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consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 

50.92, ‘‘Issuance of amendment,’’ 

because reducing the licensee’s onsite 

property damage insurance for IPEC 

does not: (1) involve a significant 

increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a 

new or different kind of accident from 

any accident previously evaluated; or 

(3) involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. The exempted 

financial protection regulation is 

unrelated to the operation of IPEC or 

site activities. Accordingly, there is no 

significant change in the types or 

significant increase in the amounts of 

any effluents that may be released 

offsite and no significant increase in 

individual or cumulative public or 

occupational radiation exposure. The 

exempted regulation is not associated 

with construction so there is no 

significant construction impact. The 

exempted regulation does not concern 

the source term (i.e., potential amount 

of radiation in an accident) or any 

activities conducted at the site. 

Therefore, there is no significant 

increase in the potential for, or 

consequences of, a radiological 

accident. In addition, there would be no 

significant impacts to biota, water 

resources, historic properties, cultural 

resources, or socioeconomic conditions 

in the region resulting from issuance of 

the requested exemption. The 

requirement for onsite property damage 

insurance involves surety, insurance, 

and indemnity matters only. 

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), ‘‘Criterion for 

categorical exclusion; identification of 

licensing and regulatory actions eligible 

for categorical exclusion or otherwise 

not requiring environmental review,’’ no 

environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

approval of this exemption request. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present as set forth in 

10 CFR 50.12. 

Therefore, the Commission hereby 

grants the licensee an exemption from 

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

for IPEC. IPEC permanently ceased 

power operations on October 31, 1974, 

April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, for 

IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively. The 

exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

permits IPEC to reduce the minimum 

required onsite property damage 

insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 

million 15 months after permanent 

cessation of power operations, which 

was August 1, 2022. Because this period 

has already elapsed, the exemption is 

effective upon issuance. 

Dated: November 14, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Jane Marshall, 

Director, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28777 Filed 12–28–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50–286; 

NRC–2022–0223] 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian 

Point Nuclear Energy Center; 

Exemption 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has issued 

exemptions in response to a request 

from Holtec Decommissioning 

International, LLC that would permit it, 

Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and Holtec 

Indian Point 3, LLC, to reduce certain 

emergency planning (EP) requirements. 

The exemptions eliminate the 

requirements to maintain an offsite 

radiological emergency preparedness 

plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP 

activities at the Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, 

collectively referred to as the Indian 

Point Energy Center (IPEC), based on the 

reduced risks of accidents that could 

result in an offsite radiological release at 

a decommissioning nuclear power 

reactor. 

DATES: The exemption was issued on 

November 1, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2022–0223 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2022–0223. Address 

questions about Docket IDs in 

Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 

telephone: 301–415–0624; email: 

Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical 

questions, contact the individual listed 

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at 

301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS 

accession number for each document 

referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that it is 

mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you 

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time (ET), Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl 

Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415– 

8534; email: Karl.Sturzebecher@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of 

the exemption is attached. 

Dated: December 26, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Marlayna V. Doell, 

Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning 

Branch, Division of Decommissioning, 

Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards. 

Attachment—Exemption 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50– 

286 

Holtec Decommissioning International, 

LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and 

Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian 

Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 

2, and 3; Exemption 

I. Background 

Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) 

Units 1, 2, and 3, are decommissioning 

power reactors located on 

approximately 239 acres of land on the 

east bank of the Hudson River at the 

Village of Buchanan in upper 

Westchester County, New York. The 


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licensee, Holtec Decommissioning 

International, LLC (HDI), is the holder of 

IPEC Facility Operating License Nos. 

DPR–5, DPR–26, and DFP–64. The 

licenses provide, among other things, 

that the facility is subject to all rules, 

regulations, and orders of the NRC now 

or hereafter in effect. 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 

No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased 

generation on October 31, 1974, and all 

fuel was removed from the IP1 reactor 

vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the 

NRC issued an order approving the safestorage condition of IP1. In 2003, the 

NRC issued Amendment No. 52 to IP1’s 

provisional operating license that 

changed the license’s expiration date to 

be consistent with that of the Indian 

Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 

(IP2) license at that time. Pursuant to 10 

CFR 50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no 

longer authorizes operation of the 

reactor or emplacement or retention of 

fuel into the reactor vessel. HDI states 

that there is no IP1 spent fuel in wet 

storage at the IPEC site; IP1 spent fuel 

is stored onsite in dry cask storage in an 

independent spent fuel storage 

installation (ISFSI). 

By letter dated February 8, 2017 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML17044A004), 

Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, 

and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC 

(the IPEC licensees at that time, 

collectively, ‘‘Entergy’’) certified to the 

NRC that it planned to permanently 

cease power operations at IP2 and 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 

No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 2020, and April 

30, 2021, respectively. By letters dated 

May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021 

(ML20113J902 and ML21131A157, 

respectively), Entergy certified to the 

NRC that power operations permanently 

ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30, 2020, 

and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the 

same letters, Entergy certified to the 

NRC that the fuel was permanently 

removed from the IP2 and IP3 reactor 

vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 

spent fuel pools (SFPs) as of May 12, 

2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively. 

Based on the docketing of these 

certifications for permanent cessation of 

operations and permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified 

in title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), 

the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility 

operating license for IPEC (Nos. DPR–26 

and DPR–64) no longer authorizes 

operation of the reactor or emplacement 

or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. 

The facility is still authorized to 

possess, and store irradiated (i.e., spent) 

nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently 

stored onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities 

in the SFPs and in a dry cask ISFSI. 

Many of the accident scenarios 

postulated in the updated safety 

analysis reports (USARs) for operating 

power reactors involve failures or 

malfunctions of systems that could 

affect the fuel in the reactor core and, in 

the most severe postulated accidents, 

would involve the release of large 

quantities of fission products. With the 

permanent cessation of power 

operations at IPEC and the permanent 

removal of the fuel from the reactor 

vessels, many accidents are no longer 

possible. The reactors, reactor coolant 

system (RCS), and supporting systems 

are no longer in operation and have no 

function related to the storage of the 

irradiated fuel. Therefore, the 

emergency planning (EP) provisions for 

postulated accidents involving failure or 

malfunction of the reactors, RCS, or 

supporting systems are no longer 

applicable. 

The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, 

‘‘Emergency plans,’’ and appendix E to 

10 CFR part 50, ‘‘Emergency Planning 

and Preparedness for Production and 

Utilization Facilities,’’ continue to apply 

to nuclear power reactors that have 

permanently ceased operation and have 

permanently removed all fuel from the 

reactor vessel. There are no explicit 

regulatory provisions distinguishing EP 

requirements for a power reactor that is 

permanently shut down and defueled 

from those for a reactor that is 

authorized to operate. To reduce or 

eliminate EP requirements that are no 

longer necessary due to the 

decommissioning status of the facility, 

HDI must obtain exemptions from those 

EP regulations. Only then can HDI 

modify the IPEC Emergency Plan to 

reflect the reduced risk associated with 

the permanently shutdown and 

defueled condition of IPEC. 

II. Request/Action 

By letter dated December 22, 2021 

(ML21356B693), revised February 1, 

2022 (ML22033A348), HDI requested 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 for IPEC. 

Specifically, HDI requested exemptions 

from certain planning standards in 10 

CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and 

offsite radiological emergency plans for 

nuclear power reactors; from certain 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that 

require establishment of plume 

exposure and ingestion pathway EP 

zones for nuclear power reactors; and 

from certain requirements in 10 CFR 

part 50, appendix E, section IV, which 

establish the elements that comprise the 

content of emergency plans. In a letter 

dated February 1, 2022 (ML22032A017), 

HDI provided responses to the NRC 

staff’s requests for additional 

information (RAI) concerning the 

proposed exemptions. 

The information provided by HDI 

included justifications for each 

exemption requested. The exemptions 

requested by HDI would eliminate the 

requirements to maintain formal offsite 

radiological emergency plans, reviewed 

by the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) under the requirements 

of 44 CFR, ‘‘Emergency Management 

and Assistance,’’ part 350, ‘‘Review and 

Approval of State and Local 

Radiological Emergency Plans and 

Preparedness,’’ and reduce the scope of 

onsite EP activities at IPEC. HDI stated 

that application of all the standards and 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E are not needed for adequate 

emergency response capability, based 

on the substantially lower onsite and 

offsite radiological consequences of 

accidents still possible at the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

facility, as compared to an operating 

facility. If offsite protective actions were 

needed for a highly unlikely beyonddesign-basis accident that could 

challenge the safe storage of spent fuel 

at IPEC, provisions exist for offsite 

agencies to take protective actions using 

a comprehensive emergency 

management plan (CEMP) under the 

National Preparedness System to protect 

the health and safety of the public. A 

CEMP in this context, also referred to as 

an emergency operations plan (EOP), is 

addressed in FEMA’s Comprehensive 

Preparedness Guide 101, ‘‘Developing 

and Maintaining Emergency Operations 

Plans.’’ Comprehensive Preparedness 

Guide 101 is the foundation for State, 

territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the 

United States. It promotes a common 

understanding of the fundamentals of 

risk-informed planning and decisionmaking and helps planners at all levels 

of government in their efforts to develop 

and maintain viable, all-hazards, allthreats emergency plans. An EOP is 

flexible enough for use in all 

emergencies. It describes how people 

and property will be protected; details 

who is responsible for carrying out 

specific actions; identifies the 

personnel, equipment, facilities, 

supplies and other resources available; 

and outlines how all actions will be 

coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to 

as a synonym for ‘‘all-hazards planning. 

III. Discussion 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, 

‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ the Commission 

may, upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50 when: (1) the exemptions 


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are authorized by law, will not present 

an undue risk to public health or safety, 

and are consistent with the common 

defense and security; and (2) any of the 

special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2) are present. These special 

circumstances include, among other 

things, that the application of the 

regulation in the particular 

circumstances would not serve the 

underlying purpose of the rule or is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. 

As noted previously, the current EP 

regulations contained in 10 CFR 

50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 

50 apply to both operating and 

shutdown power reactors. The NRC has 

consistently acknowledged that the risk 

of an offsite radiological release at a 

power reactor that has permanently 

ceased operations and permanently 

removed fuel from the reactor vessel is 

significantly lower, and the types of 

possible accidents are significantly 

fewer, than at an operating power 

reactor. However, current EP regulations 

do not recognize that once a power 

reactor permanently ceases operation, 

the risk of a large radiological release 

from credible emergency accident 

scenarios is significantly reduced. The 

reduced risk is largely the result of the 

low frequency of credible events that 

could challenge the SFP structure, and 

the reduced decay heat and reduced 

short-lived radionuclide inventory due 

to decay. The NRC’s NUREG/CR- 6451, 

‘‘A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of 

Generic BWR and PWR Permanently 

Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated 

August 31, 1997 (ML082260098) and 

NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical Study of 

Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ dated February 28, 2001 

(ML010430066), confirmed that for 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactors bounded by the 

assumptions and conditions in the 

reports, the risk of offsite radiological 

release is significantly less than that for 

an operating power reactor. 

In the past, EP exemptions similar to 

those requested by HDI, have been 

granted to licensees of permanently 

shutdown and defueled power reactors. 

However, the exemptions did not 

relieve the licensees of all EP 

requirements. Rather, the exemptions 

allowed the licensees to modify their 

emergency plans commensurate with 

the credible site-specific risks that were 

consistent with a permanently 

shutdown and defueled status. 

Specifically, the NRC’s approval of 

these prior exemptions from certain EP 

requirements was based on the 

licensee’s demonstration that: (1) the 

radiological consequences of designbasis accidents would not exceed the 

limits of the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency’s (EPA) Protective 

Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the 

exclusion area boundary, and (2) in the 

unlikely event of a beyond- design-basis 

accident resulting in a loss of all modes 

of heat transfer from the fuel stored in 

the SFP, there is sufficient time to 

initiate appropriate mitigating actions, 

and if needed, for offsite authorities to 

implement offsite protective actions 

using a CEMP approach to protect the 

health and safety of the public. Based on 

prior exemption requests, the NRC has 

generally approved such exemptions 

when the site-specific analysis 

demonstrates that there is sufficient 

time following a loss of SFP coolant 

inventory until the onset of fuel damage 

to implement onsite mitigation of the 

loss of SFP coolant inventory and if 

necessary, to implement offsite 

protective actions. In prior exemptions, 

sufficient time was demonstrated if the 

time exceeded 10 hours from the loss of 

coolant until the fuel temperature 

would be expected to reach 900 degrees 

Celsius (°C), assuming no air cooling. 

With respect to design-basis-accidents 

at IPEC, the licensee provided analysis 

demonstrating that 15 months following 

permanent cessation of power 

operations, the radiological 

consequences of the only remaining 

design-basis accident with potential for 

offsite radiological release (a fuel 

handling accident in the Reactor 

Building, where the SFP is located) will 

not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs 

at the exclusion area boundary. With 

respect to beyond-design-basis accidents 

at IPEC, HDI analyzed a beyond-designbasis accident involving a complete loss 

of SFP water inventory, where adequate 

fuel handling building air exchange 

with the environment and air cooling of 

the stored fuel was available. HDI’s 

analysis demonstrated that, as of 10 

hours, air cooling of the spent fuel 

assemblies was sufficient to keep the 

fuel within safe temperature range, 

indefinitely, without fuel cladding 

damage or offsite radiological release. 

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s 

justification for the requested 

exemptions against the criteria in 10 

CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as 

described below, that the criteria in 10 

CFR 50.12(a) will be met, and that the 

exemptions should be granted. An 

assessment of the HDI EP exemptions is 

described in SECY–22–0102 dated 

November 18, 2022 (ML22231A160). 

The Commission approved the NRC 

staff’s recommendation to grant the 

exemptions in the staff requirements 

memorandum to SECY–22–0102, dated 

October 24, 2023 (ML23297A027). 

Descriptions of the specific exemptions 

requested by HDI and the NRC staff’s 

basis for granting each exemption are 

provided in SECY–22–0102. The staff’s 

detailed review and technical basis for 

the approval of the specific EP 

exemptions requested by HDI are 

provided in the NRC staff’s safety 

evaluation dated November 1, 2023 

(ML23067A082) 

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law 

The licensee has proposed 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E, section IV, which would 

allow HDI to revise the IPEC Emergency 

Plan to reflect the permanently 

shutdown and defueled condition of the 

facility. As stated above, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission 

may, upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50. The NRC staff has 

determined that granting of the 

licensee’s proposed exemptions will not 

result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 

NRC’s regulations. Therefore, the 

exemptions are authorized by law. 

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue 

Risk to the Public Health and Safety 

As stated previously, HDI provided 

analyses that show the radiological 

consequences of design-basis accidents 

will not exceed the limits of the EPA 

PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 

Therefore, formal offsite radiological 

emergency plans required under 10 CFR 

part 50 will no longer be needed for 

protection of the public beyond the 

exclusion area boundary, based on the 

radiological consequences of designbasis accidents still possible at IPEC. 

Although highly unlikely, there is one 

postulated beyond-design-basis accident 

that might result in significant offsite 

radiological releases. However, NUREG– 

1738 confirms that the risk of beyonddesign-basis accidents is greatly reduced 

at permanently shutdown and defueled 

reactors. The NRC staff’s analyses in 

NUREG–1738 concludes that the event 

sequences important to risk at 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactors are limited to large 

earthquakes and cask drop events. For 

EP assessments, this is an important 

difference relative to the operating 

power reactors, where typically a large 

number of different sequences make 

significant contributions to risk. Per 

NUREG–1738, relaxation of offsite EP 

requirements, under 10 CFR part 50, a 

few months after shutdown resulted in 


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only a small change in risk. The report 

further concludes that the change in risk 

due to relaxation of offsite EP 

requirements is small because the 

overall risk is low, and because even 

under current EP requirements for 

operating power reactors, EP was judged 

to have marginal impact on evacuation 

effectiveness in the severe earthquake 

event that dominates SFP risk. All other 

sequences including cask drops (for 

which offsite radiological emergency 

plans are expected to be more effective) 

are too low in likelihood to have a 

significant impact on risk. 

Therefore, granting exemptions to 

eliminate the requirements of 10 CFR 

part 50 to maintain offsite radiological 

emergency plans and to reduce the 

scope of onsite EP activities will not 

present an undue risk to the public 

health and safety. 

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the 

Common Defense and Security 

The requested exemptions by HDI 

only involve EP requirements under 10 

CFR part 50 and will allow HDI to revise 

the IPEC Emergency Plan to reflect the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

condition of the facility. Physical 

security measures at IPEC are not 

affected by the requested EP 

exemptions. The discontinuation of 

formal offsite radiological emergency 

plans and the reduction in scope of the 

onsite EP activities at IPEC will not 

adversely affect HDI’s ability to 

physically secure the site or protect 

special nuclear material. Therefore, the 

proposed exemptions are consistent 

with the common defense and security. 

D. Special Circumstances 

Special circumstances, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present 

whenever application of the regulation 

in the particular circumstances is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The underlying 

purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 

50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E, section IV, is to provide 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

protective measures can and will be 

taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency, to establish plume exposure 

and ingestion pathway EP zones for 

nuclear power plants, and to ensure that 

licensees maintain effective offsite and 

onsite radiological emergency plans. 

The standards and requirements in 

these regulations were developed by 

considering the risks associated with 

operation of a nuclear power reactor at 

its licensed full-power level. These risks 

include the potential for a reactor 

accident with offsite radiological dose 

consequences. 

As discussed previously in Section Ill 

of this document, because IPEC Units 1, 

2, and 3 are permanently shutdown and 

defueled, there will no longer be a risk 

of a significant offsite radiological 

release from a design-basis accident 

exceeding early phase PAGs at the 

exclusion area boundary, and the risk of 

a significant offsite radiological release 

from a beyond-design-basis accident is 

greatly reduced when compared to the 

risk at an operating power reactor. In a 

letter dated December 22, 2021 

(ML21356B693), revised February 1, 

2022 (ML22033A348), the licensee 

provided analyses to demonstrate that 

the radiological consequences of designbasis accidents at IPEC will not exceed 

the limits of the EPA PAGs at the 

exclusion area boundary. The NRC staff 

has confirmed the reduced risks at IPEC 

by comparing the generic risk 

assumptions in the analyses in NUREG– 

1738 to site-specific conditions at IPEC; 

and has determined that the risk values 

in NUREG–1738 bound the risks 

presented by IPEC. 

In addition, the significant decay of 

short-lived radionuclides that has 

occurred since shutdown of IPEC 

provides assurance in other ways. As 

indicated by the results of research 

conducted for NUREG–1738 and more 

recently, for NUREG–2161, 

‘‘Consequence Study of a BeyondDesign-Basis Earthquake Affecting the 

Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I 

Boiling Water Reactor’’ (ML14255A365), 

while other consequences can be 

extensive, accidents from SFPs with 

significant decay time have little 

potential to cause offsite early fatalities, 

even if the formal offsite radiological EP 

requirements were relaxed. HDI’s 

analysis of a beyond-design-basis 

accident involving a complete loss of 

SFP water inventory, where adequate 

fuel handling building air exchange 

with the environment and air cooling of 

the stored fuel is available, shows that 

as of 10 hours, air cooling of the spent 

fuel assemblies was sufficient to keep 

the fuel within safe temperature range, 

indefinitely, without fuel cladding 

damage or offsite radiological release. 

The only analyzed beyond-designbasis accident scenario that progresses 

to a condition where a significant offsite 

release might occur, involves the highly 

unlikely event where the SFP drains in 

such a way that all modes of cooling or 

heat transfer are assumed to be 

unavailable, which is postulated to 

result in an adiabatic heat up of the 

spent fuel. HDI’s analysis of this 

beyond-design-basis accident shows 

that 15 months after shutdown, a 

minimum of 10 hours would be 

available between the time the fuel is 

initially uncovered (at which time 

adiabatic heat up is conservatively 

assumed to begin), until the fuel 

cladding reaches a temperature of 1652 

degrees Fahrenheit (°F) (900°C), which 

is the temperature associated with rapid 

cladding oxidation and the potential for 

a significant radiological release. This 

analysis conservatively does not include 

the period of time from the initiating 

event causing a loss of SFP water 

inventory until all cooling means are 

lost. 

The NRC staff has verified HDI’s 

analyses and its calculations. The 

analyses provide reasonable assurance 

that in granting the requested 

exemptions to HDI, there is no designbasis accident that will result in an 

offsite radiological release exceeding the 

EPA PAGs at the exclusion area 

boundary. In the highly unlikely event 

of a beyond-design-basis accident 

affecting the SFP that results in a 

complete loss of heat removal via all 

modes of heat transfer, because all Units 

at IPEC have been shutdown for well 

over 15 months, there will be a 

minimum of 10 hours available before 

an offsite release might occur and, 

therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate 

appropriate mitigating actions to restore 

a means of heat removal to the spent 

fuel. If a radiological release were 

projected to occur under this unlikely 

scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is 

considered sufficient time for offsite 

authorities to implement protective 

actions using a CEMP approach to 

protect the health and safety of the 

public. 

Exemptions from the offsite EP 

requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 

previously been approved by the NRC 

when the site-specific analyses show 

that at least 10 hours are available 

following a loss of SFP coolant 

inventory accident with no air cooling 

(or other methods of removing decay 

heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel 

assembly reaches the zirconium rapid 

oxidation temperature. The NRC staff 

concluded in its previously granted 

exemptions, as it does with the HDIrequested EP exemptions, that if a 

minimum of 10 hours are available to 

initiate mitigative actions consistent 

with plant conditions, or if needed, for 

offsite authorities to implement 

protective actions using a CEMP 

approach, then formal offsite 

radiological emergency plans, required 

under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary 

at permanently shut down and defueled 

power reactors. 

Additionally, in HDI’s letters to the 

NRC dated December 22, 2021, and 

February 2, 2022, HDI described the SFP 

makeup strategies that could be used in 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
90216 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 249 / Friday, December 29, 2023 / Notices 

1See Docket No. RM2018–3, Order Adopting 

Final Rules Relating to Non-Public Information, 

June 27, 2018, Attachment A at 19–22 (Order No. 

4679). 

the event of a catastrophic loss of SFP 

inventory. The multiple strategies for 

providing makeup water to the SFP 

include: using existing plant systems for 

inventory makeup; an internal strategy 

between IP2 and IP3 that relies on 

installed Primary Water Storage Tank, 

fire water inside the SFP buildings, and 

fire water using a temporary diesel 

pump from outside of the SFP 

buildings; or an external strategy that 

uses portable pumps to initiate makeup 

flow into the SFPs through a standpipe 

and standard fire hoses routed to the 

SFPs or to a spray nozzle. These 

strategies will continue to be required as 

License Condition 2(N), ‘‘Mitigation 

Strategy License Condition’’ and 2(AC), 

‘‘Mitigation Strategy License Condition’’ 

for Units 2 and 3 respectively. 

Considering the very low probability of 

beyond-design-basis accidents affecting 

the SFP, these diverse strategies provide 

multiple methods to obtain additional 

makeup or spray water to the SFP before 

the onset of any postulated offsite 

radiological release. Because of the 

length of time, it would take for the fuel 

to heat up, there are 10 hours available 

to respond to any draindown event that 

might cause such an occurrence by 

restoring cooling or makeup or 

providing spray to the IP2 or IP3 SFPs. 

For all the reasons stated above, the 

NRC staff finds that HDI’s requested 

exemptions meet the underlying 

purpose of all of the standards in 10 

CFR 50.47(b), as well as the 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 

10 CFR part 50, appendix E, and 

satisfies the special circumstances in 10 

CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly 

reduced risk of offsite radiological 

consequences associated with the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

state of the IPEC facility. The staff 

further concludes that the exemptions 

granted by this action will maintain an 

acceptable level of emergency 

preparedness at IPEC and provide 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

offsite protective measures, if needed, 

can and will be taken by State and local 

government agencies using a CEMP 

approach, in the highly unlikely event 

of a radiological emergency at the IPEC 

facility. Since the underlying purposes 

of the rules, as exempted, would 

continue to be achieved, even with the 

elimination of the requirements under 

10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal 

offsite radiological emergency plans and 

the reduction in the scope of the onsite 

EP activities at IPEC, the special 

circumstances required by 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist. 

E. Environmental Considerations 

In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), 

the Commission has determined that the 

granting of these exemptions will not 

have a significant effect on the quality 

of the human environment, as discussed 

in the NRC staff’s Environmental 

Assessment and Finding of No 

Significant Impact published on October 

31, 2023 (88 FR 74536). 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), that HDI’s request for 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E, section IV, and as 

summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY– 

22–0102, are authorized by law, will not 

present an undue risk to the public 

health and safety, and are consistent 

with the common defense and security. 

Also, special circumstances are present. 

Therefore, the Commission hereby 

grants HDI exemptions from certain EP 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix E, section IV, as discussed and 

evaluated in detail in the staff’s safety 

evaluation dated November 1, 2023 

(ML23067A082). The exemptions are 

effective upon issuance. 

Dated: November 1, 2023. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Jane Marshall, Director, 

Division of Decommissioning, Uranium 

Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of 

Nuclear Material Safety, and Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28778 Filed 12–28–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. MC2024–131 and CP2024–137; 

MC2024–133 and CP2024–139; MC2024–134 

and CP2024–140] 

New Postal Products 

AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Commission is noticing a 

recent Postal Service filing for the 

Commission’s consideration concerning 

a negotiated service agreement. This 

notice informs the public of the filing, 

invites public comment, and takes other 

administrative steps. 

DATES: Comments are due: January 2, 

2024. 

ADDRESSES: Submit comments 

electronically via the Commission’s 

Filing Online system at http://

www.prc.gov. Those who cannot submit 

comments electronically should contact 

the person identified in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section by 

telephone for advice on filing 

alternatives. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

David A. Trissell, General Counsel, at 

202–789–6820. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Introduction 

II. Docketed Proceeding(s) 

I. Introduction 

The Commission gives notice that the 

Postal Service filed request(s) for the 

Commission to consider matters related 

to negotiated service agreement(s). The 

request(s) may propose the addition or 

removal of a negotiated service 

agreement from the Market Dominant or 

the Competitive product list, or the 

modification of an existing product 

currently appearing on the Market 

Dominant or the Competitive product 

list. 

Section II identifies the docket 

number(s) associated with each Postal 

Service request, the title of each Postal 

Service request, the request’s acceptance 

date, and the authority cited by the 

Postal Service for each request. For each 

request, the Commission appoints an 

officer of the Commission to represent 

the interests of the general public in the 

proceeding, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 505 

(Public Representative). Section II also 

establishes comment deadline(s) 

pertaining to each request. 

The public portions of the Postal 

Service’s request(s) can be accessed via 

the Commission’s website (http://

www.prc.gov). Non-public portions of 

the Postal Service’s request(s), if any, 

can be accessed through compliance 

with the requirements of 39 CFR 

3011.301.1

The Commission invites comments on 

whether the Postal Service’s request(s) 

in the captioned docket(s) are consistent 

with the policies of title 39. For 

request(s) that the Postal Service states 

concern Market Dominant product(s), 

applicable statutory and regulatory 

requirements include 39 U.S.C. 3622, 39 

U.S.C. 3642, 39 CFR part 3030, and 39 

CFR part 3040, subpart B. For request(s) 

that the Postal Service states concern 

Competitive product(s), applicable 

statutory and regulatory requirements 

include 39 U.S.C. 3632, 39 U.S.C. 3633, 

39 U.S.C. 3642, 39 CFR part 3035, and 

39 CFR part 3040, subpart B. Comment 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1