PUBLISH UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. GABRIEL MIRABAL, Defendant-Appellant. No. 16-2188

__________________ _______________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 1:13-CR-01152-WJ-1)

__________________ _______________ Gabriel Mirabal filed a brief pro se . Mark T. Baker (Carter B. Harrison, with him on the briefs), Peifer, Hanson & Mullins, P.A., Albuquer que, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. Nicholas J. Ganjei, Assi stant United States Attorn ey (James D. Tierney, Acting United States Atto rney, with him on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plai ntiff-Appellee.

__________________ _______________ Before KELLY , HOLMES , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ BACHARACH , Circuit Judge.

__________________ _______________ This appeal is brought by Mr. Gabriel Mirabal. He is a convicted felon, which prevented him from la wfully possessing a gun. 18 U.S.C. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 29, 2017 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 § 922(g)(1). But authoritie s thought that they had seen Mr . Mirabal put an assault rifle in the trunk of a car. This sighting le d authorities to arrange for a local officer to stop Mr. Mirabal for a traffic violation and to search the trunk. Carrying out these arrangements, Depu ty Micah Barker saw Mr. Mirabal speeding and initiated a traffic stop. After telling Mr. Miraba l that he had been sp eeding, Deputy Barker looked for an assault ri fle. Though he didn’t fi nd one, he did find a kilogram of cocaine in th e car’s interior. The disc overy of cocaine in the car became key ev idence for one of the eventual charges against Mr. Mirabal. In defending ag ainst these charges, Mr. Mirabal argued that the search had violated the Fourth Amendment. This argument did not convince the district court, an d the case went to trial. At the trial, the Government presen ted testimony by the owner of the car, Mr. Dominic Anaya, who had pleaded guilty to his own drug crimes. Mr. Anaya testified that he and Mr. Mirabal had worked together to sell cocaine. So Mr. Mirabal set out to impeach Mr. Anaya. To do so, Mr. Mirabal tried to question Mr. Anaya about how much he expected his sentence to drop as a result of his plea agreement. Mr. Mirabal was allowed to probe the plea agreement in general term s, but not in detail. On appeal, Mr. Mirabal raises two primary arguments and three supplemental arguments.3 First, Mr. Mirabal challenges the introduction of ev idence involving the cocaine found in the car. Deputy Ba rker had probable cause to believe that there was an a ssault rifle in the trunk, so he looked there. But Deputy Barker claims that he could not see th e back of the trunk because of a long speaker box blocking his view. To see the trunk better, he entered the back seat and pulled an armrest down. It wa s then that Deputy Barker found the cocaine. Mr. Mirabal alleges th at Deputy Barker vi olated the Fourth Amendment by going into the interior of the car and pulling the armrest down. We disagree, concluding that the officer complied with the Fourth Amendment by acting reasonably in tryi ng to find a way to see into the back of the trunk. Second, Mr. Mirabal challenges the restrictions place d on his crossexamination of Mr. Anaya. For the sake of argument, we may assume that the restrictions violated the Confro ntation Clause. Even if they did, however, any possible violation would ha ve been harmless in light of the strength of the prosecution’s cas e and Mr. Mirabal’ s opportunity to thoroughly undermine Mr. Anaya’s credibility in cross-examination. Finally, Mr. Mirabal alleges insufficiency of the evidence, destruction of evidence, and withholding of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We reject these challenges, concluding that the trial evidence wa s sufficient to convict, the evidence was not4 destroyed in bad faith, and Mr. Mira bal did not identify the evidence allegedly withheld in violation of Brady

. In light of these conclusions , we affirm the conviction. I. Motion to Suppress We begin with Mr. Mira bal’s argument for s uppression of evidence involving the cocaine found in the car. A. Standard of Review On this issue, we review the dist rict court’s “factual findings for clear error and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. DeJear , 552 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it lacks evidenti ary support or if a review of the evidence leaves us “‘with the definite and firm conviction that a mist ake has been made.’” United States v. Haymond , 869 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Ci r. 2017) (quoting United States v. Hernandez , 847 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017)). Th e ultimate reasonableness of the search, however, is reviewed de novo. DeJear , 552 F.3d at 1200

. B. The Ruling in District Court Mr. Mirabal moved to suppress eviden ce of the cocaine , arguing that Deputy Barker’s search had exceeded th e scope permitted by the Fourth Amendment. The district court cred ited Deputy Barker’s testimony and ruled that the search had complied with the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Mirabal challenges this ruling.5 C. Reasonableness of the Search In challenging the ruling, Mr. Mirabal does not question the existence of probable cause regarding th e presence of an a ssault rifle in the trunk. He instead assert s that Deputy Barker acted unreasonably by entering the back seat and pulling the armrest down. 1 We disagree. Law-enforcement officers may sear ch a car without a warrant upon probable cause to believe that contraband is present. United States v. Chavez , 534 F.3d 1338, 1345 (10th Cir. 2008). But a search is permitted only in the parts of the car where the officers coul d reasonably expect to find the contraband. See United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (“The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile . . . is defined by the object of the search a nd the places in which th ere is probable cause to believe that it may be f ound.”). For example, “[p] robable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi c ontains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.” Id

. The officers are limited not only in the pl ace to search bu t also in the manner of searching, wh ich must be “reasonable under the circumstances.” United States v. Mendoza , 817 F.3d 695, 702 (10th Cir. 2016). Thus, an

1 Mr. Mirabal also asserts that De puty Barker violated the Fourth Amendment by searching the front-s eat area. But the cocaine was not located there; as a result, the constitutionality of Deputy Barker’s search of the front-seat area does not affect the admissibility of evidence involving the cocaine. See Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (noting that the exclusionary rule oper ates to suppress evidence “obtained either during or as a direct result” of a Fourth Amendment violation).6 officer can decide how to carry out a search as long as the officer’s decision is reasonable. Lawmaster v. Ward , 125 F.3d 1341, 1349 (10th Cir. 1997). For example, the o fficer may deem it necessary to perform “separate acts of entry or opening” in order to conduct the search. Ross , 456 U.S. at 820-21. Mr. Mirabal presents five argument s for why Deputy Barker should not have entered the back seat and pulle d down the armrest: 1. The back of the trunk , behind the speaker box, was too small to fit an assault rifle. 2. The package was not immediately recognizable as contraband, preventing seizure under the plain-view doctrine. 3. Deputy Barker could discover what ever lay in th e back of the trunk by leaning over the speaker box and searching with his hands. 4. The compartment behind the ar mrest (where the cocaine was found) was too small to c ontain an assault rifle. 5. Deputy Barker did not know wh ether the car ha d a trunk-access panel. We reject Mr. Mirabal’s first ar gument. Deput y Barker testified based on his military expe rience and familiarity with assault rifles. In light of this experience, he testified that a rifle could have fit behind the speaker box. See Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (recognizing that police officers can draw inferences from prior experience). The district court had little reason to que stion Deputy Barke r’s explanation for why he had tried to view the back of the trunk.7 Mr. Mirabal criticizes De puty Barker’s explana tion, contending that the assault rifle was too big to fit in the part of the trunk hidden from view. For this contention, Mr. Miraba l relies on a 1969 ma nual describing the length of assault rifl es. But Mr. Mirabal failed to present the district court with evidence of this manual. Without such evidence, the district court could reasonably rely on Deputy Barker’s e xplanation for why he had tried to see into the back of the trunk. We also reject Mr. Mirabal’s sec ond argument (tha t the package was not recognizable as contra band). Mr. Mirabal did no t present this argument in district court, and he has not ur ged plain-error review. Therefore, we decline to consider this argument. See United States v. Lamirand , 669 F.3d 1091, 1099 n.7 (10th Cir. 2012). Mr. Mirabal’s third argument is that Deputy Barker could have looked into the tr unk without pulling the armr est down. The only evidence on this issue came fro m Deputy Barker. He testified that

 he could see only the front part of the trunk because a speaker box ran nearly the enti re width of the trunk,

 he could not see the space behind the speaker box,

 the space behind the speaker box was big enough to contain a rifle,

 the speaker box would not move, which prevented Deputy Barker from searching the back of the trunk, and

 he entered the back seat to see if he could gain access to the trunk by folding the seats down.8 The district court credited Depu ty Barker’s testimony, and Mr. Mirabal does not point to any evidence of an ability to see into the back of the trunk without en tering the back seat. We th erefore reject Mr. Mirabal’s third argument. Mr. Mirabal’s fourth argument is th at the area behind the armrest was too small to fit an assault rifle. This argume nt ignores Depu ty Barker’s reason for looking behind the armrest. He folded the armrest dow n to gain access to the trunk, no t to find anothe r hiding space wi thin the car. And when Deputy Barker pulle d the armrest down, he sa w a void that appeared to expose the trunk. Moments later, he saw the packag e containing the cocaine. The district court again found De puty Barker’s te stimony credible. The photographs presented to the court show only an opaque black space behind the armrest; thes e photographs do not clear ly support either side. With these inconclusive phot ographs, the dist rict court had little else with which to appraise Deputy Barker’s account. In these circumstances, the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. Finally, Mr. Mirabal contends that pulling the armrest down was unreasonable because Deput y Barker did not know whether the car had a trunk-access panel in the back seat. But Deputy Barker knew that many9 cars had such panels and that going through the ba ck seat was the only practical way to search the rest of the trunk. In our view, Deputy Barker’s effort to see into the back of the trunk was reasonable. 2
II. Confrontation Clause Mr. Mirabal also claims a viola tion of the Confrontation Clause based on his inability to fully cross-examine Mr. Anaya. Mr. Anaya was a co-conspirator testifying for the Government, and Mr. Mirabal was allowed to question Mr. Anay a on how he expect ed to benefit from his cooperation. But Mr. Mirabal wanted to go further, cross-examining Mr. Anaya about how much he expected his sentence to drop because of his cooperation with the Government. This line of questioning was disallowed, and we may assume for the sake of argument that the restric tion violated the Confrontation Clause. With this assumption, we would regard the violation as harmless. A. The Cross-Examination

The district court permitted Mr. Mi rabal to cross-ex amine Mr. Anaya about his

 plea agreement with the Government and

2 The Government also ar gues that Depu ty Barker had probable cause to search for ammunition and narcot ics, justifying a search of all compartments within the car. We need not address this argument because the search would have been reasonable even if probable cause had been confined to an assau lt rifle in the trunk.10  expectation of a ligh ter sentence because of his cooperation. But the court did not permit Mr. Miraba l to use the plea ag reement itself or to ask Mr. Anaya about how much he expected his sentence to drop. The court reasoned that this questioning would entail conjecture and could cause the jury to sp eculate about Mr. Mira bal’s own sentence. B. The Harmlessness Inquiry The Government argues that any constitutional violation would have been harmless. On harmlessness, the Government bears the burden to show “beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999). To determine whether the Government satisfied this burden, we consider “the importance of [Mr. Anay a’s] testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of [Mr. Anaya] on material points, th e extent of cross- examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).11 1. Importance, Cumulativene ss, and Corroboration Three of the factors (i mportance, cumulativeness, and corroboration) are interrelated here. Considered to gether, these fact ors do not weigh heavily in either direction. Mr. Anaya was used mainly to interpret approximately twenty wiretapped telephone calls, testifying that various code words referred to the sale of crack and powder cocaine, that he and Mr. Mirabal had supplied other conspirators with crack and powder cocaine, that Mr. Mirabal had provided instruction on how to cook crack cocaine, that the two men would sell ten ounces of crack cocaine (the statutory requirement) in only a couple of days, and that Mr. Anaya would not have left $30,000 worth of cocaine in the car that he allowed Mr. Mirabal to driv e. This testimony supported the Government ’s theory that Mr. An aya and Mr. Mirabal had conspired to sell cocaine. Mr. Mirabal did not deny a conspiracy . Instead, he ar gued that the conspiracy was to sell marijuana wax rather than cocaine. Here too Mr. Anaya rebutted Mr. Mirabal’ s argument, testifying that the two men were not in the business of selling marijuana wax. Mr. Anaya’s testimony was exte nsive and important. But his testimony was also corroborated by othe r witnesses. For example, every telephone call discussed by Mr. Anay a was played fo r the jury and interpreted the same way by law-enforcemen t witnesses. In interpreting the12 calls, the law-enforcemen t witnesses testified that Mr. Mirabal had supplied various individu als with large quanti ties of crack cocaine, negotiated prices and made arrang ements to sell crack cocaine, and aggressively collected debts. Other corroborating evidence involved two undercover drug deals to buy crack cocaine from one of Mr. Mirabal’s alleged distributors, observations of Mr. Mirabal meeting with alleged buyers at the times arra nged in the te lephone calls, telephone calls in which Mr. Mirabal told Mr. Anaya how to cook crack cocaine, and telephone calls indicating Mr . Mirabal’s intent to sell the cocaine stashed in the car. The abundance of co rroboration weighs in favor of harmlessness. But the influence of Mr. Anaya remain ed substantial, for he had been intimately involved in Mr. Mirabal’s criminal enterprise. And the lawenforcement witnesses acknow ledged that they had re lied at least in part on information from Mr. An aya while he was c ooperating with the Government. Thus the factors of importance, cumulativeness, and corroboration are not dispos itive; the issue of ha rmlessness turns insteadon the strength of the prosecution’s case and the extent of crossexamination. 2. Strength of the Pr osecution’s Case The overall strength of the prosecution’s case supports harmlessness. The Government presented an enormous array of wireta pped calls that13 officers interpreted as proof that Mr. Mirabal was setting up drug deals, negotiating sales, and instructing Mr. Anaya on how to c ook crack cocaine. This evidence was couple d with officers’ observ ations of Mr. Mirabal meeting with buyers at the arranged times. The Government also presented str ong evidence that the conspiracy had involved co caine rather than ma rijuana wax. For exam ple, searches of Mr. Mirabal’s home and storage lock er did not uncove r the materials needed to make marijuana wax, and Mr. Mirabal’s pricing matched the price of cocaine. In addition, the te rminology used in the telephone calls made it unlikely that th e coded references involved marijuan a wax because

 Mr. Mirabal did not talk in code when referring to marijuana and marijuana wax,

 the law-enforcement wi tnesses testified that the code words matched crack and powder cocai ne but not ma rijuana or marijuana wax, and

 the references to “c ooking” made sense fo r the production of crack cocaine but no t for the production of marijuana wax. In our view, the st rength of the prosecution’s case weighs in favor of harmlessness. 3. Extent of Cross-Examination But the most critical fact or is the extent of cross-examination that was allowed. Even with the restri ctions, Mr. Mirabal was able to extensively cross-examine Mr. Anaya on his reliability and motive. By the14 end, Mr. Anaya’s credibilit y was sullied as much as it would have been with a fuller cro ss-examination. For example, Mr. Mira bal questioned Mr. Anay a extensively on the reliability of his testim ony, including his histor y as an abuser and a trafficker of drugs, his prior convic tions for drug tra fficking and armed robbery, his prior inconsistent stat ements, his inabilit y to know who was driving his car after he went to prison, the discrepancies between Mr. Anaya’s testimony and the testimony of other witn esses, and Mr. Anaya’s prior effort to cooperate with the Governme nt only to be told that his information was unreliable. Mr. Mirabal also questioned Mr. Anay a extensively on his motive to aid the government. For example, Mr. Anaya admitted that he had entered into a plea agreement and had underst ood that the Govern ment could help him obtain a sentence re duction in exchange for his cooperation, that his sentence would have been substantial without his cooperation, that his previous convictions could lead to a far longer se ntence if the Government sought an enhancement as a career offe nder, and that the Government had chosen not to seek enhancement of Mr. Anaya’s sentence. Mr. Mirabal drove the poin t home when Mr. Anay a admitted that he wanted to return home as soon as he could so that he could see his young ch ildren grow up. The extensive questioni ng allowed Mr. Mi rabal to aggressively attack Mr. Anaya’s credibility. For example, in closi ng argument, Mr. Mirabal15 pressed the jury to disr egard Mr. Anaya’s testimony on the ground that his plea deal had provided a motive to say whatever the Government wanted. In addition, Mr. Mirabal ef fectively used the jury in structions to cast doubt on Mr. Anaya’s believability. In these instructions, th e district court stated that the jury shoul d weigh Mr. Anaya’s testimony with caution because of his prior inconsistent statements, past convictions, status as a drug abuser, and plea agreement. See United States v. Chavez , 481 F.3d 1274, 1278 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that jury instructions can diminish the impact of an error for pur poses of harmlessness). In li ght of the extensive crossexamination, closing argument, and ju ry instructions, the jury was amply informed of Mr. Anaya’s unreliability and motive to testify against Mr. Mirabal. * * * For harmlessness, we ask: If Mr. Mirabal had been permitted to cross-examine Mr. Anaya on the specifics of Mr . Anaya’s sentencing exposure, would we conc lude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would still have return ed a guilty verdict? See Part II(B), a bove. Based on the strength of the pros ecution’s case and Mr. Mi rabal’s extensive crossexamination of Mr. Anaya, we answer “yes.” In our view, any violation of the Confrontation Clause would have been harmless.16 III. Supplemental Appeal Points Mr. Mirabal also filed a suppleme ntal brief raising eight additional appeal points. Five of these appeal points ar e either undeveloped or included within the issues already discussed. 3 But three warrant separate discussion: 1. sufficiency of the evidence, 2. destruction of evidence, and 3. withholding of exculpatory evidence. We reject Mr. Mirabal’s co ntentions on these issues. A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Mr. Mirabal contends that the evid ence was insufficie nt to convict. We review this conten tion de novo, considering “‘the eviden ce and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government.’” United States v. Toles , 297 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Malone , 222 F.3d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir.

