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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Board of Tax and Land Appeals

No. 2018-0217

APPEAL OF TOWN OF BELMONT

(New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals)

Argued: January 8, 2019

Opinion Issued: March 19, 2019

Mitchell Municipal Group, P.A., of Laconia (Laura Spector-Morgan on the 

brief and orally), for the petitioner.

Law Office of Joshua L. Gordon, of Concord (Joshua L. Gordon on the 

brief and orally), for the respondent.

BASSETT, J. The petitioner, the Town of Belmont, appeals a decision of 

the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) that, pursuant to 

RSA 72:36-a (2012), the respondent, the Robin M. Nordle 2013 Trust, is

entitled to a 100% real estate tax exemption for a homestead in Belmont. RSA 

72:36-a provides that a person who meets certain qualifications set forth in the 

statute, and “who owns a specially adapted homestead which has been 

acquired with the assistance of the Veterans Administration,” qualifies for a 

property tax exemption. We affirm.

The material facts are not in dispute. Louis Nordle served during the

Vietnam War as a member of the United States Air Force. He was honorably 

discharged in 1969. In 1998, Louis and his wife, Robin Nordle, purchased a 
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summer camp in Belmont. In 2007, the Nordles demolished the original home 

and built a new home. The house was later transferred to the Robin M. Nordle 

2013 Trust, the “taxpayer” in this case. Louis has a life estate in the trust and 

Robin is the trustee. In 2015, the United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs determined that Louis is totally and permanently disabled due to his 

service-connected disabilities. In 2016, Louis received a “Specially Adapted 

Housing Grant” from the Veterans Administration (VA) in the amount of 

$73,768, and used the funds to modify his home to accommodate his serviceconnected disability, by widening the doors, raising and leveling the floors,

installing access ramps, and remodeling the bathroom.

In 2017, the taxpayer applied to the town for an exemption from property 

taxes pursuant to RSA 72:36-a. The town denied the application, determining 

that the “home was not ‘acquired’ or ‘purchased’ by or with the assistance of a 

VA loan.” The town informed the Nordles that “the VA is providing a grant to 

adapt the home for Mr. Nordle’s disabilities, however the statute regarding this 

exemption states that the property must be acquired with the assistance of the 

VA, which you have advised us it was not.” In making its determination, the 

town relied upon advice from the New Hampshire Department of Revenue that,

in order to be entitled to the property tax exemption, the VA “had to help 

‘purchase’ the home not adapt it.”

The taxpayer appealed to the BTLA. Following a hearing, the BTLA

determined that the taxpayer’s property is entitled to the full property tax 

exemption, disagreeing with the town’s position that the statutory phrase 

“acquired with the assistance of the Veterans Administration” is limited to 

assistance with the purchase of the property. The BTLA reasoned that “the 

word ‘acquired’ in the statute has a plain meaning broader than simply 

‘purchased’ (as in the purchase of a house with specially adapted 

improvements financed by a VA loan or mortgage),” and that because Louis 

“obtained, and is now in possession of, a specially adapted homestead . . . only 

because of the financial assistance he received from the VA,” the taxpayer is 

entitled to the tax exemption set forth in RSA 72:36-a. As support for its 

conclusion, the BTLA referred to the “Grant Fact Sheet” for the VA’s Specially 

Adapted Housing grant program that states that VA assistance is available to 

veterans who “may remodel an existing home if it can be made suitable for 

specially adapted housing.” The BTLA determined that “[c]learly the 

improvements to the homestead” made by the Nordles satisfy this condition.

The town unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. In denying the 

town’s motion, the BTLA emphasized that

[i]t would be illogical and an unnecessary hardship . . . to require a 

veteran to relocate in order to qualify for an exemption intended by 

the legislature to benefit one who is totally and permanently 

disabled due to his military service to our country . . . who needs 
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to live in a specially adapted homestead because of his disabilities 

as determined by the Veterans Administration and after satisfying 

all of its requirements for financial assistance to accomplish this 

purpose.

(Parentheses omitted.) This appeal followed.

RSA 72:36-a, titled “Certain Disabled Veterans,” provides:

Any person, who is discharged from military service of the United 

States under conditions other than dishonorable, or an officer who 

is honorably separated from military service, who is totally and 

permanently disabled from service connection and satisfactory 

proof of such service connection is furnished to the assessors and 

who is a double amputee of the upper or lower extremities or any 

combination thereof, paraplegic, or has blindness of both eyes with 

visual acuity of 5/200 or less as the result of service connection 

and who owns a specially adapted homestead which has been 

acquired with the assistance of the Veterans Administration or 

which has been acquired using proceeds from the sale of any 

previous homestead which was acquired with the assistance of the 

Veterans Administration, the person or person’s surviving spouse, 

shall be exempt from all taxation on said homestead.

RSA 72:36-a (bolding omitted; emphasis added); see RSA 72:29, VI (Supp. 

2018) (providing that, for purposes of RSA 72:36-a, “the ownership of real 

estate, as expressed by such words as ‘owner,’ ‘owned’ or ‘own,’ shall include 

those who have placed their property in a grantor/revocable trust or who have 

equitable title or beneficial interest for life in the subject property”).

On appeal, the town argues that RSA 72:36-a “specifically limits the 

exemption to those veterans who have ‘acquired’ their specially adapted 

homestead with the assistance of the Veterans Administration,” and “does not 

provide for an exemption for those who have ‘adapted’ their homestead with 

such assistance.” The town reasons that the taxpayer is not entitled to the tax 

exemption because the Nordles “did not utilize” Veterans Administration funds 

when they became the owners of the property in 1998, nor was the home 

“specially adapted” at that time. The taxpayer counters that the word “acquire” 

does not refer only to the purchase of a home, but rather, that “the object of 

the transitive verb ‘acquire’ in RSA 72:36-a is a ‘specially adapted homestead.’” 

The taxpayer asserts that, because “[i]t was only with VA assistance that the 

home became specially adapted,” it is entitled to the tax exemption.

Resolving this issue requires us to interpret RSA 72:36-a; therefore, our 

review is de novo. See Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 

699, 703 (2010).
4

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the 

intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute 

considered as a whole. We first look to the language of the statute 

itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain 

and ordinary meaning. We interpret legislative intent from the 

statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might 

have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to 

include. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate 

its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. 

Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but

rather within the context of the statute as a whole. This enables 

us to better discern the legislature’s intent and to interpret 

statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be 

advanced by the statutory scheme.

Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013). “A tax exemption statute is 

construed not with rigorous strictness but to give full effect to the legislative 

intent of the statute.” Wolfeboro Camp School v. Town of Wolfeboro, 138 N.H. 

496, 499 (1994) (quotation omitted); see Appeal of Public Service Co. of N.H., 

124 N.H. 79, 84 (1983) (rejecting the argument that “a tax exemption law is to 

be construed restrictively against the taxpayer seeking the exemption”).

The sole issue on appeal is the meaning of the phrase “who owns a 

specially adapted homestead which has been acquired with the assistance of 

the Veterans Administration” in RSA 72:36-a. The parties focus on the 

meaning of the word “acquire.” The word “acquire” is not defined in RSA 

72:36-a. Unless otherwise defined in a statute, “[w]ords and phrases shall be 

construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.” RSA 

21:2 (2012); see Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005). Black’s Law 

Dictionary defines “acquire” as meaning “[t]o gain possession or control of; to 

get or obtain.” Black’s Law Dictionary 28 (10th ed. 2014). Webster’s 

Dictionary defines “acquire” as meaning “to come into possession, control, or 

power of disposal of often by some uncertain or unspecified means.” Webster’s 

Third New International Dictionary 18 (unabridged ed. 2002). Based upon 

these definitions, the town contends that a property that “had been earlier 

acquired and was later modified” with the financial assistance of the VA does 

not satisfy the statutory requirement that the taxpayer “acquired” its specially 

adapted homestead with the assistance of the VA. The taxpayer contends that 

because it was only with the assistance of the VA that the homestead became 

specially adapted, the specially adapted homestead has been “acquired” with 

the assistance of the VA.

Here, the dictionary definitions of the word “acquire” reasonably support 

each party’s position. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous. 

See Green v. Sch. Admin. Unit #55, 168 N.H. 796, 801 (2016). Under such 
5

circumstances, we look to the legislative history to aid in our interpretation of 

the meaning of the statutory language. Id.; see Town of Ossipee v. Whittier 

Lifts Trust, 149 N.H. 679, 682 (2003). Although we agree with the town that 

the legislative history of RSA 72:36-a is “scant,” we conclude that the legislative

history that does exist supports the taxpayer’s interpretation of the statutory 

language.

The New Hampshire legislature enacted RSA 72:36-a after the United 

States Congress passed a bill authorizing the Secretary of the VA to assist 

certain disabled veterans in acquiring specially adapted housing. See Pub. L. 

85-857 (1958); Laws 1965, 291:1. The plain language in RSA 72:36-a defers to 

the VA’s determination whether to provide a disabled veteran with assistance to 

acquire a specially adapted homestead. Therefore, a brief summary of the 

federal law provides useful context.

Pursuant to the federal law, the VA may assist veterans who are entitled 

to receive compensation for service-connected permanent and total disability 

“in acquiring a suitable housing unit with special fixtures or movable facilities 

made necessary by the nature of the veteran’s disability, and necessary land 

therefor.” 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (2014). Prior to providing assistance to an 

eligible veteran, the Secretary must find that: (1) “it is medically feasible for the 

veteran to reside in the proposed housing unit and in the proposed locality”; (2) 

“the proposed housing unit bears a proper relation to the veteran’s present and 

anticipated income and expenses”; and (3) “the nature and condition of the 

proposed housing unit are such as to be suitable to the veteran’s needs for 

dwelling purposes.” 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3)(A)-(C).

When enacted, the federal law only allowed those veterans with

permanent and total service-connected disability due to the loss, or loss of use, 

of both lower extremities to qualify for VA assistance. See Pub. L. 85-857 

(1958). Similarly, as originally enacted, RSA 72:36-a applied only to veterans 

with total and permanent service-connected disabilities due to double 

amputation of the legs or paraplegia. See Laws 1965, 291:1.

In 1980, the federal law was amended to expand the veterans eligible for 

VA assistance to include those with permanent and total service-connected 

disabilities due to “blindness in both eyes with 5/200 visual acuity or less,” or 

“the anatomical loss or loss of use of both hands.” Pub. L. 96-385, Title III, 

§ 301(a) (1980). Accordingly, in 1987, the New Hampshire legislature amended 

RSA 72:36-a to expand the eligible service-connected disabilities to include

double amputation of the upper or lower extremities “or any combination 

thereof,” paraplegia, or “blindness of both eyes with visual acuity of 5/200 or 

less.” Laws 1987, 200:1.
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The intent of the amendment was to

bring[ ] the New Hampshire language in line with the Federal 

language . . . . Without this, an amputee with a combination, say 

missing one arm and one leg, is not eligible. By adding the 

language or a combination thereof, our disabled veterans will now 

qualify for the homestead exemptions, that [the] committee 

unanimously felt that they were entitled to.

N.H.S. Jour. 1201 (1987). Thus, the manifest intent of the legislature is to 

align RSA 72:36-a with the federal law so that a veteran who qualifies for 

assistance from the VA to acquire a specially adapted homestead also qualifies

under New Hampshire law for a property tax exemption. Because the 

legislature expressly defers to the VA’s determination as to whether to provide a 

disabled veteran with assistance to acquire a specially adapted homestead, the 

meaning of the word “acquire” in the phrase “acquired with the assistance of 

the Veterans Administration” must be informed by the scope of the VA 

assistance authorized by federal law.

 The VA is authorized to “assist a disabled veteran . . . in acquiring a 

suitable housing unit with special fixtures or movable facilities made necessary 

by the nature of the veteran’s disability and necessary land therefor.” 38 

U.S.C. § 2101(a). The VA’s assistance “shall be afforded under one of the 

following plans, at the option of the individual.” 38 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2014). 

Pursuant to such “plans,” an eligible veteran may: (1) “elect[ ] to construct a 

housing unit on land to be acquired by such individual”; (2) “elect[ ] to 

construct a housing unit on land acquired by such individual prior to 

application for assistance”; (3) “elect[ ] to remodel a dwelling which is not 

adapted to the requirements of such individual’s disability, acquired by such 

individual prior to application for assistance”; or (4) receive compensation 

“where the individual has acquired a suitable housing unit.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 2102(a)(1)-(4).

The word “acquire” in this context, therefore, is not limited to the initial 

acquisition or purchase of a specially adapted home with the assistance of a VA 

loan. Rather, given the scope of assistance available from the VA, the term 

“acquire” encompasses remodeling a home that was itself acquired by the 

veteran prior to applying for VA assistance, but which was not adapted to the 

requirements of the veteran’s disability at that time.

The town argues that it would be illogical for the legislature to intend, for 

example, that “a person could obtain a Veterans Administration grant of 

$10,000 for a relatively modest adaptation, and then be fully exempt from 

property taxes for the rest of his or her life.” According to the town, “there is 

nothing in RSA 72:36-a . . . which suggests that veteran status alone should 

fully exempt someone from taxes.” We disagree with the town’s 
7

characterization of the exemption as being based on “veteran status alone.” As 

set forth above, the statute contains several criteria that must be met in order 

to qualify for a property tax exemption on a specially adapted homestead. 

These criteria include permanent and total service-connected disability due to

double amputation, paraplegia, or blindness, in addition to meeting the other 

requirements under federal law for receiving VA assistance to acquire the 

special adaptations that enable the disabled veteran to live in the home. The 

legislature did not establish that a minimum expenditure be made in acquiring 

a specially adapted homestead, and we will not add language to the statute 

that the legislature did not see fit to include. See Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 

at 721. The BTLA correctly observed that “[i]f the Town believes the tax 

entitlement provided by the legislature . . . is overly generous, the obvious 

remedy is to seek amendment of the statute, not prevent its application to a 

qualified veteran.”

In this case, the VA determined that, in order to accommodate Louis’s 

service-connected disability, the taxpayer was eligible to receive $73,768 to 

remodel the homestead. Once the remodeling was completed, the taxpayer

owned a specially adapted homestead which was “acquired with the assistance 

of the Veterans Administration.” RSA 72:36-a. Accordingly, we affirm the 

BTLA’s determination that the taxpayer is entitled to a 100% real estate tax 

exemption for the homestead in Belmont.

Affirmed.

LYNN, C.J., and HICKS, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., 

concurred.