* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** The Honorable William F. Downes, District Judge, Un ited States District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by desig nation. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 25 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JULIANNE E. WILLETT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. STATE OF KANSAS,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-3374 (D.C. No. 95-CV-4052) (D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and DOWNES, ** District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 Ms. Willett raises no issues on appeal regarding th e district court’s

disposition of her claims under the Rehabilitation Act. -2- Plaintiff Julianne E. Willett appeals from an orderof the district court granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment inthis action brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b. 1 See Willett v. Kansas , 942 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1996). We affirm. The parties are familiar with the facts and we will not repeat them here other than as necessary to our disposition. Ms. Wi llett was employed as a Licensed Practical Nurse by defendant at the Kansas Neurological Institute. She was diagnosed with lupus erythematosus. To enable her to perform her job, she requested a lightweight cart for passing medication s and a transfer to a unit which required less walking than the unit to which she wa s currently assigned. On appeal, Ms. Willett argues that she is a “qualif ied individual with a disability” and, with accommodation, she can perform the essential functions of her job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a); see also White v. York Int’l Corp. , 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995). She asserts her requested ac commodations were reasonable and her supervisor’s one-time offer of a transfer d id not release defendant from all subsequent duties to consider her request for r easonable accommodation.-3-

We review de novo the district court's grant of sum mary judgment, employing the same legal standard as used by the di strict court. See Williams v. Widnall 79 F.3d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir. 1996). In the pretrial order, Ms. Willett stipulated that she had received a lightweight cart and that she had been offered a tr ansfer to another unit which she refused. Parties are bound by their pretrial stipu lations. See Mills v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 827 F.2d 1418, 1422 (10th Cir. 1987). We will no t address arguments challenging stipulations which are clear and unambiguous, and which are neither improvident nor result in manifest inju stice. Id. Ms. Willett contends her stipulation was not clear and unambiguous becau se she was not initially offered a permanent cart and because the unit to wh ich she refused transfer, in her opinion, required more walking. If an individual rejects a reasonable accommodationand, therefore, cannot perform the essential functions of the job, that “i ndividual will not be considered a qualified individual with a disability.” 29 C.F. R. § 1630.9(d). We agree with the district court that it is immaterial whether Ms . Willett was initially offered a temporary or permanent lightweight cart. We also a gree that Ms. Willett failed to present material evidence contesting defendant’s as sertion that the unit to which she was offered a transfer would offer less walkingthan the one on which she2 We admonish counsel not to alter documents submitte d on appeal in order

to present evidence in a more favorable light than it appeared to the district court. We note that the alterations made here are concluso ry and would not support a reversal in this case, even were we to consider the m. -4- currently worked. 2See White , 45 F.3d at 360 (conclusory allegations will not defeat “properly supported motion for summary judgm ent”). The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge