IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

JOSE SOCORO BAUTISTA, a/k/a SOCORRO BAUTISTA-SALTO, Appellant. NO. 70294-7-1 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: February 17, 2015



### Lau, J. —Jose Bautista pleaded guilty to one count ofrape of a child in the first 

### degree. He challenges the conviction, contending (1) the court lackedjurisdictionto accept his pleabecausethe recordfails to show that his consentform stipulating to the judge pro tempore was translated into Spanish and (2) hisguilty plea was involuntary and unknowing becausethe recordfails to affirmatively demonstrate that his Spanish language interpreterfully translated his statement of defendant on plea ofguiltyform. Because both Bautista and his attorney signed the form consenting to the appointment 

### of the judge pro tempore and the recordaffirmatively shows that Bautista understood70294-7-1/2
the rights he was waiving by entering his guilty plea, we affirm thejudgmentand

sentence. FACTS Jose Socorro Bautista was charged by information with two counts ofrape of a 

### child inthe first degree and two counts of child molestation inthe first degree. Bautista, who speaks only Spanish, agreed to enter an Alford plea to one count ofrape of a child inthe first degree inexchange for dismissal ofthe remaining charges and the 

### prosecutor's recommendation of a 103-month sentence.1 The guilty plea hearing occurred before a judge pro tempore. On the same day he entered his plea, Bautista, his attorney, and the prosecutor all signed a written stipulation authorizing ajudge pro tempore to preside overthe plea hearing. A state-certified Spanish language interpreter

was present and translated English into Spanish and Spanish into English throughout the hearing. Thejudge pro tempore stipulation form contained no certification by the interpreter indicating she had translated the form for Bautista, nor did the parties discuss the stipulation on the record. The stipulation is a preprinted form entitled "Stipulation, Oath, and Order Appointing Judge Pro Tempore." (Capitalization omitted.) Itstates in part: IT IS HEREBY AGREED THAT KENNETH COMSTOCK, member ofthe bar ofthe State ofWashington, shall try and determine the above entitled cause and that his/her action inthe trial and subsequent proceedings have the same effect as ifhe/she were a judge of said court.
11nthe guilty plea form, Bautista states that he does not believe he is guilty ofthe charged crime but is pleading guilty to take advantage ofthe State's offer. Bautista 

### entered his guilty plea pursuantto N. Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed. 2d 162(1970).70294-7-1/3
Beneath the stipulation are signature lines for plaintiff, defendant, and defendant's attorney. Inthis case, it is undisputed that Bautista, his attorney, and the prosecutor each signed the form the same day Bautista entered his Alford plea. Both thejudge pro tempore and the presidingjudge for King County also signed the stipulation on the

same day as the plea. 

### Before the plea hearing, Bautista signed a statement ofdefendant on plea of guilty form (plea form) explaining all ofthe rights he was waiving as a result of his decision to plead guilty. At the hearing, the court asked Bautista if his attorney and the interpreter had 

### gone through the plea form withhim,2 and Bautista responded thatthey had. The plea form also included the interpreter's written and signed certification that she had translated the attorney's explanation ofthe plea form for Bautista. Bautista said that his attorney and the interpreter had answered "most" of his questions aboutthe plea, but he immediately clarified that he had no questions aboutthe plea at thattime. The court then reviewed the plea form with Bautista, quoted below, and asked him ifhe understood the various rights, including constitutional rights he was waiving and other aspects ofthe plea procedure. When Bautista occasionally expressed confusion, the court provided additional explanation until Bautista indicated that he understood. After reviewing the plea form with Bautista, Bautista told thejudge pro tempore that he had

no other questions. The court accepted Bautista's plea of guilty, finding that Bautista

THE COURT: All right. First thing, did [your attorneys], along with an interpreter go through this document together? [BAUTISTA]: Yes. Report of Proceedings (Mar. 4, 2013) (RP) at 2. -3-70294-7-1/4

was entering his plea of guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Bautista was sentenced to 103 months to life. Bautista appeals.
ANALYSIS Standard of Review The requirementthat the parties consent to a judge pro tempore isjurisdictional. State v. Belqarde, 119 Wn.2d 711, 718, 837 P.2d 599 (1992). Jurisdictional issues are reviewed de novo. State v. Squally, 132 Wn.2d 333, 340, 937 P.2d 1069 (1997). Appellate review ofthe validity of a guilty plea is de novo. Young v. Konz, 91 Wn.2d 532, 536, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979). Judge Pro Tempore Stipulation First, Bautista argues that his consentto thejudge pro tempore was invalid 

### because nothing inthe record indicates thatthe stipulation form was eithertranslated into Spanish or explained to him in Spanish. Therefore, his consentto thejudge pro tempore was not informed and thejudge lackedjurisdiction to accept his guilty plea. We conclude thatthe signature of Bautista's attorney standing alone constitutes valid consent underthe Washington Constitution, statute, and case authority. A case in superior court may be tried by ajudge pro tempore. Const, art. IV, 

### § 7; RCW 2.08.180. The authority of ajudge pro tempore includes the authority to accept guilty pleas and conduct other nontrial hearings. State v. Duran-Madrigal, 163 Wn. App. 608, 611, 261 P.3d 194 (2011). However, the appointment of ajudge pro 

### tempore must be "agreed upon in writing bythe parties litigant, or their attorneys of record . . . ." Const, art. IV, § 7; RCW 2.08.180. The requirement that the parties 

### consentto ajudge pro tempore isjurisdictional. Belqarde, 119 Wn.2d at 718. Ajudge -4-70294-7-1/5

pro tempore lacksjurisdiction to preside over a case absent the consent ofthe parties. Belqarde, 119 Wn.2d at 718. The express language ofthe constitution and RCW 2.08.180 unambiguously provides that consentto the appointment of ajudge pro tempore is valid ifgiven by eitherthe parties or their attorneys: "Acase in superior court may be tried by ajudge pro tempore either with the agreement ofthe parties ifthejudge pro tempore is a 

### member ofthe bar, is agreed upon in writing by the parties litigant or their attorneys of record . . . ." Const, art. IV, § 7 (emphasis added). "Acase in superior court ofany 

### county may be tried by ajudge pro tempore, who must be either: (1) A member ofthe bar, agreed upon in writing by the parties litigant, or their attorneys ofrecord RCW 2.08.180 (emphasis added). We have interpreted this unambiguous language to


### mean that an attorney need not obtain his or her client's express authorization before consenting to the appointment of ajudge pro tempore. State v. Robinson, 64 Wn. App. 201, 204, 825 P.2d 738 (1992) ("The constitution does not require an attorney to obtain his client's consent before signing such a stipulation."); State v. Osloond, 60 Wn. App. 584, 586-87, 805 P.2d 263 (1992). 

### For the first time at oral argument before this court, Bautista argued that a 2001 constitutional amendment altered the consent requirement to appoint a judge pro 

### tempore.3 Specifically, Bautista argues that by adding the phrase "with the agreement

3Bautista failed to address this argument in his briefs and raised it for the first 

### time at oral argument contrary to RAP 12.1(a) and case authority. He did not inform the courtthatthe issue was not presented in his briefs, nor did he give the courtthe 

### opportunity to determine ifthe issue should be considered to decide the case. RAP 12.1(b). Bautista claims that his bare recitation ofthe 2001 amendment's language in a -5-70294-7-1/6
ofthe parties" the amended provision requires that a client grant his express consentto


### ajudge pro tempore.4 Therefore, Bautista contends, the amendment casts doubt on the validity of Robinson and Osloond, two cases decided before the 2001 amendment. The amended constitutional provision does not require a client's express consent. Read in context, the plain language ofthe provision allows eitherthe client or his attorney to consentto a judge pro tempore. Article IV, section 7 provides in relevant part: A case inthe superior court may be tried by ajudge pro tempore eitherwith the agreement ofthe parties ifthejudge pro tempore is a member ofthe bar, is agreed upon in writing by the parties litigant or their attorneys of record, and is approved by the court and sworn to try the case; or without the agreement ofthe parties ifthejudge pro tempore is a sitting electedjudge and is acting as ajudge pro tempore pursuant to supreme court rule. Const, art. IV, § 7. When interpreting constitutional provisions, we look first to the plain language ofthe text and willaccord it its reasonable interpretation. Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrouqh, 151 Wn.2d 470, 477, 90 P.3d 42 (2004). The plain language ofthe provision allows for an attorney to provide consentfor ajudge pro tempore. Bautista contends that the added phrase "with the agreement ofthe parties" requires thatthe client grant consent. However, read in context, that phrase simply clarifies when consent is required as opposed to when it is not: "Acase .. . may be


### footnote preserves the issue. We disagree. Nonetheless, we grantthe State's motion to supplement and considerthe parties' supplemental briefs. 4The Engrossed Senate Joint Resolution enacting the amendment provides: "Acase inthe superior court may be tried by ajudge pro tempore eitherwith the agreement of the parties ifthe judge pro tempore is a member ofthe bar, is agreed 

### upon in writing bythe parties litigant or their attorneys ofrecord, and is approved bythe court and sworn to trythe case . . . ." Engrossed S.J. Res. 8208, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001) (added language is underlined). -6-70294-7-1/7 tried by ajudge pro tempore eitherwith the agreement ofthe parties ifthejudge pro tempore is a member ofthe bar. . . or without the agreement ofthe parties ifthejudge pro tempore is a sitting electedjudge." Const, art. IV, § 7. When thejudge pro tempore is simply a member ofthe bar—and not an elected sittingjudge—consent is required. When consent is required, itmust be provided "in writing by the parties litigant

or their attorneys of record

. .. ." Const, art. IV, § 7. This interpretation ofthe constitutional provision is consistentwith the 

### corresponding statute. RCW 2.08.180 provides: "Acase inthe superior court ofany county may be tried by ajudge pro tempore, who must be either: (1) A member ofthe bar, agreed upon in writing by the parties litigant, or their attorneys of record, approved by the court, and sworn to try the case; or (2) pursuantto supreme court rule, any sitting electedjudge." RCW 2.08.180. Like the constitutional provision, underthe statute the 

### parties must agree to the appointment of ajudge pro tempore only when thejudge is a member ofthe bar, and eitherthe parties or their attorneys may provide valid consent. Bautista misreads the constitutional provision as requiring the client's consent 

### regardless. But this interpretation conflicts with the unambiguous language inthe corresponding statute. Bautista's interpretation ofthe constitution is unreasonable and arguably renders the statute unconstitutional. However, Bautista fails to address this 

### inconsistency. Bautista's interpretation would also render part ofthe constitutional provision superfluous. Ifthe amended provision required the client's consent, then the 

### portion allowing a party's attorney ofrecord to consentwould be meaningless. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 260, 11 P.3d 76270294-7-1/8 (2000) ("the court should not embrace a construction causing redundancy or rendering words superfluous."). And our Supreme Court has reiterated the well-settled rule that [a] case in superior court may be tried by ajudge pro tempore only if, among other conditions, the parties or their attorneys of record have consented in writing 

### or inopen courtto trial before thejudge pro tempore. Const, art. IV, § 7; RCW 2.08.180; Nat'l Bank ofWash, v. McCrillis, 15 Wn.2d 345, 356, 130 P.2d 901 (1942); State v. Belqarde, 119 Wn.2d 711, 719, 837 P.2d 599 (1992). In re Dependency of K.N.J.. 171 Wn.2d 568, 578, 257 P.3d 522 (2011). We conclude the 2001 amendment had no effect on the consent provision. Robinson and Osloond remain valid law.5 In Robinson, a stipulation appointing a judge pro tempore was signed by both the prosecutor and defense counsel, but the defendant was not present. Robinson, 64 Wn. App. at 201-02. On appeal, Robinson argued that thejudge pro tempore lacked jurisdiction to preside over his case because he did not authorize his counsel to stipulate to thejudge pro tempore. Robinson. 64 Wn. App. at 203. The court affirmed, finding that defense counsel did not need to obtain Robinson's consent: Robinson's argument and the decisions he cites overlookthe plain 

### language ofConst, article 4, sec. 7, which expressly allows eitherthe parties or their attorneys to stipulate to use of ajudge pro tempore and to thereby waive the right to an electedjudge. The constitution does not require an attorney to obtain his client's consent before signing such a stipulation.

. . .



### . . . [A]n attorney's "general authority to try the case" authorizes him or her to stipulate to ajudge pro tempore on behalfofthe client, even ifthe client is not aware that thejudge is a judge pro tempore. Robinson. 64 Wn. App. at 203-05 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Burton v. Ascol. 105 Wn.2d 344, 352, 715 P.2d 110 (1986)).
5Since this constitutional provision was amended almost 14 years ago, no 

### Washington court has ever adopted the interpretation suggested by Bautista. -8-70294-7-1/9 Similarly, in Osloond. the defendant argued that thejudge pro tempore lacked jurisdiction because, though his attorney had stipulated to thejudge's appointment, the defendant "did not personally sign the stipulation or state his consent on the record." Osloond. 60 Wn. App. at 586. We held the attorney's stipulation sufficientfor consent


### even though the defendant's consent appeared nowhere inthe record. Osloond. 60 Wn. App. at 586-87. 

### The plain language inthe constitution, the statute, and relevant case authority control here. Written consent ofBautista's attorney was sufficientto conferjurisdiction 

### in this case. Here, Bautista signed the stipulation agreeing to thejudge pro tempore's appointment and an interpreterwas present during the entire proceedings. Substantive Right to Elected Judge 

### Bautista also argues that defendants have a substantive6 rightto have their

cases presided over by an electedjudge and that an attorney cannot waive this right 

### unless the client grants specific authority to do so. Bautista relies primarily on State v. Sain. 34 Wn. App. 553, 663 P.2d 493 (1983), and Mitchell v. Kitsap County. 59 Wn. 

### App. 177, 797 P.2d 516 (1990). InSain, defense counsel signed a stipulation consenting to the appointment of ajudge pro tempore withthe understanding thatthe courtwould address each ofthe three defendants' consentthe following day. Sain. 34 

### Wn. App. at 555. The next day, two ofthe defendants consented and one did not. Sain, 34 Wn. App. at 555. Thejudge pro tempore refused to recuse himself. Sain. 34 

### Wn. App. at 555. DivisionThree of this court held thatthejudge pro tempore lacked

6It is unclearwhether Bautista intends to argue that the right is "substantive" or "substantial." He uses both terms interchangeably. Br. ofAppellant at 6-9. -9-70294-7-1/10 jurisdiction as to the third defendant because defense counsel could not waive the 

### defendant's right to have his case presided over by an electedjudge without
authorization:While an attorney is impliedly authorized to waive procedural matters, a client's substantial rights may not be waived without that client's consent. We find the right under Const, art. 4, § 5, to be tried in a court presided over by an elected superior courtjudge accountable to the electorate, is a substantial right. Thus, the requirement of Mr. Sain's written consent could not be waived by [defense counsel's] unauthorized statements. Sain. 34 Wn. App. at 556-57 (citations omitted); see also Mitchell. 59 Wn. App. at 184: Moreover, "[a]n attorney is without authority to surrender a substantial right of a client unless the client grants specific authority to do so." Certainly, consentto the appointment of ajudge pro tempore is a substantial right. Inourjudgment, the Mitchells' attorney was without authority to waive that right. (quoting In re Marriage of Maxfield. 47 Wn. App. 699, 707, 737 P.2d 671 (1987)). We previously rejected this same argument because itignores the plain 

