alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

April 1, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 02-10468

_______________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RICHARD VAN WEIR,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Civil Docket #3:99-CR-54-1-R

_________________________________________________________________

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The court has carefully considered the appeal of Richard

Van Weir based on the briefs, the excellent oral arguments of

counsel, and pertinent parts of the record. Having done so, we

conclude that we have jurisdiction and that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in its award of restitution on remand.2 The case is not moot because Van Weir’s payments to the

v ictims was not a voluntary act due to the pendency of a court

order, and because remedial relief could be effectively ordered if

Van Weir’s appeal succeeds.

We review the amount of restitution ordered for abuse of

discretion. U nited States v. Reese

, 998 F.2d 1275, 1283 (5th Cir.

1993). Van Weir contends that the calculations as to Generali and

UNI are without sufficie nt support, that the amount ordered

erroneously ignores the commission structure of the business, and

that the district court failed to offset the amount of loss of all

the victims by amounts they allegedly owed to Van Weir. Although

Van W eir’s arguments are not without force, they demonstrate

neither clear error not an abuse of discretion by the district

court. The amount of restitution was decidedly conservative, in

part because of Van Weir’s having destroyed records of hundreds of

pertinent policies for which no loss amount could be determined.

This court has held that when the restitution amount does not

exceed actual losses, an erroneous calculation of the amount is not

an abuse of discretion. U n ited States v. Calbat , 266 F.3d 358,

365-66 (5th Cir. 2001). To the extent this restitution award

cannot be more than the total loss to the victims, the district

court did not abuse its discretion. Moreover, the offsets sought

by Van Weir from the victims do not, as is required, arise from the

same acts as those underlying his criminal conviction and are not

cognizable for these purposes. Id. at 365.3 Motion to dismiss DENIED , Judgment AFFIRMED

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>           5
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This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Combined Financial Statements at June 30, 1997 for the year ended June 30, 1997
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>               0000909120
<NAME>              SWANSEA REAL ESTATE
<MULTIPLIER>        1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           2,414
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,764
<ALLOWANCES>                                        89
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 7,377
<PP&E>                                          24,899
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,136
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  33,288
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,457
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            65
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,890
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    33,288
<SALES>                                         22,197
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                22,774
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   18,374
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,553
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,847
<INCOME-TAX>                                       245
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,602
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
# C_2010148EN.01005302.xml

| 5.6.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/53 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.6.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/53

---

Order of the Civil Service Tribunal (First Chamber) of 25 March 2010 — Marcuccio v Commission

(Case F-102/08) (1)

1

(Staff cases - Officials - Despatch of the applicant’s personal effects - Action for damages - Action manifestly inadmissible - Action manifestly unfounded in law - Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure)

2010/C 148/94

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Luigi Marcuccio (Tricase, Italy) (represented by: G. Cipressa, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J. Currall and C. Berardis-Kayser, agents, and A. Dal Ferro, lawyer)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of the Commission’s decision rejecting the applicant’s request for, first, compensation for the damage allegedly suffered as a result of the despatch of his personal effects from his official lodgings in Luanda and, second, the provision of copies of the photographs taken in the course of that despatch and the destruction of all documents relating to those effects.

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | Mr Marcuccio’s application is dismissed as, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded in law. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Mr Marcuccio’s application is dismissed as, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded in law.

| 2. | Mr Marcuccio is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mr Marcuccio is ordered to pay the costs.

| 3. | Mr Marcuccio is ordered to reimburse to the Tribunal the sum of EUR 1 500. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Mr Marcuccio is ordered to reimburse to the Tribunal the sum of EUR 1 500.

---

(1)  OJ C 55, 7.3.2009, p. 52.

1

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6478

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

BRIAN MAURICE OAKMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Aiken. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.

(1:00-cr-00154-CMC; 1:03-cv-00497)

Submitted: May 31, 2007 Decided: June 8, 2007 

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian Maurice Oakman, Appellant Pro Se. Stacey Denise Haynes,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Brian Maurice Oakman seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration

of the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit

justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000); Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir.

2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Oakman has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Curtis Grant, Jr., Appellant.

— Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Danaher Jr., J.), rendered June 25, 1990, which revoked defendant’s probation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment.

Defendant argues that the sentence he received upon the revocation of his probation was harsh and excessive in light of his sincere desire to overcome his alcohol problem and his rehabilitative needs in this regard. At the time defendant admitted to violating his probation, County Court indicated that it would impose a prison sentence of *IV2*to 4Vi years. After carefully reviewing defendant’s record with respect to his rehabilitative efforts, however, the court only sentenced defendant to a prison term of 1 to 3 years. Under the circumstances, and given the fact that defendant continued to violate the conditions of his probation by testing positive for alcohol even after completing an inpatient program, it cannot be said that County Court abused its discretion in imposing sentence *(see, People v Smith,*136 AD2d 867, *lv denied*71 NY2d 1033).

Casey, J. P., Weiss, Yesawich Jr., Mercure and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 446 

AN ACT 

To extend the deadline for commencement of construction 

of a hydroelectric project. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 446 EH

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the time period 

3 specified in section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16 

4 U.S.C. 806) that would otherwise apply to the Federal En5 ergy Regulatory Commission project numbered 12737, the 

6 Commission may, at the request of the licensee for the 

7 project, and after reasonable notice, in accordance with 

8 the good faith, due diligence, and public interest require9 ments of that section and the Commission’s procedures 

10 under that section, extend the time period during which 

11 the licensee is required to commence the construction of 

12 the project for up to 3 consecutive 2-year periods from 

13 the date of the expiration of the extension originally issued 

14 by the Commission. 

15 (b) REINSTATEMENT OF EXPIRED LICENSE.—If the 

16 period required for commencement of construction of the 

17 project described in subsection (a) has expired prior to the 

18 date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission may 

19 reinstate the license for the project effective as of the date 

20 of its expiration and the first extension authorized under 
3 

•HR 446 EH

1 subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of such expira2 tion. 

Passed the House of Representatives June 12, 2017. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 446 

AN ACT 

To extend the deadline for commencement of 

construction of a hydroelectric project.
23834

#### State v. Camacho

Affirmed
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Combined Financial Statements at June 30, 1997 for the year ended June 30, 1997
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>               0000909113
<NAME>              ROSEWOOD CARE CENTER OF SWANSEA
<MULTIPLIER>        1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           2,414
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,764
<ALLOWANCES>                                        89
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 7,377
<PP&E>                                          24,899
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,136
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  33,288
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,457
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            65
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,890
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    33,288
<SALES>                                         22,197
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                22,774
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   18,374
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,553
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,847
<INCOME-TAX>                                       245
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,602
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

N o
. 1 0

- 4 0 2 5 6 C o n f e r e n c e C a l e n d a r

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P l a i n t i f f

- A p p e l l e e

v
. S A N D R A M A R I T Z A G A R C I A

- B U S T I L L O , D e f e n d a n t

- A p p e l l a n t

A p p e a l f

r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e S o u t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f T e x a s U S D C N o
. 2 : 0 9

- C R

- 9 5 4

- 1

B e f o r e K I N G , B E N A V I D E S , a n d P R A D O , C i r c u i t J u d g e s
. P E R C U R I A M : * T h e F e d e r a l P u b l i c D e f e n d e r a p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n t S a n d r a M a r i t z a G a r c i a - B u s t i l l o h a s m o v e d f o r l e a v e t o w i t h d r a w a n d h a s f i l e d a b r i e f i n

a c c o r d a n c e w i t h A n d e r s v
. C a l i f o r n i a , 3 8 6 U

. S

. 7 3 8 ( 1 9 6 7 )

. G a r c i a - B u s t i l l o h a s

n o t f i l e d a r e s p o n s e
. O u r i n d e p e n d e n t r e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d a n d c o u n s e l ’ s b r i e f d i s c l o s e s n o n o n f

r i v o l o u s i s s u e f

o r a p p e a l

. A c c o r d i n g l y , c o u n s e l ’ s m o t i o n f o r l e a v e t o w i t h d r a w i s G R A N T E D , c o u n s e l i s e x c u s e d f r o m f u r t h e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s h e r e i n , a n d t h e A P P E A L I S D I S M I S S E D

. S e e 5 T H C I R

. R

. 4 2

. 2

. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Decem ber 8 , 20 10 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C I R
. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm ined t hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C I R
. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 10-40256 Document: 00511315446 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/08/2010
June 12, 2015

U. S. Department of Transportation Docket Management System 1200 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20590

Re: Amendment to Exemption No. 11741 issued pursuant to Section 333 of the FAA Reform Act and 14 C.F.R. Part 11 in Regulatory Docket

No. FAA

- 2015

- 0892

Dear Sir or Madam:

Witt Tech LLC was issued Exemption No. 11741 (hereinafter the Exemption) for the purpose of conducting aerial data collection . Witt Tech LLC herby requests an amendment to the Exemption to allow an additional model of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) that ful l y complies with the conditions of the Exemption.

Witt Tech LLC wishes to operate the Solo quadcopter

- type UAV, manufactured by 3D Robotics, un der the same terms and conditions contained in the Exemption. Submitted

separ a tely as a con fidential document to 333exemptions @faa.gov is the Solo Aircraft Description and Operations Manual (Witt Tech LLC requests the FAA treat this document as proprietary und er 14 C.F.R. 11.35(b) and not include it in the public docket). All operations of the additional UAS will be in full compliance with the terms of the Exemption.

Witt Tech LLC believes that the addition of the Solo is within the public's interest, as it

wou ld offer additional opportunities in aerial data collection while reducing the risk to persons and property inherent in the use of manned aircraft.

Please contact the undersigned if you have any questions concerning this request for an

amendment to the Ex emption.

Best Regards,

Trevor D Witt President, Witt Tech LLC
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 15

- 00246

- CV
Stripes LLC v. Hazzem Mrayyan

On a ppeal from the County Court at Law No

. 1 of Nueces County , Texas Trial Cause No. 2013

- CCV

- 61910

- 1

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this caus e on appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed . The Court orders the appeal DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion . Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellant. We further order this decision certified below for observance. November 12, 2 015.
# C_2008092EN.01001802.xml

| 12.4.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 92/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.4.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 92/18

---

Action brought on 11 February 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Ireland

(Case C-48/08)

(2008/C 92/34)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: N. Yerrell, Agent)

Applicant:

Defendant: Ireland

Defendant:

The applicants claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2003/59/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 July 2003 on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers, amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 and Council Directive 91/439/EEC and repealing Council Directive 76/914/EEC (1), or in any event by failing to communicate them to the Commission, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Directive; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2003/59/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 July 2003 on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers, amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 and Council Directive 91/439/EEC and repealing Council Directive 76/914/EEC (1), or in any event by failing to communicate them to the Commission, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Directive;

1

| — | order Ireland to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order Ireland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The period within which the directive had to be transposed expired on 10 September 2006.

---

(1)  OJ L 226, p. 4.

1

---
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 29, 2020

No. 04-19-00773-CV

Stephen S. STOKWITZ,

Appellant

v.

Marcus TINAJERO, Charles P. Jones, and Linda Tinajero Jones,

Appellees

From the 81st Judicial District Court, Atascosa County, Texas

Trial Court No. 18-05-0464-CVA

Honorable Lynn Ellison, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Appellant’s motion for rehearing is due by December 31, 2020. On December 28, 

2020, appellant filed an unopposed motion requesting an extension until January 15, 2021 

to file his motion for rehearing. After consideration, we GRANT the motion and 

ORDER appellant to file his motion for rehearing by January 15, 2021.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 29th day of December, 2020.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-40109

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SIXTO CORTINAS-ALDAPE,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:11-CR-695-1

Before SMITH, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sixto Cortinas-Aldape pleaded guilty to being found unlawfully present in

the United States following deportation after conviction of an aggravated felony

and was sentenced to 57 months in prison to be followed by a two-year term of

supervised release. 

For the first time on appeal, Cortinas-Aldape argues that his sentence was

improperly enhanced by 16 levels under United States Sentencing Guidelines

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(I) based on his prior federal conviction for conspiracy to possess

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 1, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 12-40109 Document: 00512226180 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/01/2013
No. 12-40109

with intent to distribute cocaine. He maintains that because his prior conspiracy

conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not require an overt act, the prior

conviction does not comport with the generic, contemporary meaning of

conspiracy, and the prior conviction should not have been used as a basis for the

16-level enhancement.

We review Cortinas-Aldape’s arguments for plain error. See United States

v. Rodriguez-Escareno, 700 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 2012). The prior conviction

used to support the enhancement in this case was based on 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and

841. In considering whether a prior federal conviction for conspiracy to commit

a drug trafficking offense will justify an enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(I),

we need look no further than the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 753-54. 

We have held in this situation that the “Guidelines themselves, reasonably

interpreted,” support the enhancement. Id. at 754. Accordingly, the district

court in this case did not err, plain or otherwise, in applying the enhancement. 

Id. at 754-55.

AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 12-40109 Document: 00512226180 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/01/2013