alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2009069EN.01001602.xml

| 21.3.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 69/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.3.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 69/16

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Tübingen (Germany) lodged on 15 October 2008 — FGK Gesellschaft für Antriebsmechanik mbH v Notar Gerhard Schwenkel

(Case C-450/08)

(2009/C 69/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Tübingen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FGK Gesellschaft für Antriebsmechanik mbH

Applicant:

Defendant: Notar Gerhard Schwenkel

Defendant:

Party Involved: President of the Landgericht Tübingen

Party Involved:

Question referred

| 1. | Is Council Directive 69/335/EEC of 17 July 1969 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital (1)(as amended by Council Directive 85/303/EEC of 10 June 1985) to be interpreted as meaning that the charges of a notary employed as a civil servant for the drawing up of a notarially attested act recording a transaction covered by that directive constitute taxes for the purposes of that directive where, under the relevant national legislation, even notaries who are civil servants may be authorised to practise and are themselves owed the charges arising from that act and the State, on the basis of a general waiver, does not receive any portion of the charges for the authentication of transactions covered by the Directive? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Council Directive 69/335/EEC of 17 July 1969 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital (1)(as amended by Council Directive 85/303/EEC of 10 June 1985) to be interpreted as meaning that the charges of a notary employed as a civil servant for the drawing up of a notarially attested act recording a transaction covered by that directive constitute taxes for the purposes of that directive where, under the relevant national legislation, even notaries who are civil servants may be authorised to practise and are themselves owed the charges arising from that act and the State, on the basis of a general waiver, does not receive any portion of the charges for the authentication of transactions covered by the Directive?

1

---

(1)  OJ L 249, p. 25.

1

---
[751 NYS2d 676]

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kevin Peacock, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department,

September 25, 2002

*673APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Storch, Amini & Munves, P.C.,*Garden City *(Norman Trabulus*of counsel), for appellant. *Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney,*Riverhead *(Ronald E. Lipetz*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Judgment convicting defendant of driving while impaired unanimously reversed on the law and matter remanded to the court below for a new trial.

Judgment convicting defendant of speeding in a construction zone unanimously modified on the law and facts by vacating the sentence imposed and remanding the matter for resentencing; as so modified, affirmed.

The defendant was charged with driving while impaired in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (1). This offense was elevated to a misdemeanor pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1) because defendant had two prior convictions of driving while impaired within the preceding 10 years. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the accusatory instrument is not jurisdictionally defective. While the initial accusatory instrument made no mention of any prior convictions, the record contains what we deem to be a prosecutor’s information (CPL 100.35, 100.50) which specifically alleges the defendant’s predicate convictions required to elevate the offense to a misdemeanor. Moreover, we note that defendant, under oath, in open court, prior to trial, admitted that he had the two prior convictions (cf. CPL 200.60).

*674Over defense counsel’s objection, the police officer testified to an ultimate issue of fact that the .07 breathalyzer reading indicated that the defendant was impaired. The admission of such testimony was improper. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2) (b) expressly provides that a reading of .07 “shall not be given prima facie effect” in determining whether an individual is impaired. The statement, in our view, was not harmless and the remaining evidence was not overwhelming as the case would have otherwise hinged upon the credibility of the witnesses *(see People v Bailey,*58 NY2d 272). Consequently, the judgment of conviction for driving while impaired should be reversed and a new trial ordered as to said misdemeanor.

While the jury found that the defendant was speeding in a construction zone (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [f]), it failed to make a finding as to the speed at which defendant was travelling. In the absence of a specific finding by the jury, the court below could not make its own finding that the defendant’s speed exceeded the applicable speed limit by more than 30 miles an hour and impose sentence upon such a finding pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (h) (3) (iii). Under the circumstances, the sentence for speeding must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (h) (3) (i).

The remaining contentions are either without merit, not preserved for appellate review or rendered academic in light of the foregoing determination.

Floyd, P.J., Doyle and Winick, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                9
<MULTIPLIER>             1000

<S> <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                           DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                 462
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                 1190
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                       0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                       0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>            13915
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                 1135
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                   1088
<LOANS>                                73815
<ALLOWANCE>                            468
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         94515
<DEPOSITS>                             65838
<SHORT-TERM>                           9750
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                    94515
<LONG-TERM>                            10700
<COMMON>                               51
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                  0
<PREFERRED>                            0
<OTHER-SE>                             7274
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>         97143
<INTEREST-LOAN>                        5246
<INTEREST-INVEST>                      1157
<INTEREST-OTHER>                       0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                       6403
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                     2965
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                     3767
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                  2454
<LOAN-LOSSES>                          182
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                     0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                        2806
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        (260)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>             (260)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                        0
<CHANGES>                              0
<NET-INCOME>                           (158)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                          (.35)
<EPS-DILUTED>                          (.35)
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                         7.33
<LOANS-NON>                            144
<LOANS-PAST>                           0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                       0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                        240
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                       330
<CHARGE-OFFS>                          44
<RECOVERIES>                           0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                      468
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                   0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                    0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                468


</TABLE>
# C_2011013EN.01003601.xml

| 15.1.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/36

---

Judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal (First Chamber) of 28 October 2010 — Vicente Carajosa and Others v Commission

(Case F-77/08) (1)

1

(Civil service - Open competitions EPSO/AD/116/08 and EPSO/AD/117/08 in the field of fraud prevention - Exclusion of candidates in consequence of their results in the admission tests - Decision of the Appointing Authority - Failure to lodge a complaint - Inadmissibility of the action)

2011/C 13/68

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicants: Isabel Vicente Carajosa and Others (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: S. Orlandi, A. Coolen, J.-N. Louis and E. Marchal, lawyers)

Applicants:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J. Currall and B. Eggaers, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the applicant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: F. Díez Moreno, acting as Agent)

Intervener in support of the applicant:

Re:

Re:

Annulment of EPSO’s individual decisions not to admit the applicants to the tests in competitions EPSO/AD/116/08 and EPSO/AD/117/08.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Tribunal:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the applicants to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the applicants to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

| 3. | Orders the Kingdom of Spain, intervener, to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Kingdom of Spain, intervener, to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 285 of 8.11.2008, p. 57.

1

---
Exhibit 23.3

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

To the Stockholders and Board of Directors
Bogen Communications International, Inc.:


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
(No. 333-21245) on Form S-8 and (No. 33-99662) on Form S-3 of Bogen
Communications International, Inc of our report dated March 7, 1998, with
respect to the consolidataed balance sheets of Speech Design GmbH and
Subsidiaries as of December 31, 1997 and 1996, and the related statements of
income and cash flows for the two years then ended.


                                                     Coopers & Lybrand

Munich, Germany
March 31, 1998
Contents

List of Tables vi

Acknowledgments vii

1 Introduction 1

Part I Methods

Introduction 9

2 Need for public consultation and stated preference 11

3 Stated preference: methods and challenges 19

4 Qualitative methods 31

Part II Analysing the results of mixing method

studies

Introduction 51

5 Interpreting stated preference responses 53

6 Investigating sensitivity to scope 98

Part III Extending the role of the group-based

approach

Introduction 119

7 Constructing better preferences? 121

8 Communal nature of stated preference 149

Conclusion

9 Evaluating and redesigning stated preference valuation 169

References 177

Index 195

Neil A. Powe - 9781845422790

Downloaded from Elgar Online at 05/20/2014 01:45:50PM

via free access
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Leonard Dare, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously reversed as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and new trial granted. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to charge the defense of justification with regard to the crime of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [3]). We agree. In its instructions to the jury the court charged the defense of justification as to the second, fourth, fifth and sixth counts of the indictment that charged defendant with assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [7]) and attempted assault in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05 [7]). The court, however, specifically instructed the jury that, on the first and third counts of the indictment that charged assault in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law § 120.05 (3), it was not to consider the defense of justification. That was error because the defense of *587justification is not limited to any particular crime involving the use of force or to any particular *mens rea (see, People v Magliato,*68 NY2d 24, 29; *People v McManus,*67 NY2d 541, 547). Because assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [3]) is a crime involving the use of force, a charge of justification must be given whenever there is evidence to support it *(see, People v McManus, supra,*at 549).

Here, defendant testified that it was the correction officers who were the aggressors, and that he used physical force only to defend himself from their use of excessive or unlawful force. Viewing that evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to defendant *(see, People v Watts,*57 NY2d 299, 301), a charge on the defense of justification was warranted.

Although the error is unpreserved, given the possibility of contradictory findings resulting from the court’s failure to charge justification on all counts of the indictment, we reverse as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice. In its verdict the jury acquitted defendant of those counts of the indictment where the defense of justification was charged, and convicted defendant of those counts where the court directed the jury not to consider that defense. The court’s failure to charge the defense of justification on the first and third counts of the indictment therefore may have resulted in the jury finding defendant not guilty of the remaining counts by reason of justification, but guilty of the first and third counts despite its finding of justification. A finding of not guilty by reason of justification, however, precludes a finding of guilt on any count because it renders defendant’s conduct lawful *(see, People v Hoy,*122 AD2d 618, 619).

Although the issue is unpreserved, we note that the court’s *Allen*charge was unbalanced because it stressed the minority’s duty to reconcile its views with that of the majority and give deference to the majority’s views, without similarly instructing the majority *(see, People v Robinson,*84 AD2d 732, 733). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Gorman, J. — Assault, 2nd Degree.) Present — Doerr, J. P., Green, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 117 (Thursday, August 2, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5709]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

           By Ms. DeGETTE:
       H.R. 6309.
       Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States 
     Constitution and Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the 
     United States Constitution.
```
# C_2008223EN.01003801.xml

| 30.8.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 223/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.8.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 223/38

---

Action brought on 15 July 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-321/08)

(2008/C 223/62)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: W. Wils and E. Adsera Ribera, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Kingdom of Spain

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | Declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2005/29/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), or in any event, by failing to inform the Commission thereof, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive. |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2005/29/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), or in any event, by failing to inform the Commission thereof, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive.

1

| — | order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The period prescribed for bringing national law into conformity with Directive 2005/29 expired on 12 June 2007.

---

(1)  OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22.

1

---
National Advisory Council for

Environmental Policy & Technology

Final Agenda

May 19-20, 2011

Hilton Garden Inn 

815 14th Street NW 

Washington, DC 20005

Tel: 1-202-783-7800 

Thursday, May 19, 2011

8:00 am Registration

8:30 am Welcome and Introductions

Mark Joyce

NACEPT Acting Designated Federal Officer

EPA Office of Federal Advisory Committee Management and Outreach

Dr. James H. Johnson, Jr.

NACEPT Chair

Cynthia Jones-Jackson

Acting Director

EPA Office of Federal Advisory Committee Management and Outreach

8:40 am Opening Remarks

Bob Perciasepe 

EPA Deputy Administrator

9:00 am Overview of NACEPT’s Second Advice Letter on EPA Workforce Planning: 

Strategies to Obtain and Retain Scientific and Technical Expertise and Leadership 

Capabilities and Culture for “One EPA”

Howard Learner and Sara Kendall

NACEPT Workforce Workgroup Co-Chairs

Paul T. Anastas

Science Advisor and Assistant Administrator

EPA Office of Research and Development
2

Nanci E. Gelb

Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator

EPA Office of Administration and Resources Management

Raul Soto Jr.

Associate Assistant Administrator

Outreach, Diversity and Collaboration 

EPA Office of Administration and Resources Management

James W. Newsom

Assistant Regional Administrator for Policy and Management

EPA Region 3

10:00 am Break

10:15 am Discussion of NACEPT’s Third Workforce Advice Letter on Achieving Greater 

Diversity in EPA 

Overview and Initial Thoughts on NACEPT Diversity Charge

o Dr. James H. Johnson, Jr.

NACEPT Chair

o Roger Rivera and Effenus Henderson

NACEPT Workforce Workgroup Diversity Co-Leads

Overview of EPA Diversity Programs and Activities and Additional Guidance for 

NACEPT Workgroup

o Raul Soto Jr.

Associate Assistant Administrator

Outreach, Diversity and Collaboration 

EPA Office of Administration and Resources Management

o Rafael DeLeon 

Director

EPA Office of Civil Rights

o James W. Newsom

Assistant Regional Administrator for Policy and Management

EPA Region 3

11:15 am Overview of FY 2011-2015 EPA Strategic Plan

Barbara J. Bennett

EPA Chief Financial Officer 

12:00 pm Public Comments

12:15 pm Lunch (on your own)
3

1:15 pm Council Discussion of Second Advice Letter on EPA Workforce Planning

2:45 pm Break

3:00 pm Review Workgroup Charges and Deliverables

Dr. James H. Johnson, Jr.

NACEPT Chair

3:15 pm Workforce Issues and Vulnerable Populations Workgroups meet in separate, 

concurrent sessions. 

6:00 pm ADJOURN

Friday, May 20, 2011

8:30 am Council Approval of Second Advice Letter on EPA Workforce Planning

9:30 am Workforce Issues and Vulnerable Populations Workgroups meet in separate, 

concurrent sessions.

11:15 am Break

11:30 am Workgroup Report-Outs

12:30 pm Public Comments 

1:00 pm Chair’s Summary, Action Items, and Future Meeting Dates

2:00 pm ADJOURN
##### 



Exhibit 31.2 CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Douglas L. Hemer, Chief Administrative Officer of Aetrium Incorporated,
certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Aetrium Incorporated; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant
as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared; (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of this
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting; and 5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting. Date: March 30, 2004
    
    
    
    /s/ Douglas L. HemerBy:
    
    Douglas L. HemerTitle:
    
    Chief Administrative Officer
<PAGE>   1


                                                                  EXHIBIT 24.1


                              POWER OF ATTORNEY






             KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that the undersigned officer and/or
     director of ANTEC Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Corporation"),
     which is about to file an annual report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
     the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended on Form 10-K, hereby 
     constitutes and appoints Lawrence A. Margolis, Daniel J. Distel and James
     E. Knox, each of them his or her true and lawful attorney-in-fact and
     agents, with full power and all capacities, to sign the Corporation's Form
     10-K and any and all amendments thereto, and any other documents in      
     connection therewith, to be filed with the Securities and Exchange 
     Commision, granting unto said attorneys-in-fact and agents full power and 
     authority to do and perform each and every act and thing requisite and 
     necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully to all intents 
     and purposes as she or he might or could do in person, hereby ratifying 
     and confirming all that said attorneys-in-fact and agents, or their 
     substitute or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue 
     hereof.





             IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has hereunto set his or her
     hand and seal as of the 15th day of March, 1997.



                                
                                                 /s/ Rod F. Dammeyer
                                                 ------------------------------