JIM MAlTOX 

Attorney Generals 

Supreme Cowl Building 

0. Box 12S4B 

Min. TX. 78711.2S48 

512l47wBo1 

Telex Sla!B74-1387 

Wcopier 51214750268 

714 Jackson. Suite 700 

1llas. TX. 75202.4508 

417428@44 

124 Albna Am, SuIta 160 

Paso. TX. 799052793 

915/wm 

)ol Texas, Suite 700 

Houston, TX. 77002-3111 

71312235888 

SW Broadway. Suite 312 

Lubbock. 7X. 79401-3479 

W747-5238 

4309 N. Tenth. Suite B 

cAllen. TX. 7SSOl.lBS5 

f21682.4547 

x) Main Plaza. Suite 400 

an Anlonlo, TX. 782052797 

5122254181 

n Equal Opporlunilyl 

Allirmatlve Action En-ploynr 

The Attorney General of Texas 

Novehber 30. 1984 

Honorable Benry Wade 

District Attorney 

Dallas County 

Condemnation Section 

Services Building 

Dallas, Texas 75202 

Dear Hr. Wade: 

Opinion No. m-237 

Re: Effect of Senate Bill No. 42. 

68th Leg., 2nd Called Sessfon on 

jurisdictions of certain county 

courts at law in Dallas County 

You have requested our opinion regarding the effect of Senate 

Bill No. 42. Sixty-e:lghth Legislature, 2nd Called Session. ou the 

jurisdiction of Counl:y Courts of Dallas County at Law Nos. 2, 3. 4, 

and 5. The bill provides In part: 

Section 2. The County Court of Dallas County 

at Law No. 1 has original and concurrent jurisdiction with district courts in all civil cases in 

which the matter in controversy exceeds $500. 

excluding interest, and does not exceed $20,000, 

excluding interest, mandatory damages and 

penalties, attorney's fees, and costs. 

Section :i. The County Court of Dallas County 

at Law No. 1 has original and concurrent jurisdiction wil:tl district courts in appeals of final 

rulings and decisions of the Industrial Accident 

Board, regardless of the amount in controversy. 

Acts 1984. 68th Leg., 2nd C.S...ch. 15, Il. at 208. 209. 

Specifically, !k!nate Bill No. 42 amended article 1970-3, 

V.T.C.S., and increased the jurisdiction of Dallas County Court at Law 

No. 1 so that its jurisdiction is original and concurrent 

vith distr:.ct courts in all civil cases in vhich 

the matter :In controversy exceeds $500. excluding 

interest, tlrld does not exceed $20,000, excluding 

interest, mandatory damages and penalties, 

attorney's fees. and costs. 

Acts 1984. supra. at 209. In addition, the bill conferred 

p. 1063 
Ilonorable Henry Wade - Page 2 (M-237) 

original and concurrmt jurisdiction with district 

courts in appeals of final rulings and decisions 

of the Industrial A:cident Board, regardless of 

the amount in controwrsy. 

Id. The legislature may estatslish the jurisdiction and organization 

ofall county courts at law. Tex . Coast., art. V. 51; Jordan v. 

Crudgington, 231 S.W.2d 641 (‘Tex. 1950); Attorney General Opinions 

M-1097 (1972); M-907 (1971). 

The jurisdictions of the County Court of Dallas County at Law, 

Nos. 2. 3, 4, and 5 are ~1% out in articles 1970-16, 1970-18, 

1970-31.1, and 1970-31.2, V.T.C.S. Articles 1970-16, 1970-31.1. and 

1970-31.2 make references to ,:he jurisdiction of Court No. 1 before 

the enactment of Senate Bill :#I,. 42. Because we believe that these 

reference statutes are statuterI of general reference, we conclude that 

Senate Bill No. 42 increased t’w jurisdiction of Courts Nos. 2. 3. 4, 

and 5. 

The jurisdiction of Court No. 1 was originally established in 

1907. Acts 1907, 30th Leg., ch. LII, I2, at p. 115. In 1917 the 

legislature created Court No. I! and provided that it 

shall have exclusive concurrent civil and criminal 

jurisdiction of all g:ases, original and appellate, 

over which by the laws of the State of Texas, the 

existing County Cour,: of Dallas County at Law [No. 

