NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0759n.06 F iled: October 25, 2007 No. 06-2649 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. RI CKEY MARTI

N, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : MA RTI

N, GI B B ON S, a

nd SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. Rickey Martin cha lleng es hi s criminal-c ontempt conviction and the six- mon th s e nte nc e that w e nt w ithit. We a ff ir m.
I. Rickey Martin pleade d g uilty to w illful de struction of g overnme nt property , see 18 U. S.C. § 1361, a f

te r “ s w in g in g w o o d e nd o o r s s e p ar a ti n g s p e c tato r s f r o m p arti c ip an ts ” in

a f e d era l courtroom a

nd causing damag e. J A 7. He rec eived a six -month sentence , consec utive to his thenpending felon-in- possession sentence , along with a two-y ear term of supe rvised re lease . J ust over tw o y e ars la te r, the dis tr ic t c ourt iss ue d a wa rr ant f or Mart in’ s arr e st ba se d on v iol a tio ns of the te rm s of his supervised r elea se.No. 06-2649

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 2 - At the he ari ng , th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo un d th a t Ma

rt in h a d c omm itt e d “ fl a g ra nt a nd pe rs ist e nt” violations. J A 38. I t note d that he had possessed firea rms on two occa sions, f

ailed t o ap p ea r f

or
a ppoi nt men ts with t

he pr ob a tio n o ff

ic e r, fa ile d to no tif

y the pr ob a tio n o ff

ic e r p ri or to a c ha ng e in residenc e, tested positive for marijuana

use, assoc iated with per sons eng ag ed in cri m i nal drug activity , failed to c ooperate i n a subst ance abuse prog ram—he fell asleep during an intake interview
and mis se d s e ve ra l a

pp oin tme nts —a

nd fa ile d to pay mon e tary pe na lti e s. As the c ourt sp ok e , M a rt in attempted to explain the violations, but h i s at t o rn ey and the c ourt told him t o wait until he was questioned or other

wise g iven an oppor

tunity to speak.
After find i n g t h at Martin had violated the conditions of his supervised re lease , the district court sentenc ed Martin to the statutory maxi mum—a 24-month prison term. JA 111. I n doing so, the cour t noted that it had “conside red the advisory g uideline ra

ng e” of 21 t o 2 4 m o n t h s and the § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s, pa rt ic ula rl y the “ se ri ou sn e ss o f t

he se ri e s o f of

fe ns e s. ” JA 11 2– 13 . “ I t se e ms t o me,” the court t old Martin, “y ou have very littl e respect for y ourself . . . and almost no respec t for other pe ople. I t’s just, it ’s astounding how consistently obstructive y ou’ve been. . . . [Y] ou’re like a child. You’ re like a

six -y ear old child in a five-f

oot-ten-inch body

. . . .” JA 113–14. Ap pa re ntl y of fe nd e d b y the se nte nc e and

the c ourt ’s e xplanatio n f

or it, Mart in s po nta

ne ou sly responde d: “I

do n ’t h ave to sit here and hea r y ou talk to me like this, man.” J A 114. When the court a dvised Martin t h at he wa s require d to list en, Mar tin responded, “ You just sit here and disrespec t me, man. . . . I f y ou’re not happy with y ourself, then don’t be ha ppy with y ourself. D on’t put me down.” JA 114. Attempting to e x plain an episode in w hich he fell aslee p during a tre atmentNo. 06-2649

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 3 - se ssi on , M art in con ti nu e d, “ [Th e tr e a tme nt c ouns e lor ] as ke d me why . . . w a s I

a sle e p. Isa id beca use I was up all night
. . . having sex. He said, do y ou think the Court would object to that. I said how ca

n the Court obje ct to some thing I was doing at home. . . . [T] hey wouldn’t object to y ou h a v i n g s e x w i t h y o u r

w i f e , w o u l d t h e y ? W h a t , y o uw an tm e t o b e g ay ? I a i n ’ tg o tt o b e g ay , d o I ?” JA 1 1 4

– 1 5
. D e s p i t e a

w ar n i n g f r o m h i s a t t o r

n e y , M art i ni n s i s t e d

t h a th e w a s “ no t stop pin g . ” JA 115. “The man’s sitting up he re disre specting me,” Ma rtin added, “He ’s not g oing to disre spect me, man. I ’m not no bitch.” Id.
W i t h that, the court found Martin in c ontempt of court and said it would impose a
consec utiv e s i x -m o n t h sentenc e. I t then g ave Ma rtin’s counsel a

n opportunity

to respond, and
c o u n s e l a s k e d t h a tt h e c o u rtn o ti mp o s e t h e s e n t e n c e . M art i ni n t e r r u p t e d , “ I d o n ’ tw an tn o m e r c y. I ’m g oing to take that six months, baby , and spit it back at him.” JA 116. The court imposed the proposed six-month s en t en ce and noted that Martin had consumed the court’s time, that he had interfe red w ith the court’s ex erc ise of its responsibilities and that five off icer s were acc ompanying Martin—an “ unusual expenditure of Court a nd staff and Marsha ll Ser

vice resour ces.” J A 120. The court issued a

12-pag e opinion and orde r explaining its finding of conte mpt and its sentence. See Fe d. R. Crim. P . 42(b).
II.
We reviewa trial c ourt’s exercise o f i ts summary contempt power

for a buse of discr etion, asking whether

the cour t made “a clea r er ror of judgme nt.” United States v. Me acham , 65 F. App’ xNo. 06-2649

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 4 - 52 9, 53 3– 34 (6 th Cir
. May 15 , 20 03 ). B e c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt ha s a “ un iqu e van tage p oi nt [ ] in these situations,” w e g ive it “ a g reat de al of defe renc e” over when to use the contempt powe r. Id. at 534. A. Rul e 4 2 ( b ) o f

t h e F e d e r a l R

u l e s o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d

u r e s ay s t h a ta

c o u rt“ m ay

s umm a ri ly punish a person w ho commits criminal contempt in its presence if the judg e s aw or hear d the contemptuous conduc t and so ce rtifies.” See also 18 U. S.C. § 40 1( 1)
. Th e c on te mpt po we r “ re sts on the nee d to maintain order and a de liberative atmosphere in the c ourtroom,” Bl oo m v . I lli no is , 391 U.S. 194, 209–10 ( 1968), and should be exercised when “an open, serious threat to orderly proce dure [requires] instant and sum mary punishment
. . . to fill the need for imm ediate penal vindication of the dig nity

of the c ourt,” Harris v. United States , 382 U.S. 162, 165 (1965) (interna l quotation marks omitted). To sustain a summary -conte mpt conviction, we g ener ally require a four -par

t showing: (1) the def endant’ s conduct must constitute “misbehavior,” (2) “ the misbehavior must amo u nt to an obstruction of the a dminist ration of justice,” (3) the conduct must take place in the presence of the court a nd (4) the de fenda

nt must have the “intent to obstruct.” In re Chandler , 906 F.2d 248, 249 (6th Cir. 1990). I n challeng ing his c onviction, Martin complain s o n ly a b o ut t h e s e c o n d e le ment of the off

ense,
c la imi ngthat hi s c on du c t di d n ot p os e a thr e a t to the a dmi nis tr a tio n of jus tic e . I t is tr ue , a s Ma rt in points out, t hat a de fenda nt’s misbehavior “must be an a ctual, not a theor etical obstruc tion” to the administration of justice. Vaughn v. City of Flint , 7 52 F .2 d 1 16 0, 11 68 (6thCir . 1 98 5) ; se e als oNo. 06-2649

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 5 - Craig v. Harney , 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947). At the same time, though, a litigant need not be violent or use phy sical for ce to e x pose himself to contempt, see Vaughn , 752 F.2d at 1168; u n s o l icited objections and repeated i nterruptions by themselves may

suffice , see M

eacham , 65 F. App’ x at 534; Gordon v. United States , 592 F.2d 1215, 1217 ( 1st Cir. 1979) (“ [ T ] h ere is a point at which mere words ar e so o ffe nsive and so unnec essar y that their ver

y utteranc e cr eate s a dela

y which is an obstruction of justice.”)
. Proving the point, we have con cl u d ed that a liti g ant obstructed the administration of justice when he “interje ct[ed] an unsol icited objection to the cour t’s ruling ” and repe atedly interrupted the cour t. Meac ham , 65 F. App’ x at 531, 534 (upholding contempt conviction wh e n , a f t e r t h e c o u rt e xp l a i n e d i t s r e a s o n i n g , t h e d e f e n d an t r e s p o n d e d , “ P e o p l e . . . c o m e to t his courtroom a

nd tell lies. . . . That’s what I know. That’s w hat y ou think otherwise. You sit up there , Imean, you’re God.”)

. Martin’s r ep ea t edi n t erru p t i o n s , o ff en s i v e l an gu age an d

u n s o l i ci t edco m m en t s o b s t ru cted the admi n is tr a ti o no f

ju s ti c e . I np o in t o f

f a c t, M arti n ’ s c o n d

u c t w a s mo r e e g r e g io u s th anth e c o n d uct at issue in Meac ham . H is langua g e wa s mor e of fe ns ive ; he de fi e d re pe a te d wa rn ing s to re ma in q

uie t; he c on su me d a

g re a te r a mou nt o f t he c ourt ’s tim e ; and

he pr omp te d f

ive of fi c e rs to a c c omp any

him
. Under these c ircumstance s, the district court did not abuse its di s cr et i o n in holding that Mar tin’s conduct pose d a re al threat to the administration of justice. Mart in s ug g e sts th a t summa ry pr oc e e din g s are wa

rr ante d o nly

wh e n a de fe nd ant d ir e c ts pr of anit y , v e rb a l th re a ts o r t

hr e a te nin g ph y sic a l g e sture s to the c ourt and that we sh ou ld e xcu se his
c on du c t be c a

us e it w a s “ a dir e c t re sp on se to the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s po int e d a sse ssm e nt o f [h is] ma tur ityNo. 06-2649

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 6 - level.” Br
. at 11. But thi s sug g estion adds a g loss to our interpretation of Rule 42(b) that does not
e xist. As Meac ham shows, even nonpr ofane interru p t i o n s and direct response s to the court’s statements may

pose a thre at to the administration of jus t i ce an d there by war rant summary proce eding s. Meac ham , 65 F . App ’x a t 53 4; se e als o U nit e d S tat es v . G iov an e lli , 897 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1990) (“ [A] judge need not toler ate disre spect or a deliberate show of de fianc e in open court.” ). Martin also ar g ues that the trial judg e should have rec used himself fr om the contempt proce eding
. Whil e the Fe dera l Rules of C riminal Procedur e require a judge to rec use himself fr om
non -summary

contempt proce eding s if the contempt “involves dispespect toward or cr iticism of a jud g e ,” F e d. R. C ri m. P. 42 (a )( 3) , the re is no su c h re qu ir e me nt f or su mma ry c on te mpt pr oc e e din g s,
see F e d. R. C ri m. P
. 42 (b ). No r d id t he jud g e be c ome so “ pe rs on a lly e mbr oil e d” in t

he c on tr ov e rs y that due proc ess re quired re cusal. Ma y be rry v . P e nn sy lv an ia , 400 U.S. 455, 465–66 (1971) ( holding that due-pr ocess pr inciples preve nt a judg e fr om waiting until the end of a trial to re nder a

summary contempt conviction whe n the individual makes “hig hly persona l asper sions” that “ar e apt to strike at the most vulnerable and human qua li t i es of a judg e’s tempe rame nt”) (inter nal quotation marks omi tte d) ; United States v. Me yer , 462 F.2d 827, 840 (D.C. C ir. 1972). Martin’s comments did not amount to personal attacks on the judg e but attac ks on the judge ’s exercise of authority in that case
. An d n o t h i n g i nt h e r ec o rdra i s es “s u ch a li k el i h o o d o f bi as o r an ap p ea ra n ce o f bi as t h at t h e j u d ge
was una ble to hold the balanc e betwe en vind i ca ting the inter ests of the c ourt and the inter ests of [Martin] .” Taylor v. Haye s , 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974) (inter nal quotation marks omitted).No. 06-2649

