alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Leisha Cunningham, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Mackston, J.), rendered June 24, 1988, convicting her of attempted robbery in the second degree (two counts), attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, assault in the second degree, and assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The complainant was accosted by three individuals, including the defendant, on his way to work in Hempstead early one morning. Together the perpetrators demanded money from him and attempted to take his gold chain and his wallet. Before they ran away, one of the assailants punched the complainant in the face, causing a cut near his right eye and a bloody nose.

On appeal, the defendant argues that she was denied a fair trial when the court allowed the People to bolster the testimony of an eyewitness to the incident by eliciting prior consistent statements from him on redirect examination. In light of the fact that on cross examination defense counsel created the inference that this witness had recently fabricated his testimony, the People’s rehabilitation by prior consistent statements or, in this case, the explanation of certain omissions in his testimony, was not error *(see, People v McClean,*69 NY2d 426, 428; *People v Melendez,*55 NY2d 445; *People v Davis,*44 NY2d 269, 277).

The defendant additionally claims that her conviction should be reversed because the People exercised peremptory *174challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. However, this issue was not preserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Jones,*143 AD2d 1044; *People v Williams,*141 AD2d 783) and, in any event, a review of the evidence reveals that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination *(see, Batson v Kentucky,*476 US 79; *People v Kern,*75 NY2d 638, *cert denied*— US —, 111 S Ct 77; *People v Jenkins, 75*NY2d 550; *see also, People v Hernandez, 75*NY2d 350, *affd*500 US —, 111 S Ct 1859).

Finally, the defendant’s claim that the People’s inflammatory summation denied her a fair trial is equally without merit. In general, the People’s remarks on summation were either related to the issues within the " 'four corners of the evidence’ ” *(People v Ashwal,*39 NY2d 105, 109) or constituted fair response to the defendant’s attacks on the credibility of the People’s witnesses *(see, People v Centino,*133 AD2d 776; *People v Medina,*133 AD2d 783). Moreover, any possible prejudice resulting from the People’s discussion of principles of law during summation was cured by the court’s proper instructions in its charge *(see, People v Aversa,*156 AD2d 371; *People v Turner,*141 AD2d 878). Kunzeman, J. P., Sullivan, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
#### Philip Wayne FITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETAIL CREDIT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 75-1473.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

July 14, 1976.

Chris J. Nelson, Billings, Mont., for plaintiff-appellant.

George C. Dalthorp, of Crowley, Kilbourne, Haughey, Hanson & Gallagher, Billings, Mont., for defendant-appellee.

*

 The Honorable Elbert P. Tuttle, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Before CHAMBERS, TUTTLE,* and KILKENNY, Circuit Judges.

The summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee is affirmed.

The issues are adequately covered in *Fite v. Retail Credit Co.,*386 F.Supp. 1045 (D.Mont., 1975).
#### Oren D. MORGAN, Petitioner, v. Robert R. RAINES, Respondent.

No. A-13007.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

March 22, 1961.

*734Oren D. Morgan, pro se.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Lewis A. Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BUSSEY, Judge.

Petitioner, Oren D. Morgan, is currently imprisoned in the State Penitentiary at McAl ester by virtue of a judgment and sentence rendered in the Superior Court of Garfield County on December 1, 1955, wherein he was charged by information with the crime of obtaining merchandise by false and bogus check after former conviction of felonies, and was found guilty by a jury who could not agree on the punishment. Judgment and sentence was fixed by the court at 15 years in the . State Penitentiary.

Petitioner’s first contention is that the punishment assessed by the court is excessive. The question of whether punishment assessed by the trial court was excessive is a matter to be considered only on appeal from a final judgment, and cannot be inquired into on habeas corpus. Perry v. Waters, 97 Okl.Cr. 17, 256 P.2d 1119; Bolton v. McLeod, Okl.Cr., 294 P.2d 586, 589.

The second contention of petitioner is that the information fails to set out in a clear manner a specific charge against him. Unless the information was fatally defective and wholly insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court to sentence petitioner for the crime alleged, this court will not interfere on habeas corpus to grant a release to a prisoner in the State Penitentiary because of the alleged defective information under which he was sentenced. Ex parte Brown, 77 Okl.Cr. 96, 139 P.2d 196; Cottrell v. McLeod, Okl.Cr., 342 P.2d 240. It is the opinion of this court that the information in the case at bar was not fatally defective and was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Superior Court of Garfield County to sentence petitioner for the crime alleged in the information.

The third contention of petitioner is that the information by virtue of alleging four previous felony convictions was highly prejudicial to him and so inflamed the jury as to cause them to render an unjust verdict against him. Alleging and proving more than one prior felony conviction where an accused is charged with a crime after former conviction of a felony is proper under 21 O.S.1951 § 51 and does not constitute error. Solomon v. State, 79 Okl.Cr. 93, 151 P.2d 944; Carr v. State, 91 Okl.Cr. 94, 216 P.2d 333. In the latter case, 16 former felony convictions were alleged and proved, and this court held that it did not constitute error.

Whereas petitioner has failed to set forth facts sufficient to warrant issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the petition should be, and the same is, hereby denied.

