NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JOSHUA SADAT WASHINGTON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-10449 

D.C. No. 

2:16-cr-00279-JAD-PAL-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 10, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: CHRISTEN and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and BATAILLON,*** District 

Judge.

Joshua Washington appeals from his convictions and sentence for Hobbs 

Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and brandishing a firearm during a crime of 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for 

the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.

FILED

AUG 12 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-10449 

violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.1

1. Washington appeals from the district court’s denial of his “Motion 

Requesting a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict—for a New Trial,” which the 

district court construed as a motion for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 and 33. We review a district court’s ruling on a motion 

for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Flores v. City of Westminster, 873 F.3d 739, 

755–56 (9th Cir. 2017).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Washington’s 

motion because he presented no facts that justified suppressing the evidence 

against him. Searches by a private individual are not subject to constitutional 

restrictions. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). While the 

Fourth Amendment does apply if the government knows of and acquiesces to a 

search and the private individual performs the search to assist law enforcement, 

United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 930–31 (9th Cir. 1994), Washington did not 

meet his burden of showing that the evidence established the government executed 

this search.

Although a UPS employee in Las Vegas testified that law enforcement asked 

1 On August 5, 2020, we received Washington’s pro se motion (Dkt. 

No. 65). Because Washington is represented by counsel, only counsel may file 

motions, and this court therefore declines to entertain the submission.
3 18-10449 

her about the package a day before the search, this testimony was contradicted by 

“overwhelming, credible evidence” at the suppression hearing and at trial, which 

showed that Washington’s involvement in the robbery became known to law 

enforcement only after UPS independently searched the package. The district 

court did not abuse its discretion when it credited this overwhelming evidence over 

the word of one witness. See OTR Wheel Eng’g, Inc. v. W. Worldwide Servs., Inc., 

897 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[C]redibility of the witnesses and the weight 

of the evidence are issues for the jury and are generally not subject to appellate 

review.”).

Washington points to inconsistent testimony regarding law enforcement’s 

search of his storage locker as proof that law enforcement knew about the package 

before UPS searched it. However, the record shows that law enforcement did not 

contact the storage facility until after UPS searched the package. None of the 

testimony at trial indicated otherwise. While one witness may have offered 

inconsistent testimony about exactly when and how the facility cooperated with 

law enforcement, even that inconsistent testimony did not rebut the district court’s 

prior finding that UPS searched the package in Miami without law enforcement’s 

knowledge or participation.

2. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) imposes heightened criminal penalties for 

brandishing a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. 
4 18-10449 

§ 924(c)(1)(A). Washington argues that § 924(c) does not apply because Hobbs 

Act robbery does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence. We review de 

novo. United States v. Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2020).

After Washington filed his appeal, we decided Dominguez, which held that 

Hobbs Act robbery remains a crime of violence under § 924(c). Id. at 1260–61. 

This panel is bound by Dominguez, and therefore Washington’s challenge to his 

conviction fails.

AFFIRMED.