alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
AMENDMENT TO LICENSING AGREEMENT

10/1/98

This will confirm our  agreement  with respect to the  amendment to that certain
License  Agreement  dated as of June 30, 1996 by and between Life  International
Products,  Inc. and IDM Environmental  Corp. We have agreed that paragraph 6.1.1
shall be amended to read as follows:

     6.1.1 For the period from the date hereof  through 12 months after the date
     on which marketable environmental equipment is manufactured, Licensor shall
     receive  net profits of no less than  $400,000,  which shall be the Minimum
     Revenues for such period.

Except  as  provided  herein,  all  other  terms and  provision  of the  License
Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.  Any inconsistency  between any
of the amendments  contained herein and the terms of the License Agreement shall
be resolved in favor of this letter.

Sincerely,

Life International Products, Inc.


By /s/ Ronald Rainson
  ----------------------------
  Ronald Rainson, President

                                           Agreed to and accepted by:
                                           IDM Environmental Corp.


                                          By /s/ Frank Falco
                                             -------------------------------
                                             Frank Falco, Chairman of the Board
# C_2009019EN.01003301.xml

| 24.1.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.1.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/33

---

Action brought on 14 November 2008 — Sun World International v OHIM — Kölla Hamburg Overseas Import (SUPERIOR SEEDLESS)

(Case T-493/08)

(2009/C 19/62)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Sun World International LLC (Bakersfield, United States) (represented by: M. Holah, Solicitor)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Kölla Hamburg Overseas Import GmbH & Co. KG (Hamburg, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 3 September 2008 in case R 1378/2007-1; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 3 September 2008 in case R 1378/2007-1; and

| — | Order OHIM to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order OHIM to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Registered Community trade mark subject of the application for a declaration of invalidity: The word mark ‘SUPERIOR SEEDLESS’ for goods in class 31 — Community trade mark registration No 610 980

Registered Community trade mark subject of the application for a declaration of invalidity:

Proprietor of the Community trade mark: The applicant

Proprietor of the Community trade mark:

Party requesting the declaration of invalidity of the Community trade mark: The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Party requesting the declaration of invalidity of the Community trade mark:

Decision of the Cancellation Division: Partial invalidity of the Community trade mark concerned

Decision of the Cancellation Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissal of the appeal

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Articles 7(3) and 51(2) of Council Regulation No 40/94 as the Board of Appeal: (i) wrongly identified the relevant public; (ii) wrongly refused to allow a withdrawal of the Community trade mark registration in respect of some of the goods in the specification; (iii) made an unlawful assumption based on the lack of a United Kingdom or Irish registration; and (iv) incorrectly assessed the evidence filed.

Pleas in law:

---
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 124 (Friday, September 14, 2012)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1538-E1539]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

 INTRODUCTION OF THE NATIONAL WOMEN'S HISTORY MUSEUM COMMISSION ACT OF 
                                  2012

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 14, 2012

  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce the National 
Women's History Museum Commission Act of 2012. I am proud to be joined 
in this effort by my friend and colleague Delegate Eleanor Holmes 
Norton, as well as by Senator Susan Collins.
  This bipartisan bill, which has also been introduced by Senator 
Collins, creates a new commission to examine the feasibility and cost 
of building a National Women's History Museum, NWHM, on or near the 
National Mall.
  This commission will be a bipartisan, eight member body comprised of 
two members appointed by the Senate Majority Leader, two members 
appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, two members 
appointed by the Minority Speaker of the Senate, and two members will 
be appointed by the House of Representatives Minority Leader. All 
appointees will need to demonstrate a commitment to the research and 
study of women's history.

[[Page E1539]]

  Most importantly, no federal dollars will be spent on this important, 
new museum. The work of the NWHM Commission would be paid for entirely 
with private funds.
  Women's history has taken a backseat to the hundreds of years of 
written and available narrative focusing on men. Women are largely 
missing from textbooks, memorials, and museum exhibits. Of the 210 
statues in the United States Capitol, only 9 are of female leaders. 
Across the country, less than 5 percent of the 2,400 national historic 
landmarks chronicle women's achievements.
  The museums and memorials in our nation's capital reveal what we as 
Americans value. Today, we have museums dedicated to many important 
people and issues of interest, including flight, postage stamps, and 
law enforcement. But we still do not have a museum dedicated to woman's 
history and their contribution to building our great country.
  A vital part of achieving equal rights for women is acknowledging and 
commemorating the deep and lasting impacts women have made in history. 
This bill would provide us with a blueprint of steps to take in order 
to finally honor 53% of our population. Certainly, women should be 
honored for their many contributions that are the very fabric of our 
country.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in filling this void and honoring our 
Nation's foremothers by cosponsoring the National Women's History 
Museum Commission Act.

                          ____________________
```
# C_2008223EN.01005201.xml

| 30.8.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 223/52 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.8.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 223/52

---

Appeal brought on 23 June 2008 by Frantisek Doktor against the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal delivered on 16 April 2008 in Case F-73/07, Doktor v Council

Doktor

Council

(Case T-248/08 P)

(2008/C 223/91)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Frantisek Doktor (Bratislava, Slovakia) (represented by S. Rodrigues and C. Bernard-Glanz, lawyers)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Other party to the proceedings:

Form of order sought by the appellant

| — | Annul the judgment delivered by the European Union Civil Service Tribunal on 16 April 2008 in Case F-73/07; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the judgment delivered by the European Union Civil Service Tribunal on 16 April 2008 in Case F-73/07;

| — | Grant the pleas seeking annulment and compensation submitted by the applicant at first instance; |
| --- | --- |

—

Grant the pleas seeking annulment and compensation submitted by the applicant at first instance;

| — | Order the defendant at first instance to pay all the costs of the action for annulment and of the appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant at first instance to pay all the costs of the action for annulment and of the appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By the present appeal, the appellant seeks annulment of the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal (CST) of 16 April 2008, delivered in Case F-73/07 Doktor v Council, dismissing the action by which the applicant had sought, on the one hand, annulment of the decision of the Council to dismiss the applicant at the end of his probationary period and, on the other, damages in compensation for the professional, financial and non-pecuniary losses allegedly suffered.

Doktor

Council

In support of his appeal, the appellant submits that the CST i) distorted the clear sense of certain pieces of evidence, in particular by basing a number of its conclusions on an incorrect material assessment of the elements of the documents submitted to it; ii) infringed the applicant's rights of the defence by not taking into consideration or not answering a number of elements or arguments put before it; and iii) committed two errors in law with respect to its interpretation of Community law relating to the applicant's right to complete his probationary period under normal conditions and to the administration's ability to supplement the reasoning of a complaint during the written procedure before the Community Courts.

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-7538

MAURICE DONIKIN-EL, a/k/a Maurice Donikin,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GENE M. JOHNSON,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District

Judge. (CA-05-493-RBS)

Submitted: February 16, 2006 Decided: February 22, 2006

Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Maurice Donikin-El, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Maurice Donikin-El, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal the

district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his petition

filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) as an unauthorized second or

successive petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit

justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000); Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683 (4th Cir.

2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable and that

any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also

debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336

(2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee,

252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed

the record and conclude that Donikin-El has not made the requisite

showing. Accordingly, we deny his motion for appointment of

counsel, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION * In the

FOR REINSTATEMENT OF BENJAMIN COYLE SUTLEY * Court of Appeals TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND * of Maryland * Misc. Docket AG No. 74 September Term, 2017 ORDER Upon consideration of the Petition for Reinstatement of Benjamin Coyle Sutley and the response filed thereto by Bar Counsel, in the above captioned case, it is this 20th day of June, 2018, ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the petition be, and it is hereby, GRANTED, and the petitioner, Benjamin Coyle Sutley, be, and is hereby, reinstated to the practice of law in this State; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall replace the name of Benjamin Coyle Sutley upon the register of attorneys entitled to practice law in this State and certify that fact to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the Clerks of all judicial tribunals in this state.

/s/ Mary Ellen Barbera Chief Judge
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

ROSEMARY FIERROS,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-10290

D.C. No. 1:11-cr-00274-LJO

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 18, 2014** 

Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Rosemary Fierros appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges

the 48-month sentence imposed following her jury-trial conviction for conspiracy

to unlawfully produce and transfer identification documents, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 371; 15 counts of unlawful production of an identification document and

FILED

NOV 24 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1028(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii),

(b)(1)(B); and 15 counts of unlawful transfer of an identification document and

aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1028(a)(2), (b)(1)(A)(ii),

(b)(1)(B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Fierros contends that the district court erred by failing to explain the extent

of its upward variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The court

stated that it was adopting the probation officer’s sentencing recommendation of

48 months in light of the seriousness of the crime and the need to deter and to

provide just punishment for the offense. This explanation was sufficient. See

United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Fierros also contends that the district court imposed a substantively

unreasonable sentence because she received a sentence 30 months longer than her

co-defendant, creating an unwarranted sentencing disparity. The district court did

not abuse its discretion in imposing Fierros’s sentence. See Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The above-Guidelines sentence is substantively

reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of

the circumstances, including Fierros’s leadership role in the conspiracy. See id.;

United States v. Espinoza-Baza, 647 F.3d 1182, 1195 (9th Cir. 2011).

AFFIRMED.

2 13-10290
### IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 18

- 00190

- CV

IN RE SETERUS, INC.

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus, filed on June 7, 2018, is denied.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Petition denied

Opinion delivered and filed June 13 , 2018

[OT06]
#### Sheila D. Dykstra et al., Respondents, v Windridge Condominium One, Appellant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

Harvey, J.

Appeal (transferred to this court by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department) from an order of the Supreme Court (Green, J.), entered May 1, 1990 in Orange County, which, *inter alia,*granted summary judgment to plaintiffs.

On February 7, 1986 at approximately 6:15 A.M., plaintiff Sheila D. Dykstra (hereinafter plaintiff) slipped and fell on an ice-covered sidewalk on defendant’s property in the Town of Monroe, Orange County. Plaintiff sustained personal injuries as a result of this fall and, thereafter, she and her husband commenced this action against defendant. Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment. In their papers opposing defendant’s motion, plaintiffs also requested summary judgment relief. Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion and granted summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor on the issue of liability. This appeal by defendant followed.

Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that Supreme Court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs because triable questions of fact allegedly exist on the issue of liability that must be resolved at trial. We agree. Summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy which should not be granted where there is any possible doubt as to the existence *483of a triable or arguable issue *(see, Passonno v Hall,*125 AD2d 767). In considering such a motion it is our duty to view all competent evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion so as not to deprive that party of his or her day in court *(supra; see, Russell v Hepburn Hosp.,*154 AD2d 796, 797).

To be entitled to summary judgment in a slip and fall case such as this, it was incumbent upon plaintiffs in the first instance to establish as a matter of law that defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that an icy condition existed on the walkway and did not take steps to alleviate it within a reasonable period of time *(see, Marcellus v Littauer Hosp. Assn.,*145 AD2d 680, 681; *see also, Russell v Hepburn Hosp.,*173 AD2d 985). Significantly, while the affidavits and evidence submitted on plaintiffs’ behalf indicate that the area where plaintiff fell was covered with ice when she fell and tenants and visitors to the building had witnessed this condition, the proof submitted does not decisively establish for summary judgment purposes that defendant’s agents had actual or constructive notice of this condition. Plaintiffs’ proof is simply too vague to mandate such a finding as a matter of law. In addition, there are still unresolved questions pertaining to the weather conditions in the area at the time of the accident. Accordingly, summary judgment should not have been awarded to plaintiffs.

Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Weiss and Mikoll, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, with costs to defendant, by reversing so much thereof as awarded summary judgment to plaintiffs, and, as so modified, affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2


Certification of Chief Financial Officer


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted Pursuant to


Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2012 (the “Report”) of MCG Capital Corporation (the “Registrant”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Keith Kennedy, the Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 that:


|    |                                                                                                                                  
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

|    |                                                                                                                                                        
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.




/s/    KEITH KENNEDYName:Keith KennedyTitle:Chief Financial OfficerDateOctober 29, 2012
# C_2009282EN.01001502.xml

| 21.11.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 282/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.11.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 282/15

---

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 6 October 2009 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-6/09) (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 2005/60/EC - Money laundering and terrorist financing - Failure to transpose within the prescribed period)

2009/C 282/28

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: V. Peere and P. Dejmek, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium (represented by: D. Haven, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations — Failure to have adopted or communicated, within the prescribed time-limit, all the measures necessary to comply with Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (OJ 2005 L 309, p. 15)

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive; |
| --- | --- |

1.

declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

| 2. | orders the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

orders the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 69, 21.03.2009.

1

---
Exhibit No.  10.01

[logo]

                                                                  March 21, 2005

Dear Barbara,

The following is an understanding that we have reached about your part-time
employment with Alliance Distributors Holding Inc. (Alliance). Part-time shall
be defined as a minimum of 25 hours per week. It can be changed only by a
written letter that both of us sign. Your position will be Chief Financial
Officer.

Your employment is at will. It may be terminated by either you or Alliance on 30
days' notice for any reason or no reason.

Based on our agreement, the starting salary is at the rate of $125,000 per year.
In addition you will have the opportunity to participate in our Medical Plan.
Each employee is responsible for 50% of the monthly premium. Blue Cross is our
current provider. Alliance has recently instituted a 401K Retirement Plan. The
terms of participation have not been finalized. Once we have done that you maybe
be eligible to participate.

Also, based on the company's current Option Plan, we will by separate grant
letter extend to you 100,000 options to purchase stock. The options will vest
over a 3 year period equally per quarter of each year while you are employed by
the company. The option and its terms will be subject to the grant letter.

While you are employed by Alliance and at all times afterwards, you will
maintain the confidentiality of the company's confidential information and trade
secrets. The Company may enforce the provisions of this section by decrees of
specific performance and by such other remedies as may be available.

Barbara we are very excited about the opportunity to work together. Please feel
free to call me with any questions you may have.


------------------                                       ----------------

Jay Gelman, dated April 7, 2005                          Barbara A. Ras
CEO
Alliance Distributors Holding Inc.