H5552 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

Price (NC) 

Quigley 

Rahall 

Rangel 

Reyes 

Richardson 

Richmond 

Ross (AR) 

Rothman (NJ) 

Roybal-Allard 

Ruppersberger 

Rush 

Ryan (OH) 

Sa ́nchez, Linda 

T. 

Sanchez, Loretta 

Sarbanes 

Schakowsky 

Schiff 

Schrader 

Schwartz 

Scott (VA) 

Scott, David 

Serrano 

Sewell 

Sherman 

Shuler 

Sires 

Slaughter 

Smith (WA) 

Speier 

Stark 

Sutton 

Thompson (CA) 

Thompson (MS) 

Tierney 

Tonko 

Towns 

Tsongas 

Van Hollen 

Vela ́ zquez 

Visclosky 

Walz (MN) 

Wasserman 

Schultz 

Waters 

Watt 

Waxman 

Welch 

Wilson (FL) 

Woolsey 

Yarmuth 

NOT VOTING—6 

Akin 

Cardoza 

Dingell 

Gutierrez 

Jackson (IL) 

McKinley 

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (during 

the vote). There are 2 minutes remaining. 

b 1420 

So the resolution, as amended, was 

agreed to. 

The result of the vote was announced 

as above recorded. 

A motion to reconsider was laid on 

the table. 

f 

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE 

A message from the Senate by Ms. 

Curtis, one of its clerks, announced 

that the Senate has agreed to a concurrent resolution of the following title in 

which the concurrence of the House is 

requested: 

S. Con. Res. 55. Concurrent resolution directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives to make a correction in the enrollment 

of H.R. 1627. 

f 

CORRECTING THE ENROLLMENT 

OF H.R. 1627 

Mr. MILLER of Florida. Mr. Speaker, 

I ask unanimous consent to take from 

the Speaker’s table the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 55) directing the 

Clerk of the House of Representatives 

to make a correction in the enrollment 

of H.R. 1627, and ask for its immediate 

consideration in the House. 

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there 

objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida? 

There was no objection. 

The text of the concurrent resolution 

is as follows: 

S. CON. RES. 55 

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That, in the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 1627) an Act to amend 

title 38, United States Code, to furnish hospital care and medical services to veterans 

who were stationed at Camp Lejeune, North 

Carolina, while the water was contaminated 

at Camp Lejeune, to improve the provision of 

housing assistance to veterans and their 

families, and for other purposes, the Clerk of 

the House of Representatives shall make the 

following correction: in section 201, strike 

‘‘Andrew Connelly’’ and insert ‘‘Andrew Connolly’’. 

The concurrent resolution was concurred in. 

A motion to reconsider was laid on 

the table. 

f 

PRESENTATION OF CONGRESSIONAL GOLD MEDAL TO DAW 

AUNG SAN SUU KYI 

Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 

consent that the Committee on House 

Administration be discharged from further consideration of the concurrent 

resolution (H. Con. Res. 135) authorizing the use of the rotunda of the Capitol for the presentation of the Congressional Gold Medal to Daw Aung 

San Suu Kyi, in recognition of her 

leadership and perseverance in the 

struggle for freedom and democracy in 

Burma, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House. 

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there 

objection to the request of the gentleman from California? 

There was no objection. 

The text of the concurrent resolution 

is as follows: 

H. CON. RES. 135 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the 

Senate concurring), 

SECTION 1. USE OF ROTUNDA FOR PRESENTATION OF CONGRESSIONAL GOLD 

MEDAL TO DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI. 

The rotunda of the Capitol is authorized to 

be used on September 19, 2012, for the presentation of the Congressional Gold Medal to 

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in recognition of her 

leadership and perseverance in the struggle 

for freedom and democracy in Burma. Physical preparations for the ceremony shall be 

carried out in accordance with such conditions as the Architect of the Capitol may 

prescribe. 

The concurrent resolution was agreed 

to. 

A motion to reconsider was laid on 

the table. 

f 

HOUR OF MEETING ON TOMORROW 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I 

ask unanimous consent that when the 

House adjourns today, it adjourn to 

meet at 9 a.m. tomorrow. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there 

objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Florida? 

There was no objection. 

f 

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER 

PRO TEMPORE 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair 

will postpone further proceedings 

today on motions to suspend the rules 

on which a recorded vote or the yeas 

and nays are ordered, or on which the 

vote incurs objection under clause 6 of 

rule XX. 

Record votes on postponed questions 

will be taken later. 

f 

IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND 

SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I 

move to suspend the rules and agree to 

the resolution (H. Res. 750) providing 

for the concurrence by the House in the 

Senate amendment to H.R. 1905, with 

an amendment. 

The Clerk read the title of the resolution. 

The text of the resolution is as follows: 

H. RES. 750 

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this 

resolution the bill (H.R. 1905) entitled ‘‘An 

Act to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the 

purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its 

pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities, and for other purposes.’’, 

with the Senate amendment thereto, shall be 

considered to have been taken from the 

Speaker’s table to the end that the Senate 

amendment thereto be, and the same is hereby, agreed to with the following amendment: 

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the amendment of the Senate, insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as 

the ‘‘Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 

Rights Act of 2012’’. 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

TITLE I—EXPANSION OF MULTILATERAL 

SANCTIONS REGIME WITH RESPECT TO 

IRAN 

Sec. 101. Sense of Congress on enforcement of 

multilateral sanctions regime and 

expansion and implementation of 

sanctions laws. 

Sec. 102. Diplomatic efforts to expand multilateral sanctions regime. 

TITLE II—EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF 

IRAN AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS 

OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY IRAN 

Subtitle A—Expansion of the Iran Sanctions Act 

of 1996 

Sec. 201. Expansion of sanctions with respect to 

the energy sector of Iran. 

Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

transportation of crude oil from 

Iran and evasion of sanctions by 

shipping companies. 

Sec. 203. Expansion of sanctions with respect to 

development by Iran of weapons 

of mass destruction. 

Sec. 204. Expansion of sanctions available 

under the Iran Sanctions Act of 

1996. 

Sec. 205. Modification of waiver standard under 

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. 

Sec. 206. Briefings on implementation of the 

Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. 

Sec. 207. Expansion of definitions under the 

Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. 

Sec. 208. Sense of Congress on energy sector of 

Iran. 

Subtitle B—Additional Measures Relating to 

Sanctions Against Iran 

Sec. 211. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

the provision of vessels or shipping services to transport certain 

goods related to proliferation or 

terrorism activities to Iran. 

Sec. 212. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

provision of underwriting services 

or insurance or reinsurance for 

the National Iranian Oil Company or the National Iranian 

Tanker Company. 

Sec. 213. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt. 


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Sec. 214. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

subsidiaries and agents of persons 

sanctioned by United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

Sec. 215. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

transactions with persons sanctioned for certain activities relating to terrorism or proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction. 

Sec. 216. Expansion of, and reports on, mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions that engage 

in certain activities relating to 

Iran. 

Sec. 217. Continuation in effect of sanctions 

with respect to the Government of 

Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, 

and sanctions evaders. 

Sec. 218. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by foreign 

subsidiaries. 

Sec. 219. Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission relating to 

sanctionable activities. 

Sec. 220. Reports on, and authorization of imposition of sanctions with respect 

to, the provision of specialized financial messaging services to the 

Central Bank of Iran and other 

sanctioned Iranian financial institutions. 

Sec. 221. Identification of, and immigration restrictions on, senior officials of 

the Government of Iran and their 

family members. 

Sec. 222. Sense of Congress and rule of construction relating to certain authorities of State and local governments. 

Sec. 223. Government Accountability Office report on foreign entities that invest 

in the energy sector of Iran or export refined petroleum products to 

Iran. 

Sec. 224. Reporting on the importation to and 

exportation from Iran of crude oil 

and refined petroleum products. 

TITLE III—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 

Subtitle A—Identification of, and Sanctions 

With Respect to, Officials, Agents, Affiliates, 

and Supporters of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 

Corps and Other Sanctioned Persons 

Sec. 301. Identification of, and imposition of 

sanctions with respect to, officials, agents, and affiliates of 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 

Corps. 

Sec. 302. Identification of, and imposition of 

sanctions with respect to, persons 

that support or conduct certain 

transactions with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or other 

sanctioned persons. 

Sec. 303. Identification of, and imposition of 

measures with respect to, foreign 

government agencies carrying out 

activities or transactions with certain Iran-affiliated persons. 

Sec. 304. Rule of construction. 

Subtitle B—Additional Measures Relating to 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Sec. 311. Expansion of procurement prohibition 

to foreign persons that engage in 

certain transactions with Iran’s 

Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

Sec. 312. Determinations of whether the National Iranian Oil Company and 

the National Iranian Tanker 

Company are agents or affiliates 

of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 

Corps. 

TITLE IV—MEASURES RELATING TO 

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN 

Subtitle A—Expansion of Sanctions Relating to 

Human Rights Abuses in Iran 

Sec. 401. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for or complicit 

in human rights abuses committed 

against citizens of Iran or their 

family members after the June 12, 

2009, elections in Iran. 

Sec. 402. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

the transfer of goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to 

be used to commit human rights 

abuses. 

Sec. 403. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

persons who engage in censorship 

or other related activities against 

citizens of Iran. 

Subtitle B—Additional Measures to Promote 

Human Rights 

Sec. 411. Codification of sanctions with respect 

to grave human rights abuses by 

the governments of Iran and 

Syria using information technology. 

Sec. 412. Clarification of sensitive technologies 

for purposes of procurement ban 

under Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010. 

Sec. 413. Expedited consideration of requests for 

authorization of certain human 

rights-, humanitarian-, and democracy-related activities with respect to Iran. 

Sec. 414. Comprehensive strategy to promote 

Internet freedom and access to information in Iran. 

Sec. 415. Statement of policy on political prisoners. 

TITLE V—MISCELLANEOUS 

Sec. 501. Exclusion of citizens of Iran seeking 

education relating to the nuclear 

and energy sectors of Iran. 

Sec. 502. Interests in certain financial assets of 

Iran. 

Sec. 503. Technical correction to section 1245 of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. 

Sec. 504. Expansion of sanctions under section 

1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2012. 

Sec. 505. Reports on natural gas exports from 

Iran. 

Sec. 506. Report on membership of Iran in international organizations. 

Sec. 507. Sense of Congress on exportation of 

goods, services, and technologies 

for aircraft produced in the 

United States. 

TITLE VI—GENERAL PROVISIONS 

Sec. 601. Implementation; penalties. 

Sec. 602. Applicability to certain intelligence 

activities. 

Sec. 603. Applicability to certain natural gas 

projects. 

Sec. 604. Rule of construction with respect to 

use of force against Iran and 

Syria. 

Sec. 605. Termination. 

TITLE VII—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SYRIA 

Sec. 701. Short title. 

Sec. 702. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

certain persons who are responsible for or complicit in human 

rights abuses committed against 

citizens of Syria or their family 

members. 

Sec. 703. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

the transfer of goods or technologies to Syria that are likely to 

be used to commit human rights 

abuses. 

Sec. 704. Imposition of sanctions with respect to 

persons who engage in censorship 

or other forms of repression in 

Syria. 

Sec. 705. Waiver. 

Sec. 706. Termination. 

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

Except as otherwise specifically provided, in 

this Act: 

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional 

committees’’ has the meaning given that term in 

section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 

(Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note). 

(2) FINANCIAL TRANSACTION.—The term ‘‘financial transaction’’ means any transfer of 

value involving a financial institution, including the transfer of forwards, futures, options, 

swaps, or precious metals, including gold, silver, 

platinum, and palladium. 

(3) KNOWINGLY.—The term ‘‘knowingly’’ has 

the meaning given that term in section 14 of the 

Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 

50 U.S.C. 1701 note). 

(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United 

States person’’ has the meaning given that term 

in section 101 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 

2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511). 

TITLE I—EXPANSION OF MULTILATERAL 

SANCTIONS REGIME WITH RESPECT TO 

IRAN 

SEC. 101. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME AND EXPANSION AND 

IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS 

LAWS. 

It is the sense of Congress that the goal of 

compelling Iran to abandon efforts to acquire a 

nuclear weapons capability and other threatening activities can be effectively achieved 

through a comprehensive policy that includes 

economic sanctions, diplomacy, and military 

planning, capabilities and options, and that this 

objective is consistent with the one stated by 

President Barack Obama in the 2012 State of the 

Union Address: ‘‘Let there be no doubt: America 

is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the 

table to achieve that goal’’. Among the economic 

measures to be taken are— 

(1) prompt enforcement of the current multilateral sanctions regime with respect to Iran; 

(2) full, timely, and vigorous implementation 

of all sanctions enacted into law, including 

sanctions imposed or expanded by this Act or 

amendments made by this Act, through— 

(A) intensified monitoring by the President 

and the designees of the President, including 

the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 

State, and senior officials in the intelligence 

community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)), 

as appropriate; 

(B) more extensive use of extraordinary authorities provided for under the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq.) and other sanctions laws; 

(C) reallocation of resources to provide the 

personnel necessary, within the Department of 

the Treasury, the Department of State, and the 

Department of Commerce, and, where appropriate, the intelligence community, to apply and 

enforce sanctions; and 

(D) expanded cooperation with international 

sanctions enforcement efforts; 

(3) urgent consideration of the expansion of 

existing sanctions with respect to such areas 

as— 

(A) the provision of energy-related services to 

Iran; 

(B) the provision of insurance and reinsurance services to Iran; 

(C) the provision of shipping services to Iran; 

and 

(D) those Iranian financial institutions not 

yet designated for the imposition of sanctions 


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H5554 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

that may be acting as intermediaries for Iranian 

financial institutions that are designated for the 

imposition of sanctions; and 

(4) a focus on countering Iran’s efforts to 

evade sanctions, including— 

(A) the activities of telecommunications, Internet, and satellite service providers, in and outside of Iran, to ensure that such providers are 

not participating in or facilitating, directly or 

indirectly, the evasion of the sanctions regime 

with respect to Iran or violations of the human 

rights of the people of Iran; 

(B) the activities of financial institutions or 

other businesses or government agencies, in or 

outside of Iran, not yet designated for the imposition of sanctions; and 

(C) urgent and ongoing evaluation of Iran’s 

energy, national security, financial, and telecommunications sectors, to gauge the effects of, 

and possible defects in, particular sanctions, 

with prompt efforts to correct any gaps in the 

existing sanctions regime with respect to Iran. 

SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO EXPAND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME. 

(a) MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.—Congress 

urges the President to intensify diplomatic efforts, both in appropriate international fora 

such as the United Nations and bilaterally with 

allies of the United States, for the purpose of— 

(1) expanding the United Nations Security 

Council sanctions regime to include— 

(A) a prohibition on the issuance of visas to 

any official of the Government of Iran who is 

involved in— 

(i) human rights violations in or outside of 

Iran; 

(ii) the development of a nuclear weapons program and a ballistic missile capability in Iran; 

or 

(iii) support by the Government of Iran for 

terrorist organizations, including Hamas and 

Hezbollah; and 

(B) a requirement that each member country 

of the United Nations— 

(i) prohibit the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines from landing at seaports, and cargo 

flights of Iran Air from landing at airports, in 

that country because of the role of those organizations in proliferation and illegal arms sales; 

and 

(ii) apply the prohibitions described in clause 

(i) to other Iranian entities designated for the 

imposition of sanctions on or after the date of 

the enactment of this Act; 

(2) expanding the range of sanctions imposed 

with respect to Iran by allies of the United 

States; 

(3) expanding efforts to limit the development 

of petroleum resources and the importation of 

refined petroleum products by Iran; 

(4) developing additional initiatives to— 

(A) increase the production of crude oil in 

countries other than Iran; and 

(B) assist countries that purchase or otherwise 

obtain crude oil or petroleum products from Iran 

to eliminate their dependence on crude oil and 

petroleum products from Iran; and 

(5) eliminating the revenue generated by the 

Government of Iran from the sale of petrochemical products produced in Iran to other 

countries. 

(b) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 

days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

and every 180 days thereafter, the President 

shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report on the extent to which diplomatic efforts described in subsection (a) have 

been successful that includes— 

(1) an identification of the countries that have 

agreed to impose sanctions or take other measures to further the policy set forth in subsection 

(a); 

(2) the extent of the implementation and enforcement of those sanctions or other measures 

by those countries; 

(3) the criteria the President uses to determine 

whether a country has significantly reduced its 

crude oil purchases from Iran pursuant to section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended 

by section 504, including considerations of reductions both in terms of volume and price; 

(4) an identification of the countries that have 

not agreed to impose such sanctions or measures, including such countries granted exceptions for significant reductions in crude oil purchases pursuant to such section 1245(d)(4)(D); 

(5) recommendations for additional measures 

that the United States could take to further diplomatic efforts described in subsection (a); and 

(6) the disposition of any decision with respect 

to sanctions imposed with respect to Iran by the 

World Trade Organization or its predecessor organization. 

TITLE II—EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF 

IRAN AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS 

OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY IRAN 

Subtitle A—Expansion of the Iran Sanctions 

Act of 1996 

SEC. 201. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF 

IRAN. 

Section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 

(Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 

amended— 

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking 

‘‘WITH RESPECT TO’’ and all that follows 

through ‘‘TO IRAN’’ and inserting ‘‘RELATING TO

THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN’’; 

(2) in paragraph (1)(A)— 

(A) by striking ‘‘3 or more’’ and inserting ‘‘5 

or more’’; and 

(B) by striking ‘‘the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010’’ and inserting ‘‘the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012’’; 

(3) in paragraph (2)— 

(A) in subparagraph (A)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘3 or more’’ and inserting ‘‘5 or 

more’’; and 

(ii) by striking ‘‘the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 

2010’’ and inserting ‘‘the Iran Threat Reduction 

and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012’’; and 

(B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting before 

the period at the end the following: ‘‘or directly 

associated infrastructure, including construction of port facilities, railways, and roads, the 

primary use of which is to support the delivery 

of refined petroleum products’’; 

(4) in paragraph (3)— 

(A) in subparagraph (A)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘3 or more’’ and inserting ‘‘5 or 

more’’; and 

(ii) by striking ‘‘the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 

2010’’ and inserting ‘‘the Iran Threat Reduction 

and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012’’; and 

(B) in subparagraph (B)— 

(i) in clause (ii), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

(ii) in clause (iii), by striking the period at the 

end and inserting a semicolon; and 

(iii) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(iv) bartering or contracting by which goods 

are exchanged for goods, including the insurance or reinsurance of such exchanges; or 

‘‘(v) purchasing, subscribing to, or facilitating 

the issuance of sovereign debt of the Government of Iran, including governmental bonds, 

issued on or after the date of the enactment of 

the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 

Rights Act of 2012.’’; and 

(5) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(4) JOINT VENTURES WITH IRAN RELATING TO

DEVELOPING PETROLEUM RESOURCES.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B) or subsection (f), the President 

shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described 

in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the 

President determines that the person knowingly 

participates, on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 

Human Rights Act of 2012, in a joint venture 

with respect to the development of petroleum resources outside of Iran if— 

‘‘(i) the joint venture is established on or after 

January 1, 2002; and 

‘‘(ii)(I) the Government of Iran is a substantial partner or investor in the joint venture; or 

‘‘(II) Iran could, through a direct operational 

role in the joint venture or by other means, receive technological knowledge or equipment not 

previously available to Iran that could directly 

and significantly contribute to the enhancement 

of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources 

in Iran. 

‘‘(B) APPLICABILITY.—Subparagraph (A) shall 

not apply with respect to participation in a joint 

venture established on or after January 1, 2002, 

and before the date of the enactment of the Iran 

Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 

of 2012, if the person participating in the joint 

venture terminates that participation not later 

than the date that is 180 days after such date of 

enactment. 

‘‘(5) SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES AND REFINED PETROLEUM

PRODUCTS IN IRAN.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more 

of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with 

respect to a person if the President determines 

that the person knowingly, on or after the date 

of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction 

and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, sells, 

leases, or provides to Iran goods, services, technology, or support described in subparagraph 

(B)— 

‘‘(i) any of which has a fair market value of 

$1,000,000 or more; or 

‘‘(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an 

aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or 

more. 

‘‘(B) GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.—Goods, services, technology, 

or support described in this subparagraph are 

goods, services, technology, or support that 

could directly and significantly contribute to 

the maintenance or enhancement of Iran’s— 

‘‘(i) ability to develop petroleum resources located in Iran; or 

‘‘(ii) domestic production of refined petroleum 

products, including any direct and significant 

assistance with respect to the construction, modernization, or repair of petroleum refineries or 

directly associated infrastructure, including 

construction of port facilities, railways, and 

roads, the primary use of which is to support 

the delivery of refined petroleum products. 

‘‘(6) DEVELOPMENT AND PURCHASE OF PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS FROM IRAN.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more 

of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with 

respect to a person if the President determines 

that the person knowingly, on or after the date 

of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction 

and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, sells, 

leases, or provides to Iran goods, services, technology, or support described in subparagraph 

(B)— 

‘‘(i) any of which has a fair market value of 

$250,000 or more; or 

‘‘(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an 

aggregate fair market value of $1,000,000 or 

more. 

‘‘(B) GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.—Goods, services, technology, 

or support described in this subparagraph are 

goods, services, technology, or support that 

could directly and significantly contribute to 

the maintenance or expansion of Iran’s domestic 

production of petrochemical products.’’. 

SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TRANSPORTATION OF 

CRUDE OIL FROM IRAN AND EVASION OF SANCTIONS BY SHIPPING 

COMPANIES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 5(a) of the Iran 

Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 

201, is further amended by adding at the end the 

following: 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5555 

‘‘(7) TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL FROM

IRAN.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more 

of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with 

respect to a person if the President determines 

that— 

‘‘(i) the person is a controlling beneficial 

owner of, or otherwise owns, operates, or controls, or insures, a vessel that, on or after the 

date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 

Human Rights Act of 2012, was used to transport crude oil from Iran to another country; and 

‘‘(ii)(I) in the case of a person that is a controlling beneficial owner of the vessel, the person had actual knowledge the vessel was so 

used; or 

‘‘(II) in the case of a person that otherwise 

owns, operates, or controls, or insures, the vessel, the person knew or should have known the 

vessel was so used. 

‘‘(B) APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS.— 

‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 

clause (ii), subparagraph (A) shall apply with 

respect to the transportation of crude oil from 

Iran only if a determination of the President 

under section 1245(d)(4)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 

U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(B)) that there is a sufficient 

supply of petroleum and petroleum products 

produced in countries other than Iran to permit 

purchasers of petroleum and petroleum products 

from Iran to reduce significantly their purchases from Iran is in effect at the time of the 

transportation of the crude oil. 

‘‘(ii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES.— 

Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect 

to the transportation of crude oil from Iran to a 

country to which the exception under paragraph (4)(D) of section 1245(d) of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 

(22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)) to the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of that section applies 

at the time of the transportation of the crude 

oil. 

‘‘(8) CONCEALING IRANIAN ORIGIN OF CRUDE OIL

AND REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more 

of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with 

respect to a person if the President determines 

that the person is a controlling beneficial 

owner, or otherwise owns, operates, or controls, 

a vessel that, on or after the date that is 90 days 

after the date of the enactment of the Iran 

Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 

of 2012, is used, with actual knowledge in the 

case of a person that is a controlling beneficial 

owner or knowingly in the case of a person that 

otherwise owns, operates, or controls the vessel, 

in a manner that conceals the Iranian origin of 

crude oil or refined petroleum products transported on the vessel, including by— 

‘‘(i) permitting the operator of the vessel to 

suspend the operation of the vessel’s satellite 

tracking device; or 

‘‘(ii) obscuring or concealing the ownership, 

operation, or control of the vessel by— 

‘‘(I) the Government of Iran; 

‘‘(II) the National Iranian Tanker Company 

or the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines; 

or 

‘‘(III) any other entity determined by the 

President to be owned or controlled by the Government of Iran or an entity specified in subclause (II). 

‘‘(B) ADDITIONAL SANCTION.—Subject to such 

regulations as the President may prescribe and 

in addition to the sanctions imposed under subparagraph (A), the President may prohibit a 

vessel owned, operated, or controlled by a person, including a controlling beneficial owner, 

with respect to which the President has imposed 

sanctions under that subparagraph and that 

was used for the activity for which the President imposed those sanctions from landing at a 

port in the United States for a period of not 

more than 2 years after the date on which the 

President imposed those sanctions. 

‘‘(C) VESSELS IDENTIFIED BY THE OFFICE OF

FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL.—For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), a person shall be deemed to 

have actual knowledge that a vessel is owned, 

operated, or controlled by the Government of 

Iran or an entity specified in subclause (II) or 

(III) of subparagraph (A)(ii) if the International 

Maritime Organization vessel registration identification for the vessel is— 

‘‘(i) included on a list of specially designated 

nationals and blocked persons maintained by 

the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for activities with respect to Iran; and 

‘‘(ii) identified by the Office of Foreign Assets 

Control as a vessel in which the Government of 

Iran or any entity specified in subclause (II) or 

(III) of subparagraph (A)(ii) has an interest. 

‘‘(D) DEFINITION OF IRANIAN ORIGIN.—For 

purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ‘Iranian 

origin’ means— 

‘‘(i) with respect to crude oil, that the crude 

oil was extracted in Iran; and 

‘‘(ii) with respect to a refined petroleum product, that the refined petroleum product was produced or refined in Iran. 

‘‘(9) EXCEPTION FOR PROVISION OF UNDERWRITING SERVICES AND INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE.—The President may not impose sanctions 

under paragraph (7) or (8) with respect to a person that provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance if the President determines 

that the person has exercised due diligence in 

establishing and enforcing official policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that the person 

does not provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the transportation of 

crude oil or refined petroleum products from 

Iran in a manner for which sanctions may be 

imposed under either such paragraph.’’. 

(b) REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES.—Not later 

than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 

this Act, the President shall prescribe such regulations or guidelines as are necessary to implement paragraphs (7), (8), and (9) of section 5(a) 

of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as added by 

this section, including such regulations or 

guidelines as are necessary to implement subparagraph (B) of such paragraph (8). 

SEC. 203. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT BY IRAN 

OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 5(b) of the Iran 

Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 

U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended— 

(1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and 

(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the 

following: 

‘‘(1) EXPORTS, TRANSFERS, AND TRANSSHIPMENTS.—Except as provided in subsection 

(f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the 

sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect 

to a person if the President determines that the 

person— 

‘‘(A) on or after the date of the enactment of 

the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 

Rights Act of 2012, exported or transferred, or 

permitted or otherwise facilitated the transshipment of, any goods, services, technology, or 

other items to any other person; and 

‘‘(B) knew or should have known that— 

‘‘(i) the export, transfer, or transshipment of 

the goods, services, technology, or other items 

would likely result in another person exporting, 

transferring, transshipping, or otherwise providing the goods, services, technology, or other 

items to Iran; and 

‘‘(ii) the export, transfer, transshipment, or 

other provision of the goods, services, technology, or other items to Iran would contribute 

materially to the ability of Iran to— 

‘‘(I) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or 

nuclear weapons or related technologies; or 

‘‘(II) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers 

and types of advanced conventional weapons. 

‘‘(2) JOINT VENTURES RELATING TO THE MINING, 

PRODUCTION, OR TRANSPORTATION OF URANIUM.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B) or subsection (f), the President 

shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described 

in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the 

President determines that the person knowingly 

participated, on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 

Human Rights Act of 2012, in a joint venture 

that involves any activity relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium— 

‘‘(i)(I) established on or after February 2, 

2012; and 

‘‘(II) with— 

‘‘(aa) the Government of Iran; 

‘‘(bb) an entity incorporated in Iran or subject 

to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran; or 

‘‘(cc) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, the Government of Iran or an entity described in item 

(bb); or 

‘‘(ii)(I) established before February 2, 2012; 

‘‘(II) with the Government of Iran, an entity 

described in item (bb) of clause (i)(II), or a person described in item (cc) of that clause; and 

‘‘(III) through which— 

‘‘(aa) uranium is transferred directly to Iran 

or indirectly to Iran through a third country; 

‘‘(bb) the Government of Iran receives significant revenue; or 

‘‘(cc) Iran could, through a direct operational 

role or by other means, receive technological 

knowledge or equipment not previously available to Iran that could contribute materially to 

the ability of Iran to develop nuclear weapons 

or related technologies. 

‘‘(B) APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to participation in a joint venture established before 

the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 if 

the person participating in the joint venture terminates that participation not later than the 

date that is 180 days after such date of enactment.’’. 

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—The Iran 

Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this section and sections 201 and 202, is further amended— 

(1) in section 5— 

(A) in paragraph (3) of subsection (b), as redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section— 

(i) by striking ‘‘paragraph (1)’’ each place it 

appears and inserting ‘‘paragraph (1) or (2)’’; 

and 

(ii) in subparagraph (F)— 

(I) by striking ‘‘that paragraph’’ and inserting ‘‘paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be’’; 

and 

(II) by striking ‘‘the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010’’ and inserting ‘‘the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012’’; 

(B) in subsection (c)— 

(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by 

striking ‘‘subsections (a) and (b)(1)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection (a) and paragraphs (1) and (2) 

of subsection (b)’’; and 

(ii) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘subsection 

(a) or (b)(1)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection (a) or 

paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b)’’; and 

(C) in subsection (f)— 

(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by 

striking ‘‘subsection (a) or (b)(1)’’ and inserting 

‘‘subsection (a) or paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b)’’; and 

(ii) by redesignating paragraphs (6) and (7) as 

paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; and 

(2) in section 9, by striking ‘‘section 5(a) or 

5(b)(1)’’ each place it appears and inserting 

‘‘subsection (a) or paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b) of section 5’’. 

SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS AVAILABLE 

UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT 

OF 1996. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(a) of the Iran 

Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 

U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended— 


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H5556 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (12); and 

(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following: 

‘‘(9) BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT

OF SANCTIONED PERSON.—The President may, 

pursuant to such regulations or guidelines as 

the President may prescribe, prohibit any 

United States person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt 

instruments of a sanctioned person. 

‘‘(10) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.— 

The President may direct the Secretary of State 

to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, 

any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder 

with a controlling interest in, a sanctioned person. 

‘‘(11) SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.—The President may impose on the principal executive officer or officers of any sanctioned person, or on persons performing similar 

functions and with similar authorities as such 

officer or officers, any of the sanctions under 

this subsection.’’. 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made 

by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of 

the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to activities described in subsections (a) 

and (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 

1996, as amended by this title, commenced on or 

after such date of enactment. 

SEC. 205. MODIFICATION OF WAIVER STANDARD 

UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT 

OF 1996. 

Section 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, 

as amended by section 203, is further amended 

by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following: 

‘‘(1) AUTHORITY.— 

‘‘(A) SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN.—The President may waive, on a 

case-by-case basis and for a period of not more 

than one year, the requirement in section 5(a) to 

impose a sanction or sanctions on a person described in section 5(c), and may waive the continued imposition of a sanction or sanctions 

under subsection (b) of this section, 30 days or 

more after the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that it is essential to the national security 

interests of the United States to exercise such 

waiver authority. 

‘‘(B) SANCTIONS RELATING TO DEVELOPMENT

OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR OTHER

MILITARY CAPABILITIES.—The President may 

waive, on a case-by-case basis and for a period 

of not more than one year, the requirement in 

paragraph (1) or (2) of section 5(b) to impose a 

sanction or sanctions on a person described in 

section 5(c), and may waive the continued imposition of a sanction or sanctions under subsection (b) of this section, 30 days or more after 

the President determines and so reports to the 

appropriate congressional committees that it is 

vital to the national security interests of the 

United States to exercise such waiver authority. 

‘‘(C) RENEWAL OF WAIVERS.—The President 

may renew, on a case-by-case basis, a waiver 

with respect to a person under subparagraph 

(A) or (B) for additional one-year periods if, not 

later than 30 days before the waiver expires, the 

President makes the determination and submits 

to the appropriate congressional committees the 

report described in subparagraph (A) or (B), as 

applicable.’’. 

SEC. 206. BRIEFINGS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF 

THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996. 

Section 4 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 

(Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 

amended by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(f) BRIEFINGS ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not 

later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 

Human Rights Act of 2012, and every 120 days 

thereafter, the President, acting through the 

Secretary of State, shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive 

briefing on efforts to implement this Act.’’. 

SEC. 207. EXPANSION OF DEFINITIONS UNDER 

THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 

1701 note) is amended— 

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (17) and (18) 

as paragraphs (20) and (21), respectively; 

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (15) and (16) 

as paragraphs (17) and (18), respectively; 

(3) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through 

(14) as paragraphs (5) through (15), respectively; 

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following: 

‘‘(4) CREDIBLE INFORMATION.—The term ‘credible information’, with respect to a person— 

‘‘(A) includes— 

‘‘(i) a public announcement by the person 

that the person has engaged in an activity described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 5; and 

‘‘(ii) information set forth in a report to stockholders of the person indicating that the person 

has engaged in such an activity; and 

‘‘(B) may include, in the discretion of the 

President— 

‘‘(i) an announcement by the Government of 

Iran that the person has engaged in such an activity; or 

‘‘(ii) information indicating that the person 

has engaged in such an activity that is set forth 

in— 

‘‘(I) a report of the Government Accountability Office, the Energy Information Administration, or the Congressional Research Service; 

or 

‘‘(II) a report or publication of a similarly reputable governmental organization or trade or industry organization.’’; 

(5) by inserting after paragraph (15), as redesignated by paragraph (3), the following: 

‘‘(16) PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCT.—The term 

‘petrochemical product’ includes any aromatic, 

olefin, or synthesis gas, and any derivative of 

such a gas, including ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and urea.’’; and 

(6) by inserting after paragraph (18), as redesignated by paragraph (2), the following: 

‘‘(19) SERVICES.—The term ‘services’ includes 

software, hardware, financial, professional consulting, engineering, and specialized energy information services, energy-related technical assistance, and maintenance and repairs.’’. 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made 

by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of 

the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to activities described in subsections (a) 

and (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 

1996, as amended by this title, commenced on or 

after such date of enactment. 

SEC. 208. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN. 

It is the sense of Congress that— 

(1) the energy sector of Iran remains a zone of 

proliferation concern since the Government of 

Iran continues to divert substantial revenues derived from sales of petroleum resources to finance its illicit nuclear and missile activities; 

and 

(2) the President should apply the full range 

of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 

1996, as amended by this Act, to address the 

threat posed by the Government of Iran. 

Subtitle B—Additional Measures Relating to 

Sanctions Against Iran 

SEC. 211. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISION OF VESSELS OR SHIPPING SERVICES TO 

TRANSPORT CERTAIN GOODS RELATED TO PROLIFERATION OR TERRORISM ACTIVITIES TO IRAN. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (c), if the President determines that a 

person, on or after the date of the enactment of 

this Act, knowingly sells, leases, or provides a 

vessel or provides insurance or reinsurance or 

any other shipping service for the transportation to or from Iran of goods that could materially contribute to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction or support for acts 

of international terrorism, the President shall, 

pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 

38567; relating to blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their 

supporters) or Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. 

Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and 

prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism), 

or otherwise pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in 

all property and interests in property of the persons specified in subsection (b) if such property 

and interests in property are in the United 

States, come within the United States, or are or 

come within the possession or control of a 

United States person. 

(b) PERSONS SPECIFIED.—The persons specified 

in this subsection are— 

(1) the person that sold, leased, or provided a 

vessel or provided insurance or reinsurance or 

another shipping service described in subsection 

(a); and 

(2) any person that— 

(A) is a successor entity to the person referred 

to in paragraph (1); 

(B) owns or controls the person referred to in 

paragraph (1), if the person that owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph (1) had 

actual knowledge or should have known that 

the person referred to in paragraph (1) sold, 

leased, or provided the vessel or provided the insurance or reinsurance or other shipping service; or 

(C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the person owned 

or controlled by, or under common ownership or 

control with (as the case may be), the person referred to in paragraph (1) knowingly engaged in 

the sale, lease, or provision of the vessel or the 

provision of the insurance or reinsurance or 

other shipping service. 

(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the requirement to impose sanctions with respect to a 

person under subsection (a) on or after the date 

that is 30 days after the President— 

(1) determines that such a waiver is vital to 

the national security interests of the United 

States; and 

(2) submits to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report that contains the reasons 

for that determination. 

(d) REPORT REQUIRED.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 

90 days thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 

shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report identifying operators of vessels and other persons that conduct or facilitate 

significant financial transactions with persons 

that manage ports in Iran that have been designated for the imposition of sanctions pursuant 

to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted 

under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 

annex. 

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

section shall be construed to limit the authority 

of the President to designate persons for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Executive 

Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to the 

blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters) or 

Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to 

commit, or support terrorism), or otherwise pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5557 

SEC. 212. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PROVISION OF UNDERWRITING SERVICES OR INSURANCE 

OR REINSURANCE FOR THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY OR 

THE NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER 

COMPANY. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), not later than 60 days after the date 

of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 

impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in 

section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as 

amended by section 204, with respect to a person 

if the President determines that the person 

knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, 

provides underwriting services or insurance or 

reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, 

or a successor entity to either such company. 

(b) EXCEPTIONS.— 

(1) UNDERWRITERS AND INSURANCE PROVIDERS

EXERCISING DUE DILIGENCE.—The President is 

authorized not to impose sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person that provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance if the President determines that the person has exercised due diligence in establishing 

and enforcing official policies, procedures, and 

controls to ensure that the person does not provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company, 

the National Iranian Tanker Company, or a 

successor entity to either such company. 

(2) FOOD; MEDICINE; HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—The President may not impose sanctions 

under subsection (a) for the provision of underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for 

any activity relating solely to— 

(A) the provision of agricultural commodities, 

food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran; or 

(B) the provision of humanitarian assistance 

to the people of Iran. 

(3) TERMINATION PERIOD.—The President is 

authorized not to impose sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person if the President receives reliable assurances that the person 

will terminate the provision of underwriting 

services or insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and any successor entity to either such company, not later than the 

date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term 

‘‘agricultural commodity’’ has the meaning 

given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602). 

(2) MEDICAL DEVICE.—The term ‘‘medical device’’ has the meaning given the term ‘‘device’’ 

in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 

Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321). 

(3) MEDICINE.—The term ‘‘medicine’’ has the 

meaning given the term ‘‘drug’’ in section 201 of 

the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 

U.S.C. 321). 

(d) APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.—The following provisions of 

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by 

this Act, apply with respect to the imposition of 

sanctions under subsection (a) to the same extent that such provisions apply with respect to 

the imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of 

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: 

(1) Subsection (c) of section 4. 

(2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5. 

(3) Section 8. 

(4) Section 9. 

(5) Section 11. 

(6) Section 12. 

(7) Subsection (b) of section 13. 

(8) Section 14. 

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION AND IMPLEMENTATION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the President to 

impose sanctions pursuant to the Iran Sanctions 

Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 

note), the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50U.S.C. 1701 et 

seq.), section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 

8513a), or any other provision of this Act. 

SEC. 213. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PURCHASE, SUBSCRIPTION TO, OR FACILITATION OF THE 

ISSUANCE OF IRANIAN SOVEREIGN 

DEBT. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose 5 

or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) 

of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended 

by section 204, with respect to a person if the 

President determines that the person knowingly, 

on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

purchases, subscribes to, or facilitates the 

issuance of— 

(1) sovereign debt of the Government of Iran 

issued on or after such date of enactment, including governmental bonds; or 

(2) debt of any entity owned or controlled by 

the Government of Iran issued on or after such 

date of enactment, including bonds. 

(b) APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.—The following provisions of 

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by 

this Act, apply with respect to the imposition of 

sanctions under subsection (a) to the same extent that such provisions apply with respect to 

the imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of 

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: 

(1) Subsection (c) of section 4. 

(2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5. 

(3) Section 8. 

(4) Section 9. 

(5) Section 11. 

(6) Section 12. 

(7) Subsection (b) of section 13. 

(8) Section 14. 

SEC. 214. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SUBSIDIARIES AND 

AGENTS OF PERSONS SANCTIONED 

BY UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 

COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 104(c)(2)(B) of the 

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 

and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 

8513(c)(2)(B)) is amended— 

(1) by striking ‘‘of a person subject’’ and inserting the following: ‘‘of— 

‘‘(i) a person subject’’; 

(2) in clause (i), as designated by paragraph 

(1), by striking the semicolon and inserting ‘‘; 

or’’; and 

(3) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(ii) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a person 

described in clause (i);’’. 

(b) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 90 days 

after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

Secretary of the Treasury shall make such revisions to the regulations prescribed under section 

104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8513) as are necessary to carry out the 

amendments made by subsection (a). 

SEC. 215. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS SANCTIONED FOR CERTAIN 

ACTIVITIES RELATING TO TERRORISM OR PROLIFERATION OF 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of 

the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 

8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) is amended in the matter preceding subclause (I) by striking ‘‘financial institution’’ and inserting ‘‘person’’. 

(b) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 90 days 

after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

Secretary of the Treasury shall make such revisions to the regulations prescribed under section 

104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8513) as are necessary to carry out the 

amendment made by subsection (a). 

SEC. 216. EXPANSION OF, AND REPORTS ON, MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT 

TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT 

ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAN. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104 the following: 

‘‘SEC. 104A. EXPANSION OF, AND REPORTS ON, 

MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 

THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 

after the date of the enactment of the Iran 

Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 

of 2012, the Secretary of the Treasury shall revise the regulations prescribed under section 

104(c)(1) to apply to a foreign financial institution described in subsection (b) to the same extent and in the same manner as those regulations apply to a foreign financial institution 

that the Secretary of the Treasury finds knowingly engages in an activity described in section 

104(c)(2). 

‘‘(b) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DESCRIBED.—A foreign financial institution described in this subsection is a foreign financial 

institution, including an Iranian financial institution, that the Secretary of the Treasury 

finds— 

‘‘(1) knowingly facilitates, or participates or 

assists in, an activity described in section 

104(c)(2), including by acting on behalf of, at 

the direction of, or as an intermediary for, or 

otherwise assisting, another person with respect 

to the activity; 

‘‘(2) attempts or conspires to facilitate or participate in such an activity; or 

‘‘(3) is owned or controlled by a foreign financial institution that the Secretary finds knowingly engages in such an activity. 

‘‘(c) REPORTS REQUIRED.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

after the date of the enactment of the Iran 

Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 

of 2012, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 

contains a detailed description of— 

‘‘(A) the effect of the regulations prescribed 

under section 104(c)(1) on the financial system 

and economy of Iran and capital flows to and 

from Iran; and 

‘‘(B) the ways in which funds move into and 

out of financial institutions described in section 

104(c)(2)(E)(ii), with specific attention to the use 

of other Iranian financial institutions and other 

foreign financial institutions to receive and 

transfer funds for financial institutions described in that section. 

‘‘(2) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted 

under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 

annex. 

‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

‘‘(1) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘financial institution’ means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), 

(E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), (M), (N), (R), or 

(Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States 

Code. 

‘‘(2) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The 

term ‘foreign financial institution’ has the 

meaning of that term as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 

104(i). 

‘‘(3) IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The 

term ‘Iranian financial institution’ means— 

‘‘(A) a financial institution organized under 

the laws of Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran, 

including a foreign branch of such an institution; 

‘‘(B) a financial institution located in Iran; 

‘‘(C) a financial institution, wherever located, 

owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; 

and 


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H5558 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

‘‘(D) a financial institution, wherever located, 

owned or controlled by a financial institution 

described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 is 

amended by inserting after the item relating to 

section 104 the following: 

‘‘Sec. 104A. Expansion of, and reports on, mandatory sanctions with respect to 

financial institutions that engage 

in certain activities.’’. 

SEC. 217. CONTINUATION IN EFFECT OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, THE CENTRAL 

BANK OF IRAN, AND SANCTIONS 

EVADERS. 

(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO BLOCKING OF

PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND

IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—United 

States sanctions with respect to Iran provided 

for in Executive Order 13599 (77 Fed. Reg. 6659), 

as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall remain in effect until 

the date that is 90 days after the date on which 

the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees the certification described 

in subsection (d). 

(b) SANCTIONS RELATING TO FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS.—United States sanctions with 

respect to Iran provided for in Executive Order 

13608 (77 Fed. Reg. 26409), as in effect on the 

day before the date of the enactment of this Act, 

shall remain in effect until the date that is 30 

days after the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees 

the certification described in section 401(a) of 

the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 

8551(a)). 

(c) CONTINUATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN.—In addition to the sanctions referred to in subsection 

(a), the President shall continue to apply to the 

Central Bank of Iran sanctions pursuant to the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), including blocking of 

property and restrictions or prohibitions on financial transactions and the exportation of 

property, until the date that is 90 days after the 

date on which the President submits to Congress 

the certification described in subsection (d). 

(d) CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The certification described in 

this subsection is the certification of the President to Congress that the Central Bank of Iran 

is not— 

(A) providing financial services in support of, 

or otherwise facilitating, the ability of Iran to— 

(i) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or 

nuclear weapons, or related technologies; 

(ii) construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear facilities that could aid Iran’s effort to acquire a nuclear capability; or 

(iii) acquire or develop ballistic missiles, cruise 

missiles, or destabilizing types and amounts of 

conventional weapons; or 

(B) facilitating transactions or providing financial services for— 

(i) Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; or 

(ii) financial institutions the property or interests in property of which are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) in connection 

with— 

(I) Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of 

mass destruction; or 

(II) Iran’s support for international terrorism. 

(2) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit 

the certification described in paragraph (1) to 

the appropriate congressional committees in 

writing and shall include a justification for the 

certification. 

(B) FORM OF CERTIFICATION.—The certification described in paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 

classified annex. 

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

section shall be construed to limit the authority 

of the President pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq.) or the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 

Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8501 et seq.). 

SEC. 218. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR 

VIOLATIONS OF SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES. 

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(1) ENTITY.—The term ‘‘entity’’ means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization. 

(2) OWN OR CONTROL.—The term ‘‘own or control’’ means, with respect to an entity— 

(A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity 

interest by vote or value in the entity; 

(B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of 

directors of the entity; or 

(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, 

or personnel decisions of the entity. 

(b) PROHIBITION.—Not later than 60 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall prohibit an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States 

from knowingly engaging in any transaction directly or indirectly with the Government of Iran 

or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 

Government of Iran that would be prohibited by 

an order or regulation issued pursuant to the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) if the transaction were 

engaged in by a United States person or in the 

United States. 

(c) CIVIL PENALTY.—The civil penalties provided for in section 206(b) of the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 

1705(b)) shall apply to a United States person to 

the same extent that such penalties apply to a 

person that commits an unlawful act described 

in section 206(a) of that Act if an entity owned 

or controlled by the United States person and 

established or maintained outside the United 

States violates, attempts to violate, conspires to 

violate, or causes a violation of any order or 

regulation issued to implement subsection (b). 

(d) APPLICABILITY.—Subsection (c) shall not 

apply with respect to a transaction described in 

subsection (b) by an entity owned or controlled 

by a United States person and established or 

maintained outside the United States if the 

United States person divests or terminates its 

business with the entity not later than the date 

that is 180 days after the date of the enactment 

of this Act. 

SEC. 219. DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND 

EXCHANGE COMMISSION RELATING 

TO SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 13 of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended 

by adding at the end the following new subsection: 

‘‘(r) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAN.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file 

an annual or quarterly report under subsection 

(a) shall disclose in that report the information 

required by paragraph (2) if, during the period 

covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate 

of the issuer— 

‘‘(A) knowingly engaged in an activity described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 5 of the 

Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 

50 U.S.C. 1701 note); 

‘‘(B) knowingly engaged in an activity described in subsection (c)(2) of section 104 of the 

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 

and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) or a 

transaction described in subsection (d)(1) of that 

section; 

‘‘(C) knowingly engaged in an activity described in section 105A(b)(2) of that Act; or 

‘‘(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or 

dealing with— 

‘‘(i) any person the property and interests in 

property of which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to 

blocking property and prohibiting transactions 

with persons who commit, threaten to commit, 

or support terrorism); 

‘‘(ii) any person the property and interests in 

property of which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to 

blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters); or 

‘‘(iii) any person or entity identified under 

section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the definition of the Government of Iran) without the specific authorization 

of a Federal department or agency. 

‘‘(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—If an issuer or 

an affiliate of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in paragraph (1), the issuer 

shall disclose a detailed description of each such 

activity, including— 

‘‘(A) the nature and extent of the activity; 

‘‘(B) the gross revenues and net profits, if 

any, attributable to the activity; and 

‘‘(C) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the 

issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue 

the activity. 

‘‘(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an 

affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in 

any activity described in that paragraph, the 

issuer shall separately file with the Commission, 

concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has been included in 

that annual or quarterly report that identifies 

the issuer and contains the information required 

by paragraph (2). 

‘‘(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.— 

Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) 

that an annual or quarterly report includes a 

disclosure of an activity described in paragraph 

(1), the Commission shall promptly— 

‘‘(A) transmit the report to— 

‘‘(i) the President; 

‘‘(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

Committee on Financial Services of the House of 

Representatives; and 

‘‘(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 

the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 

Affairs of the Senate; and 

‘‘(B) make the information provided in the 

disclosure and the notice available to the public 

by posting the information on the Internet 

website of the Commission. 

‘‘(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report 

under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure 

of an activity described in paragraph (1) (other 

than an activity described in subparagraph 

(D)(iii) of that paragraph), the President shall— 

‘‘(A) initiate an investigation into the possible 

imposition of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 

1701 note), section 104 or 105A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 

Divestment Act of 2010, an Executive Order 

specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D), 

or any other provision of law relating to the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran, as applicable; and 

‘‘(B) not later than 180 days after initiating 

such an investigation, make a determination 

with respect to whether sanctions should be imposed with respect to the issuer or the affiliate 

of the issuer (as the case may be). 

‘‘(6) SUNSET.—The provisions of this subsection shall terminate on the date that is 30 

days after the date on which the President 

makes the certification described in section 

401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8551(a)).’’. 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made 

by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect 

to reports required to be filed with the Securities 

and Exchange Commission after the date that is 

180 days after the date of the enactment of this 

Act. 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5559 

SEC. 220. REPORTS ON, AND AUTHORIZATION OF 

IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH 

RESPECT TO, THE PROVISION OF 

SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL MESSAGING SERVICES TO THE CENTRAL 

BANK OF IRAN AND OTHER SANCTIONED IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. 

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 

Congress that— 

(1) providers of specialized financial messaging services are a critical link to the international financial system; 

(2) the European Union is to be commended 

for strengthening the multilateral sanctions regime against Iran by deciding that specialized 

financial messaging services may not be provided to the Central Bank of Iran and other 

sanctioned Iranian financial institutions by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the European 

Union; and 

(3) the loss of access by sanctioned Iranian financial institutions to specialized financial messaging services must be maintained. 

(b) REPORTS REQUIRED.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 

90 days thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury 

shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report that contains— 

(A) a list of all persons that the Secretary has 

identified that directly provide specialized financial messaging services to, or enable or facilitate direct or indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran or 

a financial institution described in section 

104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 

2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)); and 

(B) a detailed assessment of the status of efforts by the Secretary to end the direct provision 

of such messaging services to, and the enabling 

or facilitation of direct or indirect access to such 

messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran 

or a financial institution described in that section. 

(2) ENABLING OR FACILITATION OF ACCESS TO

SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL MESSAGING SERVICES

THROUGH INTERMEDIARY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—For purposes of paragraph (1) and subsection (c), enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to specialized financial messaging 

services for the Central Bank of Iran or a financial institution described in section 

104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 

2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) includes doing 

so by serving as an intermediary financial institution with access to such messaging services. 

(3) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted 

under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 

annex. 

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), if, on or after the date that is 90 days 

after the date of the enactment of this Act, a 

person continues to knowingly and directly provide specialized financial messaging services to, 

or knowingly enable or facilitate direct or indirect access to such messaging services for, the 

Central Bank of Iran or a financial institution 

described in paragraph (2)(E)(ii) of section 

104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8513(c)), the President may impose sanctions pursuant to that section or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 

U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to the person. 

(2) EXCEPTION.—The President may not impose sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1) with 

respect to a person for directly providing specialized financial messaging services to, or enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to 

such messaging services for, the Central Bank of 

Iran or a financial institution described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) if— 

(A) the person is subject to a sanctions regime 

under its governing foreign law that requires it 

to eliminate the knowing provision of such messaging services to, and the knowing enabling 

and facilitation of direct or indirect access to 

such messaging services for— 

(i) the Central Bank of Iran; and 

(ii) a group of Iranian financial institutions 

identified under such governing foreign law for 

purposes of that sanctions regime if the President determines that— 

(I) the group is substantially similar to the 

group of financial institutions described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)); and 

(II) the differences between those groups of financial institutions do not adversely affect the 

national interest of the United States; and 

(B) the person has, pursuant to that sanctions 

regime, terminated the knowing provision of 

such messaging services to, and the knowing enabling and facilitation of direct or indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central 

Bank of Iran and each Iranian financial institution identified under such governing foreign 

law for purposes of that sanctions regime. 

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

section shall be construed to limit the authority 

of the President pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq.) or the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 

Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8501 et seq.). 

SEC. 221. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMMIGRATION 

RESTRICTIONS ON, SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 

IRAN AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS. 

(a) IDENTIFICATION.—Not later than 180 days 

after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

annually thereafter, the President shall publish 

a list of each individual the President determines is— 

(1) a senior official of the Government of Iran 

described in subsection (b) that is involved in 

Iran’s— 

(A) illicit nuclear activities or proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems 

for weapons of mass destruction; 

(B) support for international terrorism; or 

(C) commission of serious human rights abuses 

against citizens of Iran or their family members; 

or 

(2) a family member of such an official. 

(b) SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

IRAN DESCRIBED.—A senior official of the Government of Iran described in this subsection is 

any senior official of that Government, including— 

(1) the Supreme Leader of Iran; 

(2) the President of Iran; 

(3) a member of the Cabinet of the Government 

of Iran; 

(4) a member of the Assembly of Experts; 

(5) a senior member of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran; or 

(6) a senior member of Iran’s Revolutionary 

Guard Corps, including a senior member of a 

paramilitary organization such as Ansar-eHezbollah or Basij-e Motaz’afin. 

(c) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—Except 

as provided in subsection (d), the Secretary of 

State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of 

Homeland Security shall exclude from the 

United States, any alien who is on the list required by subsection (a). 

(d) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Subsection 

(c) shall not apply to an individual if admitting 

the individual to the United States is necessary 

to permit the United States to comply with the 

Agreement between the United Nations and the 

United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed June 26, 

1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 

and other applicable international obligations. 

(e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the 

application of subsection (a) or (c) with respect 

to an individual if the President— 

(1) determines that such a waiver is essential 

to the national interests of the United States; 

and 

(2) not less than 7 days before the waiver 

takes effect, notifies Congress of the waiver and 

the reason for the waiver. 

SEC. 222. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND RULE OF 

CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO CERTAIN AUTHORITIES OF STATE AND 

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. 

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 

Congress that the United States should support 

actions by States or local governments that are 

within their authority, including determining 

how investment assets are valued for purposes 

of safety and soundness of financial institutions 

and insurers, that are consistent with and in 

furtherance of the purposes of this Act and 

other Acts that are amended by this Act. 

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Section 202 of 

the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 

8532) is amended by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(j) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

Act or any other provision of law authorizing 

sanctions with respect to Iran shall be construed 

to abridge the authority of a State to issue and 

enforce rules governing the safety, soundness, 

and solvency of a financial institution subject to 

its jurisdiction or the business of insurance pursuant to the Act of March 9, 1945 (15 U.S.C. 1011 

et seq.) (commonly known as the ‘McCarranFerguson Act’).’’. 

SEC. 223. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT ON FOREIGN ENTITIES 

THAT INVEST IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN OR EXPORT REFINED 

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO IRAN. 

(a) INITIAL REPORT.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit 

to the appropriate congressional committees a 

report— 

(A) listing all foreign investors in the energy 

sector of Iran during the period specified in 

paragraph (2), including— 

(i) entities that exported gasoline and other 

refined petroleum products to Iran; 

(ii) entities involved in providing refined petroleum products to Iran, including— 

(I) entities that provided ships to transport refined petroleum products to Iran; and 

(II) entities that provided insurance or reinsurance for shipments of refined petroleum 

products to Iran; and 

(iii) entities involved in commercial transactions of any kind, including joint ventures 

anywhere in the world, with Iranian energy 

companies; and 

(B) identifying the countries in which gasoline and other refined petroleum products exported to Iran during the period specified in 

paragraph (2) were produced or refined. 

(2) PERIOD SPECIFIED.—The period specified in 

this paragraph is the period beginning on January 1, 2009, and ending on the date that is 150 

days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

(b) UPDATED REPORT.—Not later than one 

year after submitting the report required by subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the 

United States shall submit to the appropriate 

congressional committees a report containing 

the matters required in the report under subsection (a)(1) for the one-year period beginning 

on the date that is 30 days before the date on 

which the preceding report was required to be 

submitted by this section. 

SEC. 224. REPORTING ON THE IMPORTATION TO 

AND EXPORTATION FROM IRAN OF 

CRUDE OIL AND REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. 

Section 110(b) of the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8518(b)) is amended by striking ‘‘a report containing the matters’’ and all 

that follows through the period at the end and 


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H5560 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

inserting the following: ‘‘a report, covering the 

180-day period beginning on the date that is 30 

days before the date on which the preceding report was required to be submitted by this section, that— 

‘‘(1) contains the matters required in the report under subsection (a)(1); and 

‘‘(2) identifies— 

‘‘(A) the volume of crude oil and refined petroleum products imported to and exported from 

Iran (including through swaps and similar arrangements); 

‘‘(B) the persons selling and transporting 

crude oil and refined petroleum products described in subparagraph (A), the countries with 

primary jurisdiction over those persons, and the 

countries in which those products were refined; 

‘‘(C) the sources of financing for imports to 

Iran of crude oil and refined petroleum products 

described in subparagraph (A); and 

‘‘(D) the involvement of foreign persons in efforts to assist Iran in— 

‘‘(i) developing upstream oil and gas production capacity; 

‘‘(ii) importing advanced technology to upgrade existing Iranian refineries; 

‘‘(iii) converting existing chemical plants to 

petroleum refineries; or 

‘‘(iv) maintaining, upgrading, or expanding 

existing refineries or constructing new refineries.’’. 

TITLE III—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 

Subtitle A—Identification of, and Sanctions 

With Respect to, Officials, Agents, Affiliates, 

and Supporters of Iran’s Revolutionary 

Guard Corps and Other Sanctioned Persons 

SEC. 301. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION 

OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO, 

OFFICIALS, AGENTS, AND AFFILIATES OF IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY 

GUARD CORPS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the President shall— 

(1) identify foreign persons that are officials, 

agents, or affiliates of Iran’s Revolutionary 

Guard Corps; and 

(2) for each foreign person identified under 

paragraph (1) that is not already designated for 

the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)— 

(A) designate that foreign person for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to that Act; and 

(B) block and prohibit all transactions in all 

property and interests in property of that foreign person if such property and interests in 

property are in the United States, come within 

the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. 

(b) PRIORITY FOR INVESTIGATION.—In identifying foreign persons pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1) as officials, agents, or affiliates of Iran’s 

Revolutionary Guard Corps, the President shall 

give priority to investigating— 

(1) foreign persons or entities identified under 

section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the definition of the Government of Iran); and 

(2) foreign persons for which there is a reasonable basis to find that the person has conducted or attempted to conduct one or more sensitive transactions or activities described in subsection (c). 

(c) SENSITIVE TRANSACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES

DESCRIBED.—A sensitive transaction or activity 

described in this subsection is— 

(1) a financial transaction or series of transactions valued at more than $1,000,000 in the aggregate in any 12-month period involving a nonIranian financial institution; 

(2) a transaction to facilitate the manufacture, importation, exportation, or transfer of 

items needed for the development by Iran of nuclear, chemical, biological, or advanced conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles; 

(3) a transaction relating to the manufacture, 

procurement, or sale of goods, services, and 

technology relating to Iran’s energy sector, including a transaction relating to the development of the energy resources of Iran, the exportation of petroleum products from Iran, the importation of refined petroleum to Iran, or the 

development of refining capacity available to 

Iran; 

(4) a transaction relating to the manufacture, 

procurement, or sale of goods, services, and 

technology relating to Iran’s petrochemical sector; or 

(5) a transaction relating to the procurement 

of sensitive technologies (as defined in section 

106(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8515(c))). 

(d) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the 

Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the 

Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude 

from the United States, any alien who, on or 

after the date of the enactment of this Act, is a 

foreign person designated pursuant to subsection (a) for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 

(2) REGULATORY EXCEPTIONS TO COMPLY WITH

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—The requirement 

to deny visas to and exclude aliens from the 

United States pursuant to paragraph (1) shall 

be subject to such regulations as the President 

may prescribe, including regulatory exceptions 

to permit the United States to comply with the 

Agreement between the United Nations and the 

United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed June 26, 

1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 

and other applicable international obligations. 

(e) WAIVER OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive the 

application of subsection (a) or (d) with respect 

to a foreign person if the President— 

(A) determines that it is vital to the national 

security interests of the United States to do so; 

and 

(B) submits to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report that— 

(i) identifies the foreign person with respect to 

which the waiver applies; and 

(ii) sets forth the reasons for the determination. 

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted 

under paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in 

unclassified form but may contain a classified 

annex. 

(f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

section shall be construed to remove any sanction of the United States in force with respect to 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps as of the date 

of the enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 302. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION 

OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO, 

PERSONS THAT SUPPORT OR CONDUCT CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH 

IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 

CORPS OR OTHER SANCTIONED PERSONS. 

(a) IDENTIFICATION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 

180 days thereafter, the President shall submit 

to the appropriate congressional committees a 

report identifying foreign persons that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly— 

(A) materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, 

or goods or services in support of, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its officials, 

agents, or affiliates the property and interests in 

property of which are blocked pursuant to the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); 

(B) engage in a significant transaction or 

transactions with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 

Corps or any of its officials, agents, or affiliates— 

(i) the property and interests in property of 

which are blocked pursuant to that Act; or 

(ii) that are identified under section 301(a)(1) 

or pursuant to paragraph (4)(A) of section 

104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as 

added by section 312; or 

(C) engage in a significant transaction or 

transactions with— 

(i) a person subject to financial sanctions pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), or 1929 

(2010), or any other resolution that is adopted 

by the Security Council and imposes sanctions 

with respect to Iran or modifies such sanctions; 

or 

(ii) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a person 

described in clause (i). 

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted 

under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 

annex. 

(3) BARTER TRANSACTIONS.—For purposes of 

paragraph (1), the term ‘‘transaction’’ includes 

a barter transaction. 

(b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—If the President determines under subsection (a)(1) that a 

foreign person has knowingly engaged in an activity described in that subsection, the President— 

(1) shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act 

of 1996, as amended by section 204; and 

(2) may impose additional sanctions pursuant 

to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to 

the person. 

(c) TERMINATION.—The President may terminate a sanction imposed with respect to a foreign person pursuant to subsection (b) if the 

President determines that the person— 

(1) no longer engages in the activity for which 

the sanction was imposed; and 

(2) has provided assurances to the President 

that the person will not engage in any activity 

described in subsection (a)(1) in the future. 

(d) WAIVER OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive the 

imposition of sanctions under subsection (b) 

with respect to a foreign person if the President— 

(A)(i) determines that the person has ceased 

the activity for which sanctions would otherwise be imposed and has taken measures to prevent a recurrence of the activity; or 

(ii) determines that it is essential to the national security interests of the United States to 

do so; and 

(B) submits to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report that— 

(i) identifies the foreign person with respect to 

which the waiver applies; 

(ii) describes the activity that would otherwise 

subject the foreign person to the imposition of 

sanctions under subsection (b); and 

(iii) sets forth the reasons for the determination. 

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted 

under paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in 

unclassified form but may contain a classified 

annex. 

(e) WAIVER OF IDENTIFICATIONS AND DESIGNATIONS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of 

this subtitle and subject to paragraph (2), the 

President shall not be required to make any 

identification of a foreign person under subsection (a) or any identification or designation 

of a foreign person under section 301(a) if the 

President— 

(1) determines that doing so would cause damage to the national security of the United 

States; and 

(2) notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the exercise of the authority provided 

under this subsection. 

(f) APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.—The following provisions of 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5561 

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by 

this Act, apply with respect to the imposition 

under subsection (b)(1) of sanctions relating to 

activities described in subsection (a)(1) to the 

same extent that such provisions apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: 

(1) Subsections (c) and (e) of section 4. 

(2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5. 

(3) Section 8. 

(4) Section 9. 

(5) Section 11. 

(6) Section 12. 

(7) Subsection (b) of section 13. 

(8) Section 14. 

SEC. 303. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION 

OF MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO, 

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 

CARRYING OUT ACTIVITIES OR 

TRANSACTIONS WITH CERTAIN 

IRAN-AFFILIATED PERSONS. 

(a) IDENTIFICATION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 

180 days thereafter, the President shall submit 

to the appropriate congressional committees a 

report that identifies each agency of the government of a foreign country (other than Iran) that 

the President determines knowingly and materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, 

material, or technological support for, or goods 

or services in support of, or knowingly and materially engaged in a significant transaction 

with, any person described in paragraph (2). 

(2) PERSON DESCRIBED.—A person described in 

this paragraph is— 

(A) a foreign person that is an official, agent, 

or affiliate of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps 

that is designated for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); 

(B) a foreign person that is designated and 

subject to financial sanctions pursuant to— 

(i) the Annex of United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 1737 (2006); 

(ii) Annex I of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007); 

(iii) Annex I, II, or III of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008); 

(iv) Annex I, II, or III of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010); or 

(v) any subsequent and related United Nations Security Council resolution, or any annex 

thereto, that imposes new sanctions with respect 

to Iran or modifies existing sanctions with respect to Iran; or 

(C) a foreign person that the agency knows is 

acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or 

owned or controlled by, a person described in 

subparagraph (A) or (B). 

(3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted 

under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 

annex. 

(b) IMPOSITION OF MEASURES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose 

any of the following measures with respect to an 

agency identified pursuant to subsection (a) if 

the President determines that the assistance, exports, or other support to be prohibited by reason of the imposition of the measures have contributed and would otherwise directly or indirectly contribute to the agency’s capability to 

continue the activities or transactions for which 

the agency has been identified pursuant to subsection (a): 

(A) No assistance may be provided to the 

agency under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) other than humanitarian assistance or the provision of food or 

other agricultural commodities. 

(B) No sales of any defense articles, defense 

services, or design and construction services 

under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 

2751 et seq.) may be made to the agency. 

(C) No licenses for export of any item on the 

United States Munitions List that include the 

agency as a party to the license may be granted. 

(D) No exports may be permitted to the agency 

of any goods or technologies controlled for national security reasons under the Export Administration Regulations, except that such prohibition shall not apply to any transaction subject 

to the reporting requirements of title V of the 

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et 

seq.; relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities). 

(E) The United States shall oppose any loan 

or financial or technical assistance to the agency by international financial institutions in accordance with section 701 of the International 

Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d). 

(F) The United States shall deny to the agency any credit or financial assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the 

United States Government, except that this 

paragraph shall not apply— 

(i) to any transaction subject to the reporting 

requirements of title V of the National Security 

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities); 

(ii) to the provision of medicines, medical 

equipment, and humanitarian assistance; or 

(iii) to any credit, credit guarantee, or financial assistance provided by the Department of 

Agriculture to support the purchase of food or 

other agricultural commodities. 

(G) Additional restrictions as may be imposed 

pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 

(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

subsection shall be construed to impose measures with respect to programs under section 1501 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2632 note) and programs under the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 

U.S.C. 2501 et seq). 

(c) TERMINATION.—The President may terminate any measures imposed with respect to an 

agency pursuant to subsection (b) if the President determines and notifies the appropriate 

congressional committees that— 

(1)(A) a person described in subparagraph (A) 

or (B) of subsection (a)(2) with respect to which 

the agency is carrying out activities or transactions is no longer designated pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2); or 

(B) any person described in subparagraph (C) 

of subsection (a)(2) with respect to which the 

agency is carrying out activities or transactions 

is no longer acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, any person 

described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2); 

(2) the agency is no longer carrying out activities or transactions for which the measures were 

imposed and has provided assurances to the 

United States Government that the agency will 

not carry out the activities or transactions in 

the future; or 

(3) it is essential to the national security interest of the United States to terminate such 

measures. 

(d) WAIVER.—If the President does not impose 

one or more measures described in subsection (b) 

with respect to an agency identified in the report required by subsection (a), the President 

shall include in the subsequent report an explanation as to why the President did not impose 

such measures. 

(e) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on 

Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, 

Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on 

Finance, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on 

Armed Services, the Committee on Financial 

Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, 

and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. 

(f) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take 

effect on the date of the enactment of this Act 

and apply with respect to activities and transactions described in subsection (a) that are carried out on or after the later of— 

(1) the date that is 45 days after such date of 

enactment; or 

(2) the date that is 45 days after a person is 

designated as described in subparagraph (A) or 

(B) of subsection (a)(2). 

SEC. 304. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 

Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to 

limit the authority of the President to designate 

foreign persons for the imposition of sanctions 

pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 

Subtitle B—Additional Measures Relating to 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps 

SEC. 311. EXPANSION OF PROCUREMENT PROHIBITION TO FOREIGN PERSONS THAT 

ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS 

WITH IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY 

GUARD CORPS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(b)(1) of the Iran 

Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 

U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended— 

(1) by striking ‘‘Not later than 90 days’’ and 

inserting the following: 

‘‘(A) CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO ACTIVITIES

DESCRIBED IN SECTION 5.—Not later than 90 

days’’; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(B) CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD

CORPS.—Not later than 120 days after the date 

of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction 

and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, the Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be revised to 

require a certification from each person that is 

a prospective contractor that the person, and 

any person owned or controlled by the person, 

does not knowingly engage in a significant 

transaction or transactions with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its officials, 

agents, or affiliates the property and interests in 

property of which are blocked pursuant to the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).’’. 

(b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 

(1) Section 6(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 

1996, as amended by subsection (a), is further 

amended— 

(A) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), as 

designated by subsection (a)(1), by striking 

‘‘issued pursuant to section 25 of the Office of 

Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 

421)’’; 

(B) in paragraph (2)— 

(i) in subparagraph (A)— 

(I) by striking ‘‘the revision’’ and inserting 

‘‘the applicable revision’’; and 

(II) by striking ‘‘not more than 3 years’’ and 

inserting ‘‘not less than 2 years’’; and 

(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘issued 

pursuant to section 25 of the Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 421)’’; 

(C) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘in the national interest’’ and inserting ‘‘essential to the 

national security interests’’; 

(D) by striking paragraph (6) and inserting 

the following: 

‘‘(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 

‘‘(A) EXECUTIVE AGENCY.—The term ‘executive 

agency’ has the meaning given that term in section 133 of title 41, United States Code. 

‘‘(B) FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.—The 

term ‘Federal Acquisition Regulation’ means the 

regulation issued pursuant to section 1303(a)(1) 

of title 41, United States Code.’’; and 

(E) in paragraph (7)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘The revisions to the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation required under paragraph (1)’’ and inserting the following: 

‘‘(A) CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO ACTIVITIES

DESCRIBED IN SECTION 5.—The revisions to the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation required under 

paragraph (1)(A)’’; and 

(ii) by adding at the end the following: 


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H5562 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

‘‘(B) CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD

CORPS.—The revisions to the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation required under paragraph (1)(B) 

shall apply with respect to contracts for which 

solicitations are issued on or after the date that 

is 120 days after the date of the enactment of 

the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 

Rights Act of 2012.’’. 

(2) Section 101(3) of the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511(3)) is amended by striking 

‘‘section 4 of the Office of Federal Procurement 

Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403)’’ and inserting ‘‘section 133 of title 41, United States Code’’. 

SEC. 312. DETERMINATIONS OF WHETHER THE 

NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY 

AND THE NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY ARE AGENTS OR AFFILIATES OF IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS. 

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 

Congress that the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company are not only owned and controlled by the 

Government of Iran but that those companies 

provide significant support to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates. 

(b) DETERMINATIONS.—Section 104(c) of the 

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 

and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)) is 

amended by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(4) DETERMINATIONS REGARDING NIOC AND

NITC.— 

‘‘(A) DETERMINATIONS.—For purposes of paragraph (2)(E), the Secretary of the Treasury 

shall, not later than 45 days after the date of 

the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and 

Syria Human Rights Act of 2012— 

‘‘(i) determine whether the NIOC or the NITC 

is an agent or affiliate of Iran’s Revolutionary 

Guard Corps; and 

‘‘(ii) submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report on the determinations made 

under clause (i), together with the reasons for 

those determinations. 

‘‘(B) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted 

under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be submitted in 

unclassified form but may contain a classified 

annex. 

‘‘(C) APPLICABILITY WITH RESPECT TO PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS.— 

‘‘(i) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.—Except as 

provided in clause (ii), if the Secretary of the 

Treasury determines that the NIOC or the NITC 

is a person described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (2)(E), the regulations prescribed under 

paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to a significant transaction or transactions or significant financial services knowingly facilitated or 

provided by a foreign financial institution for 

the NIOC or the NITC, as applicable, for the 

purchase of petroleum or petroleum products 

from Iran, only if a determination of the President under section 1245(d)(4)(B) of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 

(22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(B)) that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other than Iran to 

permit purchasers of petroleum and petroleum 

products from Iran to reduce significantly their 

purchases from Iran is in effect at the time of 

the transaction or the provision of the service. 

‘‘(ii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES.—If 

the Secretary of the Treasury determines that 

the NIOC or the NITC is a person described in 

clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (2)(E), the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall not 

apply to a significant transaction or transactions or significant financial services knowingly facilitated or provided by a foreign financial institution for the NIOC or the NITC, as applicable, for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran if an exception under 

paragraph (4)(D) of section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)) applies to the 

country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution at the time of the 

transaction or the provision of the service. 

‘‘(iii) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The exceptions 

in clauses (i) and (ii) shall not be construed to 

limit the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to impose sanctions pursuant to the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) for an activity described in paragraph (2) to the extent 

the activity would meet the criteria described in 

that paragraph in the absence of the involvement of the NIOC or the NITC. 

‘‘(D) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph: 

‘‘(i) NIOC.—The term ‘NIOC’ means the National Iranian Oil Company. 

‘‘(ii) NITC.—The term ‘NITC’ means the National Iranian Tanker Company.’’. 

(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 

(1) WAIVER.—Section 104(f) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(f)) is amended 

by inserting ‘‘or section 104A’’ after ‘‘subsection 

(c)’’. 

(2) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—Section 104(g) 

of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 

8513(g)) is amended by striking ‘‘subsection 

(c)(1)’’ and inserting ‘‘paragraph (1) or (4) of 

subsection (c) or section 104A’’ both places it appears. 

(d) APPLICABILITY.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—If an exception to sanctions 

described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (4)(C) 

of section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010, as added by subsection (b), applies to a 

person that engages in a transaction described 

in paragraph (2) at the time of the transaction, 

the President is authorized not to impose sanctions with respect to the transaction under— 

(A) section 302(b)(1); 

(B) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010, as added by section 216; or 

(C) any other applicable provision of law authorizing the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran. 

(2) TRANSACTION DESCRIBED.—A transaction 

described in this paragraph is a transaction— 

(A) solely for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran; and 

(B) for which sanctions may be imposed solely 

as a result of the involvement of the National 

Iranian Oil Company or the National Iranian 

Tanker Company in the transaction under— 

(i) section 302(b)(1); 

(ii) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010, as added by section 216; or 

(iii) any other applicable provision of law authorizing the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran. 

TITLE IV—MEASURES RELATING TO 

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN 

Subtitle A—Expansion of Sanctions Relating 

to Human Rights Abuses in Iran 

SEC. 401. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR 

OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS 

ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN OR THEIR FAMILY 

MEMBERS AFTER THE JUNE 12, 2009, 

ELECTIONS IN IRAN. 

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 

Congress that the Supreme Leader of Iran, the 

President of Iran, senior members of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran, senior members of 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ansar-eHezbollah and Basij-e-Mostaz’afin, and the 

Ministers of Defense, Interior, Justice, and Telecommunications are ultimately responsible for 

ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing a 

pattern and practice of serious human rights 

abuses against the Iranian people, and thus the 

President should include such persons on the 

list of persons who are responsible for or 

complicit in committing serious human rights 

abuses and subject to sanctions pursuant to section 105 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 

Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8514). 

(b) REPORT.— 

(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 

days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report 

with respect to whether each person described in 

subsection (a) is responsible for or complicit in, 

or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing the commission of serious human 

rights abuses against citizens of Iran or their 

family members on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in 

Iran. For any such person who is not included 

in such report, the Secretary of State should describe in the report the reasons why the person 

was not included, including information on 

whether sufficient credible evidence of responsibility for such abuses was found. 

(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 

(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but 

may contain a classified annex. 

(3) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term 

‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 

means— 

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 

the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 

Affairs of the Senate; and 

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

Committee on Financial Services of the House of 

Representatives. 

SEC. 402. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF GOODS 

OR TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN THAT 

ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT 

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105 the following: 

‘‘SEC. 105A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF GOODS 

OR TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN THAT 

ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT 

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose 

sanctions in accordance with subsection (c) with 

respect to each person on the list required by 

subsection (b). 

‘‘(b) LIST.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 

the President shall submit to the appropriate 

congressional committees a list of persons that 

the President determines have knowingly engaged in an activity described in paragraph (2) 

on or after such date of enactment. 

‘‘(2) ACTIVITY DESCRIBED.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A person engages in an activity described in this paragraph if the person— 

‘‘(i) transfers, or facilitates the transfer of, 

goods or technologies described in subparagraph 

(C) to Iran, any entity organized under the laws 

of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of 

the Government of Iran, or any national of 

Iran, for use in or with respect to Iran; or 

‘‘(ii) provides services (including services relating to hardware, software, and specialized 

information, and professional consulting, engineering, and support services) with respect to 

goods or technologies described in subparagraph 

(C) after such goods or technologies are transferred to Iran. 

‘‘(B) APPLICABILITY TO CONTRACTS AND OTHER

AGREEMENTS.—A person engages in an activity 

described in subparagraph (A) without regard to 

whether the activity is carried out pursuant to 

a contract or other agreement entered into before, on, or after the date of the enactment of 

the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 

Rights Act of 2012. 

‘‘(C) GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES DESCRIBED.— 

Goods or technologies described in this subparagraph are goods or technologies that the President determines are likely to be used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies or instrumentalities (or by any other person on behalf of 


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the Government of Iran or any of such agencies 

or instrumentalities) to commit serious human 

rights abuses against the people of Iran, including— 

‘‘(i) firearms or ammunition (as those terms 

are defined in section 921 of title 18, United 

States Code), rubber bullets, police batons, pepper or chemical sprays, stun grenades, electroshock weapons, tear gas, water cannons, or surveillance technology; or 

‘‘(ii) sensitive technology (as defined in section 106(c)). 

‘‘(3) SPECIAL RULE TO ALLOW FOR TERMINATION OF SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY.—The President shall not be required to include a person on 

the list required by paragraph (1) if the President certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that— 

‘‘(A) the person is no longer engaging in, or 

has taken significant verifiable steps toward 

stopping, the activity described in paragraph (2) 

for which the President would otherwise have 

included the person on the list; and 

‘‘(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage 

in any activity described in paragraph (2) in the 

future. 

‘‘(4) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall 

submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)— 

‘‘(A) each time the President is required to 

submit an updated list to those committees 

under section 105(b)(2)(A); and 

‘‘(B) as new information becomes available. 

‘‘(5) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.— 

‘‘(A) FORM.—The list required by paragraph 

(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but 

may contain a classified annex. 

‘‘(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified 

portion of the list required by paragraph (1) 

shall be made available to the public and posted 

on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State. 

‘‘(c) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), 

the President shall impose sanctions described 

in section 105(c) with respect to a person on the 

list required by subsection (b). 

‘‘(2) TRANSFERS TO IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY

GUARD CORPS.—In the case of a person on the 

list required by subsection (b) for transferring, 

or facilitating the transfer of, goods or technologies described in subsection (b)(2)(C) to 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, or providing 

services with respect to such goods or technologies after such goods or technologies are 

transferred to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 

Corps, the President shall— 

‘‘(A) impose sanctions described in section 

105(c) with respect to the person; and 

‘‘(B) impose such other sanctions from among 

the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the 

Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 

50 U.S.C. 1701 note) as the President determines 

appropriate.’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 is 

amended by inserting after the item relating to 

section 105 the following: 

‘‘Sec. 105A. Imposition of sanctions with respect 

to the transfer of goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to 

be used to commit human rights 

abuses.’’. 

SEC. 403. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN 

CENSORSHIP OR OTHER RELATED 

ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS OF 

IRAN. 

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 

Congress that— 

(1) satellite service providers and other entities 

that have direct contractual arrangements to 

provide satellite services to the Government of 

Iran or entities owned or controlled by that 

Government should cease providing broadcast 

services to that Government and those entities 

unless that Government ceases activities intended to jam or restrict satellite signals; and 

(2) the United States should address the illegal jamming of satellite signals by the Government of Iran through the voice and vote of the 

United States in the United Nations International Telecommunications Union. 

(b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 

Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), 

as amended by section 402, is further amended 

by inserting after section 105A the following: 

SEC. 105B. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN 

CENSORSHIP OR OTHER RELATED 

ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS OF 

IRAN. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose 

sanctions described in section 105(c) with respect 

to each person on the list required by subsection 

(b). 

‘‘(b) LIST OF PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 

the President shall submit to the appropriate 

congressional committees a list of persons that 

the President determines have, on or after June 

12, 2009, engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran that— 

‘‘(A) prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of 

freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of 

Iran; or 

‘‘(B) limit access to print or broadcast media, 

including the facilitation or support of intentional frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or an entity owned or controlled by 

that Government that would jam or restrict an 

international signal. 

‘‘(2) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall 

submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)— 

‘‘(A) each time the President is required to 

submit an updated list to those committees 

under section 105(b)(2)(A); and 

‘‘(B) as new information becomes available. 

‘‘(3) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.— 

‘‘(A) FORM.—The list required by paragraph 

(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but 

may contain a classified annex. 

‘‘(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified 

portion of the list required by paragraph (1) 

shall be made available to the public and posted 

on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State.’’. 

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as 

amended by section 402, is further amended by 

inserting after the item relating to section 105A 

the following: 

‘‘Sec. 105B. Imposition of sanctions with respect 

to persons who engage in censorship or other related activities 

against citizens of Iran.’’. 

(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 

401(b)(1) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 

Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8551(b)(1)) is amended— 

(1) by inserting ‘‘, 105A(a), or 105B(a)’’ after 

‘‘105(a)’’; and 

(2) by inserting ‘‘, 105A(b), or 105B(b)’’ after 

‘‘105(b)’’. 

Subtitle B—Additional Measures to Promote 

Human Rights 

SEC. 411. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO GRAVE HUMAN RIGHTS 

ABUSES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF 

IRAN AND SYRIA USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. 

United States sanctions with respect to Iran 

and Syria provided for in Executive Order 13606 

(77 Fed. Reg. 24571), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall 

remain in effect— 

(1) with respect to Iran, until the date that is 

30 days after the date on which the President 

submits to Congress the certification described 

in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)); and 

(2) with respect to Syria, until the date on 

which the provisions of and sanctions imposed 

pursuant to title VII terminate pursuant to section 706. 

SEC. 412. CLARIFICATION OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR PURPOSES OF PROCUREMENT BAN UNDER COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT 

ACT OF 2010. 

The Secretary of State shall— 

(1) not later than 90 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act, issue guidelines to further describe the technologies that may be considered ‘‘sensitive technology’’ for purposes of 

section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 

2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515), with special attention to 

new forms of sophisticated jamming, monitoring, 

and surveillance technology relating to mobile 

telecommunications and the Internet, and publish those guidelines in the Federal Register; 

(2) determine the types of technologies that 

enable any indigenous capabilities that Iran has 

to disrupt and monitor information and communications in that country, and consider adding 

descriptions of those items to the guidelines; and 

(3) periodically review, but in no case less 

than once each year, the guidelines and, if necessary, amend the guidelines on the basis of 

technological developments and new information regarding transfers of technologies to Iran 

and the development of Iran’s indigenous capabilities to disrupt and monitor information and 

communications in Iran. 

SEC. 413. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF REQUESTS FOR AUTHORIZATION OF 

CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS-, HUMANITARIAN-, AND DEMOCRACY-RELATED 

ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN. 

(a) REQUIREMENT.—The Office of Foreign Assets Control, in consultation with the Department of State, shall establish an expedited process for the consideration of complete requests for 

authorization to engage in human rights-, humanitarian-, or democracy-related activities relating to Iran that are submitted by— 

(1) entities receiving funds from the Department of State to engage in the proposed activity; 

(2) the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and 

(3) other appropriate agencies of the United 

States Government. 

(b) PROCEDURES.—Requests for authorization 

under subsection (a) shall be submitted to the 

Office of Foreign Assets Control in conformance 

with the Office’s regulations, including section 

501.801 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations 

(commonly known as the Reporting, Procedures 

and Penalties Regulations). Applicants shall 

fully disclose the parties to the transactions as 

well as describe the activities to be undertaken. 

License applications involving the exportation 

or reexportation of goods, technology, or software to Iran shall include a copy of an official 

Commodity Classification issued by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, as part of the license application. 

(c) FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW.—The Department of State shall complete a foreign policy review of a request for authorization under subsection (a) not later than 30 days after the request is referred to the Department by the Office 

of Foreign Assets Control. 

(d) LICENSE DETERMINATIONS.—License determinations for complete requests for authorization under subsection (a) shall be made not later 

than 90 days after receipt by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, with the following exceptions: 

(1) Any requests involving the exportation or 

reexportation to Iran of goods, technology, or 

software listed on the Commerce Control List 

maintained pursuant to part 774 of title 15, Code 

of Federal Regulations, shall be processed in a 


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manner consistent with the Iran-Iraq Arms NonProliferation Act of 1992 (title XVI of Public 

Law 102–484) and other applicable provisions of 

law. 

(2) Any other requests presenting unusual or 

extraordinary circumstances. 

(e) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of the 

Treasury may prescribe such regulations as are 

appropriate to carry out this section. 

SEC. 414. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN IRAN. 

Not later than 90 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 

consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury 

and the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy 

to— 

(1) assist the people of Iran to produce, access, 

and share information freely and safely via the 

Internet, including in Farsi and regional languages; 

(2) support the development of counter-censorship technologies that enable the citizens of 

Iran to undertake Internet activities without interference from the Government of Iran; 

(3) increase the capabilities and availability of 

secure mobile and other communications 

through connective technology among human 

rights and democracy activists in Iran; 

(4) provide resources for digital safety training 

for media and academic and civil society organizations in Iran; 

(5) provide accurate and substantive Internet 

content in local languages in Iran; 

(6) increase emergency resources for the most 

vulnerable human rights advocates seeking to 

organize, share information, and support 

human rights in Iran; 

(7) expand surrogate radio, television, live 

stream, and social network communications inside Iran, including— 

(A) by expanding Voice of America’s Persian 

News Network and Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty’s Radio Farda to provide hourly live 

news update programming and breaking news 

coverage capability 24 hours a day and 7 days 

a week; and 

(B) by assisting telecommunications and software companies that are United States persons 

to comply with the export licensing requirements 

of the United States for the purpose of expanding such communications inside Iran; 

(8) expand activities to safely assist and train 

human rights, civil society, and democracy activists in Iran to operate effectively and securely; 

(9) identify and utilize all available resources 

to overcome attempts by the Government of Iran 

to jam or otherwise deny international satellite 

broadcasting signals; 

(10) expand worldwide United States embassy 

and consulate programming for and outreach to 

Iranian dissident communities; 

(11) expand access to proxy servers for democracy activists in Iran; and 

(12) discourage telecommunications and software companies from facilitating Internet censorship by the Government of Iran. 

SEC. 415. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON POLITICAL 

PRISONERS. 

It shall be the policy of the United States— 

(1) to support efforts to research and identify 

prisoners of conscience and cases of human 

rights abuses in Iran; 

(2) to offer refugee status or political asylum 

in the United States to political dissidents in 

Iran if requested and consistent with the laws 

and national security interests of the United 

States; 

(3) to offer to assist, through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, with the 

relocation of such political prisoners to other 

countries if requested, as appropriate and with 

appropriate consideration for the national security interests of the United States; and 

(4) to publicly call for the release of Iranian 

dissidents by name and raise awareness with respect to individual cases of Iranian dissidents 

and prisoners of conscience, as appropriate and 

if requested by the dissidents or prisoners themselves or their families. 

TITLE V—MISCELLANEOUS 

SEC. 501. EXCLUSION OF CITIZENS OF IRAN SEEKING EDUCATION RELATING TO THE 

NUCLEAR AND ENERGY SECTORS OF 

IRAN. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland 

Security shall exclude from the United States, 

any alien who is a citizen of Iran that the Secretary of State determines seeks to enter the 

United States to participate in coursework at an 

institution of higher education (as defined in 

section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 

1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) to prepare the alien for 

a career in the energy sector of Iran or in nuclear science or nuclear engineering or a related 

field in Iran. 

(b) APPLICABILITY.—Subsection (a) applies 

with respect to visa applications filed on or after 

the date of the enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 502. INTERESTS IN CERTAIN FINANCIAL ASSETS OF IRAN. 

(a) INTERESTS IN BLOCKED ASSETS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), 

notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any provision of law relating to sovereign immunity, and preempting any inconsistent provision of State law, a financial asset 

that is— 

(A) held in the United States for a foreign securities intermediary doing business in the 

United States, 

(B) a blocked asset (whether or not subsequently unblocked) that is property described in 

subsection (b), and 

(C) equal in value to a financial asset of Iran, 

including an asset of the central bank or monetary authority of the Government of Iran or any 

agency or instrumentality of that Government, 

that such foreign securities intermediary or a related intermediary holds abroad, 

shall be subject to execution or attachment in 

aid of execution in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or 

hostage-taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act. 

(2) COURT DETERMINATION REQUIRED.—In 

order to ensure that Iran is held accountable for 

paying the judgments described in paragraph (1) 

and in furtherance of the broader goals of this 

Act to sanction Iran, prior to an award turning 

over any asset pursuant to execution or attachment in aid of execution with respect to any 

judgments against Iran described in paragraph 

(1), the court shall determine whether Iran 

holds equitable title to, or the beneficial interest 

in, the assets described in subsection (b) and 

that no other person possesses a constitutionally 

protected interest in the assets described in subsection (b) under the Fifth Amendment to the 

Constitution of the United States. To the extent 

the court determines that a person other than 

Iran holds— 

(A) equitable title to, or a beneficial interest 

in, the assets described in subsection (b) (excluding a custodial interest of a foreign securities 

intermediary or a related intermediary that 

holds the assets abroad for the benefit of Iran), 

or 

(B) a constitutionally protected interest in the 

assets described in subsection (b), 

such assets shall be available only for execution 

or attachment in aid of execution to the extent 

of Iran’s equitable title or beneficial interest 

therein and to the extent such execution or attachment does not infringe upon such constitutionally protected interest. 

(b) FINANCIAL ASSETS DESCRIBED.—The financial assets described in this section are the financial assets that are identified in and the 

subject of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 

York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of 

Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG), 

that were restrained by restraining notices and 

levies secured by the plaintiffs in those proceedings, as modified by court order dated June 

27, 2008, and extended by court orders dated 

June 23, 2009, May 10, 2010, and June 11, 2010, 

so long as such assets remain restrained by 

court order. 

(c) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

section shall be construed— 

(1) to affect the availability, or lack thereof, 

of a right to satisfy a judgment in any other action against a terrorist party in any proceedings 

other than proceedings referred to in subsection 

(b); or 

(2) to apply to assets other than the assets described in subsection (b), or to preempt State 

law, including the Uniform Commercial Code, 

except as expressly provided in subsection (a)(1). 

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(1) BLOCKED ASSET.—The term ‘‘blocked 

asset’’— 

(A) means any asset seized or frozen by the 

United States under section 5(b) of the Trading 

With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)) or 

under section 202 or 203 of the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 

and 1702); and 

(B) does not include property that— 

(i) is subject to a license issued by the United 

States Government for final payment, transfer, 

or disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection 

with a transaction for which the issuance of the 

license has been specifically required by a provision of law other than the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 

seq.) or the United Nations Participation Act of 

1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or 

(ii) is property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys 

equivalent privileges and immunities under the 

laws of the United States, and is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes. 

(2) FINANCIAL ASSET; SECURITIES INTERMEDIARY.—The terms ‘‘financial asset’’ and ‘‘securities intermediary’’ have the meanings given 

those terms in the Uniform Commercial Code, 

but the former includes cash. 

(3) IRAN.—The term ‘‘Iran’’ means the Government of Iran, including the central bank or 

monetary authority of that Government and 

any agency or instrumentality of that Government. 

(4) PERSON.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘person’’ means 

an individual or entity. 

(B) ENTITY.—The term ‘‘entity’’ means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization. 

(5) TERRORIST PARTY.—The term ‘‘terrorist 

party’’ has the meaning given that term in section 201(d) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 

of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 note). 

(6) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United States’’ 

includes all territory and waters, continental, or 

insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United 

States. 

(e) TECHNICAL CHANGES TO THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT.— 

(1) TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE.—Section 

1610 of title 28, United States Code, is amended— 

(A) in subsection (a)(7), by inserting after 

‘‘section 1605A’’ the following: ‘‘or section 

1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008)’’; and 

(B) in subsection (b)— 

(i) in paragraph (2)— 

(I) by striking ‘‘(5), 1605(b), or 1605A’’ and inserting ‘‘(5) or 1605(b)’’; and 

(II) by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘, or’’; and 


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(ii) by adding after paragraph (2) the following: 

‘‘(3) the judgment relates to a claim for which 

the agency or instrumentality is not immune by 

virtue of section 1605A of this chapter or section 

1605(a)(7) of this chapter (as such section was in 

effect on January 27, 2008), regardless of whether the property is or was involved in the act 

upon which the claim is based.’’. 

(2) TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002.— 

Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance 

Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 note) is amended by 

striking ‘‘section 1605(a)(7)’’ and inserting ‘‘section 1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in 

effect on January 27, 2008)’’. 

SEC. 503. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO SECTION 

1245 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012. 

(a) EXCEPTION FOR SALES OF AGRICULTURAL

COMMODITIES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1245(d)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(2)) is amended— 

(A) in the paragraph heading, by inserting 

‘‘AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES,’’ after ‘‘SALES

OF’’; and 

(B) in the text, by inserting ‘‘agricultural 

commodities,’’ after ‘‘sale of’’. 

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made 

by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included 

in the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 

1298). 

(b) REPORT OF ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1245(d)(4)(A) of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(A)) is amended— 

(A) by striking ‘‘60 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act, and every 60 days thereafter’’ and inserting ‘‘October 25, 2012, and the 

last Thursday of every other month thereafter’’; 

and 

(B) by striking ‘‘60-day period’’ and inserting 

‘‘2-month period’’. 

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made 

by paragraph (1) shall take effect on September 

1, 2012. 

SEC. 504. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER SECTION 1245 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 

FISCAL YEAR 2012. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1245 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 

(22 U.S.C. 8513a), as amended by section 503, is 

further amended— 

(1) in subsection (d)— 

(A) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘a foreign financial institution owned or controlled by the 

government of a foreign country, including’’; 

and 

(B) in paragraph (4)(D)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘Sanctions imposed’’ and inserting the following: 

‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Sanctions imposed’’; 

(ii) in clause (i), as designated by clause (i) of 

this subparagraph— 

(I) by striking ‘‘a foreign financial institution’’ and inserting ‘‘a financial transaction described in clause (ii) conducted or facilitated by 

a foreign financial institution’’; 

(II) by striking ‘‘institution has significantly’’ 

and inserting ‘‘institution— 

‘‘(I) has significantly reduced’’; 

(III) by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

(IV) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(II) in the case of a country that has previously received an exception under this subparagraph, has, after receiving the exception, 

reduced its crude oil purchases from Iran to 

zero.’’; and 

(iii) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(ii) FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS DESCRIBED.—A 

financial transaction conducted or facilitated by 

a foreign financial institution is described in 

this clause if— 

‘‘(I) the financial transaction is only for trade 

in goods or services between the country with 

primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial 

institution and Iran; and 

‘‘(II) any funds owed to Iran as a result of 

such trade are credited to an account located in 

the country with primary jurisdiction over the 

foreign financial institution.’’; 

(2) in subsection (h)— 

(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and 

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: 

‘‘(3) SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS.—The terms ‘reduce significantly’, ‘significant reduction’, and 

‘significantly reduced’, with respect to purchases from Iran of petroleum and petroleum 

products, include a reduction in such purchases 

in terms of price or volume toward a complete 

cessation of such purchases.’’; and 

(3) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(i) TERMINATION.—The provisions of this section shall terminate on the date that is 30 days 

after the date on which the President submits to 

Congress the certification described in section 

401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8551(a)).’’. 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made 

by paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall 

apply with respect to financial transactions 

conducted or facilitated on or after the date 

that is 180 days after the date of the enactment 

of this Act. 

SEC. 505. REPORTS ON NATURAL GAS EXPORTS 

FROM IRAN. 

(a) REPORT BY ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION.—Not later than 60 days after the 

date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Energy Information Administration 

shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 

natural gas sector of Iran that includes— 

(1) an assessment of exports of natural gas 

from Iran; 

(2) an identification of the countries that purchase the most natural gas from Iran; 

(3) an assessment of alternative supplies of 

natural gas available to those countries; 

(4) an assessment of the impact a reduction in 

exports of natural gas from Iran would have on 

global natural gas supplies and the price of natural gas, especially in countries identified under 

paragraph (2); and 

(5) such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate. 

(b) REPORT BY PRESIDENT.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 

receiving the report required by subsection (a), 

the President shall, relying on information in 

that report, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes— 

(A) an assessment of— 

(i) the extent to which revenues from exports 

of natural gas from Iran are still enriching the 

Government of Iran; 

(ii) whether a sanctions regime similar to the 

sanctions regime imposed with respect to purchases of petroleum and petroleum products 

from Iran pursuant to section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012, as amended by sections 503 and 504, 

or other measures could be applied effectively to 

exports of natural gas from Iran; 

(iii) the geostrategic implications of a reduction in exports of natural gas from Iran, including the impact of such a reduction on the countries identified under subsection (a)(2); 

(iv) alternative supplies of natural gas available to those countries; and 

(v) the impact a reduction in exports of natural gas from Iran would have on global natural gas supplies and the price of natural gas 

and the impact, if any, on swap arrangements 

for natural gas in place between Iran and 

neighboring countries; and 

(B) specific recommendations with respect to 

measures designed to limit the revenue received 

by the Government of Iran from exports of natural gas; and 

(C) any other information the President considers appropriate. 

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required 

by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. 

SEC. 506. REPORT ON MEMBERSHIP OF IRAN IN 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

Not later than 180 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act, and not later than September 1 of each year thereafter, the Secretary 

of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report listing the international organizations of which Iran is a member and detailing the amount that the United 

States contributes to each such organization on 

an annual basis. 

SEC. 507. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPORTATION 

OF GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR AIRCRAFT PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES. 

It is the sense of Congress that licenses to export or reexport goods, services, or technologies 

for aircraft produced in the United States 

should be provided only in situations in which 

such licenses are truly essential and in a manner consistent with the laws and foreign policy 

goals of the United States. 

TITLE VI—GENERAL PROVISIONS 

SEC. 601. IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES. 

(a) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 

and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to 

carry out— 

(1) sections 211, 212, 213, 217, 218, 220, 312, and 

411, subtitle A of title III, and title VII; 

(2) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 

of 2010, as added by section 312; and 

(3) sections 105A and 105B of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by subtitle A of title 

IV. 

(b) PENALTIES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The penalties provided for in 

subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or 

causes a violation of a provision specified in 

paragraph (2) of this subsection, or an order or 

regulation prescribed under such a provision, to 

the same extent that such penalties apply to a 

person that commits an unlawful act described 

in section 206(a) of that Act. 

(2) PROVISIONS SPECIFIED.—The provisions 

specified in this paragraph are the following: 

(A) Sections 211, 212, 213, and 220, subtitle A 

of title III, and title VII. 

(B) Sections 105A and 105B of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by subtitle A of title 

IV. 

SEC. 602. APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. 

Nothing in this Act or the amendments made 

by this Act shall apply to the authorized intelligence activities of the United States. 

SEC. 603. APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN NATURAL 

GAS PROJECTS. 

(a) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN NATURAL GAS

PROJECTS.—Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall apply to any activity relating to a project— 

(1) for the development of natural gas and the 

construction and operation of a pipeline to 

transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe; 

(2) that provides to Turkey and countries in 

Europe energy security and energy independence from the Government of the Russian Federation and other governments with jurisdiction 

over persons subject to sanctions imposed under 

this Act or amendments made by this Act; and 

(3) that was initiated before the date of the 

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sharing agreement, or an ancillary agreement 

necessary to further a production-sharing agreement, entered into with, or a license granted by, 

the government of a country other than Iran before such date of enactment. 

(b) TERMINATION OF EXCEPTION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The exception under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a 

project described in that subsection on or after 

the date on which the President certifies to the 

appropriate congressional committees that— 

(A) the percentage of the equity interest in the 

project held by or on behalf of an entity described in paragraph (2) has increased relative 

to the percentage of the equity interest in the 

project held by or on behalf of such an entity on 

January 1, 2002; or 

(B) an entity described in paragraph (2) has 

assumed an operational role in the project. 

(2) ENTITY DESCRIBED.—An entity described in 

this paragraph is— 

(A) an entity— 

(i) owned or controlled by the Government of 

Iran or identified under section 560.304 of title 

31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the 

definition of the Government of Iran); or 

(ii) organized under the laws of Iran or with 

the participation or approval of the Government 

of Iran; 

(B) an entity owned or controlled by an entity 

described in subparagraph (A); or 

(C) a successor entity to an entity described in 

subparagraph (A). 

SEC. 604. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO USE OF FORCE AGAINST 

IRAN AND SYRIA. 

Nothing in this Act or the amendments made 

by this Act shall be construed as a declaration 

of war or an authorization of the use of force 

against Iran or Syria. 

SEC. 605. TERMINATION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The provisions of sections 

211, 212, 213, 218, 220, 221, and 501, title I, and 

subtitle A of title III shall terminate on the date 

that is 30 days after the date on which the 

President makes the certification described in 

section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 

2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)). 

(b) AMENDMENT TO TERMINATION DATE OF

COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010.—Section 

401(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 

Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 

U.S.C. 8551(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ‘‘, 

and verifiably dismantled its,’’ after ‘‘development of’’. 

TITLE VII—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SYRIA 

SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE. 

This title may be cited as the ‘‘Syria Human 

Rights Accountability Act of 2012’’. 

SEC. 702. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN PERSONS WHO 

ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR 

COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS 

ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF SYRIA OR THEIR FAMILY 

MEMBERS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose 

sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to each person on the list required by subsection (b). 

(b) LIST OF PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE

FOR OR COMPLICIT IN CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS

ABUSES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons who are officials of the Government of Syria or persons acting on behalf of that Government that the President determines, based on credible evidence, are 

responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for 

ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the 

commission of serious human rights abuses 

against citizens of Syria or their family members, regardless of whether such abuses occurred 

in Syria. 

(2) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall 

submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)— 

(A) not later than 300 days after the date of 

the enactment of this Act and every 180 days 

thereafter; and 

(B) as new information becomes available. 

(3) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.— 

(A) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1) 

shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 

contain a classified annex. 

(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified 

portion of the list required by paragraph (1) 

shall be made available to the public and posted 

on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State. 

(4) CONSIDERATION OF DATA FROM OTHER

COUNTRIES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.—In preparing the list required by paragraph (1), the President shall consider credible 

data already obtained by other countries and 

nongovernmental organizations, including organizations in Syria, that monitor the human 

rights abuses of the Government of Syria. 

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), including 

blocking of property and restrictions or prohibitions on financial transactions and the exportation of property, subject to such regulations as 

the President may prescribe. 

SEC. 703. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF GOODS 

OR TECHNOLOGIES TO SYRIA THAT 

ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT 

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose 

sanctions described in section 702(c) with respect 

to— 

(1) each person on the list required by subsection (b); and 

(2) any person that— 

(A) is a successor entity to a person on the 

list; 

(B) owns or controls a person on the list, if 

the person that owns or controls the person on 

the list had actual knowledge or should have 

known that the person on the list engaged in 

the activity described in subsection (b)(2) for 

which the person was included in the list; or 

(C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, the person on 

the list, if the person owned or controlled by, or 

under common ownership or control with (as the 

case may be), the person on the list knowingly 

engaged in the activity described in subsection 

(b)(2) for which the person was included in the 

list. 

(b) LIST.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that the 

President determines have knowingly engaged 

in an activity described in paragraph (2) on or 

after such date of enactment. 

(2) ACTIVITY DESCRIBED.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—A person engages in an activity described in this paragraph if the person— 

(i) transfers, or facilitates the transfer of, 

goods or technologies described in subparagraph 

(C) to Syria; or 

(ii) provides services with respect to goods or 

technologies described in subparagraph (C) after 

such goods or technologies are transferred to 

Syria. 

(B) APPLICABILITY TO CONTRACTS AND OTHER

AGREEMENTS.—A person engages in an activity 

described in subparagraph (A) without regard to 

whether the activity is carried out pursuant to 

a contract or other agreement entered into before, on, or after the date of the enactment of 

this Act. 

(C) GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES DESCRIBED.— 

Goods or technologies described in this subparagraph are goods or technologies that the President determines are likely to be used by the Government of Syria or any of its agencies or instrumentalities to commit human rights abuses 

against the people of Syria, including— 

(i) firearms or ammunition (as those terms are 

defined in section 921 of title 18, United States 

Code), rubber bullets, police batons, pepper or 

chemical sprays, stun grenades, electroshock 

weapons, tear gas, water cannons, or surveillance technology; or 

(ii) sensitive technology. 

(D) SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY DEFINED.— 

(i) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of subparagraph (C), the term ‘‘sensitive technology’’ 

means hardware, software, telecommunications 

equipment, or any other technology, that the 

President determines is to be used specifically— 

(I) to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in Syria; or 

(II) to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict 

speech of the people of Syria. 

(ii) EXCEPTION.—The term ‘‘sensitive technology’’ does not include information or informational materials the exportation of which the 

President does not have the authority to regulate or prohibit pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of 

the International Emergency Economic Powers 

Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)). 

(3) SPECIAL RULE TO ALLOW FOR TERMINATION

OF SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY.—The President 

shall not be required to include a person on the 

list required by paragraph (1) if the President 

certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that— 

(A) the person is no longer engaging in, or has 

taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping, the activity described in paragraph (2) for 

which the President would otherwise have included the person on the list; and 

(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage 

in any activity described in paragraph (2) in the 

future. 

(4) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall 

submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)— 

(A) not later than 300 days after the date of 

the enactment of this Act and every 180 days 

thereafter; and 

(B) as new information becomes available. 

(5) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.— 

(A) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1) 

shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 

contain a classified annex. 

(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified 

portion of the list required by paragraph (1) 

shall be made available to the public and posted 

on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State. 

SEC. 704. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN 

CENSORSHIP OR OTHER FORMS OF 

REPRESSION IN SYRIA. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose 

sanctions described in section 702(c) with respect 

to each person on the list required by subsection 

(b). 

(b) LIST OF PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that the 

President determines have engaged in censorship, or activities relating to censorship, in a 

manner that prohibits, limits, or penalizes the 

legitimate exercise of freedom of expression by 

citizens of Syria. 

(2) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall 

submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)— 

(A) not later than 300 days after the date of 

the enactment of this Act and every 180 days 

thereafter; and 

(B) as new information becomes available. 

(3) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.— 

(A) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1) 

shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 

contain a classified annex. 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5567 

(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified 

portion of the list required by paragraph (1) 

shall be made available to the public and posted 

on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State. 

SEC. 705. WAIVER. 

The President may waive the requirement to 

include a person on a list required by section 

702, 703, or 704 or to impose sanctions pursuant 

to any such section if the President— 

(1) determines that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; 

and 

(2) submits to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report on the reasons for that determination. 

SEC. 706. TERMINATION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The provisions of this title 

and any sanctions imposed pursuant to this title 

shall terminate on the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional 

committees— 

(1) the certification described in subsection 

(b); and 

(2) a certification that— 

(A) the Government of Syria is democratically 

elected and representative of the people of 

Syria; or 

(B) a legitimate transitional government of 

Syria is in place. 

(b) CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—A certification described in this subsection is a certification by the President that the Government of 

Syria— 

(1) has unconditionally released all political 

prisoners; 

(2) has ceased its practices of violence, unlawful detention, torture, and abuse of citizens of 

Syria engaged in peaceful political activity; 

(3) has ceased its practice of procuring sensitive technology designed to restrict the free 

flow of unbiased information in Syria, or to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict the right of 

citizens of Syria to freedom of expression; 

(4) has ceased providing support for foreign 

terrorist organizations and no longer allows 

such organizations, including Hamas, 

Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to 

maintain facilities in territory under the control 

of the Government of Syria; and 

(5) has ceased the development and deployment of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles; 

(6) is not pursuing or engaged in the research, 

development, acquisition, production, transfer, 

or deployment of biological, chemical, or nuclear 

weapons, and has provided credible assurances 

that it will not engage in such activities in the 

future; and 

(7) has agreed to allow the United Nations 

and other international observers to verify that 

the Government of Syria is not engaging in such 

activities and to assess the credibility of the assurances provided by that Government. 

(c) SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS AFTER ELECTION

OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.—If the President 

submits to the appropriate congressional committees the certification described in subsection 

(a)(2), the President may suspend the provisions 

of this title and any sanctions imposed under 

this title for not more than 180 days to allow 

time for a certification described in subsection 

(b) to be submitted. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 

Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) and the 

gentleman from California (Mr. BERMAN) each will control 20 minutes. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, 

by prior agreement with the gentleman 

from California, who will do the same, 

I would like to yield 5 minutes of my 

time to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 

KUCINICH) and ask unanimous consent 

that he be allowed to control those 5 

minutes. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there 

objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Florida? 

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, are we apportioning that 5 minutes from each side? 

Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman 

yield? 

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from California. 

Mr. BERMAN. At the point where I 

am recognized, I will be also seeking 

unanimous consent for the same kind 

of referral of time to your control. 

Mr. KUCINICH. I withdraw my reservation. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there 

objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Florida? 

There was no objection. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would 

also yield 5 minutes of my time to the 

gentleman from Ohio and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to 

control those 5 minutes. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there 

objection to the request of the gentleman from California? 

There was no objection. 

GENERAL LEAVE

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I 

ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to 

include extraneous material on the 

measure under consideration. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there 

objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Florida? 

There was no objection. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I 

yield myself such time as I may consume. 

Mr. Speaker, I have spoken on this 

floor many times about the Iranian 

threat and the need for action to stop 

it, but ultimately we will all be judged 

by a simple question: Did we stop Iran 

from getting a nuclear weapons capability? If the answer is ‘‘no,’’ if we fail, 

then nothing else matters. If we fail, it 

would be of no comfort to the American people whose security and future 

would be put in danger. If we fail, it 

would be of no comfort to our ally, 

Israel, whose very existence would be 

put in danger. 

History is full of avoidable tragedies, 

of foolish countries that have allowed 

their enemies to prepare to destroy 

them. The entire world now is fully 

aware of Iran’s true intention. Now is 

the time to take a stand. As Sir Winston Churchill said: 

You ask, What is our aim? I can answer 

with one word: victory. For without victory, 

there is no survival. 

To get us on that path to victory, Mr. 

Speaker, I ask my colleagues to render 

their full support to the Iran Threat 

Reduction and the Syria Human Rights 

Act of 2012, a bicameral, bipartisan 

agreement that represents the strongest set of sanctions ever put in place 

against the regime in Tehran. It blacklists virtually all of Iran’s energy, financial, and transportation sectors, 

and cuts off companies that keep doing 

business with Iran from access to our 

markets in the United States. 

This legislation also imposes sanctions to prevent Iran from repatriating 

any proceeds from its oil sales, depriving the Iranian regime of 80 percent of 

its hard currency earnings and half of 

the funds that support its budget. This 

bill also imposes tough new sanctions 

on the National Iranian Oil Company, 

the National Iranian Tanker Company, 

and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps. It also targets Iran’s use 

of barter transactions to bypass sanctions, the provisions of insurance to 

Iran’s energy sector. It also targets 

provisions of specialized financial messaging services to the Central Bank of 

Iran. 

Mr. Speaker, in 1995, the late former 

Secretary of State, Warren Christopher 

said: 

In terms of its organization, programs, 

procurement, and covert activities, Iran is 

pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons, which has been followed by almost all 

states that have recently sought a nuclear 

capability. 

That was in 1995. 

Secretary Christopher added: 

There is no room for complacency. 

Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in ’96. That law, now called 

the Iran Sanctions Act, sought to target Iran’s economic lifeline—its energy 

sector—and denied Tehran the financial resources to pursue its nuclear ambitions, to sponsor violent Islamic 

groups, and to dominate the region. 

b 1430 

Regrettably, just a couple years after 

enactment of that law, the Clinton administration issued a blanket waiver of 

energy sector sanctions that has been 

continued by successive administrations. 

In 1996, U.S. concerns were not shared 

by our allies in Europe and Asia, who 

argued that trade, dialogue, and engagement toward the Iranian regime 

would succeed in moderating Tehran’s 

behavior. This allowed the Iranian 

threat to flourish. 

However, Congress continued to develop new legislative countermeasures 

in the form of the Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006 and the Comprehensive 

Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 to address these 

Iranian threats and to hold the regime 

accountable for its human rights violations, for its state sponsorship of violent extremists, and for its pursuit of a 

nuclear capability. 

We have analyzed Iranian reaction 

and behavior in response to these new 

sanctions. We have looked at what 

steps our allies have undertaken and 

considered the actions, or the paralysis, of the United Nations. But most 

importantly, Mr. Speaker, we have intensified our response as the Iranian 

threat has evolved and grown. 

We know that ‘‘the price of freedom 

is eternal vigilance.’’ But far more 

than vigilance is needed in this case. 


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H5568 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

Which brings us to the Iran Threat 

Reduction and Syria Human Rights 

Act, which we are considering today. 

This bipartisan, bicameral agreement 

seeks to tighten the choke hold on the 

regime beyond anything that has been 

done before. It sends a clear message 

that the American people, through 

their elected representatives, are fully 

committed to using every economic 

and political lever at their disposal to 

prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear 

threshold. 

Through this bill, we declare that the 

Iranian energy sector is off limits, and 

it blacklists any related unauthorized 

dealings. It will undermine Iran’s ability to repatriate the revenues it receives from the sale of crude oil, depriving Iran of hard currency earnings 

and funds needed to sustain its nuclear 

program. It prevents the purchasing of 

Iranian sovereign debt, thereby further 

limiting the regime’s ability to finance 

its illicit activities. It also expands 

sanctions against Iranian and Syrian 

officials for human rights abuses, particularly those facilitated by computer 

and network disruption, monitoring, 

and tracking by those governments. 

Yet we should be under no illusions, 

Mr. Speaker, that this legislation is a 

magic wand that we wave, and we will 

resolve the problem overnight. Sanctions have helped to knock the regime 

off balance. But unless the executive 

branch fully implements these measures immediately, the regime is likely 

to regain its footing and further speed 

up its nuclear march. So let us act now 

to stop that march. 

With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the 

balance of my time. 

Mr. Speaker, the threat posed by the Iranian 

regime is not just a threat to the United 

States, or to our allies, or to the Iranian people. 

The Iranian regime is also a threat to the 

Syrian people, because of Iran’s close ties 

and assistance, including weapons that have 

helped the regime in Syria to slaughter thousands. 

Like Iran, Syria is a state sponsor of terrorism that poses a threat to the U.S., to our 

ally Israel, and to other responsible nations. 

I hope to be back on the House floor in the 

near future with the Syria Freedom Support 

Act to address the totality of the Syrian threat, 

but today we stand ready to hold the Assad 

regime accountable for its gross human rights 

violations. 

Today, we seek to ensure that neither of 

these brutal regimes has access to resources 

that would enable them to perpetuate their 

cruelty. 

Those allies who, 16 years ago, wanted to 

engage and continue business as usual with 

Iran and who, until just a few years ago, were 

proposing expanded trade agreements with 

the Assad regime in Syria, have awaken to 

take a stand against the threatening activities 

of these pariah states. 

Congress must carry out its responsibility to 

the American people and overwhelmingly 

adopt the bicameral, bipartisan agreement we 

are considering today. 

I urge the President to quickly sign it into 

law and immediately and fully implement the 

sanctions it contains. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am 

very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 

gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), 

a national leader on the issue of nonproliferation and human rights and 

particularly our efforts to stop Iran’s 

nuclear weapons program, the Democratic whip of the House. 

Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman 

from California for yielding. 

First, I want to rise and thank Chairwoman ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN for her 

continuing leadership and focus on this 

important issue, as she does on so 

many other issues as well. 

Mr. Speaker, let me thank my friend, 

the gentleman from California and 

ranking member of the Foreign Affairs 

Committee, Mr. BERMAN. His leadership on this issue in Congress is second 

to none, and I commend him for his 

work. 

This is a bill I expect will pass with 

overwhelming support in both parties 

and for good reason. Iran cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. 

America’s policy, as President Obama 

has stated, is prevention, not containment. 

We have many tools at our disposal 

to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear 

weapons technology. While President 

Obama is keeping all options on the 

table, the best diplomatic tool we have 

to deter Iran is the sanctions regime 

his administration has expanded along 

with our allies in Europe and elsewhere. These sanctions have already 

had a significant effect, and Iran continues to face the prospect of severe 

economic repercussions if they fail to 

abandon their nuclear weapons plan. 

President Obama deserves credit for 

his tough stances. The new sanctions 

this legislation would impose target 

entities conducting business with 

Iran’s insurance, energy, and shipping 

sectors. As a result of prohibitions on 

repatriating oil revenues, these sanctions would deny Iran 80 percent of its 

hard currency earnings. Iran’s banking 

sector, including its central bank, is already sanctioned, a result of the Iranian Government’s financial support 

for terrorism in the region and around 

the world. 

There is no better evidence why this 

bill is so important than the fact that 

2 weeks ago, a terrorist attack in Bulgaria killed six innocent civilians, five 

of them vacationing Israelis. There 

have been numerous press reports linking Iran to that attack. 

As long as Iran continues to pursue 

nuclear weapons, call for the destruction of Israel, and provide arms to terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, 

it will face the consequences in the 

form of sanctions, isolation, and the 

continuing reality of the option of 

military action. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The 

time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. BERMAN. I am pleased to yield 

the gentleman an additional 30 seconds. 

Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman. 

The United States continues to stand 

strongly with our ally Israel. And I am 

proud to have led an effort earlier this 

year with the majority leader to 

strengthen U.S.-Israel military and intelligence relations. 

I urge all of my colleagues to unite 

behind this bill, just as we did behind 

that one. A nuclear-armed Iran is not 

an option for the Middle East, for the 

international community, and for the 

United States. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 

21⁄2 minutes to the gentleman from 

Texas, Congressman RON PAUL, an 

American patriot, someone who has 

been relentless in his efforts to stop 

America from blundering into foreign 

adventures. 

Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman for 

yielding. 

I think this bill would be better 

named if we called it ‘‘Obsession with 

Iran Act of 2012’’ because this is what 

we continue to be doing—obsess with 

Iran and the idea that Iran is a threat 

to our national security. 

Iran happens to be a Third World nation. They have no significant navy, 

air force, intercontinental ballistic 

missiles. The IAEA and our CIA say 

they are not on the verge of a nuclear 

weapon. 

It’s so similar to what we went 

through in the early part of this last 

decade where we were beating the war 

drums to go to war against Iraq. And it 

was all a facade. There was no danger 

from Iraq. So this is what we’re doing, 

beating the war drums once again. 

Since the bill has come back from 

the conference, if we are to deal with 

civil liberties in Syria—well, I happen 

to be a civil libertarian. I am very concerned about civil liberties. But let me 

tell you, this bill is not going to do 

anything to enhance the civil liberties 

of the individuals in Syria. 

If we were really interested in civil 

liberties, why wouldn’t we look to ourselves? Why wouldn’t we look to the 

things we do here? What about our 

warrantless searches under the PATRIOT Act? What about the policy of 

assassination, assassinating American 

citizens? What about arrests by the 

military, the National Defense Authorization Act? What about the drone warfare that we go on? Do you think we 

are protecting civil liberties by arbitrarily dropping drones or threatening 

to drop drones anyplace in the world, 

with innocent people dying? 

If we want to really care about civil 

liberties in Syria, why don’t we care 

about the secret prisons we have and 

the history of torture that we have had 

in this country? 

What about the fact that kill lists 

are being made by the executive branch 

of government, and we sit idly by and 

approve of it by saying nothing, and 

the American people put up with it, 

and we march in this direction, marching into a determination to have another war? 

When you put sanctions on a country, it’s an act of war, and that is what 

this is all about. The first thing you do 

when war breaks out between two 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5569 

countries is you put sanctions on them. 

You blockade the country. So this is an 

act of war. 

What would we do if somebody blockaded and put sanctions on us and prevented the importation of any product 

of this country? We would be furious. 

We would declare war. We would go to 

war. 

b 1440 

So we are the antagonists. We’re over 

there poking our nose and poking our 

nose in other people’s affairs, just looking for a chance to start another war. 

First it’s Syria and then Iran. We have 

too many wars. We need to stop the 

wars. We don’t have the money to fight 

these wars any longer. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, 

I’m pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 

gentleman from New York (Mr. TURNER), a member of our Committee on 

Foreign Affairs. 

Mr. TURNER of New York. Mr. 

Speaker, I rise in strong support of 

H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction 

and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. I 

would like to applaud Chairwoman 

ROS-LEHTINEN’s tireless effort on this 

legislation to ensure that Iran’s terrorist regime does not threaten the security of the United States and our 

greatest ally in the Middle East, Israel. 

I’m sure many of you remember that 

Iran was found by a Federal court to 

have been directly involved in both the 

1983 attacks on the marine barracks in 

Beirut which killed 241 soldiers and the 

Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia where a suicide bomber killed 14 

airmen. The victims and their families 

won a judgment in court against the 

Iranian Government, but have had difficulty enforcing it because Iran could 

hide behind sovereign immunity. 

I introduced H.R. 4070, which is now 

part of this bill, to change a specific 

part of Federal law to allow assets 

seized from the Iranian Government to 

be allocated to the Beirut and Khobar 

Towers families to recover the judgments owed to them. It is time that 

Iran is held accountable for their involvement in the deaths of our soldiers. 

I’m proud to say that this provision 

is truly bipartisan. My colleagues on 

both sides of the aisle stand together 

against Iran. By passing this bill 

today, we offer the victims’ families 

the justice that they have long been 

denied. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in 

support of H. Res. 750, and I yield myself 21⁄2 minutes. 

The bill before us today marks a significant step forward in our sanctions 

effort against the Iranian regime and 

its illicit nuclear program, the sanctions effort which even Tehran acknowledges is already having a stressful impact on Iran’s economy. I want 

to commend my colleague, ILEANA ROSLEHTINEN, for her work on this legislation; and I’m proud to be the bill’s 

chief cosponsor in the House. 

Building on previous sanctions, this 

bill adds to what the gentlelady and I 

set out to do when we introduced it. 

For example, through further limiting 

transitions with the Central Bank of 

Iran, an initiative I originated, this 

legislation restricts Iran’s ability to 

repatriate the revenue it receives from 

its diminishing oil sales. It includes 

provisions that clamp down on Iran’s 

oil exports by targeting the National 

Iranian Oil Company and the National 

Iranian Tanker Company; and it expands sanctions on Iranian shipping, 

insurance, and financing in the energy 

sector. 

The bill also increases sanctions on 

transactions with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the spearhead 

of Iran’s nuclear proliferation and terrorism effort and the dominant player 

in the Iranian economy. Further, at 

my suggestion, this bill now includes a 

measure which expands CISADA sanctions beyond financial institutions to 

include more than 200 additional individuals and companies that have been 

linked to Iran’s nuclear weapons of 

mass destruction and terrorism programs. 

And of critical importance, this bill 

vastly strengthens sanctions on both 

Iranian and Syrian human rights abusers. These provisions are very important, but the Iranians should not be 

fooled into thinking this is the last 

word on sanctions. Far from it. 

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I want to call 

on the administration to implement 

the authorities we have given them, 

fully and without delay. Iran’s nuclear 

clock is ticking, and time is not on our 

side. The actions the executive branch 

took yesterday, including the first-ever 

CISADA sanctions on foreign banks— 

more than 2 years after CISADA became law—are a good beginning, but 

Iran’s nuclear weapons program continues apace. Every day, it is enriching 

more uranium and at higher levels. 

The only hope we have for a peaceful 

solution is to apply enough pressure to 

ensure that Iran ends its nuclear weapons program. The bill before us and the 

action the administration has taken 

applies significantly more pressure; but 

let there be no doubt, there is more we 

can do and more that we will do if Iran 

doesn’t end its nuclear weapons program verifiably and completely. We 

have more work to do. 

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FALSAFI, Mahin; FARNHAM SHIPPING 

COMPANY LIMITED; FAROOQ, Muhammad; 

FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; 

FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; 

FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; FIRST 

OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; FIRST 

OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; FIRST PERSIA 

EQUITY FUND; FOURTEENTH OCEAN 

GMBH & CO. KG; FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; FOURTH OCEAN GMBH 

& CO. KG; Frosch, Daniel; FULMEN GROUP; 

GALLIOT MARITIME INC; GHEZEL 

AYAGH, Alireza; GLOBAL INTERFACE 

COMPANY INC.; GOLPARVAR, 

Gholamhossein; GOMSHALL SHIPPING 

COMPANY LIMITED; Good Luck Shipping. 

GREAT METHOD LIMITED; GREAT 

OCEAN SHIPPING SERVICES (L.L.C.); 

HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO; HIGHER INSTITUTE OF APPLIED SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY; HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; HTTS HANSEATIC TRADE 

TRUST AND SHIPPING, GMBH; IDEAL 

SUCCESS INVESTMENTS LIMITED; INDUS 

MARITIME INC; International General 

Resourcing; IRAN AIR; IRAN AIRCRAFT 

MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIAL COMPANY; IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY 

COMPANY; IRAN COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES; IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; IRAN O MISR SHIPPING COMPANY; IRANAIR TOURS; IRINVESTSHIP 

LTD.; IRISL (MALTA) LIMITED; IRISL 

(UK) LTD.; IRISL CHINA SHIPPING CO., 

LTD. 

IRISL EUROPE GMBH; IRISL MARINE 

SERVICES & ENGINEERING COMPANY; 

IRISL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CO.; 

IRITAL SHIPPING SRL COMPANY; ISI 

MARITIME LIMITED; ISIM AMIN LIMITED; ISIM ATR LIMITED; ISIM OLIVE 

LIMITED; ISIM SAT LIMITED; ISIM SEA 

CHARIOT LIMITED; ISIM SEA CRESCENT 

LIMITED; ISIM SININ LIMITED; ISIM TAJ 

MAHAL LIMITED; ISIM TOUR LIMITED; 

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING 

LINES; JAFARI, Mani; JAFARI, Milad; 

JAFARI, Mohammad Javad; JAVEDAN 

MEHR TOOS; KAVERI MARITIME INC. 

KERMAN SHIPPING CO LTD; KHALILI, 

Jamshid; KHAZAR SEA SHIPPING LINES; 

KOHAS AG; LANCELIN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; LEADING MARITIME 

PTE. LTD.; LERCH, Gotthard; LOGISTIC 

SMART LIMITED; LOWESWATER LIMITED; M. BABAIE INDUSTRIES; MACHINE 

PARDAZAN CO.; MACPAR MAKINA SAN 

VE TIC A.S.; Malek Ashtar University; 

MALEKI, Naser; MALSHIP SHIPPING 

AGENCY LTD.; MARANER HOLDINGS LIMITED; MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED; 

MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY; 

MAZANDARAN TEXTILE COMPANY; 

MEHR CAYMAN LTD. 

MELODIOUS MARITIME INC; MILL 

DENE LIMITED; MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 

FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS; Ministry 

of Defense Logistics Export; MODALITY 

LIMITED; MOGHADDAMI FARD, Mohammad; MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INC; 


smartinez on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with HOUSE
H5570 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET 

PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI; MUNITIONS INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT; 

NABIPOUR, Ghasem; NARI SHIPPING AND 

CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG; NATIONAL 

STANDARDS AND CALIBRATION LABORATORY; NEKA NOVIN; NEUMAN LIMITED; NEW DESIRE LIMITED; NINTH 

OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; NINTH 

OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; NOOR AFZAR 

GOSTAR COMPANY; OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH; PACIFIC SHIPPING 

DMCEST. 

PAJAND, Mohammad Hadi; PARTNER 

CENTURY LIMITED; PARTO SANAT CO.; 

PAYA PARTOV CO.; PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD.; PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, 

SA; PEARL SHIP MANAGEMENT L.L.C.; 

QANNADI, Mohammad; Rabiee, Hamid Reza; 

RISHI MARITIME INC; ROYAL-MED SHIPPING AGENCY LTD; SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LIMITED; SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA 

SHIPPING COMPANY; SANDFORD GROUP 

LIMITED; SARKANDI, Ahmad; SCIENTIFIC 

STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTER; SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; 

SECOND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE; SECOND 

OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; SECOND 

OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG. 

SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 

GMBH; SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; 

SHAHID AHMAD KAZEMI INDUSTRIES 

GROUP; SHAHID BAKERI INDUSTRIAL 

GROUP; SHAHID SATTARI INDUSTRIES; 

SHALLON LIMITED; SHERE SHIPPING 

COMPANY LIMITED; SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY; SHIRAZ 

ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; SHOMAL CEMENT COMPANY; SIMATIC DEVELOPMENT CO.; SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS LIMITED; SINOSE MARITIME PTE. LTD.; 

SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; 

SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; SMART 

DAY HOLDINGS GROUP LIMITED; 

SOROUSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP MANAGEMENT COMPANY; SPRINGTHORPE 

LIMITED; STARRY SHINE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED; STEIGER, Jakob. 

STEP A.S.; SYSTEM WISE LIMITED; 

TAFAZOLI, Ahmad; TAHIR, Buhary Seyed 

Abu; TALAI, Mohamad; TENTH OCEAN 

GMBH & CO. KG; THE NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY; THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; THIRD OCEAN 

GMBH & CO. KG; THIRTEENTH OCEAN 

GMBH & CO. KG; TONGHAM SHIPPING CO 

LTD; TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED; 

TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED; 

TOSONG TECHNOLOGY TRADING CORPORATION; TRADE TREASURE LIMITED. 

TRANS MERITS CO. LTD.; TRUE 

HONOUR HOLDINGS LIMITED; TWELFTH 

OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; 

TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; 

UPPERCOURT SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; VAHIDI, Ahmad; Value-Added Services Laboratory; VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING 

LINE CO SSK; VOBSTER SHIPPING COMPANY LTD; WISSER, Gerhard; WOKING 

SHIPPING INVESTMENTS LIMITED; YASA 

PART; ZADEH, Hassan Jalil. 

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds. 

What this is doing is essentially stopping any kind of a negotiated deal and 

putting us on a path towards war with 

Iran. You know, it is likely that any 

negotiated deal that would prevent a 

nuclear-armed Iran would provide for 

Iranian enrichment for peaceful purposes under the framework of the nuclear nonproliferation weapons treaty 

with strict safeguards and inspections. 

So we’re taking a path here that guarantees that we’re put on a glide slope 

right to war. Why are we doing this, we 

don’t have enough wars in this country? We aren’t involved in enough 

places around the world in war? 

This is a bad resolution. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, 

I’d like to yield 31⁄2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CHABOT), who is 

our subcommittee chairman on Middle 

East and South Asia of our Committee 

on Foreign Affairs. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentlelady 

for yielding and I thank her for her 

very strong support and leadership on 

this particular issue and on so many 

issues in this Congress. 

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this 

well-crafted legislation which significantly ratchets up pressure on the regime in Tehran, as well as all those 

who support or enable its dangerous 

quest for a nuclear weapons capability. 

As we stand here today, Iran’s centrifuges continue to spin and the regime inches closer to that very end. If 

allowed to cross that threshold, untold 

consequences would surely follow. 

Iran, which former President George 

W. Bush aptly called the ‘‘world’s primary state sponsor of terror,’’ would 

no doubt feel emboldened in its meddling in the internal affairs of our gulf 

allies and in threats to U.S. global and 

regional interests. Questions of rationality aside, the regime would also have 

the ability to follow through on its repeated threats to eradicate the State of 

Israel. Iran cannot be allowed to acquire this capability, and I believe that 

this legislation may very well significantly enhance pressure on the regime. 

The nuclear program is, however, a 

symptom of the disease rather than the 

disease itself. A nuclear program is not 

in and of itself what makes this particular regime so nefarious. Rather, it 

is the perverse nature of the regime 

that makes the nuclear program so 

dangerous. And there can be no doubt 

that the regime in Tehran is a blight 

upon the Iranian people and on the region, and, in fact, on the whole world. 

To speak of the nuclear program independently of the regime which pursues 

it is in effect putting the cart before 

the horse. 

But this legislation does not fall into 

that trap. In addition to targeting the 

nuclear program, H.R. 1905 puts significant pressure on the regime for its horrific human rights abuses and supports 

the oppressed Iranian people in their 

fight for freedom. 

Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of this 

critical legislation, and I want to once 

again thank the distinguished chairwoman, Ms. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN from 

Florida, for her leadership on this 

issue. She has been pushing and pushing and pushing against this corrupt 

Iranian regime for such a long time, 

and to do right by our ally Israel, and 

ultimately to do what is in the best interest of the people of the United 

States as well. It is in nobody’s interest to have a nuclear Iran, and so I 

want to thank her for her leadership. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I’m 

pleased to yield 11⁄2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN), 

the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation and Trade. 

b 1450 

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

I want to thank the chairwoman of 

the Foreign Affairs Committee for her 

work on this bill and for reaching an 

agreement with the Senate Banking 

Committee, and I rise in strong support 

of this measure. 

I especially want to thank the chairman for working with me on title III of 

this bill, as it reflects several years of 

our work together. Title III targets the 

Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and 

began its life as H.R. 2379, then designated the Iran Revolutionary Guard 

Corps Designation Implementation 

Act, which I introduced along with the 

chairman in May of 2009. 

These provisions impose tough secondary sanctions against any person, 

including foreign companies, that conduct any significant transaction with 

the IRGC or any of its designated 

fronts and affiliates. The IRGC, 

through its support of Hezbollah and 

its direct action, has much blood on its 

hands. 

I want to thank the chairman and 

her staff for including section 303, 

which applies sanctions to countries 

and governments—not just companies—that conduct transactions or provide support for the IRGC and for provisions which indicate that if you want 

to be a Federal contractor, you must 

certify that you do not do prohibited 

business with the IRGC. 

This bill also includes important provisions I first proposed in the Stop 

Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program Act 

that will provide sanctions against 

those who lend money to the Iranian 

Government. It includes another provision I authored which will implement 

sanctions against those firms that give 

the Iranian Government the technologies for surveillance and repression 

of their own people. 

This is not the final act, literally or 

figuratively. What we’ve done so far is 

not enough to force Iran to abandon its 

nuclear program. We ought to stay in 

session and pass even more sanctions 

against Iran. 

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include for the RECORD a statement by 

the Friends Committee on National 

Legislation, which says that the new 

sanctions push the U.S. and Iran closer 

to war. 

NEW IRAN SANCTIONS PUSH U.S., IRAN CLOSER

TOWARD WAR—FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

WASHINGTON, DC.—FCNL’s Lobbyist on 

Middle East issues Kate Gould issued the following statement opposing the Iran Threat 

Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 

2012 (H.R. 1905) that could reach the House 

floor as early as today: 

The Friends Committee on National Legislation strongly opposes the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 

(H.R. 1905). We believe this legislation would 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5571 

undermine human rights in Iran and cripple 

the accountability of the diplomatic process 

now underway to prevent a nuclear-armed 

Iran, pushing the U.S. and Iran closer toward 

a devastating war. 

War is the ultimate human rights violation, and this bill lays the groundwork for 

war by escalating the scale of economic warfare that Congress would impose on ordinary 

Iranian citizens. As in the case of the decades of U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Iraq 

that culminated in a U.S. invasion of that 

country, economic warfare punishes civilians, emboldens hardliners in Iran’s regime, 

and forecloses diplomatic options to prevent 

a nuclear-armed Iran and war. 

PUNISHING IRANIAN CIVILIANS

FCNL and ten other national advocacy and 

religious organizations from the human 

rights and peace and security community 

wrote to Senator Tim Johnson, Chair of the 

Senate Banking Committee, last week to oppose this bill, and to highlight the importance of keeping channels open for Iranians 

to have access to food, medicine, and other 

humanitarian goods and services. 

Ordinary Iranians already face tremendous 

difficulties in accessing basic medicine under 

sanctions. For example, this week, the board 

of directors of the Iranian Hemophilia Society informed the World Federation of Hemophilia that the lives of tens of thousands of 

children are being endangered by the lack of 

proper drugs, as a consequence of international sanctions. 

The Iranian Hemophilia Society notes that 

U.S. and international sanctions technically 

do not ban medical goods. Yet, despite the 

‘humanitarian exemption’ in U.S. sanctions 

laws, medicine is not getting in to Iran because the ‘‘sanctions imposed on the Central 

Bank of Iran and the country’s other financial institutions have severely disrupted the 

purchase and transfer of medical goods.’’ 

The humanitarian exemption is of profound importance, as the U.S. business community and humanitarian organizations 

have pointed out. We are relieved that this 

legislation does not directly prohibit Iranians from accessing food, medicine, and humanitarian trade. However, if the Iranian civilian economy is destroyed by sanctions, 

then millions of Iranians will be deprived of 

their livelihoods, and unable to purchase the 

food, medicine, and other goods that the humanitarian exemption is supposed to protect. Further destabilization of the Iranian 

currency and decimation of the Iranian economy will push Iran closer to the state of Iraq 

when it was under sanctions. During that 

time, UNICEF estimated that U.N. sanctions 

contributed to the deaths of half a million 

children. 

EMBOLDENING HARDLINERS IN IRAN

This bill would embolden hardliners in the 

Iranian regime, at the expense of the civilians who will overwhelmingly bear the brunt 

of these sanctions. Just as Saddam Hussein 

never missed a meal under the decades of 

sanctions against Iraq, top Iranian officials 

will not have difficulty accessing food and 

medicine. National security expert Fareed 

Zakaria has noted that the U.S./U.N. sanctions’ ‘‘basic effect has been to weaken civil 

society and strengthen the state’’, and that 

‘‘the other effects of the sanctions has been 

that larger and larger parts of the economy 

are now controlled by Iran’s Revolutionary 

Guard—the elite corps of the armed forces.’’ 

FORECLOSING DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS, LAYING

GROUNDWORK FOR WAR

As countless U.S. and Israeli security officials have pointed out, diplomacy is the single most effective way to prevent war and a 

nuclear-armed Iran. This bill would be a setback to achieving a near-term diplomatic 

resolution of the standoff over Iran’s nuclear 

program, foreclosing diplomatic options to 

prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and a devastating war. 

This bill would tie the President’s hands, 

eroding the little flexibility that Congress 

normally allows the executive branch to conduct negotiations with Iran and allow for 

sanctions relief in exchange for serious, 

verifiable Iranian concessions. We are particularly concerned about section 217, which 

effectively endorses regime change. The provision would prohibit the President from 

lifting sanctions against the Central Bank of 

Iran unless Iran agrees to a host of conditions that the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot reasonably be expected to agree to. 

As veteran intelligence officer Paul Pillar 

has pointed out, requiring Iran to end efforts 

to ‘‘acquire or develop ballistic missiles’’, 

[section 217 (d)(1)(A)(iii)] ‘‘goes beyond any 

United Nations resolutions on Iran, which 

talk about nuclear capability of missiles, 

and even beyond anything ever demanded of 

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, for which range limits were imposed. It would be understandable 

if Tehran reads such language as further evidence that the United States is not interested in any negotiated agreement but instead only in regime change.’’ 

The bill even requires the President to certify that Iran does not ‘‘construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear facilities that 

could aid Iran’s effort to acquire a nuclear 

capability’’ [section 217 (d)(1)(A)(ii.)]: in 

order to lift sanctions against Iran’s Central 

Bank. It appears that Congress is requiring 

that t broad indiscriminate sanctions remain 

in place unless Iran surrenders its nuclear 

program entirely, even if it is a verifiably 

peace program. 

FCNL strongly urges members of Congress 

to speak out and vote against this broad, indiscriminate sanctions legislation on the 

House floor today. 

I yield 21⁄2 minutes to the gentleman 

from Texas, Representative RON PAUL. 

Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman for 

yielding. 

I’m still rather impressed with the 

obsession over a weapon that does not 

exist and no concern whatsoever about 

many nuclear weapons that are held by 

countries that never even joined the 

nuclear nonproliferation treaty. 

It’s called for in the debate that Iran 

should end all its nuclear programs, 

but they’re permitted to have the nuclear program under the nonproliferation treaty. And the other countries 

that have weapons, including the countries that hold the weapons that came 

from the Soviet system, it seems like 

that would be a much greater danger. 

The investigation by either the U.N. 

or by our CAs has never indicated that 

they have ever enriched above 20 percent. And they said they won’t even do 

it to 20 percent if the West would cooperate and sell them this material. 

They said, we don’t need it, but we 

need 20 percent enrichment for nuclear 

isotopes, medical isotopes. So our refusal to deal with them prompts them 

to take up enrichment to 25 percent; 5 

percent, of course, is what they’re allowed to do for nuclear energies. 

But this idea that we can badger people and then defy the law, what we’re 

asking them to do, to close down their 

program, is you’re asking them to defy 

international law. They agreed to this. 

They have a right to do this under this 

treaty. And for us to come and say, 

well, they must quit it, I think it really is very close to an obsession on a 

country that is incapable of attacking 

us, or attacking—they don’t have a history of invading their neighboring 

countries. The last time they were at 

war was with Iraq, and we bugged Iraq 

to go into Iran. 

So I find this very distressing that 

the obsession continues. I find it very, 

very upsetting that this vote will, of 

course, be overwhelmingly in support 

of correcting the civil liberties of Syria 

and making Iran toe the line and give 

up on something that they’re permitted to do. A vote for this, in my 

opinion, in time will show that it’s just 

one more step to another war that we 

don’t need. 

We have not been provoked. They are 

not a threat to our national security, 

and we should not be doing this. We’ve 

been doing it too long. For the last 10, 

15 years we have been just obsessed 

with this idea that we go to war and 

try to solve all the problems of the 

world; and at the same time, it is bankrupting us. 

I strongly urge a ‘‘no’’ vote on this 

resolution. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, 

I’m pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 

gentleman from California (Mr. 

ROYCE), who is the chairman of the 

Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I want to 

start here by commending Chairman 

ROS-LEHTINEN for this sustained focus 

on Iran that she has had for many, 

many years. I also want to thank 

Ranking Member BERMAN for the 

strong pressure that he has put on the 

regime in Iran, as well. 

Recently, we had the administration 

fighting hard against bipartisan sanctions targeting the Central Bank of 

Iran. But what I want to point out is 

that in a bipartisan way here, Congress 

insisted on, and today the administration touts, the impact of sanctions on 

Iran’s economy. 

Here is the point I’d like to make: 

we’d be in a much better position if the 

executive branch, both Republicans 

and Democrats—right now we have the 

problem with the Obama administration’s slow-walking this; but had they 

been more willing to work with Congress to craft tougher sanctions earlier, we’d be in a lot better position 

right now. The bill’s stepped-up penalties on those cooperating with Iran’s 

energy and shipping sectors, frankly, 

that’s the Achilles’ heel that we should 

be aiming at. 

Very importantly, this bill also includes a human rights title to go after 

those abusing Iran’s citizens. Let’s let 

Iranians know that we are on their side 

and we are going to focus on those 

crimes against humanity and on the 

brutal regime opposing them. It’s a regime that beats and that imprisons— 

I’ve talked to some of these victims— 

and that often rapes its own people in 


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H5572 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

order to try to impose its will. It’s a regime that executes political prisoners 

by the hundreds. 

Congress is increasing the pressure. 

Many of us, certainly the chairman, 

would like to go further. Iran’s centrifuges are spinning, but this progress 

here today deserves support. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 

11⁄2 minutes to my friend from Florida 

(Mr. DEUTCH), a member of the Foreign 

Affairs Committee and the author of 

the bill which declares Iran’s energy 

sector a zone of proliferation. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Speaker, first, I 

would like to recognize Chairman 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN and Ranking 

Member HOWARD BERMAN for their extraordinary leadership and their tireless work to bring forward a bipartisan 

and bicameral bill. I thank you for 

working with me to include several of 

my provisions in this legislation, including the Iran Transparency and Accountability Act, a measure that will, 

for the first time, require companies to 

disclose their business with Iran on 

SEC filings and for the first time create a public listing of these disclosures 

to clearly and definitively let the 

American people know which companies continue to support the illicit nuclear weapons program of Iran. 

Mr. Speaker, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act significantly expands sanctions against 

the Iranian regime and those who, in 

the face of united international opposition, continue to contribute to Iran’s 

quest for nuclear weapons. 

This bill sends one clear message to 

the entire world: if you do virtually 

any business in the Iranian energy sector—the financial lifeline of this regime’s nuclear program—you will be 

subject to sanctions. 

Today, the United States Congress 

takes U.S. sanctions policy to an unprecedented level. By sending this legislation to the President’s desk, Congress can initiate an unprecedented 

crackdown on the Iranian regime. But 

our work does not end here. These punishing sanctions are a means to an end; 

and we cannot, for one moment, take 

our eye off the endgame—halting Iran’s 

march toward a nuclear weapon. 

Again, I thank the chairman and 

ranking member for their leadership. I 

urge my colleagues to support this important bill. Now is the time to stand 

for human rights in Iran and Syria. 

Now is the time. Now is the time to 

stop Iran from developing nuclear 

weapons. 

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include for the RECORD a publication 

from the International Civil Society 

Action Network, ‘‘What the Women 

Say: Killing Them Softly: The Stark 

Impact of Sanctions on the Lives of Ordinary Iranians.’’ 

WHAT THE WOMEN SAY: KILLING THEM SOFTLY: THE STARK IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON

THE LIVES OF ORDINARY IRANIANS—BRIEF 3: 

JULY 2012 

The unprecedented, devastating and counterproductive impact of sanctions, coupled 

with the on-and-off threat of war, is an evergrowing reality in the lives of ordinary Iranians. For the generation of Iranians whose 

childhood was punctured by nightly bombings, fear of chemical attacks, and eight 

years of death and destruction resulting 

from the Iran-Iraq war, the current state of 

uncertainty, prospects of hardship and unraveling of the lives they rebuilt is overwhelming. 

In New York, London, Washington and 

Brussels the rationale for sanctions vary. 

Central to the case is the notion that only 

crippling sanctions can slow Iran’s nuclear 

program and bring about change. A number 

of the sanctions also target state institutions and individuals implicated in human 

rights violations. Regardless of their political leanings, among western leaders, policymakers and pundits, no one denies that economic sanctions are blunt instruments that 

typically harm the civilian population far 

more than the state. Western policy makers, 

however, respond that ‘this is the price that 

has to be paid’—the questions of price for 

what, how much, how long and by whom are 

left hanging. 

Iranians have the answers. The earliest 

sanctions imposed in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution (and 

American hostage taking) had less direct impact on the public. But since 1995, when the 

Clinton Administration honed in on the oil 

and gas sector to the current day where the 

banking and financial sectors have been targeted, private enterprise and ordinary citizens are the primary and overwhelming victims. Needless to say, they are skeptical of 

western politicians or institutions that 

claim to care about the well being, human 

rights or aspirations of the Iranian populace. 

It is not uncommon for Iranians in every 

walk of life to recall the Iran-Iraq war (1980– 

88), when the Western world was complicit 

with Saddam’s Iraq and its use of chemical 

weapons. With the impact of current sanctions seeping into every day life now, many 

Iranians consider them to be a profoundly insidious and destructive force and source of 

basic human rights violations, affecting a 

wide cross section of Iranians. 

As one women’s rights activist stated, ‘‘the 

international community’s sole focus on the 

nuclear issue has resulted in the adoption of 

policies that inflict great damage on the Iranian people, civil society and women. Militarization of the environment will prompt 

repressive state policies and the possibility 

of promoting reform in Iran will diminish.’’ 

Iranians’ wariness of the international 

community, however, has not quelled criticism of their own government. They have 

neither an appetite for war nor for the bellicose language of the state. They criticize the 

government’s mishandling of the economy in 

recent years. They balk at the continued imposition of social restrictions. Those involved in civil rights activism including students, workers, women and leaders from ethnic groups and religious minority communities are among the first to feel the endless 

pressures and limitations imposed on them. 

Not least because the sanctions and threat of 

war allow the state to invoke ‘‘a state of 

emergency’’ and in so doing suppress critics 

and voices of dissent. 

In its ongoing series of MENA region ‘What 

the Women Say’ briefs, ICAN provides a gendered analysis of the impact of sanctions, 

echoing the voices and experiences of Iranians, particularly women’s rights activists, 

regarding the social, economic, political and 

security consequences. At a time when the 

United States, the European Union and others are heralding their national action plans 

on women, peace and security that highlight 

the need for women’s protection in times of 

crisis and their participation in conflict prevention and peacemaking, this brief offers 

the international community recommendations on limiting the immediate and longterm damage being wrought on women, Iranian society and ultimately regional security. 

1. CURRENT SANCTIONS CUT DEEP AND WIDE

INTO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE OF ORDINARY IRANIANS

Iranians know war and they know sanctions. The experiences of women, men, the 

elderly and the young who lived through the 

eight years of the Iran-Iraq war are rarely 

recounted today, but the long term impact is 

still evident. Though their plight is rarely 

discussed, women of child bearing age and 

soldiers exposed to chemical warfare still 

suffer from complex health problems. Similarly the thousands of men handicapped by 

landmines and war wounds are rarely a topic 

of conversation. Another long term impact 

has been the rise of female headed households in part due to war deaths among men. 

Throughout the 1980s war years, Iranians 

also suffered from sanctions and lived under 

a strict rations policy. But it was a very different society then. Some 50 percent of Iranians lived in rural areas and were largely 

self sufficient through domestic agricultural 

production. The sanctions too were limited 

to key sectors pertaining to military equipment. As a result the public impact was less 

evident. International trade relations were 

sustained including with the U.S. private 

sector. Today only 29 percent of Iranians live 

in rural areas. Continued migration to urban 

areas has led to the expansion of cities and 

their peripheries. The majority of migrants 

eke out their living in the service industry 

and informal economy on the margins of cities. The sanctions regime is doing most damage to those who are already vulnerable—the 

urban poor. As the pressures increase, economic class and social divisions are also 

being exacerbated. 

2010 sanctions choking insurance and shipping sectors with implications for public 

health: Sanctions introduced in the summer 

of 2010 directly targeted insurance companies 

that insured Iranian shipping involved in the 

import and export of products. Despite denials by proponents of the sanctions regime, 

this round of sanctions directly affected the 

availability of foreign-made medication and 

other healthcare products to Iranians including vitamins for children and pregnant 

women and sanitary products. The implication for serious illnesses including cancer is 

particularly profound. As one women’s rights 

activists recounted, ‘‘foreign made medicine 

became difficult to find in 2010, and with the 

intensification of sanctions this trend has 

continued. Domestically produced drugs, 

which are dependent on imported ingredients, are also more expensive and difficult to 

find.’’ Others echo this experience. ‘‘Many 

Iranians can no longer afford the high cost of 

cancer treatment drugs that have become 

hard to find,’’ says the daughter of a female 

cancer patient. ‘‘Family members have to go 

from one hospital to another and to multiple 

pharmacies to find and then purchase the 

medicines at high costs for the treatment 

and life of their family members. Patients 

with poorer prognoses or those who cannot 

afford it are forgoing treatments and opting 

for an early death so they don’t burden their 

families financially.’’ 

Sanctions targeting Iran’s oil and gas sector were also intensified in 2010, through limiting or ending the sale of gasoline products 

to Iran. In anticipation, the Iranian government initiated a number of steps including 

ending of subsidies for gasoline, rationing 

gasoline and increasing domestic refining 

processes. As a result, the price increase has 

been significant, with unrationed gasoline 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5573 

costing 4000 Rials per liter in 2009 and projected to increase to 8000 Rials in 2012. Free 

market prices for gasoline are currently at 

7000 Rials per liter. Additionally the quality 

of the domestic product is much lower than 

imports, according to experts. 

One significant impact of the increased use 

of domestically produced gasoline has been a 

noticeable decline in air quality, particularly in Tehran. Reports note that Tehran’s 

air quality, which was already poor, has 

worsened significantly since gasoline imports were sanctioned. Even the New York 

Times report explained the connection between the ban on gasoline imports, the push 

to use domestically produced gasoline and 

the rapid air quality deterioration: 

‘‘According to e-mails circulated to industry experts . . . lran’s new supply of domestic gasoline may contain high levels of aromatics—more than twice the level permitted 

by Iranian law. Burning aromatics in car engines produces exhaust packed with high 

concentrations of ‘‘floating particles’’ or 

‘‘particulates’’ that, added to the typical 

smog caused by nitrous oxides and ozone, 

can cause a range of health problems, from 

headaches and dizziness to more serious cardiac and respiratory complaints.’’’ 

In the same year, Mohsen Nariman, MP 

from Babol said, ‘‘air pollution is on the rise 

at an unusual rate and it seems that one of 

the main causes is the substandard gasoline 

that is being used in Tehran.’’ One newspaper, the Hamshahri Daily, reported that 

310 persons died per day as a result of poor 

air quality in Tehran in the months of October and November 2011. The cause of death 

included increased respiratory complications, heart attacks and stroke. 

Unprecedented banking sanctions targeting Iranians in all areas of life: The banking sanctions that went into effect in December 2011 have also wreaked havoc in people’s 

lives. The Iranian Rial has almost halved in 

value against the US dollar and other currencies. With memories of the Iran-Iraq war 

still fresh for many Iranians, across Tehran 

and other cities, people, including shopkeepers and merchants reacted by hoarding 

products. Consequently the price of a wide 

range of goods and products including foodstuffs rose between 20–100 percent, and continues to fluctuate. 

The knock-on effect is evident in all areas 

of life. While incomes have not increased, 

rents have doubled in some areas of the city. 

The price of bread—a staple of the Iranian 

diet especially for the poor—has increased by 

some 1500% in the past 2 years, in part due to 

the removal of state subsidies. The uncertainty is causing stagnation for the private 

sector, while some businessmen point out 

that companies affiliated with the state are 

exploiting the situation as they have access 

to government exchange rates. Sanctions 

were imposed to prevent a nuclear weapons 

program. Instead, as one commentator notes, 

the price of manure has risen. 

Iranian students studying abroad have also 

been impacted seriously. Many are being 

forced to give up their education as their 

families can no longer afford the tuition. 

Some UK universities are refusing to register Iranian students because they cannot 

prove that they can transfer the necessary 

fees. But the sanctions—or the way that 

banks and other bodies currently interpret 

them—make it impossible for most Iranian 

students to do so. 

In addition countless Iranians who have 

relatives living in the EU and US and those 

who travel for medical treatment have become entangled in the vast banking sanctions net. Thousands have personal bank accounts and savings in western banks, some 

dating back decades. Now they are being 

forced to shut down their accounts and find 

themselves caught in a financial no-man’s 

land; being forced to close existing accounts, 

while barred from transferring their savings 

to other accounts internationally or in Iran. 

In effect the banking sanctions are forcing 

massive reliance on a cash based economy, 

making already vulnerable Iranians dependent on black marketeers for the transfer of 

funds to cover educational, health or other 

legitimate costs. It is also fostering the rise 

of informal power structures and contributing to the lack of accountability and 

transparency. Even the Iranian Vice President has acknowledged this development, 

stating, ‘‘in the framework of these sanctions we [the Iranian government] have to 

begin negotiations with goods traffickers 

near the borders and use them to buy products which are included in the sanctions.’’ 

Not surprisingly many Iranians are left 

questioning if the banking sanctions are intent on forcing Iran’s rulers to come to the 

negotiating table or if Iranian society and 

the country’s infrastructure at large are 

being deliberately targeted and weakened. 

The timing of the intensification of sanctions is particularly questionable. Iranian 

observers, notably civil and political activists are asking whether sanctions are in fact 

intent on balancing power in the region in 

favor of regimes that ‘‘despite their authoritarian nature accommodate the west and its 

security agenda in the Middle East, at a time 

when revolutions may threaten the existing 

security dynamics in the region.’’ 

In an interview with Radio Farda, Mehrdad 

Emadi, Economic Consultant to the EU, 

stressed the destructive nature of these sanctions, noting: 

‘‘This particular form of sanctioning a nation has been unprecedented in the history of 

the world. The only similar type of sanctions, were implemented for a short period of 

time, and were intended to prevent the illegal transfer of funds by Qaddafi within the 

framework of the activities of Libya’s Central Bank. But even during that time, [the 

sanctions] weren’t implemented in this fashion [as we see against Iran’s Central Bank], 

. . . not all the transactions of the Libyan 

Central Bank were sanctioned and the sanctions focused only on the illegal transfer of 

funds and money laundering . . . [The Iranian sanctions] are not related to a specific 

sector or industry nor to business entities or 

specific individuals. In this framework, all 

monetary transactions, currency transactions and business credit accounts for imports as well as exports and for the coverage 

and payment of insurance, which in every 

country falls under the responsibilities of 

the Central Bank of that country, will be 

made illegal in Iran. Iran’s Central Bank will 

no longer be able to carry-out these duties, 

because it has now been identified as a center for money laundering. In this framework, 

international corporations, governmental organizations, non-governmental bodies or security organizations will no longer be able to 

transfer funds or open credit lines for trade, 

using the Central Bank.’’ 

In the same interview, Hossein Mansour, a 

UK-based economist offered a bleaker analysis, noting, ‘‘the negative impact on Iran’s 

economy, especially in the long run, will 

only be addressed with the expenditure of 

billions of dollars and after several generations, and will be devastating for the infrastructure of the Iranian economy.’’ 

2. WOMEN ARE BEARING THE BRUNT OF THE

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF SANCTIONS

Women are especially affected by the economic fall out of the sanctions. They are 

being pushed out of the job market and bearing the brunt of increased unemployment. 

Women’s rights experts recognize socio-economic pattern emerging similar to those in 

Iraq when sanctions were imposed. In Iraq 

sanctions and the ensuing poverty resulted 

in the withdrawal of girls from education 

and increases in child marriage (families 

were forced to marry off their young daughters to reduce the number of mouths to feed). 

Iranian girls are at risk of similar developments.’’ Moreover, women’s rights experts 

believe that the externally imposed sanctions will allow conservatives to further 

their regressive social agenda by relegating 

women back to the domestic sphere, limiting 

their access to education and the job market 

and couching it as an attempt to increase 

male employment. 

Despite significant societal changes, Iran 

remains a male dominated culture, reinforced by the government’s conservative ideology that considers men as the heads of 

households and primary breadwinners. Programs in line with this ideology, seeking to 

relegate women to the home as wives and 

mothers only have been stepped up in recent 

years. 

Indirect and immeasurable consequences of 

sanctions: stifling women’s education, a key 

engine of socio-political change: Women’s 

rights activists are also wary of the indirect 

impact of sanctions—and the manipulation 

of the economic hardships by conservatives— 

on women’s access to higher education. Educated women from middle and traditional 

working classes across rural and urban 

areas, among the rich and the poor, have 

been the primary engine of socio-political 

change in Iran. The demand for equal rights 

and equal socio-political, economic and cultural rights permeates every level of society. 

From the outset of the Islamic republic, the 

status of women has been a critical and contentious issue. In 2003, conservatives proposed the imposition of quotas to limit women’s access to higher education and the 

measures were briefly implemented across 

some medical fields in the 2004 national university entrance exams. Massive outcry 

among students and women’s rights activists 

forced the withdrawal of the quotas. 

Conservatives have not backed down however. They continue to argue that when 

women are more educated than men, traditional family values are undermined, as 

women prefer to marry at an older age, seek 

similarly educated (or more educated 

spouses) and have higher expectations. These 

traditionalists also posit that women in the 

work force take away men’s jobs. Concerns 

about the impact of women being more educated than men have prompted some conservative lawmakers to reinstate quotas limiting women’s participation in higher education. Women and student’s rights activists 

believe that during President Ahmadinejad’s 

second term the quotas have been introduced 

with greater zeal and less accountability. 

They coincide with the intensification of 

sanctions and increased economic hardships. 

As the economic situation worsens, women’s 

access to higher education, will likely endure further limitations. Even school age 

girls are at risk as economic pressures may 

force families to make choices and opt for 

boys’ schooling. This may lead to diminished 

literacy rates among girls in the near future. 

In effect, the marginalization of women 

from education and employment enables extreme conservatives to kill many birds with 

one stone. They prevent a high rate of women’s entry into the public space (via universities). They eliminate women from the 

economy and job market, particularly, higher earning and more influential positions. 

They sustain and revive the power imbalance 

between women and men, as women will 

have fewer choices in life, limited control of 

resources and become (and remain) more 

economically dependent on men at greater 

rates than already exist. Ultimately they 


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H5574 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

may quash the force of women’s demands— 

the next generation’s voices—for progressive 

change in society at large. As one conservative member of parliament and staunch 

supporter of limiting women’s presence in 

university has put it: ‘‘when women can’t 

travel to far away cities without the permission of their husbands, their expertise has no 

impact on improving the situation of the 

country!’’ 

There is also a significant reduction in 

women’s share of the national budget. In the 

past for example, housewives received national insurance, but this has been eliminated, while the military budget has doubled 

for next year. 

Downturns in domestic production, increases male unemployment and violence 

against women: There are also more insidious effects, difficult to quantify but increasingly evident. The sanctions have caused 

massive downturns in domestic production. 

The fledgling private sector is unable to import the necessary raw materials for manufacturing. The banking sanctions are causing 

a virtual standstill in imports and exports by 

legitimate businesses. Even domestic agriculture will lose its markets. 

Meanwhile those with political connections are exploiting the situation often by 

importing cheaper Chinese products. This 

downward trend in domestic production will 

give rise to lower wages, increase unemployment among men and women and ultimately 

put pressure on families. As evident in other 

settings, women will bear the brunt of dealing with their unemployed spouses and the 

men of the family within the home. These 

new dynamics are likely to lead to increased 

incidences of domestic violence and family 

conflicts, as men’s inability to live up to social expectations can lead to depression and 

attacks on women. Reduction in family income inevitably is forcing women to find 

new sources of income. Their coping strategies will likely include cutting back on their 

own health, wellbeing and dietary needs to 

provide for their dependents. As in other 

countries, for the most vulnerable, poverty 

will likely lead to risky survival strategies 

including child labor and sex work—informal 

sectors which have expanded in Iran in recent years. 

The most vulnerable are at the greatest 

risk: Afghan refugee women and children: 

Vulnerable groups, such as Afghan refugees 

and migrants who have been living in Iran 

legally and illegally as a result of decades of 

war and unrest in their own country, are also 

at greater risk. The situation is most severe 

for Afghan women and children refugees or 

Iranian women married to Afghan men and 

their children who do not have identity 

cards. The intensification of government 

crackdowns and forced repatriation programs, against Afghans (including their Iranian wives and children) with illegal status 

in Iran, has already had a negative impact 

on the livelihood of these groups, but as the 

economy has worsened the hostility they 

face from Iranian society and the government has also increased. Afghans have been 

targeted with segregation programs in public 

spaces and are facing increased state and 

other forms of violence, while their access to 

income and jobs has also been severely limited. Comprising a large percent of those employed in the informal sector as household 

help, street peddlers and in the service industry Afghan women and children are at risk of 

facing worsening working conditions and 

abuse in their place of employment. 

3.INDEPENDENT CIVIL SOCIETY AND CIVIC ACTIVISM ARE AMONG THE FIRST CASUALTIES OF

CURRENT INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

Many of the men and women who founded 

and run Iran’s civil rights movements including human rights and women’s rights activists, workers unions and journalists spent 

their childhood or young adulthood at war. 

They have tasted and experienced the impact 

of war and sanctions on a personal level. 

They are also fierce advocates of international human rights and humanitarian 

norms and ideals. 

The public outpouring in the aftermath of 

the disputed 2009 presidential elections 

prompted the state to impose heavy security 

measures against civic actors. But debilitating sanctions coupled with the daily rhetoric of war has elevated national security 

concerns and further diminished the state’s 

tolerance of dissent internally. Activists are 

regularly accused of working in concert with 

the west to destroy the Islamic Republic. 

The uncertainty and fear has also affected 

the public’s receptivity to social activism. It 

is seen as a secondary issue compared to the 

urgent realities of poverty and prospect of 

war. 

The sanctions are having a long-term negative impact on the source of societal change 

in Iran. The urban middle class that has historically played a central role in creating 

change and promoting progress in Iran are 

key casualties of the sanctions regime. Many 

civil society organizations and charities survive on the basis of voluntary activism and 

support. But facing economic uncertainty, 

many people are retreating from public voluntary work. Even the most committed have 

less time, as they are working longer hours 

and often at multiple jobs to meet their economic needs. Moreover with private enterprise in demise, more people will become dependent on the state and thus unable and 

fearful of engaging in civil activism. Additionally, sanctions and in particular the limitations placed on transfer of funds, has created serious impediments for charity organizations engaged in health and medical services, education efforts, support for orphans 

and disadvantaged women and children to 

carry-out their work. Many of these organizations have ceased their activities. 

Sanctions are isolating Iranians from 

international forums: Beyond the economic 

impact, civil society, including the women’s 

movement in Iran has been further isolated 

from their international counterparts, as a 

result of the sanctions. Security challenges 

imposed by their own government already 

curtail civil society’s ability to attend regional and international conferences, workshops and other events. But the policies of 

other governments further complicate their 

lives. Visas that Iranian passport holders 

need to travel internationally, take considerable amount of time and resources. The 

new banking sanctions have ended the possibility of financial exchanges, while the falling price of the Rial has increased the financial burden for those activists who want to 

participate in conferences and training opportunities. Activists, like regular Iranians, 

cannot use banks to transfer funds for conference participation, hotel reservations, or 

to attend courses abroad. Finally, for years 

despite state restrictions, activists have used 

the internet as a critical tool for communication. But the sanctions policies have led 

many large hardware and software manufacturers in the United States to deny services 

and products to Iranians. Thus just when 

contact with and solidarity from the outside 

world are most needed, Iranians are faced 

with the greatest level of isolation. 

4. WHAT WOMEN DO: RESILIENCE, COURAGE, 

VOICES OF PEACE AND A WINDOW TO THE FUTURE

Women’s rights activists have never had it 

easy. They have fought against an assault on 

their legal and political rights as well as 

their demand for equal opportunities in the 

economic, social and cultural life of the 

country. In 2006, when a group of women initiated the Million Signatures Campaign to 

demand the reform of laws that discriminate 

against women, they immediately faced 

state scrutiny and obstruction. The movement thrived however, transcending age, 

economic, rural, urban and even political 

and religious divisions to draw in a mix of 

volunteers. Using new and old media, improvised street theater and small group education and outreach initiatives they raised 

public awareness about the impact of gender 

based discriminatory laws and called on people to sign up and join their campaign in 

favor of legal changes. Despite security pressures the movement elevated issues of gender equality to the national level both politically and within wider society. 

After the summer of 2009, and the mass 

post-election protests, women’s rights activists faced increased restrictions as the space 

for dissent became ever more limited. With 

the rise of sanctions and ratcheting up of the 

war rhetoric, these activists are under immense pressure to become silent and conform. Countless social and political activists 

have been imprisoned and or forced into 

exile. Students—female and male have been 

expelled from universities because of their 

civil activism. Under these circumstances, 

with economic hardships and prospects of 

yet another devastating war, longterm planning and the development of sustainable programs to maintain the gains already made 

and push for basic rights are increasingly 

difficult, if not impossible. 

Women’s Demands: no sanctions, no war, 

talk it out! Despite these pressures, the Iranian women’s movement has not been silenced. The call against war, in favor of a negotiated settlement, and an end to sanctions 

has become a primary issue for many, despite the risks they incur. They are using 

every opportunity to send their message to 

the world. 

Women’s rights activists now living outside of Iran draw on international platforms 

to echo the concerns and voices of their 

counterparts inside the country. Meanwhile, 

despite the risks, women in Iran have not 

been silenced either. One group, the Mothers 

for Peace, representing different sectors and 

ideologies began its activities in 2008, with 

the aim of preventing war and violence in 

the country and promoting peace regionally. 

They, along with other women’s groups, have 

issued several statements opposing the possibility of war. Echoing this, in 2011, on the 

International Day to Fight Violence Against 

Women (November 25th), another group of 

Iranian activists issued their antiwar and violence statement, noting: 

‘‘We a group of women’s rights activists in 

Iran, are worried about the increasing violence against women and children [that is 

the result] of the polarized and hostile atmosphere [and] dead-end national and international politics of tension and violence. As 

a result of these policies, violence against 

women and children infiltrates the deepest 

social and political and familial layers of 

Iranian society.’’ 

On March 8, 2012, in honor of International 

Women’s Day, several activists involved in 

the One Million Signatures Campaign recorded video messages opposing war. They 

reject the official narratives that often pose 

the problems in the terms of good and evil, 

just and unjust, and call on all sides—including their own government—to engage in constructive dialogue rather than the rhetoric 

of war and threats. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY THE US AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Fundamentally rethink policy on Iran: 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5575 

1. End the sanctions policy against Iran. 

Recognize that sanctions as a general rule 

have a poor record of influencing the behavior of states and in many situations have severely harming the population at large, particularly vulnerable groups and democratic 

movements. Ninety-nine percent of the current sanctions against Iran are too broad to 

impact the behavior of the government, instead they target the population. 

2. Sanctions are not a substitute for war. 

they are a step closer to war. Failed sanctions will only work to strengthen the position of those advocating for another war in 

the region. Resolve to address the differences 

in a mutually respectful manner immediately. 

3. Recognize that sanctions weaken society 

not the state. Iranian society is already witnessing the emergence of radical groups. As 

one women’s rights activist notes, in countries of this region, including Iran, growing 

gaps between the rich and poor do not make 

governments vulnerable, rather they make 

the population vulnerable to increased 

radicalization against the West as a way of 

coping with humiliation. In border areas, 

where poverty is severe, we already witness 

the increasing influence of terrorist groups. 

If this trend continues we will be faced with 

a weakened Iranian society—at risk of being 

radicalized, with detrimental consequences 

for regional security in the medium and long 

term. 

4. Recognize that sanctions undermine 

women’s security and empowerment. The US 

and EU have been strong proponents of the 

global women, peace and security agenda 

with the development of priorities and action plans to ensure women’s empowerment. 

But sanctions undermine and contravene 

these policies. The contradictory nature of 

US and EU rhetoric, policies and actions increase the Iranian public’s suspicion about 

them, and credence to charges of hypocrisy. 

On negotiations with the Iranian government: 

5. Engage Iran on the full range of issues. 

including regional security, economic issues. 

human rights, culture. etc. Incentives, especially those that reduce the hardship of ordinary Iranians, should be put forth to encourage a peaceful settlement to the disputes of 

the international community with Iran. 

6. Call for the inclusion of civil society in 

engagement with Iran. Should Iran and the 

international community reach an agreement that would allow for negotiations and 

dialogue on a wider set of issues, civil society, including women’s groups, human rights 

groups and peace activists, should participate. 

On immediate steps for redressing the impact of sanctions on ordinary citizens: 

7. Do not force an entire nation to adopt 

nontransparent means of financial transactions. Revise the banking sanctions so 

that ordinary people are not caught in them. 

Specifically, adopt measures to facilitate the 

transfer of funds by ordinary Iranian citizens 

and Iranians with dual nationality (EU, US, 

UK etc) for travel, tuition, and medical care, 

in the case of sale of property, inheritance or 

for other personal and familial purposes. 

Forcing Iranians to move toward a cash 

economy reduces transparency and fosters 

the growth of shadowy actors. 

8. Address the adverse healthcare impact of 

sanctions immediately. Sanctions including 

limitations impacting the import of medicines, medical equipment and forced usage of 

substandard gasoline are affecting people’s 

health and lives. These issues should be investigated and alleviated immediately with 

cooperation between the US, European and 

Iranian governments. 

9. Help ease and enable visa applications 

for Iranians seeking to visit relatives. 

Throughout the EU, US, Canada and Australia there are millions of citizens of Iranian descent. They have elderly parents and 

relatives living in Iran who visit them regularly. Visas for relatives should be expedited 

and offered for longer periods. 

10. Encourage student visas and conference 

attendance. Student visas and visas for conference participation should be processed 

more quickly and with less financial burden 

on applicants. 

11. Facilitate free and safe access to the 

internet to help foster independent civil society. Sanctions have severely limited Iranian civil society’s safe access to the internet including necessary software and hardware. The international community should 

help provide this access and limit the imposition of sanctions in this sector. 

b 1500 

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds. 

The Senate Banking Committee summarized this bill by saying that it 

‘‘aims to prevent Iran from repatriating any of the revenue from sale of 

its crude oil, depriving Iran of hard 

currency earnings and funds to run its 

state budget.’’ 

Spoken plainly, this bill would destroy the Iranian economy and further 

hurt the Iranian people that we claim 

to support. Iranians are already suffering under stifling sanctions as they 

experience rising food prices and lack 

of access to basic medicine. For example, the sanctions against the Iranian 

banking sector have greatly diminished the value of Iranian currency and 

have a negative effect on nearly every 

aspect of the lives of ordinary Iranians. 

The price of rent, education, and bread 

have all increased. 

I reserve the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I 

yield 11⁄2 minutes to the gentleman 

from Illinois (Mr. DOLD), an esteemed 

member of the Committee on Financial 

Services. 

Mr. DOLD. I certainly want to thank 

the chairwoman for her leadership on 

this very important issue. I also want 

to thank the ranking member for his 

bipartisan leadership as well. 

Mr. Speaker, I believe that a nucleararmed Iran is actually the greatest 

threat we have to our own national security here at home. This issue is not a 

right versus left issue; this is a right 

versus wrong issue. 

Mr. Speaker, this legislation is significant in its seriousness and its 

scope. By blacklisting virtually all of 

Iran’s energy, banking, and transportation sectors, and specifically targeting those who enable Iran’s attempted evasion of sanctions, this legislation sends a powerful signal to the 

Iranian regime that they should not 

ever question the resolve of the United 

States Congress to do what is necessary to confront Iran’s illicit nuclear 

ambitions. 

This legislation is the product of bipartisan efforts and hard work of many 

people, and I certainly appreciate 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN’s and Ranking 

Member BERMAN’s focus to try to get 

this passed as quickly as possible. 

I’m pleased to have contributed to 

strengthening this sanctions package 

with bipartisan proposals that I introduced with Representative DEUTCH

from Florida, whom we just heard 

from, that declare the Iranian energy 

sector a ‘‘zone of proliferation concern,’’ and which will enhance the 

human rights portion of the bill. 

I also want to note the significant 

contributions by Senator MARK KIRK, 

who has been a consistent champion 

and leader on the forcefulness of Iran 

sanctions. 

I look forward to this legislation’s 

passage today and implementation 

with urgency by the administration, 

and I look to continue to work with my 

colleagues in Congress on this issue 

until we can affirm that the Iranian regime is no longer pursuing a nuclear 

weapons capability. 

I urge adoption of this resolution and 

for the immediate implementation by 

this administration. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I’m very 

pleased to yield 11⁄2 minutes to the gentleman who organized the Iran Working Group 7 or 8 years ago to focus congressional attention on the looming 

threat of a nuclear Iran, my friend 

from New Jersey (Mr. ANDREWS). 

(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given 

permission to revise and extend his remarks.) 

Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the chairlady from Florida and my friend from 

California for recognizing some grave 

and serious points. 

First, they recognize that on the 11th 

of September of 2001, 19 people armed 

with airplane tickets and box cutters 

wreaked havoc on the United States of 

America. They recognize that a group 

of people with a small, improvised nuclear device could wreak havoc far 

worse than that on the Mall that 

stands in front of this building or on 

Times Square. 

Weapons these days are not just delivered by intercontinental ballistic 

missiles; they can be delivered by UHaul trucks or by other means. This is 

the essential threat of Iranian nuclear 

proliferation to the United States. 

The choice that we face is whether 

we should take concerted action to prevent that threat or whether we 

shouldn’t. I commend the chairlady 

and my friend from California for 

choosing to unify this Congress, this 

country with the rest of the world with 

the proposition that we should present 

the Iranian leadership with a choice. If 

they decide to abandon their nuclear 

weapons program—which they illicitly 

concealed for 25 years—if they agree to 

live under international protocols, 

then the sanctions that have been imposed will be lifted and we can move 

forward toward peace and progress. But 

if they do not, they will most certainly 

suffer the consequences of a deteriorating economy and problems within 

their social structure. 

We have made our choice to stand 

united in favor of these strong sanctions. We are presenting the Iranians 


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H5576 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

with their choice. Let us hope and pray 

they make a choice for peace and renewed prosperity. 

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds. 

We went to war against Iraq under 

the assumption they had weapons of 

mass destruction. Iran doesn’t have 

weapons of mass destruction. 

One of the problems with this bill is 

that it effectively states that sanctions 

on Iran’s Central Bank would not be 

lifted unless there’s a regime change. 

So we’re bringing a whole new dimension here. It’s about even more than 

nuclear weapons; now we’re talking 

about regime change, because this resolution creates a new requirement for 

the termination of sanctions that are 

dependent on the cessation of the Central Bank’s financing of the Revolutionary Guard, and it imposes new restrictions on the President’s ability to 

waive sanctions. 

So, what are we doing here? Setting 

the stage for another war. Regime 

change, and then upping the bar for 

Iran and essentially laying the groundwork for a conflict. 

I reserve the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I 

reserve the right to close. 

Mr. BERMAN. I’m very pleased to 

yield 1 minute to a former member of 

the Foreign Affairs Committee, my 

friend from Texas (Ms. JACKSON LEE). 

Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I thank 

the ranking member and the chairwoman of this committee for bringing 

us together. 

I don’t like sanctions, Mr. Speaker, 

but I rise in strong support of this legislation. And when I say that, I understand what sanctions can do to women 

and children and families. In fact, I’m 

reminded of a debate on apartheid and 

sanctions in South Africa. That debate 

was a question of whether you undermine that nation. But we saw what 

happened with sanctions when we came 

together as a Nation to bring down the 

dastardly structure of apartheid. 

Iran, right now today, can stop this 

legislation by shedding itself of all 

signs of building a nuclear weapon. The 

regime change is not by war. This bill 

does not suggest war. It means that 

voluntarily, by election, their government can change. But what I believe is 

most important is that we recognize, 

having seen that fallen woman bleeding 

in the street, that human rights abuses 

are massive. They’re massive in their 

influence on Iraq, where they’re influencing the treatment of residents of 

Camp Ashraf. That must stop. 

So this legislation is crucial because 

it impacts the human rights abuses, it 

indicates that there is no giving on a 

nuclear weapon, and it gives Iran, right 

now today, the ability to stop this legislation and sanctions by owning up to 

eliminating any sign of a nuclear 

weaponization, treating its people with 

dignity, and responding to the needs of 

the people in Camp Ashraf. 

I support the legislation enthusiastically. 

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds. 

Collectively, the provisions in this 

bill move the goalpost from negotiations over Iran’s nuclear enrichment 

program to regime change. I just want 

to point out that the record of our 

country on regime change isn’t all that 

good. Yes, we knocked out Saddam 

Hussein under the lie that he had weapons of mass destruction, and now al 

Qaeda is all over Iraq. 

So, what are we about here? We’re 

setting the stage for another war where 

we syphon the revenue out of this 

country, send it to war machines, can’t 

meet our own needs. Since when does 

Iran achieve greater importance than 

our own country? That’s what I want 

to know. I want somebody to explain 

that to me. 

I reserve the balance of my time. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, could I 

get another indication of the time remaining? 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 41⁄2 minutes 

remaining; the gentleman from Ohio 

has 3 minutes remaining; the gentlewoman from Florida has 30 seconds remaining. 

Mr. BERMAN. In this case, I’m 

pleased to yield 11⁄2 minutes to the 

ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, a longtime 

member and leader on the Foreign Affairs Committee and a very active legislator on the issue before us today— 

that is, the effort to stop Iran from 

getting a nuclear weapon—my friend 

from New York (Mr. ENGEL). 

Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend for 

yielding to me, and I rise in strong support of this legislation. 

I am glad that the Senate and the 

House finally came together on this 

very, very important bill. 

b 1510 

This bill has very, very strong support, as you can tell, on both sides of 

the aisle, and the reason it does is because Iran has proven itself to be a 

very, very dangerous player. 

Iran is the leading supporter of terrorism in the world. Iran supplies and 

supports the terrorist group Hezbollah 

in Lebanon. And, in fact, now we see 

what’s going on in Syria. And if it was 

not for Iran, Assad would not be able to 

continue his brutal ways and his murdering of his own people. Right now, as 

we talk, there are Iranian guards fighting on the side of Assad in Syria, and 

Iran chooses to be, and continues to be, 

a rogue nation. 

Iran must not be allowed to have a 

nuclear weapon. She has lied to the 

world consistently in talking about her 

purposes of the weapon, but Iran is not 

fooling anybody. 

And so what these sanctions do is 

hits at Iran’s oil and natural gas sectors, making it very, very difficult for 

them to launder money and making it 

very, very difficult to continue their 

repressive ways. 

The world has spoken. This isn’t only 

the United States. These are countries 

all over the world. And unfortunately, 

or the blocking of some vetoes in the 

United Nations, there would already be 

sanctions in Iran. 

So I urge my colleagues to support 

this. I think there’s a reason why virtually every Member of Congress on 

both sides of the aisle supports it. 

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 

minute. 

These sanctions are hurting ordinary 

people in Iran. I pointed out earlier, 

matters like the price of rent, bread— 

Americans can understand that—education, all of these things are increasing. And these sanctions then directly 

undermine Iran’s civil society by giving the regime a chance to crack down 

even harder on internal dissent. These 

sanctions will ensure that those crackdowns continue. 

Ordinary Iranians are struggling simply to make ends meet under this sanctions regime that already exists. They 

cannot afford to suspend the time necessary to participate in social movements which provide basic social services to push for democratic change in 

their country. 

Are these the intended effects that 

we wish to have on the Iranian people 

and Iranian Americans? 

And if not, passing this kind of a 

broad, indiscriminate sanctions bill 

sends the wrong message. If the sanctions imposed on Iraq are any precedent, we know that sanctions are not 

an effective tool in promoting or supporting domestic democracy movements. 

We also know those sanctions did not 

prevent an unnecessary and wasteful 

war with Iraq. In effect, the expansion 

of the broad and indiscriminate sanctions, including this legislation, hurts 

our ability to negotiate with Iran, imposes long-term harm detrimental to 

the Iranian people. 

I reserve the balance of my time. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 

myself such time as I may consume. I 

have no further requests for time. 

And I’d like to just raise a couple of 

the issues that my friends, Mr. PAUL

from Texas and Mr. KUCINICH from 

Ohio, have put forth in the context of 

opposition to this bill. 

This is not the next step to war. This 

is the alternative to war. Iran having a 

nuclear weapon is unacceptable for 

many, many reasons: 

It means the end of the nonproliferation regime; 

It means countries all through that 

part of the world will seek their own 

nuclear weapons; 

It raises the specter of nuclear weapons being passed on and dirty bombs 

being passed on to terrorists, and there 

is nothing in the comments of the regime that could let one relax and think 

they would never be the first to use 

those nuclear weapons. 

That is unacceptable. Our alternatives are either war or finding a diplomatic resolution of their nuclear 

weapons program, the end of that program. 


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They’ve been found, not by the White 

House, not by some Vulcans in foreign 

policy, but by the IAEA and the U.N. 

Security Council, over and over again, 

to have violated their obligations 

under the nonproliferation treaty to 

which they are a signatory. They don’t 

ratify the additional protocols. They 

move ahead with enrichment plants 

that they don’t need for a peaceful 

weapons program. 

They do not have a right to enrich. 

You could argue they have a right to a 

nuclear energy program, but not a 

right to enrich. They conceal information in violation of their treaty obligations. 

This is, hopefully, the final step, but 

if not we will have to intensify the 

sanctions to achieve that diplomatic 

program. 

And Iran is not some bucolic, peaceloving state that has never done anything against its neighbors. Everyone 

knows that Hezbollah is a direct foreign agent of Iran that gets its funding, 

its training, and its sponsorship and its 

directions from Iran. 

We know what they’ve done to the 

marines in Lebanon. We’ve known 

what they tried to do to the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington. We know 

that in Delhi and in Bulgaria and a 

number of other capitals around the 

world, their effort to commit terrorist 

acts against Israeli diplomats and 

Israeli citizens. Their record as a state 

sponsor of terror is the largest and 

most impactful in the world. 

They are pursuing a nuclear weapons 

capability. It is our obligation to do 

every measure we have to stop them 

from getting that, and we want to do it 

peacefully. This strategy that we are 

embarked on is an effort to find a way 

to do this without resorting to war, 

and I urge my colleagues to stand 

strongly behind this bill. 

This is the alternative. It is the only 

feasible alternative. Otherwise, we are 

faced with two very dismal prospects: a 

military action or an Iran with nuclear 

weapons and all that means. 

I urge an ‘‘aye’’ vote. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 

minute. 

Sanctions are a form of war in this 

case, and it will lead to war. And remember, we’re not talking about— 

some time ago we were talking about if 

Iran would have a nuclear weapon, but 

then the bar’s been lowered to say nuclear weapon capability. And now the 

game’s being changed to say not just 

nuclear weapon capability, but we 

want regime change as well. 

I mean, if this isn’t a prescription for 

war, then I didn’t participate in the debate in this House of Representatives 

in October of 2002 warning this Congress, chapter and verse, that Iraq had 

no weapons of mass destruction, no 

role with al Qaeda in 9/11, did not have 

any intention or capability of attacking the United States. This is a version 

of that debate all over again. 

I mean, come on. What are we doing 

here? Why is this more important than 

our country? 

You know, our postal service is going 

into default tonight, a manufactured 

default, mind it. No debate on the 

House floor about this today, but an attempt to manufacture a war with Iran. 

What are we about? 

I reserve the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I continue to 

reserve the balance of my time. 

I will retain my time to close, so if 

Mr. KUCINICH could wrap up his part of 

the debate, we can conclude. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Could I ask how 

much time remains? 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute remaining. 

Mr. KUCINICH. And how much time 

does the gentlelady have? 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida has 30 seconds 

remaining. 

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 

minute. 

This legislation also requires the 

President to impose sanctions on those 

who are responsible for or are 

complicit in certain human rights 

abuses in Syria, but it fails to acknowledge that our own country and a number of our allies are actively participating and stoking the violence on the 

ground. Divisions and infighting within 

the various militias operating on the 

ground are already occurring. And we 

also read that al Qaeda’s also been involved in Syria. 

So, look, we have to get serious 

about what America’s purpose is in the 

world. It’s not to be a heavy foot. It’s 

not to proliferate wars all over. 

The first thing we have to do is take 

care of things here at home: jobs for 

all, health care for all, education for 

all, retirement security for all. When 

we can do those kinds of things, then 

we can pretend that we can be the policeman of the world. But until we’ve 

done that, we don’t have any right to 

go all around the world trying to tell 

people how to live. 

And we can settle this matter with 

Iran without war. We can settle it 

through diplomacy. Diplomacy. It 

would be real interesting to try it. And 

we ought to support any efforts of the 

Obama administration to use diplomacy here. Let’s not use this political 

climate to push us into a war. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

b 1520 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I 

yield myself the remaining time. 

I would like to recognize the commitment, the dedication and tireless efforts of the members of our House Foreign Affairs Committee family, particularly of our staff director, Dr. 

Yleem Poblete, who Ranking Member 

BERMAN once described as driving a 

hard bargain. Just ask her hubby, 

Jason. Also, thanks to Matt Zweig and 

Ari Fridman. 

Thanks to Chairman JOHNSON of the 

Senate Banking Committee and to his 

staff, particularly Colin McGinnis, Patrick Grant and Steve Kroll, as well as 

Ranking Member SHELBY and his staff. 

A strong and warm thanks and big 

hug to my good friend Mr. BERMAN— 

the ranking member—and to his staff, 

particularly Shanna Winters, Alan 

Makovsky and Ed Rice, as well as minority staff director Richard Kessler. 

I would like to thank Senators 

MENENDEZ and MARK KIRK and the critical Representatives, DEUTCH, SHERMAN

and DOLD. 

Let’s stop Iran before it’s too late. 

Let’s pass this bill. I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC, July 30, 2012. 

Hon. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, 

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Rayburn, Washington, DC. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROS-LEHTINEN: I write concerning the House-Senate negotiations on 

H.R. 1905, an Act to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran 

to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons 

and other threatening activities, and for 

other purposes. I understand the House and 

Senate have reached an agreement on provisions related to an Energy Information Administration report on Iran’s natural gas 

sector. 

I wanted to notify you that the Committee 

on Energy and Commerce will forgo action 

on this House-Senate compromise language 

so that the bill may proceed expeditiously to 

the House floor for consideration. This is 

done with the understanding that the Committee is not waiving any of its jurisdiction 

on this or similar legislation. 

I would appreciate your response confirming this understanding with respect to 

this provision of the House-Senate compromise to H.R. 1905, and I ask that a copy of 

our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during 

its consideration on the House floor. 

Sincerely, 

FRED UPTON, 

Chairman. 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC, July 30, 2012. 

Hon. FRED UPTON, 

Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

Rayburn, Washington, DC. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN UPTON: Thank you for 

your letter concerning H.R. 1905, an Act to 

strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities, and for other purposes. 

I appreciate your Committee’s decision to 

forgo action on the House-Senate compromise text so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor. I acknowledge 

that your decision in this case does not represent the waiver of any of your jurisdiction 

over this bill or similar legislation. 

I will place a copy of your letter and this 

reply into the Congressional Record during 

House consideration of the Senate amendment to H.R. 1905. 

Sincerely, 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, 

Chairman. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise 

today in support of H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat 

Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 

2012. This bill is a critical effort to tighten 

sanctions against the Tehran regime, and to 

increase pressure to force the government to 

abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose a grave threat 

to the United States, to regional stability in the 


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H5578 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE August 1, 2012 

Middle East, and to the entire international 

community. Both President Obama and the 

United States Congress have unequivocally 

stated that Iran must not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons. 

On his visit to the Middle East this week, 

U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated 

that ‘‘sanctions are having a serious impact in 

terms of the economy in Iran.’’ Iran is now 

struggling to conduct international trade, losing 

markets and trading partners. Its currency has 

lost over half of its value. 

Meanwhile, the administration continues to 

expand sanctions against Tehran. Earlier this 

week, President Obama signed an executive 

order to extend sanctions to anyone, using 

any method of payment, who purchases Iranian crude oil—preventing Iran from circumventing sanctions by using bartering and other 

unconventional payment options. It also expanded sanctions on buyers of Iranian petrochemical products, and authorized penalties 

for entities seeking to evade U.S. sanctions. 

Also this week, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned 

the Bank of Kunlun in China and Elaf Islamic 

Bank in Iraq for providing financial services to 

Iranian banks. 

Today, Congress is acting to further tighten 

the economic noose on the Iranian regime. 

The bill under consideration today, H.R. 1905, 

strengthens and expands existing sanctions, 

banning any commercial activities with Iran’s 

oil and natural gas sector, including helping 

Iran ship its oil under the flag of another nation. This bill increases sanctions targeting entities involved with the Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard Corps and sanctions human rights offenders. 

When coupled with existing sanctions, today’s bill represents the strongest-ever effort 

to financially isolate Iran. This is critical, because we must persuade the Tehran government to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. I strongly support utilizing our entire diplomatic and economic arsenal to ensure that 

Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. 

Today’s bill is a critical step towards increasing pressure on the Iranian government. 

I urge my colleagues to join me in strongly 

supporting this legislation. 

Mr. REED. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to reaffirm my support for sanctions to be placed 

upon Iran. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali 

Khamenei are once again stressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within Iran’s borders and we must take 

swift and strong actions against these measures. 

Iran is not just a threat to the United States, 

but to all free countries around the globe. As 

a country that harbors terrorists, foreign leaders must stay vigilant and recognize Iran’s 

practices as a national security concern. 

Lastly, we must stand up against the human 

rights abuses the Iranian regime is supporting. 

Its citizens have continually been sheltered 

from outside information and ideas due to 

strict governmental control. We need to inform 

the regime that the Iranian citizens deserve 

the basic human rights as laid out by the 

United Nations. I am proud to support H.R. 

1905 and I encourage the President to sign 

this into law promptly. 

Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, 

I rise in strong support of the conference report to H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction 

and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. This bipartisan legislation represents the strongest 

set of sanctions to isolate any country in the 

world during peacetime. 

It is imperative that our nation takes all 

steps necessary to isolate Iran, force them to 

end their dangerous pursuit of nuclear weapons, and secure that the regime in Teheran 

will no longer be a threat to peace and prosperity in the Middle East. 

Once this legislation is passed and signed 

into law, virtually all of Iran’s energy, financial, 

and transportation sectors would be subject to 

U.S. sanctions. Companies conducting business in these industries would face the possibility of losing access to U.S. markets. 

I also applaud the inclusion of sanctions 

against human rights abusers in Iran and 

Syria in this legislation. The deplorable actions 

by the political and military leaders in Iran and 

Syria against their own people must come to 

an immediate halt and deserve global condemnation. 

Important allies, such as the European 

Union, Canada, Australia, Japan, South 

Korea, India, and Israel, have joined the 

American people in enacting sanctions against 

Iran. 

It is important that this Chamber say with a 

strong, unified voice that we stand with Israel 

during these difficult times. 

As co-chair of the Democratic Israel Working Group, I call on Members from both sides 

of the aisle to vote in support of this bipartisan 

resolution. 

I would also like to take a moment to thank 

the President for his leadership on sanctions 

on Iran. Yesterday, President Obama signed 

an Executive Order that imposes new sanctions against the Iranian energy and petrochemical sectors, as well as sanctions against 

those who are providing material support to 

the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran 

Intertrade Company, or the Central Bank of 

Iran. These measures will help strengthen the 

existing sanctions regime and bring Iran that 

much closer to ending its heedless quest for 

nuclear weapons. 

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I 

rise today in strong support of the House 

amendment to the previous Senate amendment to H.R. 1905. In his 2002 State of the 

Union Address, former President George H.W. 

Bush said that Iran was pursuing weapons of 

mass destruction and exporting terror. A decade later, Iran’s global threat is greater than 

ever. 

We are currently embroiled in a standoff 

with Iran over its pursuit of nuclear capability. 

We find ourselves on the brink of conflict over 

potential Iranian armed interference with oil 

and other shipments through the Strait of 

Hormuz and its persistent threats against 

Israel. Even prior to 9–11, Hezbollah, supported by Iran, was responsible for more 

American deaths around the world than any 

other terrorist organization. Since 2001, Iran 

has embarked on more direct efforts to harm 

American interests as evidenced by last year’s 

foiled Iranian-backed assassination plot 

against the Saudi ambassador to the United 

States. 

The current state of Iranian sanctions clearly 

has not worked to reduce Tehran’s threat to 

global peace. That’s why we need the enhanced approach this legislation will take in 

countering efforts by Iran to evade the impact 

of international sanctions. H.R. 1905 as 

amended tightens reporting on countries violating sanctions on these countries and 

strengthens measures against those who 

would aid and abet these disturbers of global 

peace. 

It also effectively blacklists Iran’s energy 

sector and anyone doing business with it. By 

preventing Iran from repatriating the proceeds 

from its oil sales, this rogue government will 

be deprived of 80 percent of its hard currency 

earning and half of the funds used to support 

its national budget. 

Iran has used many tricks to subvert current 

sanctions—from oil for gold swaps to selling 

energy bonds to other trading and bartering 

schemes. They have been successful because 

there are governments who care more for 

making profit from doing business in Iran than 

in preventing threats to world peace. International efforts to rein in the nuclear ambitions 

of Iran have been stymied particularly by 

China. 

Despite expressing formal support for 

United Nations Security Council sanctions 

against Iran since 2005, China has stepped in 

where other nations have curtailed trade with 

Iran. China’s Bank of Kunlun and the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq have facilitated transactions 

worth millions of dollars for Iranian banks already under sanctions. Stronger sanctions will 

make such unsavory alliances more difficult. 

This is why the reformulated bill we consider 

today is so vital in eliminating to the extent 

possible all avenues for Iran’s allies to play 

enabler to its nuclear ambitions and to its patronage of terrorist operations. 

I want to congratulate House Foreign Affairs 

Committee Chairman ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, 

Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 

Committee Chairman TIM JOHNSON and other 

members for their hard work in crafting a bipartisan, bicameral bill that works. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The 

question is on the motion offered by 

the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. 

ROS-LEHTINEN) that the House suspend 

the rules and agree to the resolution, 

H. Res. 750. 

The question was taken. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the 

opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being 

in the affirmative, the ayes have it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, 

on that I demand the yeas and nays. 

The yeas and nays were ordered. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed. 

f 

JOB PROTECTION AND RECESSION 

PREVENTION ACT OF 2012 

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to 

House Resolution 747, I call up the bill 

(H.R. 8) to extend certain tax relief 

provisions enacted in 2001 and 2003, and 

for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration. 

The Clerk read the title of the bill. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 747, the bill is 

considered read. 

The text of the bill is as follows: 

H.R. 8 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 

Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Job Protection and Recession Prevention Act of 2012’’. 


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