DANIEL HALLOWELL and CAROL HALLOWELL,	)	Appeal from the

Indiv. and as Co-Special	Adm'rs of		)	Circuit Court of

the Estate of Amy Hallowell, a Minor,	)	Cook County.

Deceased,							)	

								)

		Plaintiffs-Appellees,		)

								)

	v.							)		

								)

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO HOSPITAL,	)	

a Corporation, d/b/a Wyler Children's 	)	

Hospital; J. DEANE WALDMAN, 			)	

								)	

		Defendants-Appellants.		)

________________________________________)				 								)	No. 94 L 16986

DANIEL HALLOWELL and CAROL HALLOWELL,	)	

Indiv. and as Co-Special Adm'rs of 	)	

the Estate of Amy Hallowell, a Minor, 	)	

Deceased,							)	

								)

		Plaintiffs-Appellants,		)

								)	

	v.							)		

								)

MIDWEST PEDIATRIC CARDIOLOGY, P.C., a	)

corporation; OTTO G. THILENIUS,      	)	

and THOMAS E. BUMP, 				)	Honorable

								)	Sharon J. Coleman,

		Defendants-Appellees.		)	Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court:

	Following a jury trial, a verdict was entered against 

defendants the University of Chicago Hospital, a corporation,

doing business as Wyler Children's Hospital (Wyler's), and J.

Deane Waldman, M.D. (Dr. Waldman), for the wrongful death of Amy

Hallowell.  The jury also found defendants Midwest Pediatric

Cardiology, P.C. (Midwest), Otto Thilenius, M.D. (Dr. Thilenius),

and Thomas E. Bump, M.D. (Dr. Bump), not liable.  The jury awarded the plaintiffs, Daniel and Carol Hallowell (the

Hallowells), $8 million in damages.  These two consolidated

appeals followed.

	In their appeal, Wyler and Dr. Waldman assert the trial

court erred when it denied their motions for a judgment

notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.) or a new trial.  In particular, Wyler and Dr. Waldman contend the trial court

improperly granted the Hallowells' motion in limine that barred Dr. Waldman from testifying about a telephone conversation in

which Mrs. Hallowell allegedly informed another Wyler employee

that Dr. Waldman was no longer going to be Amy's physician.

	On appeal, the Hallowells argue the trial court erred when

it denied their posttrial motions for a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial as to Midwest, Dr. Thilenius and Dr. Bump.  The Hallowells

maintain there was overwhelming evidence introduced at trial

which proved that Dr. Thilenius and Dr. Bump failed to follow the

standard of care when they neglected to recommend or to provide

the Hallowells with information concerning the possibility of Amy

receiving an implantable cardiac defibrillator (ICD).

	For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decisions of the

trial court.

THE FACTS

	On May 20, 1992, nine-year-old Amy suffered a cardiac arrest

while participating in a swim meet.  After being removed from the swimming pool, Amy was found to be in a state of ventricular

fibrillation.  Paramedics performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation

and defibrillated Amy's heart.  

	After being resuscitated, Amy was taken to Wyler, where she

was treated by Dr. Waldman, a pediatric cardiologist, who

eventually became Amy's attending cardiologist.  An

electrocardiogram (EKG) revealed that Amy had abnormal heart

rhythm patterns or heart arrhythmias.  Amy was also found to have

very low potassium levels, the ultimate cause of which was never

ascertained.  Dr. Waldman was able to determine that Amy's heart

was structurally normal by using an echocardiograph, which is an

instrument used for diagnosing heart abnormalities.

	On June 9, 1992, Amy's charts indicated that a nurse, an

endocrinologist, a resident and a pediatrician observed that Amy

experienced heart arrhythmias.  However, at trial, Dr. Waldman

testified that he did not believe that Amy experienced

arrhythmias.  Amy's potassium levels were also checked and were

found to be normal.  When Amy was discharged on June 10, 1992,

Dr. Waldman had not determined the cause of her cardiac

difficulties and did not prescribe any medications. 

	On June 24, 1992, a Holter monitor study was performed on

Amy.  The study revealed that Amy was experiencing arrhythmias. 

Her potassium levels were determined to be normal.  At trial, Dr.

Waldman admitted that in a deposition taken prior to trial, he stated that he felt that as a result of the Holter monitor study,

Amy's condition was recurrent rather than a single isolated

event.  At this time, Dr. Waldman initially prescribed Inderal;

however, Amy was eventually switched to Verapamil.

	In March 1993, Amy's mother, Mrs. Hallowell, sought a second

opinion from Dr. Thilenius, a pediatric cardiologist who was an

employee of Midwest.  Dr. Thilenius performed a general physical

examination and listened to Amy's heart.  His findings were

normal.  Dr. Thilenius did not have any further contact with Amy

until December 1993.

	In October 1993, Dr. Waldman had Amy undergo a stress test.

The test results did not indicate the etiology of Amy's

arrhythmias.  Dr. Waldman also recommended that Amy undergo an

electrophysiology (EP) study and an ablation procedure.  Dr.

Waldman suggested that Dr. Bump perform the procedures.  Dr. Bump

is a cardiologist with an expertise in electrophysiology, which

is the study of heart rhythms.

	The Hallowells were familiar with Dr. Bump because he had

previously treated their nephew for a similar condition with the

same or similar procedure.  Dr. Bump sought the involvement of

Dr. Thilenius for the EP study, which was performed on December

29, 1993.  After performing the test, the doctors were still

unable to locate a ventricular source for Amy's abnormal heart

condition.

	On April 29, 1994, Amy became dizzy while taking a shower

and collapsed.  When the paramedics arrived, they found Amy in

ventricular fibrillation due to cardiac arrest.  Shortly

thereafter, Amy was pronounced dead.

	On December 30, 1994, the Hallowells filed their initial

complaint against several individuals and entities, including

Wyler, Dr. Waldman, Dr. Bump, Dr. Thilenius and Midwest, alleging

that they were medically negligent in their care and treatment of

Amy.  Following a jury trial, a verdict was entered against

Wyler's and Dr. Waldman and the plaintiffs were awarded $6

million for loss of society and $2 million for pain and

suffering.  The jury also returned a verdict in favor of Midwest,

Dr. Bump and Dr. Thilenius.

	On July 28, 2000, the Hallowells filed posttrial motions for

a judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial as to Dr. Thilenius, Midwest and Dr. Bump.  On August 1, 2000, Wyler and Dr. Waldman

also filed posttrial motions requesting a judgment n.o.v. and a new trial.  On December 27, 2000, the trial court denied all

posttrial motions filed by both the plaintiffs and the

defendants.  Subsequently, the Hallowells timely filed their

notice of appeal, on January 23, 2001, and on January 25, 2001,

Wyler and Dr. Waldman timely filed their notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I.  Wyler and Dr. Waldman's Appeal  

	Wyler and Dr. Waldman assert the trial court erred when it

granted a motion in limine that precluded Dr. Waldman from testifying about the content of a telephone conversation that

allegedly took place between Mrs. Hallowell and Michaeline

Wallig.  Wallig, the head administrator of the cardiology

department at Wyler, allegedly telephoned Mrs. Hallowell after

Amy underwent the EP to discuss a follow-up appointment.  During

their conversation, Mrs. Hallowell allegedly informed Wallig that

Amy would be going elsewhere for a follow-up appointment.  

	Dr. Waldman maintains the testimony should have been

admitted.  Dr. Waldman argues the barred testimony was offered to

show his state of mind and to explain his subsequent course of

conduct and, as such, is not hearsay. 

	In response, the Hallowells contend the restricted testimony

was either hearsay or vague because it was speculative and

unreliable.  The Hallowells allege that the testimony was hearsay

because it was not offered to show Dr. Waldman's state of mind

but rather to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein,

which was that the Hallowells had discharged Dr. Waldman as Amy's

physician.  We agree.

	A motion in limine is addressed to the trial court's

inherent power to admit or exclude evidence.  Generally, we will

not disturb the trial court's ruling on a motion in limine absent a clear abuse of discretion.  However, a trial court must exercise its discretion within the bounds of the law.  Beehn v. Eppard, 321 Ill. App. 3d 677, 680-81 (2001), citing People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999).

	The trial court's decision to grant the Hallowells' motion in limine to bar Dr. Waldman from testifying about a conversation that allegedly took place between Wallig and Mrs. Hallowell was

proper.  Dr. Waldman's testimony clearly would have been hearsay. 

	"An out-of-court statement that is offered as proof of the

matter asserted in court is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible.

(People v. Carpenter (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 116, 121.)  The distinction between admissible testimony and inadmissible hearsay

is illustrated by the 'example of the witness A testifying that

"B told me that event X occurred."  If A's testimony is offered

for the purpose of establishing that B said this, it is clearly

admissible--if offered to prove that event X occurred, it is

clearly inadmissible.'  Carpenter, 28 Ill. 2d at 121."  Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 99 (1995).

	Here, Dr. Waldman's testimony was clearly offered to prove

that he was discharged as Amy's physician.  After examining Dr.

Waldman's barred testimony, it is clear to this court that it was

not offered to show his state of mind or that the purported

conversation between Mrs. Hallowell and Wallig occurred. 

Instead, it was clearly offered to show that he was no longer

Amy's physician.  Even in arguing that the purported testimony was not hearsay, in the appellants' brief, the opening sentence

under the argument section contradicts their contentions when it

states:  "The trial court erred in refusing to permit Defendant

Waldman to testify that he had been discharged by the Plaintiff." 

We also note that the barred testimony could have been elicited

from Mrs. Hallowell during her cross-examination or from Wallig,

who was not called as a witness.  Strangely, neither of these

things was done during trial.  If the testimony was so important,

why did the defense not avail themselves of these options?  The

trial court's order granting the Hallowells' motion in limine did not bar these alternatives.  Here, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion.

	The trial court's decision was also correct because the

testimony was too speculative.  During his deposition, Dr.

Waldman said that Wallig called Mrs. Hallowell about a follow-up

appointment, and Mrs. Hallowell informed Wallig that Amy would be

seeing another doctor instead.  However, Dr. Waldman could not

remember specifically what Wallig told him.  Dr. Waldman said

that he could not remember the details of what Wallig told him

but, rather, could only state the "gist" of their conversation. 

This clearly is inadequate.

II.  The Hallowells' Appeal

	The Hallowells contend the trial court erred when it denied

their posttrial motions for a judgment n.o.v. and a new trial.  The Hallowells maintain that overwhelming evidence was introduced

at trial which proved that defendants Midwest, Dr. Thilenius and

Dr. Bump failed to follow the standard of care when they

neglected to recommend or to provide the Hallowells with

information concerning the possibility of Amy receiving an ICD. 

In particular, the Hallowells assert the testimony of their two

expert witnesses, Dr. Jeanny Kim Park and Dr. Robert Achtel,

prove the defendants failed to follow the appropriate standard of

care.

	The said defendants argue the trial court's decision to deny

the Hallowells' posttrial motions was proper.  Specifically,

these defendants assert their expert witnesses, Dr. Paul Gillette

and Dr. William Hellenbrand, provided testimony that supported

their contention that they did not breach the standard of care in

their treatment of Amy.  We agree.

	Verdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in

its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly

favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence

could ever stand.  Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967).  In recognition that trial courts are not to

weigh evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, or assess the

credibility of witnesses, a ruling on a motion for directed

verdict is subject to de novo review.  Robinson v. Chicago Park District, 325 Ill. App. 3d 493, 497 (2001), citing Dunlap v. Alcuin Montessori School, 298 Ill. App. 3d 329, 340 (1998).

	"A court's ruling on a motion for a new trial will not be

reversed except in those instances where it is affirmatively

shown that it clearly abused its discretion.  [Citations.]  In

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the

reviewing court should consider whether the jury's verdict was

supported by the evidence and whether the losing party was denied

a fair trial.  [Citation.]  Furthermore, it is important to keep

in mind that '"[t]he presiding judge in passing upon the motion

for new trial has the benefit of his previous observation of the

appearance of the witnesses, their manner in testifying, and of

the circumstances aiding in the determination of credibility."'

[Citation.]  If the trial judge, in the exercise of his

discretion, finds that the verdict is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, he should grant a new trial; on the other hand,

where there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the

jury, it constitutes an abuse of discretion for the trial court

to grant a motion for a new trial.  [Citations.]"  Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 455-56 (1992).  A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is

clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are

unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence. 

Bielaga v. Mozdzeniak, 328 Ill. App. 3d 291, 299 (2002), citing Tedrowe v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 158 Ill. App. 3d 438, 443 (1987), citing Mizowek v. De Franco, 64 Ill. 2d 303, 310 (1976), Demos v. Ferris-Shell Oil Co., 317 Ill. App. 3d 41, 52 (2000). 

	"[W]here conflicting expert testimony is introduced at

trial, it is the province of the jury as the trier of fact to

resolve the conflict.  [Citations.]  Although this court is

required to scrutinize the evidence in a medical malpractice

action when reviewing a denial of a motion for a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial [citations], we will not sit as a second jury and

reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility of the

witnesses.  [Citations.]"  Dabros v. Wang, 243 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1993). 

	In this case, the Hallowells presented expert witness

testimony which stated that the defendants deviated from the

standard of care.  In particular, Dr. Park testified that it was

her opinion that Drs. Bump, Thilenius and Waldman breached the

standard of care when they failed to give the Hallowells

information about an ICD for Amy.  In Dr. Park's opinion, she

testified that the doctors had an obligation under the standard

of care to provide this information to the Hallowells.  During

her testimony, Dr. Park stated:

		"A. They should have recommended the defibrillator

implant because, again, she was someone who had [been]

presented with sudden death and she at least was able to be resuscitated so she had a second chance and she

was at high risk for recurrence as evidenced by her

follow-up studies, and knowing that medication is not

100 percent effective, that the next thing closest to

that would have been the defibrillator."

	Dr. Achtel also testified that it was his medical opinion

that the defendants' treatment of Amy deviated from the standard

of care.  Dr. Achtel's testimony follows:

		"Q.  Now, do you have an opinion, sir, as to

whether Dr[s]. Waldman, Bump and Thilenius following

this EP study had an obligation to meet the standard of

care of providing information about the implantable

cardiodefibrillator to Amy and her parents?

	* * *

		A.  Yes, I do.

		Q.  What is that opinion, sir?

		A.  I believe that the parents should have been

informed as to the option of implanting an ICD."

	The Hallowells also claim the defendants' argument that they

did not advise them about an ICD because of Amy's low potassium

levels is disingenuous.  Specifically, the Hallowells claim the

defendants were aware that Amy had experienced arrhythmias while

exhibiting normal levels of potassium.  Our review of the record

reveals that Dr. Thilenius and Dr. Bump gave testimony which suggested that each doctor may have been aware that Amy had

experienced arrhythmias, although her potassium levels were

normal.

	However, the testimony of Dr. Park and Dr. Achtel was

directly contradicted by that of the defendants' expert

witnesses, Dr. Gillette and Dr. Hellenbrand.  The defendants'

experts testified that it was their medical opinion that the

defendants did not deviate from the standard of care during Amy's

treatment.  

	The following testimony was elicited from Dr. Gillette at

trial:

		"Q.  After reviewing the materials in this case,

did you reach an opinion whether Dr. Bump complied with

the standard of care in his entire interaction with Amy

Hallowell?

		A.  I did.

		Q.  What is that opinion, Dr. Gillette?

		A.  I believe that he did keep within the standard

of care."

	At trial, Dr. Hellenbrand testified that he did not think

that ICDs were the standard of care at the time of Amy's

treatment.  The following is testimony from Dr. Hellenbrand:

		"A.  The internal–-the cardiac defibrillators that

were available in '92 and '94 for pediatrics were really the one being used in adults.  They were very

large boxes, maybe that big and that deep.

		And they had to be implanted under the skin in the

abdomen.  And, Amy was a very thin young lady.  And

this would have been a difficult procedure to do.  It

would have protruded.  And had some risks associated

with it.

		It would have required a major incision in the

chest to place the actual wires on the heart to deliver

the energy from this big box to do that.  So it's a

major surgical procedure to do that at that point in

time.

		It just was not the standard of care at the time. 

It was basically considered if medical therapy was not

successful.

* * *

		Q.  Doctor, based upon all the information that

you have reviewed in this case, have you formed an

opinion as to whether or not Dr. Thilenius' role in

this case satisfied the standard of care applicable to

pediatric cardiologists in 1993 and 1994?

		A.  Yes, I have.

		Q.  What is your opinion?

		A.  I believe he acted totally according to the standard of care."

	People qualified in their fields stated their views and gave

their reasons for these opinions.  Nothing was said that was not

grounded somewhere in the evidence.  Not so surprisingly, the

plaintiffs' experts did not agree with the defendants' experts--

not an unusual situation as trials go.  We note that plaintiffs'

expert, Dr. Park, had been a doctor only since 1993 and she could

not recall ever having used the ICD model that she testified

should have been recommended to the Hallowells.  Conversely, Dr.

Bump had been an electrophysiologist since 1982 and had conducted

research on the use of ICDs', authoring five articles on ICD's' as

treatment for arrhythmia.  He had 50 to 100 patients with ICD's' in

place at the time of trial.  Defense expert Dr. Gillette was one

of the first pediatric cardiologists to pursue electro-

physiology.  He authored eight books about cardiac rhythm issues. 

It was the jury's job to listen to the conflicting evidence and

use its best judgment about where the truth could be found.  This

is what juries do best, and there is no reason to believe it did

not do its job in this case.  We will not second- guess a jury

without a good reason.  In this case, we find no reason to doubt

the jury's decision.  See Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Abraham- Zwirn, 314 Ill. App. 3d 527 (2000),; Dabros v. Wang, 243 Ill. App. 3d 259 (1993).

CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, the decisions of the trial court

are affirmed.

	Affirmed.