1 IN TH E SUPREME COURT O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 Opinion N um ber: 3 F ili ng D at e: M ar ch 9, 201 7 4 N O. S -1 -S C -3 5407 5 STATE OF NEW MEXI CO, 6 Pl ai nti ff

-Appe llant, 7 v

. 8 DES IREE LINA RES , 9 De fendant-Appellee. 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF LINC OLN CO UN TY 11 Ja m es W ay lonCo unt s, D istri ct Jud ge

12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 Martha A nne Kelly , A ssistant Attorney Ge neral 14 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 15 fo r Appe llant 16 Bennett Baur, Chief P ublic Defe nder 17 J.K . T heodos ia Johns on, A ssistant Public De fender 18 San ta Fe, NM 19 for Appellee15 W e are aware that i t i s no lon ge r ac ce pta ble to de sc ri be ind ivi dua ls w ith 1 16 developm ental disabilit ies as “ m entally retar ded.” Thi s now-defunct phrase is part 17 an d parc el of a rh et or ic tha t de hum an iz ed a nd d el eg iti m iz ed

va lua ble m em be rs of our 18 soc ie ty

. S ad ly , our

sta tut es c ont inu e to u til iz e thi s tr oubl ing co nve nti on. A s our duty 19 in this c as e is t o de te rm ine w he the r or not the law a s se t ou t by

sta tut e w as f

oll ow ed , 20 we m ust us e descriptive phrases we find unsettl ing. W e encourage our L egislature 21 to am en d th e sta tut es a ppl ic ab le to the de ve lop m en ta lly disab le d an d re pla ce a ny 22 te rm s th at

ha ve pe j or at ive or

de ro ga tor

y connot at ion s w ithsui ta ble a nd r es pe ct fu l 23 al te rn at ive s. 1 OPIN ION 2 N A KA M U R

A , J. 3 { 1} A co urt- ap poi nte d psy ch olo gis t ev al ua te d D ef en dant, D es ir ee L inare s, and 4 re co m m en de d th at

she be fo und inc om

pe te nt t o st an d tr ia l du e to m en ta l r et ar da tio n. 1 5 See NMS A 1978, § 31-9-1.6 (1999). The St at e doub ted the court-appointed 6 psy ch olo gis t’ s te sti ng m ethodo log y a nd c onc lus ion s and r eque ste d an oppo rt uni ty to 7 conduct an ind ependent evaluation utilizin g its own exp ert. The dist rict cou rt granted 8 thi s r eque st, but

be ca use L inare s ha d f

ile d a spe edy -tri al m oti on and the pr oc ee din gs 9 ha d be enf

ra ught w ithne ed le ss and une xpl ai ne d delay , the dis tr ic t c ourt a llo w ed the 10 co urt- a

p p o i n t e d p s y c h o l o g i s t

t o att e n d an d o b s e r v e the S ta te ’ s in de pe nde nt e va lua tio n 11 to e nsur e the iss ue of L inare s’ s m en ta l re tard at ion w as qui ck ly re sol ve d. T he S ta te 12 ins ist ed

tha t this w as una cc ep ta ble a nd u nlaw fu l and d ec lin ed to co nduc t the 1 3 e v a l u a t i o n b e c au s e t h e c o u rt

- ap p o i n t e d p s yc h o l o g i s t w o u l d b e p r e s e n t

. Ul t i mat e l y, 14 the dis tr ic t co urt ac ce pte d the co urt- ap poi nte d ps y ch olo gis t’ s r ec om m en da tio ns and2

1 found Linares incom

petent due to m ental retar dation. Linar es wa s civilly com m itted 2 to the N ewMe xic o D ep ar tm en t of H ea lth( D O H ) an d th e cr im ina l pr oc ee din gs 3 ag ai nst he r w er e dis m iss ed

. 4 { 2} In thi s d i r e c t ap p e a l , t h e S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ab u se d it s 5 dis cr et iona nd e ff

ec tiv el y de nie d it a n op portun ity fo r an “ ind ep en de nt” e va lua tio n 6 by pe rm itt ing the co urt- ap poi nte d ps y ch olo gis t t o a tte nd the se co nd, ind ep en de nt 7 evaluation which u l t i m at el y d id not occur. T he State a lso argues that the dis trict 8 co urt a buse d it s di sc re tio n inc onc lud ing tha t Lin are s is inc om pe te nt t o st an d tr ia l. 9 L as tly , the St at e as se rt s tha t the pr oc ed ur al r equir em en ts o f Se ct ion31- 9- 1. 6( B) a nd 1 0 (C ), w h i c h s p e c i f

y t h e p r o c e du r e s a d i s t r i c t c o u rt m u s t f o l l o w w h e n c o m

m i tti ng a 11 de fe ndant t o in vol unt ar y c ivi l co nf

ine m en t, w er e not

f oll ow ed

. W e fi nd n o e rr or in 1 2 t h e p r o c e e d i n g s b e l o w a n da f f i rm. 13 I. BACKGRO UND 14 { 3} L i n a r e s a n dAl e x i s S h i e l d s r e s i d e dt o g e t h e r a s t h e f o s t e r c h i l d r e n o f

Ev e l yn 15 Mi randa

. I n Ju ne 201 1, L inare s and S hie ld s de vis ed aplan to r

un aw ay f ro m 16 Mi randa ’ s ho m e. The ch ildre n inte nde d to pla ce a pie ce of cl oth soa ke d in na il pol ish 17 rem ov er o ve r Mi ran da ’s m ou th an d n os e ren de rin g h er u nc on sc io u s , t i e he r do wn 18 with electr ical cords, steal her vehicle, and drive aw ay . The c hildren’ s ill-conceived15 T he pr ed ic ate of fe nse und er ly ing the f

el ony -m ur de r ch ar ge w as unl aw fu l 2 16 taking o f a m otor vehicle. 17 The le sser offe nses charged included con spiracy to com m it first-degree 3 18 m ur de r, c onsp ir ac y

to co m m it fe lon y -m

ur de r, kidna

ppi ng, c onsp ir ac y

to co m m it 19 kidna ppi ng, unl aw fu l t ak ing of am oto r ve hi cle , c onsp ir ac y to co m m it unl aw fu l 20 taking o f a m otor vehicle, lar ceny , and tam pering with evidence. 3 1 plan went drea dfully

aw ry . Miranda struggl ed with the children when they attem pted 2 to hol d the cloth over her m outh

. Linar es restra ined Miranda as Shields sm othered 3 Mi randaw ithapil low an d suf fo ca te d he r. T he ch ildre n fl ed in Mi randa ’ s ve hic le but 4 w er e la te r ap pr eh en de d by the auth or iti es . 5 { 4} L inare s w as ind ic te d inJun e 2011 in the Twelfth Ju dic ia l D istri ct Co urt and 6 charged as a serious y outh ful offender w ith first-degree ( willful and deliberate) 7 m ur de r an d ( al te rn at ive ly ) fi rs t- de gr ee f el ony m ur de r. L inare s w as a lso c h ar g e d w ith 2 8 a host of other lesser offenses. Shortly after the indictm ent was f

iled, L inares filed 3 9 a de m an d f

or spe edy tr ia l. 10 { 5} In the m onth s following the ind ictm ent, L inares filed severa l unop posed 11 m oti ons to c ont inu e tr ia l, a nd tri al w as pos tpo ne d an d re se t se ve ra l tim es . A t the e nd 12 of May 201 2—n earl y

ay ear af

te r L inare s w as in di ct ed—L inare s a ga in s ough t a 13 co nti nuanc e, thi s ti m e ind ic at ing tha t the part ie s re qui re d addi tio na l t im e to n eg oti at e 14 a p le a. The c ou rt g ran te d t he m ot io n a nd set an Aug us t 2 4, 2 01 2, p le a d ead li ne .4

1 { 6} T he ple a the part ie s ne got ia te d r equir ed L inares to ple ad

no- co nte st t o f

ir st2 de gr ee ( w ill fu l and d el ibe ra te ) m ur de r an d to the oth er

le sse r ch ar ge s f

or w hic h sh e 3 wa s indicted and to testify against Sh i el d s . In return, the State a greed to not seek 4 ad ult sanc tio ns a ga ins t L inare s bu t t o c om m it he r to the care of

the Ch ildre n, Y outh, 5 an d F am ili es D ep ar

tm en t un til the a ge of

21. 6 { 7} Th e p ar t i es ag re ed t h at a p re d i s p o s i t i o n s tu d y an d re p o rt ad d re s s i n g Li n ar es ’s 7 am en ab ili ty

to tr ea tm en t w oul d be be ne fi ci al a nd L inar es as ked th e co urt, c iti ng 8 NMS A 1978, § 32A- 2 -1 7 (2005), to order the Children Y outh and Fam ilies 9 De partm ent to prepare a pre-dis posit ion report. I n August 20 12, the court ordered 10 Linar es to undergo a predispositio nal diagno stic evaluation and Dr . S usan Cave wa s 11 ap poi nte d by

the c ourt t o c ondu ct

tha t e va lua tio n. 12 { 8} Dr . C ave com

pleted her evaluation on Decem ber 5, 2012 , and conclud ed that 13 L inare s’ s in te lli ge nc e quot ie nt ( IQ ) is 6 8 and tha t sh e is m ild ly m en ta lly r et ar de d. 14 D es pit e thi s c onc lus ion , D r. Cave de te rm ine d th at L inare s wa s “ m ini m al ly c om pe te nt 15 to pro ceed at s en te nc in g.” 16 { 9} T he c ourt he ld a c ha nge of

ple a he ar ing on D ec em

be r 13, 201 2, to re vie w the 17 term s of the plea agree m ent the parties rea ched and to confirm that Linar es 18 understoo d the term s of the agreem ent and was e ntering into it volu ntarily

. At that5

1 hearing, the court asked both counsel w hy the case had been delay ed so long , noted 2 that plea negotiatio ns had been on goin g for so m e ti m e, and poin ted out th at trial had 3 been set for the pre viou s s u mm er. N o adequate explanation for the delay wa s 4 f o rt h c o mi n g f

r o m ei t h e r

p a rt y. 5 { 10} O n D ec em

be r 28, 201 2, L inare s w ithdr ew he r ple a. C ontrary to the part ie s’ 6 ag reem en t, t he di st ric t co ur t was req ui red by law to im po se adu l t s a n ct io ns . See 7 generally Sta te v. Jones , 201 0- N MS C- 012, ¶ 17, 14 8 N. M. 1, 229 P

. 3d 4 74 8 (explaining that a serious y outh ful offender c onvi cted of fir st-degree m urder “ m ust 9 rece ive an adult sentence.”)

. Tr ial wa s once m ore re scheduled, this tim e for M arch 10 2013

. 11 { 11} Inla te January

201 3, L inare s m ove d fo r a he ar ing on m en ta l r et ar da tio n. O ne 12 day after filing that m otion , L inares m o v ed t o dism iss the case, which had been 13 pe ndi ng f

or nin et ee n m onths, on s pe edy -tri al gr ound s. 14 { 12} A n a m en de d su pe rs ed ing gr an d j ur

y ind ic tm en t w as fil ed in F eb ru ar y 201 3. 15 The f irst

- de gr e e ( w i l l f

ul d e l i berate) m

urder char ge wa s dropped. Linar es wa s charged16 K idn ap pin g and r obbe ry se rv ed a s th e al te rn at ive pr ed ic at e fe lon ie s. 4 17 T he le sse r ch ar ge s in cl ude d k idnap pin g, c onsp ir ac y to co m m it kidna ppi ng, 5 18 ro bb ery, co ns pi racy to c omm it rob be ry , and tam pe rin g wi th ev id en ce. 18 Dr . C ave’ s May 13, 2013, report w as not m ade part of the r ecord proper. 6 6 1 w ithtw o a lte rn at ive c ount s of f el ony m ur de r a nd s ev er al le sse r of fe nse s. 4 5 2 { 13} At the e nd of February 2013 , the district court enter ed a sua sponte order 3 va ca tin g th e Marc h 20 13 tri al se tti ng. T he co urt det er m ine d that L inare s’ s po ssi ble 4 inc om pe te nc y pr ec lud ed

a ny f urthe r pr oc ee din gs. 5 { 14} InJun e 2013 , the S ta te f ile d a m oti on to com

pe l an i nde pe nde nt e va lua tio n of 6 L inare s’ s a lle ge d m en ta l r et ar da tio n onthe gr ound s that D r. Cave ’ s D ec em be r 5, 7 2012 , r eport contained prob lem atic in ternal in consist encies. The State e m phasized 8 tha t D r. Cave ’ s co nc lus ion tha t L inare s is m en ta lly re tard ed , an d thu s, inc om pe te nt, 9 co uld not be r ec onc ile d w ithD r. Cave ’ s conclu sio n th at L inare s w as c om

pe te nt t o 10 enter into a p l ea . The S tate also em phasized that Dr. Cave subm itted an additio nal 11 report on May

13, 2013, in which she withdrewher initia l conclusion that Linar es 12 wa s ever com

petent. T his su bsequent report, the State argued, w as further e vidence

6 13 tha t D r. Cave ’ s c onc lus ion s w er e sus pe ct

. 14 { 15} A he ar ing on the S ta te ’ s m oti on f or a n in de pe nde nt e va lua tio n w as he ld o n 15 Mar ch 14 , 20 14 . At th athe ari ng , th e St at e c al le d Dr. No ah Kauf m an , a7

1 ne ur opsy ch ol ogi st, a s aw itn es s and e lic ite d te sti m ony f ro m him tha t c al le d in to 2 que sti on b oth the m ethodo log y unde rl y ing D r. Cave ’ s asse ssm en t of L inare s’ s I Q a nd 3 Dr. Cav e’s de te rm in at io n t ha t Li na res is m il dl y m en ta ll y ret ard ed

. 4 { 16} A t the e nd o f the he ar ing , the c ourt agr ee d that the St at e’ s c onc er ns a bout the 5 re lia bil ity of D r. Cave ’ s e va lua tio n w er e le git im ate a nd f urthe r co nc lud ed

tha t the 6 St at e s h o u l dh av e a n o p p o rt u n i t y t o p er fo rm an i n d ep en d en t as s es s m en t o f L i n ar es ’s 7 m en ta l f

ac ult ie s. B ut gro w ing c onc er n a bout the de lay

tha t ha d pl ag ue d th e 8 pr oc ee din gs p ro m

pte d the co urt to gr an t de fe nse co unse l’ s re que st tha t D r. Cave be 9 perm itted to attend th e State ’ s independ ent evaluation

. Th e cou rt m ade clear, 10 how ev er , tha t D r. Cave c oul d no t partic ipa te or int er fe re w iththe S ta te ’ s e va lua tio n 1 1 i n a n y wa y. 12 { 17} A t the e nd o f Marc h 20 14, the S ta te f ile d am oti on t o proh ibi t D r. Cave f ro m 13 attending its independ ent evaluation. At the m otion hearing , D r. Ka ufm an insist ed 14 tha t the r

ule s of pr of es sio na l c ondu ct

gov er nin g ps y ch olo gis ts p re clud ed him f ro m 15 co nduc tin g ane ur opsy ch olo gic al e xa m ina tio n w he re athi rd -p ar ty obse rv er w oul d be 16 present. T he district court wa s unpersuaded and aff irm ed its earlier

ruling that Dr. 17 Cave could attend and obs erve the independ ent evaluation. The c ourt m ade clear that 18 its de ci sio n to pe rm it D r. Cave to at te nd w as m oti va te d by the co urt’ s de sir e to avoi d8

1 any further delay in the proceedings and to ensure that the issue of Linares’ s m ental 2 re tard at ionw as r es olv ed a s e ff ic ie ntly an d as qu ic kly

a s po ssi ble

. T he S ta te sto od 3 fi rm a nd i ndi ca te d th at

it w oul d no t c ondu ct

the e va lua tio n if

D r. Cave w oul d be 4 present. T he court also stoo d firm and entered an order quashin g its previou s order 5 pe rm itt ing the ind ep en de nt e va lua tio n. 6 { 18} A f

ina l he ar ing to de ci de w he the r or not L inare s is m en ta lly

r et ar de d w as he ld 7 on Septem

ber 1 1 , 2 0 1 4

. Dr . C ave w as present and testified, c onsis tent with her 8 reports, that L inares’ s IQ is 68 and that she is m entally retar ded as that term

is defined 9 in S ec tio n 31 -9 -1

. 6( E ). T he S ta te c al le d y et a nothe r psy ch olo gis t, D r. E dw ar d S ie ge l, 10 as a w itness. Like D r. Ka ufm an, D r. Siegel attem

pted to di scredit and underm ine Dr

. 11 Cave ’ s c onc lus ion s by hig hli ght ing th e al le ge d in ad equa ci es of he r ev al ua tio n 12 m ethods a nd by poi nti ng out sev er al inc onsi ste nc ie s th ro ugho ut h er r ep orts. A t the 13 co nc lus ionof

the he ar ing , th e co ur t ad vis ed the part ie s th at

it w oul d pr onounc e its 14 ruling bywr itten order. 15 { 19} Ina n or de r da te d O ct obe r 2, 2014 , the co urt f ound tha t L inare s’ s I Q is 68 and 16 co nc lud ed tha t Li na re s is m en ta lly re tard ed as de fi ne d by Se ct ion31- 9- 1. 6( E ). T he 17 co urt a lso f

ound tha t the re w as not

asub stanti al pr oba

bil ity tha t L inare s w oul d 18 be co m e co m

pe te nt t o pr oc ee d in a cr im ina l or y outhf ul- of fe nde r ca se w ith in a16 The district co u rt ’s order states that L inares “ is charged with Fir st Degre e 7 17 Mur de r (W ill fu l and D el ibe ra te ) or , in the a lte rn at ive , F el ony Mu rd er . . . . ” T he 18 am ended sup erseding grand jury indictm ent did no t charge L inares w ith first-degree 19 willful and deliberate m urder. A s noted, the am ended gr and j ury indictm ent included 20 on ly two al te rn at iv e co un ts of f irs t-d eg ree f

el on y m ur de r. 9 1 re as ona ble ti m e an d th at , be ca

use L inare s w as a cc used of first- de gr ee m ur de r, she

7 2 pose s ali ke lih ood of

harm to oth er s. F ina lly , the c ourt or de re d th at L inare s w as to 3 re m ai n inthe c ust ody of the L inc oln Co unty

D et en tio n C en te r pe ndi ng 4 co m m en cem en t o f ci vi l co m

m it m en t p ro ceed in gs . 5 {20} The civil com

m itm ent proceedings we re c ondu cted in the Thirtee nth Ju dicial 6 D istri ct

Co urt. I n th e pe tit ionini tia tin g th ose pr oc ee din gs file d by t he D O H on 7 Ja nuary

27, 201 5, the D O H a ve rr ed tha t L inare s is a da nge r to h er se lf a nd o the rs a nd 8 re co m m en de d tha t the co urt co m m it L inare s to the D O H fo r a pe ri od of ha bil ita tio n. 9 The T hirteenth Judicial District Court agreed with the D OH ’ s finding s and accepted 10 th e rec omm en da ti on to civ il ly comm it Lin ares to th e DOH. 11 {21} On June 11, 2015, the State f iled a d irect appeal with t his Court un der N MSA 12 1978 , S ec tio n 39- 3- 3( B) (1 972) , Ru le 12- 201( A )( 2) N MR A , a nd Sta te v . Sm all

wo od , 13 2007 -N MS C- 005, 141 N

. M. 178 , 152 P

. 3d 821. O ur j ur isd ic tio n ov er

thi s m at te r is 14 not c ont es te d. 15 II. DISC US SION10

1 { 22} As previously

noted, the State m akes three argum ents on app eal. W e re view 2 ea cha rg um en t i n turn . 3 A. The D istrict C ourt’ s Dec ision to Per m it D r. Cave t o At tend the State ’s 4 In de pe nd en t Ev alu at ion Wa s N ot an A bu se of D iscretion an d D id N ot 5 “Effec tively Den y” the St ate an Op portun ity for an Ind epen dent 6 Ev alu at ion 7 { 23} T he S ta te f

ir st arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t co urt a

buse d it s di sc re tio n inpe rm itt ing 8 D r. Cave to at te nd the S ta te ’ s in de pe nde nt ev al ua tio n. A s th e en sui ng d isc uss ion 9 m ak e s c l e a r , t hi s a r gu m e nt r e qu i r e s us t o r e vi e w t he d i str i c tc ourt ’ s di sc r e tionary 10 de te rm in at io n. Se e Sta te v . G arc ia , 200 0- N MC A -0 14, ¶ 28, 128 N

. M. 721, 998 P. 2d 11 186 (r ev ie w ing the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nial of th e sta te ’ s r eque st f or ase co nd 12 co m pe te nc y ev al ua tio n f

or abuse of dis cr et ion ); State v. L opez , 19 78 -NMSC -0 60 , ¶ 13 3, 91 N. M. 779, 581 P. 2d 87 2 (observing that we reviewthe district court’ s ruling as 14 to a defendant’ s com

petency to stand trial for abuse of discretion). 15 { 24} “ Whe re a n ab use of dis cr et ion is c la im ed by appe llant, appe llant b ears ahe av y 16 burden, in view of the long-standing rule th at t he review ing court will n ot overturn 17 the a ct ion of the tr ia l co urt ab se nt a pa te nt ab use of m an if es t er ro r in the e xe rc ise of 18 di sc r e t ion.” Sp ingola v. Spi ngola , 197 8- N MS C- 045, ¶ 19, 91 N

. M. 737 , 580 P

. 2d 19 958. “ A n a

buse of dis cr et ionoc curs w he n ar uli ng i s a ga ins t l ogi c an d is c le ar ly 20 un te na bl e or no t jus ti fie d b y reas on .” Sta te v . Sarrac ino , 1998 -N MS C- 022, ¶ 20, 12511

1 N

. M. 511 , 964 P. 2d 72 (i nte rn al quot at ion m ar ks an d ci ta tio n om itt ed ). W e vie w the 2 ev ide nc e in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n, r es olv e al l 3 conflicts and ind ulge all perm issib le i nference s to upho ld that decision , and dis regard 4 al l ev id en ce an d i nf

eren ces to th e co nt rary. See Lopez , 197 8- N MS C- 060, ¶ ¶ 6- 7. 5 { 25} “ Se ct ion 31 -9-1.6 ar ticulates the procedure for dete rm ining whether a 6 defendant is incom

petent to stand trial as a re sult of m ental retar dation . .

. . ” Sta te 7 v. Flores , 20 04 -NMSC -0 21 , ¶ 10 , 13 5 N.M. 7 59 , 9 3 P.3 d 12 64

. Sect io n 3 1- 9- 1.6 (A) 8 pr ovi de s tha t “ [u ] pon m oti on o f the de fe nse r eque sti ng a r uli ng, the c ourt sh al l ho ld 9 a he ar ing to de te rm ine w he the r the de fe ndant h as m en ta l r et ar da tio n a s de fine d in 10 Subsection E of this section.” Section 31-9-1.6(E ) and our case law m ake clear that 11 an “ intellig ence quotient of seventyor below e stablish es a p re s u m ption of m ental 12 retar dation.” Flores , 2004-NMS C-021, ¶ 10 (citing Section 31 -9-1.6(E )). 13 { 26} The var

y ing prov ision s within Section 31-9-1.6 do not give the dist rict court 14 an y spe ci fi c pr oc ed

ur al gui da nc e as to ho w it is to r es olv e iss ue s r el at ed to a 15 defendant’ s m ental co nditi on. T he statute is silent as to when the def endant m ay 16 m ove for such an evaluation, whether the court m ight independentlyarr ange for an 17 evaluation du ring the proceedings if it develops concerns abou t a defe ndant’s m ental 18 co ndi tio n, w ho m

ust pay f or the e va lua tio n, or

the ti m e fr am e tha t go ve rn s on ce it is12

1 de te rm ine d th at

a n e va lua tio n of the de fe ndant’ s m en ta l co ndi tio n is ne ce ssary . T he 2 procedural rules that govern these issues are found in NMS A 1978, Se ction 43 -1-1 3 (1999) and Rule 5-602 NMR A. T he State points to Ru l e 5-602(C) and ca se law 4 co nstru ing thi s pr ovi sio n a s su ppor t f or its cl ai m tha t pe rm itt ing D r. Cave to at te nd 5 the ind ep en de nt e va lua tio n w as a n a buse of dis cr et ion

. 6 { 27} Ru le 5- 602( C) pr ovi de s th at “ [u ] pon m oti on and u

pon good c au se sho w n, the 7 co urt sh al l or de r a m en ta l e xa m inat io n of the de fe ndant b ef or e m ak ing a ny 8 de te rm ina tio n of co m

pe te nc y unde r thi s rul e. ” L ooki ng to the pla in te xt of Ru le 5- 9 602(C), the C ourt of Appeals has observed that it “ provides an appropriate procedure 10 for any request, be it initial or subsequent , f or court-ordere d m ental evaluations o f a 11 crim inal defendant.” G arc ia , 200 0 -N M CA -014, ¶ 26. The Court noted, however, 12 th atth e ru le ne it he r pe rm it s n orpro hi bi ts ad di ti on al ev al ua ti on s. Id. Ac c o r d i n g l y, 13 the Co urt c onc lud ed

tha t a di st ric t court’ s de ci sio n to or de r a se co nd e va lua tio n is 14 en ti rel y

di sc ret io na ry . Id

. ¶ 28. W e ag re e w iththi s c onc lus ion

. 15 { 28} T he une xpl ai ne d de lay tha t pl ag ue d L inares’s case a s w el l a s th e spe ct er of 16 L inare s’ s sp ee dy -tri al m oti on w ei ghe d he av ily on the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a sse ssm en t of 17 the ar gum en ts pr es en te d at the Marc h 14, 2014 , he ar ing , the he ar ing at whi ch the 18 court determ ined that the State w ould be allowed an independent evaluation and th at13

1 Dr . C ave could a t t en d t h at evaluation. D efense c ouns el initially suggest ed, a t that 2 he ar ing , tha t the iss ue of L inare s’ s m en ta l r et ar da tio n w oul d be m ost e xpe dit iou sly 3 re sol ve d if

the S ta te ’ s in de pe nde nt e va lua tio n w as lim ite d onl y to an as se ssm en t of 4 L inare s’ s I Q

. T he c ourt di sa gr ee d, ex pr es se d c onc er n th at a ny ha lf -m ea sur es w oul d 5 onl y giv e ri se to the po ss ib il ity f or f urthe r de lay s, a nd c onc lud ed tha t i t w as m ost 6 pr ude nt t o gi ve the S ta te a full oppo rt uni ty to co m ple te ly a ddr es s and r es olv e the 7 iss ue of L inare s’ s re tard at ion

. D ef en se c ouns el the n in qui re d w he the r D r. Cave c oul d 8 attend the State’ s evaluation and sugg ested that this alter native would also do m

uch 9 to e nsur e tha t the pr oc ee din gs we re ex pe dit ed

. C ouns el e xpl ai ne d th at , if D r. Cave 10 wa s satisfied with the procedures used durin g t h e independ ent evaluation, there 11 would be no need for any further e valuation s and no furt h er delay s. T he court 12 em phasized that its in terest w as t o ensure a speedy resolution of the issue and asked 13 the State whether it had any opin ion on the m atter. The State respon ded that it was 14 not a m en ab le to de fe nse c ouns el ’ s su gge sti on. 15 { 29} Inthe e nd, the c ourt pe rm itt ed D r. Cave to at te nd t he ev al uatio n be ca use the 16 ef fi ci en t a dm ini str at ionof

j ust ic e de m an de d th is r es ult

. T he co urt m ad e it ab undantl y 17 clear that its decision to perm i t Dr

. Cave to attend wa s predicated on the fact that 18 the re ha d bee n unne ce ssary de lay an d the at tor ne y s had not bee n dilig en t i n se ei ng the14

1 case brought to a tim ely resolution

. The court inform ed the State that, if D r. Ka ufm an 2 felt he could not cond uct the evaluation with Dr. Cave present, the court wa s inclined 3 to quash the order grantin g the independ ent evaluation. The State declined to conduct 4 the evaluation and th e court quashed its previo us order. 5 { 30} It i s ap p ar en tt h at t h e c o u rt wa s wi l l i n g t o p er m i tDr . C av e t o at t en dt h e S t at e’s 6 evaluation because Linare s’ s speedy -trial cla im loom ed, ther e had b een unnecessary 7 delay , and allowing Dr. Cave to attend w ould put her in the best p o s i t i o n to testify 8 an d c om

m en t ab out the te sts co nduc te d at the ind ep en de nt ev al ua tio n and h owtho se 9 te sts w er e sc or ed

. P uttin g Dr. Cave in thi s po sit ione nsur ed tha t, if the re w as a ny 10 fu tur e dis ag re em en t be tw ee n th e pa rt ie s a bout th e m erits o f the S ta te ’ s te sti ng 11 m ethodo logy , those is sues could be addressed and resolved quickly

. W e re cognize 12 tha t pe rm itt ing obs er

ve rs to at te nd p sy ch olo gic al e va lua tio ns i s un de sir ab le , but thi s 1 3 d o e s n o to u t w e i g h t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’s r e a s o n ab l e c o n c e rn s ab o u td e l a y. 14 { 31} T he dis tr ic t c ourt pe rm itt ed D r. Cave to at te nd the St ate ’ s in de pe nde nt 15 ev al ua tio n so a s to e nsur e the sw if t a dm ini str at ionof

j ust ic e an d ba lanc e the 16 co m pe tin g in te re sts of

the parti es . The c ourt’ s de ci sio n w as not , a s th e St at e 17 contends , arbitrary , illog ical, or without j ustification. The court’ s determ ination wa s 18 ana cc ep ta

ble a nd u nde rs tanda

ble e xe rc ise of its dis cr et ion ar y auth or ity in lig ht o f the15

1 uniq ue difficulties presented in this case. 2 B. The T rial CourtDid Not Ab use Its D iscreti o n in F inding Lin ares 3 In co m pe te ntt o S ta nd Tr ial 4 { 32} T he S ta te ne xt arg ue s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt ab use d its dis cr et ionin co nc lud ing 5 tha t L inare s is inc om

pe te nt t o st an d tri al due to m en ta l re tard at ion

. T he S ta te poi nts 6 out tha t D r. Cave ini tia lly re porte d tha t L inare s w as co m pe te nt to e nte r int o aple a an d 7 pr oc ee d a t se nte nc ing an d furthe r note s that som e portio ns o f D r. Cave ’ s r ep orts and 8 te sti m ony supp ort the co nc lus ion tha t L inare s is co m pe te nt to stand tr ia l. T he 9 sta nda rd of

r e v i e w ap p l i e dt o t h i s a r g u m e n ti s t h e s a m e a s t h a tap p l i e dt o the 10 ar gum en ts i n th e im

m ed ia te ly pr ec ed ing se ct ionof

dis cu ssi on. 11 { 33} A de fe ndant m ay be inc om

pe te nt to stand tri al due to m en ta l r et ar da tio n; 12 how ev er , m enta l r et ar da tio n, in an d of it se lf , is not c onc lus ive e vid en ce tha t a 13 de fen da nt is in co m

pe te nt

. See 2 1 A m . J u r . 2d Cr im ina l L aw§ 86 ( 2016 ) (f ootnot e 14 om itt ed ) (“ A lth oughm en ta l r et ar da tio n ina nd o f its el f is g e n e r a l ly ins uf fi ci en t t o gi ve 15 rise to a finding of incom petence to stand tr ial, a defendant m ay be incom petent based 1 6 on r et ar da t i o n i f t h e c o n d i t i o n i s s o s e v e r e a s t o r e n d e r h i m o r h e r i n c ap ab le of 17 func tio nin g in c ri tic al a re as . ”) ; se e als o 27 Am . Ju r. Tr ial s 1 ( O ri gin al ly

pub lis he d in 18 1980 ) (f

ootnot es om itt ed ) (“ [N ] ot a ll fo rm s of

. . . m en ta l r et ar da tio n . . . m ak e one 19 incom petent to stand trial. In all cases, the pivot al question to be answer ed is to what11 T he Co urt of Appe al s in State v. G utierrez , 2015 -N MC A -0 82, ¶ 9, 355 P

. 3d 8 12 9 3 and the uni form

j ury instruction s district courts m ust iss ue when the evidence 13 rai s e s a r eas on ab le do ub t as to th e d efen da nt ’s com pe te nc y , UJI 1 4- 51 04 NMRA, 14 uti liz e a dif

fe re nt f orm ula tio n of th e co ndi tio ns n ec es sa ry f or ade fe ndant t o be 15 de em ed

c om pe te nt. It is unc le ar

w he re thi s di ve rg en t st an da rd or igi na te d or

w hy it 16 originated, and it is equally unclear w hether this div ergent standard (though worded 17 dif fe re ntl y ) is s ubst an tivel y di sti nc t f ro m the standard

a rt ic ula te d in R oth erham

. It 18 is c le ar , how ev er , that th e ex ist en ce of thi s di ve rg en t st an da rd

giv es r ise to the 19 poss ibi lity

f or ne ed le ss c onf

usi on. F or

ins tanc e, the S ta te c ite s th e Co urt of Appe al s 20 fo rm ula tio n in Gutierrez

w hil e L inare s c ite s to th is Court ’ s f orm ula tio n in 21 R oth erham

. The p arties do not, however , m ake any argum ents for one or the other 16 1 de gr ee doe s th e . . . dis ab ili ty a ff ec t the de fe ndant’ s m em or y a nd i nte lle ct

ua l a bil iti es , 2 which ar e c r

uc i a l t o t he c on str

uc t i ona nd

p r e se nt a t i ono f

h i s de f e ns e . ” ) ( i nt e rnal 3 quot ation m arks om itted) ; AB A Standards for Crim inal Just ice 7-4. 1(c) M en tal 4 In co m pe te nc e to S

tan d T ria l; R ules an d D ef

ini tio ns ( A m. B a r

A s s ’n 1 9 8 9 ) ( “A 5 fi ndi ng o f m en ta l i nc om pe te nc e to s tand tr ia l m ay ar ise fr om . . . m en ta l r et ar da tio n 6 or oth er de ve lop m en ta l dis ab ili ty

. . . so l ong as it r es ult s inade fe ndant’ s in ab ili ty to 7 consult with defe nse counsel or to u nderstand the proceedings .” ). 8 { 34} A pe rs on i s c o m p e t e n tt o s t a n dt r i a l w h e n h e o r s h e h a s “ s u f

f i c i e n tp r es en t 9 ability to consul t with his lawy er w ith a reasonable degree of rational 10 unde rs tandi ng[ , ] ” “ a ra tio na l as w el l a s f ac tua l un de rs tandi ng o f the pr oc ee din gs 11 ag ai nst

him [, ] ” an d “ the c ap ac ity to as sis t i n hi s ow n de fe nse a nd to c om pr eh en d th e 12 reas ons fo r pun is hm en t.” Sta te v . R oth erham , 199 6- N MS C- 048, ¶ 13, 122 N

. M. 246 , 822 standard; they sim ply state t he divergent standards as i f bo th are correc t. W e adhere 23 to the f

orm ula tio n art ic ula te d in R oth erham as tha t c as e re m ai ns c ontro lli ng 24 pr ec ed en t. 17 1 923 P. 2d 1131 ( internal quot ation m arks and citations om itted). Linare s ’s m en t al 2 retar dation m ay factor into this analy sis—and m ay factor heavily —but th e m ere fact 3 that she is m entally

retar ded does n ot, in and of itself, resolve the questio n of her 4 c o mp e t e n c y. 5 { 35} Th e d i str i c tc ourtc on c l ud e d t ha tL i nar e s’ s I Q i s 68 , t ha ts he h a s m ental 6 retar dation, that the State did not overcom e th e p resum ption that an accused w ith an 7 IQ be low70 h as m en ta l r et ar da tio n, a nd, the re fo re , tha t Li na re s is “ not co m pe te nt t o 8 stand tri al due to m en ta l r et ar da tio n. ” A t fir st blus h, the c ourt a ppe ar s to ha ve don e 9 pr ec ise ly w ha t is i m

pe rm iss ibl e: c onc lud e tha t L inare s is inc om pe te nt sol el

y be ca use 1 0 s h e i s m en t al l y re t ar d ed

. C a r ef u l re v i ew o f t h e t es t i m o n y p ro ff er ed at Li n ar es ’s 11 Se pte m

be r 11, 201 4, he ar ing on m en ta l r et ar da tio n r ev ea ls tha t this is not so. T he 12 co urt a lso he ar d evid en ce be ar ing dir ec tly on the fa cu lti es , ide nti fi ed in R oth erham , 13 a defe ndant m

ust po ssess to b e deem ed com petent and the extent to which Linares 14 poss es se d th es e fa cu lti es . 15 { 36} Dr . C ave re peatedly em phasized that she had con cerns about Linare s 16 proceeding to trial in lig ht o f h er l o w IQ and lim ited intellectual function ing. D r.18

1 Cave re ported that L inares perf orm ed very

poorly on a portion o f one test that focuses 2 on “ understandi ng case events.” When aske d what f unction a j ury

serves, Linar es 3 replied that the j ury

wa s there to “ give answer s for th e o ther side.” When asked what 4 ro le the pr ose cu tor play ed at tr ia l, L inare s re pli ed tha t the pr ose cu tor w as the re to te ll 5 he r (L inare s’ s) sid e of

the sto ry . D r. Cave al so e xpr es se d do ubt tha t L inare s w oul d 6 be able to assist defense counsel as Linare s could not reca ll critical e vents associated 7 w ithhe r ca se . Cru ci al ly , D r. Cave sta te d th at L inare s e xhi bit ed

no s ign s of 8 m al ing er ing

. 9 { 37} Dr . C ave also te stified that her determ ination that Linar es is incom petent was 10 in part prem ised on the fact that L inares w as fac ing first-degree m urder char ges. D r. 11 Cave did

not expoun d up on w hy the na tur e an d se ve ri ty

of the c ha rg es a ga ins t 12 L inare s f

ac tor ed int o he r co m

pe te nc y a sse ssm en t, but it se em s a ppare nt tha t D r. Cave 13 w as c onc er

ne d that a y oung w om anof ve ry li m ite d in te lle ct

ua l f unc tio nin g w itha 14 funda m en ta lly

f law ed c onc ep tio n of b as ic le ga l c onc ep ts w oul d no t and c oul d no t 15 unde rs tand the f

ull po ss ibl e co nse que nc es of af ir st- de gr ee m

ur de r co nvi ct ionnor 16 w hy , if

c onvi ct ed , she m igh t be r equir ed to spe nd the r es t of

he r fo re se ea

ble li fe in 17 pr iso n. 18 { 38} T he e vid en ce a dduc ed a t t h e m e n t a l r e t ar d at i o nh e ar i n g sup ports the c onc lus ion19

1 tha t L inare s is inc ap ab le of c onsu lti ng w ith he r at tor ne y w ith a re as ona

ble de gr ee of 2 rational understandi ng, that she holds a fundam entally incoherent view of the nature 3 of the pr oc ee din gs tha t w er e to b e br ough t a ga ins t he r, an d th at she w oul d no t 4 c o mp r e h e n dt h e r e a s o n s f o r p u n i s h men ti f

s h e we r e c o n v i c t e d

. Ac c o r d i n g l y, 5 subs tanti al e vid en ce sup ports the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm ina tio n th at L inare s is 6 inc om pe te nt. T he c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n inso c onc lud ing

. 7 { 39} Whil e it is true , a s the S ta te poi nts out , tha t the r ec or d r ef le ct s th at D r. Cave 8 initially concluded that Linar es wa s com petent and that there is e vidence in the record 9 that Linare s did un derstand the nature o f th e charges against her, w e cannot say that 10 the court abused its discretion when it ultim ately rej ected th e conclusion that Linar es 11 is c om

pe te nt. O ur

inquir y is lim ited on ly t o whe the r subs tanti al e vid en ce sup ports 12 th e co nc lu si on th e co ur t re ach ed

. Se e S ta te v

. Ne lso n , 198 1- N MS C- 100, ¶ 15, 96 13 N

. M. 654 , 634 P

. 2d 6 76 ( “ T he ev ide nc e pr es en te d to the co urt w as c onf lic tin g, a nd 14 w e cannot hol d as a m at te r of law tha t the tr ia l j udge abuse d hi s di sc re tio n inf ind ing 15 that the defendant was c om petent.”)

. 16 C. The D OH D id C onducta Danger ousness Evaluation Pr ior to the 17 C om m en ce m en t of C ivi l C om m it m en t P ro ce ed in gs 18 { 40} T he S ta te ’ s f

ina l arg um en t co nc er

ns the pr oc ed

ur al re qui re m en ts m an da te d by 19 Se ct ion31- 9- 1. 6( B) a nd ( C)

. T he S ta te c ont en ds tha t the se pr ovi sio ns r equir ed the20

1 “ trial court” to obtain a dangerousn ess evaluation of Linares f rom the DOH before 2 civil comm itm ent proceedings com m enced. The State claim s that this was not don e. 3 As a prelim inary m atter, we note that the State’ s argum ent that the “ trial court” f ailed 4 in s om e ca

pa ci ty pr es en ts u s wi th a dif

fi cu lty as thi s c la im

ign or es the f

ac t tha t w hil e 5 the com

petency proceedings were conducted in th e T we lfth Judi cial Di s t rict Court 6 the civil comm itm ent proceedings were conducted in the Thirtee nth Ju dicial District 7 Co urt. T he S ta te ’ s r ef

er en ce to a “ tr ia l co urt” doe s no t a de qua te ly ide nti fy w hic h of 8 the tw o c ourts i nvol ve d inthe pr oc ee din gs b el owa lle ge dly e rr ed

. I n any

c as e, a nd 9 as w e ex pla in i n th e dis cu ssi on tha t f oll ow s, our

r ev ie w of

the sta tut es a nd the 10 pr oc ee din gs b el owc onvi nc e us tha t the S ta te ’ s arg um en t f ai ls. 11 { 41} T he S ta te ’ s arg um en t r equir es us t o c onstru e Se ct ion31- 9- 1. 6( B) a nd ( C) a nd 12 to d et er

m ine w he the r the pr oc ee din gs i n di str ic t c ourt c onf orm ed to the r equir em en ts 13 of the se pr ovi sio ns. T o th e ex te nt w e en ga ge in sta tut or y c onstru ct ion , our re vie w is 14 de no vo . Sta te v . T

ruj ill o , 200 9- N MS C- 012, ¶ 9, 146 N

. M. 14, 206 P

. 3d 1 25. 15 { 42} Se ct ion31- 9- 1. 6( B) pr ovi de s a s f oll ow s: 16 If

the c ourt fin ds by a pr ep onde ranc e of the ev ide nc e tha t the de fe ndant 17 has m ental retar dation and that there is not a substant ial probabilitythat 18 the de fe ndant w ill be co m e co m pe te nt to pr oc eed i n ac ri m ina l c as e 19 w ith in a re as ona ble pe ri od o f tim e not

to ex ce ed

nin e m onths f

ro m the 20 da te of

the or igi na l f

ind ing of inc om pe te nc y , th enno l at er

than si xty 2 1 da y s fr om

n o t i f i c a t i o n t o t h e s e c r e t a ry

o f h e a l t h o r h i s d e s i g n e e o f

t he21

1 co urt’ s f

ind ing s the [D O H ] sha ll pe rf orm a n e va lua tio n to de te rm ine 2 w he the r the de fe ndant pre se nts a lik el iho od o f se ri ous ha rm to him se lf 3 or