### language ofarticle IV, section 7. Robinson, 64 Wn. App. at 203-04. Like Bautista, Robinson cited both Sain and Mitchell for the proposition thatthe constitutional right to have one's case tried before an electedjudge was a substantial right that an attorney could not waive absentthe client's consent. Robinson, 64 Wn. App. at 203-04. We rejected Robinson's argument, stating that the "constitution does not require an attorney to obtain his client's consent before signing such a stipulation. Therefore, whetherthe right to an electedjudge is a 'substantial right' is irrelevant." Robinson, 64 Wn. App. at
204. Our Supreme Court has also noted that the right to have one's case presided

over by an electedjudge is neither a "substantive" nor a "substantial" right. Belgarde, 119 Wn.2d at 721 ("Const, art. 4, § 5 does not expressly grant a right to a trial presided -10-70294-7-1/11

over by an elected superior courtjudge

.... Contrary to [Appellant's] suggestion, this court ... did not decide that the right to be tried by an elected superior courtjudge is a substantive right."); see also State v. Belgarde, 62 Wn. App. 684, 692 n.3, 815 P.2d 812 (1991) (noting thatthe Sain court equates "substantial" with "substantive," and stating that "it is debatable whether a litigant's right to an electedjudge is substantive rather than procedural."). 

### Further, both Sain and Mitchellare distinguishable from this case. InSain, the attorney's signature on the stipulation was expressly conditional on obtaining his clients' 

### consentthe next day, which one client refused to grant. Sain. 34 Wn. App. at 555. As

our Supreme Court characterized the case, "In Sain, the Court ofAppeals addressed the narrow question whether an attorney could consentto his client's being tried by a judge pro tempore inthe face ofthe client's express refusal inopen courtto the 

### appointment of ajudge pro tempore .. . ." Belgarde. 119 Wn.2d at 721. As Belgarde indicates, Sain stands for the proposition thatwhen a clientexpressly refuses to 

### consentto the appointment of ajudge pro tempore, his attorney lacks authorization to consent. Sain does not require an attorney to obtain express authorization from his 

### client before stipulating to the appointment of ajudge pro tempore. Robinson, 64 Wn. App. at 204. 

### Mitchell is also inapposite. "InMitchell, neitherthe Mitchells nor their attorney 

### consented to the judge pro tempore. Consequently, the court's discussion as to 

### whether an attorney can consentwithout the express authorization of his or her client is dictum." Robinson, 64 Wn. App. at 203 n. 1.

-11-70294-7-1/12 Finally, Bautista argues thatthe appointmentofthejudge pro tempore was invalid because there is no evidence inthe record that he was provided an interpreter in compliance with RCW 2.43.030 when he signed the form consenting to thejudge's appointment. Nothing in RCW 2.43.030's text requires an interpreter be appointed. Instead, itrequires that "[w]henever an interpreter is appointed

... the appointing 

### authority shall.

. . appoint a certified or qualified interpreterto assistthe person throughout the proceedings." RCW 2.43.030. Here, Bautista was assisted by an 

### interpreterthroughout the guilty plea proceedings. Bautista also contends that the judge pro tempore lackedjurisdiction because the record fails to establish that he 

### received any assistance from an interpreterwhen he signed the consentform forthe 

### judge's appointment. However, he cites no authority to supportthis contention. As discussed above, neitherthe constitution, statute, nor case law requires the defendant's 

### express consentfor the appointmentofjudges protempore. Const, art. IV, § 7; Robinson. 64 Wn. App. at 204. Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea 

### Next, Bautista claims that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing because 

### the record fails to affirmatively establish that his interpreterfully translated the pleaform. We conclude thatthe record demonstrates that Bautista knowingly, voluntarily, and with


### a full understanding of his constitutional rights, entered into a guilty plea. Even though Bautista did not receive a written translation ofthe guilty plea form, no authority requires
such a translation. 

### CrR 4.2(d) states that a trial court "shall not accept a plea of guilty without first 

### determining that it is made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the -12-70294-7-1/13



### nature ofthe charge and the consequences ofthe plea." CrR 4.2(d). Adefendant attempting to withdraw his guilty plea for the first time on appeal must demonstrate a manifest constitutional error. RAP 2.5; State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 6-7, 17 P.3d 591 

### (2001). The alleged error is undisputedly one ofconstitutional magnitude: "[G]iven the fundamental constitutional rights of an accused which are implicated when a defendant pleads guilty, a claim that a guilty plea pursuantto a plea agreementwas involuntary

... is the kind ofconstitutional errorthat RAP 2.5(a)(3) encompasses." Walsh. 143 

### Wn.2d at 8. However, the alleged error must also be manifest. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d at 8. [A]n alleged error is manifest only if itresults in a concrete detrimentto the claimant's constitutional rights, and the claimed error rests upon a plausible 

### argumentthat is supported by the record. To determine whethera newly claimed constitutional error is supported by a plausible argument, the court must preview the merits ofthe claimed constitutional errorto see ifthe argument has a likelihood of succeeding. State v.WWJ Corp.. 138 Wn.2d 595, 603, 980 P.2d 1257 (1999). 

### Once the trial court has accepted a guilty plea, it may allow withdrawal ofthat 

### plea only when it is "necessaryto correct a manifest injustice." CrR 4.2(f). The defendant bears the burden of proving a manifest injustice. State v. Ross, 129 Wn.2d 279, 283-84, 916 P.2d 405 (1996).7 Amanifest injustice is one that is "obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure." State v. Taylor. 83 Wn.2d 594, 596, 521 P.2d 699



### 7Bautista repeatedly asserts thatthe State bears the burden of proving the 

### validity of a guilty plea, citing Ross, 129Wn.2d at 284. However, the defendantbears the initial burden of proving a manifest injustice, for instance, that a plea was entered 

### involuntarily or unknowingly. Ross. 129Wn.2d at 283-84. Ifthe defendant meets this burden, then the State must make "an affirmative showing that a defendant entered a 

### guilty plea intelligently and voluntarily." Ross. 129 Wn.2d at 284. In any event, even ifit is the State's burden to demonstrate the validity of Bautista's guilty plea, the State has met this burden, as explained below. -13-70294-7-1/14 (1974). Demonstrating that a plea was involuntary or unknowing is sufficientto prove a manifest injustice. State v. Saas, 118 Wn.2d 37, 42, 820 P.2d 505 (1991). Due process requires that a defendant's guilty plea be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Mendoza. 157 Wn.2d 582, 587, 141 P.3d 49 (2006). Atrial court 

### must adequately inform a defendant of all direct consequences of his guilty plea but not all possible collateral consequences. Saas, 118 Wn.2d at 44. "The consequences of a 

### guilty plea include the waiver ofcertain constitutional rights which include the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers." State v. Lewis. 16 Wn. App. 132, 135, 553 P.2d 127 (1976). 

### However, due process does not require a trial court to inform a defendant "'ofeach and 

### every right which is waived by a guilty plea . . . .'" Lewis, 16 Wn. App. at 136 (finding that a trial court's failure to inform a defendant that his guilty plea waived the privilege 

### against self-incrimination does notpreclude a determination thatthe plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently) (quoting United States v. Frontero. 452 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1971)). At a minimum, "the record must show that inpleading guilty, the defendant understood he was giving up three importantconstitutional rights: the right to a jury 

### trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the privilegeagainst self-incrimination." State v. Elmore, 139 Wn.2d 250, 269, 985 P.2d 289 (1999). The record here shows that Bautista understood the constitutional rights waived 

### by his guilty plea. The plea formexplains all of the rights Bautista waived by pleading 

### guilty. Bautista signed the statement and wrote his initials throughout the document. At the end ofthe statement is a signed certification bythe interpreter indicating that she

-14-70294-7-1/15 

### translated "the attorney's explanation ofthe statement.8 Asthe colloquybetween the
court and Bautista indicates, the court also addressed all of Bautista's questions 

### regarding the plea during his colloquy, providing thorough explanations ofthe rights Bautista was waiving by entering a guilty plea:
THE COURT: We're on the record. 

### [THE STATE]: We are your honor. Thank you. This is the State of 

### Washington versus Jose Bautista, Cause No. 12-1-04662-6 SEA. [MP] on behalf ofthe State. The defendant is present incustody, joined by Counsel, [MM], also 

### joined by a Spanish speaking Interpreter. Ifshe could please introduce herself on the record. THE INTERPRETER: Forthe record, your honor, Amy Andrews, 

### Washington State Court Certified Spanish Interpreter underAOC. THE COURT: Thankyou. [The State]? [THE STATE]: Thankyou. Mr. Bautista, I'm showing you - THE COURT: Well, Ican do the inquiry, but is this going to be as charged? 

### [THESTATE]: I'm sorry. He's pleading to count one ofthe current amended information. THE COURT: So itwas previously amended? 

### [THESTATE]: Yes, that is correct, previously amended. He's pleading to one count ofrape of a child inthe first degree, domestic violence. 

### THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Bautista, I've been handed a form here called Statement ofDefendant on Plea of Guilty. I'm going to askyou questions aboutthis document. Ifyou have any questions as we're going along, you stop me right away. Understand? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: All right. The first thing, did you and [defense attorney], along with an Interpreter, go through this documenttogether? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. THE COURT: Didyour attorneys answer any questions that you had about this document? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Most ofthem. THE COURT: Do you have questions right now? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): No. 

### THE COURT: All right. Ifyou have any questions as we're going along, 

### you stop me and we will try to answerthem. Okay? Yes or no? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### 8The printed text of the certification provides the following: "I have translated this entire document for the defendant. . . ." However, the interpreter crossed out the word 

### "entire" and wrote the phrase "the attorney's explanation of in its place. -15-70294-7-1/16
THE COURT: Is your true and correct name Socorro Jose Bautista. 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): It's Socorro Bautista, yes. THE COURT: And is your birth date June 25, 1970? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: You have six years of formal education; is that correct? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: You are represented by [defense counsel], and [he] is here helping you right now; is that correct? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: You[] are charged incount one with rape of a child first 

### degree, domestic violence. Do you understand the elements of that charge? Do you understand whatthe State is saying thatyou did? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Iunderstand. THE COURT: And do you understand that inpleading guilty here today, 

### you're giving up your right to make the State prove that charge or allthose elements beyond a reasonable doubt at trial? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Iunderstand. THE COURT: Paragraph 5, which begins atthe top ofpage 2, contains a 

### list ofConstitutional rights thatyou have and that includes your right to have a 

### trial, ifyou wanted one. In pleading guilty today, you're giving up all ofthose rights as to this charge. Do you understand those rights? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes, Ihave no otheroption. THE COURT: Well, you do actually have otheroptions. You could go to trial, ifyou chose to. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Iunderstand. 

### THE COURT: Do you understand that if you plead guiltyhere today, you will give up your right to have a trial? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes, Iunderstand. THE COURT: And do you understand thatyou are giving up the other 

### Constitutional rights as listed inParagraph 5 of this document? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): What? 

### THE COURT: Do you understand that you have a right to a speedy and publictrial; that you have the right to remain silent before and during the trial, no one could evermake you testify againstyourself; you would have the right to hear and question any witnesses that wouldcome in on behalfof the State to 

### testifyagainstyou; you couldbring in people to testify for you, ifthere was anyone, and that could be done at no charge to you; you'd be presumed innocent until the charge is proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial or until you entera 

### plea ofguilty—which is why we're here today, to see ifyou wish to dothat—ifyou chose to go totrial and you were foundguilty, you'd have the rightto appeal that finding to a higher Court. Do you understand allthose rights? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Not a hundred percent, but I do understand them. 

### THE COURT: All right. Well, what part don'tyou understand? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Well, some of— -16-70294-7-1/17


### THE COURT: Do you understand what a trial is? Do you understand that a trial, that's when the State brings people inwho say, Mr. Bautista did this and 

### this and this and this, and they testify against you. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes, Iunderstand. THE COURT: And do you understand thatyou could bring in peopleto 

### testify, Mr. Bautista did not do this and this and this and that could be done at no 

### charge to you, ifthere was anyone to testify on your behalf? Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: And do you understand thatyou could testify or tell your 

### side of the story, ifyou chose to, but no one could make you do that? Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: Do you understand the right to a speedy trial? Within a certain period of time, the State needs to bring you to trial or else the matter would have to be dismissed. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): No. THE COURT: From the time that you are arraigned, ifyou do not give up 

### additional time, the State has 60 days to bring you to trial. Do you understand that? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: So do you understand that after all of the negotiations and 

### so on, at least myunderstanding is, you're choosing to givethose rights up and to enter a plea of guilty to one count or one charge here today. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. THE COURT: And is thatwhat you wish to do? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): I'll do it. 

### THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that the maximum penalty for 

### this particularcharge islife imprisonment and a—isit a $100,000fine or $50,000. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Maybe it's 50,000. [THE STATE]: Ithink it's 50,000. 

### [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thatwas mymistake, your Honor. THE COURT: I'll correctthat. So that maximum penalty is life 

### imprisonment and a $50,000 fine. Now, the standard range based on your 

### criminal history and the seriousness of this charge is from 93 to 123 months in custody. Do you understand those penalties? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: Do you understand that this particular charge is considered the most serious offense under both the Two Strikes laws ofthe State of. 

### Washington, as well as the Three Strikes laws of the State ofWashington? Did you and your lawyers talk aboutthis? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Excuse me. Ididn't understand. -17-70294-7-1/18


### THE COURT: Do you understand that underthe laws ofthe State of Washington thatthis counts as an offense which can be counted underthe Two Strikes law, which means if you have two ofthese particulartypes ofconvictions inyour lifetime you would be sentenced to prison and you would not be able to get out under any circumstances? Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: And do you understand this counts as one strike? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. THE COURT: And also under the Three Strikes laws ofthe State of 

### Washington this counts as a strike. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): No, Ididn't understand. 

### THE COURT: Okay. Well, this counts as a strike offense. So ifyou 

### would pick up two more convictions fornon-sexual strike offenses—forexample, 

### a robbery or an assault in the second degree—ifyou would be convicted of two more ofthose types ofcharges, you would be sentto prison withoutchance of release underthat law as well. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: On page 6 of this form, itindicates thatthe State will be 

### recommending that you serve 103 months incustody on this matter, that you be placed on community custody, that you register as a sex offender, that you pay restitution in an amount to be determined, have no contactwith the victim or any 

### other minors, that you have a sexual deviancy evaluation and appropriate followuptreatment—I'm sorry. Then itsays, this is an open rec. Does that mean the defense can make their own? 

### [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We can make our own recommendation. THE COURT: Okay. But the State's recommendation, in addition to what you had Ihave talked about already, is they will move to dismiss counts two, 

### three and four as part ofthe agreement. Do you understand what their position is? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): No. 

### THE COURT: They want you to spend 103 months incustody, that once 

### you get out you'd be placed on community custody where someone connected to the court system will be keeping an eye on you to make sure that you register withthe sheriffas a sex offender; thatyou pay restitution or pay for any damages 

### that you may have caused with other people and that would include counseling that they might need and that sort ofthing; they're going to ask the Judge to order you not to have any contactwith the victim in this case, norwith any other minor; they're going to ask that you be ordered to have a sexual deviancy evaluation and ifcounseling ortreatment is recommended, thatyou follow 

### through with that. Doyou understand what they'regoing to ask the Judge to do? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): No. THE COURT: Well, what part don't you get?

-18-70294-7-1/19
THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): What is he asking the Judge? 

### THE COURT: Well, the Judge will make the final decision as to your sentence. The State willmake a recommendation. You and [your attorney] will then make a recommendation. The Judge will listen to everyone and then the 

### Judge ultimately decides whatyour sentence will be. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. THE COURT: And do you understand what the State is going to ask the Judge to do? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: And do you understand then that you and [your attorney] can askthe Judge to do something else, ifyou want, so long as itdoes not involve a [special sex offender alternative]. And, again, after listening to 

### everybody then the Judge makes the finaldecision. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. 

### THE COURT: So I'm going to continue with this document here, and I'm 

### going to turn to page 13. Paragraph 11 says, "The Judge has asked me to state 

### briefly in my own words what Idid that makes me guilty of this crime," and this is your statement. "This crime occurred inKing County, Washington, between November 28th of2009 to July 16th of2012. Ido not believe Iam guilty of this 

### crime; however, after reviewingthe evidence with my attorneys, Ibelieve there is a substantial likelihood that Iwould be found guilty or convicted ifIwent to trial, 

### therefore, Iam pleading guilty to take advantage ofthe State's offer. The Court 

### may review the probable cause to find facts sufficient to acceptthis plea." Is that your statement? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. THE COURT: And is that what you wish to do today? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Ihave to. 

### THE COURT: You don't have to; but ifyou wish to acceptthe offer ofthe State, do you wish to enter into this Alford plea? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Ididn't understand. THE COURT: Inorderto acceptwhat the State has offered as far as their 

### sentencing recommendation and dismissal ofthree ofthe charges, are you willing to enter a plea of guilty today? 

### THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. THE COURT: All right. I'mjust going to takejust a momentthen to 

### reviewthe [certification fordetermination ofprobable cause]. All right. Ihave reviewed the Certification and Ido findthatthey are sufficientfacts to support a finding here. 

### Before Ienter a finding then, Mr. Bautista, do you have any questions about the documentthat you and Ijust reviewed together? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): No. 

### THE COURT: All right. Then at this time, Iam going to find that Ibelieve 

### you've entered—actually it looks like you've signed this document in pencil. I'm
-19-70294-7-1/20 going to pass itdown to you and I'll have you sign it in ink, if you would, here in open court ifyou continue to wish to enter into this plea. 

### [THE STATE]: IfImay, your Honor, did the Court inquire— THE COURT: Oh, Iwill. Do you understand, Mr. Bautista, that ifIaccept your plea here today as you are not a citizen ofthe United States, itcould affect your ability to remain in the United States, to become a citizen ofthe United States or to seek naturalization. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Is thatwhat you were looking for? [THE STATE]: Yes. 

### THE COURT: So you have signed the documents. At this time, Iam going to find that Ibelieve you've entered into the plea freely and voluntarily with fullknowledge ofthe consequences. Ido not believe that anyone has threatened you or promised you anything to get you to plead guilty. And based on the facts contained within the Certification for Determination ofProbably Cause, Iam going to find thatthere are sufficientfacts to support a guilty finding to the charge in count one ofrape of a child inthe first degree, domestic violence, and I'm 

### going to find you guilty ofthat charge atthis time. Is there a sentencing date? [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: We do have a sentencing date, your Honor, 

### and it's April 5th at 1:45 with Judge Linde, Courtroom West 921. And, Mr. Bautista, this is the only notice of this you're going to get so ifyou get out of jail, you need to show up on that date. 

### THE COURT: Mr. Bautista, ifyou have any questions prior to that next hearing date, you contact [your attorneys]. Okay? THE DEFENDANT (through the Interpreter): Yes. THE COURT: That will conclude the hearing today. Thank you, and good luck. Thank you, Madam Interpreter. Nice to see you. THE INTERPRETER: Thank you, your Honor.
RP at 1-14. The court reviewed and answered Bautista's questions about each constitutional 

### trial rightenumerated inparagraph 5 (a)-(f) ofthe plea form that Bautista would give up upon entering a plea ofguilty: right to a speedy and public trial, right to remain silent, 

### right to testify and confront witnesses, right to presentwitnesses withoutexpense, right

-20-70294-7-1/21


### to be presumed innocent, and the right to appeal a guiltyfinding.9 The court also reviewed and answered questions aboutthe maximum penalty, the consequence of pleading guilty as to the two and three strikes law, the State's sentencing recommendation, who ultimately decides the sentence imposed, who gets to make sentencing recommendations, Bautista's own Alford plea statement, immigration consequences resulting from the plea, and finally, whether Bautista understood all the 

### rights he is giving up by pleading guilty. After this extensive colloquy, in which the court answered all ofBautista's questions, the court directed Bautista to re-sign the plea form. 

### Immediately above Bautista's signature is the statement: "My lawyer has explained to

me. and we have fully discussed, all ofthe above paragraphs. I understand them all. I 

### have been given a copy of this 'Statement ofDefendant on Plea of Guilty.' Ihave no 

### further questions to ask thejudge." (Emphasis added.) Bautista does not dispute that the interpreter certified under penalty ofperjury that she translated from English into Spanish the attorney's explanation ofthe plea form. 

### Regardless, Bautista contends that a translated version ofthe guiltyplea form

was required. To supportthis assertion, Bautista relies on United States v. Mosguera. 816 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Mosguera involved a complex criminal case with 18 defendants, none ofwhom spoke English. Mosguera, 816 F. Supp. at 170. At a conference with all defendants and their attorneys—but only one interpreter—the court 

### issued an order requiring the governmentto supply each defendantwith translated


### 9Before the list of trial rights inparagraph 5 of the plea form, itstates in all bold capital letters: "I HAVE BEEN INFORMED AND FULLYUNDERSTAND THATIHAVE THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT RIGHTS, AND IGIVEALL THEM UP BYPLEADING GUILTY." -21-70294-7-1/22
versions ofimportant documents, including the indictment and all other documents except motions and original evidence. Mosguera, 816 F. Supp. at 170. The 

### government moved for reconsideration ofthe order, arguing, "[T]he courtexceeded its authority because the order is not supported by any constitutional statute or rule nor is it a valid exercise ofthe court's supervisory power and

. . . compliance with the order 

### would be 'so burdensome as to be plainly unreasonable.'" Mosguera. 816 F. Supp. at 170-71. The court upheld the order, finding that translations ofimportantdocuments

were required due to the circumstances ofthe case: Just as summaries oftestimony were inadequate in United States ex rel. Neqron v. State of New York. 434 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1970), so too is an 

### interpreter's oral description ofthe contents of a criticaldocument insufficient. Oral interpretations and written translations serve different purposes. While an oral interpretation can provide momentary understanding ofrepresentations contained in a document, a criminal defendant may need and wantto review the document alone and with others to achieve a full understanding. Mosguera, 816 F. Supp. at 175. 

### Mosguera is inapplicable here. The Mosguera court was not addressing the 

### validity of a guilty plea orwhetherdue process required a written translation of a non

### English speaking defendant's guilty plea. The court addressed onlywhether it had the authority to require translated documents. Accordingly, the court did not hold that the constitution requires a full translation ofimportant documents inevery case involving a 

### non-English speaking defendant. Rather, itemphasized that constitutional concerns implicated inthe case supported the court's authority to require translated documents. Mosguera. 816 F.Supp. at 172-76. The court also acknowledged that ordering the 

### governmentto providetranslated documents exceeded what the Constitution requires:

-22-70294-7-1/23


### Acourt's supervisory power 'extends to establishing and maintaining those higher standards necessary and helpful inpromoting fair adjudications and 

### securing the integrity of the federal court system.' United States v. Jamil. 546 F. Supp. 646, 659 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on othergrounds, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983). The court need not limit itself to 'merely enforcing the minimalstandards ofconduct and procedure derived from the Constitution.' Id. Mosguera, 816 F. Supp. at 175 (emphasis added). 

### Further, several federal appellate courts have declined to interpret Mosguera as 

### supportfor the proposition that "due process mandates that non-English speaking defendants be supplied with written translations of critical court documents 

### Appellant's ReplyBr. at 15 n.2. See, e^, United States v. Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 729 (8thCir. 2003) ("Mosgueradoes notstand for the proposition that criminal defendants enjoy a constitutional right to writtentranslations of court documents. Rather, a court may decide to provide writtentranslations indifficult and complicated cases."); see also United States v. Celis. 608 F.3d 818, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("[A] 

### numberofother courts have recognized that 'Mosguera does not stand for the 

### proposition thatcriminal defendants enjoy a constitutional righttowritten translations of [all] courtdocuments.'... We agree." (Quoting Gonzales. 339 F.3d at 729). CanizalesSatizabal v. United States. 73 F.3d 364 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Relying heavily on 

### rMosgueral, Satizabal emphasizes thatthe indictment and othertrialdocuments were 

### nottranslated into a language he couldunderstand. This court, however, has never held that a defendant has a constitutional right to have documents translated into his

own language.")). 

### NoWashington court has held that either the federal orstate constitution requires a writtentranslation of a defendant's guilty plea form. Bautista's argumentthat he
-23-70294-7-1/24 

# ^
involuntarily and unknowingly entered his guilty plea because he did not receive a 

### translation fails because he cites no authority requiring one. See State v. Logan, 102 Wn. App. 907, 911 n.1, 10 P.3d 504 (2000) ("'Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court. . . may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.'" (quoting DeHeer v. Seattle Post-lntelligencer. 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962))). An appellate court need not consider issues unsupported by citation to authority. State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 853, 822 P.2d 177 (1991). Because Bautista cannot show that he involuntarily or unknowingly entered his guilty plea, he has failed to demonstrate thatwithdrawing his plea is necessary to 

### correct a manifest injustice.10 CrR 4.2(f); Saas. 118 Wn.2d at 42.
CONCLUSION Because defense counsel's signed consentto a judge pro tempore is valid under 

### article IV, section 7 ofthe Washington Constitution, RCW 2.08.180, and controlling case 

### authority andBautistaentered aknowing, voluntary, andintelligentplea ofguilty^jj/e S~: CD O ;:v ~n ^ 

### affirm the judgmentand sentence. -j -f^,,: 

# Ar&—l-l WE CONCUR: I U ^ : 

# V&c/imJpQcnPx

10 For the first time in his reply brief, Bautista seems to suggestthatAlford pleas are subjectto a higher standard of validity compared to traditional guilty pleas. Appellant's Reply Br. at 9-10. "An issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply briefis too late to warrant consideration." Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). Moreover, even ifthe panel were to assume, 

### without deciding, that a higher standard applies, the record sufficiently demonstrates that Bautista understood the consequences of his plea and that he entered the plea voluntarily. -24-