The Honorable Theresa L. Springmann, District Judge for 

the United States District Court, Northern District of Indiana,

sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2156

NATASHA RAMA, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals Agency.

Nos. A077-650-672, 671, 673

ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2010—DECIDED MAY 28, 2010

Before KANNE and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

SPRINGMANN, District Judge.

SPRINGMANN, District Judge. In February of 2000, Albanian natives Natasha Rama, Ferrick Rama, and Ledia Rama
2 No. 09-2156

On March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist as an independent

1

agency within the Department of Justice and its functions

were transferred to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security.

attempted to enter the United States without valid passports and subsequently applied for asylum. On July 13,

2004, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their request

and ordered that they be removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed without opinion on December 7, 2005. This petition followed. For the reasons set

forth in the following opinion, we deny the petition

for review.

I. Background

On February 1, 2000, the Petitioners were stopped with

fake passports at Chicago O’Hare International Airport

by officers of the Immigration and Naturalization

Services (INS). Ferrick and Natasha were interviewed 1

separately by the officers.

In Natasha’s interview, she admitted using a

fraudulently-obtained passport that had been issued to

another resident of her native city. She claimed that she

and her family had traveled to the United States because

Ferrick had been involved in a car accident and owed a

large sum of money to the owner of the damaged car.

When the family was unable to pay the sum owed, the

owner ransacked the family’s house and poured scalding

milk on nine-year-old Ledia’s legs, permanently scarring
No. 09-2156 3

them. Natasha claimed that “[she] fear[s] for[her] husband

and [her] daughter [if they were forced to return to Albania] because the man who threatened [her] husband’s

life works for the Albanian government.” Admin. R. 647.

When the officer asked Natasha how she knew that the

person who threatened her husband and ransacked her

house works for the Albanian government, she replied,

“I don’t know. I just assumed because he has a nice car.” Id.

Ferrick was interviewed by an asylum officer on the

following day. During his interview, Ferrick admitted

that he had purchased fraudulent passports for himself,

his wife, and his daughter for ten thousand dollars. He

claimed that he came to the United States because, following an automobile accident in which he was involved,

the owner of the damaged car had come to his home

demanding money, and threw hot milk on his daughter.

He stated that he feared for his life.

After these interviews, the asylum officers determined that the Ramas had not established prima facie

eligibility for asylum and referred their cases for a

hearing before an IJ. The INS commenced removal proceedings against the Ramas on February 17, 2000, by

filing Notices to Appear (NTAs) charging them

(1) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)

§ 212(a)(6)(C)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(I), as aliens

who, by fraud or willfully representing a material fact,

sought to procure a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or benefit provided under

the INA, and (2) under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as immigrants who at the time of
4 No. 09-2156

application for admission were not in possession of valid

unexpired immigration visas, reentry permits, border

crossing cards, or other valid entry documents as

required by the INA, and a valid unexpired passport, or

other suitable travel document, or other document of

identity and nationality required under the regulations.

Before the IJ, the Ramas conceded the charge that they

were inadmissible because they did not possess valid

passports or visas at the time of admission. On January 31,

2001, Natasha filed with the IJ her application for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under

the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT),

with Ferrick and Ledia as derivatives.

In her asylum application, Natasha added numerous

facts to those she gave to the INS officials at O’Hare

airport. She now claimed the following: she was seeking

asylum because of incidents she experienced in Albania

that were a result of Ferrick’s political activities. She

stated that Ferrick had become the Council Chief of the

Democratic Party for the village of Zharres in 1992. In 1997,

when the Socialist Party took power in Albania, Ferrick

received a letter from the police to present himself at the

police station. Knowing that two other Democratic Party

members had already been arrested, Ferrick chose to go

into hiding rather than report.

In December 1999, Ferrick collided his automobile with

another automobile containing two men. Ferrick identified

one of the passengers as a former classmate and an Albanian police officer. The two men hit Ferrick and pointed

their guns at him. They then demanded that he pay
No. 09-2156 5

them $30,000, or risk being arrested. Five days later, four

masked men came to Natasha’s home, searched the home

for Ferrick, and threatened to kill the family if they

could not locate Ferrick. After that incident, Natasha

and her daughter moved to Natasha’s parents’ house.

Four days after moving in with her parents, four

masked men came to that house, blindfolded and

handcuffed Natasha and Ledia, and drove them to

another house. During their three days in captivity, the

men raped Natasha repeatedly, and threatened to kill

her and Ledia if she did not reveal Ferrick’s whereabouts.

