alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### T. L. MARTIN, Petitioner, v. R. R. RAINES, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, et al., Respondents.

No. A-13131.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Nov. 1, 1961.

*118T. L. Martin, McAlester, petitioner, pro se.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent warden.

BRETT, Judge.

The petitioner, T. L. Martin, seeks by writ of habeas corpus to secure the dismissal of a certain detainer or hold order placed against him by the State of Texas with the Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary.

The petition herein was prepared by petitioner without the aid of counsel. This Court has often held that a pleading prepared by an inmate of a State institution without the assistance of an attorney will be liberally construed. Ex parte Lewis, 92 Okl.Cr. 334, 223 P.2d 143; Ex parte Cassidy, 83 Okl.Cr. 159, 174 P.2d 271; Ex parte Walker, 84 Okl.Cr. 190, 180 P.2d 670. We have, therefore, permitted this petition to be filed, and have carefully read and considered the same.

It appears that petitioner was charged in the district court of Tulsa County with second degree burglary, and on a plea of guilty was, at the March, 1961 term of said court, sentenced to six years in the State Penitentiary. Petitioner states: “Your petitioner declares he has no complaint of this, the proceeding.”

He then states that a detainer or hold order has been lodged with the Warden of the Penitentiary by the authorities of Sherman, Texas, and prays for removal of such detainer or hold order, and that he be released from “the prejudicial effects of such hold order.”

The petition herein, while labelled petition for writ of habeas corpus, is in the nature of a petition for writ of mandamus. Ex parte Cameron, 91 Okl.Cr. 317, 218 P.2d 654.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma has no jurisdiction over the authorities of the State of Texas, or authority to order the dismissal of the retainer or hold order filed against this petitioner by the State of Texas. Langham v. Cochran, Okl.Cr., 357 P.2d 583.

 A writ of habeas corpus is a common-law writ directed to one detaining a person, commanding him to produce such detained person at a designated time and place to do, submit to and receive whatever the court shall consider in that behalf. The scope of inquiry of this Court is limited to a person restrained of his liberty, and relief will be granted when it appears the restraint is unlawful.

The validity of the judgment and sentence under which petitioner is presently incarcerated is not involved, and it is evident that there is no legal duty imposed upon the Court of Criminal Appeals to entertain this proceeding, and upon that ground, the application for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

NIX, P. J., and BUSSEY, J., concur.
EXHIBIT 99.2


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     The  undersigned  officer  of Summit Financial Corporation (the "Company"),
hereby  certifies,  pursuant  to  18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section  906  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of 2002, and in connection with this
Annual  Report  on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002 (the "Report),
that,  to  such  officer's  knowledge:

(1)  The  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),
as  applicable,  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934,  as  amended; and

(2)  The  information  contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  result  of operations of the Company.


Dated:  March  17,  2003

/s/  Blaise  B.  Bettendorf
---------------------------
Blaise  B.  Bettendorf,  Senior  Vice  President
and  Chief  Financial  Officer
**Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 16 July 2009 – Commission v Italy**

**(Case C‐244/08)**

Failure of Member State to fulfil obligations – Sixth VAT Directive – Article 17 – Eighth Directive 79/1072/EEC – Article 1 – Thirteenth Directive 86/560/EEC – Article 1 – Refund or deduction of VAT – Taxable person established in another Member State or in a non-Member State, but having a fixed establishment in the Member
State concerned

Tax provisions – Harmonisation of laws – Turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax – Refund of the tax to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country or in Community territory (Council Directives
79/1072, Art. 1, and 86/560, Art. 1) (see paras 33-39, operative part)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Infringement of Article 1 of Eighth Council Directive 79/1072/EEC of 6 December 1979 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country (OJ 1979 L 331, p. 11) and Article 1 of Thirteenth Council Directive 86/560/EEC of 17 November 1986 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable persons not established in Community territory – Refund of VAT to a taxable person established in another Member State or in a non-member country but having a fixed establishment in Italy. |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Declares that the Italian Republic has failed, in relation to the refund of value added tax to a taxable person residing in another Member State or in a non-Member State, but having a fixed establishment in the Member State concerned, to fulfil its obligations under Article 1 of the Eighth Council Directive 79/1072/EEC of 6 December 1979 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country, and Article 1 of the Thirteenth Council Directive 86/560/EEC of 17 November 1986 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable persons not established in Community territory, by requiring a taxable person established in another Member State or in a non-member State, but having a fixed establishment in Italy and who, during the period at issue, supplied goods and services in Italy, to apply for a refund of input value added tax according to the mechanism provided by those directives rather than deduct it when the purchase in respect of which repayment of that tax is sought is made not through that fixed establishment, but directly by the principal establishment of that taxable person; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders the Italian Republic to pay the costs. |
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACTAPPEALS Appeal of

-- ) ) Zuhmat Group Construction ) ) Under ContractNo. W91B4M-11-A-0005 ) APPEARANCES FORTHE APPELLANT:

APPEARANCES FORTHE GOVERNMENT: ASBCA No. 59824

Eric Montalvo, Esq. Lauren R. Brier, Esq.

The Federal Practice Group

Worldwide Service Washington, DC Raymond M. Saunders, Esq.

Army ChiefTrial Attorney Frank A. March, Esq.

Trial Attorney SUMMARYBINDINGDECISION BYADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE PROUTY By alternative dispute resolution (ADR) agreement approved bythe Board on 30 March 2016, the parties requested thatthis appeal be decided by a one-judge "summaryproceeding with binding decision." The parties agreed thatthis "decision shall be final, conclusive, not subjectto reconsideration or appeal, and may not be set aside, except for fraud." (ADRAgreement at 1-3) This decision has no value as precedent and cannot be cited in any otherproceeding. The undersigned conducted a one-day evidentiary hearing on 9 May 2016 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, after which the parties rested and presented arguments. DECISION This appeal is sustained 

### in toto. The government presented no factual defense to appellant's claim, which I determine to have been completely supported by the uncontroverted and credible testimony and by the record. The claim consisted offour portions on the above-captioned BlanketPurchase Ordercontract: Call Nos. 7, 9, 12, and 13. Atthe exchange rate ofapproximately 55.9 Afghani perdollarprevailing on 17 October 2014, when Zuhmat submitted its certified claim, Zuhmat is entitledto $8,050 for its claim on Call No. 7; $304,298 for its claim on Call No. 9; $85,509 for its claim on Call No. 12; and $122,003 for its claim on Call No. 13. The amount ofthe award for Call Nos. 7 and 9 (totaling $312,348) is subjectto ContractDisputes Act interest in accordance with 41 U.S.C. § 7109 from the 17 October 2014 putative date ofreceipt of the claim until paid. The amount ofthe award for Call No. 12 ($85,509) is subjectto interest in accordance with the rate set by 41 U.S.C. 

### § 7109 from the 12 November 2011 date that the invoice for Call No. 12 was submitted until paid. The amount ofthe awardfor Call No. 13 ($122,003) is subject to interest in accordance with the rate set by 41U.S.C.§7109 from the 21February2012 date that the invoice for Call No. 13 was submitted until paid.
Dated: 17 May 2016

Administrative Judge Armed Services Board ofContractAppeals

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Opinion and Decision ofthe Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals in ASBCANo. 59824, Appeal ofZuhmat Group Construction, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter.
Dated:

2 JEFFREYD. GARDIN Recorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dennis Simpson, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Aldrich, J.), rendered July 30, 1981, convicting him of criminal facilita*852tion in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. By decision and order of this court dated January 14, 1991 [169 AD2d 741], the matter was remitted to the County Court, Westchester County, for a hearing to determine whether the defendant requested or acquiesced in the charge to the jury permitting it to consider the defendant’s guilt of the crime of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree, and the appeal was held in abeyance pending receipt of a report. The County Court, Westchester County (Silverman, J.), has now submitted its report to this court.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Since the defendant was not indicted for criminal facilitation in the fourth degree, the only crime of which he was convicted, it had to have been charged as a lesser included offense. However, a comparative evaluation of the two operative statutes, rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35) and criminal facilitation in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 115.00 [1]) reveals that the latter crime is not a lesser included offense of the former. It is theoretically possible to commit rape in the first degree without intending to aid anyone else in the commission of a felony *(see, People v Glover,*57 NY2d 61; *People v Weissinger,*104 AD2d 917).

It is error for the trial court to consider or submit to the jury a crime arising out of a criminal transaction that is not, in fact, a lesser included offense of a crime for which the defendant had been indicted, arising out of that transaction, unless the defendant, by acquiescing in or affirmatively requesting the lesser charge, waives his right to complain of the trial court’s error *(People v Ford,*62 NY2d 275). There is now no question that the defendant’s trial counsel requested the criminal facilitation charge. Thus, the defendant has waived appellate review of the error.

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions and find that they do not warrant reversal. Mangano, P. J., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.
7/28/2015 Request for Information ­ FAA­2015­2118

https://email.dot.gov/owa/9­AWA­AVS­333Exemptions@faa.gov/?ae=Item&t=IPM.Note&id=RgAAAABFvqQJAFf5SI8crGhIsEIyBwD3qfMUO7BCQ74YBi9P12... 1/1

Request for Information ­ FAA­2015­2118

9­AWA­AVS­333Exemptions (FAA)

Sent:Tuesday, July 28, 2015 8:18 AM

To: cpeck@flyingmedia.net

Dear Mr. Peck:

This letter is to inform you that the following information is missing from your petition (Docket No. FAA­2015­2118).

This information is necessary for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to process your petition.

Describe the aircraft make(s), model(s), and type(s) (i.e., fixed‐wing, rotorcraft, lighter‐than‐air) for the

proposed UAS operation. The description(s) should include the maximum weight (including payload). This

information can be located in the aircraft manual(s).

Provide a copy of the Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM) which is required by Order

8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 1. If you wish for us to proceed without this manual and remove

closed‐set filming from your proposed operation please inform of us of your intention by the requested

response date listed below.

Please submit the additional information (non‐proprietary) to your docket at www.regulations.gov and submit any

proprietary information to the FAA Headquarters or electronically via email to 333exemptions@faa.gov. If you want

us to process your request any further, we must receive the information described above by 8/11/15. If we do not

receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 267­4264.

Sincerely,

Dan Ngo

FAA Office of Rulemaking
115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4263 

AN ACT 

To amend the Securities Act of 1933 with respect to small 

company capital formation, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 4263 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Regulation A+ Im3 provement Act of 2017’’. 

4 SEC. 2. JOBS ACT-RELATED EXEMPTION. 

5 Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 

6 77c(b)) is amended— 

7 (1) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking 

8 ‘‘$50,000,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$75,000,000, ad9 justed for inflation by the Commission every 2 years 

10 to the nearest $10,000 to reflect the change in the 

11 Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers 

12 published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’’; and 

13 (2) in paragraph (5)— 

14 (A) by striking ‘‘such amount as’’ and in15 serting: ‘‘such amount, in addition to the ad16 justment for inflation provided for under such 

17 paragraph (2)(A), as’’; and 

18 (B) by striking ‘‘such amount, it’’ and in19 serting ‘‘such amount, in addition to the adjust-
3 

•HR 4263 EH

1 ment for inflation provided for under such 

2 paragraph (2)(A), it’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives March 15, 

2018. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4263 

AN ACT 

To amend the Securities Act of 1933 with respect 

other purposes. to small company capital formation, and for
#### Billie Joe WILSON, a Minor, by Roland Wilson, father and next friend, and Roland Wilson for himself, Plaintiffs in Error, v. W. H. BUIE, Defendant in Error.

No. 37824.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 8, 1958.

J. Fred Green, Fred D. Green, Sallisaw, for plaintiffs in error.

W. S. Agent, Sallisaw, Hardin, Barton, Hardin & Garner, Fort Smith, Ark., for defendant in error.

HALLEY, Justice.

This action was commenced by Billie Joe Wilson, a minor by his father and next friend Roland Wilson and Roland Wilson for himself to recover in damages for personal injury.

At the conclusion of the evidence offered for the plaintiffs defendant demurred and' the trial court sustained the demurrer tO' the evidence and thereupon entered judgment for the defendant. Plaintiffs did not file a motion for new trial.

Plaintiffs have appealed and raise the single issue that the trial court erred in. sustaining the demurrer to the evidence.

In order to review the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer to the evidence it is necessary to file a motion for new trial. Lowenstein v. Todd, 40 Okl. 18, 135 P. 737; Tyler v. Tyler, 44 Okl. 411, 144 P. 1023; Johnson v. Board of Com’rs of Logan County, 125 Okl. 96, 256 P. 900; Sac & Fox Oil Co. v. Owens, 133 Okl. 96, 271 P. 240; Hunt v. Tribune *541Publishing Co., 172 Okl. 139, 44 P.2d 889.

A ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence can only be presented to the Supreme Court after a determination of a motion for new trial. James v. Jackson, 30 Okl. 190, 120 P. 288; Stump v. Porter, 31 Okl. 157, 120 P. 639; Insurance Co. of North America v. Little, 34 Okl. 449, 125 P. 1098; Malleck v. Thomas, 109 Okl. 95, 234 P. 1107. In Stump v. Porter, supra, it is stated:

> “The ruling on a demurrer to the evidence is a decision occurring on the trial; and, in order to enable the Supreme Court to review such ruling, it is necessary that a motion for new trial be filed within the time prescribed by law.”

Appeal dismissed.

CORN, V. C. J., and WILLIAMS, BLACKBIRD and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

WELCH, C. J., and DAVISON, JOHNSON and GARLILE, JJ., dissent.
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C SS. 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form, 10-Q (the "Report") of Amaru, Inc. (the "Company"), for the period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Chua Leong Hin, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company











/s/ Chua Leong Hin


President, Chief Executive Officer


May 16, 2011
Exhibit








Debt Repayment Agreement
American DG Energy, a Delaware corporation located at 45 First Avenue, Waltham, MA 02451, (the “Company”), and Trifon and Despina Pantopoulou Natsis (the “Debt Holders”) (hereinafter referred to jointly as the “Parties”), entered into a convertible debt agreement executed on August 9, 2016 (the “Debt Agreement”) for the debt amount of $3,416,681.00 (the “Debt”). 


WHEREAS, the Company wishes to repay the Debt to the Debt Holders and the Debt Holders desire cash;


THEREFORE, the Parties agree to the following: 
		
	1.
	The Debt Holders accept from the Company the amount of $3,058,943 on December 23, 2016 as full repayment of the Debt. The Debt Holders acknowledge and agree that with the repayment of $3,058,943 from the Company on December 23, 2016, that the Company has repaid the Debt in full and the Company no longer has any outstanding debt or obligations to the Debt Holders.  




Entire Agreement: This Debt Repayment Agreement (the “Agreement”) constitutes the sole and entire agreement between the Parties with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous understandings, agreements, representations, and warranties, both written and oral, with respect to the subject matter.


Counterparts: This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall be deemed to be one and the same agreement. A signed copy of this Agreement delivered by facsimile, e-mail or other means of electronic transmission shall be deemed to have the same legal effect as delivery of an original signed copy of this Agreement.


Debt Holders                         American DG Energy Inc.
Signed By:________________                Signed By:_________________
Name:                             Name: 
Title:                             Title:
#### Tom PETERS, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A-13065.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Sept. 20, 1961.

Sam Goodwin, Pauls Valley, Holmes H. Colbert, Stilphur,' for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

NIX, Presiding Judge.

The defendant, Tom Peters, was charged by information in the District Court of Murray County, on the 12th day of April, 1960, with the crime of murder. The defendant was tried and found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree by a jury who assessed his punishment at four years in the state penitentiary, and he appeals to this Court.

This appeal was filed herein on June 7, 1961. On June 21, a thirty day extension of time to brief by plaintiff in error was given. The case was assigned for oral argument on July 26, 1961, at which time counsel for plaintiff in error failed to appear. On July 21, 1961, the State of Oklahoma filed a brief of defendant in error and’ a motion to dismiss. In said motion to dismiss it was alleged that this Court was without jurisdiction by reason of the fact that there was no judgment and sentence contained in the case made by which the purported appeal -was attempted to be perfected. To this motion the plaintiff in error has filed no response. An examination of *175the case made discloses that it does not contain any judgment or sentence.

In Brown v. State, Okl.Cr., 276 P.2d 781, this Court said in the syllabus:

> “Where an appeal is taken from alleged judgment of conviction and the transcript of the record or case made contains no copy of the judgment of the trial court, this court does not acquire jurisdiction of the appeal, and such appeal will be dismissed.”

See Livingston v. State, Okl.Cr., 275 P.2d 1002; State v. Smith, Okl.Cr., 268 P.2d 587; State v. Kile, 96 Okl.Cr. 148, 250 P.2d 233; McMichael v. State, 93 Okl.Cr. 341, 228 P.2d 203; Thornton v. State, 86 Okl.Cr. 394, 193 P.2d 609.

, For said reasons the attempted appeal herein is dismissed.

BRETT and BUSSEY, JJ., concur.
Document Number: Revision: 

Previous Number:

Section/Area:

 Date:

Notes:

Items to Consider for Autogenous Vaccines in Relation to VS 

Memo 800.69 and 9 CFR 113.113

CVB-WI-5304 01

CVB-WI-IC

10 Nov 2022

CVB-Released