1

 Michael J. Astrue has been appointed to serve as Commissioner of Social

Security, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 43(c)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2363

___________

Melissa C. Pirtle, * 

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Michael J. Astrue,1 *

Commissioner, Social Security *

Administration, * 

* 

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 15, 2006

Filed: March 15, 2007 

___________

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Melissa C. Pirtle applied for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and

supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”) pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405. Pirtle’s applications for benefits were denied

by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”). The
2

Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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district court2

 affirmed the decision of the Commissioner. From that decision, Pirtle

appeals. We affirm.

I.

Pirtle applied for benefits on June 15, 2001. At the time of the administrative

law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, Pirtle was thirty-two years old and had a high school

education. She had past relevant work experience as a sewing machine operator, dairy

laborer, and dairy milking machine operator. Pirtle alleged an onset date of April 1,

2000, in her applications for benefits. However, the onset date was later amended to

reflect the alleged onset date of June 7, 2001. The amendment was necessary to

properly reflect the relevant periods of her prior unsuccessful applications for benefits,

from which she sought no judicial review. 

Pirtle alleged she was entitled to disability benefits due to degenerative joint

disease of the knee, fibromyalgia, joint pain, headaches, stomach pain, heart

palpitations, fatigue, neck strain, gastritis, lumbar pain and strain, scoliosis, and

thoracic strain. Following the sequential analysis, the ALJ first found that Pirtle had

not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant period. At steps two

and three of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Pirtle’s impairments were

“severe” within the meaning of the Social Security Act, but that the impairments did

not meet or equal any listed impairment. At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that

Pirtle had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a significant range of

light work, including the ability to “occasionally lift 20 pounds and frequently carry

10 pounds . . . stand and walk a total of 4 hours daily, 2 hours at a time . . . sit 4 hours

daily, for 1 hour at a time . . . occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, and bend.”
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The ALJ also found that Pirtle should avoid heights and hazardous unprotected

moving equipment, and that she would benefit from fifteen minute rest periods every

three hours. The ALJ determined that, with these limitations, Pirtle could not perform

any of her past relevant work. At step five of the sequential analysis, the ALJ relied

on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) and found Pirtle was not disabled

because there are other jobs available in substantial numbers in the national economy

which Pirtle could perform.

On December 10, 2003, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued the final

decision of the Commissioner denying Pirtle’s claims. Following the denial of review

by the Appeals Council, Pirtle appealed the denial of benefits to the district court. The

district court affirmed the findings of the Commissioner. From that decision, Pirtle

appeals.

On appeal, Pirtle argues that the ALJ erred by: 1) declining to give controlling

weight to the opinion of her primary treating physician; 2) failing to consider the

severity and disabling nature of fibromyalgia; and 3) finding her testimony less than

fully credible. 

II.

 This court reviews a district court’s decision upholding the denial of social

security benefits de novo. Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006). If

the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence on the record

as a whole, we must affirm. Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 2004).

Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind

would find it adequate to support the ALJ’s determination. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393

F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). We must consider the evidence which detracts from
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the Commissioner’s decision, as well as the evidence in support of the decision.

Karlix v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 2006). However, we will not reverse

simply because some evidence supports a conclusion other than that of the

Commissioner. Pelky, 433 F.3d at 578. Likewise, we must defer to an ALJ’s wellreasoned determinations of credibility if they are supported in the record by

substantial evidence. Id.

III.

 Pirtle argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give appropriate and controlling

weight to the opinion of Michael D. Ball, D.O., her primary treating physician. We are

not persuaded by Pirtle’s argument. 

A treating physician’s opinion is due “controlling weight” if that opinion is

“‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] record.’”

Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2) (2000)). “Although a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to great

weight, it does not automatically control or obviate the need to evaluate the record as

whole.” Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2001). When a treating

physician’s notes are inconsistent with his or her residual functional capacity

assessment, we decline to give controlling weight to the residual functional capacity

assessment. See Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2006).

Dr. Ball completed two RFC assessments for Pirtle. The first was completed

on March 16, 2001, and the second was completed on July 18, 2003. Dr. Ball’s March

16, 2001, RFC analysis indicated that Pirtle has the following work related abilities

and restrictions: frequently lift/carry five pounds; occasionally lift/carry ten pounds;

stand/walk for three hours; sit for four hours; perform only limited push/pull motions;
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frequently balance; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and bend; never climb;

occasionally reach, handle, and finger; frequently feel; unlimited ability to see, hear

and speak; environmental restrictions including restricted exposure to heights and

vibrations; and he noted that it was unknown as to whether periods of rest would be

medically helpful to Pirtle. Pirtle’s previous applications for benefits were denied on

June 6, 2001, and were not appealed. Hence, the relevant time period for the current

claims must begin after June 6, 2001. Therefore, Pirtle relies on Dr. Ball’s July 18,

2003 RFC statement, which indicated that her abilities increased. 

In the July 18, 2003, RFC assessment, Dr. Ball stated that Pirtle had the

following abilities and restrictions: frequently lift/carry ten pounds; occasionally

lift/carry twenty-five pounds; stand/walk for four hours; sit for four hours; unlimited

push/pull; frequently balance; occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch and bend;

frequently reach, handle, finger and feel; environmental restrictions include heights

and climbing; and, estimated that it would be helpful in coping with symptoms to rest

thirty minutes every three hours during an eight hour workday.

Following a review of the medical evidence and the administrative hearing, the

ALJ determined that Pirtle has the following RFC: 

occasionally lift 20 pounds and frequently carry 10 pounds, stand and

walk a total of 4 hours daily, 2 hours at a time . . . sit 4 hours daily, for

1 hour at a time . . . occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, and bend

. . . should avoid heights and hazardous unprotected moving equipment

. . . would benefit from 15 minute rest periods every 3 hours. 

As the ALJ noted, the RFC finding “is consistent with Dr. Ball’s [July 18,

2003] assessment, with the exception of his estimate of 30 minute rest periods, which

is inconsistent with the assessment of claimant’s treating rheumatologist, and with the

other evidence of record.” 
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Pirtle argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded the opinion of her treating

physician because the ALJ relied on the RFC analysis of her treating rheumatologist.

Pirtle correctly notes that the RFC analysis of the treating rheumatologist was

conducted on March 26, 2001, while her previous applications for benefits were

pending and prior to the relevant time period for the applications for benefits now

before the court. We have previously found that the ALJ may consider all evidence

of record, including medical records and opinions dated prior to the alleged onset date,

when there is no evidence of deterioration or progression of symptoms. Vandenboom

v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2005). While the ALJ relies in part on the

previous RFC of the treating rheumatologist, he also relies on other evidence in the

record to discount the estimated time of beneficial rest. 

The ALJ properly relied on the portion of Dr. Ball’s opinion which was

supported by substantial record evidence and properly disregarded the unsupported

advisory portion of the treating physician’s RFC opinion. The record establishes that

Dr. Ball saw Pirtle numerous times during the relevant time period for a wide variety

of complaints, including sinusitis, cough, congestion, GERD, palpitations,

fibromyalgia, joint pain and frequent requests for medication refills. The ALJ

determined that Pirtle’s RFC was consistent with Dr. Ball’s July 18, 2003 RFC

assessment with the exception of Dr. Ball’s reference to the advisability of thirty

minute rest periods. Instead, the ALJ determined that Pirtle would benefit from fifteen

minute rest periods. The ALJ considered the RFC analysis of Pirtle’s treating

rheumatologist, as well as the other evidence of record discounting this single portion

of Dr. Ball’s opinion. Further, we note that Dr. Ball’s RFC assessment does not assert

that the thirty minutes of rest every three hours is required. Rather, he indicates that

such rest would be beneficial. Dr. Ball’s treatment records do not indicate that he

advised Pirtle to rest thirty minutes every three hours, nor do the treatment notes

reflect that Pirtle reported that she experienced the need to rest for thirty minutes

every three hours. Likewise, the treatment notes do not reflect that Pirtle routinely

asserted fatigue as a complaint to Dr. Ball. The other evidence of record, Dr. Ball’s
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treatment notes, is not consistent with Pirtle’s assertion that thirty minutes of rest

every three hours are required. When a treating physician’s record includes

inconsistencies, his own inconsistency may undermine or diminish the weight

afforded to his opinion. Hacker, 459 F.3d at 937. 

Next, Pirtle contends that the ALJ erred in his consideration and analysis of the

severity of her fibromyalgia. We reject Pirtle’s challenge. We have previously

recognized that fibromyalgia is a chronic condition which is difficult to diagnose and

may be disabling, Garza v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 2005) (per

curiam), and the ALJ properly found Pirtle’s fibromyalgia to be a severe impairment

and took the impairment into account when determining Pirtle’s RFC. The ALJ

specifically noted that Pirtle received sporadic treatment for joint pain and muscle

spasms, but the treatment notes place a greater emphasis on treatment for menstrual

cramping and bleeding, as well as pelvic pain. The medical records reveal only a

minimal mention of musculoskeletal pain after mid-2001. After finding fibromyalgia

to be one of Pirtle’s severe impairments, the ALJ thoroughly analyzed Pirtle’s

fibromyalgia and treatment thereof during the relevant period. Thus, the ALJ properly

analyzed and considered Pirtle’s fibromyalgia.

Finally, Pirtle asserts that the ALJ erred in finding Pirtle’s testimony less than

credible. We cannot agree with Pirtle’s assertion, because the ALJ’s credibility

determination was based on valid reasons. See Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d 710, 714

(8th Cir. 2003) (“If an ALJ explicitly discredits the claimant’s testimony and gives

good reason for doing so, we will normally defer to the ALJ’s credibility

determination.”). Pirtle and her husband testified that she was severely disabled.

However, Pirtle also made inconsistent reports of her activities of daily living, such

as the ability to: regularly drive a manual-transmission vehicle; shop; perform

housework, such as cooking, cleaning, and washing dishes; fish; attend church two to

three times per week; care for her personal needs; and home-school her two children.

Because the ALJ’s credibility determination was based on good reasons and supported
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by substantial evidence, we defer to his judgment. See Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F. 3d

902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). Although Pirtle alleged that she experienced pain which

interfered with her ability to engage in work activity, the ALJ conducted the proper

analysis with respect to Pirtle’s nonexertional impairments and concluded that her

pain would not interfere with her ability to perform a significant range of light work.

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam order)

(subsequent history omitted). 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.