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. e du/thir dc ir c uit_1996/103UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 95-5648 and 95-5666

HOVSONS, INC.;

JOHN DOES

v.

TOWNSHIP OF BRICK, a Municipal Corporation in Oc ean County;

ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP O F BRICK

Hovsons, Inc., Appellant No. 95-56 48

Township of Brick, Appellant No. 95-56 66

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 94-cv-04265)

Argued June 3, 1996 BEFORE: COWEN, NYGAARD and LEWIS Circuit Judges

(Filed July 18, l996)

Beth Pepper (argued)
Stein & Schonfeld 520 West Fayette Street The Maryland Bar Center Baltimore, Maryland 21201

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
Hovsons, Inc.

Thomas E. Monahan (argued)
Charles W. Hutchinson
Gilmore & Monahan

Ten Allen Street
P.O. Box 1540 Toms River, New Jersey 08754

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT Township of Brick, a Municipal Corporation in Ocean CountySally P. Dunaway

American Association of
Retired Persons 601 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20049

American Association of
Retired Persons Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648

Andrew D. Levy Brown, Goldstein & Levy 520 West Fayette Street
Suite 300 Baltimore, Maryland 21201

The National Association of Social Workers, Inc. Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648 Amicus-appellee, No. 95-5666

American Seniors Housing Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648 Amicus-appellee, No. 95-5666

The National Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Reform Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648 Amicus-appellee, No. 95-5666

The National Senior Citizens

Law Center Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648 Amicus-appellee, No. 95-5666

OPINION OF THE COURT

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

In this case we must decide whether the To wnship of Brick's refusal to grant a variance to Hovsons, Inc . ("Hovsons") to build a nursing home in the Township's R-R-2 zon e, an area the district court found to be predominantly residentia l, violates the mandate of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1 988 ("FHAA"),
42 U.S.C.  3601 et seq., that all municipalities provide "reasonable accommodations" to handicapped persons. Id.  3604(f)(3)(B). The district court rejected Hovsons ' FHAA claims and denied its request for declaratory and injuncti ve relief.
We conclude that the accommodation Hovsons has putforward would not impose an undue financial or admi nistrative

burden upon Brick Township. Nor would building a n ursing home in the R-R-2 zone fundamentally undermine the Township 's zoning scheme. We therefore hold that the finding of the district court that the Township complied with the FHAA's "reasona ble accommodations" provision cannot stand. Accordingl y, we will reverse the August 16, 1995 order of the district c ourt and remand with instructions to enjoin the Township of Brick from interfering with Hovsons' plans to construct the nu rsing home facility that the State of New Jersey authorized it to build in Brick Township.

I.

A. Hovsons is a developer of nursing homes an d other forms of senior citizen housing, such as adult retirement communities. Hovcare of Brick, Inc., a corporation affiliated wi th Hovsons, owns a 32.73-acre parcel of land on the Brick Towns hip-Lakewood Township border in New Jersey. Hovsons has propose d to build a nursing home facility on that parcel. Approximatel y twenty-two (21.96) of the acres are located in Brick Township; the remaining (10.77) acres are in Lakewood Township. Hovsons' developmental plan calls for site construction only on the Brick Township portion of the property. Brick Township h as steadfastly opposed the construction of such a development with in the R-R-2

zone. The nursing home facility Hovsons has envi sioned is intended for persons who will require some form of nursing care
for the rest of their lives. Referred to as "Holid ay Village," it would have the capacity to house 210 residents. The density, architecture and design features of the proposed de velopment are comparable to that of the surrounding planned retir ement communities in Brick Township. The structure and i ts associated parking and access facilities would cover six to se ven acres. The remaining land area would consist of open space s, landscaped areas and preserved tree buffers. Under New Jersey law, nursing homes may no t be built unless the need for a home within the applicable he alth service area is established through a certificate of need p rocess. SeeN.J. Stat.

Ann.  26:2H-7-:2H-8. On December 2, 1989, the New Jersey Department of Health approved Hovsons' appli cation for a
certificate of need which authorized construction o f a 150-bed nursing home in Brick Township. Hovsons' certifica te was amended on August 12, 1991 to increase the authorized numbe r of beds from
150 to 210. In its August 12, 1991, approval letter to Hovsons authorizing this sixty-bed increase, the New Jersey Department of Health cited the acute need for nursing home facili ties in Brick Township. New Jersey Commissioner of Health France s J. Dunston declared that building another nursing home in Bric k Township would "help to maintain balance in the distribution of long-term care beds throughout Ocean County, thereby promotin g geographical access to care for area residents. Brick Township has approximately 6.7 long-term care beds per 1,000 pop ulation,compared to the County average of 12 beds per 1,000 population."

App. at 26. In addition, the State prioritized Hovs ons' application on account of its agreement to have Med icaid-eligible patients comprise no less than fifty-five percent o f its patient population. Brick Township is divided into a total of twenty-three zoning districts comprised of fifteen residential z ones, seven business/office zones and one hospital support zone . Nursing
homes are excluded from all fifteen residential zon es. Hovsons has proposed to construct Holiday Village in Brick Township's RR-2 or "Rural Residential-Adult Community Zone." I d. at 242. The district court found that the R-R-2 zone is "pr imarily, although not exclusively, for residential use," and that this region was zoned by community planners with the int ention of "minimiz[ing] traffic" and bringing about an enviro nment that was both "quiet" and "seclu[ded]." Hovsons, Inc. v. To wnship of Brick, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 1, 5 (D.N.J. Aug. 1 6, 1995). In the R-R-2 zone, Brick Township permits the followin g land uses as of right and without conditions: (1) customary and conventional farming activities; (2) one-family dwellings; (3) public schools and accredited private schools; (4) munici pal parks, playgrounds and other municipally owned facilities; and (5) planned residential retirement communities. The Brick Township R-R-2 zone also allows for a number of conditional uses, including: (1) public utiliti es installations; (2) hospitals; (3) public and quas i-public philanthropic and charitable uses; (4) quasi-publi c buildings and recreation areas; (5) golf courses; (6) singl e-family residential dwellings with a maximum density of 1.5 dwelling units per acre; (7) single-family residential dwel lings with open space; and (8) churches, parish houses, conve nts and cemeteries. The only area in Brick Township where nursing homes can be constructed is the hospital support zone. O ther permitted uses in the hospital support zone are doctors' offi ces, clinics, emergency treatment facilities, pharmacies, retail establishments for the sale of medical and surgical supplies, mote ls and hospitals. The hospital support zone is commercial in nature. No single or multiple-family residences may be buil t in this area without first obtaining a variance. Brick Township's hospital support zone has already been developed extensively. Less than thirty undevelope d acres remain. The remaining vacant land consists of smal l, noncontiguous, separately owned parcels, the larges t site being 8.6 acres. The record is unclear as to whether any of the undeveloped land in the hospital support zone is cu rrently on the market or otherwise available for purchase.

B. In 1990, Hovsons applied for a variance to the Brick Township Zoning Board of Adjustment ("Zoning Board" ), to build a nursing home in the R-R-2 zone. Hovsons' applicati on was debated extensively (a total of seventeen public hearings w ere conducted over a two-year period) and was ultimately denied i n April of
1992. Hovsons challenged the denial of the varia nce by filinga lawsuit against the Zoning Board in the New Jerse y Superior

Court, Law Division. On February 5, 1993, the Law Division reversed the denial of Hovsons' application and rem anded the matter to the Zoning Board for reconsideration. Ap proximately two months later, the Zoning Board again denied Hov sons' application. Hovsons appealed the second denial to the New Jersey Law Division, which issued an order on April 16, 1993, directing that the use variance be issued. On Marc h 30, 1994, the New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the Law Division and reinstated the Zoning Board's denial. Hovsons file d a petition for certification with the New Jersey Supreme Court , which was denied on July 15, 1994. Hovsons, Inc. v. Zoning B d. of Adjustment of Brick Township, 645 A.2d 142 (N.J. 19 94). On September 6, 1994, Hovsons filed suit i n the United
States District Court for the District of New Jerse y against the Township of Brick and the Zoning Board. Hovsons al leged, inter alia, that the defendants had violated the FHAA. H ovsons maintained that the Township and its Zoning Board h ad discriminated against handicapped persons by denyin g its application for a variance to construct a nursing h ome in the RR-2 zone. Specifically, Hovsons contended that the defendants'
actions amounted to intentional discrimination and that the Brick Township zoning ordinance had a disparate impact up on handicapped persons. Hovsons further asserted that the defenda nts had refused to comply with the FHAA's requirement that they provide "reasonable accommodations" to handicapped persons. Hovsons sought both declaratory and injunc tive relief to prevent the Township of Brick and its Zoning Boa rd from interfering with its plans to build a nursing home in the R-R-2 zone. The defendants responded to Hovsons' allegat ions by filing motions for summary judgment. On June 27, 1995, th e district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Zoni ng Board. The
district court ruled that the federal claims Hovson s had brought against the Zoning Board could have been raised and litigated in previous state court proceedings and were therefore barred under the entire controversy doctrine. The district cour t also
dismissed Hovsons' intentional discrimination claim against Brick Township, finding that its zoning ordinance was fac ially valid and rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Hovsons has not appealed the dismissal of these cla ims, nor was the entire controversy issue raised on appeal. The district court did find, however, that there were material factual issues in dispute regarding Hovson s' disparate impact and reasonable accommodation claims against the Township
of Brick. The district court further held that the nursing home Hovsons has proposed to build should be classified as a "dwelling" under the FHAA because it would be a hom e to its prospective residents. Accordingly, the Township's motion for summary judgment on these issues was denied and the case was set
for trial. A one-day bench trial was held on July 12, 1995. On August 16, 1995, the district court issued its find ings of fact and conclusions of law. The court rejected Hovsons ' disparate impact argument, reasoning that Hovsons had failed to establishthat handicapped persons were more adversely impact ed by the

zoning ordinance than people without disabilities. Furthermore, the district court held that Brick Township was not in violation of the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the FHAA. The district court opined that  3604(f)(3)(B) does not require municipalities "to disregard their own zoning requi rements in order to provide sufficient opportunities and accommodations for the disabled." Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 6 . In so holding, the court relied upon the fact that Brick Township permitted the construction of nursing homes in anot her area of the Township. Moreover, the nursing home would, in the district court's view, be inconsistent with the residential character of the R-R-2 zone and would not adequately "service th e immediate surrounding community." Id. at 5. Hovsons now appeals the judgment of the di strict court rejecting its "reasonable accommodations" and dispa rate impact FHAA claims. The Township of Brick has cross-appea led the district court ruling that the proposed nursing hom e is a "dwelling" within the meaning of the FHAA.

II. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
1331 and 42 U.S.C.  3613. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C.  1291. We "exercise[] plenary review over question s of statutory construction." United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1205, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991).
A number of our sister circuits have held "that in enacting the anti-discrimination provisions of the FHAA, Congress
relied on the standard of reasonable accommodation developed
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 , codified at
29 U.S.C.  794." Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328
, 334 (2d Cir. 1995). Accord United States v. Califo rnia Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416-17 (9t h Cir. 1994) (same); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylo r, Michigan, 13 F.3d 920, 930 (6th Cir. 1993). As it is support ed by the legislative history of the FHAA, we also adopt this view. SeeH.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 198 8 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2186 & n.66 ("The concept of `re asonable accommodation' has a long history in regulations an d case law dealing with discrimination on the basis of handica p.") (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 3 97, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979) (Rehabilitation Act case)); see also B ryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 911 F. Supp. 918, 940 (D. Md. 1996) ("In light of the references to Davis in the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act, the co urts have uniformly concluded that the standards for `reasona ble accommodations' developed under  504 of the Rehabilitation Act also apply to  3604(f)(3)(B)."). In Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsyl vania, 926 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1991), a Rehabilitation Act case , we held that a district court's determination as to whether a pr oposed accommodation is "reasonable" is a question of fact . Id. at 1386. Therefore, we would ordinarily review the fi nding of thedistrict court that the accommodation Hovsons proff ered was