3 In these appeal points, Mr. Mirabal contends that

 the Government used speculative in terpretations of code words,

 the Government’s case agent did not believe that the car contained drugs,

 no evidence existed to support De puty Barker’s testimony about speeding or recove ry of a folding knife,

 Deputy Barker’s testim ony was unreliable, and

 Mr. Anaya committed perjury.17 2000)). Considering th e evidence in this light, we will reverse only if the trier of fact could not rationally have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The first count involved conspiracy to distribu te at least ten ounces of crack cocaine. As discussed above, the Government presented evidence that Mr. Mirabal had arranged to manufacture and sell more than ten ounces of crack cocaine. This evidence was sufficient for guilt on the first

count. The second count enta iled possession of 500 grams or more of powder cocaine with intent to distribute. Here the Government presented evidence that Mr. Mirabal

 had been caught with one kilogram of cocaine in a car that he was driving and

 had been transporting th e cocaine to sell it. This combination of evidence was suffi cient for guilt on the second count. The third count invo lved possession of a fi rearm and ammunition. Here the Government pres ented evidence th at officers had found a firearm and ammunition in Mr. Mirabal’s residence, where he lived alone. This evidence sufficed for guilt on the th ird count. The final count invo lved possession of body armor. Here the Government showed that body armor had been f ound in Mr. Mirabal’s storage locker. Again, this showing wa s sufficient for a finding of guilt.18 Viewing the evidence in the light mo st favorable to the Government, a rational trier of fact could have found Mr. Mira bal guilty on each count. B. Destruction of Evidence Mr. Mirabal also challenges the dest ruction of drug evidence that hadallegedly been obtained from a distributor for Mr. Mirabal. Lawenforcement officers recognized the substance as crac k cocaine, and it tested positive in a field test. Bu t authorities later filed a notice announcing the destruction of the dr ugs based on a gov ernmental policy. Mr. Mirabal did not present this ar gument in district court, and he has not urged plain-error review. Thus , we could decline to address this argument. See Part I(C), above. But this argument would fail even under de novo review. To prevail, Mr. Mirabal needed to show that the Government had acted in “bad faith” by destroying potentially exculpatory evidence. United States v. Beckstead , 500 F.3d 1154, 1159 (10th Cir. 2007). “Generally, however, destroying the evidence according to ‘an established pr ocedure’. . . ‘precludes a finding of bad faith absent other compelling evidence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Gomez , 191 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999)). In our view, the authorities did no t act in bad faith. They destroyed the drugs based on an existing policy and filed a no tice announcing the destruction of the drugs. In these circumstances, we have no reason to find19 bad faith. Thus, we would reject Mr. Mirabal’s argument even if it had been preserved. C. Withholding of Exculpatory Evidence Finally, Mr. Mirabal asse rts that evidence was withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963). But he does not identify the evidence allegedly withheld or say how this evidence would have been pertinent. Instead, Mr. Mirabal asks us to overrule Brady ’s requirement of materiality. But we cannot ove rrule a Supreme Court opinion. See Burrell v. Armijo , 456 F.3d 1159, 1171 n.9 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Ne edless to say, we cannot overrule the Supreme Court.”). IV. Conclusion We reject Mr. Mirabal’s chal lenges to his conviction. First, we reject his challenge under the Fourth Amendment because Deputy Barker acted reason ably in pulling the armr est down in order to see into the back part of the trunk. Second, even if the Confrontati on Clause had been violated, the violation would have been harmless because the Government presented compelling evidence of guilt and Mr. Mirabal was able to effectively undermine Mr. Anaya’ s credibility on cross-examination. Third, the evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Mirabal on each

count.20 Fourth, Mr. Mirabal did not preserve his appeal poin t involving the destruction of evidence, and he presented no evidence of bad faith. Finally, the Brady claim is invalid because Mr. Mirabal has not identified any withheld evidence or explained why it is material. Having rejected each appeal point, we affirm the conviction.