DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CHRISTINA MARIE POWERS,

Appellant,

v.

ROY GEORGE WHITCRAFT, III,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-194

[July 21, 2021]

Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Jane D. Fishman and Phoebee R. Francois, Judges; L.T. 

Case Nos. COWE18-6373 and CACE19-3936.

Hegel Laurent of Laurent Law Office, P.L., Plantation, for appellant.

No appearance filed for appellee.

GERBER, J.

The alleged tenant appeals from the county court’s final judgment in 

the alleged landlord’s favor after a non-jury trial on the alleged tenant’s 

damages actions against the alleged landlord for violating section 83.67(1), 

Florida Statutes (2018). Section 83.67(1) permits tenants to recover 

damages against landlords for certain prohibited practices including, as 

the alleged tenant claimed here, termination or interruption of utilities. In 

the final judgment, the county court ruled in the alleged landlord’s favor 

because, in the county court’s view, the alleged tenant failed to show by 

the greater weight of the evidence that a landlord-tenant relationship 

existed, thus precluding chapter 83’s application to the action.

We agree with the alleged tenant’s argument that the final judgment’s 

findings of fact indicate the alleged tenant proved a landlord-tenant 

relationship existed as a matter of law. Therefore, we reverse the county 

court’s final judgment, and remand for the county court to determine 

whether the tenant proved the alleged landlord violated section 83.67 and, 

if so, to determine the alleged tenant’s proven damages amounts.
2

The Alleged Tenant’s Verified Complaint

The alleged tenant filed a verified complaint pertinently alleging as 

follows. She placed an ad on Craigslist indicating she sought to rent a 

room in which she and her teenage daughter could live. The alleged 

landlord responded and orally agreed to let her and her teenage daughter 

reside with him in a house which he was renting from someone else. In 

exchange, the alleged tenant was to pay the alleged landlord $600 per 

month plus one-half of the utilities, beginning on Friday, June 1, 2018.

On June 4, after the alleged tenant and her daughter had moved into 

the house, the alleged tenant accused the alleged landlord of acting 

inappropriately towards her daughter, resulting in the police being called 

to the house. The alleged landlord requested the police to remove the 

alleged tenant and her daughter from the property. The police refused to 

do so. The alleged landlord then chose to move out of the house instead.

On June 12, the alleged tenant woke to discover the house’s electricity 

and water were not working, and that the alleged landlord had placed locks

on the electricity and water boxes. The alleged tenant called the police, 

and a neighbor, under police supervision, cut the locks so the allege tenant 

could turn on the electricity and water.

On June 14, the alleged tenant came home to discover the house’s 

electricity was not working. The alleged landlord also apparently had 

entered the house and left the refrigerator door open, thus causing the 

alleged tenant’s refrigerated items to become unusable.

On June 15, the alleged tenant discovered the house’s water was not 

working.

Based on the foregoing, the alleged tenant’s verified complaint pled five

damages actions against the alleged landlord for violating section 83.67(1), 

Florida Statutes (2018) (a residential landlord “shall not cause, directly or 

indirectly, the termination or interruption of any utility service furnished 

the tenant, including, but not limited to, water ... electricity ... or 

refrigeration, whether or not the utility service is under the control of, or 

payment is made by, the landlord”). The five damages actions respectively 

pertained to the alleged landlord’s: (1) June 12 termination or interruption 

of the alleged tenant’s electricity service; (2) June 12 termination or 

interruption of the alleged tenant’s water service; (3) June 14 termination 

or interruption of the alleged tenant’s electricity service; (4) June 14 

termination or interruption of the alleged tenant’s refrigeration; and (5) 

June 15 termination or interruption of the alleged tenant’s water service.
3

For each of the five damages actions, the alleged tenant requested the 

county court to award “damages in the amount of three months’ rent ($600 

x 3 = $1,800.00)” pursuant to section 83.67(6), Florida Statutes (2018) (“A

landlord who violates any provision of this section shall be liable to the 

tenant for actual and consequential damages or 3 months’ rent, whichever 

is greater, and costs, including attorney’s fees.”).

The alleged landlord filed an answer denying the verified complaint’s 

material allegations. The alleged landlord did not plead any affirmative 

defenses.

The County Court’s Final Judgment

After a non-jury trial on the alleged tenant’s damages actions, the 

county court entered a final judgment in the alleged landlord’s favor. The 

county court’s final judgment included the following findings of fact and 

conclusions of law:

1. [The alleged tenant] placed an ad on Craig’s List, looking 

for a room for her and her daughter to share. [The alleged 

landlord], who was renting a home, responded to the ad and 

said that she could move in to one of the bedrooms in the 

home as his roommate, for $600 per month, plus one-half of 

the utilities. The credible evidence at trial also established 

that [the alleged landlord] required [the alleged tenant] to pay 

first and last month rent and a $600 security deposit, for a 

total of $1800, at the time of move in. [The alleged tenant] 

advised [the alleged landlord] that she would not have the 

money until June 4, and [the alleged landlord] agreed to let 

her move in on June 1 and pay her portion on June 4. On

June 4, [the alleged tenant] tendered $600 to [the alleged 

landlord]. [The alleged landlord] refused the $600 and told 

[the alleged tenant] that since she could not come up with the 

$1800 required, she would have to move out by the end of the 

week.

2. [The alleged tenant] did not leave the shared residence. 

Instead, the parties engaged in an extensive and acrimonious 

text messaging debate in which both parties hurled 

accusations at each other. At some point, the police were 

called, and [the alleged tenant] accused [the alleged landlord] 

of acting inappropriately towards her teenage daughter. [The 

alleged landlord] was not arrested or charged with any 
4

wrongdoing, but, because of [the alleged tenant’s] 

accusations, [the alleged landlord] vacated the premises ... to 

avoid any further accusations. Because the utilities at the 

shared residence were in [the alleged landlord’s] name, when 

he moved he terminated those utilities in order to open utility 

accounts for his new residence.

3. There was a great deal of testimony at trial regarding 

[the alleged tenant’s] claims that [the alleged landlord] was in 

fact a landlord, and not a roommate, and was therefore 

subject to all the requirements of Chapter 83, Florida 

Statutes. However, the credible evidence at trial wholly failed 

to establish that these parties had any meeting of the minds 

or ever agreed to a landlord-tenant relationship. The attempt 

by [the alleged landlord] to evict [the alleged tenant] on behalf 

of his landlord by giving [the alleged tenant] a 3-day notice for 

non-payment in which he identified himself as the landlord 

notwithstanding, no landlord-tenant relationship was created 

which would bind these parties.

4. [The alleged tenant] has failed to meet her burden of 

proof by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the 

[alleged landlord] caused her money damages in any amount, 

or that [the alleged landlord] was her landlord, or that chapter 

83 of the Florida Statutes applies to the parties[’] situation. 

Thus, [the alleged tenant] has failed to prove that she is 

entitled to statutory damages for interruption of utility 

services.

Therefore, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that [the alleged tenant] 

recover NOTHING from [the alleged landlord], and that [the 

alleged landlord] shall go hence without day.

The Alleged Tenant’s Motion for Rehearing

and Argument on Appeal

The alleged tenant filed a motion for rehearing or new trial. In the 

motion, the alleged tenant pertinently argued:

The facts found by the [county] [c]ourt have all of the 

hallmarks of a [l]andlord-tenant relationship .... A person in 

Florida who has control over a property such that he is 
5

entitled to ... make rental agreements, allow entry onto the 

premises, attempt to remove the tenant for failing to abide by 

the terms ... and even name himself a [l]andlord in a threeday notice [and yet] not [be] a [l]andlord ... brings to question 

the appropriate application of the Florida statutes that 

strongly indicate a different determination. ....

....

The [county] court also states that there was no meeting of 

the minds but all of the critical parts necessary for an oral 

lease were clearly determined: a place, a purpose for the 

place, an amount of money at a determined interval of time. 

In any case, in Florida the requirements for dictating when a 

[l]andlord-[t]enant relationship exist are defined by statute ....

A successor county court judge issued an order summarily denying the 

alleged tenant’s motion for rehearing or new trial.

The alleged tenant timely filed a notice of appeal. The alleged tenant 

argues that based on the final judgment’s factual findings, the county 

court reversibly erred in concluding as a matter of law that she had failed 

to show a landlord-tenant relationship existed, thus precluding chapter

83’s application to her damages actions.

The alleged landlord has not filed an answer brief.

Our Review

We agree with the alleged tenant’s argument. Before addressing our 

reasoning, we preliminarily note that the county court’s findings of fact 

indicate the alleged landlord was renting the house as a lessee, with the 

utilities registered in his name, when he entered into the oral agreement 

with the alleged tenant. See Final Judgment at ¶ 3 (“The attempt by [the 

alleged landlord] to evict [the alleged tenant] on behalf of his landlord by 

giving [the alleged tenant] a 3-day notice for non-payment in which he 

identified himself as the landlord notwithstanding, no landlord-tenant 

relationship was created which would bind these parties.”) (emphasis 

added). As a result, the question here is whether the alleged landlord was 

a sublessor bound by the requirements of Chapter 83, Part II, Florida 

Statutes (2018), also known as the Florida Residential Landlord and 

Tenant Act (“Residential Act”).
6

The Residential Act’s plain language answers that question as yes. 

Section 83.43(3) defines “landlord” as “the owner or lessor of a dwelling 

unit.” § 83.43(3), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). Section 83.43(2)(a) 

defines a “dwelling unit” as “[a] structure or part of a structure that is 

rented for use as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one person or by 

two or more persons who maintain a common household.” § 83.43(2)(a), 

Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). Thus, a person like the alleged 

landlord here, who already leases a dwelling unit, and then re-leases that 

dwelling unit or a portion thereof to a third party like the alleged tenant 

here, while still living in the dwelling unit himself, is, in fact, a “landlord.”

Further, the oral agreement here between the alleged landlord and the 

alleged tenant was a “rental agreement.” See § 83.43(7), Fla. Stat. (2018) 

(“‘Rental agreement’ means any written agreement, including amendments 

or addenda, or oral agreement for a duration of less than 1 year, providing 

for use and occupancy of premises.”) (emphasis added). Although the 

record does not indicate the rental agreement’s duration, the county court 

found the alleged landlord required the alleged tenant to pay first and last 

month rent and a $600 security deposit, thus indicating a month-tomonth tenancy. See § 83.46(2), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“If the rental agreement 

contains no provision as to duration of the tenancy, the duration is 

determined by the periods for which the rent is payable. If the rent is 

payable ... monthly, tenancy is from month to month. ...”).

Thus, the alleged tenant here, as a person who was entitled to occupy 

the house under the rental agreement with the alleged landlord, was, in 

fact, a “tenant.” See § 83.43(4), Fla. Stat. (2018) (‘“Tenant’ means any 

person entitled to occupy a dwelling unit under a rental agreement.”). The 

fact that the rental agreement required the alleged tenant to pay one-half 

of the utilities, in addition to the $600 monthly payment, does not alter 

that conclusion. See § 83.43(6), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“‘Rent’ means the 

periodic payments due the landlord from the tenant for occupancy under 

a rental agreement and any other payments due the landlord from the 

tenant ....”) (emphasis added).

Based on the foregoing, the county court reversibly erred when it 

concluded as a matter of law that the evidence did not establish the parties 

agreed to a landlord-tenant relationship and that the Residential Act did 

not apply to the parties’ situation. The only possible conclusion of law 

when applying the county court’s findings of fact to the Residential Act’s 

plain language is that the parties agreed to a landlord-tenant relationship, 

and thus the Residential Act applied to the parties’ situation.
7

Because the county court reversibly erred in this manner, we cannot 

discern whether the county court properly reached the issue of whether 

the alleged landlord violated section 83.67(1) (a residential landlord “shall 

not cause, directly or indirectly, the termination or interruption of any 

utility service furnished the tenant, including, but not limited to, water ... 

electricity ... or refrigeration, whether or not the utility service is under the 

control of, or payment is made by, the landlord”).

The only finding of fact which the county court made in its final 

judgment regarding the utilities was the following sentence: “Because the 

utilities at the shared residence were in [the alleged landlord’s] name, 

when he moved he terminated those utilities in order to open utility 

accounts for his new residence.” See Final Judgment at ¶ 2. We cannot 

discern from the final judgment’s context whether the county court 

intended that sentence to simply be a factual finding, or to be its legal 

conclusion that even if a landlord-tenant relationship existed, the alleged 

landlord did not intend his termination or interruption of the utilities to 

effect a self-help eviction and, therefore, did not violate section 83.67(1). 

Cf. Badaraco v. Suncoast Towers V Assocs., 676 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 1996) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the tenant’s section 

83.67 complaint where “the [utility] interruptions were not intended to 

effect self-help eviction”).

Thus, we reverse the county court’s final judgment, but remand for the 

county court to: (1) treat our conclusions that the parties agreed to a 

landlord-tenant relationship, and that the Residential Act applied to the 

parties’ situation, as law of the case; (2) determine as a matter of law 

whether the alleged landlord’s termination or interruption of the utilities 

violated section 83.67(1), as interpreted in Badaraco; and (3) if so, 

determine the alleged tenant’s damages amounts. If the county court is 

unable to make the second and third determinations based on the record, 

the county court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to do so.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

CONNER, C.J., and CIKLIN, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.