[ DO NOT PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21

- 13477

Non

- Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus
SALVADOR MAGLUTA, a.k.a. Sal,

Defendant

- Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:99

- cr

- 00583

- PAS

- 1 USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 1 of 182 Opinion of the Court 21

- 13477

____________________

Before R OSENBAUM , J ILL P RYOR , and J ULIE C ARNES , Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:Defendant Salvador Magluta, a federal prisoner at USP Allenwood, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion under 18U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) for compassionate release. After careful review, we affirm.

BACKGR OUNDDefendant was indicted in 1999 on multiple counts involving obstruction of justice, witness tampering, bribery, producing perjured testimony, and money laundering. 1 The indictment arose from Defendant’s attempts to avoid prosecution as the head of a drug trafficking organization that was active beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 1990s. At the time of his indictment, Defendant had a long history of drug

- related arrests and convictions. He was convicted of cocaine trafficking in Florida i n 1980 and sentenced to serve 14months in prison, but he failed to report for his sentence and remained at large with an outstanding warrant for several years. Defendant was arrested in California on drug charges in 1985, but heavoided rearrest for his prior Florida cocaine trafficking case by using an alias. Defendant was arrested again in 1987 when an officer

1 Multiple superseding indictments followed but the charges against Defendant did not materially change. USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 2 of 1821

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involved in the California case saw him being interviewed during an ESPN boat racing broadcast using his real name, but he fled after being bond ed out of jail and never returned to California to face the charges against him there. He was rearrested in 1988 by a Miami detective who encountered him at a local supply store and recognized him. Defendant tried to avoid the outstanding arrest warrants against him by using an alias, but the detective thwarted Defendant’s attempt. Defendant was transported to county jail, but he was released from jail a week later due to an alleged paperwork“error” that he later acknowledged was engineered by a jail employee who owed him a favor. Another arrest warrant was subsequently issued, which Defendant again defied. By 1991, Defendant was wanted not only in the Florida and California cases but also in federal drug trafficking and currency structuring cases. In October 1991, federal agents captured Defendant at a home in Miami that he had been renting for four years
under an alias. Defendant refused to surrender to the federal marshals who arrived at the home to arrest him, but he was apprehended after the marsh als fired tear gas into the home and tracked Defendant with the assistance of a police dog. He subsequentlywas acquitted of the charges against him, but it was later determined that the juror foreperson in that case had been bribed.

Defendant was then c harged in a separate case with various false document offenses based on evidence found during the search
of his Miami home. Trial in the false documents case began in late January 1997, but Defendant fled the courthouse on February 6, USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 3 of 184 Opinion of the Court 21

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1997, and he remaine d at large for several weeks. The trial continued in Defendant’s absence, and he was convicted in absentia on
all counts.
Police rearrested Defendant on April 13, 1997, in Lake Worth, Florida. When he was arrested Defendant, who had
shaved his head and was wearing a wig, claimed to be “Juan Alfonso.” A search of his car yielded numerous false identification documents, notes with instructions to associates who were helping Defendant hide from authorities and launder drug proceeds, and two key cards for a room at the Palm Beach Ritz Carlton that were
found to contain a small amount of cocaine. Thereafter, Defendantwas charged with and convicted of federal charges related to conspiring to commit fugitive harboring, making false statements, using false ide ntification documents, and jumping bond.While Defendant was in hiding, and after he was apprehended and in custody awaiting trial on the charges described above, federal agents continued their investigation into his drug trafficking activities. Defendant was kept apprised of the investigation by his attorney, Mark Dachs. Dachs advised Defendant on thestatus of the investigation as well as who was cooperating with police and who was not. Evidence discussed in the PSR suggests that
Defendant’s associates used the information from Dachs to target potential witnesses against him and his organization for murder. Three potential witnesses were murdered, and attempts were made to murder several other witnesses, during the relevant time
frame. USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 4 of 1821

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Meanwhile, Defe ndant continued to run his criminal organization while in custody via fake legal visits with a team of associates, including local lawyers and individuals claiming to be paralegals and private investigators. During the visits, Defendant instructed his associates on payments to make for him using drug proceeds, provided them records of criminal activities to maintainfor him, received messages from other conspirators in his organization, and smuggled prohibited items into prison, including

