FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KEVIN WASHINGTON, 

No. 04-35381 Petitioner-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v.  CV 00-1632 KI

ROBERT O. LAMPERT,

OPINION Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 3, 2005—Portland, Oregon

Filed September 6, 2005

Before: Procter Hug, Jr., A. Wallace Tashima, and

Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

12301
COUNSEL

Christine Stebbens Dahl, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

Portland, Oregon, for the petitioner-appellant. 

Jennifer S. Lloyd, Office of the Attorney General, Salem,

Oregon, for the respondent-appellee. 

12304 WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT
OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge: 

Kevin Washington, a state prisoner convicted of aggravated

murder and other offenses, appeals the district court’s denial

of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his habeas petition, Washington asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel (“IAC”) in the negotiation and execution of his sentencing stipulation, which waived his right to appeal in

exchange for a stipulated sentence of life imprisonment with

the possibility of parole. 

While a district court has habeas jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254, whether the district court here had

jurisdiction turns on whether Washington’s waiver of his right

to file a federal habeas petition is enforceable with respect to

an IAC claim that challenges the validity of the waiver itself.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I. State Court Trial

In December 1994, during the course of a robbery, Kevin

Washington (“Washington”) murdered James Loupe

(“Loupe”) in the presence of Loupe’s children. Washington

was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder, first

degree robbery, first degree burglary, and second degree

assault. 

Before the sentencing phase of trial, the State and Washington negotiated an agreement stipulating to a sentence of “life

imprisonment with the possibility of parole under ORS

163.105(1)(c) and 36 months to run consecutively.” The stipulation further stated: 

WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT 12305
Having been fully informed by his attorneys of the

sentencing options available in this case and having

been fully informed of possible legal and constitutional challenges to both the jury verdict and the possible sentences, the defendant specifically waives

any legal or constitutional objections to pretrial proceedings, rulings by the court, his trial, the jury verdict, his conviction, and to the sentence he will

receive based on this stipulation. This waiver is

intended to eliminate the possibility of any future litigation regarding the defendant’s pretrial motions,

his trial, conviction, entry into this agreement, or

sentencing. It includes all existing or future claims,

known or unknown, and all types of judicial or other

review, including but not limited to all claims for

post-conviction relief or federal habeas corpus relief.

The stipulation also stated that “[t]he defendant expressly

acknowledges and agrees that he is fully and completely satisfied with the advice and representation he has received from

his attorneys.” 

The trial court explained the terms of the stipulation to

Washington, stating: 

Last Thursday the jury found you guilty of various

things. As you know, the next step is to determine

the sentence. 

And the Aggravated Murder, the jury determines the

sentence, okay, and their choices are . . . the death

penalty, life without parole, called true life, and life

with the possibility of parole after 30 years, but you

can request it, you can start requesting parole after

20, and they can turn you down, okay? 

It also explained that, in return for Washington’s waiver, “the

state is agreeing not to seek . . . the death sentence or the life

12306 WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT
without the possibility of parole.” The court then engaged

Washington in the following exchange: 

Court: And I guess what I want to know from

you is you understand what that is,

what you’re doing there? 

Defendant: Yes. 

Court: Okay, why don’t you repeat to me

what you’re doing. . . . 

Defendant: If I sign this, by signing this agreement

I give up my rights for all appeals. 

Court: All appeals. And what we call postconviction. 

Defendant: Yeah, post-conviction. 

Court: Post-conviction, you can go and say

my attorney didn’t do a good job for

me, they were a bunch of clucks, et

cetera. You also give up the right to

that. You understand? 

Defendant: Uh-huh. 

The court then questioned Washington about whether he was

satisfied with the representation provided by his attorneys

Gareld Gedrose and Ed Jones: 

Court: Now, you’ve — Mr. Gedrose and Mr.

Jones have been representing you from

the very — from the beginning here.

Any complaints? 

Defendant: No. 

WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT 12307
Court: I mean, obviously they didn’t win,

that’s a complaint, but any other things

that they could have done that you felt

they should have done or anything like

that? 

Defendant: No. 

Pursuant to the stipulation, the trial court sentenced Washington to a term of life with the possibility of parole, with the

minimum sentence set at 30 years, as well as a term of 36

months imprisonment, to be served consecutively. Washington did not file a direct appeal. 

II. State Court Post-Conviction Proceedings

In 1997, Washington filed a Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief in state court. He stated the following claims for relief:

“prosecutorial & judicial misconduct — ineffective assistance

of counsel — denial of due process & equal protection of the

laws.” The petition alleged, in relevant part: 

After the guilty verdicts, my court-appointed lawyers

actively pressured me into accepting a 30 year to life

sentence and give up my appellate rights to cover-up

their outrageaous [sic] conduct which deprived me

of an unbiased, unprejudiced, independent and

informed trial jury, a fair trial, and due process of

law. 

The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that the

court should enforce Washington’s voluntary and knowing

waiver of his right to post-conviction relief. The motion was

supported by one of Washington’s trial attorneys, Gareld

Gedrose (“Gedrose”). Gedrose’s affidavit stated: 

I made a point of spending a considerable amount

of time discussing the options available to Mr.

12308 WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT
Washington regarding the State’s offer. We discussed at length the options available to the jury at

this particular stage of the proceedings. I explained

to him that there was a possibility of him receiving

the death penalty. I expressed my feeling that while

I did not think he was a strong candidate for the

death sentence, the circumstances surrounding the

shooting, the fact that it happened in front of the victim’s young children, the fact that it occurred at

christmas [sic] and the body was recovered under the

Christmas tree, would all allow a jury to reach a different conclusion and impose the death sentence. 

* * * 

During the course of our conversations, Mr.

Washington expressed a distaste for all the options

available to him but recognized that, at this stage in

the proceedings, it simply was not going to get any

better, and while the death penalty was somewhat

remote, it was a real possibility and the possibility of

a true life sentence was certainly a reality. The

opportunity to receive a sentence which included the

possibility of parole was his best option and certainly

in his best interest. 

Gedrose concluded: “I do believe that Mr. Washington did

accept and agree to the stipulation with his eyes open and did

realize what he was receiving in return. It was a rational decision based on his understanding of the facts and the law as

best I could explain them to him.” 

In his opposition to the State’s motion for summary judgment, Washington cited to both state and federal cases discussing the nature of valid, voluntary, and intelligent waivers.

He did not cite to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). 

WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT 12309
At the hearing on the State’s motion for summary judgment, Washington testified that he did not understand the

nature of post-conviction relief and that he did not fully

understand the waiver of his right to appeal: “I really didn’t

know much about it until I was, until I got down here I really

didn’t know what it was.” He also testified that he simply followed his attorneys’ instructions and didn’t fully understand

what his attorney was explaining to him. 

The state court granted the State’s motion for summary

judgment and Washington appealed to the Oregon Court of

Appeals. On appeal, Washington argued that the trial court

“erred when it found no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether [he] knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights

to direct appeal and post-conviction relief.” Washington also

asserted that the court erred “when it determined that [he]

presented no genuine issue of material fact in his application

for post-conviction relief based upon the claim of inadequate

assistance of trial counsel under the Oregon and Federal Constitutions because of counsel’s failure to explain the consequences of the stipulated sentencing agreement.” In support of

his IAC argument, Washington cited to and discussed both the

Sixth Amendment and federal cases, including Strickland.

Washington filed an affidavit in support of his appeal, stating:

“I believe I was coerced into taking a Plea agreement without

being fully aware of what I was giving up. . . . I don’t think

anyone given the proper legal advice would have given up

what I did, in return for the sentence I received.” 

Addressing Washington’s IAC claim, the Oregon Court of

Appeals concluded that Washington had not shown prejudice.

The court explained: 

petitioner offered no evidence that, had he understood the terms of the stipulation, he would have

risked the imposition of the death penalty for an

opportunity to pursue post-conviction relief. Likewise, on appeal, petitioner makes no claim that the

12310 WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT
lack of a more thorough explanation of the terms of

the stipulation prejudiced him in any way. 

The state court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment. 

Washington then filed a petition for review with the Oregon Supreme Court. He again raised the claim that his trial

counsel’s failure to explain the consequences of the stipulated

sentencing agreement amounted to constitutionally defective

assistance of counsel. The Oregon Supreme Court summarily

denied the petition for review, without opinion. 

III. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings

Washington then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. He asserted eight grounds for relief, many of which

cited to the Sixth Amendment and alleged that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel in entering into the sentencing stipulation waiving his right to appeal. Washington

alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel

“actively pressured his client into accepting a life sentence

with a thirty (30) minimum.” He also alleged that “[t]rial

counsel was ineffective and defendant was denied due process

of law where counsel coerced his client into waiving his constitutional right to appeal his trial and judgment of conviction

plus his collateral attack of post-conviction relief.” Finally,

Washington asserted that his trial counsel failed to inform him

of the consequences of his accepting the terms of the stipulation and “used false promises and inaccurate predictions to

get his client to agree to the state’s stipulated sentencing

offer.” 

In its response to the petition, the State explained that “Petitioner killed James Loupe in front of his two children,

underneath their Christmas tree. Before killing Loupe, petitioner told the children to ‘tell your father goodbye.’ ” The

State argued that the petition should be dismissed because

WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT 12311
Washington validly waived his right to appeal or collaterally

attack his conviction and sentence. 

The district court reasoned that, “[i]n order to proceed with

this case, petitioner must first show that he is entitled to bring

this action despite waiving his federal habeas corpus remedy.”

It noted that Washington asserted that his waiver was invalid

because he was given ineffective assistance of counsel. The

district court found no actual conflict of interest and no prejudice, and therefore concluded that Washington’s waiver of his

right to file a federal habeas corpus petition was valid, and

denied the petition. Washington filed a timely notice of appeal

and the district court granted a certificate of appealability.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant or

deny a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. Leavitt v. Arave, 383

F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any ground

supported by the record even if it differs from the rationale of

the district court. Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 762 (9th

Cir. 2004). We review findings of fact made by the district

court for clear error. See Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1317

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996, a petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of the merits resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States, or resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003). State court

findings of fact are presumed correct unless the petitioner

rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d

1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2003). 

12312 WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT
DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction — Waiver of the Right to Appeal

Before we proceed to the merits of Washington’s claim, we

must first determine whether Washington’s waiver of the right

to file a federal habeas petition was valid because, if it was,

then the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.

Washington argues that the sentencing stipulation’s waiver of

the right to appeal is unenforceable with respect to an IAC

claim challenging the validity of the waiver itself. 

[1] Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has addressed

the issue of whether a waiver of the right to file a collateral

challenge is unenforceable with respect to an IAC claim

implicating the voluntariness of the waiver itself. We have,

however, observed that other circuits have barred waivers of

IAC claims associated with the negotiation of plea agreements, and explained that “[c]laims of ineffective assistance

of counsel . . . challenge the voluntary and intelligent nature

of the plea agreement.” United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157,

1164 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds, 536 U.S.

622 (2002). 

Further, we have expressed “doubt” that such a waiver

could be enforceable. In United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431

(9th Cir. 1994), the petitioner previously had directly

appealed from his judgment of conviction and sentence, contending that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Id. at 432. We concluded that Pruitt, through his plea agreement, had waived his right to appeal. Id. at 432-33. Pruitt then

filed a collateral challenge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

which the district court denied. Id. at 433. We observed that

the plea agreement did not waive the right to bring a § 2255

motion, reached the merits of the IAC claim, and affirmed the

district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion. We explained that

“[w]e doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s erroneWASHINGTON v. LAMPERT 12313
ously unprofessional inducement of the defendant to plead

guilty or accept a particular plea bargain.” Id. Because the

issue was not squarely presented, however, we concluded that

“we need not face this issue here.” Id.

Similarly, in United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149 (9th

Cir. 2005), the defendant filed a direct appeal of the district

court’s rejection of his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.

at 1153. Jeronimo’s plea agreement provided that Jeronimo

waived his right to appeal and to file a petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Id. at 1154. On appeal, Jeronimo argued that

“his attorney’s failure to advise him of all the possible consequences of a guilty plea deprived him of the information necessary to render his plea — and the waiver of appeal

contained therein — truly knowing and voluntary.” Id. at

1155. We observed that IAC claims ordinarily are not

reviewed on direct appeal. Id. We then explained: 

We leave open the possibility that Jeronimo might

raise his ineffective assistance argument on federal

habeas procedure, through a § 2255 motion, notwithstanding that Jeronimo’s appeal waiver covered “all

his waivable statutory rights to file a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging the length of his

sentence.” 

. . . 

[B]ecause the issue is not squarely presented in this

case on direct appeal, we leave for another day our

assessment of whether a waiver such as made by

Jeronimo can be challenged through a § 2255 motion

questioning the validity of the waiver. 

Id. at 1156 n.4. We concluded that Jeronimo’s waiver was

valid and enforceable because the waiver was unambiguous

and the record failed to demonstrate that it was not knowingly

and voluntarily made. Id. at 1157. See also United States v.

12314 WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT
Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that,

“[w]hile we do not hold that Abarca’s waiver categorically

forecloses him from bringing any section 2255 proceeding,

such as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or involuntariness of waiver,” Abarca’s challenge to his degree of culpability was clearly foreclosed by the waiver). 

[2] We note that a number of other circuits have explicitly

held, in the context of § 2255 challenges brought by federal

prisoners, that waivers cannot bar IAC claims associated with

the negotiation of plea agreements. See United States v.

White, 307 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A] waiver of

appeal may not be enforced against a section 2255 petitioner

who claims that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered that

waiver unknowing or involuntary.”); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e hold that

a plea agreement waiver of postconviction rights does not

waive the right to bring a § 2255 petition based on ineffective

assistance of counsel claims challenging the validity of the

plea or the waiver.”); DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919,

924 (8th Cir. 2000) (“A defendant’s plea agreement waiver of

the right to seek section 2255 post-conviction relief does not

waive defendant’s right to argue, pursuant to that section, that

the decision to enter into the plea was not knowing and voluntary because it was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 

[3] For example, in Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142

(7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh Circuit held that a plea agreement

or post-conviction cooperation agreement that waives the

right to file a petition under § 2255 is unenforceable with

respect to an IAC claim that challenges the voluntariness of

the waiver. Id. at 1145. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that 

[j]ustice dictates that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation

of a cooperation agreement cannot be barred by the

agreement itself — the very product of the alleged

WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT 12315
ineffectiveness. To hold otherwise would deprive a

defendant of an opportunity to assert his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel where he had accepted

the waiver in reliance on delinquent representation.

Id. The court then observed that, “[o]rdinarily we would

remand to the district court for a determination whether Jones

was in fact denied effective assistance of counsel or whether

the agreement was involuntary.” Id. at 1145-46. The court

noted that Jones, however, “merely advances the naked assertions that he was denied effective assistance of counsel” without identifying the substance of the claim. Id. Therefore, the

court reached the merits of the claim and rejected it. Id.

[4] The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Jones applies with

equal force here, in the context of a state prisoner’s federal

habeas petition pursuant to § 2254. Indeed, the state acceded

as much at oral argument. We therefore hold that a plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

IAC claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver. 

[5] Because Washington’s waiver is unenforceable with

respect to the claim he asserts in his federal habeas petition,

the district court had jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. 

II. Exhaustion

The State argues that Washington failed to exhaust his IAC

claim. Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state

prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court

by giving the state courts an opportunity to correct the alleged

constitutional violation. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A);

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). Nevertheless, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

12316 WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT
State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Whether Washington

exhausted the claim he raises here presents a close question.

It is, however, a question that we need not resolve, because

we deny Washington’s claims on the merits. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Washington argues that his attorneys’ representation during

the negotiation and execution of the sentencing stipulation

constituted an actual conflict of interest that warrants a presumption of prejudice. First, Washington asserts that his

counsel “could not ethically advise him on whether to waive

his right to pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

against them.” Washington cites to Oregon Bar Disciplinary

Rule 6-102(A), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not

make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the

client is independently represented in making the agreement.”

