UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

TERESA A. RUSSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Secur ity Administration, Defendant-Appellee. No. 11-6320 (D.C. No. 5:10-CV-00848-R) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TYMKOVICH , HOLLOWAY , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.
Teresa A. Russell appeals from the dist rict court’s order upholding the denial of her application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. An administrative law judge (ALJ ) found that Ms. Ru ssell suffers from autoimmune deficiency disorder, chronic fa tigue syndrome, rheumatoid arthritis, and

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 28, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - Sjogren’s syndrome. But based on the medi cal evidence in the record, and testimony from Ms. Russell and a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Russell had the residual functional capacity to perform light work and, thus, was able to return to her past work as claims processor. See Wilson v. Astrue , 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010) (describi ng five-step-evaluation process). The Appeals Council denied review, and the district court affirmed. On appeal, Ms. Russell argues that th e ALJ failed to properly weigh the evidence from her treating physician, Dr. Lesl ie. He opined in 2008 that Ms. Russell had “features of mixed connective tissue disease” that met the criteria to be considered presumptively disabled under Listing § 14.06, which addresses undifferentiated connec tive tissue disease. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 14.00(D)(5)(a) (Listing § 14.06) (“This listi ng includes syndromes with clinical and immunologic features of several autoimmune disorders, but that do not satisfy the criteria for any of the [autoimmune] disord ers described [in the preceding listings].”). Ms. Russell also argues that the ALJ was obligated to ask Dr. Leslie to provide additional information about her condition before accordi ng his opinion less than controlling weight. A treating physician’s opini on that a claimant is di sabled is not dispositive because that is the ultimate issue for the ALJ to decide. See Castellano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs ., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994). Further, an ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to the opi nion of a claimant’s treating physician if- 3 - it is “not well-supported by me dically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or if it is inconsistent with the other substantia l evidence in the case record.” Watkins v. Barnhart , 350 F.3d 1297, 130 0 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is what the ALJ concluded here. The ALJ explained that he considered Dr. Leslie’s opinion probative, but not cont rolling, because it was not substantiated by clinical findings and was in consistent with other eviden ce in the record. The ALJ gave specific reasons for this conclusion, as he is required to do. See id . at 1301. The ALJ noted that Dr. Leslie’s report, wh ich was written more than two years after the date Ms. Russell was last insured for disability, provided only minimal examination findings and did not reference medical signs, symptoms, or findings for the time period in when Ms. Russell was insured. The AL J noted that during the time Dr. Leslie treated Ms. Russell prior to the date she was last insured, his treatment notes state that the medicati on he prescribed for her sy mptoms was effective. The ALJ found that Dr. Leslie’s opinion was inconsistent with other medical evidence, and gave as an example the deta iled physical examination of Ms. Russell by a consulting physician, who stated Ms. Russell had a full range of motion, full motor strength in her arms and legs, norma l hand grip strength and good use of her hands, and a normal, unassisted, stable ga it. The ALJ also noted other medical evidence that reflected a nega tive rheumatoid arth ritis factor and normal x-rays.- 4 - The record supports the ALJ’s observations and conclusions with respect to his consideration of the factors used to dete rmine the weight of a medical opinion. Dr. Leslie’s treatment notes are, as the ALJ found, mi nimal, his opinion lacked objective or laboratory supp ort, and he did not doc ument the symptoms and conditions identified by the Commissioner as necessary for a determination of disability. See Listing § 14.06 and SSR 99–2p, 1999 WL 271569, at *2 (evaluation of cases involving chronic fa tigue syndrome). The record also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Leslie’s report was inconsistent with the other substantial medical evidence. Ms. Russell argues that Dr. Leslie’s opinion is not supported by clinical findings because impairments such as ch ronic fatigue syndrome do not rely upon objective measurements, and th at “there is no dipstick laboratory test” for chronic fatigue syndrome. Aplt. Opening Br. at 16. To the contrary, under the Commissioner’s regulations, an ALJ may onl y determine that chronic fatigue is a disabling condition “when it is accompan ied by medical signs or laboratory findings.” SSR 99–2p, 1999 WL 271569, at *2. We conclude that the ALJ’s decision not to give controlling weight to Dr. Leslie’s opinion was adequa tely explained, is supporte d by substantial evidence, and is free from legal error. 1 See Wilson , 602 F.3d at 1140 (noting that we review the

1 Ms. Russell concedes th at the consultative examinat ion did not support, and was not “consistent” with, Dr . Leslie’s opinion, but she argues for the first time on (continued)- 5 - Commissioner’s decision to determine wh ether the ALJ’s “factual findings are supported by substantial ev idence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied”). We also reject Ms. Russell’s conten tion that the ALJ was obligated to re-contact Dr. Leslie to get additiona l information about his 2008 report. See 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1512(e)(1) (2008) 2 (requiring ALJ to re-contact a medical source “when the report from [a claimant’s] medical source contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolv ed, the report does not contain all the necessary information, or does not appear to be based on medica lly acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”). Sh e asserts the ALJ should have re-contacted him before inferring that Ms. Russell’s impairments would likely have worsened from 2005 (when she was last insured) to 2008 (when Dr. Leslie opined on the severity of her impairments), and before gi ving Dr. Leslie’s opinion less weight because it was unsupported by clinical evid ence. But “it is not the rejection of the treating physician’s opinion that trigge rs the duty to re-contact the physician; rather it is the inadequacy of the evidence the ALJ receives from the claimant’s treating physician that triggers the duty.” White v. Barnhart , 287 F.3d 903, 90 8 (10th Cir. 2001)

appeal that it was not “incons istent” with Dr. Leslie’s opinion. We do not address this argument because it was not pr esented to the district court. See Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994).
2 This provision was amended and rec odified, effective February 2012, at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(1) and (2)- 6 - (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the ALJ did not find Dr. Leslie’s evidence incomplete or in need of clar ification; he simply found it unsupported and inconsistent with the medical evidence viewed in its entirety. Thus, the ALJ was not obligated to re-contact Dr. Leslie. See id

. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Ms. Russell’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

Entered for the Court
William J. Holloway, Jr. Circuit Judge