PRELIMINARY PRINT 

Volume 598 U. S. Part 1 

Pages 152–174 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

March 28, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 
152 OCTOBER TERM, 2022 

Syllabus 

WILKINS et al. v. UNITED STATES 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 

the ninth circuit 

No. 21–1164. Argued November 30, 2022—Decided March 28, 2023 

Petitioners Larry Steven Wilkins and Jane Stanton own properties in 

rural Montana that border a road for which the United States has held 

an easement since 1962. The Government claims that the easement 

includes public access, which petitioners dispute. In 2018, petitioners 

sued the Government under the Quiet Title Act, which allows challenges 

to the United States' rights in real property. The Government moved 

to dismiss on the ground that petitioners' claim is barred by the Act's 

12-year time bar. 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(g). Petitioners countered that 

§ 2409a(g)'s time limit is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. 

The District Court agreed with the Government and dismissed the case 

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that 

§ 2409a(g) had already been interpreted as jurisdictional in Block v. 

North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 

and affrmed. 

Held: Section 2409a(g) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. 

Pp. 156–165. 

(a) Jurisdiction is a word of many meanings. This Court has emphasized the distinction between “the classes of cases a court may entertain 

(subject-matter jurisdiction)” and “nonjurisdictional claim-processing 

rules, which seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specifed 

times.” Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U. S. –––, –––. Nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules generally include a range of “threshold requirements that claimants must complete, or exhaust, before fling a 

lawsuit.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 166. Jurisdictional bars—which may be raised by any party at any time during the proceedings and which are required to be raised by a court 

sua sponte—run the risk of disrupting the “orderly progress of litigation” that procedural rules often “seek to promote.” Henderson v. 

Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435. 

Given the risk of disruption and waste that accompanies the jurisdictional label, a procedural requirement will be construed as jurisdictional 

only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. Boechler v. Commissioner, 

596 U. S. –––, –––. To determine whether the statutory text “plainly 

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Syllabus 

show[s] that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences,” courts apply “traditional tools of statutory construction.” 

United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410. 

Section 2409a(g) lacks a jurisdictional clear statement, and nothing 

about § 2409a(g)'s text or context gives reason to depart from this 

Court's observation that “most time bars are nonjurisdictional.” Ibid. 

Section 2409a(g) states that an action “shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued.” This 

“text speaks only to a claim's timeliness,” and its “mundane statute-oflimitations language say[s] only what every time bar, by defnition, must: 

that after a certain time a claim is barred.” Ibid. Further, “[t]his 

Court has often explained that Congress's separation of a fling deadline 

from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the time bar is not jurisdictional.” Id., at 411. Here, the Quiet Title Act's jurisdictional grant 

is in § 1346(f), well afeld of § 2409a(g). And “[n]othing [in § 1346(f)] 

conditions the jurisdictional grant on the limitations perio[d in 

§ 2409a(g)] or otherwise links those separate provisions.” Id., at 412. 

Pp. 156–159. 

(b) None of the three decisions of this Court on which the Government relies—Block, 461 U. S. 273, United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 

834, and United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38—defnitively interpreted 

§ 2409a(g) as jurisdictional. This Court has made clear that it will not 

undo a “defnitive earlier interpretation” of a statutory provision as jurisdictional without due regard for the principles of stare decisis. John 

R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 138. Yet the mere 

fact that this Court previously described something as jurisdictional is 

not dispositive, as “[c]ourts, including this Court, have more than occasionally misused the term `jurisdictional' to refer to nonjurisdictional 

prescriptions.” Fort Bend, 587 U. S., at ––– – –––, n. 4 (some internal 

quotation marks and brackets omitted). To separate “defnitive” interpretations of jurisdiction from those in which the term “jurisdictional” has 

been used imprecisely, the Court asks if a prior decision addressed 

whether a provision is “ `technically jurisdictional,' ” i. e., whether it truly 

operates as a limit on a court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and whether 

anything in the decision “turn[ed] on that characterization.” Arbaugh v. 

Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 512 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better 

Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 91). A decision that simply states that “the 

court is dismissing `for lack of jurisdiction' when some threshold fact has 

not been established” is understood as a “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]” 

and receives “no precedential effect.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 511. 

Block is a textbook “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g].” Arbaugh, 546 

U. S., at 511. The Government points to a statement in that opinion's 
154 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

conclusion that if the Quiet Title Act's time limit applied, “the courts 

below had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits,” Block, 461 U. S., 

at 292. Yet there is no discussion in Block about whether the provision 

is “ `technically jurisdictional' ”—just a mere statement that a “threshold fact” must “b[e] established” for there to be “jurisdiction.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512. While Block did describe the Act's time limit 

as “a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity,” 461 U. S., at 287, 

Block never addressed whether the Act's time limit was truly a limit on 

subject-matter jurisdiction, nor did anything in the case turn on this 

question. Contrary to the Government's contentions, even in that era, 

time limits in suits against the Government were not necessarily 

subject-matter jurisdictional under this Court's case law. 

Like Block, Mottaz contains no discussion of whether the Quiet Title 

Act's 12-year time bar was technically jurisdictional. Instead, the 

Court decided which of two possible time bars applied and, having determined it was the Quiet Title Act's 12-year limit, concluded that the 

plaintiff had notice over 12 years before she sued. Neither step in the 

Court's analysis “turn[ed] on” whether any time limits were “ `technically jurisdictional.' ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512. Once again, general 

statements in the opinion about waivers of immunity cannot change this 

basic fact. 

Finally, in Beggerly, the Court carefully analyzed whether the text 

and context of § 2409a(g) were consistent with equitable tolling. This 

would have been a mere waste of words if the Court had already held 

in Block and Mottaz that § 2409a(g) was jurisdictional. 

These three cases point in one direction: This Court has never defnitively interpreted § 2409a(g) as jurisdictional. The Government's argument about legislative acquiescence is unavailing given the absence of 

any defnitive judicial interpretation to which Congress could acquiesce. 

Pp. 159–165. 

13 F. 4th 791, reversed and remanded. 

Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kagan, 

Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., 

fled a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, J., joined, 

post, p. 166. 

Jeffrey W. McCoy argued the cause for petitioners. With 

him on the briefs were Damien M. Schiff, James M. Manley, 

and Ethan Blevins. 

Benjamin W. Snyder argued the cause for the United 

States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General PrePage Proof Pending Publication
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Opinion of the Court 

logar, Assistant Attorney General Kim, Deputy Solicitor 

General Kneedler, William B. Lazarus, John L. Smeltzer, 

Kevin W. McArdle, and Babak Rastgoufard.* 

Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Larry Steven Wilkins and Jane Stanton wanted quiet titles 

and a quiet road. Wilkins and Stanton, the petitioners here, 

both live alongside Robbins Gulch Road in rural Montana. 

The United States has permission, called an easement, for 

use of the road, which the Government interprets to include 

making the road available for public use. Petitioners allege 

that the road's public use has intruded upon their private 

lives, with strangers trespassing, stealing, and even shooting 

Wilkins' cat. 

Petitioners sued over the scope of the easement under 

the Quiet Title Act, which allows challenges to the United 

States' rights in real property. Invoking the Act's 12-year 

time limit, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(g), the Government maintains 

that the suit is jurisdictionally barred. Petitioners counter, 

and the Court holds, that § 2409a(g) is a nonjurisdictional 

claims-processing rule. 

I 

Robbins Gulch Road runs through about a mile of private 

property. Petitioners acquired their properties along the 

road in 1991 and 2004. Back in 1962, petitioners' predecessors in interest had granted the United States an easement 

for the road. The Government contends that the easement 

includes public access, which petitioners dispute. On petitioners' telling, the easement does not allow access to the 

general public and requires the Government to maintain and 

patrol the road. 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Local Government 

Organizations by Daniel H. Bromberg and Jeffrey W. Mikoni; and for the 

National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center et al. by Elizabeth Gaudio Milito, Robert Henneke, and Chance 

Weldon. 

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In 2018, petitioners brought suit under the Quiet Title Act. 

The Government moved to dismiss the action on the ground 

that the Act's 12-year time limit had expired. Under the 

Act, “[a]ny civil action . . . , except for an action brought by 

a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve 

years of the date upon which it accrued.” § 2409a(g). Accrual occurs “on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in 

interest knew or should have known of the claim of the 

United States.” Ibid. The parties disagreed as to whether 

the Act's time limit is jurisdictional, which is relevant to the 

procedures for litigating whether § 2409a(g) bars petitioners' claim.1 

The District Court agreed with the Government and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The 

Ninth Circuit affrmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 

13 F. 4th 791 (2021). Applying Circuit precedent, the Court 

of Appeals held that this Court had already interpreted 

§ 2409a(g) as jurisdictional in Block v. North Dakota ex rel. 

Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273 (1983). 

This further entrenched a divide among the Courts of Appeals.2 This Court granted certiorari to resolve the split, 

596 U. S. ––– (2022), and now reverses the Ninth Circuit's 

judgment. 

II 

A 

“Jurisdiction, this Court has observed, is a word of many, 

too many, meanings.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 

1 The parties dispute the precise implications on remand of a ruling that 

§ 2409a(g) is nonjurisdictional. This Court takes no position on that 

dispute. 2 Compare Wisconsin Valley Improvement Co. v. United States, 569 

F. 3d 331, 333–335 (CA7 2009), with, e. g., Bank One Texas v. United States, 

157 F. 3d 397, 402–403 (CA5 1998); Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 

F. 3d 732, 737–738 (CA8 2001); Kane County v. United States, 772 F. 3d 

1205, 1214–1215 (CA10 2014); and F.E.B. Corp. v. United States, 818 F. 3d 

681, 685–686 (CA11 2016). 

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500, 510 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, this Court has emphasized the distinction between 

limits on “ the classes of cases a court may entertain 

(subject-matter jurisdiction)” and “nonjurisdictional claimprocessing rules, which seek to promote the orderly progress 

of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specifed times.” Fort Bend County 

v. Davis, 587 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The latter category generally includes a 

range of “threshold requirements that claimants must complete, or exhaust, before fling a lawsuit.” Reed Elsevier, 

Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 166 (2010). 

To police this jurisdictional line, this Court will “treat a 

procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress 

`clearly states' that it is.” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 

U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515). 

This principle of construction is not a burden courts impose 

on Congress. To the contrary, this principle seeks to avoid 

judicial interpretations that undermine Congress' judgment. 

Loosely treating procedural requirements as jurisdictional 

risks undermining the very reason Congress enacted them. 

Procedural rules often “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation” within our adversarial system. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011). Limits on 

subject-matter jurisdiction, in contrast, have a unique potential to disrupt the orderly course of litigation. “Branding a 

rule as going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction alters 

the normal operation of our adversarial system.” Id., at 

434. “For purposes of effciency and fairness, our legal system is replete with rules” like forfeiture, which require parties to raise arguments themselves and to do so at certain 

times. Ibid. Jurisdictional bars, however, “may be raised 

at any time” and courts have a duty to consider them 

sua sponte. Ibid. When such eleventh-hour jurisdictional 

objections prevail post-trial or on appeal, “many months of 

work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be 

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wasted.” Id., at 435. Similarly, doctrines like waiver and 

estoppel ensure effciency and fairness by precluding parties 

from raising arguments they had previously disavowed. 

Because these doctrines do not apply to jurisdictional objections, parties can disclaim such an objection, only to resurrect it when things go poorly for them on the merits. Ibid. 

Given this risk of disruption and waste that accompanies 

the jurisdictional label, courts will not lightly apply it to procedures Congress enacted to keep things running smoothly 

and effciently. Courts will also not assume that in creating 

a mundane claims-processing rule, Congress made it “unique 

in our adversarial system” by allowing parties to raise it 

at any time and requiring courts to consider it sua sponte. 

Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 

153 (2013). Instead, “traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural 

bar with jurisdictional consequences.” United States v. 

Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410 (2015). 

Under this clear statement rule, the analysis of § 2409a(g) 

is straightforward.3 “[I]n applying th[e] clear statement 

rule, we have made plain that most time bars are nonjuris3 The dissent maintains that this Court's settled clear statement rule 

does not apply here because § 2409a(g) is a condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity and “as such, this Court should interpret it as a jurisdictional bar to suit.” Post, at 166 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Over three decades ago, this Court in “Irwin . . . foreclose[d] th[e] argument” that “time 

limits” are jurisdictional simply because they “function as conditions on 

the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity.” Wong, 575 U. S., at 

417–418 (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 

(1990)). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, Irwin extends to the “many 

statutes that create claims for relief against the United States or its agencies [and] apply only to Government defendants.” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 422 (2004); cf. also Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 

––– (2022) (applying clear statement rule to petitions for review of agency 

action). Notably, even the dissent in Wong did not engage in such an 

attempt to turn back the clock, instead arguing that the provision in that 

case was jurisdictional based on its specifc text and history. See 575 

U. S., at 423–428 (opinion of Alito, J.). 

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dictional.” Ibid. Nothing about § 2409a(g)'s text or context gives reason to depart from this beaten path. Section 

2409a(g) states that an action “shall be barred unless it is 

commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it 

accrued.” This “text speaks only to a claim's timeliness,” 

and its “mundane statute-of-limitations language . . . say[s] 

only what every time bar, by defnition, must: that after a 

certain time a claim is barred.” Id., at 410. Further, “[t]his 

Court has often explained that Congress's separation of a 

fling deadline from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the 

time bar is not jurisdictional.” Id., at 411. The Quiet Title 

Act's jurisdictional grant is in 28 U. S. C. § 1346(f),4 well afeld 

of § 2409a(g). And “[n]othing conditions the jurisdictional 

grant on the limitations perio[d], or otherwise links those 

separate provisions.” Wong, 575 U. S., at 412. Section 

2409a(g) therefore lacks a jurisdictional clear statement. 

B 

The Government does not focus on the text of § 2409a(g), 

but instead points to a trilogy of decisions by this Court that 

purportedly establish that the provision is jurisdictional. 

None of these three decisions defnitively interpreted 

§ 2409a(g) as jurisdictional. 

This Court has made clear that it will not undo a “defnitive earlier interpretation” of a statutory provision as jurisdictional without due regard for principles of stare decisis. 

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 

138 (2008). At the same time, however, “[c]ourts, including 

this Court, have more than occasionally misused the term 

`jurisdictional' to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions.” 

Fort Bend, 587 U. S., at ––– – –––, n. 4 (some internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The mere fact that this 

4 Section 1346(f ) provides that “[t]he district courts shall have exclusive 

original jurisdiction of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title to an 

estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the 

United States.” 

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Court previously described something “without elaboration” 

as jurisdictional therefore does not end the inquiry. Henderson, 562 U. S., at 437. To separate the wheat from the 

chaff, this Court has asked if the prior decision addressed 

whether a provision is “ ` technically jurisdictional' ”— 

whether it truly operates as a limit on a court's subjectmatter jurisdiction—and whether anything in the decision 

“turn[ed] on that characterization.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 

512 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 

523 U. S. 83, 91 (1998)); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 395 (1982) (looking to whether “the 

legal character of the requirement was . . . at issue”). If a 

decision simply states that “the court is dismissing `for lack 

of jurisdiction' when some threshold fact has not been established,” it is understood as a “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]” that receives “no precedential effect.” Arbaugh, 546 

U. S., at 511 (some internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Government begins with Block, 461 U. S. 273. The 

case presented “two separate issues” about the Quiet Title 

Act, neither of which was whether the 12-year limit was jurisdictional. Id., at 276. First, the Court held that the Act 

was “the exclusive procedure” for challenging “the title of 

the United States to real property.” Id., at 276–277, 286. 

Second, the Court held that the 12-year limit applied to 

States. Id., at 277. It was only in the opinion's conclusion 

that, in remanding, the Court remarked that if the time limit 

applied, “the courts below had no jurisdiction to inquire into 

the merits.” Id., at 292. The opinion contains no discussion of whether the provision was “ `technically jurisdictional' ” or what in the case would have “turn[ed] on that 

characterization.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512 (quoting Steel 

Co., 523 U. S., at 91). There is nothing more than an “unrefned dispositio[n]” stating that a “threshold fact” must “b[e] 

established” for there to be “jurisdiction.” 546 U. S., at 511 

(internal quotation marks omitted). This is a textbook 

“drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]” that Arbaugh held “should 
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be accorded no precedential effect” as to whether a limit is 

jurisdictional. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In an effort to endow a feeting statement with lasting 

signifcance, the Government and the dissent invoke historical context. Block described the Act's time limit as “a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.” 461 U. S., at 

287. Block never stated, however, that the Act's time limit 

was therefore truly a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Yet according to the Government and the dissent, this went 

without saying because the case law at the time was “unmistakably” clear that conditions on waivers of immunity were 

subject-matter jurisdictional. Post, at 174. 

This reading is undermined by the very history on which 

it draws. In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 

U. S. 89 (1990), the Court surveyed the case law about 

whether “time limits in suits against the Government” are 

subject to “equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel.” Id., at 

94. If associating time limits with waivers of sovereign immunity clearly made those limits jurisdictional, equitable exceptions would be just as clearly foreclosed. Instead, Irwin 

described the Court's approach to this question as “ad hoc” 

and “unpredictab[le],” “leaving open” whether equitable exceptions were available in any given case. Id., at 94–95. 

Accordingly, even if “a statute of limitations [was] a condition 

on the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be 

strictly construed,” this still “d[id] not answer the question 

whether equitable tolling can be applied to this statute of 

limitations.” Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 479 

(1986). The Court instead analyzed the specifc statutory 

scheme at issue, with varying results. Ibid. (citing Honda 

v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484 (1967)). 

Block itself refected the ambivalent nature of time limits 

for suits against the Government. Block recognized that 

“we should not construe such a time-bar provision unduly 

restrictively,” 461 U. S., at 287, which the Court quoted just 

a few years later in support of the proposition that some 

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such limits are subject to equitable tolling, Bowen, 476 U. S., 

at 479; see also Irwin, 498 U. S., at 94. Similarly, while 

Block cautioned that exceptions to such time limits will not 

“be lightly implied,” it did not hold they were categorically 

precluded. 461 U. S., at 287. Block thus acknowledged 

nothing more than a general proposition, echoed by Irwin, 

that “a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity . . . 

must be strictly construed.” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 94. In 

Irwin, as elsewhere, this did not mean that time limits accompanying such waivers are necessarily jurisdictional. 

Next, the Government offers United States v. Mottaz, 476 

U. S. 834 (1986). Once again, the question presented was 

not whether the Quiet Title Act's 12-year time limit was 

technically jurisdictional. The Court instead had to decide which of two possible statutory time bars applied. Id., 

at 841. This analysis proceeded in two steps. First, the 

Court asked which of several federal statutes—“the Quiet 

Title Act; the Allotment Acts; [or] the Tucker Act”—was the 

“source of . . . jurisdiction” based on the nature of the plaintiff's claim and the relief sought. Ibid. (citations omitted). 

The Court explained that the Quiet Title Act applied because 

it was “ `the exclusive means by which adverse claimants 

could challenge the United States' title to real property,' ” 

and the plaintiff's claim fell “within the Act's scope.” Id., at 

841–842 (quoting Block, 461 U. S., at 286). Second, the 

Court “then determine[d] whether [the] suit was brought 

within the relevant limitations period.” Mottaz, 476 U. S., 

at 841. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had notice 

over 12 years before she sued, and “[h]er claim [was] therefore barred.” Id., at 843–844. Neither step in the Court's 

analysis “turn[ed] on” whether any time limits were “ `technically jurisdictional.' ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512 (quoting 

Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91). 

General statements in the opinion about waivers of immunity cannot change this basic fact. At the outset of its analysis, the Court observed that “the terms of [the United 
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States'] waiver of sovereign immunity defne the extent of 

the court's jurisdiction” and that “ `a statute of limitations 

. . . constitutes a condition on the waiver.' ” Mottaz, 476 

U. S., at 841 (quoting Block, 461 U. S., at 287). Neither of 

these statements, however, played a role in determining 

which statute applied or whether the plaintiff brought her 

claim within 12 years after it accrued. There is also no indication in the opinion that the parties raised tolling or other 

equitable exceptions. As such, “ `the legal character' ” of 

the time limit was never “ `at issue.' ” Reed Elsevier, 559 

U. S., at 169, n. 8 (quoting Zipes, 455 U. S., at 395). 

The Government also points to Mottaz's procedural background section. Buried in a paragraph recounting a tangled 

procedural history, the Court remarked that the Government 

raised the Quiet Title Act, “apparently for the frst time,” in 

a petition for rehearing. 476 U. S., at 840. This supposedly 

reveals that the Court sua sponte and sub silentio raised, 

considered, and rejected an argument that the Government 

had forfeited the Quiet Title Act's time limit, doing so all 

because the time limit was jurisdictional. Yet a background 

section is an unlikely place for such a ruling. This is particularly true where, as the word “apparently” indicates, the 

Court did not pause over its passing remark. Nor did the 

Court mention this again. Further, even if the Court had 

secretly considered forfeiture, there were nonjurisdictional 

reasons the Court could have concluded forfeiture did not 

apply.5 Speculating about what this Court might have 

5 For example, the Court might have concluded forfeiture did not apply 

because of the confusing way the case had been pleaded, see Brief for 

United States in United States v. Mottaz, O. T. 1985, No. 85–546, p. 22, 

n. 11, or that any forfeiture argument had itself been forfeited. Or the 

Court might have, on refection, agreed with the Government that it had 

suffciently raised the Quiet Title Act prior to rehearing. Ibid. The dissent, post, at 173, n. 3, mistakes these observations as a suggestion that 

Mottaz actually took one of those approaches. Far from it. This Court 

is merely declining to read tea leaves to divine lost meanings about what 

the Mottaz Court might have thought about a forfeiture argument it never 
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thought about arguments it never addressed needlessly introduces confusion. This Court looks for defnitive interpretations, not holdings in hiding. 

Finally, there is United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38 

(1998). The Court in Beggerly addressed whether § 2409a(g) 

could be equitably tolled. Id., at 48–49. Subject-matter jurisdiction, as noted, is never subject to equitable tolling. If 

Block and Mottaz had defnitely interpreted § 2409a(g) as 

subject-matter jurisdictional, the Court could have just cited 

those cases and ended the matter without further discussion.6 Instead, the Court parsed the provision's text and 

context, concluding that “by providing that the statute of 

limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff `knew or 

should have known of the claim of the United States,' ” the 

law “has already effectively allowed for equitable tolling.” 

Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48. Also relevant were “the unusually generous” time limit and the importance of clarity when 

it comes to land rights. Id., at 48–49. This careful analysis 

of whether the text and context were consistent with equitable tolling would have been wasted words if the Court had 

already held that § 2409a(g) was jurisdictional. Precisely 

because the Court's inquiry was so focused on the particular 

nature of equitable tolling, Beggerly also did not address 

whether other exceptions such as “fraudulent concealment 

or equitable estoppel might apply,” as Justice Stevens noted 

in his concurrence. Id., at 49. If anything, Beggerly's discussion of nonjurisdictional reasons why tolling specifcally 

was unavailable indicates the Court understood § 2409a(g) 

not to be jurisdictional. Thus, Beggerly undermines any notion that Block and Mottaz had put the jurisdictional question to rest. 

raised and over which “the parties did not cross swords.” Arbaugh v. 

Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 512 (2006). 6 The Court was not unaware of Block, quoting it for a different point 

in the very same section. Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48. 
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Opinion of the Court 

All three cases therefore point in one direction: This 

Court has never defnitively interpreted § 2409a(g) as jurisdictional.7 For similar reasons, the Government's argument about legislative acquiescence is unavailing. Congress 

amended the Act in 1986 to provide special rules for States 

in the wake of Block. See 100 Stat. 3351–3352. Then, as 

now, “none of our decisions establishe[d]” that the time limit 

was jurisdictional, so there was no defnitive judicial interpretation to which Congress could acquiesce. Alexander v. 

Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 291 (2001). The mere existence of a 

decision employing the term jurisdiction without elaboration 

does not show Congress adopted that view. Nor can the 

Government's handful of lower court opinions stand in for 

a ruling of this Court, especially where some of these decisions contain only feeting references to jurisdiction.8 See 

Boechler, 596 U. S., at –––. 

All told, neither this Court's precedents nor Congress' actions established that § 2409a(g) is jurisdictional. While the 

Government warns that revisiting precedent results in uncertainty, no revisiting is necessary here. Far more uncertainty would follow from the Government's method of divining defnitive interpretations from stray remarks. 

* * * 

Section 2409a(g) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing 

rule. The Court of Appeals' contrary judgment is reversed, 

and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

7 The dissent invokes a fourth case, United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596 

(1990), which offers no more support. Dalm involved a separate provision 

of a separate statute, see id., at 601–602, and cannot render § 2490a(g) 

jurisdictional when Quiet Title Act cases like Block, Mottaz, and Beggerly 

failed to do so. 

8 See Fulcher v. United States, 696 F. 2d 1073, 1078 (CA4 1982). 

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166 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice and 

Justice Alito join, dissenting. 

The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against the 

United States. But, in the Quiet Title Act of 1972, Congress 

waived this immunity and consented to suits against the 

United States in order to determine the status of disputed 

property. 28 U. S. C. § 2409a. Congress conditioned this 

consent on, among other things, a 12-year statute of limitations: “Any civil action under this section, except for an action brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it 

accrued.” § 2409a(g). This Court has long construed such 

conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity as jurisdictional. And, it has acknowledged the jurisdictional nature 

of the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations in several 

precedents. 

In holding that § 2409a(g) is not jurisdictional, the majority 

commits two critical errors. First, it applies the same interpretive approach to a condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity that it would apply to any run-of-the-mill procedural 

rule. Second, by reading the Court's prior Quiet Title Act 

precedents in this way, the Court disregards their express 

recognition of the jurisdictional character of the Act's time 

bar. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

This Court's skepticism of the jurisdictional character of 

procedural bars does not extend to conditions on a waiver of 

sovereign immunity. In the context of a waiver of sovereign 

immunity, the Court presumes that procedural limitations 

are jurisdictional. The Act's time bar is one such provision, 

and, as such, this Court should interpret it as a jurisdictional 

bar to suit. 

As a sovereign, the United States “is immune from suit 

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Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 167 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

sent to be sued in any court defne that court's jurisdiction 

to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 

584, 586 (1941); see also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 

160 (1981); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 212 (1983) 

(describing this principle as “axiomatic”). Consequently, 

“[s]overeign immunity is by nature jurisdictional.” Henderson v. United States, 517 U. S. 654, 675 (1996) (Thomas, J., 

dissenting). This principle is longstanding, and the majority 

does not dispute it. See ante, at 161. 

“A necessary corollary of this rule,” however, “is that 

when Congress attaches conditions to legislation waiving the 

sovereign immunity of the United States, those conditions 

must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to 

be lightly implied.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of 

Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983); see also 

United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992) 

(stating that a waiver of sovereign immunity “must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign” and “not enlarge[d] 

. . . beyond what the language requires” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Thus, “in many cases this Court has read 

procedural rules embodied in statutes waiving immunity 

strictly, with an eye to effectuating a restrictive legislative 

purpose when Congress relinquishes sovereign immunity.” 

Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501 (1967). In United States 

v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596 (1990), the Court reaffrmed this “settled principl[e]” in the specifc context of “[a] statute of limitations requiring that a suit against the Government be 

brought within a certain time period.” Id., at 608. Such a 

requirement, the Court explained, “is one of ” the “terms of 

[the United States'] consent to be sued” and, therefore, “defne[s] th[e] court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Ibid. 

(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). 

Those straightforward principles resolve this case. The 

Quiet Title Act partially waives the immunity of the United 

States by granting federal district courts “exclusive original 

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168 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

jurisdiction of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title 

to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest 

is claimed by the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(f ). 

This provision's cross-reference to § 2409a incorporates several conditions on this waiver. For example, the Act specifes that the United States “shall not be disturbed in possession or control” of contested land “pending a fnal judgment 

or decree, the conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and sixty 

days,” and “if the fnal determination [is] adverse,” the 

United States shall have the right to purchase the land for 

just compensation. § 2409a(b). Similarly, the Act provides 

that any “civil action against the United States under this 

section shall be tried by the court without a jury” and bars 

suits based on adverse possession. § § 2409a(f ), (n). It also 

incorporates the time bar at issue here: “Any civil action 

under this section, except for an action brought by a State, 

shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years 

of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be 

deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim 

of the United States.” § 2409a(g). 

These provisions carefully delineate the scope of the Act's 

limited waiver of sovereign immunity, establishing conditions on which the United States has consented to be sued. 

The United States has not, for example, consented to a jury 

trial or to be sued on an adverse possession theory. Similarly, and just as critically, it has not consented to be sued 

(except by a State) once the 12-year statute of limitations 

has passed. 

The majority acknowledges that these restrictions must be 

strictly construed. See ante, at 161. Yet, it concludes that 

the time bar should not be considered jurisdictional. In another context, the majority's conclusion is arguably plausible. 

But, in this context, it is simply incorrect. As a condition 

on the United States' limited waiver of sovereign immunity 
Cite as: 598 U. S. 152 (2023) 169 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

in the Quiet Title Act, the Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional. Moreover, in light of this Court's longstanding 

case law, the jurisdictional character of the time bar would 

have been well understood by the 1972 Congress. See ante, 

at 157 (suggesting that the Court should “avoid judicial interpretations that undermine Congress' judgment” when interpreting arguably jurisdictional provisions). 

With no answer to the Court's longstanding view that conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity are jurisdictional, 

the majority seeks refuge in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990). Ante, at 161. Irwin considered whether equitable tolling should apply to the time to 

fle an employment-discrimination lawsuit against the Government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

There, the Court reasoned that “[t]ime requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to 

`equitable tolling,' ” and that “[o]nce Congress has made . . . 

a waiver [of sovereign immunity], . . . making the rule of 

equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, 

in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts 

to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver.” 

Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95. It thus concluded that “[s]uch a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent 

as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation.” 

Ibid. 

The majority suggests that Irwin stands for the proposition that a condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity must 

be strictly construed, but then goes on to argue that it is 

not necessarily jurisdictional. Ante, at 161. However, our 

decision in United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527 (1995), 

decided fve years after Irwin, demonstrates that statutes of 

limitations in suits brought against the United States are 

no less jurisdictional now than they were before Irwin. In 

Williams, the Court cited Dalm's holding that failure to fle 

a claim against the Government for a federal tax refund 

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170 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

within the statute-of-limitations period operates as a jurisdictional bar to suit, and the Court reaffrmed that a statute 

of limitations “narrow[s] the waiver of sovereign immunity.” 

514 U. S., at 534, n. 7 (citing 494 U. S., at 602).1 Irwin, thus, 

does not disrupt this Court's long held understanding that 

conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity are presumptively jurisdictional. 

II 

Regardless of whether conditions on waivers of sovereign 

immunity remain jurisdictional post-Irwin, we have said 

that, where the Court has offered a “defnitive earlier interpretation” of a statutory time bar as jurisdictional, we will 

continue to treat it as jurisdictional unless and until Congress directs otherwise. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 

United States, 552 U. S. 130, 137–138 (2008); see also United 

States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 416 (2015) (reaffrming John R. Sand's rule). And, we have emphasized 

that Irwin “does not imply revisiting past precedents.” 

John R. Sand, 552 U. S., at 137. 

The John R. Sand standard is amply met here. This 

Court concluded in Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of 

Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273 (1983), and again in 

United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834 (1986), that compliance 

with the Quiet Title Act's 12-year time bar is a jurisdictional prerequisite. 

1 I have previously noted that Irwin “does perhaps narrow the scope of 

the sovereign immunity canon.” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 

426 (2004) (dissenting opinion). But, it “does so only in limited circumstances,” such as “where the Government is made subject to suit to the 

same extent and in the same manner as private parties are.” Ibid. (emphasis added). This is not one of those circumstances. The Quiet Title 

Act's framework exclusively governs actions to quiet title against the 

United States. And, it includes a number of conditions favorable to the 

Federal Government that would not apply in traditional quiet title actions 

among private litigants. 

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Thomas, J., dissenting 

Block considered whether the Act's statute of limitations 

applied to state litigants.2 There, the Government had argued that the plaintiffs' failure to sue within the 12-year 

deadline established by the statute meant that the “district 

court lacked jurisdiction” to consider the plaintiffs' claims. 

Brief for Petitioners in Block v. North Dakota ex rel. 

Board of Univ. and School Lands, O. T. 1982, No. 81–2337, 

p. 5. In assessing this argument, the Court made clear that 

it understood the Act's statute of limitations to arise in the 

context of a waiver of sovereign immunity, discussing at 

some length the tradeoffs proposed as Congress deliberated 

over the scope of the Act. See 461 U. S., at 280–285. The 

Court also prominently invoked Sherwood and Lehman, 

cases discussing the jurisdictional nature of sovereignimmunity waivers, to explain why the limitations provision 

must be “strictly observed.” Block, 461 U. S., at 287. 

After concluding that States were not exempt from the time 

bar, the Court stated that, “[i]f North Dakota's suit is barred 

by [the statute of limitations], the courts below had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits,” and it remanded for the 

lower courts to determine whether the suit was so barred. 

Id., at 292–293. This statement that the time bar went to 

“jurisdiction” was an integral part of the Court's instructions 

on remand. Moreover, on remand, the Eighth Circuit understood the Court to have used the term “jurisdiction” to 

refer to a court's authority to hear the case. See North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands v. Block, 789 

2 At the time of the Court's decision, the Act's statute of limitations read 

as follows: “Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is 

commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such 

action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his 

predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the 

United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(f) (1982 ed.). Congress subsequently 

amended the provision to add its current language excepting actions 

brought by States. 

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172 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

F. 2d 1308, 1310 (CA8 1986) (noting that neither the Eighth 

Circuit nor the District Court had “ `jurisdiction to inquire 

into the merits' ” because the Act's “statute of limitations 

is jurisdictional”). 

In Mottaz, three years after Block, the Court again considered the jurisdictional nature of the Act's time bar. In the 

lower courts, the Government initially defended against a 

“somewhat opaque” set of claims by relying on the general 

6-year statute of limitations for actions against the United 

States, 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a). Mottaz, 476 U. S., at 839. The 

District Court held that the suit was time barred under 

§ 2401(a), but the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. 

Id., at 838–839. The Government then argued, for the frst 

time, in its petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals 

that the suit arose under the Quiet Title Act and was thus 

subject to the Act's 12-year statute of limitations. Id., 

at 840–841. This Court granted certiorari “to consider 

whether [the] respondent's claim was barred under either 

[the 6-year bar] or [the 12-year bar].” Id., at 841. 

In addressing these, the Court cited Sherwood for the 

proposition that, “[w]hen the United States consents to be 

sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity defne 

the extent of the court's jurisdiction.” 476 U. S., at 841. It 

then quoted Block for the proposition that “ `[w]hen waiver 

legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations 

provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign 

immunity,' ” treating Block as precedential on this point. 

476 U. S., at 841. The Court also characterized the statute 

of limitations as a “central condition of the consent given by 

the Act.” Id., at 843 (citing Block, 461 U. S., at 283–285). 

As in Block, this reasoning was a critical and substantial 

part of the Court's opinion. The Court ultimately concluded 

that the plaintiff's claim was untimely and thus barred under 

the Act. 476 U. S., at 844. The Court further concluded 

that no other statute “conferred jurisdiction” on the lower 

courts to adjudicate her claim. Id., at 841; see also id., 844– 

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Thomas, J., dissenting 

851. In deciding the case, the Court noticeably did not engage in a forfeiture analysis, underscoring that it understood 

the Government's late-raised statute-of-limitations argument 

to be jurisdictional and, thus, capable of being raised at any 

point in the proceedings. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 

U. S. 500, 514 (2006) (explaining that jurisdictional arguments cannot be forfeited).3 

United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38 (1998), on which the 

majority relies, see ante, at 164, is not to the contrary. In 

that case, the Court considered whether the Quiet Title Act's 

time bar may be equitably tolled. After noting that the 

Court of Appeals had considered the statute of limitations 

jurisdictional, see Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 42, the Court turned 

to the language of the Act. The Court emphasized that the 

12-year statute of limitations began to accrue when the litigants knew or should have known of the claim of the United 

States, and it observed that the provision's text “has already 

effectively allowed for equitable tolling.” Id., at 48 (citing 

Irwin, 498 U. S., at 96). “Given this fact, and the unusually 

generous nature of the [Act]'s limitations time period,” the 

Court concluded that “extension of the statutory period 

by additional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.” 524 

U. S., at 48–49. Thus, while Beggerly might be read to view 

the Act's time bar as potentially susceptible to tolling (and 

thus, by inference, nonjurisdictional), the Court did not hold 

3 The majority suggests that United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, may 

have (sub silentio) concluded that forfeiture did not apply in that case. 

See ante, at 163, and n. 5. But, presumably, such a conclusion would have 

merited mention in the Court's opinion. To be sure, the majority notes 

that the Government had raised the statute of limitations “ `apparently 

for the frst time' ” in a petition for rehearing. Ante, at 163 (quoting Mottaz, 476 U. S., at 840 (emphasis added)). However, the use of the word 

“apparently” does not indicate that the Court “did not pause over its passing remark,” as the majority contends. See ante, at 163. To the contrary, it suggests that the Court did not need to conduct a forfeiture analysis, because the provision was jurisdictional in any event (and thus not 

subject to forfeiture). 
174 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

that the bar actually could be tolled. Rather, the Court 

held the opposite. Beggerly is therefore, at best, ambiguous 

with respect to the jurisdictional nature of the time bar. As 

such, it does not overcome the Court's clear prior view set 

out in both Block and Mottaz. 

For the majority, the Court's statements in Block and Mottaz are not “defnitiv[e]” enough to satisfy John R. Sand. 

Ante, at 165. But, the import of the Court's references to 

“jurisdiction” in Block and Mottaz would have been clear at 

the time. A court in the 1980s discussing a provision of a 

statute as a waiver of sovereign immunity, citing Sherwood 

(and, later, Block), invoked a well-known set of ideas that 

readers at the time unmistakably associated with the concept 

of jurisdiction. In fact, the Court in Dalm cited Block and 

Mottaz—and no other cases—for the proposition that conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity “defne th[e] court's 

jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” 494 U. S., at 608 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's 

precedents must be understood in that context. 

* * * 

The Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations functions as a 

condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity, and is therefore 

jurisdictional. This Court has repeatedly characterized the 

Act's time bar as jurisdictional, and that interpretation remains authoritative under John R. Sand. Accordingly, I 

respectfully dissent. 

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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

None