Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1512-MI-2128 | May 4, 2016 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

John Lane-El

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Kyle M. Hunter

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Lane-El,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

State of Indiana, Thor R. Miller, 

Adam Kegg, et al.,

Appellees-Defendants.

May 4, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

33A01-1512-MI-2128

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court.

The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane, 

Judge.

Cause No. 33C02-1505-MI-73

Friedlander, Senior Judge

[1] John Lane-El appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his complaint and 

granting summary judgment in favor of the State of Indiana, Bruce Lemmon, 

the Indiana Parole Board, Thor R. Miller, Virgil R. Madden, Randall P. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1512-MI-2128 | May 4, 2016 Page 2 of 5

Gentry, Charles F. Miller, Frederick A. Medley, and Adam Kegg (the State). 

We affirm.

[2] In 1980, Lane-El pleaded guilty to class B felony robbery. He received a sixyear sentence, to be served consecutively to an additional state court robbery 

conviction for which he received a fifteen-year sentence, Lane v. State, 428 

N.E.2d 28 (Ind. 1981); Lane-El v. State, No. 33A01-1410-MI-451 (Ind. Ct. App. 

June 10, 2015), and a twelve-year sentence that was imposed on a federal 

conviction for robbery. On March 23, 1992, Lane-El was released on parole on 

the six-year sentence. His parole was revoked, however, when he was found 

guilty of rape and criminal confinement on August 25, 1993. His habitual 

offender adjudication was used to enhance his rape conviction resulting in an 

aggregate sentence of fifty years for the rape and criminal confinement 

convictions. The victim of Lane-El’s offenses was his ex-girlfriend, who was 

either thirty-six or forty-two years old at the time of the crimes.

[3] Lane-El was released to mandatory parole on July 26, 2015. He was given the 

general parole stipulations applicable to all parolees, and the Parole Board 

imposed additional stipulations applicable to sex offenders, the terms of which 

are contained in Form 49108, entitled Parole Stipulations For Sex Offenders. 

Appellant’s App. pp. 140-43. The Parole Stipulations For Sex Offenders 

provides in bold print as follows:

NOTE: The Parole Stipulations identified in this document are 

subject to modification (addition of requirements or change of 

existing requirements, based upon changes in information or 
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circumstances). Any modification must be recommended by the 

Parole District to the Indiana Parole Board.

[4] Id. p. 143. Lane-El did not sign the form as required, but was aware of the 

additional stipulations applicable to sex offenders. Id. pp. 117-18.

[5] Of the stipulations imposed on Lane-El, he takes issue with the following five: 

1) the prohibition against residing within 1,000 feet of a school or daycare; 2) 

the prohibition against intentional contact with children or living in a residence 

where children live or are regularly present; 3) the requirement to register as a 

sex offender; 4) the requirement that he participate in the Indiana Sex Offender 

Management and Monitoring Program (INSOMM); and 5) the requirement 

that he permit the placement of a GPS device on his person. 

[6] The Parole Board has an administrative procedure parolees must use to request 

modifications of their parole stipulations. A parolee must submit a request to 

his Parole Agent to have stipulations reduced or removed. Once a parolee 

submits his or her request, the Parole Agent consults with a containment team 

about that request. The containment team, which consists of the parolee’s 

treatment provider, a sex offender therapist or other mental health professional, 

district coordinator, polygraph examiner, or any other person deemed 

appropriate to provide information on the parolee, then makes a 

recommendation as to the request. If a parolee, such as Lane-El, committed his 

sex offense against an adult and wishes to have contact with children, he must 

pass a sexual history polygraph without admissions of sexual interest in 

children, and provide information about his past. The containment team would 
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then assess the parolee’s potential risk to children and make a recommendation 

to the Parole Board. The Parole Board makes the final determination whether 

a parolee’s parole should be modified.

[7] Lane-El did not request a modification of the conditions of his parole. Instead, 

on May 20, 2015, he filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and 

a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, later 

amending the complaint on August 13, 2015. On September 17, 2015, the State 

filed its answer and a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Lane-El’s 

complaint was premature as he had failed to exhaust his available 

administrative remedies prior to filing the complaint. Lane-El filed his 

opposition to the State’s motion. The trial court granted the State’s motion for 

summary judgment and dismissed Lane-El’s amended complaint. Lane-El now 

appeals.

[8] Although the State argues that Lane-El has failed to present cogent argument in 

support of his claims on appeal, we need not decide this appeal on that ground. 

Generally, the failure to present cogent argument operates as a waiver of an 

issue on appeal. Daniels v. State, 515 N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 1987).

[9] This is an appeal from the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion for 

summary judgment. The entry of summary judgment is appropriate only when 

the designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Liggett v. Young, 877 

N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007). All facts and reasonable inferences are construed in 
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favor of the non-moving party. Id. Our appellate review also includes careful 

review to ensure that a party is not improperly denied his or her day in court. 

Id. 

[10] A claimant who has an available administrative remedy must pursue that 

remedy before being allowed access to the courts. Higgason v. Lemmon, 818 

N.E.2d 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. A party’s failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Id. The policy behind this rule avoids premature litigation, permits the 

development of an adequate record for judicial review, and affords agencies the 

opportunity and autonomy to correct their own errors. Id. The uncontroverted 

evidence in this case reflects that Lane-El has failed to exhaust the 

administrative remedies outlined above with respect to modification of his 

parole stipulations. The trial court, therefore, properly granted summary 

judgment for the State on this ground.

[11] Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not address the merits of LaneEl’s claims, as they are prematurely brought on an inadequately developed 

record. 

[12] Judgment affirmed. 

Mathias, J., and Barnes, J., concur.