Filed 5/22/13 P. v. Molina CA2/7 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SEVEN 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

MATTHEW TOMAS MOLINA, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B240948 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. SA079155) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cynthia 

Rayvis, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. 

and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_________________________ 
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 Following his conviction for receiving stolen property, Matthew Tomas Molina 

appeals from the judgment, contending the evidence is insufficient to support the victim 

restitution award. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

1. The Complaint and Plea and Sentencing Hearings 

Molina was charged in a felony complaint with committing first degree burglary 

and grand theft of personal property. 

Represented by appointed counsel, Molina waived his rights to a preliminary 

hearing and to a jury trial and entered a negotiated plea of no contest to an amended third 

count of receiving stolen property. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court 

suspended imposition of sentence and placed Molina on three years of formal probation. 

The remaining counts were dismissed on the People’s motion. 

As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered Molina to make restitution to 

the victim, Fred Benson IV, pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f) in an 

amount to be determined at a restitution hearing. 

 2. The Restitution Hearing

At the restitution hearing, Benson testified he arrived at his apartment with a 

computer bag, a red duffel bag and some clothes on the morning of July 29, 2011. 

Benson left his bags inside his open front door and went upstairs to put away his clothes. 

When Benson returned minutes later, both bags were gone. After he was unable to find 

the bags in the apartment complex, Benson reported the theft to police, who subsequently 

recovered the red duffel bag and some of the stolen items it contained. Among the items 

police never found were a camera worth $1,200 or $1,300, an iPhone and a Blackberry 

phone each worth $500, a belt worth $275, diamond earrings worth $1,400, a diamond 

and 18 karat gold bracelet worth $5,000, custom-made jewelry worth $350, dental 

retainers worth $300, the computer bag worth $239, prescription glasses worth $200 and 

about $1,000 in cash. Benson calculated the value of most of these items based on their 
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original purchase price and provided some receipts to the defense. While the older model 

Blackberry phone was probably worth $390, Benson’s cell phone provider charged him 

$500 because it was a replacement cell phone, which he had intended to send back to the 

provider before it was stolen. The bracelet was a gift, which Benson had previously used 

to obtain a $500 loan from a pawn shop. The proprietor had estimated the bracelet’s 

value as $5,000. Photographs of the bracelet were admitted into evidence. Most of these 

items were listed in a police report admitted into evidence at the hearing. 

Molina testified he lived in the same apartment complex as Benson in July 2001 

but was at work on the morning of the theft, as corroborated by a time sheet introduced 

into evidence. According to Molina, on a different morning, he saw a red duffel bag near 

Benson’s front door. After knocking on the door and receiving no answer, Molina took 

the duffel bag to his apartment. Inside the bag, Molina found a camera, a laptop 

computer, a bracelet, an iPad2, and a Blackberry phone. Molina later returned the duffel 

bag and its contents to police, except for the watch, the camera and the bracelet. Officers 

recovered the watch during a search of Molina’s home. Molina gave the camera to a 

friend in exchange for a different camera, and he pawned the bracelet for $1,000. Molina 

denied seeing any cash, earrings, a second cell phone, or any other of the missing items. 

Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court found Molina was 

responsible for the missing items described by Benson and calculated the restitution 

award as follows: “Camera in the amount of $1,200; a Blackberry cell phone in the 

amount of $500, which is what Mr. Benson had to pay; an iPhone in the amount of $500; 

a bracelet in the amount of $5,000. And the Court does find that that’s a realistic amount 

given the number of diamond chips in the bracelet and taking a look at the bracelet; 

earrings in the amount of $1,400; a computer bag in the amount of $239; one belt for 

$275; a pair of glasses for $200, custom jewelry in the amount of $350; and two retainers 

in the amount of $300 for a total of $9,964.” 
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DISCUSSION 

Molina contends the trial court abused its discretion in assessing restitution for all 

of the unrecovered stolen items because the evidence was insufficient he was responsible 

for the loss of any item other than the camera and the bracelet. Molina further argues the 

restitution award should not have included the value of the Blackberry phone, because it 

was returned to Benson. 

Molina pleaded no contest to receiving stolen property and, as a condition of 

probation, was ordered to pay restitution in an amount to be determined following a 

contested hearing. Because it was imposed as a condition of probation, rather than 

pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4, the restitution award in this case was not only 

intended to compensate Benson, but also to address the broader goal of rehabilitating 

Molina. (See People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 27; § 1203.1, subd. (j).) 

“Restitution ‘impresses upon the offender the gravity of the harm he has inflicted upon 

another and provides an opportunity to make amends.’ [Citation.]” (Anderson, supra, at 

p. 27.) 

Restitution awards are vested in the trial court’s discretion and will be disturbed 

on appeal only where an abuse of discretion appears. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 

Cal.4th 644, 663.) “‘When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of 

restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the 

reviewing court.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 499.) The 

standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045.) 

“[I]t is well settled that ‘statements by the victims of the crimes about the value of 

the property stolen constitute “prima facie evidence of value for purposes of restitution.” 

[Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682, 690-691.) 

Here, Benson testified at length concerning the nature and value of the items stolen and 

provided supporting documentation. This constituted prima facie evidence of his loss 

and shifted the burden to “defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss [was] 
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other than that claimed by the victim.” (Id. at p. 691.) Molina, in turn, testified he was 

responsible only for the loss of the camera and bracelet; he denied having seen any of the 

other stolen items inside the red duffel bag when he found it. Molina also challenged 

Benson’s valuation of the bracelet. 

The trial court was free to discount Molina’s testimony and to believe Benson’s 

testimony. Resolving credibility issues and evidentiary conflicts were the exclusive 

province of the trial court, and Benson’s testimony constituted sufficient evidence to 

establish the appropriate restitution in this case. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 

327, 357.)1

 

We also reject Molina’s contention the restitution award must be reduced by $500 

because the Blackberry phone was returned to Benson, as amounting to no more than a 

request that we reweigh the conflicting evidence and substitute our judgment for that of 

the trier of fact, which is not the function of a reviewing court. (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 

Cal.4th 1134, 1138-1139, People v. Culver (1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548.) 

 

1

 To assess a claim of insufficient evidence in a criminal case, “we review the whole 

record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] 

The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that 

is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support 

of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from 

the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable 

suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the 

trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the 

facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility 

issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] 

A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no 

hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the jury’s 

verdict.” (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) 
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In sum, because there was sufficient evidence Molina was responsible for all of 

the stolen items, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring him to pay 

restitution for the stolen items that were never recovered. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. 

 ZELON, J. 

We concur: 

 PERLUSS, P. J. 

 WOODS, J.