### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 9, 200 4 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. S HAWN RA FA EL BO UGH
App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 68041A Hon. Richard R. Baumgar tner, Judge

No. E-2002-00717-SC- R11-CD - F iled Novem ber 1, 2004

Th e de fe nd a nt, Sha wn Ra fa e l B ou g h, wa s c on vic te d o f f e lony murd e r ande sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry . The Court of Criminal Appea ls held that the m otion for new t rial, which w as not filed until the date of the se ntencing heari n g on the espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction, fifty -two day s after

judgme nt was entered on the f elony murder c onviction, was untimely as to the felony murder conviction. The Court of Criminal Appea ls also held that two amende d motions for new tria l were untimely

. On t hese two issues, we r ever se the Court of Criminal Appea ls, finding that the orig inal motion for new tria l, as well as the two amended motions for new trial, we re timely filed
a s to bo th c on vic tio ns . T he Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls f

ou ndthat th e evi dence wa s su ff ic ie nt t o su pp ort bo th c on vic tio ns . T he re ma ini ng iss ue s a dd re sse d b y the Cou rt on ly re la te d to the e sp e c ia lly
a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y c o n v i c t i o n b e c a u s e th e C o u r th a d h e l d t h a tt h e m o t i o n f o r n e w tr i a l w a s u n t i m e l y. On those issues, the Court held that (1) whil e the State’ s ref ere nce to a

“missing witness” during closing arg ument was improper , the er ror was harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt; (2) the witnesses Dea nna Jones, Edie J ones and D ante Smith were not acc ompl ices whose testimonyneede d
corr oboration, and the ref ore the trial court did not err i n failing to give a jury instruction on
acc omplice testimony ; and (3) the defe ndant waived any objection t o the t estimony of I saiah Dixon reg arding the def

endant’ s out-of-c ourt confe ssion by his failure to raise the issue at trial. We af firm the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls o n th e se iss ue s. Ho we ve r, be c a us e the Cou rt of Cr iminal Ap pe a ls did not address these last three issues w ith respec t to the felony murder c onviction or any of the issues raised in the a mended motions for ne w trial as to e ither conviction, we rema nd the ca se to the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls f

or c on sid e ratio n o f tho se iss ue s.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 P e r m iss ion to App e al; Judg m e nt of t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als is Affir m e d in P ar t, Re ve r se d in P ar t, and R e m ande d t o t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J J ., and J. S TEVE D ANI EL , S.J ., joined.
Mark E. Stephe ns and J ohn Halstea d, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Shawn Rafa el B oug h.-2-

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Mic hael E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; and John H. Ble dsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND

On Dec ember 19, 1998, two sisters, Dea nna and E die J ones, vac ated their student housing at Knoxvil le C olleg e for winter break. They planned to stay the ni g ht in Knoxvi lle befor e catching the ir fl ight ho me to New Jer se y the fo llo wi ng mornin g . T he y we nt t o th e Expo I nn in Kno xvill e wher e Edie Jones rented r oom 207 for the nig ht. While chec king into the hotel, Dea nna J ones saw the def endant, Shawn B oug h, and co- defe ndant, Craig Shears, in the parking lot. She invited them to come up to their room late r on that eve ning. D eanna and Edie Jones knew both the defe ndant and Craig Shears be cause the two men we re a lso students at Knox ville Coll eg e.

Montes Be st was working at t he desk when two Afric an-A merica n men who claimed to be loo kin g fo r a

frie ndin r oo m 20 7 a

pp ro a c he d th e loc ke d f

ro nt doo rs la te a t nig ht. De a nn a a ndEd ie J ones re membere d the def endant, c o-def

endant a nd another

male student stopping by room 207 for
a fe w m inu te s b e fo re mid nig ht. Th e de fe nd a nt a nd Cr a ig She ars sto pp e d by a g a in a ft e r m idn ig ht,
a sk ing to us e the te le ph on e

. Th e de fe nd a nt us e d the te le ph on e to c a ll s e ve ra l a ir lin e s, a tte mpt ing to
secur e a f light fr om Tennesse e throug h Chicag o to California, his hom e state. D eanna J ones noticed a g un underne ath the corner of the bed wher e the defe ndant was sitting. She told the de fenda nt not to f or g e t hi s g un ; he thank e d he r a nd pu t the g un in his so c k. At that ti me , th e de fe nd a nt andCr a ig She ars le ft

the ro om.
Sometime afte r m idnight, the de fenda nt and Craig Shears r eturne d to room 207 for the third time, ag ain to use t he telephone. Deanna Jones hear d the def endant a sk the person on the other e nd of the phone about g etting a ride. The two men left the r oom after the phone call. The de fenda nt and Craig Shears came back to r oom 207 for a fourth and final time to tell Deanna and Edie Jones that they wer e leaving. At trial, Dea nna Jones testified that it was “still dark” whe n the two men lef t the hotel room for

the last time. Howeve r, the stateme nt she g ave to the police on the day of the incident indicates that the t wo l eft the hote l room around 9:00 a.m. on De cembe r 20, 1998. Around 10:00 a .m., D eanna and Edie hear d something downstairs in the lobby are a that sounded like thre e or fo ur g un sh ots

. Dante Smith picked up the de fenda nt and Craig Shears at the Expo I nn shortly afte r 10:00
a.m. on Dec ember 20, 1998, afte r being called repeate dly by the defendant. He drove to the hote l wher e he saw t he defenda nt and C raig Shears running out of t he lobby

. The defenda nt was c arry ing
a pla sti c tub wh ic h c on ta ine d e nv e lop e s. Da nte Smith te sti fi e d th a t:
He [the defe ndan t ] wa s just talking a lot. He ke pt on say ing some thing a bout he thinks he killed -- or he thinks he shot somebody i n s i d e. He wa sn’t sure, but -- he
sa id h e sh ot h im, bu t he wa sn ’t su re if he kil le d h im o r n ot.-3-

Mr. Smith drove the two men towar ds Knox ville Coll eg e whe re he stopped the ca r and asked them to g e t ou t be c a us e he “ ha d n e ve r do ne any th in g l ike thi s. ” Mr . Sm ith the n d ro ve ba c k to his
apa rt me nt.

The de fenda nt and Craig S h ea rs later showed up at Mr. Smit h’s apa rtment and started counting money

from the plastic c ontainer the y car ried fr om the hotel. The de fen d an t asked Mr

. Smit h if he would “ hide the g un for him.” Mr. Smith refuse d, asking th e d ef endant if he was “cr azy .” The defe ndant also aske d Mr. Smith t o g ive the two a ride to the bus stop or airport. Ag ain, Mr. Smith refused.

J ust after 10:00 a.m. on Dec ember 20, 1 9 9 8 , o ffice rs of the Knox ville Poli ce D epartment
wer e dispatche d to the Ex po I nn in response to a 9-1- 1 call fr om the hotel’s cler k that there had bee n a robbe ry and shoot ing. Acc ording to the victim, Billy Oldham, two tall, thin black males fr om room 20 7 d e ma nd e d mo ne y

a ndsh ot h im. Ac c or din g to the Kn ox Cou nty Me dic a l Exa min e r, the vic tim died as a result of c omplications from multipl e g un shot wounds.

In v e s t i g a t o r

A

. J

. L o e f

f l e r arr i v e d a tt h e E x p o In n ar o u n d 1 0 : 1 5 a

. m

. A l m o s ti m m e d i a t e l y, he g ot into the ambulance w ith the victim. The victim was “g asping for air” and kept saying “ I am losing it. I

am g oing out. I

am losing it.” The victim state d that he “wa s working the desk, a nd two g uy s came in f

rom room 207, asked me for my money , and then shot me.” The victim described the perpe trators a s “two blac k males, tall, slender ” with “a littl e bit of fa cial hair .”

After interviewing the victim, Of fice r L oeff

ler went back to the Ex po I nn. He noted that the telephone lines in the lobby wer e cut a s well as those in the adjacent offices of rooms 105 and 106. The c rime sce ne spec ialist, J oe C ox , found t hree .22 caliber long rifle cartridg e cases behind the front desk and two cartridg e cases located elsewhere in the l obby are a. The detail tape on the c ash re g ister indicated that the “ no-sale” button was pushed at 10:03 a .m. on De cembe r 20, 1998.

The defenda nt called Mr. Smit h in J anuary of 1999. He asked Mr. Smith if he talked to the po lic e abo ut the inc ide nt. Mr

. Smith tol d the de fe nd a nt he ha d n ot. A f e w m on ths la te r, Mr . Sm ith ta lke d to se ve ra l de te c tiv e s r e g ard ing his kn ow le dg e of the inc ide nt.

I sa iah Di xon, a lon g -time frie nd of the de fe nd a nt, sa w the de fe nd a nt i n Ca lif ornia so me tim e afte r the Dec ember incident. The defe ndant told Mr. Dix on that he was on b ai l fo r a h omicide
c ha rg e in T e nn e sse e . M r. Di xon state d that the de fe nd a nt “ tol d me that he wa s try ing to p ull a he ist , a ndthe re wa s [si c ] thi ng s th a t we nt wr on g

. . . . [H]e sa id the ma n w a s ta kin g too lon g , s o h e le t hi m have it.” The def

endant told Mr. Dixon that he got a “couple thousand” in the he ist, but t hat “he had went [sic] to jail shortlyafte r that for like a war rant or something, and when he had g ot [ sic] back to school, all the money wasn’t ther e.” A t t h e t i m e o f t ri al, Mr. Dixon was incarc erated in a C a l i f o r n i a p r i s o n a s a

r e s u l to f a g u i l t y p l e a

f o r s e c o n d d e g r e e b u r g l ar y.
The de fenda nt was ar

rested on May

9, 1999, at his mother’s h o m e i n San Fr ancisc o, California. Of

fice r L oeff

ler wa s prese nt during the ar rest and r ecor ded a c onversation with the-4-

defe ndant l ater that day

. During the conversation, t he defenda nt indicated that he st ay ed at a hotel with Deanna

and Edie the night he vacated the dorms for Christmas break a nd “lef t about 9:00 . . . in the morning . . . about 9:30.” He stated that “the home boy g ave me a ride to Nashville. I took my plane from there .” He told Offic er L oeff ler that the guy who gave him and Craig Shears a ride
wa s n a me d “ Te d” a ndthat he dr ov e a va n. Ac c or din g to the de fe nd a nt, “ Te d” wa s a gu y wh o “ jus t
c ome [sic ] up t o th e sc ho ol, y ou kn ow

. . . h e jus t g ive [sic ] us ride s a ndstu ff so I a sk e d him

c ou ld he g ive me a ride

. . . the night befor e

. . . he said alrig ht, I ’ll be there .” He stated that “Te d” picke d him and Craig Shears up at around 9:00 or 9: 30 a.m. on Dec ember 20, 1998, and took them straig ht to Nashville wher e he dr opped them off at t he airport afte r m aking sure their flig hts were not delay ed.

P ROCEDURAL HISTORY

On Ma y 6, 19 99 , th e Kn ox Cou nty Gr a nd Jury re turne d a mul tip le -c ou nt ind ic tme nt a g a ins t the def endant a nd Craig Shears f or one c ount of first-de g ree preme ditated murder , one count of felony murder, and one count of especi al l yag g ravated robbe ry . Following a jury trial on J une 11 and 12, 2001, the de fenda nt w as found not g uiltyof first-de g ree preme ditated murder , but guilty of felony murder and espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry . I mmediately afte r the ve rdict was a nnounced on J une 12, 2001, the trial court imposed the manda tory life sentenc e and e ntere d judgme nt on the felony murder conviction acc ording ly . At a subseque nt sentencing hearing on A ug ust 3, 2001, the trial court se ntence d the def endant to twenty -one y ear s for the e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry , to run
concur rently with the life sentenc e.
On Au gu s t3 , 2 0 0 1 , t h e de fe n d an t fi l ed a mo t i o n fo r ne w t ri al as t o b o t h co n v i ct i o n s , al l egi n g: (1 ) that th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o f

indhim g ui lt yof

fe lon y mur de r and

/or e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry ; (2) that the state committed misconduct and the trial court e rre d in permitting the state to a

rg ue the missing witness rule; (3) that the trial court err ed in f ailin g t o i n cl u d e a j ury instruction reg arding the missing witness ar g ument; (4) that there was not suffic ient corr oboration of the testimony

of Da nte S mith to sustain a finding of g uilty ; and (5) that there was not suffic ient
corr oboration of the de fenda nt’s alleg ed conf ession to I saiah Dix on to establish guilt. A hea ring on the motion wa s held on September 27, 2001, at which time the c ourt orally denied the motion. At th e c o n c lu s io n o f

th e h e ar in g , d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l o r a ll y

mo v e d to w ith d r a w f

r o m r e p r e s e n ti n g the defe ndant, and upon a cce pting the defe ndant’s aff idavit of indige ncy , the trial court appointed the Di stric t Pu bli c De fe nd e rs ’ o ff ic e a s n e w c ou ns e l.

On Octobe r 11, 2001, def

end an t’ s n e w ly

- a

p pointed counsel filed an amende d motion for new trial which asked the trial court to dire ct that a tra nscript be pr epar ed “so tha t the newly appointed
c ou ns e l . . . [c ou ld] p ro pe rl y pr e se rv e a ll o bje c tio ns and err or s f or the app e llate c ou rt s. ” Th is amende d motion for new t rial di d not raise any new substantive g rounds for relief

. On October 18, 2 0 0 1 , t h e tr i a l c o u r tc o n d u c t e d a h e ar i n g o n t h e a m e n d e d m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l w h e r e i n t h e a t t o r n e ys fo r both side s ar g ue d whe the r the a me nd e d mo tio n f or a ne w t ri a l w a s p ro pe r andtim e ly . A s a re su lt of the he aring , the trial court order ed that the transcript of the pre- trial, trial and motion for new trial proce eding s be pre pare d.-5-

A second amende d motion for new trial was filed by the defe ndant on M ar ch 6 , 2 002, alleg ing se vera l ne w substantive g rounds for relief

. On Marc h 13, 2002, the trial court he ld a hea ring on the motion where in the attorney s ag ain ar gu ed wh et h er the amende d motion for new tria l was p ro p er and timely . The trial c ourt overr uled, on the merits, the amended motion for ne w trial on Marc h 21, 2002. The de fenda nt filed a notice of appe al on Marc h 21, 2002.
On appe al, the Court of Criminal Appea ls determined that the de fenda nt’s motion for new trial and his two amende d motions for new trial wer e untimely as to the fe lony

murder c onviction beca use they wer e filed more than thirty day s after

the entry o f j u d gm en t

. As a re sult, all iss ues raise d th e re in, wi th the e xce pti on of su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , we re wa ive d. As fo r the e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction, the Court of Criminal Appe als found that the two a mended motions for ne w trial were not timely filed and that the issues raise d in those pleading s were waived. O n the
me ri ts, the Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls h e ld that th e e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ien t to su pp ort bo th convictions. The Court a lso held that with reg ard to the e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction, the tr ia l c ou rt did no t e rr in a llo wi ng the Sta te to a rg ue the mis sin g wi tne ss r ule ; th e tr ia l c ou rt

did not er r i n failing to givea jury instruction on acc omplice testimony ; and the trial c ourt did not err in failing to give a jury

instruction on the out-of-c ourt confe ssion.

AN AL YSI S
I. Motion for New Tri al as to Felony Murder
When the g uiltyverdic ts were enter ed on J une 12, 2001, the trial judgeenter ed a ma ndatory lif e se nte nc e on the fe lon y

mur der con vic tio n a ndthe n s e t a se nte nc ing he ari ng on the e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction for A ug ust 3, 2001. The defendant filed his motion for new trial as to both convictions on Aug ust 3, 2001. While this wa s the same day that he wa s sentence d for the espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction, it was fifty -two day s afte r sentenc ing was enter ed on the felony murder c onviction.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 33 (b ) p ro vid e s th a t “[a ] mot ion fo r a ne w t ri a l sh a ll be made in w riting

. . . within thirty day s of the date the order of sentenc e is e ntere d.” This filing de a dli ne is m a nd a tory

a ndjurisd ic tio na l a ndma y no t be e xten de d. Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 4 5( b) ; State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997). A trial judg e does not ha ve jurisdiction to hear a nd de te rm ine the me ri ts o f a

mot ion fo r a

ne w tr ia l wh ic h ha s n ot b e e n ti me ly fi le d. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3(e) . I f a motion for new trial is not timely filed, all issues are deeme d waived except for suff iciency of evide nce and sentenc ing. I d.; Martin, 940 S.W .2d at 569.
The Court of Criminal Appea ls held that the motion for new trial filed on Aug ust 3, 2001, was untimel y a s to th e f

e lo n y mu r d e r c o n v ic ti o n b e c a u s e it w a s n o t f il e d w ith in th irty d a y s o f

the entry o f j u d gm en t , wh i ch occ urre d on J une 12, 2001. The court re lied on the unre ported c ase of State v. Be njamin Brow n, No. W1999-00327-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1664226 (Tenn. Crim. App., Oct. 24, 2000), w hich held that wher e the judgme nt of conviction for f

elony murder w as ente red on April 30, 1999 and the judg ment of convic tion for ag g ravated child abuse was ente red on Ma y 26,I n a n a n al og ou s , bu t u n r epor t ed ca s e of K ev i n W i l k i n s v

. St at e, N o. W 2002- 00436- CC A- R3- PC , 2002 W L 1
31 62 49 7 1 (T en n. C ri m. Ap p. N ov. 14, 200 2), t he C our t of Cri mi nal Ap peal s he l d t hat for a f i r s t

- degr ee
mu r der / es pec i al l y ag g r av at ed r obber y ca s e wh er e t h e of fen s es wer e s epa r at ed i n t h e appe l l at e pr oce s s , t i me wou l d n ot b eg i n to run fo r t he f

i l i ng o f p o st

- co nv i cti o n re l i ef unti l b o t h c ase s we re d i sp o sed o f i n the a p p ell ate p ro ce ss.
-6- 1999, the motion for new trial filed o n J une 14, 1999 wa s untimelyas to the fe lony murder conviction.

Were we to acc ept the position of the Court of Criminal Appea ls, it would m ean that the two
c ri me s, wh ic h o c c ur

re d at th e sa me tim e a ndwe re tr ie d to g e the r, wo uldsu dd e nly be de a lt w ith separ ately for post-tria l purposes. Under this scheme , the m otion for new t rial on the fe lony murder conviction would have been require d to be filed by J uly 12, 2001, and if no motion for ne w trial wa s filed, then a

notice of a

ppeal would ha ve bee n due by J uly 12, 2001. Then, the de fenda nt, sentence d on Aug u s t 3 , 2 0 0 1 on the robbe ry conviction, would have had until September 2, 2001 to file a mot ion fo r ne w tri a l with re sp e c t to that con vic tio n, or if no mot ion fo r ne w tri a l wa s file d, to f ile his appea l. Requiring a

defe ndant to file two sepa rate motions for new trial whe n only one trial
oc c ur re d s e rv e s n o p ur

po se oth e r tha n to cr e a te e xtra e xpe ns e fo r the pa

rt ie s a ndthe c ou rt s, a s w e ll
a s to wa ste the tim e of

the pa rt ie s a ndthe c ou rt s.
The Rules of Criminal Procedur e “are intended to provide f or the just determination of every c ri min a l pr oc e e din g . T he y shal l be constr

ue d to se c ur e simpli c ity in p ro c e du re , f

a ir ne ss i n a d mi n is tr a ti o n a n d th e e li mi n a ti o n o f u n ju s ti f ia b le e xp e n s e a n d d e lay

. . . . ” T e nn. R. Crim. P . 2. To interpre t Tennesse e Rule of Criminal Procedur e 33(b) as requiring two separ ate motions for ne w trial would be c ontrary

to the spirit of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as expressed in Rule 2.

I n case s such as the one under submis sion, wher e there i s a si ng le t rial for felony murder a nd the under ly ing f

elony , and where the sentenc es are ente red on diff ere nt day s, we interpr et Rule 33(b)
a s to re qu ir e a

mot ion fo r n e w tr ia l to be fi le d w ith in thirty da y s o f the da y

the la st s e nte nc e is enter ed. T h i s wi l l avoid the unnec essary expense and time consumption that would result from requiring two separ ate motions for ne w trial. There fore , in this case , we hold that the motion for 1 new tria l as to both convictions must be filed within thirtyday s of the entry of senten ci n g o n the underlying f

elony . Thus we f

ind that the motion for new tria l was timely as to the fe lony

murd er conviction as we ll as to the espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction.

II. Am ended M

otions for N

ew Trial

I n the ca se under

submissi on, the initial moti on for ne w t ri al wa s denied at a hea ring on September 27, 2001. A t that time, defenda nt’s counsel moved to withdra w from the c ase, and new counsel wa s appointed. The defenda nt’s newly appointed counsel filed an a mended motion for ne w trial on Octobe r 11, 2001, re questing a new trial for “ err ors, pre sently unknown which [would] be
enumer ated by

counsel a fter dilig ent re view of the transcript of the proc eeding s.” Subsequently , on Marc h 6, 2002, the def

endant f iled a second amende d motion for new tria l stating spec ific alleg ations of er ror at trial. Over the objection of the State, t h e t ri al court conducted a hearing on the second-7-

a me nd e d mo tio n f

or ne w t ri a l a ndde nie d th e mot ion on the me ri ts.

Th e Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls h e ld that:
[T] he attempt by

the appe llant to amend the motion for a ne w trial o n October 11, 2001 that failed to spec ifically state the g rounds for a new trial and wa s filed af ter the trial court r

uled on the initial motion for ne w trial was a nullity ; the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear and de termine the m er i t s o f t he g rounds set forth in the amende d motion.

Pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure , amendments to a motion for ne w t rial shall be
a llo we d “ lib e ra lly

un til the da y

of the he aring of th e mot ion fo r a ne w t ri a l.” Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 33(b). We have held, howeve r, that this rule does not pre vent a judg e fr om allowing, at his or her discretion, an amendment to a motion for new trial at any time during which t h e t ri al judge has jurisdiction of the ca se. See State v. B utler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 12 (T en n

. 1 981); see a lso St ate v. Washington, 658 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (an amendment to a motion for new tria l comes too late w hen it is filed afte r the trial judge has ruled upon the merits of the orig inal motion).

I n Butler , the defe ndant filed a motion for a new trial that was he ard on N ovember 7, 1979. The orde r denying the motion was not enter ed u n t i l No v em ber 21, 1979. A motion to amend the mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l w a s f ile d o n N ov e mbe r 12 , 1979 , s e tti ng fo rth w hat pu rp orte d to be ne wl y discovere d evidenc e. This Court held that t he mot ion was ti mely filed. Butler , 626 S.W .2d at 12.

The Trial judge , howeve r, di d not consider the me rit of the motion, but acce pted the State’s ar g ument that an ame ndment would not be appropriate under Rule 33 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure. The rule provides in pertinent part that the

“ c o u r t s h a l l u p o n m o t i o n a l l o w a m e n d m e n t s l i b e r a l l y until the day of the he aring of th e m o t ion for a ne w trial.” ( emphasis adde d) We would point out, however, that the rule doe s not p revent a judg e, in his discretion, allowing an ame ndment to a motion for a new trial at any time the trial judg e has jurisdi ct i o n of the c ase. A s pointed out in Rul e 2 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Procedure , “the r ules are intended to provide f

or the just determination of every criminal proceeding. The y shall be construe d to secure simpli city in proce dure, f

airne ss in administ ration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and de lay .”

I d.

I n this case, the trial judge denied the de fenda nt’s orig inal motion for new tria l on September 27, 2001. Howeve r, o n October 11, 2001, fourtee n day s after that denial, the de fenda nt filed an amende d motion for new tria l. The trial court still had jurisdiction ove r the case at that time a s no notice of a

ppeal ha d y et bee n filed. See State v. Pende rg rass, 9 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d 8 3 4, 837 (Tenn. 1996) (notin g th a t a

tria l c o u r t l o s e s ju r is d ic ti o n w ith th e f il in g o f a n o ti c e o f ap p e a l)

. B e c a u s e th e tr ial judge reta ined jurisdiction, it was within his discre tion to hear and determine the amende d motion.-8- III . Sufficiency of Ev idence

The standa

rd for appellate revie w when a criminal defenda nt challeng es the suff iciency of the evidenc e is “whe ther, c onsidering the evidenc e in a lig ht most favor able to the prosec ution, any
ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.” State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 247, 276 (Tenn. 2002) ; see a lso Tenn. R. App. P

. 1 3 (e ). When
re vie wi ng the e vid e nc e , “ the Sta te is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a ndto all rea sonable and leg itimate infere nces that ma y be draw n there from.” State v. Smith, 24 S.W .3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000) . Moreove r, “this Court does not re- weig h or re-eva luate the evidenc e. Nor may this Court substitut e it s infere nces dr awn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those dr awn by the trier of fac t.” Reid, 91 S.W .3d at 277 (c itation omit ted).

Th e Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls a dd re sse d th e iss ue of the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e bo th
a s to the fe lon y

mur de r andthe e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d ro bb e ry , a nd fo un d the e vid e nc e su ff ic ie nt t o su sta in b othc on vic tio ns

. Whil e the e vid e nc e wa s f or the mos t pa

rt c ir c ums ta nti a l, w e a g re e that it
was c lear ly

sufficie nt to s u p p ort the jury ’s finding of g uilt of both the murder a nd robbery . The
e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh e d th a t th e vic tim

wa s w or kin g a t th e fr on t de sk

of the Expo I nn when t wo ta ll, thin black men “from room 207” demanded mone y and then shot him, ultim ately killing him. The defe ndant was obse rved inside r oom 207 of the Expo Inn with a g un on the nig ht prior to the shooting, and was in and out of that room throug hout the night a nd early morning . The de fenda nt
a ndc o- de fe nd a nt w e re se e n r un nin g fr om the ho te l lo bb y c los e to the tim e that th e vic tim wa s sh ot,
car ry ing a bin matching the desc ription of that used to hold money in the hotel safe

. The de fenda nt made i n c r im in a ti n g s tate me n ts to tw o d if f e r e n t p e o p le , c laim in g th a t h e s h o t s o me o n e in s id e the hotel. The re g ister tape f

rom the hotel ca sh reg ister s howed the “no sale” button was pushed right befor e the victim’s ca ll to 9-1-1.
Clearly , when c onsidering this evidence in a lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, “any
ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the cri me[ s] bey ond a

re a so na ble doubt.” Reid, 91 S.W .3d at 276.

IV . S tat e ’s Re

fe re nc e to “ Mi ssi ng W

itn e ss” During trial, the State introduced a statement g iven by the defe ndant in which he r efe renc es a per son named “ Ted,” who alleg edly picked up the de fenda nt at the Expo I nn thirty minutes before the victim was shot. The State a rg ued during closing arg uments that if “Te d” re ally exis ted, the jury would have sur ely

hear d from him at trial bec ause he would have e x o n er ated the defe ndant. The defe ndant contends that the State’s re fer ence to a missing witness constitutes reve rsible error. The Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls a dd re sse d th is i ssu e a s to the ro bb ery con vic tio n, a ndhe ld the Sta te
co mm itte d p r o s e c u to r ia l mi s c o n d u c t in ma k in g th e “ mi s s in g w it n e s s ” ar g u me n t, b u t tha t the mis c on du c t w a s n ot p re

jud ic ia l a ndwa s h arm le ss b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. A part y ma y c omm e nt ab ou t an ab se nt w itn e ss w he n th e e vid e nc e sh ow s “ that th e wi tne ss had knowledg e of material fa cts, that a re lationship ex ists between the w itne s s an d t he party that-9-

wo uldnatur a lly

inc lin e the wi tne ss t o f

a vo r the pa

rt y a ndthat the mis sin g wi tne ss wa s a va ila ble to the proc ess of the Court for the trial.” D elk v. State, 590 S.W .2d 435, 440 (Tenn. 1979). The bur den is on the proponent of the missing witness rule to e stablish t h e De l k prer equisites. See State v. Thompson, 768 S.W .2d 239, 250 (Tenn. 1989)

. The Court of Criminal Appea ls corre ctly found t he S tate failed to show that all three of the Delk require ments wer e met. Specifica lly , no showing was made that a re lationship ex isted betwee n the witness and the de fenda nt that would naturally incline the witness to fa vor the de fenda nt or that the mis sin g wi tne ss w a s a va ila ble to the pr oc e ss of the c ou rt fo r the tr ia l. B e c a us e the re qu ir e me nts outlined in Delk wer e not met, the trial c ourt err ed in al l o wi n g t h e State to comment on the defe ndant’s failure to c all the witness, and the comments by the State amoun t ed t o p rosecutorial misconduct.

We mus t no w d e te rm ine wheth er th e abo ve e rr or re su lte d in pr e

jud ic e to the de fe nd a nt. J udg e v. State sets forth five fac tors to determine whether prosec utorial misconduct during closing
arg ume nt p re

jud ic e d th e de fe nd a nt o r w a s h arm le ss b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t:

1. The c onduct complained of viewed in c ontext and in light of the fac ts and circ umstances of

the ca se. 2. The c urative me asure s undertake n by the court and the prose cution. 3. Th e int e nt o f the pr os e c uto r i n ma kin g the imp ro pe r s ta te me nt. 4. The c umulative eff

ect of the improper conduct and any other e rror s in the rec ord. 5. The re lative streng th or wea kness of the c ase.
539 S.W .2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); see also State v. Fr ancis, 669 S.W.2d 85, 91 (Tenn. 1984).
The Court of Criminal Appea ls held:

The recor d ref

lects that the only

improper c omments made by the State during
c los ing arg ume nts re la te d to the mis sin g wi tne ss inf e re nc e . Be c a us e the c omm e nts
wer e im proper , the t rial j udg e shoul d have instruc ted the jury to disreg ard tha t part of the State’s arg ument. Howeve r, the State’s ref ere nce to the missing witness was not or [si c] extensive, and the State did not make any other im proper comments. The p r o s e c uto r d id n ot a

pp e ar t o b e int e nti on a lly

try ing to u nf

a ir ly pr e jud ic e the app e lla nt. Th e ap p e l l a n td i d n o tr e q u e s ta c u r a t i v e i n s tru c t i o n

. H o w e v e r , t h e tr i a l j u d g e did explain to t he jury

befor e closing ar gu m en t s that the State had the bur den of pr oof bey ond a re asonable doubt. Furthe r, the trial court fully and acc urate ly instructed the jury o n th e d if

f e r e n c e b e tw e e n e v id e n c e a n d ar g u me n t. T h u s , w e c a n n o t c o n clude that the comment shifted the bur den o f p ro o f from the State to the Defe ndant or
u n fa i rl y prejudice d the appe llant. . . . There fore , we c onclude that a lthough the
c omm e nt w a s impr op e r, thi s e rr or wa s h arm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na bledo ub t.-10-

We ag ree with the C ourt of C riminal Appea ls’ rea soning a nd conclusion that the State’s c omment reg arding the missing witness wa s harmless er ror.
V. Acc omplice Testimony

I n this case, the de fenda nt challeng es the testimony of Dante Smit h, Edie Jones, and Dea nna J ones, ar g uing that they

wer e ac complices whose testimonyhad to be c orrobor ated. It is well-settled in Tennesse e that a de fenda nt cannot be c onvicted solely upon the uncor

roborated testimony

of an
acc omplice. See State v. B ane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2001) ; Monts v. S tate, 379 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1964)

. There must be some fac t testified to, entirely independe nt of the ac complice’ s te s ti mo n y , w h ic h , ta

k e n b y it s e lf

, le a d s to th e in f

e r e n c e , n o t o n ly th at a c rime has been c ommitt ed, but also that t he defenda nt is implicated in it; and this i ndepende nt
corr oborative te stimonymust also include some fac t establishing the de fenda nt’s ident i t y

. This corrobor ative evide nce ma y be dire ct or e ntirely

circ umstantial, and it ne e d no t be a de qu a te , in a ndof its e lf, to su pp ort a

c on vic tio n; it is suffi cient to mee t the requireme nts of the rule if it fairly and legitimately tends to connec t the defendant with t he com mission of the crime charge d.

B a ne , 5 7 S. W.3 d at 41 9 ( qu oti ng Sta te v. B ig be e , 8 85 S.W. 2d79 7, 803 (Ten n. 19 94 )) (e mph a sis added)

.
An a c c omp lic e is on e wh o kn ow ing ly , vo lun tari ly , a nd wi th c omm on int e nt pa rt ic ipate s w ith the princ ipa l of

fe nd e r i n the c omm iss ion of a c ri me . St a te v. L e wi s, 36 S.W. 3d88 , 9 4 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 2000); Conner v. State, 531 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p

. 1 9 75). To satisfy the de fi nit ion of

a n a c c omp lic e , it

is n ot e no ug h th a t the wi tne ss m e re ly po sse ss g uil ty

kn ow le dg e , is morally delinquent, or even participated in a distinct but related off ense. See State v. L awson, 794 S.W .2d 363, 369 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Rather, the te st for whe ther a witness is an ac complice is whether the witness could have been c onvicted of the offe nse. I d.

Whil e ea ch of the se witnesses wa s close in proxi mity to the def endant a nd co-de fenda nt and to the perpe tration of the offe nses, eac h witness’s testimony shows that none of the witnesses we re actua l acc omplices to the conduc t of the defe ndant and c o-def endant. The evidenc e is clea r that none of them “know ingly , voluntarily , and with c ommon intent participa te[d] with the principal off ender in the commission of [ the] offenses.” L ewis, 36 S.W.3d at 94.

I n any event, the de fenda nt never re q u ested a specia l jury

instruction on acc omplice
corr oboration, as he was re quired to do whe n the trial court did not give one

. I n S t a t e v

. Ander son, 985 S.W .2d 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), which invol ved a simi lar fa ctual situation, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that be cause the def endant failed to make a reque st for an
acc omplice instruction, the def endant waived the issue.-11-

[O] ur supre me court has held that an ins truction on the rule requiring corr oboration of a n a c c omp lic e ’s te sti mon y is n ot f un da me nta l. U pon the tr ia l c ou rt ’s failu re to instruct the jury

reg arding acc omplice testimony and the re q u irement of
c or ro bo ratio n, it b e c ome s th e ob lig a tio n of the de fe nd a nt t o ma

ke a sp e c ia l r e qu e st for the instruc tion. I n the abse nce of a spec ial reque st, the trial court does not err by failing to instruc t the jury about ac complice testimony even if the circ umstances of the ca se wa

rra nt such an instruction.

Ander son, 985 S.W .2d at 17 (citations omitted). There fore , beca use the defe ndant in this ca se fa iled to reque st a specia l jury

instruction on acc omplice testimony , he wa ived the issue.

VI. Out-O

f-Court Conf

ession

The de fenda nt contends t h at t h e trial c ourt err ed in not g iving a jury instruction on
cor ro b o ra t ion of confe ssions, point ing out that a confe ssion must be cor

roborated by

sufficie nt independe nt proof to support a g uiltyverdic t. The Court of Criminal Appea ls c orre ctly determined that the defendant waived any objection to the testimony of I saiah Dixon byhis failure to raise the issue at trial, there by

preve nting t he trial c ourt from ha ving an opportunity to rule on the matter befor e the witness be g an his testim o n y b ef o re the jury . See Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a); Smith, 24 S.W .3d at 2 8 0 (finding that a fa ilure to object to otherw ise inadmissible evidence will allow that evidenc e to be c onsidered a s if it were , in fac t, fully admissible under the la w of e vidence ).

Even if the de fenda nt’s confe ssion challeng e was not waived, the defe ndant i s not entitled to relief be cause the evidenc e i s sufficie nt to corrobor ate his conf ession. “It is a well-esta

blished principle of law in this state that a conviction cannot be founded solely upon a d efe ndant’s confe ssion, and our case s have long r equire d some corr oborating evidenc e in orde r to establish the
c or pu s d e lic ti. ” Smith, 24 S.W. 3da t 28 1. Ho we ve r, “ [the c or ro bo ratin g ] ev ide nc e is suf fi c ie nt i f

. . . it te nd s to c on ne c t th e de fe nd a nt w ith the c omm iss ion to the of fe ns e , a lth ou g h the e vid e nc e is slight, an d en t i t l ed , when standing by itself, to but lit tle consideration.” I d. (quoting Ricketts v. State, 241 S.W .2d 604, 606 (Tenn. 1951) ).

I n this case, the Court of

Criminal App eals corre ctly found suffic ient corr oboration of the de f e n d a n t’ s c o n f

e s s io n in th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s p r e s e n c e a t th e mo te l a t th e ap p r o xim a te ti me of the incident as we ll as in the testimony of Edie Jones, Deanna J ones, and D ante Smith. This evidence is sufficient to cor

roborate the conf

ession beca

use it “tends to conne ct the def end an t wi t h the commission of the off

ense.” Smit h, 24 S.W .3d at 281. Even if this evide nce c ould be cha rac terized as “slig ht,” that is all that is lega lly require d for co rrobor ation of a de fenda nt’s confe ssion of culpability . I d.

VI I. Is su e s P re te rm itt e d b

y Pr oc e du ra l R uli ng of Cou rt o f Cr im ina l A

pp e als

Be cause the Court of C riminal Appea ls held t hat t he mot ion for new trial wa s late as to the-12-

felony murder c onviction, the Court did not a ddress the issues of the missing witness ar g ument, the
acc omplice testimony , or the out-of -court confe ssion with respe ct t o the fe lony murder c onviction. Additionall y , b eca

use the Court found that the amended motions for ne w trial we re untimely , the Court did not addre ss any of t he is sues raised there in as to either c onviction. We rever se the Court of Cr imi na l Ap pe a ls’ ru lin g s a s to the tim e lin e ss of the mot ion s fo r ne w tr ia l a nd re ma ndthe c a se to the Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls t o c on sid e r the iss ue s p re te rm itt e d b y its pr oc e du ra l ruli ng s.
CO NC LU SION

I n s umm ary , w e fi nd that the mot ion fo r ne w tri a l file d on Aug us t 3, 2001 , wa s time ly a s to the fe lony murder c onviction as well as the espec ially ag g ravated robbery conviction. We further find that the two ame nded motions for new trial wer e timely filed bec ause the y

wer e filed w hile the trial court s t i l l reta ined jurisdiction over the c ase. O n these two issues, we reve rse the Court of Criminal Appeals.

We conclude that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support both convictions, an d af fi rm the Court o f Crim in a l A p p e a ls o n th a t i s s u e

. Wi thr e s p e c t t o th e e s p e c ia ll y a g g r a v a te d r o b b ery conviction, we a g ree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that: (1) wh i l e t h e S t ate’ s ref ere nce to a “missing witness” during cl o s i n g arg ument was improper , the er ror wa s harmless bey ond a
rea sonable d o u b t ; (2) the w itnesses Dea nna Jones, Edie J ones, and D ante Smith were not
acc omplices whose testimony neede d corr oboration, and there fore the trial court did not err in failing to g ive a jury ins truc tio n o n a c c omp lic e te sti mon y ; a nd (3 ) the de fe nd a nt w a ive d a ny objectio n to the te sti mon y

of I sa iah D ixon r e g ard ing the de fe nd a nt’ s o ut- of -c ou rt c on fe ssi on b y

h i s f ai l u re to r a ise the issue at trial.

Be cause the Court of C riminal Appea ls did not addre ss these last three issues with respec t to the felony

murder c onviction or any of the issues raised in the amende d motions for new tria l as to e ith e r c on vic tio n, we re ma nd the c a se to the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls f

or c on sid e ratio n o f tho se iss ue s.
The c osts of the appe al ar e taxed to the State of Tenne ssee.

_____________________________ WI LL I AM M. B AR KE R, JUS TI CE