F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT March 10, 20 06 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HEEL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

________________________ N o. 05- 1251 1

_______________________ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 4- 00 22 6- CR-LAC

UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us JESSI E SCOTT, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

________________________ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r t h e S o u t h e r n D i s tr i c to f

A l ab a ma

_______________________ (M ar ch 10, 200 6) Be fo re CA RN E S, W IL SO N a nd P RY O R, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:2

Je ssi e Sc ott

appe al s hi s se nte nc e of

120 m onths i m

pr iso nm en t f

or th reat en in g afed eral off

ic ia l i n v io la ti on of 1 8 U.S.C. § 11 5( a)(1 )(B) . He co nte nds tha t w e shou ld v ac at e his se nte nc e be cause the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr edin three w ay s: (1) by apply ing a two-level enhancement pursuant to United State s Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s § 2 A 6. 1( b) (2 ) on the gr oundthat he c ommitt eda n of fe nse that “ invo lved m ore than two threa ts;” ( 2) byappl y ing asix -l ev el e nha nc emen t pur sua nt t o U . S. S. G . § 2A 6. 1( b) (1 ) on the gr oundthat S co tt ha d e nga ge d in

“ co nduc t e vid en ci ng a n in te nt t o c ar ryout suc h th re at ;” a nd ( 3) byinc re as ing his sentence bey ond th e guidelines range based on th e 18 U. S. C. § 355 3(a) f actors w ith out giv ing S co tt not ic e lik e tha t r eq uir edbyF ed . R. Crim . P . 32( h) f or de pa rtu res . I. In O ct obe r 2001 a t the a ge of e igh te enS co tt w as c onvi ct edof c ar j ac kin g in th e So ut he rn Dis tri ctof Al ab am a. He wa s sentenced by United State s District Co ur t J ud ge Ch arl es R. Bu tl er t o s ix ty mon th s i m pr is on m en t. Sc ott

w as unh ap py wit h t he sen te nc e h e rec ei ve d a nd m ad at t he jud ge who im po se d i t. On Se ptem

ber 13, 2004, w hile serving hi s sentence at the Colem an Feder al Co rr ec tio na l C om

ple x in F lorida , S co tt m ai le d a n e nve lop e to J udge Bu tle r at the Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur th ou se forth e So ut he rn Dis tri ctof Al ab am a. T he3

en ve lop e w as m arke d w ith ar etur n a ddr es s w hic h in cl ude d S co tt’ s na m e an d inm at e ide nti fi catio n nu m be r. I nsi de , the re w as ale tte r tha t st at ed : “ I ge t ou t i n 2007 , S o U ne edto w at ch Y our ba ck E ve ryS te p O f T he W ay. . . I W ill G et y ou Kil le d On e Day .” It wa s s ig ne d, “ TIME BOMb .” On Se ptem

ber 19, 2004, Sc ott m ailed a second envelope to Ju dge Butler at th e fed eral di st ric t co ur th ou se wit h t he same retu rn ad dr es s. T ha t e nve lop e co nta ine d ale tte r w hic h m ad e re fe re nc e to b low ing up the “ fe d bu ild ing , ” an d killin g “ all feds, j udges” am ong o ther things . Also inside that envelo pe wa s an oth er e nve lop e co nta ini ng y et

a nothe r le tte r tha t st at ed : “ I sha ll kid nap y our kids and blow up y our luxu ry car up [sic] . . . He res [sic] a surprise H AP PY HA LO W EE N [ sic] .” T he “ sur pr ise ” w as that this inn er e nve lop e al so c ont ai ne d a whi te po wde r. The p owd er was lat er i de nt ifi ed as acle an in g s ub st an ce. Judg e Butler’ s staff prom

ptly notified the United States Mar shals Service of the w ritten th reat s. A ge nts f ro m the F ed er al Bu re au of

I nve sti ga tio n in te rv ie w edS co tt in p ri son on Sep te m

be r 23 , 20 04 . H e tol d th e ag en ts tha t he ha d m ai le d th e thr eate nin g le tte rs be cause he be lie ve d th at the j udge ha d li edto him r eg ar din g th e se nte nc e he would rece ive if he cooperated w ith the go vernm ent; Scott believed that he had be en pro mis ed a th irt y -m on th sen te nc e rat he r th an on e o f si xt y m on th s. Sc ott sa id4

that he placed the white c leaning sub stance in the envelope to “ scare [the j udge] good .” W he n a ske d if

he r ea llyint en de d to kil l the j udge w he n r el ea se d f ro m pr iso n, S co tt tol d th e ag en ts: “ T he re are alot of pe opl e tha t I w an t t o do som ething to , but I have not m ade up my mind when or wher e I w ill do it.” U pon he aring thi s r es pons e, one of the a ge nts r em arke d th at it sou nde d a s if

S co tt truly in te nd ed to ha rm

th e jud ge an d a sk ed hi m to cla rif y hi s s ta te m en t. Sc ott

j ust smil ed an d s ai d t ha t h e h ad no th in g m or e to say. O n N ove m

be r 17, 200 4, agr an d j ur y sittin g in the S outhe rn D istri ct of A laba m a ha nde d do w n asix -c ount ind ic tmen t a ga ins t S co tt. T w o m onths l at er , he ple ad edgui ltyto the f

ir st c ount , thr eate nin g af ed er al of fi ci al in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 11 5( a) (1 )( B) , a nd f ile d a“ fa ctua l r es um e, ” in w hic h he a dmitt edth e el em en ts of t he off

en se . The re was no writ te n p le a ag reem en t. The P re-S entence Investigation report (PSI ) set Sc ott’s base offense level at 12 in ke ep in g wi th U.S.S.G. § 2 A6.1 (a)( 1) (20 04 ). It r ec omm en de d asix -l ev el § 2A6.1(b)( 1) enhancement on the grou nd that th e offe nse invo lved “ conduct evidencing an in tent to carryout such th reat. ” A tw o-level § 2A6.1(b) (2) en ha nc em en t was reco mm en de d b ecau se “ th e o ffen se in vo lv ed m or e th an two threats.” N ex t, the of

fe nse le ve l w as a dj ust edupw ar d si x le ve ls p ur sua nt t o § 3A 1. 2( b) be cause a ll thr ee pr er eq uis ite s f or appl ic at ion of

that gu ide lin e5

provisi on were m et: the victim wa s a governm ent officer , the off ense wa s m oti va te d bythat st atus, a nd the ba se of fe nse le ve l w as se t un de r Ch ap te r T w o, PartA of t he Gui de li ne s (Of fen se s Ag ai ns t t he Pers on ). Finally , S cott was gra nted a thr ee -l ev el r ed uc tio n f

or a cc ep ta nc e of

r es pons ibi lit y pur sua nt t o § 3 E 1. 1( a) a nd (b ). The en ha nc em en ts an d re du ct io n n et te d o utto a to ta l o ffen se lev el of 2 3. Sc ott w as f oundto be in crimina l hi sto ryc at eg or y I V , w hic h a t of fe nse le ve l 23 , pr ovi de d a n a dvi sory gui de lin e ra nge of 70 t o 87 m onths i m

pr iso nm en t. T he st at ut or y m ax im

um sen te nc e fo r Sco tt ’s off

en se was 1 20 m on th s. 1 8 U.S.C. § 11 5( a)(1 )(B) (b )(4 ). Sco ttfil ed two ob

jecti on s t o t he PSI t ha t ar e rel ev an t h ere. Fi rs t, he obj ec te d th at

be cause the onl y c ondu ct he ha d e nga ge d in w as m ai lin g th e en ve lop es , the six -l ev el e nha nc emen t f or c ondu ct e vid en ci ng a n in te nt t o c ar ryout th e th reat s was no t warran te d. A t the se nte nc ing he aring , S co tt co nte ste d th e gove rn m en t’ s th eo rythat the state m en t he ha d m ad e to the F BI a ge nts a ft er the thr eate nin g le tte rs ha d be en m ai le d a m ount edto co nduc t e vid en ci ng a n in te nt t o carr y ou t t he th reat s. Because there w as no evidence of any prepara tion to car ry out the thr eats, onl y e vid en ce of the thr eats the m se lve s, S co tt ar gue d th at § 2A6.1(b)( 1) wa s inappli cable.6

The sec ond o bje ction Scott m ade to the PSI wa s that, “ [w ] hile there w ere thr ee e nve lop es , the re w er e onl y tw o m ai lin gs, ” an d th er ef or e onl y tw o th re at s f

or pu rp os es of § 2A6 .1(b )(2 ), m ak in g t he two -le ve l en ha nc em en t fo r “ m or e th an two th reat s” in ap pr op ria te . T he dis tr ic t c ourt ov er

ru le d bo th o bj ec tio ns at the se nte nc ing he aring on Apr il 21 , 20 05 . W ith regard to the six-level enhancem ent, the court stated that Scott’ s statem ent to the FBI w as “ hard to igno re” and was suffic ient to establis h an in te ntto carr y ou t t he th reat . As f or the two-level e nhancem ent, the court stated t h at“ ea ch l et t erco n t ai n ed a d i s t i n ct , i n d ep en d en t , s ep ar at e t h re at , a n d . . . t h er e’s at least three threats contained within tho se letters. ” T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud edthat the P SI w as a cc ur at e an d th at the Gui de li ne s ra ng e was 70 to 87 m on th s i m pr is on m en t. Additionally , it noted that ne it he r th e p art ie s n orth e PSI h ad id en ti fie d a ny gro un ds forde pa rtu re. Af ter determining the guidelin es range the court discussed the § 35 53(a) fact or s. The c ourt noted th at it had considered all of the factors listed in 18 U. S. C. § 355 3, including “ the nature and the circum stances of the offense a nd the his tory and characte ristics of the De fendant.” T he c ourt c ont inu edthat S co tt’ s st at emen ts to the F BI a ge nts ind ic at eda n in te nt t o c ar ryout his thr eats a ga ins t a

j udge , his f a mi l y, f e d e r a l e mp l o ye e s , a n d t h e j u d i c i a l s ys t e m. It found that Scott had7

de m onstrate d a“ tot al dis re gardf or a uth or itya nd tha t hi s f

am ilyw as unable to control his behavior as a y outh .” The c ourt also no ted that as a j uvenile, Scott w as al le ge d to ha ve c ommitt edphy sic al a nd s ex ua l abuse w hil e in f ost er c ar e an d to ha ve de st ro y ed sch oo l p ro pe rty. Moreover, at eighteen, S cott had been convicted of carjack in g, an off

en se in vo lv in g afir earm . For these re asons, the court concluded th at Scott’ s “ violentpast behavior” outweighed any mitigatin g factors su ch as h is ag e o r di sa dv an ta ge d u pb rin gi ng . T he c ourt ne xt c onsi de re d th e ne edf or the se nte nc e im

pose d to “ re fl ec t the se ri ousn es s of

the of fe nse , to pr om ote r es pe ct f or the la w , a nd t o pr ovi de j ust pu ni sh m en t fo r th e o ffen se .” It f oundthat S co tt la ck edr es pe ct f or a uth or ity fig ur es , cou ld no t co nt ro l h is an ge r, an d h ad no rem or se . The c ourt conclud ed that a le ngthy te rm

of im pr iso nm en t w oul d se rv e as a de qua te de te rr en ce a nd, in fa ct , was th e o nl y ad eq ua te de te rren ce. T he c ourt be lie ve d th at im posi tio n of

the m ax im um se nte nc e w as ne ce ssaryto pr ote ct the pub lic f

ro m f utu re c ri m es by Sco tt . A cc or din gly , upo n c onsi de ratio n of the 18 U . S. C. § 35 53( a) f ac tor s, a nd taking in to account the advis ory nature of the G uidelin es, the c ourt conclud ed that the 120 -month se nte nc e w as r ea sonable a nd c om pli edw ith the ge ne ra l go al s of puni shm ent and purpo ses of sentencing foun d in § 35 53(a). Sc ott obj ec te d to the se nte nc e, arg uin g th at it w as unr ea sonable a nd tha t he8

ha d no t be en giv en not ic e of the c ourt’ s in te nti on t o go above the gui de lin es r an ge ba se d on the § 35 53( a) f

ac tor s, m uc h le ss the ba sis on w hic h it w oul d do so. T he court responded th at it had not relied on any inform ation oth er than that contained in the PSI a nd that altho ugh th e guidelines might require notice for a departure, th is was “ no t t ech ni cal ly a dep art ur e b uta se nt en ce o ut si de of t he Gui de li ne s.” II. Pu rs ua nt t o § 2 A 6. 1( b) (2 ), atw o- le ve l e nha nc emen t t o ade fe nda nt’ s ba se offense level is w arra nted if “ the offense involved m ore than two threa ts.” U. S. S. G. § 2A6.1(b)( 2). Application not e 3(B) adds that: “ If the off ense involv ed subs tantially m ore than two threa tening comm unication s to the sam e victim or a pr olo nge d pe ri od o f m aking hara ssi ng c omm uni catio ns t o th e sa m e vic tim , or if the offense involved multip le victim s, an upward departure m ay be w arra nted.” U . S. S. G . § 2A 6. 1, c mt. n. 3( B) . S co tt co nte nds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr edin ap pl y in g t hi s § 2A6 .1(b )(2 ) en ha nc em en t b ecau se he on ly sen t t wo “ m ai li ng s,” an d t he y do no t i nv ol ve “ m or e th an two th reat s.” Sp ec if ic al ly , he arg ue s th at

the second m ailing di d not in clude m ultip le threats that w ere distin ct enough in nature an d pu rp ose that the y sho uldbe tr eate d a s se parate one s. T his Co urt ha s ne ve r publ ish edade ci sio n r eg ar din g th e ap pli catio n of § 2A6.1(b)( 2), but a per suasive decisio n of the Seventh Circuit is on poi nt. Se e9

United States v. Fra zer, 391 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2004 ). In that case Fraz er re co rd edam es sa ge a nnou nc ing that bo m bs w er e pla nte d in tw o sc hool s a nd o n a school b us, and then he m ade three separate phone calls during which he play ed that recording. I d. at 868. He placed the first c all to the superintend ent’ s office an d t he sec on d c al l t o t he hi gh sch oo l. Id . During the second call, bec ause he w as pl aced on ho ld Fraz er h un g u p a fte r ha vi ng pl ay ed on ly partof t he reco rd ed th reat . Id. He called back imm ediately and play ed the m essage in full. I d. T he district co urt i m pose d atw o- le ve l e nha nc emen t pu rs ua nt t o § 2 A 6. 1( b) (2 ) on the gr ound th atFraz er t hr eat en ed to bl ow u p b om bs at t hr ee l oc at io ns . Id. at86 9. O n appe al , F ra ze r ar gue d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt i nc orre ct lyf oc use d on the num be r of vic tim s th re at en edr athe r tha n c ounting the num be r of thr eate nin g a ct s (threatening comm

unication s or phon e calls). Id. at 869. H is pos ition wa s that the thi rdc al l sh oul d no t c ount be cause it

w as a“ de mini mis ‘ ad dit ion ’ ” to the se co nd c al l. I d. a t 86 8. F ra ze r ar gue d th at “ se ve ra l thr eats m aybe c om bin edin a ‘sin gl e in st an ce o r ep is od e.’” Id. at87 1. T he S ev en th C ir cu it re

j ec te d F ra ze r’ s arg um en t, hol din g th at the se co nd o r thi rdc al ls c oul d no t be c onsi de re d de mini mis b ec au se a ll thr ee c al ls w er e “ ‘ true thr eats. ’ ” Id . I n othe r w or ds, a ll thr ee c al ls “ co nve y edam es sa ge that a r ea sonable pe rs on w oul d f

or es ee ar ec ipi en t i nte rp re tin g a s a n e xpr es sio n of int en t t o c au se10

se ri ous harm . ” I d. F ra ze r’ s in te nt t o m ak e onl y tw o “ thr eate nin g co mm un ic at io ns ” was no t d et ermin at iv e b ecau se th ree t hr eat s wer e act ua ll y m ad e. Id . In the c our se of

it s de ci sio n th e Se ve nth Ci rc uit not edthat se ve ra l c ir cu it co urts h av e as soc ia te d th e num be r of thr eats f or § 2A 6. 1( b) (2 ) purpose s w ith the num be r of c omm uni catio ns m ad e (t el ep hone c al ls o r le tte rs ). S ee U nit edS ta te s v. St ok es , 34 7 F .3d 10 3, 1 06 (4t h C ir. 2 00 3) (“ [T]he p hr as e ‘m or e th an two th reat s,’ as use d in § 2A 6. 1( b) (2 ), r ef er s to the num

be r of thr eate nin g c omm

uni catio ns, not the num be r of vic tim s th re at en ed ”) ; U nit edS ta te s v. N ew el l, 309 F . 3d 3 96, 403 (6 th C ir . 200 2) ( re co gni zi ng tha t § 2A 6. 1( b) (2 ) take s in to a cc ount the num be r of thr eats m ad e) ; U nit edS ta te s v. S pr ing , 305 F . 3d 2 76, 280 ( 4th Ci r. 200 2) ( “ thr eat” has the sam e meaning in § 2 A6. 1(b)(2) that it has in the underly ing federal statutes tha t c ri mina liz e thr eats, e . g. , 18 U . S. C. § 84 4( e) , 18 U . S. C. § 87 5( c) , a nd 1 8 U . S. C. § 87 6( c) ); U nit edS ta te s v. G oy ne s, 175 F . 3d 3 50, 355 ( 5th Ci r. 199 9) (ref erring to § 2A6.1(b)( 2) as the provision that applies to an enhancem ent based on m ult ipl e thr eats l ike m

ult ipl e thr eate nin g le tte rs )) . W e fi nd this a uth or ityf ro m ou r si st er ci rcu it s l og ic al an d p ers ua si ve . W ith tho se threat-c ount ing decisio ns in mind, we conclude that the dis trict co ur t d id no t err in ap pl y in g t he two -le ve l en ha nc em en t p ur su an t t o § 2A6 .1(b )(2 ).11

Ther e w ere two m ailings b ut the second m ailing cont ained at least tw o disti nct threats in two letters in tw o envelopes. The two letters in the second m ailing were co nta ine d in se parate e nve lop es a nd f ro m that the dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d in fe r, a s it did , that S co tt int en de d to thr eate n th e j udge tw ic e. N ot o nlythat, but the m ult ipl e threats in the second m ailing were distin ct in their nature and purpose. Se e Stokes, 347 F.3d at 106 n.2 (stating in dicta that “ [t] here m ay be cases in w hich m ult ipl e thr eats i ssu edw ith in a sin gle le tte r or

c onve rs at ion are so d ist inc t i n nature and purpose that th ey shoul d not b e treated as a single threat for purposes of § 2A 6. 1( b) (2 ). ”) O ne le tte r in the se co nd m ai lin g m ad e re fe re nc e to b low ing up the f ed er al bui ldi ng. T he oth er one thr eate ne d to harm

the j udge ’ s c hil dr en a nd co nta ine d w hit e pow de r, w hic h th e co urt r ea sonablyc oul d in fe r w as int en de d to simulate anthrax. Because Scott m ade at lea st three distinct threats, the district co urt di d no t e rr

in fi ndi ng tha t the tw o- le ve l § 2A 6. 1( b) (2 ) en ha nc emen t di d ap pl y . III . Under U .S .S .G . § 2A 6.1(b)(1), a six-level enhancement is appropriate wher e

“ th e o ffen se in vo lv ed an y co nd uc t ev id en ci ng an in te ntto carr y ou t” th e th reat s. U . S. S. G . § 2A 6. 1( b) (1 ). S co tt ar gue s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr edbyappl y ing thi s en ha nc emen t be cause S co tt didnot e nga ge in suc h c ondu ct , but ins te adhe m er el y12

m ad e a state m en t t o th e FB I w hil e in p ri son af te r the of fe nse ha d e nde d. Sc ott poin ts to the first application note to § 2A6.1(b)(1), which explains that when determining whether

this enhancem ent is appropriate, “ the court shall consi der co nd uc t t ha t o ccu rred pri orto or d ur in g t he off en se .” U.S.S.G. § 2 A6.1 , cmt. n .1.

“ W e treat the comm entaryin the Sentencing Guidelines Manual as authoritativ e. ” Uni te d S ta te s v . Searc y , 41 8 F .3d 11 93 , 11 95 n.3 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ). W he the r Sc ott

e nga ge d in c ondu ct

e vid en ci ng a n in te nt t o c ar ryout the thr eats r ai se s amixe d qu es tio n of la w a nd f

ac t. S ee U nit edS ta te s v. Barb our , 70 F. 3d 58 0, 586 (11th Cir. 1995). “ Although we review the district court’ s factual fi ndi ngs unde r a cl earl y e rr one ous sta ndard , w he the r the f ac ts e vid en ce a n in te nt t o carry out the thr eat i s aque sti on o f la w a nd i s r ev ie w edde nov o. ” I d. ( ci ta tio n omitted). Whether a statement that was m ade af ter the threa t m ay be considered w he n de te rm

ini ng i f a de fe nda nt e vid en ce d a n in te nt t o c ar ryout that thr eat i s a pur e que sti on o f la w sub

j ec t t o de nov o r ev ie w . S ee id. ( not ing that w e de ci de de novo the pur el y le ga l qu es tio n of w he the r co nduc t oc cu rring be fo re the of fe nse m ay be co ns id ered ). W e ar e guided by our decisions in Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, and United States v. T ay lor , 88 F . 3d 9 38 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) . I n th e fi rs t c as e, Barb our tr av el edto W as hin gto n, D . C. , armedw ith agun a nd a mm uni tio n w ith the int en t t o ki ll13

Pres id en t Cl in to n, b uthe lef t af te r di sc ov eri ng th atth e Pre si de ntwas a br oa d. Barbour, 70 F.3d at 583. U pon h is return, B arbour told several acquaintances about hi s trip and his d esire to kill the President. Id. He wa s ultim ately convicted of thr eate nin g th e Pr es ide nt b as edon the state m en ts h e m ad e during tho se co nve rs at ion s. I d. A t se nte nc ing , the dis tr ic t c ourt f oundthat the Barb our ’ s trip t o W as hin gto n su pporte d asix -l ev el e nha nc emen t pu rs ua nt t o § 2 A 6. 1( b) (1 ). I d. On appeal, Bar

bour argued that the evidence of his trip and th e events that oc cu rr edduring it

didnot pr ove he ha d a n in te nt t o c ar ryout the thr eats h e m ad e after the trip. I d. at 586. W e stated that under the right circum stances pre-threat co n d u ctm ay b e u s ed t o p ro v e ad ef en d an t ’s i n t en tt o carr y o u ta t h re at . Id . We lis te d th re e fa ct or s th at

ac ourt c oul d c onsi de r in d et ermini ng the pr oba tiv e va lue of pr e- thr eat c ondu ct : ( 1) “ the pr oxi mityin time be tw ee n th e thr eat a nd the pr ior co nduc t;” ( 2) “ the se ri ousn es s of the de fe nda nt’ s prior

c ondu ct ;” a nd ( 3) “ the ex te nt t o w hic h th e pr e- thr eat c ondu ct ha s pr ogr es se d to w ar ds c ar ry ing out the thr eat. ” I d. a t 58 7. B ar

bour ha d tr av el edto the c ap ita l i nte ndi ng t o ki ll the Pres id en t an d h ad lef

t o nl y aft er d is co ve rin g t ha t h e was ou t o f th e co un try. Id. W e re asoned that based on that conduct, “ there w as everyrea son to conclude” that Barb our int en de d to a ct

on the thr eats h e m ad e w he n he r etur ne d ho m e an d th at he wa s likely to do so . Id. W e theref ore concluded that the dis trict court had14

pr ope rl y appl ie d th e six -l ev el e nha nc emen t pu rs ua nt t o § 2 A 6. 1( b) (1 ). I d. In T ay lor , the de fe nda nt w as c onvi ct edof se ndi ng thr eate nin g comm unication s throug h the m ail, a nd at sentencing the district court applied th e six -l ev el § 2A 6. 1( b) (1 ) en ha nc emen t. 88 F. 3d 9 38. T ha t c ourt r ea sone d th at the en ha nc emen t w as appr opria te in lig ht o f ev ide nc e tha t T ay lor ha d su rv ei lle d th e vic tim s’ home, c al le d th em numer ous times , hir edapr iva te inv es tig at or to obt ai n inform ation abou t them , a nd sol icited a cell- m ate to m urder them . Id. at 943. In hol din g th at

the c ourt pr ope rl y appl ie d th e en ha nc emen t f or the pr e- thr eat c ondu ct , w e not edthat “ [t ] he e sse nti al inq uiry f or § 2A 6. 1( b) (1 ) purpose s is w he the r the fa ct s of the c as e, take n a s aw hol e, e stabli sh a suf fi ci en tlydir ec t c onne ct ion betwee n the defendant’ s pre-threa t conduct and h is threat.” Id. W e concluded that th is co nd uc t was ser io us an d s pe ci fic al ly con ne ct ed to th e th reat en ed pa rti es . Id. W e al so f oundthat the se a ct ivi tie s w er e cl ose lyli nke d w ith the of fe nse of se ndi ng th reat en in g c omm

un ic at io ns th ro ug h t he m ai l. Id . A s ou r Barb our

a nd T ay lor

de ci sio ns i ndi cate , a nd the c omm en taryto § 2A 6. 1( b) (1 ) sa y s, the six -l ev el e nha nc emen t un de r tha t pr ovi sio n is appr opria te w he re se ri ous co nduc t c ommitt edbe fo re or during the of

fe nse ind ic at es a n in te nt to c ar ryout the thr eat. S ee T ay lor , 88 F . 3d a t 94 3; B ar bour , 70 F . 3d a t 58 6; U.S.S.G. § 2 A6.1 , cmt. n .1. Sco tt ’s st at em en t t o t he FBI d oe s n otam ou ntto th at .15

It w as not c ondu ct be fo re or during the c ri mina l of

fe nse but sim plya n a nsw er

( an d a somew ha t a m

big uous one a t tha t) giv en byS co tt w hil e in c ust odya nd i n response to an inv estigator’ s questio n, and it occurre d after the crime had been co m pl et ed . The d is tri ctco ur t erred by app lying th e § 2A6 .1(b )(1 ) en ha nc em en t. Si nc e the S upr eme Co urt i ssu edit s de ci sio n in U nit edS ta te s v. Bo oke r, 543 U. S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (200 5), a district court is no lo nger required to sentence wit hi n t he gu id el in es ran ge , bu t i s s ti ll ob li ga te d t o c orrect ly calcu la te th e ran ge . U nit edS ta te s v. G ibs on, 434 F . 3d 1 234, 124 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) ; U nit edS ta te s v. Cr aw fo rd , 407 F . 3d 1 174, 117 8–79 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ( “ [A ] ft er Bo oke r, ‘ [t ] he dis tr ic t c ourts, w hil e not

bou nd t o appl y the G uid el ine s, m ust c onsu lt tho se G uid el ine s a nd t ak e the m int o a cc ount

w he n se nte nc ing . ’ T his c onsu ltatio n re qui re m en t, a t a

m ini m um , obl ige s th e dis tr ic t c ourt t o c al cu la te c orre ct lythe sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Shelton, 400 F. 3d 13 25, 1332 n .9 (11th Cir. 2005 ) (“ A sentencing court under Bo oke r sti ll m

ust c onsi de r the G uid el ine s, a nd, suc h c onsi de ratio n ne ce ssari ly re qui re s th e se nte nc ing c ourt t o c al cu la te the G uid el ine s se nte nc ing r an ge in the sa m e m an ne r as be fo re Bo oke r. ”) . W e ha ve not edthat “ [a ] misi nte rp re ta tio n of the Guidelines by the district court effe ctively m eans that [the district court] has not prop erlyconsulted th e G uidelin es.” G ibson , 434 F. 3d at 124 3 (internal16

qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o mit te d) . N otw ith sta ndi ng the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e rr or , w e ar e not r eq uir edto va cate the se nte nc e an d r em an d th e ca se if the c ourt w oul d ha ve li ke lyse nte nc edS co tt in the sa m e w ayw ith out

the e rr or . S ee W ill ia m s v. U nit edS ta te s, 503 U . S. 193 , 203 , 112 S. Ct. 1112 , 1120–21 (1992) (“ [O ] nce the court of appeals has decided that the dis tr ic t c ourt misappl ie d th e G uid el ine s, ar em an d is appr opria te unl es s th e re vie w ing c ourt c onc lud es , on the r ec or d a s aw hol e, that the e rr or w as harmle ss, i.e. , that the e rror did not affec t the district court’ s selection of the sentence im pose d. ”) ; U nit edS ta te s v. W ill ia m s, 431 F . 3d 7 67, 775 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) (Carnes, J. concurring) (“ The S uprem e Court and this Court have lon g recognized that it is no t necessaryto decide guidelin es issues or rem and cases for new se nte nc e pr oc ee din gs w he re the gui de lin es e rr or , if a ny , didnot

a ff ec t the se nte nc e. ”) ; U nit edS ta te s v. Bl as , 360 F . 3d 1 268, 127 2–73 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) (d ec lin ing to de ci de w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt misappl ie d th e gui de lin es w he re the di st ric t co ur t wo ul d h av e rea ch ed th e sa m e se nt en ce re ga rd le ss of a ny error ). If the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d no t e rr one ousl y appl ie d th e six -l ev el e nha nc emen t, Sco ttwou ld ha ve ha d a n o ffen se lev el of 1 7. T ha t l ev el , w he n c om bin edw ith a crimina l hi sto ryc at eg or y of I V , w oul d ha ve pla ce d hi m in the gui de lin es r an ge of 37 to 46 m on th s, i ns te ad of t he ran ge of 7 0 t o 8 7 m on th s. The district court17

se nt en ced Sco ttto 12 0 m on th s. E ve n th ough the dis tr ic t c ourt sp en t a co nsi de rable a m ount

of ti m e ex pla ini ng w hy S co tt de se rv edthe m ax im um sentence, we cannot say that the court, had it known of the appropriate ra nge, w oul d ha ve se nte nc edS co tt to the sa m e se ve re se nte nc e. T he pr im ary r ea son fo r our r el uc ta nc e to d o so is the sub sta nti al dif fe re nc e be tw ee n th e co rr ec t r an ge a nd the one that w as e rr one ousl y use d a s gu ida nc e. T he top of the c orre ct

r an ge ( 46 m onths) is j ust

ove r ha lf the top of

the w ro ng r an ge ( 87 m onths) . T he ste p f ro m 46 m onths t o 12 0 m onths i s si gni fi ca ntl y gr eate r tha n th e ste p f ro m 87 months t o 120 m onths. B ec au se it

is unc le ar

how the c ourt w oul d ha ve a ct ed , w e m ust vacate the sentence and rem and to the court for re- sentencing o n this g round. In takin g th is a ct ion , w e not e tha t i f it ha d w ish edto do s o th e dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d have stated that it would reach the same sentence r egardless of how the disputed § 2A 6. 1( b) (1 ) iss ue w as de ci de d. A state m en t l ike that w oul d ha ve c onvi nc edus the error wa s harmless. S ee W illiam s, 431 F. 3d at 775 (Carnes, J., concurring). In va cat in g t he sen te nc e an d re m an di ng fora ne w sen te nc e p ro ceed in g, we d o n o tme a n t o i mp l y t h a tt h e d i s tr i c tc o u r to n r e ma n d c a n n o tr e a c h t h e s a me se nte nc e as it

didbe fo re , pr ovi de d th at it c orre ct s th e one e rr or

ide nti fi edin thi s opin ion. N or do we im

ply any view on issues that m ay arise f or the first tim e at th e re- se nt en ci ng .18 IV. Sc ott ’ s th ir d c ont en tio n is that the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d ha ve inf or m edhim be fo re the se nte nc e he aring that i t w as c ont em pla tin g se nte nc ing him

above the guid elines range based on the § 355 3(a) f actors, and shou ld have given h im notice of the gr ound s f

or doi ng s o. H e re lie s on the r ea soni ng o f Bu rn s v. U nit edS ta te s, 501 U . S. 129 , 111 S . Ct . 218 2 ( 1991 ), a nd the a na log y that F ed . R. Crim . P . 32( h) pr ovi de s, w hil e the gov ernm en t i n op posi tio n c ite s th e re as oni ng a nd l an gua ge of United States v. Hofie rka, 83 F.3d 357 (11th Cir. 1996 ). It is an intere sting issue, but one that w e ha ve no o cc as ion to de ci de in thi s c as e. B ec au se w e ar e re ve rs ing Sc ott ’ s se nte nc e as ar es ult of the § 2A 6. 1( b) (1 ) er

ro r an d r em an din g th e ca se to the dis tr ic t c ourt f

or r e- se nte nc ing , a ny la ck

of not ic e at the or igi na l se nte nc ing will not m atter. In light of what happened at the first sentencing, S cott is on n otice tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt m ayse nte nc e him above the gui de lin es r an ge a nd o f the gr ound s it

m ayuse to do s o. F or

that r ea son, the not ic e iss ue ha s no r em ai nin g relevance to this case. V. The sentence is VA CAT ED and the case is RE MAN DE D f or further pr oc eed in gs co ns is te ntwit h t hi s o pi ni on .