[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-14200

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cr-00060-SPC-MRM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

WILLIAM PIPER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(February 11, 2020)

Before EDMONDSON, HULL, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

William Piper appeals his conviction and 97-month sentence after pleading 

guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 

methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). No reversible error has been shown; we 

affirm in part and dismiss the appeal in part.

Briefly stated, a police detective at a shipping facility observed a package 

consistent with possible narcotics concealment. The detective -- pursuant to a 

search warrant -- opened the package and found almost a pound of 

methamphetamine. An undercover officer then conducted a controlled delivery of 

the package to “Jay Piper” at the residential address listed. 

Piper took delivery of and opened the package; officers then executed a 

search warrant of the house. Officers arrested Piper after finding him in the garage 

with the package and the methamphetamine. Officers also arrested several other 

people who were present at the house, including Piper’s husband. Piper’s husband 

was later charged with a state drug trafficking offense.

Piper, meanwhile, was charged with possession with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At the change-of-plea 

hearing on 15 June 2017, Piper pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea 

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agreement. On 1 August 2017, Piper hired a new lawyer: the lawyer who was then 

also representing Piper’s husband in the husband’s state criminal case. 

At a scheduled sentencing hearing on 7 May 2018, Piper notified the district 

court that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. Piper said that his request was 

prompted by the dismissal of his husband’s state criminal case, which was nolle 

prossed on 28 April 2018. On 20 June 2018, Piper filed a written motion to 

withdraw his plea, in which he asserted that there existed “numerous meritorious” 

and “substantial defenses” that he now wished to assert. 

The district court denied Piper’s motion to withdraw his plea. The district 

court then sentenced Piper to 97 months’ imprisonment: a sentence at the low end 

of the calculated guidelines range of 97 to 121 months. 

I.

Piper first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea. Piper contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying 

his motion without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. Piper also says that the 

district court relied improperly on a clearly erroneous fact.

We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuseof-discretion standard. United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 

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2006). No abuse of discretion occurs “unless the denial is ‘arbitrary or 

unreasonable.’” Id.

A defendant -- like Piper -- who seeks to withdraw his guilty plea after the 

court has accepted the plea but before sentencing must demonstrate “a fair and just 

reason” for doing so. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We construe liberally 

whether a defendant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw is supported by “a fair and 

just reason.” United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471 (11th Cir. 1988). A 

defendant, however, has “no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.” Id. Instead, 

whether a defendant will be allowed to withdraw his plea is a decision “left to the 

sound discretion of the trial court.” Id.

In determining whether a defendant has satisfied his burden of showing a 

“fair and just reason” for withdrawal, the district court must “consider the totality 

of the circumstances surrounding the plea.” Id. at 471-72. In particular, the 

district court considers “(1) whether close assistance of counsel was available; (2) 

whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would 

be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be prejudiced if the 

defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.” Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298. If the 

defendant cannot satisfy the first two factors, we have said that the district court 

need not give “considerable weight” or “particular attention” to the remaining 

factors. United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987). 

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In addition, the timing of a motion to withdraw may be pertinent to understanding 

a defendant’s motivation: “[a] swift change of heart is itself strong indication that 

the plea was entered in haste and confusion.” Id. 

A. Evidentiary Hearing

First, we reject Piper’s argument that the district court abused its discretion 

in ruling on his motion to withdraw without first conducting an evidentiary 

hearing. We have said that a district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing 

on a motion to withdraw constitutes no “abuse of discretion when a court has 

conducted extensive Rule 11 inquiries prior to accepting the guilty plea.” See 

Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298 (citing United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1514 

(11th Cir. 1986)). 

Here, the district court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy. Nor does 

Piper challenge the district court’s determination that his guilty plea was entered 

knowingly and voluntarily. In the district court, Piper never requested an 

evidentiary hearing. Piper also failed to cite to or to attach documents in support 

of his motion to withdraw that might have necessitated a hearing. On this record, 

the district court abused no discretion in failing to sua sponte conduct an 

evidentiary hearing before ruling on Piper’s motion. 

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B. Fact Finding

About Piper’s second argument, we accept Piper’s assertion that the district 

court misstated the timing between Piper’s motion to withdraw and the dismissal 

of the state criminal case against Piper’s husband. The district court seems to have 

believed mistakenly that the state criminal case against Piper’s husband was 

dismissed in April 2017 instead of in April 2018. As a result, the district court said 

erroneously that more than a year had passed between the dismissal of the state 

criminal proceedings against Piper’s husband and Piper’s motion to withdraw his 

plea (first raised orally in May 2018).

We cannot conclude, however, that the challenged factual finding was 

critical to the district court’s decision to deny Piper’s motion to withdraw his plea. 

Before addressing the timing of Piper’s motion, the district court had already 

determined that Piper’s plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, that Piper had 

received the close aid of counsel, and that permitting Piper to withdraw his plea 

over a year after Piper pleaded guilty (15 June 2017) would “consume greater 

judicial resources and prejudice the Government.” The district court’s 

determination that each of these four factors weighed against Piper constitutes

ample grounds to deny Piper’s motion to withdraw. See Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298. 

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We also note that Piper, on appeal, raises no challenge to these important 

determinations. 

After having addressed the pertinent factors, the district court then went on 

to address and to reject Piper’s asserted reason for seeking to withdraw his plea: 

that “newly learned” and “unspecified defenses” used to exonerate Piper’s husband 

would also apply in Piper’s case. The district court determined, instead, that 

Piper’s motion was motivated by “buyer’s remorse.” About timing, the district 

court said that Piper filed his motion to withdraw ten months after Piper retained 

his husband’s lawyer and -- said mistakenly -- “more than a year after the State of 

Florida dismissed the case against Piper’s husband.” The district court also then 

rejected Piper’s argument on the merits. Unlike Piper’s husband’s case (which 

Piper asserted was dismissed for lack of evidence), the district court said the 

evidence of Piper’s guilt was “sufficient and strong.” Because Piper had presented 

only “conclusory allegations and wishful conjecture on the existence of 

exculpatory defenses,” the district court concluded that Piper had failed to 

demonstrate a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. 

In the light of this record and the language of the district court’s order, we 

are persuaded that the sole challenged fact finding -- although erroneous -- played 

no significant role in the district court’s ruling. The district court’s decision to 

deny Piper’s motion to withdraw did not rely on a single date; the decision is 

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supported by the complete record and by the pertinent factors. We see no abuse of 

discretion. See Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298; Baker, 432 F.3d at 1202 (no abuse of 

discretion unless the district court “rests” its decision upon a clearly erroneous 

fact). 

II.

Piper also raises these challenges to his sentence: (1) the district court erred 

in concluding that Piper was ineligible for safety-valve relief; (2) the district court 

erred in increasing Piper’s offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for 

possession of a firearm; (3) Piper’s sentence is substantively unreasonable; and (4) 

the prosecutor violated Piper’s due process rights by objecting (after Piper moved 

to withdraw his plea) to a fact in the Presentence Investigation Report, which 

resulted in an increase to Piper’s total offense level. The government responds that 

Piper’s arguments are barred by the plea agreement’s sentence-appeal waiver. 

We review de novo the validity of a sentence-appeal waiver. United States 

v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence-appeal waiver is 

enforceable if it is made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert, 997 

F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was knowing and 

voluntary, the government must show either that “(1) the district court specifically 

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questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver during the Rule 11 

colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the record that the defendant otherwise 

understood the full significance of the waiver.” Id. 

We conclude that Piper’s appellate arguments challenging his sentence are 

barred by his sentence-appeal waiver. Piper’s written plea agreement provided 

expressly that Piper waived “the right to appeal [his] sentence on any ground, 

including the ground that the Court erred in determining the applicable guidelines 

range . . ..” 

During the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court also said that -- pursuant to 

the plea agreement -- Piper had agreed to waive his right to appeal his sentence 

“except on very narrow grounds.” In particular, the district court explained that 

Piper could appeal his sentence only on these grounds: (1) that the sentence 

exceeds the applicable guidelines range as determined by the district court; (2) that 

the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty; or (3) that the sentence 

violates the Eighth Amendment. Piper indicated that he understood the terms of 

the sentence-appeal waiver. 

Because the record demonstrates that Piper waived knowingly and 

voluntarily his right to appeal his sentence, we will enforce the plea agreement’s 

sentence-appeal waiver. No exception to the waiver applies: Piper’s sentence is 

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within the guidelines range as calculated by the district court, is below the statutory 

maximum, and is consistent with the Eighth Amendment. 

On appeal, Piper acknowledges that his plea agreement contained a 

sentence-appeal waiver. Piper also makes no argument challenging the 

voluntariness of his guilty plea. Instead, Piper -- relying on non-binding authority 

from other circuits -- urges us not to enforce the appeal waiver and to reach the 

merits of his arguments to avoid a purported “miscarriage of justice.” We decline 

this request. 

We stress that “[a]n appeal waiver includes the waiver of the right to appeal 

difficult or debatable legal issues or even blatant error.” United States v. GrinardHenry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). “We have consistently enforced 

knowing and voluntary appeal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. 

Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, even if we assume 

-- without deciding -- that this Court might recognize a miscarriage-of-justice 

exception in some case, nothing in this case presents the kind of exceptional 

circumstance that might warrant consideration of Piper’s appellate arguments 

despite a valid appeal waiver. Cf. United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 

n.5 (11th Cir. 1999) (“In extreme circumstances -- for instance, if the district court 

had sentenced [a defendant] to a public flogging -- due process may require that an 

appeal be heard despite a previous waiver.”); Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1350 n.18 

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(noting that “there are certain fundamental and immutable legal landmarks within 

which the district court must operate regardless of the existence of sentence appeal 

waivers,” including statutory maximums and prohibitions on basing a sentence on 

a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race). 

Accordingly, we dismiss Piper’s appeal to the extent he seeks to challenge 

his sentence.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.

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