alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Hancock *v.*Philadelphia *&*Reading Railway Co., Appellant.

*Workmen’s compensation*— Railroads—Death—Interstate *cars.*

In a proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act against a railroad company to recover damages for the death of an employee of the defendant, where the defendant sets up as a defense, that the deceased was engaged in moving interstate commerce cars at the time he was killed, a finding of the compensation hoard is conclusive, which in effect was that the cars of coal in the train, upon which the deceased was working, were being transported from the mines to different yards within the State, for the convenience of the shipper, and that the subsequent shipments of any of them upon which the deceased had worked to a point without the State, were made after his death, and after the train crew with which he had worked, had severed its connection with the cars.

Argued Feb. 17, 1919.

Appeal, No. 64, Jan. T., 1919, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Schuylkill Co., March T., 1918, No. 234, affirming award of Workmen’s Compensation Board, in case of Margaret L. Hancock v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company.

Before Brown, C. J., Stewart, Moschzisker, Walling and Kephart, JJ.

Affirmed.

Appeal from award of Workmen’s Compensation Board. Before Bechtel, P. J.

The court affirmed the award and dismissed the appeal.

*Error assigned*was in discharging exceptions to the award.

*221*George Gowen Parry,*with Mm *John F. Whalen,*for appellant.

*L. L. Frank*and *R. A. Reick,*for appellee,

were not heard.

March 24, 1919:

Per Curiam,

The sole contention of the appellant is that at the time the deceased was killed he was engaged in moving interstate commerce cars. This was a question of fact, and the finding of the compensation board was that the cars of coal in the train upon which the deceased was working were being transported from the mines to different yards within the State, for the convenience of the shipper, and that the subsequent shipments of any of them upon which the deceased had worked to a point without the State were made after Ms death and after the train crew with which he had worked had severed its connection with the cars. This finding was conclusive upon the learned court below: Poluskiewicz v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Company, 257 Pa. 305.

Appeal dismissed and award affirmed.
#### The State, ex rel. Forsberg, *v.*Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County et al.

(No. 32085

Decided April 19, 1950.)

*Mr. George J. McMonagle*and *Mr. Warren O. Smith,*for relator.

*Mr. Frank T. Cullitan,*prosecuting attorney, and *Mr. Saul S. Danaceau,*for respondents.

The question involved being moot, the cause is dismissed, *sua sponte,*on authority of *Miner*v. *Witt, City Clerk,*82 Ohio St., 237, 92 N. E., 21.

*Cause dismissed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Matthias, Hart, Stewart, Turner and Taet, JJ., concur.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 19, 2021

No. 04-20-00515-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF V.S., A CHILD

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019PA00518

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant V.S.’s motion for leave to file his brief late is GRANTED. Appellant V.S.’s 

brief was filed on January 19, 2021.

_________________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 19th day of January, 2021.

___________________________________

Michael A. Cruz, 

Clerk of Court
**Exhibit 32.2**

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Unify Corporation (the “Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended July 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Steven D. Bonham, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:

|   |           (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the   Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and                              |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|   |           (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material   respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the   Registrant. |

| Dated:    September 13, 2006 | /s/ STEVEN   D. BONHAM    |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|
|                              |                           |
|                              | Steven D.   Bonham        |
|                              | Chief Financial   Officer |

*A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Unify Corporation and will be retained by Unify Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.*
#### In the Matter of New Life Fellowship, Inc., Petitioner, v City of Cortland, Respondent.

Mikoll, J. P.

Proceeding initiated in this court pursuant to EDPL 207 to review a determination of respondent which condemned a portion of petitioner’s land as the site for construction of a public parking lot.

In this proceeding, petitioner seeks a declaration that the *344eminent domain proceedings commenced by respondent to condemn a portion of petitioner’s real property for use as a public parking lot are null and void in that they were not brought in compliance with EDPL 202 (A) and were otherwise illegal in that a public benefit would not be served by the condemnation. The first issue to be determined here is whether respondent’s failure to publish notice of the public hearing as required by EDPL 202 (A) invalidates the subsequent condemnation proceedings. The statute requires that a: "condemnor shall give notice to the public of the purpose, time and location of its hearing setting forth the proposed location of the public project * * * by causing such notice to be published in at least five successive issues of an official daily newspaper if there is one designated in the locality where the project will be situated and in at least five successive issues of a daily newspaper of general circulation in such locality” (EDPL 202 [A]).

