alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
      32.1




CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
      THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I,
      Glenn
      Welstad, President, and Chief Executive Officer of Command Center, Inc. (the
      "Company") do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
      knowledge:





This
      Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB/A1 of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended
      June 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
      "report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





The
      information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:  August
      13, 2007


/s/
                Glenn WelstadGlenn
                Welstad
              President
                and Chief Executive Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4262 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4262

 To authorize members and former members of the uniformed services who 
    are entitled to veterans disability compensation to continue to 
   participate in the Thrift Savings Plan through the deduction and 
 deposit of a percentage of their veterans disability compensation to 
                        the Thrift Savings Fund.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 6, 2017

  Mr. Walker introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To authorize members and former members of the uniformed services who 
    are entitled to veterans disability compensation to continue to 
   participate in the Thrift Savings Plan through the deduction and 
 deposit of a percentage of their veterans disability compensation to 
                        the Thrift Savings Fund.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Financial Independence for Disabled 
Veterans Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. DISABLED VETERANS CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THRIFT SAVINGS 
              PLAN.

    (a) Participation Authorized.--The Executive Director of the 
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board shall prescribe regulations 
to permit the continued participation in the Thrift Savings Plan by a 
member of the uniformed services after the discharge or release of the 
member from service in the uniformed services if the member or former 
member is entitled to veterans disability compensation.
    (b) Contributions.--For purposes of section 8432 of title 5, United 
States Code, the monthly veterans disability compensation of a member 
or former member of the uniformed services shall be deemed to be basic 
pay for a monthly pay period.
    (c) Matching Contributions Prohibited.--The deduction and deposit 
in the Thrift Savings Fund of a percentage of the veterans disability 
compensation of a member or former member of the uniformed services 
does not require or authorize Government contributions under section 
8432 of title 5, United States Code, or any other provision of law.
    (d) Veterans Disability Compensation Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``veterans disability compensation'' has the meaning given the 
term ``compensation'' in section 101(13) of title 38, United States 
Code.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



Exhibit 31.1 CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, James R. Ridings, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Craftmade
International, Inc.;  2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;  3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
and have:  a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures
or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this
report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation;c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting that
occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting: and  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize
and report financial information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in
the registrants internal control over financial reporting. Date: September 28, 2004
    
    /s/ James R. Ridings
James R. Ridings
Chairman of the Board, President and
Chief Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel Henry BOWKLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-7610.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 27, 2005.

Decided: Oct. 13, 2005.

Joel Henry Bowkley, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Joel Henry Bowkley seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. This order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); *see Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 368-69, 374 n. 7 (4th Cir.2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Bowkley has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Clarence Babcock, Claimant, *v.*State of New York, Defendant.

(Claim No. 33803.)

Court of Claims,

October 6, 1959.

*Travis S Whiting (Kenneth F. Whiting*of counsel), for claimant.

*Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General*(E. *Paul Hoskins*of counsel), for defendant.

Richard S. Heller, J.

Claimant was driving home from work on March 8, 1956, at about 11:00 f.m., when his car skidded on an ice patch just north of Spring Street, Union Center, Broome County, New York. The highway he was traveling was known as Route No. 26 and was under the control and supervision of the State of New York.

The facts adduced at the trial established that the State was negligent in allowing water to collect and ice to form on the highway creating a hazard to the traveling public. *(Goldfarb*v. *State of New York,*178 Misc. 180, affd. 264 App. Div. 976.)

The finding is based upon actual notice to the State that water frequently ran over the road at the same place where the present accident occurred and knowledge that ice would form on a cold day. No adequate flare or sign was placed to warn a driver of the dangerous condition that existed although the State’s foreman knew of the potential danger as late as 2:30 p.m. on the day of the accident. *(Sutherland*v. *State of New York,*189 Misc. 953.)

On the night of the accident the claimant had driven about 35 m.p.h. on a clear, dry road (Route No. 26) from Endicott, which was four miles south of Union Center, when he came upon the slush and ice which caused his car to skid and to crash into a utility pole. The court finds that claimant was not contributorily negligent.

Claimant’s car, a 1951 Buick, was completely demolished and was sold for $75. He sustained a loss of $605. Claimant lost four weeks wages totaling $300. In addition, hospital and *7medical bills amounted to $107 and miscellaneous damage for which he is entitled to be compensated amounted to $109.50.

The injuries suffered by the claimant included a cerebral concussion and injuries to the right chest and right leg and numerous cuts and contusions. Claimant was unconscious from the time of the accident until the next morning. X rays were negative. His present complaints include pain and vertigo. There is no proof of any permanency.

Claimant is entitled to recover the sum of $3,125 in full for all damages and injuries, including pain and suffering, past, present and future.

The foregoing constitutes the written and signed decision of the court upon which judgment may be entered. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 440.)

Let judgment be entered accordingly.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I, James L. Medina, certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this Form 10-QSB of InfoNow Corporation;

     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

     4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small
business issuer and have:

          (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

          (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

          (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

     5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit
committee of the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

          (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

          (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting.





Date: May 13, 2005

/s/ James L. Medina
-------------------------------
James L. Medina
Interim Chief Financial Officer
#### Carven Associates, Inc., et al., Respondents, v American Home Assurance Corp., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. Delro Industries, Inc., et al., Third-Party Defendants.

— In an action, *inter alia,*to enforce an insurance contract, the defendant third-party plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Hopkins, J.H.O.), dated October 3, 1988, as denied its motion for partial summary judgment.

Ordered that on the court’s own motion, the appeal is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements.

In light of our determination affirming the dismissal of the complaint in this action *(see, Carven Assocs. v American Home Assur. Corp.,*175 AD2d 790 [decided herewith]), the instant appeal is rendered academic, and, accordingly, is dismissed. Mangano, P. J., Hooper, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 6160** 

REGINALD LEE ROGERS, SR. , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v.
FRANK L. PERRY , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro
. James A. Beaty, Jr. , Senior District Judge. ( 1:13

- cv - 00738

- JAB

- LPA )

Submitted : June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015

Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Reginald Lee Rogers, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Reginal d Lee Rogers, Sr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues
a cert ificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (A) (2012)
. A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on th e merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrel l , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitu tional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Rogers has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny his motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED3
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-7076

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ROBERT LAWRENCE PAYNE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CR-90-20-R, CA-96-920-7)

Submitted: August 9, 2001 Decided: August 17, 2001

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Lawrence Payne, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Jack Bondurant,

Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Robert L. Payne seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure seeking relief from the order denying his 28

U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000) motion. We have reviewed the

record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See

United States v. Payne, Nos. CR-90-20-R; CA-96-920-7 (W.D. Va.

June 18, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 10.29**

 

**FOURTHAMENDMENT**

**OFTHE**

**SKY FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. PROFIT SHARING, 401(K) AND ESOPPLAN**

(As Amended and Restated Effective January 1, 2004) 

 

**WHEREAS**, Sky FinancialGroup, Inc. (the “Company”) maintains the Sky Financial Group, Inc. Profit Sharing, 401(k) and ESOP Plan (the “Plan”); and 

 

**WHEREAS**, the Company has delegated authority to amend the Plan to the Sky Financial Group, Inc.Benefit Plans Committee (the “Committee”), and the Committee has determined that amendment of the Plan is necessary and desirable. 

 

**NOW, THEREFORE**, pursuant to the power reserved to the Company by Section 10.01 of thePlan, and by virtue of the authority delegated to the Committee, the Plan, as previously amended, is hereby further amended, in the following particulars: 

 

1.      By inserting the phrase “anniversary awards, prizes,” after the phrase “movingexpenses,” where it appears in Section 1.03(d) of the Plan, effective as of January 1, 2004. 

 

2.      By substituting the following for the first sentence of Section 5.04 of the Plan, effective March 27, 2005: 

 

“If a Participant terminates employmentwith the Employers, and the value of the Participant’s vested Accounts is not (or at the time of any prior, periodic distribution was not) greater than $1,000, the Participant will receive a distribution of the value of the entire vestedportion of his or her Accounts and the nonvested portion will be treated as a forfeiture.” 

 

3.      By substituting the following for the second sentence of Section 6.01 of the Plan, effective March 27, 2005: 

 

“If the nonforfeitable portion of theParticipant’s Account exceeds (or at the time of any prior, periodic distribution ever exceeded) $1,000, the Plan shall 

not distribute the Participant’s Account before the Participant attains NormalRetirement Date, unless the Participant consents to such distribution in writing.” 

 

4.      By substituting the following for the second paragraph of Section 6.01 of the Plan, effective March 27, 2005: 

 

“Subject to the rules in Section 6.03,the surviving spouse shall begin to receive payments immediately, unless such surviving spouse elects a later date, except that the surviving spouse shall receive an immediate distribution if the value of the Participant’s vested Accounts isnot (or at the time of any prior, periodic distribution was not) greater than $1,000.” 

 

*        *        * 

 

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF********,** on behalf of the Committee, theundersigned Committee member has executed this amendment this 30th day of December 2004. 

 

**SKY FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.**

**BENEFIT PLANS COMMITTEE**

By:
 
/s/ Thomas A. Sciorilli

Its:
 
SVP & Chief Human Resources Officer

 

 

 

- 2 -
# C_2009205EN.01001701.xml

| 29.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 205/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 205/17

---

Order of the Court of 3 April 2009 — VDH Projektentwicklung GmbH, Edeka Handelsgesellschaft Rhein-Ruhr mbH v Commission of the European Communities

(Case C-387/08 P) (1)

1

(Appeal - Action for declaration of failure to act - Directive 89/665/EEC - Commission not implementing the corrective mechanism under Article 3(2) of Directive 89/665/EEC - Natural and legal persons - Direct concern - Inadmissibility)

2009/C 205/30

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Appellants: VDH Projektentwicklung GmbH, Edeka Handelsgesellschaft Rhein-Ruhr mbH (represented by: C. Antweiler, Rechtsanwalt)

Appellants:

Other party to the proceedings: Commission of the European Communities

Other party to the proceedings:

Re:

Re:

Appeal brought against the order of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) in Case T-185/08 VDH Projektenwicklung and Edeka Rhein-Ruhr v Commission by which the Court of First Instance dismissed as manifestly inadmissible the action for a declaration that the Commission had unlawfully failed to act, on the ground that it failed, in relation to the conclusion of a public works contract and in relation to the award of a general commercial contract, to implement without delay the corrective mechanism provided for under Article 3 of Directive 89/665/EEC and to send the Federal Republic of Germany a notification under Article 3(2) of that directive — Action brought by natural and legal persons for a declaration of failure to act — Need for the measure regarding which the institution is alleged to have unlawfully failed to act to be of direct concern to the applicant

VDH Projektenwicklung and Edeka Rhein-Ruhr

Commission

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The appeal is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The appeal is dismissed.

| 2. | VDH Projektentwicklung GmbH and Edeka Handelsgesellschaft Rhein-Ruhr mbH are to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

VDH Projektentwicklung GmbH and Edeka Handelsgesellschaft Rhein-Ruhr mbH are to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 141, 20.06.2009.

1

---