### No. 81-503
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982

TAYLOR RENTAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant,

VS.


### TED GODWIN LEASING, INC., FIRST BANK BILLINGS, Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Calton & 

### Hamman, Billinqs,Montana For Respondents: Robert 

### P. Ryan, Billings,Montana Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & 

### Mather, Billings,

llontana
Submitted on briefs: Lnlarch 5, 1982 Decided: July 28, 1982Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. Taylor Rental Corporation appeals an order of the Yellowstone County DistrictCourt granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Ted Godwin Leasing, Inc. Taylor Rental raises several issues but, inlooking through the record, 

### we find that only a partial summary judgment was entered, and even though the case was certifiedunder Rule 54(b),M.R.Civ.P., the certification iswholly inadequate. For this reason, 

### we decline tohear this appeal, 

### wewillnot accept another certification, and the appeal is dismissed without prejudice. The trialcourt granted summary judgment for Ted Godwin Leasing, Inc. (Godwin Leasing) the effect of which was to give Godwin Leasing the right topossession or to the proceeds of the saleof certain equipment which is the subject of this lawsuit. The 

### trial court, however, failedtorule on the counterclaimof Godwin Leasing. In the counterclaim Godwin alleged that Taylor Rental Corporation had agreed to
assume the debts of Taylor Rental Center, a franchisee of Taylor Rental Corporation, and that therefore Taylor Rental Corporation owed an unspecified amount of rent on the equipment. After the trial court had granted Godwin Leasing's motion forpartial summary judgment, the attorney for Taylor Rental Corporation wrote a letter tothe trialcourt and asked the court tocertify a partial summary judgment in favor of Godwin Leasing as being "final and subject to appeal." The letter stated: 

# ".


# . . inthe interest of judicial economy and administration of justice, we respectfully request thatyou certifyyour order of July 7, 1981as being final and subject toappeal and tocomplete the records, 

### we would also request you enter an order denying our motion for summary judgment."

### The trial court complied, and, in certifying the cause under Rule 54,merely stated: "Thatthe undersigned [judge] hereby certifies that there is no just reason for delay in the entry of such final judgment in this matter." That is the entire certification order. In Roy v. Neibauer (1980), Mont. 

## , 610 P.2d 1185, 37 St.Rep. 897,because we - 

### - were concernedwith partial summary judgments coming to this Court either uncertified, or improperly certified,we set out in no uncertain terms whatmust be done to certify a partial summary judgment or partial judgment for appeal. We need not repeat those requirements here except to state that
none of themwere followed. See also, Reidy v. AnacondaDeer Lodge County (1981), 

### -Mont

# . - 

## , 637P.2d 1196, 38 St.Rep. 2188,where, in holding thatwe would strictly adhere to the standards in Neibauer,we dismissed an appeal as improperly certified even though the trial court did attempt to comply with Rule 54 requirements. If parties insist in not complyingwith the rules and our decisions,we again will be compelled to resort to Rule 32,M.R.App.Civ.P., to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals. Here, the appeal, because it is premature, is obviously frivolous. If improper certifications appear before this Court again, especiallywhere there is no genuine attempt to complywith the rules,we shall treat them as frivolous appeals and impose sanctions. We dismiss this appeal, without prejudice.FJe Concur: