In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-3191 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

MARK PRICE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:18-cr-00348 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 14, 2021 — DECIDED MARCH 9, 2022 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BRENNAN,

Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. After a jury trial, Mark Price was 

convicted of unlawfully possessing firearms and ammunition 

as a felon. In this appeal he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence located during warrantless searches, arguing that federal law enforcement used 

parole officers as a “stalking horse” to circumvent the Fourth 

Amendment’s protections. Price also contests the sufficiency 
2 No. 20-3191 

of the evidence underlying his convictions as well as the applicability of various sentencing enhancements. 

I 

Price shot and killed a man for which he was convicted of 

felony aggravated battery. He was convicted later of possessing a firearm as a felon. As a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) prohibits Price from possessing ammunition or 

firearms. 

In January 2018, Price signed a conditional parole release 

agreement under which he agreed not to engage in any criminal conduct or possess any firearms or weapons. He also consented to “allow [his] supervising officer or other authorized 

officials of the Department of Correction to visit [his] residence and place of employment at any reasonable time.” Price 

further agreed: 

I understand that I am legally in the custody of 

the Department of Correction and that my person and residence or property under my control 

may be subject to reasonable search by my supervising officer or authorized official of the Department of Correction if the officer or official 

has reasonable cause to believe that the parolee 

is violating or is in imminent danger of violating 

a condition to remaining on parole. 

Price and the Gun Dealer. Over seven days in October 2018, 

Price caught the attention of law enforcement. Beginning on 

October 10, he visited a firearms and ammunition dealer, Indy 

Trading Post, and ordered a Ruger rifle magazine. Consistent 

with store policy, an employee ran a background check which 

revealed Price’s previous felony convictions. The employee 
No. 20-3191 3

contacted Special Agent Brian Clancy of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Over the next several 

days, Price called Indy Trading Post multiple times asking 

about his magazine order. 

On October 16, Clancy and fellow ATF agents visited Indy 

Trading Post looking for Price. The agents waited for him, but 

he did not arrive, so they left. Price arrived later with his girlfriend, who lived with him at the time. He told a store worker 

that he wished to pick up the Ruger rifle magazine he had ordered. Unknown to Price, his order with the store’s distributor had not been placed pending the ATF’s investigation. Instead of an operable rifle magazine, the employee gave Price 

an inoperable magazine shell. While at the store, Price also 

purchased a box of .40 caliber ammunition and a holster and 

left with those items. 

Price later called the store, complaining the magazine did 

not fit “his firearm.” He arranged to return to the store. Clancy 

was contacted and informed of Price’s purchases and plan. 

Clancy decided to disguise himself as a store employee for 

Price’s return. 

Price arrived at the store the following day, October 17, 

driving a Ford Escape and accompanied by a friend. Clancy 

posed as a store clerk while two other ATF agents hid in the 

back. Price expressed irritation to store staff that the magazine 

he had picked up the day before did not work. He and his 

friend wished to use the shooting range, and Price was interested in renting a firearm because “his 40 was too much” for 

his friend to wield. While examining rental firearms with 

staff, Price took possession of one of the weapons, examined 

it, brought it up into a shooting position, and then handed it 
4 No. 20-3191 

back. At that point Clancy escorted Price to a back room 

where ATF agents were waiting and arrested him. 

The Searches. After Price was arrested, Clancy did not immediately apply for a search warrant. Instead, aware that 

Price was on parole, Clancy contacted the Indiana Department of Correction and told them that Price was in custody. 

Clancy had previously informed parole officers that he was 

investigating Price, and they were aware of Price’s attempt to 

purchase the rifle magazine. In fact, on the day Price was arrested parole officers had already looked for Price at his place 

of work and had tentative plans to visit his residence. 

After Clancy contacted state authorities, three parole officers arrived at Indy Trading Post and searched the Ford Escape 

that Price had driven to the store. It is unclear whether they 

searched at Clancy’s request or of their own volition. According to one, Clancy had asked them to “initiate the investigation.” But Clancy testified he “did not directly ask them to 

search the vehicle,” but only “asked them to the scene so they 

could do their job.” Regardless, as authorized by the parole 

agreement, the parole officers searched the vehicle and found 

a cocked and loaded Smith & Wesson .40 caliber pistol in the 

center console. Review of the firearm’s serial number revealed 

that it was stolen. The parole officers notified Clancy about 

the weapon and he obtained and executed a search warrant 

for the vehicle. No further firearms were discovered in the car. 

Following the search of the Ford Escape, Clancy and the 

parole officers drove Price to his residence where he lived 

with his girlfriend. There, parole officers conducted a search. 

Once again, it is unclear whether the parole officers initiated 

the search or whether Clancy requested that they do so. According to one parole officer, they “were asked to go” to 
No. 20-3191 5

Price’s home. But Clancy testified that the parole officers 

“want[ed] to conduct a search of the Defendant’s residence,” 

and that Clancy “followed” the parole officers back to Price’s 

home. In any event, parole officers searched the residence 

with Price while Clancy waited outside. 

During that search the parole officers discovered ammunition and immediately notified Clancy. Clancy then requested, received, and executed a search warrant for the 

home, a parked Oldsmobile van in the driveway, and an outbuilding. In the bedroom officers found mail addressed to 

Price. Officers also located .40 caliber ammunition purchased 

at Indy Trading Post, the receipt for that purchase, and a key 

to the Oldsmobile van, all in a TV stand in the same room. In 

the bedroom closet, in a toolbox, the officers also located a 

firearm, and various ammunition, including .223 caliber. A 

search inside the Oldsmobile van revealed a Ruger Mini .223 

caliber rifle. 

A federal grand jury indicted Price, a felon, with one count 

of unlawful possession of the .40 caliber ammunition he 

bought at Indy Trading Post, and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm for the .40 caliber pistol found in the center console of the Ford Escape and the .223 caliber rifle discovered in the Oldsmobile van, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). 

Motions to Suppress and Trial. Before trial, Price moved to 

suppress the evidence obtained from the searches of the Ford 

Escape, the Oldsmobile van, and his residence. Price argued 

the warrantless parole searches violated the Fourth Amendment because the parole officers acted as a “stalking horse” 

on behalf of the ATF, allowing Clancy to circumvent typical 

warrant and probable cause requirements. The government 
6 No. 20-3191 

defended the search on multiple grounds. The stalking horse 

theory was obsolete, the government argued, and the search 

by the parole officers complied with the parole agreement because they had reasonable cause to believe Price had violated 

his parole conditions. Even if the stalking horse theory was 

valid, the government submitted it did not apply here because 

the parole officers followed standard procedures by conducting a search after receiving information giving rise to reasonable suspicion that Price had violated the terms of his parole. 

And regardless of the validity of the stalking horse theory, the 

government invoked the inevitable discovery doctrine because Clancy had probable cause and could have obtained a 

search warrant at the time he arrested Price, as well as because 

the Ford Escape would have been subject to an inventory 

search after Price’s arrest. 

The district court denied Price’s motion to suppress and 

his request for an evidentiary hearing. After considering 

several Supreme Court precedents—including Griffin v. 

Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.

112 (2001), and Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)—the 

court concluded that “the stalking horse theory has no 

application” to Price’s case. Instead, the court framed the 

inquiry as “whether the Parole Officers’ search of Mr. Price’s 

vehicle and residence were reasonable under the 

circumstances.” After weighing Price’s diminished privacy 

expectations as a parolee against the government’s 

heightened interest in supervising parolees, the court was 

satisfied that no Fourth Amendment violation took place. 

Price renewed his motion to suppress during the two-day

trial, but the court again denied his motion. After the government concluded its case on the second day of trial, Price 
No. 20-3191 7

moved for acquittal on all three counts under Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 29. The court denied the motion. 

The jury convicted Price on all three counts. He renewed 

his motion for judgment of acquittal and moved for a new 

trial, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the 

convictions. On Count 1, Price argued his parole agreement 

restored his right to possess ammunition because it was not 

listed as a prohibited item. For Count 2, Price maintained 

there was insufficient evidence to show that he was aware of 

the .40 caliber pistol’s presence inside the Ford Escape or that 

he had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the firearm. And on Count 3, Price contended the 

government had failed to show a nexus between Price and the 

.223 caliber rifle found in the Oldsmobile van. 

The district court denied Price’s post-trial motions. The 

court ruled first that the parole agreement’s “omission of express language regarding the prohibition of possessing ammunition does not affect Mr. Price’s status as a prohibited person for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),” and thus Price’s 

right to possess ammunition had not been restored by the parole agreement. The court also concluded that the government 

presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Price had constructively possessed both the .40 caliber pistol and the .223 caliber rifle. For the pistol, this included that Price had purchased .40 caliber ammunition, he 

referenced “his forty” at Indy Trading Post, and authorities 

found the firearm in the center console of the Ford Escape that 

Price had driven to the store before he was arrested. For the 

rifle, the jury heard that authorities found .223 caliber ammunition in Price’s home, Price ordered a Ruger rifle magazine

and contacted Indy Trading Post about the magazine’s 
8 No. 20-3191 

functionality, and a weapon was recovered in the Oldsmobile 

van parked at Price’s residence. 

Sentencing. Price objected to three enhancements sought 

by the government under the Sentencing Guidelines. First, he 

objected to a two-level, multiple-firearms enhancement under 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), arguing the government failed to establish that Price possessed three firearms. The court overruled Price’s objection, finding that Price had briefly possessed a rental pistol at Indy Trading Post, in addition to the

.40 caliber pistol and the .223 caliber rifle related to the underlying charges. 

Second, Price objected to a two-level enhancement under 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) for an offense involving a stolen firearm, arguing that he was unaware the .40 caliber pistol was 

stolen. The court concluded that this enhancement has no 

mens rea requirement, so it overruled Price’s objection. 

Third, Price objected to a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which was predicated on Price’s testimony at trial that he had never held or 

shot a firearm prior to October 17, 2018, and that he did not 

know how to tell whether a gun was loaded. At the sentencing 

hearing Price testified he had not intentionally misled the 

court, but rather he was “confused by the Government’s line 

of questioning.” The court rejected Price’s testimony as false 

and applied the enhancement. 

After the three enhancements were applied, Price’s base 

offense level increased from level 20 to level 26, and his

Guidelines Range moved from 51–63 months to 92–115 

months. The district court sentenced Price to 92 months for 
No. 20-3191 9

each of the three counts, to be served concurrently, followed 

by three years of supervised release. 

On appeal, Price challenges the district court’s denial of 

his motion to suppress, its rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence for Counts 2 and 3, and its imposition of the three sentencing enhancements. 

II 

A 

Price primarily challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through two warrantless searches. 

“When reviewing a district court’s decision denying a motion 

to suppress evidence, we review the court’s legal conclusions 

de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. 

Wood, 16 F.4th 529, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United 

States v. McGill, 8 F.4th 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2021)). 

“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 

‘reasonableness.’” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) 

(quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 

“[T]he reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, 

on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is 

needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). A defendant’s status as either a 

probationer or parolee “informs both sides of that balance.”

Id. at 119; see Samson, 547 U.S. at 850–57 (applying the Knights

framework to parolees). 

Two decisions guide our view of this balance of interests. 

In Knights, the Court examined the constitutionality of a warrantless search by law enforcement of a probationer’s 
10 No. 20-3191 

apartment. 534 U.S. at 114. The Court assessed the privacy interests of the probationer, noting that “[p]robation is ‘one 

point ... on a continuum of possible punishments ranging 

from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a 

few hours of mandatory community service.’” Id. at 119 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874). As a result, “probationers ‘do not 

enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.’” 

Id. (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874). Additionally, the Court 

emphasized that the probationer was aware of the conditions 

in his probation agreement that authorized searches with or 

without a warrant or “reasonable cause,” which “significantly 

diminished [the probationer’s] reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 114, 120. In contrast, the Court in Knights stressed

the government’s legitimate interest in apprehending lawbreakers, noting the increased propensity of probationers to 

commit criminal activities and destroy incriminating evidence. Id. at 120. Accordingly, the Court held in Knights that 

“the balance of these considerations requires no more than 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of [the] probationer’s house.” Id. at 121. “The same circumstances ... render 

a warrant requirement unnecessary.” Id. 

Five years later, the Court applied the Knights framework 

to a warrantless search of a parolee in Samson. 547 U.S. at 846–

47. The Court began by evaluating a parolee’s privacy interests, determining that “parolees have fewer expectations of 

privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” Id. at 850. 

“[E]rgo, parolees enjoy even less of the average citizen’s absolute liberty than do probationers.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 1990)). The Court also outlined the privacy intrusions the state imposed on parolees, 

concluding that “[t]he extent and reach of these conditions 
No. 20-3191 11

clearly demonstrate that parolees like petitioner have severely 

diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status 

alone.” Id. at 852. And, as in Knights, the Court highlighted the 

terms of the parolee’s agreement, which included a condition 

that permitted “suspicionless searches by a parole officer or 

other peace officer ‘at any time’”—a condition that was 

“clearly expressed” to the parolee. Id. (cleaned up). In sum, 

these factors meant that the parolee “did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.” 

Id. Conversely, the state had an “‘overwhelming interest’ in 

supervising parolees because ‘parolees ... are more likely to 

commit future criminal offenses.’” Id. at 853 (quoting Pa. Bd. 

of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998)). The Court 

therefore held in Samson that “the Fourth Amendment does 

not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless 

search of a parolee.” Id. at 857. 

Here, as in Knights and Samson, Price’s status as a parolee 

reduced his privacy expectations and informed the government’s legitimate interests. As a parolee his privacy expectations were diminished below even those of a probationer, 

since “parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation.” 

Samson, 547 U.S. at 850. Price’s parole agreement also included a provision that permitted parole officers to conduct a 

search based on “reasonable cause” rather than the Fourth 

Amendment’s “probable cause” standard. At the same time, 

Price’s status as a parolee gave the state an “overwhelming 

interest” in supervising him. This is especially true where, as 

here, parole officers had reason to believe that Price purchased .40 caliber ammunition and a rifle magazine, traveled 

to Indy Trading Post to use the shooting range, and was arrested by Clancy. 
12 No. 20-3191 

In response, Price attempts to distinguish these two decisions. He retained a greater degree of privacy than the defendants in Knights and Samson, Price believes, because their 

respective probation and parole agreements permitted suspicionless searches, while Price’s agreement required “reasonable cause.” Although that assertion is true, Price’s privacy expectations were nevertheless diminished by his status as a parolee and the “reasonable cause” search requirements of his 

parole agreement. Price also does not dispute that parole officers had reasonable cause to search his property and residence based on facts known by the officials at the time of his 

arrest. Even if Price’s privacy expectations were slightly 

higher than those of the defendants in Knights and Samson, the 

state’s interests in searching Price’s property and residence 

were markedly stronger. Unlike the defendant in Knights, 

Price is a parolee, which gives the state an “overwhelming interest” in his supervision.1 And distinct from Samson, where 

law enforcement conducted a search based “solely on petitioner’s status as a parolee,” Samson, 547 U.S. at 846–47, the 

parole officers here knew that Price was under arrest and had 

likely violated the terms of his parole agreement. The State 

had a heightened interest in protecting the public from Price. 

That Price was under arrest at the time of the search did not 

diminish that interest or increase Price’s privacy expectations. 

1 Price attempts to minimize the state’s heightened interest in regulating parolees as opposed to probationers, citing State v. Vanderkolk, 32 

N.E.3d 775 (Ind. 2015), where the Supreme Court of Indiana purportedly 

refused to distinguish between the two statuses. But to the extent Vanderkolk collapsed the status distinction, it did so by reducing the privacy expectations of probationers, holding that “Samson is applicable to probationers” and that probationers may be subject to “warrantless and suspicionless searches.” Id. at 779; see Wood, 16 F.4th at 536 n.1. 
No. 20-3191 13

Wood, 16 F.4th at 538 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. 

Jones, 152 F.3d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1998)).

Price retorts that his parole agreement “allows only parole 

officers, or authorized Department of Correction employees, 

to search him without a warrant”—not federal law enforcement.2 But that is what happened here. State parole officers 

were the only ones to conduct warrantless searches. Clancy’s 

search of Price’s property and residence were supported by 

probable-cause warrants. Price’s parole terms were not violated by federal law enforcement because the authorization of

Clancy’s search was independent from the parole agreement. 

In sum, Price’s status as a parolee and the terms of his parole agreement lessened his privacy expectations while bolstering the government’s legitimate interests in conducting a 

search. The terms of Price’s parole agreement were not 

breached—either by parole officers, who had “reasonable 

cause” to believe Price was in violation of parole, or by 

Clancy, whose searches were authorized by search warrants 

independent of the parole agreement. Under Knights and 

Samson, the searches of Price’s property and residence did not 

offend the Fourth Amendment. 

2 To the extent Price suggests that a breach of a state parole agreement

constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment, that argument contravenes the Court’s holding in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (“[I]t 

is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law.”). 

Properly understood, “[a] parole agreement’s terms do not directly shape 

the contours of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. They merely elucidate the nature of the parolee’s privacy expectations.” Wood, 16 F.4th at 

539. 
14 No. 20-3191 

B 

To avoid this conclusion, Price invites our court to apply 

the “stalking horse” theory. As our fellow circuit courts have 

explained, “parole officers may work with police officers provided the parole officers are pursuing parole-related objectives.” United States v. Brown, 346 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 2003). 

But when a parole or probationary search operates as “a subterfuge for a criminal investigation” to evade the Fourth 

Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements, 

such searches “violate[] the Fourth Amendment.” United 

States v. Stokes, 292 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2002). A parole officer does not act as a stalking horse if, “rather than the police,” the officer “intitate[s] the search in the performance of 

his duties as a parole officer.” United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 

1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 

790, 793–94 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, judgment rev’d on other 

grounds, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (defining the stalking horse theory). Price argues Clancy used parole officers as pawns to 

conduct a search by calling them to the scene of the arrest and 

prompting them to conduct a warrantless search under the 

parole agreement that Clancy was not himself authorized to 

conduct. According to Price, this process constituted an unconstitutional circumvention of the Fourth Amendment’s 

warrant requirement. 

Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed

the stalking horse theory, the concept appears to stem from 

the Court’s decision in Griffin, 483 U.S. 868. See United States 

v. Sweeney, 891 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 2018) (attributing the 

origins of the stalking horse theory to Griffin). In Griffin, the 

Court considered whether a probation officer’s warrantless 

search of a probationer’s home violated the Fourth 
No. 20-3191 15

Amendment. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870. The Court ruled that it 

did not because the state’s probation system presented 

“special needs”—facilitating prisoner rehabilitation while 

simultaneously protecting the community—that required 

intensive supervision, “mak[ing] the warrant requirement 

impracticable.” Id. at 875–76. But in reaching this decision, the 

Court concluded it was “unnecessary to consider whether ... 

any search of a probationer’s home by a probation officer is 

lawful when there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe 

contraband is present.” Id. at 880. Following Griffin, 

warrantless probationary searches presumably needed to be 

grounded in the special needs of a state’s probation system as 

opposed to “law-enforcement officers’ using a parole officer 

as a stalking horse to assist in an unrelated investigation.”

