UNITED STATES OF AME RICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTEC TION BOARD

BLANCA MENDOZA

- SHEARD , Appellant,

v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERA NS AFFAIRS, Agency. DOCKET NUMBER DA

- 0752

- 14

- 0533

- I

- 1

DATE: August 25, 2015



### THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Blanca Mendoza

- Sheard , San Antonio, Texas, pro se. Thomas Herpin , Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE
Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER ¶1 The appellant has filed a peti tion for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal of a 30

- day suspension as moot . Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or dis tinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117 (c).2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or in volved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 ). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the pe tition for review. We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appeal is moot. We MODIFY the ini tial decision ’s analysis of the merits of the appellant’s discrimination claim under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Right s Act of 1994 (USERRA) because that
claim is also moot

. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order, we
AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 Effective June 24, 2014, the agency suspended the appellant for 30 day s from her GS

- 0 5 Secretary position based on th e following two charges: (1) absent without leave; and (2) failure to follow proper leave requesting procedures. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1 7

- 20 . The appellant appealed her suspension to the Board and requested a hearing. Id. at 1

- 7

. She dis puted both charges and asserted multiple affirmative defenses

. See i d. at 6 ; IAF, Tab 5,
Tab 13 at 5

- 6. She also requested compensatory damages. 2 IAF, Tab 1 at 6

.

2 Our regulations provide that a compensatory damages request must state the amount of damages sought and the reasons why the appellant believes she is entitled to an award under the applicable statutory standard. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.204 (b). The appellant’s request did not comply with this requirement. We find it appropriate to waive the appellant’s failure to comply, however, because the record indicates that she was never apprised of it. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.12 ; see also Calhoon v. Department of the Treasury , 90 M.S.P.R. 375 , ¶ 14 n.7 (2001 ).3

During the prehearing conference, the agency informed the administrative judge
that it had rescinded the 30

- day suspension

. See IAF, Tab 15 at 1. In an order and summary of the telephonic prehearing conference, t he administrative judge informed the appellant that , although an agency’s rescission of the appealed
action could divest the Board of jurisdiction and render the appeal moot, the Board retains jurisdiction over a discrimination claim where there is a viable
claim for further relief, such as compensatory damages. Id. at 2. She then stated that the only issues in dispute we re whether the suspension : was the resu lt of disability discrimination; was the result of discrimination under USERRA; and
was the result of sex discrimination or in violation of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. Id. at 3. Finally, she apprised the appel lant of the burdens of proof for those issues. Id. at 3

- 11. In an order and summary of the conference call, she provided further clarification of the issues . IAF, Tab 25 at 3

- 4. ¶3 After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal as moot. IAF, Tab 40, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 25

- 26.
She also found that the appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses of
discrimination based on sex, disability, and prior military status

. 3 ID at 7

- 25

. ¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has not responded. ¶5 The administrative judge correctly rejected the a ppellant’s affirmative defenses and dismissed the appeal as moot. The administrative judge determined, and the appellant does not dispute, that the agency rescinded the 30

- day suspension and that she has received all of the back pay to which she is entitl ed.
See ID at 6 n.4. For an appeal to be deemed moot, however, the employee must
have received all of the relief that she could have received if the matter had been adjudicated and she had prevailed. Antonio v. Department of the Air Force , 107 M.S.P.R. 626 , ¶ 9 (2008). As the administrative judge correctly recognized,

3 The appellant’s claim of pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. See Thome v. Department of Homeland Security , 122 M.S.P.R. 315 , ¶ 26 (2015).4

when an appellant has an outstanding discrimination claim and has raised what appears to be a further cla im for compensatory damages before the Board, the agency’s complete rescission of the adverse action appealed does not afford her
all the relief that she could have receive d if the matter had been adjudicated and she had prevailed. ID at 6; see Antonio , 107 M.S.P.R. 626 , ¶ 13. Because the appellant could have been entitled to compensatory damages based on her sex and disability discrimination claims , the administrative judg e properly considered
these claims below. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201 (d), 1201.202(c) ; see Schultz v. U.S.
Postal Service , 70 M.S.P.R. 633 , 639 (1996)

. The administrative judge correctly determined that the appellant failed to establish these affirmative defenses

. ID

at 7

- 23. Therefore, they do not preclude dism issal of the appeal as moot. ID

at 25. ¶6 However, w e modify the analysis in the initial decision of the appellant’s
claim of discrimination based on her prior military status

. USERRA does not
authorize an a ward of damages against a F ederal agency

. See 38 U.S.C. § 4324 (c); Isabella v. Department of State , 106 M.S.P.R. 333 , ¶ 47 n.14 (200 7 ) aff’d on req. for reco ns

. , 109 M.S.P.R. 453 (2008) ; 5 C.F.R. § 1208.15

. An appellant who has prevailed in a USERRA claim is entitled to “an order requiring the agency .

. . to comply with” the violated USERRA provisions and “to compensat[ion]

. . . for any loss of wages or benefits suffered by such person by reason of such lack of compliance.” 38 U.S.C. § 4324 (c)(2); Murphy v. Department of Justice , 107 M.S.P.R. 154 , ¶ 8 (2007). The appellant has received all the relief she could have received if she had prevailed on her USERRA claim. Thus, the appellant’s USERRA claim is moot and the administrative judg e should
not have considered it

. ¶7 The appellant’s petition for review simply requests review of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5

. Her one

- sentence request fai ls to meet the
Board’s criteria for granting a petition for review. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115

. Specifically, the appellant has not provided any new and material evidence or5

legal argument, or shown any legal error in the administrative judge’s analysis
that affects the o utcome of the case. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 (b), (d). Further,
the Board must defer t o an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice , 288 F.3d 1288 , 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

. We find that the appellant has not provided a suff iciently sound reason on review to overturn the administrative judge’s credibility determinations. See ID at 10

- 19, 23

. For these reasons, we
find that the administrative judge correctly dismissed the appeal as moot.

NOTICE TO THE APPELL ANT REGARDING YOU R FURTHER REVIEW RIG HTS The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113

. You have the right to request further review of this final decision.

Discrimination Claims: Administrative Review You may request review of this final decision on your discrimination claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7702(b)(1) ( 5 U .S.C. § 7702 (b)(1)). If you submit your request by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is: Office of Federal Operations Equal Employment Opportunity Commission P.O. Box 77960 Washington, D.C. 20013 If you submit your request via commercial delivery or by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: Office of Federal Operations Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 131 M Street, NE

Suite 5SW12G Washington, D.C. 205076

You should send your request to EEOC no later than 30 calendar days af ter your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time.

Discrimination and Other Claims: Judicial Action If you do not request EEOC to review this final decision on your discrimination claims, you may file a civil action against the agency on both your
discrimination claims and your other claims in an appropriate United States
district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (b)(2). You must file your civil action with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court

- appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 5(f) and
29 U.S.C. § 794a

.

FOR THE BOARD:

W ashington, D.C. ______________________________ William D. Spencer Clerk of the Board