*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 13, 2005*

Decided December 14, 2005

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1744

FIONA FENG CHEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 03 C 3928

David H. Coar,

Judge.

O R D E R

Fiona Chen sued her former employer, Northwestern University, for race and

national origin discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq.; age discrimination in violation of

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.; and disability

discrimination and failure to accommodate a disability under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. She alleged that she was discriminated

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1744 Page 2

against when Northwestern failed to accommodate her disability, failed to promote

her, and ultimately terminated her. The district court granted summary judgment

for the defendants, and we affirm.

Chen is a native of Taiwan. In 1999, when she was 44 years old, she

interviewed for an assistant accounting position in Northwestern’s Office of Clinical

Research and Training (“OCRT”). Though she was not hired for that position,

OCRT hired her later that year as a “Technical Software Specialist,” a unique

position specifically created for her. This job required significant computer use, and

within a year Chen began to complain of arm and wrist pain. In December 2000

and January 2001 Northwestern denied her requests for accommodation that

included assistance from a secretary or a transfer to a position with secretarial

support. But Northwestern allowed her intermittent leave and modified her duties

so that less time was spent on the computer. By April 2001 Northwestern could no

longer assign modified work because none was available. Chen returned to her

computer-related assignments, and Northwestern provided her with an ergonomic

keyboard recommended by her doctors and granted her intermittent leave under

the Family and Medical Leave Act so that she could take periodic 20-minute breaks.

In August 2001 Northwestern re-organized OCRT, cutting its budget and

eliminating three staff positions including Chen’s. Nobody was hired to replace her. 

Pursuant to Northwestern’s seniority system for layoffs, Chen was offered a lesssenior position without a pay cut; the position required substantial clerical and

computer work. Chen conditionally accepted, provided that she not be required to

work more than three hours per day on the computer, but because this would

prevent her from performing the essential functions of the job, Northwestern

declined her conditional acceptance and she was laid off in November 2001.

Chen filed charges with the EEOC in December 2001 but she did not file suit

within 90 days of receiving her right-to-sue letter. In May 2002 she again filed

charges with the EEOC, and this time she timely sued in the district court, alleging

Northwestern discriminated against her on the basis of race, national origin, age,

disability, and retaliation, by terminating her employment, failing to promote her to

a financial analyst position, and failing to accommodate her requests for limited

computer-related duties.

The district court, in a thorough 38-page decision, granted Northwestern’s

motion for summary judgment. First, the district court found that all allegedly

discriminatory acts occurring before July 28, 2001 (300 days before her EEOC filing

on May 24, 2002) were time-barred, and that she could not show a continuing

violation because she did not provide evidence that Northwestern’s actions were

sufficiently frequent or related. The court found that Chen failed to establish a

prima facie case of wrongful termination or retaliation because she introduced no
No. 05-1744 Page 3

evidence suggesting that she was treated differently than similarly situated

employees. The district court also rejected her failure-to-hire and failure-topromote claims because Chen did not present evidence that she was qualified or

even applied for the financial analyst position at issue. Finally the court granted

summary judgment on Chen’s failure-to-accommodate and disability claim because

she did not show that she could perform the essential functions of the job with or

without a reasonable accommodation.

Chen’s discursive brief on appeal raises twenty-two arguments attacking the

district court’s reasons for granting summary judgment against her, but none of

these arguments require us to reverse the district court’s well-reasoned decision. 

For instance, she generally challenges the district court’s determination that her

discrimination claims based on events occurring prior to July 28, 2001 were timebarred. As the district court properly explained, however, claims under Title VII,

ADEA, and the ADA must be brought within 300 days of the alleged unlawful

employment practice, Stepney v. Naperville Sch. Dist., 392 F.3d 236, 239 (7th Cir.

2004); Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n. of America, 354 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir.

2004), and here the district court properly refused to consider events that occurred

outside the 300 day period prior to her May 2002 EEOC filing. Chen argues that

the district court should have considered claims based on her December 2001 EEOC

filing, but she waived those claims because she did not bring suit within 90 days of

receiving that right-to-sue letter. See Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d

263, 270 (7th Cir. 2004). The district court also correctly found that the allegedly

discriminatory actions were not sufficiently frequent or related to her termination

to constitute a continuing violation. See Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of America, 308

F.3d 697, 708 (7th Cir. 2002). As for Chen’s other arguments that the district court

improperly refused to consider events outside the 300-day filing period, she waived

these arguments by not raising them before the district court. See Bishop v. Gainer,

272 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2001).

Most of Chen’s remaining arguments appear to contend that the district court

failed to address certain claims or evidence. But the district court thoughtfully

addressed all of Chen’s discrimination theories, and Chen has not explained how

any particular evidence overlooked by the court raised disputed issues of material

fact.

Finally, Chen asserts with little elaboration that the district court erred in

finding that she had not established a prima facie case of discrimination under the

indirect method of proof; she contends that the court wrongly classified her position

as “unique” and found no other employees similarly situated. Indeed, to prove a

prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that other

similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were

treated more favorably. See Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, 209 F.3d
No. 05-1744 Page 4

687, 693 (7th Cir. 2000). Here Chen has not pointed to any evidence in the record to

disturb the district court’s finding that OCRT has never hired anyone other than

Chen for a comparable “software specialist” position. Even if Chen had

characterized Northwestern’s restructuring as a mini-reduction-in-force, in which

her position was not permanently eliminated but instead her work load was

assumed by others, she would have needed to prove that her duties were absorbed

by employees who were not members of her protected class, see id. But she did not

raise this theory or meet this burden of proof.

AFFIRMED.