alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002




1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


|                          |     |                                                      |  | 
|------------------------- | --- | ---------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|                          |     |                                                     
|Date:  September 25, 2008 | By: | /s/ J. Marcus Scrudder                               | 
|                          |     | J. Marcus Scrudder                                   | 
|                          |     | Chief Executive OfficerCraftmade International, Inc. | 
|
EXHIBIT 31

CERTIFICATIONS



I, Dan
OMeara, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Email Real Estate.com Inc;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and have:



(a) Designed such
disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us
by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report my conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and



5. I have disclosed, based on my most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditor and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                                                       
|-------------------------------------------------------
|Date: July 2, 2004                                     
|                                                       
|/s/ Dan OMeara                                        
|Dan OMeara                                            
|Principal Executive Officer Principal Financial
Officer
!	
 
"
" # $%&	 ' (

) *+,-./0.1 .2 345+6+5 345+6+578 9 :55

$<JK=L(MN>OPJQR?S
$@@; >?
$@@?ABCBB; *4D1EFGD.1E1HIHH TLQQUKRVLWRPO

XJKWLVPKRJKLMNOPJQRSYZSRUM YUSSJLQ[JOOU\NJWUJQ]^MJQ_RUS `a_bPQ]cdefegfdehY`]g]i

jUNLWRkJORUWlmNRJLQSnh\JRoLkUPWXLp_OU

qrstuqvwuxyvz{|}wwx~|s{|yt|tx|z

s~st{||x|zxzt~|

t{zux

x~|st~|z~x~wz~xz{{zw|zvz~

xvwut{|||y

xvwt~t|zt|t

~zxstuzt~t|t 

~s

  ¡    

o_M¢UWL£TLMNOPJQRSkJOUp cg ¤g i¤ ii i^ ]^

o_M¢UWL£TLMNOPJQPQRS ei i^ i¤ ii i¥ ]^

jUNUPRkJOUWS edgg] g xvwut{|y¦t

xvwt~t|zt|t

~zxstuzt~t|t 

~s

 § ̈©a«¬ ̈­® ̄°±2©3 ́°2μa¶± ̄a·° ̄ ̄a ̧±2 ̧­1 ̄©±® ̄aμ°3a3o

»1⁄4a31­ ̈¶©1⁄4aμ°3a3­°1⁄22 ̈©a3⁄41° ̄© ̈©° ̄ ́ ̈­® ̄°±2©3¶± ̄a·o   ¡   

jPKU d¥ d¤ di d¤ ]] e TLOLW c ¤ ] ¿di ] jUOJÀJLQ ]¤gge ¤ jUNWJSPO id ]¤ ]g d¿ ]g d¤

YU\ d¿ d^ dd d¤ dc ¿ VÁÂ dgggg g oPRJLQPOmWJÀJQ ^i¤¤^ d hÃ_POVPZÂKR gdg]d g ÂÀU ]d d] dd dg¥ e ÁJSP¢JOJRZ d¿ ]g d¥ d¤ d¤ d¿

ÄUQURJKS ggddg g oLQÅhhm ¤]]ee e xvwut{|ysz xvwt~t|zt|t

~zxstuzt~t|t 

~s

 § ̈©a«¬ ̈­® ̄°±2©3 ́°2μa¶± ̄a·° ̄ ̄a ̧±2 ̧­1 ̄©±® ̄aμ°3a3o

»1⁄4a31­ ̈¶©1⁄4aμ°3a3­°1⁄22 ̈©a3⁄41° ̄© ̈©° ̄ ́ ̈­® ̄°±2©3¶± ̄a·o   ¡   

ÂNNLJQRMUQRlÆJWU dg]]d g ÂSSJÀQMUQRL£Á_RJUS ¥ci]g g Â[PWpS ggdgg g T J RkOO`J lV YRR ggggg g

NPÀU

KLWQUW

TLQRUQRÇLpZoPÈJÀPRJLQÉJQÊS

 	   !	
 Ë Ì Í Î ÏÐÑ Ò Í Ó
#### Deborah Esteves, an Infant, by Her Mother and Natural Guardian, Margarita Ngarin, et al., Respondents, v New York City Housing Authority, Appellant.

— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff Deborah Esteves, the defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Golden, J.), dated January 26, 1990, as, upon renewal, adhered to a determination dismissing the defendant’s second, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh affirmative defenses, and the ninth affirmative defense insofar as it refers to the infant plaintiff, and deeming the notice of claim served on behalf of the infant plaintiff to have been timely served.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On appeal the defendant contends that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion by deeming the infant plaintiff’s notice of claim to have been timely served. We disagree. The record indicates that the infant’s mother first observed her child eat paint chips taken from the peeling walls of the family apartment in the fall of 1983, and that she subsequently observed the infant eat paint chips "many more times”. The defendant concedes that it received notice of the lead paint condition in the plaintiffs’ apartment in July 1984 when a representative from the New York City Department of Health inspected the subject premises in response to the mother’s complaints. Three days later, the defendant was served with a notice of a violation, advising it that the paint used in the plaintiffs’ apartment contained excessive levels of lead.

*198Although the record fails to establish the precise date upon which the infant last ingested lead paint chips peeled from her apartment walls, we find under these circumstances, that the defendant "acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim * * * within a reasonable time thereafter” (General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; *see, Matter of Logan v City of Albany,*154 AD2d 861). Moreover, the defendant has failed to show that its ability to investigate the claim has been impaired in any way and thus that it has been prejudiced by the late service of a formal notice of claim *(see,*General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; *Friedman v Syosset Cent. School Dist.,*154 AD2d 337). Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in deeming the late notice of claim timely served *(see, Cohen v Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist,*51 NY2d 256).

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and find that they are without merit. Thompson, J. P., Eiber, Balletta and Ritter, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7257

STEVEN FITZGERALD SAUNDERS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

PHILIP MORRIS, INCORPORATED; R. J. REYNOLDS,

INCORPORATED; REPUBLIC TOBACCO,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

FRANKLIN FREEMAN; LYNN PHILLIPS; JAMES B.

FRENCH; L. P. TOBACCO COMPANY,

Defendants.

No. 96-7540

STEVEN FITZGERALD SAUNDERS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

FRANKLIN FREEMAN; LYNN PHILLIPS; JAMES B.

FRENCH; PHILIP MORRIS, INCORPORATED; R. J.

REYNOLDS, INCORPORATED; REPUBLIC TOBACCO,

L. P. TOBACCO COMPANY,

Defendants - Appellees.
2

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Chief District

Judge. (CA-96-446-5-F)

Submitted: March 27, 1997 Decided: April 2, 1997

Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Steven Fitzgerald Saunders, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

Steven F. Saunders appeals the district court's orders dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint and dismissing the

Defendants that are private actors. The district court assessed a

filing fee in accordance with Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521 (4th

Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982), and dismissed the

case without prejudice when Appellant failed to comply with the fee

order. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the district

court's order. We also affirm the district court order dismissing

the Defendants that are not state actors on the reasoning of the

district court. Saunders v. Philip Morris, Inc., Saunders v. Freeman, No. CA-96-446-5-F (E.D.N.C. Aug. 2, 1996). We deny Saunders'

motions for production of documents and delay of judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 239 (Thursday, December 14, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Page 86687]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-27411]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

POSTAL SERVICE


Product Change--Priority Mail and USPS Ground Advantage[supreg] 
Negotiated Service Agreement

AGENCY: Postal Service<SUP>TM</SUP>.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the 
Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services 
contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail 
Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

DATES: Date of required notice: December 14, 2023.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sean Robinson, 202-268-8405.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The United States Postal Service[supreg] 
hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on 
December 8, 2023, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a USPS 
Request to Add Priority Mail & USPS Ground Advantage[supreg] Contract 
133 to Competitive Product List. Documents are available at 
www.prc.gov, Docket Nos. MC2024-100, CP2024-104.

Sean Robinson,
Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.
[FR Doc. 2023-27411 Filed 12-13-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
EXHIBIT 13.2








1350 CERTIFICATION





Pursuant to Section 906 of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted), Brian C. Irwin, the Chief Financial Officer of Brazauro Resources Corporation (the “Company”) hereby certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:





The Company’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the period ended January 31, 2010, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32 (the “Periodic Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and the information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company at the end of the period covered by the Periodic Report and results of operations of the Company for the period covered by the Periodic Report











Dated:  July 9, 2010
/s/ Brian C. IrwinBrian C. IrwinChief Financial Officer
22502

#### State v. Manlapit

Affirmed
### DEPARTMENT of 

### ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES PMB 2020 JOE FOSS BUILDING 523 EAST CAPITOL PIERRE, SOUTH DAKOTA 57501·3182 www.state.sd.us/denr

May 5, 2011

Deborah LebowAal, Acting Director Air and RadiationProgram US Environmental Protection Agency, Region 8 1595 Wynkoop Street Denver, CO 80202-1129
Dear Ms. Lebow Aal:
On February 1,2008,the South Dakota Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources submitted an infrastructure State Implementation Plan (SIP) certificationto meetthe requirements ofthe federal Clean AirAct (CAA), sections 11O(a)(1) and (2) for the 1997 ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard. I was contacted by MonicaMorales, Unit Chief, Air Quality Planning Unit, indicating EPAis ready to finalize approval ofthe submittal except for one glitch. Apparently three years later, the infrastructure SIP certification is no longer approvable because it was submitted priorto EPA's December 30,2010promulgationofthe Limitation ofApproval ofPrevention ofSignificant Deterioration Provisions Concerning Greenhouse Gas EmittingSources in State Implementation Plans ("PSD SIP Narrowing Rule") (75 FR 82536). This rule withdrew approval ofSouth Dakota's PSD programto the extent the program applied PSD permittingto GHG emission increases from GHG-emitting sources with emissions beiow the thresholds established in EPA's June 3, 2010 Prevention ofSignificant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule ("Tailoring Rule") (75 CFR 31514).
This is a prime example ofwhy states believe the SIP process is broken and improving this process should be an EPA top priority. Evaluating SIP submittals based onfuture rules not in place when the SIP was submitted creates a process which will never allow a SIP to be approved. This is especially true when it takes EPA three years or more to approvejustan infrastructure SIP certification. Having said that and to keep the process moving forward, the department wishes to clarify, to satisfy the requirements ofCAA section 110(a)(2), the department's infrastructure SIP certification should be read to rely only onthe portion ofSouth Dakota's PSD program that remains approved after the PSD SIP Narrowing Rule took effect on December 30,2010.Ihope EPA will work diligently with states on improving the SIP process and I want to thank Monica for working with us onthis issue. Please contact me at (605) 773-3151, ifyou have any questions. Sincerely,
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-19-00507-CR

Juan Deltoro, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 450TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. D-1-DC-18-204174, THE HONORABLE BRAD URRUTIA, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R F O R C L E R K T O P R O V I D E

A P P E L L A T E R E C O R D TO A P P E L L A N T

PER CURIAM

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw supported by 

a brief concluding that the instant appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Appellant’s counsel has certified to the Court that he 

provided copies of the motion and brief to appellant, advised appellant of his right to examine 

the appellate record and file a pro se response, and supplied appellant with a form motion for 

pro se access to the appellate record. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319-20 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2014). Appellant has timely filed the motion requesting access to the appellate record with 

this Court.

Appellant’s pro se motion is granted. We hereby direct the clerk of the trial 

court to provide a copy of the reporter’s record and clerk’s record to appellant, and to provide 
2

written verification to this Court of the date and manner in which the appellate record was 

provided, on or before April 20, 2020. See id. at 321.

It is ordered on April 10, 2020.

Before Justices Goodwin, Kelly, and Smith

Do Not Publish
#### State v. Lindsey

15655

8/18/92

Denied
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 106 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 106

 To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to permit removal to 
 United States district courts of certain civil actions filed in State 
                                courts.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 7, 2015

  Mr. Vitter introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to permit removal to 
 United States district courts of certain civil actions filed in State 
                                courts.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ending Legacy Lawsuit Abuse Act''.

SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTIONS FILED IN STATE COURTS.

    The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended by inserting 
after section 505 (33 U.S.C. 1365) the following:

``SEC. 505A. REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTIONS FILED IN STATE COURTS.

    ``Any civil action filed in a State court that involves a claim of 
environmental contamination that impacts or threatens to impact any 
waters of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the Corps of 
Engineers may be removed by the defendant to the United States district 
court for the district in which the civil action is pending.''.
                                 <all>
```
Given the size of the FWS attachment, I was afraid that my email would bounce. Thanks for letting me 

know you received it. 

Dave

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 10:48 AM, Gerardo Rios <Rios.Gerardo@epamail.epa.gov> wrote:

Hi David,

This is to acknowledge receipt of your application addendum.

Gerardo C. Rios

Chief, Permits Office

Air Division

PHONE:(415) 972-3974

FAX: (415) 947-3579

From: "Jenkins, David" <djenkins@apexpowergroup.com>

To: Gerardo Rios/R9/USEPA/US@EPA, 

Cc: Jim_Bartel@fws.gov, "Foster, Melissa A." <mafoster@stoel.com>, Steve Hill <SHill@sierraresearch.com>, Gary Chandler 

<grchandler@apexpowergroup.com>

Date: 10/15/2012 08:28 PM

Subject: Pio Pico PSD Application Addendum - USFWS Biological Opinion

Gerardo, 

Pio Pico Energy Center, LLC (“Applicant”) hereby adds the attached letter as an addendum to its 

application for a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) permit for the Pio Pico Energy 

Center project. Also attached is the Biologiccal Opinion letter from Jim A. Bartel, Fish & Wildlife 

Service, to you dated September 28, 2012. A paper copy of both documents will be sent to you.

Please call me at 317-431-1004 should you have any questions or comments in this regard. 

Sincerely,

Dave 

Re: Pio Pico PSD Application Addendum - USFWS Biological Opinion

Jenkins, David 

to:

Gerardo Rios

10/16/2012 07:58 AM

Hide Details 

From: "Jenkins, David" <djenkins@apexpowergroup.com>

To: Gerardo Rios/R9/USEPA/US@EPA, 

Page 1 of 2

file:///C:/Users/grios/AppData/Local/Temp/notes5524D1/~web5927.htm 10/16/2012
David Jenkins

Apex Power Group, LLC[attachment "PPEC Biological Opinion Letter to Gerardo Rios.pdf" deleted 

by Gerardo Rios/R9/USEPA/US] [attachment "10B0661-12F0590_SDG_ BO_Pio Pico Energy 

Center_20120928_kag.pdf" deleted by Gerardo Rios/R9/USEPA/US] 

Page 2 of 2

file:///C:/Users/grios/AppData/Local/Temp/notes5524D1/~web5927.htm 10/16/2012
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER JONES, Petitioner - Appellant,
v. MATTHEW CATE, Respondent - Appellee. No. 13-56829 D.C. No. 3:09-cv-01896-JM-DHB
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Jeffrey T. Miller, Senior District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted December 9, 2014 Pasadena, California Before: SILVERMAN and BEA, Circuit Judges, and BELL, District Judge. ** Petitioner Christopher Jones’s federa l habeas petition was dismissed as untimely. The district court granted a cer tificate of appealability solely as to the question whether Jones was entitled to equ itable tolling. Jones timely appealed. 

# FILED
JAN 22 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.We review de novo the dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus as time-barred; we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). We reverse and remand for consideration of the merits of Jones’s habeas petition. Under Bills v. Clark , 628 F.3d 1092, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2010) , Jones showed that (1) his mental impairment rendered him personally unable to prepare a habeas petition and (2) his mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circum stances, including reasonably available access to assistance. The district court co rrectly found that Jones satisfied the first prong of the Bills test because Jones’s mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing. However, the district court erred in finding that Jones did not act diligently in pursuing available remedies. The distri ct court held that Jones failed the second prong of the Bills test because between November 19, 1998, when Jones’s conviction became final, and August 29, 2009, when Jones filed his federal habeas petition, Jones filed multiple state hab eas petitions and sought assistance from other inmates to draft correspondence, complete paperwork, and file prison grievances. Based on these filings, the di strict court found that Jones was able to

2seek assistance from others and that his lack of diligence, not his mental impairment, was the but-for cause of his failure timely to file. Rather, the only inference which arises is that he was incapable of asking for help in filing a federal habeas petition. Su ch help was not offered with respect to a possible federal habeas petition until 2009. Therefore, Jones’s mental impairment was the but-for cause of Jones’s failure timely to file. REVERSED and REMANDED.

3