S5858 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE August 1, 2012 

say—and yet we respect each other. 

That is what this body is all about. We 

should have people who are on both 

sides of all these controversial issues 

talking about it. There has been a silence for 3 years. Now we are talking 

about it again. 

So welcome back to the discussion of 

global warming. I look forward to future discussions about this. 

Mr. President, I yield the floor. 

UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT S. 3326

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader. 

Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are 

about to do something really important in the Senate. It would increase 

U.S. textile exports to Central American countries, it would promote development and economic stability by creating jobs in, of course, African countries, and it would extend U.S. import 

sanctions with Burma, which the Republican leader will speak more about. 

This bill would help maintain about 

2,000 jobs in North Carolina and South 

Carolina alone. It is a very good bill. It 

is fully paid for. It is an important 

piece of legislation. 

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at a time to be determined by 

the majority leader, after consultation 

with the Republican leader, the Senate 

proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 459, S. 3326; that the only 

amendment in order be a Coburn 

amendment, the text of which is at the 

desk; that there be 30 minutes for debate equally divided and controlled in 

the usual form; that upon the use or 

yielding back of that time, the Senate 

proceed to vote in relation to the 

amendment; that if the amendment is 

not agreed to, the bill be read the third 

time and passed without further action 

or debate; that when the Senate receives H.R. 5986 and if its text is identical to S. 3326, the Senate proceed to 

the immediate consideration of H.R. 

5986, the bill be read the third time and 

passed without further debate, with no 

amendments in order prior to passage; 

further, that if the Coburn amendment 

is agreed to, the Finance Committee be 

discharged from further consideration 

of H.R. 9 and the Senate proceed to its 

immediate consideration; that all after 

the enacting clause be stricken and the 

text of S. 3326, as amended, be inserted 

in lieu thereof, the bill be read the 

third time and passed without further 

debate; that when the Senate receives 

H.R. 5986, the Senate proceed to it 

forthwith and all after the enacting 

clause be stricken and the text of sections 2 and 3 of S. 3326, as reported, by 

inserted in lieu thereof, the bill be read 

the third time and passed, without further debate, as amended, and S. 3326 be 

returned to the Calendar of Business; 

finally, that no motions be in order 

other than motions to waive or motions to table and that motions to reconsider be made and laid on the table 

with no intervening action or debate. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there 

objection? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will 

not be objecting, let me echo the remarks of the majority leader. This is 

an important piece of legislation. 

The part I have the most interest in 

renews Burma’s sanctions—something 

we have done on an annual basis for 10 

years. We are renewing the sanctions 

in spite of the fact that much progress 

has been made in Burma in the last 

year and a half. Secretary Clinton will, 

of course, recommend to the President 

that these sanctions be waived in recognition of the significant progress 

that has been made in the last year and 

a half in that country, which is trying 

to move from a rather thuggish military dictatorship to a genuine democracy. There is still a long way to go. 

This is an important step in the right 

direction. America speaks with one 

voice regarding Burma. My views are 

the same as the views of the Obama administration as expressed by Secretary 

Clinton. 

I thank the chairman of the Finance 

Committee also for helping us work 

through the process, and particularly 

Senator COBURN, who had some reservations about the non-Burma parts 

of this bill. I think we have worked 

those out and are moving forward. It is 

an important step in the right direction. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the 

quorum call be rescinded. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

f 

IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND 

SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012 

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask the 

Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House with respect to 

H.R. 1950. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 

clerk will report. 

The legislative clerk read as follows: 

Resolved, that the House agree to the 

amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 

1905) entitled ‘‘An Act to strengthen Iran 

sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling 

Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities, and for 

other purposes’’, with an amendment. 

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. 

President, I rise in strong support of 

the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 

Human Rights Act, our legislation 

which embodies a bipartisan, bicameral 

agreement to reconcile the current 

Senate and House-passed versions of 

Iran sanctions legislation. Once implemented, this comprehensive new set of 

sanctions will help dramatically to increase the pressure on Iranian government leaders to abandon their illicit 

nuclear activities and support for terrorism. This bill passed the House of 

Representatives by an overwhelming 

bipartisan vote of 421 to 6 earlier this 

evening. I hope all of my colleagues 

will join me in supporting it so that it 

can be adopted by the Senate and 

signed into law by the President as 

soon as possible. 

So far, in the sputtering P5+1 negotiations, Iran has shown no clear signs 

of a willingness to work with the international community to engage in a serious way on nuclear issues. It remains 

to be seen whether Iran will ultimately 

be willing to work towards progress on 

the central issues at upcoming negotiating sessions, or whether the meetings 

will simply be another in a series of 

stalling actions to buy time to enrich 

additional uranium and further fortify 

their nuclear program. That is why I 

think it necessary to intensify the 

pressure, and move forward quickly 

now on this new package that leaves no 

doubts about U.S. resolve on this issue. 

As we all recognize, economic sanctions are not an end: they are a means 

to an end. That end is to apply enough 

pressure to secure agreement from 

Iran’s leaders to fully, completely and 

verifiably abandon their illicit nuclear 

activities. 

Isolated diplomatically, economically, and otherwise, Iran must understand that the patience of the international community is fast running 

out. With these new sanctions, including those targeted at the I-R-G-C, we 

are pressing Iran’s military and political leaders to make a clear choice. 

They can end the suppression of their 

people, come clean on their nuclear 

program, suspend enrichment, and stop 

supporting terrorist activities around 

the globe. Or they can continue to face 

sustained multilateral economic and 

diplomatic pressure, and deepen their 

international isolation. 

This legislation is based on the Senate bill which passed with unanimous 

support in May. It incorporates new 

measures from Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate. The 

sanctions contained in this bill reach 

more deeply into Iran’s energy sector 

than ever before, and build on the 

sweeping banking sanctions Congress 

enacted 2 years ago to reach to insurance, shipping, trade, finance and other 

sectors, targeting those who help to 

bolster Iranian government revenues 

which support their illicit nuclear activities. 

As I have said before, the prospect of 

a nuclear-armed Iran is the most pressing foreign policy challenge we face, 

and we must continue to do all we 

can—politically, economically, and 

diplomatically—to avoid that result. In 

recent months, we have seen increased 

signs that the Iranian regime is feeling 

the pressure of existing sanctions. 

Their currency has plummeted, their 

trade revenues have been sharply curtailed, and they are under increasing 

pressure from the oil sanctions regime 

currently in place. With passage of this 

bill, we are taking another significant 

step to block the remaining avenues 

for the Iranians to fund their illicit behavior and evade sanctions. The bill 

also requires sanctions on those who 

purchase new Iranian sovereign debt, 

thereby further limiting the regime’s 

ability to finance its illicit activities. 

In addition, there are substantial 

new sanctions for anyone who engages 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S5859 

in joint ventures with the National Iranian Oil Company, NIOC; provides insurance or re-insurance to the National 

Iranian Oil Company or the National 

Iranian Tanker Company, NITC; helps 

Iran evade oil sanctions through reflagging or other means; or sells, leases, or 

otherwise provides oil tankers to Iran, 

unless they are from a country that is 

sharply reducing its oil purchases from 

Iran. 

The bill also expands sanctions 

against Iranian and Syrian officials for 

human rights abuses, including against 

those who engage in censorship, jamming and monitoring of communications, and tracking of Internet use by 

ordinary Iranian citizens. 

Many of my colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, have helped us 

get to this point. I want to particularly 

thank Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN of the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Without her help, we would not be 

here. I also want to thank my colleagues, including Senator MENENDEZ, 

who crafted many of its original provisions, and Senators SCHUMER, GILLIBRAND, LAUTENBERG, BROWN, KYL, LIEBERMAN, and others who contributed 

their ideas. I also want to thank Majority Leader REID for his tireless efforts 

to enact a strong comprehensive sanctions bill. 

Finally, I want to thank the staff 

who crafted the details of this bill, and 

worked long hours in intensive discussions over the last several weeks to get 

it done. They include Patrick Grant, 

Steve Kroll, Georgina Cannon, Ingianni 

Acosta and Colin McGinnis of my Committee staff; Dr. Yleem Poblete, Matt 

Zweig, and Ari Friedman of Chairman 

ROS-LEHTINEN’s staff; John O’Hara and 

Andrew Olmem of Senator SHELBY’s 

staff, and Shanna Winters, Dr. Richard 

Kessler, and Alan Makovsky of Ranking Member BERMAN’s staff. 

All told, when enacted this bill and 

other efforts by the President will significantly increase pressure on Iran to 

abandon its illicit nuclear activities. I 

ask unanimous consent to have printed 

in the RECORD a detailed summary of 

the bill. I urge all my colleagues to 

support this measure. 

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the 

RECORD, as follows: 

IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN

RIGHTS ACT OF 2012 

SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY

Sec. 1—Short Title, Table of Contents 

Sec. 2—Definitions: Provides that the definitions of key terms (‘‘appropriate congressional committees,’’ and ‘‘knowingly,’’) will 

be those found in the Iran Sanctions Act 

(ISA) of 1996, as amended, and that the definition of ‘‘United States person’’ will be that 

found in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 

Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 

(CISADA). Also defines ‘‘financial transaction,’’ to mean any transfer of value involving a financial institution, including 

precious metals and various swaps, futures, 

and other activities. 

Sec. 101—Enforcement of Multilateral 

Sanctions Regime and Expansion and Implementation of Sanctions: States the sense of 

Congress that (i) the goal of compelling Iran 

to abandon its efforts to achieve nuclear 

weapons capacity can be effectively achieved 

through a comprehensive policy that includes expansion and vigorous implementation and enforcement of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran, diplomacy, 

and military planning and options, consistent with the President’s 2012 State of the 

Union Address; and (ii) that intensified efforts to counter Iranian sanctions evasion 

are necessary. 

Sec. 102—Diplomatic Efforts to Expand 

Multilateral Sanctions Regime: Urges efforts 

by the US to expand the UN sanctions regime to include (i) imposing additional travel restrictions on Iranian officials responsible for human rights violations, the development of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and Iran’s support for terrorism; (ii) withdrawing sea- and airport 

landing rights for Iran Shipping Lines and 

Iran Air, for their role in nuclear proliferation and illegal arms sales; (iii) expanding 

the range of sanctions imposed on Iran by 

US allies; (iv) expanding sanctions to limit 

Iran’s petroleum development and imports of 

refined petroleum products; and (v) accelerating US diplomatic and economic efforts 

to help allies reduce their dependence on Iranian crude oil and other petroleum products. 

Requires periodic reporting to Congress on 

the status of such efforts. 

Sec. 201—Expansion of Sanctions with Respect to Iran’s Energy Sector: Makes a number of substantial changes in and additions 

to ISA’s energy sanctions. These include (i) 

increasing the number of required sanctions 

from three to five; (ii) making sanctionable 

certain construction of transportation infrastructure to support delivery of domestically 

refined petroleum in Iran; (iii) making 

sanctionable certain barter transactions, and 

the purchase or facilitation of Iranian debt 

issued after the date of enactment, that contribute to Iran’s ability to import refined petroleum products; (iv) extending ISA sanctions to persons knowingly participating in 

petroleum resources joint ventures established on or after January 1, 2002, anywhere 

in the world in which Iran’s government is a 

substantial partner or investor; an exception 

is provided for ventures terminated within 

180 days of enactment; (v) extending ISA 

sanctions to those providing certain goods 

and services (including construction of certain infrastructure) that support Iran’s ability to develop its petroleum resources; and 

(vi) extending ISA sanctions to support for 

Iran’s domestic production of petrochemical 

products. 

Sec. 202—Imposition of Sanctions for 

Transportation of Crude Oil from Iran and 

Evasion of Sanctions by Shipping Companies: Requires imposition of at least five ISA 

sanctions on a person who owns or operates 

a vessel that within 90 days after the date of 

enactment is used to transport crude oil 

from Iran to another country; applies only if 

the President makes a determination, under 

the NDAA, that there is a sufficient supply 

of petroleum and petroleum products from 

countries other than Iran to permit purchasers of petroleum to significantly reduce 

their purchases from Iran; an exception is 

provided for transportation of crude oil from 

Iran to countries that are exempt from 

NDAA sanctions because they are significantly reducing such purchases. Also applies 

at least five ISA sanctions to persons that 

own or operate a vessel that conceals the 

Iranian origin of crude oil or refined petroleum products transported on the vessel, including by permitting the operator of the 

vessel to suspend the vessel’s satellite tracking devices, or by obscuring or concealing 

the ownership by the government of Iran, or 

other entities owned or controlled by Iran. 

Ships involved could be barred from US ports 

for up to two years. 

Sec. 203—Expansion of Sanctions with Respect to the Development by Iran of WMDs: 

Requires imposition of five or more ISA 

sanctions on persons who export, transfer, or 

otherwise facilitate the transshipment of 

goods, services, technology or other items 

and know or should have known this action 

would materially contribute to the ability of 

Iran to develop WMDs. Also requires ISA 

sanctions to be imposed (subject to certain 

conditions) on persons who knowingly participate in joint ventures with Iran’s government, Iranian firms, or persons acting for or 

on behalf of Iran’s government, in the mining, production or transportation of uranium 

anywhere in the world. Exempts persons if 

they withdraw from such joint ventures 

within six months after date of enactment. 

Sec. 204—Expansion of Sanctions Available 

under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: Expands the current menu of sanctions available to the President under ISA, to include a 

prohibition on any US person from investing 

in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person, an exclusion from the United States of 

aliens who are corporate officers, principals 

or controlling shareholders in a sanctioned 

firm, and application of applicable ISA sanctions to the CEO or other principal executive 

officers (or persons performing similar functions) of a sanctioned firm, which could include a freeze of their US assets. 

Sec. 205—Modification of Waiver Standard 

under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: Revises 

the standard under section 9 of ISA for waivers of sanctions by the President (i) to require that energy-related sanctions can only 

be waived if waiver is essential to the national security interests of the United 

States; (ii) require that WMD-related sanctions can only be waived if waiver is ‘‘vital 

to the national security interests of the 

United States; (iii) to eliminate the ‘‘permanent’’ waiver in prior law and replace it with 

a one-year renewable waiver; and (iv) to clarify that all waivers must be on a case-bycase basis . 

Sec. 206—Briefings on Implementation of 

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: Amends ISA 

to require briefings by the Secretary of State 

to the appropriate congressional committees 

on ISA implementation. 

Sec. 207—Expansion of Definitions under 

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: Adds definitions of ‘‘credible information,’’ ‘‘petrochemical product,’’ and ‘‘services.’’ ‘‘Credible 

information’’ includes public announcements 

by persons that they are engaged in certain 

activities, including those made in a report 

to stockholders, and may include announcements by the Government of Iran, and reports from the General Accountability Office 

(GAO), the Energy Information Administration, the Congressional Research Service, or 

other reputable governmental organizations, 

or trade or industry publications. ‘‘Petrochemical product’’ is defined consistent with 

Executive Order 13590. ‘‘Services’’ include 

software, hardware, financial, professional 

consulting, engineering, specialized energy 

information services, and others. 

Sec. 208—Sense of Congress on Iran’s Energy Sector: States the sense of Congress 

that Iran’s energy sector remains a zone of 

proliferation concern, since the Iranian Government continues to divert substantial revenue from petroleum sales to finance its illicit nuclear and missile activities, and that 

the President should apply the full range of 

ISA sanctions to address the threat posed by 

Iran. 

Sec. 211—Sanctions for Shipping WMD or 

Terrorism-Related Materials to or from Iran: 

Requires the blocking of assets of, and imposes other sanctions on, persons who knowingly sell, lease, or provide ships, insurance 

or reinsurance, or other shipping services, 


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for transportation of goods that materially 

contribute to Iran’s WMD program or its terrorism-related activities. Applies as well to 

parents of the persons involved if they knew 

or should have known of the sanctionable activity and to any of subsidiaries or affiliates 

of the persons involved that knowingly participated in the activity. Permits the President to waive sanctions in cases ‘‘vital to the 

national security interest,’’ but requires a 

report to Congress regarding the use of such 

a waiver; the President must, in any event, 

submit a report to Congress identifying operators of vessels and other persons that conduct or facilitate significant financial transactions that manage Iranian ports designated for IEEPA sanctions. 

Sec. 212—Imposition of Sanctions for Provision of Underwriting Services or Insurance 

or Reinsurance for NIOC and NITC: Requires 

five or more ISA sanctions against companies providing underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance to National Iranian Oil 

Company (NIOC) or the National Iranian 

Tanker Company (NITC) or a successor entity to either company. Provides an exemption 

for persons providing such services for activities relating to the provision of food, 

medicine, and medical devices or humanitarian assistance to Iran. 

Sec. 213—Imposition of Sanctions for Purchase, Subscription to, or Facilitation of the 

Issuance of Iran Sovereign Debt: Requires 

the imposition of five or more ISA sanctions 

on persons the President determines knowingly purchase, subscribe to, or facilitate the 

issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, or debt of 

an entity owned or controlled by the Iranian 

Government, issued on or after the date of 

enactment. 

Sec. 214—Imposition of Sanctions on Subsidiaries and Agents of UN-Sanctioned Persons: Amends CISADA to ensure that US financial sanctions imposed on UN-designated 

entities reach those persons acting on behalf 

of, at the direction of, or owned or controlled 

by, the designated entities. Requires the 

Treasury Department to revise its regulations within 90 days of enactment to implement the change. 

Sec. 215—Imposition of Sanctions for 

Transactions with Persons Sanctioned for 

Certain Activities Relating to Terrorism or 

Proliferation of WMD: Extends CISADA to 

impose sanctions on a foreign financial institution that facilitates a significant transaction or transactions or provides significant 

services not only to certain designated financial institutions but also to designated persons whose property or interests in property 

are blocked based on their connection to 

Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support of terrorism. 

Sec. 216—Expansion of Mandatory Sanctions with Respect to Financial Institutions 

that Engage in Certain Activities Relating 

to Iran: Requires the Treasury Secretary to 

revise regulations under Section 104 of 

CISADA to apply rules cutting off access to 

the U.S. financial institutions to foreign financial institutions knowingly facilitating, 

participating or assisting in, or acting on behalf of or as an intermediary, in connection 

with financial activities involving designated Iranian banks, whether or not the 

transactions are directly with those banks.. 

Sec. 217—Continuation of Sanction for the 

Government of Iran, the Central Bank of 

Iran, and Sanctions Evaders: Requires that 

various sanctions imposed by Executive 

Order, including blocking the property of the 

Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions, imposing penalties on foreign 

sanction evaders, and blocking the property 

of the CBI, will remain in effect until the 

President certifies that Iran and the CBI 

have ceased to support terrorism and Iranian 

development of WMD. 

Sec. 218—Liability of Parent Companies for 

Violations of Sanctions by Foreign Subsidiaries: Requires the imposition of civil penalties under the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of up to twice 

the amount of the relevant transaction, on 

US parent companies for the activities of 

their foreign subsidiaries which, if undertaken by a US person or in the United 

States, would violate US sanctions law. Subsidiaries are defined as those entities in 

which a US person holds more than fifty percent equity interest or a majority of the 

seats on the board, or that a US person otherwise controls. Covers activities under the 

current US trade embargo with Iran and 

would apply regardless of whether the subsidiary was established to circumvent US 

sanctions. 

Sec. 219—Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosures on Certain Activities in 

Iran: Amends the Securities and Exchange 

Act of 1934 to require issuers whose stock is 

traded on US stock exchanges to disclose 

whether they or their affiliates have knowingly engaged in activities (i) described in 

section 5 of ISA (energy sector activity); (ii) 

described in 104(c)(2) or (d)(1) of CISADA (related to foreign financial institutions who 

facilitate WMD/terrorism, money laundering, IRGC activity, and other violations); 

(iii) in 105A(b)(2) of CISADA (related transfer 

of weapons and other technologies to Iran 

likely to be used for human rights abuses); 

(iv) involving persons whose property is 

blocked for WMD/terrorism and; (v)involving 

persons or entities in the government of Iran 

(without the authorization of a Federal department or agency). Provides for periodic 

public disclosure of such information, and 

communication of that information by the 

SEC to Congress and the President. Requires 

the President to initiate an investigation 

into the possible imposition of sanctions as 

specified, and to make a sanctions determination within six months. 

Sec. 220—Reports on, and Authorization of 

Imposition of Sanctions with Respect to, the 

Provision of Specialized Financial Messaging 

Services to the Central Bank of Iran and 

Other Sanctioned Iranian Financial Institutions: States the sense of Congress that specialized financial messaging services are a 

critical link to the international financial 

system; requires the Secretary of the Treasury to report periodically listing the persons 

who provide such services to the Central 

Bank of Iran and Iranian banks that have 

been designated for involvement in WMD or 

support for terror, and assessing efforts to 

cut off the direct provision of such services 

to such institutions. Authorizes the imposition of sanctions under CISADA or IEEPA on 

persons continuing to provide such services 

to the CBI or such other Iranian institutions, 

subject to an exception for persons subject to 

foreign sanctions regimes that require them 

to cut off services to a substantially similar 

group of Iranian institutions. 

Sec. 221—Identification and Immigration 

Restrictions on Senior Iranian Officials and 

their Family Members: Requires the identification of and denial of visa requests to senior officials, including the Supreme Leader, 

the President, members of the Assembly of 

Experts, senior members of the Intelligence 

Ministry of Iran, and senior members of the 

IRGC that are involved in nuclear proliferation, support international terrorism or the 

commission of serious human rights abuses 

against citizens of Iran. Also includes their 

family members. Provides for Presidential 

waiver if essential to the national interest or 

if necessary to meet our UN obligations; requires a report to Congress regarding the use 

of such a waiver. 

Sec. 222—Sense of Congress and Rule of 

Construction Relating to Certain Authorities of State and Local Governments: States 

the sense of Congress that the US should 

support actions by States or local governments, within their authority, including determining how investment assets are valued 

for financial institutions safety and soundness purposes, that are consistent with and 

in furtherance of this Act. Amends CISADA 

to state that it shall not be construed to 

abridge the authority of a State to issue and 

enforce rules governing the safety, soundness, and solvency of a financial institution 

subject to its jurisdiction or the business of 

insurance pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 

Sec. 223—GAO Reports on Foreign Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector: Mandates reports from GAO on foreign investment in 

Iran’s energy sector, exporters of refined petroleum products to Iran, entities providing 

shipping and insurance services to Iran, Iranian energy joint ventures worldwide, and 

countries where gasoline and refined petroleum products exported to Iran are produced 

or refined. 

Sec. 224—Expanded Reporting on Iran’s 

Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products: 

Amends section 110(b) of CISADA to require 

additional reporting by the President on the 

volume of crude oil and refined petroleum 

products imported to and exported from 

Iran, the persons selling and transporting 

crude oil and refined petroleum products, the 

countries with primary jurisdiction over 

those persons and the countries in which 

those products were refined, the sources of 

financing for such imports and the involvement of foreign persons in efforts to assist 

Iran in developing its oil and gas production 

capacity, importing advanced technology to 

upgrade existing Iranian refineries, converting existing chemical plants to petroleum refineries, and maintaining, upgrading 

or expanding refineries or constructing new 

refineries. 

Sec. 301—Identifications and Sanctions on 

Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps Officials, 

Agents, and Affiliates: Requires the President to identify, and designate for sanctions, 

officials, affiliates and agents of the IRGC 

within 90 days of enactment, and periodically thereafter; designation requires exclusion of such persons from the United States, 

and imposition of sanctions related to WMD 

under IEEPA, including freezing their assets 

and otherwise isolating them financially. 

Also, outlines priorities for investigating 

certain foreign persons, entities, and transactions in assessing connections to the 

IRGC. Requires the President to report on 

designations and provides for a waiver if 

vital to the national security interest of the 

US. 

Sec. 302—Identification and Sanctions on 

Foreign Persons Supporting IRGC: Subjects 

foreign persons to ISA sanctions if those persons knowingly provide material assistance 

to, or engage in any significant transaction—including barter transactions—with 

officials of the IRGC, its agents or affiliates. 

Requires imposition of similar sanctions 

against those persons who engage in significant transactions with UN-sanctioned persons, those acting for or on their behalf, or 

those owned or controlled by them. Provides 

for additional sanctions under IEEPA as the 

President deems appropriate. Requires the 

President to report on designations and 

waivers, as applicable. Waiver is available if 

essential to the national security interests 

of the US. 

Sec. 303—Identification and Sanctions on 

Foreign Government Agencies Carrying Out 

Activities or Transactions with Certain IranAffiliated Persons: Requires the President, 

within 120 days and every 180 days thereafter, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies 


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each agency of the government of a foreign 

country, other than Iran, that the President 

determines knowingly and materially supported a foreign person that is an official, 

agent, or affiliate of IRGC designated pursuant to IEEPA or various UN Resolutions. 

Provides authority for the President to impose various measures described in the section, such as denying assistance under the 

Foreign Assistance Act or proscribing certain US loans to the agency involved. 

Sec. 304—Rule of Construction: Clarifies 

that sections 301 to 303 sanctions do not 

limit the President’s authority to designate 

persons for sanction under IEEPA. 

Sec. 311—Expansion of US Procurement 

Ban to Foreign Persons who Interact with 

the IRGC: Requires certification by prospective US government contractors (for contract solicitations issued beginning 120 days 

from the date of enactment) that neither 

they nor their subsidiaries have engaged in 

significant economic transactions with designated IRGC officials, agents, or affiliates. 

Waiver is also amended, so that it is available if ‘‘essential to the national security interests.’’ Establishes a minimum procurement ban penalty of two years for violators. 

Sec. 312—Sanctions Determinations on 

NIOC and NITC: Amends CISADA to require 

the Secretary of the Treasury to determine 

and notify Congress whether the National 

Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) are 

agents or affiliates of the IRGC. If found to 

be IRGC entities, sanctions apply to transactions or relevant financial services for the 

purchase of petroleum or petroleum products 

from the NIOC or NITC, but only if the 

President determines that there exists a sufficient supply of petroleum from countries 

other than Iran to permit purchasers to significantly reduce in volume their purchases 

from Iran. Provides for an exception to financial institutions of a country that is significantly reducing its purchases of Iranian 

petroleum or petroleum products within 

specified periods which track those provided 

for in section 1245 of the FY 2012 National 

Defense Authorization Act. 

Sec. 401—Sanctions on those Complicit in 

Human Rights Abuses: States the sense of 

Congress that the Supreme Leader, seniors 

members of the Intelligence Ministry, senior 

members of the IRGC and paramilitary 

groups, and other Ministers, are responsible 

for directing and controlling serious human 

rights abuses against the Iranian people and 

should be included on the list of persons responsible for or complicit in those abuses 

and subject to property blocking and other 

CISADA 105 sanctions. Requires a report to 

appropriate congressional committees within 180 days detailing the involvement of the 

persons mentioned above in human rights 

abuses against the citizens of Iran. 

Sec. 402—Sanctions on those Transferring 

to Iran Certain Goods or Technologies: Imposes sanctions provided for in CISADA, including a visa ban and property blocking/ 

asset freeze, on persons and firms which supply Iran with equipment and technologies including weapons, rubber bullets, tear gas and 

other riot control equipment, and jamming, 

monitoring and surveillance equipment 

which the President determines are likely to 

be used by Iranian officials to commit 

human rights abuses. Requires the President 

to maintain and update lists of such persons 

who commit human rights abuses, submit 

updated lists to Congress, and make the unclassified portion of those lists public. Requires the President to report on designations and waivers, as applicable. 

Sec. 403—Sanctions on those Engaging in 

Censorship and Repression in Iran: States 

the sense of Congress that satellite service 

providers and other entities that directly 

provide satellite service to the Iranian government or its entities should cease to provide such service unless the government 

ceases its activities intended to jam or restrict the signals and the US should address 

the illegal jamming through voice and vote 

at the UN International Telecommunications Union. Requires imposition of sanctions as in section 401 against individuals 

and firms found to have engaged in censorship or curtailment of the rights of freedom 

of expression or assembly of Iran’s citizens. 

Sec. 411—Codification of Sanctions with 

Respect to Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Using Information Technology: Codifies Executive Order 

13606, Blocking The Property And Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human 

Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran 

and Syria Via Information Technology. 

Sec. 412—Clarification of Sensitive Technologies for Purposes of Procurement Ban 

under CISADA: Requires the Secretary of 

State to issue guidelines, within 90 days of 

the date of enactment, describing technologies that may be considered ‘‘sensitive 

technologies’’ for the purposes of Sec. 106 of 

CISADA, with special attention to new technologies, determine the types of technology 

that enable Iran’s indigenous capabilities to 

disrupt and monitor information and communications, and review the guidelines no 

less than once each year, adding items to the 

guidelines as necessary. 

Sec. 413—Expedited Processing of Human 

Rights, Humanitarian, and Democracy Aid: 

Requires the Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(OFAC) of the Treasury Department to establish a 90-day process to expedite processing of US Iran-related humanitarian, 

human rights and democratization aid by entities receiving funds from the State Department; the Broadcasting Board of Governors; 

and other federal agencies. Requires the 

State Department to conduct a foreign policy review within 30 days of request submission. Provides for additional time for processing of applications involving certain specified sensitive goods and technology, and requests involving extraordinary circumstances. 

Sec. 414—Comprehensive Strategy to Promote Internet Freedom in Iran: Requires the 

Administration to devise a comprehensive 

strategy and report to Congress on how best 

to assist Iran’s citizens in freely and safely 

accessing the Internet, developing countercensorship technologies, expanding access to 

‘‘surrogate’’ programming including Voice of 

America’s Persian News Network, and Radio 

FARDA inside Iran, and taking other similar 

measures. 

Sec. 415—Statement of Policy on Political 

Prisoners: Declares the policy of the US to 

expand efforts to identify, assist, and protect 

prisoners of conscience in Iran, intensify 

work to abolish Iranian human rights violations, and publicly call for the release of political prisoners, as appropriate. 

Sec. 501—Exclusion of Certain Iranian Students from the US: Requires the Secretary of 

State to deny visas and the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to exclude certain Iranian university students who may seek to 

come to the U.S. to study to prepare for 

work in Iran’s energy sector or in fields related to its nuclear program, including nuclear sciences or nuclear engineering. 

Sec. 502—Interests in Financial Assets of 

Iran: Makes certain blocked assets available 

for execution to satisfy any judgment or 

judgments to the extent of any compensatory damages against Iran for state-sponsored terrorism, so long as the court determines that Iran has an equitable title to or 

beneficial interest in those assets (subject to 

an exception for certain custodial interests), 

and the court also determines that no one 

possesses a constitutionally-protected interest in the blocked assets under the Fifth 

Amendment. 

Sec. 503—Technical Corrections: Reaffirms 

longstanding US policy allowing sale of certain licensed agricultural commodities to 

Iran by amending the National Defense Authorization Act to allow for continued payments related to such commodities. Adjusts 

date of delivery of EIA reports. 

Sec. 504—Expansion of NDAA Sanctions: 

Amends the NDAA to provide that financial 

institutions located in countries that have 

been exempted because they are significantly reducing their reliance on Iranian oil 

may continue to do business with the Central Bank of Iran only for petroleum transactions and limited bilateral trade between 

Iran and those countries; for the first time 

treats state-owned banks (other than central 

banks) as subject to the same sanctions rules 

as foreign private banks; provides incentives 

for ‘‘significantly reducing’’ countries to reduce to zero; clarifies that ‘‘significantly reducing’’ includes a reduction in price or volume toward a complete cessation of crude oil 

imports; ties termination date to termination certification in CISADA. Makes other 

technical corrections. 

Sec. 505—Report on Natural Gas Exports 

from Iran: Requires the Administrator of the 

Energy Information Administration to submit a report to Congress and the President 

within 60 days on Iran’s natural gas sector, 

including an assessment of exports of Iranian 

natural gas, identification of countries purchasing the most Iranian natural gas, assessment of alternative supplies available to 

those countries, and assessment of the impact a reduction on exports would have on 

global supplies and pricing. Requires the 

President to submit a report to Congress 

within 60 days of receiving the EIA report, 

and using the information it contains to provide analysis and recommendations on the 

revenues received by Iran from its natural 

gas exports and whether further steps should 

be taken to limit such revenues. 

Sec. 506—Report on Membership of Iran in 

International Organizations: Requires the 

Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress listing the international organizations 

of which Iran is a member and detailing the 

amount the US contributes to each such organization annually. 

Sec. 507—Sense of Congress on Exportation 

of Goods, Services, and Technologies for Aircraft Produced in the US: States the sense of 

Congress that licenses to export or re-export 

goods, services, or technologies for aircraft 

produced in the US should be provided, in 

the case of Iran, only in situations where 

such licenses are essential and in a manner 

consistent with US laws and foreign policy 

goals. 

Sec. 601—Implementation; Penalties: Provides the President with the necessary procedural tools to administer the provisions of 

the new law, including subpoena and other 

enforcement authorities for specified provisions of the bill. 

Sec. 602—Applicability to Authorized Intelligence Activities: Provides a general exemption for authorized intelligence activities of 

the U.S. 

Sec. 603—Applicability to Certain Natural 

Gas Projects: Contains special conditions for 

a project outside Iran of substantial importance to U.S. national interests and European energy security interests and energy 

independence from the Government of the 

Russian Federation. 

Sec. 604—Rule of Construction: Provides 

that nothing in this Act shall be construed 

as a declaration of war or an authorization 

of the use of force against Iran or Syria. 

Sec. 605—Termination: Provides for termination of some provisions of the new law if 


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S5862 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE August 1, 2012 

the President certifies as required in 

CISADA that Iran has ceased its support for 

terrorism and ceased efforts to pursue, acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction 

and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile 

launch technology, and has verifiably dismantled its WMD. 

Sec. 701—Short Title for Title VII: The 

‘‘Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 

2012.’’ 

Sec. 702—Sanctions on those Responsible 

for Human Rights Abuses of Syria’s Citizens: 

Requires the President to identify within 90 

days, and sanction under IEEPA, officials of 

the Syrian government or those acting on 

their behalf who are complicit in or responsible for the commission of serious human 

rights abuses against Syria’s citizens, regardless of whether the abuses occurred in 

Syria. 

Sec. 703—Sanctions on those Transferring 

to Syria Technologies for Human Rights 

Abuses: Requires the President to identify 

and sanction persons determined to have engaged in the transfer of technologies—including weapons, rubber bullets, tear gas and 

other riot control equipment, and jamming, 

monitoring and surveillance equipment— 

which the President determines are likely to 

be used by Syrian officials to commit human 

rights abuses or restrict the free flow of information in Syria. Provides for exceptions 

where a person has agreed to stop providing 

such technologies, and agreed not to knowingly provide such technologies in the future. Requires the President to report on 

designations and waivers, where applicable, 

and to update the list periodically. 

Sec. 704—Sanctions on those Engaging in 

Censorship and Repression in Syria: Requires 

the President to identify and report to Congress within 90 days of enactment those persons and firms found to have engaged in censorship or repression of the rights of freedom 

of expression or assembly of Syria’s citizens, 

and impose sanctions under IEEPA on such 

persons. Requires periodic updating of the 

list, and public access via the websites of the 

Departments of State and Treasury. 

Sec. 705—Waiver: Provides for Presidential 

national security interest waiver for Syria 

provisions; requires a report to Congress on 

the reasons for the waiver. 

Sec. 706—Termination: Provides for termination of the Syria provisions if the President certifies that certain conditions are 

met. 

PARENT COMPANIES

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I 

rise today to engage in a colloquy with 

my friend, the distinguished Chairman 

of the Senate Committee on Banking, 

Housing, and Urban Affairs, regarding 

HR 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and 

Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. I want 

to thank the chairman for crafting a 

strong sanctions package that includes 

language I authored to close a loophole 

in current law that allows foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to continue 

doing business with Iran without imposing any penalties on their U.S. parent companies. We must close this 

loophole once and for all, and I am 

pleased the Chairman agrees with me. 

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. I 

thank Senator LAUTENBERG for his 

longstanding leadership on this issue. 

As I have previously noted, it is long 

past time for foreign subsidiaries of 

U.S. companies to end their business in 

Iran. That is already happening due to 

US and international pressure on the 

business and financial sectors, and this 

new provision will accelerate that 

process. Firms realize the huge risks 

such activity poses, reputationally and 

otherwise, to their companies. I note 

that it is already a violation of U.S. 

law for U.S. subsidiaries to engage in 

sanctionable activity in Iran’s energy 

sector and certain other activities 

under U.S. sanctions laws. It is also a 

violation of U.S. trade law for a U.S. 

firm to do business of any kind in Iran 

via a subsidiary that it directs. The 

balance that has been struck in prior 

law is to focus only on the activity of 

U.S. companies. Foreign subsidiaries 

are not, by definition, U.S. companies, 

and your provision takes a major new 

step forward in this area of the law. I 

agree with you that the way we have 

addressed this issue authorizing for the 

first time penalties on U.S. parents if 

their foreign subsidiaries engages in an 

activity that would be sanctionable if 

committed by a U.S. person—is a sound 

and responsible one, and will hopefully 

shut down this activity once and for 

all. 

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Does the chairman agree that the language in the bill 

currently under consideration would 

apply the same penalties that can be 

imposed on U.S. companies that directly violate the U.S. trade ban to 

those U.S. parent companies whose foreign subsidiaries are doing business 

with Iran? 

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. The 

bill would authorize the imposition of 

similar civil penalties on such U.S. parent companies. 

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Does the chairman also agree that this language subjects to penalties U.S. parent companies if their foreign subsidiaries knew 

or should have known that the subsidiary was directly or indirectly doing 

business with an Iranian entity, even if 

it was the case that the parent companies were not actually aware of the activity of the subsidiary? 

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. I 

agree this legislation mandates penalties on a U.S. parent company if its 

foreign subsidiary has knowledge or 

should have had knowledge that the 

subsidiary was doing prohibited business with Iran, even if the U.S. parent 

company has no knowledge of these 

transactions. 

Mr. LAUTENBERG. And does the 

chairman agree that this requirement 

that the foreign subsidiary knew or 

should have known that they were 

doing business with Iran relates only 

to the actual business transaction and 

does not require that the subsidiary 

had or should have had knowledge of 

current U.S. sanctions law in order to 

place penalties on the U.S. parent company? 

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Yes. 

That is my intent. 

Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank Chairman JOHNSON for all of his work on this 

important Iran sanctions package. Iran 

continues to defy numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions. It 

funds Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations, and it commits 

severe human rights abuses against its 

own people. We must do everything we 

can to place as much pressure on the 

Iranian regime as possible to change 

its behavior, and I am pleased that we 

have finally closed this loophole in current law and put U.S. companies on notice that they will be held responsible 

for the activities of their subsidiaries 

with respect to Iran. 

Mr. REID. I move to concur in the 

House amendment, and I believe the 

Senate is ready to act on this motion. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 

question is on agreeing to the motion. 

The motion was agreed to. 

Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent 

that the motion to reconsider be laid 

upon the table with no intervening action or debate and that any statements 

related to this bill be printed in the 

RECORD. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Humanitarian trade, including agricultural commodities, food, medicine and 

medical products has long been specifically exempted by Congress from successive rounds of Iran sanctions legislation, as long as such trade is licensed 

by the Department of the Treasury’s 

Office of Foreign Assets Control, or 

OFAC. 

With the sharp drop in the value of 

Iran’s currency, and the worsening economic situation in Iran, it is becoming 

more apparent that U.S. financial sanctions targeting Iran’s banking sector 

are causing increased concern among 

U.S. and other businesses, and banks of 

our allies engaged in such trade. 

The fear is that engaging in humanitarian trade in the current sanctions 

environment might lead to sanctions 

for legitimately licensed humanitarian 

trade. We must underscore with other 

countries and their banks that humanitarian trade with Iran is not subject to 

sanctions if it is appropriately licensed 

by OFAC. 

This has been a concern since the 

Senate first considered this bill and 

this concern still remains. It is not and 

has not been the intent of U.S. policy 

to harm the Iranian people by prohibiting humanitarian trade that is licensed by the U.S. Treasury Department, and we should do all we can to 

avoid this outcome. OFAC consistently 

issues many licenses, both general and 

specific, for this type of trade. 

The practical financing difficulties 

arising today between banks and those 

engaging in licensed humanitarian 

trade can be best addressed by U.S. 

government officials, who should do 

more to make it clear that no U.S. 

sanctions will be imposed against 

third-country banks that facilitate 

OFAC-licensed or exempted humanitarian trade. The Administration must 

continue to make this clear in public 

statements, in private meetings with 

foreign financial institutions, and elsewhere as appropriate. Misinterpretation of U.S. law, among foreign financial institutions, should no longer deny 


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August 1, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S5863 

the people of Iran the benefit of OFACapproved humanitarian trade. 

Mr. REID. I am pleased that the Senate has just passed the final version of 

the Iran Sanctions legislation. 

I want to thank Senators JOHNSON, 

SHELBY and MENENDEZ for their leadership and all of their hard work getting 

this bill completed. 

At a time when Iran continues to 

defy the international community with 

its nuclear weapons program, it is critical we continue to tighten our sanctions regime. 

This legislation expands our existing 

sanctions on Iran’s energy sector, and 

imposes new sanctions targeting shipping and insurance. 

Iran continues to try to evade existing sanctions. But this legislation, in 

combination with newly announced 

measures by the Obama administration, closes loopholes and stops the use 

of front companies or financial institutions to get around international sanctions. 

Our current sanctions, and a recent 

European Union ban on purchasing Iranian oil, have already had an impact. 

In spite of the rhetoric coming out of 

Iran, the regime is clearly feeling the 

heat. 

Oil exports are down by 50 percent, 

and the Iranian currency has lost nearly 40 percent of its value. 

Iranian tankers full of oil are crowding the waters around Iran, acting as 

floating storage facilities for oil the 

rogue nation cannot sell. 

Over the past year, I have come to 

the floor many times urging passage of 

this measure. 

I am pleased we have finally completed this important work. 

There is no time to waste, as the Iranian regime continues to threaten our 

ally Israel and the national security of 

the United States. 

f 

MORNING BUSINESS 

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed 

to a period of morning business, with 

Senators allowed to speak for up to 10 

minutes. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

f 

REMEMBERING CHIEF ROD 

MAGGARD 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I 

rise today in memory of former Hazard 

Police Chief Rod Maggard. Chief 

Maggard was a prominent member of 

the Perry County, KY, community, and 

he dedicated his life to serving his 

country, State, and city. 

A native of the southeastern Kentucky region, Chief Maggard was born 

on April 9, 1944, to Ivory and Margaret 

Maggard. After graduating from Cumberland High School, he attended 

Southeast Community College. Shortly 

thereafter, Chief Maggard received his 

draft notice for the Vietnam War. Initially, he was stationed in Biloxi, MI, 

where he worked as a Morse radio 

intercept operator, and he ultimately 

served a 14-month tour in DaNang, 

Vietnam. 

Chief Maggard became a State trooper in 1967 when he returned home from 

the war. He was a decorated trooper 

and even received the Trooper of the 

Year Award for the Hazard KSP Post. 

In 1981, Maggard left public service and 

became director of Blue Diamond 

Coal’s security. However, in 1991, he returned to public duty when he accepted 

the position of police chief for the City 

of Hazard. 

His career was highly distinguished 

as he earned many different forms of 

recognition. Chief Maggard was invited 

to the White House to represent the 

Kentucky Chiefs of Police; he also 

served on the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council from 1995 to 2001; in 1997 

he was appointed to the National Law 

Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center Advisory Council; and he 

was president of the Kentucky Association of Chiefs of Police from 1999 to 

2000. In 2001, Chief Maggard retired 

from the police force and became the 

director of the Rural Law Enforcement 

Technology Center in Hazard. 

Though a decorated police officer and 

public servant, the legacy Chief Rod 

Maggard hoped to leave was that of a 

good member of his community. Current Hazard police chief Minor Allen 

said that Chief Maggard was not just a 

mentor but more like a second father 

to him. It was his love of Hazard and 

Kentucky that set Maggard apart as a 

great police chief, and that is the reason why Rod will be dearly missed by 

those he knew and with whom he 

worked. 

Today, I ask that my colleagues in 

the U.S. Senate would join me in honoring Chief Rod Maggard. I extend my 

most sincere condolences to his wife, 

Beverly; their daughters, Lesley 

Buckner, Brandi Townsley, and Vali 

Dye; his sons-in-law; brother; grandchildren; and many more beloved family members and friends. The Hazard 

Herald, a publication from Hazard, KY, 

published an obituary that highlighted 

Chief Maggard’s outstanding service to 

Kentucky. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that said article appear 

in the RECORD. 

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the 

RECORD, as follows: 

[From the Hazard Herald, June 20, 2012] 

ROD MAGGARD

Rodney Mitchell Maggard, 68, of Hazard, 

passed away on Wednesday, June 13, at the 

hospice care center in Hazard. He was the 

former director of the Rural Law Enforcement Technology Center and former chief of 

police with the Hazard Police Department. 

He was the son of the late Ivory Mitchell 

Maggard and the late Margaret McIntosh 

Maggard, and was also preceded in death by 

his brother, James Charles Maggard. 

He is survived by his wife, Beverly 

Maggard; daughters Lesley Buckner and husband Jay, Brandi Townsley and husband Jeff, 

and Vali Dye and husband Kevin; brother 

Tommy Wayne Maggard; godson Anthony 

Bersaglia; grandchildren Ali Townsley, 

Walker Townsley, Mitchell Buckner, Grayson Dye, and Avery Dye; along with a host of 

family and friends. 

Arrangements were handled by Maggard 

Mountain View Chapel of Hazard. Funeral 

services were held on Saturday, June 16, at 

the Forum, with Dr. Bill Scott and Rev. 

Chris Fugate officiating. Interment was at 

Charlie Maggard Cemetery at Blair, Kentucky. 

f 

REMEMBERING AURORA’S LOSS 

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, as we gain 

perspective on the recent horrific 

shooting in Aurora, CO, our thoughts 

and prayers are with the victims, their 

families, and on all those who have 

been impacted by this tragedy. I, like 

many Americans, have been uplifted by 

the many examples of courage and heroism that have emerged from this dark 

moment. A young woman refusing to 

leave her injured friend, pulling her out 

of harm’s way. A man giving his life to 

shield a loved one. A 19-year-old stepping back into danger to rescue a 

mother and her two young daughters. 

These stories and the others that will 

almost certainly emerge as time goes 

on serve as powerful reminders of the 

simple decency that makes our Nation 

strong. 

But as we reflect on these stories, it 

is also important that we begin to understand what caused or contributed to 

this heinous act. When the alleged 

shooter burst into the theater, he 

opened fire on the audience with an 

AR–15 assault rifle. The AR–15 is a type 

of military-style assault weapon, built 

for no purpose other than combat. According to the Congressional Research 

Service, they were designed in the 

aftermath of the Second World War to 

give soldiers a weapon suited for the 

modern battlefield. Such weapons often 

use high-capacity ammunition magazines, which allow shooters to continuously fire rounds without reloading. It 

has been reported that the alleged 

shooter used an oversized drum magazine, which reports have indicated 

could fire 100 rounds without reloading. 

Between 1994 and 2004, a Federal ban 

prohibited the purchase of assault 

weapons. The idea was that if we took 

lethal weapons with no sporting purpose off the streets, it would make our 

society safer and protect American 

lives. Our law enforcement community 

strongly supported it. And it worked. 

After the ban was enacted, Brady Campaign studies observed a 66 percent decrease in the number of assault weapons that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, ATF, traced back 

to a crime scene. When assault weapons were taken off the market, our Nation became safer. But, unfortunately, 

Congress allowed the assault weapons 

ban to lapse in 2004, and repeated efforts to reinstate it have been unsuccessful. 

So this past May, when the alleged 

gunman walked into a local gun shop, 

he was able to purchase an AR–15 assault rifle. The sale was completely 


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