alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2008008EN.01002702.xml

| 12.1.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 8/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.1.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 8/27

---

Action brought on 19 November 2007 — Okalux v OHIM — Messe Düsseldorf (OKATECH)

(Case T-419/07)

(2008/C 8/49)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Okalux GmbH (Marktheidenfeld, Germany) (represented by: M. Beckensträter, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Messe Düsseldorf GmbH

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of 3 September 2007 in Case R 766/2007-2, notified on 18 September 2007, and dismiss the application for partial revocation of 16 December 2006 of Community trade mark No 915 058 for the reasons stated in the appeal of 16 May 2007; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of 3 September 2007 in Case R 766/2007-2, notified on 18 September 2007, and dismiss the application for partial revocation of 16 December 2006 of Community trade mark No 915 058 for the reasons stated in the appeal of 16 May 2007;

| — | Alternatively, refer the case back for decision on the appeal of 16 May 2007 to the Cancellation Division; |
| --- | --- |

—

Alternatively, refer the case back for decision on the appeal of 16 May 2007 to the Cancellation Division;

| — | Order the defendant or the other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the reimbursable costs, including the costs of the main proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant or the other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the reimbursable costs, including the costs of the main proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Registered Community trade mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity has been sought: the word mark ‘OKATECH’ for goods and services in classes 6, 19 and 42 (Community trade mark No 915 058).

Registered Community trade mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity has been sought:

Proprietor of the Community trade mark: Okalux GmbH

Proprietor of the Community trade mark:

Applicant for the declaration of invalidity: Messe Düssseldorf GmbH

Applicant for the declaration of invalidity:

Decisions of the Cancellation Division: Declaration of the invalidity of the trade mark concerned for services in class 42; revocation of that decision with regard to the costs.

Decisions of the Cancellation Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissal of the appeal as inadmissible.

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: In particular, infringement of Article 57 and 77a of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (1) and violation of the right to be heard.

Pleas in law:

1

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).

1

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6734

JOHN R. BINNS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

RON ANGELONE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior

District Judge. (CA-97-1365-AM)

Submitted: August 13, 1998 Decided: September 4, 1998

Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John R. Binns, Appellant Pro Se. William W. Muse, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court’s order denying relief on

his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.

1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Binns v. Angelone, No. CA-97-1365-AM (E.D. Va. Apr.

24, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.2




CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Unify Corporation (the “Registrant”) on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended July 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Steven D. Bonham, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:




(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and




(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.




Dated: March 8, 2011

/s/ STEVEN D. BONHAMSteven D. BonhamChief Financial Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Unify Corporation and will be retained by Unify Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




---
# C_2020137EN.01002601.xml

| 27.4.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.4.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/26

---

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 3 December 2019 — Fruits de Poment, SCCL v European Commission

(Case C-183/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) - Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 - Markets for soft fruits - Disruption during the 2014 season - Temporary exceptional support measures for producers - Action to establish non-contractual liability)

(2020/C 137/34)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Fruits de Poment, SCCL (represented by: M. Roca Junyent, R. Vallina Hoset and A. Sellés Marco, abogados)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: F. Castillo de la Torre, W. Farrell and A. Sauka, Agents)

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The appeal is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The appeal is dismissed.

| 2. | Fruits de Poment SCCL is ordered to bear the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fruits de Poment SCCL is ordered to bear the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 148, 29. 4. 2019.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4285 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4285

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 123 Bridgeton Pike in Mullica Hill, New Jersey, as the ``James C. 
                `Billy' Johnson Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 7, 2017

 Mr. LoBiondo (for himself, Mr. Norcross, Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Smith of 
  New Jersey, Mr. Gottheimer, Mr. Pallone, Mr. Lance, Mr. Sires, Mr. 
   Pascrell, Mr. Payne, Mr. Frelinghuysen, and Mrs. Watson Coleman) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                    Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 123 Bridgeton Pike in Mullica Hill, New Jersey, as the ``James C. 
                `Billy' Johnson Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. JAMES C. ``BILLY'' JOHNSON POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 123 Bridgeton Pike in Mullica Hill, New Jersey, shall be 
known and designated as the ``James C. `Billy' Johnson Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``James C. 
`Billy' Johnson Post Office Building''.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-6897

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LAWRENCE GLEN GALLOWAY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior

District Judge. (CR-01-117, CA-04-5-4)

Submitted: September 16, 2004 Decided: September 22, 2004

Before LUTTIG, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion..

Lawrence Glen Galloway, Appellant Pro Se. Lisa Rae McKeel, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Lawrence Glen Galloway, a federal prisoner, seeks to

appeal the district court’s order denying his request for a

certificate of appealability in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion.

An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a habeas corpus

proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).

A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable

jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and

that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are

also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently

reviewed the record and conclude that Galloway has not made the

requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We deny Galloway’s motion to

amend his informal brief because it raises an issue not presented

in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion before the district court. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
#### Application of Berlin Acey ODOM for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

No. A-12734.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

June 3, 1959.

Berlin Acey Odom, pro se.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Lewis A. Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BRETT, Judge.

This is an original petition for habeas corpus brought by Berlin Acey Odom wherein he complains he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary. The restraint is by reason of a judgment and sentence entered against him on a charge of obtaining money or property by false pretenses, 21 O.S.1951 § 1541, for which he was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of one year.

He complains he was not extradited from Kansas as by law provided; that he was compelled to answer a charge to a nonexistent crime on what he designates as a civil complaint. He had three appointed counsel before the trial judge finally appointed Douglas Garrett, an able, reputable lawyer of Muskogee, Oklahoma, who tried his case for him. He so recognized him then, but since his conviction has become dissatisfied with the representation afforded him by the trial court. He seeks a review of the law, the evidence, and wants to produce other evidence.

The matters on which he seeks a hearing herein are matters that should have been raised on appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal. Ex parte Holder, 94 Okl.Cr. 270, 234 P.2d 958; In re Goff, Okl.Cr., 312 P.2d 902. It appears the trial court had jurisdiction of the petitioner’s person, of the subject matter, and authority under the law to render the judgment and *504sentence imposed. In re Goff, supra. The petition wholly fails to state any jurisdictional facts sufficient to warrant petitioner’s release. Ex parte Holder, supra. The petition is accordingly dismissed.

POWELL, P. J., and NIX, J., concur.
#### Application of Eunice WORLEY for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

No. A-12859.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

March 9, 1960.

*520James Clark, Coalgate, Geo. L. Hill, McAlester, for petitioner.

James H. Mathers, County Attorney Coal County, Coalgate, Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

POWELL, Presiding Judge.

This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus instituted by the petitioner, Eunice Worley, for the purpose of being admitted to bail pending her trial in the district court of Coal County, Oklahoma, on a charge of murder.

The verified petition alleges that the petitioner is restrained in the county jail of Coal County by reason of a commitment issued by an examining magistrate, and that she now stands accused of the crime of murder by information filed in the district court of said county, but that proof of her guilt is not evident, nor presumption thereof great.

Petitioner further alleges that she made application to the district court of Coal County to be admitted to bail, but her application was denied by said court.

■ Rule to show cause was issued, and a hearing held in this Court, at which time the petitioner went on the witness stand and testified at length, and was duly cross-examined. Other witnesses testified, including the Sheriff of Coal County.

According to the testimony of the defendant, the shooting of deceased was accidental while she was acting in self-defense.

We do not desire to make any comment upon the weight of the evidence, but it is our conclusion, after consideration of the evidence presented in open court, that the petitioner has made a sufficient showing to be entitled to bail. Ex parte Christenberry, 82 Okl.Cr. 378, 170 P.2d 871; Landon v. State, 82 Okl.Cr. 336, 166 P.2d 781.

It is therefore ordered that the petitioner be admitted to bail in the sum of $15,000, said bond to be conditioned as provided by law, and approved by the court clerk of Coal County; and that when said bond is so given and approved, petitioner be discharged from custody, pending the action of the district court of Coal County.

NIX and BRETT, JJ., concur.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-11-00350-CV

Floyd Pleasant Tarvin IV, Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-09-002351, HONORABLE JOHN K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On September 30, 2010, the trial court signed an order dismissing appellant’s case,

among many others, for want of prosecution. However, appellant did not file his notice of appeal

until June 23, 2011. Although appellant has informed us that he had filed a motion to retain the

cause before the dismissal order was signed and that he filed a motion to reinstate the cause after its

dismissal, because the notice of appeal was filed outside the possible deadlines for appeal, see Tex.

R. App. P. 26.1, we cannot exercise jurisdiction over the cause, see Texas Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v.

Martin, 347 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1961) (because appeal was not perfected within thirty days of

judgment, court of appeals “did not acquire jurisdiction”). We therefore must dismissthe appeal for

want of jurisdiction. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).
__________________________________________

David Puryear, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Rose and Goodwin

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: December 30, 2011

2
Exhibit 32.2



SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION OF
                  PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICE
                  PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION #1350



In connection with the Annual Report of Silicon Storage Technology, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jack K. Lai, Vice
President Finance & Administration, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

In Witness Whereof, the undersigned has set his hand hereto as of the 31st day of March, 2005.



/s/ Jack K. Lai		
                   Jack K. Lai		
   Vice President Finance & Administration,
   Chief Financial Officer and Secretary

A signed original of this written statement required by Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Form 10-K to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the
Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-K), irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.

---
# C_2020036EN.01001501.xml

| 3.2.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 36/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.2.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 36/15

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 28 November 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad — Bulgaria) — Criminal proceedings against DK

(Case C-653/19 PPU) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Urgent preliminary ruling procedure - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - Directive (EU) 2016/343 - Strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings - Article 6 - Burden of proof - Continuation of the detention on remand pending trial of an accused person)

(2020/C 36/19)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Party in the main proceedings

DK

Interested party: Spetsializirana prokuratura

Operative part of the judgment

Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, and Articles 6 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union do not apply to a national law that makes the release of a person held in detention on remand pending trial conditional on that person establishing the existence of new circumstances justifying that release.

---

(1)  OJ C 399, 25.11.2019.

---
#### Theodore G. Klumpp et al., Plaintiffs, *v.*George Schirer, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County,

October 26, 1959.

*Le Roy G. Edwards*for defendant.

*Rogers, Hoge Hills (William L. McGuire*of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Mario Pittohi, J.

The defendant moves for an order pursuant to rule 112 of the Rules of Civil Practice for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the complaint on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in that the complaint is based upon an oral agreement unenforcible under the Statute of Frauds, and granting judgment in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a desire on their part to purchase real property on a water front to afford access to the Long Island Sound and to protect their view. The defendant, a neighboring property owner, had a similar desire or interest; whereupon, the plaintiffs and defendant orally agreed *732that the defendant would take title to the real property and would then convey one half to the plaintiffs on their paying one half of the purchase price. The plaintiffs allege further that in reliance upon this agreement they forbore from buying the property, though they could have done so, and now the defendant has refused to convey the one-half interest in the property even though the plaintiffs have tendered the price to him.

The answer contains certain denials including a denial of the agreement and also the affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds. The reply admits that there was no written agreement or memorandum.

Since the defendant has interposed the affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds, and since the reply admits that there was no written agreement or memorandum thereof, and since the plaintiffs have submitted the complaint, answer and reply for consideration on this motion, the conclusion- is clear. The alleged agreement is within the Statute of Frauds *(Ryan*v. *Dox,*34 N. Y. 307; *Levy*v. *Brush,*45 N. Y. 589, 596).

*Isquith*v. *Isquith*(229 App. Div. 555) and *Peppard Realty Co.*v. *Emdon*(213 App. Div. 824) cited by the plaintiffs, are not applicable. The *Isquith*case had the element of a confidential relationship between husband and wife which is not present here, and the *Peppard*ease was one where the plaintiff lost a Suable equity of redemption by relying on the defendant’s remise.

Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

Order signed.
COURT OF A PPEAL S EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEX AS ELPASO, TEXAS

AL I CI A SERRANO, Appellant,

v. RAMSEY ESP ER, Appellee

. § § § § § § No. 08-09-00261- CV

Appea l from County Court at L aw No. 3 of El Paso County , Texas (TC # 2009-J00058-CC 3)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION This appea l is befor e the Court on its own motion fo r deter mination whether the appea l should be dismiss ed for want of prosec ution. Finding that Appellant has not filed a brief or a motion for e x tension of time, we dismiss the appea l. Appellant fa iled to file her brief by the due date and the Cler k of the Court sent the pa rties a notice tha t Appellant had not filed her brief or motion for ex tension of t ime. Fur ther, the notice advised the parties of the Court’s intent to dismiss for want of prosec ution unless one of the parties responde d showing g rounds to continue the appea l. No response has been re ce i ved. This Court possesses t he authority to dismi ss an appe al for w ant of prose cution when the appellant has failed

to file her brief in the time presc ribed, and g ives no rea sonable explanation for such failure

. T E X .R.A P P .P. 38.8(a) (1); Elizondo v. C i t y o f San Antonio , 975 S.W .2d 61, 63 (Tex.App.--San
An t o n i o 1998, no pet.). Be cause Appellant failed to file her brief and has not responde d t o o u r inquiry , we dismiss the appea l for want of prosec ution pursuant to T E X .R.A P P .P. 38.8(a) (1), 42.3(b), and 42.3(c ).October

12, 2011 A N N CR A WF O RD M c CL

URE, Chie f Ju s ti c e Be fore McClure, C.J ., Rivera, J., and Chew, C.J . (Senior)