alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Willie Buchanon, Appellant, v Adirondack Steel Casting Company et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

— Appeals from a decision and an amended decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed February 12, 1990 and September 27, 1990, which, *inter alia,*ruled that claimant does not have a total industrial disability.

Initially, we reject the employer’s contention that claimant’s supplemental notice of appeal was untimely filed given the fact that no proof was presented as to when notice of the Workers’ Compensation Board’s amended decision was served upon the parties *(see,*Workers’ Compensation Law § 23; *see also, Matter of Clark v General Elec. Corp.,*66 AD2d 983). As to the merits of claimant’s case, the Board has plenary authority to modify or rescind its previous decisions *(see, Matter of Scandale v New York Tel. Co.,*55 AD2d 761). Here, the Board’s decision to amend its prior decision is unreviewable insofar as the record fails to reveal any facts showing that its action was arbitrary or capricious *(see, Matter of Cuervo v CAB Motor Co.,*133 AD2d 894). Additionally, the Board’s conclusion that claimant did not suffer a total industrial disability was supported by substantial evidence. The issues presented essentially revolved around a conflict of medical opinion which merely presented a question of fact for the Board to resolve *(see, Matter of Stiso v Hallen Constr. Co.,*135 AD2d 974). Claimant’s remaining arguments have been considered and rejected as lacking in merit.

Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Mikoll, Levine and Crew III, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision and amended decision are affirmed, without costs.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6874

ARTHUR LEE MILLER, Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus STAFF, at Columbia Care Center; NFN FISHER, Security Guard at Columbia Care Center; NFN SCOTT, Doctor at Columbia Care Center; SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA; PROBATE COURT, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-03-725-2-10) Submitted: February 25, 2004 Decided: March 10, 2004 Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Arthur Lee Miller, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Arthur Lee Miller appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Miller v. Staff , No. CA-03-725-2-10 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
The Attorney General of Texas 

October 18, 1978 

JOHN L. HILL 

Attorney General 

Honorable Henry Wade 

Criminal District Attorney 

Sixth Floor, Records Building 

Dallas, Texas 75202 

Opinion No. H- 1259 

Re: Whether a county treasurer 

is authorized to receive fees 

earned by his services to levee 

improvement districts. 

Dear Mr. Wade: 

You ask whether the County Treasurer of Dallas County is entitled to 

receive the fees prescribed by section 57.066 of the Texas Water Code. 

Section 57.066 provides that “[tlhe treasurer is entitled to receive as 

compensation . . . not more than one-fourth of one percent of all money 

received by him . . .I’ in performing his duties for a levee improvement 

district created pursuant to section 57.011, et. seq., of the Water Code. 

Article XVI, section 61 of the Texas Constitution states that I’. . . all 

county officers in counties having a population of twenty thousand (20,000) or 

more, . . . shall be compensated on a salary basis.” The purpose of this 

section was to “abolish the fee system of compensating named officers and 

placing them on a salary basis.” Banks v. State, 362 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. Civ. 

App. - Austin 1962, writ ref’d); see V.T.C.S. art. 3912k, S 5. 

We believe that it is clear that the compensation provided for in section 

57.066 of the Water Code constitutes a fee rather than a salary. See Greer v. 

Hunt County,. 249 S.W. 831 (Tex. 1923) (salary is a fixed amount, while-F 

a contingent amount). Similar arrangements have been held unconstitutional. 

Wichita County v. Robinson, 276 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1954); Attorney General 

Opinions H-202 (1974); S-70 0953); V-743 (1948). 

SUMMARY 

The County Treasurer of Dallas County is prohibited 

by article XVI, section 61 of the Texas Constitution 

from receiving the fees provided for in section 57.066 

of the Water Code. 

P. 4990 
Honorable Henry Wade -’ Page,2 (H-1259) 

APPROVED: 

Attorney General of Texas 

Opinion Committee 

jsn 

P. 4991
#### Darius Gittens, Respondent, v State of New York, Appellant.

Weiss, J.

