Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 1, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00449-CR

LESLIE R. COLLINS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 338th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1350783

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Leslie R. Collins appeals his conviction for misapplication of 

fiduciary property. In a single issue he argues the trial court erred in allowing a 

State’s witness to testify after the witness remained in the courtroom in violation of 

the witness sequestration rule. We affirm.

Background

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of misapplication of 
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fiduciary property without an agreed recommendation on punishment. The trial 

court ordered preparation of a presentence investigation report, and held a hearing 

on sentencing.

According to the offense summary in the PSI, appellant was a licensed 

insurance agent who misappropriated funds from individual customers and 

financial entities known as premium finance companies. In 2008, appellant was 

working with title companies ostensibly to provide insurance to new homeowners. 

In these instances the purchasers of new homes were required by the mortgage 

company to pay one year’s home insurance premium at closing. Most of the 

homeowners paid with a check made out to the title company and delivered at 

closing. The title company then issued checks to appellant, and appellant was 

expected to forward the funds to the insurance provider and purchase the 

insurance. Instead of forwarding the insurance premium, appellant kept the money. 

Most of the affected homeowners did not learn they were uninsured until after their

homes were damaged by Hurricane Ike. 

While preparing for trial, the District Attorney’s office discovered appellant 

committed a similar scheme involving premium finance companies. Premium 

finance companies typically provide financing to businesses and individuals who 

cannot afford to pay a lump sum annual insurance premium. The investigators 

learned that appellant created false clients, both business and personal, submitted 

their information to the finance companies, obtained financing, but kept the money 

paid by the finance companies.

The presentence investigators received victim impact letters from eight 

victims. Two of the victims, Bret Schulte and Roland Seymour, testified during the 

punishment hearing. Schulte and Seymour were victims of an investment scheme 

perpetrated by appellant, which was separate from the insurance scheme.
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In his victim impact letter, Schulte wrote that he gave appellant and 

appellant’s partner $500,000 in a single transaction to invest in real property. 

When the transaction failed to close appellant told Schulte he needed another 

$70,000. Schulte insisted that appellant keep the money in a trust account and only 

use it for the real estate investment. According to Schulte, appellant and his partner 

stole the money. They showed him a bank statement showing hundreds of 

thousands of dollars in the account, but Schulte later learned there was almost no 

money in the account. Schulte obtained real bank statements for the account, and 

learned that appellant was withdrawing large amounts of cash from the account to 

purchase personal items. Appellant eventually purchased the real estate, but did so 

through a holding company, essentially cutting Schulte out of the transaction. 

Schulte wrote that he never received any money for his investment. Schulte 

obtained a civil judgment against appellant for approximately $8,000,000.

In his victim impact letter, Seymour wrote that in August of 2008, appellant 

asked him for a $60,000 loan as an extension payment on a 264-acre tract of land 

known as the “La Marque Project.” He said he would repay the $60,000 plus 

another $60,000 in two weeks. Within three weeks appellant paid Seymour 

$120,000. A week later appellant asked for another $125,000 to pay an insurance 

premium to a company named First Nations Insurance Group (FNIG). Seymour 

requested a written contract with appellant for return of the money. Seymour never 

received a contract or receipts he requested. Seymour became suspicious when he 

met several other investors who had paid money directly to FNIG on appellant’s 

behalf. When Seymour met with one of the investors he learned that appellant 

repaid Seymour’s $120,000 with funds he received from another investor in the La

Marque Project. 

After preparation of the PSI, the trial court held a punishment hearing. Prior
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to any testimony, appellant invoked the witness sequestration rule (the “Rule”). See

Tex. R. Evid. 614. The trial court explained to the witnesses that they should 

remain outside the courtroom and were not to discuss their testimony amongst 

themselves or with anybody else except for the attorneys representing either side.

Schulte testified during the punishment hearing that he first met appellant 

through a realtor. He invested $425,000 of his own money plus funds from his 

family members, which totaled over $1,000,000. Schulte gave the money to 

appellant with the understanding that appellant would purchase real estate in 

Galveston County, develop the land, and repay Schulte’s investment. Appellant 

continued to ask for more money, but failed to close the real estate deal. Schulte 

testified that he has a judgment against appellant for over $8,000,000, but has not 

collected. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Schulte about an 

agreement with a company named G.C. Wealth as it related to an apartment 

complex that was part of the real estate deal.

Seymour testified immediately after Schulte. Seymour began his testimony 

as follows:

Q. All right. At some point in 2008, did you enter into some sort of 

financial or investment agreement with Leslie Ray Collins?

A. Yeah. It was on August 4, 2008.

Q. What sort of project did you believe you were investing money in?

A. He told me he needed $60,000 as an extension payment for his 

seller, Mr. Bob Greg. He mentioned to me that it was supposed to be 

some sort of a mixed-use development, was what it was supposed to 

be — a town center, some apartments, some other stuff — and that he

had — it was basically a major project that was going on with the 

town of La Marque.

Q. That’s La Marque in Galveston County?

A. Yeah, it was called, quote, the “La Marque Project.” And at the 

time the project — the name of the company was L.O.A. Holdings.
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And I was just sitting here, and I heard them mention about G.C. 

Wealth, also. At the time when I met him —

Defense counsel immediately objected to Seymour’s testimony as being in 

violation of the Rule. The State asked Seymour what he had heard of Schulte’s 

testimony. Seymour replied, “I heard Mr. Schulte say that they changed the name 

of the company several different times.” The trial court permitted Seymour’s 

testimony about his experience with appellant.

Seymour testified that appellant approached him for a $60,000 extension 

payment to finance a project with FNIG. As he wrote in his victim impact letter, 

Seymour testified that appellant promised to pay him $120,000 in exchange for his 

$60,000 investment. Three weeks later, appellant paid Seymour $120,000. 

Approximately one month later, appellant asked to borrow $125,000 for a down 

payment on the deal with FNIG. Appellant promised to double Seymour’s money, 

and promised if Seymour reinvested the $250,000, appellant would, within sixty 

days, double that money, for a total return of $750,000. Seymour never got his 

$125,000 back, and never discovered where the money went.

Violation of “the Rule”

In his sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing 

Seymour to testify after he heard a portion of Schulte’s testimony.

Rule of Evidence 614, commonly known as “the Rule,” provides for the 

exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom during trial. Tex. R. Evid. 614. The 

purpose of Rule 614 is to prevent the testimony of one witness from influencing 

the testimony of another. Russell v. State, 155 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005). Once Rule 614 is invoked, witnesses are instructed by the court that they 

cannot converse with one another or with any other person about the case, except 

by permission from the court. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.06; Russell, 155 
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S.W.3d at 179. The trial court must exclude witnesses from the courtroom during 

the testimony of other witnesses. Tex. R. Evid. 614. 

However, if a witness violates this rule, the trial court still has discretion to 

allow testimony from the witness. Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 50 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996). On appeal, the trial court’s decision to admit testimony will not be 

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. A violation of the Rule is not, in itself, 

cause for reversible error. Webb v. State, 766 S.W.2d 236, 239–40 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1989). The defendant must also show that he was harmed by the violation. 

See Archer v. State, 703 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Harm is 

established by showing that (1) the witness actually conferred with or heard 

testimony of other witnesses and (2) the witness’s testimony contradicted the 

testimony of a witness from the opposing side or corroborated testimony of a 

witness he had conferred with or heard. Id.

In this case, it is clear Seymour violated the Rule because he heard a portion 

of Schulte’s testimony. Seymour’s testimony did not contradict or corroborate 

Schulte’s testimony. According to their testimony and their victim impact letters, 

Seymour and Schulte experienced different fraudulent investment schemes with 

appellant. According to Schulte’s testimony, he invested several hundred thousand 

dollars of his own money plus his family member’s money and never saw a return 

on his investment. Appellant repeatedly asked for more money from Schulte and 

when he finally purchased the real estate, did so through a holding company, 

essentially ensuring that Schulte would not see a return on his investment. In 

contrast, the fraud described in Seymour’s testimony resembled a “Ponzi” scheme 

in which appellant repaid Seymour’s initial investment with funds received from 

another investor. Nothing in Seymour’s testimony corroborated Schulte’s 

testimony or made it more compelling. Seymour’s testimony was almost identical 
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to the information he wrote about in the letter contained in the PSI. Seymour only 

heard Schulte’s testimony about the names of the false companies used by 

appellant. The record does not reflect that the testimony Seymour heard affected 

his testimony at the punishment hearing. Accordingly, appellant was not harmed 

by Seymour overhearing a portion of Schulte’s testimony. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in permitting Seymour to testify. We overrule appellant’s sole 

issue.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/ Ken Wise

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby, and Wise.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).