IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1270

Filed May 1, 2019

CLARENCE G. BRYANT,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Lucy J. Gamon, 

Judge.

Clarence Bryant appeals the denial of his motion to strike court costs. 

AFFIRMED.

Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
2

DOYLE, Judge.

Clarence Bryant appeals the denial of his motion to strike court costs. The 

sole issue presented on appeal is whether the clerk of court may impose a filing 

fee on applications for postconviction relief (PCR) filed under Iowa Code chapter 

822 (2018). Bryant argued it was improper for the clerk of court to assess a filing 

fee on his PCR application because the plain language of section 822.2(1) states 

that a person may institute a PCR action “without paying a filing fee.” The district 

court denied the motion pursuant to Iowa Code section 610A.1(1), which states 

that

if the person bringing a civil action or appeal is an inmate of an 

institution or facility under the control of the department of corrections 

or a prisoner of a county or municipal jail or detention facility, the 

inmate or prisoner shall pay in full all fees and costs associated with 

the action or appeal.

Because Bryant was an inmate of a prison at the time he filed his PCR application, 

the court concluded he was “required to pay all of the fees and costs in this case.” 

On appeal, Bryant argues the plain language of section 822.1 allows a PCR 

applicant to file without paying a filing fee.1 In interpreting section 822.2(1), we 

adhere to the following well-settled principles:

The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the 

legislature’s intent. We give words their ordinary and common 

meaning by considering the context within which they are used, 

absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law. 

We also consider the legislative history of a statute, including prior 

enactments, when ascertaining legislative intent. When we interpret 

a statute, we assess the statute in its entirety, not just isolated words 

 

1 Bryant also argues that assessing a filing fee violates his constitutional rights to due 

process and equal protection. Because this argument was not raised below, we will not 

consider it for the first time on appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 

2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both 

raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). 
3

or phrases. We may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the 

meaning of a statute under the guise of construction.

Willard v. State, 893 N.W.2d 52, 60-61 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). When we 

engage in statutory interpretation, our review is for correction of errors at law. See 

id. at 58.

The State concedes that section 822.2(1) allows a PCR applicant to initiate2

a PCR proceeding without paying a filing fee but argues the statute “does not 

absolve him of ever paying the filing fee.” It claims that filing fees are part of the 

costs of an action that may be recovered by the successful party against the losing 

party in a civil action. See Iowa Code § 625.1. In support of its argument, the 

State cites Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 415 (Iowa 1982). In Fryer, a PCR 

applicant argued the district court erred in taxing costs of the action to him because 

he had been granted permission to proceed at state expense under section 663A.5 

(1981), which provided: “If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses 

of representation, including stenographic, printing, and legal services, these costs 

and expenses shall be made available to the applicant in the preparation of the 

application, in the trial court, and on review.” 325 N.W.2d at 414. In rejecting the 

applicant’s argument that section 663A.5 [now section 822.5] superseded the 

section 625.1 requirement that the successful party shall recover costs against the 

losing party, our supreme court held that the purpose of section 663A.5 [now 

section 822.5] was to 

advance[] the costs of a postconviction proceeding to the indigent so 

that he or she will not be prevented from seeking redress of alleged 

 

2 Section 822.2(1) allows a person to “institute, without paying a filing fee, a [PCR] 

proceeding.” “Institute” means “[t]o begin or start; commence.” Institute, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
4

defects in the conviction. We assume that all applicants will not be 

destitute forever. Some will return to society, and others may obtain 

funds from other sources, e.g., civil judgments or inheritances. It is 

not unreasonable for the State to recover, whenever possible, the 

costs it has advanced. We note, however, that the practical effect of 

taxing court costs in postconviction proceedings will be the same as 

that provided for statutorily in habeas corpus proceedings: if the 

losing party is confined to a state institution and is indigent, the State 

will have to absorb the costs.

Id. (footnote omitted). We conclude the same rationale applies to section 822.2(1) 

(2018). Although an applicant may initiate a PCR action without first paying the 

filing fee, the provision does not abrogate the applicant’s responsibility to pay the 

filing fee. Rather, the filing fee is recoverable in the event that the PCR applicant 

is unsuccessful in securing relief.

We affirm the denial of Bryant’s motion to strike court costs.

AFFIRMED.