IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

DAVID J. BUCHANAN, 

Defendant Below, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

Plaintiff Below, 

Appellee. 

§ 

§ 

§ No. 357, 2016 

§ 

§ Court Below—Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware, 

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 0801031784 

§ 

§ 

§ 

 

 Submitted: October 24, 2016 

 Decided: December 12, 2016 

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 

ORDER

This 12th day of December 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s 

opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to 

the Court that: 

(1) The appellant, David J. Buchanan, filed this appeal from a Superior 

Court order denying his motion for modification of probation. The State of 

Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is 

manifest on the face of Buchanan’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit. 

We agree and affirm. 

(2) The record reflects that, in September 2008, a Superior Court jury 

convicted Buchanan of Burglary in the Third Degree, Resisting Arrest, Criminal 
2 

Contempt, three counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and two 

counts of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon. Buchanan was sentenced to nine 

years of non-suspended Level V incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of 

supervision. On appeal, this Court affirmed all of Buchanan’s convictions, except 

for the Burglary in the Third Degree conviction.1 On May 21, 2014, after 

Buchanan had filed numerous, unsuccessful motions challenging his convictions, 

we directed the Clerk of the Court to refuse any filing from Buchanan unless the 

filing was accompanied by the required filing fee or the filing was accompanied by 

a completed motion to proceed in forma pauperis, with the necessary certifications, 

and that motion was first granted by the Court.2

(3) On March 28, 2016, Buchanan filed a motion to modify his sentence. 

Buchanan asked the Superior Court to terminate his curfew or end his probation so 

he could begin working as a commercial truck driver. The State opposed 

modification until there was verification of Buchanan’s employment. Buchanan 

subsequently filed a letter indicating that while he was disqualified from working 

for the initial trucking company he had identified in his motion, he had found 

another job that would still require termination of his curfew or probation. The 

Superior Court denied the motion. This appeal followed. 

 

1

Buchanan v. State, 981 A.2d 1098 (Del. 2009). 

2

Buchanan v. State, 2014 WL 2159325, at *1 (Del. May 21, 2014). 
3 

(4) On July 12, 2016, this Court issued a notice directing Buchanan to 

show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for his failure to comply with 

the May 21, 2014 order. Buchanan filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis 

and responded to the notice to show cause. After the State indicated it was their 

position that Buchanan had complied with the Court’s May 21, 2014 order, the 

notice to show cause was discharged. 

(5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion under Superior 

Court Criminal Rule 35(b) for abuse of discretion.3

 To the extent the claim 

involves a question of law, we review the claim de novo.

4

 Under Rule 35(b), the 

Superior Court “may ... reduce the fine or term or conditions of partial confinement 

or probation, at any time.” 

(6) In his opening brief, Buchanan does not make any arguments 

regarding the impact of his probation terms on his search for employment. Instead, 

he rehashes and reframes claims he has previously made against his convictions 

and argues that his convictions should be vacated. These claims are without merit. 

(7) First, Rule 61, not Rule 35, is the exclusive remedy for a person 

seeking to set aside a judgment of conviction.5

 Second, we will not revisit claims 

 

3

State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Del. 2002). 

4 Weber v. State, 2015 WL 2329160, at *1 (Del. May 12, 2015). 

5

 Super. Ct. 61(a)(2). 
4 

that we have previously addressed and rejected.6 We conclude that the Superior 

Court did not err in finding Buchanan’s sentence remained reasonable and 

appropriate and denying termination of Buchanan’s curfew or probation so he 

could take a position that required him to be gone for days. As the Superior Court 

noted, it had already granted Buchanan’s request for a Level III interstate transfer 

so he could relocate to care for his mother in Florida. We remind Buchanan that he 

is barred from litigating claims in this Court that have been raised or disposed of 

before in any court. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.

 Justice

 

6

See, e.g., Buchanan v. State, 2011 WL 3452148, at *2-3 (Del. Aug. 8, 2011) (rejecting 

Buchanan’s attacks on protection from abuse order, search of property, and traffic stop and 

affirming denial of Buchanan’s first Rule 61 motion); State v. Buchanan, 2014 WL 704408, at *3 

(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2014) (holding arguments based upon protection from abuse order were 

barred as previously adjudicated under Rule 61), aff’d, 2014 WL 2159325 (Del. May 21, 2014).