NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

ALICIA MARIE RICHARDS,

 Debtor.

BAP Nos. CC-21-1262-SGL 

 CC-21-1266-SGL

Bk. No. 8:21-bk-10635-ES

MEMORANDUM*

ALICIA MARIE RICHARDS; 

LAWRENCE REMSEN,

Appellants,

v.

RICHARD A MARSHACK, Chapter 7 

Trustee; RYAL W. RICHARDS,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Erithe A. Smith, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: SPRAKER, GAN, and LAFFERTY, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Alicia Richards jointly owned her Newport Beach residence with her 

former husband Ryal Richards (“Residence”).1 For the past several years 

she has challenged the sale of the Residence to which she previously 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for 

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential 

value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

1 We refer to Alicia and Ryal by their first names for ease of reference and to 

avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.

FILED

NOV 7 2022

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2

stipulated, and the family court ordered, in her divorce proceedings. After 

losing several state court appeals, she filed her bankruptcy case hoping to 

forestall the sale. When the chapter 72 trustee moved to sell the Residence, 

she unsuccessfully objected to the bankruptcy sale. She raised numerous 

arguments and asserted that she and her father, Lawrence Remsen, were 

nonconsenting secured creditors. Remsen filed a separate objection to the 

sale. They appeal from the bankruptcy court’s order authorizing the trustee 

to sell the Residence (“Sale Order”) over their objections.

This Panel has limited the scope of the appeals to the sale of the 

Residence free and clear of Remsen’s and Alicia’s alleged liens. As we 

previously have ruled, all other aspects of their joint appeals have been 

rendered moot pursuant to § 363(m). Because appellants’ arguments are

meritless, we AFFIRM.

FACTS3

A. The divorce proceedings.

In 2015, Ryal commenced divorce proceedings in the Orange County 

Superior Court. At that time, Alicia and Ryal owned the Residence as 

husband and wife in joint tenancy. The parties entered into a stipulation 

giving Alicia several weeks to refinance the Residence and buy out Ryal’s 

2 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the 

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.

3 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically 

filed in the underlying bankruptcy case. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re 

Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
3

community property interest. If she was unable or unwilling, the 

stipulation required the sale of the Residence and for Alicia and Ryal to 

split the proceeds. The court entered its dissolution judgment based in part 

on the stipulation.

Alicia was unable to buyout Ryal’s interest, but she also failed to

cooperate with the required sale. She instead moved to set aside the 

stipulation claiming fraud and duress. The family court denied the motion,

and the Court of Appeal affirmed. In re Marriage of Richards, Case No. 

G055927, 2020 WL 104357, at *9-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020). The Court of 

Appeal noted that the Residence was community property and needed to 

be equitably divided between Alicia and Ryal. 

Alicia never appealed the dissolution judgment. But she did file 

several appeals from post-judgment orders aimed at enforcing the 

dissolution judgment and the required sale of the Residence. None of her

appeals were successful in overturning either the dissolution judgment or 

the required sale. As the Court of Appeal noted in its decision disposing of 

Alicia’s fifth appeal, “[c]ontrary to Wife’s contention on appeal, the former 

couple’s respective rights concerning the Property were determined long 

ago by the final marital dissolution judgment.” In re Marriage of Richards,

Case No. G057803, 2020 WL 5902889, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

B. The bankruptcy and the trustee’s motion to sell the Residence.

In the midst of her efforts to derail the sale of the Residence required 

under the dissolution judgment, Alicia filed a voluntary chapter 7 
4

bankruptcy petition. Richard Marshack was appointed to serve as chapter 7 

trustee.

Alicia scheduled the Residence as an asset and identified it as 

“community property.” Until Marshack moved to sell the Residence, she 

treated it as estate property. Indeed, she opposed Ryal’s motion for relief 

from stay to enforce the dissolution judgment on the basis that she owned 

the Residence and that it was “property of [her] estate that is being 

administered by the Trustee.” The bankruptcy court agreed and found that 

the Residence was “property of the bankruptcy estate under the exclusive 

control of the chapter 7 trustee who has exclusive authority to sell the 

property, subject to any community property interest of Movant.” No one 

appealed from the relief from stay order.

