United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued October 20, 2008

Decided November 17, 2008

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

  MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

         ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐1786

DELORES WESTON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

WAL‐MART STORES,

INCORPORATED,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern  District of

Illinois.

No. 3:07‐cv‐00088‐WDS‐DGW

William D. Stiehl,

    Judge.

O R D E R

Delores Weston slipped and fell on the floor of a retail store owned and operated by Wal‐

Mart Stores,Inc.  She sued.  The district court granted summary judgmentin favor ofWal‐Mart;

Weston appealed.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐1786 Page 2

BACKGROUND

On December 9, 2005, Weston visited a Wal‐Mart store in Belleville, Illinois.  The day’s

temperate weather had melted off much of an earlier snowfall.  The resulting slush and water

was tracked into the store by shoppers, prompting Wal‐Mart employees to place orange

triangle warning cones around the store’s entranceway.  After Weston entered the store, she

noticed an accumulation of water just beyond the entrance mats.  She attempted to avoid the

water by taking a few steps backwards, but in doing so, slipped and fell.  Weston brought a

diversity suit in federal court.  The district court granted Wal‐Mart’s motion for summary

judgment on March 10, 2008, finding that Wal‐Mart was shielded from liability by Illinois’

natural accumulation rule.  This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Weston argues that she presented evidence from which a trier of fact could

determine that Wal‐Mart negligently discharged a voluntarily assumed duty.  We review a

district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d

903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008).

Illinois law governs the extent of Wal‐Mart’s liability in this diversity action.  In Illinois, the

natural accumulation rule shields landowners from liability forinjuries resulting from natural

accumulations of substances such as ice, snow or water.  Lohan v. Walgreens Co., 499 N.E.2d 679,

681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).  Moreover, a store owner owes no duty to continuously remove the

tracks left by customers who have walked through such natural accumulations.  Id.  Although

there exists no general duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow, a voluntary

undertaking may subject a defendant to liability if it is performed negligently.    Tzakis v.

Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 987, 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).   However, the duty of care

imposed on the defendant is limited to the extent of its undertaking.  Roberson v. J.C. Penney Co.,

623 N.E.2d 364, 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).

We first note that, while Weston contended in her brief that the waterin the Wal‐Mart store

on which she slipped and fell constituted an unnatural accumulation, she conceded at oral

argument that it was in fact a natural accumulation.    Such a concession was wise, as the

evidence in the record establishes that the accumulation of water in the entranceway resulted

solely from the “slushy” conditions outside the store.  Because the natural accumulation rule

applies, Wal‐Mart had no duty to remove the water in the store.  See Tzakis, 826 N.E.2d at 992.

Nevertheless, Weston argues that Wal‐Mart took definite measures to attempt to control the

water’s accumulation by placing orange warning cones near the store’s entryway, thereby

assuming a duty to assure that the store’s entryway was “free and clear of the hazards” created
No. 08‐1786 Page 3

by the water’s accumulation.  It’s failure to take additionalprotectivemeasures,Westonasserts,

amounted to a breach of that previously‐assumed duty.  

Weston’s argument misses the mark.  Where the accumulation is a natural one, there is no

duty to continue a voluntary undertaking to remove it.  Lohan, 499 N.E.2d at 683 (defendant

had no duty to lay down additional safety mats in store entranceway when floor was wet from

tracked‐in rainwater).   Because a voluntary undertaking may only subject a defendant to

liability if that undertaking is performed negligently, Weston must show a triable question of

fact exists as to whether Wal‐Mart placed or maintained the orange warning cones in a

negligent manner.  

In an effort to overcome this hurdle, Weston argues that Wal‐Mart’s failure to place the

cones in a “readily identifiable” location amounted to negligence.  She contends that a non‐

negligent undertaking required Wal‐Mart to place the cones in a manner that alerted store

shoppers to the full extent of the danger posed by the accumulated water.  Weston attempts to

saddle Wal‐Mart with a duty that it did not owe; the duty Weston claims is beyond the scope

ofWal‐Mart’s actualundertaking.  Even assuming that a voluntaryundertaking occurred,Wal‐

Mart’s duty extended only to maintaining with reasonable care the cones thatit actually placed

near the store entranceway.  See Roberson, 623 N.E.2d at 366 (J.C. Penney did not have a duty

to install as many mats as necessary to absorb tracked‐in water, but only to maintain with

reasonable care the mats it did install).  The record is absent of any evidence, or even assertion,

that Wal‐Mart failed to do so.  Therefore, because Weston’s admission that she slipped and fell

on a natural accumulationof water shieldsWal‐Martfrom liability andWal‐Mart owednoduty

to continue the voluntary undertaking, the district court’s entry of summary judgment was

proper.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.