[Cite as Cleveland v. Barnes, 2023-Ohio-1888.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF CLEVELAND, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 111867

v. :

REGINALD E. BARNES, SR., :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 8, 2023

Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court

Case No. 2021 CRB 007382

Appearances:

Mark Griffin, City of Cleveland Law Director, and Angel 

Sanchez, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

Reginald E. Barnes, Sr., pro se. 

LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:

Reginald E. Barnes, Sr., (“Barnes”), acting pro se, appeals his 

convictions for assault and criminal damaging. After reviewing the facts of the case 

and pertinent law, we reverse the trial court’s decision, vacate Barnes’s convictions
and sentence, and remand this case to the municipal court with instructions to 

dismiss the criminal complaint against Barnes.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On July 7, 2021, Barnes was charged with assault, a first-degree 

misdemeanor, and criminal damaging, a second-degree misdemeanor, in the 

Cleveland Municipal Court for an incident that occurred on June 29, 2021. The next 

day, the court granted an ex parte criminal protection order prohibiting Barnes from 

contacting and being within 500 feet of the victim, Barnes’s second cousin L.J. and 

her son R.P. Barnes was arrested for these offenses on August 14, 2021.

Over the next year, multiple pretrials were held and the court granted 

no fewer than a dozen continuances. On March 2, 2022, almost seven months after 

his arrest, the court set Barnes’s first trial date for March 16, 2022. Trial did not 

start on this date, and the court granted several more continuances. On June 16, 

2022, Barnes filed a motion to dismiss for speedy-trial violations. The court did not 

rule on this motion.

On July 6, 2022, almost 11 months after his arrest, the court held a 

bench trial and found Barnes guilty as charged. The court held a sentencing hearing 

on July 21, 2022, and sentenced Barnes as follows: 

Assault — $1,000 fine; $990 suspended; “180 days” suspended; and 

court costs.

Criminal damaging — $750 fine; $710 suspended; “90 days” 

suspended; and court costs.
At the sentencing hearing, the court asked Barnes if he spent any time 

in jail. Barnes responded, “Approximately probably 30 days or more.” The court 

gave Barnes “credit” for 30 days and “applied” this credit to his fine and costs, 

saying, “[S]o you don’t owe any money. Cost satisfied. Fine satisfied.” The court 

ordered Barnes to pay $689.42 in restitution for damage to L.J.’s vehicle and 

sentenced Barnes to five years “active probation,” to include the following: 

substance-abuse assessment and counseling, if recommended; random substanceabuse testing one time per month with the imposition of a “jail sanction” in the event 

of a positive test; a mental-health evaluation “pending appeal”; anger management; 

and “no new cases.” The court then stated that Barnes’s entire sentence “is held in 

abeyance pending appeal.” 

It is from these convictions and sentence that Barnes now appeals, 

raising two assignments of error for our review:

I. The trial court made a reversable [sic] error by not bringing me 

to trial pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code speedy trial statutes when 

the trial was held over one year from the filing of the criminal 

complaint.

II. The cumulative errors during the course of the criminal litigation 

resulted in prejudice affecting the outcome and my substantial rights 

to a fair and impartial trial.

II. Law 

A. Pro Se Litigants

The Ohio Supreme Court has “repeatedly declared that ‘pro se 

litigants * * * must follow the same procedures as litigants represented by counsel.’” 

State ex rel. Neil v. French, 153 Ohio St.3d 271, 2018-Ohio-2692, 104 N.E.3d 764, 
¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Gessner v. Vore, 123 Ohio St.3d 96, 2009-Ohio-4150, 914 

N.E.2d 376, ¶ 5. “It is well-established that pro se litigants are presumed to have 

knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that they are held to the same 

standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.” (Emphasis sic.) Sabouri v. 

Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654, 763 N.E.2d 1238 (10th 

Dist.2001)

B. Speedy Trial 

“A criminal defendant has a right to a speedy trial under the Ohio 

Revised Code, the Ohio Constitution, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution.” State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 

45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 80. In the case at hand, we sustain Barnes’s first assignment of 

error, finding that his statutory guarantee to a speedy trial was violated. 

1. Statutory Violation

Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(B)(2), “a person against whom a charge of 

misdemeanor * * * is pending in a court of record, shall be brought to trial * * * 

[w]ithin ninety days after the person’s arrest or the service of summons, if the 

offense charged is a misdemeanor of the first or second degree * * *.” Furthermore, 

R.C. 2945.71(E) states that “[f]or purposes of computing time * * *, each day during 

which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted 

as three days.”

R.C. 2945.72 lists various circumstances under which an accused’s 

speedy-trial time is tolled. Pertinent to this appeal, these tolling events include the 
following: “(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused’s own motion; 

and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused’s 

own motion * * *.”

2. Burden Shifting 

“A defendant presents a prima facie case of a speedy-trial violation by 

alleging that he or she was not brought to trial within the statutory time limits of 

R.C. 2945.71.” State v. Thompson, 2021-Ohio-376, 167 N.E.3d 1072, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.). 

“At that point a burden of production [arises] whereby the state [becomes] obligated 

to produce evidence demonstrating [that the defendant] was not entitled to be 

brought to trial within the limits of” R.C. 2945.71. State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 

28, 31, 50 N.E.2d 1368 (1986).

3. Appellate Standard of Review

“When reviewing a speedy-trial issue, the appellate court counts the 

days and determines whether the number of days not tolled exceeds the time limits 

for bringing the defendant to trial as set forth in R.C. 2945.72.” State v. Geraci, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101946 and 101947, 2015-Ohio-2699, ¶ 20. An appellate 

court’s standard of review concerning speedy-trial issues involves a mixed question 

of fact and law. Appellate courts defer “to the trial court’s findings of fact, if any, 

provided the findings are supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.” 

State v. Sanders, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107253, 2019-Ohio-1524, ¶ 19. 

Additionally, we review de novo the legal issue of “whether the trial court properly 

applied the law to the facts.” Id. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that courts must 
“strictly construe the speedy trial statutes against the state * * *.” Brecksville v. 

Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996).

III. Analysis

In the case at hand, the municipal court did not rule on Barnes’s

motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation and did not make any findings of fact. 

Accordingly, we review de novo whether Barnes’s speedy-trial rights were violated.

Barnes’s speedy-trial clock began to run on August 15, 2021, the day 

after his arrest for the offenses at issue. See State v. Shepherd, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 97962, 2012-Ohio-5415, ¶ 17 (“Generally, when computing how much time has 

run against the state under R.C. 2945.71, we begin with day after the accused was 

arrested.”). (Emphasis omitted.). Barnes’s trial commenced on July 6, 2022. More 

than 90 days passed between his arrest and his trial. Therefore, Barnes established 

a prima facie case that his right to a speedy-trial was violated. See S. Euclid v. Schutt, 

2020-Ohio-3661, 154 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.) (“Once the statutory time limit 

has expired, the defendant has established a prima facie case for dismissal.”).

As discussed, the burden then shifted to the city to show that, taking 

into consideration the tolling events that occurred during the municipal court 

proceedings, Barnes’s speedy-trial rights were not violated. On appeal, the city

argues that 78 speedy-trial days elapsed, which is less than the 90 days allotted in 

R.C. 2945.71(B)(2). 
Using the city’s speedy-trial calculation as a baseline, we find that at 

least two municipal court events that the city categorized as “tolling events” should 

have counted as speedy-trial days. 

First, on September 1, 2021, the court held a pretrial hearing at which 

the court sua sponte told Barnes on the record, “Your next court date is exactly one 

week from today, September the eighth, 8:30, courtroom 15-C.” Neither the city nor 

Barnes requested a continuance. On appeal, the city argues that this seven-day 

continuance tolled Barnes’s speedy-trial time.

1

 We disagree.

Upon review, we find that, on September 1, 2021, the court sua sponte 

continued Barnes’s case to September 8, 2021. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H), 

speedy-trial time is tolled during “the period of any reasonable continuance granted 

other than upon the accused’s own motion * * *.” The Ohio Supreme Court has held 

that “when sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court 

must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefore by journal entry prior 

to the expiration of the time limits prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a 

defendant to trial. State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 9, 441 N.E.2d 571 (1982). See also 

State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 209, 357 N.E.2d 1095 (1976) (“The record of the 

trial court must in some manner affirmatively demonstrate that a sua sponte 

continuance by the court was reasonable in light of its necessity or purpose.”).

1 That same day, the court issued a journal entry summarily continuing the case 

until September 8, 2021, and charging this continuance to Barnes. This journal entry is 

inconsistent with the transcript, which evidences that the court issued a sua sponte 

continuance. 
The court gave no reason for its sua sponte continuance, and 

therefore, we find that the municipal court did not show that this seven-day sua 

sponte continuance was “reasonable” as contemplated by R.C. 2945.72(H). 

Therefore, it did not toll Barnes’s speedy-trial time. Using the city’s calculation that 

78 speedy-trial days elapsed, we add seven days to this count and find that the 

running total of elapsed speedy-trial days is 85.

The second “tolling” event that we review on appeal occurred on 

October 26, 2021. The court held a pretrial hearing on the record, at which Barnes’s

counsel stated, “I know that Mr. Barnes wants me to set his case for a jury trial.” The 

court asked the prosecutor, “[D]o you want to set a jury trial date now?” The 

prosecutor requested another pretrial hearing on November 3, 2021, and said, 

“[T]hen we can set a jury trial date from there. I just don’t want to call the jury and 

then potentially not have enough witnesses.” The court continued the case to 

November 3, 2021, without setting a trial date.

2 

Upon review, we find that this continuance was at the city’s request, 

and, under the ambit of R.C. 2945.72(H), it was not reasonable and did not toll 

Barnes’s speedy-trial time. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that when the 

prosecution fails to use due diligence “to secure and insure the attendance of [a] 

witness,” this “cannot be classified as a ‘* * * reasonable continuance granted other 

than upon the accused’s own motion.’” State v. Reeser, 63 Ohio St.2d 189, 191, 407 

2 On October 26, 2021, the court issued a journal entry summarily continuing the 

case until November 3, 2021, and inconsistently charging this continuance to Barnes. 
N.E.2d 25 (1980), quoting R.C. 2945.72(H). See also Cleveland v. Dancy, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 107241, 2019-Ohio-2433, ¶ 16 (holding that “the city requested the 

continuance [because it] was without its witness”; therefore, “the 35 days from 

November 6 to December 11 are charged against the city for speedy trial purposes”).

In the case at hand, there was no reason not to set a trial date as 

Barnes requested at the pretrial hearing on October 26, 2021. The city had one 

witness to secure — Barnes’s second cousin, L.J., who was the victim in this case. At 

the pretrial, the city informed the court that it spoke with L.J. two weeks prior about 

the case. We cannot say that the city used due diligence to secure this witness by 

essentially requesting that a trial date not be set yet. Accordingly, we find that the 

city’s request for a continuance from October 26, 2021, to November 3, 2021, should 

be charged as speedy-trial time under R.C. 2945.72(H).

Using our previous calculation that 85 speedy-trial days elapsed, we 

add eight days to this count and find that the running total of elapsed speedy-trial 

days is 93. This exceeds the statutory limit in R.C. 2945.71 of 90 days. The 

municipal court did not rule on Barnes’s motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial 

violation, and it is well-settled that “when a court fails to rule on a motion it will be 

presumed that the court * * * denied said motion.” Univ. Mednet v. Blue Cross & 

Blue Shield, 126 Ohio App.3d 219, 236, 710 N.E.2d 279 (8th Dist.1997). Accordingly, 

we find that the court erred by presumptively denying Barnes’s motion to dismiss 

for a speedy-trial violation. Barnes’s first assignment of error is sustained. Pursuant 

to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c), Barnes’s second assignment of error is moot.
The trial court’s judgment is reversed, Barnes’s convictions and 

sentence are vacated, and this case is remanded to the municipal court with 

instructions to dismiss with prejudice the criminal complaint against Barnes.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

Cleveland Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR