[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-15210

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:15-cr-00026-MCR-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

PAUL R. BLOOM, 

 Defendant-Appellant

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(October 5, 2016)

Before HULL, MARCUS, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Paul Bloom received a total sentence of 360 months of imprisonment, the 

statutory maximum, after pleading guilty to both producing and receiving child 

pornography. He challenges the reasonableness of his sentence on appeal. He 

argues that the district court abused its discretion in two main ways: (1) by basing

his sentence on an unsupported factual finding; and (2) by relying on an improper 

factor in arriving at a sentence greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of 

sentencing. After careful review, we affirm Bloom’s sentence. 

I.

Bloom came to the attention of law enforcement after officers, using a peerto-peer file-sharing network, downloaded several videos depicting child 

pornography from an IP address associated with Bloom’s residence. In a 

subsequent search of Bloom’s home pursuant to a warrant, law enforcement seized 

electronic devices containing over 850 videos and 2,000 images of child 

pornography downloaded over a three-year period. Law enforcement also 

discovered that Bloom had produced child pornography several months earlier 

using a nine-year-old girl he had been babysitting. 

Under a written plea agreement, Bloom pled guilty to one count of 

knowingly and intentionally producing child pornography, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) (“Count One”), and one count of knowingly receiving child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), (b)(1) (“Count Two”). 

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Counts One and Two each had applicable statutory minimum and maximum 

sentences: the range for Count One was 15 to 30 years of imprisonment; and the 

range for Count Two was 5 to 20 years of imprisonment. 

Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation 

report (“PSR”), which determined a combined guideline range of 262 to 327 

months of imprisonment based on a total offense level of 39 and a criminal history 

category of I. No objections were filed. The district court adopted the PSR and its 

guideline range at sentencing. 

The majority of the sentencing hearing concerned the parties’ arguments for 

an appropriate sentence. The government argued for a guideline-range sentence, 

while Bloom contended that a sentence at or near the statutory minimum on Count 

One (180 months) was sufficient. 

In support of its request for a guideline sentence, the government presented 

two pieces of evidence. First, the government introduced a disc containing files 

retrieved from Bloom’s electronic devices, which included a video Bloom 

produced using the nine-year-old victim. The government played a portion of this 

video at sentencing. According to the PSR and the parties’ comments at 

sentencing, the video depicts Bloom pulling down the underwear of the victim, 

exposing her vagina and anus, and then sexually manipulating her vagina and anus 

with his hand. Second, the government introduced a sex doll of child-like 

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proportions that was seized from Bloom’s home. The doll had a used condom 

attached to it. 

Bloom requested a sentence well below the guideline range, arguing that the 

child-pornography guideline was too harsh and that there were various mitigating 

factors about his conduct. He asserted that his touching of the victim was an 

isolated incident, that he never communicated with others about child 

pornography, and that he did not distribute the child pornography he produced and 

even attempted to make his files inaccessible to others on the peer-to-peer network. 

Bloom also asked the court to take into account that, in his view, the victim was 

asleep during the sexual assault, so the psychological impact on the victim was 

likely to be minimal. 

As Bloom’s counsel stressed the isolated nature of the sexual assault, the 

district court interjected that the same sexual act, had it occurred on federal 

property or had Bloom crossed state lines, would have subjected Bloom to a 

mandatory sentence of no less than 30 years in prison under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). 

Moreover, after watching a portion of the video, the district court found it 

implausible that the victim had “slept through that.” In any case, the court 

explained, “the conduct occurred” whether the victim was asleep or not. Bloom 

responded that the court should take into account the potential impact on the victim 

in comparing the severity of Bloom’s conduct to other child-pornography crimes. 

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The district court also noted that it was particularly troubled by Bloom’s

cartoons depicting child pornography. For example, one cartoon included text 

representing that a child engaged in sexual acts with her father because “she didn’t 

want to disobey [him], she didn’t want to get spanked.” These cartoons, according 

to the court, suggested more than an interest in possessing child pornography for 

his own use, because they “normalize[] child abuse in almost in a teaching fashion, 

describe[] to children that this type of behavior is okay. That suggests to me that 

this probably wasn’t a first-time incident.” Bloom responded that there was no 

evidence he had ever used the cartoons to “groom” a minor. The court replied, 

“But what other use? What other use? I mean, what other use?” The judge further 

elaborated, “he’s got plenty of the real thing. He’s got, like I said, more—he’s got 

a lifetime, in my opinion, of child pornography, real images. He doesn’t need 

cartoons for his own sexual gratification.”

After hearing personally from Bloom, who expressed remorse and shame for 

his conduct, the district court pronounced sentence. The court first discussed the 

nature and circumstances of the offenses, including the “unspeakable” acts 

depicted in the files Bloom downloaded, which the court stated were “some of the 

worst” and “most disturbing” it had seen described in a PSR, the “extreme number 

of images” Bloom possessed, the three-year period of time Bloom had been 

downloading child pornography, and the fact that Bloom had produced child 

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pornography in which he sexually assaulted a child in his care. The court 

expressly rejected Bloom’s assertion that the victim was asleep during the 

molestation, finding that she would likely have to live with the fear and 

degradation caused by Bloom’s abuse. All of these factors combined, the court 

stated, “require[d] a very severe sentence.” 

Next, the district court briefly discussed the need for the sentence to deter 

others from engaging in similar conduct and then turned to the need for the 

sentence to protect the public from the “extreme risk” Bloom posed to society. 

The court found that the cartoons Bloom possessed indicated that he viewed child 

sexual abuse as something normal and not harmful to children, a perception 

reinforced by his comments at sentencing. Specifically, in expressing remorse

during allocution, Bloom stated that he was thankful no minor had been injured by 

his actions, which told the court that he was minimizing his own conduct and had 

“very poor insight” into what he had done. This, in turn, the court concluded, 

suggested “the need for a very serious and severe sentence.” Finally, the court 

cited the child-sized sex doll, which Bloom used to satisfy himself sexually despite 

being in an apparent sexual relationship with his adult girlfriend, who was 

pregnant. Taken together, the court stated, nothing in the record mitigated the 

court’s concern that Bloom’s sexual attraction to children “will ever be something 

that [he] can get control over.”

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For these reasons and the need to protect the public “in particular,” the 

district court imposed a total sentence of 360 months of imprisonment, 

representing a 33-month variance above the high end of the guideline range.

1

 The 

sentence, the court explained, took into account “in a very measurable way the 

sexual act that was committed on the child.” The court again noted that Bloom 

would have faced a mandatory term of no less than 30 years, had he engaged in the 

same conduct on federal property or crossed state lines. 

Bloom objected to the above-guideline sentence and again addressed the 

matter of whether the victim was awake during the sexual assault. The district 

court responded that its finding that the victim was awake was based upon its 

“observation of the video and just common sense.” Without that specific finding, 

however, the court stated that it would have imposed a sentence of 327 months, 

within the guideline range. Bloom now appeals.

II.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence, including a sentence above the 

advisory guideline range, under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United 

States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1186, 1188–89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In 

reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we first ensure that the sentencing court 

committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate the guideline 

 1 Bloom received a sentence of 240 months on Count Two, the statutory maximum for 

that offense, to run concurrently with the 360-month sentence on Count One.

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range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, selecting a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 

chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the guideline 

range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Next, 

we examine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence in light of the totality of 

the circumstances. Id. 

Although Bloom expressly challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 

sentence only, his contention that the district court based its sentencing decision on 

an unsupported factual finding appears to fall within the rubric of procedural 

reasonableness—i.e., a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts. Accordingly, we 

first review whether substantial evidence supports the court’s factual finding that 

the child victim did not sleep through the sexual touching. Second, we address the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. 

A.

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States 

v. Creel, 783 F.3d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 2015). For a factual finding to be clearly 

erroneous, we must be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made based on the record as a whole. Id. We defer to the district court’s 

factual findings because “the district court is in the best position to hear the 

evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in making specific factual 

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findings.” United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 218 (11th Cir. 1993). “Where a 

fact pattern gives rise to two reasonable and different constructions, the 

factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. 

Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012).

At a minimum, factual findings must be supported by “substantial evidence” 

in the record. United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1273 n.25 (11th Cir. 2008). 

That requires some external source supporting the district court’s finding, such as 

factual admissions during a guilty plea, undisputed statements in the PSR, or 

evidence presented at trial or during the sentencing hearing. See United States v. 

Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 

1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004). Factual findings “cannot be based on speculation,”

United States v. Newman, 614 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2010), or on conclusory 

leaps in logic unsupported by the evidence, but the district court may draw 

reasonable inferences from the facts in the record, Creel, 783 F.3d at 1359. To 

draw such inferences, the court may rely on “common sense and ordinary human 

experience,” United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013), as well 

as the court’s “day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing,” United States v. 

Melvin, 187 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999).

Bloom asserts that the video fails to establish that the victim was awake, and 

that the district court’s reference to “common sense” was simply unsupported 

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speculation. However, the video upon which the court based its finding has not 

been included as part of the record on appeal. As the appellant, the burden was on 

Bloom to ensure the record on appeal is complete, which means bringing before 

this court all parts of the proceedings below necessary for a determination of the 

validity of any claimed error. Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, 

LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012); see Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2) (“If the 

appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by 

the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must include in the record 

a transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.”); Borden, Inc. v. 

Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 772 F.2d 750, 758 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Rule 10(b)(2) 

to exhibits and depositions). “[W]here a failure to discharge that burden prevents 

us from reviewing the district court’s decision we ordinarily will affirm the 

judgment.” Pensacola Motor Sales Inc., 684 F.3d at 1224 (quoting Selman v. 

Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2006)). We find that to be 

the case here. Without knowing exactly what the district court observed in the 

video, we cannot say whether the district court’s inference was reasonable or not, 

and hence, whether the district court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous.

2

 

 2 Nevertheless, we note that the district court and the parties described substantial 

manipulation of the child’s vagina and anus, suggesting that the district court’s conclusion that 

no child could sleep through the actions was not clearly erroneous.

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Accordingly, we must affirm the district court’s factual finding and reject Bloom’s 

construed challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence.

B.

In sentencing a defendant, district courts must consider the sentencing 

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and “impose a sentence sufficient, but not 

greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing listed in 

§ 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). These purposes are retribution (“to reflect 

the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just

punishment for the offense”), deterrence (“to afford adequate deterrence to 

criminal conduct”), incapacitation (“to protect the public from further crimes of the 

defendant”), and rehabilitation (“to provide the defendant with needed educational 

or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 

effective manner”). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court also must 

consider, among other factors, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the 

history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the 

applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing 

Commission, and the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). 

Generally, the weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is left to the 

sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 

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(11th Cir. 2007). However, a district court can abuse its discretion by giving an 

improper or irrelevant factor substantial weight or by committing a clear error of 

judgment in balancing the proper factors. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. 

Where a district court imposes an upward variance based upon the § 3553(a) 

factors, it should explain why the variance is appropriate, and “the justification for 

the variance must be sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” 

Id. at 1187 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we consider the extent of 

the deviation, we must give appropriate deference to the district court’s decision 

that the § 3553(a) factors justify the variance. Id. The party challenging the 

sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable in light of the record 

and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 

1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Here, Bloom has not established that his total sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. First, we are not persuaded that the district court’s reference to the 

thirty-year statutory minimum sentence for aggravated sexual abuse, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), amounted to consideration of an improper or irrelevant factor. 

As an initial matter, the district court was entitled to consider as relevant conduct at 

sentencing the undisputed fact that Bloom engaged in a sexual act with a nineyear-old child in his care, even though that conduct was not an element of either 

offense of conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Furthermore, the record reflects that 

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the district court raised the statutory minimum under § 2241(c) primarily in 

response to Bloom’s argument that mitigation was warranted in light of the 

isolated nature of the incident. 

As the district court correctly pointed out, Congress mandated a thirty-year 

sentence for a similar, single incident occurring within federal jurisdiction. See 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2246(2)(D). The only thing that separated Bloom from a 

defendant convicted of violating § 2241(c), the court explained, was a 

“jurisdictional hook,” not the seriousness of the underlying factual conduct. So 

even if Bloom abused a single child, that was hardly a basis for mitigation. 

Whether these considerations fall under the nature and circumstances of the 

offense, § 3553(a)(1), or the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities 

between defendants who engaged in similar conduct, § 3553(a)(6), we see no error 

in the district court’s reasoning, and we conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion by giving an improper or irrelevant factor substantial weight. 

Moreover, the district court’s sentencing decision was based on a number of 

other factors, many of which appear much more significant to the court’s calculus. 

The record reflects that the court thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors and 

found that many supported the need for a very severe sentence. With regard to the 

nature and characteristics of the offense, the court cited the “unspeakable acts” 

depicted in the videos, the “extreme” number of videos and images Bloom 

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possessed (850 videos and 2,000 images), the length of time he had been 

downloading child pornography (over three years), and the fact that he abused a 

child who was in his care in order to produce child pornography. Also of 

particular importance to the court was the need to protect the public, based on 

Bloom’s cartoons that depicted child sexual abuse as normal and were of the type 

often used in child-sexual-abuse cases to “groom” children for sexual abuse,

Bloom’s comments at sentencings, and the child-sized sex doll. Bloom has put 

forth no argument challenging the district court’s balancing of these factors as 

unreasonable. 

We have said before, and we say again, that “[c]hild sex crimes are among 

the most egregious and despicable of societal and criminal offenses.” United 

States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009). We “have upheld lengthy 

sentences in these cases as substantively reasonable.” Id. (affirming as reasonable 

a 100-year sentence for a first-time offender who sexually abused a single thirteenyear-old girl and took photos of it); United States v. Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239, 1244 

(11th Cir. 2006) (affirming as reasonable a 140-year sentence for an offender with 

few prior offenses who produced, possessed, and distributed child pornography);

see also Irey, 612 F.3d at 1206-08 (describing the “devastating and long-lasting 

effects” childhood sexual abuse has on its victims). Bloom’s victims included not 

just the child he sexually assaulted but also the victims depicted in the child 

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pornography he possessed and distributed. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1208 (“Every 

instance of viewing images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of 

the privacy of the victims and a repetition of their abuse.” (quoting Adam Walsh 

Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, § 501(2)(D), 120 

Stat. 587, 624 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note))). 

In sum, Bloom has not shown that his total sentence of 360 months of 

imprisonment, representing a 33-month variance above the high end of his 

guideline range of 262 to 327 months, was substantively reasonable under the 

totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm Bloom’s total sentence. 

AFFIRMED. 

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