IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 26, 2010

 MIKE SETTLE v. DAVID MILLS, WARDEN

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Morgan County

No. 2010-CR-51 E. Eugene Eblen, Judge

No. E2010-00945-CCA-R3-HC - Filed December 17, 2010

The pro se petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of

habeas corpus relief. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

and that his sentences were imposed in violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers.

After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas

corpus relief.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JERRY L. SMITH

and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.

Mike Settle, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe, Senior Counsel; and

Russell Johnson, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The petitioner contends, on appeal, that his convictions from the Madison County

Circuit Court on January 5, 2001, for especially aggravated kidnapping, felony escape,

aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault should be overturned because he

was not tried within one hundred-eighty days. The petitioner was serving a sentence when

he was charged with the underlying offenses after assaulting and escaping from a corrections

officer, taking a hostage, and leading police on a high-speed chase. While the underlying

offenses were pending in Madison County, the petitioner was moved from state custody to

federal custody so he could be prosecuted on a federal charge. The petitioner’s return to state

custody was delayed, but the record reflects that he entered guilty pleas to the Madison

County charges within one hundred-eighty days of his return to state custody.
Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees the right to seek habeas

corpus relief. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101 et seq. codifies the applicable

procedures for seeking a writ. While there is no statutory time limit in which to file for

habeas corpus relief, Tennessee law provides very narrow grounds upon which such relief

may be granted. Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). A habeas corpus petition

may be used only to contest void judgments which are facially invalid because (1) the

convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a petitioner; or (2) a

petitioner’s sentence has expired. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993).

On appeal, the petitioner contends that his judgments from Madison County are void

because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. However, it is well settled that this

issue is not a proper basis for habeas corpus relief. Lutrell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 408, 409-10

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).

Next, the petitioner argues that his judgments should be overturned based on the antishuttling provision of the Interstate Compact on Detainers. Tennessee Code Annotated

section 40-31-101 codifies the Interstate Compact on Detainers. The purpose of the compact

is to ensure the “expeditious and orderly disposition” of charges pending against a prisoner

in multiple jurisdictions. T.C.A. § 40-31-101, Article I. Pursuant to the Compact, if the

prisoner has made a request for a final disposition of the pending indictment, he should be

tried within one hundred-eighty days after his delivery to the appropriate court where charges

are pending.

The State argues that, when the petitioner entered his plea, he waived any claim of a

void judgment pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Detainers. This court has previously

concluded that a violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers was waived by the

petitioner’s guilty plea. The general rule has long been firmly established that a plea of guilty,

understandingly and voluntarily entered on the advice of counsel, constitutes an admission

of all facts alleged and a waiver of all non-jurisdictional and procedural defects and

constitutional infirmities, if any, in any prior stage of the proceeding. Terrance Lowdermilk

v. State, No. E2007-00872-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 14, **8-9 (Tenn.

Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2008) (citing Lawrence v. Mullins, 224 Tenn. 9, 449 S.W.2d 224, 229

(Tenn. 1969)). Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

The record is clear that the petitioner was charged with the Madison County crimes

in 1999, and that they did not reach a final disposition until 2001. However, the record does

not reflect that the petitioner requested a final disposition of the charges that was ignored.

The record does reflect that the State filed a motion on June 14, 2000, to return the petitioner

for disposition of the charges. The docket entries from Madison County included in the

record reflect that the petitioner was still in federal custody on August 22, 2000. He was

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returned for disposition sometime after August 22, 2000, and his cases were disposed with

his entry of guilty pleas on January 12, 2001, less than one hundred-eighty days after he was

returned to the custody of the court.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the summary dismissal

from the habeas corpus court.

_________________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE

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