NO. 96-109 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1996 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

DOUGLAS LEMIRE, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

1n and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Thomas M. McKittrick, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

John Keith, Attorney at Law, 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, 

John Paulson, Assistant Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

D. Randy Winner, Assistant City Attorney, 

Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: July 11, 1996 

crp 10 1596 Decided: September 10, 1996 

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Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing 

Company. 

The defendant, Douglas Lemire, was convicted in the City Court 

of the City of Great Falls of: (1) failure to identify himself 

after striking an unattended vehicle in violation of § 61-7-106, 

MCA; and (2) failure to obey the basic rule regarding speed 

restrictions in violation of § 61-8-303, MCA. 

He appealed his conviction to the District Court for the 

Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County, and following a nonjury 

trial, was again found guilty and convicted of both charges. 

Lemire appeals the District Court's judgment. We affirm the 

District Court. 

The issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence 

to support the judgment of the District Court. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

At approximately 6 p.m. on February 12, 1995, an orange pickup 

truck crashed into a burgundy Plymouth Voyager van which was 

legally parked at the 900 block of Seventh Avenue North in Great 

Falls. The collision resulted in damages to the van totalling 

$1500. 

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At trial, the State called as witnesses David Morgan and Vena 

Morgan who resided at 922 Seventh Avenue North and heard the impact 

of the collision. Although neither actually witnessed the 

collision, both were able to view the scene of the accident just 

seconds after the impact. Both witnesses testified that an orange 

pickup backed up from the van and proceeded down Seventh Avenue 

North. According to the Morgans, the driver then parked the orange 

pickup, got out, and entered a residence located at 909 Seventh 

Avenue North. Neither witness was able to accurately describe the 

driver of the vehicle. Vena Morgan described the driver as being 

"fairly tall" when, in fact, Lemire is only 5'5" tall. David 

Morgan stated that the driver was wearing "blue jeans" when, in 

fact, Lemire was wearing white pants. Despite these discrepancies, 

both witnesses were certain of the events immediately following the 

collision and the description of the vehicle involved. 

Bill Lahr testified that he lived at 909 Seventh Avenue North 

on the night in question, and that he was a co-worker of Lemire. 

He stated that Lemire had come to his home for a one-half hour 

visit at approximately 6 p.m. on that date. 

Officer Keith Kercher of the Great Falls Police Department 

investigated the collision. He testified regarding the damage done 

to the van and the manner in which the collision occurred. He 

related that after questioning the Morgans and then Lahr, he 

located Lemire's pickup at the Heritage Inn where he worked. The 

officer inspected the pickup, found scratches and flecks of 

maroon-colored paint on the pickup, and determined that the paint 

3 
flecks matched the color of the damaged van. Lemire denied any 

involvement in the collision, but admitted that he owned the orange 

pickup, that he had visited Lahr earlier in the evening, and that 

he was the only person who had driven the orange pickup that 

evening. 

DISCUSSION 

Was there sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the 

District Court? 

When we review the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, 

the standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Statev.Brogan (1993), 261 Mont. 79, 87, 862 P.2d 

19, 24. 

Lemire claims that there was insufficient evidence to support 

his conviction because he was not identified as the driver of the 

offending vehicle. This Court has recognized that an essential 

element of the State's burden of proof in a criminal case is the 

identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. 

Statev.Stringer (1994), 263 Mont. 295, 301, 868 P.2d 588, 591. In 

support of his claim, Lemire points to the lack of eyewitnesses to 

the actual collision; the discrepancies in David Morgan's and Vena 

Morgan's descriptions of the driver when compared to him; the lack 

of significant damage to his pickup, and the failure of Officer 

4 
Kercher to obtain samples of the paint found on Lemire's pickup 

bumper and compare it to the paint on the van. 

However, in Shinger we held that "a state can satisfy its burden 

of proving identity through circumstantial evidence." Stringer, 2 6 3 

Mont. at 301, 868 P.2d at 591. In fact, circumstantial evidence 

may, even by itself, be sufficient to sustain a conviction. state v. 

Bromgard (1993), 261 Mont. 291, 295, 862 P.2d 1140, 1142. 

Furthermore, even where, as in this case, the State's proffered 

evidence contains discrepancies or is met with conflicting evidence 

produced by the defendant, it does not necessarily follow that the 

State's evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. As we 

have recognized, it is within the province of the trier of fact to 

resolve inconsistencies in the circumstantial evidence; and "[wlhen 

circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one 

supporting guilt and the other supporting innocence, the trier of 

fact determines which is most reasonable." Bromgard ,261 Mont. at 

295, 862 P.2d at 1142. 

Ultimately, Lemire's brief does nothing more than ask this 

Court to review the facts of the case and decide that the District 

Court erred in its resolution of the factual issues. That is not 

our role. It is well established that issues of evidentiary weight 

and witness credibility are exclusively within the province of the 

trier of fact and that, when such evidence conflicts, the trier of 

fact must weigh that evidence. Statev. Bower (1992), 254 Mont. 1, 8, 

833 P.2d 1106, 1111. Furthermore, the trier of fact is authorized 

5 
to make reasonable inferences based on the circumstantial facts in 

evidence. Brogan, 261 Mont. at 89, 862 P.2d at 26. 

The evidence presented by the State, along with the 

permissible inferences drawn therefrom, was sufficient to support 

Lemire's conviction. The evidence included: (1) the testimony from 

David Morgan, Vena Morgan, and Bill Lahr; (2) the observations and 

independent investigation made by Officer Kercher; and (3) several 

admissions made by Lemire himself. The District Court noted that 

the Morgans were practically eyewitnesses to the collision, and 

that both watched as a distinctive orange pickup pulled away from 

the damaged van only moments after the collision. The witnesses 

then saw the pickup park near Lahr's residence, and saw the male 

driver emerge from the pickup and enter Lahr's home. Lahr later 

confirmed that such a visit had taken place. Officer Kercher found 

pieces of paint on the bumper of Lemire's pickup that resembled the 

paint on the van. Lemire admitted owning the orange pickup, that 

he had visited Lahr during the time in question, and that he was 

the only person who had driven his orange pickup on that day. 

We hold that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier 

of fact to find the essential elements of the crimes charged beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 

District Court. 

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We concur: