In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3789

Betty A. Stutler,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Illinois Department of Corrections 

and Diane Rockett,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of Illinois, Peoria Division.

No. 97 C 1404--Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

Argued January 17, 2001--Decided August 27, 2001

 Before Easterbrook, Evans, and Williams,

Circuit Judges.

 Williams, Circuit Judge. Betty A.

Stutler, an employee of the Illinois

Department of Corrections ("IDOC") filed

this lawsuit against IDOC for

retaliation, race and age discrimination,

and against her supervisor, Diane

Rockett, for a violation of 42 U.S.C.

sec.1983./1 The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the

defendants. Stutler appeals only the

dismissal of her retaliation claim

against IDOC. Because we find that no

reasonable jury could find that Stutler

suffered an adverse employment action, we

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

 The gravamen of Stutler’s claim is that

after she complained of Rockett’s conduct

in May 1996 and Rockett received a threeday suspension in July 1996, Rockett

engaged in retaliatory behavior that was

not adequately remedied by IDOC. To

analyze Stutler’s claim, we need to set

forth the events that led to the threeday suspension and the events that

transpired after.

 Stutler began working for IDOC in 1988

as an office associate in the clinical
services department, where she performed

secretarial duties for Diane Rockett. The

two enjoyed a friendship that extended

beyond their employment until late 1995

when Stutler complained to Assistant

Warden Wanda Bass that Rockett asked her

to do personal favors. When Rockett

learned of Stutler’s complaint, she

became angry, and threw things and

screamed at Stutler. The relationship

further deteriorated in the spring of

1996 as memorialized in a barrage of

incident reports written by Stutler. As

many of the reports complained of conduct

not protected by Title VII, we will

discuss only the ones relevant to this

appeal./2 See Hamner v. St. Vincent

Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d

701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that

the conduct complained of must be an

unlawful employment practice under Title

VII).

 In April and May 1996, Stutler filed

three incident reports complaining that:

1) Rockett stated that Stutler was "too

fucking old to run" to catch an incoming

phone call; 2) Rockett told Stutler to

"think about quitting because she was

never satisfied," and that she resented

Stutler for going to her boss and telling

lies about her; and 3) in response to

Rockett’s belief that Stutler complained

that she inappropriately ate food with an

inmate in her office, Rockett told the

inmate "to be careful of [Stutler]--that

[Stutler] was out to get him and that you

know you have to be careful around these

white women."/3 IDOC investigated the

first two reports and gave Rockett a

written reprimand pursuant to its

progressive discipline policy. It also

appears (although the record is somewhat

unclear) that the third report was

referred to the affirmative action

office, which had the responsibility of

investigating complaints of racial

discrimination. Stutler contends, and

IDOC concedes, that she engaged in Title

VII protected activity when she reported

the third incident.

 The following month, Stutler wrote a

letter to Warden Gramley complaining that

Rockett was dysfunctional and too

demanding. On that same day, Stutler

filed another incident report complaining

that Rockett told her that she was being

transferred out of the clinical services

department because she had filed a
"grievance." There is no evidence,

however, that Stutler was transferred,

but it appears that Rockett had been

instructed not to tell Stutler of the

move. This incident resulted in Rockett

receiving a one-day suspension.

 Around this time, the affirmative action

administrator completed her investigation

into Rockett’s conduct. The investigation

revealed that Rockett wore Stutler’s

shoes, borrowed money from Stutler,

yelled at her staff and believed that her

staff had formed a conspiracy against

her. On July 17, 1996, Warden Gramley

suspended Rockett for three days.

 Nine days later, Stutler saw an e-mail

that Rockett sent to the Director of IDOC

characterizing Stutler’s behavior as

"bizarre" and stating that "it would be

best if [she and Stutler] did not work

together." A few months later, Rockett

told Stutler to collect her things so

that she could move to a reception area

outside Rockett’s office that was not yet

equipped with proper lighting,

electricity, computer hook-ups or phone

jacks. Stutler, however, was not moved.

The following month, Rockett asked

Stutler to return the key to her office

because she believed items were missing.

Rockett informed Stutler that she could

continue having access to her office, but

only when it was already unlocked.

 Stutler wrote another letter to Warden

Gramley in March 1997, informing him that

Rockett was verbally abusing her. Warden

Gramley thought that one solution to the

problem might be to temporarily relocate

Stutler out of physical contact with

Rockett, so he transferred Stutler to the

business office, where she stayed for

approximately two months. Stutler asked

to return to the clinical services

department because, although she liked

the atmosphere in the business office,

she did not like the tasks she was

required to perform, and she "loved" her

job in clinical services.

 After she returned to the clinical

services department in May 1997, Stutler

asserts that Rockett verbally abused her

by repeatedly telling her "she had to go"

up until the time she filed this lawsuit

in November 1997. Stutler also asserts

that in March 1998 Rockett told her that

she could not forgive her. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor

of the defendants on all counts, and

Stutler appeals only the dismissal of her

retaliation claim against IDOC.

II. ANALYSIS

 We review a grant of summary judgment de

novo, drawing all inferences in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party.

Essex v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 111

F.3d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1997). Stutler

argues on appeal that the district court

erred in dismissing her retaliation claim

against IDOC because: 1) her transfer to

the business office "in itself was

retaliation"; and 2) Rockett’s continued

harassment after she reported Rockett for

making a racial comment in May 1996

constituted an adverse employment action,

and IDOC failed to adequately remedy the

situation. We do not find Stutler’s

arguments persuasive and affirm the

judgment of the district court.

 We begin our analysis with a discussion

of Title VII and the standards we must

apply. Title VII makes it unlawful for an

employer to retaliate against an employee

who "has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this

subchapter, or [who] has made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in

any manner in an investigation,

proceeding or hearing under this

subchapter." 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-3(a).

When a plaintiff does not have direct

evidence of retaliation to defeat a

motion for summary judgment, she can

proceed under the indirect, burdenshifting method of proof. Smart v. Ball

State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.

1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green

Corp., 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Under

that method, the plaintiff must first

establish a prima facie case. Id. After

doing so, the burden shifts to the

defendant to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its

employment decision. Id. If the employer

carries this burden, the plaintiff must

produce evidence that would, if believed

by a trier of fact, show that the true

reason for the employment action was

discriminatory--in this case, done in

retaliation for Stutler’s engaging in

protected conduct. Id. "Although

intermediate evidentiary burdens shift

back and forth under this framework, ’the

ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff

remains at all times with the plaintiff.’"

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).

 The district court dismissed Stutler’s

claim because it found that she could not

establish a prima facie case. In order to

establish a prima facie case of

retaliation, Stutler must demonstrate

that: 1) she engaged in a

protectedactivity under Title VII; 2) she

suffered an adverse employment action;

and 3) there was a causal link between

the two. Id. at 440. Both parties agree

that Stutler satisfied the first element,

engaging in a protected activity, when

she complained of Rockett’s racial

comment in May 1996. Whether Stutler can

satisfy the last two elements of the

prima facie case are at the center of the

dispute, and strike the fatal blow to

Stutler’s appeal.

 A. Lateral Transfer

 The district court properly found that

Stutler’s lateral transfer to the

business office in March 1997 was not an

adverse employment action. We have

repeatedly held that a lateral transfer

without a loss in benefits does not

constitute an adverse employment action.

Place v. Abbott Lab., Inc., 215 F.3d 803,

810 (7th Cir. 2000); Hill v. Am. Gen.

Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir.

2000); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb

Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996).

The fact that Stutler did not like the

new position is irrelevant when there is

no evidence that the transfer decreased

her responsibilities or benefits in any

way. See, e.g., Place, 215 F.3d at 810

("[B]eing shifted to an essentially

equivalent job that [the plaintiff] did

not happen to like as much does not a

Title VII claim create.").

 Even if the transfer could rise to the

level of an adverse employment action,

summary judgment in favor of IDOC was

still appropriate because no reasonable

jury could find that Stutler was

transferred in retaliation for

complaining of Rockett’s conduct. Warden

Gramley stated that he temporarily
reassigned Stutler to the business office

because he thought that relocating

Stutler out of physical contact with

Rockett might be a solution to the

problem./4 Although IDOC’s decision to

transfer Stutler may not have been the

wisest, it was the tension that resulted

from the collapse of Stutler and

Rockett’s friendship that led to the

transfer, not retaliation. See id. at 811

(concluding that an employer’s decision

to split up two workers whose soured

romance affected the company’s progress

was not retaliatory). Accordingly, the

district court properly found that no

reasonable jury could conclude that

Stutler was transferred to the business

office in retaliation for engaging in

Title VII protected activity.

 B. Retaliatory Harassment

 Stutler also asserts that the

"continued" harassment she endured after

reporting Rockett in May 1996 constituted

an adverse employment action. The

district court failed to address this

argument below, but because our review is

de novo, we will.

 We have broadly defined an adverse

employment action in this circuit. Smart,

89 F.3d at 441. It is not limited solely

to loss or reduction of pay or monetary

benefits, but can encompass other forms

of adversity. Id. Nevertheless, "not

everything that makes an employee unhappy

is an actionable adverse action." Id.

Negative performance reviews, a change in

job title, an increased travel distance

to work, do not by themselves qualify.

Hill, 218 F.3d at 645. Neither does the

loss of a telephone or cubicle. Place,

215 F.3d at 810. To be actionable, there

must be a "’significant change in

employment status, such as hiring,

firing, failing to promote, reassignment

with significantly different

responsibilities, or a decision causing a

significant change in benefits.’" Bell v.

Envtl. Prot. Agency, 232 F.3d 546, 555

(7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Burlington

Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,

761 (1998)). In other words, the adverse

action must materially alter the terms

and conditions of employment. Rabinovitz

v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir.

1996).

 Retaliatory harassment by co-workers or
a supervisor can rise to this level if it

is severe enough to cause a significant

change in the plaintiff’s employment

status. For example, in Knox v. Indiana,

93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996), we upheld a

jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff

whose co-workers embarked on a campaign

of vicious gossip and profanity aimed at

making "her life hell" in response to her

complaints that a supervisor sexually

harassed her. We reasoned that

retaliation could come in many forms and

there was sufficient evidence to support

the jury’s verdict that the plaintiff’s

co-workers engaged in a campaign of

retaliatory harassment and the employer

failed to correct it. Id. at 1334-35.

But, in Parkins v. Civil Constructors of

Illinois, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir.

1998), we found that ostracism by coworkers that did not result in material

harm to the plaintiff was not enough to

constitute an adverse employment action.

Id. at 1039.

 Similarly, in Bell, we found that

conduct by a supervisor/5 was not

sufficiently severe to be actionable. In

Bell, the supervisor failed to greet or

speak to the plaintiff and cancelled a

meeting that the plaintiff had scheduled,

apparently in response to the plaintiff’s

sex discrimination complaint. 232 F.3d at

555. We found these matters trivial. Id.

Likewise, in Hill, we concluded that a

supervisor’s rummaging through the

plaintiff’s desk drawers and waste can

and listening to the plaintiff’s

telephone calls did not rise to the level

of actionable retaliation. 218 F.3d at

645.

 Taking the facts in the light most

favorable to Stutler, we conclude that no

reasonable jury could find that the

conduct endured by Stutler was severe

enough to rise to the level of an adverse

employment action. Rockett’s conduct

after Stutler reported her in May 1996

consisted of: 1) sending an e-mail to the

Director of IDOC in July 1996

characterizing Stutler’s behavior as

"bizarre" and stating that "it would be

best if [she and Stutler] did not work

together," 2) telling Stutler repeatedly

that "she had to go," 3) telling Stutler

in September 1996 to collect her things

so that she could move to an unfinished

reception area outside Rockett’s office,

4) asking Stutler to return the key to
her office in October 1996, and 5)

telling Stutler in March 1998 (almost one

year after Stutler asked to be returned

to the clinical services department) that

she could not forgive her for filing the

lawsuit.

