1996 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-18-1996

Hovsons Inc v. Township of Brick

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 95-5648,95-5666

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1996 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Hovsons Inc v. Township of Brick" (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 103.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/103
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 Nos. 95-5648 and 95-5666 

 

 HOVSONS, INC.; 

 JOHN DOES 

 v. 

 TOWNSHIP OF BRICK, a Municipal Corporation in Ocean County; 

 ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF BRICK 

 Hovsons, Inc., 

 Appellant No. 95-5648 

 Township of Brick, 

 Appellant No. 95-5666 

 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the District of New Jersey 

 (D.C. No. 94-cv-04265) 

 

 Argued June 3, 1996 

 BEFORE: COWEN, NYGAARD and LEWIS 

 Circuit Judges 

 (Filed July 18, l996) 

Beth Pepper (argued) 

Stein & Schonfeld 

520 West Fayette Street 

The Maryland Bar Center 

Baltimore, Maryland 21201 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE 

 Hovsons, Inc. 

Thomas E. Monahan (argued) 

Charles W. Hutchinson 

Gilmore & Monahan 

Ten Allen Street 

P.O. Box 1540 

Toms River, New Jersey 08754 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 

 Township of Brick, a Municipal Corporation

 in Ocean County 
Sally P. Dunaway 

American Association of 

 Retired Persons 

601 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20049 

 American Association of 

 Retired Persons 

 Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648 

Andrew D. Levy 

Brown, Goldstein & Levy 

520 West Fayette Street 

Suite 300 

Baltimore, Maryland 21201 

 The National Association of 

 Social Workers, Inc. 

 Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648 

 Amicus-appellee, No. 95-5666 

 American Seniors Housing 

 Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648 

 Amicus-appellee, No. 95-5666 

 The National Citizens' Coalition 

 for Nursing Home Reform 

 Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648 

 Amicus-appellee, No. 95-5666 

 The National Senior Citizens 

 Law Center 

 Amicus-appellant, No. 95-5648 

 Amicus-appellee, No. 95-5666 

 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 

COWEN, Circuit Judge. 

 

 In this case we must decide whether the Township of 

Brick's refusal to grant a variance to Hovsons, Inc. ("Hovsons") 

to build a nursing home in the Township's R-R-2 zone, an area the 

district court found to be predominantly residential, violates 

the mandate of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 

42 U.S.C.  3601 et seq., that all municipalities provide 

"reasonable accommodations" to handicapped persons. Id. 

3604(f)(3)(B). The district court rejected Hovsons' FHAA claims 

and denied its request for declaratory and injunctive relief. 

 We conclude that the accommodation Hovsons has put 
forward would not impose an undue financial or administrative 

burden upon Brick Township. Nor would building a nursing home in 

the R-R-2 zone fundamentally undermine the Township's zoning 

scheme. We therefore hold that the finding of the district court 

that the Township complied with the FHAA's "reasonable 

accommodations" provision cannot stand. Accordingly, we will 

reverse the August 16, 1995 order of the district court and 

remand with instructions to enjoin the Township of Brick from 

interfering with Hovsons' plans to construct the nursing home 

facility that the State of New Jersey authorized it to build in 

Brick Township. 

 

 I. 

 A. 

 Hovsons is a developer of nursing homes and other forms 

of senior citizen housing, such as adult retirement communities. 

Hovcare of Brick, Inc., a corporation affiliated with Hovsons, 

owns a 32.73-acre parcel of land on the Brick Township-Lakewood 

Township border in New Jersey. Hovsons has proposed to build a 

nursing home facility on that parcel. Approximately twenty-two 

(21.96) of the acres are located in Brick Township; the 

remaining (10.77) acres are in Lakewood Township. Hovsons' 

developmental plan calls for site construction only on the Brick 

Township portion of the property. Brick Township has steadfastly 

opposed the construction of such a development within the R-R-2 

zone. 

 The nursing home facility Hovsons has envisioned is 

intended for persons who will require some form of nursing care 

for the rest of their lives. Referred to as "Holiday Village," 

it would have the capacity to house 210 residents. The density, 

architecture and design features of the proposed development are 

comparable to that of the surrounding planned retirement 

communities in Brick Township. The structure and its associated 

parking and access facilities would cover six to seven acres. 

The remaining land area would consist of open spaces, landscaped 

areas and preserved tree buffers. 

 Under New Jersey law, nursing homes may not be built 

unless the need for a home within the applicable health service 

area is established through a certificate of need process. SeeN.J. Stat. 

Ann.  26:2H-7-:2H-8. On December 2, 1989, the New 

Jersey Department of Health approved Hovsons' application for a 

certificate of need which authorized construction of a 150-bed 

nursing home in Brick Township. Hovsons' certificate was amended 

on August 12, 1991 to increase the authorized number of beds from 

150 to 210. 

 In its August 12, 1991, approval letter to Hovsons 

authorizing this sixty-bed increase, the New Jersey Department of 

Health cited the acute need for nursing home facilities in Brick 

Township. New Jersey Commissioner of Health Frances J. Dunston 

declared that building another nursing home in Brick Township 

would "help to maintain balance in the distribution of long-term 

care beds throughout Ocean County, thereby promoting geographical 

access to care for area residents. Brick Township has 

approximately 6.7 long-term care beds per 1,000 population, 
compared to the County average of 12 beds per 1,000 population." 

App. at 26. In addition, the State prioritized Hovsons' 

application on account of its agreement to have Medicaid-eligible 

patients comprise no less than fifty-five percent of its patient 

population. 

 Brick Township is divided into a total of twenty-three 

zoning districts comprised of fifteen residential zones, seven 

business/office zones and one hospital support zone. Nursing 

homes are excluded from all fifteen residential zones. Hovsons 

has proposed to construct Holiday Village in Brick Township's RR-2 or "Rural Residential-Adult Community Zone." Id. at 242. 

The district court found that the R-R-2 zone is "primarily, 

although not exclusively, for residential use," and that this 

region was zoned by community planners with the intention of 

"minimiz[ing] traffic" and bringing about an environment that was 

both "quiet" and "seclu[ded]." Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of 

Brick, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 1, 5 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 1995). In 

the R-R-2 zone, Brick Township permits the following land uses as 

of right and without conditions: (1) customary and conventional 

farming activities; (2) one-family dwellings; (3) public 

schools and accredited private schools; (4) municipal parks, 

playgrounds and other municipally owned facilities; and (5) 

planned residential retirement communities. 

 The Brick Township R-R-2 zone also allows for a number 

of conditional uses, including: (1) public utilities 

installations; (2) hospitals; (3) public and quasi-public 

philanthropic and charitable uses; (4) quasi-public buildings 

and recreation areas; (5) golf courses; (6) single-family 

residential dwellings with a maximum density of 1.5 dwelling 

units per acre; (7) single-family residential dwellings with 

open space; and (8) churches, parish houses, convents and 

cemeteries. The only area in Brick Township where nursing homes 

can be constructed is the hospital support zone. Other permitted 

uses in the hospital support zone are doctors' offices, clinics, 

emergency treatment facilities, pharmacies, retail establishments 

for the sale of medical and surgical supplies, motels and 

hospitals. The hospital support zone is commercial in nature. 

No single or multiple-family residences may be built in this area 

without first obtaining a variance. 

 Brick Township's hospital support zone has already been 

developed extensively. Less than thirty undeveloped acres 

remain. The remaining vacant land consists of small, 

noncontiguous, separately owned parcels, the largest site being 

8.6 acres. The record is unclear as to whether any of the 

undeveloped land in the hospital support zone is currently on the 

market or otherwise available for purchase. 

 B. 

 In 1990, Hovsons applied for a variance to the Brick 

Township Zoning Board of Adjustment ("Zoning Board"), to build a 

nursing home in the R-R-2 zone. Hovsons' application was debated 

extensively (a total of seventeen public hearings were conducted 

over a two-year period) and was ultimately denied in April of 

1992. 

 Hovsons challenged the denial of the variance by filing 
a lawsuit against the Zoning Board in the New Jersey Superior 

Court, Law Division. On February 5, 1993, the Law Division 

reversed the denial of Hovsons' application and remanded the 

matter to the Zoning Board for reconsideration. Approximately 

two months later, the Zoning Board again denied Hovsons' 

application. Hovsons appealed the second denial to the New 

Jersey Law Division, which issued an order on April 16, 1993, 

directing that the use variance be issued. On March 30, 1994, 

the New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the Law Division and 

reinstated the Zoning Board's denial. Hovsons filed a petition 

for certification with the New Jersey Supreme Court, which was 

denied on July 15, 1994. Hovsons, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of 

Adjustment of Brick Township, 645 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1994). 

 On September 6, 1994, Hovsons filed suit in the United 

States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the 

Township of Brick and the Zoning Board. Hovsons alleged, inter 

alia, that the defendants had violated the FHAA. Hovsons 

maintained that the Township and its Zoning Board had 

discriminated against handicapped persons by denying its 

application for a variance to construct a nursing home in the RR-2 zone. Specifically, Hovsons contended that the defendants' 

actions amounted to intentional discrimination and that the Brick 

Township zoning ordinance had a disparate impact upon handicapped 

persons. Hovsons further asserted that the defendants had 

refused to comply with the FHAA's requirement that they provide 

"reasonable accommodations" to handicapped persons.

 Hovsons sought both declaratory and injunctive relief 

to prevent the Township of Brick and its Zoning Board from 

interfering with its plans to build a nursing home in the R-R-2 

zone. The defendants responded to Hovsons' allegations by filing 

motions for summary judgment. On June 27, 1995, the district 

court granted summary judgment in favor of the Zoning Board. The 

district court ruled that the federal claims Hovsons had brought 

against the Zoning Board could have been raised and litigated in 

previous state court proceedings and were therefore barred under 

the entire controversy doctrine. The district court also 

dismissed Hovsons' intentional discrimination claim against Brick 

Township, finding that its zoning ordinance was facially valid 

and rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 

Hovsons has not appealed the dismissal of these claims, nor was 

the entire controversy issue raised on appeal. 

 The district court did find, however, that there were 

material factual issues in dispute regarding Hovsons' disparate 

impact and reasonable accommodation claims against the Township 

of Brick. The district court further held that the nursing home 

Hovsons has proposed to build should be classified as a 

"dwelling" under the FHAA because it would be a home to its 

prospective residents. Accordingly, the Township's motion for 

summary judgment on these issues was denied and the case was set 

for trial. 

 A one-day bench trial was held on July 12, 1995. On 

August 16, 1995, the district court issued its findings of fact 

and conclusions of law. The court rejected Hovsons' disparate 

impact argument, reasoning that Hovsons had failed to establish 
that handicapped persons were more adversely impacted by the 

zoning ordinance than people without disabilities. Furthermore, 

the district court held that Brick Township was not in violation 

of the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the FHAA. The 

district court opined that  3604(f)(3)(B) does not require 

municipalities "to disregard their own zoning requirements in 

order to provide sufficient opportunities and accommodations for 

the disabled." Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 6. In so 

holding, the court relied upon the fact that Brick Township 

permitted the construction of nursing homes in another area of 

the Township. Moreover, the nursing home would, in the district 

court's view, be inconsistent with the residential character of 

the R-R-2 zone and would not adequately "service the immediate 

surrounding community." Id. at 5. 

 Hovsons now appeals the judgment of the district court 

rejecting its "reasonable accommodations" and disparate impact 

FHAA claims. The Township of Brick has cross-appealed the 

district court ruling that the proposed nursing home is a 

"dwelling" within the meaning of the FHAA. 

 II. 

 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

1331 and 42 U.S.C.  3613. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C.  1291. We "exercise[] plenary review over questions of 

statutory construction." United States v. Columbus Country Club, 

915 F.2d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1205, 

111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 

 A number of our sister circuits have held "that in 

enacting the anti-discrimination provisions of the FHAA, Congress 

relied on the standard of reasonable accommodation developed 

under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 

29 U.S.C.  794." Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 

334 (2d Cir. 1995). Accord United States v. California Mobile 

Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416-17 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(same); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, Michigan, 

13 F.3d 920, 930 (6th Cir. 1993). As it is supported by the 

legislative history of the FHAA, we also adopt this view. SeeH.R. Rep. 

No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1988 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2186 & n.66 ("The concept of `reasonable 

accommodation' has a long history in regulations and case law 

dealing with discrimination on the basis of handicap.") (citing 

Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S. Ct. 

2361 (1979) (Rehabilitation Act case)); see also Bryant Woods 

Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 911 F. Supp. 918, 940 (D. 

Md. 1996) ("In light of the references to Davis in the 

legislative history of the Fair Housing Act, the courts have 

uniformly concluded that the standards for `reasonable 

accommodations' developed under  504 of the Rehabilitation Act 

also apply to  3604(f)(3)(B)."). 

 In Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 

F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1991), a Rehabilitation Act case, we held that 

a district court's determination as to whether a proposed 

accommodation is "reasonable" is a question of fact. Id. at 

1386. Therefore, we would ordinarily review the finding of the 
district court that the accommodation Hovsons proffered was 

unreasonable under the "clearly erroneous" standard. "A finding 

of fact is clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the evidence, 

the court of appeals is `left with a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.'" Oberti v. Board of Educ. of 

Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 

1993) (citation omitted). Our review of the factual findings of 

the district court is confined to "whether there is sufficient 

evidence in the record to support those findings." Cooper v. 

Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1988). 

 Hovsons argues that the district court applied the 

wrong legal standard when it placed the burden upon the plaintiff 

to establish that its requested modification was reasonable under 

the FHAA. We exercise plenary review over the question of 

whether the district court applied an incorrect legal standard. 

See Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1511 

n.11 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995). 

 

 III. 

 The Township of Brick contends that this case should 

not be considered under the FHAA because nursing homes are not 

"dwellings" as defined in the Act. Hovsons maintains that the 

district court erred in finding that Brick Township complied with 

the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the FHAA. We will 

address these issues in turn. 

 A. 

 Section 3604 of the FHAA proscribes discrimination "in 

the sale or rental" of "a dwelling." 42 U.S.C.  3604(f)(1). 

The FHAA defines the term "dwelling" as 

 any building, structure, or portion thereof 

 which is occupied as, or designated or 

 intended for occupancy as, a residence by one 

 or more families, and any vacant land which 

 is offered for sale or lease for the 

 construction or location thereon of any such 

 building, structure, or portion thereof. 

42 U.S.C.  3602(b) (emphasis added). We addressed the issue of 

what constitutes a "dwelling" under the FHAA in United States v. 

Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

501 U.S. 1205, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 

 One of the issues in Columbus Country Club was whether 

bungalows inhabited by club members during the summer months were 

"dwellings" within the meaning of  3602(b). The Country Club 

argued that they were not. Focusing upon what Congress intended 

the word "residence" to mean, we rejected this argument. We 

observed that "[a]lthough the meaning of the term `residence' is 

central to understanding [the definition of dwelling], the Act 

provides no statutory definition of that term." Id. at 881. 

Applying a plain meaning analysis, the court looked to the 

definition of "residence" in Webster's Third New International 

Dictionary, which defines it as "a temporary or permanent 

dwelling place, abode or habitation to which one intends to 

return as distinguished from the place of temporary sojourn or 
transient visit." Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 881 

(citation omitted). This led us to hold "that the central 

inquiry is whether the defendant's annual members intend to 

remain in the bungalows for any significant period of time and 

whether they view their bungalows as a place to return to." Id. 

 We observed that since "annual members may spend up to 

five months in their bungalows," they were "not `mere 

transients.'" Id. Furthermore, there was "no indication in the 

statutory language that Congress intended to limit coverage of 

the Act to year-round places of abode . . . ." Id. The court 

also noted that if we were to adopt the Country Club's argument, 

this "would create a broad exception to the Act" that, followed 

to its logical conclusion, could be interpreted to allow 

residents in a private development of summer homes to exclude 

members of minority groups from owning, renting or occupying 

summer homes without violating the FHAA, a result that Congress 

could not have intended. Id. We therefore held that the summer 

bungalows fell "within the ordinary meaning of `residence' and 

must be considered dwellings for purposes of the Fair Housing 

Act." Id. 

 The Township of Brick's argument that the proposed 

nursing home is not a "dwelling" under the FHAA is similarly 

without merit. To the handicapped elderly persons who would 

reside there, Holiday Village would be their home, very often for 

the rest of their lives. We therefore hold that the proposed 

nursing home is a "dwelling" within the meaning of  3602(b). 

See United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 

220 (D.P.R. 1991) (applying FHAA to case challenging the closure 

of a nursing home). We therefore will affirm the judgment of the 

district court to the extent it held that the proposed nursing 

home is a "dwelling," as that term is defined by the FHAA. 

 B. 

 1. 

 Section 3604(f)(1) of the FHAA provides that it is 

unlawful 

 [t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to 

 otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 

 buyer or renter because of a handicap of--

 (A) that buyer or renter, 

 (B) a person residing in or intending to reside 

 in that dwelling after it has been sold, rented, or 

 made available; or 

 (C) any person associated with that buyer or 

 renter. 

42 U.S.C.  3604(f)(1). Section 3604(f)(3)(B) further provides 

that "[f]or the purposes of this subsection, discrimination 

includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in 

rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations 

may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use 
and enjoy a dwelling[.]" Id.  3604(f)(3)(B). 

 Hovsons argues that the district court erred when it 

placed the burden upon the plaintiff to establish that the 

accommodation that it requested was "reasonable" under the FHAA. 

See Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 4. We agree. Our 

precedents interpreting  504 of the Rehabilitation Act have held 

that the burden of proving that a proposed accommodation is not 

reasonable rests with the defendant. See Juvelis v. Snider, 68 

F.3d 648, 653 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Nathanson v. Medical College 

of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991). As we have 

already held that courts must look to the body of law developed 

under  504 of the Rehabilitation Act as an interpretative guide 

to the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the FHAA, we 

further hold that the burden should have been placed upon the 

Township of Brick to prove that it was either unable to 

accommodate Hovsons or that the accommodation Hovsons proposed 

was unreasonable. We now turn to the question of whether there 

is a sufficient foundation in the record to support the factual 

finding of the district court that Brick Township complied with 

the FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" provision. 

 2. 

 The conclusion of the district court that the Township 

of Brick satisfied the FHAA's mandate that "reasonable 

accommodations" be provided to handicapped persons was clear 

error. Brick Township does not permit the construction of 

nursing homes in any of its residential areas. The Township 

nonetheless contends that the authorization for nursing home 

construction within its hospital support zone, an area zoned for 

hospitals and other medical support facilities, suffices to 

satisfy its legal obligation to handicapped persons. We 

disagree. 

 The reasoning and analysis of the district court 

evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the intent of Congress 

in enacting the FHAA. The district court's statement that the 

FHAA "does not ask [municipalities] to disregard their own zoning 

requirements in order to provide sufficient accommodations for 

the disabled" runs counter to the entire thrust of the FHAA. 

Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 6. The Township of Brick's 

blanket exclusion of nursing homes from its residential areas in 

general, and its refusal to permit the construction of the 

specific facility in question, is precisely the sort of isolation 

of handicapped persons from the mainstream of society that the 

FHAA was enacted to forbid. Furthermore, there is a dearth of 

evidence in the record to support Brick Township's sweeping claim 

as to the fundamental incompatibility of nursing homes and 

residential areas in general and the R-R-2 zone in particular. 

 A review of the record, case law interpreting the 

meaning of "reasonable accommodations" and the legislative 

history of the FHAA leads us to conclude that the Township of 

Brick failed to satisfy the requirements of  3604(f)(3)(B) as a 

matter of law. Although the district court applied the incorrect 

legal standard, we need not remand for further proceedings. 

There was a full hearing on the merits in the district court 

during which each side presented expert testimony on the issue of 
the compatibility of a nursing home with the other uses in the RR-2 zone, and the record is critically deficient of evidence that 

would support a ruling in Brick Township's favor. We therefore 

conclude that it is appropriate to direct entry of judgment in 

favor of Hovsons. See Rohm and Haas Co. v Adco Chem. Co., 689 

F.2d 424, 433 (3d Cir. 1982) (directing that judgment be entered 

in favor of plaintiff when adverse result in district court was 

premised upon the application of an incorrect legal standard); 

Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. McCabe, 593 F.2d 234, 239 (3d 

Cir. 1979) (remand unnecessary despite application of the 

incorrect legal standard "because the evidence on the record 

compel[led] the result"). 

 The FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" provision 

prohibits the enforcement of "zoning ordinances and local housing 

policies in a manner that denies people with disabilities access 

to housing on par with that of those who are not disabled." 

Laurie C. Malkin, Troubles at the Doorstep: The Fair Housing 

Amendments Act of 1988 and Group Homes for Recovering Substance 

Abusers, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 757, 804 (1995) (hereinafter Fair 

Housing Amendments Act). Pursuant to  3604(f)(3)(B), the 

Township of Brick has "an affirmative duty" to make reasonable 

accommodations on behalf of handicapped persons. United States 

v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 

(9th Cir. 1994). See Juvelis, 68 F.3d at 653 (" 504 requires 

some affirmative steps to accommodate handicapped persons."). 

 "The reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly factspecific, requiring a case-by-case determination." California 

Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d at 1418. AccordNathanson, 926 

F.2d at 1385. As in Rehabilitation Act cases, we 

must view the reasonable accommodations requirement "in light of 

two countervailing legislative concerns: (1) effectuation of the 

statute's objectives of assisting the handicapped; and (2) the 

need to impose reasonable boundaries in accomplishing this 

purpose." Americans Disabled For Accessible Pub. Transp. (ADAPT) 

v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 1989) (in banc). We 

keep in mind the principle that satisfaction of the FHAA's 

reasonable accommodation requirement "can and often will involve 

some costs." Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 335 

(2d Cir. 1995). 

 "Courts interpreting the reasonable accommodation 

provision of the Fair Housing Act have ruled that municipalities 

. . . must change, waive, or make exceptions in their zoning 

rules to afford people with disabilities the same opportunity to 

housing as those who are without disabilities." Horizon House 

Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 

F. Supp. 683, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (collecting cases), aff'd, 

995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993) (Table). To establish that the 

accommodation proffered by Hovsons was not reasonable, the 

Township of Brick was required to prove that it could not have 

granted the variance "without imposing undue financial and 

administrative burdens," Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 

442 U.S. 397, 412, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2370 (1979), imposing an 

"undue hardship" upon the Township, Nathanson, 926 F.3d at 1383, 

or requiring "a fundamental alteration in the nature of the 
program . . . ." Davis, 442 U.S. at 410, 99 S. Ct. at 2369. SeeAlexander 

v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300, 105 S. Ct. 712, 719-20 

(1985). We conclude that the Township of Brick has failed to 

make such a showing. 

 We acknowledge that precisely what the "reasonable 

accommodations" standard requires is not a model of clarity. 

Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1015 (3d Cir. 

1995); ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1193 (acknowledging "[t]he difficulty 

in determining precisely the extent of accommodation mandated by 

section 504"); O'Neal v. Alabama Dep't of Pub. Health, 826 F. 

Supp. 1368, 1376 (M.D. Ala. 1993) ("As centuries of jurisprudence 

have taught us, the word `reasonable' is subject to a wide 

variety of interpretations."). As one court has observed, "[t]he 

FHAA imposes an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate 

handicapped persons. However, because the precise obligations 

encompassed by this duty are ambiguous, many courts have looked 

to the legislative history of the Act for guidance." United 

States v. City of Taylor, Michigan, 872 F. Supp. 423, 436 (E.D. 

Mich. 1995) (citation omitted). We will also look to the 

legislative history of the FHAA to clarify the meaning of its 

"reasonable accommodations" requirement in the present factual 

setting. 

 We have previously emphasized that the enactment of the 

FHAA was "a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end 

the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the 

American mainstream." Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 333 n.14 

(3d Cir.) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 

reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179), cert. denied, 116 S. 

Ct. 64 (1995). The House Report further states that the FHAA "is 

intended to prohibit the application of special requirements 

through land-use regulations . . . that have the effect of 

limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the residence 

of their choice in the community." H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th 

Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185 

(emphasis added). Moreover, the FHAA was intended to "require 

that changes be made to . . . traditional rules or practices if 

necessary to permit a person with handicaps an equal opportunity 

to use and enjoy a dwelling." Id. at 2186. 

 In light of these Congressional pronouncements 

regarding the purpose and scope of the FHAA, it was clear error 

for the district court to conclude that Hovsons' request for a 

variance could not be accommodated. Granting a variance to 

Hovsons would not have saddled the Township of Brick with "undue 

financial and administrative burdens," or otherwise resulted in 

the imposition of an "undue hardship." On the contrary, the 

proprietors of Holiday Village will become taxpaying members of 

the local community. Furthermore, the district court 

acknowledged the "considerable efforts [Hovsons has made] to work 

with the township in order to make the site feasible . . . ." 

Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 5. Holiday Village intends to 

manage its own affairs with a minimum of local governmental 

involvement. Hovsons has agreed to have Holiday Village arrange 

for its own garbage collection, street maintenance and snow 

removal. The nursing home would rely upon the municipal fire, 
police and emergency services, but its use of these services 

would be no different from that of the surrounding retirement 

developments. The mere fact that the employees and residents of 

Holiday Village will at times require the assistance of the local 

police and other emergency services does not rise to the level of 

imposing a cognizable administrative and financial burden upon 

the community. 

 Nor would granting a variance to Hovsons fundamentally 

undermine the Brick Township zoning scheme. The Supreme Court 

has observed that, in broad general terms, the purpose of zoning 

law is "to prevent problems caused by the `pig in the parlor 

instead of the barnyard.'" City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 

Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1781 (1995) (quoting 

Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 

47 S. Ct. 114, 118 (1926)). As the record makes clear, however, 

permitting the construction of a nursing home in the R-R-2 zone 

would cause no such problems. 

 We reject the Township of Brick's contention that 

nursing homes are fundamentally incompatible with the other 

permitted uses in the R-R-2 zone. Brick Township appears to rely 

upon the blanket proposition that nursing homes are clearly out 

of place in residential zones. This is precisely the type of 

land use planning that the FHAA was enacted to prevent and, if 

necessary, overrule. Furthermore, the design construction of 

Holiday Village is similar to that of the local planned 

residential retirement communities, a permitted use in the R-R-2 

zone. As both of these types of facilities cater to the elderly, 

Holiday Village could provide a useful resource to members of the 

local retirement communities who do not want to locate in a new 

area, but who are no longer able to care for themselves. 

 As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 

observed, "the handicapped may have little choice but to live in 

a commercial home if they desire to live in a residential 

neighborhood. To provide the handicapped with equal housing 

opportunities, the City must make the necessary `reasonable 

accommodations.'" Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 

Michigan, 13 F.3d 920, 930 (6th Cir. 1993). We hold that under 

the facts in this case,  3604(f)(3)(B) requires that the 

Township of Brick permit Hovsons to proceed with its plans to 

build a nursing home in its R-R-2 zone. This result is 

consistent with "the broad remedial intent of Congress embodied 

in the [Fair Housing] Act." Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 

U.S. 363, 380, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1982). See City of 

Edmonds, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1780 (noting the Fair 

Housing Act's "`broad and inclusive' compass, and therefore 

according a `generous construction' to the Act's complaint-filing 

provision") (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 

409 U.S. 205, 209, 212, 93 S. Ct. 364, 367, 368 (1972)); see 

also Fair Housing Amendments Act, supra, at 763 ("The scope of 

the statute is sweeping, not only in the broad protections it 

affords, but also in the limited exceptions it allows."). 

 It is uncontroverted that the Township of Brick has a 

substantial interest in enforcing its zoning code and that, under 

appropriate circumstances, local zoning codes are entitled to a 
considerable amount of deference. See, e.g., Village of Belle 

Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974); 

Doe v. City of Butler, Pennsylvania, 892 F.2d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 

1989). We are also mindful of the fact that "[i]n requiring 

reasonable accommodation, . . . Congress surely did not mandate a 

blanket waiver of all facially neutral zoning policies and rules, 

regardless of the facts." Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia 

Beach, Virginia, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1261 (E.D. Va. 1993). Nor 

did Congress intend to "give handicapped persons carte blanche to 

determine where and how they would live regardless of zoning 

ordinances to contrary." Thornton v. City of Allegan, 863 F. 

Supp. 504, 510 (W.D. Mich. 1993). Nonetheless, the FHAA's 

promise that "reasonable accommodations" be provided to 

handicapped persons would be an empty one indeed if Brick 

Township were permitted to do nothing to accommodate the elderly 

disabled who are in need of nursing home care and desire to live 

in one of the Township's residential zones. 

 The House Report to the FHAA expressly states that the 

Act "is intended to prohibit . . . [the imposition of] terms or 

conditions . . . which have the effect of excluding . . . 

congregate living arrangements for persons with handicaps." H.R. 

Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1988 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184. As one court has explained, "strict 

adherence to a rule which has the effect of precluding 

handicapped individuals from residing in the residence [of their 

choice] was precisely the type of conduct which the Fair Housing 

Amendments Act sought to overcome with the enactment of 

3604(f)(3)(B)." United States v. Village of Marshall, Wisconsin, 

787 F. Supp. 872, 879 (W.D. Wis. 1991). 

 IV. 

 We will reverse the August 16, 1995 order of the 

district court and remand this matter with instructions to enjoin 

the Township of Brick from interfering with the construction of 

the nursing home facility under the terms, conditions and 

specifications agreed to by the State of New Jersey.