The Hon. Andrew W. Bogue, United States District Judge for the District o f 1 South Dakota, sitting by designation.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_________________________ Nos. 97-3926MN, 97-3942MN

_________________________ United States of America, * * Appellant, * * On Appeal from the United v. * States District Court * for the District of * Minnesota. Gregory Lee Grennell, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: May 15, 1998 Filed: July 15, 1998

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, Distric t 1 Judge.

___________ RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge. In this case, the United States appeals an ord er of the District Court suppressing evidence the government planned to use in prosecuting Gregory Lee Grennell fo r possess ionwith intent to distribute cocaine base, a violation of Title 21 U.S.C

. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). We reverse.-2- I. During the early evening of Ju ly 9, 1997, Kelly Simondet, a police officer in St. Cloud , Minnesota, stopped a car driven by Grennell because Simondet believed th e ca r’s tires, which protruded beyond the car’s fenders, violated Minnesota Statute s § 169.734 (1986). The statute reads as follows:
Wheel devices on automobiles. Every passenger automobile shall have fender s, or other devices, that are designed to prevent, as far a s practicable, water, dirt, or other material being thrown up and to the rear by the wheels of the vehicle. Simondet asked Grennell fo r his driver’s license, which Grennell was unable to produce, leading Simondet to arrest Grennell f or driving without a license. The officer conducted a search of the car incident to the arrest and found what was late r determined to be 25 grams of cocaine base in a backpack that was inside the car.
Fol lowing Grennell’s indictment for possession with intent to distribute, h e moved to suppress the evidence. A Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing, and re commendedthat the District Court deny the motion to suppress. The Magistrat e Judge thought the officer had probable cause to stop the car , based upon his reasonable belief that a traffic violation had occurred. The District Court reviewed the evidence before the Magistrate Judge, and found that Offic er Simondet “wavered” in his explanation for the stop and “failed to giv e specific and articulable facts to justify [it].” United States v. Grennell , No. 97-219, slip op. 2-3 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1997). The Court declined to accept the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and granted Grennell’s motion to suppress. The Court subsequently denied the United States’ motion fo r reconsideration and, shortly thereafter, dismissed the indictment.The person to whom Officer Simondet referred as having pleaded guilty t o 2 viola ting the same statute was, coincidentally, Derrick Grennell, the defendant’ s nephew and, the night he was arrested, his passenger. -3- II. The issue in this case, whether the officer had probable cause to stop Grennell’s car, is a mixed question of fact and law, and our determination is made de novo

. United States v. Dixon , 51 F.3d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir. 1995). We note, initially, tha t “a nytraffic violation, no matter how minor, provides a police officer with probabl e cause to stop the driver of the vehi cle.” United States v. Pereira-Munoz , 59 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir. 1995). In addition, an officer has probable cause to stop a vehicle if he or she “obje ctively has a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law.” United States v. Thomas , 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 1996). Having re viewed the evidence, including photographs of Grennell’s car and a transcript of the evidentiary hearing, we conclude there was probable cause for th e stop. Officer Simondet had a reasonable basis for believing that Grennell’s tire s violatedthe Minnesota statute. First, it is undisputed that the tires on Grennell’s car extended beyond th e fenders. Second, Simondet testified that he had stopped cars on at l east 10 to 12 previous occasions because their wheels exceeded the wheel wells

. Third, he testified that he knew a guilty plea had been entered in one of the 10 to 1 2 previous instances. Fourth, a reasonably prud ent person would believe, we think, that 2 the tire s on Grennell’s car, protruding as they were beyond the car’s fenders, woul d kickup water , dirt, and other material, the very thing the statute was designed t o prevent. It is therefore our view tha t Simondet had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that Grennell was violating the statute, and that probab le cause existed for the stop.-4-

Finally , although there is no allegation that the officer’s reliance on th e Minnes ota statute was pretextual, we note the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. UnitedStates , 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (in general, police officer’s ulterior motives fo r making a s top are irrelevant so long as there is probable cause to believe a traffi c violation has occurred).
The order granting the motion to suppress is reversed. On remand, th e indictment should be rein stated, and the District Court should then proceed as the law and the facts require.
It is so ordered. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT