circumstances evolve, school 

districts are able to amend their respective remote learning plans to address 

changing needs. District superintendents are able to make amendments to 

the remote learning plan on behalf of school districts without any additional 

local school board approval. Amended plans, however, must be 

resubmitted to ODE by email * * * 

{¶11} The Superintendent testified that he decided to amend the reopening plan 

due to safety concerns and financial issues. After a conversation with the teachers’ union 
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president, the Superintendent learned that many teachers were at risk and unable to 

participate in the in-class modality. Further, as of August 10, 2020, twenty to twenty five 

percent of the students had reported that they suffered from underlying health conditions. 

{¶12} The Superintendent further testified that he determined the cost to hire 

substitute teachers would be overwhelming, in excess of $1,000,000.00, a problem 

compounded by the shortage of substitute teachers in Mahoning County, as well as 

statewide, for many years. The Superintendent also cited cleaning costs ($1.50 per 

square foot for a 100,000 square foot building), in the event of an outbreak. 

{¶13} On August 10, 2020, the Board held a special meeting, which the trial court 

concluded was conducted in violation of the statutory notice provisions of the OMA. R.C. 

121.22(A) reads that the OMA is to be liberally construed to require public officials to take 

official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official business only in open meetings 

unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by law. R.C. 121.22(F) reads, in 

pertinent part, “Every public body, by rule, shall establish a reasonable method whereby 

any person may determine the time and place of all regularly scheduled meetings and the 

time, place, and purpose of all special meetings.” 

{¶14} The Board rule concerning public notice of special meetings reads, in 

relevant part, “Notice of the time, place and purpose must also be given at least 24 hours 

in advance of the meeting to all news media and individuals who have requested such 

notice.” Testimony at the trial established that notice was published in the local 

newspaper and the agenda for special meetings was posted on the school district’s 

website. Further, both the Superintendent and the Treasurer testified that the Board rule 

was adopted without revision from a model rule drafted by the Ohio School Board 

Association. 

{¶15} The notice for the August 10, 2020 special meeting provided to the Tribune 

Chronicle reads, in its entirety, “The Lowellville Board of Education will hold a Special 

Board Meeting, Monday, August 10, 2020 at 5:30 p.m. in the Cafetorium.” Through no 

fault of the Board, the Tribune failed to publish the notice. 

{¶16} Further, although testimony established that the agenda for special 

meetings is typically posted on the school district’s website, the agenda for the August 

10th special meeting included no mention of the amendment to the original reopening 
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plan. As a consequence, the trial court concluded that the Board’s rule and the notice 

regarding the August 10, 2020 special meeting violated the OMA.

{¶17} The meeting began at 5:32 p.m. at which time the Board immediately moved 

into an executive session, which lasted until 8:06 p.m. The stated purpose of the meeting 

was the potential employment of a cafeteria worker. When the Board returned from the 

roughly two-and-a-half-hour executive session, four resolutions were enacted in the three 

minutes remaining in the meeting, including a unanimous resolution to approve remote 

learning as the exclusive modality for the first nine weeks of the 2020-2021 school year, 

and to delay the start of online classes to August 31, 2020. 

{¶18} The Superintendent issued a press release, immediately following 

adjournment of the August 10, 2020 meeting to announce the amendment of the original 

reopening plan, which reads, in relevant part: 

The Lowellville Board of Education announces that the 2020-2021 school 

year will begin “remotely” the first nine weeks on August 31, 2020 (Delayed 

one week from August 24th). As such we believe that the best education is 

when the teachers and students are face-to-face, we want to get there as 

safely and quickly as we can. Unfortunately, with the number of students 

and staff members that are at-risk and not planning to return to the school 

on August 24th, we were compelled to hedge on the side of caution and 

safety for everyone and switch to remote learning which will allow us to 

return to face-to-face instruction as soon as it is feasible (emphasis added). 

{¶19} The trial court opined: 

The “rule” which the Board refers to regarding the manner in which it 

provides notice of special meeting actually is silent as to any method or 

manner of notifying the general public of the time, place, and purpose of 

special meetings. While evidence has been adduced regarding the 

practices which the Board ordinarily adopts to provide notice to the public, 

the same is subject to uncertainty and inconsistent application which the 

legislature intended to avoid in enacting R.C. 121.22. Furthermore, in failing 
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to notify the print media of the purpose of the special meetings, the Board 

also acts in derogation of the statute. The Magistrate finds that [Appellants] 

have established their right to injunctive relief by clear and convincing 

evidence. 

In light of the foregoing finding, the special meeting conducted August 10, 

2020 was held in violation of the [OMA]. Therefore, under ordinary 

circumstances the Magistrate would declare the action of the Board in 

“approving” the decision of Superintendent Thomas to adopt remote 

learning for the first nine weeks of the school year to be invalid pursuant to 

R.C. 121.22(H). However, the analysis does not end there. First, the 

“reopening Plan” approved unanimously by the Board on July 27, 2020 

vested the Superintendent with the sole, unfettered discretion to adopt a 

remote learning plan without any Board approval, whatsoever. Therefore, 

any “action” taken by the Board regarding the Superintendent’s decision 

was, and remains a nullity without any legal significance at all. Equity will 

not permit a court to do a vain and useless thing. The decision of the 

Superintendent to adopt a remote learning plan for the first nine weeks of 

the school year is a legitimate exercise of this power and will not be 

disturbed by the Magistrate. 

(10/29/20 J.E., p. 4.) 

{¶20} The trial court declined to award attorney’s fees to either party, and, 

pursuant to R.C. 121.22(I)(2), awarded statutory damages in the form of civil forfeiture in 

the amount of $500.00. This timely appeal followed. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INVALIDATE THE 

SCHOOL’S REOPENING PLAN BECAUSE IT WAS ENACTED AND 

IMPLEMENTED IN DEROGATION OF THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT 

(OMA). 
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Case No. 20 MA 0128

{¶21} The trial court found that Appellant committed a violation of OMA, due to its 

failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements prior to the August 10, 2020 

special meeting. However, the trial court declined to invalidate the Board’s action at the 

August 10, 2020 special meeting, concluding that the adoption by the Board of the 

amended plan was merely ceremonial, because the Superintendent could amend or alter 

the plan at any time pursuant to the discretion granted to him in the original school 

reopening plan. Appellants ask us to review the trial court’s decision regarding the 

requested invalidation of the Board’s adoption of the amended school reopening plan, 

and corresponding arguments challenging the Superintendent’s unfettered discretion, 

despite the fact that any decision rendered here would have no practical effect. 

{¶22} The mootness doctrine provides, “ ‘American courts will not decide * * * 

cases in which there is no longer any actual controversy.’ ” In re A.G., 139 Ohio St.3d 

572, 2014-Ohio-2597, 13 N.E.3d 1146, ¶ 37, citing Black's Law Dictionary 1100 (9th 

Ed.2009). “ ‘A moot case is one which seeks to get a judgment on a pretended 

controversy, when in reality there is none, or a decision in advance about a right before it 

has been actually asserted and contested, or a judgment upon some matter which, when 

rendered, for any reason cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then-existing 

controversy.’ ” Huntington Natl. Bank v. CPW Properties, Ltd., 7th Dist. Carroll No. 17 CA 

0917, 2018-Ohio-1219, ¶ 5, appeal not allowed sub nom. Huntington Natl. Bank v. CPW 

Properties, Ltd., 153 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2018-Ohio-3026, 103 N.E.3d 831 (2018), quoting 

Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 393, 83 N.E.2d 82, 91 (7th Dist.1948). 

{¶23} “However, courts are vested with the jurisdiction to address moot issues 

when such issues are capable of repetition yet evade review.” Citizens Word v. Canfield 

Twp., 152 Ohio App.3d 252, 2003-Ohio-1604, 787 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 8 (7th Dist.), citing State 

ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Barnes, 38 Ohio St.3d 165, 527 N.E.2d 807 (1988), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. “Courts are also vested with jurisdiction to address moot 

issues when those issues concern an important public right or a matter of great public or 

general interest.” Id., citing In re Appeal of Huffer, 47 Ohio St.3d 12, 14, 546 N.E.2d 1308 

(1989). 

{¶24} Any possible remedy in this case was foreclosed at the conclusion of the 

ninth week of the school year. Moreover, the power granted to the Superintendent to 
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amend the original reopening plan, as well as the requirements of the emergency 

legislation enacted to govern the reopening of the schools in Ohio for the 2020-2021 

school year, terminated at the conclusion of the school year and have no continuing legal 

effect. Due to the unique set of facts in this case, we find that Appellants seek an advisory 

opinion on a remedy with no practical legal effect, and their first assignment of error is 

moot. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO MAKE AN AWARD 

OF ATTORNEY FEES AFTER PLAINTIFFS ESTABLISHED A CLEAR 

OPEN MEETING ACT VIOLATION. 

{¶25} R.C. 121.22(I) reads, in relevant part: 

(1) Any person may bring an action to enforce this section. An action under 

division (I)(1) of this section shall be brought within two years after the date 

of the alleged violation or threatened violation. Upon proof of a violation or 

threatened violation of this section in an action brought by any person, the 

court of common pleas shall issue an injunction to compel the members of 

the public body to comply with its provisions. 

(2)(a) If the court of common pleas issues an injunction pursuant to division 

(I)(1) of this section, the court shall order the public body that it enjoins to 

pay a civil forfeiture of five hundred dollars to the party that sought the 

injunction and shall award to that party all court costs and, subject to 

reduction as described in division (I)(2) of this section, reasonable attorney’s 

fees. The court, in its discretion, may reduce an award of attorney’s fees to 

the party that sought the injunction or not award attorney’s fees to that party 

if the court determines both of the following: 

(i) That, based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as 

it existed at the time of violation or threatened violation that was the basis 
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of the injunction, a well-informed public body reasonably would believe that 

the public body was not violating or threatening to violate this section; 

(ii) That a well-informed public body reasonably would believe that the 

conduct or threatened conduct that was the basis of the injunction would 

serve the public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as 

permitting that conduct or threatened conduct. 

Attorney’s fees are mandatory unless the trial court concludes that neither of the prongs 

in R.C. 121.22(I)(2)(a) applies. 

{¶26} We review a decision regarding attorney’s fees in an OMA case for an 

abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Jones v. Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. Of Edn., 2nd Dist. 

No. 28637, 2020-Ohio-4931, 160 N.E.3d 777, ¶ 50, cause dismissed sub nom. State ex 

rel. Jones v. Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 163 Ohio St.3d 1422, 2021-Ohio-1580, 

167 N.E.3d 991, ¶ 50, and appeal not allowed sub nom. State ex rel. Jones v. Dayton 

Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 163 Ohio St.3d 1422, 2021-Ohio-1580, 167 N.E.3d 991, ¶ 50; 

see also Specht v. Finnegan, 149 Ohio App.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-4660, 776 N.E.2d 564, 

¶ 42 (6th Dist.); Mathews v. E. Local School Dist., 4th Dist. Pike No. 00CA647, 2001-Ohio2372. An abuse of discretion means that the court's attitude is “unreasonable, arbitrary 

or unconscionable.” Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 

1248 (1985). “[M]ost instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply 

unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” Id. Decisions 

are unreasonable where no sound reasoning process would support them.” Id.

{¶27} The magistrate’s decision merely parrots the statutory language regarding 

attorney’s fees and costs, but offers no explanation for the refusal to award attorney’s 

fees and costs in this case. Insofar as the trial court parrots the magistrate’s decision into 

the judgment entry, the judgment entry likewise contains no rationale for the trial court’s 

decision. As a consequence, we find that Appellant’s second assignment of error has 

merit as the trial court acted unreasonably in summarily denying attorney’s fees. 

Accordingly, this matter is remanded with instructions to the trial court to apply the twopart statutory test in R.C. 121.22(I)(2)(a). 
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Case No. 20 MA 0128

CONCLUSION 

{¶28} For the foregoing reasons, we find that the above-captioned appeal is moot, 

to the extent that it is predicated upon the trial court’s refusal to void the Board’s adoption 

of the amended school reopening plan for the 2020-2021 school year. We reverse the 

trial court’s decision to deny attorney’s fees and remand the matter in order for the trial 

court to apply the two-part statutory test in R.C. 121.22(I)(2)(a). 

Donofrio, P.J., concurs. 

Waite, J., concurs. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0128

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, we find that the appeal 

of the trial court’s refusal to void the Board’s adoption of the amended school reopening 

plan for the 2020-2021 school year is moot. We reverse the trial court’s denial of 

Appellant’s request for attorney’s fees, and remand this matter to the Court of Common 

Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, for further proceedings according to law and 

consistent with this Court’s Opinion. Costs to be taxed against the Appellee. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.