90208 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 249 / Friday, December 29, 2023 / Notices 

operations, which was August 1, 2022. 

Because this period has already elapsed, 

the exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated: November 16, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Jane Marshall, 

Director, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28776 Filed 12–28–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50–286; 

NRC–2023–0175] 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian 

Point Energy Center; Exemption 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has issued an 

exemption in response to a request from 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC that would permit it, Holtec Indian 

Point 2, LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, 

LLC, to reduce the minimum coverage 

limit for onsite property damage 

insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 

million for the Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, 

collectively referred to as the Indian 

Point Energy Center (IPEC). 

DATES: The exemption was issued on 

November 14, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2023–0175 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2023–0175. Address 

questions about Docket IDs in 

Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 

telephone: 301–415–0624; email: 

Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical 

questions, contact the individual listed 

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at 

301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS 

accession number for each document 

referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that it is 

mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you 

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time (ET), Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl 

Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415– 

8534, email: Karl.Sturzebecher@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of 

the exemption is attached. 

Dated: December 26, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Marlayna V. Doell, 

Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning 

Branch, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

Attachment—Exemption 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50– 

286 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian 

Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 

2, and 3; Exemption 

I. Background 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 

No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased 

generation on October 31, 1974, and all 

fuel was removed from the IP1 reactor 

vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, 

the Commission) issued an order 

approving the safe-storage condition of 

IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued 

Amendment No. 52 to IP1’s provisional 

operating license, which changed the 

expiration date of the provisional 

license to be consistent with that of the 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 

No. 2 (IP2) facility license at that time. 

Pursuant to title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section 

50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer 

authorizes operation of the reactor or 

emplacement or retention of fuel into 

the reactor vessel. There is no IP1 spent 

fuel in wet storage at the Indian Point 

Energy Center (IPEC) site; IP1 spent fuel 

is stored onsite in dry cask storage at the 

independent spent fuel storage 

installation (ISFSI). 

By letter dated February 8, 2017 

(Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System Accession No. 

ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear Indian 

Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear 

Indian Point 3, LLC (the IPEC licensees 

at that time, collectively, Entergy) 

certified to the NRC that they planned 

to permanently cease power operations 

at IP2 and Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 

2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. 

By letters dated May 12, 2020, and May 

11, 2021 (ML20133J902 and 

ML21131A157), Entergy certified to the 

NRC that power operations permanently 

ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30, 2020, 

and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the 

same letters, Entergy certified to the 

NRC that the fuel was permanently 

removed from the IP2 and IP3 reactor 

vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 

spent fuel pools (SFPs) as of May 12, 

2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively. 

Based on the docketing of these 

certifications for permanent cessation of 

operations and permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessels, as 

specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 

CFR part 50 renewed facility licenses for 

IP2 and IP3 (Nos. DPR–26 and DPR–64, 

respectively) no longer authorize 

operation of the reactors or 

emplacement or retention of fuel in the 

reactor vessels. The facility is still 

authorized to possess and store 

irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. At 

the time of the exemption request 

described below, spent fuel was stored 

onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the 

SFPs and in a dry cask ISFSI. 

II. Request/Action 

By letter dated March 18, 2022 

(ML22077A132), Holtec 

Decommissioning International, LLC 

(HDI), one of the licensees of IPEC and 

an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of 

Holtec International (Holtec), requested 

an exemption on behalf of Holtec Indian 

Point 2, LLC (a licensee of IP1 and IP2, 

referred to as Holtec IP2) and Holtec 

Indian Point 3, LLC (a licensee of IP3, 

and referred to as Holtec IP3), from the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

concerning onsite liability insurance. 

HDI, Holtec IP2, and Holtec IP3 are 

hereafter collectively referred to as the 

licensee. The exemption from 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) would permit the licensee to 

reduce the required level of onsite 


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property damage insurance from $1.06 

billion to $50 million for IPEC. 

The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

requires licensees to have and maintain 

onsite property damage insurance to 

stabilize and decontaminate the 

reactor(s) and reactor site in the event of 

an accident. The onsite insurance 

coverage must be either $1.06 billion or 

whatever amount of insurance is 

generally available from private sources 

(whichever is less). 

The licensee states that the risk of an 

incident at a permanently shutdown 

and defueled reactor is much less than 

the risk from an operating power 

reactor. In addition, since reactor 

operation is no longer authorized at 

IPEC, there are no events that would 

require the stabilization of reactor 

conditions after an accident. Similarly, 

the risk of an accident that would result 

in significant onsite contamination at 

IPEC is also much lower than the risk 

of such an event at operating reactors. 

Therefore, the licensee requested an 

exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to 

reduce its onsite property damage 

insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 

million, commensurate with the 

reduced risk of an incident at the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

IPEC site. 

III. Discussion 

Under 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific 

exemptions,’’ the Commission may, 

upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions 

are authorized by law, will not present 

an undue risk to public health or safety, 

and are consistent with the common 

defense and security; and (2) any of the 

special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2) are present. 

The financial protection limits of 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) were established after 

the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, 

Unit 2 accident out of concern that 

licensees may be unable to financially 

cover onsite cleanup costs in the event 

of a major nuclear accident. The 

specified $1.06 billion coverage amount 

requirement was developed based on an 

analysis of an accident at a nuclear 

reactor operating at power, resulting in 

a large fission product release and 

requiring significant resource 

expenditures to stabilize the reactor and 

ultimately decontaminate and cleanup 

the site. 

These cost estimates were developed 

based on the spectrum of postulated 

accidents for an operating nuclear 

reactor. Those costs were derived from 

the consequences of a release of 

radioactive material from the reactor. 

Although the risk of an accident at an 

operating reactor is very low, the 

consequences onsite and offsite can be 

significant. In an operating plant, the 

high temperature and pressure of the 

reactor coolant system (RCS), as well as 

the inventory of relatively short-lived 

radionuclides, contribute to both the 

risk and consequences of an accident. 

With the permanent cessation of reactor 

operations at IPEC and the permanent 

removal of the fuel from the reactor 

vessels, such accidents are no longer 

possible. As a result, the reactor vessels, 

RCS, and supporting systems no longer 

operate and have no function related to 

the storage of the irradiated fuel. 

Therefore, postulated accidents 

involving failure or malfunction of the 

reactors, RCS, or supporting systems are 

no longer applicable. 

During reactor decommissioning, the 

largest radiological risks are associated 

with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In 

the exemption request dated March 18, 

2022, the licensee discussed both 

design-basis and beyond design-basis 

events involving irradiated fuel stored 

in the SFPs. The licensee determined 

that there are no possible design-basis 

events at IPEC that could result in an 

offsite radiological release exceeding the 

limits established by the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency’s 

(EPA) early phase Protective Action 

Guides (PAGs) of 1 roentgen equivalent 

man (rem) at the exclusion area 

boundary, as a way to demonstrate that 

any possible radiological releases would 

be minimal and would not require 

precautionary protective actions (e.g., 

sheltering in place or evacuation). The 

NRC staff evaluated the radiological 

consequences associated with various 

decommissioning activities and the 

design basis accidents at IPEC, in 

consideration of the permanently 

shutdown and defueled condition. The 

possible design-basis accident scenarios 

at IPEC have greatly reduced 

radiological consequences. Based on its 

review, the NRC staff concluded that no 

reasonably conceivable design-basis 

accident exists that could cause an 

offsite release greater than the EPA 

PAGs. 

The only incident that has the 

potential to lead to a significant 

radiological release at a 

decommissioning reactor is a zirconium 

fire in the SFP. The zirconium fire 

scenario is a postulated, but highly 

unlikely, beyond design-basis accident 

scenario that involves loss of water 

inventory from the SFP resulting in a 

significant heat up of the spent fuel, and 

culminating in substantial zirconium 

cladding oxidation and fuel damage. 

The probability of a zirconium fire 

scenario is related to the decay heat of 

the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. 

Therefore, the risks from a zirconium 

fire scenario continue to decrease as a 

function of the time since IPEC has been 

permanently shut down. 

The Commission has previously 

authorized a lesser amount of onsite 

financial protection, based on this 

analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In 

SECY–96–256, ‘‘Changes to Financial 

Protection Requirements for 

Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 

Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 

140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996 

(ML15062A483), the NRC staff 

recommended changes to the power 

reactor financial protection regulations 

that would allow licensees to lower 

onsite insurance levels to $50 million 

upon demonstration that the fuel stored 

in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff 

Requirements Memorandum to SECY– 

96–256, dated January 28, 1997 

(ML15062A454), the Commission 

supported the NRC staff’s 

recommendation that, among other 

things, would allow permanently 

shutdown power reactor licensees to 

reduce commercial onsite property 

damage insurance coverage to $50 

million when the licensee was able to 

demonstrate the technical criterion that 

the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the 

SFP was drained of water. 

The NRC staff has used this technical 

criterion to grant similar exemptions to 

other decommissioning reactors (e.g., 

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, 

published in the Federal Register (FR) 

on January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion 

Nuclear Power Station, published in the 

FR on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); 

Kewaunee Power Station, published in 

the FR on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 

15638); Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear 

Generation Plant, published in the FR 

on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); Oyster 

Creek Nuclear Generating Station, 

published in the FR on December 28, 

2018 (83 FR 67365); Pilgrim Nuclear 

Power Station, published in the FR on 

January 14, 2020 (85 FR 2153); Three 

Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1, 

published in the FR on March 26, 2021 

(86 FR 16241); and the Duane Arnold 

Energy Center, published in the FR on 

May 18, 2021 (86 FR 26946)). These 

prior exemptions were based on these 

licensees demonstrating that the SFP 

could be air-cooled, consistent with the 

technical criterion discussed above. 

In its March 18, 2022, request, the 

licensee compared the IPEC fuel storage 

parameters with those used in NRC 

generic evaluations of fuel cooling 

included in NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety 

and Regulatory Assessment of Generic 

BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR 


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[Pressurized-Water Reactor] 

Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ dated August 1997 

(ML082260098). The analysis described 

in NUREG/CR–6451 determined that 

natural air circulation would adequately 

cool fuel in the representative PWR. 

In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated 

Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 

Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28, 

2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy 

Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, 

and Emergency Preparedness 

Regulations at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in 

Spent Fuel Pools,’’ dated June 4, 2001 

(ML003721626 and ML011450420, 

respectively), the NRC staff discussed 

additional information concerning SFP 

zirconium fire risks at decommissioning 

reactors and associated implications for 

onsite property damage insurance. 

Providing an analysis of when the spent 

fuel stored in the SFP is capable of aircooling is one measure that can be used 

to demonstrate that the probability of a 

zirconium fire is exceedingly low. 

In their letter dated March 18, 2022, 

HDI stated, and the NRC staff 

confirmed, that the bounding analyses 

for the IP2 and IP3 SFPs for beyond 

design basis events demonstrate that 15 

months after shutdown of IP3 a 

minimum of 10 hours is available before 

the fuel cladding temperature of the 

hottest fuel assembly in either SFP 

reaches 900°C with a complete loss of 

SFP water inventory. This analysis, 

‘‘Holtec Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up 

Calculation Methodology Topical 

Report, Revision 2,’’ dated December 22, 

2021 (ML21357A005 [non-public]), was 

submitted by HDI in support of a 

request for exemptions from certain 

emergency planning requirements, 

dated December 22, 2021 

(ML21356B693). HDI provided further 

information in Enclosure 1, ‘‘Indian 

Point Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool 

Heat Up Calculations,’’ to HDI’s 

supplemental letter dated February 1, 

2022 (ML22032A117). 

As stated in NUREG–1738, 

‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool 

Accident Risk at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated February 

2001 (ML010430066), 900°C is an 

acceptable temperature to use for 

assessing the onset of fission product 

release, where the SFP is drained and 

air cooling is not possible; at least 10 

hours would be available from the time 

spent fuel cooling is lost until the 

hottest fuel assembly reaches a 

temperature of 900°C. The 10-hour 

criterion, conservatively, does not 

consider the time to uncover the fuel 

and assumes instantaneous loss of 

cooling to the fuel. The 10-hour time 

period is also not intended to represent 

the time that it would take to repair all 

key safety systems or to repair a large 

SFP breach. The 10-hour criterion is a 

conservative period of time in which 

pre-planned mitigation measures to 

provide makeup water or spray to the 

SFP can be reliably implemented before 

the onset of a zirconium cladding 

ignition. In addition, in the unlikely 

event that a release is projected to occur, 

10 hours would provide sufficient time 

for offsite agencies, if deemed 

warranted, to take appropriate action to 

protect the health and safety of the 

public. 

In the NRC staff’s evaluation 

contained in SECY–22–0102, the NRC 

staff assessed the HDI accident analyses 

associated with the radiological risks 

from a zirconium fire at a permanently 

shutdown and defueled IPEC after 15 

months of fuel decay. For the highly 

unlikely beyond design-basis accident 

scenario where the SFP coolant 

inventory is lost in such a manner that 

all methods of heat removal from the 

spent fuel are no longer available, the 

NRC staff found that there will be a 

minimum of 10 hours from the 

initiation of the accident until the 

cladding reaches a temperature where 

offsite radiological release might occur. 

The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is 

sufficient time to support deployment of 

mitigation equipment, consistent with 

plant conditions, to prevent the 

zirconium cladding from reaching a 

point of rapid oxidation. As a result, the 

likelihood that such a scenario would 

progress to a zirconium fire is deemed 

not credible. 

Based on the evaluation in SECY–96– 

256, as well as analysis done by HDI 

and verified by the NRC staff, the NRC 

staff determined $50 million to be an 

adequate level of onsite property 

damage insurance for a 

decommissioning reactor once the spent 

fuel in the SFP is no longer susceptible 

to a zirconium fire. However, the NRC 

staff has postulated that there is still a 

potential for other radiological incidents 

at a decommissioning reactor that could 

result in significant onsite 

contamination besides a zirconium fire. 

In SECY–96–256, the NRC staff cited the 

rupture of a large, contaminated liquid 

storage tank (∼450,000 gallons) causing 

soil contamination and potential 

groundwater contamination as the 

costliest postulated event to 

decontaminate and remediate (other 

than an SFP zirconium fire). The 

postulated large liquid radiological 

waste storage tank rupture event was 

determined to have a bounding onsite 

cleanup cost of approximately $50 

million. Therefore, the NRC staff 

determined that the licensee’s proposal 

to reduce onsite insurance to a level of 

$50 million would be consistent with 

the bounding cleanup and 

decontamination cost, as discussed in 

SECY–96–256, to account for the 

postulated rupture of a large liquid 

radiological waste tank at the IPEC site, 

should such an event occur. 

The NRC staff has determined that the 

licensee’s proposed reduction in onsite 

property damage insurance coverage to 

a level of $50 million is consistent with 

SECY–96–256 and subsequent 

insurance considerations resulting from 

additional zirconium fire risks as 

discussed in SECY–00–0145 and SECY– 

01–0100, as well as NUREG/CR–6451 

and NUREG–1738. In addition, the NRC 

staff notes that similar exemptions have 

been granted to other permanently 

shutdown and defueled power reactors, 

upon demonstration that the criterion of 

the zirconium fire risks from the 

irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of 

negligible concern. The NRC staff 

concluded that 15 months after the 

permanent shutdown date of IP3 of 

April 30, 2021, sufficient irradiated fuel 

decay time will have elapsed at IPEC to 

decrease the probability of an onsite 

radiological release from a postulated 

zirconium fire accident to negligible 

levels. In addition, the licensee’s 

proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a 

level of $50 million is consistent with 

the maximum estimated cleanup costs 

for the recovery from the rupture of a 

large liquid radwaste storage tank. 

The NRC staff also notes that in 

accordance with letters submitted by 

HDI on February 15, 2023, and October 

16, 2023 (ML23046A102 and 

ML23289A158), all the spent fuel from 

the IP2 and IP3 SFPs has been 

transferred to dry storage within the 

ISFSI. As such, an initiating event that 

would threaten SFP integrity is no 

longer applicable. 

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law 

The requested exemption from 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow the 

licensee to reduce the minimum 

coverage limit for onsite property 

damage insurance. As stated above, 10 

CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50 when the exemptions are 

authorized by law. 

As explained above, the NRC staff has 

determined that the licensee’s proposed 

reduction in onsite property damage 

insurance coverage to a level of $50 

million is consistent with SECY–96– 

256. Moreover, the NRC staff concluded 

that 15 months after the permanent 

cessation of power operations, sufficient 

irradiated fuel decay time will have 


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elapsed at IPEC to decrease the 

probability of an onsite and offsite 

radiological release from a postulated 

zirconium fire accident to negligible 

levels. In addition, the licensee’s 

proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a 

level of $50 million is consistent with 

the maximum estimated cleanup costs 

for the recovery from the rupture of a 

large liquid radiological waste storage 

tank. 

The NRC staff has determined that 

granting the licensee’s proposed 

exemption will not result in a violation 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, or the Commission’s 

regulations. Therefore, based on its 

review of the licensee’s exemption 

request as discussed above, and 

consistent with SECY–96–256, the NRC 

staff concludes that the exemption is 

authorized by law. 

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue 

Risk to the Public Health and Safety 

The onsite property damage insurance 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

were established to provide financial 

assurance that following a significant 

nuclear incident, onsite conditions 

could be stabilized and the site 

decontaminated. The requirements of 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level 

of onsite insurance coverage for IPEC 

are predicated on the assumption that 

the reactor is operating. However, IPEC 

permanently ceased power operations 

on October 31, 1974, April 30, 2020, and 

April 30, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, 

respectively), and permanently defueled 

as of January 1976, May 12, 2020, and 

May 11, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, 

respectively). The permanent cessation 

of operations and defueled status of the 

facility results in a significant reduction 

in the number and severity of potential 

accidents and, correspondingly, a 

significant reduction in the potential for 

and severity of onsite property damage. 

The proposed reduction in the amount 

of onsite insurance coverage does not 

impact the probability or consequences 

of potential accidents. The proposed 

level of insurance coverage is 

commensurate with the reduced 

consequences of potential nuclear 

accidents at IPEC. Therefore, the NRC 

staff concludes that granting the 

requested exemption will not present an 

undue risk to the health and safety of 

the public. 

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the 

Common Defense and Security 

The proposed exemption would not 

eliminate any requirements associated 

with physical protection of the site and 

would not adversely affect the licensee’s 

ability to physically secure the site or 

protect special nuclear material. 

Physical security measures at IPEC are 

not affected by the requested exemption. 

Therefore, the proposed exemption is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. 

D. Special Circumstances 

Special circumstances, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present 

whenever application of the regulation 

in the particular circumstances is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the regulation. 

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable 

assurance that adequate funds will be 

available to stabilize reactor conditions 

and cover onsite cleanup costs 

associated with site decontamination 

following an accident that results in the 

release of a significant amount of 

radiological material. Since IPEC 

permanently ceased power operations 

on October 31, 1974, April 30, 2020, and 

April 30, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, 

respectively), and permanently defueled 

as of January 1976, May 12, 2020, and 

May 11, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, 

respectively), it is no longer possible for 

the radiological consequences of designbasis accidents or other credible events 

at IPEC to exceed the limits of the EPA 

PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 

The licensee has evaluated the 

consequences of highly unlikely, 

beyond-design-basis conditions 

involving a loss of coolant from the SFP. 

The analyses show that 15 months after 

the permanent cessation of power 

operations, the likelihood of such an 

event leading to a large radiological 

release is negligible. The NRC staff’s 

evaluation of the licensee’s analyses 

confirms this conclusion. 

The NRC staff also finds that the 

licensee’s proposed $50 million level of 

onsite insurance is consistent with the 

bounding cleanup and decontamination 

cost as discussed in SECY–96–256, to 

account for the hypothetical rupture of 

a large liquid radiological waste tank at 

the IPEC site, should such an event 

occur. Therefore, the NRC staff 

concludes that the application of the 

current requirements in 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in 

onsite insurance coverage is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule for the permanently 

shutdown and defueled IPEC reactors. 

Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special 

circumstances are present whenever 

compliance would result in undue 

hardship or other costs that are 

significantly in excess of those 

contemplated when the regulation was 

adopted, or that are significantly in 

excess of those incurred by others 

similarly situated. 

The NRC staff concludes that if the 

licensee was required to continue to 

maintain an onsite insurance level of 

$1.06 billion, the associated insurance 

premiums would be in excess of those 

necessary and commensurate with the 

radiological contamination risks posed 

by the site. In addition, such insurance 

levels would be significantly in excess 

of other decommissioning reactor 

facilities that have been granted similar 

exemptions by the NRC. 

The NRC staff finds that compliance 

with the existing rule would result in an 

undue hardship or other costs that are 

significantly in excess of those 

contemplated when the regulation was 

adopted and are significantly in excess 

of those incurred by others similarly 

situated. 

Therefore, the special circumstances 

required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist. 

E. Environmental Considerations 

The NRC’s approval of an exemption 

from insurance or indemnity 

requirements belongs to a category of 

actions that the Commission, by rule or 

regulation, has declared to be a 

categorical exclusion after first finding 

that the category of actions does not 

individually or cumulatively have a 

significant effect on the human 

environment. Specifically, the 

exemption is categorically excluded 

from the requirement to prepare an 

environmental assessment or 

environmental impact statement in 

accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25). 

Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting 

of an exemption from the requirements 

of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR, 

‘‘Nuclear Regulatory Commission,’’ is a 

categorical exclusion provided that: (i) 

there is no significant hazards 

consideration; (ii) there is no significant 

change in the types or significant 

increase in the amounts of any effluents 

that may be released offsite; (iii) there is 

no significant increase in individual or 

cumulative public or occupational 

radiation exposure; (iv) there is no 

significant construction impact; (v) 

there is no significant increase in the 

potential for or consequences from 

radiological accidents; and (vi) the 

requirements from which an exemption 

is sought involve surety, insurance, or 

indemnity requirements. 

As the Director of the Division of 

Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, 

and Waste Programs in the NRC’s Office 

of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards, I have determined that 

approval of the exemption request 

involves no significant hazards 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
90212 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 249 / Friday, December 29, 2023 / Notices 

consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 

50.92, ‘‘Issuance of amendment,’’ 

because reducing the licensee’s onsite 

property damage insurance for IPEC 

does not: (1) involve a significant 

increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a 

new or different kind of accident from 

any accident previously evaluated; or 

(3) involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. The exempted 

financial protection regulation is 

unrelated to the operation of IPEC or 

site activities. Accordingly, there is no 

significant change in the types or 

significant increase in the amounts of 

any effluents that may be released 

offsite and no significant increase in 

individual or cumulative public or 

occupational radiation exposure. The 

exempted regulation is not associated 

with construction so there is no 

significant construction impact. The 

exempted regulation does not concern 

the source term (i.e., potential amount 

of radiation in an accident) or any 

activities conducted at the site. 

Therefore, there is no significant 

increase in the potential for, or 

consequences of, a radiological 

accident. In addition, there would be no 

significant impacts to biota, water 

resources, historic properties, cultural 

resources, or socioeconomic conditions 

in the region resulting from issuance of 

the requested exemption. The 

requirement for onsite property damage 

insurance involves surety, insurance, 

and indemnity matters only. 

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), ‘‘Criterion for 

categorical exclusion; identification of 

licensing and regulatory actions eligible 

for categorical exclusion or otherwise 

not requiring environmental review,’’ no 

environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

approval of this exemption request. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present as set forth in 

10 CFR 50.12. 

Therefore, the Commission hereby 

grants the licensee an exemption from 

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

for IPEC. IPEC permanently ceased 

power operations on October 31, 1974, 

April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, for 

IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively. The 

exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

permits IPEC to reduce the minimum 

required onsite property damage 

insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 

million 15 months after permanent 

cessation of power operations, which 

was August 1, 2022. Because this period 

has already elapsed, the exemption is 

effective upon issuance. 

Dated: November 14, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Jane Marshall, 

Director, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28777 Filed 12–28–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50–286; 

NRC–2022–0223] 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian 

Point Nuclear Energy Center; 

Exemption 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has issued 

exemptions in response to a request 

from Holtec Decommissioning 

International, LLC that would permit it, 

Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and Holtec 

Indian Point 3, LLC, to reduce certain 

emergency planning (EP) requirements. 

The exemptions eliminate the 

requirements to maintain an offsite 

radiological emergency preparedness 

plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP 

activities at the Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, 

collectively referred to as the Indian 

Point Energy Center (IPEC), based on the 

reduced risks of accidents that could 

result in an offsite radiological release at 

a decommissioning nuclear power 

reactor. 

DATES: The exemption was issued on 

November 1, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2022–0223 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2022–0223. Address 

questions about Docket IDs in 

Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 

telephone: 301–415–0624; email: 

Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical 

questions, contact the individual listed 

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at 

301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS 

accession number for each document 

referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that it is 

mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you 

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time (ET), Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl 

Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415– 

8534; email: Karl.Sturzebecher@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of 

the exemption is attached. 

Dated: December 26, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Marlayna V. Doell, 

Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning 

Branch, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

Attachment—Exemption 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50– 

286 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian 

Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 

2, and 3; Exemption 

I. Background 

Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) 

Units 1, 2, and 3, are decommissioning 

power reactors located on 

approximately 239 acres of land on the 

east bank of the Hudson River at the 

Village of Buchanan in upper 

Westchester County, New York. The 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1