PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DARLENE COLLINS; BAIL BOND 

ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO; 

RICHARD MARTINEZ; BILL SHARER; 

CRAIG BRANDT; CARL TRUJILLO, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

CHARLES W. DANIELS; EDWARD L. 

CHAVEZ; PETRA JIMENEZ MAEZ; 

BARBARA J. VIGIL; JUDITH K. 

NAKAMURA; NEW MEXICO 

SUPREME COURT; NAN NASH; THE 

SECOND JUDICIAL COURT; HENRY 

A. ALAINZ; ROBERT L. PADILLA; 

BERNALILLO COUNTY 

METROPOLITAN COURT; JAMES 

NOEL; BERNALILLO COUNTY; 

BOARD OF COUNTY 

COMMISSIONERS, COUNTY OF 

BERNALILLO, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

Nos. 17-2217 and 18-2045 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-00776-RJ-KK)

_________________________________ 

Richard Westfall, Hale Westfall, Denver, Colorado (A. Blair Dunn and Dori E. Richards, 

Western Agriculture, Resource and Business Advocates, LLP, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, with him on the briefs), appearing for Appellants. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 25, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Ari Biernoff, Office of the New Mexico Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 

appearing for Appellees Charles W. Daniels, Edward L. Chavez, Petra Jimenez Maez, 

Barbara J. Vigil, Judith K. Nakamura, the New Mexico Supreme Court, Nan Nash, the 

Second Judicial Court, Henry Alainz, Robert Padilla, the Bernalillo County Metropolitan 

Court, and James Noel. 

Brandon Huss, The New Mexico Association of Counties, Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the 

brief for Appellee County Commissioners of the County of Bernalillo. 

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

This is a § 1983 case that challenges the constitutionality of New Mexico’s 

system of bail. Plaintiffs-Appellants Darlene Collins, the Bail Bond Association of 

New Mexico (“BBANM”), and five New Mexico state legislators (the “Legislator 

Plaintiffs”) allege that New Mexico’s system of bail violates the Excessive Bail 

Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as well as the procedural and substantive 

components of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1

 Plaintiffs 

further allege that the rules governing New Mexico’s system of bail were 

promulgated by the New Mexico Supreme Court in violation of the New Mexico 

Constitution. Defendants-Appellees are the New Mexico Supreme Court and its 

justices; the Second Judicial District Court of New Mexico, its chief judge, and its 

 1

 Plaintiffs have withdrawn their claim that New Mexico’s system of bail 

violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions against unreasonable search and 

seizure. Aplt. Reply. Br. at 14. 
3 

court executive officer; and the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court, its chief 

judge, and its court executive officer.2

 

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing, Defendants 

are immune from suit, and Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. Defendants also 

moved for Rule 11 sanctions on the basis that Plaintiffs’ attorneys filed suit without 

adequately researching the viability of Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs then moved for 

leave to amend their complaint to add a claim that Defendants’ Rule 11 motion 

violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. 

The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss because it found that 

BBANM and the Legislator Plaintiffs lack standing, Defendants are immune from 

suit, and Plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The district court also granted Defendants’ 

motion for sanctions and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend. Plaintiffs timely 

appealed.3

 Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM. 

I 

A. Legal Background 

As of 2014, when bail hearings were held in New Mexico, judges commonly 

set the amount of any secured bail bond based “solely on the nature of [a 

 2

 Plaintiffs have withdrawn their appeal from the dismissal of their claims 

against the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Bernalillo. Aplt. 

Reply. Br. at 19 n.10. 

 

3

 Appeal No. 17-2217 concerns the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case and denial of 

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. Appeal No. 18-2045 concerns the imposition 

of Rule 11 sanctions. The appeals have been consolidated for procedural purposes. 

Dkt. No. 10546176. 
4 

defendant’s] charged offense without regard to individual determinations of flight 

risk or continued danger to the community.” State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276, 1292 

(N.M. 2014). The New Mexico Supreme Court held that this practice was 

impermissible because “[n]either the [New Mexico] Constitution nor [New Mexico’s] 

rules of criminal procedure permit[ted] a judge to base a pretrial release decision 

solely on the severity of the charged offense.” Id. The Court explained that 

“[s]etting money bail based on the severity of the crime leads to either release or 

detention, determined by a defendant’s wealth alone instead of being based on the 

factors relevant to a particular defendant’s risk of nonappearance or reoffense in a 

particular case.” Id. 

In March 2016, the New Mexico legislature proposed amending the state 

constitution to change how the state administers bail. S.J. Res. 1, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. 

(N.M. 2016). The amendment was ratified by popular referendum in November 

2016. The relevant provision now reads: 

All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient

sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the 

presumption great and in situations in which bail is specifically 

prohibited by this section. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. 

Bail may be denied by a court of record pending trial for a 

defendant charged with a felony if the prosecuting authority requests 

a hearing and proves by clear and convincing evidence that no 

release conditions will reasonably protect the safety of any other 

person or the community. An appeal from an order denying bail 

shall be given preference over all other matters. 

A person who is not detainable on grounds of dangerousness 

nor a flight risk in the absence of bond and is otherwise eligible for 
5 

bail shall not be detained solely because of financial inability to post 

a money or property bond. A defendant who is neither a danger nor 

a flight risk and who has a financial inability to post a money or 

property bond may file a motion with the court requesting relief 

from the requirement to post bond. The court shall rule on the

motion in an expedited manner. 

N.M. Const. art. II, § 13. 

In July 2017, the Supreme Court of New Mexico revised the state’s Rules of 

Criminal Procedure to implement the recent constitutional amendment (the “2017 

Rules”). The relevant provisions state: 

Pending trial, any defendant eligible for pretrial release under 

Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution, shall be

ordered released pending trial on the defendant’s personal 

recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance 

bond in an amount set by the court, unless the court makes written 

findings of particularized reasons why the release will not 

reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required. The 

court may impose non-monetary conditions of release . . . , but the 

court shall impose the least restrictive condition or combination of 

conditions that will reasonably ensure the appearance of the 

defendant as required and the safety of any other person or the

community. 

N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401(B). 

If the court makes findings of the reasons why release on 

personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond, in addition to 

any non-monetary conditions of release, will not reasonably ensure 

the appearance of the defendant as required, the court may require a 

secured bond for the defendant’s release. 

N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401(E). 

The 2017 Rules were meant to “clarify that the amount of [a] secured bond 

must not be based on a bond schedule, i.e., a predetermined schedule of monetary 

amounts fixed according to the nature of the charge.” N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401 cmt. 
6 

(referring to N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401(E)(1)(d)). “Instead, [a] court must consider 

[each] individual defendant’s financial resources and must set secured bond at the 

lowest amount that will reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance in court after 

the defendant is released.” Id. (referring to N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401(E)(1)(a)–(c)). 

Depending on a defendant’s custodial status, a “district court shall conduct a 

hearing . . . and issue an order setting the conditions of release as soon as practicable, 

but in no event later than” three to five “days after the date of arrest.” N.M. R. Crim. 

P. 5-401(A)(1). “The chief judge of [each] district court may [also] designate by 

written court order responsible persons to implement . . . pretrial release procedures 

. . . .” N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401(N). Per these procedures, “[a] designee shall release a 

defendant from custody prior to the defendant’s first appearance before a judge if the 

defendant,” id., (1) “has been arrested and detained for [most] . . . misdemeanor[s]” 

and other “[m]inor offenses,” (2) “qualifies for pretrial release based on a risk 

assessment and a pretrial release schedule approved by the Supreme Court,” or (3) 

“qualifies for pretrial release under a local release on recognizance program that 

relies on individualized assessments of arrestees and has been approved by order of 

the Supreme Court,” N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-408(B)–(D). When a defendant is released 

pursuant to Rule 5-408, he is “released on personal recognizance on [his] . . . promise 

to appear and subject to . . . standard conditions of release.” N.M. R. Crim. P. Form 

9-302. 
7 

B. Factual Background 

Two additional events underlie Plaintiffs’ claims. First, in late 2016, the 

Second Judicial District Court of New Mexico and the Bernalillo County 

Metropolitan Court—acting through their chief judges and court executive officers—

signed a memorandum of understanding with the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 

allowing the courts to use the Arnold Tool to perform risk assessments of criminal 

defendants prior to their bail hearings. App. Vol. I at 29, 65–72. The Arnold Tool, 

formally known as the Public Safety Assessment, “considers nine factors to measure 

the risk an eligible defendant will fail to appear in court and the risk he or she will 

engage in new criminal activity while on release.” Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 

281 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Public Safety 

Assessment - What is the PSA, https://www.psapretrial.org/about/what-is-psa (last 

visited February 4, 2019). Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he use of the Arnold Tool 

result[s] in persons accused of a crime being denied the opportunity to secure their 

pre-trial release through a secured bond as the tool requires the court[,] thr[ough] an 

entirely opaque program[,] to assess non-monetary conditions of release that infringe 

upon a person’s pretrial liberty.” App. Vol. I at 29. 

Second, on Saturday, July 1, 2017—the first day when the 2017 Rules were in 

effect—Plaintiff Darlene Collins was arrested for “aggravated assault arising out of a 

domestic dispute,” id. at 32, a fourth degree felony, N.M. Stat. § 30-3-2. Plaintiffs 

allege that, prior to the effective date of the 2017 Rules, “the jailhouse could have set 

a reasonable, non-excessive, monetary bail to ensure . . . Collin’s [sic] appearance at 
8 

arraignment and then for trial.” App. Vol. I at 33. But the jailhouse “could not, 

under the new Supreme Court Rules[,] consider releasing . . . Collins subject to 

monetary bail,” even though Collins’s “family was prepared to use their own 

financial resources with the assistance of a member of . . . BBANM to pay the 

required amount for pre-arraignment release.” Id. Instead, “Collins was incarcerated 

for almost 5 full days” before her arraignment in Bernalillo County Metropolitan 

Court on July 5, 2017. Id. at 33, 272–75. “[N]o conditions were [ultimately] 

imposed upon her release post-arraignment and pre-trial other than a verbal order 

from the Court that she was being released, but she was not allowed to return to her 

home.”4

 Id. at 33. 

C. Procedural Background 

Plaintiffs Collins, BBANM,5

 and the Legislator Plaintiffs brought this case as 

a putative class action on behalf of all New Mexico criminal defendants whose bail 

hearings have been or will be conducted using the 2017 Rules or the Arnold Tool. 

Id. at 36. Plaintiffs allege that the 2017 Rules and the Arnold Tool violate the 

Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment “by permitting judges to consider 

 4

 Plaintiffs’ allegation that Collins was not allowed to return home is not fully 

supported by documents attached to their motion for a preliminary injunction. In a 

sworn declaration, Collins stated that she “was released on [her] own recognizance 

with no conditions . . . .” App. Vol. I at 122–23 (emphasis added). Moreover, the 

order setting Collins’s conditions of release does not prohibit Collins from returning 

home. Id. at 274–75. 

 

5

 BBANM “is a professional membership organization comprised of bail bond 

businesses licensed to do business and operating throughout New Mexico.” App. 

Vol. I at 23. 
9 

secured bond only when it is determined that no other conditions of release will 

reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required.” Id. at 

42. According to Plaintiffs, this “subordinat[ion] [of] secured bond” “effectively 

takes secured bonds off the table as an option” for courts deciding whether to release 

a defendant pending trial. Id. 

Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants violate the procedural component of 

the Due Process Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment “[b]y imposing libertyrestricting conditions on . . . Collins and other presumptively innocent criminal 

defendants without offering them the historically-required option of non-excessive 

monetary bail.” Id. at 44. Plaintiffs also allege that “Defendants . . . violate 

Plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth 

Amendment] because the option of non-excessive bail for a bailable offense is 

fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and deeply rooted in this Nation’s 

history and tradition.” Id. (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Finally, 

Plaintiffs allege that the New Mexico Supreme Court exceeded its authority, under 

the New Mexico Constitution, when promulgating the 2017 Rules.6

 Id. at 34–35. 

