UNITE D STATES DEPARTMEN T O F TRANSPORTATIO

N FEDERA L AVIATIO

N ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON , D.C . I N TH E MATTE

RO F GREE N AVIATIO

N MGT . CO . Fo r fee s andexpense s imde

r th e Equa l Acces s to Justic e Ac t DOCKE T NO . CP07EA000 3 (EAJ A Proceeding ) DM S NO . FAA-2007-2698 9 : - 3 c a 

### " 0 T T U J a ~ 

## ^-^sg i rn-*^,^T ^ 20:^22 : *r>.^— 1 CA > FAA' S RESPONS E T

O ORDE RFORFURTHE

RBRIEFIN

G I n accordanc e wit

h th e FA A Decisionmaker' s Orde

r fo r Furthe r Briefing Serve dJun e 14 , 2010 , th e Federa

l Aviatio n Administratio n (FAA) , by andthroug h th e Regiona l Counsel fo

r th e Easter n Region , and hi s designate d an dauthorize drepresentatives , files thi s response . Issue s fo r Furthe r Briefin g I . Whethe r

th e ALJ' s dismissa l of

th e proceeding s wit

h prejudic e afte r

th e FAA voluntaril y withdre w it s complain t resulte di n amateria l alteratio n o f th e lega l relationshi p of

th e partie s require dunde r Buckhannon ? n . I f th e ALJ' s dismissa l with prejudic e resulte di n amateria l alteratio n of th e lega l relationshi p of

th e parties , di di t

hav e th e '^judicia

l imprimatur " require d unde r

Buckhannon' ! ni.I f Gree n Ai r

i s aprevailin g party , wa s th e FAA' s positio n in th e underlyin g litigatio n substantiall y justiHed ?ARGUMEN T I . Th e Buckhanno n Standar dfo r aPrevailin g Part y Unde r 5 U.S.C . § 504(a ) (1) . Unde r 5 U.S.C . § 504(a

) (1) , apart

y i s no t eligibl e fo r attorney' s fee s unles s he/she i s a "prevailin g party. " The meanin g o f "prevailin g party " unde

r th e EAJ A i s governe dby th e Suprem e Court' s decisio n in_Buckhannon , whic h require s ajudicially-sanctione dmateria l alteratio n o f

th e lega l statu s of th e partie s tha

t derive s fro

marulin g base do n th e merit s o f th e case . I n Buckhannon , th e plaintif

f operate dassiste dlivin g residence s andwa s ordere dto clos e thembecaus e som

e of th e residence s wer

e incapabl e of

"self-preservation " a s definedimde r Wes t Virgini alaw . Buckhannon , th e plaintiff , the n sue dth e state , contendin g tha t th e state' s "self-preservation " requiremen t violate dth e Fai

r Housin g Amendment s Act (FHAA) an

d th e American s wit

h Disabilitie s Ac t

(ADA) . Afte

r th e lawsuit

wa s filed, but

befor e th e distric t

cour t judiciall y resolve d th e matter , th e stat e legislatur

e eliminate dth e "self-preservation " requirement , and Wes t Virgini amoved to dismis s th e cas e a s moot . The distric t cour t grante dth e motion , dismissin g th e case , an

d Buckhaimon requeste dattorney' s fee s unde r th e fee-shifting provision s o f th e FHA A and th e ADA . Buckhanno n contende dtha t he wa s eligibl e fo

r a n awar do f attorney' s fee s imde

r th e "catalys t

theory, " unde

r which aplaintif

f ma y b e considere da "prevailin g party " i f

it s lawsuit

achieve dth e plaintiffs desire dresult through avoluntar

y chang e i n th e defendant' s conduct

eve n i f th e plaintif

f di dno t receiv e an

y judicial relie f Th e holdin g i n Buckhannon applie s broadly t o fe e shifting statutes . Although th e plaintiff s i n Buckhannon sough

t attomey' s fee s unde

r th e FHA A andth e ADA , th e Covir

t indicate dtha

t it sanalysi s applie d generally t o fee-shifting statute s invokin g th e ter m"prevailin g party. " Buckhannon , 53 2 U.S . a

t 600,60 3 n.4 . Specifically , th e Cour t stated , "[w] e hav e interprete d thes e fe e shifting provision s consistently , ands o approac h th e nearly identica l provision s a

t issu e here. " Id . (citatio n omitted) ; se e als o Joh n T . v. Del . Count

y Intermediate Unit , 31 8 F.3 d 545 , 55 7 (3 d Cir . 2003 ) (finding tha t Buckhannon ha s broa

dapplicabilit

y andapplie s to th e hidividual s wit

h Disabilitie s Act) ; J.C . v . Reg'lJSch . Dis t 10 , Bd . ofEduc ^ 27 8 F.3 d119,123-2 4 (2 d Cir . 2002 ) (statin g tha

t "th e decisio n [i

n Buckhannon ] expressly signale dit s vwde r applicability") . Accordingly , court s hav e conclude dtha t th e rul e fix)mBuckhannon applie s to th e "prevailin g party " threshol d requiremen t unde r th e EAJA . M av . Chertoff , 54 7 F.3 d342,34 4 (2d . Cir . 2008 ) (concurrin g wit h seven othe

r U.S . Court s of

Appeal s tha

t ^Buckhannon' s definitio n o f

'prevailin g party ' applie s to fe e request s unde

r EAJA") , Buckhannon' s interpretatio n o f th e ter m"prevailin g party " applie s t o bot h prevailin g defendant s and plaintiffs . See Distric t o f Columbi av. Straus , 59 0 F.3 d898,90 1 (D.C . Cir . 2010) ; Distric t

o f Columbi av. Jeppesen , 51 4 F.3 d1287,129 0 (D.C . Cir . 2008) ; se e als o Avery . Firs t Resolutio n Managemen

t Corp. , 56 8 F.3 d1018 , 102 4 (9t h Cir . 2009) ; Osca

r v . AlaskaDep' t ofEduc . & Earl y Dev. , 54 1 F.3 d 978 , 98 1 (9t h Cir . 2008) ; RF

RIndus. , Inc . v. Centur

y Steps , Inc. , 47 7 F.3 d 1348,135 3 (Fed . Cir . 2007) ; Highwa y Equi p Co . v . FECO , Ltd. , 46 9 F.3 d1027 , 103 5 (Fed . Cir , 2006) ; Dattne r v . Conagr aFoods , Inc. , 45 8 F.3 d98,10 2 (2 dCir . 2006) ; Mr . L v . Sloan , 44 9 F.3 d 405,40 7 (2 d Cir . 2006) ; Claibor n v . Wisdom

, 41 4 F.3 d715 , 71 9 (7t

h Cir . 2005) . The D.C . Circui t

ha s recentl y applie dBuckhannon t o EAJ A in th e administrativ e contex t Turne r an d Coona

n v . NTSB , 60 8 F.3 d1 2 (D.C . Cir . 2010) . Accordingly , Buckhannon govern s Green' s reques t

fo r attomey' s fee s in thi s case .U . Becaus e th e FAA' s voluntar y chang e i n conduct—withdrawa l of th e complaint—di d no t

resul t i n ajudicially-sanctione dmateria l alteratio n o f th e legal relationshi p of

th e parties , i t

lack s th e necessary **judicia l imprimatur' ' t o establis h prevailin g part y statu s unde r th e Buckhanno n standard . I n thi s case , th e FA

A voluntaril y withdre w it s complain t prio r to th e commencemen

t o f th e hearing . Th e ALJ , in turn , pursuant t o sectio n 13.21 5 o f

th e Rule s o f

Practic e i n FA

A Civi l Penalt y Proceeding s (FA

A Rule s o f

Practice) , 1 4 C.F.R . § 13.215 , dismisse dth e proceeding s wit h prejudice . Significantly , th e A U di dno t mak e an y finding s o n th e merits , o r issu e an y orde r regardin g th e charge s in th e complain t tha t th e FA A voluntarily withdrew . Instead , th e AL J simpl y followed th e requirement s o f sectio n 13.21 5 an ddismisse dth e proceeding s wit h prejudice . Notwithstandin g tha t pursuant t o sectio n 13,21 5 tha

t dismissa l wa s wit h prejudic e t o th e FAA , i t

di d no t satisf y Buckhannon . Even assimiing tha t th e dismissa

l wit h prejudic e constitute d amateria

l alteratio n of

th e lega l statu s o f th e parties , such alteratio n wa s th e result o f completely voluntar

y conduc t o n th e par t o f th e FA A andwa s no t

judiciall y sanctioned . Neithe r th e AL J nor th e FA A Decisionmake

r grante dan

y relie f o n thes e charge s i n favo

r of Green . Indeed , sectio n 13.21 5 lef

t th e AL J wit h n o optio n othe

r tha n t o dismis s th e proceeding s wit h prejudice . Unde

r thes e circumstances , avoluntar y dismissa l wit h prejudic e doe s no t

provide the "judicia l imprimatur " require d b y Buckhannon . 53 2 U.S . a t 605 . Th e Suprem

e Cour t i n Buckhannon hel dtha

t th e ter m"prevailin g party" , whic h i s used i n numerou s federa

l fee-shifting statutes , i s limite dt o apart y "wh o ha s bee n awarde dsom e relie f b y [a] court." ' Buckhannon , 53 2 U.S . a t 602-03 . Th

e Suprem e Cour t ha s emphasize dtha

t "[t]h e

^ A s note d above , th e Cour t of Appeal s fo

r th e Distric t

o f Columbi aCircuit

along wit h nearly ever

y othe r Cour t o f Appeal s ha s determine d tha t Buckhannon' s interpretatio n o f "prevailin g party " applie s t o EAJA . Consol . Edison Co . ofN.Y. , Inc . V

. Bodman , 44 5 F.3 d 438 , 44 7 (D.C . Cir . 2006) ; Selec t Mil k Producers . Inc . v . Johnson , 40 0 F 3 d 939,94 5 (D.C . Ci

r 2005) ; Thoma

s v . NSF , 33 0 F.3d486,49 2 n. l (D.C . Cir . 2003) ; se e als o Arono v v . Napolitano , 4touchston e o f th e prevailin g part

y inquir y mus t b e th e materia

l alteratio n o f

th e lega l relationship o f th e parties, " Texa s State Teacher s As s 'n v Garlan dIn dSch . Dist. , 48 9 U.S . 782 , 792-9 3 (1989) , cite d wit

h approva l i

n Buckhannon , 53 2 U.S . a

t 604 . Th e EAJ

A doe s no t

authoriz e a

n awar d o f attomey' s fee s when th e Unite dState s ha s no t been prevaile dagainst . Kentuck y v. Graham , 47 3 U.S . 159,16 5 (1985) . Eve n wher e th e governmen

t ha s been prevaile dagainst , a prevailin g part

y i s no t entitle d t o fee s fo

r unsuccessful claim s tha

t are separat

e anddistinc t

fi*om thos e claim s o n whic h th e part y prevailed . Hensle

y v . Eckerhart , 46 1 U.S . 424,44 0 (1983 ) ("Wher e th e plaintif

f ha s failed t o prevai l o n aclai mtha t i s distinc t i n al l respect s fi-omhi s successfu l claims , th e hour s spent

o n th e unsuccessful claim s shoul db e exclude di n considerin g th e amoun t o f asuccessfu

l fee.") . Unde r Buckhannon , apart

y tha t ha s receive dasuccessful judgmen t o n th e merits , acourt ordere d consen

t decree , o r ajudicially-approve dsettlemen t ma y b e entitle dt o a

n awar dof attomey' s fees . ^ 53 2 U.S . a t 604 . Bu t apart y tha t ha s achieve dadesire dresul t o f th e litigatio n i s no t a"prevailin g party " i f

tha t desire dresult

wa s th e outcom

e o f entirel y voluntar

y conduct o n th e par t o f on e party , wit

h n o judicial ^proval , anddi dno t yiel dacourt-ordere d"materia l alteratio n o f

th e parties " Id . . The Suprem e Cour t conclude dtha

t "enforceabl e judgment s o n th e merit s and court-ordere d consen t decree s creat

e th e 'material alteratio n o f th e lega l relationship o f th e parties ' necessar

y to permit

a n awar dof attomey' s fees. " Id . (quotin g Garland , 48 9 U.S . at 792-93) . I t

distinguishe d thes e act s (judgment s o n th e merit s an dcourt-ordere dconsen t 56 2 F.3 d 84 , 8 9 (1s t

Cir . 2009) ; M av . Chertoff

, 54 7 F.3 d 342,34 4 (2 d Cir . 2008) ; Morillo-Cedro n v . U.S . Citizenshi p & Immigratio n Serv. , 45 2 F.3 d 1254,1257-5 8 (11t h Cir . 2006) ; Goldstein v . Moatz , 44 5 F.3 d 747 , 75 2 (4t h Cir . 2006) ; Marshal l v . Com m' r ofSoc . Sec , AA

A F.3 d 837 , 840 (6t

h Cir . 2006) ; Brickwoo d ConO-actors , Inc . v . Unite d States , 28 8 F.3 d 1371 , 1379-8 1 (Fed . Cir . 2002) ; Perez-Arellan o v . Smith , 27 9 F.3 d 791 , 79 7 (9t h Cir . 2002) . ^ Unlik e acourt , the FAA' s Rule s of Practic e do not

audioriz e a

n AL J t o issu e aconsen

t decre e or t o sanction a settlemen t agreemen t 5decrees ) fi-om"[a ] defendant' s voluntar y chang e i n conduct " i n tha t suc h voluntar y changes , "althoug h perhap s accomplishin g wha t th e [othe r

party ] sough t

t o achiev e b y th e lawsuit , lack Q th e necessar y judicia l imprimatu r o n th e change " t o confe r prevailin g part y status. " Id . a t 60 5 (alteration s added). ^ Thus , th e Buckhanno n Cour t rejecte d th e "catalyst " theor y an d an y othe r theor y tha t

allow s a n awar d wher e ther e i s n o judicially-sanctione d chang e mth e parties ' lega l relationship , A part y tha t ha s achieve d merel y adesirabl e resul t i s no t aprevailin g part y i f

tha t resul t wa s th e outcom e o f

entirel y voluntar y conduc t o n th e par t

o f th e othe r party , ha d n o judicia l approva l o r

sanction , an d di d no t

yiel d acourt-ordere d "materia l alteratio n o f th e lega l relationshi p o f

th e parties, " Followin g Buckhannon , th e Distric t o f Columbi aCircui t

"articulate d athree-par t

tes t fo r determinin g prevailin g part y status : (1 ) ther e mus t b e a'court-ordere d chang e i n th e lega l relationshi p o f

th e parties ; (2 ) th e judgmen t mus t b e i n favo r

o f th e party seekin g th e fees ; an d (3 ) th e judicia l pronouncemen t mus t b e accompanie d b y judicia l relief " Straus , 59 0 F.3 d a t 90 1 (quotin g Thoma s v . NSF , 33 0 F,3 d 486,492-9 3 (D.C . Cir . 2003)) . Th e Nationa l Transportatio n Safet y Board , i n Applicatio n o f Turne r an d Coonan , NTS B Orde r EA-5467,200 9 W L 241961 6 (Jul y 27,2009) , whic h i s analogou s t o th e subjec t case , applie d th e D.C . Circuit' s standar d an d Buckhanno n t o th e definitio n o f "prevailin g party " unde r th e EAJA' s administrativ e fee-shiftin g provision. ^ I n tha t case , th e Boar d foun d that : th e applicant s di d not

prevai l o n an y portio n o f th e merit s o f

th e cas e becaus e th e Administrato r

^ I n Arono v v . Napolitano , 56

2 F.3 d 84,8 9 (1s

t Cir . 2009) , th

e cour t determine d tha t receip t o f " aJudgmen

t o n th e merits " o r obtainin g " acourt-ordere

d consen t decree " ar e th e onl y tw o situations tha

t Buckhanno

n explicitl y identifie d a s meetin g th e requiremen

t fo r judicia l imprintiatur

. Se e Buckhanno

n a t 60S . ' ^ Moreover

, th e Boar d i n Turne r an d Coona n recognize d tha t smc e a n awar d o f attomey' s fee

s unde r th e EAJ A qualifies a s awaive r o f sovereig n immunity, th

e provisio n an d applicatio n o f th e EAJ A mus t b e construe d narrowl y an d i n fevor o f fee government

. Turne r an d Coona n a t *7 . Se e also , e.g. , Aronov

, 56 2 F.3 d a t 8 8 ("Th e EAJ A i swithdre w th e complain t befor e th e hearin g wa s held ; th e AL J di d no t issu e a n orde r

aki n t o a coizrt-supervise d consen t

decree ; th e AL J merel y accepte d th e Administrator' s withdrawa l o f th e complaint ; an d th e voluntar y withdrawa l o f th e charge s wa s not

wit h prejudic e no r

di d i t i n an y way alte r th e relationshi p o f

th e parties . Id . at

*6 . Th e Covir t o f Appeal s for

th e Distric t

o f Columbi aCircui t

affirme d th e Board' s decision , finding "i t

clea r tha t th e pilot s receive d nothin g aki n t o judicia l relie f an d therefor e wer e no t prevailin g parties. " Turne r an d Coona n a t

13 . Th e Cour t

fiirther fotmd tha t

ther e wa s nothin g analogou s t o judicia l relie f eve n thoug h th e AL J dismisse d th e cases , because : Onc e th e FA A withdre w it s complaints , th e pilot s wer e n o longe r th e subjec t

o f proceeding s t o suspen d thei r licenses . Fo r

all practica l purposes , th e FA A ha d unilaterall y ende d th e adversaria l relationshi p betwee n th e parties , leavin g the mwher e the y wer e befor e th e complain t wa s filed. Th e orde r

o f th e AL J dismissin g th e case s wa s jus t a n administrativ e housekeepin g measure , no t afor mo f relief , becaus e th e FA A di d no t nee dth e ALJ' s permissio n t o withdra w acomplain t Se e 4 9 C.F.R . § 821.12(b ) ("Excep t i n th e cas e of.. . acomplain t . „ pleading s ma y b e withdraw n onl y upo n approva l o f th e [ALJ ] o r

th e [NTSB]") . Ha d th e AL J don e nothing , th e pilot s woul d hav e bee n i n essentiall y th e sam e positio n a s the y wer e after th e AL J dismisse d thi s case . Thes e circumstance s d o no t

mak e the mprevailin g partie s accordin g t o th e criteri ao f Buckhanno n a s interprete di n Straus. ^ Id . a t 15 . Th e actio n a t

issu e i n Turne r

wa s brough t

imde r sectio n 821.12(b ) o f

th e Board' s rules , 4 9 C.F.R . § 821.12(b) , which , unlik e sectio n 13,215 , th e provisio n a t issu e i n th e cas e a t

bar , doe s no t direc t tha t th e complain t

b e dismisse d wit h prejudice . Thi s distinction , however , doe s no t ai d Green . A s th e Turne r an d Coona n cour t

explained , althoug h apart y nee d no t necessaril y receiv e final judgmen t

o n th e merit s o r

aconsen t

decre e t o b e considere d prevailing , aparty , a t also awaive

r b y th e governmen

t o f its sovereig

n immunit y an dso mus t b e construe d strictl y i n favo r o f th e government." ) \c\tm%Ardestaniv . INS , 50 2 U.S . 129 , 13

7 (1991)) . ' Th e cour t i n Turne r an d Coona n note d tha t unde r th e test articulate d i n Straus , " apart

y nee d receiv e onl y som e for mo f judicia l relie f no t necessaril y acourt-ordere

d consen t decre e o r ajudgmen t o n th e merits. " Turne

r an d Coonan, 60 8 F.3 d a

t 15 . 7th e ver

y least , need s to receiv e "som e for mof judicia l relief. " 60 8 F.3 da t 1 5 (citin g D.C . v . Straus , 59 0 F.3 d 898,90 1 (D.C . Cir . 2010 ) (emphasi s added)) . I n otiie r words , lega

l relie f ve / non , such a s th e dismissa

l wit h prejudic e mandate dby th e procedura l mle s in thi s case , i s no t sufficien t to confe r prevailin g part

y status . Instead , such relie f mus t b e judiciall y impose d i

n som e way . Sectio n 13.21 5 o f

th e FAA' s Rule s o f

Practic e require s th e AL

J to automatically dismis s th e proceeding s wit

h prejudic e wheneve

r th e FA A withdraw s th e complaint . Thus , th e voluntar y withdrawa l o f acomplain

t befor e ahearin g unde

r sectio n 13,21 5 ha s th e sam e effec t unde r Buckhannon a s th e withdrawa l considere db y th e D.C . Circui t i n Turne r an dCoona

n unde r 4 9 C,F,R , § 821,12(b) . I

n bot h instances , voluntar

y withdrawa

l o f acomplain

t terminate s th e litigatio n automatically , leavin g th e AL J wit h n o discretio n o r

choic e i n determinin g th e outcom

e o f th e case . Accordingly , although (jree n achieve dth e desire dresult o f th e litigation—^th

e FAA' s withdrawa

l of th e complaint—the v^thdrawa l wa s not th e result o f an y rulin g or exercis e o f authorit y o r discretio n b

y th e ALJ . Becaus e th e FAA' s voluntar y chang e i n conduct

— withdrawa l o f th e complaint—di d no t

resul t i n ajudicially-sanctione dmateria l alteratio n o f

th e lega l relationship of

th e parties , i t

lack s th e necessar

y "judicia l imprimatu r

t o establis h prevailin g part

y statu s unde

r Buckhannon . 53 2 U.S . a

t 605-606 , Th e lin e o f

circui t cour t case s considering , imde

r Buckhannon , whethe

r adistric t cour t ha d authorit y t o exercis e discretio n whethe r o r no t to dismis s th e complain

t wit h or without prejudice , i s illustiative . See Claiborn e v . Wisdom , 41 4 F.3 d715 , 71 9 (7t

h Cir . 2005 ) ("The critica l fact i s no t wha t prompte d th e distric t

cour t t o act ; it i s instea dwha t th e distric t

cour t decide d t o do . Here , th e languag e o f th e distric t

court' s judgment

make s it clea r tha t adecisio n 8o n th e merit s ha s been rendered.") ; Highwa y Equipmen

t Co. , Inc . v . FECO , Ltd. , 46 9 F.3 d 1027 , 103 4 ("[T]he distric t

cour t exercise dit s discretio n i n dismissin g th e patent claim s raise di n th e underlyin g actio n wit

h prejudic e pursuan

t t o Fed . R , Civ , P . 41(a)(2) , Tha t ml e provide s i n relevant par t tha t 'a n actio n shal l no t

b e dismisse da

t th e plaintifiPs instanc e [afte r answer] save upo n orde r o f th e cour t and upo n such term s andcondition s a s th e cour t deem s proper.'") ; Mile s V California , 32 0 F.3 d 986,98 9 (9t h Cir . 2003 ) (holdin g tha

t dismissa l o f tiie underlyin g cas e without prejudic e t o plaintiff

s righ t t o see k relie f i n stat e cour t i s amateria

l alteratio n o f

th e i n th e relationship of

th e partie s unde

r Buckhannon becaus e th e dismissa l eliminate s th e federa

l American s wit

h Disabilitie s Ac t

claimfix>mfurthe

r proceeding s i n federa

l court) . Unde

r thi s cas e law , th e touchston e fo

r th e inquir y o f whethe r th e voluntar

y withdrawa

l o f acomplain

t result s i n ajudicially-sanctione d materia l alteratio n o f

th e lega l relationship o f

th e partie s and , therefore , ha s th e necessar

y "judicia l imprimatur " i s whethe

r th e cour t ha s th e discretio n ove

r th e outcom e o f th e case . Wher

e th e cour t ha s such discretion , it s rulin g or orde r create s th e necessar y "judicia l imprimatur " t o establis h prevailin g part y statu s unde

r Buckhannon . See Buckhannon , 53 2 U.S . a t 605-606 . Conversely , wher e th e cour t doe s no t posses s discretio n ove r th e outcom

e o f th e case , voluntar

y withdrawa

l o f acomplain

t wil l no t hav e th e necessar

y judicial sanctio n or

imprimatur . Als o illustrativ e i s th e cas e la w applyin g Buckhannon t o privat e settlement

agreements , Buckhannon itsel f

explicitly distinguishe dbetwee n privat e settiemen

t agreement s accompanie d wit h a n orde r dismissin g acas e and court-ordere do r supervise dconsent-decrees , Buckhannon , 53 2 U.S . a t 605 , h i Arono v v . Napolitano , 56 2 F,3 d84 (1s t Cir . 2009) , th e Firs t

Circui t explaine d thi s distinction . I n Aronov , th e cour

t considere da

n order b y adistric t

cour t remandingacas e t o a n agency pursuant

t o asettiemen

t agreemen t between th e tw o parties . Th e cour t analyze d th e qualitie s tha

t mak e acourt' s orde

r sufficienti y simila r t o acourt-ordere dconsen

t decre e s o a s to fin

d prevailin g part

y statu s unde

r Buckhannon . Agreein g wit h othe r circuits , th e Aronov cour

t foun d tha t whethe r a n orde r coul db e formall

y labele da"consent

decree " wa s no t dispositiv e t o vkiiethe

r acour t orde r wa s sufficien

t t o confe r prevailin g part

y statu s o n aplaintif f o r defendant , 56 2 F,3 d a

t 90 , Instead , th e cour

t observe dtha

t th e prevailing-part

y inquir y shoul d focu s o n "whethe

r th e orde r contain s th e sor

t o f judicial involvemen

t andaction s inheren

t i n a 'court-ordere d consent

decree.' " Id . T o tha

t end , th e cour

t note dtha t Buckhannon describe d wha t i t mean t by a"court-ordere d consen t decree " b y distinguishin g themfi'om"privat e settlements. " Id . Th e cour

t observe dtha

t Buckhannon containe dthre e factor s tha t distinguishe d court-ordere d cotisen

t decree s fi-omprivat

e settlemen

t agreements : (1 ) th e "chang e i n th e lega l relationship [is ] court-ordered" ; (2 ) ther e mus t b e "judicia

l approva l o f th e relie f vis-a-vi s th e merit s o f th e case" ; and (3 ) there mus t b e "judicia

l oversigh t andabilit y t o enforc e th e obligation s impose d o n th e parties. " 56 2 F.3 d a t 9 0 (citin g Buckhannon , 53 2 U,S . a t 604 ; id . (citin g Kokkone n v . Guardian Lif

e Insuranc e Co . o f

America , 51 1 U.S . 375,38 1 (1994)) ; id . a t 60 4 n.7) . Th e cour t note d tha t thes e factor s ar

e typically present

i n consent

decree s because , unlik

e settiement agreements , they ar

e order s of th e court , approve db y th e court , an dar e subject t o it s oversight . 56 2 F.3 d a

t 9 1 (citin g Smyt

h v . Rivero , 28 2 F.3 d268,28 1 (4t h Cir . 2002)) . Furthermore , "[cjour

t approva l o f aconsen t decre e mus t

involv e som

e appraisa l o f th e merits. " Id . (citin g Smyth , 28 2 F.3 d a t 279) , The cour

t mus t als o mak e sur e tha t th e term s o f

aconsen t decre e ar e fai r and no t unlawful . I d(citin g Smyth , 28 2 F,3 da t 279) . Mos t

importantiy , aconsen

t decre e i s obligator

y o n th e partie s andma

y b e enforcedby th e cour

t throug h mean s suc

h a s 1 0contempt . Id . Arono v foun d tha t th e cour t order i n it s case , although i t

grante dth e plaintif

f bindin g lega

l relie f b y remandin g to th e agency a s th e plaintif f ha drequested , di dno t

contai n thes e essentia

l feature s o f

aconsen t decree , becaus e th e agency ha dvoluntarily submitte d t o such a n order . Id . a

t 92 . Therefore , th e cour

t hel dtha t th e plaintif

f wa s no t aprevailmg party . I d The Firs t Circuit' s discussio n oiBuckhanno n in Arono v i s instmctiv e here . I n th e present case , th e ALJ' s dismissa

l o f th e proceeding s wit

h prejudic e pursuan

t t o th e voluntar

y action s o f th e FA A di d no t resul t i n a n approva l or sanctionin g o f

an y chang e i n th e lega

l relationship o f

th e parties . Rather , it

merely wa s a

n acknowledgment , require db y sectio n 13.215 , tha t th e complain t ha d been voluntaril y withdraw n b y th e FAA . No r wa s th e dismissa

l orde r tantamoun

t t o acourt-approve d consen t decree , a s ther

e wa s n o agreed-upo n settlemen t tha t th e AL J approved , no r

di d th e AL

J retai n oversigh

t or jurisdictio n ove

r th e case . Se

e Buckhannon , 53 2 U.S . 604 n.7 . Whil e i t

i s tm e tha t avoluntar y dismissa l of acomplain

t vwt h prejudic e wil l result i n alega l chang e t o th e extent

tha t th e FA A caimot reinstitute th e action , in orde r to satisf y Buckhannon , thi s chang e mus t b e th e resul t

o f judicial action , no t

th e entirely voluntar

y action s of one party . Ther

e wa s n o such judicial actio n in th e present case . A s discusse d above , becaus e th e FAA' s voluntar y chang e i n conduct—^withdrawa l o f th e complaint—di d no t

resul t in ajudicially-sanctione dmateria l alteratio n of

th e lega l relationship of th e parties , i t

lack s th e necessar

y "judicia l imprimatur " t o establis h prevailin g part y statu s unde

r th e Buckhannon standard . Accordingly , Gree n i s no t entitie dto a

n awar dof attomey' s fee s an

d othe r expense s i n thi s case . "Prevailin g party " statu s i s a"threshol drequirement " tha t ever y fe e appUcan t mus t satisfy . See , e.g. . Commissioner , IN S v . Jean , 49 6 U.S . 154,16 0 (1990 ) ("h i EAJ A cases , th e 1 1cour

t first mus t determin e i f

th e applican

t i s a'prevailin g party ' by evaluatin g th e degre e of succes s obtained . If

th e Governmen

t then assert s a

n exceptio n fo

r substantia l justificatio n o r

fo r circumstance s that

rende r a n awar d unjust , th e cour

t mus t mak e asecondfinding regardin g thes e additiona l threshol d conditions.") . The "prevailin g party " determinatio n precede s andi s independen

t fro man y consideratio n of

th e government' s positio n o n th e merits . Andif th e applican t canno t establis h tha

t he o r she i s a"prevailin g party, " th e cour t nee dno t procee d an

y further , fo r th e applicant

i s no t entitle dt o attomey' s fees . III . Th e FA

A wa s substantiall y justifie di n it s positio n i n th e underlyin g litigation . Onc e i t i s establishe d tha

t th e applicant

i s aprevailin g party , th e governmen t bear s th e burden o f provin g tha

t it s positio n i n th e underlyin g litigatio n wa s substantially justifie d or tha t specia l circumstance s existed. ^ Tauche r v . Brown-Hruska . 39 6 F.3 d116 8 (D.C . Cir . 2005) . "Whethe r or no t th e positio n of

th e agency wa s substantially justifie dshal l b e determine d o n th e basi s o f th e administrativ e record , a s awhole , whic h i s made in th e adversar y adjudicatio n fo

r which fee s and other

expense s ar

e sought. " 5 U.S.C , § 504(a)(1) , T o prov e tha t it s positio n wa s substantially justified , th e agency mus t demonstrat

e tha t it s positio n wa s reasonabl e bot h i n la w an d fact . 1 4 C.F.R . § 14.04(a) ; Frev v . CFTC . 93 1 F.2 d117 1 ( 7 Cir . 1991) ; Natche z Coca-Col a t h Bottiin g Co. . Inc . v . NLRB . 75 0 F.2 d135 0 ( 5 Cir . 1985) . A s th e Suprem e Cour t explaine din Pierc e v . Underwood . 48 7 U.S . 552 , 56 5 (1988) , '"substantiall y justified ' mean s 'justifie d to a degree tha t coul d satisf

y areasonabl e person, ' o r havin g a'reasonabl e basi s bot h in la w an d 1 2fact.' " Jonesv . Luian . 88 7 F.2 d 1096 , 109 8 (D.C . Cir . 1989) . Th e substantia

l justificatio n standar d "i s satisfie d i f

ther e i s a'genuin e dispute, ' or i f reasonabl e peopl e coul ddiffe r a s t o th e appropriatenes s o f

th e conteste d action. " Pierc e v . Underwood . 48 7 U.S . a t 565 . "T o b e 'substantiall y justified ' means , o f course , mor

e tha n merely undeservin g o f

sanction s fo

r fiivolousness." Id . a

t 566 , Th e charge s in th e complaint concerne dflights operate dunde r Par t 13 5 t o and fro

mth e Bahama s ove

r aNe w Year' s weekend , wit h Eri n Daly (daughte

r o f Green' s Captain o n th e flight) occupyin g th e aircraf

t jumpsea t o n eac h flight. At issu e wa s Erin Daly' s statu s o n eac h flight: passenge r o r crewmember . Green' s operation s specification s authorize dth e us e o f th e aircraf t in nin e seat s or

les s operation s conducted unde r 1 4 C.F.R . Par

t 135 . A s apassenger , Eri n Dal y woul dhav e been th e tent h passenge

r o n thes e flights. A crewmembe r i s aperso n assigne dt o perfor mdut y i n a n aircraf t durin g flight time . 1 4 C.F.R . § 1.1 . A s aresult , a t issu e wa s whethe

r Eri n Dal y wa s assigne dfo

r eac h flight

t o perfor mdut y i n th e aircraf

t durin g flight

time . If Eri n Dal y wer e acrewmembe

r o f Green' s o n eac h flight, then sh e di dno t hav e t o b e Green' s W- 2 "employee" , but coul dhav e been acontractor . S o lon g a s she wa s assigne d t o perfor mdut y i n a n aircraf t durin g flight

time , sh e wouldhav e been acrewmember . If Eri n Dal y wer e acontracto r

or agen t fo r Green , he r action s o r inaction s ar

e attributabl e to Ckee

n an d Gree n ha s t o exercis e command and contro l ove r her activitie s o n it s part . However , Green cannot

rely o n 1 4 C.F.R . § 135.85(a) , whic h provide s tha t a n air carrie r operatin g unde

r Par t 13 5 ma y carr y acrewmembe

r or other employe e o f

th e certificat

e holde r

^ Th e FAA' s EAJAregulation s specificall yplac e th e burde n o f provin g tha t th e agency' s positio n wa s reasonabl e i n fac t an d la w o n th e agency . 1 4 C.F.R . § 1 3withou t complyin g wit h th e passenger-carryin g requirement s o f Par t 135 . Sectio n 135.85(a ) i s reall y designe d t o allo w acarg o carrie r t o carry onl y thos e peopl e liste d i n sectio n 135.85(a ) withou t havin g t o compl y wit h th e passenger-carryin g mle s o f Par t 135 . But , becaus e ther e wer e actua l passenger s o n board , sectio n 135.85(a ) wa s inapplicable . Unde r 1 4 C.F.R . sectio n 119.3 , '"all-carg o operation ' mean s an y operatio n for compensatio n o r

hir e tha t

i s othe r tha n a passenger-carryin g operatio n or , i f passenger s ar e carried , the y ar e onl y thos e specifie d i n §§121.583(a ) o r

135.8 5 o f

thi s chapter. " Green' s flights wer e no t "al l cargo " flights becaus e ther e wer e passenger s o n board . Th e administrativ e recor d o f th e cas e supporte d thes e finding s o f fac t b y th e ALJ :

• O n Decembe r

30 , 2005 , Gree n operate d aChallenge r CL60 0 aircraf

t o n acharte r flight wit h passenger s firomNe w Yor k t o th e Bahamas , returnin g o n Januar y 2 , 2006 ;

• Gree n wa s authorize d unde r it s operation s specification s t o us e th e Challenge r aircraf t i n nin e seat s o r

les s operation s conducte d unde r Part 135 ;

• Green' s weight-and-balanc e sheet s (loa d manifest ) lis t th e name s o f

th e tw o pilot s a s cre w an d includ e dat afo r nin e passengers ; • Green' s quot e for

th e charte r

flight include d alin e ite mfo r a n "attendant " at $1,600 , whic h wa s accepte d b y th e client ;

• Green' s tri p log , prepare d b y it s custome r servic e representative , liste d Eri n Dal y a s "FA" ; • Green' s eAPI S repor t t o U.S . Custom s an d Borde r Contro l o n th e da y befor e th e flight liste dEri n Dal y a s "crew" ;

• Th e FA A settle d aparalle l proceedin g agains t th e tw o Gree n pilot s throug h th e FA A droppin g th e charge s an d th e pilot s makin g n o EAJ A application ; • Th e FA A agree d o n Ma y 31 , 200 7 t o dro p th e charge s agains t Gree n upo n Green' s submissio n o f

a n affidavi t

concernin g Eri n Daly' s employmen t statu s (i. e tha t

Eri n Dal y wa s aGree n employee ; Gree n ha d n o record s othe r tha n pa y stub s evidencin g employment ; an d n o IR S o r stat e record s existe d t o substantiat e he r employment ) an d Gree n agree d no t t o pursu e a n EAJ A application ; 14.04(a) . 1 4• Th e settlement wit h Green di dno t

hol da s o n Jun e 1 , 200 7 Gree n move dto dismiss ; • Green' s Augus t

3 , 200 7 reconsideratio n motio n containe dacop y of IR S For m 109 9 listin g "nonemployee " compensatio n fo r Eri n Dal y i n th e amoun

t o f $2,100 . (Initia l Decisio n a

t 2-3) . In addition , th e AL

J foundtha

t Green' s custome

r servic e representative , wii o provide d th e quotatio n and create d th e tri p log , informedGreen' s Captai n Deil y tha t i f hi s daughte

r Erin Dal y wa s goin g o n th e trip , the n sh e woul db e expecte dt o primaril y perfor msafety-relate d dutie s and mus t b e adequately traine d t o do so , andsecondarily serv e drinks . (Initia l Decisio n a

t 5) . The AL J foim d tha t Captai n Dal

y atteste dh e provide dhi s daughte r wit h basi c familiarizatio n wit h safet y procedures , althoug h she wa s primarily to serv e drinks . (Initia l Decisio n a

t 6) . Based o n th e administrativ e record , th e AL J conclude dtha

t i t wa s no t clea r whethe r Green' s clien

t ha d contracte d fo

r someone who woul dsimpl y serv e drink s andatten dt o passenge r comfort , or

hav e onboar d aqualifie d flight

attendant traine di n safet

y procedures . Th e AL J observe d tha

t numerou s FA

A regulation s requir

e tha t a"fligh t attendant " mus t b e trained , knowledgeable , and competen t i n safet y procedure s concernin g th e passenger s and th e aircraft . (Initia

l Decisio n a

t 5) . Th e AL

J als o foun

dtha t Green wa s no t

require do n th e tri p t o provide aqualifie d flight attendant , a s th e aircraf

t wa s certificate dfo

r fewe r tha n nineteen passengers , (Initia

l Decisio n a

t 6) . Green asserte d i n litigatio n tha t Erin Dal y occupie damiddl e grounda s a"non-required " attendan t o r cabi n aide or

cabi n attendant , servin g drinks , an dthu s neithe r a s a n improperl

y traine d flight

attendant occupyin g th e aircraf

t jumpseat , nor

a s a n un-manifeste dtent

h passenge

r o n a n aircraf t certificate d fo

r only nin e passengers . Ther e wa s n o proo f

submitted , and ther

e i s 1 5n o evidenc e i n th e record , excep t Eri n Daly' s andCaptai n Daly' s statement s submitte dafte r th e complain t wa s filed, o f

ho w Gree

n a s th e certificat

e holder definedEri n Daly' s rol e a s a contractor o r agent , o r "non-required " attendant , or indee dwha

t dut y sh e wa s t o perfor

min th e aircraf t durin g flight

tim e o n behal f

o f Green a s th e certificat

e holder . The A U observe d tha

t when Gree

n asserte dtha

t Eri n Dal y require dn o trainin g becaus e she wa s anon-require d attendant , th e inquir y tume dto th e questio n o f Eri n Daly' s employmen

t status , ake

y issu e i n settiemen

t negotiation s wit

h th e FAA . Thi s inquir

y wen t to th e issu e o f whethe r Eri n Daly wa s assigne d fo r each flight

t o perfor mdut y i n th e aircraf

t durin g flight

time , and s o shoul d b e considere d acrewmember . The AL J als o observe d tha

t although thi s issu e wa s discusse dandagreed-upo n throug h Jun e 1 , 2007 , Green di d no t produc e an

y record s o f

Eri n Daly' s employmen

t unti l i n Augus t 200 7 i t produce d a

n IR S For

m109 9 listin g $2,10 0 i n "nonemployee " compensation . (Initia l Decisio n a t 6) . "Without evidenc e o f

som e employmen

t relationship, " th e A U found , "ther e wa s nothin g o f recor d t o preclude th e possibilit y tha t a n additiona

l passenger , jus t

by agreein g t o serv e drink s and si t i n th e jump-seat , coul d do n th e disguis e of anon-require dattendan

t andeasily circimiven

t th e nine-passenge

r limitatio n applicabl e t o th e CL-600. " (Initia l Decisio n a

t 6) . A s aresult , th e AL

J correcti y conclude dtha

t th e FAA' s actio n ha

dareasonabl e basi s i n la w and fact . Th e A U found : Even thoug h Green Air

wa s no t require dt o provid e aqualifiedflight attendant , i f

Ms . Dal y ha d acte d a s aflight

attendant , the n sh e woul dhav e been require dt o receiv e adequat e training. ^ I

f sh e serve da s anon-require dattendant , the n i t woul db e reasonabl e

^ Ther e i s n o provisio n i n th e FAA' s curren t rule s tha t prevent s a n ai r carrie r fro

mprovidin g a perso n acting , a s here , a "drin k server" , some , bu t no t all , fligh t attendan t training . 1 6to expec t t o se e evidenc e o f

a n employmen

t relationship . I

n orde r t o suppor t Gree n Air' s assertio n tha

t Eri n Dal y wa s no t a n un-manifeste dtent

h passenger , i t

wa s reasonabl e fo

r th e FA A t o as k fo r proo f o f a n employmen

t relationship . Green Air

wa s unable , unti l eigh t month s afte

r th e Complain

t wa s filed, t o provide an y for mo f evidenc e o f employment , albei t

"nonemployee " employment . Gree n Air' s variou s reference s to Erin Dal y a s "crew" , "attendant" , and"fligh t attendant " point

to Green Air' s own interna l confusion a s t o he

r rol e andit s complianc e wit h trainin g requirements . The lega l inquir y and factua l disput e ar e closely intertwine dandsatisf y th e EAJA' s requiremen t fo r a nexu s between th e two , (Initia l Decisio n a

t 7) , I n addition , th e AL

J correctly conclude dfi-omth e administrativ e recor dtha t Green' s weight-and-balanc e sheet s Us t th e name s o f

th e tw o pilot s andinclude dat afo r th e nin e passengers ; and tha

t althoi ^ th e Captai n denie dit , th e FA A investigator

reporte d tha

t th e Captai n di d no t

include Eri n Daly' s weigh t in th e weight-and-balanc e computation . (Initia l Decisio n a t 7). * Th e FA A had areasonabl e basi s fo r suspectin g tha

t Eri n Daly' s weigh

t wa s no t include d in th e weigh

t and balanc e calculation , a s he r nam e wa s no t describe damong th e crewmember s on either o f th e tw o loa

d manifests . No t

includin g her

weigh t i n th e aircraf

t total weigh

t calculatio n coul d lea d reasonably to th e conclusio n tha t Gree n operatedth e aircraf

t i n acareles s o

r reckles s manne r s o a s t o endange

r th e lif e or propert y o f another , i n violatio n of

1 4 C.F.R . §91.13 . Green' s dela

y i n providin g th e IR S 109 9 for mto th e FA

A ha dlef t unresolve d i n th e interi mth e issu e a s t o whethe r Eri n Dal y wa s apassenge

r or acrewmember . In light

o f th e IR S 109 9 for mtha t wa s eventually submitted . Green coul dhav e use dEri n Dal y a s acrewmembe

r (drin k server) and such crewmember s hav e n o trainin g requirements . It i s als o possibl e tha

t Eri n Dal y di d no t jus t wor k o n th e flights to andfi-omth e Bahama s a t $160 0 charge dt o th e custome r

^ Sectio n 135.6 3 o f th e Federa l Aviatio n regulation s (1 4 C.F.R . §135.63 ) require d Gree n t o prepar e a n accurat e loa d manifes t befor e eac h takeof f tha t 1 7fo

r th e service s o f

a n "attendant" , but

that she als o di dother

wor k fo r Green andthus , tha

t migh t explai n wh

y sh e made $2,100 . The AL J correctly concluded : "Th e factua l dispute s a s t o Eri n Daly' s role , training , and employmen

t status , combine d wit

h th e factua

l disput e a s to computatio n o f

weigh t and balanc e establis h tha

t th e FA A had substantia

l justificatio n fo

r it s action. " (Initia

l Decisio n at

7) . CONCLUSIO

N WHEREFORE , th e FA

A respectfiilly request s tha

t Green' s appea

l o f th e denia l o f it s applicatio n fo r attomey fee s an

d expense s b e denie di n it s entirety . Respectfull

y submitted , ALFRE D R . JOHNSON , JR . Regiona l Counsel

Christia n Levj^ r Attome y Tel : 718.553.327 3 Fax : 718.995.569 9

include d th e identificatio n o f cre w member s an d thei r cre w positio n assignments . 1 8CERTMCATE O F SERVIC E I hereb y certif y tha t o n thi s dat

e copie s of th e FAA' s respons e to orde r fo r fiirthe r briefing wa s sen

t b y Federa l Expres s Overnigh t to th e following : Federa l Aviatio n Administratio n 80 0 Independenc e Avenue , S.W . Washington , D.C . 2059 1 Attn : Appellat

e Docket Cler k Gregor y Winton , Esq . Aviatio n La

w Experts , LL

C One Research Court , Suit

e 45 0 Rockville , M

D 2085 0 Tel : 301,294.855 0 Fax : 301.294.252 5

Dated : 0 ^ J^.?y\ o Christia n Attome; ^

1 9