J. A17042/20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

STEPHEN A. REMENTER, : No. 2615 EDA 2019

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 9, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County

Criminal Division at No. CP-45-CR-0000028-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: Filed: August 25, 2020

Stephen A. Rementer appeals from the August 9, 2019 order entered 

by the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County dismissing his second petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

On September 7, 2012, appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of 

rape of a child.1 The trial court imposed a sentence of 20-40 years’ 

imprisonment on November 20, 2012. The trial court also ordered appellant 

to comply with the registration requirements of Megan’s Law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9795.1 (expired December 20, 2012). Appellant appealed his judgment of 

sentence, which this court affirmed on September 20, 2013. 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c).
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Commonwealth v. Rementer, 87 A.3d 388 (Pa.Super. 2013) (unpublished 

memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with 

our supreme court.

On December 29, 2016, appellant filed his first PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court denied appellant’s petition on August 8, 2017. Appellant filed a notice 

of appeal, and this court affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of relief on June 8, 

2018. Commonwealth v. Rementer, 193 A.3d 1060 (Pa.Super. 2018) 

(unpublished memorandum). Our supreme court denied appellant’s petition 

for allowance of appeal on December 12, 2018. Commonwealth v. 

Rementer, 199 A.3d 335 (Pa. 2018).

Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on April 18, 2019. On May 15, 

2019, the PCRA court entered a notice of its intent to dismiss appellant’s 

petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not file 

a response. The PCRA court dismissed appellant’s petition on August 9, 2019.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 4, 2019. The 

PCRA court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and appellant timely complied. 

The PCRA court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on October 24, 

2019.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Whether trial counsel [sic] erred and abused its 

discretion by denying [appellant’s] PCRA petition as 

being untimely filed?
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Appellant’s brief at 5 (full capitalization omitted).

All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must be 

filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes 

final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “A judgment becomes final at the conclusion 

of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the 

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of 

the time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania has held that the PCRA’s time restriction is 

constitutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa. 

2004) (citations omitted). In addition, our case law instructs that the 

timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional. If a PCRA petition is untimely, 

a court lacks jurisdiction over the petition. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 

101 A.3d 118, 121-122 (Pa.Super. 2014) (holding courts do not have 

jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA petition); see also Commonwealth v. 

Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Pa. 2005).

Here, the trial court entered its judgment of sentence on November 20, 

2012. This court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence on September 20, 

2013, and appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our 

supreme court. Consequently, appellant’s judgment of sentence became final 

on October 20, 2013, thirty days after this court affirmed his judgment of 

sentence and the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with our 

supreme court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). 
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Therefore appellant’s petition, filed on April 18, 2019, is facially untimely. As 

a result, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review appellant’s petition, 

unless appellant alleged and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the 

PCRA time bar, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

Those three narrow exceptions to the one-year time bar are: when the 

government has interfered with the petitioner’s ability to present his or her 

claim; when the petitioner has recently discovered facts upon which his or her 

PCRA claim is predicated; or when either the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

or the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized a new constitutional 

right and made that right retroactive. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii); 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa.Super. 2012). The 

petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving the applicability of any 

exception. Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012), citing 

Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 752 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa. 2002). If a 

petitioner fails to invoke a valid exception to the PCRA time bar, this court 

may not review the petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(a).

Here, appellant contends that our supreme court’s holding in 

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), recognized a new 

constitutional right, thereby providing appellant with an exception to the PCRA 

time-bar. (Appellant’s brief at 10.) The Muniz court held that the application 
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of the registration requirements under SORNA2to sexual offenders who 

committed their crimes before SORNA’s effective date violates the 

ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. 

Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1223. Appellant, however, presents his claim in the 

context of an untimely filed PCRA petition.

In a case involving a timely filed PCRA petition, this court has held that, 

“Muniz created a substantive rule that retroactively applies in the collateral 

context.” Commonwealth v. Rivera-Figueroa, 174 A.3d 674, 678 

(Pa.Super. 2017). Because appellant’s PCRA petition is facially untimely, 

however, he would be required to satisfy the jurisdiction requirement set forth 

at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). To do so, appellant would be required to 

demonstrate that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that Muniz

applies retroactively to otherwise facially untimely PCRA petitions. See 

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 405-406 (Pa.Super. 2018) 

(finding that when the PCRA petition is untimely filed, in order to satisfy the 

timeliness exception set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), a petitioner 

must demonstrate that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has expressly held 

that Muniz applies retroactively).

Here, appellant has failed to demonstrate that our supreme court has 

expressly held that Muniz applies retroactively to facially untimely PCRA 

 

2 Sexual Offender Registration Notification Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10, 

et seq.
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petitions. To the contrary, a recent panel of this court reaffirmed that Muniz

does not provide a petitioner with an avenue of relief in the context of an 

untimely PCRA. Commonwealth v. Hromek, A.3d , 2020 WL 

2391062 at *4 (Pa.Super. May 12, 2020), citing Murphy, 180 A.3d at 

405-406.

Appellant has failed to invoke a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. 

Consequently, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review appellant’s 

petition, and we may not review the petition on appeal.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/25/20