ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: LAURA M. TAYLOR GREGORY F. ZOELLER Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
BRIAN REITZ Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IMANI CLARK, ) ) Appellant

- Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02

- 1208

- CR

- 630 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee

- Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Robert Altice, Judge

Cause No. 49G02

- 1101

- FC

- 1441

M arch 7, 2013 MEMORANDUM DECISION

– NOT FOR PUBLICATION MATHIAS, Judge

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.2 Imani Clark ( “ Clark ” ) pleaded guilty in Marion Superior Court to Class C felony forgery and was sentenced to two years in the Marion County Community Corrections Work Release program ( “ M CCC ” ). The State subsequently filed a petition to revoke Clark ’ s probation. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Clark violated the terms of her probation and ordered that the previously suspended sentence be executed. Clark appeals and argues that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to revoke her probation and that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Cl ark ’ s probation. We affirm. Facts and Procedural History On July 10, 2011, Clark pleaded guilty to Class C felony forgery and was sentenced to two years in the M CCC . The Marion Superior Court ordered that Clark comply with the “ Order on Standard Condition s o f Home Detention ” ( “ the conditions ” )

. Appellant App. p. 42. Among other things, the conditions required Clark t o stay in her home at all times except when she was attending an approved edu cational institution, regularly

- scheduled religious services, o r seeking approved employment. The conditions further required Clark to abide by the schedule created by M CCC and to receive approval before changing the schedule. Finally, the conditions required Clark to maintain a working telephone in her home and a monitoring device both in her home and on her
person. Id

. Clark ’ s home detention officer and case manager was Justin Moed ( “ Moed ” ). While on home detention, Clark was required to submit her schedule to Moed, and Clark3 was required to verify each departur e
. Shortly after Moed began supervising Clark on April 20, 2012, Clark failed to provide verification for departures for school, church , and her job sear ch. Moed continued to allow Clark to attend church and school despite the lack of verification, but he revoked permission for her to leave for job searches. During a meeting on June 15, Moed again explained to Clark the rules of home detention, scheduling, and verification. After this meeting, Clark violated the conditions five times. On June 25, 201 2 , she left fro m 11:01 a.m. - 12:37 p.m. without prior authorization

. Between June 26 and June
27 , 2012, her monitoring device became unplugged for over sixteen hours

. When Moed tried calling Clark at her home to discuss the matter, no one answered. Clark never responded to his messages. On June 27, 2012, the device indicated that the strap had been tampered with . On J uly 3, 2012, she left her home two hours and fourteen minutes earlier than the authorized time. Finally, on July 4, 2012, she left her ho me between
12:58 a.m. - 1:34 p.m. without prior authorization . Tr. p p. 13

- 16. On July 2, 2012, the State filed a notice of community corrections violations, and amended the notice on July 18, 2012. Appellant App. pp. 43

- 44. After a hearing on July 27, 2012, the Marion Superior Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Clark had violated the terms of her probation and ordered that the two year suspended sentence be executed minus 171 days already served through home detention and awaiting trial. Clark appeals and argues that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to revoke her probation , and that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation.4 Discussion and Decision The trial court ’ s de cision whether to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Rosa v. State , 832 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “ An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. ” Id. Under Indiana Code section 35

- 38

- 2

- 3(a), a court may revoke probation if a person violates a condition of probation during the probationary period. In addition under Indiana Code section 35

- 38

- 2

- 1(b), the court may revoke probation if a prob ationer commits any additional crime.
I. Insufficient Evidence Clark argues that there was insufficient evidence f or the trial court to revoke her probation. When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, we will neither “ reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility

. ” Whatley v. State , 847 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Marsh v. State , 818 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Rather, we look to the evidence most favorable to the State and affirm the judgment if “ there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting revocation. ” Id. We are also reminded that the State ’ s burden of proof regarding a n alleged probation violation is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In this case, Clark ’ s home detention offic er, Moed, testified that Clark had violated the terms of her probation on fiv e different occasions in 2012 : June 25, June 26, June 27, July 3, and July 4. These violations occurred despite multiple explanations of the terms of her probation and Moed ’ s fle xibility with time for school and church. Clark made no attempt to provide any verification for these violations , did not call Moed to5 explain the reasons for these violations, and did not respond to Moed ’ s calls regarding these violations. Aside from Moed ’ s testimony , Clark ’ s electronic monitoring equipment indicated two different violations. Clark ’ s monitoring devi ce was unplugged for at least sixteen hours between June 26

- 27, 2012, and on June 27 the strap was tampered with. Moed called Clark during this period, and no one answered. Clark did not respond to his messages. Clark even admitted to the violation on July 4 , 2012: Q: Where were you on July 4 th [2012], where did you go ? A: I was at home. Q: It says you left from 12:58

- 1:34. A: I didn ’ t go

— I didn ’ t go no where ‘ til like, maybe, like, 12:58, like how it said. Tr. p. 39

. As previously noted, a “ violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation. ” Rosa v. State , 832 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); see also Smith v. State , 727 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Brooks v.
State , 692 N.E.2d 951, 953

- 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Under these facts and circumstances, the trial court ’ s revocation of Clark ’ s p robation is supported by sufficient evidence.
II. Sentencing Clark next argues that revoking her probation was an abuse of the trial court ’ s discretion. She asserts that the nature and circumstances of her violations are so innocuous that revocation was an abuse of the court ’ s discretion. We review a trial
court ’ s decision in a probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion

. Woods v.
State , 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.6 Prewitt v. State , 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2 007)

. Probation revocation is a two

- step process. First, the trial court must make a factual det ermination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. Terrell v. State , 886 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied

. If a violation is proven, the trial court must then determine if the violation warrants revocation of the probation

. Id

. at 104

- 05. Clark ’ s sentence was not an abuse of discretion. She repeatedly violated the terms of her probation

. Clark admitted to leaving on July 4, 2012. Clark attempts to minimize
t his probation violation by alleging that she did not know that her equipment had become unplugged and that she was doing what she claimed to be doing

. Clark also violated the conditions several other times. In light of Clark ’ s multiple probation violations , the trial court acted well within its discretion when it sentenced her to serve two years of her previously

- suspended sentence

. C o n c l u s i o n T h e r e w a s s u f f

i c i e n t e v i d e n c e f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o f i n d t h a t C l a r k h a d v i o l a t e d t h e
t e r m s o f h e r p r o b a t i o n
. T h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y o r d e r i n g C l a r k ’ s

s e n t e n c e t o b e e x e c u t e d w i t h t h e I n d i a n a D e p a r t m e n t o f C o r r e c t i o n s
. Affirmed.
K I R S C H , J

. , a n d C R O N E , J

. , c o n c u r
.