United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-1573

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Lonnie L. Perry

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

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Submitted: November 18, 2022

Filed: March 6, 2023 

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Before BENTON, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Lonnie L. Perry of interference with commerce by robbery, 

possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and 

discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
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§§ 1951 and 924(c)(1)(A). The district court1 sentenced him to 274 months in 

prison. He appeals his conviction. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this 

court affirms.

In October 2017, there was an armed robbery at a Select Mart in Omaha, 

Nebraska. A store employee and a customer witnessed the robbery, and it was 

captured on store security video. The robber left fingerprints on the door.

In November, there was an armed robbery at a VP Racing Station in Omaha. 

Two employees witnessed the robbery, and it was captured on store security video. 

As the robber left, he pulled down his mask, exposing part of his face. He also shot 

at a car trying to flee the scene. The firearm used in both robberies was a Taurus 9 

mm handgun. 

A day after the VP Racing Station robbery, officers responded to a call about 

an armed person at a Runza in Omaha. They arrested Perry near a trashcan with a 

Taurus 9 mm in it. The gun was stolen. DNA analysis found it likely that Perry 

touched the gun. Perry later pled guilty to possessing this gun in state court.

A detective assigned to the Select Mart and VP Racing Station robberies

noticed similarities between them, including similar firearms, similar aggressive 

movements, and similar shoes. This led to further investigation of Perry. DNA 

analysis found that the prints left at the Select Mart robbery matched Perry’s 

fingerprints. Rebecca C. Learned, a forensic examiner with the Omaha Police 

Department, compared a bullet from the VP Racing Station robbery to a test bullet 

from the stolen Taurus 9 mm. She concluded the bullets were fired from the same

gun. 

A jury convicted Perry of the robberies. He appeals.

1

The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Chief Judge, United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska.
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I. 

Perry claims the district court erred by allowing Learned to testify as an expert 

on firearm and bullet identification. This court reviews the admissibility of expert 

testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809, 820 

(8th Cir. 2011). Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, “a witness who is qualified as an expert” 

may testify to “specialized knowledge” that will “help the trier of fact to understand 

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). 

Learned testified that the bullet retrieved from the VP Racing Station robbery

was fired from the same gun seized when Perry was arrested at Runza. Perry argues 

that Learned was “unqualified pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 to offer an opinion” on 

firearms identification because she “has never done any type of firearms ballistic 

training.” 

A witness may be qualified as an expert by “knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Learned has a master’s degree in 

forensic science. She also attended a year-long intensive training program at the 

ATF National Firearms Examiner Academy that included written, oral, and handson experience. At the time of the robberies, she worked in the Omaha Police 

Department crime lab. She had been a forensic examiner for over eight years. She 

testified she had compared a weapon to fired bullets or projectiles “a few dozen 

times.” She also participated in firearms identification and test-firing bullets 

“several dozen times.” 

Perry does not attack the factual basis of Learned’s opinion or argue her 

methodology was faulty or her conclusions incorrect. He argues that this was her 

first time doing “this specific comparison” for a federal court case. But the rejection 

of expert testimony is “the exception rather than the rule.” Robinson v. GEICO

Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2006). See United States v. Finch, 630 

F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2011) (resolving doubts about the usefulness of expert 

testimony in favor of admissibility). Rule 702 is “satisfied where expert testimony 
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advances the trier of fact’s understanding to any degree.” Robinson, 447 F.3d at 

1100. “Gaps in an expert witness’s qualifications or knowledge generally go to the 

weight of the witness’s testimony, not its admissibility.” Id. And the weight given 

to witness testimony is the province of the jury. See Fox v. Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 

1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1990) (“The question of the expert’s credibility and the weight 

to be accorded the expert testimony are ultimately for the trier of fact to determine.”). 

Learned’s degrees and training gave her competence for the subject area of 

her testimony. Robinson, 447 F.3d at 1101. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in allowing her to testify as an expert. See Kozlov v. Associated 

Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 818 F.3d 380, 394 (8th Cir. 2016) (professional registered 

engineer with degrees in civil engineering was qualified as expert in tractor-trailer 

accident case).

II. 

Perry believes there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. This 

court reviews de novo, viewing the evidence most favorably to the verdict, resolving 

all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting all reasonable 

inferences supported by the evidence. United States v. Junge, 807 Fed. Appx. 584, 

585 (8th Cir. 2020). The district court instructed the jury that the elements of the 

crime of “interference with commerce by robbery” in Counts I and III were that: (1) 

Perry knowingly robbed the alleged victim; (2) the robbery involved United States 

currency; (3) the currency was in the “custody or possession” of employees of the 

alleged victim; and (4) Perry’s actions “obstructed, delayed, or affected commerce 

in some way or degree.” 

Perry challenges element 1, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove he 

robbed the Select Mart and the VP Racing Station because no one identified him as 

the robber. But “[c]ourtroom identification is not necessary when the evidence is 

sufficient to permit the inference that the defendant on trial is the person who 

committed the acts charged.” United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir. 
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2008) (cleaned up). The government can satisfy its burden of proof through 

circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Flores, 362 F.3d 1030,1035 (8th Cir. 

2004). This court reverses a conviction, including one based on circumstantial 

evidence, “only if no construction of the evidence exists to support the jury’s 

verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the evidence included video footage and still photos from Select Mart’s

security camera and a detailed account of how investigators found Perry’s 

fingerprints on the store’s door handle. In the VP Racing Station security video, the 

robber pulled down his mask to reveal part of his face. The lead investigator linked 

the two robberies through modus operandi, the firearm used, and the robber’s shoes. 

Additionally, ballistics evidence from the VP Racing Station robbery connected the 

firearm used there to the firearm near Perry when arrested at Runza (and the one he 

later admitted possessing). 

Perry attacks the credibility and reliability of the fingerprint evidence, the 

ballistics evidence from the VP Racing Station robbery, and the DNA evidence 

found on the firearm. But the trial court does not weigh the evidence on a judgment

for acquittal. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (holding the trial 

court is “not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses when it 

judges the merits of a motion for acquittal”). Instead, the “prevailing rule has long 

been that a district judge is to submit a case to the jury if the evidence and inferences 

therefrom most favorable to the prosecution would warrant the jury’s finding the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

Perry also challenges element 4, asserting the government failed to establish 

a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce for the Select Mart robbery because the 

conviction is based on the testimony of two Select Mart employees (who said the 

store sells products from outside Nebraska). Again, this argument asks the district 

court to weigh the credibility of government witnesses, a task barred by precedent. 

See Junge, 807 Fed. Appx. at 585; United States v. Hassan, 844 F.3d 723, 725 (8th 

Cir. 2016) (holding that a district court “must not assess witness credibility or weigh 
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evidence, and the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 

government”). 

The district court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to convict. 

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The judgment is affirmed.

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