alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Antoinette Farone, Plaintiff, *v.*Nino Bianchi, Defendant.

County Court, Schenectady County,

September 18, 1959.

*133
      *Frank N. Parisi*for defendant.

*William A. Cremo*for plaintiff.

Archibald C. Wemple, J.

On the argument the defendant’s counsel contended: 1) that the amended complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; 2) that the County Court did not have jurisdiction because the complaint demanded an accounting in equity; and 3) that the essence of the action was based upon a breach of promise to marry.

The plaintiff on the other hand contended that the action was predicated alternatively on fraud, conversion or breach of an agency contract.

The motion is addressed to the pleading, which, in this case, is the summons and the amended complaint. The court, therefore, must examine the complaint itself and determine whether or not: 1) the complaint does state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and 2) whether the cause of action is within the jurisdicton of this court.

In its examination, the court must give every fair inference and intendment in favor of the sufficiency of the pleading (see *Connelly*v. *Department of Agriculture & Markets,*162 Misc. 73 and other cases cited under *“*Construction ” in the annotations under rule 106). In short, the defect, if any, must appear on the face of the complaint in order to warrant a dismissal under rule 106 of the Buies of Civil Practice. This court finds that the plaintiff has a first cause of action in her sufficiently stated cause of action in fraud, as well as a second cause of action predicated on conversion, and a third cause of action based upon an alleged breach of contract.

A liberal construction of the complaint leads one to the conclusion that the plaintiff has informed the defendant of her various contentions in the three various causes of action set forth in the complaint. Certainly the defendant can determine the issues he must meet and put in his defense both in pleading and upon the trial. On the second point, as to the claim that the action is founded in equity, while the demand clearly asks for an *“*accounting ” the basic demand asks for the return of a definite sum of money rather than a complicated accounting which would be contemplated in an equitable cause of action.

The amount involved is within the jurisdiction of the County Court and therefore proper.

The motion to dismiss is denied. Enter order accordingly.
EXHIBIT
      32.2





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
      THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I,
      Brad
      E. Herr, Chief Financial Officer of Command Center, Inc. (the "Company") do
      hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
      knowledge:





This
      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended March
      30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "report"),
      fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and





The
      information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:  May
      12,
      2008





/s/Brad
                E. HerrBrad
                E. HerrChief
                Financial Officer
#### In the Matter of We Restaurant, Inc., Petitioner, v New York State Liquor Authority, Respondent.

— Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent New York State Liquor Authority, dated December 8, 1989, which revoked the petitioner’s liquor license and imposed a $1,000 bond forfeiture.

Adjudged that the petition is granted, on the law, without costs or disbursements, to the extent that the penalty imposed is annulled, the proceeding is otherwise dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the respondent New York State Liquor Authority for the imposition of a new penalty not to exceed (1) a $1,000 bond forfeiture, and (2) a suspension of the petitioner’s liquor license for not more than 60 days.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contentions, there was substantial evidence supporting the respondent’s determination (1) that alcoholic beverages were served to a person under the *166age of 21 years old, and (2) that the petitioner allowed the premises to become disorderly by permitting or suffering the use of marihuana on the premises. There was substantial evidence supporting the respondent’s finding that the petitioner failed to provide adequate supervision at its establishment. Significantly, we have held that a licensee "may be charged with the knowledge it would have obtained through the exercise of reasonable diligence in supervising the licensed premises” *(Matter of Mack Conroy, Inc. v Duffy,*155 AD2d 665, 665-666; *Matter of P.M. Entertainment Indus, v State Liq. Auth.,*114 AD2d 457, 458-459, *affd*67 NY2d 834).

While the petitioner takes issue with the testimony of several witnesses who appeared on the respondent’s behalf, the Administrative Law Judge, having seen and heard the witnesses testify, was in the best position to assess their credibility, and we see no reason to disturb that determination on the record before us *(see, e.g., Matter of CBH Pioneer Enters. v New York State Liq. Auth.,*172 AD2d 520).

We find, however, that the penalty was so excessive that, under the circumstances, the penalty must be annulled and the matter remitted to the respondent for imposition of a new penalty not to exceed a 60-day suspension of the petitioner’s license and a $1,000 bond forfeiture *(see, Matter of CBH Pioneer Enters. v New York State Liq. Auth., supra).*Kooper, J. P., Sullivan, Lawrence and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 116 (Wednesday, August 1, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5630]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

           By Mr. DEUTCH:
       H.R. 6259.
       Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the US Constitution
       The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
     Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
     State by the Legislature thereof; but Congress may at any 
     time make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place 
     of chusing Senators.
```
#### Roscoe WILLIAMS, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A-12819.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

March 2, 1960.

*518Geo. W. Gay, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

POWELL, Presiding Judge.

Roscoe Williams was charged by information filed in the district court of Oklahoma County with the crime of “operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, after former conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor”. He was tried before a jury and convicted, not of the felony charge, but of a misdemeanor. The verdict reads:

> “We, the jury, empaneled and sworn in the above entitled case, do upon our oaths find the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and leave the punishment therefor to be assessed by the court.”

The court ordered that the defendant pay a fine of $25 and be imprisoned in the county jail for a period of nine months, and pay certain court costs.

In many cases reaching this Court on appeal the juries have often in the face of overwhelming evidence failed to find accused persons guilty of a prior offense, which if they did, compelled a conviction for a felony, rather than a misdemeanor.

But in the within case appellant insists that there is involved a stipulation, wherein admissions of the accused compelled conviction of the felony charge, or nothing. Appellant counsel did not try the case.

The Attorney General has filed herein his motion to dismiss the appeal, insisting that this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal, pointing out that the conviction being for a misdemeanor, based on the jury failing to believe the evidence that there had been a prior conviction, that it was necessary that any appeal should be lodged in the Court of Criminal Appeals within 60 days from date of sentence, which was March 20, 1959, un*519less the court should before the expiration of said 60 days grant an additional period of 60 days. The record discloses that actually the court granted the defendant 30 days in which to make and serve casemade, but made no order extending time in which to perfect the appeal until June 30, 1959. The appeal was not lodged in this court until September 3, 1959, which was more than six weeks after the expiration of the maximum time allowed for an appeal in a misdemeanor case.1 See 22 O.S.1951 § 1054, 12 O.S.1951 § 958.

We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that this Court does not have jurisdiction, and the appeal must be, and is dismissed.

NIX and BRETT, JJ., concur.

1

.If the record could be considered as a transcript, defendant’s propositions could not be considered, as a stipulation involving evidential matters, necessary for treatment of the propositions raised form no part of a transcript. 22 O.S.1951 § 977 defines what constitutes the record.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2009-0288

Directorate Identifier: 2008NM214AD

737-57-1293 IN 01 --- 2/25/09

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
<PAGE>   1


                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.17




                              RETAINER AGREEMENT




      ANTEC Corporation (together with its subsidiaries, "Client") and
      James E. Knox ("Attorney") hereby agree as follows:


      1.  Attorney has been serving since early 1996 and will continue to serve
      as the General Counsel and Assistant Secretary or Secretary of Client and
      has provided and will continue to provide such services as shall be 
      reasonably be required in these capacities.  Client acknowledges that 
      Attorney has been and will continue to be employed in a legal capacity by
      others.  Any material increase in these other responsibilities shall not 
      be undertaken without notice to Client.


      2.  Attorney acknowledges that he has been paid in full for his services
      for Client through 1996.  For services beginning January 1, 1997 Client
      will pay Attorney a base fee of $27,850 a calendar quarter at the
      beginning of each calendar quarter.  Attorney will be given an
      opportunity similar to that provided senior officers of Client to earn a
      bonus fee of up to 75% of the base fee, with a target of 50% of that fee. 
      Client will reimburse Attorney for all reasonable expenses incurred in
      the performance of this Agreement subject to the provision of
      documentation required by Client for such reimbursement.  Such    
      reimbursement shall not include use of Attorney's automobile in the
      Chicago area (other than third party parking charges) or any other form of
      transportation between Attorney's home or office and Client's offices in 
      the Chicago area.


      3.  Client will insure Attorney against or hold Attorney harmless from
      any past or future liabilities under this Agreement, including liability
      to Client arising from Attorney's reckless or negligent acts or omissions
      or malpractice.


      4.  Either party may terminate this Agreement at any time for any reason
      by giving the other party at least 30 days advance notice. Upon such 
      termination any unearned fees will be returned by Attorney to Client.


      Dated this 17th day of March, 1997.





      ANTEC Corporation

      by /s/ Lawrence A. Margolis         /s/ James E. Knox
         ------------------------         -----------------
             Lawrence A. Margolis             James E. Knox
## Cause #: 2014

- 63727 Court # 11TH Judgment Date: 12/8/2014

Volume: Page: Image #: 63464872

Due Date: 2/6/2015 Attorney Bar No: 2 (PRO SE)

Assigned to FIRST Court of Appeals

Date Findings of Facts/Mtn of Modify/Mtn New Trial filed? N/A

Request for Tra nscript Filed? NON E BC

Notice of Appeal previously filed ? N C

Number of Days: 60 OA

File Ordered:

Notes:

BC Notice of Appeal filed

BG Notice o f Appeal filed

– Government

C Appealing Final Judgment

D

- Accelerated Appeal

OA No Clerk’s Record Request fil ed

O

– Clerk’s Record Request filed (w/Notice of Appeal)**JUFC7 (NSK#) JUSTICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DEC 29, 2014(C1)**

**INT6510 CIVIL CASE INTAKE OPT: _____**

**- INT** 

**GENERAL PARTY INQUIRY PAGE: 1**

**- 1** 

**CASE NUM: 201463727__ PJN> __ TRANS NUM: _________ CURRENT COURT: 11 PUB? _**

**CASE TYPE: OTHER CIVIL CASE STATUS: DISPOSED (FINAL)**

**STYLE: MAXUS E NERGY CORPORATION VS BROWSERWEB MEDIA AGENCY** 

**=============================================================================**

****** INACTIVE PARTIES ******

**PJN PER/CONN COC BAR PERSON NAME PTY ASSOC. ATTY** 

**NUM NUMBER STAT**

**_ 00003**

**- 0001 AGT BROWSERWEB MEDIA AGENCY BY SER** 

**_ 00002**

**- 0001 DEF BROWS**  **ERWEB MEDIA AGENCY PRO**

**- SE** 

**_ 00001**

**- 0001 PLT 24076086 MAXUS ENERGY CORPORATION BIRELEY, JOHN** 

**==> (3) CONNECTION(S) FOUND**

**1=ACTIVE 2=ATY. INQ. 3=ACT.ENTRY 4=ISS. SERV. 5=DOC. I NQ.** 

**6=CASE INQ. 7=BACKWARD 8=FORWARD 9=PTY. ADDR. 10=REFRESH 11=HELP**

**JUFC7 (NSK#) JUSTICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DEC 29, 2014 (C1)** 

**INT6510 CIVIL CASE INTAKE OPT: _____**

**- INT** 

**GENERAL PARTY INQUIRY PAGE: 1**

**- 1** 

**CASE NUM: 201463727__ PJN> __ TRANS NUM: _________ CURRENT COURT: 11 PUB? _**

**CASE TYPE: OTHER CIVIL CASE STATUS: DISPOSED (FINAL)**

**STYLE: MAXUS ENERGY CORPORATION VS BROWSERWEB MEDIA AGENCY**

**========== ===================================================================** 

****** ACTIVE PARTIES ******

**PJN PER/CONN COC BAR PERSON NAME PTY ASSOC. ATTY**

**NUM NUMBER STAT** 

**==> (0) CONNECTION(S) FOUND**

**1=INACTIVE 2=ATY. INQ. 3=ACT.ENTRY 4=ISS. SERV. 5=DOC. INQ.**

**6=CASE INQ. 7=BACKWARD 8=FORWARD 9=PTY. ADDR. 10=R EFRESH 11=HELP**
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

EDITH ROMAN,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 13

- 00066

- CR

Appeal from the

Municipal Court of Appeals

of El Paso, Texas

(TC# 12

- MCA

- 3603A)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. This decision shall be certified

below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 5TH DAY OF MARCH, 2014.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
#### John C. Viscardi, Appellant, v Carmela Viscardi, Respondent.

— In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff husband appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Smith, J.), dated October 17, 1989, which, after a hearing, (1) granted the defendant wife’s motion to hold him in contempt for his willful failure to comply with a prior order of the same court, dated May 16, 1989, which awarded the defendant wife maintenance and child support pendente lite, and (2) directed that the appellant be incarcerated for a period of 30 days unless he paid arrears of $7,450.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

We find that, under the circumstances, the court did not err in finding the plaintiff in contempt. Lawrence, J. P., Fiber, Balletta and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-01-1996
<CASH>                                           4,944
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      244
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (43)
<INVENTORY>                                        928
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 6,931
<PP&E>                                           3,046
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,671
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   8,726
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,576
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      9,903
<COMMON>                                        48,784
<OTHER-SE>                                    (51,609)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     8,726
<SALES>                                            421
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   421
<CGS>                                            2,310
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,310
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 7,081
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 304
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (14,348)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (14,348)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (14,348)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.71)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.71)
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 113 (Thursday, July 26, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5327]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

           By Mr. GARAMENDI:
       H.R. 6217.
       Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       Article 1, Section 8
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Thomas King, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Brill, J.), rendered December 12, 1989, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We disagree with the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor injected the issue of her own credibility into the trial when she questioned a defense witness as to whether he had told her about threats made to him while he was in jail. Inasmuch as the witness agreed with virtually every question the prosecutor posed, and the prosecutor never disputed the witness’s recollection, the prosecutor’s credibility never became an issue at trial (see *generally, People v Paperno,*54 NY2d 294, 300; *cf, People v Bailey,*58 NY2d 272, 274; *People v Blake,*139 AD2d 110).

We also reject the defendant’s argument that the court should have issued a limiting instruction regarding the evidence of those threats. It is settled that testimony that a defendant has threatened a witness is admissible on the ground that it " 'has some tendency to prove a consciousness of guilt’ ” *(People v Whaley,*144 AD2d 510; *see, People v Griffin,*126 AD2d 743, 744). Where the threats are not attributable to the defendant, the court must instruct the jury that such evidence is admissible only to demonstrate the witness’s state of mind or to explain prior inconsistent statements *(see, People v Rivera,*160 AD2d 267, 271). In the instant case, however, the record plainly supports the conclusion that the threats were attributable to the defendant. Accordingly, any limiting instruction was unnecessary.

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental *pro se*brief, and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4449 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4449

To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located 
at 200 West 2nd Street in Dayton, Ohio, as the ``Walter H. Rice Federal 
                Building and United States Courthouse''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 16, 2017

  Mr. Turner introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located 
at 200 West 2nd Street in Dayton, Ohio, as the ``Walter H. Rice Federal 
                Building and United States Courthouse''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The Federal building and United States courthouse located at 200 
West 2nd Street in Dayton, Ohio, shall be known and designated as the 
``Walter H. Rice Federal Building and United States Courthouse''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the Federal building and United States 
courthouse referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference 
to the ``Walter H. Rice Federal Building and United States 
Courthouse''.
                                 <all>
```
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

July Term 2014

C.C-R., the mother,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES,

Appellee.

No. 4D14-403

[July 16, 2014]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; Larry Schack, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562011DP145.

Ana Gomez-Mallada, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Karla Perkins, Appellate Counsel, Department of Children & Families, 

Miami, for appellee.

Laura E. Lawson, Sanford, for Guardian Ad Litem Program.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See In re: S.V.B., 93 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

GROSS, GERBER and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.