alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2021217EN.01000601.xml

| 7.6.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 217/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 217/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 15 April 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Areios Pagos — Greece) — AB v Olympiako Athlitiko Kentro Athinon — Spyros Louis

(Case C-511/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Directive 2000/78/EC - Principle of equal treatment in employment and occupation - Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age - Workers placed under a labour reserve system until termination of their contract of employment - Wage reduction and reduction or loss of severance pay - System applicable to public-sector workers close to full-time retirement - Reduction of public-sector wage costs - Article 6(1) - Legitimate social policy objective - Economic crisis)

(2021/C 217/07)

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Areios Pagos

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: AB

Defendant: Olympiako Athlitiko Kentro Athinon — Spyros Louis

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2 and Article 6(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which public-sector workers who, during a given period, fulfil the conditions for drawing a full pension are placed under a labour reserve system until the termination of their contract of employment, which entails a reduction in their pay, the loss of their possible advancement and the partial or even total cancellation of the severance pay to which they would have been entitled on termination of their employment relationship, where that legislation pursues a legitimate employment-policy objective and the means to achieve that objective are appropriate and necessary.

---

(1)  OJ C 319, 23.9.2019.

---
# C_2021062EN.01000801.xml

| 22.2.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 62/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.2.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 62/8

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 17 December 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — Belgium) — G.M.A. v État belge

(Case C-710/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Freedom of movement for persons - Article 45 TFEU - Citizenship of the Union - Directive 2004/38/EC - Right of residence for more than three months - Article 14(4)(b) - Jobseekers - Reasonable period of time to acquaint themselves with potentially suitable employment opportunities and take the necessary steps to obtain employment - Requirements imposed by the host Member State on the jobseeker during that period - Conditions governing the right of residence - Obligation to continue seeking employment and to have a genuine chance of being engaged)

(2021/C 62/07)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: G.M.A.

Defendant: État belge

Operative part of the judgment

Article 45 TFEU and Article 14(4)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that a host Member State is required to grant a reasonable period of time to a Union citizen, which starts to run from the time when that Union citizen registered as a jobseeker, in order to allow that person to acquaint himself or herself with potentially suitable employment opportunities and take the necessary steps to obtain employment.

During that period, the host Member State may require the jobseeker to provide evidence that he or she is seeking employment. It is only after the expiry of that period that that Member State may require the jobseeker to show not only that he or she is continuing to seek employment but also that he or she has a genuine chance of being engaged.

---

(1)  OJ C 399, 25.11.2019.

---
Company Plant Kiln

Avg

(ppmd@7%O2)

Capitol Cement* San Antonio, TX PH/PC 0.34

Alamo Cement San Antonio, TX PH or PC 0.46

Holcim Portland, CO PH/PC 1.10

Holcim Ada, OK Wet 1.42

Capitol Cement San Antonio, TX Wet 1.49

Holcim* Ste Genevieve,MO PH/PC 1.55

Lehigh Tehachapi, CA PH/PC 2.56

Holcim Devils Slide, UT PH/PC 5.15

National Cement Ragland, AL PH/PC 7.61

Holcim Catskill, NY Wet 9.11

Lafarge Harleyville, SC PH/PC 14.30

Lehigh Redding, CA PH 14.87

Lone Star Pryor, OK Dry, kiln3 15.07

Lehigh Leeds, AL PH 15.12

Lone Star* Pryor, OK Dry, kiln 1&2 17.03

Ash Grove* Louisville, NE PH or PC 24.70

Lafarge Ravena,NY Wet, K1 26.23

Lafarge Alpena, MI Dry, K23 30.78

CalPortland Mojave, CA PH/PC, K1 55.37

Avg of top 3 0.63
May 23, 2013

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

JOE LUIS VALENCIA, Appellant

NO. 14-13-00339-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. The 

record indicates that the appeal should be DISMISSED. The Court orders the 

appeal DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion and this decision be certified 

below for observance.
#### In the Matter of Anonymous, Adoptive Child. Stanley B. Michelman, Appellant. (Matter No. 1.) In the Matter of Anonymous, Adoptive Child. Stanley B. Michelman, Appellant. (Matter No. 2.) In the Matter of Anonymous, Adoptive Child. Stanley B. Michelman, Appellant. (Matter No. 3.) In the Matter of Anonymous, Adoptive Child. Stanley B. Michelman, Appellant. (Matter No. 4.)

— In four uncontested private placement adoption proceedings pursuant to NY Constitution, article VI, § 12 (d) and Domestic Relations Law article 7, Stanley Michelman, the attorney for the adoptive parents, appeals from four orders of the Surrogate’s Court, Westchester County (Brewster, S.), all dated December 21, 1989, one in each proceeding, in which the court, *sua sponte,*and without a hearing, reduced his attorney’s fees.

Ordered that the orders are reversed, as a matter of discretion, without costs or disbursements, and the appellant’s legal fees in the amount of $3,000 per proceeding are reinstated.

It is axiomatic that the courts possess the power to regulate the practice of law, including the authority to supervise the charging of legal fees *(see, Gair v Peck,*6 NY2d 97, *cert denied*361 US 374; *Matter of First Natl. Bank v Brower,*42 NY2d 471; *Matter of Male Infant B.,*96 AD2d 1055; *Matter of Female Infant H.,*96 AD2d 1055). Moreover, "[tjhere is no question that the court has authority, in a private placement adoption proceeding, both to scrutinize the amount charged for legal fees and to reduce a fee that exceeds the reasonable value of the legal services rendered” *(Matter of Male Infant B., supra,*at 1056).

However, in the instant matters, we conclude that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in reducing the fees charged. "In general the court, in determining the justice and reasonableness of an attorney’s claim for services, should consider the time spent, the difficulties involved in the matters in which the services were rendered, the nature of the services, the amount involved, the professional standing of the counsel, and the results obtained” *(Matter of Potts,*213 App Div 59, 62, *affd*241 NY 593; *Matter of Schmidt,*134 AD2d 432). Also to be considered are factors such as the customary fees charged by the bar in the geographical area for similar services *(see, Matter of Lanyi,*147 AD2d 644, 647). In the instant matters, detailed "Time Preparation and Record Keeping” sheets carefully document the precise tasks performed by counsel on behalf of his clients, the adoptive parents, enabling this court to conclude that his fee of $3,000 per adoption was not excessive, in view of the services rendered, the results *128achieved, the standing of counsel, and the customary fees charged in the legal community for comparable services. Because the record supports the fees charged by counsel, no hearing is required to determine the reasonable value of his legal services *(cf., Matter of Male Infant B., supra,*at 1056-1057). Bracken, J. P., Eiber, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1
                                  EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 33-44620) pertaining to the Sierra Tucson Companies, Inc., 1992 Stock
Option Plan and in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-38608) pertaining
to the Sierra Tucson Companies, Inc., 1990 Stock Option Plan of our report dated
January 27, 1997, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and
schedule of the Company included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year
ended December 31, 1996.


/S/ Ernst & Young LLP
Tucson, Arizona
March 21, 1997
# C_2020230EN.01001101.xml

| 13.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 230/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 230/11

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 23 April 2020 — European Commission v Republic of Austria

(Case C-161/19) (1)

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 2009/147/EC - Conservation of wild birds - Authorisations for spring hunting of male specimens of the bird species ‘Eurasian woodcock’ (Scolopax rusticola) in Lower Austria (Austria) - Article 7(4) and Article 9(1)(c) - ‘No other satisfactory solution’ - Concept of ‘small numbers’)

(2020/C 230/14)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: C. Hermes and M. Noll-Ehlers, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Austria (represented by: J. Schmoll, acting as Agent)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that, by authorising the spring hunting of male Eurasian woodcock (Scolopax rusticola) in Lower Austria (Austria), the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7(4) of Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by authorising the spring hunting of male Eurasian woodcock (Scolopax rusticola) in Lower Austria (Austria), the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7(4) of Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds.

| 2. | Orders the Republic of Austria to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Republic of Austria to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 148, 29.4.2019.

---
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-10257

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ELOY LOZANO, III,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:18-CR-298-1

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and HO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Eloy Lozano, III, has moved for 

leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Lozano has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the 

relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 14, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-10257 Document: 00515271556 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
No. 19-10257

2

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is 

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 19-10257 Document: 00515271556 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
# C_2018319EN.01002301.xml

| 10.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 319/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 319/23

---

Action brought on 13 July 2018 — Palo v Commission

(Case T-432/18)

(2018/C 319/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Peeter Palo (Tallinn, Estonia) (represented by: L. Levi and A. Blot, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

| — | annul the defendant’s decision of 5 October 2017 not to allocate the applicant the severance grant provided for under Article 12(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the defendant’s decision of 5 October 2017 not to allocate the applicant the severance grant provided for under Article 12(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations;

| — | annul the defendant’s decision of 10 April 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint of 11 December 2017 directed against the abovementioned decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the defendant’s decision of 10 April 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint of 11 December 2017 directed against the abovementioned decision;

| — | order the defendant to compensate the applicant for the material damage suffered by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to compensate the applicant for the material damage suffered by the applicant;

| — | order the defendant to compensate the applicant for the non-material damage suffered by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to compensate the applicant for the non-material damage suffered by the applicant;

| — | order the defendant to bear all the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to bear all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 12(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 12(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of good administration and of the duty of care. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of good administration and of the duty of care.

---
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Overton 

Argued by Teleconference 

MELVIN ROY SPANGLER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0527-96-3 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 MARCH 4, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

Richard C. Pattisall, Judge 

 Jonathan M. Apgar (Damico & Apgar, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Melvin Roy Spangler appeals his conviction of obtaining 

money by false pretenses. He claims that (1) the court’s 

compulsion of his waiver allowing an Internal Revenue Service 

agent to testify violated his Fifth Amendment privilege and (2) 

the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction. We 

affirm. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in the 

cause, and because this memorandum opinion carries no 

precedential value, no recitation of the facts is necessary. 

 We find no merit in Spangler’s first issue. The testimony 

of the IRS agent did not concern any statements or admissions of 

the appellant. She testified that she had mailed a copy of the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

tax lien to Spangler and that she had visited him at his 

residence in reference to the back taxes. Therefore, if any 

error was committed by forcing the appellant to allow the IRS 

agent to testify for the Commonwealth, it was harmless. 

 The evidence presented at trial supports the conviction. On 

appeal, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth. See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 

352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). A judgment will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. See Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 

172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988). Spangler’s own testimony 

demonstrated that he knew about the back taxes owed to the 

government. Nevertheless, he signed a document averring that no 

claim had been asserted against his company. This, coupled with 

other evidence clearly present in the record, is sufficient such 

that the fact finder could conclude that Spangler was guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.
**Exhibit 10.34**

**FIRST AMENDMENT**

**OFTHE**

**SKY FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 2002 STOCK OPTION**

**AND STOCK APPRECIATION RIGHTS PLAN**

**WHEREAS**, this corporation maintains the Sky Financial Group, Inc. 2002 Stock Option and Stock Appreciation RightsPlan (the “Plan”); and 

**WHEREAS**, the Company’s Board of Directors has delegatedauthority to amend the Plan to the Compensation Committee (the “Committee”), and the Committee has determined that amendment of the Plan is necessary and desirable. 

**NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS RESOLVED** that, pursuant to thepower reserved to the Company by the Plan, and by virtue of the authority delegated to the Committee, the Plan be and is hereby amended, effective as of February 1, 2005, by substituting the following for the definition of “Disability” inArticle I of the Plan: 

**“Disability**. ‘Disability’ will have the meaning set forth in any employment,consulting or other written agreement between the Company or a Subsidiary and an Eligible Person. If there is no employment, consulting or other written agreement between the Company or a Subsidiary and an Eligible Person, or if such agreement doesnot define Disability, “Disability” will mean the date on which the Eligible Person becomes permanently and totally disabled within the meaning of Code Section 22(e)(3), which the Committee shall determine on the basis of such medical orother evidence as it may reasonably require or deem appropriate.” 

*      *      * 

I, W. Granger Souder, Jr., Secretary of Sky Financial Group, Inc., hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct copy of resolutions duly adopted bythe Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of said corporation on December 13, 2005, and that the resolutions have not been changed or repealed.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 108 (Wednesday, July 18, 2012)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1278]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

              HONORING THE DEDICATED SERVICE OF SOL FLORES

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY

                              of illinois

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, July 18, 2012

  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, last week the White House honored 
leaders who have made a significant difference in the way their 
communities combat homelessness among children and youth. I am pleased 
that one of the 13 ``Champions of Change'' is Sol Flores, Executive 
Director of La Casa Norte in Chicago.
  Nearly one million American men, women and children are currently 
homeless. That is simply unacceptable, but progress is being made. 
Because of Sol's leadership of La Casa Norte, the city of Chicago--and 
the Humboldt Park neighborhood in particular--has seen a significant 
reduction in homelessness.
  Since founding La Casa Norte 10 years ago, Sol has made it her 
mission to serve youth and families facing homelessness. La Casa 
Norte's continuum of services to assist children, young adults, and 
families has proven incredibly successful. Eighty-four percent of youth 
leaving La Casa Norte's transitional housing program find permanent 
housing, and 87 percent of families who receive homeless prevention 
assistance maintain housing stability. The organization is a recognized 
leader in effective homeless prevention in the Chicago area and across 
the country.
  I thank Sol Flores for her tireless efforts to promote stable homes 
and stable communities, and I wish her continued success. Her 
leadership of La Casa Norte and dedication to eradicating homelessness 
are worthy of her distinction as a ``Champion of Change.''

                          ____________________
```
# C_2008037EN.01003202.xml

| 9.2.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 37/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.2.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 37/32

---

Action brought on 10 December 2007 — WellBiz v OHIM — Wild (WELLBIZ)

(Case T-451/07)

(2008/C 37/51)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: WellBiz Verein, WellBiz Association (Eschen, Liechtenstein) (represented by: M. Schnetzer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Rudolf Wild GmbH & Co. KG (Eppelhein, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

| — | To annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of 2 October 2007 in Case R 1575/2006-1; |
| --- | --- |

—

To annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of 2 October 2007 in Case R 1575/2006-1;

| — | To reject Opposition No B 809 394 of the opponent of 9 March 2005; |
| --- | --- |

—

To reject Opposition No B 809 394 of the opponent of 9 March 2005;

| — | To order OHIM and the opponent to pay the costs of the present case and also those incurred in the opposition and appeal proceedings before OHIM. |
| --- | --- |

—

To order OHIM and the opponent to pay the costs of the present case and also those incurred in the opposition and appeal proceedings before OHIM.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: the applicant.

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: the word mark ‘WELLBIZ’ in respect of services in Classes 35 and 41 (application No 3 844 479).

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: Rudolf Wild GmbH & Co. KG.

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: the word mark ‘WILD.BIZ’ for services in Classes 38, 41 and 42 (Community trade mark No 2 225 175), the opposition being based on some of the services in Class 41.

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Opposition upheld in relation to all the contested services in Class 41.

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissal of the appeal.

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Breach of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (1), since the marks in question differ phonetically, figuratively and conceptually, and the mark cited in opposition does not enjoy a particularly high degree of recognition and does not therefore possess a high level of distinctiveness.

Pleas in law:

1

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).

1

---