1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 08 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r
. Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s 

### JIMENEZ v
. QUAR TE RMAN, DIRECT OR, T E XAS DEPARTM E NT OF C R IMINAL J U STIC E, C O RR EC- TIONALIN STITUTI O NS DIVI SION
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 07–6 98 4. Ar g u ed November4, 2008—Dec ided Jan u a r y13, 2009 Aft e r pet i t i on er’s s t at e convict i on for b u rgla ry b e ca m e fina l on Oct o b e r 11, 19 96, th e sta t e appel l at e c o u r t h e ld i nstate h abe a s pr oc eedin g s that pe titioner had been de nied hi s r i g h t to ap pealan d g r an ted h i m the r i g h t to file an out-of-time appea l

. He filed the app e al, his c o nv ic

t i on wa s a f firm ed, a n d his t i m e for s eeking ce rt iora ri in t h is Cour t ex pir e d on Jan u a r y6, 2004

. Petition erfiled a sec o n d sta t e h abea s applic a t iononDec e mber6, 200 4, wh ic hwas den i ed 35 5 day s la ter , onJu n e 29, 2005. He th enfiled a feder a l h abeas pe tit i o nonJu ly19, 200 5, r e ly in gon28 U. S. C. §224 4(d)(1)(A) to es ta bli s hit s ti melin es s. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that th e one-year limitatio ns period for seeking review under the Antiterro ris m and Effect ive Dea t h Pena lt y Ac t of 1996 (A EDPA) beg i n s on“th e date onwh i c hth e j u dg men tbe

came final by the conclusion of dire ct review or the expiration of the time forseeki n gsuch r e v i ew.” Petitionerar g u ed that his judg ment b e ca m e fina l on J a nua ry 6 , 2 0 0 4 , when t i m e expired for s eeking cer

tiorari review of the decisio nin his out-of-time appeal, and that his Ju ly19, 200 5, petitionwas ti melybe c a u s e th e c a lc u l ationof AEDPA’ s 1-y e arlimit ation per i od ex c l u d es th e 355 d a y s “du r in g which [his] properly file d ap plication for S t ate po st-conviction .

. . re v i ew .
. . [was] pen d in g , ” §2244(d)( 2 ). Th e Distr i c tCou r t disag r eed,
r u lin gth at th e pr operstar t date forc a lc u l atin gAEDPA’ s 1-y e arl i mi

tation s per i od u n d er§2244(d)(1)(A) was Oc tober11, 19 96 , wh enpeti

t i oner’s convic t i on firs t b e cam e fina l. Th e Dis t rictCou r tdis m is s e d the feder a l ha beas peti tion as time b a r r e d. The Fif t h Cir c u it denied petition er ’ s r e qu est fora c e rtific ate of app e alab ili ty

.2 JIM E NEZ v. QUARTERMA N Sy llabu s Held: Wh er e a st ate c o u r t g r an ts a c r i min a l defen d an tt h e r i g h t to fil e

a nout

- of-t im e directa ppea l during s t a t e colla t e ra l review, b u tb e fore the defenda n t ha s firs t s o ught federa l hab e a s relief, his j u dgment is
n o t “fin al” forpu r p oses of §224 4( d)(1)(A) until the co nclusion of the out-of-time d i rect appeal, o rthe expirati on of the ti me for seeking cert iora ri re view of t h a ta ppea l

. This Courtm u s tenforc e pla i n s t at u t o ry la ngua gea ccordin g t oit s t e rm s
. S ee, e.g
. , La miev. United States T r u s te e , 540 U. S. 52 6, 534. Un der§224 4(d)(1)(A)’ s plainlan

guage, o n ce the Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals reopen ed direct re

view of petitio n er’s co nvictio nonSeptemb e r25, 200 2, th e c o nv ic tion was no longer final for §2244(d)(1 )(A) purposes. Rather, the order g r an tin ganou t-of-time app e al r e st ored the pendency of the direct appeal, and p e titioner ’ s c o nv ic tion was ag ainc a pable of modific a tion thr o ugh dir e c tappea lto the st ate c o ur ts a n d to this Cou r t on c e r t io

rari review. Therefore , it was no t u n t il Jan u a r y6, 20 04, wh entime for s eeking ce rt iora ri reviewof t h e decisio nin the out-of-time appeal
ex pir e d, that petitioner ’ s c o nv ic ti on bec a me “final” thr o ug h “the c o n clus ion of dire ctreview o rt h e expi ration of the time for seeking such review” under §2244(d)(1)(A). The Courtrej e ct s res p ondent ’s a r gu ment tha tusi n gthe laterd a te c r e atedbythe s t a t e c o ur t’ s dec i s i on t o reopen direct review, t hus r e s e t t i ng AED PA’s 1-year limita t ions pe

riod, undermi nes the policy of fina lity th a tCongres s es tab l is hed in §224 4(d)(1). S ee Careyv. Sa ffold , 536 U. S. 214, 220. Pp. 5–8. Revers ed a n d rem a nded.

T HOMAS , J

. , de livered the opi n ion forauna nimous Court._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt

NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s
. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 07–6 98 4


### CARL OS JIMENEZ, P E TITION E R v. NAT H ANIEL

QUAR TE R MAN, DIR ECT OR, T E XAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COR R E C TIONALIN STITUTI O NS DIVI SION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [Jan u a r y13, 2009] 

### J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. The Antite rrorism an d Effec t ive Death Penalty Act o f 1996 (AEDPA) establishes a 1-year time limitation for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition. That year runs from the latest of f o ur specified dates. 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1). This case inv o lves the d a te provide dby §2244(d)(1)(A), which is “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or t h e expiration of the time f o r seeking s u ch review. ” Petitioner contends that “the date on which the judgment became final” can be postponed by a st ate court’s deci sion during collateral review to gr ant a defendant the ri ght to file an out-of-time direct appe al. The District Cour t disagreed, holding instead that th e date couldnot be mov e d to reflect the out-of-time appeal, and that petitioner’s federal habeas petition was unti m ely for th at reason. The Unite d States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. See §2 253(c). We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for2 JIM E NEZ v. QUARTERMA N Opinion of theCourt 

### further proc eedings consistent with this opinion. I After petiti oner was sentenced for burglary in 1995, his attorney filed an appellate brief with the Texas Court of Appeals pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U. S. 738 (1967), explaining that he was unable to identify an y nonfrivolou s ground onwhich to base an appeal. 1 

### He left a copy of the brief and a letter (advising petit i oner of his right to file a pro se bri e f as set forth in Anders , id., at 74 4) at the cou n ty jail where he believed petitioner to be.Petitioner, however, had been transferred to a state facility and did not receive the deliver y. The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on September 11, 1996, and served peti tioner withnotice of the dismissal at th e county-jail address that, again, wa s the wrong address. Petitioner eventually learned that his appeal had been dismissed. He filed an application in state cou rt for a writ of habeas corpus purs uant to Tex. Code Cri m . Proc. An n., Art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977), arguing that he wa s denied his right to a meaningful appeal when he was denied the

——————

1 Petition erwas in dic t ed in Au g u st 199 1 forfelon ybu r g lar yof a h abitation , inv i ol ationof Tex

. Pen a l Code An n
. §30.02 (V er n o n1989),
en h a n c ed by a pr iorfelon yc o n v ic tionforag g r av ated ass a u l t with a deadlyweapo nu n d erTex

. Pen a l Code A n n
. §12.42(c ) (Ver n o n1974)

. He entered a plea agreeme n t in whic h he agreed to plead guilty to the b u rgla ry a n dtrue to the enha ncem ent in exchange f o r an order of defer r e d adjudic a tion. In Nov e mber19 91, the tr i a l c o ur t defer r e d adjudication of the burglary convic tion and orderedthat petition er ser v e fiv e y e ars of defer r e d-adju dic a tionpr obation

. InM a r c h1995, th e State moved to revoke pet i tioner’s probation based on four allege d
v i olation s of th e c o n d ition s of h i s pr obation

. At a Nov e mber1995 hear ing , petitioneradmittedto two of the violations. The court then hear d testimo n ywith r e spect to the othert w o v i olations and found that petitionerhadc o mmitted those v i olations as well. The c o ur t r e v o ked petitioner’s d e ferred-adjudication probat ion, adjudicat e d him guilty of th e enh a n c ed bu r g lar y , an d sen t en c e d h i m to a 43-y e arter m of imprisonment.3 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### opportunityto file a pro se brief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and, on September 25, 2002, granted petitioner the right to file an out-of-time appeal: “[Petitioner] is entitled to an ou t-of-time appeal in cause number CR–91 –0528–B in the 119thJudicial District Court of Tom Green County. [Petit ioner] is ordered ret u rned to that point in time at which he may give written notice of appeal so that he may then, with the aid of counsel, obtain a meaningful appeal. For purposes of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, all time limits s hall be calc ulated as ifthe sentence had b een imposed on the da te that the mandate of this Court issues.” Ex parte Jimenez, No. 74,433 (per cu riam ) , App. 26, 27. Petitioner thereafter filed the out-of-time appeal. H i s conviction was affirmed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals de nied discretionary review on October 8, 2003. Time for seeking cert iorari re view of that decision with this Court expired on January 6, 2004. On December 6, 2004, petitioner filed a second application for a writ o f habeas corpus in state court; it was denied on June 29, 2005. Petitioner then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus on July 19, 2005. To establish the timeliness of his petition, he relied on 2 8 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), which provides “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” as the trigger fo r AEDPA’s 1-year limitations peri od. Petitioner argued that his judgment thus became final on January 6, 2004, 2 

### wh en time expired for seeking certiora r i review of the decision in his out-of-time appeal. Until t hat date, petitioner ar

­

——————

2 In the Distr i ct Cour t, petiti oner co ntended that thi s dat e was Janua r y 8 , 2 0 0 4 , butpet i t i oner’s t i m e for s eeking ce rt iora ri review a c t u a lly expired two days earlier.4 JIM E NEZ v. QUARTERMA N Opinion of theCourt 

### gued, direct review of his state-court convic tion was not complete. With Janu ary 6, 2004, as the start date, petitioner contended that his J u ly 19, 2005, petition was tim e ly because the statute excludes from the 1-year limitations period “[t]h e time during which aproperly fi led application for S t ate post-co n viction orother collateral revi ew with respect to the per t inent judgment or cla i m is p e nding.” §224 4(d)(2). Pe titioner had a state h abeas application pending from December 6, 2004, through June 29, 2005, so les s than one year of included time—specifically, 355 days—passed between January 6, 2004 , and July 19, 2005. The District Court dis a greed and dismissed the federal habeas petition as tim e barre d. In the District Court’s view, the pr oper start d a te for AEDPA’s 1-yearlimitations period was October 11, 1996, wh en time for seeking discretionary review of the decision in petitioner’s first direct appeal expired. The District Court concluded that it could not take i n to accoun t the Te xa s court’s l a ter decision reopening petitioner’s direct appeal because Ci rcuit precedent established that “ ‘AEDPA provides for only a linear limitations period, one that st arts and ends on specific dates, with only the possibility that tolling wil lexpand the period in be tween.’ ” Order, Civ. Action No. 6:05–CV–05–C (ND Tex., Oct. 23, 2006), App. 75, 90 (quoting Salinas v. Dre t ke , 354 F. 3d 425, 429 (CA5 2004)). Therefore, the DistrictCo urt reasoned, the limit ations period began o n October 11, 1996, and ended on O ctober 11, 1997, becaus e petitioner had not sought any s t ate or federal collateral review by that date. The Court of Appeals deniedpetitioner’s request for a certificate o f appealability, fi nding that he had “failed to demonstrate that rea s onable jurists would debate th e correctness of the district court’ s conclusion that the §2254 petition is time-barred.” Order, No. 06–11240, (May 2 5 ,5 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### 2007), App. 124, 125. We grante dcertiora r i, 552 U. S. ___ (2008), and now reverse a n d remand for further proceedings. 3 

### II As with an y question of statutor y interpret a tion, our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute

. Lamiev. U n ited States Trustee , 54 0 U. S. 526, 534 (2004). It is well es tablished that, wh en the statutory language is plain, we m u st enforce it accor d ingto its term s. See, e. g. , Doddv. Un ited S t ates , 545 U. S. 353, 359 (2 005); Lamie , supra, at 534; H a rt ford Unde rw rit e rs Ins

. Co. v. Union Plante rs B a nk, N. A. , 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000); Camine ttiv. United Sta t es , 242 U. S. 470, 485 ( 1917).

The parties agree th at th e sta t utory pro v ision that determines the timelin ess of pe titioner’s habeas petition is 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A). That subsection defines the starting da te for pur p oses of the 1-year A E D PAlimitations period as “the d a te on whic h the jud g ment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seek ing such review.” The only disputed question before us is whether th e date on which direct review became “final” under the statute is October 11, 1996, when petitioner’s conviction initially became fin a l,

——————

3 We do not decide whethe r petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appeal abi lity onr e man dbec a u s e we ar e pr esen ted s o lelywithth e Court of Appe als’ decision o nthe timelin ess of the petition under 28 U

. S

. C

. §2 2 44(d). “When t h e di st ri ctcourt denies a habea s petition on procedura lgr o unds without rea c hin g the prisoner’s und erlying constitu tion al c l ai m , ” as h e r e , a cer t ific at e of appealabili ty should issue only when the pri s oner shows both “tha tju r i sts of r e a s o nwould find it debat able wh e t h e rth e petiti onstate s a v a lid c l aim of t h e den i al of a
c o nstitutional r i g h t andt h a tj u r i s t s o f r e a s o nw o u l df i n di td e b a t ab l e whet her t h e dis t rictcourtwa s correctin it s procedura l ruling.” Slack
v. McDa n iel , 529 U. S. 473, 484 (2 000) (e mph a si s adde d). We make n o j u dgm e ntreg a rding t h e m e rit s of pe titi oner ’ s feder a lc o nstitutiona l cla i m s
.6 JIM E NEZ v. QUARTERMA N Opinion of theCourt 

### or January 6, 2004, when the out-of-time ap peal granted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals beca me final. We agree with petitioner that, under the plain m e aning of t h e statutory text, the latte r date contr o ls. Finality is a concept that has been “variously defined; like many legal terms , its precis e meaning depends on context.” Cla yv. United St at es , 53 7 U. S. 522, 527 (2003). But here, the finality of a state-court judg ment is ex

pressly defined by st atute as “the conclusion of direc t review or the expiration of the time for seeking such r e view.” §2244(d)(1)(A). With respect to postco nvicti on relief for federal prisoners, this Court has held that the conclusion of direct re

view occurs when “this Court affir m s a convic tion on the merits on direct review or deni es a petition for a writ of certiorari.” Id., at 527, 528–532 (interpreting §2255, ¶6(1)). We have further held that if the federal prisoner chooses notto seek direct review in this Court, then the conviction becomes fina l when “the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.” Id., at 527. In construing the similar language of §2244( d)(1)(A), we see no rea s on to depart from this settled understanding, which comp orts with t h e most natural reading of the statutory text. See Lawren ce v. Florid a , 549 U. S. 327, 332– 335 (2007) (citing Cl ay , supra, at 5 28, n. 3). As a result , direct review cannot conclude for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A) unti lthe “availability of d i rect appeal to the state courts,” Caspar iv. Bohlen , 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994), and to this Court, La w rence , su pra, at 332–3 33, has b e en exhausted. Until th a t time, the “process of direct re vie w” has not “com[e] to an end” and “a presumption of finality and legality” cann ot yet have “a ttache[d] to the convict i on and sentence,” Bar e footv. Estel l e , 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1 983). Under the statutory definition, therefore, once t h e Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reopen ed direct re view of peti­7 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### tioner’s conviction on September 25, 2002, 4

### petitioner’s conviction was no longer final for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A). Ra ther, the order “granting anout-of-time appeal restore[d] the pendency o f the direct appeal,” Ex parte Torres , 943 S. W. 2d 469, 47 2 (Tex. Cri m . App. 199 7), and petitioner’s conviction was again capable of modifica

tion through direct appeal to the state courts and to this Court on certiorari re view. The r efore, it was not until January 6, 2004, when time for se eking certiorari revie w in this Court expi red, that pe titio n er’s convic tion became “final” thro ugh “the c o nclusion of direct review or th e expiration of the time for seeking such re view” unde r §2244(d)(1)(A).Respondent objects, observing that the Court has previously acknowledged Congress’ intent “to advance th e finality of c r iminal convictions” with the “tigh t time line” of §2244(d)(1)(A), Maylev. Felix , 5 45 U. S. 644, 662 (2005), which “ p inpoint[s]” a uniform federal date of finality th at does not “vary from State to State,” Clay , supra, at 530 , 531. In respondent’s view, perm itting a st ate court t o reopen direct review, and thus reset AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period, undermines the policy of finality that Congress established in §2244(d)(1). But it is the plain language of §2244(d)(1) that pinpoints the uniform date of finality set by Congress. And tha tlanguage points to th e

——————

4 We do not he re decide whether peti tioner could ha ve s o ught timely feder a l h abe as r e lief be tweenOc tober11, 199 7, wh enth e 1-y e arli mit a tion s per i od i n itiallyex pir e d, an d Septe m ber25, 20 02 , wh enth e state courto r dered t h a this directreviewb e reo p ened. We re s u ch apet i t i on timely , thoug h , it would not be thr o ug h applic a t ion o f §22 44(d)(1)(A) b e ca us e we have previous ly held tha tthe pos s i b ility that a sta t e court may reopen direct review “ d oes no t render convictions and sentences tha ta r e no longer s u bj ect to direct revie wnonfina l ,” Beardv. Banks , 542 U. S. 40 6, 412 (2 00 4). We do n o t depar tfr om th at r u le h e r e ; we mer e lyh o ld t h at, wh er e a state c o urt has in fact reopened direct review, t h econvict i onis render ed nonfinal for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A) during the pe nden cy of the reopened appeal.8 JIM E NEZ v. QUARTERMA N Opinion of theCourt 

### conclusion of direct ap pellate proceedings in state court. The statute thus ca rri es out “AEDPA’s goal of promoting ‘comity, finality, and federalism’ by giving sta t e courts ‘th e first opport unity to rev i ew [the ] claim,’ and to ‘correc t ’ an y ‘constitutional violation in the first instance.’ ” Car e yv. Saffold , 536 U. S. 214, 220 (2002 ) (quoting William s v. Taylor , 529 U. S. 420, 436 (2000); O’Sullivan v. Boe rckel , 526 U. S. 838, 844–845 (1999); citation omitted). Th e statute requires a f e deral cou rt, presented with an individual’s first petition for habeas relief, to make use of the date on wh ich the ent i rety of the state dire ct appellat e review proc ess was completed. Here, that date was January 6, 2004. * * * Our decision today is a narro w one. We hold that, where a sta t e court gra n ts a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal during sta t e collateral review, but before the defend ant has first sought federal habeas relief, his judgment is not yet “final” for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A). In such a case, “the date on which the judgment b e came final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such r e view” must reflect the conclusion of the out-of-time direct appeal, or the expiration of the ti me fo r seeking review of that appeal. Because the Court of Appeals denied a certificate of appealabilit y based ona contrary reading of the statute,
we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so orde red.