alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In re Habeas Corpus of Preston STEEL.

No. A-12777.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

May 27, 1959.

Hyde & Freeman, Oklahoma City, for petitioner.

Lewis T. Martin, County Atty., McCur-tain County, Idabel, Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and Sam H. Lattimore, Asst-Atty. Gen., for respondents.

POWELL, Presiding Judge.

Petitioner by way of writ of habeas; corpus seeks reduction of bond to answer an action filed in the district court of McCurtain County, wherein he is charged with possession of marihuana. This is a. companion case to that of In re Steel,. Okl.Cr., 339 P.2d 1079, and the statement of facts therein set out are identical to the within case.

After hearing on May 20, 1959, this-Court agreed that the bail fixed by the examining magistrate and approved by the district court in the amount of $10,000, should be reduced to $5,000.

It is therefore ordered that the appearance bond of petitioner be and the same is. hereby fixed in the sum of $5,000; said bond to be conditioned as provided by law, and approved by the Court Clerk of Mc-Curtain County, Oklahoma, and when so-approved, the petitioner to be released.

NIX and BRETT, JT., concur.
<PAGE>   1


                                                             EXHIBIT 23



INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of
Manugistics Group, Inc. on Form S-8 (File Nos. 33-67994, 33-67996, 33-89490,
33-89492, 33-98820, 333-09481, and 333-36983) and Form S-3 (File No. 333-47133)
of our reports dated March 24, 1998 (except Note 13 as to which the date is
March 26, 1998), appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Manugistics
Group, Inc. and subsidiaries for the year ended February 28, 1998.
                                                                  





DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP
Washington, D.C.
May 28, 1998
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO RULES 13A-14(A) AND
      15D-14(A) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
      TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Randall T. Mays, Chief Financial Officer of AMFM Operating, Inc. certify
that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of AMFM Operating, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual
report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c) presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
annual report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or in
other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to
the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with
regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.


Date: March 26, 2004


/s/ RANDALL T. MAYS
----------------------------------
Randall T. Mays
Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
" '

U.S. Department of

Transportation

Office of the Secretary

Of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Ave., S.E.

Washington, DC 20590

January 6, 2014

Mr. Mark W. Atwood

Counsel ~brWestern Global Airlines, LLC.

Cozen O',Connor

1627 IStteet NW

Washington, DC 20006

RE: Doctts DOT-OST-2013-0105 and DOT-OST-2013-0106

I

Applicatlon of Western Global Airlines, LLC

for certificates of public convenience and necessity to engage in interstate and foreign

h

,. .

carter cargo air transportation

Dear1Atwood:

Thank ~ou for the information you have provided on behalf of Western Global Airlines, LLC.

("WesteF"), for the determination of its fitness to operate interstate and foreign charter cargo air

transp0xr-ation. We have determined that we will need additional andlor clarifying information

before we may complete our review. I ask that you respond fully to our request within 30 days

of the d' te of this letter.

1. The resumes of the following Western personnel contain gaps in their unemployment.

Please explain or provide updated resumes:

a. Mrs. Carmit Neff (2007-2010)

b. Mr. Thomas Quehl (May 2012-ApriI2013)

c. Mr. George Boyko (1997-1999)

2. Please provide updated financial information regarding Western's ability to meet the

Department's financial fitness test in dockets DOT-OST-2013-0105 and DOT-OST2013-0106. If Western requires confidential treatment of this information, please provide

it pursuant to14 CFR 302.12 (Rule 12) of our Procedural Regulations.

As is the Department's practice, further processing of Western's application will be deferred

pendirg receipt of this information. In addition, please remember that Western should promptly

prov~' e the Department with any information regarding changes it may undergo in areas

affec ing its fitness (i. e., management, operating plans or financial condition, compliance

disp [sition, or ownership) while its application is under review by the Department.

----------
2

If you have any questions regarding this letter or the requested information, please contact me at

(202) 366-9998.

Sincerely,

()~6~

Catherine J. O'Toole

Analyst, Air Carrier Fitness Division

Office of Aviation Analysis

cc: Docket DOT-OST-2013-0105

Docket DOT-OST-2013-0l06

Mr. William Royal, FAA

Principal Operations Inspector

Tampa Flight Standards District Office
Docket No: FAA-2015-0676 Dir ID: 2014-NM-164-AD
# C_2009220EN.01001301.xml

| 12.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 220/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 220/13

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 16 July 2009 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale della Campania (Italy)) — Futura Immobiliare srl Hotel Futura, Meeting Hotel, Hotel Blanc, Hotel Clyton, Business srl v Comune di Casoria

(Case C-254/08) (1)

1

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 2006/12/EC - Article 15(a) - Waste disposal costs not allocated on the basis of actual production of waste - Compatibility with the ‘polluter pays’ principle)