Sweeney, 891 F.3d at 236. 

More recently, though, the Court’s decisions in Knights

and Samson have eroded this rationale. In Knights, the 

probationer argued that “a warrantless search of a 

probationer satisfies the Fourth Amendment only if it is just 

like the search at issue in Griffin—i.e., a ‘special needs’ search 

conducted by a probation officer monitoring whether the 

probationer is complying with probation restrictions.” 

Knights, 534 U.S. at 117. The Court rejected this argument as 

“dubious logic.” Id. Instead, the Court held that the 

warrantless probationary searches may be justified under 

“ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis,” balancing the 

probationer’s diminished privacy expectations with the 

government’s legitimate interests. Id. at 122. 

Similarly, in Samson, the Court upheld the suspicionless 

search of a parolee under the Court’s “general Fourth Amendment approach,” which examined the parolee’s privacy 
16 No. 20-3191 

expectations in contrast with the state’s “overwhelming interest” in supervising parolees. 547 U.S. at 852 n.3, 853. In so ruling, the Court said it need not address “whether California’s 

parole search condition is justified as a special need under 

Griffin v. Wisconsin because our holding under general Fourth 

Amendment principles renders such an examination unnecessary.” Id. at 852 n.3 (citation omitted). 

Knights and Samson show that warrantless probation and 

parole searches need not be based on “special needs,” but can 

also be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry by considering the totality of the circumstances. 

When the rationale for a search “rests on ordinary Fourth 

Amendment analysis that considers all the circumstances of a 

search, there is no basis for examining official purpose.” 

Knights, 534 U.S. at 122; see Sweeney, 891 F.3d at 236 (“Because 

this justification for the exception is not always related to the 

special needs of the probationary system, the reason for conducting the search need not necessarily be related to those 

needs either.”).

Price does not point to a single federal appellate decision 

invoking the stalking horse theory after the Court’s rulings in 

Knights and Samson. Our research yields that each circuit 

court to have examined the theory since Knights has either rejected it or limited its applicability to circumstances where the 

government relies on the “special needs” of a state’s probationary or parole system as the basis for a search.3 

3 United States v. Ickes, 922 F.3d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he ‘stalking 

horse’ caveat, if it survives Knights at all, does not apply when a probationer is subject to a valid search provision and law-enforcement officers 

have a reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaging in illegal activity.”); United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2005) 
No. 20-3191 17

Whether the stalking horse theory is valid is a question of 

first impression for this court. Seven years before Knights, we 

signaled approval of the doctrine in United States v. Coleman,

22 F.3d 126 (7th Cir. 1994): “[F]ederal law enforcement officers 

(or the police in general) cannot utilize state probation officials to carry out warrantless searches on their behalf which 

they as federal agents, acting alone, could not execute without 

a judicial warrant.” Id. at 129. But after Knights, our court disapproved of the theory in United States v. Emmett: “A probation officer (or a parole officer, as the case may be) does not 

violate his ‘client’s’ rights merely by aiding police.” 321 F.3d 

669, 672 (7th Cir. 2003). Notably, a stalking horse analysis was 

not essential to the holdings in either Coleman or Emmett,4 and 

both decisions predated the Court’s ruling in Samson. 

(“‘Stalking horse’ claims are necessarily premised on some notion of impermissible purpose, but Knights found that such inquiries into the purpose underlying a probationary search are themselves impermissible.”);

United States v. Brown, 346 F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The government 

counterargues that United States v. Knights eliminates the stalking horse 

theory. We agree with the government.” (citation omitted)); United States 

v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[E]ven assuming that the 

search was a subterfuge for a law enforcement investigation, it was permissible under general Fourth Amendment principles. ... As in Knights, 

the officers’ motivation is irrelevant.”); United States v. Stokes, 292 F.3d 964, 

967 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the argument that “a probation search that 

was a subterfuge for a criminal investigation violated the Fourth Amendment” because “[t]he Supreme Court put a stop to this line of reasoning” 

in Knights); United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 463 (2d Cir. 2002) (referencing the stalking horse theory as “ill-defined” and concluding that “the 

doctrine is not a valid defense in this Circuit”). 

4 Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 

N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1282 (2006) (“[B]efore relying on a formulation of law 

in a prior opinion, we must determine whether it was holding or dictum.
18 No. 20-3191 

We now hold that when the government relies on the 

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis as articulated in Knights

and Samson to justify a parole search under the Fourth 

Amendment, the stalking horse theory has no application. We 

reserve for another day whether the doctrine has viability for 

searches that rely solely on the “special needs” of a state’s

parole system. Because the government does not rely on the 

“special needs” of Indiana’s parole system to justify the 

searches of Price’s property and residence, it is irrelevant 

whether parole officers initiated their searches of Price’s 

vehicle and residence of their own volition or at Clancy’s 

request. 

III

Price also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his 

convictions on Count 2 for possessing the .40 caliber pistol 

and Count 3 for possessing the .223 caliber rifle. “We review 

de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of 

acquittal for insufficient evidence.” United States v. Godinez, 7 

F.4th 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2021). “In doing so, we construe the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and 

we affirm a jury’s verdict if any rational trier of fact could 

have found the offense’s elements satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. This is a heavy burden, which we have frequently described as “nearly insurmountable.” United States 

v. Palladinetti, 16 F.4th 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United 

States v. Grayson Enters., Inc., 950 F.3d 386, 405 (7th Cir. 2020)).

To convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the 

government must establish: “(1) the defendant was convicted 

... If a rule was declared only in dictum, the question remains 

undecided.”). 
No. 20-3191 19

of a crime punishable by more than one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; (3) the defendant knew of 

his felon status; and (4) the gun possessed by the felon had 

been in or affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Perryman, 20 F.4th 1127, 1135 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). 

Price contests only the second element: whether he possessed 

the charged firearms. 

The government can show either actual or constructive 

possession. Id. Here, Counts 2 and 3 were predicated on a 

theory of constructive possession. Because Price lived in a 

shared residence with his girlfriend, the government was 

required to establish constructive possession with direct or 

circumstantial evidence by showing Price’s proximity to the 

firearms “coupled with evidence of some other factor—

including connection with [an impermissible item], proof of 

motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or a 

statement indicating involvement in an enterprise.” United 

States v. Davis, 896 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2018) (alteration in 

original) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 696 (7th 

Cir. 2012)). 

Smith & Wesson .40 caliber pistol. Price argues there was insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that he 

constructively possessed the .40 caliber pistol found in the 

center console of the Ford Escape. He points out that neither

his DNA nor his fingerprints were found on the weapon, the 

Ford Escape was owned by his girlfriend, the government did 

not present evidence that anyone saw Price with the firearm, 

and a different friend accompanied Price in the vehicle on the 

day of the search. Price also contends the pistol was found in 

the “closed center console,” and was thus “not easily accessible 

to Price.” 
20 No. 20-3191 

Price’s arguments do not persuade us. The firearm was 

found cocked and loaded in the center console of the Ford Escape which Price drove to Indy Trading Post. This shows 

Price’s proximity to the firearm; whether the console was 

closed or open did not alter his proximity to the pistol. At the 

store Price also referred to the gun as “his forty,” connecting 

him to the weapon. In addition, Price purchased .40 caliber 

ammunition, which was later found in Price’s bedroom along 

with the receipt from the purchase. And although Price maintains he did not own the Ford Escape and that his fingerprints 

were not found on the weapon, those facts are not dispositive. 

United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 670 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(“[T]hat the car was not registered in Morris’s name, that 

other people occasionally had access to the vehicle, and that 

there were no fingerprints found on the drugs or the gun do 

nothing to change that conclusion.”). 

Price disputes his connection to the firearm by arguing 

that neither his comments regarding “his forty” nor the 

ammunition purchases show his connection with the specific

.40 caliber pistol charged in Count 2. He points to Griffin, 684 

F.3d 691, for support. There, the defendant was charged with 

unlawful possession of ten firearms after those guns were 

discovered in his parents’ home where the defendant resided, 

but the defendant was convicted of possessing only one 

shotgun and various ammunition. Id. at 693–94. On appeal, 

the defendant contested his conviction. We agreed with him, 

including because a witness’s testimony that two handguns 

and “some of the shotguns” in the house belonged to the 

defendant was insufficient to show that the defendant 

possessed “the specific shotgun ... for which he was 

convicted.” Id. at 694, 699. 
No. 20-3191 21

But Griffin differs from this case because Price has failed to 

identify any .40 caliber firearm other than the one in Count 2. 

Unlike Griffin, where several shotguns were found throughout the house, Price’s ammunition purchase and his comment 

regarding “his forty” could relate to only one gun. Without 

an alternative, the evidence allowed a rational trier of fact to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that Price constructively possessed the .40 caliber pistol in Count 2. 

Ruger Mini .223 caliber rifle. Price raises the same argument 

for the .223 caliber rifle found in the Oldsmobile van parked 

in the driveway of the residence he shared with his girlfriend. 

He emphasizes that testing did not reveal his DNA or his fingerprints on the weapon, the Oldsmobile van was owned by 

his girlfriend, the government did not present evidence that 

anyone saw Price with the rifle, and the vehicle was parked at 

Price’s shared residence. 

Once again, Price’s arguments do not convince us because 

he cannot refute his proximity to the rifle. That firearm was in 

the Oldsmobile van parked in the driveway of his residence, 

and the key to that van was found in the same TV stand that 

contained the .40 caliber ammunition Price purchased, along 

with the receipt for that ammunition. 

The government also demonstrated Price’s connection 

with the rifle through his attempt to purchase a matching .223 

caliber magazine, his follow-up calls to Indy Trading Post 

about the magazine order, his return there on October 16 to 

pick up the magazine, and his complaint that the magazine 

shell he received did not fit “his firearm.” 

Again, Price invokes Griffin, arguing the government’s 

proffered evidence does not show his connection with the 
22 No. 20-3191 

specific .223 caliber rifle in Count 3. But again, unlike in Griffin, Price points to no alternative .223 rifle to which his comments might have related. This evidence allowed the jury to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that Price constructively possessed the specific .223 caliber rifle in Count 3. 

IV 

Price also challenges the applicability of three sentencing 

enhancements: the multiple-firearms enhancement, the 

stolen-firearm enhancement, and the obstruction-of-justice 

enhancement. “We review the district court’s application of 

the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for 

clear error.” United States v. Law, 990 F.3d 1058, 1065 (7th Cir. 

2021). 

Multiple-firearms enhancement. Under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), a two-level enhancement applies if a 

defendant’s felon-in-possession offense involved “three or 

more firearms.” “That total includes not only the specific gun 

or guns which the defendant was convicted of possessing, but 

any firearm the possession of which qualifies as relevant 

conduct.” United States v. Ghiassi, 729 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 

2013) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)). Section 1B1.3(a)(2) defines 

relevant conduct to include acts that are “part of the same 

course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense 

of conviction.” In assessing what offenses constitute the same 

course of conduct, the Guidelines lists three factors to 

consider: “[T]he degree of similarity of the offenses, the 

regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time interval 

between the offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.5(B)(ii). 

Here, although Price was charged with possessing the .40 

caliber pistol and .223 caliber rifle, the prosecution relied on a 
No. 20-3191 23

third firearm—the rental gun Price handled briefly while at 

Indy Trading Post—to secure the multiple-firearms

enhancement at sentencing. An examination of each of the 

three factors shows that the district court did not err in 

applying this enhancement. 

First, the offenses are similar. Price was charged with unlawfully possessing two firearms, and when he handled a 

rental gun at Indy Trading Post, he possessed that third firearm. United States v. Matthews, 520 F.3d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 2008)

(“[H]olding a firearm for a brief period of time is sufficient to 

constitute possession.”). Although Price argues he did not intend to personally use this unloaded third gun, these distinctions have no legal significance. A felon’s possession of a firearm violates § 922(g)(1) without regard to whether the gun is 

loaded or if the felon intends to use it. Price’s possession of 

the rental firearm establishes a similar offense because it is 

proscribed by the same statute underlying Counts 2 and 3. 

Second, Price challenges the regularity of his offenses. The 

Guidelines list “regularity (repetitions) of the offenses” as a 

factor to consider when assessing whether uncharged conduct constitutes part of the “same course of conduct” as the 

charged offenses. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.5(B)(ii). We have 

previously defined “regularity” as “repeated acts or events 

that take place at fixed and certain intervals or in accordance 

with the same consistent or periodical rule or practice.” United 

States v. Singleton, 548 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1337 (7th Cir. 1993)). Here, 

the district court found only three instances of unlawful gun 

possession. Those three instances are sufficiently numerous to 

constitute repeated acts. See United States v. Birk, 453 F.3d 893, 

899–900 (7th Cir. 2006) (determining that one charged firearm 
24 No. 20-3191 

offense and two uncharged firearm offenses was sufficient to 

apply the multiple-firearms enhancement). Even if the “regularity” factor is not strong here, the other factors underlying 

this enhancement are present. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.5(B)(ii) 

(“When one of the above factors is absent, a stronger presence 

of at least one of the other factors is required.”); United States 

v. Amerson, 886 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Without evidence of regularity, the government needed to prove stronger 

evidence of similarity or temporal proximity.”). 

Third, Price does not dispute that he possessed the rental 

firearm at Indy Trading Post while he possessed the .40 caliber pistol in the Ford Escape. This fact is important considering our precedents, under which a defendant’s possession of

a gun at the “same place” and at the “same time” as other 

charged firearms supports applying the enhancement. United 

States v. Jones, 635 F.3d 909, 918–19 (7th Cir. 2011) (“‘[T]he contemporaneous, or nearly contemporaneous, possession of uncharged firearms is ... relevant conduct in the context of a 

felon-in-possession prosecution’ pursuant to § 1B1.3(a)(2).”

(quoting United States v. Santoro, 159 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir.

1998))). 

Stolen-firearm enhancement. A defendant faces a two-level 

enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm under U.S.S.G 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). Price argues this enhancement should not 

apply because he was not aware that the .40 caliber pistol was 

stolen. 

The Guidelines explicitly state that this enhancement “applies regardless of whether the defendant knew or had reason 

to believe that the firearm was stolen.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4), 

cmt. n.8(B). And our decisions have consistently held that this 

enhancement does not include a scienter requirement. United 
No. 20-3191 25

States v. Statham, 581 F.3d 548, 553 (7th Cir. 2009); United States 

v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216, 219–22 (7th Cir. 1992). 

Price responds that Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191

(2019), requires the government to show that he knew the firearm was stolen before seeking this enhancement. In Rehaif, the 

Court held that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 

§ 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Id. at 2200. The Court reached this conclusion by invoking “the presumption in favor of scienter,” 

which “applies with equal or greater force when Congress includes a general scienter provision in the statute itself.” Id. at 

2195. Of special importance was “[t]he text of § 924(a)(2),” 

which stated “that ‘[w]hoever knowingly violates’ certain 

subsections of § 922, including § 922(g), ‘shall be’ subject to 

penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment.” Id. (quoting 18 

U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)). “[B]y specifying that a defendant may be 

convicted only if he ‘knowingly violates’ § 922(g), Congress 

intended to require the Government to establish that the defendant knew he violated the material elements of § 922(g).” 

Id. at 2196. 

Price does not invoke Rehaif to appeal his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Instead, he attempts to extend Rehaif’s 

scienter requirement to this sentencing enhancement. But Rehaif never addressed sentencing enhancements, and the most 

recent Guidelines Manual makes no reference to that decision.

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021). 

Price has not cited, and our research has not revealed, a published decision by another circuit court suggesting Rehaif applies to sentencing enhancements. In fact, the opposite is true. 
26 No. 20-3191 

United States v. Palos, 978 F.3d 373, 377–78 (6th Cir. 2020). Further, the rationale of Rehaif does not support Price’s position. 

Rehaif emphasized the importance of the word “knowing” in 

the statute to infer Congress’s intent to impose a mens rea requirement. But this enhancement applies “regardless of 

whether the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the 

firearm was stolen.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4), cmt. n.8(B). We 

therefore decline to extend Rehaif beyond its holding to the 

stolen-firearm enhancement of U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A).

Obstruction-of-justice enhancement. Defendants are subject 

to a two-level enhancement if they “willfully obstructed or 

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, 

or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 3C1.1. When the enhancement is based on perjury, “the district court should make a finding as to all of the factual predicates necessary for a finding of perjury: false testimony, materiality, and willful intent.” United States v. Johnson, 612 F.3d 

889, 893 (7th Cir. 2010). While separate findings on each element are preferred, they are not always strictly necessary. Id. 

The district court determined at sentencing that Price had 

committed perjury when he testified at trial that he did not 

know how to load a firearm, how to identify if a firearm was 

loaded, or how a magazine worked, and that he had never 

shot nor held a firearm prior to October 17, 2018. While Price 

testified at the sentencing hearing that the government’s line 

of questioning had confused him, the court did not believe his 

explanation and imposed this sentencing enhancement. 

Price argues the district court erred because it did not 

make a specific finding that his testimony at trial on this topic 
No. 20-3191 27

was material.5 Johnson clarifies that such specific findings are 

not strictly necessary. 612 F.3d at 893. But even if the court 

erred, any error was harmless. As we have previously held, 

“[a] material statement is one that ‘if believed, would tend to 

influence or affect the issue under determination.’” Id. at 895 

(quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.6). Price’s false testimony

was directly relevant to the possession element of the 

underlying charges and tended to contradict evidence 

showing he possessed the relevant firearms, such as his 

statements to store employees that the magazine shell did not 

fit “his firearm.” Price’s false testimony, if believed, goes to 

the issue of whether he possessed the .40 caliber pistol and 

.223 caliber rifle—a material issue for Counts 2 and 3. 

Finally, Price maintains that the district court erred by not 

explicitly finding that his false statements were willful. But as 

we stated in Johnson, “separate findings are not strictly necessary so long as the court determined that the defendant lied 

to the judge and jury about matters crucial to the question of 

the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 893 (quoting United States v. 

White, 240 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2001)). Those requirements 

were satisfied when Price testified at sentencing that he had

not lied but was confused by the government’s line of questioning. The district judge responded by declaring that “the 

Court believes that that testimony [is] false.” Because the

court found that Price lied, and the issue is material to Count 

5 The Government argues Price failed to object below so “plain error 

review applies” to this argument. We disagree. Price objected to this enhancement at sentencing, and the district court did not specifically elicit 

objections to the adequacy of its findings, so plain error does not apply. 

United States v. Freitag, 230 F.3d 1019, 1025 n.7 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing United 

States v. Patel, 131 F.3d 1195, 1201–02 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
28 No. 20-3191 

3, the court did not err by applying the obstruction-of-justice 

enhancement at sentencing. 

* * *

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court.