11, of Dallas count:r,, Texas, would have original 

and appellate jurlsd:Lction. . . . 

V.T.C.S. art. 1970-16. Later, in 1963, the Fifty-eighth Legislature 

provided for the creation of Court Nos. 3 and 4 and provided that 

these courts 

shall have exe Lusive , concurrent civil 

jurisdiction of all :ases, original and appellate, 

over which by the 1~s of the State of Texas the 

existing County Cor.rt of Dallas County at Law 

Number 1 and County Court of Dallas County at Law 

Number 2 have original and appellate 

jurisdiction. . . . 

V.T.C.S. art. 1970-31.1. 52. In 1971, tt:e legislature enacted article 

197Oa. V.T.C.S., which inc::c!ased the jurisdictional amount in 

controversy for “all county courts at law.” Finally. in 1977. the 

legislature created Court No. 5 and provided that 

[t]he court hereby created shall have exclusive, 

concurrent civil Jurisdiktion of all cases, 

original and appelkte. over which by the laws of 

the State of Texas the existing County Courts of 

,B, 1064 
a 

gonorable Henry Wade - Page 3 (m-237) 

Dallas County at Lin# Nos. 1, 2, 3. and 4 have 

original and appellate jurisdiction. 

V.T.C.S. art. 1970-31.2. $2. As indicated above, Courts No. 3, 4. and 

5 do not have criminal jurisdiction, because the acts creating those 

courts expressly provided for only civil jurisdiction. 

this series of statutes relating to the jurisdiction of the 

County Courts of Dallas County Nos. 2. 3, 4, and 5 are knovn as 

reference statutes. The rr.l,e of construction regarding general 

reference statutes is that ths, adopting statute includes not only the 

laws in force at the time the! adopting statute became effective, but 

also subsequent legislation ,celatlng to those laws. See 82 C.J.S. 

Statutes 5370 (1953); 73 Am. ,J,lr. 2d Statutes 5028. 29 (1974); Annot. 

168 A.L.R. 627 (1947); 2A Su,:herland, Statutory Construction, 551.07 

(4th Ed. 1973). This rule of construction should be compared with 

those adopting statutes which incorporate a particular provision of a 

statute by a “specific and descriptive reference” to the earlier 

statute. Specific reference statutes incorporate only the adopted 

statute In existence at the rime of the enactment and do not Include 

subsequent modifications or additions unless there is legislative 

intent to the contrary. SSI? St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. 

--_ 

Billiot. 342 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1960, writ ref’d); 

see also Trimmier v. Carlton. 2196 S.W. 1070 (Tex. 1927). 

As outlined above, articzle 1970-16 contains the language “shall 

have exclusive concurrent civil and criminal jurisdiction of all 

cases, original and appellate” over which Court No. 1 has 

jurisdiction. Articles 197&31.1 and 1970-31.2 both contain the 

statutory language “shall have exclusive, concurrent civil 

jurisdiction of all cases, original and appellate” over which Court 

No. 1 has jurisdiction. See V.T.C.S. arts. 1970-31.1, 52; 1970-31.2. 

52. This statutory language.cefers to the jurisdiction of Court No. 1 

generally rather than incol,porating article 1970-3, V.T.C.S. s by 

specific or descriptive referssnce thereto. 

Unlike the language use<! in the adopting statutes In this case, 

in Trimmier v. Carlton. supra! at 1074, the adopting statute was held 

by the Texas Supreme Court tc make “specific reference” to s previous 

statute. The question invcllved in Triaanier was whether certain 

amendments to the Canales AC): were applicable to the organization of 

reclamation and conservation districts. The Texas Supreme ‘Court 

reasoned that the language in ,the adopting statute, vhich reads “shall 

be governed and controlled by the provisions of chapter 87. Acts of 

the Thirty-fifth Legislature [Canales Act] and amendments thereto,” 

was statutory language of specific reference. The case was decided lo 

favor of Incorporating subse’auent modification, however, because the 

lannuane “and amendment theret>” was Included in the adopting statute. 

