alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2020287EN.01001901.xml

| 31.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 287/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 287/19

---

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 May 2020 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione — Italy) — Blumar SpA (C-415/19), Roberto Abate SpA (C-416/19), Commerciale Gicap SpA (C-417/19) v Agenzia delle Entrate

(Joined Cases C-415/19 to C–417/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - State aid - European Commission decision declaring an aid scheme compatible with the internal market - National legislation precluding the award of aid under the authorised scheme in the event of non-compliance with a condition not provided for in the Commission decision)

(2020/C 287/27)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Blumar SpA (C-415/19), Roberto Abate SpA (C-416/19), Commerciale Gicap SpA (C-417/19)

Defendant: Agenzia delle Entrate

Operative part of the order

Article 108(3) TFEU, Commission Decision C(2008) 380 of 25 January 2008, ‘State aid N 39/2007 — Italy — Tax credit for new investment in less-favoured areas’, and the principle of proportionality must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State pursuant to which the award of aid, under an aid scheme established by that Member State and authorised by that decision, is subject to a declaration by the applicant that it has not received aid declared unlawful and incompatible by the European Commission, which it has failed to repay or deposit into a blocked account, even though it is not the subject of a request for repayment and despite the fact that that decision does not explicitly provide for such a requirement.

---

(1)  OJ C 328, 30.9.2019.

---
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER  PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350  (AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

In connection with the Annual Report of First Federal Financial Corporation of Kentucky (the "Corporation") on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



|Date: March 12, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/B. KEITH JOHNSONB. Keith Johnson
President and Chief Executive Officer
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                     |  |     |  |                                                                          
|Date: March 12, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/GREGORY SCHREACKEGregory Schreacke
Chief Financial Officer            



A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been provided to the Corporation and will be retained by the Corporation and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---

QuickLinks
##### 



Exhibit 99.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT OT
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of SBS Technologies, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2002, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, (the Report), I,
James E. Dixon, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.

/s/ James E. Dixon, Jr.

James E. Dixon, Jr.
Chief Financial Officer
February 12, 2003
# C_2019423EN.01004002.xml

| 16.12.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 423/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.12.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 423/40

---

Judgment of the General Court of 3 October 2019 — Vafo Praha v EUIPO — Rutzinger-Kurpas (Meatlove)

(Case T-491/18) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU word mark Meatlove - Earlier EU word mark carnilove - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2019/C 423/50)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Vafo Praha s.r.o. (Chrášt’any, Czech Republic) (represented by: M. Vojáček, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Bonne and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Susanne Rutzinger-Kurpas (Spiegelau, Germany) (represented by: F. Lichtnecker, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 June 2018 (Case R 264/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Vafo Praha and Ms Rutzinger-Kurpas.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 12 June 2018 (Case R 264/2018-4); |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 12 June 2018 (Case R 264/2018-4);

| 2. | Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Vafo Praha s.r.o.; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Vafo Praha s.r.o.;

| 3. | Orders Ms Susanne Rutzinger-Kurpas to bear her own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders Ms Susanne Rutzinger-Kurpas to bear her own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 352, 1.10.2018.

---
# C_2021138EN.01000201.xml

| 19.4.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 138/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.4.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/2

---

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 24 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione — Italy) — Agenzia delle Dogane v Silcompa SpA

(Case C-95/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 76/308/EEC - Articles 6 and 8 and Article 12(1) to (3) - Mutual assistance for the recovery of certain claims - Excise duty payable in two Member States for the same transactions - Directive 92/12/EC - Articles 6 and 20 - Release of products for consumption - Falsification of the accompanying administrative document - Offence or irregularity committed in the course of movement of products subject to excise duty under a duty suspension arrangement - Irregular departure of products from a suspension arrangement - ‘Duplication of the tax claim’ relating to the excise duties - Review carried out by the courts of the Member State in which the requested authority is situated - Refusal of the request for assistance made by the competent authorities of another Member State - Conditions)

(2021/C 138/02)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agenzia delle Dogane

Respondent: Silcompa SpA

Operative part of the judgment

Article 12(3) of Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures, as amended by Council Directive 2001/44/EC of 15 June 2001, read in conjunction with Article 20 of Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products, as amended by Council Directive 92/108/EEC of 14 December must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of an action disputing enforcement measures taken in the Member State in which the requested authority is situated, the competent body of that Member State may refuse to grant the request to recover excise duties submitted by the competent authority of another Member State in respect of goods which irregularly departed from a suspension arrangement, for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Directive 92/12, as amended by Directive 92/108, where that request is based on the facts relating to the same export transactions which are already subject to excise duty recovery in the Member State in which the requested authority is situated.

---

(1)  OJ C 182, 27.5.2019.

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesus SARABIA, a/k/a Andre Williams, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-50396.

D.C. No. CR-02-00074-VAP-01.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*617Submitted Oct. 11, 2005.*

Decided Oct. 18, 2005.

Jerry A. Behnke, Riverside, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Rudy Kraft, San Luis Obispo, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before T.G. NELSON, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jesus Sarabia appeals his guilty plea conviction and 240-month sentence imposed for conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to sell methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel for Sarabia has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, and a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. Sarabia has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.

Because our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 82-83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), indicates that Sarabia knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and was sentenced within the terms of the plea agreement, we enforce the waiver and dismiss the appeal. *See United States v. Nguyen,*235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered knowingly and voluntarily).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
02-12-00530-CR

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 3/16/2015 2:39:31 PM

Accepted 3/16/2015 2:46:47 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
Title: Inspection: Daily Notes
Release Date: 01 Jun 2009 Author: APJWATSON

CONTROLLED//PROPIN//BASIC

Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Inspection: Daily Notes

Service

Document Number: CVB-FRM-0084.01

Veterinary Services

Center for Veterinary
Biologics

1920 Dayton Avenue
PO Box 844
Ames, IA 50010

(15) 337-6100

Document Number: CVB-FRM-0084 Revision: 01
Previous Number: ICFRM0004.01

Vault: CVB-Released

Section/Area: CVB-FRM-IC

Effective Date: 01 Jun 2009

Notes:

Printed by: CRHERR on 13 Jan 2021, 09:13:42 am.
Controlled by: APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics, 515-337-6100


Title: Inspection: Daily Notes
Release Date: 01 Jun 2009 Author: APJWATSON

CONTROLLED//PROPIN//BASIC

DAILY INSPECTION NOTES

Document Number: CVB-FRM-0084.01

DATE OF VISIT:
REPORT OF VISIT TO COMMERCIAL FIRM BY USDA PERSONNEL DAY:
PAGE: OF
FIRM:
INSPECTOR:
EST. NO: OTHERS:
LOCATIONS VISITED:
SUBJECT OF VISIT:

TIME SPENT AT FIRM:
PERSONNEL CONTACTED:

BRIEF OUTLINE OF ACTIVITIES:

NOTES:

PLEASE NUMBER, DATE, AND INITIAL ALL PAGES. SIGN THE LAST PAGE AND INDICAT!

DATE NOTES COMPLETED.

ICFRM0004.01a (01Jun09) jmw Printed by: CRHERR on 13 Jan 2021, 09:13:42 am.
Controlled by: APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics, 515-337-6100


Title: Inspection: Daily Notes

Release Date: 01 Jun 2009 Author: APJWATSON Document Number: CVB-FRM-0084.01
CONTROLLED//PROPIN//BASIC
DAILY INSPECTION NOTES EST. NO: PAGE: OF
CONTINUED: DATE: INITIALS:

ICFRM0004.01b (01Jun09) jmw

Printed by: CRHERR on 13 Jan 2021, 09:13:42 am.
Controlled by: APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics, 515-337-6100
Exhibit 23.1

               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation of our report, dated February 28, 2001,
included in this Form 10-KSB in the previously filed Registration Statements of
NetCurrents, Inc. (f/k/a/IAT Resources Corporation) on Form S-3 (No. 33-64595,
333-86167, 333-63897, 333-62687, 333-91145, 333-96381, 333-32862 and 333-34034)
and Form S-8 (No. 333-71891 and 333-71885 and 333-68705).


/s/ SINGER LEWAK GREENBAUM & GOLDSTEIN LLP
--------------------------------------------
SINGER LEWAK GREENBAUM & GOLDSTEIN LLP

Los Angeles, California
March 6, 2001
UN PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 6800

DAVID A. GAMBINO
,
Plaintiff

- Appellant
,

v.
FRANK HERSHBERGER, PHD/Chief Psychologist, Federal Correctional Institution Cumberland; SHANE SHEETZ, PSY/D, Federal Correctional Institution Cumberland; Mr. EIRICH, Lieutenant, Federal Correctional Institution Cumberland; BRETT DODD, PSY/D, Federal Correctional Institution Cumberland; LEON BRYAN, PSY/D, Federal Correctional Institution Cumberland; 7 UNKNOWN OFFI CERS AND 3 UNKNOWN NURSES; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
,
Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt

. Theodore D. Chuang , District Judge. ( 8:16

- cv

- 03806

- TDC )

Submitted : October 30, 2017 Decided: November 2, 2017

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

David A. Gambino, Appellant Pro Se. Jane Elizabeth Andersen, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimor e, Maryland, for Appellee.2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM:

David Gambino filed an action in the district court seeking preliminary injunctions
to recover and preserve evidence for use in a future lawsuit a gainst prison officials. The
district court denied the motions and dismissed the complaint because the Government,

once on notice of the potential lawsuit, was already obligated to preserve any existing
evidence and provided documentation that it was complying with that obligation. On
appeal, we confine our review t o the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. See 4th Cir.

R. 34(b). Because Gambino’s in formal brief does not challenge the basis for the district
court’s disposition, Gambi no has forfeited appellate review of the court’s order. See

Williams v. Giant Food Inc. , 370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). In any event, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for injunctive relief

because Gambino fai led to demonstrate that he was likely to suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of an injunction

. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22

(2008).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument be cause the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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<PAGE>
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<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS AT SEPTEMBER 26, 1998 AND THE RELATED CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NINE MONTHS IN THE PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 26,
1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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</TABLE>
#### Winston M. REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 20508.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 25, 1963.

*372Clinton Ashmore, U. S. Atty., Jack Carrouth, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tallahassee, Fla., for appellee.

Before CAMERON, WISDOM and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was convicted in 1954 for violations of the Internal Revenue Laws relating to excise taxes on wages. This appeal from the district court’s denial of a Section 2255 motion is the appellant's third attempt to have his sentences set aside. The appellant contends, apparently for the first time, that certain evidence the state police obtained when they answered the telephone in his office was an illegal interception in violation of the Wire Tapping Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 605, and of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. At the time of trial such evidence was admissible in federal courts under the “silver platter” doctrine. Such evidence is no longer admissible in federal trials. Elkins v. United States, 1960, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669. The question, therefore, is whether to apply Elkins retroactively.

In analogous situations the Fourth Circuit applied Mapp v. Ohio, 1961, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, retroactively. Hall v. Warden, 4 Cir. 1963, 313 F.2d 483. The Tenth Circuit applied Mapp v. Ohio prospectively only. Gaitan v. United States, 10 Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 494. In an extremely thorough and carefully documented analysis of the problem, Judge Rives, for the Court, cast this Circuit’s vote for the prospective application of Mapp; Judge Tuttle dissented. United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 1963, 323 F.2d 11. In reaching this conclusion Judge Rives distinguished Griffin v. Illinois, 1956, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, which established a rule of fundamental procedural fairness, from Mapp v. Ohio, in which the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to enforce the right of privacy as a deterrent to illegal police action. We agree with the analysis and conclusion in Linkletter, and hold that Elkins should not be applied retroactively.

the Court has carefully considered all of the appellant’s contentions. We hold that they have no merit.

The judgment is affirmed.
##### 



(1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Paula J. MeilerPaula J. MeilerSenior Vice President andChief Financial Officer
 
 *
    
    This certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a-14(b) under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States
Code, and shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise
subject to the liability of that section. This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated
by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except as
otherwise stated in such filing. 26.
[No. 37984.

Department Two.

December 16, 1965.]

#### Ernest S. Martin, *Appellant,*v. Franklin S. Clinton, *Respondent.****

*Ralph B. Potts,*for appellant.

*Clinton, Moats, Andersen & Fleck,*by *Newton Paul Moats,*for respondent.

*

Reported in 408 P.2d 895.

Per Curiam.

— Ernest S. Martin loaned to Franklin S. Clinton the sum of $4,500 to enable the latter to purchase stock in the Cadet Coach Corporation. Martin took a promissory note as evidence of this debt. The suit was upon the note.

The trial court, sitting without jury, found that the parties had made an oral agreement resulting in a complete satisfaction of the debt evidenced by the note. A judgment of dismissal was entered against plaintiff Martin, from' which he appeals.

Appellant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the “finding for Respondent.” Rule on Appeal 42 (a) (7), RCW vol. 0, states in part:

> *609Each error relied on shall be clearly pointed out and discussed under appropriately designated headings. . . . Whenever error is assigned to any finding or findings of fact, so much of the finding or findings made or refused as is claimed to be erroneous shall be set out verbatim in the brief ...

Rule on Appeal 43 states in part:

> No error assigned to any finding or findings of fact made or refused will be considered unless so much of the finding or findings as is claimed to be erroneous shall be set out verbatim in the brief.

Appellant, by not setting out verbatim the findings which he claims to be erroneous, has failed to comply with the above rules. Hence, the findings as made by the trial court must be accepted as verities on appeal. Rule on Appeal 43, RCW vol. 0; *Wilson v. Elwin,*54 Wn.2d 196, 338 P.2d 762 (1959). The purpose of this rule, we again repeat to the bar, is to enable each judge to become informed as to precisely what finding is before the court in order to determine whether or not it is supported by substantial evidence. We are not willing to search the transcript on file in the clerk’s office to find out what factual disputes are involved in each particular case. This rule was designed to eliminate such a cumbersome procedure. *State v. James,*58 Wn.2d 383, 363 P.2d 116 (1961).

The trial court found that the parties orally agreed that appellant would take over respondent’s stock in full and complete satisfaction of the note, and that appellant later did, in fact, take over the stock. These findings support the conclusion that appellant took over the stock of respondent in full and complete satisfaction of the debt.

Appellant seeks reversal on the additional ground that he was prevented from receiving a fair trial. This contention is based on a belief that respondent was “unwittingly protected by the court who seemed to have been completely taken in by Respondent.” As a result of the court’s attitude toward respondent, appellant claims to have been prevented from conducting a proper cross-examination of respondent. *610A review of the record reveals nothing improper in the way the trial was conducted by the learned judge. Appellant’s claim is without merit.

Judgment affirmed.