NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BARRDAY, INC., BARRDAY CORP.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

LINCOLN FABRICS INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2022-1903

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of New York in No. 1:15-cv-00165-LJVMJR, Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo.

______________________ 

Decided: November 16, 2023

______________________ 

MICHAEL J. BERCHOU, Harter Secrest & Emery, Buffalo, NY, argued for plaintiffs-appellants.

 ROBERT J. FLUSKEY, JR., Hodgson Russ LLP, Buffalo, 

NY, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

CHARLES RAUCH. 

______________________ 

Before HUGHES, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.

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2 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CUNNINGHAM. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge STARK.

CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge. 

Barrday, Inc. and Barrday Corp. (collectively, 

“Barrday”) appeal from the stipulated final judgment of 

noninfringement of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of New York, which was entered in favor 

of Lincoln Fabrics Inc. (“Lincoln”) as to two of Barrday’s 

patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 8,573,261 and 9,127,379 (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”). See J.A. 1–4. The stipulated final judgment of noninfringement was predicated on 

the district court’s construction of the securing yarns claim 

term. See Barrday, Inc. v. Lincoln Fabrics Inc., No. 15-CV165-LJV-JWF, 2021 WL 3076869 (W.D.N.Y. July 21, 2021)

(“Claim Construction Order”); Barrday, Inc. v. Lincoln Fabrics Inc., No. 15-CV-165-LJV-JWF, 2021 WL 8263498 

(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2021) (“Clarification Order”). Because 

the district court did not err in its construction of the securing yarns claim term, we affirm the district court’s judgment of noninfringement of the Asserted Patents. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Asserted Patents 

The Asserted Patents, both entitled “Woven MultiLayer Fabrics and Methods of Fabricating Same,” cover 

certain woven, multi-layer fabrics used in ballistic applications. See, e.g., ’261 patent col. 10 ll. 10–25; see also id. col. 

1 ll. 15–17, col. 2 ll. 12–13.1 The fabrics comprise an upper

(or first) layer and a lower (or second) layer, where each

layer is made up of “warp” and “weft” yarns. Id. col. 2 ll. 

14–31. “Warp” and “weft” refer to yarn direction, with 

1 Because the Asserted Patents are related and 

share a specification, we generally cite to the specification 

of the ’261 patent. 

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warp yarns “run[ning] lengthwise along the fabric” and 

weft yarns “run[ning] across the length of the fabric” such 

that they “are interwoven with and generally perpendicular to the warp yarns.” Id. col. 1 ll. 23–26; see also id. col. 

5 ll. 55–58. The upper and lower layers are “secured together” by “securing yarns.” Id. col. 2 ll. 42–46. 

Figure 1 shows an embodiment with “an overhead perspective view”: 

Id. fig. 1, col. 1 ll. 55–56. “[T]he woven fabric 10 is formed 

by interweaving the securing yarns 22 with” the upper 

warp yarns 12, lower warp yarns 15, upper weft yarns 14, 

and lower weft yarns 17 “as the fabric 10 is formed.” Id.

col. 2 ll. 48–50; see also id. col. 2 ll. 14–31. 

The Asserted Patents each have only one independent 

claim, and both of these independent asserted claims contain the disputed “securing yarns” claim term. See id. col. 

10 ll. 10–25; ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 9–23. Independent claim 

1 of the ’379 patent recites:

1. A multi-layer ballistic woven fabric, comprising: 

a. an upper woven layer having upper warp 

yarns and upper weft yarns that are interwoven together; 

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4 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

b. a lower woven layer having lower warp 

yarns and lower weft yarns that are interwoven together; 

c. a plurality of securing yarns, each securing yarn interwoven with at least some of 

the upper yarns and some of the lower yarns 

so as to secure the upper and lower woven 

layers together; 

d. wherein the multi-layer ballistic woven 

fabric is formed by interweaving the securing yarns with the warp yarns and weft 

yarns as the upper woven layer and lower 

woven layer are made: and further wherein 

at least some of the upper and lower yarns 

are offset from each other so as to overlap 

by more than 10%. 

’379 patent col. 10 ll. 9–23 (emphasis added to relevant limitation). Independent claim 1 of the ’261 patent contains 

the same relevant limitation. See ’261 patent col. 10 ll. 15–

18. 

Dependent claims 10 through 14 of the ’379 patent, recited below, also contain limitations relevant to the claim 

construction issue on appeal: 

10. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim 

1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more 

of the upper warp yarns, the lower warp yarns, the 

upper weft yarns and the lower weft yarns. 

11. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim 

1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more 

of the upper warp yarns and the upper weft yarns. 

12. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim 

1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more 

of the lower warp yarns and the lower weft yarns. 

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13. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim 

1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more 

of the upper warp yarns and the lower warp yarns. 

14. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim 

1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more 

of the upper weft yarns and the lower weft yarns. 

’379 patent col. 10 ll. 52–67 (emphases added to relevant 

limitations). 

B. Procedural History

On February 24, 2015, Barrday sued Lincoln, alleging 

that Lincoln’s fabrics infringed one or more claims of the 

’261 patent. See J.A. 54–58. In response, Lincoln sent a 

letter to Barrday on March 10, 2015, explaining that 

Barrday lacked a reasonable basis for suit because the accused Lincoln fabrics interweave the upper (or first) and 

lower (or second) layers without using securing yarns. See 

J.A. 559–60. A few weeks later, on April 2, 2015, Barrday 

amended the claims of the pending patent application that 

issued as the ’379 patent, including by adding the claims 

that issued as dependent claims 10 through 14. See J.A. 

567; see also J.A. 564, 572, 574. After this amendment, the 

examiner issued a notice of allowance; the ’379 patent issued; and Barrday filed an amended complaint to add infringement allegations for the ’379 patent. See J.A. 82, 86–

87.2 

In July 2021, the district court issued its claim construction order, construing securing yarns to mean “yarns, 

2 We take judicial notice of the relevant portions of 

the publicly-accessible ’379 patent file history not included 

in the appellate record. See, e.g., Hoganas AB v. Dresser 

Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 954 n.27 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations 

omitted); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., 

Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 514 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

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6 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

other than yarns from the upper and lower woven layers, 

that secure the upper and lower woven layers together.” 

Claim Construction Order at *13–14. In doing so, the district court adopted in substantial part Lincoln’s proposed 

construction. See id. at *6, *14; J.A. 542. The district court 

rejected Barrday’s argument that no construction was necessary, Claim Construction Order at *6 n.4, and rejected 

Barrday’s alternative proposed construction of “yarns for 

securing or holding upper and lower woven layers together.” J.A. 200; Claim Construction Order at *6. Subsequently, Barrday filed a motion for clarification of the claim 

construction order, which the district court denied. See

J.A. 768–76; Clarification Order at *1–2. 

Following the district court’s orders, the parties stipulated to noninfringement of the asserted claims of the Asserted Patents based on the district court’s securing yarns 

construction, and the district court entered final judgment 

in accordance with the stipulation on May 12, 2022. See 

J.A. 1–4. 

II. DISCUSSION

Barrday presents only one issue on appeal: whether 

the district court erred in construing securing yarns as 

“yarns, other than yarns from the upper and lower woven 

layers, that secure the upper and lower woven layers together.” See Claim Construction Order at *13–14; Appellants’ Br. 18–21. We agree with the district court’s 

construction. 

A. Standard of Review

“Where the district court’s claim construction relies 

only on intrinsic evidence,” as is the case here, “the construction is a legal determination reviewed de novo.” PolyAm., L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1135–36 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016) (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 

574 U.S. 318, 331–33 (2015)); see also Allergan Sales, LLC 

v. Sandoz, Inc., 935 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 7

(citation omitted). “Claim terms are generally given their 

ordinary and customary meaning, which is the meaning 

they would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at 

the time of the invention.” Poly-Am., 839 F.3d at 1136 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005) (en banc)). The skilled artisan “is deemed to 

read a claim term not only in the context of the particular 

claim in which it appears, but in the context of the entire 

patent” and terms are interpreted in view of “the intrinsic 

evidence of record, including the written description, the 

drawings, and the prosecution history.” Allergan, 935 F.3d 

at 1373 (cleaned up).

B. Claim Construction

The crux of the parties’ dispute is whether the securing 

yarns claim term can include yarns from the upper and 

lower woven layers when such yarns are serving the securing function. See Appellants’ Br. 18; Appellee’s Br. 13. 

Barrday first argues that the district court should not have 

construed the securing yarns claim term because no construction is required. See Appellants’ Br. 18. Alternatively, Barrday contends that the intrinsic evidence does 

not support the district court’s construction and rather supports its proposed construction: “yarns for securing or 

holding upper and lower woven layers together.” Id. at 25; 

see also id. at 21, 41–42. Under Barrday’s proposed construction and contrary to the district court’s construction,

securing yarns include, rather than exclude, yarns from the 

upper and lower layers. See id. at 25, 38; Appellants’ Reply 

Br. 5. We address each argument in turn. 

Barrday first contends that the securing yarns claim 

term requires no construction “[g]iven the language of the 

claims.” Appellants’ Br. 25; see also id. at 23–24. We disagree. “When the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to 

resolve it.” Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring 

Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016)

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8 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

(quoting O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech.

Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Though the parties agree that “securing yarns” secure the upper and lower 

woven layers together, they dispute whether the term applies to warp and weft yarns from the upper and lower layers when such yarns are serving the securing function. See 

Appellants’ Br. 18; Appellee’s Br. 13, 17–18. In other 

words, the dispute is whether the securing yarns are separate from the yarns of the upper and lower layers. See Appellants’ Br. 18; Appellee’s Br. 13, 17–18. Because the

parties raise “a fundamental dispute regarding the scope” 

of securing yarns, it was proper for the district court—and 

is now proper for this court—to resolve the dispute. See 

Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318 (quoting O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362); 

Claim Construction Order at *5–14 & n.4. 

Moving to Barrday’s challenge to the district court’s 

construction and starting with the claim language, asserted independent claims 1 of the Asserted Patents contain the identical relevant limitation: “a plurality of 

securing yarns, each securing yarn interwoven with at 

least some of the upper yarns and some of the lower yarns 

so as to secure the upper and lower woven layers together.” 

’261 patent col. 10 ll. 15–18; ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 14–17. 

Barrday concedes that these claims refer to the upper 

yarns, lower yarns, and securing yarns as “separate structural limitations.” Oral Arg. at 5:42–53, https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=22-1903_0504202

3.mp3; see also id. at 4:35–43 (Barrday admitting same). 

Where a claim lists elements separately, as done here, 

there is “a presumption that those components are distinct.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citation 

omitted); see also Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom 

Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Our 

precedent instructs that different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings.”) (citations omitted). 

Moreover, it would be “nonsensical” to interpret yarns from 

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the upper and lower layers as the same structure as the 

securing yarns when these distinct terms are used and 

these yarns are “interwoven with” one another as claimed. 

See Neville v. Found. Constructors, Inc., 972 F.3d 1350, 

1357 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (finding it would be 

“nonsensical” to construe an “end plate” as an indistinguishable part of a “protrusion” because the latter was “extending outwardly” from the former as claimed). 

Therefore, the language of the independent claims supports the district court’s securing yarns construction excluding yarns from the upper and lower layers.

The specification, which is often “the single best guide 

to the meaning of a disputed term,” similarly supports the 

district court’s construction. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 

(citation omitted). The specification exclusively refers to 

securing yarns as structures that are separate and distinct

from warp and weft yarns of the upper and lower layers. 

See, e.g., ’261 patent col. 8 ll. 17–19 (“The upper and lower 

woven layers 411, 413 are secured together using one or 

more securing yarns 422[.]”); id. col. 5 ll. 49–52 (“The first

[i.e., upper] and second [i.e., lower] layers 111, 113 are secured together by securing yarns 122 that are interwoven 

with the first and second warp and weft yarns as the fabric 

110 is woven together.”); id. col. 2 ll. 66–col. 3 l. 2 (“[T]he

securing yarns 22 may be generally parallel to or aligned 

with the warp yarns 12, 15 and generally perpendicular to 

the weft yarns 14, 17.”). Furthermore, in at least some embodiments, the specification repeatedly describes the securing yarns as having different characteristics from the 

warp and weft yarns of the upper and lower layers. See,

e.g., id. col. 4 ll. 23–26 (“[T]he securing yarns 22 are generally of significantly smaller denier than the warp yarns 12, 

15 and/or weft yarns 14, 17 and may have significantly 

lower tenacities and tensile moduli.”); id. col. 4 ll. 42–44 

(“[T]he securing yarns 22 may be generally of a much 

smaller size than the warp yarns 12, 15 and weft yarns 14, 

17.”). 

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“Where, as here, a patent repeatedly and consistently 

characterizes a claim term in a particular way, it is proper 

to construe the claim term in accordance with that characterization.” Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found. v. Apple Inc., 905 

F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). The specification’s “clear, repeated, 

and consistent statements” treating the securing yarns as 

“different and distinct” from the warp and weft yarns of the 

upper and lower layers and statements describing how the 

characteristics of the yarns are different supports a securing yarns construction that excludes yarns from the upper 

and lower layers. See SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 

727 F.3d 1187, 1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Wis.

Alumni, 905 F.3d at 1351–52; In re Abbott Diabetes Care 

Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

And even more notably, the specification expressly criticizes the interweaving practice where securing yarns include yarns of the upper and lower layers—i.e., the 

construction proposed by Barrday and endorsed by the dissent. This excerpt states:

Generally, the yarns of one layer are not interwoven 

with the yarns of another layer because such interweaving tends to increase the degree of crimp for 

the yarn in relation to [the] rest of the yarns in the 

fabric, which can create ballistic weak points. In 

particular, the first or upper yarns 12, 14 are not 

interwoven with the second or lower yarns 15, 17, 

and vice versa. Instead, as shown, the first or upper 

layer 11 and second or lower layer 13 are secured 

together by one or more securing yarns 22. The securing yarns 22 are interwoven with at least some 

of the upper yarns 12, 14 and some of the lower 

yarns 15, 17 so as to secure the upper and lower 

layers 11, 13 together. 

’261 patent col. 2 ll. 36–46 (emphases added). As Barrday 

concedes, this excerpt describes the advantages of 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 11

interweaving with securing yarns that are distinct from 

yarns of the upper and lower layers. See Appellants’ Reply 

Br. 9. 

Although Barrday argues that this excerpt does not 

“amount to an express disavowal of claim scope,” Appellants’ Br. 34, “[o]ur case law does not require explicit redefinition or disavowal.” Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of 

N.Y. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (citation omitted). “When the scope of the invention 

is clearly stated in the specification, and is described as the 

advantage and distinction of the invention,” as is the case 

here, “it is not necessary to disavow explicitly a different 

scope.” Id. at 1364 (quoting On Demand Mach. Corp. v. 

Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 

The “repeated description” of securing yarns as separate 

and distinct structures from yarns of the upper and lower 

layers, the “extolling of the virtues” of separate securing 

yarns, and the “criticism” of the interweaving practice 

where securing yarns include yarns of the upper and lower 

layers “clearly point to the conclusion” that the construction of securing yarns excludes yarns from the upper and 

lower layers. See UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., 

816 F.3d 816, 823 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 

The Asserted Patents’ figures further support the district court’s securing yarns construction that excludes 

yarns from the upper and lower layers. Each of the nine 

figures depicts securing yarns as separate from yarns of the 

upper and lower layers. See ’261 patent figs. 1–9, col. 1 l. 

51–col. 2 l. 8. Indeed, Barrday and the dissent concede that 

none of the nine figures “show[s] an embodiment in which 

the securing yarns include upper or lower warp or weft 

yarns.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 11; see also Oral Arg. at 2:38–

47 (Barrday admitting that “[t]here’s no figure that shows 

the use of the warp and weft yarns . . . as securing yarns.”); 

Dissent at 10 (“I recognize that all of the figures in the specification only depict embodiments in which the securing 

yarns are separate from the warp and weft yarns.”). Where 

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12 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

each figure in the asserted patent aligns with a particular 

construction, as is the case here, such figures offer further 

support for that particular construction. See, e.g., Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d 

1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s construction because, in part, the “construction [wa]s supported by . . . every figure” and “patent drawings are highly 

relevant in construing the limitations of the claims”) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up); ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris 

Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 

Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 822 F.3d 1312, 

1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 

F.3d 1034, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Barrday conceded as 

much at oral argument, agreeing that “all of the figures in 

the [Asserted] Patents support the district court’s claim 

construction.” Oral Arg. at 2:27–37. 

In the face of such overwhelming intrinsic evidence 

supporting the district court’s securing yarns construction, 

Barrday directs this court to a specification excerpt and

certain dependent claims of the ’379 patent as the intrinsic 

support for its proposed construction. See Oral Arg. at 

8:20–58. Neither undermines the district court’s construction. The specification excerpt on which Barrday relies 

states: 

In some embodiments, one or more of the warp 

yarns 12, 15 and/or weft yarns 14, 17 could be used 

in addition to, or in place of, one or more securing 

yarns 22 for holding the two or more layers together. For example, one or more the [sic] of the 

warp yarns 12, 15 and/or weft yarns 14, 17 could 

be interwoven along a path similar to the path of 

the securing yarn 22 as shown in FIG. 2 to secure 

the first layer 11 to the second layer 13. 

’261 patent col. 3 ll. 35–42 (emphasis added); see Appellants’ Br. 26–27, 38. Barrday contends that this excerpt 

“spells out exactly how the warp and weft yarn may be used 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 13

as a securing yarn.” Appellants’ Br. 26. However, as the 

district court correctly explained, “the relevant question is 

one of definition, not function.” Claim Construction Order

at *10. Although this excerpt suggests that warp and weft 

yarns of the upper and lower layers can be substituted for

and serve as the functional equivalent of securing yarns, it 

does not indicate that the latter refers to the former. 

Although Barrday argues that the district court’s construction “exclude[s] the embodiment” disclosed in this excerpt where the yarns of the upper and lower layers are 

substituted for the securing yarns, see Appellants’ Br. 38,

“[o]ur precedent is replete with examples of subject matter 

that is included in the specification, but is not claimed.” 

TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 

1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (refusing “to 

construe the claim term to encompass the alternative embodiment” because such a construction “would contradict 

the language of the claims” and “the [other] intrinsic evidence”); see also Kyocera, 22 F.4th at 1382–83 (similar). 

“[T]he mere fact that there is an alternative embodiment 

disclosed [here] that is not encompassed by [the] district 

court’s claim construction does not outweigh the language 

of the claim, especially when the court’s construction is 

supported by the intrinsic evidence.” TIP, 529 F.3d at

1373. Additionally, on the other hand, Barrday contends

that the district court’s construction erroneously reads in a 

limitation from the specification—namely, “other than 

yarns from the upper and lower woven layers.” Appellants’ 

Br. 32; see also id. at 33–35. We disagree. “[R]ather than 

improperly reading a limitation . . . into the claims, the district court’s construction, with which we agree, properly 

reads the claim term in the context of the entire patent.” 

Wis. Alumni, 905 F.3d at 1352. 

Aside from the specification excerpt on which Barrday 

relies, Barrday points to the independent-dependent claim 

structure of the ’379 patent as alleged support for its proposed construction. See Appellants’ Br. 32; see also id. at 

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14 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

27–31, 39–42. Dependent claims 10 through 14 of the ’379 

patent, each of which relies on independent claim 1, recite 

that “the securing yarns include” various combinations of 

upper warp yarns, upper weft yarns, lower warp yarns, and 

lower weft yarns. See ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 52–67. Barrday

argues that the securing yarns term recited in the independent claim must therefore include the upper warp 

yarns, upper weft yarns, lower warp yarns, and lower weft 

yarns terms recited in the dependent claims. See Appellants’ Br. 24–25, 27–29. Barrday also contends that the 

district court’s construction violates this court’s precedent 

discouraging constructions that render dependent claims 

“meaningless” because the district court’s construction renders dependent claims 10 through 14 of the ’379 patent 

meaningless. See id. at 27–29 (first citing Littelfuse, Inc. v. 

Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 

2022); then citing Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 972 F.3d 

1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020); then citing Intell. Ventures I 

LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 902 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 

2018); then citing Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan 

Labys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008); and then 

citing Wright Med. Tech. Inc. v. Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d 

1440, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 

We do not find Barrday’s argument persuasive. “While 

it is true that dependent claims can aid in interpreting the 

scope of claims from which they depend, they are only an 

aid to interpretation and are not conclusive.” Multilayer 

Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 

831 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). 

“[C]laim differentiation is a rebuttable presumption that 

may be overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the 

written description or prosecution history.” Howmedica, 

822 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted). This court has adopted 

a construction rendering dependent claims meaningless 

when that construction was supported by either the specification or the prosecution history. See Marine Polymer 

Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1358–59 (Fed. 

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Cir. 2012) (en banc) (construction supported by specification); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc., 

517 F.3d 1364, 1371–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (construction supported by prosecution history); Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1154–57 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

(construction supported by specification); Multilayer 

Stretch, 831 F.3d at 1358–62 (construction supported by 

specification).3 Similarly, we do so here where the claim 

language, specification, and figures all support a securing 

yarns construction that excludes yarns from the upper and 

lower layers.4

The lack of weight afforded to the dependent claims is 

particularly appropriate here because such claims were 

added after the filing of the original patent application and 

3 Contrary to the dissent’s contention, independent 

claim 1 of the Asserted Patents is “clear on its face.” Dissent at 7 (quoting Multilayer, 831 F.3d at 1360). Independent claim 1 of the Asserted Patents refers to the upper 

yarns, lower yarns, and securing yarns as separate structural limitations “interwoven with” one another. ’261 patent col. 10 ll. 15–18; ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 14–17.

4 Even the one specification excerpt on which 

Barrday affirmatively relies that we addressed above does 

not support Barrday’s proposed construction, which

Barrday argues is supported by these dependent claims. 

The excerpt suggests that warp and weft yarns of the upper 

and lower layers can only serve as the functional equivalent

of securing yarns, not that securing yarns can be warp and 

weft yarns of the upper and lower layers as recited in the 

dependent claims. Compare ’261 patent col. 3 ll. 35–42 

with ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 52–67. Counsel for Barrday did 

not have an explanation for this linguistic difference at oral 

argument, stating “I don’t have an answer for that” when 

asked why the excerpt fails to employ the same language 

as the dependent claims. See Oral Arg. at 4:12–23. 

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16 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

because the motive for adding such claims appears to be 

litigation-driven. See ICU, 558 F.3d at 1376 (affirming 

summary judgment of noninfringement based on a construction rendering a dependent claim superfluous because, in part, the claim was only added “after the filing 

date of the original patents” and after “the introduction of 

the allegedly infringing [competitor] products”); Cave Consulting Grp., LLC v. Optum Insight, Inc., 725 F. App’x 988, 

995 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (adopting a construction rendering dependent claims meaningless because it was “significant” 

that the claims “were added after the filing of the original 

application”), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 825 (2019); Barkan 

Wireless Access Techs., L.P. v. Cellco P’ship, 748 F. App’x 

987, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (same). Dependent claims 10 

through 14 were not only added after the filing of the underlying litigation, but also mere weeks after Barrday received a letter from Lincoln explaining that there was no

reasonable basis for suit as to the ’261 patent because the 

accused Lincoln fabrics interweave the upper and lower

layers without using securing yarns. See J.A. 559–60 (Lincoln’s March 10, 2015 letter); J.A. 564, 567, 572, 574

(Barrday’s April 2, 2015 prosecution amendment adding 

claims that issued as claims 10 through 14 of the ’379 patent). On these facts, “[t]he dependent claim tail cannot 

wag the independent claim dog.” Multilayer, 831 F.3d at 

1360 (citations omitted).5

5 The dissent argues that “broadening claims during 

prosecution to capture a competitor’s product is not improper.” Dissent at 13 (quoting Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) and 

citing Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade 

Comm’n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). However, 

in Synthes and Texas Instruments, this court explained 

that such broadening was permissible when the specification already disclosed the embodiments covered by the 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 17

The cases on which Barrday relies, where this court rejected a construction that rendered dependent claims 

meaningless, are inapposite. In those cases, the specification did not support such a construction, unlike the specification here. See Littelfuse, 29 F.4th at 1379–81; Baxalta,

972 F.3d at 1347–48; Intell. Ventures, 902 F.3d at 1377–78; 

Ortho-McNeil, 520 F.3d at 1362; Wright, 122 F.3d at 1444–

45. And in none of those cases did the motive for adding 

the dependent claims at issue appear to be litigationdriven, as is the case here. 

In sum, based on the intrinsic evidence,6 we conclude 

that the district court correctly construed securing yarns in 

the Asserted Patents as “yarns, other than yarns from the 

upper and lower woven layers, that secure the upper and 

lower woven layers together.” Claim Construction Order

broadened claims. See Synthes, 734 F.3d at 1341; Texas 

Instruments, 871 F.2d at 1065. As discussed in the previous footnote, the single specification excerpt on which both 

Barrday and the dissent relies for support for their proposed construction does not actually disclose the embodiments covered by the dependent claims. See supra note 4 

(explaining the linguistic differences between column 3 

lines 35 through 42 of the ’261 patent and dependent claims 

10 through 14 of the ’379 patent).

6 Although Lincoln points to extrinsic evidence in the 

form of a related foreign application as alleged claim construction support, see Appellee’s Br. 30–32, we—like the 

district court—decline to consider this extrinsic evidence. 

See J.A. 272, 289–91 (Lincoln raising arguments on related 

foreign application); Claim Construction Order at *5–14 

(district court not addressing such extrinsic evidence). Because the intrinsic evidence “resolves any ambiguity” as to 

the meaning of securing yarns, “it is improper to rely on 

extrinsic evidence to contradict the meaning so ascertained.” Helmsderfer, 527 F.3d at 1382 (citation omitted). 

Case: 22-1903 Document: 29 Page: 17 Filed: 11/16/2023
18 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

at *13–14. Because the parties stipulated to noninfringement of the asserted claims of the Asserted Patents based 

on the district court’s construction of securing yarns, see 

J.A. 1–4, we affirm the district court’s judgment of noninfringement. See Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 

1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. 

MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered Barrday’s remaining arguments, 

and we find them unpersuasive. For the above reasons, we 

affirm the district court’s judgment of noninfringement of 

the asserted claims of the Asserted Patents. 

AFFIRMED 

Case: 22-1903 Document: 29 Page: 18 Filed: 11/16/2023
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BARRDAY, INC., BARRDAY CORP.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

LINCOLN FABRICS INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2022-1903

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of New York in No. 1:15-cv-00165-LJVMJR, Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo.

______________________ 

STARK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

As is often the case, the claim construction dispute before us today presents a close call. Determining what a 

person of ordinary skill in the art, reading the claims in the 

context of the patent, would understand to be the scope of 

the claims is frequently entirely contestable, with reasonable (even strong) arguments on both sides. That is certainly the situation we confront here. For the reasons I 

explain below, I think the patentee, who proposes a broader 

construction than was adopted by the district court, has the 

more persuasive position. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

I 

Case: 22-1903 Document: 29 Page: 19 Filed: 11/16/2023
2 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

The disputed claim term is “securing yarns,” which appears in all of the claims at issue in this appeal. Independent claim 1 of the ’379 patent is representative and recites:

1. A multi-layer ballistic woven fabric, comprising:

a. an upper woven layer having upper warp 

yarns and upper weft yarns that are interwoven together;

b. a lower woven layer having lower warp 

yarns and lower weft yarns that are interwoven together;

c. a plurality of securing yarns, each securing yarn interwoven with at least some of 

the upper yarns and some of the lower 

yarns so as to secure the upper and lower 

woven layers together;

d. wherein the multi-layer ballistic woven 

fabric is formed by interweaving the securing yarns with the warp yarns and weft 

yarns as the upper woven layer and lower 

woven layer are made; and further wherein 

at least some of the upper and lower yarns 

are offset from each other so as to overlap 

by more than 10%.

’379 patent col. 10 ll. 9-23 (emphasis added).1 

1 Claim 1 of the ’261 patent contains the identical 

“securing yarns” limitations (i.e., limitations c and d) and 

only differs from claim 1 of the ’379 patent by reciting the 

“offset” limitation (i.e., the second half of limitation d of 

claim 1 of the ’379 patent) as a separate limitation (e), with 

a different range: “wherein at least some of the upper yarns 

and lower yarns are offset from each other so as to overlap 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 3

The patentee, Barrday, proposed that “securing yarns” 

be construed as “yarns for securing or holding upper and 

lower woven layers together.”2 By contrast, the accused infringer, Lincoln, argued that “securing yarns” should be 

more narrowly construed as “[y]arns, other than yarns from 

the upper and lower woven layers, that tie the upper and 

lower woven layers together.” J.A. 283 (emphasis added). 

The difference between the proposals, and the only issue 

before us on appeal, is whether the construction should, as 

Lincoln proposed, exclude embodiments in which an upper 

or lower layer warp or weft yarn may also be a securing 

yarn. The district court included Lincoln’s narrowing limitation in the construction it adopted: “yarns, other than 

yarns from the upper and lower woven layers, that secure 

the upper and lower woven layers together.” Barrday, Inc. 

v. Lincoln Fabrics Inc., No. 15-CV-165-LJV-JWF, 2021 WL 

3076869, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. July 21, 2021) (“Claim Construction Order”) (emphasis added). 

The Majority affirms the district court’s construction. 

Reviewing the issue de novo, see Poly-Am., L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 2016), I would, 

instead, side with Barrday. I believe that a skilled artisan 

considering the claims in the context of the intrinsic and 

by between 10% and 95%.” ’261 patent col. 10 ll. 10-25. 

These differences are not relevant to this appeal.

2 I agree with my colleagues that the district court 

properly rejected Barrday’s alternative position that “securing yarns” requires no construction. Where, as here, the 

parties present “a fundamental dispute regarding the scope 

of a claim” – such as whether the securing yarns must be 

separate from the yarns of the upper and lower layers – “it 

is the court’s duty to resolve it.” O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008).

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4 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

extrinsic evidence would conclude that an upper or lower

layer warp or weft yarn may serve as a securing yarn.

II

The claim language, specification, prosecution history, 

and extrinsic evidence all favor Barrday’s proposed broader 

construction rather than the narrower construction preferred by Lincoln and adopted by the district court.

A 

The claims do not expressly indicate whether upper 

and lower layer warp and weft yarns may also be securing 

yarns. Importantly, the claim language is broad and nonlimiting. The claims, including representative claim 1 of 

the ’379 patent (reproduced above), contain no language 

that excludes embodiments in which the same yarn serves 

as both a warp or weft yarn and also, at the same time, as 

a securing yarn. Given that “[t]here are no words of manifest exclusion,” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 

F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014), a person of ordinary skill 

would likely understand that the patentee intended to 

claim the full scope of what is captured by the plain meaning of “securing yarns,” which includes when upper and 

lower layer yarns serve the function of holding two or more 

layers together. See also Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. 

Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain 

the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning unless the 

patentee explicitly redefines the term or disavows its full 

scope.”).

Because the claims identify, on the one hand, upper 

and lower layer yarns and, on the other hand, securing 

yarns, it is presumed that these separately described yarns 

are different structures. See Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools 

Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 

2022); see also Maj. Op. at 8. This presumption, however, 

may be rebutted. A patentee is free to claim embodiments 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 5

in which a single structure performs the functions of multiple, separately recited claim limitations. See, e.g., Powell 

v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1231-32 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (“[T]he specification teaches that the cutting box may 

also function as a ‘dust collection structure.’”) (emphasis 

added); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 

653 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The claims and the 

specifications indicate that the ‘needle holder’ and ‘retainer 

member’ need not be separately molded pieces.”). That is 

just what a person of skill in the art would understand to 

be the case here, since the presumption of separate structures is rebutted by the claims (and by the specification, as 

I describe below in Part II.B).

In my view, the presumption that securing yarns must 

be a separate structure from the warp and weft yarns is 

persuasively rebutted by the existence of claims that unambiguously claim embodiments in which warp or weft 

yarns are performing the agreed-upon function of securing 

yarns. I am referring here to dependent claims 10-14 of the 

’379 patent, which expressly claim embodiments wherein, 

for example, “the securing yarns include one or more of the 

upper warp yarns, the lower warp yarns, the upper weft 

yarns and the lower weft yarns.” ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 52-

54 (emphasis added); see also Maj. Op. at 4-5 (reproducing 

all pertinent dependent claims). No one – not Lincoln, not 

the district court, and not the Majority – disputes that 

these dependent claims read on embodiments in which an 

upper or lower layer warp or weft yarn is holding two layers together and there is no separate securing yarn.

Nonetheless, the district court’s construction requires 

that the securing yarns be “yarns, other than yarns from 

the upper and lower woven layers,” and thereby reads the

undisputed embodiments of claims 10-14 out of independent claim 1, from which they depend. This results in the 

scope of dependent claims 10-14 being broader than the 

scope of independent claim 1, an outcome not permitted by 

the law – making the district court’s construction a 

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6 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

strongly disfavored one. See Alcon Research, Ltd. v. Apotex 

Inc., 687 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is axiomatic 

that a dependent claim cannot be broader than the claim 

from which it depends.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 (“A 

claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate 

by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.”). The district court’s construction is problematic for 

the additional reason that it renders dependent claims 10-

14 unintelligible, as it means these claims simultaneously 

allow and prohibit warp and weft yarns serving as securing 

yarns. We have directed courts to “strive[] to reach a claim 

construction that does not render claim language in dependent claims meaningless,” Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. 

v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 

and also to apply a “strong presumption against a claim 

construction that excludes a disclosed embodiment,” In re 

Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 

1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The construction affirmed by 

the Majority is inconsistent with these instructions.

I recognize that “[c]anons of claim construction, such as 

the doctrine of claim differentiation and the canon of interpreting claims to preserve their validity, are not absolute.” 

Cave Consulting Grp., LLC v. Optum Insight, Inc., 725 F. 

App’x 988, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also ICU Med., Inc. 

v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1376 (explaining 

claim differentiation “is not a rigid rule but rather is one of 

several claim construction tools”). While not dispositive, 

neither are these canons irrelevant, and both of them here 

support Barrday’s construction, which complies with the 

presumption that dependent claims should be “of narrower 

scope than the independent claims from which they depend,” AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 

1242 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and which may preserve the validity 

of the claims, see generally Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Solutions, LLC, 824 F.3d 999, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (“If, after applying all other available tools of claim 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 7

construction, a claim is ambiguous, it should be construed 

to preserve its validity.”). 

The Majority rightly notes that the “dependent claim 

tail” cannot be permitted to wag the “independent claim 

dog,” echoing our warning in Multilayer Stretch Cling Film 

Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1360 

(Fed. Cir. 2016). See Maj. Op. at 16. I do not find Barrday’s 

construction to run afoul of this guidance. Our point in 

Multilayer was that “the language of a dependent claim 

cannot change the meaning of an independent claim whose 

meaning is clear on its face.” Multilayer, 831 F.3d at 1360 

(emphasis added). Here, it is far from “clear on its face” 

that independent claims 1 of the ’261 and ’379 patents do 

not include embodiments lacking separate securing yarns. 

The other cases the Majority relies on, see Maj. Op. at 

14-15, provide little support for its conclusion that dependent claims 10-14 should not factor heavily in the claim construction analysis. In Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. 

v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 

we adopted a construction that rendered dependent claims 

meaningless because any other construction would have resulted in the scope of these claims contradicting limiting 

statements we read as referring to all embodiments “of the 

invention.” See also id. at 1359 (analogizing to cases involving patents with specifications referring to “the present 

invention.”). Barrday’s specifications do not similarly use 

the term “of the invention” (or the like) to limit claim 

scope.3 In Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal, 

Inc., 517 F.3d 1364, 1371-76 (Fed. Cir. 2008), we noted that 

3 To the contrary, Barrday’s specification expressly 

states that “[t]he drawings included herewith are for illustrating various examples . . . and are not intended to limit 

the scope of what is taught in any way.” ’261 patent col. 1 

ll. 51-54.

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8 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

the presumption of claim differentiation can be rebutted by 

prosecution history. Here, nothing in the prosecution history does so. See infra Part II.C. And in Enzo Biochem Inc. 

v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1154-57 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 

we held that “dependent claims cannot broaden an independent claim from which they depend,” but there is nothing in Barrday’s proposed construction that results in the 

independent claims being any broader than a person of ordinary skill in the art would find them to be, even without 

the dependent claims. See generally Curtiss-Wright Flow 

Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 

2006) (“[C]laim differentiation can not broaden claims beyond their correct scope.”) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, I conclude that the claim language, and particularly that of dependent claims 10-14 of the ’379 patent, favors a construction which allows the warp and weft yarns 

of the upper and lower layers to be securing yarns. 

B 

That securing yarns do not have to be separate structures from the upper and lower layer warp and weft yarns 

is further confirmed by the specification, which explicitly 

contemplates embodiments in which a warp or weft yarn is 

also a securing yarn. Although the specification generally 

distinguishes between securing yarns and the yarns in the 

upper and lower woven layers, and teaches that embodiments using a separate securing yarn are preferred, the 

specification also states: 

[i]n some embodiments, one or more of the warp 

yarns and/or weft yarns could be used in addition 

to, or in place of, one or more securing yarns for 

holding the two or more layers together. 

’261 patent col. 3 ll. 35-38 (emphasis added; internal citations to numbered elements omitted). The specification 

even describes one way such an embodiment could be 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 9

structured: “one or more of the warp yarns and/or weft 

yarns could be interwoven along a path similar to the path 

of the securing yarn . . . to secure the first layer to the second layer.” ’261 patent col. 3 ll. 38-42 (internal citations to 

numbered elements omitted); see also Appellant Br. at 26-

27 (“For example, every fifth lengthwise yarn could be a 

‘securing yarn’ holding the layers together, while the first 

to fourth lengthwise yarns in this example would be warp 

yarns.”); Reply Br. at 3 (“If, for example, every fifth lengthwise (warp) yarn in the upper layer of the claimed multilayer fabric is interwoven with ‘at least some’ of the upper 

yarns and some of the lower yarns, so as to secure the upper layer to the lower layer, that fifth lengthwise yarn 

would constitute a ‘securing yarn’ performing the function 

of holding the layers together and that fifth lengthwise 

yarn would be structurally distinct from the other four 

lengthwise yarns in the pattern.”).4 The Majority is incorrect, then, when it asserts that “[t]he specification exclusively refers to securing yarns as structures that are 

separate and distinct from warp and weft yarns of the upper and lower layers.” Maj. Op. at 9 (emphasis added).

Since the specification calls out that “in some embodiments” the warp and weft yarns may be used “in place of” 

securing yarns, a claim construction that mandates separate securing yarns – and thereby excludes disclosed embodiments – is most likely incorrect. See, e.g., Oatey Co. 

v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We 

4 I see nothing in the record to support a conclusion 

that these embodiments would be a “physical impossibility,” Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP, 

616 F.3d 1249, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding “hinged 

arm” could not be connected to itself), or otherwise “nonsensical,” Maj. Op. at 9. After all, Lincoln contends that its 

accused products are precisely such embodiments. See, 

e.g., J.A. 560. 

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10 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes embodiments disclosed in the specification.”). This 

is yet another mark against the district court’s construction.

In discussing this portion of the specification, the Majority says: “The excerpt suggests that warp and weft yarns 

of the upper and lower layers can only serve as the functional equivalent of securing yarns, not that securing yarns 

can be warp and weft yarns of the upper and lower layers 

as recited in the dependent claims.” Maj. Op. at 15 n.4; see 

also id. at 13 (explaining concern is with “definition, not 

function”). I do not understand how this distinction leads 

to a decision to affirm the district court, especially because 

the definition of securing yarns is all about their function, 

i.e., to hold two layers together. Elsewhere, the Majority 

recognizes that “[t]he crux of the parties’ dispute is 

whether the securing yarns claim term can include yarns 

from the upper and lower woven layers when such yarns 

are serving the securing function.” Maj. Op. at 7 (emphasis 

added). The district court likewise framed the dispute as 

one about function, writing:

As a general matter, the parties agree that, for purposes of the ’261 and ’379 patents, “securing yarns” 

are yarns that serve the function of holding the upper and lower woven layers together. What they 

dispute is whether the term applies to a warp or 

weft yarn from the upper or lower layer when such 

yarn is serving that function. 

Claim Construction Order at *6 (emphasis added). To me, 

then, this appeal is about whether warp and weft yarns can 

function as securing yarns, and the specification (like the 

claims) makes clear that they can.

I recognize that all of the figures in the specification

only depict embodiments in which the securing yarns are 

separate from the warp and weft yarns. The specification, 

however, “did not need to include a drawing of [an 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 11

embodiment] to cover that particular embodiment.” CCS 

Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002). I further recognize that the specification

teaches that the preferred embodiments of the invention 

employ separate securing yarns and criticizes embodiments lacking them. But “statements about the difficulties 

and failures in the prior art, without more, do not act to 

disclaim claim scope.” Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 

1306; see also Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 

F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[D]iscussion of the shortcomings of certain techniques is not a disavowal of the use 

of those techniques in a manner consistent with the 

claimed invention.”). Moreover, claims are not limited to 

their preferred embodiments, even when the specification 

discloses only a single embodiment. See Apple Inc. v. WiLAN Inc., 25 F.4th 960, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“Embodiments in the specification – even if there is only one embodiment – cannot limit the scope of the claims absent the 

patentee’s words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).5

5 Lincoln suggests that various passages in the specification do contain words of exclusion, but all of the statements on which Lincoln relies are discussing exemplary

embodiments, not the full scope of the claims. See ’261 patent col. 2 l. 65 – col. 3 l. 9 (“As shown, in some embodiments 

the securing yarns may be aligned with the warp or weft 

yarns.”) (emphasis added; (internal citations to numbered 

elements omitted); id. at col. 3 ll. 10-25 (describing specific 

embodiment illustrated in Figure 2); id. at col. 3 ll. 58-67 

(“The ratio between securing yarns and ballistic yarns . . . 

tends to depend on the desired inter-layer stability.”) (emphasis added); id. at col. 4 ll. 23-26 (“In some embodiments, 

the securing yarns are generally of significantly smaller denier than the warp yarns.”) (emphasis added; internal 

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12 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

Barrday’s specification, when describing the advantages of embodiments with separate securing yarns, reiterates that embodiments lacking these advantages are 

also contemplated, stating:

Generally the yarns of one layer are not interwoven 

with the yarns of another layer because such interweaving tends to increase the degree of crimp for 

the yarn in relation to [the] rest of the yarns in the 

fabric, which can create ballistic weak points.

’261 patent col. 2 ll. 36-39 (emphasis added). The patentee’s statement that the claims “generally” have separate securing yarns tells a person of ordinary skill in the 

art that the claims also extend to specific embodiments – 

which are expressly called out in column 3, lines 35-42 of 

the ’261 patent – that do not have separate securing yarns.

In sum, then, the specification, like the claim language, 

would most likely be understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art as supporting the conclusion that “securing yarns” include upper and lower layer warp and weft 

yarns when those yarns hold the upper and lower layers 

together. 

C 

“[T]he prosecution history provides evidence of how the 

PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” Phillips 

v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For 

purposes of the claim construction dispute we resolve today, the most significant event in the prosecution of 

Barrday’s patents was the addition, by amendment, of 

citations to numbered elements omitted); id. at col. 4 ll. 42-

50 (“In some embodiments, the securing yarns may be generally of a much smaller size than the warp yarns and weft 

yarns.”) (emphasis added; internal citations to numbered 

elements omitted). 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 13

dependent claims 10-14 of the ’379 patent. These are the 

claims which expressly claim embodiments in which the 

upper and lower layer warp and weft yarns function as securing yarns. The record shows that Barrday applied for 

dependent claims 10-14, in its then-pending application for 

the ’379 patent, only after learning that Lincoln’s accused 

products directly interweave upper and lower layers without separate securing yarns. See J.A. 559-60. The district 

court placed little weight on these dependent claims because of concerns about the timing and motivation by 

which Barrday obtained them. See Claim Construction Order at *11 (“[T]he probative value of a dependent claim in 

defining the scope of an independent claim is vitiated 

where the motive for creating the dependent claim appears 

to be litigation-driven.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In my view, these facts are not relevant to the claim 

construction analysis. All patent claims – even those added 

by amendment, during litigation, and with the specific intent to aid an infringement case – are presumed valid. See 

35 U.S.C. § 282. Neither the statute nor our cases makes 

any distinction in the strength of this presumption on the 

basis of the timing or motivation underlying acquisition of 

a claim. To the contrary, we have said “[i]t is not improper 

to amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor’s 

product the applicant’s attorney has learned about during 

the prosecution of a patent application.” Texas Instruments 

Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com’n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1065 (Fed. 

Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1341 

(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[B]roadening claims during prosecution 

to capture a competitor’s product is not improper.”).6

6 My colleagues distinguish Texas Instruments and

Synthes as cases in which “the specification already 

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14 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

My colleagues state that “[t]he lack of weight afforded 

to the dependent claims is particularly appropriate here 

because such claims were added after the filing of the original patent application and because the motive for adding 

such claims appears to be litigation-driven.” Maj. Op. at 

15-16. The Majority’s conclusion is not well-supported in 

the cases on which it relies. In ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris 

Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009), we 

repeated the district court’s observation that a dependent 

claim “was only added . . . years after the filing date of the 

original patents . . . and the introduction of the allegedly 

infringing . . . products.” We did not, however, accord any 

importance to this fact; for instance, we did not use it to 

devalue the weight of the dependent claims or to question 

their validity. In Cave Consulting, 725 F. App’x at 995, a 

nonprecedential opinion, we allowed that application of the 

doctrine of claim differentiation could be affected by the 

fact that dependent claims were added after the filing of an

original application, finding this to be a “significant” but 

“not dispositive” factor. But we also stressed that “had the 

originally filed application . . . in any way indicated that its 

invention included direct standardization, the later-added 

dependent claims” – which indisputably claimed direct 

standardization – “could have lent support to [the patent 

owner’s] contention that the independent claims cover direct standardization.” Id. Here there is just such an “indication,” as Barrday’s original specification always and 

expressly disclosed embodiments with no separate securing yarns. See ’261 patent col. 3 ll. 35-42. This would lead 

a skilled artisan to conclude that the dependent claims 

disclosed the embodiments” covered by the added claims. 

Maj. Op. at 16 n.5. As explained above (see supra Part 

II.B), I read Barrday’s specification as disclosing embodiments that use the warp/weft yarn “in place of” securing 

yarns – that is, the embodiments that are also the subject 

of the dependent claims.

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 15

were added for clarification and not as an (improper) expansion of claim scope. In Barkan Wireless Access Techs., 

L.P. v. Cellco P’ship, 748 F. App’x 987, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018), 

another nonbinding opinion, we found that dependent 

claims identified by the patentee did “not compel a construction of [a disputed claim term that is] inconsistent 

with the specification, particularly where these claims 

were added after the patent application filing date.” Here, 

by contrast, Barrday is not relying on dependent claims to 

compel a construction that is inconsistent with the specification.

From all this, I believe a person of ordinary skill in the 

art would find the prosecution history to be supportive of 

Barrday’s proposed construction. Certainly, there is nothing in the prosecution history that detracts from the conclusion the skilled artisan would derive from the claims 

and the specification. At worst, from Barrday’s perspective, the prosecution history is neutral.

In reaching these conclusions, I do not mean to suggest 

that one or more of Barrday’s claims cannot be found invalid or unenforceable. It may be that the breadth of the construction preferred by Barrday makes its claims more 

vulnerable to an obviousness or anticipation defense. See 

generally 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 889 

F.3d 735, 742 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a claim term must be 

broadly interpreted to read on an accused device, then this 

same broad construction will read on the prior art.”). It 

may also be that some or all of the claims would capture 

embodiments that are unsupported by the specification’s 

written description or are not adequately enabled. See, 

e.g., Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 

1155-59 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (applying patentee’s preferred 

construction and invalidating claims for lack of adequate 

written description and enablement); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. 

v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371,1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The 

irony of this situation is that [patent owner] successfully 

pressed to have its claims include a jacketless system, but, 

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16 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

having won that battle, it then had to show that such a 

claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could not meet.”). 

Because this case ended at the claim construction stage, 

the district court did not reach issues of validity or enforceability.7 I would remand to allow the parties to resume 

their litigation based on application of the correct claim 

construction.

D 

The district court did not consider any extrinsic evidence. I agree it is unnecessary to do so. See Seabed Geosolutions (U.S.) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 

1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“If the meaning of a claim term is 

clear from the intrinsic evidence, there is no reason to resort to extrinsic evidence.”). However, the parties have 

presented extrinsic evidence and have briefed their arguments regarding it. Therefore, I will briefly address it.

Like the intrinsic evidence, the extrinsic evidence here 

supports Barrday’s proposed construction. The extrinsic 

evidence is the prosecution history of Barrday’s application 

for a European patent related to its ’261 and ’379 patents. 

See J.A. 289-91, 420-23, 548-49; see also Starhome GmbH 

v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(“[S]tatements made before foreign patent offices are sometimes relevant to interpreting the claims.”). As part of the 

European prosecution, in responding to an examiner 

7 Barrday filed a motion seeking clarification as to 

whether the district court’s construction rendered dependent claims 10-14 invalid or unenforceable. It was denied 

without prejudice because the magistrate judge who handled the motion had only been referred the matter of claim 

construction. See Barrday, Inc. v. Lincoln Fabrics Inc., No. 

15-CV-165-LJV-JWF, 2021 WL 8263498 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 

28, 2021). 

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BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 17

objection, Barrday stated that the specification paragraph 

I highlighted above – including the statement that “one or 

more of the warp yarns . . . and/or weft yarns . . . could be 

used in addition to, or in place of, one or more securing 

yarns” – described features that “are not illustrated in a 

drawing or claimed, [although] these features [nevertheless] form part of an embodiment of the invention.” J.A. 

349 (emphasis added). Barrday eventually amended the 

European specification to strike reference to embodiments 

in which warp or weft yarns are used “in place of” separate 

securing yarns; thereafter, the European claims were allowed. See J.A. 355, 361.

This history – which relates to a different patent with 

different claim scope, examined and granted under a different set of patent laws – does not support a conclusion 

that the U.S. patents at issue in this appeal likewise fail to 

claim embodiments lacking separate securing yarns. To 

the contrary, because the “in place of” language remains in 

the specifications of the ’261 and ’379 patents, a person of 

ordinary skill in the art would understand the European

application to have been prosecuted with a different claim 

scope in mind.

Additionally, the European claims require securing 

yarns having different characteristics – such as tenacity, 

tensile moduli, and denier (i.e., are finer) – than the warp 

and weft yarns. See J.A. 440. The claims of the patents we 

are considering, by contrast, contain no requirement that 

the securing yarns and warp/weft yarns differ in any of 

these characteristics (and Lincoln does not contend otherwise).

From all this, a person of ordinary skill in the art would 

conclude, once again, that embodiments without separate 

securing yarns are within the scope of the claims of the U.S. 

patents that are the subject of this appeal. The extrinsic 

evidence, then, confirms what such an artisan would already have concluded based on the intrinsic evidence.

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18 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC. 

III

For all of these reasons, I would vacate the district 

court’s judgment of non-infringement and remand with instructions to conduct further proceedings based on a construction of “securing yarns” as “yarns for securing or 

holding upper and lower woven layers together.” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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