Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A04-1701-PL-185 | February 22, 2018 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Jason R. Delk

Daniel J. Gibson

Delk McNally LLP

Muncie, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory A. Neibarger

Briana L. Clark

Meaghan Klem Haller

Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

John H. Brooke

Brooke-Stevens, P.C.

Muncie, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Samuel D. Pitman, II,

Individually and as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of 

Samuel D. Pitman, the Estate of 

Samuel D. Pitman, and Steven 

Pitman,

Appellants-Plaintiffs,

v.

Stanley Pitman, Selena Hall, 

Drury Hall, and SDP 

Manufacturing, Inc.,

Appellees-Defendants.

February 22, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A04-1701-PL-185

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit 

Court.

The Honorable Marianne L. 

Vorhees, Judge.

Trial Court Cause No.

18C01-1304-PL-15
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Shepard, Senior Judge

[1] Samuel D. Pitman, II, individually and as the executor of the Estate of Samuel 

D. Pitman, the Estate itself, and Steven Pitman appeal the trial court’s 

judgment in favor of Stanley Pitman, Selena Hall, Drury Hall, and SDP 

Manufacturing, Inc. We affirm.

[2] SDP is a family-owned, closely-held corporation. It was originally incorporated 

in 1992. SDP manufactures digging devices that are used to install telephone 

poles and similar equipment in hard-to-navigate areas such as utility easements.

[3] SDP’s original incorporators were Samuel Pitman, his wife Dixie Pitman, 

attorney John Brooke, and Samuel and Dixie’s children: Samuel D. Pitman II

(who we will refer to as David to avoid confusion), Steven Pitman, Stanley 

Pitman, Selena Hall, and Scott Pitman. All of the children worked at SDP at 

various times over the years. Later, an ownership share was granted to Selena’s 

husband, Drury Hall.

[4] Samuel Pitman left SDP in 1995, retaining his two ownership shares in the 

company. David also left the company in 1995, retaining his one share. Before 

they left SDP, Samuel and David started S.D. Pitman, Inc., which competes 

with SDP. Steven left SDP in 1998, but he also retains his ownership share.

[5] Stanley, Selena, and Drury have continued to run SDP, and Scott is an

employee. In 1998, SDP created a deferred compensation plan and trust for 

key management employees. That same year, Stanley and Selena incorporated 
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Easement Equipment Specialists (EES), a separate entity which purchased 

manufacturing equipment that was in turn leased to SDP. In 2003, SDP 

created a second deferred compensation plan and trust, which was intended to 

keep Scott as an employee. Also in 2003, Stanley, Selena, and Scott 

incorporated SSS Land Group, which purchased land and leased it to SDP. 

Stanley and Selena also created Southpaw Enterprises, which was a passthrough entity through which SDP’s laborers were paid.

[6] From 1995 through today, the siblings (and Dixie and Samuel, prior to her 

death in 1996 and his death in 2011) have disputed the way SDP and its assets 

are managed, including SDP’s intellectual property and SDP’s deferred 

compensation plans. In 1995, SDP, Stanley, Selena, Steven, and Dixie sued 

David, Samuel, and S.D. Pitman, Inc. in Blackford Circuit Court, alleging 

claims that included theft of trade secrets. Steven was dismissed from the 

lawsuit at his request after he left SDP. David and Samuel asserted 

counterclaims such as breach of fiduciary duty. As we discuss in more detail 

below, David and Samuel argued that Stanley, Selena, and Scott were 

managing SDP for their own personal benefit, to the detriment of SDP’s other 

shareholders.

[7] The Blackford Circuit Court dismissed the case with prejudice in 2005, per the 

parties’ agreement. No money was exchanged as part of the dismissal. Instead, 

the parties agreed “to stop all the court proceedings and be able to go on our 

separate ways.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 141.
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[8] Meanwhile, in 1998, Samuel, David, and Steven sued SDP in Delaware 

County, seeking a court-ordered shareholders’ meeting. They claimed the 

shareholders had failed to schedule a required meeting, in violation of SDP’s 

bylaws. They later sought to amend their complaint to request SDP’s 

dissolution, arguing the shareholders had “conducted a sham Annual Meeting.” 

