*

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 21, 2010*

Decided October 25, 2010

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

  JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

      MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 10‐1350

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

CARLOS CURRY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 91 CR 463‐9

Ruben Castillo,

Judge.

O R D E R

Carlos Curry is serving 30 years in prison for his role in a drug enterprise that

trafficked in heroin, powder cocaine, and crack. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 843, 846. On

direct appeal we affirmed his convictions and sentence. See United States v. Willis, 49 F.3d

1271 (7th Cir. 1995). For the second time Curry seeks a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(2). The district court denied a previous motion, and we affirmed that decision. This

time Curry invokes recent amendments that lowered the base offense levels for most drug

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 10-1350 Page 2

crimes involving crack. The district court deemed the amendments inapplicable and denied

his motion. We affirm that ruling. 

At Curry’s sentencing the district court found him responsible for distributing 30

kilograms of powder cocaine to wholesale customers. He was not involved with crack. His

total offense level of 39 and Category IV criminal history yielded an imprisonment range of

360 months to life. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (1992). 

Section 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce a prison sentence that is based

on a guidelines range which has been lowered by a retroactive amendment. See U.S.S.G. §

1B1.10(a)(1); Dillon v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2687 (2010); United States v. Poole, 550 F.3d

676, 678 (7th Cir. 2008). In 2007 the Sentencing Commission reduced the base offense levels

for most crack offenses and made the changes retroactive. See U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C

amends. 706, 711, 713 (2008). The revisions were designed to lessen the differential between

offense levels for like amounts of powder and crack cocaine. See United States v. Woods, 581

F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2009). The changes did not lower the offense levels for powder

cocaine, but since some of his coconspirators also dealt in crack, Curry argues that he can

receive a reduction. That contention is erroneous; even if crack is involved, a defendant like

Curry whose guidelines range is based entirely on a different drug cannot benefit from the

changes to the offense levels for crack. See U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C amends. 715, 716

(2008); United States v. White, 582 F.3d 787, 799 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1542 (2010);

United States v. Johnson, 569 F.3d 619, 624-25 (6th Cir. 2009). 

In his brief Curry presses other contentions that he included in his first motion under

§ 3582(c)(2) and then repeated in the second. Curry did not timely appeal the denial of his

first motion. That decision resolved Curry’s additional claims, and he is barred from

litigating them a second time. See United States v. Boyd, 591 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 2010);

United States v. Lykes, 73 F.3d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1995). 

AFFIRMED.