1-06-3080 FIFTH DI VISI ON MAY 23, 2008 ARTHUR BRITTON, ) Circuit Court of ) Co ok Co un ty. Plaintiff -Appella nt, ) v. ) No. 05 L 8145 ) UNI VERSI TY OF CHI

CAGO HOSPI

TALS, ) Honorab le a Corporation, ) Susan F. Zwick

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presi ding.

JUSTICE TULL Y deliver ed the opi nion of the

court: The plaintiff, Arthur Britton, filed a complaint sounding in premises liability against the University of Chicago Hospitals. Mr. Britton was injured while entering the hospital through a revolving door when the glass surrounding the revolving door shattered. The trial court g ranted summary judgmen t in favor of the de fendant . We affir m. Background On Septem

ber 24, 2 004, the p laintiff went to the

Universi ty o f Chicag o Hospital

to visit his son who was a patient there. The plaintiff was carr ying a n overnight bag and some food when he tried to enter the hospital through a revolving door. As the plaintiff pushed the door with his left hand, the door jammed. The plaintiff gave the door a “shove” and “pushed real hard”; however, the door did not move. Then, the outer, cur ved glass surrounding the revolving door broke. Plaintiff injured his left shin and knee. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defenda nt was negligent through ca reless management of the revolving door. The plaintiff also alleg ed the defendant was liable under the doctrine of1-06-3080

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res ipsa loquitur . The tria l court g ranted s ummary judgmen t in favor of the de fendant

. On appeal, the plaintiff first contends that the defendant had a duty to maintain a proper ingress/egress to the premises. Specific ally, plaintiff arg ues that defendant’s failure to make a reasonable inspection of its entrance confe rs upon it constructive notice of the defect in the door. Plaintiff further argues that whether or not defendant made a proper inspection is a question of fact. Analysis In vie wing the record , this cour

t must view

all the ev idence i n the lig ht most favorable t

o the plaintiff--the nonmoving party

. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 131, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). I n responding to the hospital’s summary judgment motion, the plaintiff may not rest on the pleading s but must affirmatively demonstrate tha t there is a genuine issue of material fact that re quires trial. To establish a claim for neglige nce, the plaintiff must present evidence demonstrating that (1) the de fendant owed a duty of care; (2) the defenda nt breac hed that d uty ; and (3)the brea

ch proxima

tely caused t he plaint iff’s inj uries. Here, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any issue of fact exists regarding the defendant’s breach of any duty or that any

breach proximately c aused his injuries. To prevail on his theory that the defe

ndant's negligent maintenanc e of its revolving door proximately c aused his injurie s, the pla

intiff is r equired to come f

orward with some e

vidence tending to prove t

hat a specified condition under the defendant's c ontrol caused the glass to break. See Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos. , 92 I ll. App. 3d 813, 416 N .E.2d 328 ( 1981). I n this cas e the re cord doe s not conta in any evidenc e which raises a question of fact reg arding a specific condition under the hospital’s1-06-3080

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control that caused plaintiff’s injury . There is nothing in the record reg arding any defect in the glass or the revolving door. There is nothing in the record regarding maintenance of the revolving door. Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the hospital had actual or constructive notice of any defect in the revolving door. Here the record merely

contains general allega tions ag ainst the d

efenda nt but no ev

idence c reating any issues of materia l fact. The plaintiff next contends that he has presented sufficient evidence of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur . Specifically, the plaintiff a sserts that he was injured by a door that was u

nder the defenda nt's con trol and ma

nageme nt. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur require s that (1)the occu rrence is one tha

t ordinar ily does not occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the defenda nt had exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury

. Dyback v. Webe r , 114 Ill. 2d 232, 242, 500 N.E. 2d 8 (1986). The issue before this court is whether the def endant had sole and exclusive control of the revolvin g door a t the time o f plaintif

f's inju ry . " We thin

k not. This door, as well as doors of like design, did not and does not operate itself. I t was made available by the

hospital, but was not being operated by it. By the plaintiff' s own testimony he was oper ating the door wh

en the g lass brok

e. He ha d to exerc ise some f

orce to e nter the hospital. In fact, since no other

person was within the door at the time, he was the sole age ncy which caused the door to revolve. This being true, then, a t the time of injury, the hospital had no control over the door. The plaintiff maintains that Illinois law does not require that the de fendant have "exclusive contro l" over

the instru

mentality . Plaintiff

cites Ly nch v. Precision Machine Shop,1-06-3080

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Ltd. , 93 I ll. 2d 266, 2 72, 443 N. E.2d 569 ( 1982), in s upport of his position

that the r equisite degree of control is not a rigid standa rd. It must be noted that the doctrine is simply a rule of evidence relating to the suf ficiency of plaintiff's proof. Here, we find that the doc trine is not applicable. The operation of a revolving door is not within the exclusive control of the owner of the premises. Persons using them take a distinct pa

rt in their operati on and ar

e chargeable with the exer cise of ordinary

care in the use thereof. Injuries may

occur in their operation from a lack of due c are, either on the part of the person injured or from that of those using the door at or nea r the same time as the person injured. Under conditions of that character, a propr ietor cannot be considered liable. Further, w here a structure not obviously dang erous has been in daily use for an extended period of time and has proven adequate, safe, and conve nient for the purposes to which it was being put, it may be further continued in use without the imputation of negligence

. Moreover, the res ipsa lo quitur doctrine applies only whe n the facts proved by

the plaintiff admit of the single inference that the ac cident would not have happened unless the defendant had been neglig ent. Here, that is not the case. I f it is reasonable to presume from the facts that defendant's negligence proximately c aused plaintiff's injury , it is equally logical to infe r that some t

hird par ty p assing t

hrough the door j ust prior t

o plaintif f had ca relessly subjecte d it to an unusual strain which caused the glass to brea k and that such an act was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Clea

rly if two rea sonable inferences are deduc ible from the same facts, one of wh ic h c om po rt s w it h d ef

en da nt 's re sp on si bi li ty a nd th e o th er is di re ct ly contra thereto, neither should be indulged to permit recovery by use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur for the apparent1-06-3080

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reason that, if such a practice is permissible, a jury is called upon to enter the field of speculation and eng age in a

guessin g conte st. Accordingly , we find that the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgme

nt. The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. FITZG ERALD SMITH, P.J., and O'MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.