J. S48020/16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 : PENNSYLVANIA 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

LONNELLE M. JOHNSON, JR., : 

 : 

 Appellant : No. 1429 WDA 2015 

 

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 11, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division No(s): CP-02-CR-0011414-2009 

 

BEFORE: BOWES, DUBOW, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED OCTOBER 21, 2016 

Appellant, Lonnelle M. Johnson, Jr., appeals the PCRA court’s Order 

dismissing without a hearing his first Petition under the Post-Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541, et seq. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm. 

The trial court previously summarized the factual history of this case 

as follows: 

Thomas Nguyen testified that he and his brother, Hoang, were in 

the Hill District of Pittsburgh at approximately noon on June 26, 

2009, dropping his brother’s baby off to the mother. Hoang[] 

was driving and Thomas was in the passenger’s seat while the 

vehicle was stopped on Bedford Avenue. As they were stopped 

there, a group of people, which included [Appellant], waved 

toward Hoang. Hoang pulled the vehicle to the side of the road 

to talk to those individuals. One of the individuals, later 

identified by [Thomas] as “Woozy” [a/k/a Daniel Williams], was 

speaking with [Hoang] through the driver’s side window. Two 

other individuals were also present outside the vehicle. While 
J.S48020/16 

- 2 -

[Hoang] was talking with Woozy, another individual, later 

identified as [Appellant], jumped into the backseat of the car on 

the driver’s side, pointed a gun at Hoang and told him to “give it 

up.” Thomas took that to mean that he wanted them to give 

him anything of value that he and [Hoang] had. 

At this point, however, Hoang put the car into drive and began 

to drive away. When he did this, [Appellant] said, “Don’t try it. 

I’ll shoot you.” Hoang stepped on the gas pedal. As soon as the 

car started moving, [Appellant] started shooting. Thomas heard 

at least three gunshots. The vehicle then crashed into a tree. 

Thomas blacked out for a few seconds. When he awoke, he did 

not see [Hoang] in the driver’s seat any longer. He tried to get 

out, but his door would not open. He indicated that he noticed 

that he had been shot in the leg. He still saw the individual 

identified as Woozy standing near a building but did not see the 

individual who had shot him. 

While he was at the hospital, the police came and showed him 

photographs. He stated that he was able to speak to the police 

and was not under the influence of drugs at that point. He 

recalls the conversation he had with the police. He was shown 

several sets of photographs. He identified Woozy from one set 

and [Appellant] from another set of photographs. Thomas 

identified [Appellant] in the [c]ourtroom and identified him as 

the individual who jumped into the back seat of the car, pointed 

the gun at him and [Hoang] and shot them. 

Daniel Williams (“Woozy”), also testified. He stated that he saw 

[] Hoang, drive up and wave[] at him to speak with him. 

[Williams] spoke with [Hoang] through the driver’s side door and 

noticed that [Hoang’s] brother was in the passenger seat. 

[Williams] stated that he talked to [Hoang] for a few minutes. 

While standing next to the driver’s window, [Williams] saw 

someone holding a gun jump into the back seat of the car and 

say something to the two victims. [Williams] testified that 

[Hoang] drove off with the individual still in the backseat. The 

car travelled a short distance and then struck a tree. ... 

[Williams] said that the individual in the car got out and ran. He 

then saw [Hoang] get out of the car, put his hand to his head 

and fall to the ground. Williams stated that he stayed at the 

scene and was placed under arrest when the police showed up. 

He stated that he provided a description of the individual he saw 
J.S48020/16 

- 3 -

but could not provide the name of the person. He admitted that 

he told them that he was afraid to identify that person. 

On cross[-]examination, Williams testified that he knew 

[Appellant], and had known him for years. He stated that 

[Appellant] was not the individual who was in the backseat of 

the vehicle. 

Detective Bonzale Boose, with the City of Pittsburgh Homicide 

Division, testified that he interviewed Williams and that Williams 

told him that while he was standing at the driver’s window 

talking with [Hoang], an individual walked up to his right side, 

opened the rear door on the driver’s side, and got in with a 

handgun pointed at the driver. He said the car pulled away and 

he heard several shots. The car then accelerated a few feet, 

turned and struck the tree, where it came to rest. He said he 

saw the individual get out of the car and run into the projects. 

He also said he saw the driver get out of the car and collapse to 

the ground. When Detective Boose asked him if he could 

identify the person he saw enter the car[], [Williams], according 

to Detective Boose, said “He could ID that individual, but he will 

not ID an individual under any circumstances out of safety for 

himself and his family.” 

The Commonwealth also presented fingerprint evidence. Latent 

prints were obtained from [the] rear driver’s door and door 

frame, which was where both the surviving victim and Williams 

said the assailant had entered the vehicle. Of the total of nine 

latent prints of value obtained from the [] vehicle, three were 

matched to [Appellant]. Two from the rear door matched 

[Appellant’s] left little finger and one matched his left middle 

finger. 

In addition, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Walter 

Lorenz, a forensic scientist from the Allegheny County Medical 

Examiner’s Division of Laboratories. Dr. Lorenz testified that 

DNA samples were obtained from the exterior and interior 

handles from the rear driver’s side door. Samples were also 

obtained from [Appellant] and the victim, Hoang Nguyen. The 

comparison between the sample from the interior door handle 

and the samples from [Appellant] and the victim resulted in Dr. 

Lorenz excluding both as significant contributors to the DNA 

material obtained from the interior door handle. The comparison 

between the DNA material obtained from the exterior handle and 

that from the victim and [Appellant], however, resulted in the 
J.S48020/16 

- 4 -

exclusion of the victim as being a possible contributor and the 

determination that the DNA from the door handle and from 

[Appellant] matched. The probability of such a match was one 

in 1.3 billion among African-Americans. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/18/11, at 4-9 (citations to the record omitted). 

Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder, 

aggravated assault, carrying a firearm without a license, and two counts of 

robbery. On October 25, 2010, the court sentenced him to a mandatory 

term of life imprisonment for the murder conviction, as well as a concurrent, 

aggregate term of 20 to 60 years’ incarceration for the remaining 

convictions. On July 11, 2012, this Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, 

but vacated his Judgment of Sentence and remanded for resentencing based 

upon the trial court’s failure to grant Appellant credit for time served. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 1937 WDA 2010, unpublished 

memorandum (Pa. Super. filed July 11, 2012). Appellant was re-sentenced 

on May 5, 2013. 

On August 26, 2013, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA Petition. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel 

with a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 

927 (Pa. 1988), Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 

1988) (en banc). Shortly thereafter, PCRA counsel filed a Motion to 

Supplement Previous Motion to Withdraw. 

On June 30, 2014, the PCRA court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss 

Appellant’s PCRA Petition without a hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 
J.S48020/16 

- 5 -

Criminal Procedure 907. In response, Appellant filed an amended PCRA 

Petition pro se. On August 11, 2015, after reviewing Appellant’s amended 

pro se Petition, the PCRA court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Amended 

Rule 907 Notice. 

On September 2, 2015, Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. 

The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant did 

not do so of his own accord. The PCRA court did not file an Opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

In his Brief to this Court, Appellant provides the following “Statement 

of Questions Presented”: 

1. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA 

Petition without holding an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether trial counsel was ineffective? 

2. Whether trial counsel provided and serviced Appellant 

ineffective assistance when trial counsel failed to investigate and 

interview potential alibi exculpatory witnesses in support of 

Appellant’s actual innocence? 

3. Whether [the] PCRA court erred in permitting PCRA counsel to 

withdraw when the language it used shows that PCRA counsel’s 

‘no-merit’ lettered petition reveals that PCRA counsel had limited 

its investigation and interview to just ‘one’ lonely witness where 

PCRA counsel’s investigation was solely based and relied upon 

review of previous transcripts of witness’s testimony that witness 

could not positively identified Appellant as the actual suspect? 

Appellant’s Brief at iv. 

We note at the outset that Appellant’s pro se Brief is comprised of a 

repetitive and rambling assertion of errors that does not comply with 
J.S48020/16 

- 6 -

Pa.R.A.P. 2118-2119.1 Despite its significant flaws, we are able to discern 

from the discussion portion of the Brief two distinct issues: (i) ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate and present four 

witnesses at trial; and (ii) a challenge to the denial of the PCRA Petition 

without a hearing. 

When reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA 

relief, this Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record 

supports the determination of the PCRA court, and whether the ruling is free 

of legal error. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa. Super. 

2007). We grant great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and 

these findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the 

certified record. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 

Super. 2003). When the PCRA court denies a petition without an evidentiary 

hearing, we “examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the 

record certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its 

determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact in 

controversy and in denying relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing.” 

 

1

 The argument section of Appellant’s Brief contains three subsections with 

headings that do not match or otherwise correspond with the questions 

presented in the Statement of Questions Presented. See Appellant’s Brief at 

3, 13, 16. Moreover, our review of Appellant’s Brief reveals that the 

headings, which subdivide his argument sections, bear little relation to the 

arguments developed thereunder. 
J.S48020/16 

- 7 -

Commonwealth v. Khalifah, 852 A.2d 1238, 1240 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citation omitted). 

Trial Counsel’s Failure to Call Potential Witnesses 

In his first issue, Appellant avers that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to investigate, interview, and call four witnesses at trial. 

In analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we presume 

that trial counsel was effective unless the PCRA petitioner proves otherwise. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1177 (Pa. 1999). In order to 

succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must 

demonstrate (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that 

counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) that the 

ineffectiveness of counsel caused the appellant prejudice. Commonwealth 

v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). Appellant bears the burden of 

proving each of these elements, and his “failure to satisfy any prong of the 

ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.” 

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 2009). 

It is well settled that a PCRA petitioner cannot prevail on a claim of 

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to call a witness unless the 

petitioner shows that: “(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available 

to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the 

existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the 

defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness was so 
J.S48020/16 

- 8 -

prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 599 (Pa. 2007). To satisfy the prejudice prong 

of this analysis, a PCRA petitioner “must show how the uncalled witnesses’ 

testimony would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case.” 

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1134 (Pa. 2008) (citations 

omitted). 

Witness Andrew Davis

Appellant avers that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate and interview Andrew Davis (“Davis”).2 This argument is without 

merit because, as explained by the PCRA court, trial counsel did interview 

Davis and discovered that Davis’ testimony would not have aided in 

Appellant’s defense: 

First, trial counsel did, in fact, secure an interview of Andrew 

Davis through his private investigator. The report from that 

interview was attached to the defendant's Motion to Supplement 

Previous Motion to Withdraw. Second, the report of that 

interview reveals that Mr. Davis would not have offered 

testimony favorable to the defendant. He told the investigator 

that he could not identify any of the three individuals he saw, 

including the person who shot the victim. His inability to identify 

the assailants could not possibly have aided Mr. Johnson in his 

trial. 

. . . 

Nowhere in this statement is Andrew Davis reported to have said 

anything that would have been exculpatory to the defendant. It 

was the defendant's burden to proffer, in his Petition, facts 

 

2

 Davis was the only witness mentioned by Appellant in his initial pro se

Petition. 
J.S48020/16 

- 9 -

which, if proven at a hearing, would establish his right to relief. 

Here, as he is alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to present testimony from Andrew Davis, it was his burden to 

establish what Andrew Davis would have said if called as a 

witness and how that testimony would have changed the 

outcome of the trial. He failed to meet that burden because all 

that Andrew Davis could have said is that he could not identify 

any of the men. He did not say, as the defendant seems to 

suggest, that the defendant was not present. He said he could 

not identify any of the men present. Because Andrew Davis 

would not have offered any testimony helpful to the defendant, 

counsel was not ineffective in failing to present him as a witness. 

Trial Court Memorandum Opinion and Amended Notice of Intention to 

Dismiss, filed 8/11/15, at 1-3. 

Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s analysis. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in determining that 

there were no genuine issues of material fact in controversy, and that 

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

Witnesses George Lyle and Daniel Williams

Appellant next avers that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call 

witness George Lyle (“Lyle”), who “if [he] had been called upon, would have 

testified truthfully that Appellant was with him on the day and at the time of 

the alleged shooting incident for which [Appellant] was wrongfully accused 

of” and failing to call Daniel Williams (“Williams”). Appellant’s Brief at 8, 5. 

Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, both Lyle and Williams testified at 

trial. Lyle, who testified on Appellant’s behalf, told the jury that Appellant 

was with him at the time of the murder. N.T., 7/28/10, at 249-66. 

Williams, called as a witness for the Commonwealth, testified to seeing a 
J.S48020/16 

- 10 -

man with a gun enter the victim’s vehicle, threaten him, and run from scene 

following the crash. N.T., 7/27/10, at 84-87. On cross-examination by trial 

counsel, Williams testified that he knew Appellant and that Appellant was not 

the man he saw running from the vehicle. Id. at 92. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s contention fails: trial counsel can hardly be deemed ineffective 

for failing to call witnesses who did, in fact, testify. 

Witness Marcel Green

Finally, Appellant avers that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

call Marcel Green (“Green”) as a witness at trial. Appellant did not mention 

Green in his initial pro se PCRA Petition, or in his counseled amended PCRA 

Petition. Moreover, his Brief to this Court contains no information regarding 

what testimony Appellant believes Green might have given had he been 

called at trial, or any of the other elements required under Washington, 

927 A.2d at 599. Instead, Appellant’s only reference to, and entire 

argument regarding, Green is the following single sentence: “The dispositive 

issue is whether trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to investigate other 

potential exculpatory witnesses [sic]; Daniel Williams, Andrew Davis, and 

Marcel Green.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. Therefore, Appellant waived all claims 

regarding Green by failing to raise this claim below or develop it in his Brief 

to this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court 

are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Harkins v. 

Calumet Realty Co., 614 A.2d 699, 703 (Pa. Super. 1992) (noting that 
J.S48020/16 

- 11 -

issues raised but not developed the argument section of a brief will be 

deemed waived). 

Denial of PCRA Petition Without a Hearing

In his second and third argument sections, Appellant avers, in 

substance, that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his Petition without a 

hearing.3 We disagree. There is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing 

on a PCRA petition, and the PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing if the 

claims are patently frivolous and without a trace of support in the record. 

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

In the instant case, as discussed supra, the claims raised by Appellant 

were either patently frivolous or never raised before the PCRA court. PCRA 

counsel, in a Motion to Supplement Previous Motion to Withdraw, provided 

the PCRA court with a copy of trial counsel’s witness interview report for 

Davis. Motion to Supplement Previous Motion to Withdraw, Exhibit A, filed 

 

3

 We note that the headings for these argument sections purport to raise 

other claims of error by the PCRA court and ineffectiveness by trial counsel. 

None of these claims are developed in the argument that follows, however, 

and in substance both arguments aver that the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing Appellant’s claim without a hearing. To properly develop an issue 

for our review, Appellant bore the burden of ensuring that his argument 

section included citations to pertinent authorities as well as discussion and 

analysis of the authorities. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Commonwealth v. 

Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[I]t is an appellant’s duty to 

present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief 

must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the 

record and with citations to legal authorities.” (citations omitted)). 

Therefore, Appellant waived any claims suggested in his headings, where he 

failed to discuss them or develop them in the arguments that follow. 
J.S48020/16 

- 12 -

6/16/14. That statement made it clear that counsel did, in fact, interview 

Davis and discovered that he had no exculpatory testimony to offer. For 

Lyle and Williams, a review of the trial record was sufficient to show that 

both witnesses did in fact testify at trial. Therefore, a hearing was not 

needed to further develop any of Appellant’s meritless claims regarding 

these witnesses. 

Based on all of the foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court did not 

err in dismissing Appellant’s Petition without a hearing. Accordingly, we 

affirm the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s Petition. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/21/2016