alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 243 (Wednesday, December 20, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Page 88059]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-27881]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 2628-000]


Alabama Power Company; Notice of Authorization for Continued 
Project Operation

    The license for the R.L. Harris Hydroelectric Project No. 2628 was 
issued for a period ending November 30, 2023.
    Section 15(a)(1) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 808(a)(1), requires the 
Commission, at the expiration of a license term, to issue from year-to-
year an annual license to the then licensee(s) under the terms and 
conditions of the prior license until a new license is issued, or the 
project is otherwise disposed of as provided in section 15 or any other 
applicable section of the FPA. If the project's prior license waived 
the applicability of section 15 of the FPA, then, based on section 9(b) 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 558(c), and as set forth 
at 18 CFR 16.21(a), if the licensee of such project has filed an 
application for a subsequent license, the licensee may continue to 
operate the project in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
license after the minor or minor part license expires, until the 
Commission acts on its application. If the licensee of such a project 
has not filed an application for a subsequent license, then it may be 
required, pursuant to 18 CFR 16.21(b), to continue project operations 
until the Commission issues someone else a license for the project or 
otherwise orders disposition of the project.
    If the project is subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that an annual license for Project No. 2628 is issued to 
Alabama Power Company for a period effective December 1, 2023, through 
November 30, 2024, or until the issuance of a new license for the 
project or other disposition under the FPA, whichever comes first. If 
issuance of a new license (or other disposition) does not take place on 
or before November 30, 2024, notice is hereby given that, pursuant to 
18 CFR 16.18(c), an annual license under section 15(a)(1) of the FPA is 
renewed automatically without further order or notice by the 
Commission, unless the Commission orders otherwise.
    If the project is not subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that Alabama Power Company is authorized to continue 
operation of the R.L. Harris Hydroelectric Project under the terms and 
conditions of the prior license until the issuance of a subsequent 
license for the project or other disposition under the FPA, whichever 
comes first.

    Dated: December 13, 2023.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-27881 Filed 12-19-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
Exhibit 10.67

 

SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE
 LAUREATE EDUCATION, INC. 2013 LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN

 

This Second Amendment to the Laureate Education, Inc. 2013 Long-Term Incentive Plan (this “Second Amendment”), effective as of December 14, 2016, is made and entered into by Laureate Education, Inc., a Delaware public corporation (the “Company”). Terms used in this Amendment with initial capital letters that are not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Laureate Education, Inc. 2013 Long-Term Incentive Plan (the “Plan”).

 

RECITALS

 

WHEREAS, Article 15 of the Plan provides that the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) may amend the Plan at any time; and

 

WHEREAS, the Board desires to amend the Plan, to increase the aggregate number of shares of Common Stock issuable pursuant to Awards that may be granted under the Plan as set forth in Article 5 of the Plan; and

 

WHEREAS, the Board intends to submit this Amendment to the Company’s shareholders for approval.

 

NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with Article 15 of the Plan, the Company hereby amends the Plan as follows:

 

1.              Section 5(a) of the Plan is hereby amended by deleting said section in its entirety and substituting in lieu thereof the following new Section 5(a):

 

5(a)                          Initial Share Pool.  As of the effective date of the Second Amendment, the number of shares of Common Stock issuable pursuant to Awards that may be granted under the Plan (the “Share Pool”) shall be equal to the sum of (i) 48,683,673 shares plus (ii) the number of unallocated shares of Common Stock available for issuance as of the Effective Date under Laureate’s 2007 Plan that are not then subject to outstanding Awards.

 

2.              This Amendment shall be effective on the date first set forth above. In the event shareholder approval of this Amendment is not obtained within twelve (12) months of the date the Board approved this Amendment, the additional shares added to the Plan pursuant to this Amendment shall not be available for grant as incentive stock options within the meaning of Section 422 of the Code.

 

3.              Except as expressly amended by this Amendment, the Plan shall continue in full force and effect in accordance with the provisions thereof.

 

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank Signature Page Follows]

 











 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be duly executed as of the date first written above.

 

	
 
    	
LAUREATE   EDUCATION, INC.
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
By:
    	
/s/   Robert W. Zentz
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Name:
    	
Robert W.   Zentz
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Title:
    	
Senior   Vice President and General Counsel
IV 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 552 

Expressing support for health and wellness coaches and ‘‘National Health 

and Wellness Coach Recognition Week’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 3, 2015 

Mr. PAYNE (for himself, Mr. MULLIN, Mr. BUCHANAN, Mrs. NAPOLITANO, 

and Mr. RYAN of Ohio) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing support for health and wellness coaches and 

‘‘National Health and Wellness Coach Recognition Week’’. 

Whereas, January 11, 2016, through January 17, 2016, is 

‘‘National Health and Wellness Coach Recognition 

Week’’; 

Whereas lifestyle-related chronic diseases are at the heart of 

the current health care crisis in the United States; 

Whereas the United States Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention has deemed chronic disease ‘‘the public health 

challenge of the 21st century’’; 

Whereas decades of research have linked lifestyle factors, 

such as inactivity, poor diet, tobacco smoking, and sustained stress, with increased risk for major illnesses and 

death; 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HRES 552 IH 

Whereas attempts to reduce these lifestyle-related chronic disease and costs have proven to be financially unsustainable within a system that rewards hospitalizations and 

invasive procedures; 

Whereas incentives for interventions and technologies that 

achieve desired outcomes such as outpatient care, risk 

management, patient support, and health coaching should 

be encouraged; 

Whereas a large gap exists between health care provider recommendations and sustainable health-related behavior 

change; 

Whereas health coaches are a new type of health care worker 

who serve as wellness guides and supportive mentors that 

motivate individuals to cultivate positive health choices 

and move them toward those specific goals; 

Whereas health coaches serve a vital role in improving an individual’s wellness that complements and does not replace 

the work of health care professionals; and 

Whereas there are an increasing number of studies that show 

the effectiveness of health and wellness coaches in improving individual health and wellness and reducing 

health care costs: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

2 (1) supports the designation of ‘‘National 

3 Health and Wellness Coach Recognition Week’’; and 

4 (2) support the efforts of health and wellness 

5 coaches of the United States on their important 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
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•HRES 552 IH 

1 work to improve the health and wellness of the Na2 tion. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 1, 2018

No. 04-17-00775-CR

Silas WIRTH,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CR9447

Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The trial court’s certification in this appeal states that “this criminal case is a plea-bargain 

case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” The clerk’s record contains a written plea 

bargain, and the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the 

prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant; therefore, the trial court’s certification accurately 

reflects that the criminal case is a plea-bargain case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Rule 

25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, “The appeal must be dismissed if a 

certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record 

under these rules.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). It is therefore ORDERED that this appeal will be 

dismissed pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure unless appellant 

causes an amended trial court certification to be filed within thirty (30) days from the date of 

this order showing appellant has the right of appeal.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); 37.1; see also 

Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 2003, order). All other appellate 

deadlines are SUSPENDED pending our resolution of the certification issue.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

 

1 We note that the clerk’s record does not contain a notice of appeal, only a “Motion for Extension of Time to File 

Late Notice of Appeal.”
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 1st day of February, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
# C_2022198EN.01000301.xml

| 16.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 198/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 198/3

---

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 March 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy — Poland) — M.F. v J.M.

(Case C-508/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 267 TFEU - Interpretation sought by the referring court necessary to enable it to give judgment - Concept - Disciplinary proceedings brought against a judge of an ordinary court - Designation of the disciplinary court having jurisdiction to hear those proceedings by the President of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) - Civil action for a declaration that a service relationship does not exist between the President of that disciplinary chamber and the Supreme Court - Lack of jurisdiction of the referring court to review the validity of the appointment of a Supreme Court judge and inadmissibility of such an action under national law - Inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling)

(2022/C 198/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Najwyższy

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: M.F.

Defendant: J.M.

Intervening party: Prokurator Generalny, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich

Operative part of the judgment

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Izba Pracy i Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) (Supreme Court (Labour and Social Insurance Chamber), Poland) is inadmissible.

---

(1)  OJ C 337, 7.10.2019.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jeffrey Doty, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously modified as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and as modified affirmed, in accordance with the following Memorandum: From our review of the record, we find that defendant’s conviction of felony murder, robbery, and criminally negligent homicide was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence *(see, People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495). We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its *Sandoval*ruling *(see, e.g., People v Conwell,*168 AD2d 906). We conclude, however, that the imposition of 25 years to life imprisonment for felony murder was excessive *(see,*CPL 470.15 [6] [b]). Decedent’s tragic death resulted from a subdural hematoma caused by a single punch to the eye during an argument with defendant. Although defendant had numerous convictions stemming from his addiction to alcohol prior to this incident, he had never been convicted of a felony. Given those circumstances, we modify the judgment by reducing his sentence for felony murder to 15 years to life imprisonment.

Defendant’s remaining contention has not been preserved for our review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]). (Appeal from Judgment of Cayuga County Court, Contiguglia, J. — Murder, 2nd Degree.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Lawton, Lowery and Davis, JJ.
# C_2021138EN.01000501.xml

| 19.4.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 138/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.4.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/5

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 25 February 2021 — John Dalli v European Commission

(Case C-615/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Action for damages - Non-contractual liability of the European Union - Allegedly illegal conduct of the European Commission and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) - Termination of office of a Member of the Commission - Procedural rules governing the OLAF investigation - Opening of an investigation - Right to be heard - OLAF Supervisory Committee - Presumption of innocence - Assessment of the alleged damage)

(2021/C 138/06)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: John Dalli (represented by: L. Levi and S. Rodrigues, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: J.P. Keppenne and J. Baquero Cruz, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Mr John Dalli to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr John Dalli to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

---

(1)  OJ C 328, 30.9.2019.

---
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 7669** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. RENE ELLIS, a/k/a Money, a/k/a Nut , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Columbia
. Cameron McGowan Currie , Senior District Judge. ( 3:01

- cr - 01024

- CMC

- 7; 3:14

- cv - 03607

- CMC )

Submitted : January 14, 2016 Decided: January 20, 2016

Before AGEE, WYNN, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Rene Ellis, Appellant Pro Se. Jimmie Ewing, Marshall Prince, II, Assistant United States Attorneys, Nancy Chastain Wicker, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Colu mbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Rene Ellis seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion as successive . We dismiss the appeal fo r lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than 60 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requ irement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on September 11, 2014 . The notice of appeal was filed on September 25, 2015
. * Because Ellis failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

* For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988).3 in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Brenda Franck, Respondent, v CNY Anesthesia Group, Appellant.

— Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. Memorandum: Plaintiff failed to demonstrate an acceptable excuse for her failure to file a note of issue within the 90-day demand period or the existence of a meritorious cause of action, and the motion to dismiss her medical malpractice complaint should have been granted *(see,*CPLR 3216 [e]; *Walker v Town of Lockport,*109 AD2d 1102, *affd*65 NY2d 840; *Young v Tompkins,*124 AD2d 1061; *MacLeod v Nolte,*106 AD2d 860). Supreme Court erred in concluding that settlement negotiations with a codefendant well after expiration of the 90-day demand period constituted an acceptable excuse for the failure to file a note of issue *(see, Berna v Monroe Community Coll.,*91 AD2d 1199). Further, neither the fact that plaintiff filed a note of issue more than a year after service of defendant’s demand nor the inconvenience resulting from plaintiff’s relocation to Maine shortly after commencement of the action amounts to an acceptable excuse *(see, Scott v Columbia Mem. Hosp.,*134 AD2d 792; *Young v Tompkins, supra).*

Plaintiff’s submission of the hospital records and the letter report of a plastic surgeon was not sufficient to show a meritorious cause of action. These materials describe the events resulting in plaintiff’s injury and the nature of that injury, but fail to state whether the injury was caused by a departure from accepted standards of medical care *(see, Fileccia v Massapequa Gen. Hosp.,*99 AD2d 796, *affd*63 NY2d 639; *Wind v Cacho,*111 AD2d 808, *appeal dismissed*67 NY2d 871; *Nelson v Eastman Dental Center,*85 AD2d 887). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Miller, J. — Dismiss Complaint.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Boomer, Pine, Balio and Davis, JJ.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 17-2280

___________________________

Derrick Wayne Walker

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Tyson Foods Inc

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

____________

Submitted: May 9, 2018

Filed: May 24, 2018

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Derrick Walker appeals after the district court1adversely granted a motion to

dismiss his complaint as untimely or in the alternative for summary judgment on the

1The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.
merits. Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal,

we conclude that the district court did not err in its decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1) (suit filed under Title VII must be brought within ninety days after receipt of

right-to-sue letter from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); Hill v. John

Chezik Imps., 869 F.2d 1122, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing equitable tolling);

see also Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en

banc) (standard of review for summary judgment decisions). We also conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker appointed counsel.

See Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review;

there is no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel in civil cases).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-2-
1 In The



### Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO

. 09

- 1 5

- 00 256

- C R



### ____________________

IN RE WILLIAM DURHAM

_______________________________________________________ ______________

Original Proceeding

________________________________________________________ _____________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

William Durham petitioned for a writ of mandamus

, in which he asks that

the court compel the District Clerk of Liberty County, Texas to process his

application for a post

- conviction writ of habeas corpus. See generally Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (West 2015). The petition does not invoke this Court’s

mandamus jurisdiction. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 (West 2004) (A court

of appeals may issue a writ of mandamus against a judge of a district or county

court in the court’s district, or issue a writ that is necessary to enforce the

jurisdiction of the court.); see also P adieu v. Court o f Appeals of Tex

. , Fifth Dist.

,

392 S.W.3d 115 , 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ( instructing that t he Texas Court of2 Criminal Appeals possesses sole authority to grant relief in a post

- conviction

habeas corpus proceeding filed in state court). Accordingly, we dismiss the petition

for writ of mandamus.

PETITION DISMISS ED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on July 14, 2015

Opinion Delivered July 15, 2015

Do Not Publish

Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
July 25, 1997

19305

#### Kaleialoha v. Dobis

Affirmed
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed

February 2 , 2021

.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 21

- 00059

- CR

IN RE LEONARD TYRONE TEAL , Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 179th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1091458



### MEMORANDUM OPINION
January 26, 2021 , relator Leonard Tyrone Teal filed a petition for writ of

m andamus in this court

. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App.
P. 52. In the petition, relator ask s this court to compel the Honorable Marilyn Burgess , Harris County District Clerk , to bring relator’s motion for DNA testing to
the attention of the trial court

.2

This court’s mandamus jurisdiction is gove rned by section 22.221 of the Texas Government Code. A court of appeals may issue writs of mandamus against (1) a judge of a district, statutory county, statutory probate county, or county court in the court of appeals district; (2) a judge of a district court who is acting as a magistrate at a court of inquiry under Chapter 52 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in the court of appeals district; or (3) an associate judge of a district or county court appointed by a judge under Chapter 201 of the Texas Family Code in the court of appeals district for the judge who appointed the associate judge. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221(b). The courts of appeals also may issue all writs necessary to enforce the court of appeals’ jurisdiction. Id. § 22.221(a).

Th e Harris County District Clerk is not among the parties specified section 22.221(b). See id. § 22.221(b)

. Moreover, relator has not shown that the issuance of a writ compelling the requested relief is necessary to enforce our appellate jurisdiction. See id. § 22.221( a ). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against the Harris County District Clerk Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Relator’s motion for lea ve to file a petition for writ of mandamus is
dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel c onsists of Justices Wise , Hassan, and Wilson. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).