# FILED
December 2, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF AP PEALS OF

TENNESSEE WESTERN SECTI ON AT JACK SON

RONNIE BRADFIELD, ) ) Plaintiff /Appella nt, ) Lake Chancery No. 4249 ) vs. ) ) BILLY COMPTON, et al, ) Appeal No. 02A01-9705-CH-00111 ) Defend ants/Appe

llees. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF L AKE COUNTY AT TIPTONVI

LL E, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE J. STEVEN STAFF ORD, CHANCELL OR
For the Plaintiff/Appellant : For the Defendants/Appellees : Ronnie Bradfield, Pro Se John Knox Walkup Tiptonville, Tennessee Jeffrey L. Hill Nashville, Tennessee

AFFI RMED

HOLL Y KIRBY L

IL LARD, JUDGE

CONCUR:
W. FRANK CR

AWFORD, P. J., W.S.
ALAN E. HI

GHERS, J.1 For clarity , it should be noted that some of the plaintiff’s pleadings filed in the trial court

were signed: Paul M. Biff Farnsworth, Esq.

A/K/A Ronn

ie Brad field OPINION This case involves a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, filed by a stat e pris oner ag ainst employees of the Tennessee Department of Corrections. One de fendant is a physician employ

ed by Departm ent. Plain

tiff appe als the dis missal of h is claims a

gainst a ll defen dants. We a

ffirm. Plainti ff/Appellant

Ronnie Bradfield (“Bradfie ld”) 1 is an inmate at the Lake Cou nt y Correctional Facility in Tiptonville, Tennessee. Bradfield filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint agains tseveral employ ee s of t he Tennessee Department of Corrections, including Defendant/Appellee

Harold Butler, M.D. (“Dr. Butler” ), a physician emplo yed by

the prison. Bradfield’s Co mplaint al leges t hat the de

fendant s force d him to per form ce rtain tas ks that he

is unable to perform due to his medical condition, failed to protect his Constitutional rights to be “free from cruel a nd unusua

l pain,” d enied him accessto court b y lim

iting the amount of

legal m aterial s that he could keep in hi s cell, a

nd faile d to provid

e him with a

dequate medical c are. B radfield also charges that the D efenda

nts denie d him due pr

ocess of law in his d

isciplina ry hearing , levied f

alse accusations against him, and retaliated ag ainst him for pursuing litigation. Dr. Butl er filed a n answer to the complaint, as well as an affidavit acknow ledging that he treated Bradf ield and a sserting : In perfor ming such medi c al diagnosis, care and treatment, the a ffiant states he exercised that degree

of care and

skill prev ailing in

this commun

ity b y ph ysi cians in good standing considering the phy sical conditions and needs of the plaintiff, Ronnie Bradfield, a/k/a Paul Farnsworth. Dr. Butler then filed a motion for summary judg ment. Dr. Butler asserted that Bradf ield’s Complaint failedto articu

late a “ short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitle d to relief.” Donaldson v. Donaldson, 557 S.W.2d 60 , 61-62 (Tenn. 1977 ); Tenn. R
. Civ. P. 8.01. Dr. Butler noted further that Bradfield failed to proff er any evide nce crea ting a genuine issue of material fact concerning Dr. Butler’s a lleged negligenc e. Bradfield t hen filed his own summary judgment motion against Dr. Butler, without including a phy sician’s affidavit or oth er expert testimony regarding Dr. B utler’s purported negligence
. The rema ining defendant s filed a m otion to dism

iss for fail

ure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). These defe ndants maintained that, to the extent2

that the Compla

int asser ted neg ligenc e, they

are immune from the

lawsuit purs uant to Tennessee Code Annot ated § 9-8-307 (h) (Supp . 1997). A dditionall y, t he defe ndants as serted th at Brad field failedto specify his factual allegations, so as to show the pe rsonal involvement of any of the defenda nts. As to Bra

dfield’sclaim of d

enial to a ccess to the courts, the defendants argued that the right to access to the courts is not unlimited and must be w eighed agains t the priso n’s inter est in penal administration. They noted that B radfield failed to specify how the alleged

de nial of permission to keep un

limited leg al mater

ials in his c ell resulted

in “actual prejudice” reg arding the claimed a bridge ment of hisrights. In a succinct

order, the trial court granted Dr
. Butler’s motion for summary judgment and the other defendants’ m otion to dismiss. The trial court did not elaborate on its reasoning. The trial court de nied a mot

ion to rehear file d by

Bradf ield. Fr om these o

rders B radfield now app eals. On appeal, Bradfield claims that the trial court er red by g ranting summary

judgment in favor of Dr. Butler and granting the other defendants’ motion to dismiss. Bradfield also allegesthat the trial court erred by

not granting his summary judgment motion. In addition, Bradf ield asserts that the trial court improperly de nied his motion for interlocutory appeal and his motion for a rehear ing. A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ten

n. R. Civ. P. 56.03. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genui n e issue of material fact exists. Byrd v. Ha ll , 847 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all rea sonable inferences in favo r of that party, an d di scard all countervailing evidence. Id. at 210-11 . Summary j udgment is only appropr iatewhen the

facts a nd the leg al concl

usions dra

wn from th

e facts reasona

bly permit

only
one conclusion. Carvell

v. Bottoms , 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law
are in volved, there is no presumption of correctness regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Id. Therefore, our review of the trial court’s grant of summar

y judgment

is de novo on the record before this Court. Id. In support of his motion for summary judgmen t, Dr. Bu tler submitted his affidavit, stating that he diagnosed and

treated Bradfield in accorda nce with the proper

standar d of car e preva iling in the community. Although Dr. B utler is a party, his aff

idavit alone is sufficient to support a summary3

judgment motion. Smith v. Graves, 672 S.W.2d 78 7, 789-90 (Tenn. A pp. 1984) ; Crowe v. Cr

aig , No. 02A01-9612-CV-00297, 1997 WL 359261, *6 (Tenn. App. June 27, 1997). On a medi cal ma lpract ice cl aim su ch as Br adfiel d’s, i n orde r to cr eate a ge nuine issue of material fact in a

ccorda nce with R

ule 56 of t

he Tenne ssee Rule s of Ci vil Procedure, the plaintiff must produce a counter affidavit from an expert. Bowman v. Henard, 547 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1977); Gambill v. Middle Tenn. Medical Center, Inc. , 751 S.W.2d 145, 146-47 (Tenn. App. 1988). Bradf ield did not pro ffer a counter affi davit or any other evi dence to refut e Dr. Bu tler’s affidav it. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary

judgment in favor of Dr. Butler. When considering the remaining defe ndants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a c laim, “we are re quired to

construe the compl aint liber

ally in the plaintiff’s favor and take the allegations of the complaint as true.” Pursell v. First American National Bank, 937 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. 1996). Our examination is limited to determining as a matter of law whether the allega

tions set f orth in the complaint are sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. T o th e extent tha

t Bradf ield’s cl aims involv e alleg ed neg ligenc e by the priso n employ

ees, they are immune from suit. Tenne ssee Code Annotate d § 9-8-30 7(h) pro vides: Stateoffice

rs and em ploy ees are

absolutely

immune from liability for acts or omissions within the scope of the offi c er’s or employ ee’s of fice or employ ment, except for willful, malicious, or criminal acts or omissions or for acts or omissions done for personal gain. Therefore, the decision of the trial court is af firmed as to Bradfield’s allega tions of negligence. Bradf ield claims that he has been

denied access to the courts, because the pr ison has limited the amount of legal material that he can keep in hi s cell. B radfield does not allege denial of access to legal material available elsewhe re in the prison. Moreover, Bradfield has failed to show how the limitation on his ability t o keep le gal mat

e rials in his cell has directly pre judiced his pursuit of a
cause of action. Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 ( 6th Cir. 1985) . The pla intiff is e ntitled onl

y to meaning ful acc ess to leg al mater ials, not to tal, unlimited access. Campbell v. Miller , 787 F.2d 217, 227-30 (7th Cir. 1986). Consequently, the decision of the tria l court on this issue is affirmed. Bradf ield alleges further that his due proce ss right s were vio lated by the filing of a fal se disciplinary

report against him. The filing of an allegedly false charge does not depri ve an inma te of a lib erty intere st pursuant to Section 1983. Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986); El-Amin v. Tirey , 817 F. Supp. 694, 698-99 (W.D.Tenn. 1993), aff’d. 35 F.3d 565 (6th Cir.4

1994) (“An inmate does not have a liberty intere st in not bei ng charged with disciplinary violations.”). “The inmate’s right to due process is protected by the entire hearing procedur e, and is not violated merely by

a false report.” El-Amin , 817 F. Supp. at 698. In addition, Bradf

ield’s co mplaint ma

kes only concluso ry allega tions, and fails to a rticulat e any factual basis for his claims. For instance, Bra dfield c la ims that the

defenda nts forc ed him to perform tasks in spite of his medical condition. He does not specify the task s he was a

lleged ly forced to per fo rm, the medical condition to which he refers, or the particula r defendants who allegedly forced him to perform the tasks. Bradfield’s Complaint also alleges that he was denied medical care. The pleadings do not
enumera te the nature of the lack o f t reatment of which he complains and does not specify which specific defenda nts denied him this trea

tment. Br adfield also cla ims that the

defenda nts denie d him due proces s of l aw durin g discip linary procee dings. A gain, he fails to specify the proc eeding

to which he refers and who was involv ed. Br adfield, m oreover, fails to demonstrate how any of the defendants deprived him of his Eight Amendment right to be “ free from cruel and unusual pain.” In Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir . 1986), th e Sixth Circu

it held that “[i]t is not enough for a complaint under § 1983 to contain mere conclusory

allegations of unconstitutional conduct b y persons acting under color of state law. Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the pleadings.” Si mi la rl y, Bradfi eld fai ls to state a clai m for h is ret aliat ion al lega tion . This cla im fails to “include a chronology

of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferr

ed.” Stamps v. McWher ter , 888 F. Supp . 71, 7 4 (cit ing Cain v. Lane , 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988) )
. Thus, Bradfield may

not “bootstrap a fri vol ous complaint with a conclusory a nd speculative allegation of retaliation.” Stamps , 888 F. Supp. at 74. Alth ough pro se litigants are given a certa in amount of “leeway ” in drafting pleadings, “we cannot excuse a pro se party from c omplying with applicable procedural and substantive law.” Kaylorv. Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728, 733 n.4 (Tenn. App. 1995). In Irvin v. Cit y of Clarks ville , 767 S.W.2d 649 (Tenn. App. 1988), this Court stated: Parties who choose to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal tr eatment. However, they

are not excused from comply ing with applicable substantive and5

procedural law, and they

must follow

the same procedural and substantive law as the represented party
. Id. at 652 (citations omitted). Therefore, because Bradfield’s complaint contains only conclusory a

llegations unsupported by an y articula

ted fac tual basis , the dec ision of the trial cou rt is aff irmed on th

is basis aswell. Bradfi eld’s remai ning i ssues on app eal are preter mitt ed by this hold ing. The decision

of the tri al court

is affirme d. Costs on a

ppeal ar e taxed ag ainst the A

ppellant , fo r w hi ch ex ec ut io n m ay i ss ue if ne ce ss ar y.

HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J. CONCUR:

W. FRAN K CRAWF ORD, P.J., W.S.
ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.