The Hon. Andrew W. Bogue, United States District Judge for the District of

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South Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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Nos. 97-3926MN, 97-3942MN

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United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* On Appeal from the United

v. * States District Court

* for the District of

* Minnesota.

Gregory Lee Grennell, *

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: May 15, 1998

Filed: July 15, 1998

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Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, District

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Judge.

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RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

In this case, the United States appeals an order of the District Court suppressing

evidence the government planned to use in prosecuting Gregory Lee Grennell for

possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, a violation of Title 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). We reverse.
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I.

During the early evening of July 9, 1997, Kelly Simondet, a police officer in St.

Cloud, Minnesota, stopped a car driven by Grennell because Simondet believed the

car’s tires, which protruded beyond the car’s fenders, violated Minnesota Statutes

§ 169.734 (1986). The statute reads as follows:

Wheel devices on automobiles. Every passenger automobile shall have

fenders, or other devices, that are designed to prevent, as far as

practicable, water, dirt, or other material being thrown up and to the rear

by the wheels of the vehicle.

Simondet asked Grennell for his driver’s license, which Grennell was unable to

produce, leading Simondet to arrest Grennell for driving without a license. The officer

conducted a search of the car incident to the arrest and found what was later

determined to be 25 grams of cocaine base in a backpack that was inside the car.

Following Grennell’s indictment for possession with intent to distribute, he

moved to suppress the evidence. A Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing, and

recommended that the District Court deny the motion to suppress. The Magistrate

Judge thought the officer had probable cause to stop the car, based upon his reasonable

belief that a traffic violation had occurred. 

The District Court reviewed the evidence before the Magistrate Judge, and found

that Officer Simondet “wavered” in his explanation for the stop and “failed to give

specific and articulable facts to justify [it].” United States v. Grennell, No. 97-219, slip

op. 2-3 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1997). The Court declined to accept the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation and granted Grennell’s motion to suppress. The Court subsequently

denied the United States’ motion for reconsideration and, shortly thereafter, dismissed

the indictment.
The person to whom Officer Simondet referred as having pleaded guilty to

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violating the same statute was, coincidentally, Derrick Grennell, the defendant’s

nephew and, the night he was arrested, his passenger.

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II.

The issue in this case, whether the officer had probable cause to stop Grennell’s

car, is a mixed question of fact and law, and our determination is made de novo.

United States v. Dixon, 51 F.3d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir. 1995). We note, initially, that

“any traffic violation, no matter how minor, provides a police officer with probable

cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.” United States v. Pereira-Munoz, 59 F.3d 788,

791 (8th Cir. 1995). In addition, an officer has probable cause to stop a vehicle if he

or she “objectively has a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a

traffic law.” United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 1996).

Having reviewed the evidence, including photographs of Grennell’s car and a

transcript of the evidentiary hearing, we conclude there was probable cause for the

stop. Officer Simondet had a reasonable basis for believing that Grennell’s tires

violated the Minnesota statute. First, it is undisputed that the tires on Grennell’s car

extended beyond the fenders. Second, Simondet testified that he had stopped cars on

at least 10 to 12 previous occasions because their wheels exceeded the wheel wells.

Third, he testified that he knew a guilty plea had been entered in one of the 10 to 12

previous instances. Fourth, a reasonably prudent person would believe, we think, that 2

the tires on Grennell’s car, protruding as they were beyond the car’s fenders, would

kick up water, dirt, and other material, the very thing the statute was designed to

prevent. It is therefore our view that Simondet had an objectively reasonable basis for

believing that Grennell was violating the statute, and that probable cause existed for the

stop.
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Finally, although there is no allegation that the officer’s reliance on the

Minnesota statute was pretextual, we note the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (in general, police officer’s ulterior motives for

making a stop are irrelevant so long as there is probable cause to believe a traffic

violation has occurred).

The order granting the motion to suppress is reversed. On remand, the

indictment should be reinstated, and the District Court should then proceed as the law

and the facts require.

It is so ordered.

 A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT