[Cite as State v. Hewitt, 2015-Ohio-5489.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MIAMI COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v. 

HUSTON W. HEWITT 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2015-CA-5 

Trial Court Case No. 2014-CR-382 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 30th day of December, 2015. 

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PAUL M. WATKINS, Atty. Reg. No. 0090868, Assistant Miami County Prosecuting 

Attorney, 201 West Main Street, Troy, Ohio 45373 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

ANDREW C. SCHLUETER, Atty. Reg. No. 0086701, 5540 Far Hills Avenue, Suite 202, 

Dayton, Ohio 45429 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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WELBAUM, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Huston W. Hewitt, appeals from the sentence he 

received in the Miami County Court of Common Pleas after he was found guilty of 

possessing cocaine following a no contest plea. For the reasons outlined below, the 

judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

Facts and Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 2} On August 25, 2014, Hewitt was arraigned in the Miami County Municipal 

Court for possessing cocaine. His case was then bound over to the Miami County Court 

of Common Pleas. Thereafter, on October 22, 2014, a bill of information was filed 

charging Hewitt with one count of possessing cocaine in an amount less than five grams 

in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(a), a felony of the fifth degree. The charge 

arose after an officer discovered cocaine in Hewitt’s vehicle following a traffic stop. 

{¶ 3} Hewitt initially pled not guilty to the possession charge. However, as part of 

a plea agreement, Hewitt later agreed to plead no contest in exchange for the State 

remaining silent at sentencing. Accordingly, the trial court held a change of plea hearing 

on January 12, 2015, during which Hewitt entered a plea of no contest. After entering 

his plea, the trial court found Hewitt guilty of possessing cocaine and scheduled a 

sentencing hearing for February 18, 2015. 

{¶ 4} At Hewitt’s sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a ten-month prison 

sentence and suspended Hewitt’s driver’s license for six months. The trial court also 
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ordered Hewitt to pay court costs and restitution to the Piqua Police Department in the 

amount of $125 for the cost of having the cocaine tested by the Miami Valley Regional 

Crime Lab (MVRCL). 

{¶ 5} Hewitt now appeals from his sentence, raising two assignments of error for 

review. For purposes of clarity, we will address Hewitt’s assignments of error out of 

order. 

Second Assignment of Error 

{¶ 6} Hewitt’s Second Assignment of Error is as follows: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY 

RESTITUTION TO A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WITHOUT HIS 

CONSENT. 

{¶ 7} Under his Second Assignment of Error, Hewitt contends the trial court erred 

in ordering him to pay $125 in restitution to the Piqua Police Department for the cost of 

testing the drugs found inside his vehicle. Although the State also believes the trial court 

erred by ordering him to pay the restitution, we disagree. 

{¶ 8} In support of his argument, Hewitt cites to State v. Moody, 2d Dist. Greene 

No. 2011-CA-29, 2013-Ohio-2234. In Moody, the appellant was a registered sex 

offender who was convicted of attempted failure to provide notice of a change of 

residence. Id. at ¶ 1. At sentencing, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay $302.94 

in restitution to the Greene County Sheriff’s Department for unknown expenses incurred 

in the investigation. Thereafter, the appellant appealed from the order of restitution. Id. 

at ¶ 9. 
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{¶ 9} In deciding the appeal, we noted that “[p]ursuant to R.C. 2929.18(A)(1), a 

trial court may order ‘[r]estitution by the offender to the victim of the offender’s crime * * * 

in an amount based on the victim’s economic loss.’ ” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting R.C. 

2929.18(A)(1). However, we recognized that law-enforcement agencies are not entitled 

to restitution for funds spent in the performance of their investigative or other duties. Id. 

at ¶ 12. We also noted that a defendant can consent to pay restitution to a lawenforcement agency pursuant to a plea agreement, but the mere inclusion of language in 

a plea form listing restitution as a possible financial sanction does not establish consent. 

Id. Thus, we held the trial court in Moody erred by ordering the appellant to pay 

restitution to the Greene County Sheriff’s Department because it was not authorized by 

R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) and the appellant had not consented to the restitution as part of his 

plea agreement. Id. at ¶ 16. We recently followed our holding in Moody in State v. 

Payne, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-21, 2015-Ohio-698, finding the trial court erred in 

ordering the appellant to pay restitution to the Clark County Sheriff’s department for 

money spent on controlled drug purchases by a confidential informant. Id. at ¶ 6. 

{¶ 10} The present case, however, is distinguishable from both Moody and Payne. 

Unlike Moody and Payne, the $125 restitution order at issue in this case accrued as a 

result of the Piqua Police Department sending the substance found in Hewitt’s vehicle to 

MVRCL for testing. Effective October 12, 2006, R.C. 2925.511 authorizes a sentencing 

court to order an offender to reimburse law enforcement agencies for the costs of tests to 

identify the controlled substance at issue, so long as the tests come back positive. H.B. 

No. 163, 2006 Ohio Laws 135. 

{¶ 11} Specifically, R.C. 2925.511 states the following: 
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In addition to the financial sanctions authorized or required under 

sections 2929.18 and 2929.28 of the Revised Code and to any costs 

otherwise authorized or required under any provision of law, the court 

imposing sentence upon an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to 

a drug abuse offense may order the offender to pay to the state, municipal, 

or county law enforcement agencies that handled the investigation and 

prosecution all of the costs that the state, municipal corporation, or county 

reasonably incurred in having tests performed under section 2925.51 of the 

Revised Code or in any other manner on any substance that was the basis 

of, or involved in, the offense to determine whether the substance contained 

any amount of a controlled substance if the results of the tests indicate that 

the substance tested contained any controlled substance. No court shall 

order an offender under this section to pay the costs of tests performed on 

a substance if the results of the tests do not indicate that the substance 

tested contained any controlled substance. The court shall hold a hearing 

to determine the amount of costs to be imposed under this section. The 

court may hold the hearing as part of the sentencing hearing for the 

offender. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 12} In this case, the record indicates that the substance found in Hewitt’s vehicle 

yielded positive results for cocaine when it was initially field tested. Following the field 

test, the substance was sent to MVRCL for additional testing. The presentence 

investigation report noted that the MVRCL analysis cost $125. The report also noted 
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that the author of the report “was not in receipt of the final [lab] results at the submission 

of this report[.]” The final results were not otherwise incorporated in the record; however, 

we presume the MVRCL test results showed positive results for cocaine since: (1) Hewitt 

pled no contest to possessing cocaine and admitted during the presentence investigation 

that he had cocaine in his car;1 and (2) the initial field test showed positive results for 

cocaine. Based on these circumstances, it would not have been an abuse of discretion 

for the trial court to make the same presumption at sentencing when it ordered Hewitt to 

pay the cost of the MVRCL analysis. In addition, the cost of the MVRCL analysis was 

discussed, albeit briefly, as part of the sentencing hearing and was clearly stated in the 

presentence investigation report that was reviewed by the trial court. Accordingly, under 

R.C. 2925.511, the trial court did not err in ordering Hewitt to pay $125 in restitution to the 

Piqua Police Department for the testing performed by MVRCL. 

{¶ 13} Hewitt’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled. 

First Assignment of Error 

{¶ 14} Hewitt’s First Assignment of error is as follows: 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 

APPELLANT TO A NEAR-MAXIMUM SENTENCE. 

{¶ 15} Under his First Assignment of Error, Hewitt claims the trial court’s decision 

to impose a ten-month prison sentence was an abuse of discretion because the court 

 

1 Under the defendant’s version of events, the presentence investigation report states 

the following: “In conjunction with the PSI, the Defendant wrote the following statement: 

‘was driving to a dentist appointment got pulled over with cocaine in car.’ ” The report 

also notes that Hewitt indicated “he was addicted to cocaine at the time of the Instant 

Offense, but that he has not used since the date of arrest.” 
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weighed the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12 in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner. 

We disagree. 

{¶ 16} In reviewing felony sentences, this court now applies R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) as 

the appellate standard of review. State v. Rodeffer, 2013-Ohio-5759, 5 N.E.3d 1069, 

¶ 29 (2d Dist.). R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states, in pertinent part, that: 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence 

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand 

the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s 

standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this 

division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following: 

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under 

division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 

2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929. 20 of the Revised Code, whichever, 

if any, is relevant; 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶ 17} “ ‘[C]ontrary to law’ means that a sentencing decision manifestly ignores an 

issue or factor which a statute requires a court to consider.” (Citation omitted.) State v. 

Lofton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19852, 2004-Ohio-169, ¶ 11. “[A] sentence is not 

contrary to law when the trial court imposes a sentence within the statutory range, after 

expressly stating that it had considered the purposes and principles of sentencing set 

forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors in R .C. 2929.12.” Rodeffer at ¶ 32, citing 

State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 18. 
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{¶ 18} Hewitt concedes that his sentence cannot be modified or vacated under the 

standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Specifically, he concedes that the 

trial court had discretion to impose a prison term under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(x), that his 

ten-month prison sentence was within the prescribed statutory range for fifth degree 

felonies, and that the trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing 

under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the standard 

of review in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), Hewitt urges this court to also review his sentence for an 

abuse of discretion. However, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) specifically states that “[t]he appellate 

court’s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion[.]” 

Regardless of this provision, even when reviewing Hewitt’s sentence for an abuse of 

discretion, we find no error. 

{¶ 19} “A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is 

unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary. An abuse of discretion includes a situation 

in which a trial court did not engage in a ‘ “sound reasoning process.” ’ Abuse-ofdiscretion review is deferential and does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute 

its judgment for that of the trial court.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio 

St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34, quoting State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 

337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place 

Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 

(1990). 

{¶ 20} As previously noted, Hewitt contends his ten-month prison sentence was 

an abuse of discretion because the trial court weighed the seriousness and recidivism 

factors in R.C. 2929.12 in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner. In support of this 
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claim, Hewitt argues the trial court’s “more serious” finding under R.C. 2929.12(B)(2), i.e., 

that he caused the victim serious economic harm as a result of the offense, was made in 

error because it was based on the $125 fee for the drug testing, which he claims does 

not amount to serious economic harm and was not to be paid to the victim, but rather the 

Piqua Police Department. Hewitt also notes that the trial court made a “less serious” 

finding under R.C. 2929.12(C)(3), i.e., that he did not cause or expect to cause physical 

harm to persons or property. Lastly, Hewitt contends the trial court should have 

considered that recidivism is unlikely under the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(D)(5) and 

(E)(5) because he was genuinely remorseful for his offense. 

{¶ 21} With respect to genuine remorse, the trial court was not obligated to believe 

Hewitt’s claim that he was remorseful, as the court was free to determine the remorseful 

factor for itself, and it was not obligated to weigh the factor in Hewitt’s favor. Hewitt’s 

claim otherwise is simply incorrect. 

{¶ 22} As for the trial court’s finding that Hewitt caused the victim serious economic 

harm, we find the trial court partially rectified the finding on the record after Hewitt’s trial 

counsel objected to it at the sentencing hearing. In response to Hewitt’s objection, the 

author of the presentence investigation report clarified that the finding was made in the 

report as a result of the Piqua Police Department’s economic loss. Thereafter, the trial 

court noted the clarification on the record and stated it was “the economic harm that [was] 

the result of Defendant’s conduct.” Sentencing Trans. (Feb. 18, 2015), p. 14. We find 

that this statement sufficiently negated the trial court’s initial finding that the economic 

harm suffered by the Police Department was serious; therefore, that finding no longer had 

any effect. 
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{¶ 23} Nevertheless, the trial court’s modified finding still implies that the Piqua 

Police Department was a victim that suffered economic harm. A law enforcement 

agency cannot be characterized as a victim entitled to restitution as the result of economic 

harm that arose out of its investigation of the offense. State v. Jones, 7th Dist. Jefferson 

Nos. 08 JE 20, 08 JE 29, 2010-Ohio-2704, ¶ 44-47 (“the government or a police 

department is not a victim merely because they expended funds in order to gather 

evidence against the offender”), citing State v. Samuels, 4th Dist. Washington No. 03CA8, 

2003-Ohio-6106, ¶ 5. (Other citation omitted.) Accord State v. Christian, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 25256, 2014-Ohio-2672, ¶ 126-129, vacated on other grounds, 143 

Ohio St.3d 417, 2015-Ohio-3374, 38 N.E.3d 888. 

{¶ 24} Regardless, we find the trial court’s error in characterizing the Piqua Police 

Department as a victim is harmless error. We come to this conclusion because pursuant 

to R.C. 2925.511, the trial court was permitted to order Hewitt to pay the Department for 

the cost of the drug testing and Hewitt’s ten-month prison sentence was reasonable in 

light of all the other factors weighed by the trial court at sentencing. For example, during 

the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that several other recidivism factors under 

R.C. 2929.12(B) applied and indicated that recidivism was likely. Specifically, the trial 

court found, based on the presentence investigation report, that recidivism was likely 

because Hewitt was on bail awaiting trial or sentencing when the offense was committed; 

had a history of juvenile adjudications and criminal convictions; and failed to respond 

favorably to past sanctions, which included a prior prison term. The presentence 

investigation report also indicated that Hewitt previously had his probation revoked. 

{¶ 25} Also, upon reviewing the record, we find that Hewitt’s extensive criminal 
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history is, by itself, a reasonable basis to affirm his ten-month prison sentence, as the trial 

court summarized his lengthy criminal record as follows: 

I had a chance to look over the PSI that was done by Ms. Scott, and 

some things to be noted are your extensive criminal record both as a 

juvenile and as well as an adult. Specifically in 1993 you had an Assault 

charge in Juvenile Court where you received four hours of Community 

Service, and 1995 you had another Assault where you also received twelve 

hours of Community Service. In 1996 you had an Assault with twelve 

hours Community Service. In 1995 you had a Robbery where you were 

placed on probation and were—did a temporary stint at the DYS. Again in 

1996 you had Criminal * * * Damaging and a Contempt charge and 

conviction and where you got twelve and twenty hours of Community 

Service. Again in ‘97 you had another Assault, twelve hours of Community 

Service; 1998 a Squealing Tires and Criminal Damaging where those were 

brought to the Juvenile Court’s attention. You received fines and costs and 

had to pay restitution. * * * 

Now as an adult you had a Felonious Assault case which was bound 

over in 2000. And as part of that incident you had an Aggravated Assault 

where you served twelve months in ODRC [.] * * * 

Let’s see—again in 2002 you had an Assault, which was amended 

to Attempted Assault, did a hundred twenty-eight days (sic) sentence, as 

well as a ninety day sentence with fines and costs. In 2005 you had a 

Disorderly Conduct which was amended from an Assault, thirty days 
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suspended. 2005 an Open Container. 2006 a DUI/Physical Control and 

Reasonable Control, thirty days suspended as well as fines and costs. 

2007 you were convicted of * * * Willful Wanton Disregard of Property as 

well as—that was well just that one charge where you received a one-year 

probation sentence. 2007 Disorderly Conduct, amended from an Assault, 

thirty days suspended. 2008 Disorderly Conduct, fines and costs. 2008 

Disorderly Conduct, fines and costs. 2009 Obstructing Official Business, 

fines and costs; 2010 Disorderly Conduct, again in 2010 an Attempted 

Assault where you received probation and had a revocation hearing and put 

back on probation as well. 2010 a Disorderly Conduct, fines and costs. 

2011 Domestic Violence, thirty days suspended. 2012 an OVI, another 

2012 Assault—two counts, a hundred eighty – eighty days suspended, 

placed on probation, fines, costs, restitution. 2012 a Menacing that was 

part of your two years’ probation in the earlier charge. As part of this 

incident you had the Physical Control, While Under the Influence, which you 

noted as being currently on probation through Municipal Court. 

Sentencing Trans. (Feb. 18, 2015), p. 6-9. 

{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion 

when it weighed the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12, as the recidivism 

factors, especially Hewitt’s extensive criminal history, provided a reasonable basis for 

imposing the ten-month prison sentence at issue. 

{¶ 27} Hewitt’s First Assignment of Error is overruled. 
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Conclusion 

{¶ 28} Having overruled both assignments of error raised by Hewitt, the judgment 

of the trial court is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HALL, J., concurs. 

DONOVAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

{¶ 29} I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the second assignment of error. 

The PSI lists a single seriousness factor out of nine factors. Specifically, it notes, and 

the judge made a finding that, the “Victim suffered serious physical, psychological or 

economic harm as a result of the offense.” Under “Explanation,” the PSI indicates 

“Economic loss incurred by Piqua Police Department (drug analysis).” 

{¶ 30} Assuming arguendo, the court modified its finding from “serious economic 

harm” to “economic harm” (a fact which is not clear to this author), the law, in my view, is 

clear that the Piqua Police Department cannot be characterized as a “victim” under R.C. 

2929.12(B)(2) in a drug possession offense. “[A] police department is not a victim of an 

offense when the only economic harm arising out of the offense is the cost of investigating 

that offense,” State v. Moody, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2011-CA-29, 2013-Ohio-2234, ¶ 12 

(citing in part State v. Jones, 7th Dist. Jefferson Nos. 08 JE 20, 08 JE 29, 2010-Ohio2704, ¶ 40, 47, which found plain error where the trial court ordered Appellant to pay 

restitution to the government, noting “that the government is not a victim under the 

restitution statute merely because it expended funds in some manner as a result of the 

defendant’s offense.”) The fact that the Piqua Police Dept. can recoup the expense of 
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lab analysis under R.C. 2929.511 does not make them a victim for purposes of 

sentencing. 

{¶ 31} The question of who constitutes a victim under R.C. 2929.12(B)(2) is 

reviewed under a de novo standard. See generally State v. Hunter, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 25521, 2013-Ohio-3759, ¶ 7. In relevant part, R.C. 2930.01(H) defines victim as “a 

person who is identified as the victim of a crime. . . in a police report or in a complaint, 

information or indictment that charges the commission of a crime and that provides the 

basis for the criminal prosecution . . . .” The bill of information filed against Hewitt does 

not identify the police as the victim, nor should it. In this case, it is an error of law to 

characterize the Piqua Police Dept. as the victim for purposes of sentencing analysis. 

{¶ 32} Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for resentencing as to the 

restitution issue. 

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Copies mailed to: 

Paul M. Watkins 

Andrew C. Schlueter 

Hon. Jeannine N. Pratt