unreasonable under the "clearly erroneous" standard . "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals is `left with a definite and f irm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.'" Oberti v. Boa rd of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 122 0 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Our review of the factua l findings of
the district court is confined to "whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support those findings." Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1988). Hovsons argues that the district court app lied the wrong legal standard when it placed the burden upon the plaintiff to establish that its requested modification was re asonable under the FHAA. We exercise plenary review over the ques tion of whether the district court applied an incorrect leg al standard. See Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F. 3d 1503, 1511 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct . 1920 (1995).

III. The Township of Brick contends that this c ase should not be considered under the FHAA because nursing ho mes are not "dwellings" as defined in the Act. Hovsons maintai ns that the district court erred in finding that Brick Township complied with the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the FH AA. We will
address these issues in turn.

A. Section 3604 of the FHAA proscribes discri mination "in the sale or rental" of "a dwelling." 42 U.S.C.  3604(f)(1). The FHAA defines the term "dwelling" as any building, structure, or portion thereo f which is occupied as, or designated or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land whic h
is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any su ch building, structure, or portion thereof.

42 U.S.C.  3602(b) (emphasis added). We addressed the issue of what constitutes a "dwelling" under the FHAA in Uni ted States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1205, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). One of the issues in Columbus Country Club was whether bungalows inhabited by club members during the summ er months were "dwellings" within the meaning of  3602(b). The Country Club argued that they were not. Focusing upon what Cong ress intended the word "residence" to mean, we rejected this argu ment. We observed that "[a]lthough the meaning of the term ` residence' is central to understanding [the definition of dwellin g], the Act provides no statutory definition of that term." Id . at 881. Applying a plain meaning analysis, the court looked to the
definition of "residence" in Webster's Third New In ternational Dictionary, which defines it as "a temporary or per manent dwelling place, abode or habitation to which one in tends to return as distinguished from the place of temporary sojourn ortransient visit." Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 881

(citation omitted). This led us to hold "that the central inquiry is whether the defendant's annual members i ntend to remain in the bungalows for any significant period of time and whether they view their bungalows as a place to ret urn to." Id. We observed that since "annual members may spend up to five months in their bungalows," they were "not `me re transients.'" Id. Furthermore, there was "no indi cation in the statutory language that Congress intended to limit coverage of the Act to year-round places of abode . . . ." Id. The court also noted that if we were to adopt the Country Clu b's argument, this "would create a broad exception to the Act" th at, followed to its logical conclusion, could be interpreted to allow residents in a private development of summer homes to exclude members of minority groups from owning, renting or occupying summer homes without violating the FHAA, a result t hat Congress
could not have intended. Id. We therefore held th at the summer bungalows fell "within the ordinary meaning of `res idence' and must be considered dwellings for purposes of the Fa ir Housing

Act." Id. The Township of Brick's argument that the proposed nursing home is not a "dwelling" under the FHAA is similarly without merit. To the handicapped elderly persons who would reside there, Holiday Village would be their home, very often for
the rest of their lives. We therefore hold that th e proposed nursing home is a "dwelling" within the meaning of  3602(b). See United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 7 64 F. Supp. 220 (D.P.R. 1991) (applying FHAA to case challengin g the closure of a nursing home). We therefore will affirm the j udgment of the district court to the extent it held that the propo sed nursing home is a "dwelling," as that term is defined by th e FHAA.

B.
1. Section 3604(f)(1) of the FHAA provides th at it is

unlawful

[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, o r to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwel ling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of--

(A) that buyer or renter,

(B) a person residing in or intendin g to reside in that dwelling after it has been sold, r ented, or made available; or

(C) any person associated with that buyer or

renter.

42 U.S.C.  3604(f)(1). Section 3604(f)(3)(B) further provide s that "[f]or the purposes of this subsection, discri mination
includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable accommo dations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opport unity to useand enjoy a dwelling[.]" Id.  3604(f)(3)(B).

Hovsons argues that the district court err ed when it placed the burden upon the plaintiff to establish t hat the accommodation that it requested was "reasonable" un der the FHAA. See Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 4. We agree. Our precedents interpreting  504 of the Rehabilitation Act have held that the burden of proving that a proposed accommod ation is not
reasonable rests with the defendant. See Juvelis v . Snider, 68 F.3d 648, 653 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Nathanson v. M edical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991) . As we have already held that courts must look to the body of l aw developed

under  504 of the Rehabilitation Act as an interpretative guide to the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the FHAA, we further hold that the burden should have been place d upon the Township of Brick to prove that it was either unabl e to
accommodate Hovsons or that the accommodation Hovso ns proposed was unreasonable. We now turn to the question of w hether there is a sufficient foundation in the record to support the factual finding of the district court that Brick Township c omplied with the FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" provision.
2.
The conclusion of the district court that the Township
of Brick satisfied the FHAA's mandate that "reasona ble accommodations" be provided to handicapped persons was clear error. Brick Township does not permit the construc tion of nursing homes in any of its residential areas. The Township
nonetheless contends that the authorization for nur sing home construction within its hospital support zone, an a rea zoned for hospitals and other medical support facilities, suf fices to satisfy its legal obligation to handicapped persons . We disagree. The reasoning and analysis of the district court evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the inten t of Congress in enacting the FHAA. The district court's stateme nt that the FHAA "does not ask [municipalities] to disregard th eir own zoning requirements in order to provide sufficient accommo dations for
the disabled" runs counter to the entire thrust of the FHAA. Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 6. The Township of Brick's blanket exclusion of nursing homes from its residen tial areas in general, and its refusal to permit the construction of the specific facility in question, is precisely the sor t of isolation of handicapped persons from the mainstream of socie ty that the FHAA was enacted to forbid. Furthermore, there is a dearth of evidence in the record to support Brick Township's sweeping claim as to the fundamental incompatibility of nursing ho mes and residential areas in general and the R-R-2 zone in particular. A review of the record, case law interpret ing the meaning of "reasonable accommodations" and the legi slative history of the FHAA leads us to conclude that the T ownship of Brick failed to satisfy the requirements of  3604(f)(3)(B) as a matter of law. Although the district court applied the incorrect legal standard, we need not remand for further proc eedings. There was a full hearing on the merits in the distr ict court during which each side presented expert testimony o n the issue ofthe compatibility of a nursing home with the other uses in the RR-2 zone, and the record is critically deficient of evidence that would support a ruling in Brick Township's favor. We therefore conclude that it is appropriate to direct entry of judgment in

favor of Hovsons. See Rohm and Haas Co. v Adco Che m. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 433 (3d Cir. 1982) (directing that judgme nt be entered in favor of plaintiff when adverse result in distri ct court was premised upon the application of an incorrect legal standard); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. McCabe, 593 F.2d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 1979) (remand unnecessary despite application of the incorrect legal standard "because the evidence on t he record compel[led] the result"). The FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" pro vision prohibits the enforcement of "zoning ordinances and local housing policies in a manner that denies people with disabi lities access to housing on par with that of those who are not di sabled." Laurie C. Malkin, Troubles at the Doorstep: The Fa ir Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Group Homes for Recoveri ng Substance Abusers, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 757, 804 (1995) (herein after Fair Housing Amendments Act). Pursuant to  3604(f)(3)(B), the Township of Brick has "an affirmative duty" to make reasonable accommodations on behalf of handicapped persons. U nited States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F .3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994). See Juvelis, 68 F.3d at 653 ("  504 requires some affirmative steps to accommodate handicapped p ersons."). "The reasonable accommodation inquiry is h ighly factspecific, requiring a case-by-case determination." California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d at 1418. AccordNathanson, 926 F.2d at 1385. As in Rehabilitation Act cases, we must view the reasonable accommodations requirement "in light of two countervailing legislative concerns: (1) effec tuation of the statute's objectives of assisting the handicapped; and (2) the need to impose reasonable boundaries in accomplishi ng this purpose." Americans Disabled For Accessible Pub. T ransp. (ADAPT) v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 1989) (in banc). We keep in mind the principle that satisfaction of the FHAA's reasonable accommodation requirement "can and often will involve some costs." Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F. 3d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1995). "Courts interpreting the reasonable accomm odation provision of the Fair Housing Act have ruled that m unicipalities . . . must change, waive, or make exceptions in the ir zoning rules to afford people with disabilities the same o pportunity to housing as those who are without disabilities." Ho rizon House Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Sou thampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (collecting c ases), aff'd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993) (Table). To establish that the accommodation proffered by Hovsons was not reasonab le, the Township of Brick was required to prove that it cou ld not have granted the variance "without imposing undue financ ial and administrative burdens," Southeastern Community Col lege v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2370 (1979), imp osing an "undue hardship" upon the Township, Nathanson, 926 F.3d at 1383, or requiring "a fundamental alteration in the natur e of theprogram . . . ." Davis, 442 U.S. at 410, 99 S. Ct. at 2369. SeeAlexander

v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300, 105 S. Ct. 712, 719-2 0 (1985). We conclude that the Township of Brick has failed to make such a showing. We acknowledge that precisely what the "re asonable accommodations" standard requires is not a model of clarity. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1015 (3d Cir. 1995); ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1193 (acknowledging "[t] he difficulty in determining precisely the extent of accommodatio n mandated by section 504"); O'Neal v. Alabama Dep't of Pub. Hea lth, 826 F. Supp. 1368, 1376 (M.D. Ala. 1993) ("As centuries of jurisprudence have taught us, the word `reasonable' is subject to a wide variety of interpretations."). As one court has ob served, "[t]he FHAA imposes an affirmative duty to reasonably acco mmodate handicapped persons. However, because the precise obligations encompassed by this duty are ambiguous, many courts have looked to the legislative history of the Act for guidance. " United States v. City of Taylor, Michigan, 872 F. Supp. 42 3, 436 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (citation omitted). We will also look to the legislative history of the FHAA to clarify the mean ing of its "reasonable accommodations" requirement in the pres ent factual setting. We have previously emphasized that the ena ctment of the FHAA was "a clear pronouncement of a national commi tment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream." Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 333 n.14 (3d Cir.) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179), cert. d enied, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995). The House Report further states tha t the FHAA "is intended to prohibit the application of special req uirements through land-use regulations . . . that have the ef fect of limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the residence of their choice in the community." H.R. Rep. No. 7 11, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185 (emphasis added). Moreover, the FHAA was intended to "require that changes be made to . . . traditional rules or practices if necessary to permit a person with handicaps an equa l opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." Id. at 2186. In light of these Congressional pronouncem ents regarding the purpose and scope of the FHAA, it was clear error
for the district court to conclude that Hovsons' re quest for a variance could not be accommodated. Granting a var iance to Hovsons would not have saddled the Township of Bric k with "undue financial and administrative burdens," or otherwis e resulted in the imposition of an "undue hardship." On the cont rary, the proprietors of Holiday Village will become taxpayin g members of the local community. Furthermore, the district cou rt acknowledged the "considerable efforts [Hovsons has made] to work with the township in order to make the site feasibl e . . . ." Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 5. Holiday Villa ge intends to manage its own affairs with a minimum of local gove rnmental involvement. Hovsons has agreed to have Holiday Vi llage arrange for its own garbage collection, street maintenance and snow removal. The nursing home would rely upon the muni cipal fire,police and emergency services, but its use of these services

would be no different from that of the surrounding retirement developments. The mere fact that the employees and residents of Holiday Village will at times require the assistanc e of the local police and other emergency services does not rise t o the level of imposing a cognizable administrative and financial burden upon the community. Nor would granting a variance to Hovsons f undamentally undermine the Brick Township zoning scheme. The Su preme Court has observed that, in broad general terms, the purp ose of zoning law is "to prevent problems caused by the `pig in t he parlor instead of the barnyard.'" City of Edmonds v. Oxfo rd House, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1781 (199 5) (quoting Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 388, 47 S. Ct. 114, 118 (1926)). As the record makes cl ear, however, permitting the construction of a nursing home in th e R-R-2 zone would cause no such problems. We reject the Township of Brick's contenti on that nursing homes are fundamentally incompatible with t he other permitted uses in the R-R-2 zone. Brick Township a ppears to rely upon the blanket proposition that nursing homes are clearly out of place in residential zones. This is precisely t he type of land use planning that the FHAA was enacted to prev ent and, if necessary, overrule. Furthermore, the design const ruction of Holiday Village is similar to that of the local pla nned residential retirement communities, a permitted use in the R-R-2 zone. As both of these types of facilities cater t o the elderly, Holiday Village could provide a useful resource to members of the
local retirement communities who do not want to loc ate in a new area, but who are no longer able to care for themse lves. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circ uit has observed, "the handicapped may have little choice b ut to live in a commercial home if they desire to live in a resid ential neighborhood. To provide the handicapped with equa l housing opportunities, the City must make the necessary `re asonable accommodations.'" Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. Cit y of Taylor, Michigan, 13 F.3d 920, 930 (6th Cir. 1993). We hol d that under the facts in this case,  3604(f)(3)(B) requires that the Township of Brick permit Hovsons to proceed with it s plans to build a nursing home in its R-R-2 zone. This resul t is consistent with "the broad remedial intent of Congr ess embodied in the [Fair Housing] Act." Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1982). See C ity of Edmonds, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1780 (notin g the Fair Housing Act's "`broad and inclusive' compass, and t herefore according a `generous construction' to the Act's co mplaint-filing provision") (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Li fe Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212, 93 S. Ct. 364, 367, 368 (19 72)); see also Fair Housing Amendments Act, supra, at 763 ("T he scope of the statute is sweeping, not only in the broad prot ections it affords, but also in the limited exceptions it allo ws."). It is uncontroverted that the Township of Brick has a substantial interest in enforcing its zoning code a nd that, under appropriate circumstances, local zoning codes are e ntitled to aconsiderable amount of deference. See, e.g., Villa ge of Belle

Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1 540 (1974); Doe v. City of Butler, Pennsylvania, 892 F.2d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 1989). We are also mindful of the fact that "[i]n requiring reasonable accommodation, . . . Congress surely did not mandate a blanket waiver of all facially neutral zoning polic ies and rules, regardless of the facts." Oxford House, Inc. v. Ci ty of Virginia Beach, Virginia, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1261 (E.D. Va. 1993). Nor did Congress intend to "give handicapped persons ca rte blanche to determine where and how they would live regardless of zoning ordinances to contrary." Thornton v. City of Alleg an, 863 F. Supp. 504, 510 (W.D. Mich. 1993). Nonetheless, the FHAA's promise that "reasonable accommodations" be provide d to handicapped persons would be an empty one indeed if Brick Township were permitted to do nothing to accommodat e the elderly disabled who are in need of nursing home care and d esire to live in one of the Township's residential zones. The House Report to the FHAA expressly sta tes that the Act "is intended to prohibit . . . [the imposition of] terms or conditions . . . which have the effect of excluding

. . . congregate living arrangements for persons with han dicaps." H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted i n 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184. As one court has explaine d, "strict adherence to a rule which has the effect of preclud ing handicapped individuals from residing in the reside nce [of their choice] was precisely the type of conduct which the Fair Housing Amendments Act sought to overcome with the enactmen t of  3604(f)(3)(B)." United States v. Village of Marsha ll, Wisconsin, 787 F. Supp. 872, 879 (W.D. Wis. 1991).

IV. We will reverse the August 16, 1995 order of the
district court and remand this matter with instruct ions to enjoin the Township of Brick from interfering with the con struction of the nursing home facility under the terms, conditio ns and specifications agreed to by the State of New Jersey

.