## No. ________________ COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________ JOHN DELOACH,

Petitioner,

v. STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent.

__________________________________________________________________

On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth District Court of Texas San Antonio, Texas

__________________________________________________________________

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

_______________________________________________ ___ _______________ Mark J. Cannan State Bar No. 03743800 CLEMENS & SPENCER 112 E. Pecan St., Suite 1300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 (210) 227-7121 - Telephone (210) 227-0732

–

Facsimile Email: cannanm@clemens-spencer.com Carleton B. Spears State Bar No. 18893800 Carleton B. Spears, P.C. 330 North Park San Antonio, Texas 78216 (210) 366-3100

–

Telephone (210) 375-8588

–

Telecopier Email: carleton@carletonspears.com ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, JOHN DELOACH PD-0382-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 4/3/2015 3:09:46 PM Accepted 4/3/2015 3:34:21 PM

ABEL ACOSTA CLERK213723/0002279

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### i 

## IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL 1. Trial Court: Hon. Robert Lipo, Judge, San Antonio Municipal Court 2. Initial Appeal: Hon. Scott Roberts, Judge, Bexar County Court at Law No. 12 3. Parties: State of Texas/City of San Antonio and John DeLoach 4. Trial and appellate counsel for the State of Texas: Samuel C.W. Adams, Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 24003680 Savita Rai, Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 24013368 Office of the City Attorney

– San Antonio 401 S. Frio San Antonio, Texas 78207 (210) 207

- 7335

- Telephone (210) 207

- 7358

– Telecopier Email: Samuel.Adams@sanantonio.gov Savita.Rai@sanantonio.gov Dan Pozza State Bar No. 16224800 Attorney at Law 239 E. Commerce St. San Antonio, Texas 78205 (210) 226

- 8888

- Telephone (210) 224

- 6373

- Telecopier Email: danpozza@yahoo.com Tr ial and appellate counsel for John DeLoach: Mark J. Cannan State Bar No. 03743800 Clemens & Spencer 112 E. Pecan St., Suite 1300 San Antonio, Texas 78205

- 1531 (210) 227

- 7121

- Telephone (210) 227

- 0732

– Facsimile Email: cannanm@clemens

- spencer.com213723/0002279

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## ii

Carleton B. Spears State Bar No. 18893800 Carleton B. Spears, P.C. 330 North Park San Antonio, Texas 78216 (210) 366

- 3100

– Telephone (210) 375

- 8588

– Telecopier Email: carleton@carletonspears.com213723/0002279

- 24559 

## iii TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES AND COUNSEL

................................ ......... i, ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

................................ ................................ ........................ iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

................................ ................................ ................. i v , v STATEMENT R E GARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

................................ .............. 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

................................ ................................ ................. 2 S TATEMENT OF PR OC ED URAL HISTOR Y
................................ ........................ 2 GROUND S F OR REVIEW

................................ ................................ ....................... 3 ARGUMENT

................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 3 Introduc t ion

................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 3 2003 Legislation

- A Framework for Local Regulation

................................ ..... 4 San Antonio Ignores Legislature’s Requirements

................................ .............. 6 To the Extent of Conflict the City Ordinance is Preempted

............................... 7 The Court of Appea ls Opinion

– A Flawed Analysis

................................ ......... 9 Conclusion

................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 1 1 PRAYER

................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 1 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

................................ ................................ ............... 1 3 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

................................ ................................ ...... 1 4 APPENDIX

................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 1 5 A Fourth Court of Appeals Opinion dated November 19, 2014. B Fourth Court of Appeals Opinion dated March 4, 2015

.213723/0002279

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## iv INDEX O F AUTHORITIES CASES : Pages Bay City Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Lewis, 474 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1971)

................................ ................................ ............... 6 Bolton v. Sparks , 362 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. 1962)

................................ ................................ ............... 8 French v. State , 546 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)

................................ ....................... 3 , 4 Honeycutt v. State , 627 S.W.2d 417 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1981)

................................ ............................ 8 Rountree v. The State of Texas , 2012 WL 3612497 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2012, no pet.)

.................. 10 , 11 State v.Chacon , 273 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2008, no pet.)

................................ . 6 STATUTES , ORDINANCES AND CONSTITUTIONAL Pages PROVISIONS: Acts 2003, 78 Leg., Ch. 1034 (H.B. 849)

................................ .................... 4 , 5, 6, 10 San Antonio City Code 19

- 427

................................ ................................ .................. 6 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 86.455

................................ ................................ ................ 7 TEX. CONST. Art. XI § 5

................................ ................................ ..................... 3, 8 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016(1) and (2)

................................ ............................... 8 TEX. OCC. CODE § 2308.202

................................ ................................ ........ 4, 5 , 10 TEX. OCC. CODE § 2308.203

................................ ...................... 4, 5 , 6, 7 , 8 , 10 , 11213723/0002279

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## v

TRANSPORTATION CODE, § 643.203

................................ ................................ .. 5 TRANSPORTATION CODE, § 643.204

................................ ................................ .. 5 OTHER: Pages San Antonio Express

- News , January 8, 2015

................................ ........................... 1 1 Senate Committee on Bus. & Comm., Bill Analysis, HB 849

................................ .. 9213723/0002279

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## 1 No. ________________ COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________ JOHN DELOACH,

Petitioner,

v. STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent.

__________________________________________________________________

On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth District Court of Texas San Antonio, Texas

__________________________________________________________________

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

__________________________________________________________________ TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL A PPEALS IN TEXAS: Now comes Petitioner, John DeLoach, and files his Petition for Discretionary Review.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT The issue raised is not complex and requires no detailed appraisal of disputed evidentiary points. As such, oral ar gument would not appear necessary and Petitioner waives it

.213723/0002279

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## 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioner John DeLoach (“DeLoach”) was charged with violation of a San Antonio Municipal ordinance limiting the charges for a non

- consent tow of a motor vehicle. The p rosecution was before the Municipal Court of the City of San Antonio. DeLoach filed a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that the City ordinance was inconsistent with and therefore preempted by state statut e. That Motion was hear d and denied and the case proceeded to trial before the Court. Defendant was found guilty and assessed a fine of $500.00. Defendant’s Motion for New Trial was denied and appeal was perfected to the County Courts of Law of Bexar County, Texas. Sitting as an appellate court, the County Court at Law No. 12 of Bexar County, Texas, found in favor of Defendant DeLoach on the issue of preemption and reversed the ruling of the San Antonio Municipal Court, entering an order dismissing the case. That order was ap pealed by the State to the Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, Texas. That Court issued an opinion and order reversing the County Court at Law and reinstating the conviction in the San Antonio Municipal Court. It is from that ruling that this appeal is prosecuted.

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY The proceedings before the Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, Texas, were as follows:213723/0002279

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## 3

November 19, 2014

– Opinion issued and Judgment entered December 10, 2014

– Order entered extending time to file Motion f or Rehearing December 10, 2014

– Motion for En Banc Reconsideration filed December 17, 2014

– Order entered requesting Response to Motion for En Banc Reconsideration March 4, 2015

– Opinion and Judgment of November 19, 2014 withdrawn March 4, 2015

– Moti on for En Banc Reconsideration denied March 4, 2015

– Opinion issued and Judgment entered No further motions for rehearing were filed.

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW Inconsistency between a 2002 San Antonio City ordinance limiting charges for vehicle tows and the man dates of the state statute regulating such tows cannot be reconciled, rendering the City ordinance under which Mr. DeLoach was

con victed violative of Art. XI § 5 of the Texas Constitution. ARGUMENT Introduction Conflict between municipal ordinances and sta te statutes is addressed in Article 11, § 5 of the Texas Constitution. In relevant part it requires that no ordinance “shall contain any provision inconsistent with ... the general laws enacted by the legislature ....” As observed by this Court in French v. State , 546213723/0002279

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## 4

S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), that mandate is to be “strictly construed in favor of the dominant power of the legislature.” In its 2003 session, the legislature enacted provisions relating to the regulation of tow trucks and granting certain authority to municipalities within an overall regulatory framework. Acts 2003, 78 Leg., Ch. 1034 (H.B. 849). Although the enactment included a grant of authority for municipalities to regulate fees for towing, it established mandatory provisions to ensure that the allowable fees represented fair value for towing services. 1 

## San Antonio has disregarded that mandate and enforced a restriction on towing charges inconsistent with the requirements of the legislative framework. As such, the ordinance u nder which Mr. DeLoach was convicted should be held unenforceable because preempted by the state statute

. 2003 Legislation - A Framework for Local Regulation In 2003 the legislature enacted House Bill 849, described in its caption as “relating to the regul ation of tow trucks, to the authority of a political subdivision of the estate to regulate tow trucks, and to insurance for commercial motor vehicles; providing penalties.” Acts 2003, 78 Leg., Ch. 1034 (H.B. 849).

1 

### Those pro visions were in section 10 of the Act as amendments to the Transportation Code. Those provisions are now at Tex. Occ. Code §§ 2308.202 and 203.213723/0002279

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## 5

As indicated by that caption, the enact ment covered multiple aspects of the towing industry. It included limitations on fees to be charged by vehicle storage facilities, procedures and fees for registration of tow trucks, requirements of insurance coverage, and provisions relating to offenses and penalties for violations. At issue are those provisions of HB 849 relating to fees that may be charged or collected in connection with non

- consent tows. Section 10 of the bill amended the Transportation Code, adding § 643.203 relating to regulation of tow fees by political subdivisions and § 643.204 regarding towing fee studies in connection with the setting of those charges based on fair value for the services. Those are now at TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2308.202 and 2308.203. They provide as follows: “§ 2 308.202. Regulation by Political Subdivisions of Fees for Nonconsent

Tows The governing body of a political subdivision may regulate the fees that may be charged or collected in connection with a nonconsent tow originating in the territory of the p olitical subdivision if the private property tow fees: (1) are authorized by commission rule; and (2) do not exceed the maximum amount authorized by commission rule. § 2308.203. Towing Fee Studies (a) The governing body of a political sub division that regulates nonconsent tow fees shall establish procedures by which a towing company may request that a towing fee study be performed.213723/0002279

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(b) The governing body of the political subdivision shall establish or amend the allowable fees for noncon sent tows at amounts that represent the fair value of the services of a towing company and are reasonably related to any financial or accounting information provided to the governing body.” These provisions need be considered in light of the principle tha t when the legislature delegates certain authority it can be exercised “only in the manner prescribed by the legislature.” Bay City Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Lewis , 474 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1971). When the legislature provides a broad framew ork of regulation, as with the towing industry, thereafter municipalities are only authorized “to enact ordinances within that framework.” State v. Chacon , 273 S.W. 3d 375, 379 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2008, no pet.). San Antonio Ignores Legislature’s Requi rements The City of San Antonio had established a limit for vehicle tows in 2002. Section 19

- 427 of the ordinances of the City of San Antonio provided that vehicle tow fees could not exceed $85.00. After the legislature’s enactment of House Bill 849, Sa n Antonio was requested to bring its towing ordinance into compliance with that statute’s requirements by taking the steps to “amend the allowable fees ... at amounts that represent the fair value of the services ....” TEX. OCC. CODE § 2308.203(b). (RR 11/1 4, pp. 130

- 131, Ex. D

- 5). Eventually, in 2006 the Finance Department of the City initiated a tow fee study. The study was conducted by Morris Harris, a rate analyst for that213723/0002279

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## 7

department (RR 11/14, pp. 24

- 28). After receiving financial and accounting info rmation from the towing industry (RR 11/14, p. 31), Mr. Harris completed that report in early 2007. (RR 11/14, pp. 34

- 38). That report concluded that the fair value fee for automobile tows in 2007 was $134.00. (RR 11/14, Ex. D

- 1 at p. 4). Mr. Harris te stified that figure reflected “a reasonable and fair rate adjustment.” (RR 11/14, p. 42). Although Mr. Harris submitted his report, no further action was taken. The City ordinance limiting tow charges to $85.00 remained in place, and the Deputy City M anager with authority over the matter could offer no explanation for that inaction. (RR 11/15, pp. 10

- 13). Thus, notwithstanding the determination of its own tow fee study that the City limit on towing fees was significantly less than the fair value of the services, the City took no action to amend the allowable fee pursuant to TEX. OCC. CODE § 2308.203(b). On July 31, 2012, John DeLoach was cited for charging a towing fee in excess of the $85.00 limit allowed by the 2002 ordinance. He had charged a f ee of $250.00 for the tow in question, a charge consistent with that otherwise allowed by the state under TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 86.455. To the Extent of Conflict the City Ordinance is Preempted The Constitution mandates that no city ordinance “shall contain any provision inconsistent with ... the general laws enacted by the legislature of this213723/0002279

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## 8

state.” TEX. CONST. Art. 11 § 5. As explained in Bolton v. Sparks , 362 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex. 1962), “(m)unicipal ordinances must conform to the limitations imposed by t he superior statutes, and only where the ordinance is consistent with them, and each of them, will it be enforced.” This Court acknowledged that principle in Honeycutt v. State , 627 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Tex. Cr. App. 1981), directing that “a municipal ordinan ce must not conflict with a state statute.” The 2003 statute provided a framework with certain limitations for the municipal regulation of towing which the City of San Antonio has ignored and disregarded. The result is a city ordinance with provisions i nconsistent with the state statute. The key requirement is in TEX. OCC. CODE § 2308.203(b).

 A city “ shall establish or amend the allowable fees for non

- consent tows in amounts that represent the fair value of the services ... and are reasonably related to any financial or accounting information provided to the governing body.” Certainly, the mandatory nature of the requirement for establishing a fair value is clear. Under statutory rules of construction, “shall’ imposes a duty,” as opposed to the “discre tionary authority” allowed by “may.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016(1) and (2). The legislative history confirms the intent to have mandatory requirements imposed upon municipalities. The Senate Committee Report reflects that the statute “requires” amendment of the allowable fees for non

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## 9

consent tows in order to represent the fair value of the services of a towing company. Senate Committee on Bus. & Comm., Bill Analysis, HB 849. It is this provision that the City of San Antonio has ignored. As described abo ve, in 2007 the City completed a tow fee study showing that the fees allowed by the 2002 City ordinance were substantially below the fair value for the services. Yet no action was taken to comply with the state requirement that a city “shall ... amend the a llowable fees” to reflect fair value. The City of San Antonio’s continued enforcement of a tow fee acknowledged to be less than fair value for the services is a failure to conform to the limitations imposed by the statute. That conflict and inconsistency renders the ordinance preempted and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals Opinion - A Flawed Analysis The basic flaw in the approach of the Court of Appeals can be seen in its statement that “nowhere in the Act did the legislature include a provision that contains an explicit expression of the legislature’s intent that the Act exclusively govern the regulation of non

- consent tow fees.” (Opinion dated March 6, 2015, at p. 6). Of course not, that is not the test. The Constitutional issue arises when a muni cipal ordinance contains “any provision inconsistent with ... the general law as enacted by the legislature ....” By looking for exclusivity the lower court ignored the “any provision inconsistent” standard.213723/0002279

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## 10

HB 849 was neither an attempt by the state to as sert exclusive authority to regulate the tow industry nor was it a grant of exclusive authority to municipalities. Rather, it provided a framework within which municipalities were permitted to exercise certain regulatory authority. San Antonio seemed to acknowledge that framework by completing a tow fee study. The failure to implement the results of that study was inconsistent with the requirement of the statute that municipalities “shall ... amend the allowable fees” to represent fair value as determined by such a study. The lower court relies upon Rountree v. State , 2012 WL 3612497 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2012, no pet.). It observes that the Rountree court considered “a similar argument” and agrees “with the reasoning in Rountree .” (Opinion dated Marc h 6, 2015, at 5

- 6). Assuming the correctness of the Rountree opinion, the case is nonetheless not in point. In Rountree the municipality failed to conduct a tow fee study and continued to enforce its towing ordinance, making no further attempt to determi ne fair value. As such, the reasoning in Rountree focused on the relationship between TEX. OCC. §§ 2308.202 and 2308.203(a). The former allowed municipal regulation of tows and the latter, as relevant to that case, required procedures for tow fee studies . The Rountree court found those to be independent of each other , and thus a tow fee study was not required

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## 11

The San Antonio situation is distinctly different. San Antonio completed a tow fee study that determined its current ordinance was not providing fair value for services. What is at issue is the relationship between § 2308.203(a) and (b), provisions of the same section which are clearly not independent of one another. Part (a) sets out the process for a tow fee study and part (b) follows with the requirement that the results of that process be utilized to “establish or amend” the allowable fees to represent fair value for the services. The reasoning in Rountree is simply not applicable since San Antonio set in motion the procedures of § 2308.203 but stopped half way. Having implemented procedures for a tow fee study and then completed it, San Antonio triggered and then ignored requirements not at issue in Rountree
. Conclusion The authority of municipalities to regulate economic activity must b e carried out within the limitations imposed by the Constitution. Allowing cities to ignore state imposed limitations is to risk having “a patchwork quilt of bans and rules and regulations ....” San Antonio Express

- News , January 8, 2015 (quoting then Gover nor - elect Abbott). The legislature established a regulatory framework for the towing industry to avoid such patchwork. If San Antonio is allowed to avoid the state framework by ignoring its own tow fee study, municipalities will be given carte blanche to set213723/0002279

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## 12

tow fees irrespective of not only fair value but also irrespective of economic reality. PRAYER Petitioner John DeLoach prays that the Petition for Discretionary Review be granted and that, upon review, the judgment of the Court of Appeals be reversed

. Respectfully submitted, C ARLETON 

## B. S PEARS 

## State Bar No. 18893800 CARLETON B. SPEARS, P.C. 330 North Park San Antonio, TX 78216 (210) 366

- 3100 Telephone (210) 375

- 8588 Telecopier C LEMENS & SPENCER 112 E. Pecan St., Suite 1300 San Antonio, Texas 78205

- 1531 (210) 227

- 7121 (210) 227

- 0732 Telecopier
By: /s/ Mark J. Cannan MARK J. CANNAN State Bar No. 03743800 ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, JOHN DeLOACH213723/0002279

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## 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fo regoing was delivered via Email on this the 3 rd 

## day of April, 2015, to: Mr. Samuel Adams Assistant City Attorney Office of the City Attorney

– San Antonio 401 S. Frio San Antonio, TX 78207 via Email: samuel.adams@sanantonio.gov Mr. Dan Pozza Law Office of Dan Pozza 239 E. Commerce St. San Antonio, TX 78205 via Email: danpozza@yahoo.com

/s/ Mark J. Cannan MARK J. CANNAN213723/0002279

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## 14 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE At the request of the Court, I certify that this submitted email attachment complies with the following requests of the Court: 1. This filing is labeled with or accompanied by the following information:

a. Case Style: John DeLoach v. State of Texas b. Case Number: Unknown

– new filing c. The Type of Brief: Petition for Discretionary Review d. The Word Processing Software and Version Used to prepare the filing: MS Word 2010 2. The electronic filing is free of viruses or any othe r files that would be disruptive to the Court's computer system. The following software, if any, was used to ensure the filing is virus

- free: Trend Micro. 3

. Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4, I hereby certify that this Petition for Discretionary Review contains 2,338 words . This is a compute r - generated document created in Microsoft Word, using 14

- point typeface for all text, except for footnotes which are in 12

- point typeface. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document. CLEMENS & SPENCER 112 E. Pecan St., Suite 1300 San Antonio, Texas 78205

- 1531 (210) 227

- 7121 (210) 227

- 0732 Telecopier

Date: April 3, 2015 By: /s/ Mark J. Cannan MARK J. CANNAN State Bar No. 03743800 ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, JOHN DeL OACH213723/0002279

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## 15 No. ________________ COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________ JOHN DELOACH,

Petitioner,

v. STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent.

_____________________________________________________________ _____

On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth District Court of Texas San Antonio, Texas

APPENDIX

A Fourth C ourt of Appeals Opinion dated November 19, 2014

. B Fourth Court of Appeals Opinion dated March 4, 2015

.

# APPENDIX **A**

# jf **ourtb QCourt**  **of %lppeaLs**  **�an %lntonio,**  **W:exa% OPINION**  

### No. **04-14 -00324-CR**  **The STATE**  

### of **Texas, Appellant** 

**v. John**  **D. DELOACH,**  

### Appellee **From the**  **County Court**  **at Law**  **No. 12,**  **Bexar County,**  **Texas**

**Trial Court**  **No. 130**  **556 Honorable**  **Scott Roberts,**  **Judge Presiding**  **Opinion by:**  **Sandee Bryan**  **Marion, Justice**  **Sitting: Sandee**  **Bryan Marion,**  **Justice**

**Marialy.n Barnard,**  **Justice Luz**  **Elena D.**  **Chapa, Justice**  **Delivered and**  **Filed: November**  **19, 2014**  **REVERSED AND**  **RENDERED In**  **2002, the**  **City of**  **San Antonio**  **adopted a**  **municipal ordinance**  **that set**  **the maximum**  **fee·**

**a towing**  **company could**  **charge for**  **the non-consent**  **tow of**  **an automobile**  **at $85.**  **SAN ANTONlO,**  

### TEX. **, CODE**  **OF ORDINANCES**  **§** 

### 19-427 **( 2 012).1**  **A violation**  **of the**  **ordinance was**  **punishable by**  **a fine**  **of not less**  **than $ 2**  **00 nor**  **more than $500.**  **Id. §**  

### 19-413. **In** 

### 2003, **the Legislature**  **enacted House**  **Bill 849,**  **currently incorporated**  **in the**  **Texas Towing**  **and Boot**  **Act ("the**  **Act"), which** 

**1 The**  **non-consent towing**  **fee has**  **since been**  **amended to**  **$177 for**  **vehicles 10,000**  **pounds or**  **less. SAN**  **ANTONIO, TEX., CODE**  **OF ORDINANCES**  **§ 19-402**  **(2013). 04-14-00324-CR** 



### regulates towing **companies and the**  **fees they**  **may charge**  **for non-consent**  **tows. See**  

### Acts **2003,** 

### 78th **Leg., ch.**  **10 34**  **, § 10**  **,** 

### eff. **Sept. 1,**  **2003** 

### (currently **codified in**  **TEX. Occ.**  

### CODE ANN. **§§ 2 3**  **08. 202,**  **.2 03**  

### (West **20 1**  **2)).** 

### On **August 3 1**  **, 201**  **2,** 

### the **State2 filed**  **a complaint**  **against John**  **DeLoach for**  **charging a**  **non consent**  **tow fee**  **of $250,**  

### in excess **of the**  **$85** 

### fee **authorized by**  **the ordinance.**  **DeLoach was**  **convicted in**  **municipal court,**  **and appealed**  **to the**  **county court**  **at law**  **asserting (1)**  **the ordinance**  **is preempted**  **by sections**  **23 08.202**  

### and **2308. 203**  

### of **the Act,**  **and (2)**  

### he **established the**  **af firmative**  **defense of**  **mista'ke of**  **law. The**  **county court reversed**  **the municipal**  **court and**  **rendered judgment**  **in favor**  **of DeLoach,**  **finding that**  **the ordinance**  **was preempted**  **and unenforceable.**  **The county**  **court rejected**  **DeLoach's mistake**  **of law**  **defense. The**  **City now**  **appeals to**  **this court.**  **The record**  **and the**  **brief s**  **from the**  **county court**  **have been**  **filed and**  **constitute the**  **record and**  **brief s**  **in this**  **appeal. See**  

### TEX. **Gov'T** 

### CODE **ANN. §**  **30.00027(b)** 

### (West **Supp. 20**  **14).** 

### Thus, we **review the**  **same issues**  **raised in**  **the briefs**  **submitted to**  **the county**  **court. See**  **id. PREEMPTION**  

### In **his briefbefore**  **the county**  **court ,**  **DeLoach asserted**  **the ordinance**  **conflicts with**  **the Act.**  **According to**  **DeLoach ,**  **the Act requires**  **a towing**  **fee study**  **be performed**  **before a**  **city may**  **regulate the maximum**  **fee a**  **towing company**  **may charge**  **for a**  **non-consent tow. Because**  **the City failed**  **to conduct**  **a towing**  **fee study, DeLoach**  **contends the**  **ordinance is**  **void and**  **unenforceable. In**  **its responsive**  **brief before**  **the county**  **court, the**  **City raised**  **a variety**  **of arguments,**  **including that**  **the Act**  **does not**  **contain a**  **"death- penalt**  **y" clause**  **for not**  **conducting a**  **towing fee**  **study. Because we** 

**2 The**  **complaint was**  **filed by**  **the State**  **of Texas.**  **However, attorneys**  **for the**  **City of**  **San Antonio**  **prosecuted the**  **case against**  **DeLoach, and**  **the City**  **of San Antonio**  **filed the notice**  **of appeal with this court.**  **Therefore; although**  **the style**  **of this**  **appeal mirrors**  **the trial**  **court's style**  **and shows**  **the State**  **of Texas**  **as appellant,**  **we will refer**  **to appellant**  **hereinafter as**  **the City.**  **- 2 - 04-14-00324-CR** 



### conclude the **Act does**  **not preempt**  **the ordinance,**  **we do**  **not address**  **all of**  **the City's**  **arguments. See**  

### TEX. **R. APP.**  

### P. **47.1. 1.**  **Applicable Law**  **and Standard**  **of Review**  

### The **City of**  **San Antonio**  **is a**  **home-rule city that derives**  **its powers**  **from the**  **Texas Constitution.**  **See** 

### TEX. **CONST. art.**  **XI, §**  

### 5; **City of**  **Haus. v.**  **Bates,** 

### 406 **S.W.3d 539,**  **546 (Tex.**  **2013); RC!**  **Entm 't,**  **Inc. v.**  **City of**  **San Antonio,**  

### 373 **S.W.3d 589, 595**  **(Tex. App.**  **-San Antonio**  **2012, no**  **pet.). A**  **home-rule city**  **has the**  **full power**  **of self**  **-government and**  **look �**  **to the**  **Legislature not**  **for grants**  **of authority, but**  **only for**  **limitations on**  **its powers.**  **RC!Entm 't,** 

### 373 **S.W.3d at**  **595. A**  **home-rule city**  **ordinance is presumed**  **to be**  **valid. State**  **v. Chacon,**  

### 273 **S.W.3d 375,**  **378 (Tex.**  **App.-San Antonio 2008, no**  **pet.). The**  **Legislature may**  **limit a**  **home-rule city's**  **broad powers**  **only when**  **it expresses**  **its intent**  **to do**  **so with**  **"unmistakable clarity.**  **" Bates,**  

### 406 **S.W.3d at**  **546. "[T]he**  **mere fact**  **that the**  **[L ]egislature**  **has enacted**  **a law**  **addressing a**  **subject does**  **not mean**  **that the**  **sub ject**  **mattet is**  **completely preem**  **pted. "**  **City of**  **Richardson v.**  **Responsible Dog**  **Owners of**  **Tex.,** 

### 794 **S. W.**  **2d 17,**  **19 (Tex.**  **1990). A**  **home-rule city ordinance**  **that conflicts**  **with a**  **state statute**  **is unenforceable**  **to the**  **extent of**  **such conflict.**  **Dall. Merchant's**  **& Concessionaire**  **'s Ass**  **'n v.**  **City of**  **Dall.,** 

### 85 **2 S.W.2d**  **489, 491**  **(Tex. 19**  **93). If**  **a reasonable**  **construction giving**  **effect to**  **both the state**  **statute and**  **the ordinance**  **can be**  **reached, the**  **ordinance will**  **not be**  **held to**  **have been**  **preempted by the.statute.**  **Bates,** 

### 406 **S.W.3d at**  **546; Dall.**  **Merchant's,** 

### 852 **S.W.2d at**  **491. Statutory**  **construction is a**  **question of**  **law we**  **review de novo.**  **Yazdchi v.**  **State,** 

### 42 **8 S.W.3d 831,**  **8371**

**(T ex.**  **2014) (internal**  **citations and**  **quotations omitted).**  **In** 

### construing a statute,

**we must**  **seek to**  **'effectuate the**  **collective intent**  **or purpose**  **of the**  **legislators who**  **enacted the**  **legislation**

**. .** 

**Id.** 

### In **interpreting statutes,**  **we presume**  **the Legislature**  **intended for the**  **entire statutory**  **scheme to**  **be effective.**  **Id.** 

### We **look first**  **to the**  **statute's literal**  **text, and**  **we read**  **words and**  **phrases in**  **context and**  **construe them**  **according to**  **the rules**  **of grammar**  **and usage.**  **Id. - 3 -** **04-14-00324-CR**

**2. Analysis**  **We must**  **first determine**  **whether the**  **ordinance and**  **the Act**  **are. attempting**  **to regulate**  **the**
**same activity.**  **RC! Entm**  **'t, 373**  **S.W.3d at**  **5 9 6.**  **We begin**  **by examining**  **the statutory**  **text. Bates,**  **406 S.W.3d**  **at 546.**  **Section 2308**  **.202 provides:**  **The governing**  **body· of**  **a political**  **subdivision may**  **regulate the**  **fees that**  **may be**  **charged or**  **collect ed**  **in connection**  **with a**  **non-consent tow**  **originating in**  **the territory**  **of the**  **political subdivision**  **if the private**  **property tow**  **fees;** 

### (1) **are authorized**  **by commission**  **rule; and (2)**  **do not**  **exceed the**  **maximum amount**  **authorized by**  **commission rule.**  **TEX.** 

### Occ. **CODE §**  **23 0 8**  **.202. Section**  **2 3 0 8**  **.203 provides;**  **(a) The**  **governing body**  **of a**  **political subdivision**  **that regulates**  **non-consent tow fees**  **shall establish procedures**  **by which**  **a towing**  **company may request**  **that a**  **towing fee**  **study shall**  **be performed.**  **(b) The**  **governing body**  **of the**  **political subdivision**  **shall establish**  **or amend**  **the allowiible**  **fees for**  **non-consent tows**  **at amounts**  **that represent**  **the fair**  **value of**  **the services of a**  **towing company**  **and are reasonably**  **related to**  **any financial**  **or accom;iting**  **information provided**  **to the**  **governing body.**  **Id. §**  **23 08**  **.203. !**  **.**
**The sections**  **of the**  **Act at**  **issue regulate**  **the allowable**  **fee a**  **towing company**  **may charge**  **for the**  **non-consent tow**  **of an**  **automobile. Similarly,**  **the ordinance**  **also regulates the allowable**  **fee a**  **towing company may**  **charge for**  **the non-consent**  **tow of**  **an automobile.**  **The plain**  **language of**  **the Act**  **and the**  **ordinance establish**  **that they**  **are both**  **attempting to**  **regulate the**  **same activity.**  **Therefore, we**  **next decide**  **whether the**  **ordinance is**  **inconsistent with**  **or conflicts**  **with the**  **Act. RC!**  **Entm 't, 37**  **3 S.W.3d**  **at 5 9**  **6.**

**- 4 -** **04-14-00324-CR**



### DeLoach **asserts the**  **ordinance conflicts**  **with the**  **Act because**  **section 2308**  **.2 03**  **requires a towing**  **fee study**  **be performed**  **if a**  **city chooses**  **to regulate**  **non-consent tow fees.**  **He contends**  **the language**  **of the Act**  **dem onstrates**  **the legislative**  **intent "to**  **require a**  **fa ir**  **value for all non-consent**  **tows [be]**  **based on**  **a tow**  **fee study,**  **" and the**  **city has**  **"ignored ...**  **disregarded ... and**  **failed to**  **comply with th[is]**  **mandatory requireme**  **nt. "**  **Therefore ,**  **he argues**  **that because**  **the City**  **has "f**  **ailed to**  **comply with**  **mandatory requirements,**  **the ordinance is**  **unenforce able.**  **" The**  **Corpus Christi Court**  **of Appeals**  **considered a similar**  **argument in**  **Rountree v.**  **State,** 

### No. **13-12-000 63-CR,**  **2012 WL**  **36124 97**  **(Tex. App.**  **-Corpus Christi**  **Aug. 23,**  **2012, no**  **pet. )**  **(mem. op.**  **, not**  **designated for**  **publication). 3**  **There, Rountree was**  **convicted of**  **violating the**  **City of**  **Be aumont's**  **o\:dinance that**  **set the**  **maximum fee**  **for a**  **non-consent tow**  **at $85.**  **Id.** 

### at ***** **1.** 

### Rountree **argued he**  **was entitled**  **to acquittal**  **because Beaumont**  **had not**  **established procedures**  **by which**  **a towing**  **company could request**  **a towing**  **fee study**  **be performed**  **and argued**  **that Beaumont**  **"was not**  **in** 

### compliance **with section**  **23 08**  **.2 03**  **of the**  **occupations code.**  **" Id.**  

### The **State acknowledged**  **Beaumont did**  **not establish**  **the required**  **procedure set**  **forth in**  **section 2308.**  **203 at**  **the time**  **the ordinance**  **was enforced**  **against Rountree;**  **however, the State asserted that**  **Beaumont's non-compliance**  **with the statute**  **"did not**  **make the**  **ordinance invalid,**  **nor did**  **it preclude**  **the enfor**  **cement of**  **the ordinance."**  **Id.** 

### at ***2**
**. The**  **court of**  **appeals agreed with**  **the State, noting**  **that "noth**  **ing in the**  **ldnguage of**  **sections 230**  **8.202 or**  **2308. 203(a)**  **bars a**  **municipalit y's**  **authority to**  **reg ulate**  **non-consent towing fees**  **due to**  **a municipality's**  **non-compliance with**  **setting up**  **a proc**  **edure for**  **a towing compariy**  **to request a**  **fee study.**  **" Id.**  

### The **court concluded**  **that its**  **interpret ation**  **did not lead**  **to an**  **absurd result**  **because it**  **appeared that**  **the Legislature**  **intended**

**3 Rountree**  **was decided**  **by the Corpus Christi**  **Court of**  **Appeals pursuant**  **to 'a**  **Supreme Court**  **of Texas**  **transfer order**  **from the**  **Beaumont Court of**  **Appeals. - 5 -** **04-14-00324-CR**

**section 2 3**  **0 8.**  **202 and**  **section 230**  **8. 20**  **3 to**  **be "independent, rather**  **than dependent,**  **from one**  **another." Id.**  **We agree**  **with the**  **reasoning in**  **Rountree. Nowhere**  **in the**  **Act did**  **the Legislature**  **include**

**a provision**  **that contains**  **an explicit**  **expression of**  **the Legislature's**  **intent that**  **the Act**  **exclusively govern**  **the regulation**  **of non-consent**  **tow fees.**  **Cf RC!**  **Entm't, 37**  **3 S.**  **W. 3d**  **at 5 9**  **6 n.3**  **(quoting Dall.**  **Merchant's ;**  **852 S.W.**  **2d at**  **491 )**  **("The Legislature's intent**  **is clearly**  **expressed in**  **section I**  **0 9 .57(b)**  **of the**  **TABC-the regulation**  **of alcoholic**  **beverages is**  **exclusively governed**  **by the**  **provisions of**  **the T**  **ABC unless**  **otherwise provided**
**. . . . Section**  **10 9**  **.57 clearly**  **preempts an**  **' ordinance of a**  **home-rule city**  **that regulates**  **where alcoholic**  **beverages are**  **sold under**  **most circumstance**  **s."). To**  **the contrary,**  **the Act expressly**  **allows a**  **city to**  **"regulate the**  **fees that**  **may be**  **charged or**  **collected in**  **COl)llection with**  **a non-consent**  **tow," provided**  **the fees**  **"are authorized** 

**· by**  **commission rule"**  **and "do**  **not exceed**  **the maximum**  **amount authorized**  **by commission**  **rul e."**  **TEX. Occ.**  **CODE §**  **23 08.202.4**  **Accordingly, we**  **conclude the**  **ordinance does**  **not conflict**  **with the**  **Act, and**  **is therefore,**  **not �**  **reempted. MISTAKE**  **OF LAW**  **DeLoach �!so**  **asserts he**  **established the**  **affirmative defense**  **of mistake**  **of law**  **because he**  **reasonably relied on an**  **opinion from**  **the Attorney**  **General. 1.**  **Standard of**  **Review The**  **parties' briefs**  **before the**  **county court are**  **the same**  **briefs we**  **must consider**  **on appeal.**  **See TEX.**  **Gov'T CoDE**  **§ 30.**  **00027(b ).**  **In those**  **briefs, neither**  **the City**  **nor DeLoach cite**  **to an**  **appropriate standard**  **of review.**  **However, in**  **De Loach'**  **s prayer**  **for relief,**  **he requested**  **only that** 

**4 The**  **Texas Commission**  **of Licensing**  **and Regulation**  **has authorized**  **the maximum**  **fee of**  **$250 for**  **a non-consent**  **tow. See**  **TEX. ADM**  **�**
**. CODE,**  **tit. 16,**  **§§ 86.455,**  **.458:**

**- 6 -** **04- 1**  **4-003 24-CR** 

**the county**  **court reverse**  **the municipal**  **court's judgment**  **and render**  **a judgment**  **of not guilty.**  **Therefore, we**  **review the**  **evidence only**  **under a**  **legal sufficiency**  **standard. See**  **Maynard v.**  **Booth, 421**  **S. W.3d**  **182, .183**  **(Tex. App.**  **- S an**  **Antonio 201**  **3, pet.**  **denied). We**  **review the**  **sufficiency of**  **the evidence**  **establishing the**  **elements of**  **a criminal**  **offense for**  **which the State**  **has the**  **burden of**  **proof in**  **the light**  **most favorable**  **to the**  **verdict and**  **determine whether**  **any rational**  **trier of**  **fact could**  **have found**  **the essential**  **elements of**  **the offense**  **beyond a**  **reasonable doubt.**  **Jackson v.**  **Virginia, 443**  **U.S. 307,**  **3 1 9**  **(197 9);**  **Brooks v.**  **State, 32**  **3 S.**  **W.3d 893,**  **895 (Tex.**  **Crim. App.**  **201 0).**  **However, the**  **Jackson and**  **Brooks standard**  **of review**  **"does not**  **apply to**  **elements. of an**  **affirmative defense**  **that the**  **defendant must**  **prove by**  **a preponderance**  **of the**  **evi dence.**  **" Matlockv.**  **State, 3 9**  **2 S.**  **W.3d 662,**  **667 (Tex.**  **Crim. App.**  **20 13).**  **When an**  **appellant asserts**  **that there**  **is no**  **evidence to**  **support an**  **adverse finding**  **on which**  **f]he had**  **the burden**  **of proof,**  **we construe**  **the issue**  **as an**  **assertion that**  **the contniry was established**  **as a**  **matter of**  **law. We first search**  **the record**  **for evidence**  **favorable to**  **the finding,**  **disregarding all**  **contrary evidence**  **unless a**  **reasonable factfinder**  **could not.**  **If we**  **find no**  **evidence supporting**  **the finding, we**  **then determine whether**  **the contrary**  **was established**  **as a**  **matter of**  **law. Id.**  **at 66**  **9 (emphasis**  **in original).**  **A defendant**  **is entitled**  **to an**  **acquittal on**  **appeal despite**  **the trial**  **court's adverse**  **finding on**  **his affirmative**  **defense "only**  **if the**  **evidence conclusively**  **establishes his**  **affirmative defense.**  **" Id.**  **at 670.**  **2. Analysis**  **"It is**  **.an affirmative**  **defense to**  **prosecution that**  **the actor**  **reasonably believed**  **the conduct** 

**' .**  **charged did**  **not constitute a**  **crime and**  **that he**  **acted in**  **reasonable reliance**  **upon a**  **written interpretation**  **of the**  **law**
**... made**  **by a**  **public official**  **charged by**  **law with**  **responsibility for**  **interpreting the**  **law in**  **question." TEX.**  **PENAL CODE**  **ANN. §**  **8.0 3(b)(2)**  **(West 20**  **11)**
**. A**  **defendant bears**  **the burden of production**  **of evidence**  **and persuasion**  **to prove**  **an affirmative**  **defense by**  **a**

**- 7 -** **04- 1**  **4-00 3**  **24-CR**



### preponderance **of the**  **evidence. Id.**  **§** 

### 2. **04(d); Roberts**  **v. State,**  

### 319 S.W.3d 37, **51 (Tex.**  **App.- San**  **Antonio 2010,**  **pet. refd).**  **DeLoach testified**  **he was**  **aware of**  **the ordinance**  **regulating non-consent tow**  **fees. However,**  **he contends**  **the evidence**  **at trial**  **was sufficient**  **to prove**  **his affirmative defense**  **of mistake**  **of law because he**  **reas onably**  **relied on**  **an Attorney**  **General's opinion.**  **See** 

### Tex. **Att'y Gen.**  **Op. No.**  **GA-0315 ( 2**  **005). DeLoach**  **argues the**  **Attorney General's**  **opinion stands**  **for the**  **proposition that**  **the ordinance**  **is preempted**  **by the**  **Act. In**  

### support **of this**  **argument, he**  **cites to**  **the Attorney**  **General1's reference**  **to the**  **general rule that**  **city ordinances**  **must comply**  **with state**  **law. See**  

### TEX. **C O**  **N S**  **T** 

### . **art. XI,**  **§** 

### 5(a). **The Attorney**  **General's opinion**  **that De**  **Loach contends**  **he relied**  **on was**  **issued in**  **response to**  **an inquiry**  **regarding an**  **ordinance established**  **by the**  **City of**  **Victoria pertaining to police**  **initiated non-consent**  **tows. Tex.**  **Att'y Gen.**  **Op. No. GA-0315,**  **at*** **1. Victoria's**  **ordinance stated:**  **(a) All**  **tow truck permit**  **holders operating**  **permitted tow trucks on the public streets**  **shall e;harge**  **no more**  **than the**  **storage rates prescribed by**  **the Texas**  **Department of**  **Transportation for**  **performing non-consent**  **tows. A**  **charge fo**  **r any**  **storage service**  **exceeding the**  **rates prescribed**  **or in**  **addition to**  **the storage**  **related services**  **prescribed shall**  **constitute a**  **violation of**  **this article.**

**'** 

### (b) **The city**  **manager may**  **establish further**  **rate limits**  **in the**  **city's contracts**  **with rotation**  **list privilege**  **holders. These**  **rate limits**  **shall not**  **be considered**  **rate regulations,**  **but shall instead**  **be considered**  **contractual obligations**  **pursuant to**  **the city's**  **provision of**  **referrals to**  **contractees. Failure**  **to comply**  **with any**  **such contractual**  **rate limits**  **shall not**  **be** 

### punishable **as** 

### a **violation of**  **this ordinance,**  **but shall**  **instead merely**  **give" the**  **city the**  **right to**  **declare a**  **breach of**  **contract and**  **potentially terminate**  **said contract.**  **Id.** 

### at ***** **1-*** **2. The**  **issue addressed**  **by the**  **Attorney General**  **was "whether**  **a municipality**  **that limits**  **fees for**  **police-initiated non-consent**  **tows must**  **comply with**  **[section 2308.2033""5**  **Id.** 

### The **inquiry**

**5 At**  **the time**  **the Attorney**  **General's opinion**  **was issued,**  **section 2308.203**  **was codified**  **uoder Texas Transportation**  **Code section**  **643 204.**  **The language**  **is identical**  **in both**  **versions"**

**- 8 -** **04-14-00324-CR**

**stated that**  **the Texas**  **Towing and**  **Storage Association considered Victoria's**  **ordinance to**  **be a**  **regulation of**  **non�consent tow**  **fees and**  **complained that**  **Victoria had**  **not esta**  **blished the**  **procedures by**  **which a**  **towing company**  **could request**  **a towing**  **fee study**  **be performed.**  **Id. at**  ***2. The**  **inquiry specifically**  **asked "whether**  **a city**  **can bypass**  **the clear**  **intent of**  **[section 2 3**  **0 8 .203]**  **by refusing**  **to set**  **procedures even**  **though it**  **has set**  **fees for**  **non-consent tows."**  **Id. Relying**  **on Cardinal**  **Towing, the**  **Attorney General**  **concluded Victoria's**  **ordinance did**  **not appear to**  **regulate non-consent**  **tow fees,**  **but was**  **instead designed**  **to create**  **efficiencies for**  **Victoria and**  **controlled only**  **a portion**  **of the**  **non-consent tow**  **market. Id.**  **at** ***5; see**  **also Cardinal**  **Towing &**  **Auto Repair,**  **Inc. v.**  **City of**  **Bed ford,**  **Tex., 18**  **0 F.3d**  **6 8 6,**  **6 9 4-**  **95** 

### (5th **Cir. 19**  **99 )**  **(concluding ordinance**  **was not**  **a regulation**  **because city**  **merely created**  **efficiencies for**  **police-initiated non-consent tow**  **market). Therefore,**  **the Attorney General concluded that**  **Victoria was**  **not impermissibly**  **ignoring the**  **towing fee**  **study requirement.**  **Id. ·**  **The Attorney**  **General's opinion**  **states only**  **that it**  **does not**  **consider Victoria's**  **ordinance a**  **regulation of**  **non-consent tow**  **.fees. It**  **does not**  **stand for**  **the proposition that the**  **ordinance is**  **preempted by**  **the Act.**  **Accordingly, we**  **conclude DeLoach**  **did not**  **conclusively establish**  **his affirmative**  **defen$e under**  **the legal sufficiency**  **standard set**  **forth in**  **Matlock, and**  **is not**  **entitled to** 
**an acquittal**  **on ap**  

# p **eal. CONCLUSION**  **We conclude**  **the ordinance**  **is not**  **preempted, and**  **we agree**  **with the county**  **court that**  **DeLoach did**  **not conclusively**  **establish the**  **affirmative defense**  **of mistake**  **oflaw. Therefore,**  **we**
**reverse the**  **comity court's judgment and**  **render judgment**  **reinstating the**  **municipal court's judgment.**  **Sandee Bryan**  **Marion, Justice Publish** 

**. -9-** 

# APPENDIXB

# jf **ourtb QCourt**  **of )tlppeal%**  **$?an �ntonio,**  **l!rexas OPINION**  **No. 04-14-00324-CR**  **The STATE**  **of Texas,**  **Appellant**

**v. John**  **D. DELOACH,**  **Appellee From**  **the County**  **Court at**  **Law No.**  **12, Bexar**  **County, Texas** 

**Trial Court**  **No. 130556**  **Honorable Scott Roberts,**  **Judge Presiding**  **Opinion by:**  **Sandee Bryan**  **Marion, Chief**  **Justice Sitting:**  **Sandee Bryan**  **Marion, Chief**  **Justice**

**Marialyn Barnard, Justice**  **Luz Elena**  **D. Chapa,**  **Justice Delive**  **red and**  **Filed: March**  **4, 2015**  **REVERSED AND**  **RENDERED**

**In an**  **opinion dated**  **November 19,**  **2014, this**  **court reversed the county court's**  **judgment and rendered**  **judgment reinstating**  **the municipal**  **court's judgment**  **in favor**  **of appellant.**  **Appellee filed**  **a motion**  **for en**  **bane reconsideration. We**  **withdraw our**  **opinion and**  **judgment of**  **November 19,**  **2014 and**  **issue this opinion and**  **judgment in**  **their place.** 

**In 2002,**  **the City**  **of San**  **Antonio adopted**  **a municipal**  **ordinance that**  **set the**  **maximum fee** 

**a towing**  **company could charge**  **for the**  **non-consent tow**  **of an**  **automobile at**  **$85. SAN**  **ANTONIO, 04-14**  **-003 24-CR** 

**TEX., CODE**  **OF ORDINANCES**  **§ 19-427**  **(2012).1 A**  **violation of**  **the ordinance**  **was punishable**  **by a**  **fine of**  **not less**  **than $200**  **nor more**  **than $500.**  **Id. §**  **19-413. In**  **2003, the**  **Legislature enacted**  **House Bill**  **849, currently**  **incorporated in**  **the Texas**  **Towing and**  **Boot Act**  **("the Act"), which**  **regulates towing**  **companies and**  **the fees**  **they may**  **charge for**  **non-consent tows.**  **See Acts**  **2003, 78th**  **Leg., ch.**  **1034, §**  **10, eff.**  **Sept. 1,**  **2003 (currently**  **codified in**  **TEX. Occ.**  **CODE ANN.**  **§§ 2308.202,**  **.203 (West**  **2012)).**

**On August**  **31, 2012,**  **the State2**  **filed a**  **complaint against**  **John DeLoach**  **for charging**  **a n on**  **consent tow**  **fee of**  **$250, in**  **excess of the $85**  **fee authorized**  **by the**  **ordinance. DeLoach**  **was convicted**  **in municipal**  **court, and**  **appealed to**  **the county**  **court at**  **law asserting**  **(1) the**  **ordinance is**  **preempted by**  **sections 2308.202**  **and 2308.203**  **of the**  **Act, and**  **(2) he**  **established the**  **affirm ative**  **defense of**  **mistake of**  **law. The**  **county court**  **reversed the**  **municipal court and**  **rendered judgment**  **in favor**  **of DeLoach, finding**  **that the**  **ordinance was**  **preempted and**  **unenforceable. The**  **county court**  **rejected DeLoach's**  **mistake of**  **law defense.**  **The City**  **appealed to**  **this court.3**  **PREEMPTION The**  **City of**  **San Antonio is**  **a home-rule city**  **that derives its powers**  **from the**  **Texas Constitution.**  **See TEX.**  **CO N**  **S T**  **. art.**  **XI, §**  **5; City**  **of Hous.**  **v. Bate**  **s ,**  **406 S.W.3d**  **539, 546**  **(Tex. 2013);**  **RC! Entm**  **'t, Inc.**  **v. City**  **of San**  **Antonio, 373**  **S,WJd 589,**  **595 (Tex.**  **App.-San Antonio**  **2012, no**  **pet.). A**  **home-rule city**  **has the**  **full power**  **of self-govermnent**  **and looks**  **to the**  **Legislature**

**1 The**  **non-consent towing**  **fee has**  **since been**  **amended to**  **$177 for**  **vehicles 10,000**  **pounds or**  **less**

**. SAN**  **ANTONIO, TEX.,**  **CO D**  **E OF**  **ORDINANCES §**  **19-4 02**  **(201 3).**  **2 The**  **complaint was**  **filed by**  **the State**  **of Texas.**  **However, attorneys**  **for the City**  **of San**  **Antonio prosecuted**  **the case**  **against De**  **Loach, and**  **the City**  **of San**  **Antonio° filed**  **the notice**  **ofappeal with**  **this court.**  **Therefore, although**  **the style**  **of this**  **appeal mirrors**  **the trial**  **court's style and shows the State of**  **Texas as**  **appellant, we**  **will refer**  **to appellant**  **hereinafter as**  **the City.**  **3 The**  **record and**  **the brief**  **s from the**  **county court**  **have been**  **filed and**  **constitute the**  **record and**  **briefs in**  **this appeal.**  **See TEX.**  **GoV'T CODE**  **ANN. §**  **30. 0002**  **7(b) (West**  **Supp. 2014).**  **Tuns, we**  **review the**  **same issues**  **raised in**  **the briefs**  **submitted to the county**  **court. See**  **id. - 2 -** **04- 1**  **4-003 24-CR** 
**not for**  **grants of**  **authority, but**  **only for limitations**  **on its powers.**  **RC! Entm**  **'t, 373**  **S.W.3d at**  **595. A**  **home-rule city**  **ordinance is**  **presumed to**  **be valid.**  **State v.**  **Chacon, 273**  **S.W.3d 375,**  **378 (Tex.**  **App.-San Antonio**  **2008, no**  **pet.). The**  **Legislature may**  **limit a**  **home-rule city's**  **broad powers**  **only when**  **it expresses**  **its intent**  **to do**  **so with**  **"unmistakable clarity."**  **Bates, 406**  **S.W.3d at**  **546. "[T]he**  **mere fact that**  **the [L]egislature**  **has enacted a**  **law addressing**  **a subject**  **does not mean that**  **the subject**  **inatter is**  **completely preempted."**  **City of**  **Richardson v.**  **Responsible Dog**  **Owners of**  **Tex., 794 S.W.2d 17,**  **19 (Tex.**  **1990). A**  **home-rule city**  **ordinance that**  **conflicts with**  **a state**  **statute is**  **unenforceable to**  **the extent of**  **such conflict.**  **Dall. Merchant's**  **& Concessionaire**  **'s Ass**  **'n v.**  **City of**  **Dall., 852**  **S.W.2d 489,**  **491 (Tex.**  **1993). If**  **a reasonable**  **construction giving**  **effect to**  **both the**  **state statute**  **and the**  **ordinance can**  **be reached,**  **the ordinance**  **will not**  **be held**  **to have**  **been preempted**  **by the**  **statute. Bates,**  **406 S.W.3d**  **at 546;**  **Dall. Merchant's,**  **852 S.W.2d**  **at 491.**  **Statutory construction is**  **a question**  **of law**  **we review**  **de nova.**  **Yazdchi v.**  **State, 428**  **S.W.3d 831,**  **837 (Tex. 2014)**  **(internal citations**  **and quotations**  **omitted). In**  **construing a**  **statute,**
**we .must**  **seek to**  **effectuate the**  **collective intent or**  **purpose of**  **the legislators who**  **enacted the**  **legislation. Id.**  **In interpreting**  **statutes, we**  **presume the**  **Legislature intended**  **for the**  **entire statutory**  **scheme to**  **be effective.**  **Id. We**  **look first**  **to the**  **statute's literal**  **text, and**  **we read words**  **and phrases**  **in context**  **and construe**  **them according to**  **the rules**  **of gr**  **amm ar**  **and usage.**  **Id. 1.**  **Regulate Same**  **Activity? DeLoach asserts**  **the City's**  **ordinance setting**  **the allowable**  **fees for**  **non-consent tows**  **was preempted by**  **sections 2308.202**  **and 230S.203**  **of the**  **Act. We**  **must first**  **determine whether**  **the ordinance**  **and the**  **Act are**  **attempting to**  **regulate the**  **same activity.**  **RC! Entm 't,**  **373 S.W.3d**  **at 596.**  **We begin by**  **examining the**  **statutory text.**  **Bates, 406**  **S.W.3d at**  **546.**

**- 3**
**- 04-14-**  **0 0324**  **-CR Section**  **2308.202 provides:**  **The governing**  **body of**  **a political**  **subdivision may**  **regulate the**  **fees that**  **may be**  **charged or**  **collected in**  **connection with**  **a non-consent**  **tow originating**  **in the**  **territory of**  **the political**  **subdivision if**  **the private**  **property tow**  **fees: (1)**  **are authorized**  **by commission**  **rule; and**  **(2) do**  **not exceed**  **the maximum**  **amount authorized**  **by commission**  **rule. TEX.**  **Occ. CODE§**  **2308.202. Section**  **2308.203 provides:**  **(a) The**  **governing body**  **of a**  **political subdivision**  **that regulates**  **non-consent tow**  **fees shall**  **establish procedures**  **by which**  **a towing**  **comp�y may**  **request that**  **a towing fee study**  **shall be**  **performed. (b)**  **The governing**  **body of**  **the political**  **subdivision shall**  **establish or**  **amend the**  **allowable fees**  **for non-consent**  **tows at**  **amounts that**  **represent the**  **fair value**  **of the**  **services of**  **a towing**  **company and**  **are reasonably**  **related to**  **any financial**  **or accounting**  **information provided**  **to the**  **governing body. Id.**  **§ 2308.203.**  **The sections**  **of the**  **Act at**  **issue regulate**  **the allowable**  **fee a**  **towing company**  **may charge**  **for the**  **non-consent tow**  **of an**  **automobile. Similarly,**  **the ordinance**  **also regulates**  **the allowable**  **fee a**  **towing company**  **may charge**  **for the**  **non-consent tow**  **of an**  **automobile. The**  **plain language of**  **the Act**  **and the**  **ordinance establish**  **that they**  **are both**  **attempting to**  **regulate the**  **same activity**  **.. Therefore,**  **we next**  **decide whether**  **the ordinance**  **is inconsistent**  **with or**  **conflicts with**  **the Act.**  **RCI Entm**  **'t, 3**  **73 S.**  **W .3d**  **at 596.**  **2. Conflict?**  **DeLoach .asserts**  **the ordinance**  **conflicts with the**  **Act because**  **section 2308.203**  **requires a**  **towing fee**  **study be**  **performed if**  **a city**  **chooses to**  **regulate non-consent**  **tow fees.**  **He contends**  **the language**  **of the**  **Act demonstrates**  **the legislative**  **intent "to**  **require a**  **fair value**  **for all**  **non-consent tows**  **[be] based**  **on a**  **tow fee study,"**  **the city**  **"shall establish**  **or amend**  **the allowable fees**  **for non-** 

**- 4 - 04-14-003**  **24-CR**

**consent tows**  **in amounts**  **that represent**  **the fair**  **market value**  **of the**  **ser vices,"**  **and the city**  **has "ignored** 

**...**

**disregar ded**  **. . .**  **and failed**  **to comply**  **with th[is]**  **mandatory requirement."**  **Therefore, he**  **argues that**  **because the**  **City has**  **"failed to**  **comply with**  **mandatory requirements,**  **the ordinance**  **is unenforceable.**  **" The**  **Corpus Christi**  **Court of**  **Appeals considered a similar**  **argumeμtin Rountree**  **v. State,**  **No. 13-12-00063-CR,**  **2012 WL**  **3612497 (Tex.**  **App.--Corpus Christi**  **Aug. 23,**  **2012, no**  **pet.) (mem.**  **op., not**  **designated for**  **publication).4 There,**  **Rountree was**  **convicted of**  **violating the City of**  **Beaumont's ordinance**  **that set**  **the maximum**  **fee for**  **a non-consent**  **tow at**  **$85. Id.**  **at** ***l. Rountree**  **argued he**  **was entitled**  **to acquittal because**  **Beaumont had**  **not established procedures**  **by which**  **a towing company could**  **request a**  **towing fee**  **study be**  **performed and**  **argued that Beaumont**  **"was not**  **in compliance**  **with section**  **2308. 203**  **of the**  **occupations code."**  **Id. The State**  **acknowledged Beaumont did**  **not establish**  **the required**  **procedure set**  **forth in**  **section 2308.203 at**  **the time**  **the ordinance**  **was enforced**  **against Rountree; however, the**  **State asserted**  **that Beaumont's**  **non-compliance with**  **the statute**  **"did not**  **make the**  **ordinance invalid,**  **.nor did**  **it preclude**  **the enforcement**  **of the**  **ordinance." Id.**  **at** ***2. The**  **court 0f**  **appeals agreed**  **with the**  **State, noting**  **that "nothing**  **in the**  **language of**  **sections 2308.202**  **or 2308.203(a)**  **bars a**  **municipality's authority**  **to regulate**  **non-consent towing fees**  **due to**  **a municipality's**  **non-compliance with**  **setting up**  **a procedure**  **for a**  **towing company**  **to request**  **a fee study.**  **". Id.**  **The court**  **concluded that**  **its interpretation**  **did not**  **lead to**  **an absurd**  **result because**  **it appeared**  **that the**  **Legislature intended** 
**· section**  **2308.202 and**  **section 2308.203**  **to be**  **"independent, rather**  **than dependent,**  **from one**  **another." Id.** 

**4 Rountree**  **was decided**  **by the**  **Corpus Christi**  **Court of**  **Appeals pursuant**  **to a**  **Supreme Court**  **of Texas transfer**  **order from**  **the Beaumont**  **Court of**  **Appeals. -5-** **04-14-0 0324-CR**  **Although the**  **issue in**  **Rountree involved**  **Beaumont's failure**  **to conduct**  **the fee**  **study, and**  **the issue**  **here is**  **DeLoach' s**  **complaint that**  **the City**  **failed to**  **amend its**  **ordinance to**  **reflect fair**  **market value,**  **we agree**  **with the**  **reasoning in**  **Rountree. Nowhere**  **in the**  **Act did**  **the Legislature**  **include a**  **provision that**  **contains an**  **explicit expression**  **of the**  **Legislature's intent that**  **the Act**  **exclusively govern**  **the regulation**  **of non-consent**  **tow fees.**  **Cf RC!**  **Entm 't,**  **373 S.W.3d**  **at 596**  **n.3 (quoting**  **Dall. Merchant's,**  **852 S.W.2d**  **at 491)**  **("The Legislature's**  **intent is**  **clearly expressed**  **in**
**· section**  **109 .57(b**  **)·of the T**  **ABC-the regulation**  **of alcoholic**  **beverages is**  **exclusively governed**  **by the**  **provisions of the**  **TABC unless**  **otherwise provided**
**.... Section**  **109.57 clearly preempts**  **an ordinance**  **of a**  **home -rule**  **city that**  **regulates where**  **alcoholic beverages**  **are sold**  **under most**  **circumstances."). To**  **the contrary,**  **the Act**  **expressly allows**  **a city**  **to "regulate the**  **fees that**  **may be**  **charged or**  **collected in**  **connection with**  **a non-consent**  **tow," provided the**  **fees "are**  **authorized by**  **commission rule**  **" and**  **"do not**  **exceed the**  **maximum amount authorized by**  **commission rule."**  **TEX. Occ.**  **CODE §**  **2308.202.5 Accordingly,**  **we conclude**  **the ordinance**  **does not**  **conflict with**  **the Act,**  **and is**  **therefore, not**  **preempted. MISTAKE**  **OF LAW DeLoach**  **also asserts**  **he established**  **the affirmative**  **defense of**  **mistake of**  **law because**  **he reasonably**  **relied on**  **an opinion**  **from the**  **Attorney General.**  **1. Standard**  **of Review**  **The parties'**  **briefs before**  **the county**  **court are**  **the same**  **briefs we**  **must consider**  **on appeal.**  **See TEX.**  **Gov'T CODE§**  **30.00027(b). In**  **those briefs,**  **neither the**  **City nor**  **DeLoach cite to**  **an appropriate**  **standard of**  **review. However, in DeLoach's**  **prayer for**  **relief, he**  **requested only**  **that**

**5 The**  **Texas Commi**  **ssion of**  **Licensing and**  **Re gulat**  **iqn has**  **authorized the**  **maximum fee**  **of $250**  **for a**  **non-consent ·tow.**  **See TEX.**  **ADMIN. CODE,**  **tit. 16,**  **§§ 86**  **.455, .458**  **.**

