NO. 07-09-0300-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL B 

MAY 26, 2010 

TIMOTHY MARK RAMIREZ, 

 

 Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee 

___________________________ 

FROM THE 121ST DISTRICT COURT OF TERRY COUNTY; 

NO. 5897; HONORABLE KELLY G. MOORE, PRESIDING 

Memorandum Opinion 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

 Timothy Mark Ramirez was convicted of possessing at least one gram but less 

than four grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. On appeal, he challenges the legal 

and factual sufficiency of the evidence showing that he possessed the drugs and had 

the intent to deliver them to others. We affirm the judgment. 

Background 

On December 13, 2008, the Brownfield Police Department executed a search 

warrant at the home of Crystal Garza. Those present were Crystal, her two small 
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daughters, Sammy Martinez, and appellant. The latter was Crystal’s intermittent 

boyfriend and the father of the two children. When the police entered, both appellant 

and Crystal informed them of the drugs’ location. According to one officer, appellant not 

only said that “he’ll show us where everything was at” but also that “’[t]hey had nothing 

to do with it’” and “[l]et them go.’” In a dresser upon which were placed men’s 

underwear and socks were found several individual packets of cocaine. Also 

discovered in the same dresser was approximately $1300 in cash. The cash consisted 

of five, ten, and twenty dollar bills, which denominations were normally found on those 

selling drugs, according to one officer. A police scanner and a set of scales (two items 

also used in the drug trade according to the officer), were discovered on or in the 

dresser as well. So too did those searching the abode find checks payable to appellant, 

a crack pipe, a black book with names and numbers in it, and plastic baggies with the 

corners cut off. Several of the latter items, though, were found in another bedroom as 

opposed to the master bedroom where the drugs and money were located. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 As previously stated, appellant attacks the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence showing that he knowingly possessed the drugs with intent to deliver. The 

pertinent standards of review are well known and need not be reiterated. They can be 

found in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and 

Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 

 Next, to convict appellant of the charged offense, the State was required to prove 

that he intentionally and knowingly possessed cocaine with intent to deliver. TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §481.112(c) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Upon perusing the 
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record to determine whether those elements were established, we came upon the 

following evidence. 

 Appellant was in the house at the time, and though he supposedly lived 

elsewhere, he intended to spend the night and was receiving friends there before the 

raid. Checks addressed to him were also at the house. Men’s boxer shorts and socks 

were located in the master bedroom atop one of the two dressers; ladies 

undergarments were found in the other dresser. The individually wrapped packets of 

cocaine, packets of money, scales, and police scanner were found in or on the dresser 

upon which were located the men’s boxer shorts. And, most importantly, appellant not 

only directed the officers to the location of the drugs but also said that others present 

should be released because they had nothing to do with the substances. That the 

denomination of the paper money discovered coincided with that possessed by drug 

traffickers was another bit of evidence upon which a rational jury could have relied in 

reaching its verdict. The same can be said of the scales and police scanner. Nor can 

we ignore Crystal’s testimony that the drugs were acquired not only for her use but to 

distribute or “give” to others or her friends. When taken together, the sum of this 

evidence was enough to permit a rational jury to link appellant to the drugs and 

conclude beyond reasonable doubt that he exercised care, custody and control over 

them with the intent to deliver. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161-62 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006). 

 Admittedly, Crystal testified that she owned the drugs, that appellant knew 

nothing of them, that she bought them to distribute at a bachelorette party, that she was 

estranged from appellant (though she already had two children by him and was 
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pregnant with his child at the time of trial, sought financial help from him, and allowed 

him to sleep over), that she owned and wore the men’s boxer shorts that were atop the 

dresser, and that she owned and read the sexually explicit men’s magazines depicting 

nude women which were found at the house. Yet, that simply created a question of fact 

regarding who actually possessed the contraband. So too did it raise credibility issues 

which were for the jury to decide. And, though the jury was free to accept her version of 

the circumstances, it was not required to do so. Indeed, it could well have concluded 

that she was less than truthful in order to save from prison the father of her expected 

child upon whom she relied for financial assistance. If in prison, he would not be able to 

provide her the financial support which she admittedly sought from him. That she had 

already been granted probation by the time she testified and was unlikely to be further 

prosecuted by the time she testified could have also been a factor considered by the 

jury in assessing her veracity. Consequently, we cannot say that the jury’s verdict was 

against the great weight of the evidence or manifestly wrong. 

 Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the judgment. 

 Brian Quinn 

 Chief Justice 

Do not publish.