alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED

April 25, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-21027 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ-MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Carlos Rodriguez-Martinez pleaded guilty to transportation of

illegal aliens under circumstances that placed the life of a person

in jeopardy in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and

(v)(II). He was sentenced to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment and

five years ’ supervised release. Rodriguez-Martinez appeals his

sente nce only and argues that the district court committed plain

error by sentencing him to five years’ supervised release, a term2

in excess of the three year statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. §

3559(a)(3). This contention was not raised in any form below. He

asks this court to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

The Government concedes plain error. The authorized term of

imprisonment for a violation of 8 U.S.C . § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and

(v)(II) is not more than twenty years. 8 U.S.C. §

1324(a)(1)(B)(iii). This makes Rodriguez-Martinez’s offense a

Class C felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3). The authorized term of

s upervised release for a Class C felony is not more than thre e

years. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2).

The sentence of five years’ supervised release meets the plain

error standard. United States v. Moreci , 283 F.3d 293, 300 (5th

Cir. 2002). The only disagreement between the defendant and the

Government is whether to remand for resentencing, or merely to

modify the term of supervised release. There is no need to remand.

The district court, having previously imposed the maximum five-year

supervised release term (and sentenced to the guideline maximum

term of imprisonment), would most likely impose the maximum of

three years’ supervised release again on remand. S ee United States

v. Hord , 6 F.3d 276, 280 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993); U nited States v.

Johnson

, 961 F.2d 1188, 1189 (5th Cir. 1992). Rodriguez-Martinez’s

term of supervised release is accordingly modified to a term of

three years.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

JUSTIN JOHN FISHER, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0404 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-002573-001

The Honorable Sam J. Myers, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Krista Wood

Counsel for Respondent

Justin John Fisher, Kingman

Petitioner

FILED 3-21-2023
STATE v. FISHER

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma, Judge Randall M. Howe, and Judge 

Anni Hill Foster delivered the following decision.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Petitioner Justin John Fisher seeks review of the superior 

court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant 

to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. This is Fisher’s first petition.

¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or legal error, this court will not 

disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. See 

State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577 ¶ 19 (2012). Petitioner has the burden to 

show that the superior court erred in denying the petition for postconviction relief. See State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 538 ¶ 1 (App. 2011).

¶3 This court has reviewed the record in this matter, the order 

denying the petition for post-conviction relief and the petition for review. 

This court finds the petitioner has not established error. 

¶4 This court grants review but denies relief.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric Clark, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rappaport, J.), rendered February 7, 1990, convicting him of grand larceny in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the evidence adduced by the People was legally insufficient to establish his guilt is *256unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Bynum,*70 NY2d 858; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245), and, in any event, is without merit *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620). Further, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the jury verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]). Thompson, J. P., Fiber, Balletta and Ritter, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification of President and Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as Amended



Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(18 U.S.C.   1350, as adopted), Bing Yeh, the President and Chief Executive
Officer of Silicon Storage Technology, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby
certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:

1. The Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
2003, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the "Annual
Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
2. The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

In Witness Whereof, the undersigned has set his hand hereto
as of the 15th day of March, 2004.





A signed original of this written statement required by Rule 13a-14(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, has been provided to Silicon
Storage Technology, Inc. and will be retained by Silicon Storage Technology,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

This certification accompanies the Form 10-K to which it relates, is not
deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be
incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-K), irrespective of any
general incorporation language contained in such filing.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, *v.*Mineola Coal Co., Inc., Defendant.

District Court of Nassau County, First District,

March 1, 1971.

*Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General {Alfred Dorf*of counsel), for plaintiff.

Edward J. Pollos, J.

An information alleging the defendant violated the provisions of subdivision 1 of section 575 of the Labor Law and section 472.3 of the Industrial Commissioner’s regulations (12 NYCRR 472.3) in that the defendant failed to *732file unemployment insurance contribution reports for certain specified periods was returnable in the arraignment part of this court at which time the defendant corporation failed to appear. The file disclosed that the defendant was served with a summons that stated a complaint had been made by a named tax auditor and advising the defendant that upon its failure to appear it would be liable to a fine ‘ *‘*not exceeding twenty-five dollars. ’ ’

On the return date the Assistant Attorney-General moved for judgment against the defendant pursuant to the provisions of section 681 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the assessment of a fine of not less than $100 as provided by section 213 of the Labor Law.

Section 681 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is entitled ££ Bringing an *indicted*corporation into court ” (emphasis supplied) and the first sentence begins: “ When an *indictment*is filed against any corporation ’ ’. Subdivision 1 of the section spells out the form of the summons to be used in a criminal proceeding against a corporation and it says the defendant is summoned to 1 £ answer an indictment filed against you by the grand jury of this county on the - day of - * * * and in case of your failure to so appear and answer, judgment will be pronounced against you.”

Subdivision 2 of the said section specifies the manner of service and says *‘ ‘*if the corporation does not appear in the manner and at the time and pláce specified in the summons, judgment must be pronounced against it.” It is this subdivision upon which the Attorney-General makes his motion for judgment.

While there is some judicial discretion in the interpretation and application of statutory law it only exists when there is some ambiguity in the statute as enacted.

No such ambiguity in the statute exists here. It is abundantly clear that the power of the court to, in effect, find a corporation guilty and fine it *in absentia*is predicated on an *indictment*and not on an information. As a matter of fact the entire proceedings against a corporation in a criminal matter as set forth in chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure cast doubt upon the jurisdiction of a Court of Special Sessions to try such matters at all.

However, it is not necessary to make that decision in this case. Clearly the content of section 681, as well as the summons issued, in this matter, requires the denial of the motion for judgment and it is so denied.
#### In the Matter of Madeleine D. Corya, Deceased. Bankers Trust Company et al., Appellants.

— In a proceeding for a judicial settlement of the accounts of the coexecutors of the decedent, the coexecutors appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County (Signorelli, S.), entered June 12, 1990, as awarded them only one commission, and directed restitution of any additional commissions.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs payable out of the estate, the provisions of the order which awarded the coexecutors only one commission and directed restitution of any additional commissions are deleted, each coexecutor is awarded a commission, and the matter is remitted to the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

*163We agree with the coexecutors that the Surrogate improperly limited them to only one commission. In *Matter of Weinstock*(40 NY2d 1, 7), the Court of Appeals stated that courts may interfere with a testator’s manifested intention and exclude an executor only where "the evidence warrants an affirmative finding of impropriety and overreaching”. Accordingly, where the will provides for more than one coexecutor and the statute permits each to receive a commission, the failure of the attorney draftsman of the decedent’s will to advise the decedent of the multiple commissions may be grounds for denying multiple commissions *(see, Matter of Laflin,*111 AD2d 924; *Matter of Becker,*104 AD2d 444; *Matter of Thron,*139 Misc 2d 1045; *Matter of Harris,*123 Misc 2d 247).

In the instant case, however, the record clearly reveals that the decedent knowingly and freely nominated both coexecutors after being fully informed that they would each receive a two percent commission *(see,*SCPA 2307 [1], [5]; *see, Matter of Atterbury,*173 AD2d 817). Accordingly, each coexecutor is entitled to receive a statutory commission. Because the record is unclear as to the amount of the commission the coexecutors have received to date, the matter is remitted to the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County, to determine the amounts owing to them. Lawrence, J. P., Eiber, Balletta and Ritter, JJ., concur. *[See,*148 Mise 2d 723.]
**Order of the Court of First Instance (Eighth Chamber) of 17 April 2008 – Dimos Kerateas v Commission**

**(Case T-372/07)**

Actions for annulment –Time-limits – Inadmissibility

Actions for annulment – Time-limits – Mandatory (Art. 230, fifth para., EC) (see para. 9)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | APPLICATION for annulment of Commission Decision C(2004) 5611 of 22 December 2004 concerning the grant of a financial contribution from the Cohesion Fund for the carrying out of a waste management project in Attica (Greece). |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders Dimos Kerateas to pay the costs. |
# C_2018341EN.01002501.xml

| 24.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 341/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/25

---

Action brought on 25 July 2018 — Eurolamp v EUIPO (EUROLAMP pioneers in new technology)

(Case T-466/18)

(2018/C 341/36)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Applicant: Eurolamp AVEE Eisagogis kai Emporias Lamptiron (Thessaloniki, Greece) (represented by: A. Argyriadis, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for registration in the European Union of the figurative colour mark ‘EUROLAMP pioneers in new technology’ representing a combination of the following colours: green and black — Application for registration No 16 180 821

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 May 2018 in Case R 1359/2017-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | hold this action to be admissible; |
| --- | --- |

—

hold this action to be admissible;

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | uphold in its entirety the application No 16 180 821 for trade mark registration in the European Union with respect to all the claimed goods; |
| --- | --- |

—

uphold in its entirety the application No 16 180 821 for trade mark registration in the European Union with respect to all the claimed goods;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE DECEMBER
31, 1996, FORM 10K FOR FIRST PATRIOT BANKSHARES, INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           6,775
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         120,863
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 9,943
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     40,838
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        127,868
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,530
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 191,852
<DEPOSITS>                                     154,329
<SHORT-TERM>                                    19,994
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,819
<LONG-TERM>                                      1,185
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         5,052
<OTHER-SE>                                       9,473
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  14,525
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 12,035
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,166
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   488
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                14,689
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               4,914
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,912
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            8,777
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      751
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                  42
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  7,748
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,186
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       3,186
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,090
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .93
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .93
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    5.65
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
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<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,332
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      553
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,530
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<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                             49
        

</TABLE>
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 4244 

To require the release of all records relating to the assassination of President 

John F. Kennedy, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 3, 2017 

Mr. COHEN (for himself and Mr. BRENDAN F. BOYLE of Pennsylvania) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To require the release of all records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT TO RELEASE ASSASSINATION 

4 RECORDS. 

5 (a) DETERMINATION.—Not later than 2 days after 

6 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 

7 make a determination about whether to release any assas8 sination record (in whole or in part) that was not released 

9 on October 26, 2017. 


srobinson on DSKBC5CHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4244 IH

1 (b) RECORDS RELEASED.—Those records determined 

2 to be released under subsection (a) shall be released not 

3 later than 2 days after such determination. 

4 (c) ASSASSINATION RECORD DEFINED.—The term 

5 ‘‘assassination record’’ has the meaning given that term 

6 in section 3 of the President John F. Kennedy Assassina7 tion Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–526; 

8 44 U.S.C. 2107 note). 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKBC5CHB2PROD with BILLS
#### Application of Nathaniel DAVIS for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

No. A-12826.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 6, 1959.

Nathaniel Davis, petitioner, pro se.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Lewis A. Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BRETT, Judge.

This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus brought by Nathaniel Davis, an inmate of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, by unverified petition. In said petition he complains he is unlawfully confined in said penitentiary by virtue of a judgment and sentence made and entered against him on December 20, 1958, in the District Court of Logan County, Oklahoma, on a verdict of conviction upon a charge of burglary in the second degree after former conviction of a felony, for which he was sentenced to serve a term of ten years imprisonment.

Petitioner alleges the judgment and sentence to be void for numerous reasons, among which are: he was appointed an attorney against his wishes; he was denied his right of appeal by said attorney; denial by the court of his motion for new trial by reason of expiration of time therefor; his conviction was obtained by means of fraud in that certain witnesses were coerced into testifying against him, and other witnesses testified in a contradictory manner; failure of the court to call a certain requested witness; and that jurors *546were allowed to roam the court room during the trial.

None of these alleged errors, if proven to be true, would afford a reason for this Court to hold the judgment and sentence to be void for the reason none'of them go to the jurisdiction of the trial court, but are matters which are properly raised on appeal. A writ of habeas corpus may not be resorted to as a substitute for an appeal, Ex parte Holder, 94 Okl.Cr. 270, 234 P.2d 958, for the inquiry in habeas corpus matters is limited to matters which are jurisdictional in nature and may not be used to correct errors of law occurring at the trial. Perry v. Waters, 97 Okl.Cr. 17, 256 P.2d 1119; In re Anderson, Okl.Cr., 344 P.2d 674. Where the court has jurisdiction of the person, jurisdiction of the subject matter, and authority under the law to pronounce the judgment and sentence imposed, and did nothing to lose jurisdiction, the writ of habeas corpus will be denied. In re Eidenmueller, Okl.Cr., 341 P.2d 920.

Such being the situation herein, the writ of habeas corpus is accordingly denied.

POWELL, P. J., and NIX, J., concur.
**Exhibit 23**
 
 
**INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ CONSENT**
**POTASH CORPORATION OF SASKATCHEWAN INC.**
We consent to the incorporation by reference of our report dated February 7,2003 in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Potash Corporation of SaskatchewanInc. for the year ended December 31, 2002 and in the following RegistrationStatements:
 • Registration Statement No. 33-37855 on Form S-8  • Registration Statement No. 333-19215 on Form S-8  • Registration Statement No. 333-93773 on Form S-8  • Registration Statement No. 333-53531 on Form S-8  • Registration Statement No. 333-75742 on Form S-8  • Registration Statement No. 333-75744 on Form S-8  • Registration Statement No. 333-27685 on Form S-3  • Registration Statement No. 333-89350 on Form S-3  • Registration Statement No. 33-57920 on Form S-3DPOS
 
 
/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP
Chartered Accountants
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada
March 26, 2003
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-22-00118-CR

KAMBRESHA THOMAS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 396th District 

Court

of Tarrant County (1683896D)

July 14, 2022

Memorandum Opinion by Chief 

Justice Sudderth

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the 

appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

 Chief Justice Bonnie Sudderth