FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

EDWIN ISAAC MENDEZ, 

AKA Carabina, AKA 

Chino,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-50086

D.C. Nos.

2:19-cr-00117-ODW-16

2:19-cr-00117-ODW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 8, 2022

Pasadena, California

Filed March 24, 2022

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Richard C. Tallman, and

Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman
2 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming the district court’s denial of a motion to 

dismiss a Second Superseding Indictment (SSI) charging 

Edwin Mendez with racketeering conspiracy under 

18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), the panel held that the Juvenile 

Delinquency Act (JDA) does not preclude the government 

from prosecuting a person as an adult for a continuing 

conspiracy that includes both pre- and post-majority conduct 

after the court dismisses a JDA information charging that 

person with conspiracy based solely on pre-majority 

conduct.

The panel held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral 

order doctrine to hear this interlocutory appeal.

The panel addressed whether JDA jurisdiction had 

attached to preclude Mendez’s prosecution as an adult given 

the government’s failure to complete the procedure set forth 

in 18 U.S.C. § 5032 for transfer to adult prosecution and the 

absence of a judicial determination regarding transfer. The 

panel held that a defendant who continues to participate in a 

conspiracy after reaching majority ratifies his prior conduct 

in the conspiracy, such that the conspiracy carries over into 

his majority, and that in this situation, the JDA is 

inapplicable. The panel also held that, because Mendez 

allegedly continued to participate in the racketeering 

conspiracy on his eighteenth birthday and beyond, his 

racketeering conspiracy offense was not an act of juvenile 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 3

delinquency under the JDA. The panel concluded that the 

district court therefore has adult criminal jurisdiction over 

the majority-spanning RICO conspiracy offense charged in 

the SSI.

COUNSEL

Charles P. Diamond (argued), Law Offices of Charles P. 

Diamond, Los Angeles, California; Seth Fortin, Biola 

Macaulay, and Vanessa Guerrero, O’Melveny & Myers 

LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant.

Joanna M. Curtis (argued), Chief, Violent and Organized 

Crime Section; Bram M. Alden, Chief, Criminal Appeals 

Section; Tracy L. Wilkison, Acting United States Attorney; 

United States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, California; 

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Entry into adulthood is a significant milestone. It 

provides a new set of privileges and consequences, many 

life-changing. A person’s eighteenth birthday also brings 

with it new legal considerations. We look at one of those in 

this criminal gang conspiracy case.

Edwin Mendez appeals the district court’s order denying 

his motion to dismiss the Second Superseding Indictment 

charging him with one count of racketeering conspiracy 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). He stands accused of 

participating in the operation of the criminal street gang 
4 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

Mara Salvatrucha (also known as MS-13) in Los Angeles, 

constituting a RICO enterprise which the grand jury charged 

operated through various acts including drug distribution, 

extortion, robbery, assault with intent to commit murder, 

kidnapping, and murder. The district court’s interlocutory 

order rested on the conclusion that the Juvenile Delinquency 

Act (“JDA”) did not bar Mendez’s prosecution as an adult 

under the superseding indictment. Mendez argues that the 

district court erred because the government had previously 

charged him in a JDA criminal information for related acts, 

which the statute labels “act[s] of juvenile delinquency,” 

including inter alia racketeering conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 5031, 5032. We must decide whether the JDA precludes 

the government from prosecuting a person as an adult for a 

continuing conspiracy that includes both pre- and postmajority conduct after the court dismisses a JDA information 

charging that person with conspiracy based solely on premajority conduct. We hold it does not and affirm.

