June 4, 1968 

The Honorable Joe Resweber Opinion No. M-240 

County Attorney 

Harris County 

Houston, Texas 

Re: Constitutionality of 

Senate Bill 105, 60th '.,',: 

Legislature, 1967, cod%- 

Pied as Section, 22 of 

Article 7150. Vernon's 

Dear Mr. Reswebers Civil Statutes. 

Your request for an opinion reads, in part, 

follows; 

as 

"Carl Smith, Tax Assessor-Collector 

of Harris County has recently requested 

this 'office to obtain an Attorney Ckneral's 

Opinion as to whether or not S.B. 105, 60th 

Legislature, 1967, which is codified as 

Section 22 of Article 7150, V.T.C.S., is 

constitutional." 

You also expressed the opfnlon that said Section 22 

is unconstitutional, but you have not presented us wtth any 

factual situatfon for application of‘ the statute, 

Thfs opinion will deal only with said Senate Bill 105 

(60th Legfslature, p0 319, Ch e 1>2), and it does not relate, 

to House Bill N 0. 2, both Legislature. p* 623, Ch 1 3b3 

which3fnvolves non-profft corporatfons (as deffned In thi 

Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act), and which is also codfmed as Sectfon 22 of Vernon's Civil Statutes. 

Senate Bill 105, 60th Legislature, 1967, codffied as 

Section 22 of Artfcle 7150,~ Vernon,Js Civil Statutes, provides 

fn parts 

"22. The property of all fraternal 

organizationi shall be exempt from taxation 

so long as the property is owned and used 

for charitable, benevolent, re3fgIous,,aPld 

educational purposesp and is not fn whole 

-1171- 
The Hon. Joe Resweber, Page 2 (M-240) 

or in part leased out to others, or 

otherwise used with a view to profit. 

"The term 'Fraternal Organization' 

as used in this Act shall mean, 'A lodger 

or lodges, engaged in charitable, benevolent, religious, and educational work.' 

"However, this Act shall not apply 

to any fraternal organization or lodge 

which pays to its members, either directly 

or indirectly, any type of insurance benefit, 

be It life, health, accident or death benefit,, 

or any other type of insurance; neither shall 

any organization which shall directly or 

indirectly participate or engage in any 

political activity, either in support of or 

in opposition to any candidate seeking anyQub1j.c office, have or be entitl$d to benefits as provided under this Act. 

c 

The constitutionality of the statute In exempting 

property from ad valorem taxation Is controlled by Article 

VIII, Section 2 of the Texas Constitution, reading as follows: 

“Set, 2. All occupation taxes shall b+ 

equal and uniform upon the same class, of subjects within the limits of the authority levying 

the tax; but the legislature may, by general 

laws, exempt from taxation public property 

tised for public purposes; actual places or [of] 

religious worship, also any property armed by 

a church or by 'a strictly religious society for 

the exclusive uae.as a dwelling place for the 

ministry of sticlf church or religious. society, 

and which.ylelds no revenue whatever to such 

church or religious society; provided that such ' 

exemption shall not extend to more property 

than is reasonably necessary for a dwelling 

place, and in no event more than one acre of 

land; places of burial not held for private 

or corporate profit; all buildings,used - 

exclusively and owned by persons or associations of persons for school purposes and the 

necessary furniture of all schools and property used exclusively and reasonably necessary 

-1172- 
. . 

The Hon. Joe Resweber, Page 3 ‘(M-240) 

fn conducting any association. engaged In pro- " :' 

motfng the religious, educational and physical 

development of boys, girls, young men or young 

women operating under a State or National - 

organization of like character; also the endawment funds of such institutions of learning 

and religion not used with a view to profit; 

and when the same are invested in bonds or 

mortgages, or in land or other property which 

has been and shall hereafter be bought in by 

such institutions under foreclosure sales made 

to satisfy or protect such,bonds or mortgages, 

that such exemption of such land and property 

shall continue only for two years after the 

purchase of the same at such sale by such 

institutions and no longer, and institutions - 

of purely public charity; and all laws exempting property from taxation other than the 

property above mentioned shall be null and 

void." 

The controlling question is whether' the exempt pnrposes 

set forth in Section 22 of Article 7150 are broader than the 

exempt purposes provided by the ~Constitution. If the statute 

is subject to a broader construction than Section 2 of Article, 

VIII of the Constitution of Texas, that construction must be 

rejected as an unconstitutional construction. Dicklson, v * 

Woodmen of the World Insurance Society 280 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 

i71 A 

l$T::: 

1932, error ref.), I 

156, 155: S,W.2d 631, 

Clt 0: Waco v* Landingham, 

6"33f3[941) th Supreme Court,. 

recog ized that 0 a o 

lu 

it is a’ settled~rkle Ef statutory 

const ctfon that where the language of a, statute is broad 

enough to cover matters without, as well as within, t.he power 

of the. Legislature to enact, courts should construe the statute’ 

in a restricted manner, as aptlying only to the’:matte3+ lying 

within the legislative power. 

Statutes wfll be presumed to be constitutfonal, and if 

they may be upheld by a construction in harmony with the 

Constitution it is the duty of the courts to do so, 54 Tex, 

Jur.2d 140-142, Sec. 23, Taxation. 

The exempt purposes In the statute are defined by the 

:. y,,.;, .,;.~,y ,~~. ~'.?. .' words 

:;.~:.-< ,,,!.

"ct+arftable, benevo,lent, religious and educational." 

z;, :&g; 'i .~ 

,, We will compare each~.of such words separately with the language 

y$$:':' : ,,: of Section 22 of Article VIII of the Constitution. 

._ 

..&;$ ;"'.,:L .:: ,: 

$.T~ 2.: 

-1173- 
The~Hon. Joe Resweber, Page 4 (M-240) 

Charitable. In construing the word charitable in, 

the statute, it will be construed to mean "purely public 

charity" for ad valorem tax purposes. See City of Houston 

v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n., 111 Tex. 1 1 2 0 S W 

m (1921) River Oaks Garden Club v. City of ~o&st~n~,~O 

S,W.2d 85l’(lgb3) Th f th d "charitable" 

be limited to mean "pu~~*'pr~~lIcecr$O~ity." 

Benevolent. The word benevolent Is generally held 

to mean "charitable." Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Rd., 

Q. 201. "Purely public charity" is the only phrase in 

Section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution that might 

be considered as synonymous with "benevolent." However, 

the Supreme Court of Texas In the River Oaks Garden Club 

case, supra, held that the accomplishment of "ends wholly 

benevolent" was only one-third part of the definition of 

an "institution of purely public charity." Therefore, the 

word ".benevolent" will be construed and limited to mean the 

same as "purely public charity." 

the:flrst portion of Article VIII 

Section%%%*co%%red reads: "actual places OP reliilous 

worship, also any property owned by a church or by a strictly 

religious society for the exclusive use as a dwelling place 

for the ministry of such church or religious society, and 

which yields no revenue whatever to such church'or religious 

society; provided that .such exemption shall not extend to ~' 

more property than is reasonably necessary for a dwellil;tg 

place and in no event more than one acre of land, . e D 

In construing this exemption, it has many times been 

held that the exemption goes only to the explicit property 

defined In the Constitution. City of San Antonio v. Young 

The second part of Article VIII; Section 2 to be .- 

examined fn regard to "religion" is as follows: "and Qroperty used exclusively and reasonably necessary In conducting 

any association engaged in promoting the religious, educational and physical development of boys, girls, young men or 

young,women operating under a State or National organization 

of like character." 

-1174- 
. . 

The Hon. Joe Resweber, Page 5 (M-240) ', 

Thus* 

7150 wfll be 

Constitution 

then "religious purpose" of Section 22 of Article 

limited wfth respect to this clause of the 

to those fraternal organizations which are of ^_^ _ . - - ._ _. 

,:, 

the cnaracter speclrled In such Clause. -8 conclusion 1s 

also applicable to the only other constitutional exemption 

relating to "religious," f,e., "also the endowment funds of 

such fnstftutfons of learning and religion not used with a 

view to profit," This provision relates to endowment funds 

and not to property generally, Harris v. City of Ft. Worth, 

142 Tex. 600, 180 S,W.2d 131 (192F4). 

We thus conclude that the phrase "religious purpose" 

wfll be construed to encompass only the religious activities 

which are within the confines of the last three quoted portions 

of the Constitution. 

: Educational. With respect to "educational," the only 

applicable clauses"of Section 2 of Article VIII are those 

dealing wfth buildings and furniture of institutions which 

are used exclusively for school purposes, and endowment funds 

of such fnstftutions. 

In order to fit th#se"'educational" exemptions, the ~- 

property must be of the exact nature described in the Constl- .' 

tutlon, and no statute will be construed so as to afford a 

broader exemption. 

17 S.W, 512 Bn891); 

82 Tex. 1, ~ 

o-871~(193g). 

WRfle the statute in question does not specifically 

require that the property be owned and used exclusively for 

the named purposes, we are required to construe the statute 

to have been passed with a constitutional intent and thus such 

property must be owned and used wholly and completely for one 

or more of the constitutionally exempt 

v, Feather, 149 Tex. 402, 234 S,W.2d 41 1 

urposes. See Smith 

(1950); Morris v~. 

Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 5 S.W, 519 flBgl)* 

David Graham Hall Foundation v. Highland Park Independ& 

e e s 02 0 0 762 I- X. Cl v.App. 19b3, writ yef., n.r.C.). 

It is our opinfon that Article 7150, Section 22,.is 

valid, as constftutfonally limited as herein construed, .ln '- 

conferring an ad valorem property tax exemption on that QI'CPerty of those fraternal organizations which is wholly, cozy', 

pletely and exclusively owned and used by them for,purely 

public charitable, religious and educational purposes. Therefore, the applfcation of the statute to the particular facts 

presented will determine in caeh case whether the property 

Is exempt, Insofar as this statute is subject to a broader 

-1175- 
The lion;. Joe'Resweber, Page 6 (M-240) 

construction, 

such would be 

,.I.: 

< 

that construction will not be adopted because 

unconstitutional. 

SUMMARY 

Senate BSll 105, Acts 60th Legislature, 

1967, codified as Section 22 of Article 7150, 

Vernon's Civil Statutes, is constitutional; 

however, Its effect is limited by the restrlctlve provisions of Article VIII, Section 2 of 

the Constitution of Texas. (This opinion does ,_ 

not deal with House Bill No. 372, Acts 60th 

Legislature, p. 855, Ch. 363, which was also 

codified as Section 22 of Article 7150, Vernon's 

Civil Statutes:) 

Prepared by Alfred Walker 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

s very truly, 

Tzm= 

C. MARTIN 

General of Texas 

OPINION COMMITTEEi 

Hawthorne Phillips, Chairman 

Kerns ,Taylor, Co-chairman 

Jack Goodman 

Bill C aig 

Ralph +iash 

Mariettia McGregor Payne 

A. J. CARUBBI, Jr. 

Executive Asslstant " 

-1176-