Xanax. In addition to substantial money laundering operations, Defendant and his associates used the visits to arrange for bribes of favorable jurors and witnesses and intimidation and harassment of witnesses who were cooperating with the Government. Th is conduct ultimately resulted in the obstruction of justice, bribery, witness tampering, and money laundering charges against Defendant
in this case. A jury acquitted Defendant of certain charges, but found him guilty of conspiring to obstruct justice, co nspiring to resist a court order by transferring millions of dollars in drug trafficking proceeds, obstruction of justice through witness and juror bribery, and multiple counts of money laundering. This Court reversed
Defendant’s conviction on one count o f juror bribery based on an erroneous evidentiary ruling, 2 after which the district court resentenced Defendant, imposing a prison term of 195 years. This sentence was affirmed on appeal, the Supreme Court denied certiorari,

2 See United States v. Magluta , 418 F.3d 1166, 1180 (11th Cir. 2005). USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 5 of 186 Opinion of the Court 21

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and the district court denied Defendant’s motion for relief under § 2255.
In December 2020, Defendant filed a motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 3 As amendedby the First Step Act of 2018 (the “First Step Act”), that statute authorizes a distric t court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the reduction is warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and if it is consistent with the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable Guidelines policy statements.
See 18 U .S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 4 Defendant filed his § 3582(c) motion with the assistance of counsel, and he has been counseled throughout the proceedings related to his motion below and on appeal.
In support of his motion for compassionate release, Defendant cited his age (66 at the time) and the fact that he had spent manyof the last 25 years in solitary confinement at ADX Florence, a supermax facility with limited access to environmental stimulation or
social interaction. Defendant was housed at another su permax facility, USP Marion, from 2003 to 2006, after which time he was transferred to ADX Florence when USP Marion was redesignated

3 Defendant first exhausted his administrative remedies by submitting a request for compassionate release to the warden of his facility on July 1, 2020.

4 Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also authorizes a sentence reduction under certain circumstances if “the defen dant is at least 70 years of age,” but it is undisputedthat Defendant does not yet qualify for compassionate release under that provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i i). USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 6 of 1821

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as a medium security prison. He was transferred to USP Terre Haute in 2010 pursuant to a civil settlement with the BOP tha t challenged his confinement in extended isolation, but he was returned to ADX Florence in 2013 after staff found two illegal cell phones,one of which was linked to a relative of Defendant’s, near Defendant’s bunk in a shared cell. The Government has adv ised the Court in its appellate brief that Defendant recently was transferred from ADX Florence to USP Allenwood, a high

- security prison. Defendant argued in his motion below that his conditions of confinement at ADX Florence had caused a rapid decline in his physical and mental health, resulting in mental illness, symptoms of dementia, and other deleterious health outcomes. He also
claimed to suffer from medical conditions

— including kidney disease, diabetes, hypertension, hypothyroidism, hyperlipidemia, dysmetabolic syndrome, obesity, ulcerative colitis, preglaucoma, dental and gum disease, temporomandibular joint (TMJ) disorder, dyspepsia, and major depressive disorder

— that placed him in the highest risk category for developing serious illness or dying i f he
contracted Covid

- 19. Citing his advanced age and his rehabilitativeefforts while incarcerated, Defendant stated that he no longer presented a threat to society and that his release at this point would be consistent with the sentencing factors of § 3 553(a). The district court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that he did not establish an extraordinary or compelling reason for his release as required to obtain relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As an initial matter, the court rejected Defendant’s claim that his USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 7 of 188 Opinion of the Court 21

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release was justified by the conditions of his confinement at ADX
Florence. Specifically, the court stated that it lacked authority to consider Defendant’s “Eighth Amendment

- related claims” per this
Court’s decision in United States v. Bry ant , 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2021), in which the Court held that relief is only authorized under§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) based on one of the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” expressly set forth in USSG § 1B1.13

— that is, a qualifying medical condition, ce rtain family circumstances, or age

- related physical or mental health deterioration. See Bryant , 996 F.3d

at 1248. As to his claim for release based on a qualifying medical condition or age

- related deterioration, the court determined that
the record evide nce did not support such a claim. Having concluded that Defendant did not establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release, the district court did not consider whether his release was consistent with the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors.

Defe ndant appeals, arguing that the district court erred and abused its discretion when it denied his motion for compassionate
release. Specifically, Defendant claims the district court misinterpreted the bases for his motion and misconstrued the record evide nce and the applicable Guidelines policy statement when it concluded that his age

- related deterioration did not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for his immediate release. Alternatively, Defendant argues this Court should reconsider Bryan t or disregard it in cases involving an inmate’s health decline and premature aging related to unwarranted solitary confinement. We USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 8 of 1821

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find no error in the court’s ruling denying compassionate release
and thus affirm.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for compassionate release under § 3582(c). United States v. Giron , 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). Once eligibility is established, we review the denial of a defendant’s motion for compassionate release pursuant to § 3582(c) motion for an abuse of discretion. See id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legalstandard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United
States v. Harris , 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC , 942 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotationmarks omitted)). The abuse of discretion standard allows the district court a “range of choice” that we will not reverse “just because we might have come to a different conclusion had it been our call
to make.” See id. at 912 (quotation marks omitted). As amended by the First Step Act, § 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes the district court to grant a defendant’s motion for compa ssionate release if the court finds that: (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” such relief and (2) the defendant’s early release isconsistent with the sentencing factors of § 3553(a) and the “applicable policy statements issued by the Sente ncing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The relevant policy statement echoes thestatutory requirements, stating that a district court may grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate release “if, after considering USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 9 of 1810 Opinion of the Court 21

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the factors set forth in

. . . § 3553(a),” the court determines that: (1) “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” the defendant’s release and (2) “[t]the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” See USSG § 1B1.13. See also Bryant , 996 F.3d at 1248 (holding that “1B1.13 is an applicable policy statement for all [§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)] motions” and that district courts do not have discretion “to develop other reasons that might justify a reduction
in a d efendant’s sentence” (quotation marks omitted)). The policy statement further identifies three extraordinaryand compelling reasons that can authorize a court to grant a motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See USSG § 1B1.13 comment . n.1(A)

- (C). First, a defendant’s medical condition can constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release if the defendant can show he is suffering either from a “terminal illness” or a “serious physical or medical condition, . . . a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or . . . deteriorating physical ormental health because of the aging process” that “substantially diminishes [his] ability . . . to provide self

- care” in prison and “from which he . . . is not expected to recover.” USS G § 1B1.13 comment. n.1(A). Second, release is permitted if the defendant is at least 65 years old, has served the lesser of at least 10 years or 75 percent ofhis sentence, and is experiencing a “serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process.” See USSG § 1B1.13 comment. n.1(B). Finally, a defendant’s family circumstances can create an extraordinary and compelling reason for release based on the “death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 10 of 1821

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defendant’s minor child” or the “incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.” USSG § 1B1.13 comment. n.1(C). The policy statement also contains a
catch

- all provision t hat allows the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to identify other extraordinary and compelling reasons for a particular defendant’s release, but this Court has held that only the BOP

— as opposed to the court

— has the authority to decide release is warranted under t hat provision. See Bryant , 996 F.3d at 1263 (“We cannot replace the phrase ‘[a]s determined by the Director of the [BOP]’ with ‘as determined by a district court.’”).
As discussed, the district court concluded that Defendant was not eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because (1) hecould not establish any of the extraordinary and compelling reasons set out in USSG § 1B1.13 and (2) the statute does not authorizecompassionate release as a means for redressing Defendant’s complaints about his co nditions of confinement. We agree with thedistrict court as to the latter point. Defendant’s motion below focused on the harsh conditions of his imprisonment

— specifically,his prolonged assignment to solitary confinement at ADX Florence

— as a reason for his release. In his argument on appeal, Defendant again focuses on his conditions of confinement at ADX Florence, and he adds that his placement in solitary confinement is particularly unfair given that he was convicted of “non

- violent offenses that resul ted in no actual harm.” But as the district courtcorrectly held, § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) does not authorize an inmate’s release based on the conditions of his confinement or the fact that USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 11 of 1812 Opinion of the Court 21

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those conditions are unfair. Rather, per Bryant , compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is only authorized based on one of the reasons expressly set out in USSG § 1B1.13: a qualifying medicalcondition, deterioration related to the aging process, or family circumstances requiring the defendant to act as a caretaker t o a minor child, spouse, or registered partner. See Bryant , 996 F.3d at 1265 (“Because [the defendant’s] motion does not fall within any of the reasons that 1B1.13 identifies as extraordinary and compelling, the district court correctly denied his motion for a reduction of his sentence.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Nor are we authorized to reconsider or limit the application
of Bryant , as Defendant urges us to do. In this circuit, a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels “unless and u ntil it isoverruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by . . . the Supreme Court” or by this Court sitting en banc. See United States v.
Gillis , 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019). Because Bryant has not been overturned by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc, this Court is bound by it. Id. See also United States v. Archer

,531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Under [the prior panel precedent] rule, a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc

. ”). Defendant’s argument that we should disregard the holding of Bryant in this case is thus unavailing. Proceeding to the three bases upon wh ich relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is available per Bryant , Defendant did not allege USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 12 of 1821

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family circumstances warranting his release and the district courtcorrectly held that he failed to establish a qualifying medical condition or aging

- related deterioratio n. As to the medical conditionprong, Defendant cited in his motion below a laundry list of diagnoses, including anxiety, depression, a panic disorder, and a mood
disorder. 5 But he did not claim to suffer from a “terminal illness” nor explain how any of his documented medical conditions “substantially diminishe[ed][his] ability . . . to provide self

- care” in prison. See USSG § 1B1.13. And as the district court pointed out, (1) Defendant’s medical records did not show that he was unable
to attend to the daily tasks of living in prison, including receiving and taking medication for and otherwise participating in treatment for his mental health issues and (2) while the records documented Defendant’s mental illness, they also categorized him as having “no

m edical restrictions” and as being “cleared for employment opportunities.” As such, the district court did not err when it concludedthat Defendant’s release was not warranted as a result of a qualifying medical condition.

5 As noted, Defendant also argued below that h e suffered from various medical conditions that put him at greater risk of severe illness related to COVID

19, but he abandoned that argument by failing to raise it in his appellate brief

. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co. , 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he l aw is by now well settled in this Circuit that a legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.”). We note further that Defendant did not dispute the Government’s data showing l ow infection and transmission rates among inmates and staff at ADX Florence, the facility that housed Defendant when he filed his motion. USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 13 of 1814 Opinion of the Court 21

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Regarding the aging

- related det erioration prong, Defendant argued below that he was entitled to release because of his “rapidlydeteriorating” mental and physical health related to his harsh conditions of confinement “exacerbated by his age.” The district court acknowledged that Defend ant met the first two requirements of the age

- related deterioration provision because he was over 65 years old and had served at least 10 years of his prison sentence
when he filed his motion. Nevertheless, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that he satisfied the third requirement. Specifically,the court found that Defendant “ha[d] not demonstrated . . . a serious deterioration in physical or mental health” that could be attributed to aging. Defendant relied primarily on his mental health issues t o support his aging

- related deterioration claim. 6 The district court noted Defendant’s documented history of recurring mental health issues, but it found scant evidence as to the severity of any changes
in his mental health status. Relevant to this pron g of the analysis,

6 Although Defendant cited in his brief below a list of diagnoses and conditions suggesting he was in poor physic al health, he did not explain or provide any records to substantiate his claim to have experienced a “serious deterioration in physical health.

. . because of the aging process.” See USSG § 1B1.13 comment. n.1(B). To the extent Defendant intended to purs ue a claim based on deteriorating physical health, we note that his medical records suggest several of the physical conditions from which he previously suffered

— including hypothyroidism, type 2 diabetes, and kidney disease

— were found to be resolved
or in r emission by 2019

. Thus, based on the records it appears that Defendant’s physical health had generally improved rather than deteriorated just prior to when he filed his motion. USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 14 of 1821

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the court took note of a recent brain scan indicating “senescentchanges roughly commensurate” with Defendant’s age, but it emphasized that Defendant did not make any claim as to the severity of the changes, which was not evident from th e scan.In addition, the court cited several medical records suggesting that Defendant’s own choices played a greater role than did the aging process in causing any deterioration in Defendant’s mental
health. For example, a 2013 report indicated that Defendant wa s“feeling very down” but that his mood issue was related to loneliness stemming from being put in isolated housing due to behavioral issues. Similarly, a 2017 report noted Defendant’s “lack of willingness to engage in treatment” or to “consider alternati ve activities to improve his mood [such as] exercise [or] extra time out of [his] cell.” The report concluded that while Defendant presented with some depressive symptoms, “his presentation suggest[ed] [an] exaggeration of symptoms, likely as a means to a ssist with facilitating [his] transfer” from ADX Florence. Along those same lines, the
court cited evidence that a March 2019 incident

— during which Defendant had put bags of medication in his mouth and had to be restrained to remove them

— appeared to be st rategic as the medical note regarding the incident related Defendant’s statement that this “was the only way he could get anyone to listen to him.”Reviewing the district court’s conclusions on appeal, we emphasize that Defendant, as the movant, had the b urden of showing a serious, aging

- related deterioration in his mental or physical health to obtain relief under this prong of the compassionate USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 15 of 1816 Opinion of the Court 21

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release statute and policy statement. See United States v. Hamilton

, 715 F.3d 328, 337 (11th Cir. 2013). Based on the available medical records, the district court did not err by concluding Defendant
failed to meet that burden here. The record evidence as to Defendant’s mental health

— and particularly the alleged deterioration in his mental health that might be re lated to the “aging process”

— is mixed. Defendant’s chronic mental health issues are well

- documented in the record, but the issues appear to have been presentfor most if not all of Defendant’s period of incarceration, with fluctuating and episodic symptom s. And as the district court pointed out, several records suggest that Defendant’s documented flare

- upsor worsening of symptoms were exaggerated by Defendant to further strategic goals or could be attributed to Defendant’s own choices rather than to age

- related deterioration.Indeed, only one report from July 2019 suggests that Defendant’s mental state was “worsening” or had “deteriorated.” Thedoctor who drafted the report ordered a brain MRI to look for “possible cerebral vascular disease or any othe r signs that could help explain dementia like symptoms.” But neither the July 2019 report nor any other record describes the severity of the deterioration or symptoms. Presumably the March 2019 medication bag incident informed the July 2019 report. But as the district court noted, records concerning that incident suggest it was a strategic effort by Defendant to get someone “to listen to him.” Further, the ensuingMRI merely indicated “[s]enescent changes roughly commensurate with [Defendant’s] age” and “[t]race chronic small vessel ischemic changes.” No serious cerebral vascular disease was noted USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 16 of 1821

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in the MRI and Defendant’s subsequent medical records do not contain any indication of such disease, or of dementia. Thus, the
district court did not err when it determined that on balance Defendant did not meet his burden of showing a serious, age

- related
deterioration in his mental health.Nor did the district court erroneously eliminate deterioration related to “rapid aging associated with solitary confinem ent” as a possible basis for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as Defendant argues on appeal. Again, the applicable policy statement authorizes relief only when an inmate can show that, in addition to meeting the age and time

- served requirements, he has su ffered deterioration that is both “serious” and related to “the aging process.” See USSG § 1B1.13 comment. n.1(B). Based on the records described
above

— in particular, records showing that Defendant’s physical
health was stable and that his mental health issues were chronic, episodic but not necessarily worsening, and related to factors other than aging

— the court simply concluded that Defendant failed to substantiate his claim to be suffering from serious, aging

- related
deterioration. Finally, Defendant suggests in his appellate brief that the district court erred by failing to consider whether the § 3553(a) sentencing factors supported his early release. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, this Court has held that “a district court need not analyze the § 3553(a) factors if it finds . . . that no extraordinary and compelling reason exists” for granting a motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c). See Giron , 15 F.4th at 1347. Here, like in USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 17 of 1818 Opinion of the Court 21

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Giron , the district court found that no extraordinary and co mpelling reason exists to grant Defendant’s motion. Thus, it was not necessary for the court to consider the § 3553(a) factors because thelack of an extraordinary and compelling reason foreclosed a sentence reduction in any event. Id. See also United States v. Tinker , 14 F.4th 1234, 1237

– 38 (11th Cir. 2021) (emphasizing that all three requirements must be met to grant relief under § 3582(c)).

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is AFFIRMED. USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 18 of 18