### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 22
- 00458
- CR

Andrew Jones , Appellant

v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE 428TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY NO. CR -19-0893-D, THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HENRY , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
And rew Jones was convicted of the offense of murder and sentenced to sixty

- five
years ’ imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code § § 12.32, 19.02 . In two issues on appeal, Jones argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion f or continuance and by overruling his objection to witness testim ony rega rding evidence that had been excluded . We will affirm the trial cou rt ’s judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND On Ap ril 5, 2019, Nicholas White made plans to socialize with a friend in his apartment at the Uptown S quare Apartments in San Marcos, Texas. The friend arrived at White ’ s apartment first and w aite d in the parking lot for White to arrive. When White drove up, the friends greeted one another and walked toward White ’ s a part ment. Before reaching the apartment, a man approached the friends and yelled something about money to White. White responded, “What are you go i ng to do? Shoot me?” At that point, th e man pulled out a gun and2 shot White multiple times before g etting int o his car, speeding off, and near ly driving over White who had fallen to the ground. White ’ s friend , residents of the apartment comple x, and peop le vi siting residents of the complex rushed to aid White , and the police and par ame dics responded
to a 911 cal l mad e at 6:36 p.m

. reporting the shooting

. Although the neighbors, police, and
param edic s attempted to save White ’ s life, he succumbed t o his multiple gun shot wounds and died en route to the hospital. While at the apartment complex , the p olice ques ti one d Wh ite ’ s friend and the neighbors and visitors about what they saw . The witnesses described the shoote r as a “ light

skinned African Ame rican ” man who had tattoos on one of his arms , was wearing a yellow s hirt , and had been smoking before the inciden t

. Addit ionall y , the witnes ses informed the police that the shooter drove off in a silver SUV. While examining the scene , the officers noticed on the ground s hell casings from

. 40 caliber Smith & Wesson ammunition and noti ced that several proje ctiles had h it cars in the parking lot. As part of the ir investigation , the p olice col lected the casings as well as cigarette butts that were found in the area. Two of the responding officers contact ed the manager for the Uptown Square Apartments to see if there wa s any sur veillance foota ge of veh icles entering or exiting the complex near the time of the shooting. While watching the footage, the officer s noticed a Nissan Rog ue matching the witnesses ’ des cription of the shooter ’ s SUV entering the comp lex at 6:15 p .m
. By slo wing down the footage, one o f the officer s was able to obtain the li cense plate number for the vehicle

. The footage also showed the Nissan Rogue leav ing the complex around the time of the shooting at 6:36 p.m., and the officers wer e able to obser ve that t he dri v er entering the complex and l ater leaving was an African American man with a yellow sh irt.3 After running the plate n umber through a database, the officer s learned that th e vehicle belon ged to a car - rental company. After t he officer s contac te d the c ar - rental company , they learned th at the SUV had been rented to Jones at 11:14 a.m. on April 5, 2019 , and that
Jones ’ s address was u nit 517 of a not her apartment complex in San Marcos called T he Pointe. The officer used this information to search th rough d river ’ s license records and found Jones ’ s driver ’ s license and his license pho to. The photo was consistent with the witnesses ’ description of t he shooter. Police officer s went to The Pointe complex and noticed the Nissan Rogue in the parking lo t. One off icer asked the apartment manager if there was any survei llance footage for individuals entering and leaving the complex that day. After the man a ger allowed t he officer to review the footage , the officer observed a Nissan Rogue with the same lice n se plate as the one from Uptown Square Apartments enter ing The Pointe complex at 6:49 p.m. When reviewing the footage , the officer notic ed that no one other than the driv er was in the car and that the driver had tattoos on his right arm.
R elying on thi s informatio n, t he police obtained an arrest warrant for Jones , and a
SW AT t eam entered unit 517 at 5:30 a.m. on A pril 6, 2019. Jones was not inside the apartment. When s earching the apartment, the polic e found in a bathroom a pistol box with a pawn rece i pt inside i t and two Glock magazines with .40 caliber ammunition

. T he ammunition was consi stent with the c asing s recovered from the scene of the sho oting. The pawn recei pt documented that Jones bought a .40 caliber Glock 27 in S epte mber 2018. As part o f the investi gation, the police learned that Jones had recently moved into unit 517 after moving from un it 503. The police knocked on the door of unit 503 after failing t o find Jones in unit 517, and one of the occupants and forme r roommates of Jones ope n ed the door.4 He explained to the police that when he arrived home the night before (April 5 ), he noticed in his trash can a gun holster, two loaded gun magazi nes with .40 caliber ammunition , and some clothes. The police collected those items, including a yellow shirt , while talking with the occupant. The occupant also relat ed that neither of his other roommates consistently lo cked the
fr ont door to the apartment or the lo ck to the door on the third

- floor loft , and the occu pant gave the police permission t o search the apartment

. During the se arch of unit 503, the polic e learned that unit s 503 and 517 shared

access to a roo ftop d eck and that from t he rooftop someone could enter both units. While search ing the loft where Jones used to li ve, the police found keys to the N issan Rogue rented to Jones and pr escription bottles wit h Jones ’ s name on them. After the police searched th e apartme nts, Jones turned hi mself in. In July 2019, Jones was charged with murdering White by shooting him

. Three years l ater, t he trial began. During the trial, investigati ng police officers , paramedics, the owner of a pawn shop, and witnesses from Up town Square Apartments testified regarding the even ts set out above. In addition, a forensic chemist testified that testing he pe r formed on the gea rsh ift and steering wheel of the Nissan Rogue showed gunsh ot resid ue on both loc ations, meaning that a gun h ad either been discha rged near those portions of the vehicle or those parts of the vehicle contact ed another surface that had guns h ot resid ue on it

. A fi rearm and toolmark examiner testifie d that the casings collected from the scene were all fired from t he same weapon and that the weapon was made by one of a handful of manufacturers, including Glock. A DNA analys t explained that
te s ting performed on one of the cigarette butts retrieved from the scene showed a single DNA profile for a man and calculated t he probability of the profile coming from Jones as being 24.6 septillion times greater than i f it came from an unrelated, unknown i n dividual

. Addi ti onally, the5 analy st testifie d th at testing performed on a sample collect ed from the bumper of the Nissan
Ro gue showed a single DNA profile and calculated the probabi lity of the profile coming from White as bein g 64.4 septillion times grea t er than if it cam e from an unrelated, unkno wn individual. Next, the analys t explained that testing of a swab from the yel lo w shirt collected in the investigation showed that the DNA profile was a mixture of three people and ca lculated the probability of o btaining the prof ile if Jones was one of the contributors as bei ng 2.9 septillion times greater than if the sample came from three unrelated, unknown individuals. Further, Officer David Camp bell testified regard ing his efforts during the investigation i n the case , includin g his review of surveillance footage from The Pointe where Jones lived. In his testimony, Offi cer Campbe ll discussed what he saw on the footage, including seeing the Niss an Rogue enter ing the complex at 6:49 p.m., noting that only the d river was in the

ca r, and stating that footage showed that the driver had tat toos on his right arm. Officer Chris Tankersley pro vided similar testimony regarding the footage. In addition, Off icer Campbell said that photos taken of Jones aft er his arrest show ed that he ha d tattoos on hi s right arm that look ed like the driver ’ s tattoos. Another office r testified that a pho ne logged into Jones ’ s personal email
account began moving at 6:12 p.m. on April 5, 2019, away f rom the apartment complex where
Jones ’ s girlfriend lived ; t hat the phone moved tow a rd the Uptown Squa re Apartments and was near the parking lot of the com plex between 6: 18 p.m. and 6 :22 p.m. ; that the phone stayed in t he same location near White ’ s apartment until 6:36 p.m. ; that th e phone began movin g away from th e Uptown Square Apartmen ts at 6:38 p .m. ; that the phone travelled toward The Pointe ; and that
t he phone stoppe d near units 503 and 517

. After considering the evidence presented at t rial, the jury found Jones guilty of

mur der. Jones ap peals his conviction.6 DISCUSSION In his first issue on appeal, Jones contends that the trial court erred by den ying his motion for a continuance. In his se cond issue, Jones asserts that the trial court erred by

ov erruling his objection to witness testi mony regarding s urveil lance footage from The Pointe

.
Motion for Continuance Prior to trial, o n June 29, 2022, Jone s filed a motion for continuance asserting that he was told that day that evidence was available in the prosecutor ’ s offic e on a US B dri ve that had not been d isclosed on any li st of evidence pro vided or turned over to him. Jones asserted that the US B drive contain ed appr oximately 2,000 individual video files and related documents.
At a hearing on the motion, Jones repeated his assertion that the USB drive and the files had not been disclosed to him and argued t hat he had no idea what was on the driv e other than four videos that the S t ate sent to him by email. Jones argued that the S t ate should have turned over the files in response to hi s discovery request. Accordingly, Jones requested a continuance to review the contents on the drive

. In respons e, the S t ate d escribed the files as surveillance footage that was captured by motion

- activated camer as at Jones ’ s apartment comp lex about the time of the mur der and

s h ow ed “ the comings and goings of residents at the ” complex

. Regarding Jones, the S t ate

a sserted that four of the recordings previously disclosed document ed his returning to the apartment complex shortly after the mur der. Further , the State asserted that the videos were mentioned in a police report that had been provided in discovery. Speci f ically, the State discus sed how Officer Cam p b ell mentioned in his report that he talked with the manager of The Pointe where Jon es resided, tha t the videos show ed a Ni ssan entering the complex at 6:49 p.m.,7 that the driver was an African American male with a “ sleeved tat too, ” that the man ager recognized Jones as the driver, and that the only person in the car was the driver

. Additionally, the St ate pointed out that Off icer Campbell discussed in his report how another officer and he
went to the apartment complex and that t he o ther officer was able to download videos f rom the surveillance camer as made from 6:30 p.m. to midnight on the day of the mu rder . Although Officer Cam pbell explained that he attempted to download the files into the electronic evidence system used by th e San Marcos Police Depa rtment, he wrote that there were errors in submitting the files, that most of the files had been downlo aded , and that he was ab le to dow nload all of the
content onto a USB drive and s ubmit it into evidence. The S t ate me ntioned that the USB drive was included in the list of evidence in the custody of the San Marcos Poli ce Departme nt. Although the State re cognized that the USB driv e had not phy sically been given to Jones, it explained that the drive had been in evidence, th at Jones ha d a report s aying that the drive was in evidence, and that Jones could have but did not try to look at the eviden ce
. Further , the S t ate related that i t moved the drive to the pro secutor ’ s office to allow Jones even more of an opportunity to look at it in the l ead

- up to trial and that it had told Jones about the move

. T he State also related that the evidence on the drive would be the s a me as Officer Cam pbell ’ s testimony describing what he saw when he watched the videos. Aft er considering the parties ’ ar guments and hi ghligh ting how Jones had already been in ja il for three and a half years , the t rial court ex cluded t he evidence from the USB drive and appoi nt ed an additional attorney to the defense team to review evidence on the drive to see if there was anyt hing tha t might be helpful to the defense , but the trial court denied Jones ’ s motion for a co ntinuance. The additional atto rney spent fo rty hours revie win g those files before trial, and the trial began approximately one week after the hearin g.8 When challenging o n appeal the trial c ourt ’ s denial of his motion for contin uance , Jones argues that the State ’ s failure to turn ov er the flas h drive sooner viol ated article 39.14 of the Code of Crimi nal Procedure and the requirements of B rady v. Maryland because the S t ate f ailed to timely disclose the drive and its contents

. See Te x. Code C rim. Proc. a rt. 39.14; 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Although J ones recognizes tha t the trial cour t ordered th at the videos be excluded , Jones contends that the trial court ’ s denial of his motion for continuance harmed him because it forced him to proceed to trial even though he had only been made aware of the USB dri ve with 2 ,000 files on it approximately one week before trial

. Jones contends that the time between the disclosure of the drive and the start of trial was insufficient to properly review the
fi les and that , theref ore, proceeding to trial vio lat ed his due

- process rights Mor eover , Jones argues that the appointment of additional counsel to review the files did not mitigate the harm because the additional attorney was unfamiliar with the case and because the lead atto rney on the case should have be en allowed time to review the f iles given his familiar ity with the case
. 1 Finally , Jones contends that granting the con tinuance would not have prejudiced the S t ate ’ s case , particularly where the S t ate had requested and been given a continuan ce earlier on in the pr oceedings. To prese rve a complaint regarding the denial o f a motion for continu ance, certain procedural st e ps must be complied with. Article 29.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the motion be wr itten and provides that the pro ceeding may be continued “ upon

s ufficient cause show n, which cause shall be set forth in the motion

. ” Tex. Code Cri m. Proc. art.

1 In his brief, Jones seems to suggest that the trial court should have allowed th e additional attorney t o assist throughout the remainder of the trial. However, Jones has not sh own that h e made that t ype o f request and that the r equest was denied

. See Te x. R. App. P. 33.1 ( setting out requirements for preserving appella te complaint).9 29. 03. Further, article 29. 08 mandates that a motion for continuance “ be sworn to by a person having p ersonal knowledge of th e f acts relied on for the contin uance. ” Id. art. 29.08. When construing these statutory requirements , the Court of Crim inal Appeals has determined that the
sta tu tes require “ a sworn written motion to preserve review from a trial court ’ s denial of a

mo tio n for continuance. ” Anderson v. State , 301 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 09) ; see B lackshear v. State , 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 2012) (noting that “ an unsworn oral motion preserves nothing for review ” ). The re is no due

- pr ocess excepti on to the requirement that a motion for continuance be written and sworn to preserve the issue for appeal. Blackshear , 3 8 5 S.W.3d at 591. Although the term “ sworn ” is not defined in the relevant portions of the Code of Crimi nal Procedure, this Court ha s a dd ressed the meaning of that term in this context and concluded that the statutory provisions “ require some form of an oath, jurat, verification statement, or affid avit. ” See Ruiz v. State , No. 03

- 19

- 00551

- CR, 2021 WL 32338 5 8, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Au stin J uly 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., no t designat ed for publication) (considering multiple dictionary definitions ) ; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 3.01 (noting that terms in Code are “ to b e taken a nd understood in thei r usual acceptation in common lan gua ge, except where speci ally defined ” ) ; Watkins v. State , 619 S.W.3d 265, 272

- 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (explaining that appellate courts may consult dic tionar ies and legal di ctionarie s when attempti n g to determine fair meaning of unde fined terms)

. In this ca se, the motion for continuance la c ked an oath , verification, attached affidavit, jur at , or similar equ ival ent. Cf. Woodman v. State , 491 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref ’ d) (noting that motion f or continuance was written but not

sworn and had no affidavit)

. Inste ad, Jones ’ s attorney si mply signed the motion after reques ti ng10 a continuance and again under the certificate of service. “ [T]here is no statement or jurat declaring that the contents of the motion were subscribed an d sworn to before [a] notary or ma d e under oath or penalty of perjury

. ” Ruiz , 2021 WL 3233858, at *6. “ There is likewise no avowal that the contents of the motion are true. ” Id. Accordingly, Jones failed to preserve the is sue for appellate review.
E ven if the issue had been preserved for appellate considera tion, we would be unable to sustain this issue. “The granting or denying of a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Rent eria v. State , 206 S.W.3d 689, 699 (T e x. Crim. App. 2006) ; see also Tex. C ode Crim. Proc. art. 29. 06(6) (noting that motion for continuance “ shall not be granted as matter of right ” )

. Accordingly, “[w]e review a trial court ’ s ruling on a motion for continuance f or abuse of discretion.” Gall o v. State , 239 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex

. Crim. App. 2007). Under that standard, a trial court ’ s ruling will only be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is so clearly wrong as to lie outside “the zone of reasonable disagreement,” Lopez v. State , 86 S.W.3d 228 , 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), or is “ arbitrary or unreasonable,” State v. Mechler , 153 S.W. 3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Under that standard, appellate courts review the

re cord evidence “in the light most favorable to t he trial court ’ s ruling.” Ex p arte Nelson , 546 S.W.3d 742, 746 (T e x. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). In the circumstances present here, “[t]o establish an abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the defendant was actually prejudiced by the denial of the motion.” S p lawn v. State , 160 S.W.3d 103, 108 ( Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2005, pet. ref ’ d). Actu al prejudice is not shown where the defendant

“ should have anticipated the possibility ” of the claimed su rprise. Vasquez v. State , 67 S.W.3d 229 , 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).11 As set out above, Jones contends t h at the S t ate fail ed to comply with the requi rements of article 39.14 and Brady by failing to timely disclose the record ings. Article 39.14 requires the S t ate “ as soon as practicable ” to “ produce and permit the inspec t ion and the electronic duplication, c o pying, and photographing, by or on behalf of the defendant ” containing

“ evidence material to any matte r involved in the a ction and that are in the possession , custody, or control of the s tate .

. . . ” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(a). Si milarly, Brad y requires the
S t ate to dis c lose evidence that “ is material either to guilt or to punishment. ” 373 U.S. at 87

. Under articl e 39.14, the S t ate is also obligated to “ disclose . . . any exc ulpatory, impeachment, or miti g ating ” evidence “ in the possession , c u stody, or control of the state

. . . . ” Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 39.14 (h) ; se e also W atkins , 619 S.W.3d at 277 (noting that duty to dis close under article 39.14 is b roader than require ments under Brady )

. At the hea r ing, the S t ate explain ed that the exi s tence of the USB drive and a summary of the surveillanc e foot age review ed around the time of the murder were mentioned in

a polic e report from the night of the offense that had been discl osed in discovery , and as noted by the trial court, the police bega n investigating the case three years b efore trial . Further, the S t ate related that Officer Campbell attempted to download all the sur veillance foo tage on to the electronic system used by the San Marcos Polic e Department , that most of the file s were downlo ad e d to that site, and that the entire ty of the files was copied onto the USB drive that was submitted into evidence and included in the list of evidence in the cu stody of the police. Ne xt, the State mentioned that it no tified Jone s that it h ad moved the dr i ve to the pr osecutor ’ s office and that he had not tri ed to look at the drive.
I n light of the prece ding , the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the existence of the d r ive and a summary of its contents had been disclosed to Jones timely , that he12 had been i nformed of the existence and nature of the survei llan ce footage, that he had been given the opportunity to inspect the cont ents of the drive in ad vance of trial , and th at he should have anticipated that the State would seek to have the conten t s of the drive introduced into evidence

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art . 39.14 ; Amoles v. State , No. 05

- 21

- 00556

- CR, 2022 WL 3572691, at *10 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Aug. 19, 2022, no pet. ) (mem . op., not designat ed for pu blication) (concluding that defendant fa i led to demonstrate requisite harm where record shows defense was

aware of information at issue before f iling of motion to dism iss) ; see also State v. Garcia , Nos. 13

- 21

- 0040 4

— 004 05

- CR, 2022 WL 3452413, at *5 (Tex. A pp.

— Corpus Christi

- Edinburg Aug. 18 , 202 2 , no pe t.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining that article 39.14 requires State to provide defendant with open file of every thing in S t ate ’ s possession )

. Inste ad , the trial court elected to exc lude the evidence on the drive, which is t h e

“ sanction that is gene rally accepted as the re medy for violations o f article 39.14

. ” In re State , 605 S.W.3d 721, 726, 727 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, orig. proceeding ) ; see also State v. Heath , 642 S. W.3d 591, 597 (Tex. App.

— W aco 2022 , pet. g r ante d) (determining that trial court did not abuse i ts discretion by exclu ding 911 call not previously produced w hen S t ate was set for t rial without evidence )

. To further aid Jon es and to facilitate the trial giv en the long de lay leading up to it , the tr i al court elected to take the additional step of appointing an other attorney to help Jone s ’ s primary attorney go through the contents of the drive and determine if th ere was any ev idence on the dri ve that could hel p the defense . Although Jones contends th a t this additional remedy was inef fectual by postulat ing that the second attorney was unable to perf orm as good a re view of the evidence as the primary attorney would have done , Jones does not identify how he was a ctually prejudiced by the trial court ’ s ru l in g or what additional material

o r exculpatory evidence the primary attorney would h ave been abl e to discover had he been13 given additional ti me. Cf. Pitman v. State , 372 S.W.3 d 2 61, 268

- 69 (T ex. App.

— Fort Worth
2 012, pet. ref ’ d) (concluding that trial co u rt did not err by denying motion for new trial where defendant failed to identify what undisclos ed evidence was exculpatory or material)

. In fact,
Jones con cedes that he has n o idea if any of the files would have been beneficial to him and that , accordin g ly, this Court could not “ conduct a harmful error analysis ” here. On this record and considering the mitigating measures adopted by the tr ial court,

even if the issue had been preserved, we would be unable to con clude that the trial court abused it s discr e tion by denying Jones ’ s motio n for continuance. Accordingly , we overrule his first issue on ap peal.

Officers ’ Testimony A b out Surveillance Footage
I n his second issue on appeal, Jones contends that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to t h e testimony of Officer Campbell who testified about the contents of some of the surveillance footage fro m The Pointe. W hen presenting this argu ment, Jones again urges that the S t ate violated the requirements o f article 39.14 and Brady by failing to discl o se the
USB drive and that the trial court ’ s decision to appoint an additio nal attorney did no t cure the injury. Next , Jones argues that the trial court then improperly allo wed Officers Campbell and Tankersley to testify about the surveillanc e footage sho w ing the Nissa n Ro gue entering The Pointe complex because , a c cording to him, that contravened t rial court ’ s prior ruling excluding the surveillance footage and because he did not have sufficient notice that the evidence would be allowed in through the offi c ers ’ testimony. In the previous issue, we addressed Jones ’ s arguments regarding article 39 .14, Brady , and re garding the appointment of an additional attorney

. Turning t o the testimony of the14 officers, we r eview a trial court ’ s decision to admit testimo n y from witness es under an abuse

- of

discretion standard even if the State did not comply with discover y requirements

. See Hall

v. State , 283 S.W.3d 137, 164

- 65 (Tex. App.

— Austin 20 09, pet. ref ’ d). Additionally , t o
pr eserve e rror in admitting evidence, “ a party m us t object eac h time the inadmissible evidence is offered o r obtain a running obje ction. An e rror [if any] in the admission of evidence is cured when the same evi dence come s in elsewhere without obje ction. ” L ane v. State , 151 S.W.3d 188,
193 (Tex . Crim . Ap p. 2004) (quoting Valle v. State , 109 S.W.3d 500 , 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). This rule ap plies whether the same evidence was admitted “without objection .

. . before

or after the complained

- of ruling.” Da vis v. State , 614 S.W.3d 223, 2 29 (Tex . App.

— Tex arkana 2020, no pet.) (quoting Lane , 151 S.W.3d at 1 93 ).
Du ring Officer Cam pbell ’ s testi mony, Jones objected after the officer testified that he went to The Pointe to look for surveillance vi deos. In a c onference o utside the presence

o f the ju ry , Jones argu ed that Officer Campbell would only be testifying about footage that had already been excluded by the trial court and that the State was attempting to get around tha t ruling

. In response, the S t ate exp lained that Officer C ampbell ’ s report ex plained th at he

“ review[ed] the video ” and described the content of the footage, and the S tate read from the portio ns of the report describing the Nissan Rogue entering the comple x and desc ribing the driver

. Further , the S t ate noted that the report had be en disclos ed when it gave Jones the “ initial discov ery in this case ” and argued that Jones was awa re that Officer Cam pbell could testify regarding h is observations. After conside ring the part ies ’ arguments, the tria l court denied the ob jection and allowed Officer C ampbel l to testify about the conten ts of the footage that he reviewed. Following the trial court ’ s ruling, Officer Cam pbell testified tha t he reviewed surveillance foot age from The Pointe and observed the Nissan Rogue enter ing the comp lex at15 6:4 9 p.m., no one other than the driver was in the vehicle , and that the driver had tattoos on his arm. In light of th e prece ding, includin g the contents of Officer Ca mpbell ’ s report that had been disclos ed in advance of trial , and given th at the trial cou rt ’ s prior ruling regarding the USB drive excluded only the cont ents of the drive and that the S t a te specifically mentioned during the hear ing on the motio n for contin uance that it planned to call Officer Campbell to discuss his viewing o f the fo o tage , we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Officer Campbell to testify. S ee Hall , 283 S.W.3d at 164

- 65 ; see al so Hines

v. State , No. 14

- 15

- 00325

- CR, 2016 WL 2935636, at * 3 (Te x. App.

— Ho uston [ 14th Dist.] May 17, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publi cation) ( overruling ineffective

assistance claim asserting that trial attorney should have objected to s tore manage r testifying abou t content of surveillance footage )

. In any event, as noted by Jones , Officer T ankersley provided simila r testimony by stating that the Nissan Rogue arri v ed at The P ointe at 6:49 p.m. , that surveillanc e foo tage from The Pointe s howed the Nissan Rogue drivi ng into the complex , and that the dri ve r was an Af rican American man in a yello w shirt wh o matched the de scription of the shooter. No objection was made to th is e vidence. Acc ordingly, any error from the admission of Officer Ca mpbell ’ s testimony was cured by the admission of the same evidenc e without objection. Lane , 151 S.W.3d at 193

. For these reason s, we overrule Jones ’ s second issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION Having overrul ed both of Jones ’ s issues on appeal, we a ffirm the trial court ’ s judg ment of conviction.16 ________________ __________________________ Thomas J. Baker , Justice Before Justices Baker , Trian a, and Smith Affirmed Filed: December 15, 2023 Do Not Pub lish