Clinton T. Eldridge, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Blake R. Davis, 

Respondent. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

FILED 

AUG 2 5 2010 

Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy 

Courts for the District of Columbia 

10 1440 

This action, brought pro se, is before the Court on petitioner's application for a writ of 

habeas corpus, accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will 

grant the application to proceed in forma pauperis and will dismiss the case for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

, 

. Petitioner is a prisoner at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado, serving a 

sentence of 40 to 120 years imposed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on July 

19, 1984. Pet. at 2. He challenges his convictions on multiple counts of rape, robbery and 

burglary following his pleas of guilty. See Pet. at 2 & Ex. A. It is established that challenges to a 

Superior Court judgment of conviction must be pursued in that court under D.C. Code § 23-110, 

see Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 

34,36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and that absent a showing of an inadequate or ineffective local 

remedy, "a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum," Garris v. 

Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986) (internal footnote 

omitted). Under District of Columbia law, 

[an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to 
apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by ... any 

Federal ... court ifit appears ... that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless 

it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the 

legality of his detention. 

D.C. Code § 23-110(g). Petitioner acknowledges that he has applied for relief under § 23-110 

more than once and that "[ e ]ach time I appeal, the court always deny [sic] my appeal. ... Even 

the Supreme Court have [sic] denied appeal." Pet. at 4; see Ex. H (Judgment of the District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals) (observing in December 2009 that "this appeal represents 

appellant's ninth post judgment filing wherein [he] raises issues that have previously been 

considered and rejected by the Superior Court and this court"). Petitioner's lack of success in 

those courts does not render his local remedy inadequate or ineffective, see Garris v. Lindsay, 

794 F.2d at 727; Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753,756-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing cases), and he 

has provided no other basis for finding the local remedy inadequate. See Williams v. Martinez, 

586 F.3d 995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (concluding that this Court would have jurisdiction over a 

"federal habeas petition asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel after [the petitioner 

has] moved to recall the mandate in the D.C. Court of Appeals[.]"). This Court therefore lacks 

authority to entertain the petition. A separate Order of dismissal accompanies this Memorandum 

Opinion. 

Date: August 11 ,2010 

2