# C_2011103EN.01000301.xml

| 2.4.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 103/3 |
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2.4.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 103/3

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Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 17 February 2011 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Stockholms tingsrätt — Sweden) — Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera AB

(Case C-52/09) (1)

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(Preliminary ruling - Article 102 TFEU - Abuse of dominant position - Prices applied by telecommunications operator - ADSL input services - Broadband connection services to end users - Margin squeeze on competitors)

2011/C 103/03

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Referring court

Stockholms tingsrätt

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Konkurrensverket

Applicant:

Defendant: TeliaSonera Sverige AB

Defendant:

Intervening party: Tele2 Sverige AB

Intervening party:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Stockholms tingsrätt — Interpretation of Article 82 EC — Margin squeeze — Prices applied by a telecommunications operator which formerly held a historical monopoly for ADSL access — Spread between the prices invoiced by the operator to intermediate operators for the wholesale supply of ADSL access and the tariffs applied by the operator to consumers for ADSL access not sufficient to cover the additional costs borne by the operator itself for the supply of those retail services

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

In the absence of any objective justification, the fact that a vertically integrated undertaking, holding a dominant position on the wholesale market in asymmetric digital subscriber line input services, applies a pricing practice of such a kind that the spread between the prices applied on that market and those applied in the retail market for broadband connection services to end users is not sufficient to cover the specific costs which that undertaking must incur in order to gain access to that retail market may constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.

When assessing whether such a practice is abusive, all of the circumstances of each individual case should be taken into consideration. In particular:

| — | as a general rule, primarily the prices and costs of the undertaking concerned on the retail services market should be taken into consideration. Only where it is not possible, in particular circumstances, to refer to those prices and costs should those of competitors on the same market be examined, and |
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as a general rule, primarily the prices and costs of the undertaking concerned on the retail services market should be taken into consideration. Only where it is not possible, in particular circumstances, to refer to those prices and costs should those of competitors on the same market be examined, and

| — | it is necessary to demonstrate that, taking particular account of whether the wholesale product is indispensable, that practice produces an anti-competitive effect, at least potentially, on the retail market, and that the practice is not in any way economically justified. |
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it is necessary to demonstrate that, taking particular account of whether the wholesale product is indispensable, that practice produces an anti-competitive effect, at least potentially, on the retail market, and that the practice is not in any way economically justified.

The following factors are, as a general rule, not relevant to such an assessment:

| — | the absence of any regulatory obligation on the undertaking concerned to supply asymmetric digital subscriber line input services on the wholesale market in which it holds a dominant position; |
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the absence of any regulatory obligation on the undertaking concerned to supply asymmetric digital subscriber line input services on the wholesale market in which it holds a dominant position;

| — | the degree of dominance held by that undertaking in that market; |
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the degree of dominance held by that undertaking in that market;

| — | the fact that that undertaking does not also hold a dominant position in the retail market for broadband connection services to end users; |
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the fact that that undertaking does not also hold a dominant position in the retail market for broadband connection services to end users;

| — | whether the customers to whom such a pricing practice is applied are new or existing customers of the undertaking concerned; |
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whether the customers to whom such a pricing practice is applied are new or existing customers of the undertaking concerned;

| — | the fact that the dominant undertaking is unable to recoup any losses which the establishment of such a pricing practice might cause, or |
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the fact that the dominant undertaking is unable to recoup any losses which the establishment of such a pricing practice might cause, or

| — | the extent to which the markets concerned are mature markets and whether they involve new technology, requiring high levels of investment |
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the extent to which the markets concerned are mature markets and whether they involve new technology, requiring high levels of investment

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(1)  OJ C 90, 18.04.2009.

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