HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA

RESPONSE PLAN

THE RED BOOK

UPDATED MAY 2017
ii

May 22, 2017 

USDA APHIS, Veterinary Services 

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center 

Between December 2014 and June 2015, the United States experienced its largest highly pathogenic 

avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak—and most serious animal health disease incident—in history. This plan 

was updated in August 2015 to reflect immediate changes required based on those events. Soon 

thereafter, in January 2016, there was an HPAI/low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) outbreak in 

Indiana. This version of the USDA APHIS HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book (Updated May 2017)

reflects the knowledge and lessons learned during both of these outbreaks, as well as in the recent 

HPAI/LPAI incident in 2017. Additionally, this version incorporates changes made in related Foreign 

Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials. 

The following list highlights important revisions that were made to this version of the HPAI Response 

Plan. 

 Reflects policy changes resulting from the 2014–2015 outbreak that was developed after August

2015.

 Incorporates policy guidance from the 2016 outbreak.

 Reflects the new National Response Framework, released June 2016.

 Reflects the 2016 World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

 Includes new surveillance sections, revised by the Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health.

 Incorporates new permitted movement guidance.

 Corrects any errors identified in the prior version.

 Addresses comments made on the Draft August 2015 version.

 Provides additional guidance on restocking activities.

 Reflects the updated Secure Poultry Supply Plan, which harmonizes and integrates existing plans

for eggs, turkeys, and broilers.

Additional policy guidance documents for HPAI response are available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

These documents, developed by the National Incident Coordination Group during the 2014–2015 and 

2016 responses, contain details on specific aspects of a response. While the HPAI Response Plan: The 

Red Book provides strategic guidance, these policy guidance documents provide information on how to 

operationalize activities, particularly for the unified Incident Command. They are consistent with the HPAI 

Response Plan. These documents, alongside the HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book, should be used 

in any future HPAI outbreak. Please check these documents frequently as they do change as needed. 

As of May 2017, the following policy guidance documents are available: 

Initial Response

 Stamping-Out & Depopulation Policy

 Ventilation Shutdown Evidence & Policy

 New State Checklist

 Initial Contact Epi Report
iii

 Financing the Response: State/Tribal Information

Finance and Administration Procedures

 Overview of Finance and Administration Procedures

 Details for Bird and Egg Appraisal and Indemnity Procedures

 Details for Virus Elimination Financial Processes

 Details for Materials Destroyed Financial Processes

 Appraisal and Indemnity Request Form Appendix A1: Form for Poultry Owner

 Appraisal and Indemnity Request Form Appendix A2: Form for Contract Grower

 Appraisal and Indemnity Request Procedures Appendix B1: Contract Grower Worksheet for Meat

Birds

 Appraisal and Indemnity Request Procedures Appendix B2: Contract Grower Worksheet for

Layers

 Appraisal and Indemnity Procedures Appendix C: DUNS and SAM

 Commercial Flock Plan: H5/H7 AI Euthanasia/Depopulation, Disposal & Virus Elimination

Procedures for Commercial Infected Premises

 Backyard Flock Plan: H5/H7 AI Euthanasia/Depopulation, Disposal & Virus Elimination

Procedures for Backyard Infected Premises

Critical Response Activities

 Surveillance and Diagnostics:

o Avian Sample Collection for Influenza A and Newcastle Disease

o Surveillance of Backyard Flocks Around Infected Premises

o Surveillance Sampling for Commercial Premises in the Control Area.

 Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business:

o HPAI Zones and Premises

o Movement Control

o Overview: HPAI Control Area Permitting Process

o Overview of the EMRS Customer Permit Gateway

o Testing Requirements for Movement from the Control Area

o Contact Premises

o HPAI in the Live Bird Marketing System

 Disposal and Cleaning/Disinfection (Virus Elimination):

o Mortality Composting Protocol for AI Infected Flocks

 Job Aids for Composting Process

o Cleaning and Disinfection Basics: Virus Elimination

o Using Heat Treatment for Virus Elimination

o Landfill Disposal Guidance—Recommended Waste Acceptance Practices for Landfills

 CDC Interim Guidance for Landfill Workers

Recovery and Restocking 

 Control Area Release

 Timeline, Eligibility, and Approval for Restocking

 Example Restocking Form

 Post C&D Environmental Sampling Guide
iv

Health & Safety Information 

 Quick Response Card

 Personal Protective Equipment Recommendations for HPAI Responders

For More Information on HPAI & Response 

 General Resources and Information

 H5/H7 Avian Influenza Case Definition

 Use of the Antigen Capture Immunoassay

We realize that preparing for and responding to an HPAI outbreak remains a complex effort, requiring 

collaboration from all levels of government and industry stakeholders. We will accept comments on the 

HPAI Response Plan for incorporation into future versions. Ongoing HPAI events will dictate when the 

next version of this response plan will be released and the extent of the changes required; further policy 

guidance may also be released depending on what is requested, required, and based on current events. 

Please email all comments to FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov with the subject line of “Comments 

to Updated 2017 HPAI Response Plan.”

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) mission is to raise 

awareness, define expectations, and improve capabilities for FAD preparedness and response. 

For more information, please go to: 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep 

or e-mail FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov
UPDATED May 2017 v

Executive Summary

This Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Response Plan: The Red Book 

(Updated May 2017) incorporates policy guidance developed during the 2014–

2015 and 2016 HPAI outbreaks in the United States, as well as comments 

received and updates to other Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response 

Plan (FAD PReP) materials. This plan strives to reflect the important lessons 

learned from the three recent U.S. HPAI outbreaks–particularly the 2014–2015 

outbreak, which was the largest HPAI outbreak in U.S. history, as well as the 

smaller, mixed HPAI/low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) incidents in 2016 

and 2017. 

The objectives of this plan are to identify (1) the capabilities needed to respond to 

an HPAI outbreak and (2) the critical activities that are involved in responding to 

that outbreak, and time-frames for these activities. These critical activities are the 

responsibility of unified Incident Command in an outbreak situation. This plan 

protects public health and the environment, promotes agricultural security, 

secures the food supply, and guards animal health and animal agriculture by 

providing strategic guidance on responding to an HPAI outbreak. Developed by 

the National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center in Surveillance, 

Preparedness, and Response Services in Veterinary Services, this plan gives 

direction to emergency responders at the Federal, State, Tribal, local, and industry 

levels to facilitate HPAI control and eradication efforts in poultry in the United 

States. This plan complements, not replaces, existing regional, State, Tribal, local, 

and industry plans. 

HPAI is potentially zoonotic, and while it appears to have a relatively high 

species-specific transmission barrier, it also can be fatal for humans. Animal 

health officials coordinate with public health officials in the event that HPAI is 

identified in the United States; appropriate health and safety measures should 

always be observed when conducting HPAI response activities. 

The HPAI virus is highly contagious and causes extremely high morbidity and 

mortality rates in poultry. During the 2014–2015 outbreak, HPAI H5N2 rapidly 

spread to over 200 commercial premises in the Midwest, where the focal point of 

the outbreak was Iowa and Minnesota. Turkeys and layer-type chickens were 

heavily affected: for example, approximately 10 percent of the annual average 

U.S. layer inventory was depopulated. Nearly $850 million was obligated for 

response activities (including personnel support) and indemnity payments, in 

addition to $100 million, which was made available for further preparedness 

activities. 

HPAI is easily spread through direct contact with sick or infected poultry, as well 

as via fomites, such as equipment and vehicles. An HPAI outbreak in the United 
UPDATED May 2017 vi 

States results in major economic consequences: in the 2014–2015 outbreak, 

current estimates suggest that the outbreak had a $3.3 billion impact on the U.S. 

economy, with $1.6 billion in direct losses from poultry flocks that had to be 

depopulated.1 While none of the HPAI strains that affected the United States were 

demonstrated to be zoonotic, there is a significant social and psychological impact 

on flock owners and responders from response activities. 

The goals of an HPAI response are to (1) detect, control, and contain HPAI in 

poultry as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate HPAI using strategies that seek to 

protect public health and the environment, and stabilize animal agriculture, the 

food supply, and the economy; and (3) provide science- and risk-based 

approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected 

animals and non-contaminated animal products. Achieving these three goals will 

allow individual poultry facilities, States, Tribes, regions, and industries to 

resume normal production as rapidly as possible. The objective is to allow the 

United States to regain disease-free status without the response effort causing 

more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself.

The United States’ primary control and eradication strategy for HPAI in domestic 

poultry, as recommended by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), is 

“stamping-out.” 

During an HPAI outbreak response, many activities—such as epidemiology, 

surveillance, biosecurity, quarantine and movement control, and depopulation—

must occur in a deliberate, coordinated fashion. In particular, rapid depopulation 

of infected poultry is critical to halt virus transmission and must be prioritized. In 

addition to providing strategic direction on these various activities, this plan 

explains the underlying Incident Command System structure, applying the 

National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System 

(NIMS) principles and systems to control and eradicate an outbreak of HPAI in 

the domestic poultry population.

Incorporating current scientific knowledge and policy guidance about HPAI, the 

HPAI Response Plan

 provides information for responders at all levels in the event of an HPAI 

outbreak; 

 provides technical information on HPAI and the impact an HPAI outbreak 

can have in the United States; 

 explains the integration of the NRF, NIMS, and the other FAD PReP 

documents; 

1

 Greene, Joel L. (2015, July). Update on the highly-pathogenic avian influenza outbreak of 

2014–2015. Congressional Research Service, R44114. Retrieved from 

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44114.pdf. 
Executive Summary 

UPDATED May 2017 vii 

 describes U.S. Department of Agriculture preparedness and response 

activities, both domestic and international, including collaboration with 

public health agencies and APHIS Incident Management; 

 presents information on 23 specific response critical activities and tools, 

such as surveillance, diagnostics, cleaning and disinfection, health and 

safety, personal protective equipment, and depopulation; 

 details OIE standards for HPAI surveillance, virus inactivation, and 

disease freedom; and 

 supplies information on proof-of-freedom procedures and restocking after 

an HPAI outbreak. 

This response plan is carefully integrated with other FAD PReP documents, 

including the HPAI Standard Operating Procedures and National Animal Health 

Emergency Management System Guidelines. Additionally, policy guidance 

documents specifically for HPAI are listed in the memo which precedes this 

executive summary. Together, these documents provide a comprehensive 

preparedness and response framework for an HPAI outbreak. Please visit the FAD 

PReP website, which promotes preparedness relationships and advances response 

capabilities. The website is at: www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. Public health 

information about avian influenza and humans can be found at 

http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu. 

This plan is a dynamic document that will be updated and revised based on future 

knowledge and further stakeholder input. Your comments and recommendations 

on this document are invited. Please send them to: 

FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov. 
UPDATED May 2017 viii 

Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction and HPAI Information ............................................ 1-1

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN................................................................. 1-1

1.2 AUDIENCE AND PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT.......................................................... 1-1

1.3 SCOPE OF RESPONSE PLAN ............................................................................ 1-2

1.4 PREPAREDNESS PLANNING.............................................................................. 1-2

1.5 CURRENT SITUATION ...................................................................................... 1-3

1.6 HPAI INFORMATION........................................................................................ 1-4

1.6.1 Etiology ................................................................................................... 1-4

1.6.2 History and Global Distribution ............................................................... 1-6

1.6.3 HPAI in the United States ....................................................................... 1-7

1.6.4 International Trade .................................................................................. 1-9

1.6.5 Impact of an HPAI Outbreak ................................................................. 1-10

1.6.6 Ecology ................................................................................................. 1-11

1.6.7 Diagnosis in Avian Species ................................................................... 1-13

1.6.8 Immunity ............................................................................................... 1-15

Chapter 2 Framework for HPAI Preparedness and Response ................. 2-1

2.1 FOUNDATION OF PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ............................................ 2-1

2.1.1 National Response Framework ............................................................... 2-1

2.1.2 National Incident Management System .................................................. 2-1

2.1.3 Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan ................. 2-2

2.1.4 Coordination and Collaboration .............................................................. 2-3

2.2 FEDERAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS .................. 2-3

2.2.1 Overview ................................................................................................. 2-3

2.2.2 USDA Roles and Responsibilities Overview ........................................... 2-4

2.3 AUTHORITY .................................................................................................... 2-5

Chapter 3 USDA HPAI Preparedness and Response ............................... 3-1

3.1 USDA APHIS HPAI RESPONSE AUTHORITIES ................................................. 3-1

3.1.1 Preparedness Exercises and Training .................................................... 3-1

3.1.2 Domestic Activities .................................................................................. 3-2

3.1.3 International Activities ............................................................................. 3-4
Contents 

UPDATED May 2017 ix

3.1.4 International Trade .................................................................................. 3-4

3.1.5 Compartmentalization ............................................................................. 3-5

3.2 USDA APHIS ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY..................................................... 3-5

3.3 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.................................................... 3-6

3.3.1 Multiagency Coordination ....................................................................... 3-8

3.3.2 APHIS Incident Coordination Group ....................................................... 3-9

3.3.3 Organization at the Field Level ............................................................... 3-9

3.4 USDA APHIS TIERED RESPONSE TO HPAI ................................................... 3-10

3.5 DIAGNOSTIC RESOURCES AND LABORATORY SUPPORT................................... 3-10

3.5.1 National Veterinary Services Laboratories ............................................ 3-10

3.5.2 National Animal Health Laboratory Network ......................................... 3-11

3.5.3 Center for Veterinary Biologics ............................................................. 3-11

Chapter 4 HPAI Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy ......................... 4-1

4.1 RESPONSE GOALS.......................................................................................... 4-1

4.2 PRINCIPLES, CRITICAL ACTIVITIES, AND TOOLS FOR AN HPAI RESPONSE............ 4-2

4.2.1 Critical Activities ...................................................................................... 4-2

4.2.2 Epidemiological Principles ...................................................................... 4-2

4.2.3 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign .............................................. 4-3

4.2.4 Timeline in Any HPAI Response for First 72 Hours ................................ 4-4

4.3 RESPONSE STRATEGY FOR CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF HPAI IN POULTRY .. 4-5

4.3.1 Defining Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy for Poultry .................. 4-5

4.3.2 Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out ........................................ 4-6

4.3.3 Assessing a Possible Outbreak .............................................................. 4-6

4.3.4 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities ............................ 4-7

4.3.5 Management of Incident ......................................................................... 4-8

4.3.6 Control and Eradication Strategy for Other Species ............................... 4-9

4.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING RESPONSE.................................................................. 4-9

4.5 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR AI............................................................... 4-10

4.5.1 OIE Standards for HPAI Response ....................................................... 4-10

4.5.2 Recognition of Disease-Free Status ..................................................... 4-11

4.5.3 Criteria Needed for AI-Free Status ....................................................... 4-11

Chapter 5Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools .............. 5-1
UPDATED May 2017 x

5.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY................................................................................ 5-1

5.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS AND CASE DEFINITIONS .......................................... 5-1

5.2.1 Laboratory Definitions ............................................................................. 5-1

5.2.2 Case Definitions ...................................................................................... 5-3

5.2.3 Case Definition Development Process.................................................... 5-5

5.3 SURVEILLANCE............................................................................................... 5-6

5.3.1 Surveillance Goals and Objectives ......................................................... 5-6

5.3.2 Surveillance Activities by Time Period and Zone for the Unified 

Incident Command .................................................................................. 5-7

5.3.3 Outbreak Surveillance Guidance— Passive Surveillance ....................... 5-9

5.3.4 Outbreak Surveillance Guidance—Active Surveillance .......................... 5-9

5.3.5 Additional Guidance .............................................................................. 5-12

5.4 DIAGNOSTICS............................................................................................... 5-13

5.4.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing ............................................ 5-13

5.4.2 Surge Capacity ..................................................................................... 5-16

5.4.3 Reporting .............................................................................................. 5-17

5.5 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION AND TRACING ............................................ 5-17

5.5.1 Summary of Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations ...................... 5-17

5.5.2 Epidemiological Investigation ................................................................ 5-20

5.5.3 Tracing .................................................................................................. 5-20

5.5.4 Considerations for Size of Control Area and Minimum Sizes of Other 

Zones .................................................................................................... 5-21

5.6 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ......................................................................... 5-23

5.6.1 Data Entry ............................................................................................. 5-23

5.6.2 Reporting .............................................................................................. 5-24

5.6.3 Information Management Systems and Tools ....................................... 5-24

5.7 COMMUNICATION .......................................................................................... 5-24

5.7.1 Objectives ............................................................................................. 5-25

5.7.2 Key Messages ...................................................................................... 5-25

5.7.3 Further Communications Guidance ...................................................... 5-26

5.8 HEALTH AND SAFETY AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT ....................... 5-26

5.8.1 Mental Health Concerns ....................................................................... 5-27
Contents 

UPDATED May 2017 xi 

5.8.2 Further Information on Health, Safety, and Personal Protective 

Equipment ............................................................................................. 5-28

5.9 BIOSECURITY ............................................................................................... 5-28

5.9.1 Biosecurity as Related to Health and Safety ......................................... 5-29

5.9.2 Biosecurity Hazards and Mitigating Measures ...................................... 5-30

5.9.3 Closed Flocks ....................................................................................... 5-30

5.9.4 Waiting Period ...................................................................................... 5-31

5.10 QUARANTINE AND MOVEMENT CONTROL ........................................................ 5-31

5.10.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations ........................................... 5-32

5.10.2 Movement Guidance into, within, and out of a Control Area ................ 5-32

5.10.3 Moving Commodities, Poultry, and Conveyances in an HPAI 

Outbreak ............................................................................................... 5-38

5.10.4 Guidance for All Premises .................................................................... 5-38

5.10.5 OIE Treatment Guidelines for HPAI ...................................................... 5-38

5.10.6 Surveillance Required for Poultry and Poultry Product Movement....... 5-39

5.11 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS............................................................................. 5-40

5.12 REGIONALIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE (FOR A U.S. HPAI RESPONSE) .. 5-41

5.12.1 Compartmentalization ........................................................................... 5-41

5.12.2 Further Guidance .................................................................................. 5-42

5.13 MASS DEPOPULATION AND EUTHANASIA......................................................... 5-42

5.13.1 Overview ............................................................................................... 5-42

5.13.2 APHIS Stamping-Out and Depopulation Policy .................................... 5-42

5.13.3 Additional Information ........................................................................... 5-44

5.14 DISPOSAL .................................................................................................... 5-44

5.15 CLEANING AND DISINFECTION ........................................................................ 5-45

5.15.1 Cost Effective Virus Elimination from Infected Premises ...................... 5-45

5.15.2 Premises that Can’t Be Cleaned and Disinfected ................................. 5-46

5.15.3 Further Information ............................................................................... 5-46

5.16 VACCINATION ............................................................................................... 5-47

5.16.1 Emergency Vaccination Strategies for Poultry ...................................... 5-47

5.16.2 Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals and Surveillance of 

Vaccinated Flocks ................................................................................. 5-48

5.16.3 Assessment and Overview ................................................................... 5-48
UPDATED May 2017 xii 

5.16.4 Strategic Vaccine Distribution ............................................................... 5-50

5.16.5 Vaccination Zone Designations ............................................................ 5-51

5.16.6 Vaccinated Premises ............................................................................ 5-52

5.16.7 Movement Restrictions for Vaccinates .................................................. 5-53

5.16.8 Cessation of Vaccination ...................................................................... 5-53

5.17 LOGISTICS.................................................................................................... 5-54

5.18 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND VECTOR CONTROL............................................ 5-54

5.18.1 Wildlife Management ............................................................................ 5-54

5.18.2 Vector Control ....................................................................................... 5-55

5.19 ANIMAL WELFARE......................................................................................... 5-55

5.20 MODELING AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS ............................................................. 5-55

5.21 APPRAISAL AND COMPENSATION.................................................................... 5-56

5.21.1 Authority ................................................................................................ 5-56

5.21.2 Appraisal and Compensation Procedures during an Outbreak ............. 5-56

5.22 FINANCE ...................................................................................................... 5-57

5.23 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT................................................................................ 5-58

Chapter 6 Recovery after an HPAI Outbreak ............................................. 6-1

6.1 PROOF-OF-FREEDOM...................................................................................... 6-1

6.1.1 Recognition of Disease-Free Status ....................................................... 6-1

6.1.2 Surveillance for Recognition of Disease Freedom .................................. 6-2

6.1.3 Country Freedom Declaration ................................................................. 6-3

6.1.4 Release of Quarantine and Movement Control ....................................... 6-4

6.1.5 Disposition of Vaccinates ........................................................................ 6-5

6.2 RESTOCKING OF PREVIOUSLY INFECTED PREMISES........................................... 6-5

6.2.1 Environmental Sampling ......................................................................... 6-5

6.2.2 Commercial Premises that Can’t Be Cleaned......................................... 6-6

6.2.3 Restocking Guidance and Approval Process .......................................... 6-6

6.2.4 Approved Sources of Poultry .................................................................. 6-6

6.2.5 Testing Requirements after Restocking .................................................. 6-7

6.2.6 Additional Guidance ................................................................................ 6-7
Contents 

UPDATED May 2017 xiii 

Appendix A Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response 

Materials to Support HPAI Response 

Appendix B Laboratory Network List for Avian Influenza 

Appendix C Overview of Secure Poultry Supply Plan 

Appendix D HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance for Poultry 

Appendix E Procedures for HPAI Investigations and Specimen 

Submission 

Appendix F Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire 

Appendix G Example of Movement Control Notices 

Appendix H Available Avian Influenza Vaccines 

Appendix I USDA Response Process for Infected Premises 

Appendix J Glossary 

Appendix K Abbreviations 

Appendix L Selected References and Resources 

Figures 

Figure 1-1. HPAI in the United States 2014–2015; Detections in All Birds ............. 1-8

Figure 3-1. Overview of USDA APHIS Multiagency Coordination, Incident 

Coordination Group, Field Personnel (National Incident Management 

Teams and Districts), and Stakeholder Relationships for an HPAI Incident ...... 3-7

Figure 3-2. Details of USDA APHIS Multiagency Coordination, Incident 

Coordination Group, and a Unified Incident Management Team for an HPAI 

Incident .............................................................................................................. 3-8

Figure 4-1. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of U.S. HPAI Response ............ 4-4

Figure 4-2. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out (Infected 

Premises would be Depopulated) ...................................................................... 4-6

Figure 5-1. Diagnostic Flow for FAD Investigations of Suspected HPAI ............... 5-15

Figure 5-2. Diagnostic Flow During an HPAI Outbreak ......................................... 5-16

Figure 5-3. Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises in HPAI Outbreak 

Response ........................................................................................................ 5-19

Figure 5-4. Premises Designations in Relation to Permitting and Movement 

Control............................................................................................................. 5-37

Figure 5-5. Example Decision Tree for Emergency Vaccination in Domestic 

Poultry ............................................................................................................. 5-50
UPDATED May 2017 xiv 

Figure 5-6. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones .................................... 5-51

Figure 5-7. Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones ........................................ 5-52

Figure 5-8. Examples of Vaccinated Premises ..................................................... 5-53

Tables 

Table 5-1. Sampling Frequency Guidelines by Control Area Premises 

Designations .................................................................................................... 5-11

Table 5-2. Abbreviations for Diagnostic Figures ................................................... 5-14

Table 5-3. Summary of Premises Designations .................................................... 5-18

Table 5-4. Summary of Zone and Area Designations ........................................... 5-19

Table 5-5. Minimum Sizes of Areas and Zones .................................................... 5-22

Table 5-6. Factors To Consider in Determining Control Area Size for HPAI ......... 5-22

Table 5-7. Movement into a Control Area from Outside a Control Area (to 

Specific Premises) ........................................................................................... 5-34

Table 5-8. Movement within a Control Area .......................................................... 5-35

Table 5-9. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area 

(from Specific Premises).................................................................................. 5-36

Table 5-10. Inactivation of AI in Eggs and Egg Products ...................................... 5-39

Table 5-11. Inactivation of AI in Meat .................................................................... 5-39
UPDATED May 2017 xiii

Preface

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)—

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Response Plan: The Red Book 

(Updated May 2017) provides strategic guidance for responding to an animal 

health emergency caused by HPAI in the United States. This HPAI Response Plan 

(Updated May 2017) updates the HPAI Response Plan (Draft August 2015) and 

replaces previous versions of HPAI summary response plans. Information in this 

plan may require further discussion and development with stakeholders.

This HPAI Response Plan is under ongoing review. This document was last 

updated in May 2017. Please send questions or comments to: 

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center

Veterinary Services

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

4700 River Road, Unit 41

Riverdale, MD 20737-1231

Fax: (301) 734-7817

E-mail: FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov

While best efforts have been used in developing and preparing the HPAI

Response Plan, the U.S. Government, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and other parties, such as 

employees and contractors contributing to this document, neither warrant nor 

assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or 

usefulness of any information or procedure disclosed. The primary purpose of this 

HPAI Response Plan is to provide strategic guidance to those government 

officials responding to an HPAI outbreak. It is only posted for public access as a 

reference.

The HPAI Response Plan may refer to links to various other Federal and State 

agencies and private organizations. These links are maintained solely for the 

user’s information and convenience. If you link to such site, please be aware that 

you are then subject to the policies of that site. In addition, please note that USDA 

does not control and cannot guarantee the relevance, timeliness, or accuracy of 

these outside materials. Further, the inclusion of links or pointers to particular 

items in hypertext is not intended to reflect their importance, nor is it intended to 

constitute approval or endorsement of any views expressed, or products or 

services offered, on these outside websites, or the organizations sponsoring the 

websites.
UPDATED May 2017 xiv

Trade names are used solely for the purpose of providing specific information. 

Mention of a trade name does not constitute a guarantee or warranty of the 

product by USDA or an endorsement over other products not mentioned.

USDA prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of 

race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual 

orientation, or marital or family status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all 

programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for 

communication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) 

should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and 

telecommunications device for the deaf [TDD]).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil 

Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue SW, 

Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is 

an equal opportunity provider and employer.
UPDATED May 2017 1-1

Chapter 1 

Introduction and HPAI Information

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN

This updated version of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Response 

Plan: The Red Book (Updated May 2017) has been updated based on three recent 

outbreaks in the United States: the widespread 2014–2015 outbreak, the 2016 

HPAI/low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) outbreak in Indiana, and the 

2017 HPAI/LPAI outbreak in the southeastern United States. It also incorporates 

comments received and updates made to other Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness and Response (FAD PReP) materials. 

The objectives of this plan are to identify the (1) capabilities needed to respond to 

an HPAI outbreak in poultry and (2) critical activities that are involved in 

responding to that outbreak and the time-frames for these activities. In an 

outbreak situation, these critical activities are under the authority of a unified 

Incident Command (IC) per the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 

This HPAI Response Plan provides current information on HPAI and presents an 

overview of the organizational strategy for an effective response to a detection of 

HPAI in poultry. In addition, it offers guidance on stamping-out, the primary 

HPAI outbreak response strategy. This plan also contains guidance for conducting 

critical response activities, which include biosecurity, mass depopulation, 

disposal, and appraisal and compensation. 

1.2 AUDIENCE AND PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT

This plan provides strategic guidance for the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and 

responders at all levels in the event of an HPAI outbreak. It also provides current 

policy information and a strategic framework for the control and eradication of 

HPAI, should an outbreak occur in the United States. It offers additional resources 

for tactical information for responders (Federal, State, Tribal, local, and industry), 

owners, growers, and industry stakeholders who act during an HPAI outbreak in 

poultry. 

This plan does not replace existing regional, State, Tribal, local, or industry 

preparedness and response plans relating to HPAI. Regional, State, Tribal, local, 

and industry plans should be aimed at more specific issues in an HPAI response. 

In particular, States should develop response plans focused on the specific 

characteristics of the State and the State’s poultry industry. Industry should 
UPDATED May 2017 1-2

develop response plans focused on the specific characteristics of their commercial 

operations and business practices. 

As indicated by links throughout the document, this plan is integrated and 

coordinated with other FAD PReP documents such as HPAI standard operating 

procedures (SOPs), National Animal Health Emergency Management System 

(NAHEMS) Guidelines, and existing APHIS policy guidance. (Appendix A

provides a list of documents related to HPAI outbreak response and an overview 

of FAD PReP). 

1.3 SCOPE OF RESPONSE PLAN

Avian influenza (AI) is primarily an infection of birds. While other species are 

susceptible (for a list see Section 1.6.6 of this plan), this plan is focused on 

poultry.1 However, if susceptible animals other than poultry become significant to 

the response effort, the case and laboratory definitions will be adapted by the 

unified IC to fit the prevailing epidemiological findings during an outbreak. This 

is further discussed in Chapter 4. 

The plan does not address control and eradication of LPAI in poultry. However, 

LPAI is addressed comprehensively in the USDA APHIS National Poultry 

Improvement Plan (NPIP): http://www.poultryimprovement.org. 

1.4 PREPAREDNESS PLANNING

There has been a tremendous amount of preparedness planning based on past 

HPAI detections in the United States and the ongoing HPAI outbreaks worldwide. 

Finding more efficient and effective ways to control and contain the virus is a 

priority. As specified in the 2016 HPAI Preparedness and Response Plan—

presented to the Secretary of Agriculture—many capabilities were enhanced and 

improved after the 2014–2015 outbreak.2 In particular, new policies were 

implemented to facilitate rapid depopulation of affected flocks, appraisal and 

indemnity processes were streamlined, and a shift from cleaning and disinfection 

to virus elimination was made; additionally, flat rate compensation for virus 

elimination was developed. This enabled, and continues to enable, effective 

cleaning and disinfection with appropriate cost controls. Though the guidance 

provided in this HPAI Response Plan is not highly detailed to remain applicable 

1

 For this HPAI Response Plan, poultry is defined as: chickens, and any of the following 

birds, if these other birds are kept, raised, captured, bred, or otherwise used for a commercial 

purpose: turkeys, ducks, geese, swans, pheasants, partridges, grouse, quail, guinea fowl, pea fowl, 

pigeons, doves, ostriches, emus, rheas, cassowaries. Commercial purposes include the production 

or sale of birds, or of their meat, eggs, or feathers. Does not include chickens or other birds 

displayed in a licensed exhibition or zoo. 

2

 APHIS Veterinary Services. (2016). 2016 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) 

Preparedness and Response Plan. USDA. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/hpai-preparedness-andresponse-plan-2015.pdf. 
Introduction and HPAI Information

UPDATED May 2017 1-3

to a wide variety of potential HPAI incidents, the information provided within this 

plan remains consistent with the intent of and activities pursuant to these 

initiatives. Industry, academic, and USDA APHIS scientists and veterinarians—as 

well as all responders—continue to prepare for a resurgence of HPAI each fall, as 

temperatures cool and migratory routes become highly active. 

1.5 CURRENT SITUATION

HPAI remains a high-priority concern for USDA APHIS. Caused by influenza 

virus A, AI viruses are classified as either HPAI or LPAI, depending on the 

genetic features of the virus and the severity of disease produced in poultry. Most 

AI viruses are LPAI and do not result in high mortality in wild birds or domestic 

poultry. However, HPAI can be associated with morbidity and mortality rates of 

up to 100 percent: the 2014–2015 outbreak resulted in the loss (death or 

depopulation) of approximately 50 million birds.

Reservoirs of LPAI virus exist worldwide in wild bird populations. The ongoing 

transmission of LPAI viruses, and the transmission of LPAI from reservoirs to 

susceptible species—typically poultry—can result in strain mutation or 

reassortment to an HPAI virus (through antigenic shift or antigenic drift). For 

example, in the 2016 HPAI/LPAI outbreak in Indiana: an LPAI virus mutated to 

an HPAI virus in a commercial turkey flock. While historically HPAI viruses 

have not established endemic infection status in the poultry populations of 

countries that have developed veterinary infrastructure, the spread of HPAI in the 

United States during the 2014–2015 outbreak shows the critical threat that HPAI 

poses to animal health and agriculture.

In the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, H5N2 was the most 

common subtype of HPAI followed by H5N8. In 2016, the LPAI/HPAI was an 

H7N8 virus. In 2017, the HPAI virus was an H7N9 (of a North American wild 

bird lineage—not related to the Asian H7N9 HPAI virus). None of these strains 

were detected in humans during these U.S. outbreaks, including in response 

personnel who were monitored for illness. 

However, it is worth acknowledging that there are AI viruses circulating in 

poultry that are of significant concern to public health, such as H5N13, H5N6, and 

the Asian lineage H7N9. The majority of these infections have been detected in 

Asia, though there have been human cases identified around the world. While 

human infections remain relatively uncommon due to an apparently high speciesspecific transmission barrier, mortality rates can be high. Current evidence 

suggests that close contact with dead, sick, and infected birds or their secretions is 

 

3 There was an H5N1 virus detected in the State of Washington during the 2014–2015 

outbreak, but this strain was genetically distinct and is not the same strain causing human illness 

and death in Asia and Africa.
UPDATED May 2017 1-4

the primary mode of human infection.4 Therefore, it is critically important for 

agriculture and public health agencies to coordinate efforts in any response to 

HPAI.

1.6 HPAI INFORMATION

The following sections provide an overview of HPAI and cover the following

subjects:

 Etiology

 History and global distribution

 HPAI in the United States

 International Trade

 Impact of an HPAI outbreak

 Ecology

 Diagnosis in avian species

 Immunity.

The USDA AI website also contains valuable information: www.usda.gov/birdflu.

Further information on HPAI can be found in the HPAI Overview of Etiology and 

Ecology SOP. Chapter 5 of this plan includes a current USDA APHIS Case 

Definition for H5/H7 AI.

1.6.1 Etiology

1.6.1.1 OVERVIEW

AI, also known as fowl plague, is caused by Influenzavirus A, which is in the 

family Orthomyxoviridae. Influenza A viruses are further classified by their 

surface glycoproteins, hemagglutinin (H or HA) and neuraminidase (N or NA). 

Sixteen H (H1 to H16) subtypes and nine N (N1 to N9) subtypes of influenza A 

have been identified.

 

4 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2015, June 2). HPAI A H5 virus 

background and clinical illness. Influenza (Flu). Retrieved from 

https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/hpai/hpai-background-clinical-illness.htm. 
Introduction and HPAI Information

UPDATED May 2017 1-5

1.6.1.2 WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH (OIE) INFECTION WITH 

AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUSES5

In the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016), the OIE defines infection with 

avian influenza as follows: 

1. For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, avian influenza is defined as 

an infection of poultry caused by any influenza A virus of the H5 or 

H7 subtypes or by any influenza A virus with an intravenous 

pathogenicity index (IVPI) greater than 1.2 (or as an alternative at least 

75% mortality) as described below. These viruses are divided into 

high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses and low pathogenicity 

avian influenza viruses:

a. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses have an IVPI in sixweek-old chickens greater than 1.2 or, as an alternative, cause at 

least 75% mortality in four-to eight-week-old chickens infected 

intravenously. H5 and H7 viruses which do not have an IVPI of 

greater than 1.2 or cause less than 75% mortality in an intravenous 

lethality test should be sequenced to determine whether multiple 

basic amino acids are present at the cleavage site of the 

haemagglutinin molecule (HA0); if the amino acid motif is similar 

to that observed for other high pathogenicity avian influenza 

isolates, the isolate being tested should be considered as highly 

pathogenicity avian influenza virus; 

b. Low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses are all influenza A 

viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes that are not high pathogenicity 

avian influenza viruses.

2. The following defines the occurrence of infection with an avian influenza 

virus: the virus has been isolated and identified as such or specific viral 

ribonucleic acid has been detected in poultry or a product derived from 

poultry.

 

5 The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (2016 Terrestrial Animal Health Code) 

defines poultry as “all domesticated birds, including backyard poultry, used for the production of 

meat or eggs for consumption, for the production of other commercial products, for restocking 

supplies of game, or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as fighting cocks used for any 

purpose. 

Birds that are kept in captivity for any reason other than those reasons referred to in the 

preceding paragraph, including those that are kept for shows, races, exhibitions, competitions or 

for breeding or selling these categories of birds as well as pet birds, are not considered to be 

poultry.”
UPDATED May 2017 1-6

1.6.1.3 U.S. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS DEFINITIONS OF AI6

In 9 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) §53, HPAI is defined as:

(1) Any influenza virus that kills at least 75 percent of eight 4- to 6-weekold susceptible chickens within 10 days following intravenous 

inoculation with 0.2 ml of a 1:10 dilution of a bacteria-free, infections 

allantoic fluid;

(2) Any H5 or H7 virus that does not meet the criteria in paragraph (1) of 

this definition, but has an amino acid sequence at the hemagglutinin 

cleavage site that is compatible with highly pathogenic avian influenza 

viruses; or

(3) Any influenza virus that is not an H5 or H7 subtype and that kills one 

to five chickens and grows in cell culture in the absence of trypsin.

1.6.2 History and Global Distribution

AI was first reported in Italy and described as a serious disease of poultry in 1878. 

An influenza A virus was identified as the causative agent of fowl plague in 1955. 

AI viruses, including HPAI, are found in most countries of the world where 

poultry is produced. The worldwide prevalence of AI viruses is influenced by the 

distribution of both domestic and wild avian species, locality of poultry 

production, migratory routes, and season. Accurate prevalence rates of infection 

are difficult to determine—particularly for LPAI—because international 

surveillance systems and procedures used to identify and track AI vary.

Outbreaks of HPAI occur worldwide in domestic poultry. Some countries have 

endemic HPAI, such as Egypt, China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Vietnam 

(this is list is not exhaustive). However, in countries with advanced veterinary 

infrastructure, outbreaks of HPAI have historically been sporadic and infrequent. 

However, starting in late fall of 2016 and continuing into 2017, widespread HPAI 

outbreaks have occurred and continue to occur in Europe in domestic poultry.

These outbreaks have been primarily been caused by HPAI H5N8, though other 

strains have also been reported. As these outbreaks continue, H5N8 has been 

reported from over 30 countries spanning not only Europe, but Africa, the Middle 

East, and Asia. Additional information on the distribution of HPAI is available 

from the OIE and U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. 

Fortunately, in terms of zoonotic potential, the number of H5N1 cases in humans

has decreased significantly in recent years.7 However, other AI viruses, including 

 

6 Please see the appropriate CFR sections for further information, such as CFR definitions of 

poultry. 

7 World Health Organization (WHO). (2017, January). Cumulative number of confirmed 

human cases for avian influenza A (H5N1) reported to WHO, 2003–2017. Retrieved from 

http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative_table_archives/en/. 
Introduction and HPAI Information

UPDATED May 2017 1-7

the Asian lineage H7N9, continue to circulate and result in human illness and 

fatalities.8 Again, none of the HPAI viruses which were detected in the recent 

U.S. outbreaks are known to have caused disease in humans.

1.6.3 HPAI in the United States

1.6.3.1 HISTORICAL

LPAI viruses are present in wild birds and are periodically detected in domestic 

poultry flocks in the United States. In addition, the United States experienced 

HPAI outbreaks in 1924, 1983, 2004, 2014–2015, 2016, and 2017. No significant 

human illness has been reported from any of these HPAI outbreaks. 

The 1983 and 2004 outbreaks were linked to the live bird marketing system 

(LBMS) via epidemiological investigation. By contrast, scientists believe the 

initial introduction of HPAI in 2014 was from wild birds into poultry flocks; in 

2016, an LPAI virus mutated into an HPAI virus.

1.6.3.2 2014–2015 HPAI OUTBREAK9

The 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak is the largest ever in the United States, and 

resulted in the loss of 50.5 million commercial birds (depopulated or succumbed 

to the virus) mostly infected with H5N2. The first case was detected in December 

of 2014 and the last case was confirmed on June 16, 2015. Based on the 

calculations made in June/July 2015, the death/depopulation losses represent 7.46 

percent of average U.S. turkey inventory, 10.01 percent of the average layer 

inventory, and 6.33 percent of average U.S. pullet inventory. Broilers were mainly

unaffected during the outbreak. 

The hardest hit States were Minnesota (over 100 affected premises) and Iowa 

(over 70 affected premises); the States of South Dakota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, 

California, Missouri, North Dakota, and Arkansas also had one or more detections 

of HPAI in commercial flocks. Figure 1-1 illustrates the detections of HPAI in the 

United States, and includes detections in wild birds, captive wild birds, backyard 

flocks, and commercial operations. In all, 21 States had one or more detections of 

HPAI. 

 

8 WHO. (2017, April). Human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus--China. 

Retrieved from http://www.who.int/csr/don/20-april-2017-ah7n9-china/en/. 

9 APHIS. (2016). Final report for the 2014–2015 outbreak of HPAI in the United States

(Public Version). Retrieved from www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
UPDATED May 2017 1-8

Figure 1-1. HPAI in the United States 2014–2015; Detections in All Birds 

Though the initial introduction is believed to be from migratory wild birds, the 

virus eventually spread through other means as well. While it is difficult to 

identify a single pathway, known and predictable routes of disease spread have 

been implicated. These include breakdowns in farm biosecurity, rodents and small 

birds inside poultry houses, sharing of equipment, and the movement of 

employees and other personnel. It is also conceivable that airborne transmission 

of HPAI occurred over limited distances.

1.6.3.3 2016 INDIANA HPAI/LPAI OUTBREAK10

While APHIS and all stakeholders prepared for a resurgence of HPAI in the fall 

of 2015, as temperatures cooled and migratory routes became highly active, the 

United States remained HPAI-free until January of 2016 when HPAI was detected 

in a single commercial flock in Indiana. Further diagnostic testing and 

epidemiological investigation showed that an LPAI virus had mutated into an 

HPAI virus in that flock; LPAI was confirmed on eight additional premises. The 

HPAI-infected flock, LPAI-infected flocks, and dangerous contact flocks were 

 

10 APHIS. (2016). Final report for the 2016 HPAI outbreak in the United States

[Presentation]. Retrieved from www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
Introduction and HPAI Information

UPDATED May 2017 1-9

rapidly depopulated, and the virus did not spread. Just over 400,000 commercial 

birds were affected; no backyard flocks were affected by this incident.

1.6.3.4 2017 SOUTHEASTERN HPAI/LPAI OUTBREAK

On March 4, 2017, HPAI H7N9 (of a North American wild bird lineage—not 

related to the Asian H7N9 HPAI virus) was confirmed in a commercial broiler 

breeder flock in Lincoln County, Tennessee. Subsequently, 12 additional premises 

were confirmed to have presumptive or confirmed LPAI H7N9 in Tennessee (3

premises), Alabama (6 premises), Kentucky (2 premises), and Georgia (1 

premises).11 In addition, there was a second HPAI detection in the same county 

(Lincoln County), which was confirmed on March 15, 2017. Information suggests 

that the LPAI virus and HPAI virus were extremely similar across all genes. In 

total, 14 premises were affected, including 8 commercial premises (all 

commercial broiler breeders), and 6 backyard premises. At the writing of this 

plan, there have been no further HPAI detections and response activities to this 

mixed HPAI/LPAI incident are concluding.

1.6.3.5 CURRENT STATUS

At the writing of this plan (May 2017), there have been no recent HPAI detections 

in wild birds (click here for more information): since July 2016, the only 

detections were in Montana in August 2016 and Alaska in December 2016. Both 

of these detections were the Eurasian/North American virus H5N2, which are 

highly pathogenic to poultry. 

In the fall of 2016 and into the spring 2017, Europe has experienced and 

continues to respond to significant and widespread HPAI transmission.12 Due to 

bird migration patterns and resurgence of HPAI worldwide, the USDA and all 

stakeholders continue to prepare for the reemergence of HPAI in the fall and 

winter of 2017 and beyond. 

1.6.4 International Trade

The United States does not import live poultry from countries or regions currently 

experiencing HPAI outbreaks in commercial or backyard poultry flocks. 

However, USDA APHIS may recognize HPAI-free regions (also called zones) for 

trade in countries affected by HPAI that demonstrate adequate veterinary 

 

11 In some cases, the pathogenicity was unable to be determined from the existing sample. In 

these cases, the lack of clinical signs indicated that these were LPAI infections. Thus, they were 

termed “H7N9 Confirmed/Presumptive LPAI” or “H7 Confirmed/Presumptive LPAI” to note that 

while the subtype was determined (either the hemagglutinin, neuraminidase, or both), the 

pathogenicity was presumptive based on clinical findings.

12 The OIE publishes situation reports summarizing HPAI reports from around the world. 

OIE. (2017, May). OIE situation report for avian influenza. Retrieved from 

http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/OIE_AI_situation

_report/OIE_SituationReport_AI__6_8May2017.pdf. 
UPDATED May 2017 1-10

infrastructure and authority, movement, disease control measures, and 

surveillance activities for HPAI. Countries and regions that are recognized, per 

9 CFR 94.6 (a)(2), by the United States as affected with HPAI are listed here.

Just as the United States bans imports from HPAI affected countries and regions, 

in the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, many countries placed 

restrictions on exported U.S. poultry and poultry products. While some countries 

placed bans only on a specific region, county, or State, other countries did ban 

poultry and poultry products from the entire United States. These bans have a 

significant economic impact. However, in 2016, decisions made by some 

countries to regionalize the United States helped to significantly limit the 

economic impact of this particular incident; only one country imposed limitations 

on the entire United States.

1.6.5 Impact of an HPAI Outbreak

1.6.5.1 ECONOMIC

A widespread HPAI outbreak can have a substantial economic impact, as clearly 

demonstrated in the 2014–2015 outbreak in the United States. The 1983–1984 

HPAI outbreak in the northeastern United States resulted in the destruction of 

more than 17 million birds at a cost of approximately $65 million. The retail price 

of eggs jumped nearly 30 percent. A 2004 outbreak of H7N3 in Canada resulted 

in C$360 million in gross economic losses.13

For the 2014–2015 outbreak, nearly $850 million was obligated for response

activities (including personnel support) and indemnity payments. Another $100 

million was made available for further preparedness activities. Estimates suggest 

that this HPAI outbreak gave rise to $1.6 billion in direct losses from the turkeys 

and chicken layers euthanized. In total—when accounting for factors like 

restocking and future production—impact to the U.S. economy is assessed closer 

to $3.3 billion.14 In part, this is a consequence of partial or full trade embargoes 

from over 30 countries; there was a reported decline in poultry and egg exports of 

14 percent from January to June 2015.

15 With these restrictions, egg prices where 

the highest observed in over 30 years (adjusting for inflation).16

 

13 Swayne, D.E. (2008). High pathogenicity avian influenza in the Americas. In D.E. Swayne 

(Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 191–216). Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing. 

14 Greene, J.L. (2015, July). Update on the highly-pathogenic avian influenza outbreak of 

2014–2015. Congressional Research Service, R44114. Retrieved from 

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44114.pdf.

15 USA Poultry & Egg Export Council. (2015, August). Avian influenza takes a toll on U.S. 

poultry exports. Retrieved from http://www.usapeec.org/p_documents/press_492700213.pdf. 

16 Huang, W., Hagerman, A., & Bessler, D.A. (2016). The impact of highly pathogenic avian 

influenza on table egg prices. Choices, 31(2). Retrieved from 

http://www.choicesmagazine.org/UserFiles/file/cmsarticle_507.pdf. 
Introduction and HPAI Information

UPDATED May 2017 1-11

1.6.5.2 ZOONOTIC POTENTIAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS

HPAI can have significant public health implications. AI viruses are potentially 

zoonotic, and although it appears to have a relatively high species-specific 

transmission barrier, under certain circumstances, specific strains of HPAI have

been demonstrated to infect and be fatal to humans.17 For example, as of February

2017, there have been 856 cases and 452 deaths of laboratory-confirmed HPAI 

H5N1 reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) between the years of 

2003 and 2017; the numbers dropped significantly after 2015—only 10 cases 

were reported in 2016.

18 However, other HPAI viruses including H5N6, H7N7, 

and H7N9 viruses have also infected humans. Public health officials and animal 

health officials vigilantly monitor AI because of the unique ability of influenza A 

viruses to genetically reassort to more pathogenic—and possibly mammalian—

strains. Fortunately, rates of HPAI infections in humans remain low.

1.6.6 Ecology

Many avian species are susceptible to infection with HPAI viruses, including but 

not limited to

 chickens,

 turkeys,

 ducks,

 geese,

 guinea fowl, and

 a wide variety of other birds, including migratory waterfowl and 

shorebirds.

Psittacine birds (such as parrots and cockatiels) are more rarely affected. 

Mammalian hosts, including swine and humans, may be vulnerable to infection 

by some AI strains, particularly the H5, H7, and H9 subtypes.

1.6.6.1 RESERVOIR

AI viruses usually infect migratory waterfowl, particularly Anseriformes (ducks 

and geese) and Charadriiformes (gulls and shorebirds) that can carry LPAI viruses 

without showing illness. Other aquatic species may also be maintenance hosts. 

 

17 Swayne, D.E., & Thomas, C. (2008). Trade and food safety aspects for avian influenza 

viruses. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 499–512). Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing. 

18 WHO. (2017, January). Cumulative number of confirmed cases for avian influenza 

A/(H5N1) reported to WHO, 2003–2017. Retrieved from

http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative_table_archives/en/.
UPDATED May 2017 1-12

LPAI virus strains occur worldwide and have been isolated from more than 100 

different species of birds.19 The wild-bird reservoir of LPAI viruses is a major 

potential source of infection for domestic birds, particularly free- and open-range 

poultry. Following transmission of LPAI from wild to commercial birds, the virus 

can mutate or reassort in gallinaceous (e.g., chickens) poultry flocks, resulting in 

an HPAI virus.20 It remains unclear how long and to what extent wild birds can 

maintain HPAI viruses, though there is evidence that certain species of 

Anseriformes can carry and shed certain HPAI viruses without clinical signs. This 

poses a serious transmission risk to commercial poultry.

1.6.6.2 INTRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION OF AI IN POULTRY

Contact with infected wild birds or their secretions is a common mode of AI 

introduction into a poultry population. While live poultry markets have been 

documented as a source of introduction and further dissemination of both LPAI 

and HPAI in past outbreaks both in Asia and the Americas, there is strong 

evidence that the 2014–2015 outbreak in the United States was introduced from 

wild birds to poultry flocks.

HPAI virus is transmitted via direct exposure to infected birds, feces, or secretions 

from infected birds. Transmission can occur through the movement of 

contaminated fomites, including by people, on contaminated clothing, equipment, 

and vehicles. Airborne transmission is not likely a primary mode of transmission, 

although it may occur over short distances as an aerosol via contaminated dust

and debris. Especially in windy environments where there are high concentrations 

of virus, this mode of transmission may occur to nearby premises and houses. 

When a hen is infected, the HPAI virus is also likely to be present on the eggshell 

and internal egg contents.

1.6.6.3 PERSISTENCE IN ENVIRONMENT AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS

AI viruses are easily inactivated by heat but may remain viable for longer in cold 

and humid environments. At colder temperatures, virus survival has been 

documented in feces from less than 4 days to at least 30–40 days in various 

experiments.21 Two H5N1 HPAI viruses were also shown to persist in water at

cool temperatures, surviving for 94–158 days at 17oC, but not after 30 days at 

 

19 Swayne, D.E. (2008). Epidemiology of avian influenza in agricultural and other man-made 

systems. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 59–85). Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing. 

20 Alexander, D. J. (2007). An overview of the epidemiology of avian influenza. Vaccine, 

25(30), 5637–5644. doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2006.10.051.

21 The Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH). (2016). Avian Influenza. Iowa 

State University. Retrieved from 

www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/highly_pathogenic_avian_influenza.pdf.
Introduction and HPAI Information

UPDATED May 2017 1-13

28oC.22 The virus can also survive for extended periods when protected from 

sunlight (from 2 days to 2 weeks depending on temperatures).

AI viruses can also be isolated from animal products, including eggs.

23 Therefore, 

the OIE recommends guidance for the inactivation of AI in poultry and poultry 

products; for example, for the inactivation of AI in meat, the core temperature

must reach 70oC for 3.5 seconds, and whole eggs should be heated to a core 

temperature of 60oC for 188 seconds. Refer to the OIE Code Articles 10.4.24–

10.4.26 for the full inactivation standards of AI in poultry products. Furthermore, 

heat can be used to effectively inactivate virus in poultry housing, as determined 

by a study from USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS); this in turn serves 

as a basis for the USDA guidance document Using Heat Treatment for Virus 

Elimination.

24

1.6.7 Diagnosis in Avian Species

The incubation period for HPAI viruses in naturally infected chickens ranges 

from 3 to 14 days.25 The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016) gives the 

incubation period for AI infection as 21 days.26 AI may have longer incubation 

periods in some species than others; each HPAI virus—even those of the same 

subtype—may have a slightly different incubation period.

1.6.7.1 CLINICAL SIGNS

Birds affected with HPAI show a variety of clinical signs, involving the 

respiratory, digestive, reproductive, or nervous systems. Signs of LPAI are 

typically much milder.

1.6.7.1.1 Galliformes

Common clinical signs of HPAI in galliformes (such as chickens, turkeys, and 

guinea fowl) include

 marked depression with ruffled feathers,

 

22 Swayne, D.E. (2008). Epidemiology of avian influenza in agricultural and other man-made 

systems. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 59–85). Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing.

23 Cappucci D.T., et al. (1985). Isolation of avian influenza virus (subtype H5N2) from 

chicken eggs during a natural outbreak. Senne Avian Diseases, 29(4), 1195–1200. doi: 

10.2307/1590473.

24 Stephens, C. & Spackman, E. (2015). Inactivation of avian influenza virus in chicken litter 

as a potential method to decontaminate poultry houses. American Association of Avian 

Practitioners. Abstract retrieved from ARS. (Publication #323923). 

25 Swayne, D.E. (2008). Epidemiology of avian influenza in agricultural and other man-made 

systems. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 59–85). Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing.

26 OIE. (2016). Infection with avian influenza viruses. Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 

Article 10.4.1. Retrieved from http://www.oie.int/. 
UPDATED May 2017 1-14

 decreased feed consumption,

 excessive thirst,

 decreased or cessation of egg production,

 mild to severe respiratory distress, 

 swollen wattles and combs, and 

 watery greenish diarrhea.

Clinical signs relating to the nervous system are not frequently observed in 

Galliformes. However, if present, they include the inability to walk or stand and a

loss of coordination.

1.6.7.1.2 Anseriformes

Anseriformes (such as, ducks and geese) usually do not show clinical signs with 

infection of LPAI. While some species of these birds may also carry HPAI viruses 

sub-clinically, HPAI viruses can also present as the following 

 sudden death;

 nervous signs (such as a lack of coordination and the inability to stand and 

walk); and

 dyspnea, depression, and diarrhea.

1.6.7.1.3 Other Birds

Birds from other orders may also become affected with HPAI, as demonstrated in 

the recent 2014–2015 outbreak, where captive birds were infected. These birds 

include Falconiformes (e.g., the gyrfalcon) and Strigiformes (e.g., great-horned 

owls). These animals can die suddenly but may also experience clinical signs 

(including depression, diarrhea, and decreased food consumption) and recover 

from the virus.

1.6.7.2 GROSS PATHOLOGICAL LESIONS

Lesions have been observed in susceptible avian species, but they are extremely 

variable.27 Galliformes with HPAI may not have prominent lesions, except those 

associated with general muscular congestion and dehydration. However, a variety 

of edematous, hemorrhagic, and necrotic lesions in visceral organs and the skin 

have been reported. In Anseriformes, the following gross lesions have been 

 

27 Swayne, D.E., & Patin-Jackwood, M. (2008). Pathobiology of avian influenza virus 

infections in birds and mammals. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 87–122). Ames, 

Iowa: Blackwell Publishing.
Introduction and HPAI Information

UPDATED May 2017 1-15

reported: ocular and nasal discharge, conjunctivitis, ecchymotic or petechial 

hemorrhage of leg and footpad, serous fluid surrounding vital organs, and 

pancreatic mottling.

1.6.7.3 DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSES

HPAI may resemble acute fowl cholera (caused by Pasturella spp.), velogenic 

viscerotropic Newcastle disease (caused by Paramyxovirus PMV-1), intoxication 

(e.g., from contaminated food or water), as well as some respiratory diseases (e.g., 

infectious laryngotracheitis).

1.6.8 Immunity

1.6.8.1 ACTIVE

Infection with or exposure to AI viruses, as well as immunization with vaccines, 

stimulates an antibody response at both the systemic and mucosal levels. 

Immunoglobulin A is the primary antibody to mediate mucosal protection in 

birds; immunoglobulin G and immunoglobulin M have also been identified.

28 The 

intensity of the antibody response varies with bird species. 

Antibodies against the surface proteins are neutralizing and protective. Protection 

has been primarily associated with antibodies directed to the HA protein; 

however, either HA or NA antibodies, or both, prevent clinical signs and death 

following challenge with HPAI viruses having homologous HA or NA subtypes. 

The level of protection against mucosal infection and subsequent shedding of the 

challenge virus may depend on the degree of sequence similarity in the HA of 

vaccine and challenge virus. The duration of protection is variable and depends on 

many factors; in chicken layer flocks, protection against clinical signs and death 

has been demonstrated to be at least 30 weeks following a single immunization.

Immune response against internal proteins has not been shown to prevent clinical 

signs or death, but may shorten the period of the virus replication and 

consequently reduce virus shedding.

1.6.8.2 PASSIVE

Studies on protection by maternal antibodies to homologous HA or NA have not 

been reported. On the basis of available information on other viral avian diseases, 

protection against clinical signs and death from a homologous AI viral challenge 

is probable for the first 2 weeks after hatching. For surveillance purposes, the OIE 

 

28 Swayne, D.E., & Kapczynski, D.R. (2008). Vaccines, vaccination, and immunology for 

avian influenza viruses in poultry. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 407–451). Ames, 

Iowa: Blackwell Publishing.
UPDATED May 2017 1-16

suggests that maternal antibodies derived from a vaccinated parent flock are 

usually found in the yolk and can persist in progeny for up to 4 weeks.29

1.6.8.3 VACCINATION

Vaccination against different AI virus subtypes has been used in a variety of 

poultry species. Vaccine has been documented to be effective in both preventing 

clinical signs, reducing virus shedding, and preventing mortality. The duration 

and level of protection provided by the vaccine is affected by many factors 

including the dose of the virus challenge, the type of adjuvant used, the length of 

protection produced, the HA match of the vaccine to the field strain, the species 

and age of birds vaccination, and how the vaccine is administered.

30

USDA APHIS’ primary response strategy to an HPAI outbreak is rapid stampingout. Implementation of effective biosecurity measures is also critical to control 

and contain the virus. Emergency vaccination has not been implemented in the 

recent outbreaks in the United States. Under certain conditions and with an 

appropriate vaccine product available, an emergency vaccination strategy could 

be considered, particularly for specific types of poultry. DIVA (differentiation of 

infected from vaccinated animals) testing is necessary for an effective emergency 

vaccination strategy. Emergency vaccination is further discussed in Chapter 5.

 

29 OIE. (2016). Infection with avian influenza viruses. Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 

Article 10.4.28. Retrieved from http://www.oie.int.

30 Swayne, D.E., & Kapczynski, D.R. (2008). Vaccines, vaccination, and immunology for 

avian influenza viruses in poultry. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 407–451). Ames, 

Iowa: Blackwell Publishing.
UPDATED May 2017 2-1

Chapter 2 

Framework for HPAI Preparedness 

and Response

2.1 FOUNDATION OF PREPAREDNESS 

AND RESPONSE

Successful emergency preparedness for and response to HPAI is based on the 

principles found in the National Response Framework (NRF) and NIMS. FAD 

PReP, including this HPAI-specific plan, provides detailed information and 

specific guidance on response requirements for an outbreak in the United States. 

FAD PReP documents are consistent with both NRF and NIMS. 

2.1.1 National Response Framework 

The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response, through a 

whole community approach.1 It describes core capabilities for response, defines 

specific authorities, and establishes a comprehensive approach for responding to 

domestic incidents that range from serious, but purely local, events to large-scale 

terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF is one of the five 

National Planning Frameworks; it builds on NIMS, which provides a consistent 

template for managing incidents. The NRF is available at www.fema.gov/ 

national-response-framework. 

2.1.2 National Incident Management System 

NIMS, a companion document to the NRF, provides a systematic, nationwide, 

proactive approach guiding departments and agencies at all levels of government, 

the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Its goal is to help these 

organizations work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, 

and mitigate the effects of incidents, “...regardless of cause, size, location, or 

complexity—in order to reduce the loss of life, liberty, property, and harm to the 

environment.” NIMS provides a core set of concepts, principles, procedures, 

organizational processes, and standard requirements, including the Incident 

Command System (ICS). ICS offers standard terminology and common 

1

 As defined in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Preparedness 

Goal, the whole community is a focus on enabling the participation in a wider range of players 

from the private and nonprofit sectors, including nongovernmental organization and the general 

public, in conjunction with the participation of all levels of government in order to foster better 

coordination and working relationships. For more information visit www.fema.gov. 
UPDATED May 2017 2-2

organizational structures. NIMS information is available at www.fema.gov/ 

national-incident-management-system.

NIMS consists of five key components that work together:

1. Preparedness (including, but not limited to, procedures, protocols, training 

and exercises, personnel qualifications, and evaluation);

2. Communications and information management (including, but not limited 

to, requirements for standardized communications and a common 

operating picture, based on reliability, interoperability, and scalability); 

3. Resource management (including, but not limited to, resources needed to 

support critical incident objectives, in particular the process to identify, 

order, acquire, mobilize, track, demobilize, and inventory resources);

4. Command and management (including, but not limited to, three key 

organizational constructs: ICS, Multiagency Coordination [MAC] 

Systems, and Public Information); 

5. Ongoing management and maintenance (including, but not limited to, the 

National Integration Center and Supporting Technologies that support 

both routine maintenance and continuous review of NIMS and associated 

research and development). 

2.1.3 Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness 

and Response Plan

APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) established FAD PReP to provide guidance for 

preparing and responding to a foreign animal disease (FAD) emergency. The 

precursor to FAD PReP was the NAHEMS, which offered a functional veterinary

framework for responding to FADs like HPAI. Now incorporated into FAD 

PReP, the NAHEMS Guidelines join strategic concept of operations documents, 

disease response plans (such as this HPAI-specific plan), SOPs, and other 

materials to create a comprehensive approach to FADs that is consistent with 

NRF and NIMS. These documents aim to ensure a successful response 

commensurate with the severity of the outbreak. Federal, State, and local 

agencies; Tribal nations; and other stakeholders involved in animal health 

emergency management activities should integrate the information found in these 

documents into their preparedness and response planning activities and processes.

FAD PReP offers

 competent veterinary guidance on cleaning and disinfection (virus 

elimination), disposal, mass depopulation, and other critical activities;

 information on disease control and eradication strategies and principles;
Framework for HPAI Preparedness and Response

UPDATED May 2017 2-3

 guidance on health, safety, and personal protective equipment;

 biosecurity information and site-specific management strategies; and

 training and educational resources.

These documents provide the foundation for coordinated national, regional, State, 

Tribal, and local activities in an emergency situation. They also serve as a 

practical guide and complement non-Federal preparedness activities.

Appendix A provides more information on FAD PReP and associated materials. 

Typically documents are cleared by APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) 

and posted on the FAD PReP website: www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. This website 

also hosts critical policy updates relating to ongoing or recent FAD outbreaks.

2.1.4 Coordination and Collaboration

This HPAI Response Plan is coordinated with the other FAD PReP documents, 

which are consistent with the tenets, terminology, and processes found in NRF

and NIMS. This document provides strategic guidance for responding to an HPAI

outbreak. Other FAD PReP documents provide information on general veterinary 

activities and include industry or facility manuals as well as SOPs for planners 

and responders. Together, these documents provide strategic and tactical details 

for Federal, State, Tribal, and local officials that are useful for HPAI preparedness 

and response. Building on existing planning and response knowledge and 

relationships, FAD PReP efforts raise awareness of critical issues in FAD 

response and foster further collaboration between Federal partners, States, Tribes,

industry, academia, and other stakeholders.

2.2 FEDERAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES,

AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

2.2.1 Overview

Understanding the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments or agencies 

involved in responding to a FAD domestic incident promotes an effective,

coordinated emergency response. The section that follows describes the roles,

responsibilities, and authority of USDA in an HPAI response. The functions 

described are consistent with the roles and responsibilities outlined in the NRF.

Federal response to the detection of an FAD such as HPAI is based on the 

response structure of NIMS as outlined in the NRF. The NRF defines Federal 

departmental responsibilities for sector-specific responses. During the course of 

an HPAI outbreak response, the USDA may request Federal-to-Federal support 

(FFS) from other Federal departments and agencies. FFS refers to the 

circumstance in which a Federal department or agency requests Federal resource 
UPDATED May 2017 2-4

support under the NRF that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or another

mechanism.

2.2.2 USDA Roles and Responsibilities Overview

As the primary Federal agency for incident management during an FAD event of 

livestock or poultry, like an HPAI outbreak, USDA APHIS deploys National 

Incident Management Teams (NIMTs), coordinates the incident response, 

manages public messages, and takes measures to control and eradicate HPAI.

Measures used to control and eradicate HPAI include surveillance and 

diagnostics, quarantine and movement control, biosecurity measures, 

epidemiological investigations, appraisal and compensation, depopulation or 

euthanasia of affected poultry, carcass disposal, and cleaning and disinfection. In 

some cases, emergency vaccination may be used.

The USDA is the primary agency and performs the coordinating role in 

Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11—Agriculture and Natural Resources—

under the NRF. As stated in ESF #11, USDA responds “to animal and agricultural 

health issues” under USDA statutory authority. Under ESF #11, APHIS is the 

sub-agency responsible for detecting “animal disease anomalies,” assigning 

“foreign animal disease diagnosticians to conduct investigations,” and 

coordinating “tasks with other ESFs, State veterinary emergency response teams, 

and voluntary animal care organizations to respond.” 

In addition to being the primary/coordinator for ESF #11, USDA (as a wholeagency) also plays supporting roles in the following ESFs: 

 ESF #2—Communications

 ESF #5—Information and Planning

 ESF #7—Logistics 

 ESF #8—Public Health and Medical Services

 ESF #10—Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

 ESF #12—Energy

 ESF #15—External Affairs.

In addition to these whole-agency responsibilities, other USDA sub-agencies are 

identified in the ESFs as having coordinating, primary, or support responsibilities. 

The U.S. Forest Service (USFS), which is part of USDA, has the only other 

coordinator/primary role for ESF #4—Firefighting. Other sub-agencies, including 

the USFS, have supporting roles in many of the ESFs (for more information, 

please see http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-resource-library). APHIS 

plays a supporting role in the following ESFs:
Framework for HPAI Preparedness and Response

UPDATED May 2017 2-5

 ESF #5—Information and Planning 

 ESF #6—Public Health and Medical Services

 ESF #11—Agriculture and Natural Resources.

During the course of an HPAI outbreak response, USDA may request Federal-toFederal support as necessary from other Federal departments or agencies; FFS is 

not necessarily requested in an HPAI incident. If the President declares an 

emergency or major disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lead coordination, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security and DHS assume the lead for coordinating Federal resources. 

USDA maintains the lead of overall incident management. Please note than in the 

2014–2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, the largest in U.S. history with 

approximately 50.5 million affected birds, there was no federal emergency or 

disaster declaration.

For more information on the roles of other Federal agencies, such as the 

Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Interior (DOI), in the 

event of an HPAI outbreak, see the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: 

Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

2.3 AUTHORITY

The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq., authorizes 

the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the importation, entry, or further movement 

in the United States or order the destruction or removal of animals and related 

conveyances and facilities to prevent the introduction or dissemination of 

livestock pests or diseases. It authorizes related activities with respect to 

exportation, interstate movement, cooperative agreements, enforcement and 

penalties, seizure, quarantine, and disease and pest eradication. The Act also 

authorizes the Secretary to establish a veterinary accreditation program and enter 

into reimbursable fee agreements for pre-clearance abroad of animals or articles 

for movement into the United States.

Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S. Code 231 transfers to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security certain agricultural import and entry inspection 

functions under the AHPA, including the authority to enforce the prohibitions or 

restrictions imposed by USDA.

The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to cooperate with other Federal 

agencies, States, or political subdivisions of States, national or local governments 

of foreign governments, domestic or international organizations or associations, 

Tribal nations, and other persons to prevent, detect, control, or eradicate HPAI. If 

measures taken by a State or Indian Tribe to control or eradicate a pest or disease 

of livestock are inadequate, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary—after notice to 

and review and consultation with certain State or Tribal officials—to declare that 
UPDATED May 2017 2-6

an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence in the United States of 

a pest or disease of livestock that threatens the livestock of the United States 

(7 U.S. Code 8306).

Additionally, the CFR gives the APHIS Administrator authority to determine the 

existence of disease and the authority to prevent the spread of disease through the 

destruction and/or disinfection of animals, eggs, and materials as appropriate. As 

such, it also authorizes APHIS to appraise and indemnify animals and materials 

destroyed, provided certain conditions are met; these conditions include 

complying with quarantines, adhering to proper biosecurity protocols, and 

accurately designating payments between contract growers and owners of birds (9 

CFR 53).

For further information on USDA APHIS authorities, see the APHIS Foreign 

Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) at

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
UPDATED May 2017 3-1

Chapter 3

USDA HPAI Preparedness and Response

3.1 USDA APHIS HPAI RESPONSE AUTHORITIES

USDA APHIS is the lead primary Federal agency with responsibility and 

authority for agricultural animal disease control. USDA APHIS interfaces with 

Federal, State, Tribal, and local partners to prevent the introduction of HPAI into 

U.S. poultry and to control, contain, and eradicate the disease if it is introduced. If 

the President declares an emergency or major disaster, or if the Secretary of 

Agriculture requests that DHS lead coordination, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security and DHS lead the coordination of Federal-to-Federal Support and 

Federal resources for the incident, while the USDA maintains lead of overall 

incident management.

USDA is the primary Federal liaison to the U.S. animal industry. In addition, it 

operates the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), including 

NVSL-Ames, which is an OIE reference laboratory for identifying and 

confirming HPAI. USDA also administers a National Wildlife Disease Program 

that provides assistance for the targeted surveillance of emerging and known

diseases in wildlife, including AI.

The following sections detail USDA APHIS activities to prepare for an HPAI

outbreak.

3.1.1 Preparedness Exercises and Training 

Preparedness and response exercises help ensure our Nation is able to respond 

quickly and effectively to an HPAI outbreak. Exercises provide an ideal, no-fault 

learning environment to discuss, practice, and implement plans, procedures, and 

processes in advance of an actual event. APHIS exercises are conducted in 

accordance with Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program guidance.

Multiple preparedness exercises and training events have been conducted to 

simulate an HPAI outbreak and response effort in the United States. These 

exercises and other events allow responders from all sectors—Federal, State and 

Tribal, local, industry, and academia—to discuss and practice critical activities (as 

discussed in Chapter 5) that would be required in an HPAI outbreak response. VS 

recently initiated a revitalized training and exercise program to address topics 

such as animal disease incident management, emergency operations, and current 

issues. Additionally, the Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services 

(SPRS) Logistics Center, which includes the National Veterinary Stockpile

(NVS), routinely conducts exercises to deliver and stage supplies as well as 
UPDATED May 2017 3-2

operate stockpiled equipment. Valuable lessons learned and important 

recommendations have resulted from these exercises as well as the recent HPAI 

outbreaks in 2014–2015, 2016, and 2017.

3.1.2 Domestic Activities

USDA has a variety of ongoing preparedness and response activities with respect 

to HPAI, many of which have been significantly ramped up in response to recent 

events. Domestically, the USDA prevents the introduction of AI at its borders, 

performs FAD investigations, and monitors all H5 and H7 AI viruses in U.S. 

commercial broilers, layers, and turkeys; their respective breeders; backyard 

flocks; and the LBMS. In addition to import restrictions on poultry and poultry 

products from all countries or regions affected by HPAI in poultry, a critical

component of these domestic activities is the AI surveillance program. The 

following list details a selection of ongoing USDA activities:

 Poultry surveillance and diagnostics. APHIS has a two-pronged approach 

to AI surveillance:

 The first is through the National Poultry Improvement Plan, a 

voluntary Federal-State-industry cooperative program that conducts AI

surveillance in (1) egg- and meat-type chicken and turkey breeding 

flocks, including game fowl and hobby poultry breeding flocks, and 

(2) commercial table-egg layer chickens, meat-type chickens (boilers, 

roasters, fryers, etc.), and meat-type turkeys.

 The second is through AI surveillance in the LBMS. APHIS is 

currently cooperating with States that are conducting surveillance in 

their LBMS using a system of uniform standards established by a 

multi-stakeholder working group.

 National Import Export Services (NIES). NIES safeguards the poultry 

industry by working with other Federal agencies to ensure poultry 

products and birds imported into the United States are free of 

transmissible diseases under 9 CFR. This link provides information on the 

requirements for importing poultry and poultry products. The list of HPAI 

affected countries/regions for trade purposes is here.

1

 Wildlife surveillance. APHIS Wildlife Services (APHIS WS) coordinates 

with universities and other entities to support wildlife surveillance and 

diagnostics. In the event of an HPAI outbreak, USDA APHIS WS works 

in close collaboration, communication, and coordination with and other 

Federal, State, Tribal, and local wildlife agencies that have primary 

jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for wildlife. In 

response to the recent HPAI outbreak, APHIS WS, in coordination with 

 

1 The web address is https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/animal-andanimal-product-import-information/import-live-animals/ct_hp_avian_influenza. 
USDA HPAI Preparedness and Response

UPDATED May 2017 3-3

the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, USDA APHIS VS, U.S. Geological 

Survey, and the National Flyway Council drafted a comprehensive plan 

for wild bird surveillance in migratory flyways (found here).

 Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC). SITC conducts risk 

management and anti-smuggling activities to prevent unlawful entry and

distribution of prohibited agricultural commodities. It looks at domestic 

markets likely to have illegally imported avian products to establish 

baseline estimates on how much product is bypassing ports of entry.

 Emergency veterinary assistance. USDA works to assist States in training 

and maintaining State Incident Management Teams (IMT) and veterinary 

reserve corps; State groups serve as early response teams for an HPAI

event and can educate stakeholders on AI signs, symptoms, and reporting 

procedures. In addition, USDA APHIS recently created the Voluntary 

Emergency Ready Response Corps (VERRC) to further increase the 

agency’s capacity to respond to an emergency. USDA APHIS also has the 

National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps (NAHERC), which 

trained and deployed some responders in the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak

 Public health. USDA APHIS engages public health agencies to ensure 

coordination in the event of an HPAI outbreak in poultry; a USDA APHIS 

VS representative from the One Health Coordination Center is designated 

as a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)-based liaison. 

APHIS engages and coordinates with CDC during any HPAI outbreak to 

not only protect the public, but field responders as well.

 Animal Care. APHIS Animal Care works with the American Zoological 

Association (AZA) to establish effective surveillance plans for AI. 

Facilities that participate undertake active and passive surveillance of 

exhibit and wild birds on their premises. AI testing is already undertaken 

at all AZA zoos (and may include sampling of wild birds on the premises); 

AZA actively works with APHIS Animal Care and VS to develop HPAI 

response plans and procedures for birds held in zoo collections. 

 Modeling, Assessments & Geospatial Analyses. The USDA Center for 

Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) uses complex disease spread 

simulation models, such as Interspread Plus and the Animal Disease 

Spread Model (ADSM), to develop computer-generated outbreak 

scenarios for HPAI. The results of these models can be further analyzed 

using economic modeling tools. Other modeling tools are used to examine 

within-flock spread, wind dispersion, and geospatial risk factors. Risk 

assessments can also inform decision making processes. Additionally, 

geographic information systems (GIS) are used to support preparedness

and response activities. Together, various models, assessments, and 

analyses are used to explore possible control strategies and evaluate the 

consequences of HPAI incursions in the United States. They may also help 
UPDATED May 2017 3-4

to estimate the countermeasures, materials, and personnel needed for 

control and eradication.

 Education. Key USDA initiatives are the Biosecurity for Birds and Defend 

the Flock campaigns, which provide materials, messages, and biosecurity

information on how to protect poultry from diseases including AI. 

Biosecurity for Birds encourages awareness about AI amongst bird owners 

(backyard, hobby, and pet birds) and the public. Defend the Flock is 

targeted at commercial owners and producers. Materials are available in 

multiple languages and located 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/animal-diseaseinformation/avian-influenza-disease. 

3.1.3 International Activities

In addition to the domestic activities discussed above, the USDA also has ongoing 

international activities to bolster HPAI preparedness, planning, and response 

capabilities: 

 Emergency veterinary assistance. USDA APHIS works to provide 

technical assistance and expertise, at a country’s request, in the event of an 

animal health emergency.

 International coordination. USDA APHIS collaborates with other 

agencies and international partners to mitigate, prevent, and control HPAI

threats outside the United States through the sharing of information and 

development of infrastructure.

3.1.4 International Trade

USDA, in collaboration with the Department of State and the United States Trade 

Representative, promptly addresses foreign governments that impose unjustifiable 

U.S. poultry and product trade restrictions because of an HPAI case. These efforts 

focus on cases where bans are inconsistent with OIE standards, or with any U.S. 

AI bilateral protocols.

USDA overseas embassy offices have guidance on how to rapidly report trade 

disruptions to Washington, DC headquarters and how to help foreign officials 

respond to such events. Multiple USDA agencies, led by the Foreign Agricultural 

Service, coordinates a response to any such trade disruption and communicates

with industry in the United States. USDA APHIS would also quickly fulfill any 

official requests for additional scientific information, such as U.S. HPAI domestic 

poultry flock case surveillance, movement control measures, and laboratory 

diagnostics.
USDA HPAI Preparedness and Response

UPDATED May 2017 3-5

OIE member countries, like the United States, are to “immediately” notify the 

OIE of any confirmed HPAI cases in poultry, defined in the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code (2016) as 

all domesticated birds, including backyard poultry, used for the production 

of meat or eggs for consumption, for the production of other commercial 

products, for restocking supplies of game, or for breeding these categories 

of birds, as well as fighting cocks used for any purpose.

Birds that are kept in captivity for any other reason referred to in the 

preceding paragraph, including those that are kept for shows, races, 

exhibitions, competitions, or for breeding or selling these categories of 

birds as well as pet birds, are not considered to be poultry. 

In addition, member countries are to notify the OIE in the event of an LPAI H5 or 

H7 detection in poultry. International standards for HPAI do allow countries to 

impose bans (which may be country-wide or regional) on imports from countries 

with HPAI infection in poultry. USDA APHIS actively maintains a list of HPAIaffected countries here.

3.1.5 Compartmentalization

Another tool that may mitigate the economic consequences of a disease outbreak 

is compartmentalization. Compartmentalization defines subpopulations of distinct 

health status by management and husbandry practices, as related to biosecurity. 

Compartmentalization is best implemented, as suggested by the OIE in the 

Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016), by trading partners through the 

establishment of parameters and agreement on necessary measures, before a 

disease outbreak.

Implementation of compartmentalization would rely on Federal and State animal 

health authorities as well as producers and industry stakeholders. The importing 

country must be satisfied that its animal health status is appropriately protected by 

the biosecurity measures undertaken by the exporting country.

Currently, no compartmentalization plans have been fully accepted or 

implemented in the United States. Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 of the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code (2016) explain the concept and the application of 

compartmentalization. 

3.2 USDA APHIS ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

In the event of an HPAI outbreak, effective and efficient whole community 

situation management and clear communication pathways are critical for an 

effective response effort. A synchronized management and organizational 

structure supports the control and eradication actions. Accordingly, APHIS

employs NIMS and the ICS organizational structures to manage response to an 
UPDATED May 2017 3-6

HPAI outbreak. ICS is designed to enable efficient and effective domestic 

incident management by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, 

and communications operating within a common organizational structure. 

3.3 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive responsible for implementing 

APHIS policy during an HPAI outbreak; the Administrator is supported by the 

APHIS Management Team (AMT) (Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2). Depending on the 

size of the outbreak, the APHIS Administrator and AMT may establish an 

APHIS-level MAC Group to coordinate resources; many of the MAC functions

may be delegated to the VS Deputy Administrator, who is the Chief Veterinary 

Officer of the United States. The VS Deputy Administrator is supported by the 

VS Executive Team (VSET) to coordinate policy. 

An APHIS National Incident Coordination Group (ICG), led by an Incident 

Coordinator and a deputy National Incident Coordinator, is immediately 

established to oversee the functions and response activities associated with the 

incident. This ICG is flexible and scalable to the size and scope of the incident, 

and works closely with IC personnel in the field, in a unified IMT (pictured in 

Figure 3-2). The ICG also coordinates with any MAC Group that is established at 

the APHIS or USDA level, based on the specific incident. For example, in the 

2014–2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, both the USDA MAC Group and 

the APHIS MAC Group were formed due to the size, scope, and impact of the 

incident. 

In addition to policy and incident coordination, the APHIS Administrator, AMT, 

VS Deputy Administrator, and VSET communicate, collaborate, and coordinate 

with relevant industry associations, the National Assembly of State Animal 

Health Officials and National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, 

public health agencies (Federal and State), and other partners in a whole 

community approach.

Figure 3-1 is an example of an overview of the relationship between USDA, 

APHIS, and VS Leadership, MAC Groups, ICG, VS NIMTs, and Districts for an 

HPAI incident. Figure 3-2 provides more details on the MAC Groups, ICG, and 

the unified IMTs.

2 These figures reflect the incident management structure that 

was executed in the recent HPAI outbreaks in the United States; all organizational 

structures may be modified or scaled based on the needs of future incidents.

 

2 NIMT refers to the standing VS IMTs that exist; a unified IMT includes the NIMT, but also 

State/local personnel who are part of the unified IC structure.
USDA HPAI Preparedness and Response

UPDATED May 2017 3-7

Figure 3-1. Overview of USDA APHIS Multiagency Coordination, Incident Coordination Group, 

Field Personnel (National Incident Management Teams and Districts), and Stakeholder

Relationships for an HPAI Incident

Note: NASAHO = National Association of State Animal Health Officials, NASDA = National Association of State 

Departments of Agriculture
UPDATED May 2017 3-8

Figure 3-2. Details of USDA APHIS Multiagency Coordination, Incident Coordination Group, 

and a Unified Incident Management Team for an HPAI Incident

The following subsections describe the MAC Group and APHIS ICG, as well as 

the APHIS organization for single and multiple incidents. The APHIS Foreign 

Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness and Response Plan [FAD PReP] Manual 1-0) contains more 

information.

3.3.1 Multiagency Coordination

MAC functions are executed at various levels, and typically include the 

coordination of policy, incident priorities, resource allocation and acquisition, and 

resolution of issues common to all parties. The size and scope of the HPAI 

incident dictates what levels and types of MAC Groups and MAC functions are 

required. However, these groups are not part of the on-scene IC; therefore, MAC 

groups do not command activities in the field.

An APHIS MAC Group would typically be composed of senior-level APHIS

representatives, and may include subject matter experts that can reach across the 

agency to achieve an effective coordination structure. In the event that there are 

significant threats or consequences to public health, the environment, or the 

economy, a USDA MAC Group could also be established, composed of highlevel representatives from programs and agencies throughout the department. 

MAC Groups establish supportive relationships among departments, agencies, 

and units preparing for and responding to an HPAI outbreak. Further information 

can also be found in the APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide. The current 

APHIS Administrator & AMT

Planning Section Chief Finance/Admin Section Chief Operations Section Chief Logistics Section Chief

VS Deputy Administrator & VS Executive Team District Directors

APHIS HPAI MAC

APHIS Incident Coordination Group APHIS Emergency Operations Center (AEOC) Assistant District Directors Public Information Officer Liaison Officer

Incident Commander & Unified Incident Management Team SAHOs

Safety Officer

Requests and Information Support and Coordination
USDA HPAI Preparedness and Response 

UPDATED May 2017 3-9

version is located at 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/library/manuals/pdf/aphis_1050.pdf). 

3.3.2 APHIS Incident Coordination Group 

The APHIS ICG is responsible for acquiring resources, formulating policy 

options, and assisting in implementing response and recovery strategies for an 

HPAI outbreak. APHIS ICG responsibilities in an HPAI outbreak include 

 providing policy guidance for response activities, 

 providing information and coordination with health and safety personnel 

to ensure responder and public health and safety, 

 supporting NIMTs and the unified ICs and their requirements,

 assisting in coordinating resources and integrating other organizations into 

the ICS, and 

 providing information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) for use in 

media and stakeholder briefings. 

The organization of the ICG is flexible and scalable by incident, but it is 

consistent with NIMS and includes the typical Planning Section, Operations 

Section, Finance/Administration Section, and Logistics Section. It is led by a 

National Incident Coordinator and a Deputy Incident Coordinator. The ICG 

includes Groups and Units to handle functions such as epidemiology, policy, 

information management, diagnostics, budget, contracting, personnel, 

depopulation, disposal, and logistics. Additional information, including an ICG 

organizational chart, can be found in the APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide 

and in the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination 

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0).

3.3.3 Organization at the Field Level 

At the beginning of an incident, the State Animal Health Official (SAHO) or 

designee, and the VS Assistant Director (AD), or designee, initially serve as CoIncident Commanders in a unified IC structure. The AD and SAHO (or their

designees) may be relieved by a VS NIMT as requested. To-date, VS has five 

standing NIMTs. Either the SAHO/AD or NIMT establish an Incident Command 

Post (ICP), which serves as the base of deployment for field personnel. There may 

be multiple ICPs, depending on the incident. These remain unified State-Federal 

IC organizational structures. 

If there is more than one incident, more than one IC is likely to be established. An 

Area Command (AC) may also be established. In this case, individual Incident 

Commanders responsible for potentially multiple unified IMTs would report to 
UPDATED May 2017 3-10

the AC. AC organizational structures may not be established or appropriate in all 

incidents; in many cases, the ICG will perform the same functions as an AC. For 

more information on single incident and multiple incident coordination along with 

a full NIMT configuration, please see APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 

Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0). 

3.4 USDA APHIS TIERED RESPONSE TO HPAI

Consistent with the NRF, USDA APHIS uses a tiered response to FAD incidents, 

which includes HPAI. HPAI response will begin and end locally. As suggested by 

the NRF, organizational structures used to respond to HPAI—like a NIMT, ICG, 

or MAC Group—can be “partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, 

in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident.”3 This ensures 

that the level of response is consistent and appropriate with the scale of the 

incident. For example, the HPAI outbreak in 2014–2015—a very large event—

required rapid scale-up of organizational structures, coordination, and resources. 

Smaller incidents are handled by State, Tribal, and local resources; larger events 

require full mobilization of VS and resource and coordination from APHIS. 

Depending on the incident, resources or coordination may also be requested from 

USDA by the APHIS Administrator. USDA is the lead Federal agency in any 

HPAI incident detected in poultry. 

3.5 DIAGNOSTIC RESOURCES 

AND LABORATORY SUPPORT

USDA also has critical diagnostic resources and laboratory support that are

leveraged in an HPAI outbreak.

3.5.1 National Veterinary Services Laboratories

The NVSL is the official reference laboratory for FAD diagnostic testing and 

study in the United States. The NVSL performs animal disease testing in support 

of USDA-APHIS programs designed to protect the health of U.S. poultry and 

livestock. The NVSL provides all confirmatory testing for HPAI on all 

specimens, including those found presumptively positive at a National Animal 

Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory or other USDA-approved 

laboratory. The NVSL has two locations for FAD diagnostic testing: Ames, IA

(NVSL-Ames), and the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory 

(FADDL), Plum Island, NY (NVSL-FADDL). NVSL-Ames provides 

confirmatory testing for HPAI.

 

3FEMA. (2016). National Response Framework. Retrieved from 

https://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework. 
USDA HPAI Preparedness and Response

UPDATED May 2017 3-11

3.5.2 National Animal Health Laboratory Network

As of the date of publication, the NAHLN consists of more than 60 laboratories 

and coordinates the veterinary diagnostic laboratory capacity of State animal 

health laboratories and their extensive infrastructure, including facilities, 

equipment, and professional expertise. Of these laboratories, over 55 are currently 

approved to perform AI testing diagnostics (Appendix B).

The NAHLN provides a means for early detection of AI, rapid response through 

surge capacity to test outbreak samples, and recovery by the capability to test 

large numbers of samples to show freedom from AI. The confirmation of an 

HPAI outbreak is made at NVSL-Ames. After positive confirmation of HPAI, 

subsequent samples from premises inside the established Control Area may be 

sent directly to laboratories that are part of NAHLN. Please see Section 5.4 for 

more information on diagnostics.

3.5.3 Center for Veterinary Biologics

APHIS’s Center for Veterinary Biologics is responsible for licensing new 

products, including new diagnostic test kits and vaccines for AI. This work—

centered on enforcement of the Virus Serum Toxin Act—ensures that pure, safe, 

potent, and effective veterinary biologics are available for the diagnosis, 

prevention, and treatment of animal diseases.
UPDATED May 2017 4-1

Chapter 4

HPAI Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Chapter 4 covers a wide range of information about how USDA APHIS, States, 

Tribal Nations, localities, and stakeholders respond to an HPAI outbreak in 

poultry in the United States. In particular, this chapter

 identifies USDA APHIS goals for responding to an HPAI outbreak,

 identifies critical activities and tools required to achieve the response 

goals,

 discusses the epidemiological principles for an HPAI response effort,

 provides the USDA APHIS primary response strategy for HPAI in 

poultry,

 introduces factors influencing the scope of regulatory intervention, and

 reviews the international standards from the OIE for AI.

4.1 RESPONSE GOALS

The goals of an HPAI response are to (1) detect, control, and contain HPAI in 

poultry as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate HPAI using strategies that seek to

protect public health and the environment, and stabilize animal agriculture, the 

food supply, and the economy; and (3) provide science- and risk-based 

approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected 

animals and non-contaminated animal products.

Achieving these three goals will allow individual poultry facilities, States, Tribes, 

regions, and industries to resume normal production as rapidly as possible. The 

objective is to allow the United States to regain disease-free status without the 

response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak 

itself.

The United States protects its poultry from HPAI through a number of measures, 

including extensive AI surveillance, import restrictions, and education programs.

In the event of an HPAI outbreak, USDA and the affected State(s) work with the 

poultry industry to control and eradicate the disease as expeditiously as possible.

In an HPAI outbreak, APHIS coordinates with the CDC and other public health 

authorities, including at the State, Tribal, and local level, as needed. APHIS also

collaborates with the DOI and other Federal, State, tribal, and local wildlife 
UPDATED May 2017 4-2

agencies that have primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for 

wildlife. 

4.2 PRINCIPLES, CRITICAL ACTIVITIES, AND TOOLS

FOR AN HPAI RESPONSE

4.2.1 Critical Activities

In order to achieve the goals of an HPAI response, critical activities and tools 

must be implemented to successfully execute the response strategy. Box 4-1 lists 

these critical activities and tools. A science- and risk-based approach that protects 

the public, animal health, the environment, and stabilizes animal agriculture, the 

food supply, and the economy is employed at all times. Please see Chapter 5 for 

further information on these activities and tools.

Box 4-1. Critical Activities and Tools for an HPAI Response1

4.2.2 Epidemiological Principles

Three basic epidemiological principles form the foundation to contain, control, 

and eradicate HPAI in the U.S. poultry population: 

1. Prevent contact between the HPAI virus and susceptible poultry.

a. This is accomplished through quarantine of infected poultry and 

movement controls in the Infected Zone(s) (IZ) and Buffer Zone(s) 

 

1 Emergency vaccination may be considered, but has not been implemented in past HPAI 

outbreaks.

Critical Activities and Tools for Containment, Control, and Eradication

 Public communication and messaging campaign

 Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls

 Stringent and effective biosecurity measures

 Rapid diagnosis and reporting

 Epidemiological investigation and tracing

 Rapid appraisal and indemnity process for producers

 Increased surveillance

 Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and non-contaminated 

animal products (Secure Poultry Supply Plan)

 Rapid mass depopulation and euthanasia

 Effective and appropriate disposal procedures

 Cleaning and disinfection (virus elimination) measures
HPAI Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy 

UPDATED May 2017 4-3

(BZ) (which comprise the Control Areas [CA]), along with biosecurity 

procedures to protect non-infected poultry. 

b. Certain circumstances may warrant accelerating the depopulation or

euthanasia of poultry at risk for exposure to HPAI to decrease the

population density of susceptible poultry.

c. There is a serious transmission risk posed by people, material,

conveyances, and animals that may have been in contact with HPAI

and serve as mechanical vectors. Contact between poultry and these

items should be prevented, and transmission risk mitigated through

stringent biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection measures.

2. Stop the production of HPAI virus by infected or exposed animals. This is

accomplished by rapid mass depopulation (and disposal) of infected and

potentially infected poultry.

3. Increase the disease resistance of susceptible poultry to the HPAI virus or

reduce the shedding of HPAI in infected or exposed poultry. This may be

accomplished by strategic emergency vaccination if a suitable vaccine is

available and can be administered in a timely manner.

4.2.3 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign 

One of the most important critical activities is a public awareness campaign. Box 

4-2 details the importance of effective communication and messaging to the 

overall HPAI response effort. 

Box 4-2. Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign 

Importance of Communication to Support Response

In all HPAI outbreaks, a public awareness campaign must be effectively coordinated 

with audience-appropriate information both created and distributed. This supports the 

response strategy by

 engaging and leveraging Federal, State, Tribal, local, and stakeholder

relationships to provide unified public messages for local, national, and

international audiences;

 addressing issues and concerns relating to food safety, public health, and animal

welfare;

 addressing issues and concerns relating to interstate commerce, continuity of

business, and international trade; and

 widely disseminating key communication messages to consumers and producers.
UPDATED May 2017 4-4

4.2.4 Timeline in Any HPAI Response for First 72 Hours 

In the first 72 hours after the detection of HPAI in the United States, specific 

actions must occur; as seen in Figure 4-1, these critical tasks are fundamental to 

the rapid control and containment of HPAI. Figure 4-1 covers many of the most 

important tasks and activities but is not all-inclusive. Each response effort is 

different; however, some activities—such as rapid appraisal and depopulation of 

affected flocks—are of ultimate importance in any HPAI outbreak. 

Figure 4-1. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of U.S. HPAI Response 

48–72

hours

• Establish quarantine, hold orders, movement restrictions, and

standstill notices (e.g., 24–72 hours) for relevant zones and regions

• Initiate flock appraisal process

• Begin depopulation activities

• Notify States, industry, trading partners, media

• Implement increased biosecurity measures

• Start tracing activities (epidemiological investigation)

• Begin confirmatory diagnostics and further virus typing

• Initiate incident management organizational structures and processes

• Decide to deploy National Incident Management Team (NIMT) to field

• Begin data collection and information management in Emergency

Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS2)

• Evaluate quarantine and movement controls

• Continue depopulation and disposal activities

• Ensure compensation process moves forward for indemnity

• Proceed with surveillance and tracing activities

• Execute timely and accurate data entry in EMRS2

• Initiate public awareness messaging and communication campaign

• Implement and enforce increased biosecurity measures

• Initiate continuity of business plans

• Continue confirmatory diagnostics

• Prepare with State affected for arrival of NIMT

• Continue ramping up Incident Command and Incident Coordination

Group

• Ensure compensation (including flock plan) process proceeds

• Continue any ongoing depopulation and/or disposal activities

• Continue timely and accurate data entry in EMRS2

• Continue surveillance and tracing activities

• Implement and enforce increased biosecurity activities

• Continue public awareness campaign

• Ramp up permitting and continuity of business activities

Use of appropriate critical activities and tools continues 

throughout HPAI response

24–48

hours

0–24

hours

Presumptive positive detection of HPAI in the United States
HPAI Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

UPDATED May 2017 4-5

4.3 RESPONSE STRATEGY FOR CONTROL 

AND ERADICATION OF HPAI IN POULTRY

The United States’ primary control and eradication (response) strategy for HPAI

in poultry is stamping-out. If the spread of HPAI outpaces the resources for 

stamping-out, or if other factors direct the response away from a stamping-out 

strategy alone, emergency vaccination strategies might be considered.

Currently, it is not possible to delineate a priori the specific factors that might 

signal the need to deviate from an exclusive stamping-out strategy in any given 

outbreak. A decision to use emergency vaccination will be based on the prevailing 

epidemiological circumstances during the outbreak, as well as the availability of 

an appropriate vaccine. Vaccine was not used in the 2014–2015, 2016, or 2017

outbreaks in the United States. Please see Section 5.16 for information on 

emergency vaccination. 

Regardless of the response strategy, critical activities and tools are employed, 

such as health and safety, biosecurity, surveillance, depopulation, disposal, and 

movement control (see Chapter 5). This chapter provides general strategic 

guidance for a response to the detection of HPAI in poultry.

4.3.1 Defining Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy

for Poultry 

For HPAI, stamping-out is the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible poultry. Box 4-3 lists the key elements of stamping-out (disposal 

issues are covered in Section 5.14 in the next chapter). The OIE definition of 

stamping-out is provided in Section 4.5.1.
UPDATED May 2017 4-6

Box 4-3. Strategy of Stamping-Out HPAI 

4.3.2 Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Figure 4-2 shows an example of a stamping-out strategy, where Infected Premises 

(IP) are depopulated. See Section 5.5 in Chapter 5 for more information on zones, 

areas, and premises for HPAI outbreak response. 

Figure 4-2. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

(Infected Premises would be Depopulated) 

4.3.3 Assessing a Possible Outbreak 

During the investigation of premises suspected of having HPAI, animal health 

responders use clinical signs, history, and professional judgment to determine the 

Stamping-Out: Critical Goals

 The goal is that, within 24 hours of (or as soon as possible after) a presumptive

positive classification, infected poultry are depopulated in the quickest, safest, and

most humane way possible. In many cases, poultry on Contact Premises (CP) or those

meeting the suspect case definition may also be depopulated as soon as possible.

 Where resources are limited, premises are prioritized so that those with the highest

potential for active HPAI spread are ‘stamped-out’ first.

 Based on the epidemiology of the outbreak, prioritizing which poultry to depopulate

first may also be necessary.

 Public concerns about stamping-out require a well-planned and proactive public

relations and liaison campaign. Stakeholders, the public, and the international

community must be involved.

 Care should be taken to consider mental health implications for owners and

responders when implementing a stamping-out strategy.
HPAI Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy 

UPDATED May 2017 4-7

likelihood that HPAI exists on the premises. Appropriate control measures are 

initiated based on this rapid assessment. This assessment includes 

 a history of clinical and epidemiological findings, 

 results of physical examinations, 

 necropsy findings, 

 specimen collection and submission to an approved laboratory, and 

 reporting/situational information. 

Incident management includes quarantine and movement control, tracing, 

activation of response plans, and communication of these actions to all 

stakeholders, the public, and the international community. Cooperative Federal, 

State, Tribal, local, and industry response measures are carried out with extreme 

urgency using the broadest geographic scope appropriate. 

If HPAI has not been or cannot be detected on a premises, but epidemiological 

evidence indicates that the disease has spread beyond the initial premises, the 

premises should be treated as presumptive positive premises and control and 

containment measures implemented. 

4.3.4 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities 

When the criteria for a presumptive positive HPAI case have been met (see 

Chapter 5 for case definitions), the APHIS Administrator or VS Deputy 

Administrator (Chief Veterinary Officer [CVO] of the United States) can 

authorize APHIS personnel—in conjunction with State, Tribal, and unified IC

personnel—to initiate depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection procedures of the 

index case (IP) and investigation of CP. Depopulation of poultry on CP, or those 

meeting the suspect case definition, may also be warranted and conducted 

depending on the epidemiological information; this action will be authorized by 

APHIS and SAHOs/Tribal officials.2

 The need to initiate depopulation of poultry 

and cleaning and disinfection procedures on other poultry flocks in the IZ (which 

surrounds the index case/IP) may also be assessed. 

HPAI may be listed as a disease reportable to animal health or public health 

officials depending on the laws and policy of the State or Tribal nation. In some 

States, all FADs or animal diseases of consequence are listed for reporting to a 

State authority, which would include HPAI. Detection of HPAI may result in 

emergency intervention by Federal, State, Tribal, and/or local authorities. 

2

 Contact Premises that are depopulated because of epidemiological risk factors are often 

termed “dangerous Contact Premises.”
UPDATED May 2017 4-8

When HPAI is detected, USDA, State, and/or Tribal officials immediately issue a 

quarantine, hold order, or standstill notice for the IP based on the authority and 

regulations of the affected State. A Federal quarantine may be issued when 

requested by SAHOs or as directed by the Secretary of Agriculture; Federal 

quarantines may not always be issued in HPAI outbreaks. Within the unified IC, 

the Incident Commander works with the Operations Section and Situation Unit 

(in the Planning Section) to determine zone, area, and premises designations 

during an HPAI outbreak. These designations are captured in the Emergency 

Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS2). 

4.3.5 Management of Incident 

The outbreak response effort should be implemented in a manner consistent with 

NIMS and ICS, with an appropriate span of control and delegation of authority. 

Response management and associated critical activities remain as local as 

possible. Clear, consistent, and timely communication internally (in the unified 

IC organizational structure and between the unified IC and ICG) and also within 

the whole community is imperative. 

As soon as possible, a National Incident Coordinator (in the ICG) and an Incident 

Commander should be identified. In addition, a NIMT may be deployed and a 

unified State-Federal ICP established. There may be co-Incident Commanders in 

a unified IC, one State and one Federal. In-State resources (whether Federal, 

State, Tribal, local, or privately owned) should be used to manage the response. 

If the response requires, out-of-State resources may be used to support the State 

impacted by the outbreak. 

If the outbreak involves wild birds, USDA collaborates with Federal and State 

agencies, including the DOI, which have jurisdictional authority over wild birds. 

Due to its zoonotic potential, the USDA also notifies and coordinates with 

appropriate local, State, and Federal public health agencies in response to an 

HPAI detection in poultry. 

Incident management includes critical activities to prevent further spread of HPAI 

and implementation of relevant response plans, processes, and procedures. 

Cooperative Federal, State, Tribal, local, and industry response measures will be 

carried out with extreme urgency using the most appropriate geographic and 

jurisdictional scopes required to manage the situation. Response information must 

be communicated clearly and frequently to the whole community throughout the 

duration of the outbreak. USDA APHIS incident management is further discussed 

in the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD 

PReP Manual 1-0). 
HPAI Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy 

UPDATED May 2017 4-9

4.3.6 Control and Eradication Strategy for Other Species 

4.3.6.1 CAPTIVE WILD BIRDS

Should detections occur in captive wild birds (e.g., falcons or gyrfalcons used in 

falconry), these cases are managed individually based on the best information 

available to Federal and State animal health authorities. Captive wild birds (on 

premises without other poultry) may be quarantined under State authority and 

allowed to recover; diagnostic testing indicates when those birds are free of 

HPAI. An epidemiological investigation is conducted for all HPAI detections in 

captive wild birds. This assessment dictates the extent and duration of 

surveillance required in the surrounding area/premises. 

4.3.6.2 OTHER ANIMALS

Susceptible animals, as referred to in this response plan, are limited to poultry 

unless otherwise specified in the case definition used during the outbreak. 

Additional susceptible animals or species may be determined, as needed, by the 

current knowledge of the epidemiology of the event. USDA notifies and 

coordinates with public health agencies and authorities in a response to a 

detection of HPAI in poultry or other animal species. For more specific 

information on roles and responsibilities, please see the APHIS Foreign Animal 

Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0). 

Influenza viruses are typically adapted to a specific animal species and have a 

relatively high transmission barrier between species. However, interspecies 

transmission of influenza A viruses can occur. In particular, transmission and 

genetic re-assortment of influenza A viruses among humans, swine, and avian 

species have been well documented. In the event of an HPAI outbreak, 

appropriate biosecurity measures are implemented so that contact between 

infected poultry and all other susceptible animals is avoided. Should other 

species, besides poultry, become infected with HPAI virus, these animals are 

appropriately monitored to ensure that currently infected animals are not sent to 

slaughter or other premises. Other measures that are appropriate to the given 

situation may be applied based on the recommendation of the unified Incident 

Commander(s) and National Incident Coordinator. To limit human exposure, in 

addition to appropriate biosecurity and health and safety precautions, other 

strategies may be implemented based on the recommendations of USDA APHIS 

and public health agencies. 

4.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING RESPONSE

Previous sections identified the primary response strategy (stamping-out) for an 

HPAI outbreak. Detection of HPAI may result in emergency intervention by 
UPDATED May 2017 4-10

Federal, State, Tribal, and/or local authorities; the scope of regulatory intervention 

depends on the following factors:

 Consequences of the HPAI outbreak. The consequences of the HPAI

outbreak, and the impact of the response, in terms of disruptions to 

national security, food security, animal health, public health, environment, 

economy, interstate commerce, international trade, and regulatory issues.

This includes short- and long-term impacts for owners and growers, local 

economies, and intrastate commerce. 

 Acceptance. Acceptance of response policy and strategy (social and 

political) by different communities, from local to international. This 

includes all stakeholders.

 Scale of outbreak. The number of poultry infected, species infected, 

number of premises infected, type of premises affected, and poultry

population density for infected areas or high risk area.

 Rate of outbreak spread. The rate of spread of infection in terms of 

number of premises, types of premises, number of susceptible poultry, 

types of poultry; rate at which each IP leads to infection of one or more

new IP.

 Veterinary countermeasures available. The availability and efficacy of 

veterinary countermeasures, particularly HPAI vaccines; the acceptance of 

any emergency vaccination strategy.

 Resources available to implement response strategies. The capabilities 

and resources available to eradicate HPAI in poultry and to control and 

eradicate HPAI in potential wildlife reservoirs. 

4.5 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR AI

4.5.1 OIE Standards for HPAI Response

In terms of general international standards, for countries that have competent 

veterinary authorities, the initial response eradication policy for HPAI outbreaks 

is stamping-out. Stamping-out, as defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 

Code (2016) means

A policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out under the 

authority of the Veterinary Authority the following:

a. The killing of animals which are affected and those suspected of being 

affected in the herd and, where appropriate, those in other herds which 

have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, or 

by indirect contact with the causal pathogen; animals should be killed 
HPAI Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

UPDATED May 2017 4-11

in accordance with Chapter 7.6.

b. The disposal of carcasses and, where relevant, animal products by rendering, 

burning or burial, or by any other method described in Chapter 4.12.

c. The cleansing and disinfection of establishments through procedures defined 

in Chapter 4.13.

4.5.2 Recognition of Disease-Free Status

As a member of the OIE, the United States has agreed to abide by standards 

drafted and approved by member countries. The OIE does not grant official 

recognition for HPAI-freedom, but OIE members can self-declare their entire 

country, zone or compartment (within their country) free from certain OIE-listed 

diseases, including HPAI.

In cases of self-declaration, delegates are advised to consult the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code for specific requirements for self-declaration of freedom 

from HPAI. By providing the relevant epidemiological evidence, the OIE member 

can prove to a potential importing country that the entire country, zone or 

compartment under discussion meets the provisions of the specific disease 

chapter. Any submitted self-declaration should contain evidence demonstrating 

that the requirements for the disease status have been met in accordance with OIE

standards. This self-declaration must be signed by the official OIE delegate of the 

OIE member concerned. As mentioned in Article 10.4.27 of the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code (2016), no member can declare itself free from influenza A 

infection in wild birds; the definitions for AI-free status apply to poultry only.

4.5.3 Criteria Needed for AI-Free Status

The OIE has two categories for country recognition for AI: (1) a country, zone, or 

compartment free from avian influenza (2) a country, zone, or compartment free 

from infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in poultry. These 

determinations are described in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016) in 

Articles 10.4.2, 10.4.3, and 10.4.4.

Per article 10.4.4, the OIE defines a country, zone, or compartment free from 

infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in poultry as follows:

A country, zone, or compartment may be considered free from infection 

with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in poultry when:

1) It has been shown that infection with high pathogenicity avian 

influenza viruses in poultry has not been present in the country, 

zone, or compartment for the past 12 months, although its status 

with respect to low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses may be 

unknown; or
UPDATED May 2017 4-12

2) When based on surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.27 

to 10.4.33, it does not meet the criteria for freedom from avian 

influenza but any virus detected has not been identified as high 

pathogenicity avian influenza virus.

The surveillance may need to be adapted to parts of the country or existing 

zones or compartments depending on historical or geographical factors, 

industry structure, population data, or proximity to recent outbreaks.

If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone, or 

compartment, the free status can be regained three months after a 

stamping-out policy (including disinfection of all affected establishments) 

is applied, providing that surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.27 

to 10.4.33 has been carried out during that three-month period.
UPDATED May 2017 5-1

Chapter 5 

Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities 

and Tools

FAD PReP documents identify critical activities and tools to be employed in the 

event of an HPAI outbreak. These critical activities and response tools assist in 

controlling, containing, and eradicating HPAI while facilitating continuity of 

business in an outbreak. This chapter describes key parts of these critical activities 

and tools. 

Documents referenced in this chapter can be found at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

5.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY

Information on the etiology and ecology of HPAI helps promote a common 

understanding of the disease agent among responders and other stakeholders (see 

Chapter 1 for HPAI information). The HPAI Overview of Etiology and Ecology 

SOP contains additional information. 

5.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS 

AND CASE DEFINITIONS

Laboratory and case definitions provide a common point of reference for all 

responders. The following definitions are applicable to poultry. If animals other 

than poultry become significant in the response effort, the case and laboratory 

definitions may be adapted by the unified IC to fit the prevailing epidemiological 

findings during an outbreak. 

Case definitions and laboratory criteria are developed according to the Case 

Definition Development Process SOP (see Section 5.2.3). The H5/H7 AI Case 

Definition is available in the following sections, and also on 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

5.2.1 Laboratory Definitions 

The following sections include definitions for H5/H7 AI, dated December 2015. 

For further information on the diagnostic tests conducted by NVSL in the event of 

an HPAI outbreak, please see Section 5.4. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-2

5.2.1.1 LABORATORY CRITERIA

Subclinical infections identified through active laboratory surveillance or clinical 

cases with compatible clinical signs and pathologic lesions in a susceptible 

species are evaluated using laboratory criteria for HPAI and LPAI H5/H7 defined 

by one or more of the following diagnostic strategies: 

1. Serologic tests: Demonstration of influenza A antibody by:

a. Agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID) OR USDA-licensed influenza A

enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA); AND

b. Confirmation of antibody to H5 or H7 by hemagglutination inhibition

(HI).

2. Antigen tests: Detect presence of influenza A virus by:

a. Antigen capture immunoassays (ACIA): collect

tracheal/oropharyngeal and/or cloacal swab samples from clinically ill

or dead birds. ACIA (test kits approved by APHIS) are for flock level

testing; the ability to detect low levels of infection is enhanced by

testing multiple samples. Molecular confirmation of positive results is

required; negative results with clinical signs require confirmatory

diagnostics as indicated in VS Guidance 12001, “Policy for the

Investigation of Potential Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease

Incidents (FAD/EDI).” Samples will be forwarded to USDA’s NVSL

to determine subtype and pathotype.

b. Direct RNA detection: real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase

chain reaction (rRT-PCR) using NVSL-approved molecular assays for

influenza A and H5/H7 subtypes, WITH molecular determination of

subtype and pathotype direct from swab sample by Sanger sequence

methods, OR virus isolation with antigenic and/or molecular

characterization.

3. Virus isolation and identification: Preferred specimens for virus isolation

include tracheal/oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs, fresh feces from live or

dead birds, or samples from organs pooled by system (e.g., respiratorytrachea, lungs, air sacs; enteric-intestine, spleen, kidney, liver;

reproductive) from dead birds. A preparation of the specimen is inoculated

into the allantoic cavity of susceptible embryonated chicken eggs. The

eggs are incubated at 37oC for 4 to 5 days. The amniotic-allantoic fluid is

harvested from inoculated embryos and tested for presence of virus by

molecular, hemagglutination, or antigen capture methods with subtype

(HA and NA) determination by molecular or HI and neuraminidase

inhibition (NI) assays.

4. Strain virulence evaluation:

a. Determination of the amino acid sequence at the hemagglutinin

cleavage site (of H5 and H7 viruses) to identify viruses that have the
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-3

capacity to become highly pathogenic with or without elevated 

mortality in in vivo assays (see b. below). 

b. Viruses with an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) greater than

1.2, or that cause at least 75 percent mortality within 10 days in 4- to

8-week-old chickens infected intravenously, are classified as HPAI.

c. If H5 or H7 subtypes do not meet the criteria for HPAI, they are

classified as H5/H7 LPAI.

5. Assumptions: Influenza virus may be detected 48 hours post-infection

(HPAI within 24 hours post-infection) by virus isolation or rRT-PCR

(Spackman 2006) and 1–5 days post-infection by antigen capture enzyme

immunoassay, when virus is shed at moderate to high levels (Gelb and

Ladman 2006). Oropharyngeal/tracheal specimens are preferred for

poultry because there generally are fewer inhibitors and therefore higher

test sensitivity especially during the early phase of infection. While

oropharyngeal/tracheal swabs are preferred for detection of AI in poultry,

cloacal swabs are more preferred in wild birds. Presence of blood or fecal

material in swab specimens (i.e., cloacal swabs) can result in lower

sensitivity on the rRT-PCR assay due to the presence of non-specific

inhibitors, and should be processed appropriately.

5.2.2 Case Definitions 

The following sections include case definitions developed by APHIS VS Science, 

Technology, and Analysis Services (STAS) CEAH Surveillance Design and 

Analysis as of December 2015. These definitions may be revised at any time 

based on current epidemiological information. This case definition is available 

with the other HPAI materials at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

5.2.2.1 CASE DEFINITION

1. General comments: AI virus can infect almost all species of birds.

Domestic poultry defined as having illness compatible with OIE

reportable AI infection (H5/H7 HPAI and LPAI) are those with one or

more of the following clinical signs and gross lesions: reduction in normal

vocalization; listlessness; conjunctivitis; drops in egg production

sometimes with pale, misshapen or thin-shelled eggs; respiratory signs

such as rales, snicking, and dyspnea; neurological signs such as

incoordination or torticollis; a drop in feed and/or water consumption;

swollen or necrotic combs and wattles; swollen head and legs; lungs filled

with fluid and blood; tracheitis and airsacculitis; hemorrhages on the

unfeathered parts of legs and feet; petechial hemorrhages on internal

organs (Easterday et al. 1997); OR flocks within a CA that experience

mortality as listed for each compartment as follows (S. Malladi and E.

Gingerich, personal communications, 2013):

a. Commercial broilers: mortality exceeding 3.5 birds/1,000 per day.
UPDATED May 2017 5-4

b. Commercial layers: mortality exceeding 3 times the normal daily

mortality per day (normal: 0.13 birds/1,000 per day for layers from 2

to 50 weeks, and 0.43 birds/1,000 per day for layers over 50 weeks);

OR 5 percent drop in egg production for 3 consecutive days.

c. Commercial turkeys: mortality exceeding 2 birds/1,000 per day.

d. Broiler breeders: mortality exceeding 2 birds/1,000 per day.

e. Layer breeders: mortality exceeding 3 times the normal daily mortality

per day (normal: 0.2 birds/1,000 per day prior up to 50 weeks, and

0.37 birds/1,000 per day after 50 weeks).

f. Turkey breeders: mortality exceeding 2 birds/1,000 per day; OR a

decrease in egg production of 15 percent occurring over a 2-day

period.

g. Small volume high-value commercial poultry and backyard flocks: any

sudden and significant mortality event or sudden drop in egg

production should be investigated.

2. Suspect case: Domestic poultry with:

a. Illness compatible with H5/H7 AI infection; OR

b. Detection of antibodies to influenza A as determined by AGID or

ELISA serological test with or without the presence of compatible

illness; OR

c. Detection of influenza A antigen using a commercially available

influenza A antigen test kit (ACIA, approved by USDA) with the

presence of compatible illness.

3. Presumptive positive case:

a. A suspect positive case as defined above with detection of antibodies

to influenza A as determined by AGID serological test that cannot be

explained by vaccination (USDA permission required for use in the

United States), and subtyping by HI and NI as H5/H7 with any NA

subtype; OR

b. Domestic poultry with identification of influenza A RNA by rRT-PCR

with or without the presence of compatible illness.

4. Confirmed positive case: Domestic poultry with influenza A antigen

detection (virologic or molecular detection methods) AND the

confirmation of the H5/H7 subtype WITH determination of pathogenicity
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-5

by NVSL as described in Section 2.2 of the OIE Manual of Diagnostic 

Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals (HPAI or H5/H7 LPAI). 

5. Epidemiological criteria and restrictions: Surveillance efforts are

restricted along the lines of the compartmentalization concept.

Compartmentalization is intended to create a functional separation of the

commercial poultry industry, the LBMS, backyard poultry flocks, and

wild migratory waterfowl through management practices (Scott 2006).

The efficacy of compartmentalization can be verified through surveillance

information and evaluation.

a. Commercial poultry breeder and production flock surveillance

(including many game bird breeders) is conducted through the NPIP.

b. Commercial meat-type chicken and meat-type turkey surveillance is an

industry initiative of the National Chicken Council and National

Turkey Federation that meets or exceeds the NPIP commercial

surveillance program.

c. LBMS surveillance occurs through cooperative agreements between

APHIS and participating SAHO. The federally funded and Stateadministered program is designed to enhance and unify existing State

programs and to assist States in meeting their goals for prevention and

control of H5/H7 LPAI in the LBMS. State programs often exceed

APHIS minimum standards.

d. Surveillance of the non-traditional backyard compartment occurs

through individual State surveillance programs in cooperation with

APHIS.

5.2.3 Case Definition Development Process 

The Case Definition Development Process SOP describes the general process for 

developing and approving animal disease case definitions for use in animal health 

surveillance and reporting. 

CEAH (part of STAS), in cooperation and coordination with SPRS, develops 

animal disease case definitions for animal health surveillance and reporting. VS 

units and other stakeholders review draft definitions; the VS Deputy 

Administrator (U.S. CVO) and VSET approve the case definitions. Case 

definitions enhance the usefulness of animal disease data by providing uniform 

criteria for reporting purposes. 

In any specific HPAI outbreak, case definitions may be edited within 24 hours of 

the first presumptive or confirmed positive case (index case). The case definitions 

are reviewed throughout the outbreak and modified on the basis of additional 

information or the changing requirements of the eradication effort. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-6

5.3 SURVEILLANCE

This section provides an overview of HPAI outbreak surveillance. It is 

important to read this section prior to Appendix D. Appendix D provides 

surveillance parameter definitions, sampling examples, data to illustrate how 

different HPAI strains may affect surveillance, and guidance on adjusting 

surveillance plans accordingly. 

The surveillance guidelines presented here do not specifically or comprehensively 

address surveillance for continuity of business in an outbreak such as surveillance 

testing for daily bird or product movement from layer, broiler, or turkey flocks. 

However, when testing and sampling methods comply, test results from business 

continuity surveillance help to meet outbreak surveillance testing requirements. 

For more information on the diagnostic testing required for business continuity 

movements, please see the Secure Poultry Supply Plan (includes eggs, broilers, 

and turkeys). 

5.3.1 Surveillance Goals and Objectives 

Surveillance is a critical activity during an outbreak of HPAI. The following are 

the goals of surveillance in response to an HPAI outbreak: 

 Implement a surveillance plan within 48 hours of the confirmation of an 

outbreak. 

 Implement a surveillance plan that will (1) define the present extent of 

HPAI and (2) detect unknown IP quickly. 

 Consider susceptible wildlife populations in the surveillance plan; 

coordinate with APHIS WS, DOI, State wildlife agencies, and State 

agriculture departments to perform appropriate surveillance in wildlife 

populations. 

 Provide complete surveillance data summaries and analyses at intervals 

specified by the unified IC. 

Box 5-1 lists key objectives of surveillance activities during and immediately after 

an HPAI outbreak in poultry. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-7

Box 5-1. Surveillance Plan Objectives in an HPAI Outbreak 

5.3.2 Surveillance Activities by Time Period and Zone for the 

Unified Incident Command 

There are three key time periods defining surveillance activities in an outbreak, 

each with distinct implementation priorities. 

1. The initial 72 hours post-HPAI outbreak declaration. During this period,

surveillance-related activities of the unified IC should include the

following:

a. Create the IZ and BZ designations and the boundary of the CA.

b. Create a list of known premises with susceptible poultry in the CA.

Gather additional information for each premises including species,

production type, and estimated population size.

c. Determine CP (this includes direct and indirect exposure, per the

definition of a CP) to known IP.

d. Evaluate surveillance guidance below (Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4) and

HPAI Response and Policy information on surveillance (available

from www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep, navigate to the HPAI-specific

page). Modify existing surveillance guidance with outbreak-specific

information to create a surveillance plan for the CA. The initial

objectives of surveillance in the CA are to detect infected flocks and

premises as quickly as possible, and to determine the size and extent of

the HPAI outbreak.

e. Initiate surveillance within the CA as soon as possible. A common

approach is to actively sample all commercial premises and ensure

active outreach to all backyard premises with investigation of those

deemed high-risk.

Surveillance Plan Objectives

 Detect HPAI IP quickly.

 Determine the size and extent of the HPAI outbreak.

 Supply information to assess and modify outbreak response activities.

 Provide information for animal and product movement within the CA.

 Provide information for animal and product movement out of the CA.

 Prove evidence to demonstrate HPAI absence on a premises, or demonstrate HPAI

absence in an area during (e.g., in the Surveillance Zone [SZ]) or after (e.g., in the

CA) eradication of the outbreak.
UPDATED May 2017 5-8

f. Determine the boundary of the SZ, which is located in the Free Area

(FA), and start developing a surveillance plan for the SZ based on

existing HPAI Response and Policy information on surveillance

(available from www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep, navigate to the HPAIspecific page). The objective of surveillance in the SZ is to provide

evidence of freedom of disease.

2. The control period (from initial 72-hour period until last case is detected

and depopulated). The key surveillance activities to accomplish

simultaneously in this period are as follows:

a. Continue CA surveillance. The objectives are to detect IP so that

control measures can be immediately implemented and zone/CA

boundaries can be adjusted as needed.

b. Provide evidence that premises are free of HPAI, thereby setting the

stage to permit poultry and poultry product movements within and out

of the CA. For more information on surveillance testing required for

business continuity, please see the Secure Poultry Supply Plan

(includes guidance for eggs, broilers, and turkeys).1 These plans

provide information on the diagnostic testing required for movement

during an HPAI outbreak. Appendix C also provides additional

information on the Secure Poultry Supply Plan.

c. Conduct surveillance in the SZ sufficient to demonstrate that the

pathogen has not extended its distribution beyond the CA.

d. Gather information about the epidemiology of the outbreak strain of

the virus (virulence, incubation period, etc.) through observation and

communication with other agencies, researchers, and partners.

e. Determine the role of backyard poultry in outbreak spread; if backyard

poultry are not implicated in virus transmission, surveillance in this

population can be reduced.

f. Revise or prioritize ongoing control and surveillance activities based

on surveillance results and available epidemiologic information.

Information may support modification of sampling frequency,

movement restrictions, risk factor mitigations, vaccination decisions,

or targeted sampling, as examples.

3. Completion of depopulation to freedom. The objective is to provide

evidence that the CA and FA are free of disease. Multiple streams of

1

 At the time of writing, each commodity had an individual website: 

www.secureeggsupply.com, www.securebroilersupply.com, and www.secureturkeysupply.com. 

Work continues to integrate these all the work completed on these three plans into a single Secure 

Poultry Supply Plan. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-9

surveillance may be considered including sampling through NPIP, LBMS, 

wild birds, and passive surveillance activities. See Chapter 6 for more 

information. 

5.3.3 Outbreak Surveillance Guidance—

Passive Surveillance 

Passive surveillance is the voluntary reporting of suspect cases by producers and 

practitioners. Passive surveillance is ongoing in the United States; suspect cases 

will trigger a FAD investigation (per VS Guidance Document 12001). In the event 

of an HPAI detection, passive surveillance is intensified through rapid and clear 

communication to all producers in the CA. Though respiratory signs sometimes 

accompany LPAI infections, especially in association with age (older birds) or 

stress (e.g., puberty), passive surveillance is most sensitive when used to detect 

highly pathogenic strains of the virus. 

 Commercial poultry: Commercial flocks within the CA that exceed the

mortality/morbidity thresholds as described in Section 5.2.2.1 should be 

investigated and sampled for avian influenza as rapidly as possible. 

 Backyard poultry: The unified IC, in coordination with subject matter 

experts, should develop species-specific morbidity and mortality criteria 

that dictate the need for further investigation in backyard flocks. Reports 

of clinical signs or unusual mortality from backyard producers (sick bird 

calls) should be investigated as rapidly as possible. However, sick bird 

calls may overwhelm available resources, particularly when investigation 

and/or management of the IP and CP are not complete. In this case, the 

unified IC may recommend triaging disease investigations on backyard 

premises, using the morbidity and mortality criteria and/or farm risk 

factors (e.g., close proximity to bodies of water with waterfowl 

concentrations). These triggers should be based on the best information 

available and should be developed in coordination with State/Tribal 

officials. 

See HPAI Response and Policy information on surveillance (available from 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep, navigate to the HPAI-specific page) for further 

guidance on passive surveillance in the CA. 

5.3.4 Outbreak Surveillance Guidance—Active Surveillance 

It is challenging to develop active surveillance guidelines a priori that will be 

optimal for all HPAI outbreaks. Surveillance plans will vary to address objectives 

that may differ by zone, area, and premises designations (see Section 5.5 for 

details on zone, area, and premises designations). Plans may also vary by 

outbreak type, field capacity, and epidemiologic characteristics that can differ by 

region, host, and virus. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-10

Note on active surveillance of backyard flocks: The role of backyard flocks in the 

spread and duration of an HPAI outbreak is variable. Due to this variability, it is 

recommended that active surveillance in backyard premises either follow the 

general commercial premises sampling guidelines, or follow specific HPAI 

Response and Policy information on surveillance in backyard flocks (available 

from www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep, navigate to the HPAI-specific page). 

5.3.4.1 GENERAL ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE PARAMETERS 

The core of any surveillance plan describes the frequency, number, and 

distribution of animals and premises targeted for sampling. Recommendations and 

decisions regarding these components come from knowledge about, and trade-offs 

between, surveillance parameters. At the onset of an outbreak, default parameter 

settings for early detection in the CA and demonstration of disease absence in the 

SZ can be helpful and are listed below. However, it is critical to note that during 

an outbreak, parameter estimates and surveillance plans may change as new 

information about viral characteristics and epidemiology becomes available. 

Further information on these surveillance parameters and modification 

instructions are provided in Appendix D. 

Common default parameter settings are as follows: 

1. Design (threshold) prevalence:

a. Premises level: For the SZ, which is part of the FA and assumed to be

free of disease, start with 10 percent then adjust as the outbreak

progresses and additional information becomes available. The

appropriate premises level design prevalence depends on the number

of premises in the zone, viral characteristics, mechanisms of spread,

public health consequences, and other factors (see Appendix D, Table

D-1 and D-2). Note that the recommended surveillance plan requires

testing of all commercial premises in the CA (i.e., a ‘census’, rather

than a statistical sample) and thus a design prevalence here is not

needed.

b. Bird level: A common setting is 40 percent within the sick and dead

bird population in a house, whether located in the CA or a SZ.

2. Confidence level: Ninety-five percent is the standard.

3. Risk-based sampling: Target sick and dead birds in a house.

4. Type of tests: rRT-PCR is ascribed a test sensitivity of 85 to 88 percent for

detection of one or more infected bird samples for both the 5-bird and 11-

bird pools.

5. Sampling frequency: This varies by area/zone and premises type. See

Table 5-1 below and Table D-5 (Appendix D) for CA guidance. In the SZ,
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-11

frequency of sampling could be limited: e.g., performed once near 

initiation and once near the close of a CA, or more or less frequently 

depending on potential pathways of disease introduction. In any case, a 

sample of premises should be conducted for at least one incubation period 

beyond the last known exposure. See Table D-5 (Appendix D).

Table 5-1. Sampling Frequency Guidelines by 

Control Area Premises Designations 

Premises Type Sampling 

Frequency

Sampling Duration

Contact Premises (CP) Every other 

day

14 days, then as 

ARP/MP

Suspect Premises (SP) Once Temporary designation

At-Risk Premises (ARP) Every 5–7days 3 rounds minimum for 

duration of quarantine

Monitored Premises (MP) Every 5–7 

days or more 

often for 

movement

3 rounds minimum or 

more often for 

movement for duration 

of quarantine

6. Sample size:

a. Premises: Sample all premises (i.e., conduct a census) in the CA. In

the SZ, a subset of premises can be selected for sampling. The target

number of premises to sample varies with the total number of premises

in the SZ and the value selected for the premises-level design

prevalence. See Tables D-1, D-2, and D-5 (Appendix D) for guidance

on the number of premises to sample per zone for various design

prevalence settings and the number of premises in the zone.

b. Birds: Using the recommended bird-level design prevalence given in 1

above, sample two 5-bird (or 11-bird) pools from the sick and deadbird group per house; only 5-bird pools are approved for use in

backyard flocks. Divide available sick and dead birds approximately

equally between the two pools when less than 10 (for 5-bird pools) or

less than 22 (for 11-bird pools) birds are available. Sampling

apparently healthy gallinaceous birds provides negligible benefit in

most cases. In Appendix D, see Table D-3 and D-5 for guidance on the

recommended number of pooled samples per house for other design

prevalence values.
UPDATED May 2017 5-12

Box 5-2. Pooled Sampling Guidelines 

5.3.5 Additional Guidance 

At the APHIS level, the CEAH Surveillance Design and Analysis (SDA) Unit is 

responsible for and assists the unified IC and NIMT in surveillance planning for 

the CA and SZ. SPRS is responsible for surveillance implementation. 

Existing HPAI Response and Policy information on surveillance (available from 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep, navigate to the HPAI-specific page) describes 

surveillance conducted in previous outbreaks and provides protocols which 

distinguish between commercial and backyard premises. These documents can be 

consulted as templates or starting points to guide immediate outbreak response. 

Appendix D in this document contains example active surveillance strategies for 

commercial premises and introduces assumptions and methods that influence 

surveillance decisions. On-line calculators are available to assist with certain 

aspects (e.g., FreeCalc). However, development of a detailed plan should either 

follow the templates and guidance in existing surveillance documents or involve 

the help of field or program teams with surveillance planning expertise. CEAH 

SDA is available to advise, construct, or review outbreak surveillance plans on 

request. 

Pooled Sampling Guidelines for HPAI Surveillance in Gallinaceous Birds

 5-Bird (or 11-Bird) Pool: A swab is taken from each bird, for up to 5 or 11

dead or euthanized sick birds from the house’s daily sick and dead birds. The 5

or 11 swabs are placed into one tube and constitute one pooled sample.

 Choosing the 5-Bird or 11-Bird Pool: The probability of detection is higher

with the 11-bird pool, but 11-bird pools are approved for use in gallinaceous

poultry in commercial settings only. Using 2 5-bird or 11-bird pools will

detect 1 positive bird if design prevalence is 40 percent within the sick and

dead birds, although the 11-bird pool will result in a slightly higher confidence

(96 percent and 98 percent respectively). See Figure D-1 and Table D-3 for

comparison of detection capabilities of the 5-bird and 11-bird pools.

 Apparently Healthy Gallinaceous Birds: In situations where less than 5 or 11

dead or sick birds are available, only the available dead or sick birds should be

sampled, but swabs should still be divided approximately equally between the

two pooled samples. Sampling apparently healthy gallinaceous birds provides

negligible benefit.

 Additional Sampling Guidelines: Please see Avian Sample Collection for

Influenza A and Newcastle Disease at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep and

navigate to the HPAI-specific page.
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-13

5.4 DIAGNOSTICS

Effective and appropriate sample collection, diagnostic testing, surge capacity, 

and reporting are critical in an effective HPAI response. These activities may 

require additional resources in the event of an HPAI outbreak. In particular, flock 

sampling requires additional personnel. Surge capacity may also be required for 

diagnostic laboratory testing. Surveillance plan requirements must be fully 

integrated with current diagnostic sample collection, sample testing, surge 

capacity, and reporting capabilities. Section 5.2 provides laboratory definitions 

that are important to this section. 

During a suspected or actual HPAI outbreak, the key goals for diagnostics are to 

(1) provide clear direction to responders on sample collection and processing 

procedures, if modification from routine standards is required, (2) meet the surge 

requirements for diagnostic testing at specific intervals, starting at time zero and 

at 24-hour intervals as the response escalates, and (3) report all diagnostic test 

results to appropriate personnel and information management systems (EMRS2) 

as soon as possible and within 4 hours of diagnostic test completion. 

The FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0) offers detailed 

information on diagnostic sample collection, diagnostic testing, and reporting. 

This document provides guidance on who is responsible for diagnostic testing, 

sample packaging and shipping, and roles in FAD investigations. Additional, 

specific information on how to package and label laboratory submissions is also 

available here. 

Appendix E references VS Guidance Document 12001 for FAD investigations, 

and provides the associated ready reference guide. The procedures outlined in this 

document should be followed in all FAD investigations, including those in which 

HPAI is a differential diagnosis. 

5.4.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing 

Trained personnel and field collection kits are required to effectively collect 

samples from poultry. AI may be presumptively diagnosed on the basis of clinical 

signs, a sudden and significant increase in mortality, a decrease in egg production, 

or gross or microscopic pathologic lesions in combination with laboratory 

diagnostic tests. The rRT-PCR is typically used for early detection of AI because 

test results can be produced in 4–7 hours. Other types of samples may be required 

if infection is suspected in species other than poultry. 

Confirmatory tests are more specific and used to verify the presence of AI, 

identify specific viral subtypes, and evaluate pathogenicity. Partial gene 

sequencing using Sanger technology has allowed more rapid confirmation of 

subtype and pathotype (determination of LPAI or HPAI) where sufficient viral 

RNA is present in the samples (~10 hours to conduct partial HA/NA sequencing). 
UPDATED May 2017 5-14

Other definitive tests such as isolating the virus in embryonated chicken eggs and 

whole genome sequencing can take 5–10 days per procedure. It is typically 

advantageous to respond to an H5 or H7 presumptive PCR result—in accordance 

with the case definition—to facilitate the rapid initiation of control and 

eradication activities. 

The confirmation of an HPAI outbreak is made by NVSL-Ames. After positive 

confirmation of HPAI, subsequent samples from premises inside the established 

CA may be sent to approved laboratories that are part of the NAHLN (Appendix B 

provides a link to the NAHLN laboratories approved for HPAI testing). Please 

follow guidance from the ICG and unified IC on where to send samples 

(NAHLN, NVSL, or both). 

The following sections describe the diagnostic tests performed when HPAI is 

suspected (e.g., an FAD investigation) in Figure 5-1 and when it has been 

confirmed in the United States in Figure 5-2. Table 5-2 provides the 

corresponding legend for these figures. 

Table 5-2. Abbreviations for Diagnostic Figures

Abbreviation Definition

fluA influenza A virus

IVPI intravenous pathogenicity index

rRT-PCR real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction

VI virus isolation

5.4.1.1 DIAGNOSTICS FOR INITIAL HPAI DETECTION

Figure 5-1 illustrates the typical diagnostic flow for a suspected case of HPAI via 

an FAD investigation. For the diagnostic flow after an initial detection, or during 

an outbreak, see Figure 5-2. Confirmation of HPAI is only made at NVSL-Ames. 

In the event that HPAI is suspected as part of routine surveillance activities 

(rather than through a traditional FAD investigation), samples should be 

forwarded to NVSL for confirmation and sequencing immediately. This does not 

change the subsequent response (Section 4.3.4): when criteria for a presumptive 

positive have been met (per the HPAI case definition), the APHIS Administrator, 

or VS Deputy Administrator (U.S. CVO) or their designee, will authorize APHIS 

personnel—in conjunction with State and Tribal officials, and IC personnel—to 

initiate depopulation, disposal, cleaning, and disinfection procedures on the 

Infected Premises. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-15

Figure 5-1. Diagnostic Flow for FAD Investigations of Suspected HPAI 

5.4.1.2 DIAGNOSTICS AFTER HPAI DETECTION

Figure 5-2 illustrates the diagnostic flow after HPAI has been detected; this is 

after NVSL-Ames has confirmed HPAI on an index premises. IC provides 

specific instructions regarding the direction and collection of samples, which is 

likely to change as the outbreak changes in size or scope. 

In all cases, (1) NVSL confirms the index case, (2) presumptive positive samples 

based upon rRT-PCR results from outside an established CA are tested and 

Virus isolation

(VI)

Detected Not 

detected

Presumptive 

positive HPAI (if 

meets case def); 

Attempt partial HA/

NA sequencing to 

determine subtype/

pathotype

FAD investigations for HPAI

(Samples sent to NVSL; NAHLN may

receive second set of samples)a

fluA and H5/H7

rRT-PCR 

Positive

a

See VS Guidance Document 12001. The first or best set of samples must be sent to NVSL. A second set may be sent 

to an approved NAHLN laboratory. This figure describes NVSL testing.

STOP means not infected, unless there is a circumstantial reason to request additional samples and conduct

more diagnostic testing.

Estimated Time to Test Completion Under Optimal Conditions 

H5/H7 or Matrix fluA rRT-PCR: 4 hours

Partial HA/NA Sequencing: 10 hours

Whole genome sequencing: 4-5 days

Virus Isolation (VI): 5-10 days

IVPI: 10 days

Simultaneous testing

Negative

Confirmed HPAI

Further

characterization 

(sequencing and/or

IVPI)

Confirmed LPAI Confirmed HPAI
UPDATED May 2017 5-16

confirmed by NVSL, and (3) NVSL receives samples routinely from inside the 

CA to monitor for changes in the HPAI virus. Based on the recommendation of 

the IC and ICG, all presumptive positive samples from NAHLN laboratories may 

be forwarded to NVSL for confirmation and subtyping. 

Figure 5-2. Diagnostic Flow During an HPAI Outbreak 

5.4.2 Surge Capacity 

Surge capacity may be needed in an HPAI outbreak. Additional resources, such as 

personnel and materials, may be needed for sample collection. Additional 

capacity may also be required for laboratory sample testing. Surge capacity can 

help to ensure a rapid response and continuity of business for uninfected 

Sample collected based on clinical 

signs or for surveillancea

fluA and H5/H7

rRT-PCR

Not 

detected Detected

Presumptive 

positive HPAI 

(if meets case 

def)

At NAHLN 

Laboratory

Inside the Control Area

Virus isolation, 

sequencing, and/or

IVPI

Detected Not 

detected

At NVSL-Ames

Forward all presumptive positive to NVSL for 

confirmation (outside Control Area) and/or 

determination of subtype, pathotype 

(within Control Area)

Confirmatory 

rRT-PCR

Simultaneous testing

Confirmed positive 

with determination 

of subtype, 

pathotype, and 

geographic lineage

Outside the Control Areaa

a See VS Guidance Document 12001. The first or best set of samples must be sent to NVSL. A second set may be sent to an approved 

NAHLN laboratory. 

STOP means not infected, unless there is a circumstantial reason to request additional samples and conduct more diagnostic 

testing.

Estimated Time to Test Completion Under Optimal Conditions

H5/H7 or Matrix fluA rRT-PCR: 4 hours

Partial HA/NA Sequencing: 10 hours

Whole genome sequencing: 4-5 days

Virus Isolation (VI): 5-10 days

IVPI: 10 days

Confirmed 

positive HPAI
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-17

premises. In the event that the State NAHLN laboratory and NVSL-Ames are 

overwhelmed by the diagnostic testing requirements, NAHLN labs from 

neighboring States provide surge capacity for diagnostic testing. For more 

information, please see the NAHLN Operational and Emergency Activation Plan.

2

Individual laboratories have independent protocols on how to manage personnel if 

a surge is required. Appendix B contains a link to the list of the NAHLN labs 

approved to conduct HPAI diagnostics. 

5.4.3 Reporting 

Box 5-3 clarifies reporting and notification of HPAI. See VS Guidance Document 

12001 and the FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0) for further 

information on HPAI investigation and reporting. This document and a link to this 

manual are available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. VS Guidance Document

8602 also provides information on reporting relating to HPAI in domestic poultry. 

Box 5-3. Reporting and Notification 

5.5 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION 

AND TRACING

5.5.1 Summary of Zones, Areas, 

and Premises Designations 

A critical component of an HPAI response is the designation of zones, areas, and 

premises. The Incident Commander works with the Operations Section and 

Planning Section to (1) determine appropriate zones, areas, and premises 

designations in the event of an HPAI outbreak and (2) reevaluate these 

designations as needed throughout the outbreak based on the epidemiological 

situation. These zones, areas, and premises designations are used in quarantine 

and movement control efforts. For details on the zones, areas, and premises, 

2

 Available from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/nahln-operationalemergency-activation-plan.pdf. 

Reporting and Notification

 Cases considered a presumptive positive for HPAI, based on the current case definition,

are reported as appropriate to the affected States, other States, Tribal nations, industry,

other Federal agencies, trading partners, and the OIE.

 This includes breeder and commercial poultry flocks, domestic waterfowl and upland

game birds, backyard flocks, and LBMS.

 Appropriate Federal-State-Tribal-industry response and containment measures are

initiated during HPAI investigations.
UPDATED May 2017 5-18

please see the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies 

(FAD PReP Manual 2-0). 

Table 5-3 summarizes the premises designations that are employed in an HPAI 

outbreak response. Table 5-4 summarizes the zone and area designations that 

would be used in an HPAI outbreak response. Figure 5-3 illustrates these 

premises, zone, and area designations. 

Table 5-3. Summary of Premises Designations

Premises Definition Zone

Infected Premises (IP) Premises where a presumptive positive case or 

confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory 

results, compatible clinical signs, HPAI case 

definition, and international standards.

Infected Zone

Contact Premises (CP) Premises with susceptible animals that may have 

been exposed to HPAI, either directly or indirectly, 

including but not limited to exposure to animals, 

animal products, fomites, or people from Infected 

Premises.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone

Suspect Premises (SP) Premises under investigation due to the presence of 

susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs 

compatible with HPAI. This is intended to be a shortterm premises designation.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone, Surveillance Zone, 

Vaccination Zone

At-Risk Premises (ARP) Premises that have susceptible animals, but none of 

those susceptible animals have clinical signs 

compatible with HPAI. Premises objectively 

demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, 

Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk 

Premises may seek to move susceptible animals or 

products within the Control Area by permit. Only AtRisk Premises are eligible to become Monitored 

Premises.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone

Monitored Premises (MP)3 Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an 

Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect 

Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to 

become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises 

meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move 

susceptible animals or products out of the Control 

Area by permit.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone

Free Premises (FP) Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact 

or Suspect Premises.

Surveillance Zone, Free 

Area

Vaccinated Premises (VP) Premises where emergency vaccination has been 

performed. This may be a secondary premises 

designation. 

Containment Vaccination 

Zone, Protection 

Vaccination Zone

3 The Secure Poultry Supply Plan sets out the “defined criteria” for Monitored Premises for 

this type of movement during an HPAI outbreak. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-19

Table 5-4. Summary of Zone and Area Designations

Zone/Area Definition

Infected Zone (IZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises.

Buffer Zone (BZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises.

Control Area (CA) Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area. The Surveillance Zone is 

part of the Free Area.

Free Area (FA) Area not included in any Control Area. Includes the Surveillance Zone.

Vaccination Zone (VZ) Emergency Vaccination Zone classified as either a Containment Vaccination 

Zone (typically inside a Control Area) or a Protection Vaccination Zone 

(typically outside a Control Area). This may be a secondary zone designation.

The Secure Poultry Plan has specific criteria for poultry premises to meet the 

definition of a MP. Please refer to the Secure Poultry Plan (which covers broilers, 

eggs, and turkeys) for more information.

Figure 5-3. Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises in HPAI Outbreak Response 

Zones and Areas Premises

Note: The Vaccination Zone can be either a Protection Vaccination Zone or Containment Vaccination Zone. 

Stamping-out is not pictured in these figures. The Surveillance Zone is part of the Free Area.
UPDATED May 2017 5-20

5.5.2 Epidemiological Investigation 

Epidemiological investigation and movement tracing during an outbreak are 

critical in controlling and eradicating HPAI in poultry. In an HPAI outbreak, the 

goals are to 

 assign a premises designation and priority of investigation within 6 hours 

of identifying a potential IP or CP through tracing activities. 

 identify all CP within 24 hours of identifying the IP or the initial CP. 

 enter tracing information into EMRS2 in 24-hour intervals or less. 

 determine within 96 hours of identifying the index case, the nature of the 

HPAI outbreak, identify the risk factors for transmission, and develop 

mitigation strategies. 

 collect trace-back and trace-forward information for at least 14–21 days 

before the appearance of clinical signs in HPAI infected poultry. 

 analyze epidemiological data at routine intervals so that information 

gathered can apply to response activities to rapidly and effectively control, 

contain, and eradicate HPAI. 

These measures aid in the control of HPAI and lessen the impact during the 

response effort. Appendix F provides two documents: (1) an epidemiological 

questionnaire used in turkey flocks in the recent HPAI outbreak, and (2) a casecontrol questionnaire used in layer flocks in the recent HPAI outbreak. 

The scope of any such questionnaire should be based on the circumstances of the 

outbreak, and is at the discretion of the IC and epidemiological subject matter 

experts. It is likely that any epidemiological questionnaire will need to be 

modified and tailored to the specific outbreak. 

The Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing SOP as well as the NAHEMS 

Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing both provide more 

information. 

5.5.3 Tracing 

Box 5-4 explains the fundamental importance of movement tracing in an HPAI 

response effort. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-21

Box 5-4. Importance of Movement Tracing in HPAI Outbreak 

When resources or personnel are limited in a widespread outbreak, movements 

considered high-risk by the unified IC should be traced first, so that any necessary 

action can be rapidly taken to control and contain the spread of HPAI. Recent 

trace-forwards involving hatching eggs, hatchlings, or live poultry are typically 

the first priority. 

Based on guidance from the unified IC and National ICG, trace-back and traceforward information should ideally be collected for at least 14–21 days before the 

appearance of clinical signs in HPAI-infected poultry. Additional tracing 

information is collected for movements up to the time that quarantine was 

imposed. 

Tracing information is obtained from many sources (such as reports from field 

veterinarians, producers, industry, farm service providers, or the public). EMRS2

is used to collect and report tracing information; tracing information must be 

entered routinely, and ideally at 24-hour intervals or less depending on the 

requirements of the situation. 

5.5.4 Considerations for Size of Control Area and Minimum 

Sizes of Other Zones 

The perimeter of the CA should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the 

perimeter of the closest IP. The size of the CA depends on the circumstances of 

the outbreak, including the IP transmission pathways and estimates of 

transmission risk, poultry movement patterns and concentrations, distribution of 

susceptible wildlife in proximity, natural terrain, jurisdictional boundaries, and 

other factors. The boundaries of the CA can be modified or redefined when 

tracing and other epidemiological information becomes available. 

Table 5-5 provides a description of the minimum sizes of areas and zones. 

Table 5-6 reviews the factors used to determine the size of the CA. 

Tracing

One of the single most important and urgent veterinary activities during an HPAI outbreak 

is to rapidly and diligently trace-back and trace-forward movements from an IP. This 

tracing aids in the control of the spread of HPAI virus and limits the impact of the 

outbreak. Tracing should capture all movements to and from the premises including, but 

not limited to, susceptible poultry and livestock, non-susceptible species, animal products, 

vehicles, crops/grains, and personnel. Tracing also includes consideration of all potential 

modes of transmission and possible contact with wild birds. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-22

Table 5-5. Minimum Sizes of Areas and Zones

Zone or Area Minimum Size and Details

Infected Zone (IZ) Perimeter should be at least 3 km (~1.86 miles) beyond perimeters of 

presumptive or confirmed Infected Premises. Will depend on disease agent and 

epidemiological circumstances. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak 

continues.

Buffer Zone (BZ) Perimeter should be at least 7 km (~4.35 miles) beyond the perimeter of the 

Infected Zone. Width is generally not less than the minimum radius of the 

associated Infected Zone, but may be much larger. This zone may be redefined 

as the outbreak continues. 

Control Area (CA) Perimeter should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the perimeter of the 

closest Infected Premises. Please see Table 5-6 for factors that influence the 

size of the Control Area. This area may be redefined as the outbreak continues. 

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Width should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles), but may be much larger.

Table 5-6. Factors To Consider in Determining Control Area Size for HPAI

Factors Additional Details

Jurisdictional areas  Effectiveness and efficiency of administration

 Multi-jurisdictional considerations: local, State, Tribal, and multistate

Physical boundaries  Areas defined by geography

 Areas defined by distance between premises

HPAI epidemiology  Reproductive rate

 Incubation period

 Ease of transmission

 Infectious dose

 Species susceptibility

 Modes of transmission (fecal-oral, droplet, aerosol, vectors)

 Survivability in the environment

 Ease of diagnosis (for example, no pathognomonic signs; requires diagnostic 

laboratory testing)

Infected Premises 

characteristics

 Number of contacts

 Transmission pathways and transmission risk

 Extent of animal movement

 Number of animals

 Species of animals

 Age of animals

 Movement of traffic and personnel to and from premises (fomite spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place at time of outbreak

Contact Premises

characteristics

 Number and types of premises

 Susceptible animal populations and population density

 Animal movements

 Movement of traffic (fomites) and personnel to and from premises (fomite 

spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place prior to outbreak
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-23

Table 5-6. Factors To Consider in Determining Control Area Size for HPAI

Factors Additional Details

Environment  Types of premises in area or region

 Land use in area or region

 Susceptible wildlife and population density

 Wildlife as biological or mechanical vectors

Climate  Prevailing winds

General area, region, or 

agricultural sector biosecurity

 Biosecurity practices in place prior to outbreak

 Biosecurity practices implemented once outbreak detected

Number of backyard or 

transitional premises 

 Types of premises, animal movements, and network of animal and fomite 

movements

Continuity of business  Continuity of business plans and processes in place or activated at beginning 

of outbreak (such as surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises 

biosecurity, and risk-assessments)

 Permit processes, memorandums of understanding, and information 

management systems in place or activated at beginning of outbreak

5.6 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Information management and reporting during an HPAI incident or outbreak 

ensures that responders, stakeholders, and decision-makers have access to 

accurate and timely critical emergency response information. Ideally, Federal, 

State, Tribal, and local information management systems are compatible for 

information and data sharing. EMRS2 is the official USDA APHIS system of 

record in an HPAI outbreak. EMRS2 contains data on IP, permits (including 

for continuity of business activities), movements, and traces, among other 

information. 

5.6.1 Data Entry 

In an HPAI outbreak, the goal is to have EMRS2 data entry processes performed 

in 12-hour or shorter intervals. Data should be entered as quickly as possible. 

Data must be entered in both an accurate and consistent manner across 

widespread field operations: this is particularly important when there is more than 

one ICP. If possible, it may be necessary and/or beneficial to centralize certain 

data-entry capabilities, particularly when field resources are stretched. 

Field personnel should be provided with access to mobile technology devices 

necessary for collecting, monitoring, and sharing information. EMRS2Go is a 

mobile application which enables rapid and straightforward data entry into 

EMRS2 from the field. Rapidly functional, robust, and scalable information 

technology infrastructure is needed during an HPAI outbreak. 
 

UPDATED May 2017 5-24

5.6.2 Reporting 

Data entered into EMRS2 is used for internal and external situation reports 

produced daily, weekly, and as requested. It is also used to produce specific 

reports on key aspects of the response, such as permitting or deployments. Both 

the NIMT and National ICG rely on EMRS2 for producing accurate reports 

during an outbreak. It is imperative in an HPAI outbreak that information 

management, data quality, and data integrity is a priority. 

5.6.3 Information Management Systems and Tools 

In an HPAI outbreak, there are key systems which help to facilitate outbreak 

response. These include the following: 

 EMRS2, the USDA APHIS official system of record; 

 APHIS Emergency Qualifications System (EQS), managed by APHIS 

Dispatch personnel, used for requesting and deploying qualified personnel 

to the incident; 

 Laboratory Messaging System, which communicates (messages) 

laboratory results from NVSL and some NAHLN laboratories, including 

directly to EMRS2.4

Additionally, USDA APHIS leverages and tailors capabilities like ArcGIS and 

Tableau to communicate, illustrate, and analyze information from an HPAI 

incident. In addition to internal mapping and visualization capabilities, there is 

also now a public, online mapping tool—developed by CEAH—for HPAI 

planning. It is available here: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/maps/AnimalHealth/HPAI-Mapping. 

5.7 COMMUNICATION

The HPAI Communications SOP provides guidance on communication activities 

during an HPAI outbreak. This SOP covers the responsibilities of personnel and 

internal and external communication procedures. APHIS LPA serves as the 

primary liaison with the news media in the event of an HPAI outbreak. Under the 

ICS, a JIC is established. During an HPAI outbreak, APHIS LPA and the USDA 

Office of Communications staff the JIC. 

 

4

 Not all NAHLN laboratories currently have messaging capabilities. This is a high priority 

for USDA APHIS and the NAHLN laboratories. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-25

Effective communication during an HPAI outbreak may be carried out and 

maintained by achieving the following goals: 

 Briefing the media, public, industry, Congress, trading partners, and others 

on the HPAI outbreak status and the actions being taken to control and 

eradicate the disease. 

 Highlighting the importance of sound biosecurity practices and steps that 

producers and owners can take to protect their own flocks against HPAI 

infection. 

 Coordinating with Federal, State, and local agencies, Tribal entities, 

producer groups, and Land Grant University-based Cooperative Extension 

Services to ensure consistent messaging regarding animal health, public 

health, and food safety. 

 Assuring consumers that USDA is working on HPAI poultry health 

concerns, in an informed and timely manner. 

 Assuring the public that USDA is cooperating with the CDC on real and 

perceived threats of zoonotic disease. 

5.7.1 Objectives 

All HPAI communications must

 furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information; 

 maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the government’s 

ability to respond to an outbreak; 

 minimize public panic and fear; and 

 address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as possible. 

5.7.2 Key Messages 

Five key messages are conveyed in an HPAI outbreak (Box 5-5). 
 

UPDATED May 2017 5-26

Box 5-5. HPAI Communication Messages 

5.7.3 Further Communications Guidance 

In addition to the HPAI Communications SOP, the following resources provide 

guidance on communication and information about various stakeholder groups: 

 USDA AI website: www.usda.gov/birdflu. 

 APHIS AI website: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/ 

animalhealth/animal-disease-information/avian-influenza-disease. 

 A Partial Listing of FAD Stakeholders: 

www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/d

ocuments_manuals/fad_stakeholders_par_list.pdf. 

 CDC website on AI: www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/. 

 For information on the safe handling of poultry and poultry products, 

please see: www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safetyeducation/get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/poultry-preparation or 

www.foodsafety.gov. 

5.8 HEALTH AND SAFETY AND PERSONAL 

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

During an HPAI outbreak, responders are exposed to many hazards. Taking 

precautions to prevent adverse human health events related to emergency 

response efforts is important. In an HPAI response, personal protection and safety 

is particularly essential to protect individuals from HPAI. Even if there have been 

no documented human infections with the field strain of the outbreak, all strains 

of HPAI should be treated as potentially zoonotic. Typically, those at increased 

Key Communication Messages

Four key messages are conveyed to the public:

1. This detection does not signal the start of a human flu pandemic.

2. We are responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the virus.

3. Properly prepared eggs and poultry are safe to eat.

4. We are safeguarding the food supply.

An additional key message is conveyed to producers:

Protect your flocks with good biosecurity practices and be vigilant in 

reporting signs of illness.
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-27

risk for HPAI infection are personnel in prolonged and direct contact with 

infected birds in an enclosed setting. 

Upon the confirmation of HPAI, public health authorities should implement 

appropriate public health measures, including observation, prevention, and case 

management (as required). Influenza-like illness (ILI) monitoring is implemented 

for responders deployed to the field. APHIS works closely with the CDC and 

State/local health departments in developing any ILI protocol or other necessary 

response measures for responders. Unvaccinated responders are highly 

encouraged to immediately receive the current season’s inactivated influenza 

virus vaccine to reduce the possibility of dual infection with avian and human 

influenza A viruses and potential genetic reassortment. 

Personal protective equipment (PPE) is fundamental in ensuring personnel are 

protected from HPAI, as well as other hazards. Disposable or reusable outwear 

may be acceptable, and all workers involved in the depopulation, transport, or 

disposal of HPAI virus-infected poultry must be provided with appropriate PPE. 

All visitors and employees, regardless of their exposure, should be provided with 

disposable coveralls, boots, hats, and gloves for their use before entering 

premises. Proper disposal of this PPE is required after leaving. 

Daily pre-entry safety briefings should be provided for all response personnel. For 

further information on health, safety, and PPE, see the HPAI Health and Safety 

and PPE SOP. This SOP provides information on best practices to ensure the 

well-being and safety of all individuals involved in the response effort. Specific 

topics covered include the following: 

 Procedures to create a site-specific health and safety plan. 

 Details of hazard analysis, necessary training, and medical surveillance 

requirements. 

 Information on PPE, including Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration respirator fit testing. 

5.8.1 Mental Health Concerns 

The health and safety of all personnel is affected by the mental state of those 

involved in the HPAI response effort. An HPAI outbreak could have a significant 

psychological effect on both responders and owners of affected poultry. 

Quarantine and movement restrictions may also impact mental health in 

populations affected by such controls. Care should be taken in the event of an 

HPAI outbreak to consider and provide resources and directions for support. 

Incident Commanders should encourage reporting of such concerns; Safety 

Officers assigned to ICPs are a key resource for personnel. HHS has developed 

resources specifically for emergency and disaster responders, State and local 

planners, health professionals, and the general public at
 

UPDATED May 2017 5-28

https://emergency.cdc.gov/coping/index.asp; additional general mental health 

information is here: www.cdc.gov/mentalhealth. 

5.8.2 Further Information on Health, Safety, and Personal 

Protective Equipment 

In addition to the resources already listed, more information and guidance can be 

found in the following documents. 

 APHIS Safety & Health Manual

 CDC website on AI: www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/ 

 NAHEMS Guidelines: Health and Safety 

 NAHEMS Guidelines: Personal Protective Equipment 

 Incident-specific guidance, including PPE recommendations and health 

and safety guidance, are located at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

5.9 BIOSECURITY

An HPAI outbreak will have a serious impact on the agricultural industry, and 

could also impact public health. Strict biosecurity measures need to be 

implemented immediately, ideally before an outbreak, to prevent or slow the 

spread of HPAI. Enhanced biosecurity procedures should be implemented as 

quickly and effectively as possible with suspect or presumptive positive cases. 

Accordingly, veterinarians, owners, and anyone else in contact with enterprises 

that have poultry or other susceptible species need to observe biosecurity 

measures. 

Proper biosecurity measures have two functions: (1) containing the virus on IP

(biocontainment) and (2) preventing the introduction of the virus via movement of 

personnel and material to naïve poultry and premises (bioexclusion). During an 

HPAI outbreak, a careful balance must be maintained between facilitating 

response activities and ensuring personnel do not expose naïve animals and 

premises to HPAI. 

In the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, biosecurity breaches and 

inadequately implemented biosecurity measures were cited as one of multiple 

potential reasons for widespread HPAI transmission in the Midwest. Biosecurity 

is of utmost importance in controlling and containing the virus. 

Further information on biosecurity is discussed in the HPAI Biosecurity SOP

which provides guidance on how to draft a site-specific biosecurity plan and 

 identifies the roles and responsibilities of key personnel, 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-29

 explains biosecurity training and briefing requirements, 

 addresses site security and safety, 

 discusses biosecurity practices for shipping and transportation, and 

 provides a biosecurity checklist. 

In addition to the HPAI Biosecurity SOP, information and guidance on 

appropriate biosecurity measures in an HPAI outbreak can be found in the 

NAHEMS Guidelines: Biosecurity. Additional information for backyard flock 

owners is available on the Biosecurity for Birds website: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/animal-diseaseinformation/avian-influenza-disease/birdbiosecurity. For commercial producers, 

please refer to the Defend the Flock website: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/animal-diseaseinformation/avian-influenza-disease/defend-the-flock/defend-the-flock-bio-infocomm-poultry. 

Additionally, NPIP recently announced that the revised NPIP Program Standards 

document establishes new biosecurity principles. The notice in the Federal 

Register can be found here. The NPIP Program Standards and associated 

biosecurity principles can be found at the NPIP website: 

www.poultryimprovement.org. 

5.9.1 Biosecurity as Related to Health and Safety 

Health and safety of personnel is always the first priority. In outbreaks with 

zoonotic potential, such as HPAI, appropriate PPE is provided to persons 

involved in outbreak control and eradication as an additional biosecurity measure. 

For more information on health, safety, and PPE, see Section 5.8. USDA APHIS 

coordinates with Federal, State, and local public health agencies to minimize risk 

to responders and others exposed to HPAI. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-30

5.9.2 Biosecurity Hazards and Mitigating Measures 

Box 5-6 provides an example of selected biosecurity hazards that are likely to be 

encountered with an HPAI outbreak and the associated biosecurity measures to 

mitigate these risks. This list is not exhaustive. 

Box 5-6. HPAI Biosecurity Hazards and Appropriate Biosecurity Measures 

Biosecurity Hazards

 Movement of poultry, other

livestock, vehicles, equipment,

and people.

 Contaminated feed and water.

 Contact with poultry and other

HPAI-susceptible animals.

Biosecurity Measures to Mitigate Risk

 Clean and disinfect premises, vehicles, and

equipment, and dispose of materials that cannot be

disinfected in an appropriate manner.

 Account for the movement of all poultry, livestock,

and equipment for accurate records.

 Provide a location for all individuals to carry out

appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures and

insist these measures be followed.

 Ensure that housed poultry remain housed and that

entry of rodents, ground water, and wild birds is

prevented.

 Prevent close or direct contact between poultry and

other species reared outside.

In some cases, responders may own poultry or birds at their residence. Incident 

Commanders should be aware of this possibility, and if personnel are traveling 

between their residence and their assigned location each day, this risk needs to be 

immediately mitigated. The unified IC recommends appropriate measures, which 

may include avoiding contact with their own poultry for the duration of 

deployment or being assigned to the ICP for other activities that do not involve 

contact with infected birds or material. Personnel are urged to protect their own 

flocks from HPAI. 

5.9.3 Closed Flocks 

In the event of an HPAI outbreak, one of the most fundamental biosecurity 

measures is closed flocks. Box 5-7 provides guidance on employing closed flocks 

as a critical biosecurity measure. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-31

Box 5-7. Biosecurity Measure—Closed Flocks 

5.9.4 Waiting Period 

Another important biosecurity measure is to ensure personnel are not travelling 

between IP and unknown or uninfected premises. During an HPAI outbreak, it is 

important that personnel—in addition to following strict and appropriate 

biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection protocols—wait the allotted time 

between premises visits. Actual waiting periods are recommended by IC on the 

basis of the outbreak circumstances, and need for personnel. Typical waiting 

times may vary between 12 and 72 hours. Regardless of wait time, team members 

should not travel directly from an IP or SP to an unknown or uninfected premises. 

However, personnel may travel between IP, if proper mitigating procedures are 

followed. Extended avoidance periods may be unnecessary with stringent 

biosecurity practices and effective cleaning and disinfection protocols. 

Responding veterinarians and other personnel should adhere to the guidance 

provided by the local IC; it is critical to remember that any real or perceived 

belief that responders are spreading HPAI is incredibly detrimental to the 

response effort. For example, when and where possible, responders may be able 

to avoid the need to enter premises that are not infected and interact with 

unaffected poultry by meeting producers at the end of their driveway. 

5.10 QUARANTINE AND MOVEMENT CONTROL

By restricting the movement of infected animals, animal products, and 

contaminated fomites, quarantine and movement control can be a powerful tool in 

controlling and eradicating an HPAI outbreak. Movement control is accomplished 

through a permit system that allows entities to make necessary permitted 

movements without creating an unacceptable risk of disease spread. EMRS2 is the 

system of record for permits and permitted movements made into, within, and out 

of the HPAI CAs. Movement control procedures are based on the best scientific 

information available at the time, and all personnel—premises owners, managers, 

and responders—should adhere to these measures. 

When HPAI is detected, SAHOs and Tribal officials issue a quarantine, hold 

order, or standstill notice for the IP based on the authority of the affected State. 

Biosecurity: Closed Flocks

 To the fullest extent possible, close the flock or herd to the introduction of new poultry 

and other livestock (with population increases occurring only from offspring).

 If closing a flock is not possible, isolate newly introduced poultry (from the healthiest 

possible sources) and those returning from existing flocks or herds for 30 days or more.

 Vaccination status of introduced poultry should be known and well-documented. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-32

This action is based on statutes and regulations of the affected State, and varies by 

State. Within 6 hours of the identification of the index case, the Incident 

Commander, Operations Section, and Planning Section in a unified IC coordinate 

to establish an IZ and a BZ (a CA). Once the CA (IZ plus BZ) is established, 

quarantine and movement controls are implemented as rapidly as possible by the 

unified IC. Appendix G contains examples of movement control notices. 

It is important that quarantine and movement controls, while critical to stopping 

disease transmission, also consider competing priorities: in implementing 

measures, the unified IC must weigh the risk of disease transmission against the 

need for critical movements (e.g., feed trucks) and business continuity. 

Each State’s animal health emergency response plan should describe the 

implementation of quarantine and movement controls. In some cases, USDA may 

impose a Federal quarantine (under the AHPA and CFR authorities) when 

requested by SAHOs or as directed by the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict 

interstate commerce from the infected State(s). States may be asked to provide 

resources to maintain and enforce the quarantine; reimbursement formulas for 

these activities would be established between the States and USDA via 

cooperative agreement. Federal quarantines may or may not be issued depending 

on the outbreak situation; in recent HPAI outbreaks, Federal quarantines have not 

been implemented. See Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and 

Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) for further information on authorities and 

funding. 

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Quarantine and Movement Control provides 

information on measures considered necessary to prevent the spread of HPAI 

through movement, including (1) keeping HPAI out of poultry populations in 

areas free of HPAI and (2) preventing the spread of HPAI to non-infected poultry 

in areas where HPAI exists. 

5.10.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations 

In addition to working to establish the boundaries of the CA, the Incident 

Commander works with the Operations Section and Planning Section to 

determine appropriate premises designations in the event of an HPAI outbreak. 

These zone, area, and premises designations are used for quarantine and 

movement control efforts. Again, refer to Tables 5-3 and 5-4 and Figure 5-3 for 

the designations used here. 

5.10.2 Movement Guidance into, within, and out 

of a Control Area 

During an HPAI outbreak, the following guidance in Table 5-7 (movement into a 

CA), Table 5-8 (movement within a CA), and Table 5-9 (movement out of a CA) 

is used to issue permits in permitted movement control efforts. For general 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-33

information and guidance on permitting, please see the document Permitted 

Movement (FAD PReP Manual 6-0). This document provides comprehensive 

information on permits, permitted movements, roles and responsibilities for 

permitted movement with regard to a CA, information about EMRS2 and 

permitting, and a detailed review of the permitting process. 

The guidance provided in Tables 5-7 to 5-9 is general; as noted in the Permitted 

Movement manual, States and/or APHIS officials, depending on the outbreak 

situation, may vary how At-Risk and Monitored Premises are managed during an 

outbreak and what is required for movement to/from these types of premises. This 

may vary between States as well as between disease outbreaks, depending on the 

size, scope, and epidemiological situation. 

For Secure Food Supply permits and for more information on permit guidance for 

turkeys, broilers, and eggs, please see the Secure Poultry Supply Plan, which 

covers these commodities, and is further discussed in Section 5.11. Additional 

information is also provided in Appendix C. Please note that for permitted 

movement (which, by definition, involves the CA) under the Secure Poultry 

Supply Plan, premises must have a premises identification number (PIN). 

Premises are encouraged to obtain a PIN prior to an outbreak to facilitate permit 

requests during an incident. 

For movement of susceptible poultry and poultry products out of the CA to an 

FA, the permit process occurs as described in the document entitled Permitted 

Movement (FAD PReP Manual 6-0). This includes approval from the origin State, 

and if interstate, the destination State. Requirements for a permit may vary 

depending on the permit, which takes into consideration the incident, national 

standards, state regulations, applicable OIE standards, and conditions for the 

particular permitted movement(s) such as biosecurity procedures and risk 

assessment recommendations. In addition, commodity-specific proactive risk 

assessments, continuity of business plans, movement and marketability plans, and 

compartmentalization plans (as available or applicable) are considered. Figure 5-4

illustrates premises designations in relation to permitting and movement control. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-34

Table 5-7. Movement into a Control Area from Outside a Control Area (to Specific Premises)a

Item Moving into a Control 

Area to a/an...

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premisesc

Contact 

Premisesc

At-Risk 

Premises

Monitored 

Premises

Poultryb Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Permit for movement 

must be approved by 

the IC with appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Permit for movement 

must be approved by 

the IC with appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Poultry products See continuity of business plans (Secure Poultry Supply Plan) for information on susceptible poultry products, or guidance and 

processes as determined by the unified IC. Please see Section 5.10.5 which contains OIE AI-specific guidance for inactivating AI. In 

addition, Appendix C contains information on the Secure Poultry Supply Plan for commodity-specific movement guidance during an 

HPAI outbreak.

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from premises 

with poultry

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement depending 

on HPAI epidemiology 

and characteristics of 

destination premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement depending 

on HPAI epidemiology 

and characteristics of 

destination premises.

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from premises 

without poultry

IC will determine 

movement restrictions 

based on HPAI 

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

IC will determine 

movement restrictions 

based on HPAI 

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

IC will determine 

movement restrictions 

based on HPAI 

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement depending 

on HPAI epidemiology 

and characteristics of 

destination premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement depending 

on HPAI epidemiology 

and characteristics of 

destination premises.

Equipment, vehicles, and 

other fomites from premises 

with poultry

Allowed with appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed with appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos from 

poultry

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permitted movement processes may change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

b May include pet birds and other susceptible species as defined by IC during the outbreak.

c Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these premises should be re-designated before 

movements occur.
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-35

Table 5-8. Movement within a Control Areaa

Item Moving within a Control 

Area from a/an....

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premisesc

Contact 

Premisesc

At-Risk 

Premises

Monitored 

Premises

Poultryb Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Poultry products See continuity of business plans (Secure Poultry Supply Plan) for information on susceptible poultry products, or guidance and 

processes as determined by the unified IC. Please see Section 5.10.5 which contains OIE AI-specific guidance for inactivating AI. In 

addition, Appendix C contains information on the Secure Poultry Supply Plan for commodity-specific movement guidance during an 

HPAI outbreak.

Other animals (nonsusceptible livestock or

poultry) from premises with 

poultry

Prohibited unless specific 

permit granted by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from premises 

without poultry

Not Applicable (N/A)

(Infected Premises have 

poultry)

N/A

(Suspect Premises have 

poultry)

N/A

(Contact Premises have 

poultry)

N/A

(At-Risk Premises 

have poultry)

N/A

(Monitored Premises 

have poultry)

Equipment, vehicles, and 

other fomites from premises 

with poultry

Prohibited unless specific 

permit granted by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos from poultry Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permitted movement processes may change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

b May include pet birds and other susceptible species as defined by IC during the outbreak.

c Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these premises should be re-designated before movements 

occur.
UPDATED May 2017 5-36

Table 5-9. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area (from Specific Premises)a

Item Moving out of a Control 

Area from a/an...

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premisesc

Contact 

Premisesc

At-Risk 

Premises

Monitored 

Premisesd

Poultryb Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC.

Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC.

Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC.

At-Risk Premises 

must become

Monitored Premises 

to move susceptible 

poultry out of a 

Control Area.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by IC; 

surveillance, negative 

diagnostic tests, 

premises biosecurity, 

and risk-assessment 

may be required for 

permit.

Poultry products See continuity of business plans (Secure Poultry Supply Plan) for information on susceptible poultry products, or guidance and processes as 

determined by the unified IC. Please see Section 5.10.5 which contains OIE AI-specific guidance for inactivating AI. In addition, Appendix C

contains information on the Secure Poultry Supply Plan for commodity-specific movement guidance during an HPAI outbreak.

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from premises 

with poultry

Prohibited unless specific 

permit approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures and riskassessment.

Prohibited unless specific 

permit approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity measures 

and risk-assessment.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit approved 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures 

and risk-assessment.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by IC; 

surveillance and 

negative diagnostic 

tests for susceptible 

poultry on premises, 

premises biosecurity, 

and risk-assessment 

may be required for 

permit.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by IC; 

surveillance and 

negative diagnostic tests 

for susceptible poultry on 

premises, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from premises 

without poultry

N/A

(Infected Premises have 

poultry)

N/A

(Suspect Premises have 

poultry)

N/A

(Contact Premises have 

poultry)

N/A

(At-Risk Premises have 

poultry)

N/A

(Monitored Premises 

have poultry)

Equipment, vehicles, and other 

fomites from premises with 

poultry

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos from poultry Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. At-Risk Premises must 

become Monitored 

Premises to move 

semen, embryos from 

susceptible poultry out 

of a Control Area.

Monitored Premises only 

allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permitted movement processes may change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

b May include pet birds and other susceptible species as defined by IC during the outbreak.

c Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these premises should be re-designated before movements 

occur.

d Continuity of business plans (the Secure Poultry Supply Plan) may apply.
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-37

Figure 5-4. Premises Designations in Relation to Permitting 

and Movement Control 

Infected 

Premises Quarantine and depopulation No products leave premises

Suspect Premises: Birds 

show clinical signs of HPAI? Quarantine Infected 

Premises PCR test positive?Confirmation?

Contact

 Premises?

PCR test 

negative & 

mortality normal At-Risk 

Premisesa

 Quarantine Infected 

Premises

At-Risk Premises  Epi invest. 

complete  Diagnostic 

negative  Biosecurity 

measures Requirements 

for Monitored 

Premises met? Monitored 

Premises

Premises 

outside of Infected & Buffer Zone? Free Premises

YES NO YES

YES YES

NO

YES YES

YES NO

NO

NO YES

YES YES YES

Decision Point

Monitored 

Premisesa

Monitored 

Premisesa

Meets req’s 

for Monitored 

Premises

Meets req’s 

for Monitored 

Premises

Request permit 

to move out of 

Control Area YES

PCR test 

negative & 

mortality normal

NO At-Risk 

Premises YES a Meets req’s 

for At-Risk 

Premises

Meets req’s 

for At-Risk 

Premises

Request permit 

to move within 

Control Area

Request permit 

to move within 

Control Area

PCR test positive?

Confirmation?

a

 Continuity of business plans (the Secure Poultry Supply Plan) may apply.
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-38

5.10.3 Moving Commodities, Poultry, and Conveyances 

in an HPAI Outbreak 

Any movement of commodities, animals, and conveyances brings some level of 

risk of HPAI transmission from a known or unknown IP to non-infected premises. 

The risk of moving commodities, poultry, and conveyances depends on the nature 

of the item being moved and its ability to transmit or be contaminated with HPAI. 

HPAI can be transmitted via items that contain biological material (such as 

manure), through infected animals, or via a contaminated fomite or person. 

5.10.4 Guidance for All Premises 

Because of the variation in the risk of the commodities, animals, and conveyances 

which move regularly in the poultry industries, it is possible that movements of 

one type of commodity, animal, or conveyance are allowed, but other types are 

not—even from the same premises. In making decisions regarding permit 

requests, substantial consideration is given to critical movements (to ensure 

animal welfare, such as feed trucks) and essential movements (related to response 

activities like depopulation and disposal). Please see Permitted Movement (FAD 

PReP Manual 6-0) for more information. 

5.10.5 OIE Treatment Guidelines for HPAI 

The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016) provides guidance for the 

inactivation of AI virus in eggs, egg products, and meat. The Code also provides 

extensive information on the importation of various poultry products, including 

feather meal, down, meat products, and other products of poultry origin, including 

those intended for animal feeding or industrial use. The procedures for 

inactivating AI virus in eggs, egg products, and meat are reproduced here for easy 

reference, and should be considered in any movement control and permitting 

during an outbreak. 

5.10.5.1 PROCEDURES FOR THE INACTIVATION OF THE AI VIRUS IN EGGS 

AND EGG PRODUCTS (ARTICLE 10.4.25) 

Table 5-10 lists times for industry standard temperatures suitable for the 

inactivation of AI virus present in eggs and egg products: 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-39

Table 5-10. Inactivation of AI in Eggs and Egg Products

Temperature (°C) Time

Whole egg 60.0 188 seconds

Whole egg blends 60.0 188 seconds

Whole egg blends 61.1 94 seconds

Liquid egg white 55.6 870 seconds

Liquid egg white 56.7 232 seconds

10% salted yolk 62.2 138 seconds

Dried egg white 67.0 20 hours

Dried egg white 54.4 513 hours

Note: The listed temperatures are indicative of a range that achieves a 

7-log kill. Where scientifically documented, variances from these times and 

temperatures may also be suitable when they achieve the inactivation of 

the virus.

5.10.5.2 PROCEDURES FOR THE INACTIVATION OF THE AI VIRUS IN MEAT 

(ARTICLE 10.4.26) 

Table 5-11 lists times for industry standard temperatures are suitable for the 

inactivation of AI virus present in meat. 

Table 5-11. Inactivation of AI in Meat

Temperature (°C) Time

Poultry meat 60.0 507 seconds

65.0 42 seconds

70.0 3.5 seconds

73.9 0.51 seconds

Note: The listed temperatures are indicative of a range that achieves a 

7-log kill. Where scientifically documented, variances from these times 

and temperatures may also be suitable when they achieve the inactivation 

of the virus.

5.10.6 Surveillance Required for Poultry 

and Poultry Product Movement 

Surveillance measures are required for movement of poultry and poultry products 

for premises located in the CA (IZ and BZ). These steps include visual 

surveillance and monitoring of production parameters, as well as diagnostic 

testing as specified in the Secure Poultry Supply Plan or directed by the unified 

IC. Depending on the specific type of movement and item moved, diagnostic 

testing is often required for 2 days prior to movement; one sample with negative 

diagnostic results is typically required 24-hours prior to movement. For more 

information on poultry and poultry product movement, and the specific 

surveillance requirements, see Section 5.11 and the Secure Poultry Supply Plan. 
 

UPDATED May 2017 5-40

In some cases (e.g., widespread HPAI infection) States or the unified IC may elect 

to implement additional surveillance and testing measures—beyond those 

required by continuity of business plans—for specific movements, such as those 

involving live birds or other high-risk movements. In some situations, additional 

requirements may extend to include premises residing in the FA. 

5.11 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS

Continuity of business is the management of non-infected premises and noncontaminated animal products in the event of an HPAI outbreak. Continuity of 

business provides science- and risk-based approaches and systems as a critical 

activity in an HPAI response. This helps to facilitate agriculture and food 

industries maintain typical business, or return to business during a disease 

response, while the risk of disease spread and threat to public health is effectively 

managed. Continuity of business planning can help to minimize unintended 

consequences on producers and consumers impacted by HPAI. During an HPAI 

outbreak, permitting, movement control, and prioritized disruptions—all based on 

science- and risk-based approaches—are critical measures to ensure continuity of 

business during an HPAI outbreak. USDA APHIS uses EMRS2 to record 

permitted movement during an FAD incident. EMRS2 may be used to issue 

permits for permitted movements, including those for continuity of business. For 

more information on permitting in EMRS2, and an overview of the EMRS2 

Customer Permit Gateway that producers can use to request permits, please see 

Permitted Movement (Manual 6-0). 

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Continuity of Business covers topics such as 

 preparedness and response goals, 

 key roles and responsibilities in continuity of business planning, 

 details of continuity of business as part of an FAD response, and 

 potential components required for a continuity of business plan. 

For more information on continuity of business for an HPAI outbreak, please 

refer to the Secure Poultry Supply Plan which provides guidance for eggs, egg 

products, turkeys, and broilers, including surveillance, biosecurity, cleaning and 

disinfection, and other procedures for movement during an HPAI outbreak.5

 

5

 These plans were previously known individually as the Secure Egg Supply Plan, Secure 

Broiler Supply Plan, and Secure Turkey Supply Plan. They have been unified under the Secure 

Egg Supply Plan, though individual guidance is still available for each of the different 

commodities and products. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-41

5.12 REGIONALIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

(FOR A U.S. HPAI RESPONSE) 

In the event of an HPAI outbreak in the United States, international trade of 

animals and animal products may be adversely affected for a significant period of 

time. This would have serious economic implications for the affected industries 

and the United States. Therefore it is important to identify, prior to an outbreak, 

potential procedures and plans that may mitigate the consequences and reestablish 

international trade as rapidly as possible. 

As defined by the OIE, regionalization, also known as zoning, is the concept of 

separating subpopulations of animals in order to maintain a specific health status 

in one or more disease-free regions or zones. Disease-free regions can be created 

to facilitate continuity of business and reestablish international trade from the 

regions demonstrated to be disease-free. Regionalization recognizes that risk may 

be tied to factors that are not reflected by political boundaries of the nation or 

individual States, especially when the outbreak has been confined to specific areas 

within an individual State or group of States. Providing information to the OIE, its 

member countries and our trading partners, which clearly identifies the 

boundaries of the disease-free areas, can be used to inform our trading partners’

decisions whether to receive or reject our exports. This risk-based process, based 

on sound science, can mitigate the adverse economic effects of an HPAI outbreak. 

In the widespread 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak, many (but not all) trading 

partners—based on the evidence the United States provided to the OIE and other 

countries—did decide to regionalize the United States and ban exports only from 

affected counties or States. This allowed exports from unaffected regions to 

continue, mitigating the overall economic impact of the outbreak and indicating 

the importance of regionalization efforts with trading partners. 

5.12.1 Compartmentalization 

Another tool that may potentially mitigate the economic consequences of a 

disease outbreak is compartmentalization. Compartmentalization, which defines 

an animal subpopulation by management and husbandry practices related to 

biosecurity, could be used by the veterinary authorities to demonstrate and 

maintain disease freedom in certain commercial establishments whose practices 

have prevented the introduction of the disease. The disease-free status of these 

compartments could enable trade movement of poultry and poultry products. 

Compartmentalization has not been fully implemented by the United States for 

any disease agent to-date, and will depend on the recognition of the status of these 

compartments by international trading partners. Implementation of 

compartmentalization will rely on producers, industry, and State and Federal 

animal health authorities. By working closely together to develop and strengthen 

relationships and implementing the agreed upon procedures proceeding an FAD 

outbreak, compartmentalization may be a useful tool. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-42

5.12.2 Further Guidance 

The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016) also offers guidance on 

regionalization and compartmentalization in Chapters 4.3 and 4.4. Currently there 

are no internationally accepted or fully implemented HPAI-free compartments in 

the United States. 

5.13 MASS DEPOPULATION AND EUTHANASIA

5.13.1 Overview 

When the criteria for a presumptive positive have been met (per the HPAI case 

definition), the APHIS Administrator or VS Deputy Administrator (U.S. CVO) or 

their designee authorizes APHIS personnel—in conjunction with State and Tribal 

officials, and unified IC personnel—to initiate depopulation on IP. Investigation 

of CP is also authorized at this time. Depopulation of poultry on CP, or poultry 

meeting the suspect case definition, may also be authorized by APHIS officials 

in coordination with State and Tribal officials and the unified IC—depending on 

epidemiological information and outbreak characteristics. Preemptive 

depopulation of poultry on other premises in the Infected Zone (typically 3 km 

around the IP) may also be authorized. 

Indemnity for depopulated poultry is authorized by APHIS as funds are available. 

The final determination to depopulate entire Infected Premises, or specific 

houses/barns on Infected Premises, or depopulate Contact Premises, is made by 

SAHOs/Tribal officials and APHIS. 

Best practices for containment and eradication of HPAI require rapid 

depopulation of infected poultry. Swift-stamping-out is required to prevent the 

amplification of HPAI virus and subsequent environmental contamination. In all 

cases, depopulation activities must incorporate excellent biosecurity practices to 

control the HPAI virus and prevent further transmission. 

5.13.2 APHIS Stamping-Out and Depopulation Policy 

Based on the experiences of the 2014–2015 outbreak, USDA APHIS developed a 

document HPAI Outbreak: Stamping-Out & Depopulation Policy (available from 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep). In addition to this section, please refer to this 

document for further information. 

5.13.2.1 BEST PRACTICE GUIDANCE

Mass depopulation and euthanasia are not synonymous, and APHIS recognizes a 

clear distinction. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as 

painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass depopulation is a method by which 

large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much 

consideration given to the welfare of animals as practicable, given extenuating 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-43

circumstances. Mass depopulation is employed in an HPAI outbreak as a response 

measure to prevent or mitigate the spread of HPAI through the elimination of 

infected or potentially infected poultry. 

As stated by the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) on their 

website, “mass depopulation refers to methods by which large numbers of animals 

must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the 

welfare of the animals as practicable, but where the circumstances and tasks 

facing those doing the depopulation are understood to be extenuating.”6

 AVMA is 

currently developing guidelines specifically on depopulation activities, which 

“aim to ensure as much consideration is given to animal welfare as practicable 

given the constraints of an emergency event.”7

In the event of an HPAI outbreak, euthanasia or mass depopulation should be 

provided to affected poultry as safely, quickly, efficiently, and humanely as 

possible. In addition, the emotional and psychological impact on animal owners, 

caretakers, their families, and other personnel should be minimized. 

Qualified personnel should perform mass depopulation in the event of an HPAI 

outbreak using the safest, quickest, and most humane procedures available. In an 

HPAI outbreak, it is likely that contactor support for 3D (depopulation, 

decontamination, and disposal) activities is required for both personnel and 

materials. This should be coordinated with the SPRS Logistics Center through the 

ICG. 

5.13.2.2 OIE DEFINITION OF STAMPING-OUT

The United States’ primary control and eradication strategy for HPAI in domestic 

poultry, as defined by international standards and the OIE, is “stamping-out.” 

“Stamping-out” is defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016) as 

the 

killing of animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected 

in the herd and, where appropriate, those in other herds which have been 

exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, or by indirect 

contact with the casual pathogen; animals should be killed in accordance 

with OIE Chapter 7.6. 

5.13.2.3 DEPOPULATION GOAL & METHODS

Due to the risk of virus amplification in infected poultry, poultry that meet the 

HPAI presumptive positive case definition are depopulated as soon as possible, 

with the depopulation goal of 24-hours or less. Infected poultry shed large 

 

6

 American Veterinary Medical Association. (2017). Poultry Depopulation. Retrieved from 

https://www.avma.org/KB/Policies/Pages/Poultry-Depopulation.aspx. 

7

 American Veterinary Medical Association. (2017). Depopulation. Retrieved from 

https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Reference/AnimalWelfare/Pages/Depopulation.aspx. 
 

UPDATED May 2017 5-44

amounts of HPAI virus, making control and eradication of HPAI more difficult 

and increasing the potential for environmental contamination. 

In almost all cases, water-based foam or carbon dioxide are the depopulation 

methods available to rapidly stamp-out the HPAI virus in poultry. Each premises 

is evaluated individually, considering epidemiological information, housing and 

environmental conditions, currently available resources and personnel, and other 

relevant factors. However, to meet the goal of depopulation within 24 hours and 

halt virus production, other alternative methods may also be considered by State 

and APHIS officials. 

5.13.3 Additional Information 

Please refer to the APHIS FAD PReP website for current HPAI response and 

policy guidance on depopulation, including the document Ventilation Shutdown 

Evidence & Policy (www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep). 

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia also contains 

additional information on euthanasia and mass depopulation methods for poultry, 

including the following: 

 carbon dioxide or other gas, 

 water-based foam concentrate, and 

 other methods. 

5.14 DISPOSAL

Appropriate disposal of animal carcasses and materials is a critical component of 

a successful HPAI response. HPAI can survive for long periods on both organic 

and inorganic materials. The Disposal SOP discusses how to dispose of thousands 

of bird carcasses, contaminated and potentially contaminated materials, poultry 

products, items that cannot be properly cleaned and disinfected (such as manure, 

litter, and bedding), products of the response effort (such as PPE), and products of 

vaccination response. Disposal occurs as soon as possible after flock 

depopulation. 

There are multiple options for disposal. Composting and disposal by managed 

landfill are two methods that address the need to minimize negative 

environmental impact while also mitigating virus spread. Composting was 

implemented in the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak on many premises; it can be 

performed on-site, either “in-house” or outdoors (with the appropriate cleaning 

and disinfection/biosecurity measures implemented in either case). Composting 

materials are likely to be readily available (e.g., a carbon source, in particular). 

Managed landfills may be equipped to handle such waste appropriately, though 

their ability or willingness to accept carcasses may vary. Incineration is another 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-45

option, though fuel requirements, lower capacities, and smoke discharge can be 

challenging. On-site burial has been a commonly accepted means of disposal, 

though it may present significant issues related to potential environmental 

contamination. Off-site burial may also be considered in a large HPAI incident. In 

a widespread outbreak, multiple means of disposal may be required. 

Please see the Disposal SOP for more details on any of the disposal methods 

mentioned. Other methods such as digestion, rendering, and hydrolysis may be 

considered, as indicated by the circumstances of the outbreak and disposal 

requirements. Disposal methods should always be assessed and applied 

appropriately, given the facility location, type of housing, premises 

characteristics, and other situational factors. Subject matter experts (i.e., for 

composting) are available to assist field personnel to ensure disposal methods are 

efficient and effective. 

Disposal must always occur in a biosecure way that does not allow HPAI virus to 

spread and minimizes negative environmental impact. In addition, local and State 

regulations must be observed or memorandums of understanding must be 

obtained to ensure disposal capability. The unified IC coordinates closely with 

local authorities in deciding how to dispose of carcasses and other items. Cost 

effectiveness and stakeholder acceptance must also be considered in disposal 

decisions. If movement is required for disposal, the unified IC must permit such 

movement. In the event that available personnel are insufficient for disposal 

requirements in an HPAI outbreak, the Incident Commander can request 

emergency 3D contractor support from the SPRS Logistics Center through the 

ICG. The NAHEMS Guidelines: Disposal contains further guidance on disposal. 

5.15 CLEANING AND DISINFECTION

5.15.1 Cost Effective Virus Elimination from Infected 

Premises 

Because of HPAI’s high survival rate on both organic and inorganic materials, 

aggressive cleaning and disinfection practices are required for both ongoing 

biosecurity measures to contain the HPAI virus to IP and to eliminate virus from 

contaminated equipment, materials, and all other fomites. Cleaning and 

disinfection steps are necessary to control and eliminate HPAI during an outbreak. 

Cleaning is the removal of gross contamination, organic material, and debris from 

the premises and their structures. This can be conducted through a mechanical 

means like sweeping (dry cleaning) and/or the use of water and a soap or 

detergent (wet cleaning). The goal is to minimize the remaining organic material 

so disinfection can be effective. Disinfection refers to the methods that are used 

on surfaces to destroy or eliminate HPAI virus. This can be physical (e.g., heat) or 

chemical (e.g., disinfectant). A combination of methods may be required; 

generally a premises must be both cleaned and disinfected, based on the 

recommendation of the unified IC. All disinfectants must be Environmental 
UPDATED May 2017 5-46

Protection Agency (EPA)-approved for AI; off-label use of disinfectants is illegal. 

The ICG and unified IC provide guidance on the available options for both 

cleaning and disinfection. 

Cleaning and disinfection practices during an outbreak should focus on virus 

elimination in a cost effective manner. While traditionally wet cleaning and 

disinfectant have been performed in many incidents, dry cleaning and heating of 

the houses/barns may be a preferred approach during a widespread HPAI 

outbreak. Any method selected should consider the characteristics of the 

premises/houses and other factors which may impact the effectiveness of the virus 

elimination activities. For example, freezing or sub-zero temperatures may make 

certain techniques impractical and unsuccessful. USDA continues to seek novel 

methods for cleaning and disinfection activities, and modify recommendations 

based on new scientific information on virus elimination methods. 

Depending on the disposal method, initial cleaning and disinfection may occur 

prior to final cleaning and disinfection—for example, if compost piles are set 

inside a house, the house cannot be cleaned and disinfected until those compost 

piles are removed. However, the initial cleaning and disinfection on vehicles, 

equipment, and outdoor areas can be completed prior to the final cleaning and 

disinfection of the entire premises. Any cleaning and disinfection steps on 

Infected Premises need to account for water and feeding systems, ventilation, 

slats, nest box material, egg packing machines, egg storage areas, floor areas, the 

exterior of the house, and other materials and areas must be cleaned and 

disinfected (this is not an all-inclusive list). 

5.15.2 Premises that Can’t Be Cleaned and Disinfected

In the unusual circumstance in which commercial premises cannot be cleaned and 

disinfected, fallowing for 120-days—or a period recommended by the unified 

IC—is prescribed. The length of this period varies depending on ambient 

temperature and season. Fallowing should be reserved for premises that would 

need to be completely repaired or destroyed in order to be effectively cleaned and 

disinfected. An inspection may be required by the SAHO or APHIS at the end of 

the fallow period. 

5.15.3 Further Information 

The Cleaning and Disinfection SOP provides information on

 the HPAI cleaning and disinfection effort, 

 optimal cleaning and disinfection methods for HPAI, 

 processes used to inactivate HPAI from organic materials, 

 how to clean and disinfect equipment and premises after HPAI detection, 

and 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-47

 EPA antimicrobial products registered for use against avian influenza A 

viruses: http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-

09/documents/list-m-avianflu.pdf. 

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Cleaning and Disinfection and associated educational 

materials contain additional information on cleaning and disinfection. 

5.16 VACCINATION

Although stamping-out is the preferred and primary strategy for controlling and 

eradicating HPAI in the event of an outbreak, emergency vaccination may be 

considered in specific circumstances. However, even if some type of emergency 

vaccination strategy is implemented, stamping-out will always be part of any 

HPAI response policy. 

5.16.1 Emergency Vaccination Strategies for Poultry 

There are two distinct purposes of emergency vaccination: 

1. Emergency vaccination to kill

a. A suppressive emergency vaccination strategy.

b. The goal is to suppress virus replication in high-risk susceptible

poultry using emergency vaccination and then killing vaccinates at a

later date as determined by unified IC and the VS Deputy

Administrator (U.S. CVO).

c. Target vaccination of high-risk susceptible poultry in an IZ, CA, or

VZ. Ring or regional vaccination around an IP or an IZ is a frequently

cited example of this strategy.

2. Emergency vaccination to live

a. A protective emergency vaccination strategy.

b. The goal is to protect susceptible poultry from infection using

emergency vaccination with the deliberate intent to maintain

vaccinates for the duration of their usefulness.

c. Targeted vaccination may include layers, valuable genetic stock, or

endangered birds.

Appendix H contains information on available HPAI vaccine. The NAHEMS 

Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases—Appendix C: Vaccination for 

HPAI contains more information. 
 

UPDATED May 2017 5-48

5.16.2 Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals 

and Surveillance of Vaccinated Flocks 

Emergency vaccination requires vaccinated animal traceability and the diagnostic 

capability to differentiate infected and vaccinated animals (also known as a DIVA 

strategy) for movement between zones, interstate commerce, and international 

trade. In addition, even if a vaccine is used, surveillance must be continued to 

detect any antigenic change of the circulating influenza virus. 

The DIVA strategy can help to control an HPAI outbreak and is fundamental to 

safeguarding international trade. It may employ 

 serological and viral detection in unvaccinated sentinels placed in a 

vaccinated flock, and 

 viral detection in vaccinated or non-vaccinated nondomestic avian species 

by diagnostic test, and 

 use of a licensed recombinant vaccine containing only the AI 

hemagglutinin gene and detection of infection by the presence of 

antibodies to nucleoprotein or matrix protein, or 

 use of inactivated oil emulsion heterologous vaccine containing the same 

H subtype as the field virus but a different N subtype. 

5.16.3 Assessment and Overview 

Federal, State, and other advisors evaluate whether to vaccinate if vaccine has 

been requested; emergency vaccine use is a critical strategic decision that will be 

deliberated by the offices of the Administrator and Secretary of APHIS and 

USDA, respectively. The SAHO or Tribal official and the APHIS VS Deputy 

Administrator (the U.S. CVO) must agree on the decision to vaccinate. A 

decision-tree matrix may also be employed to help decision-makers. 

H5 and H7 vaccines are for use only under the supervision or control of USDA 

APHIS VS, and only as part of an official USDA Animal Disease Control 

Program (see VS Memorandum 800.85 www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/ 

vet_biologics/publications/memo_800_85.pdf). Other subtypes are under the 

authority of the SAHO. USDA APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics 

implements the provisions of the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act to ensure that veterinary 

biologics used to treat animal diseases are pure, potent, and effective. 

Please refer to the AZA for more information on vaccinating zoo animals: 

www.zooanimalhealthnetwork.org/ai/Home. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-49

5.16.3.1 DECIDING TO VACCINATE FOR HPAI

The decision for emergency vaccination will be based on the consideration of the 

following elements: 

 Probability that the disease can or cannot be rapidly contained; 

 Proximity of high-value genetic birds to the rapidly spreading disease 

focal point; 

 Risk of infection of valuable, rare, or endangered nondomestic species; 

 Poultry density in an area; 

 Impact on international trade; 

 Increased risk of introduction due to the presence of HPAI in neighboring 

countries; 

 The extent to which disease is found in waterfowl, other wild birds, 

backyard flocks, or in live bird markets; 

 Availability of physical and human resources; 

 Sociopolitical factors (public confidence in commercial poultry products); 

 Acceptance of industry stakeholders; 

 Potential risk of zoonotic infection of the public from exhibition birds; and 

 Economic consequences of failure to control the disease. 

The safety and health of vaccination personnel must be considered in any 

vaccination effort, and appropriate PPE must be used. 

5.16.3.2 EXAMPLE DECISION TREE FOR HPAI VACCINE USE

Figure 5-5 shows a possible decision tree for emergency vaccine use in domestic 

poultry in the event of an HPAI outbreak. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-50

Figure 5-5. Example Decision Tree for Emergency Vaccination in Domestic Poultry 

Can HPAI

 be eradicated 

using stampingout only?

Is vaccinate-to-live 

preferred 

strategy?c

Is HPAI 

emergency 

vaccination 

feasible and 

accepted?

Country 

Not Free of HPAI

+3 monthsa

HPAI-Free Country, 

Region, or Zone with 

Vaccination

HPAI-Free Country 

without Vaccination

aPer Article 1 0.4.3; 3-months is after a 

stamping-out policy, disinfection, and 

surveillance in accordance with Article 

1 0.4.27 to 1 0.4.3 3. 3-months is the 

minimum time at which HPAI-freedom 

can be re-considered.

Stamping-out of 

Infected Premises 

(may include 

preemptive 

depopulation) 

Stamping-out + 

vaccinate-to-live Endemic HPAI

N O N O

YES YES

DIVA test for 

vaccinates?

N O

+3 monthsa

Stamping-out + 

vaccinate-to-killb

N O

YES

cCan you vaccinate and conduct 

surveillance in accordance with the 2016 

OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (e.g., 

Articles 1 0.4.2 9, 1 0.4.3 0, 1 0.4.3 3, and 

Fig.1 in Chapter 1 0.4) and Terrestrial 

YES Manual?

+~3-6 monthsd

bVaccinates must be depopulated and 

disposed of for the outbreak to be 

declared over.

dHPAI-free with vaccination is not an 

official designation in the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code. It is possible that 

with sufficient surveillance, including 

DIVA testing, that the United States could 

demonstrate freedom from active HPAIinfection; trading partners may or may 

not consider this self-recognition.

5.16.4 Strategic Vaccine Distribution 

Typically, if emergency vaccination is employed for the purposes of disease 

control, it is strategically implemented to create a ring or “firebreak” of 

vaccinated poultry around the IZ, creating a Containment Vaccination Zone 

(CVZ). A second option is to vaccinate susceptible poultry on premises that are 

farthest from known IP as a priority, and then vaccinate progressively closer to 

the IP. A third option is to vaccinate susceptible poultry only on premises that are 

closest to an IP. Vaccination may also be used (as a protection strategy) to protect 

valuable, rare, or endangered non-domestic species of birds, creating a Protection 

Vaccination Zone (PVZ). 

An emergency vaccination strategy will be carefully tailored to the epidemiology 

and threats of the specific outbreak. Genetically valuable birds, including 

breeding stock, may be a priority in an emergency vaccination strategy with the 

concurrence of the unified IC, SAHO, and APHIS. The priority in which other 

birds are vaccinated will be determined at the time of an outbreak, and will also 

be based on many of the factors listed in Section 5.16.3.1. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-51

5.16.5 Vaccination Zone Designations 

The following sections present illustrations of the VZ designations. 

5.16.5.1 CONTAINMENT VACCINATION ZONE

The CVZ is an emergency vaccination zone typically inside the CA, and may 

include the IZ or the BZ. A CVZ is typically observed with stamping-out 

modified with emergency vaccination to kill. Figure 5-6 shows examples of 

CVZs. Please note that the SZ is part of the FA. 

Figure 5-6. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones 

Emergency Vaccination in IZ Emergency Vaccination in BZ

Emergency Vaccination in CA Emergency Vaccination in IZ and Partial BZ
 

UPDATED May 2017 5-52

5.16.5.2 PROTECTION VACCINATION ZONE

The PVZ is an emergency vaccination zone typically outside the CA. It is 

consistent with the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016) definition for a 

Protection Zone: 

A zone established to protect the health status of animals in a free country 

or free zone, from those in a country or zone of a different animal health 

status, using measures based on the epidemiology of the disease under 

consideration to prevent spread of the causative pathogenic agent into a 

free country or free zone. These measures may include, but are not limited 

to, vaccination, movement control and an intensified degree of 

surveillance. 

Typically, a PVZ is observed with stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to live. Figure 5-7 shows examples of PVZs. Please note that the SZ 

is part of the FA. 

Figure 5-7. Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones 

Irregular Circle

5.16.6 Vaccinated Premises 

VP is typically a secondary designation to another premises designation, and is 

only used if vaccination is employed in an outbreak. A VP may be located in a 

CVZ, typically inside a CA (an IZ or BZ), or in a PVZ, typically outside a CA. 

Figure 5-8 shows VP in a CVZ (left) and a PVZ (right). 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-53

Figure 5-8. Examples of Vaccinated Premises 

Containment Vaccination Zone Protection Vaccination Zone

5.16.7 Movement Restrictions for Vaccinates 

Vaccination occurs within a CVZ or a PVZ. If vaccination is used, a vaccination 

plan will define procedures to prevent the spread of HPAI by vaccination teams. 

All vaccinated animals will be identified with specific and permanent (tamperproof) identification. When vaccine is used, surveillance must continue to assess 

vaccination effectiveness and detect any antigenic change. 

VP will be subject to the risk assessments, surveillance requirements, and 

biosecurity procedures established for the primary premises or zone designation. 

In addition to the movement and permit process outlined by the unified IC, 

consideration must be given to any national or international (OIE) standards or 

conditions for such movement. EMRS2 will be used as the system of record for 

all permits and permitted movements, including those issued for vaccinates. 

5.16.8 Cessation of Vaccination 

AI vaccination should cease as soon as possible to allow the region or State to 

return quickly to a favorable trade status. While IC, SAHOs, and APHIS will 

indicate when vaccination must cease, it is likely that no new vaccinations will be 

given more than 42 days (2 times the 21 day OIE-incubation period) after the last 

known new case of HPAI is detected. The best epidemiological evidence 

available will be taken into consideration in making this decision. 
UPDATED May 2017 5-54

5.17 LOGISTICS

During an HPAI outbreak, getting resources and personnel where they are needed 

when they are needed is a critical activity that grows in complexity based on the 

size and scope of the response operation. Contractor support for these operations 

is available if required, and can be requested through the unified IC and ICG. The 

SPRS Logistics Center (which includes the NVS) works with the unified IC 

through the ICG to coordinate APHIS resources and resources contracted by 

APHIS (both personnel and equipment) for field operations. Personnel can be onsite in 24 hours and ramped up quickly. However, in a widespread outbreak, 

personnel shortages can still occur. 

The Overview of the NVS SOP also provides information on NVS capabilities and 

lays out the required steps to request resources from the NVS. In addition, State, 

Tribal, and local responders should refer to the NVS website, where State 

preparedness officials and responders can find additional information regarding 

the NVS, its capabilities, and past exercises. Upon request and approval from the 

NVS, Federal, State, and local authorities can request planning guides and other 

templates. 

5.18 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 

AND VECTOR CONTROL

USDA APHIS works in close collaboration, communication, and coordination 

with DOI and other Federal, State, Tribal, and local wildlife agencies that have 

primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for wildlife. This 

collaboration, communication, and coordination occurs in both the unified IC as 

well as in MAC Groups. 

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Wildlife Management and Vector Control for an FAD 

Response in Domestic Livestock discusses personnel and equipment required for 

wildlife management, quarantine and movement control for wildlife, wildlife risk 

assessment, wildlife surveillance, and related activities. Please see VS 

Memorandum 573.1 for additional information on VS animal health policy in 

relation to wildlife. 

5.18.1 Wildlife Management 

In any HPAI response, wildlife surveillance and other management must be 

conducted by persons trained and proficient in wildlife health, capture, collection, 

biosecurity, and restraint. 

A wildlife management plan that addresses transmission of HPAI in wildlife (in 

particular, wild birds) is developed as soon as possible after identification of the 

index case in domestic poultry. If there is evidence of HPAI transmission between 

wild birds and domestic poultry in either direction, this plan should aim to 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-55

mitigate this transmission pathway, preventing the exposure of wild birds to 

poultry and other livestock. Additionally, an assessment of the risk that wildlife 

poses for HPAI transmission to susceptible birds, poultry, and other animals 

should be conducted within 7 days of confirmation of the index case. 

Importantly, HPAI in wild birds does not impact OIE HPAI-free status. As stated 

in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016), in Article 10.4.1, 

Infection with influenza A viruses of high pathogenicity in birds other than 

poultry, including wild birds, should be notified in accordance with Article 

1.1.3. However, a Member Country should not impose bans on the trade 

in poultry and poultry commodities in response to such a notification, or 

other information on the presence of any influenza A virus in birds other 

than poultry, including wild birds. 

5.18.2 Vector Control 

HPAI can be transmitted mechanically by mice, vultures, and other vectors. 

Appropriate biosecurity measures should be in place during an HPAI outbreak to 

ensure that mechanical vectors do not have contact with infected flocks or other 

infected material. These biosecurity measures must also prevent the 

contamination of food and water by all vectors. 

5.19 ANIMAL WELFARE

During an HPAI outbreak, humane treatment must be provided to poultry given 

the specific circumstances of the outbreak, particularly from the time they are 

identified for depopulation or vaccination activities until they are depopulated, or 

euthanized, as prescribed by veterinary authorities of the affected States or Tribal 

nations. The Overview of Animal Welfare SOP contains additional information. 

5.20 MODELING AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS

The development of models and risk assessments are critical to HPAI 

preparedness and in a successful HPAI response, by giving decision-makers 

valuable insight into potential epidemiological spread, economic impact, and 

geospatial risk factors. During an outbreak, one or more multidisciplinary teams 

(consisting of epidemiologists, disease agent experts, economists, affected 

commodity experts, and others) may be established to perform risk assessments 

and other relevant analyses as needed. An appropriate, scientific, and rapid ad-hoc 

risk assessment on any issue of concern will be provided within 72 hours after a 

request from the Incident Commander or ICG. 

The Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools SOP provides information on 

modeling and risk assessment, covering the following: 

 Key roles and responsibilities in modeling and risk analysis; 
 

UPDATED May 2017 5-56

 Uses of epidemiological models; 

 Proactive risk assessments; 

 Risk assessment during and after an outbreak; and 

 Examples of current models and assessment tools. 

5.21 APPRAISAL AND COMPENSATION

Indemnity payments are to encourage disease reporting, reduce the spread of 

animal disease, and compensate owners on the basis of fair market value during 

an HPAI incident or outbreak. 

5.21.1 Authority 

The AHPA gives APHIS authority to establish and implement an indemnification 

program to prevent or eradicate an HPAI outbreak; 9 CFR 53 provides additional 

regulations. Indemnity is a key component of APHIS’s disease control programs 

in that the promise of fair compensation for losses helps to ensure cooperation 

from the owners of affected poultry. Such cooperation is important for rapid 

disease control and eradication. In addition to the depopulation of IP, in many 

cases, poultry on CP or those meeting the suspect case definition may also be 

depopulated as soon as possible. This helps to ensure that HPAI does not spread. 

The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to pay up to 100 percent of the fair 

market value of the poultry, as well as for disposal, cleaning, and disinfection. 

However, compensation is only paid in cases where State and Federal animal 

health officials concur with the recommendations to order the destruction of 

poultry, whether those recommendations emerged from industry, State, or Federal 

authorities. Title 9 CFR 53 provides regulations for indemnifying the owner (and 

or grower, as applicable) of animals or materials requiring destruction.8

5.21.2 Appraisal and Compensation Procedures during an 

Outbreak 

State and APHIS officials approve depopulation prior to its occurrence. This 

requires rapid communication between producer, company, State officials, 

APHIS, and laboratory officials. During an HPAI outbreak, poultry may be 

depopulated based on a presumptive positive (consistent with the case definition) 

from a diagnostic test conducted at a NAHLN laboratory. Depopulation of poultry 

on Contact Premises, or poultry meeting the suspect case definition, may also be 

authorized by APHIS officials—in coordination with State and Tribal officials 

 

8

 Title 9 CFR Chapter 1, Part 53, www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_10/9cfr53_10.html. 
Specific HPAI Response Critical Activities and Tools 

UPDATED May 2017 5-57

and the unified IC—depending on epidemiological information and outbreak 

characteristics. 

Best practices for rapid containment and eradication of HPAI means that in many 

instances, 3D activities must commence immediately, making slow or deliberate 

appraisal processes unsuitable. While it is ideal to provide an accurate fair market 

appraisal to owners and flock managers prior to depopulation, in emergency 

situations, appraisals are not be required to be signed prior to depopulation if 

APHIS and the cooperating State agree that the poultry must be destroyed 

immediately to mitigate the potential spread or amplification of HPAI virus on a 

presumptive or confirmed positive premises. Depopulation can occur immediately 

after the USDA APHIS Appraisal & Indemnity Request Form is signed; however, 

every attempt should be made to collect inventory information and other relevant 

data prior to depopulation. 

Appraisal and compensation documents released by the ICG or unified IC during 

the incident specify personnel responsibilities, appraisal procedures, assessment 

of compensation eligibility, payment of indemnity, and required forms and reports 

during an HPAI outbreak. The Operations Section in the ICG is responsible for 

calculating indemnity payments and appraisal processing. 

Please refer to the HPAI policy guidance documents on the FAD PReP website 

(www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep) for additional finance and administration 

procedures, including on appraisal and compensation. The Appraisal & Indemnity 

Request Form is also available at that link. 

5.22 FINANCE

During an HPAI outbreak, funding may be rapidly required. For responding to 

specific emergency situations, VS has access to a variety of sources for funding. 

The two most common sources are the APHIS Contingency Fund (CF) and the 

Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). 

APHIS CF takes care of unforeseen, unpredictable problems requiring temporary 

programs. The following four conditions must exist to qualify for the release of 

agency contingency funds: 

1. The outbreak must pose an economic threat.

2. Eradication technology must be feasible and cost effective.

3. No program or no effective program must currently exist.

4. The proposed program must have industry support.

For funds in excess of $1 million, CCC funding is typically requested. During an 

emergency, the Secretary is authorized to transfer funds from the CCC. The funds 

are provided to APHIS as no-year funds. Before APHIS can ask the Secretary to 
UPDATED May 2017 5-58

transfer funds, however, it must consider whether it can redirect funds from a 

budget line item or if other funding sources are available. APHIS considers the 

total estimated amount of funding needed to address the issue and whether there is 

political support before deciding whether or not to seek a CCC transfer. 

The Overview of Finance SOP contains additional guidance on 

 key roles and responsibilities in finance, 

 emergency funding processes for FAD outbreaks, and 

 triggering events for APHIS emergency funding. 

5.23 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

In any HPAI outbreak, the capability to rapidly scale up the size of a unified IC

and other structures, as well as to effectively integrate veterinary functions and 

countermeasures is critical for a successful response. The principles of the NRF 

and NIMS, already discussed in this plan, allow such scalability and govern the 

entire HPAI response. 

The Overview of NRF and NIMS SOP provides additional information on the 

relation of NRF and NIMS to APHIS and lists the responsibilities of Federal, 

State, Tribal, and local governments in an HPAI outbreak. The APHIS Foreign 

Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination also provides further details 

on high-level incident management for incidents. 

The SOPs and NAHEMS Guidelines referenced in this chapter can be found at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
UPDATED May 2017 6-1

Chapter 6 

Recovery after an HPAI Outbreak

6.1 PROOF-OF-FREEDOM

6.1.1 Recognition of Disease-Free Status 

The OIE does not grant official recognition for AI-freedom or HPAI-freedom, but 

as a member of the OIE, the United States can self-declare the entire country, 

zone, or compartment free from AI and HPAI. The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 

Code contains specific requirements for self-declaration of freedom from AI and 

HPAI. Any submitted self-declaration should contain evidence demonstrating that 

the requirements for the disease status have been met in accordance with OIE 

standards. By providing relevant epidemiological evidence, the United States can 

demonstrate to potential importing countries that the entire country, zone, or 

compartment under discussion meets the provisions of the avian influenza 

chapter. As mentioned in Article 10.4.27 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 

Code (2016), no member can declare itself from influenza A infection in wild 

birds; the definitions for AI-free status apply to poultry only. 

6.1.1.1 CRITERIA NEEDED FOR AI-FREE STATUS

The OIE defines an AI-free country, zone, or compartment as follows (Article 

10.4.3): 

A country, zone, or compartment may be considered free from avian 

influenza when it has been shown that infection with avian influenza 

viruses in poultry has not been present in the country, zone or compartment 

for the past 12 months, based on surveillance in accordance with Articles 

10.4.27 to 10.4.33. 

If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone, or 

compartment, avian influenza free status can be regained: 

1. In the case of infections with high pathogenicity avian influenza

viruses, three months after a stamping-out policy (including

disinfection of all affected establishments) is applied, providing that

surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.27 to 10.4.33 has been

carried out during that three-month period.
UPDATED May 2017 6-2

2. In the case of infections with low pathogenicity avian influenza 

viruses, poultry may be kept for slaughter for human consumption 

subject to conditions specified in Article 10.4.19 or a stamping-out 

policy may be applied; in either case, three months after the 

disinfection of all affected establishments, providing that surveillance 

in accordance with Articles 10.4.27 to 10.4.33 has been carried out 

during that three-month period.

6.1.1.2 CRITERIA NEEDED FOR HPAI-FREE STATUS

The OIE defines an HPAI-free country, zone, or compartment as follows (Article 

10.4.4):

A country, zone or compartment may be considered free from infection 

with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in poultry when:

1. it has been shown that infection with high pathogenicity avian 

influenza viruses in poultry has not been present in the country, 

zone or compartment for the past 12 months, although its status 

with respect to low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses may be 

unknown; or

2. when, based on surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.27 

to 10.4.33, it does not meet the criteria for freedom from avian 

influenza but any virus detected has not been identified as high 

pathogenicity avian influenza virus.

The surveillance may need to be adapted to parts of the country or existing 

zones or compartments depending on historical or geographical factors, 

industry structure, population data, or proximity to recent outbreaks.

If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone or 

compartment, the free status can be regained three months after a 

stamping-out policy (including disinfection of all affected establishments) 

is applied, providing that surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.27 

to 10.4.33 has been carried out during that three-month period.

6.1.1.3 HPAI-FREE COMPARTMENTS

There are no HPAI-free compartments in the United States that have been fully 

implemented and internationally accepted; compartmentalization/compartments 

have not been established in recent HPAI outbreaks in the United States or in 

other OIE-member countries.

6.1.2 Surveillance for Recognition of Disease Freedom

Surveillance is fundamental in proving disease freedom to gain or regain selfdeclared disease-free status or to support a resumption of business activities after 

an HPAI outbreak. According to the OIE, a country re-declaring for country, 

zone, or compartment freedom from HPAI virus should show evidence of an 
Recovery after an HPAI Outbreak 

UPDATED May 2017 6-3

effective surveillance program considering the epidemiological circumstances of 

the outbreak, to demonstrate absence from infection in susceptible poultry 

populations. This requires surveillance that incorporates virus detection and 

antibody tests as described in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016) 

Articles 10.4.27 to 10.4.33. If vaccination is used, surveillance must incorporate 

the diagnostic ability to differentiate infected and vaccinated animals (see Section 

5.16.2). 

Evidence of disease freedom in the United States may involve information from 

multiple surveillance streams including the NPIP1, LBMS, wild bird surveillance, 

as well as other passive surveillance activities. 

For countries that are regaining freedom from AI or HPAI after an outbreak, the 

OIE states (Article 10.4.31): 

In addition to the general conditions described in the above-mentioned 

articles, a Member Country declaring that it has regained country, zone or 

compartment freedom from avian influenza or from infection with high 

pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in poultry should show evidence of 

an active surveillance program depending on the epidemiological 

circumstances of the outbreak to demonstrate the absence of the infection. 

This will require surveillance incorporating virus detection and antibody 

tests. The use of sentinel birds may facilitate the interpretation of 

surveillance results. 

A Member Country declaring freedom of country, zone or compartment 

after an outbreak of avian influenza should report the results of an active 

surveillance program in which the susceptible poultry population 

undergoes regular clinical examination and active surveillance planned 

and implemented in accordance with the general conditions and methods 

described in these recommendations. The surveillance should at least give 

the confidence that can be given by a randomized representative sample 

of the populations at risk. 

6.1.3 Country Freedom Declaration 

The United States will self-declare disease freedom after meeting the OIE 

requirements outlined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016) in 

Articles 10.4.27 to 10.4.33. Individual trading partners may require additional 

information including HPAI response policy, eradication measures, surveillance, 

and monitoring activities of vaccinates, as well as evidence of veterinary 

infrastructure, industry organization, and, if vaccination has been used, the tracing 

system for vaccinates. Acceptance of the claim for country freedom may also 

involve an inspection by an international panel to review the eradication program 

and all available information to verify HPAI freedom. 

1

 The NPIP (9 CFR 145) provides additional information on surveillance for H5/H7 

surveillance for LPAI.
UPDATED May 2017 6-4

6.1.4 Release of Quarantine and Movement Control 

6.1.4.1 RELEASE OF CONTROL AREA 

IC and SAHOs need to plan for the release of the CA (and associated movement 

controls) when the CA is established under a State-Federal unified IC. The 

specifics of CA release may be refined based on the epidemiology of the 

outbreak. Typically, the following conditions must be met and these criteria may 

be modified during an incident: 

 The last IP in the CA has been depopulated; the compost pile has been 

started (temperature monitoring has commenced), or mortality buried, or 

mortality removed from premises for appropriate disposal. 

 Initial cleaning and disinfection/virus elimination activities on all IP and 

dangerous Contact Premises, as applicable, have been completed 

(including, but not limited to, outside areas of premises, equipment, 

trucks, and other potential fomites used in depopulation activities). This 

does not include barn interiors. 

 Required outbreak surveillance tests indicate no HPAI infection in the CA. 

 Surveillance requirements for international or bilateral trade are conducted 

and continue to be conducted (based on the density of poultry, 

epidemiological information, species, and commodity). 

Upon meeting these criteria, the CA can be released if there are no positive 

diagnostic results for HPAI in the CA for 21 days since the initial cleaning and 

disinfection of the last IP, and all specified conditions have been met designated 

by the unified IC. Please note, based on these conditions, it is possible that a CA

could be released before the date in which restocking activities are approved on 

the last diagnosed IP. 

Release of a CA is a unified IC decision; trading partners may require enhanced 

surveillance procedures prior to and after the release of the CA. 

6.1.4.2 RELEASE OF FEDERAL QUARANTINE

Federal quarantines have not been established in recent HPAI outbreaks in the 

United States. However, in the event that a Federal quarantine is implemented 

under Federal authority, a Federal Register notice must be published notifying of 

quarantine release. The Federal quarantine area or region may or may not be the 

same as the CA, and may be released by sections, by risk, or in its entirety. 
Recovery after an HPAI Outbreak 

UPDATED May 2017 6-5

6.1.4.3 RELEASE OF QUARANTINE ON INFECTED PREMISES

IP may remain under quarantine even when the CA has been released. If IP are 

under quarantine based on State authority, the SAHO is responsible for releasing 

the quarantine based on the evidence and requirements established by the State. 

This process should consider how quarantined premises are evaluated for HPAI 

freedom, any restocking activities, and other critical risk factors. 

6.1.5 Disposition of Vaccinates 

While HPAI vaccine has not been used in recent HPAI outbreaks, in the event 

vaccination strategies are implemented, HPAI vaccinates may still be subject to 

movement control and monitoring measures under State and/or Federal authority. 

6.2 RESTOCKING OF PREVIOUSLY INFECTED 

PREMISES

The total time in which it takes a premises to go from an IP with sick birds, to a 

premises that has finished virus elimination, to a restocked premises is based on 

many factors, including: the type of premises, epidemiology of the outbreak, 

location of other HPAI IP, evidence provided to State and APHIS officials, and 

method of disposal. Restocking on previously IP may take place before the end of 

the outbreak has been declared, under conditions established by the unified IC. 

A primary goal of the HPAI response is to ensure that the response efforts and 

activities do not cause more damage and disruption than the disease outbreak 

itself. Restocked premises that subsequently become infected with HPAI a second 

time place significant additional stress on constrained resources and continue the 

risk of ongoing HPAI transmission. Therefore, appropriate caution is urged in 

restocking premises. Depending on outbreak-specific circumstances, APHIS may 

not indemnify premises that are restocked without APHIS and State approval that 

subsequently become re-infected. 

6.2.1 Environmental Sampling 

Environmental sampling is required of the premises prior to restocking activities. 

It usually occurs during the typical 21 day fallow (vacant) period that begins upon 

completion of virus elimination activities. Personnel taking environmental

samples should continue to follow biosecurity and PPE procedures as indicated by 

the IC. In the event that houses are left vacant for an extended fallow period 

(often 120 days, but as determined by the unified IC), State and APHIS officials 

may decide environmental sampling may or may not be required, depending on 

ambient temperature, outbreak epidemiology, and other factors. 
UPDATED May 2017 6-6

6.2.2 Commercial Premises that Can’t Be Cleaned

In the unusual circumstance in which commercial premises cannot be cleaned and 

disinfected, fallowing for 120-days—or a period recommended by the unified 

IC—is prescribed. The length of this period will vary depending on ambient 

temperature and season, as well as premises condition and circumstances. The 

fallowing period may need to be longer than 120 days, or can be shorter than 120 

days, depending on the factors just noted. Fallowing is often reserved for 

premises that would need to be completely repaired or destroyed in order to be 

effectively cleaned and disinfected. An inspection may be required by the State 

Animal Health Official or APHIS at the end of the fallow period. Premises that 

cannot be cleaned would still need to meet the requirements set by the unified IC 

to be eligible to restock, and their restocking would need to be approved by State 

and APHIS officials. Environmental testing may be required at the discretion of 

the unified IC. 

6.2.3 Restocking Guidance and Approval Process 

Following official approval of all cleaning and disinfection (virus elimination) 

procedures, IP remain fallow (vacant without birds) for a minimum of 21 days to 

ensure that any residual virus has been eliminated from the houses and other areas 

of the premises. Under certain conditions, the unified IC may decide this 21-day 

period following disinfection procedures can be slightly decreased based on 

ambient temperature, length of time before disinfection was completed, type of 

disinfection procedures carried out on the premises, and further assessment of 

risk. However, 21 days remains the common standard for fallowing after HPAI 

virus elimination procedures. 

In order to gain restocking approval, a previously Infected Premises must (1) meet 

all the requirements of any State Quarantine Notice/Hold Order and USDA flock 

plan, (2) fallow for the minimum prescribed time, and (3) have conducted 

environmental sampling with no evidence of HPAI infection. Risk factors are also 

evaluated in consultation with State officials. A premises is “approved” for 

restocking when it has met all the criteria required to restock and State and 

APHIS officials approve restocking. In some cases, additional criteria may be 

imposed by the unified IC and/or State and APHIS officials prior to restocking:

this may include stringent, additional biosecurity measures. Requirements may 

vary by State. Restock approval may be delayed by ongoing HPAI activity or 

transmission. 

6.2.4 Approved Sources of Poultry 

Birds used for restocking must be from flocks tested for HPAI. These flocks must 

be tested for HPAI prior to movement; the minimum standard is 2 negative rRTPCR tests at least 24 hours apart, with one negative test within 24 hours of 

movement. 
Recovery after an HPAI Outbreak

UPDATED May 2017 6-7

6.2.5 Testing Requirements after Restocking

Birds placed into previously infected houses or premises may be subjected to 

further diagnostic testing at the discretion of State and/or APHIS officials.

6.2.6 Additional Guidance

For more specific guidance on restocking after HPAI-infection, please refer to the 

HPAI policy guidance and procedures that is provided on 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
UPDATED May 2017 A-1

Appendix A

Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness 

and Response Plan Materials to Support 

HPAI Response

This appendix provides a broad overview of the Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP), and lists the FAD PReP 

documents that support this Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Response 

Plan (2017). The new and revised documents may be useful for stakeholders in 

preparedness and response planning related to HPAI. Most of these documents 

have been released, others are forthcoming. These resources are found online at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

OVERVIEW OF FAD PREP

FAD PReP Mission and Goals

The significant threat and potential consequences of foreign animal diseases 

(FADs) and the challenges and lessons-learned of effective and rapid FAD 

response have led to the development of FAD PReP. The mission of FAD PReP is 

to raise awareness, build expectations, and develop capabilities surrounding FAD 

preparedness and response. The goal of FAD PReP is to integrate, synchronize, 

and deconflict preparedness and response capabilities as much as possible before 

an outbreak by providing goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures that are 

clear, comprehensive, easily readable, easily updated, and that comply with the 

National Incident Management System.

In the event of an FAD outbreak, the three key response goals are to: (1) detect, 

control, and contain the FAD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate the 

FAD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the 

economy, and that protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide 

science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of 

business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products. In 

summary, achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock and poultry 

facilities, States, Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as 

quickly as possible. They will also allow the United States to regain FAD-free 

status without the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the 

disease outbreak itself.
UPDATED May 2017 A-2 

FAD PReP Documents and Materials 

FAD PReP is a comprehensive U.S. preparedness and response strategy for FAD 

threats, both zoonotic and non-zoonotic. Types of FAD PReP documents include: 

 Strategic Plans—Concept of Operations 

 National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) 

Guidelines 

 Industry Manuals 

 Disease Response Plans 

 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Critical Activities 

 Continuity of Business/Secure Food Supply Plans (commodity specific 

plans developed by public-private-academic partnerships) 

 Ready Reference Guides.

Lessons Learned from Past Outbreaks 

The foundation of FAD PReP is lessons learned in successfully managing past 

FAD incidents. FAD PReP is based on the following: 

 Achieving rapid FAD detection and tracing. 

 Providing processes for emergency planning that respect local knowledge. 

 Integrating State-Federal-Tribal-industry planning processes. 

 Ensuring that there are clearly defined, obtainable, and unified goals for 

response. 

 Having a unified Incident Command with a proper delegation of 

authority that is able to act with speed and certainty. 

 Employing science and risk-based management approaches to FAD 

response. 

 Ensuring that all guidelines, strategies, and procedures are communicated 

effectively to responders and stakeholders. 

 Identifying resources and trained personnel required for an effective 

incident response. 
FAD PReP Materials to Support HPAI Response

UPDATED May 2017 A-3

 Trying to resolve competing interests prior to an outbreak and addressing 

them quickly during an outbreak.

HPAI RESPONSE AND POLICY INFORMATION

In light of the recent HPAI outbreaks, lessons learned were incorporated into 

existing and new policy and response guidance. This guidance is more specific 

and granular than the guidance provided within this HPAI Response Plan. It is 

also updated as required based on ongoing or recent HPAI outbreaks.

These documents fall within the following general topics:

 Initial Response

 Finance and Administration Processes

 Surveillance & Diagnostics

 Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business

 Disposal & Cleaning/Disinfection (Virus Elimination)

 Recovery and Restocking

 Health and Safety Information

 Other outbreak related information. 

These documents are all available on the HPAI page of the FAD PReP website 

and should be consulted in any HPAI response for further information. 

HPAI CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS PLANNING

 Secure Poultry Supply Plan (www.securepoultrysupply.com).

HPAI CRITICAL ACTIVITIES & SOPS

There are 23 critical activities conducted during a response to HPAI. Many of 

these activities have associated SOPs. These SOPs are templates to provide a 

common picture or set of procedures for the following 23 tools and strategies:

1. Overview of Etiology and Ecology 

2. Case Definition Development Process 

3. Surveillance 
UPDATED May 2017 A-4

4. Diagnostics (Sample Collection, Surge Capacity, and Reporting) 

5. Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing 

6. Overview of Information Management 

7. Communications 

8. Health and Safety and Personal Protective Equipment

9. Biosecurity 

10. Quarantine and Movement Control 

11. Continuity of Business 

12. Overview of Regionalization for International Trade 

13. Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia 

14. Disposal 

15. Cleaning and Disinfection 

16. Vaccination 

17. Logistics

18. Overview of Wildlife Management and Vector Control 

19. Overview of Animal Welfare 

20. Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools 

21. Appraisal and Compensation 

22. Overview of Finance 

23. Overview of Incident Management.

READY REFERENCE GUIDES

 HPAI Response

 Overview of the HPAI Response Plan

 Etiology and Ecology

 Reported H5 HPAI in 2016
FAD PReP Materials to Support HPAI Response

UPDATED May 2017 A-5

 HPAI Zones and Premises

 Common Operating Picture

 Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business

 Overview of Diagnostics

 Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS2) Customer 

Permit Gateway

 Additional Information 

 General Response for all FADs

 Introduction to FAD PReP

 Introduction to EMRS2 

 Understanding the EMRS2 Interface

 FAD Framework: Roles and Coordination

 FAD Framework: Response Strategies

 Critical Activities and Tools During an FAD Response

 Overview of Continuity of Business and the Secure Food Supply Plans

 Zones, Areas, and Premises in an FAD Outbreak

 Movement Control in an FAD Outbreak

 Defining Permitted Movement

 Permitting Process

 VS Guidance 12001.2: Procedures and Policy for the Investigation of 

Potential FAD/Emerging Disease Incidents

INDUSTRY MANUAL

 Poultry 
UPDATED May 2017 A-6

NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM GUIDELINES

 Biosecurity 

 Cleaning and Disinfection 

 Continuity of Business

 Disposal 

 Health and Safety 

 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia 

 Personal Protective Equipment 

 Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing 

 Quarantine and Movement Control 

 Vaccination for Contagious Diseases 

 Wildlife Management and Vector Control for an FAD Response in 

Domestic Livestock

STRATEGIC PLANS—CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0)

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies

(FAD PReP Manual 2-0) 

 Information Management and Reporting (FAD PReP Manual 3-0)

(forthcoming at time of publication)

 FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0)

 A Partial List of FAD Stakeholders (FAD PReP Manual 5-0)

 Permitted Movement (FAD PReP Manual 6-0).
UPDATED May 2017 B-1

Appendix B

Laboratory Network List for Avian Influenza

National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratories are listed at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/nahln/downloads/ai_lab_list.pdf. The listed

laboratories are those that can currently perform testing for avian influenza. 

During an outbreak, the National Veterinary Services Laboratories must confirm

highly pathogenic avian influenza. Please see Chapter 5 for more information on 

diagnostics.
UPDATED May 2017 C-1

Appendix C

Overview of Secure Poultry Supply Plan

More information about the Secure Poultry Supply (SPltryS) Plan is located at 

www.securepoultrysupply.com and www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. This appendix 

provides a brief overview of the SPltryS Plan.

SUMMARY

The SPltryS Plan encompasses the Secure Egg Supply (SES) Plan, Secure Turkey 

Supply (STS) Plan, and Secure Broiler Supply (SBS) Plan; together these plans 

promote food security and animal health through continuity of market planning 

for a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak. Each plan makes 

specific science- and risk-based recommendations that emergency decision 

makers (such as Incident Commanders) can use to rapidly decide whether to issue 

or deny permits for the movement of poultry and egg products during an HPAI 

outbreak. These plans have been used successfully in the 2014–2015, 2016, and 

2017 HPAI outbreaks.

The SPltryS Plan is one of several Secure Food Supply Plans, which have resulted 

from a collaboration between public, private, and academic partners. The team for 

the SPltryS includes representatives of the following organizations (in 

alphabetical order):

 Association of Veterinarians in Broiler Production

 Association of Veterinarians in Turkey Production

 Egg sector veterinarians, officials, and representatives

 Iowa State University, Center for Food Security and Public Health 

 State Animal Health Officials

 University of Minnesota, Center for Animal Health and Food Safety 

 USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services 

 United Egg Association 

 United Egg Producers.

The SPltryS Plan is based on current research and practice in fields including 

virology, flock husbandry, epidemiology, and risk-assessment. The SPltryS Plan
UPDATED May 2017 C-2

uses science- and risk-based preparedness and response components (see Figure 

C-1) to provide guidance on permitting the movement of poultry and egg industry 

products from a Control Area during an HPAI outbreak. Simultaneously, these 

recommendations effectively manage the risk of HPAI transmission to naïve 

premises. Through the integrated implementation of the components listed in 

Figure C-1, this plan provides a high degree of confidence that poultry and egg 

industry products moved into market channels do not contain HPAI virus.

Figure C-1. Process of the Secure Poultry Supply Plan and Secure Food Supply Plans

The SES Plan focuses on permit guidance for pasteurized liquid egg, nonpasteurized liquid egg, washed and sanitized shell eggs, nest run shell eggs, layer 

hatching eggs, and layer day-old chicks (Table C-1). Guidance for other products, 

such as dry eggshells, is also found in the SES Plan.

The SBS Plan provides guidance for moving hatching eggs and broiler industry 

products within, out of, and into an HPAI Control Area. Product-specific 

guidance is available for hatching eggs, day-old chicks, broilers to market, and 

other products.

The STS Plan is under development to minimize exposure and transmission of 

HPAI during an outbreak and give consumers a high degree of confidence that 

turkeys are free of HPAI virus. A final draft plan is available with input from 

stakeholders, Federal and State authorities, and academic partners.

Specific criteria must be fulfilled to qualify for movement permits.1 Movement is

allowed, by permit, for movements from inside a Control Area that meet 

epidemiological and biosecurity standards, which for most movements includes 

one or more negative rRT-PCRs for HPAI. 

Additional components, including surveillance guidelines, product specific 

biosecurity practices, cleaning and disinfection guidelines, cleaning and 

disinfection checklists, proactive product-specific risk assessments, permit 

examples, and the voluntary preparedness components (epidemiological 

assessment and biosecurity checklist), can be found at 

 

1 For detailed information on permitted movements, please see the document Permitted 

Movement (FAD PReP Manual 6-0). 
Secure Poultry Supply Plan 

UPDATED May 2017 C-3

www.securepoultrysupply.com. Currently, the focus is on simplifying existing 

guidance to facilitate implementation during an outbreak, and creating a unified 

SPltryS Plan across the poultry industries. 
Overview of Secure Poultry Supply Plan

UPDATED May 2017 C-4

Table C-1. Summary of SES Plan Permitting
UPDATED May 2017 D-1

Appendix D

HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance 

for Poultry

INTRODUCTION

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS), 

Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) Surveillance Design and 

Analysis (SDA) Unit prepared the following outbreak surveillance guidelines for 

highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in poultry. These guidelines take into 

account lessons learned from the recent HPAI outbreaks and may be updated at 

any time. Based on current scientific and best practice information, these 

guidelines may serve as examples for use by the unified Incident Command (IC) 

in developing incident-specific surveillance plans. For further detail on previous 

outbreak-specific sampling strategies, also see the HPAI policy guidance 

documents under “Surveillance” on the HPAI page of 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

Box D-1. Important Note on Appendix D 

PURPOSE

This guidance expands upon the information presented in Section 5.3 and offers 

recommendations for the design of HPAI active outbreak surveillance focused on 

disease detection. These guidelines do not specifically or comprehensively 

address surveillance for continuity of business in an outbreak, such as surveillance 

Important Note Concerning Guidance Found in Appendix D

 Information contained within is intended to be ancillary to that in Section 5.3

in this response plan.

 During the initial stages of an outbreak, use the default surveillance parameters 

provided in Section 5.3 unless otherwise directed by the unified IC or State 

Animal Health Official. 

 Review this appendix when time allows or when new information becomes

available during an outbreak. This appendix contains definitions for surveillance 

parameters, sampling examples, data to illustrate how different HPAI strains may 

affect surveillance, and guidance on adjusting surveillance plans accordingly. 
UPDATED May 2017 D-2

testing for daily bird or product movement from layer, broiler, or turkey flocks. 

However, when testing and sampling methods comply, test results from business 

continuity surveillance for bird and product movement may help to meet outbreak 

surveillance testing requirements. For more information on surveillance testing 

required for business continuity, please see the Secure Poultry Supply Plan which 

includes guidance for egg, broiler, and turkey flocks 

(www.securepoultrysupply.com). 

ASSUMPTIONS

Several assumptions are embedded in the design of surveillance plans and 

analyses of surveillance data. The accuracy of these assumptions impacts the 

strength of conclusions drawn from surveillance activities. For the example HPAI 

surveillance schemes discussed in this appendix, the following assumptions apply: 

1. Passive surveillance activities are routine and ongoing in all

commercial and backyard flocks.

2. HPAI rapidly manifests clinically in gallinaceous species.1

3. In commercial premises, the producer places all sick and dead birds

into a group from which pooled surveillance samples are drawn.

4. The proportion of HPAI infected birds is much higher among the sick

and dead group than among apparently healthy birds in the same

house.

5. Outbreak response field personnel visiting premises with ill birds will

suspect HPAI if compatible signs are present, and will initiate testing.

6. The rRT-PCR [real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain

reaction] test sensitivity for detection of one or more infected bird

samples in a 5-bird or 11-bird pool is 85 to 88 percent.

SURVEILLANCE PARAMETERS

At the core of any surveillance plan is a description of the frequency, number, and 

distribution of animals and premises to be targeted for sampling. 

Recommendations and decisions regarding these core components often derive 

from knowledge about and trade-offs between surveillance parameters. The seven 

surveillance parameters are discussed below. Default settings for these 

surveillance parameters are provided in Section 5.3 in this HPAI Response Plan. 

1

 A noted exception occurred during the Texas 2004 HPAI outbreak where clinical signs in poultry were 

absent. 
HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance for Poultry

UPDATED May 2017 D-3

1. Design (threshold) prevalence. Design prevalence describes the 

minimum prevalence of infection we aim to detect in a population or a 

targeted subgroup of that population. Surveillance sample size 

calculations are directly tied to design prevalence, with larger sample 

sizes required for detection of lower prevalences. Design prevalence 

values are typically lower for insidious diseases or diseases with public 

health consequences and much higher for acute presentations or if 

highly susceptible subgroups are targeted (e.g., 40-50 percent). 

Design prevalence can also vary based upon mechanisms for disease 

spread. There are two design prevalence levels to consider for a 

surveillance plan: premises level design prevalence and bird level 

design prevalence.

a. Premises level. Start with a design prevalence of 10 percent in 

the Surveillance Zone (SZ), which is part of the Free Area (FA)

and assumed to be free of disease. A design prevalence is not 

needed in the Control Area (CA) where testing of all 

commercial premises is required. Spread by vector, wind, or 

another environmental pathway with wide distribution may 

justify a higher design prevalence. In contrast, spread by 

company networks or directed movements may lead to a more 

clustered distribution and justify a lower design prevalence. In 

either case, sampling of all trace-out (animal movements) or 

indirect contacts (shared company, management or service 

providers) can help to balance the need for an otherwise more 

intensive (lower design prevalence) sampling strategy. The 

total number of premises in the zone may also influence choice 

of design prevalence; one may want to design the surveillance 

to detect infection by considering the absolute number of 

potentially Infected Premises (IP) rather than the proportion of 

potentially IP. 

b. Bird level. In cases where infection manifests clinically, a 

higher design prevalence, such as 40 percent, can be used when 

sampling focuses on sick or recently dead birds. However, a 

lower design prevalence may be required for early detection in 

the case of imminent animal movement for a premises in the 

CA, for example, than would be required to provide evidence 

of disease freedom for a premises in a SZ. A lower design 

prevalence may also be desirable in houses with higher than 

normal mortality (due to breed and/or production type) 

because it may take longer to reach the design prevalence in 

the sick and dead birds in those houses compared to houses 

with lower levels of normal mortality.

2. Confidence level. The confidence level is typically set at 95 percent. 

The confidence level provides a quantitative measure of the assurance 
UPDATED May 2017 D-4

in disease absence achieved through surveillance. Also called 

surveillance system sensitivity, confidence level describes the system’s 

ability to detect infection at or above design prevalence.2 When 

consequences of failing to detect infection are particularly high, the 

confidence level is occasionally set at 99 percent. If the sampling 

scheme is not carried out according to plan, the actual confidence 

derived through surveillance (a function of sample size, population 

size, test accuracy and the selected design prevalence) may not reach 

the desired level. 

3. Risk-based sampling. Selectively targeting populations or subgroups

expected to have higher-than-average pathogen exposure or higherthan average pathogen prevalence can minimize the number of

samples required to detect infection or substantiate its absence.

Preferential sampling of sick or recently dead birds is an example of

risk-based sampling. If affected by HPAI, sick/dead birds in the flock

are expected to exhibit a higher prevalence of infection than those

appearing healthy. By focusing on the sick/dead subpopulations, we

can use a higher value for design prevalence and lower sample sizes

accordingly.

4. Population or target group size. Sample sizes are also a function of the

size of the population (or subgroup) from which the sample is selected.

The population may comprise premises within a zone, birds within a

house, or daily mortalities.

5. Types of tests. Sample sizes are a function of the accuracy of selected

diagnostic tests (also see Section 5.4), whether clinical inspection,

polymerase chain reaction, serology, etc. Test sensitivity and

specificity also vary with a diagnostic test’s cutoff values. Test

sensitivity and specificity are used in calculating the surveillance

sample sizes.

6. Sampling frequency. Optimum sampling frequency depends on

surveillance objectives and the epidemiology of the pathogen and is

probably the most difficult of surveillance parameters to assign.

Previous test results, for example, can augment information gained

from current test results if the time period between sampling is short—

ideally less than an incubation period—and the introduction risk is

minimal. However, surveillance objectives will also play a role in this

decision. A strain with a short incubation period (see Table D-5) may

require frequent sampling if the objective is early detection (prior to

clinical signs) in an area that may have been recently exposed.

Alternatively, an extended sampling interval may suffice for strains

with long incubation periods if the objective is to demonstrate disease

2

 When using Bayesian models or simulation studies, a system’s ability to detect infection can 

be computed as a probability and may be called the detection probability or credibility. 
HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance for Poultry

UPDATED May 2017 D-5

freedom and sampling occurs at least one incubation period beyond the 

most recent exposure. 

7. Sample size. Surveillance plans provide sample sizes for (1) the 

number of premises in a zone/area to be tested and (2) the number of 

pooled bird samples to collect at each premises. 

a. The sample size for number of premises. In a CA, where HPAI 

is known to be present and the goal is to find every IP, 

sampling all premises will typically be required. Outside of the 

CA, the number of premises to sample is set to ensure the 

surveillance system’s ability to identify an infected region, 

presuming that the proportion of premises infected in the 

region equals or exceeds design prevalence. This number will 

vary with the total number of premises in the area and the value 

selected for the premises level design prevalence (see Tables 

D-1 and D-2). The sensitivity of the bird level surveillance 

system also affects the number of premises sampled; D-2 

assumes 95 percent bird level sensitivity.

b. The sample size for the number of birds. This is set to ensure 

the surveillance system can successfully identify an infected 

house or sick and dead bird group, presuming that the 

proportion of infected birds in the house or sick and dead birds 

equals or exceeds design prevalence. This number will vary 

with the total number of birds in the group, the diagnostic 

sensitivity and specificity of the test, and the value selected for 

the design prevalence within the house or mortality group (bird 

level). Initially, sample sizes are computed to achieve the 

desired confidence in one round of testing, but they can be 

adjusted to incorporate multiple rounds of testing over short 

time periods (see Box D-2).

All HPAI surveillance plans should aim to achieve or exceed 95 percent 

confidence of detection. Similarly, high-risk flocks and highly susceptible 

subgroups should typically be prioritized for sampling in any HPAI outbreak. 

However, the other surveillance parameters, as well as factors driving risk 

categorization, will likely vary by outbreak. If there isn’t an example plan that fits 

the parameter settings, further help designing the surveillance and sampling plans 

may be required. APHIS CEAH SDA can provide this assistance.
UPDATED May 2017 D-6

Box D-2. Surveillance Design Assistance 

COMMERCIAL PREMISES EXAMPLES

APHIS and/or State officials will determine the appropriate time period for active 

surveillance. Critical decisions in active surveillance include the criteria for 

selection of premises, the sample size and targets for sampling birds on selected 

premises, and the optimum frequency and duration of sampling. Guidance and 

rationale for selection of these surveillance planning parameters is provided 

below. 

Selection of Premises 

Criteria for selection of premises for sampling will vary by region and objective. 

In the Infected Zone and Buffer Zone (which comprise the CA), the objective is to 

detect all IP as quickly as possible. In the SZ, the objective is typically to 

demonstrate that HPAI has not moved outside the CA. In other words, the 

objective of surveillance in the SZ is to demonstrate freedom. 

INFECTED ZONE AND BUFFER ZONE (THE CONTROL AREA) 

Include all premises within the CA in active surveillance, prioritizing by 

epidemiological investigation and continuity of business requirements. 

SURVEILLANCE ZONE (IN THE FREE AREA) 

Include a subset of premises within the SZ in active surveillance, prioritized by 

epidemiological investigation or other requirements.3

 The number of premises 

necessary to sample will vary by total number of premises in the zone and the 

premises level design prevalence. Table D-1 provides sample sizes to achieve 95 

percent confidence of detection based on the number of premises in the zone and 

choice of design prevalence. Table D-2 provides guidance on selecting a design 

prevalence. For example, in designing a sampling scheme for a zone with 150 

premises, a 10 percent premises level design prevalence may seem appropriate 

3

 In a disease outbreak, permits are issued to move specific transports/items into, within, and 

out of a regulatory CA. Movement exclusively in a FA are not managed by the unified IC, though 

affected State(s) may have additional surveillance and/or testing criteria in FAs. 

Surveillance Design Assistance

If circumstances prevent achieving 95 percent confidence in a single 

round of testing (e.g., unable to collect the recommended number of 

pooled samples), contact APHIS VS CEAH SDA unit for assistance to 

determine how many additional rounds of testing are required. 
HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance for Poultry

UPDATED May 2017 D-7

and based on Table D-1, the plan is to sample 27 premises. As shown in Table D2, a surveillance scheme designed to detect infection at a 10 percent premises 

level design prevalence in a zone with 150 premises may have up to 14 infected 

premises go undetected. If this seems too high, then a lower design prevalence 

should be selected, say 5 percent or up to 7 undetected premises. With this lower 

design prevalence, using Table D-1, the new scheme should be to sample 51 

premises.

Table D-1. Minimum Number of Premises to Select for Sampling from a Zone or 

Area (to achieve 95 percent confidence1in detecting at least one infected 

premises for the chosen premises level design prevalence)

Number of Premises in 

Zone or Area

Premises Level Prevalence

1% 3% 5% 10% 15%

11 or less All All All All 9*

12 to 15 All All All 13* 11

16 to 40 All All 32* 21* 16

41 to 50 All 45* 36 23 16

51 to 75 All 58 43 25 17

76 to 100 All 66 47 26 18

101 to 150 136* 76 51 27 18

151 to 200 163* 82 53 28 19

201 to 500 236* 94 58 29 19

>500 309 103 61 30 20

1 These sample sizes assume that a sufficient number of pooled-bird samples 

are collected and tested within a barn to achieve a 95 percent confidence in 

detection at an appropriate bird level prevalence. 

*Select all premises if number of premises within the zone or area is less than 

the value given.
UPDATED May 2017 D-8

Table D-2. Number of Infected Premises in Zones or Areas with Differing 

Numbers of Premises for Different Premises Level Prevalence Values1

Number of Premises in 

Zone or Area

Premises Level Prevalence

1% 3% 5% 10% 15%

10 or less <1 <1 <1 1 2

11 to 14 <1 <1 1 2 2

15 to 20 <1 <1 1 2 3

21 to 30 <1 1 2 3 5

31 to 50 <1 2 3 5 8

51 to 75 <1 3 4 8 12

76 to 100 <1 3 5 10 15

101 to 150 1 5 8 15 23

151 to 200 2 6 10 20 30

201 to 500 5 15 25 50 75

>500 >5 >15 >25 >50 >75

1

Infected premises values have been rounded up to the nearest whole 

number for the maximum area of the size range. For example, a surveillance 

system designed to detection 10 percent prevalence in a zone with 150 

premises has a 95 percent chance of detecting at least one infected premises 

if there are 15 or more infected premises in the zone. In other words, the zone 

could go undetected using this sample size if less than 15 premises were 

infected.

Sampling Birds within Selected Premises

Guidance for sampling birds on selected premises will vary by HPAI strain and 

host characteristics (see Figures D-1, D-2a and D-2b later in this Appendix). If the 

strain is expected to manifest clinically in the affected host population, sampling 

can center on sick or recently dead birds and use smaller sample sizes. If the 

strain may not manifest clinically in the affected host population, sampling may 

need to be more intensive. Guidelines for bird level sampling are the same 

whether the selected premises falls within the CA or the SZ.

SPECIES LIKELY TO MANIFEST CLINICAL SIGNS

From each house on the premises where sick or dead birds are observed, or 

epidemiological links are found, collect swabs for two 5- or 11-bird pool(s). This 

ensures 95 percent confidence of detecting at least 1 infected pool from each 

house if 40 percent of the sick and dead birds (design prevalence in the target 

group) are infected. 

When the number of sick or dead birds is small, it may not be possible to detect 

the desired design prevalence. It is not unusual in turkey breeder houses or smaller 

houses to have fewer than 5 or 11 sick or dead birds daily. In situations where 
HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance for Poultry

UPDATED May 2017 D-9

fewer than 5 or 11 dead or sick birds are available, only available dead or sick 

birds should be sampled but swabs should still be divided approximately equally 

between the two pooled samples. Sampling apparently healthy gallinaceous birds 

provides negligible benefit. 

For cases where it is desired to detect at a target prevalence less than 40 percent 

within the sick and dead bird group, see Table D-3 for the number of pooled 

samples to collect in each house. For example, when the epidemiologic curve of

the strain progresses slowly (compare strains shown in Figures D-2.a and D-2.b), 

selecting a lower bird-level design prevalence can result in more rapid detection. 

However, a lower bird-level design prevalence requires more than 2 pooled 

samples per house (see Table D-3). Note that testing for business continuity 

purposes will likely require collecting 5- or 11-bird pool(s) from each group of 50 

sick and dead birds from each house on the premises.

Table D-3. Number of Pooled Samples to Collect per House to Achieve 95

Percent Confidence in Detecting at Least One Infected Pool (assuming the 

design prevalence given on the left)

1

Design 

prevalence in 

target 

population

Target population 

size

Number of 5-

bird pooled 

samples

Number of 11-

bird pooled 

samples

5%

>650 birds 14 7

400 - 650 13 6

250 - 399 13 6

150 - 249 12 6

100 - 149 11 6

40* - 99 10 6

10%

>200 birds 7 4

20* - 200 7 3

15% >13* 5 3

20% >9* 4 2

30% >6* 3 2

40% >4* 2 2

1 When the target population contains fewer birds than what is recommended, divide them 

approximately equally between the number of pools recommended.

*For target population sizes below these lower bounds, the design prevalence (for that row) 

cannot be achieved with 95% confidence. Sample all birds, dividing approximately equally 

among tubes.
UPDATED May 2017 D-10

PREMISES/SPECIES UNLIKELY TO MANIFEST CLINICAL STUDIES

There are three exceptions to the ‘sampling sick or dead birds only’ rule. The rule 

does not apply to 

1. Outbreaks in which LPAI is also a concern (e.g., Indiana 2016 or 

Tennessee 2017), 

2. Facilities lacking species known to respond clinically to HPAI, such as 

waterfowl, and 

3. HPAI outbreaks that do not cause clinical signs in gallinaceous birds. 

In these cases, if sick or dead birds total less than the described sample size, swab 

apparently healthy birds to make up the difference and consider increasing the 

sample size to meet a lower design prevalence. Target sampling of apparently 

healthy birds to stressed animals (e.g., puberty), and distribute effort across each 

house with preference given to areas near doorways, vents, or with higher 

potential traffic of fomites. 

As an example, in the Indiana 2016 incident, a sample size of 20–22 turkeys was 

designed to detect AI with 95 percent confidence, presuming a detection 

prevalence of 20 percent at any single visit or closer to 10 percent detection 

prevalence from accumulated sampling of two consecutive sampling visits. In 

contrast, a sample size of 30–33 broilers and layers was designed to detect AI 

with 95 percent confidence, presuming a detection prevalence of 10 percent at any 

single visit or closer to 5 percent detection prevalence from accumulated sampling 

of two consecutive sampling visits. These targets presume a higher expected 

susceptibility to AI viruses in turkeys than in broilers or layers. See Box D-1 for 

obtaining surveillance design assistance when sampling does not reach 95 percent 

confidence.

Frequency of Sampling

Frequency of sampling is determined by classification of premises, the objective 

of surveillance (to detect disease or to demonstrate freedom), resource 

availability, and the type of behavior of the virus (e.g., its incubation period4,

infectious period5, and potential routes of new exposure). Sampling frequency is 

highest when there are continuing opportunities for virus introduction. Sampling 

frequency is also highest early in an outbreak, when little is known of the 

behavior of the virus. In these cases, in which early detection is the primary 

objective, repeat visits to high-risk premises (e.g., Contact Premises [CP]) may be 

necessary to detect the virus during its incubation period. Frequency may be 

adjusted based on virus transmission characteristics (see Table D-4) and by 

premises designation (see Table D-5). Sampling frequency can be reduced in 

 

4

Incubation period: The period between exposure and onset of clinical signs.

5

Infectious period: The period during which an infected animal can transmit the pathogen to other 

hosts. The infectious period varies by pathogen.
HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance for Poultry 

UPDATED May 2017 D-11

situations in which exposure opportunities are resolved and demonstration of 

disease freedom is the goal. In these cases, the final sampling should occur at least 

one incubation period following the last opportunity for exposure. 

IN THE CONTROL AREA

1. Suspect Premises (SP): SP is a temporary designation determined by State

Animal Health Official, APHIS, and/or the unified IC. These premises 

should be immediately investigated. SP should be reclassified after 

investigation is complete and testing results are received.

2. Contact Premises (CP): Collect samples on each premises every other day for

14 days, or similar sampling frequency depending on resources available.

Collect samples following the recommended sampling guidance above. CP that

test negative in the above sampling regime may be sampled as described for the

Monitored Premises (MP) and At-Risk Premises (ARP) below.

3. Monitored Premises (MP) and At-Risk Premises (ARP): Collect samples

on each premises once every 5–7 days for the duration of the quarantine

period with a minimum of three sampling rounds or similar sampling

frequency depending on the resources available and guidance provided by

the unified IC. Sampling may occur more frequently depending on premovement surveillance guidelines. Samples collected and tested for premovement may be used to meet the requirements of routine active

surveillance if samples and tests meet criteria given in Recommended

Sampling Scheme above.

OUTSIDE OF THE CONTROL AREA

1. Surveillance Zone (SZ): Sample selected premises as directed by IC.

Sampling selected premises once near the initiation and once near the

close of the CA will help to ensure that outbreak response was

appropriately targeted. Sampling every 2 to 3 weeks throughout the

duration may be necessary if the outbreak is extensive, ongoing, or

exposure risk is considered high.

Recommendations for selection of premises, sampling within all selected 

premises and frequency of sampling are summarized in Table D-5. 
UPDATED May 2017 D-12

Table D-4. Simulated Mean Time to Detection with 90 Percent Prediction 

Intervals (for various frequencies of sampling for different strains representing 

varying latent and infectious periods)1

HPAI Strain

(species)

Latent period2

(days)

Infectious 

period3(days)

Predicted time to detect via 

simulation (days)

Daily 

testing

Every other 

day testing

Every 5 

days 

testing

East 

Asian/American

H5N2

(Turkeys)4

1.41 (0.2-3.5) 3.87 (2-6.3) 5.3(3-8) 6 (3-9) 7 (3-11)

Netherlands H7N7 

(Broilers)5 0.7 (.1-1.7) 4.1 (2.7-5.4) 5.3 (4-7) 6 (4-8) 7.6 (5-11)

1983 Pennsylvania 

H5N2 (Table egg 

layers)6

0.7 (.1-1.7) 3.8 (0.9-7.4) 4.7 (2-7) 5.6 (3-9) 7(4-11)

Guangdong lineage

H5N1 (Broilers)7 0.7 (0.1-1.7) 1.8(0.2-4.7) 2.7(1-4) 3.5(2-6) 5.1 (2-9)

Italy H7N1

(Turkeys)8 0.42 (0.1-0.9) 1.5 (0.4-2.8) 2.7 (1-4) 3.4 (2-6) 4.5 (2-7)

1This provides context for changing frequency of testing to address new strains, for differing objectives by zone, 

or when resources are limited.

2Latent period: The period between exposure and first detection of infection (not necessarily concurrent with 

onset of clinical signs).

3

Infectious period: The host may become infectious (i.e. able to transmit the pathogen to other hosts) at any 

moment of the infection. This moment will vary per pathogen.

4Spackman, personal communication

5Maas et al. 2009; van der Groot et al. 2005.

6Swayne, Eggert, Beck 2012; van der Groot et al. 2003.

7Bouma et al. 2009; Das et al. 2008; Pfeiffer et al. 2009; Spekreijse et al. 2011.

8Saenz et al. 2012.
HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance for Poultry 

UPDATED May 2017 D-13

Table D-5. Outbreak Surveillance for Disease Detection in Commercial Poultry1 

Sampling Infected Zone and

Buffer Zone Surveillance Zone

Number of

premises

All Sample for a selected design 

prevalence (Table D-2), or as unified

IC recommends.

Number of 

samples per 

house

For clinical strains and hosts:

Collect two 5- or 11-bird pooled samples from daily sick and dead from 

each house on the premises. Do NOT include apparently healthy birds in 

sampling.

For non-clinical strains or hosts:

Pool as described above. But, set an elevated minimum sample size and 

include apparently healthy birds when sick and dead do not meet target 

above.

Frequency

Free Premises

Once to investigate spread. Consider 

repeating again prior to release of the 

Control Area. Or, repeat every 14–21 

days if the unified IC/State/APHIS 

recommends.

Suspect 

Premises

Immediately investigate and sample as described. Consider repeating every 

other day through a full incubation period if unified IC recommends. Although 

a Suspect Premises can exist briefly in the Surveillance Zone, confirmation of 

a positive will create a new Control Area around the new Infected Premises.

Monitored

Premises

Consider sampling every 5-7 days 

until the Control Area is released,

or more frequently as required for 

movement testing. Optimum 

frequency depends on incubation 

period and exposure risk 

(Table D-4). Also see “Poultry and 

Product Movement.”

At-Risk Premises

Consider sampling every 5-7 days 

until the Control Area is released,

or as IC recommends. Optimum 

frequency depends on incubation 

period and exposure risk 

(Table D-4). Also see “Poultry and 

Product Movement.”

Contact

Premises Every other day for 14 days, or as unified IC recommends.

Specific 

Poultry and 

Product

Movement

Refer to Secure Poultry Supply plans. Only applies to MPs and ARPs.

1 Backyard surveillance should follow commercial guidelines or specific policy guidance documents 

developed for an outbreak, which may be provided by the unified IC or posted to the HPAI page on 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
UPDATED May 2017 D-14

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Predicted detection probability from simulation

Days post house exposure

Guangdong HPAI

H5N1 Turkeys (5

bird pool)

Guangdong HPAI

H5N1 Turkeys (11

bird pool)

1983 Pennsylvania

HPAI H5N2 Layers

(5 bird pool)

1983 Pennsylvania

HPAI H5N2 Layers

(11 bird pool)

ADDITIONAL FIGURES & INFORMATION

The figures below provide examples of HPAI strains and how they behave in 

different hosts. This information can be used to help adjust sampling guidelines or 

to show impacts of altering sampling guidelines. 

Figure D-1. Detection Probability When Testing Occurs “x” Number of Days 

Post-Poultry House Exposure to HPAI1

1 Calculations presume a total of 2 pooled samples obtained by the selected date. These predictions are 

based on the behavior of the Guangdong lineage H5N1 virus in turkeys (see Aldous et al. 2010) and the 

1983 Pennsylvania H5N2 in chickens (see Swayne et al. 2012 & van der groot et al. 2003). Disease spread 

dynamics for these HPAI strains could vary depending on factors such as housing, environmental 

conditions, management practices, and bird breeds.
HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance for Poultry

UPDATED May 2017 D-15

Figure D-2a. Prevalence of Infection in Dead and Apparently Health Birds Over 

Time Since Exposure (simulated in a layer flock using characteristics of the 1983 

Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain)

1

1 See Swayne et al. 2012 & van der Groot et al. 2003. 

Figure D-2b. Prevalence of Infection in Dead and Apparently Healthy Birds Over 

Time Since Exposure (simulated in a turkey flock using characteristics of the 

Guangdong lineage HPAI H5N1 strain) 1

1 See Aldous et al. 2010. 

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1 3 5 7 9 11

Prevalence 

Days post house exposure

Prevalence of

infectious birds

in dead bird

pool

Prevalence of

infectious birds

in the flock

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1 3 5 7 9 11

Prevalence 

Days post house exposure

Prevalence

of infectious

birds in

dead bird

pool

Prevalence

of infectious

birds in the

flock
UPDATED May 2017 D-16

REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX D

Aldous, E.W., Seekings, J.M., McNally, A., Nili, H., Fuller, C.M., Irvine, R.M., 

Alexander, D.J., & Brown, I.H. (2010). Infection dynamics of highly pathogenic 

avian influenza and virulent avian paramyxovirus type 1 viruses in chickens, 

turkeys and ducks. Avian Pathology, 39, 265–273. 

Bouma, A., Claassen, I., Natih, K., Klinkenberg, D., Donnelly, C.A., Koch, G., &

van Boven, M. (2009). Estimation of transmission parameters of H5N1 avian 

influenza virus in chickens. PLoS Pathog, 5, e1000281.

Cannon, R.M. (2001). Sense and sensitivity-designing surveys based on an

imperfect test. Prev Vet Med, 49, 141–163. 

Cannon, R.M. & Roe, R.T. (1982). Livestock disease surveys—A field manual

for veterinarians. Bureau of Rural Science, Department of Primary Industry.

Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Das, A., Spackman, E., Thomas, C., Swayne, D.E., & Suarez, D.L. (2008). 

Detection of H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus in meat and tracheal 

samples from experimentally infected chickens. Avian Dis, 52, 40–48.

Flock, D.K., Laughlin, K.F., and Bentley, J. (2006). Minimizing losses to

poultry breeding and production; how breeding companies contribute to poultry

welfare. Lohmann Information, 41, 20–28.

Maas, R., Tacken, M., van Zoelen, D., & Oei, H. (2009). Dose response effects of 

avian influenza (H7N7) vaccination of chickens: Serology, clinical protection and 

reduction of virus excretion. Vaccine, 27, 3592–3597. 

Pfeiffer, J., Pantin-Jackwood, M., To, T.L., Nguyen, T., & Suarez, D.L. (2009). 

Phylogenetic and biological characterization of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian 

influenza viruses (Vietnam 2005) in chickens and ducks. Virus Res, 142, 108–

120.

Poetri, O., Bouma, A., Claassen, I., Koch, G., Soejoedono, R., Stegeman, A., &

van Boven, M. (2011). A single vaccination of commercial broilers does not 

reduce transmission of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza. Vet Res, 42, 74. 

Saenz, R. A., Essen, S.C., Brookes, S.M., Iqbal, M., Wood, J. L., Grenfell, B. T., 

McCauley, J.W., Brown, I.H., & Gog, J.R. (2012). Quantifying transmission of 

highly pathogenic and low pathogenicity H7N1 avian influenza in turkeys. PLoS 

ONE, 7, e45059.

Spekreijse, D., Bouma, A., Stegeman, J.A., Koch, G., & de Jong, M.C.M. (2011). 

The effect of inoculation dose of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus strain 

H5N1 on the infectiousness of chickens. Veterinary Microbiology, 147, 59–66. 
HPAI Active Outbreak Surveillance Guidance for Poultry

UPDATED May 2017 D-17

Swayne, D. E., Eggert, D., & Beck, J. R. (2012). Reduction of high pathogenicity 

avian influenza virus in eggs from chickens once or twice vaccinated with an oilemulsified inactivated H5 avian influenza vaccine. Vaccine, 30, 4964–4970. 

NC State Poultry Extension. (2009). North Carolina Layer Performance and 

Management Test. Available at https://poultry.ces.ncsu.edu/layer-performance/

United Egg Producers. Available at www.uepcertified.com and 

www.unitedegg.org.

USDA APHIS. (2007, 2013). National H5/H7 Avian Influenza Surveillance 

Plan. Available at 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/surveil

lance-plan.pdf. 

van der Goot, J.A., De Jong, M.C.M., Koch, G., & van Boven, M. (2003). 

Comparison of the Transmission Characteristics of Low and High Pathogenicity 

Avian Influenza A Virus (H5N2). Epidemiology and Infection, 131, 1003–1013.

van der Goot, J.A., Koch, G., De Jong, M.C.M., & van Boven, M. (2005). 

Quantification of the effect of vaccination on transmission of avian influenza 

(H7N7) in chickens. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 

United States of America, 102, 18141–18146.
UPDATED May 2017 E-1 

Appendix E

Procedures for HPAI Investigations 

and Specimen Submission

Veterinary Services (VS) Guidance Document 12001 provides guidance for the 

investigation of potential foreign animal disease/emerging disease incidents. This 

document is available under “APHIS and VS Emergency Management 

Resources” at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
UPDATED May 2017 E-2
Procedures for HPAI Investigations and Specimen Submission

UPDATED May 2017 E-3
UPDATED May 2017 F-1

Appendix F

Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

This appendix contains two documents (1) a sample epidemiological 

questionnaire used in the 2014–2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 

outbreak for turkey flocks and (2) the survey used in the epidemiological case 

control study for layer flocks. In addition, you can find an Initial Contact Epi 

Report on the HPAI page at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. This document is 

significantly shorter than a full epidemiological questionnaire and can be used 

initially in an outbreak to identify critical information from premises.

The purpose of the epidemiological investigation is twofold: first, it works to 

assess pathways of initial introduction of the HPAI virus on to premises; second, 

the data collected helps to examine potential routes for lateral (infected premises 

to non-infected premises) transmission.

In any epidemiological investigation, it is important that the individual filling out 

the questionnaire or responding to the survey is highly knowledgeable about the 

premises management and operations. When possible, on-farm observation can 

help to augment the information provided by the manager or owner (e.g., 

watching required biosecurity procedures). 

Based on the epidemiological situation or the types of premises involved in any 

HPAI outbreak, it may be appropriate to modify the questionnaire or add other 

questions regarding additional risk factors that may play a role in transmission. It 

is not unusual for each HPAI outbreak to result in one or more epidemiological 

questionnaires specific to that outbreak; however, existing questionnaires and 

questions can be a good foundation from which to start.
UPDATED May 2017 F-2
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-3
UPDATED May 2017 F-4
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-5
UPDATED May 2017 F-6
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-7
UPDATED May 2017 F-8
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-9
UPDATED May 2017 F-10
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-11
UPDATED May 2017 F-12
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-13
UPDATED May 2017 F-14
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-15
UPDATED May 2017 F-16
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-17
UPDATED May 2017 F-18
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-19
UPDATED May 2017 F-20
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-21
UPDATED May 2017 F-22
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-23
UPDATED May 2017 F-24
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-25
UPDATED May 2017 F-26
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-27
UPDATED May 2017 F-28
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-29
UPDATED May 2017 F-30
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-31
UPDATED May 2017 F-32
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-33
UPDATED May 2017 F-34
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-35
UPDATED May 2017 F-36
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-37
UPDATED May 2017 F-38
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-39
UPDATED May 2017 F-40
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-41
UPDATED May 2017 F-42
Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

UPDATED May 2017 F-43
UPDATED May 2017 G-1

Appendix G

Examples of Movement Control Notices

This appendix provides examples, both Federal and State, of halting movement of 

animals during a disease outbreak. Each State has different authorities and 

processes regarding movement controls—frequently called a “stop movement 

order” or a “hold order”—in response to an animal health emergency.

EXAMPLE—KANSAS (2015)

Manhattan, Kansas – In an effort to protect the Kansas poultry industry 

and to promote stronger biosecurity practices throughout the state, 

Kansas Department of Agriculture Division of Animal Health has issued 

a stop movement order, signed by Secretary of Agriculture Jackie 

McClaskey, targeting Kansas poultry and live birds, effectively 

cancelling all poultry-related shows and events through calendar year 

2015. This includes all types of poultry activities where birds from 

different flocks are co-mingled. 

This will include, but is not limited to: regional and county fairs, 

festivals, the Kansas State Fair, swap meets, exotic sales and live bird 

auctions. This measure is being implemented in an effort to prevent the 

spread of highly pathogenic H5N2 avian influenza (HPAI). Kansas 

experienced a positive case of HPAI in Leavenworth County in March 

2015.

This decision was made after careful consideration and consultation with 

the K-State Research and Extension, Kansas 4-H, Kansas State Fair 

representatives and other poultry industry officials. Dr. Justin Smith, 

Deputy Animal Health Commissioner made the announcement.

“The decision to issue movement restrictions regarding poultry and bird 

events has been made in an effort to protect the poultry industry in 

Kansas and the economic contribution that the industry makes to our 

agricultural economy. It is a difficult decision, as I know youth and

adults would soon be exhibiting their projects at local fairs,” said Smith. 

“This decision was not made lightly, but it is necessary we do everything 

possible to protect the Kansas poultry flock.”

K-State Research and Extension and Kansas 4-H, along with the Kansas 

State Fair, is working to identify options for youth enrolled in poultry 

projects to showcase their learning and participate in fairs in ways other 

than having their birds present.
UPDATED May 2017 G-2

It is important that all poultry producers continue to monitor their flocks 

for symptoms of the virus, and notify KDA immediately if they suspect 

any problems. All bird owners, whether commercial producers or 

backyard enthusiasts, should prevent contact between their birds and 

other birds including wild fowl. 

If you see sickness in birds, please contact KDA Division of Animal 

Health at (785) 564-6601 or email HPAI@kda.ks.gov. Additional 

information about HPAI can be found online at www.agriculture.ks.gov/ 

avianinfluenza. 

Source: http://agriculture.ks.gov/AllNewsItems/2015/06/09/movementrestrictions-for-poultry-events-exhibitions-and-sales-issued-in-kansas 

EXAMPLE—NORTH DAKOTA (2015) 

BISMARCK, N.D. – To protect North Dakota’s poultry industry from 

potential exposure to H5 avian influenza virus, the State Board of 

Animal Health (BOAH) has halted bird movement to shows, exhibitions 

and public sales within the state in which birds from different locations 

are intermingled at an event. This does not apply to approved private 

sales that meet North Dakota importation requirements. 

“The state board is taking this precaution to reduce the risk of avian 

influenza exposure to North Dakota birds,” State Veterinarian Dr. Susan 

Keller said. “Mixing birds could unnecessarily increase the risk of 

exposure.”

This board action prohibits the specified poultry/bird movements until 

further notice. BOAH is continuing to monitor and assess the disease 

threat, which will be reviewed at their June 10 quarterly meeting. 

North Dakota has had two confirmed cases of avian influenza in 

commercial poultry operations in Dickey and LaMoure counties 

affecting over 100,000 birds. Nationally, the outbreak has affected nearly 

10 million birds in 13 states. 

Bird owners should immediately report death loss to their local and state 

veterinarian, restrict access to their property, prevent contact between 

their birds and wild birds and practice enhanced biosecurity.

State Veterinarian Dr. Susan Keller is reminding anyone bringing birds 

into North Dakota to contact the North Dakota Department of 

Agriculture’s Animal Health Division at 701-328-2655 to ensure they are 

meeting all importation requirements.
Examples of Movement Control Notices

UPDATED May 2017 G-3

More information about avian influenza and biosecurity is available at 

www.nd.gov/ndda/disease/avian-influenza and from the USDA-APHIS 

at www.aphis.usda.gov.

Source: www.nd.gov/ndda/news/poultrybird-movements-limited-control-spreadavian-influenza. 

EXAMPLE—WEST VIRGINIA (2007)

Commissioner of Agriculture Halts Poultry Shows and Sales after 

AI-Positive Flock Discovered in Virginia 

Commissioner of Agriculture Gus R. Douglass has ordered a halt to 

poultry shows and sales throughout West Virginia in response to a turkey 

flock that tested positive for low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) in 

Mt. Jackson, Va., just across the West Virginia border.

The strain is not the “bird flu” that has been plaguing Southeast Asia and 

parts of Europe and poses no threat to human health. 

The order applies to any gathering of live birds, including shows at fairs 

and festivals and sales of poultry. The order is effective Monday, July 9, 

and will be in place for 30 days unless another positive flock is 

discovered.

The order does not apply to the commercial industry, which tests every 

flock for AI before it is moved off the farm to ensure that infected birds 

are not trucked past other poultry farms.

“Having already dealt with a positive flock in West Virginia earlier this 

year, we want to take every precaution to protect our poultry industry 

from a potentially devastating situation,” said Commissioner Douglass.

He also noted that the West Virginia Department of Agriculture is on 

high alert for any signs of the disease here, and that the industry has been 

exercising enhanced surveillance protocols since a 2002 AI outbreak that 

affected West Virginia and Virginia.

Poultry companies on both sides of the border have instructed their 

growers not to spread litter or move it from their farms until further 

notice.

According to the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer 

Services (VDACS), testing over the weekend by the USDA’s National 

Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, confirmed the 

presence of AI antibodies, which indicates possible prior exposure to the 

virus. The turkeys did not show any signs of illness prior to testing. 

Virginia is closely monitoring all poultry operations within a six-mile 

radius of the affected farm. 
UPDATED May 2017 G-4

NVSL is doing further testing to help identify the virus and hopefully 

determine its source. VDACS, USDA and the poultry owner are working 

cooperatively to minimize the possibility that the virus will move beyond 

this farm. 

The affected flock contains 54,000 birds, which will be euthanized as a 

precaution as soon as possible and composted on-site. While LPAI poses 

no risk to human health, federal and state policy is to eradicate H5 and 

H7 subtypes because of their potential to change into more serious types, 

which have a higher mortality rate among birds. 

Source: www.wvagriculture.org/news_releases/2007/7-9-07.html.

EXAMPLE—FEDERAL (2003)

Source: www.federalregister.gov/articles/2003/04/16/03-9322/exotic-newcastledisease-additions-to-quarantined-area#p-3.
Examples of Movement Control Notices

UPDATED May 2017 G-5
UPDATED May 2017 G-6
UPDATED May 2017 H-1

Appendix H

Available Avian Influenza Vaccines 

INFORMATION ABOUT VACCINE

This section is provided to be a quick reference appendix for general information 

on avian influenza (AI) vaccine; this appendix may be updated at any time. For 

further information on AI vaccines, please see National Animal Health 

Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) Guidelines: Vaccination for 

Contagious Diseases Appendix C: Vaccination for High Pathogenicity Avian 

Influenza at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

In the event of a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak in the United 

States, stamping-out is the primary response strategy. Other strategies may be 

considered for implementation by the USDA, such as emergency vaccination, but 

there are a multitude of factors that need to be carefully considered before 

deciding to vaccinate U.S. poultry flocks. Vaccination against HPAI is not 

currently a primary response strategy in the United States, in part because it can 

mask infection, complicate detection and eradication, and also has international 

trade implications. 

Effective vaccination can decrease transmission between animals by 1) decreasing 

the susceptibility of animals to infection, and 2) reducing virus shedding, if a 

vaccinated animal becomes infected. In addition to reducing transmission between 

flocks, decreased virus shedding reduces contamination of the environment and 

the risk to humans. However, vaccination may allow birds to survive longer 

without clinical signs, and if virus shedding is not substantially reduced, 

transmission could be enhanced. Advancements have been made in vaccine 

development and research continues. 

Inactivated Avian Influenza Vaccines 

For poultry, inactivated (killed) vaccines are usually supplied as oil emulsions. 

Generally, inactivated vaccines contain field strains of low pathogenicity avian 

influenza viruses (either naturally occurring or engineered) that are cross-reactive 

with the same hemagglutinin subtype that is causing the infection. Inactivated 

vaccines are not for use in poultry less than 2–3 weeks of age (i.e., for first dose), 

due to dosage volume as well as the potential interference of maternal antibody. 

Two doses of inactivated vaccine are required (a priming dose plus a booster 2–4 

weeks later). Vaccination of short production span birds (i.e., broilers) is 

generally impractical, but in birds with extended life-spans, such as turkeys, 

layers, genetic stock, and multiplier flocks, vaccination may be warranted. After 
UPDATED May 2017 H-2

the initial prime/booster doses, the birds must be re-vaccinated every 6 months 

throughout their production lifespan. These vaccines have been used in other 

avian species, though this does not imply associated efficacy testing has been 

completed. Use in any animal besides chickens or turkeys must be considered 

experimental.

A pre-vaccination AI test may be required. Withdrawal prior to slaughter is 

42 days (6 weeks). The inactivated vaccine may provide protection to an outbreak 

virus of the same hemagglutinin type, but this must always be evaluated at the 

time of the outbreak. Maternal antibodies can be passed to progeny, resulting in 

seropositive test results in progeny for a period. 

It would be possible to use inactivated vaccine and a companion diagnostic test

for differentiating infected and vaccinated animals (DIVA),

1

if the neuraminidase 

of the vaccine was different than the field strain: a DIVA strategy would monitor 

for N antibodies matching the field strain, indicating infection in vaccinated 

animals. However, neuraminidase DIVA testing has not been validated or 

recognized as an accepted DIVA strategy for purposes of international trade.

Live Recombinant Vaccine

FOWLPOX-VECTORED H5 VACCINE

Another possibility is a live, fowlpox-vectored H5 vaccine. Fowlpox vaccines 

replicate well only in chickens and have been licensed for emergency use in this 

species. However, experimental evidence is needed to demonstrate how well these 

vaccines protect against a current H5 outbreak strain. In addition, use in any 

animal besides chickens must be considered experimental. It would be possible to 

use this vaccine as a DIVA vaccine. 

Fowlpox-vectored AI vaccines must be given individually to birds by injection, 

and can be given to chicks 1 day or older. Chickens to be vaccinated, and hens 

which produced the hatching eggs, should not have received a prior fowlpox

vaccination nor have been exposed to indigenous fowlpox viruses transmitted by 

mosquitoes, since pre-existing fowlpox virus antibodies can interfere with the 

vaccine. A booster vaccination with an homologous inactivated virus vaccine 

must be applied 2–3 weeks later to ensure sufficient protection. Withdrawal time 

prior to slaughter for this vaccine is 21 days (3 weeks). However, the withdrawal 

time for the inactivated vaccine booster is 42 days. If the bird’s production 

lifespan is lengthy, it must receive a booster with a homologous inactivated 

vaccine every 6 months.

 

1 This is sometimes also called detecting infection in vaccinated animals.
Available AI Vaccines

UPDATED May 2017 H-3

MAREK’S DISEASE VECTOR VACCINE

In addition to fowlpox-vectored H5 vaccine, live turkey herpesvirus (HVT) 

vectored H5 vaccine is also available for potential emergency use in the United 

States. This vaccine protects against both Marek’s disease and homologous H5 

HPAI viruses. Current labeling allows injection of 1 day-old chicks, and it could 

also be used in ovo 2–3 days before hatching. The vaccine is to be handled with 

care, as it is supplied frozen, must be thawed and mixed, and must be 

administered in a timely manner. HVT-vectored H7 vaccines are in experimental 

stages and not currently available. 

Each serological DIVA strategy is appropriate only with certain types of avian 

influenza vaccines and have not yet been validated with vectored avian influenza 

vaccines. 
UPDATED May 2017 I-1

Appendix I

USDA Response Process for Infected Premises

This attachment contains succinct guidance about the step-by-step process of U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)

response. It highlights the entire response process for an Infected Premises, from 

detection to restocking.
UPDATED May 2017 I-2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

USDA Response Process

Detection and 

Quarantine

Premises 

s spected of 

 in PAI m 

 e p ced nder 

st ndsti notice or 

 o d order t e 

St te S mp es re 

s mitted to S 

 nd St te A 

 

 oc ppr is 

process is initi ted 

prior to depop tion 

e er ttempt s o d 

 e m de to co ect 

in entor nd ot er 

d t for indemnit so 

t t f ir m r et e 

c n e p id for t e 

f oc 

Appraisal and 

Compensation

 it in - o rs of 

pres mpti e positi e c se 

definition f oc s i e 

depop ted to imit t e 

spre d of t e ir s nd 

f rt er en ironment 

cont min tion 

Depopulation

Disposal

 sed on t e f ci it 

 oc tion o sin nd 

ot er f ctors c rc sses 

 re disposed of sin 

one or more met ods 

compostin ri 

inciner tion renderin 

or ndfi in 

Virus 

Elimination

 ir s m st e e imin ted 

from rn e ipment nd 

 ffected re s of t e 

f rm et ods i e sitespecific sed on Incident 

 omm nd id nce nd 

preference of prod cers 

Re ired 

en ironment 

s mp es re 

co ected nd tested 

to confirm t t t e 

 ir s is one efore 

f rt er steps re 

t en to reest is 

prod ction Testing

USDA nd St te offici s 

m st ppro e restoc in 

 fter ppro prod cers 

c n restoc t eir f ci ities 

from n PAI ne ti e 

so rce f oc nd res me 

prod ction 

Restocking

Maintain 

Biosecurity

At times nd 

especi fter 

restoc in t e o ners 

m int ins t e i est 

 iosec rit st nd rds to 

protect t eir f oc s or 

 iosec rit tips o to 

 p is sd o 

f dprep 

 ote A tion Anim e t or tor et or 

 S tion eterin r Ser ices or tories 
UPDATED May 2017 J-1

Appendix J

Glossary

Animal product Blood or any of its components, bones, bristles, feathers, flesh, offal, 

skins, and any by product containing any of those components that 

originated from an animal or bird.

Anseriformes An order of birds that includes ducks, geese, and swans. There are

about 150 living species of birds in three extant families: the 

Anhimidae (the screamers), Anseranatidae (the Magpie Goose), and 

the Anatidae, which includes more than 140 species of waterfowl.

Case Any individual animal infected by HPAI virus, with or without 

clinical signs.

Charadriiformes A diverse order of small to medium-large birds including those 

commonly known as shorebirds. There are about 350 species in all 

parts of the world. Most live near water and eat invertebrates or other 

small animals.

Compartment 

(compartmentalization)

(OIE)

An animal subpopulation contained in one or more establishments 

under a common biosecurity management system with a distinct 

health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases for 

which required surveillance, control and biosecurity measures have 

been applied for the purpose of international trade.

Control Area A Control Area (an Infected Zone and Buffer Zone) has individual 

premises quarantine for Infected Premises, Suspect Premises, and 

Contact Premises and movement restrictions for At-Risk Premises 

and Monitored Premises.

Domestic poultry See poultry.

Emergency 

vaccination

A disease control strategy using the immunization of susceptible 

animals through the administration of a vaccine comprising antigens 

appropriate to the disease to be controlled.

Etiology The causes or origin of disease, or the factors that produce or 

predispose toward a certain disease or disorder.

Euthanasia (OIE) Means the act of inducing death using a method that causes a rapid 

and irreversible loss of consciousness with minimum pain and 

distress to animal.
UPDATED May 2017 J-2

FAD PReP (Foreign 

Animal Disease 

Preparedness and 

Response Plan)

Documents used to identify overall strategies, veterinary functions, 

organization, and countermeasures necessary to contain and control 

an FAD outbreak. It is also used to integrate functions and 

countermeasures with emergency management systems and 

operations conducted in joint and unified command by Federal, 

State, Tribal, and local personnel.

Fomites Inanimate objects that can transmit infectious agents from one 

animal or person to another.

Foreign animal disease A transboundary animal disease not known to exist in the U.S.

animal population.

Galliformes An order of birds containing turkeys, grouse, chickens, quails, and 

pheasants. Common names are gamefowl or gamebirds, landfowl, 

gallinaceous birds, or galliformes.

Highly pathogenic 

avian influenza (HPAI) 

(9 CFR 53)

(1) “Any influenza virus that kills at least 75 percent of eight 4- to 

6-week-old susceptible chickens within 10 days following 

intravenous inoculation with 0.2ml of a 1:10 dilution of a 

bacteria-free, infectious allantoic fluid;

(2) Any H5 or H7 virus that does not meet the criteria in paragraph 

(1) of this definition, but has an amino acid sequence at the 

hemagglutinin cleavage site that is compatible with highly 

pathogenic avian influenza viruses; or

(3) Any influenza virus that is not an H5 or H7 subtype that kills 

one to five chickens and grows in cell culture in the absence of 

trypsin.”

Highly pathogenic 

avian influenza (HPAI)

(OIE)

“High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses have an IVPI

[intravenous pathogenicity index] in six-week-old chickens greater 

than 1.2, or as an alternative, cause at least 75 percent mortality in 

four- to eight-week-old chickens infected intravenously. H5 and H7

viruses which do not have an IVPI of greater than 1.2 or cause less 

than 75 percent mortality in an intravenous lethality test should be 

sequenced to determine whether multiple basic amino acids are 

present at the cleavage site of the haemagglutinin molecule (HA0); if 

the amino acid motif is similar to that observed for other HPAI

isolates, the isolate being tested should be considered as high 

pathogenicity avian influenza virus.”
Glossary 

UPDATED May 2017 J-3

Incident Command 

System

A standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach 

that

 allows for the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, 

procedures, and communications operating within a common 

organizational structure;

 enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions 

and functional agencies, both public and private; and

 establishes common processes for planning and managing 

resources. 

Incubation period

(OIE)

For the purposes of the OIE Terrestrial Code (2016) the incubation 

period for AI shall be 21 days. The incubation period is the longest 

period which elapses between the introduction of the pathogen into 

the animal and the occurrence of the first clinical signs of the 

disease.

Index case The first or original case identified in a disease outbreak.

Low pathogenicity 

avian influenza (LPAI)

(OIE)

All influenza A viruses of H5 and H7 subtype that are not HPAI 

viruses.

Mass depopulation Method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed 

quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the 

welfare of the animals as practicable, but where the circumstances 

and tasks facing those doing the depopulation are understood to be 

extenuating. 

Mutation (genetic) Change in the sequence of a cell’s genome caused by radiation, 

viruses, transposons, and mutagenic chemicals, as well as errors that 

occur during meiosis or replication. 

National Animal 

Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN)

NAHLN is a cooperative effort between two U.S. Department of 

Agriculture agencies and the American Association of Veterinary 

Laboratory Diagnosticians. It is a national network of State and 

University laboratories, which use common testing methods and 

software platforms to perform diagnostics and share information.

Non-susceptible 

animal

Animal that does not develop a particular disease when exposed to 

the causative infectious agent of that disease.

OIE (World 

Organization for 

Animal Health)

Organization that collects and publishes information on animal 

diseases from approximately 180 member countries and develops 

standards for animal health.

Outbreak The occurrence of cases of a disease that are in excess of what is 

normally expected in a given population.
UPDATED May 2017 J-4

Poultry Chickens, and any of the following birds, if these other birds are 

kept, raised, captured, bred, or otherwise used for a commercial 

purpose: turkeys, ducks, geese, swans, pheasants, partridges, grouse, 

quail, guinea fowl, pea fowl, pigeons, doves, ostriches, emus, rheas, 

cassowaries. Commercial purposes include the production or sale of 

birds, or of their meat, eggs, or feathers. Does not include chickens 

or other birds displayed in a licensed exhibition or zoo. 

Personal protective 

equipment (PPE)

Clothing and equipment to prevent occupational injuries and diseases 

through control of exposure to potential hazards in the work place 

after engineering and administrative controls have been implemented 

to the fullest extent.

Preemptive 

depopulation

Depopulation under the competent authority of susceptible animal 

species in herds or flocks on premises that have been exposed to 

infection by direct animal-to-animal contact or by indirect contact of 

a kind likely to result in the transmission of HPAI virus prior to the 

expression of clinical signs.

Premises A geographically and epidemiologically defined location, including a 

ranch, farm, stable, or other establishment.

Reassortment (genetic) The mixing of the genetic material of a species into new 

combinations in different individuals. In particular, reassortment 

occurs among influenza viruses, whose genomes consist of eight 

distinct segments of RNA. These segments act like minichromosomes, and each time a flu virus is assembled, it requires one 

copy of each segment.

Regionalization (also 

known as zoning)

An animal subpopulation defined primarily on a geographical basis 

(using natural, artificial, or legal boundaries). 

Slaughter The killing of an animal or animals for food.

Stamping-out (OIE) Means a policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out 

under the authority of the Veterinary Authority the following: a) the 

killing of the animals which are affected and those suspected of 

being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, those in other 

herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to 

animal contact, or by indirect contact with the causal pathogen 

animals should be killed in accordance with Chapter 7.6; b) the 

disposal of carcasses and, where relevant, animal products by 

rendering, burning or burial, or by any other method described in 

Chapter 4.12; and c) the cleansing and disinfection of establishments 

through procedures defined in Chapter 4.13.

Susceptible animal Any animal that can be infected with and replicate the disease 

pathogen of concern. The susceptible animals of primary concern to 

this plan are poultry.

Susceptible species See susceptible animal.
Glossary

UPDATED May 2017 J-5

Trace back The identification of the origin and movements of all animals, animal 

products, possible fomites, people, possible vectors, and so on that 

have entered onto an infected premises.

Trace forward The tracing of all animals, people, fomites, and so on that have left 

an infected premises. The premises that received the animals or

goods should be investigated and kept under surveillance or 

quarantine.

Vector (OIE) Means an insect or any living carrier that transports an infectious 

agent from an infected individual to a susceptible individual or its 

food or immediate surroundings. The organism may or may not pass 

through a development cycle within the vector.

Wild birds Migratory game birds, upland game birds, and all undomesticated 

feathered vertebrates.

Zoonotic Any disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from animals

to humans. 
UPDATED May 2017 K-1

Appendix K

Abbreviations

3D depopulation, decontamination, and disposal 

AC Area Command

ACIA antigen capture immunoassay

AD Assistant District Director

ADA Associate Deputy Administrator

ADSM Animal Disease Spread Model

AEOC APHIS Emergency Operations Center 

AGID agar-gel immunodiffusion

AHPA Animal Health Protection Act

AI avian influenza 

AMT APHIS Management Team

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

APHIS WS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Wildlife Services

ARP At-Risk Premises

ARS Agricultural Research Service

AVMA American Veterinary Medical Association

AZA American Zoological Association

BZ Buffer Zone

CA Control Area

CCC Commodity Credit Corporation

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CEAH Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health

CF Contingency Fund

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CP Contact Premises

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States (VS DA)

CVZ Containment Vaccination Zone

DA Deputy Administrator
UPDATED May 2017 K-2 

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DIVA differentiation of infected from vaccinated animals

DOI Department of Interior 

EDI emerging disease incidents

ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

EMRS2 Emergency Management Response System 2.0

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EQS Emergency Qualifications System

ESF Emergency Support Function 

FA Free Area

FAD foreign animal disease

FADD Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician 

FAD PReP Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

FADDL Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (Plum Island, NY)

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFS Federal-to-Federal support

fluA influenza A virus

FP Free Premises

GIS geographic information system

aH or HA hemagglutinin 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HI hemagglutination inhibition

HPAI highly pathogenic avian influenza

HVT turkey herpesvirus

IC Incident Command 

ICG Incident Coordination Group

ICP Incident Command Post

ICS Incident Command System

ILI influenza-like illness

IMT Incident Management Team

IP Infected Premises

IVPI intravenous pathogenicity index
Abbreviations

UPDATED May 2017 K-3

IZ Infected Zone

JIC Joint Information Center

LBMS Live Bird Marketing System

LPA Legislative and Public Affairs

LPAI low pathogenic avian influenza

MAC Multiagency Coordination 

MP Monitored Premises

N or NA neuraminidase 

NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency Management System

NAHERC National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps

NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network

NASAHO National Association of State Animal Health Officials

NASDA National Association of State Departments of Agriculture

NI neuraminidase inhibition

NIES National Import Export Services

NIMS National Incident Management System

NIMT National Incident Management Team

NPIC National Preparedness and Incident Coordination

NPIP National Poultry Improvement Plan

NRF National Response Framework

NVS National Veterinary Stockpile

NVSL National Veterinary Services Laboratories 

NVSL-Ames National Veterinary Services Laboratories-Ames, IA

NVSL-FADDL National Veterinary Services Laboratories-Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostic Laboratory Plum Island, NY

OIE World Organization for Animal Health

PCR polymerase chain reaction

PIN premises identification number

PMV-1 Paramyxovirus

PPE personal protective equipment

PVZ Protection Vaccination Zone

RNA ribonucleic acid

rRT-PCR real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction
UPDATED May 2017 K-4

SAHO State Animal Health Official

SBS Secure Broiler Supply

SDA Surveillance Design and Analysis

SES Secure Egg Supply

SITC Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance

SOP standard operating procedure

SP Suspect Premises

SPltryS Secure Poultry Supply 

SPRS Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services

STAS Science, Technology, and Analysis Services

STS Secure Turkey Supply

SZ Surveillance Zone

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

USFS U.S. Forest Service

VDACS Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

VERRC Volunteer Emergency Ready Response Corps

VI virus isolation

VP Vaccinated Premises

VS Veterinary Services

VSET VS Executive Team

VZ Vaccination Zone

WHO World Health Organization
UPDATED May 2017 L-1

Appendix L

Selected References and Resources

Note: all related FAD PReP documents listed in Appendix A are also references 

to this APHIS USDA HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book. 

Alexander, D. J. (2007). An overview of the epidemiology of avian influenza. 

Vaccine, 25(30), 5637–5644. doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2006.10.051.

APHIS Veterinary Services. (2016). 2016 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 

(HPAI) Preparedness and Response Plan. USDA. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/hpai

-preparedness-and-response-plan-2015.pdf. 

APHIS. (2015). APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide. USDA. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/library/manuals/pdf/aphis_1050.pdf. 

APHIS. (2016, August). Presentation: Final Report for the 2014–2015 Outbreak 

of HPAI in the United States. USDA. Retrieved from 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

APHIS. (2016, September). Presentation: Final Report for the 2016 HPAI 

Outbreak in the United States. USDA. Retrieved from 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

APHIS. (2017). Avian Influenza Homepage. USDA. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/animal-diseaseinformation/avian-influenza-disease. 

APHIS. (2017). Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Guidance. USDA. Retrieved 

from www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan. (2011). AUSVETPLAN Disease Strategy: 

Avian Influenza, version 3.4. Commonwealth of Australia. Retrieved from

www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au. 

Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). (2013). Notifiable Avian Influenza 

Hazard Specific Plan. Government of Canada. Retrieved from 

www.inspection.gc.ca/animals/terrestrialanimals/diseases/reportable/ai/hazard-specific-plan/eng/ 

1374504359532/1374504482294. 
UPDATED May 2017 L-2

Cappucci, D.T., Johnson, D.C., Brugh, M., Smith, T.M., & Jackson, C.F. (1985). 

Isolation of avian influenza virus (subtype H5N2) from chicken eggs during a 

natural outbreak. Senne Avian Diseases, 29(4), 1195–1200. doi: 

10.2307/1590473.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2015, June 2). HPAI A H5 

virus background and clinical illness. Influenza (Flu). Retrieved from 

https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/hpai/hpai-background-clinical-illness.htm. 

Easterday, B.C., Hinshaw, V.S., and Halvorson, D.A. (1997). Influenza. In B.W. 

Calnek, H.J Barns, C.W. Beard, L.R. McDougald, & Y.M. Saif (Eds.),

Disease of Poultry (10th ed.) (pp. 583–605). Ames, Iowa: Iowa State 

University Press.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2008). National Incident 

Management System. USDA. Retrieved from www.fema.gov/nationalincident-management-system. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2016). National Response 

Framework. Retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/national-responseframework. 

Geering, W.A., Roeder, P.L., & Obi, T.U. (1999). Manual on the Preparation of 

National Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Plans. Food and 

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Retrieved from www.fao.org/ 

docrep/004/x2096e/x2096e00.htm.

Greene, Joel L. (2015, July). Update on the highly-pathogenic avian influenza 

outbreak of 2014–2015. Congressional Research Service, R44114. Retrieved 

from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44114.pdf. 

Huang, W., Hagerman, A., & Bessler, D.A. (2016). The impact of highly 

pathogenic avian influenza on table egg prices. Choices, 31(2). Retrieved 

from http://www.choicesmagazine.org/UserFiles/file/cmsarticle_507.pdf. 

National Flyway Council. (2015, June). Early detection and monitoring for avian 

influenzas of significance in wild birds: A U.S. interagency strategic plan. 

Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/wil

d-bird-strategic-plan.pdf. 

Scott, A., Zepeda, C., Garber, L., Smith, J., Swayne, D., Rhorer, A., Kellar, J., 

Shimshoney A., Batho, H., Caporale, V., & Giovannini, A. (2006). The 

concept of compartmentalization. Scientific and Technical Review, 25(3), 

873–879.
Selected References and Resources

UPDATED May 2017 L-3

Sims, L., & Narrod C. (2010). Understanding Avian Influenza. Food and 

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Animal Production and Health 

Division. www.fao.org/avianflu/ documents/key_ai/key_book_preface.htm.

Spackman, E. (Ed.). (2008). Avian Influenza Virus. Totowa, New Jersey: Humana 

Press, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Swayne, D.E. (2008). Epidemiology of avian influenza in agricultural and other 

man-made systems. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 59–85). 

Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing.

Swayne, D.E. (2008). High pathogenicity avian influenza in the Americas. In D.E. 

Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 191–216). Ames, Iowa: Blackwell 

Publishing. 

Swayne, D.E., & Kapczynski, D.R. (2008). Vaccines, vaccination, and 

immunology for avian influenza viruses in poultry. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), 

Avian Influenza (pp. 407–451). Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing.

Swayne, D.E., & Patin-Jackwood, M. (2008). Pathobiology of avian influenza 

virus infections in birds and mammals. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza 

(pp. 87–122). Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing.

Swayne, D.E., & Thomas, C. (2008). Trade and food safety aspects for avian 

influenza viruses. In D.E. Swayne (Ed.), Avian Influenza (pp. 499–512). 

Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing. 

The Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH). (2016). Avian Influenza. 

Iowa State University. Retrieved from 

www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/highly_pathogenic_avian_influenza.pdf.

Title 9 CFR Chapter 1, Part 53, 

www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_10/9cfr53_10.html.

USA Poultry & Egg Export Council. (2015, August 11). Avian influenza takes a 

toll on U.S. poultry exports. Retrieved from 

http://www.usapeec.org/p_documents/press_492700213.pdf. 

World Health Organization (WHO). (2017, January). Cumulative number of 

confirmed human cases for avian influenza A (H5N1) reported to WHO, 

2003–2017. Retrieved from 

http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative_tab

le_archives/en/. 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). (2016). Infection with avian 

influenza viruses, Article 10.4. Terrestrial Animal Health Code,. Retrieved 

from http://www.oie.int/. 
UPDATED May 2017 L-4

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). (2016). Manual of Diagnostic Tests 

and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. Retrieved from http://www.oie.int/.

Writing Committee of the World Health Organization (WHO) Consultation on 

Human Influenza A/H5. (2005). Avian influenza A (H5N1) infection in 

humans. The New England Journal of Medicine, 353(13), 1374–1385.

Retrieved from 

https://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/45195/1/122035.pdf?accept=1%EF%BF%

BD%C3%9C.