alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

HHH Farms, L.L.C., Hartwell Farms, LLC, 

and Waymon Scott Hartwell, Appellant

No. 06-20-00068-CV v.

Fannin Bank, Appellee

Appeal from the 336th District Court of 

Fannin County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. CV-15-

42242). Opinion delivered by Justice 

Burgess, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Stevens participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find there was partial reversible error in 

the judgment of the court below. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment on 

Fannin’s breach of contract claims against H. Farms and Hartwell. We reverse the trial court’s 

judgment on Fannin’s alter ego and sham claims and remand those claims to the trial court for 

resolution by the fact-finder. Because the trial court’s imposition of joint and several liability 

necessarily flows from Fannin’s alter ego and sham claims, that portion of the judgment

imposing joint and several liability against the Hartwell Parties is likewise reversed. We reverse 

the attorney fee award in favor of Fannin and remand the attorney fee claim to the trial court for 

resolution by the fact-finder. We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Fannin 

on the Hartwell Parties’ counterclaims. 

We reverse the summary judgment in favor of American against Fannin. 

We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We further order that the costs of this appeal be taxed fifty percent to Hartwell, twentyfive percent to Fannin, and twenty-five percent to American.

RENDERED NOVEMBER 12, 2021

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
53 P.3d 263

SUPREME COURT OF HAWAI'I

August 21, 2002

24193

#### State v. Irvine

Affirmed
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-1490
In Re: FRANK PAUL LUKACS, Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-96-2913-PJM) Submitted: May 14, 1998 Decided: May 27, 1998 Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Frank Paul Lukacs, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Frank Paul Lukacs filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that this court order the district court: (1) to vacate three of its orders; (2) to permit Lukacs to file pleadings, motions, affidavits, and appeals; (3) to reevaluate his motion for injunctive relief in light of the factors enumerated in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co. , 550 F.2d 189, 195-96 (4th Cir. 1977); (4) to specify the court's reasons for denying his motion for injunctive relief; and (5) to grant his motion for permanent injunction against the federal government's affirmative action program. Lukacs raised these issues on appeal and this Court denied relief. See Lukacs v. Shalala , No. 97-2047 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 1998)(unpublished). In this mandamus petition, Lukacs failed to establish that he has a clear right to the relief sought and that no other remedy is adequate. See In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. See In re United Steelworkers , 595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1979). We therefore deny Lukacs's petition for a writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
EXHIBIT 12



PERFORMANCE FOOD GROUP COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES

COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

(UNAUDITED)

(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

The following table sets forth our ratio of earnings to fixed charges for the periods indicated:



|                                                 |  |        |   | FISCAL YEAR ENDED
|------------------------------------------------ |  | ------ | - | -----------------
|                                                 |  |        |   |                  
|                                                 |  |        |   | January 3,
2004  
|                                                 |  |        |   |                  
|EARNINGS:                                        |  |        |   |                  
|Earnings before income taxes                     |  |        | $ | 119,663          
|Fixed charges, exclusive of capitalized interest |  | 18,444 |   | 20,492           
|                                                 |  |        |   | $                
|                                                 |  |        |   |                  
|FIXED CHARGES:                                   |  |        |   |                  
|Interest charge to expense                       |  |        | $ | 17,701           
|Interest portion of rental expense               |  | 743    |   | 1,729            
|                                                 |  |        |   |                  
|Fixed charges, exclusive of capitalized interest |  | 18,444 |   | 20,492           
|Capitalized interest                             |  |        |   |                  
|                                                 |  |        |   | $                
|                                                 |  |        |   |                  
|Ratio of earnings to fixed charges               |  | 7.4    |   | 6.1
#### The State, ex rel. Horvath, *v.*Rider, Commr. of Div. of Conservation and Natural Resources of the Dept. of Agriculture of Ohio et al.

(No. 31894

Decided April 19, 1950.)

*418
      *Mr. Chalmers M. Parker*and *Messrs. Wright, Parlor, Pur pus, Morris & Arnold,*for relator.

*Mr. Herbert 8. Duffy,*attorney general, and *Mr. Frank Wilke,*for respondents.

By the Court.

Only two defenses challenged by the demurrer need be considered in deciding the present cause.

The fifth defense contains allegations that at the time the relator filed the petition in this court there was and still is pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County an action against the relator and the respondents, in which action the plaintiffs allege they are in possession of the premises; that relator filed a cross-petition in that action alleging he is owner of a leasehold estate in the premises and entitled to the possession thereof; and that prior to the filing of this mandamus proceeding the Court of Common *419Pleas enjoined relator from molesting, interfering with or hindering the plaintiffs in their use and occupancy of the premises during the pendency of that action to quiet title of plaintiffs to possession of the premises, under a claimed right to a leasehold estate therein.

The sixth defense states that there is available to the relator an adequate and sufficient remedy under the ordinary processes of the law.

The facts in the present mandamus proceeding bring it within the general principle announced in *State, ex rel. Akron Coal Co.,*v. *Bd. of Directors, Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District,*136 Ohio St., 485, 26 N. E. (2d), 766, in which this court held in the syllabus : “Where a prior action is pending between the same litigants, involving the same subject matter, in a court having jurisdiction, a mandamus proceeding in another court is barred, unless it is plain that adequate relief is not obtainable in the prior case.” See, also, *State, ex rel. First Natl. Bank, North Baltimore, Ohio,*v. *Village of Botkins,*141 Ohio St., 437, 48 N. E. (2d), 865; *State, ex rel. Johnson,*v. *Industrial Commission,*144 Ohio St., 159, 57 N. E. (2d), 775; *State, ex rel. Kurtz,*v. *Bliss et al., Deputy State Supervisors of Elections, Summit County,*147 Ohio St., 211, 70 N. E. (2d), 653.

The demurrer of the relator to the answer is overruled and a writ of mandamus is denied.

*Writ denied.*

Weygandt, C. J., Matthias, Hart, Zimmerman, Stewart, Turner and Taet, JJ., concur.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

773

KA 11-00975

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JASON M. MEDEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DAVID J. FARRUGIA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LOCKPORT (JOSEPH G. FRAZIER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

MICHAEL J. VIOLANTE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (LAURA T. BITTNER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Niagara County Court (Matthew J. Murphy, III, J.), rendered April 12, 2011. The judgment revoked defendant’s sentence of probation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by vacating the sentence and as modified the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to Niagara County Court for resentencing in accordance with the following Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking the sentence of probation previously imposed and convicting him of violating the terms and conditions of his probation. He was sentenced to a determinate term of incarceration of three years, to be followed by three years of postrelease supervision. We reject defendant’s challenge to the severity of the sentence, but we conclude that the sentence imposed is illegal and cannot stand despite the failure of either defendant or the People to raise the issue in County Court or on appeal ( see People v Davis , 37 AD3d 1179, 1180, lv denied 8 NY3d 983). Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the second degree, a class E felony and, although he was convicted of rape in the second degree in 2007, there is no indication in the record that he was adjudicated a second felony offender. Defendant therefore faced an indeterminate term of incarceration ranging from a minimum of 1 to 3 years to a maximum of 1 a to 4 years ( see Penal Law § 70.00 [2] [e]; [3] [b]). However, the court erroneously imposed a sentence of a determinate term of three years. The certificate of conviction correctly reflects that defendant was convicted of attempted assault in the second degree but it also reflects the illegal sentence. We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the sentence imposed, and we-2- 773

KA 11-00975

remit the matter to County Court for resentencing.

Entered: June 8, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court
#### BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF KAY COUNTY, Oklahoma, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the State OF OKLAHOMA, Defendant in Error.

No. 39415.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

June 13, 1961.

*258Ralph C. Haynes, County Atty., Kay County, Ponca City, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Fred Hansen, First Asst. Atty. Gen., L. G. Hy-den, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albert D. Lynn, Gen. Counsel, Oklahoma Tax Commission, Ed Armstrong, Asst. Counsel, Oklahoma Tax Commission, Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

Otjen & Carter, by Frank Carter, Enid, for Oklahoma Farm Bureau, amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal lodged by the Board of County Commissioners of Kay County, Oklahoma, from the same order appealed from by other boards of county commissioners, in Causes Numbered 39321 and 39323, Okl., 363 P.2d 242; Okl., 363 P.2d 263, said plaintiff in error advances the same arguments for reversal that were urged under the appellant’s first two propositions, and determined to show insufficient ground for reversal, in Cause No. 39321, supra. The portion of our opinion in that case, relating thereto, is therefore adopted, by reference, as our opinion herein, without repetition.

Affirmed, and the period for filing a petition for rehearing herein is hereby reduced to 10 days from the date this opinion is filed.

WILLIAMS, C. J., BLACKBIRD, V. C. J., and WELCH, DAVISON, HALLEY, JOPINSON and BERRY, JJ., concur.

IRWIN, J., concurs specially.

JACKSON, J., dissents.

IRWIN, Justice

(concurring specially).

*259I concur specially for the reasons set forth in Case No. 39,321, Board of County Commissioners of Canadian County, Oklahoma v. State Board of Equalization, Okl., 363 P.2d 242.
<PAGE>
EXHIBIT 99.01

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of Prism Software Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), the undersigned, E.
Ted Daniels, Chief Executive Officer of the Company and interim Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

                                         /s/ E. Ted Daniels
                                         ---------------------------------------
                                         E. Ted Daniels, Chief Executive Officer
                                         and Interim Chief Financial Officer

                                         May 19, 2003
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Unify Corporation (the “Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended July 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Todd E. Wille, Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:




(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and




(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.




Dated: December 9, 2010
/s/ TODD E. WILLETodd E. WilleChief Executive Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Unify Corporation and will be retained by Unify Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




---
#### J. B. ACTON, Inc., a Corporation, and Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, and Insurance Company, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Walter DIRION and Perry Edward Wells, Defendants in Error.

No. 37992.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

June 17, 1958.

*676Green & Feldman, W. E. Green, Raymond G. Feldman, Wm. S. Hall, George A. Farrar, Tulsa, for plaintiffs in error.

Landrith & McGee, Thomas A. Landrith, Jr., Richard K. McGee, John W. Hager, Tulsa, for defendants in error.

CORN, Vice Chief Justice.

This is an attempted appeal by petition in error, with case-made attached, from a judgment of the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, in an action for damages by reason of personal injuries suffered in an accident. Judgment was rendered by the court on the 26th day of April, 1957. The motion for new trial, timely filed, was overruled May 27, 1957. Notice of appeal to this court was given. The case-made was settled and signed by the trial judge on September 4, 1957 and was filed in the District Court of Tulsa County, on the same date. The petition in error, with case-made attached, was not filed in this Court until the 30th day of September, 1957, which was more than twenty days from the date the case-made was settled and signed.

Our statute requires that all proceedings by case-made be commenced within twenty days from the date the case-made is settled. 12 O.S.1957, Supp. Sec. 972. It is apparent that this court is without jurisdiction to review the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

HALLEY, JOHNSON, WILLIAMS, BLACKBIRD and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
Order entered October 29, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00926-CV

SUN KYUM CHA A/K/A STEPHEN CHA, ET AL., Appellants

V.

BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-13-15020

ORDER

We GRANT appellants’ October 27, 2014 second motion for an extension of time to file 

a brief. We ORDER the brief tendered to this Court by appellants on October 27, 2014 filed as 

of the date of this order.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
# C_2009267EN.01001901.xml

| 7.11.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 267/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.11.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 267/19

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 10 September 2009 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — Dr. Erhard Eschig v UNIQA Sachversicherung AG

(Case C-199/08) (1)

1

(Legal expenses insurance - Directive 87/344/EEC - Article 4(1) - Right of insured persons to choose their own lawyer - Contractual limitation - Multiple insured persons suffering loss as a result of the same event - Selection of the legal representative by the insurer)

2009/C 267/32

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Dr. Erhard Eschig

Applicant:

Defendant: UNIQA Sachversicherung AG

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) — Interpretation of Article 4(1), of Council Directive 87/344/EEC on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to legal expenses insurance (OJ 1987 L 185, p. 77) — Clause contained in the standard terms and conditions of insurance of a legal expenses insurer enabling it, in the case of an accident in which a large number of insured persons suffer losses as a result of the same event, to choose a legal representative, and thereby limiting the right of the individual insured person to choose his own lawyer (‘mass torts clause’).

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 4(1)(a) of Council Directive 87/344/EEC of 22 June 1987 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to legal expenses insurance must be interpreted as not permitting the legal expenses insurer to reserve the right, where a large number of insured persons suffer loss as a result of the same event, itself to select the legal representative of all the insured persons concerned.

---

(1)  OJ C 197, 02.08.2008.

1

---
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 117 (Thursday, August 2, 2012)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1392]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                    HONORING THE LIFE OF CHAD FOSTER

                                 ______
                                 

                    HON. FRANCISCO ``QUICO'' CANSECO

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, August 2, 2012

  Mr. CANSECO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor the life of Chad 
Foster. Chad passed away this past Saturday after a battle with cancer 
at the age of 63. He is survived by his wife Jill and their son Chad 
Jr. and daughter Savannah.
   Chad was a true public servant, who will be remembered as a 
committed leader and strong supporter of the Eagle Pass community. 
After serving three terms as Eagle Pass mayor, Chad went on to serve 
the community by leading numerous local and state organizations, 
including as the chairman of the Texas Border Coalition.
   Chad was passionate about the advancement of our border communities. 
He focused his life on encouraging education, border security, health 
care, and other development programs that supported the people of South 
Texas. Chad will be sorely missed in our community, but his passion and 
legacy will certainly live on.

                          ____________________
```
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 4398 

To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to suspend immigration enforcement operations within an area for which the President has declared 

a major disaster or an emergency, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 15, 2017 

Ms. BARRAGA ́N (for herself, Ms. LOFGREN, Ms. NORTON, Mr. EVANS, Mr. 

MCGOVERN, Mrs. NAPOLITANO, Mr. BEYER, Mr. HUFFMAN, Mr. 

GUTIE ́RREZ, Mr. VARGAS, Mr. SOTO, Mr. GOMEZ, Mr. CARBAJAL, and 

Mr. KIHUEN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to suspend 

immigration enforcement operations within an area for 

which the President has declared a major disaster or 

an emergency, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Safe Emergency Re5 sponse Act’’. 


daltland on DSK30NT082PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4398 IH

1 SEC. 2. SUSPENSION OF LESS SERIOUS IMMIGRATION EN2 FORCEMENT OPERATIONS IN AREAS AF3 FECTED BY MAJOR DISASTER OR EMER4 GENCY. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland Secu6 rity shall suspend immigration enforcement operations 

7 and initiatives, including immigration enforcement initia8 tives associated with evacuations or sheltering and the use 

9 of checkpoints for immigration enforcement purposes, 

10 within an area for which the President has declared a 

11 major disaster or an emergency under section 401 or 501, 

12 respectively, of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 

13 Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.). 

14 (b) STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—To the 

15 extent State and local officials are otherwise permitted to 

16 participate in immigration enforcement, including any 

17 lawful detention of individuals who are not citizens of the 

18 United States, such participation shall be suspended ex19 cept in cases specifically identified by the Secretary of 

20 Homeland Security, and communicated to the State or lo21 cality, that pose an urgent and individualized threat to 

22 public safety or national security. With respect to persons 

23 in State or local detention during a major disaster or an 

24 emergency, the Secretary of Homeland Security should ad25 vise and support State and local law enforcement agencies 


daltland on DSK30NT082PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 4398 IH

1 to prioritize the safety needs of their communities and in2 dividual detainees. 

Æ 


daltland on DSK30NT082PROD with BILLS