alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2009282EN.01001402.xml

| 21.11.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 282/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.11.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 282/14

---

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 1 October 2009 — Commission of the European Communities v Ireland

(Case C-549/08) (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 2006/70/EC - Money laundering and terrorist financing - Failure to transpose within the period prescribed)

2009/C 282/26

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: P. Dejmek and A.-A. Gilly, Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Ireland (represented by: D. O’Hagan, Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Failure to have adopted, within the prescribed period, the measures necessary to comply with Commission Directive 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition of politically exposed person and the technical criteria for simplified customer due diligence procedures and for exemption on grounds of a financial activity conducted on an occasional or very limited basis (OJ 2008 L 214, p. 29)

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that, by failing to adopt all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Commission Directive 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition of ‘politically exposed person’ and the technical criteria for simplified customer due diligence procedures and for exemption on grounds of a financial activity conducted on an occasional or very limited basis, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by failing to adopt all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Commission Directive 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition of ‘politically exposed person’ and the technical criteria for simplified customer due diligence procedures and for exemption on grounds of a financial activity conducted on an occasional or very limited basis, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

| 2. | Orders Ireland to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Ireland to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 55, 07.03.2009.

1

---
# C_2009069EN.01003302.xml

| 21.3.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 69/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.3.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 69/33

---

Order of the President of the Court of 5 November 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic

(Case C-191/08) (1)

1

(2009/C 69/74)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Language of the case: Portuguese

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 171, 5.7.2008.

1

---
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-09-00136-CV

George Geoffrey Potts, Appellant

v.

Greystone Office, LP, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. C-1-CV-08-006124, HONORABLE J. DAVID PHILLIPS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

George Geoffrey Potts has filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and has certified that the

motion is unopposed. We grant the motion and dismiss this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1).

 

G. Alan Waldrop, Justice

Before Justices Patterson, Pemberton and Waldrop

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: May 29, 2009
<PAGE>

                              EXHIBIT NUMBER 13(1)

                                  CERTIFICATION
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                 WITH RESPECT TO THE ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 20-F
                      FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2003
                          OF CHINA ENTERPRISES LIMITED

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and
(b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the
undersigned officer of China Enterprises Limited, a Bermuda company (the
"Company"), does hereby certify, to the best of such officer's knowledge, that:

      (i) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: July 22, 2004

                        /s/ Dr. Chan Kwok Keung, Charles
                        --------------------------------
                          DR. CHAN KWOK KEUNG, CHARLES
                             Chief Executive Officer

The certification set forth above is being furnished as an Exhibit solely
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not being filed
as part of the Form 20-F or as a separate disclosure document of the Company or
the certifying officer.

                                      253
#### Educational Reading Aids Corp., Appellant, v Preston Young et al., Respondents.

— In an action to recover damages, *inter alia,*for unfair competition, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Murphy, J.), dated October 17, 1989, which denied its motion to hold the defendants in civil and criminal contempt of a consent order and judgment (one paper) of the same court (Samenga, J.), entered August 12, 1985.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff Educational Reading Aids Corp. and the defendants are engaged in the business of selling educational aids to the parents of elementary and junior high school students. This appeal concerns the plaintiff’s motion to hold the defendants in civil and criminal contempt of a consent order and judgment entered in this action in 1985 which permanently enjoined the defendants, their agents, servants, employees and all persons acting on their behalf *inter alia,*from communicating with the plaintiff’s employees for the purpose of enticing them to leave the plaintiff’s employ and from using the plaintiff’s "leads” (potential customers) in soliciting business.

An application to punish a party for contempt is addressed to the sound discretion of the court *(see, Matter of Storm,*28 AD2d 290; *cf, City of Poughkeepsie v Hetey,*121 AD2d 496). "In order to find that contempt has occurred in a given case, it must be determined that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect. It must appear, with reasonable certainty, that the order has been disobeyed” *(Matter of McCormick v Axelrod,*59 NY2d 574, 583, *amended*60 NY2d 652; *see also, Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection v Department of Envtl. Conservation,*70 NY2d 233, 240). The distinguishing element between civil and criminal contempt is the degree of willfulness of the conduct *(see, Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection v Department of Envtl. Conservation, supra).*

Following a hearing, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants disobeyed the terms of the consent order and judgment and denied the application to hold them in contempt. We find that the court properly exercised its discretion, and therefore affirm the order appealed from. The plaintiff’s contentions were based on the *153activities of its former salesperson, Paul Carluccio. The evidence established that Carluccio was an independent contractor who sold the defendants’ products and that his communications with the plaintiff’s salespersons were not undertaken on behalf of the defendants.

In view of our determination, we need not reach the plaintiff’s remaining contentions. Bracken, J. P., Kooper, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Wayne Smarr, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree for selling cocaine to an undercover police officer on two occasions. The officer was introduced to defendant by a confidential informant who did not testify at defendant’s trial.

*585Although the court was mistaken in its belief that the undercover officer, on direct examination, used a certain term and, therefore, erred by allowing the prosecutor, on redirect examination, to question the officer concerning the meaning of this term, we find the error to be harmless in light of the overwhelming proof of defendant’s guilt.

The prosecutor, on summation, improperly implied that defendant could have subpoenaed the confidential informant if defendant desired his testimony. However, the court sustained defendant’s objection to this remark and gave curative instructions to the jury as well as a missing witness charge, instructing the jury that they could draw an adverse inference from the prosecutor’s failure to call the confidential informant. Under these circumstances, any prejudice to defendant from the prosecutor’s improper remark was eliminated. The remaining remarks of the prosecutor to which defendant assigns error were not so egregious as to require reversal.

We agree with defendant that the court’s commencing a read-back of testimony as requested by the jury before defense counsel was present violated CPL 310.30. However, reversal is not required. Defense counsel missed only about three lines of the read-back and had the opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether additional testimony should have been read. The jury indicated that it was satisfied with the court’s response and requested no further testimony. Moreover, defendant was present for the entire read-back *(cf., People v Mehmedi,*69 NY2d 759, *rearg denied*69 NY2d 985). Under these circumstances, there is no basis to conclude that defendant suffered any prejudice or was deprived of a substantial right *(see, People v Payne,*135 AD2d 746, *lv denied*71 NY2d 900).

We have examined the remaining issues raised by defendant and find them to be lacking in merit. We see no reason to modify defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. (Appeal from Judgment of Onondaga County Court, Cunningham, J. — Criminal Sale Controlled Substance, 3rd Degree.) Present — Doerr, J. P., Green, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
Fourth Department,

July, 1991

(July 12, 1991)

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *560Jose Ramos Burgos, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted *(see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). (Appeal from Judgment of Ontario County Court, Henry, Jr., J. — Criminal Sale Controlled Substance, 2nd Degree.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Lawton, Lowery and Davis, JJ.
# C_2010063EN.01001401.xml

| 13.3.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 63/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.3.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 63/14

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 21 January 2010 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākās tiesas Senāts (Republic of Latvia)) — Alstom Power Hydro v Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

(Case C-472/08) (1)

1

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Sixth VAT Directive - Article 18(4) - National legislation laying down a limitation period of three years for the refund of excess VAT)

2010/C 63/21

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Referring court

Augstākās tiesas Senāts

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Alstom Power Hydro

Applicant:

Defendant: Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Augstākās tiesas Senāts — Interpretation of Article 18(4) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1) — National legislation providing for a period of three years for the introduction of applications for the refund of excess tax.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 18(4) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment is to be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which lays down a limitation period of three years in which to make an application for the refund of excess value added tax collected by, though not due to, the tax authority.

---

(1)  OJ C 327, 20.12.2008.

1

---
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 4330 

To provide that any State or local law enforcement agency that has in 

effect a cooling-off period is ineligible to receive Federal funds pursuant 

to a Department of Justice law enforcement grant program, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 9, 2017 

Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia (for himself, Ms. MOORE, Mr. CLAY, and Mr. 

THOMPSON of Mississippi) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To provide that any State or local law enforcement agency 

that has in effect a cooling-off period is ineligible to 

receive Federal funds pursuant to a Department of Justice law enforcement grant program, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Cooling-Off Period 

5 Elimination Act of 2017’’. 


daltland on DSK30NT082PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4330 IH

1 SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF COOLING-OFF PERIODS. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Any State or local law enforce3 ment agency which the Attorney General determines has 

4 in effect a cooling-off period is ineligible to receive any 

5 Federal funds pursuant to a Department of Justice law 

6 enforcement grant program for the following fiscal year. 

7 (b) COOLING-OFF PERIOD DEFINED.—The term 

8 ‘‘cooling-off period’’ means a period of time following an 

9 officer-involved shooting, during which individuals inves10 tigating the shooting are prohibited from communicating 

11 with any officer involved in the shooting. 

Æ 


daltland on DSK30NT082PROD with BILLS
Order entered August 8, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00496-CR

AQUILINO ABONZA MEDINA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MB10-31605-B

ORDER

Appellant’s August 5, 2013 motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief is 

GRANTED. The time to file appellant’s brief is EXTENDED to THIRTY DAYS from the 

date of this order.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATE OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERPursuant to Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18United States Code**

The undersigned, being the Principal Financial Officerof Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (the “Partnership”), hereby certifies thatthe Partnership’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly periodended March 31, 2007, filed with the United States Securities and ExchangeCommission pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)), fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that informationcontained in such Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906, or otherdocument authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature thatappears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statementrequired by Section 906, has been provided to the Partnership and will beretained by the Partnership and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.
| Date: April 30, 2007 |   |                            |
|----------------------|--------|---------------------------------|
|                 | By:    | /s/ MARK A.  MAKI               |
|                 |   | Mark A. Maki                    |
|                 |   | *Vice President, Finance*       |
|                 |   | *(Principal Financial Officer)* |

 

----
#### People v Edward Arend, Defendant.

— Motion to extend time to take appeal granted. Memorandum: The failure to comply with 22 NYCRR 1022.11 (a) constitutes improper conduct of defense counsel. Present — Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Boomer, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
#### Six Nations Apartment Housing Fund Development Company, Inc., Appellant, v Six Nations Properties, Ltd., Respondent.

— Judgment unanimously reversed on the law without costs, complaint reinstated, and matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings, in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court erred by resolving the issue of the reasonableness of plaintiff’s actions on defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint without giving appropriate notice to the parties of its intention to treat the motion as one for summary judgment (CPLR 3211 [c]; *Mihlovan v Grozavu,*72 NY2d 506, 508). The court’s action cannot be justified as a proper response to plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Although a motion for a preliminary injunction does allow the court to search the record and pass upon the sufficiency of the underlying pleadings, that inquiry is limited to whether plaintiff has a cause of action *(see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg,*43 NY2d 268, 275). The power does not extend to an evaluation of conflicting evidence.

Defendant’s reliance upon *Bero v Bero*(143 AD2d 866) is misplaced. There, dismissal of the complaint was proper upon defendant’s production of a later, valid deed which demonstrated that a material fact, as claimed by plaintiff, was not a fact at all *(see, Bero v Bero, supra,*at 868). Here, whether plaintiff’s conduct was reasonable is an issue of fact that *568cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Consequently, we reverse the judgment and remit the matter to Supreme Court to consider the merits of plaintiffs motion and of defendant’s cross motion. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Tenney, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present— Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Lowery and Davis, JJ.
Hardesty
, J. Saitta IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
PETER JASON HELFRICH, Petitioner, vs. THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NYE, Respondent. PETER JASON HELFRICH, Petitioner, vs. THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NYE, Resoondent. No. 67005 

# FILED MAR 1 7 2016
TRADE K LINDEMAN CLER OF, ''UPREME COURT 6Y DEPUTY CLERK No. 68539



### ORDER DENYING PETITIONS These are pro se petitions for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner seeks an order directing the district court to grant his request to withdraw appointed counsel and represent himself in his postconviction proceeding. Without deciding upon the merits of any claims raised in the documents submitted in this matter, we decline to exercise our original jurisdiction. 

### See NRS 34.160; NRS 34.170. Accordingly, we

ORDER the petitions DENIED.

, J.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA cc: Hon. David R. Gamble, Senior District Judge

Peter Jason Helfrich Attorney General/Carson City Nye County Clerk

(0) 1947k QC> 1 (0 -08 

### 4q
# C_2020320EN.01002201.xml

| 28.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 320/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 320/22

---

Order of the President of the Court of 14 February 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof — Germany) — B-GmbH v Finanzamt D

(Case C-797/19) (1)

(2020/C 320/46)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 27, 27.1.2020.

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 17, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-40576

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTONIO RAMOS-LUCAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CR-58-ALL

--------------------

Before KING, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Antonio Ramos-Lucas (“Ramos”) appeals his guilty-plea

conviction and sentence for illegal reentry after deportation. 

He argues that the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and that his sentence is

improper under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 

These arguments are, as he concedes, foreclosed. See

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998); United
No. 04-40576

-2-

States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 465-66 (5th Cir. 2004), petition

for cert. filed (U.S. July 14, 2004) (No. 04-5263); United States

v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). Ramos’s conviction

and sentence are AFFIRMED.
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 242 (Tuesday, December 19, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 87838-87839]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-27849]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of Foreign Assets Control


Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions

AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) is publishing the names of one or more persons that have 
been placed on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 
Persons List (SDN List) based on OFAC's determination that one or more 
applicable legal criteria were satisfied. All property and interests in 
property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these persons are blocked, and 
U.S. persons

[[Page 87839]]

are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.

DATES: See Supplementary Information section for effective date(s).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: OFAC: Bradley T. Smith, Director, 
tel.: 202-622-6922; Associate Director for Global Targeting, tel.: 202-
622-2420; Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.: 202-622-2480; 
Assistant Director for Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202-622-4855; or 
Assistant Director for Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation, tel.: 202-
622-2490.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Electronic Availability

    The SDN List and additional information concerning OFAC sanctions 
programs are available on OFAC's website (https://ofac.treasury.gov/).

Notice of OFAC Action

    On December 8, 2023, OFAC determined that the property and 
interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of the following 
persons are blocked under the relevant sanctions authority listed 
below.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN19DE23.017


    Dated: December 8, 2023.
Bradley T. Smith,
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the 
Treasury.
[FR Doc. 2023-27849 Filed 12-18-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-AL-P