PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ DARLENE COLLINS; BAIL BOND ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO; RICHARD MARTINEZ; BILL SHARER; CRAIG BRANDT; CARL TRUJILLO, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. CHARLES W. DANIELS; EDWARD L. CHAVEZ; PETRA JIMENEZ MAEZ; BARBARA J. VIGIL; JUDITH K. NAKAMURA; NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT; NAN NASH; THE SECOND JUDICIAL COURT; HENRY A. ALAINZ; ROBERT L. PADILLA; BERNALILLO COUNTY METROPOLITAN COURT; JAMES NOEL; BERNALILLO COUNTY; BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, COUNTY OF BERNALILLO, Defendants - Appellees. Nos. 17-2217 and 18-2045

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 1:17-CV-00776-RJ-KK)

________________ _________________ Richard Westfall, Hale Westfall , Denver, Colorado (A. Blair Dun n and Dori E. Richards, Western Agriculture, Resource and Business Advocates, LLP, Albu querque, New Mexico, with him on the briefs), appearing for Appellants. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 25, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Ari Biernoff, Office of the New Mex ico Attorney G eneral, Santa Fe, New Mexico, appearing for Appellees Charles W . Daniels, Edward L. Chavez, P etra Jimenez Maez, Barbara J. Vigil, Judith K. Nakamura, the New Mexico Supreme Co urt, Nan Nash, the Second Judicial Court, Henry Ala inz, Robert Padilla, the Bernal illo County Metropolitan Court, and James Noel. Brandon Huss, The New Mexico A ssociation of Coun ties, Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the brief for Appellee County Commissi oners of the County of Bernal illo.

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , MATHESON , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ BRISCOE , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ This is a § 1983 case that chall enges the constitutionality of New Mexico’s system of bail. Plaintiffs-Appe llants Darlene Collins, the Bai l Bond Association of New Mexico (“BBANM”), and five New Mexico state legislators (th e “Legislator Plaintiffs”) allege th at New Mexico’s system of bail violates t he Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, a s well as the procedural and s ubstantive components of the Due Process Clau se of the Fourteenth Amendmen t. 1 Plaintiffs further allege that the rules gove rning New Mexico’s system of bail were promulgated by the New Mexico S upreme Court in violation of the New Mexico Constitution. Defendants-Appellees are the New Mexico Supreme Court and its justices; the Second Judicial Dis trict Court of New Mexico, its chief judge, and its

1 Plaintiffs have withdr awn their claim thatNew Mexico’s system of bail violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions against unreasonab le search and seizure. Aplt. Reply. Br. at 14.3 court executive officer; and th e Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court, its chief judge, and its court executive officer. 2 Defendants moved to dismiss, ar guing that Plaintiffs lack stand ing, Defendants are immune from suit, and Plain tiffs have failed to state a cla im. Defendants also moved for Rule 11 sanctions on th e basis that Plaintiffs’ attor neys filed suit without adequately researching the viab ility of Plainti ffs’ claims. Pl aintiffs then moved for leave to amend their co mplaint to add a claim that Defendants’ Rule 11 motion violated Plaintiffs’ Firs t Amendment rights. The district court granted Defe ndants’ motion to dismiss becaus e it found that BBANM and the Legislator Plainti ffs lack standing, Defendants a re immune from suit, and Plaintiffs failed to sta te a claim. The district cou rt also granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend. P laintiffs timely appealed. 3 Exercising jurisdiction pursuan t to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFI RM.
I A. Legal Background As of 2014, when bail hearings w ere held in New Mexico, judges commonly set the amount of any secured bail bond based “solely on the na ture of [a

2 Plaintiffs have withdr awn their appeal from the dismissal of t heir claims against the Board of County Comm issioners of the County of Bern alillo. Aplt. Reply. Br. at 19 n.10.

3 Appeal No. 17-2217 concerns the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case and denial of Plaintiffs’ motion fo r leave to amend. App eal No. 18-2045 conc erns the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. The appeal s have been consolidated for p rocedural purposes. Dkt. No. 10546176.4 defendant’s] charged offense with out regard to individual deter minations of flight risk or continued dang er to the community.” State v. Brown , 338 P.3d 1276, 1292 (N.M. 2014). The New Mexico Supr eme Court held that this pract ice was impermissible because “[n]eitherthe [New Mexico] Constitution nor [New Mexico’s] rules of criminal procedure pe rmit[ted] a judge to base a pretr ial release decision solely on the severity of the charged offense.” Id. The Court explained that “[s]etting money bail based on th e severity of the crime leads to either release or detention, determined by a defe ndant’s wealth alone instead of being based on the factors relevant to a particular defendant’s risk of nonappeara nce or reoffense in a particular case.” Id. In March 2016, the New Mexico legislature proposed amending the state constitution to change how the sta te administers bail. S.J. Re s. 1, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2016). The amendment was ratified by popular referendum in November 2016. The relevant provision now reads: All persons shall, before convict ion, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offe nses when the proof is evident or the presumption great and in situations in which bail is specifical ly prohibited by this section. Exce ssive bail shall not be requir ed, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cru el and unusual punishment infli cted. Bail may be denied by a court of record pending trial for a defendant charged with a felonyif the prosecuting authority re quests a hearing and proves by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions will reasonabl y protect the safety of any ot her person or the community. An a ppeal from an order denying bail shall be given preference over all other matters. A person who is not detainabl e on grounds of dangerousness nor a flight risk in the absence of bond and is otherwise eligi ble for5 bail shall not be detained solely because of financial inabilit y to post a money or property bond. A def endant who is neither a danger nor a flight risk and who has a financial inability to post a moneyor property bond may file a moti on with the court requesting relie f from the requirement to post bo nd. The court shall rule on the motion in an expedited manner. N.M. Const. art. II, § 13. In July 2017, the Supreme Court of New Mexico revised the state ’s Rules of Criminal Procedure to implementthe recent constitutional amend ment (the “2017 Rules”). The relevan t provisions state: Pending trial, any defendant elig ible for pretrial release unde r Article II, Section 13 of the NewMexico Constitution, shall be ordered released pending trial on the defendant’s personal recognizance or upon the executi on of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount set by the cour t, unless the court makes written findings of particularized reasons why the release will not reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required. The court may impose non- monetary conditions of release . . . , but the court shall impose the least re strictive condition or combinati on of conditions that will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required and the sa fety of any other person or the community. N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401(B). If the court makes findings o f the reasons why release on personal recognizance or unsecure d appearance bond, in additionto any non-monetaryconditions of release, w ill not reasonably ens ure the appearance of the defendant as required, the court may requ ire a secured bond for the defendant’s release. N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401(E). The 2017 Rules were meant to “cla rify that the amount of [a] se cured bond must not be based on a bond schedul e, i.e., a predetermined sch edule of monetary amounts fixed according to the nat ure of the charge.” N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401 cmt.6 (referring to N.M. R. Crim. P. 5 -401(E)(1)(d)). “Instead, [a] court must consider [each] individual defendant’s fin ancial resources and must set secured bond at the lowest amount that will reasonabl y ensure the defendant’s appea rance in court after the defendant is released.” Id. (referring to N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401(E)(1)(a)–(c)). Depending on a defendant ’s custodial status , a “district court shall conduct a hearing . . . and issue an order setting th e conditions of rele ase as soon as practicable, but in no event later than” three to five “days after the date of arrest.” N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401(A)(1). “The chief judge of [each] district court may [also] designate by written court order re sponsible persons to implement . . . pret rial release procedures . . . .” N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-401( N). Per these procedures, “[a ] designee shall release a defendant from custody prior to t he defendant’s first appearanc e before a judge if the defendant,” id. , (1) “has been arrested and deta ined for [most] . . . misdemea nor[s]” and other “[m]inor offenses,” ( 2) “qualifies for pretrial relea se based on a risk assessment and a pretrial release schedule approved by the Supr eme Court,” or (3) “qualifies for pretrial release under a local release on recogn izance program that relies on individualized assessme nts of arrestees and has been approved by order of the Supreme Court,” N.M. R. Cri m. P. 5-408(B)–(D). When a defe ndant is released pursuant to Rule 5-408, he is “re leased on personal recognizanc e on [his] . . . promise to appear and subject to . . . st andard conditions of release.” N.M. R. Crim. P. Form
9-302.7 B. Factual Background Two additional events underlie P laintiffs’ claims. First, in l ate 2016, the Second Judicial District Court of New Mexico and the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court—acting through their chief judges and court executive officers— signed a memorandum of understandi ng with the Laura and John Ar nold Foundation, allowing the courts to use the Arnold Tool to perform risk asse ssments of criminal defendants prior to their bail hearings. App. Vol. I at 29, 65 –72. The Arnold Tool, formally known as the Public Saf ety Assessment, “ considers nine factors to measure the risk an eligible defendant w ill fail to appear in court and the risk he or she will engage in new criminal ac tivity while on release.” Holland v. Rosen , 895 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Public Safety Assessment - What is the PSA , https://www.psapretrial.org/about/what-is-psa(last visited February 4, 2019). Plain tiffs allege that “[t]he use o f the Arnold Tool result[s] in persons a ccused of a crime be ing denied the opport unity to secure their pre-trial release through a secu red bond as the tool requires t he court[,] thr[ough] an entirely opaque program[,] to a ssess non-monetary conditions of release that infringe upon a person’s pretrial lib erty.” App. Vol. I at 29. Second, on Saturday, July 1, 201 7—the first day when the 2017 Rules were in effect—Plaintiff Darlene Collins was arrested for “aggravated a ssault arising out of a domestic dispute,” id. at 32, a fourth degree felony, N .M. Stat. § 30-3-2. Plaintiff s allege that, prior to the effec tive date of the 2017 Rules, “th e jailhouse could have set a reasonable, non-excessive, mone tary bail to ensure . . . Coll in’s [sic] appearance at8 arraignment and then for trial .” App. Vol. I at 33. But the j ailhouse “could not, under the new Supreme Court Rules[,] consider releasing . . . C ollins subject to monetary bail,” even though Collin s’s “family was prepared to u se their own financial resources with the ass istance of a member of . . . BB ANM to pay the required amount for pre-a rraignment release.” Id. Instead, “Collins was incarcerated for almost 5 full days” before h er arraignment in Bernalillo Co unty Metropolitan Court on July 5, 2017. Id. at 33, 272–75. “[N]o cond itions were [ultimately] imposed upon her release post-arra ignment and pre-trial other t han a verbal order from the Court that she was bei ng released, but she was not all owed to return to her home.” 4 Id. at 33. C. Procedural Background Plaintiffs Collins, BBANM, 5 and the Legislator Plainti ffs brought this case as a putative class action on behalf of all New Mexico criminal de fendants whose bail hearings have been o r will be conducted using the 2017 Rules orthe Arnold Tool.
Id. at 36. Plaintiffs allege that the 2017 Rules and the Arnold T ool violate the Excessive Bail Clause of the Ei ghth Amendment “by permitting ju dges to consider

4 Plaintiffs’ allegation that Co llins was not allowed to return home is not fully supported by documents attached t o their motion for a prelimina ry injunction. In a sworn declaration, Co llins stated that she “was released on [he r] own recognizance with no conditions . . . .” App. Vol. I a t 122–23 (emphasis added). Moreover, the order setting Collins’s conditions of release does not prohibit Collins from returning home. Id. at 274–75.

5 BBANM “is a professiona l membership organi zation comprised of bail bond businesses licensed to do busin ess and operating throughout New Mexico.” App. Vol. I at 23.9 secured bond only when it is deter mined that no other condition s of release will reasonably assure the eligible d efendant’s appearance in court when required.” Id. at 42. According to Plaintiffs, this “subordinat[ion] [of] secure d bond” “effectively takes secured bonds off the tabl e as an option” for courts deci ding whether to release a defendant pending trial. Id. Plaintiffs further allege that “ Defendants violate the procedur al component of the Due Process Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment “[b]y impos ing libertyrestricting conditions on . . . Col lins and other presumptively innocent criminal defendants without offering them t he historically-required opti on of non-excessive monetary bail.” Id. at 44. Plaintiffs also allege t hat “Defendants . . . violate Plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] because the option of non-excessive bail for a baila ble offense is fundamental to our scheme of ord ered liberty and deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Id. (quotation marks and empha sis omitted). Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the New Mexico Supreme Court exceeded it s authority, under the New Mexico Constitution, whe n promulgating the 2017 Rules. 6 Id. at 34–35. Plaintiffs seek damages, a declar ation that the 2017 Rules and use of the Arnold Tool are unconstitutional , and an injunction against fut ure use of the 2017 Rules and the Arnold Tool. Id. at 47–48. Plaintiffs sued the New Mexico Supreme

