IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 1, 2020

JASON HALE v. TURNEY CENTER DISCIPLINARY BOARD ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hickman County

No. 19-CV-6547 Michael E. Spitzer, Judge

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No. M2020-00724-COA-R3-CV

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Appellant prison inmate appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of certiorari. On 

appeal, Appellant asserts that the board failed to comply with the Uniform Disciplinary 

Procedure in imposing discipline in this case. Because the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying the appellant relief, we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

Jason Hale, Only, Tennessee, Pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Erin A. Shackelford, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, Turney Center Disciplinary Board, Timothy Thomas, 

Kevin Genovese, and Tony Parker.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

 

1 Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse 

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion 

would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it 

shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not

be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

11/25/2020
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a case involving the discipline imposed on Petitioner/Appellant Jason Hale 

(“Appellant”) by Respondent/Appellee Turney Center Disciplinary Board et al. (“the 

State”). Appellant is an inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). 

At the time of the events at issue in this case, he was housed at the Turney Center Industrial 

Complex (“Turney Center”). On October 8, 2018, Appellant was placed in segregation 

“pending investigation for the safety and security of the institution.” On October 9, 2018, 

an informant provided Turney Center officials with information that led to the discovery 

of a cell phone in a common area. Appellant was questioned on the same day, and he 

produced a SIM card that officials believed went with the confiscated cell phone. A 

disciplinary report was created concerning the incident on October 10, 2018. Appellant 

was served with the report the following day. Appellant remained in segregation. 

The disciplinary proceedings were continued three times: (1) on October 12, 2018, 

to allow Appellant “Time To Prepare”; (2) on October 18, 2018, again to allow Appellant 

“Time To Prepare”; and (3) on October 25, 2018, “For Admin Due To Scheduling[.]” 

The parties dispute what came next. Appellant contends in his brief that a 

disciplinary hearing occurred on October 26, 2018, after which he, with the advice of his 

inmate advisor, decided to plead guilty to the offense. According to the State, however, 

Appellant chose to enter the plea “in lieu of a disciplinary hearing.” In any event, Appellant 

signed a form entitled “Agreement to Plead Guilty and Waiver of Disciplinary Hearing and 

Due Process Rights” (“plea form”) on October 26, 2018. The plea form included the 

following language:

I admit I violated the above listed rule(s) and agree to plead guilty and accept 

whatever punishment the disciplinary board may impose. 

* * *

I am signing this agreement of my own free will and under no threat or 

coercion to do so. I understand that by signing this agreement, I must accept 

whatever punishment the disciplinary board may impose and will not be 

allowed to appeal. 

Although Appellant insists that the section of the plea form for “[o]ffenses and [c]ategory” 

was blank at the time he signed, all of the copies of the plea form included in the appellate 

record contain a hand-written notation in this section that provides that Appellant is to 

receive a written warning, nine-month package restriction, and three-month visit 

suspension. Appellant signed the plea form, but he asserted that it was not signed in the 
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presence of a staff witness or signed and dated by the disciplinary board chairperson.2 A 

disciplinary report hearing summary confirms that Appellant was found guilty of a “Class 

B PCT” infraction based on Appellant’s plea and given a written warning, among other 

penalties. This summary was signed by the disciplinary board chairperson or hearing 

officer on October 26, 2018. 

Appellant, however, contends that his inmate advisor “led [him] to believe” that he 

would only receive a verbal warning if he pleaded guilty to the offense. This type of 

warning was particularly important to Appellant because a written warning would cause 

him to lose his job with the Tennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction (“TRICOR”), 

which paid substantially more than other inmate jobs.

Following the written warning, Appellant alleged that he lost his TRICOR job. He 

then appealed the disciplinary finding to the Turney Center Warden, who affirmed the 

discipline. Appellant next appealed to the TDOC commissioner, who denied the appeal on 

December 12, 2018, citing as the ground that Appellant was not permitted to appeal a guilty 

plea. 

Appellant thereafter filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on February 1, 2019. 

TDOC notified the trial court on March 21, 2019, that it did not oppose the petition. The 

trial court therefore granted the writ on April 1, 2019, and ordered that the record of the 

disciplinary proceedings be filed in the trial court. Appellant filed an amendment to his 

petition on the same day. Appellant’s TDOC disciplinary report related to the subject 

offense was filed on April 23, 2019. 

Eventually, on April 27, 2020, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s 

petition. Therein, the trial court ruled that Appellant failed to show that the State “exceeded 

their jurisdiction, followed an unlawful practice, patterns, procedure, or acted illegally 

arbitrarily, fraudulently, or without material evidence to support its decision.” Moreover, 

the trial court noted that 

Possibly, if there had been a hearing, this [c]ourt would have more to 

consider, but that is not the case. While there may have been minor 

discrepancies in the exact procedure being following . . . it was all in the face 

of the petitioner surrendering the SIM card and somewhat quickly admitting 

guilt. 

The trial court therefore denied Appellant relief, and he appealed to this Court. 

 

2 There are two different copies of the plea form in the appellate record. One copy is signed only 

by Appellant. Another copy contains signatures in the spaces designated for the staff witness and 

disciplinary board chairperson, both of which are dated October 26, 2018. The copies appear to be identical 

otherwise. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves the common law writ of certiorari. See Clark v. Rose, 183 S.W.3d 

669, 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Rhoden v. State Dep’t of Corr., 984 S.W.2d 955, 

956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (“The proper vehicle for challenging a disciplinary action is a 

petition for a common law writ of certiorari. . . .”)). “Since a writ of certiorari is not 

available as a matter of right, its grant or denial is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. Such decision will not be reversed on appeal unless there is abuse of that discretion.” 

Id. at 674.

The scope of review in the trial court was also limited. According to the Tennessee 

Supreme Court, 

This writ provides a limited scope of review by the courts. Review of [a 

board’s] action in this case is limited to determining whether the board 

exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure, acted illegally, 

arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted without material evidence to support its 

decision. In proceedings involving a common law writ of certiorari, illegal, 

arbitrary, or fraudulent actions include: 1) the failure to follow the minimum 

standards of due process; 2) the misrepresentation or misapplication of legal 

standards; 3) basing a decision on ulterior motives; and 4) violating 

applicable constitutional standards. . . . 

Harding Academy v. Metro. Gov. of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 222 S.W.3d 359, 363 

(Tenn. 2007). 

Appellant raises a single issue in this appeal: whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by not recognizing or utilizing the appropriate standard of review as determined 

by the Tennessee Supreme Court. In particular, Appellant contends that the trial court 

“made its decision based on the correctness of the decision[,]” rather than his actual 

argument concerning whether unlawful procedure was followed. According to Appellant, 

the disciplinary board failed to follow the TDOC Uniform Disciplinary Procedures 

(“UDP”), and he is therefore entitled to relief from the discipline imposed. Although we 

cannot agree that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of review,3 we nevertheless 

consider Appellant’s argument on appeal that relief should be granted because unlawful 

procedure was followed in the disciplinary proceedings.

DISCUSSION

 

3 The trial court’s order specifically addresses whether proper procedure was followed, as detailed,

supra.
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I.

As an initial matter, we note that Appellant is proceeding pro se in this appeal, as 

he did in the trial court. The law is well-settled in Tennessee, however, that pro se litigants 

must comply with the same standards to which lawyers must adhere. Watson v. City of 

Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). As explained by this Court:

Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal 

treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro se 

litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system. 

However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness 

to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary. Thus, the 

courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same 

substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to 

observe.

Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *3 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011) (quoting Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2003) (internal citations omitted)). Moreover, “we have ruled that this leeway is 

generally reserved for those ‘untrained in the law.’’” Masserano v. Masserano, No. 

W2018-01592-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2207476, at *5 n.11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2019 

(quoting Lacy v. Mitchell, 541 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Hessmer, 138 

S.W.3d at 903)). Regardless of Appellant’s pro se status, his brief is fully compliant with 

Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In addition, Appellant’s arguments 

are both well-executed and properly supported. 

II.

“A prisoner seeking judicial review of a prison disciplinary proceeding states a 

claim for relief under common-law writ of certiorari if the prisoner’s complaint alleges 

facts demonstrating that the disciplinary board failed to follow the Uniform Disciplinary 

Procedures and this failure substantially prejudiced the petitioner.” Willis v. Tennessee 

Dep’t of Correction, 113 S.W.3d 706, 713 (Tenn. 2003). “Not every departure from the 

Uniform Disciplinary Procedures amounts to a due process violation warranting relief 

through a writ of common-law certiorari.” Jeffries v. Tennessee Dep’t of Correction, 108 

S.W.3d 862, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Indeed, TDOC Policy “itself provides that ‘minor 

deviations’ from the procedures that do not prejudice the prisoner do not require dismissal 

of the disciplinary offense.” Id. (quoting UDP 502.01(V) (“Minor deviations from the 

procedures set forth below shall not be grounds for dismissal of a disciplinary offense 

unless the inmate is able to show substantial prejudice as a result and that the error would 

have affected the disposition of the case.”)). “To trigger judicial relief, a departure from 

the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures must effectively deny the prisoner a fair hearing.” Id.
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Here, Appellant alleges that three violations of UDP 502.01.VI(K)(2) occurred in 

the disciplinary proceedings. The policy provides, in relevant part, as follows:

If the inmate wishes to exercise the waiver provided by this agreement form, 

he/she will sign the form in the presence of a staff witness (other than the 

reporting official) who will also sign the form. . . . The form will be attached 

to the disciplinary report and forwarded to the disciplinary board chairperson 

who will sign and date the form. The form must be completed within two 

working days after the issuance of the disciplinary report.

UDP 502.01.VI(K)(2). According to Appellant, the plea form was not witnessed or signed 

by a staff witness, was not signed by the disciplinary chairperson, and was not completed 

within two days of the issuance of the disciplinary report. Appellant further contends that 

he was confined for more than seventy-two hours prior to the disciplinary hearing in 

violation of UDP 502.01.VI(A)(b) (“Inmates who are confined in segregation pending a 

disciplinary hearing should not be confined for more than 72 hours (including weekends) 

prior to a hearing, unless the hearing is continued at the inmate’s request.”).

The State does not generally dispute these allegations, but contends that Appellant 

has not shown that he was in any way prejudiced by these failures. We agree. First, we note 

that it is unclear how the plea form could possibly have been completed within two days 

of the issuance of the disciplinary report. First, the first hearing date was continued at 

Appellant’s request. Moreover, according to Appellant’s own timeline, he did not decide 

to complete the plea form and waive his rights until October 26, 2018. As such, it does not 

appear appropriate to hold the State responsible for the violation of the two-day time 

period. 

The same is generally true of the issue regarding Appellant’s prolonged segregation. 

Here, the record reflects that Appellant requested the first two continuances. Thus, only the 

final continuance was not requested by Appellant. The policy limiting segregation unless 

a continuance is requested by the inmate, however, provides that a violation thereof should 

not result in dismissal of the disciplinary charge. Rather, the policy states that “[f]ailure to 

comply with this provision [regarding continuances] shall not constitute grounds for 

dismissal of the pending charge.” Id. As such, even though this provision may have been 

violated, it is simply not sufficient to justify dismissal of the disciplinary action against 

Appellant. 

The State also asserts that Appellant can show no prejudice for the failure of a staff 

member to witness and sign the plea form, as well as the failure of the board chairperson 

to sign it.4 We agree. Here, Appellant signed a form that specifically stated that he signed 

 

4 Again, we note that the record contains two copies of this form, one of which contained the 

necessary signatures. However, TDOC does not appear to dispute that the alleged deviations occurred. 
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of his “own free will” and agreed that by doing so, he “must accept whatever punishment 

the disciplinary board may impose[.]” Appellant does not assert that his decision to sign 

the plea form was in any way influenced by the fact that it was not also signed by the other 

required individuals. Nor does he explain how his ability to present a defense was 

prejudiced by these deviations. Rather, he simply takes issue with the punishment that the 

disciplinary board chose to impose. Indeed, Appellant does not state that he was promised 

or even expressly informed that the punishment would be lighter, but only that his inmate 

advisor “led [him] to believe” that he would only receive a verbal warning. Respectfully, 

this complaint has no relation to the procedural failures that he now contends entitle him 

to relief from his decision to forgo a hearing. 

In sum, although the record does reflect “minor deviations” from the applicable 

procedures, see Jeffries, 108 S.W.3d at 873, Appellant has not shown that he was 

“substantially prejudiced” by these failures. Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 713. Appellant is simply 

unhappy with the discipline that was imposed based on his voluntary decision to forgo a 

hearing and plead guilty to the disciplinary charges against him. There is no dispute, 

however, that Appellant was found with a SIM card for a cell phone and that he voluntarily 

chose to plead guilty to the charge of possessing a cell phone and to accepting the 

punishment that the disciplinary board chose to impose. Thus, even after a thorough review 

of the record and Appellant’s allegations, we cannot conclude that Appellant was 

effectively denied a fair hearing. See Jeffries, 108 S.W.3d at 873. As such, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s petition for relief. 

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Hickman County Chancery Court is affirmed, and this cause is 

remanded for all further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this 

Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant, Jason Hale, for which execution may 

issue if necessary. 

S/ J. Steven Stafford 

 J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE