IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 140 / 04-1729 

Filed May 5, 2006 

KENNETH FAIRFAX and GERALDINE WATSON, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

OAKS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 

Appellee. 

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert Blink, 

Judge. 

Vendees under contract for sale of real estate appeal from judgment 

confirming the forfeiture of their interest. The court of appeals affirmed. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Phil Watson and David M. Coco of Phil Watson P.C., Des Moines, and 

Patrick W. O'Bryan of O'Bryan Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellants. 

Dustin D. Smith of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville & 

Schoenebaum, PLC, West Des Moines, for appellee. 
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CARTER, Justice.

 Geraldine Watson and Ken Fairfax, vendees under a contract for the 

sale of real estate, appeal from a judgment confirming the forfeiture of their 

interest. Watson and Fairfax were plaintiffs in the district court who had 

sued in equity to enjoin the forfeiture. The appellee, which was the 

defendant in the district court, is Oaks Development Company. The issue 

involving the purported forfeiture of the vendees’ interest in a real estate 

contract arose in connection with the trial of several other issues in 

consolidated cases before the district court. In connection with the validity 

of the forfeiture, the vendees urged that the service of the statutory notice of 

forfeiture required by Iowa Code section 656.3 (2003) had not been properly 

completed as to both vendees and that this circumstance rendered the 

attempted forfeiture under Iowa Code section 656.2 ineffective and invalid. 

 The court of appeals found that the forfeiture had been properly 

completed by service of proper legal notice. Upon reviewing the record and 

considering the arguments presented, we disagree with that conclusion and 

find that notice of forfeiture was not completed as required by law. We 

vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse that portion of the 

district court’s ruling upholding the forfeiture. Because this ruling may 

affect other issues that were decided in the district court, we remand the 

case to that court for such further proceedings as may be necessary. 

 The contract vendees entered into an agreement to purchase a 

residence property that was new construction financed by the appellee, 

Oaks Development Company. Oaks Development Company, at the time of 

the agreement, had become the legal owner of the property and was the 

vendor under the contract. The contract provided for a $12,000 down 

payment and monthly installments beginning February 15, 2003, in the 

amount of $977.23 continuing monthly until a balloon payment due on 
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January 5, 2005. The remedies paragraph of the contract allowed for 

forfeiture of the vendees’ interest in accordance with chapter 656 of the 

Iowa Code. 

 The vendees made the required down payment and paid the monthly 

payments that had become due prior to the June 2004 installment, 

although many payments were late. When the June 2004 installment was 

not paid on time, the vendor attempted to serve the vendees with a notice of 

forfeiture. The return on the attempted service by a process server was as 

follows: 

I did personally serve a copy of Notice of Forfeiture of Real 

Estate Contract 

By delivering a true and correct copy thereof as follows: 

Name: Geraldine Watson Address: 5401 S.E. 28th Court 

Name: Kenneth Fairfax Address: " " " " 

By delivering a true and correct copy to: 

Geraldine Watson, a person identified as being at least eighteen 

years old residing therein. 

The process server’s return of service was attached to the affidavit filed with 

the county recorder in support of forfeiture of the vendees’ interest. 

 At the trial, vendee Watson, who accepted the notice of forfeiture from 

the process server, testified that only one copy of the notice had been 

delivered to her. The vendees then called the process server as a witness, 

who confirmed the fact that only one copy of the notice of forfeiture had 

been served on the vendees. The vendees contended in the district court, 

and continue to urge on appeal, that it was necessary to serve a separate 

copy of the notice of forfeiture on each contract vendee in order for the 

forfeiture to be valid under Iowa Code sections 656.2 and 656.3. The 

district court rejected that conclusion, as did a majority of the court of 

appeals. 
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I. Scope of Review. 

 Because the proceeding in the district court was tried by equitable 

proceedings, our review of both the facts and the law is de novo. Goodale v. 

Bray, 546 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Iowa 1996); Lett v. Grummer, 300 N.W.2d 147, 

148 (Iowa 1981); Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. 

II. The Statutory Notice Requirements. 

 Iowa Code section 656.2 provides, in part: 

 1. The forfeiture shall be initiated by the vendor by 

serving on the vendee a written notice . . . . 

 2. The vendor shall also serve a copy of the notice 

required in subsection 1 on the person in possession of the real 

estate, if different than the vendee; on all the vendee’s 

mortgagees of record; and on a person who asserts a claim 

against the vendee’s interest . . . . 

Iowa Code section 656.3 provides, in part: 

 Said notice may be served personally or by publication, 

on the same conditions, and in the same manner as is provided 

for the service of original notices . . . . 

Lastly, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.305(1) provides: 

Personal service may be made as follows: 

1.305(1) Upon any individual who has attained majority 

and who has not been adjudged incompetent, either by taking 

the individual’s signed, dated acknowledgement of service 

endorsed on the notice, or by serving the individual personally; 

or by serving, at the individual’s dwelling house or usual place 

of abode, any person residing therein who is at least 18 years 

old . . . . 

It is undisputed that a process server served one copy of a facially valid 

notice of forfeiture addressed to both vendees by delivering that copy to 

vendee Watson. The process server then completed a return of service, 

indicating personal service on Watson and substituted service on Fairfax. 

At the time the notice was served, Watson and Fairfax were husband and 
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wife who resided together at the property that is the subject of the 

attempted forfeiture. 

 The issue presented is whether a single copy of a forfeiture notice that 

has been personally served on one of two contract vendees with the intent 

to serve both is sufficient service of notice to sustain a forfeiture of the 

interests of both vendees. The district court and a majority of the court of 

appeals held that it is. The dissenting judge on the court of appeals 

believed otherwise and stated the proposition as follows: 

 The process server could achieve proper service on 

Geraldine Watson by handing her a copy of the notice. And as 

the majority [of the court of appeals] has correctly noted the 

process server could achieve proper service on Ken Fairfax by 

handing Geraldine Watson a copy of the notice for Fairfax. 

However, here there was only one notice and because the 

process server indicated both parties were served by the 

delivery of a single copy it is unclear which party actually was 

served and at most only one party was served. 

We agree with the dissenting judge’s views. 

 In speaking to a similar situation, the text in 62B Am. Jur. 2d 

Process, suggests by way of a practice guide: 

In making substituted service against two or more defendants 

having the same place of residence or abode, a copy of the 

summons must be left for each defendant. 

62B Am. Jur. 2d Process § 191, at 765 (2005) (footnote omitted). Although 

we have rendered no decisions involving this issue, support for that 

conclusion is contained in decisions from other jurisdictions. In Chaney v. 

Reddin, 205 P.2d 310 (Okla. 1949), an attempt was made to serve two 

defendants who were members of the same family residing at the same 

address by leaving one copy of the process with a third member of the 

family at that address. In determining that the service was invalid, the 

Oklahoma court stated: 
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Each defendant, whether there be one or many, and whether 

they be members of the same family or strangers, must be 

served as required by the statute. . . . Where several copies of 

the summons are left with a member of a family, one copy 

being left for each defendant, the law presumes that the 

member with whom they are left will deliver a copy to each 

defendant sued. But such presumption cannot be indulged 

where only one copy is left for several defendants. 

Chaney, 205 P.2d at 313 (citations omitted). 

 Although the situation in Chaney involved substituted service on each 

of several parties, we are satisfied that the requirement that there be a copy 

of the notice for each party required to be served is equally applicable in 

situations like the present in which one party to the proceeding is 

personally served, but substituted service is provided for other parties. 

That was the situation in Idlewine v. Madison County Bank & Trust Co., 439 

N.E.2d 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). In that case, there was an attempt to 

serve a husband (Ronald) and wife (Roberta) with a single copy of a 

summons directed to both. The husband received personal service of the 

summons at his residence and neglected to inform the wife that this had 

occurred. A default judgment was entered against both defendants. The 

court set aside the judgment against the wife, stating “one copy of a joint 

summons delivered to a residence where two parties to the suit reside does 

not constitute proper service.” Id. at 1201. In support of this conclusion, 

the Indiana court cited the Oklahoma court’s ruling in Chaney and a similar 

ruling of the Nevada Supreme Court in Doyle v. Jorgensen, 414 P.2d 707, 

710 (Nev. 1966). The same court that decided Idlewine later made it clear 

that this decision did not turn on the fact that Roberta’s husband had 

concealed the service of process from her. In Allburn v. Indiana ex rel. 

Warrick County Sheriff’s Department, 826 N.E.2d 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), 

the court stated: 

[W]e do not discern that such fact [that the service of summons 

had been concealed] affected the court’s holding. To be sure, 
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in addressing whether Ronald acted as Roberta’s agent for 

purposes of accepting service, the Idlewine court concluded 

that even assuming such, “there remains the insurmountable 

problem” that only one summons was served upon both Ronald 

and Roberta. From this, we think it is clear that even had 

Roberta’s husband not concealed the summons from her, the 

court’s holding would have been the same. Roberta would 

have still been entitled to relief because the “insurmountable 

problem” still existed—only one summons was served at the 

residence where two parties to the suit resided. 

826 N.E.2d at 684 (citations omitted). 

 We have recognized that “forfeiture statutes are to be construed 

strictly against a forfeiture, with the burden to show full and strict 

compliance with the statutory procedures upon the party seeking 

forfeiture.” Jamison v. Knosby, 423 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Iowa 1988); Lett, 300 

N.W.2d at 149. In keeping with that admonition, we are satisfied that, 

because our forfeiture statutes have incorporated by reference the lawful 

method of serving original notices as the standard for serving notices of 

forfeiture, the decisions we have discussed concerning the service of notice 

to initiate actions in court are proper guides for determining the sufficiency 

of the method of service of a notice of forfeiture under section 656.2. 

 The vendors contend that substituted service is always dependent on 

the good-faith conduct of the party receiving a legal notice intended for 

another. As a result, the vendors urge, it was sufficient to rely on Watson to 

apprise Fairfax of the notice of forfeiture. We disagree. Although provisions 

authorizing substituted service do assume the good-faith of the person on 

whom the notice is served, we think the probability that the notice will be 

passed on to the party for whom it is intended is substantially reduced if a 

separate notice is not left for each of the parties upon whom service is 

attempted. It is not unreasonable and is indeed prudent to require that this 

be done. 
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 In civil actions in which some defendants are legally served and 

others are not, and the parties not receiving proper service are not 

indispensable to the proceedings, the action may proceed against those 

parties who have been properly served. We are unable to apply that 

principle in the present controversy for two reasons. First, as noted by the 

dissenting judge in the court of appeals, it is unclear which party was 

properly served. Consequently, we cannot declare that either party was 

properly served. This point was stated as follows by the Oklahoma court in 

Chaney: 

“[W]here there are two . . . defendants, a copy of the petition 

and publication notice addressed to them jointly at their place 

of residence is an insufficient compliance with the statute, as 

the same, at best, shows service only upon one of the 

defendants and the uncertainty upon which of them service is 

had renders the . . . service prima facie void as to both . . . .” 

205 P.2d at 312 (quoting Stumpff v. Price, 177 P. 109, 109 (Okla. 1918)). 

 A second reason why an attempt to uphold the forfeiture against one 

of the two contract vendees is untenable is the manifest impracticability of 

that course of action. What would be the rights of the vendor against the 

remaining vendee if the other vendee’s interest was held to have been 

forfeited? Certainly the vendor would claim continued entitlement to the 

full contract payments, but it would be totally impractical to expect the 

vendee whose interest had not been forfeited to make full payment for half 

of the property. In addition, attempting to approach the problem in this 

manner would necessitate a partition action between the remaining vendee 

and the vendor. For these reasons, we hold that the interest of neither 

Watson nor Fairfax was validly forfeited by the vendor. 

 The vendor argues that, if the forfeiture is found to be invalid, the 

ruling of the court of appeals with respect to its claim for money damages 

must be overturned. Because we vacate the decision of the court of appeals 
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in all respects, the effect of our ruling on the claim for money damages can 

be resolved by the district court. We remand the case to that court for 

consideration of that issue and any other issues that may have been 

precipitated in the consolidated cases by our ruling on the validity of the 

forfeiture. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

 All justices concur except Streit, J., who takes no part.