[Cite as State v. Schnarr, 2019-Ohio-29.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsZACHARY SCHNARR 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. John W. Wise, P. J. 

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

Case No. 18 CA 0035 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 17 CR 783 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 7, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

DAN BENOIT JENNIFER WARMOLTS 

ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR WOLFE LAW GROUP LLC 

20 South 2nd Street 1350 West 5th Avenue, Suite 330 

Newark, Ohio 43055 Columbus, Ohio 43212 
Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 0035 2

Wise, P. J. 

{¶1} Defendant–Appellant Zachary Schnarr appeals from his conviction for 

felonious assault in the Court of Common Pleas, Licking County. Plaintiff-Appellee is the 

State of Ohio.1 A brief summary of the relevant facts and procedural history leading to 

this appeal is as follows. 

{¶2} On September 17, 2017, a male individual and members of his family were 

walking near Geller Park in Newark, Ohio. According to the State’s allegations, appellant 

drove by in a Ford Mustang, and the male individual yelled at him to slow down. Appellant 

turned the vehicle around and drove back. A verbal altercation ensued. Appellant 

ultimately accelerated toward the man who had yelled. He then struck him with the 

Mustang and “continued to swerve and accelerate” for a time. The man finally fell off of 

the hood, and had to be taken to the hospital. He later reported being unable to work and 

to pay his rent. See Plea and Sentencing Transcript at 9-11, 19. 

{¶3} On March 12, 2018, appellant appeared with counsel before the trial court 

and pled guilty to one count of felonious assault, R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)/(D)(1)(a), a felony of 

the second degree. The State dismissed an additional misdemeanor count of aggravated 

menacing. Appellant was thereupon sentenced to two years in prison. 

{¶4} Appellant, originally proceeding pro se, initiated a delayed appeal, with 

subsequent leave of this Court, on May 9, 2018. 

{¶5} Appellant's present counsel, upon her assignment to the case, reviewed the 

matter and thereafter filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, infra, asserting that 

 

1 The State has not filed a response brief in this matter. 
Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 0035 3

she could find no error prejudicial to appellant for argument. Appellate counsel, on the 

same day, filed a conditional motion to withdraw. 

{¶6} However, counsel for appellant has submitted one potential assigned error 

under Anders, which we re-state as follows: 

{¶7} “I. APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND 

INTELLIGENTLY ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 

OF HIS TRIAL COUNSEL.” 

{¶8} Appellant was given an opportunity to file a pro se brief raising additional 

potential assignments of error, but he has apparently chosen not to do so. 

{¶9} As noted in our recitation of facts, present appellate counsel has presented 

us with an Anders brief following her appointment to the case. In Anders v. California

(1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, the United States Supreme Court 

established the following five criteria: (1) A showing that appellant's counsel thoroughly 

reviewed the transcript and record in the case before determining the appeal to be 

frivolous; (2) a showing that a motion to withdraw has been filed by appellant's counsel; 

(3) the existence of a brief filed by appellant's counsel raising any potential assignments 

of error; (4) a showing that appellant's counsel provided to the appellant a copy of said 

brief; and (5) a showing that appellant's counsel provided appellant adequate opportunity 

to file a pro se brief raising any additional assignments of error appellant believes the 

appellate court should address. See State v. Jennings, 5th Dist. Richland No. 98CA24, 

1999 WL 547919. 

{¶10} Pursuant to Anders, if, after a conscientious examination of the record, a 

defendant's counsel concludes the case is wholly frivolous, then he or she should so 
Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 0035 4

advise the court and request permission to withdraw. Id. at 744. Once the defendant's 

counsel satisfies the aforesaid requirements, the appellate court must fully examine the 

proceedings below to determine if any arguably meritorious issues exist. If the appellate 

court also determines that the appeal is wholly frivolous, it may grant counsel's request 

to withdraw and dismiss the appeal without violating constitutional requirements, or may 

proceed to a decision on the merits if state law so requires. Id.

{¶11} We initially find appellate counsel in this matter has adequately followed the 

procedures required by Anders v. California, supra. 

I. 

{¶12} We first turn to the merits of appellant's counsel's potential Assignment of 

Error alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in appellant’s entry of a guilty plea. 

{¶13} Our standard of review for ineffective assistance claims is set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Ohio 

adopted this standard in the case of State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 

N.E.2d 373. These cases require a two-pronged analysis in reviewing a claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel. First, we must determine whether counsel's assistance 

was ineffective; i.e., whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonable representation and was violative of any of his or her essential duties to the 

client. If we find ineffective assistance of counsel, we must then determine whether or not 

the defense was actually prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness such that the reliability 

of the outcome of the trial is suspect. This requires a showing that there is a reasonable 

probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error, the outcome of the trial would have 

been different. Id. However, trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all 
Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 0035 5

decisions fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie

(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675, 693 N.E.2d 267. 

{¶14} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) states as follows: 

 In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a 

plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without 

first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following: 

 (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, 

with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty 

involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or 

for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 

 (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, 

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence. 

 (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, 

to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for 

obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to 

prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the 

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. 

{¶15} Generally, an attorney's advice to take a plea deal is not ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See State v. Shannon, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2017-T-0012, 2017-

Ohio-9344, ¶ 34, citing State v. Sturgill, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2014–09–066, 2015–

Ohio–1933, ¶ 20. In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel in a plea deal, a 
Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 0035 6

defendant must show that the ineffective assistance “precluded a defendant from entering 

his plea knowingly and voluntarily.” State v. Selvaggio, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-128, 

2018-Ohio-3532, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Madeline, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2000-T-0156, 

2002 WL 445036. 

{¶16} In reviewing the present issue in an Anders context, an appellate court 

should review the transcript of the plea hearing in light of Crim.R. 11 and consider whether 

there are any arguable issues with respect to the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

nature of the appellant’s guilty plea. See State v. Kerr, 2nd Dist. Champaign No. 2018-

CA-8, 2018-Ohio-4882, ¶ 5. Having done so in the case sub judice, we find no arguable 

issues in regard to appellant’s counsel’s sole potential Assignment of Error, and it is 

therefore overruled. 

Additional Potential Issues 

{¶17} In the case sub judice, appellant was convicted, following his guilty plea, of 

a single second-degree felony count. We sua sponte note, inter alia, that a guilty plea 

waives a defendant's right to challenge the sufficiency or manifest weight of the evidence. 

See State v. Loper, 5th Dist. Licking No. 09-CA-0043, 2009-Ohio-5919, ¶ 7. The fact of 

the sole count would also obviate any issues of merger of offenses. Furthermore, “[a] 

prison sentence for a second-degree felony is not mandatory, but presumed.” State v. 

Bauman, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 17 CO 0016, 2018-Ohio-4913, ¶87; R.C. 

2929.13(D)(1). Under R.C. 2929.14(A)(2), the possible prison sentences for a seconddegree felony are two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years. Here, appellant’s prison 

sentence was the minimum term under the statutory range. 
Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 0035 7

{¶18} Accordingly, after independently reviewing the record, we agree with 

counsel's conclusion that no arguably meritorious claims presently exist upon which to 

base further direct appeal. 

{¶19} Therefore, we find the present appeal to be wholly frivolous under Anders, 

grant counsel's request to withdraw, and affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction and 

sentence. 

{¶20} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the Court 

of Common Pleas, Licking County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed. 

By: Wise, P. J. 

Delaney, J., and 

Baldwin, J., concur. 

JWW/D 1220