COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Frank and Clements 

JEAN E. ATTARD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 2288-01-2 PER CURIAM 

 MARCH 12, 2002 

ANTHONY J. ATTARD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

George F. Tidey, Judge 

(Deanna D. Cook; Bremner, Janus, Cook & 

Marcus, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Carol A.N. Breit, on brief), for appellee. 

 Jean E. Attard (mother) appeals the decision of the trial 

court to grant Anthony J. Attard (father) future unsupervised 

visitation with their minor child. Mother contends the circuit 

court abused its discretion in (1) granting husband future 

unsupervised visitation, (2) deferring decision making authority 

on the issue of unsupervised visits to Clinical Alternatives, and 

(3) placing husband in charge of monitoring his own counseling and 

reporting his minor child's difficulties. Upon reviewing the 

record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
BACKGROUND 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the party prevailing below and grant to that party all 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See McGuire v. McGuire, 10 

Va. App. 248, 250, 391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). The parties 

married on December 6, 1986. One child, Charles J. Attard (the 

child), was born of this marriage on November 18, 1994. The 

parties separated in February 1999. 

 Mother was diagnosed with brain cancer during her pregnancy 

in August 1994. She underwent brain surgery on December 19, 1994, 

one month after delivering the child. During the course of this 

surgery, a tumor was removed from the right frontal parietal lobe 

of mother’s brain. Mother subsequently suffered a recurrence of 

symptoms for which she underwent additional chemotherapy in 1998. 

She is presently taking the medications Dilantin and Phenobarbital 

to prevent seizures. 

 In January 1998, mother and father noted that the child's 

behavior toward father abruptly changed. On at least five or six 

occasions, the child told father to die; go away. On these 

occasions, the child resisted being alone with father. The child 

also resisted father's attempts to change his diapers. Mother 

testified that it was about this time she learned of husband’s 

alleged sexually deviant behavior. 

 Concerned about the child’s behavior, the parties consulted a 

child psychologist, Dr. Crichigno. Father met once with 

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Dr. Crichigno and was questioned about his sexual behavior. 

Within two months of this meeting, father sought counseling to 

address mother's concerns about his sexual behavior. Father 

admitted suffering sexual abuse as a child. 

 In 1998, father accepted an extended work assignment in 

Japan; the child accompanied mother to New York where she received 

medical treatment. Upon arriving in Japan, father decided to 

abandon the assignment and return to Richmond. A month later, 

father traveled to New York to visit mother and the child. Both 

parties testified that father's access to the child was restricted 

and supervised by mother during this and subsequent visits. 

 In February 1999, mother returned with the child to Richmond, 

but she did not resume cohabitation with father. Before the 

issuance of an order allowing supervised visitation in late 2000, 

father visited the child "on a majority of the weekends" for 

periods of up to three and one-half hours. All such visits were 

supervised. By May or June of 1999, the child's behavior, 

according to mother, again started to decline. She initiated 

divorce proceedings on August 12, 1999. 

 That month, mother consulted Dr. Pamela Waaland regarding her 

perception that the child's behavior had declined. Dr. Waaland 

testified that during the initial meeting mother stated that the 

child was having trouble with sleep, very fearful, having 

nightmares, bizarre behavior, [and] having some aggression. At 

that meeting, mother expressed her concern about father's sexual 

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behavior and her suspicion that father was sexually abusing the 

child. Since August 1999, Dr. Waaland has conducted over thirty 

sessions with the child. She characterized the meetings as 

common. Dr. Waaland met with father once, in January 2000. At 

trial, Dr. Waaland diagnosed the child with adjustment reaction 

disorder and stated that she was unable to rule out a diagnosis of 

post-traumatic stress disorder. One possible explanation for the 

child's disorder, Waaland stated, was that he was sexually abused. 

 The trial court directed Dr. Evan Nelson to evaluate father 

to assess him for traits of sexual deviancy that might be relevant 

to his parenting abilities. For the evaluation, Dr. Nelson 

reviewed his interviews with father, documents submitted by 

mother, and the testimony of, among others, Dr. Waaland and 

mother. Dr. Nelson noted that mother's allegation of sexual abuse 

seemed to be the primary reason for requesting this evaluation and 

addressed the issue accordingly. 

 Dr. Nelson administered the Multiphastic Sexual Inventory - 

II (MSI-II) test and a portion of the ABEL Assessment of Sexual 

Interest (ABEL) test to father. His score on the MSI-II indicated 

some attitudes about sexuality that are problematic, but does not 

predict that he will molest in the future. On the ABEL test, 

father tested as sexually interested in preschool-aged boys. 

Nelson noted that only the ABEL results suggested father's 

interests were anything but normal. On the probative value of the 

ABEL results Dr. Nelson wrote that "[a] psychological test cannot 

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prove what [father] did in the past; and . . . a deviant result on 

the ABEL might not be meaningful for predicting the future." 

 Dr. Nelson did determine, based upon all of the information 

available, that father manifested a sexual disorder. He stated 

that father's behavior met criteria for the DSM-IV diagnosis of 

Paraphilia, NOS, an interest in sexual activity that is atypical 

and that may eclipse normal sexual functioning. However, 

Dr. Nelson opined that this sexual disorder was not related to the 

child. Accordingly, he "found no clear and convincing evidence 

that [father's] psychological problems would affect his behavior 

with [the child]." 

 By order dated January 30, 2001, the trial court permitted 

father supervised visitation with the child for eight hours every 

other weekend. Pamela Taylor, a social worker with Clinical 

Alternatives, supervised nine such visits. Each of the visits 

went well. She testified that father was cooperative and complied 

with the rules set forth by Clinical Alternatives. As ordered by 

the trial court, Taylor maintained constant eye-to-eye contact 

with the child throughout the visits. Taylor testified that the 

visits, preplanned by mother, often consisted of educational 

outings: trips to science museums, the children's museum, and 

schoolhouses. She noted that father takes the "time to talk with 

[the child] regarding different activities, working on his 

school," and on a one to ten scale of a dad she rated father a 

ten, the very best. The child, initially timid or reserved in the 

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company of father, has grown more comfortable in father's 

presence. 

 Gerard Kilyk, another social worker with Clinical 

Alternatives, supervised four visits. He corroborated Taylor's 

account of the manner in which father and child collectively 

decided on an activity. Kilyk noted how they interacted, and 

recalled how the two "would have a dialogue that would be very 

lengthy" and that "[t]here would be lots of interaction about 

. . . play type things and just general life things." He, too, 

rated father's parenting skills a ten. 

 During the hearing on mother's motion to terminate or further 

limit father's supervised visits, father presented the testimony 

of Dr. Michael Martelli, a rehabilitation neuropsychologist. 

Dr. Martelli opined that damage to the brain would always produce 

a consequence. He reviewed mother's medical records and stated 

that the damage to a brain after an operation identical to that 

performed on mother might affect the patient's perception and 

ability to make decisions. Dr. Martelli explained that those who 

suffer brain damage similar to mother's commonly lack an awareness 

of their impairment. They also frequently misperceive the 

intentions and the motivations of others. In his experience, 

relationships change in almost every case after a brain injury. 

He estimated the divorce rate to be fifty percent in the year 

following brain injury. 

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 By final decree of divorce dated August 8, 2001, the trial 

court awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child to 

mother. The trial court allowed father to continue supervised 

visitation as established by the January 30, 2001 order, and it 

also allowed father to begin unsupervised visitation on Father's 

Day (June 2002) "[a]s long as the supervisors at Clinical 

Alternatives report that" ongoing supervised visitation went well. 

Moreover, in case "the parties cannot agree on expanded 

visitation," the trial court included in the order a statement 

that it "will hear it." It is from that decree mother appeals. 

ANALYSIS 

ISSUE I: UNSUPERVISED VISITATION 

 Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

granting father future unsupervised visitation and that, in so 

ruling, it failed to address the child's best interests. 

Specifically, mother relies on the evidence presented at trial 

regarding alleged abuse and the child's perceived distress in 

the presence of father to support her claim that the trial court 

abused its discretion in allowing visitation. 

 "In matters of custody, visitation, and related child care 

issues, the court's paramount concern is always the best interests 

of the child." Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 327-28, 387 

S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). "In matters of a child's welfare, trial 

courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisions 

necessary to guard and to foster a child's best interests." Id.

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at 328, 387 S.E.2d at 795 (citing Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 2 

Va. App. 409, 412, 345 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1986)). "A trial court's 

determination of matters within its discretion is reversible on 

appeal only for an abuse of that discretion . . . and a trial 

court's decision will not be set aside unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it." Id. (citations omitted). 

 Evidence of the child's alleged abuse produced at trial 

consisted primarily of the testimony of mother and Dr. Waaland, 

the child's psychologist. From an alleged statement by the 

child about a tickling game with father, mother inferred sexual 

abuse. Hers was the only testimony to recount a direct 

statement by the child about father's alleged abusive behavior. 

After conducting over thirty sessions with the child, 

Dr. Waaland was unable to recount a single direct statement by 

the child of any abusive incident. 

 Although Dr. Nelson found that father manifested an 

interest in sexual activity that was atypical, he did not believe 

that this sexual disorder was related to the child. Dr. Nelson 

informed the trial court that he uncovered "no clear and 

convincing evidence that [father's] psychological problems would 

affect his behavior with [the child]." 

 A January 30, 2001 order permitted father supervised 

visitation for eight hours every other weekend. The trial court 

heard the testimony of two counselors assigned to supervise 

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father's visits. Both counselors praised father and expressed 

unequivocal confidence in his parenting skills. 

 For purposes of appellate review, "'[a] trial court is 

presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered 

the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on 

the child's best interests.'" Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of 

Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) 

(citation omitted). The record reveals that the trial court's 

decision to grant father unsupervised visitation was supported by 

the evidence and not plainly wrong. Therefore, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion. 

 Mother further asserts that the trial court wrongly 

considered her possible premature death in making the custody 

decision. Her assertion is without merit. Code § 20-124.3 

provides that in determining a child's best interest, the court 

shall consider, among other factors, "[t]he age and physical and 

mental condition of each parent" and "[t]he role each parent has 

played and will play in the future." (Emphasis added). Mother's 

brain condition has been and continues to be an issue in 

mother's life and, thus, a factor for the trial court to 

consider in determining the child's best interests pursuant to 

the statute. 

 Moreover, Wilson v. Wilson, 12 Va. App. 1251, 408 S.E.2d 

576 (1991), cited by appellant in support of her argument, is 

distinguishable from the facts here. In Wilson, the mother 

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sought to move to another state with the child and contested the 

award of visitation to father, after the father had violated a 

court order enjoining him from performing certain hygiene 

practices on the son. Id. at 1254, 408 S.E.2d at 578. The 

trial court continued joint custody, awarded father liberal 

visitation, found that the father was in contempt of the 

juvenile court injunction forbidding the questionable practices 

and authorized mother's move to Tennessee. The trial court also 

"ordered that should [mother] move from that location, primary 

custody of the son would automatically transfer to [father]." 

Id. We held that the trial court abused its discretion in 

awarding unsupervised visitation to father after he "persisted 

in these activities in contravention of a court order [namely, 

an injunction]." Id. at 1254, 408 S.E.2d at 578-79. We also 

held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 

include in its order a "predetermined automatic reversal of 

primary custody [from mother to father], based on an 

undetermined move in the future." Id. at 1255, 408 S.E.2d at 

579 (noting that child's best interests could not be assessed 

until a move is actually contemplated and/or accomplished). 

 Here, father did not violate any court orders or engage in 

questionable conduct in violation of a court order or 

injunction. Instead, the evidence showed that father complied 

with supervision requirements and conducted himself in an 

appropriate and exemplary manner. In contrast to the uncertain 

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event in Wilson, viz., a possible move by mother, this case 

established that mother underwent an operation for brain cancer 

and presently takes medications for seizures. Therefore, the 

trial court was required to consider the parents' physical 

condition and their respective roles in the future. See Code 

§ 20-124.3. Moreover, the contested order provides for 

additional hearings in the event that the parties are unable to 

agree on expanded visitation in the future. 

 The record demonstrates that the trial court properly 

considered the factors contemplated by Code § 20-124.3 and 

determined that, under the present conditions, the best 

interests of the child were consistent with a grant of future, 

conditional unsupervised visitation. Accordingly, we find no 

abuse of discretion. 

ISSUE II: DEFERENCE TO CLINICAL ALTERNATIVES 

 Mother asserts the trial court committed reversible error by 

delegating its authority to Clinical Alternatives to grant father 

unsupervised visits with the child. 

 "The trial court's decision, when based upon credibility 

determinations made during an ore tenus hearing, is owed great 

weight and will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it." Douglas v. Hammett, 28 Va. App. 517, 

525, 507 S.E.2d 98, 102 (1998). Because we review the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, all 

evidence in conflict with the father's evidence must be 

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disregarded. See Garst v. Obenchain, 196 Va. 664, 668, 85 S.E.2d 

207, 210 (1955); Rusty's Welding Service, Inc. v. Gibson, 29 Va. 

App. 119, 131, 510 S.E.2d 255, 261 (1999). 

 The trial court heard and considered the testimony of the 

parties and their witnesses, including the observations by two 

social workers at Clinical Alternatives regarding father's 

supervised visits with the child. The record demonstrates that 

Clinical Alternatives and its staff performed in a professional 

and conscientious manner supervising and reporting on visits 

between father and child. Mother presented no evidence that 

Clinical Alternatives was not competent or qualified. Moreover, 

in its August 8, 2001 order, the trial court expressly reserved 

its authority to hear and determine any visitation issues "[i]f 

in the future the parties cannot agree on expanded visitation." 

Accordingly, we cannot say the decision to delegate some authority 

to Clinical Alternatives to oversee and/or assess present 

visitation and recommend future visitation was plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. 

ISSUE III: ALLOWING FATHER TO REPORT AND MONITOR 

 Mother contends the trial court erred by allowing father to 

monitor his own counseling and by ordering father to report any 

behavior problems by the child to wife or others. 

 "Rule 5A:18 requires that objections to a trial court's 

action or ruling be made with specificity in order to preserve 

an issue for appeal." Collado v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 356, 

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367, 533 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000). The purpose of Rule 5A:18 is 

to ensure that the trial court and opposing party are given the 

opportunity to intelligently address, examine, and resolve 

issues in the trial court, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and 

reversals. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 12 Va. App. 1200, 1204, 409 

S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1991); Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 514, 404 

S.E.2d 736, 737 (1991) (en banc). 

 Wife claims she preserved Issue III in her objections to 

the final decree of divorce. A review of this document fails to 

show she preserved that issue. Although mother objected to 

"Dr. Nelson's involvement in the duty to report unusual 

behaviors," mother failed to object to father's role of 

notifying "the mother, [father's] attorney or Dr. Nelson." 

Because wife failed to indicate where and if she preserved this 

issue, Rule 5A:18 precludes appellate review. Moreover, due to 

the thorough and intense amount of supervision and oversight by 

the trial court and Clinical Alternatives in working with the 

parties, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the 

good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. 

 Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial 

court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.

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