alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2007269EN.01006502.xml

| 10.11.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 269/65 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 269/65

---

Action brought on 14 September 2007 — El Fatmi v Council

(Case T-362/07)

(2007/C 269/119)

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Applicant: Nouriddin El Fatmi (Amsterdam, Netherlands) (represented by: J. Pauw, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | Declare Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 inapplicable and/or annul Decision 2007/445 in so far as those measures relate to the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 inapplicable and/or annul Decision 2007/445 in so far as those measures relate to the applicant;

| — | Order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of his application, the applicant first of all submits that Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344, p. 70) is not applicable to him inasmuch as there is no connection whatsoever between the common foreign and security policy and the applicant.

Second, the applicant submits that Regulation No 2580/2001 is not applicable to him inasmuch as he is not committing, or attempting to commit, participating in or facilitating the commission of any act of terrorism.

In conclusion, the applicant contends that the contested decision is at variance with the principle of proportionality and is inadequately reasoned.

---
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

October 4, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00349

- CV

Scott Ralph WHEELOCK aka Scott Wheelock, et al., Appella nt

v.

KERR COUNTY , Headwaters Groudwater Conservation District, Kerr County Emergency Services District #2, Kerr County Lateral Roads, Upper Guadalupe River Authority, Harper Independent School District, Appellee

From the County Court at Law

, Kerr Count y, Texas

Trial Court No. 21317A

Honorable Rex Emerson , Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant’s brief was initially due on August 24 , 20 22 but was not filed . On September 12, 2022

, we ordered appellant to file his brief by September 29, 2022

. On September 29, 2022

, appellant filed a motion for extension of time to file his brief and on Sept ember 30, 2022 appellant filed his brief. Appellant ’s brief arrived within the window of time permitted under the mailbox rule, rendering it timely filed . We therefore DENY AS MOO T appellant’s motion for

extension of time.

_________________________________ Beth Watkins , Justice

IN WITNE SS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 4th day of October, 2022

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
February 25, 1999

21632

#### Anzai v. State, Dept. of Land and Natural Resources

Affirmed
# C_2009220EN.01001401.xml

| 12.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 220/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 220/14

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 16 July 2009 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Kościanie — Republic of Poland) — Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach

(Case C-344/08) (1)

1

(Protection of species of wild fauna and flora - Species listed in Annex B to Regulation (EC) No 338/97 - Evidence of lawful acquisition of specimens of those species - Burden of proof - Presumption of innocence - Rights of the defence)

2009/C 220/22

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy w Kościanie

Party involved in the criminal prosecution in the main proceedings

Party involved in the criminal prosecution in the main proceedings

Tomasz Rubach

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Sąd Rejonowy w Kościanie — Interpretation of Article 8(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ 1997 L 61, p. 1) — Notion of ‘proof’ that specimens of the species listed in Annex B were lawfully acquired

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 8(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of criminal proceedings brought against a person accused of having infringed that provision, any type of evidence accepted under the procedural law of the Member State concerned in similar proceedings is in principle admissible for the purpose of establishing whether specimens of animal species listed in Annex B to that regulation were lawfully acquired. In the light also of the principle of the presumption of innocence, such a person may adduce any such evidence to prove that those specimens came lawfully into his possession in accordance with the conditions laid down in that provision.

---

(1)  OJ C 272, 25.10.2008.

1

---
# C_2009113EN.01001901.xml

| 16.5.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 113/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 113/19

---

Order of the Court of 3 March 2009 — Christos Michail v Commission of the European Communities

(Case C-268/08 P) (1)

1

(Appeal - Staff case - Articles 12a and 24 of the Staff Regulations - Psychological harassment - Duty to provide assistance - Distortion of facts - Errors in the legal assessment of the facts)

2009/C 113/37

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Appellant: Christos Michail (represented by: C. Meïdanis, dikigoros)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: G. Berscheid and J. Currall, Agents, E. Bourtzalas and I. Antypas, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings:

Re:

Re:

Appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber) delivered on 16 April 2008 in Case T-486/04 Michail v Commission in which the Court dismissed the appellant’s action for annulment of the Commission’s implied decision of 20 March 2004 rejecting the request for assistance made by the appellant pursuant to Article 24 of the Staff Regulations — Infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations — Psychological harassment — Distortion of facts — Errors made in the legal assessment of the facts

Michail

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The appeal is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The appeal is dismissed.

| 2. | The appellant is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The appellant is ordered to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 223, 30.8.2008.

1

---
1 

### M EMORANDUM

T O : Docket for Navajo Generating Station: EPA

‐ R09

‐ OAR

‐ 2013

‐ 0009

F ROM : Anita Lee, EPA Region 9

D ATE : September 13, 2013

R E : Consultation Conference Call on September 13, 2013 with the Hopi Tribe

Participants:

Hopi Tribe (by teleconference)

 Chairman LeRoy Shingoitewa

 Robert Lyttle

EPA Region 9

 Jared Blumenfeld, Regional Administrator

 Deborah Jordan, Air Division

 Colleen McKaughan, Air Division (by teleconference from Arizona)

 Anita Lee, Air Planning Office

 Ann Lyons, Office of Regional Counsel

 Zoe Heller, Office of the Regional Administrator

 Pamela Overman, Tribal Programs Office

Location:

 EPA Region 9 Office in San Francisco, CA

Summary:

 Chairman Shingoitewa and Mr. Lyttle discussed several issues, including:

o the concerns raised in their September 9, 2013 letter to Interior Secretary Jewell regarding NGS

and the Technical Work Group Alternative, especially that the TWG Agreement does not

represent the interests of the Hopi Tribe

o Hopi’s position of neutrality on NGS based on July 2011 resolution passed by the Tribal Council

was forced by provisions of the Lower Colorado River water rights negotiations.

o The revenue Hopi receives from NGS coal

‐ mining activities is often overstated. Mr. Lyttle

explained that the Hopi receive $9

‐ 11 million per year, with a total budget of $50 million per

year. The tribe’s economy is less dependent on coal mining than it once was.

o The Hopi Tribal Council is looking at all options related to NGS and coal mining on Hopi land.

Presentation Materials Received (attached):

 None
# C_2020077EN.01003703.xml

| 9.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 77/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 77/37

---

Order of the President of the Court of 23 October 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark — Austria) — Proceedings brought by DY v Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld, interested party: Finanzpolizei

(Case C-138/19) (1)

(2020/C 77/52)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 187, 3.6.2019.

---
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 19, 2018

No. 04-18-00924-CR

Rudy DELGADO, Sr.,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 81st Judicial District Court, Atascosa County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12-07-0141-CRA

Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding

ORDER

This appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

It is so ORDERED on December 19, 2018.

_____________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 19th day of December, 2018.

_____________________________

Keith E. Hottle, Clerk of Court
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 240 (Friday, December 15, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 86933-86934]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-27608]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Consortium for Rare Earth Technologies

    Notice is hereby given that, on October 23, 2023, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Consortium for Rare Earth 
Technologies (``CREaTe'') has filed written notifications 
simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission disclosing changes in its membership. The notifications were 
filed for the purpose of extending the Act's provisions limiting the 
recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified 
circumstances.
    Specifically, Beacon Industries, Inc., Newington, CT; Blue 
Technology LLC, Lindenhurst, NY; Capitol Integration, Bradenton, FL; 
Corinne Young LLC, Duxbury, MA; Cornerstone Government Affairs, 
Washington, DC; Creative Engineers, Inc., New Freedom, PA; GE Chaplin, 
Flemington, NJ; Infinite Elements, El Paso, TX; Los Alamos National 
Lab, Los Alamos, NM; Montana Technological University, Butte, MT; Naval 
Research Laboratory, Washington, DC; Rare Earth Technologies, Inc., 
Cincinnati, OH; Raytheon Technologies, Cambridge, MA; ReElement 
Technologies, Fishers, IN; South Dakota School of Mines and Technology, 
Rapid City, SD; Tetramer Technologies, Pendleton, SC; and, The Process 
Group LLC, Chesterfield, MO have been added as parties to this venture.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and CREaTe intends to file additional 
written notifications disclosing all changes in membership.
    On April 22, 2022, CREaTe filed its original notification pursuant 
to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a 
notice in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act on 
May 13, 2022 (87 FR 29384).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on May 1, 2023. 
A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 6(b) 
of the Act on June 13, 2023 (88 FR 38540).


[[Page 86934]]


Suzanne Morris,
Deputy Director Civil Enforcement Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 2023-27608 Filed 12-14-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17D0179. AMBER SIGAFOOSE v. HERBERT RHETT COBB.

On November 22, 2016, Amber Sigafoose filed this application for

discretionary appeal of the trial court’s July 18, 2016 temporary order awarding

Herbert Rhett Cobb sole physical and legal custody of the parties’ minor child. We,

however, lack jurisdiction.

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11), “[a]ll judgments or orders in child

custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or modifying child custody” are directly

appealable. Therefore, a party seeking to challenge a child custody order, including

an interlocutory order, may file a direct appeal. Cohen v. Cohen, 300 Ga. App. 7, 8

(1) (684 SE2d 94) (2009); Lacy v. Lacy, 320 Ga. App. 739, 742 (3) (740 SE2d 695)

(2013). Ordinarily, when a party applies for discretionary review of a directly

appealable order, we grant the application. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). To fall within

this general rule, however, the application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the

order or judgment to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v State, 204 Ga. App.

582, 582 (420 SE2d 393) (1992). Here, Sigafoose filed her application 127 days after

the trial court’s order was entered.

1 Because the application is untimely, it is hereby

1 Sigafoose also filed a pro se motion titled “Motion to Waive the Required 10

Day Filing,” in which she requeststhis Court to grant an out-of-time appeal. Pursuant

to OCGA § 5-6-39 (a) (5), this Court may grant an extension of time for filing an

application for discretionary appeal. Gable v. State, 290 Ga. 81, 84 (2) (a) (720 SE2d

170) (2011). The request for an extension, however, “must be made before expiration

of the period for filing as originally prescribed or as extended by a permissible

previous order.” OCGA § 5-6-39 (d); see also Gable, 290 Ga. at 84-85 (2) (a). 

December 06, 2016
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Furthermore, this Court has no authority to permit an out-of-time appeal at this

juncture, where the trial court has not determined whether Sigafoose is entitled to file

an out-of-time appeal. See e.g. In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 298-299 (788

SE2d 416) (2016). 

12/06/2016
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Daniel E. Kasten, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (D’Amaro, J.), rendered October 6, 1988, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by him to law enforcement authorities.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of the fatal shooting of both of his adoptive parents. The defense at trial was lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect (Penal Law § 40.15). The defendant claimed that he shot his parents while he was under a delusion that his body and will had been taken over by "Lord Derelith”, a "Mind Flayer” monster associated with the game "Dungeons and Dragons”, and, therefore, that he was not responsible for his actions. The defendant’s expert witnesses testified that the defendant was schizophrenic and delusional at the time he killed his adoptive parents and, therefore, was not responsible for his actions. The People’s experts rejected the diagnosis of the defendant’s expert and diagnosed him as having a personality disorder at the time of the killings. The People’s expert witnesses testified that the defendant had the substantial capacity to know and appreciate the nature and consequences of his conduct and that his conduct was wrong.

As a general rule, where conflicting expert testimony is presented at trial, the question of sanity is for the trier-of-fact, who has the right to accept or reject the opinion of any expert (see, *People v Wood,*12 NY2d 69, 77; *People v Enchautegui,*156 AD2d 461). Where, as here, there is an absence of a serious flaw in the testimony of the People’s expert, the resolution of the trier-of-fact of the issue of sanity will not be disturbed *(see, e.g., People v Enchautegui, supra,*at 461; *People v Briecke,*143 AD2d 1025). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, resolution of issues of credibility as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see, People*
      *885
      *v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions, including the alleged excessiveness of the sentence imposed, and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Balletta and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
# C_2009113EN.01001302.xml

| 16.5.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 113/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 113/13

---

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 12 March 2009 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-342/08) (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 96/82/EC - Article 11(1)(c) - Failure to draw up external emergency plans - Incomplete transposition)

2009/C 113/26

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: G. Rozet and A. Sipos, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium (represented by: T. Materne, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Failure to draw up external emergency plans for the measures to be taken outside establishments falling within Article 9 of Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (OJ 1997 L 10, p. 13)

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that, by failing to ensure that an external emergency plan is drawn up for all the establishments covered by Article 9 of Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, as amended by Directive 2003/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2003, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by failing to ensure that an external emergency plan is drawn up for all the establishments covered by Article 9 of Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, as amended by Directive 2003/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2003, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

| 2. | orders the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

orders the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 285, 8.11.2008.

1

---
Exhibit 32.2



SARBANES-OXLEY ACT SECTION 906



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, the undersigned officer of Sky Financial Group, Inc. (the Company), hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge,
that the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: February 18, 2005



|    |  |                                                     
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------
|By: |  | /s/ Kevin T. Thompson                               
|    |  | Kevin T. Thompson                                   
|    |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



The signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Fulton Savings Bank, Respondent, v Gene A. Rebeor, Appellant. James Medcraf, Nonparty Respondent.

— Order unanimously reversed on the law with costs and motion granted. Memorandum: Plaintiff purportedly commenced this action for a judgment of foreclosure by substituted service upon defendant pursuant to CPLR 308 (4). The record reveals that defendant leased his residence to tenants two months prior to any attempt to serve him there and that he was not residing there on the date the process server attempted substituted service pursuant to CPLR 308 (4). Plaintiff, therefore, failed to satisfy the requirement that the summons be affixed to the door of defendant’s actual dwelling place (CPLR 308 [4]). Accordingly, defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction should have been granted *(see,*CPLR 5015 [a] [4]; *Feinstein v Bergner,*48 NY2d 234; *Community State Bank v Haakonson,*94 AD2d 838; *Polansky v Paugh,*23 AD2d 643). Moreover, by failing to make any inquiry of neighbors or others regarding defendant’s habits and employment and by failing to attempt to serve defendant at his place of business, plaintiff, who was aware at least two days before the fourth attempt at service that defendant had leased the premises to others, did not exercise due diligence in attempting to serve defendant pursuant to CPLR 308 (1) or (2) *(see, Moss v Corwin,*154 AD2d 443; *DeShong v Marks,*144 AD2d 623, *lv dismissed*74 NY2d 946; *Smith v Wilson,*130 AD2d 821; *Bleier v Heschel,*128 AD2d 662).

There is no merit to plaintiff’s contention that defendant should be estopped from contesting jurisdiction. The record is devoid of evidence that defendant engaged in affirmative conduct calculated to prevent plaintiff from learning of his actual residence *(see, Feinstein v Bergner,*48 NY2d 234, 241, *supra; Community State Bank v Haakonson,*94 AD2d 838, 839, *supra).*(Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Reagan, J. — Vacate Default Judgment.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Denman, Boomer, Balio and Lowery, JJ.