# rVED BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

## 27 2015 

## 11\JG DOCKET

In the matter of Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING SERVICES Respondent Administrative Law Judge J.E. Sullivan


### REPLY OF RESPONDENT TO FAA'S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Respondent, Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services ("AMES" or "Respondent") hereby replies to the FAA's (sometimes "Complainant") opposition to Respondent's Summary Judgment Motion. The FAA seeks to bolster its position by including a declaration by the principal FAA inspector raising new arguments not previous!y articulated by the witness or the FAA and AMES will respond to these new assertions accordingly. Further, the FAA continues to misinterpret the relevant provisions ofthe AMM and the testimony ofthe AMES witness as well as the AMES maintenance records, which AMES will take the opportunity to correct. Finally, the FAA wastes time addressing the issue ofthe Inspector's prejudice and bias, even though AMES specifically did not ask Your Honor to rule on the issue in deciding the merits of Respondent's motion. Respondent will address these and other issues in this reply. 

### I. The AMES Witness is Competent to Address Maintenance Issnes The first argument presented by the FAA is that the AMES witness, Jeffrey (not John as stated on page I ofthe FAA's opposition) "is not a mechanic and is not competent to offer opinions on aviation maintenance." FAA Opposition at 1-2 (citingpage 9 ofMr. Becker's deposition transcript (attached as Exhibit B to the FAA's Motion for Summary Judgment)). In what can only be viewed as an intention to mislead Your Honor about Mr. Becker's qualifications, the FAA fails to note that, in response to questions from FAA counsel, Mr. Becker testified that he possesses a Bachelor's Degree in Aeronautical Engineering from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University --perhaps the premier aeronautical university in the United States. See Exhibit 2 (Becker Tr. at 8). Mr. Becker also holds a Masters ofBusiness Administration from Xavier University in Cincinnati. See id (Becker Tr. at 8). Starting in 1986, Mr. Becker was employedby the Douglas Aircraft Company (now Boeing) as a design engineer on the MD-80 aircraft program. Subsequently, he was a structural design engineer on the Air Force large transport aircraft, the C-17. During the latter part ofMr. Becker's career at Douglas, he
was as a flight test engineer on the MD-11 program. See id (Becker Tr. at 8). When Mr. Becker was employedby ABX Air, Inc. (f/k/aAirborne Express) in 1991 until2009, he held, among other positions, that ofAircraft Structures Engineer; Manager-Fleet Service Engineering; Manager-Technical Services for the B-767 aircraft; Manager-Avionics Engineering; and Senior Director, Engineering and Quality Control. From 2009 to the present, Mr. Becker is in the position ofDirector ofQuality Assurance for AMES. This position has responsibility for the training ofmaintenance technicians and inspectors, the establishment ofmaintenance policies, instructions and procedures, compliance with applicable Federal Aviation Regulations (PARs) and manufacturer specifications, and the properperformance of all aircraft inspections and maintenance by AMES personnel. The details ofMr. Becker's experience are described more fully in the Declaration ofJeffrey Becker attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

- 2-That Mr. Becker has held important engineering and other positions, which includedresponsibility for maintenance programs, is clear and beyond question. Mr. Becker'sbackground and experience clearly establishes his extensive knowledge and experience and the FAA's blatant attempt to shield Your Honor from this information is emblematic ofthe lengths to which the FAA will go to distort the record. 1 IfFAA counsel had only bothered to turn one page in the Becker deposition transcript (to page 8 from page 9) on which Becker'sbackground and experience is more fully disclosed, and then acknowledge his level ofexperience rather than to try to mislead the Tribunal, this
case could perhaps come to a more rapid conclusion. The case law holds that one does not need to be a certified aircraft mechanic to be knowledgeable ofaircraft maintenance issues ifone has, as does Mr. Becker, years of actual experience in aircraft maintenance departments and a university degree in aeronautical engineering. In Maloney v. CentralAviation, Inc., 450 F. Supp.2d 905, 910- 911 (W.D. Wi. 2006), for example, the Court found that neither the evidentiary rules, nor the applicable case law, impose a rigid set ofqualifications on an individual before he can qualified to testify regarding maintenance issues. Consequently, years ofrelevant work experience, plus the knowledge and skills gained from that work, were found sufficient to allow an individual to testify as an expertregarding the maintenance of an aircraft, notwithstanding the lack ofan FAA mechanics license. See id at 911; see also Bouret Echevarria v. CarribeanAviationMaint. Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10227, *12-13 (D.P.R. 2012). Indeed, even when an expert has the relevant license, a witness's

1 Knowing full well that AMES would respond to the incorrect assertion that Mr. Becker is not expert in matters of aircraft maintenance by pointing outhis aeronautical degree and experience, one wonders why FAA counselbothered to argue the point. - 3 -qualifications are based upon the entire relevant professional experience, not the license alone. See DemocraticRepublic ofthe Congo v. Air Capital Group, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84136, *16-18 (S.D. Fl. 2013). Mr. Becker is more than qualified to address maintenance issues as an expert witness byvirtue oftraining and experience. On page 2 ofits Opposition, the FAA states that YourHonor "recently denied the FAA's motion to exclude Becker [from] serving as an expert witness on the basis that Beckerwas only identified as an expert witness in order to rebut the testimony ofFAA expert witness Michael Christensen and the Judge had granted Respondent's motion to exclude Christensen." FAA Opposition at 2. Therefore, the FAA concludes that Your Honor should not consider any "expert" opinion testimony from Mr. Becker since "it would be outside the identified scope ofBecker's 'expert' testimony (that scopebeing purely the rebuttal ofChristensen's expert opinions)." ld. The FAA is wrong on two counts. First, Your Honor's February 11, 2015 Order did not deny the FAA's motion to exclude Mr. Becker (and Mr. James Savastano) as expert witnesses. Instead, Your Honor deemed the FAA's motion as moot. See Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Exclude, and Granting/Denying OtherMotions, served February 11, 2015 at second ordering paragraph 6. Second, Respondent did not identify Mr. Becker (or Mr. Savastano) as experts "purely'' to rebut the expert testimony ofMichael Christensen as the FAA states. See id. Rather, Respondent identified Mr. Becker (and Mr. Savastano) in its December 12, 2014 Expert Rebuttal Disclosures as expert rebuttal witnesses "as necessary to rebut any expert and opinion testimony providedby Complainant's witnesses[]"(emphasis added) and Inspector Lipinski was identified on December 1, 2014
as an expert witness for Complainant in the FAA's late-provided expert disclosures. See

-4-Exhibit 3 (Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures, served December 12, 2014 at'![ I) and Complainant's Additional Expert Disclosures, served December I, 2014

**at~** 1).2 Thus, Your Honor can properly consider as expert testimony the Declaration ofJeffrey Becker (attached hereto as Exhibit I) and Mr. Becker's deposition testimony to the extent theyrebut the expert testimony proffered by FrankLipinski, even at this late stage ofthe proceeding, in his declaration (FAA Exhibit JJ) or otherwise provided. Further, Your Honor can properly consider the opinion testimony given byJeffrey Becker at deposition and contained in his Declaration to the extentpermittedunder Federal Rule ofEvidence 701. 

### II. The Circumstantial Nature ofthe Evidence is Insufficient Proofofa Violation The FAA attempts, but fails, to effectively respond to the AMES contention that the Inspector's later-in-time findings about the condition ofthe aircraft must be carefully scrutinized because this is at best circumstantial evidence and it must in any event be found to be reliable, probative and substantial in order to meet the§ 13.223 standard. See Administrator v. Lewis, NTSB OrderEA-1177, 3 NTSB 1241, 1978 NTSB LEXIS 51, 

## *16-17 (Aug. 17, 1978); see also In the Matter of Florida Propeller &Accessories, Inc., FAA Order No. 97-32, 1997 FAA LEXIS 1280 (Oct. 8, 1997). The burden is on the FAA to fill in the gaps in time with strong supporting evidence. In its failed attempt to

2 AMES also stated in its Supplemental Responses to FAA's First Discovery Requests that Mr. Becker and Mr. Savastano are expected to provide testimony "as expert witnesses as necessary to rebut any expert or opinion testimony providedby Complainant's witnesses
..." Exhibit 4 (Respondent's Supplemental Responses to FAA's First Discovery Requests, served December 23, 2014 at 1) (emphasis added). Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures and Respondent's Supplemental Responses to FAA's First Discovery Requests explainedthat Mr. Becker andMr. Savastano will also testify as fact witnesses, including providing opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. See Exhibit 3 and Exhibit4.



### - 5-do so, it now argues that AMES has not rebutted the FAA's proffered testimony, See FAA Opposition at 3-4. In the FAA's Enforcement Investigative Report (EIR), Section B, the investigating inspector never once mentions the possibility ofwear and tearbeing a factor. See Exhibit 1 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. And so before this case got started, the FAA position was that ithad no reason to even raise the question ofwear and tear or give any meaningful consideration to the possibility ofintervening maintenance and its impact on their legal theory ofthe case. In the Lipinski deposition, the Inspector did not address wear and tear other than to deny it would have had any impact on the condition ofthe flying doors despite months offlight operations by all three aircraft and to deny that any intervening maintenance could have altered the condition ofthe flying doors. See Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Lipinski Tr. at 204-205). Only now, in the Lipinski Declaration attached to the FAA's Opposition did the FAA make any attempt to explain itself. Now the Inspector states that the "damage" ofthe type he observed on the three aircraft "almost
never occur[s] prior to the next C check (when the doors will be removed, reinstalled and rigged again)." FAA ExhibitJJ (Lipinski Declaration**at~** 14). This is an entirely new assertion ofthe FAA-- one never raised before either in the EIR, any answers to interrogatories or in any deposition testimony. At least the FAA is now conceding that the type ofdamage alleged bythe FAA couldhave resulted from the impact offlight operations-in the case ofthe three aircraft-collectively on 1,584 flights. Thatbeing the case, how can the FAA conclusively assert in this case that all ofthe "damage and other problems" the FAA

- 6-claims it observed were definitively not the product ofnormal wear and tear? To the extent some damage ofthe type repaired by AMES can occur, then the FAAhas not explained why this possibility does not apply to the three CCIA aircraft. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Declaration

**at~** 3). More critically, the FAA has not met its burden ofproofto explain the gap in time with the required supporting evidence that would be necessary to conclusively show the damage could only have resulted from mis-rigging ofthe flying doors. Lipinski allows for the possibility ofworn orpossibly torn rubber seals, paint deterioration, dust and dirt. See FAA Exhibit JJ (Lipinski Declaration

**at~** 14). If seals
can wear, so can shims and washers, and the wearing down of shims and washers can clearly change the geometry ofthe flying door. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Declaration

**at~** 2). Hence, the FAA needs to be able to prove that such normal wear and tear could not account for the condition ofthe flying doors when the aircraft in question were flown to the AMES facility after the FAA's May 25, 2010 inspection. The FAA has not met this burden.Further, without benefit ofany documentary evidence ofthe condition ofother B727 aircraft, Lipinski strikes a comparison ofthe three subject aircraft with otherwise unidentified and undocumented CCIA B-727 aircraft. See FAA Exhibit JJ (Lipinski Declaration at

**~** 14). Ithardly serves the purpose ofthis proceeding for the Inspector to start comparing the three subject aircraft to otherwise unidentified and undocumented "other aircraft." In any event, the FAA is doing its best to ignore Lipinski's acknowledgement that for the many months the three aircraft were operating after the main landing gear changes and that there could have been "hundreds oftire changes"



### - 7

-some ofwhich would require moving the flying door in order to get to the tire. See Exhibit 5 (Lipinski Tr. at 53). The FAAhas not presented any probative evidence or testimony to negate the fact that this intervening maintenance could have had an impact
on the condition ofthe flying doors despite the fact that the case law establishes that the circumstantial must be "carefully scrutinized" when the gap in time between the alleged violations and their discovery is so long (see Administrator v. Lewis, NTSB OrderEA1177, 3 NTSB 1241, 1978 NTSB LEXIS 51, *16-17 (Aug. 17, 1978)) and given the FAA's admission ofso many flight cycles and intervening tire changes. 3 Complainant asserts that "Respondenthas proffered no evidence to rebut the fact that AMES' own documents stated that it improperly installed the landing gear and flying doors. See FAA Opposition at 4. Forthe many reasons set forth in the Respondent's Answer in Opposition to the FAA Summary Judgment Motion at pages 6 to 17, and pages 22 to 27, it is simply wrong to contend that AMES has admitted it did notproperly install the flying doors. Nor can itbe said, as has the FAA, that AMES has produced no evidence that the condition ofthe flying doors on the day ofthe FAA inspection on May 25, 2010 was consistent with "wear and tear" when Mr. Becker carefully explainedthe
reasons that support the AMES position during his deposition and AMES timely submittedthe expert report ofMr. Daniel J. Hancher supporting the AMES position on
wear and tear. See Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 93-145); Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Expert Report ofDaniel J. Hancher, date April30, 2014).

3 While Lipinski asserts that moving the flying door, ifdone properly, to remove a tire would not likely cause damage, he has no evidence on which to prove his hypothesis that every tire change was properly accomplished. See Exhibit 5 (Lipinski Tr. at 53-54).

- 8-Onpage 4 ofthe FAA Opposition, Complainant castigates Mr. Becker for his statement that the only way you can determine a flying door is properly rigged is to perform a gear swing to see whether or not the door is properly faired. See Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 71). Butthe Lipinski Declaration states that "[a] gear swing is required to definitely determine that a flying door is properlyrigged." FAA ExhibitJJ (Lipinski Declaration at 

### 'II 15). The significance ofthe assertion that only a gear swing will prove whether or not the flying door is properly faired, that the FAAhas now conceded is correct, is that Lipinski could notknow ifthe doors were properly rigged on the day ofthe May 2010 inspection without witnessing a gear swing, which by Lipinski's own admission, he did not do. See Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Lipinski Tr. at 203). So, although the FAA's witness is in agreement with AMES, FAA counsel is reduced to questioning the qualifications ofMr. Becker to offer the statement even though he is a trained aeronautical engineer with 24 years ofmaintenance-related experience. 

### III. AMES Properly Installed the Tubular Bearing on N287SC at the Time ofthe MLG Change On pages 5-8 ofits Opposition, the FAA responds to AMES' position that the missing tubular bearing on N287SC was causedby an intervening tire change. This issue
was addressed in detail in Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at pages 20-21 and in Respondent's Answerin Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment at pages 17-22. First, the FAA does not dispute that on March 25, 2010 the number 4 outboard tire on the right-hand MLG ofN287SC was change- three days after AMES replaced the aircraft's MLG on March 22,2010. See Exhibit 11 to Respondent's Motion for Summary

- 9-Judgment (CCIA Aircraft technical Log Report DocumentingTire Change). In its Opposition, the FAA attempts to explain away the compelling evidence that AMES had, in fact, replaced the tubular bearing when performing the MLG change on N287SC and that the likely cause ofthe missing tubular bearing was the intervening tire change. The FAA claims that Respondent's explanation that the intervening tire change resulted in the missing tubular bearing "is based on a misunderstanding ofwhich part of the aircraft was missing" (FAA Opposition at 5) and that the "procedure that Becker describes doesn't have anything to do with the tubular bearing that was missing." ld at 7- 8. This is simply on the case. AMES is well aware ofwhich part was missing on N287SC after the April16, 2010 aircraft vibration incident, and based on its investigation ofthe matter, is confident that AMES included the tubular bearing when it replaced the aircraft's right-hand MLG. See Exhibit 1to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 126). AMES maintains that the method employed to change the tire after the MLG change performedby AMES may well have causedthe tubular bearing to go missing. In any event, the sequence of events, cast sufficient doubt on the FAA's theory, which is based solely on circumstantial evidence and which is insufficient to meet the FAA'sburden ofproofunder the evidentiary standard in section 13.223. Mr. Becker was very clear during his testimony that he was referring to the "tubularbearing" when addressing how the tire change likely caused the part to go missing. See Exhibit 1to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 42-49, 123-127). Indeed, Mr. Becker used the specific words "tubularbearing" no less than 10 times during this part ofhis testimony.

- 10-See id. The tubular bearing, which is part ofthe mechanism that connects the wing door actuation rod to the drag strut, is clearly identified as such in Section 32-11-00, Figure 401, Detail A (Page 404) ofthe AMM. See Exhibit 5 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. There is no doubt that this is the part that Mr. Becker was referring to in his deposition testimony when describing the implications ofthe intervening tire change. Not once during his testimony did Mr. Becker refer to the "hollow pin" that is used to attach the other end ofthe actuation rod to the flying door (Becker Tr. at 42-49, 123-127)), and which is shown in AMM Section 32-12-11, Figure 401 (Page 403). See Exhibit 6 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. FAA counsel even noted during the deposition that he had seen references to "abushing or a tubular bearing" and asked Mr. Beckerifhe was aware of any difference between the two or ifthey are referring to the same thing. See Exhibit 1to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 47). Mr. Beckerresponded that he too had seen the part described as a "tubularbearing or tubular bushing" and confirmed to FAA counsel that they are references to the same component. See id (Becker Tr. at 47). Notably, FAA counsel never asked Mr. Beckerwhether he was referring to the "hollow pin" at the other end ofthe actuation rod because it was clear that he was not. Moreover, Mr. Becker specifically testified that the AMES investigation revealed that "attimes, the line maintenance people will remove that bolt that contains the tubularbearing and hold up the flying door out ofthe way as they change the wheel." 

### Id (Becker Tr. at 124) (emphasis added). Simply put, Mr. Becker's testimony regarding the likelihood ofthe intervening tire change to cause the tubular bearingto go missing

- 11-was not based on any "misunderstanding" ofwhich part was found missing on the aircraft
as the FAA claims. Mr. Becker also noted to FAA counsel that during the AMES investigation ofthe missing tubularbearing the AMES technician who replaced the right-hand MLG on N287SC stated that he specificallyrecalled replacing the tubular bearing. See id (Becker Tr. at 125-126). Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 are the AMES Discrepancy Notices and the CCIA Corrective Action Record produced in connection with the investigation ofthe missing tubular bearing4 Attached to AMES Discrepancy Notice No. Q20293 is a handwritten statement signed by David Johanson. the AMES mechanic who replaced the tubularbushing. In his statement. which was made on June 21, 2010, three months after the work was performed, Mr. Johanson states with respect to N287SC that "OnMarch 21,2010, I was assigned to install the right hand main landing gear flying door. I did install this bushing sleeve on that day." Exhibit 6 (emphasis added). Mr. Johanson goes
on to note that he had been involved in the two otherMLG changes in previous months "and would have known to include that part on the flying door gimbal joint." !d. There
can be no doubt that where Mr. Johanson refers in his statementto a "bushing sleeve" he
was referring to the tubular bearing shown in Detail A ofFigure 401 ofAMM Section 32-11-00 (Page 404) and referred to in Section 32-11-00, Step 5, AL (11) (Page422) since that was clearly the subject ofthe AMES investigation.

4 In connection with preparing this reply, AMES learned that these documents were not included in the Items ofProof attached to the FAA's EIR or in the AMES document production sent to the FAA on March 6, 2014. Consistent with its obligation to seasonably supplement its discovery responses under Rule 220(i) ofthe FAA Rules of Practice and Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 26(e)(1)(a), AMES is now providing these documents to the FAA.

- 12-The AMES inspector on duty at the time, William Ashford, also provided a written statement attached to AMES Discrepancy Notice No. Q20294. Mr. Ashford states "To the best ofmy knowledge and recollection, nothing was left out or missed during replacement ofthe landing gear." Exhibit 6. Mr. Ashford also notes inhis statement that a gear extension and retraction test was performed pursuant to Section 32- 11-00, Step 5 AR and that the "extension and retraction test revealed no defects or problems and there were no issues with the RMG wing door." Id; Exhibit 5 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (AMM Section 32-11-00, Step 5 AR (Page 423). Finally, the AMES response included in the CCIA Corrective Action Record, Page 2 of2, notes that "A statementfrom the AMES technician states that he recalls installing the tubular bearing. This is also reflected in the sign-offon the partial worksheet (entry 20, ofpage 3)
.... Based on the paperwork sign offand statements provided, AMES cannot confirm that the tubularbearing was missing when it left our facility
...." Exhibit 6. Thus, the statements ofthe AMES mechanic and inspector included in the Discrepancy Notices and the AMES response to the CCIA Corrective Action Record supports Mr. Becker's deposition testimony stating: I think as I stated in my response to Ben Buck [in the CCIA Corrective Action Record], we did not have any proofor even an inkling that that bushing or that tubular bearing was missing. And not on!y did we have a statement from the technician that says he specifically recalls putting the bearing back in, but again, the doors were swung. They met all the fair conditions. We can only assume that ifyou're gonna go ahead and do a function check to make sure that all of [the] procedures [were] followed, [regarding] that door, there would have been issues or problems with that door ifthe tubular bearing was missing when it left the AMES facility. Exhibit I to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 126).

- 13-The FAA belittles AMES' explanationby stating that "Respondent's argument that [the tubular bearing] probably fell offduring a tire change is nonsensical and without any evidentiary foundation." FAA Opposition at 8. Granted FAA counsel did not have the benefit ofthe AMES Discrepancy Notices and the CCIA Corrective Action Record (Exhibit 6 hereto) when making this statement. But as these documents and the deposition testimony ofMr. Becker show, however, this is simply not the case. What is nonsensical is the lengths to which the FAA and its principal inspector will go to confuse the facts in an attempt to defeat the Respondent's Summary Judgment Motion. 

### IV. AMES Properly Installed the Shims When it Performed the MLG Changes In this section ofthe FAA's Opposition (pages 9-11) it attempts to suggest that Mr. Beckeris not competent to correct!y analyze the maintenance records ofAMES. FAA counsel sets himselfup as abetter interpreter ofthe documents (particularly FAA Exhibit N). First, Mr. Becker is the official in charge ofthe AMES Quality Assurance ("QA") Department, which includes oversight ofthe qualifications ofline mechanics and the proper documentation ofthe work performed bythemincluding aircraft maintenance records. Analyzing maintenance records and comparing them to AMM requirements and best practices is a fundamental part ofthe Director ofQAjob description. FAA counsel may want to take pot shots at the AMES witness, but as the holder of an aeronautical engineering degree and at least 24 years ofexperience in the realm ofaircraft maintenance, FAA's attempt to denigrate the experience and expertise ofthe AMES witness seems somewhat desperate. Inthis section ofthe Opposition, FAA claims that AMES has admitted that it did not properly rig the flying doors, but that contention has already been responded to and

- 14-need not be repeated other than to cite Your Honor to pages 22 through 26 ofthe AMES Opposition to the FAA's Summary Judgment Motion. Second, the FAA relies on the Lipinski statement that he personally viewed improperly configured shimming washers. See FAA Opposition at 9; FAA Exhibit I. It is telling that the FAA does not even attempt to rebut the AMES argument on pages 18-19 ofits Summary Judgment Motion that Lipinski was simply uninformed ofthe AMM section that called for the insertion of washers (shims) in the forward hinge only. There is no comparable instruction for inserting shims in the aft hinge. See Exhibit 5 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (AMM Section 32-11-00, step AL(2)(Page 422)); Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 70). Rather than admit to Lipinski's error, the FAA ignores the point. So while the FAA contends the Inspector "personally observed improperly configured shimming washers" (FAA Opposition at 9) it intentionally ignores the proofthat the Inspector measured AMES compliance with the AMM based on an inaccurate understanding ofthe document believing shims should have been installed in the aft hinge. Next, the FAA argues at page 9-10 ofits Opposition that the notation of "improperhardware stack ups" noted in FAAExhibit N (AMES non-routine cards) is conclusive proofthat the flying doors were not properly installed when in the case of N899AA the work was originally accomplished on July 31, 2009. Apart from the fact that Mr. Becker is in a far betterposition than the FAAto interpret the meaning ofAMES generated maintenance documents, the records show, as testified to by Mr. Becker (see Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 111-114)) that the flying door was removed and the hardware was then "verified" in accordance with

- 15-Service Bulletin 727-32-324/R3 after which the door was then reinstalled using the hardware that was found to have been in compliance with the Service Bulletin standard. Exhibit I(Becker Declaration at**~** 7). As to the FAA complaint about the status ofthe gear or gimbal fitting on N899AA, AMES has already stated that when inspected by AMES at its facility it found "play" in the linkage andjoint that includes the tubular bearing at the end ofthe actuation rod attached to the landing gear (drag strut). See AMES Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9. Other relevant facts regarding this fitting previously noted in the AMES Opposition to the FAA Motion were that the landing gear on N899AA were extended and retracted 1,586 times after the MLG were installedby AMES. See id. Consequently, wear and tear ofshimming washers in moving structure is not unexpected. In addition, since the "play" was in the area ofthe tubularbearing and given Mr. Becker's testimony that ifincorrect methods to move the flying door to facilitate tire changes (ofwhich Lipinski testified there could have been "hundreds" (Lipinski Tr. at 53-54) were used (meaning that a mechanic removed the attachment bolt at the end ofthe actuation rod attached to the drag strut, then the documented discrepancy ("excessive play at gear fitting") is not necessarily attributable to AMES. See Exhibit 5 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Figure 401 in AMM 32-11-00)(Page 404); Exhibit 5 to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to FAA's Motion for Summary Judgment (AMM Section 32-45-01 (Page 402)) In the absence of substantial evidence that it was, the FAA has not met its burden ofproof. FAA concludes this section with an attack on Mr. Becker's interpretation ofthe aircraft maintenance records. Having observed the aircraft when they were flown to the

- 16-AMES facility after the FAA inspection (see Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 75)) and having studied the follow-on AMEScompiled maintenance records, Mr. Becker is far more informed and knowledgeable of their content and meaning than is the FAA, which had no representative on site to observe the aircraft in the AMES facility or to observe the corrective action taken by the AMES mechanics. See Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Lipinski Tr. at 203); Exhibit l(Becker Declaration at '11 7). 

### V. AMES Received the Landing Gear with the Hydraulic Lines and Clamps in Place FAA claims at page 12 ofits Opposition that the finding that chafe marks created by hydraulic line clamps on N899AA was the responsibility ofAMES because Step S.A in the AMM (Section 32-11-00 (Page 416)) directs the maintenance provider to "prepare
a landing gear assembly for installation". The Note that follows states: A landing gear assembly consists of a shock strut, two brake units, two tire and wheel assemblies, upper and lower torsion links, and, on some airplanes, a shock strut safety switch, a drag strut, trunnion link, static discharge assembly, deboost valves, hydraulic and pneumatic lines, electric wiring and clamps. Inthe case ofleft gear, the assembly also includes ground spoiler shutoffvalve linkage. As observed, all the note consists ofis a listing ofcertain components that are part ofthe landing gear assembly, but there are no directions instructing the maintenance provider to install and clamp the hydraulic lines. This is fully consistent with the AMES position that the vendor ofthe landing gear is responsible for such installation and clamping and AMES properly relied upon the vendor's FAA Form 8130 (Airworthiness Approval Tags) executedby the landing gear vendor (ATI) stating that the gear was completed according to IAW BAC OHM 32-10-01 except for "transducer assembly, hub cap, wheel

- 17

-and tire assembly, deflector installation and brake assembly." Exhibit 7 (Box 13 of Authorized Release Certificate, FAA Form 8130-3, Airworthiness Approval Tags issued byATIAviation Services, LLC for the LHMLG on N899AA and N898AA). This
means the hydraulic lines and hose swivel clamps were preinstalled and were not positioned orinstalled by AMES at the time ofthe MLG change. However, when the hydraulic lines appeared to have produced chafing (FAA Exhibit N, non-routine 0001) AMES corrected the matter but only by reference to the landing gear Overhaul Manual and not the AMM because the AMM is silent on the positioning ofthe hydraulic lines meaning the organization that built up the landing gear
was responsible ofhydraulic line placement. FAA makes a similar argument for the positioning ofthe so called swivel clamps. AMES does not contest that iffound the left hand main landing gear on N898AA had mispositioned "hose swivel clamps" that required rectification. FAA Exhibit T (nonroutine 0021). But the FAA, perhaps intentionally, seeks to confuse the matterby arguing that the AMM 32-11-00 placed responsibility on AMES for positioning ofthe swivel clamps. Such is not the case. First FAA refers to step S(AH) in FAA Exhibit Cat Page 422 as proofthat AMES had responsibility for clamp placement. But all step S(AH) says is to "install trunnion swivel complete with hydraulic lines" with reference to Figure 404. But Figure 404 does not show the position ofthe swivel clamps. The depiction of the landing gear assembly as seen in Figure 404 is absent any instructions ofthe "arrangement and installation ofthe hydraulic lines and clamps" as incorrectly claimed by the FAA. FAA Opposition at 13. In any event, and more importantly, when AMES

- 18-received from CCIA's vendor (ATI) the gear assembly the clamps were already positioned and nothing in AMM 32-ll-00instructed AMES to reposition the clamps. 

### VI. Wear and Tear Explains the Condition ofthe Flying Doors The FAA seeks to undermine Mr. Becker's testimony in this section ofits pleading (FAA Opposition at pages 14 through 16) by again trying to suggest the AMES witness, even though he holds a degree in aeronautical engineering and even though he has had at least 24 years ofmanagement experience in aircraft maintenance activities, is not qualified to comment on the proper interpretation ofthe AMES work records. See FAA Opposition at 14. Itis absurd to think the Inspector on whom the FAA relies is any
more qualified to do so, especially since he onlyinspected the aircraft at one time and
never once saw the aircraft when they were flown back to the AMES facility for any . 5 necessary repmrs: The FAA Opposition distorts the statement in the AMES Summary Judgment Motion onpage 17 that some ofthe discrepancies noted on the non-routine cards were "inaccurately stated." All this meant is that in cases where a non-routine card referred to
a suspected improperhardware stack up, for example, it was subsequently proven not to be the case on closer inspection. That is why the final corrective action taken is more telling ofthe nature ofthe suspect structure or part than the preliminary findings of a cursory inspection. ("Again, regardless ofthe discrepancy, the discrepancy isjust an

5 At pages 14-15 ofits Opposition the FAA makes much ofthe fact that Mr. Becker's knowledge ofthe condition ofthe flying doors on the three aircraft is based on his review ofthe AMES maintenance records. But it is also true that Mr. Becker accompanied Mr. Lipinski when inspecting aircraft N287SC in particular onMay 25, 2010 in Toledo (see Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 70) and after this inspection Lipinski never again saw the three aircraft while Mr. Becker did so on a daily basis when they were returned to the AMES facility. See id (Becker Tr. at 75-76).

- 19-initialjudgment.") Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 113). In the attached Becker Declaration, the AMES Director of QA explains that the description ofthe discrepancy is but an initial and non-conclusive determination of a possible problem. See Exhibit 1 (BeckerDeclaration**at~** 7). Next, the discrepancy is evaluated to estimate the man hours and coordinatedthe possible need for new parts. See id. The final step in the process, and the most important step, is to assign a mechanic to take the necessary corrective action, which is then recorded. See id. FAA reliance on the "Discrepancy" and "Evaluation" sections ofthe non-routine forms, and ignoring the more telling "Corrective Action" section ofthe form, leads the FAA to make arguments that only confuse the issue. Mr. Becker's experience in interpreting the AMES maintenance records is far superior in that ofa single FAA inspector who apparently has no particular knowledge ofthe AMES recordkeeping system. The FAA's contention that the AMES position that the doors were simply shown to be experiencing normal wear and tear "makes little sense" because ifproperly rigged there would be no reason to inspect the doors except at the next "C" check as asserted by Lipinski. See FAA Exhibit JJ (Lipinski Declaration**at~** 14). Is the FAA really suggesting that contrary to long standing practice and procedure, that walk around inspections, daily service checks, and "A" checks, which are conducted in the thousands between aircraft "C" checks, are unnecessary and cannotpossibly be productive orbe necessary ifthe flying doors are properly rigged at the time ofreinstallation? See Exhibit 1 (Becker Declaration**at~** 3). And ifthese intervening visual and other inspections are

-20-in fact necessary, then the FAA position that wear and tear is simply out ofthe realm of possibility, seems very wide ofthe mark indeed. Hardware in moving components like flying doors, such as shims and washers,
can wear with use. See id (Becker Declaration at**~** 2). Seals can tear and parts or structure canbecome nicked or scored in the normal course ofoperations. Ifhardware does wear, and gaps develop as aresult that, in turn, cause downstream damage, then the FAA claim that the flying doors can never be subject to wear and tear is simply an unsupportable claimput forward by an Inspector that has a difficult time distinguishing fact from fiction. Replacing worn hardware, tom seals and blending and treating structure to remove nonstructural mars or gouges onlyrequires minor maintenance and is far from proofthat the flying doors were not properly rigged by AMES. Quite the opposite. The minor nature ofthe corrective action taken belies any claim that the flying doors were not properlyrigged byAMES. And this AMES position is supported by AMES' outside expert witness with over 700 B-727 gear changes in his background who states he has "no difficulty concluding that the issues requiring attention were ofa 'wear and tear' variety and not the result ofimproper reinstallation ofthe MLGs and flying doors." See Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for SummaryJudgment (Expert Report ofDaniel J. Hancher**at~~** 2 and 5). 

### VII. AMES Cannot be Violated for Following the AMM The FAAMotion for Summary Judgment did not seek a decision on the issue of whether AMES should have rigged the flying doors with reference to AMM 32-12- ll/401 in lieu of32-12-ll/501. But as the FAA is raising the issue in its Opposition to

- 21

-the AMES Summary Judgment Motion (pages 16-18), AMES will address the FAA contentions now, Lipinski continues to make the extravagant claimthat AMES was required to consults AMM 32-12-111401 in order to rig the flying doors once reinstalled on the aircraft. FAA ExhibitJJ (Lipinski Declaration**at~~** 12 and 13). Now, however, the FAA seeks to rebut the AMES explanation ofwhy the Inspector has erred in his interpretation ofthe AMM. It does this by setting up a straw man argument by asserting at page 17 ofits Opposition that AMES and its mechanics mustbe aware ofthe contents ofthe AMM beyondthose sections referred to specifically in the maintenance instructions. This FAA argument comes immediately after the statement that "As Respondent notes, it is undisputed that AMM 32-12-11/401 is not explicitly called out in AMM 32-11-00." At leastthe parties agree on this point. But AMES never stated or suggestedthat its mechanics wearblinders and consult
no other applicable AMM manuals or sections ofmanuals. What AMES did argue was that there is a specific cross reference in AMM 32-1-00 Step AL(19) to AMM Step 32- 12-111501 and AMES is not free to simplyignore the instructionbecause the Inspector favors another section ofthe manual. AMES was citedby the FAA for not following the applicable AMM, and nothing in the AMM directs the maintenance provider to consult or follow Step 32-12-111401. Now that there is agreement among the parties that AMES correctly followed the AMM steps as directed byBoeing in its AMM, the issue can and shouldbe decided in Respondent's favor on summaryjudgment. The FAA argument that the AMM contains basic instructions to, for example, hang the flying door, orto tighten bolts and install cotterpins, but not with specificity,

-22-and claiming the detailed information is found in other manual chapters (citing AMM 43- 12-11/401), but not in AMM 32-11-00, is not a correct analogy. See FAA Opposition at 17. Clearly, if a mechanic needs further guidance on how to accomplish a task the mechanic is required by AMES to consult the other chapters ofthe AMM. Butin the
case ofAMM 32-11-00, step AL(19), which has a specific cross reference to another AMM chapter and section, there is no basis for the mechanic to seek other guidance and sign offthe work as having been performed in accordance with any other AMM section but 32-12-111501. See Exhibit 2 (Becker Tr. at 192-196); Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Lipinski Tr. at 28-29) (conceding there is no cross reference to 32-11-111401). In fact, doing so could leadto the allegation that AMES failed to follow the customer's AMM as required. Summary Judgment infavor ofAMES
on this issue is appropriate. VIII. Inspector Bias is an Issue butAMES Did Not Ask for a Ruling on this Issue in Connection with its Summary Judgment Motion The AMES Motion for Summary Judgment was clearthat a ruling on the arguments presented to show Inspectorbias and prejudice is not necessaryfor a favorable ruling on the AMES motion. See AMES Motion for SummaryJudgment at 29-30. Yet the FAA Opposition takes four pages ofargument to rebut the AMES position. See FAA Opposition at 18-22. Was a nerve hit? The FAA Opposition is apparently based on the Lipinski Declaration, FAA Exhibit JJ at paragraphs 7 through 9. The FAA now states, as does Lipinski, that unidentified individuals from CCIA complained about having to use the services ofAMES and that other unidentified CCIA personnel stated that they preferred to use the services ofFlight Star

-- the repair station promotedby Lipinski.

-23-Convenientthat the Lipinski Declaration refers to these individuals but never identifies who they are. Even ifthat were so, it was not the role ofthe Inspector to complain to Mr. Becker about the situation while performing the D-091 audit (to qualify AMES to performmaintenance on the part ofCCIA), but without reservation or otherwise indicating he was referring to the views ofCCIA when he made these statements. See Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 63-64 and 67). The FAA tries also to brush offthe charge saying that holding opinions about "the skill and safety level ofvarious certificate holders" is normal. See FAA Opposition at 19. Is it normal for aFAA inspector to recommend one repair station over another even after he approved the new repair station to perform maintenance on CCIA aircraft? See Exhibit 5 (Lipinski Tr. at 165). Most definitely not. Next, the FAA tries to diminish the significance ofthe Inspector's highly intemperate remarks referred to on page 20 oftheFAA Opposition, saying the FAA official may have "lost his temper." 6 That's hardly a denial (given that there were witnesses to the Inspector's statements, the FAA is in no position to refute that the comments were communicated) and one has to question why a supposedly professional FAAinspector could ever be quoted as saying such things unless there was some deep seated animosity against the certificate holder. As to the timing ofthe remarks, they appear to be reflective ofthe Inspector's attitude as first exhibited in 2009 before Mr. Becker (see Exhibit 3 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Becker Tr. at 63-

6 In paragraph 9 ofthe Lipinski Deposition, he does not deny he made the profane statements, only that he did not recall doing so.

- 24-67)) and his bias against AMES manifest itselfeven more strongly a couple ofyears later. This continuum ofaprejudicial attitude cannot simplybe ignored. Apart from the Lipinski exaggerations as to the extent ofthe damage to the CCIA aircraft, the FAA's attempts to rehabilitate the Inspector failed to address the obvious overstatements contained in Section B ofthe FAA EIR (Exhibit 1to Respondent's Motion for SummaryJudgment). On page 15 ofEIR Section B, the Inspector states that AMES took no corrective action as a result ofits investigation into this matter. In fact, several corrective actions were taken. See Exhibit 8 (Letter from Jeffrey Becker to Frank Lipinski, dated March 21, 2011) and Lipinski admitted that his statement in the EIR that AMES took no corrective action was incorrect. See Exhibit 5 (Lipinski Tr. at 198). Likewise, he admitted that while he accepted as correct and true all ofthe CCIA response to the FAA's letter ofinvestigation into this matter, and that he already knew that AMES had contradicted certain ofthe CCIA statements, he made no effort to sort outthe factual disputes and accepted the CCIA rendition ofthe facts. See Exhibit 5 (Lipinski Tr. at 81- 82). In short, it appears from the manner in which Lipinski (i) spoke to Mr. Becker in 2009 complaining ofthe involvement ofAMES in CCIA maintenance activities, (ii) compiled the EIR in 2010 containing significant and admitted factual errors, (iii) exaggerated the extent of"damage" to the CCIA aircraft, (iv) urged CCIA to use the services on another repair station, and (v) subsequently cursed at representatives at CCIA in speaking ofAMES, there is more than enough evidence tojustify AMES in raising the issue and bringing it to Your Honor's attention. However, as noted, AMES is not suggesting Your Honor must find the Inspector was prejudiced in order to rule favorably upon the Respondent's Summary Judgment Motion.

-25-Dated: February 26, 2015 Respectfully submitted, SILVERBERG GOLDMAN, L.L.P. Attorneys for AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

### ENC,RJNG

### SER~<]<S By:

# Lit!!£~ Robert P. Silverberg, Esq. 1101 30'h Street, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20007 Tel: (202) 944-3304 Fax: (202) 944-3306 Email: rsilverberg@sgbdc.com

- 26-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certifythat on this 261 h day ofFebruary 2015, I causedthe foregoing Reply of Respondent to FAA's Opposition to Respondent's Motionfor Summary Judgment to be served by FedEx uponthe following: Federal Aviation Administration 600 Independence Avenue, S.W. Wilbur Wright Building Suite 2W1000 Washington, D.C. 20591 (Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430) Tel: (202) 267-0377 (original and one copy)
The Hon. J.E. Sullivan Administrative LawJudge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) Washington, D.C. 20590 Tel: (202) 366-2132 Fax: (202) 366-7536 Christopher R. Stevenson, Attorney Federal Aviation Administration Office ofthe Regional Counsel, AS0-7 Southern Region 1701 ColumbiaAvenue College Park, GA 30337 Tel: (404) 305-5200Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3
Exhibit 4
Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6
Exhibit 7

Exhibit 8 List ofExhibits

Declaration ofJeffrey Becker Transcript Pages from Deposition ofJeffrey Becker, taken Oct. 29, 2014 Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures, dated December 12, 2014 and Complainant's Additional Expert Disclosure, dated December 1, 2014 Respondent's Supplemental Responses to FAA's First Discovery Requests, dated December 23, 2014 Transcript Pages from Deposition ofFrank Lipinski, taken Dec. 18,2014 AMES DiscrepancyNotices and CCIA Corrective Action Record for Tubular Bearing on N287SC Authorized Release Certificates, FAA Form 8130-3, Airworthiness Approval Tags, issued by ATI Aviation Services, LLC for LH MLG onN899AA and N898AA Letter from Jeffrey Beckerto Frank Lipinski, date March 21, 2011

# Exhibit 1
Declaration ofJeffrey Becker

### BEFORE THE U.S. 

### DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C.
In the matter of AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING SERVICES Respondent DocketNo. FAA-2013-0291 FAA CaseNo. 2011S0290032

Administrative LawJudge J.E. Sullivan 

### DECLARATION OF JEFFREY BECKER I, Jeffrey Becker, hereby declare as follows: 1. I have read the FAA's Response inOppositiontoRespondent's Motionfor Summary

.Judgment. In its pleadingthe FAA arguesthatI amnot competent to offer opinions on

aviationmaintenancebecause I do notpossess a mechanics license. Eventhoughthe FAAknows Ihold a degree in aeronautical engineering and a Masters inBusiness Administrationwith considerable maintenance related experience as I testified to atmy deposition, set outbelowis the details ofmy background and expetience
A. In 1986 I eamed a B.S. degree Aeronautical Engineering from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. In 2007 I earned a Masters BusinessAdministration from Xavier University. B. From 1986 through 1992 I held a Professional Engineering license from the State ofCalifornia. C. From 1986 through 1991 I was employedbyDouglas Aircraft Co., Long Beach, California where I was a DesignEngineer onboth theMD-80 and C-17 aircraft thenwas a FlightTest Engineer for the initial certificationprogram ofthe MD-11.In

### myrole as bothDesignEngineer and FlightTest engineer Ideveloped and authored Service Bulletins and AMM instluctions for vadous systems on each of the three aircrafttypes Iworked on. D. From 1991 to 2009 Iheld avariety ofroles with ABX Air, Inc which is a large all cargo Pati 

### 121 earner, in whichIhad directresponsibility for developing and approving maintenance instmctions as well as direct responsibilities over maintenance and inspectionpersonnel. 1. Aircraft Stmctures Engineer. Inthis role my responsibilities included developing repair instmctions for repairs not found inpublished OEM manuals, authoring AMM procedures changes and coordinating new service bulletins withthe OEM (Douglas Aircraft). 2. Manager-Fleet Service Engineering. In thisrole my responsibilities includedmanaging liaison engineering staff, held SFAR36 approval authority (approvingrepair data and instluctions onbehalfofthe FAA). I
was also the primary contact withthe manufacture regarding in-service problems and service bulletin incorporation issues. 3. Manager-Technical Services, B-767 aircraft. Inthis role Iwas responsible for onsite support at the primary vendor's facility for the developmentof the passengerto freighter Supplemental Type Certificate, fabrication of modificationparts and installationofthe 120,000 hourfreighter modification. I was also responsible for implementingthe B767 aircraft type into service for ABX as well as coordination ofaircraft delivery including importand FAAregistl·ation.

-2-4. Manager- Avionics Engineering. Inthis position myresponsibilities included drafting and publishing of jobcards (maintenance instructions) to incorporate avionics modifications to the ABXfleet ofaircraft which then included YS-11, DC-8, DC-9 and B-767 type aircraft. 5. Senior Director, Engineering and Quality Control. Inthis positionmy responsibilities included maintainingABX's aircraftreliabilityprogram, maintenance program, custom suite ofmanuals (including AMM, SRM andWDM), AD compliance, aircraftupgrade programs, auditprogram and managing a staffofinspectors (including ABX's ChiefInspector). E. From2009 to present I have beenthe Director, Quality Assurance for AMES. Mydepartmentresponsibilities include auditing, aircraftrecords,

· developing/maintaining policymanuals, ensuring compliance withFAA

requirements, and managing a staffofmaintenance inspectors. More specifically myresponsibilities are outlined inthe AMES Repair Station and QualityManual (which is FAA approved) and include in part: 1. Responsibilityfor the AMES InspectionProgramwhichincludes training, qualifications, and authorization oftechnicians and inspectors. 2. Have the authority to establish and modify policies, procedures and instmctions. 3. Directing, planning, and detetmining details ofinspection standards, methods andprocedures used bythe Repair Stationincomplying withall applicable FAAregulations as well as manufacture's specifications and recommendations.



### - 3 -

### 4. Responsible for ensuring all inspections are properly perfmmed andthat properinspection records, reports, and forms used by the Repair Station
are properly completed prior to releasing aproduct to service.
2. In

### the Lipinski Declaration Inote that inparagraph 14 he concedes that notmal wear and· tearcanbe observed on flying door components. In particularhe notes that "frequent movement" ofthe flying doors canlead to "paint deterioration, worn orpossibly tom rubber seals, aged lubrication, affixed dirt, orpresence ofmetallic dust in the hinges." ButLipinski resists the extensionofthis logic to the wearing ofotherpatts, such as shims and washers installed in gaps that are also subject to "frequentmovement" oflanding gear components. Had herecognizedthe affect of"frequentmovement" along the entire range offlying door components he would be unable to assert as he does that damage due to possibly worn shims and washers mustbe attributed to the maintenance performedby AMES and notnormal wear andtear. To allegethat onlyAMES could be responsible for the condition ofthe doors as documented inthe non-routine cards is to deny the affect of normal wear andtear onall manner offlying door components and notjustthe ones singled out by Lipinski. 3. The Lipinski statementinparagraph 14 ofhis Declaration states that if

### properly performed, damage to the flying door structure (when the doors are removed) will "almostnever occurpriorto the next "C" check. The B-727 "C" checkinterval is 24 months or 3000 flight hours, whichever occurs first. Is the Inspector seriously suggesting that one would not expectto seewear andtear or even damage to any ofthe flying door components during this interval? Ifthat were the case, then why would the FAArequire carriers as patt oftheirmaintenance programs to schedule andpetformroutine overnight

- 4-checks, service checks, "A" level checks, and daily walk around inspections to visually inspectthe condition ofthe aircraft. The question answers itself-carriersmust constantly be onthe lookout for evidence ofwear andtear or damage and reactto it when observed. Inanyevent, the Inspector nowhas concededthatthere canbe wear and tear
or damage to the flying doors and related structure between the "C" checkinterval. That being the case, howcanthe FAA conclusively assert in this case that

### all ofthe "damage and otherproblems" the FAA claims it observed were not the productofnormal wear and tear? To the extent some damage ofthe type repaired byAMES can occur, then the FAAhas not explained why this possibility does not apply to the three CCIA aircraft. 4. Inparagraph21 ofthe Lipinski Declaration, he again inconectlyasserts, as he did to
me on May 25,2010while inToledo, that shims and washers are to be installed in both the forward and afthinge assemblies. I, along withmy colleague, Dan Boggs, while in Toledo withthe Inspectorphotographed the hinges onN287SC as they appeared onMay 25, 2010. WhenIreturned to myofficeI confirmed myunderstanding ofthe AMM 32- 11-00 requirements thatwashers and shims are only to beinserted inthe f01ward hinge assembly. No shims are required for the afthinge. AMM 32-11-00 step AL(2), page 422. Lipinski's insistence that washers are to be installed on the afthinge and the forward hinge is simply not consistentwith the applicable AMM. 5. I have read the Lipinski Declarationthat states that AMES isresponsible for the positioning ofswivel clamps and hydraulic lines inconnection with the installationofthe main landing gear onthe three CCIA aircraft. Lipinski is 

### in error because AMM 32-11- 00 neither directsthe maintenanceprovider changingthe landing gearto positionorroute the hydraulic lines or swivel clampsthat are in question. Whilethe AMMdoes depict in

- 5-

### Figure 404 the build up oflanding gear assembly itdoes notinstructthe mechanic as to the position ofthe lines or clamps inquestion and, in fact, does not evendepictthe swivel clamps much less instmct as to theirposition and orientation. In

### the case ofN899AA, non-routine 0001 (FAAExhibitN, page 1) and N898AA, non-routine 0021 (FAA Exhibit T, non-routine 0021) the resolution ofthe discrepancies was the repositioning ofthe hose swivel clamps, respectively, using for the authority to do so the Overhaul Manual32-l0- 01 as reflected onthe non-routine cards. Reliance on the Overhaul Manual instead ofthe AMM means that the AMMdid not address the issue ofthe clamping ofany hydraulic lines or the position oftheswivel clamps and further this means that the landing gear assembly when supplied to AMES by its customer already had the hydraulic lines secured andthe swivel clamps inposition and AMES would have had no reasonto relocate them at the time the gear were installed. IfAMM 32-11-00 had so directed or instructed AMES to positionthe hydraulic lines and secure the swivel clamps in a certain location, its mechanics would have complied with the instmction. The FAA argument thatjustbecause AMES installed the landing gear thatthe positioning ofevery component ofthe landing gearbecomes AMES responsibility constitutes a misunderstanding ofthe relationship between AMM 32-11-00 and landing gear overhaul manual used by the vendor to build up the landing gear assembly. Further, the Forms 8130s for the two landing gear assemblies in question state thatthe airworthiness release certificate was withrespectto the entire MLG assembly less onlythe "transducer assembly, hub cap, wheel andtire assembly, deflector installation andbrake assembly," There is no reference to any missinghydraulic lines or

- 6-

### swivel clamps meaning those components were installed onthe MLG assembly as received by AMES, and subsequently installed in the aircraft. 6. Lipinski Declarationparagraph 18, 25, 29, 31 and 40 purportto list "damage and other· problems" to the flying doors onthe identified aircraft. AMES has annotated each ofthe alleged discrepancies in its Opposition to the FAA's SummaryJudgment Motion andthe record need not be fm1her burdened by repeating the AMES responses based onmy prior testimony and contents ofthe each ofthe non-routine cards and corrective actiontaken by AMES as set out on pages 6through 17 inthe AMES Oppositionto the FAAMotion. 7. The FAAOpposition at pages 9-10 claims thatI am providing mypersonal opinion only and thatI amincorrectly intetpreting the meaning ofthe maintenance records compiled by AMES. Irepeatedly stated inmy deposition thatto understand the maintenance Wl'iteups, one must look atthe cnrrective actiontaken. The AMES nonroutine fmms that FAAcites are prepared in three steps. Firstthe initial write up ofthe potential problem is recorded-the discrepancy. Next, the discrepancy is evaluatedby a maintenance supervisor ortheirdesignee to estimate man-hours and parts requirements that is anecessary planning step. The fmal andmost impot1antand telling step is to assignthe taskto amechanic to take corrective action, meaning a technician details the actual conditionofthe aircraft and steps, ifany, required to remedy the situation. Let
me illustrate the process. Using the "improper stackup" allegations as an example (pages 9 and 10 ofF AA's Opposition) and specificallynon-routine 0003 for N899AA (FAAExhibitN, pages 2-7). The "Discrepancy" (the initial detetmination) is stated to be "L!H MLG Flying Door AftHinge has improper stackup". The "Evaluation" reads "Remove andReplace hardware IAW SB 727-32-234". Once againthis is an evaluation



### -7-onlyand waswritten so the bushings could beput onorderinthe eventthey wereneeded to complete the corrective action. However, most impmtantlythe "CorrectiveAction" portion ofthe non-routine fotm states "RemovedLeftMain gear WingDoor Verified hardware IA W 727 SB 727-32-0234 R3 andperformed adjust/testIAW 727 MM 32-12- 11". This section ofthe document records what is actually found to be the case andhow the original discrepancy was rectified. The FAA continues to argue thatAMES records documentAMES installed

**'~improper** stackups" andthat to remedy the issue it "replaced
new hardware". Only by incorrectly referring to the discrepancy and evaluationportions ofthenon-routine document and notpaying attentionto the corrective action description

canthe FAAmake the assertionthatAMES didnotproperlyrig the flying doors. I have consistently assetiedthatnone ofthe cmrective action taken by AMES inresponse to the FAA May25, 2010 inspection implicates the original workperfmmedbyAMES when riggingthe flying doors onthe three subject aircraft since a carefulreviewofthe cotTective actiontakenreveals evidence ofwear andtear andnotimproperrigging ofthe flying doors. Declared under penalty ofpetjurythisZ:Gday ofFebtuary 2015.



### - 8-

# Exhibit 2 Transcript Pages from Deposition of

Jeffrey Becker, taken Oct. 29, 2014

## In The Matter Of: 

# Airborne Maintenance andEngineeringServices

Jeffrey Becker October 29, 2014

LegalRealtimeReporting 622 E. CentralBlvd.

Orlando, FL 32801

Original File 102914Becker final.txt1 

### 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

### 10 11 

### 12 13 14 15 16 

### 17 

### 18 19 20 21 22 

### 23 24 25 BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

In the matter of AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING SERVICES Respondent


## * * * * * * * Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 Case No. 2011S0290032
: Administrative Law Judge J.E. Sullivan 

## * * * 

## * * * 

## * DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY BECKER DATE TAKEN: October 29, 2014 TIME: COMMENCED: 8:55 a.m. CONCLUDED: 2:55 p.m. PLACE: 215 North Eola Drive Orlando, Florida 32801 REPORTED BY: Rita G. Meyer, RDR, CRR, CBC, 

## * * * * 

## * * * * * * * 

## * * * 1



## *

CCP 

## *

### 1 Q. Thank you. All right. I'd like to ask you a 2 few questions about your background. Can you tell me 3 generally what your history in aviation maintenance is? 4 A. Yeah. I have a Bachelor's degree in 5 aeronautical engineering from Embry Riddle University in 6 

### Daytona Beach. I also have a Master's degree in business 

### 7 administration from Xavier University in Cincinnati. 8 Started in 1980

-- 1986 with Douglas Aircraft 9 Company. Was a design engineer on the MB80 Program, then 10 transferred to the Cl7. I was a structures design 11 engineer for the Cl7 and then spent the last few years on 12 the MDll flight test program as a flight test engineer. 13 Then I 

### came to Airborne Express as a structures 14 engineer; shortly afterwards was promoted to supervisor of liaison engineering. Held the manager of fleet service program manager 767 operations direct, then director of engineering. And as the director of engineering, was responsible for reliability, maintenance programs, tech hubs, engineering and then eventually also included quality control. 

### Q. And do you remember when you started at ABX? A. April of 1991. Q. 

### A. Okay. And at what point did you leave ABX? During the in May of 2009, there was a 8



### 15 

### 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 

### restructuring due to DHL pull out, and that's when I left

### 192
1 manufacturer. 2 Q. Okay. You indicated in response to questions 3 of counsel, that you reviewed the EIR. Did the FAA 4 produce any evidence of the maintenance history of any of 5 the aircraft in the ensuing months between the time the 6 original work was performed by AMES in connection with 7 the two "C" Checks and the one landing gear change and 8 the time that the aircraft were inspected again in 9 Toledo? 10 A. 

### No. No, they did not provide any documentation 11 for that time frame. 12 Q. In connection with Exhibit U, which is the 13 training module that you were asked some questions about, 14 you were asked some questions about this so-called 400 15 series of pages and the pictures from those pages out of 16 32-12-11 and why they were included in the training 17 module. Do you recall that? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Okay. In connection with the replacement

-- 20 the removal and replacement of the landing gear doors 21 that you were contracted to perform for Capital Cargo, 22 was it necessary for you to consult the 400 series of 23 pages and the pictures associated therewith, the diagrams 24 to complete your work for Capital Cargo? 25 A. Not in the initial landing gear change. If the

### 193
1 flying doors are removed and replaced consistent with the 2 landing gear change, then, no, you do not use Section 3 

### 401. 4 And if you -- for instance, in the May time 5 frame when we removed just the doors and we installed 6 them, we signed them off to Section 401. 7 8 9 

### Q. A. 

### Q. So that's the distinction. Yes. Let's make sure it's clear. The distinction 10 is between removing of the landing gear doors
-- excuse 11 me. Removal of the landing gear and replacement of the 12 landing gear and the associated work to remove and then 13 reinstall the landing, so-called flying door. And the 14 steps to -- referenced in the 400 series of pages out of 15 the manual that relate to just to the reinstallation of 16 the flying door. 17 MR. STEVENSON: Objection, leading. 18 

### 19 20 

### 21 A. Yes. MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. That's all the questions we have. MR. STEVENSON: Sure. 22 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 23 BY MR. STEVENSON: 24 

### Q. Opposing counsel, Mr. Silverberg just asked you 25 about maintenance documents on these aircraft for the

### 194 1 time between the gear changes and May of 2010. 2 AMES is, in fact

-- sorry. AMES was, in fact, 3 owned at this time by the same parent company that owns 4 CCIA, correct? 5 

### 6 

### A. Q. 

### Correct. And in fact, you and CCIA shared joint 7 representation by opposing counsel. 8 A. I don't know that for a fact. 9 

### Q. Well, we had an informal conference and he was 10 the only attorney there representing both AMES and CCIA, 11 right? 12 A. Yeah. I don't remember exactly. I mean, I 13 recall that there was some gentleman there from Capital 14 Cargo, but

-- 15 

### Q. Okay. And every single maintenance document on 16 these aircraft would've been in the possession of CCIA, 17 right? 18 A. Oh, absolutely. 19 Q. So if there was anything helpful to CCIA's case 20 or your case in those documents, CCIA could've produced 21 those documents, right? 22 23 24 25 

### MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Look, you've got the burden of proof. We do not. You didn't produce the documents. MR. STEVENSON: Bob, that's not the basis for1 

### 2 3 

### 4 5 

### 6 

### 7 an objection. MR. SILVERBERG: I'm just telling you. MR. STEVENSON: You don't need to make an argument to me in the middle of a deposition. We
can have that discussion some other time. MR. SILVERBERG: I'm telling you, you know, it's your failure of proof. Proceed if you wish. 195

8 BY MR. STEVENSON: 9 

### 10 

### 11 12 13 

### 14 

### 15 16 

### 17 18 

### 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 

### Q. A. 

### Q. Yes. What was the question again? CCIA had possession of those documents.

MR. SILVERBERG: Do you know whether or not they had possession of those documents? MR. STEVENSON: Bob, I am asking the questions. Okay? I do not MR. SILVERBERG: It's a leading question. You said CCIA is in possession

-- MR. STEVENSON: You're allowed to ask leading questions in a deposition. MR. SILVERBERG: Yes, and they are objectionable as such. MR. STEVENSON: But you didn't object to them. You asked your own questions. color commentary. Please, stop the

MR. SILVERBERG: Stop the leading questions1 2 3 

### 4 that you know are inappropriate. MR. STEVENSON: I can ask leading questions. MR. SILVERBERG: And they are objectionable. MR. STEVENSON: I mean, he already

-- I'm 5 repeating a question you answered a second ago 6 anyway. 7 BY MR. STEVENSON: 8 Q. But those documents were in the possession of 196

9 CCIA, right? All maintenance records for these aircraft 10 would've been in CCIA's possession, right? 11 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. He's speculating 12 what's in the possession of the carrier. 13 

### A. When we perform the work, we provide the 14 records to the carrier. 15 

### 16 17 18 

### 19 20 

### 21 22 23 

### Q. Yes. And it would be

-- do you agree if would be an extremely unusual situation where an air carrier did not have the maintenance records on its aircraft? A. I mean, I would be answering for Capital Cargo. Now that they're not a certificated entity, I have no idea what the status is of the records. 

### Q. A. Q. You understand

-- We provided them the records. And you understand that an air carrier is, in 24 fact, required to maintain the maintenance records for 25 its aircraft.

# Exhibit 3 Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures, dated December 12, 2014

and Complainant's Additional Expert

Disclosure, dated December 1, 2014

### In the matter of BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C.
DocketNo. FAA-2013-0291 FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING SERVICES Respondent Administrative LawJudge J.E. Sullivan

**RESPO~'DENT'S** EXPERT REBUTTAL DISCLOSURES Pursuantto the Order Granting/Denying Relief, and ModifYing the LitigationDates and Procedures, served September 30,2014, and Federal Ru1es ofCivil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C), Respondent Airborne Maintenance andEngineering Service ("AMES") hereby providesthe following expertrebuttal disclosures: 1) Jeffrey Becker and James Savastano: Mr. Becker, the AMES Director, Quality Assurance & Training, and Mr. Savastano, the AMES Vice President ofTechnical Operations andformer Vice President ofMaintenance at Capital Cargo International Airlines, Inc., will provide experttestimony as necessaryto rebut any expert and opiniontestimony providedby Complainant's witnesses. 1 

### Mr. Becker's and 

### Mr. Savastano's expertrebuttal testimony may include testimony regarding theminor nature ofthe discrepancies claimedbythe FAA, the extent ofthe corrective actiontaken andthe cause ofthe discrepancies, namely wear andtear and interveningthird-party maintenance and nottheresult ofthe alleged improper installation or rigging ofthe flying doors byAMES. Messrs. Becker and Savastano may also testify thatthe likely cause ofthe N287SC air returnwas vibration caused bythe aircraft's rudder assembly

1Messrs. Becker and Savastano will also testify as a fact witnesses and may provide opinion testimonyunder Rule 701 oftheFederal Rules ofEvidence.bushings and not AMES's installation or rigging ofthe aircraft's flying doors. Messrs. Becker and Savastano may further testify thatthe flying doors were initially installed and rigged by Respondent in accordance with the applicable Aircraft Maintenance Manuel provisions. 2) Da.'liel 

### I. Hancher: Respondent incorporates byreference t.l}e expertreport of Daniel J. Hancher, dated April30, 2014. 

### Mr. Hancher maytestify as described inhis expert report as necessary to rebut expert and opiniontestimony provided by Complainant's witness.

Dated: December 12,2014 Respectfully submitted, SILVERBERG, GOLDMAN & BIKOFF, L.L.P. Attorneys 

### for AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING SER CES



# By:--';/__'-:'&·-.......~'1/~W,~~~- Robert P. Silverberg, Esq. 1101 30th Street,N.W. Suite 120 Washington, D.C. 20007 Tel: (202) 944-3304 Fax: (202) 944-3306 Email: rsilverberg@sgbdc.com

2CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that onthis 

### 12th day ofDecember 

### 2014, I causedthe foregoing Respondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures to be served uponthe following: Christopher R. Stevenson, Attorney Office ofthe Regional Counsel, ASO-7 SouthernRegion Federal AviationAdministration 

### P.O. Box 

### 20636 Atlanta, GA 

### 30320 Tel: (404) 305-5200 Fax: (404) 305-5223 (one copy byfacsimile and First Class Mail)**i~/D1/2014** 15:38 4D43B55223 FAA REGIONAL COUNSEL

U.S. 

### DEPARTMENJ: OF TRANSPORTAHON OFFICE OF HEARJNGS FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,
VS. AIRBORNE MAINTENANCEAND ENGrNEERING SERVICES, Respondent. DocketNo. FAA-2013-0291 FAA CaseNo. 20llS0290032
Judge Sullivan 

### ADDITIONAL EXPERT DISCLOSURES PAGE D2/B4

In addition to the expert testimony previously disclosed by the FAA during general discovery, the FAA hereby identifies the following expert disclosures pursuant to FRCP 26(a)(2)(C): I) Inspectors Previously Identified (Frank Lipinski, Bobby Evans, Jack Gascbe): Each of these inspectors may testify as to their personal observations ofthe aircraft in question, and the conclusions drawn from those observations

**a.~** to the condition ofthe aircraft (as it relates to the main landing gear, flying doors, and related and adjacent components). A surnmaty ofthe personal observations, aT).d the conclusions drawn, by these inspectors, have previously beenprovided in the form oftheir statements and letters. Consistent with those statements, Inspector Evans may testify with respect to the vibration incident, including tb.e absence of the bushing and the cause of that absence. InspectoJ: Gasche may, as summarized in his statement, testify as to the nature ofthe damage he personally observed on the aircraft, and that, in his opinion, this damage was caused by improper rigging of the flying doors. Inspector Lipinski may, as summarized in his statement, testify as to the nature ofthe damage he personally observed on the aircraft, the damage docum.ented by CCIA and Respondent, and that, in his opinion, this damage was caused by improper rigging ofthe flying doors (that is, that the flying doors were not rigged in accordance with Boeing and CCIA maintenance requirements), which was perfonned by Respondent, and that the missing bushing was caused by Respondent's improper installation ofthe flying doors. 2) Michael Christensen: Specialist Christenson may be called as an expert witness concerning the cause of the damage (and missing bushing) observed by the fAA Inspectors, CC!A persormel, and Respondent's personnel. Specialist Christensen may testifY that these problems were caused by improper rigging ofthe flying doors (that is,Y2/0ll2014 15:38 4043055223 FAA REGIONAL COUNSEL PAGE 03104

that the flying doors were not rigged in accordance with CCIA and Boeing maintenance requirements) by Respondent at the time the flying doors were installed. As a regional specialist, Specialist Christensen serves as an authoritative technical specialist with regards to maintenance and avionics to other Aviation Safety Inspectors, fi.eld office personnel, FAA management, other governmental/private entities, and the general public, conducting evaluation and investigation activities, both internal and external, to ensure that aviation organizations, operatots, and air carriers meet Federal Aviation Regulmions, applicable laws and. Flight Standards program objectives. Prior to serving 

### as a regional specialist, Specialist Christensen served in the FAA as a prillcipal inspector !l1 the international field office.

**P~ior** to working at the 

### FAA, Specialist Christensen served as a lead technician (A&P Mechanic and Avionics) at Delta Airlines, where he was authorized to inspect RII items. At Delta, Specialist Christensen was trained to, and did, 

### perform maintenance on MD-88/90, B727, B737-200/300/800/BBJ, B757, B767- 200/300/400ER, and LlOll aircraft, including 

### MLG rnainte.n.ance on B727 aircraft. 

# st--- s 

## I day ofDecember, 2014.
CHRlSTOPHER R. EVENSON Attomey Officeofthe Regional Counsel

# Exhibit 4 Respondent's Supplemental Responses to FAA's First Discovery Requests, dated December 23, 2014In the matter of BEFORE THE 

### U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C.
DocketNo. FAA-2013-0291 Case No. 2011S0290032 AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING SERVICES Administrative LawJudge J.E. Sullivan Respondent
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO FAA'S FIRST DISCOVERYREQUESTS Pursuant to Rule 220 ofthe Federal AviationAdministration's Rules ofPractice, 14 C.F.R. § 13.220, Respondent Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services ("AMES") hereby supplements its responses to ComplainantFederal Aviation Administration ("FAA") Interrogatory nos. 13 and 14. Respondentreserves the rightto further supplement or amend these responses. 13. Identify eachpersonyou may call as a witness at hearing in this matter, identify the subject oftheir testimony, and summarize the substance oftheir expectedtestimony. You do not needto repeat information already contained in your initial disclosures, but you must expand onthose answers to the extent necessary to answer this interrogatory. ANSWER: InAMES's initial disclosures, dated January 14,2014,the names of individuals knowledgeable aboutthe circumstances ofthis matter who could be usedto support AMES's defenses were disclosedto Complainant. AMES also supplemented this information in its answerto Complainant's interrogatory no. 1. See Respondent's Responses to FAA's First Discovery Requests, dated March 6, 2014. Further, the date for the exchange ofwitness lists by the parties is not until April 9, 2015. However, consistentwiththe obligation ofeach partyto seasonally supplement its prior initial disclosures and discovery responses pursuantto Rule of Practice 220(i) and Federal Rule 26(e)(l)(A), AMES has now determined that the following individuals will be called as witnesses byAMES. Jeffrey Becker, the AMES Director, Quality Assurance & Training, and James Savastano, the AMES Vice President ofTechnical Operations and former Vice President of Maintenance at Capital Cargo International Airlines, Inc. ("CCIA"), are expectedto provide testimony as fact witnesses, including providing opiniontestimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, or as expert witnesses as necessary to rebut any expert or opiniontestimony providedby Complainant's witnesses, regardingtheminor nature ofthe discrepancies claimed bythe FAA, the extent ofthe corrective actiontaken andthe cause ofthe discrepancies, namely wear andtear and interveningthird-party maintenance and not theresult ofthe alleged improperinstallation orrigging ofthe flying doors by AMES. Messrs. Becker and Savastano may also testifY that the likely cause ofthe N287SC air return was vibration causedby the aircraft's rudder assembly bushings and not AMES's installation or rigging ofthe aircraft's flying doors. Messrs. Becker and Savastano may further testifY thatthe flying doors were initially installed and rigged by Respondent in accordance withthe applicable Aircraft Maintenance Manual provisions. James Savastano will also provide testimony regarding the inappropriate and inflammatory statements Inspector Frank Lipinski made evidencing his bias against AMES and that Inspector Lipinski told himthat CCIA should use another repair stationby name, specifically Flightstar Aircraft Services, LLP, for its aircraft repair and maintenance services instead ofAMES. Mr. Savastano will also testifY that he filed a complaint against Mr. Lipinski and that he was interviewedbythe FAAregarding the allegations inhis complaint. Steven Santangelo, the former Director ofQuality Control and ChiefInspector ofCCIA, will provide testimonyregardingthe inappropriate and inflammatory statements Inspector Frank Lipinski made evidencing his bias against AMES. Mr. Santangelo will also providetestimony that Inspectors Lipinski and RichardD'Arcy suggesting that ifCCIAremoved AMES from its D-091 Operations Specifications (essential maintenance provided list) that it would benefit CCIA in another potential enforcement action. Dennis Manibusan, the former President ofCCIA, will provide testimonyregarding a meeting he attended with Robert Talmadge, Manager ofthe FAA's SouthFlorida Certificate Management Office, to express concerns that Inspector Lipinski hadbeen and was continuingto abuse his discretion and act inappropriately in overseeing the operations ofCCIA, including providing examples ofintimidating, harassing, abusive and inappropriate behavior on the part of InspectorLipinski, and Inspector Lipinski's insistence that CCIA cease its business relationship with AMES and instead use Flightstar Aircraft Services, LLP for aircraft repair and maintenance services. AMES may also call FAAInspectors Jack Gasche and Billie Steffey as rebuttal witnesses for Respondent. 14. IdentifY eachperson you may call as an expert witness in this matter, identify the subject oftheirtestimony, summarize the substance oftheir expectedtestimony, and describe in detail your basis for believing that the witness is an expert. ANSWER: The individuals Respondent may call as expert witnesses inthis matter are Daniel 

### J. Hancher and the other individuals identified inRespondent's Expert Rebuttal Disclosures, servedDecember 12,2014. The substance ofMr. Hancher's expectedtestimony is provided inhis expert report, dated April 30, 2014, whichreport was sent to you onMay l, 2014. A summary ofthe expert rebuttal testimony expected to beprovidedby Messrs. Becker and Savastano was provided inRespondent'sExpertRebuttal Disclosures.' The qualifications of Mr. Hancherto serve as an expert are described in paragraphs l and 2 ofhis expertreport and in

1 As noted, Messrs. Becker and Savastano will also testifY as fact witnesses and mayprovide opiniontestimony under Rule 701 ofthe Federal Rules ofEvidence. 2Exhibit 1thereto. 

### Mr. Beckerholds a Bachelor ofScience Aeronautical Engineering Degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a Masters ofBusiness Administration from XavierUniversity and has been licensed bythe State ofCalifornia as a professional engineer. 

### Mr. Becker has 28 years ofexperience inthe aeronautical fteld. Mr. Savastano is a licensed airframe and powerplant mechanic and a graduate ofBarryUniversity. Since 1980 Mr. Savastano has held ofnumber ofmanager, departmenthead, a..11d vice president positions at

**fi_~_"'1l1s** holding Parts 135, 121 and 145 authority. AtAMES, 

### Mr. Savastano is responsible for all Part 145 MRO activities inconnection with four major product lines, namely, heavy maintenance, line maintenance, componentrepair and overhaul, and engineering. Priortojoining AMES, Mr. Savastano was the Vice President ofAirline Maintenance and CCIA.

Dated: December 23, 2014 Respectfully submitted, SILVERBERG, GOLDMAN & BIKOFF, L.L.P. Attorneys for AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

# ::G&N"7U

3 Robert P. Silverberg, Esq. 1101 30'h Street, N.W. Suite 120 Washington, D.C. 20007 Tel: (202) 944-3304 Fax: (202) 944-3306 Email: rsilverberg@sgbdc.com

# Exhibit 5 Transcript Pages from Deposition of Frank Lipinski, taken Dec. 18, 2014

# In The Matter Of: 

# In the matter ofAirborneMaintenance andEngineering

FrankLipinski December 18, 2014

LYONREPORTING, INC

Certified CourtReporters P.O. Box 81124 Atlanta, Georgia 30366 770/458-5500 800/767-2030

Original File 121814airb-jlp.txt1 2 3 

### BEFORE THE US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, DC 4 In the matter of: ) Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 ) FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 5 AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND) ENGINEERING SERVICES, ) 6 ) Administrative Law Judge Respondent ) J.E. Sullivan 7 ) 8 9 

### FRANK LIPINSKI 10 11 Deposition of FRANK LIPINSKI taken on behalf of 12 Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services, at the 13 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional 14 Counsel, Southern Region, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College 15 Park, Georgia, commencing on December 18, 2014, at 16 9:25 a.m. before Jennifer L. Pope, Certified Court 17 Reporter and Registered Professional Reporter. 18 19 20 21 22 

### 23 24 25 LYON REPORTING, INC. Certified Court Reporters P.O. Box 81124 Atlanta, Georgia 30366 770/458-5500 800/767-2030 LYON REPORTING, INC. 1

### 1 anything like that as a factor for the flying doors. 2 But I put the demand on Capital to provide all gear 3 maintenance from the time, including the AMES and 4 any subsequent work. And what I got was what I got. 5 Q. Well, in some instances, a tire change 6 main landing gear tire change does require the 7 movement of the flying door, does it not? 8 A. Yes. I can speak to that. 9 

### Q. And did you determine with respect to each 10 of the three aircraft whether or not there had been 11 any tire changes that would require access to the 12 and the movement of the flying door in order to 13 facilitate the tire change? Did you look at that? 14 A. No. It wouldn't have been something

-- 15 32-45-01 gives the procedures to change a tire. And 16 two bolts are taken out of an arm. The arm is 17 extended to red being shown, and it's put back. So 18 it really wouldn't have anything to do with the 19 flying doors, other than

-- if the maintenance is 20 done like it's supposed to be done, 32-45-01. 21 There's probably hundreds of tire changes. 22 Q. 

### Are you talking about

-- not these three 23 aircraft over the course of the months, but several 24 tire changes? 25 A. Well, you could imagine in that many LYON REPORTING, INC. 531 

### cycles
-- what you get out of a tire? 2 THE WITNESS: 30, 40 landings, Jim, maybe? 3 30, 40 landings maybe out of a tire. Maybe 4 

### more, if it's serviced properly and nobody hit the 5 

### breaks and the anti-skid works properly. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 

### 17 18 19 20 21 

### 22 23 24 25 

### Anyway, the long of the short of it is there would have been multiple tire changes. I can't speak to 287 

### because I don't think it had that many cycles on it. I don't know for sure. But I know there was an issue with one of the two doors. BY MR. SILVERBERG: Q. So with respect to tire changes, wheel changes, brake changes, you didn't consider the implications of those changes and whether or not somebody correctly or incorrectly went about their duties to see whether or not they may have damaged the flying door? A. 

### No. 

### Q. A. 

### factor. You didn't consider that at all? No, not at all. It wouldn't have been a If they were changed properly, it wouldn't have been a factor. Q. If they were changed properly? A. Q. That's right. If they were not changed properly LYON REPORTING, INC. 54

### 1 2 3 4 

### Q. And, in fact, you chastise

-- in Section B, this Exhibit 1, you chastise AMES for its response. But in the paragraph we were just looking at, you don't note that some of the conclusions of Capital 5 were being contradicted. Is that correct or not? 6 MR. STEVENSON: I'm going to object on lack 7 of a factual basis, unless there's a -- you have a 8 reference to chastising AMES's response. 9 MR. SILVERBERG: We'll get there. 10 

### MR. STEVENSON: If you'd point that out. 11 Okay. So I'm going to object on the basis 12 that we're asking about a fact not in evidence. 13 

### MR. SILVERBERG: Section B is in evidence, 14 and it does contain those statements. And we'll 15 talk about them. 16 

### MR. STEVENSON: If you'd like to ask the 17 witness a question about why he said something in 18 Section B, why don't you point him to that question. 19 Why don't you point him to that statement so he 20 knows what you're talking about. 21 MR. SILVERBERG: I've asked him whether or 22 not he's included any reference to the 23 contradictions between the two carriers

-- sorry 24 between the carrier on the one hand and the 25 maintenance provider on the other. LYON REPORTING, INC. 81

### 1 THE WITNESS: I see what you're talking 2 about on page 2, and it looks like it speaks only to 3 the Capital response, as you indicated. 4 BY MR. SILVERBERG: 5 6 7 8 9 

### Q. A. Q. A. Q. Okay. Okay. That's fine. Page 3, sir. Okay. I'm there. And we had talked a little bit about the 10 information that's contained in this second full 11 paragraph on page 2

-- excuse me, page 3. 12 And here we've got
-- you recite the number 13 of cycles that were amassed with respect to each 14 aircraft 15 16 

### A. Q. Yes.

-- between the main landing gear change and 17 the inspection that you performed? 18 A. That's correct. Data provided me from 19 Capital for the aircraft usage. 20 Q. Now, we also talked about the air return, 21 the aerodynamic buffeting. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Did you see any other evidence of any 24 write-ups with regard to the doors not being 25 properly faired, any aerodynamic concerns raised by LYON REPORTING, INC. 821 

### Q. But ultimately you did amend the Capital 2 Cargo ops specs to include AMES as a provider or 3 potential provider of heavy maintenance? 4 

### 5 

### A. Q. 

### Yes. And you did that based on the results of 6 your inspection? 7 

### 8 

### A. Q. Uh-huh. Yes. And you found they had the organization 9 necessary to support the operation? 10 A. And if they didn't have enough people, they 11 were hiring contractors through reputable industry 12 contracting to man themselves appropriately to 13 perform the maintenance. But they had the 14 inspection department in place, and they had 15 engineering in place and inspection
-- and
-- 16 Q. 

### The quality? 17 

### A. Yeah. Well, their inspection department 18 and quality, I think, are tied into each other. But 19 they had those tools in place, so we added them to 20 the D-91. 21 Q. 

### And you did that. 22 Were there any qualifications associated 23 with that, other than, you know, the scope of the 24 work that they were able to perform under the 25 limitations section of their authority? LYON REPORTING, INC. 

### 165

### 1 up. 2 3 4 5 

### 6 7 8 9 10 

### Q. And didn't they make some training materials up? A. They made training materials for themselves. Q. 

### Okay. A. For themselves. that said used the AMM. the AMM. Capital had a task card That's what it said, use Q. But, in fact, you can amplify on that and 11 provide detailed task cards and help the mechanic? 12 A. A repair station did that. 13 Q. And that's what they did; right? 14 A. Okay. So if the repair station is doing 15 that

-- okay, if they're doing that and they're 16 trying to be sincere

-- that's all after the fact 17 but they're trying to be sincere

-- I have no basis 18 to take them off the ops specs, which answers your 19 question; correct? 20 

### 21 22 23 24 25 

### Q. 

### And yet in Section B you listed under corrective action, none? A. That's correct. Q. A. Q. 

### Okay. Which is not factually correct? That's correct. Did you view that

-- was the services that LYON REPORTING, INC. 

### 198

# Exhibit 6
AMES DiscrepancyNotices and CCIA

Corrective Action Record for Tubular Bearing onN287SCR-2 O?Fl!U09 

## DISCREPANCY NOTICE 

## NQ 020293

TO: CC: Ryan Dailey Todd Norton 

## DEPT: Heavy Maintenance ILN C-Ck DATE: CATEGORY: 6/8/2010 Minor



### !J)]§CRlPTIONDFbiscg§pA~C:YhirpJZEQUIRED 

## (:_QRREC'IIYE:i\C:IION
. .. . . . ... _ CCIA CAR issued to AMES,# QAAILN001. During investigation of CCIA customer aircraft, N287SC, high frequency vibration, tubular bearing in the R MLG, PIN 65-72761-36, S/N 8H68, was found to be missing. Aircraft was at AMES for C-Check in March 2010. Boeing 727 MM gear installation (AL) signed as completed by employee# 350365, Todd Norton. Partial work sheet no. 3, entry no. 20. AL (11) of the Boeing MM 32-11-00 calls for check that tubular bearing is in position in door actuation rod fitting on drag strut. Return completed discrepancy notice to AMES Quality Assurance to the attention of Marlene C. Hewitt no later than 06-15-10.



### ~br{RECTIYEACTIO]\f(S) **ACCO:tv1PLIS}Il~_D** .••. Employees required to comply with 727 flying door install and adjustment computer based training course. 

### lgONTRIBUTING

**FA~T,()_R$~Aj\1J)** 

### AJ;LAl,I_SIS
_ .·--_ ..... __ _ __ **~-··** Please consider each ofthe following factors and indicate whetherthey were contibnting (YES) ornot (NO) or did not apply (N/A). ALL ITEMS MOST BE MARKED. LACK OFTIME No TRAINING No COMMUNICATIONS No --'-- EXPERIENCE No --'-- Explnin any factors marked "YES 11 MANPOWER No DOCUMENTATION No PROCEDURES

**_No_~** SUPPORT {OTHER DEPT) _N_o
_ PARTS/MATERIALS _:_:No::.__ TOOLING No HUMAN ERROR No OTHER Yes This \ask was performed lAW \he G'/2'1 AMM. The opcrotor representative \'tos onsite and witnessed all gear swings and door adjustments ol the time of gear change. It is our position thol this bearing was lost or misplaced during maintenance after it deported our facility. \Vhat actions were taken or recommendations can you suggest that could prevent a reoccurrence notjust in this situation, but across the entlre operation? To ensure ulten\ion lo deloil, AMES developed a course spccificu!ly to the remove ond replace, and adjustment of the flying gear door and mandated all technicians cornp!e\e \he course. U<ETURN TI·I!SFORM W!THIN-:iDAYS FROMDATEISSUEb wrrHREQviESTEDINFORMATIONTO:
. "

**~ ~~;_;..**  ' • L

**···~ "',,·.~**  • • ••• ' o:"
..

**,~** ,.,• ·- • MARLENE C. HEWITT, QUALITY ASSURANCE, ILN, IOOSB

..

**,..~-·-·** ..........··--·--... ·-- . .-···..·-·····-..--.........-- ..... ··- .. ·- ... ._ ...... JSSUEDBY: Original signed by: Marlene C. Hewitt ANSWERED BY: RYAN DAILEY 350044 Nmne Employee#
DAN BOGGS 350009 6/11/2010 Supervisor's Name Date Supervisor must review compktcd fonn with employee before signing.

## Airborne Mx DISCREPANCY NOTICE 

# NQ Q20293
TO: Ryan Dailey CC: 

### Todd Norton DEPT: DATE: 

### Heavy Maintenance 

### ILN C-Ck 6/8/2010 FROM: 

### Marlene C. Hewitt CATEGORY: 

### Minor

l"' : :' -·- _, ...... · -. .·, •"" _-- " : - 'L'
.. - ··:· ': ._.,. · -,

**·:~.** _ ' • **©~SQRJ!2I!QliQ1lPIS<:;]ZI;P?;l'{C,YAND.]ZEQUT]ZEDgQIQ\J3<:;TlYE.ACTION_** CC!A CAR isstJcd to AMES,# QAAlLNOOJ. During investigation ofCCIA customer aircraft, N287SC, high fi·equency vibration, tubular bearing in the RMLG, PIN 65-72761-36, SIN 8H68, was found to be missing. Aircraftwas at AMES for CCheckin March2010. Boeing727 MM gear installation (AL) signed as completed by employee# 350365, Todd Norton. Partial work sheet no. 3, entry no. 20. AL (II)ofthe Boeing MM 32-11-00 callsfor check that tubular bearing is in position in door actuation tod fitting on drag strut. Return completed discrepancy notice to AMES Quality Assurance to the attention of Marlene C. Hewitt no later than 06-15-10.

**(}~(!'ItA**

### tJ

**l.-L:.-lflL~** iJ 1\"Sp-;

**~** 1/'t-; ;.../ (, Conti,tutonbad: 

### CON'rRIBUTrNOFACTORS·ANDANALYSIS.' r .._."
.. , __ ..__ . __,_,__ "-·· .... --- --"---·---'"--- --·-··---·- ..-- -· Please consider each ofthe following factors and indicate whetherthey were contibuting (YES) ornot (NO) or did not apply (N/A). ALL ITEMS MUST BE MARKED. LACK OF TIME 

### i.J(/t MANPOWER 

### tJD PARTS/MATERIALS /jiJ TltA!NTNG tJO DOCUMENTATION tJQ TOOLING ,t}0 COMMUNICATIONS iJO PROCEllURES f)O HUMAN ERROR 

### tfi! EXPEl\IENCE 

### AID SUPPORT (OTHER DEl'!')



## ~ OTHER 

# X Explain any f1c1orsmarked "YES" 'HI() "Jl1,;f<._ lrHS ().!.r<fP>tW?CJ fMJ 

### ff/tf 7!i72) fn·Gfttj, ·[7f1f OPt:illfiJPr& 

### IZePU5Vt1.il1{l-t Ue 

### 1.0.JS Ofl{lk (l)t1d UJifl16\&"1) 

### A1.-L- 

### f.\yl4il 5i.'ultJ(:,5 

# !'rt# Ooov !vljc,JhMRti/5 

# d
.. fte 

# -hiu.c 

# o/

**C%'t~_r ~tl,l!Je,**  

## cr t.J



## ot><M~ \Vhat actions were taken or recommendations can you suggest that could prevent areoccurrence notjust in this situation, but across the entire operation? ({:Itt'-lt.:-'' {



## r,!~l-'--'

Answered by: Employee#
Employee# Supervisor nmst rtwicw coll\jllctcd form with employee before signing.. Dnte

## PARTU-\l VVORK SHEET NO. R-1BA 09FEBD9AH. 

### AI. AJ. AK.

**~AL.** 

# DDIIF.I~ MAINTENANCE

**~1ANUAL** Install trunnion swivel complete with hydraulic lines (Fig. 404}. Connect swivel antirotation strut. Connect electrical cable. Install flap track fairing. Install tnain gear wing doors. <1) Place door in position to align Hith hinge halves on structure. (2) Insert washers bet\leen lugs of the forward hinges. Position door in fore and aft position that ·provides a clearance between lugs of aft hinge. (3) Insert hollo11 hinge pins and hang door. (1,) Place Hashers on bolts, coat bolts ;Jith cor·rosion-preventive compound and insert through hinge pins !Jith heads facing aft. Add Hasher· and nut to each bolt. (5) Tighten nuts and install cotte1· pins. (6) Hold do01' clear and place door-actuating rod in position to line up with attachment point on door. (7) Insert hollow pin th•·ough doop fitting and rod. (8) Install a washer on actuation rod attachment bolt, coat bolt with corrosion-pr·eventive compound, and insert bolt through hollml pin with head facing forward. (9) Add a washer and nut. Tighten nut to standard torque and install cottel' pin. (10) Install actuator •·od support gimbal fitting ·(i"f l'emoved). 

### <aJ Install countersunk Hasher on gimbal fitting. (b) Install gimbal fitting ·in actuator rod support and measur·e total gap between cotrntarsunk washer and support. (c) Install shim washers between countersunk HasheJ' and support to t·imit gap to a total maximum of 0.006 ±0.003 inoh. (d) Install Yashers. Add nut and tighten to 2200•3300 pound-inches. Install cotter• pin. · NOTE: Additional AN960XC1616 >rashers may be used to engage cotter pin. /(11) Check that removable tubular bearing is 1n posit·ion in actuation t•od fitting on drag strut. 

# doo~/

**~2)** (13} Align actuation rod t'!th fitting on drag strut. Insert fiber \lashers between actuation rod lugs and attachment fitting.

EFFECTIVITY------------, 

# 32-11-00 1 02 fWEI!lG. PROPR1ETMY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished

**~ark ~**  See title page: foo details, ALL Page 1,22 Dec 01/05

## ~~cr' **2?~~ DDE-'~** ............ 

### MAINTENANCE MANUAL (11,) Place countersunk Hasher on attachment bolt. Coat bolt Hith corrosion-preventive compound and insert bolt through rod and fitting. NOTE: Install shim 1/asheJ'S bet11een fiber Hashers and drag strut fitting to limit total maximum gap to .005 +.013 or -.000 inch. (15) Add Hasher and nut. (16) Tighten nut to 480-600 inch pounds. (17) Install cotter pin. 

### <18) Attach bonding jumpers at aft Hing door hinge access door and

**¥~~~!:~** access doors over forward and aft Hing_ door hing-es. 

### <19) 'tid1usCtr:r;;y-·;:;rnii""aoor"<AI1H 

## 3z=rt::rflsifl>:·" · '"···' AM. Service shock strut and lubricate landing gear (Ref. Chapter 12). AN. PJ·essuri ze. hydraulic system and bleed brakes and pneumatic brake system (MII•I 32-41-00/201, AW1 32-43-00/201). AO. Check hydraulic brake line connections for leaks. fiARNING: TO PREVENT PERSONNELL INJURY OR EQUIPNENT DA14AGE DURING INTERNAL LEAKAGE CHECKS, KEEP PERSONNEL AND EG.UIPI•1ENT CLEAR OF HYDRAULIC COI•IPONENTS THAT CAN 1•10VE. AP. Check continuity of skid detectors: (1) Airplanes with 2 or 3 INOP lights on antiskid panel. (a) Check that circuit breakers on panel P6 a1·e closed. (b) Provide electt'ical poJ.Jer to system. (c) On pi lots ove1·head panel, place antiskid switches to ON. (d) Place SELECTOR switch on front of antiskid control unit in inboard position for applicable gear (LI or Rl). Press XDCR test switch and check that meter reads in gJ•een band. (e) Place SELECTOR switch in outboard position for applicable gear (LO or RO). Press XDCR test switch and check that meter reads in gt·een band. (f) Place SELECTOR sHitch to OFF. (g) Remove power from system, if no longer required. (2) Airplanes with 4 or 5 REL lights on antiskid panel. (a) Release pa1·king brake. (b) Check that circuit bJ·eakers on panel P6 are closed. (c) Provide electrical poHer to system. (d) On pilot's overhead panel, place antiskid switches to ON. (e) Place antiskid test sJ.Jitch to INBD. Check that inboard indicators show blank and outboard indicators show REL. (f) Place antiskid test sHitch to OUTBD. Check that outboard indicato1·s show blank and inboaJ'd indicators show REL. (g) Apply parking brakes.

EFFECTIVITY'------------.! 

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### [[> INSTALl ME:"TAL WASHERS TO LIMIT TOTAL MAXIMUM GAP TO 0,008 INCH, SEE DETAil A G)-..--ATIAGHMENT BOLl 

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# I \; WASHER FlBF.R WASHER**~ ~**  ,.-1 j -WING DOOR ACTUATION Ctb) If..

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# y I DETAIL A**~ling** Door Actuation Rod Drag Strut Attachmont Figure 401 EFFECTIVITY------------, ALL 01 

# 32-11-00 Page 1,04 Dec 01/05 BOEH!t PROPRIETARY- Ccpydght (C) -. Unpubtish<!cl Work- See tltla pagn for- details, 

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### DATE
. 6/10/10 TIME 14:57:23 Employee NO: 350365 Title: A& P 'I'ECH 

### Last Name: NORTON First Name: TODD Initial (s) : 

### Address: City: State: Postcode: Area/Phone: ABX AIR INC. EMPI.OYEE MASTER FILE INQUIRY

Drug Test Require: Days Between Test: 0 Date Last: Medical Ear: Date Last: Medical 

### EYE: Date Last: Qualifications?: Memo: 0 

### Delete: F3=Exit PGM: P0304 WKST: ABX16038Al USER: 

### MROMCH

Compliance:

### DATE ,6/10/10 TIME 

### 14:57:34 

### Employee NO: 350215 Title: A&P TECH 

### Last Name: SNAPP 

### First Name: DAN Initial(s): Address: City: State: Postoode: Area/Phone: ABX AIR INC. EMPLOYEE MASTER FILE INQUIRY

Drug 

### Test Require: Days Between Test: 0 Date Last: Medical Ear: Date Last: Medical EYE: Date Last: Qualifications?: Memo:,, 0 Delete: F3=Exit PGM: P0304 WKST: ABX16038Al USER: t4ROMCH



### Compliance:

## RefDiscrepancyNotice No 020293 On 3/21/2010 at the start ofmy shift I picked up on the installation ofthe RHMLG wing door onA/C N287SC. I looked over thejob and did not see any obvious problems and completed the installation ofthe door lAW 727MM 32-11-00 step 5(AL)l0 and step 5(AL)15 thru step 5(AL)l9.

Todd Norton

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**Capita~argo** International

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**~** S CORRECTIVE ACTION RECORD- FORM IEP 01 Issueto:

**It-=='-=~-** ·-··--···-······-·-·-··

Location: ILN Risk: 2 Medium Risk Issue Date: June 7, 2010 J.Becker Director of QA ControiJ'Lulll.'"<Jr: QMILN001 Type: OM Class: QRC Corrective Due Date: June 17,2010 Auditor Emp fJ and

**N<~me** • , , Auditor: BenJamin Buck Ch1ef Inspector Initial Database Entry: NO Deficiency Description: See additional information seclion,

RESPONSE

.. . ..··· .' .•. 

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### inforMation ,;'<>!lunGes

**~n ~~go**  2. We'h8ve

**reVi~w~d non~routine**  0004; statements .from the.inspe.CtOrs an?

**teChn!cl~ms** Which

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**e~thanged correspondenc~**  wtth BenJamin-Buck inr6gards

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**Directoi'IMan~!ler:** ·· .
Actions Acceptable: Follow-up: 

## ·· • · I implementation Date: · ·. ··
Verification Req'd: 

## I On Site: 

## I Follow-up Date: •

### ... ·. . ··.

Closed: Date: ReisstJed ContJ'act #: ,,,, ...,..............**----J-'=='----------+~=""--"'==-"~----11** Verification Accepted: VDRP: CAS: Emp #and Dale Final Database Entry: THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURES ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE FINAL DATABASE ENTRY:

**Vice~President** ofFligllt Operations I Datf} Vice-President ofMaintenance I Dflfe DirectorofSafety, SectJriJyRegttlc1toryCompliance I Date Manager ofQualityAssurance/Dt'1te Manager ofGround& Cargo OpsI Date Manager oflntemal Evaluation Program I Date

. Form-IEP 01 (04122110) Page1of2**/.~tt'4)~** 

### Capltat(i:rgo International
II I k l CORRECTIVE ACTION RECORD· FORM IEP 01 Additional information (Continued): During the initial high frequency vibration inspection it appeared that the removable tubular bearing was missing from the right hand main landing gear drag strut were the wing door actuation rod attaches. The wing door actuator rod was removed and It was verified that the tubular bearing was missing. In March 2010 N287SC had the main landing gears replaced at our vendor Airborne Maintenance & Engineering Services (A.M.E.S.) in Wilmington, Ohio under A.M.E.S. work order number 10840, item 0004 removal and replacement ofthe right hand main landing gear. This bearing is to be removed during the main landing gear removal lAW MM 32-11-00 page 402, paragraph 3, step F. (3) and re-installed during main landing gear installation lAW MM 32-11'00 page 422, paragraph 5, step AL. (11 ). The tubular bearing installation was signed for by A.M.E.S. maintenance work order 10840, item 0004, step 13. During a complete review of all records for this aircraft no other records could be located for the removal of this tubular bearing orthe wing door actuator rod. A.M:E.S. maintenance was the last certifying agency signing for the installation of the tubular bearing up until the aircraft turn back with high frequency vibrations on April16, 2010 and the verification of the missing tubular bushing under aircraft log page 88224, item 1, step 6. The tubular bearing could not have been installed during the installation of the main landing gear at our vendor facilities Airborne Maintenance & Engineering Services (A.M.E.S.) in Wilmington, Ohio. Capital Cargo International Airlines has issued a Corrective Action Report (CAR) to A.M.E.S. The completed CAR should include the root cause ofthe stated issues, the immediate fix put in place, and the permanent fix that will be put in place that will remedy future issues ofthis type. AMES response continued: A statement from the AMES teclmician states that he recalls installing the tubular bearing. This is also reflected in the sign-off on the partial worksheet (entry 20, of page 3). In addition, our investigalion found some turnover steps not clearly documented on the partial work sheet. Based on the paperwork signed off and statements provided, AMES cannot confirm that the tubular bearing was missing when it left our facility. To prevent the chance ofa reoccurrence from happening again we have Implemented the following corrective actions: 1) We have counselled the (2) inspectors involved in ensuring they follow partial work step procedures (per our Heavy Maintenance Processes and Procedures Manual) when turning overwork between shifts. 2) We have issued a MIL (Maintenance Information Letter) to all techn·rcians and inspectors whic11 covers the missing tubular bearing found and highlights the maintenance procedures. This is to increase awareness among the technicians and inspectors that this issue has occurred and to take additional precautions when performing gear changes on B727's. A copy has been allached for your information. 3) As part of the corrective action to assist CCIA in preventing this from reoccurring, we have developed a draft MLG change card for CCIA which includes an additional sign offstep and figure added to check for this tubular bearing when performing agear change. As of this date the draft has been sent to CCIA for their review and approval for use.

. Form -IEP 01 (04122/10) Page 2 of2R-2 09l'Ell® 

## DISCREPANCY NOTICE NQ 

# 020294

TO: Mike Hall DATE: 6/8/2010 

### CC: Dan Snapp CATEGORY: Minor DEPT: Quality Control 

### ,DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY AND REQUIRED CORRECTIVEA(:TION CCIA CAR issued to AMES, #QAAILN001, During investigationof CCIA customer aircraft, N287SC, high frequency vibralion, tubular bearing in the R MLG, P/N 65-72761-36, SiN 8H68, was found to be missing. Aircraft was at AMES for C-Check in March 2010. Boeing 727 MM gear installation ( AL) signed as inspected by employee# 350215, Dan Snapp. Partial work sheet no. 3, entry no. 20. AL (11) ofthe Boeing MM 32-11-00 calls for check that tubular bearing is in position in door actuation rod fitting on drag strut. Return completed discrepancy notice to AMES Quality Assurance to the attention of Marlene C. Hewitt no later than 06-15-10.



### iCORRECTIVEACTION(S)A(:(;Q1vi.PLISI-IE])
.. Completed 727 geor door training CBT 

### 'CONTRJBUTING FACTORS AND ANALYSIS Please consider each oft he following factors and indicate whetherthey were contibuting (YES) ornot (NO) or did not apply (N/A). ALL ITEMS MUST BE MARKED. LACK OF TIME No MANPOWER No PARTS/MATERIALS No TRAINING No DOCUMENTATION Yes TOOLING No COMMUNICATIONS No PROCEDURES No HUMAN ERROR No EXPERIENCE No SUPPORT (OTI-IER DEPT) No OTHER No Explain mty factors marked "YES 11 Need to moke sure \he prior shill documents what they complete. What actions were taken or recommendations can you suggest that could prevent areoccurrence notjust in this situation, but across the entire operation? Set up o CBT Module about gear door installation and odjustrncnt. :RETURN

## TIDS FORMWtTHlN 15 DAYS PROM DATE ISSUED WITH REQUESTED INJ'ORMATION TO:". MARLENE C. HEWITT, QUALITY ASSURANCE, ILN, 1OOSB

**~--~----------------------** ISSUED BY: Original signed by: Marlene C. Hewitt ANSWERED IW: DAN SNAPP 350215 Name Employee#

**ALA~!** M. HALL 350016 611412010 Snpervisor's Name Employee# Dote Sttpe-rv!sor must review completed fonn with ClllJ}lo)'CC before signing,

## Airborne Mx DISCREPANCY NOTICE NQ 

## Q20294
TO: Mike Hall m:PT: Quality Control CC: Dan Snapp DATE: 6/8/2010 FROM: Marlene C. Hewitt CATEGORY: Minor



## fJ;l~~WI!®Jitmiil1~ir~ll~f~,[W~~w.llL~~j{\fL\U_li;:IU:2~1.t~!iw:WiiliBJiiJ!:I•~ CCJA CARissued to AMES,# QAAJLNOOJ. During investigation ofCCIA customer aircraft, N287SC, high fi·equency vibration, tubular bearing in the RMLG, PIN 65-72761-36, SIN 8H68, was found to be missing. Aircrafi was at AMES for CCheckin March 2010. Boeing 727lv!M gear installation ( AL) signed as inspected by employee //3502!5,Dan Snapp. Partial work sheet no. 3, enl!y no. 20. AL (II) ofthe Boeing MM 32-11-00 calls for check that tubular bearing is in ]Josition in door actuation rod fitting on dmg stmt Return completed discrepancynotice to AMES Quality Assuranceto I he attention of Marlene C. Hewitt no laterthan 06-15-10.

Please considereach ofthe following factors and indicate whether they were contibuting (Y&')) or not not apply (NIA). ALL ITEMS MUST BE MARKED. LACK OfTIME 

## N /A TRAINING 

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### \4 COMMUNICATIONS j,_\Vi, EXPERIENCE 

### h\\1, Explain any factors mnrked "YES" rAo<l'V/IvlevJs II)

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**lJAL!T'f'_\~SURANCE,** JLN, lOOSB
______ Answered by:



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Supen•isor's Signature Date Supervisor rnliSt review

**complet~d** fonn ·with employee before signing.**DA~E** 

### 6/08/J.O TIME 14:25:58 Employee NO: 350215 Title: 

### A&P 'l'ECB Last Name: 

### SNAPP First Name: 

### DAN Initial(s}: Address: City: State: Postcode: Area/Phone: 

### ABX AIR INC. EMPLOYEE l;y.STER 

### FILEf INQUIRY
_____

Drug Test Require: Days Between Test: 0 Date Last: Medical Ear: Date Last: Medical EYE: 

### Date Last: Qualifications?: Memo: 0 

### Delete: F3=Exit PGM: P0304 

### WKST: ABX16038Al USER: MROMCH

Compliance:

# PARTIAL WORK SHEET

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# __ c:3
_______

DlSCREPANCY: CORRECTIVE ACTION:

----- ------·---·-----------!

**------------------~----1**

# HOE§~~ MAINTENANCE MANUAL All, Install tr·unnion sHivel complete uith hydraulic lines (fig. 404). Al. Connect swivel antirotation strut. AJ. Connect electrical cable. AK. Install flap track fairing. 

## --7AL. Install rnai n gear- Hing

**doOJ~s.** C1) Place door in position to align 11ith hinge halves on structur·e. (2) Insert washers between lugs of the for>wrd hinges. Position door· in fore and aft position that pr•ovides a clearance bet11een lugs of aft hinge. C3) Insert hollow hinge pins and hang door. C4l Place washers on bolts, coat bolts with corr·osion-preventive compound and insert through hinge pins with heads facing aft. Add washer and nut to each bolt. (5) Tighten nuts and install cotter pins. (6) Hold door clear and place door-actuating rod in position to line up with attachment point on door'. <7) Insert hollow pin through door fitting and rod. (8) Install a ;rashe1· on actuation rod attachment bolt, coat bolt with corr·osion-preventive compound, and insert bolt through hollo11 pin vith head facing forward. (9) Add a washer and nut. Tighten nut to standard torque and install cotter pin. (10) Install actuator rod support gimbal fitting (if removed). (a) Install countersunk washer on

**~limbal** fitting.

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# ~2) (13) Cbl Install gimbal fitting in actuator rod support and measure total gap between countersunk washer and support. (c) Install shim washers between countersunk washer and suppor't to limit gap to a total maximum of 0.006 ±0.003 inch. Cdl Install washers. Add nut and tighten to 2200-3300 pound-inches. Install cotter pin. NOTE: Additional AN960XC1616 washers may be used to engage cotter pin. Check that removable tubular bear'ing is in position in actlJation rod 'fitting on drag strut. Align actuation rod

**~with** fitting on drag strut. 

# dOOI'/

Inser·t ·fiber washers between actuation rod lugs and attachrner1t fitting.

EFFECTIVITY'------------, 

# 32-11-00 ALL 02 Page 422 Dec 01/05 SOE.ING PROPR1ETARY- Copyri9ht (C)

- UnpUblhhitd \l'ork- See title- page for details.-SEE DETAIL A

INSTALL METAL WASHER$ TO LIMIT iOTA!.. MAXIMUM GAP TO 0.008 INCH, G)--AlTACHMENT BOLT 

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# .**v~3j:** I TUBULAR _{5'!4-WAStlER BEARING**__;~** '**~**

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lling Door Actuation Rod Drag Sti'Ut Attachment Figure 401 EFfECTIVITY'-------------, ALL 01 

# 32-11-00 Page 404 Dec 01/05 OOEtllG PROPRIE1ARY

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- See title page- 1or dotaits.RefDiscrepancyNotice No Q20293
On 3/21/2010 I came in and got a turnover from the inspector on duty. Then went and talked with the mechanics about where they were with the paperwork. I looked over the door and didn't see anything out of sink with the paperwork. Completed the install of the door lAW 727MM 32-11-00 step S(AL) 10 and stepS (AL) 15 through step 5(AL) 19. I would like to rcqucstto sec the Logbookpages for the month after the aircraft left this maintenance visit.
Dan Snapp



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DISCREPANCY : r4ANUAL AGEAR EX'l'ENGION REQUIRED AFTER LM.G & RMG CHA.NGE PER CUSTOMER REQUES'l' T ASHFORD 350194 032HO

EVALUATION : t-11\NUAL GEAR EXTENSION PER c USTONER REQUEST 350108

PARTIAL NORK ( I



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. CORRECTIVE ACTION RECORD- FOI'1_M IEP 01

Issue to: J.Becker Director of Q.A Control Number: OAAILN001 

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.... Location: ILN Typ<!: QAA Risl<: 2 Medium Risk Class: ORC

- 

### ' Issue Date: June 7, 2010 Corrective Due Date: June 17, 2010

1\udltorEmpii and Nan;e Benjamin Buck Chief Inspector Initial Database Entry: NO Auditor: Deficiency Description: See additional information section.


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**sl~aded** area and re-turn· to rllofderi'ii.l.CaTJitalcamo.com

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**_~aVe** reviewed rmn-rouHne000,4 1 **s;tatemf;l'_nts-.fr~m** the inspectors and tec_hnidans which sigr)ed forthe

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## ! Closed: Date: Reissued Contract#:

---·------ ···--···-· Verification Accepted: VDRP: CAS: Emp #and Date Final Database Entry:

....._ ..

- THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURES ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE FINAL DATABASE ENTRY:

Vice-President ofFligbt Operations I Date Vfce-PresfdentofMaintenance I Date Director ofSafely, SewrilyRegulatory ComplimlcelDate ManagerofQuafilyAssurance I Date ManagerofGround & Cargo Ops I Date Manager offntcmaf Evaluation Program I Date

··- Form -IEP 01 (04122110) Page 1 of 2CORRECTIVE ACTION RECORD - FORM IEP 01 Additional information (Continued): During the initial high frequency vibration inspection it appeared that the removable tubular bearing was missing from the right hand main landing gear drag strutwere the wing door actuation rod attaches.The wing door actuator rod was removed and it was verified that the tubular bearing was missing. In March 2010 N287SC had the main landing gears replaced at our vendor Airborne Maintenance & Engineering Services (A.M.E.S.) in Wilmington, Ohio under A.M.E.S. work order number 10840, item 0004 removal and replacement of the right hand main landing gear. This bearing is to be removed during the main landing gear removal lAW MM 32-11-00 page 402, paragraph 3, step F. (3) and re-installed during main landing gear installation lAW MM 32-11-00 page 422, paragraph 5, step AL. (11). The tubular bearing installation was signed for by A.M.E.S. maintenancework order 10840, item 0004, step 13. During a complete review of all records forthis aircraft no other records could be located for the removal of this tubular bearing orthe wing door actuator rod. A.M.E.S. maintenance was the last certifying agency signing for the installation of the tubular bearing up until the aircraft turn back with high frequency vibrations on Apri116, 2010 and the verification of the missing tubular bushing under aircraft log page 88224, item 1, step 6. The tubular bearing could not have been installed during the installation ofthe main landing gear at our vendor facilities Airborne Maintenance & Engineering Services (A.M.E.S.) in Wilmington, Ohio. Capital Cargo International Airlines has issued a Corrective Action Report (CAR) to A.M.E.S. The completed CAR should include the root cause ofthe stated issues, the immediate fix put in place, and the permanentfix that will be put in place t11at will remedy future issues of this type, AMES response continued: A statement from the AMES technician states that he recalls installing the tubular bearing. This is also reflected in the sign-off on the partial worksheet (entl)' 20, of page 3). In addition, our investigation found some turnover steps notclearly documented on the partial work sheet. Based on the paperwork signed off and slatements provided, AMES cannot confirm that the tubular bearing was missing when it left ourfacility, however, in the spirit of doing our partto preventthe chance of a reoccurrence from happening again we have implemented the following corrective actions: 1) We have counselled the (2) inspectors involved in ensuring they follow partial work step procedures (per our Heavy Maintenance Processes and Procedures Manual) when turning over work between shifts. 2) We have issued a MIL (Maintenance Information Letter) to all technicians and inspectors which covers the missing tubular bearing found and highlights the maintenance procedures. This is to increase awareness among the technicians and inspectors that this issue has occurred and to take additional precautions when performing gear changes on B727's, A copy has been attached for your information. 3) As part of the corrective action to assist CCIA in preventing this from reoccurring, we have developed a draft MLG change card for CCIA which includes an additional sign off step and figure added to checkfor this tubular bearing when performing a gear change. As ofthis date the draft has been sent to CCIA for their review and approval for use.

Form -IEP 01 (04/22110) Pago 2of 2

# Exhibit 7
Authorized Release Certificates, FAA Form 8130-3, Airworthiness Approval Tags, issued byATI Aviation Services, LLC for LH MLG onN899AA and N898AA----- **-------------~--~--- ~""""'** 

1 Approving National Aviatklo Authority/Country: FAA/United States 4. Organization Name. and Address:

2.
'\ :.:A_UTllrORIZED

RELEASE CERTIJFICATE r·-;:···•
·.• **~r J!'~Fo~m8l31J-3,Al.RWORTHINESSAPl'ROVALTAG**  **·~:·• -~,N'**  ATI Aviation Services, LLC, 12401 TaftiAvenue; Cieveland, Ohio 44108 (OQTR977Y)

i' OMS Control No. 212(}-{1018 **091301~007** 3. Fonn Tracking Number! A TI-0609-2525 5. WorkOrder7Contri-dl1nvtlice Number:

' V2525-1'0 09-19844-E 6. Item:

I 7. **Des~:ription:**

i:l 8. ;.. _Part »lumber:

9, Eligibility:

* 10. Quantity:

! ll Serial/Batch **Numb~r:**

I l:Z. Status/Work: :I..;:;..,

.; ,. **~-:** 1 LH MLG Assembly

65-7l761-37

NIA

1 PW017 Overhauled 13. Remarks:

.,. ' ...... **~·-;.**:

1 Overhauled complete lAW B.AC OHM 32 10-01, Rev.43, Dated 11-01-2005 and OHM 32-11-01, Rev. 40, Dated 11-01-2001. Less transducer assembly, hub·cap,.wheel

and tire assembly, deflector installation and brake assembly, Zero TSO/CSO. 'Traceability provid-ed on corresponding

form .A Tl-011. • .. '.
**~**

' All customer requested

OEM Se;yice En etins and FAA Airworthiness Directives complied with, see ATI Form AAS-005. The work specified was **carri'\~** .;ut in **ac~r~ance** with EASA-145, and in respect to that **w~~k,**the aircraft component

is considered ready for release to service **node~** EASA-145 Ac ptance Certificate number EASA.l45.5392. Pertinent details of the work performed

is on file at this agency under the Sales Order number given in 'block 5.

' **c~rt:Lfies** the items identified above wen **~nufad~,d.**

in **confo~ity**
to:

I 19 .. 1&1 i4 CFR 43.9 Return
to Servlc:e

1&1 Other regubltion specified
in Block 13 0 **Appro.v~n** data and are in a condition toT safe opernHon. 0 **Non-approved~~diuBloekl.**

Certifies that **un1~:Ss** othenvise- specified in Block 13, the work iden_tified
in Bloc1<.12 · and described
in Block 13 was accomplis bed ID accordance with. Title 14, Code nf Federal Regulations, pflrt 43 ana in respect to tlult work, the items are approved for return to service. 15. Authorized Signature:

**~ovaVAnthorization**

No,, 10.- Authorized Signature: **~~4£1/)d** 18. **Date(m/~**

_, ' **~I** '22. Name (Typed or **~td):** Timothy Aish 17, Name (Typed or Printed):

. ;_- t· :.i: -;,>-•:.

**~-** ;· User/Installer

Responsibilities ,,,,-.--.

21. **App~val!Cerlifil:ate**
No.: OQTrul77Y 23. Date (m!d/y): JUNE 1,2009 It is important

to **uuderst:n:~.d**tbat the **exi~tC:nee** Atthis **do~ument** alone does not automaticaU:y constitute anthorily
tn instan the part/camponent/:issembly. Wbe.-e the user/installer **perform~** work iil·aicOtdiiDce

w tb the national regulations
of an ainvorthiness authority different than the ainvoithlness authority of the **coll~try** specified in Block I, tt is essential that the. US£rlinstaller **~res,** that is:Jber airworthiness authority accepts partslcompnnentslass:eroblie:s

fnm the airworthiness authority of the country specified in **'R1o~:kl.**

·

.-r -"

-.

)

· .: : **~-:..**

.

;

'

. Stat-ements

In Blockl'l14 and 19 do not **con'~>titJ.tfe Uu:falla~iDn**  cei"tification.
In all eases, aircraft maintenance. records must contain an installation certification issued in accordance with tbe -natioDal regub!ltions by the user/installer ildcli-e thi} 'il"r_rh.ft roa.y be fiown.

.

·

,

·

·

. ! ...... --11

l

•. FAA Form 8130-3 (6-0 1) ***ln~~l~!=-_r~u:~s~cross~k** eltgibi!ity with applh:able **~chnical**data.

NSN:

0052-00-012-9005 Paperwork RedUCtion P4 Statement::

· An agency **m&Y.ri~i-JJJ~'cifotsponbcr,**

and a perl!on Js nat reqUired
to **re~pand** to, a c:ollecllcnoflnfotiTiatlon unless H displays

a Q\liTenUy valld OMB c:ontrlll nwnber **a~soclat!!tl ~!h**  thls **ecn~~l~!i·.~~~aliM!s** *120-0012. **Comment!~** eoocnemlng \he-acouracy

of lh1s **~den**and suggestions fof-red:.tclng the burden should be directei:l
to the FAA at BOO **'"''""~n~:~,::.:.WeTton,_oc**

'""· A!lno In"""'""' Col"""'" c•''"'"' OFfire<, 1\SA..:!O.

·

**~**-------------·-·OMBConlrolNo.2120.0018-09/3(1/20071.A.,provingNatloaltlAvlaUonz.3.FormTrackingNumber:Aut._ority/Count.-y:FAA/UnitedStatesAUTHORIZEDRELEASECERTIFICATEATI-0709-2531FAAForm813()-3AIRWORTmNESSAffROVALTAG4.Otpab:afJonNameand.AdclftSI":5.WorkO.rder/C.atradllnv41ocN•mher:ATIAviationServices,LLC,12401TaftAvenue,Cleveland,Ohio44108(OQTR977Y)V2S31-PO09-19845-E£.Item:7.DC:#riptlou.:8.PartNumHr::•-ElfgibiUty:"'10-4;!oandty:11.SerlaVBatcllNumber.IZ.Statut/WmiHILHMLGInstallation65-72761-35N/A16P48Overhanled13.Remarb:Overhauledcompletebuildup65-72761-37lAWBACOHM32-10-01,Rev.43,Dated11-01-2005andOHM32-11-01,Rev.40,Dated11-01-2001.Lesotransducerassembly,hubcap,wheelandtireassembly,deflectorinstallationandbrakeassembly.Note:65-72761-35installationnumberisforengineeringreferenceonly,ZeroTSO/CSO.TraceabUityprovidedoncorrespondingfonnATI-DII.AllcustomerrequestedOEMServiceBulletinsandFAAAirworthinessDirectivescompliedwith,seeATIFormAAS-005.TheworkspecifiedwascarriedoutinaccordancewithEASA-145,andinrespecttothatwork,theaircrallcomponentisconsideredreadyforreleasetoserviceunderEASA-145AcceptanceCertificatenumberEASA.l4S.S392.PertinentdetailsoftheworkperformedisonfileattbisageneyundertbeSalesOrdernumbergiveninbloek5.the•umidt:ntfficd.aboveweremaauracturtdtooonfi:Jrmit]lto:19.1!914CFR43,!itRetumt•Servk:eOtherngulatioainBJodt13..................__Certifiesthaiunlessotherwisespecirwlin81Q(kll.tbeworkideatlfitdinBloekll0dataandareina-wndilionforsafe-operation,anddescribedIll.Block13wuaccompUs•edhiacunlaru:ewltbTitle14.Cedeof0Non-approvedinBlockl;l,Feder.alRegulatloM,part43andIarespecttothatwork.theitemsarf!spprovmror...........rduratoservice.IS.Authorizedto.Approvai!Anlhodzatioa:No.:ll.ApprGvai!CertificateNo.:""'-.---OQTR977Y-·--·17.Name(TypedorPrinkd):18.Date{mfd{9);-..._22.Name(Type'Priated);u.Date(mJdty):--...--..TimothyAishJULY/10/2009User/InstallerResponsibilities]tistollnderstallld•attileaislem:eofthisdocumeut.alonedoesnotsuhJJI\&tlc:aJlteoastieateauthorityfoiastalltbcpart/compcmltbt/a5H"mbly.Wberetheusuliastal&rworkiaaa:ordancewithfilenationalregulationsofanairwerthlnttsautlloritydiffere:ntDiantheairworthinCMnuthorityorthecou11tryspecifiedinBlockI?itkesseati:illlthattheIDtrlinttallereusurathathkllletaut:horit)'aeeep1sparts/eompotteats/assemhliesfmmlhealrworthinessf.ulhorltyoftileceuntryspecifiediaBlockI.Statt:nacnfslnBlocks14andl!JdoaotconstituteInstallationcerllftCIItioa.Joallcues,airc:raflmaintenancerecord!mustcontainaninstallatioaC!ertificalionisSIIMlnaccordaoawUhfilenationalRgulatloasbytltf:UJt:rlinJtallctbeforethemaybeflown.FAAFonn8130-3(6-0I)*Installermustcross-cbccl::eligibilitywithappJic.abletechnicaldata.NSN:0052.00-012-9005Redu!CIIoaAd:Sblemtt;f:An011gancymllfnotcotlduclarsp<>niOf,•nd•IllnotrequiredIafUJIDndta.•o:JitJCtlonoflnft:lrmatlanuntassit•currenllywritOMBC0"1lrolr1vmberamc:itltNwilhlhiOIII»>IoclianDfinfaonelklni1l2120.0018.C:Omi1\Cfllsc:oocn1minvlhoati:I.JI'liCYarttusburdln.and*lggutlons101feli;jl!lngtheburdenshouldbedirededto!heFAAat800lndep1ndanceAW.SW,W•shfllgton,DC20591,Attn:lnfDrmaliolllCo!L!clionQeuanceOF'ker,ABA-20.!ff9g

# Exhibit 8
Letter from Jeffrey Beckerto Frank Lipinski, date March 21, 2011

# c



# c March 21,2011 Mr. Frank V. Lipinski Principal Maintenance Inspector Federal Aviation Administration 145 Hunter Drive • Wilmington, Ohio 45177 • (937)

**382~5591** • www.airbornemx.com

South Florida Certification Management Office 5950 Hazeltine National Dr. Suite 410 Orlando, FL 32822 Subject: Letter received March 7, 2011 re: Capital Cargo International Airlines (CCIA) B727 Flying Door Rigging FAA File Number: 201180290032 Dear Mr. Lipinski: This correspondence is in response to your Letter of Investigation dated March 7, 2011 regarding installation and rigging of B727 Flying Doors on three CCIA aircraft during maintenance visits from June 2009 thru March 2010. First and foremostwe wish to assure you that Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services, Inc. (AMES) takes any apparentviolation on our part very seriously. We also take pride in our review of systemic issues and the high priority placed on implementing corrective actions to mitigate future reoccurrences. In this case, once it became apparent that a valued customer of ours (CCIA) was having operational problems, we initiated a very detailed investigation to review all aspects of the issue. This was not only to resolve any future problems for AMES but also provide to CCIAthe benefit of the results of our investigation to share the lessons learned to further help prevent a reoccurrence not only for us but for CCIA also. A few points in your letter require clarification. The airworthiness release date for each aircraft is listed below based on logpage sign-offs. Some of the dates reflected in your original letter where notthe dates in which the aircraft visit was signed off and released from our facility. 898AA- 10/24/2009, logpage 67443 899AA- 8/26/2009, logpage 46202 287SC- 3/22/2010, logpage 90919 AMES does not have access to aircraft times and cycles, therefore we cannot confirm the cycles of aircraft operation referenced in your letter. Additionally, there was one conduit that was in question due to the door rigging issues encountered in the three aircraft. This was a R/H anti-skid conduit which was installed on tail number 287SC. The conduit is part of the build-up assembly of the gear and AMES technicians did not relocate or alter the routing ofthis conduit prior to installation of the gear on the aircraft (reference Enclosure 1). The results of our review and actions taken were documented on CCIA's Corrective Action Report #'s QAACVG004, QAACVG005 and QAACVG006 (provided as Enclosures 2,3 and 4). The details ofthe investigation and results have been sent to you by CCIA in a letter dated October 25, 2010 in response to your letter dated October 4, 2010 (FAA File number201080290120). We worked very closely with the operator to put a corrective action plan together thatwould prevent the reoccurrence for both our operations. I have summarized the AMES corrective action program below: 1. Developed an online training module MRO-M2-202, 727 MLG DoorTraining Module (Enclosure 5). This module was issued to all Heavy Maintenance Technicians, Line Maintenance Technicians in CVG, and QC Inspectors. A copy was also provided to CCIAfor their use.

# (



# c i45 Hunter Drive • Wilmington, Ohio 451 t t • (937) 382-5591 • ww·w.airbornemx.com 2. The contents of the online training module MRO-M2-202 was incorporated into the AMES 8727 Systems Initial 40 hr training class. These training materials were also provided to CCIA. 3. AMES developed and provided to CCIA a detailed MLG removal/installation task card for RH and LH sides. This included instructions for rigging the flying doors. These cards include detail worksteps with sign offs to prevent a reoccurrence ofthe issues encountered (Enclosure 6 LIH side provided as example). Iwould like to take this final opportunity to restate our commitment to absolute compliance at all times throughout our operations. Anything less is simply not acceptable and we are committed to putting in place the proper training, processes and procedures to prevent reoccurrences. We hope you find this information satisfactory in completing your investigation into this matter. Ifthere is any additional information that you may require please do not hesitate to contact me directly. Sincerely,

Jeffrey Becker Director, Quality Assurance and Training Cc: Alan J. Wilkirnon (FAA, EastMichigan FSDO), Billie R. Steffey (FAA, EastMichigan FSDO), Brady Templeton (AMES, President) Enclosure: I -287SC RJH MLG FAA form 8130 and relevant CMM section 2

- CCIA CAR# QAACVG004 3

- CCIA CAR# QAACVG005 4- CCIA CAR# QAACVG006 5- MRO-M2-202, 727 MLG Door Training Module 6- CCIA Task cards 32-001-01-1 Main Landing Gear- RemovaV!nstallation