MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2019 ME	25

Docket: Cum-18-278

Argued: February	7,	2019

Decided: February	14,	2019

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and HUMPHREY,	JJ.

PETITION	OF	EDWIN	R.	JONAS	III	FOR	REINSTATEMENT	

TO	THE	BAR	OF	THE	STATE	OF	MAINE

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]		Edwin	R.	Jonas	III	appeals	from	a	judgment	of	a	single	justice	of	the	

Maine	 Supreme	 Judicial	 Court	 (Gorman,	 J.)	 denying	 his	 petition	 for	

reinstatement	 to	 the	Maine	Bar.		This	is	 Jonas’s	second	appeal	in	 this	matter.		

On	his	first	appeal	from	the	denial	of	his	petition,	we	remanded	the	matter	after	

clarifying	that	the	admissibility	of	evidence	is	to	be	determined	pursuant	to	the	

reasonable	 person	 standard	 rather	 than	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Evidence—the	

original	 ruling,	 before	 clarification, may	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	 exclusion	 of

evidence	 that	 would have	 been	 admissible pursuant	 to	 the	 more	 inclusive	

standard.		See	In	re Edwin	R.	Jonas III,	2017	ME	115,	¶¶	1-3,	164 A.3d 120.		

[¶2]		On	remand,	we	indicated	that,	in	addition	to	the	evidence	admitted	

in	 the	 original	 proceeding, the	 single	 justice	 should “consider	 only	 (1)	 the	

evidence	that	was	explicitly	offered	and	excluded based	on	the	application	of	

the	 Rules	 of	 Evidence	 and	 that	 was	 not	 otherwise	 admitted,	 and	 (2)	 to	 the	
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extent	 allowed	 by	 the	 single	 justice,	 any	 evidence	 of	 reinstatement	 or	

disciplinary	actions,	 further	litigation,	 or	 other	evidence	deemed	 relevant	by	

the single	justice	that	has	occurred	after	the	closing	of	evidence	in	the	original	

trial.”		Id.	¶	39.		Jonas	contends	that	the	limited	scope	of	our	remand	denied	him	

due	 process	 of	 the	 law	 and	 that	 the	 evidence	 he	 presented	 supports	 his	

reinstatement.			

[¶3]		During	the	proceedings	on	remand,	the	single	justice adhered	to	the	

parameters	 that	we	articulated	in	 the	mandate.		Therefore,	Jonas’s argument	

that	 he	 should	 have	 been	 entitled	 to	 present	 evidence	 outside	 of	 those	

parameters constitutes	a	challenge	to	our	prior	decision establishing	the	nature	

and	scope	of	the	remand	proceedings.		

[¶4]	 	 Contrary	 to	 his contention,	 Jonas	 has	 not	 demonstrated	 that	 the	

process	prescribed	in	our	opinion	and	then	implemented	by	the	single	justice	

resulted	 in	 an	 erroneous	 or	 unjust	 outcome.	 	 See	 Greaton	 v.	 Greaton,	

2012 ME 17,	¶	 7,	36	A.3d	913 (“In	 appealing	 a	judgment,	it	is	 not	enough	 to	

challenge	 procedural	 errors	 allegedly	 made	 by	 the	 trial	 court	 without	 also	

showing	actual error	in	the	judgment.”).		Nor	does	he	 seem	 to	 recognize	 the	

mitigatory	opportunity of	the	additional	process,	which allowed	him	to	present	

additional	evidence developed	since	the	original	trial, that	has	been available

to	him	since we remanded	the	matter	almost	two	years	ago.		
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[¶5]	 	The	 additional	 evidence	he	 now	 argues	 he	is	 entitled	 to	 present,

even	 though	it	is	outside	 the	scope	of	what	we	stated	could	be	presented	on	

remand,	would	not change	the	outcome	of	the	case	given	his	own	description	

of	what	such	evidence would	show	and	the	weight	that	the	single	justice	gave	

to	the	great	amount	of	contrary	evidence	admitted	against him.		

[¶6]		Balancing	the	factors relevant	to	a	determination	of	what	process	is	

due,	including	Jonas’s	interest	in	his	professional	license	and	the	burden	that	

remanding	the	matter	again	would	place on limited judicial	time	and	resources,	

we	conclude	that	Jonas	was	not	deprived	of	due	process	by	the	limited	scope	of	

the	remand.		See	Mathews	v.	Eldridge,	424	U.S.	319,	335 (1976);	see	also	Fichter

v.	Bd.	 of	Environmental	Protection,	604	A.2d	433,	436-37 (Me.	1992)	(stating	

that	 due	 process	 “requirements	 are	 flexible	 and	 entail	 no	 specified form	 or	

procedure”;	instead, “[w]hat	process	is	due	will	vary	 from	case	 to	case	.	.	.	 to	

assure	 the	 basic	 fairness	 of	 each	 particular	 action	 according	 to	 its	

circumstances” (alterations in	original)).	

[¶7]	 	The	 only	 remaining	issue	we	 need	 address	is	whether	 the	 entire	

record,	 including the	 evidence	 Jonas	 and	 the	 Board	 of	 Overseers	 of	 the	 Bar

introduced	 on	 remand,	 compelled the	 single	 justice to	 change	 her original	
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conclusions,	all	of	which	are supported	by	the	record.

1		Even	with	the	evidence	

presented	to	the	single	justice	on	remand,	we	note	the	great	deal	of	competent	

evidence	that	the	single	justice	relied	on	in	her	findings to	conclude	that Jonas	

should	not	be	reinstated.			

[¶8]		A	review	of	the	evidence Jonas	introduced	on	remand	supports	the	

single	justice’s	assessment that	it added	“little	.	.	.	to	the	issue	to	be	decided	in	

this	 matter—that	 is, Jonas’s	 demonstration	 of	 the	 evidence	 necessary	 for	

reinstatement.”		The	evidence,	including	the	evidence	introduced	by	the	Board	

of	 events	 since	 the	 closing	 of	 evidence	 in	 the	 original	 trial,	 demonstrates	 a	

continuing	 practice	 of	 frivolous	 and	 vexatious	 actions	 and	 use	 of	 court	

pleadings	and	processes	for	improper	purposes.	

[¶9]		We	discern	no	error	in	 the	single	justice’s	ultimate	conclusion on	

remand	that	Jonas	did	not	meet	his	burden	“to	satisfy, by	clear	and	convincing	

evidence,	each	of	the	criteria	for	reinstatement	set	out	in	M.	Bar	R.	29(e).”		

The	entry	is:

Judgment affirmed.

 1	 	 The	 single	 justice’s	 first	 judgment	 analyzed	 Jonas’s	 petition	 pursuant	 to	 the	 reinstatement	

factors	 enumerated	in	 the	 then	 applicable	M.	 Bar	R.	 7.3(j).	 	 The	 single	justice’s	 second	judgment	

analyzed	Jonas’s	petition	pursuant	to	current	M.	Bar	R.	29(e),	which	replaced	the	former	rule	after	

the	first	judgment	was	entered.		The	findings	in	the	first	opinion	remain	relevant	because	the	rules	

are—with	the	exception	of	a	few	inapplicable	subsections—substantively	the	same.		Compare M.	Bar	

R.	7.3(j)(5)(A)-(F)	(Tower	2014)	with M.	Bar	R.	29(e)(1)-(8).	
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James M. Bowie, Esq. (orally), Thompson Bowie & Hatch LLC, Portland, for 

appellant Edwin R. Jonas III

Aria Eee, Esq. (orally), Board of Overseers of the Bar, Augusta, for appellee Board 

of Overseers of the Bar

Maine	Supreme	Judicial	Court	docket	number	Bar-13-16

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY