SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO . A

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- 19

PATRICK WOODS,

Petitioner

- Ap pellant

,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'

RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

Respondent

- Respondent.

_________________________

Submitted January 25, 2021

– Decided March 19 , 202 1

Before Judges Sabatino and Currier.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public

Employees' Retirement System, Department of the

Treasury, PERS No. 1143205.

Destribats Campbell , LLC, attorneys for appellant

(Raymond C. Staub, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for

respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney

General, of counsel; Jakai T. Jackson , Deputy Attorney

General, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court

. " A lthough it is posted on the

internet

, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited

. R

. 1:36

- 3.2 A

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PER CURIAM

Appe l lant Patrick W oods was employed by the New Jersey Department of

Health and H uman Servic e s and assigned to the Trenton Psychiatric H o spital

(Hospital)

. In 2014

, he was disciplined for actual or attempted theft of state

property or equipment. At that time

, he agreed to a settlement with the Hospital

under which t he Hospital would seek his removal from employment if there w ere

any further issues with his p ersonal conduct or misuse of public property.

In September 2016, a security camera captured appellant removing items

from the Hospital's plumbing storeroom and placing them first into a s tate

vehicle and then into his own c ar. A second inci d e n t occurred two weeks later

when appellant again removed some items from state property

, placing them into

his state tru c k and later his personal vehicle. The misuse of public property for

personal u se was a violation of the New Jersey Administrative Code, and

Department of Human Services policy.

Appellant was charged with disciplinary violations and suspended.

Thereafter, the Hospital sought his removal from employment. Appellant

requested a heari ng, following which a final notice of disciplinary action

sustained the charges. Appellant was removed from his employment effective

October 27, 2016.3 A

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After appe ll ant appealed the decision, it w a s referred to t h e Office of

Administrative L a w as a contest ed c ase. The parties executed a settlement

agreement in January 201 9 in which appellant agreed he would resign as a

resolution to the administrative charges. 1 He also agreed he would not seek or

accept any employment in the future with the Hospital or a ny of its subsidiaries.

Under the a greement, appellant could apply for a disability pension , to be

effective January 1, 2017

.

During the pendency of the disciplinary appeal, appellant was involved in

a motor vehicle accident in November 2017 in which he claimed injuries. In

May 2018

, he applied for an ordinary disability retirement with the Public

Employees' Retirement System (P ERS)

.

On October 17, 2019

, defendant Board of Trustees of the P ublic

E mployees' Retirement System (Board) issued a final administrative

determination, f

inding appellant was not eligible to file for ordinary disability

retirement benefits

. Because appellan t was separated from his employment due

to the administrative charges and his agreement to resign

, rather than as the

result of a disability, he was not eligible for a disability retirement.

1 Appellant was represented by counsel during the proceedings and the

execution of the settlement agreement

.4 A

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On appeal, appellant contends (1) there w e re ambiguities in the s e ttl e ment

agreement which require the court to "examine the surrounding circumstances

regarding the formation of [ the ] agreement [ ; ] " and (2) the Board's decision was

capricious and arbitrary because it did not "sufficiently acknowledge

[ a ] ppellant's accident causing his disability [

. ] "

Appellant bears the burden to demonstrate grounds for reversal.

McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd. , 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002).

We will "not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings

unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the

decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not

supported by substantial evidence." In re Application of Virtua

- West Jersey

Hosp . Voorhees for a Certificate of Need , 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).

When an agency decision satisfies such criteria, we accord substantial

deference to the agency's fact

- finding and legal conclusions, acknowledging

"the agency's 'expertise and superior knowled ge of a particular field.'" Circus

Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp. , 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009)

(quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr. , 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)).

We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's even though we might have

reached a different conclusion. In re Stallworth , 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)

.5 A

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The is s ue before us , whether appellant is eligibl e for disability retirement

benefits, is governed by our recent decision in Cardinale v. Bd. of Trs. , 458 N.J.

Super. 2 60 (App. Div. 2019).

In Cardinale

, this court considered an application for disability benefits

under the Police & Firemen's Retirement System ("PFRS"). Id. at 262. The

plaintiff, a former police officer, had voluntarily and irrevocably retired from

his position under a settlement agreement after he was suspended for a positive

drug test. Id. at 264

- 65. We held "that when a PFRS member

— here a police

officer

— voluntarily irrevocably resigns from active service, such a separation

from employment automa tically renders the individual ineligible for ordinary

disability benefits." Id. at 263 (emphasis added). We found the plaintiff's

claimed disability "irrelevant to our holding that his irrevocable resignation

made him ineligible for benefits in the firs t place." Id. at 268

.

In Cardinale

, we noted that the applicable PFRS statute, N.J.S.A. 43:16A

8(2), directs that a public employee who retired due to disability, but then

recovered sufficiently to "perform either his former duty or any other available

duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign to him

. . . shall

report for duty ." Id. at 269 ( e mphasis added). This statutory requirement

provides a way "to return the previously disabled retiree to work as if that6 A

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individual had never suffered a disability or interruption of service." Id. at 270;

s ee also In re Terebetski

, 338 N.J. Super. 564, 570 (App. Div. 2001)

. The

statutory scheme accordingly strikes a balance between "a worker's interest with

those of an employer and the public by requiring PFRS workers

— upon

rehabilitation

— to forgo the benefits and return to work." Cardinale

, 458 N.J.

Super. at 270.

Crucially, we found in Cardinale that N.J.S.A. 43:16A

- 8(2) dic tates that

this process

— whereby a recipient recovers from his or her disability and returns

to work

— is the only way the Board can cut off disability benefits. Id. at 271

.

If, on the other hand, a worker "irrevocably resigned" from his or her former

position, that creates:

[A] practical problem that strains the workability of the

system

. . . . [T] he Board cannot statutorily cease

paying any approved disability benefits, once they have

begun, for an individual who voluntarily resigns from

duty to settle disciplinary charges and agrees never to

return.

[ Id. at 270

- 73 .]

Consequently, we ruled in Cardinale that allowing an employee to seek

disability bene fits in a situation where he or she had irrevocably retired would

prevent the State from ever cutting off disability benefits, even upon recovery,

because the employee could never "return" to his or her former employment. Id.7 A

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at 273. Such an outcome "would violate public policy, contravene the

rehabilitation statute, and encourage abuse of the disability retirement system."

Ibid. Accordingly, the plaintiff's irrevocable resignation rendered him ineligible

for participation in the disability pension scheme. Ibid.

The pension scheme discussed in Cardinale

, covering police and

firefighters, is different than the PERS pension scheme at issue in this case, and

governed by different statutes. However, a comparison of the statutes

demonstrates tha t Cardinale's logic applies with equal force to the PERS pension

scheme. Such comparisons are particularly appropriate because t he various

pension schemes were designed to be "part of a harmonious whole." Klumb v.

Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan

- Englishtown Reg' l High Sch. Dist., Monmouth

C n ty.

, 199 N.J. 14, 32 (2009)

. In fact, the Supreme Court has analyzed one

pension scheme using other pension statutes as reference. See id. at 30

- 33.

N.J.S .A. 43:16A

- 8(2) , the PFRS statute at issue in Cardinale , requires a

recipient of disability benefits to, "upon the request of the retirement system"

undergo a medical examination and "[i]f the report of the medical board shall

show that such beneficiary is able to perform either his former duty or any other

available duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign to him,

the beneficiary shall report for duty

. . . . " Cardinale , 458 N.J. Super. at 269

- 70.8 A

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By comparison, N.J.S.A. 43:15A

- 44 , the PERS statute at issue in this

appeal, likewise requires an employee receiving disability pension benefits to

undergo a medical examination, in this case on an annual basis. It uses identical

la nguage to N.J.S.A. 43:16A

- 8(2) , stating : "[i]f the report of the medical board

shall show that such beneficiary is able to perfor m either his former duty or other

comparable duty which his former employer is willing to assign to him, the

beneficiary shall report for duty

. . . . "

Like the statute in Cardinale

, N.J.S.A. 43:15A

- 44 does not provide an

alternative means for the Board to cut off disability pension benefits even where

a former employee's disability has ended. The two schemes use identical

language regarding a pensioner's return to active service. Both statutes envisio n

a return to work as the sole means available to a p ension b oard to cut off

disability benefits.

The regulatory scheme for the PERS pension fund also supports the

Board's decision here. The pertinent PERS regulations instruct that an employee

who resign s for any other reason than inability to work due to a disability,

including resignation under a settlement agreement, is disqualified from seeking

disability retirement:

a) Each disability retirement applicant must prove that

his or her retirement is due to a total and permanent9 A

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- 19 disability that renders the applicant physically or

mentally incapacitated from performing normal or

assigned job duties at the time the member left

employment; the disability must be the reason the

member left employment.

b) M embers who have involuntarily or voluntarily

terminated service for any of the reasons listed below

will not be permitted to apply for a disability

retirement:

. . . .

2. Settlement agreements reached due to pending

administrative or criminal charges, un less the

underlying charges relate to the disability;

. . . .

[N.J.A.C. 17:1

- 6.4

. ]

The denial of appellant's disability application is therefore consistent with

the underlying statutes and the public policy on terminating pension benefits.

Here, appellant cannot demonstrate any alleged disability is the reason he

left his employment. Moreover, the car accident in which appellant claims to

have sustained injuries resulting in his disability occurred a lmost a year after the

imposition of the disciplinary charges and his suspension from his job.

In addition, appellant cannot pur s ue a disability retirement because he

executed a settlement agreement pertaining to the disciplinary charges in which

he agreed he could never work for the Hospital ag ain. As we stated in Cardinale

,10 A

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an irrevocable r e si g nation from employment bars appellant from eligibility for

a disability retirement as there is no mechanism for the termination of disability

benefits since appellant can never return to his job.

We are satisfied the Board's decision was supported by the credible

evidence in the r e c o rd an d was not arbitrary or capricious. Any remaining

arguments present ed by appellant, not discussed her e , lack sufficient merit to

w a rrant discussion. R. 2:11

- 3(e)( 1)(D) and (E).

Affirmed.