The Honorable Ross A. Walters, United Sta tes Magistrate Judge 1 for the Southern District of Iowa, acting upon consent of th e parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-1750

___________ Starlet L. Pegump, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Souther n * District of Iowa. Rockwell International * Corporation; International * Brotherhood of Electrical * Workers, Local Union 1634, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: January 15, 1997 Filed: March 21, 1997

___________ Before BEAM, ROSS, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Starlet Pegump app eals the district court’s grant of summary 1 judgment for defendants Rockwell International Corporatio n (Rockwell) and the Internation al Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union Local 1634 (Union) in her action for breach of the col lective bar gaining agreement and for breach of the duty of fai r representation. We affirm.-2-Pegu mp had seen a psychiatrist, complaining that she wa s 2 of tentired. The psychiatrist, Dr. Castillo, prescribed anti

depressant medication for Pegump at that time. -3- I. BACKGROUND
Peg ump worked for Rockwell as an assembler until she wa s suspended and fired for allegedly threatening to shoot two fellow employees. Two of Pegump’s co workers reported that they overheard her threaten to bring a gun to work and shoot two plant managers. Pegump d enied ever making the statement but said that if she ha d made the statement, she would have only been joking. Following an investigation, Rockwell’s security directo r determined that Pegump had pro bably made the statement, whether or not in jest. Concerned that she posed a risk to plant safety , Rockwe ll suspended Pegump from work on August 25, 1994, pendin g further investigation. During the course of this investigation, Pegump’ s psychiatrist wrote a letter on her behalf, sta ting that Pegump had 2
neve r posed a risk to herself or to others. In response to thi s letter, and in an effort to co nfirm the psychiatrist’s conclusion, Rockwe ll requested a medical release from Pegump to discuss th e situation with her psychiatrist, or, in the alternative, forPegump to meet with a Rockwell-provided psychiatrist to discuss hermental condition. Pegump refused to g ive such a release, arguing that her medic al records had nothing to do with her suspension. She wa s fired on February 7, 1995. Immediately following Pegump’s suspension, the Union filed a grievance with Rockwell on Pegump’s behalf. After Pegump refused Rockwell’s medical release request, the Union president encouraged-4-

Peg ump to cooperate with the investigation and informed her tha t her lack of cooperation was preventing the Union from proceeding-5-

with her grievance. In respon se to this letter, Pegump reiterated her belief that her medical records were irrelevant to he r suspension and continued to refuse to issue the release. Pegump brought this action in state court against Rockwell f or breach of the collective bargaining agreement and against th e Union fo r breach of its duty of fair representation. The action wa s later removed to federal court . Both Rockwell and the Union filed motions for summary judgment which the district court grante d. The district court found that Rockwell could properly suspend an d terminate Pegump under the available facts and that the Union had provided reasonable assistance to Pegump. On appeal, Pegumpargues that summary judgment was not proper because genuine issues o f material fact exist.

II. DISCUSSION

Summaryjudgment is proper only when no genuine issue o f material fact is present and judgment should be awarded to th e movant as a matter of law. Yo well v. Combs , 89 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, In c ., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We review the entry of summary judgment de nov o, giving the nonmoving party the benefit of every reasonabl e inference drawn from the evidence. Yowell , 89 F.3d at 544.
Pegump brought this action under section 301 of the Labo r Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. That statute allows a lab or organization representing an employee to bring a breach o f contract suit against an employer for a labor violation. For a n employee to bring such a suit on her own behalf, prior to th e exhaus tionof internal grievance procedures, however, she mus t-6-

allege both that the employer committed a labor violation, a nd that the union has violated its duty of fair representation. Vaca v.-7-

Sipes , 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). The district court found tha t Pegump failed to prove either allegation. We agree. We first address Pegump’s alle gations that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. Pegump claims that the Unio n arbi trarilyrefused to process her grievance, or in th e alternative, processed it in a perfunctory manner. A union i s grantedbroad latitude in its dealings with its members and it s performance is viewed in a highly deferential light. Air Lin e Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill , 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991). A breach of the duty of fair representation occurs only when a union’ s conduct is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Va ca , 386 U.S. at 190. Applying those s tandards, we find that the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation.

It is undisputed that immediately following Pegump’ s sus pension, the Union filed a grievance with Rockwell. Althoug h the Union later ceased its efforts to process the grievance, it did so only after Pegump refused to cooperate in the investigation of her conduct. Additionally, the Union president participatedin the investigation of the situation . He spoke with all persons who had direct knowledge of the allege d threats: Pegump, the coworker to whom she made the statement, and the two coworkers that overheard and reported the statement. The president also discussed Pegump’s situation with the international union representative, Rockwell’s Human Resource Department, sec urity personnel at other facilities, and Pegump’s attorney.
Alt houghthe Union president concurred with Rockwell i n reques ting Pegump’s medical information, that position was no t unreas onable. Because of the evidence surrounding the statemen t and Pegump’s recent treatment for depression, the Union can hardly-8-

be faulted for such cooperation. Although Pegump may believe the Union was a less than zealous advocate, under the facts of this-9-

case, the Union simply did not breach its duty of fai r representation to her.
Pegu mp’s section 301 claim fails for the additional reaso n that Rockwell’s actions did not violate the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA allowed for the termination of Unio n emp loyees for just cause. A violation of Rockwell’s employe e handbookpolicy prohibiting disruptive or offensive behavio r consti tutes such cause. The right to discharge for caus e nece ssarilyimplies the right to reasonably investigate whethe r suchcause exists. Under the facts of this case, no jury coul d find that Rockwell’s request for a medical release, to rule out any danger posed by Pegump’s menta l condition, was beyond the scope of a r easonable investigation of the situation or its potential fo r harm. T herefore, as a matter of law, Rockwell’s actions did no t violate the CBA. We have considered the remainder of Pegump’ s arguments and find them to be without merit.

III. CONCLUSION Finding no error in the district court’s grant of summar y judgment in favor of Rockwell and the Union, we affirm.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.