UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ LEROY BUHL, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. D. BERKEBILE, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 15-1204 (D.C. No. 1:14- CV-02029-PAB) (D. Colorado)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , LUCERO , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ After examining the briefs and appella te record, the pane l has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Ci r. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Petitioner-appellant Leroy Buhl, a fe deral inmate proceeding pro se, 1 appeals from the dismissal of his a pplication for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Mr. Buhl appears pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Garza v. Davis , 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 9, 2015 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Mr. Buhl is an inmate in the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons at the United States Penitentiary, Administra tive Maximum, in Florence, Colorado. Mr. Buhl filed this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging his due process rights were violated during a pris on disciplinary action. Accord ing to Mr. Buhl, he was attacked by two other inmates wielding kn ives on May 18, 2012. During the course of the attack, Mr. Buhl claims he was able to disarm one of his assailants, after which he picked up the assailant’s knife and turn ed it over to prison o fficials at the first opportunity. Nonetheless, Mr. Buhl was charged with possession of a weapon. Mr. Buhl did not receive a copy of th e incident report charging him with possession of a weapon during the usual tw enty-four-hour timeframe contemplated by federal regulations because the prison was waiting for the F.B.I. to review reports of the incident and to determine whether criminal charges should be brought against Mr. Buhl. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(a) (“ You will ordinarily receiv e the incident report within 24 hours of staff becoming aware of your involvement in the incident.” (emphasis added)). The F.B.I. declined to prosecute on J une 1, 2012, and Mr. Buhl received a copy of the incident report that same day. Following a hearing, Mr. Buhl was convicted of the disciplinary offens e and received a disciplinary sanction involving segregation and the loss of te lephone and commissary privileges for sixty days. Importantly, the disciplinary sanc tion did not include a loss of good time credits. On July 22, 2014, 2 Mr. Buhl filed the instant ac tion, alleging his due process

2 Due to a series of procedural missteps not relevant to this appeal, Mr. Buhl’s habeas petition was delayed, but was nevertheless timely filed.3 rights were violated because the June 1, 2012, incident report was issued after the twenty-four-hour period contempl ated by federal regulations. The district court denied Mr. Buhl’s application for relief on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Buhl’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In the alternative, the district court concluded Mr. Buhl had failed to demonstrate a due process violation. Mr. Buhl appeals. We review the district court’s dis position of Mr. Buhl’s § 2241 petition de novo but review the court’s fact ual findings for clear error. See Palma-Salazar v. Davis , 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Ci r. 2012). Under § 2241, ha beas corpus relief is available if an individual is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This court has routinely held that habeas corpus relief—including relie f under § 2241—is ava ilable only when an inmate is challenging “the fact or dur ation of his confinement” or seeking “immediate release or a shor tened period of confinement.” Palma-Salazar , 677 F.3d at 1035. We have expressly dis tinguished claims that are a ppropriate for habeas relief from those challenging an inmate ’s “conditions of confinement.” See McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 115 F.3d 809, 811–1 2 (10th Cir. 1997). Although prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their confinement may proceed through an action in habeas, prisoners challe nging the conditions of thei r confinement “must do so through a civil rights action.” Palma-Salazar , 677 F.3d at 1035. And when a prisoner seeks to challenge the conditions of his c onfinement via § 2241, we lack jurisdiction to consider his claim. See id. at 1038. Thus, because Mr. Buhl’s disciplinary sanction4 did not impact the duration of his senten ce, we lack jurisdiction under § 2241 to consider his claim. Mr. Buhl relies on our decision in Gamble v. Calbone , 375 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2004), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Magar v. Parker , 490 F.3d 816, 818–19 (1 0th Cir. 2007), to argue that § 224 1 is the appropria te vehicle to challenge prison disciplinary rulings. But as we have previously explained to Mr. Buhl, see Buhl v. Berkebile , 597 F. App’x 958, 959 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), Gamble involved a challenge to discipli nary proceedings that resulted in the loss of a prisoner’s good time credits and, thus, affected the duration of his

sentence. Gamble , 375 F.3d at 1026; see also McIntosh , 115 F.3d at 811 (indicating the deprivation of good time credits can be challenged through § 22 41). In this case, the prison disciplinary action did not impl icate Mr. Buhl’s good time credits or otherwise impact the duration of his sent ence. Instead, Mr. Buhl was placed in segregation and lost telephone and commissar y privileges for sixty days. These are quintessential conditions of confinement, a nd § 2241 is not the appropriate vehicle through which to challenge them. Thus, Gamble is inapposite. Because we lack jurisdiction to cons ider Mr. Buhl’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, we dismiss the appeal. Accordingly, we express no opinion as to the merits of Mr. Buhl’s underlying due process claim. Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge