alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4338 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4338

 To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of 
 Veterans Affairs to furnish urns for the remains of certain veterans 
       whose remains are placed in non-traditional resting sites.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 9, 2017

  Ms. Tenney introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of 
 Veterans Affairs to furnish urns for the remains of certain veterans 
       whose remains are placed in non-traditional resting sites.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Chuck Osier Burial Benefits Act''.

SEC. 2. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS PROVISION OF URNS FOR REMAINS OF 
              CERTAIN VETERANS WHOSE REMAINS ARE PLACED IN NON-
              TRADITIONAL RESTING SITES.

    Section 2306(d) of title 38, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
    ``(6)(A) In lieu of furnishing a headstone or marker under this 
subsection to a deceased individual described in subparagraph (B), the 
Secretary shall furnish, upon request and at the expense of the United 
States--
            ``(i) an urn made of any material to signify the 
        individual's status as a veteran, in which the remains of such 
        individual may be placed at private expense; or
            ``(ii) a commemorative plaque signifying the individual's 
        status as a veteran.
    ``(B) A deceased individual described in this subsection is an 
individual--
            ``(i) who served in the Armed Forces on or after April 6, 
        1917;
            ``(ii) who is eligible for a headstone or marker furnished 
        under paragraph (1) (or would be so eligible but for the date 
        of the death of the individual); and
            ``(iii) whose remains were cremated and are placed in a 
        non-traditional resting site.
    ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `non-traditional resting site' 
means a site of interment or inurnment other than a national cemetery, 
a State veterans' cemetery, a tribal cemetery, or a private 
cemetery.''.
                                 <all>
```
An Equal Opportunity Provider and Employer

CENTER FOR VETERINARY BIOLOGICS NOTICE 19-07

TO: Veterinary Services Leadership Team

Directors, Center for Veterinary Biologics

Biologics Licensees, Permittees, and Applicants

FROM: Byron E. Rippke

Director

SUBJECT: Discontinued Availability of Pasteurella multocida 169 (Porcine) 

Bacterin

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of the document is to notify veterinary biologics manufacturers that the 

Center for Veterinary Biologics (CVB) will stop distributing Pasteurella multocida 

169 (Porcine) Bacterin after December 31, 2020.

II. BACKGROUND

The CVB laboratory has routinely provided reference Pasteurella multocida 169 

(porcine) bacterin to veterinary biologics manufactures. Due to reduced resources, 

the CVB is discontinuing supply of this reagent. 

III. ACTION

Firms must qualify a reference bacterin for use in swine after December 31, 2020, if 

testing a bacterin for potency by title 9, Code of Federal Regulations, section 

113.121. The Outline of Production, Section V.C, must include information 

regarding the Pasteurella multocida reference bacterin used for serial release 

testing. This information must be supplied to the firm’s reviewer for CVB 

acceptance prior to use.

IV. IMPLEMENT/APPLICABILITY

CVB will stop shipping this reagent December 31, 2020. Complete any necessary 

Outline of Production changes by the same date.

Animal and Plant

Health Inspection

Service

Veterinary Services

Center for Veterinary 

Biologics

1920 Dayton Avenue

PO Box 844

Ames, IA 50010

(515) 337-6100
# C_2009282EN.01003302.xml

| 21.11.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 282/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.11.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 282/33

---

Order of the President of the Fifth Chamber of the Court of 21 July 2009 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden

(Case C-547/08) (1)

1

2009/C 282/60

Language of the case: Swedish

Language of the case: Swedish

The President of the Fifth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 32, 7.2.2009.

1

---
Gm· . ·•r. 

-·· . lnventoryExpertService -·-----·-- ·------ -----------·---- ·---· 

A division of the American Chemical Society Phone: 800-63t -1 884, 614-447-3870 

Fax: 614-447-3747 

E-mail: answers@cas.org 

Web: www.cas.org/products/other-cas·products/client-sorvicos/ 

CAS 

D 

INVENTORY EXPERT SERVICE REPORT 

Please print the above CA Index Name on the appropriate page of your PMN. 

If t his box is checked, CAS has made correction(s ) mar ked in red to your IES order. 

Please make the same correctio ns to your PMN before submitt ing it to the EPA. 

2540 Olentangy River Road P.O. Box 3343 Columbus, OH 43210-0334 USA
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GAIL ROSIER,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

JEFFREY STROBEL,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 15

- 15091

D.C. No. 2:14

- cv

- 01399

- JJT

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 15, 2017 ** San Francisco, California

Before: CANBY, SILER, *** and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

The contract and tort claims alleged by Gail Rosier in this diversity action

arise out of the attempts by her ex

- husband, Jeffrey Strobel

, to collect child support

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by desig nation. 

# FILED

FEB 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

and out of statements made by Strobel in New Hampshire and Arizona state court

proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint , finding the contract claims

precluded by a New Hampshire state court judgment and the remaining claims

premised on statements for which Strobel enjoys immunity . We affirm.

1. Rosier’s contract claims arise from a child support agreement between her

and Strobel

. Upon Strobel’s motion, a New Hampshire trial court enforce d the

agreement, order ing Rosier to make funds available for the education of the couple’s

son

. The court later found Rosier in contempt of that order

, and ordered her to pay

child support arrearages

. Applying New Hampshire law, see Holcombe v. Hosmer

,

477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007), the district court correctly found Rosier’s

contract claims in this case precluded because they “ could ha ve been litigated” in

that proceeding

. In re Hampers , 97 A.3d 1106, 1112

– 13 (N.H. 2014) (quoting Gray

v. Kelly , 13 A.3d 848, 851 (N.H. 2010)) ; see also Osman v. Gagnon , 876 A.2d 193,

195 (N.H. 2005)

.

2. Rosier’s tort claims arise from Strobel’s statements to the New Hampshire

court during the proceedings described above and his statements to an Arizona court

regarding Rosier’s sentencing for an unrelated crime. These statements are

privileged from c ivil liability because they were “made in the course of j udicial3

proceedings” and “pertinent or relevant to the proceedings.” Provencher v. Buzzell

Plourde Assocs. , 711 A.2d 251, 255 (N.H. 1998); see also Green Acres Tr. v.

London , 688 P.2d 617, 620

– 22 (Ariz. 1984). And, because Strobel’s statements

were privileged, the district court did not err in denying Rosier leave to amend her

complaint to add a claim for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

relating to those statements. 1

AFFIRMED.

1 In any event, Rule 11 sanctions are sought by motion, not as part of a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 113 (Thursday, July 26, 2012)]
[Senate]
[Page S5628]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

             CONDEMNING THE ATROCITIES IN AURORA, COLORADO

  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the consideration of H. Con. Res. 134 just received from the 
House, and it is at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the concurrent 
resolution by title.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 134) condemning, in 
     the strongest possible terms, the heinous atrocities that 
     occurred in Aurora, Colorado.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consideration of 
the concurrent resolution.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
concurrent resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the 
motion to reconsider be laid upon the table with no intervening action 
or debate, and that any statements be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 134) was agreed to.
  The preamble was agreed to.

                          ____________________
```
# C_2020230EN.01001001.xml

| 13.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 230/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 230/10

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 23 April 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Ryanair Ltd, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato — Antitrust v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato — Antitrust, Ryanair Ltd, Ryanair DAC

(Case C-28/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Transport - Air services - Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 - Article 23(1) - Indication of the final price to be paid - Online passenger check-in fees - VAT - Administrative fees for purchases made by means of a credit card other than that approved by the air carrier - Unavoidable and foreseeable elements of the final price to be paid - Optional price supplements - Concept)

(2020/C 230/12)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Ryanair Ltd, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato — Antitrust

Defendants: Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato — Antitrust, Ryanair Ltd, Ryanair DAC

Operative part of the judgment

Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community must be interpreted as meaning that passengers’ check-in fees whose payment cannot be avoided because there is no alternative method of checking-in free of charge, the value added tax (VAT) applied to fares for domestic flights, and administrative fees for purchases made by means of a credit card other than that approved by the air carrier constitute price elements that are unavoidable and foreseeable within the meaning of the second sentence of that provision. By contrast, that provision must be interpreted as meaning that passengers’ check-in fees whose payment can be avoided by using a free check-in option and the VAT applied to optional supplements relating to domestic flights constitute an optional price supplement within the meaning of the fourth sentence of that provision.

---

(1)  OJ C 164, 13.5.2019.

---
December
30, 2016


 


 


Royal
Energy Resources, Inc.


Attention:
William L. Tuorto


56
Broad Street, Suite 2


Charleston,
South Carolina 29401


 


	 	Re:	Securities
    Purchase Agreement, dated March 21, 2016 and related Note (the “Rhino Note”), between Rhino Resource Partners
    LP (“Rhino”) and Royal Energy Resources, Inc. (“Royal”) and Secured Promissory Note, dated September
    30, 2016 originally payable by Royal to Weston Energy LLC, as assigned to Rhino (the “Weston Note”)


 


Dear
Bill:


 


As
you are aware, Rhino and Royal are parties to the Rhino Note and, by assignment, the Weston Note.


 


Under
the terms of the Rhino Note, Royal has made total payments of $5,000,000. The total amount currently outstanding under the Rhino
Note is $2,000,000. Under the terms of the Weston Note, the total amount outstanding is $2,000,000. Total aggregate amounts due
under the Rhino Note and the Weston Note are referred to herein as the “Outstanding Balance”.


 


It
is the intent of Rhino and Royal to amend the terms of the Rhino Note and the Weston Note to extend the maturity dates thereof,
and Rhino and Royal hereby agree that the maturity dates under the Rhino Note and the Weston Note are hereby extended to December
31, 2018, at which time the Outstanding Balance shall be due and payable to Rhino in full. Rhino and Royal further agree that
the Outstanding Balance, including any interest thereon, may be converted, at the option of Royal, at any time prior to December
31, 2018, in exchange for unregistered Royal common stock issued to Rhino at a price per share equal to seventy five percent (75%)
of the volume weighted average closing price for the ninety (90) trading days preceding the date of conversion, if such shall
occur, provided that for the purpose of this calculation, such average closing price shall be no less than $3.50 and no more than
$7.50.


 




    	 	 	 



    	 		 



    


 


Page
2


 


Royal
acknowledges and agrees to the amount and validity of the Rhino Note, the Weston Note, and the Outstanding Balance.


 


Except
as modified hereby, the Rhino Note and the Weston Note shall remain in full force and effect, and are hereby ratified and affirmed
by Rhino and Royal.


 


If
the forgoing reflects your understanding and agreement, please execute this letter where indicated below, and return it to us.


 


	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 	 
	 	Rhino Resource Partners LP
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/
    Richard A. Boone
	 	Title:	President
    


 


The
foregoing is acknowledged and agreed:


 


	Royal Energy Resources, Inc.	 
	 	 	 
	By:
    	/s/
    William L. Tuorto	 
	Title:
    	Chief
    Executive Officer
1 ... S itt ing b y a ssig n m e n t.

i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION
No. 04-08-00583- CV J e r r y WA NZ ER , Appellant
v. TEX AS D EP AR TM EN T OF CRIM IN AL JU STIC E – I NST ITU TIO NA L D IV ISI ON , et al., Appellee s F ro m th e 81 st Jud ic ia l D ist ri c t Co ur t, K arn e s Co un ty , T e xas Trial Court No. 04-03- 00051-CVK Honora ble David Pee ples, J udg e Presiding 1
PER C URI AM Sitt ing: Phy lis J . Speedlin , J ustice

Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: October 15, 2008 DI SMI SSED F ro m ou r i nit ia l r e vie w o f t

he re c or d it

a pp e ared tha t th e or de r s ou g ht t o b e a pp e a le d is interlocuto ry b ec au s e it does not dispose of a pe nding c laim for attorne y ’s fe es, and no se vera nce
or de r a pp e a rs in t

he re c or d. Th e re fo re , w e order e d a pp e lla nt t o s ho w c a

us e in w ri tin g wh y

thi s04
- 08
- 00 58 3- CV

- 2- appea l should n o t b e dis missed for lac k of jurisdiction. Appellant’s re sponse ac knowledg ed the pending claim for a

ttorney ’s fe es . Ba sed on our r eview of the re cord, w e conc lude that the orde r sig ne d o n M arc h 2 7, 20 06 is n ot a fi na l and a pp e a la ble jud g me nt be c a

us e it doe s n ot d isp os e of

a ll parties a nd cause s of ac tion in thi s suit. Theref ore, w e do not have jurisdiction over this appea l. See Lehmann v. Har- Con Corp. , 39 S.W .3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001). Acc ording ly , this appeal is dismissed for lac k of jurisdiction. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 42.3(a)
. PER C URI AM
Sl()-l()()4()7-()23 

Shreveport Airport Authorit y 

5103 HollywocxJ Ave., Suite 300 • Shreveport, LA 71109 

Phono (318) 673-5370 • Telefax (318) 673-5377 

Shreveport Regional Airport • Shreveport Downtown Municipal Airport 

March 25,2010 

The Honorable Raymond H. LaHood 

Secretary 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Ave, SE 1: J 

Washington, DC 20590 ri^ 

Docket DOT-OST-2010-«B» f^ 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

Thank you for the opportunity to express the Shreveport Airport Authority's support for the 

application for antitrust inmiunity and proposed joint business agreement filed by American 

Airlines and Japan Airlines. 

The proposed alliance between these two airlines is vital for oneworld to compete effectively 

with the Star and SkyTeam alliance. This increased interalliance competition will in turn enhance 

the benefits of the Department's Open Skies policy - first by solidifying U.S.-Japan Open Skies, 

then by serving as a foundation for further liberalization across Asia. 

After a thorough review, the Shreveport Airport Authority encourages the Department of 

Transportation to approve this application as it would enable these oneworld alliance aurlines to 

work closely together to deliver highly competitive air transportation services. American 

Airlines provides eight daily flights between Shreveport and DFW International Airport. Thus, 

the proposed agreement between the two airlines will benefit travelers in the three-state region 

served by Shreveport Regional Airport. 

Approval for AA/JAL alliance will have a positive impact on air travel by offering customers 

more service, scheduling and pricing options and will help to ensure that customers continue to 

benefit fi"om having three competitive air alliances to choose fi-om. 

I urge you to quickly approve this application. 

Sincerely, 

Director of Airports
EXHIBIT 21.1
                                          NEXTHEALTH, INC.
                                        SUBSIDIARY SCHEDULE

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

Subsidiaries                  State of Incorporation        Doing Business As
-------------                 ----------------------        -----------------
<S>                           <C>                           <C>
Sierra Tucson, Inc.                Arizona

Sierra Tucson AC, Inc. (STAC)      Arizona

Sierra Tucson Educational
 Materials, Inc. (STEM)            Arizona

Onsite Workshops,Inc.(inactive)    Arizona

Sierra Healthstyles, Inc.          Arizona                       Miraval

NextHealth Water Resources, Inc.   Arizona

Hilton Head Health
 Institute, Inc. (inactive)        Arizona

Sierra Tucson, LLC                 Delaware                 Sierra Tucson
</TABLE>
Second Department,

July, 1991

(July 1, 1991)

#### Aetna Casualty & Surety Company et al., Respondents, v Richard Santos, Jr., Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Kevin Santos, Deceased, et al., Appellants.

— In an action, *inter alia,*for a judgment declaring that the defendant Cornealouis Davis was not an insured under the contract of insurance between Aetna Casualty & Surety Company and Sallie Mae Porter, the defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Meehan, J.), entered September 22, 1989, which made the declaration.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant Cornealouis Davis was driving the plaintiff Sallie Mae Porter’s car when he allegedly had an epileptic seizure and struck Kevin Santos, a one-and-one-half year old child, and killed him. Other members of the Santos family who were present at the scene of the accident also sustained *92personal injuries. This declaratory judgment action was subsequently brought by Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (hereinafter Aetna) and Porter to seek a determination as to whether Davis had permission to use Porter’s vehicle at the time of the accident. Following a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court found that Davis did not have permissive use of Porter’s vehicle.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs failed to present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of permissive use created by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. The plaintiffs do not dispute the applicability of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, which section gives rise to the "presumption that the vehicle is being operated with the owner’s consent” *(Walls v Zuvic,*113 AD2d 936; *see, Albouyeh v County of Suffolk,*96 AD2d 543, *affd*62 NY2d 681; *Leotta v Plessinger,*8 NY2d 449, 461). The presumption that an owner of a vehicle has consented to its use is " Very strong’ and continues until there is 'substantial evidence to the contrary’ ” *(Bruno v Privilegi,*148 AD2d 652, 653, *quoting Albouyeh v County of Suffolk, supra,*at 544).

The record reveals that the plaintiff Sallie Mae Porter testified that Davis did not have permission to use her vehicle on the day of the accident. Davis was a tenant in Porter’s house and was generally not permitted to use Porter’s car. Ms. Porter’s daughter also corroborated her testimony. Moreover, Davis testified, through his deposition testimony read at trial, that he was not permitted to use the car unless an emergency existed. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Davis’s use of the car to attend an appointment at the Department of Social Services was not an emergency under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of permissive use under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388.

We have considered the defendants’ remaining contention and find that it is without merit. Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
19478

#### Adoption of Male Child (b. 8/24/89), In re

Affirmed
<PAGE>
                                                          Exhibit 11

          VIEWLOGIC SYSTEMS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
         COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE
            (In thousands, except per share data)
     
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                     Three Months
                                   Ended March 31,
                                   ---------------
                                   1997      1996
                                   ----      ----
<S>                             <C>        <C>
Weighted average number of
shares outstanding:
  Common stock                   16,550    16,813
  Common equivalent shares
   resulting from stock
   options and warrants
   (treasury stock method)          888       237
Less:  Repurchased shares                    (167)
                                 ------    ------
        Total                    17,438    16,883
                                 ======    ======
Net income (loss)               ($3,245)   $  609
                                 ======    ======
Net income (loss) per
  common share                  ($ 0.19)   $ 0.04
                                 ======    ======
</TABLE>
                              33
**Exhibit 13.2**

 

 

**CERTIFICATION**

**PURSUANTTOSECTION 906 OFTHE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002**

(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) 

Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Alumina Limited, anAustralian company (the “Company”), hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that: 

The AnnualReport on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2010 (the “Report”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

Dated: May 26, 2011