ali ke lih ood of

se ri ous ha rm

to oth er s. 4 Se ct ion31- 9- 1. 6( C) the n pr ovi de s th at : 5 If

the [D O H ] ev al ua tio n re sul ts in a fin din g that the de fe ndant p re se nts 6 a likelihoo d of serious harm to him self o r a likeliho od of serious harm 7 to o the rs , w ith in s ixty day s of the [ D O H ’ s] e va lua tio n the [D O H ] sha ll 8 co m

m en ce pr oc ee din gs p ur suant t o C ha pte r 43, A rt ic le 1 N MS A 197 8 9 if

the de fe ndant w as c ha rg ed w ithm ur de r in the f

ir st d eg ree . . . in th e 10 ini tia l pr oc ee din gs, a nd the c ourt pr es idi ng o ve r the ini tia l pr oc ee din gs 11 sha ll en te r a fi ndi ng tha t the r es pond en t pr es en ts a li ke lih ood of

harm to 12 oth er s. 13 W e sha ll not at tem

pt t o f ull y e xpl ic at e the pr oc ed

ur al r equir em en ts o f the se 1 4 p ro v i s i o n s an dfo cu s i n s t ea do n l y o n t h e r eq u i re m en t s g er ma n e t o t h e S t at e’s 15 argum ent. W e agree with the State that these provis ions require the DO H to perf orm 16 a da nge ro usne ss ev alua tio n be fo re c ivi l c om m itm en t pr oc ee din gs are c om m en ce d. 17 See Sta te v. Gutierrez , 2 0 1 5

- N M C A

- 0 8 2 , ¶ 4 7 , 3 5 5 P

. 3 d9 3 ( “ O n c e ad e f e n d a n tis 18 fo und to h av e m en ta l re tard at ion , the sta tut e re qui re s a [D O H ] ev al ua tio n r eg ar din g 19 w he the r the de fe ndant p ose s ase ri ous thr eat of harm to him self or ot he rs . I f the 20 [D O H ] fi nds tha t the de fe ndant is da nge ro us, the n S ec tio n 43 -1 -1 c ivi l c om m itm en t 21 proceedings m

ust be comm enced.” ). W e d i sa gr e e , h ow e ve r, that this requirem ent was 22 not m et in this case. 23 { 43} On O ctober 2, 2014, the T we lfth Judi cial D istrict Court ent ered an order22

1 fi ndi ng tha t L inare s is inc om pe te nt d ue to m en ta l r et ar da tio n, tha t the re w as not a 2 subs tanti al pr oba

bil ity tha t L inare s w oul d be co m e co m pe te nt w ithin a rea sona

ble 3 period of tim e not to exceed nine m onth s, and that L inares is a danger to others. In 4 tha t sam e or de r, the c ourt di re ct ed the D O H to com

m en ce c ivi l c om

m itm en t 5 pr oc ee d i n g s u nd er Se ct io n 4 3- 1- 1, b ut th e co ur t m ad e cl ear t ha t u nt il th e DOH 6 co m m en ce d th ose pr oc ee din gs, L inare s wou ld r em ai n inthe c ust ody of the L inc oln 7 CountyDe tention Center. 8 { 44} On January

27, 2015, the DO H f

iled a petit i on with the Thirteenth Judicial 9 D istri ct

Co urt f or the inv olu ntary co m

m itm en t of L inare s unde r Se ct ion 43- 1- 1. T he 10 D O H ’ s pe tit ion sta te s tha t L inare s’ s “ de ve lop m en ta l dis ab ili ty c re at es a n im

m ine nt 11 likeliho od of serious harm to herself or others.” The petitio n further indicates that D r. 12 John G at lin g wa s pre pa re d to te sti fy on b eh al f of

the D O H a t the a nti ci pa te d he ar ing 13 on c ivi l c om

m itm en t. 14 { 45} O n F eb ru ar

y 12, 2015 , the T hirte en th Judi ci al D istri ct Co urt he ld a

he ar ing a nd 15 de te rm ine d th at

L inare s “pr es en ts an im

m ine nt like lih ood of

se ri ous ha rm

to he rs el f 16 or others[,] ” and that civil com m itm ent was in Linares’ s best interests and cons tituted 17 t he “ l e a st dr a st i c m eans.” See § 43-1-13(G). A ccordingly , the T hirteenth Jud icial 18 D istri ct

Co urt c om

m itt ed L inare s to the DO H unde r Se ct ion 43- 1- 13 for ape ri od o f23

1 habil ita tio n no t t o e xc ee d si x m onths. 2 { 46} T he S ta te ’ s co nte nti on tha t the “ tr ia l co urt” er re d in som e re spe ct

by ini tia tin g 3 c i v i l c o m

m i t m e n tp r o c e e d i n g s w i t h o u t f i r s to b t a i n i n g t h e r e q u i s i t e d a n g e r o u sne ss 4 evaluation from

the DO H is unavailing. When the Thirtee nth Ju dicial District Court 5 co m m it te d Li na res t o t he DOH on Feb ru ary 12 , 20 15 , it di d s o o nl y aft er t he DOH 6 evaluated Linar es and concluded th at she wa s a d anger to herself and others and after 7 the court presiding over the initial proceedings—t he Twelfth Judicial District 8 Court—found that Linar es wa s a danger to others. To the extent Section 31-9-1.6(B) 9 an d (C ) re qui re dange ro usne ss d et er m ina tio ns, the se pr oc ee din gs c om pli ed w iththe 10 m an da te s of

the se pr ovi sio ns. A s th e St at e pr es en ts n o othe r ch al le nge to the 11 pr o ce d u re or m erits of the civil com m itm ent proceedings, we dedicate no further 12 sc ru ti ny to t he su bjec t. Se e In re D oe , 198 2- N MS C- 099, ¶ ¶ 2- 3, 98 N

. M. 540 , 650 13 P. 2d 82 4 (observing that we do not address argum ents not raised on appeal). 14 III. CON CLU SION 15 { 47} F o r

t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , w e r e

j e c t t h e S t a t e ’s a r g u me n t s a n da f f i rm. 16 { 48} IT IS SO ORDERED

.

17

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 18 JUD ITH K. NA KAM UR A, Justice24

1 WE CO NCUR:

2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 3 CHA RLE S W. DA NIEL S, Ch ief Justice

4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 5 PE TRAJIMEN EZMA ES, Justice

6

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 7 EDWA RD L. CH ÁV EZ , Just ice

8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 9 BARBAR

A J. VIGIL, Justice