IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-20600

Summary Calendar

LATIA M. JONES

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

FJC SECURITY SERVICES, INC.

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:12-CV-03688

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Latia M. Jones,1 proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment 

of August 19, 2014, granting summary judgment against her Title VII claims.

I.

Ms. Jones filed an Original Complaint in December 2012 alleging that 

she was discriminated against by her employer FJC Security Services, Inc. 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 Ms. Jones’s first name is written “LaTia” in some of the filings before us, but her own 

briefs use “Latia.”

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 24, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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(“FJC”) on the basis of sex and race. She also alleged that she faced retaliation 

for filing an earlier employment discrimination complaint. FJC filed an 

answer, and the parties proceeded to discovery. 

In October 2013, FJC moved for an extension of the discovery and 

motions deadlines, informing the court that that Ms. Jones had filed a new 

charge against it with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(EEOC). The parties had agreed to mediation of the new EEOC charge, to take 

place in November 2013; FJC requested the extension “in furtherance of the 

goals of mediating the claim.” The record shows that the district court granted 

the unopposed motion and set new discovery and motions deadlines for 

December 2013 and January 2014, respectively. Ms. Jones appears to have 

understood that the court was suspending discovery and encouraging the 

parties to mediate the instant case (not just postponing to allow mediation on 

the new EEOC charge).

Apart from a motion by Ms. Jones to extend the deadline to provide 

discovery materials to FJC, which the court granted, no further activity 

occurred in the district court for several months. Ms. Jones argues that during 

this time she diligently attempted to contact FJC in order to participate in 

mediation, but FJC never responded. In December 2013, FJC deposed Ms. 

Jones. Then on January 15, 2014, FJC filed a motion for summary judgment. 

Ms. Jones moved for a 10-day extension of time to respond to the 

summary judgment motion, and the court extended the deadline to February 

14, 2014. Ms. Jones also attempted to subpoena documents from the EEOC. 

On the new deadline for her opposition to summary judgment, Ms. Jones filed 

a “Motion for Order of Compliance.” She stated in her motion that she “would

like to provide a response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and 

include all information in support of her claims” but that she could not do so 

unless the EEOC was compelled to produce relevant documents. Both the 

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EEOC and FJC filed oppositions to the Motion for Order of Compliance, 

arguing, inter alia, that the motion was filed after the close of discovery, and 

that the subpoena sought documents that did not exist, was not calculated to 

produce relevant evidence, and provided impossible-to-meet deadlines.

With the summary judgment and Order of Compliance motions pending, 

on March 3, 2014 the court vacated the docket control schedule, noting that it 

would reset the schedule if appropriate after the motions were resolved. Ms. 

Jones appears to have understood that this order paused proceedings once 

again in order to allow the parties to follow through on mediation. On March 

5th, the magistrate judge to whom Ms. Jones’s motion had been referred denied 

the Motion for Order of Compliance.2 In the weeks following, Ms. Jones again 

attempted to engage in mediation with FJC. No further activity appears on 

the district court docket until August 19, 2014, when the court issued an 

Opinion and Order granting FJC’s motion for summary judgment on the 

merits.3 Ms. Jones appeals.

II.

Ms. Jones does not argue that the motion for summary judgment was 

wrongly granted on the merits; her argument is procedural. She urges that 

FJC’s motion for summary judgment, the corresponding deadline for her 

response, and the district court’s final decision all took her by surprise. 

According to Ms. Jones, the district court postponed discovery to allow 

mediation, but FJC refused to participate despite her diligent efforts. Because 

Ms. Jones understood that proceedings were paused, she was unprepared to 

respond when the motion for summary judgment was filed. Though she 

2 Ms. Jones filed a Reply regarding this motion on March 6th, the day after it was 

denied.

3 The only exception is Ms. Jones’s Reply to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Order of Compliance, which was filed the day after the motion it addressed was denied.

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attempted to comply with the deadline, she could not obtain needed documents 

in time, so she instead asked the court to compel the EEOC’s cooperation. 

Then, after the court vacated its docket control schedule, Ms. Jones again 

understood that proceedings were paused for mediation and thus was 

surprised by the district court’s final order and judgment. Ms. Jones maintains 

that the parties could have settled the case if the district court had not 

“prematurely” granted summary judgment.

Ms. Jones does not offer a legal theory explaining why the grant of 

summary judgment should be overturned. Construing her briefs liberally,4 she 

argues that she was denied a fair chance to respond to the motion for summary 

judgment because the district court orders were unclear or otherwise failed to

inform her what was expected of her.

III.

Bringing a case pro se is challenging, especially for non-lawyers. Ms. 

Jones was at a significant disadvantage because she was unable to hire counsel 

familiar with court proceedings. Recognizing such disadvantages, we 

traditionally extend leniency to pro se litigants,5 and applaud district court 

efforts to facilitate pro se litigants’ understanding of their responsibilities. 

Nonetheless, we expect litigants to meet court deadlines and observe the rules 

of civil procedure.6 

4 S.E.C. v. AMX, Intern., Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1993). 5 Id.; Fujita v. United States, 416 Fed. App’x. 400, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that 

plaintiff’s discovery “difficulties deserve some solicitude because of ‘this court’s traditional 

disposition of leniency toward pro se litigants’”) (quoting Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 377 

(5th Cir. 1998)).

6 Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Vafaiyan v. City of Wichita 

Falls, Tex., 398 Fed. Appx. 989, 990 (5th Cir. 2010); Fujita, 416 Fed App’x. at 402 (noting that 

the district “court would have been justified in enforcing the deadline” against pro se

plaintiff).

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District courts have broad discretion to enforce their scheduling orders.7

Here, the district court’s order extending deadlines clearly stated that 

discovery was to be completed by December 15, 2013 and that both dispositive 

and non-dispositive motions were to be filed by January 15, 2014. Ms. Jones 

does not dispute that she received this order. Even if Ms. Jones initially 

believed that the order suspended discovery pending mediation, her October 

and December 2013 participation in discovery activities provided additional 

notice that discovery was ongoing. 

Ms. Jones was also clearly aware of the February 14, 2014 deadline for 

her response to the motion for summary judgment because she asked for and 

received an extension.8 Finally, though she may have misunderstood the effect 

of the district court’s March 4th order vacating its docket control schedule, by 

that time she had already missed the deadlines to complete discovery and 

respond to the motion for summary judgment. 

More could have been done to ensure that Ms. Jones understood the 

effect of the district court’s orders. Nevertheless, that Ms. Jones may have 

misunderstood the orders does not excuse her failure to meet its deadlines.9 

The court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give Ms. Jones additional 

7 Fujita, 416 Fed. Appx. at 402 & n.6 (explaining, in case involving pro se litigant, the 

district court’s discretion to manage discovery); Martinez v. Union Carbide Corp., 62 F.3d 392 

(5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (reviewing district court’s refusal to allow pro se litigant to latedesignate her expert witnesses for abuse of discretion).

8 The district court also granted Ms. Jones additional time to comply with FJC’s 

discovery requests.

9 See Thunderhorse v. Lynaugh, 38 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (noting that 

the court “was under no obligation to affirmatively notify [the pro se litigant] that he could 

conduct discovery”); see also Murry v. Gen. Services Admin., 553 Fed. App’x. 362, 364 (5th

Cir. 2014) (rejecting pro se plaintiff’s argument that her claims should not be barred by res 

judicata because “no one told her that her [] claims should have been brought alongside” 

earlier claims).

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time to complete discovery,10 or by denying her Motion for Order of 

Compliance.11 Nor did it abuse its discretion by failing to grant a second 

extension of time for her response to the motion for summary judgment.12 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

10 Though Ms. Jones did not ask the court to extend the discovery deadline, the court 

could conceivably have construed her Motion for Order of Compliance as such a request.

11 In denying the Motion, the magistrate noted that Ms. Jones “did not serve a copy of 

the Motion on the EEOC,” and further cited, inter alia, the “EEOC’s confidentiality objections 

to Plaintiff’s request for documents related to a third party” and the extremely limited time 

the subpoena gave the EEOC to comply.

12 The court did grant Ms. Jones’s requested 10-day extension. Her Motion for Order 

of Compliance could be construed as a request for an additional extension of time, though it 

focused on the need for additional discovery.

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