On the third day, one of the men threw hot milk on Ledia.

The men then drove Natasha and Ledia to the hospital,

where Natasha stayed for three days and Ledia

remained for two weeks.

At the Merits Hearing before the IJ, Ferrick and Natasha

gave testimony that largely conformed to Natasha’s

asylum application. Also testifying was Professor Bernie

Fisher, who testified to the poor relationship between the

Albanian Socialist and Democratic Parties, the Socialist

Party’s use of intimidation tactics, and the stigma

attached to rape in Albania, which he said could explain

Natasha’s failure to mention the rape in her interview

with INS officials.

On July 13, 2004, the IJ issued a written opinion

finding the Ramas removable as charged and denying

their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under CAT. In a thorough opinion that contained a detailed recitation of the facts, the IJ made an

adverse credibility determination based on inconsis-
6 No. 09-2156

tencies between the Ramas’ statements at O’Hare Airport,

and the claims made in Natasha’s asylum application

and the testimony before the IJ. Notably, the IJ found that

during the airport interviews, the Ramas did not disclose

any details regarding Natasha’s rape, Ferrick’s political

involvement in the Democratic Party, the notice Ferrick

had received ordering him to report to the police station,

Ferrick’s going into hiding, or the kidnaping of Natasha

and Ledia. The IJ found that there was good excuse for

the non-disclosure of the rape, but noted that “the omissions extend well beyond the multiple rapes to the very

heart of [the Ramas’] claim: [Ferrick’s] Democratic Party

involvement.” Admin. R. 179. Other inconsistencies cited

by the IJ included inconsistencies between Natasha’s

testimony about her hospitalization and a medical certificate from the hospital that did not mention any injuries

consistent with rape. Finally, the IJ found persuasive

Ferrick’s failure to submit evidence to corroborate his

claimed leadership in the Democratic Party. While

Ferrick did submit a letter confirming his membership in

the party, the letter made no mention of a leadership

position. Concluding, the IJ stated that “[the Ramas]

have failed to meet their burden of proof in establishing

eligibility for asylum . . . specifically, they failed to

credibly establish that they suffered past persecution

or have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Admin. R. at

182-83. On August 9, 2004, the Ramas timely appealed

the IJ’s decision to the BIA. On December 7, 2005, the

BIA summarily affirmed without opinion the IJ’s findings.
No. 09-2156 7

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Because the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision

without opinion, we base our review on the IJ’s analysis.

See Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2006). We

review the IJ’s denial of Natasha’s petition for asylum and

withholding of removal under the highly deferential

substantial evidence test. See Ememe v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d

446, 450 (7th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to this test, we must

uphold the IJ’s findings if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record

considered as a whole; we may reverse the IJ’s determinations only if we determine that the evidence compels a

different result. Id. at 451; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)

(“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive

unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.”). Similarly, the IJ’s “[c]redibility

determinations are questions of fact and should only be

overturned under extraordinary circumstances, although

they must be supported by specific, cogent reasons that

bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” Balogun v. Ashcroft,

374 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pop v. I.N.S.,

270 F.3d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2001)).

B. Asylum

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) affords the Attorney General the

discretionary authority to grant “asylum to an alien . . . if

the Attorney General determines that such alien is a

refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of
8 No. 09-2156

this title.” Section 1101(a)(42)(A) defines “refugee” as one

who is unable or unwilling to return to her country

“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership

in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The

burden of proof is on the Ramas to show that they are

“refugees” and are thus eligible for asylum. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.13(a). “[C]redibility is the linchpin of a ‘well

founded fear’ claim.” Balogun, 374 F.3d at 498. Regarding

a claim of well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant’s burden “turns largely upon the applicant’s own

testimony and credibility.” Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075,

1085 (7th Cir. 2004). The testimony of an applicant, if

credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof

without corroboration. Id. However, if the IJ finds the

testimony to be incredible, corroborating evidence is

required. Balogun, 374 F.3d at 500.

In this case, we find that the IJ’s credibility determination is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative

evidence on the record considered as a whole. The IJ

relied on three reasons in entering an adverse credibility determination: (1) new factual assertions raised

during the petitioners’ testimony before the IJ that were

not raised to the immigration officers at the airport;

(2) the petitioners’ testimony before the IJ concerning

Ferrick’s participation in the Democratic Party was inconsistent with the documentary evidence; and (3) Natasha’s

oral testimony concerning her hospitalization and the

hospitalization of Ledia was inconsistent with the documentary evidence. We will address each reason, in turn.
No. 09-2156 9

1. New Factual Assertions

The IJ’s first basis for questioning the petitioners’ credibility is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. As she noted, the petitioners did not

disclose at the airport any details regarding Natasha’s

rape, Ferrick’s political involvement with the Democratic

Party, the notice that Ferrick received ordering him to the

police station, the incident that caused Ferrick to go into

hiding, or the kidnaping of Natasha and Ledia. The IJ

accepted the petitioners’ explanation that the rape may

not have been mentioned because of the cultural and other

difficulties of disclosing it, but noted that “the omissions

extend well beyond the multiple rapes to the very heart

of [the petitioners’] claim: [Ferrick’s] Democratic Party

involvement.” She found unconvincing Ferrick’s explanation that he did not discuss his political involvement at

the airport interview because he did not know how

much information to disclose.

The IJ also found the petitioners not to be credible

because at the airport interview, Ferrick did not state

the identities of his daughter’s attackers by name,

despite the fact that he was able to identify the men

during the Merits Hearing. When pressed at the airport

for their identities, Ferrick merely identified the men as

people from “the city.” The IJ found that the petitioners

did not provide any explanation to resolve the inconsistency and that their failure to do so was a specific

reason to support an adverse credibility determination.
10 No. 09-2156

2. Ferrick’s Involvement with the Democratic Party

The next factor upon which the IJ relied was Ferrick’s

testimony that he was the town leader of the Democratic

Party, which was not consistent with the letter Ferrick

obtained verifying his membership. The letter did not

mention that Ferrick had any leadership position. The IJ

held that “it is reasonable to expect him to submit a

letter confirming his position as an elected leader[,]

something significantly different from mere membership” in light of his submission of a letter from the Democratic Party. We find the IJ’s reasoning sound and cannot

say that it was not based on reasonable, substantial, and

probative evidence in the record.

3. Natasha’s and Ledia’s Hospitalization

Third, in making her adverse credibility determination,

the IJ determined that Natasha’s medical statement

from the time of her hospitalization indicates that she

was about three months pregnant, and was admitted for

treatment of an “incipient abdomen.” The medical documentation did not reference torn clothes, bruises, or cuts

on Natasha’s body, as she had claimed. Based on these

inconsistencies, the IJ found Natasha’s testimony about

her rape “disingenuous.” The IJ also found that the

medical certificate indicated that Natasha was hospitalized for eight days, but Natasha testified that she had

been hospitalized for three. Natasha testified that Ledia

was hospitalized for twelve days, but the medical certificate indicated that Ledia had been hospitalized for ten.

The IJ determined that Natasha’s explanation that she
No. 09-2156 11

could not recall the number of days that Ledia remained

in the hospital to be “unconvincing especially in light of

the previous discrepancies regarding [Natasha’s] own

alleged hospitalization.” Admin. R. at 181. That the IJ

relied on the medical certificate as well as testimony

to reach her adverse credibility determination on this

point shows us that the determination was based on

reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the

record.

For this Court “[t]o reverse the BIA finding we must

find that the evidence not only supports [reversal], but

compels it.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1

(1992). The IJ found the Ramas’ claim of fear to be not

credible, and she cited specific, cogent reasons that bore

a legitimate nexus to that finding. Because the evidence

does not compel reversal, we will affirm the IJ’s denial

of the Ramas’ asylum claim, and the BIA’s summary

affirmance of the IJ’s decision. 

C. Withholding of Removal

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) provides that “the Attorney General

may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney

General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be

threatened in that country because of the alien’s race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” In order to gain relief under

this Section, “the applicant must demonstrate a clear

probability of persecution,” which is “a much more

demanding burden” than is found in the asylum context.

Capric, 355 F.3d at 1095. Therefore, as we have often
12 No. 09-2156

said, “if an applicant’s asylum claim fails, his withholding of deportation claim will also necessarily fail.” Id.

This rule includes those claims for withholding of

removal under CAT. See Aung v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 742,

747 (7th Cir. 2007). Because we have found that the IJ’s

decision denying Natasha’s asylum claim fails, we must

also uphold her decision denying Natasha’s claim for

withholding of deportation.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review

is DENIED.

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