IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1137

Filed August 13, 2014

IN RE THE DETENTION OF

CLYDE HOLLINS,

Applicant-Appellee,

STATE OF IOWA,

Petitioner-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Michael J. 

Schilling, Judge. 

The State appeals the district court’s order denying its request for 

supervised release of Clyde Hollins, a sexually violent predator found to be 

suitable for discharge from the civil commitment program. AFFIRMED. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John McCormally, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellant.

Michael Adams, Local Public Defender, and Amy Kepes, Assistant Public 

Defender, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ. Tabor, 

J., takes no part. 
2

BOWER, J.

The State appeals the district court’s order denying its request for 

supervised release of Clyde Hollins, a sexually violent predator found to be 

suitable for discharge from the civil commitment program. See Iowa Code 

§ 229A.9A (2013). The State contends the district court abused its discretion in 

failing to order release with supervision. Finding no abuse of discretion in 

discharging Hollins from the program and no provision in Iowa law for his 

supervision once discharged, we affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Starting in March 1975, seventeen-year-old Hollins committed eight sexual 

assaults in a ten-year period. In September 1990, Hollins was convicted of two 

counts of third-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to serve an indeterminate 

term of incarceration not to exceed thirty years. In re Det. of Hollins, No. 04-

1829, 2006 WL 623523, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2006). Prior to his 

scheduled release in August 2004, the State “filed a petition requesting Hollins’s 

commitment as a sexually violent predator.” Id. At his civil commitment trial, 

Hollins was found “to be ‘a sexually violent predator’ [(SVP),1and] the court 

placed him in the custody of the Iowa Department of Human Services [(DHS)] for 

confinement in a secure facility.” Id. at *3. Hollins appealed, and we affirmed. 

Id. at *7. 

 

1 A “sexually violent predator” is a person who “[(1)] has been convicted of or charged 

with a sexually violent offense and [(2)] suffers from a mental abnormality which makes 

the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not 

confined in a secure facility.” Iowa Code § 229A.2(11). The State was required to prove

both elements in order to show Hollins was subject to commitment. See In re Det. of 

Blaise, 830 N.W.2d 310, 318 (Iowa 2013).
3

At the time of his 2004 commitment, Hollins was diagnosed with two 

mental abnormalities,2anti-social personality disorder and paraphilia not 

otherwise specified. After his commitment, Hollins resided at the civil 

commitment unit for sex offenders (CCUSO). The statutory scheme of chapter 

229A establishes a goal of treatment services:

If the court or jury determines . . . the respondent is a [SVP], the 

respondent shall be committed to the custody of the [DHS] for 

control, care, and treatment until such time as the person’s mental 

abnormality has so changed that the person is safe to be placed in 

a transitional release program or discharged.

Iowa Code § 229A.7(5)(b) (emphasis added). 

In 2009, Hollins was placed in the transitional release facility at CCUSO. 

Within a few months, Hollins was removed from this facility.

3

 We note Dr. 

Thomas of CCUSO testified the 2009 incident is not relevant to the issues now 

reviewed.

 

2

“[M]ental abnormality” is defined as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the 

emotional or volitional capacity of a person and predisposing that person to commit 

sexually violent offenses to a degree which would constitute a menace to the health and 

safety of others.” Iowa Code § 229A.2(5). “Both the definition of ‘mental abnormality’ 

and the definition of ‘sexually violent predator’ are focused on the likelihood that the 

respondent will commit a sexual offense.” In re Det. of Altman, 723 N.W.2d 181, 185 

(Iowa 2006). 

3 The district court found the CCUSO director had filed a motion requesting the court 

remove Hollins from his first transitional release due to alleged violations of the 

transitional release agreement. The court also found, before the matter could be heard, 

the State moved to dismiss its motion, stating: “In the twelve months since his return to 

confinement, [Hollins] has successfully completed specific treatment goals identified by 

the CCUSO staff. CCUSO staff now believes that Mr. Hollins should be given another 

opportunity for transitional release.” Based on this history, the court concluded: “In view 

of this recommendation, no final violation hearing was ever held and no finding was ever 

made that [Hollins] violated any condition of transitional release.” 
4

After Hollins successfully completed treatment goals, in 2011 he was 

again placed in the transitional release facility. Hollins’s 2012 annual report4filed 

in December 2011 and prepared by Dr. Thomas of CCUSO, stated Hollins had 

made progress over the last several years and he no longer suffered from 

paraphilia. Dr. Thomas testified and explained the transitional program:

Patients who are in transitional release have the opportunity 

to have more independence, more access to the community, and 

they are expected to really guide their treatment with some more 

independence.

So patients in transition will have the opportunity to get a 

driver’s license, get a vehicle, get a job in the community. They will 

start traveling with staff escorts into the community for things like 

shopping or AA appointments, and then gradually once they’ve 

done well in those trips into the community, start traveling 

independently back and forth to shopping or to work.

Dr. Thomas’s next annual report on Hollins, filed on March 5, 2013, opined 

Hollins’s antisocial personality disorder had abated. She concluded, to a 

reasonable degree of medical certainty, Hollins no longer suffers from a mental 

abnormality making him more likely than not to reoffend. 

The next month, Hollins filed a petition for discharge and request for 

hearing regarding annual review. In July 2013, the district court held a final 

hearing, at which the State had the burden “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt” 

that Hollins’s “mental abnormality remains such that [he] is likely to engage in 

predatory acts that constitute sexually violent offenses if discharged.” Iowa Code

§ 229A.8(6)(d)(1).

 

4

Iowa Code section 229A.8(2) provides: “A person committed . . . shall have a current 

examination of the person’s mental abnormality made once every year.”
5

At the time of the hearing, fifty-six-year-old Hollins had been in the

transitional release program for twenty-six months. During that time, Hollins had 

no “reports of incident,” had obtained employment at Tyson Foods in Storm Lake, 

had bid on and was selected for a promotion at Tyson Foods, had prepaid three 

months of rent on an apartment, and had saved $30,000. Independently, Hollins 

travelled to work in Storm Lake from CCUSO in Cherokee without incident. 

Hollins also went shopping, exercised, and participated in treatment without 

direct supervision. 

At the final hearing the State requested, if it had not met its burden of 

proof, the court order DHS to release with supervision under Iowa Code section 

229A.9A(1)(b). Hollins requested a “direct discharge.” 

The court heard the testimony of Hollins, Dr. Thomas of CCUSO, forensic 

psychologist Dr. Rosell, and K.K., a woman Hollins sexually assaulted in 1989. 

Both doctors testified Hollins did not suffer from a mental abnormality such that 

he was more likely to engage in predatory acts that constitute sexually violent 

offenses if discharged from CCUSO. Thus, Hollins no longer met the criteria for 

civil commitment. But, the doctors disagreed on whether release with 

supervision was warranted—the proverbial battle of the experts. 

At the end of the testimony, Hollins moved for a directed verdict, and the 

court and the parties discussed the statutory language in section 229A.9A(1)(b), 

which states the court “may order the committed person released with or without 

supervision if” the court “has determined that the person should be discharged 

from the program, but the court has determined it is in the best interest of the 
6

community to order release with or without supervision before the committed 

person is discharged.” (Emphasis added.) The parties agreed the word 

“program” referred to the CCUSO program. See id. § 229A.9A(1)(b).

The court recognized the next statutory section stated, when a court 

orders a release “with or without supervision,” the DHS has thirty days to prepare 

a release plan.

5

Id. § 229A.9A(2). The State emphasized that a person released

“with or without supervision” from the CCUSO program “is not discharged from 

being civilly committed until ordered by the court at a subsequent proceeding” 

after successful “completion of the release program.”6 

The court told the parties it would enter an order discharging Hollins from 

the CCUSO program and “he can go live at the apartment.” The court also 

stated it would resolve by a separate order whether Hollins is discharged from 

commitment: “I don’t believe it’s appropriate if I discharge him from the program 

to continue to make him live at CCUSO while I decide the issue of whether he’s 

discharged from commitment in its entirety.” The State objected: “[I]f the court is 

going to go ahead and discharge him from the program today and he can go live 

in the apartment as of tomorrow, I think it becomes difficult to reestablish 

supervision over him.” 

 

5 The release plan addresses “the person’s needs for counseling, medication, 

community support services, residential services, vocational services, alcohol or other 

drug abuse treatment, sex offender treatment, or any other treatment or supervision 

necessary.” Iowa Code § 229A.9A(2). 

6

Iowa Code section 229A.9A(6) states: “A committed person released with or without 

supervision is not considered discharged from civil commitment.” Iowa Code section 

229A.9A(7) states: “After being released with or without supervision, the person may 

petition the court for discharge.” 
7

The court’s “order for discharge from program,” filed on the morning of 

July 8, 2013, retained jurisdiction to rule “in the near future” upon the State’s 

“request that the court order Hollins released with supervision before he is 

discharged from commitment.” The court ordered Hollins “be discharged from 

CCUSO.” 

Following this order, the State e-mailed an “emergency motion for stay 

pending court’s order on release with supervision” to the court. The motion 

stated it “is uncertain how to proceed with physical custody of Mr. Hollins while 

the court decides the supervision issue.” On the afternoon of July 8, the court 

denied the State’s motion for stay and also ruled: “[T]he request made by the 

State of Iowa to order [Hollins] released with supervision . . . or in the alternative 

released without supervision is DENIED.” 

The State appeals and does not challenge the court’s conclusion Hollins 

should be released from the program, admitting “the evidence both from the 

CCUSO evaluator and Dr. Rosell[7] was that [Hollins] no longer meets the 

statutory criteria of being ‘more likely than not’ to reoffend.” On appeal, the State 

claims the court abused its discretion in ordering an “unconditional release” 

instead of a release with supervision. 

II. Standard of Review.

The parties dispute the applicable standard of review. Commitment 

proceedings under chapter 229A are civil in nature. In re Det. of Garren, 620

 

7 Dr. Rosell opined he would not have diagnosed Hollins with paraphilia not otherwise 

specified at any time, past or present, because he does not believe it is an official 

diagnosis—it is not in the DSM-V. 
8

N.W.2d 275, 283 (Iowa 2000); see also Iowa Code § 229A.1 (recognizing the 

need for a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of 

SVPs). 

Hollins claims this court should review the district court’s decision “for an 

abuse of discretion.” The State agrees “chapter 229A vests discretion with the 

district court for a determination of whether release with supervision is 

appropriate following a determination a [SVP] should be discharged from the 

program.” However, the State claims our review should be “de novo to the extent 

of examining all the evidence to determine whether the court abused that 

discretion in denying the State’s request for supervision.” In support of its 

proposed standard of review, the State cites two juvenile court cases, 

proceedings that are non-civil and are generally reviewed de novo: State v. 

Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2005) and In re Matzen, 305 N.W.2d 479, 

482 (Iowa 1981). The Tesch court cited Matzen and explained:

We generally review court rulings in juvenile proceedings de 

novo. See In re Interest of Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Iowa 

1972) (stating because juvenile proceedings are neither criminal 

nor civil, they are special proceedings subject to de novo review). 

Nonetheless, where the legislature has clearly vested the juvenile 

court with discretion in a specific area, we review the court’s 

decision on that matter for an abuse of discretion. See In re 

Interest of Matzen, 305 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1981) (considering 

juvenile court’s statutory discretion to enter a consent decree). Our 

review remains de novo only in the sense that we examine “all the 

evidence to determine whether the court abused that discretion.” 

State v. Greiman, 344 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Iowa 1984) (reviewing 

juvenile court’s waiver ruling).

704 N.W.2d at 447 (emphasis added).

We are not persuaded by the State’s authorities. First, the State cites no 

authority, from this State or any other, using its proposed standard in 
9

circumstances similar to the circumstances herein. Second, as the above 

quotation shows, juvenile proceedings are not civil or criminal and are generally 

reviewed de novo. Thus, juvenile cases are clearly distinguishable from civil

commitment cases. See also In re Det. of Geltz, 840 N.W.2d 273, 274 (Iowa 

2013) (holding we review the district court’s construction of chapter 229A for the 

correction of errors at law and a juvenile adjudication of delinquency cannot 

serve as a predicate conviction to adjudicate the offender a SVP under the civil 

commitment statute).

It is undisputed that our supreme court has not explicitly adopted the 

standard of review urged by the State. In the absence of a clear direction to 

employ such a standard, we will review for an abuse of discretion. Under an 

abuse of discretion standard, “we reverse only if the district court exercised its 

discretion on clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds.” In re Det. of Stenzel, 

827 N.W.2d 690, 697 (Iowa 2013). “A ground or reason is untenable when it is 

not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous 

application of the law.” Id. (quoting Ranes v. Adams Labs., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 

677, 685 (Iowa 2010)).

III. Discussion.

The State raises one issue: whether the district court abused its discretion 

in declining the State’s request that Hollins be released with supervision and 

subject to a release plan under section 229A.9A upon his discharge from the 

CCUSO program. Iowa Code section 229A.9A(1)(b) states:
10

In any proceeding under section 229A.8,[8]the court may order the 

committed person released with or without supervision if . . . [t]he 

court . . . has determined that the person should be discharged 

from the program, but the court has determined it is in the best 

interest of the community to order release with or without 

supervision before the committed person is discharged.

At the 2013 hearing, Dr. Thomas testified she joined CCUSO in September 

2011 “primarily to conduct the annual evaluations.” She also testified she spent 

five hours with Hollins as she created his 2012 and 2013 annual reports and 

Hollins “has done very well” during his second transitional release. She 

acknowledged that since 2004, Hollins has had his victim pool—adult women—

available to him. Further:

Q. [I]n your interview, you asked Mr. Hollins if he sees 

himself as a risk at all for committing future sex offenses; correct? 

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall his response? A. . . . I believe my 

question was a . . . zero to ten scale, and he had said a “one” with 

the rationale that essentially anybody with a history and that has 

done these things in the past has to acknowledge that they have 

some chance in the future of re-engaging in those activities.

Dr. Thomas opined it is in the best interest of the community “for Mr. Hollins 

to be supervised.” As to “why,” she explained:

A. I think that any time you have an offender having 

additional supervision it’s going to increase public safety and 

having supervision and/or additional treatment is going to serve to 

reduce the chance that they reoffend.

. . . . 

Q. Now, you were asked if additional supervision would 

increase public safety, and you said, yes? A. Correct.

Q. Wouldn’t it always increase public safety? A. It would.

 

8 Section 229A.8(1) states civil commitment continues unless “facts exist to warrant a 

hearing to determine whether a committed person no longer suffers from a mental 

abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting 

sexually violent offenses if discharged.” See Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 309, 313 

(Iowa 2013). 
11

Q. Wouldn’t we all be safer if Mr. Hollins and those in his 

position are supervised forever? A. Yes. 

Dr. Rosell testified, after spending ten years working in a Maryland 

prison’s sex offender program, he worked as the sex offender treatment director 

for the Mount Pleasant, Iowa correctional facility from 1998 until 2002. He then 

entered private practice. Dr. Rosell testified he has known Hollins since Hollins 

was involved in sex offender treatment in 2000 or 2001 at Mt. Pleasant. Hollins 

stood out to Dr. Rosell from the hundreds of offenders—“I was aware of his 

criminal history, which was pretty significant. But he was involved in treatment. 

He was doing really well. He was very interested in treatment. So he was trying 

to do his best at that time.” 

After he left Mt. Pleasant for private practice, Dr. Rosell observed changes 

in Hollins:

Q. In the time that you have known Mr. Hollins, how has he 

changed? A. . . . First of all, I was asked in [2004] to determine if 

he was an SVP, and I evaluated him and I found that he was. And 

that’s why I wasn’t in that case because I . . . wasn’t favorable for 

the attorney who hired me . . . . [Hollins] always had this underlying 

anger . . . . 

And then since that time, he has changed immensely . . . . 

[H]e had changed significantly in [2009] when I was here and saw 

him testify, and I interviewed him before he testified.

The more I see him, the more he continues to change, and 

not just talking the talk . . . he also does the work. 

Twenty-six months in the community, no problems, making 

money, access to do whatever he wants . . . . [H]e could have 

easily left Iowa if he wanted to, but he chose not to. He chose to 

work a twelve-hour day, go back to CCUSO, spend the night, go 

back to work. I mean, while still going to groups, going to AA, 

helping other people, getting help from other people when he 

needed it.

. . . [T]he record shows . . . how well he’s done. If he still has 

this underlying anger, it’s not being expressed in any untoward 
12

manner . . . and I think that’s important . . . . And I think he is 

genuine when he talks about the harm he has done to others. 

So in those ways . . . this is a very unique situation. It’s not 

often that I come in and testify for an individual who actually has 

been in the community back and forth and is following all the rules

. . . . It’s over two years of doing the right thing. And why would he 

not continue to do the right thing? [It] would be absurd for him to 

then all of a sudden start doing the wrong thing, just because he’s 

no longer supervised. I think [he has] done well under this 

supervision period. 

Dr. Rosell specifically opined supervision of Hollins would not “really make that 

much of a difference.” Also:

The community would feel a little better, but . . . I’m of the 

opinion that if an individual wants to do something, they’re going to 

do it. And he has had the opportunity to do something, and he 

didn’t.

If he didn’t have such a good record, then it would be 

different. I often recommend supervision for individuals who I’m not 

as comfortable with . . . [b]ut that’s not Mr. Hollins. Not everybody 

is the same.

So I think he has demonstrated responsibility. I mean, he 

already has an apartment paid for, for three months. That’s taking 

responsibility. That’s just trying to keep progressing . . . . [I]n this 

case, I don’t think he needs [supervision]. 

Section 229A.9A provides the district court with the discretion to release 

committed persons unconditionally, as was done here, or with or without 

supervision, either of which makes the person subject to a release plan and to 

continuing civil commitment until another, separate hearing. The district court’s 

ruling shows the court concluded Dr. Rosell’s testimony was more credible and 

more responsive to the particular circumstances of Hollins’s case. 

Generally, we defer to a district court’s assessment of conflicting expert 

witnesses because that court is in a better position to judge the credibility of 

witnesses. See In re Det. of Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 461 (Iowa 2004)
13

(“Because the issue essentially turned on a judgment of credibility of two experts 

with different opinions, we give weight to the district court’s judgment.”); State v. 

Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Iowa 2000) (“When a case evolves into a battle of 

experts, we, as the reviewing court, readily defer to the district court’s judgment 

as it is in a better position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.”); State v. 

Fetters, 562 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (“When the psychiatric 

testimony is conflicting, the reviewing court will not determine anew the weight to 

be given trial testimony.”). 

The expert opinion testimony of Drs. Thomas and Rosell was in conflict,

and the district court certainly could have accepted Dr. Thomas’s evidence—it 

chose not to. We do not interfere with such decisions, and even though this 

court may have come to a different conclusion, we give deference to the district 

court and will only overturn its ruling for an abuse of discretion. We note Dr. 

Rosell undisputedly was more familiar with Hollins and his circumstances for 

much longer periods of time—years versus hours for Dr. Thomas. We find that 

once the court’s order of July 8, 2013 was filed, discharging Hollins from the 

program, the question of whether he should have been supervised or not 

became moot. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.