Respondent concedes that it published notice of the public hearing on only three dates in the local paper but urges that the oversight did not deprive petitioner of any due process rights and should be disregarded in light of EDPL 202 (C), which states that the "[ijnadvertent failure to notify a person or persons entitled to notice under this section shall not be jurisdictional nor construed to affect the validity of any title acquired by a condemnor under this law”.

The logic of respondent’s argument is flawed. EDPL 202 (C) deals with notification of persons entitled to notice, while EDPL 202 (A) prescribes publication procedures to advise the public of the condemnation. The stringent public notice requirements of EDPL are intended to afford the public an exercise of its right to be heard and are jurisdictional in nature. The interpretation of the statute proposed by respondent would render EDPL 202 (A) meaningless. "[A] construction is favored which harmonizes the various provisions of the statute with each other and with the general intent of the statute” *(Matter of Anderson v Board of Educ.,*46 AD2d 360, 364-365, *affd*38 NY2d 897).

The failure to comply with EDPL 202 (A) invalidates any subsequent proceedings under the EDPL. The publishing of the notice as required by the EDPL is a condition precedent to further proceedings by respondent *(see, Green v Oneida-Madison Elec. Coop.,*134 AD2d 897).

Respondent is therefore enjoined from proceeding pursuant to EDPL article 4 until it has fully complied with the notice *345requirements of EDPL 204 (A). Having so found we decline to address the remaining contentions raised by petitioner.

Levine, Mercure and Crew III, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is annulled, with costs, and petition granted.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATIONS BY THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Education Management Corporation
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert T. McDowell, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, hereby certify in such capacity, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the periods reflected
therein.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: November 9, 2005



By:

/s/    ROBERT T.
MCDOWELLRobert T. McDowell Chief Financial Officer
1 of 2

4.15 Sterile Diluents 

The Center for Veterinary Biologics (CVB) does not consider Sterile Diluent to be a veterinary 

biological product; however, licensees must provide the proper amount of Sterile Diluent with 

each licensed veterinary biological product when diluent is required for rehydration or dilution of 

the product. 

Guidance and regulations regarding Sterile Diluent are included in: 

 Veterinary Services Memorandum 800.74 

 9CFR 112.3, 112.6, and 113.54 

Location of manufacture 

Sterile Diluents may be prepared in USDA-licensed establishments or unlicensed facilities, 

provided the conditions outlined in V.S. Memo 800.74 are met. Diluent used in licensed 

exported products may be manufactured in foreign, unlicensed facilities. In general, diluents for 

products distributed in the United States should be manufactured in the U.S., due to issues 

related to inspection of foreign manufacturing facilities. The location of manufacture is specified 

in a Special Outline filed by the licensee. In the case of diluent prepared in a foreign 

manufacturing facility that contains ingredients of animal origin, CVB-Inspection & Compliance 

will arrange for an inspection of the foreign facility prior to importation of any diluent. If an 

unlicensed facility prepares the diluent, the Special Outline should not receive final approval 

until CVB-Inspection & Compliance has inspected the diluent manufacturer. 

Packaging of diluents 

In most cases, the diluent must be packaged with the final container of licensed product. 

Exceptions exist for Marek’s Disease Vaccine, poultry vaccines administered by automatic 

vaccinating equipment, and product for in ovo administration. In these cases, the licensee must 

provide the diluent, but not necessarily packaged with the vaccine. 

Unregulated additives 

Some firms sell dye (which may contain stabilizers) for use with poultry biologics administered 

in the drinking water. Dyes are not regulated by the CVB. Extenders may also be purchased 

separately by the poultry industry. These products are used to dilute biologics used to vaccinate 

poultry. Extenders are not regulated by the CVB. Extenders should not be used in studies 

submitted for licensure. 

Dating 

The CVB does not require expiration dating on inert diluents, but the firm may include an 

expiration date in the Special Outline if they wish to do so. Some countries require expiration 

dating for diluent. Diluent labels may contain an expiration date even if none is specified in the 

Special Outline. 

Some diluents contain biological components, such as bacterial extracts that serve as adjuvant. 

The reviewer may require, at his/her discretion, an expiration date in the Special Outline for this 

type of diluent. 
Sterile Diluents 2 of 2
Exhibit 11
 POTASH CORPORATION OF SASKATCHEWAN INC.
COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
FOR THE YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31
 2008
    
    2007A Net income as reported, Canadian GAAP ($ millions)
    
    
    3,495.2
    
    
    
    1,103.6B Items adjusting net income ($ millions)
    
    
    (100.0
    )
    
    
    (42.1
    )C Net income, US GAAP ($ millions)
    
    
    3,395.2
    
    
    
    1,061.5D Weighted average number of shares outstanding
    
    
    307,480,000
    
    
    
    315,641,000E Net additional shares issuable for diluted earnings per share calculation (Canadian GAAP)
    
    
    9,958,000
    
    
    
    8,667,000F Net additional shares issuable for diluted earnings per share calculation (US GAAP)
    
    
    9,954,000
    
    
    
    8,651,000CANADIAN GAAPBasic earnings per share (A/D)
    
    
    11.37
    
    
    
    3.50Diluted earnings per share (A/(D+E))
    
    
    11.01
    
    
    
    3.40UNITED STATES GAAPBasic earnings per share (C/D)
    
    
    11.04
    
    
    
    3.36Diluted earnings per share (C/(D+F))
    
    
    10.70
    
    
    
    3.27
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Unify Corporation (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended October 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Todd E. Wille, Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:

(1)the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and (2)the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.


|Dated: April 30, 2007 | /s/ TODD E. WILLE      
|--------------------- | -----------------------
|                     
|                      | Todd E. Wille          
|                      | Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Unify Corporation and will be retained by Unify Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
# NO. 12-09-00120-CR IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEXA S

IN RE: DA VID GE OR GEBAU GH , § RELATOR § ORIGINAL PROCEE DING § MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION PER CU RIAM In this original proce eding, David Geor g e Baugh seeks a writ of habe as cor

pus and a decla ratory judgment al l eging that he is being unlaw fully detained by thesheriff of Cheroke e County, Texas. Wedismiss the petition. Th eTe xa s G ov ernme nt C od eprov ide s a s f oll ow s:
Concur r ent l y w i t h t he s upr em e cour t , t he cour t of a ppea l s of

a c our t of

a pp eal s d i st ri cti n w hi ch a pers on i s r es t r ai ned i n hi s l i bert y, or a j ust i ce of t he courtof appeal s , m ay issu e a w r i t of habeas cor pus w hen i t appe ar s t hatt he r es t r ai nt of l i ber t y i s by vi r t ue of

a n or der , pr oce s s , or c om m i t m ent i s s ued by a court o r j ud ge becaus e o f t he vi ol at i on o f

an order , j ud gm ent , or decr ee previ ou s l y m ade, r ende r ed, or e nt er ed by t he cour t or j udge i n a c i vi l c as e. Pe ndi ng t he hea r i ng of an appl i ca t i on for a w rit o f h a b e a s c o rp u s, th e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls o r a ju stice o f th e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls m a y a d m it to b a il a per s on t o w hom t he w r i t of ha bea s c or pus m ay be gr ant ed. 

## T EX 

## . G OV 

## ’ T 

## C ODE 

## A NN 

## . § 22.221(d) ( Vernon 2004). Thus, the original juris d i ct i on of courts of
app e als to is su ea

writ of ha be a s c or pu s is limite d totho sec a se s inwhic h a pers on 's lib erty is restrained bec ause theperson ha s violated an order, judgment, or dec ree entered in a civil case

. Id. Consequently, courts of a ppeals d o n o t have original habea s corpus jurisdiction in criminal law matters. Do ds on v . St

ate , 988 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, no pet.); Ex p ar te Hawkin s , 8 85 S.W .2 d 5 86 , 5 88 (T e x. Ap p. –El P aso 199 4, no pe t.) . I n s uc h matters , th e ir

## 2

jurisdiction is appellate only. Dodson , 988 S.W.2d at 835. Acc ordingly, we dis mis s Baugh’s habe as petition and reque st for dec laratory judgmentfor want of ju risdiction

. Opinion delivere d April 30, 2009. P an el consi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.



## (DO N OT PUBLISH)
# C_2020414EN.01001601.xml

| 30.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 414/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 414/16

---

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 8 October 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — Admiral Sportwetten GmbH, Novomatic AG, AKO Gastronomiebetriebs GmbH v Magistrat der Stadt Wien

(Case C-711/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive (EU) 2015/1535 - Article 1 - Procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services - Definition of ‘technical regulation’ - Games of chance - Local duty on the operation of betting terminals - Tax rule - European Commission not notified - Enforceability against the taxpayer)

(2020/C 414/19)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Admiral Sportwetten GmbH, Novomatic AG, AKO Gastronomiebetriebs GmbH

Defendant: Magistrat der Stadt Wien

Operative part of the judgment

Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services must be interpreted as meaning that a national tax rule that provides for taxation of the operation of betting terminals does not constitute a ‘technical regulation’ within the meaning of that article.

---

(1)  OJ C 406, 2.12.2019.

---
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-7309
TERRY LEE STONE, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RAY ANDREWS, Warden, FCI Estill; JOHN F. FANELLO, Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (CA-94-1177) Submitted: November 16, 1995 Decided: February 14, 1996 Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Terry Lee Stone, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Parkwood Griffith, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988) petition. We have reviewedthe record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Stone v. Andrews , No. CA-94-1177 (D.S.C. July 13, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Dunmore Borough’s Election.

*Election law*— Amendment—Jurisdiction *of court*— *Thirty-day limit*— Act *of May 19,187k,*P. *L. 218.*

In a contested election proceeding, an amendment which' affects the jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed after the expiration of the statutory period of thirty days.

Argued Feb. 24,1919.

Appeal, No. 164, Jan. T., 1919, by V. Ameliano, E. E. Myers et al., from order of Q. S. Lackawanna Co., Dec. T., 1917, No. 234, dismissing petition and quashing proceedings In re Contested Election in the Fifth Ward of the Borough of Dunmore.

Before Brown, C. J., Stewart, Moschzisker, Frazer and Kephart, JJ.

Affirmed.

Petition to contest the election of James O’Hara to the office of councilman of the Fifth Ward of the Borough of Dunmore. The petition was filed on December 5, 1917. On December 29, 1917, a rule was granted to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was not signed by twenty-five qualified electors, and that the affidavit was not sworn to by five qualified electors. On August 21, 1918, a motion to amend the petition by adding the name of six other petitioners, was refused, and the proceedings were quashed in an opinion by Edwards, P. J.

The contestants appealed.

*Error assigned*was the order of the court quashing the appeal.

*A. A. VosTmrg,*with him *B. A. Zimmerman,*for appellants.

The proposed amendment cured any possible de*232feet, and it should have been allowed by the court: Sheppard’s Contested Election, 65 Pa. 20; Welti’s Contested Election, 3 W. N. C. 165; Wylie’s App., 239 Pa. 510; Mooch v. Conrad, 155 Pa. 586.

*David J. Reedy,*with him *M. J. Murray, Jr.,*for appellee.

An amendment to cure a jurisdictional defect in the original petition will not be allowed after the expiration of the thirty days allowed for filing the petition: Election Cases, 65 Pa. 20; Contested Election, 1 W. N. C. 326; Williams v. Johnson, 16 W. N. C. 223; North Union Twp. Election Case, 250 Pa. 98; Forst’s License, 208 Pa. 578.

March 24,1919:

Per Curiam,

This appeal is dismissed, at the costs of the appellants, on the following from the opinion of the learned president judge of the court below refusing to allow their petition to be amended and quashing the proceeding: “Whatever has been said by our appellate courts as to the liberality with which amendments should be allowed in contested election cases, it must be understood that amendments which affect the jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed after the expiration of the statutory period of thirty days.”

Appeal dismissed.