rVED 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

2 7 2015 

11\JG DOCKET 

In the matter of Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENGINEERING SERVICES 

Respondent 

Administrative Law Judge 

J.E. Sullivan 

REPLY OF RESPONDENT TO FAA'S OPPOSITION 

TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Respondent, Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services ("AMES" or 

"Respondent") hereby replies to the FAA's (sometimes "Complainant") opposition to 

Respondent's Summary Judgment Motion. The FAA seeks to bolster its position by 

including a declaration by the principal FAA inspector raising new arguments not 

previous! y articulated by the witness or the FAA and AMES will respond to these new 

assertions accordingly. Further, the FAA continues to misinterpret the relevant 

provisions of the AMM and the testimony of the AMES witness as well as the AMES 

maintenance records, which AMES will take the opportunity to correct. Finally, the FAA 

wastes time addressing the issue of the Inspector's prejudice and bias, even though 

AMES specifically did not ask Your Honor to rule on the issue in deciding the merits of 

Respondent's motion. Respondent will address these and other issues in this reply. 

I. The AMES Witness is Competent to Address Maintenance Issnes 

The first argument presented by the FAA is that the AMES witness, Jeffrey (not 

John as stated on page I of the FAA's opposition) "is not a mechanic and is not 

competent to offer opinions on aviation maintenance." FAA Opposition at 1-2 (citing 
page 9 of Mr. Becker's deposition transcript (attached as Exhibit B to the FAA's Motion 

for Summary Judgment)). In what can only be viewed as an intention to mislead Your 

Honor about Mr. Becker's qualifications, the FAA fails to note that, in response to 

questions from FAA counsel, Mr. Becker testified that he possesses a Bachelor's Degree 

in Aeronautical Engineering from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University --perhaps the 

premier aeronautical university in the United States. See Exhibit 2 (Becker Tr. at 8). Mr. 

Becker also holds a Masters of Business Administration from Xavier University in 

Cincinnati. See id (Becker Tr. at 8). Starting in 1986, Mr. Becker was employed by the 

Douglas Aircraft Company (now Boeing) as a design engineer on the MD-80 aircraft 

program. Subsequently, he was a structural design engineer on the Air Force large 

transport aircraft, the C-17. During the latter part of Mr. Becker's career at Douglas, he 

was as a flight test engineer on the MD-11 program. See id (Becker Tr. at 8). When Mr. 

Becker was employed by ABX Air, Inc. (f/k/a Airborne Express) in 1991 until2009, he 

held, among other positions, that of Aircraft Structures Engineer; Manager-Fleet Service 

Engineering; Manager-Technical Services for the B-767 aircraft; Manager-Avionics 

Engineering; and Senior Director, Engineering and Quality Control. From 2009 to the 

present, Mr. Becker is in the position of Director of Quality Assurance for AMES. This 

position has responsibility for the training of maintenance technicians and inspectors, the 

establishment of maintenance policies, instructions and procedures, compliance with 

applicable Federal Aviation Regulations (PARs) and manufacturer specifications, and the 

proper performance of all aircraft inspections and maintenance by AMES personnel. The 

details of Mr. Becker's experience are described more fully in the Declaration of Jeffrey 

Becker attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 

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That Mr. Becker has held important engineering and other positions, which 

included responsibility for maintenance programs, is clear and beyond question. Mr. 

Becker's background and experience clearly establishes his extensive knowledge and 

experience and the FAA's blatant attempt to shield Your Honor from this information is 

emblematic of the lengths to which the FAA will go to distort the record. 1 If FAA 

counsel had only bothered to turn one page in the Becker deposition transcript (to page 8 

from page 9) on which Becker's background and experience is more fully disclosed, and 

then acknowledge his level of experience rather than to try to mislead the Tribunal, this 

case could perhaps come to a more rapid conclusion. 

The case law holds that one does not need to be a certified aircraft mechanic to be 

knowledgeable of aircraft maintenance issues if one has, as does Mr. Becker, years of 

actual experience in aircraft maintenance departments and a university degree in 

aeronautical engineering. In Maloney v. Central Aviation, Inc., 450 F. Supp.2d 905, 910-

911 (W.D. Wi. 2006), for example, the Court found that neither the evidentiary rules, nor 

the applicable case law, impose a rigid set of qualifications on an individual before he can 

qualified to testify regarding maintenance issues. Consequently, years of relevant work 

experience, plus the know ledge and skills gained from that work, were found sufficient to 

allow an individual to testify as an expert regarding the maintenance of an aircraft, 

notwithstanding the lack of an FAA mechanics license. See id at 911; see also Bouret 

Echevarria v. Carribean Aviation Maint. Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10227, *12-13 

(D.P.R. 2012). Indeed, even when an expert has the relevant license, a witness's 

1 Knowing full well that AMES would respond to the incorrect assertion that Mr. Becker 

is not expert in matters of aircraft maintenance by pointing out his aeronautical degree 

and experience, one wonders why FAA counsel bothered to argue the point. 

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qualifications are based upon the entire relevant professional experience, not the license 

alone. See Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Air Capital Group, LLC, 2013 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 84136, *16-18 (S.D. Fl. 2013). Mr. Becker is more than qualified to address 

maintenance issues as an expert witness by virtue of training and experience. 

On page 2 of its Opposition, the FAA states that Your Honor "recently denied the 

FAA's motion to exclude Becker [from] serving as an expert witness on the basis that 

Becker was only identified as an expert witness in order to rebut the testimony of FAA 

expert witness Michael Christensen and the Judge had granted Respondent's motion to 

exclude Christensen." FAA Opposition at 2. Therefore, the FAA concludes that Your 

Honor should not consider any "expert" opinion testimony from Mr. Becker since "it 

would be outside the identified scope of Becker's 'expert' testimony (that scope being 

purely the rebuttal of Christensen's expert opinions)." ld. The FAA is wrong on two 

counts. First, Your Honor's February 11, 2015 Order did not deny the FAA's motion to 

exclude Mr. Becker (and Mr. James Savastano) as expert witnesses. Instead, Your Honor 

deemed the FAA's motion as moot. See Order Granting Respondent's Motion to 

Exclude, and Granting/Denying Other Motions, served February 11, 2015 at second 

ordering paragraph 6. Second, Respondent did not identify Mr. Becker (or Mr. 

Savastano) as experts "purely'' to rebut the expert testimony of Michael Christensen as 

the FAA states. See id. Rather, Respondent identified Mr. Becker (and Mr. Savastano) 

in its December 12, 2014 Expert Rebuttal Disclosures as expert rebuttal witnesses "as 

necessary to rebut any expert and opinion testimony provided by Complainant's 

witnesses[]"( emphasis added) and Inspector Lipinski was identified on December 1, 2014 

as an expert witness for Complainant in the FAA's late-provided expert disclosures. See 

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Exhibit 3 (Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures, served December 12, 2014 at'![ I) 

and Complainant's Additional Expert Disclosures, served December I, 2014 at~ 1).2 

Thus, Your Honor can properly consider as expert testimony the Declaration of Jeffrey 

Becker (attached hereto as Exhibit I) and Mr. Becker's deposition testimony to the extent 

they rebut the expert testimony proffered by Frank Lipinski, even at this late stage of the 

proceeding, in his declaration (FAA Exhibit JJ) or otherwise provided. Further, Your 

Honor can properly consider the opinion testimony given by Jeffrey Becker at deposition 

and contained in his Declaration to the extent permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 

701. 

II. The Circumstantial Nature of the Evidence is Insufficient Proof of a 

Violation 

The FAA attempts, but fails, to effectively respond to the AMES contention that 

the Inspector's later-in-time findings about the condition of the aircraft must be carefully 

scrutinized because this is at best circumstantial evidence and it must in any event be 

found to be reliable, probative and substantial in order to meet the§ 13.223 standard. See 

Administrator v. Lewis, NTSB Order EA-1177, 3 NTSB 1241, 1978 NTSB LEXIS 51, 

* 16-17 (Aug. 17, 1978); see also In the Matter of Florida Propeller &Accessories, Inc., 

FAA Order No. 97-32, 1997 FAA LEXIS 1280 (Oct. 8, 1997). The burden is on the 

FAA to fill in the gaps in time with strong supporting evidence. In its failed attempt to 

2 AMES also stated in its Supplemental Responses to FAA's First Discovery Requests 

that Mr. Becker and Mr. Savastano are expected to provide testimony "as expert 

witnesses as necessary to rebut any expert or opinion testimony provided by 

Complainant's witnesses ... " Exhibit 4 (Respondent's Supplemental Responses to FAA's 

First Discovery Requests, served December 23, 2014 at 1) (emphasis added). 

Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures and Respondent's Supplemental Responses to 

FAA's First Discovery Requests explained that Mr. Becker and Mr. Savastano will also 

testify as fact witnesses, including providing opinion testimony under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 701. See Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4. 

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do so, it now argues that AMES has not rebutted the FAA's proffered testimony, See 

FAA Opposition at 3-4. 

In the FAA's Enforcement Investigative Report (EIR), Section B, the 

investigating inspector never once mentions the possibility of wear and tear being a 

factor. See Exhibit 1 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. And so before 

this case got started, the FAA position was that it had no reason to even raise the question 

of wear and tear or give any meaningful consideration to the possibility of intervening 

maintenance and its impact on their legal theory of the case. In the Lipinski deposition, 

the Inspector did not address wear and tear other than to deny it would have had any 

impact on the condition of the flying doors despite months of flight operations by all 

three aircraft and to deny that any intervening maintenance could have altered the 

condition of the flying doors. See Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Lipinski Tr. at 204-205). Only now, in the Lipinski Declaration attached to 

the FAA's Opposition did the FAA make any attempt to explain itself. Now the 

Inspector states that the "damage" of the type he observed on the three aircraft "almost 

never occur[s] prior to the next C check (when the doors will be removed, reinstalled and 

rigged again)." FAA Exhibit JJ (Lipinski Declaration at~ 14). This is an entirely new 

assertion of the FAA-- one never raised before either in the EIR, any answers to 

interrogatories or in any deposition testimony. 

At least the FAA is now conceding that the type of damage alleged by the FAA 

could have resulted from the impact of flight operations-in the case of the three 

aircraft-collectively on 1,584 flights. That being the case, how can the FAA 

conclusively assert in this case that all of the "damage and other problems" the FAA 

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claims it observed were definitively not the product of normal wear and tear? To the 

extent some damage of the type repaired by AMES can occur, then the FAA has not 

explained why this possibility does not apply to the three CCIA aircraft. See Exhibit 1 

(Becker Declaration at~ 3). More critically, the FAA has not met its burden of proof to 

explain the gap in time with the required supporting evidence that would be necessary to 

conclusively show the damage could only have resulted from mis-rigging of the flying 

doors. 

Lipinski allows for the possibility of worn or possibly torn rubber seals, paint 

deterioration, dust and dirt. See FAA Exhibit JJ (Lipinski Declaration at~ 14). If seals 

can wear, so can shims and washers, and the wearing down of shims and washers can 

clearly change the geometry of the flying door. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Declaration at~ 

2). Hence, the FAA needs to be able to prove that such normal wear and tear could not 

account for the condition of the flying doors when the aircraft in question were flown to 

the AMES facility after the FAA's May 25, 2010 inspection. The FAA has not met this 

burden. 

Further, without benefit of any documentary evidence of the condition of other B727 aircraft, Lipinski strikes a comparison of the three subject aircraft with otherwise 

unidentified and undocumented CCIA B-727 aircraft. See FAA Exhibit JJ (Lipinski 

Declaration at ~ 14). It hardly serves the purpose of this proceeding for the Inspector to 

start comparing the three subject aircraft to otherwise unidentified and undocumented 

"other aircraft." In any event, the FAA is doing its best to ignore Lipinski's 

acknowledgement that for the many months the three aircraft were operating after the 

main landing gear changes and that there could have been "hundreds of tire changes" 

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some of which would require moving the flying door in order to get to the tire. See 

Exhibit 5 (Lipinski Tr. at 53). The FAA has not presented any probative evidence or 

testimony to negate the fact that this intervening maintenance could have had an impact 

on the condition of the flying doors despite the fact that the case law establishes that the 

circumstantial must be "carefully scrutinized" when the gap in time between the alleged 

violations and their discovery is so long (see Administrator v. Lewis, NTSB Order EA1177, 3 NTSB 1241, 1978 NTSB LEXIS 51, *16-17 (Aug. 17, 1978)) and given the 

FAA's admission of so many flight cycles and intervening tire changes.3 

Complainant asserts that "Respondent has proffered no evidence to rebut the fact 

that AMES' own documents stated that it improperly installed the landing gear and flying 

doors. See FAA Opposition at 4. For the many reasons set forth in the Respondent's 

Answer in Opposition to the FAA Summary Judgment Motion at pages 6 to 17, and 

pages 22 to 27, it is simply wrong to contend that AMES has admitted it did not properly 

install the flying doors. Nor can it be said, as has the FAA, that AMES has produced no 

evidence that the condition of the flying doors on the day of the FAA inspection on May 

25, 2010 was consistent with "wear and tear" when Mr. Becker carefully explained the 

reasons that support the AMES position during his deposition and AMES timely 

submitted the expert report of Mr. Daniel J. Hancher supporting the AMES position on 

wear and tear. See Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. 

at 93-145); Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Expert Report of Daniel J. Hancher, date April30, 2014). 

3 While Lipinski asserts that moving the flying door, if done properly, to remove a tire 

would not likely cause damage, he has no evidence on which to prove his hypothesis that 

every tire change was properly accomplished. See Exhibit 5 (Lipinski Tr. at 53-54). 

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On page 4 of the FAA Opposition, Complainant castigates Mr. Becker for his 

statement that the only way you can determine a flying door is properly rigged is to 

perform a gear swing to see whether or not the door is properly faired. See Exhibit 3 to 

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 71). But the Lipinski 

Declaration states that "[a] gear swing is required to definitely determine that a flying 

door is properly rigged." FAA Exhibit JJ (Lipinski Declaration at 'II 15). The 

significance of the assertion that only a gear swing will prove whether or not the flying 

door is properly faired, that the FAA has now conceded is correct, is that Lipinski could 

not know if the doors were properly rigged on the day of the May 2010 inspection 

without witnessing a gear swing, which by Lipinski's own admission, he did not do. See 

Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Lipinski Tr. at 203). So, 

although the FAA's witness is in agreement with AMES, FAA counsel is reduced to 

questioning the qualifications of Mr. Becker to offer the statement even though he is a 

trained aeronautical engineer with 24 years of maintenance-related experience. 

III. AMES Properly Installed the Tubular Bearing on N287SC at the 

Time of the MLG Change 

On pages 5-8 of its Opposition, the FAA responds to AMES' position that the 

missing tubular bearing on N287SC was caused by an intervening tire change. This issue 

was addressed in detail in Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at pages 20-21 

and in Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary 

Judgment at pages 17-22. 

First, the FAA does not dispute that on March 25, 2010 the number 4 outboard 

tire on the right-hand MLG of N287SC was change- three days after AMES replaced the 

aircraft's MLG on March 22,2010. See Exhibit 11 to Respondent's Motion for Summary 

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Judgment (CCIA Aircraft technical Log Report Documenting Tire Change). In its 

Opposition, the FAA attempts to explain away the compelling evidence that AMES had, 

in fact, replaced the tubular bearing when performing the MLG change on N287SC and 

that the likely cause of the missing tubular bearing was the intervening tire change. 

The FAA claims that Respondent's explanation that the intervening tire change 

resulted in the missing tubular bearing "is based on a misunderstanding of which part of 

the aircraft was missing" (FAA Opposition at 5) and that the "procedure that Becker 

describes doesn't have anything to do with the tubular bearing that was missing." ld at 7-

8. This is simply on the case. AMES is well aware of which part was missing on 

N287SC after the April16, 2010 aircraft vibration incident, and based on its investigation 

of the matter, is confident that AMES included the tubular bearing when it replaced the 

aircraft's right-hand MLG. See Exhibit 1 to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to 

Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 126). AMES maintains 

that the method employed to change the tire after the MLG change performed by AMES 

may well have caused the tubular bearing to go missing. In any event, the sequence of 

events, cast sufficient doubt on the FAA's theory, which is based solely on circumstantial 

evidence and which is insufficient to meet the FAA's burden of proof under the 

evidentiary standard in section 13.223. 

Mr. Becker was very clear during his testimony that he was referring to the 

"tubular bearing" when addressing how the tire change likely caused the part to go 

missing. See Exhibit 1 to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 42-49, 123-127). Indeed, Mr. Becker used the 

specific words "tubular bearing" no less than 10 times during this part of his testimony. 

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See id. The tubular bearing, which is part of the mechanism that connects the wing door 

actuation rod to the drag strut, is clearly identified as such in Section 32-11-00, Figure 

401, Detail A (Page 404) of the AMM. See Exhibit 5 to Respondent's Motion for 

Summary Judgment. There is no doubt that this is the part that Mr. Becker was referring 

to in his deposition testimony when describing the implications of the intervening tire 

change. Not once during his testimony did Mr. Becker refer to the "hollow pin" that is 

used to attach the other end of the actuation rod to the flying door (Becker Tr. at 42-49, 

123-127)), and which is shown in AMM Section 32-12-11, Figure 401 (Page 403). See 

Exhibit 6 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. FAA counsel even noted 

during the deposition that he had seen references to "a bushing or a tubular bearing" and 

asked Mr. Becker if he was aware of any difference between the two or if they are 

referring to the same thing. See Exhibit 1 to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to 

Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 47). Mr. Becker responded 

that he too had seen the part described as a "tubular bearing or tubular bushing" and 

confirmed to FAA counsel that they are references to the same component. See id 

(Becker Tr. at 47). Notably, FAA counsel never asked Mr. Becker whether he was 

referring to the "hollow pin" at the other end of the actuation rod because it was clear that 

he was not. Moreover, Mr. Becker specifically testified that the AMES investigation 

revealed that "at times, the line maintenance people will remove that bolt that contains 

the tubular bearing and hold up the flying door out of the way as they change the wheel." 

Id (Becker Tr. at 124) (emphasis added). Simply put, Mr. Becker's testimony regarding 

the likelihood of the intervening tire change to cause the tubular bearing to go missing 

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was not based on any "misunderstanding" of which part was found missing on the aircraft 

as the FAA claims. 

Mr. Becker also noted to FAA counsel that during the AMES investigation of the 

missing tubular bearing the AMES technician who replaced the right-hand MLG on 

N287SC stated that he specifically recalled replacing the tubular bearing. See id (Becker 

Tr. at 125-126). Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 are the AMES Discrepancy Notices and the 

CCIA Corrective Action Record produced in connection with the investigation of the 

missing tubular bearing4 Attached to AMES Discrepancy Notice No. Q20293 is a 

handwritten statement signed by David Johanson. the AMES mechanic who replaced the 

tubular bushing. In his statement. which was made on June 21, 2010, three months after 

the work was performed, Mr. Johanson states with respect to N287SC that "On March 

21,2010, I was assigned to install the right hand main landing gear flying door. I did 

install this bushing sleeve on that day." Exhibit 6 (emphasis added). Mr. Johanson goes 

on to note that he had been involved in the two other MLG changes in previous months 

"and would have known to include that part on the flying door gimbal joint." !d. There 

can be no doubt that where Mr. Johanson refers in his statement to a "bushing sleeve" he 

was referring to the tubular bearing shown in Detail A of Figure 401 of AMM Section 

32-11-00 (Page 404) and referred to in Section 32-11-00, Step 5, AL (11) (Page422) 

since that was clearly the subject of the AMES investigation. 

4 In connection with preparing this reply, AMES learned that these documents were not 

included in the Items of Proof attached to the FAA's EIR or in the AMES document 

production sent to the FAA on March 6, 2014. Consistent with its obligation to 

seasonably supplement its discovery responses under Rule 220(i) of the FAA Rules of 

Practice and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1)(a), AMES is now providing these 

documents to the FAA. 

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The AMES inspector on duty at the time, William Ashford, also provided a 

written statement attached to AMES Discrepancy Notice No. Q20294. Mr. Ashford 

states "To the best of my knowledge and recollection, nothing was left out or missed 

during replacement of the landing gear." Exhibit 6. Mr. Ashford also notes in his 

statement that a gear extension and retraction test was performed pursuant to Section 32-

11-00, Step 5 AR and that the "extension and retraction test revealed no defects or 

problems and there were no issues with the RMG wing door." Id; Exhibit 5 to 

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (AMM Section 32-11-00, Step 5 AR (Page 

423). Finally, the AMES response included in the CCIA Corrective Action Record, Page 

2 of 2, notes that "A statement from the AMES technician states that he recalls installing 

the tubular bearing. This is also reflected in the sign-off on the partial worksheet (entry 

20, of page 3) .... Based on the paperwork sign off and statements provided, AMES 

cannot confirm that the tubular bearing was missing when it left our facility .... " Exhibit 

6. Thus, the statements of the AMES mechanic and inspector included in the 

Discrepancy Notices and the AMES response to the CCIA Corrective Action Record 

supports Mr. Becker's deposition testimony stating: 

I think as I stated in my response to Ben Buck [in the CCIA 

Corrective Action Record], we did not have any proof or even an inkling 

that that bushing or that tubular bearing was missing. And not on! y did we 

have a statement from the technician that says he specifically recalls 

putting the bearing back in, but again, the doors were swung. They met all 

the fair conditions. We can only assume that if you're gonna go ahead and 

do a function check to make sure that all of [the] procedures [were] 

followed, [regarding] that door, there would have been issues or problems 

with that door if the tubular bearing was missing when it left the AMES 

facility. 

Exhibit I to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Becker Tr. at 126). 

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The FAA belittles AMES' explanation by stating that "Respondent's argument 

that [the tubular bearing] probably fell off during a tire change is nonsensical and without 

any evidentiary foundation." FAA Opposition at 8. Granted FAA counsel did not have 

the benefit of the AMES Discrepancy Notices and the CCIA Corrective Action Record 

(Exhibit 6 hereto) when making this statement. But as these documents and the 

deposition testimony of Mr. Becker show, however, this is simply not the case. What is 

nonsensical is the lengths to which the FAA and its principal inspector will go to confuse 

the facts in an attempt to defeat the Respondent's Summary Judgment Motion. 

IV. AMES Properly Installed the Shims When it Performed the MLG 

Changes 

In this section of the FAA's Opposition (pages 9-11) it attempts to suggest that 

Mr. Becker is not competent to correct! y analyze the maintenance records of AMES. 

FAA counsel sets himself up as a better interpreter of the documents (particularly FAA 

Exhibit N). First, Mr. Becker is the official in charge of the AMES Quality Assurance 

("QA") Department, which includes oversight of the qualifications of line mechanics and 

the proper documentation of the work performed by them including aircraft maintenance 

records. Analyzing maintenance records and comparing them to AMM requirements and 

best practices is a fundamental part of the Director of QA job description. FAA counsel 

may want to take pot shots at the AMES witness, but as the holder of an aeronautical 

engineering degree and at least 24 years of experience in the realm of aircraft 

maintenance, FAA's attempt to denigrate the experience and expertise of the AMES 

witness seems somewhat desperate. 

In this section of the Opposition, FAA claims that AMES has admitted that it did 

not properly rig the flying doors, but that contention has already been responded to and 

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need not be repeated other than to cite Your Honor to pages 22 through 26 of the AMES 

Opposition to the FAA's Summary Judgment Motion. Second, the FAA relies on the 

Lipinski statement that he personally viewed improperly configured shimming washers. 

See FAA Opposition at 9; FAA Exhibit I. It is telling that the FAA does not even attempt 

to rebut the AMES argument on pages 18-19 ofits Summary Judgment Motion that 

Lipinski was simply uninformed of the AMM section that called for the insertion of 

washers (shims) in the forward hinge only. There is no comparable instruction for 

inserting shims in the aft hinge. See Exhibit 5 to Respondent's Motion for Summary 

Judgment (AMM Section 32-11-00, step AL(2)(Page 422)); Exhibit 3 to Respondent's 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 70). Rather than admit to Lipinski's error, 

the FAA ignores the point. So while the FAA contends the Inspector "personally 

observed improperly configured shimming washers" (FAA Opposition at 9) it 

intentionally ignores the proof that the Inspector measured AMES compliance with the 

AMM based on an inaccurate understanding of the document believing shims should 

have been installed in the aft hinge. 

Next, the FAA argues at page 9-10 of its Opposition that the notation of 

"improper hardware stack ups" noted in FAA Exhibit N (AMES non-routine cards) is 

conclusive proof that the flying doors were not properly installed when in the case of 

N899AA the work was originally accomplished on July 31, 2009. Apart from the fact 

that Mr. Becker is in a far better position than the FAA to interpret the meaning of AMES 

generated maintenance documents, the records show, as testified to by Mr. Becker (see 

Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 111-114)) that 

the flying door was removed and the hardware was then "verified" in accordance with 

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Service Bulletin 727-32-324/R3 after which the door was then reinstalled using the 

hardware that was found to have been in compliance with the Service Bulletin standard. 

Exhibit I (Becker Declaration at ~ 7). 

As to the FAA complaint about the status of the gear or gimbal fitting on 

N899AA, AMES has already stated that when inspected by AMES at its facility it found 

"play" in the linkage and joint that includes the tubular bearing at the end of the actuation 

rod attached to the landing gear (drag strut). See AMES Answer in Opposition to 

Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9. Other relevant facts regarding this 

fitting previously noted in the AMES Opposition to the FAA Motion were that the 

landing gear on N899AA were extended and retracted 1,586 times after the MLG were 

installed by AMES. See id. Consequently, wear and tear of shimming washers in 

moving structure is not unexpected. In addition, since the "play" was in the area of the 

tubular bearing and given Mr. Becker's testimony that if incorrect methods to move the 

flying door to facilitate tire changes (of which Lipinski testified there could have been 

"hundreds" (Lipinski Tr. at 53-54) were used (meaning that a mechanic removed the 

attachment bolt at the end of the actuation rod attached to the drag strut, then the 

documented discrepancy ("excessive play at gear fitting") is not necessarily attributable 

to AMES. See Exhibit 5 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Figure 401 in 

AMM 32-11-00)(Page 404); Exhibit 5 to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to FAA's 

Motion for Summary Judgment (AMM Section 32-45-01 (Page 402)) In the absence of 

substantial evidence that it was, the FAA has not met its burden of proof. 

FAA concludes this section with an attack on Mr. Becker's interpretation of the 

aircraft maintenance records. Having observed the aircraft when they were flown to the 

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AMES facility after the FAA inspection (see Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 75)) and having studied the follow-on AMEScompiled maintenance records, Mr. Becker is far more informed and knowledgeable of 

their content and meaning than is the FAA, which had no representative on site to 

observe the aircraft in the AMES facility or to observe the corrective action taken by the 

AMES mechanics. See Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Lipinski Tr. at 203); Exhibit l (Becker Declaration at '11 7). 

V. AMES Received the Landing Gear with the Hydraulic Lines and 

Clamps in Place 

FAA claims at page 12 of its Opposition that the finding that chafe marks created 

by hydraulic line clamps on N899AA was the responsibility of AMES because Step S.A 

in the AMM (Section 32-11-00 (Page 416)) directs the maintenance provider to "prepare 

a landing gear assembly for installation". The Note that follows states: 

A landing gear assembly consists of a shock strut, two brake units, two tire 

and wheel assemblies, upper and lower torsion links, and, on some 

airplanes, a shock strut safety switch, a drag strut, trunnion link, static 

discharge assembly, deboost valves, hydraulic and pneumatic lines, 

electric wiring and clamps. In the case of left gear, the assembly also 

includes ground spoiler shutoff valve linkage. 

As observed, all the note consists of is a listing of certain components that are part of the 

landing gear assembly, but there are no directions instructing the maintenance provider to 

install and clamp the hydraulic lines. This is fully consistent with the AMES position 

that the vendor of the landing gear is responsible for such installation and clamping and 

AMES properly relied upon the vendor's FAA Form 8130 (Airworthiness Approval 

Tags) executed by the landing gear vendor (A TI) stating that the gear was completed 

according to IA W BAC OHM 32-10-01 except for "transducer assembly, hub cap, wheel 

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and tire assembly, deflector installation and brake assembly." Exhibit 7 (Box 13 of 

Authorized Release Certificate, FAA Form 8130-3, Airworthiness Approval Tags issued 

by ATI Aviation Services, LLC for the LH MLG on N899AA and N898AA). This 

means the hydraulic lines and hose swivel clamps were preinstalled and were not 

positioned or installed by AMES at the time of the MLG change. 

However, when the hydraulic lines appeared to have produced chafing (FAA 

Exhibit N, non-routine 0001) AMES corrected the matter but only by reference to the 

landing gear Overhaul Manual and not the AMM because the AMM is silent on the 

positioning of the hydraulic lines meaning the organization that built up the landing gear 

was responsible of hydraulic line placement. 

FAA makes a similar argument for the positioning of the so called swivel clamps. 

AMES does not contest that if found the left hand main landing gear on N898AA had 

mispositioned "hose swivel clamps" that required rectification. FAA Exhibit T (nonroutine 0021). But the FAA, perhaps intentionally, seeks to confuse the matter by 

arguing that the AMM 32-11-00 placed responsibility on AMES for positioning of the 

swivel clamps. Such is not the case. First FAA refers to step S(AH) in FAA Exhibit Cat 

Page 422 as proof that AMES had responsibility for clamp placement. But all step S(AH) 

says is to "install trunnion swivel complete with hydraulic lines" with reference to Figure 

404. But Figure 404 does not show the position of the swivel clamps. The depiction of 

the landing gear assembly as seen in Figure 404 is absent any instructions of the 

"arrangement and installation of the hydraulic lines and clamps" as incorrectly claimed 

by the FAA. FAA Opposition at 13. In any event, and more importantly, when AMES 

- 18-
received from CCIA's vendor (ATI) the gear assembly the clamps were already 

positioned and nothing in AMM 32-ll-00 instructed AMES to reposition the clamps. 

VI. Wear and Tear Explains the Condition of the Flying Doors 

The FAA seeks to undermine Mr. Becker's testimony in this section of its 

pleading (FAA Opposition at pages 14 through 16) by again trying to suggest the AMES 

witness, even though he holds a degree in aeronautical engineering and even though he 

has had at least 24 years of management experience in aircraft maintenance activities, is 

not qualified to comment on the proper interpretation of the AMES work records. See 

FAA Opposition at 14. It is absurd to think the Inspector on whom the FAA relies is any 

more qualified to do so, especially since he only inspected the aircraft at one time and 

never once saw the aircraft when they were flown back to the AMES facility for any 

. 5 

necessary repmrs: 

The FAA Opposition distorts the statement in the AMES Summary Judgment 

Motion on page 17 that some of the discrepancies noted on the non-routine cards were 

"inaccurately stated." All this meant is that in cases where a non-routine card referred to 

a suspected improper hardware stack up, for example, it was subsequently proven not to 

be the case on closer inspection. That is why the final corrective action taken is more 

telling of the nature of the suspect structure or part than the preliminary findings of a 

cursory inspection. ("Again, regardless of the discrepancy, the discrepancy is just an 

5 At pages 14-15 of its Opposition the FAA makes much of the fact that Mr. Becker's 

knowledge of the condition of the flying doors on the three aircraft is based on his review 

of the AMES maintenance records. But it is also true that Mr. Becker accompanied Mr. 

Lipinski when inspecting aircraft N287SC in particular on May 25, 2010 in Toledo (see 

Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 70) and after 

this inspection Lipinski never again saw the three aircraft while Mr. Becker did so on a 

daily basis when they were returned to the AMES facility. See id (Becker Tr. at 75-76). 

- 19-
initial judgment.") Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker 

Tr. at 113). 

In the attached Becker Declaration, the AMES Director of QA explains that the 

description of the discrepancy is but an initial and non-conclusive determination of a 

possible problem. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Declaration at~ 7). Next, the discrepancy is 

evaluated to estimate the man hours and coordinated the possible need for new parts. See 

id. The final step in the process, and the most important step, is to assign a mechanic to 

take the necessary corrective action, which is then recorded. See id. FAA reliance on the 

"Discrepancy" and "Evaluation" sections of the non-routine forms, and ignoring the more 

telling "Corrective Action" section of the form, leads the FAA to make arguments that 

only confuse the issue. Mr. Becker's experience in interpreting the AMES maintenance 

records is far superior in that of a single FAA inspector who apparently has no particular 

knowledge of the AMES recordkeeping system. 

The FAA's contention that the AMES position that the doors were simply shown 

to be experiencing normal wear and tear "makes little sense" because if properly rigged 

there would be no reason to inspect the doors except at the next "C" check as asserted by 

Lipinski. See FAA Exhibit JJ (Lipinski Declaration at~ 14). Is the FAA really 

suggesting that contrary to long standing practice and procedure, that walk around 

inspections, daily service checks, and "A" checks, which are conducted in the thousands 

between aircraft "C" checks, are unnecessary and cannot possibly be productive or be 

necessary if the flying doors are properly rigged at the time of reinstallation? See Exhibit 

1 (Becker Declaration at~ 3). And if these intervening visual and other inspections are 

-20-
in fact necessary, then the FAA position that wear and tear is simply out of the realm of 

possibility, seems very wide of the mark indeed. 

Hardware in moving components like flying doors, such as shims and washers, 

can wear with use. See id (Becker Declaration at ~ 2). Seals can tear and parts or 

structure can become nicked or scored in the normal course of operations. If hardware 

does wear, and gaps develop as a result that, in turn, cause downstream damage, then the 

FAA claim that the flying doors can never be subject to wear and tear is simply an 

unsupportable claim put forward by an Inspector that has a difficult time distinguishing 

fact from fiction. Replacing worn hardware, tom seals and blending and treating 

structure to remove nonstructural mars or gouges only requires minor maintenance and is 

far from proof that the flying doors were not properly rigged by AMES. Quite the 

opposite. The minor nature of the corrective action taken belies any claim that the flying 

doors were not properly rigged by AMES. And this AMES position is supported by 

AMES' outside expert witness with over 700 B-727 gear changes in his background who 

states he has "no difficulty concluding that the issues requiring attention were of a 'wear 

and tear' variety and not the result of improper reinstallation of the MLGs and flying 

doors." See Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Expert Report of Daniel J. Hancher at~~ 2 and 5). 

VII. AMES Cannot be Violated for Following the AMM 

The FAA Motion for Summary Judgment did not seek a decision on the issue of 

whether AMES should have rigged the flying doors with reference to AMM 32-12-

ll/401 in lieu of 32-12-ll/501. But as the FAA is raising the issue in its Opposition to 

- 21 -
the AMES Summary Judgment Motion (pages 16-18), AMES will address the FAA 

contentions now, 

Lipinski continues to make the extravagant claim that AMES was required to 

consults AMM 32-12-111401 in order to rig the flying doors once reinstalled on the 

aircraft. FAA Exhibit JJ (Lipinski Declaration at~~ 12 and 13). Now, however, the 

FAA seeks to rebut the AMES explanation of why the Inspector has erred in his 

interpretation of the AMM. It does this by setting up a straw man argument by asserting 

at page 17 of its Opposition that AMES and its mechanics must be aware of the contents 

of the AMM beyond those sections referred to specifically in the maintenance 

instructions. This FAA argument comes immediately after the statement that "As 

Respondent notes, it is undisputed that AMM 32-12-11/401 is not explicitly called out in 

AMM 32-11-00." At least the parties agree on this point. 

But AMES never stated or suggested that its mechanics wear blinders and consult 

no other applicable AMM manuals or sections of manuals. What AMES did argue was 

that there is a specific cross reference in AMM 32-1-00 Step AL(19) to AMM Step 32-

12-111501 and AMES is not free to simply ignore the instruction because the Inspector 

favors another section of the manual. AMES was cited by the FAA for not following the 

applicable AMM, and nothing in the AMM directs the maintenance provider to consult or 

follow Step 32-12-111401. Now that there is agreement among the parties that AMES 

correctly followed the AMM steps as directed by Boeing in its AMM, the issue can and 

should be decided in Respondent's favor on summary judgment. 

The FAA argument that the AMM contains basic instructions to, for example, 

hang the flying door, or to tighten bolts and install cotter pins, but not with specificity, 

-22-
and claiming the detailed information is found in other manual chapters (citing AMM 43-

12-11/401), but not in AMM 32-11-00, is not a correct analogy. See FAA Opposition at 

17. Clearly, if a mechanic needs further guidance on how to accomplish a task the 

mechanic is required by AMES to consult the other chapters of the AMM. But in the 

case of AMM 32-11-00, step AL(19), which has a specific cross reference to another 

AMM chapter and section, there is no basis for the mechanic to seek other guidance and 

sign off the work as having been performed in accordance with any other AMM section 

but 32-12-111501. See Exhibit 2 (Becker Tr. at 192-196); Exhibit 2 to Respondent's 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Lipinski Tr. at 28-29) (conceding there is no cross 

reference to 32-11-111401). In fact, doing so could lead to the allegation that AMES 

failed to follow the customer's AMM as required. Summary Judgment in favor of AMES 

on this issue is appropriate. 

VIII. Inspector Bias is an Issue but AMES Did Not Ask for a Ruling on this 

Issue in Connection with its Summary Judgment Motion 

The AMES Motion for Summary Judgment was clear that a ruling on the 

arguments presented to show Inspector bias and prejudice is not necessary for a favorable 

ruling on the AMES motion. See AMES Motion for Summary Judgment at 29-30. Yet 

the FAA Opposition takes four pages of argument to rebut the AMES position. See FAA 

Opposition at 18-22. Was a nerve hit? The FAA Opposition is apparently based on the 

Lipinski Declaration, FAA Exhibit JJ at paragraphs 7 through 9. The FAA now states, as 

does Lipinski, that unidentified individuals from CCIA complained about having to use 

the services of AMES and that other unidentified CCIA personnel stated that they 

preferred to use the services of Flight Star -- the repair station promoted by Lipinski. 

-23-
Convenient that the Lipinski Declaration refers to these individuals but never identifies 

who they are. 

Even if that were so, it was not the role of the Inspector to complain to Mr. 

Becker about the situation while performing the D-091 audit (to qualify AMES to 

perform maintenance on the part of CCIA), but without reservation or otherwise 

indicating he was referring to the views of CCIA when he made these statements. See 

Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 63-64 and 67). 

The FAA tries also to brush off the charge saying that holding opinions about "the skill 

and safety level of various certificate holders" is normal. See FAA Opposition at 19. Is 

it normal for a FAA inspector to recommend one repair station over another even after he 

approved the new repair station to perform maintenance on CCIA aircraft? See Exhibit 5 

(Lipinski Tr. at 165). Most definitely not. 

Next, the FAA tries to diminish the significance of the Inspector's highly 

intemperate remarks referred to on page 20 ofthe FAA Opposition, saying the FAA 

official may have "lost his temper."6 That's hardly a denial (given that there were 

witnesses to the Inspector's statements, the FAA is in no position to refute that the 

comments were communicated) and one has to question why a supposedly professional 

FAA inspector could ever be quoted as saying such things unless there was some deep 

seated animosity against the certificate holder. As to the timing of the remarks, they 

appear to be reflective of the Inspector's attitude as first exhibited in 2009 before Mr. 

Becker (see Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 63-

6 In paragraph 9 of the Lipinski Deposition, he does not deny he made the profane 

statements, only that he did not recall doing so. 

- 24-
67)) and his bias against AMES manifest itself even more strongly a couple of years later. 

This continuum of a prejudicial attitude cannot simply be ignored. 

Apart from the Lipinski exaggerations as to the extent of the damage to the CCIA 

aircraft, the FAA's attempts to rehabilitate the Inspector failed to address the obvious 

overstatements contained in Section B of the FAA EIR (Exhibit 1 to Respondent's 

Motion for Summary Judgment). On page 15 of EIR Section B, the Inspector states that 

AMES took no corrective action as a result of its investigation into this matter. In fact, 

several corrective actions were taken. See Exhibit 8 (Letter from Jeffrey Becker to Frank 

Lipinski, dated March 21, 2011) and Lipinski admitted that his statement in the EIR that 

AMES took no corrective action was incorrect. See Exhibit 5 (Lipinski Tr. at 198). 

Likewise, he admitted that while he accepted as correct and true all of the CCIA response 

to the FAA's letter of investigation into this matter, and that he already knew that AMES 

had contradicted certain of the CCIA statements, he made no effort to sort out the factual 

disputes and accepted the CCIA rendition of the facts. See Exhibit 5 (Lipinski Tr. at 81-

82). In short, it appears from the manner in which Lipinski (i) spoke to Mr. Becker in 

2009 complaining of the involvement of AMES in CCIA maintenance activities, (ii) 

compiled the EIR in 2010 containing significant and admitted factual errors, (iii) 

exaggerated the extent of "damage" to the CCIA aircraft, (iv) urged CCIA to use the 

services on another repair station, and (v) subsequently cursed at representatives at CCIA 

in speaking of AMES, there is more than enough evidence to justify AMES in raising the 

issue and bringing it to Your Honor's attention. However, as noted, AMES is not 

suggesting Your Honor must find the Inspector was prejudiced in order to rule favorably 

upon the Respondent's Summary Judgment Motion. 

-25-
Dated: February 26, 2015 

Respectfully submitted, 

SILVERBERG GOLDMAN, L.L.P. 

Attorneys for 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENC,RJNG SER~<]<S 

By: 

Robert 

Lit!!£~ P. Silverberg, Esq. 

1101 30'h Street, N.W. 

Suite 300 

Washington, D.C. 20007 

Tel: (202) 944-3304 

Fax: (202) 944-3306 

Email: rsilverberg@sgbdc.com 

- 26-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 261

h day of February 2015, I caused the foregoing Reply of 

Respondent to FAA's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment to be served 

by FedEx upon the following: 

Federal Aviation Administration 

600 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Wilbur Wright Building 

Suite 2W1000 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

(Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430) 

Tel: (202) 267-0377 

(original and one copy) 

The Hon. J.E. Sullivan 

Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Tel: (202) 366-2132 

Fax: (202) 366-7536 

Christopher R. Stevenson, Attorney 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Office of the Regional Counsel, AS0-7 

Southern Region 

1701 Columbia Avenue 

College Park, GA 30337 

Tel: (404) 305-5200 
Exhibit 1 

Exhibit 2 

Exhibit 3 

Exhibit 4 

Exhibit 5 

Exhibit 6 

Exhibit 7 

Exhibit 8 

List of Exhibits 

Declaration of Jeffrey Becker 

Transcript Pages from Deposition of Jeffrey Becker, taken Oct. 29, 2014 

Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures, dated December 12, 2014 and 

Complainant's Additional Expert Disclosure, dated December 1, 2014 

Respondent's Supplemental Responses to FAA's First Discovery Requests, dated 

December 23, 2014 

Transcript Pages from Deposition of Frank Lipinski, taken Dec. 18,2014 

AMES Discrepancy Notices and CCIA Corrective Action Record for Tubular 

Bearing on N287SC 

Authorized Release Certificates, FAA Form 8130-3, Airworthiness Approval 

Tags, issued by ATI Aviation Services, LLC for LH MLG on N899AA and 

N898AA 

Letter from Jeffrey Becker to Frank Lipinski, date March 21, 2011 

Exhibit 1 

Declaration of Jeffrey Becker 
BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

In the matter of 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENGINEERING SERVICES 

Respondent 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 

Administrative Law Judge 

J.E. Sullivan 

DECLARATION OF JEFFREY BECKER 

I, Jeffrey Becker, hereby declare as follows: 

1. I have read the FAA's Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary 

. Judgment. In its pleading the FAA argues that I am not competent to offer opinions on 

aviation maintenance because I do not possess a mechanics license. Even though the 

FAA knows I hold a degree in aeronautical engineering and a Masters in Business 

Administration with considerable maintenance related experience as I testified to at my 

deposition, set out below is the details of my background and expetience 

A. In 1986 I eamed a B.S. degree Aeronautical Engineering from Embry-Riddle 

Aeronautical University. In 2007 I earned a Masters Business Administration 

from Xavier University. 

B. From 1986 through 1992 I held a Professional Engineering license from the State 

of California. 

C. From 1986 through 1991 I was employed by Douglas Aircraft Co., Long Beach, 

California where I was a Design Engineer on both the MD-80 and C-17 aircraft 

then was a Flight Test Engineer for the initial certification program of the MD-11. 
In my role as both Design Engineer and Flight Test engineer I developed and 

authored Service Bulletins and AMM instluctions for vadous systems on each of 

the three aircraft types I worked on. 

D. From 1991 to 2009 I held a variety of roles with ABX Air, Inc which is a large all 

cargo Pati 121 earner, in which I had direct responsibility for developing and 

approving maintenance instmctions as well as direct responsibilities over 

maintenance and inspection personnel. 

1. Aircraft Stmctures Engineer. In this role my responsibilities included 

developing repair instmctions for repairs not found in published OEM 

manuals, authoring AMM procedures changes and coordinating new 

service bulletins with the OEM (Douglas Aircraft). 

2. Manager-Fleet Service Engineering. In this role my responsibilities 

included managing liaison engineering staff, held SFAR 36 approval 

authority (approving repair data and instluctions on behalf of the FAA). I 

was also the primary contact with the manufacture regarding in-service 

problems and service bulletin incorporation issues. 

3. Manager-Technical Services, B-767 aircraft. In this role I was responsible 

for onsite support at the primary vendor's facility for the development of 

the passenger to freighter Supplemental Type Certificate, fabrication of 

modification parts and installation of the 120,000 hour freighter 

modification. I was also responsible for implementing the B767 aircraft 

type into service for ABX as well as coordination of aircraft delivery 

including import and FAA registl·ation. 

-2-
4. Manager- Avionics Engineering. In this position my responsibilities 

included drafting and publishing of jobcards (maintenance instructions) to 

incorporate avionics modifications to the ABX fleet of aircraft which then 

included YS-11, DC-8, DC-9 and B-767 type aircraft. 

5. Senior Director, Engineering and Quality Control. In this position my 

responsibilities included maintaining ABX' s aircraft reliability program, 

maintenance program, custom suite of manuals (including AMM, SRM 

and WDM), AD compliance, aircraft upgrade programs, audit program 

and managing a staff of inspectors (including ABX's Chief Inspector). 

E. From 2009 to present I have been the Director, Quality Assurance for AMES. 

My department responsibilities include auditing, aircraft records, 

· developing/maintaining policy manuals, ensuring compliance with FAA 

requirements, and managing a staff of maintenance inspectors. More specifically 

my responsibilities are outlined in the AMES Repair Station and Quality Manual 

(which is FAA approved) and include in part: 

1. Responsibility for the AMES Inspection Program which includes training, 

qualifications, and authorization of technicians and inspectors. 

2. Have the authority to establish and modify policies, procedures and 

instmctions. 

3. Directing, planning, and detetmining details of inspection standards, 

methods and procedures used by the Repair Station in complying with all 

applicable FAA regulations as well as manufacture's specifications and 

recommendations. 

- 3 -
4. Responsible for ensuring all inspections are properly perfmmed and that 

proper inspection records, reports, and forms used by the Repair Station 

are properly completed prior to releasing a product to service. 

2. In the Lipinski Declaration I note that in paragraph 14 he concedes that notmal wear 

and· tear can be observed on flying door components. In particular he notes that "frequent 

movement" of the flying doors can lead to "paint deterioration, worn or possibly tom 

rubber seals, aged lubrication, affixed dirt, or presence of metallic dust in the hinges." 

But Lipinski resists the extension of this logic to the wearing of other patts, such as shims 

and washers installed in gaps that are also subject to "frequent movement" of landing 

gear components. Had he recognized the affect of "frequent movement" along the entire 

range of flying door components he would be unable to assert as he does that damage due 

to possibly worn shims and washers must be attributed to the maintenance performed by 

AMES and not normal wear and tear. To allege that only AMES could be responsible for 

the condition of the doors as documented in the non-routine cards is to deny the affect of 

normal wear and tear on all manner of flying door components and not just the ones 

singled out by Lipinski. 

3. The Lipinski statement in paragraph 14 of his Declaration states that if properly 

performed, damage to the flying door structure (when the doors are removed) will 

"almost never occur prior to the next "C" check. The B-727 "C" check interval is 24 

months or 3000 flight hours, whichever occurs first. Is the Inspector seriously suggesting 

that one would not expect to see wear and tear or even damage to any of the flying door 

components during this interval? If that were the case, then why would the FAA require 

carriers as patt of their maintenance programs to schedule and petform routine overnight 

- 4-
checks, service checks, "A" level checks, and daily walk around inspections to visually 

inspect the condition of the aircraft. The question answers itself-carriers must 

constantly be on the lookout for evidence of wear and tear or damage and react to it when 

observed. In any event, the Inspector now has conceded that there can be wear and tear 

or damage to the flying doors and related structure between the "C" check interval. That 

being the case, how can the FAA conclusively assert in this case that all of the "damage 

and other problems" the FAA claims it observed were not the product of normal wear and 

tear? To the extent some damage of the type repaired by AMES can occur, then the 

FAA has not explained why this possibility does not apply to the three CCIA aircraft. 

4. In paragraph 21 of the Lipinski Declaration, he again inconectly asserts, as he did to 

me on May 25,2010 while in Toledo, that shims and washers are to be installed in both 

the forward and aft hinge assemblies. I, along with my colleague, Dan Boggs, while in 

Toledo with the Inspector photographed the hinges on N287SC as they appeared on May 

25, 2010. When I returned to my office I confirmed my understanding of the AMM 32-

11-00 requirements that washers and shims are only to be inserted in the f01ward hinge 

assembly. No shims are required for the aft hinge. AMM 32-11-00 step AL(2), page 

422. Lipinski's insistence that washers are to be installed on the aft hinge and the 

forward hinge is simply not consistent with the applicable AMM. 

5. I have read the Lipinski Declaration that states that AMES is responsible for the 

positioning of swivel clamps and hydraulic lines in connection with the installation of the 

main landing gear on the three CCIA aircraft. Lipinski is in error because AMM 32-11-

00 neither directs the maintenance provider changing the landing gear to position or route 

the hydraulic lines or swivel clamps that are in question. While the AMM does depict in 

- 5-
Figure 404 the build up of landing gear assembly it does not instruct the mechanic as to 

the position of the lines or clamps in question and, in fact, does not even depict the swivel 

clamps much less instmct as to their position and orientation. In the case ofN899AA, 

non-routine 0001 (FAA Exhibit N, page 1) and N898AA, non-routine 0021 (FAA Exhibit 

T, non-routine 0021) the resolution of the discrepancies was the repositioning of the hose 

swivel clamps, respectively, using for the authority to do so the Overhaul Manual32-l 0-

01 as reflected on the non-routine cards. Reliance on the Overhaul Manual instead of the 

AMM means that the AMM did not address the issue of the clamping of any hydraulic 

lines or the position ofthe swivel clamps and further this means that the landing gear 

assembly when supplied to AMES by its customer already had the hydraulic lines 

secured and the swivel clamps in position and AMES would have had no reason to 

relocate them at the time the gear were installed. If AMM 32-11-00 had so directed or 

instructed AMES to position the hydraulic lines and secure the swivel clamps in a certain 

location, its mechanics would have complied with the instmction. The FAA argument 

that just because AMES installed the landing gear that the positioning of every 

component of the landing gear becomes AMES responsibility constitutes a 

misunderstanding of the relationship between AMM 32-11-00 and landing gear overhaul 

manual used by the vendor to build up the landing gear assembly. 

Further, the Forms 8130s for the two landing gear assemblies in question state 

that the airworthiness release certificate was with respect to the entire MLG assembly 

less only the "transducer assembly, hub cap, wheel and tire assembly, deflector 

installation and brake assembly," There is no reference to any missing hydraulic lines or 

- 6-
swivel clamps meaning those components were installed on the MLG assembly as 

received by AMES, and subsequently installed in the aircraft. 

6. Lipinski Declaration paragraph 18, 25, 29, 31 and 40 purport to list "damage and other· 

problems" to the flying doors on the identified aircraft. AMES has annotated each of the 

alleged discrepancies in its Opposition to the FAA's Summary Judgment Motion and the 

record need not be fm1her burdened by repeating the AMES responses based on my prior 

testimony and contents of the each of the non-routine cards and corrective action taken by 

AMES as set out on pages 6 through 17 in the AMES Opposition to the FAA Motion. 

7. The FAA Opposition at pages 9-10 claims that I am providing my personal opinion 

only and that I am incorrectly intetpreting the meaning of the maintenance records 

compiled by AMES. I repeatedly stated in my deposition that to understand the 

maintenance Wl'ite ups, one must look at the cnrrective action taken. The AMES nonroutine fmms that FAA cites are prepared in three steps. First the initial write up of the 

potential problem is recorded-the discrepancy. Next, the discrepancy is evaluated by a 

maintenance supervisor or their designee to estimate man-hours and parts requirements 

that is a necessary planning step. The fmal and most impot1ant and telling step is to 

assign the task to a mechanic to take corrective action, meaning a technician details the 

actual condition of the aircraft and steps, if any, required to remedy the situation. Let 

me illustrate the process. Using the "improper stack up" allegations as an example 

(pages 9 and 10 ofF AA's Opposition) and specifically non-routine 0003 for N899AA 

(FAA Exhibit N, pages 2-7). The "Discrepancy" (the initial detetmination) is stated to be 

"L!H MLG Flying Door Aft Hinge has improper stack up". The "Evaluation" reads 

"Remove and Replace hardware IA W SB 727-32-234". Once again this is an evaluation 

-7-
only and was written so the bushings could be put on order in the event they were needed 

to complete the corrective action. However, most impmtantly the "Corrective Action" 

portion of the non-routine fotm states "Removed Left Main gear Wing Door Verified 

hardware IA W 727 SB 727-32-0234 R3 and performed adjust/test IA W 727 MM 32-12-

11 ". This section of the document records what is actually found to be the case and how 

the original discrepancy was rectified. The FAA continues to argue that AMES records 

document AMES installed '~improper stack ups" and that to remedy the issue it "replaced 

new hardware". Only by incorrectly referring to the discrepancy and evaluation portions 

of the non-routine document and not paying attention to the corrective action description 

can the FAA make the assertion that AMES did not properly rig the flying doors. I have 

consistently assetied that none of the cmrective action taken by AMES in response to the 

FAA May 25, 2010 inspection implicates the original work perfmmed by AMES when 

rigging the flying doors on the three subject aircraft since a careful review of the 

cotTective action taken reveals evidence of wear and tear and not improper rigging of the 

flying doors. 

Declared under penalty of petjury thisZ:Gday of Febtuary 2015. 

- 8-

Exhibit 2 

Transcript Pages from Deposition of 

Jeffrey Becker, taken Oct. 29, 2014 
In The Matter Of: 

Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services 

Jeffrey Becker 

October 29, 2014 

Legal Realtime Reporting 

622 E. Central Blvd. 

Orlando, FL 32801 

Original File 102914 Becker final. txt 
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BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

In the matter of 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENGINEERING SERVICES 

Respondent 

* * * * * * * 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

Case No. 2011S0290032 

: Administrative Law Judge 

J.E. Sullivan 

* * * * * * * 

DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY BECKER 

DATE TAKEN: October 29, 2014 

TIME: COMMENCED: 8:55 a.m. 

CONCLUDED: 2:55 p.m. 

PLACE: 215 North Eola Drive 

Orlando, Florida 32801 

REPORTED BY: Rita G. Meyer, RDR, CRR, CBC, 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

1 

* 

CCP 

* 
1 Q. Thank you. All right. I'd like to ask you a 

2 few questions about your background. Can you tell me 

3 generally what your history in aviation maintenance is? 

4 A. Yeah. I have a Bachelor's degree in 

5 aeronautical engineering from Embry Riddle University in 

6 Daytona Beach. I also have a Master's degree in business 

7 administration from Xavier University in Cincinnati. 

8 Started in 1980 -- 1986 with Douglas Aircraft 

9 Company. Was a design engineer on the MB80 Program, then 

10 transferred to the Cl7. I was a structures design 

11 engineer for the Cl7 and then spent the last few years on 

12 the MDll flight test program as a flight test engineer. 

13 Then I came to Airborne Express as a structures 

14 engineer; shortly afterwards was promoted to supervisor 

of liaison engineering. Held the manager of fleet 

service program manager 767 operations direct, then 

director of engineering. And as the director of 

engineering, was responsible for reliability, maintenance 

programs, tech hubs, engineering and then eventually also 

included quality control. 

Q. And do you remember when you started at ABX? 

A. April of 1991. 

Q. 

A. 

Okay. And at what point did you leave ABX? 

During the in May of 2009, there was a 

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21 

22 

23 

24 

25 restructuring due to DHL pull out, and that's when I left 
192 

1 manufacturer. 

2 Q. Okay. You indicated in response to questions 

3 of counsel, that you reviewed the EIR. Did the FAA 

4 produce any evidence of the maintenance history of any of 

5 the aircraft in the ensuing months between the time the 

6 original work was performed by AMES in connection with 

7 the two "C" Checks and the one landing gear change and 

8 the time that the aircraft were inspected again in 

9 Toledo? 

10 A. No. No, they did not provide any documentation 

11 for that time frame. 

12 Q. In connection with Exhibit U, which is the 

13 training module that you were asked some questions about, 

14 you were asked some questions about this so-called 400 

15 series of pages and the pictures from those pages out of 

16 32-12-11 and why they were included in the training 

17 module. Do you recall that? 

18 A. Yes. 

19 Q. Okay. In connection with the replacement --

20 the removal and replacement of the landing gear doors 

21 that you were contracted to perform for Capital Cargo, 

22 was it necessary for you to consult the 400 series of 

23 pages and the pictures associated therewith, the diagrams 

24 to complete your work for Capital Cargo? 

25 A. Not in the initial landing gear change. If the 
193 

1 flying doors are removed and replaced consistent with the 

2 landing gear change, then, no, you do not use Section 

3 401. 

4 And if you -- for instance, in the May time 

5 frame when we removed just the doors and we installed 

6 them, we signed them off to Section 401. 

7 

8 

9 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

So that's the distinction. 

Yes. 

Let's make sure it's clear. The distinction 

10 is between removing of the landing gear doors -- excuse 

11 me. Removal of the landing gear and replacement of the 

12 landing gear and the associated work to remove and then 

13 reinstall the landing, so-called flying door. And the 

14 steps to -- referenced in the 400 series of pages out of 

15 the manual that relate to just to the reinstallation of 

16 the flying door. 

17 MR. STEVENSON: Objection, leading. 

18 

19 

20 

21 

A. Yes. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. That's all the 

questions we have. 

MR. STEVENSON: Sure. 

22 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 

23 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

24 Q. Opposing counsel, Mr. Silverberg just asked you 

25 about maintenance documents on these aircraft for the 
194 

1 time between the gear changes and May of 2010. 

2 AMES is, in fact -- sorry. AMES was, in fact, 

3 owned at this time by the same parent company that owns 

4 CCIA, correct? 

5 

6 

A. 

Q. 

Correct. 

And in fact, you and CCIA shared joint 

7 representation by opposing counsel. 

8 A. I don't know that for a fact. 

9 Q. Well, we had an informal conference and he was 

10 the only attorney there representing both AMES and CCIA, 

11 right? 

12 A. Yeah. I don't remember exactly. I mean, I 

13 recall that there was some gentleman there from Capital 

14 Cargo, but --

15 Q. Okay. And every single maintenance document on 

16 these aircraft would've been in the possession of CCIA, 

17 right? 

18 A. Oh, absolutely. 

19 Q. So if there was anything helpful to CCIA's case 

20 or your case in those documents, CCIA could've produced 

21 those documents, right? 

22 

23 

24 

25 

MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Look, you've got 

the burden of proof. We do not. You didn't produce 

the documents. 

MR. STEVENSON: Bob, that's not the basis for 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

an objection. 

MR. SILVERBERG: I'm just telling you. 

MR. STEVENSON: You don't need to make an 

argument to me in the middle of a deposition. We 

can have that discussion some other time. 

MR. SILVERBERG: I'm telling you, you know, 

it's your failure of proof. Proceed if you wish. 

195 

8 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

Yes. 

What was the question again? 

CCIA had possession of those documents. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Do you know whether or not 

they had possession of those documents? 

MR. STEVENSON: Bob, I am asking the 

questions. Okay? I do not 

MR. SILVERBERG: It's a leading question. You 

said CCIA is in possession --

MR. STEVENSON: You're allowed to ask leading 

questions in a deposition. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Yes, and they are 

objectionable as such. 

MR. STEVENSON: But you didn't object to them. 

You asked your own questions. 

color commentary. 

Please, stop the 

MR. SILVERBERG: Stop the leading questions 
1 

2 

3 

4 

that you know are inappropriate. 

MR. STEVENSON: I can ask leading questions. 

MR. SILVERBERG: And they are objectionable. 

MR. STEVENSON: I mean, he already -- I'm 

5 repeating a question you answered a second ago 

6 anyway. 

7 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

8 Q. But those documents were in the possession of 

196 

9 CCIA, right? All maintenance records for these aircraft 

10 would've been in CCIA's possession, right? 

11 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. He's speculating 

12 what's in the possession of the carrier. 

13 A. When we perform the work, we provide the 

14 records to the carrier. 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

Q. Yes. And it would be -- do you agree if would 

be an extremely unusual situation where an air carrier 

did not have the maintenance records on its aircraft? 

A. I mean, I would be answering for Capital Cargo. 

Now that they're not a certificated entity, I have no 

idea what the status is of the records. 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

You understand --

We provided them the records. 

And you understand that an air carrier is, in 

24 fact, required to maintain the maintenance records for 

25 its aircraft. 

Exhibit 3 

Respondent's Expert Rebuttal 

Disclosures, dated December 12, 2014 

and Complainant's Additional Expert 

Disclosure, dated December 1, 2014 
In the matter of 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENGINEERING SERVICES 

Respondent 

Administrative Law Judge 

J.E. Sullivan 

RESPO~'DENT'S EXPERT REBUTTAL DISCLOSURES 

Pursuant to the Order Granting/Denying Relief, and ModifYing the Litigation Dates and 

Procedures, served September 30,2014, and Federal Ru1es of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) and 

(a)(2)(C), Respondent Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Service ("AMES") hereby 

provides the following expert rebuttal disclosures: 

1) Jeffrey Becker and James Savastano: Mr. Becker, the AMES Director, Quality 

Assurance & Training, and Mr. Savastano, the AMES Vice President of Technical Operations 

and former Vice President of Maintenance at Capital Cargo International Airlines, Inc., will 

provide expert testimony as necessary to rebut any expert and opinion testimony provided by 

Complainant's witnesses. 1 Mr. Becker's and Mr. Savastano's expert rebuttal testimony may 

include testimony regarding the minor nature of the discrepancies claimed by the FAA, the 

extent of the corrective action taken and the cause of the discrepancies, namely wear and tear and 

intervening third-party maintenance and not the result of the alleged improper installation or 

rigging of the flying doors by AMES. Messrs. Becker and Savastano may also testify that the 

likely cause of the N287SC air return was vibration caused by the aircraft's rudder assembly 

1 Messrs. Becker and Savastano will also testify as a fact witnesses and may provide opinion 

testimony under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
bushings and not AMES's installation or rigging of the aircraft's flying doors. Messrs. Becker 

and Savastano may further testify that the flying doors were initially installed and rigged by 

Respondent in accordance with the applicable Aircraft Maintenance Manuel provisions. 

2) Da.'liel I. Hancher: Respondent incorporates by reference t.l}e expert report of 

Daniel J. Hancher, dated April30, 2014. Mr. Hancher may testify as described in his expert 

report as necessary to rebut expert and opinion testimony provided by Complainant's witness. 

Dated: December 12,2014 

Respectfully submitted, 

SILVERBERG, GOLDMAN & BIKOFF, L.L.P. 

Attorneys for 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING 

SER CES 

By:--';/__'-:'&·-.......~'1/~W,~~~- Robert P. Silverberg, Esq. 

1101 30th Street, N.W. 

Suite 120 

Washington, D.C. 20007 

Tel: (202) 944-3304 

Fax: (202) 944-3306 

Email: rsilverberg@sgbdc.com 

2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 12th day of December 2014, I caused the foregoing 

Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures to be served upon the following: 

Christopher R. Stevenson, Attorney 

Office of the Regional Counsel, ASO-7 

Southern Region 

Federal Aviation Administration 

P.O. Box 20636 

Atlanta, GA 30320 

Tel: (404) 305-5200 

Fax: (404) 305-5223 

(one copy by facsimile and First Class Mail) 
i~/D1/2014 15:38 4D43B55223 FAA REGIONAL COUNSEL 

U.S. DEPARTMENJ: OF TRANSPORTAHON 

OFFICE OF HEARJNGS 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

Complainant, 

VS. 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENGrNEERING SERVICES, 

Respondent. 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

FAA Case No. 20llS0290032 

Judge Sullivan 

ADDITIONAL EXPERT DISCLOSURES 

PAGE D2/B4 

discovery, 

In addition to the expert testimony previously disclosed by the FAA during general 

26(a)(2)(C): 

the FAA hereby identifies the following expert disclosures pursuant to FRCP 

I) Inspectors Previously Identified (Frank Lipinski, Bobby Evans, Jack Gascbe): Each of 

these 

and 

inspectors may testify as to their personal observations of the aircraft in question, 

the conclusions drawn from those observations a.~ to the condition of the aircraft (as 

surnmaty 

it relates to 

of 

the main landing gear, flying doors, and related and adjacent components). A 

have 

the personal observations, aT).d the conclusions drawn, by these inspectors, 

previously been provided in the form of their statements and letters. Consistent with 

those statements, Inspector Evans may testify with respect to the vibration incident, 

including 

may, 

tb.e absence of the bushing and the cause of that absence. InspectoJ: Gasche 

as summarized in his statement, testify as to the nature of the damage he personally 

observed on the aircraft, and that, in his opinion, this damage was caused by improper 

rigging of the flying doors. Inspector Lipinski may, as summarized in his statement, 

docum.ented 

testify as to the nature of the damage he personally observed on the aircraft, the damage 

by 

by CCIA and Respondent, and that, in his opinion, this damage was caused 

accordance 

improper 

with 

rigging of the flying doors (that is, that the flying doors were not rigged in 

Respondent, 

Boeing and CCI A maintenance requirements), which was perfonned by 

and that the missing bushing was caused by Respondent's improper 

installation of the flying doors. 

2) 

concerning 

Michael Christensen: Specialist Christenson may be called as an expert witness 

the cause of the damage (and missing bushing) observed by the fAA 

Inspectors, CC!A persormel, and Respondent's personnel. Specialist Christensen may 

testifY that these problems were caused by improper rigging of the flying doors (that is, 
Y2/0ll2014 15:38 4043055223 FAA REGIONAL COUNSEL PAGE 03104 

that the flying doors were not rigged in accordance with CCIA and Boeing maintenance 

requirements) by Respondent at the time the flying doors were installed. As a regional 

specialist, Specialist Christensen serves as an authoritative technical specialist with 

regards 

personnel, 

to maintenance and avionics to other Aviation Safety Inspectors, fi.eld office 

FAA management, other governmental/private entities, and the general public, 

conducting evaluation and investigation activities, both internal and external, to ensure 

that aviation organizations, operatots, and air carriers meet Federal Aviation Regulmions, 

applicable laws and. Flight Standards program objectives. Prior to serving as a regional 

specialist, Specialist Christensen served in the FAA as a prillcipal inspector !l1 the 

international field office. P~ior to working at the FAA, Specialist Christensen served as a 

lead technician (A&P Mechanic and Avionics) at Delta Airlines, where he was 

perform 

authorized 

maintenance 

to inspect RII items. At Delta, Specialist Christensen was trained to, and did, 

200/300/400ER, 

on MD-88/90, B727, B737-200/300/800/BBJ, B757, B767-

and LlOll aircraft, including MLG rnainte.n.ance on B727 aircraft. 

st---

s I day of December, 2014. 

CHRlSTOPHER R. EVENSON 

Attomey 

Officeof the Regional Counsel 
Exhibit 4 

Respondent's Supplemental Responses 

to FAA's First Discovery Requests, 

dated December 23, 2014 
In the matter of 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

Case No. 2011S0290032 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENGINEERING SERVICES Administrative Law Judge 

J .E. Sullivan 

Respondent 

RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL 

RESPONSES TO FAA'S FIRST DISCOVERY REQUESTS 

Pursuant to Rule 220 of the Federal Aviation Administration's Rules of Practice, 14 

C.F.R. § 13.220, Respondent Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services ("AMES") hereby 

supplements its responses to Complainant Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") 

Interrogatory nos. 13 and 14. Respondent reserves the right to further supplement or amend 

these responses. 

13. Identify each person you may call as a witness at hearing in this matter, identify 

the subject of their testimony, and summarize the substance of their expected testimony. You do 

not need to repeat information already contained in your initial disclosures, but you must expand 

on those answers to the extent necessary to answer this interrogatory. 

ANSWER: In AMES's initial disclosures, dated January 14,2014, the names of 

individuals knowledgeable about the circumstances of this matter who could be used to support 

AMES's defenses were disclosed to Complainant. AMES also supplemented this information in 

its answer to Complainant's interrogatory no. 1. See Respondent's Responses to FAA's First 

Discovery Requests, dated March 6, 2014. Further, the date for the exchange of witness lists by 

the parties is not until April 9, 2015. However, consistent with the obligation of each party to 

seasonally supplement its prior initial disclosures and discovery responses pursuant to Rule of 

Practice 220(i) and Federal Rule 26(e)(l)(A), AMES has now determined that the following 

individuals will be called as witnesses by AMES. 

Jeffrey Becker, the AMES Director, Quality Assurance & Training, and James 

Savastano, the AMES Vice President of Technical Operations and former Vice President of 

Maintenance at Capital Cargo International Airlines, Inc. ("CCIA"), are expected to provide 

testimony as fact witnesses, including providing opinion testimony under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 701, or as expert witnesses as necessary to rebut any expert or opinion testimony 

provided by Complainant's witnesses, regarding the minor nature of the discrepancies claimed 

by the FAA, the extent of the corrective action taken and the cause of the discrepancies, namely 

wear and tear and intervening third-party maintenance and not the result of the alleged improper 
installation or rigging of the flying doors by AMES. Messrs. Becker and Savastano may also 

testifY that the likely cause of the N287SC air return was vibration caused by the aircraft's rudder 

assembly bushings and not AMES's installation or rigging of the aircraft's flying doors. Messrs. 

Becker and Savastano may further testifY that the flying doors were initially installed and rigged 

by Respondent in accordance with the applicable Aircraft Maintenance Manual provisions. 

James Savastano will also provide testimony regarding the inappropriate and 

inflammatory statements Inspector Frank Lipinski made evidencing his bias against AMES and 

that Inspector Lipinski told him that CCIA should use another repair station by name, 

specifically Flightstar Aircraft Services, LLP, for its aircraft repair and maintenance services 

instead of AMES. Mr. Savastano will also testifY that he filed a complaint against Mr. Lipinski 

and that he was interviewed by the FAA regarding the allegations in his complaint. 

Steven Santangelo, the former Director of Quality Control and Chief Inspector of CCIA, 

will provide testimony regarding the inappropriate and inflammatory statements Inspector Frank 

Lipinski made evidencing his bias against AMES. Mr. Santangelo will also provide testimony 

that Inspectors Lipinski and Richard D' Arcy suggesting that if CCIA removed AMES from its 

D-091 Operations Specifications (essential maintenance provided list) that it would benefit 

CCIA in another potential enforcement action. 

Dennis Manibusan, the former President of CCIA, will provide testimony regarding a 

meeting he attended with Robert Talmadge, Manager of the FAA's South Florida Certificate 

Management Office, to express concerns that Inspector Lipinski had been and was continuing to 

abuse his discretion and act inappropriately in overseeing the operations of CCIA, including 

providing examples of intimidating, harassing, abusive and inappropriate behavior on the part of 

Inspector Lipinski, and Inspector Lipinski's insistence that CCIA cease its business relationship 

with AMES and instead use Flightstar Aircraft Services, LLP for aircraft repair and maintenance 

services. 

AMES may also call FAA Inspectors Jack Gasche and Billie Steffey as rebuttal witnesses 

for Respondent. 

14. IdentifY each person you may call as an expert witness in this matter, identify the 

subject of their testimony, summarize the substance of their expected testimony, and describe in 

detail your basis for believing that the witness is an expert. 

ANSWER: The individuals Respondent may call as expert witnesses in this matter are 

Daniel J. Hancher and the other individuals identified in Respondent's Expert Rebuttal 

Disclosures, served December 12,2014. The substance of Mr. Hancher's expected testimony is 

provided in his expert report, dated April 30, 2014, which report was sent to you on May l, 

2014. A summary of the expert rebuttal testimony expected to be provided by Messrs. Becker 

and Savastano was provided in Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures.' The qualifications of 

Mr. Hancher to serve as an expert are described in paragraphs l and 2 of his expert report and in 

1 As noted, Messrs. Becker and Savastano will also testifY as fact witnesses and may provide 

opinion testimony under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 

2 
Exhibit 1 thereto. Mr. Becker holds a Bachelor of Science Aeronautical Engineering Degree 

from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a Masters of Business Administration from 

Xavier University and has been licensed by the State of California as a professional engineer. 

Mr. Becker has 28 years of experience in the aeronautical fteld. Mr. Savastano is a licensed 

airframe and powerplant mechanic and a graduate of Barry University. Since 1980 Mr. 

Savastano has held of number of manager, department head, a..11d vice president positions at fi_~_"'1l1s 

holding Parts 135, 121 and 145 authority. At AMES, Mr. Savastano is responsible for all Part 

145 MRO activities in connection with four major product lines, namely, heavy maintenance, 

line maintenance, component repair and overhaul, and engineering. Prior to joining AMES, Mr. 

Savastano was the Vice President of Airline Maintenance and CCIA. 

Dated: December 23, 2014 

Respectfully submitted, 

SILVERBERG, GOLDMAN & BIKOFF, L.L.P. 

Attorneys for 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

::G&N"7U 

3 

Robert P. Silverberg, Esq. 

1101 30'h Street, N.W. 

Suite 120 

Washington, D.C. 20007 

Tel: (202) 944-3304 

Fax: (202) 944-3306 

Email: rsilverberg@sgbdc.com 
Exhibit 5 

Transcript Pages from Deposition of 

Frank Lipinski, taken Dec. 18, 2014 
In The Matter Of: 

In the matter of Airborne Maintenance and Engineering 

Frank Lipinski 

December 18, 2014 

LYON REPORTING, INC 

Certified Court Reporters 

P.O. Box 81124 

Atlanta, Georgia 30366 

770/458-5500 800/767-2030 

Original File 121814airb-jlp.txt 
1 

2 

3 

BEFORE THE 

US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

4 In the matter of: ) Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

) FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 

5 AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND) 

ENGINEERING SERVICES, ) 

6 ) Administrative Law Judge 

Respondent ) J.E. Sullivan 

7 ) 

8 

9 FRANK LIPINSKI 

10 

11 Deposition of FRANK LIPINSKI taken on behalf of 

12 Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services, at the 

13 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional 

14 Counsel, Southern Region, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College 

15 Park, Georgia, commencing on December 18, 2014, at 

16 9:25 a.m. before Jennifer L. Pope, Certified Court 

17 Reporter and Registered Professional Reporter. 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

Certified Court Reporters 

P.O. Box 81124 

Atlanta, Georgia 30366 

770/458-5500 800/767-2030 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

1 
1 anything like that as a factor for the flying doors. 

2 But I put the demand on Capital to provide all gear 

3 maintenance from the time, including the AMES and 

4 any subsequent work. And what I got was what I got. 

5 Q. Well, in some instances, a tire change 

6 main landing gear tire change does require the 

7 movement of the flying door, does it not? 

8 A. Yes. I can speak to that. 

9 Q. And did you determine with respect to each 

10 of the three aircraft whether or not there had been 

11 any tire changes that would require access to the 

12 and the movement of the flying door in order to 

13 facilitate the tire change? Did you look at that? 

14 A. No. It wouldn't have been something --

15 32-45-01 gives the procedures to change a tire. And 

16 two bolts are taken out of an arm. The arm is 

17 extended to red being shown, and it's put back. So 

18 it really wouldn't have anything to do with the 

19 flying doors, other than -- if the maintenance is 

20 done like it's supposed to be done, 32-45-01. 

21 There's probably hundreds of tire changes. 

22 Q. Are you talking about -- not these three 

23 aircraft over the course of the months, but several 

24 tire changes? 

25 A. Well, you could imagine in that many 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

53 
1 cycles -- what you get out of a tire? 

2 THE WITNESS: 30, 40 landings, Jim, maybe? 

3 30, 40 landings maybe out of a tire. Maybe 

4 more, if it's serviced properly and nobody hit the 

5 breaks and the anti-skid works properly. 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

Anyway, the long of the short of it is 

there would have been multiple tire changes. I 

can't speak to 287 because I don't think it had that 

many cycles on it. I don't know for sure. But I 

know there was an issue with one of the two doors. 

BY MR. SILVERBERG: 

Q. So with respect to tire changes, wheel 

changes, brake changes, you didn't consider the 

implications of those changes and whether or not 

somebody correctly or incorrectly went about their 

duties to see whether or not they may have damaged 

the flying door? 

A. No. 

Q. 

A. 

factor. 

You didn't consider that at all? 

No, not at all. It wouldn't have been a 

If they were changed properly, it wouldn't 

have been a factor. 

Q. If they were changed properly? 

A. 

Q. 

That's right. 

If they were not changed properly 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

54 
1 

2 

3 

4 

Q. And, in fact, you chastise -- in Section B, 

this Exhibit 1, you chastise AMES for its response. 

But in the paragraph we were just looking at, you 

don't note that some of the conclusions of Capital 

5 were being contradicted. Is that correct or not? 

6 MR. STEVENSON: I'm going to object on lack 

7 of a factual basis, unless there's a -- you have a 

8 reference to chastising AMES's response. 

9 MR. SILVERBERG: We'll get there. 

10 MR. STEVENSON: If you'd point that out. 

11 Okay. So I'm going to object on the basis 

12 that we're asking about a fact not in evidence. 

13 MR. SILVERBERG: Section B is in evidence, 

14 and it does contain those statements. And we'll 

15 talk about them. 

16 MR. STEVENSON: If you'd like to ask the 

17 witness a question about why he said something in 

18 Section B, why don't you point him to that question. 

19 Why don't you point him to that statement so he 

20 knows what you're talking about. 

21 MR. SILVERBERG: I've asked him whether or 

22 not he's included any reference to the 

23 contradictions between the two carriers -- sorry 

24 between the carrier on the one hand and the 

25 maintenance provider on the other. 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

81 
1 THE WITNESS: I see what you're talking 

2 about on page 2, and it looks like it speaks only to 

3 the Capital response, as you indicated. 

4 BY MR. SILVERBERG: 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

Okay. 

Okay. That's fine. 

Page 3, sir. 

Okay. I'm there. 

And we had talked a little bit about the 

10 information that's contained in this second full 

11 paragraph on page 2 -- excuse me, page 3. 

12 And here we've got -- you recite the number 

13 of cycles that were amassed with respect to each 

14 aircraft 

15 

16 

A. 

Q. 

Yes. 

-- between the main landing gear change and 

17 the inspection that you performed? 

18 A. That's correct. Data provided me from 

19 Capital for the aircraft usage. 

20 Q. Now, we also talked about the air return, 

21 the aerodynamic buffeting. 

22 A. Yes. 

23 Q. Did you see any other evidence of any 

24 write-ups with regard to the doors not being 

25 properly faired, any aerodynamic concerns raised by 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

82 
1 Q. But ultimately you did amend the Capital 

2 Cargo ops specs to include AMES as a provider or 

3 potential provider of heavy maintenance? 

4 

5 

A. 

Q. 

Yes. 

And you did that based on the results of 

6 your inspection? 

7 

8 

A. 

Q. 

Uh-huh. Yes. 

And you found they had the organization 

9 necessary to support the operation? 

10 A. And if they didn't have enough people, they 

11 were hiring contractors through reputable industry 

12 contracting to man themselves appropriately to 

13 perform the maintenance. But they had the 

14 inspection department in place, and they had 

15 engineering in place and inspection -- and --

16 Q. The quality? 

17 A. Yeah. Well, their inspection department 

18 and quality, I think, are tied into each other. But 

19 they had those tools in place, so we added them to 

20 the D-91. 

21 Q. And you did that. 

22 Were there any qualifications associated 

23 with that, other than, you know, the scope of the 

24 work that they were able to perform under the 

25 limitations section of their authority? 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

165 
1 up. 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

Q. And didn't they make some training 

materials up? 

A. They made training materials for 

themselves. 

Q. Okay. 

A. For themselves. 

that said used the AMM. 

the AMM. 

Capital had a task card 

That's what it said, use 

Q. But, in fact, you can amplify on that and 

11 provide detailed task cards and help the mechanic? 

12 A. A repair station did that. 

13 Q. And that's what they did; right? 

14 A. Okay. So if the repair station is doing 

15 that -- okay, if they're doing that and they're 

16 trying to be sincere -- that's all after the fact 

17 but they're trying to be sincere -- I have no basis 

18 to take them off the ops specs, which answers your 

19 question; correct? 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

Q. And yet in Section B you listed under 

corrective action, none? 

A. That's correct. 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

Okay. Which is not factually correct? 

That's correct. 

Did you view that -- was the services that 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

198 

Exhibit 6 

AMES Discrepancy Notices and CCIA 

Corrective Action Record for Tubular 

Bearing on N287SC 
R-2 

O?Fl!U09 

DISCREPANCY NOTICE NQ 020293 

TO: 

CC: 

Ryan Dailey 

Todd Norton 

DEPT: Heavy Maintenance ILN C-Ck 

DATE: 

CATEGORY: 

6/8/2010 

Minor 

!J)]§CRlPTIONDFbiscg§pA~C:YhirpJZEQUIRED (:_QRREC'IIYE:i\C:IION . .. . . . ... _ CCIA CAR issued to AMES,# QAAILN001. During investigation of CCIA customer aircraft, N287SC, high frequency 

vibration, tubular bearing in the R MLG, PIN 65-72761-36, S/N 8H68, was found to be missing. Aircraft was at 

AMES for C-Check in March 2010. Boeing 727 MM gear installation ( AL) signed as completed by employee# 

350365, Todd Norton. Partial work sheet no. 3, entry no. 20. AL (11) of the Boeing MM 32-11-00 calls for check that 

tubular bearing is in position in door actuation rod fitting on drag strut. Return completed discrepancy notice to 

AMES Quality Assurance to the attention of Marlene C. Hewitt no later than 06-15-10. 

~br{RECTIYEACTIO]\f(S) ACCO:tv1PLIS}Il~_D .••. 

Employees required to comply with 727 flying door install and adjustment computer based training course. 

lgONTRIBUTING FA~T,()_R$~Aj\1J) AJ;LAl,I_SIS _ . ·-- _ ..... __ _ __ ~-·· Please consider each of the following factors and indicate whether they were contibnting (YES) or not (NO) or did 

not apply (N/ A). ALL ITEMS MOST BE MARKED. 

LACK OF TIME No 

TRAINING No 

COMMUNICATIONS No --'--

EXPERIENCE No --'--

Explnin any factors marked "YES11 

MANPOWER No 

DOCUMENTATION No 

PROCEDURES _No_~ 

SUPPORT {OTHER DEPT) _N_o _ 

PARTS/MATERIALS _:_:No::.__ 

TOOLING No 

HUMAN ERROR No 

OTHER Yes 

This \ask was performed lAW \he G'/2'1 AMM. The opcrotor representative \'tos onsite and witnessed all gear swings and door 

adjustments ol the time of gear change. It is our position thol this bearing was lost or misplaced during maintenance after it 

deported our facility. 

\Vhat actions were taken or recommendations can you suggest that could prevent a reoccurrence not just in this situation, but 

across the entlre operation? 

To ensure ulten\ion lo deloil, AMES developed a course spccificu!ly to the remove ond replace, and adjustment of the flying gear 

door and mandated all technicians cornp!e\e \he course. 

U<ETURN TI·I!S FORM W!THIN-:iDAYS FROMDATEISSUEb wrrHREQviESTEDINFORMATIONTO: . " ~ ~~;_;.. ' • L ···~ "',,·.~ • • • •• ' o:" .. ,~ ,.,• ·- • 

MARLENE C. HEWITT, QUALITY ASSURANCE, ILN, IOOSB . . ,..~-·-· .......... ··--·--... ·--. . -··· .. ·-·····-.. --......... -- ..... ··- .. ·- ... . _ ..... . 

JSSUEDBY: Original signed by: 

Marlene C. Hewitt ANSWERED BY: RYAN DAILEY 350044 

Nmne Employee# 

DAN BOGGS 350009 6/11/2010 

Supervisor's Name Date 

Supervisor must review compktcd fonn with employee before signing. 
Airborne Mx DISCREPANCY NOTICE NQ Q20293 

TO: Ryan Dailey 

CC: Todd Norton 

DEPT: 

DATE: 

Heavy Maintenance ILN C-Ck 

6/8/2010 

FROM: Marlene C. Hewitt CATEGORY: Minor 

l"' : :' -·- _, ...... · -. .·, •"" _-- " : - 'L' .. - ··:· ': ._.,. · -, ·:~. _ ' • 

©~SQRJ!2I!QliQ1lPIS<:;]ZI;P?;l'{C,YAND.]ZEQUT]ZEDgQIQ\J3<:;TlYE.ACTION_ 

CC!A CAR isstJcd to AMES,# QAAlLNOOJ. During investigation of CCIA customer aircraft, N287SC, high fi·equency 

vibration, tubular bearing in the R MLG, PIN 65-72761-36, SIN 8H68, was found to be missing. Aircraft was at AMES for CCheck in March 2010. Boeing 727 MM gear installation ( AL) signed as completed by employee# 350365, Todd Norton. 

Partial work sheet no. 3, entry no. 20. AL (II) of the Boeing MM 32-11-00 calls for check that tubular bearing is in position in 

door actuation tod fitting on drag strut. Return completed discrepancy notice to AMES Quality Assurance to the attention of 

Marlene C. Hewitt no later than 06-15-10. 

(}~(!'ItA tJ l.-L:.-lflL~ iJ 1\"S p-; ~ 1/'t-; ;.../ (, Conti,tut on bad: 

CON'rRIBUTrNOFACTORS·ANDANALYSIS.' 

r . ._." .. , __ .. __ . __ ,_, __ "-·· .... --- --"---·---'"--- --·-··---·- .. -- -· 

Please consider each of the following factors and indicate whether they were contibuting (YES) or not (NO) or did 

not apply (N/A). ALL ITEMS MUST BE MARKED. 

LACK OF TIME i.J(/t MANPOWER tJD PARTS/MATERIALS /j iJ 

TltA!NTNG tJO DOCUMENTATION tJ Q TOOLING ,t} 0 

COMMUNICATIONS iJO PROCEllURES f)O HUMAN ERROR tfi! 

EXPEl\IENCE AID SUPPORT (OTHER DEl'!') ~ OTHER X 

Explain any f1c1orsmarked "YES" 'HI() "Jl1,;f<._ lrHS ().!.r<fP>tW?CJ fMJ ff/tf 7!i72) fn·Gf ttj, ·[7f1f 

OPt:illfiJPr& IZePU5Vt1.il1{l-t Ue 1.0.JS Ofl{lk (l)t1d UJ ifl16\&"1) A1.-L- f.\yl4il 5i.'ultJ(:,5 

!'rt# Ooov !vljc,JhMRti/5 d .. fte -hiu.c o/ C%'t~_r ~tl,l!Je, cr t.J ot><M~ 

\Vhat actions were taken or recommendations can you suggest that could prevent a reoccurrence not just in this situation, but 

across the entire operation? 

({:It t'-l t.:-'' { r,!~l-'--' 

Answered by: 

Employee# 

Employee# 

Supervisor nmst rtwicw coll\jllctcd form with employee before signing.. 

Dnte 
PARTU-\l VVORK SHEET NO. 

R-1BA 

09FEBD9 
AH. 

AI. 

AJ. 

AK. ~AL. 

DDIIF.I~ MAINTENANCE ~1ANUAL 

Install trunnion swivel complete with hydraulic lines (Fig. 404}. 

Connect swivel antirotation strut. 

Connect e lectri cal cable. 

Install flap track fairing. 

Install tnain gear wing doors. 

<1) Place door in position to align Hith hinge halves on structure. 

(2) Insert washers bet\leen lugs of the forward hinges. Position door in 

fore and aft position that ·provides a clearance between lugs of aft 

hinge. 

(3) Insert hollo11 hinge pins and hang door. 

(1,) Place Hashers on bolts, coat bolts ;Jith cor·rosion-preventive 

compound and insert through hinge pins !Jith heads facing aft. Add 

Hasher· and nut to each bolt. 

(5) Tighten nuts and install cotte1· pins. 

(6) Hold do01' clear and place door-actuating rod in position to line up 

with attachment point on door. 

(7) Insert hollow pin th•·ough doop fitting and rod. 

(8) Install a washer on actuation rod attachment bolt, coat bolt with 

corrosion-pr·eventive compound, and insert bolt through hollml pin 

with head facing forward. 

(9) Add a washer and nut. Tighten nut to standard torque and install 

cottel' pin. 

(10) Install actuator •·od support gimbal fitting ·(i"f l'emoved). 

<aJ Install countersunk Hasher on gimbal fitting. 

(b) Install gimbal fitting ·in actuator rod support and measur·e 

total gap between cotrntarsunk washer and support. 

(c) Install shim washers between countersunk HasheJ' and support to 

t·imit gap to a total maximum of 0.006 ±0.003 inoh. 

(d) Install Yashers. Add nut and tighten to 2200•3300 

pound-inches. Install cotter• pin. · 

NOTE: Additional AN960XC1616 >rashers may be used to engage 

cotter pin. 

/(11) Check that removable tubular bearing is 1n posit·ion in 

actuation t•od fitting on drag strut. doo~/ ~2) (13} 

Align actuation rod t'!th fitting on drag strut. 

Insert fiber \lashers between actuation rod lugs and attachment 

fitting. 

EFFECTIVITY------------, 

32-11-00 

1 02 

fWEI!lG. PROPR1ETMY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished ~ark ~ See title page: foo details, 

ALL 

Page 1,22 

Dec 01/05 
DDE-'~ ~~cr' 2?~~ ........... . 

MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

(11,) Place countersunk Hasher on attachment bolt. Coat bolt Hith 

corrosion-preventive compound and insert bolt through rod and 

fitting. 

NOTE: Install shim 1/asheJ'S bet11een fiber Hashers and drag strut 

fitting to limit total maximum gap to .005 +.013 or -.000 

inch. 

(15) Add Hasher and nut. 

(16) Tighten nut to 480-600 inch pounds. 

(17) Install cotter pin. 

<18) Attach bonding jumpers at aft Hing door hinge access door and ¥~~~!:~ 

access doors over forward and aft Hing_ door hing-es. 

<19) 'tid1usCtr:r;;y-·;:;rnii""aoor"<AI1H 3z=rt::rflsifl> :·" · '"···' AM. Service shock strut and lubricate landing gear (Ref. Chapter 12). AN. PJ·essur i ze. hydraulic system and bleed brakes and pneumatic brake system 

(MII•I 32-41-00/201, AW1 32-43-00/201). 

AO. Check hydraulic brake line connections for leaks. 

fiARNING: TO PREVENT PERSONNELL INJURY OR EQUIPNENT DA14AGE DURING 

INTERNAL LEAKAGE CHECKS, KEEP PERSONNEL AND EG.UIPI•1ENT CLEAR OF 

HYDRAULIC COI•IPONENTS THAT CAN 1•10VE. 

AP. Check continuity of skid detectors: 

(1) Airplanes with 2 or 3 INOP lights on antiskid panel. 

(a) Check that circuit breakers on panel P6 a1·e closed. 

(b) Provide electt'ical poJ.Jer to system. 

(c) On pi lots ove1·head panel, place anti skid switches to ON. 

(d) Place SELECTOR switch on front of antiskid control unit in 

inboard position for applicable gear (LI or Rl). Press XDCR 

test switch and check that meter reads in gJ•een band. 

(e) Place SELECTOR switch in outboard posit ion for applicable gear 

(LO or RO). Press XDCR test switch and check that meter reads 

in gt·een band. 

(f) Place SELECTOR sHitch to OFF. 

(g) Remove power from system, if no longer required. 

(2) Airplanes with 4 or 5 REL lights on antiskid panel. 

(a) Release pa1·king brake. 

(b) Check that circuit bJ·eakers on panel P6 are closed. 

(c) Provide electrical poHer to system. 

(d) On pilot's overhead panel, place antiskid switches to ON. 

(e) Place antiskid test sJ.Jitch to INBD. Check that inboard 

indicators show blank and outboard indicators show REL. 

(f) Place antiskid test sHitch to OUTBD. Check that outboard 

indicato1·s show blank and inboaJ'd indicators show REL. 

(g) Apply parking brakes. 

EFFECTIVITY'------------.! 32 11 DO 

~'"' :~. "'"' " ·~· .• ' '" " -· "''' .,, " ,,. ""' ... ':' .... ". ~; ';, ;; 
[[> INSTALl ME:"TAL WASHERS 

TO LIMIT TOTAL MAXIMUM 

GAP TO 0,008 INCH, 

SEE DETAil A 

G)-..--ATIAGHMENT BOLl 

IJ 

@~COUNTERSUNK 

I \; WASHER FlBF.R WASHER ~ 

~ ,.-1 j -WING DOOR 

ACTUATION Ctb) If.. J} ACTUATOR ROO 

ROD ATfACHMENT ~ l). , 

FITflNG ON ~ Je<: DRAG STRUT I I """ 

. 0 i : I 

TUBULAA---B @·-··-WAStiE~l eEARINO ~ rb'l 

FIBEH c:t::V: 

WASHER y 

I 

DETAIL A 

~ling Door Actuation Rod Drag Strut Attachmont 

Figure 401 

EFFECTIVITY------------, 

ALL 

01 

32-11-00 

Page 1,04 

Dec 01/05 BOEH!t PROPRIETARY- Ccpydght (C) -. Unpubtish<!cl Work- See tltla pagn for- details, 

I 

r 

I 

I 

I 

I 
DATE . 6/10/10 

TIME 14:57:23 

Employee NO: 350365 

Title: A& P 'I'ECH 

Last Name: NORTON 

First Name: TODD 

Initial (s) : 

Address: 

City: 

State: 

Postcode: 

Area/Phone: 

ABX AIR INC. 

EMPI.OYEE MASTER FILE INQUIRY 

Drug Test Require: Days Between Test: 0 Date Last: 

Medical Ear: Date Last: 

Medical EYE: Date Last: 

Qualifications?: 

Memo: 0 

Delete: 

F3=Exit 

PGM: P0304 

WKST: ABX16038Al 

USER: MROMCH 

Compliance: 
DATE ,6/10/10 

TIME 14:57:34 

Employee NO: 350215 

Title: A&P TECH 

Last Name: SNAPP 

First Name: DAN 

Initial(s): 

Address: 

City: 

State: 

Postoode: 

Area/Phone: 

ABX AIR INC. 

EMPLOYEE MASTER FILE INQUIRY 

Drug Test Require: Days Between Test: 0 Date Last: 

Medical Ear: Date Last: 

Medical EYE: Date Last: 

Qualifications?: 

Memo:,, 0 

Delete: 

F3=Exit 

PGM: P0304 

WKST: ABX16038Al 

USER: t4ROMCH 

Compliance: 
Ref Discrepancy Notice No 020293 

On 3/21/2010 at the start of my shift I picked up on the installation 

of the RH MLG wing door on A/C N287SC. I looked over the job 

and did not see any obvious problems and completed the 

installation of the door lAW 727MM 32-11-00 step 5(AL)l0 and 

step 5(AL)15 thru step 5(AL)l9. 

Todd Norton 
fLY L'V G\ boo(~ 

url 7lt.-+-T t:YtY 

/fltt;ftd t-A?vDtNC

1 G&-AI( c/f/<f?'JO. 'E-5 ;rJ r!Z-E v 1 Dt-'-S t-tt (57M TbfS, 

AiJt, 1Jf0UW'J t+t<V&- [.::.;Jot-vtJ !" t!JC-Lu..Ot: TlfA:r-- .PA~( oA 

1-t\ :rz;l{A-J smV 

_5J2~''f .S I ~~ rj; o 
-<·-~~ 

if~~· 

(/:~, Capita~argo International 

A I R l I ); ~ S 

CORRECTIVE ACTION RECORD- FORM IEP 01 

Issue to: It-=='-=~- ·-··--···-······-·-·-·· 

Location: ILN 

Risk: 2 Medium Risk 

Issue Date: June 7, 2010 

J.Becker Director of QA ControiJ'Lulll.'"<Jr: QMILN001 

Type: OM 

Class: QRC 

Corrective Due Date: June 17,2010 

Auditor Emp fJ and N<~me • , , 

Auditor: BenJamin Buck Ch1ef Inspector Initial Database Entry: NO 

Deficiency Description: 

See additional information seclion, 

RESPONSE . . . .. ··· . ' .•. /<• .. · · .• : Complete shaded area and return to rhotder(!f!capltalcargo.coni .· :• · ·.. ·i ·: · • ( · · .· 

R6otCa\)se Analysis: . • ·.. · · · · · '· o Chock if additional inforMation ,;'<>!lunGes ~n ~~go 2. 

We'h8ve reVi~w~d non~routine 0004; statements .from the.inspe.CtOrs an? teChn!cl~ms Which s·19n~d toi.th-t:;~:y~;QCk·:a:nt{also. 

e~thanged correspondenc~ wtth BenJamin -Buck in r6gards wha~ other maintenarlce .oppo.rtl)nlties.aftBr ihe air?~_8.tlle.fUh~ __ Afv1ES · 

faCij_ity that r:nax_ ·h~v~ _preseni~d _an exp,osuie for maifltenance p~-ff~rm~~ in th~t area. _se~ ~dditio~al}.~f0imati~_p:, _·:.: · ____ :_-_~ __ : _ .. 

. . . .. ··•·• •·· ···•· .. . . . • . • . . . • ·.·· : ... ' . . • • .. c:• ,,. .· •.• 

'iOirectO-r/Ma_na~er·cori'ebtive Aci1on: ·. . . .. :tlcheCk-tr additionaOnf~r:mauon c·&i~tlnues ~11··Pane 2-. 

'·... ' ' 

Directoi'IMan~!ler: · · . 

Actions Acceptable: 

Follow-up: 

·· • · I implementation Date: · ·. ·· 

Verification Req'd: I On Site: I Follow-up Date: 

• ... ·. 

. 

··. 

Closed: Date: ReisstJed ContJ'act #: ,,,, ... , .............. ----J-'=='----------+~=""--"'==-"~----11 

Verification Accepted: VDRP: CAS: 

Emp #and Dale 

Final Database Entry: 

THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURES ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE FINAL DATABASE ENTRY: 

Vice~President of Fligllt Operations I Datf} Vice-President of Maintenance I Dflfe 

Director of Safety, SectJriJy Regttlc1tory Compliance I Date Manager of Quality Assurance/ Dt'1te 

Manager of Ground & Cargo Ops I Date Manager of lntemal Evaluation Program I Date 

. 

Form-IEP 01 (04122110) Page1of2 
/.~tt'4)~ 

Capltat(i:rgo Intern a tiona l 

II I k l 

CORRECTIVE ACTION RECORD· FORM IEP 01 

Additional information (Continued): 

During the initial high frequency vibration inspection it appeared that the removable tubular bearing was missing from the 

right hand main landing gear drag strut were the wing door actuation rod attaches. The wing door actuator rod was 

removed and It was verified that the tubular bearing was missing. In March 2010 N287SC had the main landing gears 

replaced at our vendor Airborne Maintenance & Engineering Services (A.M.E.S.) in Wilmington, Ohio under A.M.E.S. 

work order number 10840, item 0004 removal and replacement of the right hand main landing gear. This bearing is to be 

removed during the main landing gear removal lAW MM 32-11-00 page 402, paragraph 3, step F. (3) and re-installed 

during main landing gear installation lAW MM 32-11'00 page 422, paragraph 5, step AL. (11 ). The tubular bearing 

installation was signed for by A.M.E.S. maintenance work order 10840, item 0004, step 13. 

During a complete review of all records for this aircraft no other records could be located for the removal of this tubular 

bearing or the wing door actuator rod. A.M:E.S. maintenance was the last certifying agency signing for the installation of 

the tubular bearing up until the aircraft turn back with high frequency vibrations on April16, 2010 and the verification of 

the missing tubular bushing under aircraft log page 88224, item 1, step 6. The tubular bearing could not have been 

installed during the installation of the main landing gear at our vendor facilities Airborne Maintenance & Engineering 

Services (A.M.E.S.) in Wilmington, Ohio. Capital Cargo International Airlines has issued a Corrective Action Report 

(CAR) to A.M.E.S. The completed CAR should include the root cause of the stated issues, the immediate fix put in place, 

and the permanent fix that will be put in place that will remedy future issues of this type. 

AMES response continued: 

A statement from the AMES teclmician states that he recalls installing the tubular bearing. This is also reflected in the 

sign-off on the partial worksheet (entry 20, of page 3). In addition, our investigalion found some turnover steps not clearly 

documented on the partial work sheet. Based on the paperwork signed off and statements provided, AMES cannot 

confirm that the tubular bearing was missing when it left our facility. To prevent the chance of a reoccurrence from 

happening again we have Implemented the following corrective actions: 

1) We have counselled the (2) inspectors involved in ensuring they follow partial work step procedures (per our Heavy 

Maintenance Processes and Procedures Manual) when turning overwork between shifts. 

2) We have issued a MIL (Maintenance Information Letter) to all techn·rcians and inspectors whic11 covers the missing 

tubular bearing found and highlights the maintenance procedures. This is to increase awareness among the technicians 

and inspectors that this issue has occurred and to take additional precautions when performing gear changes on B727's. 

A copy has been allached for your information. 

3) As part of the corrective action to assist CCI A in preventing this from reoccurring, we have developed a draft MLG 

change card for CCIA which includes an additional sign off step and figure added to check for this tubular bearing when 

performing a gear change. As of this date the draft has been sent to CCIA for their review and approval for use . 

. 

Form -IEP 01 (04122/10) Page 2 of2 
R-2 

09l'Ell® 

DISCREPANCY NOTICE NQ 020294 

TO: Mike Hall DATE: 6/8/2010 

CC: Dan Snapp CATEGORY: Minor 

DEPT: Quality Control 

,DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY AND REQUIRED CORRECTIVE A(:TION 

CCIA CAR issued to AMES, #QAAILN001, During investigation of CCIA customer aircraft, N287SC, high frequency 

vibralion, tubular bearing in the R MLG, P/N 65-72761-36, SiN 8H68, was found to be missing. Aircraft was at 

AMES for C-Check in March 2010. Boeing 727 MM gear installation ( AL) signed as inspected by employee# 

350215, Dan Snapp. Partial work sheet no. 3, entry no. 20. AL (11) of the Boeing MM 32-11-00 calls for check that 

tubular bearing is in position in door actuation rod fitting on drag strut. Return completed discrepancy notice to 

AMES Quality Assurance to the attention of Marlene C. Hewitt no later than 06-15-10. 

iCORRECTIVE ACTION(S)A(:(;Q1vi.PLISI-IE]) .. 

Completed 727 geor door training CBT 

'CONTRJBUTING FACTORS AND ANALYSIS 

Please consider each oft he following factors and indicate whether they were contibuting (YES) or not (NO) or did 

not apply (N/A). ALL ITEMS MUST BE MARKED. 

LACK OF TIME No MANPOWER No PARTS/MATERIALS No 

TRAINING No DOCUMENTATION Yes TOOLING No 

COMMUNICATIONS No PROCEDURES No HUMAN ERROR No 

EXPERIENCE No SUPPORT (OTI-IER DEPT) No OTHER No 

Explain mty factors marked "YES11 

Need to moke sure \he prior shill documents what they complete. 

What actions were taken or recommendations can you suggest that could prevent a reoccurrence not just in this situation, but 

across the entire operation? 

Set up o CBT Module about gear door installation and od justrncnt. 

:RETURN TIDS FORM WtTHlN 15 DAYS PROM DATE ISSUED WITH REQUESTED INJ'ORMA TION TO:". 

MARLENE C. HEWITT, QUALITY ASSURANCE, ILN, 1 OOSB ~--~----------------------

ISSUED BY: Original signed by: 

Marlene C. Hewitt ANSWERED IW: DAN SNAPP 350215 

Name Employee# 

ALA~! M. HALL 350016 611412010 

Snpervisor's Name Employee# Dote 

Sttpe-rv!sor must review completed fonn with ClllJ}lo)'CC before signing, 
Airborne Mx DISCREPANCY NOTICE NQ Q20294 

TO: Mike Hall m:PT: Quality Control 

CC: Dan Snapp DATE: 6/8/2010 

FROM: Marlene C. Hewitt CATEGORY: Minor 

fJ;l~~WI!®Jitmiil1~ir~ll~f~,[W~~w.llL~~j{\fL\U_li;:IU:2~1.t~!iw:WiiliBJiiJ!:I•~ CCJA CAR issued to AMES,# QAAJLNOOJ. During investigation ofCCIA customer aircraft, N287SC, high fi·equency 

vibration, tubular bearing in the RMLG, PIN 65-72761-36, SIN 8H68, was found to be missing. Aircrafi was at AMES for CCheck in March 2010. Boeing 727lv!M gear installation ( AL) signed as inspected by employee //3502!5, Dan Snapp. Partial 

work sheet no. 3, enl!y no. 20. AL (II) of the Boeing MM 32-11-00 calls for check that tubular bearing is in ]Josition in door 

actuation rod fitting on dmg stmt Return completed discrepancy notice to AMES Quality Assurance to I he attention of 

Marlene C. Hewitt no later than 06-15-10. 

Please consider each of the following factors and indicate whether they were contibuting (Y&')) or not 

not apply (NIA). ALL ITEMS MUST BE MARKED. 

LACK Of TIME N /A 

TRAINING J,{ \4 

COMMUNICATIONS j,_\ Vi, 

EXPERIENCE h\ \1, 

Explain any factors mnrked "YES" 

rAo<l'V/IvlevJs II) ko)-

MANPOWER {'Jl'\: PARTSIMATER!ALS Allk 

DOCUMENTATION Yf5 TOOLlNG /~lAPROCEDURES }'(If\: HUMAN ERROR f'i IllSUPPORT (OTHER DEPT) /d [\; OTHER -~ 

:r heecl f,, "'~<,.Je s·uv-e /-toJ h,,_e @r<OV 

~\W&~~tr!2IDrl:it~~ll!$1WJI~~EeNJ:i11J~tlfcr~~ilim~~rw~t:~:rmit~i~~;~~~llJ;lf&wJ•mlfi:ll!Jifl~~~,~m 

MARLENE C.llEWITI, lJAL!T'f'_\~SURANCE, JLN, lOOSB _____ _ 

Answered by: ~ ':))_~ t:t-.. 350 d-1 :5- 0 -/c(-f 6 

.Employee li 

Supen•isor's Signature Date 

Supervisor rnliSt review complet~d fonn ·with employee before signing. 
DA~E 6/08/J.O 

TIME 14:25:58 

Employee NO: 350215 

Title: A&P 'l'ECB 

Last Name: SNAPP 

First Name: DAN 

Initial(s}: 

Address: 

City: 

State: 

Postcode: 

Area/Phone: 

ABX AIR INC. 

EMPLOYEE l;y.STER FILEf INQUIRY ____ _ 

Drug Test Require: Days Between Test: 0 Date Last: 

Medical Ear: Date Last: 

Medical EYE: Date Last: 

Qualifications?: 

Memo: 0 

Delete: 

F3=Exit 

PGM: P0304 

WKST: ABX16038Al 

USER: MROMCH 

Compliance: 
PARTIAL WORK SHEET ~\!0. __ c:3 ______ _ 

DlSCREPANCY: CORRECTIVE ACTION: 

----- ------·---·-----------! 

------------------~----1 
HOE§~~ 

MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

All, Install tr·unnion sHivel complete uith hydraulic lines (fig. 404). 

Al. Connect swivel antirotation strut. 

AJ. Connect electrical cable. 

AK. Install flap track fairing. 

--7 AL. Install rnai n gear- Hing doOJ~s. 

C1) Place door in position to align 11ith hinge halves on structur·e. 

(2) Insert washers between lugs of the for>wrd hinges. Position door· in 

fore and aft position that pr•ovides a clearance bet11een lugs of aft 

hinge. 

C3) Insert hollow hinge pins and hang door. 

C4l Place washers on bolts, coat bolts with corr·osion-preventive 

compound and insert through hinge pins with heads facing aft. Add 

washer and nut to each bolt. 

(5) Tighten nuts and install cotter pins. 

(6) Hold door clear and place door-actuating rod in position to line up 

with attachment point on door'. 

<7) Insert hollow pin through door fitting and rod. 

(8) Install a ;rashe1· on actuation rod attachment bolt, coat bolt with 

corr·osion-preventive compound, and insert bolt through hollo11 pin 

vi th head facing forward. 

(9) Add a washer and nut. Tighten nut to standard torque and install 

cotter pin. 

(10) Install actuator rod support gimbal fitting (if removed). 

(a) Install countersunk washer on ~limbal fitting. 

/<11) 

~2) (13) 

Cbl Install gimbal fitting in actuator rod support and measure 

total gap between countersunk washer and support. 

(c) Install shim washers between countersunk washer and suppor't to 

limit gap to a total maximum of 0. 006 ±0. 003 inch. 

Cdl Install washers. Add nut and tighten to 2200-3300 

pound-inches. Install cotter pin. 

NOTE: Additional AN960XC1616 washers may be used to engage 

cotter pin. 

Check that removable tubular bear'ing is in position in 

actlJation rod 'fitting on drag strut. 

Align actuation rod ~with fitting on drag strut. 

dOOI'/ 

Inser·t ·fiber washers between actuation rod lugs and attachrner1t 

fitting. 

EFFECTIVITY'------------, 

32-11-00 

ALL 

02 Page 422 

Dec 01/05 

SOE.ING PROPR1ETARY- Copyri9ht (C) - UnpUblhhitd \l'ork- See title- page for details. 
-SEE DETAIL A 

INSTALL METAL WASHER$ 

TO LIMIT iOTA!.. MAXIMUM 

GAP TO 0.008 INCH, 

G)--AlTACHMENT BOLT 

lul 

ACTUAT~~:R W~(~~'~@~ ~~~~~~~:~~RROD ROD ATTACHMtJ-.\T ® 

FITIING ON 

DRAG STRUT-~ I Y-' 

. v~3j: I 

TUBULAR _{5'!4-WAStlER 

BEARING __;~ ' ~ r"cb> 

FJOER Q..P 

WASHER ~ 

I 

DETAIL A 

lling Door Actuation Rod Drag Sti'Ut Attachment 

Figure 401 

EFfECTIVITY'-------------, 

ALL 

01 

32-11-00 

Page 404 

Dec 01/05 OOEtllG PROPRIE1ARY - Cc.pyright ~C) .. Unpublished J.'of'k - See title page- 1or dotaits. 
Ref Discrepancy Notice No Q20293 

On 3/21/2010 I came in and got a turnover from the inspector on duty. Then went and 

talked with the mechanics about where they were with the paperwork. I looked over the 

door and didn't see anything out of sink with the paperwork. Completed the install of 

the door lAW 727MM 32-11-00 step S(AL) 10 and stepS (AL) 15 through step 5(AL) 

19. I would like to rcqucstto sec the Logbook pages for the month after the aircraft left 

this maintenance visit. 

Dan Snapp 

1141 

h{).)e/ blfJ •· 

·-r;,n /1)~ t,J 

s/uf)j 

wa..-s·t'z.;f me ul<N4ct7( -~ 

-;-It <!' tlC~V'J/ tt/ a 5 
lv•S'~l ~>Ie})&i·\S. 

dct t1f2 o\ <h~ lrcsl~.llc</:,},,, -<"-<Lf~"·*- ,~J +~c 
~AM \!U30 R.NlE MECHANIC 

llllllllll\lll\llllllllllllillllll 

I IM!IiT!;Ilii.Ht:E & EtH11UE£RH-<O SERVICES CKPT ' 

A/C TYPll/SERIES CUSTOMER PO NON"ROUTINll GENERATED BY viORK ORDER-ZONE-ITEM PAGE 

1287SC B727 900018220 0023 Pl 0004 Pl 1oM o -o oo o~ oo21 1 I 1 

SKIIJlt ES1'.TIME ~1ILESTONE \'i/0 DAT.E STATION BAY AREA sf 

M 3.00 45 03/21/2010 ILN H2 )( 

>1lt4 REF : 

""''- """""""-···---···- ··-····---·" -----------------

"u" ""o : 

-·:·: .. ------ ACCESS PANTI:L8 : 

DISCREPANCY : r4ANUAL AGEAR EX'l'ENGION REQUIRED AFTER LM.G & RMG CHA.NGE PER CUSTOMER REQUES'l' 

T ASHFORD 350194 032HO 

EVALUATION : t-11\NUAL GEAR EXTENSION PER c US TONER REQUEST 350108 

PARTIAL NORK ( I LEAK.~HECK ( I I ENGINE RUN ( I I OPS CHECK ( I 

CORRECTIVE ACTION '_i)r__y__ ;V\ A-AlVI\ l ~Xi t:-U5t 0.\.i c'JF ldLt ;"7H [, - /vl'L C, 

---.. .. ±l'tc,A1 __ )?_·z/<..2_1~ YL. 3<2·~}({_:05) ___ ~,~~'f' _ __5'_[.4) ± G_{[f}.. __________ 

. -- !: l/;oc;:~ 2 ____ ci!!t:Ji ~ - ----·- "--·-·--------·--···----

----·---~--~---·· " - ··················---·- ............. --------------------··------

.. -··-·--·--· -··. -------------- . ··-------------·""· ------- -

----- ------------·- --~----------------------. ---- ······---------------- ------------------------- -- ··- --·-------·----------------

DANGE:R 'l'AG INSTAI..LSD: YES I I NO I I I DANGER TA~ REt·fOVED: YES ( I 

' 

CORRECTED B;-;"'-<i·~- ~--- __ ::;, -· ''GS" I EM Pit ' ;;>,:_S,. .1 ::> ,. - , _____ I• 

II ;::L;<'-!5' DATE , 3 I J.. \ I { D TIME . - ' -

I 

INSPECTED BY : (~ ~0 EMPU : __ }!0lh! ----~-·--- - ----------

DATE : ;/! I /ttc\ "". ' t'l. I ..d:!Z_/0 Tit18 : ,;/,2::,'()·? 

R-2526-0CT -2009 
PAR"f'IAL W'ORKACCOIVfPL!SHED 

C0Hl~CC'1W\! 1\CTIOtJ 

: 

i, 

I 
I /:=-, 1 Capita~:rgo International ...-:;:_,,,. 

" ' ' ' ' " • ' 

. CORRECTIVE ACTION RECORD- FOI'1_M IEP 01 

Issue to: J.Becker Director of Q.A Control Number: OAAILN001 il ---" .... 

Location: ILN Typ<!: QAA 

Risl<: 2 Medium Risk Class: ORC -

' Issue Date: June 7, 2010 Corrective Due Date: June 17, 2010 

1\udltor Emp ii and Nan;e Benjamin Buck Chief Inspector Initial Database Entry: NO Auditor: 

Deficiency Description: 

See additional information section. 

'··. ... < . , ··.·. . , RESPONSE> ...... ·.. . . . . ....... , . .. . · •.. · .. ·.· ..... ·. . .... Comolete sl~aded area and re-turn· to rllofderi'ii.l.CaTJitalcamo.com 

Root'.C~~s6 Amily~is: , ·:· _: -_- -,' _· · _:,_::- _,· :_,_-·. ,.- · _ _ ---. __ ,:"' _, __ '· • :;:--""Check ifactdiU~flal informatio .. n_;~on_tiOues_ on Pa9_~ ~; 

We .. _~aVe reviewed rmn-rouHne000,41 s;tatemf;l'_nts-.fr~m the inspectors and tec_hnidans which sigr)ed forthe wOrk_~lld.I:)ISo 

exChaflgSd ·co_ireSp_pndeilCe\viltl ~_enjall)id'B.uCK,'_in_ re'g.ardS'What other nfaintena:Oce opportullmes after U1_e ~tfcratt left the AMES 

·, 

fricil_ity that lil.~~-~-3\i'~-- Presented iui' CXpoSilre f~'f,rOai?t~~-~ri_OO perf9rrned ·irl'that ~rea:- see addlt1~nat inf6rmatf6~, > _ 

0 

_ • _- ·.,· -

·. . . .. .• • • . ;- • • ; • . • "' . i. . ..... '' •• 

Dire-ctoriManagel' Corrective Action: .. •. •·•··• ~i-9bk If ad(liUoha.l infOrmation conUni.Jes·~~i_paQ:e 2. 

·.· . . . 

•• . · .... • • ! ···/)·. /1 < /.:l ::::. /•' · ... · ... .\ "•: 

Director/Manager: ·-·~ . I \ ,-.,; ; A"L-eA:(L !' .... ' !Implementation Date: C... -g· . .0 

lERS ·········--r---- ··- ·---· 

Actions Acceptable: Verification R<>g'd: On Site: .J Follow-up Date: 

Follow-up: 

! 

Closed: Date: Reissued Contract#: ---·------ ···--···-· 

Verification Accepted: VDRP: CAS: 

Emp #and Date 

Final Database Entry: ..... _ ..

-

THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURES ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE FINAL DATABASE ENTRY: 

Vice-President of Fligbt Operations I Date Vfce-Presfdent of Maintenance I Date 

Director of Safely, Sewrily Regulatory Complimlcel Date Manager of Quafily Assurance I Date 

Manager of Ground & Cargo Ops I Date Manager of fntcmaf Evaluation Program I Date 

··-

Form -IEP 01 (04122110) Page 1 of 2 
CORRECTIVE ACTION RECORD - FORM IEP 01 

Additional information (Continued): 

During the initial high frequency vibration inspection it appeared that the removable tubular bearing was missing from the 

right hand main landing gear drag strut were the wing door actuation rod attaches. The wing door actuator rod was 

removed and it was verified that the tubular bearing was missing. In March 2010 N287SC had the main landing gears 

replaced at our vendor Airborne Maintenance & Engineering Services (A.M.E.S.) in Wilmington, Ohio under A.M.E.S. 

work order number 10840, item 0004 removal and replacement of the right hand main landing gear. This bearing is to be 

removed during the main landing gear removal lAW MM 32-11-00 page 402, paragraph 3, step F. (3) and re-installed 

during main landing gear installation lAW MM 32-11-00 page 422, paragraph 5, step AL. (11). The tubular bearing 

installation was signed for by A.M.E.S. maintenance work order 10840, item 0004, step 13. 

During a complete review of all records for this aircraft no other records could be located for the removal of this tubular 

bearing or the wing door actuator rod. A.M.E.S. maintenance was the last certifying agency signing for the installation of 

the tubular bearing up until the aircraft turn back with high frequency vibrations on Apri116, 2010 and the verification of 

the missing tubular bushing under aircraft log page 88224, item 1, step 6. The tubular bearing could not have been 

installed during the installation of the main landing gear at our vendor facilities Airborne Maintenance & Engineering 

Services (A.M.E.S.) in Wilmington, Ohio. Capital Cargo International Airlines has issued a Corrective Action Report 

(CAR) to A.M.E.S. The completed CAR should include the root cause of the stated issues, the immediate fix put in place, 

and the permanent fix that will be put in place t11at will remedy future issues of this type, 

AMES response continued: 

A statement from the AMES technician states that he recalls installing the tubular bearing. This is also reflected in the 

sign-off on the partial worksheet (entl)' 20, of page 3). In addition, our investigation found some turnover steps not clearly 

documented on the partial work sheet. Based on the paperwork signed off and slatements provided, AMES cannot 

confirm that the tubular bearing was missing when it left our facility, however, in the spirit of doing our part to prevent the 

chance of a reoccurrence from happening again we have implemented the following corrective actions: 

1) We have counselled the (2) inspectors involved in ensuring they follow partial work step procedures (per our Heavy 

Maintenance Processes and Procedures Manual) when turning over work between shifts. 

2) We have issued a MIL (Maintenance Information Letter) to all technicians and inspectors which covers the missing 

tubular bearing found and highlights the maintenance procedures. This is to increase awareness among the technicians 

and inspectors that this issue has occurred and to take additional precautions when performing gear changes on B727's, 

A copy has been attached for your information. 

3) As part of the corrective action to assist CCIA in preventing this from reoccurring, we have developed a draft MLG 

change card for CCIA which includes an additional sign off step and figure added to check for this tubular bearing when 

performing a gear change. As of this date the draft has been sent to CCIA for their review and approval for use. 

Form -IEP 01 (04/22110) Pago 2 of 2 

Exhibit 7 

Authorized Release Certificates, FAA 

Form 8130-3, Airworthiness Approval 

Tags, issued by ATI Aviation Services, 

LLC for LH MLG on N899AA and 

N898AA 
---------~--~---

viatklo 

: 

ates 

nd Address: 

2. '\ 

:.:A_UTllrORIZED RELEASE CERTIJFICATE 

r·-;:···• ·.• ~r J!'~Fo~m8l31J-3,Al.RWORTHINESSAPl'ROVALTAG 

·~:·• 

-~,N' 

rvices, LLC, 12401 TaftiAvenue; Cieveland, Ohio 44108 (OQTR977Y) 

i' 

OMS Control No. 212(}-{1018 

091301~007 

3. Fonn Tracking Number! 

A TI-0609-2525 

5. WorkOrder7Contri-dl1nvtlice 

Number: ' 

V2525-1'0 09-19844-E 

s~:ription: i:l 8. ;.. _Part »lumber: 9, Eligibility: * 10. Quantity: ! ll Serial/Batch Numb~r: I l:Z. Status/Work: :I..;:;.., .; ,. ~-: 

G Assembly 65-7l761-37 NIA 1 PW017 Overhauled 

.,. ' ...... ~·-;. : 

1 

plete lAW B.AC OHM 32 10-01, Rev.43, Dated 11-01-2005 and OHM 32-11-01, Rev. 40, Dated 11-01-2001. 

ssembly, hub·cap,.wheel and tire assembly, deflector installation and brake assembly, 

Traceability provid-ed on corresponding • .. form .A Tl-011. '. ~ ' 

uested OEM Se;yice En etins and FAA Airworthiness Directives complied with, see ATI Form AAS-005. 

ed was carri'\~ .;ut in ac~r~ance with EASA-145, and in respect to that w~~k, the aircraft component is considered ready 

ice node~ EASA-145 Ac ptance Certificate number EASA.l45.5392. Pertinent details of the work performed is on file at 

 the Sales Order number given in 'block 5. 

' 

dentified above wen ~nufad~,d. in confo~ity to: I 19 .. 1&1 i4 CFR 43.9 Return to Servlc:e 1&1 Other regubltion specified in Block 13 

v~n data and are in a condition toT safe opernHon. 

proved~~diuBloekl. 

Certifies that un1~:Ss othenvise-specified in Block 13, the work iden_tified in Bloc1<.12 

· and described in Block 13 was accomplis bed ID accordance with. Title 14, Code nf 

Federal Regulations, pflrt 43 ana in respect to tlult work, the items are approved for 

return to service. 

ure: ~ovaVAnthorization No,, 10.- Authorized Signature: 

~~4£1/)d 

18. Date(m/~ _, 

' ~I 

'22. Name (Typed or ~td): 

Timothy Aish 

rinted): . ;_-

t· :.i: 

-;,>-•:. ~- ;· 

User/Installer Responsibilities 

,,,,-.--. 

21. App~val!Cerlifil:ate No.: 

OQTrul77Y 

23. Date (m!d/y): 

JUNE 1,2009 

st:n:~.d tbat the exi~tC:nee Atthis do~ument alone does not automaticaU:y constitute anthorily tn instan the part/camponent/:issembly. 

er perform~ work iil·aicOtdiiDce w tb the national regulations of an ainvorthiness authority different than the ainvoithlness authority of the coll~try specified in 

that the. US£rlinstaller ~res, that is:Jber airworthiness authority accepts partslcompnnentslass:eroblie:s fnm the airworthiness authority of the country specified in 

· .-r -" -. ) 

· 

.: : ~-:.. . ; ' 

. 

14 and 19 do not con'~>titJ.tfe Uu:falla~iDn cei"tification. In all eases, aircraft maintenance. records must contain an installation certification issued in accordance with tbe 

y the user/installer ildcli-e thi} 'il"r_rh.ft roa.y be fiown. . · , 

· · . 

! ...... --11 l 

•. 

0 1) *ln~~l~!=-_r~u:~s~cross~k eltgibi!ity with applh:able ~chnical data. 

NSN: 0052-00-012-9005 

Paperwork RedUCtion P4 Statement:: · 

An agency m&Y.ri~i-JJJ~'cifotsponbcr, and a perl!on Js nat reqUired to re~pand to, a c:ollecllcnoflnfotiTiatlon unless H displays a Q\liTenUy valld OMB c:ontrlll nwnber a~soclat!!tl 

~!h thls ecn~~l~!i·.~~~aliM!s *120-0012. Comment!~ eoocnemlng \he-acouracy of lh1s ~den and suggestions fof-red:.tclng the burden should be directei:l to the FAA at 

BOO '"''""~n~:~,::.:.WeTton,_oc '""· A!lno In"""'""' Col"""'" c•''"'"' OFfire<, 1\SA..:!O. · 

~ 
 

OMB Conlrol No. 2120.0018 

- 09/3(1/2007 

l AvlaUon z. 3. Form Tracking Number: 

t.-y: 

States AUTHORIZED RELEASE CERTIFICATE ATI-0709-2531 

FAA Form 813()-3 AIRWORTmNESS AffROV AL TAG 

 and .AdclftSI": 5. Work O.rder/C.atradllnv41oc 

N•mher: 

Services, LLC, 12401 Taft Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44108 (OQTR977Y) V2S31-PO 09-19845-E 

DC:#riptlou.: 8. PartNumHr:: •- ElfgibiUty: "' 10- 4;!oandty: 11. SerlaVBatcll Number. IZ. Statut/WmiH 

G Installation 65-72761-35 N/A 1 6P48 Overhanled 

mplete buildup 65-72761-37 lAW BAC OHM 32-10-01, Rev. 43, Dated 11-01-2005 and OHM 32-11-01, Rev. 40, 

1. Leso transducer assembly, hub cap, wheel and tire assembly, deflector installation and brake assembly. 

35 installation number is for engineering reference only, 

 TraceabUity provided on corresponding fonn A TI-D II. 

quested OEM Service Bulletins and FAA Airworthiness Directives complied with, see ATI Form AAS-005. 

ied was carried out in accordance with EASA-145, and in respect to that work, the aircrall component is considered ready 

vice under EASA-145 Acceptance Certificate number EASA.l4S.S392. Pertinent details ofthe work performed is on file at 

r tbe Sales Order number given in bloek 5. 

 idt:ntfficd. above were maauracturtd to oonfi:Jrmit]l to: 19. 1!9 14CFR43,!itRetumt•Servk:e Other ngulatioa in BJodt 13 

Certifies thai unless otherwise specirwl in 81Q(k ll. tbe work ideatlfitd in Bloek ll 

data and are in a -wndilion for safe -operation, and described Ill. Block 13 wu accompUs•ed hi acunlaru:e wltb Title 14. Cede of 

ed in Block l;l, Feder.al RegulatloM, part 43 and Ia respect to that work. the items arf! spprovm ror 

........... 

rdura to service. 

to. Approvai!Anlhodzatioa: No.: ll. ApprGvai!Certificate No.: 

""'-

. 

--- OQTR977Y -·-

-

rinkd): 18. Date{mfd{9);-..._ 22. Name (Type' Priated); u. Date (mJdty): 

--

... 

--.. Timothy Aish JULY/10/2009 

User/Installer Responsibilities 

rstallld •at tile aislem:e of this documeut .alone does not suhJJI\&tlc:aJlt eoastieate authority fo iastall tbc part/compcmltbt/a5H"mbly. 

&r work ia aa:ordance with file national regulations of an airwerthlntts autllority differe:nt Dian the airworthinCM nuthority orthe cou11try specified in 

hat the IDtrlinttaller eusura that hklllet aut:horit)' aeeep1s parts/eompotteats/assemhlies fmm lhe alrworthinessf.ulhorlty of tile ceuntry specified ia 

4 and l!J do aot constitute Installation cerllftCIItioa. Jo all cues, airc:rafl maintenance record! must contain an installatioa C!ertificalion isSIIM ln accordaoa wUh file 

 tltf: UJt:rlinJtallct before the may be flown. 

I) *Installer must cross-cbccl:: eligibility with appJic.able technical data. NSN: 0052.00-0 12-9005 

Redu!CIIoaAd: Sblemtt;f: 

An 011gancy mllf notcotlducl ar sp<>niOf, •nd • Ill not required Ia fUJIDnd ta. • o:JitJCtlon oflnft:lrmatlan untass it • currenlly writ OMB C0"1lrol r1vmber amc:itltN 

wilh lhiOIII»>Ioclian Dfinfaonelkln i1l 2120.0018. C:Omi1\Cflls c:oocn1minvlho ati:I.JI'liCY arttus burdln .and *lggutlons 101 feli;jl!lng the burden should be direded to !he FAA at 

800 lndep1ndance AW. SW, W•shfllgton, DC 20591, Attn: lnfDrmaliolll Co!L!clion Qeuance OF'ker, ABA-20. 

! 

ff9 g 

Exhibit 8 

Letter from Jeffrey Becker to Frank 

Lipinski, date March 21, 2011 
c 

c 

March 21,2011 

Mr. Frank V. Lipinski 

Principal Maintenance Inspector 

Federal Aviation Administration 

145 Hunter Drive • Wilmington, Ohio 45177 • (937) 382~5591 • www.airbornemx.com 

South Florida Certification Management Office 

5950 Hazeltine National Dr. Suite 410 

Orlando, FL 32822 

Subject: Letter received March 7, 2011 re: Capital Cargo International Airlines (CCIA) B727 Flying Door 

Rigging 

FAA File Number: 201180290032 

Dear Mr. Lipinski: 

This correspondence is in response to your Letter of Investigation dated March 7, 2011 regarding 

installation and rigging of B727 Flying Doors on three CCIA aircraft during maintenance visits from June 

2009 thru March 2010. 

First and foremost we wish to assure you that Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services, Inc. 

(AMES) takes any apparent violation on our part very seriously. We also take pride in our review of 

systemic issues and the high priority placed on implementing corrective actions to mitigate future 

reoccurrences. In this case, once it became apparent that a valued customer of ours (CCIA) was having 

operational problems, we initiated a very detailed investigation to review all aspects of the issue. This 

was not only to resolve any future problems for AMES but also provide to CCIA the benefit of the results 

of our investigation to share the lessons learned to further help prevent a reoccurrence not only for us but 

for CCIA also. 

A few points in your letter require clarification. The airworthiness release date for each aircraft is listed 

below based on logpage sign-offs. Some of the dates reflected in your original letter where not the dates 

in which the aircraft visit was signed off and released from our facility. 

898AA- 10/24/2009, log page 67 443 

899AA- 8/26/2009, logpage 46202 

287SC- 3/22/2010, logpage 90919 

AMES does not have access to aircraft times and cycles, therefore we cannot confirm the cycles of 

aircraft operation referenced in your letter. 

Additionally, there was one conduit that was in question due to the door rigging issues encountered in the 

three aircraft. This was a R/H anti-skid conduit which was installed on tail number 287SC. The conduit is 

part of the build-up assembly of the gear and AMES technicians did not relocate or alter the routing of this 

conduit prior to installation of the gear on the aircraft (reference Enclosure 1 ). 

The results of our review and actions taken were documented on CCIA's Corrective Action Report #'s 

QAACVG004, QAACVG005 and QAACVG006 (provided as Enclosures 2,3 and 4). The details of the 

investigation and results have been sent to you by CCI A in a letter dated October 25, 2010 in response to 

your letter dated October 4, 2010 (FAA File number 201080290120). We worked very closely with the 

operator to put a corrective action plan together that would prevent the reoccurrence for both our 

operations. I have summarized the AMES corrective action program below: 

1. Developed an online training module MRO-M2-202, 727 MLG Door Training Module (Enclosure 

5). This module was issued to all Heavy Maintenance Technicians, Line Maintenance 

Technicians in CVG, and QC Inspectors. A copy was also provided to CCIA for their use. 
( 

c 

i45 Hunter Drive • Wilmington, Ohio 451 t t • (937) 382-5591 • ww·w.airbornemx.com 

2. The contents of the online training module MRO-M2-202 was incorporated into the AMES 8727 

Systems Initial 40 hr training class. These training materials were also provided to CCIA. 

3. AMES developed and provided to CCIA a detailed MLG removal/installation task card for RH and 

LH sides. This included instructions for rigging the flying doors. These cards include detail 

worksteps with sign offs to prevent a reoccurrence of the issues encountered (Enclosure 6 LIH 

side provided as example). 

I would like to take this final opportunity to restate our commitment to absolute compliance at all times 

throughout our operations. Anything less is simply not acceptable and we are committed to putting in 

place the proper training, processes and procedures to prevent reoccurrences. We hope you find this 

information satisfactory in completing your investigation into this matter. If there is any additional 

information that you may require please do not hesitate to contact me directly. 

Sincerely, 

Jeffrey Becker 

Director, Quality Assurance and Training 

Cc: Alan J. Wilkirnon (FAA, East Michigan FSDO), Billie R. Steffey (FAA, East Michigan FSDO), Brady 

Templeton (AMES, President) 

Enclosure: 

I -287SC RJH MLG FAA form 8130 and relevant CMM section 

2 - CCIA CAR# QAACVG004 

3 - CCIA CAR# QAACVG005 

4- CCIA CAR# QAACVG006 

5- MRO-M2-202, 727 MLG Door Training Module 

6- CCIA Task cards 32-001-01-1 Main Landing Gear- RemovaV!nstallation