alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2018104EN.01004801.xml

| 19.3.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 104/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.3.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 104/48

---

Action brought on 22 January 2018 — Asahi Intecc v EUIPO — Celesio (Celeson)

(Case T-36/18)

(2018/C 104/61)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Asahi Intecc Co. Ltd (Nagoya City, Japan) (represented by: T. Schmidpeter, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Celesio AG (Stuttgart, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Applicant of the trade mark at issue:

Trade mark at issue: International registration designating the European Union in respect of the mark ‘Celeson’ – International registration designating the European Union No 1 254 798

Trade mark at issue:

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Procedure before EUIPO

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 November 2017 in Case R 1004/2017-4

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | reject the opposition No B 2 644 816 filed by McKesson Europe AG (formerly Celesion AG) to the international registration designating the European Union in respect of the word mark Celeson applied for by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

reject the opposition No B 2 644 816 filed by McKesson Europe AG (formerly Celesion AG) to the international registration designating the European Union in respect of the word mark Celeson applied for by the applicant;

| — | order EUIPO to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the applicant for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court; |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the applicant for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court;

| — | order EUIPO and McKesson Europe AG (formerly Celesion AG) each to pay half of the costs necessarily incurred by the applicant for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and McKesson Europe AG (formerly Celesion AG) each to pay half of the costs necessarily incurred by the applicant for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

Plea in law

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Artcile 8(1)(b) Regulation No 2017/1001. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Artcile 8(1)(b) Regulation No 2017/1001.

---
# Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Global Illicit Drug Trade

                        On December 15, 2021, by Executive Order 14059, I declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701*et seq.*) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by global illicit drug trafficking.                    

The trafficking into the United States of illicit drugs, including fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, is causing the deaths of tens of thousands of Americans annually, as well as countless more non-fatal overdoses with their own tragic human toll. Drug cartels, transnational criminal organizations, and their facilitators are the primary sources of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals that fuel the current opioid epidemic, as well as drug-related violence that harms our communities. International drug trafficking—including the illicit production, global sale, and widespread distribution of illegal drugs; the rise of extremely potent drugs such as fentanyl and other synthetic opioids; as well as the growing role of internet-based drug sales—continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14059 of December 15, 2021, must continue in effect beyond December 15, 2023. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14059 with respect to global illicit drug trafficking.

                        This notice shall be published in the                         *Federal Register*                         and transmitted to the Congress.                    

[FR Doc. 2023-27732

Billing code 3395-F4-P
<PAGE>


Exhibit 11.1
 
CORE, INC.
COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
 
<TABLE> 
<CAPTION> 
                                             For the three months ended September 30,      For the nine months ended September 30,
                                                      1995           1996                         1995               1996
                                                      ----           ----                         ----               ----
<S>                                                <C>           <C>                            <C>               <C> 
Primary:
  Average shares outstanding                          4,744,000      6,072,000                     4,744,000         6,072,000
    
  Shares issuable on assumed exercise of
   dilutive options and warrants - based on
   treasury stock method using average
   market price
                                                        527,000                                      527,000 
                                                   ------------  -------------                  ------------      ------------ 
                                            Total     5,271,000      6,072,000                     5,271,000         6,072,000
                                                   ============  =============                  ============      ============ 

  Net income (loss)                                $    396,667  $  (1,257,138)                 $   (500,449)     $   (220,346)
                                                   ============  =============                  ============      ============ 
 
  Net income (loss) per share                      $       0.08  $       (0.21)                 $      (0.09)     $      (0.04)
                                                   ============  =============                  ============      ============ 
</TABLE>
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  In Re: A LAN V ERNON C ECIL , a/k/a Allen Cecil, a/k/a Alan Cecil, Debtor.

A LAN V ERNON C ECIL , No. 02-1881



#  Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. P AUL -M ICHAELS WEENEY ,

Defendant-Appellee. 

# 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (CA-01-2318-AW, BK-99-22685) Argued: April 4, 2003 Decided: April 30, 2003 Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and Terry L. WOOTEN, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL
ARGUED: Thomas F. DeCaro, Jr., DECARO & HOWELL, P.C., Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellant. Paul-Michael Sweeney,LINOWES & BLOCHER, L.L.P., Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jennifer D. Larkin, LINOWES & BLOCHER, L.L.P., Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION
PER CURIAM: Alan V. Cecil, the debtor in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, received a workers’ compensation award of $24,212.52 during thependency of the bankruptcy proceeding. While Cecil listed the workers’ compensation claim as an asset of the estate, the value of which was not yet known, he received the actual award a little over a month later. Cecil did not, however, claim the award as exempt from the estate, as authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) and Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-504(b)(2), until 17 months after he disclosed the asset and 16 months after he received the award. The bankruptcy court allowed Cecil’s exemption, but on the condition that Cecil payfrom the award $2,675, representing a portion of the Chapter 7 trustee’s expenses incurred during the period of delay in pursuing the award as property of the estate. Cecil appealed the bankruptcy court’s ruling, and the district court affirmed. We now too affirm. Although Cecil’s bankruptcy attorney was on medical leave for the last four months before he asserted Cecil’s exemption with respect to the workers’ compensation award, Cecil provided no justification for his failure to claim the exemption during the first 12 months after hereceived the award. After careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the bankruptcy court acted well within its equitable powers in conditioning exemption of the award on a partial payment of the trustee’s attorneys fees and costs. See Arnold v. Gill (In re Arnold) , 252 BR 778, 789 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000). Cecil’s claim of exemption, 16 months after he received 2 I N R E : C ECILthe property, came after the trustee undertook, during the period of delay, reasonable activities in seeking to bring the award into the estate, as he was statutorily obligated to do on behalf of creditors with respect to property not claimed as exempt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED 3 I N R E : C ECIL
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
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<MULTIPLIER>      1
<CURRENCY>        U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                            YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                    JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                      DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                             1
<CASH>                             12,819,366
<SECURITIES>                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                         546,935
<ALLOWANCES>                           65,000
<INVENTORY>                         3,121,084
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                   19,086,818
<PP&E>                             14,948,862
<DEPRECIATION>                      9,872,843
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                     24,307,318
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>               2,255,043
<BONDS>                                     0
<COMMON>                               54,868
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       0
<PREFERRED>                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                         20,608,943
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>       24,307,318
<SALES>                            14,182,239
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                   15,466,069
<CGS>                              11,824,433
<TOTAL-COSTS>                      12,903,814
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                    3,726,959
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                    114,241
<INCOME-PRETAX>                    (1,164,704)
<INCOME-TAX>                            1,256
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                (1,165,960)
<DISCONTINUED>                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                             0
<CHANGES>                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                       (1,165,960)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                           (0.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                           (0.17)
        

</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 4, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-50968

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID LEE JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:04-CV-215

USDC NO. 6:03-CR-16-1

--------------------

Before GARZA, DEMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

David Lee Johnson, federal prisoner # 26676-180, seeks a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district

court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his

guilty-plea conviction to manufacture of methamphetamine. 

Johnson also moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). In order to obtain a COA, Johnson must demonstrate that

“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of

the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.
No. 04-50968

-2-

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003).

Johnson argues that the district court erroneously concluded

that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was procedurally

defaulted. Johnson is correct. A claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel may be raised for the first time in a 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.

500, 509 (2003).

Johnson also argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal on

his behalf, despite Johnson’s request that he do so. COA is

GRANTED on the question whether and when Johnson requested an

appeal and the advice or information provided by counsel. See

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477-78, 485-86 (2000). This

case is REMANDED for consideration of this issue in the first

instance by the district court and for an evidentiary hearing, if

necessary. To assist the district court in its consideration of

this issue and Johnson’s related issues concerning the appeal

waiver and the Government’s alleged breach of the plea agreement,

and to assist with any subsequent appellate review, Johnson is

advised that, if he meets the requirements, he should move in the

district court for production at Government expense of the

transcripts of the rearraignment and sentencing proceedings. See

28 U.S.C. § 753(f); Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569, 571 (5th

Cir. 1985). 
No. 04-50968

-3-

 Johnson further argues that his sentence violated the Sixth

Amendment and Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). In

light of our order to grant COA and remand for further

consideration, we DEFER ruling on this issue. Johnson is advised

that if the district court denies relief on the aforementioned

claim, he should address this claim in a future COA request. 

Johnson’s motion for IFP is GRANTED.

 COA GRANTED; IFP GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED.
10570

#### Hawaii Thrift and Loan, Inc. v. Tolzmann

Dismissed
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A0646. GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL PROCESS

SERVERS et al. v. THEODORE JACKSON, AS SHERIFF OF FULTON

COUNTY et al.

The Georgia Association of ProfessionalServers filed a petition for mandamus,

declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief against the sheriffs of several counties,

requesting that the trial court compel the sheriffsto consider their petitionsto become

certified process servers, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-4.1. The sheriffs filed motions

for summary judgment, arguing that OCGA § 9-11-4.1 gives them discretion to

decide whether to allow such servers to serve process in their counties. The trial

court granted the sheriffs’ motions, and this appeal followed.

1 Appellees, however,

have filed a motion to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial

court’s mandamus ruling implicates the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction and

that the constitutional issue raised also falls within the Supreme Court’s exclusive

jurisdiction.

Under our Constitution, the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction

over all cases involving extraordinary remedies, includingmandamus. See Ga. Const.

of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (5); Mid-Georgia Environmental Mgt. Group,

1 The notice of appeal was filed on March 18, 2015. Pursuant to the Appellate

Jurisdiction Review Act of 2016, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over cases

involving extraordinary remedies in which the notice of appeal was filed on or after

January 1, 2017. See Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, § 3-1 [codified as OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a)

(5)].

January 24, 2017
L.L.P. v. Meriwether County, 277 Ga. 670, 671 (1) (594 SE2d 344) (2004). Because

the order in this case addresses the appropriateness of mandamus relief, this appeal

is hereby TRANSFERRED to the Supreme Court for disposition. See Saxton v.

Coastal Dialysis &c., 267 Ga. 177, 178 (476 SE2d 587) (1996) (Supreme Court has

the ultimate responsibility for determining appellate jurisdiction).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

01/24/2017
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN NO. 03-0 7 -00 340 -CR Edwin Sa nc he z , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BELL CO UNTY, 4 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 6041 5 , HO NORAB LE F ANCY H . JEZ EK , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E MO R

A N D UMO P I N I O N Appellant’s p ro se motion to dism iss this appea l is gra nted. SeeTe x. R. A

pp . P. 42.2(a) . All other motions are dismissed. The a ppeal is dismissed.

________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Waldrop a nd Henson Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion Filed: August 21, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh
#### State v. Batongbacol

23759

06/10/2002

Affirmed
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
CONSOLIDATED  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS OF LAHAINA  ACQUISITIONS FOR THE PERIOD FROM
JULY 9, 1999 (DATE OF INCEPTION) TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1999,  AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CURRENCY>                    US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          15,300
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                          94,434
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,333
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,005,426
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,642,691
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    (1,389,431)
<OTHER-SE>                                  (1,155,305)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,005,426
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,076,566
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,957,009
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               137,304
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             138,906
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (1,155,305)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (1,155,305)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.08)



</TABLE>
شجرة قرارات تحديد األغنام والماعز الفيدرالية، الخاصة بالحيوانات التي تدخل في 

التجارة بين الواليات

تنطبق قواعد التحديد عندما يدخل الحيوان ألول مرة في التجارة بين الواليات، مثل تفريغ حمولة الحيوانات في األسواق أو المبيعات أو المعارض أو المواقع 

األخرى التي تحدث فيها التجارة بين الواليات؛ أو نقل الحيوانات عبر خط الوالية؛ أو بيع الحيوانات لمشتري خارج الوالية؛ أو عندما يحصل األشخاص الذين 

يشاركون في التجارة بين الواليات على حيوانات. قد تكون هناك متطلبات إضافية لوالية إقامة الحيوانات أو الوالية المتلقية.

ِبل نفس الشخص، وال يوجد اختالط مع حيوانات أخرى غير معروفة من قطيع آخر. 

1 ينطبق فقط عندما يكون كال المبنيين مملوكين أو مستأجرين من ق

2 ً قد ال يقبل للسوق المعتمد حيوانات سليمة مختلطة ومجهولة المصدر، للتعرف عليها وبيعها دون قيود. يجب بيع هذه الحيوانات على أنها مقتصرة على الذبح. لالمتثال للوائح، يجب أن يكون لدى األسواق أيضا 

اتفاقية امتثال لقبول هذه الحيوانات إذا كان عمرها 18 ً شهرا أو أكثر. 

ًا، التي ليست في قنوات الذبح التي تذهب إلى سوق داخل الوالية.ًا وفردي

3 ال يلزم تقديم بيان متعهد النقل للحيوانات المحددة رسمي

ابدأ هنا

نعم ال

نعم

نعم

نعم

نعم

نعم

نعم

ال

ال

ال

ال

ال

ال

هل الحيوانات سليمة 

ًا؟

جنسي

هل الحيوانات في قنوات 

الذبح؟

هل الحيوانات عمرها أقل من 18 ً شهرا 

)بما في ذلك المصدر الفردي والمختلط(؟

هل تنتقل الحيوانات ألغراض 

21 إلى سوق 

اإلدارة أو الرعي 

ًا؟

معتمد فيدرالي

هل الحيوانات من مصدر 

واحد؟

يلزم تقديم بطاقة هوية 

الحيوان الرسمية، 

وبيان متعهد النقل.

3 بما في ذلك 

يمكن استخدام بيان متعهد النقل 

ً من بطاقة هوية 

رقم تعريف المجموعة، بدال

الحيوان الرسمية وشهادة الفحص البيطري بين 

الواليات.

مطلوب بطاقة هوية 

الحيوان الرسمية، وشهادة 

الفحص البيطري بين 

الواليات.

بطاقة هوية الحيوان الرسمية 

مطلوبة )ال يلزم تقديم بيان متعهد 

النقل أو شهادة الفحص البيطري 

بين الواليات(.

هل الحيوانات عمرها أقل من 

18 ً شهرا؟

ال توجد متطلبات.

هل تعبر الحيوانات حدود 

الوالية؟
IV 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 63 

Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on House 

Administration in the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 28, 2015 

Mrs. MILLER of Michigan submitted the following resolution; which was 

referred to the Committee on House Administration 

RESOLUTION 

Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on 

House Administration in the One Hundred Fourteenth 

Congress. 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. AMOUNTS FOR COMMITTEE EXPENSES. 

3 For the expenses of the Committee on House Admin4 istration (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the 

5 ‘‘Committee’’), including the expenses of all staff salaries, 

6 there shall be paid, out of the applicable accounts of the 

7 House of Representatives for committee salaries and ex8 penses, not more than $9,293,130 for the One Hundred 

9 Fourteenth Congress. 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS

2 

•HRES 63 IH 

1 SEC. 2. SESSION LIMITATIONS. 

2 Of the amount specified in section 1— 

3 (1) not more than $4,646,565 shall be available 

4 for expenses incurred during the period beginning at 

5 noon on January 3, 2015, and ending immediately 

6 before noon on January 3, 2016; and 

7 (2) not more than $4,646,565 shall be available 

8 for expenses incurred during the period beginning at 

9 noon on January 3, 2016, and ending immediately 

10 before noon on January 3, 2017. 

11 SEC. 3. VOUCHERS. 

12 Payments under this resolution shall be made on 

13 vouchers authorized by the Committee, signed by the 

14 Chairman of the Committee, and approved in the manner 

15 directed by the Committee on House Administration. 

16 SEC. 4. REGULATIONS. 

17 Amounts made available under this resolution shall 

18 be expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by 

19 the Committee on House Administration. 

Æ 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS