1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELLEN F. GROSS , Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 12
- 1 531 (JEB) LOGISTICS SUPPORT, INC., Defendant .

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER On July 8, 2013 , this Court denied Logistics Support, Inc. ’s Motion for Summary Judgment o n Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim , h old ing that there was sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find that Defendant’s reason for terminating Ellen Gross was discrimi natory

. See Gross v. Logistics Support, Inc. , No. 12

- 1531, 2013 WL 3369078 (D.D.C. July 8, 2013) ( Gross I ). Ten days later, LSI moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Court erred in basing its decision solely on LSI’s “ reversal of course ” in its decision to terminate Gross rather than another human

- resources manager . Finding that LSI has not shown that a different result is warranted, the Court will deny its M otion. Because Defendant seeks reconsideration of an interlocutory order denying its Motion for Summary Judgment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs . See Judicial Watch v. Dep’ t of Army , 466 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123 (D.D.C .2006) (discussing Rule 54(b)’s application to denials of dispositive motions ). “The standard of review for interlocutory decisions differs from the standards applied to final judgments under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).” Williams v. Savage , 569 F. Supp. 2d 99, 108 (D.D.C. 2008). Defendant need only clear a lowe r bar as “ reconsideration of an interlocutory decision is available under the standard ‘as2 justice requires.’” Judicial Watch , 466 F. Supp. 2d at 123; accord Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 241 F.R.D. 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2007). The “as justice requires” st andard may be met where the court has patently misunderstood the parties, strayed far afield of the issues presented, or failed to consider a controlling or significant change in the law or facts sin ce the submission of the issue. See Cobell v. Norton , 22 4 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004). “ These considerations leave a g reat deal of room for the court’ s di scretion and, accordingly, the ‘ as justice requires’

s tandard amounts to determining ‘ whether [relief upon] reconsideration is necessary under t he relevant circumstances.’” Lewis v. Dist. of Columbia , 736 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoti ng Cobell , 224 F.R.D. at 272). A court’ s discretion under Rule 54(b) , however, is “ limited by the law of the case doctrine and subject to the caveat that where litigants have once battled for the court’ s decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” Singh v. George Washington Univ

. , 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal citations omitted). LSI maintains that judgment should have been entered in its favor because “[e]vidence that an employer has changed its mind in making an employment decision is not, standing alone, evidence of discrimination. . . . [ Gross ] must show not only that her emp loyer ‘reversed course’ in reaching an adverse employment decision, but also that the employer’s proffered explanation for why it changed its mind is unworthy of credence. ” Mot. at 2 (emphasis in original)

. The
Court , however, d id not base its decision o n LSI’s reversal of course alone ; what D efendant omits from its argument is the chronology of events. In denying summary judgment, the Court determined that a jury could infer discrimination where LSI abruptly reversed course in such close proximity

– just sixt een days later

– to Gross ’s announcement of her pregnancy. S ee Gross I , 2013 WL 3369078 , at *4

.3 In the similar context of retaliation suits, courts have consistently looked at the timing of the employer’s action when determining whether a plaintiff can rebut the employer’s legitimate

non - retaliatory reason for the adverse action

. See, e.g. , Nuskey v. Hochberg , 657 F. Supp. 2d 47, 62 (D.D.C. 2009) ( while defendant had proffered nonretaliatory ex planations for its actions , “ the tempo ral proximity between plaintiff’ s protected activity and the alleged retaliation is too close for defendant to escape the inference of a retaliatory motiv e at the summary judgment stage”); see also Cones v. Shalala , 19 9 F.3d 512, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“the close t emporal proximity of [plaintiff’ s] discrimination complaints to the [adverse action] is sufficient t o establish a causal connection ”); Glenn v. Bair , 643 F. Supp. 2d 23, 42 (D.D.C. 2009) ( “Even absent direct

ev idence, however, temporal proximity can support an inference of causation if the interval between the protected activity and the adverse pe rsonnel action is ‘very close.’ ”) (quoting Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden , 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)).

The timing of LSI’s termination of Gross

– combined with its apparent about

- face as to which human

- resources manager it would terminate

– is sufficient to raise g enuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc

. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ( noting that trial courts should act with “caution in granting summary judgment” and may “ deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course woul d be to proceed to a full trial ”). A lthough D efendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment presented a close call

– and its Motion for Reconsideration is hardly frivolous

– the Court believes it may not take the case from a jury

.4 The Court, therefore, ORDERS that Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED

.

/s/ **James E. Boasberg** JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge

Date: August 29, 2013