Rel: August 2, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

SPECIAL TERM, 2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0646

_________________________

C.L.S.

v.

D.B.S. and Jefferson County Department of Human Resources 

Appeal from Jefferson Juvenile Court

(JU-21-62.01)

HANSON, Judge.

On January 22, 2021, the Jefferson County Department of Human 

Resources ("DHR") filed in the Jefferson Juvenile Court ("the juvenile 

court") a petition seeking to have the minor child of C.L.S. ("the mother") 

and D.B.S. ("the father") found dependent. The record indicates that, at 
CL-2023-0646

2

that time, the mother and father were no longer in a relationship and 

that the child was in the custody of the mother. On January 31, 2021, the 

juvenile court entered a shelter-care order in which, among other things, 

it placed the child in the pendente lite custody of the father and awarded 

the mother supervised visitation with the child. The father filed in the 

dependency action a request for an award of custody of the child and for 

an award of child support. 

On May 18, 2022, the father filed in the dependency action a motion 

in which he again sought an award of child support from the mother. On 

July 20, 2022, the mother filed a petition seeking the return of custody of 

the child to her. On July 23, 2022, the juvenile court entered a pendente 

lite order in which it found the child dependent and awarded custody of 

the child to the father and awarded the mother visitation.

The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 25, 

2022. At the beginning of that hearing, the father's attorney reminded 

the juvenile court that the father had requested an award of child support 

from the mother in the dependency action. The juvenile court referenced 

a separate child-support action also pending in that court and stated that 

it intended to address that action separately. At the close of the 
CL-2023-0646

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dependency hearing, the father's attorney represented to the juvenile 

court that the father had requested an award of child support as a part 

of the dependency action but that he had not made a request for an award 

of child support in the child-support action. Accordingly, it appears that 

the child-support action was initiated by DHR. 

On August 26, 2022, the juvenile court entered an order in which it 

found the child dependent, awarded custody of the child to the father, 

and awarded the mother supervised visitation with the child. In addition, 

in that August 26, 2022, order, the juvenile court relieved DHR of any 

future supervision of the family and directed that the action be closed.

The August 26, 2022, order did not make any reference to the father's 

request for an award of child support, which he had asserted in the 

dependency action, nor did it reference the separate child-support action 

that appears to have been initiated by DHR.

On September 9, 2022, the father, joined by the child's guardian ad 

litem, filed in the dependency action a purported postjudgment motion.1

1It is questionable whether the father's September 9, 2022, motion 

could be said to be, in substance, a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 

59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., because, as discussed infra, it did not seek to alter 

or amend the August 26, 2022, order. See Evans v. Waddell, 689 So. 2d 
CL-2023-0646

4

In that motion, the father alleged that some background checks and an 

investigation of relatives of the mother, upon which the award of 

supervised visitation for the mother had been based, had not been 

completed. The father requested that the juvenile court delay the 

mother's scheduled visitation until those background checks and 

investigation had been completed or to require the mother to exercise her 

emergency visitation at a local counseling center. On that same date, the 

juvenile court entered an order granting the father's motion and 

specifying that the mother could visit the child at the counseling center 

until the completion of the required background checks and investigation 

of the relatives who were to supervise her visitations with the child.

The mother filed a notice of appeal to the Jefferson Circuit Court 

("the circuit court") on October 13, 2022. See § 12-15-601, Ala. Code 1975 

("A party, including the state or any subdivision of the state, has the right 

to appeal a judgment or order from any juvenile court proceeding 

pursuant to this chapter. The procedure for appealing these cases shall 

be pursuant to rules of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court of 

23, 26 (Ala. 1997) ("The substance of a motion and not its style 

determines what kind of motion it is.").
CL-2023-0646

5

Alabama."); Rule 28, Ala. R. Juv. P. (governing appeals from a juvenilecourt judgment). On January 18, 2023, DHR filed in the circuit court a 

motion to transfer the mother's appeal to this court, arguing that because 

recordings of the August 25, 2022, hearing were available to create an 

adequate appellate record, jurisdiction over the mother's October 13, 

2022, appeal was in this court. See Rule 28, Ala. R. Juv. P. The mother 

filed an opposition to the motion to transfer in which she argued that no 

electronic recording of the August 25, 2022, hearing was available.2 The 

circuit court conducted a hearing, and, on March 13, 2023, it granted 

DHR's motion and ordered that the matter "be transferred to the 

[juvenile court] for submission" to this court.

We interpret the circuit court's March 13, 2023, order not as 

effecting a transfer of jurisdiction over the appeal to the juvenile court, 

2We note that, as the court receiving the appeal, the circuit court 

was required to determine whether the appeal was properly filed in that 

court or whether it should have been filed in this court. Rule 28(E), Ala. 

R. Juv. P. ("An appellate court or circuit court may transfer an appeal to 

another court if it determines that the appeal should be transferred to or 

should have been brought in that court."); Ex parte A.A., 263 So. 3d 1063, 

1066 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018) ("Pursuant to Rule 28(D), [now Rule 28(E),] 

Ala. R. Juv. P., the court that receives an appeal must determine whether 

the appeal should have been brought in another court before transferring 

the appeal to the other court.") 
CL-2023-0646

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but, instead, as an order directing the juvenile court to compile the record 

on appeal for the mother's appeal to this court. In Ex parte A.A., this 

court explained:

"We note that the circuit court has general superintendence 

over the juvenile court. See § 12-11-30(4), Ala. Code 1975 ('The 

circuit court shall exercise a general superintendence over all 

district courts, municipal courts, and probate courts.'). 

Accordingly, the circuit court may take measures, if 

necessary, to direct the completion of the records in order to 

determine whether an adequate record exists in each case."

263 So. 3d at 1067.

The juvenile court took no action in response to the circuit court's 

March 13, 2023, order. Instead, on August 15, 2023, the juvenile court 

entered an order again stating that the case was "closed," and it ordered 

the action removed from the juvenile court's docket. Thereafter, on 

August 24, 2023, DHR filed a motion in the circuit court requesting that 

the appeal be transferred to this court. On August 28, 2023, the circuit 

court entered an order granting that request, and the appeal was 

transferred to this court.3

3DHR had also filed in the circuit court on July 26, 2023, a motion 

seeking the dismissal of the mother's appeal because she had failed to 

prosecute the appeal, which she had filed on October 13, 2022. The circuit 

court did not rule on that motion to dismiss before it ordered that the 

appeal be transferred to this court.
CL-2023-0646

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Initially, we note that this court, ex mero motu, may take notice of 

any jurisdictional issues such as whether a judgment from which an 

appeal arises is not sufficiently final to support that appeal. P.D.S. v. 

Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 32 So. 3d 1288, 1290 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2009); Butler v. Phillips, 3 So. 3d 922, 925 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008); J.S. v. 

J.D.R., 987 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). An appeal from a 

judgment entered under the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act § 12-15-101 et 

seq., Ala. Code 1975, which governs, among other things, dependency 

actions, must be taken from a final judgment or order. P.J. v. Shelby 

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 338 So. 3d 781, 784 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021). See 

also § 12-15-601, Ala. Code 1975 ("A party, including the state or any 

subdivision of the state, has the right to appeal a judgment or order from 

any juvenile court proceeding pursuant to this chapter."); Rule 28(A)(1), 

Ala. R. Juv. P. ("Appeals from final orders or judgments of the juvenile 

court shall be to the appropriate appellate court."); Ex parte T.C., 96 So. 

3d 123, 129 (Ala. 2012) (quoting T.C. v. Mac.M., 96 So. 3d 115, 121 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 2011) quoting in turn former Rule 28, Ala. R. Juv. P.) (" 'Rule 

28, Ala. R. Juv. P., continues to govern the detailed procedure for appeals 

from the juvenile court, and that rule expressly authorizes appeals only 
CL-2023-0646

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from "final orders, judgments, or decrees of the juvenile court." '"); B.J. v. 

Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 372 So. 3d 1213, 1217 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2022) ("In a dependency proceeding, an appeal will lie only from a final 

judgment."); and S.A.M. v. M.H.W., 227 So. 3d 1232, 1233 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2017) ("An appeal of a juvenile court's order lies from a final judgment.").

A final judgment is one that adjudicates all the claims and issues 

presented to the trier of fact. Bean v. Craig, 557 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala. 

1990); S.M. v. C.A., 267 So. 3d 851, 852 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018); S.A.M. v. 

M.H.W., 227 So. 3d at 1233; M.H. v. H.N.M., 46 So. 3d 967, 969 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2009). In J.M.M. v. J.C., 50 So. 3d 1076 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), the 

juvenile court entered an order that left custody of a child with the child's 

custodian and "reserved" the issue of an award of child support from the 

mother. This court dismissed the mother's appeal as taken from a 

nonfinal order, holding that because the pending child-support claim 

remained pending, the judgment from which the mother had appealed 

was nonfinal and could not support the appeal. J.M.M. v. J.C., 50 So. 3d 

at 1078.

Similarly, in T.H. v. Jefferson County Department of Human 

Resources, 100 So. 3d 583 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), a juvenile court entered 
CL-2023-0646

9

orders in the dependency actions pertaining to a mother's four children 

in which, among other things, it left custody of the children with DHR 

and ordered the mother to produce evidence of her income for the purpose 

of determining her child-support obligation at a later date. The mother 

appealed those orders, and this court dismissed the mother's appeals on 

the basis that those appeals were taken from a nonfinal judgment 

because the child-support claims remained pending. T.H. v. Jefferson 

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 100 So. 3d at 585-86.

In this case, in addition to the dependency claims and the parties' 

competing claims for custody of the child, the father asserted a claim 

seeking an award of child support from the mother in the dependency 

action. The August 26, 2022, order does not mention the father's childsupport claim. Moreover, that order does not contain any ruling that 

contains language or grants relief that might be said to implicitly deny 

the father's claim seeking an award of child support. See Wells v. 

Tankersley, 244 So. 3d 975, 977 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (holding that 

because the relief granted by the trial court in its judgment was 

incompatible with certain claims asserted by the mother, the trial court 

had implicitly denied the mother's claims); Morgan v. Morgan, 183 So. 3d 
CL-2023-0646

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945, 966 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (holding that a claim seeking relief from 

all pendente lite support obligations was implicitly denied when the trial 

court reduced only the pendente lite child-support obligation); and 

Wellborn v. Wellborn, 100 So. 3d 1122, 1126 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) 

(holding that because the trial court had granted the father's request to 

decrease his child-support obligation, it had implicitly denied the 

mother's claim seeking an increase in that child-support obligation). 

In Faellaci v. Faellaci, 67 So. 3d 923 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), a trial 

court orally indicated that its award of a child-support arrearage was 

intended as a ruling on the wife's claim seeking to have the husband held 

in contempt for his failure to pay child support as previously ordered. The 

trial court's judgment in that case did not address the issue of contempt, 

and this court determined that, under the specific facts of that case, the 

trial court had implicitly denied the wife's contempt claim. This court 

explained:

"At the conclusion of the ore tenus hearing in this case, 

the trial court issued its judgment from the bench and ordered 

the parties' attorneys to draw up an order reflecting its ruling. 

During that discussion, the wife's attorney stated that the 

trial court had not ruled on the wife's pending petition for a 

rule nisi, and he pointed out that the trial court's failure to do 

so would render the judgment nonfinal. The trial-court judge 

responded that his award of a child-support arrearage to the 
CL-2023-0646

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wife was intended as a ruling on her petition for a rule nisi. 

See Frasemer v. Frasemer, 578 So. 2d 1346, 1349 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 1991) (child-support arrearage must be awarded even if 

payor's behavior was not contemptuous). We conclude that 

such an expression, followed by an order that did not 

specifically hold the husband in contempt, satisfies this court, 

in these particular circumstances, that the trial court 

implicitly concluded that the husband's behavior did not rise 

to the level of contempt in this case. Although an explicit 

ruling on pending contempt petitions is always more 

desirable, we find that the trial court's judgment sufficiently 

indicates an intention to conclusively rule on the wife's 

pending petition for a rule nisi."

Faellaci v. Faellaci, 67 So. 3d 923, 925 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

As in Faellaci v. Faellaci, supra, the juvenile court in this case made 

oral statements during an evidentiary hearing regarding its intention not 

to address a claim asserted by one of the parties to the dependency action, 

i.e., the father's child-support claim. In Faellaci v. Faellaci, however, the 

mother had alleged that the father was in contempt for his failure to pay 

child support, and the trial court's judgment in that case awarded the 

mother a child-support arrearage for amounts that the father had failed 

to pay. Thus, this court held that the judgment in Faellaci v. Faellaci, 

together with the trial court's oral statements during the hearing, 

contained a sufficient expression of an intent to determine the contempt 

claim. 
CL-2023-0646

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In this case, however, the juvenile court's judgment contains no 

indication that the juvenile court considered the father's child-support 

claim as a part of the dependency action. The juvenile court orally stated

that it intended to determine the issue of child support as a part of the 

separate child-support action initiated by DHR. Given that distinction, 

i.e., that the father had no other child-support claim pending in another 

action, the juvenile court's failure to adjudicate all the pending claims in 

the dependency action rendered the August 26, 2022, order nonfinal. 

We note that the record also indicates that, had the August 26, 

2022, order been a final judgment, this appeal was arguably untimely. 

We need not resolve that issue, however. This court may not dismiss an 

appeal as untimely if it is taken from a nonfinal order. Ex parte 

Harrington, 289 So. 3d 1232, 1235-37 (Ala. 2019); Kyles v. Kyles, 202 So. 

3d 684, 686 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). See also Grubbs v. Grubbs, 729 So. 2d 

346, 347 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (holding that, generally, an appeal lies only 

from a final judgment); T.B. v. A.J., 812 So. 2d 1287, 1289 n.1 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2001) ("Because the father's appeal was taken from a nonfinal 

judgment, we deny the grandmother's motion to dismiss the appeal as 

untimely (i.e., late)."). "Because the order appealed from was not final, it 
CL-2023-0646

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is irrelevant whether [the appellant's] appeal was [arguably] untimely." 

Erskine v. Guin, 384 So. 3d 583, 597 (Ala. 2023).

"'The question whether a judgment is final is a jurisdictional 

question, and the reviewing court, on a determination that the judgment 

is not final, has a duty to dismiss the case.' Hubbard v. Hubbard, 935 So. 

2d 1191, 1192 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)." M.H. v. H.N.M., 46 So. 3d at 969.

The mother's appeal is taken from a nonfinal judgment, and, therefore, 

we dismiss the appeal. 

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.