IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2018-KA-01732-COA LORENZ O QUENTIN SHEAD JR. A/K/A LORENZ O SHEAD JR. APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/05/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CAROL L. W HITE-RICHARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: W A SHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: MATTHEW

W YATT W ALTON DISTRICT ATTORNEY: W I LLIE DEW AYNE RICHARDSON NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/03/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND TINDELL, JJ. TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. A W a shington County g rand jury indicted Lorenzo Shead Jr. f o r one count of sexual battery a gainst eight-y e ar-old Roshanda. 1 Af t er the State presented its case-in-chief at trial, the W ashington County Circuit Court granted the def ense’s m otion f

or a directed verdict on the sexual-battery charge. At the clo s e o f t rial, the circuit court instructed the jury on f ondling as a lesser-included of f ense of sexual battery

. Following its deliberations, the jury convicted Shead of f

o ndling, a nd the circuit court sentenced S head to ten y ears in the custody

1 We u se a f

i ctitio u s n am e to p ro tect th e id en tity o f th e m in o r v ictim

in th is case.of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections (MDOC), with f ive y e ars to serve, f

ive y ears suspended, a nd f

i ve y ears of s u p e r v i s e d probation. The circuit court f urther ordered that Shead p ay $2,100 i n various f e es a n d f

i nes and that his sentence f or f ondling run concurrently

with his sentence in a separate case docketed as cause num ber 2016-0135. ¶2. On appeal, Shead argues that (1) the circuit court erred by lim iting the testim ony

of

one of his def

e nse witnesses; (2) the circuit court e rred by giving the jury the lesser-includedof f ense instruction on f

o n dling; (3) the evidence was insuf f icient to support the jury ’s verdict; and (4) the verdict was against the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence. Finding no error, we af

f irm Shead’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS ¶3. At trial, K.W

. 2 testif ied she was visiting her grandm other’s house in Decem ber 2014 when her cousin Roshanda s tated, “My brother touched m e.” R oshanda had two older brothers: S head (ref

erred to a s e ither Lorenzo or L.J.) was the elder of the two brothers, and Jerem i ah w as the y ounger o f the two brothers. K .W

. testif i ed that Roshanda did not clarif y which b r o ther had touched her. K.W

. inf orm ed h er f

ather, Eugene W i lliam s, about Roshanda’s com m e nt, and W illiam s took K.W

. to the Greenville Police Departm ent to speak to police of

f icers and to m ake a statem ent. ¶4. Investigator Tam m ie Hudson with the Greenville Police D e p a rtm ent stated that the Greenville police chief called her and asked that she c o m e into the p olice station to m eet with K.W

. and W illiam s in ref erence to a m olestation allegation. A f ter speaking t o K

. W. and

2 We u se in itials in p lace o f th e m in o r w itn ess’s n am e.

2W i lliam s at the police station, Investigator Hudson contacted Sergeant Laquanna W esley

.

I n v e s t i g a t or Hudson and Sergeant W esley drove to the Sheads’ h om e and spoke t o Roshanda’s m other. T he of f i cers explained they h ad r eceived allegations that R oshanda was

a victim of sexual abuse. R osh a n d a ’ s mo t h e r g ave the of f icers p erm i ssion to speak to Roshanda. Both of

f icers testif

ied that Roshanda disclosed two incidents of abuse to them

. According to Investigator Hudson’s testim ony , Roshanda s tated that on Monday , Decem ber 22, 2014, her brother “ L.J.” had “tried to put his p enis in her . . . behind” and that the next day , on Tuesday , Decem

ber 2 3, 2014, “L.J.” had “tried to t ouch her private area and

. . . tried
to g et her to touch h i s private

. . . a r e a . ” Wi t h r egard to the D ecem ber 2 2, 2014 incident, Sergeant W esley sim ilarly testif ied that Roshanda told the of f icers that “Lorenzo Shead had put his private into her behind.” ¶5. Investigator Hudson testif ied that Roshanda s tated she had told h er m other about the incidents but that she did not f e el her m o ther beli e v e d h e r. In addition, R oshanda told the of f icers that she told her cousin K.W

. Roshanda then told the of f icers that she did not want L.J. t o touch her any

m o re. Sergeant W e sley t estif ied that a t the t im e of the alleged incidents, Roshanda was eight y ears old, and Shead was nineteen y ears o ld. Af ter hearing Roshanda’s
stat e me n t , S ergeant W esley c ontacted the Mississippi Departm ent o f Child P rotection Services (CPS). E stell a J o h nson, a CPS f a m ily -protection specialist, and her supervisor Earnestine Perry

m an responded to Sergeant W esley ’s call. Upo n t h e C P S e m

p l o y e e s ’ arrival, Investigator Hudson j oined Sergeant W esley outside the car, where they rem ained while the CPS workers spoke to Roshanda.

3¶6. Sergeant W e s l e y o b s e r v e d R o s h a n d a ’ s subsequent f orensic interview. Sergeant W e sley testif

ied that R oshanda m ade the sam e disclosure during the f orensic interview that she had previously m ade to the of f icers. A ccording to S ergeant W esley , Roshanda “disclosed that her brother put his private int o h e r b ehind.” Roshanda a lso underwent a

m edical exam ination, and Sergea n t We s ley received and reviewed the results. Af ter reviewing the r e sults of Roshanda’s m edical exam ination, Sergeant W esley prepared an

a f f i d a vit and warrant f

o r Shead’s arrest f

or sexual b attery

. Af

ter being a rrested and processed, Shead was tested f or sexually transm itted diseases (STDs). ¶7. J o h n s o n t e stif

ied that in D ecem

ber 2014 CPS received a phone call requestin g a worker’s p resence at a certain address due to allegations of abuse and neglect. J ohnson and Perry m an arrived at the specif

ied a ddress and saw Sergeant W esley standing outside a house and speaking on her cell phone. Johnson testif ied that Investigator Hudson w as sitting in a

car with Roshanda. Johnson and Perry m an spoke t o Roshanda’s m other, who w a s inside the house, and inf

orm ed Roshanda’s m other abo u t the allegations. Af t er Roshanda’s m other gave p erm ission f

or them t o speak with Roshanda, Johnson testif ied that she and Perry

m an returned to the car and s poke w ith Roshanda. Johnson corroborated that the of f icers waited outside while she and P erry m a n spoke to Roshanda. Johnson testif ie d t h a t w h en she and Perry m an asked whether Roshand a k n e w why they were there, Roshanda answered af f irm atively

. W ithout g iving any details about the allegati o n they had received, the CPS workers asked R oshanda to tell them “ a b o u t the incident that [ had] happened with her brother.” Johnson testif

i ed as f ollows regarding Roshanda’s statem ent:

4[ Roshanda] stated that she was asleep in her m other’s bedroom

. Her b rother

L.J. cam e i nto the room . He got in t h e b e d w i t h her. She sa[ id] he tried to unbutton her pants and stick his penis in her behind. S he s a[ id] s h e woke up, and he ran -- he g r abbed a pillow, put it in f ront of h is private area, and ran out the door. ¶8. P e r r y

ma n , a s a n a r e a C P S s upervisor f o r W ashington and Sunf lower Counties , testif i ed that s he accom

panied J ohnson in D ecem ber 2014 to the S heads’ hom e a f ter CPS received an a llegation of a buse. Like Johnson, Perry m an testif ied that s he observed Sergeant W e sley outside the hous e w h e n s h e and Johnson arrived. Perry m an likewise testif

ied that

s h e and Johnson entered the Sheads’ residence, obtained p erm ission f r o m R o s h a

n d a ’ s m o t h e r to speak to Roshanda, a nd then w ent back o utside to speak with Roshanda. W ith regard to the conversation she and Johnson had with Roshanda, P erry m a n testif ied, “ And we asked her [ (Roshanda)] did she know why we [ were] there, and she said[ , ‘Y]es.[ ’] And we a sked her
to tell us what happened, and she a lleged that h er brother tried to put h is penis in her behind.” Perry m an state d t h a t R o s handa then clarif ied that she was speaking about h er brother L.J. Perry m an f urther testif

i ed that in a ccordance with h er p rof essional training, she only asked “open-end[ ed] questions when a sexual abus e o r e i ther a real bad phy sical abuse ha[ s] occurred on a child due t o [ a] f orensic m edical [ e xam ination] and [ an] interview ha[ ving] to be done.” Perry

m an stated that CPS scheduled a f orensic interview f

or Roshanda and that she observed that interview. ¶9. Roshanda also testif ied at Shead’s trial. Roshanda stated that d uring Decem

ber 2014 she told K.W

. that L.J. had touched her. Roshanda t estif ied that w hen the incident happened, her m o ther had taken her f ather t o work and that she w as sleeping a lone in her parents’

5bedroom

. Roshanda stated that she a woke because she heard the “handles on the drawers

rattling.” She turned to her side and saw her brother L.J. in the room . Roshanda stated that L.J. c am e over t o the bed a nd that “[ h]is private p art was -- was on m y b ehind.” Roshanda then testif

ied that “[ h]e grabbed the pillow to hide his private part. He walked out [ of ] the

room . I went back to sleep. I woke back up, went t o use the restroom

. ” Roshanda testif ied that she could not rem em

ber whether she f

e lt her brother’s private part on h er skin or on her clothes. ¶10. Rachel Daniels, the director of p rogram services f o r the Children’s Advocacy Centers of Mississippi, conducted Roshanda’s f o r e n sic interview o n February 9, 2015. Daniels testif i ed that she had p r eviously worked as the social worker and f orensic i nterviewer at the Mississippi Children’s Saf e Center (CSC) and h a d c o n ducted f orensic interviews with children who w ere suspected abuse victim s. The circuit court accepted Daniels as an expert in f orensic interviewing. Af

t er interviewing Roshanda, Daniels wrote a report that c ontained her f indings and conclusions. B ased on R o s h anda’s statem e nts and dem eanor during the interview, Daniels concluded that R oshanda ’ s “ s tatem ents were consistent [ with] other children who have m ade statem ents r egarding abuse

. . . .” The circuit court allowed the State to enter into evidence a redacted copy o f the f orensic interview. Daniels testif ied that during the f

orensic interview, Roshanda described being asleep in h er parents’ bedroom when a noise awoke h er. Roshanda told Daniels that around the tim e of a h oliday when she

was eight y ears old, her brother L.J., “put h is private part n ear her butthole.” According to Daniels, Roshanda “described that when she was [ awoken] that her pants were u nbuttoned

6a n d t h a t her b rother was naked, and she reported that he lef t the room , that he cover e d him self with a pillow.” ¶11. W e ndi Nopper, a f am ily nurse practitioner at C S C, testif i ed that in the c ourse of her

em ploy m ent, s he routinely assessed, diagnosed, and treated children w h o were s uspected of having suf

f ered neglect, sexual abuse, and phy sical abuse. For an a l leged sexual-abuse case, Nopper explained that C SC personnel conducted a f ull head-to-toe exam ination of the child and then tested the child’s u rine f or any STDs. Depending o n the inf orm ation received, CSC personnel m ight also swab the child’s m outh and bottom a nd obtain blood work to test f or HIV a nd sy

p hilis. If a test result cam e back p ositive f or any STDs, Nopper stated that CSC contacted law enf

o rcem ent and the Departm ent of Hum an Services (D H S) with the inf orm ation. ¶12. Af ter observing Roshanda’s f ore n s i c i n t e r v i e w o n F e b r u a r y 9 , 2 0 1 5, Nopper perf orm ed a f ull head-to-toe f

orensic m edical exam ination on Roshanda. Nopper testif ied that based on Roshanda’s history and the circum stances of the ref e rral, she took s a m

ples of Roshanda’s urine to test f

or g onorrhea and chlamy dia and did blood work to test f or HIV and sy philis. Nopper received Roshanda’s test results b ack two day s later o n February 11, 2015. Nopper testif

ied that R o s h a n d a ’ s urine sam ple tested positive f

or chlamy dia. Nopper explained that “ chlamy dia is d ef initive, wh i c h

. . . m eans it has to be obtained f r om direct
contact with inf

ected body secretions, and so she [ (Roshanda) ] h a d t o h a v e . . . [ com e in] intim ate co ntact with som eone [ who] actually had that sam e inf ection, a chlam y dia inf ection.” The s am e day that sh e r e v i e w e d R o s h a n d a ’ s m e d i c a l -exam ination results, Nopper

7contacted DHS and law enf o rcem ent. ¶13. As a result of the s e x u a l

- a s s a u l t a llegation, Dr. Jam es W right evaluated Shead in February 2015. Dr. W right testif ied that a u rinaly sis a nd a “DNA chlamy dia p r o b e” were perf orm ed on Shead. Dr. W right conf irm ed that Shead tested positive f or chlam y dia. ¶14. Af ter the State rested its case-in-chief , the def ense m oved f

o r a d irected verdict on the sexual- b a t t e r y charge. The circuit court concluded that i nsuf f icient evidence e xisted f

or a reasonable juror to f

i nd bey ond a reasonable d oubt that the State had proved pen e t ration. The circuit court theref

o re g ranted a d i r e c t ed verdict as to the indicted charge of sexual battery

. However, the circuit c ourt allowed the case to m ove f orward on the lesser-included of f ense of f o ndling, and the def

ense presented its two witnesses. Af ter considering all the evidence and testim ony , the jury convicted Shead of f ondling. The circuit court sentenced Shead to ten y ears in MDOC’s custody , with f ive y e a rs to s e rve, f

ive y ears s uspended, and f ive y e ars of supervised probation. The c ircuit c o urt also assessed Shead $ 2,100 in various f ees and f ines and o rdered Shead’s sentence f or f ondling to run concurrently with another
sentence im

posed in cause num

ber 2016-0135

. Shead f

i led an unsuccessf

ul m otion f

or a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively , a new trial. Aggrieved, he appeals. DISCUSSION I. Ex c lusion of Witness Testim o ny ¶15. S h e a d argues that the circuit court erroneously lim i ted the testim o n y o f d e f e n s e witness Tem eka Cam

pbell, who is K.W .’s m o ther and W illiam s’s ex-wif e . W e review the adm ission or e xclusion of evidence f or abuse o f discretion. Dennis v. State , 271 S o. 3d 722,

8728 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). Any “error i n the adm ission or exclusion of e v idence is not

grounds f o r reversal u nless the e rror af f ected a substantial r ight of a party .” Martin v. State , 266 So. 3d 652, 667 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). ¶16. I n c a lling Cam

pbell as a witness, the def ense explained that it intended to use h e r testim o ny (1) to im

peach Sergean t W esley ’s testim ony that she and her husband did not per s o n a lly know W illiam s and ( 2 ) to give her opinion a s t o W illiam s ’ s truthf ulness and credibility

. The circuit court allowed the def en se to use Cam

pbell’s testim ony to im

peach Sergeant W esley ’s statem ents. T he circuit court questioned, however, h o w C a mp b ell’s testim o ny about W illiam s’s credibility was “helpf ul to c l early understand

. . . [ a] witness’[ s] testim o ny or to determ i n[ e] a f

act in issue.” In response, the def e nse relied on Mississippi Rule of Evidence 608(a), which provides: A w itness’s credibility m ay be attacked or supported b y test im ony about the witness’s r eputation f

or having a c haracter f

or truthf ulness or u ntruthf

ulness, or by testim ony in the f

orm of an opinion about that character. But evidence of truthf u l character is adm issible only af ter the witness’s character f or truthf ulness has been attacked. ¶17. Specif

i cally , the def

ense stated that during W illiam s’s cross-exam i nation, it had spent

m uch of the tim e asking W illiam s about his character f or truthf ulness and had attacked his character f

or truthf ulness. Shead’s attorney s theref ore r easoned that under Mississippi Rule of E vidence 608(a), the y w ere then allowed to of f er evidence about W i lliam s’s untruthf ul character. From the argum ent m ade by Shead’s attorney s, it a ppears the def

ense was rely ing

on the last sentence of Rule 6 08(a) as the o nly b asis f or of f ering Cam

pbell’s testim ony . The State responded that “ under the norm al construction o f [ the] rules,

. . . [ it did not] think that

9the party that attacked the credibility

. . . [ could] then com e back and f urther attack it or even support it.” The circuit court agreed and excluded Cam pbell’s t estim ony about W illiam s’s credibility

and lack of

truthf ulness. ¶18. On appeal, Shead argues the circuit court e rroneously lim i ted C am pbell’s testim ony because W illiam s’s testim ony and K.W .’s testim ony had conf l icted on two m ain points: f irst, wh e t h e r K.W

. disclosed a specif ic nam e when she relay ed to W illiam s Roshanda’s disclosure about the abuse, a n d s econd, whether W i lliam s rem ained with K.W

. while she spoke to

o f f i c e rs. Shead also c ontends that an im plication existed that W illiam s was closer t o Sergeant W esley

than W illiam s had adm i tted. ¶19. Upon review, we f i nd that these issues relating to whether W illiam s had a character f or truthf u lness or untruthf

ulness constituted col l a teral inquiries rather than “ substantive, probative f

act[ s] relevant to the real issue involved, which w as the g u i l t o r innocence of

. . . [ Shead]. ” Bingham v. State , 723 So. 2d 1 189, 1191 ( ¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 1 998). The State’s case against Shead neither hing e d o n n or relied on W illiam s’s testim ony or credibility

. Roshanda herself testif ied that Shead had touched her by putting his penis on her bottom

. Investigator Hudson, S ergeant W esley , Perry m an, J ohnson, a nd D a n iels all testif ied that Roshanda disclosed to them that Shead had touched her in this m anner. Furtherm ore, Nopper testif

i e d that Roshanda tested positive f or chlamy dia, which the jur y l a t e r learned f rom a dif f erent State’s witness was the sam e S T D S h e a d h a d

. B ecause an inquiry into W i lliam s’s character f

o r truthf u lness was neither relevant to whether S head com m itted the crim e of f ondling nor t ended to prove or disprove any m a t erial issue at h and, we conclude

1 0the circuit cou r t ’ s exclusion of s uch evidence f ails to warrant a reversal. Accordingly , we f ind this issue lacks m erit. II. Lesser-Included-Offense Instruction ¶20. Shead asserts that no evidentiary basis existed f or the circuit court to i nstruct the jury

on f ondling as a lesser-included of f ense of sexual battery

. More specif ically , S head argues that his alleged c onduct a nd the circum s tances surrounding the a lleged conduct f ell short of proving the “lustf

ul- i n t e nt” elem ent necessary to sustain a conviction f or f ondling. He theref ore contends that the c ircuit court erred by giving the jury the lesser-included-of f ense instruction on f

ondling, and he asks t h i s C o u r t t o grant h im a new trial. “A lesser-included-of

f ense instruction m ay be given where there is som e evidence s u pporting the lesser-included of

f e nse.” W illiams v. State , 240 So. 3d 4 36, 441 ( ¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). W e review the jury instructions given by the c i rcuit court f or abuse of discretion. Id. ¶21. The grand jury indicted Shead f or sexual battery u nder M ississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2 0 1 4 ) , w h i c h states that “[ a] person is g uilty o f sexual battery if h e or she engages in sexual penetration with

. . . [ a] c hild under the age of f o urteen ( 14) y ears of age, if the person is twenty -f our ( 24) or m ore m onths older than the child.” “Sexual penetration” includes “any penetration of the genital or anal openings of a n other perso n’s body by a n y part of a person’s body

. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-97(a) (Rev. 2014). ¶22. Af ter grantin g t

h e d e fe n s e ’ s d i r e c t ed-verdict m otion as to the indicted c harge of sexual battery , the circuit court allowed Shead’s case to proceed to the jury on the lesser-included of f ense of f o ndling. Our statutory

law def ines f ondling as f

ollows:

1 1Any per son above the age of eighteen (18) y ears, who, f or the purpose of gratif y ing his o r h er lust, o r indulging his or her depraved licentious sexual desires, shall handle, touch[ ,] or rub with hands or any part of his or her body or any m e m

b er thereof

, any child u nder the age of s ixteen (16) y ears, w ith or without the child’s consent, . . . shall be guilty

. . . . Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-23(1) (Rev. 2014). ¶23. As discussed, Shead’s only argum ent appears to be that the State f ailed to prove that he touched Roshanda to gratif y his lust or indulge his depraved l icentious sexual desires. Mississippi caselaw clearly holds that f

o ndling can be “a lesser-included of f ense of sexual battery , ” and a def

endant’s “ specif

ic, lustf u l i ntent can be inf

erred” f rom the circum stances of the touching. W

i lliams , 240 So. 3d at 4 42 ( ¶13) (internal q uotation m ark o m i tted) (citing Jenkins v. State , 131 So. 3d 544, 550 (¶¶18-19) (Miss. 2 013)); see also Friley v. State , 879 So. 2d 1 0 31, 1035 (¶¶16-17) (Miss. 2004); Ringer v. State , 203 So. 3 d 794, 798 ( ¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). ¶24. W i th regard to the “lustf ul-intent” or “lustf

ul-purpose” elem ent required f or f ondling, the Mississippi Supr e me C o u r t s tated in Friley that the def endant, “by his very acts of grabbing [ the victim ], touching her genital area, and touching him self , . . . w as g ratif

y ing his lust. There is absolutely no other reason why [ the def endant] would have perf

orm ed these acts.” F riley , 879 So. 2 d at 1035 (¶16). More recently , in Ringer , this Court explained that “while there was insuf

f icient evidence to f

ind penetration of the victim ’s a n u s , t he proof showed that, at the v ery least,

. . . [ the def endant] rubbed his penis between the vict i m ’s butto c k s ” and that such e vidence “undoubtedly am ounted to a touching under the gratif ication[ -]of

[ -]lust statute.” Ringer , 203 So. 3d at 798-99 (¶17).

1 2¶25. Here, R oshanda testif ied that she was sleeping alone in her p arents’ b edroom when

a n oise a woke her. Turning to her side, Roshanda saw that S head was in the bedroom with her. Roshanda testif

ied that Shead cam e over to the bed and that “[ h]is p rivate part was on

. . . [ her] behind.” At other points during her testim ony , Roshanda provided that S head had “touched her” and that s he had f elt his penis on her bottom

. Daniels, w ho testif ied about the f orensic interview she conducted with Roshanda, stated that Roshanda disclosed f inding her pants unbuttoned and Sh e a d standing n aked in the bedroom with her. I n both the f orensic interview and a t trial, Roshanda stated that S head grabbed a pillow to cover h im self and lef t the bedroom

. Subsequent m edical testing revealed that both S head and Roshanda ( who was only eight y ears old a t the tim e of t he alleged incident) had chlamy dia. Nopper, who conducted Roshanda’s f

orensic m edical exam ination, later explained during her testim ony that chlamy dia required “direct contact with inf ected body secretions , and so she [ (Roshanda)] had to have

. . . [ com e in] intim ate contact with som eone [ who] a ctually had that sam e inf

ection, a chlam y dia inf

ection” to contract the STD. ¶26. Based on such evidence, w e f ind no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s decision
to instruct the jury on f

ondling as a lesser-included of f ense of s exual battery

. T h e record contained suf

f icient evidence to support the lesser-include d of f e nse of f ondling, and the lustf ul-intent elem ent of f

ondling could be i n f

e r red f rom Shead’s actions as t estif ied to by Roshanda and as described in her interview w ith Daniels. As stated in previous cases, “we f ind that there is ‘no other reason w hy ’” Shead w ould perf orm these actions, “except f or the purpose of gratif

y i ng his lust.” R i nger , 203 So. 3d a t 799 (¶17) (citing Friley , 879 So. 2d at

1 31035 (¶16); Jenkins , 131 So. 3d at 550-51 ( ¶¶19-20)). W e theref ore f ind this assignm ent of error lacks m erit. III. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶27. Shead also contends there was insuf f icient evidence to support the j ury ’s verdict. As with his previous assignm e nt o f error, Shead’s a rgum ent f ocuses s olely on the lustf

ul-intent elem ent of f

ondling. Shead asserts that f or the sam e reason the “lesser-included[ -]of f ense instruction f

or f ondling was not supported b y the evidence [ (a lack o f proof o f intent to gratif y his lust)], it necessarily f ollows that the evidence was insuf f icient f or a conviction f

or f ondling . . . .” ¶28. In considering Shead’s challenge to the suf f iciency of the evidence, this Court m

ust decide whether

. . . [ the e v idence] allows a jury to f ind bey o nd a reasonable doubt that the accused com m itted the act charged, and that he did so under such circum stances that every e l em ent o f the of f ense existed; and where the evidence f

ails to m ee t this t est it i s insuf f icient to support a conviction. T he relevant question i s w hether, af ter viewing the evidence in the light m ost f

avorable to the prosecution, an y r ational trier of f a c t could have f ound the essential elem ents of the crim e bey ond a reasonable doubt. Ringer , 203 So. 3d at 796 (¶3) (citation a nd quotation m a rks o m i tted) (quoting Bush v. State , 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Little v. State , 233 So. 3d 288, 292 (¶¶19-20) (Miss. 2017)). ¶29. As discussed, the State p r e s e n t e d evidence that a t the tim e of the alleged incident, S h e a d was nineteen y ears old, and Roshanda was o nly eight y ears old. Between he r t r i a l testim o ny and f

orensic-interview statem ent, Roshanda disclosed that she awoke to f ind her pants unbuttoned, that a naked Shead was standing in her p arents’ b edroom , and that Shead

1 4touched her by putting his penis on her bottom

. Shead then g rabbed a pillow and used it to

cover his penis as he l ef t the bedroom

. In ad d i t i o n , me d i c al tests later determ ined that Roshanda had the sam e STD as Shead. Viewing this evidence in the light m ost f avorable to the State, we conclude that a rational juror c ould h ave f o und b ey ond a reasonable doubt that the S tate proved the essential elem ents o f f ondling, including the e lem ent of lustf u l purpose or lustf ul intent. W e theref

o re f ind this argum ent lacks m erit. IV. Weight of the Evidence ¶30. Shead also a sserts that the jury ’ s verdict was a gainst the w e i g h t o f t h e evidence. W e ighing the evidence in the light m ost f avorable to the v e r d i c t , “ w e will only reverse a jury ’s verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelm i ng weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction a n unconscionable i njustice.” Crawford v. State , 282 So. 3d 1230, 1238 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (internal quotation m ark om itted). ¶31. Sim ilarly to his previous two assignm e nts of error, Shead’s argum ent as to this issue f ocuses on an alleged lack of proof of lustf u l i ntent. As previously d iscussed, however, the jury can inf

er a def endant’s l ustf

ul intent f r o m the circum stances of the touching. W illiams , 240 So. 3d at 442 ( ¶13). As also dis c u s s e d , t h e State provided s uf f icient evidence f

rom which a juror could f

ind bey ond a reasonable doubt that the State proved the lustf ul-intent elem ent. Our caselaw holds that “the unsupported word of the victim o f a sex crim e is suf f i cient to support a guilty verdict where that testim ony is n ot discredited or contradicted by other credible eviden c e . ” Herbert v. State , 281 So. 3d 851, 856 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) ( quoting Lindsey v. State , 212 So. 3d 44, 47 (¶14) (Miss. 2017))

. I n addition to

1 5Roshanda’s tr i a l testim o ny and f orensic-interview statem ent, the S tate p resented other supporting t e s t im ony and m edical evidence to prove f ondling, and the def

ense f ailed to provide any testim ony or evidence that contradicted the allegations of abuse or Roshanda’s testim o ny . Thus, af

ter viewing the evidence in the light m o st f avora b l e t o t he v erdict, we cannot say that allowing the verdict to s tand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. W e theref ore f ind this issue lacks m erit. CONCLUSION ¶32. Because we f

i nd no error, we af

f irm Shead’s conviction and sentence f o r f ondling. ¶33. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, L A W RENCE, McCARTY AND C. W ILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

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