Plaintiffs seek damages, a declaration that the 2017 Rules and use of the 

Arnold Tool are unconstitutional, and an injunction against future use of the 2017 

Rules and the Arnold Tool. Id. at 47–48. Plaintiffs sued the New Mexico Supreme 

 6

 Plaintiffs’ allegation that the New Mexico Supreme Court violated the New 

Mexico Constitution when it promulgated the 2017 Rules is not enumerated as a 

claim in the complaint. See App. Vol. I at 34–35. Nevertheless, the parties and the 

district court treated it as a claim. 
10 

Court, the Second Judicial District Court, and the Bernalillo County Metropolitan 

Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 24–26. Plaintiffs also sued the 

justices of the New Mexico Supreme Court, as well as the chief judges and court 

executive officers of the Second Judicial District Court of New Mexico and the 

Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court. Id. Plaintiffs sued these defendants in their 

individual capacities for damages and in their official capacities for declaratory and 

injunctive relief. Id. 

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing; sovereign 

immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims against the courts themselves and the state officials 

in their official capacities; legislative immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims against the 

supreme court justices; judicial immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims against the state 

court judges and court executive officers; and Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. 

Id. 171–99. While their motion to dismiss was pending, Defendants moved for Rule 

11 sanctions. App. Vol. II at 445–58. Defendants argued that they were entitled to 

sanctions because Plaintiffs’ counsel pursued unwarranted claims without offering a 

reasonable argument to modify existing law on standing or immunity. After being 

served with Defendants’ motion for sanctions, Plaintiffs moved to amend their 

complaint to add a claim for “violations of the First Amendment [from the] vindictive 

prosecution undertaken by” Defendants. Id. at 362. Plaintiffs argued that 

“Defendants undertook to threaten and intimidate Plaintiffs into abandoning their 

Free Speech and their right of access to the Courts through the service of a 
11 

defamatory Rule 11 [m]otion directed personally at Plaintiffs’ counsel.” Id. at 361–

62. 

The district court granted the motion to dismiss after finding that BBANM and 

the Legislator Plaintiffs lacked standing; that Plaintiffs’ claims against the state 

courts and individual defendants, in their official capacities, are barred by sovereign 

immunity; that Plaintiffs’ claims against the state court judges and court executives, 

in their individual capacities, are barred by judicial immunity; that Plaintiffs’ claims 

against the state supreme court justices, in their individual capacities, are barred by 

legislative immunity; and that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The district court 

granted the motion for sanctions because it found that there was no objectively 

reasonable basis for Plaintiffs to think that BBANM or the Legislator Plaintiffs had 

standing, or that Plaintiffs could overcome Defendants’ immunities. The district 

court also found that BBANM and the Legislator Plaintiffs were named as plaintiffs 

for an improper purpose. Finally, the district court denied the motion to amend as 

futile. Plaintiffs timely appealed all three rulings. 

II 

We review de novo whether Plaintiffs have standing. S. Utah Wilderness All. 

v. Palma, 707 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2013). “Each plaintiff must have standing 

to seek each form of relief in each claim.” Am. Humanist Ass’n, Inc. v. Douglas Cty. 

Sch. Dist. RE-1, 859 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bronson v. Swensen, 

500 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
12 

“[S]tanding ‘is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy 

requirement of Article III.’” S. Utah Wilderness All., 707 F.3d at 1153 (quoting 

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 

To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show: 

“(1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and 

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged 

action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely 

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 

decision.” 

Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 

180–81 (2000)). 

A. BBANM 

Plaintiffs argue that BBANM has standing because it (1) “has associational 

standing,” Aplt. Br. at 30, and (2) “has third-party standing to assert the 

constitutional rights of potential customers [who will be] denied bail,” id. at 32.7

 In 

 7

 Plaintiffs further allege that BBANM’s member companies “have been 

severely [financially] harmed by the drastic reduction in the number of defendants 

given the option of jailhouse bonds or secured bonds.” App. Vol. I at 32. This 

echoes Plaintiffs’ argument in district court that the 2017 Rules deprive BBANM’s 

members of a “constitutionally protected property interest in engaging in one’s 

chosen profession.” App. Vol. II at 302. But Plaintiffs do not allege a deprivation of 

a protected property interest in their First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs only allege 

violations of criminal defendants’ rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. App. Vol. I at 40–47. Therefore, even assuming that BBANM can 

satisfy Article III’s standing requirements based on its members’ economic injury, 

we must still examine whether BBANM has standing to assert the constitutional 

rights of criminal defendants. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128–29 & n.2 

(2004). 

(continued . . .) 
13 

reality, whether BBANM has standing is only a question of third-party standing. “An 

association has . . . standing” “to raise [the] claims of [its] members” “only if: ‘(a) its 

members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it 

seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim 

asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in 

the lawsuit.’” Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson, 594 F.3d 742, 756 (10th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 

(1977)). We need only consider the first prong of associational standing. Because 

BBANM’s members are not criminal defendants, they do not possess the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights asserted in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Therefore, like 

BBANM itself, BBANM’s members only have standing if they can assert the 

constitutional rights of criminal defendants. 

“Ordinarily, a party ‘must assert his own legal rights’ and ‘cannot rest his 

claim to relief on the legal rights . . . of third parties.’” Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 

137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). 

“But we recognize an exception where . . . ‘the party asserting the right has a close 

relationship with the person who possesses the right and there is a hindrance to the 

possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting 

 

(cont’d) 

BBANM does not argue that it has standing to assert the claim that the 2017 

Rules “infringe[] upon the power of the [New Mexico] Legislature to make law.” 

App. Vol. I at 35. 
14 

Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130). Neither BBANM nor its members are eligible for this 

exception to the rule against third-party standing. 

In Kowalski, two attorneys challenged a state statute that generally prohibited 

the “appointment of appellate counsel for indigents who plead guilty.” 543 U.S. at 

128. The plaintiffs alleged that the “statute denied indigents their federal 

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.” Id. The Supreme Court 

held that “the attorneys [did] not have third-party standing to assert the rights of . . . 

indigent defendants denied appellate counsel.” Id. at 134. First, the Court reasoned 

that, because the attorneys sought to assert the rights of “as yet unascertained . . . 

criminal defendants” whose rights would be violated, “[t]he attorneys . . . [did] not 

have a close relationship with their alleged clients; indeed, they [had] no relationship 

at all.” Id. at 130–31 (quotation marks omitted). Next, the Court explained “that the 

lack of an attorney . . . is [not] the type of hindrance necessary to allow another to 

assert the indigent defendants’ rights.” Id. at 132. Proceeding pro se, the indigent 

defendants could assert their constitutional rights on direct appeal and in collateral 

proceedings. Id. at 131–32. 

Like the attorneys in Kowalski, BBANM and its members lack third-party 

standing. First, BBANM and its members have “no relationship at all,” id. at 131, 

with “potential customers denied bail under” the 2017 Rules and the Arnold Tool, 

Aplt. Br. at 32. Second, criminal defendants in New Mexico are not hindered in 

asserting their own constitutional rights in their own criminal proceedings or in a 

§ 1983 suit, as Collins has done here. Plaintiffs argue that criminal defendants are 
15 

hindered in asserting their own rights because they need “a third-party willing to 

expend funds to challenge the constitutionality of the” 2017 Rules, especially 

because criminal defendants subject to pretrial conditions of release “need to prepare 

for their criminal trial[s].” Aplt. Br. at 33–34. But the criminal defendants in 

Kowalski were not hindered in asserting their constitutional rights even though they 

were proceeding pro se and needed to prepare for their criminal appeals, likely while 

in custody. 543 U.S. at 131–32. 

B. The Legislator Plaintiffs 

“[A] threshold question in the legislator standing inquiry is whether the 

legislator-plaintiffs assert an institutional injury.” Kerr v. Hickenlooper (Kerr II), 

824 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2016). “[I]ndividual legislators may not support 

standing by alleging only an institutional injury.” Id. “[A]n institutional injury 

constitutes some injury to the power of the legislature as a whole rather than harm to 

an individual legislator.” Id. “[I]nstitutional injuries . . . do not ‘zero in on any 

individual’” legislator and are “‘widely dispersed’ and ‘necessarily impact all 

members of a legislature equally.’” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Ariz. State 

Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015)). 

Plaintiffs suggest that the Legislator Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the 

2017 Rules because the rules represent “an unconstitutional usurpation of 
16 

[legislative] power by” the New Mexico Supreme Court.8

 Aplt. Br. at 36. In our 

view, it is difficult to conceive of a better example of an institutional injury. The 

injury alleged by Plaintiffs “is based on [a] loss of legislative power that necessarily 

impacts all members of the [New Mexico Legislature] equally.” Kerr II, 824 F.3d at 

1215. Therefore, the Legislator Plaintiffs lack standing. Id. at 1217. 

In an attempt to evade our holding in Kerr II, Plaintiffs contend that their 

situation is “sui generis” because the Legislator Plaintiffs’ claim involves a 

“separation-of-powers component.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 22–23. Notwithstanding that 

Plaintiffs waive this argument by first raising it in their Reply Brief, In re Motor Fuel 

Temperature Sales Practices Litigation, 872 F.3d 1094, 1105 n.2 (10th Cir. 2017), a 

“case [that] presents separation of powers concerns” merits a rigorous standing 

inquiry, Kerr II, 824 F.3d at 1215 (citing Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 

n.12). Rather than advance their standing argument, Plaintiffs have highlighted a 

facet of their case that weighs against concluding that the Legislator Plaintiffs have 

standing. 

C. Darlene Collins 

Defendants do not challenge Collins’s standing on appeal, though they did 

unsuccessfully raise the issue before the district court in their motion to dismiss. We 

can raise issues of standing and mootness sua sponte because we “have an 

independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even 

 8

 The Legislator Plaintiffs do not argue that they have standing to assert the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of criminal defendants. 
17 

in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 

514 (2006). “Plaintiffs have the burden to demonstrate standing for each form of 

relief sought.” Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006). This burden 

exists “at all times throughout the litigation,” id., though our terminology changes 

depending on the stage of litigation. “[M]ootness ‘[is] the doctrine of standing set in 

a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of 

the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).’” Brown 

v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Arizonans for Official 

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)). 

Collins seeks damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. App. Vol. 

I at 47–48. When Collins filed suit, she had standing to seek damages for the alleged 

deprivation of her constitutional rights.9

 See Faustin v. City, Cty. of Denver, 268 

F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 2001). Her claim for damages is not moot; a damages award 

would still compensate Collins for her alleged injury. Lippoldt, 468 F.3d at 1216–17. 

The same is true insofar as Collins seeks a retrospective declaratory judgment that 

her constitutional rights were violated in July 2017. Id. at 1217. 

But Collins also seeks prospective relief, in the form of a declaratory judgment 

and a permanent injunction. App. Vol. I at 47–48. Assuming that Collins had 

standing to seek prospective relief when she filed suit, Collins’s claims for 

 9

 Collins does not have standing to pursue the claim that the 2017 Rules 

“infringe[] upon the power of the [New Mexico] Legislature to make law,” App. Vol. 

I at 35. Collins cannot assert the state legislature’s legislative power. Sessions, 137 

S. Ct. at 1689. 
18 

prospective relief are now moot because she is no longer subject to pretrial 

supervision. Lippoldt, 468 F.3d at 1217–19; Oral Argument at 5:35–5:45 

(representation by Plaintiffs’ counsel that New Mexico is not pursuing criminal 

charges against Collins). 

Moreover, a plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for prospective injunctive relief 

that is based on “speculative future harm.” Lippoldt, 468 F.3d at 1218. Plaintiffs 

have never suggested that Collins faces an appreciable risk of future arrest and 

subsequent arraignment using the 2017 Rules and the Arnold Tool. “[T]o establish 

an actual controversy . . . , [Collins] would [need] . . . to allege that [she will] . . . 

have another encounter with the police.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 

105–06 (1983); see also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (“We assume 

that respondents will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution 

and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct said to be 

followed by petitioners.”). “Absent a sufficient likelihood that [she] will again be 

wronged in a similar way, [Collins] is no more entitled to an injunction than any 

other citizen of [New Mexico]; and a federal court may not entertain a claim by any 

or all citizens who no more than assert that [a state’s laws] . . . are unconstitutional.” 

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. 

In summary, BBANM and the Legislator Plaintiffs lack standing to assert the 

claims raised in this case; Collins has standing to seek damages and retrospective 

declaratory relief based on the alleged violation of her Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights; but Collins’s claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive 
19 

relief are moot. Therefore, we turn to the question of whether Defendants are 

immune to Collins’s claims for damages and retrospective declaratory relief. 

III 

We review de novo whether Defendants are immune from suit. Muscogee 

(Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2010) 

(sovereign immunity); Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 938 (10th Cir. 2002) 

(judicial immunity); Kamplain v. Curry Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 159 F.3d 1248, 1250 

(10th Cir. 1998) (legislative immunity). “The proponent of a claim to absolute 

immunity bears the burden of establishing the justification for such immunity.” 

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). Three immunity 

doctrines are at issue in this case—sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and 

legislative immunity. We address each in turn. 

A. Sovereign Immunity 

Per the Eleventh Amendment, “[s]tates may not be sued in federal court unless 

they consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid 

exercise of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity.” 

Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 611 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 

68 (1985)). “This prohibition encompasses suits against state agencies[ and] [s]uits 

against state officials acting in their official capacities.” Id. (citations omitted). But, 

“[u]nder Ex parte Young[, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)], a plaintiff may avoid the Eleventh 

Amendment’s prohibition on suits against states in federal court by seeking to enjoin 

a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.” Cressman v. Thompson, 
20 

719 F.3d 1139, 1146 n.8 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Collins has 

sued three New Mexico courts and various state officials in their official capacities to 

obtain declaratory and injunctive relief. New Mexico has not consented to this suit 

and Congress has not abrogated New Mexico’s immunity from Plaintiffs’ § 1983 

claims. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 611 F.3d at 1227. Therefore, we must decide 

whether the New Mexico courts named as defendants are entitled to sovereign 

immunity and whether Ex parte Young allows Collins to proceed against the state 

officials in their official capacities. Plaintiffs’ discussion of sovereign immunity is 

limited to a single sentence in their Opening Brief. See Aplt. Br. at 48. Plaintiffs’ 

“conclusory assertion[] . . . do[es] not adequately present us with an argument . . . , 

so we [could] consider [the point] abandoned.” Stender v. Archstone-Smith 

Operating Tr., 910 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2018). We briefly address sovereign 

immunity to more clearly explain our disposition of Collins’s claims. 

“As a general matter, state courts are considered arms of the state” and are 

entitled to sovereign immunity. 13 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 

Practice & Procedure § 3524.2 (3d ed. 2018). The general rule holds true in this 

case. The New Mexico Supreme Court, the Second Judicial District Court, and the 

Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court are state agencies. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 1 

(“The judicial power of the state shall be vested in . . . a supreme court, a court of 

appeals, district courts; . . . and such other courts inferior to the district courts as may 

be established by law from time to time in any district, county or municipality of the 

state.”); N.M. Stat. § 34-6-21 (“The district courts are agencies of the judicial 
21 

department of the state government.”); N.M. Stat. § 34-8a-8 (“The metropolitan court 

is an agency of the judicial department of state government.”). Therefore, sovereign 

immunity bars Collins’s claims against the New Mexico Supreme Court, the Second 

Judicial District Court, and the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court. 

Collins’s claims against the state officials in their official capacities also fail. 

Collins cannot proceed under Ex parte Young because she only has standing to seek 

retrospective declaratory relief.10 Ex parte Young “may not be used to obtain a 

declaration that a state officer has violated a plaintiff’s federal rights in the past.” 

Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 495 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing 

Puerto Rico Aqueduct v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). 

Therefore, sovereign immunity also bars Collins’s claims against the individual 

defendants in their official capacities. 

B. Judicial Immunity 

“Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from 

suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 

 10 The district court, when analyzing Collins’s demand for prospective 

declaratory and injunctive relief, found that Collins could not proceed under Ex parte 

Young. App. Vol. III at 667–68. The district court reasoned that Ex parte Young was 

inapplicable because “Plaintiffs fail[ed] to state a claim for an ongoing violation of 

federal law.” Id. at 668. “But the inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex parte 

Young does not include an analysis of the merits of the claim.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. 

Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 646 (2002). “In determining whether the doctrine 

of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only 

conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing 

violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Id. at 

645 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). Collins does not raise this error in the 

district court’s reasoning. 
22 

(1991) (per curiam) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The 

“immunity applies only to personal capacity claims.” Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. 

Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1156 (10th Cir. 2011). At issue here is whether the chief 

judges and court executive officers of the Second Judicial District Court and the 

Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court are immune from Collins’s claims for 

damages. 

In two sentences of their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Second Judicial 

District Court and the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court “adopted and 

implemented the” Arnold Tool.11 App. Vol. I at 20; see also id. at 29. In the district 

court, Plaintiffs argued that these were “administrative,” not judicial, acts. App. Vol. 

II at 298. The district court found that judicial immunity barred Plaintiffs’ claims 

against the chief judges and court executive officers, in their individual capacities, 

because Plaintiffs’ claims targeted the judicial act of “implement[ing] [] the 2017 

Rules.” App. Vol. III at 670. In their briefing on appeal, Plaintiffs never discuss 

how the district court erred when analyzing judicial immunity. In a single clause 

 11 Chief Judge Nash, Chief Judge Alaniz, Court Executive Officer Noel, and 

Court Executive Officer Padilla are only mentioned in the caption of the complaint 

and in the list of parties. App. Vol. I at 17, 25–26. Their names also appear in an 

attachment to the complaint. Id. at 66, 71. “[I]n a § 1983 action it is ‘particularly 

important’ that ‘[a] complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to 

whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against 

him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state.’” Brown v. 

Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kansas Penn Gambling, 

LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2015)). Here, Collins’s allegations 

are so sparse that it is difficult to identify the factual basis for her claims against the 

state court judges and court executive officers. 
23 

from the section of their Opening Brief discussing Rule 11 sanctions, Plaintiffs 

passingly characterize adoption of the Arnold Tool as a “ministerial decision[].” 

Aplt. Br. at 46. Plaintiffs have abandoned their argument regarding judicial 

immunity by failing to address the district court’s analysis or cite authority for their 

position. Stender, 910 F.3d at 1117; see also, e.g., Benham v. Ozark Materials River 

Rock, LLC, 885 F.3d 1267, 1276 (10th Cir. 2018) (concluding that appellant waived 

argument “by inadequately briefing the issue”). “[T]he court cannot take on the 

responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and 

searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 

(10th Cir. 2005) (describing limits of our role when litigants proceed pro se; 

Plaintiffs are represented by counsel). 

C. Legislative Immunity 

“Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken ‘in the sphere of 

legitimate legislative activity.’” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) 

(quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)). “Whether an act is 

legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the 

official performing it.” Id. A state “[c]ourt and its members are immune from suit 

when acting in their legislative capacity,” such as by promulgating “rules of general 

application [that] are statutory in character.” Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers 

Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731–34 (1980). Plaintiffs do not dispute that 
24 

New Mexico’s Rules of Criminal Procedure are “rules of general application.”12 Id.

at 731. Therefore, the justices of the Supreme Court of New Mexico “act[ed] in their 

legislative capacity” when they amended the state’s rules of criminal procedure in 

2017. Id. at 734. 

Instead, Plaintiffs focus on whether the 2017 Rules are the result of 

“legitimate” legislative activity. They argue that the New Mexico legislature retains 

legislative power over criminal defendants’ substantive right to bail, such that the 

New Mexico Supreme Court exceeded its legislative power when promulgating the 

2017 Rules. Aplt. Br. at 18–20, 49–51; Aplt. Reply Br. at 14–19. “To find that [an 

action] has exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there 

was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in” another branch of government. 

Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378. That is not the case here. The New Mexico legislature has 

given the New Mexico Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of criminal 

procedure. 

The supreme court of New Mexico shall, by rules promulgated by it 

from time to time, regulate pleading, practice and procedure in

judicial proceedings in all courts of New Mexico for the purpose of 

 12 Plaintiffs repeatedly suggest that promulgating the 2017 Rules was an 

enforcement action, such that legislative immunity would not apply. Aplt. Br. at 46, 

50. Plaintiffs cite Consumers Union for the proposition that legislative immunity 

does not bar a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against a state supreme court 

and its justices when the defendants exercised their own “authority . . . to initiate 

[disciplinary] proceedings against attorneys.” 446 U.S. at 736. This analysis does 

not apply here because Plaintiffs have not sued the justices of the New Mexico 

Supreme Court for enforcing the 2017 Rules. See App. Vol. I at 19–20. As 

explained in Consumers Union, legislative immunity applies when a case arises from 

a court’s promulgation of generally applicable rules. 446 U.S. at 731–34. 
25 

simplifying and promoting the speedy determination of litigation 

upon its merits. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the 

substantive rights of any litigant. 

N.M. Stat. § 38-1-1. The delegated authority is not unlimited, but Plaintiffs have not 

pointed to anything suggesting that the New Mexico legislature exercises exclusive 

legislative authority over bail.13 Therefore, it is not “obvious” that the New Mexico 

Supreme Court justices have exceeded the legislative authority vested in them by N.M. 

Stat. § 38-1-1, which means that the justices are entitled to legislative immunity for 

claims arising from their promulgation of the 2017 Rules. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378–79; 

see also Sable v. Myers, 563 F.3d 1120, 1126 (10th Cir. 2009) (refusing to “adopt a very 

restrictive view of what is legitimate legislative activity” (quotation marks omitted)). 

In summary, sovereign immunity bars Collins’s claims against the state courts 

and state officials in their official capacities; Plaintiffs have abandoned their 

argument regarding judicial immunity, which disposes of Collins’s claims against the 

state court chief judges and court executive officers in their individual capacities; and 

legislative immunity bars Collin’s claims against the supreme court justices in their 

individual capacities. 

 13 We have identified two statutes that substantively discuss bail. Both 

envision a necessary role for the New Mexico Supreme Court, further demonstrating 

that the Court has legislative authority over the procedural aspects of bail. See N.M. 

Stat. § 31-3-1 (“Any statutory provision or rule of court governing the release of an 

accused may be carried out by a responsible person designated by the court.”); N.M. 

Stat. § 31-3-5 (“No bond shall be accepted from a paid surety . . . by a . . . district 

court unless executed on a form which has been approved by the supreme court.”). 
26 

“Absolute immunity [undoubtedly] has its costs” for plaintiffs like Collins 

who seek to vindicate their constitutional rights. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 687 

(10th Cir. 1990). “The rationale for according absolute immunity in the civil rights 

context is to incorporate traditional common law immunities and to allow 

functionaries in the judicial system the latitude to perform their tasks absent the 

threat of retaliatory § 1983 litigation.” Id. at 686–87 (footnote omitted). “Though 

such suits might be satisfying personally for a plaintiff, they could jeopardize the 

judicial system’s ability to function.” Id. at 687. “[S]uits against judges [are not] the 

only available means through which litigants can protect themselves from the 

consequences of judicial error.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227. Collins could have 

raised the alleged error in her criminal proceedings. See id. Collins could have also 

named defendants who caused her pretrial detention and supervision but are not 

members of the state judiciary. See, e.g., Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 723 

(D.N.J. 2017), aff’d 895 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2018) (naming as a defendant the person 

who “enforce[ed] the pretrial release conditions”). 

To bring it all together, Collins is the only Plaintiff with standing, but 

Defendants are immune to her claims, so we do not address the merits of Collins’s 

claims that the 2017 Rules and the Arnold Tool violate the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments.14 Rather, we turn to the issue of sanctions. 

 14 As explained throughout this Opinion, no Plaintiff has standing to pursue the 

claim that the New Mexico supreme court justices violated the New Mexico 

(continued . . .) 
27 

IV 

Before discussing the district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, we 

briefly address appellate jurisdiction. We ordered briefing on the question of 

whether there is a final appealable order because the sanctions order contemplates a 

“future final award” of attorney’s fees and does not define the amount of interest 

applicable to the sanctions award. Dkt. No. 10550099 at 3–4. “[I]n considering 

whether a judgment is ‘final’ under § 1291, the ‘label used to describe the judicial 

demand is not controlling,’ meaning we ‘analyze the substance of the district court’s 

decision, not its label or form.’” Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th 

Cir. 2003) (quoting Albright v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 

1995)). 

“[A] sanction order against an attorney currently of record is not a final 

decision for purposes of a § 1291 appeal where the underlying controversy remains 

unresolved.” Howard v. Mail-Well Envelope Co., 90 F.3d 433, 435 (10th Cir. 1996). 

Even once the merits of a case have been resolved, “an appeal from the award of 

sanctions may not be taken until the amount has been determined.” Turnbull v. 

Wilcken, 893 F.2d 256, 258 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Phelps v. Washburn 

Univ. of Topeka, 807 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986)). Here, the district court’s order 

imposing Rule 11 sanctions is a final appealable order because the substance of the 

 

(cont’d) 

Constitution by promulgating the 2017 Rules. Therefore, we need not discuss that 

claim further. 
28 

case has been resolved and the parties have stipulated that the sanction is $14,868.00. 

App. Vol. III at 636–77, 678–79, 732–33. The funds have been deposited in the 

registry of the district court, where they are earning interest. Id. at 732–33. 

Turning to the substance of the issue, “[w]e review for an abuse of discretion 

the district court’s . . . imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.” King v. Fleming, 899 F.3d 

1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2018). “Under this standard, we will reverse a district court 

only ‘if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 

U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). “[T]he award of Rule 11 sanctions involves two steps. The 

district court first must find that a pleading violates Rule 11.” Adamson v. Bowen, 

855 F.2d 668, 672 (10th Cir. 1988). “The second step is for the district court to 

impose an appropriate sanction.” Id. 

Rule 11 states: 

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other

paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating 

it—an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of the person’s

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 

reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for 

any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 

needlessly increase the cost of litigation; [and] (2) the claims, 

defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law 

or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 

reversing existing law or for establishing new law . . . . 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11 “imposes . . . an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable 

inquiry into the facts and the law before filing.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic 

Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991). We “evaluate [an attorney’s] conduct 
29 

under a standard of ‘objective reasonableness—whether a reasonable attorney admitted to 

practice before the district court would file such a document.’” Predator Int’l, Inc. v. 

Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc., 793 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Adamson, 855 

F.2d at 673). “Because our adversary system expects lawyers to zealously represent their 

clients, [the Rule 11] standard is a tough one to satisfy; an attorney can be rather 

aggressive and still be reasonable.” Id. 

When, as here, a pleading contains allegations that are not warranted by 

existing law, we examine whether they are “warranted ‘by a nonfrivolous argument 

for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.’” Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). Again, we employ an objective standard “intended to 

eliminate any ‘empty-head pure-heart’ justification for patently frivolous arguments.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. But, when we 

analyze the frivolity of an attorney’s arguments, “it is not sufficient for an offending 

attorney to allege that a competent attorney could have made a colorable claim based 

on the facts and law at issue; the offending attorney must actually present a colorable 

claim.” White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 680 (10th Cir. 1990) 

“[P]laintiffs may not shield their own incompetence by arguing that, while they failed 

to make a colorable argument, a competent attorney would have done so.” Id. 

After holding a hearing, the district court granted the motion for sanctions 

because (1) the Legislator Plaintiffs and BBANM “ha[d] no objectively reasonable 

basis for asserting standing to sue” and (2) “Plaintiffs’ claims for money damages 

against . . . Defendants are frivolous because . . . Defendants are protected by well-
30 

established immunity doctrines.”15 App. Vol. III at 687–90. The district court also 

found that “Plaintiffs’ counsel added the [L]egislator Plaintiffs and [BBANM] as 

parties to this case for [an] improper purpose—namely, for political reasons to 

express their opposition to lawful bail reforms in the State of New Mexico rather than 

to advance colorable claims for judicial relief.” Id. at 687. The district court ordered 

A. Blair Dunn, one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, to pay the attorney’s fees and costs 

incurred by Defendants because of the Rule 11 violation; the sanction amounted to 

$14,868.00. Id. at 692, 732–34. 

The district court followed the correct two-step process for imposing a Rule 11 

sanction. Adamson, 855 F.2d at 672. As we explain below, the district court’s 

analysis of the evidence was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion when it granted Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions.16 

Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1188–90 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that district court 

 15 Plaintiffs argue that the Rule 11 hearing was deficient because Plaintiffs 

should have been allowed to produce evidence. Aplt. Br. at 54. The hearing was not 

deficient. “Although a party must receive notice and an opportunity to respond 

before being sanctioned under Rule 11, ‘[t]he opportunity to fully brief the issue is 

sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.’” Dodd Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Royal Ins. 

Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted) 

(quoting White, 908 F.2d at 686). 

 

16 Plaintiffs argue that sanctions were inappropriate because Collins’s 

constitutional claims were not frivolous. Aplt. Br. at 44. But the relative quality of 

Collins’s constitutional claims is not dispositive because “a pleading containing both 

frivolous and nonfrivolous claims may violate Rule 11.” Dodd Ins. Servs., 935 F.2d 

at 1158. This is not a case in which “a single frivolous or groundless claim” was 

“easily disposed of by the opposing part[ies].” Id. Rather, Plaintiffs’ arguments 

regarding standing and immunity materially increased the complexity of the case by 

involving improper parties. 
31 

did not abuse its discretion when finding that plaintiffs’ attorney violated Rule 11 

because there were “a host of legal impediments to [plaintiffs] prevailing on their 

claims,” including that “the majority of the defendants had, at best, only tangential 

relationships to” plaintiffs’ claims and plaintiffs’ counsel ignored controlling 

precedent).

Plaintiffs’ standing arguments ignored controlling precedent. Under Kowalski, 

543 U.S. at 131–34, BBANM and its members lack standing to assert the 

constitutional rights of criminal defendants. Under Kerr II, 824 F.3d at 1214–17, the 

Legislator Plaintiffs lack standing to assert an institutional injury. When Plaintiffs 

were confronted with these binding authorities in Defendants’ motion to dismiss and 

motion for Rule 11 sanctions, Plaintiffs unreasonably attempted to distinguish 

themselves from the plaintiffs in Kowalski and Kerr II. App. Vol. II at 300–11, 551. 

For example, without acknowledging that pro se criminal defendants in 

Kowalski were able to assert their own constitutional rights, Plaintiffs argued that 

criminal defendants in New Mexico cannot assert their own constitutional rights 

because they lack “funds to . . . retain counsel.” Id. at 307. Plaintiffs then asserted 

that BBANM and its members have a close relationship with every criminal 

defendant arrested in New Mexico since July 2017 because these defendants “already 

exist,” notwithstanding that the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in 

Kowalski under a materially similar set of facts. Id. at 308. When attempting to 

evade Kerr II, Plaintiffs paradoxically claimed that the alleged loss of “the right of 

the legislature to pass laws” was not “an institutional injury.” Id. at 310. 
32 

Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding immunity suffer from similar infirmities.17 

Most glaringly, Plaintiffs maintained that “any argument regarding sovereign 

immunity . . . [was] just not applicable” in this case because “Congress waived . . . 

sovereign immunity for individual state actors [by enacting] . . . § 1983.” App. Vol. 

II at 547. This statement is inaccurate. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 

58, 63–71 (1989). It also offers no explanation why Plaintiffs thought the New 

Mexico Supreme Court, the Second Judicial District Court, and the Bernalillo County 

Metropolitan Court were proper defendants.18 Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding 

judicial and legislative immunity fare little better. 

As discussed previously, Plaintiffs abandoned their arguments about judicial 

immunity by failing to adequately brief them on appeal. Stender, 910 F.3d at 1117. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown how the district court abused its discretion 

when finding that Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding judicial immunity were not 

supported by existing law. 

 17 Plaintiffs argue that “[j]udicial immunity principles are a developing area of 

the law, warranting litigation and clarification.” Aplt. Br. at 45. The district court 

found that “Plaintiffs [did] not make any argument for extending, modifying, or 

reversing existing law or for establishing new law” on judicial immunity. App. Vol. 

III at 690 (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs do not challenge this finding, which 

forecloses their attempt to now argue for “clarification.” White, 908 F.2d at 680. 

 

18 If Collins had standing to seek prospective relief, her claims for prospective 

declaratory and injunctive relief could have proceeded, under Ex parte Young, against 

the state officials in their official capacities. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645–46. But, 

Plaintiffs have never raised Ex parte Young themselves, choosing instead to deny that 

sovereign immunity is even applicable. Therefore, the fact that Plaintiffs might have 

relied on Ex parte Young when discussing sovereign immunity does not weigh 

against the district court’s imposition of sanctions. White, 908 F.2d at 680. 
33 

Plaintiffs then argued that legislative immunity was unavailable to New 

Mexico’s supreme court justices because the New Mexico legislature “has never 

delegated exclusive legislative authority to the New Mexico Supreme Court.” App. 

Vol. II at 549. But the New Mexico legislature has empowered the New Mexico 

Supreme Court to promulgate rules of criminal procedure. N.M. Stat. § 38-1-1. 

When exercising that delegated legislative authority to promulgate generally 

applicable rules, the court and its justices are entitled to legislative immunity. 

Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731–34. 

We now turn to the district court’s finding that Plaintiffs included BBANM 

and the Legislator Plaintiffs for an improper purpose—to express political opposition 

to the 2017 Rules. Plaintiffs argue that “improper motivation does not warrant 

sanction when there is [an] objective basis for filing suit.” Aplt. Br. at 58–59; see 

also Burkhart ex rel. Meeks v. Kinsley Bank, 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(reasoning that an attorney who filed a harassing complaint could not be sanctioned 

under Rule 11 if the complaint’s allegations were legally and factually warranted). 

But, as just discussed, there was no reasonable basis for including BBANM and the 

Legislator Plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, this is not a situation in which the 

district court awarded sanctions based on a finding of improper purpose even though 

there was an objective basis for filing suit. The district court could have concluded that 

Rule 11 sanctions were warranted without relying on any potential political purpose 

behind the suit, and we affirm on that basis. 
34 

Plaintiffs also argue that evidence of Dunn’s letter to the New Mexico 

legislature about this lawsuit cannot support the district court’s finding of political 

motivation because Dunn’s letter is protected by the First Amendment. Aplt. Br. at 

55; Aplt. Reply Br. at 25–26. The district court did not sanction Dunn for his letter 

to the state legislature. App. Vol. III at 687–88 (“While Plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled 

to express opinions regarding bail reform in New Mexico, Plaintiffs are not entitled 

to file claims in a federal court without standing solely to achieve political 

objectives.”). For the district court, Dunn’s letter supported its finding that Dunn’s 

choice to name BBANM and the Legislator Plaintiffs as plaintiffs was not motivated 

by a reasonable belief that they had standing. 

Before moving on from the issue of Rule 11 sanctions, we emphasize that “the 

central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and thus . . . 

streamline the administration and procedure of the federal courts.” Cooter & Gell, 

496 U.S. at 393. “Baseless filing puts the machinery of justice in motion, burdening 

courts and individuals alike with needless expense and delay.” Id. at 398. This case 

is a prime example of the waste and distraction that result when attorneys disregard 

Rule 11’s certifications. At the heart of this case lies Darlene Collins’s allegation 

that her constitutional rights were violated when she was detained by the state of 

New Mexico. But because of the various parties unreasonably named in the 

complaint by Plaintiffs’ attorneys, this case instead was broadly pled to include 

entities and individuals whose standing to sue, or whose immunity from suit, became 

the main focus of the litigation. 
35 

V 

“We ordinarily review a denial of a motion to amend a pleading for abuse of 

discretion.” Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 565 F.3d 1232, 1249 (10th Cir. 

2009). “However, when denial is based on a determination that amendment would be 

futile, our review for abuse of discretion includes de novo review of the legal basis 

for the finding of futility.” Id. at 1249. 

While Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for Rule 11 sanctions were 

pending, Plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to add a new claim: that 

Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to freedom of speech by 

moving for sanctions. App. Vol. II at 397. The district court denied the motion to 

amend as futile because “[t]he First Amendment does not protect frivolous claims,” 

so the “Rule 11 Motion was not a retaliatory act to punish Plaintiffs, but rather, an 

acceptable pleading expressly allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 

App. Vol. III at 673–74. 

“[T]he right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right 

to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. 

NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). But “[t]he [F]irst [A]mendment interests involved 

in private litigation . . . are not advanced when the litigation is based on . . . 

knowingly frivolous claims.” United States v. Ambort, 405 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Bill Johnson’s Rests., 461 U.S. at 743); see also In re Harper, 

725 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he First Amendment does not protect the 

filing of frivolous motions.”). As discussed when affirming the district court’s 
36 

imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding standing and 

immunity were baseless. Therefore, the district court correctly found that Plaintiffs’ 

motion to amend was futile; Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions did not 

interfere with Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. See King, 899 F.3d at 1151 n.17 

(“[T]he First Amendment is in no way a defense to Rule 11 violations.”). 

VI 

We AFFIRM.