alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
.-. OFFICEOFTHEATTORNEYGENERAL
**AUSTIN** January 16th,

Hon. Bazel 9. Beckham,Exeoutlve Secrety$?---.....-..- -._~ ..-, --_- State Commissionfor the Blind State Office BuJJdlng Austin,Texas Dear E.kckm:

296Sa aa the

Your request i or Rot it is n~oessar an exelmptfon

oertlfi primariesend in the less than 10,000 en reoeivedby this offioe.

the Revised Uivll Statutes of 1923, ?zho does nut reside In a oity of 10 000 inhabitants or more, and who is exempi from the paymentOS a poll tax bJT reason of the faot that he or aha has not get reaohsd the age of 21 years aa the flxst day of Jaauarp pmoeding it.8

levy ~orwho 29 eXem@ fram the payment of a poh tax baeauss he or she wan not a residentof the state on the first d8YHon. Hazel II, &ckhhan, January 16th, 1939 82

:. of Januarypreoedingits levy, but who s!lall have sincebecome eligibleto vote by reason of length of residenceor age, s:inll, on or boiore the ;Ilst day of January of the yesr I5 which he or she oifere to vote, obtain from tile Usessor or Collector OS taxes Sor the county of his or her rtisidenca,

a oertifioateof exemption .xpon the paymentOS a poll tax, and no suoh personV&C 1~s fniled to refuse to obtain a certiSic&e oS exemptionfromthe payment of a poll C-ax

shall be allowedto vote." The oaptionto Article 2968a as enaotedw the 44th Legislatureof the State OS Texas, Regular Session,reads in part as Sollows:

* * * * * *providingror the issuanoe of a certificbate OS examption

without oost to certain qualifiedvotersnot subjectto the payment of a'p0l.l tax* * *. It.is' our opinion that toterswho are otherwise qualified, **but** who are blind end reside in a oity of 10,000 inhabitantsor less, are entitledto vote without an exemptionoertifioate. It ia our opitliott that Artiole 2968a only requires an exemptLo@ oerbuioate for personarrho are exempt fromthe paymantOf a poll tax by reason of the iaot that he or she hae no* ? reaohed the age OS 81 yeare on the first day OS Yamary prodsdingits levy or who ia exempt Srom the wme&, of a poll tax beoaueehe or she was not a reaLdent 

### ai the 

### atate on the first day OS January preoodingits l&y. .The oaption of this bill states that 20s purme la to provide for an exemptionoertifioatefor oertain persone and the body OS the bLl.1 itself cm4 stater that the twa olassesabove nsmed s&Ulhave an exemptian oertlfloate,

an8 it ia our opihion that it 'irtil) the $ntentionof the Legislatureto only requfre an ezemption csrtifiaatefor the two olaases named and not for **blind** persons. Yours very truly

RHCtob 

# -L:

AYTORNES GZNERAL OF TEU2
CAUSE NO. 03-14-00698-CV 

________________________________________ 

IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS IN AUSTIN, TEXAS 

________________________________________ 

SHAMARK SMITH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL., 

 Appellants, 

v. 

MARTIN LONGORIA, 

 Appellee. 

________________________________________ 

On appeal from the 20th Judicial District Court of Milam County, Texas 

________________________________________ 

THIRD UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

________________________________________ 

Tracy J. Willi 

Texas Bar No. 00784633 

Willi Law Firm, P.C. 

9600 Escarpment Blvd., Suite 745, PMB 34 

Austin, TX 78749-1983 

Tel. (512) 288-3204 

Fax (512) 677-2010 

twilli@willi.com 

ATTORNEY FOR SHAMARK SMITH 

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, SHARON D. 

MARCUS, AND PAUL J. SMITH 

ACCEPTED

03-14-00698-CV

4437659

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

3/10/2015 12:11:00 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/10/2015 12:11:00 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
2 

THIRD UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE 

OPENING BRIEFS 

Shamark Smith Limited Partnership, Sharon D. Marcus, and Paul J. Smith 

file this Third Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellants’ Brief. 

The trial court in this case entered judgment on August 15, 2014. This is the 

third motion for extension of time filed in this appeal. Appellants’ Brief was due 

on March 6, 2015. 

Due to intervening deadlines in other matters and due to serious family 

matters that have arisen for Appellants’ counsel, there will not be sufficient time to 

complete the Appellants’ Brief. Appellants’ counsel does not expect there to be a 

further extension necessary. Therefore, Appellants request that the deadline for 

opening briefs be extended from March 6, 2015 to April 6, 2015. This motion is 

filed not for delay but so that justice can be done. 
3 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Tracy J. Willi 

Tracy J. Willi 

Texas Bar No. 00784633 

Willi Law Firm, P.C. 

9600 Escarpment Blvd., Suite 745, PMB 34 

Austin, TX 78749-1983 

Tel. (512) 288-3204 

Fax (512) 677-2010 

twilli@willi.com 

ATTORNEY FOR SHAMARK SMITH 

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, SHARON D. 

MARCUS, AND PAUL J. SMITH 
4 

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE 

I hereby certify that I conferred with opposing counsel, James David 

Walker, and he is not opposed to this motion. 

/s/ Tracy J. Willi 

Tracy J. Willi 

 

CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE 

I hereby certify that this document was filed with Clerk of Court through the 

Court’s electronic filing system (“efs”) and served on all counsel of record by 

email on March 10, 2015 as follows: 

James David Walker 

P.O. Box 41 

Milano, Texas 76556 

(512) 636-9520 

(512) 455-7992 (fax) 

walker@2appeal.com 

ATTORNEY FOR MARTIN M. LONGORIA 

/s/ Tracy J. Willi 

Tracy J. Willi
# C_2019280EN.01004101.xml

| 19.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 280/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 280/41

---

Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — Porus v EUIPO (oral Dialysis)

(Case T-652/18) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for the EU word mark oral Dialysis - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2019/C 280/57)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Porus GmbH (Monheim am Rhein, Germany) (represented by: C. Weil, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: G. Schneider and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 September 2018 (Case R 1375/2018-2), concerning an application for registration of the word sign oral Dialysis as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Porus GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Porus GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 4, 7.1.2019.

---
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-10056

Conference Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

AKEEM OMOMEGI YUSUF,

 Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:94-CR-251-G

- - - - - - - - - -

August 24, 1995

Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Akeem Omomegi Yusuf challenges the district court's

restitution order. This court reviews particular awards of

restitution for abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1992). 

Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3663 (VWPA), restitution for victims can be awarded only for

the loss caused by the specific offense that is the basis of the
No. 95-10056

-2-

offense of conviction. United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469, 473

(5th Cir. 1995) (citing Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411

(1990)). To convict Yusuf of mail fraud, the Government had to

prove a scheme to defraud, rather than specific incidents of

fraud limited to individual investors. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and

1342; see also Pepper, 51 F.3d at 473. Because a fraudulent

scheme is an element of Yusuf's offense of mail fraud, actions

pursuant to that scheme are conduct underlying the offense of

conviction. Pepper, 51 F.3d at 473 (citing United States v.

Stouffer, 986 F.2d 916, 928 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.

115 (1993)). 

The indictment specifically defined Yusuf's scheme to

defraud in that it described the duration of the scheme, i.e.,

"beginning in early May, 1994, and continuing thereafter until on

or about July 12, 1994," and the methods used, i.e., caused to be

delivered an envelope containing a credit card in another

individual's name. Therefore, it is specific enough to satisfy

Hughey's requirement that sentencing courts focus on the specific

conduct underlying the offense of conviction. See Pepper, 51

F.3d at 473. Thus, the district court could order restitution

for the loss caused by this scheme.

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF SCIENTIFIC GAMES FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER
30, 1996, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996<F1>
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          22,618
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   26,635
<ALLOWANCES>                                       138
<INVENTORY>                                      9,720
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                60,809
<PP&E>                                          77,320
<DEPRECIATION>                                  30,838
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 110,650
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,178
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            12
<OTHER-SE>                                      86,561
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   110,650
<SALES>                                        102,363
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               102,363
<CGS>                                           62,701
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   62,701
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                19,027
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  (280)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  45
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 22,049
<INCOME-TAX>                                     8,835
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             13,214
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    13,214
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.98
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.98
<FN>
<F1>AN ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE WHICH HAD BEEN FULLY RESERVED IN A PRIOR PERIOD WAS
PAID IN FULL, THEREFORE, THERE WAS A NET CREDIT BALANCE IN THE PROVISION FOR
DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Arthur Emmett SIMPSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A-12353.

Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

Dec. 5, 1956.

*1005Alvin C. Bruce, Ardmore, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Lewis A. Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

JONES, Presiding Judge.

The defendant, Arthur Emmett Simpson, was charged by an information filed in the County Court of Carter County with the crime of driving an automobile on the public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, was tried, convicted and pursuant to the verdict of the jury was sentenced to pay a fine of $250.'

Two propositions are presented by the appeal: First, the evidence was insufficient to sustáin the conviction. Second, the punishment assessed was excessive.

The first proposition is based upon the contention of the accused that no witness for the State testified that he saw the defendant driving his automobile at the time it struck a car belonging to Mrs. Morrison.' However, our examination of the record discloses that Mrs. Morrison, who owned the automobile which was struck by the defendant, testified that she had wálked out of -a cafe and started around the ' front of her car and saw the defendant hit the back of her car; that no one else was in the -defendant’s car and defendant was sitting- under the wheel.

A police officer a few yards away heard the crash, went to the scene and saw defendant sitting alone in his car under the wheel. Defendant was very drunk.

The defendant testified in his own defense that he became intoxicated and that a man by the- name of Jones started to drive him home in defendant’s car; that in backing defendant’s car out from the curb Jones struck the car belonging to Mrs. Morrison and when he did so, Jones jumped from the car and ran. The divergent testimony raised an issue of fact for the -determination of the jury.

The contention that the punishment was excessive was based upon the fact that only minor damage was caused to the automobile of Mrs. Morrison and that the defendant had paid for its repair. The verdict was fixed by the jury who had all of the facts before them and we do not set aside verdicts of juries on the grounds of excessiveness of punishment unless we can see the jury acted from bias or prejudice and that the punishment assessed bears no reasonable relation to the crime which was committed.

Affirmed.

BRETT and POWELL, JJ., concur.
# C_2018427EN.01009001.xml

| 26.11.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 427/90 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.11.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 427/90

---

Action brought on 18 September 2018 — Medrobotics v EUIPO (See More. Reach More. Treat More.)

(Case T-555/18)

(2018/C 427/118)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Medrobotics Corp. (Raynham, Massachusetts, United States) (represented by: B. Bittner and U. Heinrich, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark See More. Reach More. Treat More. — Application for registration No 17 205 055

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 July 2018 in Case R 463/2018-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
SMITH COUNTY COURTHOUSE

100 N. BROADWAY 4 th Floor TYLER, TEXAS 75702 April Allison Sikes, First Assistant 

# D. Matt Bingham Criminal District Attorney Smith County TELEPHONE: (903) 535-0520 TELECOPIER: (903) 590-1719 Jennifer Barfield, Office Manager Michael J. West. Appellate Chief Ms. Pam Estes, Clerk 12 th Court of Appeals 1517 W Front St., Ste. 354 Tyler, TX 75701 November 27, 2015
RE: Patterson v. State , Cause No. 12-15-00191-CR
Dear Ms. Lusk: The State acknowledges receipt of the brief filed by Appellant’s counsel pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in the above-listed cause(s). The brief presents no claims of error; therefore, the State has no points to which to respond. See T EX
. R. A

PP
. P. 38.2(a)(2). The State will not file any further response unless the Court decides that the appeal is not frivolous and orders one. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744; High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Respectfully submitted,
D. MATT BINGHAM Criminal District Attorney Smith County, Texas

_______________________ Michael J. West Assistant Criminal District Attorney SBOT# 21203300 ACCEPTED 12-15-00191-CR TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS 11/27/2015 9:15:36 AM

Pam Estes CLERKC ERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the State’s acknowledgment of filing of an Anders brief was served by electronic filing on November 27, 2015, on Mr. Austin Jackson, Attorney at Law, 112 East Line, Ste. 310, Tyler, Texas 75702.

_________________________ Michael J. West Assistant Criminal District Attorney SBOT# 21203300 100 N. Broadway, 4th Fl. Tyler, Texas 75702 (903) 590-1720 (903) 590-1719 (fax) mwest@smith-county.com
EXHIBIT 23.1

      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement
No. 333-113590 on Form S-3, and Registration Statement Nos. 333-104249,
333-80577 and 33-3537, on Form S-8, of our report dated March 1, 2007,
relating to the financial statements of Giant Industries, Inc. and
subsidiaries (the "Company") (which report expresses an unqualified
opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph relating to a change in
accounting method for the adoption of Financial Accounting Standards
Board ("FASB") Interpretation 47, Accounting for Conditional Asset
Retirement Obligations in 2005 and a change in accounting method for
the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158,
Employer's Accounting for Defined Benefit Plans and Other
Postretirement Benefits, an Amendment of FASB Statements No. 87, 88,
106, and 132(R) in 2006), our report dated March 1, 2007 relating to
the financial statement schedule of the Company, and our report dated
March 1, 2007 relating to management's report on the effectiveness of
internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual
Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31,
2006.


/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

Phoenix, Arizona
March 1, 2007
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

The Board of Directors
 MAF Bancorp, Inc.

We consent to incorporation by reference
in the registration statements (No.s 33-79110, 333-83534, 333-61792, 333-72863,
333-72865, 333-110986, 333-110990 and 333-132231) on Form S-8 of MAF Bancorp, Inc. of our
reports dated March 1, 2007, relating to the consolidated statements of financial
condition of MAF Bancorp, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2006 and 2005, and the
related consolidated statements of operations, changes in stockholders equity and
cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2006 and
managements assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial
reporting as of December 31, 2006 and the effectiveness of internal control over financial
reporting as of December 31, 2006, which reports appear in the 2006 Form 10-K/A of MAF
Bancorp, Inc., dated March 2, 2007.

/s/ KPMG LLP

Chicago, Illinois
March 1, 2007
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER>                       1,000
       
<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 Year
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                  DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                             3,030           
<SECURITIES>                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                     13,786
<ALLOWANCES>                        (166)
<INVENTORY>                            0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  17,949
<PP&E>                           237,487
<DEPRECIATION>                    16,589
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                   251,069
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             15,339
<BONDS>                          162,262   
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                  0
<PREFERRED>                            1
<COMMON>                              43
<OTHER-SE>                        72,096
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>     251,069
<SALES>                           45,955
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  49,923
<CGS>                             21,810
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     25,555
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  13,580
<LOSS-PROVISION>                     373
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                13,788
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   (3,373)
<INCOME-TAX>                      (1,284)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>               (2,108)
<DISCONTINUED>                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                   (1,384) 
<CHANGES>                              0
<NET-INCOME>                      (4,367)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                      (0.30)  
<EPS-DILUTED>                      (0.30)   
        


</TABLE>
# C_2020399EN.01002901.xml

| 23.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 399/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 399/29

---

Judgment of the General Court of 23 September 2020 –Bax v ECB

(Case T-433/18) (1)

(Civil service - ECB staff - Career transition support - Eligibility - Legal certainty - Equal treatment - Legitimate expectations - Duty of care - Discrimination on grounds of sex - Proportionality - Liability)

(2020/C 399/41)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Annemieke Bax (Frankfurt, Germany) (represented by: L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank (represented by: F. Malfrère and D. Camilleri Podestà, acting as Agents, and by B. Wägenbaur, lawyer)

Re:

Application under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union for the annulment of, first, the decision of the ECB of 14 December 2017 rejecting the applicant’s application for career transition support and, in so far as necessary, the decision of the ECB of 8 May 2018 dismissing the applicant’s special appeal against the abovementioned decision of 14 December 2017 and, second, for compensation for the non-material damage which the applicant claims to have suffered.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 328, 17.9.2018.

---
```

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 113 (Thursday, July 26, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H5327]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

           By Mr. FARENTHOLD:
       H.R. 6208.
       Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant 
     to the following:
       Article 1, Section 8, Clauses 1 and 3 of the Constitution
```