\ 

USDA APHIS 

VETERINARY 

SERVICES

November 2021 

Planning and Preparing for

African Swine 

Fever 
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1. WHAT IS ASF? 

• ASF is a highly contagious hemorrhagic viral disease of swine. 

− There is only one recognized serotype of ASF virus (ASFV), p72; and 

there are over 20 identified genotypes of the major capsid protein p72.

− There is no effective treatment for ASF-infected swine, nor is there a 

protective vaccine. 

− ASF is currently widespread and endemic in sub-Saharan Africa, parts of 

western Africa, and has spread through Asian countries, notably China,

Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

− In July 2021, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 

confirmed the presence of African swine fever (ASF) in the Dominican 

Republic, near the Haiti border. 

• ASFV can persistently infect domestic and wild pigs.

− Natural reservoir hosts are warthogs and bushpigs, although infection is 

imperceptible. 

− Soft ticks belonging to the Ornithodoros genus are competent vectors 

and transmit the virus to other ticks or susceptible swine species.

• Clinical signs of ASF are similar to those of classical swine fever and require 

a differential laboratory diagnosis.

• ASF presents in four clinical disease forms (peracute, acute, subacute, and 

chronic) which are classified based on strain virulence, immune status, 

clinical signs, and gross lesions.

• Pigs with a highly virulent strain of ASFV typically experience fever, loss of 

appetite, depression, abnormal breathing, shivering, possible cough, 

unsteadiness when standing, spontaneous abortion in pregnant sows, 

blueish-purple extremities in white-skinned pigs, hemorrhages of the ears 

and abdomen. 

• Morbidity is high in domestic pigs; mortality varies by disease form—young 

pigs, in particular, experience high death rates with the acute form of ASF.

2. IS ASF A THREAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH?

• ASF is not a threat to public health and does not infect humans.

OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN SWINE FEVER (ASF)
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• ASF is not a food safety concern—properly prepared meat is safe to eat.

• In a widespread ASF outbreak, the supply of swine protein available for 

consumers could be affected.

3. DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE ASF?

• The United States is currently free of ASF.

• The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have never

experienced an ASF outbreak.

• USDA created a foreign animal disease protection zone in Puerto Rico and 

the U.S. Virgin Islands to provide an additional layer of safety beyond 

existing controls to safeguard the U.S. swine herd and protect the interests 

and livelihoods of U.S. pork producers.

• With the protection zone established, APHIS has established processes in 

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to:

− Restrict movement of live swine and products out of the protection 

zone. 

− Conduct appropriate surveillance within the protection zone to quickly 

detect introductions of disease.

4. WHERE HAS ASF HISTORICALLY BEEN FOUND IN THE 

WORLD?

• ASF is currently widespread and endemic in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of 

western Africa.

• ASF is present in nearly one-fifth of countries in the world.

5. HAVE THERE BEEN RECENT ASF OUTBREAKS IN THE 

WORLD?

• In the last decade, ASF has spread through Eastern Europe and the 

Caucasus. Since 2018:

− Ten European Union Member Countries had ASF outbreaks in domestic 

pigs.

− Four other European countries had ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs.

− Twelve 2018 European Union Member Countries had ASF outbreaks in 

wild boar.
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− Four other European countries had ASF outbreaks in wild boar.

− Fifteen Asian countries had ASF outbreaks in domestic swine.

6. WHO IS CONCERNED ABOUT ASF? 

• ASF is a high priority for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). 

• ASF is of significant concern for State Animal Health Officials, swine

producers, and many other stakeholders in animal agriculture.

7. WHY IS ASF SO CONCERNING?

• ASF is a contagious and lethal disease of swine species. 

• As of September 2021, the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service 

identified an inventory of 75.4 million hogs and pigs in the United States. 

− Breeding inventory: 6.19 million head.

− Market hog inventory: 69.2 million head.

− Pig crop: 33.9 million head. 

• An outbreak of ASF in the United States would have a substantial and 

devastating impact on the agricultural economy and consumers. 

• ASF outbreaks in other countries have had a significantly negative impact 

on their economies.

• Research suggests epidemic outbreaks of ASF result in tremendous 

economic burden, depending on the duration of the outbreak, extent of 

trade embargoes, and reaction of consumers to the disease and response 

measures.

8. WHY IS ASF SO ECONOMICALLY DAMAGING?

• In an ASF outbreak of any size, there would be immediate disruptions to 

international exports of meat, meat products, and byproducts of swine. 

• In a large, multistate ASF outbreak, international trade would be severely 

impacted, potentially for an extended period. 

RELEVANCE OF ASF
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• There would also be losses from disruptions to interstate commerce and 

production.

− Highly integrated animal agriculture relies on rapid and just-in-time 

movements.

− Disruption (e.g., movement standstill orders) of animal and product 

movement could interrupt food supply chains in both the short- and 

long-term. 

• The direct costs of controlling an outbreak would be high: indemnity 

payments could be large, and activities such as depopulation and humane 

euthanasia activities for animal welfare, carcass disposal, and disinfection 

are resource and personnel intensive.

• In addition to direct costs, there are numerous indirect costs and impacts, 

including unemployment and losses or disruptions in related industries 

(such as grain, other feed products, tourism, etc.).

9. WHAT DOES USDA APHIS PLAN TO DO IN AN ASF

OUTBREAK?

• USDA APHIS will work to achieve its goals for an ASF response. These goals 

are to: 

− Goal 1: Detect, control, and contain ASF in swine as quickly as possible; 

− Goal 2: Eradicate ASF using strategies that seek to stabilize animal 

agriculture, the food supply, and the economy, protect public health and 

the environment; and 

− Goal 3: Provide science-and risk-based approaches and systems to 

facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals and noncontaminated animal products. 

• Achieving these goals will allow individual livestock facilities, States, Tribes, 

regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as possible.

• USDA APHIS, by achieving these goals, will help ensure the United States 

regains ASF-free status and reestablishes international trade without the 

response effort causing more disruption and damage than the outbreak 

itself.

USDA APHIS RESPONSE STRATEGY
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• USDA will work with other Federal agencies, States, Tribes, and Territories 

to manage and control the outbreak in a unified approach alongside the 

owners, producers, industries, and communities affected.

• USDA—as part of a cohesive communications strategy—will assure 

consumers that USDA is responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the 

virus and that meat/meat products are safe to consume.

10. WHAT IS THE ASF RESPONSE STRATEGY? 

• The United States’ primary response strategy for ASF in swine is the 

establishment of quarantines and movement controls with eradication by 

stamping-out. 

• ASF is only controlled and eradicated by depopulation (also known as 

stamping-out) infected animals.

− Stamping-out consists of depopulation of clinically affected swine and, 

as appropriate, swine that are directly exposed to the virus.

− Depopulation and disposal of pigs on Infected Premises must be 

conducted with biosecurity, to prevent further viral spread.

11. WHAT ARE CONTROL AREAS, CONTACT TRACING, AND 

NETWORK-BASED CONTROLS? 

• APHIS acknowledges there will be significant challenges to eradicate ASF, 

depending on outbreak severity. 

• An ASF outbreak may involve both domestic swine and/or feral pigs. Thus, 

movement control measures are critical, as ASF is readily spread by 

infected swine and contaminated fomites. 

• Science- and risk-based movement controls are essential to ensure minimal 

business disruption and allocation of resources for response. 

• Contact tracing and network-based controls (NBC) will be emphasized in 

addition to Control Areas. 

• Contact tracing and NBCs will target high-risk Contact Premises for 

immediate investigation and testing.

• Once infected premises are detected, contact tracing and Network-based 

controls will be employed to identify additional infection and reduce 
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transmission through the application of movement controls to 

epidemiologically-linked Contact Premises.

• Upon ASF detection in domestic or feral swine, Control Areas will be 

established around Infected Premises and/or the location of infected feral 

pigs. 

− Control Areas, supported by quarantine and movement controls, are 

established to reduce the risk of susceptible swine from coming into

contact with ASFV. 

− The size and number of Control Areas will vary based on infected 

population(s) (i.e., commercial, backyard, or feral), the epidemiological 

information available, and the risk of ASFV transmission through swine, 

fomites or vectors.

− A positive ASFV detection will minimally require a 5-kilometer Control 

Area; consisting of a 3-kilometer Incident Zone, 2-kilometer Buffer Zone, 

and a 5-kilometer Surveillance Zone in the Free Area. 

• Epidemiological assessments must be completed to determine the extent 

of the outbreak.

− This entails the identification and prioritization of epidemiologicallylinked Contact Premises (also known as network premises), surveillance 

for contact, sick and dead feral swine.

− Feral swine found near ASF-infected domestic swine may be 

depopulated.

− All domestic swine premises, infected or non-infected, should take 

additional biosecurity precaution to prevent contact between feral 

swine and domestic swine.

• Response strategies will be adjusted to best fit the outbreak situation.

12. WILL THE USDA DECLARE AN EXTRAORDINARY

EMERGENCY TO CONTROL AN ASF OUTBREAK? 

• A feral or domestic ASF outbreak will have immediate and serious negative 

interstate commerce and international trade impacts. 

• USDA plans to issue a declaration of extraordinary emergency to enhance 

response readiness and provide appropriate resources to impacted States 

and Tribes. 
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• It is important to emphasize an effective response to an ASF outbreak in 

the United States, will require unity of effort and unity of purpose from 

States, Tribes, private sector, and USDA.

• No single entity can conduct an ASF response alone, but we can effectively 

respond together.

• Depending on outbreak jurisdiction, response actions and authorities begin 

with the State or Tribe, with supporting USDA coordination, resources, and 

authority. 

• There is currently no approved vaccine available in the United States for 

ASFV in domestic swine. 

13. WHAT IS THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT STANDSTILL? 

• USDA plans on issuing a 72-hour National Movement Standstill for a 

detection of ASF in domestic swine and/or feral swine. 

− This movement standstill is only for live swine and swine germplasm – 

not for pork or pork products that have passed FSIS inspection.

− All swine in transportation at the start of the movement standstill will 

continue to their destination or return to point of origin. 

− There will be a standardized start and stop time for the national 

standstill.

− A National Movement Standstill will allow States, Tribes, and industry to 

begin collecting critical information for a unified approach for an ASF 

response.

• Initial critical activities include communicating situation awareness, 

conducting high priority contact tracing, establishing Control Areas, and 

conducting critical national and international communications. 

• USDA wants to emphasize the National Movement Standstill only applies to 

live swine or germplasm that are not in movement at the time of issuance.

• USDA will issue a National Movement Standstill for 72-hours through 

communications with State Animal Health Officials and public 

announcements. A Federal Register Order will follow within 10 days.

• The actual duration of a National Movement Standstill may vary depending 

on the epidemiological circumstances of the outbreak.
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• In the event of a movement standstill, USDA will provide clear and concise 

policy guidance on the implementation and provisions.

− Specific geographical area or boundary (e.g., Nationwide, or other).

− Specific requirement that all live swine in transit at issuance must reach 

a destination.

− Specific time indicating the duration of a standstill (e.g., 72-hours).

− Specific list of what items are restricted from movement (e.g., live swine 

and germplasm). 

− Specific list of what items are exempt from movement restrictions (e.g., 

negligible risk FSIS-inspected products).

14. IS THE UNITED STATES DOING ANYTHING TO KEEP ASF

OUT OF THE COUNTRY?

• APHIS has a series of interlocking safeguards to prevent ASF from entering 

the United States. These safeguards include:

o Import restrictions on pork and pork products;

o Increased vigilance from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at 

ports of entry, paying particular attention to cargo, passengers and 

products arriving from China and other ASF-affected countries;

 Travelers who pose an ASF risk will receive a secondary 

agricultural inspection. 

o Added 65 additional detector dog teams for a total of 184 dog teams 

with CBP at key U.S. commercial sea and airports.

 USDA trains dogs at its National Detector Dog Training Center 

in Newnan, Georgia.

 U.S. CBP personnel rely on the dogs to detect illegal 

agricultural products that could carry foreign animal diseases.

• APHIS increased collaboration with states that allow garbage feeding to 

ensure the swine industry follows best practices and increases testing of 

sick pigs in these garbage feeders to include ASF.

• APHIS educates the public on the risk of ASF through outreach measures 

and agreements with academia and States. 

ASF EXCLUSION
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• APHIS enhanced the capacity of our National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network, and are actively engaged in expanding testing capabilities and

capacity. 

• APHIS also implemented a surveillance plan in 2019, and continues to work 

with the swine industry, states and veterinary diagnostic laboratories to 

test for ASF.

15. IF WE ARE DOING SO MUCH TO ENSURE ASF DOESN’T 

ENTER THE COUNTRY, WHY DO WE NEED TO PREPARE 

FOR AN ASF OUTBREAK?

• There is always the risk of an ASF introduction into the United States.

− ASF is highly contagious and there is an increasing volume of 

international travel and trade.

− Due to the volume of legal products entering the United States, it is 

impossible to search and inspect every shipment, piece of baggage, or 

person entering the country for illegal products.

− There is an unknown quantity of illegal animals and animal products 

entering the United States that may contain ASFV. 

− It is also possible ASF may be introduced intentionally or accidentally.

− To successfully execute an ASF response, we must prepare and plan 

ahead of time; this also helps USDA prepare to respond to other 

significant animal health incidents.

16. WHAT IS USDA APHIS DOING TO PREPARE FOR AN ASF

OUTBREAK?

Investigations & Monitoring 

• USDA APHIS trains veterinarians to recognize ASF in domestic swine. 

• USDA APHIS, in coordination with State Animal Health Officials, actively 

investigates suspected U.S. cases of vesicular lesions and classical swine 

fever. 

USDA APHIS ASF PREPAREDNESS
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• USDA APHIS coordinates with the National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN) so that NAHLN laboratories can run preliminary 

diagnostic testing during an investigation of hemorrhagic diseases . 

• USDA APHIS also monitors disease outbreaks occurring around the world 

for situational awareness.

Capability Development

• The National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) develops and 

improves diagnostic tests to improve early detection and overall diagnostic 

capabilities; NVSL also coordinates with USDA’s Agriculture Research 

Service to update science and information related to diagnostics.

• NVSL supports NAHLN laboratories—the NVSL Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostic Laboratory—serves as the U.S. reference laboratory to confirm 

ASF in the United States.

• There are approximately 50 State, university, and Federal laboratories 

within the NAHLN that conduct diagnostic testing for African Swine Fever

investigations. 

• Ten (10) of the 49 laboratories are currently approved for active 

surveillance

• The NAHLN has capacity for 57,000 tests/day; or, with approved pooling 

protocol, 285,000 animals/day

• The National Veterinary Stockpile has contracts in place to provide 

veterinary countermeasures, supplies, and equipment—to States, Tribes, or 

Territories in a disease outbreak.

• During a large-scale animal agriculture incident, USDA can leverage 

additional personnel to provide the necessary surge support to States; this 

includes the Voluntary Emergency Ready Response Corps, which draws 

responders from the entire USDA APHIS agency.

• The USDA APHIS National Veterinary Accreditation Program provides USDA 

accredited veterinarians with supplemental training on foreign animal, 

vesicular, hemorrhagic, and other exotic animal diseases, as well as on 

critical response activities and emergency management.

Response Planning
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• USDA APHIS produces a public ASF Response Plan: The Red Book which 

provides a clear strategic framework for ASF response.

• USDA APHIS updates ASF response policy with response strategies to 

include network-based controls and stamping-out strategies. 

• USDA APHIS provides multiple documents to help all responders prepare 

for an ASF outbreak, from investigating a potential case to executing a 

response effort.

• USDA APHIS engages in public-private-academic partnerships to develop 

the Secure Food Supply Plans, which help to facilitate continuity of business 

in an ASF outbreak: these plans use science- and risk-based approaches to 

mitigate disruptions for producers, haulers, and processors in the event of 

an outbreak.

• USDA APHIS develops, utilizes, and improves models and other analytical 

tools that can help inform decision-making prior to and during outbreak 

situations.

Engagement

• USDA APHIS conducts training and exercises with States and private sector 

for ASF preparedness, including the 2019 SFEAR* ASF exercise and the 2021 

Packer exercise series. (*Swine Fever Exercise for Agriculture Response) 

• USDA APHIS conducts stakeholder meetings to discuss and inform ASF

preparedness and response policies. 

• USDA APHIS coordinates with other government agencies to identify 

resources, develop processes and agreements, and foster partnerships to 

support coordinated response efforts across government.

• USDA APHIS is collaborating with non-governmental organizations and 

providing resources to assist the Dominical Republic and Haiti in their ASF 

eradication effort.

• USDA APHIS also works with public and private researchers to discuss and 

improve current ASFV diagnostic tests and vaccine capabilities.

• USDA APHIS routinely engages with bilateral and multilateral trading 

partners on issues of international commerce.

• USDA APHIS engages with international partners, including the World 

Organization for Animal Health [OIE] to harmonize test capabilities, 

collaborate on issues of capacity building, and discuss standards for trade 
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and ASF freedom—particularly reducing the time to freedom when 

response strategies are implemented.

Exercises

• USDA APHIS Veterinary Services has a National Training and Exercise 

Program to build preparedness within VS.

• USDA APHIS conducts exercises to test Incident Command System 

procedures and processes for an ASF outbreak.

• The National Veterinary Stockpile carries out exercises practicing the 

staging of depopulation and disposal support from contractors, should 

these capabilities be required in an outbreak.

• NAHLN conducts tabletop exercises to test laboratory response procedures 

and processes.

17. WHAT ARE USDA’S FUTURE OBJECTIVES RELATED TO 

IMPROVING ASF PREPAREDNESS IN THE UNITED 

STATES?

• USDA APHIS will continue working with stakeholders to define expectations 

and preparedness goals for an ASF outbreak. In doing so, USDA APHIS: 

− Understands requirements and best practices may change by region 

and/or affected animal populations; 

− Is cognizant of the challenges of mass depopulation and disposal as a 

response strategy and is procuring equipment to alleviate disposal 

challenges; 

− Seeks to broaden the stakeholder groups it reaches out to so as to 

generate increased interest and participation in ASF preparedness.

• USDA APHIS will continue to work to improve and expand communication 

to external and internal stakeholders regarding the capabilities required to 

effectively execute ASF response strategies.

• USDA APHIS will continue to participate in exercises and update response 

plans, procedures, and processes with lessons learned.

• USDA APHIS will continue to collaborate to improve diagnostic capabilities 

and veterinary countermeasures.
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18. WHAT PLANS AND PROCEDURES ARE CURRENTLY 

 AVAILABLE FROM USDA APHIS FOR ASFV? 

• APHIS Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Framework (Manual 1-0): Roles and

Coordination

• APHIS FAD Framework (Manual 2-0): Response Strategies

• APHIS FAD Framework (Manual 3-0) Incident Information Management and 

Reporting 

• APHIS FAD Investigation Manual (Manual 4-0)

• APHIS Permitted Movement (Manual 6-0)

• ASF Response Plan: The Red Book

• APHIS Policy Information, including 

− Epidemiology Questionnaire, 

− ASF Chronology and Affected State Checklist, 

− Overview of Finance & Administration Procedures, 

− Appraisal and Indemnity Request Forms, and 

− ASF Herd Plan Template. 

• FAD PReP Standard Operating Procedures (including Etiology and Ecology

and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing, among others)

• ASF Ready Reference Guides

• ASF Infographics in English, Spanish, French, Hmong, and Traditional 

Chinese

− ASF: Know the Signs and Symptoms

− ASF: Don’t Spread this Deadly Disease

− ASF and International Travel

− ASF: Protect your Farm Using Biosecurity

− ASF: Report Feral Swine

− ASF: A Producer’s Guide to the Federal Emergency Response Process 

(English only)

PLANS & FURTHER INFORMATION
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19. WHERE CAN I GET MORE INFORMATION?

• For more information on ASF and foreign animal disease (FAD) 

preparedness, and documents previously referenced, please go to:

− FAD PReP Materials: www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

− APHIS Animal Health Emergency Management: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/emergencymanagement/ct_emergency_management_home.

• For more information on USDA APHIS Veterinary Services, please go to:

− APHIS Veterinary Services Animal Health: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth

− Approved NAHLN Laboratories: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/nahln/downloads/asf_lab_li

st.pdf.

• For more information on the public-private-academic collaborations, please 

go to:

− Secure Pork Supply: www.securepork.org