 Although we in no way condone Rockett’s

conduct or believe that she acted

appropriately as a supervisor, we find

her behavior too petty and tepid to

constitute a material change in the terms

and conditions of Stutler’s employment.

Rockett’s threats never materialized or

resulted in any material harm to Stutler-

-there is no evidence that Stutler was

transferred in response to Rockett’s July

e-mail nor that Stutler was moved to the

unfinished area outside Rockett’s office.

There is also no evidence that Stutler

was unable to perform her job duties

after Rockett asked her to return the key

to Rockett’s office. Additionally,

Stutler’s own conduct in requesting to

return to the clinical services

department because she "loved" her job

there cuts against a finding that

Rockett’s behavior was anything more than

"a mere inconvenience." Rabinovitz, 89

F.3d at 488. We have no doubt that the

environment was unpleasant, but none of

the conduct complained of constituted the

material harm necessary for a Title VII

retaliation claim.

 Even if Stutler had suffered an adverse

employment action, we doubt whether

Stutler could establish a causal link

between the protected activity and

Rockett’s conduct. For one, the conduct

did not increase or "ratchet up" after

Stutler reported Rockett in May 1996 for

the racial comment. See Johnson v.

Nordstrom, Inc. et al., ___ F.3d ___, No.

00-3827, 2001 WL 818874, at *5 (7th Cir.

Jul. 20, 2001) (doubting existence of

causal connection when "there was ’no

ratcheting up of the harassment’ after

the complaint was filed"). Rockett

treated Stutler just as poorly before

Stutler reported her for making the

racial comment as she did afterward. And,

most of Rockett’s behavior appeared to be

in response to the barrage of incident

reports that Stutler filed concerning her

belief that Rockett was not following

office procedures (i.e., by allowing the

files to be moved to another area and by

using the telephone to make personal

calls), and in response to Stutler’s
complaint to Assistant Warden Bass that

Rockett had her do personal favors, which

are not protected activities under Title

VII.

 Because we find the conduct that Stutler

endured was not sufficiently severe to

rise to the level of an adverse

employment action (and probably not

causally connected to protected

activity), we need not determine whether

IDOC was vicariously liable for Rockett’s

conduct or if it could establish the

affirmative defense set forth in

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524

U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). See

Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334 (holding that

"there is nothing to indicate that the

principle of employer responsibility does

not extend equally to other Title VII

claims, such as a claim of unlawful

retaliation"). Therefore, we do not

consider whether IDOC’s progressive

discipline against Rockett was adequate

or whether its decision to transfer

Stutler was a reasonable response to the

situation.

III. CONCLUSION

 Because Stutler has failed to

demonstrate that she suffered an adverse

employment action, her retaliation claim

fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the

judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

/1 Stutler’s complaint lists only two counts against

IDOC--Count I (race discrimination) and Count II

(age discrimination). Because each count also

contained allegations of retaliation, the district court construed Stutler’s complaint as if

it stated three counts against IDOC. We agree

with the district court’s construction of the

complaint and will treat Stutler’s complaint as

if it asserted a retaliation claim against IDOC.

/2 The majority of the incident reports written by

Stutler consisted of her perception that Rockett

was not strictly following office procedures

(i.e., Stutler thought Rockett should not have

allowed a file clerk to move files to another

area of the office, allowed an inmate to help

sort files that may have contained confidential

information, used the telephone to make personal

calls while at work, etc.).
/3 Stutler is white, and Rockett is bi-racial.

/4 By March 1997, Stutler’s incident reports were

all geared toward her beliefs that Rockett was

not following office procedures or acting professionally, i.e., by using the telephone to make

personal calls or allowing the files to be reviewed by an inmate. Because these are not prohibited by Title VII, and therefore, reporting

them is not protected activity, the cases cited

by Stutler admonishing the employer for transferring the victim instead of the harasser are

distinguishable.

/5 We refer to the actor in Bell as a supervisor

because he was a section chief who was a member

of a panel that made the hiring decisions.