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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

WILLIAM E. TRAVIS, : No. 2101 EDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, November 9, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0002337-2009

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 24, 2018

William E. Travis appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on November 9, 2016, 

following revocation of his probation. We vacate the judgment of sentence

and remand for re-sentencing consistent with this memorandum.

The trial court set forth the following:

On January 28th, 2010, [appellant] pled guilty to 

Forgery[1] before the Honorable Roxanne Covington, 

and was sentenced to five (5) years of probation. 

On November 11th, 2011, following [appellant’s] first 

Violation of Probation (“VOP”), Judge Covington 

revoked [appellant’s] probation and imposed a new 

sentence of five (5) years of probation. Following 

the imposition of this sentence, [appellant’s] 

probation was transferred to this Court. On 

September 24th, 2014, following a second VOP 

hearing, this Court revoked [appellant’s] probation 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4101(a)(1).
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and imposed a new sentence of five (5) years of 

probation. After [appellant] violated his probation 

for a third time, this Court sentenced [appellant] on 

November 9th, 2016 to three to six (3-6) years[’]

confinement following by one (1) year probation. 

[Appellant] filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

VOP sentence on November 21st, 2016, followed by a 

timely [PCRA2] petition on March 27th, 2017. This 

Court granted [appellant’s] PCRA petition and 

reinstated his appellate rights on June 26th, 2017. 

[Appellant], through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal 

to the Superior Court on June 30th, 2017. This Court 

issued a [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) Order on July 11th, 

2017, and [appellant] filed a [Rule 1925(b)] 

Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal on 

July 17th, 2017.

Trial court opinion, 7/18/17 at unnumbered pp. 1-2.

Thereafter, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding 

[a]ppellant in technical violation when the evidence 

presented at the [VOP] hearing did not establish a 

violation occurred and if such violation occurred the 

trial court did abuse its discretion by sentencing 

[a]ppellant to an excessive and unreasonable three 

to six year sentence when the record is lacking in 

justification for the sentence?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

In reviewing a revocation of probation, we employ the following 

standard of review:

Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court 

and that court’s decision will not be disturbed on 

appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse 

 

2 Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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of discretion. When assessing whether to revoke 

probation, the trial court must balance the interests 

of society in preventing future criminal conduct by 

the defendant against the possibility of rehabilitating 

the defendant outside of prison. In order to uphold a 

revocation of probation, the Commonwealth must 

show by a preponderance of the evidence that a 

defendant violated his probation.

Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1041 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Here, the record reflects that Theresa Slaughter,3the mother of two of 

appellant’s children (ages six and two), obtained a protection from abuse 

(“PFA”) order against appellant on August 15, 2016, in connection with an 

incident that occurred on August 10, 2016. (Notes of testimony, 11/9/16 at 

5, 9, 15; Gagnon II summary, 8/24/16 at 2.) The PFA order was the 

impetus for the VOP hearing. At the hearing, Ms. Slaughter testified as to 

the facts that gave rise to the entry of the PFA order. Ms. Slaughter testified 

that appellant had brought his new girlfriend to her home and “[w]e had an 

altercation in my home with his -- another girl.” (Notes of testimony, 

11/9/16 at 6.) During Ms. Slaughter’s direct examination, she indicated that 

appellant was somehow involved in the altercation, that she did not know 

the extent of appellant’s involvement in the altercation, but that she knew 

 

3 The VOP hearing transcript identifies the complainant as 

“Theresa Slaughter.” The August 24, 2016 Gagnon II summary, however, 

identifies the complainant as “Dareisha Slaughter.”
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that she and appellant’s new paramour “had a fight.” (Id. at 6-7.) 

Following testimony, the trial court found appellant in technical violation of 

his probation, revoked appellant’s probation, and sentenced appellant to 

three to six years of imprisonment, followed by one year of probation. (Id.

at 19.)

Appellant contends that the trial court found a probation violation 

“based on scant information” and that “there is no information indicating 

[a]ppellant ever assaulted [Ms. Slaughter] or much less an arrest being 

made.” (Appellant’s brief at 16.) Appellant further contends that “[i]t is 

unclear whether the court found a violation of the PFA [order] or an assault 

had occurred.” (Id.) In its brief, the Commonwealth “agrees with

[appellant] that the evidence was insufficient to support his revocation of 

probation, because it did not establish that he assaulted Ms. Slaughter.” 

(Commonwealth’s brief at 5.)

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court based its 

revocation of appellant’s probation on insufficient evidence of a technical 

violation of his probation because the evidence presented merely 

demonstrated that appellant’s new girlfriend and his former paramour 

engaged in a physical altercation with each other. Although the record 

reveals that appellant was present during this physical altercation between 

the two women, it does not demonstrate that appellant participated or that 

he physically assaulted Ms. Slaughter.
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Therefore, because the Commonwealth failed to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that appellant was in technical violation of his 

probation, we are constrained to find that the trial court erred in revoking 

appellant’s probation.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for re-sentencing 

consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/18