alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
p130047.eng

INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT 

PMN: 13-0047

Focus Ready Draft 11/19/2012

ENGINEER: Choudhary \ JAS

PV (kg/yr): 

SUBMITTER: 

USE: 

 

OTHER USES:

 

 

 

 

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SAT (concerns) (11/06/2012):

Related Cases and Related Cases and Misc SAT Info:

Ecotox Related Cases:

Migration to groundwater: Negligible

PBT rating: P2B3T2 Linear: P1B2T2 // Branched: P2B3T2.

Health: 2 Dermal, Drinking Water, Inhalation

Eco: 3 Water (All releases to water with a CC = 1 ppb.)

OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE RATING: 1D

NOTES & KEY ASSUMPTIONS:

Generated by the 06/07/2005 version of ChemSTEER. 

 

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# C_2022011EN.01000302.xml

| 10.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 11/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 11/3

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 11 November 2021 — Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A. v European Commission, Republic of Poland

(Case C-933/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - State aid - Toll-motorway concession - Law providing for an exemption from tolls for certain vehicles - Compensation granted to the concession holder by the Member State for loss of revenue - Shadow toll - Compensation found by the European Commission to be excessive and to include State aid - Commission decision declaring that aid incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery - Procedural rights of the aid beneficiary - Commission’s obligation to exercise particular vigilance - Concept of ‘State aid’ - Advantage - Improvement of the concession holder’s expected financial situation - Criterion of the private operator in a market economy - Distortion of the evidence - Breach of the obligation to state reasons - Misreading of the decision at issue - Substitution of grounds - Reversal of the burden of proof - Breach of the principle of primacy of EU law - Judicial review to be conducted by the General Court - Requirements and limits)

(2022/C 11/04)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A. (represented by: O. Geiss, Rechtsanwalt, and T. Siakka, dikigoros)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: L. Armati, K. Herrmann and S. Noë, acting as Agents), Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna and M. Rzotkiewicz, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

| 3. | Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 87, 16.3.2020.

---
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CHARLES WEINSCHENK , Plaintiff,

v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY , et al. , Defendant s
. Civil Action No. 20

- 2510 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION ( November 9 , 202 1 ) On June 24, 2021, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s pro se action “in its entirety for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction.” Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 26, at 5. In response , Plaintiff filed a

m otion for r econsideration of the Court’s dismissal orde r on June 30, 2021

. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 29, at 1. On July 12, 2021, however, Plaintiff then filed an “Expedited Request for Dismissal.” Therein, Plaintiff requested a voluntary dismissal order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), based on his desi re to “voluntarily cede th[is] matter.” Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 30, at 1. In that same motion , Plaintiff also requested that the Court “dismiss[] the action prior to ruling on the pending . . . Request for Reconsideration.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff’s [29] Motion for Reconsideration and [30] Expedited Request for Dismissal are presently pending before the Court. First, the Court will deny the [29] Motion for Reconsideration
as moot . This ruling comports with Plaintiff’s decision to “ volunt arily cede ” his position in this
case, id. at 1, and his corresponding request for the Court not to rule on his motion for reconsideration , but instead deny that motion as moot, see id. at 2 (The “ Court’s indulgence is requested in denying [the] pending mo tion as moot at the plaintiff’s request. ”).2 Second, the Court will also deny Plaintiff’s “Expedited Request for Dismissal

. ” Again, this motion asks the Court for a voluntary dismissal order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). As a general mat ter, courts grant dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2) “unless the defendant would suffer prejudice other than the prospect of a second lawsuit or some tactical disadvantage.” Conafay v. Wyeth Labs. , 793 F.2d 350, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Nonetheless, courts evaluating Rule 41(a)(2) motions also consider “ the adequacy of the plaintiff ’ s explanation for voluntary dismissal ” and “ the stage of the litigation at the time the motion to dismiss is made. ” Mitchell v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for W ells Fargo Asset Sec. Corp. Mortg. Pass

- Through Certificates Series 2006

- AR4 , 293 F. Supp. 3d 209, 213 (D.D.C. 2018) . Here, Plaintiff requests a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal order after the Court has already dismissed this case for lack of subject

- matter juris diction. See Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 26, at 5. And Plaintiff offers no plausible explanation why a subsequent Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal order would be necessary or appropriate at this juncture. Under these circumstances, the Court does not find that Pla intiff’s request for a voluntary dismissal order is warranted.
Date d : November 9 , 2021 /s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR

- KOTELLY United States District Judge
# C_2021072EN.01000501.xml

| 1.3.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 72/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.3.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/5

---

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 14 January 2021 — European Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA) v Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis

(Case C-280/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Arbitration clause - Minatran contract concluded under the Seventh Framework Programme - Eligible costs - Debit note issued by the ERCEA - Recovery of amounts advanced - Personnel costs and indirect expenditure relating to those personnel costs - Obligation to carry out work solely on the premises of the beneficiary of the grant - Supervision by the beneficiary - Normal practices of the beneficiary)

(2021/C 72/06)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: European Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA) (represented by: F. Sgritta and M. Pesquera Alonso, acting as Agents, and by E.Κourakis, dikigoros)

Other party to the proceedings: Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis (represented by: V. Christianos, dikigoros)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders the European Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA) to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the European Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA) to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 182, 27.5.2019.

---
ُ اهبتالانى 

رجی

 أصحاب الماعز! یا

ام نالأغو

ارة جتالوي تحتأن بجیارة جتالي فزاعموالام نالأغم ظعمرك حتت

ة.یمرسيرابكسات لامعىلع

لشراء علامات سكرابي الرسمیة للأذن، قطیعك یجب أن یكون 

لدیك رقم معرف القطیع. یجب علیك تقدیمھا إلى شركة العلامات 

 اتصل بالرقم عند طلب العلامات. رجاء USDA1-866-

(866-873-2824) لطلب رقم معرف القطیع أو لتقدیم طلب 

علامة لأول مرة.قم بالمسح الضوئي للحصول على أحدث 

معلومات علامة سكرابي. 

ً

ھل أنت جدید 

ام والماعزنإلى الأغ

برنامج الھویة؟ تحدید

الأمریكیةراعةزوزارة ال (USDA (ستوفر

یصل إلىما 100 بطاقة ھویة قطیع بلاستیكیة 

بلاستیكیةقطیعھویةبطاقات كینرللمشامجانیة

ویل).متالرمتسیماال(طرةملأول یرة).الأخالأموال

كاتالشر المصنعة لعلامة سكرابي الرسمیة المعتمدة من وزارة الزراعة الأمریكیة

AllFlex USA, Inc. 

اتف:ھ (833-727-2743) SCRAPIE833-

س:اكفال 972-338-3445

scrapiefullaf@merck.com :الإلكتروني البرید

www.allflex.global/na/product/scrapie-tags/ :الإنترنت على

• برنامج شھادة القطیع العادي والخالي من سكرابي 

لامات البلاستیكیة (الع SFCP (

• معرف تردد الرادیو ( RFID(

• علامات أذن بلاستیكیة بعدة ألوان 

Premier 1 Supplies, LLC

ھاتف: 800-282-6631 

س:اكفال 800-346-7992 

info@premier1supplies.com :الإلكتروني البرید

www.premier1supplies.com :الإنترنت على

• العلامات العادیة وعلامات SFCP البلاستیكیة

• علامات أذن بلاستیكیة بعدة ألوان 

National Band & Tag Company 

اتف:ھ 859-261-2035

س:اكفال 859-261-8247 

tags@nationalband.com :الإلكتروني البرید

www.nationalband.com/ :الإنترنت على

• علامات أذن معدنیة بعدة ألوان

Shearwell North America, Inc. 

ف:ھات 800-778-6014

SalesUSA@shearwell.com كسلفاا :

www.shearwell.com :الإلكتروني البرید

• العلامات العادیة وعلامات SFCP البلاستیكیة

 • معرف تردد الرادیو 

• علامات أذن بلاستیكیة بعدة ألوان 

تختلف تطبیقات العلامات لكل علامة شركة. یجب علیك شراء أدوات التطبیق على نفقتك الخاصة.

غیر متضمنة مع العلامات المقدمة من وزارة الزراعة الأمریكیة. 

صأرض. قموالل معالباحوصرص فالؤافكتروفميھةیكریالأمة زراعالوزارة ُ ر بمتبسيفدر 2023 | -23-033APHIS
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Jimmy S.M. Lee, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Integrated Silicon Solution, Inc. on Form 10-K for the annual period
ended September 30, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects
the financial condition and results of operations of Integrated Silicon Solution, Inc. as of and for the periods presented in such Annual Report on Form 10-K.



By:

/s/    JIMMY S.M.
LEEJimmy S.M. LeeChairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and
PresidentDecember 14, 2005




I, Gary L.
Fischer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Integrated Silicon Solution, Inc. on Form 10-K for the annual period ended
September 30, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of Integrated Silicon Solution, Inc. as of and for the periods presented in such Annual Report on Form 10-K.



By:

/s/    GARY L.
FISCHERGary L. FischerActing Chief Financial OfficerDecember 14, 2005
#### In the Matter of Lawrence Epps, Petitioner, v David Miller, as First Deputy Superintendent of Shawangunk Correctional Facility, Respondent.

— Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Ulster County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

Even if the Program Committee was not constituted in accordance with the facility’s rules, petitioner was still required to comply with the orders of the facility’s personnel *(see, Matter of Rivera v Smith,*63 NY2d 501, 515). Petitioner admitted that he refused to accept his assigned program because he was not interested in any of the specific programs available. Such refusal justified the determination that petitioner violated the rules charged in the misbehavior report *(see, Matter of Lee v Coughlin,*142 AD2d 802, 803, *appeal dismissed*72 NY2d 1041, *cert denied*488 US 1014). We also *974find unpersuasive petitioner’s argument that he was denied the right to submit documentary evidence. A review of the record indicates that the Hearing Officer read all three of petitioner’s letters into the record. We have examined petitioner’s remaining contention and find it lacking in merit.

Mikoll, J. P., Levine, Mercure, Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs.
## In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07 - 19 - 00045 - CR ALISHIA MORRIS, APPE LLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 364th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2016 - 409,491, Honorable William R. Eichman II, Presiding



### February 13 , 2019 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PARKER , JJ. Appellant Alishia Morris, proceeding pro se , appeals the trial court’s order f or a n in competen cy examination pursuant to article 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure . We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 1

1 On April 13, 2018, w e dismissed a ppellant’s appeal from the trial court’s “ Agreed Judgment of Commitment Following Competency Exam Incompetent B ut Likely to Regain Competency ” for want of jurisdiction. See Morris v. State , No. 07 - 18 - 00061 - CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 2638 (Tex. App. — Amarillo Apr. 13, 2018, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem . op . , not designated for publication).2

Appellant was indicted for aggravated assault causing bodily injury to a family member by use of a deadly weapon. 2 On January 14 , 2019, the trial court issued an

“ Amended Order for Examination Regarding Incompetency and Order to Turn Over Discovery and Order for Protective Order , ” appointing an expert to examine appellant to determine whether she is incompetent to stand trial and directing appellant to submit to the examination. See T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 46B.005( a ) (West 2018 ), 46B.021 (West 2018 ) . Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal from the order . Generally, this court only ha s jurisdiction to consider an appeal by a criminal defendant where there has been a judgment of conviction. McKown v. State , 915 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 1996, no pet.) (per curiam) . We do not have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders unless that jurisdiction has been expressly granted by law . See Ragston v. State , 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014 ); Abbott v. State , 271 S.W.3d 694, 696 – 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) . The trial court’s order for a n in competency examination is not a judgment of conviction. And, there is no statutory or constitutional provision allow ing an interlocutory appeal from the order . See T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 46B.011 (West 2018 ) ( “N either the s tate nor the defendant is entitled to make an interlocutory appeal relating to a determination or ruling under A rticle 46B.005 .” ); Johnson v. Hays Cty. Dist. Att orney’s Office , Nos. 03 - 16 - 00228 - CV, 03 - 16 - 00229 - CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6442, at *1 - 2 (Tex. App. — Austin June 17, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( dismissing appeal from trial court’s order for a n in competency examination for want of jurisdiction).

2 T EX . P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 22.02(b)(1) (West 2011 ) .3

Accordingly , we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Per Curiam Do not publish .
EXHIBIT 32.2

I, A. Mark Young, certify that:

(1)   I have  reviewed  this  quarterly  report on Form 10-Q of E Com  Ventures,
      Inc.;

(2)   Based on my knowledge,  this quarterly  report does not contain any untrue
      statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
      make the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such
      statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
      this quarterly report; and

(3)   Based on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and other  financial
      information  included  in this  quarterly  report,  fairly  present in all
      material respects the financial condition,  results of operations and cash
      flows of the  registrant  as of, and for,  the periods  presented  in this
      quarterly report.