NIX, P. J., and BRETT, J., concur.
# C_2010301EN.01002701.xml

| 6.11.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 301/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.11.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 301/27

---

Judgment of the General Court of 13 September 2010 — Inditex v OHIM — Marín Díaz de Cerio (OFTEN)

(Case T-292/08) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the Community word mark OFTEN - Earlier national word mark OLTEN - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Similarity of the signs - Similarity of the goods - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009) - Proof of genuine use of the earlier mark - Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation No 40/94 (now Article 42(2) and (3) of Regulation No 207/2009) - Subject-matter of the dispute before the Board of Appeal - Articles 61 and 62 of Regulation No 40/94 (now Articles 63 and 64 of Regulation No 207/2009))

2010/C 301/44

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Industria de Diseño Textil (Inditex), SA (Arteixo, Spain) (represented by: E. Armijo Chávarri and A. Castán Pérez-Gómez, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: O. Mondéjar Ortuño, Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Roberto Fernando Marín Díaz de Cerio (Logroño, Spain)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 24 April 2008 (Case R 484/2007-2) in opposition proceedings between Roberto Fernando Marín Díaz de Cerio and Industria de Diseño Textil (Inditex), SA.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Industria de Diseño Textil (Inditex), SA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Industria de Diseño Textil (Inditex), SA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 236, 13.9.2008.

1

---
# C_2008285EN.01003101.xml

| 8.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 285/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 285/31

---

Action brought on 25 September 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Cyprus

(Case C-426/08)

(2008/C 285/51)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: H. Støvlbaek and I. Khatzigiannis)

Applicant:

Defendant: Republic of Cyprus

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | declare that, by not adopting the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Council Directive 2006/100/EC of 20 November 2006 adapting certain directives in the field of freedom of movement of persons, by reason of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (1), or in any event by not notifying those provisions to the Commission, the Republic of Cyprus has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that, by not adopting the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Council Directive 2006/100/EC of 20 November 2006 adapting certain directives in the field of freedom of movement of persons, by reason of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (1), or in any event by not notifying those provisions to the Commission, the Republic of Cyprus has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

1

| — | order the Republic of Cyprus to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Republic of Cyprus to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The time-limit for transposition of the directive into domestic law expired on 1 January 2007.

---

(1)  OJ L 363, 20.12.2006, p. 141.

1

---
# C_2010161EN.01004002.xml

| 19.6.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 161/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.6.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/40

---

Judgment of the General Court of 29 April 2010 — Kerma v OHIM (BIOPIETRA)

(Case T-586/08) (1)

(Community trade mark - Application for the Community word mark BIOPIETRA - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009))

(2010/C 161/62)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Kerma SpA (Raffa di Puegnago sul Garda, Italy) (represented by: A. Manzoni, lawyer)

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (represented by: O. Montalto, Agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 16 October 2008 (Case R 889/2008-1) concerning an application for registration of the word mark BIOPIETRA as a Community trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Kerma SpA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Kerma SpA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 55, 7.3.2009.

---
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 4612 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

125 North Main Street in Louisburg, North Carolina, as the ‘‘Warren 

E. Massenburg Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 11, 2017 

Mr. HOLDING (for himself, Mr. BUTTERFIELD, Mr. MEADOWS, Ms. FOXX, 

Mr. MCHENRY, Mr. BUDD, Mr. WALKER, Mr. HUDSON, Mr. PRICE of 

North Carolina, and Mr. JONES) introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 125 North Main Street in Louisburg, North 

Carolina, as the ‘‘Warren E. Massenburg Post Office 

Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. WARREN E. MASSENBURG POST OFFICE BUILD4 ING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 125 North Main Street in 


SSpencer on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4612 IH

1 Louisburg, North Carolina, shall be known and designated 

2 as the ‘‘Warren E. Massenburg Post Office Building’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Warren E. 

7 Massenburg Post Office Building’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS
<Page>

                                                              Exhibit 10.12

November 16, 2004


BY OVERNIGHT COURIER

Viviana Wolinsky, Licensing Manager
Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
1 Cyclotron Road, MS 90R1070
Berkeley, California 94720-8125

Re:  LICENSE AGREEMENT/L-03-1370

Dear Ms. Wolinsky:

Reference is made to the License Agreement for Installing Novel Functional
Groups for Therapeutics between Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Momenta") and
the Regents of the University of California through the Ernest Orlando Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory ("Berkeley Lab") dated November 20, 2002 (the
"Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have
the meanings given such terms in the Agreement.

In accordance with Section 29.3 of the Agreement, Berkeley Lab and Momenta
hereby agree that the Field Election Date shall be extended to December 31,
2004. All other terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain in full force
and effect.

In order to indicate your concurrence with the foregoing extension, please
countersign both copies of this letter and return one fully-executed copy to me
no later than November 20, 2004.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Susan K. Whoriskey
Susan K. Whoriskey
Vice President, Licensing & Business Development


Agreed and accepted:

The Regents of the University of California, through the
Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

By:    /s/ V. Wolinsky
   ------------------------------------------------
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Crum, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lipp, J.), rendered November 13, 1989, convicting him of burglary in the third degree under Indictment No. 4392/89, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, and (2), as limited by his brief, from a sentence of the same court, also imposed November 13, 1989, upon his conviction of attempted burglary in the second degree under Indictment No. 3820/89, upon his plea of guilty.

Ordered that the judgment and sentence are affirmed.

As the defendant failed to object to either the court’s original or supplemental charge on burglary in the third degree, his claim that the trial court’s charge was improper is unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Bynum,*70 NY2d 858; *People v Santana,*172 AD2d 299). In view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt we decline to reach his contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.

*137The defendant also contends that he did not waive his right to appeal his sentence on the charge of attempted burglary in the second degree, for which he pleaded guilty, by waiving his right to appeal any issues raised by the plea proceeding. "A waiver, to be enforceable, must not only be voluntary but also knowing and intelligent” *(People v Seaberg,*74 NY2d 1,11; *see, People v Bray,*154 AD2d 692). Since the defendant did not expressly waive the right to appeal his sentence on the plea, nor was this issue mentioned at his plea hearing, we find that his right to appeal the sentence was not waived *(see, People v Seaberg, supra,*at 7; *People v Thompson,*60 NY2d 513, 520). However, we find the sentences imposed to be neither unduly harsh nor excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 99.1

CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
Quarterly Report of SIN Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB
for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filedwith the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Steve S.
Sinohui, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 USC § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge and belief:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | /s/ Steve S. Sinohui
Steve S. Sinohui, Chief Executive Officer
    and Chief Financial Officer
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated:
August 14, 2002
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jeffrey D. Williams, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant was not denied his statutory right to a speedy trial *(see,*CPL 30.30). A warrant of arrest based on a felony complaint was issued on January 19, 1989, and the People announced their readiness for trial within six months thereafter, on July 19, 1989. There is no proof in the record establishing the date of the filing of the felony complaint and defendant asks us to assume that it was filed on January 6, 1989. We find no basis for that assumption. The burden of proof on a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy *662trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 is, in the first instance, upon defendant to show that more than six months have elapsed from the date of the commencement of the criminal action (here by the filing of the felony complaint) and the date of the People’s announcement of readiness for trial *(see, People v Del Valle,*63 AD2d 830). Defendant has failed to meet that burden because he has failed to show a delay of more than six months from the time of the commencement of the action to the announcement of readiness.

We have reviewed the other issues raised by defendant and find them to be without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Ostrowski, J. — Criminal Possession Stolen Property, 4th Degree.) Present — Denman, J. P., Boomer, Balio, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
Exhibit 32
                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Two Moons Kachinas, Corp. (the
"Registrant") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Quarterly Report"), I, David C. Merrell, President and director of the
Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
the Registrant.


Dated: 11/11/2003                          /s/David C. Merrell
                                           David C. Merrell
                                           President and director
# C_2009019EN.01002101.xml

| 24.1.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.1.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/21

---

Action brought on 2 December 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Hungary

(Case C-530/08)

(2009/C 19/38)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant(s): Commission of the European Communities (represented by: H. Støvlbaek and B. Béres, acting as Agent(s))

Applicant(s):

Defendant(s): Republic of Hungary

Defendant(s):

Form of order sought

| — | Declare that by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to implement Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications (1) or, at least, by failing to communicate those provisions to the Commission, the Republic of Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive. |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare that by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to implement Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications (1) or, at least, by failing to communicate those provisions to the Commission, the Republic of Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive.

1

| — | order the Republic of Hungary to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Republic of Hungary to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The period prescribed for the implementation of Directive 2005/36/EC expired on 20 October 2007.

---

(1)  OJ 2005 L 255, p. 22.

1

---
EXHIBIT 32.1

                   CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORTS
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Armkel, LLC (the
"Company") certifies to his knowledge that:

(1) The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period
ended September 26, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in that Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial conditions and results of operation of the Company.



November 10, 2003                         /s/  Robert A. Davies, III
---------------------------               -------------------------------------
Date                                      Robert A. Davies, III
                                          Chief Executive Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Church & Dwight Co., Inc. and will
be retained by Church & Dwight Co., Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 21.1

                           SUBSIDIARIES OF REGISTRANT

Aqueduct Software, Inc.
FTP Software, Inc.
NetManage Benelux bvba (Belgium)
NetManage Japan K.K. (Japan)
NetManage, Ltd. (Haifa, Israel)
NetManage S.A. (France)
NetManage Software GmbH (Germany)
NetManage Italia srl (Italy)
NetManage UK Ltd. (England)
NetManage Canada Inc.
NetManage Iberia SL (Spain)
NetManage Nordic AB (Sweden)
NetManage Bid Ltd.
NetSoft, Inc.
Network International Ltd. (England)
Network Software Associates, Inc.
NY NetManage (Yerushalayim), Ltd. (Jerusalem, Israel)
Preston Delaware Acquisition Corp.
Relay Technology, Inc.
Wall Data Incorporated
Wall Data Mexico SA de CV
Wall Data do Brasil Limitada
Wall Data, Ltd. (Ireland)