NEWCASTLE DISEASE

RESPONSE PLAN

THE RED BOOK

 FEBRUARY 2014
February 11, 2014

USDA APHIS, Veterinary Services

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center (NPIC)

This version of the USDA APHIS Newcastle Disease (ND) Response Plan: The Red Book (February 2014) has been 

updated according to comments received on a prior version and revisions to the current Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials that are referenced within. The following list summarizes 

the important changes that were made in 2014. 

• Updates to reflect the 2013 OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

• Revisions to ensure consistency with other response plans and strategic documents.

• Updates to ND case definition.

• Changes in nomenclature per the updated Code of Federal Regulations.

• Corrections and clarifications made in response to comments throughout the plan, including those

comments received on the Exotic ND Response Plan: The Red Book (draft August 2013) version that was

circulated.

We realize that preparing for and responding to an ND outbreak will be a complex effort, requiring collaboration for 

multiple stakeholders. As such, we will accept comments on the ND Response Plan for incorporation into future 

versions. Please email these comments to FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov with the subject line of “ND 

Response Plan.”

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) mission is to raise

awareness, define expectations, and improve capabilities for FAD preparedness and response.

For more information, please go to:

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml (APHIS employees)

or e-mail FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov

ii
Executive Summary

This Newcastle Disease (ND) Response Plan: The Red Book (2014) incorporates 

comments received on the Exotic ND Response Plan: The Red Book (draft 2013).

This 2014 plan was also updated to be consistent with other Foreign Animal 

Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials. This plan has

changed significantly from the END Red Book (1992). The objectives of this plan 

are to identify (1) the capabilities needed to respond to an ND outbreak and (2) 

the critical activities that are involved in responding to that outbreak, and timeframes for these activities. These critical activities are the responsibility of 

Incident Command in an outbreak situation.

This plan protects public health and the environment, promotes agricultural 

security, secures the food supply, and guards animal health by providing strategic 

guidance on responding to an ND outbreak. Developed by the United States 

Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS), the plan gives direction to emergency 

responders at the local, State, Tribal, and Federal levels to facilitate ND control 

and eradication efforts in poultry in the United States. This plan complements, not 

replaces, existing regional, State, Tribal, local, and industry plans. 

As defined by the Code of Federal Regulations, ND is caused by an avian 

paramyxovirus serotype-1 that meets specific criteria for virulence. This virus is 

also called virulent ND virus (vNDV). For the purposes of this plan, ND—

formerly known as exotic Newcastle disease or END—is defined as an infection 

of poultry with vNDV. ND is readily transmitted through sick and infected birds; 

the 2002–2003 outbreak in the United States was estimated to cause $5 billion in 

industry losses. 

ND is a zoonotic disease, though not one that poses a significant threat to public 

health. Infections in humans are usually characterized by conjunctivitis, though 

mild, self-limiting influenza-like symptoms have been reported. Individuals most 

at risk for ND are those exposed to large quantities of the virus through direct 

contact with infected poultry, like laboratory workers and vaccination crews. No 

known infections have occurred from handling or consuming poultry products. In 

the event of an ND outbreak, animal health officials will collaborate with public 

health officials. In addition to the potential public health threat, there may also be 

a significant social and psychological impact on flock owners.

The goals of an ND response are to (1) detect, control, and contain ND in poultry 

as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate ND using strategies that seek to protect 

public health and the environment, and stabilize animal agriculture, the food 

supply, and the economy; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches 

and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected poultry and noncontaminated poultry products. 

February 2014 iii
 

Achieving these three goals will allow individual poultry facilities, States, Tribes, 

regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as possible. They

will also allow the United States to regain ND-free status without the response 

effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself.

During an ND outbreak response effort, many activities—such as epidemiology, 

surveillance, biosecurity, quarantine and movement control, and depopulation—

must occur in a deliberate, coordinated fashion. In addition to providing strategic 

direction on these various activities, this plan explains the underlying Incident 

Command System structure, applying the National Response Framework (NRF) 

and National Incident Management System (NIMS) principles and systems to 

control and eradicate an outbreak of ND in the domestic poultry population.

The United States’ primary control and eradication strategy for ND in domestic 

poultry is “stamping-out,” as prescribed by the World Organization for Animal 

Health (OIE), in order to regain ND-free status. However, if the spread of ND 

outpaces the resources for stamping-out, or if other factors direct the response 

away from a stamping-out policy alone, emergency vaccination strategies may be 

considered. 

Incorporating current scientific knowledge and policy guidance about ND, the ND

Response Plan does the following: 

 Identifies the audience for and purpose of the document. 

 Provides technical information on ND and the impact an ND outbreak 

could have in the United States. 

 Explains the integration of the NRF, NIMS, and other FAD PReP 

documents. 

 Describes USDA preparedness and response activities, both domestic and 

international, including collaboration with public health agencies and the 

APHIS Incident Management Structure. 

 Presents 23 specific response critical activities and tools, such as 

surveillance, diagnostics, cleaning and disinfection, health and safety, 

personal protective equipment, and depopulation. 

 Details OIE standards for ND surveillance, virus inactivation, and disease

freedom. 

 Supplies information on proof-of-freedom procedures and restocking after 

an ND outbreak.

This response plan is carefully integrated with other FAD PReP documents, 

including the ND Standard Operating Procedures and National Animal Health 

Emergency Management System Guidelines. Together, these documents provide 

a comprehensive preparedness and response framework for an ND outbreak. 

February 2014 iv
Executive Summary 

Further information on FAD PReP is available at 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep and for APHIS employees at 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml. 

This plan is a dynamic document that will be updated and revised based on future 

knowledge and further stakeholder input. Your comments and recommendations 

on this document are invited. Send them to the following e-mail address: 

FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov. 

February 2014 v 
Contents

Preface.......................................................................................xii

Chapter 1 Introduction and ND Information ...............................................1-1

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN................................................................. 1-1

1.2 PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT ................................................................................ 1-2

1.3 AUDIENCE... .................................................................................................. 1-2

1.4 DEFINITIONS....................................................................................1-2

1.5 ND INFORMATION ........................................................................................... 1-3

1.5.1 Etiology.................................................................................................. 1-3

1.5.2 History and Global Distribution ............................................................... 1-4

1.5.3 International Trade.................................................................................. 1-5

1.5.4 Impact of an ND Outbreak ...................................................................... 1-5

1.5.5 Ecology.................................................................................................. 1-6

1.5.6 Diagnosis in Avian Species..................................................................... 1-7

1.5.7 Vaccines and Induced Immunity ............................................................. 1-9

Chapter 2 Framework for ND Preparedness and Response....................2-1

2.1 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEM, AND NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEM INTEGRATION..................................................................................... 2-1

2.1.1 National Response Framework............................................................... 2-1

2.1.2 National Incident Management System .................................................. 2-1

2.1.3 National Animal Health Emergency Management System..................... 2-2

2.1.4 Coordination and Collaboration .............................................................. 2-3

2.2 FEDERAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS .................. 2-3

2.2.1 Overview..... ........................................................................................... 2-3

2.2.2 USDA Roles and Responsibilities Overview........................................... 2-3

2.3 AUTHORITY.. .................................................................................................. 2-5

Chapter 3 USDA ND Preparedness and Response ..................................3-1

3.1 USDA........ .................................................................................................. 3-1

3.1.1 Preparedness Exercises......................................................................... 3-1

3.1.2 Domestic Activities.................................................................................. 3-2

February 2014 vi
 

3.1.3 International Activities............................................................................. 3-2

3.1.4 International Trade.................................................................................. 3-3

3.1.5 Compartmentalization............................................................................. 3-3

3.2 USDA ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY ................................................................ 3-4

3.3 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.................................................... 3-4

3.3.1 Multiagency Coordination Group ............................................................ 3-5

3.3.2 APHIS Incident Coordination Group ....................................................... 3-6

3.3.3 Organization for a Single Incident........................................................... 3-6

3.3.4 Organization for Multiple Incidents.......................................................... 3-6

3.3.5 Guidance on Incident Management and Organizational Strategy.......... 3-7

3.4 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT LEVELS .......................................................... 3-7

3.5 NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE CORPS (NAHERC)............ 3-9

3.6 DIAGNOSTIC RESOURCES AND LABORATORY SUPPORT..................................... 3-9

3.6.1 National Veterinary Services Laboratories.............................................. 3-9

3.6.2 National Animal Health Laboratory Network ........................................... 3-9

3.6.3 Center for Veterinary Biologics ............................................................. 3-10

Chapter 4 ND Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy............................4-1

4.1 RESPONSE GOALS.......................................................................................... 4-1

4.2 PRINCIPLES, CRITICAL ACTIVITIES, AND TOOLS FOR AN ND RESPONSE............... 4-2

4.2.1 Critical Activities...................................................................................... 4-2

4.2.2 Epidemiological Principles ...................................................................... 4-2

4.2.3 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign.............................................. 4-3

4.2.4 Timeline in any ND Response for First 72 Hours.................................... 4-3

4.3 RESPONSE STRATEGY FOR CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF ND IN POULTRY ..... 4-4

4.3.1 Defining Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy for Poultry .................. 4-4

4.3.2 Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out........................................ 4-5

4.3.3 Assessing a Possible Outbreak .............................................................. 4-6

4.3.4 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities ............................ 4-6

4.3.5 Management of Incident ......................................................................... 4-7

4.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING RESPONSE.................................................................. 4-7

4.5 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ND............................................................... 4-8

4.5.1 World Organization for Animal Health Standards for ND Response ...... 4-8

February 2014 vii
Contents

4.5.2 Recognition of Disease-Free Status ....................................................... 4-8

4.5.3 Criteria Needed for ND-Free Status........................................................ 4-9

Chapter 5 Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools.................5-1

5.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY................................................................................ 5-1

5.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS AND CASE DEFINITIONS .......................................... 5-1

5.2.1 Laboratory Definitions............................................................................. 5-1

5.2.2 Case Definitions...................................................................................... 5-2

5.2.3 Case Definition Development Process.................................................... 5-3

5.3 SURVEILLANCE............................................................................................... 5-3

5.3.1 Surveillance Planning for ND Outbreak .................................................. 5-4

5.3.2 Surveillance Sampling ............................................................................ 5-6

5.3.3 Surveillance Schemes Based on Zone ................................................... 5-7

5.4 DIAGNOSTICS................................................................................................. 5-8

5.4.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing.............................................. 5-8

5.4.2 Surge Capacity ..................................................................................... 5-11

5.4.3 Reporting.............................................................................................. 5-11

5.5 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION AND TRACING ............................................ 5-11

5.5.1 Summary of Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations....................... 5-11

5.5.2 Epidemiological Investigation................................................................ 5-13

5.5.3 Tracing................................................................................................. 5-14

5.5.4 Considerations for Size of Control Area and Minimum Sizes of 

Other Zones.......................................................................................... 5-15

5.6 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ......................................................................... 5-16

5.7 COMMUNICATION .......................................................................................... 5-17

5.7.1 Objectives... ......................................................................................... 5-18

5.7.2 Key Messages ...................................................................................... 5-18

5.7.3 Further Communications Guidance ...................................................... 5-18

5.8 HEALTH AND SAFETY AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT ....................... 5-19

5.8.1 Mental Health Concerns ....................................................................... 5-19

5.8.2 Further Information on Health, Safety, and Personal Protective 

Equipment............................................................................................ 5-20

5.9 BIOSECURITY ............................................................................................... 5-20

5.9.1 Biosecurity Hazards and Mitigating Measures...................................... 5-21

February 2014 viii
 

5.9.2 Closed Flocks ....................................................................................... 5-21

5.9.3 Waiting Period ...................................................................................... 5-22

5.10 QUARANTINE AND MOVEMENT CONTROL ........................................................ 5-22

5.10.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations........................................... 5-23

5.10.2 Permit Guidance to Move into a Control Area, within a Control 

Area, and out of a Control Area ............................................................ 5-23

5.10.3 Moving Commodities, Animals, and Conveyances ............................... 5-28

5.10.4 Guidance for All Premises .................................................................... 5-28

5.10.5 World Organization for Animal Health Treatment Guidelines for ND .... 5-28

5.10.6 Surveillance Required for Poultry and Product Movement................... 5-29

5.11 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS............................................................................. 5-29

5.12 REGIONALIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE (FOR A U.S. ND RESPONSE)..... 5-30

5.12.1 Compartmentalization........................................................................... 5-31

5.12.2 Further Guidance.................................................................................. 5-31

5.13 MASS DEPOPULATION AND EUTHANASIA......................................................... 5-31

5.13.1 Best Practice Guidance ........................................................................ 5-32

5.13.2 Water-Based Foam for Poultry Depopulation ....................................... 5-32

5.14 DISPOSAL.................................................................................................... 5-33

5.15 CLEANING AND DISINFECTION ........................................................................ 5-34

5.16 VACCINATION ............................................................................................... 5-34

5.16.1 General Vaccination Information........................................................... 5-34

5.16.2 Emergency Vaccination Strategies for Poultry...................................... 5-35

5.16.3 Assessment and Overview ................................................................... 5-36

5.16.4 Strategic Vaccine Distribution............................................................... 5-36

5.16.5 Vaccination Zone Designations ............................................................ 5-37

5.16.6 Vaccinated Premises ............................................................................ 5-39

5.16.7 Movement Restrictions for Vaccinates.................................................. 5-40

5.16.8 Cessation of Vaccination ...................................................................... 5-40

5.17 NATIONAL VETERINARY STOCKPILE................................................................ 5-41

5.18 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND VECTOR CONTROL............................................ 5-41

5.18.1 Wildlife Management ............................................................................ 5-41

5.18.2 Vector Control....................................................................................... 5-42

5.19 ANIMAL WELFARE......................................................................................... 5-42

February 2014 ix
Contents

5.20 MODELING AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS ............................................................. 5-42

5.21 APPRAISAL AND COMPENSATION.................................................................... 5-43

5.22 FINANCE..................................................................................................... 5-43

5.23 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK AND NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEM...................................................................................................... 5-44

Chapter 6 Recovery after an ND Outbreak................................................6-1

6.1 PROOF-OF-FREEDOM...................................................................................... 6-1

6.1.1 Recognition of Disease-Free Status ....................................................... 6-1

6.1.2 Surveillance for Recognition of Disease Freedom .................................. 6-2

6.1.3 Release of Control Area Restrictions...................................................... 6-3

6.1.4 Disposition of Vaccinates........................................................................ 6-3

6.1.5 Country Freedom Declaration................................................................. 6-3

6.2 REPOPULATION .............................................................................................. 6-3

6.2.1 Restocking Guidance.............................................................................. 6-3

6.2.2 Testing Requirements for Restocking..................................................... 6-3

6.2.3 Approved Sources of Poultry .................................................................. 6-4

Appendix A FAD PReP Materials to Support ND Response

Appendix B Incident Management

Appendix C Laboratory List for ND

Appendix D Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

for Poultry

Appendix E Procedures for ND Investigation and Specimen Submission

Appendix F Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

Appendix G Examples of Movement Control Notices

Appendix H Glossary

Appendix I Abbreviations

Appendix J References

February 2014 x
 

Figures

Figure 3-1. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS 

Emergency Operations Center: Relationship to Incident Management 

Team (Assuming Single Incident)..................................................................... 3-5

Figure 3-2. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS 

Emergency Operations Center: Relationship to Multiple Incident 

Management Team Structures (Assuming Multiple Incidents and Unified 

Area Command) ................................................................................................ 3-7

Figure 3-3. Incident Management Levels................................................................ 3-8

Figure 4-1. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of U.S. ND Response ............... 4-4

Figure 4-2. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

(Infected Premises would be Depopulated)....................................................... 4-5

Figure 5-1. Diagnostic Flow for FAD Investigations for ND................................... 5-10

Figure 5-2. Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises in ND Outbreak 

Response ........................................................................................................ 5-13

Figure 5-3. Premises Designations in Relation to Permitting and Movement 

Control............................................................................................................. 5-27

Figure 5-4. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones .................................... 5-38

Figure 5-5. Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones ........................................ 5-39

Figure 5-6. Examples of Vaccinated Premises ..................................................... 5-40

Tables

Table 5-1. Legend for Figure 5-1 ............................................................................ 5-9

Table 5-2. Summary of Premises Designations.................................................... 5-12

Table 5-3. Summary of Zone and Area Designations ........................................... 5-13

Table 5-4. Minimum Sizes of Areas and Zones .................................................... 5-15

Table 5-5. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for ND ............. 5-15

Table 5-6. Movement into Control Area from Outside Control Area to Specific 

Premises.......................................................................................................... 5-24

Table 5-7. Movement within a Control Area.......................................................... 5-25

Table 5-8. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area 

from Specific Premises.................................................................................... 5-26

Table 5-9. Inactivation of Newcastle Disease in Eggs and Egg Products............ 5-28

Table 5-10. Inactivation of Newcastle Disease in Meat......................................... 5-29

February 2014 xi
 

Preface

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)—

Newcastle Disease (ND) Response Plan: The Red Book (2014) provides strategic 

guidance for responding to an animal health emergency caused by ND in the 

United States. This ND Response Plan (2014) replaces previous ND summary 

response plans. Information in this plan may require further discussion and 

development with stakeholders.

This ND Response Plan is under ongoing review. This document was last updated 

in February 2014. Please send questions or comments to: 

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination

Veterinary Services

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

4700 River Road, Unit 41

Riverdale, Maryland 20737-1231 

Telephone: (301) 851-3595 

Fax: (301) 734-7817 

E-mail: FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov 

While best efforts have been used in developing and preparing the ND Response 

Plan, the U.S. Government, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and other parties, such as employees 

and contractors contributing to this document, neither warrant nor assume any 

legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of 

any information or procedure disclosed. The primary purpose of this ND 

Response Plan is to provide strategic guidance to those government officials 

responding to an ND outbreak. It is only posted for public access as a reference. 

The ND Response Plan may refer to links to various other Federal and State 

agencies and private organizations. These links are maintained solely for the 

user’s information and convenience. If you link to such site, please be aware that 

you are then subject to the policies of that site. In addition, please note that the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture does not control and cannot guarantee the 

relevance, timeliness, or accuracy of these outside materials. Further, the 

inclusion of links or pointers to particular items in hypertext is not intended to 

reflect their importance, nor is it intended to constitute approval or endorsement 

of any views expressed, or products or services offered, on these outside web 

sites, or the organizations sponsoring the web sites. 

February 2014 xii 
 

Trade names are used solely for the purpose of providing specific information. 

Mention of a trade name does not constitute a guarantee or warranty of the 

product by USDA or an endorsement over other products not mentioned.

USDA prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of 

race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual 

orientation, or marital or family status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all 

programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for 

communication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) 

should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and 

telecommunications device for the deaf [TDD]).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil 

Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue SW, 

Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is 

an equal opportunity provider and employer.

February 2014 xiii
Chapter 1

Introduction and ND Information

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN

This Newcastle Disease (ND) Response Plan: The Red Book (2014) incorporates 

comments received on the Exotic ND Response Plan: The Red Book (draft 2013)

and updates to current Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan 

(FAD PReP) materials. This plan has been updated significantly from the Exotic 

ND Red Book (1992). The objectives of this plan are to identify the 

(1) capabilities needed to respond to an ND outbreak and (2) critical activities that 

are involved in responding to that outbreak and associated time-frames. These 

critical activities are the responsibility of Incident Command (IC) in an outbreak 

situation.

To achieve these objectives, this plan provides current information on ND and its 

relevance to the United States, and presents the organizational strategy for an 

effective response to a detection of ND in poultry. In addition, it offers guidance

on stamping-out, the primary ND outbreak response strategy. This plan also

contains updated guidance on 23 critical response activities and tools, such as

disposal, appraisal and compensation, and quarantine and movement control. As 

indicated by links throughout the document, this plan is integrated and 

coordinated with other FAD PReP documents such as standard operating 

procedures (SOPs), National Animal Health Emergency Management System 

(NAHEMS) Guidelines, and existing Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS) Guidance. (Appendix A provides a list of documents related to ND

outbreak response and an overview of FAD PReP.) 

In the United States, historically, ND has been called exotic Newcastle disease, or 

END. The Code of Federal Regulations was recently updated, and END is now 

referred to as ND.

This plan does not replace existing regional, State, Tribal, local, or industry 

preparedness and response plans relating to ND. Regional, State, Tribal, local, and 

industry plans should be aimed at more specific issues in ND response. In 

particular, States should develop response plans focused on the specific 

characteristics of the State and its poultry industry. 

Newcastle disease viruses (NDV) can infect over 250 bird species. There are three 

different pathotypes of NDV, lentogenic, mesogenic, and velogenic. These 

pathotypes are categorized by their level of virulence: lentogenic viruses are low 

virulence (loNDV); mesogenic and velogenic viruses are virulent (vNDV). In the 

United States only the occurrence of vNDV is referred to as ND. In unvaccinated 

February 2014 1-1 
 

chickens, vNDV may cause morbidity close to 100 percent. Mortality is typically 

between 70–100 percent; surviving birds may have permanent neurological 

damage. ND is a high priority for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 

APHIS. 

ND is endemic in many parts of the world, including Asia, Africa, Central and 

South America, and parts of Mexico, but has not been detected in U.S. poultry 

populations since 2003. ND is easily transmitted, through direct contact with 

infected birds or indirect contact with contaminated feed, water, and fomites.

Humans can be infected with vNDV, but it is not considered a significant threat to 

public health. Typically, the virus causes conjunctivitis which resolves rapidly. 

Mild, self-limiting influenza-like symptoms have also been reported. From past 

outbreaks, it appears that laboratory workers and vaccination crews are at the 

highest risk for infection. The USDA will coordinate with public health agencies 

to ensure the public’s health is protected in an ND outbreak in domestic poultry.

1.2 PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT

This plan provides strategic guidance for USDA APHIS and responders at all 

levels in the event of an ND outbreak, specifically in poultry. It also provides 

current policy information and a strategic framework for the control and 

eradication of ND, should an outbreak occur in the United States.

1.3 AUDIENCE

This document is intended for animal health emergency responders at all levels of 

government, as well as industry partners. It provides strategic guidance and offers

additional resources for more tactical information for responders and other 

individuals who will act during an ND outbreak in poultry. 

1.4 DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this plan, please use the following:

 Avian paramyxovirus serotype 1(APMV-1) is the etiologic agent of 

Newcastle disease (ND) in birds.

 APMV-1 viruses that cause ND are either virulent (vNDV) or low 

virulence (loNDV).

 In the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Newcastle Disease (ND) refers 

to an infection of poultry with vNDV.

 NDV refers to the virus in general, for example, when discussing 

environmental persistence.

February 2014 1-2 
Introduction and ND Information

1.5 ND INFORMATION

These sections provide an overview of ND and cover the following subjects: 

 Etiology

 History and global distribution

 Impact of an ND outbreak

 Ecology

 Diagnosis

 Immunity. 

The USDA ND website also contains valuable information: 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/birdbiosecurity/end/. Further 

information on ND can be found in the ND Overview of Etiology and Ecology 

SOP. Chapter 5 of this plan includes a current case definition for ND. 

1.5.1 Etiology

1.5.1.1 OVERVIEW

ND is an infection of birds caused by vNDV, an avian paramyxovirus serotype-1 

(APMV-1). This virus is a single stranded ribonucleic acid (RNA) virus, in the 

family Paramyxoviridae and genus Avulavirus. Nine serotypes of avian 

paramyxovirus have been identified. There is one serotype of APMV-1 and six 

phylogenetic lineages.

There are three major pathotypes based on virulence: lentogenic (low virulence 

viruses), mesogenic and velogenic (virulent viruses). The velogenic viruses are 

further classified as either neurotropic or viscerotropic.

1.5.1.2 WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH DEFINITION 

OF NEWCASTLE DISEASE

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (2013) defines Newcastle 

disease for international trade as “an infection of poultry caused by a virus (NDV) 

of avian paramyxovirus serotype 1 (APMV-1) that meets one of the following 

criteria for virulence:”1

1 OIE. 2013. Article 10.9.1, Chapter 10.9: Newcastle Disease. OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 

Code. http://www.oie.int. 

February 2014 1-3 

 
 

a. The virus has an intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) in day-old 

chicks (Gallus gallus) of 0.7 or greater; or

b. Multiple basic amino acids have been demonstrated in the virus 

(either directly or by deduction) at the C-terminus of the F2 protein 

and phenylalanine at residue 117, which is the N-terminus of the F1 

protein. The term ‘multiple basic amino acids’ refers to at least three 

arginine or lysine residues between residues 113 and 116. Failure to 

demonstrate the characteristic pattern of amino acid residues as 

described above would require characterization of the isolated virus 

by an ICPI test.

Only infection and disease attributable to vNDV in poultry is reportable to the 

OIE.

1.5.1.3 U.S. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS DEFINITIONS OF ND2

In 9 CFR 82.1, ND is defined as

Newcastle disease is an acute, rapidly spreading, and usually fatal viral 

infection of poultry caused by an avian paramyxovirus serotype 1 that 

meets one of the following criteria for virulence: The virus has an 

intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) in day-old chicks (Gallus gallus) 

of 0.7 or greater; or multiple basic amino acids have been demonstrated 

in the virus (either directly or by deduction) at the C-terminus of the F2 

protein and phenylalanine at residue 117, which is the N-terminus of the 

F1 protein. The term “multiple basic amino acids” refers to at least three 

arginine or lysine residues between residues 113 and 116. In this 

definition, amino acid residues are numbered from the N-terminus of the 

amino acid sequence deduced from the nucleotide sequence of the F0 

gene; 113-116 corresponds to residues -4 to -1 from the cleavage site. 

Failure to demonstrate the characteristic pattern of amino acid residues as 

described above may require characterization of the isolated virus by an 

ICPI test. A failure to detect a cleavage site that is consistent with 

virulent strains does not confirm the absence of a virulent virus.

Infections with vNDV in poultry are referred to as ND in the United States.

1.5.2 History and Global Distribution

ND was first identified in England in 1927. It is highly infectious, and often 

transmitted through the smuggling of pet birds who may be disease carriers. 

Velogenic strains are considered exotic to the United States. The first major 

outbreak of ND in the United States was identified in the early 1970s; this 

2 Please see the appropriate CFR sections for further information, such as CFR definitions of 

poultry. 

February 2014 1-4 

 
Introduction and ND Information

outbreak was epidemiologically linked to the transmission of ND from infected 

parrots to commercial poultry.

3

 

Virulent NDV remains endemic in many parts of the world, including Asia, the 

Middle East, and Africa. In 2011–2012, vNDV outbreaks were reported in 

Australia, Czech Republic, Israel, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Sweden, 

and Switzerland.

4 The last ND outbreaks in the United States included the States 

of California (2002–2003), Nevada (2003), Arizona (2003), and Texas (2003). 

Virulent NDV is endemic in wild cormorants in the United States and Canada, but 

commercial poultry are currently free of velogenic isolates.5 LoNDV is endemic 

in poultry. 

1.5.3 International Trade

The United States does not import live poultry from countries or regions currently 

experiencing ND outbreaks in commercial or traditionally raised flocks. However, 

USDA APHIS may recognize ND-free regions (also called zones) for trade in 

countries affected by ND that demonstrate adequate veterinary infrastructure and 

authority, quarantine and movement controls, other disease control measures, and 

surveillance activities for ND. Countries and regions that are recognized, per 9 

CFR 94.6, by the United States as free of ND are listed on the APHIS website. 

1.5.4 Impact of an ND Outbreak

1.5.4.1 ECONOMIC

In 1971, the ND outbreak in the United States resulted in the destruction of 

12 million birds at a cost of $56 million to eradicate the virus in 3 years. The 

2002–2003 epidemic in the western United States resulted in industry losses 

estimated at $5 billion, and a direct cost of $160 million to control the outbreak.

Three million birds were culled. An ND outbreak in the United States today could 

exceed these economic costs and also result in significant disruptions to the U.S.

food supply. 

1.5.4.2 ZOONOTIC POTENTIAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS

Virulent NDV can cause infection in humans. This infection is mild and selflimiting. It usually causes conjunctivitis, but can also result in mild influenza-like 

symptoms. Direct contact with infected birds is the most common transmission 

pathway; it is not transmitted through the consumption of poultry products.

3 Walker, J.W., Heron, B.R., Mixson, M.A. 1972 “Exotic Newcastle Disease Eradication 

Program in the United States.” Avian Diseases 17(3), 486–503. 4 OIE. 2013. World Animal Health Information Database. www.oie.int. 5 Center for Food Security and Public Health. 2008. “Newcastle Disease.” 

http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/newcastle_disease.pdf. 

February 2014 1-5 

 
 

Responders—particularly poultry workers and vaccination crews—should be 

protected from the virus through appropriate health and safety measures and 

personal protective equipment (PPE). Immunosuppressed individuals should take 

extra precautions, as vNDV can cause more severe opportunistic infections. An 

outbreak of ND in birds does not pose a serious public health threat to humans. 

1.5.5 Ecology

More than 250 avian species can be infected with NDV. The most severely 

affected avian species are typically Galliformes, an order that includes 

 chickens, 

 guinea fowl,

 peafowl,

 pheasant, and

 quail. 

Turkeys can be infected, but usually present less severe clinical signs than 

chickens. A species adapted strain is also frequently found in pigeons 

(Columbidae). Psittacine birds (such as parrots) can be carriers of the disease and 

not show clinical signs. In addition, waterfowl (Anseriformes) often carry the 

virus without clinical signs, though illness has been observed in ducks. Penguins 

(Sphenisciformes) are also highly susceptible.6

1.5.5.1 RESERVOIRS AND CARRIERS

Wild birds and waterfowl can be reservoirs for NDV. Upon transmission to 

domestic poultry, these strains may mutate into more virulent viruses.7 In 

addition, some psittacine species may shed virus for extended periods of time 

(several months to a year), but may not show clinical signs. 

1.5.5.2 INTRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION OF ND IN DOMESTIC POULTRY

Contact with reservoir birds, like migratory waterfowl, or subclinically infected 

birds (which may not show clinical signs) is a common mode of introduction of 

NDV into a domestic poultry population. Secretions of affected birds—including 

6 Center for Food Security and Public Health. 2008. “Newcastle Disease.” 

http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/newcastle_disease.pdf. 7 OIE. 2009. Technical Disease Card: Newcastle Disease. http://www.oie.int. 

February 2014 1-6 

 
Introduction and ND Information

fecal and respiratory secretions—are highly infectious. Vertical transmission of 

virulent strains is unlikely, because the embryo typically dies.8 

Short distance aerosolized transmission has been documented.

9,10 In particular, 

care should be taken to ensure litter, feathers, and other materials are not airborne 

during cleaning and disinfection. Transmission of NDV occurs readily through 

fomites, including food, water, egg packing materials, vehicles, footwear, and 

clothing. 

1.5.5.3 PERSISTENCE IN ENVIRONMENT AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS

NDV can be easily inactivated, but it remains viable for long periods of time 

particularly at ambient temperatures and in the presence of feces. The results of 

one study suggest that the virus may survive in lake water for approximately 

2 weeks. NDV is inactivated by heating to 56oC for 3 hours or 60oC for 

30 minutes.11 NDV is also inactivated by acidic pH (≤ 2). Ether, formalin, and 

disinfectants like Virkon® S all inactivate NDV. 

NDV may be present in eggs and egg products. For virus inactivation, the OIE

recommends that whole eggs are heated to a temperature of 59oC for 674 seconds.

Liquid egg will need to be heated for 301 seconds at this temperature. In meat, 

NDV can be inactivated by heating to a 70oC core temperature for 3.6 seconds.

The OIE provides additional guidance based on various temperatures in the OIE

Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013).

12

1.5.6 Diagnosis in Avian Species

The incubation period for ND is typically 5–6 days but can range from 

2–15 days. In some species, the OIE suggests incubation periods may be over 

20 days.13 For the purposes of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013) the 

incubation period for ND is 21 days.14

8 Chen, J.P. and Wang, C.H. 2002. “Clinical Epidemiologic and Experimental Evidence for 

the Transmission of Newcastle Disease Virus through Eggs.” Avian Diseases. 46(2), 461–465. 9 Alexander, D.J. 2000. “Newcastle disease and other avian paramyxoviruses.” Rev sci tech 

Off Int Epiz. 19(2): 443–462. 10 Hugh-Jones, M., W.H. Allan, F.A. Dark, and G.J. Harper. “The evidence for the airborne 

spread of Newcastle disease.” J Hyg, Camb. 71, 325–339. 11 OIE. 2009. Technical Disease Card: Newcastle Disease. http://www.oie.int. 12 OIE. 2013. Article 10.9.20, Chapter 10.9: Newcastle Disease. OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code. http://www.oie.int. 13 OIE. 2009. Technical Disease Card: Newcastle Disease. http://www.oie.int. 14 OIE. 2013. Article 10.9.1, Chapter 10.9: Newcastle Disease. OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 

Code. http://www.oie.int. 

February 2014 1-7 

 
 

1.5.6.1 CLINICAL SIGNS15

Clinical signs vary widely depending on the strain of the virus, host species, age 

of the host, co-infection, and other factors. The typical clinical signs for loNDV 

(lentogenic pathotypes) and vNDV (mesogenic and velongenic pathotypes) are 

listed below. 

1.5.6.1.1 Low Virulence Strains (Lentogenic)

Strains of loNDV typically result in little mortality. Common clinical signs 

include the following: 

 Coughing, 

 Gasping, 

 Sneezing, and

 Rales.

1.5.6.1.2 Virulent Strains (Mesogenic and Velogenic)

Mesogenic strains of NDV typically result in low mortality, but can cause acute 

respiratory and neurologic signs.

Velogenic strains cause severe disease, particularly in chickens. Velogenic strains 

are divided into viserotropic forms and neurotropic forms. The viscerotropic form 

typically causes hemorrhagic lesions while the neurotropic form usually causes 

respiratory and neurological signs. However, these signs can often be observed 

simultaneously, and vary depending on the strain and species of bird.16 In general, 

clinical signs common with velogenic NDV include the following:

 Lethargy, 

 Inappetence, 

 Ruffled feathers, 

 Edema, 

 Greenish or watery diarrhea, 

 Dyspnoea, 

 Inflammation of the head and neck, 

 Cyanotic discoloration, 

15 OIE. 2009. Technical Disease Card: Newcastle Disease. http://www.oie.int. 16 Spickler, A.R., and J.A. Roth. 2008. “Newcastle disease.” In Emerging and exotic diseases 

of animals. Ames, IA: Iowa State University.

February 2014 1-8 

 
Introduction and ND Information

 Death. 

As the disease progresses, neurologic signs may become more apparent, including 

tremors, tonic/clonic spasms, wing/leg paralysis, and torticollis. Egg production is 

likely to drop suddenly, and eggs become misshapen or abnormally colored. In 

unvaccinated chickens, morbidity and mortality can reach 100 percent. 

1.5.6.2 GROSS LESIONS

Only velogenic strains will result in significant gross lesions. Lesions can be 

variable within neurotropic and viscerotropic forms. In general, velogenic gross 

lesions may include the following: 

 Swelling of the periorbital area or head, 

 Edema of the interstitial or peritracheal neck tissue, 

 Petechiae and small ecchymoses on the mucosa of the proventriculus, 

 Necrosis, ulcerations, or hemorrhages of respiratory, digestive, or 

lymphoid tissue, and

 Enlarged spleen.

1.5.6.3 DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSES

Virulent NDV can resemble highly pathogenic avian influenza (caused by 

influenzavirus A), laryngotracheitis (caused by infectious laryngotracheitis virus), 

psittacosis (caused by Chlamydophila psittaci), mycoplasmosis (caused by 

mycoplasma gallisepticum), and fowl cholera (caused by Pasturella spp.). 

