NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MATTHEW F., Appellant,

v.

GABRIELLE N., R.F., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 19-0222 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. V1300SV201880003

The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

FILED 12-10-2019
MATTHEW F. v. GABRIELLE N., R.F.

Decision of the Court

2

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Mathew F. (Father) challenges the superior court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his biological child R.F. Father argues the 

court erred in terminating his rights and in finding termination was in the 

child’s best interests. Because sufficient evidence supports both findings, 

the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 R.F. was born in 2010 to Father and Gabrielle N. (Mother).

Mother and Father dated for many years but never married. When R.F. was 

18 months old, the couple broke up while Father was serving time in prison 

for felony convictions. Mother then began a relationship with, and 

eventually married, Daniel H. After being released from prison in 2013, 

Father committed additional felony offenses and, in February 2018, was 

sentenced to another prison term, this time for two years and five months.

Shortly after Father’s sentencing, Mother petitioned to terminate his 

parental rights based on abandonment, nature of felony conviction and 

length of felony sentence. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (2019).

¶3 After a one-day severance adjudication in June 2019, during 

which Mother, Daniel H. and Father testified, the court granted Mother’s

motion based on abandonment and length of felony sentence, also finding 

severance was in R.F.’s best interests. This court has jurisdiction over 

Father’s timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section, 9, of the Arizona 

Constitution, A.R.S. § 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A) and 12-2101(A) and Ariz. R.P. 

Juv. Ct. 103-104 (2019).1

DISCUSSION

¶4 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must 

find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground 

articulated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) has been proven and must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

child. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. 

 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. Although Father’s 

failure to file an answering brief could be deemed a concession of error, in 

the exercise of its discretion and because a child’s best interests are 

implicated, this court will address the merits of the issues raised on appeal. 

See Bugh v. Bugh, 125 Ariz. 190, 191 (App. 1980).
MATTHEW F. v. GABRIELLE N., R.F.

Decision of the Court

3

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior court 

“is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm 

an order terminating parental rights so long as it is supported by reasonable 

evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 

2009) (citations omitted).

I. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Abandonment Finding.

¶5 Father first argues there was insufficient evidence to support

abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Abandonment is defined as

the failure of a parent to provide reasonable

support and to maintain regular contact with

the child, including providing normal

supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial

finding that a parent has made only minimal

efforts to support and communicate with the

child. Failure to maintain a normal parental

relationship with the child without just cause

for a period of six months constitutes prima

facie evidence of abandonment.

A.R.S. § 8-531(1). “[A]bandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective

intent, but by the parent’s conduct: the statute asks whether a parent has

provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more than

minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and

maintained a normal parental relationship.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50

¶18. “‘What constitutes reasonable support, regular contact, and normal

supervision varies from case to case.’” Id. at 250 ¶ 20 (citation omitted).

“Therefore, questions of abandonment . . . are questions of fact for

resolution by the trial court,” to which this court defers. Matter of Appeal in

Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 4 (1990).

¶6 Father has not shown the superior court abused its discretion 

in finding abandonment. Father had limited and intermittent contact with 

R.F. for much of her life. Father has been in prison repeatedly. When R.F. 

was about six months old, Father was incarcerated for a year and a half, and 

he is currently serving a sentence of two and a half years. When not 

incarcerated, Father had irregular and minimal contact with R.F. After his 

release from prison in 2013, Father moved to California for several years.

Despite testifying that during this time he would regularly call R.F. and 

send her gifts, the record shows he often failed to call her when he had 
MATTHEW F. v. GABRIELLE N., R.F.

Decision of the Court

4

promised to do so. Father last saw R.F., who was eight years old at the time 

of trial, on her third birthday. Father last spoke to her on the phone in 

January 2017. Moreover, in assessing credibility, the superior court was not 

required to accept or give full weight to Father’s statements. 

¶7 Although Mother has prevented Father from contacting R.F.

since the January 2017 phone call, the record shows Father failed to develop 

his relationship with R.F. before that time. Mother testified Father often 

missed opportunities to bond with R.F. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 25

(“The burden to act as a parent rests with the parent, who should assert his 

legal rights at the first and every opportunity.”); In re Pima Cty. Juvenile 

Severance Action No. S–114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 99 (1994) (affirming termination 

where the parent “failed to promptly and persistently grasp the 

opportunity to develop a relationship with his child or assert his legal 

rights”). While in prison, Father sent one letter to Mother and R.F. To his 

credit, he also completed several self-improvement classes and worked to 

obtain a college degree. These efforts, however, are not a substitute for

“regular contact, and normal supervision.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250 ¶ 20 

(citation omitted). 

¶8 In recent years, Father has provided minimal and sporadic 

support at best. Mother obtained a child support order in 2014. Although 

the parties disputed how often Father made payments and for how much, 

the court found Father last made payments to Mother in March 2015. There 

is no evidence compelling a finding that he provided any support for R.F. 

since that time.

¶9 On this record, Father has failed to show that the superior 

court’s findings were not supported by sufficient evidence or otherwise 

were an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the abandonment finding is 

affirmed. Given this conclusion, this court need not address Father’s 

arguments regarding the other statutory grounds for severance. See Michael 

J., 196 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 27.

II. Father Has Not Shown the Superior Court Erred in Finding 

Termination Was in the Best Interests of the Child.

¶10 Father argues insufficient evidence showed termination was

in R.F.’s best interests. This court reviews the best interests finding for an

abuse of discretion. Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 369 ¶ 15

(App. 2018) (citations omitted). If a court has found the existence of a

statutory ground for termination, the court “can presume that the interests

of the parent and child diverge.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz.
MATTHEW F. v. GABRIELLE N., R.F.

Decision of the Court

5

146, 150 ¶ 12 (2018) (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 35). At that point,

the “child’s interest in stability and security” are the court’s main concern.

Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016) (quoting Kent K., 210

Ariz. at 286 ¶ 34). Termination is in a child’s best interests if either the child 

will benefit from severance or be harmed if the parent-child relationship 

continues. See JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at 5.

¶11 On appeal, Father claims Mother is an unfit parent due to her 

regular use of marijuana. The trial evidence shows use by Mother but that 

she has had a medical marijuana card since November 2018 and there is no 

indication such use has compromised her ability to parent during the time 

relevant here. Indeed, Father testified Mother is “a good mom” and he has

“heard nothing but good things about” Daniel H. Mother and Daniel H. 

have two children together; Daniel H. has taken care of and provided 

financial support for R.F. for five years, and he plans to adopt R.F. R.F.’s 

“prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding.” 

Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4 ¶ 16 (citation omitted). On this record, Father 

has failed to show the court erred in finding severance was in the best 

interests of R.F.

CONCLUSION

¶12 Because Father has shown no error, the superior court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to R.F. is affirmed.