Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1406-CR-215 | March 6, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Zachary A. Witte

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indian

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darius T. Fisher,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 6, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1406-CR-215

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court; The Honorable John Surbeck,

Jr., Judge;

02D06-1310-FC-291

May, Judge.
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[1] Darius T. Fisher appeals his convictions of Class C felony aiding robbery1 and 

Class D felony receiving stolen property.2 Fisher argues the evidence was 

insufficient to convict him. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the morning of July 22, 2013, Reggie Greenwell was at Fisher’s house to 

help Fisher and Ashley Beard pack for a move. Before the men left the 

apartment, Greenwell asked Beard for a piece of paper and a pen to write a 

number down. The two men then left in Fisher’s car.

[3] Around 1 p.m., Greenwell entered the Three Rivers Federal Credit Union 

inside a grocery store in Fort Wayne. Greenwell bypassed the customer line 

and handed the teller a note stating the bank was being robbed and demanding 

money. After receiving $7,542.00, Greenwell exited the store with a paper bag 

and ran around the side of the building. A witness heard a car speed away but 

did not see the car. 

[4] Somewhere between “noon [and] one-ish,” Mark Gilliam saw Fisher driving a 

car in which Greenwell was the passenger. (Tr. at 260.) Gilliam, whose wife is 

Beard’s sister, recognized both men. Fisher parked the car on the street, and he 

and Greenwell ran toward Gilliam’s house. Along the way, Greenwell dropped 

some money from the bag he carried. When Greenwell reached the door, he 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (robbery) and Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4 (accomplice liability).

2

Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(b).
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beat on the door of the house “like somebody needed to use the bathroom real 

bad.” (Id. at 245.) Gilliam’s nephew and friend, who were standing by 

Gilliam’s van waiting to leave, tried to help pick up the money but neither 

Greenwell nor Fisher would let anyone touch the money. Fisher approached 

Gilliam, who was standing by his van, and promised to tell him later what was 

happening. At this time, Gilliam heard police sirens and saw police cars 

driving in the direction of the credit union.

[5] Gilliam offered Greenwell and Fisher a ride. The men accepted and sat on the 

floor of the van counting the money from the bag. Greenwell gave Fisher some 

money before the men were dropped off at Fisher’s house together. At Fisher’s 

house, the two men sat on the couch counting money and laughing. The next 

day, Gilliam hosted a cookout where Fisher displayed a large amount of cash. 

Fisher had on new shoes, and he gave new shoes to Gilliam’s family. Gilliam 

thought that was odd because he knew Fisher had been struggling with his 

finances, including having his electricity shut off for lack of payment. Three 

days after the robbery, Fisher and Greenwell took pictures together with large 

sums of money. 

[6] On October 1, 2013, the State charged Fisher with Class C felony aiding 

robbery and Class D felony receiving stolen property. At trial, a jury found 

Fisher guilty of both charges. 
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Discussion and Decision

[7] When reviewing sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we examine 

“only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” 

McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We will not reweigh 

evidence or substitute our judgment for the jury’s judgment. Id. at 127. We 

affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of 

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 

146 (Ind. 2007). It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every 

reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an 

inference reasonably may be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at 147.

1. Aiding Robbery

[8] Fisher argues the State failed to prove he aided Greenwell’s robbery. According 

to the statutory definition of aiding a crime, “a person who knowingly or 

intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense 

commits that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. Fisher contends that because he 

was not present at the robbery he does not meet the factors for determining a 

person aided another in a crime as set out in Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 

431 (Ind. 2003). The Garland factors include: (1) presence at the scene of the 

crime; (2) companionship with another engaged in criminal activity; (3) failure 

to oppose the crime; and (4) a defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the 

crime. We disagree with Fisher’s allegation.
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[9] First, Fisher’s presence at the scene of the crime can be inferred from the facts 

that before the robbery, Greenwell was at Fisher’s house and the two men left 

together, and then after the robbery, the men drove to Gilliam’s house where 

they ran toward the house as Greenwell held a bag of money. Both men 

accepted a ride from Gilliam to Fisher’s house, leaving the car they had driven 

parked on the street. Based on this evidence, it can reasonably be inferred 

Fisher was in the getaway car and was thus present at the scene of the crime.

[10] Second, that same evidence speaks to the companionship between Fisher and 

Greenwell. Greenwell was helping pack for a move at Fisher’s house on the 

day of the robbery, and Greenwell returned to Fisher’s house after the robbery. 

The men also took pictures together with large amounts of money. 

[11] Third, the evidence does not suggest Fisher opposed the crime. He willingly 

took money from Greenwell in Gilliam’s van on the way to Fisher’s house. At 

Fisher’s house, the men counted the money together on the couch while 

laughing. 

[12] Finally, Fisher’s conduct before, during, and after the crime permits an 

inference that he was aiding Greenwell. The men left Fisher’s house together, 

and Fisher was next seen driving Greenwell to Gilliam’s house. Neither man 

would let anyone else touch the money that spilled on the ground from 

Greenwell’s bag. As this occurred, Gilliam could hear police cars heading in 

the direction of the scene of the crime. Once in the van, the men counted the 

money and, at Fisher’s house, they counted the money again while laughing 
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together. The next day, Fisher showed up at Gilliam’s cookout with a large 

amount of money and had purchased shoes for the whole family. Thus, the 

evidence demonstrates each of the factors Garland indicated could be used to 

determine whether a defendant aided another in committing a crime. See 

Garland, 788 N.E.2d at 431.

[13] Fisher also argues his only link to the robbery “was his presence in the van.” 

(Br. of Appellant at 13.) We must decline Fisher’s invitation to reweigh the 

evidence we reviewed above. Rather, the evidence is sufficient to support his 

conviction. See, e.g., Stroud v. State, 450 N.E.2d. 992, 996 (Ind. 1983) 

(accomplice’s participation in robbery was not too insignificant to convict him 

because “it is not necessary that the evidence show that the accomplice 

personally participated in the commission of each element”). 

2. Stolen Property

[14] Fisher further alleges there was no evidence he received stolen property. 

However, Fisher did not provide any argument to support this allegation. Thus, 

the allegation is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(a)(8) (“The argument must 

contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by 

cogent reasoning.”).

[15] Waiver notwithstanding, the evidence supports Fisher’s conviction of receiving 

stolen property. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a) states “a person who knowingly or 

intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person, with 

intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft . 
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. . .” To convict a person of receiving stolen property, “the State must prove the 

defendant had knowledge that the property was stolen.” Johnson v. State, 441 

N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). However, the State may prove the 

defendant’s knowledge that the property was stolen by circumstantial evidence. 

Id. 

[16] Greenwell gave Fisher money in the van immediately following the robbery, 

the next day Fisher’s money problems appeared alleviated, and the State 

presented photographs of Greenwell and Fisher posing together with money 

three days after the robbery. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 643 N.E.2d. 885, 888 (Ind. 

1994) (“Possession of recently stolen property when joined with attempts at 

concealment, evasive or false statements, or an unusual manner of acquisition 

has been held sufficient to support a conviction for Receiving Stolen 

Property.”).

Conclusion

[17] The State presented sufficient evidence that Fisher aided Greenwell in robbing 

Three Rivers Federal Credit Union and that Fisher received some of the money 

that was stolen. Accordingly, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.