alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ex parte KARNER.

No. A-11954.

Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

July 8, 1953.

*335Paul W. Updegraff, Norman, for petitioner.

Hez Bussey, County Atty. Cleveland County, Norman, for respondent.

JONES, Judge.

This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus insitituted by the' petitioner Allan Earner for the purpose of being admitted to bail on a charge of robbery with firearms pending against the petitioner in the District Court of Cleveland County. The verified petition alleges that the petitioner is restrained in the County Jail of Cleveland County at Norman, Oklahoma, and that prior to his incarceration, he was stationed at the Naval Air Technical Training Center at Norman, and that he is not guilty as charged and the presumption is not great nor the proof evident that he is guilty of robbery with firearms, as charged in the information.

At a hearing before this court, the defendant testified and his evidence was in the nature of an alibi. There was proof of the State which included positive identification of the defendant as the person who committed a robbery at the Santa Fe depot in Norman. It is unnecessary to give a summary of the evidence or to comment upon the same, as the defendant will later be tried for the alleged commission of this offense. It is sufficient to state that a sufficient showing has been made to entitle the defendant to be admitted to bail. 22 O.S.1951 § 1102; Ex parte Sistrunk, 84 Okl.Cr. 17, 178 P.2d 627.

It is therefore ordered that the petitioner Allan Earner be admitted to bail in the reasonable sum of $15,000, said bond to be conditioned as provided by,law, to be approved by the Court Clerk of Cleveland County, that when said bond is given and approved by the court clerk of said county, the petitioner be discharged from custody.

POWELL, P. J., and BRETT, J., concur.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 117 (Thursday, August 2, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5708]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

           By Mr. KUCINICH:
       H.R. 6290.
       Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       The constitutional authority on which this bill rests is 
     Article I, Section 8, which enumerates the power of Congress 
     to make rules for the government and regulation of the land 
     and naval forces. The bill will assert Congress' 
     constitutionally granted authority to decide whether America 
     enters into war, continues a war, or otherwise introduces 
     armed forces or materiel into hostilities.
```
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-21-00082-CR 

 

AMBER ROSE EDMONDS, APPELLANT 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

On Appeal from the 264th District Court 

 Bell County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 83002, Honorable Paul L. LePak, Presiding 

June 22, 2021 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 

Appellant Amber Rose Edmonds, proceeding pro se, was convicted of possession 

of a controlled substance,

1 enhanced, and sentenced to five years’ confinement.2 The 

trial court’s certification of Appellant’s right of appeal reflects that this is a plea bargain 

case from which Appellant has no right of appeal and that Appellant has waived the right 

1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(b) (West 2017).

2 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the 

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 

(West 2013).
2

of appeal. The certification comports with the record before the Court. See Dears v. 

State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Notwithstanding the certification, 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging her conviction.

We are required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d) to dismiss an appeal “if a 

certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of 

the record.” By letter of May 7, 2021, we notified Appellant of the consequences of the 

trial court’s certification and directed her to file a response demonstrating grounds for 

continuing the appeal. By letter filed on May 28, 2021, Appellant notified the Court that 

she no longer seeks to appeal her conviction. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal based on the trial court’s certification and 

Appellant’s request to dismiss. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d), 42.2(a).

Per Curiam

Do not publish.
AFS-10-144-E March 12, 2010 Exemption No. 8333C Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2003-15381

E. Tazewell Ellett, Esq. Counsel for Amerijet International, Inc. Hogan & Hartson, LLP 555 Thirteenth Street, NW. Washington, DC 20004

Dear Mr. Ellett:

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your petition to extend Exemption No. 8333, as amended. It explains the basis for our decision and describes its effect.

The Basis for Our Decision

By letter dated January 28, 2010, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of Amerijet International, Inc. (Ame rijet), for an extension of Exemption No. 8333, as amended. That exemption from § 91.303(f) and 91.307(c) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) allows Amerijet to operate a specially modified Boeing 727 aircraft (B-727) under 14 CFR part 121 on behalf of the Ze ro Gravity Corporation in parabolic flight operations (1) when the flight visibility is less than 3 statute miles and (2) without each occupant of the aircraft wearing an approved parachute when the pilot executes an intentional maneuver that exceeds a nose-up or nose-down attitude of 30 degrees relative to the horizon.

In your petition, you indicate that there has been no change in the conditions and reasons relative to public interest and safety that were the basis for granting the original exemption.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition

in the Federal Register because the requested extension of the exemption would not set a precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Amerijet.2

Our Decision

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 8333, as amended, remains valid with respect to this exemption and is in the public interest. Therefore, under the authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator has delegated to me, I grant your petition.

The Effect of Our Decision

Our decision extends the termination date of Exemption No. 8333, as amended, to May 31, 2012, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

All conditions and limitations of Exemption No. 8333, as amended, remain the same. This letter must be attached to, and is a part of, Exemption No. 8333.

Sincerely,

/s/

John W. McGraw Acting Director, Flight Standards

Service
##### 



EXHIBIT 21.0
 CRAFTMADE INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES
SUBSIDIARIES OF CRAFTMADE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
AS OF JUNE 30, 2006
  State ofCorporate Name
    
    OrganizationDurocraft International, Inc.
    
    TexasC/D/R Incorporated
    
    DelawareTeiber Lighting Products, Inc.
    
    TexasTrade Source International, Inc. (TSI)
    
    DelawareTSI Prime Asia Limited
    
    Hong KongElitex Development Limited
    
    Hong KongPrime/Home Impressions, LLC
(in which TSI owns a 50% interest)
    
    North CarolinaDesign Trends, LLC
(in which Craftmade owns a 50%
interest)
    
    Delaware
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 118 (Friday, August 3, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5715]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                              THE JOURNAL

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3(a) of House Resolution 
747, the Journal of the last day's proceedings is approved.

                          ____________________
```
#### Honora E. Forte, Respondent, v Thomas S. Vaccaro et al., Appellants.

— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Molloy, J.), dated January 5, 1990, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to demonstrate that the plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendants’ motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

A review of the record demonstrates that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case that she sustained "serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Among the injuries claimed by the plaintiff are sprain of the cervical and lumbosacral spines with radiculitis, contusions and sprains of the pelvis and acute thoracic sprain with continuing pain and suffering, residual functional limitations, and restriction of range of motion. Although the plaintiff continued to be treated by an orthopedic surgeon approximately two years subsequent to the accident, neither the affidavit submitted by that physician nor the medical reports previously prepared demonstrated that the purported limitations suffered by the plaintiff were objectively measured or quantified *(see, Philpotts v Petrovic,*160 AD2d 856, 857).

The mere repetition of the word "permanent” in the affidavits of a plaintiff or a treating physician does not suffice to establish serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Summary judgment should be granted to the defendant where the plaintiff’s evidence is limited to conclusory assertions tailored to meet statutory requirements *(see, Lopez v Senatore,*65 NY2d 1017, 1019).

Since the X-rays taken of the plaintiff were negative for fractures, the record contains no indication that other diagnostic tests were performed, and the plaintiff conceded that she only missed two days of work after the accident, the *154plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact on the crucial issue of "serious injury”. Under the circumstances, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted *(see, Scheer v Koubek,*70 NY2d 678; *Adolphe v Ramirez,*173 AD2d 583; *Reid v Spivack,*160 AD2d 859). Kunzeman, J. P., Sullivan, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Ronnie Dale Walker, * From the 104 th District

Court of Taylor County,

Trial Court No. 19306B

.

Vs. No. 11

- 15

- 00165

- CR * May 27 , 2016

T he State of Texas, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J. , and Bailey, J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the

appeal should be dismissed. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s

opinion, the appeal is dismissed.
USDA APHIS

2150 Centre Ave

Fort Collins, Co 80526

Data Source:

Reports to OIE by the

United States and Canada

These data, and all the information contained therein, have been collected by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), or by its cooperators on APHIS’ behalf, for restricted government purposes only and is

the sole property of APHIS. See full disclaimer: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/help/data-disclaimer

United States

Department of

Agriculture

RABBIT HEMORRHAGIC DISEASE VIRUS 2 (RHDV2)

For a map of the current outbreak, visit

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/maps/animal-health/rhd

As reported to OIE July 2016 - March 14, 2020

These cases are genetically different from the current outbreak

that started in late March 2020 in the southwest U.S.

Historic Detections in the United States and Canada

U.S. RHDV2 Detections

Onset year

2018

2019

2020

Canada RHDV2 Detections

Onset year

2016

2018 0 250 500

Miles

0 250 500

Kilometers

Date Created:

10/27/2022 [

Washington,

United States

British Columbia,

Canada
|Exhibit 23.1
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
          We have issued our report dated March 27, 2007, accompanying the consolidated financial statements and schedule included in the Annual Report of Castelle on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the Registration Statements of Castelle on Forms S-8 (File No. 333-75247, File No. 333-21845, and File No. 333-06083).
          /s/ Grant Thornton LLP San Francisco, CA March 27, 2007
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|
|
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tony O’Neal LLOYD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-11720

Non-Argument Calendar.

D.C. Docket No. 04-00069-CR-WS.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 14, 2005.

Kristen Gartman Rogers, Carlos Alfredo Williams, Federal Defender Org., Mobile, AL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Richard H. Loftin, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before HULL, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Tony O’Neal Lloyd appeals his sentence of 120 months of imprisonment based on his conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lloyd argues that because he committed his crime after *Blakely v. Washington,*542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), but before *United States v. Booker,*— U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the district court violated his rights under the ex post facto principle of fair warning in the Due Process Clause when it enhanced his sentence based on post-verdict findings of fact and retroactively applied the sentencing guidelines as advisory. Because, as Lloyd concedes, we have rejected this argument, *United States v. Duncan,*400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir.2005), and “only the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc can judicially overrule a prior panel decision,” *United States v. Marte,*356 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11th Cir.2004), we affirm.

AFFIRMED.
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

 Case No. 5D22-2727

LT Case No. 2021-CF-948-A

_____________________________

STEVEN MERIC GUNKLE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County.

Joel D. Fritton, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Teresa D. Sutton, 

Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard A. 

Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellee.

October 17, 2023

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

MAKAR, HARRIS, and SOUD, JJ., concur.
2

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
#### John Thomas WRIGHT, Plaintiff in Error, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A-12331.

Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

Sept. 5, 1956.

S. S. Lawrence, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

BRETT, Judge.

John Thomas Wright, plaintiff in error, defendant below, was charged in the Municipal Criminal Court of City of Tulsa, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, with the offense of operating a motor vehicle on a public street of the City of Tulsa on May 8, 1955, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was tried without a jury by the Honorable Harry Seaton, Judge, convicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of $100. Judgment and sentence were entered accordingly, from which this appeal has been perfected.

The case was set for oral argument on July 16, 1956. No briefs were filed and said cause was submitted on oral argument and the record. We have examined the record and find the same free from reversible error.

While the evidence herein is conflicting, the same is sufficient to sustain the trial judge’s findings of fact. Judgment is affirmed.

POWELL, J., concurs.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 112 (Wednesday, July 25, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5291]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

            By Mr. THOMPSON of California:
        H.R. 6182.
        Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       The Congress enacts this bill pursuant to Sections 7 & 8 of 
     Article I of the United States Constitution and Amendment XVI 
     of the United States Constitution.
```
#### Elizabeth Davidman, Respondent, v Samuel H. Davidman, Appellant.

— In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Durante, J.), dated September 27, 1989, as denied those branches of his cross motion which were to dismiss the first, third, fifth and sixth causes of action asserted in the complaint, and granted the plaintiff wife’s motion to the *233extent of awarding her $5,000 per month for pendente lite maintenance and $15,000 for pendente lite counsel fees.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by (1) deleting the first decretal paragraph thereof and substituting therefor a provision granting those branches of the defendant’s cross motion which were to dismiss the fifth and sixth causes of action and otherwise denying the cross motion, and (2) deleting from the fifth decretal paragraph the words "the sum of $15,000”, and substituting therefor the words "the sum of $7,500”; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

In the first and third causes of action of the complaint, the plaintiff wife seeks, in the alternative, a divorce or separation, predicated upon a claim of cruel and inhuman treatment by the defendant. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the allegations set forth in those causes of action are sufficient to preclude dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see, *Miglio v Miglio,*147 AD2d 460; *cf., Pone v Pone,*129 AD2d 957). Further, we find no basis to disturb the Supreme Court’s award to the plaintiff of $5,000 per month for pendente lite maintenance.

However, we do agree with the defendant that the fifth and sixth causes of action in the complaint, seeking, in relevant part, the imposition of a constructive trust with regard to the marital residence, should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). The plaintiff had no prior interest in the marital residence, which was acquired by the defendant prior to the parties’ marriage, and her allegations are insufficient to establish that the defendant’s failure to fulfill his alleged oral promise to convey an interest in the marital residence has resulted in his unjust enrichment *(see, Onorato v Lupoli,*135 AD2d 693, 695).

In addition, we find that the award to the plaintiff of $15,000 for pendente lite counsel fees was excessive and should be reduced to $7,500. Our determination is without prejudice to a further application by the plaintiff for counsel fees before the trial court. Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Lawrence and Miller, JJ., concur.
# C_2008079EN.01002301.xml

| 29.3.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 79/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.3.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 79/23

---

Action brought on 25 January 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic

(Case C-31/08)

(2008/C 79/39)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: C. Zadra, acting as Agent)

Applicant:

Defendant: Italian Republic

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Commission Directive 2006/51/EC of 6 June 2006 (1) amending for the purposes of adapting to technical progress Annex I to Directive 2005/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and Annexes IV and V to Directive 2005/78/EC (3) as regards requirements for the emission control monitoring system for use in vehicles and exemptions for gas engines and, in any event, by failing to communicate such provisions to the Commission, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3 of that directive; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Commission Directive 2006/51/EC of 6 June 2006 (1) amending for the purposes of adapting to technical progress Annex I to Directive 2005/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and Annexes IV and V to Directive 2005/78/EC (3) as regards requirements for the emission control monitoring system for use in vehicles and exemptions for gas engines and, in any event, by failing to communicate such provisions to the Commission, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3 of that directive;

1

2

3

| — | order the Italian Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The period for transposition of Directive 2006/51/EC expired on 8 November 2006.

---

(1)  OJ L 152 of 7.6.2006, p. 11.

1

(2)  OJ L 275 of 20.10.2005, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ L 313 of 29.11.2005, p. 1.

3

---
AL'S 

AERIAL SPRAYING, LLC 

Spraying - Fertilizing - Seeding 

Michael D. Schiffer 

December 12, 2011 

~ \SD«-'\ 

3473 N. Shepardsville Rd. 

Ovid, Ml 48866 

(989) 834-5067 

Fax (989) 834-5098 

VIA EMAIL AND FEDERAL EXPRESS 

Marc L. Warren, ting Chief Counsel 

Federal Aviatio Administration 

800 Indepen nee Avenue, S.W. 

Room 90 ast 

Washi ton, D.C. 20591 

Dear Mr. Warren: 

Re: Al's Aerial Spraying, LLC 

Exemption 10142A 

FAA Docket No. FAA 2010-0134 

Albert E. Schiffer 

A1's Aerial Spraying, LLC hereby requests the FAA to renew and/or extend the 

termination date ofExemption No. 10142A as amended for a two-year period from April30, 

2012, or for such longer period as the FAA may deem appropriate. 

This exemption from 14 CFR § 137.5l(b)(4)(i) allows Al's Aerial Spraying to use a 

single engine turbo-propeller-powered Air Tractor aircraft to make turnarounds over congested 

areas in a loaded configuration, subject to listed conditions and limitations. 

There has been no change in the conditions and reasons relative to public interest and 

safety that were the basis for granting the original exemption. Al's Aerial Spraying, LLC has 

strictly complied with all of the conditions and limitations set forth in the exemption. It has 

collected and submitted all of the requested data to their FAA Principal Operations Inspector. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, Al's Aerial Spraying, LLC requests the FAA to extend 

and/or renew Exemption No. 10142A for an additional two-year period from. April30, 2012, or 

for such longer period as the FAA may deem appropriate. 

CC: Carl N. Johnson, Manager FSS Operations & FAAST Support Branch