alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

Exhibit 11.0

                                 Statement re: Computation of per share earnings

Reconciliations of net income per share and net income per share, assuming
dilution  computations for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2001
and 2000 are as follows (amounts in thousands, except per share amounts):

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                         Three Months Ended             Nine Months Ended
                                                            September 30,                 September 30,
                                                      ----------------------       -----------------------
                                                        2001           2000           2001           2000
                                                      --------       --------       --------       --------
<S>                                                   <C>            <C>            <C>            <C>
Numerator:

Net loss-numerator for basic and
        diluted net income (loss) per share ....      $ (2,753)      $ (2,179)      $ (7,488)      $ (3,156)
                                                      ========       ========       ========       ========
Denominator:
       Denominator for basic income (loss) per
        common share weighted average shares ...        32,890         28,165         30,385         27,670

Effect of dilutive securities-stock option .....            --             --             --             --
                                                      --------       --------       --------       --------
Denominator for diluted income (loss) per
      common share .............................        32,890         28,165         30,385         27,670
                                                      ========       ========       ========       ========
</TABLE>

Potentially dilutive shares are excluded from the computation in loss periods,
as their effect would be antidilutive.


                                       22
22343

#### State v. Draper

Affirmed
June 10, 1997

17550

#### Lawai Development Co. v. Big Save, Inc.

Affirmed and ■ Remanded
#### Earl EDMONDSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A-12443.

*'Criminal*Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

May 22, 1957.

Elmore Page, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., L. O. Thomas, County Atty. of Craig County, Vinita, for defendant in error.

BRETT, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff in error, Earl Edmondson, defendant below, was charged by information in the County Court of Craig County, Oklahoma, with the offense of unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor, said offense *956being committed on or about May 26, 1956. The record discloses by stipulation of counsel, that the automobile contained 18 fifths of Scotch whiskey, 294 fifths of bourbon whiskey, 48 pints of bourbon whiskey, 320 one-half pints bourbon whiskey, 24 one-half pints gin, 36 fifths gin, and 16 one-half pints vodka. A jury was waived and the defendant was tried by the Court which found him guilty as charged and fixed his punishment at 30 days in jail and a fine of $200. The Court allowed the defendant 60-10-5 days in which to prepare, sign, settle, and certify casemade. Judgment and sentence were entered accordingly from which this appeal has been attempted.

This matter comes on for hearing on the state’s motion to dismiss. It appears from the record that judgment and sentence were entered on October 30, 1956, and no further extension of time was obtained in which to perfect the appeal. It appears that on December 19, 1956, and on December 28, 1956, the defendant was notified that his casemade was ready. On January 14, 1957, the defendant attempted to obtain an extension of time in which to perfect his appeal.

It is apparent that the casemade was not served within the time allowed by law nor in any valid extension thereof, under the provisions of 22 O.S.1951 § 1054; Nowlin v. State, Okl.Cr., 308 P.2d 668; McLean v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 271, 244 P.2d 335; and Roller v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 87, 240 P.2d 112, in which it was said:

> “When an appeal in misdemeanor case is not taken within the 60 days prescribed by the statute, 22 O.S.A. § 1054, the record or case-made must affirmatively show that the trial court or judge thereof for good cause shown extended the time; otherwise, this court is without jurisdiction to review the judgment, and such appeal will be dismissed.”

The motion to dismiss is granted. Dismissed.

POWELL and NIX, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5


<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                       12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 FEB-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   JAN-31-1999
<CASH>                                               6,634
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     6,634
<PP&E>                                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       6,634
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                         7,408,910
<OTHER-SE>                                      (7,402,426)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         6,635
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                       127
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     4,141
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (4,014)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (4,014)
<EPS-BASIC>                                              0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0



</TABLE>
**Order of the Court of First Instance (Sixth Chamber) of 16 December 2008 – Italy v Parliament and Commission**

**(Case T-285/07)**

Procedural step – Objection of inadmissibility – Partial inadmissibility of the action – Non-attributability of the contested measure to the Parliament

Actions for annulment – Action brought against a competition notice published by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) for filling posts
vacant at the Parliament – Measure exclusively imputable to the Commission – Action brought against the Commission and the Parliament – Partial inadmissibility (Art. 230 EC; Staff Regulations, Art. 91a; Decision of the European Parliament, the Council, the
Commission, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and
the Ombudsman 2002/620, Art. 4) (see paras 18-19, 21-23, 25-27)

**Re:**

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ANNULMENT of the notice of open competition EPSO/AD/95/07 to constitute a reserve pool for 20 posts of Administrator (AD5) in the field of ‘Information Science (Library/Documentation)’, published in the | Official Journal of the European Union | of 8 May 2007 (OJ 2007 C 103 A, p. 7). |

**Operative part**

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | The action is dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it is directed against the Parliament. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | The Italian Republic is ordered to pay the costs which it has incurred in this action in so far as it is directed against the Parliament. The Parliament is ordered to bear its own costs. |
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 4, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-50968 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus DAVID LEE JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 6:04-CV-215 USDC NO. 6:03-CR-16-1

-------------------- Before GARZA, D E MOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * David Lee Johnson, federal prisoner # 26676-180, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his guilty-plea conviction to manufacture of methamphetamine. Johnson also moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). In order to obtain a COA, Johnson must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.No. 04-50968 -2- McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003). Johnson argues that the district court erroneously concluded that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was procedurally defaulted. Johnson is correct. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised for the first time in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003). Johnson also argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal on his behalf, despite Johnson’s request that he do so. COA is GRANTED on the question whether and when Johnson requested an appeal and the advice or information provided by counsel. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega , 528 U.S. 470, 477-78, 485-86 (2000). This case is REMANDED for consideration of this issue in the first instance by the district court and for an evidentiary hearing, if necessary. To assist the district court in its consideration of this issue and Johnson’s related issues concerning the appeal waiver and the Government’s alleged breach of the plea agreement, and to assist with any subsequent appellate review, Johnson is advised that, if he meets the requirements, he should move in the district court for production at Government expense of the transcripts of the rearraignment and sentencing proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(f); Harvey v. Andrist , 754 F.2d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 1985).No. 04-50968 -3- Johnson further argues that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment and Blakely v. Washington , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). In light of our order to grant COA and remand for further consideration, we DEFER ruling on this issue. Johnson is advised that if the district court denies relief on the aforementioned claim, he should address this claim in a future COA request. Johnson’s motion for IFP is GRANTED.
COA GRANTED; IFP GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED.
# C_2020019EN.01004001.xml

| 20.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/40

---

Order of the President of the Court of 19 July 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción de Ceuta — Spain) — HC, ID v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.

(Case C-247/19) (1)

(2020/C 19/45)

Language of the case: Spanish

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 246, 22.7.2019.

---
Exhibit 99.1





CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Education Management Corporation (the Company) for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert B. Knutson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:





(1).  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2).  The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: November 13, 2002

/s/ ROBERT B. KNUTSONRobert B. KnutsonChairman and Chief Executive Officer





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Education
Management Corporation (the Company) for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert T. McDowell, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1).  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2).  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:  November 13, 2002

/s/ ROBERT T. MCDOWELLRobert T. McDowellExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
# C_2020287EN.01001302.xml

| 31.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 287/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 287/13

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 9 July 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof — Germany) — HF v Finanzamt Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler

(Case C-374/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Adjustment of deductions - Variation in the deduction entitlement - Capital goods used for both taxed and exempt transactions - Cessation of the activity giving rise to the right of deduction - Remaining use solely for exempt transactions)

(2020/C 287/19)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: HF

Defendant: Finanzamt Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler

Operative part of the judgment

Articles 184, 185 and 187 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation pursuant to which a taxable person who has acquired the right to deduct, on a pro-rata basis, value added tax (VAT) related to the construction of a cafeteria, which is annexed to the retirement home operated by him as an activity exempt from VAT and which is intended to be used for both taxed and exempt transactions, is required to adjust the initial VAT deduction where he has ceased all taxed transactions in that cafeteria’s premises, if he has continued to carry out exempt transactions in those premises, thus using them henceforth only for those transactions.

---

(1)  OJ C 288, 26.8.2019.

---
#### Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, Ltd.

15457

11/1/94

Denied

77 Hawai'i 117, 883 P.2d 38
# C_2020137EN.01005501.xml

| 27.4.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/55 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.4.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/55

---

Order of the General Court of 6 February 2020 — Bernis and Others v ECB

(Case T-564/18) (1)

(2020/C 137/86)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Tenth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 436, 3.12.2018.

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-2251

DERRICK M. ALLEN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BRUNSWICK COUNTY FINANCE DEPARTMENT; ALTA THOMAS, Human 

Resource Coordinator; BRUNSWICK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; A. W. 

CONNELL, Deputy; BRUNSWICK COUNTY; MAYOR SCOTT MARTIN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, District Judge. (3:21-cv-00486-MHL)

Submitted: March 24, 2022 Decided: March 28, 2022

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Derrick Michael Allen, Sr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Derrick M. Allen appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We have reviewed the record and find no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Allen 

v. Brunswick Cnty. Fin. Dep’t, No. 3:21-cv-00486-MHL (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2021). We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
# C_2018352EN.01004001.xml

| 1.10.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 352/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.10.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 352/40

---

Action brought on 30 July 2018 — Novartis v EUIPO (SMARTSURFACE)

(Case T-463/18)

(2018/C 352/47)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Novartis AG (Basel, Switzerland) (represented by: L. Junquera Lara, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark SMARTSURFACE — Application for registration No 16 492 076

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 May 2018 in Case R 1765/2017-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | declare that Articles 7(1)(b) and (c) and 7(2) of Regulation No. 207/2009 do not preclude the sign at issue (Community Trademark No. 16 492 076) in respect of the goods in Class 09 described in the application for registration and; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that Articles 7(1)(b) and (c) and 7(2) of Regulation No. 207/2009 do not preclude the sign at issue (Community Trademark No. 16 492 076) in respect of the goods in Class 09 described in the application for registration and;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Articles 7(1)(b) and (c) and 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Articles 7(1)(b) and (c) and 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
EX-10.1



 Exhibit 10.1 
  





 
 Sent to Email: XXXXXXXX.XXXX@XXXXX.XXX 

December 24, 2016 
 Lori Freedman 

74 Bacon Street 
 Winchester, MA 01890 

Re:        Cooperation Agreement 

Dear Lori, 
 You agree that, during the Cooperation Period
(defined below), you will reasonably cooperate with pSivida Corp. (the “Company”) and its subsidiaries and affiliates for up to 20 hours in each of January and February 2017 by taking phone calls, responding to emails, and/or meeting with
me at a time convenient to you upon advance notice, in each case as reasonably requested, regarding all matters for which you have knowledge of, were involved in or handled as Vice President, Corporate Affairs and General Counsel. 

In consideration for meeting your obligations set forth herein, the Company shall extend your time to exercise your options to purchase common stock of the
Company an additional 6 months to June 26, 2018, effective as of the last day of the Cooperation Period. 
 For purposes of this agreement, the term
“Cooperation Period” shall mean January 3, 2017 through February 28, 2017. 
 Please acknowledge your acceptance of this agreement by
signing below. 
 Sincerely, 
  

			
	By:	 	 /s/ Nancy Lurker

	Nancy Lurker
	 President and CEO

pSivida


 Accepted and agreed: 
  

	
	 /s/ Lori Freedman

	Lori Freedman

 Date: 12/25/2016
# C_2008064EN.01004601.xml

| 8.3.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 64/46 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.3.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 64/46

---

Action brought on 27 December 2007 — CB v Commission

(Case T-491/07)

(2008/C 64/76)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) GIE (Paris, France) (represented by: A. Georges, J. Ruiz Calzado, É. Barbier de La Serre, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | annul the contested decision in its entirety; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision in its entirety;

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By this action, the applicant seeks annulment of Commission Decision C(2007) 5060 final of 17 October 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC (Case COMP/D1/38606 — GROUPEMENT DES CARTES BANCAIRES ‘CB’), concerning tariff measures for membership of the Groupement applicable to new members and the ‘sleeper member fee’ applicable to members of the Groupement which have not developed significant business in banking cards since becoming members.

In support of its application, the applicant puts forward six pleas in law.

The first plea alleges infringement of Article 81 EC, the principle of equal treatment and a failure to state reasons on account of alleged defects in the method of analysis of the measures and the markets adopted by the Commission, in that it failed to take account of either the overall context, all the relevant information, or the specific circumstances in which they were adopted and in which their effects are felt.

Second, the applicant puts forward a plea alleging infringement of Article 81(1) EC on account of errors of law, fact and assessment that the Commission made during the examination of the purpose of the measures which were notified to it. The applicant takes the view that the Commission has failed to comply with the obligation to examine the purpose of a decision by an association of undertakings and has not established that that purpose is anticompetitive.

By the third plea, the applicant claims that the contested decision infringes Article 81(1) EC also because of errors of law, fact and assessment that the Commission made during the examination of the effect of the measures notified to it.

In the alternative, the applicant argues that the Commission infringed Article 81(3) EC in the examination of the applicability of the four conditions required in order to obtain an exemption.

The fifth plea relied on by the applicant alleges infringement of the principle of sound administration resulting from supposed omissions, contradictions and distortions of a number of its arguments in the contested decision.

The final plea alleges infringement of the principles of proportionality and legal certainty.

---