DA 09-0326

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2009 MT 347N

CITY OF BILLINGS,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ALLEN DEAN JORDAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 2008-466

Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Joslyn Hunt, Chief Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

Eric Bunn, Deputy Public Defender, Billings, Montana

For Appellee:

Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General, Sheri K. Sprigg,

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Brent Brooks, Billings City Attorney, Melanie Pfeifer, Deputy City

Attorney, Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: September 30, 2009

Decided: October 21, 2009

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

October 21 2009
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Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal

Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be

cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme

Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in

this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and

Montana Reports. 

¶2 On May 26, 2008, Allen Jordan was ticketed for speeding and for failure to carry

proof of motor vehicle insurance. Jordan pled guilty in Billings Municipal Court to the

speeding charge. He moved to dismiss the “no-insurance charge” on the grounds that,

even though his insurance card showed that the insurance on the vehicle he was driving

expired on April 30, 2008, his insurance agent had agreed to provide coverage for the

vehicle. Jordan testified that he had called his insurance agent on May 5, 2008, and

instructed her to switch the insurance coverage from his other vehicle to this vehicle.

Thus, Jordan claimed that he believed he had insurance coverage.

¶3 Jordan also testified that the day after he was cited for failure to carry proof of

motor vehicle insurance, he went to see his insurance agent. She informed him that

because he failed to pay the premium that was due on April 30, 2008, she was unable to

make the change he requested. She also told Jordan that she had tried to contact him, but

the phone number in his file was incorrect. Because Jordan was unable to show that his

vehicle was insured at the time of his arrest, the Municipal Court judge denied his motion

to dismiss the charge.
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¶4 Jordan eventually pled guilty to the no-insurance charge reserving his right to 

appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Because this was Jordan’s fifth offense of

failing to carry proof of motor vehicle insurance, he was given a jail sentence of six

months with all time suspended except for 48 days of house arrest. He was also fined

$500 and ordered to pay a court surcharge of $45.

¶5 Jordan appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss to the District Court for the

Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County. On August 21, 2008, the District Court

entered an order setting forth a briefing schedule. That order gave the City until October

24, 2008, to file its opening brief. On January 15, 2009, Jordan filed a motion to deem

his appeal well taken as the City had not filed an opening brief in this case. The District 

Court granted Jordan’s motion and entered an order on February 4, 2009, reversing and

remanding to the Municipal Court with instructions to enter an order dismissing Jordan’s 

no-insurance conviction.

¶6 On February 10, 2009, over Jordan’s objection, the District Court entered an order

setting aside its previous order to dismiss this case. This order was based on the City’s 

position that it never received the District Court’s order regarding the briefing schedule.

Apparently, the court had served the order on the deputy county attorney rather than the

deputy city attorney. Both Jordan and the City filed briefs in the matter, and, on April 3, 

2009, the District Court entered its decision affirming Jordan’s conviction for failure to

carry proof of motor vehicle insurance. The District Court stated: “One either has motor 

vehicle insurance or one does not. Mr. Jordan did not. Thus, Mr. Jordan’s appeal from 

the lower Court must fail.”
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¶7 On appeal from the District Court’s decision, Jordan raises two issues which we

have reframed as follows: (1) Whether the District Court erred in setting aside its earlier

order to dismiss this case, and (2) Whether the Municipal Court erred in denying Jordan’s 

motion to dismiss.

¶8 Having reviewed the record, the District Court’s decision and the parties’

arguments on appeal, we have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I,

Paragraph 3(d) of our 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which 

provides for memorandum opinions. 

¶9 Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred in setting aside its earlier order to

dismiss this case.

¶10 Jordan argues on appeal that the District Court committed reversible error in

setting aside the dismissal of his conviction because the court had lost jurisdiction via its

previous order reversing the conviction. Jordan further argues that the dismissal should

not have been set aside because the City slept on its rights by waiting 196 days from the

time it was served with Jordan’s brief on appeal until it finally filed its opening brief in 

the District Court.