2009/C 220/21

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale della Campania

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Futura Immobiliare srl Hotel Futura, Meeting Hotel, Hotel Blanc, Hotel Clyton, Business srl

Applicants:

Defendant: Comune di Casoria

Defendant:

Intervener: Azienda Speciale Igiene Ambientale (ASIA) SpA

Intervener:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale della Campania — Interpretation of Article 15 of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste (OJ 1975 L 194, p. 39) — National system not allocating the costs of waste disposal on the basis of the production of waste or its possession with a view to handling by a waste collector or an undertaking responsible for its disposal — Compatibility with the ‘polluter pays’ principle

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 15(a) of Directive 2006/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on waste must, as Community law currently stands, be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, for the purposes of financing an urban waste management and disposal service, provides for a tax or charge calculated on the basis of an estimate of the volume of waste generated by users of that service and not on the basis of the quantity of waste which they have actually produced and presented for collection.

It is, however, incumbent upon the national court to review, on the basis of the matters of fact and law placed before it, whether the tax for the disposal of private solid urban waste at issue in the main proceedings results in the allocation to certain ‘holders’, in the case in point hotel establishments, of costs which are manifestly disproportionate to the volumes or nature of the waste that they are liable to produce.

---

(1)  OJ C 209, 15.8.2008.

1

---
EXHIBIT
31.1
  Certification
of Chief Executive Officer
 Pursuant
to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 and
Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
  I, Dennis
P. Calvert, certify that:
  1. I have
reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of BioLargo, Inc.;
  2. Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;
  3. Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;
  4. The
registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
  (a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;
  (b)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and
  (c)
Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
  5. The
registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
  (a) All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and
  (b) Any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting.
  Date: November
      16, 2009
                
                
                
                By:
                
                /s/
      DENNIS P. CALVERTDennis
      P. CalvertChief
      Executive
Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sherwin Brown, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Tomei, J.), rendered November 18, 1988, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Wharton,*74 NY2d 921; *People v Morales,*37 NY2d 262, 271). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt is not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s further contention is not preserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]), and in any event, it is without merit. Bracken, J. P., Kooper, Lawrence and Miller, JJ., concur.
#### Bernard C. Madden et al., Plaintiffs, *v.*Charles T. Atkins, Individually and as President of New York Association No. 88 of Masters and Mates of National Organization Masters, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Queens County,

September 8, 1959.

*Harold Luca, Persky & Mozer*for plaintiffs.

*Marvin Schwartz*and *Betty H. Olchin*for defendants.

J. Irwin Shapiro, J.

Motion by five of the six plaintiffs for partial summary judgment, pursuant to rule 114 of the Buies of Civil Practice.

In *Madden*v. *Atkins*(4 N Y 2d 283, 297) the Court of Appeals determined that these plaintiffs were *“*unjustly expelled by action of the ” defendants and that they “ may recover from Local 88 whatever damages they may have sustained.” The judgment of the Appellate Division in favor of the plaintiffs was thereupon “ modified insofar as it failed to grant damages to the plaintiffs * * * and the matter remitted to Special Term for the assessment of such damages”. Special Term referred the question of assessment of damages to Honorable Charles S. Golden, Official Beferee, before whom testimony on that issue was taken. The hearings have been concluded and, *139at the request of the learned Referee, memoranda of law were submitted by both sides, setting forth their respective theory of damages. As part of such memorandum so submitted each side made, mathematical computations of damages.

It is now contended by the plaintiffs that in its memorandum of law submitted by its attorney, defendant admitted that no matter on what basis the plaintiffs’ damages are calculated it owes the five moving plaintiffs here a minimum of $42,887.17, and it is for that sum that this motion for partial summary judgment is made.

I know of no case which granted summary or partial summary judgment when the action was *sub judice*after the taking of testimony before any judge or tribunal. The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to determine *in advance of trial*whether there is an issue to be tried.

Though one can sympathize with the plaintiffs’ desire to lay their hands on some money quickly and to which, according to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, they are entitled, the adoption of any procedure such as is suggested by this motion would prevent the orderly and seemly administration of justice in a court composed of many judges. It would introduce a procedure in which the same issue *in the same case*might be determined differently by two separate judges or courts. In the absence of the submission by the plaintiffs of any convincing authorities on this matter and considering the question *de novo,*the court feels that regardless of any merits in the plaintiffs’ position the motion for partial summary judgment, under the circumstances hereinabove outlined, is not maintainable.

The motion is denied. Submit order.
# C_2008008EN.01002202.xml

| 12.1.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 8/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.1.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 8/22

---

Action brought on 7 November 2007 — Crunch Fitness International v OHIM — ILG (CRUNCH)

(Case T-408/07)

(2008/C 8/40)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Crunch Fitness International Inc. (New York, United States) (represented by: J. Barry, Solicitor)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: ILG Ltd (Dun Laoghaire, Ireland)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

| — | The decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal in relation to class 41 of the CTM be annulled; |
| --- | --- |

—

The decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal in relation to class 41 of the CTM be annulled;

| — | the CTM remain registered for services in class 41; and |
| --- | --- |

—

the CTM remain registered for services in class 41; and

| — | order that OHIM pay its costs both in these proceedings and in the appeal proceedings before OHIM. |
| --- | --- |

—

order that OHIM pay its costs both in these proceedings and in the appeal proceedings before OHIM.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Registered Community trade mark subject of the application for a declaration of invalidity: The figurative mark ‘CRUNCH’ for goods and services in classes 9, 25 and 41 — Community trade mark No 62 083

Registered Community trade mark subject of the application for a declaration of invalidity:

Proprietor of the Community trade mark: The applicant

Proprietor of the Community trade mark:

Party requesting the declaration of invalidity of the Community trade mark: ILG Ltd

Party requesting the declaration of invalidity of the Community trade mark:

Decision of the Cancellation Division: Partial declaration of invalidity of the Community trade mark for the goods and services in classes 9 and 25

Decision of the Cancellation Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Declaration of invalidity of the Community trade mark also for the services in class 41

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 50(1)(a), alternatively Article 50(2), of Council Regulation No 40/94, as the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was no genuine use of the trade mark in question in the Community in connection with the services in class 41.

Pleas in law:

---
# Broadband and Data - Appalachian Regional Commission

- Beth Sanner The post Beth Sanner appeared first on Appalachian Regional Commission.
- Christopher Brazell Program Manager.The post Christopher Brazell appeared first on Appalachian Regional Commission.
#### LOVE v. WEEKS.

No. 36211.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

March 16, 1954.

Neal A. Sullivan, Newkirk, for plaintiff in error.

Cox & Buhrman, Blackwell, O. E. McKenzie, Tonkawa, for defendant in error.

O’NEAL, Justice.

Plaintiff obtained a judgment in the trial court in damages against defendant and on October 1, 1953, defendant filed his petition in error with case-made attached in this court. The order overruling the motion for new trial was entered June 5, 1953. No order was made by the trial court extending the time in which .an appeal could be filed.

A motion to dismiss has been filed for the reason the appeal was not filed within three months after the . order overruling the motion for new trial or any order extending the time for appeal. The motion to dismiss must be sustained. In Roof v. Fechtel, Okl. Sup., 258 P.2d 890, we said:

> “Where the petition in error with record or case made is not filed within three months after the judgment or final order made in the case and there has been no order of the trial court extending the time for appeal as provided by 12, O.S.1951 § 972, the appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”

> Appeal dismissed.

HALLEY, C. J., JOHNSON, V. C. J., and WELCH, CORN,' DAVISON, WILLIAMS and'BLACKBIRD, JJ., ■ concur.
#### St. Mary’s Protectress Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Respondent, v Challenger Electrical Equipment Corp. et al., Defendants, and Federal Pacific Electric Company, Appellant.

— Order unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth and eighth causes of action. In its complaint alleging strict products liability, plaintiff alleges that a defective electrical baseboard heater manufactured by defendant caused a fire which resulted in extensive structural damage to plaintiff’s recreation hall. Contrary to defendant’s contention, plaintiff does not seek to recover economic loss only *(see, Schiavone Constr. Co. v Mayo Corp.,*56 NY2d 667, *revg on dissenting opn*81 AD2d 221, 228). The cases upon which defendant relies cover a different situation entirely — the situation where a product fails to perform adequately, resulting in economic loss only. In those cases, courts have limited plaintiff to available contract remedies *(see, Ralston Purina Co. v McKee & Co.,*158 AD2d 969; *Richman v Albert,*127 AD2d 992, *lv denied*70 NY2d 745; *Butler v Caldwell & Cook,*122 AD2d 559; *County of Chenango Indus. Dev. Agency v Lockwood Greene Engrs.,*114 AD2d 728, *appeal dismissed*67 NY2d 757). Such is not the case here.

Supreme Court also properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim as time-barred. Plaintiff’s claim, which sounds in tort, arose on the date of the injury *(see, Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,*37 NY2d 395, 402-404). Plaintiff’s action, commenced within three years of the date of the injury, was timely *(see, Heller v U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp.,*64 NY2d 407, 412). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Curran, J. — Dismiss Causes of Action.) Present — Doerr, J. P., Green, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
#### State v. Chen

16374

11/28/94

Denied

77 Hawai'i 329, 884 P.2d 392
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 1, 2019

No. 04-18-00827-CR

Jake Eric ALVARADO,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 38th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas

Trial Court No. 16-05-11973-CR

Honorable Camile Glasscock Dubose, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The Appellee’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is hereby GRANTED.

_________________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 1st day of August, 2019.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court