alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 243 (Wednesday, December 20, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Page 88065]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-27880]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 2639-000]


Northern States Power Company; Notice of Authorization for 
Continued Project Operation

    The license for the Cornell Hydroelectric Project No. 2639 was 
issued for a period ending November 30, 2023.
    Section 15(a)(1) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 808(a)(1), requires the 
Commission, at the expiration of a license term, to issue from year-to-
year an annual license to the then licensee(s) under the terms and 
conditions of the prior license until a new license is issued, or the 
project is otherwise disposed of as provided in section 15 or any other 
applicable section of the FPA. If the project's prior license waived 
the applicability of section 15 of the FPA, then, based on section 9(b) 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 558(c), and as set forth 
at 18 CFR 16.21(a), if the licensee of such project has filed an 
application for a subsequent license, the licensee may continue to 
operate the project in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
license after the minor or minor part license expires, until the 
Commission acts on its application. If the licensee of such a project 
has not filed an application for a subsequent license, then it may be 
required, pursuant to 18 CFR 16.21(b), to continue project operations 
until the Commission issues someone else a license for the project or 
otherwise orders disposition of the project.
    If the project is subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that an annual license for Project No. 2639 is issued to 
Northern States Power Company for a period effective December 1, 2023, 
through November 30, 2024, or until the issuance of a new license for 
the project or other disposition under the FPA, whichever comes first. 
If issuance of a new license (or other disposition) does not take place 
on or before November 30, 2024, notice is hereby given that, pursuant 
to 18 CFR 16.18(c), an annual license under section 15(a)(1) of the FPA 
is renewed automatically without further order or notice by the 
Commission, unless the Commission orders otherwise.
    If the project is not subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that Northern States Power Company is authorized to 
continue operation of the Cornell Hydroelectric Project under the terms 
and conditions of the prior license until the issuance of a subsequent 
license for the project or other disposition under the FPA, whichever 
comes first.

    Dated: December 13, 2023.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-27880 Filed 12-19-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 113 (Thursday, July 26, 2012)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5467-S5468]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                            MORNING BUSINESS

  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate 
proceed to a period of morning business, with

[[Page S5468]]

Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________
```
# C_2021289EN.01000602.xml

| 19.7.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 289/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.7.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 289/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 3 June 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Watford Employment Tribunal — United Kingdom) — K and Others, L, M, N and Others, O, P, Q, R, S, T v Tesco Stores Ltd

(Case C-624/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Equal pay for male and female workers - Article 157 TFEU - Direct effect - Concept of ‘work of equal value’ - Claims seeking equal pay for work of equal value - Single source - Workers of different sex having the same employer - Different establishments - Comparison)

(2021/C 289/08)

Language of the case: English

Referring tribunal

Watford Employment Tribunal

Parties to the main proceedings

Claimants: K and Others, L, M, N and Others, O, P, Q, R, S, T

Respondent: Tesco Stores Ltd

Operative part of the judgment

Article 157 TFEU must be interpreted as having direct effect in proceedings between individuals in which failure to observe the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for ‘work of equal value’, as referred to in that article, is pleaded.

---

(1)  OJ C 357, 21.10.2019.

---
James Louis Ferris , Jr

Lockheed Martin Corporation MS2 1801 State Route 17C Owego, NY 13827

Lockheed Martin, through its MS2 facility located in Owego, NY, is working with the FAA to obtain experimental certification to operate its Desert Hawk UAV in the Owego area. As part of the experimental certification process Lockheed Martin is requesting exemption from the following regulations: 14 CFR Part 91.9(b) : requirement for a flight manual in the aircraft 14 CFR Part 91.203 (a) & (b) : requirement for displ ay of airworthiness certificate in the aircraft 14 CFR Part 45.22(d): Aircraft marking The Desert Hawk is a small unmanned aerial vehicle operated remotely via a ground control stations. As a UAV, the Desert Hawk does not have a location or need for a fli ght manual or on board display of an airworthiness certificate. Lockheed Martin requests an exemption from the above listed regulations as application to a UAV aircraft is not appropriate to the usage of a UAV. Lockheed Martin believes that this exemptio n is in the public interest in that both the manual and experimental certification should reside with the ground control station operator, where the operator has access to this information to support operation of the UAV . As such granting this exemption d oes not compromise safety, in any way. With respect to Part 45.22(d), the Desert Hawk UAV’s size precludes marking the UAV with a country designator and tail number in any manner that would provide for a legible display of this information. Lockheed Martin recommends maintaining this information with the ground control station. For the purposes of the experimental approval that Lockheed Martin is seeking for the Desert Hawk, the UAV will be operated within a defined area that operators will maintain lin e of sight observation of the UAV and the ability to immediately retrieve it at the conclusion of any flight. Any aircraft markings would not be of any aid to the public in identifying the UAV. As the operation of the UAV will be in a defined area, the l ack of markings will not introduce any safety issues to the public. To summarize, Lockheed Martin request exemption from 14 CFR Parts 91.9(b), 91.203(a)&(b), and 45.22(d) to support operation of the Desert Hawk UAV under an FAA Experimental Certification

. Standard aircraft markings are not suitable for the small UAV as the size constraints of the UAV would render any aircraft marking illegible due to the minute size needed to fit onto the UAV. As a UAV there is no need to carry and have available on boa rd manuals or other documentation for display. As such Lockheed Martin request exemption from these regulations with the associated information being available at the ground stations as appropriate.
**Order of the President of the of the Court of First Instance of 9 November 2007 – Poland v Commission**

**(Case T-183/07 R)**

Application for interim measures – Directive 2003/87/EC – Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading – National allocation plan for greenhouse gas emission allowances for Poland for the period from 2008 to 2012 – Commission decision rejecting that plan – Application for suspension of operation – Lack of urgency

1.                     *Applications for interim measures – Suspension of operation of a measure – Interim measures – Conditions for granting – Prima
facie case – Urgency – Cumulative nature – Weighing-up of all the interests at stake (Arts 242 EC and 243 EC; Rules of Procedure
of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2)) (see paras 17-19)*

2.                     *Applications for interim measures – Suspension of operation of a measure – Conditions for granting – Urgency – Serious and
irreparable damage (Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2)) (see paras 38-39)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | APPLICATION for suspension of the operation of Commission Decision C(2007) 1295 final of 26 March 2007, concerning the national allocation plan for greenhouse gas emission allowances notified by the Republic of Poland for the period from 2008 to 2012, in accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003, establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ 2003 L 275, p. 32). |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the application for interim measures; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Reserves the costs. |
#### Catherine Blais, Appellant, v Katherine Balzer, Respondent. (And a Third-Party Action.)

Yesawich Jr., J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Hughes, J.), entered November 5, 1990 in Albany County, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

When a branch from a tree on defendant’s residential property partially broke during a storm and severed a telephone wire, plaintiff (defendant’s daughter), plaintiff’s husband (the third-party defendant) and their 13-year-old son undertook to remedy the situation. The parties disagree as to whether defendant asked plaintiff’s husband or he volunteered to remove the branch and repair the wire; however, it is undisputed that defendant provided the ladder, rope, hand saw and chain saw for plaintiff’s husband and her son to use. Plaintiff occupied herself collecting smaller branches and debris which she carried to the woods behind the house. After the branch had been partially cut and while it was being moved with the rope, it fell in a direction other than that intended and struck plaintiff, causing serious injuries. Plaintiff sued charging that defendant, her agents and/or employees had been negligent. Defendant successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

*386Significantly, plaintiffs injuries were not caused by any unsafe condition defendant left uncorrected upon her land, but were the direct result of the attempt by plaintiff’s husband and her son to cut and remove the branch *(see, Macey v Truman, 70*NY2d 918, 919). Here, unlike the situation in *Schoonmaker v Ridge Runners Club 99*(119 AD2d 858, *appeal dismissed*68 NY2d 807), upon which plaintiff relies, defendant did not participate in the cutting activities which led to the tragic accident. Nor is *Lichtenthal v St. Mary’s Church*(166 AD2d 873) any more helpful to plaintiff’s cause, for even if it is conceded that defendant asked plaintiff’s husband and son to remove the branch and provided all of the necessary tree cutting equipment to do so, she did not, as the parties’ depositions disclose, direct or supervise the work in the slightest way. Furthermore, as the record is devoid of proof that defendant contributed to the activities of plaintiff’s husband or son in any respect, there is no merit to plaintiff’s contention that they were defendant’s agents or employees.

Finally, even assuming that this was an accident of the kind which was foreseeable under the circumstances and one that defendant failed to exercise due care to prevent, plaintiff did not establish a causal nexus between defendant’s actions and her injuries.

Casey, J. P., Mercure, Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6018
JEFFREY CLARK WATSON, SR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus JAMES B. HUNT, JR., Governor, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge. (CA-96-822-5-H3) Submitted: March 27, 1997 Decided: April 4, 1997 Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jeffrey Clark Watson, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant, a North Carolina inmate, appeals the districtcourt's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (1994), amended by Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find that this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Watson v. Hunt , No. CA-96-822-5-H3 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 20, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### R. M. OLDS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. Jack W. HOSFORD, Appellee (Plaintiff below), J. H. Kell (Third-Party Defendant below). J. H. KEIL, Appellant (Third-Party Defendant below), v. Jack W. HOSFORD, Appellee (Plaintiff below), R. M. Olds (Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff below).

Nos. 2918, 2919.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Feb. 10, 1961.

William H. Brown, Brown, Healy, Drew, Apostólos & Barton; Casper, on the brief, for appellant Olds.

Edward E. Murane of Murane, Bostwick & McDaniel, Casper, for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNSBERGER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Because of the appellee’s insistence that there was no issue before the trial court on the question of malice, fraud, oppression or willful wrong on the part of the appellee, we carefully re-examined the entire record, as well as the opinion of this court. This re-examination satisfies us that the very question now insisted upon was sufficiently considered and disposed of in the original opinion.

Furthermore, the remanding of the case to the district court for further proceedings was occasioned by the refusal of the trial court to consider or admit evidence as to recoverability of attorneys’ fees under any circumstance. This was the fundamental, error which made necessary the reversal.

Rehearing denied.

McINTYRE, J., not participating.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 112 (Wednesday, July 25, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5291]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

            By Ms. MOORE:
        H.R. 6186.
        Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       Article I, Section 8.
```
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Overton Argued by Teleconference

MELVIN ROY SPANGLER MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0527-96-3 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON MARCH 4, 1997 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE Richard C. Pattisall, Judge Jonathan M. Apgar (Damico & Apgar, on brief), for appellant. Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Melvin Roy Spangler appeals his conviction of obtaining money by false pretenses. He claims that (1) the court’s compulsion of his waiver allowing an Internal Revenue Service agent to testify violated his Fifth Amendment privilege and (2) the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction. We

affirm. The parties are fully conversant with the record in the cause, and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, no recitation of the facts is necessary. We find no merit in Spangler’s first issue. The testimony of the IRS agent did not concern any statements or admissions of the appellant. She testified that she had mailed a copy of the

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.2 tax lien to Spangler and that she had visited him at his residence in reference to the back taxes. Therefore, if any error was committed by forcing the appellant to allow the IRS agent to testify for the Commonwealth, it was harmless. The evidence presented at trial supports the conviction. On appeal, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to

the Commonwealth. See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth , 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). A judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. See Traverso v. Commonwealth , 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988). Spangler’s own testimony

demonstrated that he knew about the back taxes owed to the government. Nevertheless, he signed a document averring that no claim had been asserted against his company. This, coupled with other evidence clearly present in the record, is sufficient such that the fact finder could conclude that Spangler was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed.

Affirmed.
ex10a.htm


 







Exhibit (10)(a)

















Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm












We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in Post-Effective Amendment No. 31 to the 1933 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-145531) and Amendment No. 383 to the 1940 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 811-09763), and to the use therein of our reports dated (a) March 31, 2016, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln Life & Annuity Company of New York and (b) April 12, 2016, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln New York Account N for Variable Annuities for the interests in a separate account under individual flexible payment deferred variable annuity contracts.







/s/ Ernst & Young LLP









Philadelphia, Pennsylvania


December 27, 2016
#### In the Matter of the Habeas Corpus of Billy Joe KUNKEL, Petitioner, v. R. R. RAINES, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent.

No. A-12906.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

June 8, 1960.

*145Billy Joe Kunkel, petitioner, pro se.

Mac Q. Williams, Atty. Gen., Lewis A. Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BRETT, Judge.

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Billy Joe Kunkel, petitioner, wherein he complains that he is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty by R. R. Raines, warden of the Oklahoma State penitentiary.

The cause of his restraint is a certain judgment and sentence of 50 years on a plea of guilty entered by Honorable E. G. Carrol, judge of the District Court of Muskogee County, Oklahoma on the 2nd day of July, 1954, on a charge of robbery with firearms. The petitioner complains that he was found guilty on a plea of guilty to a charge of robbery with firearms as a second and subsequent offender. T. 21, Sec. 51, O.S.A.1951.

The gist of his petition is that the habitual criminal statute authorizing punishment for subsequent conviction (T. 21 O.S.A. 51, 1951) should not be used by the prosecution in capital felonies because there can be no cumulative punishment in a capital case. Such has been held to be the rule in capital cases where the punishment can be only life imprisonment and death, but the contrary has been held to apply to felonies involving robbery with firearms etc., although classified as capital penalties since the death penalty may be invoked but in which cases a lesser penalty of a comparatively short term of imprisonment in the penitentiary may be imposed. Sheppard v. State, Okl.Cr., 269 P.2d 791; Salisbury v. State, 80 Okl.Cr. 13, 156 P.2d 149, 151, it is held:

> “Under habitual criminal statute, 21 O.S.1941 § 51, where the subsequent conviction is for the crime of robbery with firearms, the minimum punishment which may be assessed upon conviction is any term in the State Penitentiary not less than 10 years.”

It thus clearly appears that under the foregoing authorities the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, of the person, and authority to pronounce the judgment and sentence rendered in the case presented before Judge Carrol and the defendant was not thus denied “due process of law” as alleged in his petition. Application of Kunkel, Okl.Cr., 347 P.2d 230; In re Eidenmueller, Okl.Cr., 341 P.2d 920. The petition is accordingly dismissed.

POWELL, P. J., and NIX, J., concur.
Tom Carlson 

Associate, Government Affalrs & Policy 

m. 651.587.0730 

A®®JANCED e. tcarlson@aee.net 

ENEi2GY 

ECONOMY 1101 14th St NW, Suite 1200 

Washington, OC 20005 

www.aee.net @aeenet 
a

the business voice 

m 

of advanced energy 

AEE Testimony for Hearing on EPA's Clean Power Plan 

July 30, 2014 

Washington, DC 

AEE is a national association of businesses making the energy we use secure, clean, 

and affordable. AEE also leads a State Coalition consisting of 15 partner organizations 

active in 23 states across the country and representing more than 1,000 companies and 

organizations. 

AEE strongly supports EPA's draft rule for reducing carbon emissions from electric 

power plants under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act — the "Clean Power Plan." 

AEE also sees a number of ways this proposal could be improved. 

The final rule should build on this solid foundation by: 

• strengthening the targets set for advanced energy technologies; 

• allowing periodic review of targets to reflect technological progress; 

• rewarding early use of these technologies; and 

• recognizing the 40 technologies described in AEE's Advanced Energy 

Technologies for Greenhouse Gas Reduction report as compliance 

mechanisms for states. 

AEE believes that EPA's Clean Power Plan provides a historic opportunity to modernize 

our electric power system for the 21 st century. This rule will drive investment in an 

electric power system that is sorely in need of it. 

Many of the technologies that are already changing the U.S. electric power system also 

help to reduce carbon emissions. A recent AEE report, Advanced Energy Technologies 

for Greenhouse Gas Reduction, details 40 separate technologies that provide these 

improvements. These technologies include energy efficiency, demand response, natural 

gas electricity generation, solar, wind, hydropower, nuclear, smart grid, and energy 

storage. 

AEE applauds EPA for referencing, by name, many of these advanced energy 

technologies in its proposal. We urge EPA to clarify the value of advanced energy 

technologies further by recognizing the 40 technologies described in the 

Advanced Energy Technologies for Greenhouse Gas Reduction report as 

compliance options for states. 

Already, by including so many of these established and market-tested technologies as 

compliance options, EPA has made the targets it sets for states easy to achieve. 

Nonetheless, advanced energy can contribute more to emissions reduction and electric 

system modernization than the draft rule anticipates. Specifically, the Clean Power 

www.aee.net@aeenet Washington DC San Francisco eoston 
completed prior to 2020. This will encourage, rather than discourage, early action 

toward state targets and stimulate investment. 

Finally, EPA should also provide for periodic updates of the standard in order to reflect 

the progress that is already taking place in emission-reducing technologies — and will 

only accelerate in response to the EPA rule. 

Thank you for giving AEE the opportunity to provide input on this vitally 

important rule.