Tr. Ex. Vol. II, p. 238. They further alleged the “incumbent Directors,” 

referring to Stanley, Selena, and Drury, were “motivated by a fraudulent desire 

to maintain their corporate authority.” Id. at 242. This case was later 

dismissed without prejudice. See also Pitman v. Pitman, 717 N.E.2d 627 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1999) (dispute between Steven and Stanley over Steven’s failure to return 

an SDP-owned backhoe that he had borrowed).

[9] The current case began in 2013, when David, Samuel’s estate, and Steven (who 

we collectively refer to as David) sued Stanley, Selena, Drury, and SDP (who 

we collectively refer to as Stanley), along with the two employee benefit trusts. 

David claimed Stanley breached a fiduciary duty to manage the company fairly 

and in good faith for the benefit of all shareholders. David further claimed 

Stanley engaged in constructive fraud by paying inflated salaries and bonuses to 

SDP’s officers and by granting dividends to Stanley, Selena, and Drury that 

were not paid to other shareholders.

[10] Stanley filed an answer denying the alleged breach of fiduciary duty and a 

motion to dismiss the claim of constructive fraud. Among other defenses, 

Stanley argued David’s complaint was “barred, in whole or in part, by the 

doctrines of estoppel, equitable estoppel, release, waiver, accord and 
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satisfaction, and payment.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 94. The court denied 

Stanley’s motion to dismiss. Stanley next filed an amended answer in which he 

restated his defenses of estoppel and equitable estoppel.

[11] On June 6, 2014, Stanley filed a motion for partial summary judgment. David

responded, and Stanley replied. On January 13, 2015, the court granted the 

motion as to the two employee benefit trusts, dismissing them from the case.

[12] The parties attempted to mediate their case but were unsuccessful. On June 1, 

2016, Stanley filed another motion for summary judgment, alleging David’s 

claims were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Stanley also filed a 

motion to amend his answer to add a defense of res judicata. The court granted 

the motion to amend, stating David would not be prejudiced. After a bench 

trial limited to the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the court issued 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon, concluding David’s claims were 

barred. This appeal followed.

[13] David first argues the court erred in allowing Stanley to amend his answer to 

add an affirmative defense of res judicata, claiming Stanley waived that defense 

by failing to include it in his initial answer to the complaint and instead waiting 

three years to request the amendment.

[14] When a party seeks to amend a responsive pleading after the deadline has 

elapsed, the amendment is allowed “only by leave of court or by written 

consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be given when justice so requires.” 

Ind. Trial Rule 15(A). It is within the trial court’s sound discretion to grant a 
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party leave to amend an answer to add an affirmative defense. Shewmaker v. 

Etter, 644 N.E.2d 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), adopted by Supreme Court, 659 

N.E.2d 1021 (1995). In general, leave to amend should be given unless the 

amendment would result in prejudice to the opposing party. Fowler v. Brewer, 

773 N.E.2d 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[15] David argues the amendment prejudiced him because he had already spent

hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney’s fees and expert witness fees

litigating the case when the amendment occurred. We disagree. David cannot 

claim to be surprised by the issue because Stanley’s initial answer raised 

“estoppel” as a defense, which should have put him on notice that past conduct 

was at issue. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 94. Further, the trial court allowed 

the parties to conduct additional discovery on the newly-added affirmative 

defense, allowing David time to investigate and adjust his strategy. For these 

reasons, the trial court acted within its discretion by allowing the amendment.

[16] David next argues the court erred in admitting certain evidence during the 

evidentiary hearing, claiming the court considered evidence that was irrelevant 

to the parties’ claims. Stanley responds that David waived this argument by 

failing to timely object during trial. We disagree with Stanley because David 

objected on grounds of relevance at several points during the hearing. See Reply 

Br. p. 22 (listing objections in transcript).

[17] A ruling regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. Carlson v. Warren, 878 N.E.2d 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
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We reverse only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances. Id.

[18] In general, relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is not 

admissible. Indiana Evid. Rule 402. Evidence is relevant if:

(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence; and 

(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.

Ind. Evidence Rule 401.

[19] David claims Stanley presented irrelevant evidence as to: (1) the creation of 

one of the employee benefit trusts and the incorporation of EES and SSS Land 

Group; and (2) the circumstances under which Samuel, David, and Steven left 

SDP. Having reviewed the evidence, and keeping in mind that the main claim 

on appeal is the applicability of res judicata, we conclude the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. The timing and circumstances of 

the creation of the trusts and the corporations are relevant to whether David 

could have addressed those issues in the Blackford County litigation. Similarly, 

evidence pertaining to the circumstances under which Samuel, David and 

Steven left SDP are relevant to establishing David’s knowledge of how the 

defendants ran SDP and compensated executives during the Blackford County 

litigation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

[20] The final issue is whether the trial court erred in granting judgment to Stanley 

on grounds of res judicata. The court entered findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon, and our standard of review is two-tiered. Briles v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 858 
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N.E.2d 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We review for clear error whether the 

evidence supported the findings, then whether the findings supported the 

judgment. Elwood v. Parker, 77 N.E.3d 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. 

Error is clear when our review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a 

mistake has been made. Id. We do not reweigh evidence and consider only the 

evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Stevenson v. Cty. Comm’rs of 

Gibson Cty., 3 N.E.3d 1062 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[21] Res judicata serves to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are 

essentially the same. Hilliard v. Jacobs, 957 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), 

trans. denied. A claim is precluded under res judicata if these four requirements 

are met:

(1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of 

competent jurisdiction;

(2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits;

(3) the matter now in issue was, or could have been, determined 

in the prior action; and

(4) the controversy adjudicated in the prior action must have 

been between the same parties to the present suit or their privies.

Richter v. Asbestos Insulating & Roofing, 790 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2003), trans. denied. A dismissal with prejudice is conclusive of the rights of the 

parties and is res judicata as to any claims that might have been litigated. Id. In 

determining whether res judicata applies, it is useful to inquire whether 

identical evidence will support the issues in both actions. Id.
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[22] The crucial dispute here is whether David’s current claims were determined, or 

could have been determined, in the Blackford County case, which was litigated 

from 1995 to 2005. In the Blackford County case, David and Samuel filed a 

counterclaim alleging “breach of fiduciary duty” by Stanley, Selena, and Scott. 

Tr. Ex. Vol. I, p. 222. Specifically, David and Samuel claimed Stanley, Selena, 

and Scott stood “in a fiduciary relationship to [SDP] and to other shareholders” 

and were not permitted to “promote their self interest in derogation of their 

fiduciary duty.” Id. at 221. They further alleged Stanley, Selena, and Scott had 

“caused to be issued” three shares of SDP stock to an employee deferred 

compensation trust, which had the effect of advancing their own interests to the 

detriment of SDP, David, and Samuel. Id. at 221-22. David and Samuel 

argued Stanley, Selena, and Scott had “seize[d] control of the corporation by 

diluting the stock of the counterclaimants, [froze] out other shareholders and 

diminish[ed] the value of their interest in [SDP].” Id. at 222. David and 

Samuel requested compensatory damages and “remediation” of Stanley, 

Selena, and Scott’s acts. Id.

[23] David and Samuel pursued discovery in the Blackford County case, sending 

146 interrogatories to the plaintiffs. In addition, they requested a protective 

order to prohibit SDP’s board of shareholders from meeting, claiming Stanley, 

Selena, and Scott were acting “for their exclusive benefit and for the purpose of 

enabling them to acquire a controlling interest in the corporation.” Id. at 229. 

David and Samuel also accused them of “fraudulent” behavior “as to the other 

shareholders of [SDP].” Id. In 2002, David and Samuel informed the court 
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they were “in the process of pursuing their claims, but need[ed] additional time 

in which to complete discovery and complete their preparation for trial, if the 

case cannot be settled.” Id. at Vol. II, p. 36.

[24] SDP’s board of shareholders met while the Blackford County case progressed. 

During a meeting in 1998, David accused the board of misconduct including 

“fail[ure] to maintain proper corporate records, [failure to] properly conduct 

meetings, . . . issu[ing] cash bonuses and other sorts of misuse.” Id. at 190. 

Further, David, Samuel and Steven filed a case in Delaware County in 1998 

accusing SDP of failing to hold regularly scheduled shareholders’ meetings and 

engaging in fraudulent behavior intended to freeze them out of the 

corporation’s operations.

[25] In summary, during the long-running Blackford County litigation, David and

Samuel argued that Stanley, Serena, and Scott breached their fiduciary duties as 

shareholders of SDP and engaged in fraudulent behavior to gain control of 

SDP, dilute the value of David and Samuel’s shares, and enrich themselves 

through deferred compensation plans and undisclosed cash payments. David 

and Samuel further claimed Stanley, Serena and Scott had damaged the value 

of their shares in SDP. They pursued discovery as to the plaintiffs’ claims and 

had ample opportunity to seek information about their counterclaims.

[26] In the current case, David alleged in his complaint that Stanley “took control 

over the operations of [SDP] to the complete exclusion of Samuel David 

Pitman, Samuel David Pitman II, and Steven Pitman.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 
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II, p. 69. He further alleged that Stanley created a deferred compensation trust 

to “dilute the ownership interest” of David, Steven, and their father and 

exclude them from control of SDP. Id. David also claimed SDP’s shareholders 

had not held regular meetings and refused to provide him with information as 

to salaries and bonuses for officers, as well as dividends or distributions.

[27] David further accused Stanley of breaching his fiduciary duties by:

a. Freezing Plaintiffs out of the management and operation 

of the Corporation;

b. Freezing Plaintiffs out of the fruits and benefits of their 

shareholder/ownership interests in the Corporation, 

including compensation, benefits, distributions and 

dividends;

c. Failing to deal with Plaintiffs in a fair, honest and open 

manner with respect to the business and operation of the 

Corporation;

d. Failing to apprise Plaintiffs of certain significant 

management and financial decisions related to the 

Corporation;

e. Failing to make proper distributions of profits, earnings, 

and/or dividends to Plaintiffs;

f. Failing to follow corporate formalities with respect to the 

notice and meeting requirements for the shareholders and 

board of directors;

g. Improperly diluting the shareholder interest of Plaintiffs 

for an improper purpose and without following proper 

procedures;

h. Improperly withholding profits, earnings, dividends and 

distributions to Plaintiffs by diverting earnings of the 

Corporation back to the Individual Defendants in the form 

of inflated salaries, bonuses and corporate perks; and
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i. Engaging in self-dealing by providing Individual 

Defendants with unreasonable compensation in an effort 

to prevent earnings from passing to the remaining 

shareholders.

[28] Id. at 74-75. David further alleged in the complaint that Stanley committed

constructive fraud by deceiving him about SDP’s income while paying himself

“inflated salaries and bonuses,” thus engaging in self-dealing. Id. at 76.

[29] Here, the trial court did not err in determining that David’s claims of breach of 

fiduciary duty and constructive fraud could have been resolved during the 

Blackford County case and were thus barred by res judicata. The same issues –

alleged hiding of information, self-dealing, improper salaries and bonuses –

arose in both cases. Further, the specific acts David complains of, including the 

establishment of the deferred compensation trusts and the new companies that 

are owned by Stanley and sell equipment or rent land to SDP, occurred during 

the Blackford County case. David had ample opportunity to conduct discovery 

to develop his claims of breach of fiduciary duty and fraud in that case, during 

which he would have learned of SDP’s method for calculating salaries, the 

existence of the deferred compensation trusts, and the existence of EES and SSS 

Land Group. See Hilliard, 957 N.E.2d 1043 (claims including breach of 

fiduciary duty and constructive fraud barred by res judicata; claims could have 

been raised in prior case involving the same contract).

[30] David argues that if res judicata bars his claims, then Stanley is free to commit 

new breaches of his fiduciary duties or additional acts of constructive fraud 

without being held accountable. He further states res judicata does not bar 
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claims based on acts that occurred after the prior litigation ended. As a general 

principle David is surely correct, but in this case he has not pointed to any 

actions that he could not have discovered and addressed in the Blackford 

County case. The record supports the trial court’s findings that SDP has used 

the same formula to calculate directors’ salaries since the 1990s. Further, there 

is no indication that SDP’s agreements with EES and SSS Land Group have 

changed from the days of the Blackford County case. In addition, David and 

Steven separately and repeatedly expressed concerns about lack of access to 

SDP financial information while the Blackford County case was pending. The 

same evidence would have been used in both cases. Cf. Afolabi v. Atlantic Mortg. 

& Inv. Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (mortgage foreclosure action 

not barred by res judicata due to prior foreclosure case; plaintiff alleged and 

demonstrated new wrong acts based on different evidence, specifically a new 

failure to make timely mortgage payments).

[31] We need not address the parties’ arguments as to collateral estoppel. For the 

reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[32] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Baker, J., concur.