[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13123

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

KEITH TAIG,

individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF VERO BEACH, 

LIEUTENANT JOHN PENDERSEN,

in his individual capacity, 

DETECTIVE PHIL HUDDY,

in his individual capacity, 

DETECTIVE SEAN CROWLEY, 

in his individual capacity,

DETECTIVE MIKE GASBARRINI, et al.,

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Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80391-RLR

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Keith Taig appeals the dismissal of his complaint against the 

City of Vero Beach and the summary judgment in favor of Chief 

David Currey, retired Captain Kevin Martin, Lieutenant John 

Pedersen, Detective Phil Huddy, Detective Sean Crowley, and Detective Mike Gasbarrini. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Taig filed a putative class 

action alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights after the

police department monitored and recorded him during its investigation of prostitution, racketeering, and human trafficking at a 

massage spa. The district court dismissed the complaint against the 

city for failure to state a claim and entered summary judgment in 

favor of the officers based on qualified immunity. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

After police began receiving anonymous complaints about a 

local massage spa, the police department’s special investigations 

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unit and the United States Department of Homeland Security began investigating the spa for suspected prostitution, racketeering, 

and human trafficking. An undercover detective visited the spa 

twice in September 2018, and both times he was asked if he wanted 

sexual acts performed for money. Officers spoke with two men 

who had left the spa, and both men reported that a woman had

offered them sexual acts in exchange for money. Officers conducted trash pulls and retrieved items including used condoms and 

tissues with semen on them. Three weeks of surveillance revealed 

that women working at the spa slept there overnight, and the spa

had only male customers. Based on these findings, officers sought 

an order authorizing surreptitious video surveillance inside the spa.

On November 27, 2018, a state judge issued an “Order for 

the Surreptitious Entry and Installation of Electronic Surveillance 

Camera.” The order provided: “[Y]ou . . . are hereby commanded 

in the name of the state of Florida, . . . to enter and install . . . video 

surveillance cameras, and to monitor these surveillance cameras 

for a period of no longer than 30 days. . . .” The order further 

stated, “[T]he executing officers shall take steps to minimize the invasion of privacy to any parties not engaged in the unlawful acts 

set forth in the affidavit. The officers shall also make efforts to minimize the disclosure of this surveillance operation to only those 

sworn law enforcement officers pertinent and relevant to this surreptitious investigation . . . .” On December 28, 2018, a second order with identical language extended the surveillance period for 30 

days. The order did not expressly prohibit or authorize recording 

the video surveillance.

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On November 29, 2018, video-only cameras were installed 

at the front desk and in two massage rooms. The cameras transmitted a live feed to monitors inside a controlled room at the police 

department. The silent video feed, which could not be turned off 

remotely, was recorded on a hard drive. The police department required a username and password to access the video feed in the 

controlled evidence room and logged the time and date that anyone entered the room. In January 2019, the State Attorney’s Office 

directed the officers to stop recording sex acts and to focus on investigating racketeering and human trafficking. The officers curtailed monitoring the video feed within the spa and focused on 

monetary and mobile surveillance.

During the 30 days that the officers monitored the video 

feed, the officers saw 145 customers enter massage rooms, and 142 

of those customers participated in sex acts with a masseuse. Taig 

was one of those customers. He was arrested for soliciting prostitution based on his visit to the spa on December 27, 2018. Later, 

Taig successfully moved to suppress the video evidence, and an intermediate appellate court upheld the suppression order.

Taig sued the city and various police officials alleging that 

the video surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. His amended complaint alleged that the city and officers 

violated his right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure and 

that they had a custom or policy of failing to train and supervise 

employees in minimization techniques. He cited Florida statutes 

that prohibited video recording in areas like restrooms or changing 

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rooms and limited the availability of audio surveillance to certain 

major criminal offenses. He also moved to certify the class and to 

appoint a class representative and class counsel.

The district court granted the city’s motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim. It ruled that Taig alleged no prior misconduct that could support his argument that the city had a custom of 

allowing or had adopted policies allowing constitutional violations.

It ruled that Taig also failed to allege facts to support his argument 

that the city deliberately chose not to train and supervise employees of the police department, and his allegation that the city was 

deliberately indifferent to his rights was conclusory.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 

officers based on qualified immunity. It ruled that Taig failed to 

identify any clearly established law prohibiting the officers from 

conducting or recording the surveillance, and the Florida statutes 

were inapposite. It ruled that Taig failed to identify any clearly established law that put the officers on notice that their mitigation 

measures were constitutionally inadequate. It rejected his alternative argument that the surveillance and minimization techniques 

were so egregious that every reasonable officer would have known 

that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. It explained

that the warrant expressly permitted video surveillance, and the officers used at least some minimization techniques by restricting and 

logging physical entry into the secured room and requiring a 

username and password to access the video feed. The district court

also rejected Taig’s failure-to-train claim because he failed to 

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provide evidence establishing that the officers had actual or constructive notice that an omission in their training program caused 

the officers to violate his rights. The district court ruled that, without evidence of any prior misconduct or a violation of a clearly established right, the officers could not be liable under a theory of 

supervisory liability. The district court denied Taig’s motion for 

class certification.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the dismissal of Taig’s amended complaint against the city. Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 577 (11th 

Cir. 2023). The alleged facts “must make a claim for relief not 

merely possible, but plausible.” Id. “We review de novo

whether . . . [law enforcement] officers are entitled to immunity.” 

Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2016). We resolve 

any issues of material fact in Taig’s favor and then address the legal 

question whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. 

See Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion in two parts. First, we address 

Taig’s claims against the city. Second, we address his claims against 

the officers.

A. Taig’s Claims Against the City Fail.

Taig argues that the district court erred by dismissing his 

claims against the city. He argues that he sufficiently alleged that

the officers had a repeated policy or custom of failing to minimize 

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their video surveillance, which “demonstrated practices on the part 

of the City that constituted Fourth Amendment violations.” He argues that the facts supporting his failure-to-train-and-supervise 

claim against the city were sufficient to withstand dismissal.

To impose liability on the city, Taig must allege facts that 

would establish that the city had a policy or custom that constituted deliberate indifference to a right protected by the Constitution. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Because Taig attributes the alleged constitutional violation to the 

city’s failure to train, he must plead facts establishing there existed 

“[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees,” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011); see Gold v. City 

of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1998). He has not done so.

Taig’s amended complaint identified no other instance in 

which the police department’s surveillance of suspected criminal 

activity rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Even assuming that a constitutional violation occurred, Taig sought to impose 

liability on the city based on one investigation. Because “random 

acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or 

policy,” Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 

1986), the district court did not err by dismissing the amended complaint against the city for failing to state a claim for relief.

B. Qualified Immunity Bars Taig’s Claims Against the Officers.

Qualified immunity shields officials acting within their discretionary authority from liability when their conduct does not violate a federal constitutional right that was clearly established at 

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the time of the challenged action. Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 

1156 (11th Cir. 2020). If the official is acting within the scope of his

discretionary authority when he commits the allegedly unlawful 

actions, the plaintiff must prove “that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Penley, 605 F.3d at 849. “We are required to grant qualified immunity to a defendant official unless the plaintiff can 

demonstrate two things: (1) that the facts, when construed in the 

plaintiff’s favor, show that the official committed a constitutional 

violation and, if so, (2) that the law, at the time of the official’s act, 

clearly established the unconstitutionality of that conduct.” Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 2015). We may consider these two requirements in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 227 (2009).

Taig argues that the officers were not entitled to qualified 

immunity because they failed to minimize their invasion of the spa 

customers’ privacy as the warrant required. He argues that the officers had clear guidance that customers in a private massage room 

were entitled to an expectation of privacy because various state 

statutes prohibited video recording in areas like restrooms or 

changing rooms and limited the availability of audio surveillance 

to certain major criminal offenses. See Fla. Stat. §§ 810.145(1)(c), 

877.26, 934.07, 933.02.

Taig failed to establish that the officers’ conduct violated a 

clearly established constitutional prohibition. See Singletary, 804 

F.3d at 1180. Qualified immunity may only be denied when the officers have “fair and clear warning of what the Constitution 

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requires,” such that a reasonable officer would understand that his

conduct violates a constitutional right. City & Cnty. of San Francisco 

v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 617 (2015). A constitutional violation may 

be “clearly established” by controlling precedent with indistinguishable facts, a broad statement of principle in the Constitution 

that clearly establishes the violation, or where the officer’s conduct 

so egregiously violated the constitutional right that prior caselaw 

was unnecessary to provide fair notice. See Lewis v. City of West Palm 

Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009).

Taig identifies no caselaw clearly establishing minimization 

requirements for covert, silent video surveillance of criminal activity pursuant to a warrant. Instead, he cites to United States v. 

Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1990), and the decision 

of the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida upholding the suppression of the spa video. But neither were decided at the time of 

the relevant conduct by the Supreme Court, this Court, or the Florida Supreme Court. See J W by & Through Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2018). And the 

state statutes Taig cites do not clearly establish a federal constitutional right.

The officers’ actions also were not so egregious that every 

reasonable officer would have known that they violated the Fourth 

Amendment. See Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1291–92. The officers, working 

with the Department of Homeland Security, obtained several warrants authorizing the surreptitious video surveillance. Although 

the warrants did not expressly allow video recording, the warrants

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did not prohibit it either. The cameras transmitted no audio, which 

complied with the order. And the officers employed at least some 

minimization techniques, including reducing the number of hours 

each day that officers monitored the video feed, restricting access 

to the video feed with a username and password, monitoring the 

video feed for only 30 out of 60 available days, and securing the 

hard drive in the evidence room. Moreover, although the order required the officers to “take steps to minimize the invasion of privacy to any parties not engaged in the unlawful acts set forth in the 

affidavit,” Taig did not fall within that class of persons.

Taig argues that the facts established that the officers failed 

to train and supervise other officers and each other and that, if they 

had, they would not have violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

We disagree. To succeed on this claim, Taig was required “to 

demonstrate that the [supervisory officers] had actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program 

causes [his or her] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional 

rights and that armed with that knowledge the supervisor chose to 

retain that training program.” Keith v. DeKalb County ̧ Georgia, 749 

F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted, second alteration in original). But Taig failed to establish that the officers knew 

or should have known that the department’s minimization techniques were constitutionally deficient or that the alleged deficiency 

was caused by an omission in their training. Because the district 

court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the 

officers, we need not address Taig’s argument that the district court 

erred by denying his motion for class certification.

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IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Taig’s complaint against the 

city and the summary judgment in favor of the officers.

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