United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued February 28, 2013

Decided August 28, 2013

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 12-2834

COREY H., et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 92 C 3409

Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

O R D E R

I. Background

Because this litigation has been ongoing for over twenty years, we only briefly

recount the underlying facts and procedural posture. In 1992, a group of disabled

students who attended various Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”, which we use to refer to

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 12-2834 Page 2

the Chicago Board of Education as well) filed a putative class action lawsuit against the

Illinois State Board of Education (“ISBE”), CPS, and other governmental entities.

Among the numerous claims that the plaintiffs raised was the allegation that the ISBE

was responsible for CPS's district-wide practice of assigning disabled students to

schools and classrooms based solely on their disability classifications, in violation of the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The IDEA required the various

governmental entities to educate children in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”)

according to their needs. Of the more than 500,000 students then enrolled in CPS, at

least 10% had been classified by CPS as having disabilities. 

The case was initially assigned to Judge Leinenweber, who denied motions to

dismiss and certified the class, which was defined as: “all children who are enrolled in

[CPS] and who are or will be classified as having a disability by [CPS], and who are

therefore subject to [CPS’s] and ISBE’s illegal practice and policy of failing to educate

children with disabilities ... .” The parties attempted to settle the case, and CPS

negotiated a comprehensive settlement agreement that assumed the class definition

above and was approved by the district court in February 1998. The CPS consent decree

committed CPS to instituting a series of reforms and administering a program called the

“Education Connection,” which would provide resources to approximately one-third of

its schools to bring them into compliance with the IDEA. 

Settlement negotiations with the ISBE, however, fell through and the parties

proceeded to a bench trial. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held

that the ISBE violated the IDEA. It also ordered the ISBE to submit a plan detailing how

it would bring CPS into compliance with the law. In response to the district court's

judgment, in June 1999 the ISBE entered into a consent decree with the plaintiffs in

which it outlined the steps that it would take to correct CPS's noncompliance with the

IDEA and to monitor CPS's future compliance. 

The consent decrees mandated: (1) that the district court would oversee the

consent decrees until January 2006; (2) that the district court would appoint a Monitor1

to oversee the implementation of the decrees and compliance with its terms; (3) that the

parties would establish district-wide targets and benchmarks by which CPS could show

 The original court-appointed Monitor was Judge Joseph Schneider, a judge on the

1

Circuit Court of Cook County. After he retired in 2003, the court appointed Kathleen Yannias

as Monitor. 
No. 12-2834 Page 3

it was complying with the decrees; and (4) that if CPS schools were unable to meet

established targets, the schools could request exemptions from those targets. 

Although the parties entered into the consent decrees in good faith, the parties

were unable to agree upon a number of items related to the decrees’ implementation.

Consequently, the Monitor formulated the district-wide targets and determined that,

beginning on June 1, 2005, the maximum percentage of students with disabilities in any

school in the CPS system could be no greater than 20% of the school's total student

population. The Monitor also stated that the ISBE could grant waivers to schools from

the 20% cap. 

CPS objected to the district court, arguing that the 20% enrollment cap was

erroneously based on the Monitor's inconsistent use of nationwide statistics and

definitions of terms used to determine IDEA compliance. But in an order issued on

February 17, 2000, the district court rejected CPS’s arguments and concluded that the

Monitor did not abuse her discretion by establishing the 20% cap. For five years, CPS

sought no waivers from the Monitor's targets. But on June 1, 2005—the deadline by

which all CPS schools were required to comply with the 20% enrollment cap—CPS sent

a letter to the Monitor and the ISBE seeking waivers from the 20% cap for 96 schools. 

As a result of the request, and in consideration of various other difficulties CPS

had in meeting district-wide targets, when the Monitor reported to the district court on

the progress of the consent decree, she recommended extending the term the district

court would oversee the consent decrees to the end of the 2009–2010 school year. The

district court adopted the Monitor's decision (over objections by CPS) and both

extended its jurisdiction over the decrees until September 1, 2010, and confirmed that

the maximum percentage of disabled students allowed per school remained at 20%. 

CPS appealed the district court's order to this court, asserting that the court

abused its discretion by reaffirming the 20% enrollment cap. In Corey H. v. Board of Educ.

of Chi., 534 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2008), we dismissed CPS’s appeal, holding that the

challenge was not ripe because it was too early for us to entertain any challenge to the

20% enrollment cap, as CPS could still seek and obtain waivers for the schools that

could not comply with the cap. Id. at 689. 

In 2010, the district court determined that the interests of all parties and the

public required that both consent decrees should terminate. The parties agreed, and the
No. 12-2834 Page 4

court ordered that the consent decree for the ISBE would terminate on August 1, 2011,

and the consent decree for CPS on September 1, 2012. With the consent decrees

terminated, the only remaining action is for the Monitor to file the final report detailing

her findings of the agencies’ compliance with the decrees. Then, just a few months

before the consent decree for CPS was set to terminate, CPS filed a motion with the

district court to decertify the original “Corey H.” class and vacate the consent decree it

had agreed to in 1998 and also in 2010. The district court denied the motion and CPS

appealed to this court.

On appeal, CPS contends that the district court erred by denying its motion on

the ground that our decision in Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 688 F.3d 481 (7th Cir.

2012), mandates that we decertify the class and vacate the consent decree. We need not

consider CPS’s arguments, however, because this case is moot. We have no jurisdiction

to entertain CPS’s motion, and this appeal is therefore dismissed.

II. Discussion

A federal court's jurisdiction is limited to cases that present a live controversy.

See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2. The consent decree at issue here expired on September 1,

2012; thus, there is no longer a consent decree for us to vacate. Since there is no decree, 2

there is no controversy, and the case is moot. See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d

65, 91 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that any issues regarding settlement approval were moot

because the settlement agreement had already expired under its own terms); Hallett v.

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 749 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a motion to terminate a consent

decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired); Taylor v.

United States, 181 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that a motion to

terminate a consent decree was “moot” because there was “no ... consent decree left to

be terminated”).

Consent decrees are construed strictly to preserve the bargained-for positions of the

2

parties, and courts have an affirmative duty to protect the integrity of their decrees and ensure

that the terms are effectuated. See Cleveland Firefighters for Fair Hiring Practices v. City of

Cleveland, 669 F.3d 737, 743 (6th Cir. 2012) (Keith, J., dissenting) (citing Williams v. Vukovich, 720

F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983)). For that reason, we strictly enforce the termination of the decree

on September 1, 2012.
No. 12-2834 Page 5

Even if this case were not moot, we would not grant the relief CPS seeks. As the

district court noted, over the past twenty-one years, during which the parties invested

thousands of hours and spent tens of millions of dollars in an effort to reform the CPS

special education system for the benefit of disabled children, no one—not the plaintiffs,

ISBE, or CPS—has ever complained about the class certification definition. Why, at this

late date, the CPS would try to obliterate two decades’ worth of effort is mystifying to

us. The CPS just reaffirmed its commitment to the decree in 2010, and nothing has

occurred since then to suggest that complying with the terms of the decree had changed

in any meaningful way. Even if circumstances had changed, however, CPS is no longer

under any burden, substantial or otherwise, to comply with any obligations it assumed

under the expired decree. As we noted above, the only remaining obligation is for the

Monitor, who will file her report at some point presumably in the near future. Thus,

3

even if this case were not moot, no justification exists for vacating the decree.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reason, this appeal is moot and is therefore DISMISSED.

3 At oral argument, one of the attorneys for CPS suggested that the school system

was concerned that information contained in the Monitor’s pending report might

provide grounds for future lawsuits. That may well be true, but as we have held in the

past, a vague or nebulous fear is insufficient to create a case or controversy. See In re

Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 515 Fed. Appx. 590 (7th Cir. 2013).