Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 150 / Monday, August 5, 2013 / Notices 47421 

1The CRJ Order Referring Material Question of 

Substantive Law also referred a question and 

participants’ views regarding detail requirements, 

which are not at issue in this referral of a novel 

question of law. 

2The National Music Publishers’ Association, 

Inc., the Songwriters Guild of America, the 

Nashville Songwriters Association International, 

the Church Music Publishers Association, the 

Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., 

the Digital Media Association, CTIA—The Wireless 

Association, Google, Inc., RealNetworks, Inc., 

Rhapsody International Inc., Cricket 

Communications, Inc., and Rdio, Inc. 

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

U.S. Copyright Office 

[Docket No. 2011–3 CRB] 

Scope of the Copyright Royalty Judges 

Authority to Adopt Confidentiality 

Requirements upon Copyright Owners 

within a Voluntarily Negotiated License 

Agreement 

AGENCY: U.S. Copyright Office, Library 

of Congress. 

ACTION: Final Order. 

SUMMARY: The Copyright Royalty 

Judges, acting pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 

802(f)(1)(B), referred a novel material 

question of substantive law to the 

Register of Copyrights concerning the 

Copyright Royalty Judges’ authority to 

adopt regulations imposing a duty of 

confidentiality upon copyright owners, 

whether or not that duty is included in 

a voluntarily negotiated license 

agreement between copyright owners 

and licensees in a proceeding under 

section 115 of the Act. The Register of 

Copyrights responded in a timely 

fashion by delivering a Memorandum 

Opinion to the Copyright Royalty Board 

on July 25, 2013. 

DATES: Effective Date: July 25, 2013. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Stephen Ruwe, Attorney Advisor, 

Copyright GC/I&R, P.O. Box 70400, 

Washington, DC 20024. Telephone: 

(202) 707–8380. Telefax: (202) 707– 

8366. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the 

Copyright Royalty and Distribution 

Reform Act of 2004, Congress amended 

Title 17 to replace the Copyright 

Arbitration Royalty Panel (‘‘CARP’’) 

with the Copyright Royalty Judges 

(‘‘CRJs’’). One of the functions of the 

CRJs is to make determinations and 

adjustments of reasonable terms and 

rates of royalty payments as provided in 

sections 112(e), 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 

and 1004 of the Copyright Act. The CRJs 

have the authority to request from the 

Register of Copyrights (‘‘Register’’) an 

interpretation of any novel material 

question of substantive law that relates 

to the construction of provisions of Title 

17 and arises out the course of the 

proceeding before the CRJs. See 17 

U.S.C. 802(f)(1)(B). 

On June 25, 2013, the CRJs delivered 

to the Register: (1) an Order referring a 

novel material question of substantive 

law; and (2) a brief filed with the CRJs 

by Settling Participants (identified 

below in the Register’s Memorandum 

Opinion). The CRJs’ delivery of the 

request for an interpretation triggered 

the 30–day response period prescribed 

in section 802 of the Copyright Act. This 

statutory provision states that the 

Register ‘‘shall transmit his or her 

decision to the Copyright Royalty Judges 

a written response within 30 days after 

the Register receives of all briefs or 

comments from the participants.’’ See 

17 U.S.C. 802(f)(1)(B). The statute also 

states that ‘‘[i]f such a decision is timely 

delivered to the Copyright Royalty 

Judges, the Copyright Royalty Judges 

shall apply the legal determinations 

embodied in the decision of the Register 

of Copyrights in resolving material 

questions of substantive law.’’ Id. On 

July 25, 2013 the Register responded in 

a Memorandum Opinion to the CRJs 

that addressed the novel questions of 

law. To provide the public with notice 

of the decision rendered by the Register, 

the Memorandum Opinion is 

reproduced in its entirety, below. 

Dated: July 29, 2013. 

Maria A. Pallante, 

Register of Copyrights. 

Before the U.S. Copyright Office Library of 

Congress Washington, DC 20559 

In the Matter of Mechanical and Digital 

Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment 

Proceeding 

Docket No. 2011–3 CRB (Phonorecords II) 

Memorandum Opinion on a Novel 

Question of Law 

I. Procedural Background 

On May 17, 2012, the Copyright 

Royalty Judges (‘‘CRJs’’) published for 

comment in the Federal Register 

proposed regulations for the section 115 

compulsory license, which were the 

result of a settlement submitted to the 

CRJs on April 11, 2012. Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking, Mechanical and 

Digital Phonorecord Delivery 

Compulsory License, Docket No. 2011– 

3 CRB Phonorecords II, 77 FR 29259 

(May 17, 2012). The proposed 

regulations included ‘‘confidentiality 

requirements’’ in 37 CFR 385.12(f) and 

385.22(e), which would require 

copyright owners to maintain in 

confidence statements of account that 

they receive under the license. Id. 

The ‘‘confidentiality requirements’’ 

proposed for sections 385.12(f) and 

385.22(e) state: 

Confidentiality. A licensee’s statements of 

account, including any and all information 

provided by a licensee with respect to the 

computation of a subminimum, shall be 

maintained in confidence by any copyright 

owner, authorized representative or agent 

that receives it, and shall solely be used by 

the copyright owner, authorized 

representative or agent for purposes of 

reviewing the amounts paid by the licensee 

and verifying the accuracy of any such 

payments, and only those employees of the 

copyright owner, authorized representative 

or agent who need to have access to such 

information for such purposes will be given 

access to such information; provided that in 

no event shall access be granted to any 

individual who, on behalf of a record 

company, is directly involved in negotiating 

or approving royalty rates in transactions 

authorizing third party services to undertake 

licensed activity with respect to sound 

recordings. A licensee’s statements of 

account, including any and all information 

provided by a licensee with respect to the 

computation of a subminimum, shall not be 

used for any other purpose, and shall not be 

disclosed to or used by or for any record 

company affiliate or any third party, 

including any third-party record company. 

Id. at 29262. 

After considering both the Proposed 

Settlement regulations and the public 

comments received in response to them, 

on March 27, 2013, Chief Copyright 

Royalty Judge Suzanne Barnett 

proposed two material questions of 

substantive law for referral to the 

Register and invited participants to 

submit briefs to accompany the referral 

of questions to the Register of 

Copyrights, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 

802(f)(1)(A)(ii). The referral asked 

whether the confidentiality 

requirements proposed for §§ 385.12(f) 

and 385.22(e) encroach upon the 

exclusive statutory domain of the 

Register under section 115 of the Act. 

CRJ Order Referring Material Question 

of Substantive Law, Docket No. 2011–3 

CRB (Mar. 27, 2013).1 After receiving a 

single brief filed jointly by the Settling 

Participants 2 regarding whether 

proposed terms encroach upon the 

exclusive statutory domain of the 

Register, the Chief Copyright Royalty 

Judge delivered the referred questions 

and the Settling Participants brief to the 

Register on April 17, 2013. 

Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 802(f)(1)(A)(ii), 

the Register issued a timely reply 

clarifying that the proposed terms do 

not encroach upon the Register’s 

authority with respect to statements of 

account as provided in 17 U.S.C. 

115(c)(5). Memorandum Opinion on 

Material Questions of Substantive Law, 

Docket No. 2011–3 CRB (May 1, 2013). 

However, the Register also noted that it 

is unclear whether the CRJs have any 

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47422 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 150 / Monday, August 5, 2013 / Notices 

independent authority to issue 

regulations such as the proposed 

‘‘confidentiality requirement’’ which 

would impose obligations on a 

copyright owner with regard to what he 

or she is able to do with a statement of 

account received by a licensee. The 

Register suggested that the question of 

whether the CRJs have authority to issue 

regulations imposing requirements on 

what a copyright owner (as opposed to 

a nonexclusive licensee) may do or not 

do with information in a statement of 

account after that statement has been 

prepared and served in accordance with 

the Office’s regulations represents a 

novel question of law that may be 

separately referred to the Register. Id. 

Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 802(f)(l)(B), on 

May 17, 2013 the Chief Copyright 

Royalty Judge issued an order to the 

proceeding participants regarding 

referral of a novel material question and 

set forth a schedule governing receipt of 

comments by the participants in the 

proceeding. On June 7, 2013, the 

Settling Participants filed the only 

comment in response to the order. On 

June 25, 2013, Chief Judge Barnett 

delivered the following novel material 

question to the Register, along with the 

sole comment filed by the Settling 

Participants: 

Do the Judges have the statutory authority to 

adopt regulations imposing a duty of 

confidentiality upon copyright owners, 

whether or not that duty is included in a 

voluntarily negotiated license agreement 

between copyright owners and licensees in a 

proceeding under section 115 of the Act? 

CRJ Order Referring Novel Question of 

Law and Setting Briefing Schedule, 

Docket No. 2011–3 CRB (May 17, 2013). 

II. Summary of Parties’ Arguments 

In the sole brief submitted in relation 

to the referred novel material question 

to the Register, the Settling Participants 

assert that it is clear that the CRJs have 

the authority to issue the confidentiality 

provisions. In support of this position, 

the Settling Participants point to three 

distinct but overlapping statutory grants 

to the CRJs, namely the authority to: (i) 

Adopt settlements; (ii) determine terms; 

and (iii) establish notice and 

recordkeeping requirements. The 

Settling Participants claim that each of 

these grants of authority provides an 

independent basis for adoption of the 

confidentiality provisions by the Judges. 

Brief of Settling Participants, Docket No. 

2011–3 CRB Phonorecords II (June 7, 

2013) at 6–17. 

The Settling Participants point out 

that analogous statutory provisions 

grant authority relative to the section 

114 statutory license, and that based on 

such grants the Register, the Librarian of 

Congress and the CRJs have routinely 

adopted section 114 confidentiality 

provisions that are equivalent to the 

instant confidentiality provisions. The 

Settling Participants posit that the 

confidentiality provisions at issue here 

are like confidentiality provisions 

adopted pursuant to the section 114 

license and that the only thing that 

distinguishes section 115 from section 

114 in this regard is the grant of certain 

exclusive authority to the Register with 

respect to statements of account under 

section 115. They assert that because the 

Register has determined that the CRJs’ 

adoption of the confidentiality 

provisions does not encroach on the 

Register’s power with respect to 

statements of account as provided in 

section 115(c)(5), there is no question 

that the statutory language granting 

authority to the CRJs is sufficient to 

empower them to adopt the 

confidentiality provisions. Id. at 6–7. 

The Settling Participants assert that 

the CRJs have both the authority and the 

obligation to adopt settlements among 

some or all of the participants in a 

proceeding unless the agreement is 

contrary to law or a participant in the 

proceeding objects and the CRJs 

conclude that the settlement ‘‘does not 

provide a reasonable basis for setting 

statutory terms or rates.’’ Id. at 7, citing 

17 U.S.C. 801(b)(7)(A). They state that 

Congress’ clear goal was to streamline 

the adoption of settlements. They point 

to legislative history as support for the 

proposition that Congress intended the 

CRJs to facilitate and encourage 

settlement agreements. Id. at 7–8, citing 

H.R. Rep. No. 108–408, at 24 and 30 

(2002). They add that in adopting 

previous settlements the CRJs have 

acknowledged this obligation, stating 

‘‘we are mandated to adopt the 

determination of the settling parties to 

a distribution and rate proceeding’’ Id. 

at 8, citing 74 FR 4510, 4514 (Jan. 26, 

2009). The Settling Participants also 

note that the Register has confirmed that 

section 801(b)(7)(A) generally directs 

the CRJs to adopt settlements, except to 

the extent that a participant in the 

proceeding objects to the settlement or 

where the settlement agreement 

includes provisions that are contrary to 

the provisions of the applicable 

license(s) or otherwise contrary to 

statutory law. Id. at 8–9, citing 74 FR 

4537, 4540 (Jan. 26, 2009). 

The Settling Participants point out 

that the only suggestion that anyone has 

made that the settlement is contrary to 

law concerned the question of whether 

there was an encroachment of the 

Register’s authority with respect to 

statements of account, and, in that case, 

the Register determined that there was 

no such encroachment. Id., citing 78 FR 

28,773 (May 16, 2013). The Settling 

Participants assert that nothing in the 

statutory text, its legislative history, or 

any binding precedent, suggests that the 

CRJs’ authority—and duty—to adopt 

settlements has any exception for 

provisions that impose obligations on 

copyright owners. They also point 

toward settlements under the section 

114 license that impose confidentiality 

requirements, which have never been 

challenged by the Register. Id. at 9–10. 

The Settling Participants state that the 

grant of authority to determine 

reasonable terms of royalty payments 

permits the CRJs to adopt the 

confidentiality provisions as terms and 

make them binding on copyright 

owners. They point out that the statute 

expressly states that ‘‘[t]he schedule of 

reasonable rates and terms determined 

by the Copyright Royalty Judges shall 

. . . be binding on all copyright owners 

of nondramatic musical works and 

persons entitled to obtain a compulsory 

license.’’ 17 U.S.C. 115(c)(3)(D) 

(emphasis added). 

The Settling Participants point to the 

DC Circuit’s finding that analogous 

language in section 114 was sufficient to 

justify imposing audit terms on agents 

of copyright owners. Id. at 11, citing 

Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. 

Librarian of Congress, 176 F.3d 528, 535 

(DC Cir. 1999). They also refer to the 

legislative history as support for the 

CRJs’ authority to impose 

confidentiality provision requirements 

on copyright owners. Id. at 11–12, citing 

S. Rep. No. 104–128, at 40 (1995). The 

Settling Participants then refer to the 

Register’s prior description of the CRJs’ 

power to determine terms under section 

115, which included a conclusion by 

the Register that the CRJs may issue 

terms that are necessary to effectively 

implement the statutory license and that 

the authority to set reasonable terms 

extends only so far as those terms 

ensured the smooth administration of 

the license. Id. at 12, citing 73 FR at 

48,398 (Aug. 19, 2008). They point out 

that when making such findings 

regarding the scope of the CRJs 

authority to issue terms under section 

115, the Register properly relied on 

authority construing analogous section 

114 provisions regarding the CRJs 

authority to issue terms. Id. at 13. 

The Settling Participants point to the 

long history of agents of copyright 

owners being required to maintain the 

confidentiality of statements of account 

as a section 114 term, and that the 

Register has endorsed such terms under 

the CARP system and has never taken 

exception to such terms issued by the 

CRJs. Id. at 13–15. The Settling 

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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 150 / Monday, August 5, 2013 / Notices 47423 

3See also, 17 U.S.C. 803(c)(3) (‘‘the Copyright 

Royalty Judges may specify notice and 

recordkeeping requirements of users of the 

copyrights at issue’’) (emphasis added). 

Participants state that in the context of 

the percentage rate structure for section 

115 rates, the statements of account 

contain sensitive financial information 

and that the confidentiality provisions 

avoid the risk of competitive injury to 

users of copyrighted works while 

ensuring the smooth administration of 

the license and effectively implement 

the statutory license. Id. at 15. 

The Settling Participants point to the 

CRJs’ notice and recordkeeping 

authority as support for the 

confidentiality provisions. Id., citing 17 

U.S.C. 115(c)(3)(D), 17 U.S.C. 

801(b)(7)(C), and 17 U.S.C. 803(c)(3). 

They point out that similar provisions 

authorize the CRJs to issue notice and 

recordkeeping requirements under the 

section 114 license. They assert that if 

section 114 notice and recordkeeping 

authority permits imposing a 

requirement of confidential treatment 

for a report of use, section 115 notice 

and recordkeeping authority must also 

permit imposing a requirement of 

confidential treatment for a section 115 

statement of account. Id., at 16–17 

III. Register’s Determination 

Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 802(f)(l)(B), the 

Register issues this timely response to 

the referred novel material question and 

determines that the CRJs do not have the 

authority to adopt the provisions 

imposing a duty of confidentiality upon 

copyright owners, regardless of whether 

the provisions are included in a 

voluntarily negotiated license agreement 

between copyright owners and 

licensees. 

A. CRJs’ Authority To Determine 

Reasonable Terms of Payment 

Under section 115(c)(3)(C), the CRJs 

are authorized to ‘‘determine reasonable 

rates and terms of royalty payments.’’ 17 

U.S.C. 115(c)(3)(C). However, the 

confidentiality provisions at issue here 

would function as an obligation on 

copyright owners who have already 

received royalty payments. This kind of 

restriction is distinct in its nature and 

potential impact than the terms of 

royalty payments offered as precedent 

by the Settling Participants. 

It is true that section 115(c)(3)(D) 

states ‘‘[t]he schedule of reasonable rates 

and terms determined by the Copyright 

Royalty Judges shall * * * be binding 

on all copyright owners of nondramatic 

musical works and persons entitled to 

obtain a compulsory license.’’ 17 U.S.C. 

115(c)(3)(D). It is also true that the DC 

Circuit, in Recording Indus. Ass’n of 

Am., Inc., 176 F.3d at 535, found that 

analogous provisions governing the 

section 114 license authorize binding 

copyright owners and their agents with 

regard to terms concerning the audit of 

royalty payments. However, the audit 

provisions at issue before the DC Circuit 

were terms that applied to the method 

by which accurate royalty payments 

make their way to copyright owners, 

and served as an obligation on 

intermediaries to allow copyright 

owners to ensure the accuracy of such 

royalty payments. Similarly, the 

confidentiality provisions that have 

been repeatedly established under 

section 114 are terms that address the 

method by which accurate royalty 

payments make their way to copyright 

owners in accordance with the statute. 

The confidentiality provisions currently 

at issue are very different and are not 

‘‘terms of royalty payments.’’ They do 

not address the method by which 

accurate royalty payments make their 

way to copyright owners. Indeed, the 

Settling Participants assert that the 

confidentiality provisions are intended 

to prevent the risk of competitive injury 

to licensees by disclosure of the 

licensees’ financial information. 

While the confidentiality provisions 

may avoid a risk of competitive injury 

for licensees, such provisions are not 

necessary to effectively implement the 

statutory license or to insure the smooth 

administration of the license. The 

Register notes that the previous 

determination of rates and terms for the 

section 115 license, which also included 

a percentage rate structure, did not 

include such provisions and the Settling 

Participants do not identify any 

apparent detrimental effect on 

administration of the license. 

Having found that the confidentiality 

provisions are not the sort of terms of 

payment that the CRJs are authorized to 

issue, the Register also notes a policy 

concern that, in the context of statutory 

licenses, government actors should err 

on the side of transparency. 

Transparency, serves to provide 

maximum confidence in the law for all 

who rely upon it, including those who 

require access to the details of license 

records. 

B. CRJs’ Authority To Establish Notice 

and Recordkeeping Requirements 

The relevant notice and 

recordkeeping provisions authorize the 

CRJs to ‘‘establish requirements by 

which copyright owners may receive 

reasonable notice of the use of their 

works under this section, and under 

which records of such use shall be kept 

and made available by persons making 

digital phonorecord deliveries.’’ 17 

U.S.C. 115(c)(3)(D) (emphasis added).3

By the clear language of the statute, the 

CRJs are authorized to issue notice and 

recordkeeping requirements under 

which records of such use shall be kept 

and made available by licensees. Section 

115(c)(3)(D) does not provide authority 

for the CRJs to issue notice and 

recordkeeping requirements under 

which records of such use shall be kept 

and made available by copyright owners. 

The Settling Participants have not 

pointed to any other authority by which 

the CRJs’ notice and recordkeeping 

authority authorizes the imposition of 

obligations on the copyright owners 

who are subject to the section 115 

license. 

C. CRJs’ Authority To Adopt Settlements 

The Register acknowledges that 

Congress’ clear goal was to streamline 

the adoption of settlements. However, 

the provisions of section 801(b)(7)(A) 

under which the CRJs are able to adopt 

aspects of an agreement are limited. The 

CRJs are not compelled to adopt a 

privately negotiated agreement to the 

extent that it includes provisions that 

are inconsistent with the statutory 

license. As the Register has stated 

previously, section 801(b)(7)(A) ‘‘does 

not foreclose the CRJs from ascertaining 

whether specific provisions are contrary 

to law.’’ See 74 FR 4537, 4540 (Jan. 26, 

2009). The Settling Participants 

acknowledge that section 801(b)(7)(A) 

generally directs the CRJs to adopt 

settlements, except to the extent that a 

participant in the proceeding objects to 

the settlement or where the settlement 

agreement includes provisions that are 

contrary to the provisions of the 

applicable statute or otherwise contrary 

to statutory law. Brief of Settling 

Participants, Docket No. 2011–3 CRB 

Phonorecords II (June 7, 2013) at 8–9, 

citing 74 FR 4537, 4540 (Jan. 26, 2009). 

Moreover, courts have consistently held 

that agencies cannot adopt regulations 

that are contrary to law. See, e.g., Cal. 

Cosmetology Coalition v. Riley, 110 F.3d 

1454, 1460–61 (9th Cir. 1997) (‘‘The 

power of an administrative officer or 

board to administer a federal statute and 

to prescribe rules and regulations to that 

end is not the power to make law, for 

no such power can be delegated by 

Congress, but the power to adopt 

regulations to carry into effect the will 

of Congress as expressed by the statute. 

A regulation which does not do this, but 

operates to create a rule out of harmony 

with the statute, is a mere nullity.’’). 

As set forth above, the Register 

determines that the CRJs do not have the 

statutory authority to adopt 

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47424 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 150 / Monday, August 5, 2013 / Notices 

confidentiality provisions that would 

impose obligations on a copyright 

owner with regard to what he or she is 

able to do with a statement of account 

received by a licensee. The Register’s 

finding of the lack of CRJs’ authority to 

impose such confidentiality 

requirements is consistent with court 

findings that statutory licenses must ‘‘be 

construed narrowly,’’ especially as they 

apply against the rights of copyright 

owners. See, e.g., Fame Publ’g Co. v. 

Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 

667, 670 (5th Cir. 1975). Accordingly, 

the Register reads the statute as 

precluding the CRJs from adopting the 

confidentiality provisions, including in 

the context of a negotiated license 

agreement. 

Dated: July 25, 2013. 

Maria A. Pallante, 

Register of Copyrights. 

[FR Doc. 2013–18672 Filed 8–2–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 

SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

[Notice 13–087] 

Notice of Intent To Grant Partially 

Exclusive License 

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration. 

ACTION: Notice of Intent to Grant 

Exclusive License. 

SUMMARY: This notice is issued in 

accordance with 35 U.S.C. 209(e) and 37 

CFR 404.7(a)(1)(i). NASA hereby gives 

notice of its intent to grant an partially 

exclusive license in the United States to 

practice the inventions described and 

claimed in USPN 6,730,498, Production 

of Functional Proteins: Balance of Shear 

Stress and Gravity, NASA Case No. 

MSC–22859–1 to Technology 

Applications International Corporation 

(TAIC)/Renue`ll International 

Incorporated, having its principal place 

of business in Aventura, Florida. The 

fields of use may be limited to topical 

applications including shampoo. The 

patent rights in this invention have been 

assigned to the United States of America 

as represented by the Administrator of 

the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration. The prospective 

partially exclusive license will comply 

with the terms and conditions of 35 

U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7. 

DATES: The prospective partially 

exclusive license may be granted unless 

within fifteen (15)days from the date of 

this published notice, NASA receives 

written objections including evidence 

and argument that establish that the 

grant of the license would not be 

consistent with the requirements of 35 

U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7. 

Competing applications completed and 

received by NASA within fifteen (15) 

days of the date of this published notice 

will also be treated as objections to the 

grant of the contemplated exclusive 

license. 

Objections submitted in response to 

this notice will not be made available to 

the public for inspection and, to the 

extent permitted by law, will not be 

released under the Freedom of 

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. 

ADDRESSES: Objections relating to the 

prospective license may be submitted to 

Patent Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, 

NASA Johnson Space Center, 2101 

NASA Parkway, Houston, Texas 77058, 

Mail Code AL; Phone (281) 483–3021; 

Fax (281) 483–6936 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ted 

Ro, Intellectual Property Attorney, 

Office of Chief Counsel, NASA Johnson 

Space Center, 2101 NASA Parkway, 

Houston, Texas 77058, Mail Code AL; 

Phone (281) 244–7148; Fax (281) 483– 

6936. Information about other NASA 

inventions available for licensing can be 

found online at http:// 

technology.nasa.gov/. 

Sumara M. Thompson-King, 

Deputy General Counsel. 

[FR Doc. 2013–18668 Filed 8–2–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7510–13–P 

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION 

ADMINISTRATION 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Submission to OMB for 

Reinstatement, With Change, of a 

Previously Approved Collection; 

Comment Request 

AGENCY: National Credit Union 

Administration (NCUA). 

ACTION: Request for comment. 

SUMMARY: NCUA intends to submit the 

following information collection to the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for reinstatement under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. 

L. 104–13, 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35). This 

information collection is published to 

obtain comments from the public. The 

Truth in Savings Act (TISA) requires 

depository institutions to disclose to 

consumers certain information, 

including interest rates, bonuses, and 

fees associated with their deposit 

accounts and accompanying services. 

TISA also requires NCUA to promulgate 

implementing regulations governing all 

credit unions. NCUA regulations require 

credit unions to provide specific 

disclosures when an account is opened, 

when a disclosed term changes or a term 

account is close to renewal, on periodic 

statements of account activity, in 

advertisements, and upon a member or 

potential member’s request. The 

disclosures are for the benefit of credit 

union members and consumers; NCUA 

does not collect the information. 

Additionally, NCUA regulations contain 

a recordkeeping requirement for 

compliance purposes. 

DATES: Comments will be accepted until 

October 4, 2013. 

ADDRESSES: Interested parties are 

invited to submit written comments to 

the NCUA Contact and the OMB 

Reviewer listed below: 

NCUA Contact: Tracy Crews, National 

Credit Union Administration, 1775 

Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia 

22314–3428, Fax No. 703–837–2861, 

Email: OCIOPRA@ncua.gov. 

OMB Contact: Office of Management 

and Budget, ATTN: Desk Officer for the 

National Credit Union Administration, 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Washington, DC 20503. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Requests for additional information, a 

copy of the information collection 

request or a copy of submitted 

comments should be directed to Tracy 

Crews at the National Credit Union 

Administration, 1775 Duke Street, 

Alexandria, VA 22314–3428, or at (703) 

518–6444. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Abstract and Request for Comments 

NCUA is reinstating the information 

collection approved as OMB control 

number 3133–0134, under the Truth in 

Savings Act (TISA), 12 U.S.C. 4301 et 

seq. TISA requires depository 

institutions to disclose to consumers 

certain information, including interest 

rates, bonuses, and fees associated with 

their deposit accounts and 

accompanying services. Clear and 

uniform disclosures of the interest rates 

payable on deposit accounts and the 

fees assessable against them by 

depository institutions permits 

consumers to make meaningful 

decisions about their finances. 

Under TISA, NCUA must promulgate 

regulations substantially similar to those 

issued by the Consumer Financial 

Protection Bureau, taking into account 

the nature of credit unions. See 12 

U.S.C. 4311. NCUA’s regulations 

governing all credit unions are found in 

12 CFR Part 707. For the benefit of 

credit union members and consumers, 

NCUA regulations require credit unions 

to provide specific disclosures when an 

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