Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 4, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00203-CR

JAIME LEE GAMEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 268th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 12-DCR-061850

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant Jaime Lee Gamez guilty of felony driving while 

intoxicated (DWI), enhanced by a prior felony DWI, and assessed punishment at fifteen 

years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(b), 49.04, 49.09(b)(2). In two 

issues, appellant contends (1) the evidence is legally insufficient, and (2) the trial court 

erred by denying appellant’s motion to suppress. We affirm.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to prove 
2

he was intoxicated. Appellant argues that because there is no evidence his blood 

alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more, the “only issue is whether [he] did not have his 

normal use of his mental or physical faculties due to alcohol.” See Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. § 49.01(2) (defining “intoxicated”).

“In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, 

a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences 

therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (quotation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). 

In reviewing historical facts that support conflicting inferences, we must presume that 

the jury resolved any conflicts in the State’s favor, and we must defer to that resolution.

Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166. “[A]n inference is a conclusion reached by considering 

other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Id. (alteration in original) 

(quotation omitted). 

In a DWI prosecution, generally evidence is sufficient to prove intoxication when 

the arresting officer opines that a person is intoxicated based on observed cues of 

intoxication. See Annis v. State, 578 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1979) (sufficient evidence based on arresting officer’s opinion testimony); Kiffe v. State, 

361 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“Also, as a 

general rule, the testimony of an officer that a person is intoxicated provides sufficient 

evidence to establish the element of intoxication for the offense of DW[I].”); accord 

Irion v. State, 703 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, no writ); see also Lovett 

v. State, No. 14-12-00556-CR, 2013 WL 3243363, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Cloud v. State, 

No. 14-07-00847-CR, 2008 WL 2520826, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 
3

24, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Here, two police officers stopped appellant because he was driving the wrong 

way on a freeway. Officer Benny Gonzalez opined that appellant was intoxicated 

because appellant (1) had a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his person and 

breath; (2) did not realize he was driving the wrong way on the freeway; (3) was 

unsteady on his feet and unbalanced; (4) had red, bloodshot eyes; (5) appeared to have 

urinated on himself, which is common for DWI suspects; and (6) refused field sobriety 

tests and a blood test. There was also an open bottle of beer on the floorboard of the 

driver’s side of appellant’s vehicle. On cross-examination, Gonzalez acknowledged that 

appellant did not stumble or fall, and it was possible the wet spot on appellant’s pants 

was from a spilled beer rather than urine. Sergeant Marty Morales also testified that he 

believed appellant was intoxicated, and appellant (1) had slurred speech; (2) was dazed 

and confused; and (3) urinated on himself. On cross-examination, Morales 

acknowledged that it was a mistake to not have tested appellant’s blood for alcohol.

Appellant cites six cases in which various appellate courts affirmed convictions 

for DWI,1and he attempts to distinguish those cases because there is no evidence that 

appellant failed field sobriety tests or a breath test, was in an accident or swerved from 

lane to lane, or staggered while he walked. However, none of those particular facts is 

required for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was 

intoxicated. Reviewing the evidence discussed above and the entire record, a rational 

jury could have found that appellant was intoxicated. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, No.

14-13-00170-CR, — S.W.3d —, 2015 WL 3459521, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] May 28, 2015, no pet. h.) (sufficient evidence of intoxication existed when 

 

1

See Annis, 578 S.W.2d 406; Kiffe, 361 S.W.3d 104; Hartman v. State, 198 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. struck); Scott v. State, 914 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, 

no pet.); Martin v. State, 724 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no pet.); Irion, 703 S.W.2d 

362.
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the defendant wore disorderly clothing and had an unsteady gait and stance, incoherent 

speech, red and glassy eyes, and a combative behavior; the defendant’s breath smelled 

of alcohol; the defendant refused a breath test and field sobriety tests; a fresh alcoholic 

beverage was found in the vehicle; and a police officer opined that the defendant was 

intoxicated); Kiffe, 361 S.W.3d at 106, 108–09 (sufficient evidence of intoxication 

existed when an officer opined that the defendant was intoxicated because he observed 

slurred speech, unstable gait, and pinpointed pupils, and the defendant was swerving in 

and out of his lane, struck another vehicle, and drove into oncoming traffic; officer did 

not conduct a field sobriety test or smell alcohol); see also Lovett, 2013 WL 3243363, at 

*3 (“As a general rule, the testimony of a peace officer that a person is intoxicated 

provides sufficient evidence to establish the element of intoxication.”). The evidence is 

legally sufficient to prove intoxication.

Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying appellant’s motion to suppress. He contends that the officers “lacked any 

probable cause to arrest [him] for driving while intoxicated.” Appellant appears to be 

urging that an unlawful arrest occurred when the officers stopped appellant’s vehicle, 

ordered him out at gunpoint, and briefly handcuffed him. Then, the officers uncuffed 

appellant and began questioning him to investigate a possible DWI. The officers asked 

appellant to take field sobriety tests several times, and after appellant refused to perform 

the tests, the officers arrested him for DWI.

However, appellant’s counsel concedes that the undisputed facts support 

appellant being “under arrest at the moment Gonzales drew his gun for the offense of 

driving the wrong way.” See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.063 (operator shall drive 

on the right roadway of a divided freeway); id. § 543.001 (peace officer may arrest 
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person violating the rules of the road). The test for probable cause for a warrantless 

arrest is “whether at the moment of the arrest the facts and circumstances within the 

officer’s knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were 

sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed 

or was committing an offense.” State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002) (quotation omitted). Here, the officers observed appellant violating the 

rules of the road by driving on the wrong side of the freeway. The trial court would not 

have abused its discretion in concluding that the officers had probable cause to arrest 

appellant at the beginning of the traffic stop, and so an arrest occurring at that time 

would have been lawful.2

Appellant’s second issue is overruled.

III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Sharon McCally

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, McCally, and Donovan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

 

2

To the extent appellant is complaining about his arrest at the conclusion of the traffic stop, we 

note that the trial court in fact suppressed all verbal statements obtained after appellant unequivocally 

refused the field sobriety test for the first time.

Appellant limits his argument on appeal to the issue of probable cause. He does not contend, as 

trial counsel did, that he was subject to a custodial interrogation without receiving adequate Miranda

warnings.