alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2008197EN.01000902.xml

| 2.8.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 197/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.8.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 197/9

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale della Sicilia (Italy) lodged on 14 May 2008 — Acoset SpA v Conferenza Sindaci e Presidenza Prov.Reg.ATO Idrico Ragusa and Others

(Case C-196/08)

(2008/C 197/14)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale della Sicilia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Acoset SpA

Applicant:

Defendants: Conferenza Sindaci e Presidenza Prov.Reg.ATO Idrico Ragusa and Others

Defendants:

Question referred

Is the model of a semi-public company formed specifically to provide a particular public service of industrial importance and possessing a single corporate purpose, to which that service is awarded directly, the private ‘industrial’ and ‘operational’ participant in the company being selected by means of a public and open procedure, after verification of the financial and technical requirements and of the operating and managerial requirements specific to the service to be performed and the specific services to be provided, consistent with Community law and in particular with the obligations of transparency and free competition referred to in Articles 43, 49 and 86 of the Treaty?

---
Summary of Interagency Working Comments on Draft Language under EO 

12866 and EO 13563 Interagency Review. Subject to Further Policy Review.

EO 12866 Interagency Comments on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) draft final 

rule titled, “Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2014, 2015, and 2016 and 

Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017,” RIN 2060-AS22

 While it would be instructive to show not only the costs but also the potential benefits of the 

standards being finalized and analyzing both will be an important consideration in any future 

reassessment of the RFS program, the short timeframe provided for the annual renewable fuel 

rule process does not allow sufficient time for EPA to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the 

benefits of the 2015 and 2016 standards and the statute does not require it. Moreover, as 

discussed in the final rule establishing the 1.28 billion gallon requirement for BBD in 2013, the 

costs and benefits of the RFS program as a whole are best assessed when the program is fully 

mature in 2022 and beyond.1 We continue to believe that this is the case, as the annual standardsetting process encourages consideration of the program on a piecemeal (i.e., year-to-year) basis, 

which may not reflect the long-term economic effects of the program. Therefore, for the purpose 

of this annual rulemaking, we have not quantified benefits for the 2015 and 2016 final standards. 

We do not have a quantified estimate of the GHG impacts for the single year (e.g., 2015, 2016). 

When the RFS program is fully phased in, the program will result in considerable volumes of 

renewable fuels that will reduce GHG emissions in comparison to the fossil fuels which they 

replace. EPA estimated GHG, energy security, and air quality impacts and benefits for the 2010 

RFS2 final rule for 2022. 

 

1 77 FR 59477, September 27, 2012.

Deleted: understanding 

Deleted: would

Deleted: As mentioned above

Deleted: If, at some point in the future, the agency needs to 

issue a rulemaking to modify the applicable volumes set 

forth in the statute as a result of lowering the applicable 

statutory volumes by at least 20 percent for two consecutive 

years or at least 50 percent for a single year, then the agency

will conduct a comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of the 

revised volumes at that time.
#### Henry SARCOXIE, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A-12861.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Nov. 23, 1960.

*251Elmore Page, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Ted Flanagan, Asst. Co. Atty., Tulsa, for defendant in error.

BRETT, Judge.

Plaintiff in Error, Henry Sarcoxie, defendant below, was charged by information in the Court of Common Pleas in and for 'Tulsa County, Oklahoma, with the offense •of unlawful sale of an alcoholic beverage to wit:

> “21⁄2 pints whiskey to M. K. Quesen-bury, without first having applied for and being issued a license for sale of said beverage by Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.”

He was tried by a jury, convicted, and punishment was fixed at $50.00 fine and 30 ■days in jail. Judgment and sentence was ■entered accordingly from which this appeal has been perfected.

The case was set for oral argument in this court on May 11, 1960; no briefs were filed and no appearance was made, and said ■cause was submitted on the record.

We have carefully examined the record for fundamental error and none appears on the face thereof.

This court has repeatedly held under such conditions the judgment and sentence will be affirmed. Welborn v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 130, 240 P.2d 1130; Sisk v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 229, 261 P.2d 629. The judgment and sentence is accordingly affirmed.

POWELL, P. J., and NIX, J., concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 24, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-51325 Conference Calendar

MACIEL M. ROMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus EL PASO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:04-CV-399

-------------------- Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Maciel M. Roman, federal prisoner # 33878-180, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the El Paso County Detention Center as well as the district court’s dismissal of his motion seeking an order of protection with respect to Bureau of Prison (BOP) officials. The district court dismissed the § 1983 suit on the basis that Roman had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court denied the motion regarding the BOP officials for lack of jurisdiction. Roman’s brief does not address either the district court’sNo. 05-51325 -2- conclusion that Roman did not exhaust his administrative remedies or that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion for an order of protection. Roman addresses only the underlying merits of his claims. Accordingly, he has abandoned the only issues on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Although we construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, even pro se litigants must identify errors and brief the relevant issues. See Yohey , 985 F.2d at 224-25. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as frivolous. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983); 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We caution Roman that if he accumulates three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he will not be able to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
**Exhibit 10.3.1**

 

ASSIGNMENT

 

THIS ASSIGNMENT is made effective July 1,2002, by Wake Forest University, on behalf of Wake Forest University School ofMedicine (“WFU”);

 

WITNESSETH:

 

Whereas, WFU and Advanced Cell Technology,Inc. entered into that Materials Transfer and Research Data License Agreement,effective January 28, 2000, (the “Agreement”); and

 

WHEREAS, WFU desires to assign such Agreementto WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES, a North Carolina non-profitcorporation, (“WFUHS”), which entity is a wholly-controlled subsidiary of WakeForest University;

 

NOW, THEREFORE, WFU hereby takes thefollowing action:

 

1.             WFUhereby assigns all of its rights and obligations under the Agreement, **effective July 1, 2002,** to WAKE FORESTUNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES; and

 

2.             **effectiveJuly 1, 2002,** all paymentsto be made under the Agreement to WFU shall be paid instead to WAKE FORESTUNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES, using Employer Identification Number (“EIN”)22-3849199; and

 

3.             **effective****July 1, 2002,** allnotices to be provided under the agreement to WFU shall be provided instead toWAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES, at the following notice address:

 

Director, Office of Technology AssetManagementWake Forest University Health SciencesMedical Center BoulevardWinston-Salem, NC 27157-1023

 

Wake Forest University

 

 
| By:                                                                | /s/ Spencer K. Lemons |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|
| Spencer K. Lemons  Director  Office of Technology Asset Management |

 

----
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1098 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1098

For the relief of Esidronio Arreola-Saucedo, Maria Elna Cobian Arreola, 
             Nayely Arreola Carlos, and Cindy Jael Arreola.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 27, 2015

Mrs. Feinstein introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
For the relief of Esidronio Arreola-Saucedo, Maria Elna Cobian Arreola, 
             Nayely Arreola Carlos, and Cindy Jael Arreola.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any 
order, for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), Esidronio Arreola-Saucedo, Maria Elna Cobian 
Arreola, Nayely Arreola Carlos, and Cindy Jael Arreola shall be deemed 
to have been lawfully admitted to, and remained in, the United States, 
and shall be eligible for issuance of an immigrant visa or for 
adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1255).
    (b) Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsection (a) shall apply 
only if the applications for issuance of immigrant visas or the 
applications for adjustment of status are filed with appropriate fees 
not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Reduction of Immigrant Visa Numbers.--Upon the granting of 
immigrant visas to Esidronio Arreola-Saucedo, Maria Elna Cobian 
Arreola, Nayely Arreola Carlos, and Cindy Jael Arreola, the Secretary 
of State shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 4, during the 
current or subsequent fiscal year, the total number of immigrant visas 
that are made available to natives of the country of birth of Esidronio 
Arreola-Saucedo, Marina Elna Cobian Arreola, Nayely Arreola Carlos, and 
Cindy Jael Arreola under section 203(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(a)) or, if applicable, the total number 
of immigrant visas that are made available to natives of the country of 
birth of Esidronio Arreola-Saucedo, Maria Elna Cobian Arreola, Nayely 
Arreola Carlos, and Cindy Jael Arreola under section 202(e) of such Act 
(8 U.S.C. 1152(c)).
    (d) PAYGO.--The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 
complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be 
determined by reference to the latest statement titled ``Budgetary 
Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in 
the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget 
Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted prior to the 
vote on passage.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Stephen Simms, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Starkey, J.), rendered October 16, 1989, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and criminal possession of a *145controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the inference of his guilt with regard to his criminal sale of a controlled substance is consistent with, and flows naturally and logically from the facts proved *(see, People v Kennedy,*47 NY2d 196, 202; *People v McLeod,*168 AD2d 461). An undercover officer met an individual on the street and had a conversation related to the subject of controlled substances with him. The individual then brought the undercover officer into a store. The defendant, who was sitting behind a glass partition, spoke with the individual and then told the undercover officer to wait outside. Shortly thereafter, the individual emerged from the store and gave the undercover officer two vials of crack cocaine. The defendant’s conversation with the undercover officer and the individual and the defendant’s behavior displayed the defendant’s familiarity with the situation as well as his desire not to have anyone not making a purchase witness the transaction. Upon the defendant’s arrest, when the police searched the store they recovered a significant sum of money which included two ten-dollar bills which had been previously recorded by the police.

The defendant’s contention that he did not have sufficient dominion and control over the weapon and drugs recovered from the store is unpreserved for appellate review and is, in any event, without merit *(see, People v Winslow,*170 AD2d 553; *People v Dawkins,*136 AD2d 726). The defendant was seen by the undercover officer in the precise area from which the contraband was recovered. When the defendant was arrested he was seen emerging from that same area. Moreover, the defendant was the only person present in the store on both occasions and was alone in the area from which the contraband was recovered and to which the public did not have free access.

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J. R, Eiber, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Elie Marinescu, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Browne, J.), rendered August 30, 1989, convicting him of rape in the third degree (two counts), sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of the crimes charged. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

Although the defendant argues that the testimony of the complaining witness was not credible, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by *142the jury, which saw and heard the witness *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94). The jury’s determination that she was a credible witness should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see, People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88).

The defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in submitting a verdict sheet to the jury. However, he has failed to specify why this was error *(see,*CPL 310.20) and, in any event, he consented to the submission of the verdict sheet. Thus, this contention is unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *cf, People v Nimmons,*72 NY2d 830).

The defendant has also failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel *(see, People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137).

The defendant’s remaining contention has not been preserved for appellate review *(see, People v Alfaro,*66 NY2d 985) and we decline to address it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Bracken, J. P., Eiber, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Harry Reichenbaum, Deceased. Elea*836nor F. Reichenbaum, Appellant; Reichenbaum & Silberstein, P. C., Respondent.

— In a proceeding pursuant to SCPA 2103 to discover property in the possession of the respondent and to compel the respondent to turn such property over to the estate, the petitioner appeals from so much of an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Nassau County (Radigan, S.), dated December 29, 1989, as (1) denied her motion to dismiss the respondent’s first counterclaim, (2) denied her motion for leave to renew a prior motion to dismiss the respondent’s first affirmative defense, and (3) granted the respondent’s cross motion for leave to serve a second amended answer.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs payable out of the estate.

We agree with the Surrogate that summary judgment is not warranted, either with respect to the respondent’s first counterclaim, or with respect to the respondent’s first affirmative defense. There are triable issues of fact which preclude such relief. These issues include whether the decedent and the respondent (a law firm of which the decedent was a member) intended that the payment of the proceeds of a certain life insurance policy would buy out the financial interest of the decedent’s estate in the respondent law firm.

We have examined the petitioner-appellant’s remaining contentions, and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J. P., Fiber, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.
# C_2010234EN.01005602.xml

| 28.8.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 234/56 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.8.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 234/56

---

Judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal (Plenary Formation) of 5 May 2010 — Bouillez and Others v Council

(Case F-53/08) (1)

1

(Staff cases - Officials - Promotion - 2007 promotion procedure - Interest in bringing proceedings - Promotion decision - Liste of promoted officials - Consideration of the comparative merits - Criterion of the level of responsibility held - Application for annulment of the promotion decisions - Balance of interests)

2010/C 234/102

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicants: Vincent Bouillez (Overijse, Belgium) and Others (represented by: S. Orlandi, A. Coolen, J.-N. Louis, E. Marchal, lawyers)

Applicants:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Interveners: Eliza Niniou and Maria-Béatrice Postiglione Branco, residing at Schaerbeek (Belgium) and at Kraainem (Belgium) respectively, (represented by: T. Bontinck and S. Woog initially, and then by T. Bontinck and S. Greco, lawyers)

Interveners:

and

Maria De Jesus Cabrita and Marie-France Liegard, officials of the Council of the European Union, residing in Brussels (Belgium), (represented by: N. Lhoëst initially, then by N. Lhoëst and L. Delhaye, lawyers)

Re:

Re:

Annulment of the decisions of the appointing authority not to promote the applicants to grade AST 7 under the 2007 promotion procedure

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Tribunal:

| 1. | Annuls the decisions by which the Council of the European Union refused to promote Mr Bouillez and Van Neyghem and Ms Wagner-Leclercq to grade AST 7 under the 2007 promotion procedure; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decisions by which the Council of the European Union refused to promote Mr Bouillez and Van Neyghem and Ms Wagner-Leclercq to grade AST 7 under the 2007 promotion procedure;

| 2. | Dismisses the remainder of the claims in the actions brought by Mr Bouillez and Van Neyghem and by Ms Wagner-Leclercq; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the remainder of the claims in the actions brought by Mr Bouillez and Van Neyghem and by Ms Wagner-Leclercq;

| 3. | Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs;

| 4. | Orders the interveners to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders the interveners to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 183, 19.7.2008, p. 35.

1

---
Exhibit 32.1







CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Command Center, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 1, 2011, to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Glenn Welstad, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods covered by the Report.





It is not intended that this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.





Dated:  May 13, 2011






/s/Glen WelstadGlen WelstadChief Executive Officer
#### Michael. J. Prudenti, Respondent, *v.*Catherine L. Nash, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department,

September 25, 1959.

*Terry S. Finch*for appellant.

*Robert Swaybill*and *Benjamin Schwarts*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

The provisions of the Civil Practice Act (§ 1410 *et seq.)*do not authorize the maintenance of summary proceedings against the life tenant herein. *(Matter of Bigelow,*67 Misc. 545; see, also, Real Property Law, § 33.)

The final order should be unanimously reversed upon the law, with $30 costs to the tenant, and petition dismissed, with appropriate costs in the court below.

Concur — Pette, Hart and Brown, JJ.

Final order reversed, etc.