Appeal from that part of an order of the Court of Claims (Orlando, J.), entered September 20, 1990, which granted claimant’s motion for discovery and inspection and required the State to pay for the expense of photocopies.

Claimant, an inmate at Clinton Correctional Facility in Clinton County, sought to compel discovery and inspection of documents in this suit against the State for monetary damages arising out of alleged harassment and negligence. Although he had not sought poor person status, he did ask that he be provided with copies of the documents he sought pursuant to CPLR 3124. The Court of Claims granted the relief sought and required the State to furnish photocopies to claimant at State expense. The State has appealed that portion of the order which required photocopying without reimbursement, arguing that there was no authority for such requirement. We agree.

There is no general provision which requires the State to pay the litigation expenses in claims brought against it. Court of Claims Act § 27 specifically provides that, except in instances not here present, "costs, witnesses’ fees and disbursements shall not be taxed * * * by the court to any party”. Moreover, claimant is an inmate in a State correctional facility subject to a sentence of imprisonment. Civil Rights Law § 79 (3) and § 79-a (3) specifically provide that the State shall not be liable for any expense of, or related to, inmate *531litigation and shall not be required to perform any services related thereto, particularly where, as here, poor person status has not been granted *(see, Mapp v State of New York,*69 AD2d 911, 912).

Claimant essentially argues that the direction by the Court of Claims was a sanction. While disclosure can be compelled pursuant to CPLR 3124, that provision does not provide for sanctions *(see,*Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3124:6, at 631). Accordingly, the order must be modified to remove the requirement that photocopying be at the State’s expense.

Casey, J. P., Mikoll, Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as required the State to pay for the expense of photocopying, and, as so modified, affirmed.
EXHIBIT 99.1


Office of Chief Accountant
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C., 20549

March 27, 2002

Dear Sir or Madam,

Arthur Andersen LLP has represented to Fonix Corporation that the audit
completed for the year ended December 31, 2001 was subject to Arthur Andersen
LLP's quality control system for the United States accounting and auditing
practice. Arthur Andersen LLP has provided assurance to Fonix Corporation that
the audit engagement was conducted in compliance with professional standards.
The audit was conducted with the appropriate continuity and availability of
personnel, both in the United States and at the Company's foreign affiliate, as
well as the appropriate availability of national office consultation.


Sincerely,


/s/ Roger D. Dudley
--------------------------
Roger D. Dudley
Executive Vice President
Chief Financial Officer
**Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 14 March 2008 – Huta Buczek v Commission**

**(Case T-440/07 R)**

Interim measures – Application for suspension of operation of a measure – Admissibility – No urgency

1.                     *Applications for interim measures – Suspension of operation of a measure – Interim measures – Conditions for granting – Prima
facie case – Urgency – Cumulative nature – Balancing of all the interests involved (Arts 225(1) EC, 242 EC and 243 EC; Rules
of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2)) (see paras 18-20)*

2.                     *Applications for interim measures – Suspension of operation of a measure – Conditions for granting – Urgency – Serious and
irreparable damage (Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2)) (see paras 23-24, 46-50,
62)*

3.                     *Applications for interim measures – Suspension of operation of a measure – Conditions for granting – Serious and irreparable
damage – Commission decision ordering recovery of State aid (Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance,
Art. 104(2)) (see paras 67-68)*

4.                     *Applications for interim measures – Suspension of operation of a measure – Conditions for granting – Balancing of all the
interests involved – Decision on State aid (Arts 88(2) EC and 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art.
104(2); Council Regulation No 659/1999, Art. 7) (see paras 75-76)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | APPLICATION for suspension of operation of Commission Decision C(2007) 5087 final of 23 October 2007 in Case No C 23/2006 (ex NN 35/2006) concerning State aid granted by Poland to the steel producer Grupa Technologie Buczek. |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the application; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Reserves the costs. |
# C_2008116EN.01001301.xml

| 9.5.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 116/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.5.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 116/13

---

Action brought on 28 February 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-92/08)

(2008/C 116/23)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: G. Rozet and J. Enegren, Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium (represented by: D. Haven, Agent)

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | Declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society with regard to the involvement of employees (1), or by not ensuring that management and labour introduce the required provisions by way of agreement, or, in any case, by failing to communicate those measures to the Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 16(1) of that directive; |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society with regard to the involvement of employees (1), or by not ensuring that management and labour introduce the required provisions by way of agreement, or, in any case, by failing to communicate those measures to the Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 16(1) of that directive;

1

| — | order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The time-limit for transposition of Directive 2003/72/EC expired on 18 August 2006.

---

(1)  OJ 2003 L 207, p. 25.

1

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
     financial statements contained in the Registrant's Form 10-QSB for the
     quarter ended March 31, 1997 and is qualified in its entirety by
     reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               Jun-30-1997               
<PERIOD-START>                  Jul-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                    Mar-31-1997               
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                 1               
<CASH>                          457,670               
<SECURITIES>                          0         
<RECEIVABLES>                         0         
<ALLOWANCES>                          0         
<INVENTORY>                           0         
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                511,303               
<PP&E>                          375,007               
<DEPRECIATION>                 (123,680)                
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                2,915,282                 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           406,661               
<BONDS>                               0         
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0         
<PREFERRED>                           0         
<COMMON>                        476,758              
<OTHER-SE>                   15,475,796                  
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  2,915,282                 
<SALES>                               0         
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      0         
<CGS>                                 0         
<TOTAL-COSTS>                         0         
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      0         
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0         
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                    0         
<INCOME-PRETAX>              (1,121,882)                  
<INCOME-TAX>                          0         
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                   0         
<DISCONTINUED>                        0         
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0         
<CHANGES>                             0         
<NET-INCOME>                 (1,121,882)                  
<EPS-PRIMARY>                     (0.02)           
<EPS-DILUTED>                     (0.02)           
        


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           1,171
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   17,846
<ALLOWANCES>                                       236
<INVENTORY>                                     15,322
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                35,483
<PP&E>                                          11,873
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,410
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  50,101
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           24,221
<BONDS>                                          8,588
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         32
<COMMON>                                            93
<OTHER-SE>                                      16,834
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    50,101
<SALES>                                         85,499
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                85,499
<CGS>                                           55,640
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   55,640
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                20,203
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,645
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  8,011
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,583
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,280
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,280
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.63
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.63


</TABLE>
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

REGION 4

ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER

61 FORSYTH STREET ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8960 March 9, 2015

Sheila Holman, Director Division of Air Quality North Carolina Dept. of

Environment and Natural Resources

1641 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-1641

Dear Ms. Holman:

Enclosed is the final end-of-year report for your agency’s FY 2014 Air Pollution Control grant authorized by §105 of the Clean Air Act. This repor t outlines your agency’s various grant commitments and their status. Since there were no issues, your report is now finalized. This letter documents the conclusion of the joint evaluation process requ ired by 40 Code of Federal Regulations 35.115 and identified as a commitment in your FY 2014 Air Planning Agreement under Cross Cutting Issues

.

We appreciate the progress you made in FY 2014 and look forward to continuing our joint efforts to protect and improve air quality. If you have any ques tions or comments, please contact Stuart Perry at (404) 562-8980 or Shantel Shelmon at (404) 562-9817.

Sincerely,

Beverly H. Banister

Director Air, Pesticides a nd Toxics Management Division

Enclosure
#### Williams v. State

16151

10/25/94

Affirmed
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 426 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 426

 To prohibit any regulation, rule, guidance, recommendation, or policy 
 issued after May 15, 2015, that limits the sale or donation of excess 
property of the Federal Government to State and local agencies for law 
            enforcement activities, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 10, 2017

  Mr. Ratcliffe (for himself, Mr. Olson, Mr. Hensarling, Mr. Brady of 
Texas, Mr. Barletta, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Johnson of Ohio, Mr. Huizenga, Mr. 
 Meehan, Mr. Byrne, and Mr. Moolenaar) introduced the following bill; 
 which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition 
  to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit any regulation, rule, guidance, recommendation, or policy 
 issued after May 15, 2015, that limits the sale or donation of excess 
property of the Federal Government to State and local agencies for law 
            enforcement activities, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Lives Using Surplus 
Equipment Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. GENERAL PROHIBITION.

    No regulation, rule, guidance, recommendation, or policy issued 
after May 15, 2015, that limits the sale or donation of excess property 
of the Federal Government, including excess property of the Department 
of Defense, to State and local agencies for law enforcement activities 
(whether pursuant to section 2576a of title 10, United States Code, or 
any other provision of law, or as a condition on the use of Federal 
funds) shall have any force or effect unless enacted into law by 
Congress.

SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON FEDERAL FUNDS.

    No agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government may use any 
Federal funds, fees, or resources to implement such regulation, rule, 
guidance, recommendation, or policy.

SEC. 4. RETURN OR REISSUE OF EQUIPMENT RECALLED OR SEIZED.

    Any property recalled or seized on or after May 15, 2015, pursuant 
to a regulation, rule, guidance, recommendation, or policy described in 
section 1 shall be returned, replaced, or reissued to the State or 
local agency from which it was recalled or seized, at no cost to such 
agency, as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Randall L. Garwood, Appellant, v Sheen & Shine, Inc., et al., Respondents.

— Order and judgment unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: In this action for fraud, plaintiff alleges that he had been employed by defendant corporation as a bookkeeper for approximately one year when he was offered employment by the Town of Irondequoit at a higher rate of pay; that he intended to accept such offer, and submitted his resignation to defendants; that defendants thereupon offered to continue plaintiff’s employment "at a pay equal to that offered by the Town of Irondequoit”; that defendants’ representative "told plaintiff that he was satisfied with the plaintiff’s job performance and would continue the plaintiff as an employee as long as plaintiff performed his job in the *570same manner as he had previously done so”; that in reliance thereon, plaintiff accepted defendants’ offer and rejected the Town’s offer; and that approximately three weeks later, defendants terminated plaintiff’s employment without stating "any cause of such termination”.

The essence of plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud is found in paragraph 15 of the complaint, which states: "At the time the representations were made by defendants to the plaintiff the defendants had no intention to perform the continued agreement for employment at higher pay, and at the time that said representations were made by the defendants said defendants intended to discharge the plaintiff after a short period of continued employment when plaintiff no longer had the opportunity of employment with the Town of Irondequoit.”

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action *(see,*CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Supreme Court granted the motion, and we affirm.

The complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action for fraud because the only fraud alleged relates to the breach of the employment contract *(see, Dalton v Union Bank,*134 AD2d 174, 176; *Wegman v Dairylea Coop.,*50 AD2d 108, 113, *lv dismissed 38*NY2d 918; *see also, Spellman v Columbia Manicure Mfg. Co.,*111 AD2d 320, 324). A failure to perform the contract as agreed "is merely a breach of contract, which must be enforced by an action on that contract” *(Wegman v Dairylea Coop., supra,*at 113). Here, however, plaintiff is an at-will employee, terminable at any time for any reason, or for no reason at all *(see, O’Connor v Eastman Kodak Co.,*65 NY2d 724). Thus a contract claim, if pleaded, would also fail. Plaintiff has stated no legally sufficient cause of action, and the complaint was properly dismissed. (Appeal from Order and Judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Willis, J. — Dismiss Complaint.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Lawton, Lowery and Davis, JJ.