[Cite as State v. Aldrich , 2020-Ohio-4104.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

MADISON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, Appellee,

- vs -

MICHAEL W. ALDRICH, Appellant. :

:

:

:

:

: CASE NO. CA2019-06-016

O P I N I O N

8/17/2020

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISION C OUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CRI20180127

Stephen J. Pronai, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, Rachel M. Price, 59 North Main Street, London, Ohio 43140, for appellee Shannon M. Treynor, 63 North Main Street, P.O. Box 735, London, Ohio 43140, for appellant

RINGLAND, J. {¶1} Appellant, Michael Aldrich, appeals his conviction in the Madis on County

Court of Common Pleas for failure to comply with an order or si gnal of a police officer. For the reasons detailed below, we affirm. {¶2} On June 22, 2018, Deputy Loura Higaki was on patrol in the vill age of Mount Sterling. While patrolling, Deputy Higaki noticed a white Chev y Trailblazer backedMadison CA2019-06-016

- 2 - suspiciously in front of the Family Dollar. The passenger in t he vehicle was a woman with blue hair who had just exited the vehicle to enter the nearby M ilton Bank. When Deputy Higaki ran the license plate for the vehicle, she discovered th at the tags were expired. {¶3} Shortly thereafter, the woman returned to the vehicle, which wa s driven by a man, later identified as Aldrich. When they pulled out from th e Family Dollar, Deputy Higaki initiated a traffic stop by activating her lights and sirens. Aldrich initially pulled his vehicle over, but as Deputy Higaki parked her cruiser, Aldrich suddenly took off. {¶4} A high-speed chase ensued beginning in the small residential vi llage. During the chase, Aldrich ran two stop signs and turned onto Route 207 , also a residential area, and traveled at speeds of between 90 and 100 m.p.h. Aldrich al so passed by two playgrounds and was observed weaving across the center line as cars traveled in the opposite lane. After approximately six minutes, Deputy Higaki was ordered to discontinue her pursuit for safety reasons. {¶5} Subsequently, the Madison County Sheriff's office began an inve stigation. During the course of the investigation, Deputy Kelly Sparks was sent to Pickaway County upon receiving information that a white Chevy Trailblazer had b een abandoned. Though the license plates had been removed, Deputy Sparks was able to confirm that the vehicle was the same involved in the high-speed chase after matching th e VIN number. {¶6} Once Deputy Sparks confirmed that this was the correct vehicle, she photographed both the exterior of the vehicle and the contents of the vehicle, which included stolen fishing items, clothing, and a wallet containing Aldrich 's state issued identification card. Also, Deputy Sparks observed that a nylon tow strap was holding part of the vehicle together where there had once been a steel bolt. {¶7} On August 8, 2018, Aldrich was indicted on one count of failure to comply in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a third-degree felony. The case proceeded to a jury trial.Madison CA2019-06-016

- 3 - The jury found Aldrich guilty as charged. The trial court subs equently sentenced Aldrich to a 30-month prison term and imposed a mandatory five-year driver 's license suspension. Aldrich now appeals, raising three assignments of error for rev iew. {¶8} Assignment of Error No. 1: {¶9} THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DUPLICATIVE AND PREJUDICIAL

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ELEMENT OF WILLFULNESS. {¶10} In his first assignment of error, Aldrich alleges the trial cou rt erred by permitting "motive testimony" that he argued was both unnecessa ry and prejudicial to his case. We find Aldrich's argument is without merit. {¶11} A trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusi on of evidence, including evidence of other acts under Evid.R. 404(B). State v. Kirkland , 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, ¶ 67. A reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions absent an abuse of discretion that has created material prejudi ce. Id .; State v. Vore , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-08-093, 2012-Ohio-2431, ¶ 40. {¶12} Evid.R. 404(B) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, i dentity, or absence of mistake or accident. Evid.R. 404(B). {¶13} "Evidence that an accused committed a crime other than the one for which he is on trial is not admissible when its sole purpose is to show the accused's propensity or inclination to commit crime or that he acted in conformity with bad character." State v.

Williams , 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, ¶ 15. "[E]vidence of oth er acts is admissible if it is offered for a purpose other than to prove the characte r of a person in order to show action in conformity with that character, Evid.R. 404(B), it is relevant when offered for thatMadison CA2019-06-016

- 4 - purpose, Evid.R. 401, and the danger of unfair prejudice does n ot substantially outweigh its probative value, Evid.R. 403." Kirkland , 2014-Ohio-1966 at ¶ 68, citing Williams at ¶ 20. {¶14} In this case, the state introduced evidence that Aldrich had st olen fishing equipment in his vehicle and a suspended driver's license. Ald rich claims this evidence is prejudicial because i t was unnecessary to prove the "willful" e lement contained in R.C. 2921.331(B) because the state could have established that "by t he mere fact that the vehicle moved after being ordered to stop." This court has rej ected similar arguments in

State v. Harner , 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2019-10-012, 2020-Ohio-3071. {¶15} In Harnar , this court found that evidence of a defendant's suspended dri ver's license and outstanding warrants was "relevant to the failure t o comply offense, was used for a legitimate purpose, and the probative value was not subst antially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Id. at ¶ 28. {¶16} In this case, in order to prove a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) , the state had to prove that Aldrich acted willfully in fleeing from Deputy Hi gaki. Therefore, evidence that Aldrich was driving with a suspended license and had stolen fis hing equipment in his vehicle was relevant to and presented for the legitimate purpose of sho wing Aldrich's motive and intent in fleeing from the deputy. Id. at ¶ 29, citing State v. Craig , 5th Dist. Licking No. 17- CA-61, 2018-Ohio-1987, ¶ 45; see also State v. Kaser , 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-98-11, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5096 (Oct. 15, 1998). For the same reason, the photograph of Aldrich's identification card also served as additional incidental proof that he had been the driver of the white Chevy Trailblazer. See Evid.R. 404(B). The evidence was therefore presented for a valid purpose other than to show Aldrich's propensity or inclination to commit crime or that he acted in conformity with bad character. See Kirkland , 2014-Ohio-1966 at ¶ 69. {¶17} Additionally, the probative value of the other-acts evidence wa s not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. De puty Sparks' testimony thatMadison CA2019-06-016

- 5 - Aldrich had a suspended license and possessed stolen fishing eq uipment was brief and general in nature. The testimony did not mention propensity or inclination to commit crime or that he acted in conformity with bad character. Rather, the focus of the state's inquiry was measured towards the legitimate willful element of the offe nse. After reviewing the record, this court is not concerned that the challenged testimo ny affected the outcome of the case. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discre tion in allowing Deputy Sparks to testify about this other-acts evidence or by permitting phot ographs of the relevant evidence to be presented to the jury. {¶18} Finally, Aldrich makes passing reference to testimony presented by Deputy Sparks that the Chevy Trailblazer was held together by nylon to w straps instead of a steel bolt. Though he does not present any argument in this assignme nt of error as to why that testimony would be improper, we note that evidence that the veh icle was structurally unsound is relevant for purposes of establishing that he create d a "substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property" by operating his vehicle with a passenger and throughout a residential neighborhood at speeds between 90 and 100 m.p.h. Having found no error in the admission of evidence, we find Aldrich's first assignment of error is without

merit and is overruled. {¶19} Assignment of Error No. 2: {¶20} THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE OF

FAILURE TO COMPLY AS A FELONY OFFENSE. {¶21} Assignment of Error No. 3: {¶22} THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT

OF THE EVIDENCE. {¶23} In his second and third assignments of error, Aldrich argues th at his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the mani fest weight of the evidence.Madison CA2019-06-016

- 6 - We disagree. {¶24} The concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the e vidence are legally distinct. State v. Wright , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-08-152, 2014-Ohio-985, ¶ 10. Nonetheless, as this court has observed, a finding that a convi ction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence is also dispositive of the issu e of sufficiency. State v. Jones , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-03-049, 2013-Ohio-150, ¶ 19. "Bec ause sufficiency is required to take a case to the jury, a finding that a convictio n is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency. " State v. Hart , 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2011-03-008, 2012-Ohio-1896, ¶ 43. {¶25} A manifest weight challenge scrutinizes the proclivity of the g reater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of t he issue over another. State v.

Barnett , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14. I n assessing whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court examines the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inference s, considers the credibility of the witnesses, and determines whether, in resolving conflict s in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarria ge of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Morgan , 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2013- 08-146 and CA2013-08-147, 2014-Ohio-2472, ¶ 34. {¶26} Aldrich was convicted of failure to comply with an order or sig nal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), which provides: (B) No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or aud ible signal from a police officer to bring the person’s motor vehicl e to a stop. To constitute a third-degree felony, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the "operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused a substantial risk ofMadison CA2019-06-016

- 7 - serious physical harm to persons or property." R.C. 2921.331(C )(5)(a)(ii). {¶27} On appeal, Aldrich does not dispute that he was driving the Che vy Trailblazer during the high-speed chase. Rather, he argues that his conduc t did not cause a "substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or proper ty." In so doing, Aldrich argues that the "substantial risk" of harm was merely hypotheti cal. {¶28} Following review, we find Aldrich's argument to be without meri t. The state presented evidence that Deputy Higaki initiated a traffic stop by activating her lights and sirens. Though Aldrich initially pulled over, he suddenly took off. A high-speed chase ensued in a residential area where Aldrich ran two stop signs, passed several playgrounds, and encountered several vehicles traveling in the opposite dire ction. After approximately six minutes, the chase was called off for safety reasons. When the vehicle was later discovered, Deputy Sparks noted that Aldrich's vehicle was held together by a nylon tow strap instead of a steel bolt. That Aldrich claims the "substa ntial risk" to other people or property was "merely hypothetical" is belied by the record. Al drich actions clearly posed a substantial risk to other people and property in the community, not to mention the risk to his passenger. Moreover, this was a matter that was fully argued t o the jury below. While Aldrich argues differently, the jury, as trier of fact, was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witness. State v. Johnson , 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2019-07-076 and CA2019-08-080, 2020-Ohio-3501, ¶ 24. As his conviction is supp orted by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidenc e, Aldrich's second and third assignments of error are overruled. {¶29} Judgment affirmed.

S. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.