(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

JIMENEZ v. QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS 
 

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORREC-
 

TIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION 
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07–6984. Argued November 4, 2008—Decided January 13, 2009 

After petitioner’s state conviction for burglary became final on October

11, 1996, the state appellate court held in state habeas proceedings

that petitioner had been denied his right to appeal and granted him

the right to file an out-of-time appeal. He filed the appeal, his conviction was affirmed, and his time for seeking certiorari in this Court 

expired on January 6, 2004. Petitioner filed a second state habeas 

application on December 6, 2004, which was denied 355 days later,

on June 29, 2005. He then filed a federal habeas petition on July 19, 

2005, relying on 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A) to establish its timeliness.

Section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that the one-year limitations period for 

seeking review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA) begins on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the

time for seeking such review.” Petitioner argued that his judgment

became final on January 6, 2004, when time expired for seeking certiorari review of the decision in his out-of-time appeal, and that his 

July 19, 2005, petition was timely because the calculation of 

AEDPA’s 1-year limitation period excludes the 355 days “during 

which [his] properly filed application for State post-conviction . . . review . . . [was] pending,” §2244(d)(2). The District Court disagreed,

ruling that the proper start date for calculating AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period under §2244(d)(1)(A) was October 11, 1996, when petitioner’s conviction first became final. The District Court dismissed 

the federal habeas petition as time barred. The Fifth Circuit denied 

petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability. 
2 JIMENEZ v. QUARTERMAN 

Syllabus 

Held: Where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file

an out-of-time direct appeal during state collateral review, but before

the defendant has first sought federal habeas relief, his judgment is 

not “final” for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A) until the conclusion of the

out-of-time direct appeal, or the expiration of the time for seeking 

certiorari review of that appeal. This Court must enforce plain statutory language according to its terms. See, e.g., Lamie v. United 

States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 534. Under §2244(d)(1)(A)’s plain language, once the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reopened direct review of petitioner’s conviction on September 25, 2002, the conviction

was no longer final for §2244(d)(1)(A) purposes. Rather, the order 

granting an out-of-time appeal restored the pendency of the direct 

appeal, and petitioner’s conviction was again capable of modification

through direct appeal to the state courts and to this Court on certiorari review. Therefore, it was not until January 6, 2004, when time

for seeking certiorari review of the decision in the out-of-time appeal

expired, that petitioner’s conviction became “final” through “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review” under §2244(d)(1)(A). The Court rejects respondent’s argument that using the later date created by the state court’s decision to

reopen direct review, thus resetting AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period, undermines the policy of finality that Congress established in

§2244(d)(1). See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214, 220. Pp. 5–8. 

Reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 07–6984 

CARLOS JIMENEZ, PETITIONER v. NATHANIEL 

QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[January 13, 2009] 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA) establishes a 1-year time limitation for a

state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition.

That year runs from the latest of four specified dates. 28 

U. S. C. §2244(d)(1). This case involves the date provided

by §2244(d)(1)(A), which is “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Petitioner 

contends that “the date on which the judgment became

final” can be postponed by a state court’s decision during

collateral review to grant a defendant the right to file an 

out-of-time direct appeal. The District Court disagreed,

holding instead that the date could not be moved to reflect

the out-of-time appeal, and that petitioner’s federal habeas petition was untimely for that reason. The United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a

certificate of appealability. See §2253(c). We now reverse 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
2 JIMENEZ v. QUARTERMAN 

Opinion of the Court 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I 

After petitioner was sentenced for burglary in 1995, his

attorney filed an appellate brief with the Texas Court of 

Appeals pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 

(1967), explaining that he was unable to identify any 

nonfrivolous ground on which to base an appeal.1 He left a 

copy of the brief and a letter (advising petitioner of his 

right to file a pro se brief as set forth in Anders, id., at 744) 

at the county jail where he believed petitioner to be. 

Petitioner, however, had been transferred to a state facility and did not receive the delivery. The Texas Court of 

Appeals dismissed the appeal on September 11, 1996, and 

served petitioner with notice of the dismissal at the 

county-jail address that, again, was the wrong address. 

Petitioner eventually learned that his appeal had been

dismissed. He filed an application in state court for a writ 

of habeas corpus pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.,

Art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977), arguing that he was denied his 

right to a meaningful appeal when he was denied the 

—————— 

1Petitioner was indicted in August 1991 for felony burglary of a habitation, in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. §30.02 (Vernon 1989), 

enhanced by a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon under Tex. Penal Code Ann. §12.42(c) (Vernon 1974). 

He entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the 

burglary and true to the enhancement in exchange for an order of

deferred adjudication. In November 1991, the trial court deferred 

adjudication of the burglary conviction and ordered that petitioner 

serve five years of deferred-adjudication probation. In March 1995, the 

State moved to revoke petitioner’s probation based on four alleged

violations of the conditions of his probation. At a November 1995 

hearing, petitioner admitted to two of the violations. The court then 

heard testimony with respect to the other two violations and found that

petitioner had committed those violations as well. The court revoked 

petitioner’s deferred-adjudication probation, adjudicated him guilty 

of the enhanced burglary, and sentenced him to a 43-year term of

imprisonment. 
Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

opportunity to file a pro se brief. The Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals agreed and, on September 25, 2002,

granted petitioner the right to file an out-of-time appeal: 

“[Petitioner] is entitled to an out-of-time appeal in 

cause number CR–91–0528–B in the 119th Judicial 

District Court of Tom Green County. [Petitioner] is

ordered returned to that point in time at which he 

may give written notice of appeal so that he may then, 

with the aid of counsel, obtain a meaningful appeal.

For purposes of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, all time limits shall be calculated as if the sentence had been imposed on the date that the mandate 

of this Court issues.” Ex parte Jimenez, No. 74,433 

(per curiam), App. 26, 27. 

Petitioner thereafter filed the out-of-time appeal. His 

conviction was affirmed. The Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals denied discretionary review on October 8, 2003.

Time for seeking certiorari review of that decision with

this Court expired on January 6, 2004. On December 6, 

2004, petitioner filed a second application for a writ of

habeas corpus in state court; it was denied on June 29,

2005. 

Petitioner then filed a federal petition for a writ of

habeas corpus on July 19, 2005. To establish the timeliness of his petition, he relied on 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A),

which provides “the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review” as the trigger for

AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period. Petitioner argued that

his judgment thus became final on January 6, 2004,2 when 

time expired for seeking certiorari review of the decision

in his out-of-time appeal. Until that date, petitioner ar­

—————— 

2 In the District Court, petitioner contended that this date was January 8, 2004, but petitioner’s time for seeking certiorari review actually 

expired two days earlier. 
4 JIMENEZ v. QUARTERMAN 

Opinion of the Court 

gued, direct review of his state-court conviction was not 

complete.

With January 6, 2004, as the start date, petitioner 

contended that his July 19, 2005, petition was timely 

because the statute excludes from the 1-year limitations 

period “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review 

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” §2244(d)(2). Petitioner had a state habeas application pending from December 6, 2004, through June 29,

2005, so less than one year of included time—specifically,

355 days—passed between January 6, 2004, and July 19, 

2005. 

The District Court disagreed and dismissed the federal

habeas petition as time barred. In the District Court’s 

view, the proper start date for AEDPA’s 1-year limitations 

period was October 11, 1996, when time for seeking discretionary review of the decision in petitioner’s first direct

appeal expired. The District Court concluded that it could 

not take into account the Texas court’s later decision 

reopening petitioner’s direct appeal because Circuit precedent established that “‘AEDPA provides for only a linear 

limitations period, one that starts and ends on specific 

dates, with only the possibility that tolling will expand the

period in between.’” Order, Civ. Action No. 6:05–CV–05–C 

(ND Tex., Oct. 23, 2006), App. 75, 90 (quoting Salinas v. 

Dretke, 354 F. 3d 425, 429 (CA5 2004)). Therefore, the 

District Court reasoned, the limitations period began on

October 11, 1996, and ended on October 11, 1997, because 

petitioner had not sought any state or federal collateral 

review by that date.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s request for a

certificate of appealability, finding that he had “failed to

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would debate the 

correctness of the district court’s conclusion that the §2254

petition is time-barred.” Order, No. 06–11240, (May 25, 
Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

2007), App. 124, 125. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S.

___ (2008), and now reverse and remand for further 

proceedings.3 

II 

As with any question of statutory interpretation, our 

analysis begins with the plain language of the statute. 

Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 534 (2004).

It is well established that, when the statutory language is 

plain, we must enforce it according to its terms. See, e.g., 

Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 359 (2005); Lamie, 

supra, at 534; Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union 

Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000); Caminetti v. 

United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917). 

The parties agree that the statutory provision that 

determines the timeliness of petitioner’s habeas petition is

28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A). That subsection defines the 

starting date for purposes of the 1-year AEDPA limitations period as “the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review.” The only disputed 

question before us is whether the date on which direct 

review became “final” under the statute is October 11, 

1996, when petitioner’s conviction initially became final, 

—————— 

3We do not decide whether petitioner is entitled to a certificate of 

appealability on remand because we are presented solely with the

Court of Appeals’ decision on the timeliness of the petition under 28 

U. S. C. §2244(d). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,” as here, a certificate of appealability should issue only 

when the prisoner shows both “that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack 

v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added). We make no 

judgment regarding the merits of petitioner’s federal constitutional 

claims. 
6 JIMENEZ v. QUARTERMAN 

Opinion of the Court 

or January 6, 2004, when the out-of-time appeal granted 

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals became final. We

agree with petitioner that, under the plain meaning of the 

statutory text, the latter date controls. 

Finality is a concept that has been “variously defined;

like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on 

context.” Clay v. United States, 537 U. S. 522, 527 (2003).

But here, the finality of a state-court judgment is expressly defined by statute as “the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” §2244(d)(1)(A).

With respect to postconviction relief for federal prisoners, this Court has held that the conclusion of direct review occurs when “this Court affirms a conviction on the 

merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of

certiorari.” Id., at 527, 528–532 (interpreting §2255,

¶6(1)). We have further held that if the federal prisoner

chooses not to seek direct review in this Court, then the 

conviction becomes final when “the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.” Id., at 527. In construing the similar language of §2244(d)(1)(A), we see no reason to depart 

from this settled understanding, which comports with the 

most natural reading of the statutory text. See Lawrence 

v. Florida, 549 U. S. 327, 332–335 (2007) (citing Clay, 

supra, at 528, n. 3). As a result, direct review cannot 

conclude for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A) until the “availability of direct appeal to the state courts,” Caspari v. 

Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994), and to this Court, Lawrence, supra, at 332–333, has been exhausted. Until that 

time, the “process of direct review” has not “com[e] to an

end” and “a presumption of finality and legality” cannot 

yet have “attache[d] to the conviction and sentence,” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983). 

Under the statutory definition, therefore, once the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals reopened direct review of peti­
Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

tioner’s conviction on September 25, 2002,4 petitioner’s

conviction was no longer final for purposes of 

§2244(d)(1)(A). Rather, the order “granting an out-of-time 

appeal restore[d] the pendency of the direct appeal,” Ex 

parte Torres, 943 S. W. 2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), 

and petitioner’s conviction was again capable of modification through direct appeal to the state courts and to this

Court on certiorari review. Therefore, it was not until 

January 6, 2004, when time for seeking certiorari review

in this Court expired, that petitioner’s conviction became 

“final” through “the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review” under

§2244(d)(1)(A).

Respondent objects, observing that the Court has previously acknowledged Congress’ intent “to advance the 

finality of criminal convictions” with the “tight time line” 

of §2244(d)(1)(A), Mayle v. Felix, 545 U. S. 644, 662 (2005), 

which “pinpoint[s]” a uniform federal date of finality that

does not “vary from State to State,” Clay, supra, at 530, 

531. In respondent’s view, permitting a state court to

reopen direct review, and thus reset AEDPA’s 1-year

limitations period, undermines the policy of finality that 

Congress established in §2244(d)(1). But it is the plain

language of §2244(d)(1) that pinpoints the uniform date of 

finality set by Congress. And that language points to the 

—————— 

4We do not here decide whether petitioner could have sought timely 

federal habeas relief between October 11, 1997, when the 1-year limitations period initially expired, and September 25, 2002, when the state

court ordered that his direct review be reopened. Were such a petition

timely, though, it would not be through application of §2244(d)(1)(A)

because we have previously held that the possibility that a state court 

may reopen direct review “does not render convictions and sentences 

that are no longer subject to direct review nonfinal,” Beard v. Banks, 

542 U. S. 406, 412 (2004). We do not depart from that rule here; we 

merely hold that, where a state court has in fact reopened direct 

review, the conviction is rendered nonfinal for purposes of 

§2244(d)(1)(A) during the pendency of the reopened appeal. 
8 JIMENEZ v. QUARTERMAN 

Opinion of the Court 

conclusion of direct appellate proceedings in state court.

The statute thus carries out “AEDPA’s goal of promoting 

‘comity, finality, and federalism’ by giving state courts ‘the

first opportunity to review [the] claim,’ and to ‘correct’ any

‘constitutional violation in the first instance.’” Carey v. 

Saffold, 536 U. S. 214, 220 (2002) (quoting Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 436 (2000); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

526 U. S. 838, 844–845 (1999); citation omitted). The 

statute requires a federal court, presented with an individual’s first petition for habeas relief, to make use of the 

date on which the entirety of the state direct appellate

review process was completed. Here, that date was January 6, 2004. 

* * * 

Our decision today is a narrow one. We hold that, 

where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right

to file an out-of-time direct appeal during state collateral

review, but before the defendant has first sought federal

habeas relief, his judgment is not yet “final” for purposes 

of §2244(d)(1)(A). In such a case, “the date on which the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” must 

reflect the conclusion of the out-of-time direct appeal, or

the expiration of the time for seeking review of that appeal. Because the Court of Appeals denied a certificate of 

appealability based on a contrary reading of the statute, 

we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.