**- 6 -** **04-14-0 0324-CR** 

**the county court**  **reverse the**  **municipal court's**  **judgment and**  **render a**  **judgment of**  **not guilty.**  **Therefore, we review**  **the evidence**  **only under**  **a legal**  **sufficiency standard. See Maynard**  **v. Booth,**  **421 S.W.3d**  **182, 183**  **(Tex. App**  **.- San**  **Antonio 2013,**  **pet. denied).**  **We review**  **the sufficiency**  **of the evidence**  **establishing the**  **elements of**  **a criminal offense**  **for which**  **the State**  **has the**  **burden of**  **proof in**  **the light**  **mostfavorable to**  **the verdict**  **and determine**  **whether any**  **rational trier**  **of fact**  **could have**  **found the**  **essential elements**  **of the**  **offense beyond**  **a reasonable**  **doubt. Jackson**  **v. Virginia,**  **443 U.**  **S. 307,**  **319 (1979);**  **Brooks v.**  **State, 323**  **S.W.3d 893,**  **895 (Tex.**  **Crim. App. 2010).**  **However, the**  **Jackson and**  **Brooks standard**  **of review**  **"does not**  **apply to**  **elements of**  **an affirmative**  **defense that the defendant**  **must prove**  **by a**  **preponderance of**  **the evidence."**  **Matlockv. State,**  **392 S.W.3d 662,**  **667·(Tex. Crim.**  **ARP· 2013).**  **When an**  **appellant asserts**  **that there**  **is no**  **evidence to**  **support an**  **adverse finding**  **on which**  **[]he had**  **the burden**  **of proof, we**  **construe the**  **issue as**  **an assertion**  **that the**  **contrary was**  **established as**  **a matter of**  **law. We**  **first search**  **the record**  **for evidence**  **favorable to**  **the finding,**  **disregarding all**  **contrary evidence**  **unless a**  **reasonable fa**  **ctfinder could**  **not. If**  **we find**  **no evidence**  **supporting the**  **finding, we**  **then determine**  **whether the contrary**  **was established**  **as a**  **matter of**  **law. Id.**  **at 669**  **(emphasis in**  **original). A**  **defendant is**  **entitled to**  **an acquittal**  **on appeal**  **despite the**  **trial court's**  **adverse finding**  **on his**  **affirmative defense**  **"only if**  **the evidence**  **conclusively establishes**  **his affirmative**  **defense." Id.**  **at 670.**  **2. Analysis**  **"It is**  **an affirmative**  **defense to**  **prosecution that**  **the actor reasonably**  **believed the**  **conduct charged**  **did not**  **constitute a**  **crime and**  **that he**  **acted in**  **reasonable reliance upon a**  **written interpretation**  **of the**  **law . . .**  **made by**  **a public**  **official c)larged**  **by law**  **with responsibility**  **for interpreting**  **the law in**  **question." TEX.**  **PENAL CODE**  **ANN. §**  **8.03(b )(2)**  **(West 2011**  **)**
**. A**  **defendant bears**  **the burden**  **of production**  **of evidence**  **and persuasion**  **to prove**  **an affirmative**  **defense by**  **a**

**- 7 - 04-**  **14 -003**  **24-CR preponderance**  **of the**  **evidence. Id.**  **§ 2.04(d);**  **Roberts v.**  **State, 319**  **S.W.3d 37,**  **51 (Tex. App.-**  **San Antonio 2010,**  **pet. refd).**  **DeLoach testified**  **he was**  **aware of**  **the ordinance**  **regulating non-consent**  **tow fees.**  **However, he**  **contends the**  **evidence at**  **trial was**  **sufficient to**  **prove his**  **affirmative defense**  **of mistake**  **of law**  **because he**  **reasonably relied**  **on an Attorney General's**  **opinion. See**  **Tex. Att'y**  **Gen. Op.**  **No. GA-0315 (2005).**  **DeLoach argues**  **the Attorney**  **General's opinion**  **stands for**  **the proposition**  **that the**  **ordinance is**  **preempted by**  **the Act.**  **In support**  **of this**  **argument, he**  **cites to**  **the Attorney**  **General's reference**  **to the**  **general rule**  **that city**  **ordinances must**  **comply with**  **state law.**  **See TEX.**  **CONST. art.**  **XI, §**  **5(a). ·**  **The Attorney**  **General's opinion**  **that De**  **Loach contends**  **he relied**  **on was**  **issued in**  **response to**  **an inquiry**  **regarding an**  **ordinance established**  **by the**  **City of**  **Victoria pertaining**  **to police**  **initiated non-consent**  **tows. Tex.**  **Att'y Gen.**  **Op. No.**  **GA-0315, at**  ***l. Victoria's**  **ordinance stated:**  **(a) All**  **tow truck**  **permit holders**  **operating permitted**  **tow trucks**  **on the**  **public streets**  **shall charge**  **no more**  **than the**  **storage rates**  **prescribed by**  **the Texas**  **Department of**  **Transportation for**  **performing non-consent**  **tows. A**  **charge for**  **any storage**  **service exceeding**  **the rates**  **prescribed or**  **in addition**  **to the**  **storage related**  **services prescribed**  **shall constitute**  **a violation**  **of this**  **article. (b)**  **The city**  **manager may**  **establish further**  **rate limits**  **in the**  **city's contracts**  **with rotation**  **list privilege**  **holders. These**  **rate limits**  **shall not**  **be considered**  **rate regulations,**  **but shall**  **instead be**  **considered contractual obligations pursuant to the**  **city's provision**  **of referrals**  **to contractees. Failure**  **to comply**  **with any**  **such contractual**  **rate limits shall not**  **be punishable**  **as a**  **violation of**  **this ordinance,**  **but shall**  **instead merely give**  **the city**  **the right**  **to declare**  **a breach**  **of contract**  **and potentially**  **terminate said**  **contra ct.**  **· Id.**  **at** ***1-*2.** **The issue**  **addressed by**  **the Attorney**  **General was**  **"whether a**  **municipality that**  **limits fe**  **es for**  **police-initiated non-consent**  **tows must comply with**  **[section 2308.20**  **3]."6 Id.**  **The inquiry** 

**6 At**  **the time**  **the Attorney**  **General's opinion**  **was issued,**  **section 2308.203**  **was codified under**  **Texas Transport**  **ation Code**  **section 643.204.**  **The language**  **is identi**  **cal in**  **both versions.**  **-8- 04-14-00324-CR** 

**stated that**  **the Texas**  **Towing and**  **Storage Association considered**  **Victoria's ordinance to**  **be a**  **regulation of**  **non-consent tow**  **fees and**  **complained that**  **Victoria had**  **not establish**  **ed the**  **procedures by**  **which a**  **towing company**  **could request**  **a towing**  **fee study**  **be pe**  **rfor med.**  **Id. at**  ***2. The**  **inquiry specifically**  **asked "whether**  **a city**  **can bypass**  **the clear**  **intent of**  **[section 2308.203]**  **by refusing**  **to set**  **procedures even**  **though it**  **has set**  **fees for**  **non-consent tows."**  **Id. Relying**  **on Cardinal**  **Towing, the**  **Attorney General concluded**  **Victoria's ordinance**  **did not**  **appear to regulate**  **non-consent tow**  **fees, but was instead designed**  **to create**  **efficiencies for**  **Victori a**  **and controlled**  **only a**  **portion of**  **the non-consent**  **tow market.**  **Id. at**  ***5; see also**  **Cardinal Towing**  **& Auto**  **Repair, Inc.**  **v. City**  **of Bedf**  **ord, Tex.**  **, 180**  **F**
**. 3**  **d 686,**  **694-95 (5th**  **Cir. 1999)**  **(concludi ng**  **ordinance was**  **not a**  **regulation because**  **city merely**  **created ef**  **ficiencies for**  **police-initiated non-consent**  **tow market). Therefore,**  **the Attorney General concluded**  **that Victoria**  **was not**  **impermissibly ignoring**  **the towing**  **fee study**  **requirement. Id.**  **The Attorney**  **General's opinion**  **states only that**  **it does**  **not consider**  **Victoria's ordinance**  **a regulation**  **of non-consent**  **tow fees.**  **It does**  **not stand**  **for the**  **proposition that**  **the ordinance**  **is preempted**  **by the**  **Act. Accordingly,**  **we conclude**  **DeLoach did not**  **conclusively establish**  **his af**  **firmative defense**  **under the legal suf**  **ficfoncy standard**  **set forth**  **in Matlock,**  **and is**  **not entitled**  **to**
**an acquittal**  **on appeal.**  **CONCLUSION**

**. We**  **conclude the**  **ordinance is**  **not preempted,**  **and we**  **agree with**  **the county**  **court that**  **DeLoach did**  **not conclusively**  **establish the**  **af firmative**  **defense of**  **mistake of**  **law. Therefore,**  **we**
**reverse the**  **county court's**  **judgment and**  **render judgment**  **reinstating the municipal**  **court's judgment.**  **Sandee Bryan Marion,**  **Chief Justice**  **Publish -9 -**