Filed 7/6/16 Vaughn v. Darwish CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JACK VAUGHN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

BARBARA DARWISH et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B252762

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC454063)

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Amy Hogue, Judge. Affirmed as modified, subject to Plaintiffs/Appellants’ consent.

Mesisca Riley & Kreitenberg, Dennis P. Riley, Rena E. Kreitenberg for Plaintiffs 

and Appellants.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Roy G. Weatherup, Caroline E. Chan for 

Defendants and Appellants.

___________________________________________________
2

Defendants, through a foreclosure sale, purchased a property housing long-term 

tenants. After the purchase, defendants continually harassed the tenants, attempting to 

force them to vacate the premises. The tenants sued. A jury awarded the tenants 

(plaintiffs) compensatory damages and punitive damages.

Following the original entry of judgment, the trial court entered two amended 

judgments. We determine these latter judgments are void, and the original judgment is 

effective. We deem the awards of punitive damages excessive, however, and therefore 

reduce the punitive damages awards, conditioned on plaintiffs’ consent.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendants, appellants, and cross-respondents David and Barbara Darwish1 are 

real estate investors who buy foreclosed properties in association with various entities in 

which one or both spouses have interests, including defendants, appellants, and crossrespondents Gingko Rose Ltd. (Gingko Rose) and Logerm LLC (Logerm). In 2010, the 

Darwishes learned of a foreclosed property on Hyperion Avenue in Los Angeles. They 

caused the property to be purchased on August 27, 2010, in the name of a trust, with 

Barbara, doing business as 13 Wish, as trustee. 

Plaintiffs, respondents, and cross-appellants Jack Vaughn, Esmeralda Hernandez, 

Wayne Hart, Dennis Goldson, Carlos Rodriguez, and Ernest Johnson are long-time 

tenants of the property, which consists of a two-story house. At the time defendants 

purchased the property, plaintiffs each occupied single rooms in the house, except for 

Vaughn, who occupied two rooms. The house had four kitchens and four bathrooms, two 

of each upstairs and two of each downstairs. The floors in the house were not connected 

by an interior set of stairs, as a prior stairway had been converted into a room in which 

Hart lived. Thus, the second floor, where a number of plaintiffs lived, was accessible 

only by an exterior set of stairs.

 

1 For ease of reference, the Darwishes are often referred to by their first names in 

this opinion.
3

Disputes between plaintiffs and defendants arose almost immediately after 

defendants purchased the property. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against defendants in 

January 2011 alleging numerous claims, including tortious breach of warranty of 

habitability and quiet enjoyment, retaliatory eviction, and violations of the Los Angeles 

Rent Stabilization Ordinance (LARSO) (L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.00 et seq.).

A. First phase of trial

The trial was conducted in three phases. In the first phase, the legal claims were 

tried to a jury. We summarize the evidence in a light favorable to the judgment (see

OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 

Cal.App.4th 835, 846, fn. 4) as follows:

Plaintiff Vaughn first met David on August 27, 2010, when David came to view 

the house. David told Vaughn the Darwishes intended to purchase the property and 

asked Vaughn how many people lived there. Vaughn responded that the house had six 

units housing seven people, including one child. David told Vaughn that the “D.A.” 

would not let the tenants live there, that they would not be able to get relocation money, 

and that they “might as well leave right away.”

Soon after the Darwishes bought the property, they called a landlord-tenant 

meeting. At the meeting, Barbara and David requested information from plaintiffs 

including their age, how long they lived at the property, and how much in monthly rent 

they paid. Plaintiffs provided information, including how much rent they paid to the 

prior owner, which ranged from $450 to $855 per month. At the meeting, Barbara gave 

plaintiffs a list of other rental properties owned by the Darwishes with monthly rental 

rates. When plaintiffs said they would rather be paid to relocate and choose their next 

residences themselves, Barbara indicated that no relocation assistance would be provided.

On September 23, 2010, Barbara wrote a letter to plaintiffs claiming that none of 

them gave her information regarding their rental agreements. The letter also stated that 

plaintiffs had the “options” of either (i) remaining as tenants and paying monthly rent of 
4

$825 per room per month (significantly more than plaintiffs had been paying2) or (ii) 

receiving $1,000 in return for relocating to another residence within 30 days. The next 

day, plaintiffs’ attorney wrote a letter to Barbara informing her of plaintiffs’ contact 

information and how long they had lived at the property, and reconfirming their rate of 

monthly rent at the time of purchase. 

On or around September 27, 2010, Barbara received a “substandard order” from 

the City of Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety. The order stated that, based 

on an inspection, the property was determined to be substandard because of the 

unapproved use of a “single family dwelling” as a “boarding house.” The order also 

noted several maintenance and repair issues in the house, including problems with the 

electrical system and plumbing. At trial, the city inspector testified that more than six 

tenants were living at the property without a certificate of occupancy for a boarding 

house. Based on the zoning requirements for the property, 1,500 square feet could only 

accommodate one unit, so even if the house was 6,000 square feet, only four units would 

be allowed. The inspector also noted that during his inspection he identified an illegal 

kitchen and an illegal bathroom upstairs. While he was inspecting the property, David 

told the inspector to “be careful” because David had “retired judges working for” him and 

would “sue the city.” Barbara testified that she did not attempt to address the repair 

issues identified in the substandard order. 

On September 29, 2010, Barbara prepared a notice to quit addressed to Walter 

Majano, the former owner of the property. The notice stated that the property had been 

foreclosed upon and instructed tenants to vacate the premises. At the time she prepared 

the notice, Barbara knew that Majano no longer owned the property. She also knew the 

names of the actual tenants, but chose not to directly address the notice to them. Shortly 

thereafter, Barbara wrote a letter to the inspector who issued the substandard order, 

stating that the tenants were being evicted and that the home would soon be restored. On 

 

2 Vaughn, whose rent under the prior owner of $855 per month was substantially 

higher than any other tenant’s, occupied two rooms. 
5

October 12, 2010, Barbara caused to be filed an unlawful detainer complaint, naming 

only Majano as a defendant. 

Around this time, three tenants, Vaughn, Goldson, and Hernandez, mailed checks 

to Barbara for payment of rent, based on the rates that they most recently paid. The 

checks were never cashed and, according to Barbara, she never demanded any rent. 

On or around October 20, 2010, Barbara received a letter from the Los Angeles 

Housing Department. The letter stated the property was subject to the LARSO, that 

tenants could not be evicted because of foreclosure, and that the September 29, 2010, 

notice to quit did not provide a legal reason for eviction. Barbara was requested to 

provide a written cancellation of the notice. Barbara received a second letter from the 

Los Angeles Housing Department a few weeks later reiterating that foreclosure was not a 

permitted reason for eviction of a tenant. The letter stated that, if Barbara sought to 

recover possession of the units to comply with the substandard order, she was required to 

serve a proper notice to vacate and pay relocation fees to the tenants. Barbara did not 

cancel the notice to quit or attempt to pay relocation fees. 

The unlawful detainer action was decided in favor of the tenants on January 14, 

2011. The trust holding title to the property was ordered to pay $43,955.60 in attorney 

fees to Vaughn and Hernandez. On January 19, 2011, Barbara prepared a grant deed 

transferring the property from the trust to Gingko Rose. Although the deed described the 

transfer as a “bonafide [sic] gift,” Barbara testified at trial that the property was 

transferred to avoid foreclosure by Gingko Rose because it had lent money for the initial 

purchase. Barbara said, however, that there were no documents evidencing the loan and 

she did not know the terms of the loan. David testified that they never intended to have 

Gingko Rose own the property. He was impeached with a declaration he signed stating 

that Gingko Rose was always intended to be the owner.

In March 2011, Gingko Rose received letters from the Los Angeles Housing 

Department referencing notices to allow access to premises or quit served on the tenants 

in January and February 2011. The letters reiterated that the property was subject to the 
6

LARSO and stated that the tenants were entitled to relocation assistance in the event of 

eviction. 

The first time David had any work done on the property was in August or 

September 2011, approximately a year after issuance of the substandard order. David 

testified that, among other things, he had an upstairs kitchen and shower removed. 

Plaintiffs testified that David had other facilities removed, including a kitchen in 

Vaughn’s room, a second kitchen upstairs, and an upstairs bathroom. In addition, David 

had Hart’s room, which was located above a former stairway, demolished, and converted 

the area into an interior stairway. 

Throughout this period the property remained unregistered under the LARSO. In 

March 2012, Barbara, on behalf of Gingko Rose, sent a letter to the Los Angeles Housing 

Department enclosing a check for, according to the letter, “[r]egistration of [seven] rooms 

which are currently rented individually at [the property].” The letter further stated: “This 

is the first time that the property is being registered.” At the time of trial in December 

2012, Barbara had “not yet” received a certificate of registration for the property. 

In April 2012, Barbara and David served on each tenant a three-day notice to quit. 

The notices listed Gingko Rose as the owner, identified the tenants’ monthly rent rates, 

ranging from $450 to $855, and demanded payment of 10 months’ back rent. David had 

never asked for rent prior to this time because, according to his testimony, the property 

was “substandard.”

At trial, plaintiffs uniformly testified that they endured incessant harassment from 

the Darwishes. From the time they purchased the property, the Darwishes would 

repeatedly arrive at the house unannounced, walk through the house, and tell plaintiffs to 

throw away personal items. They frequently videotaped and took pictures of the tenants, 

their rooms, and their vehicle license plates. David told several plaintiffs that he had 

sued many people, that he knew the tenants’ license plate information, and that he would 

follow them for decades. Barbara called one tenant a “sex offender.” She told an 

African-American tenant that she knew he was on parole and would have him arrested.
7

Hart testified that, one day in 2011, David told him he needed to install a smoke 

detector in Hart’s room. Hart temporarily left, and when he returned the room had been 

demolished. Several plaintiffs testified that David had their kitchens, which existed at the 

time they began renting the units, removed. Rodriguez testified that his kitchen 

implements, worth approximately $1,000, were thrown away by David’s workers. 

In September 2011, around the time Hart’s room was destroyed, David came to 

the property with a box of “Hot Shot” cockroach foggers. Without any warning to the 

tenants, the foggers were released, causing a strong odor and a “white cloud” to waft 

through the house. Vaughn went to the doctor due to effects from the fogger and 

Hernandez developed coughing and pain in her nose and throat.

Plaintiffs testified that they developed anxiety, suffered emotionally, and lost sleep 

due to the Darwishes’ behavior. They stayed at the property because they believed they 

were entitled to relocation assistance, which the Darwishes refused to pay.

Meanwhile, at trial, the Darwishes’ testimony was strikingly evasive, and the 

testimony of both was repeatedly impeached. Further, in deposition testimony presented 

at trial, Barbara often referred to plaintiffs as “vagrants.” As the trial court later 

described their testimony, the Darwishes “came across as disingenuous, callous and 

condescending . . . .” 

After the close of evidence, the jury rendered its verdict, finding in favor of 

plaintiffs on all causes of action at issue: negligence, tortious breach of warranty of 

habitability, intentional influence to vacate, retaliatory eviction, violation of the LARSO, 

and fraudulent transfer. The jury’s awards to each individual plaintiff ranged from 

$34,600 to $43,400, consisting of (i) past economic loss and/or relocation benefits, (ii) 

past noneconomic loss, including mental pain and suffering, and (iii) civil penalties. In 

addition, Vaughn and Hernandez were each awarded $21,977.80 on the fraudulent 

transfer claim, relating to the prior judgment for attorney fees in their favor. Finally, the 

jury found there to be clear and convincing evidence that each defendant acted with 

malice, oppression or fraud. 
8

B. Second and third phases of trial

Evidence relating to defendants’ wealth was presented at the second phase of trial, 

determining the issue of punitive damages. After hearing the evidence, the jury awarded 

each plaintiff a total of $916,666.67 in punitive damages, consisting of $277,777.78 each 

against Barbara individually, David, and Gingko Rose, and $83,333.33 against Barbara 

“as agent for 13 Wish Trustee.”

The third phase of trial dealt with issues including whether defendants were alter 

egos of each other. The trial court found that plaintiffs failed to prove their alter ego 

allegations, but determined that defendant Logerm, as the general partner of Gingko 

Rose, was liable for Gingko Rose’s actions. 

C. Initial entry of judgment and postjudgment issues

Judgment was entered on August 28, 2013. On August 30, 2013, plaintiffs served 

notice of entry of judgment. 

Defendants thereafter filed motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding 

the verdict, which plaintiffs opposed. On October 25, 2013, a minute order was filed 

stating that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied, and that the 

motion for new trial was denied if plaintiffs consented to a reduced award of punitive 

damages. The minute order referenced an “order” specifying the conditionally remitted 

amount of punitive damages and the trial court’s findings and reasoning, supposedly 

signed and filed that date. An unsigned and apparently unfiled “order” dated October 25, 

2013, however, appears in the record. This document stated that the punitive damages 

awarded were not reasonably proportionate to the compensatory damages, as they totaled 

20 times the highest amount of compensatory damages awarded to a plaintiff. It further 

stated that defendants were entitled to a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, unless 

plaintiffs consented to the following punitive damages awards: $60,000 to Vaughn, 

$60,000 to Hernandez, $25,000 to Hart, $30,000 to Goldson, $25,000 to Rodriguez, and 

$15,000 to Johnson.

At a hearing on October 28, 2013, the trial court indicated it believed that 

October 25 was the last day to rule on the motion for new trial, so it had rushed to issue 
9

the October 25 ruling. After hearing argument and contemplating the matter, the trial 

court entered an October 28 minute order stating: “Court, on its own motion, amends its 

10-25-13 order on motion for new trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict 

(argued/submitted on 10-21-13) as follows: Order is deemed a **tentative** ruling, not a 

final one.”

Then, on November 12, 2013, the trial court entered an “amended” order denying 

the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and denying the motion for new 

trial on the condition that plaintiffs consented to reduced punitive damages awards. This 

amended order closely resembled the court’s October 25 unsigned and “tentative” order. 

Thereafter, on November 20, 2013, the trial court issued a “corrected” amended order 

making several typographical and/or clerical corrections, including a conditional punitive 

damages award of $25,000 (instead of $15,000) to Johnson. 

Plaintiffs accepted the remitted punitive damages awards in the following 

amounts: for Vaughn, $60,000 against each of four defendants ($240,000 total); for 

Hernandez, $60,000 against each of four defendants ($240,000 total); for Hart, $25,000 

against each of four defendants ($100,000 total); for Goldson, $30,000 against each of 

four defendants ($120,000 total); for Rodriguez, $25,000 against each of four defendants 

($100,000 total); for Johnson, $25,000 against each of four defendants ($100,000 total). 

After resolution of further issues, the trial court issued a “corrected amended judgment” 

on February 18, 2014.

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion plaintiffs were tenants3

Defendants argue that plaintiffs were not tenants during the time defendants 

owned the property, so defendants did not owe them any cognizable duties. Defendants’ 

first assertion in this regard is that plaintiffs never had rental agreements and did not pay 

rent for years, even when prior landlords owned the property. This assertion is flatly 

 

3 Plaintiffs’ December 22, 2014, motion to dismiss appeal and corresponding 

motion for judicial notice and to take evidence are denied.
10

contradicted by the record. Plaintiffs, through documentary evidence and testimony, 

established that they had rental agreements for their units at the property and paid rent to 

prior owners.4

Defendants next contend that the foreclosure on the property nullified plaintiffs’ 

tenancies. This argument finds neither factual nor legal support. The LARSO (which, as 

we further discuss below, applied to plaintiffs’ tenancies) specifies 14 legal reasons a 

tenant may be evicted. (L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.09, subd. A.) Foreclosure is not one of 

them. (Ibid.) Defendants were informed of this rule against eviction by the Los Angeles 

Housing Department in October 2010. 

In explaining a similar rule against eviction in San Francisco’s rent stabilization 

ordinance, the court in Gross v. Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 265, 271-272 

(Gross), found that the ordinance placed a substantive limitation on an owner’s property 

rights which was not preempted by foreclosure rules. The real party in that case argued 

that a purchaser at a foreclosure was not a landlord, and so no landlord-tenant 

relationship was established. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the 

definition of “landlord” in the ordinance included a “successor.” (Id. at p. 274.) Here, 

the LARSO similarly defines “landlord” to include a “successor.” (L.A. Mun. Code, 

§ 151.02.) The Gross court also explained that the “‘chief consideration’” in such cases 

is whether the same tenant continues to occupy the unit. (171 Cal.App.3d at pp. 274-

275.) “‘If the occupant originally took lawful possession of the premises as a tenant, he 

 

4

Indeed, defendants’ opening brief contains numerous, obvious 

mischaracterizations of the record, as well as incorrect and omitted citations to the record 

and repeated reference to matters not appearing in the record. These defects violate the 

rules on appeal (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) & (a)(2)(C)) and may lead to 

forfeiture of contentions (see Liberty National Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.

(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 839, 846; Lonely Maiden Productions, LLC v. GoldenTree Asset 

Management, LP (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 368, 384). In addition, by failing to set forth 

evidence favorable to plaintiffs that supports the judgment, defendants’ opening brief 

does not comply with the substantial evidence standard applicable to much of this appeal. 

(See Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881; Mendoza v. City of 

West Covina (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 702, 713-714.)
11

remains such for the purposes of the [ordinance] no matter what change in ownership 

occurs . . . .’” (Ibid.) Plaintiffs here all occupied their units as tenants under prior 

owners. Defendants’ purchase of the property at a foreclosure sale did nothing to change 

plaintiffs’ status as tenants.

On appeal, defendants also argue that the former owner Majano’s filing for 

Chapter 7 bankruptcy extinguished plaintiffs’ leases. Defendants failed to make this 

argument in the trial court. They now attempt to introduce evidence of Majano’s 

bankruptcy by a request for judicial notice dated February 18, 2016, which we deny in its 

entirety. “[N]ormally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an 

appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the 

judgment was entered.’” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 

434, 444, fn. 3.) The documents that defendants seek to introduce primarily date from 

2009 and 2010, while trial in this matter began in November 2012. Defendants’ request, 

therefore, is an “untimely attempt to introduce new evidence on appeal.” (Templeton 

Action Committee v. County of San Luis Obispo (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 427, 433.)5, 6 In 

any event, even if judicial notice were warranted, these documents would not assist 

defendants, as bankruptcy of a prior owner is not a stated basis for eviction under the 

LARSO. (L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.09, subd. A; see also Gross, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d 

265, 274-275.) 

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ failure to pay rent while defendants 

owned the property eliminated any obligations owed to plaintiffs. Normally, a failure to 

 

5 Defendants repeatedly referred to these bankruptcy documents in their opening 

and reply briefs. They did not make their request for judicial notice, however, until all 

briefs were filed, giving plaintiffs no opportunity to respond to the documents in their 

appellate briefs. Such gamesmanship will not be countenanced.

6 Defendants’ request for judicial notice was combined with a motion to augment 

the record. Because the motion to augment was also filed extremely late, for no apparent 

legitimate reason, we deny it. (See Regents of University of California v. Sheily (2004) 

122 Cal.App.4th 824, 827; Ct. App., Second Dist., Local Rules, rule 2(b), Augmentation 

of Record [augmentation should be sought within 40 days of the filing of the record].)
12

pay rent would be a valid basis for eviction. (L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.09, subd. A.1.) 

Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that plaintiffs’ tenancies were not 

terminated by a failure to pay rent here. First, soon after defendants purchased the 

property, plaintiffs informed them of their rental rates. Barbara, though, demanded that 

most plaintiffs pay almost twice what they had previously paid for rent. This demand 

violated LARSO restrictions on maximum rents (L.A. Mun. Code, §§ 151.02, 151.04) 

and provided plaintiffs with a valid defense to an unlawful detainer action. (L.A. Mun. 

Code, § 151.11.) Second, several plaintiffs attempted to pay rent anyway, at the rates 

they had previously been charged, but defendants did not cash the rent checks. Third, 

both Barbara and David testified that, other than the initial improper demand for rent and 

April 2012 notices to quit demanding 10 months of back rent, they did not make any 

request that plaintiffs pay rent.7 Fourth, the LARSO prohibits a landlord from 

demanding or accepting rent “for a rental unit without first serving a copy of a valid 

registration or annual registration renewal statement on the tenant of that rental unit.” 

(L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.05.) The evidence at trial showed that defendants did not even 

attempt to register plaintiffs’ rental units until March 2012, and had not received a 

registration statement by the time of trial. Thus, given all of these facts, there was ample 

basis for the jury to conclude that any obligation plaintiffs may have otherwise had to pay 

rent to the Darwishes was excused.8 

 

7 Pursuant to plaintiffs’ request of September 2, 2015, we take judicial notice of 

documents filed in numerous unlawful detainer actions initiated by defendants against 

plaintiffs from 2010 to 2012, all of which were resolved in plaintiffs’ favor, including the 

actions based on the April 2012 notices to quit. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) 

Specifically, we take judicial notice of exhibits 1-16 and deny judicial notice of the 

remaining exhibits.

8 Because plaintiffs were shown to be lawful tenants, we reject defendants’ related 

contention that the trial court erred by giving jury instructions pertaining to duties of 

landlords.
13

II. The tenancies were properly found subject to the LARSO

Defendants next contend the LARSO did not apply to the property. They argue 

that the property is a single-family home and therefore exempt from the LARSO. They 

further assert in their opening brief—without citation to the record or anything else—that, 

following trial, the city issued a notice confirming the property is a single-family home.

Defendants are correct that single-family homes are generally exempt from the 

LARSO. “Rental units,” defined as subject to the LARSO, do not include: “Dwellings, 

one family, except where two or more dwelling units are located on the same lot.” (L.A. 

Mun. Code, § 151.02.)

Defendants’ argument fails, however, because the evidence supported a 

conclusion that the property contained more than one “dwelling unit,” which is defined as 

a “group of two or more rooms, one of which is a kitchen, designed for occupancy by one 

family for living and sleeping purposes.” (L.A. Mun. Code, § 12.03.) At the time 

defendants purchased the property, it had four kitchens. Two of these kitchens were in 

rooms rented by Vaughn and Johnson, while the others were for communal use. Six 

households lived in the house. One unit was occupied by two people, Hernandez and her 

daughter. This evidence supported a conclusion that at least four, and possibly six, 

dwelling units were on the property. (See Salazar v. Maradeaga (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 

Supp. 1, 3-4 (Salazar) [finding that the LARSO applied to an illegal garage unit].)

The finding that the property was not a typical one-family dwelling exempt from 

the LARSO was further supported by Barbara’s March 2012 letter to the Los Angeles 

Housing Department, seeking to register “‘7’ rooms which are currently rented 

individually.” It also found support in the Department of Building and Safety’s October 

2010 substandard order, which noted that the property was being used as a “boarding 

house.” Boarding houses holding long-term occupants are subject to the LARSO. (L.A. 

Mun. Code, § 151.02.) 
14

 Further, the fact that the property was not registered under the LARSO did not 

mean the tenancies were not subject to the LARSO.9, 10 In Carter v. Cohen (2010) 188 

Cal.App.4th 1038, a defendant landlord argued that the tenancy of a renter, who lived in 

an unpermitted guesthouse not registered under the LARSO, was not governed by the 

LARSO. At trial, a witness from the Los Angeles Housing Department testified that the 

City would not allow the landlord to register the guesthouse because it was built without 

permits. (Carter, at p. 1045.) The court found that, although the rental agreement was 

unlawful and the property was not registered, the LARSO still applied. (Carter, at pp. 

1048-1050.) Otherwise, to deny the tenant relief “would effectively shift landlords’ 

burdens under the RSO to tenants, as it would force tenants who learned that their rental 

units were unlawful to terminate their leases voluntarily . . . .” (Id. at p. 1050.)11

 

9

In their request for judicial notice, defendants seek to introduce a document, 

apparently from the Los Angeles Housing & Community Investment Department, which 

references the property. Among other things the document states that the property “has 

never been registered,” and that “the Department has not had the opportunity to 

determine whether the property is subject to the provisions of the RSO.” Under an “other 

notes” heading, the document states “record indicate [sic] property address is a single 

family residence. And it is not under the RSO.” The meaning and effect of this 

document is unclear. It is also hearsay, and judicial notice is not warranted. 

10 It is possible that, after demolishing Hart’s room, constructing an interior stairway, 

and removing numerous kitchens and bathrooms, defendants turned what was once a 

multiple-dwelling unit property into a more typical single-family residence. This would 

not remove the plaintiffs’ tenancies from the protections of the LARSO, however. 

Instead, the LARSO would require defendants to pay relocation fees to plaintiffs. (L.A. 

Mun. Code, § 151.09, subd. G; see also Salazar, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 5-6.)

11 Gabor v. Cox (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th Supp. 16, a case relied on by defendants, is 

distinguishable. At the time the case was decided, the rent stabilization ordinance applied 

when a lot contained three or more dwelling units; only two potential dwelling units were 

at issue in the case. (Id. at p. 19.) Furthermore, the house at issue was a single-family 

residence with an interior stairway. (Ibid.) In contrast, the evidence showed that the 

property here contained at least four and possibly six dwelling units, some of which were 

located on the second floor, which was only accessible by exterior stairs. 
15

In a related argument, defendants contend that the trial court erred by either giving 

the jury instructions on the LARSO or allowing the jury to decide the applicability of the 

LARSO. We disagree. Although the verdict form did present plaintiffs’ claim for 

violation of the LARSO to the jury, the record shows that the trial court heard extensive 

evidence and argument regarding the applicability of the LARSO prior to determining 

that the claim could go forward to the jury. Under these circumstances, the trial court did 

not err by allowing the jury to decide whether plaintiffs ultimately proved their claim. 

III. Defendants’ motion for mistrial was properly denied

Defendants assert that the opening statement of plaintiffs’ attorney was 

excessively inflammatory and that mistrial (requested by defendants’ attorney following 

the opening statement) should have been granted. Defendants take issue with various 

assertions made during the opening statement, including that “the Darwishes are 

experienced litigators,” that they “bully and they threaten with the help of attorneys to get 

their way,” and that they are “experienced liars.”

Personal attacks on the character of an adverse party, as well as “attempts to 

appeal to the prejudice, passions or sympathy of the jury” can be grounds for mistrial. 

(Stone v. Foster (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 334, 355.) “‘A mistrial should be granted if the 

court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. 

[Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a 

speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on 

mistrial motions. [Citation.]’” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 198.)

We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a mistrial. 

Although some of the statements by plaintiffs’ counsel were overzealous,12 viewed in the 

context of the case as a whole they did not constitute prejudicial misconduct. (See 

Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800 [party must demonstrate 

misconduct was prejudicial to justify new trial]; Sabella v. Southern Pac. Co. (1969) 70 

 

12 Defendants’ counsel was not blameless in this regard. During closing argument, 

she asserted that plaintiffs were trying to “extort money” and that they were “burglars.”
16

Cal.2d 311, 318 [“it is only the record as a whole, and not specific phrases out of context, 

that can reveal the nature and effect of” attorney misconduct].) Furthermore, statements 

by plaintiffs’ attorney, though impolite, actually found some support in the evidence at 

trial. (See Hawk v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 121 [opening statement 

should be based on evidence reasonably believed to be admitted at trial].) Several 

plaintiffs testified that David, while threatening to follow them for years, told them he 

had sued many people. And, given the number of times the Darwishes were impeached 

at trial, and their generally evasive testimony, a claim that they were “liars” was not 

baseless.

Indeed, rather than the inflammatory nature of the opening statement, the trial 

court was more concerned that counsel’s references to the filing of lawsuits could run 

afoul of the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47). The court determined that a curative 

instruction was the proper remedy, and instructed defendants’ counsel to draft such an 

instruction. It appears from the record that defendants’ attorney never provided the court 

with the requested instruction. Nevertheless, the jury was eventually instructed, in part, 

that “[u]nder California Law, the filing of an unlawful detainer action or any other 

lawsuit is absolutely privileged against any later claims for damages based on the 

lawsuit.” This instruction was sufficient to cure any possible prejudice.13

IV. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s decision on fraudulent transfer

As noted above, an unlawful detainer action was brought by 13 Wish, as trustee 

for the trust holding the property, in October 2010. The matter was decided in favor of 

plaintiffs on January 14, 2011, and attorney fees totaling $43,955.60 were eventually 

 

13 Actually, if there was any prejudice arising from this instruction, it more likely 

affected plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought a claim under Civil Code section 1942.5. A 

plaintiff may base such a claim on a landlord’s filing of an action to recover possession, 

if the filing was in retaliation for a tenant’s exercise of legal rights. (Banuelos v. LA 

Investment, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 323, 332-333.) It appears that the jury was 

improperly instructed that they could not consider defendants’ numerous unlawful 

detainer actions against plaintiffs in deciding the retaliation claim. Since plaintiffs did 

not appeal from this issue, however, we do not discuss it further.
17

awarded to Vaughn and Hernandez. On January 19, 2011, Barbara prepared a grant deed 

transferring the property from the trust to Gingko Rose. At trial in this matter, plaintiffs 

claimed that this transfer of the property was made with the intent to prevent Vaughn and 

Hernandez’s efforts to collect the awarded fees. The jury agreed. On appeal, defendants 

argue that there was insufficient evidence of intent to support a fraudulent transfer claim, 

and that the claim was improper because the transfer of the property preceded the fees 

award. 

Civil Code section 3439.04, subdivision (a) states: “A transfer made or obligation 

incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before 

or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the 

transfer or incurred the obligation as follows: [¶] (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, 

or defraud any creditor of the debtor. [¶] (2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent 

value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor either: [¶] (A) Was 

engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining 

assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction. [¶] 

(B) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor 

would incur, debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as they became due.” In 

determining “actual intent,” a fact-finder may consider, among other factors, “[w]hether 

the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets,” “[w]hether the value of the 

consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset 

transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred,” and “[w]hether the transfer 

occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred.” (Civ. Code, 

§ 3439.04, subd.(b)(5), (8), (10).) 

There clearly was substantial evidence to find that the transfer was made with an 

intent to hinder creditors, Vaughn and Hernandez. The transfer of the property from the 

trust was made soon after the unlawful detainer action was decided against the trustee, 

with an adverse attorney fees award looming. The fact that the transfer occurred prior to 

the actual fees award was of no consequence. A creditor’s claim can arise “after the 

transfer.” (Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (a); see also subd. (b)(10).) 
18

Further, the jury had legitimate reasons to disbelieve Barbara’s explanation that 

the property was transferred to avoid foreclosure by Gingko Rose because it had lent 

money for the initial purchase. The grant deed, prepared by Barbara, described the 

transfer as a “bonafide [sic] gift,” contradicting her testimony that the transfer was 

repayment for a loan. Moreover, evidence of the purported loan was lacking. Barbara 

testified that no documents evidenced the loan from Gingko Rose to purchase the 

property, and Barbara did not know the terms of the loan. Additionally, the evidence 

showed that, other than the property itself, the trust had minimal or no assets, a fact 

further supporting the finding of actual intent. (Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (b)(5).) 

Thus, substantial evidence supported the judgment on the fraudulent transfer claim.

V. Barbara and David could properly be held personally liable

Defendants next argue that all of plaintiffs’ causes of action are of a type directed 

only against landlords. They assert that Gingko Rose was the landlord, and that Barbara 

and David could not be personally liable for its conduct. This argument fails.

One cause of action upon which plaintiffs were awarded damages was for 

violation of the LARSO. This claim was based, in part, on defendants’ failure to pay 

relocation fees, an obligation that the LARSO assigns to the “landlord.” (L.A. Mun. 

Code, § 151.09, subd. G.) The LARSO defines “landlord” as including an “owner, 

lessor, or sublessor,” as well as the “agent, representative or successor of any of the 

foregoing.” (L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.02.) The evidence supported the conclusion that 

Barbara and David were agents and/or representatives of Gingko Rose, so the finding that 

they were individually liable was proper.

Additionally, Civil Code section 1942.5, under which plaintiffs brought their 

retaliatory eviction claim, provides that an “agent of a lessor” who violates the statute 

shall be liable for damages sustained by a lessee. (Civ. Code, § 1942.5, subd. (f).) 

Again, as agents, Barbara and David were properly found liable. 

Moreover, as agents and managers of Gingko Rose, Barbara and David could be 

held liable for their personal participation in tortious conduct. (People v. Pacific 

Landmark, LLC (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1213; Bonfigli v. Strachan (2011) 192 
19

Cal.App.4th 1302, 1317-1318.) Abundant evidence supported a conclusion that Barbara 

and David personally participated in tortious conduct, including through their repeated 

harassment of plaintiffs. This evidence supports the jury’s findings of individual liability, 

including with respect to the tortious breach of warranty of habitability and the 

intentional influence to vacate claims. Thus, the findings of individual liability were 

sufficiently supported by the evidence and the law.

VI. An award of punitive damages was justified

Punitive damages were properly awardable in this matter. At least three causes of 

action supported an award for punitive damages: tortious breach of warranty of 

habitability (see Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858, 867; Smith v. David (1981) 

120 Cal.App.3d 101, 112, fn. 3); retaliatory eviction (see Civ. Code, § 1942.5, subd. 

(f)(2); Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, 281); and fraudulent transfer (see 

Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); Cheung v. Daley (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1673, 1676).

Substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict that defendants were guilty of 

“oppression, fraud, or malice.” (See Civ. Code, § 3294.) The jury reasonably could have 

found that punitive damages were justified based on, among other acts: defendants’ 

repeated entries into plaintiffs’ residence without notice, defendants’ practice of 

frequently videotaping and photographing plaintiffs and their personal items, the threats 

to follow plaintiffs for decades, the verbal insults lobbed at plaintiffs, and the release of 

cockroach foggers without warning. 

Defendants argue, however, that any award of punitive damages cannot be upheld 

because no competent evidence of defendants’ financial condition was presented. “[A]n 

award of punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the trial record contains 

meaningful evidence of the defendant’s financial condition.” (Adams v. Murakami

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109.) “[T]he most important question is whether the amount of the 

punitive damages award will have deterrent effect—without being excessive. Even if an 

award is entirely reasonable in light of the other two factors . . . (nature of the misconduct 

and amount of compensatory damages), the award can be so disproportionate to the 
20

defendant’s ability to pay that the award is excessive for that reason alone.” (Id. at p. 

111.) 

We reject defendants’ argument because, by stonewalling attempts to obtain 

evidence of financial condition and disregarding a court order, defendants have forfeited 

any right to complain of a lack of sufficient financial evidence. (Mike Davidov Co. v. 

Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 597, 608-609 (Davidoff); Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 

Cal.App.4th 441, 453-454.)

Following the jury’s verdict on the first phase of trial, the trial court issued wideranging orders requiring defendants to deliver to plaintiffs’ counsel documents 

evidencing their financial condition, including: statements from bank accounts, checking 

accounts, and credit card accounts in defendants’ own name as well as for entities in 

which they had interests; title to real estate, including mortgage statements and

appraisals; loan applications made over the preceding six years; outstanding promissory 

notes; leases; and retirement account statements. In spite of these broad orders, 

defendants’ production was paltry, only containing a few records showing interests in six 

properties. 

Plaintiffs themselves produced evidence relating to defendants’ net wealth, 

obtained through public records of property ownership and through subpoena. One 

document obtained by subpoena to a bank was a loan application made by David in

2007—the type of document defendants were expressly ordered to produce that they did 

not produce. Based on the information plaintiffs discovered through their own efforts,14

an expert witness retained by plaintiffs testified that defendants’ real estate holdings had 

a fair market value of $16 million to $57 million at the time of trial.

 

14 Defendants argue that this information was not properly obtained by plaintiffs and 

therefore should not be considered. The trial court, however, found that defendants were 

given notice that plaintiffs sought to subpoena records from financial institutions. It 

found defendants’ possible failure to give notice of a subpoena issued in Iowa immaterial. 

Given the circumstances, the trial court’s decision does not constitute reversible error.
21

During this punitives phase of trial, defendants called a bookkeeper for Gingko 

Rose to testify. He testified, among other things, that he prepared written market 

analyses for properties owned by Gingko Rose. 

Following the bookkeeper’s testimony, the trial court noted that the market 

analyses the bookkeeper testified about were appraisals—again, documents ordered 

produced that were not. The trial court found that by failing to produce such documents, 

which defendants’ own witness acknowledged creating, defendants violated the court’s 

orders: “There were no financial statements produced in response to plaintiff which 

[was] my order.”

As stated of the defendant in Davidoff, “By his disobedience of a proper court 

order, defendant improperly deprived plaintiff of the opportunity to meet his burden of 

proof on the issue. Defendant may not now be heard to complain about the absence of 

such evidence.” (78 Cal.App.4th 597, 609.) Defendants, here, likewise disobeyed valid 

court orders, and now seek to leverage an asserted lack of evidence, caused by their own 

insubordination, into an advantage on appeal. We reject their efforts to do so.15

After hearing evidence relating to defendants’ financial condition, the jury 

awarded each plaintiff a total of $916,666.67 in punitive damages. The trial court later 

attempted to remit these punitive damages significantly, stating that a range of a total of 

$100,000 to $240,000 per plaintiff was called for. The evidence presented at trial 

sufficiently shows that defendants can afford to pay these lower amounts of punitive 

damages, which, as we discuss further below, are appropriate. 

 

15 Defendants also complain that the trial court did not allow David to testify at the 

punitives stage of trial. This again was a situation created entirely by defendants. 

Plaintiffs attempted to call David to testify during the second phase, but defendants’ 

attorney stated David would not appear. It was only after plaintiffs introduced documents 

relating to defendants’ financial condition (which defendants failed to produce 

themselves) that defendants sought to call David to testify. The trial court found it “not 

fair to plaintiffs at all” if David were to testify on rebuttal after refusing to testify earlier. 

Given the earlier refusal, and defendants’ disobedience of the court’s orders, we do not 

find error in the court’s ruling.
22

VII. The attorney fees award was not an abuse of discretion

Plaintiffs were awarded $845,351.25 in attorney fees. Fees were properly 

awardable pursuant to the LARSO (L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.09, subd. H), as well as on 

plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the warranty of habitability (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. 

(b)(2); Larson v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1297) 

and for retaliatory eviction (Civ. Code, § 1942.5, subd. (g); Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 

Cal.App.4th 803, 818).

Defendants argue that the fees award was excessive. We review the trial court’s 

determination for an abuse of discretion. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 

Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140 (Ketchum).) 

In moving for a fees award, plaintiffs’ counsel submitted extensive evidence, 

including 67 pages of billing records, detailing the work done on the case, which at that 

point had lasted over two and a half years. The record shows that the litigation was hotly 

contested by both sides. As the trial court stated, “this matter was fought tooth and nail, 

so I’m not surprised at the amount of the fees.” The trial court also had reasonable basis 

to conclude that an hourly rate of $500 was “in keeping with what we see in the 

community” and that counsel was “well-versed in the areas of law at issue in the case.”

In determining the amount of fees, the trial court elected to adjust the lodestar by 

awarding a 1.5 multiplier to compensate counsel for the risks involved in prosecuting the 

matter on a contingency basis. One factor a trial court may consider when deciding 

whether to adjust the lodestar by a multiplier is “the contingent nature of the fee award.” 

(Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; (Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 

Cal.App.4th 1157, 1217-1218 (Amaral).) “[T]he purpose of a fee enhancement is 

primarily to compensate the attorney for the prevailing party at a rate reflecting the risk 

of nonpayment in contingency cases as a class.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 

1138.)

This matter involved somewhat complicated legal issues for which only a 

relatively small amount of compensatory damages were potentially recoverable. Indeed, 

most tenants of modest means would likely have difficulty finding a lawyer to take on 
23

such a case because of the prospect of a small recovery. The trial court was therefore 

justified in considering counsel’s contingent risk in pursuing the case, as well as other 

factors, in choosing to award a multiplier of 1.5. (Amaral, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 

1216.)

Furthermore, the contingent risk persisted throughout the case, since after the 

initial verdict was entered, defendants continued to file motions arguing that no award of 

damages was proper. The record shows that defendants filed at least three postverdict 

motions directly challenging the liability and damages findings, as well as associated 

ex parte applications. Plaintiffs’ ability to collect on the judgment, including attorney 

fees, also remained contingent. As demonstrated at trial, defendants fraudulently 

transferred property in order to avoid collection of a prior fees award. Thus, we find that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a multiplier of 1.5 to the fees 

generated through the entirety of the case.

VIII. The original judgment was effective, but punitive damages must be reduced

Plaintiffs served notice of entry of judgment on August 30, 2013, making 

October 29, 2013, the last day to rule on defendants’ new trial motion. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 660.) The trial court purported to rule on the motion on October 25, 2013, but then, on 

October 28, 2013, entered an order deeming the prior ruling tentative. We find that the 

trial court failed to enter a timely new trial order, and therefore defendants’ motion for 

new trial was denied by operation of law.

Code of Civil Procedure sections 657 and 660 lay out mandatory procedural steps 

for ruling on a motion for new trial, which must be decided within 60 days of (as 

applicable here) service of notice of entry of judgment. (Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of 

America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 899 (Sanchez-Corea).) When a motion for new trial is 

granted, the order granting the motion must state the grounds relied on by the court. 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 657; Sanchez-Corea, at p. 899.) An order based on excessive 

damages cannot be affirmed unless this ground is specified in the trial court’s order. 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 657; Sanchez-Corea, at p. 899.) Moreover, even though an order 

granting new trial need not itself contain specification of the reasons for the order, 
24

specification of the reasons must be signed and filed by the court within 10 days of the 

filing of the order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 657; Sanchez-Corea, at p. 899.) 

The trial court’s purported order of October 25, 2013, did not comply with these 

requirements. The trial court’s minute order, which stated that the motion for new trial 

was denied, “if plaintiffs consent to reduced punitive damages awards,” would have 

actually been, if effective, an order granting new trial. (See Mokler v. County of Orange

(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 147.) But the minute order did not state any grounds for 

reducing the punitive damages awards. The order was therefore defective. (See Code 

Civ. Proc., § 657; Sanchez-Corea, supra, 38 Cal.3d 892, 899.) Furthermore, no signed 

statement of reasons was filed within 10 days, rendering the purported order void. (See 

Code Civ. Proc., § 657; Sanchez-Corea, at p. 899.) Although the record contains an 

“order” explaining the court’s reasoning on the motion for new trial, this document is 

neither signed nor file-stamped. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 657; Sanchez-Corea, at p. 899.) 

Moreover, even if this October 25, 2013, unsigned “order” could somehow be considered 

valid, the trial court timely vacated the order on October 28 by ruling that the order was 

merely tentative. (See Jones v. Sieve (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 359, 370 [trial court may 

reconsider an order if still within Code of Civil Procedure section 660’s 60-day limitation 

period].)

Thus, no order granting new trial was issued by and effective on October 29, 2013, 

the last day to rule on such a motion. Defendants’ motion for new trial was therefore 

denied by operation of law. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 660, 657.) And any further purported 

order on the motion for new trial—including the one entered on November 12, 2013—

was defective for exceeding the 60-day jurisdictional period. (Sanchez-Corea, supra, 38 

Cal.3d 892, 903.) 

This leaves the August 28, 2013, judgment as the effective final judgment. This 

judgment, however, awarded each plaintiff a total of $916,666.67 in punitive damages, an 

amount (as the trial court noted) 20 times greater than the highest amount of 

compensatory damages (not including civil penalties) awarded to any plaintiff. We find 

that this ratio is excessive and not proportionate to the wrongs committed by defendants 
25

and the harm suffered by plaintiffs. (See Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc.

(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1182-1183.) Instead, we believe that the following punitive 

damages awards are appropriate: for Vaughn, $240,000 total; for Hernandez, $240,000 

total; for Hart, $100,000 total; for Goldson, $120,000 total; for Rodriguez, $100,000 

total; for Johnson, $100,000 total. Remittitur of punitive damages in this manner is 

proper. (See Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1704.) 

DISPOSITION

The August 28, 2013, judgment is modified so that plaintiffs are awarded the 

following amounts of punitive damages: Vaughn—$60,000 against each of the four 

defendants Barbara Darwish DBA 13 Wish Trustee, Barbara individually, David 

individually, and Gingko Rose (collectively, the four punitives defendants) ($240,000 

total); Hernandez—$60,000 against each of the four punitives defendants ($240,000 

total); Hart—$25,000 against each of the four punitives defendants ($100,000 total); 

Goldson—$30,000 against each of the four punitives defendants ($120,000 total); 

Rodriguez—$25,000 against each of the four punitives defendants ($100,000 total); 

Johnson—$25,000 against each of the four punitives defendants ($100,000 total). The 

judgment is affirmed in its entirety as so modified, on the condition that plaintiffs timely 

consent in writing to such a reduction in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 

8.264(d). If consent is not filed within the time allowed, judgment for any plaintiff not 

filing consent is reversed as to the amount of punitive damages only, and the matter is 

remanded for a new trial to determine the amount of punitive damages as to that plaintiff, 

liability having been established. The attorney fees award in favor of plaintiffs is also 

affirmed. 

Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

BOREN, P.J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J. HOFFSTADT, J.