The Honorable Ross A. Walters, United States Magistrate Judge 1

for the Southern District of Iowa, acting upon consent of the

parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 96-1750

___________

Starlet L. Pegump, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Rockwell International *

Corporation; International *

Brotherhood of Electrical *

Workers, Local Union 1634, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: January 15, 1997

 Filed: March 21, 1997

___________

Before BEAM, ROSS, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Starlet Pegump appeals the district court’s grant of summary 1

judgment for defendants Rockwell International Corporation

(Rockwell) and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

Union Local 1634 (Union) in her action for breach of the collective

bargaining agreement and for breach of the duty of fair

representation. We affirm. 
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Pegump had seen a psychiatrist, complaining that she was

2

often tired. The psychiatrist, Dr. Castillo, prescribed antidepressant medication for Pegump at that time. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Pegump worked for Rockwell as an assembler until she was

suspended and fired for allegedly threatening to shoot two fellow

employees. Two of Pegump’s coworkers reported that they overheard

her threaten to bring a gun to work and shoot two plant managers.

Pegump denied ever making the statement but said that if she had

made the statement, she would have only been joking.

 

Following an investigation, Rockwell’s security director

determined that Pegump had probably made the statement, whether or

not in jest. Concerned that she posed a risk to plant safety,

Rockwell suspended Pegump from work on August 25, 1994, pending

further investigation. 

During the course of this investigation, Pegump’s

psychiatrist wrote a letter on her behalf, stating that Pegump had 2

never posed a risk to herself or to others. In response to this

letter, and in an effort to confirm the psychiatrist’s conclusion,

Rockwell requested a medical release from Pegump to discuss the

situation with her psychiatrist, or, in the alternative, for Pegump

to meet with a Rockwell-provided psychiatrist to discuss her mental

condition. Pegump refused to give such a release, arguing that her

medical records had nothing to do with her suspension. She was

fired on February 7, 1995. 

Immediately following Pegump’s suspension, the Union filed a

grievance with Rockwell on Pegump’s behalf. After Pegump refused

Rockwell’s medical release request, the Union president encouraged
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Pegump to cooperate with the investigation and informed her that

her lack of cooperation was preventing the Union from proceeding
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with her grievance. In response to this letter, Pegump reiterated

her belief that her medical records were irrelevant to her

suspension and continued to refuse to issue the release. 

Pegump brought this action in state court against Rockwell for

breach of the collective bargaining agreement and against the Union

for breach of its duty of fair representation. The action was

later removed to federal court. Both Rockwell and the Union filed

motions for summary judgment which the district court granted. The

district court found that Rockwell could properly suspend and

terminate Pegump under the available facts and that the Union had

provided reasonable assistance to Pegump. On appeal, Pegump argues

that summary judgment was not proper because genuine issues of

material fact exist.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of

material fact is present and judgment should be awarded to the

movant as a matter of law. Yowell v. Combs, 89 F.3d 542, 544 (8th

Cir. 1996). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of

the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We review the entry of summary judgment de

novo, giving the nonmoving party the benefit of every reasonable

inference drawn from the evidence. Yowell, 89 F.3d at 544. 

Pegump brought this action under section 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. That statute allows a

labor organization representing an employee to bring a breach of

contract suit against an employer for a labor violation. For an

employee to bring such a suit on her own behalf, prior to the

exhaustion of internal grievance procedures, however, she must
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allege both that the employer committed a labor violation, and that

the union has violated its duty of fair representation. Vaca v.
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Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). The district court found that

Pegump failed to prove either allegation. We agree. 

We first address Pegump’s allegations that the Union breached

its duty of fair representation. Pegump claims that the Union

arbitrarily refused to process her grievance, or in the

alternative, processed it in a perfunctory manner. A union is

granted broad latitude in its dealings with its members and its

performance is viewed in a highly deferential light. Air Line

Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991). A breach

of the duty of fair representation occurs only when a union’s

conduct is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Vaca, 386

U.S. at 190. Applying those standards, we find that the Union did

not breach its duty of fair representation.

It is undisputed that immediately following Pegump’s

suspension, the Union filed a grievance with Rockwell. Although

the Union later ceased its efforts to process the grievance, it did

so only after Pegump refused to cooperate in the investigation of

her conduct. Additionally, the Union president participated in the

investigation of the situation. He spoke with all persons who had

direct knowledge of the alleged threats: Pegump, the coworker to

whom she made the statement, and the two coworkers that overheard

and reported the statement. The president also discussed Pegump’s

situation with the international union representative, Rockwell’s

Human Resource Department, security personnel at other facilities,

and Pegump’s attorney. 

Although the Union president concurred with Rockwell in

requesting Pegump’s medical information, that position was not

unreasonable. Because of the evidence surrounding the statement

and Pegump’s recent treatment for depression, the Union can hardly
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be faulted for such cooperation. Although Pegump may believe the

Union was a less than zealous advocate, under the facts of this 
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case, the Union simply did not breach its duty of fair

representation to her. 

Pegump’s section 301 claim fails for the additional reason

that Rockwell’s actions did not violate the collective bargaining

agreement (CBA). The CBA allowed for the termination of Union

employees for just cause. A violation of Rockwell’s employee

handbook policy prohibiting disruptive or offensive behavior

constitutes such cause. The right to discharge for cause

necessarily implies the right to reasonably investigate whether

such cause exists. Under the facts of this case, no jury could

find that Rockwell’s request for a medical release, to rule out any

danger posed by Pegump’s mental condition, was beyond the scope of

a reasonable investigation of the situation or its potential for

harm. Therefore, as a matter of law, Rockwell’s actions did not

violate the CBA. We have considered the remainder of Pegump’s

arguments and find them to be without merit. 

III. CONCLUSION

Finding no error in the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Rockwell and the Union, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.