T he def endan t ’ s na me i s s pel l ed bo t h “ Scot t y ” and “ Scot t i e” i n t he r ecor d. A s i s t he cus t om of t hi s cour t , we 1

w ill us e the sp e lli n g utilize d in the ind ic tm e n t. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nua ry 30, 200 8
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. SC OTTY D. HA TF IELD 1 Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Cam pbell Cou nty No. 12931 E. Sh ayne Sexton, Jud ge

No. E2007-01330-CC A-R3- CD - F iled May 1, 1008

The de fenda

nt, Scotty D. Hatf ield, orig inally

char g ed with three counts of ag g ravated assault and one
c ount o f f e lony re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt, wa s c on vic te d of on e c ount o f atte mpt e d a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult and mi s d emea

nor re ckless enda

ng erme nt. The trial cour t imposed an eff

ective se ntence of three y ear s to be served in the Department of Correc tion. I n this appea l, the defe ndant contends that the sentenc e is excessive and that the trial court erre d by denying a lternative se ntencing . We affir m the sentenc ing de cision of the trial c ourt. T h e ca s e m u s t be re manded, howe ver, f or the e ntry

of a
corr ecte d judgme nt refle cting th a t t h e d e f e n d a nt w a s c o nv ic te d

o f a tte mpted ag g ravated assault rather than ag g ravated assault on Count 1. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed; Re m anded
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J J ., joined.
Martha Y oakum, District Public De fende r, and Charles Her man, Assistant D istrict Public De fende r, for the a ppellant, Scotty

D. Hatf ield. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd R ep o rt er; J ennife r L . Ble dsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Will iam Paul Phil lips, District A t torney Gene ral; and Sca

rlett Ellis, Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
The tra nscript of the de fenda

nt’s trial was not included in the r ecor d on appea l. The following version of e vents was include d in the aff idavit of complaint and incor porate d into the pr e se nte nc e re po rt :-2- Affia nt learne d throug h an investigation through the vict i m s[] that on 12-4-05 at approx[ imately 3:15 p.m.] , [t he] above named de fenda

nt confront ed t hem at Stanfield Churc h located on [hig hw ay ] 29 7. Vi c tim s st a te d th a t th e de fe nd ant g ot o ut o f h is
ve hic le and

wa lke d o ver t o the v e hic le the y w[e re ] in w itha

g un in his ha nd. Victims stated that the def endant ope ned the ba ck door of thei r v ehicle and pointed the handgun at Danny J ames Ditty [,] J r. Victim[ ] Amy

Renee Hatfie ld, wh[o] was drivingthe vehicle , stated that s h e d rove out of the churc h parkinglot, at which time the defe ndant shot at them with the handg un. Victims stated that [t he] defe n d an tfo l l o we d

t h em d o wn t h e r o ad([ h i gh wa y ] 2 9 7 ), p o i n ting the handgun at them and shooting. Vic tims st ated that the de fenda nt then rammed the ir vehicle with his vehicle. Victims s t ated that they w[ere] in fear

of their life and we ll being. A bove off enses oc curr ed in Ca mp b e ll Co u n ty , T [e n n e s s e e ].

Ne i t h er t h e S t at e n o r t h e d ef

en d an to ff

er edt es t i m o n y

at t h e s e n t en ci n g h ea ri n g. I ns te a d, bo th r e lie d u

po n th e e vide nc e a dd

uc e d at tr ia l and

the c on te nts of

the pr e se nte nc e re po rt

. The pr e s e n te n c e r e p o rt e s ta b li s h e d th a t t h e 3 1

- y e ar - o ld

d e f e n d an t h a d

tw o p r io r

c o n v ic ti o n s f

or dr ivi ngun de r t

he inf lue nc e a s w e ll as c on vic tio ns fo r dr ivi ng on a su sp e nd e d li c e ns e and

dis or de rl y c o n d u c t

. I n a d d i t i o n , c h ar g e s o f a s s a u l t , c r i m i n a l t r e s p a s s , an d f a i l u r e t o a

p p e ar w e r e p e nd ing in McCrea ry County , Kentucky , at the time of the sentenc ing hear ing. The de fenda nt admitted using marijuana daily , explaining that “it helps him stay ca l m an d h el p s him eat.” The defe ndant, who resided w ith his fourth wife at the time of the sentenc ing he aring , dropped out of high sc hool in the tenth g rade , had an unve rifiable e mploy ment history , and stated that his only income wa s Social Se c ur ity dis a bil ity pa y me nts . T he de fe nd ant p ro vid e d th e fo llo wi ngve rs ion of the of fe ns e s: My 11[-] y ear [-] old daug hter infor med m e that she ha d been moleste d by her 17[-]y ear [-] old cousin, and wit hout time to think I snapped a nd tried my very best to kill the boy

. I later afte r Ig ot out of jail found out that he had rape d my

[ni ne-]y ear [-] old son. And my 12[-] y ear [-] old da ug hte r a s w e ll.
Wit hout a trial transc ript, we c an only assume the de fenda

nt was re fer

ring to the attempted ag g ravated assault victim Danny Ditty , J r.
I n imposing sentenc es of three y ear s for the attempted agg ravated assault convic tion and 11 months and 29 d ay s fo r t he re ckless enda ng erme nt conviction, the trial cour t applied
e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s 1 , th a t the de fe nd ant h a d a his tor y of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns in a dd iti on to t ho se nece ssary to e stablish the appropr iate rang e, and 9, that the defe ndant employ ed a firea rm during the commission of the offe nse. See T.C.A

. § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4(1), ( 9) (2006) . I n mitigation, the trial c ourt found t hat “the defe ndant acted under strong provocation.” See id. § 40-35-113( 2). The trial court ref used to find in mitigation that the def endant c ommitt ed the of fense s under suc h unusual-3-

circ umstances that it was unlikely that the defe ndant’s conduct was the r esult of a sustained intent to violate the law. The court re marke d

We have may

be not convictions, but we have accusations of violent be havio r. I n r e a din g t he vi c timimp a c t st a te me nt,

. . . th e re ’s so me troubling pa

rts about [the defenda

nt’s] fai lure to dea l with ang er issues, and . . . one c an envi s i o n h ow this very thing oc curs whe n s o m e o n e i s n o t d e a l i n g w i t h an g e r i s s u e s
. H a d t h i s b e e n p ro pe rl y de a lt w ithy e ars ba c k, we mig ht no t have be e n in a sit uatio n li ke thi s.
The trial c ourt also denied alternative sentenc ing, ruling that “af ter c onsideration of our

Sentencing Cod e , b a se d o n th e de fe nd ant’ s p a st h ist or y , a c c us a tio ns and co nv ic tio ns ; ba se d o n th e ne e d to proper ly deter this ty pe of be havior,” the s entenc e shoul d be served in the De partment of Corr ection.

I n this appea l, the defendant mount s sever al challeng es t o the sentenc e imposed. He
asser ts that the trial court er re d b y u t iliz ing e nhance ment fac tor 9 to enhanc e his conviction for
a tte mpt e d a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult . H e a lso c la ims that th e tr ia l court e rr e d by c on sid e ri ng in i ts e nti re ty the statement of r eckle ss endang erme nt victim Amy Renee Hatfie ld. Finally , he contends that the trial court e rre d by

order ing a

fully incar cer ative sente nce.
Whe n a de fe nd ant c ha lle ng e s th e le ng th a nd mann e r o f s ervi ce of a

se nte nc e , th is court g ener ally

conducts a

de novo review of the rec ord with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations
ma de by the tr ia l c ourt are c or

re c t. T. C.A

. § 40 -3 5- 40 1( d) (2 00 6) . T his pr e sumpt ion , h ow e ve r, is conditioned upon the af

firmative showing in the re cord tha t the trial court c onsidered the sentenc ing p ri n ci ples and a ll releva

nt fac ts and circ umstances. State v. Ashby , 8 2 3 S. W. 2 d 1 6 6 , 1 6 9 ( T e n n. 1991). The burden of showing that the se ntence is improper is upon the def endant. Id . I f the re view
re fl e c ts the tr ia l court pr op e rl y c on sid e re d all re le va nt fa c tor s and its fi nd ing s of f a c t are a de qu a te ly supported by

the re cord, this cour

t must affirm the sente nce, “ eve n i f we would have pr efe rre d a differ ent re sult.” State v. Fletc her , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . I n the eve nt the
rec ord fa ils t o d em o nstrate the r equire d considera tion by the trial cour

t, appellate r eview of

the sentenc e is purely

de novo. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

I n makin g i t s s en t encingdeter mination in the present ca se, the trial c ourt, at the conclusion of the se ntencinghear ing, w as oblig ed to deter mine the proprie ty

of sentenc ing alternatives by

considering ( 1 ) t he evide nce, if any , rec eived at the g uilty plea a nd sentenc ing hear ings, ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port, (3) the principles of se ntencingand ar g uments as to sentenc ing alternati v e s , ( 4 ) th e n a tu

r e an d c h ar a c te r is ti c s o f

th e c r im in a l c o n d

u c t i n v o lv e d , ( 5 ) e v id e n c e and information offe red by

the par ties on the enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors, (6) any statements the de fe nd ant m a de in h is b e ha lf a bo ut s e nte nc ing , a

nd (7 ) t he po te nti a l f

or re ha bil itatio n o r t

re a tme nt. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0( b) ;- 10 3( 5) (2 00 6) ; State v. Holland , 860 S.W .2d 53, 60 (T enn. Crim. App. 1993).T he 2 0 0 5 am end m ent s t o t he Se nt enci ng A ct remo ved l anguage p rovidi ng t hat t he d escri b ed off end ers were 2

“ pres umed t o be” f

avor abl e c andi dat es f

or a l t er nat i ve s ent enc i ng i n t he abs enc e o f ev i dence t o t he cont r ar y an d re pl ace d i t wi t h l anguage p rovidi ng t hat s uch o f f end ers “shoul d b e co nsi d ered ” f avo rable cand i d at es f

o r al t ernat i ve sent enci ng in th e a b se n c e o f ev id e n c e to the c o n tra ry. See T

. C. A. § 40- 35- 102( 6) ( 2006)

. T h e ame n dmen t s a l s o ma de t h i s pr ov i s i on “a d v iso ry” in n a tur e
. I d. B e c a u se the d e fen d a n t h a s faile d to d e m o n stra te th a t, e v e n a ssu m ing th a t h e w a s e n tit le d to a p res um p t i o n of f

avo rable cand id a c y fo r a lternat i ve sent ence, t he t ri al co urt err ed by ord eri ng a f ul l y i ncarcerat i ve sent ence, we need not ad d res s whether t hese ame nd m e n ts c h a n ged t he b urden o f pro o f f o r ent i t l em ent t o al t ernat i ve sent enci ng. -4- I. Length of Sentenc e Although the defe ndant does not spec ifically contest the leng th of his sentence , he d o es asse rt that the trial cour t erre d by using e nhance ment fac tor 9 to increa se his sentenc e for attempted ag g ravated assault fr om the minimum sentenc e of two y ear s to a mi d -poi nt sentence of three y ea rs
. T h e S tate conc edes that the trial court e rre d by applying e nhance ment fac tor 9 to the
c on vic tio n f

or a tte mpt e d a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult , b ut a sse rt s th a t the thr e e -ye ar se nte nc e is n e ve rt he le ss appropr iate. We ag ree with the State.

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-114 provides that “ [i ]f appropriate for the offe nse and if not alre ady an essential element of the offe nse,” the trial court may consider a

ny one of 22 enume rate d en h an cement fac tors to increa se a de fenda nt’s sentenc e beyond the statutory minimum

. T.C.A. § 40-35-114 (2006). I n this case, the de fenda nt was convic ted of the attempted ag g ravated assault of D anny Ditty , J r., “by

the use of a deadly wea

pon, to wit: a gun.” B eca use the use of a firea rm was an essential ele ment of the off ense f or which the defe ndant was c onvicted, the trial court erre d by using e nhance ment fac tor 9 to increa se the de fenda nt’s sentenc e. See id. B e c a us e of thi s e rr or , th e tr ia l c ourt

is n ot e nti tle d to a pre sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss wit

h r e g ard to t he le ng th of the sente nce. O ur re view is purely de novo. Upon our de novo revie w of the r ecor d, the def endant ’ s r e c o r d

o f c r im in al convictions is sufficient to war

rant a n enhanc ement of one y ear
. The rec ord establishes that the de fenda nt has two prior convic tions for driving under the influence as we l l as convic tions for driving on a su sp e nd e d li c e ns e and

dis or de rl y

c on du c t.
II. De nial of Alt ernative Se ntencing
Th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

ha s r e c ognize d th a t be c a

us e of the lim ite d c a

pa c iti e s o f s tate prisons, “convic t ed felons committi ng the most severe offe nses, possessing criminal histories evincinga cle ar disre g ard f or the law s and morals of society , and evincing failure of past ef forts at reha bilitation shall be g iven first priority reg ardingsentenc ing involving incar cer ation.” T.C.A. § 40-35-102( 5) (2006) . Acc ording ly , a defe ndant who does not f all within these para

meters a nd “who is an espec ially

mitigated or

standard of

fende r convic ted o f a Class C, D or E f elony , should be
c on sid e re d a s a f

a vo ra ble c and idate fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ingop tio ns in t he a bs e nc e of e vid e nc e to t h e contr ary .” Id. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 ( 6 ) ( 2 0 0 6 )

. A n a lt e r n a ti v e s e n te n c e is an y s e n te n c e th a t d o es not 2 involve total confineme nt. See ge nerally State v. Fie lds , 4 0 S. W.3 d 43 5 (T e nn
. 20 01 ). B e c a us e , in-5-

this inst ance , the sen t en ce i m posed is ten y ear s or less, the trial c ourt was r equire d to consider probation as a

sentenc ing option. See T.C.A. § 40-35-303( a), ( b). Sentenc ing issue s ar e t o be d e te r mi n e d b y th e f

a c ts an d c ir c u ms ta

n c e s ma d e kn o w n in e a ch ca se. S ee State v. Taylor , 744 S.W .2d 919, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.

When examining a defe ndant’s suitability for a n alternative sentenc e, the tria l court should consider whe ther:

(A ) C o n fi n em en ti s n ec es s ary t o p ro t ec ts o ci et y

b y re s t ra i n i n g a de fe nd ant who ha s a

lon g his tor

y of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nec essar y to avoid depre ciating the seriousne ss of the offe nse or c onfinement is par ti cu l arly suited to provide an eff ective de terre nce to other s likely to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less re strict i v e t han conf inement have fre quently

or rec ently been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant[.] T.C.A. § 40-35-103( 1)(A) -(C). In addition, a defenda nt’s potential for rehabilitation or l ack the reof should be examined when determining if an alternative sentence is a ppropriate

. Id. § 40-35-103( 5).
The de fenda

nt is required to e stablish his “suitabili ty for f ull probation.” State v. Mounger , 7 S.W. 3d

70 , 7 8 ( Te nn
. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); see T.C.A. § 40-35-303( b); State v. Bingham , 910 S.W .2d 448, 455-56 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled in part on other grounds by Stat e v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000)

. A defe ndant seeking full probation bear s the burde n of showing that probation wil l “subser ve the ends of justice and the best interest of both the public a nd the def endant.” State v. Dykes , 8 0 3 S

. W

. 2 d 2 5 0 , 2 5 9 (T en n
. C ri m
. Ap p
. 1 9 9 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Hooper v

. Sta te , 297 S.W .2d 78, 81 (1956)) , overruled on othe r grounds by Hooper , 2 9 S.W .3d at 9-10. Among the fa ctors applica ble to probation co nsideration ar e the c ircumstance s of the off ense; the defe ndant’s cr iminal recor d, social history , and pre sent condi t i o n ; the deter rent e ffe ct upon the defe ndant; and the best interests of the def endant a nd the public. State v. Gre ar , 568 S.W .2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978)

.

I n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ourt imp os e d a

fu lly inc arc e ra tiv e se nte nc e ba se d u

po n it s finding that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 40-35-103(1)( A) a n d (B ) wer e applica ble. The defe ndant contends that the trial court err ed by utiliz ing the nee d for de terre nce to support the de nial
o f a lt e r n a ti v e s e n te n c in g b e c a

u s e th e r e w a s n o p r o o f

in th e r e c o r d

o f th e n e e d f o r d e te r r e n c e
. We ag ree . Our supre me cour

t has repe atedly held t hat “the rec ord m ust contain som e proof of t he nee d for de terre nce be fore a def endant, who is other

wise elig ible for pr obation or other a lternative sentenc e, may

be inca rce rate d.” Hooper , 2 9 S

. W .3d at 9. Althoug h the statute “doe s not require proof that inca

rce ration ‘will’ or ‘ should’ deter others from committi ng simil ar c rimes,” the r ecor d must de monstrate that “conf inement [i s] ‘particularly

suited’ to provide a

deter rent e ffe ct.” Id. After concludingthat “trial courts should be given c onsiderable latitude in determining whether a nee d for-6-

deter renc e exists and whether incar cer ation appropr iately addre sses that need,” the court ruled that
a re viewing court

will presume that a tr ial court’s de cision to incarc erate a de fenda nt ba se d o n a

ne e d f or deterre nc e is c or

re c t so lon g a s any

re a so na ble pe rs on loo kin g a t the e nti re re c or d c ou ld c on c lud e that ( 1) a ne e d to d e t e r s i m i l ar c r i m e s i s p r e s e n ti nt h e p art i c u l ar c o m m u n i t y, jurisdiction, or in the state as a whole, and ( 2) inca

rce ration of the de fe nd ant m ay

ra tio na lly se rv e a s a

de te rr e nt to oth e rs sim ila rl y sit uate d a nd lik e ly to c omm it s imi lar c ri me s.
Id. at 10. A m o n g t h e fa ctors that a trial court should consider when de termining whether incar cer ation is “particula rly suited” to the nee d for de terre nce a re: 1) Whe the r o the r i nc ide nts of the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e are inc re a sin g ly prese nt in the community , jurisdiction, or in the state as a whole.

. . . . 2 ) W h e t h e r

t h e d e f e n d an t ’ s c r i m e w a s t h e r e s u l to f i n t e n t i o na l, knowing , or re ckless conduc t or was other wise motivated by

a desire to profit or g ain from the c riminal behavior.

. . . . 3) Whether the de fenda

nt’s crime a

nd conviction have rec eived substantial publicity

bey ond that normally

expected in the ty

pical
case
.

. . . . 4) Whether the de fenda

nt was a member of a cr iminal enterprise , or substantially

encour ag ed or assisted others in achievingthe cr iminal objective.

. . . . 5) Whether the defe ndant has previously eng ag ed in cr iminal conduct of the same ty

pe as the offe nse in question, irrespe ctive of w h et h er su c h c on du c t r e su lte d in

pr e vio us arr e sts or

c on vic tio ns
. Id. at 10-12.

I n this c ase, the trial court failed to c onsider any of the re levant fa ctors, and the rec ord does not contai n an y ev idence that bespea ks either “ a nee d to deter similar c rimes” or a rational relationship between the inc arc erat i o n o f t h is defenda nt and the dete rre nce of

simil arly situated individuals li kely t o co mmit s imilar crimes. Thus, the tria l court er red by denying a lternative sentenc ing on the basis of the ne ed for deter renc e.
Th e de fe nd ant a lso c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y rel yingon

ina dmi ssi ble p o rt i o n s o f M s
. Ha t fi el d ’s v i ct i m i mp ac ts t at em en tt o s u p p o rt t h e d en i al o f al t ern at i v e s en t en ci n g.-7-

Ag a in, we mus t a g re e wi th t he de fe nd ant. Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d se c tio n 40 -3 8- 20 3 d e fi ne s a victim impact statement as

a statement providing information about the f inancial, e motional, and p h ys i c a l e f

f e c t s o f t h e c r i m e o n t h e v i c t i m an d t h e v i c t i m ’ s f a m i l y, and spec ific information about the victim, the circumstanc es surroundingthe cr ime, and the manne r in which it was pe rpetrated.

T.C.A. § 40-38-203( 2) (2006) . I n this case, the stat ement provide d by Ms. Hatfield include d not
o n ly th e in f o r ma ti o n d e e me d r e le v ant by

Code section 40-38- 203 but also unsubstantiated alleg ations of the de fenda

nt’s unchar g ed criminal activity

. The re cord e stablishes that althoug h the trial cour t stated that it did not find the statem en t “o v erly persua sive,” it did rely

upon the unsubstantiated alleg ations included in the statement to conc lude t hat t he def endant ha d “ang er issues.” The c ourt t h e nr e l i e d

o n t h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s “ f

a i l u r e t o d e a l w i t h an g e r

i s s u e s ” an d

t h e “ d e f e n d an t ’ s p a s th i s t o r

y, acc usations and convictions,” in its denial of alternative sentenc ing. The trial c ourt’s re liance on the unsubstantiated alleg ations contained in Ms. H atfield’s state ment to deny alternative sentenc ing w as err or.
Be cause the trial court err ed by rely ing on err oneous fa ctors in its denial of alter native sentenc ing, our

revie w of the m anner of service of the s entenc e is also de novo, with no presumption
o f cor rec tness. See A shby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. Neve rtheless, upon our de novo revie w of the sentenc ing de cision of the trial c ourt, we c onclude th at the def endant is not entitled to alternative sentenc ing. T he re cord e stablished that the defendant has a long history of cr iminal conduct and that confine ment is ne cessa

ry to avoid depre ciating the seriousne ss of the off ense. See T.C.A. § 40-35- 103(1) ( A)-( B)

.

As t o t h e def

endant’ s history

of cr iminal conduct, at the time of the sentenc ing h e ar i n g , t h e 3 1

- y e ar - o l d

d e f e n d an th a d

f o u r p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s s p an n i n g a p e r i o d o f e i g h t y e ar s
. In addition, the defe ndant admitted daily marijuana

use.
The re cord a lso e stablishes the serious natur e of the crimes in this case . Although the trial transc ript was not included in the a ppellate r ecor d, the ver sion of the offe nses included in the pr e se nte nc e re po rt , a s w e ll a s th e state me nts pr ov ide d b y Ms. Hatf ie ld and the de fe nd ant, e sta

bli sh that the def

endant, a rmed with a ha

ndg un, approa ched the victims as they sat in their car in a

churc h pa rk inglot . T he de fe nd ant o pe ne d th e c ar doo r an d be g an fir ingsh ots in a n atte mpt to k ill vic tim Da nny Di tty , Jr. Whe n M s. Hatf ie ld f le d, the de fe nd ant f

oll ow e d in his c ar, a ll the wh ile fi ri nghis g un at the victim s’ vehicle. The defenda nt admitted that he was trying his “ver y best to kill the boy .” Any thing less than a

fully incar cer ative sente nce w ould, i n our view, de prec iate the ve ry serious nature of the de fenda

nt’s conduct. Se e Sta te v . Th om as C. R us se ll , No. E2006-00827- CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. , Kn o x v i l l e, May 24, 2007) (“ [A] sentenc ing c ourt may consider a defe ndant’s enjoy

ment of leniency in the selec tion of a par ticular c onviction offense in awar ding or reje cting alternative sentenc ing options.”) , perm. app. denied (T en n
. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Samue l-8-

D. Braden , No. 01C01-9610-CC-00457, slip op. at 15 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, Feb. 18, 1998) ; Sta te v . Ste v e n A . B us h , No. 01C01-9605-CC-00220, slip op. at 9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, J une 26 , 1 99 7) ; State v. Frederick D ona Black, No

. 03 C01 -9 40 4- CR- 00 13 9, sli p op
. a t 3- 4 ( Te nn . Cr im. App., Knoxvil le, Apr. 6, 1995) ).

Reg ardingthe def

endant ’s p o t enti al for r ehabilitation, his lack of a high sc hool diploma or any

verifia ble employ

ment history , leng thy

criminal history , and complete lack of
remorse demonstrate a poor potential for reha bilitation. Given the poor potential for r ehabilitation and the satisfaction of the f actor s supporting a

n incar cer ative sente nce unde r Code sec tion 40-35- 103(1), the tr ial court did not err by denying a

n alterna tive sentenc e.
CO NC LU SION
Be cause the trial cour

t committed err ors of law whe n setting the leng th of sentenc e and when de ny ing a lternative se ntencing , our re view of both de cisions is purely de novo with no presumption of cor

rec tness. Neve rtheless, on de novo revie w of the r ecor d, we c onclude th at the de fe nd ant’ s p re vio us c ri min a l c on vic tio ns su pp or t the thr e e -ye ar se nte nc e imp os e d by the tr ia l c ourt

. I n addition, the rec ord establishes that a fully incar cer ative sente nce is a ppropriate based upon the considerations in Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-103. Accor dingly , the j udg ment of the trial court is a ffirme d. The case must be remande d, howeve r, for the entry of a c orre cted judg ment on Count 1. The judgme nt fo rm m u st be amende d to refle ct that the def endant wa s convicted of
a tte mpt e d a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult rathe r t ha n a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult

.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE