Rel: January 5, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0289

_________________________

Christie Teague 

v. 

John Hamm, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the 

Alabama Department of Corrections

Appeal from Lawrence Circuit Court

(CV-21-900046)

PER CURIAM.

Christie Teague appeals from a judgment of the Lawrence Circuit 

Court dismissing her action against John Hamm ("the commissioner") in 

his official capacity as commissioner of the Alabama Department of 
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Corrections ("the DOC").1 For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the 

judgment to the extent that it dismisses Teague's petition without 

prejudice for improper venue, and we reverse that portion of the 

judgment dismissing the petition on the ground of sovereign immunity.

Background

A number of years before the current action, the State of Alabama 

brought an action in the Morgan Circuit Court on behalf of Teague to 

obtain past-due child support from her former husband, John David 

Teague ("John David"). John David had been incarcerated in Alabama 

after being convicted of unspecified crimes. In October 2001, the Morgan 

Circuit Court entered a judgment in which it directed the DOC to collect 

child-support payments from John David's inmate account and his workrelease fund, among other sources. According to the judgment, the DOC 

1The original defendant in this action was Jefferson Dunn, who was 

the commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections at the time 

Christie Teague commenced the action. However, John Hamm was 

appointed to replace Dunn in that position in January 2022. Rule 43(b), 

Ala. R. App. P., provides that, "[w]hen a public officer is a party to an 

appeal ... in that officer's official capacity, and during its pendency ... 

ceases to hold office, the action shall not abate and the public officer's 

successor is automatically substituted as a party." Thus, we have ex mero 

motu substituted Hamm for Dunn as the defendant. See Ex parte 

Alabama Dep't of Corr., 74 So. 3d 25, 26 n.1 (Ala. 2011). 
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was to forward the payments to the Morgan circuit clerk for 

disbursement to Teague. 

On May 6, 2021, Teague filed a petition in the Lawrence Circuit 

Court seeking to have the commissioner of the DOC, in his official 

capacity, held in contempt for his alleged failure to obey the October 2001 

judgment. See n.1, supra. She attached a copy of the judgment to her 

petition. Teague asserted that she had never received the child-support 

payments, so she also sought to have the State of Alabama, described in 

the petition as a "garnishee," "remit the money owed" to her. 

Teague asserted in her petition that, in addition to the money John 

David had earned from his prison jobs, his family had deposited money 

into his inmate account. She claimed that "tens of thousands of dollars, 

if not more," went "into and out of" John David's inmate account but, she 

said, instead of using the money to pay child support, DOC officials had 

allowed it to be used to pay "strong, predatory inmates" who had 

demanded money from "weak inmates." She asserted that John David 

had been murdered in prison "[o]n the day that Governor Kay Ivey 

announced her prison reform initiative." She did not provide the specific 

date John David had died.
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On June 17, 2021, the commissioner filed a motion to dismiss 

Teague's action in the Lawrence Circuit Court asserting that, pursuant 

to Article 1, § 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, he was entitled to 

sovereign immunity. He asserted that claims against state officers in 

their official capacities are "functionally equivalent" to claims against the 

entities they represent.

On February 15, 2023, the Lawrence Circuit Court entered an order 

stating that it appeared to that court that, because Teague was 

attempting to enforce an order from the Morgan Circuit Court, the 

Lawrence Circuit Court did not have "jurisdiction" to consider the matter. 

The Lawrence Circuit Court also said that it appeared that Teague was 

"attempting to penetrate the absolute immunity afforded to the State and 

[sic] Alabama." It ordered Teague to respond to the commissioner's 

motion to dismiss within ten days. 

In her response, Teague argued that the commissioner could not 

establish that he was entitled to sovereign immunity because, she said, 

she was not seeking money from the State. Instead, she said, she was 

seeking money that had belonged to John David and was owed to her. 

She also said that the State had previously brought an action in 
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Lawrence County to enforce child support; therefore, she argued, the 

state could not complain in this action that venue was not proper in the 

Lawrence Circuit Court. Moreover, even if the Lawrence Circuit Court 

determined that venue was improper in Lawrence County, she said, the 

proper remedy would be to transfer the current action rather than 

dismiss it. 

On March 24, 2023, the Lawrence Circuit Court entered a judgment 

dismissing Teague's action.2 In the judgment, the Lawrence Circuit 

Court found that an attempt to enforce an order of the Morgan Circuit 

Court did not vest jurisdiction in Lawrence County. It also determined 

that the commissioner was entitled to absolute immunity under Art. 1, §

14, Ala. Const. 1901. On May 4, 2023, Teague filed a timely notice of 

appeal to this court. 

2The order indicated that the dismissal was without prejudice. We 

note that, generally, a dismissal without prejudice is considered a 

nonfinal order that cannot support an appeal. Palughi v. Dow, 659 So. 2d 

112, 113 (Ala. 1995). However, when a trial court enters a judgment 

dismissing an action based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, that 

judgment is considered sufficiently final to support an appeal because it 

has "'conclusively determine[d] the issues before the court.'" Hutchinson 

v. Miller, 962 So. 2d 884, 887 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (quoting Palughi, 659 

So. 2d at 113). A dismissal on the ground of improper venue is without 

prejudice. Ex parte PT Sols. Holdings, LLC, 225 So. 3d 37, 46 (Ala. 2016).
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Analysis

Teague first contends that the Lawrence Circuit Court erred in 

dismissing her action on the ground that the commissioner was entitled 

to State immunity, also known as sovereign immunity or § 14 immunity. 

See Ex parte Whitlow, [Ms. CL-2023-0050, Oct. 6, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___ 

(Ala Civ. App. 2023) (noting that our supreme court's most recent 

decisions have preferred the term "State immunity"). Teague specifically 

argues that State immunity does not bar contempt proceedings against 

members of the executive branch of state government such as the 

commissioner.

State immunity is not an affirmative defense but a "'jurisdictional 

bar, '" Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 985 So. 2d 892, 894 (Ala. 2007)

(quoting Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. V. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 435 

(Ala. 2001)), that "preclud[es] a court from exercising subject-matter 

jurisdiction" over the action against the State or a State agency, Lyons v. 

River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257, 261 (Ala. 2003). "'"[A] complaint 

filed solely against the State or one of its agencies is a nullity and is void 

ab initio."'" Ex parte Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 348 So. 3d 397, 400 

(Ala. 2021) (quoting Ex parte Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 264 So. 
CL-2023-0289

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3d. 850, 853 (Ala. 2018)). Any action taken by a court without subjectmatter jurisdiction, other than dismissing the action, is void. State v. 

Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999).

Further, "[s]tate officers and employees, in their official capacities 

and individually, are also absolutely immune from suit when the action 

is, in effect, one against the state." Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 

(Ala. 1989). "This means not only that the state itself may not be sued, 

but that this cannot be indirectly accomplished by suing its officers or 

agents in their official capacity, when a result favorable to plaintiff would 

be directly to affect the financial status of the state treasury." State 

Docks Comm'n v. Barnes, 225 Ala. 403, 405, 143 So. 581, 582 (1932). See 

also Alabama State Univ. v. Danley, 212 So. 3d 112, 122-24 (Ala. 2016).

In Haley v. Barbour Cnty., 885 So. 2d 783, 789 (Ala. 2004), our supreme 

court held that State immunity forbids the imposition of sanctions 

intended to punish a state officer or agent for contempt and to compel 

compliance with a court's orders because the effect of the sanctions 

impacts the treasury and divests it of funds.
CL-2023-0289

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However, State immunity is not absolute. In Ex parte Hampton, 

189 So. 3d 14 (Ala. 2015), our supreme court catalogued six general types 

of actions that are not subject to State immunity: 

"'(1) actions brought to compel State officials to perform their 

legal duties; (2) actions brought to enjoin State officials from 

enforcing an unconstitutional law; (3) actions to compel State 

officials to perform ministerial acts; (4) actions brought 

against State officials under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 

Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq., seeking construction of a 

statute and its application in a given situation; (5) valid 

inverse condemnation actions brought against State officials 

in their representative capacity; and (6) actions for injunction 

or damages brought against State officials in their 

representative capacity and individually where it was alleged 

that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their 

authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law.'"

189 So. 3d at 17-18 (quoting Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Fin., 991 So. 2d 

1254, 1256 (Ala. 2008)).

"'In determining whether an action against a state officer is barred by § 

14 [State immunity], the Court considers the nature of the suit or the 

relief demanded, not the character of the office of the person against 

whom the suit is brought.' Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65, 67-68 (Ala. 

1980) (emphasis added)." Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 

(Ala. 2002).

Teague contends that the commissioner had an obligation to 

perform what she says was the ministerial act of remitting John David's 
CL-2023-0289

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money to her as the Morgan Circuit Court's child-support withholding 

order directed. "Ministerial acts" are those acts "'" done by officers and 

employees who are required to carry out the orders of others or to 

administer the law with little choice as to when, where, how, or under 

what circumstances their acts are to be done." '" Carroll v. Hammett, 744 

So. 2d 906, 910 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 

300 (Ala. 1993), quoting in turn Smith v. Arnold, 564 So. 2d 873, 876 (Ala. 

1990)). The commissioner had a duty to obey a lawful order requiring him 

to withhold money from John David's inmate account, Teague says, and 

he failed to perform that "ministerial act." Therefore, she says, the 

commissioner cannot avoid carrying out that duty by claiming he is 

entitled to State immunity.

In his appellate brief, the commissioner cites § 14-3-36, Ala. Code 

1975, which provides:

"The officer in charge of any prison or camp must take 

in charge any property, money or other thing of value in the 

possession of any convict at the time of the delivery of such 

convict to him and shall pay or deliver the same to such person 

as the convict may in writing direct, to the convict on his 

discharge or to his personal representative in case of his death 

previous thereto, and should no personal representative be 

appointed within six months after his death, then into the 

State Treasury."
CL-2023-0289

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The commissioner then explains the statutory restrictions governing 

how the DOC handles inmate earnings from prison jobs, including how 

the money is credited and disbursed, as well as how inmate accounts are 

maintained and managed. He states that, "[u]pon John David Teague's 

death, any such funds [in his inmate account] would have been paid to 

his personal representative or to the State Treasury if there was no

personal representative." 

We conclude that compliance with the statutory requirements of §

14-3-36 and with the Morgan Circuit Court's October 2001 judgment 

constitute ministerial acts that the commissioner and the DOC would not 

have the discretion to avoid. There is no evidence in the record to support 

the commissioner's assertion that the money in John David's inmate 

account had been disbursed pursuant to § 14-3-36. Nothing in the record, 

other than an imprecise statement from Teague that John David died "on 

the day that Governor Kay Ivey announced her prison reform initiative," 

indicates whether six months had passed since John David's death, 

which would have indicated that his inmate account could have been

liquidated. There is also nothing in the record to indicate that the 

commissioner or the DOC carried out the directives of the October 2001 
CL-2023-0289

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judgment of the Morgan Circuit Court. Because Teague is seeking to 

compel the commissioner to carry out these ministerial acts, the 

commissioner is not entitled to claim State immunity.

Teague also argues that because she is not seeking the payment of 

money that belongs to the state but is instead seeking to be paid money 

belonging to John David, State immunity is not implicated in this case. 

This court has explained that, under certain circumstances, State 

immunity "does not bar a proceeding against the State for the recovery 

of moneys that do not belong to the State or that have not been properly 

acquired by the State." Alabama Dep't of Env't Mgmt. v. Town of 

Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1180, 1190 n.6 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). In that 

case, we relied on Department of Industrial Relations v. West Boylston 

Manufacturing Co., 253 Ala. 67, 42 So. 2d 787 (1949), to explain that, 

"in the context of an employer's claim for a refund of certain 

contributions to the unemployment-compensation fund under 

Ala. Code 1940, tit. 26, § 243:

"'[T]here is no refund of money out of the State 

Treasury. The money subject to refund payments 

is collected and administered for certain purposes 

as directed by law, and that is one of them....

"'Moreover, when it is thus by law collected 

and put into the custody of some person who is 

charged by law with the duty of administering it 
CL-2023-0289

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according to standards set up, it is the legal duty 

of such person thus to apply the money.... [H]is 

duty to administer it according to law may be 

enforced by mandamus or by some statutory 

procedure if one is enacted. In such a proceeding 

the State is not made a party in violation of section 

14 of the Constitution....'"

In this case, Teague has made clear that she is not seeking money 

from the State or a payment that would directly affect the financial status 

of the State treasury. She is seeking to be paid money from John David's 

inmate account -- money that belonged to John David -- that she says the 

commissioner had a legal duty to administer. Because there is nothing in 

the record to demonstrate that the money being held in John David's 

inmate account had been disbursed to the State Treasury or that the 

payment of that money to Teague would in any way affect the State 

Treasury, we cannot say that, at the present point in the litigation, the 

commissioner was entitled to State immunity. Alabama Dep't of Env't 

Mgmt., 950 So. 2d at 1190 n.6. Therefore, the Lawrence Circuit Court 

erred in determining that the commissioner was entitled to State 

immunity.3

3This is not to say that the commissioner may not ultimately prevail 

on his State-immunity argument, only that he cannot prevail on that 
CL-2023-0289

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Teague also argues that the Lawrence Circuit Court erred in 

finding that venue for this action was properly in Morgan County, which 

had entered the judgment she was seeking to have enforced. In its order 

of dismissal, the Lawrence Circuit Court ruled that, because Teague was 

seeking to enforce an order of the Morgan Circuit Court, the Lawrence 

Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction over the matter. On appeal, the 

parties do not argue the propriety of the Lawrence Circuit Court's 

jurisdiction to consider this matter based on where the action was filed. 

Instead, they properly frame the issue as one regarding proper venue.

See Ex parte N.M., 132 So. 3d 1088 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (treating 

questions of the location where contempt proceedings are to be filed as 

matters of venue and not of jurisdiction). Thus, we address the issue as 

it has been presented to us. 

Teague concedes that a trial court can interpret and enforce its 

owns judgments. Stephens v. Nelson, 141 So. 3d 1073, 1076 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2013). Thus, she appears to agree that the Morgan Circuit Court 

could properly entertain her action seeking to enforce that court's order 

argument right now, given the present record at this early stage of the 

action.
CL-2023-0289

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directing the DOC to collect John David's child-support payments from 

his prison accounts. However, Teague contends that, although she could 

have brought her contempt action in the Morgan Circuit Court, she was 

not required to do so under § 6-3-2(b)(2), Ala. Code 1975. She argues that 

that statute permitted her to bring the current action in the Lawrence 

Circuit Court, because, she says, she is seeking "equitable relief on a 

judgment entered by the circuit court sitting in Morgan County." 

Teague's reliance on § 6-3-2(b)(2) is misplaced. That statute, which 

Teague quotes in her appellate brief, provides that "[i]n proceedings of an 

equitable nature against individuals ... [i]f the action is to enjoin 

proceedings on judgments in other courts, it may be commenced in the 

county in which such proceedings are pending or judgment entered." 

Teague focuses on the use of the word "may" in § 6-3-2, arguing that it

means that she could but was not required to bring her action seeking 

enforcement of the Morgan Circuit Court's order in Morgan County. 

For purposes of this case, however, the key provision in the statute 

is not whether the action "may" have been brought in Morgan County or 

in Lawrence County. In making her argument, Teague overlooks the 

phrase, "[i]f the action is to enjoin proceedings on judgments in other 
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courts ...." The action that Teague commenced in the Lawrence Circuit 

Court does not seek to enjoin any proceedings of the Morgan Circuit 

Court. Therefore, § 6-3-2, the lynchpin of Teague's argument regarding 

venue, has no application to this case. Because Teague has failed to 

demonstrate that the Lawrence Circuit Court, not the Morgan Circuit 

Court, should hear her claim for contempt, we cannot hold the Lawrence 

Circuit Court in error for determining that the Morgan Circuit Court 

serves as the only proper venue for Teague's petition.

Teague asserts that, even if venue were improper in the Lawrence 

Circuit Court, the Lawrence Circuit Court should have transferred her 

action to the Morgan Circuit Court instead of dismissing it. In support of 

her argument, Teague cites Rule 82(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides 

that, "[w]hen an action is commenced laying venue in the wrong county, 

the court, on timely motion of any defendant, shall transfer the action to 

the court in which the action might have been properly filed and the case 

shall proceed as though originally filed therein." (Emphasis added.) That 

rule, however, has no relevance to the present action because, as the 

commissioner points out, he, not Teague, is the defendant, and he has not 

sought a transfer of the action to the Morgan Circuit Court. Thus, given 
CL-2023-0289

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the inapplicability of Rule 82(d)(1) to the action, we cannot conclude that 

the Lawrence Circuit Court erred in dismissing Teague's action without 

prejudice. See Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. (authorizing the dismissal, 

without prejudice, of an action on the ground of improper venue); Ex 

parte PT Sols. Holdings, LLC, 225 So. 3d 37, 46 (Ala. 2016).

Conclusion

The Lawrence Circuit Court erred in dismissing Teague's action 

based on its determination, at this point in the proceedings, that the 

commissioner was entitled to State immunity. However, Teague has 

failed to demonstrate that the Lawrence Circuit Court's dismissal, 

without prejudice, of her action for improper venue was wrong. As a 

result, the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the 

cause is remanded to the Lawrence Circuit Court for it to set aside that 

portion of its order of dismissal that dismisses the action on the ground 

of State immunity.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED 

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
CL-2023-0289

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Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., 

concur.