IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DAVID J. BUCHANAN, Defendant Below, Appellant,

v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. § § § No. 357, 2016 § § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware, § § Cr. ID No. 0801031784 § § § Submitted: October 24, 2016 Decided: December 12, 2016

Before STRINE , Chief Justice; VAUGHN , and SEITZ , Justices.

ORDER

This 12 th day of December 2016, upon consideration of the ap pellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to

the Court that: (1) The appellant, David J. Buchanan, filed this appeal from a Superior Court order denying his motion for modification of probation. The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Buchanan’s opening brief th at his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm. (2) The record reflects that, in September 2008, a Supe rior Court jury convicted Buchanan of Burglary in the Third Degree, Resisting Arrest, Criminal2

Contempt, three counts of Possession of a Firearm b y a Person Prohibited, and two counts of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon. Buch anan was sentenced to nine years of non-suspended Level V incarceration, follo wed by decreasing levels of supervision. On appeal, this Court affirmed all of Buchanan’s convictions, except for the Burglary in the Third Degree conviction. 1 On May 21, 2014, after Buchanan had filed numerous, unsuccessful motions c hallenging his convictions, we directed the Clerk of the Court to refuse any fi ling from Buchanan unless the filing was accompanied by the required filing fee o r the filing was accompanied by a completed motion to proceed in forma pauperis , with the necessary certifications, and that motion was first granted by the Court. 2 (3) On March 28, 2016, Buchanan filed a motion to modif y his sentence. Buchanan asked the Superior Court to terminate his curfew or end his probation so he could begin working as a commercial truck driver . The State opposed

modification until there was verification of Buchan an’s employment. Buchanan subsequently filed a letter indicating that while h e was disqualified from working for the initial trucking company he had identified in his motion, he had found another job that would still require termination of his curfew or probation. The Superior Court denied the motion. This appeal foll owed.

1 Buchanan v. State , 981 A.2d 1098 (Del. 2009). 2 Buchanan v. State , 2014 WL 2159325, at *1 (Del. May 21, 2014).3

(4) On July 12, 2016, this Court issued a notice direct ing Buchanan to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed f or his failure to comply with the May 21, 2014 order. Buchanan filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and responded to the notice to show cause. After t he State indicated it was their position that Buchanan had complied with the Court’ s May 21, 2014 order, the notice to show cause was discharged. (5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion u nder Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) for abuse of discretion. 3 To the extent the claim involves a question of law, we review the claim de novo

. 4 Under Rule 35(b), the Superior Court “may ... reduce the fine or term or conditions of partial confinement or probation, at any time.” (6) In his opening brief, Buchanan does not make any ar guments regarding the impact of his probation terms on his search for employment. Instead, he rehashes and reframes claims he has previously m ade against his convictions and argues that his convictions should be vacated. These claims are without merit. (7) First, Rule 61, not Rule 35, is the exclusive remed y for a person seeking to set aside a judgment of conviction. 5 Second, we will not revisit claims

3 State v. Lewis , 797 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Del. 2002). 4 Weber v. State , 2015 WL 2329160, at *1 (Del. May 12, 2015). 5 Super. Ct. 61(a)(2).4

that we have previously addressed and rejected. 6 We conclude that the Superior Court did not err in finding Buchanan’s sentence re mained reasonable and appropriate and denying termination of Buchanan’s c urfew or probation so he could take a position that required him to be gone for days. As the Superior Court noted, it had already granted Buchanan’s request fo r a Level III interstate transfer

so he could relocate to care for his mother in Flor ida. We remind Buchanan that he is barred from litigating claims in this Court that have been raised or disposed of before in any court. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to af firm is GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is A FFIRMED.

BY THE COURT: /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Justice

6 See, e.g., Buchanan v. State , 2011 WL 3452148, at *2-3 (Del. Aug. 8, 2011) (rej ecting Buchanan’s attacks on protection from abuse order, search of property, and traffic stop and affirming denial of Buchanan’s first Rule 61 motion ); State v. Buchanan , 2014 WL 704408, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2014) (holding arguments based upon protection from abuse order were barred as previously adjudicated under Rule 61), aff’d , 2014 WL 2159325 (Del. May 21, 2014).