Dismissed and Opinion Filed April 24, 2014 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00300-CV LANCE ARMSTRONG AND TAILWIND SPORTS CORP., Appellants V. SCA PROMOTIONS, INC., Appellee On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC13-01564


### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices FitzGerald, Fillmore, and Evans Opinion by Justice FitzGerald This is an appeal of an or der denying the motions of Ta ilwind Sports Corp. and Lance Armstrong to stay arbitration proceedings or, alternatively, to vacate the order signed by the arbitration panel in which it concluded it had jurisdiction over the arb itration. Appellee SCA Promotions, Inc. has moved to dismiss the appeal fo r want of jurisdiction. We agree that we lack jurisdiction over this in terlocutory appeal and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.–2– I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL C ONTEXT 1
SCA is a business that underw rites prizes and contests. In exchange for the payment of a fee, it accepts the risk of paying monetary prizes or awards based on a competitor’s performance in an athletic event. Tailwind 2 is a sports management company that served as Armstrong’s management company during certain periods re levant to this dispute. In 2002, SCA and Tailwind’s predecessor in interest entered in to a contract under which SCA indemnified Tailwind’s predecessor in interest for certain incentive compensa tion offered to Armstrong in the event he was named the official winner of th e Tour de France in 2002, 2003, or 2004. A dispute arose concerning SCA’s obligation under the contract, culminating in an arbitration proceeding among Armstrong, Tailwind, and SCA that conc luded with a settlement agreement and arbitration award that became effective in February 2006. On February 7, 2013, SCA Promotions filed suit in the trial court a lleging that Tailwind and Armstrong procured the settlement agreement and resulting final arb itration award by fraud. SCA sought, among other things, to vacate the arbi tration award and settlement agreement, to require Armstrong and Tailwind to disgorge and return the prize money, and to obtain an award of damages and sanctions against Armstrong and Tailwind. Armstrong and Tailwind filed a variety of dispositive motions in the trial court. SCA subse quently moved to reconvene the original arbitration proceeding and requested sanctions and fo rfeiture against Armstrong and Tailwind. Armstrong and Tailwind objected to reconvening the arbitration, arguing the

1 Although Armstrong and Tailwind have moved to consolidate this appeal with their petition for writ of mandamus in a related ca se, In re Tailwind Sports Corp. and Lance Armstrong , No. 05-14-00252-CV, Armstrong and Tailwind object to consideration of SCA’s motion to dismiss the appeal because, despite being well past due, the record has not yet been filed in this appeal. Armstrong and Tailwind have had a full opportunity to brief the jurisdictional issues in this case and ha ve filed an extensive record in the mandamus. The Court take s judicial notice of the mandamus record. In re Estate of York , 934 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of its own records in a case involving the same subject ma tter between the same, or practically the same, parties.”). T he facts recited in this opinion are not dispositive of the merits of the jurisdictiona l issue, but rather merely se rve to elucidate the context in which the actions of the arbitration panel and trial court arose. 2 Tailwind’s directors took action to dissolve the corporation on D ecember 31, 2007. The current corporate status of Tailwind i s not relevant to the jurisdictional issue presented by th e motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.–3– arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction to reconvene the proceedings, but the ar bitration panel, in an order captioned as a “partial final award on juri sdiction” concluded by majority vote it had jurisdiction to proceed. Armstr ong and Tailwind also filed separa te motions in the trial court seeking to stay the reconvened proceedings and to vacate the arbitration panel’s partial final award on jurisdiction. The trial court conducted oral argument and denied the motions filed by Armstrong and Tailwind. 3 Although the trial court’s order doe s not state grounds for its actions, Armstrong and Tailwind argue that th e trial court’s order operates not only as a denial of their motions to stay, but also implicitly confirms the arbitrators’ partial final award on jurisdiction. Neither the arbitration panel nor the trial court ha s taken further action in this case and there is neither a final award on the merits by the arbitrati on panel nor a final judgment in the trial court.
II. J URISDICTION OVER I NTERLOCUTORY A PPEALS Generally, this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Te xas appellate courts have jurisdiction over interlocutory orde rs or judgments only when a st atute permits an interlocutory appeal. Ogletree v. Matthews , 262 S.W.3d 316, 319 n.1 (Tex. 2007); Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson , 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001); Saxa Inc. v. DFD Architecture Inc ., 312 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied). The Court never presumes appellate jurisdiction, Brashear v. Victoria Ga rdens of McKinney, L.L.C. , 302 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.), and has a duty to inquire as to its own juri sdiction even if the parties do not raise the issue. Bank of New York Mellon v. Guzman , 390 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).

3 Armstrong and Tailwind filed a petition for wr it of mandamus challenging the trial cour t’s refusal to stay the arbitration. See In re Tailwind Sports Corp. and Lance Armstrong , No. 05- 14-00252-CV. This Court stayed all proceedings in the arbitration pending determination of the petition for writ of mandamus. Today, by separate opinion and order in the ma ndamus, we have denied the petition for w rit of mandamus and have ordered the stay vacated.–4– III. A PPEAL OF O RDERS D ENYING A RBITRATION Under Texas law, orders denying arbitr ation may be immediately appealed. See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE § 171.098(a)(1) & (2) (West 2011). Ther e is no statutory authority for an interlocutory appeal of an orde r compelling arbitration, however. See In re Gulf Exploration,
LLC , 289 S.W.3d 836, 839–40. (Tex. 2009) (orig. pr oceeding). Tailwind and Armstrong nonetheless argue that this appeal is permissi ble under the Texas Arbitration Act because the appeal from the trial court’s failure to vacate th e partial final award on jurisdiction is an appeal from an order “confirming or denyi ng confirmation of an award.” T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 171.098(a)(3) (West 2011). We need not determine whether the trial court’s failure to grant the motion to vacate operated as an order confirming the partial final award on jurisdiction. As a general matter, an arbitration must be complete before appellate review is appropriate. Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge , 422 S.W.3d 582, 586–87 (Tex. 2012) (dictum extensively discussing Texas Arbitrati on Act in a case involving Federal Arbitration Act); Yaseen Educ. Soc’y v. Islamic Ass’n of Arabi, Ltd. , 406 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2013, no pet.) (“Policies di sfavoring partial re solution by arbitrati on preclude appellate intrusion until the arbitration is complete.”). The circumstances of this case do not warrant departure from the general rule. An appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review an incomplete arbitration award. Yaseen, 406 S.W.3d at 392. On its face, the partial fina l award on jurisdiction signed by the arbitration panel addre sses only the question whet her the arbitration panel has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute between the part ies. It does not finally resolv e any of the ultimate disputes between Armstrong, Tailwind, and SCA. It clearly relates only to the pr eliminary question of arbitrability. It “does not dispose of the substance of the claims.” See Bison Bldg. Materials , 422 S.W.3d at 586–87. Instead the arbitr ation panel must still “complete its fact finding and legal–5– determinations.” Id. The partial final award on jurisdiction “leaves significant factual and legal issues open for further determination and is interlocutory.” Yaseen, 406 S.W.3d at 389.
IV. C ONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court concl udes it lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

140300F.P05 /Kerry P. FitzGerald/ KERRY P. FITZGERALD JUSTICE–6– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

LANCE ARMSTRONG AND TAILWIND SPORTS CORP., Appellants
No. 05-14-00300-CV V. SCA PROMOTIONS, INC., Appellee On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC13-01564. Opinion delivered by Justice FitzGerald. Justices Fillmore and Evans participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opi nion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. It is ORDERED that appellee SCA PROMOTIONS, INC. recover its costs of this appeal from appellants LANCE ARMSTR ONG AND TAILWIND SPORTS CORP.
Judgment entered April 24, 2014

/Kerry P. FitzGerald/ KERRY P. FITZGERALD JUSTICE