I

The United States filed a seven-count juvenile 

information on March 29, 2019, charging Mendez—an 

alleged member of MS-13’s Fulton clique in Los Angeles 

County—with acts of juvenile delinquency, including 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 

(“RICO”) conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), two counts 

of first-degree murder, violent crimes in aid of racketeering, 

and aiding and abetting.1 According to the JDA information, 

1 We GRANT Defendant-Appellant’s motion for judicial notice 

(Dkt. No. 12) and Plaintiff-Appellee’s request for judicial notice 

(Dkt. No. 21) of the prior proceedings before the district court under the 

JDA. Although juvenile records are generally sealed, and DefendantAppellant’s exhibits were filed under seal, most of the allegations 
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 5

these alleged acts of juvenile delinquency occurred prior to 

Mendez’s eighteenth birthday on June 16, 2017. With 

respect to the RICO conspiracy charge, the information 

alleged the commission of 29 overt acts of juvenile 

delinquency in furtherance and to accomplish the objects of 

the RICO conspiracy, the last of which allegedly involved 

an illegal firearm transaction occurring on June 14, 2017, 

when Mendez was still a minor. All of these alleged crimes 

would have been violations of various provisions of Title 18 

but for Mendez’s age.

The government continued to investigate the MS-13 

enterprise. In July 2019, a federal grand jury returned a 

Second Superseding Indictment (“SSI”), indicting a total of 

22 defendants alleged to be MS-13 gang members from 

various cliques in Los Angeles. Mendez, then 20, was 

charged with one count under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). This 

adult RICO conspiracy charge covers both pre- and postmajority conduct. The SSI accuses Mendez—participating 

with other co-defendants and unindicted co-conspirators—

of displaying gang signs, possessing weapons, and engaging 

in narcotics trafficking. While the JDA information had 

originally charged Mendez with two counts of first-degree 

murder and violent crimes in aid of racketeering as acts of 

juvenile delinquency, the SSI did not charge Mendez with 

those crimes.

On January 23, 2020, the government filed a motion to 

transfer Mendez for adult criminal prosecution on the 

discussed in this opinion have been realleged in the SSI, a publicly 

available filing. Our opinion contains a generalized discussion of the 

JDA pleadings and proceedings only for context, procedural posture, and 

to explain the reasoning behind our decision. The orders sealing these 

documents are lifted to the extent necessary to permit these references.
6 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

charges in the JDA information. But the government later 

determined that it would not proceed on the juvenile murderrelated charges, only on the adult RICO conspiracy charged 

in the SSI. So, on June 1, 2020, the government moved to 

dismiss the JDA information to “conserve government, 

judicial, and Criminal Justice Act resources.” Mendez 

objected. But the district court dismissed the JDA case the 

next day without a hearing.

On January 19, 2021, Mendez moved to dismiss the SSI 

for lack of statutory jurisdiction over the sole charge as to 

him—RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The 

district court denied Mendez’s motion on March 29, 2021, 

rejecting his argument that the government was required—

once having decided to proceed under the JDA—to continue 

the juvenile proceedings against him. The court further 

rejected Mendez’s argument that the government could not 

prosecute him for the same offense conduct as an adult 

absent a formal JDA transfer proceeding in which the district 

court would decide whether Mendez would be tried as an 

adult. Accordingly, the adult prosecution could go forward. 

Mendez timely filed a notice of interlocutory appeal.2

II

We must presume the facts in the SSI to be true for 

purposes of reviewing the district court’s ruling on the 

2 Subsequently, on August 5, 2021, while this appeal was pending, 

the government filed a Third Superseding Indictment (“TSI”) charging 

additional co-defendants and adding new allegations of Mendez’s postmajority conduct. We agree with the government that the TSI does not 

render this case moot because “deciding the appeal from the [SSI] . . .

[could] affect the resolution of the government’s case against the 

defendant under the [TSI].” United States v. Scott, 884 F.2d 1163, 1165 

(9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 7

motion to dismiss. See United States v. Fiander, 547 F.3d 

1036, 1041 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008). We review de novo the 

district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment 

based on its interpretation of the JDA. See United States v. 

Camez, 839 F.3d 871, 872 (9th Cir. 2016).

III

A

We must first ensure our appellate jurisdiction. See 

United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 

2016). The final judgment rule applies in direct criminal 

appeals. See id. Absent, for example, a claim of double 

jeopardy, a pretrial order denying a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss is generally not immediately appealable. See Abney 

v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659, 662 (1977). However, 

the collateral order doctrine permits review of a “small class 

of decisions,” including some non-final orders that do not 

terminate the underlying action. United States v. Pace, 

201 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). The order must: 

1) conclusively determine the disputed question; 2) resolve 

an important issue completely separate from the merits of the 

action; and 3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 

final judgment. Id.

The district court’s denial of Mendez’s motion to dismiss 

meets that standard. First, the district court’s denial of 

Mendez’s motion to dismiss conclusively determined that 

the JDA does not prevent Mendez’s prosecution under the 

SSI. Second, whether the JDA applies to prohibit 

prosecution as an adult is a separate question from Mendez’s 

criminal culpability for the racketeering conspiracy charge. 

Finally, the issue here is effectively unreviewable on appeal 

from a final judgment because Mendez’s claimed statutory 

right not to be tried as an adult will be lost if not appealed 
8 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

immediately. See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 

489 U.S. 794, 801 (1989); United States v. Gerald N., 

900 F.2d 189, 190–91 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“[T]he 

legal and practical value of the right to be tried as a juvenile 

would be destroyed without the concomitant right of 

immediate appeal.”). We therefore hold that we have 

interlocutory jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

B

We must decide whether JDA jurisdiction had attached 

to preclude Mendez’s prosecution as an adult given the 

government’s failure to complete the transfer procedure set 

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 5032 and the absence of a judicial 

determination regarding transfer. Mendez argues that the 

JDA “unambiguously bars” his prosecution under the SSI 

because by charging the RICO conspiracy offense as an “act 

of juvenile delinquency” in the JDA information, “the 

government triggered the JDA’s mandatory procedural 

mechanism,” which requires dismissal because the 

government dismissed the information without completing 

the transfer process and submitting the question to the 

district court. But the government responds that because 

Mendez’s alleged participation in the conspiracy continued 

beyond his eighteenth birthday, it was no longer an “act of 

juvenile delinquency” as defined by the JDA, and an act that 

is not one of “juvenile delinquency” is not subject to the 

JDA’s transfer requirements. We think the government has 

the better of the argument.

1

The JDA’s purpose is to “remove juveniles from the 

ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a 

prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and 

rehabilitation.” United States v. Doe, 94 F.3d 532, 536 (9th 
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 9

Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Camez, 839 F.3d at 

873. The JDA “does not create a substantive offense with 

its own jurisdictional basis, but rather establishes a 

procedural mechanism for the treatment of juveniles who are 

already subject to federal jurisdiction because of the 

commission of acts cognizable under other federal criminal 

statutes.” Camez, 839 F.3d at 873–74 (citation omitted). A 

successful JDA prosecution results in adjudication of a status 

as a juvenile delinquent, not conviction of a crime as an adult 

would suffer. See United States v. Araiza-Valdez, 713 F.2d 

430, 432 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).

To prosecute “an act of juvenile delinquency” in the 

federal criminal justice system, “the government must 

follow the certification procedures required by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 5032.” United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 

1999). Certification is jurisdictional. Id. If the Attorney 

General, or his designee, makes the requisite certification, 

the United States “shall proceed by information . . . and no 

criminal prosecution shall be instituted for the alleged act of 

juvenile delinquency except as provided [in the JDA].” 

18 U.S.C. § 5032.3

The statutory definitions are critical. A juvenile is “a 

person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for 

the purpose of proceedings and disposition under [the JDA] 

for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, a person who has 

not attained his twenty-first birthday.” Id. § 5031. The 

defendant’s age is determined at the time of indictment. 

3 The statute also includes a jeopardy provision: “Once a juvenile 

has entered a plea of guilty or the proceeding has reached the stage that 

evidence has begun to be taken with respect to a crime or an alleged act 

of juvenile delinquency subsequent criminal prosecution or juvenile 

proceedings based upon such alleged act of delinquency shall be barred.” 

Id. The facts here do not meet either triggering event under the statute.
10 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

Camez, 839 F.3d at 874. Juvenile delinquency is “the 

violation of a law of the United States committed by a person 

prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a 

crime if committed by an adult or a violation by such a 

person of section 922(x).” 18 U.S.C. § 5031.

“A juvenile who is alleged to have committed an act of 

juvenile delinquency . . . shall be proceeded against under 

[the JDA],” with limited exceptions, only one of which is 

relevant in this appeal. Id. § 5032. The JDA permits the 

government to initiate the transfer for adult prosecution of a 

juvenile who is 15 years or older and has allegedly 

committed an act which would constitute an adult felony for 

a crime of violence, or certain other narcotics and weapons 

crimes. See id. The court must find, “after hearing, such 

transfer would be in the interest of justice,” considering the 

evidence and making record findings with respect to several 

specific statutory factors. Id. As explained above, the 

transfer process was never completed. Instead, the 

government elected to proceed on the SSI, and the district 

court dismissed the JDA information before any hearing in 

support of the transfer.

2

We begin our analysis with the pertinent definitions. 

Mendez was a “juvenile” under 18 U.S.C. § 5031 when the 

government first charged him by information at age 19 for 

the various acts of “juvenile delinquency” allegedly 

committed before his eighteenth birthday. See Camez, 

839 F.3d at 874. And by filing the information, the 

government was undisputedly bound by the JDA’s 

provisions—including the adult transfer protocol—for those 

alleged acts of juvenile delinquency. Therefore, the key to 

resolving this appeal is determining whether the racketeering 

conspiracy charged in the SSI was an “act of juvenile 
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 11

delinquency” or was instead a majority-spanning criminal 

offense for which he may be tried and convicted as an adult.

The ratification doctrine answers the question presented 

in this case and our decision in Camez helps guide the 

analysis. Camez considered the evidentiary question

whether the JDA barred consideration of pre-majority 

conduct as proof of substantive RICO crimes. Id. at 872–73. 

The government there indicted the defendant alleging preand post-majority conduct. Id. The defendant challenged 

his conviction only on the substantive RICO count, arguing 

that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could 

consider his pre-majority conduct. Id. at 873. We affirmed, 

reasoning in part that analogy to the contract ratification 

doctrine supports the admissibility of pre-majority conduct. 

Id. at 876. As we explained, “a defendant may ratify his preeighteen participation in a conspiracy or other continuing 

crime by continued participation after attaining majority.” 

Id. (cleaned up) (citing United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 

1366 (2d Cir. 1994)). We rejected the notion that Congress 

in enacting the JDA “intended to allow all persons 

effectively to start with a clean slate” on their eighteenth 

birthday. Id. To the contrary, “for continuing crimes alleged 

to have occurred both before and after the defendant turned 

18 . . . adult prosecution is warranted.” Id. at 874.

Mendez argues that Camez is inapposite because it does 

not address the JDA’s criminal prosecution bar and transfer 

provision, see 18 U.S.C. § 5032, where JDA jurisdiction had 

already attached to an alleged act of juvenile delinquency. It 

is true that the government in Camez did not first pursue a 

juvenile action before bringing an adult prosecution. But the 

JDA transfer requirement applies only to acts of juvenile 

delinquency. Thus, we look to the nature of the offense 

itself. See United States v. Delatorre, 157 F.3d 1205, 1210 
12 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

(10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that an offense completed by 

age 18 will constitute an act of juvenile delinquency under 

the JDA). And a majority-spanning conspiracy is simply not 

an act of juvenile delinquency.

To be sure, what Mendez describes as “the thin 

allegations of post-majority conduct” in the SSI might 

ultimately be insufficient to prove that Mendez ratified his 

pre-majority conduct. And thus, Mendez argues that the SSI 

does not actually allege a majority-spanning conspiracy. 

However, at this stage the SSI’s facts are presumed true; the 

inquiry is not whether the United States can prove its case. 

See United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 

1993). On the merits, we conclude that Mendez’s argument 

fails because the SSI alleges multiple post-majority 

instances of Mendez possessing drugs and weapons and 

flashing MS-13 gang signs with co-defendants and 

unindicted co-conspirators—all acts which, if proved, a 

reasonable jury could determine were intended by Mendez 

to achieve the goals of the enterprise conspiracy. See, e.g., 

Fiander, 547 F.3d at 1041 (explaining a defendant need not 

commit the substantive offense to be guilty of RICO 

conspiracy; rather “it is sufficient that he knew about and 

agreed to facilitate the scheme” (cleaned up)).

Most of our sister circuits agree that the government may 

charge a majority-spanning conspiracy as an adult offense. 

See Camez, 839 F.3d at 875–77 (collecting cases from the 

First, Second, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); see also 

United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 361–62 (5th Cir. 

2014), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 916 (2015); United States v. 

Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 969–70 (7th Cir. 1989). To illustrate, 

the government directs us to United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 

1464, 1475–77 (11th Cir. 1986). Cruz addressed in part 

whether the federal district court had jurisdiction over one 
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 13

defendant who was convicted of conspiracy to possess and 

distribute cocaine where he was indicted as an adult and was 

a juvenile at the time he entered into the conspiracy. Id. 

at 1475. The Eleventh Circuit held that “once sufficient 

evidence has been introduced that would allow a jury to 

reasonably conclude that the defendant’s participation in a 

conspiracy continued after his eighteenth birthday, then he 

may be tried as an adult.” Id. at 1476. The court explained 

that none of the JDA’s provisions “are applicable in a trial 

involving one who is not a juvenile and has not committed 

an act of juvenile delinquency.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing 

18 U.S.C. § 5031); accord United States v. Welch, 15 F.3d 

1202, 1211 (1st Cir. 1993).

The Second Circuit’s decision in Wong, upon which 

Camez also relied, supports our analysis with respect to the 

JDA’s applicability to continuing offenses like racketeering 

conspiracy. See 40 F.3d at 1365–68. Wong held that where 

the defendants began committing the RICO offenses charged 

in the indictment “while they were juveniles, but continued 

to do so after their eighteenth birthdays,” the JDA did not 

apply “[b]ecause the RICO offenses were not ‘committed by 

a [defendant] prior to his eighteenth birthday.’” Id. at 1365 

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5031). Indeed, because “RICO 

conspiracy offenses are continuing crimes,” the Second 

Circuit held that the district court properly exercised 

jurisdiction over the adult RICO conspiracy charges based 

on the defendants’ post-18 conduct, notwithstanding their 

argument that the JDA barred their prosecution. Id. at 1366–

67.

The Tenth Circuit also found Wong persuasive. See 

Delatorre, 157 F.3d at 1210. Delatorre held that because the 

government, invoking its prosecutorial discretion, charged a 

continuing, majoring-spanning RICO conspiracy, it “need 
14 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

not comply with the JDA’s provisions governing acts of 

juvenile delinquency.” Id. (explaining that an offense 

completed by age 18 will constitute an act of juvenile 

delinquency under the JDA). In sum, we find our sister 

circuits’ approaches to majority-spanning conspiracies 

persuasive. We hold that a defendant who continues to 

participate in a conspiracy after reaching majority ratifies his 

prior conduct in the conspiracy, such that the conspiracy 

carries over into his majority. In this situation, the JDA is 

inapplicable.

We also hold that, because Mendez allegedly continued 

to participate in the racketeering conspiracy on his 

eighteenth birthday and beyond, his racketeering conspiracy 

offense was not an act of juvenile delinquency under the 

JDA. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031, 5032. To be fair, there is no 

dispute that JDA jurisdiction attached to Mendez’s alleged 

acts of juvenile delinquency such as the completed murders 

in furtherance of the pre-18 RICO conspiracy, see id. § 5032, 

as those offenses were complete before he turned 18. But at 

the moment he decided not to withdraw, but rather ratified 

his pre-majority conduct by continuing to participate in the 

conspiracy after his eighteenth birthday, the JDA’s exclusive 

jurisdiction over the offense—and the required application 

of its transfer protocol—ceased. Cf. Camez, 839 F.3d at 876; 

see also Delatorre, 157 F.3d at 1210; Wong, 40 F.3d at 

1366–67; Cruz, 805 F.2d at 1476. Consequently, the district 

court has adult criminal jurisdiction over the majorityspanning RICO conspiracy offense charged in the SSI.4

4 Indeed, we have previously concluded that, under certain 

circumstances, the filing of a JDA information does not necessarily bar 

the government from proceeding against a defendant as an adult for the 

same conduct, even without a formal transfer hearing. See United States 
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 15

Mendez relies on contrary language in United States v. 

Smith suggesting that “once the government invokes 

18 U.S.C. § 5032, it may not in the future proceed against 

the defendant except in accordance with the terms of that 

provision.” 851 F.2d 706, 709–10 (4th Cir. 1988). There, 

the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant’s motion to 

dismiss the indictment should have been granted where the 

government had previously dismissed a JDA information 

against the defendant. Id.

But the problem with Mendez’s argument is that the 

grand jury in Smith indicted the defendant, then 21, for the 

same completed substantive offenses charged in the prior 

JDA information the government dismissed before the 

indictment: three counts of first-degree murder committed 

at age 15. Id. at 707–08. Here, unlike Smith, the SSI does 

not charge Mendez with the same completed substantive 

offenses—first-degree murder, violent crimes in aid of 

racketeering, and aiding and abetting—as the JDA 

information charged as acts of juvenile delinquency.

In contrast, the government maintains the Mendez 

indictment does not charge the same offense, and thus it was 

not required to proceed under § 5032. Given the continuing 

nature of the crime of conspiracy, as we explain above, and 

on these facts, we agree that is the correct view. See Camez, 

839 F.3d at 876–77; see also Cruz, 805 F.2d at 1477; 

Delatorre, 157 F.3d at 1211 (“The Government may 

prosecute [the defendant] as an adult in accordance with the 

federal evidentiary and procedural rules so long as the 

v. HOS, 696 F.3d 869, 870–72 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that where the 

government continued its investigation and later learned the defendant 

was an adult when he committed the offenses, the adult criminal case 

could proceed).
16 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

Government establishes that [the defendant] participated in 

the continuing crimes with which he is charged beyond his 

eighteenth birthday.”).

That the government previously filed the JDA 

information alleging Mendez violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) 

is a distinction without a difference. Looking at the offense, 

see Delatorre, 157 F.3d at 1210, the one charged in the 

information was an act of juvenile delinquency. But the SSI 

alleges post-majority acts sufficient to support a majorityspanning § 1962(d) adult RICO conspiracy charge. 

Ultimately, whether Mendez ratified his conduct is a 

question left for the factfinder. See Blinder, 10 F.3d at 1471.

Because Mendez’s participation in the conspiracy 

allegedly continued beyond his eighteenth birthday, it was 

no longer an act of juvenile delinquency under the JDA. 

Rather, the conduct became a continuing adult RICO 

conspiracy offense which began when he was a juvenile but 

continued when he allegedly engaged in additional acts in 

furtherance of the ongoing conspiracy after reaching the age 

of majority. The JDA does not shield Mendez from having 

to answer for this continuing criminal behavior as an adult.

IV

When a minor ratifies his pre-majority conduct by 

continuing to participate in an ongoing criminal conspiracy 

after his eighteenth birthday, the offense is not insulated by 

the JDA’s procedural enclave.

The district court’s order denying Mendez’s motion to 

dismiss the superseding indictment is AFFIRMED.