UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4765

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

TANESHA BANNISTER, 

 Defendant – Appellant, 

 and 

RANDY MARTIN; GEORGEAN MCCONNELL; ALISIA H. AKBAR; GUSSIE D. 

NOLLKAMPER; FLORENCE NOLLKAMPER; CHRISTOPHER M. MORRIS; 

LAVACA COUNTY TEXAS; JOSEPH E. MCCONNELL; JOHN M. WARTHER; 

WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INCORPORATED; CHERYL L. AMAKER; 

DONNA C. ADKINS; CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION; 

LACARIA BROWN; LUTHER BRYAN, 

 Parties-in-Interest. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:02-cr-00548-CMC-40) 

Submitted: March 18, 2009 Decided: April 6, 2009 

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and John 

Preston BAILEY, Chief United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 
William Woodward Webb, THE EDMISTEN & WEBB LAW FIRM, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Beth Drake, Mark C. Moore, Jane 

Barrett Taylor, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

 Tanesha Bannister was convicted by a jury of 

conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 

fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (2006), and was sentenced to life in prison. 

Bannister appealed, challenging her conviction and sentence. 

We affirmed Bannister’s conviction and rejected claims relating 

to Bannister’s sentence, but because she was sentenced under the 

then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, vacated and remanded for 

resentencing consistent with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 

220 (2005). See United States v. Davis, 270 F. App’x 236 

(4th Cir. March 17, 2008) (unpublished). 

 On remand, the district court imposed a 280-month 

variant sentence on Bannister and Bannister timely appealed. 

Counsel for Bannister has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), alleging that he has found no 

meritorious issues for appeal but asserting that the district 

court may have improperly calculated Bannister’s Guidelines 

range. Bannister has filed a pro se supplemental brief, also 

challenging the district court’s calculation of her Guidelines 

range and asking this court to appoint her new counsel. The 

Government has declined to file a responding brief. Finding no 

error, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

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 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

review. First, because Bannister’s arguments pertaining to her 

Guidelines range calculation were either litigated by Bannister 

on her first appeal and were rejected, or could have been 

litigated but were not, the mandate rule precludes their present 

consideration by this court. See Volvo Trademark Holding 

Aktiebolaget v. Clark Mach. Co., 510 F.3d 474, 481 (4th Cir. 

2007) (“[A] remand proceeding is not the occasion for raising 

new arguments or legal theories.”); United States v. Bell, 

5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the mandate rule 

“forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly 

decided by the appellate court,” as well as “issues decided by 

the district court but foregone on appeal.”). 

 “[T]he doctrine [of the law of the case] posits that 

when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should 

continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the 

same case.” United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th 

Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 

The law of the case must be applied 

in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in 

the trial court or on a later appeal . . . unless: 

(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially 

different evidence, (2) controlling authority has 

since made a contrary decision of law applicable to 

the issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly 

erroneous and would work manifest injustice. 

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Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see Doe v. 

Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 464-66 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing mandate 

rule and its exceptions). Because Bannister’s Guidelines claims 

do not fall within any of the above-mentioned exceptions, she 

may not challenge her Guidelines range calculation on this 

appeal. 

 After Booker, a sentence is reviewed for 

reasonableness, using an abuse of discretion standard of review. 

Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). The first 

step in this review requires the court to ensure that the 

district court committed no significant procedural error. 

United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Assuming the district court committed no significant procedural 

error, this court must next consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the 

totality of the circumstances. Id. at 161-62. 

 While the court may presume that a sentence within the 

Guidelines range is reasonable, it may not presume that a 

sentence outside the Guidelines range is unreasonable. Gall, 

128 S. Ct. at 597; see United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 

261 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A] sentence that deviates from the 

Guidelines is reviewed under the same deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard as a sentence imposed within the applicable 

guidelines range.”). Rather, in reviewing a sentence outside 

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the Guidelines range, we “consider the extent of the deviation, 

but must give due deference to the district court's decision 

that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of 

the variance.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Even if this court 

would have imposed a different sentence, this fact alone will 

not justify vacatur of the district court’s sentence. Id.

 We find the district court’s 280-month variant 

sentence to be reasonable. On remand, the district court 

entertained counsel’s argument regarding the weight that should 

be afforded the § 3553(a) factors, allowed Bannister an 

opportunity to allocute, and thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) 

factors before imposing Bannister’s sentence. We conclude that 

the district court adequately explained its rationale for 

imposing the variant sentence, that the sentence was selected 

pursuant to a reasoned process in accordance with law, and that 

the reasons relied upon by the district court are plausible and 

justify the sentence imposed. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 260-61; 

United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-76 (4th Cir. 2007). 

 Having reviewed the record in this case and finding no 

meritorious issues for review, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment and deny Bannister’s motion for appointment of new 

counsel. This court requires that counsel inform Bannister in 

writing of her right to petition the Supreme Court of the United 

States for further review. If Bannister requests that a 

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petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave 

to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state 

that a copy thereof was served on Bannister. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED