1 In the record there are two spellings f or the mother's name: Deloresand Dolor es. We will use th e Delo res sp elli ng. Fourth Division June 19, 2008

No. 1-05-3370

In re MARK W., a Minor, ) ) Appeal from the Respondent ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County (The Peo ple of the State of I llinois, )

) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 99 JA 00877 ) Delores W., )

Responde nt )

) ) Honorab le ) Sharon Coleman (AMY B., ) Noreen Daly ) Candace

Fabri, Respondent-Appellant)). ) Judges Presiding.

PRESID ING

JUSTICE

NEVI LL E deliver ed the opinion of the

court: Amy B., responden t a nd pl en ar y gu ar di an of th e p er so n f or De lo re s W ., th e m en ta ll ydisabled -adult

mother and respondent, appeals from the July 12, 2005 , order of the juvenile court finding Delores W. 1 unfit. Fo llowing t he termin ation of th

e paren tal righ ts hearin g, a best-in

terest hear ing w as held whe

re the tri al court te

rmina ted D elor es W.' s par

enta l rights to Mark W. On December 29, 2006, this court rever sed and remanded the trial court’s order that1-05-3370

- 2 -

terminatedDelores W.’s pare ntal rig hts. On Apr

il 3, 2008, t

he supre me court revers ed this court and remanded the case with directions that we address the issues that

were initially ra

ised in Amy B.’s appeal. Ac co rd in gl y, pursuant to the supreme court's directions, we re view Amy B.’ s claims on the merits. In this appeal, Amy B. presents the following issues for review: (1) whether Delores W., a mentally disabled adult with a plenary guardian of the person, was denied due proce ss by t he juveni le court when on December 9, 2002, the juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) dur ing a hearing to termina te the mother's parental rights; (2) whethe r the trial court's findings at the termination of pare ntal r ights hearin gs were against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) whe ther the trial court had jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of Delore s W. w hen Del ores W .'s plenary guardian of the person

had not received notice of the proceeding s; and (4) whether the trial court abused it s discre

tion when it denied the plena ry guard ian's a ttempts to c all witnesse s, including the minor. For the r

easons th at follow , we aff irm. BACKGROUND The Probate Court's Determination That Delores W. is Disabled On A u gust 2 9, 199 7, th e prob ate cou rt ent ered an order n aming A my B., Delo res W. 's mother, plenary g

uardian of the person for

Delores W. The probate court found, as of July 10, 1997, that a rep ort by

Dr. Simon Ge

wold indic ated

that D elor

es W. is mentall

y ha ndicapped, has mild

to moderat e mental re

tardatio n, and functions a

t a third -grade l evel. The pr obate court 's order indicated that the appointment

of a GAL for the g

uardianship proceedings had been w aived. The probate court issued letters of office t o A my B . naming her plenary guardian of the person of Delore s W., a1-05-3370

- 3 -

disabled person. The letters of office provided t hat Amy B. " is authorized to have under the direction of the court the custody of the ward and to do all acts required by law." The B irth o f Mar

k W. According to the pet

itio n for adjudi cation of wardship, on July 1, 1998, approximately 10 months after Amy

B. was appointed Delores W.'s plenary guardian of the person, Delores W. gave birth to a son, Mark W. Mark W.'s father is Bradley B, who is not a party

to this appeal. The Juvenil e Court' s Termina tion of De

lores W.' s Parenta

l Rights The Illinois Department of Children and Fa mily Services'

(DCFS) client service plan for March31, 1999, reveals that Mark W.'s baby sitter called DCFS and reported that Delores W. had forced a plastic toy down Mar

k W.'s mout

h and that she hit him on the head

with a tel evision r

emote control. On April 4, 1999, DCFS t ook pr otec tive c ustod y o f Mar k W. and plac ed him

in foster care withhis maternal grandmother, Amy B. At the same time, Mark W.' s mother, DeloresW., was als o a resident in Amy B .'s home because Amy B. was the plenary

guardian of her person. The Temporary

Custody Hearing On Apr il 8, 1999, the State filed a p etition fo

r adjudic ation of w ardship a lleging that, pursuant to sections 2-3(1)(b) and 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juv enile Cour

t Act) (705 IL CS 405/2-3(l)(b), ( 2)(ii) ( West 1998) ), nine- month-old Mark W. wa s neglected in th at his environment

was injurious to his welfare and that he was a bused due to a substa

ntial risk of physical injury. The following

information was provided to support the allegations in the petition: "Onor about March 31, 1999, natural mother shoved a plastic object into minor'smouth and d own his thr

oat caus ing min or to gag .1-05-3370

- 4 - Natural mother the

n hit minor o n the hea

d with an o

bje ct sever al times. N a tural mother also attempted to choke minor when minor continuedto c ry . Natura l mother g

rabbed m inor and a

ttempted t

o pull min or away from another ind ividual. " On April 9,1999, the court took temporary custody of Mark

W., and DCFS p lace d Mar k W. in the care of Amy

B. On July 29, 1999, Mark W. was removed from Amy B.’s c are to a specialized foste r car e pla ceme nt due to ris k of h arm a

nd co ncer ns ab out Am

y B .'s p aren

ting skill s. Ma

rk W. had what appeared to be burns on his stomach and on his toe that Amy B. was unable to explain. The A ppoin tment of an Attor ney and G AL for D elor es W. On October 3, 2000, Mark W.’s case was set for trial, but Judge Sharon Col eman was informedby the assistant State’s Attorney that Delor es W. was no t repr esent ed by an att orney. J udge Coleman had a discussion with Amy B. a bout Delores W.’s resources and confirme d that the probate court had appointed her guardian of De lores W. After the discussion with Amy B ., Judge Coleman made the following

statemen t: "The Cou rt will make a finding of indig ency as to Delo

ris [ sic ], and per your motion the Court will appoint an attorney to repre sent the mother. * * * The Court believes that would be the appropriate thing to do, understanding that that a

ttorney is going to be appointed to represent her as attorney

and as guardian ad litem

.1-05-3370

- 5 - As fo r l eg al pu rp os es on ly yo u [ Am y B .] are still her legal guardian. But for legal purposes in this court she will have a guardian ad litem, s o every

one unde rstands? * * * An d you can c onfer with that person to a certain extent, bu t that perso n also has a dual role as an attorney and as a guardian ad litem. This is a person who is a guardian for minors or people who have to have so meone spe ak to them and have guardian ad litem . Just like a ch ild can' t speak f

or themse lves. Do y

ou under stand tha

t? * * * That persona l [ sic ] will c onsult with

you , but they

will also speak independ ently withyou. Do

you understand that? You will not have au thority over tha t person. Do y ou under stand tha t? * * * Apart fr om the parent. In this case y ou have a mother who has a le g al guardian because of he r condition, and that needs to be able to wat ch ove r her ev eryday livin g, and she will have an attorney who will consult with you as an a ttorney , but that a ttorney will also be her guardian ad l item and may speak wi th two hats on, okay?" Judge Coleman passedthe case to "make sure” Delor es W. and Amy B. ha

d an opportuni

ty to meet with

and spea k to the ba

r attorne y th at t he court intended to appoint. When the case was1-05-3370

- 6 -

recalled, Ray Morrissey , the bar attorney the c ourt intended to appoint, reported that he had met and talked wi th Delore s W. and Amy

B., and h e made th e following state

ment to the

court: "Your Honor, Ray Morrissey . I am the bar attorney today, and I have attempted to speak with themo ther along with her guardian. The guard

ian is not p

resent a t this ti me. She has made it known emphatic ally

clear th at she doe s not want m e to repr ese nt h er daughter as attorney or

guardian, and that she wants to hire a private attorney for

her daughter. * * * I have talk ed to the mother, and I also explained to the guardian that there ma y be a confli ct between what s he feel s is in the best interest of her daughter and wha t I feel is the best interest, a n d then she stopped me and sh e said: I want to hire a private a ttorney for my daug hter. * * * I have no p

roblem w ith accepting appointment as the guardian. I am j ust not s ure i f she [A my B.] as a leg al guardian would have a ri ght to hire a pr ivate attor ney for her daughter." After learning from Morrissey

that Amy B. did not want him appointed to re present Delores W. as either her attorney

or GAL, Judge Coleman stat ed that Amy B. w ould be allowed time to hire a private attorne y. F inally , Judge Col eman did not e nter an or der appointing Morrissey as Delores W.’s1-05-3370

2 Although the Octo

ber 3, 20 00, orde

r is ambig

uous and does not specifically indicate whether Morrissey was a

ppointed as both Delores W.’s attor ney and GA L, the October 3, 2000, transcript is clear that Morrissey was only appointed as D elores W.'s GAL.

- 7 - att orn ey bu t en ter ed a n or der app oi nt in g Mo rri ss ey as Del ore s W .'s GAL. 2

The Fir st Adj udica tory and D ispo siti onal H earings On October 10, 2000, Judge Colem an entered an order amending the petition for adjudication of wardship as follows: "the minor is dependant in that he is under 18 y ears of age and is w ithout proper care because of the phy sical or mental disability of his pare nt, guardian or custodian pursuant to 70 5 IL CS 40 5/ 2- 4. " O n N ov em be r 2 7, 20 00 , J ud ge Co le ma n h el d a n a dj ud ic at or y he aring and foun d tha t Mar k W. was a dependant child, pursuant to section 2-4 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 IL CS 405/2-4 (West 1998)), due to the mental condition of his mother. OnMarch 2 9, 200 1, Ju dge Coleman conducted a dispositional hearing making Mar k W. a ward of the State. Judge Noreen

Daly was presiding over Mark W.'s case on March 15, 2002, and, a fter making

a finding that Amy B ., the plenary g uardian of Delores W .'s per son, h ad not been n otifi ed, J udge Daly vacated the adjudicatory

and dispositional orders. The court based its decision upon In re K.C. , 323 Ill. App. 3d 839, 852 (2001 ), which held that the p lenary

guard ian of a d isabled p erson whose parental rights are the subject of proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act is a necessar

y pa rty under the Act and must be named as a party respondent and served

with n otice. The adjudication of wardship petition was amended and added Amy B.'s name as a respondent. On Oc tober 15, 2002, the ad judi catio n of war dshi p peti tion was agai n amen ded to inclu de the follo wing: "The maternal grandmother was appointed a s-the natur al mot her's1-05-3370

- 8 - plenary guardian of the p erson on August 29, 1997. The natural mother is incapable of taking care of herself or theminor

due to her di sa bi li ty. On or abo ut March 29, 1999 the natural mother left the homewiththe minor without any additional supervision. On or about March30, 1999 the natural mother ran away with the minor without any additional supervision on two occ asions." On December 9, 2002, Judge Daly was informed

by the p arti es’ a

ttorney s that

Delores W. had a GAL, but was not repr esentedby an

attorney. Judge D aley stated that she was unaware that Delores W. did not have an attorney because she thought that Mo rr is se y wa s D el or es W. 's at to rn ey. Finally, Judge Da

ly appointed Mark W. Kusatzsky , a bar attorney , as Delores W.'s legal counsel. The Se cond A djud icato ry and Dis posi tion al Hear ings On January

17, 2003, the juvenile court held a second adjudicatory hearing and

entered an adjudication order finding that Mark W. was neglected due to exposure to an injurious environment andwas abus ed due to

exposure to a substantial risk of physical injury . The reasons given for the court 's findings were

that Delores W. has mental limi tations and Delore s W.'s leg al guar dian, Amy B., failed to

ensure that Delores W. was supervised at all times, resulting in Delore s W. hitting Mark W. and pu ttin g p lastic toys in his mouth. The adjudication order noted that the findings were the result of abuse or neglect inflicted by a parent. On March 6, 2003, the

juvenile cour t ente red a dispo sitio nal order

adju dging Ma

rk W. a ward of the cour t and find

ing that (1) Delo res W. wasunwilling

and unab le for reas ons other than financial circumst

ances to care f or, protect, train, or discipline the minor; (2) Bradley B. was unable1-05-3370

- 9 -

for reasons other than financial circumstances to c are for, protect, train, or discipline the minor; and (3) Amy B. wa s unwilling and unable for reasons other than financial circumstances to care for, protect , train, or discipline the minor. The cour t placed Mark W. und

er the g uardian ship of DCF S. On January

16, 2004, the juvenile court found that Delores W. had not made any progress toward the goal of

return home, and t

he juvenile court

establish ed a per manency goal of sub stitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rig hts. In August o f 2004, the

juvenile court en tered a n order a llowing s ix-ye ar-old M ark W. to move toCaliforn

ia with his foster mother Michelle N., who had been caring for Mark W. for four ye ars. The Fitness Hearing On November 9, 2004, the fitness portion of thetermination proceedings began. During the h earing on November 9, 2004, Judge Fabri, another judg e who presided over the case, wa nted a history of th e c as e: an ex pl an at io n o f w hy A my B ., th e p le na ry g ua rd ia n, an d M or ri ss ey, the GAL,

were both gua

rdians in the same case. Kusatzky, Delores W.'s c ourt-appointed attorney , explained to Judge Fa

bri how Mo

rrissey was appo inted as D elores W. 's GAL in the proc eeding s to terminat e Delores W.'s parental rights. While Judge Fabri did not think that Delores W. needed a guardian and a GA L, sh e pe rmi tt ed M orr is sey t o re mai n on th e ca se a s De lo res W. 's G AL. The State presen ted the following witnesses: (1) Meg O' Rourke, a clinical social worker employed at Little City

Foundation; (2) Traneeka J ackson , a caseworker employ ed at L ittle City Foundation; and (3) George Ka ulich, a DCFS investigator. Meg O’Rourke , a part- time emplo ye e of the L ittle City Foundat ion, testif ied d uring the1-05-3370

- 10 -

fitness portion of the termination proceeding that she was the sup ervis or of Mark W.’s case. O’Rourke testified that

her duties included (1) having regular supervision of the caseworker; (2) insuring that the needs of the child and the famil y in volved ar e met; and (3) making su

re that th e case

was moving towards the permanency goal. O’Rourke testified that Delores W.’s indicated services includedregula

r visitation, weekly visitation, vocational prog rams, parenting classes, medication monitoring and individual and family counse ling for her and Amy

B. Accordingto O’Rourke, the goal, at least at the beginning, w as definitely towar d a return for the child to her. O’Rourke testified that she believed Delores W. had received a diagno sis of mild mental retardation. O’Rourke

also testi fied th at Delo res W. was rated unsatisfactory on the parental

assessme nt, in part, be cause she did not participate in the assessment. She was also rated unsatisfactoryfor fai ling to consistently take he r prescribed medication. However, whe n Delores W. particip ated in individual therapy, she was rated satisfactory . O’Rourke also testified that the goal changed in January

2004 from

return home to termination of parental rights. Finally , O’Rourke testified that her supervision of the Mark W. case ended in mid-September 2004. Traneeka Jac kson, an a

doption specialist wo

rking f or the L ittle City Foundat ion, testif ie d that in October 2001, s he was assigned to work on the Mark

W. case a s a child w elfare specialist. Jackson testifie d that she sent a le tter to De lores W. tha

t offered p arenting assessment evaluation services. According

to Jackson, DeloresW. attempted to eng age in service s but did not

complete themby the end of 2003. Jackson also testified that she atte mpted to c ommunica

te with Amy B. by telephone to learn

if she wou

ld permit th e release of her daug

hter’s information to be released by agencies and offices in which she was alread y partici patin g. Howeve r, Jackson testifie d that Amy1-05-3370

- 11 -

B. refused to p rovid e them with the releases they sought to obtain information from the service provider s. Jackson al so testified that Amy B. infor med her that she and

DeloresW. did not wis h to particip atein any

of the se rvices o ffere d by

Little City . Jackson te stified th at Amy B.’s refusal to permit her daug hter to pa

rticipat e in services waslaced w ith obsce nities and vulg ar l anguage. Jackson also testified that Amy B. beca me abusiv e during

someof Mark W. ’s visitat ions with hi s mother. Finally , based u pon incon sistent vis itations a nd incompl ete ser

vice pla ns, Jack son

recomme nded ag ainst unsu

pervise d visitatio ns. George Kaulich, a DCFS investiga tor, testified that his investigation revealed that Delores W. had an adult guardian. Kaulich also testified that his investigation revealed that Amy B. was Delores W.’ s adult guardian. Kaulich testified that he spoke with Amy B re garding her daug hter andher mental health issues but that Amy B . became abrasive and uncoopera tive. Acc ordin g to Kaulich, Amy

B. state d that she

did not wa

nt to be inv olved with

DCFS. Neither Delores W. nor Am y B . was present during t he termin ation pro ceeding s, but thei r at to rn eys were present in court. Amy B. was represented by

attorney De an Bast

oune s. Delore s W.

was rep res ent ed b y Kus atz ky, a nd M orr is sey a ppe are d as Del ore s W .'s GAL. After al l the par ties rest

ed, the Sta

te mainta ined that DeloresW. should be

found unf

it. Mo rr is se y, DeloresW.'s GAL , along with the Sta

te and the Public Guardian, asked the court to find Delores W. to be unf

it. Morris sey

told th e court t

hat he understood that the court felt this was an unusual approac

h for some one in his p osition to ta ke. He e xplained th at the tes tim on y h ad made clear that the on ly wa

y Delores W. could be r eunited with Mark W. would be if she entered a residential assisted-living program. Morrissey maintained that Delores W. had been given the1-05-3370

- 12 -

opportuni ty to do so, bu

t had chos en not to. B ased on th ese facts, Morris sey

felt that the State had met its burden of proving Delores W. unfit. Both Delores W.' s attorn ey, Kusat zky, and Amy B.'s attorne y, B astounes , argu ed aga

inst the findings o f unfitne ss. On April 29, 2005, the juvenile court found that Delores W. was unfit based upon her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of intere st, conce

rn, or re sponsibilit

y and base d upon her

failure to make reason able p rogress . Delo res W. 's failure to visit with Mark W. and to comply with the service plans establish

ed her f ailure to maintain r

easonab le intere st, concer n, or res ponsibility . The juve nile court further found that Delores W. failed to make reasona ble progress toward Mark W.'s re turn home, notonly during the f irst nine months after the adjudication in January of 2003, but during the entire year- long period be ginning with the adjudication and ending with the cha nge of the permanency

goal in January of

2004. Best Interest He aring On July 12, 2005, the trial court commenced the be st in teres t heari ng. The State presented the following

witnesse s: (1) Michelle N., Mark W.' s foster mother; (2) Traneeka Jackson, a caseworker

employed by

Little City Foundation; (3) Tina Dorow , an adoption supervisor employed at Little City

Foundation; and (4) Julie Evets, a caseworker employ ed by L ittle City Foundation. Michelle N. testified that Mark W. was placed with her when he was two a nd th at he was

se ven at the time of the best interest hearing. Michelle N. testified tha t, when he wa s first place d withher, Mark

W. needed special services, including oc cupational therapy , physical therapy, speech therapy, vision thera

py and play thera

py. Howeve

r, with her help to make certain that he attended the needed

therapy sessions, Mark W. ma

de gre at prog

ress. Michelle N. a

lso test ified that Mar k1-05-3370

- 13 -

W.’s asthma has improved during h is time in he

r smoke- free ho me. Miche lle N. als o testified that Mark W. does not n

eed toattend dayc are because she alway s picks him up from school. According to Michelle N., she views Mark W. asher son a nd treat s him

no differently tha

n she treats her other children. Traneeka Jackson te stified th at she wa s Mark W.’ s casew orker f rom Octob er 2001 until June 2005. Jackson te stified th at, during that tim e, she fo und Miche

lle N.’s home to be a

n approp riate place for Mark

W. to live. Jackson also testified that she found the interaction between Mark W. and his foster mother to b e very

positive a

nd that, a lthough s he discip lined him when needed, Jackson

never feared for Mark W.’s safety while he was in Michelle N.’ s home. J ackson further testified that, when he was asked where he wa nted to live, Mark W. told her that he wanted to live with his “mommy,” Michelle N. Tina Dorow, of the Little City Foundation, testifi ed that she was assigned as Mark W.’s caseworker

in June 2005. Dorow testified that Little City recommended

that Delores W.’s parental rights be terminated (1) because of the lac k of consistent contact

between Delores W. and

Mark W; (2) because

DeloresW. failed t

o eng age in ne eded

reun ific ation services ; (3) beca

use M ark W. had develope d a strong and positive relationship with Michelle N. and her extended family ; and (4) because, wh il e i n t he cu st od y of his foster mother, Mark W. experienced positive progress in the areas of his special needs and his education. Julie Evets, of

the L ittle City Foundat ion, testif ied that sh

e was as s igned a s Mark W.’s caseworker

during 2000 and 2001 and was reassigned before the best interest hearing at which she testified. Evets testified that, because there had b een n o visits bet ween Delo res W. and M ark W.1-05-3370

- 14 -

following Miche lle N. ’s mov e to Ca lifor nia, s he att empte d to fa cili tate a meeti ng. Acco rding t o Evets, when she

telephoned Amy

B. to ge t an addr ess, Amy B. ref used togive her addr

ess beca use she feared that she would be subpoenaed. Amy B. agreed

to permit a

visit at her attorney ’s office. Evets also testi fied tha

t, after further attempts t

o facilit atea public meeting, Amy

B. told her that she wantedno furthe

r contact with the L

ittle City Foundation and that she did not want anyone a sking her about visits between Mark W. and Delores W. After the conclusion of the testimony of Michelle N., Traneeka Jackson, Tina Dorow, and Julie Evets, the State, the Public Guardian, and Mor rissey, as Delores W.'s GAL, e ach asked the

c ourt to grant the State's petition. Counsel for Delores W. and counsel for Amy B. asked that th e Stat e's petition be denied. The juvenile court found, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that it was in Mark W.' s best

interest s to termin ateDeloresW.'s par ental rig hts and to a

ppoint a g uardian with the right to

consent to h is adoption. The juvenile court entered an order on July 12, 2005, which found Delores W. unfit un der sect ions 1(D) (b) and 1 (D)(m) of the Adoption Ac t (750 I LCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(m) (West 1998)), found the father unfit, terminated the r ights of the parents, and appointed a guardian with the right to consent to Mar k W.'s adoption. Amy B.' s Motion to Reconsider On August 1 0, 2005, Am y B. filed a motion to reconsider which included, among other things, an alleg ation tha

t the juve nile cour t erred by a llowing D elores W. 's GAL , Morrisse y, t o remain on the case after he

took a posi tion favori ng term inati on of D elores W.'s rights and that the evidence failed to

show that i

t was in Mark W.' s best interests to terminate Delores W.'s parental rights. On September 16, 2005, the court entered an order denying the motion to reconsider. On1-05-3370

- 15 -

October 14, 2005, Amy B. filed a

notice of appeal from

the June 9, 2005, order finding that Delores W. was unfit, the July 12, 2005, order terminating Delores W.'s pare ntal rights, and the September 16, 2005, order deny

ing her motion to reconsider. On December 29, 2006, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court that terminated the mother’s parental rights in an opini on tha t found that the appointment of the GAL rende red the termination proceedi n g funda mentally flawed b ecause

Morrisse y ha d a confl ict but co ntinued to represent Delores W. In re Mark

W. , 371 Ill. App. 3d 81, 101 (2006). The supreme c ourt reversed andremanded this c ase to the appellate court with directions “to address those issues that wer e initially raised b y A

my in her appe al f

rom the jud

gment of the circuit court t

erminating Delo

res’ parental rights.” In

re Ma rk W. , 228 Ill. 2d 365, 381 (2008).

ANA LYSIS Authority to Appoint a Guardian ad Litem The first question presen ted to thi s court is w hether a mentally -disable d-adult p arent, represented by a plenar

y gua rdian of the person appointed by the probate court, was denied d u e processby the juvenile court whe n , during the proceedings to terminate the parental rights of the mentally -disable d-adult

mother, the juvenile court permitted the bar attor ney to hol d a n a tt or ne yclient conference with the mother and her g uardian, but only appointed the ba r attorney as a GAL for the menta

lly -disabl ed-adul

t mother so

he could inform the

court ab out the ad

ult mother 's best interest s. Amy B. argues that Delor

es W.'s due process rights were violated beca use Morrissey, he

r GAL, was ineffective when he advocated to the juve

nilecourt that Delores W.'s parental rights be1-05-3370

- 16 -

terminated. The Public Guardianargues that although the juvenile court had no authority , pursuant to either the Juvenile Court Act or case law, to appoint Morrissey as De lores W.'s GAL, there wa s nothing to prevent

the juvenile court from appointing Morrissey as DeloresW.'s GAL . The Publi c Guardianalso argues that Morrissey 's role as GAL was not to advocate for Delores W., but to make recommendations to the juvenile court that he believes are in the best interest of Delores W., even if hisopini on is c ontra

ry to the desir es of Delores W. The Stateargue s that the Juv enile Court Act does not address whether the court may appoint

a GAL f or an indi g ent, di sabled pa rent in te rmination -of-pa

rental- rights p

roceed ings. Th e State maintains , instead, that Morrissey, a s Delores W.'s GAL, acted prope rly and that in any

event the evidence of Delor

es W.'s un fitness was overwhelming. The State also arg ues that Delores W.’s due processrights w ere not violated b ecause she was provided with counsel to advocate the position she chose and a GAL

to advoca

te the pos ition that w as deemed to be in he r best inte rests. Our supreme court held that, without being limited to the dictates of expres s statutor y te rms, when dealing

with a disa

bled per son, “[t]he c ourt has a duty to judicia

lly interfe re and pr otect t h e wardif the guardian is about to do any thing that would cause harm.” Mark W. , 228 Ill. 2d at 375, citing In re Estate of

Nel son , 250 Ill. App. 3d 282, 287 (1993). The supreme c ourt also held that

“ '[t]he cir cuit cour t is charged with

a duty to protect the inter ests of its wardand has, by statute and otherwise , those powers necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem t o represent the interests of the respondent

during t he court 's exercise of its jurisdiction.' ” (Emphasis added.) Mark W. , 228 Ill. 2d at 375 , quot ing In re

Serafin , 272 Ill. App. 3d 239, 244 (1995). The supreme court continued and stated that “[a] guardian ad litem functions as the ‘ey es and1-05-3370

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ears of the cou rt’ and not as the ward's attorney .” Mark W. , 228 Ill . 2d at 374, q uoti ng In re Guardia nship of Mabry , 281 Ill. App. 3 d 76, 8 8 (199 6), ci ting In re Marriage of Wy

coff , 266 Ill. App. 3d 408, 415 (1994). The supreme court noted that “[t]he traditional role of the guardian ad

litem is notto advoca

te for wh at the wa

rd wants but, instead, to make a recommendation to the court as to what is in the ward's best interests.” Mark W. , 228 I ll. 2d at 374 , citi ng Mabry , 281 Ill. App. 3d at 88. The supreme court found that, althoug

h no provis ion in the Juv enile Cour t Act or th

e Probate Act ex plicit ly gra

nted the trial court the authority to appoint a GAL for Delore s, no statutory provision expressly forbids such an appointment of a GAL unde r the circumstances of this case. In

re Mark W. , 228 Ill. 2d 36 5, 374 -75 (2008). Therefore, the supreme c ourt stated “[t]he question, then, is whether in the absence of controlling statutory authority, the

circuit c ourt has t

he author ity to make such an appointment. We believe it does.” Mark W. , 228 Ill. 2d

at 374. Finally, answe

ring the question presented

in thi s cas e, th e supreme

cour t held that “ [i]naccord ance with this precedent, andgiven Delores' status as a disabled pe rson entitled to the utmost protection of the courts, we have little difficulty concluding tha t the circuit court had the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem to make a recommendation

to the court as to what was in Delores' best interests.” Mark W. , 228 I

ll. 2d at 375. Parenta l Unfitne ss Next, Amy

B. arg ues that th

e trial court’ s finding s at the te rmination of pare ntal rig hts hearing were ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidence because it does not support a finding ( 1) that Delores W. did not maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern o r respon si bility for the child’s welfare as require d b y section 1(D )(b) of the Adopt

ion Act (7 50 IL

CS 50/1(D) (b) (West1-05-3370

- 18 -

2002)); and (2) t

hat Delor es W. faile

d to make r

easonab le prog

ress toward the return of the child to her as required by

section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 I LCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2002)). The Public Guardian argue s that the r ecord sufficien

tly demonstrates that Delores W. failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child’s welfare because , altho ugh she engaged in some of the r eunification serv ices called for by the ser vice plans implemented by D CFS, she ultimately proved u nsatisfa cto ry i n almost all of those services. The Public Guardian al so argues that Delores W. failed to make rea sonable progress toward Mark’s return home. Much like the Pu

blic Guar dian, the State also argues that the record sufficiently demonstrates that DeloresW. failed t

o maintain a

reasona ble deg ree of interest, concer

n or resp onsibility

for the child’s welfar

e and ad ds that a p erson ca

n be found unfit wit

hout faul tif that person is unable rather than unwilli ng to com ply with the st

atutes. T he State a lso argues that th

e failur e to compl

y w ith service plans and court

directives is sufficient evidence to support the findings that Delores W. (1) failedto maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility ; and (2) failed to make reasonable progress toward the child’s return home. We note th at "cases involving allega tions of neglect and adjudication of wardship are sui generis , and must be decided on thebasis of th eir unique ci rcumstances ." In re Arthur H. , 212 I ll. 2d 441, 4 63 (20 04), c itin g In re N.B. , 191 Ill. 2d 338, 346 (2000), and In re Christina M. , 333 I ll. App. 3d 1030, 1034 (2002). “This analy tical principle underscores the ‘fact-dr iven nature of neglect andinjurious environment rulings.’ ” Arthur H. , 212 Ill . 2d at 463, q uoti ng N.B. , 191 Ill. 2d at 346. The Juvenile Cou

rt Act pr ovides a s tep-by-step pr

ocess that courts use to decide whether a1-05-3370

- 19 -

child should be removed from his or her parents and made a ward of the court. Arthur H. , 212 I ll. 2d at 462, citing 705 IL

CS 405/1-1 et seq . ( We st 20 00 ). On ce a c hi ld is pl ac ed in te mp or ar y cu st od y,

a trial court must make a finding of abuse, neglect or dependenc e before it conducts an adjudication of wardship. Arthur H. , 212 Ill. 2d at 462, citing705 IL CS 405/2-21 (West 2000), and In re N.B. , 191 Ill. 2 d 338, 343 ( 2000). Th e State’ s burden i s to prove t h e allegations of abuse, neglect or dependency

by a preponde

rance of the evidence. In re Faith B. , 216 Ill . 2d 1, 13 (20 05), c itin g In re Arthur H. , 212 Ill. 2d 441, 463-64 (2004). The trial court’ s findings of abuse, neglect or de pendence

are known as a

n adjudic atio n of un fitness w hich req uires sup porting ground s that are

found in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. In re Janira T. , 368 Ill. App. 3d 883, 892 (2006), citing 750 I LCS 50/1(D) (West 2002), and In re Chilean , 304 Ill. App. 3d 580, 583 (1999). “Although section 1(D) sets out various grounds under which a par en t may be dee

med unfit, an unfitness finding may be entered if there is sufficient evidence to sa tisfy any one statutory

ground.” Janira T. , 368 Ill. App. 3d at 892, citi ng In re Donald A.G. , 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). The trial court’s “finding of parenta l unfitnes s must be supported by clea r andconvincing evidence.” Janira T. , 368 Ill. App. 3d at 892, citing In re

Katrina R. , 364 Ill. App. 3d 834, 842 (2006). “Only if the court makes a fi nding of unfitness will the court g o on to con sider whe ther it is in the be st intere st of the child to ter minate parental rights.” In re

Reiny S. , 374 I ll. App. 3d

1036, 1045 (2007), citing 705 IL CS 405/2-29(2) (West 2004); see also, In

re C. W. , 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002). Therefore, we only disturb the trial court 's finding that there has been a showing of clear and c onvincing evidence that a paren t is unfit if that finding is found to be against the manifest weight of the evide nce. Faith B. , 216 Ill. 2d at 13- 14, quot ing Arthur H. , 212 I ll. 2d at 464; see al so Janira T. , 368 I ll. App. 3 d at 89 2, cit ing In re D.D. ,1-05-3370

- 20 -

196 Ill. 2d 405, 417 (2001). In this case, Mark W. was adjudicated a neglec te d an d ab use d ch il d i n J anu ary 2 003 . In March2003, the trial court ma de Mark W. a ward o f the cou rt after finding DeloresW. unable t

o

care for him. In order to deter mine a parent's fitness and whether the parent has failed

to maintain

a reasonable degree of

interest, concern

and responsibility (750 I

LCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2002), and has failed to make reasonable efforts and r easonab le progre ss toward reunific ation (75 0 IL

CS 50/1(D)( m)(ii) (West 2002),) “the trial court must focus on th e paren t's ‘reasonable efforts’ during the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect” ( In

re V ero nic a J. , 371 Ill. App. 3d 822, 8 28 (20 07), c itin g In re D.F. , 208 Ill. 2d 223, 239 (2003)). “The ‘initial nine-month period’ begi ns upon the entry of the court's order of adjudication.” Ver oni ca J

. , 371 Ill. App. 3d at 828 , citing D.F. , 208 I

ll. 2d at 24 1-42. The

refore , the rel evant pe

riod afte r adjudic ation is the

nine-mon

th period between January

17, 2003, and October 17, 2003. The reco rd re veal s (1) that D elor

es W. o nly

visit ed Ma rk W. three times, whichrepresented approxima

tely 25% of her visitation opportunities; (2) that, with the exception of her completion of

a home parenting class wit h house c alls, Del ores W. wa s rated a s unsatisf actory on six out of seven service plans andfailed to comply with those

service plans; (3 ) that, because

Amy B. woul d not sign consent forms for the release o f informa tion about

DeloresW.’s parti cipation in day treatme nts, individual therapy

andfamily therapy , that information was not available; (4) that, when she did have visits with Mark W., the child was distant and no bond was observed; and (5) that, despite Amy B.’s consent to all ow Delore s W. to participate in professional assessments by the parenting assessment team, both Amy B. and De lores W. were hostile, threatening and abusive. The r ecord also rev eals1-05-3370

- 21 -

that the trial court considered these facts wh ile als o conside

ring the obstacle s that wer

e argu ably caused by D elores W.’s developmental disabilities and the fact that she (Delores W.) had Amy B.

as her guardian. I

n light of the aforementioned evidence, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision

was against the manifest weight of the evide nce or that

the opposi

te concl usion is clearly

evident. Faith B. , 216 Ill . 2d at 13-14 , quot ing Arthur H. , 212 Ill. 2d at 464; see also Janira T. , 368 I ll. App. 3d at 8 92, ci ting In re D.D. , 196 Ill. 2d at 417. Best I nterest o f the Child In child custody case s, parental rights are considered to be of fu ndamental importance, therefore, courts will not lightly terminate them. In re Veronica J. , 371 Ill. App. 3d 822, 831 (2007), citing In re M.H. , 196 I

ll. 2d 356, 3 62-63 (20 01). At the best inte rest stage of

a proceeding to terminat e a parent’s rights, the parent' s rights must yield to the best inter est of the child. Veronica J. , 371 Ill. App. 3 d at 83 1, cit ing In re Tashika F. , 333 Ill . App. 3d 165 , 170 ( 2002) . "The c ourt's best-inte rest find ing will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence." Ver oni ca J

. , 371 Ill . App. 3d at 8 31-32 , citi ng In re H.D. , 343 Ill. App. 3d 483, 494 (2003). Alth ough Amy B.’s a

ppeal challenges the

trial cou rt’ s finding

that Delo

res W. is an

unfit parent, she has not challenged the trial court’s finding that the termination of Delores W.’s parental rights is in the best interest of Mark W. Our supreme court has consistently held that a party' s failure to raise an issue may

be deemed a forfeiture (the f ailure to t imely

comp ly with procedura l require ments) or waive r (the vo lunta ry relinquishment of a known right) of that issue. Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co. , 227 Ill. 2d 302, 320-21 (2 008), citi ng Sullivan v. Edward Hospital , 209 Ill. 2d 100, 124-25 (2004); see also, 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7) (“Points not argued [in the appellant’s1-05-3370

- 22 -

brief] are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral ar gument, or on petition for rehearing”). Waivernotwith standing, the foster home i nto which Mark W. was placed ha s providedstability and a nurturing environment for

him. Because he has been with his foster parent since he was two yea

rs old andhas been found to have bonded with his foster parent, whom he r efers to as “mommy,” and he

r family, the trial cour

t properly found the bond

between them to be a strong

one. In light of the afor

ementioned facts, the trial court’s finding that the term i nation of Delores W.’s parenta

l rights i s in Mark W. ’s b est inter ests was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Remaining Issues A. Illegal Removal of Mark W. Fro m Amy B. Next, Amy B. ar

gues that, because she was De lores W.’s plenary g

uardian, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to terminate Delores W. parental rights because Amy B. should be

consider ed to be Mark W.’s legalcustodia n under section 11a-17 of the Probate A

ct. The Pu

blic Guardian argues that Ma rk W. wa s n ot il le ga ll y re mo ve d f ro m A my B.’s care in 1999 because she never had leg al custody of him. The Public Guardian also argues that, beca use Amy B. ne

ve r filed a timely administrative service appeal, she has waived any issue reg arding DCFS’s decision to remove Mark W. fro m her home. The State concurs with the Public Guardian’s argume nt and adds that the Probate Act does not conta

in a provision that automatically g rants legal custodian status to a plenary guardian of a disabled adult simply because that disabled adult has a minor child. Alth ough Amy

B. did not file a timely service a ppeal of this issue and has, therefore, waived

con sideration of that iss ue by this cour t, we note

that it is we

ll settled that the w aiv er rule

is a n1-05-3370

- 23 -

admonition to the par

ties and p

rovides no limitation

on this c ourt’s juri sdiction. Illin ois State Chamber of Commerce v. Filan , 216 I ll. 2d 653, 664 (2005); see also In re W.C. , 167 Ill. 2d 307, 323 (1 995). “A revi ewing c ourt may , in furtherance of its responsibility

to provide

a just res ult and to maintain a sound and uniform body of precedent, override considerationsof waiver that stem from the adversarial nature of our sy stem.” Filan , 216 Ill. 2d at 664; see also Dillon v. Evanston Hospital , 199 Ill. 2d 483, 504-05 (2002). Theref ore, in ord er to maintain a sound and uniform body of preced ent, we decline to apply the w aiver doctrine to the que stion of wh

ether Ma rk W. was illegall

y removed from Amy

B.’s custody. Filan , 216 Ill. 2d at 664. In pe rtinent pa rt, secti on 11a-1 7 of the Pr obate Act provide s: “(a) To the extent

ordered b y the cou rt

and under the direction of the court, the guardian of the person shall have custody of the wa

rd andthe ward's minor and adult dependent childre n; shall procure for themand shall make p r ovision for their support, care, comfort, health, education and maintenance, and professional ser vices as are appropriate, butthe ward's spouse may not be deprived

of the custody andeducation of the ward's minor and ad ult dependent children, without t he consent of the spouse, unless the court finds that the sp ouse is no t a fit and competent person to have that custody and education.” (Emphasis added.) 755 I LCS 5/11a-17(a) (West 1998). Our supreme court has consistently held that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction, and the

one to which all other

cannons and rules must yie ld, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent1-05-3370

- 24 -

andmeaning of the legislature.” StateFarm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. , 226 Ill . 2d 39 5, 401 (2007 ), cit ing Progressive Universal I nsurance Co. of I llinois

v. Libe rty Mutual Fire Insuranc e Co. , 215 Ill . 2d 12 1, 134 (2005 ), cit ing Country Mutual I nsurance Co. v. Teachers Insurance Co. , 195 Ill. 2d 322, 330 (2001). “The most reliable indica tor of legislative intentis found in the language of the statute.” State Farm , 226 Ill. 2d at 4 01, ci ting Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers , 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320 (2003 ), cit ing Mi chigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook , 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000 ). There fore, “ [s]tatutory

langua ge is af forded its plain andordinary

meaning.” StateFarm , 226 Ill . 2d at 401, c itin g Midstate Siding & Window Co. , 204 Ill. 2d a t 320 , citi ng Michigan Avenue National Bank , 191 Ill. 2d at 504. The record reveals that on April 9, 1999, when the trial court found that there wa s probabl e

cause to believe that Mark W. had been neg lected and/or abused, it entered a temporary custody order that appointed the DCFS guardianship administrator as Mark W.’s temporary guardian and custodian. Thereafter, on March 6, 2003, as par tof the disposition al order , the tria l court g ave full custo dy of Ma rk W. to the DCFS guardianship administrator. Therefore , Amy B. neve r had legal custo dyof Mar k W because, although section 11a-17 of the Probate Act provides that “[t]o the extent ordered by

the court and under the direction of the court, the gua rdian of the person shall have custody of the ward and the ward's minor and a dult dependent children” (75 5 IL CS 5/11a-17(a) (West 1998)), the trial court never entered a n order that madeAmy B. the leg al custodian of Mark W. Accordingly, because an o rder was never ent ered that mad e Amy B. Mark W.’s custodian, she

never had legal custody

of Mark W. and there is no basis for her claim that she was entitled to a temporary

custody hear

ing pursuant to section 2-9 of the Juvenile Court Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-91-05-3370

3 Section 2-9 of the Juvenile Court Act provides, in pertinent part, that “a minor * * * taken into tempora

ry protect iv e cust ody

must be br

ought be fore a j udicial o fficer

within 48 ho

urs, exclusive of Saturd ay s, Sundays and court-de signated holiday s, for a temporary custody hear

ing to determine whether he shall be further he ld in custody.” 705 I

LCS 405/2-9 (West 1998).
- 25 - (West 1998). 3 B. Trial Court Discretion Fi na ll y, Amy B., as ple

nary g uar dian, ar

gues t hat the trial court erred when it denied her attempts to call witnesses, including the minor. The Public

Guardia n argu es that the decision concerning whether Mark W. must appear and testify and whethe

r his testimo ny w ould be he ard in open court or in camer

a are matters within the trial court’s discretion. The State also arg ues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Amy B.’s request to have Mark W. testify

. Illin ois courts traditional ly hold t hat “[c]omp elling th

e appea rance o f a part

y a t trial is a matter for the sou nd discretion of the trial court, and the court's power to order a party

to appear should only be exercised for

a good ca use and in

such a ma

nner tha t a party may not be subj ect to harassment, oppression, or hardship.” Pickering v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. , 265 Ill. App. 3d 806, 8 16 (19 94), c itin g Pacemak er Food Stores, Inc . v. Seven

th Mont Corp. , 117 Ill. App. 3d 636, 648 (1983). Here, the record revea ls that Mark W.’s therapist felt that it would be detrimental for him to appear in court because he had behavioral and emotionalproblems associated with a fear that Delores W. was going to take him away from his foster mother. The ther apist also indicate d it could set back Mark W.’s therapeu tic progress and intensify his fears and could hinder the child’s emotional stability. The trial court understood that Amy B. wanted to ask Mark W. whether he had1-05-3370

- 26 -

been subjected to corpo

ral punis hment and , after

balancing his age and the

effortsthat coul d be made to make him feel co mfortabl e in court, found tha t it would not be in his b est inter ests to for ce him to testi fy . The

evidence esta blishes tha

t it would ha

ve be en de

trime ntal t o Mar k W. for the trial court to force him

to appear in court to testify as a witness. Accordingly , based upon the evidence in the record, and fo llow ing Pickering and Pacemaker Food Stores , we c annot say that the trial cour t ab us ed it s d is cr et io n w he n i t r ef us ed to fo rc e M ar k W . t o t es ti fy. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the trial cour t’s July 12, 2005, order that terminated Delores W.’s parental rights and the September 16, 2005, order that denied the motion to reconsider are affirmed. Affirmed. O'BRIEN , J., and O'MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.