2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-14-2014

Daniel Spuck v. Pennsylvania Board of Probatio

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-3375

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Recommended Citation

"Daniel Spuck v. Pennsylvania Board of Probatio" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 401.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-3375

___________

DANIEL L. SPUCK,

 Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION & PAROLE;

ALAN ROBINSON

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-00159)

District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 11, 2014

Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 14, 2014)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant, Daniel Spuck, appeals from the order of the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights action

for failure to state a claim. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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Spuck is currently confined in the State Correctional Institution at Mercer, 

Pennsylvania. Back in June 2010, Spuck submitted a complaint naming as defendants 

the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“the Board”) and Alan Robinson, an 

attorney employed in the Chief Counsel’s office of the Board. Two attempts to amend

the complaint followed. To be certain, Spuck’s complaint is a far cry from a model of 

clarity. In addition to complaining about the Board’s particular policies and procedures 

as applied to him, Spuck alleged that the Board has “no constitutional jurisdiction to deny 

Parole.” See Compl. at 2, IV(C). Spuck also alleged that Defendant Robinson, while 

representing the Board during proceedings before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 

“misled” the court with respect to whether certain exhibits had been made a part of the 

record. Id. at 3. Finally, it appears that Spuck intended to include such state law claims 

as dereliction of duty, fraud, and defamation of character. See id. at 2, III; 2nd Amended 

Compl. at 4, ¶ 18. Spuck sought various forms of injunctive relief and monetary 

damages.

The Board and Defendant Robinson sought to have the complaints dismissed for 

failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Spuck’s action was referred 

to a Magistrate Judge (“MJ”). Even with the liberal construction afforded a pro se

litigant and the opportunity to twice attempt to amend his complaint, the MJ concluded 

that the complaint was subject to summary dismissal. (We note that the MJ determined 

that Spuck’s “amendments” were more accurately viewed as opposition to defendants’ 

motion to dismiss.) The MJ determined that the Board was protected from Spuck’s suit 

by Eleventh Amendment immunity. With respect to Defendant Robinson, the MJ
3

concluded that Robinson could not be held liable for any alleged unconstitutional parole 

board procedures and rules solely by operation of respondeat superior, and that he was 

protected from liability for his conduct during proceedings before the state supreme court 

by prosecutorial immunity. Having determined that further amendment would be futile, 

the MJ issued a Report recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted and that the 

court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Spuck’s state law claims. The 

MJ likewise recommended that Spuck’s Motion to Supplement Newly Discovered 

Evidence, wherein he asserted that he had acquired evidence that a Board member did not 

“properly swear and take the Constitutional oath of Office,” be denied.

After considering Spuck’s objections, the District Court adopted the MJ’s Report 

and Recommendation as the opinion of the court, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss,

and denied the motion to supplement. This timely appeal followed.

We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary 

review over the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss. See Lora-Pena v. 

F.B.I., 529 F.3d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 2008). In doing so, we presume the complaint’s wellpleaded facts to be true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). “To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Initially, we note that Spuck does not appear to challenge the District Court’s 

dismissal of the Board on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. See Kost v. 
4

Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (An appellant is “required to set forth the 

issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in support of those issues in [his] 

opening brief.”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5). Even if this issue were not waived, it 

is meritless. As the District Court correctly determined, the Eleventh Amendment affords 

the Board protection from suit in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 

U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam)). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its 

rights under the Eleventh Amendment. See Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 

195 (3d Cir. 2000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. ' 8521(b). Additionally, Spuck did not allege 

that Defendant Robinson had any personal involvement in the parole suitability 

determination, and thus he could not be liable for an alleged constitutional violation. See

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 

U.S. 527, 537 n.3 (1981) (liability in a civil rights action cannot be predicated solely on 

the operation of respondeat superior)). 

Spuck does, however, specifically challenge the District Court’s determination 

that Defendant Robinson is entitled to immunity for his actions in representing the Board 

in proceedings before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. While we have not addressed 

this direct issue, we discern no error with the District Court’s conclusion that a state 

agency attorney should be afforded such protection from liability in damages when 

carrying out courtroom functions. See, e.g., Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 

178 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991), and noting that 

absolute immunity attaches to those who perform functions integral to the judicial 
5

process); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1986) (extending absolute 

immunity to defending government litigators); Fry v. Melaragna, 939 F.2d 832, 837 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (extending absolute immunity to government attorneys involved in civil tax 

litigation in a state or federal court).

The other contentions that Spuck raises in his informal brief are likewise meritless 

and we dispose of them with little discussion. Spuck contends that the District Court 

erred in denying his request to supplement his filings with “newly discovered evidence 

that Appellee/Defendant Mangino was not eligible to preside or interview Appellant for 

parole,” see Informal Br. at 3, because he was not “properly sworn in and or did not 

satisfy the requirements to be a legal Pennsylvania Board Member.” See Mot. to 

Supplement Newly Discovered Evidence. However, Spuck did not name Mangino in his 

complaint nor did he seek to add him as a defendant in the two “amended complaints” 

that followed. While Spuck did make mention of Mangino in his third response to 

defendants’ motion to dismiss, he did not have permission to file an amended complaint

at this point and no additional parties were served. Spuck is a seasoned pro se litigant

and was advised of the proper manner in which to file a proposed amended complaint. 

His failure to follow procedure appears to be an ongoing problem. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Spuck, -- A.3d --, 2014 WL 527024, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 

2014)(noting Spuck’s “flagrant failure to file a brief that conforms to the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Appellate procedure”). As such, we cannot conclude that the District Court 

abused its discretion in handling his filings in the manner it did. Moreover, in light of the 

nature of the factual allegations set forth in Spuck’s filings, we further find no abuse of 
6

discretion on the part of the District Court in determining that allowing him leave to 

further amend his complaint would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State 

Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

Spuck’s final contention on appeal is that the District Court “incorrectly 

permitted” the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to allow appellees to file a “second 

preliminary objection” to various challenges that he had made on appeal with respect to 

the Board’s past decisions to deny him parole. (Spuck had attached the Board’s decisions 

issued in 2007 and 2009 to his filings in the District Court.) As best we can decipher this 

claim, Spuck seeks to lodge some type of challenge against the decision of the state 

appellate court. Even assuming arguendo that such a claim had been properly presented 

to the District Court, review would have been precluded by the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine, which provides that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to sit 

in direct review of state court decisions. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

1

 

1

 We would further note that Spuck’s attempts to challenge the Board’s decisions 

denying him parole would face their own issues in a § 1983 action. Even if Spuck had 

filed a proper amended complaint naming the individual Board members, his requests for 

monetary damages as a result of those adverse decisions would likely be precluded by the 

favorable termination bar set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

Additionally, he would be required to seek relief via a petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 in order to proceed with any claim which could be construed as containing a 

request for release from confinement or expressly seeking to overturn the results of his 

prior parole proceedings. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78-82 (2005).

Assuming for the sake of argument that any of the arguments set forth in Spuck’s 

filings could be construed as due process claims appropriately presented in a § 1983

complaint and assuming proper exhaustion, we conclude that he nonetheless failed to 

state a claim for relief. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
7

Having dismissed all of Spuck’s claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the 

District Court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over his state law claims. See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 

169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 

curiam) (We “may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the 

record.”). While states may, under certain circumstances, create liberty interests that are 

protected by the due process clause, see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), 

procedural due process is generally satisfied if the procedures employed afford notice of 

the hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and notice of any adverse action. See Greenholtz 

v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). Spuck has not alleged 

that the Board members did not comply with these procedures. Nor has he stated a claim 

for a substantive due process violation as he would have to show that the violation 

involved action that shocks the conscience. See Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 

418, 425 (3d Cir. 2006). “[F]ederal courts are not authorized by the due process clause to 

second-guess parole boards and the requirements of substantive due process are met if 

there is some basis for the challenged decision.” Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 

(3d Cir. 2001). From a review of the Board decisions that Spuck himself provided, there 

is no indication that the Board weighed his parole suitability factors in an arbitrary 

manner, let alone in a “conscience-shocking” one.