J-S30028-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 

RIGHTS OF S.D. AND W.F. AS TO 

THE MINOR CHILD A.W.F.

APPEAL OF: W.F., FATHER OF THE 

MINOR CHILD

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1880 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree November 2, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Elk County 

Orphans’ Court at No: No. 3 of 2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 2, 2018

W.F. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered November 2, 2017, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Elk County, which terminated involuntarily his 

parental rights to his minor son, A.W.F. (“Child”), born in July 2011.1 After 

careful review, we affirm. 

The record reveals that Elk County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) 

became involved with this family in 2014, after it received reports alleging 

deplorable living conditions in Father’s home. N.T., 7/7/16, at 7. The reports 

further alleged that drug use was occurring in the home and “that threats were 

being made” against Child’s older sister, J.E.D. Id. CYS obtained custody of 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The decree also terminated the parental rights of S.D., Child’s mother. S.D.

filed an appeal at Superior Court docket number 1879 WDA 2017. We address 

her appeal in a separate memorandum.
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Child pursuant to an emergency order dated September 4, 2014. The trial 

court adjudicated Child dependent by order dated September 10, 2014. 

On January 8, 2016, CYS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental 

right to Child involuntarily. The trial court conducted a termination hearing 

on July 7, 2016, November 10, 2016, and February 1, 2017.2, 3 Following the 

hearing, on November 2, 2017, the court entered a decree terminating 

Father’s parental rights. Father timely filed a notice of appeal on November 

28, 2017, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Father now presents the following questions for our review: 

I. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating [Father’s] parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?

II. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating [Father’s] parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?

III. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating [Father’s] parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?

____________________________________________

2 The hearing actually began on March 31, 2016, but Father was not present 

or represented by counsel that day, and the testimony focused on Child’s older 

half-brother, C.J.D., who is not Father’s child. 

3 The trial court appointed Thomas G.G. Coppolo, Esquire, to represent Child

during the termination proceedings. Our review of the record indicates that 

Attorney Coppolo provided adequate representation of Child’s legal interests

during the hearing. However, we note with disapproval that Attorney Coppolo 

failed to file a brief advocating for Child’s legal interests on appeal. See In 

re Adoption of T.M.L.M., 184 A.3d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2018) (explaining 

that counsel’s duty to represent a child continues on appeal).
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IV. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating [Father’s] parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?

V. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion by finding that terminating [Father’s] parental rights 

would best serve the child’s needs and welfare pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization and trial court answers 

omitted).

We review a decree terminating parental rights involuntarily in 

accordance with the following standard:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, governs 

involuntary termination of parental rights. It requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 
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the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the 

court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), 

in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the court’s 

decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provides as 

follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 
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control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8): 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The 

child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more 

from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require consideration of a 

parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal

of his or her child. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa. Super. 

2006). 

In its opinion accompanying the termination decree, the trial court found

that Child has remained in foster care for longer than twelve months, and that 

the conditions leading to Child’s removal continue to exist. Trial Court 

Opinion, 11/2/17, at 10, 15, 17. The court reasoned that Father failed to 

comply with services in a timely manner, failed to obtain suitable housing, and 

failed to maintain a healthy relationship with Child. Id. at 13-15. The court 

further found that terminating Father’s parental rights would best serve Child’s 

needs and welfare. Id. at 16. The court reasoned that there is no evidence 
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that Father and Child share a necessary and beneficial bond, and that Child

will not suffer irreparable harm. Id. The court concluded that Child’s 

relationship with Father is, at best, “a primary or basic parental bond . . . that 

is not secure.” Id.

Father contends that the trial court erred by finding that CYS presented 

sufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights. Father’s Brief at 33.

Father maintains that the court removed Child from his care due primarily to 

poor housing conditions, and that he remedied those conditions by obtaining 

a suitable home. Id. at 34. Father insists that CYS visited his home only 

twice, that the home was inadequate during only one of those visits, and that 

he was performing work on the home at that time. Id. at 27-29. Father also 

insists that his delay in finding a suitable home resulted from his financial 

circumstances, and from his inability to find someone willing to rent to him. 

Id. at 29-30. 

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. As discussed 

above, the trial court removed Child from Father’s care in September 2014. 

