[Cite as State ex rel. Battin v. Lynch, 2019-Ohio-2457.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State ex rel. James L. Battin, : 

 

 Relator, : 

 No. 18AP-584 

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Judge Julie Marie Lynch, : 

 

 Respondent. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

 

Rendered on June 20, 2019 

 

James L. Battin, pro se. 

 

IN PROHIBITION 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} Relator, James L. Battin, has filed this original action requesting this court 

issue a writ of prohibition on grounds that respondent, the Honorable Julie Marie Lynch, 

a judge of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, did not have jurisdiction to 

proceed in his underlying criminal case. 

{¶ 2} This matter was referred to a magistrate of this court, pursuant to Civ.R. 53 

and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued the 

attached decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended 

this court dismiss relator's complaint for a writ of prohibition. No objections have been 

filed to that decision. However, respondent has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Civ.R. 12(B)(6). 

{¶ 3} As there have been no objections filed to the magistrate's decision, and it 

contains no error of law or other defect on its face, based on an independent review of the 
No. 18AP-584 2

file, this court adopts the magistrate's decision. Therefore, we dismiss relator's complaint 

for a writ of prohibition. Respondent's motion to dismiss is rendered moot. 

Action dismissed. 

SADLER and DORRIAN, JJ., concur. 

_________________ 
No. 18AP-584 3 

APPENDIX 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

The State ex rel. James L. Battin, : 

 

 Relator, : 

v. : No. 18AP-584 

 

Judge Julie Marie Lynch, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Respondent. : 

 

M A G I S T R A T E ' S D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on August 15, 2018

 

James L. Battin, pro se. 

 

IN PROHIBITION 

ON SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL 

{¶ 4} Relator, James L. Battin, has filed this original action requesting this court 

issue a writ of prohibition on grounds that respondent, the Honorable Julie Marie Lynch, 

judge of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, did not have jurisdiction to proceed 

in his underlying criminal case. 

Findings of Fact: 

{¶ 5} 1. Relator is an inmate currently incarcerated at London Correctional 

Institution. 

{¶ 6} 2. Relator was charged with one count of kidnapping and one count of rape 

with the specification that a firearm was used during the commission of those crimes. 

{¶ 7} 3. On March 16, 2015, relator withdrew his previously entered plea of not 

guilty and plead guilty to: 

Count 2: the stipulated lesser included offense of Felonious 

Assault, a violation of 2903.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, a 
No. 18AP-584 4 

felony of the second degree with the three (3) year firearm 

specification. 

{¶ 8} 4. Relator was sentenced as follows: "Four (4) years in the Ohio 

Department of Rehabilitation of Correction plus three (3) years for the firearm 

specification. Total= 7 years in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction." 

{¶ 9} 5. Relator did not file an appeal; however, on September 26, 2017, relator 

filed a motion to vacate conviction, sentence, and dismiss indictment with prejudice. In 

that motion to vacate, relator raised the same issue he raises here: that the trial court 

exceeded its jurisdiction by accepting his plea to the offense of felonious assault when this 

charge was not specified in the indictment. 

{¶ 10} 6. On November 28, 2017, respondent entered its decision and entry 

denying relator's motion finding that the motion was "barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata because the claim was actually raised or could have been raised in the trial court 

or on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction." (Emphasis sic.) 

{¶ 11} 7. On December 27, 2017, relator appealed the decision and entry of the 

trial court denying his motion to vacate. 

{¶ 12} 8. On June 28, 2018, this court affirmed the trial court's decision denying 

relator's petition for postconviction relief. 

{¶ 13} 9. On July 31, 2018, relator filed this prohibition action asserting that 

respondent did not have jurisdiction to find him guilty of felonious assault. 

{¶ 14} 10. At the time he filed this complaint, relator filed an affidavit of 

indigency; however, relator failed to attach thereto a statement of the amount in his 

inmate account for each of the preceding six months as certified by the institutional 

cashier, and a statement of all other cash and things of value that he owns. 

Conclusions of Law: 

{¶ 15} The magistrate recommends that this court dismiss this action because 

relator has failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25(C). 

{¶ 16} In regard to filing fees, R.C. 2969.25(C) and 2969.22 distinguish between 

paying the full amount of filing fees upon filing (referred to as "prepayment" of fees) and 

paying the fees pursuant to periodic deductions from the inmate's account maintained by 
No. 18AP-584 5

the prison.1 Under R.C. 2969.25(C), an inmate who seeks waiver of prepayment on 

grounds of indigency must file an affidavit that includes: (1) a statement of the amount in 

the inmate's account for each of the preceding six months as certified by the institutional 

cashier, and (2) a statement of all other cash and things of value owned by the inmate. 

{¶ 17} Compliance with the provisions of R.C. 2969.25 is mandatory and failure to 

satisfy the statutory requirements is grounds for dismissal of the action. State ex rel. 

Washington v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 87 Ohio St.3d 258 (1999); State ex rel. 

Zanders v. Ohio Parole Bd., 82 Ohio St.3d 421 (1998); State ex rel. Alford v. Winters, 80 

Ohio St.3d 285 (1997). 

{¶ 18} In State ex rel. Pamer v. Collier, 108 Ohio St.3d 492, 2006-Ohio-1507, the 

Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals from Medina 

County which had dismissed the complaint of George D. Pamer, an inmate at Mansfield 

Correctional Institution, for his failure to comply with the requirements of R.C. 

2969.25(C). Specifically, the court stated: 

Pamer's cashier statement did not set forth the account 

balance for the month immediately preceding his mandamus 

complaint - August 2005. See R.C. 2969.25(C)(1), which 

requires an inmate filing a civil action against a government 

employee seeking waiver of prepayment of court filing fees to 

file a "statement that sets forth the balance in the inmate 

account for each of the preceding six months, as certified by 

the institutional cashier." Pamer's failure to comply with R.C. 

2969.25(C)(1) warranted dismissal of the complaint. State ex 

rel. Foster v. Belmont Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 107 Ohio 

St.3d 195, 2005-Ohio-6184, 837 N.E.2d 777, ¶ 5. 

In addition, nothing in R.C. 2969.25 required the court of 

appeals to afford Pamer the opportunity to pay the requisite 

filing fee before dismissing the case when Pamer expressly 

requested waiver of prepayment of those fees. 

Finally, because Pamer did not prevail and did not establish 

his indigency, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion 

in ordering him to pay the costs of the proceeding. See State 

ex rel. Frailey v. Wolfe (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 320, 321, 750 

N.E.2d 164; Civ.R. 54(D). 

Id. at ¶ 5-7. 

 

1Under the statute, when the inmate has submitted the requisite affidavit of indigency, the clerk charges 

the inmate's account for funds in excess of ten dollars. Following that payment, all income in the inmate's 

account (excluding the ten dollars) is forwarded to the clerk each month until the fees are paid. 
No. 18AP-584 6

{¶ 19} Likewise, in State ex rel. Ridenour v. Brunsman, 117 Ohio St.3d 260, 2008-

Ohio-854, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ross County Court of Appeals 

which had dismissed the complaint filed by William L. Ridenour because of his failure to 

comply with R.C. 2969.25(C). In that case, Ridenour had filed a motion for 

reconsideration attaching a statement setting forth his inmate account balance for the six 

months preceding the filing of his complaint; however, the statement was not certified by 

the institutional cashier. 

 In affirming the judgment of the appellate court, the Supreme Court stated: 

"The requirements of R.C. 2969.25 are mandatory, and 

failure to comply with them subjects an inmate's action to 

dismissal." State ex rel. White v. Bechtel, 99 Ohio St.3d 11, 

2003-Ohio-2262, 788 N.E.2d 634, ¶ 5. Ridenour failed to 

comply with R.C. 2969.25(C)(1), which requires an inmate 

filing a civil action against a government employee seeking 

waiver of prepayment of court filing fees to file with the 

complaint a "statement that sets forth the balance in the 

inmate account of the inmate for each of the preceding six 

months, as certified by the institutional cashier." 

Moreover, although Ridenour claims that the court erred in 

failing to grant him leave to amend his complaint to comply 

with R.C. 2969.25(C)(1), he never filed a motion to amend 

his complaint. Instead, he filed a motion for reconsideration, 

which was "a nullity because his mandamus action was filed 

originally in the court of appeals, rendering App.R. 26(A) 

inapplicable." State ex rel. Washington v. Crush, 106 Ohio 

St.3d 60, 2005-Ohio-3675, 831 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 5. 

Id. at ¶ 5-6. 

{¶ 20} Pursuant to the above-cited authority and because relator cannot cure this 

deficiency now or at a later date, it is the magistrate's decision that this court should 

dismiss relator's complaint. Further, pursuant to the above-cited authority, inasmuch as 

relator did not prevail and did not establish indigency, this court should order relator to 

pay the costs of the proceedings. And finally, as respondent determined when denying 

relator's motion to vacate, this is an issue which relator raised or could have raised on 

appeal. Having failed to do so, relator cannot raise that issue now. Perry. 

 /S/ MAGISTRATE 

 STEPHANIE BISCA 
No. 18AP-584 7

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as 

error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or 

legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a 

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects 

to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(b).