MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 9 ME 25 Docket: Cum

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- 278 Argued : February	7,	2019 Decided: February	14,	2019 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY , JJ.
PETITION	OF	EDWIN	R.	JONAS	III	FOR	REINSTATEMENT TO	THE	BAR	OF	THE	STATE	OF	MAINE

PER	CURIAM [¶1] Edwin	R.	Jonas	III	appeals	from	a	judgment	of	a	single	justice	of	the Maine	 Supreme	 Judicial	 Court	 ( Gorman,	 J. )	 denying	 his	 petition	 for reinstatement	 to	 the	Maine	Bar.		This	is	 Jonas’s	second	appeal	in	 this	matter. On	his	first	appeal	from	the	denial	of	his	petition,	we	remanded	the	matter after clarifying	that	the	admissibility	of	evidence	is	to	be	determined	p ursuant to the reasonable	 person	 standard	 rather	 than	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Evidence

— the original	 ruling,	 before	 clarification, may	 have	 resulted	 in	 the exclusion	 of evidence	 that would have	 been	 admi ssible pursuant	 to	 the	 more	 inclusive standard

. See In	re Edwin	R. Jonas III ,	2017	ME	115,	¶¶	1

- 3,	164 A.3d 120

. [¶ 2 ] On	remand,	we indicated	that,	in	addition	to	the	evidence	admitted in	 the	 original	 proceeding, the	 single	 justice should “consider	 only	 (1)	 the evidence	that	was	explicitly	offered	and	excluded based	on	the	application	of the	 Rules	 of	 Evidence	 and	 that	 was	 not	 otherwise	 admitted,	 and	 (2)	 to	 the2 extent	 allowed	 by	 the	 single	 justice,	 any	 evidence	 of	 reinstatement	 or disciplinary	actions,	 further	litigation,	 or	 other	evidence	deemed	 relevant	by the single	justice	that	has	occurred	after	the	closing	of	evidence	in	the	original trial.” Id .	¶	39.		Jonas	contends	that	the	limited	scope	of	our	remand	denied	him due	 process	 of	 the	 law	 and	 that	 the	 evidence	 he	 presented	 supports	 his
reinstatement. [¶ 3 ] During	the	proceedings	on	remand,	the	single	justice adhered	to the parameters	 that	we	articulated	in	 the	mandate. Therefore, Jonas’ s argument that	 he	 should	 have	 been	 entitled	 to	 present	 evidence	 outside	 of	 those parameters constitutes	a	challenge	to our prior	decision establishing	the	nature and	scope	of	the	remand	proceedings

. [¶ 4 ] Contrary	 to his contention,	 Jonas	 has	 not	 demonstrated	 that	 the
process prescribed	in	our	opinion	and	then	implemented	by	the	single	justice resulted	 in	 an	 erroneous	 o r	 unjust	 outcome. See Greaton	 v.	 Greaton , 2012 ME 17,	¶	 7,	36	A.3d	913 (“In	 appealing	 a	judgment,	it	is	 not	enough	 to challenge	 procedural	 errors	 allegedly	 made	 by	 the	 trial	 court	 without	 also showing actual error	in the judgment.”)

. Nor	does	he	 seem	 to	 recognize	 the mitigatory opportunity of	the	additional	process ,	which allowed	him	to	present additional	evidence developed	since	the	original	trial , that	has	been available to	him	since we remanded	the	matter	almost	two	years	ago.3 [¶ 5 ] The	 additional	 evidence he	 now	 argues	 he	is	 entitled	 to	 present , even	 though	it	is	outside	 the	scope	of	what	we	stated	could	be	presented	on remand , would	not change	the	outcome	of	the	case	given	his	own	description of	what such	evidence would	show	a nd	the weight	that	the	single	justice	gave to	the great	amount	of	contrary	evidence admitted	against him. [¶ 6 ] Balancing	the	factors relevant	to	a	determination	of	what	process	is due , including Jonas’s	interest	in	his	professional	license	and	the	burd en	that remanding	the	matter	again	would place on limited judicial	time	and	resources, we	conclude	that	Jonas	was	not	deprived	of	due	process	by	the	limited	scope	of the	remand. See Mathews	v.	Eldridge ,	424	U.S.	319,	335 (1976) ; see	also Fichter v.	Bd.	 of	Environmental	Protection ,	604	A.2d	433,	436

- 37 (Me.	1992) ( stating that	 due	 process	 “ requirements	 are	 flexible	 and	 entail	 no	 speci fied form	 or procedure ”;	instead, “ [ w ] hat	process	is	due	will	vary	 from	case	 to	case	.	.	.	 to assure	 the	 basic	 fair ness	 of	 each	 particular	 action	 according	 to	 its circumstances” (alteration s in	original ) )

. [¶ 7 ] The	 only remaining issue	we	 need	 address	is whether	 the	 entire record,	 including the	 evidence Jonas	 and	 the	 Board	 of	 Overseers	 of	 the	 Bar introduced	 on	 remand ,	 compelled the	 single	 justice to	 change	 her original4 conclusions,	all	of	which are supported	by	the	record

. 1 Even	with	the	evidence presented	to	the	single	justice	on	remand,	we	note	the	great	deal	of	competent evidence	that	the	sing le	justice relied	on	in	her	findings to conclude	that Jonas should	not be	reinstated. [ ¶ 8 ] A	review	of	the evidence Jonas	introduced	on	remand	supports	the single	justice’s assessment that it added “little

.	.	. to	the	issue	to	be	decided	in this	 matte r — that	 is , Jonas’s	 demonstration	 of	 the	 evidence	 necessary	 for reinstatement.” The	evidence,	including	the	evidence	introduced	by	the	Board of	 events	 since	 the	 closing	 of	 evidence	 in	 the	 original	 trial,	 demonstrates	 a continuing	 practice	 of	 frivolous	 and vexatious	 actions	 and	 use	 of	 court pleadings	and	processes	for	improper	purposes. [¶ 9 ] We discern	no	error	in	 the	single	justice’s ultimate	conclusion on remand that	Jonas	did	not	meet	his	burden	“to	satisfy , by	clear	and	convincing evidence,	each	of	the	criteria	for	reinstatement	set	out	in	M.	Bar	R.	29(e).” The	entry	is: Judgment affirmed.

1 The	 single	 justice’s	 first	 judgment	 analyzed	 Jonas’s	 petition	 pursuant	 to	 the	 reinstatement factors	 enumerated	in	 the	 then	 applicable	M.	 Bar	R.	 7.3(j).	 	 The	 single	justice’s	 second	judgment analyzed	Jonas’s	petition	pursuant	to	current	M.	Bar	R.	29(e),	w hich	replaced	the	former	rule	after the	first	judgment	was	entered.		The	findings	in	the	first	opinion	remain	relevant	because	the	rules are — with	the	exception	of	a	few	inapplicable	subsections

— substantively	the	same. Compare M.	Bar R.	7.3(j)(5)(A)

- (F)	(T ower	2014) with M.	Bar	R.	29(e)(1)

- (8).5 James M. Bowie, Esq. (orally) , Thompson Bowie & Hatch LLC, Por tland, for appellant Edwin R. Jonas III Aria Eee, Esq. (orally) , Board of Overseers of the Bar, Augusta, for appellee Board of Overseers of the Bar

Maine	Supre me	Judicial	Court	docket	number	Bar

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