DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

CLARENCE JENKINS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D2023-1547

May 8, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for

Sarasota County; Dana Moss, Judge.

Clarence Jenkins, pro se.

SILBERMAN, Judge.

Clarence Jenkins appeals the order summarily denying his motion 

for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 

3.850. We affirm the denial of ground two of Jenkins' motion without 

discussion, but we reverse the denial of ground one and remand for 

further proceedings.

The State originally charged Jenkins with sexual battery by a 

person eighteen years of age or older upon a child less than twelve years 

of age. It later amended the information to charge him with lewd or
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lascivious molestation by a person eighteen years of age or older upon a 

child less than twelve years of age. Just before trial, Jenkins entered a 

negotiated plea to attempted sexual battery by a person eighteen years of 

age or older upon a child less than twelve years of age in exchange for a 

sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment followed by fifteen years of sex 

offender probation. 

Jenkins provided the following factual allegations as background 

for his claim in ground one. Jenkins called the police after being 

physically attacked by W.W.

1 for not vacating the room he had been 

renting for five years. The house in which the room was located had 

been divided into three living spaces that the landlord rented out. W.W.,

the victim, and the victim's mother and sister wanted Jenkins' room 

because they needed extra space and had tricked the landlord into 

evicting him. When the police arrived, the mother of the victim reported 

that the victim told her that Jenkins had exposed himself to her and 

licked her vagina. Jenkins asserted that the allegation against him was 

a ruse to deflect from the battery committed on him by W.W. He 

asserted that he has always maintained his innocence. He claimed that 

his innocence was confirmed when the victim told Brooke Bell, a Child 

Protective Team coordinator with the Department of Children and 

Families (DCF), that no one had ever touched her inappropriately2 and 

1 It is not clear from Jenkins' motion whether W.W. is related to the 

victim, so we refer to him by his initials to protect the victim's identity.

2 The record before this court reveals that the victim repeated the 

allegation of sexual battery that she had made to her mother to hospital 

personnel at about 6 a.m., but she denied that anyone had ever touched 

her inappropriately during the forensic interview with Bell later that 

afternoon.
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when the victim's sister, who shared the victim's bed, testified at 

deposition that she never saw Jenkins touch her sister that night. 

Jenkins referred to Bell's deposition testimony that law 

enforcement told her to expect a call to set up another interview with the 

victim because she told her mother that she lied during the forensic 

interview. Bell was never contacted to conduct a second interview, and 

Jenkins argued that this revealed that it was clear that the victim had 

not lied during the forensic interview. Jenkins alleged that DCF closed 

its case concerning the victim after she denied any inappropriate 

touching. Jenkins attached reports to his motion stating that the victim 

told her mother that she lied during the forensic interview because she 

was afraid she would be taken from her family. He alleged that the 

statement that the victim lied has never been corroborated. 

In ground one of his rule 3.850 motion, Jenkins argued that his 

trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to enter a best interest 

guilty plea without informing him that the victim had denied that anyone 

had touched her inappropriately, thereby rendering his plea involuntary. 

He alleged that there was no physical evidence against him, only the 

allegation reportedly made by the victim to her mother.3 Jenkins 

maintained that if he had known of this viable defense, he would have 

insisted on going to trial. See Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176, 1179

(Fla. 2004) (stating that to state a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel in the context of a plea, a defendant must demonstrate that 

counsel performed deficiently and that but for counsel's deficient 

3 The State's notice of intent to introduce child hearsay says that a 

woman who was like an aunt or godmother to the victim heard the victim 

tell her mother about the alleged abuse and that the victim told one or 

two women who conducted the sexual assault exam that she awakened 

to Jenkins with his mouth in her vaginal area. 
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performance there is a reasonable probability that he would not have 

entered a guilty plea but would have insisted on going to trial (quoting 

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59–60 (1985))).

In denying ground one, the postconviction court found that 

Jenkins' plea was not involuntary because the plea colloquy was 

thorough and Jenkins had ample opportunity to advise the trial court 

that he had an issue with counsel's performance. The postconviction 

court noted that at the change of plea hearing, the trial court informed 

Jenkins that it was granting the State's request to introduce child 

hearsay. The postconviction court also noted that after a hearing on 

Jenkins' motion to withdraw plea,

4 the trial court found that counsel had 

not rendered ineffective assistance and denied the motion. 

We must reverse the postconviction court's denial of ground one 

because the court did not address Jenkins' claim that counsel failed to 

inform him that the victim denied during the forensic interview that 

anyone had touched her inappropriately, and the record attachments to 

the court's order do not refute the claim. Further, the postconviction 

court did not conduct a proper analysis of the prejudice prong. See 

Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 1181–82 ("[I]n determining whether a 

reasonable probability exists that the defendant would have insisted on 

going to trial, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the plea, including such factors as whether a particular 

defense was likely to succeed at trial, the colloquy between the defendant 

and the trial court at the time of the plea, and the difference between the 

4 In his motion to withdraw plea, Jenkins had not alleged that

counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the victim's denial that 

anyone had touched her inappropriately. At the hearing on the motion to 

withdraw plea, the victim's denial of any inappropriate contact was not 

mentioned. 
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sentence imposed under the plea and the maximum possible sentence 

the defendant faced at a trial."). Jenkins alleged that the only evidence 

against him was the victim's allegation, so the fact that she made a 

statement inconsistent with that allegation would have been material to 

Jenkins' decision to enter a plea. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of 

ground one and remand for the postconviction court to either attach 

portions of the record refuting the claim or hold an evidentiary hearing.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

LaROSE and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.