Date:  September 15, 2003

/s/ A. Mark Young
------------------------
A. Mark Young
Chief Financial Officer


                                      -21-
# C_2010063EN.01000601.xml

| 13.3.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 63/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.3.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 63/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12 January 2010 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany)) — Colin Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am Main

(Case C-229/08) (1)

1

(Directive 2008/78/EC - Article 4(1) - Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age - National provision setting a maximum age of 30 years for the recruitment of officials to posts in the fire service - Aim pursued - Genuine and determining occupational requirement)

2010/C 63/08

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt am Main

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Colin Wolf

Applicant:

Defendant: Stadt Frankfurt am Main

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) — Interpretation of Articles 6(1) and 17 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16) — Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age — Differences of treatment on grounds of age which are ‘objectively and reasonably justified’ and the ‘need for a reasonable period of employment before retirement’ — National provision laying down a maximum recruitment age of 30 for officers in the fire service

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which sets the maximum age for recruitment to intermediate career posts in the fire service at 30 years.

---

(1)  OJ C 223, 30.8.2008.

1

---
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 4255 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude corporations 

operating prisons from the definition of taxable REIT subsidiary. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 6, 2017 

Mr. MEEKS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude 

corporations operating prisons from the definition of taxable REIT subsidiary. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ending Tax Breaks 

5 for Private Prisons Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXCLUSION OF CORPORATIONS OPERATING PRIS7 ON FACILITIES FROM DEFINITION OF TAX8 ABLE REIT FACILITY. 

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 856(l)(3) of the Internal 

10 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended— 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4255 IH

1 (1) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting 

2 the following: 

3 ‘‘(A) any corporation which— 

4 ‘‘(i) directly or indirectly operates or 

5 manages a lodging facility or a health care 

6 facility, or 

7 ‘‘(ii) directly or indirectly operates or 

8 manages a prison facility or provides serv9 ices at or in connection with a prison facil10 ity, and’’; 

11 (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘any lodg12 ing facility or health care facility’’ and inserting 

13 ‘‘any lodging facility, health care facility, or prison 

14 facility’’; and 

15 (3) by striking the last sentence and inserting 

16 the following: ‘‘Subparagraph (B) shall not apply to 

17 rights provided to an eligible independent contractor 

18 to operate or manage a lodging facility, a health 

19 care facility, or a prison facility if such rights are 

20 held by such corporation as a franchisee, licensee, or 

21 in a similar capacity and such lodging facility, health 

22 care facility, or prison facility is either owned by 

23 such corporation or is leased to such corporation 

24 from the real estate investment trust.’’. 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 4255 IH

1 (b) DEFINITION OF PRISON FACILITY.—Section 

2 856(l)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amend3 ed by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: 

4 ‘‘(C) PRISON FACILITY.—The term ‘prison 

5 facility’ means any correctional, detention, or 

6 penal facility.’’. 

7 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

8 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

9 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
BRIAN QUINN

Chief Justice

JAMES T. CAMPBELL

Justice

MACKEY K. HANCOCK

Justice

PATRICK A. PIRTLE

Justice 

# Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas

Potter County Courts Building

501 S. Fillmore, Suite 2-A

Amarillo, Texas 79101-2449

www.txcourts.gov/7thcoa.aspx VIVIAN LONG

Clerk

MAILING ADDRESS:

P. O. Box 9540

79105-9540

(806) 342-2650

March 24, 2015

Danny Shead

TDCJ-ID#01484832

Tulia Transfer Facility

400 Hwy 86 West

Tulia, TX 79088

James A. Farren

Criminal District Attorney

2309 Russell Long Blvd., Suite 120

Canyon, TX 79015

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL * Harry Ingram

Randall County Domestic Relations Office

4111 S. Georgia Street

Amarillo, TX 79109

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

RE: Case Numbers: 07-15-00084-CV, 07-15-00085-CV, 07-15-00086-CV

Trial Court Case Numbers: 8460-B, 8461-B, 19,154-B

Style: Danny Lee Shead v. The State of Texas

Dear Mr. Shead and Counsel:

The Court this day issued an opinion and judgment in the captioned causes. T EX

. R.

A PP

. P. 48.

In addition, pursuant to Texas Government Code, Sec. 51.204(b)(2), exhibits on file

with this Court, if any

, will be destroyed three years after final disposition of the case or at

an earlier date if ordered by the Court.

Very truly yours, 

# Vivian Long

VIVIAN LONG, CLERK

xc: Honorable John B. Board (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

Jo Carter (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)
Exhibit 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Milestone Scientific, Inc. on Form
10-KSB for the year ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Leonard Osser, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.


                                /s/ Leonard Osser
                                ----------------------
                                Leonard Osser
                                Chief Executive Officer
                                April 8, 2004