Id.- a; 1074. 

Billiot, supra, 

Similarly, in St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company v. 

the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the 

adopting statute contained language of specific reference. The 

adopting statute provided that, 

p. 1065 
Ronorable Henry Wade - Page 4 s:JM-237) 

[uloless otherwise provided herein [the relevant 

section] of Article 8306 of the Revised Civil 

Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended [is] hereby 

adopted and shall govern. . . . (Emphasis added). 

V.T.C.S. art. 8309c. 56 (repeaLed 1973). Thus, we believe that Texas 

courts require a specific and descriptive reference to the statute 

being incorporated in order to construe a statute as one of specific 

reference. Those adopting statutes that do not contain such statutory 

language, such as those involved herein, are statutes of general 

reference. 

The language used by rho legislature to establish the jurisdiction of Court Nos. 2, 3, 4. and 5 is similar to the language used 

in 10 Re Eeiman’s Will, 2 P.2d 982 (N.M. 1931). 10 that case, the New 

Mexico Supreme Court held tha,: the adopting statute which contained 

the language 

appeals from the judgment of the probate court 

shall be allowed to 1:t.e district court in the same 

manner, and subject I:CI the same restrictions as in 

case of appeals fros the district to the supreme 

court 

was a statute of general referonce. Id. at 984. Similarly, in Reward 

v. State, 267 S.W.Zd 763, 764 (Ark. m), the Arkansas Supreme Court 

held that when an adopting statute contained the statutory language 

“an appeal will lie . . . as in cases of appeals from judgments of 

justices of the peace to circuit courts,” the statutory reference was 

to the general law relating to that subject. Thus, we believe that 

the general statutory language, “shall have exclusive concurrent . . . 

jurisdiction of all cases, ori@al and appellate,” relates to the law 

as it existed when articles 1’370-16, 1970-31.1. and 1970-31.2 were 

enacted and encompasses any subsequent amendment of the jurisdiction 

of Court No. 1 by Senate Bill Ho. 42. 

Because there is no express intent, or any intent, shown in any 

of the statutes involved to exclude any subsequent amendment of 

article 1970-3, we are of the opinion that articles 1970-16, 

1970-31.1, and 1970-31.2. V.T.,:.S., are statutes which incorporate the 

jurisdiction of Court No. 1 b7’ making general reference to its jurlsdiction. 10 addition, we conc:lude that when the legislature enacted 

sections 2 and 3 of amended article 1970-3 with regard to the 

jurisdiction of Court No. 1, I:he jurisdiction of Courts No. 2. 3. 4. 

and 5 was increased as speciEied in sections 2 and 3 of amended 

article 1970-3. 

2-U M H A R Y 

Senate Bill No. ,i:!, Acts 1984, 68th Leg., 2nd 

C.S., -ch. 15, $1, i~t 208, which amended article 

1970-3. V.T.C.S., aod increased the jurisdiction 

‘3. 1066 c 
Nonorsble Henry Wade - Page 5 (JM-237) 

of the County Court of Dallas County at Law No. 1, 

also had the effect of increasing the jurisdiction 

of the County Court of Dallas County at Law Nos. 

2. 3, 4. and 5 SIY that their jurisdiction is 

concurrent with district courts in all civil cases 

in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500, 

excluding interest, and does not exceed $20.000, 

excluding interest , mandatory damages and 

penalties, attorwy's fees, and costs. 

Additionally, Senal:e Bill No. 42 conferred on 

these courts original and concurrent jurisdiction 

with district courts in appeals of final rulings 

and decisions of the Industrial Accident Board, 

regardless of the amount in controversy. 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

TOM GREEN 

First Assistant Attorney Gene::al 

DAVID R. RICRARDS 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman. Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Tony Guillory 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Rick G~lplo. Chairman 

Colin Carl 

Susan Garrison 

Tony Guillory 

Jim Moellioger 

Jennifer Riggs 

Nancy Sutton 

p. 1067