6 Plaintiffs’ allegation that the N ew Mexico Supreme Court viola ted the New Mexico Constitution when it prom ulgated the 2017 Rules is not e numerated as a claim in the complaint. See App. Vol. I at 34–35. Neverth eless, the parties and the district court treated it as a claim.10 Court, the Second Judicial Distr ict Court, and the Bernalillo C ounty Metropolitan Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 24–26. Plaintiffs also sued the justices of the New Mexico Suprem e Court, as well as the chief judges and court executive officers of the Second J udicial District Court of New Mexico and the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court. Id. Plaintiffs sued thes e defendants in their individual capacities for damages and in their official capacit ies for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss, ar guing that Plaintiffs lack stand ing; sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims against the courts themselves and the state officials in their official capacities; leg islative immunity bars Plainti ffs’ claims against the supreme court justices; judicial immunity bars Plaintiffs’ clai ms against the state court judges and court executive officers; and Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim.
Id. 171–99. While their motion to d ismiss was pending, Defendant s moved for Rule 11 sanctions. App. Vol. II at 445 –58. Defendants argued that they were entitled to sanctions because Plaintiffs’ couns el pursued unwarranted claim s without offering a reasonable argument to modify exi sting law on standing or immun ity. After being served with Defendants’ motion for sanctions, Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add a claim for “vio lations of the Fi rst Amendment [from the] vindictive prosecution undertaken by” Defendants. Id. at 362. Plaintiffs argued that “Defendants undertook to threaten and intimidate Plaintiffs int o abandoning their Free Speech and their right of ac cess to the Courts through the service of a11 defamatory Rule 11 [m]otion dir ected personally at Plaintiffs’ counsel.” Id. at 361–
62. The district court granted the motion to dismiss after finding that BBANM and the Legislator Plaintiffs lacked standing; that Plaintiffs’ cla ims against the state courts and individual defendants, in their official capacities, are barred by sovereign immunity; that Plain tiffs’ claims against the state court judge s and court executives, in their individual capacities, are barred by judicial immunity ; that Plaintiffs’ claims against the state supreme court justices, in the ir individual c apacities, are barred by legislative immunity; and that P laintiffs failed to state a cla im. The district court granted the motion for sanctions because it found that there wa s no objectively reasonable basis for Plaintiffs t o think that BBANM or the Legi slator Plaintiffs had standing, or that Plaintiffs coul d overcome Defendants’ immunit ies. The district court also found that BBANM and the Legislator Plaintiffs were named as plaintiffs for an improper purpose. Finally , the district court denied th e motion to amend as futile. Plaintiffs timely app ealed all three rulings.
II We review de novo whether Plaintiffs have standing. S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Palma , 707 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2013). “Each p laintiff must h ave standing to seek each form of re lief in each claim.” Am. Humanist Ass’n, In c. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1 , 859 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10t h Cir. 2017) (quoting Bronson v. Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 1106 ( 10th Cir. 2007)).12 “[S]tanding ‘is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or -controversy requirement of Article III.’” S. Utah Wilderness All. , 707 F.3d at 1153 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff mus t show: “(1) it has suffered an ‘injuryin fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challen ged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to me rely speculative, that the injury w ill be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. La idlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)).
A. BBANM Plaintiffs argue that BBANM has standing because it (1) “has as sociational standing,” Aplt. Br. at 30, and (2 ) “has third-party standing t o assert the constitutional rights of potential customers [who will be] deni ed bail,” id. at 32. 7 In

7 Plaintiffs further allege that BBANM’s member companies “have been severely [financially] harmed by the drastic reduction in the n umber of defendants given the option of jailhouse b onds or secured bonds.” App. Vo l. I at 32. This echoes Plaintiffs’ argument in dis trict court that the 2017 Rul es deprive BBANM’s members of a “constitutionally pro tected property interest in e ngaging in one’s chosen profession.” App. Vol. II at 302. But Plaintiffs do no t allege a deprivation of a protected property interest in their First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs only allege violations of criminal defenda nts’ rights under the Fourth, Eig hth, and Fourteenth Amendments. App. Vol . I at 40–47. Therefore, even assuming th at BBANM can satisfy Article III’s standing requirements based on its member s’ economic injury, we must still examine whether BB ANM has standing to assert the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. Kowalski v. Tesmer , 543 U.S. 125, 128–29 & n.2 (2004). (continued . . .)13 reality, whether BBANM has standi ng is only a question of third -party standing. “An association has . . . s tanding” “to raise [t he] claims of [its] members” “only if: ‘(a) its members would otherwise have s tanding to sue in their own right ; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane t o the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.’” Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson , 594 F.3d 742, 756 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n , 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). We need only consider t he first prong of associationa l standing. Because BBANM’s members are not crimina l defendants, they do not posses s the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights assert ed in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Therefore, like BBANM itself, BBANM’s members only have standing if they can as sert the constitutional rights of c riminal defendants. “Ordinarily, a party ‘ must assert his own legal rights’ and ‘ca nnot rest his claim to relief on th e legal rights . . . of third parties.’” Sessions v. Morales-Santana , 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (quoting Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). “But we recognize an exception wh ere . . . ‘the party asserting the right has a close relationship with the person wh o possesses the right and there is a hindrance to the possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting

(cont’d) BBANM does not argue that it has standing to assert the claim t hat the 2017 Rules “infringe[] upon the power o f the [New Mexico] Legislatur e to make law.” App. Vol. I at 35.14 Kowalski , 543 U.S. at 130). Neither BBANM nor its members are eligible for this exception to the rule agains t third-party standing.
In Kowalski , two attorneys challenged a stat e statute that generally prohi bited the “appointment of appellate cou nsel for indigents who plead g uilty.” 543 U.S. at 128. The plaintiffs alleged that the “statute denied indigents their federal constitutional rights to due pro cess and equal protection.” Id. The Supreme Court held that “the attorneys [did] not have third-party standing to assert the rights of . . . indigent defendants de nied appellate counsel.” Id. at 134. First, the Court reasoned that, because the attorneys sough t to assert the rights of “as yet unascertained . . . criminal defendants” whose rights would be violated, “[t]he att orneys . . . [did] not have a close relationship with their alleged clients; indeed, t hey [had] no relationship at all.” Id. at 130–31 (quotation ma rks omitted). Next , the Court explaine d “that the lack of an attorney . . . is [not ] the type of hindrance necess ary to allow another to assert the indigent def endants’ rights.” Id. at 132. Proceeding pro se, the indigent defendants could assert their c onstitutional rights on direct a ppeal and in collateral proceedings. Id. at 131–32. Like the attorneys in Kowalski , BBANM and its members lack third-party standing. First, BBANM and its m embers have “no relationship a t all,” id. at 131, with “potential customers deniedbail under” the 2017 Rules and the Arnold Tool, Aplt. Br. at 32. Second, criminal defendants in New Mexico are not hindered in asserting their own constitutiona l rights in their own criminal proceedings or in a § 1983 suit, as Collins has done h ere. Plaintiffs argue that c riminal defendants are15 hindered in asserting their own rights because th ey need “a thi rd-party willing to expend funds to challenge the constitutionality of the” 2017 Ru les, especially because criminal defendants subj ect to pretrial conditions of r elease “need to prepare for their criminal t rial[s].” Aplt. Br. at 33–34. But the cri minal defendants in
Kowalski were not hindered in asserting their constitutional rights eve n though they were proceeding pro se and needed to prepare for their criminal appeals, likely while in custody. 543 U.S. at 131–32. B. The Legislator Plaintiffs “[A] threshold question in the l egislator standing inquiry is w hether the legislator-plaintiffs assert an institutional injury.” Kerr v. Hickenlooper (Kerr II ), 824 F.3d 1207, 1214 ( 10th Cir. 2016). “[I] ndividual legislator s may not support standing by alleging only an institutional injury.” Id. “[A]n institutional injury constitutes some injury to the pow er of the legislature as a wh ole rather than harm to an individual legislator.” Id. “[I]nstitutional injuries . . . do not ‘zero in on any individual’” legislator and are “‘widely dispersed’ and ‘necess arily impact all members of a legislature equally.’” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Inde p. Redistricting Comm’n , 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015)). Plaintiffs suggest that the Legi slator Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the 2017 Rules because the rules rep resent “an unconstitutional usu rpation of16 [legislative] power by” the New Mexico Supreme Court. 8 Aplt. Br. at 36. In our view, it is difficult to conceive of a better example of an ins titutional injury. The injury alleged by Plaintiffs “is based on [a] loss of legislati ve power that necessarily impacts all members of the [New Mexico Legislature] equally.” Kerr II, 824 F.3d at 1215. Therefore, the Legislat or Plaintiffs lack standing. Id. at 1217. In an attempt to eva de our holding in Kerr II , Plaintiffs contend that their situation is “ sui generis ” because the Legislator Pl aintiffs’ claim involves a “separation-of-powers component .” Aplt. Reply Br. at 22–23. N otwithstanding that Plaintiffs waive this argument by first raising it in their Rep ly Brief, In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litigation , 872 F.3d 1094, 1105 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2017), a “case [that] presents separation of powers concerns” merits a r igorous standing inquiry, Kerr II , 824 F.3d at 1215 (citing Ariz. State Legislature , 135 S. Ct. at 2665 n.12). Rather than advance thei r standing argument, Plaintiffs have highlighted a facet of their case that weighs against concluding that the Leg islator Plaintiffs have standing.
C. Darlene Collins Defendants do not challenge Collin s’s standing on appeal, thoug h they did unsuccessfully raise the issue be fore the district court in the ir motion to dismiss. We can raise issues of standing and mootness sua sponte because we “have an independent obligation to deter mine whether subject-matter juri sdiction exists, even

8 The Legislator Plaintiffs do notargue that they have standing to assert the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of criminal defendants.17 in the absence of a challe nge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “Plaintiffs have th e burden to demonstrate standin g for each form of relief sought.” Lippoldt v. Cole , 468 F.3d 1204, 1216 (10t h Cir. 2006). This burden exists “at all times thro ughout the litigation,” id. , though our terminology changes depending on the stage of litiga tion. “[M]ootness ‘[is] the do ctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requi site personal interest that must exist a t the commencement of the litigation (standing) must c ontinue throughout its existenc e (mootness).’” Brown v. Buhman , 822 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10t h Cir. 2016) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona , 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)). Collins seeks damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive re lief. App. Vol. I at 47–48. When Collins filed suit, she had standing to seek damages for the alleged deprivation of her constitutional rights. 9 See Faustin v. City, Cty. of Denver , 268 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 2001). H er claim for damages is not m oot; a damages award would still compensate Collin s for her alleged injury. Lippoldt , 468 F.3d at 1216–17. The same is true insofar as Colli ns seeks a retrospective decla ratory judgment that her constitutional rights we re violated in July 2017. Id. at 1217. But Collins also seeks prospectiv e relief, in the form of a dec laratory judgment and a permanent injunction. App . Vol. I at 47–48. Assuming th at Collins had standing to seek prospective relie f when she filed suit, Collin s’s claims for

9 Collins does not have standing to pursue the claim that the 20 17 Rules “infringe[] upon the power of the [New Mexico] Legislature to m ake law,” App. Vol. I at 35. Collins cannot assert the state legislature’s legisla tive power. Sessions , 137 S. Ct. at 1689.18 prospective relief are now moot because she is no longer subjec t to pretrial supervision. Lippoldt , 468 F.3d at 1217–19; Oral A rgument at 5:35–5:45 (representation by Plaintiffs’ c ounsel that New Mexico is not p ursuing criminal charges against Collins). Moreover, a plaintiff cannot susta in a claim for prospective in junctive relief that is based on “specu lative future harm.” Lippoldt , 468 F.3d at 1218. Plaintiffs have never suggested that Collins faces an appreciable risk of future arrest and subsequent arraignment using th e 2017 Rules and the Arnold Tool . “[T]o establish an actual controversy . . . , [Co llins] would [need] . . . to a llege that [she will] . . . have another encounter with the police.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983); see also O’Shea v. Littleton , 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (“We assume that respondents will conduct th eir activities w ithin the law a nd so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposur e to the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by petitioners.”). “Abs ent a sufficient likelihood th at [she] will again be wronged in a similar way, [Collins ] is no more entitled to an i njunction than any other citizen of [New Mexico]; a nd a federal court may not ente rtain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that [a state’s laws] . . . are unconstitutional.” Lyons , 461 U.S. at 111. In summary, BBANM and the Legisl ator Plaintiffs lack standing t o assert the claims raised in this case; Co llins has standing to seek damage s and retrospective declaratory relief based on the alleged violation of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; but Collins’s claims for prosp ective declarat ory and injunctive19 relief are moot. Therefore, we turn to the question of whetherDefendants are immune to Collins’s claims for d amages and retrospective declar atory relief.
III We review de novo whether Defe ndants are immune from suit. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n , 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2010) (sovereign immunity); Lundahl v. Zimmer , 296 F.3d 936, 938 (10th Cir. 2002) (judicial immunity); Kamplain v. Curry Ct y. Bd. of Comm’rs , 159 F.3d 1248, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998) (legislative im munity). “The proponent of a c laim to absolute immunity bears the burden of est ablishing the justification forsuch immunity.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc. , 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). Three immunity doctrines are at issu e in this case—sovereign immunity, judicia l immunity, and legislative immunity. W e address each in turn. A. Sovereign Immunity Per the Eleventh Amendment, “[s]t ates may not be sued in federa l court unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pur suant to a valid exercise of power, unequivocally e xpresses its intent to abroga te the immunity.” Muscogee (Creek) Nation , 611 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Green v. Mansour , 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)). “This prohibition en compasses suits against state agencies[ and] [s]uits against state officials acting in their official capacities.” Id. (citations omitted). But, “[u]nder Ex parte Young [, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)], a plain tiff may avoid the Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition on suits a gainst states in federal cour t by seeking to enjoin a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.” Cressman v. Thompson ,20 719 F.3d 1139, 1146 n.8 (10th Cir. 2013) (quota tion marks omitt ed). Collins has sued three New Mexico courts and various state officials in the ir official capacities to obtain declaratory and injunctiv e relief. New Mexico has not c onsented to this suit and Congress has not a brogated New Mexico’s immunity from Plain tiffs’ § 1983 claims. Muscogee (Creek) Nation , 611 F.3d at 1227. The refore, we must decide whether the New Mexico courts n amed as defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity and whether Ex parte Young allows Collins to procee d against the state officials in their official cap acities. Plainti ffs’ discussion of sovereign immunity is limited to a single sentence in their Opening Brief. See Aplt. Br. at 48. Plaintiffs’ “conclusory assertion[] . . . do[ es] not adequately present us with an argument . . . , so we [could] consider [ the point] abandoned.” Stender v. Archstone-Smith Operating Tr. , 910 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir . 2018). We briefly address sov ereign immunity to more clearly explai n our disposition of Collins’s c laims. “As a general matter, state cour ts are considered arms of the s tate” and are entitled to sovereign immunity. 13 Charles Alan Wright & Arthu r R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3524.2 (3d ed. 2018). The gen eral rule holds true in this case. The New Mexico Supreme C ourt, the Second Judicial Distri ct Court, and the Bernalillo County Metropolitan C ourt are state agencies. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 1 (“The judicial power of the stat e shall be vested in . . . a su preme court, a court of appeals, district courts; . . . a nd such other courts inferior to the district courts as may be established by law from time t o time in any district, county or municipality of the state.”); N.M. Stat. § 34-6-21 ( “The district courts are agenci es of the judicial21 department of the state governme nt.”); N.M. Stat. § 34-8a-8 (“T he metropolitan court is an agency of the judicial dep artment of state government.”). Therefore, sovereign immunity bars Collins’s claims aga inst the New Mexico Supreme C ourt, the Second Judicial District Court, and th e Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court. Collins’s claims against the sta te officials in their official capacities also fail. Collins cannot proceed under Ex parte Youngbecause she only has standing to seek retrospective declaratory relief. 10 Ex parte Young“may not be used to obtain a declaration that a state officer has violated a plaintiff’s fed eral rights in the past.” Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med. , 159 F.3d 487, 495 (10t h Cir. 1998) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. , 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). Therefore, sovereign immunity als o bars Collins’s claims agains t the individual defendants in their o fficial capacities. B. Judicial Immunity “Like other forms of official i mmunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 11

10 The district court, when anal yzing Collins’s demand for prospe ctive declaratory and injunctive reli ef, found that Collins could not proceed under Ex parte Young . App. Vol. III at 667–68. The dis trict court reasoned that Ex parte Young was inapplicable because “Plaintiffs f ail[ed] to state a claim for an ongoing violation of federal law.” Id. at 668. “But the inquiry int o whether suit lies under Ex parte Young does not include an analysis o f the merits of the claim.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n , 535 U.S. 635, 646 (2002). “In d etermining whether the doctri ne of Ex parte Youngavoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint al leges an ongoing violation of federal law and seek s relief properly characterize d as prospective.” Id. at 645 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). Collins does no t raise this error in the district court’s reasoning.22 (1991) (per curiam) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The “immunity applies only to per sonal capacity claims.” Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham , 640 F.3d 1140, 1156 (10th Cir. 2011). At issue here is wheth er the chief judges and court executive office rs of the Second Judicial Dist rict Court and the Bernalillo County Metropolitan C ourt are immune from Collins’s claims for damages. In two sentences of th eir complaint, Plain tiffs allege that the Second Judicial District Court and the Bernali llo County Metropolitan Court “ad opted and implemented the” Arnold Tool. 11 App. Vol. I at 20; see also id. at 29. In the district court, Plaintiffs argued that t hese were “administrative,” not judicial, acts. App. Vol. II at 298. The district court found that judicial immunity bar red Plaintiffs’ claims against the chief judges and c ourt executive officers, in theirindividual capacities, because Plaintiffs’ claims targete d the judicial act of “implem ent[ing] [] the 2017 Rules.” App. Vol. III at 670. I n their briefing on appeal, Pl aintiffs never discuss how the district court erred wh en analyzing judicial immunity. In a single clause

11 Chief Judge Nash, Chief Judge A laniz, Court Executive Officer Noel, and Court Executive Officer Padilla are only mentioned in the capti on of the complaint and in the list of parties. A pp. Vol. I at 17, 25–26. Their n ames also appear in an attachment to the complaint. Id. at 66, 71. “[I]n a § 1983 action it is ‘particularly important’ that ‘[a] complaint make clearexactly who is allege d to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the bas is of the claims against him or her, as distinguished fro m collective allegations agains t the state.’” Brown v. Montoya , 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10t h Cir. 2011) (quoting Kansas Penn Gambling, LLC v. Collins , 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 ( 10th Cir. 2015)). Here, Collins’s alleg ations are so sparse that it is difficult to iden tify the factual basi s for her claims against the state court judges and cour t executive officers.23 from the section of their Openi ng Brief discussing Rule 11 sanc tions, Plaintiffs passingly characterize adoption of the Arnold Tool as a “minist erial decision[].” Aplt. Br. at 46. Plaintiffs have abandoned their argument rega rding judicial immunity by failing to address th e district court’s analysis orcite authority for their position. Stender , 910 F.3d at 1117; see also, e.g. , Benham v. Ozark Materials River Rock, LLC , 885 F.3d 1267, 1276 (10th Cir. 2018) (concluding that appella nt waived argument “by inadequately briefi ng the issue”). “[T]he court c annot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constru cting arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (desc ribing limits of our r ole when litigants proceed pro se; Plaintiffs are represented by counsel). C. Legislative Immunity “Absolute legislative immunity a ttaches to all actions taken ‘i n the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.’” Bogan v. Scott-Harris , 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove , 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951 )). “Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature o f the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Id. A state “[c]ourt and its me mbers are immune from suit when acting in their legislativ e capacity,” such as by promulga ting “rules of general application [that] are s tatutory in character.” Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. , 446 U.S. 719, 731–34 (1980). Pla intiffs do not dispute that24 New Mexico’s Rules of Criminal P rocedure are “rules of general application.” 12 Id. at 731. Therefore, the justices of the Supreme Court of New Me xico “act[ed] in their legislative capacity” wh en they amended the state’s rules of cr iminal procedure in
2017. Id. at 734. Instead, Plaintiffs focus on whet her the 2017 Rules are the res ult of “legitimate” legislative activity . They argue that the New Mex ico legislature retains legislative power over criminal defendants’ substantive right t o bail, such that the New Mexico Supreme Court exceeded its legislative power when pr omulgating the 2017 Rules. Aplt. Br. at 18–20, 4 9–51; Aplt. Reply Br. at 14–1 9. “To find that [an action] has exceeded the bounds o f legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of f unctions exclusively v ested in” another br anch of government. Tenney , 341 U.S. at 378. That is not t he case here. The New Mexico legislature has given the New Mexico Supreme Cour t the power to promulgate rule s of criminal procedure. The supreme court of New Mexico shall, by rules promulgated by it from time to time, regulate plead ing, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in all cour ts of New Mexico for the purpos e of

12 Plaintiffs repeatedly suggest t hat promulgating the 2017 Rules was an enforcement action, such that l egislative immunity would not ap ply. Aplt. Br. at 46, 50. Plaintiffs cite Consumers Union for the proposition that legislative immunity does not bar a suit for declarat ory and injunctive relief again st a state supreme court and its justices when the defenda nts exercised their own “autho rity . . . to initiate [disciplinary] proceedings aga inst attorneys.” 446 U.S. at 736 . This analysis does not apply here because Plaintiffs have not sued the justices of the New Mexico Supreme Court for enforcing the 2017 Rules. See App. Vol. I at 19–20. As explained in Consumers Union , legislative immun ity applies when a case arises from a court’s promulgation of gener ally applicable rules. 446 U.S. at 731–34.25 simplifying and promoting the sp eedy determination of litigatio n upon its merits. Such rules sha ll not abridge, enlarge or modif y the substantive rights of any litigant. N.M. Stat. § 38-1-1. The deleg ated authority is not unlimited, but Plaintiffs have not pointed to anything suggesting th at the New Mexico legislature exercises exclusive legislative authority over bail. 13 Therefore, it is not “obvi ous” that the New Mexico Supreme Court justices have exce eded the legislative authority vested in them by N.M. Stat. § 38-1-1, which means that the justices are entitled to l egislative immunity for claims arising from their pro mulgation of the 2017 Rules. Tenney , 341 U.S. at 378–79; see also Sable v. Myers , 563 F.3d 1120, 1126 (10th Cir. 2009) (refusing to “adopt a ve ry restrictive view of what is le gitimate legislative activity” (quotation marks omitted)). In summary, sovereign immunity bar s Collins’s claims against th e state courts and state officials in their official capac ities; Plaintiffs ha ve abandoned their argument regarding judicial imm unity, which disposes of Collins ’s claims against the state court chief judges and c ourt executive offi cers in their individual capacities; and legislative immunity b ars Collin’s claims ag ainst the supreme c ourt justices in their individual capacities.

13 We have identified two statutes that substantively discuss bai l. Both envision a necessary role for th e New Mexico Supreme Court, fur ther demonstrating that the Court has legislative au thority over the procedural as pects of bail. See N.M. Stat. § 31-3-1 (“Any statutory provision or rul e of court gover ning the release of an accused may be carried out by a responsible person designated b y the court.”); N.M. Stat. § 31-3-5 (“No bond shall be accepted from a paid surety . . . by a . . . district court unless executed on a form w hich has been approved by the supreme court.”).26 “Absolute immunity [undoubtedly] has its costs” for plaintiffs like Collins who seek to vindicate thei r constitutional rights. Snell v. Tunnell , 920 F.2d 673, 687 (10th Cir. 1990). “The rationale for according absolute immuni ty in the civil rights context is to incorporate tradi tional common law immunities and to allow functionaries in the judicial s ystem the latitude to perform th eir tasks absent the threat of retaliator y § 1983 litigation.” Id. at 686–87 (footnote omitted). “Though such suits might be satisfying personally for a plaintiff, they could jeopardize the judicial system’s ab ility to function.” Id. at 687. “[S]uits against judges [are not] the only available means through wh ich litigants can p rotect themse lves from the consequences of judicial error.” Forrester , 484 U.S. at 227. Collins could have raised the alleged error in her criminal proceedings. See id. Collins could have also named defendants who caused her pretrial detention and supervis ion but are not members of the state judiciary. See, e.g. , Holland v. Rosen , 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 723 (D.N.J. 2017), aff’d 895 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2018) (na ming as a defendant the person who “enforce[ed] the pretri al release conditions”). To bring it all together, Collins is the only Plaintiff with st anding, but Defendants are immune to her cl aims, so we do not address the m erits of Collins’s claims that the 2017 Rules and th e Arnold Tool violate the Eigh th and Fourteenth Amendments. 14 Rather, we turn to the issue of sanctions.

14 As explained throughou t this Opinion, no Pl aintiff has standin g to pursue the claim that the New Mexico suprem e court justices violated the N ew Mexico (continued . . .)27 IV Before discussing the district c ourt’s imposition of Rule 11 sa nctions, we briefly address appellate juri sdiction. We ordered briefing on the question of whether there is a final appeal able order because the sanctions order contemplates a “future final award” of attorney ’s fees and does not define the amount of interest applicable to the sanctions a ward. Dkt. No. 10550099 at 3–4. “[I]n considering whether a judgment is ‘final’ under § 1291, the ‘label used to describe the judicial demand is not controlling,’ meani ng we ‘analyze the substance o f the district court’s decision, not its label or form.’” Dodge v. Cotter Corp. , 328 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Albright v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. , 59 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 1995)). “[A] sanction order against an a ttorney currently of record is not a final decision for purposes of a § 1291 appeal where the underlying c ontroversy remains unresolved.” Howard v. Mail-Well Envelope Co. , 90 F.3d 433, 435 ( 10th Cir. 1996). Even once the merits o f a case have been r esolved, “an appeal f rom the award of sanctions may not be taken until the amount has b een determined .” Turnbull v. Wilcken , 893 F.2d 256, 258 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Phelps v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka , 807 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986)). Here, the district cour t’s order imposing Rule 11 sanctions is a final appealable order because the substance of the

(cont’d) Constitution by promulgating the 2017 Rules. Therefore, we nee d not discuss that claim further.28 case has been resolved and the pa rties have stipulated that the sanction is $14,868.00. App. Vol. III at 636–77, 678–79 , 732–33. The funds have been d eposited in the registry of the district court , where they are earning interest

. Id. at 732–33. Turning to the substance of the issue, “[w]e review for an abus e of discretion the district court’s . . . im position of Rule 11 sanctions.” King v. Fleming , 899 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2018). “U nder this standard, we will rev erse a district court only ‘if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law oron a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. , 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). “[T]he a ward of Rule 11 sanctions invol ves two steps. The district court first must find th at a pleading violates Rule 11 .” Adamson v. Bowen , 855 F.2d 668, 672 (10th Cir. 1988). “The second step is for th e district court to impose an appropriate sanction.” Id. Rule 11 states: By presenting to the court a ple ading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, fili ng, submitting, or later advocati ng it—an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and b elief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstanc es: (1) it is not being present ed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost o f litigation; [and] (2) the claim s, defenses, and other legal contenti ons are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or fo r establishing new law . . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11 “ imposes . . . an affirmative d uty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before filing.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc. , 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991). We “e valuate [an attorney’s] condu ct29 under a standard of ‘objective re asonableness—whether a reasona ble attorney admitted to practice before the district cour t would file such a document.’ ” Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc. , 793 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Adamson , 855 F.2d at 673). “Because our adver sary system expects lawyers to zealously represent their clients, [the Rule 11] standard i s a tough one to satisfy; an attorney can be rather aggressive and still be reasonable.” Id. When, as here, a pleading contai ns allegations that are not war ranted by existing law, we examine whether they are “warranted ‘by a nonf rivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reve rsing existing law or for esta blishing new law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). Again, we employ an objective standard “intended to eliminate any ‘empty-head pure-h eart’ justification for patentl y frivolous arguments.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory commi ttee’s note to 1993 amendment. But, when we analyze the frivolity of an atto rney’s arguments, “it is not su fficient for an offending attorney to allege that a compet ent attorney could have made a colorable claim based on the facts and law at issue; t he offending attorney must actu ally present a colorable claim.” White v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 908 F.2d 675, 680 (10th Cir. 1990) “[P]laintiffs may not shield th eir own incompetence by arguing that, while they failed to make a colorable argument, a competent attorney would have d one so.” Id. After holding a hearing, the dis trict court granted the motion for sanctions because (1) the Legislator Plai ntiffs and BBANM “ha[d] no objec tively reasonable basis for asserting standing to sue” and (2) “Plaintiffs’ claim s for money damages against . . . Defendants are fr ivolous because . . . Defendants are protected by well-30 established immunity doctrines.” 15 App. Vol. III at 687–90. The district court also found that “Plaintiffs’ counsel a dded the [L]egislator Plaintif fs and [BBANM] as parties to this case for [an] improper purpose—namely, for poli tical reasons to express their opposition to lawful bail reforms in the State of New Mexico rather than to advance colorable claims for judicial relief.” Id. at 687. The district court ordered A. Blair Dunn, one of Plaintiffs ’ attorneys, to pay the attorne y’s fees and costs incurred by Defendants because of the Rule 11 violation; the sa nction amounted to $14,868.00. Id. at 692, 732–34. The district court followed the correct two-step process for im posing a Rule 11 sanction. Adamson , 855 F.2d at 672. As we explain below, the district court’s analysis of the evidence was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Defendants’ motion forRule 11 sanctions. 16
Roth v. Green , 466 F.3d 1179, 1188–90 (10th Ci r. 2006) (holding that distric t court

15 Plaintiffs argue that the Rule 11 hearing was deficient becaus e Plaintiffs should have been allowed to pro duce evidence. Aplt. Br. at 54. The hearing was not deficient. “Although a party mu st receive notice and an opportunity to respond before being sanctioned under Ru le 11, ‘[t]he opportunity to fu lly brief the issue is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.’” Dodd Ins. Servs., In c. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. , 935 F.2d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omit ted) (quoting White , 908 F.2d at 686).

16 Plaintiffs argue that sanctions were inappropriate because Col lins’s constitutional claims were not f rivolous. Aplt. Br. at 44. Bu t the relative quality of Collins’s constitutional claims i s not dispositive because “a p leading containing both frivolous and nonfrivolous claim s may violate Rule 11.” Dodd Ins. Servs. , 935 F.2d at 1158. This is not a case in w hich “a single frivolous or gr oundless claim” was “easily disposed of by the opposing part[ies].” Id. Rather, Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding standing and immunity m aterially increased the comple xity of the case by involving improper parties.31 did not abuse its discretion wh en finding that plaintiffs’ atto rney violated Rule 11 because there were “a host of leg al impediments t o [plaintiffs] prevailing on their claims,” including that “the majo rity of the defendants had, at best, only tangential relationships to” plaintiffs’ cl aims and plaintiffs’ counsel ig nored controlling precedent). Plaintiffs’ standing arguments ignored controlling precedent. Under Kowalski , 543 U.S. at 131–34, BBANM and its members lack standing to asse rt the constitutional rights of cri minal defendants. Under Kerr II , 824 F.3d at 1214–17, the Legislator Plaintiffs lack sta nding to assert an institutional injury. When Plaintiffs were confronted with these bindi ng authorities in Defendants’ m otion to dismiss and motion for Rule 11 sanctions, Pla intiffs unreasonably attempted to distinguish themselves from th e plaintiffs in Kowalski and Kerr II . App. Vol. II at 300–11, 551. For example, without acknowledging that pro se criminal defenda nts in
Kowalski were able to assert their own constitutional rights, Plaintiff s argued that criminal defendants in New Mexic o cannot assert their own const itutional rights because they lack “funds t o . . . retain counsel.” Id. at 307. Plaintiffs then asserted that BBANM and its members have a close relationship with every criminal defendant arrested in New Mexico since July 2017 because these defendants “already exist,” notwithstanding that the Supreme Court reached the oppo site conclusion in
Kowalski under a materially similar set of facts. Id. at 308. When attempting to evade Kerr II , Plaintiffs paradoxically claimed that the alleged loss of “th e right of the legislature to pass laws” wa s not “an institutional injury. ” Id. at 310.32 Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding i mmunity suffer from similar in firmities. 17 Most glaringly, Plaintiffs maint ained that “any argument regard ing sovereign immunity . . . [was] just not app licable” in this case because “Congress waived . . . sovereign immunity for individu al state actors [by enacting] . . . § 1983.” App. Vol. II at 547. This statement is inaccurate. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 63–71 (1989). It al so offers no explanation why Plaintiffs thought the New Mexico Supreme Court, the Second Judicial District Court, and t he Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court were proper defendants. 18 Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding judicial and legislative i mmunity fare little better. As discussed previously, Plainti ffs abandoned their arguments a bout judicial immunity by failing to adequate ly brief them on appeal. Stender , 910 F.3d at 1117. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown how the district court a bused its discretion when finding that Plaintiffs’ ar guments regarding judicial immu nity were not supported by existing law.

17 Plaintiffs argue that “[j]udici al immunity principles are a de veloping area of the law, warranting litigation a nd clarification.” Aplt. Br. a t 45. The district court found that “Plaintiffs [did] not make any argument for extendin g, modifying, or reversing existing law or for e stablishing new law” on judicial immunity. App. Vol. III at 690 (quotation marks omitt ed). Plaintiffs do not challe nge this finding, which forecloses their attempt to now argue for “clarification.” White , 908 F.2d at 680.

18 If Collins had standing to seek prospective relief, her claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive re lief could have proceeded, under Ex parte Young , against the state officials in the ir official capacities. Verizon , 535 U.S. at 645–46. But, Plaintiffs have never raised Ex parte Young themselves, choosing in stead to deny that sovereign immunity is even appli cable. Therefore, the fact tha t Plaintiffs might have relied on Ex parte Youngwhen discussing soverei gn immunity does not weigh against the district court’s imposition of sanctions. White , 908 F.2d at 680.33 Plaintiffs then argued that leg islative immunity was unavailabl e to New Mexico’s supreme court justices because the New Mexico legislat ure “has never delegated exclusive legislative authority to the New Mexico Sup reme Court.” App. Vol. II at 549. But the New Mexico legislature has empowered the New Mexico Supreme Court to promulgate rule s of criminal procedure. N.M. Stat. § 38-1-1. When exercising that delegated l egislative authority to promulg ate generally applicable rules, the court a nd its justices are entitled to le gislative immunity.
Consumers Union , 446 U.S. at 731–34. We now turn to the district cour t’s finding that Plaintiffs inc luded BBANM and the Legislator Plaintiffs f or an improper purpose—to expres s political opposition to the 2017 Rules. Plaintiffs a rgue that “improper motivation does not warrant sanction when there is [an] obj ective basis for filing suit.” Aplt. Br. at 58–59; see also Burkhart ex rel. Meeks v. Kinsley Bank , 852 F.2d 512, 515 ( 10th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that an attorney who f iled a harassing complaint cou ld not be sanctioned under Rule 11 if the complaint’s allegations were legally and f actually warranted). But, as just discussed , there was no reasonable basis for inclu ding BBANM and the Legislator Plaintiffs in this c ase. Therefore, this is not a s ituation in which the district court awarded sanctions based on a finding of improperpurpose even though there was an objective basis fo r filing suit. The district court could have concluded that Rule 11 sanctions were warrantedwithout relying on any potenti al political purpose behind the suit, and we a ffirm on that basis.34 Plaintiffs also argue that evid ence of Dunn’s letter to the New Mexico legislature about this lawsuit cannot support the district cour t’s finding of political motivation because Dunn’s letter is protected by the First Amen dment. Aplt. Br. at 55; Aplt. Reply Br. at 25–26. The district court did not sanct ion Dunn for his letter to the state legislature. App. V ol. III at 687–88 (“While Plai ntiffs’ counsel is entitled to express opinions regarding ba il reform in New Mexico, Plaint iffs are not entitled to file claims in a federal cour t without standing solely to ac hieve political objectives.”). For the distri ct court, Dunn’s letter supported its finding that Dunn’s choice to name BBANM and the Legi slator Plaintiffs as plaintiff s was not motivated by a reasonable belief that they had standing. Before moving on from the issue of Rule 11 sanctions, we emphas ize that “the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in dist rict court and thus . . . streamline the administration a nd procedure of the federal cour ts.” Cooter & Gell , 496 U.S. at 393. “Baseless filing puts the machinery of justic e in motion, burdening courts and individuals alike with needless expense and delay.” Id. at 398. This case is a prime example of the waste and distraction that result whe n attorneys disregard Rule 11’s certifications. At the heart of this case lies Darle ne Collins’s allegation that her constitutional rights were violated when she was detai ned by the state of New Mexico. But because of the various parties unreasonably na med in the complaint by Plaintiffs ’ attorneys, this ca se instead was broad ly pled to include entities and individuals whose st anding to sue, or whose immuni ty from suit, became the main focus of the litigation.35 V “We ordinarily review a denial o f a motion to amend a pleading for abuse of discretion.” Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ. , 565 F.3d 1232, 124 9 (10th Cir. 2009). “However, when denial is based on a determination that amendment would be futile, our review for abuse of d iscretion includes de novo rev iew of the legal basis for the finding of futility.” Id. at 1249. While Defendants’ motion to dis miss and motion for Rule 11 sanc tions were pending, Plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to ad d a new claim: that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to freedo m of speech by moving for sanctions. App. Vol. II at 397. The district courtdenied the motion to amend as futile becau se “[t]he First Ame ndment does not protect frivolous claims,” so the “Rule 11 Motion was not a r etaliatory act to punish Plai ntiffs, but rather, an acceptable pleading expressly allo wed by the Federal Rules of C ivil Procedure.” App. Vol. III at 673–74. “[T]he right of access to the c ourts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government f or redress of grievances.” Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v.
NLRB , 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). But “[t ]he [F]irst [A]mendment int erests involved in private litigation . . . are not advanced when the litigatio n is based on . . . knowingly frivolous claims.” United States v. Ambort , 405 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bill Johnson’s Rests. , 461 U.S. at 743); see also In re Harper , 725 F.3d 1253, 1261 ( 10th Cir. 2013) (“[T] he First Amendment do es not protect the filing of frivolous motions.”). As discussed when affirming th e district court’s36 imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, Plaintiffs’ arguments regardin g standing and immunity were baseless. Therefo re, the district court correctl y found that Plaintiffs’ motion to amend was futile; Defe ndants’ motion for Rule 11 sanc tions did not interfere with Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. See King , 899 F.3d at 1151 n.17 (“[T]he First Amendment is in no way a defense to Rule 11 viola tions.”).
VI We AFFIRM.