Marshack moved to sell the Residence, subject to overbids, to a thirdparty purchaser for $1,662,500 free and clear of all liens and other interests.

Marshack attached to his motion a preliminary title report showing that 

Alicia and Ryal held the title to the property.

Marshack proposed to pay all real property tax liens, and all

undisputed, perfected, and consensual liens upon closing. All remaining 

proceeds were to be held pending a determination of the validity, priority 

and extent of all judgment liens, IRS tax liens, and disputed liens.

Marshack proposed to sell the Residence free and clear of liens under 

§ 363(f)(4) to the extent there existed some “objective basis for dispute”

regarding the specific liens. Marshack alternately argued that the sale was 
5

authorized by § 363(f)(3) because all affected interests in the property were 

liens and the sale price was significantly more than the aggregate value of 

all liens against the property. Marshack included as disputed secured 

claims an unrecorded lien for support filed by Alicia and an unrecorded 

deed of trust filed by the Remsen Family Trust. But even with these claims, 

the $1,662,500 sale price was substantially more than the $1,223,514.80

aggregate value of these liens.

The motion also requested a finding that the proposed purchaser 

qualified as a good faith purchaser for purposes of § 363(m).

Alicia opposed the sale motion on numerous grounds. She argued 

the proposed sale price was inadequate and Marshack had insufficiently 

marketed the Residence. She contended that the sale could not be approved 

without her consent, as well as the consent from her minor daughter, 

Remsen, the Remsen Family Trust, and the Estate of Greg Remsen. Alicia 

also argued that the proposed purchaser was not a good faith purchaser.

Remsen separately opposed the sale motion. He stated that he had 

not received notice of the sale.4 He also asserted for the first time that he 

was a secured creditor for $1,500,000 “by right of contract,” that preempted 

other claims. Previously, Remsen had filed a proof of claim for $1,750,000 

as an unsecured debt arising from a prepetition “Contractual Agreement”

4 Remsen is incarcerated following a murder conviction. He claims he never 

received written notice of the sale from Marshack but learned of the sale motion from 

Alicia. Allegedly one day after learning of the sale motion, he signed and caused to be 

mailed his written opposition.
6

with Alicia. He also argued that the family court had deprived him and 

Alicia of their substantive due process and equal protection rights by not 

following California law.

At the hearing on the sale motion, at which Alicia argued at length, 

the court overruled the objections. Marshack then auctioned the Residence, 

selling it to a third party based on a successful bid of $2,200,000. After 

questioning the successful bidder under oath, the court ruled that the

buyer qualified as good faith purchaser under § 363(m). The bankruptcy 

court entered its Sale Order on November 29, 2021, and a slightly amended 

Sale Order a day later. Alicia and Remsen objected to the form of the Sale 

Order, but the court specifically overruled their objections. 

C. The appeals and the determination that the appeals of the sale are

moot under § 363(m).

Alicia and Remsen timely appealed. On June 29, 2022, this panel 

issued an order denying Marshack’s motion to dismiss these appeals as 

moot but held that under § 363(m) the sale could not be unwound because 

the Residence was sold to a good faith purchaser. Under such 

circumstances, we observed, relief only could be granted to the extent 

appellants challenged the portion of the Sale Order selling free and clear of 

liens under § 363(f). Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 

391 B.R. 25, 35-37 (9th Cir. BAP 2008). We also denied appellants’ motion 

for reconsideration. The appellants have not timely and meaningfully 
7

challenged the good faith of the purchaser on appeal.5 Thus, our June 29, 

2021 order limits our consideration to any jurisdictional issues and the 

bankruptcy court’s application of § 363(f) to authorize the sale free and 

clear of liens. See id.

JURISDICTION

Subject to our jurisdictional discussion below, the bankruptcy court 

had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(N). We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

1. Is the bankruptcy court’s sale order void for lack of jurisdiction? 

2. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion when it authorized 

Marshack to sell the Residence free and clear of liens under § 363(f)(3) 

and (f)(4)?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction de 

novo. Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alaska (In re Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass'n), 439 

F.3d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2006).

We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s sale 

order. See In re PW, LLC, 391 B.R. at 32. The bankruptcy court abused its 

discretion if it applied an incorrect legal rule or its factual findings were 

5 Appellants did not address this issue in their opening brief. Accordingly, they 

have forfeited it. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 487–88 (9th Cir. 2010); 

Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010).
8

illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. TrafficSchool.com v. 

Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

A. Appellants’ jurisdictional argument does not justify reversal.

Alicia and Remsen challenge the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to 

approve the sale of the Residence. They argue that the bankruptcy court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sell the Residence because it was not 

property of the estate. They contend that the bankruptcy court did not have 

jurisdiction over the Residence because the family court retained 

continuing jurisdiction and because they continue to dispute title to the 

property.

The family court’s dissolution judgment fully and finally decided 

that the Residence was community property. “[U]ntil division, all 

community property of the divorcing couple is property of the bankruptcy 

estate pursuant to § 541(a)(2).” Dumas v. Mantle (In re Mantle), 153 F.3d 

1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998). The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction 

over all estate property, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1), and the trustee has both the 

authority and the duty to administer that property, § 704(a)(1). In 

furtherance of this duty, § 363(b)(1) enables the trustee to sell estate 

property outside the ordinary course of business, Pinnacle Rest. at Big Sky, 

LLC v. CH SP Acquisitions, LLC (In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC), 872 

F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2017), and § 363(f) authorizes him to sell property 
9

free and clear of interests, including liens, see In re PW, LLC, 391 B.R. at 37.

The Court of Appeal has affirmed the dissolution judgment and the 

community property nature of the Residence. While appellants want to set 

aside these decisions, the bankruptcy court is bound by those decisions. 

Alicia has made arguments attacking the dissolution judgment multiple 

times in state court, and the California Court of Appeal has repeatedly 

rejected them. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Richards, 2020 WL 104357, at *9-13; 

In re Marriage of Richards, 2020 WL 5902889, at *5. Appellants seem to 

believe that so long as they continuously filed motions and actions 

collaterally attacking the dissolution judgment, no sale of the Residence 

could occur. They are simply incorrect; their disagreement with the 

California courts’ final decisions does not create a genuine dispute as to 

ownership. In the absence of jurisdictional defects, the family court’s 

dissolution judgment is final and binding in the state courts, see People v. 

Am. Contractors Indem. Co., 33 Cal. 4th 653, 661 (2004), and similarly is 

binding on this Panel, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

6

6 Appellants point to the fact that the dissolution judgment provided for the 

family court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the required sale of the Residence. They 

claim that this retention of jurisdiction deprived the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to 

sell the Residence. It did not. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (granting the bankruptcy court 

exclusive jurisdiction over all estate property). They also claim that their position is 

supported by Keller v. Keller (In re Keller), 185 B.R. 796 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). They are 

incorrect. Keller concerned the spouses’ separate property interests in proceeds from a 

community property residence sold prepetition. Here, in contrast, the asset in question 

is the community property Residence itself, which was not sold before Alicia filed 

bankruptcy.
10

Appellants rely heavily on Darby v. Zimmerman (In re Popp), 323 B.R. 

260, 270–71 (9th Cir. BAP 2005), and Warnick v. Yassian (In re Rodeo Canon 

Development Corp.), 362 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2004), opinion withdrawn and 

superseded, 126 F. App’x 353 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the bankruptcy sales 

before those courts were found to have been improperly authorized under 

§ 363(b)(1) because of pending adversary proceedings challenging the 

estate’s interest (if any) in the subject property. Both cases involved 

genuine disputes concerning the estate’s ownership of the property. Here, 

there is no such genuine dispute. Additionally, neither Popp nor Rodeo

Canon support the proposition that the bankruptcy court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction in the face of a genuine title dispute. Both decisions 

specifically declined to unwind the respective bankruptcy sales. See In re 

Rodeo Canon Dev. Corp., 362 F.3d at 610; In re Popp, 323 B.R. at 272.

Until Marshack filed his sale motion, Alicia recognized that the 

Residence was community property and, therefore, property of the 

bankruptcy estate. Indeed, she relied on the estate’s interest in the 

Residence to stave off Ryal’s efforts to obtain relief from stay. Furthermore, 

the preliminary title report Marshack presented with his sale motion 

showed that Alicia and Ryal jointly held title to the Residence. In any 

event, Alicia argues that she owns the entirety of the Residence because 

Ryal prevented her from refinancing the debts. Success on this argument 

would vest the estate with all the interest in the Residence rather than a 
11

community property interest.

When as here there is no factual support offered for allegations 

challenging the estate’s ownership of property subject to a sale motion, 

such spurious allegations cannot be permitted to undermine the 

bankruptcy trustee’s efforts to administer estate assets. See, e.g., In re Grubb 

& Ellis Co., Case No. 12-10685 MG, 2012 WL 1036071, at *5-8 (Bankr. 

S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012) (overruling sale objection because objector “failed 

to provide any evidence” establishing the existence of alleged competing 

ownership interest), aff'd, 523 B.R. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re Conrad, Case 

No. 10-08505-PB7, 2012 WL 1744741, at *2–3 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012)

(same); see also Kwai v. Wirum (In re Glob. Reach Inv. Corp.), 570 F. App’x 723 

(9th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing Popp because neither the debtor nor its sole 

shareholder who opposed the bankruptcy sale “disclosed any dispute over 

the stock ownership until the Trustee attempted to sell the stock.”).

In sum, appellants’ argument that the sale order was void because 

the Residence was not estate property or because the family court retained 

jurisdiction over the Residence is both factually and legally meritless.

B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it 

authorized Marshack to sell the residence free and clear of liens.

Appellants also contest the bankruptcy court’s ruling that Marshack 

was authorized to sell the Residence free of all liens, with the liens to attach 

to the sale proceeds. According to the bankruptcy court, § 363(f)(3) and (4) 

supported the sale free and clear. Under § 363(f)(3), the trustee may sell 
12

free and clear of liens when “the price at which such property is to be sold 

is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property.” In re PW, 

LLC, 391 B.R. at 39. In turn, the trustee may sell free and clear of a lien or 

other competing property interest under § 363(f)(4) when that interest is 

subject to bona fide dispute. See Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Burns (In re 

Gaylord Grain L.L.C.), 306 B.R. 624, 627 (8th Cir. BAP 2004). Such interest is 

subject to bona fide dispute when, “there is an objective basis for either a 

factual or legal dispute” regarding the lien’s validity. Id. at 627 (quoting In 

re Busick, 831 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir.1987)); accord, In re Kellogg-Taxe, Case 

No. 2:12-bk-51208-RN, 2014 WL 1016045, at *6 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 

2014).

In challenging the court’s order authorizing sale free and clear, 

appellants focus on three alleged liens: (1) Remsen’s purported $1,750,000 

lien supposedly arising from the “Contractual Agreement” between him 

and Alicia; (2) the Remsen Trust’s unrecorded deed of trust securing a 

principal amount of $235,280.88; and (3) Alicia’s recorded abstract of 

support judgment. According to appellants, § 363(f)(3) and (4) do not 

permit a sale free and clear of these liens. 

Appellants are incorrect. The record amply supports the conclusion 

that all three liens were subject to bona fide dispute. Remsen’s alleged lien 

was not genuinely supported by any documentation and conflicted with 

his earlier proofs of claim, signed under penalty of perjury, stating that his 

claim was unsecured. Remsen also failed to perfect his alleged lien. Remsen 
13

never obtained an executed or recorded deed of trust securing any debt 

Alicia allegedly owed him. As such, his alleged lien (if it even existed) 

would have been subject to avoidance by Marshack under § 544(a)(3). The 

lien held by the Remsen Trust also was not recorded. As for Alicia’s 

support abstract of judgment, she admitted in appellants’ reply brief on 

appeal and at oral argument before this panel that her support abstract of 

judgment has been vacated by the family court. She claims to hold a second 

support abstract of judgment that has not been vacated. Alicia did not 

present this second abstract to the bankruptcy court as part of the sale 

proceedings or to this Panel on appeal. According to the trustee’s title 

report, both support abstracts of judgment arise from the same judgment—

entered on the same day. Thus, both appear to secure the same support 

judgment obligations; Alicia has not argued otherwise. Even if the 

duplicate abstract of judgment somehow remains valid, the sale has 

generated sufficient funds to satisfy that obligation in full.

On the record presented, both § 363(f)(3) and (f)(4) support the sale 

free and clear. Without Remsen’s alleged $1,750,000 lien, the $2,200,000 sale 

price clearly was more than enough to satisfy all liens actually held against 

the Residence. And neither § 363(f)(3) nor (4) enable Remsen to challenge 

the sale free and clear without him presenting some material, competent 

evidence supporting his bare belated assertion that his claim was secured. 

§ 363(p)(2); Chequers Inv. Assocs. v. Hotel Sierra Vista Ltd. P’ship (Hotel Sierra 

Vista Ltd. P’ship), 112 F.3d 429, 434 (9th Cir. 1997) (objecting lienholder 
14

opposing use of cash collateral); see also Wilmington Tr., Nat’l Ass’n v. Boh 

Park Highlands NV, L.P (In re Nov. 2005 Land Invs., LLC), 636 F. App’x 723, 

725-26 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that contingent interest holder opposing

§ 363(f) sale free and clear failed to meet his burden to establish that his 

contingent interest had any value); In re Conrad, 2012 WL 1744741, at *2–3.

The Contractual Agreement on which Remsen relies fails to set forth any 

specific debt, grant any encumbrance, and was never recorded. The 

bankruptcy court did not err in granting the motion to sell free and clear of 

whatever claims Remsen may assert under the Contractual Agreement. 

C. Appellants have not established that their due process rights were 

violated. 

Finally, appellants argue that Remsen was not given sufficient time 

and opportunity to oppose the sale motion. According to appellants, 

Marshack never served the sale motion on Remsen. They are incorrect. The 

certificate of service shows that the sale motion and notice of motion was 

properly mailed to both the Remsen Trust and Remsen individually.

Moreover, Remsen had actual knowledge of the sale motion in time to file 

his objection to the motion, and the bankruptcy court was clear that it 

considered the opposition.

Appellants also claim that they needed more time and opportunity to 

present evidence. The court specifically overruled this argument, and the 

record supports the bankruptcy court’s ruling. There is no evidence that 

any additional time or opportunity to present evidence would have 
15

improved appellants’ position. Remsen’s alleged lienholder status was 

legally insupportable because the Contractual Agreement on which he 

relied to establish the alleged lien was insufficient as a matter of law to 

create such a lien. Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, neither 

conveyances nor encumbrances of real property can be made under 

California law without a written instrument containing a grant transferring 

the property interest from the grantor to the grantee. See Cal. Civ. Code 

§§ 1091, 2922; Swiss Bank Corp. v. Van Ness Assocs. (In re Van Ness Assocs.), 

173 B.R. 661, 666 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994); see generally 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. 

Real Est. § 8:3 (4th ed.) (describing prerequisites for a valid conveyance of 

real property). The Contractual Agreement on which Remsen relies 

contained no such grant transferring any property interest from Alicia to 

Remsen.

When as here the party asserting a violation of its due process rights 

was not prejudiced by the alleged due process violation, the alleged 

violation cannot constitute reversible error. See Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re 

Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 776 (9th Cir. 2008), partially abrogated on other grounds 

as recognized in Nichols v. Marana Stockyard & Livestock Mkt., Inc. (In re 

Nichols), 10 F.4th 956, 962 (9th Cir. 2021).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.