By the time the court terminated Father’s parental rights in November 2017, 

Child had been removed from Father’s care for over three years, well beyond 

the twelve months required by Section 2511(a)(8). 

In addition, the record is replete with evidence supporting the trial 

court’s finding with respect to the second requirement of Section 2511(a)(8), 

that the conditions which led to the removal of Child continue to exist. During 

the termination hearing, CYS presented the testimony of caseworker, Carrie 
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Shutters. Ms. Shutters testified that the court ordered Father to comply with

several goals. N.T., 7/7/16, at 13-15. Father’s goals included completing 

parent/child interactive therapy, completing an anger management program, 

completing a drug and alcohol assessment and following all recommendations, 

completing a mental health assessment and following all recommendations, 

participating in services to help teach cleaning and organizational techniques, 

completing age-appropriate parenting education classes and demonstrating 

appropriate parenting skills, and obtaining and maintaining safe and stable 

housing. Id. at 15. 

Concerning Father’s compliance with these goals, Ms. Shutters testified 

that Father completed parent/child interactive therapy sometime in 2015. Id.

at 14. Father also completed an anger management program, but he did not 

begin the program until March 16, 2016, and did not finish it until May 5, 

2016. Id. at 15. Ms. Shutters reported that Father’s anger management 

program did not appear to be successful. Id. She recalled, “I made a phone 

call to him, and he was upset with me. He yelled, screamed at me and swore 

at me and then hung up the phone.” Id. 

Ms. Shutters further testified that Father did not complete a drug and 

alcohol assessment until March 29, 2016. Id. at 13. After completing the 

assessment, Father failed to sign the release necessary for Ms. Shutters to 

contact his doctor and confirm that he “was prescribed the medications which 

he states he was.” Id. Father completed a mental health intake “after March” 

2016, but did not complete the assessment. Id. Father did not participate in
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services to help teach cleaning and organizational techniques, and began but 

did not complete parenting classes.4 Id. at 14, 24. Relatedly, Ms. Shutters 

testified that CYS cancelled eleven of Father’s forty-nine possible visits with 

Child, because he did not call to confirm or failed to appear. Id. at 20. Father 

arrived late at fifteen of the visits, and ended one visit early. Id. 

Concerning Father’s housing, Ms. Shutters testified that Father moved 

twice after Child entered foster care. Id. at 10-11. Father moved into his 

current home in approximately December 2015. Id. at 11. Ms. Shutters 

reported that she made eleven attempts to visit Father’s home between 

December 2015 and March 2016 before he allowed her to see it. Id. at 12. 

She explained, 

I would call and ask if I could come. I would ask them, when they 

were at visits, if I could come see the house, and I was told 

repeatedly that I could not come; it was not ready yet. And then 

they told me on several days that I could come see it the next 

day, and then they would cancel and say that they weren’t going 

to be home. 

Id. at 12-13. 

When Ms. Shutters finally succeeded in conducting a visit at Father’s 

home, it appeared to meet “all the standards.” Id. at 12. However, when 

Ms. Shutters returned and conducted a surprise visit in May 2016, she

discovered that the home was now dirty and unsafe. Id. at 12, 16. She

recalled, “[t]he pathways were not clear. There was -- were piles of paint 

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4 Father testified later, on November 10, 2016, that he did complete parenting 

classes. N.T., 11/10/16, at 44. 
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chips lying around. . . . there were shoes in the middle. There were boxes. 

There were just household items scattered around. The kitchen, there were 

dirty items on the counter.” Id. at 26.

Thus, it is clear that the conditions leading to Child’s removal from 

Father’s care remain unresolved. Each of Father’s court-ordered goals related 

in some way to addressing the concerns and circumstances resulting in Child’s 

removal. However, Father did not complete the majority of those goals, and 

did not even begin working toward many of them until after CYS filed its 

petition to terminate his parental rights. The Adoption Act prohibits trial courts 

from considering efforts first initiated by a parent after receiving notice of the 

filing of a termination petition. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) (“With respect to 

any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.”). In addition, we reject Father’s claim that his failure to obtain 

suitable housing more quickly was due to his financial circumstances, or due 

to his difficulty finding someone who would rent to him. The record indicates

that Father had housing throughout Child’s dependency. It appears that 

Father’s problem was not finding housing, but keeping the housing that he 

had in a safe and sanitary condition.

Finally, the record supports the trial court’s findings with respect to the

third requirement of Section 2511(a)(8), that terminating Father’s parental 

rights would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. On November 10, 2016, 
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CYS presented the testimony of psychologist, Allen H. Ryen, Ph.D. Dr. Ryen 

testified that he conducted a bonding assessment of Father and Child, and 

authored a report detailing his findings. N.T., 11/10/16, at 6-9. During his 

assessment, Dr. Ryen did not observe any evidence that Father and Child 

share a primary or secure bond. Id. at 10. He opined that terminating 

Father’s parental rights would not be harmful to Child, but that he would 

anticipate “closure and security emanating from that sort of a decision.” Id.

at 25.

In his report, Dr. Ryen wrote that he conducted an interview of Child, 

followed by an observation of Child and Father interacting during a visit. Dr. 

Ryen’s Report, 5/28/16, at 4-7. During the interview, Child referred to Father 

by his first name, rather than “Dad” or “Daddy.” Id. at 5. Child criticized 

Father at length, describing the poor living conditions of his previous home, 

and recounting that Father was “‘the worst. . . . [he] locked us in the bedroom 

for no reason. . . . we were always scared.’” Id. at 4. Child insisted that 

Father is “‘bad,’” and that it would be “‘really bad’” if he had to live with him 

again. Id.

During the interactional portion of the assessment, Child showed little 

interest in Father. Dr. Ryen wrote that Child approached Father to show him 

a toy truck, “regressing significantly . . . and becoming much more active than 

previously observed.” Id. at 5. Child became increasingly agitated and out 

of control, while Father did nothing to address his behavior. Id. at 6. When 

the assessment was over, Child “left hastily, without any farewell greetings or 
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backwards glances, and . . . appeared more than anxious to leave the office.” 

Id. at 7. 

Thus, Child does not share a necessary or beneficial bond with Father. 

As Dr. Ryen’s report demonstrates, Child is hostile toward Father and does 

not want to return to his care. Child does not even refer to Father as his 

father, instead calling him by his first name. Combined with Father’s failure 

to remedy the conditions leading to Child’s placement in foster care, it is clear 

that terminating Father’s parental rights would best serve Child’s needs and 

welfare. We conclude that CYS met its burden of proof with respect to all 

three requirements of Section 2511(a)(8), and that the court did not abuse 

its discretion.

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). The 

requisite analysis is as follows:

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 
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with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).5

As we stated above, the trial court concluded that terminating Father’s 

parental rights would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. Trial Court 

Opinion, 11/2/17, at 16. The court reasoned that there is no evidence of a 

necessary and beneficial bond between Father and Child, and that Child will 

not suffer irreparable harm. Id.

Father challenges Dr. Ryen’s opinion that Child does not share a primary 

or secure bond with him. Father’s Brief at 36-40. Father maintains that 

Child’s behavior during the bonding assessment “was influenced by the 

negative attitudes and opinions of both [Child’s] older sister as well as the 

maternal uncle and his paramour, who were the foster parents at the time of 

the assessment.” Id. at 37. Father suggests that other evidence presented 

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5 Section 2511(a)(8) and (b) both require trial courts to consider the needs 

and welfare of the child. However, the needs and welfare analysis required 

by Section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from the needs and welfare analysis required 

by Section 2511(b), and must be addressed separately. See In re C.L.G., 

956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]hile both Section 

2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the ‘needs and welfare 

of the child,’ . . . they are distinct in that we must address Section 2511(a) 

before reaching Section 2511(b).”).
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during the termination hearing rebuts the court’s finding that no bond exists. 

Id. at 39-40.

We conclude that Father is not entitled to relief. Even accepting for the 

sake of argument that Child’s older sister or former foster parents played some 

role in his negative view of Father, that does not excuse Father’s failure to 

cultivate a meaningful relationship with Child during his lengthy dependency, 

nor does it excuse Father’s failure to remedy the conditions resulting in Child’s 

placement in foster care. Contrary to Father’s argument, the record is clear 

that Child does not have a necessary or beneficial bond with him, and that 

Child is in need of permanency and stability that he cannot provide. It was 

well within the court’s discretion to conclude that Child’s needs and welfare 

would best be served by severing his relationship with Father.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights to Child involuntarily. 

Therefore, we affirm the court’s November 2, 2017 decree.

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/2/2018
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