Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 17A03-1512-CR-2090 | June 30, 2016 Page 1 of 18

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Kevin L. Likes

Likes Law Office

Auburn, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Megan J. Cassady,

Appellee-Defendant.

June 30, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

17A03-1512-CR-2090

Appeal from the DeKalb Superior 

Court

The Honorable Kevin P. Wallace, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

17D01-1504-F6-70

Brown, Judge.
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[1] The State appeals the trial court’s grant of Megan Cassady’s motion to suppress 

evidence following a traffic stop and dog sniff. The State raises one issue which 

we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in granting Cassady’s 

motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 19, 2015, DeKalb County Sheriff’s Deputy Todd McCormick 

observed Cassady stop at an intersection and then turn right without allowing 

any distance between her approach to the intersection and the activation of her 

turn signal. Deputy McCormick initiated a traffic stop,

1 and called dispatch 

with the location, the vehicle description, and the license plate information. He

then approached Cassady and explained the reason for the stop. Cassady 

reported: “I am allowed to change my mind, am I not.” Transcript at 10. 

Deputy McCormick obtained her license and observed her become defensive 

and very guarded in her comments. 

[3] He then returned to his vehicle, hooked up his dog “on lead,” and requested a 

license check on Cassady. Id. at 13. He then walked his dog around Cassady’s 

vehicle while he waited for dispatch to provide information on her status. The 

dog went around Cassady’s vehicle and alerted for the odor of narcotics prior to 

 

1 Deputy McCormick testified that he initiated the traffic stop because Cassady violated Ind. Code § 9-21-8-

25, which provides: “A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during not less than 

the last two hundred (200) feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or changing lanes. A vehicle traveling in a 

speed zone of at least fifty (50) miles per hour shall give a signal continuously for not less than the last three 

hundred (300) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning or changing lanes.” 
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the time that dispatch informed Deputy McCormick that Cassady had a valid 

license. Deputy McCormick took the dog around again, and the dog again 

alerted for the odor of narcotics, specifically, hitting on the driver and passenger 

doors. The dog’s second alert occurred just prior to or at approximately the 

same time as dispatch communicated to Deputy McCormick that Cassady had 

a valid license. Approximately four minutes passed between the time Cassady 

stopped her vehicle and the completion of the dog sniff. Deputy McCormick

then searched the vehicle and discovered drugs under the driver’s seat. 

[4] On April 21, 2015, the State charged Cassady with possession of 

methamphetamine as a level 6 felony, possession of paraphernalia as a class A 

misdemeanor, and failure to signal turn as a class C infraction. On September 

17, 2015, Cassady filed a motion to suppress and argued that the search of her 

vehicle was in violation of the United States and Indiana Constitutions. 

[5] On October 14, 2015, the court held a hearing. When asked what he observed, 

Deputy McCormick answered: 

[A]s I was speaking with her, she became defensive in her, and 

very guarded in her comments or answering questions that I had 

for her, and, uh, that’s based on experience as a police officer 

dealing with many people during the day. Uh, just my initial 

observations of their behaviors and their attitude towards law 

enforcement.

Id. at 11. When asked if he thought everybody is a little nervous when they are 

pulled over, Deputy McCormick testified: “They are to some degree, but others 

more than usual. There’s no definite difference you can, you just, I can’t 
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explain it to you. It’s something that you would have to be able to experience, 

based on stopping thousands of people.” Id. at 12. He testified that while he 

was asking Cassady questions and waiting for her to produce her license, he 

decided that he was going to remove his dog and perform a scan with the dog. 

The following exchange occurred during the direct examination of Deputy 

McCormick:

Q Uh, the dog search, which happened first? You got the return 

on the radio, or you did the dog search and the dog hit?

A I’m not sure exactly. I know the way that I normally do them, 

I obtain their return while I am conducting the scan. So, I don’t 

know that I received the result back prior to the alert. I, I 

probably did, but I was in the middle of conducting a free-air 

scan while I’m waiting for the return.

Q Very close in time, hard to say which happened first?

A Correct.

Id. at 16. On cross-examination, Deputy McCormick testified that it was not 

his intention to walk his dog around all cars that he stopped for a traffic 

violation. 

[6] Recordings of the radio communications were admitted at the hearing as State’s 

Exhibit 2, consisting of a cd with six recordings, each titled by a time stamp of 

when the track began recording according to the dispatch computers. One of 

the recordings with a title of 21.49.07 reveals Deputy McCormick calling in his 
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location of “Quincy and Randolph” at about ten seconds into the recording. 

State’s Exhibit 2. In a recording titled 21.51.54, Deputy McCormick states 

“license check on the registered owner.” Id. In another titled 21.52.50, 

dispatch states: “she’s a valid zero operator,” and Deputy McCormick testified 

that this indicated that Cassady had a valid license. Id. The last recording on 

State’s Exhibit 2, titled in part 21.55.43, included Deputy McCormick’s 

statements to dispatch that his dog issued a positive alert on the vehicle. 

[7] The court also admitted as State’s Exhibit 3 an in-car video recording of Deputy 

McCormick following Cassady’s vehicle and performing the stop and dog sniff. 

Cassady’s vehicle stopped at approximately 0:43 (forty-three seconds) into the 

video, Deputy McCormick gave his location as “Quincy and Randolph” at 

0:59, he exited his vehicle around 1:15, he talked with Cassady and obtained 

her driver’s license between approximately 1:20 and 2:10, he then returned to 

his vehicle with something in his hand at approximately 2:15-2:20, and he 

walked his dog around Cassady’s vehicle between approximately 3:45 and 4:35. 

State’s Exhibit 3.

[8] On November 5, 2015, the court entered an order granting Cassady’s motion to 

suppress, which states: 

A vehicle driven by Megan Cassady, the Defendant, was stopped 

for a red light at the corner of Randolph Street and Quincy Street 

in Garrett, Indiana during the evening of April 19, 2015. While 

stopped at the light, [Cassady] turned on her right turn signal, 

and, when the light changed, turned right onto Quincy Street. 

Deputy Todd McCormick of the DeKalb County Sheriff’s 
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Department, was in a patrol car behind [Cassady], and initiated a 

traffic stop for violation of I.C. 9-21-8-25 for failing to signal 

intention to turn not less than 200 feet before turning.

Deputy McCormick’s in-car camera recorded the stop. Deputy 

McCormick approached [Cassady’s] driver’s side front window. 

According to Deputy McCormick, [Cassady] (who remained in 

her vehicle and is not seen at that point in the video), was 

defensive and guarded. These conclusions were “based on my 

(Deputy McCormick’s) experience. I can’t explain. I had 

suspicions.” These conclusions were reached in just a very few 

seconds of contact with [Cassady]. Deputy McCormick admitted 

he was working a drug interdiction detail that evening, and had 

pretty much decided to conduct a free-air dog sniff when he 

made the stop.

Both sides have cited the recent U.S. Supreme Court case 

Rodriguez v. U.S. for the proposition that [sic], “that a dog search 

cannot extend a traffic stop unless there is reasonable suspicion 

for a further, non-traffic investigation” as phrased in the 

argument section of the State’s brief.

Under the facts of this case, there was no reasonably articulable 

suspicion of criminal activity for a further non-traffic 

investigation. The State argues that the stop in this case was 

around three and a half minutes, not twenty-nine minutes as in 

Rodriguez, but neither the total amount of time of the stop nor the 

sequence of whether the drug dog hit before or after dispatch 

completed the check of [Cassady’s] license are determinative.

As such, the items discovered and seized from [Cassady’s] 

vehicle were taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and will be suppressed.

Appellant’s Appendix at 34-35.
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Discussion

[9] The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Cassady’s motion to 

suppress. The State asserts that the initial stop was valid because Cassady 

committed a traffic infraction, and that a dog sniff conducted while a traffic stop 

is ongoing, before the results of a license check have been received or the ticket 

written, does not implicate the Fourth Amendment and does not need to be 

supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. The State posits 

that, because the dog sniff did not prolong an otherwise completed stop, it did 

not violate the Fourth Amendment and that the results of that sniff, in turn, 

authorized a search of the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception. It 

points out that Deputy McCormick had his dog with him when he initiated the 

stop and did not have to wait for a dog to be brought to the scene, that he called 

in the license plate number immediately at the initiation of the stop, that he 

explained the purpose of the stop and obtained Cassady’s license and 

registration, and that he returned to his vehicle to call in the information to run 

a check on her license. The State contends that it was only while Deputy 

McCormick was waiting for dispatch to respond with the results of that check 

that he performed the dog sniff. 

[10] The State’s position is that the trial court clearly erred as a matter of law in 

suppressing the evidence on the basis that there was no reasonably articulable 

suspicion of criminal activity for a further non-traffic investigation, and that 

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 

405, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005), and the long line of Indiana dog sniff cases require 
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reasonable suspicion of criminal activity only when the dog sniff occurs after the 

traffic stop has been, or reasonably should have been, completed. The State 

argues that, at the moment when his dog alerted on Cassady’s vehicle, Deputy 

McCormick had probable cause of criminal wrongdoing that justified any 

further detention occurring beyond that point in time. The State further argues

“[a]lthough the video begins earlier in time than the first radio transmission, the 

two can be correlated to determine at which time events on the video took 

place.” Appellant’s Brief at 6 n.1. 

[11] Cassady does not challenge the initial traffic stop or allege that the automobile 

exception did not apply.

2

 Rather, she argues that the dog sniff occurred after 

Deputy McCormick should have completed the tasks relating to the traffic stop,

thus prolonging the stop. She asserts that Deputy McCormick did not have any 

reasonable suspicion of any ongoing criminal activity and that he should have 

conducted the traffic stop as expeditiously as possible. She agrees that the time 

involved in the dog sniff was minimal, but asserts that Deputy McCormick 

added to his stop of her vehicle by the additional criminal investigation of the 

dog sniff, and that he began preparing for the dog sniff rather than writing the 

ticket for the infraction. 

 

2 We note that the trial court did not base its decision on the validity of the underlying traffic stop and, as 

Cassady does not challenge the stop itself, we will not review that issue. 
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[12] The State responds that Cassady’s assertion “ignores the reality that until the 

officer receives the report back he will often not have decided whether to issue a 

ticket or just a warning.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6. The State further 

responds that even assuming the deputy began writing out a ticket while he was

waiting and that the ticket was completed and ready to hand over to Cassady as 

soon as the report from dispatch was received, by the time dispatch informed 

him that Cassady had a valid license, the continued detention was supported by 

probable cause of criminal wrongdoing. 

[13] “In reviewing a trial court’s motion to suppress, we determine whether the 

record discloses ‘substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial 

court’s decision.’” State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (Ind. 2011) (quoting 

State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006)). “We do not reweigh the 

evidence, but consider ‘conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s 

ruling.’” Id. (quoting Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340). “When the State appeals from 

a negative judgment, as here, it ‘must show that the trial court’s ruling on the 

suppression motion was contrary to law.’” Id. (quoting State v. Washington, 898 

N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied). “[T]he ultimate determination of 

the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider 

de novo.” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014).

[14] To the extent the trial court based its grant of Cassady’s motion to suppress 

merely on the idea that no reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity 

existed, we disagree. “It is well settled that a dog sniff is not a search protected 

by the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010). 
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Accordingly, no degree of suspicion is required to summon the canine unit to 

the scene to conduct an exterior sniff of the car or to conduct the sniff itself. Id. 

We also note that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not 

depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. State v. 

Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Whren v. United States, 

517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)), trans. denied.

[15] In Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), the United States Supreme 

Court addressed dog sniffs in the context of traffic stops. The Court held that 

“a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the 

stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” 

135 S. Ct. at 1612. The Court held that “[a] seizure justified only by a policeobserved traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged 

beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a 

ticket for the violation.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 

S. Ct. 834 (2005)). The Court observed that it had “so recognized in Caballes” 

and “adhere[d] to the line drawn in that decision.” Id. 

[16] The Court held that because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, 

“it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’” Id. at

1614 (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S. Ct. 834). The Court further held 

that “[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic 

infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. The Court 

observed that its decisions in Caballes and Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 

S. Ct. 781 (2009), heed these constraints. Id. at 1614. The Court stated:
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In [Caballes and Johnson], we concluded that the Fourth 

Amendment tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did 

not lengthen the roadside detention. Johnson, 555 U.S., at 327-

328, 129 S. Ct. 781 (questioning); Caballes, 543 U.S., at 406, 408, 

125 S. Ct. 834 (dog sniff). In Caballes, however, we cautioned 

that a traffic stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond 

the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of 

issuing a warning ticket. 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S. Ct. 834. And 

we repeated that admonition in Johnson: The seizure remains 

lawful only “so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably 

extend the duration of the stop.” 555 U.S., at 333, 129 S. Ct. 

781. See also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 

161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (because unrelated inquiries did not 

“exten[d] the time [petitioner] was detained[,] . . . no additional 

Fourth Amendment justification . . . was required”). An officer, 

in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an 

otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way 

that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily 

demanded to justify detaining an individual. 

Id. at 1614-1615. The Court held that beyond determining whether to issue a 

traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the 

traffic stop which typically include checking the driver’s license, determining 

whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the 

automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. Id. The Court held that the 

critical question is whether conducting the sniff prolongs or adds time to the 

stop. Id. at 1616. This Court has previously held that the burden is on the State 

to show the time for the traffic stop was not increased due to a canine sniff. 

Wells v. State, 922 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
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[17] The trial court made no finding regarding whether conducting the dog sniff 

prolonged the stop. Deputy McCormick testified that he called in Cassady’s 

information, and began a search with his dog while he was waiting for dispatch 

to provide information back on her status. Based upon the audio recording, 

approximately three minutes and thirty-five seconds passed between the time 

Deputy McCormick gave his location of “Quincy and Randolph” and a 

description of the vehicle to dispatch at approximately 21.49.17, and the time 

that he was informed that Cassady was a valid operator at approximately 

21.52.52. Similarly, based upon the video recording, approximately three 

minutes and thirty-five seconds passed between the time Deputy McCormick 

gave his location of “Quincy and Randolph” and the time when he concluded 

walking his dog around Cassady’s vehicle. 

[18] Comparing the time on the audio and video recordings, we conclude that

Deputy McCormick’s dog alerted for the odor of narcotics at least once prior to 

the time that dispatch informed Deputy McCormick that Cassady had a valid 

license. The dog’s second alert occurred just prior to or at approximately the 

same time as dispatch communicated to Deputy McCormick that Cassady had 

a valid license. We also observe that only approximately four minutes passed 

between the time Cassady stopped her vehicle and the completion of the dog 

sniff. Under the circumstances, we conclude that Deputy McCormick’s actions 

were conducted in a manner that did not prolong the stop beyond the time 
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reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket.3 See Myers v. 

State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind. 2005) (finding no error in the trial court’s 

determination that the canine sniff test occurred while the traffic stop was 

ongoing, that is, while defendant was having the traffic citation explained to 

him); cf. Wells, 922 N.E.2d at 700-702 (holding that dog sniff and ensuing search 

were the result of an unconstitutional seizure where canine unit summoned 

only after officer obtained all information needed to write traffic ticket and 

canine unit arrived “nearly twenty minutes after [defendant’s] traffic stop could 

have been completed and almost forty minutes after it began”); Wilson v. State, 

847 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the trial court erred 

in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress where warrant check was 

completed at 1:58 a.m., warning tickets were written at 2:06 a.m., and canine 

unit was summoned at 2:15 a.m., only after defendant declined consent to 

search car). Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting 

Cassady’s motion to suppress.4 

 

3 The State asserts that Cassady did not make any separate argument of a violation under Article 1, Section 

11 of the Indiana Constitution or cite any cases applying a Section 11 analysis, nor did the trial court’s order 

address any claim or find any violation under the Indiana Constitution. While Cassady’s motion to suppress 

mentioned the Indiana Constitution, she does not cite or develop an argument under the Indiana 

Constitution on appeal. Nonetheless, we reach the same conclusion under the Indiana Constitution. In 

analyzing a defendant’s claim under Article 1, Section 11, the Indiana Supreme Court held that a dog sniff 

“is an unreasonable investigatory detention if the motorist is held for longer than necessary to complete the 

officer’s work related to the traffic violation and the officer lacks reasonable suspicion that the motorist is 

engaged in criminal activity.” Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). Given that Deputy 

McCormick performed the dog sniff while he was waiting for a response from dispatch with respect to the 

license check, we cannot say that the deputy’s actions were unreasonable. 

4 Cassady cites State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In Gray, an officer initiated 

a traffic stop, approached the vehicle, obtained the driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, 

returned to his police vehicle, placed the driver’s information on the seat, and conducted a dog sniff of the 
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Conclusion

[19] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Cassady’s motion 

to suppress and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[20] Reversed and remanded.

Baker, J., concurs.

May, J., dissents with separate opinion.

 

stopped vehicle. 997 N.E.2d at 1149-1150. The officer did not run the standard license/warrant check or 

report the driver’s information to dispatch prior to the dog sniff. Id. at 1150. The officer later testified that he 

“postponed the ‘normal traffic stop’ procedure (performing checks on driver license, license plate and 

outstanding warrants) in order to conduct the canine sniff.” Id. at 1152. On appeal, this court held that the 

delay amounted to an increase in the duration of the seizure for purposes outside the scope of the traffic stop. 

Id. Here, unlike in Gray, Deputy McCormick performed the dog sniff after he requested a license check and 

while he was waiting for a response. Accordingly, we find Gray distinguishable.
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I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Megan J. Cassady,

Appellee-Defendant.

Court of Appeals Case No.

17A03-1512-CR-2090

Appeal from the DeKalb Superior 

Court

The Honorable Kevin P. Wallace, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

17D01-1504-F6-70

May, Judge, dissenting.

[21] The trial court granted Cassady’s motion to suppress the evidence gathered as 

part of a dog sniff during a traffic stop. The majority reverses because “Deputy 

McCormick’s actions were conducted in a manner that did not prolong the stop 

beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing the 

ticket.” Slip op. at 13. As I would affirm the trial court’s decision, I must 

respectfully dissent.
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[22] The majority acknowledges “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle 

the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield 

against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct 1609, 1612 

(2015). When a seizure is justified based on the observation of a traffic 

violation, it “become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably 

required to complete th[e] mission [of issuing a traffic citation].” Illinois v. 

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). A dog sniff “is not fairly characterized as 

part of the officer’s traffic mission.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. The 

“[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are 

- or reasonably should have been - completed.” Id. 

[23] In Rodriguez, the Government argued the stop was not unreasonably prolonged 

because the officer was “reasonably diligent” in completing the purpose of the 

stop and the “overall duration of the stop remain[ed] reasonable in relation to 

the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances.” Id. The 

Court characterized the Government’s argument as allowing the officer “bonus 

time” should he complete “all traffic-related tasks expeditiously.” Id. The 

Court rejected that argument and held, “[t]he critical question, then, is not 

whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket . . . but 

whether conductingthe sniff ‘prolongs’ - i.e., adds time to - ‘the stop[.]’” Id. 

(quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). The State has the burden to prove the traffic 

stop was not prolonged due to the dog sniff. Bradshaw v. State, 759 N.E.2d 271, 

273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
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[24] The State did not meet that burden here. The video reveals the officer did not 

have time to complete any steps related to the observed traffic violation, as he 

was in the car for approximately sixteen seconds before exiting the car to 

retrieve the drug sniffing dog. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (ordinary 

inquiries incident to a traffic stop “involve checking the driver’s license, 

determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and 

inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”). Deputy 

McCormick called in Cassady’s license after removing the dog from the car, 

and over a minute after receiving it from her. That prolonged the traffic stop 

beyond what was required to complete the mission of the stop – issuing a 

citation to Cassady because she didn’t signal a turn. 

[25] An officer may prolong the traffic stop to complete a dog sniff if the officer has 

“the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an 

individual.” Id. Deputy McCormick did not have such reasonable suspicion. 

In Wilson v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), the officer 

indicated Wilson possessed $4000 in cash, was watching police activity before 

he was confronted, sped off at a high rate of speed, had shaking hands, and had 

been convicted of drug related offenses. Those facts did not give the officer 

reasonable suspicion to call for a dog sniff for narcotics: “A person’s 

nervousness when stopped by the police at 2:00 a.m. is understandable, as is 

watching a passing patrol car. Carrying $4,000.00 in cash is unusual, but it is 

not illegal.” Id. at 1068. 
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[26] Here, the officer testified Cassady “became defensive in her, [sic] and very 

guarded in her comments or answering questions that I had for her[.]” (Tr. at 

11.) He also testified that while he was waiting for Cassady to produce her 

license and registration, he had “already made the decision that [he] was going 

to remove the dog, and perform a scan with the dog.” (Id. at 13.) Cassady’s 

actions were not enough to give the officer reasonable suspicion.

[27] I believe the trial court correctly suppressed the evidence because the officer 

prolonged the traffic stop to complete the dog sniff and did not have reasonable 

suspicion to justify prolonging the stop. I acknowledge other decisions involve 

stops that were prolonged more. But under Rodriguez, the amount of time by 

which the stop is prolonged is not determinative. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 

1616 (“The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or 

after the officer issues a ticket . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’ -

i.e., adds time to - ‘the stop[.]’”). 

[28] As the officer prolonged the stop without reasonable suspicion, I respectfully 

dissent.