IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-2007

Filed February 8, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M. and A.M.,

Minor Children,

B.B., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David F. 

Staudt, Judge.

A mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her fouryear-old son and two-year-old daughter. AFFIRMED.

Joshua M. Moon of Dutton, Braun, Staack & Hellman P.L.C., Waterloo, for 

appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Timothy M. Baldwin of Juvenile Public Defender’s Office, Waterloo, 

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
2

TABOR, Judge.

A mother, Brittany, appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her 

parental rights. Two children are at issue—her son, A.M., born in July 2012, and 

her daughter, A.M., born in April 2014.1 She challenges the statutory grounds for 

termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2016), argues termination was 

not in the children’s best interests under section 232.116(2), and contends there 

was clear and convincing evidence termination of her rights would be detrimental 

to the children because of the closeness of the parent-child relationship under 

section 232.116(3)(c). Finding the mother’s arguments unconvincing, we affirm 

the juvenile court’s order.2

Police arrested Brittany in late April 2015 for violating a court order 

prohibiting her contact with a paramour. At that time, the Iowa Department of 

Human Services (DHS) workers found unsanitary conditions in the home she 

shared with her two young children and removed them from her care. Other 

adults staying in the home reported Brittany left the children alone in a bedroom 

most of the day. 

Brittany had been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, obsessivecompulsive disorder, bipolar disorder, and borderline personality disorder. 

Brittany, who was expecting her fourth child in June 2015, could not take her 

 

1 Brittany has a total of five children. One child is older than A.M. and A.M. and lives in 

Texas. Brittany gave birth to two younger children while A.M. and A.M. were removed 

from her care.

2 We review termination orders de novo. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). 

We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings of fact, especially when witness credibility 

is at issue, but we are not obliged to accept them. Id. 
3

prescribed medications for those conditions while she was pregnant. Brittany 

gave birth to J.B. in mid-June.3 

The juvenile court adjudicated A.M. and A.M. as children in need of 

assistance (CINA) in August 2015. The children have not been returned home 

since that time. The DHS case worker identified Brittany’s mental-health 

problems, her struggles with basic parenting skills, and her unhealthy 

relationships with men4as the reasons for their continued removal. 

In November and December 2015, the DHS reported to the juvenile court 

that Brittany and the children’s biological father, Timothy, were making progress

in their parenting roles. In recognition of that progress, in January 2016, the 

court deferred permanency for six months. But in February, Timothy fell back 

into his pattern of substance abuse and was arrested for a probation violation. 

While Timothy was incarcerated, Brittany’s parenting progress stalled. She 

missed counseling sessions and could not consistently apply safe parenting skills 

during visits with the children. Complicating the situation, Brittany was expecting 

another baby in early September 2016 and had a high-risk pregnancy.

5

 

 

3

J.B., who was removed from Brittany’s care in early 2016 due to safety concerns, is not 

a subject of this appeal.

4 During the CINA case, Brittany had no-contact orders against three different men, two 

of whom were fathers to her children. 

5 The DHS scheduled limited visitation during late May and early June 2016 because 

Brittany’s doctor recommended strict bed rest. Nevertheless, Brittany took the city bus 

eight times in two weeks to visit Timothy in jail. Her fifth child, N.M., was born 

prematurely at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics in mid-June 2016. Brittany 

stayed in Iowa City while the infant remained hospitalized and told the DHS she could 

not return to Waterloo to attend visits with A.M. and A.M. But the DHS worker later 

learned Brittany did return to visit Timothy in jail on three occasions.
4

In April 2016, the State filed a petition to terminate Brittany’s parental 

rights to A.M. and A.M., citing subsections 232.116(1)(a), (b), (e), and (h).

6

 At 

that time, both children were under four years of age. The juvenile court held a 

permanency and termination hearing on August 29, 2016. By the date of the 

hearing, Brittany’s son had turned four years old. At the hearing, the State 

dismissed its allegation under subsection (a). On November 14, 2016, the 

juvenile court issued an order denying the State’s request to terminate under 

subsection (b) and granting termination of parental rights concerning Brittany’s 

daughter under subsection (h) and both children under subsection (e). Brittany 

now appeals.

In examining Brittany’s claims, we follow the three-step termination 

framework set out in In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). First, we must 

determine if the evidence proves one of the enumerated grounds for termination 

in section 232.116(1). Id. at 40. If a ground is proven, we must consider the 

best-interests factors in section 232.116(2). Id. Finally, if those factors require 

termination, we must decide if any countervailing reasons exist under section 

232.116(3) to forego termination. Id.

Statutory ground. When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on 

more than one statutory ground, we may affirm if we find clear and convincing 

evidence supports any of the subsections cited by the juvenile court. In re D.W., 

791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). In this case, we find clear and convincing 

evidence under section 232.116(1)(e).

 

6 The petition also sought to terminate the rights of their biological father, but he is not a 

party to this appeal.
5

To terminate parental rights under subsection (e), the State must show: 

(1) the children have been adjudicated CINA under section 232.96, (2) they have 

been removed from the parent’s physical custody for a period of at least six 

consecutive months, and (3) there is clear and convincing evidence the parent 

has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the children during 

those months and has made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the children

despite being given the opportunity to do so. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e). The 

code section defines “significant and meaningful contact” as an “affirmative 

assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by the role of being a 

parent.” Id. Those affirmative duties include making a genuine effort to complete 

the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan. See In re T.S., 868 

N.W.2d 425, 436–37 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).

The juvenile court found Brittany “failed to show a continued genuine 

interest in her children or a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities 

prescribed in the case permanency plan.” On appeal, Brittany contests this 

finding, insisting she was “able to maintain a clean apartment” and “continued to 

show interest in her children even throughout a complicated pregnancy that 

required her to be on bed rest at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics.”

After our de novo review of the record, we reach the same conclusion as 

the juvenile court. Brittany did not exert genuine, sustained efforts to meet the 

expectations in the case permanency plan that would ensure the safety of her 

children. The DHS case worker estimated Brittany’s overall compliance with

recommended services at only sixty percent. During visits, Brittany exhibited 

frequent lapses in supervision of her three young children, exposing them to 
6

potentially harmful situations. She was unable to treat her mental-health 

conditions by medication due to her pregnancies and attended only half of the 

scheduled counseling sessions. And most significantly, she allowed her volatile 

relationships with men to interfere with regaining custody of her children. Her 

misplaced priorities are evident from her repeated visits to see Timothy in jail 

when doctor-ordered bed rest and N.M.’s premature birth limited her contact with 

A.M. and A.M. We affirm termination under section 232.116(1)(e).

Best interests. Having determined the State satisfied a statutory ground 

for termination, we turn to Brittany’s argument that severing the parent-child 

bonds did not serve the best interests of A.M. and A.M. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2). In determining best interests, we must consider the children’s

safety, the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth, 

and their physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. See P.L., 778 

N.W.2d at 37. Our consideration of these factors leads us to conclude 

termination would promote the well-being of A.M. and A.M.—both in the short 

term and the long run.

The DHS worker testified Brittany continued “to put herself in situations 

with men that are very unhealthy and put her children at risk” and “after providing 

her with services it was obvious that she struggled to learn basic parenting skills 

needed to keep the children safe.” According to the DHS reports, during their 

sixteen months in family foster care, the children have “come a long way”

developmentally. A.M. and A.M. need a safe place to grow up, and Brittany has 

proved herself unwilling or unable to provide it. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113 

(citing In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring 
7

specially), which identified children’s safety and need for a permanent home as 

the “defining elements” of their best interests). Accordingly, we find termination 

of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. 

Closeness of parent-child bonds. Having established termination of 

Brittany’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, the last step of our 

analysis is to decide if any factors in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude the 

termination. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016). Brittany points 

to subsection (c), asserting the DHS reports entered into evidence “repeatedly 

reference the excitement experienced by the children when they attended visits 

with their mother.” Section 232.116(3)(c) allows the juvenile court to refrain from 

terminating parental rights if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the 

termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of 

the parent-child relationship.” This factor is permissive, not mandatory. See

M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 225. 

We agree the record reveals A.M. and A.M. enjoy a warm bond with their 

mother. But we do not find the closeness of the relationship between Brittany 

and her children outweighs their need for a safe and permanent placement. 

Accordingly, we affirm the termination order.

AFFIRMED.