* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

October 20, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 04-10532

MILLBROOK CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,

VERSUS

MEDICAL FINANCIAL SERVICES INC.; ET AL,

Defendants,

DOUGLAS E. KASSAB and LAURA KLEIN,

Defendants-Appellants,

EXIGENT MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC. d/b/a CLINISOFT,

Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant,

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division

(3:01-CV-01343)

Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendants-Appellants Exigent Management Co., Inc. d/b/a

Clinisoft (“Clinisoft”) and Douglas Kassab and Laura Klein

(collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the district court’s orders and2

entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Millbrook

Corporation (“Millbrook”) following a jury trial. Clinisoft argues

the court erred in: (1) denying judgment as a matter of law on

Millbrook’s quasi-contract claims in light of an express contract

between the parties; (2) denying judgment as a matter o f law on

Millbrook’s fraud claim; and (3) denying Clinisoft a new trial on

its counterclaims. The dispute arises out of a contract between

t he parties for the resale of computer software licenses and

Clinisoft’s delinquency for invoices on the sale of annual upgrades

or renewals for the software. We AFFIRM.

Millbrook designed and marketed computer software for medical

servi ce providers and sold its software through a network of

resellers. Clinisoft entered negotiations with Millbrook to become

a reseller, and the parties entered an agreement on September 10,

1997 (the “ Agreement”) that provided for a nonexclusive right to

market licenses for the software to end users. The Agreement’s

term was one year, renewable autom atically, unless either a

condition for termination was met or either party opted out of

renewal at the end of a term. On June 7, 2001, Millbrook notified

Clinisoft of its intent to terminate based upon Clinisoft’s

nonpayment of amounts owing under the Agreement and to cease

provision of annual software upgrades to end users. Millbrook

notified Clinisoft of its timeliness with payments on licenses but

continuing delinquency on the upgrade accounts. Clinisoft

responded that the owing amounts were not for renewals sold, but3

rather for renewals billed by Millbrook prior to the annual date

relevant to each affected end user. On July 2, 2001, Millbrook

notified Clinisoft of the termination of the Agreement for cause,

effective June 30, 2001.

Millbrook filed its com plaint in state court against

Clinisoft, allegi ng breach of contract and unjust enrichment and

claiming damages related to unpaid invoices totaling $114,114.70.

M illbrook also claimed Appellants committed fraud by falsely

categorizing certain licenses for use in order to obtain a

discounted price, offered by Millbrook for licensees requiring only

partial use of the software’s capacity, and by submitting a false

order form on behalf of a nonexistent customer in order to obtain

the discounted price. Upon removal, Millbrook supplemented its

complaint in federal court with claims of fraud and conspiracy to

commit fraud and additional quasi-contractual claims, including

quantum meruit and breach of implied promise. Clinisoft

counterclaimed, alleging that Millbrook’s termination of the

Agreement constituted breach of contract and that Millbrook

tortiously interfered with Clinisoft’s prospective business

relationships by notifying Cl inisoft’s customers of the contract

termination.

On cross motions for partial summary judgment, a magistrate

judge recommended dismissal of Millbrook’s breach of contract claim

bec ause the magistrate concluded the plain language of the

Agreement did not create a procedure by which Clinisoft was4

required to order or pay for upgrades. The magistrate also

recommended the denial of Clinisoft’s motion for summary judgment

on its breach of contract claim related to termination. The

district court accepted the magistrate’s recommendations. The

remaining claims and counterclaims proceeded to jury trial. At the

conclusion of the evidence, the court granted Millbrook’s motion

for judgment as a matter of law as to Clinisoft’s cause of action

for tortious interference with contracts.

The remaining claims were sub mitted to the jury, which

returned a verdict for Millbrook on its quasi-contract claims and

awarded damages in the amount of $114,114.70. The jury also

returned a ve rdict in favor of Millbrook on the fraud claim, but

found no damages on that cause of action, and in favor of Millbrook

with respect to Clinisoft’s count erclaims for breach of contract

and tortious interference with prospective business relations.

Finally, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Clinisoft on

Millbrook’s conspiracy to commit fraud claim.

After trial, Clinisoft moved for judgment as a matter of law

and/or new trial on all claims, and the court denie d the motion.

This appeal timely followed. This Court reviews d e novo a district

court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. D P

Solutions v. Rollins

, 353 F.3d 421, 427 (5th Cir. 2003). “Judgment

as a matter of law is proper after a party has been fully heard by

the jury on a given issue, and there is no le gally sufficient5

evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that

party with respect to that issue.” Id . (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is

within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed

absent an abuse of discretion or a misapprehe nsion of the law.”

Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co. , 179 F.3d 169,

173 (5th Cir. 1999).

Clinisoft argues T exas law, applicable by virtue of the

Agreement’s choice of law provision , precludes Millbrook from

stating a valid quasi-contract claim because the parties’ dispute

is governed by a valid express contract. See U.S. Quest, Ltd. v.

Kimmons , 228 F.3d 399, 406 (5th Cir. 2000); s ee also Trul y v.

Austin

, 744 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1988). Clinisoft argues the

quasi-contract claim is based on precisely the same subject matter

as that covered by the express agreement between the parties.

Ac cordingly, Clinisoft argues it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on Millbrook’s quasi-contract claims.

As to the fraud claim, Clinisoft argues that the evidence

f ailed to establish the materiality of the statements at issue,

that the evidence of reliance was insufficient, and that the jury’s

verdict assessing no damages on the fraud claim precludes, as a

matter of law, the satisfaction of the requisite injury element.

With respect to the denial of a motion for new trial,

Clinisoft argues the district court abused its discretion because6

t he jury’s verdict is the result of passion and prejudice,

attributable to the court’s presentation of overlapping claims, the

quasi-contract and fraud claims, that prevented the jury from

adequately distinguishing between two or more mutually exclus ive

theories of liability. S ee Imperial Premium Fin., Inc. v. Khoury

,

129 F.3d 347, 354 (5th Cir. 1997).

After thorough review of the briefs, the oral arguments of the

parties, and review of relevant portions of the record, we conclude

the district court did not abuse its discre tion in denying

Clinisoft’s motion for new trial. We AFFIRM the district court’s

denial of Clinisoft’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

quasi-contrac t claims and fraud claim and the district court’s

entry of judgment for Millbro ok for essentially the reasons

provided by the district court.

AFFIRMED

.