¶11 Relying on the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Office of the Attorney

General (the State), acting on behalf of the City, argues that the District Court had

jurisdiction to reconsider its decision on appeal until remittitur was issued. The State

points out that in this case, the District Court realized before remittitur was issued that it

failed to send the briefing schedule to the correct prosecutor’s office, and that, under
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these circumstances, the court’s decision to allow the case to be briefed and decided on 

the merits was not an abuse of discretion.

¶12 Contrary to the State’s arguments on appeal, the Montana Rules of Appellate 

Procedure do not apply to appeals to District Court. “These rules shall govern 

proceedings before the supreme court.” M. R. App. P. 1(2). The correct procedure to

follow in appeals from a municipal court to a district court can be found in the Montana

Uniform Municipal Court Rules of Appeal to District Court (Title 25, chapter 30, MCA).

To that end, M. U. Mun. Ct. R. App. 14(c) provides that the failure of a respondent to file 

an answer brief “shall be deemed an admission that the appeal is well taken and subject to 

summary ruling by the district court.” However, “a district court judge has the discretion 

to dismiss—or decline to dismiss—an appeal, for failure to file a timely brief. The court

may do so, but no rule says the court must do so.” State v. Frazier, 2005 MT 99, ¶ 8, 326 

Mont. 524, 111 P.3d 215 (emphasis in original) (citing M. U. Mun. Ct. R. App. 14(c); 

§ 25-33-304, MCA (“For a failure to prosecute an appeal or unnecessary delay in

bringing it to a hearing, the district court may order the appeal to be dismissed . . . .” 

(emphasis added))).

¶13 In the instant case, the District Court determined that it was at least partially at 

fault for the City’s failure to file a brief because the court sent the order setting forth the

briefing schedule to a deputy county attorney instead of to the deputy city attorney who

was the prosecutor of record in both the Municipal and District Courts. The State pointed 

out in its brief on appeal that this confusion persisted on appeal as the “Notice of Appeal 

filed on June 2, 2009, was served on ‘Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney’
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instead of on the Billings City Attorney.” Under these circumstances, we hold that the

District Court did not abuse its discretion in rescinding its order to dismiss and allowing

the appeal to continue with a new briefing schedule.

¶14 Issue 2: Whether the Municipal Court erred in denying Jordan’s motion to 

dismiss?

¶15 Jordan argues that the Municipal Court committed reversible error by not finding

that the interests of justice demanded the dismissal of his conviction because Jordan’s 

failure to have motor vehicle insurance was due to his insurance agent’s error. The State 

argues on the other hand that the Municipal Court’s decision was correct because Jordan

never produced an insurance card showing that his vehicle was covered on the date of his

arrest. 

¶16 Section 61-6-302(2), MCA, provides:

Each person shall carry in a motor vehicle being operated by the

person an insurance card approved by the department but issued by the

insurance carrier to the motor vehicle owner as proof of compliance with

61-6-301. A motor vehicle operator shall exhibit the insurance card upon

demand of a justice of the peace, a city or municipal judge, a peace officer,

a highway patrol officer, or a field deputy or inspector of the department.

A person commits an offense under this subsection if the person fails to

carry the insurance card in a motor vehicle or fails to exhibit the insurance

card upon demand of a person specified in this subsection. However, a

person charged with violating this subsection may not be convicted if the

person produces in court or the office of the arresting officer proof of

insurance valid at the time of arrest. [Emphasis added.]

¶17 In this case, the insurance card that Jordan carried in his vehicle indicated that his

motor vehicle insurance had expired on April 30, 2008, almost a month prior to his arrest.

Moreover, Jordan did not produce in court “proof of insurance valid at the time of [his]

arrest.” As the State points out in its brief on appeal, § 61-6-302(2), MCA, places on the
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operator of the motor vehicle the burden of ensuring that there is in the vehicle at all

times an insurance card showing that the vehicle is insured. Jordan’s argument that his 

insurance agent should have provided coverage is irrelevant. Under the plain language of 

§ 61-6-302(2), MCA, Jordan committed the offense of failure to carry proof of motor

vehicle insurance. Accordingly, we hold that the Municipal Court did not err in denying 

Jordan’s motion to dismiss.

¶18 Affirmed.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JIM RICE

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS