(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 14–6368. Argued April 27, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015 

While petitioner Kingsley was awaiting trial in county jail, officers forcibly removed him from his cell when he refused to comply with their

instructions. Kingsley filed a complaint in Federal District Court

claiming, as relevant here, that two of the officers used excessive 

force against him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause. At the trial’s conclusion, the District Court instructed the jury that Kingsley was required to prove, inter alia, that the 

officers “recklessly disregarded [Kingsley’s] safety” and “acted with 

reckless disregard of [his] rights.” The jury found in the officers’ favor. On appeal, Kingsley argued that the jury instruction did not adhere to the proper standard for judging a pretrial detainee’s excessive 

force claim, namely, objective unreasonableness. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the law required a subjective inquiry into 

the officers’ state of mind, i.e., whether the officers actually intended

to violate, or recklessly disregarded, Kingsley’s rights. 

Held: 

1. Under 42 U. S. C. §1983, a pretrial detainee must show only

that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable to prevail on an excessive force claim. Pp. 5–13.

(a) This determination must be made from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at 

the time, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396, and must account for the “legitimate interests [stemming from the government’s] 

need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,” appropriately deferring to “policies and practices that in th[e] judgment” of jail officials “are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security,” Bell v. Wolfish, 

441 U. S. 520, 540, 547. Pp. 5–7. 
 

 

 

 

 

2 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

Syllabus 

(b) Several considerations lead to this conclusion. An objective 

standard is consistent with precedent. In Bell, for instance, this 

Court held that a pretrial detainee could prevail on a claim that his

due process rights were violated by providing only objective evidence 

that the challenged governmental action was not rationally related to

a legitimate governmental objective or that it was excessive in relation to that purpose. 441 U. S., at 541–543. Cf. Block v. Rutherford, 

468 U. S. 576, 585–586. Experience also suggests that an objective 

standard is workable. It is consistent with the pattern jury instructions used in several Circuits, and many facilities train officers to interact with detainees as if the officers’ conduct is subject to objective 

reasonableness. Finally, the use of an objective standard adequately 

protects an officer who acts in good faith, e.g., by acknowledging that

judging the reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and 

with the knowledge of the defendant officer is an appropriate part of 

the analysis. Pp. 7–10.

(c) None of the cases respondents point to provides significant 

support for a subjective standard. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 

and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, lack relevance in this context 

because they involved claims brought by convicted prisoners under 

the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, not 

claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. And in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 

523 U. S. 833, a statement indicating the need to show “purpose to

cause harm,” id., at 854, for due process liability refers not to whether the force intentionally used was excessive, but whether the defendant intended to commit the acts in question, id., at 854, and 

n. 13. Finally, in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028 (CA2), a malicious-and-sadistic-purpose-to-cause-harm factor was not suggested as 

a necessary condition for liability, but as a factor, among others, that 

might help show that the use of force was excessive. Pp. 10–13. 

2. Applying the proper standard, the jury instruction was erroneous. Taken together, the features of that instruction suggested that

the jury should weigh respondents’ subjective reasons for using force 

and subjective views about the excessiveness of that force. Respondents’ claim that, irrespective of this Court’s holding, any error in the 

instruction was harmless is left to the Seventh Circuit to resolve on 

remand. Pp. 13–14. 

744 F. 3d 443, vacated and remanded. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, 

GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined. ALITO, 

J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 14–6368 

MICHAEL B. KINGSLEY, PETITIONER v. STAN 

HENDRICKSON, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 22, 2015] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In this case, an individual detained in a jail prior to trial

brought a claim under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, 

against several jail officers, alleging that they used excessive force against him, in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The officers concede 

that they intended to use the force that they used. But 

the parties disagree about whether the force used was

excessive. 

The question before us is whether, to prove an excessive 

force claim, a pretrial detainee must show that the officers 

were subjectively aware that their use of force was unreasonable, or only that the officers’ use of that force was 

objectively unreasonable. We conclude that the latter 

standard is the correct one. 

I 

A 

Some but not all of the facts are undisputed: Michael 

Kingsley, the petitioner, was arrested on a drug charge

and detained in a Wisconsin county jail prior to trial. On 

the evening of May 20, 2010, an officer performing a cell 
 

 

 

2 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

Opinion of the Court 

check noticed a piece of paper covering the light fixture 

above Kingsley’s bed. The officer told Kingsley to remove

it; Kingsley refused; subsequently other officers told 

Kingsley to remove the paper; and each time Kingsley

refused. The next morning, the jail administrator, Lieutenant Robert Conroy, ordered Kingsley to remove the 

paper. Kingsley once again refused. Conroy then told

Kingsley that officers would remove the paper and that he

would be moved to a receiving cell in the interim.

Shortly thereafter, four officers, including respondents 

Sergeant Stan Hendrickson and Deputy Sheriff Fritz

Degner, approached the cell and ordered Kingsley to 

stand, back up to the door, and keep his hands behind 

him. When Kingsley refused to comply, the officers handcuffed him, forcibly removed him from the cell, carried him

to a receiving cell, and placed him face down on a bunk 

with his hands handcuffed behind his back. 

The parties’ views about what happened next differ.

The officers testified that Kingsley resisted their efforts to

remove his handcuffs. Kingsley testified that he did not 

resist. All agree that Sergeant Hendrickson placed his

knee in Kingsley’s back and Kingsley told him in impolite 

language to get off. Kingsley testified that Hendrickson

and Degner then slammed his head into the concrete 

bunk—an allegation the officers deny. 

The parties agree, however, about what happened next:

Hendrickson directed Degner to stun Kingsley with a 

Taser; Degner applied a Taser to Kingsley’s back for approximately five seconds; the officers then left the handcuffed Kingsley alone in the receiving cell; and officers

returned to the cell 15 minutes later and removed Kingsley’s handcuffs. 

B 

Based on these and related events, Kingsley filed a

§1983 complaint in Federal District Court claiming 
 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

(among other things) that Hendrickson and Degner used 

excessive force against him, in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The officers moved for 

summary judgment, which the District Court denied, 

stating that “a reasonable jury could conclude that [the

officers] acted with malice and intended to harm [Kingsley] when they used force against him.” Kingsley v. 

Josvai, No. 10–cv–832–bbc (WD Wis., Nov. 16, 2011), App

to Pet. for Cert. 66a–67a. Kingsley’s excessive force claim 

accordingly proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the 

trial, the District Court instructed the jury as follows: 

“Excessive force means force applied recklessly that 

is unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances

of the time. Thus, to succeed on his claim of excessive 

use of force, plaintiff must prove each of the following

factors by a preponderance of the evidence: 

“(1) Defendants used force on plaintiff; 

“(2) Defendants’ use of force was unreasonable in 

light of the facts and circumstances at the time; 

“(3) Defendants knew that using force presented a 

risk of harm to plaintiff, but they recklessly disregarded plaintiff ’s safety by failing to take reasonable

measures to minimize the risk of harm to plaintiff;

and 

“(4) Defendants’ conduct caused some harm to

plaintiff. 

“In deciding whether one or more defendants used

‘unreasonable’ force against plaintiff, you must consider whether it was unreasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer facing the same circumstances that defendants faced. You must make this 

decision based on what defendants knew at the time 

of the incident, not based on what you know now. 
 

 

 

4 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

Opinion of the Court 

“Also, in deciding whether one or more defendants 

used unreasonable force and acted with reckless disregard of plaintiff ’s rights, you may consider factors 

such as: 

“• The need to use force; 

“• The relationship between the need to use force

and the amount of force used; 

“• The extent of plaintiff ’s injury; 

“• Whether defendants reasonably believed there was 

a threat to the safety of staff or prisoners; and 

“• Any efforts made by defendants to limit the

amount of force used.” App. 277–278 (emphasis 

added). 

The jury found in the officers’ favor. 

On appeal, Kingsley argued that the correct standard

for judging a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is 

objective unreasonableness. And, the jury instruction, he 

said, did not hew to that standard. A panel of the Court of 

Appeals disagreed, with one judge dissenting. The majority held that the law required a “subjective inquiry” into 

the officer’s state of mind. There must be “‘an actual 

intent to violate [the plaintiff ’s] rights or reckless disregard for his rights.’” 744 F. 3d 443, 451 (CA7 2014) (quoting Wilson v. Williams, 83 F. 3d 870, 875 (CA7 1996)).

The dissent would have used instructions promulgated by 

the Committee on Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the 

Seventh Circuit, which require a pretrial detainee claiming excessive force to show only that the use of force was 

objectively unreasonable. 744 F. 3d, at 455 (opinion of 

Hamilton, J.); see Pattern Civ. Jury Instr. §7.08 (2009).

The dissent further stated that the District Court’s use of 

the word “reckless” in the jury instruction added “an

unnecessary and confusing element.” 744 F. 3d, at 455. 
 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Kingsley filed a petition for certiorari asking us to determine whether the requirements of a §1983 excessive 

force claim brought by a pretrial detainee must satisfy the 

subjective standard or only the objective standard. In 

light of disagreement among the Circuits, we agreed to do 

so. Compare, e.g., Murray v. Johnson No. 260, 367 Fed. 

Appx. 196, 198 (CA2 2010); Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F. 3d 

1265, 1271 (CA11 2005) (per curiam), with Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F. 3d 858, 865–866 (CA6 2010); Young v. Wolfe, 

478 Fed. Appx. 354, 356 (CA9 2012). 

II
 

A 

We consider a legally requisite state of mind. In a case 

like this one, there are, in a sense, two separate state-ofmind questions. The first concerns the defendant’s state 

of mind with respect to his physical acts—i.e., his state of 

mind with respect to the bringing about of certain physical

consequences in the world. The second question concerns

the defendant’s state of mind with respect to whether his

use of force was “excessive.” Here, as to the first question,

there is no dispute. As to the second, whether to interpret

the defendant’s physical acts in the world as involving 

force that was “excessive,” there is a dispute. We conclude 

with respect to that question that the relevant standard is

objective not subjective. Thus, the defendant’s state of 

mind is not a matter that a plaintiff is required to prove.

Consider the series of physical events that take place in

the world—a series of events that might consist, for example, of the swing of a fist that hits a face, a push that leads

to a fall, or the shot of a Taser that leads to the stunning 

of its recipient. No one here denies, and we must assume, 

that, as to the series of events that have taken place in the 

world, the defendant must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind. That is because, 

as we have stated, “liability for negligently inflicted harm 
 

 

6 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

Opinion of the Court 

is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due 

process.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 

849 (1998) (emphasis added). See also Daniels v. Williams, 

474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986) (“Historically, this guarantee of

due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of 

government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or

property”). Thus, if an officer’s Taser goes off by accident

or if an officer unintentionally trips and falls on a detainee,

causing him harm, the pretrial detainee cannot prevail on 

an excessive force claim. But if the use of force is deliberate—i.e., purposeful or knowing—the pretrial detainee’s 

claim may proceed. In the context of a police pursuit of a 

suspect the Court noted, though without so holding, that

recklessness in some cases might suffice as a standard for 

imposing liability. See Lewis, supra, at 849. Whether 

that standard might suffice for liability in the case of an 

alleged mistreatment of a pretrial detainee need not be

decided here; for the officers do not dispute that they acted

purposefully or knowingly with respect to the force they 

used against Kingsley.

We now consider the question before us here—the defendant’s state of mind with respect to the proper interpretation of the force (a series of events in the world) that the

defendant deliberately (not accidentally or negligently) 

used. In deciding whether the force deliberately used is,

constitutionally speaking, “excessive,” should courts use

an objective standard only, or instead a subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of mind? It 

is with respect to this question that we hold that courts

must use an objective standard. In short, we agree with

the dissenting appeals court judge, the Seventh Circuit’s

jury instruction committee, and Kingsley, that a pretrial 

detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.

A court (judge or jury) cannot apply this standard mechanically. See Lewis, supra, at 850. Rather, objective 
Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

reasonableness turns on the “facts and circumstances of 

each particular case.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 

396 (1989). A court must make this determination from 

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20

vision of hindsight. See ibid. A court must also account 

for the “legitimate interests that stem from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual

is detained,” appropriately deferring to “policies and practices that in th[e] judgment” of jail officials “are needed to

preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain

institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 540, 

547 (1979).

Considerations such as the following may bear on the

reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used: the 

relationship between the need for the use of force and the 

amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff ’s injury;

any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the

amount of force; the severity of the security problem at 

issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and 

whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. See, e.g., 

Graham, supra, at 396. We do not consider this list to be 

exclusive. We mention these factors only to illustrate the

types of objective circumstances potentially relevant to a

determination of excessive force. 

B 

Several considerations have led us to conclude that the 

appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive 

force claim is solely an objective one. For one thing, it is 

consistent with our precedent. We have said that “the 

Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the 

use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham, supra, at 395, n. 10. And in Bell, we explained that 

such “punishment” can consist of actions taken with an

“expressed intent to punish.” 441 U. S., at 538. But the 
 

 

 

8 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

Opinion of the Court 

Bell Court went on to explain that, in the absence of an

expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not “rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental 

purpose” or that the actions “appear excessive in relation 

to that purpose.” Id., at 561. The Bell Court applied this

latter objective standard to evaluate a variety of prison

conditions, including a prison’s practice of double-bunking.

In doing so, it did not consider the prison officials’ subjective beliefs about the policy. Id., at 541–543. Rather, the 

Court examined objective evidence, such as the size of the 

rooms and available amenities, before concluding that the 

conditions were reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of holding detainees for trial and did not appear

excessive in relation to that purpose. Ibid. 

Bell’s focus on “punishment” does not mean that proof of 

intent (or motive) to punish is required for a pretrial detainee to prevail on a claim that his due process rights

were violated. Rather, as Bell itself shows (and as our 

later precedent affirms), a pretrial detainee can prevail by

providing only objective evidence that the challenged

governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in 

relation to that purpose. Cf. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 

576, 585–586 (1984) (where there was no suggestion that

the purpose of jail policy of denying contact visitation was 

to punish inmates, the Court need only evaluate whether 

the policy was “reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives” and whether it appears excessive in 

relation to that objective); Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 

269–271 (1984) (similar); see also United States v. Salerno, 

481 U. S. 739, 747 (1987) (“[T]he punitive/regulatory 

distinction turns on ‘whether an alternative purpose to 

which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is

assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in

relation to the alternative purpose assigned [toit]’” (quot-
Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

ing Schall, supra, at 269; emphasis added and some internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court did not suggest

in any of these cases, either by its words or its analysis, 

that its application of Bell’s objective standard should 

involve subjective considerations. Our standard is also 

consistent with our use of an objective “excessive force” 

standard where officers apply force to a person who, like

Kingsley, has been accused but not convicted of a crime, 

but who, unlike Kingsley, is free on bail. See Graham, 

supra. 

For another thing, experience suggests that an objective

standard is workable. It is consistent with the pattern

jury instructions used in several Circuits. We are also told 

that many facilities, including the facility at issue here, 

train officers to interact with all detainees as if the officers’ conduct is subject to an objective reasonableness 

standard. See Brief for Petitioner 26; App. 247–248; Brief 

for Former Corrections Administrators and Experts as 

Amici Curiae 8–18. 

Finally, the use of an objective standard adequately

protects an officer who acts in good faith. We recognize

that “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking,” Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84–85 (1987), and 

that “safety and order at these institutions requires the 

expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face,” Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of 

County of Burlington, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 

5). Officers facing disturbances “are often forced to make 

split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 

397. For these reasons, we have stressed that a court 

must judge the reasonableness of the force used from the

perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant 

officer. We have also explained that a court must take 

account of the legitimate interests in managing a jail, 
 

 

10 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

Opinion of the Court 

acknowledging as part of the objective reasonableness

analysis that deference to policies and practices needed to

maintain order and institutional security is appropriate.

See Part II–A, supra. And we have limited liability for 

excessive force to situations in which the use of force was 

the result of an intentional and knowing act (though we 

leave open the possibility of including a “reckless” act as

well). Ibid. Additionally, an officer enjoys qualified immunity and is not liable for excessive force unless he has 

violated a “clearly established” right, such that “it would

[have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct 

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001); see also Brief for United 

States as Amicus Curiae 27–28. It is unlikely (though

theoretically possible) that a plaintiff could overcome 

these hurdles where an officer acted in good faith. 

C 

Respondents believe that the relevant legal standard 

should be subjective, i.e., that the plaintiff must prove that

the use of force was not “applied in a good-faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline” but, rather, was applied 

“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Brief for 

Respondents 27. And they refer to several cases that they

believe support their position. See id., at 26–31 (citing 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312 (1986); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992); Lewis, 523 U. S. 833; Johnson v. 

Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028 (CA2 1973)).

The first two of these cases, however, concern excessive 

force claims brought by convicted prisoners under the 

Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

Clause, not claims brought by pretrial detainees under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Whitley, 

supra, at 320; Hudson, supra, at 6–7. The language of the

two Clauses differs, and the nature of the claims often 

differs. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike 
 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less

“maliciously and sadistically.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 

U. S. 651, 671–672, n. 40 (1977); Graham, supra, at 395, 

n. 10 (1989); see also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *300

(“[I]f the offence be not bailable, or the party cannot find 

bail, he is to be committed to the county [jail] . . . [b]ut . . .

only for safe custody, and not for punishment”). Thus, 

there is no need here, as there might be in an Eighth 

Amendment case, to determine when punishment is unconstitutional. Whitley and Hudson are relevant here only

insofar as they address the practical importance of taking

into account the legitimate safety-related concerns of those

who run jails. And, as explained above, we believe we 

have done so. 

Lewis does not prove respondents’ point, either. There, 

the Court considered a claim that a police officer had 

violated due process by causing a death during a highspeed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspect. 

We wrote that “[j]ust as a purpose to cause harm is needed 

for Eighth Amendment liability in a [prison] riot case, so it 

ought to be needed for due process liability in a pursuit 

case.” 523 U. S., at 854. Respondents contend that this

statement shows that the Court embraced a standard for 

due process claims that requires a showing of subjective

intent. Brief for Respondents 30–31. Other portions of 

the Lewis opinion make clear, however, that this statement referred to the defendant’s intent to commit the acts 

in question, not to whether the force intentionally used 

was “excessive.” 523 U. S., at 854, and n. 13. As explained above, the parties here do not dispute that respondents’ use of force was intentional. See Part II–A, 

supra. 

 Nor does Glick provide respondents with significant 

support. In that case Judge Friendly, writing for the

Second Circuit, considered an excessive force claim 

brought by a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth 
 

12 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

Opinion of the Court 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Judge Friendly pointed 

out that the “management by a few guards of large numbers of prisoners” in an institution “may require and justify 

the occasional use of a degree of intentional force.” 481 

F. 2d, at 1033. He added that, in determining whether 

that intentional use of force “crosse[s]” the “constitutional 

line,” a court should look: 

“to such factors as [(1)] the need for the application of 

force, [(2)] the relationship between the need and the

amount of force that was used, [(3)] the extent of injury inflicted, and [(4)] whether force was applied in a 

good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or

maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of

causing harm.” Ibid. 

This statement does not suggest that the fourth factor 

(malicious and sadistic purpose to cause harm) is a necessary condition for liability. To the contrary, the words

“such . . . as” make clear that the four factors provide

examples of some considerations, among others, that

might help show that the use of force was excessive.

Respondents believe these cases nonetheless help them 

make a broader point—namely, that a subjective standard

“protects against a relative flood of claims,” many of them

perhaps unfounded, brought by pretrial detainees. Brief 

for Respondents 38. But we note that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U. S. C. §1997e, which is 

designed to deter the filing of frivolous litigation against 

prison officials, applies to both pretrial detainees and

convicted prisoners. Nor is there evidence of a rash of 

unfounded filings in Circuits that use an objective standard.

We acknowledge that our view that an objective standard is appropriate in the context of excessive force claims

brought by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth

Amendment may raise questions about the use of a subjective standard in the context of excessive force claims 
Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

brought by convicted prisoners. We are not confronted 

with such a claim, however, so we need not address that 

issue today. 

III 

We now consider the lawfulness of the jury instruction

given in this case in light of our adoption of an objective 

standard for pretrial detainees’ excessive force claims. See 

Part II–A, supra. That jury instruction defined “excessive

force” as “force applied recklessly that is unreasonable in

light of the facts and circumstances of the time.” App. 

277. It required Kingsley to show that the officers “recklessly disregarded [Kingsley’s] safety.” Id., at 278. And it 

suggested that Kingsley must show the defendants “acted 

with reckless disregard of [Kingsley’s] rights,” while telling the jury that it could consider several objective factors

in making this determination. Ibid. 

Kingsley argues that the jury instruction is faulty because the word “reckless” suggests a need to prove that 

respondents acted with a certain subjective state of mind

with respect to the excessive or nonexcessive nature of the 

force used, contrary to what we have just held. Reply

Brief 20–22. Respondents argue that irrespective of our 

holding, any error in the instruction was harmless. Brief 

for Respondents 57–58. And the Solicitor General suggests that, because the instructions defined “recklessness”

with reference to objective factors, those instructions 

effectively embody our objective standard and did not 

confuse the jury. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 

28–32. 

We agree with Kingsley that the instructions were 

erroneous. “[R]eckles[s] disregar[d] [of Kingsley’s] safety”

was listed as an additional requirement, beyond the need 

to find that “[respondents’] use of force was unreasonable

in light of the facts and circumstances at the time.” App. 

278. See also ibid. (Kingsley had to show respondents 
 

14 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

Opinion of the Court 

“used unreasonable force and acted with reckless disregard of [Kingsley’s] rights” (emphasis added)). And in 

determining whether respondents “acted with reckless 

disregard of [Kingsley’s] rights,” the jury was instructed to

“consider . . . [w]hether [respondents] reasonably believed 

there was a threat to the safety of staff or prisoners.” Ibid. 

(emphasis added). Together, these features suggested the 

jury should weigh respondents’ subjective reasons for 

using force and subjective views about the excessiveness of 

the force. As we have just held, that was error. But because the question whether that error was harmless may

depend in part on the detailed specifics of this case, we 

leave that question for the Court of Appeals to resolve in 

the first instance. 

The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the

case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this

opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 14–6368 

MICHAEL B. KINGSLEY, PETITIONER v. STAN 

HENDRICKSON, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 22, 2015]

 JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 

JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting. 

The Constitution contains no freestanding prohibition of 

excessive force. There are, however, four constitutional 

provisions that we have said forbid the use of excessive

force in certain circumstances. The Fourth Amendment 

prohibits it when it makes a search or seizure “unreasonable.” The Eighth Amendment prohibits it when it constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment. The Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments prohibit it (or, for that matter,

any use of force) when it is used to “deprive” someone of

“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 

This is a Fourteenth Amendment case. The Fifth 

Amendment applies only to federal actors; Kingsley forfeited any argument under the Fourth Amendment by 

failing to raise it below; and he acknowledges that the

Eighth Amendment standard is inapplicable, Brief for 

Petitioner 27, n. 8. The only question before us is whether 

a pretrial detainee’s due process rights are violated when 

“the force purposely or knowingly used against him [is] 

objectively unreasonable.” Ante, at 6. In my view, the 

answer is no. Our cases hold that the intentional infliction of punishment upon a pretrial detainee may violate

the Fourteenth Amendment; but the infliction of “objectively unreasonable” force, without more, is not the inten-
 

 

2 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

tional infliction of punishment. 

In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), we held that the

Due Process Clause forbids holding pretrial detainees in 

conditions that “amount to punishment.” Id., at 535. 

Conditions amount to punishment, we explained, when

they are “imposed for the purpose of punishment.” Id., at 

538. Acting with the intent to punish means taking a 

“‘deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.’” Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 300 (1991) (quoting Duckworth v. 

Franzen, 780 F. 2d 645, 652 (CA7 1985)); see also Bell, 

supra, at 537–538. The Court in Bell recognized that

intent to punish need not be “expressed,” 441 U. S. at 538, 

but may be established with circumstantial evidence. 

More specifically, if the condition of confinement being

challenged “is not reasonably related to a legitimate

goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly

may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is 

punishment.” Id., at 539. We endorsed the same inference when we applied Bell’s intent-to-punish test in challenges brought by pretrial detainees against jailhouse

security policies, id., at 560–562; Block v. Rutherford, 468 

U. S. 576, 583–584 (1984), and statutes permitting pretrial detention, Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 255, 269 

(1984); United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 741, 746– 

747 (1987).

In light of these cases, I agree with the Court that “the

Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the 

use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 395, n. 10 (1989) (citing 

Bell, supra, at 535–539). I disagree, however, that any 

intentional application of force that is objectively unreasonable in degree is a use of excessive force that

“amount[s] to punishment.” Bell, 441 U. S., at 535. The 

Court reaches that conclusion by misreading Bell as forbidding States to take any harmful action against pretrial

detainees that is not “reasonably related to a legitimate 
 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

goal.” Id., at 539. 

Bell endorsed this “reasonable relation” inference in the 

context of a challenge to conditions of a confinement— 

specifically, challenges to the State’s policy of housing two

people in each cell, id., at 528, and various security policies, id., at 548–549, 553, 555, 558, 560–562. The conditions in which pretrial detainees are held, and the security

policies to which they are subject, are the result of considered deliberation by the authority imposing the detention.

If those conditions and policies lack any reasonable relationship to a legitimate, nonpunitive goal, it is logical to 

infer a punitive intent. And the same logic supports finding a punitive intent in statutes authorizing detention 

that lacks any reasonable relationship to a valid government interest. Schall, supra, at 269; Salerno, supra, at 

746–747. 

 It is illogical, however, automatically to infer punitive

intent from the fact that a prison guard used more force 

against a pretrial detainee than was necessary. That 

could easily have been the result of a misjudgment about 

the degree of force required to maintain order or protect 

other inmates, rather than the product of an intent to 

punish the detainee for his charged crime (or for any other 

behavior). An officer’s decision regarding how much force 

to use is made “in haste, under pressure, and frequently

without the luxury of a second chance,” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 6 (1992) (internal quotation marks 

omitted), not after the considered thought that precedes

detention-policy determinations like those at issue in Bell, 

Block, Schall, and Salerno. That an officer used more 

force than necessary might be evidence that he acted with 

intent to punish, but it is no more than that. 

 In sum: Bell makes intent to punish the focus of its dueprocess analysis. Objective reasonableness of the force

used is nothing more than a heuristic for identifying this

intent. That heuristic makes good sense for considered 
 

 

4 KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

decisions by the detaining authority, but is much weaker

in the context of excessive-force cl+aims. Kingsley does

not argue that respondents actually intended to punish

him, and his reliance on Bell to infer such an intent is 

misplaced.

Kingsley claims that “the protections of due process . . . 

extend beyond the narrow context of ‘punishment.’” Brief 

for Petitioner 15. Unquestionably. A State would plainly

violate the Due Process Clause if it extended a detainee’s 

confinement because it believed him mentally ill (not as 

“punishment”), without giving him the constitutionally

guaranteed processes that must precede the deprivation of 

liberty. But Kingsley does not claim deprivation of liberty 

in that normal sense of that word—the right to walk about 

free. He claims that the Due Process Clause confers, on 

pretrial detainees, a substantive “liberty” interest that

consists of freedom from objectively unreasonable force. 

Kingsley seeks relief, in other words, under the doctrine of 

“substantive due process,” through which we have occasionally recognized “liberty” interests other than freedom 

from incarceration or detention, that “cannot be limited at 

all, except by provisions that are ‘narrowly tailored to 

serve a compelling state interest.’” Kerry v. Din, ante, at 6 

(plurality opinion) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 

301–302 (1993)).

Even if one believed that the right to process can confer 

the right to substance in particular cases, Kingsley’s

interest is not one of the “fundamental liberty interests”

that substantive due process protects. We have said that 

that doctrine protects only those liberty interests that,

carefully described, are “objectively, deeply rooted in this

Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept

of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice

would exist if they were sacrificed.” Washington v. 

Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720–721 (1997) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Carefully described, 
 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 5 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

the liberty interest Kingsley asserts is the right of pretrial

detainees to be free from the application of force that is 

more than is objectively required to further some legitimate, nonpunitive, governmental interest. He does not 

argue (nor could he) that this asserted interest could pass

the test announced in Glucksberg. 

I conclude by emphasizing that our Constitution is not 

the only source of American law. There is an immense 

body of state statutory and common law under which

individuals abused by state officials can seek relief.

Kingsley himself, in addition to suing respondents for 

excessive force under 42 U. S. C. §1983, brought a statelaw claim for assault and battery. 744 F. 3d 443, 446, n. 6 

(CA7 2014). The Due Process Clause is not “a font of tort 

law to be superimposed upon” that state system. Daniels 

v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 332 (1986) (quoting Paul v. 

Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976)). Today’s majority overlooks this in its tender-hearted desire to tortify the Fourteenth Amendment. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 14–6368 

MICHAEL B. KINGSLEY, PETITIONER v. STAN 

HENDRICKSON, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 22, 2015] 

JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting. 

I would dismiss this case as improvidently granted. 

Before deciding what a pretrial detainee must show in 

order to prevail on a due process excessive force claim, we 

should decide whether a pretrial detainee can bring a

Fourth Amendment claim based on the use of excessive 

force by a detention facility employee. We have not yet 

decided that question. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 

386, 395, n. 10 (1989). If a pretrial detainee can bring

such a claim, we need not and should not rely on substantive due process. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266, 273 

(1994) (plurality opinion); Graham, 490 U. S., at 395. It is 

settled that the test for an unreasonable seizure under the 

Fourth Amendment is objective, see id., at 397, so if a 

pretrial detainee can bring such a claim, it apparently

would be indistinguishable from the substantive due

process claim that the Court discusses.

I would not decide the due process issue presented in 

this case until the availability of a Fourth Amendment 

claim is settled, and I would therefore dismiss this case as 

improvidently granted.