89436 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 247 / Wednesday, December 27, 2023 / Notices 

the Applicant have been previously 

authorized by Presidential permits 

issued pursuant to Executive Order 

10485, as amended, and are appropriate 

for open access transmission by third 

parties. See App. at Exhibit C. 

Procedural Matters: Any person 

desiring to be heard in this proceeding 

should file a comment or protest to the 

Application at the Electricity.Exports@

hq.doe.gov. Protests should be filed in 

accordance with Rule 211 of FERC’s 

Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 

385.211). Any person desiring to 

become a party to this proceeding 

should file a motion to intervene at 

Electricity.Exports@hq.doe.gov in 

accordance with FERC Rule 214 (18 CFR 

385.214). 

Comments and other filings 

concerning EES No. 7’s Application 

should be clearly marked with GDO 

Docket No. EA–392–B. Additional 

copies are to be provided directly to 

Keith Sutherland, Vice President, Legal 

& Regulatory Affairs, Emera Energy, 

Inc., 5151 Terminal Road, Halifax, NS 

B3J 1A1, Canada, keith.sutherland@

emeraenergy.com, Jeffrey Jakubiak, 

Vinson & Elkins LLP, 1114 Avenue of 

the Americas, 32nd Floor, New York, 

NY 10036, JJakubiak@velaw.com, and 

Jennifer Mansh, Vinson & Elkins LLP, 

2200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 

500 West, Washington, DC 20037, 

JMansh@velaw.com. 

A final decision will be made on the 

requested authorization after the 

environmental impacts have been 

evaluated pursuant to DOE’s National 

Environmental Policy Act Implementing 

Procedures (10 CFR part 1021) and after 

DOE evaluates whether the proposed 

action will have an adverse impact on 

the sufficiency of supply or reliability of 

the United States electric power supply 

system. 

Copies of this Application will be 

made available, upon request, by 

accessing the program website at 

https://www.energy.gov/gdo/pendingapplications-0 or by emailing 

Electricity.Exports@hq.doe.gov. 

Signing Authority: This document of 

the Department of Energy was signed on 

December 19, 2023, by Maria Robinson, 

Director, Grid Deployment Office, 

pursuant to delegated authority from the 

Secretary of Energy. That document 

with the original signature and date is 

maintained by DOE. For administrative 

purposes only, and in compliance with 

requirements of the Office of the Federal 

Register, the undersigned DOE Federal 

Register Liaison Officer has been 

authorized to sign and submit the 

document in electronic format for 

publication, as an official document of 

the Department of Energy. This 

administrative process in no way alters 

the legal effect of this document upon 

publication in the Federal Register. 

Signed in Washington, DC, on December 

20, 2023. 

Treena V. Garrett, 

Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. 

Department of Energy. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28464 Filed 12–26–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

National Nuclear Security 

Administration 

Secretarial Determination of No 

Adverse Material Impact on the 

Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, 

and Enrichment Industries To Support 

Mo-99 Production 

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA), Department of 

Energy (DOE). 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: On November 22, 2023, the 

Secretary of Energy issued a Secretarial 

Determination (hereafter 

‘‘determination’’) covering the sale, 

lease, or transfer of up to 750 kilograms 

uranium (kgU) of high-assay lowenriched uranium (HALEU) (above 5, 

but less than 20 weight percent (wt.-%) 

uranium-235) per year during the twoyear period following signature of the 

determination to support molybdenum99 (Mo-99) production. For the reasons 

set forth in the Department’s ‘‘Analysis 

of Potential Impacts of Certain Uranium 

Transactions on the Domestic Uranium 

Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment 

Industries,’’ which is incorporated into 

the determination, the Secretary 

determined that these transactions will 

not have an adverse material impact on 

the domestic uranium mining, 

conversion, or enrichment industries. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Requests for additional information may 

be sent to Peter Rocco: 

officeofconversion@nnsa.doe.gov or 

(202) 287–1018. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority and Background 

The Department of Energy (‘‘the 

Department’’) holds limited inventories 

of uranium in various forms and 

quantities that have been declared as 

excess and are not dedicated to U.S. 

national security missions. Within DOE, 

the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) manages these 

inventories to carry out critical 

missions, including minimizing the use 

of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in 

civilian applications. NNSA downblends excess HEU from these 

inventories to high-assay, low-enriched 

uranium (HALEU)—a subset of low 

enriched uranium (LEU) enriched above 

the commercial level of 5 wt.-% and 

below 20 wt.-% of the isotope U–235— 

to be used as fuel for research reactors 

and target material for the production of 

critical medical isotopes. 

This notice involves the sale, lease, or 

transfer of HALEU to support 

molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) producers. 

Leases covered by this determination 

fulfill a directive in the American 

Medical Isotopes Production Act of 

2012 (Pub. L. 112–239, Division C, Title 

XXXI, Subtitle F, 42 U.S.C. 2065) for the 

Department to establish a program to 

make HALEU available, through lease 

contracts, for the production of Mo-99 

for medical uses. The sales, leases, or 

transfers covered by this determination 

also support U.S. nuclear 

nonproliferation initiatives by downblending HEU and encouraging the use 

of HALEU in civilian applications in 

lieu of HEU. 

These sales, leases, or transfers are 

conducted in accordance with the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 

2011 et seq., ‘‘AEA’’), as amended, and 

other applicable laws. Specifically, title 

I, chapters 6 and 14 of the AEA 

authorize DOE to sell or transfer special 

nuclear material, including HALEU. The 

USEC Privatization Act (Pub. L. 104– 

134, 42 U.S.C. 2297h et seq.), however, 

places certain limitations on DOE’s 

authority to sell or transfer uranium 

from its excess uranium inventory. 

Specifically, under section 3112(d)(2) of 

the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 

2297h–10(d)(2)), DOE may make certain 

sales or transfers of natural uranium or 

LEU if the Secretary determines that the 

sales ‘‘will not have an adverse material 

impact on the domestic uranium 

mining, conversion, or enrichment 

industry, taking into account the sales of 

uranium under the Russian HEU 

Agreement and the Suspension 

Agreement,’’ 

On November 22, 2023, the Secretary 

of Energy issued a determination 

covering the sale, lease, or transfer of up 

to 750 kgU of HALEU per year during 

the two-year period following signing of 

the determination to support Mo-99 

production. For the reasons set forth in 

the Department’s ‘‘Analysis of Potential 

Impacts of Certain Uranium 

Transactions on the Domestic Uranium 

Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment 

Industries,’’ which is incorporated into 

the determination, the Secretary 

determined that these transactions will 

not have an adverse material impact on 

the domestic uranium mining, 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 247 / Wednesday, December 27, 2023 / Notices 89437 

1Section 3102 of the USEC Privatization Act 

defines ‘‘low-enriched uranium’’ as ‘‘uranium 

enriched to less than 20 percent of the uranium-235 

isotope, including that which is derived from 

highly enriched uranium.’’ 42 U.S.C. 2297h(5). 

Section 3112A of the USEC Privatization Act also 

provides a definition of LEU: ‘‘a uranium product 

in any form, including uranium hexafluoride (UF6) 

and uranium oxide (UO2), in which the uranium 

contains less than 20 percent uranium-235, 

including natural uranium, without regard to 

whether the uranium is incorporated into fuel rods 

or complete fuel assemblies.’’ 42 U.S.C. 2297h– 

10a(a)(5). Both definitions encompass HALEU, 

which is U–235 enriched between 5%–20%. Thus, 

HALEU is a form of LEU and falls within the 

Secretarial Determination requirement. 

2See section 306(a) of Division D, Title III of the 

Consolidated and Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2015 (Pub. L. 113–235). 

3Public Law 112–239, Division C, Title XXXI, 

Subtitle F, 42 U.S.C. 2065. 

conversion, or enrichment industries. In 

accordance with section 306(a) of 

Division D, Title III of the Consolidated 

and Further Continuing Appropriations 

Act, 2015 (Pub. L. 113–235), this 

determination is valid for no more than 

two calendar years following the date of 

the determination. 

Signing Authority 

This document of the Department of 

Energy was signed on December 18, 

2023, by Corey Hinderstein, Deputy 

Administrator for Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation, pursuant to delegated 

authority from the Secretary of Energy. 

The document with the original 

signature and date is maintained by 

DOE. For administrative purposes only, 

and in compliance with requirements of 

the Office of the Federal Register, the 

undersigned DOE Federal Register 

Liaison Officer has been authorized to 

sign and submit the document in 

electronic format for publication, as an 

official document of the Department of 

Energy. This administrative process in 

no way alters the legal effect of this 

document upon publication in the 

Federal Register. 

Signed in Washington, DC, on December 

21, 2023. 

Treena V. Garrett, 

Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. 

Department of Energy. 

Set forth below is the full text of the 

Secretarial Determination. 

Secretarial Determination for the Sale, 

Lease, or Transfer of Certain High– 

Assay, Low–Enriched Uranium for the 

Next Two Years 

I determine that the sale, lease, or 

transfer of up to 750 kilograms uranium 

(kgU) of high-assay low-enriched 

uranium (above 5, but less than 20 

weight percent uranium-235) per 

calendar year subsequent to signing this 

determination to support molybdenum99 production will not have an adverse 

material impact on the domestic 

uranium mining, conversion, or 

enrichment industries. I base my 

conclusions on the Department’s 

Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain 

Uranium Transactions on the Domestic 

Uranium Mining, Conversion, and 

Enrichment Industries, which is 

incorporated herein. I have considered, 

inter alia, the requirements of the USEC 

Privatization Act of 1996 (42 U.S.C. 

2297h et seq.), the nature of uranium 

markets, and the current status of the 

domestic uranium industries. I have 

also taken into account the sales of 

uranium under the Agreement Between 

the Government of the United States of 

America and the Government of the 

Russian Federation Concerning the 

Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium 

Extracted from Nuclear Weapons 

(‘‘Russian HEU Agreement’’) and the 

Agreement Suspending the 

Antidumping Investigation on Uranium 

From the Russian Federation 

(‘‘Suspension Agreement’’). 

Jennifer Granholm 

Date: November 22, 2023 

Set forth below is the full text of the 

Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain 

Uranium Transactions on the Domestic 

Uranium Mining, Conversion, and 

Enrichment Industries. 

Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain 

Uranium Transactions on the Domestic 

Uranium Mining, Conversion, and 

Enrichment Industries 

I. Introduction 

A. Legal Authority 

The Department of Energy (DOE) 

manages its excess uranium inventory 

in accordance with the Atomic Energy 

Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., 

‘‘AEA’’), as amended, and other 

applicable laws. Specifically, Title I, 

Chapters 6 and 14 of the AEA authorize 

DOE to sell or transfer special nuclear 

material. Low-enriched uranium (LEU) 

is a type of special nuclear material. 

The USEC Privatization Act (Pub. L. 

104–134, 42 U.S.C. 2297h et seq.) places 

certain limitations on DOE’s authority to 

sell or transfer uranium from its excess 

uranium inventory. Specifically, under 

section 3112(d)(2)(B) of the USEC 

Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h 

10(d)(2)(B)), DOE may make certain 

sales or transfers of natural uranium or 

LEU 1 if: 

(A) The President determines that the 

material is not necessary for national 

security needs; 

(B) The Secretary determines that the 

sale of the material will not have an 

adverse material impact on the domestic 

uranium mining, conversion, or 

enrichment industry, taking into 

account the sales of uranium under the 

Russian HEU Agreement and the 

Suspension Agreement; and, 

(C) The price paid to the Secretary 

will not be less than the fair market 

value of the material. 

Regarding condition (A): for purposes 

of section 3112(d)(2)(A) of the USEC 

Privatization Act, DOE has historically 

treated material not included in the 

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 

Memorandum (a memorandum signed 

by the President that identifies uranium 

necessary for defense needs) as being 

excess to national security needs. None 

of the material included in the proposed 

transactions was included in the most 

recent Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 

Memorandum. 

This analysis focuses on condition B 

above. 

Regarding condition (C): the price 

paid to the Secretary will not be less 

than the fair market value of the LEU 

sold, transferred, or leased. Specifically, 

for HALEU leased under the ULTB 

Program, the lease contracts contain a 

pricing mechanism to ensure that the 

Department receives the prevailing 

market value for its material, as required 

by AMIPA. For other HALEU sales or 

transfers, the contracts will require cash 

payment for the fair market value of the 

HALEU sold. Accordingly, all sale or 

lease transactions will comply with 

section 3112(d)(2)(C), and the fair 

market value will be determined at the 

time of the transaction. 

The validity of any determination 

under this section is limited to no more 

than two calendar years subsequent to 

the determination.2 The USEC 

Privatization Act also permits sales or 

transfers of enriched uranium for 

governmental purposes under section 

3112(e), which are not subject to the 

limitations imposed by section 3112(d). 

B. Transactions Considered in This 

Analysis 

Two types of potential transactions 

are considered in this analysis: (1) the 

lease of LEU for the production of 

molybdenum-99 (Mo–99) pursuant to 

the American Medical Isotopes 

Production Act of 2012 (AMIPA); 3 and 

(2) the sale or transfer of LEU to 

producers for use in medical isotope 

development and production, which 

would enable the material to be used for 

Mo–99 production outside of AMIPA 

requirements. The exact uses of LEU 

under these transactions and designs of 

facilities in which the LEU would be 

utilized vary by producer, but fissionbased production usually involves 

fabrication or preparation of uranium 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
89438 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 247 / Wednesday, December 27, 2023 / Notices 

4The calculation is based on the Y–12 Standard 

Specification for LEU Metal Supply for Mo-99 

Isotope Production, which assumes deliveries of 

quantities of 19.75 wt.-% LEU. If any sale, lease, or 

transfer includes material at an assay other than 

19.75 wt.-%, the amount will be converted so that 

the total amount in any year covered by this 

Determination is equivalent to no more than 750 

kgU at 19.75 wt.-%. 

5Energy Resources International, Inc. (ERI), 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Supply and Price Report, ERI– 

2006–2202/December 2022. 

6U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Materials 

License. License Number SNM–2010, Amendment 

57, Docket Number 70–3103. 

7The global requirements information comes 

from an analysis prepared by Energy Resources 

International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel Cycle Supply 

and Price Report, ERI–2006–2101/June 2021. 

for irradiation, followed by chemical 

processing to extract the Mo-99 for 

packaging into a generator and delivery 

to a radiopharmacy. 

The first type of transaction would be 

under AMIPA. These transfers would 

support the Uranium Lease and Take 

Back (ULTB) program, was established 

under AMIPA and enables DOE to lease 

LEU to produce Mo-99 in the United 

States without the use of highly 

enriched uranium (HEU). 

The second type of transaction 

considered in this analysis is a sale or 

transfer of LEU to producers for use in 

medical isotope development and 

production processes, including Mo-99, 

that are not under the ULTB program 

and do not meet the criteria of section 

3112(e)(3) of the USEC Privatization Act 

for governmental purposes. 

Both types of transactions require a 

Secretarial Determination under section 

3112(d)(2)(B) of the USEC Privatization 

Act as well as meeting the other criteria 

of section 3112(d)(2). 

The materials considered in this 

analysis would be sold, leased, or 

transferred during the two-year period 

following the signing of the Secretarial 

Determination and would consist of no 

more than 750 kgU of HALEU in any 

year. Based on semi-annual HALEU 

demand surveys conducted to 

determine producers’ material needs, 

DOE’s National Nuclear Security 

Administration (DOE/NNSA) assessed 

750 kgU of HALEU for each year 

covered by this determination. 

Assuming a tails assay of 0.20 wt.-% 

U–235, this quantity would be 

equivalent to approximately 28,700 kgU 

of natural uranium hexafluoride and 

approximately 33,850 separative work 

units (‘‘SWU’’) to produce 750 kgU of 

HALEU at 19.75 weight-% U–235.4

II. Analytical Approach 

The analytical approach relied on for 

previous Secretarial Determinations 

covering the sale, transfer, or lease of 

excess uranium for Mo-99 development 

and production (80 FR 65728, Oct. 27, 

2015), the ULTB program (81 FR 1409, 

Jan. 12, 2016), and the Secretarial 

Determinations for the Sale, Lease or 

Transfer of Uranium (signed and dated 

Nov. 26, 2019 and Nov. 23, 2021, 

respectively) is repeated here and 

updated to the extent necessary. 

This analysis evaluates the state of the 

domestic uranium industries and the 

relevant impacts if DOE goes forward 

with these potential transactions. DOE 

has developed a set of factors that this 

analysis considers in assessing whether 

DOE’s uranium sales and transfers will 

have an ‘‘adverse material impact’’ on 

the domestic uranium mining, 

conversion, or enrichment industry: 

1. Prices 

2. Production at existing facilities 

3. Employment levels in the industry 

4. Changes in capital improvement 

plans and development of future 

facilities 

5. Long-term viability and health of the 

industry 

6. Russian HEU Agreement and Russian 

Suspension Agreement 

While no single factor is dispositive of 

the issue, DOE believes that these 

factors are representative of the types of 

impacts that the proposed sale, lease, or 

transfer may have on the domestic 

uranium industries. Not every factor 

will necessarily be relevant on a given 

occasion or to a particular industry; 

DOE intends this list of factors only as 

a guide to its analysis. 

III. Assessment of Potential Impacts 

1. Prices 

There is currently no domestic 

commercial supplier for HALEU. 

Therefore, there is no established 

market price for HALEU. DOE sets a 

price for HALEU based on a 

combination of commercial market price 

components for LEU, plus a charge for 

the separative work above the 5% LEU 

limit reflecting the historical cost to 

DOE to produce this material. Through 

the end of 2022, the market value of 

4.95% enriched LEU rose 200% from its 

low point in October 2017. The market 

price rose 90% from December 2020 

through December 2022. Industry 

analysts forecast a continued increase in 

the market value of LEU.5 The relatively 

small quantities of HALEU provided by 

DOE have not impacted the price 

increases in this market, and DOE does 

not expect that they would impact price 

in the future. 

Further, with no domestic commercial 

provider for HALEU, the DOE sales and 

leases of HALEU would not displace 

production or affect prices among the 

commercial domestic uranium mining, 

conversion, or enrichment industries. 

Even if it did, the amount would be so 

small that the effects would be minimal. 

2. Production at Existing Facilities 

An analysis of the impact of the 

proposed sales and leases based on an 

assessment of production at existing 

facilities is straightforward. There is 

currently no domestic commercial 

supplier of HALEU in the United States. 

Due to the lack of a sufficient near-term 

market, owners and operators of 

enrichment facilities have not 

developed HALEU enrichment 

capability to produce uranium enriched 

to 19.75 wt.-% U–235. With the closing 

of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant 

in 2013, the only uranium enrichment 

facility in the United States operating at 

commercial scale is the URENCO USA 

facility operated by Louisiana Energy 

Services, LLC (LES), in Eunice, New 

Mexico, which is currently licensed by 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) to possess uranium only up to 5.5 

wt. % U 235.6

Further, it is not feasible for 

commercial Mo-99 producers to use 

commercially available assays of LEU 

(i.e., LEU enriched to 5.5 wt.-% U–235 

or less) instead of HALEU. Given the 

specialized uses, designs, and regulatory 

requirements of these isotope producers, 

the use of commercial-assay LEU would 

prevent the facility or target from 

achieving the same performance or 

efficiency and thus from being used for 

their intended purposes. 

Although the DOE sales and leases of 

HALEU would not displace production 

among the commercial domestic 

uranium mining, conversion, or 

enrichment industries, even if it did, the 

amount would be so small that the 

effects would be minimal. With respect 

to these industries, to produce the 

amount of HALEU in the proposed sales 

and leases from primary production 

would require approximately 75,000 

pounds of uranium concentrates 

(U3O8), 28,700 kgU of conversion 

services, and 33,800 SWU of enrichment 

services. By comparison, the entire 

domestic fleet of nuclear reactors in 

2020 required approximately 43 million 

pounds of U3O8, 16.2 million kgU of 

conversion services, and about 14.8 

million SWU.7 Therefore, the feed, 

conversion, and SWU content of the 

DOE material represents 0.17%, 0.17%, 

and 0.22% of annual domestic 

requirements, respectively. 

The domestic conversion industry 

consists of only one facility that 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 247 / Wednesday, December 27, 2023 / Notices 89439 

8HALEU Demonstration Project Starts 

Enrichment Operations in Ohio | Department of 

Energy. 

9 ‘‘Centrus gets NRC’s okay to introduce uranium 

in HALEU demonstration cascade.’’ https:// 

www.ans.org/news/article-5092/centrus-gets-nrcsokay-to-introduce-uranium-in-haleudemonstration-cascade/. 

10American Centrifuge Plant and HALEU, from 

an analysis prepared by Energy Resources 

International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel Cycle Supply 

and Price Report, ERI–2006–2202/December 2022. 

11Louisiana Energy Services, LLC, dba Urenco 

USA, Submittal of License Amendment Request for 

Revision for MCNP6 Validation Report (LAR 21–03) 

(nrc.gov). 

12U.S. Department of Energy to Acquire HighAssay Low-Enriched Uranium Material | 

Department of Energy. 

13 2020 Amendment to the Agreement 

Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on 

Uranium From the Russian Federation, Federal 

Register/Vol. 85, No. 197/Friday, October 9, 2020/ 

Notices https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/ 

2020/10/09/2020-22431/2020-amendment-to-theagreementsuspending-the-antidumpinginvestigation-on-uranium-from-the-russian. 

historically produced between 10 

million kgU and 12 million kgU per year 

and reduced its capability to 7 million 

kgU in 2017. Honeywell, the owner of 

that facility, suspended operation in 

2018, but resumed operation in July 

2023 at 7 million kgU per year. Thus, 

although there has been no conversion 

occurring in the United States for 

several years, there are signs of the 

market improving given Honeywell’s 

recent restart. As mentioned above, 

there is only one currently operating 

commercial enrichment facility, 

URENCO USA’s subsidiary, LES, in the 

United States. The total capacity of that 

facility is 4.9 million SWU. 

In October 2023, American Centrifuge 

Operating, LLC (ACO), a subsidiary of 

the U.S. company, Centrus Energy Corp. 

(Centrus), began enrichment operations 

on a demonstration basis at DOE’s 

facility in Piketon, Ohio.8 The initial 

production goal is 20 kgU 19.75% 

HALEU. ACO/Centrus is discussed at 

length in Section 4 below. 

3. Employment Levels in the Industry

As stated above, DOE sales and leases

of HALEU would not displace 

production among the commercial 

domestic uranium mining, conversion, 

or enrichment industries, and therefore 

will not affect employment levels in 

these industries. 

4. Changes in Capital Improvement

Plans and Development of Future

Facilities

Although there is currently no 

domestic uranium enrichment 

capability to produce HALEU, there 

have been recent noteworthy 

developments. In 2019, the Department 

entered into a cost-shared contract for a 

HALEU Demonstration Program with 

ACO to deploy a 16-machine cascade of 

AC–100 M centrifuges in Piketon, Ohio 

to produce 19.75 wt.-% U–235 with 

U.S.-origin enrichment technology that

will result in a small quantity of

HALEU. In June 2021, the NRC

approved ACO’s license amendment

request to produce HALEU with an

enrichment assay of up to 20 wt.-% U–

235 at the Piketon facility. In November

2022, DOE announced another costshared award with ACO, equating to

approximately $150 million and

including a $30 million cost share

during the first year to start up and

operate the 16 centrifuges at the Piketon

facility. In June 2023, ACO received

NRC approval to introduce uranium

hexafluoride into its cascade following

completion of an operational readiness 

review.9 As part of the 2022 award, 

ACO must produce 20 kilograms of 

19.75% enriched HALEU by December 

31, 2023. Following completion of the 

demonstration, the contract calls for 

production at an annual rate of 900 kg 

of HALEU in 2024 with additional 

options to produce more material under 

the contract in future years, all subject 

to appropriations.10

Additionally, URENCO USA provided 

a notice to the NRC in April 2021 of its 

intent to amend the URENCO USA 

license to increase the enrichment level 

up to 10 wt.-% U–235.11 URENCO USA 

expects to have capability to deliver 

HALEU up to 10 wt.-% U–235 in 2024. 

URENCO USA also has longer term 

plans to produce up to 19.75 wt.-% U– 

235. 

However, the relatively small 

amounts of material covered by this 

Determination have no impact on 

capital improvement plans and 

development of future facilities 

including mines, conversion facilities, 

and enrichment plants. 

5. Long-Term Viability and Health of the

Industry

There is currently no commercial 

supplier of HALEU in the United States. 

Therefore, there is no long-term 

industry impact to assess. During the 

period covered by this Determination, 

Centrus/ACO may begin producing up 

to 900 kgU annually in both 2024 and 

2025. However, DOE providing a 

maximum of 750 kgU annually over the 

same time period to a specific subset of 

end users—Mo-99 producers—would 

not displace production by Centrus/ 

ACO, given DOE’s own estimate of 

extant HALEU demand (up to 40 metric 

tons by 2029–30).12

6. Russian HEU Agreement and Russian

Suspension Agreement

The Russian HEU Agreement ended 

in December 2013. The Suspension 

Agreement was extended on October 5, 

2020 (85 FR 64112) and remains in force 

through 2040 with annual export limits 

on Russian enriched uranium product 

sold to U.S. utilities at commercially 

available assays (e.g., 5 wt.-% U–235).13

The Suspension Agreement allows for 

the sale of up to the following amounts 

of U–235 per year in 2023, 2024, and 

2025 respectively: 25,471 kg, 20,968 kg, 

and 20,697 kg. The relatively small 

amount of material covered by this 

Determination is minimal compared to 

domestic needs for LEU and imports 

from the Russian Federation. 

IV. Conclusion

With respect to the six factors listed

above to assess market impacts: 

1. The relatively small amounts of

material covered by this Determination 

have no impact on the price of HALEU, 

for which there is currently no domestic 

commercial market price. 

2. There are new developments in the

industry, but production timelines will 

not be impacted in the timeframe for 

this Determination. 

3. The relatively small amounts of

material covered by this Determination 

have no impact on employment levels 

in the mining, conversion, or 

enrichment industries. 

4. New market developments will not

mature during this Determination 

period to a point where the market 

could be impacted by DOE sales, leases, 

or transfers. 

5. The relatively small amounts of

material covered by this Determination 

have no impact on the long-term 

viability and health of the mining, 

conversion, and enrichment industries. 

6. The Russian HEU Agreement and

Suspension Agreement are not factors 

because there is no HALEU currently 

being imported from Russia to the 

United States. 

Thus, DOE concludes that the sale, 

lease, or transfer of up to 750 kgU of 

HALEU per year to support the 

development and production of Mo-99 

will not have an adverse material 

impact on the domestic uranium 

mining, conversion, or enrichment 

industry, taking into account the ended 

Russian HEU Agreement and extended 

Russian Suspension Agreement. 

[FR Doc. 2023–28501 Filed 12–26–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1