If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PREYDE ONE LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 25, 2020

v No. 346192

Ingham Circuit Court

HOFFMAN CONSULTANTS LLC, LC No. 18-000003-CB

Defendant-Appellant,

and

GLASERS LUMBER and CONSOLIDATED 

BUILDING SYSTEMS INC,

Defendants.

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and JANSEN and M. J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this interlocutory appeal, defendant, Hoffman Consultants LLC (Hoffman), appeals by 

leave granted1the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary disposition. Because the trial 

court erred by denying summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we reverse and remand for 

entry of an order granting Hoffman summary disposition.

I. BASIC FACTS

This case arises from the construction of a hotel in Lansing, Michigan. Plaintiff, Preyde 

One LLC (Preyde One), filed suit against Glasers Lumber (Glasers) on December 18, 2017, 

alleging that Glasers had breached its contract with Preyde One by providing defective and 

substandard work and materials and by failing to timely complete the work or cure the defects with 

 

1 Preyde One LLC v Glasers Lumber, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 29, 

2019 (Docket No. 346192).
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the work performed. It also brought claims for unjust enrichment and fraudulent misrepresentation 

against Glasers. Relevant to this appeal, Glasers filed a notice of non-party fault identifying 

Hoffman as a responsible non-party.

Preyde One filed a second amended complaint, naming Hoffman as a party. Preyde One 

alleged that Hoffman, the structural engineer for the hotel, had a duty to exercise ordinary and 

reasonable skill and care when preparing the drawings and specifications for the hotel and when 

conducting its inspections and supervision of the structural work on the hotel. In addition, Preyde 

One asserted that Hoffman had a “duty to use its technical skill, ability and diligence, as required 

by professional engineers, in performing the structural work.” Preyde One asserted that Hoffman 

breached those duties “by preparing insufficient drawings and specifications and by failing to 

properly inspect and supervise the structural work on the Hotel.”

In lieu of filing an answer, Hoffman moved for summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10). Hoffman explained that it entered into a contract with Andrus 

Architecture to provide structural engineering services for Preyde One’s hotel. It noted that it had 

no contractual relationship with Preyde One, and argued that as a stranger to the contract between 

Hoffman and Andrus Architecture, Preyde One could not prevail on a tort claim without showing 

that Hoffman owed it a “separate and distinct” duty arising from Hoffman’s design work. Hoffman 

asserted that Preyde One had failed to adequately allege that it owed such a separate and distinct 

duty to Preyde One, so Preyde One’s claim should be dismissed. In addition, Hoffman argued that 

summary disposition was warranted because Preyde One’s claim against it was a malpractice claim 

governed by the two-year limitations period set forth in MCL 600.5805(8).

In response, Preyde One argued that when Hoffman prepared the design plans and 

specifications for construction of the hotel, Hoffman had a common-law duty to exercise due care 

to avoid damage to Preyde One’s property and to avoid endangering people. It also asserted that 

because it had no contract with Hoffman, its claim was a third-party negligence claim, not a 

malpractice claim. As a result, it argued that the claim was governed by the six-year period set 

forth in MCL 600.5839(1)(a)2or the three-year limitations period set forth in MCL 600.5805(2). 

Moreover, Preyde One contended that the accrual statute for malpractice claims, MCL 

600.5838(1), provides that a malpractice claim accrues when a licensed professional discontinues 

service to “the plaintiff.” It asserted that because Hoffman’s contract was with Andrus 

Architecture, Hoffman never rendered any professional services to Preyde One, so it was 

impossible for it to discontinue serving Preyde One. As a result, no malpractice claim accrued or

could accrue in this case. Following oral argument, the trial court denied Hoffman’s motion for 

summary disposition.

 

2 Preyde One asserts that as it relates to ordinary negligence claims, MCL 600.5838(1) is both a 

statute of repose and a statute of limitations. Resolution of this argument is not necessary for this 

appeal; however, we note that our Legislature has expressly stated that the period in MCL 

600.3839 is a period of repose. See MCL 600.5805(14) (“The periods of limitation under this 

section are subject to any applicable period of repose established in section 5838a, 5838b, or 

5839.”).
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II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hoffman argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary disposition 

under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (claim barred by statute of limitations). We review de novo whether a 

cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Seyburn, Kahn, Ginn, Bess, Deitch 

and Serlin, PC v Bakshi, 483 Mich 345, 354; 771 NW2d 411 (2009). We also review de novo a 

trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates 

Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). Summary 

dismissal is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when an action is barred because of the “statute 

of limitations.” When reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7), “this Court must 

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff, unless 

other evidence contradicts them.” Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 428; 789 NW2d 

211 (2010). “If any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence are 

submitted, the court must consider them to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material 

fact.” Id. at 429. “If no facts are in dispute, and if reasonable minds could not differ regarding the 

legal effect of those facts, the question whether the claim is barred is an issue of law for the court.” 

Id.

B. ANALYSIS

Preyde One argues that its negligence claim against Hoffman is an ordinary, third-party 

negligence claim, not a malpractice claim. However, the Legislature has determined that “[a]n 

action against a state licensed architect or professional engineer or licensed professional surveyor 

arising from professional services rendered is an action charging malpractice subject to the period 

of limitation contained in [MCL 600.5805(8)].” MCL 600.3805(3) (emphasis added). Here, it is 

undisputed that Hoffman is a professional engineer. Moreover, it is also plain that Preyde One’s 

action against Hoffman arose “from professional services rendered.” The second amended 

complaint provides:

87. In its capacity as structural engineer, Hoffman prepared drawings and 

specification, conducted inspections and supervised the structural work [on Preyde 

One’s hotel].”

88. In preparing the drawings and specifications and in its inspections and 

supervision of the structural work on the Hotel, Hoffman had a duty to exercise 

ordinary and reasonable care and skill.

89. Hoffman also had a duty to use its technical skill, ability and diligence, 

as required by professional engineers, in performing the structural work.

90. Hoffman breached its duties by preparing insufficient drawings and 

specifications and by failing to properly inspect and supervise the structural work 

on the Hotel.
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91. The design defects include, but are not limited to, inadequate 

specifications for the bracing of the cantilevered second through fourth floors, 

which subjected the Hotel to movement, twisting and racking.

92. The design defects may have also caused all, or some, of the 

Construction defects. [Emphasis added.]

In other words, Preyde One alleged that Hoffman was negligent in performing its professional 

engineering services, which included preparing the drawings and specifications for the hotel and 

inspecting and supervising the structural work on the hotel. Based on a plain reading of the second 

amended complaint, it is clear that none of the allegedly negligent acts and omissions are unrelated 

to the professional services rendered in this case.

Preyde One argues that because it does not have a contractual relationship with Hoffman 

its claim can only sound in ordinary negligence and can never sound in malpractice. But MCL 

600.3805(13) includes no language limiting a malpractice action to an action arising from a 

contract between the defendant and the plaintiff. Instead, it provides in broad terms that an action 

against a professional engineer is an action charging malpractice if it arises “from professional 

services rendered.” If the Legislature intended a contractual relationship between the parties it 

would have used language indicating that such a relationship was mandated. See Polkton Twp v 

Pellegrom, 265 Mich App 88, 102; 693 NW2d 170 (2005) (“Nothing will be read into a clear 

statute that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as derived from the language of 

the statute itself.”). Moreover, examination of the relevant accrual statute does not mandate a 

different result. MCL 600.5838(1) provides that “a claim based on the malpractice of a person 

who is, or holds himself or herself out to be, a member of a state licensed profession accrues at the 

time that person discontinues serving the plaintiff in a professional or pseudoprofessional capacity 

as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose, regardless of the time the plaintiff 

discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.” (Emphasis added). Preyde One argues that 

Hoffman did not—and could not—discontinue serving it because there is no contractual 

relationship between Preyde One and Hoffman. We disagree. Even in the absence of a direct 

contractual relationship, by providing structural engineering services for Preyde One’s hotel, 

Hoffman was serving Preyde One. Specifically, Preyde One (or one of its affiliates) contracted 

with Andrus Architecture, which in turn contracted with Hoffman to provide structuralengineering services for Preyde One’s hotel. Although the relationship is indirect, the plain 

language of the accrual statute does not mandate that a direct contractual relationship exist between 

the defendant and the plaintiff in an action charging malpractice. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the claim in this case alleges malpractice, not ordinary negligence, because it is an action against 

a professional engineer arising from professional services rendered. See MCL 600.5805(13). As 

such the two-year limitations period in MCL 600.3805(8) applies to Preyde One’s claim against 

Hoffman. Hoffman last performed professional services in relation to Preyde One’s hotel on 

August 25, 2015. At that time, Preyde One’s malpractice claim accrued pursuant to MCL 

600.5838(1). Preyde One did not file its claim against Hoffman until June 14, 2018, which is more 

than two years after the malpractice claim accrued. Consequently, as a matter of law, Preyde One’s 
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malpractice claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court, therefore, erred by denying 

summary disposition.3

We reverse the trial court’s order denying summary disposition and remand for entry of an 

order granting summary disposition in Hoffman’s favor under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Hoffman may 

tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219(A). We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

 

3 Given our resolution, we need not address the parties dispute over whether Hoffman owed any 

legal duty to Preyde One that was separate and distinct from its contractual obligations to Andrus 

Architecture.