COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardn er, Clements and McClanahan Argued by teleconference

HARRISONBURG ROCKINGHAM SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICT v. Record No. 2375-04-3
SHANNON SHIFFLETT AND ELVIS GENE SHIFFLETT, SR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY WARREN A. PICCIOLO, GUARDIAN AD LITEM JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS JULY 19, 2005 v. Record No. 2379-04-3
SHANNON SHIFFLETT AND ELVIS GENE SHIFFLETT, SR.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge Christopher Brown, County Attorn ey; Warren A. Picciolo, Guardian ad litem for the infant children (Kim Van Horn Gutterman, Assistant County Attorney, on br ief), for appellants. Thomas A. Howell for appellee Elvis Gene Shifflett, Sr. (Kathleen M. Mizzi Todd, on brief), for appellee Shannon Shifflett. Appellee Shannon Shifflett submitting on brief.
The Harrisonburg Rockingham Social Serv ices District (HRSSD) and the guardian ad litem for the eight minor children (children) of Shanno n Shifflett (mother) and Elvis Shifflett (father) appeal the decision of the Circu it Court of Rockingham County (cir cuit court) not to close to the public the entire parental abuse and neglect hearing held in this case. Because the appeals are moot, we dismiss them.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - As the parties are fully co nversant with the record in this case, and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, th is opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as ar e necessary to the parties’ unders tanding of the disposition of these appeals.
I. BACKGROUND On July 23, 2004, the circ uit court began hearing the de novo appeal of mother and father (collectively, appellees) of the ru lings of the juvenile and domestic relations di strict court finding the children were abused or neglected under Code § 16.1-241(A)(2a) and continuing their temporary custody with HRSSD. 1 After the first witness had completed her testimony and the examination of a second witness had begun, a reporter from the Daily News Record , a local newspaper, entered the courtroom and sat in the public gallery. Upon noticing the reporter’s presence in the courtroom, HRSSD and the children’s guardian ad litem (collectively, appellants) moved to close the entire hearing to the public, arguing that Code §§ 16.1-302 and 17.1-513.1 each mandated the complete cl osure of the parental abuse and negl ect proceedings. Appellants further argued that closure was necessary to protect the children’s priv acy and save them from lasting embarrassment and emotional harm that would resu lt from the publication of the many humiliating details that would emerge during the hearing. Appellees objected to closure. Denying the motion, the circuit court stayed the pare ntal abuse and neglect proceedings until August 26, 2004, “in order to give [appellants] an opportunity to seek immediate appellate review of [the] decision.” No party sought such review. The circuit court also “continued further argume nt in the case” until July 27, 2004, “in order to permit additional research , . . . briefing and argume nt on the closure issue.”

1 The juvenile and domestic relations district c ourt had removed the children from appellees’ home and awarded their temporary custody to HR SSD because of poor hy giene, lack of basic housekeeping, educational deficienci es, and neglect of the children’s mental and physical health.- 3 - At the July 27, 2004 hearing, appellees indicated they no longer opposed clos ure. However, a representative of the Daily News Record appeared and argu ed against closure on public policy grounds. The circuit court advised th e newspaper’s representative that the Daily News Record had the right to file a motion to intervene in the pro ceedings as an interested party so that it could participate in any appeal. No su ch motion was filed, however, and the newspaper is not a party to the present appeals. The court took the matter of closure under advisement. On August 4, 2004, the circuit court ente red an order vacating its previous ruling and ordering the parties to submit prehearing proffers of witness testimony an d documentary evidence and to “designate which part of that testimony or evidence they contend[ed ] would be injurious to the children if made public.” The court further st ated in the order that, based on those proffers, it would rule at the August 26, 20 04 hearing “on which types of testimony an d evidence, if any, [would] be taken when the [hearing was] open to the public, and which type of evidence, if any [would] be taken in closed session.” When the parental abuse and neglect hearing recommenced on August 26, 2004, appellants renewed their motion to close the entire hearing to the pu blic and objected to the circuit court’s anticipated ruling that only limited portions of the hearing would be closed to th e public. Changing their positions again, appellees ar gued against closure. Clarifying th e terms of its August 4, 2004 order, the circuit court expressly denied appellants’ motion to close the pr oceedings completely and ruled that the hearing would be closed only when testimony or ev idence was presen ted relating to “personal, medical and other pr ivate matters of the children.” The parental abuse and neglect hearing lasted three days. Much of the proceedings were open to the public, but the courtroom was clos ed when evidence was presented regarding the children’s personal hygiene habits and their mental, me dical, physical, and e ducational conditions.- 4 - At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found th at the children were in an abused and neglected condition prior to th eir removal from appellees’ home an d that the condition continued. Between July 24 an d August 30, 2004, the Daily News Record published six articles concerning appellees and the children. Some of the later articles included information clearly gleaned from direct observation of the parental abuse and neglect hearing, including quotes of argument, colloquy, and testimony detailing the substandard co nditions to which it was alleged the parents had subjected the children. On September 11, 2004 , the circuit court en tered dispositional orders memorializing its finding of parental abuse and neglect and continui ng the children’s tempor ary legal custody with HRSSD. These appeals followed.
II. ANALYSIS Appellants contend on appeal that the circuit court erred in not closing the parental abuse and neglect hearing to the public. In support of that position, a ppellants articulate injuries the children suffered as a result of the hearing not being closed to th e public, namely, the publication in the Daily News Record of embarrassing facts adduced during th e hearing. Citing Code §§ 16.1-296, 16.1-302, and 16.1-307, appellants urge us to es tablish a rule that parental abuse and neglect proceedings on de novo appeal to the circuit court proceed un der a presumption that they are closed to the public. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the instant claim of error must be dismissed because it is moot. “As a general rule, ‘[m]oot questions are not justiciable and courts do not rule on such questions to avoid issuin g advisory opinions.’” In re Times-World Corporation , 7 Va. App. 317, 323, 373 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1988) (quoting United States v. Peters , 754 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1985)). This is so because “[t]he duty of this court, as of ev ery other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried- 5 - into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach , 182 Va. 642, 644, 29 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1944) (quoting Mills
v. Green , 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). Indeed, “[w]henever it appears or is made to appear that there is no actual controversy between the litigants, or that, if it once existed it has ceased to do so, it is the duty of every judicial tribunal not to proceed to the formal determina tion of the apparent controversy, but to dismiss the case. It is not the office of courts to give opinions on abstract propositions of law, or to decide questions upon which no rights depend, and where no relief can be afforded. Only real controversies and existi ng rights are entitled to invoke the exercise of their powers.” Id. at 643-44, 29 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting Franklin v. Peers , 95 Va. 602, 603, 29 S.E. 321, 321 (1898)); see also Baldwin v. Commonwealth , 43 Va. App. 415, 421, 598 S.E.2d 754, 757 (2004) (“‘[A] case is moot when the issu es presented are no longer “live,”’ Powell v. McCormack , 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969), because ‘an actual controversy mu st be extant at all st ages of review,’ to escape the notion that a case is moot, Preiser v. Newkirk , 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975).”). “It necessarily follows that whe n, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and w ithout any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the c ourt will not proceed to a formal judgment but will dismiss the appeal.” Hankins , 182 Va. at 644, 29 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting Mills , 159 U.S. at 653). “Moreover, even when the parties do not raise th e issue of mootness, appellate courts should raise the issue sua sponte when the record does not presen t a live case or controversy.” Baldwin , 43 Va. App. at 421-22, 598 S.E.2d at 757 (citing Friedman’s Inc. v. Dunlap , 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002)). In the instant case, even if, assuming arguendo , the circuit court erre d in deciding not to close the entire parental abuse a nd neglect hearing to th e public, it is clear that during the interval of time between that decision and our review th ereof an event has occurred that renders it- 6 - entirely impossible for this Court to grant effectual relief to appellant s: a hearing open in part to the public has already taken place, and the inform ation appellants seek to protect from public consumption has been irretrievably disseminated. Plainly, the granting of appellants’ requested relief—that we “overrule” the ci rcuit court’s decision to open the hearing to the public—would neither rectify the particular j udicial action that made that di ssemination possible nor cure the dissemination itself. Likewise, appellants descri be no conceivable injury to the rights of the children that may result from our inaction on the merits. Indee d, the outcome of these appeals will have no foreseeable effect on the children whatsoever. Thus, no controversy survives for our review, and any opinion we render would only serve to advise, rather than adjudicate. Accordingly, the appeals are moot. There are, however, two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. First, cases involving voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal activity are exempted from the mootness doctrine. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis , 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (noting that, “as a general rule, ‘voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive th e tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does no t make the case moot’” (quoting United States v. W. T. Grant
Co. , 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953))); City of Virginia Beach v. Brown , 858 F. Supp. 585, 590 (E.D. Va. 1994). Second, cases that are “‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’” remain justiciable. State Water Control Bd. v. Appalachian Power Co. , 12 Va. App. 73, 75, 402 S.E.2d 703, 705 (1991) (en banc) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt , 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)); In re Times-World Corp. , 7 Va. App. at 323, 373 S.E.2d at 477. Neither exception to the mootness doctrine applies here, however. This case does not involve the voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal activity. Th e only cessation in this case concerning appellants’ present claim was the c onclusion of the parental abuse and neglect- 7 - hearing. Such a cessation does not constitute “voluntary cessation” as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Davis

. Moreover, the second exception “ only applies when ‘(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigate d prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaini ng party would be subjected to the same action again.’” Brown , 858 F. Supp. at 589-90 (emphases added) (alterations in original) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford , 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). The second prong requires more than “a mere physical or theoretical possibili ty”; rather, “there must be a ‘reasonable expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probability’ that the same controve rsy will recur involving the same complaining party.” Murphy , 455 U.S. at 482. Here, while the circumstances of this case were such that the challenged action of the circuit court arguably could not ha ve been fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, there is no reasonable expectation that appellants will ever again be subjected, in their respective capacities as legal cu stodian and guardian ad litem of the children, to the same judicial action of not closing the circuit court’s entire parental abus e and neglect hearing to the public. Indeed, the facts relevant to the circuit co urt’s parental abuse and neglect determination in this case having already been established, an occurrence of circumstances necessitati ng a renewed open-court elicitation of the same facts is neither expected nor probable. The exception, therefore, does not apply. Accordingly, we “‘will not proceed to a form al judgment but will dismiss’” these appeals

as moot. Hankins , 182 Va. at 644, 29 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting Mills , 159 U.S. at 653); see Jackson v. Marshall , 19 Va. App. 628, 635, 454 S.E.2d 23, 27 (1995) (stating that “[d]ismissal is the proper remedy” when an appeal is moot). Dismissed.