NO. 07-09-0300-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL B MAY 26, 2010

TIMOTHY MARK RAMIREZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________ _________ FROM THE 121ST DISTRICT COURT OF TERRY COUNTY;

NO. 5897; HONORABLE KELLY G. MOORE, PRESIDING

Memorandum Opinion

Before QUINN, C.J., a nd CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. Timothy Mark Ramirez was convicted of possessing at least one gram but less than four grams of cocaine wi th intent to deliver. On appeal, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence sho wing that he possessed the drugs and had the intent to deliver them to ot hers. We affirm the judgment. Background On December 13, 2008, the Brownfield Police Depart ment executed a search warrant at the home of Crystal Garza. Those present were Crystal, her two small2 daughters, Sammy Martinez, and appellant. The latter was Crystal’s intermittent boyfriend and the father of t he two children. When the po lice entered, both appellant and Crystal informed them of t he drugs’ location. According to one officer, appellant not only said that “he’ll show us where everythi ng was at” but also that “’[t]hey had nothing to do with it’” and “[l]et them go.’” In a dresser upon which were placed men’s underwear and socks were found several indi vidual packets of cocaine. Also discovered in the same dresser was approximat ely $1300 in cash. The cash consisted of five, ten, and twenty dollar bills, which denominations were normally found on those selling drugs, according to one officer. A police scanner and a set of scales (two items also used in the drug trade according to t he officer), were discovered on or in the dresser as well. So too did those search ing the abode find checks payable to appellant, a crack pipe, a black book with names and numbers in it, and plastic baggies with the corners cut off. Several of the latter item s, though, were found in another bedroom as opposed to the master bedroom where the drugs and money were located. Sufficiency of the Evidence As previously stated, appellant attacks the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence showing that he knowingly possessed the drugs with intent to deliver. The pertinent standards of review are well known and need not be re iterated. They can be found in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim . App. 2006). Next, to convict appellant of the charged offense, the State was required to prove that he intentionally and kn owingly possessed cocaine with intent to deliver. T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN

. §481.112(c) (Vernon Supp. 200 9). Upon perusing the3 record to determine whether those elemen ts were established, we came upon the following evidence. Appellant was in the house at t he time, and though he supposedly lived elsewhere, he intended to spend the night and was receiving friends there before the raid. Checks addressed to him were also at the house. Men’s boxer shorts and socks were located in the master bedroom at op one of the two dressers; ladies undergarments were found in the other dresser. The indi vidually wrapped packets of cocaine, packets of money, scales, and polic e scanner were found in or on the dresser upon which were located the men’s boxer shor ts. And, most importantly, appellant not only directed the officers to the location of t he drugs but also said that others present should be released because they had nothing to do with the substances. That the denomination of the paper money discovered co incided with that possessed by drug traffickers was another bit of evidence upon which a rational jury could have relied in reaching its verdict. The same can be said of the scales and police scanner. Nor can we ignore Crystal’s testimony that the drugs were acquired not only for her use but to distribute or “give” to others or her fri ends. When taken together, the sum of this evidence was enough to permit a rational ju ry to link appellant to the drugs and conclude beyond reasonable doubt that he ex ercised care, custody and control over them with the intent to deliver. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161- 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Admittedly, Crystal testified that she owned the drugs, t hat appellant knew nothing of them, that she bought them to distribute at a bache lorette party, that she was estranged from appellant (though she already had two children by him and was4 pregnant with his child at the time of trial, sought financia l help from him, and allowed him to sleep over), that she owned and wore t he men’s boxer shorts that were atop the dresser, and that she owned and read the sexu ally explicit men’ s magazines depicting nude women which were found at the house. Ye t, that simply created a question of fact regarding who actually possessed the contraband. So too did it raise credibility issues which were for the jury to deci de. And, though the jury was free to accept her version of the circumstances, it was not re quired to do so. Indeed, it could well have concluded that she was less than truthful in order to save from prison the fa ther of her expected child upon whom she relied for fi nancial assistance. If in pris on, he would not be able to provide her the financial support which she adm ittedly sought from him. That she had already been granted pr obation by the time she testified and was unlikely to be further prosecuted by the time she testified could have also been a factor considered by the jury in assessing her veracity. Consequently, we cannot say that t he jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence or manifestly wrong. Accordingly, we overrule appellant ’s issues and affirm the judgment.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice Do not publish.