alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Commissioner of Social Services, on Behalf of Julia Santiago, Appellant, v Pedro Diaz, Respondent. In the Matter of Commissioner of Social Services, on Behalf of Jacqueline Mora, Appellant, v Jose Rodriguez, Respondent. In the Matter of Commissioner of Social Services, on Behalf of Josephine Quintana, Appellant, v Walter Barbot, Respondent. In the Matter of Commissioner of Social Services, on Behalf of Nancy Maldonado, Appellant, v John Diaz, Respondent.

— Order of the Family Court, New York County (George Jurow, J.), entered on May 22, 1989, which upheld a hearing determination limiting a child support award from the non-custodial parent to that child’s share of the public assistance grant, is unanimously reversed on the law and the matter remanded for further proceedings, without costs or disbursements.

Order of the Family Court, New York County (George Jurow, J.), entered on May 22, 1989, which upheld a hearing determination limiting a child support award from the noncustodial parent to that child’s share of the public assistance grant, is unanimously reversed on the law and the matter remanded for further proceedings, without costs or disbursements.

Order of the Family Court, New York County (Bruce M. Kaplan, J.), entered on May 19, 1989, which upheld a hearing determination limiting a child support award from the non*731custodial parent to that child’s share of the public assistance grant, is unanimously reversed on the law and the matter remanded for further proceedings, without costs or disbursements.

Order of the Family Court, New York County (George Jurow, J.), entered on May 30, 1989, which upheld a hearing determination limiting a child support award from the noncustodial parent to that child’s share of the public assistance grant, is unanimously reversed on the law and the matter remanded for further proceedings, without costs or disbursements.

These cases all involve the same issue: whether the Commissioner of Social Services, as assignee of the child support rights of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, may collect from the non-custodial parent an amount in excess of that child’s share of the public assistance grant. The Family Court, in each of the subject matters and in reliance upon its prior decision in *Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Segarra*(George Jurow, J., entered on or about May 15, 1989, *affd*165 AD2d 655), upheld the Hearing Examiner’s determination in limiting the child support awards from the noncustodial parent to the child’s share of the public assistance grant regardless of the financial means of the parent in question. However, in view of the reversal by the Court of Appeals in *Matter of Commissioner of Social Services v Segarra*(78 NY2d 220), the orders being appealed herein must be reversed. Accordingly, a remand of these cases is required to ascertain the appropriate support obligations of the noncustodial parent, taking into consideration both the reasonable needs of the child and the parental means. Concur — Ross, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
# C_2008092EN.01001202.xml

| 12.4.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 92/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.4.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 92/12

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción no 5 San Javier (Spain) lodged on 14 January 2008 — Roda Golf & Beach Resort SL

o

(Case C-14/08)

(2008/C 92/21)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción (Court of First Instance and Preliminary Investigations) no 5 San Javier

o

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Roda Golf & Beach Resort SL

Applicant:

Questions referred

| 1. | Does the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (1) extend to the service of extrajudicial documents exclusively by and on private persons using the physical and personal resources of the courts and tribunals of the European Union and the regulatory framework of European law even when no court proceedings have been commenced? Or, |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (1) extend to the service of extrajudicial documents exclusively by and on private persons using the physical and personal resources of the courts and tribunals of the European Union and the regulatory framework of European law even when no court proceedings have been commenced? Or,

1

| 2 | Does Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 on the contrary apply exclusively in the context of judicial cooperation between Member States and court proceedings in progress (Articles 61(c), 67(1) and 65 EC and recital 6 of the preamble to Regulation 1348/2000)? |
| --- | --- |

2

Does Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 on the contrary apply exclusively in the context of judicial cooperation between Member States and court proceedings in progress (Articles 61(c), 67(1) and 65 EC and recital 6 of the preamble to Regulation 1348/2000)?

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (OJ 2000 L 160, p. 37).

1

---
#### Edmond Harrison CLARK, Plaintiff in Error, v. W. O. McCUNE and Cherie McCune, Defendants in Error.

No. 38988.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 11, 1961.

Houston, Klein & Davidson, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Van Cleave, Thomas & Liebler, by Ollie W. Gresham, Tulsa, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs alleged in their petition that they were the owners of certain described real property and that on or about the 13th day of December, 1958, the defendant entered upon said premises and unlawfully converted certain articles of plaintiffs’ personalty as listed in Exhibit “A” attached to the petition and made a part thereof; that plaintiffs made demand upon the defendant to return said personalty or pay for the same and that the defendant refused and neglected to return or pay for the personalty. In her petition she fixed the value at $1,550.50.

The defendant filed his answer consisting of a general denial.

*220The case was called for trial, a jury-selected and evidence taken. At the conclusion of plaintiffs’ evidence the defendant demurred and the same was overruled. The defendant then rested. The plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict which was sustained by the trial judge, who instructed the jury to return a verdict in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $1,475.50.

Plaintiffs gave, by their testimony, the value of items taken. Their knowledge was gained principally by contacting merchandisers.

There was undisputed evidence to the effect that defendant did take the property in question.

Defendant contends trial court erred in denying demurrer to plaintiffs’ evidence; that the court erred in permitting the introduction of incompetent evidence, fixing values of the property and matters not pertinent, which were prejudicial. We find the last contention without merit. A slight examination of the record will disclose this. The other two contentions will be treated together.

The plaintiffs testified that people who sold like property gave them prices or values. We think the record bears out that, while under the facts here, the method of plaintiffs in establishing the value of the property taken might not have been the best, we certainly cannot say it was reversible error. See Rutherford v. James, 33 N.M. 440, 270 P. 794, 63 A.L.R. 237, wherein it is held that evidence of the cost price of HHG, or wearing apparel is admissible in an action for their loss is the rule. Also notice O. K. Transfer & Storage Co. v. Neill, 59 Okl. 291, 159 P. 272, L.R.A.1917A, 58.

 We think the trial court was correct in directing a verdict. See State ex rel, Jennings v. Strange, 202 Okl. 11, 209 P.2d 691.

Affirmed.

BLACKBIRD, V. C. J., and DAVISON, HALLEY, JOHNSON, JACKSON and BERRY, JJ., concur.

WILLIAMS, C. J., and WELCH and IRWIN, JJ., concur in result.

The Court acknowledges the aid of Supernumerary Judge N. S. Corn in the preparation of this opinion. After a tentative opinion was written, the cause was assigned to a Justice of this Court. Thereafter, upon report and consideration in conference, the foregoing opinion was adopted by the court.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Larry Frazier, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Broomer, J.), both rendered January 10, 1989, convicting him of robbery in the third degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree under Indictment No. 5695/87, upon a jury verdict, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree under Indictment No. 4247/87, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentences.

*258Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.

On appeal, the defendant contends that his motion to dismiss Indictment No. 5695/87 on the ground that he was not afforded a speedy trial *(see,*CPL 30.30) was improperly denied. Pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (a), the People are required to announce their readiness for the trial of a felony within six months of the commencement of the criminal proceeding, less certain enumerated excludable periods *(see,*CPL 30.30 [4]; *People v Kendzia,*64 NY2d 331, 336). Criminal proceedings were commenced against the defendant on June 26, 1987, the day the felony complaint was filed *(see,*CPL 1.20 [17]; *People v Osgood,*52 NY2d 37, 40). After subtracting periods of delay not chargeable to the People, the period of unexcused delay is less than the statutorily mandated six-calendar-month time limit *(see,*CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). In reaching this determination, we exclude from our computation the postreadiness period commencing on October 26, 1987, when the People announced their readiness on the record, to January 6, 1988, which period of delay was attributable to the defendant’s filing of pretrial motions and did not affect the People’s continued readiness for trial *(see,*CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; *People v Anderson,*66 NY2d 529, 536).

The defendant next contends that certain of the prosecutor’s remarks in summation deprived him of a fair trial. With respect to at least two of the challenged comments no objection was made by defense counsel and, therefore, any claims of errors with respect thereto have not been preserved for appellate review as a matter of law *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]). To the extent the claimed errors are preserved for appellate review, any error is harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

In view of our determination, we do not reach any issue with respect to vacatur of the defendant’s plea under Indictment No. 4247/87 *(cf, People v Clark,*45 NY2d 432). Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
File Name: Northeast model weighted.lim

Author: Robert Johnston, Clark University Created: February 3, 2012 Purpose: LIMDEP program for estimating the Northeast model weighted for education and gender.

RESET $ READ ; File ="D:\Rob Johnston\LIMDEP Data\NE_data_020212_cleaned3.xls" ; Format = XLS ; Names $ CALC ; Ran(12345) $ CREATE ; If(option=0) Neither=1; (Else) Neither=0 $ CREATE ; cost = cost$ CREATE; w_var = p_prop/s_prop $ REJECT; choice = -999 $ REJECT; choice = -999 $ REJECT; w_var = -999 $ NLOGIT ; Lhs = Choice

; Choices = A,B,Neither

; Rhs = neither, com_fish, fish_pop, fish_sav, aquatic, cost

; RPL ; WTP = com_fish/cost, fish_pop/cost, fish_sav/cost, aquatic/cost ; Fcn = neither(N), com_fish(N), fish_pop(N), fish_sav(N), aquatic(N)

; Parameters ; Correlation ; Pds = num_r
; Pts = 300 ; Maxit = 1000 ; Halton

; Wts = w_var $

Page 1
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Senior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to
Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as Amended

Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended (18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted), James B. Boyd, the Senior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer of Silicon Storage Technology, Inc. (the Company), hereby certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:



| | 1. | The Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.2 (the Periodic
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In Witness Whereof, the undersigned has set his hand hereto as of the 20th day of March, 2009.



|                                                                                             
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/    JAMES B.
BOYD James B. Boyd Senior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, has been provided to Silicon Storage Technology, Inc. and will be retained by Silicon Storage Technology, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Form 10-K to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to
be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-K), irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.
H. Res. 826 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

July 13, 2016. 

Resolved, That Philip George Kiko of the State of Ohio, 

be, and is hereby, chosen Chief Administrative Officer of the 

House of Representatives, effective August 1, 2016. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

8Onor8ble Joe.* 8. Wlmr 

kr dot 

oouat Attorlwf 

Juduad, Tour 

mm air: OplrrLorr No. O-7305 

il. I aursio1e s son OS 8n 

laiormat 

Artiole 

n, draua u&r 

Fi 

, V.fi aeation 34, 

date, vhioh rmdrr 

%rvvlth la a o 

mclti0o rim in th0 0 

TaMa, upon vhioh vm 

month, 

ther or not thr 

rm 18 objeetioaml 011 ths allegedesetld8Qt. Thl9re 

lml~l Form to 

omtlon lr ror l violaand 1~ oonmo~loo vlth the eorglalnt ot J, D. Uhtte, 

henla tiled, per&r, in ad to uld oount~ sourt 
4 

fb*urn Hilton Watkins for a period bf SIX months from 

date 0f aa 00meti00, t0 w, em aate 0f wp~ch 

30, 1946, agu1aet the pace nab dlpfty of the Stebe. 

Joe Hins 

Attorney or HlUlbnd county, 

tabe, ’ 

j.rticle G637t, Sactiou 34, prorides: 

“Any pemon vhow operetor@s, comeralal operator’s, 

or obbtifer ’ 8 llceaac or & Lvltag privilege as a nonresident hbr been obneelleU,, suepemUad, or retohsd b8) 

provided fo this Aat, md vao driver uy motor vehlole 

upon the h¶.&hvays of thin 8tate vhlle rooh lloeaee or 

privilege la caaoelkd, suspended, olr mvoked ir sollty 

of a alsdemebnor, bnd U,QOU OonviOtlon, rhbll ba pWlahed bp fine cf not Leo t!uan Pvsnty-fire Dollar8 t&?F), 

end not more than Five Hundred Dollars<$500), and, la 

.sddit;o~ tkereto, thcw3 may be ITI owd b aehteacc of 

~risoaseat not to axused slz (6f month.” 

For purpoaeer, of this opinion ve aaaume tbt there &a 

bosn otn6~l.iance w:tih bll requirements regatiing the complalat. 

8ee 0 Ter. Jerfr. 601-60, aeotlonv 22, 4. 

‘Au indiotment or lafomatloa eoU8isto of four 

r niPant 

PP 

partsr 

) tha cbargw, ( 

1) thu caption, \2) the ccawenuement, 

) the ocnolualoo , 23 TSX. Jurir 610, 

Bcctioo 17. 
The laforrtloa quoted rupra meet8 the requirement8 

of (I), (2), l rrd (h), hOROe VLO d18CU881On Of th88. prt8 i8 

MOO 8Ur’J. 

A8 t0 (3), th. O&r68 1 

“fa OhWgif&g the Otf8QM th8 8uiiiO1OlM~ Of U 

lDfora8ttOn i8 terted by the l’Ub8 lQplio8bl8 to l l 

lndiotwnt. Under either method of lnrtltutlag a 

~roncutlon the defetitint I8 l ntithd to be itiOrmSd 

of the bBtUre of th8 rCOU88tiOll l @llk8t hir. Th8 

IJOll8titUh OhHTI8Rttr Of the OfiOn8I3 8ad OTWJ fa0t 

O'F QiraU8t&MO8 lM~6888r~ t0 4 o=plIBt* dOlcl'iptloa thereof 8hould be alleged; . . .’ 23 Tex. Jurlo. 

619, mctloa 23. 

Appl~l~ the foregolag tort, it appear8 that the Charge 

j.n the aforementioned information meet8 those rsquirlmeatr. It 

16, therefore, tb opinion of thir department that the form of 

the said information 1s suffioient. 

Trueting that the foregoing fully answer8 your huestioas, ve u-e 

Your8 very truly 

ATTOBBEY OBRBRAL OF TXAB
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Pauline Wacher, Appellant. Thomas F. Hartnett, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

— Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed December 7, 1990, which *inter alia,*ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

Claimant quit her job as a part-time secretary because she could not comply with the employer’s policy that she refrain from smoking in the office. This policy came as a result of the fact that one of the officers of the corporation, whose office was next to claimant’s office, had developed a health problem which would have been aggravated by smoking. Claimant testified that, even when there was no nonsmoking policy, she would leave the office and go to the street level to smoke when others came in. There is no indication that claimant could not still do this when she wanted to smoke. It is also clear that had claimant chosen to abide by this policy, she would still be working. Consequently, the determination that claimant left her employment for personal and noncompelling reasons when work was still available is supported by substantial evidence and must be upheld *(see, Matter of Baker [Hartnett]*147 AD2d 790; *see also, Matter of Nonnon [Ross]*74 AD2d 943, 943-944). Furthermore, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision that claimant willfully made false statements to obtain benefits *(see, Matter of Muller [Levine],*50 AD2d 1005, *Iv denied*40 NY2d 806) and that the benefits were recoverable (Labor Law § 597 [4]).

Mikoll, J. P., Levine, Mercure, Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 99.2

                                CERTIFICATION OF
                           PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Temporary  Financial  Services,  Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2003
as filed with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the
"Report"),  I, Brad E. Herr,  Chief Financial  Officer of the Company,  certify,
pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  ss.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  ss.  906  of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

/s/ Brad E. Herr
-------------------------------
Brad E. Herr
Principal Financial Officer
November 7, 2003
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS UNAUDITED SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
THE CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF JUNE 30, 1997 AND FOR THE SIX MONTH
PERIOD THEN ENDED. THIS INFORMATION IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         544,581
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,122,957
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (25,000)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,773,735
<PP&E>                                         519,070
<DEPRECIATION>                               (279,599)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,359,478
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          969,422
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        38,844
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,315,862
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,359,478
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,616,454
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,322,392
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                362,239
<INCOME-TAX>                                    69,600
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            292,639
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   292,639
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        


</TABLE>