[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 2, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 101-105]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28813]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-255; NRC-2023-0200]


Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades, 
LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice; issuance.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an 
exemption in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning 
International, LLC (HDI), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec 
International, that would allow HDI and Holtec Palisades, LLC, 
regarding certain emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemption 
eliminates the requirements to maintain an offsite radiological 
emergency preparedness plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP 
activities at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, based on the reduced risks 
of accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a 
decommissioning nuclear power reactor.

DATES: The exemption was issued on December 22, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2023-0200 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2023-0200. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#db88afbab8a2f588b8b3aeb6bab5b59bb5a9b8f5bcb4ad"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3063445153491e635358455d515e5e705e42531e575f46">[email protected]</span></a>. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this document.
    <bullet> NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, 
or by email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#db8b9f89f589bea8b4aea9b8be9bb5a9b8f5bcb4ad"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="de8e9a8cf08cbbadb1abacbdbb9eb0acbdf0b9b1a8">[email protected]</span></a>. The ADAMS accession number for 
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the 
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
    <bullet> NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an 
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6f3f2b3d413d0a1c001a1d0c0a2f011d0c41080019"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a1f1e5f38ff3c4d2ced4d3c2c4e1cfd3c28fc6ced7">[email protected]</span></a> or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8 
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tanya E. Hood, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1387; email: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1d497c73647c33557272795d736f7e337a726b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d581b4bbacb4fb9dbabab195bba7b6fbb2baa3">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated: December 27, 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tanya E. Hood,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of 
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Docket No. 50-255

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC; 
Palisades Nuclear Plant, Exemption

I. Background

    By letter dated October 19, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML17292A032), Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC, or Commission) that it planned to permanently cease 
power operations at the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades) no later 
than May 31, 2022. On May 20, 2022, ENOI permanently ceased power 
operations at Palisades, and by letter dated June 13, 2022 
(ML22164A067), ENOI certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently 
removed from the Palisades reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel 
pool (SFP) on June 10, 2022.
    By application dated December 23, 2020 (ML20358A075), as 
supplemented

[[Page 102]]

by information provided in letters from Holtec Decommissioning 
International, LLC (HDI, the licensee) dated December 23, 2020, and 
October 29, 2021 (ML20358A232, ML20358A239, and ML21302A064), ENOI, 
Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC, Holtec International, and HDI submitted 
an ``Application for Order Consenting to Transfers of Control of 
Licenses and Approving Conforming License Amendments'' requesting 
transfer of the Palisades license to HDI. By letter dated December 13, 
2021 (ML21292A145), the NRC issued an order consenting to the license 
transfer and draft conforming administrative license amendments. The 
license transfer was executed on June 28, 2022 (ML22173A173), 
coinciding with the transition of Palisades from an operational to a 
decommissioning status.
    Based on the docketing of the certifications for permanent 
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor 
vessel, as specified in section 50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility 
operating license for Palisades no longer authorizes operation of the 
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The 
facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., 
spent) nuclear fuel. Palisades spent fuel is currently stored in the 
SFP and in dry cask storage at the independent spent fuel storage 
installation (ISFSI).
    Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety 
analysis reports (USARs) for operating nuclear power reactors involve 
failures or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the 
reactor core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would 
involve the release of some fission products. With the permanent 
cessation of power operations at Palisades and the permanent removal of 
fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible. 
The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems are no 
longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of the 
spent fuel. Therefore, the emergency planning (EP) provisions for 
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, 
reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
appendix E, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and 
Utilization Facilities,'' to 10 CFR part 50 continue to apply to 
nuclear power reactors that have provided certification that they have 
permanently ceased operations and have permanently removed all fuel 
from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions 
distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is permanently 
shut down and defueled from those for a reactor that is authorized to 
operate. To reduce or eliminate EP requirements that are no longer 
necessary due to the decommissioning status of the facility, the 
licensee must obtain exemptions from those EP regulations. Only then 
can HDI modify the Palisades emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk 
associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of 
Palisades.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated July 11, 2022 (ML22192A134), HDI requested 
exemptions from specific portions of the EP requirements of 10 CFR 
50.47 and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 for Palisades. More 
specifically, HDI requested exemptions from certain planning standards 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency 
preparedness plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) for establishment of plume exposure 
pathway and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones (EPZs) for 
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, section IV, ``Content of Emergency Plans.''
    The exemptions requested by HDI would eliminate the requirements to 
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 
CFR, ``Emergency Management and Assistance,'' Part 350, ``Review and 
Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and 
Preparedness,'' and would reduce the scope of the onsite EP activities 
at Palisades. HDI stated that application of all the standards and 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, 
appendix E is not needed for adequate emergency response capability, 
based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological 
consequences of accidents still possible at the permanently shutdown 
and defueled facility as compared to an operating facility.
    If offsite protective actions were needed for a highly unlikely 
beyond design-basis accidents (DBAs) that could challenge the safe 
storage of spent fuel at Palisades, provisions exist for offsite 
agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency 
management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to 
protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, 
also referred to as an emergency operations plan, is addressed in 
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and 
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is publicly available 
at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation for State, 
territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It promotes a 
common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and 
decision-making and helps planners at all levels of government in their 
efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats 
emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is flexible enough for 
use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be 
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific 
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and 
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be 
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards 
planning.''

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50 when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the 
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances 
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances 
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in 
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of 
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.
    As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the 
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has 
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the 
reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible 
accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. 
However, current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power

[[Page 103]]

reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological 
release from a credible emergency accident scenario is reduced. Due to 
the permanently defueled status of the reactor, no new spent fuel will 
be added to the Palisades SFP and the radionuclides in the current 
spent fuel will continue to decay as the spent fuel ages. The spent 
fuel will produce less heat due to radioactive decay, increasing the 
available time to mitigate a loss of water inventory from the SFP. The 
NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic 
BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor] 
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 1997 
(ML082260098), and the NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent 
Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' 
dated February 2001 (ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently 
shutdown and defueled power reactors that are bounded by the 
assumptions and conditions in the report, the risk of offsite 
radiological release is significantly less than for an operating 
nuclear power reactor.
    In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by HDI, have 
been granted to licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power 
reactors. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all 
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify 
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific 
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled 
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions from 
certain EP requirements was based on the licensee's demonstration that: 
(1) the radiological consequences of DBAs would not exceed the limits 
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protective Action 
Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary, and (2) in the highly 
unlikely event of a beyond DBA resulting in a loss of all modes of 
cooling for the spent fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time 
to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite 
authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP 
approach to protect the health and safety of the public. In prior 
exemptions, sufficient time was demonstrated if the time exceeded 10 
hours from the loss of coolant until the fuel temperature would be 
expected to reach 900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), assuming no air 
cooling. In this exemption request, the licensee provided an analysis 
demonstrating that after the spent fuel has decayed for 12 months, for 
beyond-design-basis events where the SFP is drained and air cooling is 
not possible, at least 10 hours would be available from the time spent 
fuel cooling is lost until the hottest fuel assembly reaches a 
temperature of 900 [deg]C. This 10-hour minimum threshold provides 
sufficient time for the licensee to take mitigative actions, or if 
government officials deem warranted, for offsite protective actions to 
be initiated using a CEMP or ``all-hazards'' approach.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the 
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and 
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) 
are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment of 
the HDI EP exemptions is described in SECY-23-0043, ``Request by Holtec 
Decommissioning International, LLC for Exemptions from Certain 
Emergency Planning Requirements for Palisades Nuclear Plant,'' dated 
May 30, 2023 (ML23054A179). The Commission approved the NRC staff's 
recommendation to grant the exemptions in the staff requirements 
memorandum to SECY-23-0043, dated December 7, 2023 (ML23341A181). The 
exemptions are conditioned to make it clear that the exemptions will 
terminate if the status of the Palisades reactor changes such that the 
certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent 
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are no longer applicable. 
Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by HDI and the NRC 
staff's basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-23-0043. 
The staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the 
specific EP exemptions, requested by HDI, are provided in the NRC 
staff's safety evaluation dated December 22, 2023 (ML23263A977).

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, 
section IV, which would allow HDI to revise the Palisades Emergency 
Plan to reflect the submittal of the certification of the permanently 
shutdown and defueled condition of the facility. As stated above, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined that 
granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will not result in a 
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's 
regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Presents no Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    As stated previously, HDI provided analyses that show the 
radiological consequences of DBA will not exceed the limits of the EPA 
PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, formal offsite 
radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR part 50 are no 
longer needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area 
boundary, based on the radiological consequences of DBAs still possible 
at Palisades.
    Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond DBA that 
might result in significant offsite radiological releases. However, 
NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond DBAs is greatly reduced at 
permanently shutdown and defueled reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in 
NUREG-1738 concludes that the event sequences important to risk at 
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors are limited to large 
earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an 
important difference relative to the operating power reactors, where 
typically a large number of different sequences make significant 
contributions to risk. As described in NUREG-1738, relaxation of 
offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a few months after shutdown 
resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further concludes 
that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP requirements is 
small because the overall risk is low, and because even under current 
EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was judged to have 
marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the severe earthquake 
event that dominates SFP risk. All other sequences including cask drops 
(for which offsite radiological emergency plans are expected to be more 
effective) are too low in likelihood to have a significant impact on 
risk. Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 
10 CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present 
an undue risk to the public health and safety.

[[Page 104]]

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The requested exemptions by HDI only involve EP requirements under 
10 CFR part 50 and will allow HDI to revise the Palisades Emergency 
Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. Physical security measures at Palisades are not affected by 
the requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite 
radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in scope of 
the onsite EP activities at Palisades will not adversely affect the 
licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect special 
nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent 
with common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, is to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, 
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite 
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and 
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the 
risks associated with operation of a nuclear power reactor at its 
licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a 
reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
    As discussed previously in Section III, because Palisades is 
permanently shut down and defueled, there is no longer a risk of 
offsite radiological release from a DBA and the risk of a significant 
offsite radiological release from a beyond DBA is greatly reduced when 
compared to the risk at an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has 
confirmed the reduced risks at Palisades by comparing the generic risk 
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific conditions 
at Palisades and determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound 
the risks presented for Palisades. As indicated by the results of the 
research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more recently for NUREG-2161, 
``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the 
Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,'' dated 
September 2014 (ML14255A365), while other consequences can be 
extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have little 
potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite 
radiological EP requirements were relaxed. HDI's analysis of a beyond 
DBA involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an 
adiabatic heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, 
shows that 12 months after permanent cessation of power operations at 
Palisades, the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C 
is at least 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming 
a loss of all cooling means.
    The NRC staff has verified the licensee's analyses and its 
calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in 
granting the requested exemptions to HDI, there is no DBA that will 
result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the 
exclusion area boundary. In the highly unlikely event of a beyond DBA 
affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via 
all modes of heat transfer, there will be a minimum of 10 hours 
available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at 
least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a 
means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were 
projected to occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 
hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to 
implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the 
health and safety of the public.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory with no air cooling (or other methods of removing 
decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the 
rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously 
granted exemptions, as it does with the licensee's requested EP 
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate 
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP 
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently 
shutdown and defueled facilities.
    Additionally, in its letter to the NRC dated July 11, 2022, HDI 
described the SFP makeup strategies that could be used in the event of 
a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple strategies for 
providing makeup water to the SFP include: using various existing plant 
systems for inventory makeup and an internal strategy that relies on 
the portable FLEX pump manifold, and having available two installed 
diesel-driven fire pumps and one motor-driven fire pump that can 
provide 1,500 gallons per minute makeup water from the facility intake 
via hard pipe or hose stations. In addition, HDI states that two onsite 
FLEX pumper units with a capacity of 1,000 gallons per minute each can 
provide makeup water from the facility intake or from Lake Michigan 
directly. Further, Palisades procedures specify that the installation 
of the SFP spray monitor nozzles and direct fill should be given 
priority over the hard pipe fill connection due to expected SFP area 
high radiation levels if the SFP water level cannot be maintained. 
These strategies will continue to be required as License Condition 6.b 
of Renewed Facility License No. DPR-20 for Palisades. Considering the 
very low probability of beyond DBAs affecting the SFP, these diverse 
strategies provide multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or 
spray to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite 
radiological release.
    For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the 
licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of 
the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as the requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, and satisfy the special 
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the 
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated 
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the Palisades 
facility 12 months after the facility permanently ceases operation.
    The NRC staff further concludes that the exemptions granted by this 
action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at 
Palisades and provide reasonable assurance that adequate offsite 
protective measures, if needed, can and will be taken by State and 
local government agencies using a CEMP approach, in the highly unlikely 
event of a radiological emergency at Palisades. Since the underlying 
purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even 
with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to 
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and the reduction 
in the scope of the onsite EP activities at Palisades, the special

[[Page 105]]

circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's 
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact published 
in the Federal Register (FR) on December 21, 2023 (88 FR 88664).

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, the licensee's request for exemptions from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
23-0043, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense 
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants HDI exemptions from certain EP requirements in 
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, 
section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's 
safety evaluation dated December 22, 2023. The exemptions are effective 
12 months after permanent cessation of power operations, which was May 
20, 2023. Because this period had already elapsed, the exemption is 
effective upon issuance. These exemptions will terminate if the status 
of the Palisades reactor changes such that the certifications of 
permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from 
the reactor vessel are no longer applicable.

    Dated: this 22nd day of December 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jane Marshall,

Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 2023-28813 Filed 12-29-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>