Second, Washington asserts that, because prejudice should be

presumed based on the existence of an actual conflict, he need

not demonstrate adverse effect. Third, Washington asserts that

the sentencing stipulation was based on “false promises and

inaccurate predictions” and coercion by his attorneys and

therefore was not voluntary and intelligent. 

To prove an IAC claim premised on an alleged conflict of

interest, a petitioner must “establish that an actual conflict of

interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler

v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). “While ‘a defendant

who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in

order to obtain relief,’ the Supreme Court also clarified in

Cuyler that ‘until a defendant shows that his counsel actively

represented conflicting interests, he has not established the

constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.’ ” Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir.

1994) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50). “The client must

demonstrate that his attorney made a choice between possible

WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT 12317
alternative courses of action that impermissibly favored an

interest in competition with those of the client.” McClure, 323

F.3d at 1248. 

For example, in Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th

Cir. 1995), we rejected the petitioner’s argument that an

actual conflict of interest existed because “the fact that payment for any investigation or psychiatric services could have

come from counsel’s pocket forced counsel to choose

between Williams’ interests and his own.” Id. at 1473. We

reasoned that “[a]ll Williams alleges is the same theoretical

conflict that exists between an attorney’s personal fisc and his

client’s interests in any pro bono or underfunded appointment

case. Such arrangements, without more, do not require Sixth

Amendment scrutiny.” Id.

As for the effect of state bar disciplinary rules, 

The [Supreme] Court has yet to “define with greater

precision the weight to be given to recognized canons of ethics, the standards established by the state

in statutes or professional codes, and the Sixth

Amendment” in defining the proper scope of and

limits on attorney conduct for Strickland purposes. It

has, however, suggested that when “virtually all of

[those] sources speak with one voice” as to what

constitutes reasonable attorney performance, departure from ethical canons and ABA guidelines

“make[s] out a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel.” 

McClure, 323 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475

U.S. 157, 165-66 (1986)). 

[6] The Supreme Court has, however, articulated a specific

test for IAC claims challenging guilty pleas, which are analogous to the sentencing stipulation challenged here. In Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Supreme Court held that

12318 WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT
the Strickland test for evaluating IAC claims applies to guilty

plea challenges based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

at 58. The Court reasoned that a defendant who pleads guilty

upon the advice of counsel may attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice

he received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. at 56 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970), and

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)). Thus, to prevail, the petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s representation

fell below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases, and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 58-59. 

[7] Here, Washington fails to satisfy either of the tests set

forth in Cuyler and Hill. Washington points to no evidence

that “demonstrate[s] that his attorney made a choice between

possible alternative courses of action that impermissibly

favored an interest in competition with those of the client.”

McClure, 323 F.3d at 1248. Rather, the evidence shows that

Washington’s counsel wisely negotiated a bargain that

allowed Washington the lightest possible sentence, thus

avoiding imposition of either the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole — sentences that

appeared likely, given the circumstances of the murder. 

[8] Further, even if we consider Oregon Bar Disciplinary

Rule 6-102(A) in determining whether an actual conflict of

interest existed, it appears that, similar to the petitioner in Williams, all that Washington alleges is the same theoretical conflict that exists between an attorney’s interests and his client’s

interests in most plea agreement negotiations involving a

waiver of the right to appeal. See Williams, 52 F.3d at 1473.

Washington points to no evidence demonstrating that any

conflict, actual or theoretical, adversely affected his attorneys’

performance. Further, Washington points to no evidence indicating that, had his attorneys performed differently, he would

WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT 12319
have rejected the sentencing stipulation and insisted on proceeding with the sentencing phase of trial. See Hill, 474 U.S.

at 60 (rejecting IAC claim because petitioner did not allege

that, “had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on

going to trial”). 

[9] Finally, Washington points to no evidence demonstrating that his agreement to enter into the sentencing stipulation

was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. The transcript of

the colloquy shows that the court meticulously explained the

rights that Washington was agreeing to waive, including postconviction proceedings and IAC claims, and that Washington

understood the nature of the waiver. In sum, Washington fails

to demonstrate that the state courts’ rejection of his IAC claim

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The district court’s denial of Washington’s petition for writ

of habeas corpus is therefore 

AFFIRMED.

12320 WASHINGTON v. LAMPERT