Interim Decision #2013 

MATTER OF HOLGUIN 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-19052331 

A-19052332 

Decided by Board November 19, 1969 

Where respondents' generalized statements of the reasons for their appeals 

do not indicate the aspect of the special inquiry officer's orders they consider incorrect and for what reason, their appeals in deportation proceedings from orders of the special inquiry officer granting voluntary departure, the relief requested, and the only relief for which eligible, are 

summarily dismissed as frivolous appeals and oral argument thereon denied by the Board of Immigration Appeals since respondents failed to 

clearly specify the reasons for their appeals within the meaning of 8 CFR 

3.1(d) (1–a) (i), and they were granted the relief requested by the special 

inquiry officer (8 CFR 3.1 (d) (1–a) (iii)). 

CHARGE : 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2))—Nonimmigrant—remained longer (both respondents). 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: Manuel Lopez, Esquire 

1725 West Beverly Boulevard 

Los Angeles, California 90026 

Respondents, husband and wife, appeal from orders of a special 

inquiry officer finding them deportable and granting them voluntary departure. Their notices of appeal request oral argument before this Board. The requests for oral argument will be denied 

and the appeals will be summarily dismissed pursuant to 8 CFR 

3.1(d) (1—a). 

The facts are not in dispute. The respondents are natives and 

citizens of Mexico. The husband, aged 33, was last admitted to 

the United States on November 23, 1966. The wife, aged 28, was 

last admitted on December 18, 1966. Both were admitted as temporary visitors and authorized to remain until May 9, 1969. A 

child born to them on September 23, 1967, in Los Angeles, is a 

citizen of the United States. 

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Interim Decision #2013 

Orders to show cause, issued on July 18, 1969, charged alienage 

and entry as above-stated and that respondents had remained 

longer than permitted. At a joint deportation hearing on August 

29, 1969, at which they were represented by counsel, both respondents admitted the truth of the factual allegations of their 

respective orders to show cause and conceded deportability as 

charged. Each applied for the privilege of voluntary departure. It 

was brought out that both respondents had submitted applications for immigrant visas to the American Consul at Juarez, 

Mexico four months previously. Counsel estimated that it would 

be roughly two or three months before the visas would be issued. 

The special inquiry officer stated that he would not be able Co 

grant the respondents sufficient time to remain in the United 

States to await the visas, pointing out that any extension of the 

voluntary departure time he fixed would be a matter for the District Director to decide. The special inquiry officer entered separate orders granting respondents until September 19, 1969 to depart voluntarily, with alternate orders for their deportation to 

Mexico if they failed to depart by that date or any extended date 

fixed by the District Director. It is these orders which are before 

us on appeal. 

In the space provided for a statement of the reasons for the appeal, each notice of appeal sets forth, "Decission [sic] is contrary 

e customary and enacted law as it relates to the operative facts 

n the present matter." No briefs have been filed. 

Appeals to this Board from decisions of special inquiry officers 

n deportation cases are generally available as a matter of right. 

lost such appeals are submitted to the Board for adjudication on 

he record and briefs, if any, without request for oral argument. 

Trader 8 CFR 3.6, execution of the special inquiry officer's order 

stayed pending appeal. The availability of this respite from deortation opens the door to appeals which are purely frivolous 

ad taken solely for purposes of delay. As we stated in Matter of 

aqui, Interim Decision No. 1964 (BIA, 1969), "Delay as an end 

itself, whether achieved by obstructionism or dilatory tactics, 

Lnnot in our view be considered a legitimate object." 

Frivolous and dilatory appeals are extremely wasteful of the 

n-vice's and this Board's limited resources. They require need3S transcription of the records of deportation hearings. They 

ipinge upon the time and professional attention needed for 

aly meritorious cases, of which there are many. Effective adnistration of the immigration laws requires that we discourage 

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frivolous appeals. We try to do this by expediting our consideration and decision in appeals of that sort. 

Under 8 CFR 3.1 (e), oral argument on appeal before the Board 

is available upon request. The opportunity for oral argument 

serves a useful purpose in many cases. In frivolous and dilatory 

appeals, it merely makes available an additional avenue of delay. 

Since our calendars of oral argument automatically guarantees at 

least some delay. Oral arguments before the Board are recorded 

and transcribed, and this, too, makes for delay. 

It has been our sad experience that in many appeals in which 

oral argument has been requested, neither the attorney nor the 

respondent appearing pro se is present when the case is called, 

and the Board receives no advance notice of their non-attendance. 

In such instances, we consider the case as submitted on the record. Such requests for oral argument and failure to appear do afford a little more delay, where that is the real object of the appeal; but they are extremely wasteful of the Government's 

facilities. Not only is oral argument delayed in other cases which 

have been preempted on the oral argument calendar, but valuable 

professional time is needlessly expended by Board members and 

Service attorneys in preparing for oral arguments which never 

materialize. 

8 CFR 3.1 (d) (1—a) provides as follows: 

Summary dismissal of appeals. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (e) of this section, the Board may deny oral argument concerning, 

and summarily dismiss, any appeal in any deportation proceeding under 

Part 242 of this chapter in any case in which (i) the party concerned fails 

to specify the reasons for his appeal on Form 1-290A (Notice of Appeal), 

(ii) the only reason specified by the party concerned for his appeal involves 

a finding of fact or a conclusion of law which was conceded by him at the 

hearing, or (iii) the appeal is from an order that granted the party concerned the relief which he requested. 

As we have pointed out, we deal promptly with frivolous appeals 

submitted on the record without oral argument. The above-quoted 

regulation was designed to permit us to deal equally promptly 

with frivolous appeals in which oral argument has been requested. In our view, these are such appeals. 

The generalized statements of the reasons for these appeals, as 

set forth in the respective notices of appeal, are totally inadequate. They do not tell us what aspect of the special inquiry 

officer's order they consider incorrect and for what reason. They 

do not apprise the Service of the issues its representative must be 

prepared to discuss at the oral argument. Respondents have 

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Interim Decision #2013 

clearly failed to specify the reasons for their appeals within the 

meaning of 8 CFR 3.1(d) (1—a) (i), supra. 

From our review of the record, we are satisfied that deportabilty has been established by evidence that is clear, convincing and 

inequivocal. The only form of discretionary relief for which repondents are eligible is voluntary departure. They requested this 

elief and the special inquiry officer granted it. This would aptar to bring their appeals squarely within the ambit of 8 CFR 

.1(d) (1—a) (iii), supra. 

Even if the notices of appeal be considered as specifying that 

le special inquiry officer was arbitrary in granting only three 

eeks' departure time, we would still be required to dismiss these 

)peals. As the special inquiry officer pointed out, and as we have 

∎ nsistently held, under 8 CFR 244.2 the extension of voluntary 

!parture time is within the sole jurisdiction of the District 

irector. In view of the indefiniteness of the additional time. 

eded for visa purposes and in view of the adequacy of the adnistrative remedy available under 8 CFR 244.2, the special iniry officer's refusal to fix a longer departure period can 

trcely be called arbitrary. 

dis we have pointed out in Matter of Aguirre, Interim Decision 

. 1940 (BIA, 1969), under 8 CFR 3.6 the running of the voluny departure time authorized by the special inquiry officer has 

n stayed pending appeal. Thus, the respondents still have 21 

s from the date of our decision within which to depart volunly and thereby avoid the automatic entry of the deportation 

?rs prescribed by the special inquiry officer. 

RDER: It is ordered that the requests for oral argument be 

ed and that the appeals be dismissed. 

is further ordered that, pursuant to the special inquiry 

?r's orders, the respondents be permitted to depart from the 

,ed States voluntarily within 21 days from the date of this den or any extension beyond that date as may be granted by 

District Director ; and that, in the event of failure so to dethe respondents shall be deported as provided in the special 

ry officer's orders. 

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