J-S25027-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KRISTOFER TRENT PARZYCK 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1844 MDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 24, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0000422-2016

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: MAY 21, 2019

Kristofer Trent Parzyck (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his 

second petition, filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, as untimely. Upon review, we affirm.

On January 26, 2016, Appellant was charged with two counts of rape of 

a child, three counts of aggravated indecent assault of a complainant less than 

13 years old, corruption of minors, and three counts of indecent assault of a 

complainant less than 13 years old. The charges arose from incidents alleged 

to have occurred between January 1, 2011, and December 31, 2011. On 

August 24, 2016, Appellant pled guilty to one count of aggravated indecent 

assault of a complainant less than 13 years old. The same day, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to 111⁄2 to 23 months of incarceration followed by 8 years 

of probation. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Sex Offender Registration and 
J-S25027-19

- 2 -

Notification Act, (SORNA),

1 Appellant was classified as a Tier III sex offender 

and ordered to register with the Pennsylvania State Police for the remainder 

of his life. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(d)(7), 9799.15,(a)(3). 

Appellant did not file a direct appeal. Thus, Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final 30 days later on September 23, 2016, when the 30-

day period for filing an appeal with this Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).

On September 21, 2017, Appellant filed, through counsel, a “Motion to 

Bar the Applicability of Sex Offender Registration and/or Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus” (habeas petition or first PCRA petition). Appellant argued

that his registration and reporting requirements were illegal under 

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), because he committed 

the aforementioned offenses prior to SORNA’s effective date. In Muniz, our 

Supreme Court held that retroactive application of the registration and 

reporting requirements of the Pennsylvania SORNA violated the ex post facto

clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id. at 1223. On 

October 24, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s Muniz claim.

On November 20, 2017, the trial court denied the petition.

On November 28, 2017, Appellant filed, again through counsel, a

petition for reconsideration. Appellant argued, inter alia, that the trial court 

should have treated his habeas petition as his first PCRA petition. On 

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.
J-S25027-19

- 3 -

December 19, 2017, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s request for

reconsideration of his habeas petition, agreeing that it should have treated 

the habeas petition as his first PCRA petition. On February 16, 2018, following 

a hearing and full consideration of Appellant’s Muniz claim, the PCRA court 

issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s first PCRA petition pursuant 

to Rule 907 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. On March 22, 

2018, the PCRA court formally dismissed the petition.

On April 9, 2018, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the order 

dismissing his first PCRA petition. On April 20, 2018, Appellant filed another 

PCRA petition (second PCRA petition), once again asserting that his SORNA 

registration and reporting requirements were illegal under Muniz. On May 

29, 2018, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s 

second PCRA petition based on our Supreme Court’s decision in

Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 (Pa. 2000). In Lark, the Supreme 

Court held that a PCRA petitioner cannot file a new PCRA petition while a prior 

petition is still under review on appeal. Id. at 588. On June 21, 2018, 

Appellant discontinued the appeal of his first PCRA petition. Consequently, 

the PCRA court declined to dismiss Appellant’s second PCRA petition and 

ordered the Commonwealth to file an answer. On July 31, 2018, the 

Commonwealth filed its answer.

On September 26, 2018, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to 

dismiss Appellant’s second PCRA petition as untimely. On October 15, 2018, 
J-S25027-19

- 4 -

Appellant filed a response. By order dated October 24, 2018, the PCRA court 

formally dismissed Appellant’s second PCRA petition. This timely appeal 

followed.2

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for review:

Whether the [PCRA] court erred and abused its discretion in

dismissing Appellant’s petition under the Post-Conviction Relief

Act (PCRA) by 1) failing to consider Appellant’s September 21,

2017 Motion to Bar Applicability of Sex Offender Registration

and/or Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a PCRA petition; and

2) by dismissing Appellant’s April 20, 2018 petition for PostConviction Relief/Petition of Reconsideration based on its belief 

that it did not have jurisdiction, where both filings were timely and 

raised the same issue, whether sex offender registration can be 

retroactively applied to Appellant.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

The sole issue Appellant presents on appeal directly challenges the PCRA 

court’s decision to dismiss his petition as untimely. “Pennsylvania law makes 

clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” 

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)). 

A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within one year of the date on which the 

petitioner’s judgment became final, unless one of the three statutory 

exceptions apply:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

____________________________________________

2 Both the PCRA court and Appellant have complied with Rule 1925 of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
J-S25027-19

- 5 -

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). If a petition is untimely, and the petitioner has 

not pled and proven any exception, “‘neither this Court nor the trial court has 

jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the 

legal authority to address the substantive claims.’” Commonwealth v. 

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006)).

Until recently, a petition invoking an exception had to be filed within 60 

days of the date the claim could have been presented. However, effective 

December 2017, Act 146 of 2018 amended 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), and 

now provides that a PCRA petition invoking a timeliness exception must be 

filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. See

Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 2 and § 3. Although we note the 

change in the law from 60 days to one year, it does not impact our disposition 

of this appeal.

In this case, there is no dispute that Appellant did not file his second

PCRA petition within one year of the date his judgment of sentence became 
J-S25027-19

- 6 -

final. As stated above, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on 

September 23, 2016, and he filed his second PCRA petition on April 20, 2018. 

Instead, Appellant argues that we should not consider his second PCRA 

petition to be untimely for two reasons: (1) because the trial court improperly 

failed to treat his habeas petition as timely-filed first PCRA petition, and (2)

because the PCRA petition at issue raises the same claims relating to Muniz

that Appellant asserted in his habeas petition. We disagree.

With respect to Appellant’s first point, as set forth above, after initially 

denying Appellant’s habeas petition, the PCRA court granted his motion for 

reconsideration, agreeing with Appellant’s assertion that it should have 

treated his habeas petition as a PCRA petition. It was only after a hearing and 

full consideration of Appellant’s Muniz claim that the PCRA court dismissed, 

for a second time, Appellant’s habeas petition. See N.T., 1/3/18, at 2-7. 

Thus, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the PCRA court did construe

Appellant’s habeas petition as a timely-filed first PCRA petition. 

Regarding his second point, our Supreme Court has consistently 

rejected “various theories devised to avoid the effects of the [PCRA’s] oneyear time limitation[.]” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1157 

(Pa. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Baroni, 827 A.2d 419 (Pa. 2003)). 

Specifically, in Robinson, the extension theory was explicitly rejected after 

our Supreme Court concluded that “neither the language of the statute nor 

[the Supreme Court’s] decisional law authorize[] suspension of the time-bar 
J-S25027-19

- 7 -

in instances where the petitioner is . . . reiterating claims which were litigated 

on a previous petition.” Id. at 1161. The Court further explained:

[T]he . . . ‘extension’ theory ignores bedrock principles of finality. 

Once a PCRA petition has been decided and the ruling on it has 

become final, there is nothing for a subsequent petition or 

pleading to ‘extend.’ Far from continuing into perpetuity, the trial 

court's jurisdiction over a matter generally ends once an appeal is 

taken from a final order or, if no appeal is taken, thirty days elapse 

after the final order.

Id. at 1162 (internal citation omitted).

Instantly, Appellant’s argument is nothing more than an attempt to 

utilize the “extension” theory to circumvent the PCRA’s one year time 

limitation. As Robinson explains, such argument has no merit.

Finally, Appellant does not argue or discuss in his brief how his second 

PCRA petition satisfies any of the timeliness exceptions of Section 9545(b)(1). 

Therefore, because Appellant’s second PCRA petition is untimely and he has 

not pled or proven an exception to the PCRA’s one year time limitation, we 

are without jurisdiction to address the merits of Appellant’s claim. See 

Derrickson, 923 A.2d at 468.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/21/2019