alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and Alco-Gravure, Inc., Appellant, v. The BALTIMORE AND ANNAPOLIS RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, and Elmer J. Jubb, Appellees. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and Alco-Gravure, Inc., Appellees, v. The BALTIMORE AND ANNAPOLIS RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, and Elmer J. Jubb, Appellants (two cases).

Nos. 75-1787 to 75-1789.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 3, 1976.

Decided April 19, 1976.

Lee A. Monroe, Washington, D. C. (John S. Edwards, Washington, D. C., Joseph I. Huesman, Lerch & Huesman, Baltimore, Md., and Sidley & Austin, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellants in Nos. 75-1788 and 75-1789 and appellees in No. 75-1787.

Daniel S. Linhardt, Washington, D. C. (Dennis M. Hart, Daniel M. O’Donoghue, Bernard A. Gould, Attys., Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellees in Nos. 75-1788 and 75-1789.

John J. Walsh, New York City, (Earl H. Nemser, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, New York City, on brief), for appellant in No. 75-1787 and appellees in Nos. 75-1788 and 75-1789.

Before CRAVEN, FIELD and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) instituted this action pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) against the defend*78ants, the Baltimore and Annapolis Railroad Company (B & A) and its President, Elmer J. Jubb, seeking injunctive relief against B & A for the alleged illegal abandonment of a segment of its railroad running from Clifford Junction in Baltimore City to a point approximately six miles south. Alco-Gravure, Inc. (Aleo), a former customer of B & A, was permitted to intervene, and filed its amended complaint with a prayer for damages against B & A based upon common law principles as well as 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(4) and 1(11). In addition to its contest on the merits, B & A filed a motion to stay the action pending the disposition of its application to the Commission under 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) for a certificate permitting abandonment.

Following a hearing the district judge filed an opinion containing his findings of fact and conclusions of law in which he held that B *& A's*failure to provide rail service on the segment in question constituted an unlawful abandonment within the meaning of Section 1(18) and granted injunctive relief requiring B & A to proceed with the repairs necessary to restore such rail service. With respect to Alco’s claim for damages, the district judge concluded that its pursuit of damages in the Commission proceeding constituted an election of remedies under 49 U.S.C. § 9, precluding its assertion of damages in the district court.

Upon consideration of the record, the briefs and oral argument, we affirm upon the opinion of the district judge. *I.C.C. v. Baltimore and Annapolis Railroad Company,*398 F.Supp. 454 (D.C.Md.1975).

*AFFIRMED.*
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Medical Connections Holdings, Inc.  (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



3. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





|                        |  |     |                        
|----------------------- |  | --- | -----------------------
|Date: November 14, 2009 |  |     |                        
|                        |  | By: | /s/ BRIAN NEILL        
|                        |  |     | Brian Neill,           
|                        |  |     | Chief Financial Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Norman Eugene GARDNER, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 76-1054.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued June 10, 1976.

Decided July 6, 1976.

Ralph B. Guy, Jr., U. S. Atty., Michael P. Millikin, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

*862Anthony C. Lutostanski (Court-appointed GJA), Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellee.

Before WEICK, PECK and McCREE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The government appeals from an order granting a motion to suppress a sawed-off shotgun seized pursuant to a warrant issued by a state court judge. We affirm the district court’s order on the ground that the search warrant authorizing the seizure of “all firearms and ammunition” was over-broad.

Based on the affidavit filed in support of the warrant, probable cause existed, if at all, to search solely for a .38 caliber pistol that was allegedly used in an armed robbery and murder. The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to particularly describe the items to be seized. Warrants may not authorize general searches, nor may they permit police officers to exercise undirected discretion in determining what to seize. *Berger v. New York,*388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967); *United States v. Sanchez,*509 F.2d 886, 889 (6th Cir. 1975). Accordingly, the district court properly suppressed the gun, since the warrant was defective. Also, since the officer who seized it had no right to be on the premises, he cannot avail himself of the plain view doctrine as urged by the government. *Coolidge v. New Hampshire,*403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

The district court also held that the affidavit did not contain information sufficient to establish the informant’s credibility as required by *Aguilar v. Texas,*378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). We disagree with this determination ber cause the informant’s declaration that he had participated in other armed robberies was against his penal interest, and therefore provided a sufficient basis for crediting his statement that he saw weapons in appellee’s apartment. *United States v. Harris,*403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971).

In affirming, however, we observe that the district court erred in stating that it would resolve any doubt surrounding the warrant against the government, because the crime under investigation was “obviously a local case.” So long as Gardner was indicted for a federal offense, it is irrelevant that the crime came to light during a state investigation. The movant in a suppression hearing has the burden of proof. *Nardone v. United States,*308 U.S. 338, 341-42, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939); *United States v. Thompson,*409 F.2d 113, 117 (6th Cir. 1969). However, since the court was presented solely with a question of law in determining the sufficiency of the affidavit and the legality of the warrant, there were no factual disputes in which the court might have applied an erroneous standard.

AFFIRMED.

WEICK, J., would reverse the order suppressing the evidence. He concurs in this per curiam except with reference to its determination of overbreadth.
#### In the Matter of Christopher Casey, Petitioner, v New York City Transit Authority et al., Respondents.

— Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent New York City Transit Authority Police Department, dated August 31, 1989, which, after a hearing, *inter alia,*found that the petitioner had wrongfully refused to submit to a fitness for duty test, and imposed the penalty of dismissal.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.

We find that there was substantial evidence to support the Hearing Referee’s determination, including the finding that the petitioner wrongfully refused to submit to a fitness for duty test after showing up for his February 5, 1989, tour of duty as a New York City Transit Police Officer apparently in an intoxicated state *(see, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights,*45 NY2d 176). The petitioner’s contention that, in finding him guilty, the Referee relied on an improper inference that the petitioner may have been under the influence of drugs, is unsupported by the record. The controverted portion of the Referee’s report was not a finding of fact, but merely the Referee’s reasoning for rejecting the petitioner’s argument, made at the hearing, that because "[ejveryone knew he was drunk”, there was no necessity for him to submit to the test. The Referee properly concluded that the Department was entitled to have the petitioner submit to the test in order to ascertain the reason for his intoxicated state *(see, Matter of Barretto v City of New York,*157 AD2d 116).

The sanction of dismissal, in light of the circumstances of this case, including the petitioner’s disciplinary record, was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness *(see, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, supra; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222; *Matter of Barretto v City of New York, supra).*We must accord due deference to the respondents’ determination of the appropriate penalty *(see, Matter of Berenhaus v*
      *129
      *Ward,*70 NY2d 436). Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.
# C_2011030EN.01000201.xml

| 29.1.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 30/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.1.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 30/2

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 25 November 2010 — European Commission v Italian Republic

(Case C-47/09) (1)

1

(Approximation of laws - Cocoa and chocolate products - Labelling - Addition of the word ‘pure’ or the phrase ‘pure chocolate’ to the labelling of certain products)

2011/C 30/02

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: F. Clotuche-Duvieusart and D. Nardi, Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Italian Republic (represented by: G. Palmieri, Agent, and P. Gentili, avvocato dello Stato)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Infringement of Article 3 of Directive 2000/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption (OJ 2000 L 197, p. 9) and Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs (OJ 2000 L 109, p. 29) — Labelling of chocolate products — Inclusion of the word ‘puro’ or the phrase ‘cioccolato puro’ in the labelling of chocolate products containing only cocoa butter by way of vegetable fat.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that, by providing that the adjective ‘pure’ may be added to the sales name of chocolate products which do not contain vegetable fats other than cocoa butter, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3(5) of Directive 2000/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption and under Article 3(1) of that directive, read in conjunction with Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by providing that the adjective ‘pure’ may be added to the sales name of chocolate products which do not contain vegetable fats other than cocoa butter, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3(5) of Directive 2000/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption and under Article 3(1) of that directive, read in conjunction with Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs;

| 2. | Orders the Italian Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 82, 4.4.2009.

1

---
# C_2010346EN.01000902.xml

| 18.12.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 346/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 346/9

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 28 October 2010 — European Commission v Republic of Poland

(Case C-49/09) (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Value added tax - Directive 2006/112/EC - Later accession of Member States - Transitional provisions - Temporal application - Application of a reduced rate - Clothing and clothing accessories for babies and children’s footwear)

2010/C 346/15

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: D. Triantafyllou and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Republic of Poland (represented by: M. Szpunar, M. Dowgielewicz, M. Jarosz and A. Rutkowska, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Infringement of Article 98 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1), in conjunction with Annex III thereto — Application of a reduced rate of VAT to clothing and clothing accessories for babies and children’s footwear

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that, by applying a reduced value added tax rate of 7 % to supplies, import and intra-Community acquisition of clothing and clothing accessories for babies and of children’s footwear, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 98 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, in conjunction with Annex III thereto; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by applying a reduced value added tax rate of 7 % to supplies, import and intra-Community acquisition of clothing and clothing accessories for babies and of children’s footwear, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 98 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, in conjunction with Annex III thereto;

| 2. | Orders the Republic of Poland to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 102, 1.5.2009.

1

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21

- 045 5 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v. NEIL LYNN NUNES,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time to produce transcripts on appeal, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Court Reporter Kelsey McAlpine is granted an extension of time to and including July 5, 202 2 , within which to prepare, file, and serve the transcripts requested on appeal. The Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order upon the district court and the court reporter.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 11 2022

05/11/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0455
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 17-1061

___________________________

Pablo Ajqui De La Cruz

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner

v.

Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General of the United States

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

 Board of Immigration Appeals

____________

 Submitted: September 20, 2017

Filed: September 29, 2017

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.
Guatemalan citizen Pablo Ajqui De La Cruz petitions for review of an order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from the decision of an

immigration judge (IJ), which denied him asylum and withholding of removal.

1

To qualify for asylum, Ajqui De La Cruz was required to show that he was

unable or unwilling to return to Guatemala due to persecution or a well-founded fear

of persecution, on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or

membership in a particular social group. See Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709 F.3d

728, 732 (8th Cir. 2013). In testimony found credible by the IJ, Ajqui De La Cruz

described how he and his father-in-law were attacked in 2000 by unknown, masked

individuals whom he believed may have been motivated by his former association

with guerillas. The agency determined he had not established persecution asrequired

for asylumrelief, finding, inter alia, that he failed to show the government was unable

or unwilling to control the private individuals who attacked himand his father-in-law

in 2000, or any individuals he fears might seek him if he returned. Ajqui De La Cruz

has not presented any meaningful argument that this finding was erroneous; thus, we

conclude that he has waived thisissue. See Chay-Velasquez, 367 F.3d at 756 (waiver

of issues). Because Ajqui De La Cruz’s failure to make this showing was fatal to

both his asylum claim and his withholding-of-removal claim, we need not consider

the arguments he raises on appeal. See Gutierrez-Vidal, 709 F.3d at 732 (to establish

past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, asylum applicant must

show that the government condoned assaults, or was unable or unwilling to control

the private actors who committed them); see also Edionseri v. Sessions, 860 F.3d

1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 2017) (standard for withholding of removal also requires

showing that the government, or private partiesthe government is unable or unwilling

The IJ’s denial of relief under the Convention Against Terror is not before this 1

court. See Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004) (petitioner

waives claim by failing to raise it in opening brief).

-2-
to control, inflicted or will inflict harm). Accordingly, the petition is denied. See 8th

Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-3-
#### AMES v. STATE.

No. A-11914.

Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 27, 1954.

J. H. Hill, Newkirk, for plaintiff in error. Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ned Looney, County Atty., Kay County, Ponca City, for defendant in error.

POWELL, Presiding Judge.

The defendant, Darrel J. Ames, was charged in the county court of Kay County with the possession of twelve pints of intoxicating liquor with the intent to sell the same. The jury found him guilty and fixed the penalty at a fine of $100 and thirty days’ imprisonment in the county jail.

The brief of accused was due to have been filed in this court on April 24, 1953. No brief has been filed, and when the case came on for oral argument on September 30, 1953 no one appeared in behalf of the defendant.

We have examined the record and find the verdict of the jury to be supported by competent evidence. The defendant testified and denied ownership of the liquor. The jury believed the State’s witnesses.

The judgment and sentence of the county court of Kay County is affir'med.

JONES and BRETT, JJ., concur.
STEAM ELECTRIC CBI REPLACEMENT PAGE

EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819

DCN: SE02959

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION (CBI) PER 40 CFR PART 2, SUBPART B.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 121 (Tuesday, September 11, 2012)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1472]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                          PERSONAL EXPLANATION

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. ROBERT E. ANDREWS

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                      Tuesday, September 11, 2012

  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I was not present for rollcall No. 558; had 
I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
  Mr. Speaker, I was not present for rollcall No. 559; had I been 
present, I would have voted ``aye.''

                          ____________________
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                        (23,196)
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               261,096
<PP&E>                                      10,206,105
<DEPRECIATION>                                  45,533
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,467,641
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,224,372
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        5,674,797
<PREFERRED>                                  4,313,678
<COMMON>                                    19,506,404
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,467,641
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,700,000
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             298,397
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<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          5,532,632
<DISCONTINUED>                               7,483,067
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                13,015,699
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.93)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.93)
        

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