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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

KIMBERLY STURGIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED August 9, 2016

v No. 326163 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division URIAN STURGIS, SR., LC No. 00-030453-DM

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: J ANSEN , P.J., and O’C ONNELL and R IORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Plaintiff, Kimberly Sturgis, appe als as of right the trial court order finding her in contempt of court and sentencing her to two days in jail as par t of this ongoing divorce action against defendant, Urian Sturgi s, Sr., her former husband. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case has a long and protracted history in both the Wayne C ircuit Court and this Court. There is no dispute that plaintiff failed to secure counseling services for the parties’ children as required under orders entered by the trial court onAugust 13, 2013, October 16, 2013, November 18, 2013, and August 28, 2014. Throughout the p roceedings, plaintiff acknowledged her failure to do so, but offered a variety of exc uses, which primarily related to her lack of income, defendant’s failure to pay child support, and a lack of healthcare coverage for the children during cer tain periods of time.

On December 3, 2014, defendant filed a motion to show cause, re questing that the trial court hold plaintiff in contempt of court due to her failure to comply with the court’s orders. His motion seemingly alleged that (1) plaintiff falsely described the status of the children’s health insurance, and (2) insurance was not required for the children to receive counseling, as the relevant agency “said the children are in the system.” On the same day, the Friend of the Court filed a motion to show cause for contempt, which stated that it had received information that plaintiff violated the trial court’s August 28, 2014 order by r efusing to enroll the children in counseling and by providing misinformation regarding the status of the children’s health insurance. The trial court entered a show cause order, requiri ng plaintiff to appear on January 28, 2015, to show why she should not be held in contempt.-2- The trial court held the hearing as scheduled on January 28, 20 15, at which time it stated its conclusion that plaintiff s hould go to jail for her failure to comply with its orders requiring counseling for the children. How ever, it subsequently provided counsel for plaintiff and then adjourned the proceedings unt il February 4, 2015, due to its st ated belief that such an adjournment was required given the fact that plaintiff was not personally served with notice of the contempt proceedings before the January 28, 2015 hearing. Consistent with its statement on the record during the February 4, 2015 hearing, the trial court entered an order holding plaintiff in contempt of court for her failure to comply with the trial c ourt’s orders and sentencing her to two days in jail. It is not clear f rom the record whether plai ntiff completed the jail time.

II. APPEAL OF CONTEMPT ORDER

On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s contempt ord er on two grounds. First, she contends that the trial court cl early erred in concluding that she willfully disobeyed the trial court’s orders requiring that her children be afforded mental h ealth treatment. Second, she contends that the trial court violated her due process rights d uring the contempt proceedings.

The evidentiary and due process standards applicable to contem pt proceedings vary depending on whether the contempt proceedings are criminal or c ivil in nature. See Porter v Porter , 285 Mich App 450, 456-457; 776 NW2d 377 (2009); DeGeorge v Warheit , 276 Mich App 587, 592; 741 NW2d 384 (2007); In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 243 Mich App 697, 711-714; 624 NW2d 443 (2000). H owever, the trial court inthis case did not specify whether it was holding plaintiff in criminal or civil contempt. It is unclear from the trial court’s limited findings on the record, especially when considered in c onjunction with the ongoing efforts of the parties to enroll the children in counseling ser vices, whether the court believed that plaintiff should be held in contempt of court (1) because it co ncluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that plaintiff failed to comply with its previous ord ers, such that sanctions were required to coerce plaintiff to comply ( i.e. , civil contempt), or (2) because it concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it had been clearly and unequivocally sh own that plaintiff willfully disregarded or disobeyed a court order, such that plaintiff’s p ast disobedience should be punished ( i.e. , criminal contempt). See Porter , 285 Mich App at 455-457; DeGeorge , 276 Mich App at 592; In re Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 243 Mich App at 711-714. 1

1 Although the dissent cites the definition of civil contempt in Porter , 285 Mich App at 456, it fails to identify any facts in the record in support of its con clusory finding that “the trial court’s ruling was clear” and “clearly civil in nature.” Instead of ap plying the relevant standards, the dissent, to reach its desired out come, focuses primarily on the trial court’s patience in this matter. Although we also acknowledge the learned trial court judge’s to lerance in this case and commend her, a trial court’s patience is not a factor that we s hould consider in determining whether the contempt proceedings were civil or criminal and, ac cordingly, whether the proceedings fulfilled the due process standards applicable to e ach type of contempt proceeding. See Porter , 285 Mich App at 455-457; DeGeorge , 276 Mich App at 592; In re Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 243 Mich App at 711-714. Yet, the dissent relies solely on t his to reach its conclusion. Again, we conclude, based on our review of the record, that further clarification from the trial-3- “When adjudicating contempt proceedings without a jury, a cour t must make findings of fact, state its conclusions of l aw, and direct entry of the app ropriate judgment.” In re Contempt of Henry , 282 Mich App 656, 674; 765 NW2d 44 (2009); see also DeGeorge , 276 Mich App at 596 (“A court that is adjudicating contempt proceedings without a jury must make findings of fact.”). This was not accomplished here. Because the nature o f the proceedings is not immediately apparent from the record, we conclude that addition al clarification regarding the classification of the proceedings and the trial court’s finding s is required for us to review plaintiff’s claims. Therefore, remand is necessary to allow th e trial court to provide detailed factual findings and reasoning for holding plaintiff in contemp t of court. See MCR 7.216(A)(7).

On remand, the trial court sha ll (1) indicate the intended pur pose of the contempt proceedings so that we may determine whether the trial court in tended them to be criminal or civil in nature, (2) clarify t he factual findings and conclusio ns of law that supported its finding of contempt, and (3) state whether plaintiff actually served two d ays in jail after the trial court’s order was entered.

III. CONCLUSION

We remand this case to the trial court for more complete findin gs and conclusions of law regarding the contempt proceedings in this case. The trial court shall have 28 days from the date that this opinion is released to make all necessary findings an d conclusions, to prepare a supplemental order containing t hose findings and conclusions, a nd to transmit a copy of that supplemental order to this Court. See MCR 7.216(A)(7). The tr ial court need not take any additional evidence on remand.

Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen /s/ Michael J. Riordan

court is necessary for us to re nder a decision in this matter b ecause it is not apparent from the existing record whether the contem pt proceedings were civil or criminal in nature.**Court of**  **Appeals, State**  **of Michigan** 

**Kimberley turgis**  **v Urian**  **Sturgis, Sr.** 

**Docket No.**  **326163**

**LC No.**  **00-030453-DM ORDER** 

**Kathleen Jansen**  **Presiding Judge** 

**Peter D.**  **O'Connell**

**Michael J.**  **Riordan Judges** 

**Pursuant to**  **the opinion**  **issued concurrently**  **with this**  **order, this**  **case is**  **REMANDED for**  **further proceedings**  **consistent with**  **the opinion**  **of this**  **Court. We**  **retain jurisdiction.** 

**The t1ial**  **cowi shall**  **have 28**  **days from**  **the date**  **of the**  **Clerk's certification**  **of this**  **order lo**  **make all**  **necessary findings and**  **conclusions, to**  **prepare a**  **supplemental order**  **containing those**  **findings and**  **conclusions, and**  **to transmit**  **a copy**  **of that**  **supplemental order**  **to this**  **Court. See**  **MCR 7.2**  **l 6(A)(7).**  **In particular,**  **as stated**  **in the**  **accompanying opinion,**  **the trial**  **court shall**  **(1) indicate**  **the intended**  **purpose of**  **the contempt**  **proceedings (2)**  **clarify the**  **factual findings**  **and conclusions**  **of law**  **that suppotted**  **its finding**  **of contempt,**  **and (3)**  **state whether**  **plaintiff did,**  **in fact,**  **serve two**  **days in**  **jail after**  **the order**  **was entered.**  **The trial**  **court need**  **not take**  **any additional**  **evidence on**  **remand.**

**We retain**  **jurisdiction.**

**A true**  **copy entered**  **and certified**  **by J**  **e ro**  **m e**  **W. Zimmer**  **Jr., Chief**  **Clerk. on** 



## AUG 0 9 **2016**

**Date**