If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re ESTATE OF JOHN ALBERT PIIPPO.

ANDREW JAY THAV, Personal Representative of 

the ESTATE OF JOHN ALBERT PIIPPO and 

JESSICA PIIPPO, 

Appellees,

UNPUBLISHED

August 17, 2023

v No. 362103

Washtenaw Probate Court

VIRGINIA WHEELER PIIPPO,

Appellant,

and 

TED DIMITRI, Personal Representative of the 

ESTATE OF KATHLEEN DIMITRI

LC No. 19-000364-DE

Other Party.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and MARKEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, a daughter of the decedent John Albert Piippo (Piippo), appeals as of right an 

order entered by the probate court on June 17, 2022 approving the sale of real estate following the 

filing of a petition for approval of that sale by the successor personal representative of Piippo’s 

estate, Andrew Jay Thav. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Piippo died on March 23, 2019. He was survived by three heirs: his daughters, appellant

and Kathleen Dimitri (Kathleen), as well as his granddaughter, Jessica Piippo (Jessica). On April 

5, 2019, appellant filed an application for informal probate—indicating that her father died 

intestate—and requested to be appointed the personal representative of her father’s estate. The 
-2-

request was granted and letters of authority were issued on April 19, 2019. On June 3, 2019, an 

attorney, Andrew Jay Thav (Thav), filed an appearance on behalf of Jessica.

The relevant property at issue in this case included three pieces of real property: (1) a 

residence located at 13340 Firesteel Road, Ontonagon, Michigan; (2) vacant land in Ontonagon, 

Michigan, and (3) a second piece of vacant land in Ontonagon, Michigan. Located on the 

residential property were a pole barn, sheds, farm equipment, and motor vehicles.

On July 19, 2019, appellant, as personal representative of Piippo’s estate, filed an inventory 

of the assets of the estate stating that it was “a complete and accurate inventory of all the assets of 

the estate and the fair market valuations as of 03/23/2019.” The document that appellant signed 

and submitted stated: “I declare under the penalties of perjury that this inventory has been 

examined by me and that its contents are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and 

belief.” The inventory listed the value of all three real properties in Ontonagon, Michigan as 

$117,700. The inventory stated that the contents of the barn on the Ontonagon property consisted 

of “non operable [sic] farm equipment & junk vehicles.” The “gross value” was noted to be 

“scrap” of unknown value. A “non operable [sic] 1988 GMC pick up [sic] truck” was also listed 

and its gross value was noted to be “junk” with zero value. The estate fee calculated by the probate 

court was based on the value of the assets listed in the inventory prepared by appellant.

On September 13, 2019, attorney Thav filed an appearance on behalf of Kathleen. Through 

attorney Thav, Jessica and Kathleen sought the removal of appellant as personal representative of 

Piippo’s estate and the appointment of a successor personal representative, as well as the 

conversion from an unsupervised informal estate to a supervised formal estate. The petition

seeking a supervised administration of the estate stated that appellant failed to serve on them a 

copy of the inventory, and was being “very secretive with regard to matters relating to the estate” 

in that she refused to provide to them any information regarding the administration of Piippo’s 

estate.

On October 7, 2019, appellant, through retained counsel, filed a response to the petitions,

primarily denying the allegations and requesting that the probate court deny the relief requested 

by Jessica and Kathleen. Appellant attached as exhibits purported excerpts from text message 

conversations she had with Jessica and Kathleen which demonstrated their acrimonious 

relationships.

A hearing on the petitions was conducted on October 10, 2019. The court ordered the 

parties to mediation and adjourned the hearing on the petitions.

A hearing on the petitions was conducted on March 5, 2020, with attorney Thav indicating 

in pertinent part that appellant agreed to provide an accounting with regard to estate income and 

liabilities by March 31, 2020. Further, the parties agreed that appellant would retain a realtor or 

an appraiser within 10 days to makes determinations as to the property in Ontonagon, Michigan, 

including its value and whether it could be divided three ways. Because of the acrimonious 

relationships between the parties, they were to have no contact with each other. These agreements 

resolved the pending petitions and an order was entered to that effect on the same date.
-3-

On July 29, 2020, counsel for appellant filed a motion to withdraw from representation,

indicating that appellant had not had contact with him for several months and had failed to pay for 

services despite several requests. Thereafter, counsel for Jessica and Kathleen filed a motion to 

show cause, stating that appellant failed to comply with the March 5, 2020 order and, on August 

6, 2020, the court issued an order to show cause why appellant should not be held in civil contempt. 

On August 28, 2020, counsel for appellant withdrew his motion to withdraw from representation 

and indicated that he would continue to represent appellant.

A hearing was conducted on September 10, 2020, at which time attorney Thav argued that 

appellant failed to comply with the court’s March 5, 2020 order. Counsel for appellant disagreed, 

noting in relevant part that appellant listed the Ontonagon properties for sale with a realtor—which 

was difficult to find in the upper peninsula where the property is located—and took pictures of the 

property. Appellant’s counsel further indicated that several vehicles were on the property but had 

no idea if the estate had title or keys to any of them or even if they were operable. Attorney Thav 

disagreed that the accounting was complete or accurate and renewed his motion to have appellant 

removed as the personal representative. Attorney Thav indicated that either one of his clients 

could be appointed or he could be appointed so that this estate matter could be resolved. 

Appellant’s counsel argued that they could not find anyone to go to the upper peninsula and 

appraise or survey the Ontonagon property; it was not financially feasible for the estate. The 

probate could ordered an evidentiary hearing on the motion to show cause and on the petition to 

remove appellant as personal representative.

On September 21, 2020, appellant filed, in pertinent part: an account detailing the income 

and liabilities of the estate; a petition to allow the account; various receipts, and an amended 

inventory which indicated that the inventory value of the Ontonagon properties was $117,700. She 

also attached several documents, including the purported real estate sales contract she entered into 

three days before with regard to the Ontonagon properties, listing the properties for $160,000.

On September 21, 2020, an evidentiary hearing was conducted on the motion to show cause 

and on the petition to remove appellant as personal representative. Appellant was the only witness. 

In pertinent part, appellant testified that she did not get a survey of the Ontonagon property but 

went there, took pictures, and hired a realtor to get a fair market value sale of the property. The 

March order allowed for either the retention of a realtor or surveyor, but appellant did not have it 

surveyed because it is very expensive. The property was listed for sale with Domitrovich Real 

Estate for $160,000 and that listing agreement was dated September 18, 2020, three days before 

this evidentiary hearing. Appellant testified that her husband had accompanied her to the property 

to help her get the buildings open. Appellant admitted that she billed the estate for almost 1,100 

hours of fiduciary time at $25 an hour, totaling almost $27,000 but never provided an itemized 

billing statement in that regard.

Following appellant’s testimony, the court concluded that it was in the best interests of the 

estate to remove appellant as personal representative. Appellant disregarded the court’s order and

did not perform her duties for the estate in a timely manner. Attorney Thav was appointed as 

successor personal representative. The court further found that appellant was in contempt for not 

complying with the March 2020 order in a timely manner and she was ordered to provide 

documentation for her fiduciary fees. Appellant was also ordered to return to the estate a check 

for over $20,000 that she had not yet cashed which was purportedly in payment of her fiduciary 
-4-

fees. On September 21, 2020, an order was entered consistent with the court’s holdings. On 

September 29, 2020, an order was entered appointing attorney Thav as successor personal 

representative.

On November 12, 2020, appellant, through new counsel, filed an amended inventory of 

decedent’s estate. In relevant part, appellant listed the three real properties located in Ontonagon 

separately, noting that the residential property had a value of $147,100; one piece of vacant land 

had a value of $57,600; and the second piece of vacant land had a value of $30,700. Appellant 

again listed the contents of the Ontonagon barn as being “non operable [sic] farm equip & junk 

vehicles,” having a value of zero. Two pick-up trucks, one vehicle, and two trailers were also 

listed—all having a value to be determined. Appellant again sought fiduciary fees at a rate of $25 

an hour for driving to Ontonagon (24 hours) and inventorying (6 hours) “the Ontonagon pole barn, 

out sheds and the farm of John Albert Piippo . . . .”

At a hearing conducted on January 4, 2021, attorney Thav advised the court that Kathleen

had passed away and her interests were being represented by the personal representative of her 

estate, Ted Dimitri. Dimitri subsequently retained an attorney.

A hearing was conducted on April 28, 2021 with regard to the final account submitted by 

appellant as personal representative, as well as for sentencing appellant on the court’s finding of 

civil contempt. During discussions, attorney Thav indicated that appellant wanted to purchase the 

Ontonagon properties and wanted an appraisal done but the cost would be about $1,000. She 

requested that the estate pay the entire cost of the appraisal—not half as he suggested—but Thav 

did not think the estate should pay for that expense and instead would just list the property with a 

realtor if she would not agree to pay half of that cost. Appellant’s counsel indicated that appellant 

should not have to pay any portion of the fee for an appraisal. Appellant’s sanction for the finding 

of contempt was that her fiduciary fees would be reduced by $3,796.94. An order allowing 

accounts was thereafter entered by the court consistent with its rulings.

On March 4, 2022 attorney Thav, as personal representative of the estate, filed a petition 

for approval of the sale of all three Ontonagon real properties for $230,000 to appellant. That 

petition was subsequently withdrawn.

On May 25, 2022, attorney Thav, as personal representative of the estate, filed a petition 

for approval of the sale of all three Ontonagon real properties to MKEMP LLC for $230,000.

On June 7, 2022, appellant filed a response to the petition for approval of the sale of the 

Ontonagon real properties, arguing that the sale would also include all personal property located 

in the sheds and a pole barn—the contents of which were unknown. Appellant claimed that there 

were vehicles, trailers, and pieces of farm equipment, as well as other personal property that had 

not been given a fair market value contrary to MCL 700.3706 and MCL 700.3708. Moreover, 

appellant argued, she was the legal owner of a 1972 Ford Bronco located in the pole barn. 

Accordingly, appellant requested that the court deny the petition for approval of the sale, order 

that an inventory and valuation of the personal property be conducted, and order that appellant be 

permitted to retrieve her Bronco.
-5-

On June 15, 2022, appellant filed a brief for the June 17, 2022 evidentiary hearing to occur 

regarding the approval of the proposed account of the fiduciary, attorney Thav, as well as on the 

petition for approval of the sale of the Ontonagon properties. Appellant argued, in pertinent part, 

that the court should not approve the sale of the properties because it included the sale of all 

personal property and the value of such property was unknown. Further, the proposed sale would 

include the sale of appellant’s 1972 Ford Bronco which she wanted returned to her possession. 

Accordingly, appellant requested that the petition for approval of the sale be denied and that a 

written appraisal be conducted of the real and personal property.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted on June 17, 2022. Appellant’s counsel argued that 

appellant was opposing the sale of the Ontonagon properties and all of the personal property 

contained on the properties without a proper inventory and valuation being performed. The first 

witness was the realtor for the Ontonagon properties, Adam Taivalkoski. The Ontonagon 

properties consists of three different parcels totaling 273.5 acres. It was listed for sale in September 

2021. An offer to purchase was received from appellant in December 2021 for the amount of 

$230,000. The properties would be sold as-is with all the junk, trash, and debris because it was 

very expensive to remove everything and the house was about to fall over. Appellant’s offer was 

subject to a satisfactory appraisal. The purchase agreement at issue in this case and up for the 

court’s approval contained nearly identical terms as appellant’s purchase agreement but was not 

subject to an appraisal. Taivalkoski testified that appellant allegedly had an appraisal performed 

on the property but—despite asking for it numerous times, he had never seen a copy of it. But 

Taivalkoski was told that the appraised value was $150,000. Thereafter, he received a revised 

offer for $150,000 from appellant but never received a copy of the alleged appraisal. Taivalkoski 

indicated that when deciding a fair price for a property, the offers received for it are relevant as to 

the determination of reasonableness. Appellant’s offer was declined.

Subsequently, a cash offer was received from Mark Kemppainen for $230,000 for 

everything on the property. Appellant was then provided a courtesy opportunity to match or beat 

that offer and she made no such offer. About a month before this evidentiary hearing, appellant 

claimed for the first time that she had a Ford Bronco on the property or in the pole barn building. 

Appellant was then offered the opportunity to remove that vehicle and Kemppainen was apprised 

of that fact. The first time that Taivalkoski heard that appellant took the position that all of the 

personal property had to be appraised for its value was the day of this evidentiary hearing. He had 

hired a locksmith to re-key the pole barn before listing the property but the locksmith would not 

do the job because of concerns of structural stability; he felt it was unsafe. There was a big hole 

in the roof and other issues. Other locksmiths declined as well. He knew that there were about 20 

motor vehicles outside in the field but did not know what was in the pole barn. Those vehicles 

would bring the value of the overall property down because they were an eyesore and, at scrap 

metal prices, it would be a job of itself to get rid of those vehicles. Taivalkoski testified that 

appellant was given the opportunity to go and retrieve her personal property, but she requested to 

come on Memorial weekend and he was unavailable. Taivalkoski believed the offer to purchase 

for $230,000 by Kemppainen was a fair and reasonable price for the Ontonagon properties. They 

are actually getting about $850 an acre which was about a $100 an acre more than comparable 

properties in the area had sold for.

On cross-examination, Taivalkoski testified that the pole barn had a big hole in the roof, 

the house was dilapidated, and there were two or three small sheds on the property but all of the 
-6-

buildings were locked so he could not see inside them. He did see inside the front door of the 

house and there was what appeared to be junk inside, “like a house that’s been sitting there for a 

long time.” Taivalkoski said “it’s common for farm-type properties like this to sell [with]

abandoned vehicles and junk just because of the cost of removing it.” In setting the sale price for 

the property, a lot of considerations were involved including that there were several old vehicles 

on the property, there were swampy areas and beaver ponds on it, the house was in disrepair with 

a big hole in it plus its foundation wall was caved in entirely, and the pole barn had shifted 

structurally on a side of the building plus there was a big hole (10 by 15 feet in size) in the roof. 

He attempted to have the pole barn door opened so he could see inside it before he listed the 

property but the only locksmith that he was able to hire would not open the door because he felt it 

was unsafe due to the instability of the building. Taivalkoski absolutely considered appellant’s 

offer of $150,000 a lowball offer. The proposed purchaser of the property, Kemppainen, never 

asked him for permission to look inside the buildings on the property but said there was a piece of 

siding torn off of the pole barn which allowed him to look inside and see a Ford Bronco. The 

purchase agreement specifically stated that the buildings would not be opened for inspection before 

purchase. That provision was included because Taivalkoski did not know what was in the 

buildings, he could not get the locks opened, and the buildings were structurally unsound. The 

purchaser of the property was told that appellant wanted her Ford Bronco from the property and 

he was agreeable.

At the conclusion of Taivalkoski’s testimony, attorney Thav rested his case in support of 

the petition to approve the sale of the Ontonagon properties and moved for a directed verdict on 

the issue. The court apparently took the matter under advisement and allowed appellant’s counsel 

to present evidence.

Appellant’s counsel called the proposed purchaser of the property as a witness, Mark 

Kemppainen. Kemppainen testified that he knew the property was 273 acres. He knew that two 

of the buildings on the property had already fallen down. The foundation of the house was bowed 

in and about ready to fall down. The pole barn had about a 9 by 30-foot hole in the roof; the wall 

running parallel to the road was unstable and not straight; and the roofline was not straight. The 

building was unstable. He knew that there were semi-trailers on the grounds around the building 

but did not know what was in them. He looked into the windows of the house and the ceiling was 

down inside the house. He looked into the pole barn building through a hole where a piece of 

metal sheeting had been bent back and it was dark inside but he thought he saw a Ford Bronco, a 

bulldozer, and a lot of junk. There was a tractor outside. He agreed that appellant could have her 

Ford Bronco after he saw that the title was in her name. All of the vehicles on the property had 

been parked for 20 to 25 years probably so he did not know what kind of condition they were in 

and the vehicles inside the barn looked to be in rough shape but be could not see them too well 

from outside.

Appellant’s counsel then called attorney Thav as a witness. He testified that he only 

learned about a month before that appellant owned the Ford Bronco; that is when any evidence of 

that fact was produced. To determine the value of the real property at issue, he hired a realtor who 

was very reputable and passed a background check and interview. He had spoken with the realtor 

that appellant claimed she had retained the day prior to her removal as personal representative but 

appellant had, in fact, never signed the listing agreement with that realtor. Attorney Thav was 

advised by the realtor he retained, Taivalkoski, that the yard of the property was full of junk or old 
-7-

vehicles that appeared to have been broken into, were rusted out and had broken windows. It was 

like a junk yard with a bunch of junk. He knew there was a pole barn on the property but had not 

been inside and did not know what was inside. A locksmith had been hired—the only one who 

would go to the property—and determined that it was far too dangerous to try to open up the pole 

barn and go inside. According to what he had been told, a construction company would have had

to be hired to deconstruct the pole barn piece by piece because of the dangerous nature of the 

condition of the building and he did not believe that it was in the best interest of the estate to spend 

those funds and purchase the necessary liability insurance for such an undertaking. As far as he 

knew, the barn contained 20 to 40-year-old junk cars and maybe farm equipment, and other junk

and was not worth the tens of thousands of dollars it would have cost to access that unstable 

building safely. He based his opinions on his 27 years of experience handling probate matters 

exclusively. And he clarified that appellant could retrieve her Ford Bronco from the property. The

potential buyer, Kemppainen, then stated to the court that he would get the Bronco out of the 

building for appellant after the deal closes. Attorney Thav repeated that he had “no intention of 

taking upon the liability, the undertaking, and the expense of opening up that pole barn before 

selling the property . . . .”

On cross-examination of attorney Thav, he testified that he offered all of the heirs of the 

estate an opportunity to buy the Ontonagon properties but no one except appellant made an offer

and she was the only one who objected to this sale going forward. Appellant had made an offer 

of $230,000 for the property—the same terms at issue in this hearing—and that offer was accepted 

but she later rescinded that offer, ostensibly because of an appraisal she had performed, and 

submitted a revised offer of $150,000. Appellant had been the personal representative of the estate 

for about 19 months and had listed on her inventory submitted to the court that the pole barn 

contents consisted of non-operable farm equipment and junk vehicles with a zero-dollar value. In 

fact, her final accounting did not list any of the vehicles sitting outside in the fields, likely because 

they were junk and could not even be proved to be owned by the estate. After he had received the 

offer to purchase at issue, he gave appellant another opportunity to meet or beat the purchase price 

being offered and she failed to do so; therefore, he proceeded with the sale at issue.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the probate court rendered its opinion. The 

court noted that the issue came down to whether the personal representative of the estate 

appropriately accepted the offer to purchase the property without knowing what was in the pole 

barn. The court stated:

Looking at the pictures that were provided, it is exceedingly far more likely 

that there is nothing in that pole barn but junk. The pole barn’s falling down, there’s 

a hole in the roof. It is in a remote location to expend the funds to figure out how 

to safely get in the pole barn. To make that determination that that is not a benefit 

to the estate was a reasonable determination to make on the part of the personal 

representative. . . . [T]hat was a reasonable decision, cost-effective decision to 

make.

In addition to that, that’s enough, but in addition, [appellant] was personal 

representative from April of 2019 until September of 2020. That’s two summers 

she had to get in that pole barn. Two years that presumably it was in a better 

condition than it was two years later. She listed - - I didn’t go through all of them, 
-8-

but at least two inventories she had, the July ’19 inventory she lists the three 

Ontonagon properties worth 117, and the barn, stuff in the unopened barn “scrap” 

on the September ’20 inventory she listed again the properties as a 117 - - value of 

117,000, and doesn’t even mention the property inside the pole barn.

So from every information here, she did nothing to protect that property 

while she was personal representative. She did nothing to value the property. She 

didn’t even include it on the inventory and did nothing to protect it and/or retrieve 

it. So that, in addition to just the fact that it was a reasonable decision to make, 

cost-effective decision to make for the estate, I am going to approve the sale of the 

property.

On that same date, June 17, 2022, an order was entered approving the sale of the Ontonagon 

properties for the sum of $230,000 to MKEMP LLC.

Thereafter, appellant filed a motion for stay of the order regarding the sale of real estate, 

which was denied by order entered on July 8, 2022 following a hearing on the motion. At the 

hearing, the personal representative noted that he was unable to secure any liability insurance 

(three companies refused) on the property—because of its dangerous and unsafe condition—which 

made the estate vulnerable to liability if someone went into the pole barn to conduct an inspection 

or inventory and it fell down and killed the person. Following arguments, the court stated:

I would agree that the normal course would absolutely be that a personal 

representative would inventory the personal property prior to a sale, and obviously 

that’s, [sic] would be the preferred procedure. So I understand that. But the fact 

that she was personal representative for 17 months and had time herself to inventory 

that property, never did, and her inventory called the value of that property zero in 

her inventory, she has from day one . . . . [S]he had to be show caused to do 

anything with the property. So to now come in and, again, just continuing to 

obstruct.

All the testimony supports the fact that the chances of anything of 

significant value being in that pole barn is significantly low. We had testimony 

about a hole in it so the weather has gotten in there. It -- the only thing that was 

presented would indicate that there’s not much of value in there.

Also that they did try to get the locksmith to come out. They did attempt to 

get in the barn. Did have a locksmith come out and get into the barn, but he refused 

to even open it because it was too dangerous to even open.

I think it is within the personal representative’s decision-making authority 

to be able to abandon that property and/or include it, this is -- he’s getting something 

for it, he’s included it in the sale, so it’s not really even an abandonment. But 

without taking the time to inventory it. I just think it is going to cause harm to the 

estate to lose this sale. It is a unique piece of property that is not -- you know, 

you’re selling a house in Ann Arbor that you’re going to get another buyer the next 

day. I am going to deny leave here to stay the proceedings.
-9-

Appellant then filed this appeal. Appellant also filed in this Court a motion for stay pending 

appeal which was denied. In re Piippo Estate, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

July 14, 2022 (Docket No. 362103). And appellant filed a motion to expand the record on appeal, 

which was denied without prejudice. In re Piippo Estate, unpublished order of the Court of 

Appeals, entered December 19, 2022 (Docket No. 362103). Subsequently appellant filed a 

renewed motion to expand the record on appeal, which was denied. In re Piippo Estate, 

unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 19, 2023 (Docket No. 362103).

II. ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the probate court reversibly erred by authorizing the sale of the 

Ontonagon real properties, including all of the personal property, because the personal 

representative failed to satisfy his obligations under MCL 700.3706 and MCL 700.3708 to 

inventory and value that personal property. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

MCL 600.866(1) provides: “All appeals from the probate court shall be on a written 

transcript of the record made in the probate court or on a record settled and agreed to be the parties 

and approved by the probate court. An appeal shall not be tried de novo.” See also MCR 

5.802(B)(1). “The standard of review on appeal in cases where a probate court sits without a jury 

is whether the court’s [factual] findings are clearly erroneous.” In re Bennett Estate, 255 Mich 

App 545, 549; 662 NW2d 772 (2003); see also In re Webb H Coe Marital & Residuary Trusts, 

233 Mich App 525, 531; 593 NW2d 190 (1999). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if this 

Court is definitely and firmly convinced that the probate court made a mistake. In re Townsend 

Conservatorship, 293 Mich App 182, 186; 809 NW2d 424 (2011) (citation omitted). The probate 

court’s substantive and dispositional decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re 

Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich App 122, 128; 748 NW2d 265 (2008); In re Weber Estate, 257 

Mich App 558, 560; 669 NW2d 288 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the probate court 

chooses an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. In re Temple

Marital Trust, 278 Mich App at 128. We review de novo issues of statutory or court rule 

construction and application. In re DeCoste Estate, 317 Mich App 339, 345; 894 NW2d 685 

(2016).

B. PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF SALE

“A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standard of care applicable 

to a trustee . . . .” MCL 700.3703(1). The personal representative has a duty to act “as 

expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate.” Id. Another 

duty that a personal representative has, pursuant to MCL 700.3706(1), is to “prepare an inventory 

of property owned by the decedent at the time of death, listing it with reasonable detail, and 

indicating as to each listed item, its fair market value as of the date of the decedent’s death, and 

the type and amount of an encumbrance that may exist with reference to each listed item.” The 

calculation of the probate inventory fee is based on the inventory submitted to the probate court. 

MCL 700.3706(2). And if the personal representative believes there is reasonable doubt about the 
-10-

fair market value of a piece of property in the estate, an appropriate appraiser may be employed. 

MCL 700.3707. Moreover, under MCL 700.3708:

If property not included in the original inventory comes to the knowledge of a 

personal representative or if the personal representative learns that the value or 

description indicated in the original inventory for an item is erroneous or 

misleading, the personal representative shall make a supplementary inventory or 

appraisal showing the market value as of the date of the decedent’s death of the 

new item or the revised market value or description, and showing the appraiser or 

other data relied upon, if any.

In this case, appellant was the personal representative of this estate until she was removed 

by the probate court. In her capacity as personal representative, appellant filed an inventory of the 

estate’s assets on July 19, 2019, as required under MCL 700.3706(1). Appellant filed that 

document under oath, stating that the value of all three real properties in Ontonagon, Michigan 

was $117,700. That inventory stated that the contents of the barn on the Ontonagon property 

consisted of “non operable [sic] farm equipment & junk vehicles.” The “gross value” was noted 

to be “scrap” of unknown value. A “non operable [sic] 1988 GMC pick up [sic] truck” was also 

listed, and its gross value was noted to be “junk” with zero value. Based on appellant’s 

representations, the estate fee charged by the probate court was $211.

Before appellant was removed as personal representative, she claimed that she was entitled 

to fiduciary expenses totaling $12,218.71. A significant portion of those fiduciary fees were 

accrued for one trip that she made to Ontonagon, from August 29, 2020 to August 31, 2020, 

including for drive time, mileage, hotel costs, bridge fare, and “hardware.”1 One of the entries 

included on the expense report submitted to the probate court stated: “Time to Inventory Barn, 

Sheds & Farm,” dated for August 30, 2020, and appellant sought $150.00 (“6 hrs x $25 per hr”) 

for that service. We further note that at the September 21, 2020 evidentiary hearing conducted by 

the probate court on the motion to show cause and on the petition to remove her as personal 

representative, appellant testified that during her visit to the Ontonagon properties when she took 

the inventory, her husband accompanied her to help her get inside the buildings on the property.

Accordingly, to the extent that the probate court noted that appellant did not, in fact, conduct an 

inventory of the pole barn, sheds, and surrounding property while she was the personal 

representative, such a factual finding by the court was clearly erroneous.

Thus, when appellant filed an amended inventory with the probate court in September 

2020, she actually had already been inside the buildings on the property on August 30, 2020, and 

knew what they contained. Appellant never indicated to the court that she believed there was 

reasonable doubt about the fair market value of the property she inventoried, and thus, never 

requested an appraiser as permitted under MCL 700.3707. Appellant’s amended inventory listed 

the Ontonagon properties as, again, having a value of $117,700. No other property was listed with 

regard to the Ontonagon properties.

 

1 Appellant’s request for fiduciary expenses included expenses for “hardware” from Ace in the 

amounts of $208.94, $12.71, and $47.31. The type of “hardware” is unknown.
-11-

On November 12, 2020, after appellant was removed as personal representative of the 

estate, she filed another amended inventory. This inventory—without clarifying explanation—

stated that the residential Ontonagon property had a value of $147,100; one piece of vacant land 

in Ontonagon had a value of $57,600; and the other piece of vacant land had a value of $30,700.

Appellant again listed the “Contents of the Ontonagon barn” as being “non operable [sic] farm 

equip & junk vehicles,” having a value of zero. She also listed vehicles that were outside, including 

two pick-up trucks, one vehicle, and two trailers with unknown value. By letter dated November 

3, 2020, appellant again sought fiduciary fees at a rate of $25 an hour for driving to Ontonagon 

(24 hours) and stated that she “spent six hours at $25/hour, as the Personal Representative, for 

inventorying the Ontonagon pole barn, out sheds and the farm of John Albert Piippo . . . .”

After attorney Thav was appointed personal representative of the estate, appellant advised 

him that she wanted to purchase the Ontonagon properties and he submitted a petition for approval 

of the sale in the amount of $230,000 to the probate court. Apparently, that offer to purchase was 

contingent on an appraisal being performed but appellant refused to pay for half of the appraisal 

fee, which was estimated to be $500. Then appellant submitted a revised offer to purchase the 

properties for $150,000—and this was after appellant had conducted her six-hour inventory of the 

properties—which was declined by the estate. Thereafter, the estate received a cash offer from 

Kemppainen to purchase the properties for $230,000, which was accepted. When the estate sought 

approval of the sale from the probate court, appellant objected claiming that the value of the 

personal property located on the Ontonagon residential property was unknown. Following an 

evidentiary hearing on the matter, the probate court approved the sale.

On appeal, appellant challenges the probate court’s approval of the sale of the Ontonagon 

properties to Kemppainen, asserting an argument that is directly contrary to her sworn statements 

submitted to the probate court. Appellant claims that the successor personal representative was 

required to “determine the nature or value of the pole barn’s contents,” but appellant did that when 

she was personal representative of the estate. As MCL 700.3706(1) states, within 91 days after 

appointment, a personal representative “who is not a . . . successor to another representative who 

has previously discharged this duty, shall prepare an inventory . . . .” Attorney Thav was a 

successor to appellant—who had discharged the duty of preparing an inventory, including an 

inventory of the pole barn’s contents. As set forth at MCL 700.3608, although appellant was 

terminated as personal representative of the estate, “[t]ermination does not discharge a personal 

representative from liability for a transaction or omission occurring before termination . . . .” While 

the personal representative of the estate, appellant submitted an inventory and amended inventory 

to the probate court which listed the personal property on the Ontonagon properties, including in 

the pole barn, as basically, junk with scrap or zero value. In fact, appellant charged the estate for 

six hours of her time taking an inventory of the “Ontonagon pole barn, out sheds and the farm of 

John Albert Piippo . . . .”

The amended inventory appellant submitted to the probate court on September 21, 2020—

after that August 30, 2020 six-hour inventory service appellant provided to the estate—did not 

even list any personal property associated with the Ontonagon properties. Appellant’s second 

amended inventory filed November 12, 2020 still stated that the “contents of the Ontonagon barn” 

consisted of non-operable farm equipment and junk vehicles that had an inventory value of zero. 

Nonetheless, appellant argues that attorney Thav as successor personal representative of the estate 

had a duty to send an appraiser to the Ontonagon barn “to determine the nature or value of the pole 
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barn’s contents” and asserts that Thav’s excuse for not doing so—that the barn structure was unsafe 

and the contents were likely ruined because of the big hole in the roof that had been there for 

years—was “based on mere speculation or supposition.” Like the probate court, we cannot agree 

with appellant. In essence, appellant is arguing that the successor personal representative had a 

duty to disbelieve appellant’s sworn fiduciary statements about the personal property on the 

Ontonagon properties—which were made after she took a six-hour inventory for which she sought 

fiduciary fees—and hire an appraiser. Moreover, at the September 10, 2020 hearing, appellant’s 

counsel admitted on the record that it was not financially feasible for the estate to have an appraisal 

of the property performed and also stated that the estate may not have title or keys to any of the 

several vehicles on the property.

While attorney Thav as successor personal representative of the estate had a duty under 

MCL 700.3708 to file a supplementary inventory “[i]f property not included in the original 

inventory comes to the knowledge of a personal representative or if the personal representative 

learns that the value or description indicated in the original inventory for an item is erroneous or 

misleading,” there is no evidence that such was the case here. In other words, despite a lengthy 

evidentiary hearing, there is no record evidence that Thav was made aware of the existence of 

some personal property of the estate that was missed or misrepresented by appellant in the 

inventory documents that she filed with the probate court when she was the personal 

representative—and after she conducted a six-hour inventory that included all of the buildings on 

the properties. In light of appellant’s fiduciary obligation and sworn statements made “under the 

penalties of perjury,” attorney Thav could reasonably rely on her repeated representations to the 

court that there was nothing of value in the pole barn, sheds, or in the fields of the “farm.”

Moreover, as personal representative of the estate, attorney Thav was empowered under 

MCL 700.3715(1)(k) to “[a]bandon property when, in the opinion of the personal representative, 

it is valueless, or is so encumbered or in such a condition as to be of no benefit to the estate.” As 

the probate court noted, the pictures provided to the court supported attorney Thav’s decision not 

to waste estate assets by purchasing liability insurance and hiring the necessary experts—including 

construction personnel to secure the structural safety of the dilapidated barn and an appraiser—to 

investigate and verify appellant’s sworn fiduciary statements about the personal property on the 

Ontonagon properties. This cost-effective decision was particularly reasonable and sound 

considering that attorney Thav was never provided with any evidence that valuable assets existed 

on the properties. To the contrary, appellant’s inventory submitted to the court after her six-hour 

investigation did not list any valuable personal property and she had only offered $150,000 to buy 

the properties despite her extensive in-person investigation.

In summary, the probate court did not abuse its discretion by approving the sale of the 

Ontonagon properties, including all of the personal property, after concluding that the successor 

personal representative fulfilled his duties and acted in the best interests of the estate.
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Affirmed. Appellees are entitled to costs as the prevailing parties. See MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Jane E. Markey