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 7 - B. Mart in a lso c ha lle ng e s h is s ix-m on th s e ntenc e. Con g re ss h a s a uth or ize d f

e de ra l c ourt s to punish contempt “by

fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discre tion,” 18 U.S.C. § 401, and has not presc ribed a statutory

sentenc ing r ang e, se e Un ite d S tat es v . G old

be rg , 8 F. App’x 391, 393 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2001) ( per c uriam). In the case of a summar y -conte mpt conviction, the rig ht to a jury trial protec ted by

the Six th Amendment limits the per missibl e sente nce t o s i x m o n t hs. See Che ff v. Sc hn ac k e nb e rg , 384 U
. S. 3 7 3 , 3 8 0 ( 1 9 66) (“ [S ]entences e x cee ding six mont hs for c riminal contempt may not be imposed by

fede ral c ourts absent a jury trial or wa iver ther eof.” ); see also Bloom , 391 U.S. at 209–10. Th e se nte nc ingg uid e lin e s d o n ot a pp ly to c on te mpt

c on vi ctions c arr

y ingse nte nc e s o f s ix months or less. See U. S.S. G. § 1B1.9 & cm t. n. 1; In re Solomon , 465 F.3d 114, 119–20 ( 3d Cir. 2 006); Un ite d S

tat es v . O rti

z , 8 4 F
. 3 d 9 7 7 , 9 7 9 ( 7 th Ci r . 1 9 9 6 )
. T h e s e n te n c e ma y acc ount for fac tors such as the ex tent of the de fenda nt’s willful and deliberate def iance , the seriousne ss of the conseque nces, the public interest and de terre nce. Un ite d Stat es v . U nit e d M ineW or k e rs , 3 30 U. S. 25 8, 30 3 ( 19 47 ); Go ldb e rg , 8 F. App’x at 393. “B eca use of the nature of these st an d ar d s , great relianc e must be plac ed upon the discr etion of the trial judg e.” Un ite d M ineW or k e rs , 330 U.S. at 30 3; se e als o G old

be rg , 8 F. App’ x at 393. Th e tr ia l cou rt di d not a

bu se its dis c re tio n in

g ivi ngMa

rt in a six- mon th s e nte nc e fo r h is outbursts. T h e c o u rt c o u l d f a i r l y f i n d t h a tM art i n ’ s b e h a v i o r

w a s “ a g r o s s c o n t e mp to f

c o u rt , ” JA 119, and that he wa s “a f

undamentally

disrespec tful, obstreper ous individual” who “show[ed] veryNo. 06-2649

Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin

- 8 - l i t t l e r ega rdfo r o t h er s an d es p ec i al l y t h o s e i n p o s i t i o n s o f au t h o ri t y , ” J A 1 1 8
. E v en af t er t h e j u d ge offe red Ma

rtin an opportunit y to respond to the sentenc e, Mar tin continued his tirade, “I don’t want
no merc y . I ’m g oing to take that six months, baby , and spit it back at him. . . . Put it on my back, baby . I t’s nothing.” J A 116. The court attempted to interjec t twice, but Martin continued, “I don’t want no mer cy

from y ou, man, not the way y ou just sat here and talked to my self. You don’ t know what my life’s like. You a in’t lived like me. You can’t j ust sit here and dog me be cause of what I ’ve been thr oug h in the past.” J A 116–17. On thi s rec ord, the sente nce did not amount to an a buse of discretion. III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.