T.C. Summary Opinion 2012-63

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

JAMES P. CHIAVACCI AND JOYCE L. CHIAVACCI, Petitioners v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 11157-10S. Filed July 2, 2012.

Donald F. Brown, for petitioners.

Erika B. Cormier, for respondent.

SUMMARY OPINION

MARVEL, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section

7463.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by

1Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal

Revenue Code, as amended, in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references

(continued...)
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any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other 

case.

Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners’ 2007 Federal income tax

of $6,600 and a section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty of $1,320. After

concessions,2 the issues for decision are: (1) whether petitioners are entitled to an

additional $20,000 deduction for alimony paid during 2007; and (2) whether

petitioners are liable for the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty.

1

(...continued)

 are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Monetary amounts have

been rounded to the nearest dollar.

2Respondent concedes that petitioners are entitled to a $4,000 deduction for

alimony paid. The $4,000 amount represents Mr. Chiavacci’s $500 monthly

alimony payments for January through August 2007. Respondent’s concession

results in a $5,002 deficiency and a $1,000 sec. 6662(a) penalty.

In the notice of deficiency respondent disallowed $2,000 of petitioners’

claimed deduction for tuition and fees and $112 of petitioners’ itemized deductions. 

In their petition, petitioners assign error only to respondent’s disallowance of the

claimed alimony deduction. We deem any issue not raised in the assignments of

error in the petition conceded. See Rule 34(b)(4). Accordingly, we conclude that

petitioners have conceded the other adjustments in the notice of deficiency.
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Background

The parties submitted this case fully stipulated pursuant to Rule 122. The

stipulation of facts is incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioners resided in

Maine when they filed their petition.

Mr. Chiavacci’s Divorce Decree

James P. Chiavacci was married to Leigh A. Charles. He filed for divorce

from Ms. Charles in the District Court of Bangor, Maine (district court). On

January 3, 1994, while their divorce proceedings were pending, Mr. Chiavacci and

Ms. Charles executed an agreement relating to their “marital property rights, support

and other rights” (1994 agreement). On January 10, 1994, the district court entered

a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage of Mr. Chiavacci and Ms. Charles and

approving the 1994 agreement, as well as a child support order, an alimony order,

and immediate income withholding orders, all of which were incorporated into the

decree of divorce.

Among other things, the 1994 agreement provided that Mr. Chiavacci had to

pay Ms. Charles spousal support. Under section 4, “ALIMONY”, they agreed that

“[t]he Husband shall pay to the Wife the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per

month as alimony, first payment to be made on January 31, 1994, payment to cease

upon death or remarriage of the Wife.” The divorce decree also provided that Mr.
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Chiavacci had to pay Ms. Charles child support each month starting January 31,

1994.3

Mr. Chiavacci’s 2007 Payment Obligations and Payments

From January through August 2007 Mr. Chiavacci paid Ms. Charles alimony

of $500 per month.

On April 2, 2007, Mr. Chiavacci filed a motion with the district court

requesting modification of his alimony obligations to Ms. Charles. In the motion

Mr. Chiavacci requested that the district court eliminate or decrease his alimony

obligations because of changes in circumstances. Ms. Charles subsequently filed an

objection to Mr. Chiavacci’s motion to modify his alimony obligations.

Mr. Chiavacci and Ms. Charles entered into negotiations and eventually

reached a settlement agreement whereby Mr. Chiavacci would make a one-time

lump-sum payment of $20,000 to Ms. Charles in exchange for a release of his future

spousal support obligations (2007 settlement agreement). On September 4, 2007,

Mr. Chiavacci purchased a cashier’s check for $20,000. On September 11, 2007,

Mr. Chiavacci’s attorney, Donald F. Brown, mailed the cashier’s check to Ms.

Charles’ attorney, Martha Harris. In an attached letter, Mr. Brown stated that,

3On August 23, 2001, the district court entered a child support order

modifying Mr. Chiavacci’s child support obligations.
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during negotiations, Ms. Harris agreed to draft a document asking the district court

to order that Mr. Chiavacci’s alimony payment obligation had been terminated,

effective immediately.

On September 13, 2007, the district court entered an order amending the

divorce judgment (amending order). The amending order contains the following

statement: “By agreement of the parties, Spousal Support is terminated effective

September 2, 2007. In all other respects, the Divorce Judgment dated January 10,

1994, as amended on August 31, 2001, remains in full force and effect.” The

amending order makes no reference to Mr. Chiavacci’s $20,000 payment to Ms.

Charles.

Petitioners’ 2007 Return; Notice of Deficiency

Petitioners jointly filed a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for

2007 on which they claimed an alimony deduction of $24,000 for alimony Mr.

Chiavacci claimed he paid to Ms. Charles. On February 17, 2010, respondent

mailed petitioners a notice of deficiency disallowing the alimony deduction in full.

Discussion

Burden of Proof

The Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of deficiency are presumed

correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determinations are
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erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The

burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner, however, if the taxpayer produces

credible evidence to support the deduction or position, the taxpayer complied with

the substantiation requirements, and the taxpayer cooperated with the Secretary4

with regard to all reasonable requests for information. Sec. 7491(a); see also

Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001).

Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(c) applies. Furthermore, because

the relevant facts are stipulated and only a legal issue remains, we need not decide

whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent. See Estate of Morgens v.

Commissioner, 133 T.C. 402, 409 (2009), aff’d, 678 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2012); see

also Waamiq-Ali v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-86.

Petitioners’ Alimony Deduction

Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer ordinarily must

prove that he is entitled to the claimed deduction. INDOPCO, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). A taxpayer who makes alimony payments

4The term “Secretary” means “the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate”,

sec. 7701(a)(11)(B), and the term “or his delegate” means “any officer, employee,

or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized by the Secretary of the

Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority, to perform

the function mentioned or described in the context”, sec. 7701(a)(12)(A)(i).
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that satisfy the requirements of section 2155 may deduct those payments on his

income tax return for the year in which the payments are made. Sec. 215. Section

71(b)(1) defines the term “alimony” as follows:

SEC. 71(b). Alimony or Separate Maintenance Payments

Defined.--For purposes of this section--

(1) In general.--The term “alimony or separate

maintenance payment” means any payment in cash if--

(A) such payment is received by (or on

behalf of) a spouse under a divorce or separation

instrument,

(B) the divorce or separation instrument does

not designate such payment as a payment which is

not includible in gross income under this section

and not allowable as a deduction under section 215,

(C) in the case of an individual legally

separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce

or of separate maintenance, the payee spouse and

the payor spouse are not members of the same

household at the time such payment is made, and

(D) there is no liability to make any such

payment for any period after the death of the payee

spouse and there is no liability to make any

5Sec. 215 provides that a taxpayer who makes “alimony or separate

maintenance payments”, as defined in sec. 71(b), may deduct those payments for the

year in which the payments are made.
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payment (in cash or property) as a substitute for 

such payments after the death of the payee spouse.

All four requirements of section 71(b)(1) must be met for payments to qualify as

alimony or separate maintenance. Jaffe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-196.

The term “divorce of separation instrument” includes “a decree of divorce or

separate maintenance or a written instrument incident to such a decree”. Sec.

71(b)(2)(A). This Court previously has considered the tax treatment of payments

made pursuant to a separate contractual agreement. As we have stated: “[W]here a

separate contractual instrument has been entered into by the parties modifying,

changing or replacing the provisions of the initial agreement with respect to alimony,

the deductibility of a payment made pursuant to the second agreement is governed

by the provisions of the second instrument.” Lehrer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1980-256; see also Bernard v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1029, 1034 (1986); Loverin

v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 406 (1948). The portion of the lump-sum payment

attributable to past, unpaid, alimony payments retains the tax character of the

original payments made pursuant to the divorce decree. Bernard v. Commissioner,

87 T.C. at 1037; see also Berry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-91. The tax

treatment of the portion of the lump-sum payment attributable to future alimony
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obligations does not depend on the tax character of the original payments. Bernard

v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. at 1037.

The parties stipulated that Mr. Chiavacci and Ms. Charles were not members

of the same household in 2007 and therefore the payment satisfies the requirements

of section 71(b)(1)(C). The parties disagree, however, as to whether the other

requirements of section 71(b)(1) have been satisfied. We turn first to the

termination requirement of section 71(b)(1)(D). Because Mr. Chiavacci’s $20,000

payment was not attributable to past, unpaid alimony obligations, we look to the

2007 settlement agreement in evaluating whether the payment satisfied the

termination requirement of section 71(b)(1)(D).

Section 71(b)(1)(D) requires that there be no liability to make alimony or

separate maintenance payments for any period after the death of the payee spouse. 

If the divorce decree or relevant instrument does not expressly state that the

payment obligation terminates upon the death of the payee spouse, the payment will

qualify as alimony provided that the termination of the obligation would occur upon

the death of the payee spouse by operation of State law. See Hoover v.

Commissioner, 102 F.3d 842, 845-846 (6th Cir. 1996), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1995-183.
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With respect to the 2007 settlement agreement, the record contains only the

letter from Mr. Brown to Ms. Harris. The letter does not expressly state that the

payment obligation terminates upon the death of Ms. Charles. Although the divorce

decree provides that spousal support would terminate upon Ms. Charles’ death, the

district court’s amending order did not incorporate the 2007 settlement agreement

into the divorce decree.6 The district court’s amending order made no reference to

the 2007 settlement agreement or the terms thereof. Consequently, we must decide

whether the payment obligation would terminate upon the death of Ms. Charles by

operation of Maine law.

Under Maine law, the obligation to make a spousal support payment “ceases

upon the death of either the payee or the payor with respect to any payment not yet

due and owing as of the date of death.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, sec. 951-

A(8) (2012). If a court awards a lump-sum spousal support payment,7 the payment

is due and owing upon the entry of a final judgment. See Chow v. Chow, 704 A.2d

6The amending order provided that, except for the termination of “Spousal

Support”, the divorce judgment remained in full force and effect. Therefore, the

amending order effectively excised the “ALIMONY” section of the 1994

agreement, eliminating the provision that spousal support would terminate upon Ms.

Charles’ death.

7Maine law provides for lump-sum spousal support payments. See Me. Rev.

Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, sec. 951-A(3) (2012); Hebert v. Hebert, 475 A.2d 422, 425

(Me. 1984).
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323 (Me. 1997) (holding that interest on a lump-sum alimony award is calculated as

of the date of the judgment); see also Brown v. Habrle, 1 A.3d 401, 405-406 (Me.

2010) (holding that postjudgment interest accrues from the date of entry of

judgment). Once the payment is due and owing, the payor has a personal obligation

to make payment and the payee has a right to receive payment. See Fitzgerald v.

Trueworthy, 476 A.2d 183, 184-185 (Me. 1984). Under Maine law, “[n]o personal

action or cause of action is lost by the death of either party”. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.

tit. 18-A, sec. 3-817(a) (2012).

Although Ms. Charles received the $20,000 lump-sum payment pursuant to

the 2007 settlement agreement rather than a court order, we believe the same

analysis applies. Once Mr. Chiavacci and Ms. Charles entered into the 2007

settlement agreement, Mr. Chiavacci had a personal obligation to make the $20,000

payment to Ms. Charles. Mr. Chiavacci’s personal obligation to make the payment

would have continued if Ms. Charles had died before payment of the $20,000. See

Chow, 704 A.2d at 323-324; Fitzgerald, 476 A.2d at 184-185; Hardy v. Asbury,

No. Civ.A. RE-03-013, 2004 WL 1434518 (Me. Super. Ct. May 24, 2004).

Because Mr. Chiavacci would have been liable to make payment even after

the death of Ms. Charles, his $20,000 payment does not satisfy the termination
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requirement of section 71(b)(1)(D). Since the payment fails to satisfy the

termination requirement, we need not address whether the section 71(b)(1)(A) and

(B) requirements are met. The $20,000 payment is not deductible by petitioners.

Accuracy-Related Penalty Under Section 6662

Section 6662 authorizes the Commissioner to impose a penalty on an

underpayment of tax that is attributable to one or more of the following: (1)

negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, (2) any substantial understatement of

income tax, (3) any substantial valuation misstatement, (4) any substantial

overstatement of pension liabilities, and (5) any substantial estate or gift tax

valuation understatement. Sec. 6662(a) and (b). Only one section 6662 accuracyrelated penalty may be imposed with respect to any given portion of an

underpayment, even if that portion is attributable to more than one of the types of

conduct listed in section 6662(b). See New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v.

Commissioner, 132 T.C. 161, 187 (2009), aff’d, 408 Fed. Appx. 908 (6th Cir.

2010); sec. 1.6662-2(c), Income Tax Regs.

Section 7491(c) provides that the Commissioner bears the initial burden of

production with respect to the taxpayer’s liability for the section 6662 penalty; i.e.,

the Commissioner must first introduce sufficient evidence to establish that a section

6662 penalty is appropriate. See also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 446-
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447. Once the Commissioner meets his burden, the taxpayer must come forward

with evidence sufficient to persuade this Court that the determination is incorrect. 

Id.

Respondent contends that petitioners are liable for the section 6662(a)

accuracy-related penalty because the underpayment of tax is due to one or more of

the following: (1) substantial understatement of income tax, (2) negligence or

disregard of the rules or regulations, or (3) substantial valuation misstatement. 

However, respondent does not contend that any valuation misstatement made by

petitioners is a gross valuation misstatement within the meaning of section 6662(h).

We turn first to respondent’s contention that the section 6662(a) penalty

should be imposed because the underpayment is attributable to petitioners’

substantial understatement of income tax. For a taxpayer other than a C

corporation, a substantial understatement is any understatement that exceeds 10% of

the tax required to be shown on the return for the year or $5,000, whichever is

greater. Sec. 6662(d)(1).

Respondent satisfied his burden of production under section 7491(c) by

showing that petitioners’ understatement of tax exceeded the greater of 10% of the
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amount of tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000. Thus, petitioners must

prove that respondent’s determination to impose the penalty is inappropriate.

A taxpayer may avoid the imposition of a section 6662(a) penalty if he

demonstrates that he had a reasonable basis for the underpayment and that he acted

in good faith with respect to the underpayment. Sec. 6664(c)(1); sec. 1.6664-4(a),

Income Tax Regs. Whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good

faith is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant facts and

circumstances, including the taxpayer’s experience, knowledge, and education. Sec.

1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

Petitioners neither argued that they acted nor introduced any evidence to

show that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to the

underpayment. Consequently, we sustain respondent’s determination with respect

to the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty.

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, and to the extent not

discussed above, conclude those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered

under Rule 155.