FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PHILIP ROY GALANTI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v. 

NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS; CLARK COUNTY 

SCHOOL DISTRICT; JAMES 

DZURENDA, Director; BRIAN 

WILLIAMS, Warden, Warden; 

MOORE, Caseworker; RITZ, 

Caseworker; NASH, Associate 

Warden; KIM PETERSON, NDOC 

Administrator; J. CAVIN, School 

Counselor; ROLAND; HOWELL, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-17332 

D.C. No. 

2:19-cv-01044-

GMN-EJY 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 28, 2023

San Francisco, California

Filed April 25, 2023
2 GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS

Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and JOHN B. OWENS, 

Circuit Judges, and XAVIER RODRIGUEZ,

* District 

Judge. 

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

SUMMARY**

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the 

district court’s dismissal of an action brought pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against the Nevada Department of 

Corrections and several Department officials alleging that 

they violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by failing to 

deduct education-credits he earned from his sentence, and 

remanded.

While incarcerated, plaintiff completed several 

education courses which entitled him to sentence deductions 

under Nevada law. After he was released and his parole 

ended, plaintiff sued, asserting that defendants’ failure to 

apply earned credit-deductions to his sentence deprived him 

of liberty without due process and denied him equal 

protection of the law by targeting him for the denial of 

credits because he is a sex offender. 

* The Honorable Xavier Rodriguez, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS 3

The panel first rejected defendants’ argument that 

plaintiff’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 

U.S. 477 (1994), because they necessarily implied that the 

duration of his sentence was invalid. The panel held that 

Heck did not apply in this case. Plaintiff was no longer in 

custody and was thus unable to raise claims for creditdeductions in a petition for habeas corpus. As such, this case 

fell within the limited exception to Heck this court 

recognized in Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875–76 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

The panel held that the district court erred by interpreting 

plaintiff’s due process claim as asserting only a deprivation 

of minimum-sentence deductions affecting his parole 

eligibility date and ignoring his claim for maximumsentence deductions. Despite being instructed to brief the 

issue, defendants did not respond to plaintiff’s argument that 

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 209.4465 contains the mandatory language 

necessary to create a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest in maximum-sentence deductions, similar to goodtime statutes this court previously found to create liberty 

interests. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded 

with respect to plaintiff’s due process claim. 

The panel affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection 

claim because plaintiff had not alleged facts supporting 

discrimination.
4 GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS

COUNSEL

Rizelle Dizon (argued) and Justine Chang, Certified Law 

Students; Leah Spero, Gary A. Watt, and Stephen Tollafield, 

Supervising Attorneys; University of California, Hasting 

College of the Law, Hastings Appellate Project; San 

Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Sabrena K. Clinton (argued), Deputy Attorney General; 

Gregory L. Zunino, Deputy Solicitor General; Frank A. 

Toddre II, Senior Deputy Attorney General; D. Randall 

Gilmer, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Aaron D. Ford, 

Attorney General of Nevada; Office of the Nevada Attorney 

General; Las Vegas, Nevada; Patrick J. Murch, McDonald 

Carano LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge: 

Philip Roy Galanti sued the Nevada Department of 

Corrections (NDOC) and several NDOC officials pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they violated his 

constitutional rights by failing to deduct education-credits he 

earned from his sentence. Defendants argue that Galanti’s 

claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 

(1994), because they necessarily imply that the duration of 

his sentence was invalid. 

We hold that Heck does not apply in this case. Galanti 

is no longer in custody and is thus unable to raise claims for 

credit deductions in a petition for habeas corpus. As such,
GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS 5

this case falls within the limited exception to Heck we 

recognized in Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875–76 (9th 

Cir. 2002). Because Heck does not bar this lawsuit, we 

reverse and remand with respect to Galanti’s due process 

claim, which the district court misconstrued as challenging 

only the denial of credit-deductions from his parole date. 

We affirm the dismissal of the equal protection claim, as 

Galanti failed to allege discrimination.

BACKGROUND

Philip Roy Galanti is a former Nevada state prisoner. 

While incarcerated, he completed several education courses, 

which entitled him to sentence deductions under Nevada 

law. He alleges that, with the deductions he earned from 

obtaining his high school diploma and two vocational 

certificates, his sentence should have expired on June 1, 

2018. However, because NDOC officials did not apply the 

deductions, his sentence did not expire until August 22, 

2018. 

After he was released and his parole ended, Galanti sued 

NDOC and several NDOC officials pro se. In his First 

Amended Complaint (FAC), Galanti raises two claims. 

First, he asserts that Defendants’ failure to apply earned 

credit-deductions to his sentence deprived him of liberty 

without due process. Second, he claims Defendants denied 

him equal protection of the law by targeting him for the 

denial of credits because he is a sex offender. Galanti alleges 

that NDOC officials failed to rectify the situation despite his 

complaints while he was still incarcerated and complaints 

from his mother. He further alleges they denied him access 
6 GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS

to his credit and sentence reports, which prevented him from 

verifying his credit calculations while incarcerated.

1

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Galanti failed 

to state any constitutional violations, Heck bars his claims, 

qualified immunity shields the officer-defendants from 

liability, and NDOC is not a proper party. The district court 

granted the motion. Construing Galanti’s due process claim 

as being based on the failure to apply credit-deductions to 

his “minimum sentence,” or parole eligibility date, the 

district court dismissed the claim with prejudice on the 

ground that Nevada law does not create a constitutionally 

protected liberty interest in parole. The court dismissed the 

equal protection claim for failure to plead discrimination and 

declined to reach the remaining issues.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review a decision on a motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint 

as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 885 (9th Cir. 

2021). Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. Thompson 

v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).

ANALYSIS

Although the district court did not reach the issue, 

Defendants assert that all of Galanti’s claims are barred by 

Heck because a judgment in his favor would necessarily 

1 The FAC also contains an equal protection claim based on allegations 

that Defendants awarded fewer discretionary credits to inmate students 

compared to inmate workers, as well as Fourth, Fifth, and Eight 

Amendment claims, which are not at issue in this appeal. 
GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS 7

imply the invalidity of the duration of his sentence. Galanti 

argues that his claims fall under an exception to Heck 

recognized by our court in Nonnette because he is no longer 

incarcerated and thus cannot bring his claim for credit 

deductions in a habeas petition. Defendants contend that 

Nonnette is inapplicable because Galanti did not timely 

pursue habeas relief while in custody. 

Apart from Heck, Galanti argues that the district court 

misconstrued his due process claim as challenging the denial 

of minimum-sentence deductions—in which he concedes 

that he lacks a liberty interest—and ignored his interest in 

maximum-sentence deductions. With respect to his equal 

protection claim, Galanti argues that he sufficiently alleged 

discrimination. Defendants endorse the district court’s 

analysis of both claims. We address each argument in turn. 

I. Heck v. Humphrey Does Not Bar Galanti’s Claims

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that to recover 

damages pursuant to § 1983 for an unconstitutional 

conviction or sentence, the plaintiff “must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state 

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called 

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of 

habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. at 486–87. If a “judgment in 

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity 

of his conviction or sentence” and that conviction or 

sentence has not been invalidated, the claim is not 

cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. The Court has since 

clarified that the Heck rule applies to claims for 

unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits, if a 

favorable judgment would imply the invalidity of such 
8 GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS

deprivation. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 

(1997). 

After Heck, five Justices in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 

1 (1998), “suggested that Heck’s scope might be narrower 

than Heck itself indicated.” Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 

807 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court held that, 

while an ex-prisoner’s habeas petition challenging his 

underlying conviction does not become moot upon his 

release due to the continuing consequences of a criminal 

record, the petitioner’s challenge to his parole revocation 

was mooted by his release from custody. See Spencer, 523 

U.S. at 7–13. But five Justices noted that the petitioner

could bring such a claim under § 1983 without satisfying

Heck’s favorable-termination requirement, as “it would be 

impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy” that 

requirement due to the unavailability of habeas relief. Id. 

at 21 (Souter, J., concurring); see id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., 

dissenting); see also Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 704 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“The Spencer concurrence suggests that a 

plaintiff’s inability to pursue habeas relief after release from 

incarceration should create an exception to Heck’s bar.”). 

Then in Nonnette, we applied this reasoning in holding 

that Heck did not preclude an ex-prisoner’s § 1983 claim 

challenging denial of good-time credits because he could no 

longer bring that claim in a habeas petition. See 316 F.3d 

at 875–76. Nonnette filed his § 1983 suit while in custody, 

alleging that prison officials miscalculated his sentence and 

unlawfully revoked his credits. Id. at 874. The district 

court dismissed pursuant to Heck because a judgment in 

Nonnette’sfavor would imply the invalidity of his sentence. 

