* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 98-11239

Summary Calendar

_________________

TINA ANTOINE-TUBBS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

LOCAL 513, AIR TRANSPORT DIVISION, TRANSPORT

WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO; AMERICAN AIRLINES,

INC; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS

OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:96-CV-572-P)

July 19, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plain t iff-Appellant, Tina Antoine-Tubbs (“Tubbs”), appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Ap pel lee, American Airlines, Inc. (“American”). We affirm.

I

Tubbs worked as a building cleaner and then as a fleet service clerk for American. Tubbs

brought suit claiming that American intentionally inflict ed emotional distress upon her, that American

discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and race, and that American vio lat ed t he Family

Medical Leave Act. The district court granted American summary judgment on each of Tubbs’

claims. Tubbs timely appealed. On appeal, Tubbs argues that the district court erred for three-2-

reasons.

First, Tubbs claims that the district court erred in gra nt ing summary judgment on her

intentional inflict

i o n o f emotional distress claim. Tubbs specifically argues that the district court

erroneously excl

uded the testimony of her expert witness, Dr. Rhodesia LaStrap. Dr. LaStrap

te s t ified that American’s conduct resulted in work-related stress that caused Tubbs to develop

preeclampsia and miscarry her child. The district court found Dr. LaStrap’s testimony inadmissable

under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Chemical Co.

, 509 U.S. 5 79, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469

(1993), and concluded that, withou t Dr. LaStrap’s testimony, Tubbs presented no evidence that

American’s conduct caused Tubbs emotional distress.

We review the district court’s decision to exclude Dr. La St rap’s testimony for abuse of

discretion. S ee Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc.

, 151 F.3d 269, 274 (5 th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Under

Daubert

, the district court must perform a gatekeepin g ro le and “ensure that any and all scientific

testimony

. . . is not only relevant, but reliable.” D aubert

, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2795, 125

L. Ed. 2d at __.

The record shows that Dr. LaStrap did not possess specialized knowledge of preeclampsia,

and did not rely on medical studies or literature in support of her expert opi nio n t hat American’s

conduct caused the severe preeclampsia that led to the death of Tubbs’ baby. Thus, Dr. LaStrap’s

testimony was unreliable, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding her testimony.

See Ta n ner v. Westbrook, M.D.

, No. 97-60416, 1999 WL 246712 at *6 (5 th Cir. Apr. 27, 1999)

(concluding that district court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony where the expert

“did not have the kind of specialized knowledge required to testify regarding causation

. . . [and did

not] rely upon medical literature directly addressing the causation issue.”). We agree with the district

court that, exce pt fo r the testimony of Dr. LaStrap, Tubbs presented no evidence that American

caused her emotional distress. Accordingly, Tubbs’ claim o f intentional infliction of emotional

distress fails. S ee Twyman v. Twyman

, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.1993) (noting that to establish an

intentional inflict

ion of emotional distress claim, a plaint iff must show th at the defendant’s actions-3-

caused the plaintiff emotional distress).

Second, Tubbs ar gues t hat the district court erred in denying her motion for leave to file

affidavits from additional witnesses with her response to American’s motion for summary judgment.

The district court denied the motion because it concluded that Tubbs failed to show “good cause or

substantial justification for her failure to disclose the[] witnesses prior to the close of discovery,” as

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1). Tubbs contends, however, that Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(e) entitles her to supplement her summary ju dgment response wi th the

affidavits.

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. S ee General Electric

Co. v. Joiner , 522 U.S. 136, __ 118 S.Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed.2d 508, __ (1997). In this case, the

record shows that Tubbs did not identify her additional witnesses pr ior t o t he close of discovery

.

Tubbs has offered no persu asive explanation for her failure to comply with the district court’s

discovery deadline. See Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 95 F.3d 375, 380 (5 th Cir. 1996) (noting

that a party’s ex planat ion for its failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order is one

factor that informs our determination as to whether the district court abused its discretion in

excluding expert testimony). Accordingly, we hold that the district court acted within its discretion

in refusing to grant Tubbs’ motion for leave to file affidavits from additional witnesses. S ee Reliance

Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.

, 110 F.3d 253, 257 (5 th Cir. 1997)(“District judges

have the power to control their dockets by refusing to give ineffective litigants a second chance to

develop their case.”).

Finally, Tubbs argues that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment because,

according to Tubbs, she established a m at erial fact as to her hostile work environment sexual

harassment claim. Tubbs alleged sexual harassment based upon “(1) the frequent and recurring

presence of lewd and obscene drawings, pictures and g raffit i in areas [where] employees would

traverse, and (2) comments and touching from supervisory personnel. . . .”

To avoid dismissal of her suit, Tubbs ne eded t o have filed her complaint with the EEOC1 Tubbs identified one comment that might have been made in either 1994 or 1989.

-4- within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. S ee 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); W ebb

v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc.

, 139 F.3d 532, 537 (5 th Cir. 1998). It is undisputed that, with one

possible exception, 1 all of the incidents of improper comments or touching about which Tubbs

complains occurred more than 300 days before Tubbs filed her EEO complaint. Moreover, even if

one incident did occur within the applicable limitations period, we hold that the conduct about which

Tubbs complains is insufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute actionable harassment. See

Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts

, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5 th Cir. 1999) (ho lding that

co-worker's sexual harassment did not render empl oy ee's work environment objectively hostile, where

co-worker made comment about the color of plaint iff’s nipples and the size of her thighs, attempted

to look down her shirt, touched plaint iff’s arm several times and rubbed his hand from her shoulder

to her waist, and on two occasions told her too sit on his lap). With respect to the drawings, pictures

and graffiti, we agree with the district court that the summary judgment evidence properly before it

showed that American took prompt remedial action. S ee Jones v. Flagship Int’l

, 793 F.2d 714, 719-

20 (5 th Cir. 198 6) (list ing the five elements necessary to make out a hostile environment claim,

including “that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to

take prompt remedial action”).

II

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment.