1

Bradley’s name was incorrectly listed as “Herbert” on district court pleadings

and on his notice of appeal. Bradley’s medical records consistently label Bradley’s

first name as “Hubert.” Both parties also used “Hubert” as Bradley’s first name on

their respective briefs. We presume the parties and medical records correctly identify

Bradley’s name. We therefore correct the apparent error.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2440

___________

Hubert Bradley,1 *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

*

Michael J. Astrue, *

Commissioner of Social Security *

Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 10, 2008 

Filed: June 20, 2008

___________

Before RILEY, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________
2

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

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RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Hubert Bradley (Bradley) appeals the district court’s2 order affirming the denial

of supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. (Act). After a hearing on January 28, 2005, an

administrative law judge (ALJ) found Bradley was not disabled as defined by the Act

and, thus, not entitled to Social Security benefits. The appeals council denied review.

The district court affirmed, and we agree. 

I. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s decision affirming the ALJ’s denial of

benefits. See Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2007). In conducting

this review, we consider whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a

reasonable mind would find adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion.” Nicola v.

Astrue, 480 F.3d 885, 886 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). We will not disturb the

denial of benefits so long as the ALJ’s decision falls within the “available zone of

choice.” Id. (quoting Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). “An ALJ’s decision is not outside the ‘zone of choice’

simply because we might have reached a different conclusion had we been the initial

finder of fact.” Id.

The ALJ’s determination Bradley was not disabled under the Act is supported

by substantial evidence. Bradley suffers from HIV and no doubt faces significant

obstacles in both his work and personal life. The ALJ relied upon the expert medical

testimony of Dr. Selbert Chernoff (Dr. Chernoff). Dr. Chernoff recognized a

combination of HIV-related and unrelated factors, including Bradley’s depression,
3

Bradley contends the ALJ erred by failing to consider Bradley’s global

assessment of functioning (GAF) test score. Given this test was part of Dr. True’s

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symptoms of diarrhea, fatigue and chronic shoulder disease causing difficulty in

overhead (and far) reaching, “would limit [Bradley’s] ability to work . . . .” (emphasis

added). Yet, the expert opined Bradley’s limitations did not qualify him as having an

impairment under Social Security regulations. The ALJ also relied upon testimony

from a vocational expert who answered a hypothetical limiting Bradley’s physical and

mental abilities consistent with the medical expert’s testimony, and opined Bradley

would be able to work in a number of light or sedentary jobs available in the national

economy.

The ALJ’s adverse credibility finding against Bradley is also supported by

substantial evidence. The ALJ articulated factors supporting the adverse finding,

including (1) many of Bradley’s complaints were inconsistent with, or not supported

by, the medical findings and treatment; (2) Bradley’s discharge from therapy after

failing to attend recommended appointments; (3) Bradley’s sporadic work history; and

(4) the lack of any additional evidence corroborating Bradley’s subjective complaints.

The record supports these findings; for example, Bradley was discharged from therapy

after failing to show up for appointments, and Bradley had no reported earnings in

seven separate years since 1987. Our case law permits the ALJ’s reasonable

inferences. See Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 2005) (“A failure

to follow a recommended course of treatment . . . weighs against a claimant’s

credibility.” (citation omitted)); see also Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1218

(8th Cir. 2001) (“A lack of work history may indicate a lack of motivation to work

rather than a lack of ability.” (citation omitted)). “The credibility of a claimant’s

subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts.” Id. at 1218

(citation omitted). 

Finally, the ALJ did not err in discounting more favorable testimony from two

physicians, Dr. James True (Dr. True) and Dr. David Dembinski.3

 The ALJ noted
assessment, the ALJ necessarily considered the test when considering the overall

evidence from Dr. True.

4

We recognize symptoms, particularly relating to something like depression, are

likely to ebb and flow over the course of time. Such inconsistencies may still lend

support to the ALJ’s findings, especially when, as here, one of Bradley’s assessments

was undated, making it impossible to determine how far apart the assessments

occurred. 

5

We also reject Bradley’s contention the ALJ’s mistaken reference to Dr. True

as “Dr. Truenz” “raises a question of whether the ALJ actually read the records . . . .”

On the contrary, although Dr. True’s name was typed below his signature, the

signature itself overlapped the typing and was amenable to reading the signature as

“Truenz,” indicating the ALJ did read Dr. True’s records. In any event, like federal

judges, ALJ’s are not infallible. 

-4-

both doctors’ opinions were conclusory and inconsistent with medical evidence in the

record. Our review confirms these findings and shows us the doctors’ statements

regarding the extent of Bradley’s impairments were at times even inconsistent with

their own examinations. Compare: Dr. True concluding Bradley was “incapable of

gainful employment based on his depression alone” with Dr. True assessing Bradley

as only “mildly depressed.”4

 Doctor opinions on a patient’s employment capability,

e.g., Bradley was “incapable of gainful employment,” are often not entitled to

significant weight. See Flynn v. Chater, 107 F.3d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining

doctor opinions regarding application of the Social Security statute are not as

persuasive as medical opinions).5

II. CONCLUSION

We affirm the ALJ’s decision and incorporate the well-reasoned opinion of the

district court.

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