N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C U IT

AAR ON HAHN, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt,
v. DOUG W ADDINGTON e t a l., De fe nda

nts - Appe lle e s. No. 15-35091 D.C . No. C V-14-5047-R

JB
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the W e ste rn Distric t of W a shington R obe rt J. B ry a

n, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d M ay

11, 2017 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : O’ SC A

NNLAIN a

nd OW ENS, C irc uit Judge s a nd C HR ISTENSEN, ** C hie f Distric t

Judge
. Pla intiff Aa

ron Ha hn a ppe a ls from

the distric t c ourt’ s dism issa l of his 42 U.S.C . § 1983 c la im . W e have jurisdic tion pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 1291, a

nd we 

# F IL ED
J UN 05 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The Honora

ble Da na L. C h riste nse n, C hie f Distric t Judge for the U.S. Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of M onta na , sitting by

de signa tion.re ve rse an d re m and. As the pa rtie s a re fa m ilia r with the fa c t s, we do not re c ount the m he re . The distric t c ourt e rre d whe n it dism isse d Ha hn’ s § 1983 c la im

a s untim e ly
a s a m a tte r of la

w. Although the

c om pla int wa s file d ove r thre e y e ars a fte r Hahn’ s
a lle ge d injury , se e W a s h. R e v. C ode § 4.16.080(2) (2015), W a shington la w
m andate s e quita

b le tolling whe n , a s he re , “ justic e re quire s.” Se e Millay v . C am , 955 P.2d 791, 797 (W a sh. 1998) (e n ba nc ); se e also In re

Pe rs. Re straint of C

arte r , 263 P.3d 1241, 1248–49 (W a sh. 2011) (e n ba

nc ) (a dopting the

a c tua l innoc e nc e doc trine ). Ha

h n’ s c om pla int wa s untim e ly

through no fa

u l t of his own. Ha

h n tim e ly an d a ppropria te ly file d in the Ea ste rn Distric t of W a shington; a fte r the Ea ste rn Distric t dism i sse d Ha hn’ s c la im s a g a i nst re side nts of the distric t, tha t c ourt
e rre d by dism issing inste a d

of tra nsfe rring ve nue to the W e ste rn Distric t of W a shington, whe re the sole re m a ining de fe nda n ts re side d
. Se e Goldlaw r, Inc . v . He iman , 369 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1962); se e also Burne tt v . N

. Y. C e nt. R.R. C

o. , 380 U.S. 424, 430 n.7 (1965). B y the tim e Ha

hn re c e i ve d notic e of the dism i ssa l, the sta tute of lim ita

tions ha d e xpire d. Unde r the pa

rtic ula r c irc um sta

nc e s of this c a se , e quita

ble tolling is
c onsiste n t with thepolic ie s unde rly ing § 1983, a n d it is not inc onsiste nt with those
se rve d by W a shington’ s sta

tute of lim ita

tions. Se e Millay , 955 P.2d a t 797 (“ In -2-W a shington e quita ble tolling is a

ppropria te whe n c o nsiste nt with both the purpose of the sta tute providing the

c a use of a c tion a

nd the purpose of the sta

tute of lim ita tions.” ). Stric t a dhe re nc e to the sta tute of lim ita

tions in the

fa c e of proc e d ura l unfa irne ss c annot be re c onc ile d with § 1983, whic h e xists to prom

ote

“ c o m pe nsation of pe rsons whose c ivil rights ha ve be e n viola

te d , a nd pre ve ntion of the a buse of sta

te powe r.” Burne tt v . Grattan , 468 U.S. 42, 53 (1984); se e also Bd. of Re ge nts of Univ . of N

.Y. v

. Tomanio , 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980). M ore ove r, the purpose s unde rly ing the sta t ute of lim ita

tions— fina lity

and prote c t ion a ga inst sta le
and unve rifia

ble c la im s
—

will not be

frustra t e d by

a l lowing e quita

ble tolling he re . Se e K ittinge r v . Boe ing C

o. , 585 P.2d 812, 814 (W a sh. C t. App. 1978). The de fe nda n ts we re aware of Ha

hn’ s c la im

within the

sta tutory tim e fra m e , whe n Hahn first file d in the Ea ste rn Distric t of W a s hington. Unde r W a s hington la w, justic e re q

uire s tolling, but the

re m e dy is m ode st—

H ahn will sim

ply be pla c e d in the p osition he

would ha ve be e n in ha d the Ea s te rn Distric t a ppropria te ly transfe rre d his c l a im
. Thus, Ha hn is e n title d

to e quita ble tolling unde

r W a s hington la

w only if he
wa s dilige nt in pursuing this a c tion in the

W e ste rn Distric t of W a shington a fte r dism issa l. Se e

, e .g., Millay , 955 P.2d a

t 797–98; Douc he ttev . Be the l Sc h. Dist. N o. 403 , 818 P.2d 1362, 1365 (W a sh. 1991) (e n ba nc ). A dispute

of fa c t re m a ins a s to -3-Hahn’ s dilige nc e , whic h c annot be re solve d on a ppe a l. Se e Spitsy n v . Moore , 345 F.3d 796, 802 (9th C ir. 2003). The issue of Ha hn’ s dilige nc e , a long with De fe nda nts’ othe r a rgum e nts in fa v or of dism issa l, c an a

p propria te ly be re solve d by the distric t

c o urt on re m and. RE V E RSE D AND RE M ANDE D.

-4-Hahn v. Waddington , No. 15
- 35091

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I re spectfully dissent from the memorandum disposition because I disagree with its characterization of Washington law. I The majority asserts that “Washington law mandates equitable tolling when, as here, ‘justice requires.’” Majority at 2. However, Washington’s highest court has repeatedly emphasized that “equitable tolling is allowed when justice requires and when the pr edicates for equitable tolling are met . The predicates . . . [are] bad faith, deception, or false assurances by the defendant and the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff.” In re Bonds , 165 Wash. 2d 135, 141 (2008) (en banc) (emphasis added) ; se e also In re Haghighi , 178 Wash. 2d 435, 447 (2013) (en banc) (“[T]raditionally we have allowed equitable tolling when justice requires its application and when the predicates of bad faith, deception, or false assurances are met , and where the petitioner has exer cised diligence in pursuing his or her rights.”) (emphasis added); Douchette v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 , 117 Wash. 2d 805, 812 (1991) (en banc) (“ In the absence of bad faith on the part of the defendant and reasonable diligence on the part of the plain tiff, equity cannot be invoked .”) (emphasis added). 

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JUN 5 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

Washington precedent may be read to leave open the possibility that bad faith, deception, or false assurances by a third party

— as opposed to by defendants

—

might satisfy the predicate rule. Specificall y, in In re Bonds , the court characterizes the predicate rule as “mak[ing] equitable tolling available only in instances where petitioner missed the filing deadline due to another’s malfeasance.” Id. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, it remains clear that bad faith rather than mere negligence is necessary for equitably tolling to apply. II Hahn raises no allegation that the Eastern District of Washington acted maliciously or in bad faith when it dismissed his claims against certain defendants for imprope r venue. Rather, he asserts that the court acted in error. Such does not constitute adequate grounds for equitable tolling under Washington’s predicate rule. III “[F] ailure to comply with the [Washington] statute of l imitations, therefore, preclude[s] maintenance of this action
. . . [ because Washington’s] tolling rule is [not] ‘inconsistent’ with the policies underlying § 1983. ” Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. v. Tomanio , 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980)
. Like the New York tolling rule at issue in Tomanio , Washington’s rule is motivated by “policies of repose [which] cannot be said to be disfavored in federal3

law.” Id
. at 488. Furthermore, “ [n] either [deterrence nor compensation, the princip al policies embodied in § 1983,] is significantly affected by thi s rule of limitations since plaintiffs can still readily enforce their claims, thereby recovering compensation and fostering deterrence, simply by [filing a direct appeal that challenges a district court’s alleged error].” Id. See generally In re Hall, B ayoutree Assoc. , 939 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We review a determination of whether to transfer or dismiss for abuse of discretion.”). Hahn opted not to take advantage of such opportunity to recover compensation and foster deterrence by filing an ap peal , but it was readily available to him nonetheless. IV Because I see no reason to displace a longstanding state rule in favor of an ad hoc federal one, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.