*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publicat ion of opinions that have no precedential value and

merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles oflaw imposes needless expense

on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 95-10452

Summary Calendar

___________________

STEPHEN BROWN

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Defendant-Appellee,

_______________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas 

(3:94 CV 1940 X)

______________________________________

September 13, 1995

BEFORE REYNALDO G. GARZA, KING, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM* 

Stephen Brown, a federal inmate and citizen ofJamaica, was arrested and searched when he

arrived at the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, via airplane. He was found in possession of cocaine with

intent to distribute and Drug Enforcement Agents confiscated $43,400, personal baggage, and

documents found during the search after his arrest. He subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of

cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to commit the same, and reentry of a deported alien and

isserving a sentence for these offenses. After this plea of guilty, he filed a pro se "Motion to Recover

Illegally Seized Property," in which he wanted to recover the $43,400, personal luggage and

documents confiscated by the DEA agents when he was searched. In his motion for relief, he asked
2

compensatory damages for loss of his property, including the $43,400 that was seized at the airport

and, in addition to $100 per day for each day that he had been deprived of his property. 

His case was sent to a magistrate judge who reported to the district court that the Court of

Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction of all constitutional claims against the federal government

for money damages exceeding $10,000. See, the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 2 

§1491(a)(1)) and the "Little Tucker Act" (28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2)). See also, Preseault v. I.C.C. 494

U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 914 (1990). The magistrate recommended that the plaintiff's complaint be

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). The district court in the Northern District of Texas followed

the recommendation and dismissed Brown's "Motion to Recover Illegally Seized Property". 

Brown did not file a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. However, some six months

later Brown filed a motion to reconsider the district court's decision. The district court denied the

motion and Brown filed a timely notice of appeal as to denial of the motion. 

We first must find that what he has filed can be denominated as Rule 60(b) motion. That

motion however, cannot serve as an appeal to the original judgment where he sought hisfirst attempt

to get his money back. This court cannot treat his 60(b) motion as an appeal from the underlying

judgment that Brown is complaining of. Aucoin v. K-Mart Apparel FashionCorp., 943 F.2d 6, 8 (5th

Cir. 1991). Brown therefore cannot challenge the original judgment but can only raise on appeal the

district court's denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. 

A denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. We find no such abuse

in this case. We see not hing in the record to allow the court to grant the motion on any kind of

mistake, excusable neglect or of fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct of an adverse party, or any

other reason that a 60(b) motion allows a court to grant relief. 

The underlying judgment that Brown filed his 60(b) motion for reconsiderationwas dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction. Nothing that a 60(b) motion could be granted on is present. The denial of

the 60(b) motion is hereby AFFIRMED.