CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER

RESPONSE PLAN

THE RED BOOK

National Center for Animal 

Health Emergency Management 

Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness & Response Plan 

FAD PReP

United States Department of Agriculture • Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service • Veterinary Services

MAY 2013
ii 

May 15, 2013 

USDA APHIS, Veterinary Services 

Preparedness and Incident Coordination Staff 

This version of the USDA APHIS CSF Response Plan: The Red Book (May 2013) has been updated according to 

comments received on the prior version and revisions to the current Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and 

Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials that are referenced here. The following list summarizes the important changes 

that were made in 2013. 

 Reflects 2012 OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

 Revisions in Chapter 4 to improve understanding of the differences between vaccination strategies.

 Revisions to ensure consistency with other existing response plans and strategic documents.

 Corrections and clarifications made in response to comments throughout the plan.

This plan will continue to be reviewed as needed. We realize that preparing for and responding to a CSF outbreak 

will be a complex effort, requiring collaboration for multiple stakeholders. As such, we will continue to accept 

comments on the CSF Response Plan for incorporation into future versions. 

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) mission is to raise 

awareness, define expectations, and improve capabilities for FAD preparedness and response. 

For more information, please go to: 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml (APHIS employees) 

or e-mail FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov 
May 2013 iii

Executive Summary

This Classical Swine Fever (CSF) Response Plan: The Red Book (2013)

incorporates comments received on the CSF Response Plan: The Red Book (2012)

as well as updates to other current Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and 

Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials. The objectives of this plan are to identify 

(1) the capabilities needed to respond to a CSF outbreak and (2) the critical 

activities that will be involved in responding to that outbreak, and time-frames for 

these activities. These critical activities are the responsibility of Incident 

Command in an outbreak situation. 

This plan promotes agricultural security, secures the food supply, guards animal 

health, and protects public health and the environment by providing strategic 

guidance on responding to a CSF outbreak. Developed by the United States 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS), the plan gives direction to emergency 

responders at the local, State, Tribal, and Federal levels to facilitate CSF control 

and eradication efforts in swine in the United States. This plan complements, not 

replaces, existing regional, State, Tribal, local, and industry plans. 

CSF is a highly contagious viral disease of swine, including wild (feral) pigs. The 

United States eradicated CSF in 1978, but it continues to be prevalent throughout 

most of the world. CSF is easily spread through direct contact between infected 

and susceptible swine, contaminated fomites, as well as swine consuming 

insufficiently cooked swill. A CSF outbreak in the United States would have a 

significant economic impact and lasting trade repercussions to swine and pork 

industries. CSF is not a threat to public health. 

The goals of a CSF response are to (1) detect, control, and contain CSF in 

domestic swine as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate CSF using strategies that 

seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and protect 

public health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based 

approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected swine 

and non-contaminated pork products. 

Achieving these three goals will allow individual swine facilities, States, Tribes, 

regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as possible. They 

will also allow the United States to regain CSF-free status without the response 

effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself. 

Four key outbreak response strategies, which are not mutually exclusive, are 

detailed in this plan. These strategies are stamping-out, stamping-out modified 

with emergency vaccination to kill, stamping-out modified with emergency 
 

May 2013 iv

vaccination to slaughter, and stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination 

to live. 

During a CSF outbreak response effort, many activities—such as epidemiology, 

surveillance, biosecurity, quarantine and movement control, and depopulation—

must occur in a deliberate, coordinated fashion. In addition to providing strategic 

direction on these various activities, this plan explains the underlying Incident 

Command System structure, applying National Response Framework (NRF) and 

National Incident Management System (NIMS) principles and systems to control 

and eradicate an outbreak of CSF in domestic swine.

Incorporating current scientific knowledge and policy guidance on CSF, this plan 

does the following: 

 Identifies the audience for and purpose of the document. 

 Provides technical information on CSF and the impact a CSF outbreak 

could have in the United States. 

 Explains the integration of the NRF, NIMS, and other FAD PReP 

documents. 

 Describes USDA preparedness and response activities, both domestic and 

international, including the APHIS Incident Management Structure. 

 Presents 23 critical activities and tools, such as case definitions, 

surveillance, diagnostics, cleaning and disinfection, health and safety and 

personal protective equipment, and depopulation. 

 Details the World Organization for Animal Health standards for CSF 

surveillance, virus inactivation, and disease freedom. 

 Supplies information on proof-of-freedom procedures and restocking after 

a CSF outbreak. 

This response plan is carefully integrated with other FAD PReP documents, 

including the CSF Standard Operating Procedures, and National Animal Health 

Emergency Management System Guidelines. Together, these documents provide 

a comprehensive preparedness and response framework for a CSF outbreak. 

This plan is a dynamic document that will be updated and revised on the basis of 

future knowledge and stakeholder input. Your comments and recommendations 

on this document are invited. Please send them to the following e-mail address: 

FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov. 
May 2013 v 

Contents

Preface ......................................................................................................xii 

Chapter 1 Introduction and CSF Information............................................ 1-1 

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN................................................................. 1-1 

1.2 PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT ................................................................................ 1-2 

1.3 AUDIENCE...................................................................................................... 1-2 

1.4 CSF INFORMATION ......................................................................................... 1-2 

1.4.1 Etiology................................................................................................... 1-2 

1.4.2 History and Global Distribution ............................................................... 1-3 

1.4.3 International Trade.................................................................................. 1-3 

1.4.4 Impact of a CSF Outbreak ...................................................................... 1-4 

1.4.5 Ecology................................................................................................... 1-5 

1.4.6 Diagnosis ................................................................................................ 1-6 

1.4.7 Immunity ................................................................................................. 1-9 

Chapter 2 Framework for CSF Preparedness and Response .................. 2-1 

2.1 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEM, AND NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEM INTEGRATION..................................................................................... 2-1 

2.1.1 National Response Framework............................................................... 2-1 

2.1.2 National Incident Management System .................................................. 2-1 

2.1.3 National Animal Health Emergency Management System...................... 2-2 

2.1.4 Coordination and Collaboration .............................................................. 2-3 

2.2 FEDERAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS ................... 2-3 

2.2.1 Overview................................................................................................. 2-3 

2.2.2 USDA Roles and Responsibilities Overview........................................... 2-3 

2.3 AUTHORITY .................................................................................................... 2-5 

Chapter 3 USDA CSF Preparedness and Response ............................... 3-1 

3.1 USDA........................................................................................................... 3-1 

3.1.1 Preparedness Exercises......................................................................... 3-1 
May 2013 vi 

3.1.2 Domestic Activities .................................................................................. 3-2 

3.1.3 International Activities ............................................................................. 3-3 

3.1.4 International Trade .................................................................................. 3-3 

3.1.5 Compartmentalization ............................................................................. 3-3 

3.2 USDA ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY ................................................................ 3-4 

3.3 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.................................................... 3-4 

3.3.1 Multiagency Coordination Group ............................................................ 3-5 

3.3.2 APHIS Incident Coordination Group ....................................................... 3-6 

3.3.3 Organization for a Single Incident ........................................................... 3-6 

3.3.4 Organization for Multiple Incidents .......................................................... 3-6 

3.3.5 Guidance on Incident Management and Organizational Strategy ........... 3-7 

3.4 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT LEVELS .......................................................... 3-8 

3.5 NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE CORPS (NAHERC) ............ 3-9 

3.6 DIAGNOSTIC RESOURCES AND LABORATORY SUPPORT ..................................... 3-9 

3.6.1 National Veterinary Services Laboratories .............................................. 3-9 

3.6.2 National Animal Health Laboratory Network ......................................... 3-10 

3.6.3 Center for Veterinary Biologics ............................................................. 3-10 

Chapter 4 CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy ......................... 4-1 

4.1 RESPONSE GOALS .......................................................................................... 4-1 

4.2 PRINCIPLES AND CRITICAL ACTIVITIES OF A CSF RESPONSE .............................. 4-2 

4.2.1 Critical Activities ...................................................................................... 4-2 

4.2.2 Epidemiological Principles ...................................................................... 4-2 

4.2.3 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign .............................................. 4-3 

4.2.4 Timeline in any CSF Response for the First 72 Hours ............................ 4-4 

4.3 RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF CSF IN

DOMESTIC SWINE ........................................................................................... 4-4 

4.3.1 Stamping-Out .......................................................................................... 4-5 

4.3.2 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill .................... 4-7 

4.3.3 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter ......... 4-9 

4.3.4 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live ................ 4-11 

4.3.5 Control and Eradication Strategy for Other Animals ............................. 4-12 

4.3.6 Summary of CSF Vaccination ............................................................... 4-13 
Contents 

May 2013 vii 

4.3.7 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities .......................... 4-13 

4.3.8 Management of Incident ....................................................................... 4-13 

4.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SELECTION OF RESPONSE STRATEGY OR

STRATEGIES................................................................................................. 4-14 

4.4.1 General Factors that Influence the Response Strategy ........................ 4-14 

4.4.2 Determining an Appropriate CSF Response Strategy .......................... 4-15 

4.4.3 Desired CSF-Status Post-Outbreak (World Animal Health 

Organization Standards for CSF Disease-Freedom) ............................ 4-16 

4.5 IMPLEMENTING A RESPONSE STRATEGY OR STRATEGIES IN THE EVENT OF A

CSF OUTBREAK IN THE UNITED STATES ......................................................... 4-18 

4.5.1 Examples of Strategies for a CSF Response, including Emergency 

Vaccination ........................................................................................... 4-19 

Chapter 5 Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools ............... 5-1 

5.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY ................................................................................ 5-1 

5.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS AND CASE DEFINITIONS ........................................... 5-1 

5.2.1 Laboratory Definitions ............................................................................. 5-1 

5.2.2 Case Definitions ...................................................................................... 5-2 

5.2.3 Case Definition Development Process.................................................... 5-3 

5.3 SURVEILLANCE ............................................................................................... 5-4 

5.3.1 Surveillance Planning for CSF Outbreak ................................................ 5-5 

5.3.2 Surveillance Sampling ............................................................................ 5-7 

5.4 DIAGNOSTICS ............................................................................................... 5-11 

5.4.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing ............................................ 5-11 

5.4.2 OIE Requirements for Differentiation of Infected from Vaccinated 

Animals Testing for CSF-Free Status ................................................... 5-14 

5.4.3 Surge Capacity ..................................................................................... 5-14 

5.4.4 Reporting .............................................................................................. 5-15 

5.5 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION AND TRACING ............................................ 5-15 

5.5.1 Summary of Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations ....................... 5-15 

5.5.2 Epidemiological Investigation ................................................................ 5-17 

5.5.3 Tracing .................................................................................................. 5-18 

5.5.4 Considerations for Size of Control Area and Minimum Sizes of 

Other Zones .......................................................................................... 5-18 

5.6 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ......................................................................... 5-20 
May 2013 viii 

5.7 COMMUNICATION .......................................................................................... 5-21 

5.7.1 Objectives ............................................................................................. 5-22 

5.7.2 Key Messages ...................................................................................... 5-22 

5.7.3 Further Communications Guidance ...................................................... 5-22 

5.8 HEALTH AND SAFETY AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT ....................... 5-23 

5.8.1 Mental Health Concerns ....................................................................... 5-23 

5.8.2 Further Information on Health, Safety, and Personal Protective 

Equipment ............................................................................................. 5-24 

5.9 BIOSECURITY ............................................................................................... 5-24 

5.9.1 Biosecurity Hazards and Mitigating Measures ...................................... 5-25 

5.9.2 Closed Herds ........................................................................................ 5-25 

5.9.3 Waiting Period ...................................................................................... 5-25 

5.10 QUARANTINE AND MOVEMENT CONTROL ........................................................ 5-26 

5.10.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations ........................................... 5-26 

5.10.2 Permit Guidance to Move into a Control Area, within a Control 

Area, and out of a Control Area ............................................................ 5-27 

5.10.3 Moving Commodities, Animals, and Conveyances in CSF Outbreak ... 5-32 

5.10.4 Guidance for All Premises .................................................................... 5-32 

5.10.5 OIE Treatment Guidelines for CSF ....................................................... 5-32 

5.10.6 Surveillance Required for Swine and Product Movement .................... 5-34 

5.11 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS ............................................................................. 5-34 

5.12 REGIONALIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE (FOR A U.S. CSF RESPONSE) ... 5-34 

5.12.1 Compartmentalization ........................................................................... 5-35 

5.12.2 Further Guidance .................................................................................. 5-35 

5.13 MASS DEPOPULATION AND EUTHANASIA ......................................................... 5-36 

5.14 DISPOSAL .................................................................................................... 5-37 

5.15 CLEANING AND DISINFECTION ........................................................................ 5-38 

5.16 VACCINATION ............................................................................................... 5-38 

5.16.1 Vaccination and Differentiation of Infected from Vaccinated Animals 

Testing .................................................................................................. 5-39 

5.16.2 Zone, Area, and Premises Designations ............................................... 5-39 

5.16.3 Movement Restrictions for Vaccinates .................................................. 5-42 

5.16.4 Cessation of Vaccination ...................................................................... 5-42 
Contents 

May 2013 ix 

5.17 NATIONAL VETERINARY STOCKPILE ................................................................ 5-43 

5.18 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND VECTOR CONTROL ............................................. 5-43 

5.18.1 Wildlife Management ............................................................................ 5-43 

5.18.2 Vector Control ....................................................................................... 5-44 

5.19 ANIMAL WELFARE ......................................................................................... 5-44 

5.20 MODELING AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS ............................................................. 5-44 

5.21 APPRAISAL AND COMPENSATION .................................................................... 5-45 

5.22 FINANCE ...................................................................................................... 5-46 

5.23 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK AND NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

SYSTEM ....................................................................................................... 5-46 

Chapter 6 Recovery after CSF Outbreak .................................................. 6-1 

6.1 PROOF OF FREEDOM ...................................................................................... 6-1 

6.1.1 Recognition of Disease-Free Status ....................................................... 6-1 

6.1.2 Criteria Needed for CSF-Free Status ...................................................... 6-1 

6.1.3 Surveillance for Recognition of Disease Freedom .................................. 6-2 

6.1.4 Release of Control Area Restrictions ...................................................... 6-5 

6.1.5 Disposition of Vaccinates ........................................................................ 6-5 

6.1.6 Country Freedom Declaration ................................................................. 6-5 

6.2 REPOPULATION .............................................................................................. 6-5 

6.2.1 Restocking Guidance .............................................................................. 6-5 

6.2.2 Testing Requirements for Restocking ..................................................... 6-6 

6.2.3 Approved Sources of Swine .................................................................... 6-6 

Appendix A FAD PReP Materials to Support CSF Response 

Appendix B Incident Management 

Appendix C Laboratory Network List for Classical Swine Fever 

Appendix D Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and 

Rationale 

Appendix E Procedures for CSF Investigation and Specimen 

Submission 

Appendix F Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire 
 

May 2013 x 

Appendix G Secure Pork Supply Plan 

Appendix H Examples of Movement Control Notices 

Appendix I Glossary 

Appendix J Abbreviations 

Appendix K Selected References and Resources 

Figures 

Figure 1-1. Countries/Regions that the United States Considers as Free or 

Low Risk of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) ......................................................... 1-4 

Figure 3-1. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS 

Emergency Operations Center: Relationship to Incident Management 

Team (Assuming Single Incident) ...................................................................... 3-5 

Figure 3-2. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS 

Emergency Operations Center: Relationship to Multiple Incident 

Management Team Structures (Assuming Multiple Incidents and Unified 

Area Command) ................................................................................................ 3-7 

Figure 3-3. Incident Management Levels ................................................................ 3-8 

Figure 4-1. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of a U.S. CSF Outbreak ............ 4-4 

Figure 4-2. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

(Infected Premises would be Depopulated) ....................................................... 4-6 

Figure 4-3. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill (Infected Premises would be 

Depopulated) ..................................................................................................... 4-8 

Figure 4-4. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter (Infected Premises 

would be Depopulated) .................................................................................... 4-10 

Figure 4-5. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Infected Premises would be 

Depopulated) ................................................................................................... 4-12 

Figure 4-6. Example of Stamping-Out ................................................................... 4-19 

Figure 4-7. Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination 

to Kill or Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter ................................................. 4-20 

Figure 4-8. Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination 

to Live .............................................................................................................. 4-21 
Contents

May 2013 xi

Figure 4-9. Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination 

to Slaughter and Emergency Vaccination to Live ............................................ 4-22

Figure 5-1. Developing a CSF Outbreak Surveillance Sample Scheme: Acute 

Form .................................................................................................................. 5-9 

Figure 5-2. Developing a CSF Outbreak Surveillance Sampling Scheme:

Non-Acute Forms ............................................................................................ 5-10

Figure 5-3. Diagnostic Flowchart for Initial Investigation of CSF........................... 5-13

Figure 5-4. Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises in CSF Outbreak 

Response ........................................................................................................ 5-17

Figure 5-5. Premises Designations in Relation to Permitting and Movement 

Control............................................................................................................. 5-31

Figure 5-6. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones .................................... 5-40

Figure 5-7. Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones ........................................ 5-41

Figure 5-8. Vaccinated Premises.......................................................................... 5-42

Tables

Table 4-1. Factors Influencing a Response Strategy or Strategies for U.S. 

CSF Outbreak.................................................................................................. 4-15

Table 5-1. Legend to the CSF Diagnostics Chart ................................................. 5-12

Table 5-2. Summary of Premises.......................................................................... 5-16

Table 5-3. Summary of Zones and Areas ............................................................. 5-16 

Table 5-4. Minimum Sizes of Areas and Zones .................................................... 5-19

Table 5-5. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for CSF ........... 5-19

Table 5-6. Movement into Control Area from Outside Control Area to Specific 

Premises ........................................................................................................ 5-28

Table 5-7. Movement within a Control Area ......................................................... 5-29

Table 5-8. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area 

from Specific Premises ................................................................................... 5-30
May 2013 xii 

Preface

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)—

Classical Swine Fever (CSF) Response Plan: The Red Book provides strategic 

guidance for responding to an animal health emergency caused by CSF in the 

United States. The CSF Response Plan (2013) replaces previous CSF summary 

response plans. Information in this plan may require further discussion and 

development with stakeholders. 

This CSF Response Plan is under ongoing review. This document was last 

updated in May 2013. Please send questions or comments to the following: 

Preparedness and Incident Coordination 

Veterinary Services 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

U.S. Department of Agriculture 

4700 River Road, Unit 41 

Riverdale, MD 20737-1231 

Telephone: (301) 851-3595 

Fax: (301) 734-7817 

E-mail: FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov. 

While best efforts have been used in developing and preparing the CSF Response 

Plan, the U.S. Government, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and other parties, such as employees 

and contractors contributing to this document, neither warrant nor assume any 

legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of 

any information or procedure disclosed. The primary purpose of the CSF 

Response Plan is to provide strategic guidance to those government officials 

responding to a CSF outbreak. It is only posted for public access as a reference. 

The CSF Response Plan may refer to links to various other Federal and State 

agencies and private organizations. These links are maintained solely for the 

user’s information and convenience. If you link to such site, please be aware that 

you are then subject to the policies of that site. In addition, please note that USDA 

does not control and cannot guarantee the relevance, timeliness, or accuracy of 

these outside materials. Further, the inclusion of links or pointers to particular 

items in hypertext is not intended to reflect their importance, nor is it intended to 

constitute approval or endorsement of any views expressed, or products or 

services offered on these outside websites, or the organizations sponsoring the 

websites. 
 

May 2013 xiii

Trade names are used solely for the purpose of providing specific information. 

Mention of a trade name does not constitute a guarantee or warranty of the 

product by USDA or an endorsement over other products not mentioned. 

USDA prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of 

race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual 

orientation, or marital or family status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all 

programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for 

communication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) 

should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and 

telecommunications device for the deaf [TDD]).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil 

Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue SW, 

Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is 

an equal opportunity provider and employer. 
May 2013 1-1 

Chapter 1

Introduction and CSF Information

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN

This Classical Swine Fever (CSF) Response Plan: The Red Book (May 2013)

incorporates comments on the CSF Response Plan: The Red Book (draft June 

2012) and has been updated significantly from prior CSF response documents. 

The objectives of this plan are to identify the (1) capabilities needed to respond to 

a CSF outbreak and (2) critical activities that will be involved in responding to 

that outbreak and time-frames for these activities. These critical activities will be 

the responsibility of the Incident Command (IC) in an outbreak situation. 

To achieve these objectives, this plan provides current information on CSF and its 

relevance to the United States, and presents the organizational strategy for an 

effective CSF response. In addition, it offers guidance on four key, but not 

mutually exclusive, outbreak response strategies. This plan also contains updated 

strategic guidance on 23 critical response activities and tools, such as disposal, 

appraisal and compensation, and quarantine and movement control. As indicated 

by links throughout the document, this plan is integrated and coordinated with 

other new and forthcoming Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response 

Plan (FAD PReP) documents such as standard operating procedures (SOPs), 

National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) 

Guidelines, and existing Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 

Guidance. (Appendix A provides a list of documents related to CSF outbreak 

response and an overview of FAD PReP.) 

This plan does not replace existing regional, State, Tribal, local, or industry 

preparedness and response plans relating to CSF. Regional, State, Tribal, local, 

and industry plans should be aimed at more specific issues in CSF response. In 

particular, States should develop response plans focused on the specific 

characteristics of the State and its swine industry. 

CSF is a highly contagious viral disease of swine, including wild (feral) swine. 

There are different forms of CSF: acute, subacute, and chronic. High fever, 

depression, and gastrointestinal signs are the most common symptoms of CSF 

infection. Skin hemorrhages can occur, particularly toward the end of the disease.

CSF is not a public health risk. CSF is a high priority concern for the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) APHIS.

The United States eradicated CSF in 1978. However, the disease is still prevalent 

worldwide. The United States has approximately 66 million swine that would be 

susceptible to CSF, as well as feral swine. 
May 2013 1-2 

An outbreak of CSF in the United States would have a significant economic 

impact, considering the loss of international trade, as well as costs directly 

associated with depopulation, disposal, and disinfection. There would be 

significant costs related to lost production. 

1.2 PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT

This plan provides strategic guidance for USDA APHIS and responders at all 

levels to follow in the event of a CSF outbreak. It provides current policy 

information and a strategic framework for the control and eradication of CSF, 

should an outbreak occur in the United States.

1.3 AUDIENCE

This document is intended for animal health emergency responders at all levels of 

government, as well as industry partners. It provides strategic guidance and offers

additional resources for tactical information for responders and other individuals 

who will act during a CSF outbreak. 

1.4 CSF INFORMATION

These sections provide an overview of CSF and cover the following subjects: 

 Etiology 

 History and global distribution

 Impact of a CSF outbreak 

 Ecology 

 Diagnosis 

 Immunity.

Further information on CSF can be found in the CSF Overview of Etiology and 

Ecology SOP. Chapter 5 of this plan includes the current case and laboratory 

definitions for CSF.

1.4.1 Etiology 

The classical swine fever virus (CSFV) is a Pestivirus in the family Flaviviridae. 

CSFV is the etiologic agent of a highly contagious viral disease of domestic pigs1

1 The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) defines CSF, for purposes of international 

trade, “as an infection of domestic pigs.” OIE, Article 15.2.1. “General Provisions.” Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code, 2012, www.oie.int. 
Introduction and CSF Information

and wild boar. CSF is also known as hog cholera, peste du porc, cólera porcina, 

and virusschweinepest.

1.4.2 History and Global Distribution

CSF was first recognized in the United States in 1833. During the last two 

decades, more than 60 countries have experienced CSF outbreaks. APHIS 

maintains a list of countries/regions considered “Free or Low Risk of CSF.” The 

United States eradicated CSF in 1978; Canada last reported a case in 1963.

In the last 2 years, the OIE reports that CSFV has been present in Bhutan, Bolivia, 

Cambodia, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia,

Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mongolia, Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Russia, 

Serbia, Thailand, and Vietnam. 

Although the United States has been CSF-free since 1978, there is a risk of CSF 

introduction into the United States through international travel and trade. With 

millions of swine, and a significant production industry, CSF is a critical threat to 

the United States. CSF can be transmitted over long distances by contaminated 

fomites and people. Feeding swine insufficiently cooked swill is one of the most 

common ways CSF is introduced to healthy swine populations. CSFV is also 

considered a potential agent for agricultural terrorism.

1.4.3 International Trade

The USDA maintains a list of countries and regions that are considered free or 

low risk of CSF in 9 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 94.9 and 94.10 (Figure 

1-1). In addition, the United States places special restrictions under 9 CFR 94.25 

for live swine, pork, and pork products from certain countries and regions that are 

free from CSF, but which one or more of the following conditions occur:

1. They supplement their pork supplies with fresh (chilled or frozen) 

pork imported from regions designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as being

affected by CSF; or

2. They supplement their pork supplies with pork from CSF-affected 

regions that is not processed in accordance with the requirements of 

part 94; or

3. They share a common land border with CSF-affected regions; or

4. They import live swine from CSF-affected regions under conditions 

less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the 

United States.

May 2013 1-3
May 2013 1-4

Figure 1-1. Countries/Regions that the United States Considers as Free or Low 

Risk of Classical Swine Fever (CSF)

1.4.4 Impact of a CSF Outbreak

1.4.4.1 ECONOMIC

A 1997–1998 outbreak in the Netherlands cost an estimated $2 billion and 

11 million swine were euthanized.2,3 A U.S. outbreak would have a significant 

economic impact on the pork export market, with many exports of pork and pork 

products being halted for a significant period of time. In addition, a CSF response 

effort would involve direct costs for depopulation, indemnity payments, animal 

disposal, disinfection, and movement control measures. Additional indirect costs 

would be incurred by consumers and related sectors of the economy, such as feed 

producers and suppliers. Any CSF outbreak in the United States would have a 

sizeable and lingering economic impact.

1.4.4.2 PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS

CSF is not considered a public health problem. Humans do not contract CSFV. A 

CSF outbreak may have public health implications from the mental health effects 

 2 Stegeman, A., Elbers, A., de Smit H., Moser, H., Smak, J., Pluimers, F. 2000. The 1997–

1998 epidemic of classical swine fever in the Netherlands. Veterinary Microbiology. 73, 183–196. 3 Terpstra, C. and de Smit, AJ. 2000. The 1997/1998 epizootic of swine fever in the 

Netherlands: control strategies under a non-vaccination regimen. Veterinary Microbiology. 77, 

3–15.
Introduction and CSF Information

May 2013 1-5 

on personnel and individuals associated with the response effort, particularly 

depopulation and disposal. The effects of a CSF outbreak on mental health may 

include post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. Support should be made 

available to those involved, particularly responders and owners of affected 

livestock. 

1.4.5 Ecology 

The CSFV infects domestic and wild swine (Sus domestica and Sus scrofa 

domestica, respectively). European wild boars, Peccaries (also known as 

javelinas), and feral swine in general are also susceptible, but it is unclear what 

epidemiological role these animals play in CSF transmission.

1.4.5.1 RESERVOIRS

The only natural reservoir of CSFV is swine and wild boars, though wild boars 

may not be a significant reservoir in many cases. Swine can become chronically 

infected and shed virus for several months. Carrier swine may not show signs of 

disease. If sows are infected with a mild CSFV strain, they may shed the virus 

when giving birth. This results in “carrier-sows,” in which their offspring may be 

carriers of the disease.4 

1.4.5.2 INTRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION OF CSF 

CSFV is primarily introduced though direct contact with infected animals, 

contaminated fomites, and feeding on contaminated swill. Wild swine may infect 

domestic animals. CSFV is highly contagious, and shed in oronasal and lachrymal 

discharges, semen, blood, urine, feces, and other secretions of infected pigs. CSF

can be shed prior to the onset of clinical symptoms. 

Feeding contaminated and/or improperly cooked waste food (swill) to swine is 

one of the most common ways to introduce CSFV (both domestically and 

internationally) from infected to health swine populations. 

CSFV is easily spread through the movement of contaminated fomites, including 

conveyances (for example, trucks), and personnel. Insects and birds may 

mechanically introduce CSFV to healthy populations. Short distance airborne 

transmission has occurred from small areas containing large numbers of infected 

swine. 

1.4.5.3 PERSISTENCE IN ENVIRONMENT AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS

CSFV does not persist in natural environments for long periods of time, as it is 

adversely affected and easily inactivated by both low and high temperatures. In 

 4 Merck Veterinary Manual, 2008. “Classical swine fever.” 

http://www.merckvetmanual.com/mvm/index.jsp?cfile=htm/bc/53400.htm&word=classical%2csw

ine%2cfever. 
May 2013 1-6 

processed meat, CSFV can survive for months in refrigerated meat, and years in 

frozen meat. It can also survive for approximately 2–6 weeks in salt-cured and 

smoked meats. The CSFV is susceptible to both acid and alkaline pH, and is 

quickly inactivated by pH < 3.0 and pH > 11.0.5 CSF is susceptible to chlorinebased disinfectants, as well as ether and chloroform.

The OIE recommends that countries importing fresh meat of domestic swine from 

countries, zones, or compartments free of CSF, that the animals have been kept in 

a CSF-free zone or compartment and slaughtered in an approved abattoir, where 

ante- and post-mortem inspections have not indicated CSF.

6 Meat can be heat 

treated to kill the virus by heating the meat to a minimum temperature of 70oC or 

heat treatment in a hermetically sealed container with a F0 value of 3.00 or more.7

CSFV can also persist in products of swine origin, bristles, and skins. Please refer 

to the CSF Overview of Etiology and Ecology SOP for further information, as 

well as the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012) (www.oie.int). 

1.4.6 Diagnosis 

Producers as well as veterinarians should be familiar with signs of the disease, as 

they may be the initial detectors of a CSF outbreak. The incubation period is 

typically 2–14 days, as defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 

(2012), though experimental data provides evidence that the incubation period 

will depend on the dose of the virus and the route of infection. 

Clinical presentation and pathological findings vary depending on the form of the 

CSF infection. The three clinical presentations—acute, chronic, and congenital—

are dependent on factors including the strain of the virus (and its virulence), 

previous exposure to the virus, and host factors such as age and health status. 

1.4.6.1 ACUTE FORM OF DISEASE

1.4.6.1.1 Clinical Signs

Common clinical signs of infection with an acute form of CSF include the 

following: 

 Pyrexia 

 Anorexia 

5 OIE, Classical swine fever, Technical Disease Card, 2009, www.oie.int. 6 OIE, Article 15.2.12. “Recommendations for importation from countries, zones or 

compartments free of CSF.” Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2012, www.oie.int. 7

 F0 is a measure of heat treatment; it is equivalent to heating for one minute at 121.1oC. OIE, 

Article 15.2.21. “Procedures for the inactivation of CSF virus in meat,” Terrestrial Animal Health 

Code, 2012. www.oie.int. 
Introduction and CSF Information

May 2013 1-7 

 Severe leucopenia 

 Multifocal hyperemia and/or hemorrhagic lesions of the skin 

 Conjunctivitis

 Cyanosis of extremities

 Ataxia, paresis, and convulsions 

 Huddling together of swine. 

Death typically occurs 5–25 days after onset of illness. Mortality in young swine

can reach 100 percent. 

1.4.6.1.2 Pathological Findings

Some common pathological findings observed in acute forms of CSF disease in 

necropsy include the following: 

 Severe tonsillitis 

 Hemorrhagic lymph nodes 

 Petechia

 Multifocal infarction of the margin of the spleen. 

1.4.6.2 CHRONIC FORM OF DISEASE

1.4.6.2.1 Clinical Signs

Possible clinical signs of infection with the chronic form of CSF include the 

following: 

 Pyrexia

 Weight loss

 Periods of constipation or diarrhea 

 Stunted growth. 

Animals typically appear to recover and then relapse, typically dying within 1–3 

months. The death rate varies, but can be low.
May 2013 1-8 

1.4.6.2.2 Pathological Findings

Some common pathological findings in chronic CSF cases include the following: 

 Button ulcers 

 Depletion of lymphoid tissue 

 Possible bone lesions in growing swine. 

Pathological lesions are more severe in the acute form of the disease. For pictures 

of CSF lesions, see http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/DiseaseInfo/diseaseimages.php?name=classical-swine-fever&lang=en. 

1.4.6.3 CONGENITAL

1.4.6.3.1 Clinical Signs

Possible signs of congenital infection include the following: 

 Reduced reproductive performance 

 Abortions 

 Congenital tremors

 Stillbirths

 Resorption 

 Mummification

 Weak piglets.

1.4.6.4 DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSES

Among other diseases, African swine fever, salmonellosis, erysipelas, acute 

pasteurellosis, streptococcosis, leptospirosis, and coumarin poisoning all are 

clinically indistinguishable from CSF, depending on the stage of the disease.

Other viruses that may be considered in a differential diagnosis include 

pseudorabies, parvovirus, porcine dermatitis and nephropathy syndrome, porcine 

circovirus-associated disease, post-weaning multisystemic wasting syndrome, and 

thrombocytopenic purpura. 
Introduction and CSF Information

May 2013 1-9 

1.4.7 Immunity 

1.4.7.1 NATURAL INFECTION

Uninfected swine are totally susceptible to CSF. CSFV significantly compromises 

the immune system. As a consequence, immune response is delayed and virus 

neutralizing antibodies usually do not develop until after the third week of illness. 

Swine that have recovered from CSF may become carriers of the virus for a 

sustained period of time. Sows that are seropositive do transmit antibodies to their 

offspring. While this passive immunity does protect piglets against mortality, 

offspring sometimes become carriers and shed CSFV. 

1.4.7.2 VACCINATION

Live-attenuated vaccines are the most widely-used vaccines for the control of 

CSF in countries where the disease is endemic. Bait versions have also been 

developed for wild swine. Problematically, these vaccines result in immunized 

swine that produce the same antibodies as CSF field-infected animals, making it

not possible to differentiate infected and vaccinated animals (also known as 

DIVA). Subsequently, marker vaccines have been developed; these vaccines 

permit the diagnostic DIVA. However, marker vaccines are not as effective at 

preventing CSF transmission, and more than one injection is necessary for 

sufficient immunity. However, this diagnostic DIVA capability is critical for an 

effective emergency vaccination campaign and maintaining continuity of 

business. 

Emergency vaccination and DIVA are further discussed later in this document 

and also in the NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, 

including Appendix B: Vaccination for Classical Swine Fever. 
May 2013 2-1

Chapter 2 

Framework for CSF Preparedness 

and Response

2.1 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, NATIONAL 

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, AND NATIONAL 

ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEM INTEGRATION

Successful emergency preparedness for and response to CSF requires integration 

between the National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident 

Management System (NIMS), and NAHEMS. This CSF-specific plan fits into this 

hierarchy to provide more detailed information and specific direction on response 

requirements in the event of a CSF outbreak in the United States. 

2.1.1 National Response Framework 

The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. It describes 

specific authorities and establishes a comprehensive approach for responding to 

domestic incidents that range from serious but purely local events to large-scale 

terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. It builds on NIMS, which 

provides a consistent template for managing incidents. The NRF is available from 

http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/. 

2.1.2 National Incident Management System 

NIMS, a companion document to the NRF, provides a systematic, nationwide, 

proactive approach guiding departments and agencies at all levels of government, 

the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Its goal is to help these 

organizations work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, 

and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or 

complexity, to reduce the loss of life, liberty, property, and harm to the 

environment. NIMS provides a core set of concepts, principles, procedures, 

organizational processes, terminology, and standard requirements. NIMS 

information is available at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/. 

NIMS consists of five key components: 

1. A set of preparedness concepts and principles for all hazards;
2. Essential principles for a common operating picture and interoperability of 

communications and information management;

3. Standardized resource management procedures that enable coordination 

among different jurisdictions or organizations;

4. Scalability, for use in all incidents (ranging from day to day to large 

scale); and

5. A dynamic system that promotes ongoing management and maintenance.

2.1.3 National Animal Health Emergency Management

System

APHIS and its stakeholders established NAHEMS to provide a functional

framework for responding to foreign animal disease (FAD) emergencies through 

NAHEMS Guidelines, disease response plans (such as this CSF-specific plan), 

SOPs, and other associated documents. The purpose of the NAHEMS Guidelines 

is to ensure a successful response commensurate with the severity of the outbreak.

Federal, State, and local agencies; Tribal nations; and other groups involved in 

animal health emergency management activities should integrate the information 

provided in NAHEMS Guidelines into their preparedness plans.

NAHEMS Guidelines (and other FAD PReP documents) offer

 competent veterinary guidance on cleaning and disinfection, disposal, 

mass depopulation, and other activities;

 information on disease control and eradication strategies and principles;

 guidance on health, safety, and personal protective equipment (PPE) 

issues;

 biosecurity information and site-specific management strategies; and

 training and educational resources.

In particular, NAHEMS Guidelines provide a foundation for coordinated national, 

regional, State, Tribal, and local activities in an emergency situation. These 

guidelines serve as a practical guide and complement non-Federal preparedness 

activities.

These NAHEMS Guidelines can be found at 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml for APHIS employees, and here 

for the public: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

May 2013 2-2
Framework for CSF Preparedness and Response 

May 2013 2-3

2.1.4 Coordination and Collaboration 

This CSF Response Plan is coordinated with the other FAD PReP documents, 

which follow NRF and NIMS. This document provides strategic guidance for 

responding to a CSF outbreak. Other FAD PReP documents provide information 

on general veterinary activities and include industry or facility manuals for 

industry stakeholders as well as SOPs for planners and responders. Together, 

these documents provide strategic and tactical details for Federal, State, Tribal, 

and local officials that are useful for CSF preparedness and response. 

Building on existing planning and response relationships, raising awareness on 

critical issues, and collaborating to address significant problems are key goals of 

FAD PReP efforts. Exercises and real events can improve CSF preparedness and 

response planning and collaboration. 

2.2 FEDERAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES,

AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

2.2.1 Overview 

Understanding the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments or agencies 

involved in responding to a domestic incident of an FAD promotes an effective, 

coordinated emergency response. The subsection that follows describes the roles, 

responsibilities, and authority of USDA in a CSF response. The functions 

described are consistent with the roles and responsibilities outlined in the NRF. 

Federal response to the detection of an FAD such as CSF is based on the response 

structure of NIMS as outlined in the NRF. The NRF defines Federal departmental 

responsibilities for sector-specific responses. During the course of a CSF outbreak 

response, the USDA may request Federal-to-Federal support (FFS) from other 

Federal departments and agencies. FFS refers to the circumstance in which a 

Federal department or agency requests Federal resource support under the NRF 

that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or another mechanism. 

2.2.2 USDA Roles and Responsibilities Overview 

As the primary Federal agency for incident management during an FAD event of 

livestock, like a CSF outbreak, USDA coordinates Incident Management Teams 

(IMTs), manages incident response, manages public messages, and takes 

measures to control and eradicate CSF. Measures used to control and eradicate 

CSF include quarantine and movement control, epidemiologic investigation, 

appraisal and compensation, depopulation (euthanasia) of affected livestock, 

carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, active surveillance for additional 

cases, diagnostics, and potentially, emergency vaccination. 
 

May 2013 2-4 

The USDA performs the coordination role in Emergency Support Function (ESF) 

#11—Agriculture and Natural Resources—under the NRF. Under ESF #11, 

APHIS is responsible for detecting “animal disease anomalies” and providing 

“technical assistance as requested on pet/animal and agricultural issues.” As 

stated in ESF #11, USDA “responds to animal and agricultural health 

emergencies under USDA statutory authority.” 

USDA (not including the additional ESF responsibilities carried by the U.S. 

Forest Service, which is part of USDA) also plays supporting roles in the 

following ESFs: 

 ESF #3—Public Works and Engineering 

 ESF #5—Information and Planning 

 ESF #6—Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and 

Human Services 

 ESF #7—Logistics 

 ESF #8—Public Health and Medical Services 

 ESF #10—Oil and Hazardous Materials Response 

 ESF #12—Energy 

 ESF #15—External Affairs. 

During the course of a CSF outbreak response, USDA may request support as 

necessary from other Federal agencies. If the President declares an emergency or 

major disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) lead coordination, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

and DHS assume the lead for coordinating Federal resources. USDA maintains 

the lead of overall incident management. 

For more information on the roles of other Federal agencies, such as the 

Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Interior (DOI), in the 

event of a CSF outbreak, see the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: 

Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) and APHIS Foreign Animal 

Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0). [Appendix B

of this plan contains an organizational chart showing the coordination between 

DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and USDA in the event 

of a major CSF outbreak.] 
Framework for CSF Preparedness and Response

2.3 AUTHORITY

The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq., authorizes 

the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the importation, entry, or further movement 

in the United States or order the destruction or removal of animals and related 

conveyances and facilities to prevent the introduction or dissemination of 

livestock pests or diseases. It authorizes related activities with respect to 

exportation, interstate movement, cooperative agreements, enforcement and 

penalties, seizure, quarantine, and disease and pest eradication. The Act also 

authorizes the Secretary to establish a veterinary accreditation program and enter 

into reimbursable fee agreements for pre-clearance abroad of animals or articles 

for movement into the United States.

Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S. Code 231 transfers to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security certain agricultural import and entry inspection 

functions under the AHPA, including the authority to enforce the prohibitions or 

restrictions imposed by USDA.

The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to cooperate with other Federal 

agencies, States, or political subdivisions of States, national or local governments 

of foreign governments, domestic or international organizations or associations, 

Tribal nations, and other persons to prevent, detect, control, or eradicate CSF. If 

measures taken by a State or Indian Tribe to control or eradicate a pest or disease 

of livestock are inadequate, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary, after notice to 

and review and consultation with certain State or Tribal officials, to declare that 

an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence in the United States of 

a pest or disease of livestock that threatens the livestock of the United States 

(7 U.S. Code 8306).

For further information on USDA APHIS authorities, see the APHIS Foreign 

Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) at

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

May 2013 2-5
May 2013 3-1

Chapter 3

USDA CSF Preparedness and Response

3.1 USDA

USDA APHIS is the Federal agency with primary responsibility and authority for 

animal disease control and will interface with Federal, State, Tribal, and local 

partners in CSF eradication and control efforts. If the President declares an 

emergency or major disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests that DHS

lead coordination, the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS leads the 

coordination of FFS and Federal resources for the incident while USDA maintains 

the lead of overall incident management.

USDA is the primary Federal liaison to the U.S. animal industry. In addition, it 

operates the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), including the 

Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL). 

The following subsections detail USDA activities to prepare for a CSF outbreak.

3.1.1 Preparedness Exercises

Preparedness and response exercises help ensure our Nation is able to respond 

quickly and effectively to a CSF outbreak. They are an ideal, no-fault learning 

environment to discuss, practice, and implement plans, procedures, and processes 

in advance of an actual event. APHIS exercises are conducted in accordance with 

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program guidance.

Multiple preparedness exercises have been conducted to simulate an FAD

outbreak and response effort in the United States. These exercises allow 

responders to discuss and practice activities relating to this highly contagious 

animal disease, such as movement control, and to consider the social and 

economic implications of an FAD outbreak. They help prepare the United States 

and responders for the difficult decisions that will be made regarding animal 

depopulation and business continuity.

The NVS has also conducted multiple exercises to assess and test its ability to 

deliver supplies (including vaccine) and services and State and Tribal ability to 

receive and stage these items in the event of a FAD outbreak. These exercises 

have incorporated multiple States, various State agencies, as well as industry and 

academia to simulate a response effort.

Multi-state exercises have enhanced coordination and collaboration between 

States and between States and the Federal government. Valuable logistics lessons 
 

May 2013 3-2 

have been learned and important recommendations have resulted from the 

evaluation of these exercises. 

3.1.2 Domestic Activities 

USDA has a variety of ongoing preparedness and response activities with respect 

to CSF. Domestically, the USDA prevents the introduction of CSF into the 

country, conducts proactive surveillance for CSF, and also performs FAD

investigations as needed for suspected cases. The following list details a selection 

of USDA activities:

 Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC). SITC conducts risk 

management and anti-smuggling activities to prevent unlawful entry and 

distribution of prohibited agricultural commodities. It looks at domestic 

markets likely to have illegal imported animal products to establish 

baseline estimates on how much product is bypassing ports of entry. 

 National Center for Import and Export (NCIE). NCIE facilitates 

international trade, monitoring the health of animals presented at the 

border as well as regulating the import and export of animals and animal 

products. Swine typically cannot be imported into the United States from 

countries where CSF is known to exist (9 CFR 94.10).

 CSF surveillance. USDA, in cooperation with the National Animal Health 

Laboratory Network (NAHLN), conducts enhanced surveillance for the 

rapid detection of CSFV. In addition to passive surveillance through FAD

investigations of suspected CSF cases, USDA conducts surveillance in 

high risk swine populations with targeted specimen testing. For example, 

waste feeding operations and swine condemned by the USDA Food Safety 

Inspection Service (FSIS) are high risk populations targeted for 

surveillance.

 Other preparedness and disease models. USDA uses various models to 

develop computer-generated scenarios for CSF. This allows it to evaluate 

the potential consequences of CSF in the United States, as well as the 

countermeasures, materials, and supplies needed for control and 

eradication. 

 Emergency veterinary assistance. USDA will work to assist States in 

training and maintaining State Incident Management Teams and veterinary 

reserve corps, such as the National Animal Health Emergency Response 

Corps, (NAHERC) (Subsection 3.5). State groups will serve as early 

response teams for a CSF incident and can educate groups on the signs, 

symptoms, and reporting procedures. 
USDA CSF Preparedness and Response

3.1.3 International Activities

USDA also conducts international activities in support of CSF eradication and to 

bolster preparedness planning and response capabilities. The following list details 

a selection of USDA activities:

 International coordination. USDA APHIS collaborates with interagency 

and international partners to mitigate animal health threats outside the 

United States through the sharing of information and development of infrastructure. APHIS International Services also collaborates to sponsor 

CSF eradication programs in other countries.

 Emergency veterinary assistance. USDA APHIS works to provide 

technical assistance and expertise at a country’s request, in the event of an 

animal health emergency.

3.1.4 International Trade

USDA, in collaboration with the Department of State and the United States Trade 

Representative, will promptly address foreign governments that impose 

unjustifiable U.S. swine and pork product trade restrictions because of a CSF 

outbreak.

USDA overseas embassy offices also have guidance on how to rapidly report 

trade disruptions to Washington, DC, headquarters and how to help foreign 

officials respond to such events. Multiple USDA agencies, led by the Foreign 

Agricultural Service, will coordinate a response to any such trade disruption and 

communicate with industry in the United States. USDA would also quickly fulfill

any official requests for additional scientific information, including case 

surveillance, movement control measures, and laboratory diagnostics.

These efforts focus on cases where bans are inconsistent with OIE standards. OIE

member countries, like the United States, are to “immediately” notify the OIE in 

any confirmed CSF case, as defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code

(2012). International standards for CSF do allow countries to impose bans on 

imports from CSF-infected countries and zones.

Countries that the United States considers free or low risk of CSF are listed on the 

APHIS Import Export website. 

3.1.5 Compartmentalization

Another tool that may mitigate the economic consequences of a disease outbreak 

is compartmentalization. Compartmentalization defines subpopulations of distinct 

health status by management and husbandry practices, as related to biosecurity. 

Compartmentalization is best implemented, as suggested by the OIE in the 

Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012), by trading partners through the 

May 2013 3-3
 

May 2013 3-4 

Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012), by trading partners through the 

establishment of parameters and agreement on necessary measures before a 

disease outbreak. 

Implementation of compartmentalization will rely on producers, industry, and 

State and Federal animal health authorities. The importing country must be 

satisfied that its animal health status is appropriately protected by the biosecurity 

measures undertaken by the exporting country. 

Because of the nature of the CSFV, compartmentalization may be difficult to 

achieve. Currently, no CSF compartmentalization plans have been internationally 

accepted or implemented. 

Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012) explain 

the concept and application of compartmentalization. More information on 

compartmentalization can be found in the NAHEMS Guidelines: Regionalization 

for International Trade for a U.S. FAD Response. 

3.2 USDA ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

In the event of a CSF outbreak, effective and efficient management of the 

situation and clear communication pathways will be critical. A synchronized 

management and organizational structure will help to support the control and 

eradication actions. Accordingly, APHIS has adopted NIMS and Incident 

Command System (ICS) organizational structures to manage the response to a 

CSF outbreak. The ICS is designed to enable efficient and effective domestic 

incident management by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, 

and communications operating within a common organizational structure. The 

next section discusses the APHIS incident management organizational structure.

3.3 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive responsible for implementing 

APHIS policy during a CSF outbreak. The APHIS Administrator will delegate 

much of the actual multiagency coordination (MAC) functions to the Veterinary 

Services (VS) Deputy Administrator, who is the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) 

of the United States, and the APHIS Emergency Management Leadership Council

(EMLC). 

The VS Deputy Administrator and EMLC will establish an APHIS Incident 

Coordination Group (ICG) to oversee the staff functions associated with the 

incident at the APHIS headquarters level. The APHIS ICG will work closely with 

the personnel in charge of establishing operations for the incident response at the 

Area Command (AC) or Incident Command Post (ICP) in the field and coordinate 

with the APHIS MAC Group. 
USDA CSF Preparedness and Response

May 2013 3-5

Figure 3-1 displays the APHIS FAD incident management organizational 

structure, starting with the APHIS Administrator.

Figure 3-1. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations 

Center: Relationship to Incident Management Team (Assuming Single Incident)

Note: AVIC = Area Veterinarian in Charge; SAHO = State Animal Health Official.

The following subsections describe the MAC Group and APHIS ICG, as well as 

the APHIS organization for single and multiple events. (Appendix B contains 

further information and organizational diagrams describing APHIS’s Incident 

Management Structure.) Also, see the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 

Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) and NCAHEM

Incident Coordination Group Plan.

3.3.1 Multiagency Coordination Group

The APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide defines coordination for CSF

responses at the APHIS level. In the event of a CSF outbreak, the EMLC typically 

serves as the APHIS MAC Group, unless the members decide to transfer 

responsibility for a specific incident (please see Appendix B for a list of EMLC 

members). The APHIS MAC Group structure is adaptable and easily expands and 

contracts to provide flexibility. The MAC Group—formed if the CSF response 
May 2013 3-6

needs more support—establishes supportive relationships among the agencies

preparing for and responding to a CSF outbreak.

The APHIS MAC Group offers guidance on the most efficient way to allocate 

resources during a CSF outbreak. General functions of the group include

 incident prioritization,

 resource allocation and acquisition, and

 identification and resolution of issues common to all parties.

If additional support is needed, particularly in the event there are significant 

threats or consequences to public health and welfare, the natural environment, or 

the economy, the USDA may also stand up other MAC Groups, which may be 

composed of representatives from other programs and agencies.

3.3.2 APHIS Incident Coordination Group

The APHIS ICG is responsible for acquiring resources, formulating policy

options, and assisting in implementing response and recovery strategies for a CSF

outbreak. For additional information, see the NCAHEM Incident Coordination 

Group Plan. APHIS ICG responsibilities in a CSF outbreak include

 providing guidance to ensure responder and public health and safety,

 supporting ICP(s) and AC(s),

 assisting in coordinating resources and integrating response organizations 

into the ICS, and

 providing information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) for use in

media and stakeholder briefings.

3.3.3 Organization for a Single Incident

In the event of a single CSF incident, the SAHO or designee, and AVIC or 

designee, will initially serve as the Co-Incident Commanders for the Unified IC.

The AVIC and SAHO may be relieved by a VS Incident Management Team if 

there is a delegation of authority.

3.3.4 Organization for Multiple Incidents

When more than one CSF incident happens simultaneously, more than one ICP

may be established. An AC may also be established. The VS Region Director will 

establish a Unified AC, and the Area Commander will be responsible for 

managing the multiple incidents. The AVIC and SAHO for each incident (or the 
USDA CSF Preparedness and Response

May 2013 3-7

Incident Management Team) will report to the AC. Figure 3-2 shows the 

organization for multiple incidents.

Figure 3-2. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations 

Center: Relationship to Multiple Incident Management Team Structures 

(Assuming Multiple Incidents and Unified Area Command)

If the emergency response becomes too complex for a single APHIS MAC Group

to handle efficiently—for example, a large multistate CSF incident with numerous 

response activities—cooperation with other agencies or committees will be 

implemented. As stated previously, this is referred to as MAC. Other MAC 

Groups would likely be stood up. These groups, comprised of representatives 

from across USDA sub-agencies or other government agencies, would make 

decisions regarding the prioritizing of incidents and the sharing and use of critical 

resources. However, these groups are not part of the on-scene IC.

3.3.5 Guidance on Incident Management and 

Organizational Strategy

See Appendix B for further information on incident management and 

organizational structure .
May 2013 3-8

3.4 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT LEVELS

APHIS uses a three-level system of emergency response types. The levels range 

from Level III, which has the lowest significance, to Level I, which is an event of 

national significance. The levels are used both within APHIS and externally to 

communicate the resource requirements for an event or incident. Figure 3-3

illustrates these three incident management levels. In Figure 3-3, sector refers to 

the agriculture sector and USDA. Additional information can be found in the 

APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide and in the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 

Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0).

Figure 3-3. Incident Management Levels

These levels are as follows:

 Level III. A response to an event or incident, the scope or severity of 

which the lead program unit is evaluating or that requires a limited 

response. In either case, enough resources (Federal, State, or local 

personnel) are available in the area or State to staff the evaluation or initial 

response effort. An equine piroplasmosis outbreak would be a Level III

incident.

 Level II. A response to an event or incident that requires resources beyond 

an area or State’s resource capacity but which is within the lead program 

unit’s ability to provide resources to support the response. Requests for 

additional resources outside the lead program unit are not necessary for a 

Level II response. However, volunteers will be considered for assignment 
USDA CSF Preparedness and Response

May 2013 3-9 

from outside the unit if they wish to be considered for the assignment, 

have supervisory approval, and are qualified for the position requested. 

Typically, a CSF outbreak in domestic swine would be a Level II event.

 Level I. A response that requires resources or expertise beyond the lead 

program unit’s capacity to respond. In many cases, these emergencies will 

be of national significance. If the lead program unit lacks qualified 

resources to meet the response needs, it will make a request through the 

EMLC to the APHIS Administrator to declare a total mobilization. If 

qualified volunteers are insufficient, direct assignments will be made. A 

multistate foot-and-mouth disease outbreak would be a Level I event. 

3.5 NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY 

RESPONSE CORPS (NAHERC)

In addition to the activities just discussed, NAHERC assists and augments Federal 

and State response to domestic and international animal disease outbreaks, threats, 

or natural disasters. NAHERC is composed of veterinarians and veterinary 

technicians who volunteer to become temporary Federal employees in the event 

of a national animal health emergency. For further information on NAHERC and 

NAHERC deployment, see the NAHEMS Guidelines: NAHERC Deployment 

Guide. 

3.6 DIAGNOSTIC RESOURCES AND LABORATORY 

SUPPORT

USDA also has critical diagnostic resources and laboratory support that will be 

leveraged in a CSF outbreak. 

3.6.1 National Veterinary Services Laboratories 

The NVSL is the official reference laboratory for FAD diagnostic testing and 

study in the United States. The NVSL performs animal disease testing in support 

of USDA-APHIS programs designed to protect the health of the Nation’s 

livestock. The NVSL provides all confirmatory testing for CSF on all specimens 

found presumptively positive at a NAHLN laboratory or other USDA-approved 

laboratory. The NVSL has two locations for FAD diagnostic testing: Ames, IA 

(NVSL Ames), and FADDL at Plum Island, NY (NVSL FADDL).

NVSL FADDL is where CSFV would be isolated. FADDL also assists in 

validating diagnostic procedures for CSF. 
May 2013 3-10

3.6.2 National Animal Health Laboratory Network

As of the date of publication, the NAHLN consists of approximately 60 

laboratories and coordinates the veterinary diagnostic laboratory capacity of State 

animal health laboratories and their extensive infrastructure, including facilities, 

equipment, and professional expertise. Of these laboratories, approximately 40—

including NVSL Ames and NVSL FADDL—are approved to conduct CSF testing 

diagnostics (Appendix C). 

The NAHLN provides a means for early detection of CSF, rapid response through 

surge capacity to test outbreak samples, and recovery by the capability to test 

large numbers of samples to show freedom from CSF. The confirmation of a CSF 

outbreak will be made at NVSL FADDL. After positive confirmation of CSF, 

subsequent samples from premises inside the established Control Area (CA) may 

be sent to laboratories that are part of NAHLN. Please see Subsection 5.4 for 

more information. 

3.6.3 Center for Veterinary Biologics

APHIS’s Center for Veterinary Biologics is responsible for licensing new 

products, including new diagnostic test kits and vaccines for CSF. This work—

centered on enforcement of the Virus Serum Toxin Act—ensures that pure, safe, 

potent, and effective veterinary biologics are available for the diagnosis, 

prevention, and treatment of animal diseases.
May 2013 4-1

Chapter 4

CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

This chapter covers a wide range of information about how USDA APHIS, States, 

Tribal Nations, localities, and stakeholders would respond to a CSF outbreak in 

the United States. In particular, this chapter

 identifies USDA APHIS goals for responding to a CSF outbreak;

 identifies tools and critical activities required to achieve the response 

goals;

 discusses the epidemiological principles for any CSF response strategy;

 defines and describes the four key response strategies;

 reviews factors that may influence the response strategies;

 illustrates the implementation of response strategies in a CSF outbreak in 

the United States; and

 reviews the international standards from the OIE for CSF-free status.

4.1 RESPONSE GOALS 

The goals of a CSF response are to (1) detect, control, and contain CSF in 

domestic swine as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate CSF using strategies that 

seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and protect 

public health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based 

approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected swine 

and non-contaminated pork products. 

Achieving these three goals will allow individual swine facilities, States, Tribes, 

regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as possible. They 

will also allow the United States to regain CSF-free status without the response 

effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself. 
 

May 2013 4-2 

4.2 PRINCIPLES AND CRITICAL ACTIVITIES OF A 

CSF RESPONSE

4.2.1 Critical Activities 

In order to achieve the goals of a CSF response, critical activities, and tools, must 

be implemented to execute the response strategy. Box 4-1 lists these critical 

activities and tools. A science- and risk-based approach that protects public and 

animal health and stabilizes animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy 

will be employed at all times. Please see Chapter 5 for more information on these 

critical activities and tools (i.e., movement control, disposal, and epidemiological 

investigation and tracing).

Box 4-1. Critical Activities and Tools for a CSF Response

4.2.2 Epidemiological Principles

Three basic epidemiological principles form the foundation of any response 

strategy to contain, control, and eradicate CSF in the U.S. domestic swine 

population: 

1. Prevent contact between CSFV and susceptible swine. 

a. This is accomplished through quarantine of infected animals, 

movement controls in the Infected Zone(s) and Buffer Zone(s) (the 

CAs), and biosecurity procedures to protect non-infected animals.

b. Certain circumstances may warrant accelerating the depopulation of 

animals at risk for exposure to CSF to decrease the population density 

of susceptible animals.

Critical Activities and Tools for Containment, Control, and Eradication

• Public awareness campaign

• Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls 

• Rapid diagnosis and reporting 

• Epidemiological investigation and tracing 

• Increased surveillance

• Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and noncontaminated animal products 

• Biosecurity measures

• Cleaning and disinfection measures

• Effective and appropriate disposal procedures 

• Mass depopulation and euthanasia (as response strategy indicates) 

• Emergency vaccination (as response strategy indicates)
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy 

May 2013 4-3 

c. There is a serious but lesser transmission risk posed by other people, 

material, conveyances, and animals that may have been in contact with 

CSF and serve as mechanical vectors. Contact with susceptible swine 

should be prevented and transmission risk mitigated through 

biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection measures. 

2. Stop the production of CSFV in infected or exposed swine. This is 

accomplished by timely slaughter (and processing) or mass depopulation 

(and disposal) of infected and potentially infected animals.

3. Increase the disease resistance of susceptible swine to the CSFV or reduce 

the shedding of CSFV in infected or exposed swine. This can be 

accomplished by emergency vaccination if a suitable vaccine is available

and can be administered in a timely manner. 

4.2.3 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign 

One of the most important critical activities is a public awareness campaign. 

Box 4-2 details the importance of a coordinated public awareness campaign in an 

effective response strategy. 

Box 4-2. Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign

Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign

Regardless of the response strategy or strategies selected, a public awareness campaign must 

be effectively coordinated. This will support the response strategy by 

• engaging and leveraging Federal, State, Tribal, local, and stakeholder relationships to 

provide unified public messages for local, national, and international audiences; 

• addressing the issues and concerns relating to food safety, public health, the 

environment, and animal welfare; 

• addressing issues and concerns related to interstate commerce, continuity of business, 

and international trade; and 

• widely disseminating key communication messages to consumers and producers. 

It is also important to convey how critical biosecurity measures are for preventing the 

incursion of CSF into the United States. For more information on preventing the introduction 

of CSF, please see Section 5.9 and the NAHEMS Guidelines: Biosecurity.
May 2013 4-4

4.2.4 Timeline in any CSF Response for the First 72 Hours

In the first 72 hours after the detection of CSF in the United States, specific 

actions will occur, regardless of outbreak characteristics. These critical tasks are 

fundamental to the rapid control and containment of CSF. Figure 4-1 highlights 

these tasks.

Figure 4-1. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of a U.S. CSF Outbreak

4.3 RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL AND 

ERADICATION OF CSF IN DOMESTIC SWINE

There are four strategies for the control and eradication of CSF in domestic swine 

following an outbreak.

 Stamping-out

 Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill

 Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter

 Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live.

This section defines and describes each of these strategies in turn. Depending 

upon the circumstances and scale of the outbreak, a combination of one or more 

of these strategies can be applied. In some cases, the intended disposition of 

vaccinated animals (kill, slaughter, live) may be affected by epidemiological, 

logistical, and other considerations during the outbreak. As mentioned, a 

coordinated public awareness campaign will support any response strategy or 

strategies. Analogous strategies are recognized in the OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code (2012), Article 15.2.4.
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

May 2013 4-5

4.3.1 Stamping-Out

4.3.1.1 DEFINING STAMPING-OUT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Box 4-3 defines stamping-out.

Box 4-3. Stamping-Out

4.3.1.2 DESCRIBING STAMPING-OUT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Stamping-out has been a common approach in past CSF outbreaks in countries 

that were previously CSF-free. This strategy is most appropriate if the outbreak is 

contained to a jurisdictional area or a region in which CSF can be readily 

contained and further dissemination of the virus is unlikely. Stamping-out is 

currently defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012), as

carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Authority, on 

confirmation of a disease, the killing of the animals which are affected 

and those suspected of being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, 

those in other herds which have been exposed to infection by direct 

animal to animal contact, or by indirect contact of a kind likely to cause 

the transmission of the causal pathogen. All susceptible animals, 

vaccinated or unvaccinated, on an infected premises should be killed and 

their carcasses destroyed by burning or burial, or by any other method 

which will eliminate the spread of infection through the carcasses or 

products of the animals killed.

This policy should be accompanied by the cleansing and disinfection 

procedures defined in the Terrestrial Code.

The term modified stamping-out policy should be used in 

communications to the OIE whenever the above animal health measures 

are not implemented in full and details of the modifications should be 

given.

Box 4-4 lists the critical elements of stamping-out. The OIE recognizes that if 

outbreaks cannot be confined to a Containment Zone (equivalent to a CA), 

response strategies other than just stamping-out may be necessary.

Stamping-Out

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals. 
May 2013 4-6

Box 4-4. Critical Elements of Stamping-Out CSF

4.3.1.3 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT

Figure 4-2 shows an example of a stamping-out response strategy, where IP are 

depopulated. See Subsection 5.5 in Chapter 5 for more information on zones, 

areas, and premises for CSF outbreak response.

Figure 4-2. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

(Infected Premises would be Depopulated)

Note: Figure is not to scale.

Stamping-Out: Critical Goals

• Within 24 hours, or as soon as possible, after classification of premises as 

Infected Premises (IP), the infected and susceptible swine will be euthanized or 

depopulated. In many cases, susceptible swine on Contact Premises (CP) may 

also be depopulated as soon as possible.

• Where resources are limited, premises will be prioritized so that those with the 

highest potential for active CSF spread are “stamped-out” first. 

• Based on an epidemiological assessment, animals with clinical signs may be 

prioritized for depopulation to reduce virus excretion.

• Public concerns about stamping-out will require a well-planned and proactive 

public relations and liaison campaign. Stakeholders, the public, and the international community must be involved. 

• Care should be taken to consider mental health implications for owners and 

responders in the event a stamping-out strategy is implemented. 
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

May 2013 4-7

4.3.2 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to 

Kill

4.3.2.1 DEFINING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION 

TO KILL AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Box 4-5 defines stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill.

Box 4-5. Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill

4.3.2.2 DESCRIBING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO KILL AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

This strategy involves the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible swine and vaccination of at-risk swine, with subsequent depopulation 

and disposal of vaccinated swine. This strategy involves the following:

 A suppressive emergency vaccination strategy.

 The goal is to suppress virus replication in high-risk susceptible animals 

by using emergency vaccination and then depopulate vaccinates at a later 

date as determined by IC and the VS Deputy Administrator (U.S. CVO).

 The targeted vaccination of high-risk susceptible animals in an Infected 

Zone (IZ), Buffer Zone (BZ), or Vaccination Zone (VZ). Ring or regional 

vaccination around an IP or IZ is a frequently cited example for this 

strategy.

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary.

4.3.2.3 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH 

EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO KILL

Figure 4-3 shows four examples of how a stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to kill response strategy might be implemented. Animals on IP would 

be depopulated, while other animals in a Containment Vaccination Zone (CVZ) 

may be vaccinated. Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill is 

Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and 

vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent depopulation and disposal of 

vaccinated animals. Depopulation and disposal of vaccinated animals may be 

delayed until logistically feasible, as determined by IC and the VS Deputy 

Administrator (U.S. CVO).
May 2013 4-8

the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact animals and vaccination of 

at-risk animals, with the subsequent depopulation and disposal of vaccinated 

animals.

Figure 4-3. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out Modified 

with Emergency Vaccination to Kill (Infected Premises would be Depopulated)

Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone Emergency Vaccination in Buffer Zone

Emergency Vaccination in Control Area Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone and Partial Buffer Zone

Note: Figures are not to scale. 
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

May 2013 4-9

4.3.3 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to 

Slaughter

4.3.3.1 DEFINING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION 

TO SLAUGHTER AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Box 4-6 defines stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter.

Box 4-6. Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter

4.3.3.2 DESCRIBING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO SLAUGHTER AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

This strategy involves the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible swine and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent slaughter of 

vaccinated animals. Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to 

slaughter is the slaughter and processing of vaccinated animals, if animals are 

eligible for slaughter under USDA FSIS authority and rules and/or State and 

Tribal authority and rules. This strategy involves the following:

 A suppressive emergency vaccination strategy.

 The goal is to suppress virus replication in high-risk susceptible animals 

by using emergency vaccination and then slaughtering vaccinates at a later 

date as determined by IC and the VS Deputy Administrator (U.S. CVO).

 The targeted vaccination of high-risk susceptible animals in an IZ, BZ, or 

VZ. Ring or regional vaccination around an IP or IZ is a frequently cited 

example for this strategy.

 DIVA testing may be necessary for movement between zones, interstate 

commerce, and international trade.

1

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary.

 1 See Chapters 1 and 5 for more on DIVA.

Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and 

vaccination of at-risk animals, with slaughter and processing of vaccinated 

animals, if animals are eligible for slaughter under USDA FSIS authority and 

rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules.
May 2013 4-10

4.3.3.3 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH 

EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO SLAUGHTER

Figure 4-4 shows four examples of how a stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to slaughter response strategy might be implemented. Animals on IP

would be depopulated, while other animals in a CVZ may be vaccinated. 

Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter is the slaughter

and processing of vaccinated animals, if animals are eligible for slaughter under 

USDA FSIS authority and rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules. 

Figure 4-4. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency 

Vaccination to Slaughter (Infected Premises would be Depopulated)

Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone Emergency Vaccination in Buffer Zone

Emergency Vaccination in Control Area Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone and Partial Buffer Zone

Note: Figures are not to scale. 
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

May 2013 4-11

4.3.4 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to 

Live

4.3.4.1 DEFINING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION 

TO LIVE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Box 4-7 defines stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live.

Box 4-7. Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live

4.3.4.2 DESCRIBING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO LIVE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

This strategy involves the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, without subsequent 

slaughter or depopulation of vaccinated animals because of their vaccination 

status. Stamping out- modified with emergency vaccination to live is when

vaccinated animals intended for breeding, slaughter, or other purposes live out 

their useful lives. This strategy involves the following: 

 A protective emergency vaccination strategy.

 The goal is to protect susceptible animals from infection using emergency 

vaccination with the deliberate intent to maintain vaccinates for the 

duration of their usefulness.

 The targeted vaccination of non-infected swine. This may include valuable 

genetic stock, long-lived production swine, or areas with a high-density

population of susceptible swine at high risk of becoming infected. 

 Requires the establishment of one or more VZs free of CSF, the 

establishment of one or more CAs for infected swine, and movement 

controls to keep infected swine out of VZs free of CSF.

Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and 

vaccination of at-risk animals, without subsequent depopulation of vaccinated 

animals. Vaccinated animals intended for breeding, slaughter, or other purposes live out their useful lives.
May 2013 4-12

 DIVA testing may be necessary for movement between zones, interstate 

commerce, and international trade.

2

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary. 

4.3.4.3 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH 

EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO LIVE STRATEGY

Figure 4-5 shows how a stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to 

live response strategy might be implemented. Animals on IP would be 

depopulated, while other animals in a Protection Vaccination Zone (PVZ) would 

be vaccinated. Any animals vaccinated would not be subsequently depopulated or 

slaughtered solely on the basis of vaccination status. 

Figure 4-5. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out Modified 

with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Infected Premises would be Depopulated)

Note: Figure is not to scale.

4.3.5 Control and Eradication Strategy for Other Animals

Feral swine are an important risk factor in the dissemination or persistence of 

CSF. Biosecurity measures, particularly around known or suspected infected 

premises, must include strict measures to prevent contact with feral swine 

populations. The preferred strategy for CSF in feral swine is stamping-out, though 

vaccination is a possibility. Please see the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 

(2012) Chapter 15.2 for more information on wild swine and surveillance. Any 

 2 See Chapters 1 and 5 and for more on vaccination and DIVA.
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

May 2013 4-13

attempt to control CSF in wildlife must be balanced against the risk of disease

dispersal. (See Subsection 5.18 for information on wildlife management.)

4.3.6 Summary of CSF Vaccination

Box 4-8 provides a summary of CSF vaccination in relation to a CSF response 

effort.

Box 4-8. CSF Response and Vaccination Strategies

4.3.7 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities

When the criteria for a presumptive CSFV case have been met (see Chapter 5 for 

case definitions), the APHIS Administrator or VS Deputy Administrator (U.S. 

CVO) can authorize APHIS personnel—in conjunction with State, Tribal, and IC 

personnel—to initiate activities such as the depopulation and cleaning and 

disinfection of the index case and the epidemiological investigations of CP.

When CSF is detected, SAHOs and Tribal officials issue a quarantine or hold 

order for the relevant zones and regions within 24 hours. A Federal quarantine 

may be issued when requested by SAHOs or as directed by the Secretary of 

Agriculture. The Incident Commander works with the Operations Section and 

Situation Unit in the Planning Section to determine zone, area, and premises 

designations during a CSF outbreak. 

4.3.8 Management of Incident

The outbreak response effort should be implemented through a Unified Command

(ICS) with an appropriate span of control and delegation of authority. Responses 

will be as local as possible. Good communication within the chain of command is 

imperative. 

An Incident Commander should be identified and an ICP established. In-State 

resources (whether State, Federal, Tribal, or privately owned) should be used to 

CSF Response and Vaccination Strategies

The use of emergency vaccination strategies may be considered in a CSF outbreak. 

An emergency vaccination strategy can help to achieve the goals of a CSF response 

effort, and is founded upon the three epidemiological principles of response. There 

are many challenges to using emergency vaccination in a CSF response, but also 

many benefits. A CSF response may use one strategy or a variety of strategies in 

order to detect, control, contain, and ultimately eradicate CSF in domestic swine. 

The use of emergency vaccination will be determined by the Unified IC, the 

SAHOs, and the VS Deputy Administrator (U.S. CVO). 
May 2013 4-14

manage a local response. Out-of-State resources may be used to support the State 

impacted by the outbreak.

Incident management will include quarantine and movement control, tracing, and 

activation of response plans to communicate these actions to all stakeholders, the 

public, and the international community. Cooperative Federal, State, Tribal, local, 

and industry response measures will be carried out with extreme urgency using 

the broadest geographic scope possible. (Appendix B contains organizational 

charts and further information on organizational structure in an incident.)

4.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SELECTION OF 

RESPONSE STRATEGY OR STRATEGIES

The previous sections have identified and described the response strategies. 

However choosing one strategy, multiple strategies, or modifying strategies as an 

outbreak unfolds is an important, but very complex decision process. Depending 

upon the circumstances and scale of the outbreak, a combination of one or more 

of the response strategies can be applied.

If it becomes apparent at any point in the response that stamping-out will not 

achieve control, containment, and ultimately eradication of CSF, alternative 

strategies will immediately be considered. Currently, it is not possible to delineate 

a priori the specific factors that might signal the need to modify the response to a 

CSF outbreak.

This section identifies the wide range of factors which may impact the choice of 

response strategy in a CSF outbreak.

4.4.1 General Factors that Influence the Response Strategy

The scope of regulatory intervention and the selection of a response strategy or 

strategies in a CSF outbreak will depend on the following:

 Consequences of the outbreak. The consequences of the CSF outbreak, 

and the impact of the response, in terms of disruptions to interstate 

commerce and international trade, national security, food security, animal 

health, the environment, the economy, and regulatory issues.

 Acceptance. Acceptance of response policy (social and political) by 

different communities, from local to international.

 Scale of the outbreak. The number of swine infected, number of premises 

affected, and susceptible swine population density for infected areas or 

areas at high-risk of becoming infected with CSFV. 
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

May 2013 4-15

 Rate of outbreak spread. The rate of spread of infection in terms of 

number of premises, types of premises, number of animals; rate at which 

each IP leads to infection of one or more additional IP.

 Veterinary countermeasures available. The availability and efficacy of 

veterinary countermeasures such as CSF vaccines.

 Resources available to implement response strategies. The capabilities

and resources available to eradicate CSF in domestic animals and to

control and eradicate CSF in potential wildlife reservoirs.

4.4.2 Determining an Appropriate CSF Response Strategy

Table 4-1 highlights key factors to be considered when determining whether a 

particular response strategy would be appropriate and advantageous for 

responding to a CSF outbreak. This table simply lists important factors that will 

be considered in determining the initial response strategy or modifying this 

strategy. No single factor listed below will independently dictate a response 

strategy, or a decision of whether to employ an emergency vaccination strategy.

Table 4-1. Factors Influencing a Response Strategy or Strategies for U.S. CSF Outbreak

Strategy

Factor or criterion supporting 

the response strategy... Stamping-out

Stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to kill

Stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to 

slaughter

Stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to live

Suitable vaccine for CSF

outbreak strain

Not available/

feasible

Available Available Available

Resources for stamping-out

(such as disposal)

Adequate Adequate Adequate Limited

Resources for vaccination (such 

as diagnostic testing, tracing 

efforts, and permitting activities)

Limited Adequate Adequate Adequate

Population density of 

susceptible swine at high risk of 

becoming infected

Low Medium High High

Movement of infected animals, 

products, or fomites out of 

Control Area

No evidence of 

extensive 

movement

Evidence of 

movement

Evidence of extensive 

movement

Evidence of 

extensive 

movement

Source of outbreak Known Known Unknown Unknown

Location of initial outbreak Isolated premises Swine producing 

area

Swine producing area Swine producing 

area

Spread of outbreak Slow Moderate Rapid Rapid

Distribution of outbreak Limited or 

restricted

Small Widespread Widespread 
May 2013 4-16

Table 4-1. Factors Influencing a Response Strategy or Strategies for U.S. CSF Outbreak

Strategy

Factor or criterion supporting 

the response strategy... Stamping-out

Stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to kill

Stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to 

slaughter

Stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to live

Risk of infection in valuable, 

rare, endangered, or high value 

genetic swine

High High High Moderate

Likelihood that CSF could 

become prevalent in feral swine

High High High Moderate

Public acceptance of stampingout strategyNeutral reaction or 

weak opposition

Neutral reaction or 

weak opposition

Weak opposition Strong opposition

Surveillance, diagnostic, and 

laboratory resources for 

serosurveillance after 

vaccination

Limited Limited Limited Available

Domestic stakeholders’ 

acceptance of regionalization 

with vaccination to live or 

vaccination to slaughter 

No No Yes Yes

Third-country acceptance of 

regionalization with vaccination 

to slaughter

N/A N/A Accepted N/A

Third-country acceptance of 

regionalization with vaccination 

to live

N/A N/A Not Accepted Accepted

Assessments and economic 

analysis of competing control 

strategies (particularly for 

producers)

It is likely that a 

control strategy 

without stampingout will lead to 

significantly higher 

economic losses, 

or longer duration 

of the outbreak.

It is likely that a 

control strategy 

without stampingout modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to kill 

will lead to 

significantly higher 

economic losses 

or longer duration 

of the outbreak.

It is likely that a 

control strategy 

without stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to 

slaughter will lead to 

significantly higher 

economic losses or 

longer duration of the 

outbreak.

It is likely that a 

control strategy 

without stampingout modified with 

vaccination to live 

will lead to 

significantly higher 

economic losses or 

longer duration of 

the outbreak.

4.4.3 Desired CSF-Status Post-Outbreak (World Animal 

Health Organization Standards for CSF Disease-Freedom)

As a member of the OIE, the United States has agreed to abide by standards 

drafted and approved by member countries. The OIE does not grant official 

recognition for CSF-freedom, but OIE members can self-declare a compartment, 

zone, or country free from certain OIE-listed diseases such as CSF.
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

After any CSF outbreak in the United States, the goal is to return the United 

States to a CSF-free status. The response strategy or strategies selected may affect 

the length of time it takes to return the United States to a CSF-free status. This 

OIE CSF-free status applies only to domestic swine (see Article 15.2.3 and 15.2.4 

of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2012). 

In cases of self-declaration, delegates are advised to consult the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code for specific requirements for self-declaration of freedom 

from CSF. By providing the relevant epidemiological evidence, the OIE member 

can prove to a potential importing country that the entire country, zone, or 

compartment under discussion meets the provisions of the specific disease 

chapter. Any submitted self-declaration should contain evidence demonstrating 

that the requirements for the disease status have been met in accordance with OIE

standards. This self-declaration must be signed by the official OIE delegate of the 

OIE member concerned.

4.4.3.1 CSF-FREE DESIGNATION

The OIE defines a CSF-free country, zone or compartment as follows:

A country, zone or compartment may be considered free from CSF when 

surveillance in accordance with Articles 15.2.23 to 15.2.28 has been in 

place for at least 12 months, and when:

1. there has been no outbreak of CSF in domestic pigs during the past 

12 months;

2. no evidence of CSFV infection has been found in domestic pigs 

during the past 12 months;

3. no vaccination against CSF has been carried out in domestic pigs 

during the past 12 months unless there are means, validated to OIE

standards (Chapter 2.8.3 of the Terrestrial Manual),

3 of 

distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs;

4. imported domestic pigs comply with the requirements in Article 

15.2.5 or Article 15.2.6.

The OIE does not provide an official list of CSF-free countries. The United States 

considers 10 countries and 3 zones as free or low risk of CSF (October 2013). 

This includes the APHIS-defined European Union region. This list, and special 

restrictions to countries/regions on this list, is provided here. 

3 The OIE DIVA validation requirements are in Chapter 5, Subsection 5.4.

May 2013 4-17

 
May 2013 4-18

4.4.3.2 RECOVERY OF FREE STATUS

As stated in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012), in a country, zone, 

or compartment which is previously free of CSF, and an outbreak occurs, CSFfree status may be regained as follows (Article 15.2.4).

Should a CSF outbreak occur in a free country, zone or compartment, the 

free status may be restored where surveillance in accordance with 

Articles 15.2.23 to 15.2.28 has been carried out with negative results 

either:

1. three months after the last case where a stamping-out policy without 

vaccination is practiced;

OR

2. where a stamping-out policy with emergency vaccination is 

practiced:

a. three months after the last case and slaughter of all vaccinated 

animals, or

b. three months after the last case without the slaughter of

vaccinated animals where there are means, validated to OIE

standards (Chapter 2.8.3 of the Terrestrial Manual), of 

distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs;

OR

3. where a stamping-out policy is not practiced, the provisions of 

Article 15.2.3 should be followed.

4.5 IMPLEMENTING A RESPONSE STRATEGY OR 

STRATEGIES IN THE EVENT OF A CSF OUTBREAK IN 

THE UNITED STATES

In order to achieve the goals of a CSF response—to (1) detect, control, and 

eradicate CSF in domestic swine as quickly as possible, (2) eradicate CSF using 

strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, 

and protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and 

risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for noninfected swine and non-contaminated pork products—one or more response

strategies may need to be employed at any time during the outbreak. The 

strategies employed may vary by region or other defining characteristic. In each 

case, the decision and application of a specific response strategy or strategies will 

be based on weighing many criteria, such as those listed in Table 4-1. Any 

response strategy or strategies with emergency vaccination need to be approved 
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

May 2013 4-19

by the U.S. CVO prior to implementation, with agreement from the SAHO and 

the Unified Command Incident Commander.

In the event of CSF detection, USDA and the affected States and Tribal nations 

will work together in a Unified Command, per NIMS, to detect, control, and 

contain CSF as expeditiously as possible. Detection of CSF in the United States 

will result in emergency intervention by State, Tribal, and Federal authorities. 

4.5.1 Examples of Strategies for a CSF Response, including 

Emergency Vaccination

4.5.1.1 STAMPING-OUT

Figure 4-6 illustrates a stamping-out strategy for controlling, containing, and 

eradicating CSF in the United States. This map is not prescriptive—it is only an 

illustration. In this example, the IP would be stamped-out, and there would be no 

emergency vaccination strategies employed.

Figure 4-6. Example of Stamping-Out
May 2013 4-20

4.5.1.2 EXAMPLE OF STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO KILL OR SLAUGHTER

Figure 4-7 illustrates a stamping-out strategy modified with emergency 

vaccination to kill or emergency vaccination to slaughter, for controlling, 

containing, and eradicating CSF in the United States. This map is not 

prescriptive—it is only an illustration. In this example, the IP would be stampedout, and there would be emergency vaccination to kill or emergency vaccination 

to slaughter within the CAs in CVZs.

Figure 4-7. Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill or 

Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter
CSF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

May 2013 4-21

4.5.1.3 EXAMPLE OF STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO LIVE

Figure 4-8 illustrates a stamping-out strategy modified with emergency 

vaccination to live, for controlling, containing, and eradicating CSF. This map is 

not prescriptive—it is only an illustration. In this example, the IP would be 

stamped-out, and there would be emergency vaccination to live outside of the 

CAs in PVZs.

Figure 4-8. Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live
May 2013 4-22

4.5.1.4 EXAMPLE OF STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO SLAUGHTER AND EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO LIVE

Figure 4-9 illustrates a stamping-out strategy, modified with emergency

vaccination to slaughter and vaccination to live. This map is not prescriptive—it 

is only an illustration demonstrating the possibility of employing multiple 

vaccination strategies during an outbreak. In this example, the IP would be 

stamped-out, and there would be emergency vaccination both inside (in CVZs) 

and outside (in PVZs) the CAs. Emergency vaccinated animals intended for 

breeding, slaughter, or other purposes can live out their useful lives.

Figure 4-9. Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination 

to Slaughter and Emergency Vaccination to Live
Chapter 5

Specific CSF Response Critical Activities

and Tools 

FAD PReP documents identify critical activities and tools to be employed in the 

event of a CSF outbreak. These critical activities and response tools will assist in 

controlling, containing, and eradicating CSF while facilitating continuity of 

business in an outbreak. This chapter describes key parts of these critical activities 

and tools.

Documents referenced in this chapter can be found, for APHIS employees, at 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml, or, for others, at 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

5.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY

Information on the etiology and ecology of CSF promotes a common

understanding of the disease agent among responders and other stakeholders (see 

Chapter 1 for CSF information). The CSF Overview of Etiology and Ecology

SOP contains further information.

5.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS 

AND CASE DEFINITIONS

Laboratory and case definitions provide a common point of reference for all 

responders. Case definitions and laboratory criteria are developed according to the 

Case Definition Development Process SOP (see Subsection 5.2.3). These 

definitions are available here for APHIS employees: http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/

vs/ceah/nsu/case_definitions.shtml.

5.2.1 Laboratory Definitions

The following subsections are the APHIS-VS Centers for Epidemiology and 

Animal Health (CEAH) National Surveillance Unit (NSU) draft definitions for 

CSF from February 2011, which are undergoing review. For further information 

on the diagnostic tests conducted by NVSL-FADDL in the event of a CSF

outbreak, please see Subsection 5.4.

May 2013 5-1
5.2.1.1 LABORATORY CRITERIA

OIE Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial 

Animals (2008), Chapter 2.8.3.

1. Agent identification: Tonsils, spleen, kidney, lymph nodes, or distal ileum 

should be transported without preservatives under cool conditions (not 

frozen). Whole blood (heparin or EDTA [ethylenediaminetetraacetic 

acid]) from clinically ill pigs is also a suitable sample. Methods of 

detection include immunohistochemistry using CSF-specific monoclonal 

antibody (ABC [Avidin-Biotin complex] staining) on tissue samples, realtime and conventional reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction 

(rRT-PCR and RT-PCR), and virus isolation followed by ABC staining 

and/or rRT-PCR or RT-PCR. Sequencing can also be performed if the 

RT-PCR assays are positive to allow for genotyping of the virus. An 

antigen-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (AgELISA) exists, 

but is not preferred (or performed at FADDL) because of low sensitivity.

2. Serological tests: Serological tests include the neutralizing peroxidaselinked assay (also called immunoperoxidase virus neutralization test, 

IP-VN), immunoperoxidase test (IP), and E2 antibody enzyme-linked 

immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Due to immunosuppression with virulent 

strains, antibodies are not detectable before 18 days post infection and last 

at least several years. With chronic infections, antibodies are potentially 

briefly detectable at the end of the first month but if present, quickly 

disappear. Congenitally infected pigs are persistently viremic and seldom 

produce specific antibodies.

5.2.2 Case Definitions

The following subsections are the APHIS-VS CEAH NSU draft definitions for 

CSF from February 2011, which are undergoing review. 

5.2.2.1 SUSPECT CASE

A pig or herd that has:

 Clinical signs consistent with CSF; OR

 Inconclusive or positive RT-PCR/rRT-PCR performed on a sample taken 

during routine surveillance, without the presence of clinical criteria, for 

which either additional laboratory diagnostics (sequencing information or 

confirmatory testing) or epidemiological investigation results are pending; 

OR

 A positive antibody ELISA with subsequent positive results to IP and IPVN tests with neither epidemiological information nor known clinical 

signs consistent with CSF.

May 2013 5-2
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.2.2.2 PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE CASE

 A suspect case with positive RT-PCR/rRT-PCR or genomic sequencing 

consistent with CSFV conducted at FADDL after an initial positive RTPCR/rRT-PCR on a sample from a pig with or without clinical signs

and/or epidemiological evidence of CSF conducted; OR

 A pig or herd with epidemiological information and/or clinical criteria 

consistent with CSF; AND

 Positive rRT-PCR or RT-PCR; OR

 Positive ABC test on tissue samples; OR

 Positive IP-VN test.

5.2.2.3 CONFIRMED POSITIVE CASE

A pig from which CSFV has been isolated with sequence confirmation at the 

NVSL, FADDL, or a laboratory designated by the Secretary of Agriculture.

5.2.2.4 EVOLVING DEFINITIONS

The above presumptive positive and confirmed positive case definitions are for 

the index case and may change as an outbreak progresses. For example, the 

positive predictive value of clinical signs will increase if CSF prevalence 

increases.

5.2.3 Case Definition Development Process

The Case Definition Development Process SOP describes the general process for 

developing and approving animal disease case definitions for use in animal health 

surveillance and reporting. Case definitions are developed by NSU, in cooperation 

with the National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management

(NCAHEM). NSU coordinates review with SAHOs, subject matter experts, 

stakeholders, and VS units. Case definitions are approved by the VS Deputy 

Administrator (the U.S. CVO) and VS Leadership Team. Case definitions 

enhance the usefulness of animal disease data by providing uniform criteria for 

reporting purposes.

In a CSF outbreak, case definitions may be edited within 24 hours of the first 

presumptive positive or confirmed positive case (index case). The case definition 

will be reviewed throughout the outbreak and modified on the basis of additional 

information or the changing needs of the eradication effort.

May 2013 5-3
5.3 SURVEILLANCE

CSF surveillance is proactively conducted in the United States through the 

Classical Swine Fever Surveillance Program. This program conducts surveillance 

in five swine populations through tissue and serology samples:

 Sick animals submitted to diagnostic laboratories,

 Swine condemned at slaughter by USDA FSIS,

 High-risk swine populations, including waste-feeding operations and highrisk swine herds,

 Feral swine, and

 Swine FAD investigations submitted to FADDL as suspicious for CSF.

In the event of a CSF outbreak, additional, targeted surveillance would occur with 

the objective of not only detecting CSF-infected swine, but to determine the 

extent of the outbreak.

The following are response goals in a CSF outbreak:

 To implement surveillance plans within 48 hours of the confirmation of an 

outbreak.

 To implement a surveillance plan that will (1) define the present extent of 

CSF and (2) detect unknown IP quickly. 

 To have the surveillance plan consider the susceptible wildlife population 

in the area, and to coordinate with APHIS Wildlife Services (WS), DOI, 

State wildlife agencies, and State agriculture departments to perform 

appropriate CSF surveillance in these populations.

 To provide complete surveillance data summaries and analysis at intervals 

as specified by IC.

 To develop effective surveillance plans that can achieve desired outcomes 

by leveraging available resources, satisfying jurisdictional requirements, 

and implementing continuity of business measures.

At the APHIS level, NSU is responsible for surveillance activities. Box 5-1 lists 

the key objectives of surveillance activities during and immediately after a CSF

outbreak.

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Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

Box 5-1. Surveillance Objectives in a CSF Outbreak

5.3.1 Surveillance Planning for CSF Outbreak

5.3.1.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A surveillance plan will indicate the frequency, number, and distribution of 

animals and premises to be sampled. This requires tradeoffs be made among six 

surveillance parameters or tools, listed below. These tradeoffs are made 

employing initial information collected about the outbreak, and best estimates.

During an outbreak, surveillance plans will change as new information becomes 

available. (Appendix D contains more detailed surveillance information.) The six 

surveillance parameters are as follows:

1. Design (threshold) prevalence. The goal is to determine the lowest 

feasible prevalence that can be used to detect infected herds on premises.

The chosen proportion of animals or premises infected that, if exceeded,

will indicate the disease has been detected for a given confidence level and 

population size (1 percent vs. 5 percent vs. 15 percent).

2. Confidence level. The selected level (90 percent confident vs. 95 percent 

confident) that the disease can be detected for the chosen design threshold, 

given the population size.

3. Types of tests. Test choices—clinical inspection, polymerase chain 

reaction testing (PCR), serology testing, etc.—and the test cutoff values 

can influence the design prevalence choice. Each test has a sensitivity and 

specificity that varies with the cutoff values.

4. Sampling frequency. Previous negative test results can augment 

information gained from negative test results if the time period between 

sampling is short—ideally daily, but definitely less than the incubation 

period. The value of the previous negative test results decreases as the 

interval between sampling increases (daily vs. every other day).

Objectives of Surveillance

• Detect CSF IP during an outbreak.

• Determine the size and extent of a CSF outbreak.

• Supply information to evaluate outbreak control activities.

• Provide information for animal and product movement within the CA.

• Provide information for animal and product movement out of the CA. 

• Prove disease freedom (DF) and regain disease-free status after eradication of the 

outbreak.

May 2013 5-5
5. Risk-based sampling. Selecting populations with a higher proportion of

infected animals (1 percent vs. 10 percent) reduces the number of samples

needed for a given confidence level and population size.

6. Sampling scheme. Within the selected population (risk-based or total

population), a random, convenience, or other scheme may be used, and the

choice will influence the number of animals and premises sampled.

5.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE OBJECTIVES BY TIME PERIOD

There are three key segments of surveillance activity in an outbreak. These 

segments have distinct goals to aid in the control, containment, and eradication of 

CSF from domestic swine. For more information on the zone, area, and premises 

designations referred to in this section, please refer to Subsection 5.5 in this 

chapter. 

1. The initial 72 hours post CSF outbreak declaration. The objective is to

detect existing infected animals and premises as quickly as possible.

During this period, there are three goals of IC:

a. Create the initial BZ designation and the boundary of the CA.

b. Create a list of premises with susceptible herds in the CA.

c. Determine the boundary of the Surveillance Zone (SZ) and start

developing a surveillance plan to be used in the SZ.

2. The control and eradication period (from initial 72-hour period until last

case is detected and eradicated). Four key surveillance objectives need to

be accomplished simultaneously in this period.

a. Detect IP, new and existing, so that control measures can be put in

place.

b. Provide evidence that premises are free of CSF, thereby permitting

swine and pork product movements in the CA.

c. Evaluate the outbreak management control activities.

d. Provide evidence that the Free Area (FA) is free of disease, thereby

enabling unrestricted animal and animal product movement.

3. Post eradication. The objective is to prove that the CA and FA are free of

disease (using OIE recommendations and requirements on surveillance).

a. Prove DF on depopulated premises.

May 2013 5-6 
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

b. Prove DF on At-Risk Premises (ARP) in the CA by random 

sampling or targeted sampling (choosing populations based on 

risk) on selected premises and selected herds.

c. Prove DF in the FA, following OIE guidelines, using multiple 

methods including serological slaughter sampling and passive 

surveillance by veterinarians and the public.

5.3.2 Surveillance Sampling

The goal of surveillance sampling is to detect CSF as soon as possible. Currently, 

there are no validated mass population sampling techniques such as water trough 

sampling or saliva sampling from ropes for swine. Without mass population 

sampling, the only method for early detection of the acute form of CSF is by 

individual sampling of clinically ill swine using rRT-PCR tests. Serological 

testing will be used on convalescent or asymptomatic swine that were exposed to 

the CSFV. Serological test sensitivity is highest on swine exposed to the CSFV at 

least three weeks prior to sampling.

It is a priority to get these mass population tests validated, particularly for swine, 

so that additional diagnostics can supplement and amplify visual observation and 

individual animal sampling for early detection. Additionally, mass population 

sampling will aid in the serological testing of swine with mild or subclinical signs, 

because positive serological tests demonstrate the presence of CSFV, or document 

the exposure to CSFV, thereby showing evidence of CSF on the premises.

Given that no validated mass population sampling techniques are available, the 

following questions provide guidance to develop a surveillance sampling scheme 

after declaration of a CSF outbreak in a location or area.

5.3.2.1 ACUTE FORM (CLINICALLY ILL ANIMALS ON PREMISES)

1. Are resources available to intensively survey premises (for example, 

collect tissue and whole blood samples from the needed number of 

clinically ill animals)?

If “yes,” then

2. Does evidence suggest the introduction of the virus (the start of the 

outbreak) on the premises or in the zone began at least 5 days ago but less

than 21 days ago?

3. Is there evidence that the CSF serotype is highly pathogenic (a high 

proportion of the infected animals will show clinical signs and/or severe

clinical signs)?

May 2013 5-7
If “yes” to Questions 2 and 3, then

4. Is it likely that the outbreak can be contained locally (for example, on a 

farm or within a small geographic area)?

5. Are there limited movements of animals, vehicles, products, and personnel 

on and off premises (in other words, it is unlikely that the virus will be 

introduced to, or spread from, this premises or zone)? 

6. Are the swine operations in the zone managed for low-risks of exposure 

(for example, biosecurity practices in place, little opportunity for fomite 

transmission)? 

7. Are there few noncommercial swine operations or feral swine in the zone?

8. Are there large swine operations in the zone?

If all or most of the answers to Questions 4–8 are “yes,” the minimum 

surveillance sampling to detect CSFV is observational surveillance with routine 

visual inspection of swine for clinical signs, and targeted tissue sampling of 

individual animals with clinical signs. 

If all or most of the answers to Questions 4–8 are “no,” both animals with clinical 

signs and those appearing healthy should be sampled.

If the answer to Question 1 is “no,” then visual surveillance should be conducted. 

Laboratory sampling/testing should be initiated upon positive visual exam for 

verification. Premises must be sampled based on the probability of transmitting 

CSF (the highest probability premises will be sampled first), whether rRT-PCR or 

serologic tests are used.

Figure 5-1 demonstrates how these questions should be used to inform a 

surveillance sampling scheme.

May 2013 5-8
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

Figure 5-1. Developing a CSF Outbreak Surveillance Sample Scheme:

Acute Form

Are resources 

available 

(Question 1)?

Answer questions 

2-3

Answer questions 

4-8

YES NO

If “Yes” to questions 2-3

Visual 

surveillance;

 premises with highest 

probability of CSF transmission will 

be sampled first; initiate laboratory 

sampling for verification upon 

positive visual exam

Answered “Yes” more times than “No”?

Visually inspect 

swine for clinical signs and 

collect tissues from clinical 

animals

See “Non-Acute Form” flowchart

If “No” to questions 2-3

Answered “No” more times than “Yes”?

Sample both 

clinical and healthy 

animals on premises

5.3.2.2 NON-ACUTE FORMS (CONVALESCENT, ASYMPTOMATIC,

OR ANIMALS WITH MILD CLINICAL SIGNS) 

1. Are resources available to intensively survey premises (for example,

collect tissue and whole blood samples from the needed number of

clinically ill animals)?

If “yes,” then:

2. Does evidence suggest that the introduction of virus (the start of the

outbreak) on the premises or in the zone began at least 21 days ago?

3. Is there evidence that the CSF serotype is not highly pathogenic (a high

proportion of infected animals will show clinical signs and/or severe

clinical signs)?

If the answer is “yes” to either Question 2 or 3, then sampling and serological 

testing of both ill and healthy animals on the premises is necessary. 

May 2013 5-9 
If the answer to Questions 2 and 3 is “no,” then please see the Acute Form 

flowchart.

Questions 4–8 in the previous section will help design the specific surveillance 

scheme, but do not influence the test choice or sampling targets.

If the answer to Question 1 is “no,” then visual surveillance should be conducted. 

Laboratory sampling/testing should be initiated upon positive visual exam for 

verification. Because there may be few or no clinical signs, premises must be 

sampled based on the probability of transmitting CSF (the highest probability 

premises will be sampled first), whether rRT-PCR or serologic tests are used.

Figure 5-2 demonstrates how these questions should be used to inform a 

surveillance sampling scheme. 

Figure 5-2. Developing a CSF Outbreak Surveillance Sampling Scheme:

Non-Acute Forms

Are resources 

available 

(Question 1)?

Answer questions 

2-3

YES NO

If “Yes” to questions 2 or 3

Visual 

surveillance;

 premises with highest 

probability of CSF transmission will 

be sampled first; initiate laboratory 

sampling for verification upon 

positive visual exam

Sampling and 

serology of both clinical 

and healthy animals on 

premises

See “Acute Form” flowchart

If “No” to questions 2 and 3

It is likely that individual animal sampling may quickly exceed resource capacity, 

and any surveillance sampling scheme may have to adjust accordingly by 

switching from individual animal sampling to observation with rRT-PCR 

confirmation. The plan may require visual inspection on premises least likely to 

spread the disease and individual animal sampling on premises most likely to 

transmit CSF.

5.3.2.3 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appendix D of this CSF Response Plan contains additional guidance on creating a 

surveillance scheme based on the sensitivity and specificity of available 

diagnostics, CSF prevalence in a population, herd size, and other factors for 

commercial and noncommercial premises. The CSF Surveillance SOP provides 

additional information on the protocol for a surveillance team responding to CSF

May 2013 5-10 
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

IP, the distinction between commercial and noncommercial premises surveillance, 

equipment checklists, and surveillance for proof of DF. 

The Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox, available to people with access to the Inside 

APHIS webpage (http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/nsu/toolbox/), or to those 

outside APHIS by emailing (national.surveillance.unit@aphis.usda.gov), provides 

additional surveillance resources.

5.4 DIAGNOSTICS 

Effective and appropriate sample collection, diagnostic testing, surge capacity, 

and reporting are critical in an effective CSF response. These activities will 

require additional resources in the event of a CSF outbreak. In particular, sample 

collection will require additional personnel. Surge capacity may also be required 

for diagnostic laboratory testing. Surveillance plan requirements must be fully 

integrated with current diagnostic sample collection, sample testing, surge 

capacity, and reporting capabilities.

During a suspected or actual CSF outbreak, the key goals of response are to (1) 

meet the surge requirements for diagnostic testing at specific intervals, starting at 

time zero and at 24-hour intervals as the response escalates and (2) report all 

diagnostic test results to appropriate personnel and information management 

systems within 12 hours of diagnostic test completion.

The FAD Investigation Manual offers detailed information on sample collection, 

diagnostic testing, surge capacity, and reporting. In particular, this document

provides additional guidance on who is responsible for diagnostic testing, sample 

collection and processing, and analyzing diagnostic test results. (Appendix E, 

references VS Guidance Document 12001.1, which contains more information on 

submitting diagnostic samples. Procedures outlined in this document should be 

followed regarding the submission of diagnostic samples in an FAD investigation. 

More information on packaging and labeling submissions is available on the 

APHIS Laboratory Information Services site. 

5.4.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing

Trained personnel and field collection kits are required to effectively collect 

samples from swine. Specific diagnostic tests are used for antigen detection, virus 

identification, and antibody detection. For antigen detection, rRT-PCRs are used 

simultaneously with other tests selected on the basis of the type and priority of 

sample. Virus isolation is used to confirm a CSF diagnosis, but this can take up to 

7 days. 

Confirmation of a CSF outbreak will be made by NVSL-FADDL; confirmation of 

CSF on any premises not currently in a CSF CA will also be done by NVSLFADDL. After NVSL confirmation of CSF on a premises (index case), 

subsequent samples for rRT-PCR may be sent to USDA-approved laboratories 

May 2013 5-11 
which are part of the NAHLN. (Appendix C lists NAHLN laboratories approved 

for CSF testing). 

The IC will provide specific instructions regarding the direction and collection of 

samples, which is likely to change as the outbreak evolves. In all cases (1) NVSL 

will confirm the index case, (2) presumptive positive samples (on a rRT-PCR) 

from outside an established CA will be tested and confirmed by NVSL, and (3) 

NVSL will receive samples routinely from inside the CA to monitor the virus.

5.4.1.1 DIAGNOSTICS FOR INVESTIGATION OF CSF 

Table 5-1 and Figure 5-3 displays diagnostics for a suspected case of CSF. In the 

figure, Priority 1 or Priority 2 refer to categorizations explained in VS Guidance 

Document 12001.1. (Appendix E provides the link to this document.) 

Table 5-1. Legend to the CSF Diagnostics Chart

Abbreviation Definition

ABC Avidin-Biotin complex 

BVD bovine viral diarrhea

ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

IP Immunoperoxidase

PCR polymerase chain reaction

rRT-PCR real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase 

chain reaction

SK-6 swine kidney cells

VI virus isolation

VN virus neutralization

May 2013 5-12 
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

Figure 5-3. Diagnostic Flowchart for Initial Investigation of CSF

May 2013 5-13
5.4.2 OIE Requirements for Differentiation of Infected from 

Vaccinated Animals Testing for CSF-Free Status

In particular reference to the DIVA diagnostics for marker vaccines, the OIE 

states the following on the “companion discriminatory test” for the marker 

vaccine in the OIE Terrestrial Manual (2008), Chapter 2.8.3.

The companion discriminatory serological test should be very sensitive 

because vaccination will reduce the prevalence of the disease. It should 

ideally provide discrimination within the same time-frame as for 

development of antibody to the immunizing protein and should be used 

primarily as a herd test. If a high sensitivity reduces the specificity of the 

test, already compromised by the presence of antibodies to other 

pestiviruses, good and fast confirmatory assays should be available to 

discriminate positive from false-positive results.

The existing accompanying DIVA tests for E2 subunit vaccines are 

ELISAs that rely on the detection of antibody to the Erns protein. Such 

tests have recently been approved by the European Commission for use 

in determining whether herds vaccinated with an E2 subunit vaccine may 

also have been exposed to field virus. An assessment of their 

performance has revealed that neither discriminatory ELISA consistently 

detected individual marker-vaccinated, CSF-challenged weaner pigs, 

hence the recommendation only to employ such a strategy at the herd 

level.

5.4.3 Surge Capacity

Surge capacity may be needed in a CSF outbreak. Additional resources, such as 

personnel and materials, will be needed for sample collection. Additional capacity 

may also be required for laboratory sample testing. Surge capacity can help 

facilitate a rapid response and continuity of business for non-infected premises. In 

the event that the State NAHLN laboratory and NVSL-FADDL are overwhelmed 

by the diagnostic testing requirements, NAHLN labs from across the country will 

provide surge capacity for diagnostic testing. For more information on surge 

capacity, please see the NAHLN Activation Guide. Individual laboratories have 

independent protocols on how to manage personnel if a surge is required. 

Appendix C contains a list of the NAHLN labs approved to conduct CSF 

diagnostics.

NAHLN labs currently have the capability to conduct rRT-PCR tests as shown in 

Figure 5-3. Ideally, NAHLN labs will also have the capability to conduct 3ABC 

ELISA tests to detect CSFV in herds. It is a priority to ensure that NAHLN labs 

have sufficient diagnostic capacity to test samples in the event of a CSF outbreak, 

particularly for recovering and proving DF.

May 2013 5-14
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.4.4 Reporting

Box 5-2 clarifies reporting and notification of presumptive positive CSF cases.

See VS Guidance Document 12001.1 (regarding FAD investigations) for further 

information on CSF investigations and notifications. This document is available

here: http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml. 

Box 5-2. Reporting and Notification

5.5 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION 

AND TRACING

5.5.1 Summary of Zones, Areas, 

and Premises Designations

A critical component of CSF response is the designation of zones, areas, and 

premises. The Incident Commander will work with the Operations Section and 

Situation Unit (in the Planning Section) to (1) determine appropriate zones, areas, 

and premises designations in the event of a CSF outbreak, and (2) reevaluate these 

designations as needed throughout the outbreak based on the epidemiological 

situation (see Appendix B for organizational charts). These zones, areas, and 

premises designations are used in quarantine and movement control efforts. For 

details on the zones, areas, and premises, please see the APHIS Foreign Animal 

Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0). 

Table 5-2 summarizes the premises designations that would be employed in a CSF 

outbreak response. Table 5-3 summarizes the zone and area designations that 

would be used in a CSF outbreak response. Figure 5-4 illustrates these premises, 

zone, and area designations.

Reporting and Notification

• Cases of clinical illness that are found to be presumptive positive, based on the

current case definition, for CSF at NVSL-FADDL will be reported to the affected

States, other States, Tribal nations, industry, other Federal agencies, trading partners,

and the OIE.

• Appropriate Federal-State-Tribal-industry response and containment measures will be

initiated during CSF investigations.

May 2013 5-15 
Table 5-2. Summary of Premises

Premises Definition Zone

Infected Premises (IP) Premises where presumptive positive case or 

confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory 

results, compatible clinical signs, CSF case 

definition and international standards.

Infected Zone

Contact Premises (CP) Premises with susceptible animals that may have 

been exposed to CSF, either directly or indirectly, 

including but not limited to exposure to animals, 

animal products, fomites, or people from Infected 

Premises.

Infected Zone, Buffer Zone

Suspect Premises (SP) Premises under investigation due to the presence of 

susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs 

compatible with CSF. This is intended to be a shortterm premises designation.

Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, 

Surveillance Zone, 

Vaccination Zone

At-Risk Premises (ARP) Premises that have susceptible animals, but none 

of those susceptible animals have clinical signs 

compatible with CSF. Premises objectively 

demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, 

Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk 

Premises seek to move susceptible animals or 

products within the Control Area by permit. Only AtRisk Premises are eligible to become Monitored 

Premises

Infected Zone, Buffer Zone

Monitored Premises (MP) Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an 

Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect 

Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to 

become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises 

meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move

susceptible animals or products out of the Control 

Area by permit.

Infected Zone, Buffer Zone

Free Premises (FP) Premises outside of a Control Area and not a 

Contact or Suspect Premises.

Surveillance Zone, Free 

Area

Vaccinated Premises (VP) Premises where emergency vaccination has been 

performed. This may be a secondary premises 

designation. 

Containment Vaccination 

Zone, Protection 

Vaccination Zone

Table 5-3. Summary of Zones and Areas

Zone/Area Definition

Infected Zone (IZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises.

Buffer Zone (BZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact 

Premises.

Control Area (CA) Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area.

Free Area (FA) Area not included in any Control Area.

Vaccination Zone (VZ) Emergency Vaccination Zone classified as either a Containment 

Vaccination Zone (typically inside a Control Area) or a Protection 

Vaccination Zone (typically outside a Control Area). This may be a 

secondary zone designation.

May 2013 5-16
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

Figure 5-4. Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises in CSF Outbreak Response

Zones and Areas Premises

Note: The Vaccination Zone can be either a Protection Vaccination Zone or Containment Vaccination Zone. Stamping-out is 

not pictured in these figures. These figures are not to scale.

5.5.2 Epidemiological Investigation

Epidemiological investigation and movement tracing during an outbreak are 

critical in controlling and eradicating CSF. In a CSF outbreak, the goals are 

 within 96 hours of identifying the index case, characterize the nature of 

the CSF outbreak, identify the risk factors for transmission, and develop 

mitigation strategies; 

 within 6 hours of identifying potential IP or CP through tracing activities, 

assign a premises classification and a priority of investigation; and

 within 24 hours of identifying the IP or initial CP, identify all additional 

CP. 

These measures will aid in the control of CSF and lessen the impact of the 

outbreak during the response effort. Appendix F contains a sample 

epidemiological questionnaire. Please note that this questionnaire is only an 

example. In an outbreak, other factors may be considered; the scope of such a 

questionnaire should be assessed based on the epidemiological situation, and is at 

the discretion of IC. The CSF Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing SOP as 

well as the NAHEMS Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing both 

provide more information.

May 2013 5-17 
5.5.3 Tracing

Box 5-3 explains the fundamental importance of movement tracing in a CSF

response effort.

Box 5-3. Importance of Movement Tracing in CSF Outbreak

Trace-back and trace-forward information should ideally be collected for at least 

28 days prior to the appearance of clinical signs in animals infected with CSF. 

Additional tracing information will be collected for movements up to the time 

quarantine was imposed.

Tracing information will be obtained from many sources (such as reports from 

field veterinarians, producers, industry, farm service providers, or the public). The 

Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) will be used to collect and 

report epidemiological data, including movement tracing information, locally and 

nationally.

5.5.4 Considerations for Size of Control Area and Minimum 

Sizes of Other Zones

The perimeter of the CA should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the 

perimeter of the closest IP. The size of the CA depends on the circumstances of 

the outbreak, including the IP transmission pathways and estimates of 

transmission risk, livestock movement patterns and concentrations, distribution of 

susceptible wildlife in proximity, natural terrain, jurisdictional boundaries, and 

other factors. The boundaries of the CA can be modified or redefined when 

tracing and other epidemiological information becomes available.

Table 5-4 provides a description of the minimum sizes of areas and zones. 

Table 5-5 reviews the factors used to determine the size of the CA.

Tracing

One of the single most important and urgent veterinary activities during a CSF outbreak is to 

rapidly and diligently trace-back and trace-forward movements from an IP. This tracing will 

aid in the control of the spread of CSFV and limit the impact of the outbreak. Tracing should 

cover all movements from the premises, including susceptible swine, non-susceptible species, 

animal products, vehicles, crops and grains, and people. Tracing will also include 

consideration of all potential modes of transmission and possible contact with feral swine. 

May 2013 5-18
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

Table 5-4. Minimum Sizes of Areas and Zones

Zone or Area Minimum size and details

Infected Zone (IZ) Perimeter should be at least 3 km (~1.86 miles) beyond perimeters of 

presumptive or confirmed Infected Premises. Will depend on disease agent and 

epidemiological circumstances. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak 

continues.

Buffer Zone (BZ) Perimeter should be at least 7 km (~4.35 miles) beyond the perimeter of the 

Infected Zone. Width is generally not less than the minimum radius of the 

associated Infected Zone, but may be much larger. This zone may be redefined 

as the outbreak continues.

Control Area (CA) Perimeter should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the perimeter of the 

closest Infected Premises. Please see Table 5-5 for factors that influence the 

size of the Control Area. This area may be redefined as the outbreak continues.

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Width should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles), but may be much larger.

Table 5-5. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for CSF

Factors Additional details

Jurisdictional areas ♦ Effectiveness and efficiency of administration

♦ Multi-jurisdictional considerations: local, State, Tribal, and multistate

Physical boundaries ♦ Areas defined by geography

♦ Areas defined by distance between premises

CSF epidemiology ♦ Reproductive rate

♦ Incubation period

♦ Ease of transmission

♦ Infectious dose

♦ Modes of transmission (fecal-oral, droplet, aerosol, vectors)

♦ Survivability in the environment

♦ Ease of diagnosis (for example, no pathognomonic signs; requires diagnostic 

laboratory testing)

♦ Age of lesions

Infected Premises 

characteristics

♦ Number of contacts

♦ Transmission pathways and transmission risk

 Extent of animal movement

 Number of animals

 Age of animals

 Movement of traffic and personnel to and from premises (fomite spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place at time of outbreak

Contact Premises 

characteristics

♦ Number and types of premises

♦ Susceptible swine populations and population density

♦ Animal movements

♦ Movement of traffic (fomites) and personnel to and from premises (fomite 

spread)

♦ Biosecurity measures in place prior to outbreak

May 2013 5-19
Table 5-5. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for CSF

Factors Additional details

Environment ♦ Types of premises in area or region

♦ Land use in area or region

♦ Susceptible feral swine and population density

♦ Wildlife as biological or mechanical vectors

Climate (for aerosol spread 

diseases)

♦ Prevailing winds

♦ Humidity

General area, region, or 

agricultural sector biosecurity

♦ Biosecurity practices in place prior to outbreak

♦ Biosecurity practices implemented once outbreak detected

Number of non-commercial 

or transitional premises 

♦ Types of premises, animal movements, and network of animal and fomite 

movements

Continuity of business ♦ Continuity of business plans and processes in place or activated at beginning

of outbreak (such as surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises 

biosecurity, and risk-assessments)

♦ Permit processes, memorandums of understanding, and information 

management systems in place or activated at beginning of outbreak

5.6 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Local, State, Tribal, and Federal information management systems need to be 

compatible for information and data sharing. In a CSF outbreak, the response goal 

is to have EMRS information downloads or data entry processes performed in 

24-hour or shorter intervals. Field personnel should be provided with access to the 

mobile technology devices necessary for collecting, monitoring, and sharing 

information. Rapidly functional, robust, and scalable information technology 

infrastructure will be needed in a CSF outbreak.

The Overview of Information Management SOP provides information on key 

selected systems (covered in the SOP in the following order):

 CoreOne (Surveillance Collaboration Services)

 Animal Health and Surveillance Management 

 Veterinary Services Process Streamlining 

 Animal Disease Traceability Information System

 NAHLN

 EMRS

 National Veterinary Logistics System 

 LabWare Laboratory Information Management System 

May 2013 5-20
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

 Licensing, Serial Release, and Testing Information System 

 Mobile Information Management. 

It also covers the following APHIS information technology systems:

 APHIS Emergency Qualifications System 

 Resource Ordering and Status System. 

5.7 COMMUNICATION

The CSF Communications SOP provides guidance on communications activities 

during a CSF outbreak, covering the responsibilities of personnel and internal and

external communication procedures. APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) 

will serve as the primary liaison with the news media in the event of a CSF

outbreak. Under the ICS, a JIC will be established. During a CSF outbreak, 

APHIS LPA and the USDA Office of Communications will operate from the JIC.

Effective communication during a CSF outbreak should be carried out and 

maintained by 

 establishing a network of stakeholders and systems for communication 

prior to an incident or outbreak; 

 briefing the media, public, industry, Congress, trading partners, and others 

on the CSF outbreak status and the actions being taken to control and 

eradicate the disease; 

 coordinating with Federal, State, and local agencies, Tribal entities, 

producer groups, and Land Grant University based Cooperative Extension 

Services to ensure consistent messaging regarding animal health, public 

health, and food safety; and 

 assuring consumers that USDA is working on animal health issues, in an 

informed and timely manner. 

In addition, all communications should highlight the importance of sound 

biosecurity measures and steps that producers and owners can take to protect 

against CSF infection in their own swine herds. 

May 2013 5-21 
5.7.1 Objectives

All CSF communications must

 furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information; 

 maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the government’s 

ability to respond to an outbreak; 

 minimize public panic and fear; and

 address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as possible.

5.7.2 Key Messages

Five key messages will be conveyed in a CSF outbreak (Box 5-4). 

Box 5-4. CSF Communication Messages

5.7.3 Further Communications Guidance

In addition to the CSF Communications SOP, the following resources provide 

guidance on communication and information about various stakeholder groups: 

 APHIS Animal Health website

 CSF information in English and Spanish 

(http://www.classicalswinefever.org/) 

 FAD PReP Stakeholder Coordination and Collaboration Resource Guide. 

Key Communication Messages

For consumers: 

1. CSF does not cause disease in humans.

2. Pork and pork products are safe to eat.

3. We are responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the virus.

For producers: 

1. Protect your swine with good biosecurity practices.

2. Be vigilant about reporting signs of illness.

May 2013 5-22 
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.8 HEALTH AND SAFETY AND PERSONAL 

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

During a CSF outbreak, responders are exposed to many hazards, particularly in 

working with heavy equipment and large animals. Taking precautions to prevent 

adverse human health events related to emergency response efforts is important. 

PPE is crucial in protecting health and safety during a CSF outbreak response 

effort. PPE also helps ensure response personnel are taking care to avoid 

transmitting CSFV to naïve premises. 

PPE is fundamental in ensuring personnel are protected in the CSF response 

effort. All workers involved in the handling, culling, transport, or disposal of 

items or animals infected with CSFV must be provided with appropriate PPE. All 

visitors and employees, regardless of their exposure, should be provided with 

disposable coveralls, boots, hats, and gloves before entering a premises. Disposal 

of this PPE is required after leaving.

For further information on health and safety and PPE, see the CSF Health and 

Safety and Personal Protective Equipment SOP. It provides information on best 

practices to ensure the well-being and safety of all individuals involved in the 

response effort. Specific topics covered include the following: 

 Procedures to create a site-specific health and safety plan

 Details of hazard analysis, necessary training, and medical surveillance 

requirements

 PPE, including Occupational Safety and Health Administration respirator 

fit testing 

 Pre-deployment information and guidance

 A protocol for staff field safety in a CSF response.

5.8.1 Mental Health Concerns

The health and safety of all personnel is affected by the mental state of those 

involved in the CSF response effort. The toll a CSF outbreak may take on mental 

and physical health must be considered to protect the health and safety of all 

personnel.

CSF depopulation efforts can significantly affect the health of responders, swine

owners, and others impacted by the outbreak and response efforts. The HHS has 

developed resources specifically for emergency and disaster responders, States 

and local planners, health professionals, and the general public

(www.bt.cdc.gov/mentalhealth/). The Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia SOP

May 2013 5-23 
provides further information on how personnel can effectively deal with 

euthanasia-related stress. 

5.8.2 Further Information on Health, Safety, and Personal 

Protective Equipment

In addition to the resources already listed, the following documents contain 

information and guidance: 

 APHIS Health and Safety Manual. Available to APHIS employees at 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/mrpbs/publications/safety_health_wellness_ 

manual/index.shtml

 NAHEMS Guidelines: Health and Safety

 NAHEMS Guidelines: Personal Protective Equipment. 

5.9 BIOSECURITY

A CSF outbreak would seriously impact the agricultural industry; strict 

biosecurity measures need to be implemented to prevent or slow the spread of 

CSF. Biosecurity procedures should be implemented within 24 hours of the 

identification of an index CSF case. Accordingly, veterinarians, owners, and 

anyone else in contact with enterprises that have susceptible animals need to 

observe biosecurity measures. 

Proper biosecurity measures have two functions: (1) containing the virus on IP

(biocontainment), and (2) preventing the introduction of the virus via movement 

of personnel and material to naïve swine and premises (bioexclusion). During a 

CSF outbreak, a careful balance must be maintained between facilitating response 

activities and ensuring personnel do not expose naïve animals and premises to 

CSFV. 

Further information on biosecurity is provided in the CSF Biosecurity SOP, which 

offers guidance on how to draft a site-specific biosecurity plan and

 identifies the roles and responsibilities of key personnel,

 explains biosecurity training and briefing requirements,

 addresses site security and safety,

 discusses biosecurity practices for shipping and transportation, and

 provides a biosecurity checklist.

May 2013 5-24 
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

In addition, more information on appropriate biosecurity measures can be found 

in the NAHEMS Guidelines: Biosecurity. 

5.9.1 Biosecurity Hazards and Mitigating Measures

Box 5-5 shows biosecurity hazards and biosecurity measures to mitigate these 

risks during a CSF outbreak.

Box 5-5. CSF Biosecurity Hazards and Appropriate Biosecurity Measures

Biosecurity Hazards

• Movement of swine, vehicles,

equipment, and people.

• Contaminated feed and water.

• Contact with infected swine and

other non-susceptible animals that

can act as mechanical vectors

(other livestock, cats, or foxes).

• Contact with contaminated people,

clothes, footwear, or hands.

Biosecurity Measures to Mitigate Risk

• Clean and disinfect premises, vehicles, and

equipment and dispose of materials that cannot

be disinfected in an appropriate manner.

• Account for the movement of all swine, other

animals, and equipment for accurate records.

• Provide a location for all individuals to carry out

appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures

and insist that these procedures are followed.

• Prevent close or direct contact between herds

(over a single fence line).

5.9.2 Closed Herds

In the event of a CSF outbreak, an important biosecurity measure is closing herds 

to new swine. Box 5-6 provides guidance on employing closed herds as a critical 

biosecurity measure.

Box 5-6. Biosecurity Measure—Closed Herds

5.9.3 Waiting Period

Another important biosecurity measure is to ensure personnel are not travelling 

between IP and unknown or non-infected premises. During a CSF outbreak, it is 

important that personnel wait the allotted time between premises visits in addition

to following appropriate biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection protocols (see 

Biosecurity: Closed Herds

• To the fullest extent possible, close the herd to the introduction of new swine (with

population increases occurring only from offspring).

• If a closed herd is not possible, isolate newly purchased swine (from the healthiest

possible sources) and those returning from existing herds for 30 days or more.

• Do not introduce vaccinated animals to naïve herds.

May 2013 5-25 
Section 5.15). Actual waiting periods will be recommended by IC on the basis of 

the outbreak circumstances, and need for personnel. Typical waiting times vary 

between 24 and 72 hours. Team members should not travel from IP or SP to 

unknown or non-infected premises. However, they may travel between IP, if 

proper mitigating procedures are followed.

Extended avoidance periods for personnel may be unnecessary with stringent 

biosecurity practices and effective cleaning and disinfection protocols. However, 

until further information is available, veterinarians and other responders should 

adhere to the guidance provided by the local IC.

5.10 QUARANTINE AND MOVEMENT CONTROL

By restricting the movement of infected swine, pork products, and contaminated 

fomites, quarantine and movement control can be a powerful tool in controlling

and containing a CSF outbreak. Movement control is accomplished through a 

permit system that allows entities to make necessary movements without creating 

an unacceptable risk of disease spread. Operational staff members need to strictly 

adhere to movement control procedures, which are based on the best scientific 

information available at the time.

The Incident Commander, Disease Surveillance Branch (Operations Section), and 

Situation Unit (Planning Section), will coordinate to establish an IZ and a BZ

within 12 hours of the identification of an index case. Controlled movement 

orders and 24-hour standstill notices are likely to be implemented upon detection

of CSF in the United States in relevant regions or zones. (Appendix H contains 

examples of movement control notices.) Once the CA (IZ plus BZ) is established, 

quarantine and movement controls will be implemented. 

Each State’s animal health emergency response plan should describe the

implementation of quarantine and movement controls, including a permit system.

USDA will impose a Federal quarantine and restrict interstate commerce from the 

infected States, asking the States (or adjoining countries) to provide resources to

maintain and enforce the quarantine. Reimbursement formulas will be established 

between the States and USDA in a cooperative agreement.

5.10.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations

The Incident Commander will work with the Disease Surveillance Branch 

(Operations Section) and the Situation Unit (Planning Section) to determine 

appropriate premises designations in the event of a CSF outbreak (see 

Appendix B for an organizational chart). These zone, area, and premises 

designations will be used for quarantine and movement control efforts. Again, 

refer to Tables 5-2 and 5-3 and Figure 5-4 for the designations used here.

May 2013 5-26 
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.10.2 Permit Guidance to Move into a Control Area, within 

a Control Area, and out of a Control Area

During a CSF outbreak, the following guidance in Table 5-6 (movement into a 

CA), Table 5-7 (movement within a CA), and Table 5-8 (movement out of a CA) 

will be used to issue permits in movement control efforts. For permit guidance for 

pork and pork products, see the Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan, discussed in 

Appendix G. See Subsection 5.16 for additional guidance for movement control 

of vaccinates. 

May 2013 5-27
Table 5-6. Movement into Control Area from Outside Control Area to Specific Premisesa

Item Moving into a Control 

Area to a/an...

Infected 

Premises Suspect Premises^ Contact Premises^ At-Risk Premises Monitored Premises

Susceptible animals Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC, such 

as slaughter.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Permit for movement 

must be approved by 

the IC with appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Permit for movement must 

be approved by the IC with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Susceptible animal products See continuity of business plans for information on susceptible pork products, or guidance and processes as determined by the IC. 

Please see Subsection 5.10.5 which contains OIE CSF-specific guidance for inactivating CSF. In addition, Appendix G contains 

information on the SPS Plan for pork and pork product movement during a CSF outbreak.

Other animals (nonsusceptible swine) from 

premises with susceptible 

swine

Prohibited unless 

permit approved by 

IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved by IC

and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement depending 

upon CSF

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

Allowed with appropriate 

biosecurity measures. IC

may require a permit for 

movement depending upon 

CSF epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

Other animals (nonsusceptible swine) from 

premises without susceptible 

swine

IC will determine 

movement restrictions 

based on CSF

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

IC will determine movement 

restrictions based on CSF

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

IC will determine 

movement restrictions 

based on CSF

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement depending 

upon CSF

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

Allowed with appropriate 

biosecurity measures. IC

may require a permit for 

movement depending upon 

CSF epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

Equipment, vehicles, and other 

fomites from premises with 

susceptible swine

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed with appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Semen, embryos from 

susceptible swine

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.

May 2013 5-28
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

Table 5-7. Movement within a Control Areaa

Item Moving within a Control 

Area from a/an....

Infected 

Premises Suspect Premises^ Contact Premises^ At-Risk Premises Monitored Premises

Susceptible animals Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Susceptible animal products See continuity of business plans for information on susceptible animal products, or guidance and processes as determined by the 

IC. Please see Subsection 5.10.5 which contains OIE CSF-specific guidance for inactivating CSF. In addition, Appendix G

contains information on the SPS Plan for pork and pork product movement during a CSF outbreak.

Other animals (nonsusceptible swine) from 

premises with susceptible 

swine

Prohibited unless specific 

permit granted by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Other animals (nonsusceptible swine) from 

premises without susceptible 

swine

n/a

(Infected Premises have 

susceptible species.) 

n/a

(Suspect Premises 

have susceptible 

species.) 

n/a

(Contact Premises 

have susceptible 

species.) 

n/a

(At-Risk Premises 

have susceptible 

species.) 

n/a

(Monitored Premises 

have susceptible 

species.) 

Equipment, vehicles, and 

other fomites from premises 

with susceptible swine

Prohibited unless specific 

permit granted by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Semen, embryos from 

susceptible animals

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements 

occur.

May 2013 5-29 
Table 5-8. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area from Specific Premisesa

Item Moving out of a 

Control Area from a/an...

Infected 

Premises Suspect Premises^ Contact Premises^ At-Risk Premises Monitored Premises*

Susceptible animals Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC.

Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC.

At-Risk Premises must 

become Monitored 

Premises to move 

susceptible livestock out 

of a Control Area.

Allowed to move by permit 

approved by IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic tests, 

premises biosecurity, and riskassessment may be required 

for permit.

Susceptible animal 

products

See continuity of business plans for information on susceptible animal products, or guidance and processes as determined by the IC. 

Please see Subsection 5.10.5 which contains OIE CSF-specific guidance for inactivating CSF. In addition, Appendix G contains information 

on the SPS Plan for pork and pork product movement during a CSF outbreak.

Other animals (nonsusceptible swine) from 

premises with susceptible 

swine

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures and riskassessment.

Prohibited unless specific 

permit approved by IC

and appropriate 

biosecurity measures 

and risk-assessment.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures and riskassessment.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by IC; 

surveillance and negative 

diagnostic tests for 

susceptible animals on 

premises, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Allowed to move by permit 

approved by IC; surveillance 

and negative diagnostic tests 

for susceptible animals on 

premises, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be required 

for permit.

Other animals (nonsusceptible swine) from

premises without 

susceptible swine

n/a

(Infected Premises 

have susceptible 

species.)

n/a

(Suspect Premises have 

susceptible species.)

n/a

(Contact Premises 

have susceptible 

species.)

n/a

(At-Risk Premises have 

susceptible species.)

n/a

(Monitored Premises have 

susceptible species.)

Equipment, vehicles, and 

other fomites from 

premises with susceptible 

swine

Prohibited unless 

permit approved by IC

and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved by IC

and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit approved by 

IC and appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos from 

susceptible animals

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. At-Risk Premises must 

become Monitored 

Premises to move 

semen, embryos from 

susceptible livestock out 

of a Control Area.

Monitored Premises only 

allowed by permit approved by 

IC and appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.

* Continuity of business plans may apply.

May 2013 5-30
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

For movement of swine and pork products out of the CA to a FA, the permit 

process must consider national standards, any OIE standards, and conditions for 

such movement such as biosecurity procedures and risk assessment 

recommendations. In addition, commodity-specific proactive risk assessments, 

continuity of business plans, movement and marketability plans, and 

compartmentalization plans will also be considered. Figure 5-5 illustrates 

movement control and permitting in relation to premises designation.

Figure 5-5. Premises Designations in Relation to Permitting 

and Movement Control

May 2013 5-31
5.10.3 Moving Commodities, Animals, and Conveyances 

in CSF Outbreak

Any movement of commodities, animals, and conveyances brings some level of 

risk of CSFV transmission from a known IP or an unknown IP to non-infected

premises. The risk of moving commodities, animals, and conveyances depends on 

the nature of the item being moved and its ability to transmit or be contaminated 

with CSFV. CSFV can be transmitted via items that contain biological material 

(such as manure), through infected swine, or via a contaminated fomite or person.

5.10.4 Guidance for All Premises

Because of the variation in the risk of the commodities, animals, and 

conveyances, it is possible that premises—particularly MP and ARP—may be 

permitted to move one commodity or conveyance but not another. In making the 

decision whether movement will be allowed, substantial consideration will be 

given to critical movements (for example, the movement of animal feed onto 

premises). 

See Subsection 5.16 for additional guidance for movement control of vaccinates.

5.10.5 OIE Treatment Guidelines for CSF

The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012) provides guidance for the 

importation of animals, products, and commodities from CSF infected countries 

or zones, as well as processes for inactivating CSFV. The guidance for the 

inactivation of CSF in swill, meat, skins and trophies is provided below and can 

also be found in Article 15.2.20 to Article 15.2.22 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code (2012).

5.10.5.1 PROCEDURES FOR THE INACTIVATION OF CSF VIRUS IN SWILL

For the inactivation of CSF viruses likely to be present in swill, one of the 

following procedures should be used:

1. The swill should be maintained at a temperature of at least 90oC for at 

least 60 minutes, with continuous stirring; or

2. The swill should be maintained at a temperature of at least 121oC for at 

least 10 minutes at an absolute pressure of 3 bar.

May 2013 5-32
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5.10.5.2 PROCEDURES FOR THE INACTIVATION OF THE CSF VIRUS IN MEAT

1. Heat treatment

Meat, shall be subjected to one of the following treatments:

a) heat treatment in a hermetically sealed container with a F0 value of 

3.00 or more;1

b) heat treatment at a minimum temperature of 70oC, which should be 

reached throughout the meat.

2. Natural fermentation and maturation

The meat should be subjected to a treatment consisting of natural 

fermentation and maturation having the following characteristics:

a) an aw value of not more than 0.93, or2

b) a pH value of not more than 6.0.

Hams should be subjected to a natural fermentation and maturation process 

for at least 190 days and loins for 140 days. 

3. Dry cured pork meat

a) Italian style hams with bone-in should be cured with salt and dried 

for a minimum of 313 days.

b) Spanish style pork meat with bone-in should be cured with salt and 

dried for a minimum of 252 days for Iberian hams, 140 days for 

Iberian shoulders, 126 days for Iberian loin, and 140 days for 

Serrano hams.

5.10.5.3 PROCEDURES FOR THE INACTIVATION OF CSF VIRUS 

IN SKINS AND TROPHIES

For the inactivation of CSF viruses likely to be present in skins and trophies, one 

of the following procedures should be used

1. boiling in water for an appropriate time so as to ensure that any matter 

other than bone, tusks or teeth is removed;

2. gamma irradiation at a dose of at least 20 kilogray at room temperature 

(20oC or higher);

3. soaking, with agitation, in a 4 percent (w/v) solution of washing soda 

(sodium carbonate - Na2CO3) maintained at pH 11.5 or above for at least 

48 hours;

1 F0 value is the time in minutes to provide the appropriate spore destruction. 2 aw is the measure of water reactivity in food.

May 2013 5-33

 
4. soaking, with agitation, in a formic acid solution (100 kg salt [NaCl] and 

12 kg formic acid per 1,000 liters water) maintained at below pH 3.0 for 

at least 48 hours; wetting and dressing agents may be added; and

5. in the case of raw hides, salting for at least 28 days with sea salt 

containing 2% washing soda (sodium carbonate Na2CO3).

5.10.6 Surveillance Required for Swine 

and Product Movement

Surveillance measures are required for movement of swine and pork products for 

premises located in the CA (IZ and BZ). These steps include visual surveillance 

along with diagnostic testing prior to movement. (Appendix D contains more 

information on surveillance measures for movement of swine and pork products.) 

5.11 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS

Continuity of business is the management of non-infected premises and noncontaminated pork products in the event of a CSF outbreak. Continuity of 

business provides science- and risk-based approaches and systems as a critical 

activity in a CSF response. This helps to facilitate agriculture and food industries 

maintain typical business, or return to business during a disease response, while 

the risk of disease spread is effectively managed. Continuity of business planning 

can help to minimize unintended consequences on producers and consumers 

impacted by CSF. During a CSF outbreak, permitting, movement control, and 

prioritized disruptions—all based on science and risk-based approaches—are 

critical measures to ensure continuity of business. The NAHEMS Guidelines: 

Continuity of Business covers topics such as

 key roles and responsibilities in continuity of business planning,

 details of developing continuity of business plans,

 potential components required for continuity of business planning, and

 preparedness and response goals.

The SPS Plan offers additional continuity of business information, particularly 

applicable to interstate trade. (Appendix G contains information on the SPS Plan.)

5.12 REGIONALIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

(FOR A U.S. CSF RESPONSE)

In the event of a CSF outbreak in the United States, international trade of swine 

and pork products may be adversely affected for a significant period of time. This 

would have serious economic implications for the affected industries and the 

May 2013 5-34
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

United States. Therefore, it is important to identify, prior to an outbreak, potential 

procedures and plans that may mitigate the consequences and reestablish 

international trade as rapidly as possible.

As defined by the OIE, regionalization, also known as zoning, is the concept of 

separating subpopulations of animals in order to maintain a specific health status 

in one or more disease-free regions or zones. Disease-free regions can be created 

to facilitate continuity of business and reestablish international trade from the 

regions demonstrated to be disease-free. Regionalization recognizes that risk may 

be tied to factors that are not reflected by political boundaries of the nation or 

individual states, especially when the outbreak has been confined to specific areas 

within an individual state, or group of states. Providing information to the OIE, its 

member countries and our trading partners, that clearly identifies the boundaries 

of the disease-free areas, can be used to inform our trading partners’ decisions 

whether to receive or reject our exports. This risk-based process, based on sound 

science, can mitigate the adverse economic effects of a CSF outbreak.

5.12.1 Compartmentalization

Another tool that may potentially mitigate the economic consequences of a 

disease outbreak is compartmentalization. Compartmentalization, which defines 

an animal subpopulation by management and husbandry practices related to 

biosecurity, could be used by the veterinary authorities to demonstrate and 

maintain disease freedom in certain commercial establishments whose practices 

have prevented the introduction of the disease. The disease-free status of these 

compartments could enable trade movement of animal products. 

Compartmentalization has not been fully implemented by the United States for 

any disease agent to-date, and will depend on the recognition of the status of these 

compartments by international trading partners. Implementation of 

compartmentalization will rely on producers, industry, and State and Federal 

animal health authorities. By working closely together to develop and strengthen 

relationships and implementing the agreed upon procedures preceding an FAD 

outbreak, compartmentalization may be a useful tool.

5.12.2 Further Guidance

The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012) (www.oie.int) also offers 

guidance on regionalization and compartmentalization in Chapters 4.3 and 4.4. 

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Regionalization for International Trade for a U.S. 

FAD Response contains information on regionalization as an FAD response tool.

Specific guidelines for a CSF-free compartment are found in Chapter 15.2.3 of the 

OIE Code. Currently there are no internationally accepted or fully implemented 

CSF-free compartments in the United States.

May 2013 5-35
5.13 MASS DEPOPULATION AND EUTHANASIA

Depending on the CSF strategy or strategies selected, animals on an IP will be 

depopulated as soon as possible after declaration of a CSF outbreak. Susceptible 

swine on CP may also be depopulated as soon as possible after the premises are 

classified as CP. The Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia SOP provides 

instructions for personnel following the declaration of a CSF outbreak and the 

classification of IP and CP. This SOP offers CSF-specific information on mass 

depopulation and euthanasia, including evaluation of various euthanasia methods,

such as

 gunshot,

 penetrating captive bolt,

 electrocution,

 injectable euthanasia, and

 carbon dioxide and other gas. 

In a CSF outbreak, euthanasia or mass depopulation should be provided to the

affected animals as safely, quickly, efficiently, and humanely as possible. In 

addition, the emotional and psychological impact on animal owners, caretakers, 

their families, and other personnel should be minimized.

Mass depopulation and euthanasia are not synonymous and APHIS recognizes a 

clear distinction. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as 

painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass depopulation is a method by which 

large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much 

consideration given to the welfare of animals as practicable, given extenuating 

circumstances. Mass depopulation is employed in a CSF response to prevent or 

mitigate the spread of CSF through eliminating infected or potentially infected 

animals. Best practice guidance issued in 2007 from the American Veterinary 

Medical Association (AVMA) states that “Under unusual conditions, such as 

disease eradication and natural disasters, euthanasia options may be limited. In 

these situations, the most appropriate technique that minimizes human and animal 

health concerns must be used.” Qualified personnel should perform mass 

depopulation in the event of a CSF outbreak using the safest, quickest, and most 

humane procedures in accordance with AVMA guidance.

If personnel or materials are insufficient, the Incident Commander or other 

official should request emergency depopulation, disposal, and decontamination 

(3D) contractor support for CSF depopulation efforts from the NVS.

NAHEMS Guidelines: Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia contains additional 

information on euthanasia and mass depopulation.

May 2013 5-36
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.14 DISPOSAL

Appropriate disposal of animal carcasses and materials is a critical component of 

a successful CSF response. CSF can survive for long periods on both organic and 

inorganic materials. The Disposal SOP discusses how to dispose of carcasses, 

animal products, other materials, and items that cannot be properly cleaned and 

disinfected (such as manure, litter, and bedding), products of the response effort 

(such as PPE), and products of vaccination response. Disposal will occur as soon 

as possible after the depopulation of animals on premises.

Disposal must be done in a manner that does not allow CSFV to spread, 

minimizes negative environmental effects, and conserves meat or animal protein 

if logistically supportable from a biosecurity standpoint. In some cases, moving 

clinically normal animals to a slaughter facility within the CA may be possible, 

though they may have been exposed to the CSFV on IP or CP. IC must permit any 

movement required for disposal. Local and State regulations must be observed or 

memorandums of understanding must be obtained to ensure disposal capability. 

Cost effectiveness and stakeholder acceptance must also be considered.

On-site burial may be an inexpensive and biosecure method of disposal that 

minimizes the transportation of infected materials. However, on-site methods may 

be limited by several factors such as topography, soil type, soil depth to bedrock, 

seasonal high-water table, and environmental regulations. Off-site burial may be 

needed when on-site burial is not possible or when a number of IP must be 

depopulated and a common burial site would be more efficient. Other disposal 

methods such as composting, incineration, digestion, and rendering may also be 

employed, as indicated by the circumstances of the outbreak and disposal 

requirements.

In addition, in any CSF outbreak, multiple methods of disposal may be required,

due to the large quantity of materials in need of disposal. Rendering, incineration, 

and composting are considered viable alternatives for both large and small 

ruminants. For the disposal of syringes and unused but opened vaccine vials, onsite incineration is highly recommended. 

Disposal methods should always be assessed and applied appropriately, given the 

facility location, type of housing, premises characteristics, and other situational 

factors. IC will coordinate closely with local authorities in deciding how to 

dispose of carcasses and other items. 

In the event that available personnel are insufficient for disposal requirements in a

CSF outbreak, the Incident Commander can request emergency 3D contractor 

support from the NVS. The NAHEMS Guidelines: Disposal contains further 

guidance on disposal activities.

May 2013 5-37
5.15 CLEANING AND DISINFECTION

Because of CSF’s high survival rate on both organic and inorganic materials, 

aggressive cleaning and disinfection practices are required for control and 

eradication. Cleaning and disinfection are to be conducted within 48 hours of the 

disposal of depopulated animals. The Cleaning and Disinfection SOP provides 

information on

 the CSF cleaning and disinfection effort,

 optimal cleaning and disinfection methods for CSF,

 processes used to inactivate CSFV from organic materials, 

 how to clean and disinfect equipment and premises after CSF detection,

and 

 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-approved disinfectants for CSF

virus.

Because the aerosol transmission of CSF is a concern, care should be taken to 

reduce the generation and dispersal of potentially infective dust and aerosolized 

materials during cleaning and disinfection procedures. If items cannot be cleaned 

and disinfected adequately, they will be disposed of using burial, incineration, or

other appropriate means. All disinfectants must be EPA-approved for CSF; offlabel use of disinfectants is illegal.

If available personnel or materials are insufficient for cleaning and disinfection in 

a CSF outbreak, the Incident Commander can request emergency 3D contractor 

support from NVS.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Cleaning and Disinfection contains additional 

information.

5.16 VACCINATION

The use of emergency vaccination in the event of a CSF outbreak has been

discussed in Chapter 4. This section provides an overview of: (1) DIVA testing, 

(2) the zones and premises employed in the event an emergency vaccination 

strategy is used, and (3) movement controls for vaccinates. The NAHEMS

Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, including Appendix B: 

Classical Swine Fever contains additional information.

May 2013 5-38
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.16.1 Vaccination and Differentiation of Infected from 

Vaccinated Animals Testing

There are two types of CSF vaccine. The NVS has access to both types of 

vaccine. The first type, the CSFV Vaccine, with a modified live virus (MLV), has 

been successfully used in countries where CSF is endemic, successfully 

preventing the transmission of CSF from animal to animal. The MLV vaccine 

may be administered parenterally or orally (i.e., in bait vaccines to immunize feral 

swine) and confers immunity in 4–5 days. However, swine immunized with the 

live attenuated vaccine cannot be differentiated from CSF field-infected swine.

The immunized swine and the field-infected swine produce the same antibodies.

Because of this lack of DIVA capability, marker vaccines were developed. 

Animals vaccinated with the DIVA-compatible E2 antigen-based CSFV, killed 

baculovirus vector vaccine can be differentiated from field-infected animals 

through an ELISA test for a specific glycoprotein. These marker vaccines permit 

the use of DIVA diagnostic tests, so that field-infected and vaccinated swine can 

be distinguished. This is critical in any emergency vaccination strategy. The 

DIVA-compatible vaccine requires two doses for maximum immunity, and an 

effective onset of immunity may not occur until 14–21 days after the first dose is 

administered. The vaccine is only effective when given parenterally.

This DIVA capability is a critical benefit, particularly for continuity of business.

Should DIVA vaccine be used, APHIS will acquire DIVA diagnostics.

In a focal CSF outbreak, the MLV vaccine might be used in an inner ring 

vaccination program, where vaccinates will be depopulated in a “vaccinate-tokill” program, while the DIVA vaccine was used in an outer “vaccinate-to-live” 

Protection Vaccination Zone. In a wide-spread CSF outbreak, the MLV vaccine 

might be used in terminal market swine, while the DIVA vaccine was used in 

breeding stocks. 

5.16.2 Zone, Area, and Premises Designations

Also provided in Chapter 4 of this document, this subsection provides figures to 

illustrate the use of emergency vaccination in a CSF outbreak. 

5.16.2.1 CONTAINMENT VACCINATION ZONE

The CVZ is an emergency vaccination zone typically within the CA, and may 

include the IZ and/or the BZ. A CVZ is typically observed in stamping-out 

modified with emergency vaccination to kill or to slaughter. Figure 5-6 shows 

examples of a CVZ.

May 2013 5-39
Figure 5-6. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones

Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone Emergency Vaccination in Buffer Zone

Emergency Vaccination in Control Area Emergency Vaccination in IZ and Partial BZ

Note: Figures are not to scale. 

May 2013 5-40 
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.16.2.2 PROTECTION VACCINATION ZONE

The PVZ is an emergency vaccination zone in the FA. It is consistent with the 

OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012) definition for a Protection Zone:

A zone established to protect the health status of animals in a free 

country or free zone, from those in a country or zone of a different 

animal health status, using measures based on the epidemiology of the 

disease under consideration to prevent spread of the causative pathogenic 

agent into a free country or free zone. These measures may include, but 

are not limited to, vaccination, movement control and an intensified 

degree of surveillance.

Typically, a PVZ would be observed with stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to live. Figure 5-7 shows examples of a PVZ.

Figure 5-7. Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones

Circle Irregular

Note: Figures are not to scale. 

5.16.2.3 VACCINATED PREMISES

VP may be a secondary designation to another premises designation and is only 

used if emergency vaccination is employed in an outbreak. A VP may be located 

in a CVZ within the CA (IZ or BZ) or in a PVZ in the FA. Figure 5-8 shows VP

in a CVZ (left) and in a PVZ (right).

May 2013 5-41
Figure 5-8. Vaccinated Premises

Containment Vaccination Zone Protection Vaccination Zone

Note: Figures are not to scale. 

5.16.3 Movement Restrictions for Vaccinates

If emergency vaccination is used, a vaccination plan will define procedures to 

prevent the spread of CSF by vaccination teams. Emergency vaccination occurs 

within a CVZ or a PVZ. All vaccinated animals may be identified with specific 

and permanent (tamper-proof) identification. When vaccine is used, surveillance 

must continue to assess vaccination effectiveness and detect any antigenic change. 

Movement restrictions for vaccinates are as follows:

 VP may be subject to movement restrictions for their primary premises 

designation.

 Animals receiving emergency vaccination on the VP may be subject to 

vaccinated animal identification, vaccinated animal traceability, and 

DIVA testing.

 For movement of emergency vaccinated animals, consideration must be 

given to any national or international standards or conditions for such 

movement.

5.16.4 Cessation of Vaccination 

CSF emergency vaccination should cease as soon as possible to allow the region 

or State to return quickly to a favorable trade status. No new vaccinations will be 

given more than 28 days after the last known new case of CSF is detected.

May 2013 5-42
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases and Appendix B: 

Classical Swine Fever contain further guidance. 

5.17 NATIONAL VETERINARY STOCKPILE

The Overview of the NVS SOP provides information on NVS capabilities and 

lays out the required steps to request countermeasures from the NVS. It also 

provides a direct link to the NVS website, where State preparedness officials and 

responders can download important publications to help them understand the 

NVS. This website provides

 a planning guide for Federal, State, and local authorities;

 a template for a State NVS plan; and

 outreach and exercise programs.

The NVS also has contractor support for 3D activities, which can be requested

through IC. The surge response capacity of 3D commercial responders is a 

response to the site within 24 hours, 500–600 people within 72 hours, and 1,000 

people within a week.

5.18 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND VECTOR 

CONTROL

USDA APHIS will work in close collaboration, communication, and coordination 

with DOI and other Federal, State, Tribal, and local wildlife agencies that have 

primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for wildlife. This 

collaboration, communication, and coordination will occur in both the Unified 

Command and in MAC Groups.

The Overview of Wildlife Management and Vector Control SOP also discusses 

personnel and equipment required for wildlife management, quarantine and 

movement control for wildlife, wildlife risk assessment, wildlife surveillance, and 

related activities. Further information can also be found in the NAHEMS 

Guidelines: Wildlife Management and Vector Control.

Importantly, as stated in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012), “for the 

purposes of international trade, classical swine fever (CSF) is defined as an 

infection of domestic pigs.”

5.18.1 Wildlife Management

A wildlife management plan that addresses feral swine will be developed as soon 

as possible after identification of the index case in domestic swine. An assessment 

of the risk that feral swine pose for the transmission of CSFV to susceptible 

May 2013 5-43
domestic swine will be conducted within 7 days of confirmation of the index case.

Assessment of the risks posed by wildlife will require information on

 density and distribution, 

 social organization, 

 habitat, 

 contact with domestic swine, and

 length of time feral swine could have been exposed to the virus.

If feral swine are determined to be infected with CSFV or otherwise pose a 

biological risk for transmission, appropriate wildlife management principles will 

be applied as needed to reduce exposure of wildlife to domestic swine. If wildlife 

populations are determined not to be infected or be a biological risk for 

transmission of CSFV to domestic swine, wildlife management tools will be 

implemented to keep wildlife populations from acting as mechanical vectors.

5.18.2 Vector Control

CSF may be transmitted mechanically by mice, vultures, and other vectors. Todate, there is no evidence that insects can biologically transmit the CSFV to 

susceptible animals. Appropriate biosecurity measures should be in place during a 

CSF outbreak to ensure that mechanical vectors do not have contact with infected 

swine herds or other infected material. 

5.19 ANIMAL WELFARE

During a CSF outbreak, humane treatment must be provided to animals given the 

specific circumstances of the outbreak, particularly from the time they are 

identified for destruction or vaccination activities until they are depopulated, 

euthanized, or slaughtered, as prescribed by veterinary authorities of the affected 

States or Tribal nations. The Overview of Animal Welfare SOP contains 

additional information.

5.20 MODELING AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS

The development of models and risk assessments are critical in a successful CSF

response. These tools give decision makers valuable insight. During an outbreak, 

one or more multidisciplinary teams (consisting of epidemiologists, disease agent 

experts, economists, affected commodity experts, and others) will be established 

to perform risk assessments as needed. An appropriate, scientific risk assessment 

on an issue of concern will be provided within 72 hours after a request from the 

Incident Commander. 

May 2013 5-44 
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

For CSFV, the Tool for the Assessment of Intervention Options (TAIO) may be 

used prior to an outbreak to inform strategy decisions. TAIO provides decision

makers with additional information on the most efficacious, feasible, and costeffective approach to manage the response effort. More information about 

modeling is available from CEAH.

The Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools SOP provides information on 

modeling and risk assessment, covering the following:

 Key roles and responsibilities in modeling and risk analysis

 Uses of epidemiological models

 Proactive risk assessments

 Risk assessment during and after an outbreak

 Examples of current models and assessment tools.

5.21 APPRAISAL AND COMPENSATION

Indemnity payments are to encourage disease reporting, reduce the spread of 

animal disease, and compensate owners on the basis of fair market value. Fair 

market value appraisals are provided to owners of destroyed animals and 

materials. The Appraisal and Compensation SOP focuses on specifying personnel 

responsibilities, appraisal procedures, assessment of compensation eligibility, 

payment of indemnity, and required forms and reports during a CSF outbreak.

The AHPA gives APHIS authority to establish and implement an indemnification 

program to prevent or eradicate a CSF outbreak. Indemnity is a key component of 

APHIS’s disease control programs in that the promise of fair compensation for 

losses helps to ensure cooperation from the owners of affected swine. Such 

cooperation is important for rapid disease control and eradication. 

The best practices for containment and eradication of CSF will in many instances 

require depopulation, disposal, and decontamination that are faster than can be 

achieved with slow appraisal processes. In some circumstances, appraisals will 

not be required to be signed prior to destruction if APHIS and the cooperating 

State agree that the swine must be destroyed immediately to mitigate the potential 

spread or amplification of CSFV during a response to a confirmed or presumptive 

CSF incident. Data required to determine fair market value will be collected prior 

to depopulation, including a complete inventory of swine being destroyed and any 

relevant value information.

The following resources offer additional guidance on appraisal and compensation: 

APHIS’s Livestock Appraisal, Indemnity, and Compensation Website.

May 2013 5-45
5.22 FINANCE

During a CSF outbreak, funding will be rapidly required. For responding to 

specific emergency situations, VS has access to a variety of sources for funding. 

The two most common sources are the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and 

the APHIS Contingency Fund (CF).

During an emergency, the Secretary is authorized to transfer funds from the CCC.

The funds are provided to APHIS as no-year funds. Before APHIS can ask the 

Secretary to transfer funds, however, it must consider whether it can redirect 

funds from a budget line item or if other funding sources are available. APHIS 

will consider the total estimated amount of funding needed to address the issue 

and whether the program has political support prior to deciding whether or not to 

seek a CCC transfer.

The APHIS CF takes care of unforeseen, unpredictable program activities. The 

following four conditions must exist to qualify for the release of agency 

contingency funds:

1. The outbreak must pose an economic threat.

2. Eradication technology must be feasible and cost-effective.

3. No program or no effective program must currently exist.

4. The proposed program must have industry support.

The Overview of Finance SOP contains additional guidance on

 key roles and responsibilities in finance,

 emergency funding processes for foreign animal disease outbreaks, and

 triggering events for APHIS emergency funding.

5.23 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK AND

NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

In any CSF outbreak, the capability to rapidly scale up the size of an IC and 

integrate veterinary functions and countermeasures is critical for an effective 

response. NRF and NIMS, already discussed in this plan, allow such scalability.

The Overview of NRF and NIMS SOP provides additional information on the 

relation of NRF and NIMS to APHIS and lists the responsibilities of Federal, 

State, Tribal, and local governments in a CSF outbreak.

May 2013 5-46
Specific CSF Response Critical Activities and Tools

The documents referenced in this chapter can be found for APHIS employees, at 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml, or for others, at 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

May 2013 5-47 
May 2013 6-1

Chapter 6

Recovery after CSF Outbreak

6.1 PROOF OF FREEDOM

6.1.1 Recognition of Disease-Free Status

As a member of the OIE, the United States has agreed to abide by standards 

drafted and approved by member countries. The OIE does not grant official 

recognition for CSF-freedom, but OIE members can self-declare a compartment, 

zone, or country free from certain OIE-listed diseases such as CSF.

In cases of self-declaration, delegates are advised to consult the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code for specific requirements for self-declaration of freedom 

from CSF. By providing the relevant epidemiological evidence, the OIE member 

can prove to a potential importing country that the entire country, zone, or 

compartment under discussion meets the provisions of the specific disease 

chapter. Any submitted self-declaration should contain evidence demonstrating 

that the requirements for the disease status have been met in accordance with OIE 

standards. This self-declaration must be signed by the official OIE delegate of the 

OIE member concerned.

6.1.2 Criteria Needed for CSF-Free Status

The OIE defines a CSF-free country, zone or compartment as follows (OIE 

Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012), Article 15.2.3):

A country, zone or compartment may be considered free from CSF when 

surveillance in accordance with Articles 15.2.23 to 15.2.28 has been in 

place for at least 12 months, and when:

1. there has been no outbreak of CSF in domestic pigs during the past 

12 months;

2. no evidence of CSFV infection has been found in domestic pigs 

during the past 12 months;

3. no vaccination against CSF has been carried out in domestic pigs 

during the past 12 months unless there are means, validated to OIE 

standards (Chapter 2.8.3 of the Terrestrial Manual), of 

distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs;

4. imported domestic pigs comply with the requirements in Article 

15.2.5 or Article 15.2.6.
May 2013 6-2

6.1.2.1 RECOVERY OF FREE STATUS

There are separate requirements for the recovery of free status in previously CSFfree countries. These requirements, listed below, are taken from Article 15.2.4 of 

the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012).

Should a CSF outbreak occur in a free country, zone or compartment, the 

free status may be restored where surveillance in accordance with 

Articles 15.2.23 to 15.2.28 has been carried out with negative results 

either:

1. three months after the last case where a stamping-out policy without 

vaccination is practiced;

OR

2. where a stamping-out policy with emergency vaccination is 

practiced:

a. three months after the last case and the slaughter of all 

vaccinated animals, or

b. three months after the last case without the slaughter of 

vaccinated animals where there are means, validated to OIE 

standards (Chapter 2.8.3 of the Terrestrial Manual), of 

distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs;

OR

3. where a stamping-out policy is not practiced, the provisions of 

Article 15.2.3 should be followed.

6.1.2.1.1 CSF-Free Compartments

There are no OIE-recognized CSF-free compartments in the world. At this time, a

CSF compartment is unlikely to be established in a CSF outbreak in the United 

States.

6.1.3 Surveillance for Recognition of Disease Freedom

Surveillance is fundamental in proving DF to regain disease-free status after a

CSF outbreak. The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012) specifies 

surveillance procedures for members re-applying for recognition of freedom from 

CSF for the whole country, zone, or compartment.

The introduction to and general conditions for CSF surveillance is provided in 

Article 15.2.23 and Article 15.2.24. Article 15.2.25 explains surveillance

strategies for CSF.
Recovery After a CSF Outbreak

May 2013 6-3 

6.1.3.1 ADDITIONAL SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES FOR COUNTRIES, ZONES,

OR COMPARTMENTS DECLARING FREEDOM FROM CSF 

Article 15.2.26 contains additional surveillance procedures for countries, zones, 

or compartments declaring CSF-freedom. This section is reproduced here. 

1. Country or zone free of CSF

In addition to the general conditions described above, a Member seeking 

recognition of CSF freedom for the country or a zone, whether or not 

vaccination has been practiced, should provide evidence for the existence 

of an effective surveillance program. The strategy and design of the 

surveillance program will depend on the prevailing epidemiological 

circumstances in and around the country or zone and will be planned and 

implemented according to the general conditions and methods described 

in this chapter, to demonstrate the absence of CSFV infection in 

domestic and wild pig populations. This requires the support of a 

national or other laboratory able to undertake identification of CSFV 

infection through virus detection and serological tests described in the 

Terrestrial Manual. 

2. Compartment free of CSF

The objective of surveillance is to demonstrate the absence of CSFV 

infection in the compartment. The provisions of Chapter 4.3 should be 

followed. The effective separation of the two subpopulations should be 

demonstrated. To this end, a biosecurity plan that includes but is not 

limited to the following provisions should be implemented:

a. proper containment of domestic pigs;

b. control of movement of vehicles with cleaning and disinfection

as appropriate;

c. control of personnel entering into the establishments and

awareness of risk of fomite spread;

d. prohibition of introduction to the establishments of wild caught

animals and their products;

e. record of animal movements into and out of establishments;

f. information and training programs for farmers, processors,

veterinarians, etc.

The biosecurity plan implemented also requires internal and external 

monitoring by the Veterinary Authority. This monitoring should include: 

g. periodic clinical and serological monitoring of herds in the

country or zone, and adjacent wild pig populations following

these recommendations;
 

May 2013 6-4 

h. herd registration;

i. official accreditation of biosecurity plans;

j. periodic monitoring and review. 

Monitoring the CSF status of wild and domestic pig populations outside 

the compartment will be of value in assessing the degree of risk they 

pose to the CSF free compartment. The design of a monitoring system is 

dependent on several factors such as the size and distribution of the 

population, the organization of the Veterinary Services and resources 

available. The occurrence of CSF in wild and domestic pigs may vary 

considerably among countries. Surveillance design should be 

epidemiologically based, and the Member should justify its choice of 

design prevalence and level of confidence based on Chapter 1.4. 

The geographic distribution and approximate size of wild pig populations 

need to be assessed as a prerequisite for designing a monitoring system. 

Sources of information may include government wildlife authorities, 

wildlife conservation organizations, hunter associations and other 

available sources. The objectives of a surveillance program when the 

disease is already known to exist should be to determine the geographic 

distribution and the extent of the infection.

6.1.3.2 RECOVERY OF FREE STATUS: ADDITIONAL SURVEILLANCE 

PROCEDURES

For countries that were CSF-free and experienced an outbreak, the OIE has 

additional surveillance procedures for recovering CSF-free status in Article 

15.2.27. 

In addition to the general conditions described in the above-mentioned 

articles, a Member seeking reestablishment of country or zone freedom 

from CSF should show evidence of an active surveillance program to 

demonstrate the absence of CSFV infection.

Populations under this surveillance program should include: 

1. establishments in the proximity of the outbreak; 

2. establishments epidemiologically linked to the outbreak;

3. animals used to re-populate affected establishments and any 

establishments where contiguous culling is carried out; 

4. wild pig populations in the area of the outbreak.
Recovery After a CSF Outbreak

May 2013 6-5

In all circumstances, a Member seeking reestablishment of country or 

zone freedom from CSF with vaccination or without vaccination should 

report the results of an active and a passive surveillance program in 

which the pig population undergoes regular clinical, pathological, 

virological, and/or serological examination, planned and implemented 

according to the general conditions and methods described in these 

recommendations. The surveillance should be based on a statistically 

representative sample of the populations at risk. 

6.1.4 Release of Control Area Restrictions

Quarantine and movement control restrictions will be maintained until at least 28 

days have elapsed since the decontamination of all confirmed IP and negative 

results of surveillance activities. IC and animal health officials need to plan for a 

release of quarantine prior to or during the issuance of quarantine and movement 

controls. Such a plan would specify procedures by which quarantined premises 

will be evaluated for CSF freedom and how the quarantine will be released (by 

sections, by risk, or in its entirety).

6.1.5 Disposition of Vaccinates

If vaccination was used in the outbreak, CSF vaccinates will still be subject to 

movement control and monitoring measures.

6.1.6 Country Freedom Declaration

The United States will apply to the OIE after meeting OIE requirements. CSF-free 

status will require a formal submission detailing CSF policy, eradication 

procedures, surveillance, monitoring and tracing of vaccinates, and veterinary 

infrastructure. Acceptance of the claim for country freedom may also involve an 

inspection by an international panel to review the eradication program and all 

available information.

6.2 REPOPULATION

6.2.1 Restocking Guidance

Following appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures, IP will remain vacant 

for a period of time before restocking susceptible animals onto premises. The 

minimum recommendation is 28 days (two OIE incubation periods for postnatally 

exposed swine). If it is not possible to carry out full cleaning and disinfection

procedures, the premises must remain vacant for a longer period of time to be 

determined by the IC. It is critically important that in restocking, the IC consider 

the likelihood of CSFV survival based on environmental conditions, the execution 

of cleaning and disinfection procedures, and specific circumstances of the 
May 2013 6-6 

outbreak. In some cases, previously IP may need to remain vacant for 

significantly longer than 28 days. 

The producer should provide a restocking plan, including details of the 

susceptible animals, number of animals and locations of sentinel animals. Once 

introduced to the previously IP, no animals may leave until all locations on that 

premises have been restocked and serological diagnostics are negative. 

Non-susceptible species also must be restocked a minimum of 28 days after full 

cleaning and disinfection procedures, as non-susceptible species can act as 

mechanical vectors for CSFV. The IC has the discretion to consider the risk of 

non-susceptible animals and make appropriate considerations for these species.

6.2.2 Testing Requirements for Restocking 

During restocking, animals will be subject to clinical inspection every 3 days for 

the first 14 days (one OIE incubation period for postnatally exposed swine), and 

once per week thereafter up to 28 days (two OIE incubation periods for 

postnatally exposed swine). At 28 days after the last animals are introduced, each 

animal must be clinically examined by a veterinary inspector and samples tested 

for the presence of CSFV antibodies. 

6.2.3 Approved Sources of Swine

Introduced swine must be derived from areas not subject to quarantine and 

movement control measures. All swine must test negative before introduction. A 

24-hour pre-movement clinical inspection is also required. Animals must 

originate on and come from premises on which there has not been a confirmed 

case of CSF within 6.2 miles (10 kilometers) for at least 30 days. 
Appendix A

FAD PReP Materials to Support CSF Response

This appendix lists the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

(FAD PReP) documents that directly support this Classical Swine Fever (CSF) 

Response Plan (2013). The new and revised documents listed below will be 

useful in preparedness and response efforts related to CSF. Many of these 

documents have been released; others are forthcoming. These resources are found 

online for Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) employees at 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml. Select documents are also 

available here: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

CSF CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS PLANNING

Secure Pork Supply Plan (in progress)

CSF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

(SOPS)—CRITICAL ACTIVITIES

These documents are templates to provide a common picture or set of procedures 

for the following tools and strategies used in CSF response:

1. Overview of Etiology and Ecology 

2. Case Definition Development Process 

3. Surveillance 

4. Diagnostics (Sample Collection, Surge Capacity and Reporting)

5. Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing 

6. Overview of Information Management 

7. Communications

8. Health and Safety and Personal Protective Equipment

9. Biosecurity

10. Quarantine and Movement Control

11. Continuity of Business

May 2013 A-1
May 2013 A-2

11. Continuity of Business

12. Overview of Regionalization for International Trade

13. Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

14. Disposal

15. Cleaning and Disinfection

16. Vaccination

17. Overview of the National Veterinary Stockpile 

18. Overview of Wildlife Management and Vector Control

19. Overview of Animal Welfare

20. Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools 

21. Appraisal and Compensation

22. Overview of Finance 

23. Overview of the National Response Framework and National Incident 

Management System 

INDUSTRY MANUAL

 Swine

NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM GUIDELINES

 Health and Safety 

 Personal Protective Equipment 

 Biosecurity

 Quarantine and Movement Control 

 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

 Disposal

 Cleaning and Disinfection 
FAD PReP Materials to Support CSF Response

May 2013 A-3 

 Vaccination for Contagious Diseases 

 Wildlife Management and Vector Control for a Foreign Animal Disease 

(FAD) Response in Domestic Livestock

 National Animal Health Emergency Response Corp (NAHERC) 

Deployment Guide 

 Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing 

 Regionalization for International Trade for a U.S. FAD Response 

 Continuity of Business. 

STRATEGIC PLANS—CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination 

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0) 

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD

PReP Manual 2-0) 

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 

4-0) 

 NCAHEM (National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management) 

Stakeholder Coordination and Collaboration Resource Guide 

 NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan. 

OVERVIEW OF FAD PREP 

FAD PReP Mission and Goals 

The significant threat and potential consequences of FADs and the challenges and 

lessons-learned of effective and rapid FAD response have led to the development 

of the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan, also known as 

“FAD PReP.” The mission of FAD PReP is to raise awareness, expectations, and 

develop capabilities surrounding FAD preparedness and response. The goal of 

FAD PReP is to integrate, synchronize, and de-conflict preparedness and response 

capabilities as much as possible before an outbreak, by providing goals, 

guidelines, strategies, and procedures that are clear, comprehensive, easily 

readable, easily updated, and that comply with the National Incident Management 

System.
May 2013 A-4

In the event of an FAD outbreak, the three key response goals are to: (1) detect, 

control, and contain the FAD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate the 

FAD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the 

economy, and protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide scienceand risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for 

non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.

Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, States, 

Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as 

possible. They will also allow the United States to regain CSF-free status without 

the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak 

itself.

FAD PReP Documents and Materials

FAD PReP is a comprehensive U.S. preparedness and response strategy for FAD 

threats. This strategy is provided and explained in a series of different types of 

integrated documents, as illustrated below in Figure A-1.

Figure A-1. FAD PReP Suite of Documents and Materials

Lessons Learned from Past Outbreaks

Past outbreaks both in the United States and other countries offer important 

lessons that can be applied to preparedness and response efforts. To achieve 

successful outcomes in future FAD response, it is vital to identify, understand, 

and apply these lessons learned: 

 Provide a unified State-Federal-Tribal-industry planning process that 

respects local knowledge.

 Ensure the Unified Command sets clearly defined, obtainable, and unified

goals.

 Have a Unified Command with a clear and proper delegation of authority 

that acts with speed and certainty to achieve united goals.
FAD PReP Materials to Support CSF Response

May 2013 A-5

 Employ science-based and risk-management approaches that protect 

public health, animal health, and the environment, and protect animal 

agriculture, and stabilize the food supply and the U.S. economy.

 Ensure guidelines, strategies, and procedures are communicated to and 

understood by responders and stakeholders.

 Acknowledge that high expectations for timely and successful outcomes 

require the

 rapid scale-up of resources and trained personnel for veterinary 

activities and countermeasures, and

 capability to quickly address competing interests before or during an 

outbreak.

 Ensure rapid detection and effective FAD tracing, essential for timely 

control of FAD outbreaks.
Appendix B

Incident Management

This appendix contains Chapter 4 from the APHIS [Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service] Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination 

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0) document. This chapter explains incident management 

in the event of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. Please refer to the APHIS 

Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP 

Manual 1-0) and the Incident Coordination Group Plan for more information 

(available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep).

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, 

directed the development and administration of the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS). NIMS, in conjunction with the National Response 

Framework, provides the template for managing incidents and provides the 

structure and mechanisms for National-level policy for incident management. 

NIMS provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and 

agencies at all levels of government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 

and the private sector to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the 

effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to 

reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment.

A basic premise of NIMS is that all incidents begin and end locally. NIMS does 

not take command away from State and local authorities. NIMS simply provides 

the framework to enhance the ability of responders, including the private sector 

and NGOs, to work together more effectively. The Federal government supports 

State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed or anticipated to 

be overwhelmed.

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a management system designed to enable 

effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a 

combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communication 

within a common organizational structure. The Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service (APHIS) has adopted NIMS and ICS organizational structures 

and processes to manage animal health incidents. Additional information on 

NIMS can be found at: http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/. Additional 

information on ICS can be found at: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/

IS/ICSResource/index.htm.

APHIS policy and procedures for APHIS Emergency Responder positions and 

APHIS Specialized Emergency Responder positions are described in the APHIS 

May 2013 B-1
 

May 2013 B-2 

Emergency Response Qualification Process and APHIS Emergency Responder 

Position Catalog.

1 APHIS employees can find these documents at: 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/emergency_info/organization/resp_cat.shtml. 

MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION

Multiagency coordination (MAC) is a process that allows all levels of government 

and all disciplines to work together more efficiently and effectively. MAC occurs 

across the different disciplines involved in incident management, across 

jurisdictional lines, or across levels of government. The APHIS Emergency 

Mobilization Guide defines APHIS coordination for major agricultural disasters 

and agro-terrorism responses (see Figure B-1). In the event of an animal 

emergency an APHIS MAC Group will be formed if the incident response needs 

more support. Fundamentally, the APHIS MAC Group will provide support, 

coordination, and assistance with policy-level decisions to the ICS structure 

managing an incident. 

Figure B-1. Coordination Structures: U.S. Department of Agriculture 

and Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency2

Note: EMLC = Emergency Management Leadership Council, ESF = Emergency Support 

Function. 

Figure B-2 illustrates an overview of a MAC system according to NIMS. The 

figure shows the transition over the course of an incident. The incident begins 

with an on-scene single Incident Command (IC); as the incident expands in size 

 1 Information on USDA policies and procedures can be found in Departmental Manual #1800-

001. Incident Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. November 2011; and Departmental 

Regulation #1800-001. Incident Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. November 2011.

2 USDA APHIS, 2009, Emergency Mobilization Guide. 
Incident Management

May 2013 B-3

or complexity developing into a Unified Command, the incident may require offscene coordination and support, which is when MAC Groups are activated.

Figure B-2. Multiagency Coordination System3

Note: EOC = Emergency Operations Center.

APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Figure B-3 displays the APHIS foreign animal disease (FAD) incident 

management organizational structure, starting with the APHIS Administrator.

 3 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 2008. National Incident Management 

System. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf. 
May 2013 B-4

Figure B-3. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and 

APHIS Emergency Operations Center: Relationship to Incident Management Team 

(Assuming a Single Incident)

Note: SAHO = State Animal Health Official, AVIC = Area Veterinarian in Charge.

The APHIS Administrator is the primary Federal executive responsible for 

implementing APHIS policy during an FAD outbreak. The APHIS Administrator 

will delegate many of the actual MAC functions to the Veterinary Services (VS)

Deputy Administrator (Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States) and the 

APHIS Emergency Management Leadership Council (EMLC).

The VS Deputy Administrator and the EMLC will establish an APHIS Incident 

Coordination Group (ICG) to oversee the staff functions associated with the 

incident at the APHIS headquarters level. The APHIS ICG will work closely with 

the personnel in charge of establishing operations for the incident response at the 

Area Command (AC) or Incident Command Post (ICP) in the field and coordinate 

with the APHIS MAC Group.
Incident Management

May 2013 B-5

APHIS MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP

In the event of a significant FAD emergency, the EMLC typically serves as the 

APHIS MAC Group, unless it transfers responsibility for a specific incident. The 

EMLC is co-chaired by Plant Protection and Quarantine’s Associate Director, 

Emergency and Domestic Programs and VS’ Associate Deputy Administrator, 

Emergency Management and Diagnostics. The EMLC is comprised of the 

following headquarters and regional members:

 Plant Protection and Quarantine,

 VS,

 Animal Care,

 Wildlife Services,

 International Services,

 Biotechnology Regulatory Services,

 Marketing and Regulatory Programs Business Services,

 Legislative and Public Affairs,

 Policy and Program Development,

 Investigative Enforcement Services,

 Emergency Management and Safety and Security Division, and

 APHIS Chief Information Officer.

The APHIS MAC Group may include additional members if the response requires 

them and may be activated if one or more of the following conditions take place:

 complex incidents that overwhelm local and regional assets;

 overlapping USDA agency jurisdictions;

 an incident that crosses international borders; or

 the existence of or potential for a high level of National political and 

media interest.

The APHIS MAC Group provides a forum to discuss actions that need to be taken 

to ensure that an adequate number of resources are available to meet anticipated 
May 2013 B-6 

needs. The APHIS MAC Group strategically coordinates the incident response, 

but does not typically direct the APHIS ICG.

The APHIS MAC Group offers guidance on the most efficient way to allocate 

resources during an animal health event. Specific responsibilities vary from 

disease to disease, but the general functions of the APHIS MAC Group include 

 incident prioritization,

 resource allocation and acquisition, and 

 identification and resolution of issues common to all parties. 

APHIS INCIDENT COORDINATION GROUP

The APHIS ICG is responsible for supporting an IC and AC in acquiring 

resources, formulating policy options, and assisting in developing and 

implementing response and recovery strategies for FAD outbreaks. For additional 

information and details, see the National Center for Animal Health Emergency 

Management (NCAHEM) Incident Coordination Group Plan. Figure B-4 

illustrates an example organizational chart for an APHIS ICG. The group has the 

following responsibilities:

 providing guidelines to ensure responder and public health and safety; 

 supporting IC(s) and AC(s); 

 assisting in developing response policy as needed; 

 coordinating effective communication; 

 coordinating resources; 

 assisting in establishing epidemiological priorities; 

 assisting in developing incident objectives and approving response 

strategies for emergency vaccination as needed; 

 assisting in integrating response organizations into the ICS; 

 assisting in developing protocols as needed; 

 providing information to the Joint Information Center for use in media and 

stakeholder briefings; 

 providing budget requests and projections as needed; and
Incident Management

May 2013 B-7

 assessing response progress, response strategies, and providing economic 

analyses as needed.

Figure B-4. Example APHIS Incident Coordination Group—Organizational Structure 

(for Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak)

Note: SAHO = State Animal Health Official, CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, EPA = 

Environmental Protection Agency, EOC = Emergency Operations Center, FDA = Food and Drug Administration, FSIS

= Food Safety Inspection Service, AEOC = APHIS Emergency Operations Center, NASDA = National Association of 

State Departments of Agriculture, GIS = Geographic Information System, NVSL = National Veterinary Services 

Laboratories, NAHLN = National Animal Health Laboratory Network, CF = Contingency Fund, CA = Cooperative 

Agreement, CCC = Commodity Credit Corporation, BPA = Blanket Purchase Agreement, ESF = Emergency Support 

Function, NVS = National Veterinary Stockpile, NRMT = National Response Management Team.
May 2013 B-8

APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR A SINGLE INCIDENT

The ICP is a physical location that administers the on-scene IC and the other 

major incident management functions. An Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

is a physical location that is located separately from the on-scene ICP and 

supports the on-scene response by providing external coordination and securing of 

additional resources. A MAC Group does not have any direct IC involvement and 

will often be located some distance from the incident site(s). EOC/MAC Groups 

do not command the on-scene level of the incident, but rather supports the ICP’s

command and management efforts.

At the start of any FAD outbreak, the State Animal Health Official (SAHO), or 

designee, and Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC), or designee, will initially 

serve as the co-Incident Commanders for the Unified Command. The AVIC and 

SAHO may be relieved by an Incident Management Team (IMT) if there is a 

delegation of authority to the IMT. Figure B-3 is an example of an APHIS 

organization chart for a single incident.

APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR MULTIPLE INCIDENTS

When more than one incident is occurring at the same time, more than one IC

may be established. An AC may also be established. An AC is an organization 

that oversees the management of multiple incidents handled individually by 

separate IC organizations or to oversee the management of a very large or 

evolving incident engaging multiple IMTs. An AC should not be confused with 

the functions performed by MAC as AC oversees management coordination of 

the incident(s), while a MAC element (such as a communications/dispatch center, 

EOC, or MAC Group) coordinates support.

In terms of MAC Group structures, if the emergency response becomes too large 

for an APHIS MAC Group to handle efficiently—for example, a large multistate 

incident with numerous response activities—cooperation from other agencies or 

committees will be implemented. MAC Groups will coordinate additional 

resources and make decisions regarding the prioritization of incidents and the 

sharing and use of critical resources, but are not a part of the on-scene IC. Figure 

B-5 is an example of the command structure when multiple incidents are 

involved.
Incident Management

May 2013 B-9

Figure B-5. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations 

Center: Relationship to Multiple Incident Management Team Structures

(Assuming Multiple Incidents and a Unified Area Command)

APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAMS

Upon detection and confirmation of an FAD incident, the SAHO or AVIC 

establishes an ICP with an IMT, headed by an Incident Commander. Figure B-6 

depicts the organization of the APHIS VS IMT for managing an incident.

Figure B-6. Current APHIS VS Incident Management Team—Short Team Configuration
May 2013 B-10

The IMT includes an Incident Commander and staff for various types of 

communication, safety, and liaison purposes. This staff and the heads of the 

Incident Commander’s line organization sections are considered the Incident 

Commander’s general staff. The IMT also includes four line organizations to 

perform all of the efforts required to identify, contain, eradicate, recover, and 

return the situation to normal business practices. These line organizations include 

sections for operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. 

Within each of these sections is the capability to accomplish all of the tasks 

necessary to ensure a successful outcome to an FAD incident.

For single-incident outbreaks where the potential for spread is low, a short team 

configuration as depicted in Table B-1 will suffice.

Table B-1. List of Short Team Configuration Positions

APHIS VS IMT Short Team APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog

Incident Commander A800 Incident Commander

Deputy Incident Commander A800 Incident Commander

Operations Section Chief A810 Operations Section Chief

Deputy Operations Section A810 Operations Section Chief

Planning Section Chief A820 Planning Section Chief

Deputy Planning Section A820 Planning Section Chief

Logistics Section Chief A830 Logistics Section Chief

Deputy Logistics Section A830 Logistics Section Chief

Finance Section Chief A840 Finance Section Chief

Deputy Finance Section A840 Finance Section Chief

Safety Officer A805 Safety Officer (or A001)

Assistant Safety Officer A805 Safety Officer

Public Information Officer A803 Public Information Officer

Liaison Officer A807 Liaison Officer

Assistant Liaison Officer A807 Liaison Officer

Information Technology (IT)

Specialist

A122 IT Specialist

Assistant IT Specialist A122 IT Specialist

EMRS Specialist A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)

Assistant EMRS Specialist A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)

Epidemiologist A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)

Assistant Epidemiologist A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)

Note: EMRS = Emergency Management Response System.

When an outbreak occurs that is complex or large scale, a long team 

configuration, as listed in Table B-2, will be established. The long team consists 

of additional team members beyond those in the initial short team configuration. 
Incident Management

May 2013 B-11

Figure B-7 shows an example long team configuration; however, the exact 

makeup of the long teams will depend on the type of disease and magnitude of 

spread.

Table B-2. Typical Positions—Long Team Configuration

APHIS VS Long IMT Configuration

APHIS Emergency

Responder Position Catalog

Deputy Operations Section Chief A810 Operations Section Chief

Deputy Planning Section Chief A820 Planning Section Chief

Deputy Logistics Section Chief A830 Logistics Section Chief

Deputy Finance Section Chief A840 Finance Section Chief

Disease Management Branch Director

 Appraisal Group Supervisor

 Euthanasia Group Supervisor

 Disposal Group Supervisor

 Cleaning and Disinfection Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

Disease Surveillance Branch Director

 Mortality Surveillance Group Supervisor

 Diagnosis and Inspection Group Supervisor

 Disease Survey Group Supervisor

 Vaccination Group Supervisor

 Tactical Epidemiology Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

Disease Support Branch Director

 Education/Outreach Group Supervisor

 Vector Control Group Supervisor

 Biosecurity and Disease Prevention Group 

Supervisor

 Movement and Permits Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

Air Operations Branch —

Staging Area Manager (Operations) —

Resources Unit Leader

 Orientation and Training Group Supervisor

A821 Resources Unit Leader

A813 Group Supervisor

Documentation Unit Leader A823 Documentation Unit Leader

Situation Unit Leader

 Disease Reporting Cell Supervisor

 Epidemiology Cell Supervisor

 Geographic Information System (GIS) Cell

Supervisor

 Intelligence Cell Supervisor

 Wildlife Cell Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor (or A822)

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor (or A825)

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor (or A045)

Demobilization Unit Leader A824 Demobilization Unit Leader
May 2013 B-12

Table B-2. Typical Positions—Long Team Configuration

APHIS VS Long IMT Configuration

APHIS Emergency

Responder Position Catalog

 Communications Unit Leader

 Medical Unit Leader

 Information Technology Specialist

 Supply Unit Leader

 Facilities Unit Leader

 Ground Support Unit Leader

 Waste Management Unit Leader

A831 Communications Unit Leader

A815 Team Leader (or A001 or A057)

A122 IT Specialist

A833 Supply Unit Leader

A834 Facilities Unit Leader

A832 Ground Support Unit Leader

A003 Environmental Protection Specialist

 Time Unit Leader

 Procurement Unit Leader

 Compensation/Claims Unit Leader

 Cost Unit Leader

A842 Time Unit Leader

A841 Procurement Unit Leader

A844 Compensation/Claims Unit Leader

A843 Cost Unit Leader
Incident Management

May 2013 B-13

Figure B-7. Example APHIS VS Incident Management Team—Long Team Configuration
 

May 2013 B-14 

RESPONSE RESOURCES

The IMT, ICG, and APHIS MAC Group can use a number of systems to aid in 

staffing and resourcing during an event such as the Emergency Qualification 

System (EQS) and the Resource Ordering and Status System (ROSS), which are 

discussed below. The APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide and the NCAHEM 

Incident Coordination Group Plan are two planning documents that are used as 

response resources. 

APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide 

The APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide provides information and policy for 

mobilizing APHIS personnel for emergency events. The APHIS Emergency 

Mobilization Guide is available at: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/emergency_ 

response/. 

NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan 

The NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan provides details on how the VS 

program unit will provide incident coordination support during FAD outbreaks. 

APHIS Emergency Qualification System 

The APHIS EQS is used to store the skills and qualifications of emergency 

response personnel and other data imported from the National Finance Center and 

AgLearn and to feed certification data to ROSS. It is customizable to APHIS 

program needs and can house training documents. Training documentation flow 

into EQS from AgLearn for APHIS employees. If the National Animal Health 

Emergency Response Corps (NAHERC) volunteers do not have access to 

AgLearn, their training documentation can be manually entered or imported 

through an Excel spreadsheet. 

APHIS Resource Ordering and Status System 

The APHIS ROSS allows APHIS to identify, track, and mobilize the resources 

needed to support emergency response. It provides a database of qualified 

emergency response personnel. The database can be searched according to 

personnel training levels and subject of expertise, such as procurement, 

epidemiology, or public information. Being able to quickly identify and dispatch 

appropriate personnel and supplies is a key component of emergency response, 

and ROSS facilitates that process. ROSS initiatives include the following: 

 developing the APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog
Incident Management

May 2013 B-15

 integrating ROSS into APHIS emergency management practices

 training and sustaining an APHIS dispatch community.

Figure B-8 illustrates the relationships among the APHIS ICG, Dispatch

Coordination Centers, ACs, and ICPs.

Figure B-8. Resource Ordering Coordination4

Note: AEOC = APHIS Emergency Operations Center, DCC = Dispatch Coordinating Center. 

 4 USDA APHIS, 2009. Emergency Mobilization Guide.
Appendix C

Laboratory Network List

for Classical Swine Fever

The list of laboratories in the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) is 

found here. The following laboratories can currently perform testing for classical swine 

fever (CSF) after National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) confirmation of 

CSF. 

Table C-1. CSF NAHLN Laboratories

# State Laboratory Phone numbers

1 Arizona Arizona Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

2831 N. Freeway

Tucson, AZ 85705 

520-621-2356

Fax 520-626-8696

2 Arkansas Arkansas Livestock & Poultry Commission Laboratory

One Natural Resources Dr.

Little Rock, AR 72205 

501-907-2430

Fax 501-907-2410

3 California California Animal Health & Food Safety Laboratory

University of California, School of Vet Med 

West Health Sciences Drive 

Davis, CA 95616

530-752-8709 

Fax 530-752-5680

4 Colorado Colorado State University Veterinary Diag. Lab 

300 West Drake Rd, Bldg C

Fort Collins, CO 80523-1644

970-297-1281

Fax 970-297-0320

5 Colorado Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Lab-Rocky 

Ford

27847 County Road 21

Rocky Ford, CO 81067 

719-254-6382

Fax 719-254-6055

6 Connecticut Connecticut Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory 

University of Connecticut 

Unit 3089, 61 N. Eagleville Rd. 

Storrs, CT 06269-3089

860-486-3738 

Fax 860-486-2737

7 Florida Bronson Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Florida Dept. of Ag. and Consumer Services

2700 N. John Young Parkway

Kissimmee, FL 34741 

321-697-1400

Fax 321-697-1467

8 Georgia University of Georgia Tifton Veterinary Diag. Laboratory

43 Brighton Road, PO Box 1389

Tifton, GA 31793-3000

229-386-3340

Fax 229-386-3399

9 Georgia Athens Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

501 DW Brooks Drive

University of Georgia College of Vet Med, 

Athens, GA 30602 

706-542-5568

Fax 706-542-5977

May 2013 C-1
May 2013 C-2 

Table C-1. CSF NAHLN Laboratories

# State Laboratory Phone numbers

10 Illinois Illinois Department of Agriculture, Animal Disease Laboratory

Galesburg Animal Disease Lab

2100 S. Lake Storey Rd.

Galesburg, IL 61401

309-344-2451

Fax 309-344-7358

11 Illinois University of Illinois Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

2001 S. Lincoln Avenue

Urbana, IL 61802-6199 

217-333-1620

Fax 217-244-2439

12 Indiana Indiana Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory at Purdue 

University

406 South University St.

West Lafayette, IN 47907 

765-494-7440

Fax 765-494-9181

13 Iowa Iowa State University

Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

1600 S. 16th St.

Ames, IA 50011 

515-294-1950

Fax 515-294-3564

14 Iowa USDA, APHIS, VS, NVSL, Diagnostic Virology Laboratory

1920 Dayton Ave

Ames, IA 50010 

515-337-7551

Fax 515-337-7527

15 Kansas Kansas State Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

Kansas State University, CVM

L232 Mosier Hall, 1800 Dennison Ave

Manhattan, KS 66506 

785-532-5650

Fax 785-532-4039

16 Kentucky Breathitt Veterinary Center

Murray State University

715 North Drive

Hopkinsville, KY 42240 

270-886-3959

Fax 270-886-4295

17 Kentucky University of Kentucky, Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

1490 Bull Lea Road

Lexington, KY 40511

859-257-8283

Fax 859-255-1624

18 Louisiana Louisiana Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Veterinary Med Diag. Laboratory, LSU

1909 Skip Bertman Drive 

Baton Rouge, LA 70803 

225-578-9777

Fax 225-578-9784

19 Michigan Diagnostic Center for Population and Animal Health

Michigan State University

4125 Beaumont Rd, Ste 201H

Lansing, MI 48910 

517-353-1683

Fax 517-432-5836

20 Minnesota University of Minnesota Veterinary Diagnostic Lab

1333 Gortner Ave, 244 Vet DL,

St. Paul, MN 55108 

612-625-8787

Fax 612-624-8707

21 Mississippi Mississippi Veterinary Research & Diagnostic Laboratory 

3137 Hwy 468 West

Pearl, MS 39208 

601-420-4700

Fax 601-420-4719

22 Missouri Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory

University of Missouri

1600 East Rollins

Columbia, MO 65211 

573-882-6811

Fax 573-882-1411
Laboratory Network List for Classical Swine Fever

May 2013 C-3

Table C-1. CSF NAHLN Laboratories

# State Laboratory Phone numbers

23 Montana Montana Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

PO Box 997

Marsh Laboratory, 19th and Lincoln

Bozeman, MT 59771

406-994-4885

Fax 406-994-6344

24 Nebraska Veterinary Diagnostic Center

University of Nebraska

East Campus Loop and Fair Street 

Lincoln, NE 68583-0907 

402-472-1434 

Fax 402-472-3094

25 New Jersey New Jersey Department of Agriculture, Division of Animal 

Health

Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory, NJPHEAL

3 Schwarzkopf Drive

Ewing, NJ 08628

609-406-6999

Fax 609-671-6414

26 New York Animal Health Diagnostic Center

Upper Tower Road,

College of Vet Med, Cornell University

Ithaca, NY 14853 

607-253-3900

27 New York USDA, APHIS, VS, Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

PO Box 848 40550 Route 25

Greenport, NY 11857

631-323-3256

Fax 631-323-3366

28 North 

Carolina

Rollins Diagnostic Laboratory

North Carolina Department of Agriculture

2101 Blue Ridge Rd.

Raleigh, NC 27607 

919-733-3986

Fax 919-733-0454

29 North Dakota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

North Dakota State University

NDSU Dept. 7691, PO Box 6050

Fargo, ND 58108-6050 

701-231-8307

Fax 701-231-7514

30 Ohio Ohio Department of Agriculture

Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

8995 E. Main Street, Building 6

Reynoldsburg, OH 43068

614-728-6220

Fax 614-728-6310

31 Oklahoma Oklahoma Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Oklahoma State University, College of Veterinary Medicine

Farm & Ridge Road

Stillwater, OK 74078 

405-744-6623

Fax 405-744-8612

32 Oregon Oregon State University Veterinary Diagnostic Lab

Magruder Hall 134

Corvallis, OR 97331

541-737-3261

Fax 541-737-6817

33 Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Veterinary Laboratory

Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture

2305 N. Cameron Street

Harrisburg, PA 17110 

717-787-8808

Fax 717-772-3895

34 South 

Carolina

Clemson Veterinary Diagnostic Center

PO Box 102406

500 Clemson Road

Brookings, SC 29229

803-788-2260

Fax 803-788-8058
May 2013 C-4

Table C-1. CSF NAHLN Laboratories

# State Laboratory Phone numbers

35 South 

Dakota

Animal Disease Research & Diagnostic Laboratory

South Dakota State University

Box 2175, N. Campus Dr.

Brookings, SD 57007 

605-688-5171

Fax 605-688-6003

36 Tennessee CE Kord Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Ellington Agricultural Center

440 Hogan Rd.

Nashville, TN 37220 

615-837-5125

Fax 615-837-5250

37 Texas Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory

1 Sippel Road, Drawer 3040

College Station, TX 77843 

979-845-3414

Fax 979-845-1794

38 Texas Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory - Amarillo

6610 Amarillo Blvd West

Amarillo, TX 79106 

806-353-7478

Fax 806-359-0636

39 Utah Utah Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

950 E.1400 North

Logan, UT 84341 

435-797-1895

Fax 435-797-2805

40 Washington Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

PO Box 647034

Bustad Hall, Room 155-N

Pullman, WA 99164-7034 

509-335-9696/

509-335-6190

Fax 509-335-7424

41 Wisconsin Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

University of Wisconsin-Madison

445 Easterday Lane

Madison, WI 53706-1253 

608-262-5432 

Fax 847-574-8085

42 Wyoming Wyoming State Veterinary Laboratory

1174 Snowy Range Road

Laramie, WY 82070 

307-766-9925

Fax 307-721-2051
May 2013 D-1

Appendix D

Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance 

Guidance and Rationale

CSF OUTBREAK SURVEILLANCE GUIDELINES

These are updated recommendations for classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak 

surveillance, prepared by the National Surveillance Unit (NSU) of the Centers for 

Epidemiology and Animal Health, Veterinary Services (VS), Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service (APHIS). These guidelines may be updated 

periodically.

Purpose

The purpose of these guidelines is to provide recommendations for surveillance 

activities in domestic swine for this CSF Response Plan. These are sample 

guidelines. 

These are strategies regarding sampling sizes and sampling frequencies for 

premises in the Infected Zone (IZ), Buffer Zone (BZ), Surveillance Zone (SZ), 

and proof of disease freedom (DF) that do not require daily product movement. 

Surveillance will be conducted at intervals as specified by the Incident Command 

(IC) using the most current scientific information and best practice guidance 

available. 

Objectives

The objectives of CSF outbreak surveillance are to

 detect CSF Infected Premises (IP) during an outbreak;

 determine the size and extent of a CSF outbreak;

 supply information to evaluate outbreak control activities;

 provide information for animal and product movement within the Control 

Area (CA); 

 provide information for animal and product movement out of the CA;

 prove DF to regain CSF-free status after eradication of the outbreak.
May 2013 D-2

Definitions

There are two key definitions that are important in outbreak surveillance.

 Clinically ill animals. Animals with clinical signs of illness compatible 

with CSF.

 Detection probability. Likelihood that the sampling scheme will detect at 

least one infected animal in each premises or epidemiological unit with 95 

percent confidence at the selected design prevalence, population size, and 

sensitivity of the chosen validated test.

Rationale for Selecting a Design Prevalence

It is difficult to recommend a single surveillance sampling scheme for a CSF 

outbreak because many factors impact the nature and characteristics of the 

outbreak. Each outbreak is different; surveillance plans will need to be tailored to 

individual outbreaks. 

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTING A DESIGN PREVALENCE

There are a number of general factors that impact the selection of a design 

prevalence to be used in a CSF surveillance plan. Some of these factors are 

related to the nature of the CSF outbreak itself, while others are related to the 

surveillance plan. 

 Outbreak or disease related factors:

 Prevalence. (1) proportion of infected animals on the premises, or 

(2) proportion of IP in the area at a specific time period.

 Incubation period. Length of the period that elapses between the 

introduction of the pathogen into the animal and the occurrence of the 

first clinical signs.

 Transmission and generation. Length of time between when one 

animal is infected, becomes infectious, and infects another animal.

 Ease of recognition. The ease of recognition of clinical signs of CSF in 

affected species.

 Time. The length of time which has passed since the disease was 

introduced to the premises or area.

 Herd size. Number of animals on a given premises.

 Density of premises. Number of IP in a given area.
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-3

 Surveillance plan factors:

 Resources. Resources that are available for sample collection or visual 

observation, including personnel.

 Diagnostics. Tests that are available, including how many animals 

must be tested, and what type of sample (tissue, serum) is needed.

 Detection time. How long it takes before a test can detect the presence 

of CSF virus (CSFV) in an animal. For example, does the test require 

the animal to be clinically ill or can it detect prior to visual signs.

 Test sensitivity. The estimated proportion of true diseased or infected 

animals that will test positive.

 Test specificity. The estimated proportion of true non-diseased or noninfected animals that will test negative.

 Frequency. How often samples must be collected and diagnostic tests 

must be conducted for effective surveillance.

 Goal of surveillance. A surveillance scheme will depend on whether 

the goal is to prove DF or detect disease in a vaccinated or 

unvaccinated population.

 Confidence level. The probability of accepting the null hypothesis 

when it is true; choosing a confidence level (for example, 90 percent,

95 percent, or 99 percent) for the surveillance plan.

All of the factors listed above are interrelated. Table D-1 lists the factors and 

general surveillance design in an outbreak response effort. It is important to 

consider all factors together, rather than independently, when developing a 

surveillance plan.
May 2013 D-4

Table D-1. Interaction of Disease/Outbreak and Surveillance Factors, with Suggested 

Adaptations in Surveillance Scheme

Surveillance Factors

Disease/Outbreak

Factor Design 

prevalence

Sampling 

frequency

Visual/

observational 

exam (lower 

sensitivity 

test)

Animal 

handling

Test 

sensitivity

Early 

detection

Tissue 

testing 

(higher 

sensitivity 

test)

Shorter incubation 

period

Increase Increase Use, depending 

on strength of 

clinical signs

Decrease Less

important

Increased 

likelihood

Less

important

Strong clinical signs Increase Depends Use Decrease Less

important

Increased 

likelihood

Less

important

Size of epidemiological

unit

Decrease Frequent Depends Depends More

important

Depends More

important

Increased prevalence Decrease Less 

frequent

Depends Depends Less

important

Depends Less

important

REASONS TO SELECT A LOW DESIGN PREVALENCE

It is impossible to select one disease factor and one surveillance factor from Table 

D-1 and to understand how the surveillance factor should change based on that 

one disease factor independently of the other factors. However, if possible, it is 

always desired to (1) select the test that detects CSFV as early as possible, and 

(2) use the lowest design prevalence. A low design prevalence is consistent with 

surveillance schemes used for disease detection, business continuity, and proof of 

DF.

The reasons for selecting the low design prevalence are as follows.

 CSFV is highly contagious. In a naïve population, the virus multiplies 

rapidly in multiple animals and spreads quickly throughout the population 

via direct contact, indirect contact (fomites), and possible aerosol 

transmission.

 Animals infected with CSFV may become infectious and transmit the 

virus early in the infectious process (1 to 14 days after exposure, 

depending on the specific virus and susceptibility of the infected pigs); 

this may be before clinical signs are apparent.

 Clinical infection varies from very mild to severe; animals with mild 

clinical signs may not be detected.

 Low design prevalence will be exceeded rapidly, as CSF spreads quickly 

through an epidemiological unit, which fosters early disease detection in 

comparison to a high design prevalence.

 Early detection reduces the time that premises are infectious.
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-5

 The CSFV is detectable in lymphoidal and reticuloendothelial tissues (for 

example, spleen, lymph nodes, and tonsils [preferred]) before animals 

display clinical signs.

 Collection of samples required for approved and validated diagnostic 

tests—such as tissue, whole blood, or serum—requires direct contact with 

the animal.

 There are no approved and validated mass population or pooled sampling 

procedures.

 Monitoring feed intake in large swine herds may require more than a few 

infected animals before signs trigger additional diagnostics.

 It is not likely that the index premises is the first IP; CSFV may be widely 

dispersed.

 All IP may be a source for transmission of CSFV.

 More undetected IP (without movement controls) increases the 

probability that the CSF outbreak will be widespread.

 Personnel may unknowingly transmit CSF from clinically normal but 

infected animals to uninfected animals.

 Following appropriate biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection 

requirements, surveillance teams can sample approximately 2 premises per 

day if taking individual animal samples.

Surveillance Scheme Sampling Considerations

Surveillance on susceptible premises should detect the presence of CSFV at the 

earliest possible moment after viral introduction. This occurs when the virus is 

detectable, using the lowest possible design prevalence, in tissues or serum.

The choice of the design prevalence depends on (1) the surveillance methodology, 

(2) the diagnostic test sensitivity, and (3) the chosen confidence level.

At present, there are no validated mass population sampling techniques, as 

explained in Chapter 5 of this CSF Response Plan. It is a priority to validate mass 

population or pooled sample testing. 

Currently, as explained in Chapter 5, the following diagnostic tests will be used in 

a CSF outbreak to detect and characterize CSFV. 

 Virus isolation 

 Avidin-Biotin Complex stain (known as ABC stain)
May 2013 D-6

 Immunoperoxidase 

 Ab enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (Ab ELISA)

 Virus neutralization (VNT)

 Real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR)

 Nested PCR.

The rRT-PCR test will be used in an outbreak to detect infected, unvaccinated 

animals because of its rapid turnaround time (approximately 4 hours). 

Given that no mass population sampling techniques are available at this time, the 

following questions provide guidance to develop a surveillance sampling scheme 

after declaration of a CSF outbreak in a location or area. 

ACUTE FORM (CLINICALLY ILL ANIMALS ON PREMISES)

1. Are resources available to intensively survey premises (for example, 

collect tissue and whole blood samples from the needed number of 

clinically ill animals)?

If “yes,” then

2. Does evidence suggest the introduction of the virus (the start of the 

outbreak) on the premises or in the zone began at least 5 days ago but less 

than 21 days ago?

3. Is there evidence that the CSF serotype is highly pathogenic (a high 

proportion of the infected animals will show clinical signs and/or severe

clinical signs)?

If “yes” to Questions 2 and 3, then

4. Is it likely that the outbreak can be contained locally (for example, on a 

farm or within a small geographic area)?

5. Are there limited movements of animals, vehicles, products, and personnel 

on and off premises (in other words, it is unlikely that the virus will be 

introduced to, or spread from, this premises or zone)? 

6. Are the swine operations in the zone managed for low-risks of exposure 

(for example, biosecurity practices in place, little opportunity for fomite 

transmission)? 

7. Are there few noncommercial swine operations or feral swine in the zone?

8. Are there large swine operations in the zone?
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-7

If all or most of the answers to Questions 4–8 are “yes,” the minimum 

surveillance sampling to detect CSFV is observational surveillance with routine 

visual inspection of swine for clinical signs, and targeted tissue sampling of 

individual animals with clinical signs. 

If all or most of the answers to Questions 4–8 are “no,” both animals with clinical 

signs and those appearing healthy should be sampled.

If the answer to Question 1 is “no,” then visual surveillance should be conducted. 

Laboratory sampling/testing should be initiated upon positive visual exam for 

verification. Premises must be sampled based on the probability of transmitting 

CSF (the highest probability premises will be sampled first), whether rRT-PCR or 

serologic tests are used.

Please see these questions illustrated in Figure D-1.

NON-ACUTE FORMS (CONVALESCENT, ASYMPTOMATIC, OR ANIMALS WITH MILD 

CLINICAL SIGNS)

1. Are resources available to intensively survey premises (for example, 

collect tissue, serum, or whole blood samples from the needed number of 

clinically ill animals)?

If “yes,” then

2. Does evidence suggest that the introduction of virus (the start of the 

outbreak) on the premises or in the zone began at least 21 days ago?

3. Is there evidence that the CSF serotype is not highly pathogenic (a high 

proportion of infected animals will show clinical signs and/or severe 

clinical signs)?

If the answer is “yes” to either Question 2 or 3, then sampling and serological 

testing of both ill and healthy animals on the premises is necessary. 

If the answer to Questions 2 and 3 is “no,” then please see the Acute Form 

flowchart.

Questions 4–8 in the previous section will help design the specific surveillance 

scheme, but do not influence the test choice or sampling targets.

If the answer to Question 1 is “no,” then visual surveillance should be conducted. 

Laboratory sampling/testing should be initiated upon positive visual exam for 

verification. Because there may be few or no clinical signs, premises must be 

sampled based on the probability of transmitting CSF (the highest probability 

premises will be sampled first), whether rRT-PCR or serologic tests are used.

Please see these questions illustrated in Figure D-2.
May 2013 D-8

Figure D-1. Surveillance Scheme Sampling Considerations: Acute Form

Are resources 

available 

(Question 1)?

Answer questions 

2-3

Answer questions 

4-8

YES NO

If “Yes” to questions 2-3

Visual 

surveillance;

premises with highest 

probability of CSF transmission will 

be sampled first; initiate laboratory 

sampling for verification upon 

positive visual exam 

Answered “Yes” more times than “No”?

Visually inspect 

swine for clinical signs and 

collect tissues from clinical 

animals

See “Non-Acute Form” flowchart

If “No” to questions 2-3

Answered “No” more times than “Yes”?

Sample both 

clinical and healthy 

animals on premises
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-9

Figure D-2. Surveillance Scheme Sampling Considerations: Non-Acute Form

Are resources 

available 

(Question 1)?

Answer questions 

2-3

YES NO

If “Yes” to questions 2 or 3

Visual 

surveillance;

premises with highest 

probability of CSF transmission will 

be sampled first; initiate laboratory 

sampling for verification upon 

positive visual exam 

Sampling and 

serology of both clinical 

and healthy animals on 

premises

See “Acute Form” flowchart

If “No” to questions 2 and 3

Surveillance Test Choices

The positive predictive value (PPV) of a diagnostic test depends, foremost, on the 

disease prevalence in the population. The PPV also depends on test specificity 

and sensitivity. The PPV of any test is poor if the prevalence in the population is 

less than 5 percent. Early in the disease outbreak, it can be difficult to estimate the 

prevalence of IP in a given area, or the prevalence of infected animals on a given 

premises. The goal is always to detect viral presence with the least number of 

infectious animals. Subsequently, it is important to use the lowest design 

prevalence possible.

The negative predictive value of a test is best used when the disease is not 

prevalent (less than 1 percent), the specificity of the test is high, and there is little 

disease clustering. These conditions, coupled with low design prevalence and 

negative diagnostic test results, facilitate proving DF in a given population.

As CSF viral prevalence increases, the PPV increases and the specificity of the 

test plays a minor role in disease detection. With CSF, the rRT-PCR has the 

ability to detect viral presence earlier than visual examination. 

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DIAGNOSTIC TEST CHOICE

The choice of a diagnostic test or tests is influenced by a number of choices, 

including the following:

 Resources available.
May 2013 D-10

 CSF prevalence in the population. The following factors increase 

prevalence:

 Highly contagious animals.

 Short incubation period (2 days vs. 2 weeks).

 Number of contacts between infectious and susceptible animals.

 Animals infected with CSFV may become infectious and transmit the 

virus early in the infectious process (1 to 14 days after exposure, 

depending on viral virulence and pig susceptibility); this is before 

clinical signs are apparent.

 Pathogenicity of the virus.

 Test characteristics.

 Prevalence at which the test can detect disease.

 For example, visual inspection may require approximately 50–75 

percent of the herd to be infected before morbidity is likely to 

appear abnormally high.

 Speed of test results.

 Sensitivity.

 Sampling frequency.

 Level of animal contact required.

SAMPLING ALTERNATIVES

If resources are not significantly limited, (1) use the lowest intra-premises and 

inter-premises design threshold, and (2) sample at least three times per incubation 

period.

If mass population sampling tests become available, substitute these tests for 

individual animal sampling, and sample frequently.

The following are sampling scheme alternatives to individual sampling using a 1 

percent design prevalence.

 Increase the design intra-premises prevalence from 1 to 2 percent, or 5 to 

10 percent. With each percent increase, fewer animals will be sampled.

 With a highly contagious CSF viral strain, there will be less time lost 

between infection and detection when using higher design prevalence. 
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-11

This is because the number of ill animals increases exponentially. If R0=2, 

each animal infects 2 others, so then the number of infected animals will 

increase in the exposed group from 1, 2, 4, 8 etc. If R0=5, every animal 

infected will infect five other animals, so the number of infected animals 

will increase from 1, 5, 25, 125, etc.1

 Visual detection of CSF infected animals will become easier.

 If the CSFV strain has a short incubation period, there will be less time 

lost between infection and detection using a higher design prevalence 

because the animals become infectious and display clinical signs rapidly. 

 The reverse is true with a CSFV that has a longer incubation period.

SAMPLING EXAMPLES

1. rRT-PCR. The rRT-PCR test would be used to sample all clinically ill 

swine. The remainder of the samples (from the calculated total needed) 

would be from swine selected from the population without clinical signs. 

In this population of swine that do not have clinical signs, the prevalence 

of infected swine is expected to be less than in the sub-population of 

animals with clinical signs.

2. Visual examination. Visual examination will occur in the sub-population 

of animals with clinical signs. 

For example, 5 pyretic pigs may be expected each day in a group of 250 

pigs (pneumonia, etc.). Visual observation would detect the 5 additional 

CSF clinically ill pigs (the prevalence of CSF in the group may vary from 

10 to 80 percent). The prevalence of CSF infected animals would be 50 

percent in the group of 10 clinically ill animals.

MINIMUM SAMPLE SIZES

Tissue or whole blood collection from apparently healthy animals/herds is 

performed to detect subclinical animals as quickly as possible, reducing the risk 

of virus spread. The selection of an appropriate prevalence level in a CSF 

outbreak should be based on known or estimated epidemiological findings. 

Table D-2 presents sample sizes based on prevalence levels. Five percent and 10 

percent prevalence rates are also provided. 

 1 R0 is the basic reproduction number, or the expected number of cases produced by a single 

case in a susceptible population.
May 2013 D-12 

Table D-2. Minimum Sample Sizes with Various Design Prevalence Levels 

Needed to Detect CSF in Apparently Healthy Herds/Animals

Herd Size or

Number of Premises Prevalence

1% 2% 5% 10%

<=50 ALL ALL 37 23

51–100 ALL 82 47 27

101–200 164 111 54 28

201–300 199 124 56 29

301–400 222 131 58 29

401–500 237 136 59 30

501–600 248 139 62 30

601–700 256 141 62 30

701–800 262 143 62 30

801–900 268 144 62 30

901–1,000 272 146 62 30

1,001–2,000 292 157 62 30

>2,000 314 157 62 30

Note: These sample sizes are based on an rRT-PCR sensitivity of 95 percent for detecting CSFV in 

appropriately collected samples from infected pigs. The sizes provide 95 percent confidence that the 

premises or area has a CSF prevalence less than the design prevalence given that the virus is there and all 

animals test negative.

Prevalence in this table indicates:

1. If determining the number of animals in a herd, then the within herd prevalence is the level chosen.

2. If determining the number of herds in a zone to test, then the herd level prevalence is the level chosen.

Table D-3 presents sample sizes, based on prevalence level expected in the group 

of clinically ill swine on premises. This shows fewer samples are required to 

detect CSF with clinically ill animals because of the high prevalence of CSF 

infected animals in the clinically ill animal population. The provided sample sizes 

in the table are based on within-herd prevalence of CSF infection by the time 

animals develop clinical illness. 
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

May 2013 D-13

Table D-3. Minimum Sample Sizes with Various Prevalence Levels Needed 

to Detect CSFV Using Visual Observation with Clinically Ill Animals 

Herd Size or

Number of 

Premises

Prevalence

40% 60% 80%

<=15 6 4 3

16–75 7 4 3

>75 8 4 3

Note: These sample sizes are based on an rRT-PCR sensitivity of 95 percent for detecting CSFV in 

appropriately collected samples from infected animals with clinical signs of infection. The sizes provide 

95 percent confidence of detecting infection in a herd or zone, given that it is there at the given 

prevalence. 

Prevalence in this table indicates: 

1. If determining the number of animals to test in a herd, then the within herd prevalence is the level

chosen. Thus using rRT-PCR for detection, we have 95 percent confidence of detecting an infected 

animal in the herd if the prevalence in the herd is 40 to 80 percent. 

2. If determining the number of herds in a zone to test, then the herd level prevalence is the level

chosen. Thus using rRT-PCR for detection, we have 95 percent confidence of detecting an infected 

herd in the zone if the prevalence in the herd is 40 to 80 percent. 

Sampling Schemes for Commercial and Noncommercial 

Premises 

The following definitions apply to both commercial and noncommercial premises.

1. Sampling Unit. Premises or epidemiological units on premises (pens,

barns, or air management units in swine operations, etc.).

2. Sample. (1) Visual observation of sick or dead animals followed by rRTPCR confirmation if suspicion of CSF, (2) Collection of individual animal

tissue or whole blood from calculated number of animals or premises and

then test with rRT-PCR.

Frequency recommendations are based on the following. 

 Short incubation period of CSF (2–14 days). 

 Sufficient personnel available for surveillance activities. 

 High probability of spreading CSF with frequent inspection/sampling. 

 Recommendations for changing frequency of premises 

inspection/sampling are listed in Table D-4 (later in this Appendix). 
May 2013 D-14 

To calculate sample sizes, the Outbreak Toolbox can be used.2

This information is summarized in Tables D-5a, b, and c. 

CSF SAMPLING SCHEMES FOR BOTH COMMERCIAL AND NONCOMMERCIAL 

PREMISES

CSF surveillance sampling recommendations are based on virus/host behavior 

during the outbreak and the approved tests available. The virus/host behavior is 

divided into three classes and each viral/host class has general surveillance 

scheme recommendations.

1. Outbreak where the virus is highly pathogenic and transmissible, with

acutely ill animals.

2. Outbreak where the virus is mildly or slightly pathogenic, with ill animals

that have few or mild clinical signs.

3. Established disease with convalescent, asymptomatic or mildly ill animals.

Box D-1. Important Note on Observational Sampling for Commercial 

and Noncommercial Premises

ACUTE HIGHLY PATHOGENIC VIRUS

Infected Zone and Buffer Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled: 

 Census of premises within zone; sample premises as prioritized by

results of epidemiological investigation and continuity of business

requirements.

2 For the Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox, mentioned throughout this document, please go to 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/nsu/toolbox/, or e-mail 

National.Surveillance.Unit@aphis.usda.gov. 

Individual animal sampling is recommended for commercial and noncommercial 

premises. However, if resources are limited, and in the event it is an acute clinical signs 

outbreak, observational surveillance may be used in noncommercial premises.
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-15

 Contact Premises (CP), Suspect Premises (SP), and Monitored Premises 

(MP):

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Observe the herd for CSF compatible signs.

 If CSF compatible signs are observed, collect samples from the 

calculated number of animals (Tables D-2 and D-3) or calculated 

using the Outbreak Toolbox using a 15 percent design prevalence.

 A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used.

 Sampling frequency:

 Collect samples on each premises every 5th day for the duration of 

the area quarantine or a minimum of 28 days.

 MP may be sampled more frequently depending on the need to 

move products, but must be sampled at the minimum listed above.

For example, a swine operation needing to ship pigs daily will be 

evaluated daily. For a finishing premises, the premises will be 

evaluated on each of the 3 days prior to shipping the animals. 

 At-Risk Premises (ARP):

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Observe/collect samples from the calculated number of animals 

(Tables D-2 and D-3), or calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox, 

using a 10 percent design prevalence.

o Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve 

calculated sample size.

o A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used.

 Sampling frequency:

 Collect samples on each premises every 5th day for the duration of 

the area quarantine.

Surveillance Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled:

 Calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox or Cannon formulae.
May 2013 D-16

 Premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least one IP with 95 

percent confidence, where 

 IP prevalence equals or exceeds 1 percent of all premises with 

susceptible animals, or

 a census, if the number of premises in the zone is small, and

 in order as prioritized by results of epidemiological investigation 

and continuity of business requirements.

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Collect samples on the premises using a 5 percent design prevalence.

 Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve 

calculated sample size.

 A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used on clinical 

animals; an Ab ELISA will be used on blood samples.

 Sampling frequency:

 Randomly select the calculated number of premises to be sampled (as 

determined above, such as 60), and collect the appropriate samples on 

each of the selected premises once during the first 21 day period of the 

area quarantine. Then,

 Randomly select (include in the sampling list frame the premises 

sampled in the first 21 day period) and sample an equal number of 

premises (as calculated above) once during each additional 21 day 

period of the area quarantine.

 For example, select and sample 60 premises once during the first 

21 day period, then reselect (with replacement) another 60 

premises to be sampled in the second 21 day period.

MILDLY PATHOGENIC VIRUS

Infected Zone and Buffer Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled:

 Census of premises within zone; sample premises as prioritized by 

results of epidemiological investigation and continuity of business 

requirements.
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-17

 CP, SP, and MP: 

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Collect samples from the calculated number of animals (Tables 

D-2 and D-3), or calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox, using a 5 

percent design prevalence.

o Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve 

calculated sample size.

o A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used on clinical 

animals; an Ab ELISA will be used on blood samples.

 Sampling frequency:

 Collect samples on each premises every 5th day for the duration of 

area quarantine or a minimum of 28 days.

 MP may be sampled more frequently depending on the need to 

move products, but must be sampled at the minimum listed above. 

For example, a swine operation needing to ship pigs daily will be 

evaluated daily. For a finishing premises, the premises will be 

evaluated on each of the 3 days prior to shipping the animals.

 ARP:

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Collect samples from the calculated number of animals (Table D-2 

and D-3), or calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox, using a 5 

percent design prevalence.

o Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve 

calculated sample size.

o A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used on clinical 

animals; an Ab ELISA will be used on blood samples.

 Sampling frequency:

 Collect samples on premises every 5th day for duration of area 

quarantine.

Surveillance Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled:

 Calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox or Cannon formulae.
May 2013 D-18 

 Premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least one IP with 95

percent confidence, where

 IP prevalence equals or exceeds 1 percent of all premises with

susceptible animals, or 

 a census, if the number of premises in the zone is small, and 

 in order as prioritized by results of epidemiological investigation 

and continuity of business requirements. 

 Number of animals to be sampled: 

 Collect samples on the premises using a 1 percent design prevalence.

 Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve

calculated sample size.

 A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used on clinical 

animals; an Ab ELISA will be used on blood samples. 

 Sampling frequency: 

 Randomly select the calculated number of premises to be sampled (as

determined above, such as 60), and collect the appropriate samples on

each of the selected premises once during the first 21 day period of the

area quarantine. Then,

 Randomly select (include in the sampling list frame the premises

sampled in the first 21 day period) and sample an equal number of

premises (as calculated above) once during each additional 21 day

period of the area quarantine.

 For example, select and sample 60 premises once during the first

21 day period, then reselect (with replacement) another 60 

premises to be sampled in the second 21 day period. 

ESTABLISHED MILDLY PATHOGENIC VIRUS 

Infected Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled: 

 Census of premises within zone; sample premises as prioritized by

results of epidemiological investigation and continuity of business

requirements.
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-19 

 CP, SP, and MP: 

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Collect samples from the calculated number of animals (Tables

D-2 and D-3), or calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox, using a 

census of animals within the zone. 

o Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve

calculated sample size.

o A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used on clinical

animals; an Ab ELISA will be used on blood samples.

 Sampling frequency:

 Collect samples on each premises every 7th day for the duration of

area quarantine or a minimum of 28 days.

 ARP:

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Collect samples from the calculated number of animals (Tables

D-2 and D-3), or calculated using the Outbreak Toolbox, using a 

census of animals within the zone. 

o Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve

calculated sample size.

o A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used on clinical

animals; an Ab ELISA will be used on blood samples.

 Sampling frequency:

 Collect samples on each premises every 14th day for the duration of

area quarantine.

Buffer Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled: 

 Calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox or Cannon formulae.

 Premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least one IP with 95

percent confidence, where

 IP prevalence equals or exceeds 2 percent of all premises with

susceptible animals, or 
May 2013 D-20

 a census, if the number of premises in the zone is small, and

 in order as prioritized by results of epidemiological investigation 

and continuity of business requirements.

 CP, SP, and MP:

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Collect samples from the calculated number of animals (Tables 

D-2 and D-3), or calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox, using a 2 

percent design prevalence.

o Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve 

calculated sample size.

o A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used on clinical 

animals; an Ab ELISA will be used on blood samples.

 Sampling frequency:

 Collect samples on each premises every 14th day for the duration of 

area quarantine or a minimum of 28 days.

 ARP:

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Collect samples from the calculated number of animals (Tables 

D-2 and D-3), or calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox, using a 2 

percent design prevalence.

o Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve 

calculated sample size.

o A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used on clinical 

animals; an Ab ELISA will be used on blood samples.

 Sampling frequency:

 Collect samples on each premises every 14th day for the duration of 

area quarantine.

Surveillance Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled:

 Calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox or Cannon formulae.
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-21

 Premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least one IP with 95 

percent confidence, where

 IP prevalence equals or exceeds 1 percent of all premises with 

susceptible animals, or

 a census, if the number of premises in the zone is small, and

 in order as prioritized by results of epidemiological investigation 

and continuity of business requirements.

 Number of animals to be sampled:

 Collect samples on the premises using a 1 percent design prevalence.

 Add randomly selected animals to pool if necessary to achieve 

calculated sample size.

 A PCR or other acceptable rapid test will be used on clinical 

animals; an Ab ELISA will be used on blood samples. 

 Sampling frequency:

 Randomly select the calculated number of premises to be sampled (as 

determined above, such as 60), and collect the appropriate samples on 

each of the selected premises once during the first 21 day period of the 

area quarantine. Then,

 Randomly select (include in the sampling list frame the premises 

sampled in the first 21 day period) and sample an equal number of 

premises (as calculated above) once during each additional 21 day 

period of the area quarantine.

 For example, select and sample 60 premises once during the first 

21 day period, then reselect (with replacement) another 60 

premises to be sampled in the second 21 day period. 

Proof of Disease Freedom Surveillance

This information is summarized in Table D-6.

1. Surveillance samples will be tested using the Ab ELISA that demonstrates 

exposure to the virus, thus, adding a time element into the surveillance 

scheme. Additionally, there will be enhanced passive clinical surveillance 

with accepted testing protocols of suspect cases, surveillance in slaughter 

plants, and enhanced surveillance in markets and shows. Surveillance for 

proof of DF starts 21 days (World Organization for Animal Health [OIE] 

recommendation) after depopulation of the last IP.
May 2013 D-22 

2. The goal is to demonstrate that all premises are disease free at the design

prevalence level because diagnostic tests are negative. OIE recommends

intensifying surveillance schemes in conjunction with (1) active

investigation of herds with suspicious clinical signs, and (2) increased

slaughter serosurveillance.

COMMERCIAL PREMISES (DISEASE FREEDOM) 

Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, and Surveillance Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled: 

 Calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox or Cannon formulae.

 Premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least one IP with 95

percent confidence, where

 the IP prevalence equals or exceeds 1 percent of all premises with

susceptible animals in the IZ.

 Number of animals to be sampled per herd: 

 Calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox or Cannon formulae.

 Number of animals to be sampled is based on detecting at least one IP

with 95 percent confidence, where

 IP prevalence equals or exceeds 5 percent where the maximum

animals sampled doesn’t exceed 60 animals per herd.

 Sampling frequency: 

 Sample the number of premises calculated above (for example, 60

premises one time each) during a 3-month period after the outbreak

has been eradicated.

NONCOMMERCIAL PREMISES (DISEASE FREEDOM) 

Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, and Surveillance Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled: 

 Calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox or Cannon formulae.

 Premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least one IP with 95

percent confidence, where

 the IP prevalence equals or exceeds 1 percent of all premises with

susceptible animals in the IZ.
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-23 

 Number of animals to be sampled per herd: 

 Calculate using the Outbreak Toolbox or Cannon formulae.

 Number of animals to be sampled is based on detecting at least one IP

with 95 percent confidence, where

 IP prevalence equals or exceeds 1 percent where the maximum

number of animals sampled doesn’t exceed 60 animals per herd. 

 Sampling frequency: 

 Sample the number of premises calculated above (for example, 60

premises one time each) during a 3-month period after the outbreak

has been eradicated.

FURTHER SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION

Table D-4 shows the incubation periods and sampling frequency. 

Table D-4. Incubation Period and Sampling Frequency

Estimated Incubation Period Based on Field Information

Incubation 

Period

Frequency of Sampling (days between sampling)

Minimum (Days) Maximum (Days)

1 to 2 Days 1 1 

3 to 4 Days 2 3 

5 to 7 Days 4 6 

8 to 14 Days 5 10

> 14 Days 10

Table D-5a summarizes the outbreak surveillance scheme for disease detection in 

commercial and noncommercial operations for the highly pathogenic viral strain. 

Table D-5b summarizes the outbreak surveillance scheme for disease detection in 

commercial and noncommercial operations for the mildly pathogenic virus. 

Table D-5c summarizes the outbreak surveillance scheme for disease detection in 

commercial and noncommercial operations for the established mildly pathogenic 

virus. 
May 2013 D-24

Table D-5a. Outbreak Surveillance for Disease Detection-Highly Pathogenic Viral Strain 

Disease Detection in Commercial and Noncommercial Operations

CSF Outbreak Response

14 Day 

Incubation Period

Epidemic (Early; < than 1 Month Duration)

Highly Pathogenic Viral Strain (Overt Clinical Signs)

Sampling Infected Zone and Buffer Zone Surveillance Zonea

Number of 

Premises Census 1% Design Prevalence*

Free Premises

Unit - - Individual Animal Sample

Target - -

Clinically Sick Pigs & 

Randomly Selected Animals^

Number of Animals - - 5% Design Prevalence*

Test#

- -

PCR/other acceptable rapid 

test on ill animals (tonsil 

preferred) and Ab ELISA 

Frequency - - Reselect sampling every 21 

days Duration - -

Contact, Suspect, or Monitored Premisesa

Unit Observation/Individual Animal -

Target Clinically Sick Pigs -

Number of 

Animals 15% Design Prevalence* -

Test# PCR/other acceptable rapid test -

Frequency 5 days

-

Duration Duration of Area Quarantine or 28 day minimum

At-Risk Premises

Unit Observation/Individual Animal -

Target Clinically Sick Pigs & Randomly Selected Animals^ -

Number of 

Animals 10% Design Prevalence* -

Test# PCR/other acceptable rapid test -

Frequency 5 days

-

Duration Duration of Area Quarantine

Product 

Movement

Daily sampling and testing is required for moving products or animals each day.

For non-daily animal or product movement, sample and test 3 consecutive days prior to animal or 

product movement.
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

May 2013 D-25

Table D-5b. Outbreak Surveillance for Disease Detection-Mildly Pathogenic Strain 

Disease Detection in Commercial and Noncommercial Operations

CSF Outbreak Response

14 Day 

Incubation Period

Epidemic (Early; < than 1 Month Duration)

Mildly Pathogenic Viral Strain (Mild Clinical Signs or Asymptomatic Animals)

Sampling Infected Zone and Buffer Zone Surveillance Zonea

Number of 

Premises Census 1% Design Prevalence*

Free Premises

Unit - - Individual Animal Sample

Target - -

Clinically Sick Pigs & 

Randomly Selected Animals^

Number of Animals - - 1% Design Prevalence*

Test#

- -

PCR/other acceptable rapid 

test on ill animals (tonsil 

preferred) and Ab ELISA

Frequency - - Reselect sampling every 21 

days Duration - -

Contact, Suspect, or Monitored Premisesa

Unit Individual Animal Sample -

Target Clinically Sick Pigs & Randomly Selected Animals^ -

Number of 

Animals 5% Design Prevalence* -

Test# PCR/other acceptable rapid test on ill animals and Ab ELISA on blood -

Frequency 5 days

-

Duration Duration of Area Quarantine or 28 day minimum

At-Risk Premises

Unit Individual Animal Sample -

Target Clinically Sick Pigs & Randomly Selected Animals^ -

Number of 

Animals 5% Design Prevalence* -

Test# PCR/other acceptable rapid test on ill animals and Ab ELISA on blood -

Frequency 5 days

-

Duration Duration of Area Quarantine

Product 

Movement

Daily sampling and testing is required for moving products or animals each day.

For non-daily animal or product movement, sample and test 3 consecutive days prior to animal or 

product movement.
May 2013 D-26

Table D-5c. Outbreak Surveillance for Disease Detection-Established Mildly Pathogenic Strain 

Disease Detection in Commercial and Noncommercial Operations

CSF Outbreak Response

14 Day Incubation 

Period

Established (Duration of CSF in Control Area>1 Month Duration)

Established Mildly Pathogenic Viral Strain (Convalescent, Asymptomatic, or Mildly Ill Animals)

Sampling Infected Zone Buffer Zone Surveillance Zonea

Number of Premises Census 2% Design Prevalence* 1% Design Prevalence*

Free Premises

Unit - - Individual Animal Sample

Target - -

Clinically Sick Pigs & 

Randomly Selected Animals^

Number of Animals - - 1% Design Prevalence*

Test#

- -

PCR/other acceptable rapid 

test on ill animals (tonsil

preferred) and Ab ELISA

Frequency - - Reselect sampling every 21 

Duration - - days

Contact, Suspect, or Monitored Premisesa

Unit Individual Animal Sample Individual Animal Sample -

Target Clinically Sick Pigs & Randomly 

Selected Animals^

Clinically Sick Pigs & Randomly 

Selected Animals^ -

Number of Animals Census 2% Design Prevalence* -

Test#

PCR/other acceptable rapid test

on ill animals and Ab ELISA on 

blood

PCR/other acceptable rapid test

on ill animals and Ab ELISA on 

blood

-

Frequency 7 days 14 days

-

Duration Duration of Area Quarantine or 28 

day minimum

Duration of Area Quarantine or 

28 day minimum

At-Risk Premises

Unit Individual Animal Sample Individual Animal Sample -

Target Clinically Sick Pigs & Randomly 

Selected Animals^

Clinically Sick Pigs & Randomly 

Selected Animals^ -

Number of Animals Census 2% Design Prevalence* -

Test#

PCR/other acceptable rapid test

on ill animals and Ab ELISA on 

blood

PCR/other acceptable rapid test

on ill animals and Ab ELISA on 

blood

-

Frequency 14 days 14 days

-

Duration Duration of Area Quarantine Duration of Area Quarantine

Product Movement

Daily sampling and testing is required for moving products or animals each day.

For non-daily animal or product movement, sample and test 3 consecutive days prior to animal or 

product movement.

Notes to Tables D-5a, D-5b, and D-5c. 

* Design prevalence is the predetermined proportion of IP (for example, 5 percent) used to calculate the number of premises to

be sampled at a specific confidence level (for example, 95 percent) in a population of a given size (for example, 1,000 premises) 

based on detecting at least one IP. 

^ Add randomly selected animals to pool to achieve calculated sample size. 

 # Sample types (whole blood, tissue, etc.) depends on the requirements of the available tests. 

a Suspect Premises in a Surveillance Zone will be subject to surveillance procedures and diagnostic testing as indicated by 

relevant authorities. 
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-27

Table D-6 shows surveillance requirements to prove CSF-freedom.

Table D-6. Surveillance for Proof of Disease Freedom

Proof of Disease Freedom#

CSF Outbreak Response

Commercial Noncommercial

Sampling* Infected

Zone$

Buffer

Zone$

Surveillance

Zone$

Infected

Zone$

Buffer

Zone$

Surveillance

Zone$

Number of

Premises

1%

Prevalence 

Threshold°

1%

Prevalence

Threshold°

1%

Prevalence

Threshold°

1%

Prevalence

Threshold°

1%

Prevalence

Threshold°

1%

Prevalence

Threshold°

Number of 

Animals to be 

Sampled per 

Herd

5%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

5%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

5%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

1%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

1%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

1%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

Frequency Sample each premises of the calculated number of premises once during

a 3-month period

# Serosurveillance conducted in the area to be proved disease free in addition to any other animal sampling. $ Infected, Buffer, and Surveillance Zones combine as one unit for proof of disease freedom. & Number of animals sero-sampled based on 5 percent prevalence in herd at the 95 percent confidence level where 

the maximum number of animals sampled per epidemiological unit does not exceed 60 animals.

° Prevalence threshold is a predetermined proportion of Infected Premises (for example, 5 percent) used to calculate 

the number of premises to be sampled at a specific confidence level (for example, 95 percent) in a population of a 

given size (for example, 1,000 premises) based on detecting at least one IP. A census of the premises in a zone will 

be sampled if there are few premises. Sample premises in order as by epidemiological investigation and continuity 

of business requirements.

*Sampling Unit used in all Surveillance Schemes: Individual animal observation, appropriate individual animal 

sample or, if available, mass population sampling techniques.

Assumptions for Surveillance Schemes

1. Production parameters will be monitored for indications of CSF intrusion.

2. The consequences of an infected but undetected premises is greater if it is 

located at the periphery of the BZ vs. the periphery of the IZ:

 Increased opportunity of disease spread due to less stringent 

movement requirements in the BZ.

 Increased difficulty of surveillance.

 A larger number of ARP that require sampling.

 A larger geographic area over which to sample ARP.
May 2013 D-28

3. Increased size of the Control Area (CA): An IP will increase the size of 

the CA by the radius of the IZ. However, if the newly detected IP is 

located on the periphery of the BZ, the size of the CA will increase by the 

radius of the IZ and the BZ.

Figure D-3 shows that the size of the CA depends on where the new IP is located.

Figure D-3. Infected Premises’ Effect on Size of Control Area
Updated CSF Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale

May 2013 D-29

Selected References and Resources 

Koenen, F. G. Van Caenegem, J.P. Vermeersch, J. Vandenheede, and H. Deluyker.

“Epidemiological characteristics of an outbreak of classical swine fever in an area of 

high pig density.” Veterinary Record, 1996, 139, pp. 367–371.

Risatti, G.R., J.D. Callahan, W.M. Nelson, M.V. Borca. “Rapid detection of classical 

swine fever virus by a portable real-time reverse transcriptase PCR assay.” J Clin 

Microbio, 2003, 41(1), pp. 500–505.

Stegeman, A., A.R.W. Elbers, J. Smak, and M.C.M. de Jong. “Quantification of the 

transmission of classical swine fever virus between herds during the 1997–1998 

epidemic in The Netherlands. Prev Vet Med, 1999, 42(3-4) pp. 219–234.
May 2013 E-1 

Appendix E

Procedures for CSF Investigation 

and Specimen Submission

Veterinary Services (VS) Guidance 12001.1 “Policy for the Investigation of 

Potential Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease Incidents” provides VS 

policy for the investigation and communication of potential foreign animal 

disease/emerging disease incidents. 

The document is available at http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml for 

APHIS employees).
May 2013 F-1

Appendix F

Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

This appendix contains a sample epidemiological questionnaire that could be 

employed in the event of a classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak.

This epidemiological questionnaire is only an example template. Based on the 

epidemiological situation or the types of premises involved in the actual outbreak, 

it may be appropriate to add other questions regarding other risk factors which 

may play a role in transmission.
May 2013 F-2 

Sample CSF Epidemiology Questionnaire 

Date: ______________________ 

Business/farm name: ______ 

Primary contact: 

Business address: 

Business telephone number: ______ 

Cell telephone number: 

Fax number: 

Home telephone number: 

E-mail address: 

Secondary contact: 

Business address: 

Business telephone number: ______ 

Cell telephone number: 

Fax number: 

Home telephone number: 

E-mail address: 

Farm address (911 and Animal Location): 

City: Zip code: 

County: Township: 

Range: Section: _______ 

GPS coordinates (decimal degrees): 

Premises identification number: 

The purpose of this epidemiological questionnaire is to help the Incident Command determine 

premises designations: Contact Premises, At-Risk Premises, or Monitored Premises. Additional 

information will be considered (for example, diagnostic tests) for movement permits. 
May 2013 F-3 

A. General Information 

1. Species on premises: 

2. Type of premises (commercial or non-commercial): 

3. Have you observed feral swine or wild animals on or near the premises? 

 Yes  No  Don’t know 

4. Are there backyard premises with susceptible swine nearby? 

 Yes  No  Don’t know 

5. Do you have multiple, non-contiguous premises you travel and work between (yes/no)? 

 Yes  No 

6. Are there contiguous premises with susceptible swine (not owned by you)? 

 Yes  No 

B. Animal Population on Premises 

7. a. Please identify the animals on the premises.

Species Males > 1 year Females > 1 year < 1 year 

Swine 

b. Non-susceptible species (type and number): ______ 

 

C. Employee Risk Factors 

8. Do any of your personnel work at other premises with swine or have they visited 

other premises, feedlots, processing plants, or swine slaughtering facilities 

within the past 28 days?  Yes  No 

 If Yes, what premises? _________________________________________________________ 

9. Do any of your workers live with someone who works at another swine premises, feedlot, 

processing plant, slaughter facility or rendering plant?  Yes  No 

10. Have you hired new personnel during the past 28 days?  Yes  No 

If Yes, did they work for another swine premises before you hired them?  Yes  No 

If Yes, where did they work prior to coming to your premises? ____________________________ 

11. Has an employee from this premises visited a slaughter/rendering facility 

within the past 28 days?  Yes  No 
May 2013 F-4 

 If Yes, what facility?___________________________________________________ 

If Yes, did the person clean and disinfect his vehicle?  Yes  No 

If Yes, did the person change outer clothes?  Yes  No 

If Yes, did the person disinfect footwear or change into footwear 

assigned to this premises upon return?  Yes  No 

12. Have any of your employees been overseas?  Yes  No 

If Yes, where? ______________________________ 

D. Biosecurity Risk Factors 

13. Have wild or feral swine been seen on the property in the last 28 days?  Yes  No

14. Have rodents, dogs, or cats been observed in swine housing in the past 28 days?  Yes  No 

15. Which of the following best describes this farm’s usual carcass (normal mortality) 

disposal method? 

 Rendering 

 Composting on site 

 Burial on site 

 Incineration on site 

 Other (specify: _____________________________________________________________) 

16. Do you dispose of swine for other farms?  Yes  No 

17. Have you maintained all requirements since your last regular biosecurity audit?  Yes  No 

 If no, what requirements have not been met? 

18. What additional biosecurity measures have been implemented? (For example, once the premises 

has been determined to be within a Control Area, all vehicles, including feed trucks, must now be 

cleaned and disinfected prior to entry to and exit from the premises.) 
May 2013 F-5 

E. Trace Back Information

In the last 28 days, did the following movements onto the farm occur? If yes, please 

provide as much accurate information as possible for each unique source. You can 

add more rows by ‘right clicking’ in the box and selecting “InsertInsert Rows 

Below”. 

19. Susceptible Swine  Yes  Don’t know  No 

 

If yes, 

a. How many animals? ________________________________________________ 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D before 

entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas 

(Yes/No) 

Animals 

tested for 

CSF prior to 

movement 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

20. Pork Products or By-Products  Yes  Don’t know  No 

 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D before 

entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter 

swine 

areas 

(Yes/No) 

Pork or 

product tested 

for CSF prior 

to movement 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

21. Feed trucks  Yes  Don’t know  No 

 If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 
May 2013 F-6 

22. Fresh litter/bedding  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

23. Manure  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

24. Hoof Trimmers  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

25. Mortality Pick Up/Renderer  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas (Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

a. Did the driver leave the vehicle while on this premises?  Yes  Don’t know  No 

b. If Yes, 

 What area of the premises did he enter? ___________________________________________ 

 Was driver required to wear outer clothes 

 and foot wear provided by this premises?  Yes  Don’t know  No 
May 2013 F-7 

26. Company vet/service tech  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas (Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

27. Non-company vet/consultant  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas (Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

28. Construction or service person (e.g., gas, plumbing, pest control) Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas (Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

29. Customer/buyer/dealer  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas (Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

30. Other producer  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas (Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 
May 2013 F-8 

31. Non-business visitor (friend/neighbor)  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Source/name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas (Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

F. Trace Forward Information 

In the last 28 days, did the following movements off the farm occur? If yes, please 

provide as much accurate information as possible for each unique source. You can 

add more rows by ‘right clicking’ in the box and selecting “InsertInsert Rows 

Below”. 

32. Susceptible Swine  Yes  Don’t know  No 

 

If yes, 

a. How many animals? ________________________________________________ 

Destination/name; 

date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter 

swine 

areas 

(Yes/No) 

Animals tested 

for CSF prior to 

movement 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

33. Pork Products or By-Products  Yes  Don’t know  No 

 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter 

swine 

areas 

(Yes/No) 

Pork or product 

tested for CSF 

prior to 

movement 

(Yes/No) 

Entered 

in visitor 

log 

(Yes/No)

 

34. Feed trucks  Yes  Don’t know  No 

 If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel 

enter swine 

areas (Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 
May 2013 F-9 

35. Fresh litter/bedding  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

36. Manure  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

37. Hoof Trimmers  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

38. Mortality Pick Up/Renderer  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

a. Did the driver leave the vehicle while on this premises?  Yes  Don’t know  No 

b. If Yes, 

 What area of the premises did he enter? ___________________________________________ 

 Was driver required to wear outer clothes 

 and foot wear provided by this premises?  Yes  Don’t know  No 
May 2013 F-10 

39. Company vet/service tech  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

40. Non-company vet/consultant  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

41. Construction or service person (e.g., gas, plumbing, pest control) Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

42. Customer/buyer/dealer  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 

43. Other producer  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/ 

name; date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 
May 2013 F-11 

44. Non-business visitor (friend/neighbor)  Yes  Don’t know  No 

If yes, 

Destination/name; 

date 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No) 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No) 

Personnel enter 

swine areas 

(Yes/No) 

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No) 

 
May 2013 G-1 

Appendix G

Secure Pork Supply Plan

The Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan is a public-private-academic collaboration, 

currently in progress. The overall goal is to maintain business continuity for pork 

and pork product producers and processors in a foreign animal disease (FAD) 

outbreak and to provide a continuous supply of pork and pork products for 

consumers. The SPS plan will address classical swine fever (CSF) as well as footand-mouth disease, African swine fever, and swine vesicular disease. 

The SPS Plan will develop processes and procedures that pork producers, 

processors, and Federal and State agencies agree are feasible. These processes and 

procedures will allow the safe movement of pork and pork products from 

producers in a CSF Control Area (as long as they have no evidence of disease)

through a processing plant, such that the classical swine fever virus does not 

spread. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the 

National Pork Board have provided funding to examine this issue in detail and 

develop specific response recommendations. Each group has a set of objectives 

that will contribute to developing a national SPS Plan. Communication among the 

researchers through development will ensure the final products are 

complementary and well coordinated. Participants include individuals from the 

following organizations and entities (in alphabetical order): 

 American Association of Swine Veterinarians

 Center for Animal Health and Food Safety, University of Minnesota 

 Center for Food Security and Public Health, Iowa State University 

 National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense 

 National Pork Board 

 National Pork Producers Council 

 State Animal Health Officials

 U.S. Department of Agriculture, APHIS, Veterinary Services. 

The SPS Plan has also created seven working groups:

1. Biosecurity

2. Surveillance
May 2013 G-2

3. Monitored Premises and Compartmentalization 

4. Data Collection, Management, and Sharing

5. Risk Assessments

6. Communication

Response to a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Outbreak Tomorrow. Each of these 

groups consists of members from academia and industry, State Animal Health 

Officials, and APHIS officials. These groups will take part in activities that 

contribute to the development of the SPS Plan, including the following:

 Development of biosecurity performance standards for all phases of swine 

production, transportation, and processing.

 Development of recommendations for Comprehensive and Integrated 

Swine Surveillance to meet needs for FAD surveillance before, during, 

and after an FAD outbreak.

 Develop criteria to receive and maintain monitored premises status during 

an FAD outbreak.

 Develop criteria for swine production systems to be eligible for

compartmentalization according to the World Health Organization for 

Animal Health guidelines. 

 Recommend data that should be collected prior to, and in the event of, an 

outbreak to enable optimal management of an FAD outbreak. 

 Recommend and prioritize risk assessments necessary to provide 

additional scientific basis for the SPS Plan.

 Develop recommendations for policies and procedures for maximizing a 

secure pork supply while minimizing FAD spread with resources that are 

currently available. 

 Develop communications plans for use before and after an outbreak. 
May 2013 H-1

Appendix H

Examples of Movement Control Notices

This appendix provides two examples—Federal and State—of halting movement 

of animals during a disease outbreak.

EXAMPLE—WEST VIRGINIA 

Commissioner of Agriculture Halts Poultry Shows and Sales after 

AI-Positive Flock Discovered in Virginia 

Commissioner of Agriculture Gus R. Douglass has ordered a halt to 

poultry shows and sales throughout West Virginia in response to a turkey 

flock that tested positive for low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) in 

Mt. Jackson, Va., just across the West Virginia border.

The strain is not the “bird flu” that has been plaguing Southeast Asia and 

parts of Europe and poses no threat to human health. 

The order applies to any gathering of live birds, including shows at fairs

and festivals and sales of poultry. The order is effective Monday, July 9, 

and will be in place for 30 days unless another positive flock is 

discovered.

The order does not apply to the commercial industry, which tests every 

flock for AI before it is moved off the farm to ensure that infected birds 

are not trucked past other poultry farms.

“Having already dealt with a positive flock in West Virginia earlier this 

year, we want to take every precaution to protect our poultry industry 

from a potentially devastating situation,” said Commissioner Douglass.

He also noted that the West Virginia Department of Agriculture is on 

high alert for any signs of the disease here, and that the industry has been 

exercising enhanced surveillance protocols since a 2002 AI outbreak that 

affected West Virginia and Virginia.

Poultry companies on both sides of the border have instructed their 

growers not to spread litter or move it from their farms until further 

notice.

According to the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer 

Services (VDACS), testing over the weekend by the USDA’s National 

Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, confirmed the 

presence of AI antibodies, which indicates possible prior exposure to the 

virus. The turkeys did not show any signs of illness prior to testing. 
May 2013 H-2

Virginia is closely monitoring all poultry operations within a six-mile 

radius of the affected farm. 

NVSL is doing further testing to help identify the virus and hopefully 

determine its source. VDACS, USDA and the poultry owner are working 

cooperatively to minimize the possibility that the virus will move beyond 

this farm. 

The affected flock contains 54,000 birds, which will be euthanized as a 

precaution as soon as possible and composted on-site. While LPAI poses 

no risk to human health, federal and state policy is to eradicate H5 and 

H7 subtypes because of their potential to change into more serious types, 

which have a higher mortality rate among birds. 

Source: http://www.wvagriculture.org/news_releases/2007/7-9-07.html

EXAMPLE—FEDERAL 

Source: http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2003/04/16/03-9322/exoticnewcastle-disease-additions-to-quarantined-area#p-3
Examples of Movement Control Notices

May 2013 H-3
May 2013 H-4
May 2013 I-1 

Appendix I

Glossary

Animal product Blood or any of its components, bones, bristles, feathers, flesh, offal, 

skins, and any by-product containing any of those components that 

originated from an animal or bird.

Case An individual animal infected by classical swine fever virus (CSFV), 

with or without clinical signs.

Compartment 

(compartmentalization)

An animal subpopulation contained in one or more establishments 

under a common biosecurity management system with a distinct 

health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases for 

which required surveillance, control, and biosecurity measures have 

been applied for the purpose of international trade. 

Confirmed positive 

premises 

Any premises with at least one confirmed positive case (animal) as 

specified by the current APHIS definition for classical swine fever

(CSF); Infected Premises.

Control Area A Control Area (an Infected Zone and Buffer Zone) has individual 

premises quarantine for Infected Premises, Suspect Premises, and 

Contact Premises and movement restrictions for At-Risk Premises and 

Monitored Premises. 

Emergency vaccination A disease control strategy using the immunization of susceptible 

animals through the administration of a vaccine comprising antigens 

appropriate to the disease to be controlled. 

Etiology The causes or origin of disease or the factors that produce or 

predispose toward a certain disease or disorder. 

Euthanasia The humane destruction of an animal accomplished by a method that 

produces rapid unconsciousness and subsequent death with a 

minimum of pain or distress, or a method that utilizes anesthesia 

produced by an agent that causes painless loss of consciousness and 

subsequent death. 

FAD PReP (Foreign 

Animal Disease

Preparedness and 

Response Plan) 

Documents used to identify veterinary functions and countermeasures 

necessary to contain and control a foreign animal disease (FAD) 

outbreak. It is also used to integrate functions and countermeasures 

with emergency management systems and operations conducted in a 

Unified Command by local, State, and Federal personnel. 
 

May 2013 I-2 

Domestic Pigs (OIE 

Definition)

All domesticated pigs, permanently captive or farmed free range, used 

for the production of meat for consumption, for the production of 

other commercial products or for breeding these categories of pigs. 

Fomites Inanimate objects that can transmit infectious agents from one animal 

or person to another. 

Foreign animal disease A transboundary animal disease not known to exist in the U.S. animal 

population. 

Incident Command 

System

A standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach 

that

 allows for the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, 

procedures, and communications operating within a common 

organizational structure; 

 enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions 

and functional agencies, both public and private; and 

 establishes common processes for planning and managing resources. 

Incubation period For the purposes of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012),

the incubation period for pigs exposed postnatally is 2–14 days. The 

incubation period is the longest period that elapses between the 

introduction of the pathogen into the animal and the first clinical signs 

of the disease.

Index case The first or original case identified in a disease outbreak.

Kill Any procedure which causes the death of an animal.

Mass depopulation Method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly 

and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of the 

animals as practicable, but where the circumstances and tasks facing 

those doing the depopulation are understood to be extenuating. 

Modified stamping-out 

policy 

Animal health measures for stamping-out that are not implemented in 

full. 

National Animal Health 

Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN)

A network comprised of laboratories, including National Veterinary 

Services Laboratories and State/university laboratories, that perform 

diagnostic tests for endemic diseases, targeted surveillance, and FAD 

response testing.

Non-susceptible animal Animal that does not develop a particular disease when exposed to the 

causative infectious agent of that disease. 
Glossary

May 2013 I-3 

OIE (World 

Organization for 

Animal Health) 

International organization that collects and publishes information on 

animal diseases from 178 countries (April 2012) and develops 

standards for animal health.

Outbreak The occurrence of cases of a disease that are in excess of what is 

normally expected in a given population. 

Personal protective 

equipment (PPE)

Clothing and equipment to prevent occupational injuries and diseases 

through control of exposure to potential hazards in the work place 

after engineering and administrative controls have been implemented 

to the fullest extent.

Preemptive slaughter Depopulation under the competent authority of susceptible animal 

species in herds or flocks on premises that have been exposed to 

infection by direct animal-to-animal contact or by indirect contact of a 

kind likely to cause the transmission of CSFV prior to the expression 

of clinical signs. 

Premises A geographically and epidemiologically defined location, including a 

ranch, farm, stable, or other establishment. 

Regionalization (also 

known as zoning) 

An animal subpopulation defined primarily on a geographical basis 

(using natural, artificial, or legal boundaries). 

Rendering Process by which purified fat and protein products are recovered from 

inedible portions of animals by cooking at high temperatures.

Slaughter The killing of an animal or animals for human consumption, often by 

bleeding. 

Stamping-out (OIE 

definition) 

Means carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Authority, on 

confirmation of a disease, the killing of the animals which are affected 

and those suspected of being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, those in other herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, or by indirect contact of a kind likely to 

cause the transmission of the causal pathogen. All susceptible animals, 

vaccinated or unvaccinated, on an infected premises should be killed 

and their carcasses destroyed by burning or burial, or by any other 

method which will eliminate the spread of infection through the carcasses or products of the animals killed. 

Susceptible animal Any animal that can be infected with and replicate the disease 

pathogen of concern. In the case of CSF, this is only domestic and 

wild swine (Sus scrofa). 
 

May 2013 I-4 

Trace back The identification of the origin and movements of all animals, animal 

products, possible fomites, people, possible vectors, and so on that 

have entered onto an infected premises.

Trace forward The tracing of all animals, people, fomites, and so on that have left an 

infected premises. The premises that received the animals or goods 

should be investigated and kept under surveillance or quarantine. 

Vector An insect or any living carrier that transports an infectious agent from 

an infected individual to a susceptible individual or its food or 

immediate surroundings. 
May 2013 J-1

Appendix J

Abbreviations

3D depopulation, disposal, and decontamination

ABC Avidin-Biotin complex 

AC Area Command 

AEOC APHIS Emergency Operations Center 

AgELISA antigen-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

AHPA Animal Health Protection Act 

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

ARP At-Risk Premises 

AVIC Area Veterinarian In Charge 

AVMA American Veterinary Medical Association 

BVD bovine viral diarrhea

BPA Blanket Purchase Agreement

BZ Buffer Zone 

CA Control Area 

CCC Commodity Credit Corporation 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CEAH Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health

CF Contingency Fund 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CP Contact Premises 

CSF classical swine fever

CSFV classical swine fever virus

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer 

CVZ Containment Vaccination Zone

DCC Dispatch Coordinating Center

DF disease freedom

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DIVA differentiation of infected from vaccinated animals
May 2013 J-2

DOI Department of Interior 

EDTA ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid

ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 

EMLC Emergency Management Leadership Council 

EMRS Emergency Management Response System 

EOC emergency operations center

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EQS Emergency Qualification System

ESF Emergency Support Function 

FA Free Area 

FAD foreign animal disease

FADDL Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

FAD PReP Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFS Federal-to-Federal support 

FSIS Food Safety Inspection Service

GIS geographic information system

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

IC Incident Command

ICG Incident Coordination Group

ICP Incident Command Post 

ICS Incident Command System 

IMT Incident Management Team

IP Infected Premises

IP Immunoperoxidase (In Section 5.2.1.1)

IP-VN Immunoperoxidase virus neutralization test

IRCT International Response Coordination Team

IZ Infected Zone 

JFO Joint Field Office

JIC Joint Information Center 

LPA Legislative and Public Affairs
Appendix K

Selected References and Resources

Note: This appendix lists documents related to classical swine fever (CSF)

response. All related FAD PReP documents listed in Appendix A are also 

references for this CSF Response Plan. 

APHIS-USDA. CSF Surveillance Plan. 2007. 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth?1dmy&urile=

wcm%3apath%3a%2Faphis_content_library%2Fsa_our_focus%2Fsa_animal_hea

lth%2Fsa_animal_disease_information%2Fsa_swine_health%2Fct_classical_swin

e_fever_surveillance. 

APHIS-USDA. CSF Procedure Manual. 2007. 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth?1dmy&urile=

wcm%3apath%3a%2Faphis_content_library%2Fsa_our_focus%2Fsa_animal_hea

lth%2Fsa_animal_disease_information%2Fsa_swine_health%2Fct_classical_swin

e_fever_surveillance.

APHIS-USDA. Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination. 

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0). 

APHIS-USDA. Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies. (FAD 

PReP Manual 2-0).

AUSVET. Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan: Disease Strategy Classical 

swine fever. 2009. http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/

2011/04/CSF3_0-11PROOF27Aug09.pdf.

Benard, H.J., K.D. Stark, R.S. Morris, D.U. Pfeiffer, and H. Moser. “The 

1997−1998 classical swine fever epidemic in The Netherlands—a survival 

analysis.” Prev Vet Med, 1999, 42, pp. 235−48.

Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Biosecurity 

Guidance to Prevent the Spread of Animal Diseases. 2008. 

http://archive.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/documents/biosecurity_

guidance.pdf. 

Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Contingency 

Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals. 2012.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69

631/pb13857-animal-disease-plan-121219.pdf.

May 2013 K-1
Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Classical Swine 

Fever Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain. 2010.

http://archive.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/atoz/documents/100310

-csf-disease-control-strategy.pdf.

Code of Federal Regulations. Title 9, Chapter 1, Part 94. 

http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_10/9cfr94_10.html. 

Elbers, A.R., A. Stegeman, H. Moser, H.M. Ekker, J.A. Smak, and F.H. Pluimers. 

“The classical swine fever epidemic 1997−1998 in The Netherlands: descriptive 

epidemiology.” Prev Vet Med, 1999, 42, pp. 157−84.

Elsken, L.A., M.Y. Carr, T.S. Frana, et al. “Regulations for vaccines against 

emerging infections and agrobioterrorism in the United States of America.” Rev. 

Sci. Tech., 2007, 26(2), pp. 429–441.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). National Response 

Framework (NRF). 2008. http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). National Incident 

Management System (NIMS). 2008. http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/.

Laddomada, A. “Incidence and control of CSF in wild boar in Europe.” Vet 

Microbiol, 2000, 73, pp. 121−30.

Spickler, A.R., J.A. Roth, J. Galyon, and J. Lofstedt (Eds). Emerging and Exotic 

Diseases of Livestock, 4th Ed. (Ames, IA: Iowa State University, College of 

Veterinary Medicine; Center for Food Security and Public Health; Institute for 

International Cooperation in Animal Biologics, 2010).

Stegeman, J.A., A.R. Elbers, A. Boum, M.C. de Jong. “Rate of inter-herd 

transmission of classical swine fever virus by different types of contact during the 

1997−1998 epidemic in The Netherlands.” Epidemiol Infec, 2002, 128, pp.

285−91.

United States Animal Health Association (USAHA). Foreign Animal Diseases. 

(Boca Raton, FL: Boca Publications Group, 2008).

United States Department of Agriculture. 2011. Departmental Manual #1800-001. 

Incident Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. 

United States Department of Agriculture. 2011. Departmental Regulation #1800-

001. Incident Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. 

Van Oirshot, J.T. “Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera)” in B.E. Straw, S. 

D’Allaire, W. Mengeling, and D. Taylor (eds.) Diseases of Swine, 8th Ed. (Ames, 

IA: Iowa State University Press, 1999).

May 2013 K-2
Selected References and Resources

Weesendorp, E., Stegeman, A. and Loeffen, W. “Dynamics of virus excretion via 

different routes in pigs experimentally infected with classical swine fever virus 

strains of high, moderate or low virulence.” Vet Microbio, 2009, 133, pp. 9−22. 

Weesendorp, E. Stegeman, A., and Loeffen, W. “Survival of classical swine fever 

virus at various temperatures in faeces and urine derived from experimentally 

infected pigs.” Vet Microbio, 2008, 132, pp. 254−59.

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Classical swine fever. Technical 

Disease Card. 2009. http://www.oie.int/. 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Manual of Diagnostic tests and 

Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. Classical swine fever (Hog Cholera). Chapter 

2.8.3. 2008. http://www.oie.int/. 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Manual of Diagnostic Tests and 

Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. 2012. http://www.oie.int/.

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

Chapter 15.2, “Classical swine fever.” 2012. http://www.oie.int/. 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 

2012. http://www.oie.int/.

May 2013 K-3
Abbreviations

May 2013 J-3

MAC Multiagency Coordination 

MLV modified live virus

MP Monitored Premises 

NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency Management System 

NAHERC National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps

NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network

NASDA National Association of State Departments of Agriculture

NCAHEM National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management

NCIE National Center for Import and Export 

NGO non-governmental organization

NIC National Incident Coordinator 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NRCC National Response Coordinator Center

NRCT National Response Coordination Team

NRF National Response Framework

NRMT National Response Management Team

NSU National Surveillance Unit

NVS National Veterinary Stockpile

NVSL National Veterinary Services Laboratories 

NVSL Ames NVSL location for FAD diagnostic testing in Ames, IA 

NVSL FADDL NVSL location for FAD diagnostic testing in Plum Island, NY 

OIE World Organization for Animal Health

PCR polymerase chain reaction

PPE personal protective equipment

PPV positive predictive value

PVZ Protection Vaccination Zone 

ROSS Resource Ordering and Status System

RRCC Regional Response Coordinator Center

rRT-PCR real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction

RT-PCR reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction

SAHO State Animal Health Official 

SITC Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance 
May 2013 J-4

SK-6 swine kidney cells

SOP standard operating procedure

SP Suspect Premises 

SPS Secure Pork Supply

SZ Surveillance Zone 

TAIO Tool for the Assessment of Intervention Options

TDD telecommunications device for the deaf

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

VI virus isolation

VN virus neutralization

VNT virus neutralization test

VP Vaccinated Premises 

VS Veterinary Services

VZ Vaccination Zone

WS Wildlife Services