No. 81-119 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

WYSE , 

Relator, 

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 

DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, MISSOULA 

COUNTY, JOHN S. HENSON, Dist. Judge, 

Respondent. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: 

Counsel of Record: 

For Relator: 

Ronald C. Wyse, Pro Se, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Robert L. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, 

Missoula, Montana 

Submitted: September 23, 1981 

Decided : 85 m 

Filed: @OV 2 5 1981 
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Relator, Ronald C. Wyse, petitioned this Court for a 

writ of review on March 23, 1981, concerning the order of 

the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 

State of Montana, in and for the County of Missoula, finding 

him guilty of contempt as hereafter stated. 

Relator Wyse is an attorney duly licensed to practice 

law in the State of Montana. In the afternoon of October 

28, 1980, Wyse was contacted by Alan Robbins, a California 

state senator. Robbins informed Wyse that he had recently 

been charged with sexual misconduct involving two minor 

girls. Robbins further stated that one of the minor girls 

making the accusations formerly resided in Missoula, and it 

was Robbins' belief that she had been the subject of a 

juvenile proceeding while in Missoula. Robbins informed 

Wyse that a grand jury was to be convened on October 30 

( forty-eight hours later ) to consider the charges. Wyse 

agreed to provide all the information he could obtain to 

" assist Robbins. 

That same day Wyse discovered that his firm had 

represented the mother of the girl in a dependent and 

neglected child action in 1977. Wyse decided to look at the 

court file in the matter to determine if it contained any 

information which was not contained in the law firm's file. 

Wyse obtained the court file from the clerk of court by 

representing himself as a member of the firm that handled 

the neglected child action. 

Later that same day Wyse went to examine the county 

attorney's file. The county attorney's file contained a 

psychologist's report that was not present in the other 
files. Wyse made a photocopy of the report, included it 

with the other information he had collected and sent the 

information to Robbins and his attorney in California. 

Upon discovering that Wyse had obtained this information from the files, the Missoula County Attorney petitioned 

the District Court for an order directing Wyse to appear and 

show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court 

under section 3-1-501(1), MCA. 

Although this action involved contempt of court, the 

specific act at issue was the release by Wyse of dependent 

and neglected child files to persons not authorized to 

receive them. Section 41-3-205, MCA, prohibits 

"dissemination" of such files without authorization, and 

anyone violating this provision is deemed guilty of "a 

misdemeanor." At the hearing, Wyse made a motion in limine 

to restrict any testimony as to how he obtained the file 

from the county attorney's office. The motion was denied. 

Wyse admits he was aware that such files are confidential 

and could be released pursuant to some statutory procedure. 

However, he did not attempt to comply with the statute. The 

District Court held that Wyse's actions constituted a violation of the duty of an attorney and was found in contempt of 

court under section 3-1-501(l)(c), MCA. 

The basic issue here is whether an unauthorized 

dissemination, under section 41-3-205, MCA, occurred when 

relator (Wyse) released the information contained in the 

dependent and neglected child files. 

Section 41-3-205, MCA, provides: 

"Confidentialitx. (1) The case records of 

the department of social and rehabilitation 

services and its local affiliate, the county 

welfare department, the county attorney, and 
the court concerning actions taken under this 

chapter and all records concerning reports of 

child abuse and neglect shall be kept 

confidential except as provided by this 

section. Any person who permits or 

encourages the unauthorized dissemination of 

their contents is guilty of a misdemeanor. 

"(2) Records may be used by interagency 

interdisciplinary child protective teams as 

authorized under 41-3-108 for the purposes of 

assessing the needs of the child and family, 

formulating a treatment plan, and monitoring 

the plan. Members of the team are required 

to keep information about the subject 

individuals confidential. 

"(3) Records may be disclosed to a court for 

in camera inspection if relevant to an issue 

before it. The court may permit public 

disclosure if it finds such disclosure to be 

necessary for the fair resolution of an issue 

before it. 

"(4) Nothing in this section is intended to 

af fect the confidentiality of criminal court 

records of law enforcement agencies." (Emphasis added. ) 

Relator argues that in order to ascertain the intent 

of the statute, the word "dissemination" must be strictly 

analyzed. He alleges that the meaning of the word 

"dissemination" is synonymous with "public disclosure" and 

is defined by the dictionary as "to broadcast" or 

"communicate widely." (Webster's International Dictionary, 

2nd Ed. at 753.) Therefore, he argues that the statute does 

not apply to the type of communication involved here. 

The intent of a statute cannot be derived from the 

definition of one word. ,A statute derives its meaning from 

the entire body of words taken together. This Court in 

State ex rel. Freepan v. Abstraces Board of Examiners 

(1935), 99 Mont. 564, 577, 45 P.2d 668, 670, stated: 

"'The meaning of a given term employed in a 

statute must be measured and controlled by 

the connection in which it is employed, the 

evident purpose of the statute, and the 

subject to which it relates' (Northern 
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sanders County, 66 Mont. 

608, 612, 214 Pac. 596), and, if the term has 

a well-defined meaning in the law, its use, 

without specific definition, will not render 

the Act inoperative for uncertainty (State ex 

rel. Lyman v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 1, 190 Pac. 

129)." 

Relator admits in his brief, and admitted at the 

hearing, that he knew the records of juvenile matters were 

generally protected and that one could not disseminate such 

information publicly. He also stated that he did not bother 

to look up the statute, but that he "would have expected to 

have found some provision for some kind of court hearing to 

get a ruling as to its ultimate public disclosure." Relator 

cannot argue that the statute is vague when he admits 

knowing that this type of statute exists and admits knowing 

that a court order is required to obtain the information in 

the file. Relator is an officer of the court, a licensed 

professional. He is not subject to the reasonable man 

standard but to a higher standard, one dictated by the 

nature of his profession. 

Relator further contends that the provision contained 

in section 41-3-205(3), MCA, which provides for court 

approval to release the information does not apply here 

because there was no issue before the court. Relator had 

simply to file a petition requesting the court to release 

the information and an "issue" would have been before the 

court . 

The next argument relator presents is that the 

information must be communicated to the defendant and 

co-counsel to determine if the information is relevant to 

their defense; also, that any requirement that defense 

counsel obtain a court order prior to that time makes it 
impossible to obtain such an order. The statute is clear 

that information relating to depenaent and neglected 

children will not be released unless a court order is 

obtained. To say that one needs to release the information 

before one can determine if it is relevant is contrary to 

the clear intent of the statute. If the information 

contained in the file is not relevant, then the attorney 

will just have to "discover" other sources of information. 

The attorney takes a chance that the file contains relevant 

information. Again, the attorney must obtain a court order 

before he obtains the information in the file, not after the 

fact. 

Finally, the relator contends that, "Authorized 

dissemination is not limited to statutory authorization." 

Relator suggests by his argument that persons who are not 

authorized by statute to receive the information often do 

and that he should not be singled out. 

The law is often applied discriminately. A police 

I I 

officer does not cite all speeders, drinking drivers, 

I negligent drivers, etc. The fact that relator was cited is 

part of the discretionary aspect of the law and simply 

I because a possible violation may have gone unnoticed does 

1 not mean that all persons are thereby free to violate the 

, statute. 

The writ of review is hereby denied. 

i 

.-? 
I We concur: 

I 

Chief Jus'tice 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber specially concurs: 

I concur in the conclusion of the majority that the 

requested writ of review be denied. However, I do not 

concur in all that is said in the majority opinion. 

I do not find that section 41-3-205(3), MCA, sets out 

a procedure under which relator could have petitioned the 

Court for a release of information and thereby created an 

"issue" as provided in that code section. I believe paragraph 

(3) applies where a court already has an issue before it and 

record disclosure relates in some manner to that issue. 

That is not the fact situation here. 

Nonetheless, I do find that section 41-3-205 (1) contains 

a prohibition against unauthorized dissemination. That 

paragraph in part states: "Any person who permits or encourages 

the unauthorized dissemination of their contents is guilty 

of a misdemeanor." The facts show a dissemination by relator 

of information to an attorney and client in California which 

was not authorized in any manner. 

Relator is charged with a contempt under section 3-1- 

501 (c) , MCA, which in pertinent part provides: 

" (1) The following acts . . . in respect 

to a court of justice or proceedings therein are contempts of the authority of court: 

" (c) . . . violation of duty by an attorney 11 ... 

Relator is both an attorney and law professor and is 

aware of the standards of professional conduct required of 

him in those capacities. Relator could readily have contacted 

a judge of the district court in Missoula, whether in person 

or by telephone, and requested authority to disseminate the 

information. He chose instead to make an unauthorized 

dissemination to the persons in California. Clearly that 
constitutes a violation of his duty as an attorney and is 

therefore a contempt within the statute. Relator in good 

faith was seeking to help a friend and client and was faced 

with limited time in which to furnish the information. 

However, I do not find facts warranting the unauthorized 

dissemination. I therefore join in the holding of the 

majority. 

Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a 

written dissent later.