UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

LEROY BUHL, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

D. BERKEBILE, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 15-1204 

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02029-PAB) 

(D. Colorado) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, the panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner-appellant Leroy Buhl, a federal inmate proceeding pro se,1

 appeals 

from the dismissal of his application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Mr. Buhl appears pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Garza 

v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

September 9, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Mr. Buhl is an inmate in the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons at the 

United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum, in Florence, Colorado. 

Mr. Buhl filed this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging his due process rights 

were violated during a prison disciplinary action. According to Mr. Buhl, he was 

attacked by two other inmates wielding knives on May 18, 2012. During the course 

of the attack, Mr. Buhl claims he was able to disarm one of his assailants, after which 

he picked up the assailant’s knife and turned it over to prison officials at the first 

opportunity. Nonetheless, Mr. Buhl was charged with possession of a weapon. 

Mr. Buhl did not receive a copy of the incident report charging him with 

possession of a weapon during the usual twenty-four-hour timeframe contemplated 

by federal regulations because the prison was waiting for the F.B.I. to review reports 

of the incident and to determine whether criminal charges should be brought against 

Mr. Buhl. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(a) (“You will ordinarily receive the incident report 

within 24 hours of staff becoming aware of your involvement in the incident.” 

(emphasis added)). The F.B.I. declined to prosecute on June 1, 2012, and Mr. Buhl 

received a copy of the incident report that same day. Following a hearing, Mr. Buhl 

was convicted of the disciplinary offense and received a disciplinary sanction 

involving segregation and the loss of telephone and commissary privileges for sixty 

days. Importantly, the disciplinary sanction did not include a loss of good time 

credits. On July 22, 2014,2

 Mr. Buhl filed the instant action, alleging his due process 

 2

 Due to a series of procedural missteps not relevant to this appeal, Mr. Buhl’s 

habeas petition was delayed, but was nevertheless timely filed. 
3 

rights were violated because the June 1, 2012, incident report was issued after the 

twenty-four-hour period contemplated by federal regulations. 

The district court denied Mr. Buhl’s application for relief on the ground that 

the court lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Buhl’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In 

the alternative, the district court concluded Mr. Buhl had failed to demonstrate a due 

process violation. Mr. Buhl appeals. 

We review the district court’s disposition of Mr. Buhl’s § 2241 petition de 

novo but review the court’s factual findings for clear error. See Palma-Salazar v. 

Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012). Under § 2241, habeas corpus relief is 

available if an individual is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This court has routinely held 

that habeas corpus relief—including relief under § 2241—is available only when an 

inmate is challenging “the fact or duration of his confinement” or seeking 

“immediate release or a shortened period of confinement.” Palma-Salazar, 677 F.3d 

at 1035. We have expressly distinguished claims that are appropriate for habeas relief 

from those challenging an inmate’s “conditions of confinement.” See McIntosh v. 

U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811–12 (10th Cir. 1997). Although prisoners 

challenging the fact or duration of their confinement may proceed through an action 

in habeas, prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement “must do so 

through a civil rights action.” Palma-Salazar, 677 F.3d at 1035. And when a prisoner 

seeks to challenge the conditions of his confinement via § 2241, we lack jurisdiction 

to consider his claim. See id. at 1038. Thus, because Mr. Buhl’s disciplinary sanction 
4 

did not impact the duration of his sentence, we lack jurisdiction under § 2241 to 

consider his claim. 

Mr. Buhl relies on our decision in Gamble v. Calbone, 375 F.3d 1021 (10th 

Cir. 2004), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Magar v. Parker, 490 

F.3d 816, 818–19 (10th Cir. 2007), to argue that § 2241 is the appropriate vehicle to 

challenge prison disciplinary rulings. But as we have previously explained to 

Mr. Buhl, see Buhl v. Berkebile, 597 F. App’x 958, 959 (10th Cir. 2014) 

(unpublished), Gamble involved a challenge to disciplinary proceedings that resulted 

in the loss of a prisoner’s good time credits and, thus, affected the duration of his 

sentence. Gamble, 375 F.3d at 1026; see also McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 811 (indicating 

the deprivation of good time credits can be challenged through § 2241). In this case, 

the prison disciplinary action did not implicate Mr. Buhl’s good time credits or 

otherwise impact the duration of his sentence. Instead, Mr. Buhl was placed in 

segregation and lost telephone and commissary privileges for sixty days. These are 

quintessential conditions of confinement, and § 2241 is not the appropriate vehicle 

through which to challenge them. Thus, Gamble is inapposite. 

Because we lack jurisdiction to consider Mr. Buhl’s claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241, we dismiss the appeal. Accordingly, we express no opinion as to the merits 

of Mr. Buhl’s underlying due process claim. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge