# C_2018094EN.01002901.xml

| 12.3.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 94/29 |
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12.3.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 94/29

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Action brought on 11 January 2018 — easyJet Airline v Commission

(Case T-8/18)

(2018/C 094/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: easyJet Airline Co. Ltd (Luton, United Kingdom) (represented by: P. Willis, Solicitor, and E. Bourtzalas, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1861 (1) in its entirety and, in any event, so far as the alleged unlawful State aid given to the applicant is concerned; and |
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annul Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1861 (1) in its entirety and, in any event, so far as the alleged unlawful State aid given to the applicant is concerned; and

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| — | order the European Commission to pay the costs incurred by the applicant. |
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order the European Commission to pay the costs incurred by the applicant.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law as regards the conclusion that the airport operators acted as mere ‘intermediaries’ of the region of Sardinia, and thus that the funding they provided to the applicant involved State resources and was imputable to the State. |
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1.

First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law as regards the conclusion that the airport operators acted as mere ‘intermediaries’ of the region of Sardinia, and thus that the funding they provided to the applicant involved State resources and was imputable to the State.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law as regards the conclusion that the funding provided to the applicant by the airport operators conferred an undue advantage on the applicant and in particular that the Commission applied the market economy operator principle incorrectly. |
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2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law as regards the conclusion that the funding provided to the applicant by the airport operators conferred an undue advantage on the applicant and in particular that the Commission applied the market economy operator principle incorrectly.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law as regards the conclusion that the financing of the airlines concerned distorts or threatens to distort competition and affects trade between Member States. |
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3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law as regards the conclusion that the financing of the airlines concerned distorts or threatens to distort competition and affects trade between Member States.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law as regards the conclusion that the alleged aid that the Commission found was given to the applicant could not be approved as compatible with the internal market under one of the exemptions laid down in Article 107(3) TFEU. |
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4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law as regards the conclusion that the alleged aid that the Commission found was given to the applicant could not be approved as compatible with the internal market under one of the exemptions laid down in Article 107(3) TFEU.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law insofar as the Commission breached the principle of legitimate expectations, as the applicant had a legitimate expectation that its arrangements with the airport operators did not involve State aid. |
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5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment of fact and of law insofar as the Commission breached the principle of legitimate expectations, as the applicant had a legitimate expectation that its arrangements with the airport operators did not involve State aid.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by insufficient reasoning as regards both: (a) the conclusion that the airport operators acted as mere ‘intermediaries’ of the region of Sardinia and that therefore the funding they provided to the applicant involved State resources and was imputable to the State; and (b) the application of the market economy operator principle with a view to establishing that the applicant received an undue advantage. |
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6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by insufficient reasoning as regards both: (a) the conclusion that the airport operators acted as mere ‘intermediaries’ of the region of Sardinia and that therefore the funding they provided to the applicant involved State resources and was imputable to the State; and (b) the application of the market economy operator principle with a view to establishing that the applicant received an undue advantage.

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(1)  Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1861 of 29 July 2016 on State aid SA33983 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) (ex 2011/N) — Italy — Compensation to Sardinian airports for public service obligations (SGEI) (OJ 2017 L 268, p. 1).

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