Id. After that decision was entered, he was released from 

custody. Id. at 875. We reasoned that because Nonnette’s

release rendered habeas relief unavailable under Spencer,
GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS 9

his § 1983 action could be maintained. See id. at 875–76. 

We also “emphasize[d] that [the] holding affects only 

former prisoners challenging loss of good-time credits, 

revocation of parole or similar matters”—not challenges to 

underlying convictions, because ex-prisoners continue to be 

able to challenge their underlying convictions in habeas 

after their release. Id. at 878 n.7 (citing Spencer, 523 U.S. 

at 7–12); see also Lyall, 807 F.3d at 1192 (holding that the 

plaintiff’s claim “d[id] not come within the narrow 

exception recognized in Spencer and Nonnette” because it 

challenged his underlying conviction). 

We have since recognized potential limits to Nonnette. 

In Guerrero, we held that Heck barred the plaintiff’s § 1983 

suit even though he was no longer in custody and habeas 

relief was unavailable, distinguishing the case from 

Nonnette on two grounds. See 442 F.3d 702–05. First,

Guerrero’s claims attacked his conviction, not “loss of 

good-time credits, revocation of parole or similar matters,”

and thus they were plainly outside Nonnette’s purview. Id. 

at 705 (quoting Nonnette, 316 F.3d at 878 n.7). Second, 

Guerrero did not “timely pursue[] appropriate relief.” Id.

(emphasis added). We noted that the plaintiff in Nonnette 

“immediately pursued relief after the incident giving rise to 

[his] claims and could not seek habeas relief only because 

of the shortness of his prison sentence.” Id. In contrast, 

Guerrero waited three years to file suit, allowing the statute 

of limitations on his habeas claim to expire. Id.; see 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (establishing one-year deadline for 

filing federal habeas corpus petitions). As such, “[h]is 

failure to timely achieve habeas relief [wa]s self-imposed” 

and not a reason for him to avoid the Heck bar. Guerrero, 

442 F.3d at 705. 
10 GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS

This case is much more like Nonnette than Guerrero. 

First, Galanti challenges the deprivation of creditdeductions, not his underlying sentence. Second, to the 

extent that Guerrero imposes a diligence requirement on 

§ 1983 plaintiffs under Nonnette, it does not bar Galanti’s 

claim. Given the timeline Galanti alleges, he had little time 

to obtain habeas relief. Galanti earned the credits at issue 

on April 1, 2018, he was released on June 1, 2018, and his 

parole expired on August 22, 2018, giving him only a few 

months during which he could have filed a habeas petition. 

And if his sentence expired during the pendency of his case, 

which is very likely given the timeframe, it would have 

been dismissed as moot. This differs from the situation in 

Guerrero, in which the plaintiff allowed the habeas statute 

of limitations to lapse and then attempted to “use his failure 

to timely pursue habeas remedies as a shield against the 

implications of Heck.” Id. at 705 (cleaned up). Moreover, 

Galanti alleges that he made complaints and took other 

efforts to rectify the situation while in custody, unlike 

Guerrero, who waited years before taking “any action at 

all.” Id. Accordingly, Heck does not bar this suit. 

II. The District Court Erred by Ignoring Galanti’s 

Due Process Claim for Maximum-Sentence 

Deductions

The district court dismissed Galanti’s claims on grounds 

other than Heck, which we now address. Galanti argues that 

the court misconstrued his due process claim as asserting the 

deprivation of deductions to his minimum sentence alone 

and ignored his claim related to maximum-sentence 

deductions. Nevada prisoners are generally sentenced to a 

minimum term, after which they are eligible for parole, and 

a maximum term, after which they are released if 

incarcerated or their parole expires. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 
GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS 11

§§ 213.120(2), 213.1215. The district court interpreted 

Galanti’s FAC as asserting “that the NDOC Defendants 

failed to apply the good-time credits that he earned by 

attending educational classes to his parole eligibility date,” 

or minimum sentence, “which extended his period of 

incarceration without due process.” The court did not 

consider whether Galanti stated a claim for deprivation of 

maximum-sentence deductions. 

Galanti now concedes that, to the extent his FAC asserts 

a claim for minimum-sentence deductions, that claim fails 

because Nevada prisoners do not have a liberty interest in 

parole, see Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 661–62 (9th Cir. 

2010), and he is not statutorily eligible for such deductions 

in any event because he has been convicted of a felony sex 

crime.

2 However, he argues that his FAC also contains a due 

2 Under Nevada law, all prisoners are eligible for maximum-sentence 

deductions, but those convicted of certain enumerated offenses including 

felony sex crimes—like Galanti—are ineligible for minimum-sentence 

deductions. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 209.4465. The relevant provisions

provide that:

7. Except as otherwise provided in subsection[] 8 ... credits earned 

pursuant to this section:

(a) Must be deducted from the maximum term or the 

maximum aggregate term imposed by the sentence, as 

applicable; and

(b) Apply to eligibility for parole unless the offender 

was sentenced pursuant to a statute which specifies a 

minimum sentence that must be served before a person 

becomes eligible for parole.

8. Credits earned pursuant to this section by an offender who 

has not been convicted of:
12 GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS

process claim for deprivation of maximum-sentence 

deductions, in which he has a liberty interest and for which 

he was eligible, and the district court erred by ignoring that 

claim. 

Construed liberally, Galanti’s FAC contains a claim for 

deprivation of maximum-sentence deductions. He alleges 

that his sentence “should have expired on or about June 1st, 

2018 [rather than August 22, 2018], and he should not have 

had to be on parole for 2 months and bear costs associated 

with it”—referencing his maximum sentence. In his 

response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Galanti

continued to assert that he was entitled to deductions from 

his “maximum term” and that his sentence should have 

“expired” earlier. Moreover, throughout his filings, Galanti 

referenced Nev. Rev. Stat. § 209.4465, which addresses both 

types of deductions. Accordingly, the district court erred by 

interpreting Galanti’s due process claim as asserting only 

deprivation of minimum-sentence deductions and ignoring 

his claim for maximum-sentence deductions. 

Defendants’ remaining arguments related to due process 

are premised on the district court’s erroneous interpretation

and do not address maximum-sentence deductions. Despite 

being instructed by our court to brief the issue, Defendants 

...

(b) A sexual offense that is punishable as a felony;

...,

apply to eligibility for parole and ... must be deducted from the 

minimum term or the minimum aggregate term imposed by the 

sentence, as applicable, until the offender becomes eligible for 

parole and must be deducted from the maximum term or the 

maximum aggregate term imposed by the sentence, as applicable.
GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS 13

do not respond to Galanti’s argument that Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 209.4465 contains the mandatory language necessary to 

create a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 

maximum-sentence deductions, similar to good-time 

statutes we have previously found to create liberty interests. 

See Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1989)

(holding Washington statute creates liberty interest); 

McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1986)

(same for similar Arizona statute). Rather, Defendants argue 

that Galanti did not have a liberty interest in parole, which 

he does not dispute and is irrelevant to his maximumsentence claim in any event.

3 Similarly, Defendants argue 

that Galanti is not statutorily eligible for deductions to his 

parole date, which is neither disputed nor relevant.

4

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with respect to 

Galanti’s due process claim. 

III. Galanti Failed to State an Equal Protection Claim

Finally, Galanti claims that Defendants violated the 

Equal Protection Clause by treating him less favorably with 

respect to applying credit-deductions due to animus against 

sex offenders. This claim fails because Galanti has not 

alleged facts supporting discrimination. See Ariz. Dream Act 

Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2017) (“To 

prevail on an Equal Protection claim, plaintiffs must show 

that a class that is similarly situated has been treated 

disparately.” (cleaned up)). He asserts that Defendants did 

3 Relatedly, Defendants argue that the officer-defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity because “Nevada law does not provide inmates with 

a clearly established liberty interest in parole eligibility,” which is also 

irrelevant to Galanti’s maximum-sentence deductions claim. 

4 In their Supplemental Answering Brief, Defendants concede that 

Galanti is eligible for maximum-sentence deductions. 
14 GALANTI V. NEVADA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS

not apply deductions to his sentence “in a manner equal to 

the deductions given to various other inmate[s]” because 

Defendants “‘hate’ sex offenders.” But this conclusory 

statement does not support his claim. See Ventura 

Mobilehome Comms. Owners Ass’n v. City of San 

Buenaventura, 371 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(affirming dismissal of equal protection claim because 

“[a]side from conclusory allegations, Appellant has not . . . 

alleged how [similarly situated individuals] are treated 

differently”).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the district court’s decision granting 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is AFFIRMED in part,

REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

5

5 In light of the issues in this case, the district court should carefully 

consider appointing counsel for Galanti in future proceedings.