1 Filed 4/3/13 P. v. Harris CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. DONTA DEMETRUS HARRIS, Defendant and Appellant. E055516 (Super.Ct.No. RIF142633) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Gary B. Tranbarger, Judge. Affirmed. Richard de la Sota, under appoin tment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney Genera l, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assi stant Attorney General, Andrew Mestman and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys Gene ral, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Following a jury trial, defendant and appellant Donta Demetrus Harris was convicted of one count of first degree murder and three counts of willful,2 deliberate and premeditated murder. On th is appeal, he contends the sentencing court erred in staying rather than striki ng a three-year enhan cement for personally inflicting great bodily injury on one of the surviving victims. We disagree and affirm the conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND When a fracas developed at a basket ball court among several individuals, defendant fired several shots into a group of men. He shot four men, killing one and inflicting crippling injuries on another. As a result, he was charged with on e count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, count 1), 1 and three counts of willful, delib erate and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 187/664, counts 2-4). As to each of the four counts, it was alleged that the defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing death or great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53, former subd. (d).) As to count 2, the amended information alleged that the defendant pers onally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim who sustained a paralyzing inju ry. (§ 12022.7, subd . (a).) It was also alleged that defendant had suffe red a prior strike conviction. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of one count of first degree murder, and three counts of attempte d deliberated murder. The allegations that defendant had discharged a firearm, ca using death or great bodily injury under section 12022.53, former subdivision (d), were found true as to each count. The verdict forms did not contain a separate fi nding that defendant personally inflicted

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.3 great bodily injury upon the victim in count 2. After a bench trial, the trial court subsequently found the prior st rike conviction to be true. Defendant was sentenced to a 114-year-t o-life term, composed as follows: for count 1, 25 years to life, doubled as a re sult of the prior strike, plus 25 years to life based on the enhancement under secti on 12022.53, former subdivision (d); for count 2, 14 years to life, plus another 25 years to life for the enhancement under 12022.53, former subdivisi on (d). The court also impos ed a three-year term for the enhancement under section 12022.7 for co unt 2, but stayed the sentence under section 654. The sentences for counts 3 and 4 were ordered to run concurrently.
ISSUE The sole issue defendant raises on this appeal is that the trial court should have stricken the three-year enhancement as to count 2 for inflicting great bodily injury under section 12022.7, subdivisi on (a), because the jury did not render a verdict as to that specific enhancement. The People argue that the amende d information properly charged the enhancement, and the jury found the necessary opera tive facts to justify its imposition.
ANALYSIS Section 12022.7, subdivision (a), read s as follows: “Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted fe lony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.”4 Defendant contends that the trial court had no auth ority to impose a term of imprisonment for this enhancement as to count 2 because it was neither admitted nor found to be true by the trier of fact . In this case, the trial court failed to instruct the jury with resp ect to the section 12022.7 a llegation or to provide the jury with an appropri ate verdict form. The People counter that the jury found defendan t guilty for deliberate and premeditated attempted murder with respect to this count. As it indicated on the verdict form, the jury found that with respect to th is count, defendant did intentionally discharge a firearm causing great bodily injury or death in the commission of count 2. The People cont end that the jury was not required to render a special true finding in order for the court to impose the enhancement. Section 1170.1, subdivision (e), merely re quires that the enhancement be found true by the trier of fact, but there is no ex press requirement of a separate finding. It submits that the findings that the jury did make are sufficient to show under the facts of this case that it found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the attempted murder alleged in count 2. We agree. A finding that the section 12022.53, former subdivision (d) enhancement is true does not in theory necessarily mean that the section 12022.7 enhancement is also true. In order for the section 120 22.53, former subdivision (d) enhancement to be true, the defendant has to persona lly and intentionally discharge a firearm during the commission of an enumerated felony and proximately cause death or great bodily injury to another person. The elements of the section 12022.75 enhancement require that the jury find that the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury during the commission of a felony. “Proximately causing” and “personally inflicting” injuries are two different things. ( People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 336-337.) As the Supreme Court has explained, for example, an aider and abettor of a crime can commit a direct act, such as affirmatively blocking a victim’s exit, wh ich proximately causes inju ry but does not constitute personal infliction of an injury. ( People v. Bland , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 337; People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 571.) Although we agree with defendant that there is a distinction in theory between the elements of thes e enhancements, the jury’s ve rdict in this case reveals that it found to be true the factual elem ents of both the 12022.7 enhancement, as well as the 12022.53, former subdivision (d) enhancemen t. Here, defendant was the only shooter, and the conclusion is ines capable that he personally as well as proximately caused the injury to the victim. In light of the information, evidence, and its express findings, it is clear that th e jury found the facts necessary to find defendant personally inflicted great bodily in jury on the victim alleged in count 2. (See People v. Bautista (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 646, 654-656.) Moreover, any error in failing to instruct the jury or ha ve it make a specific finding on the section 12022.7 enhancement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 849-852; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 254-255 [failure to submit question of grea t bodily injury to jury held harmless where defendant murdered victim].)6 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

KING Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER J.

CODRINGTON J.