1.5.7 Vaccines and Induced Immunity

Vaccination has long been used in the United States as a control measure for 

loNDV.17 Many commercial poultry operations, including broiler breeders, layers, 

and turkeys use low virulence live and/or inactivated vaccines (lentogenic 

vaccines) to protect poultry from clinical ND. Importantly, while these low 

virulence live and inactivated vaccines do protect against clinical ND, they do not

protect against infection, virus replication, and virus shedding.18,19

17 Hitchner, S.B. 2004. “History of Biological Control of Poultry Diseases in the U.S.A.” 

Avian Diseases. 48(1), 1–8. 18 Senne, D.A., D.J. King, and D.R. Kapczynski. 2004. “Control of Newcastle disease by 

vaccination.” Developments in Biologicals 119, 165–170. 

19 Miller, P.J., D.J. King, C.L. Afonso, D.L. Suarez. 2007. “Antigenic differences among 

Newcastle disease virus strains of different genotypes used in vaccine formulation affect viral 

shedding after a virulent challenge.” Vaccine. 25, 7238–7246.

February 2014 1-9 

 
 

Live virus vaccines have been shown to result in less virus shedding when 

compared to inactivated vaccines.20 Poultry also shed less virus when vaccinated 

with a vaccine more genotypically similar to the challenge virus.21 In addition to 

shedding NDV, another concern about ND vaccination is that the induced 

immunity of either type of vaccine is relatively short-lived, and vaccination must 

be repeated over the life-span of the birds. 

In addition to these lentogenic vaccines, mesogenic strains of vaccine are 

available. However, these strains are not used as live vaccines in many countries, 

including the United States, because mesogenic and velogenic NDV infections 

have been eradicated in poultry.

Additional vaccines are under development with the objectives of preventing not 

only clinical disease, but also infection (and prevention of transmission). In 

addition, new technologies are working towards a vaccine that could provide 

sufficient immunity in one dose, can be delivered through mass vaccination 

techniques, provide better cross-protection, and allow for the diagnostic 

differentiation between infected and vaccinated poultry. 

20 Kapczynski, D.R. and D.J. King. 2005. “Protection of chickens against overt clinical 

disease and determination of viral shedding following vaccination with commercially available 

Newcastle disease virus vaccines upon challenge with highly virulent virus from the California 

2002 exotic Newcastle disease outbreak.” Vaccine. 23, 3424–3433. 21 Miller, P.J., C. Estevez, Q. Yu, D. Suarez, and D.J. King. 2008. “Comparison of Viral 

Shedding Following Vaccination with Inactivated and Live Newcastle Disease Vaccines 

Formulated with Wild-Type and Recombinant Viruses.” Avian Diseases. 53, 39–49.

February 2014 1-10 

 
Chapter 2

Framework for ND Preparedness 

and Response

2.1 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, NATIONAL 

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, AND NATIONAL 

ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEM INTEGRATION

Successful emergency preparedness for and response to ND requires integration 

between the National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident 

Management System (NIMS), and NAHEMS. This ND-specific plan fits into this 

hierarchy to provide more detailed information and specific direction on response 

requirements in the event of an ND outbreak in the United States.

2.1.1 National Response Framework

The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. It describes 

specific authorities and establishes a comprehensive approach for responding to 

domestic incidents that range from serious but purely local events to large-scale 

terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. It builds on NIMS, which 

provides a consistent template for managing incidents. The NRF is available 

from http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/.

2.1.2 National Incident Management System

NIMS, a companion document to the NRF, provides a systematic, nationwide, 

proactive approach guiding departments and agencies at all levels of government, 

the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Its goal is to help these 

organizations work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, 

and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or 

complexity, to reduce the loss of life, liberty, property, and harm to the 

environment. NIMS provides a core set of concepts, principles, procedures, 

organizational processes, terminology, and standard requirements. NIMS

information is available at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/.

NIMS consists of five key components:

1. A set of preparedness concepts and principles for all hazards;

February 2014 2-1
2. Essential principles for a common operating picture and interoperability of

communications and information management;

3. Standardized resource management procedures that enable coordination

among different jurisdictions or organizations;

4. Scalability, for use in all incidents (ranging from day to day to large

scale); and

5. A dynamic system that promotes ongoing management and maintenance.

2.1.3 National Animal Health Emergency Management 

System

APHIS and its stakeholders established NAHEMS to provide a functional

framework for responding to foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents through 

NAHEMS Guidelines, disease response plans (such as this ND-specific plan), 

SOPs, and other associated documents. The purpose of the NAHEMS Guidelines 

is to ensure a successful response commensurate with the severity of the outbreak.

Federal, State, and local agencies; Tribal nations; and other groups involved in 

animal health emergency management activities should integrate the information 

provided in NAHEMS Guidelines into their preparedness plans.

NAHEMS Guidelines (and other FAD PReP documents) offer

 competent veterinary guidance on cleaning and disinfection, disposal, 

mass depopulation, and other activities; 

 information on disease control and eradication strategies and principles; 

 guidance on health, safety, and PPE issues; 

 biosecurity information and site-specific management strategies; and

 training and educational resources.

In particular, NAHEMS Guidelines provide a foundation for coordinated national, 

regional, State, Tribal, and local activities in an emergency situation. These 

guidelines serve as a practical guide and complement non-Federal preparedness 

activities.

These NAHEMS documents can be found at http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ 

em/fadprep.shtml for APHIS employees, and here for the public:

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

February 2014 2-2 
Framework for ND Preparedness and Response

2.1.4 Coordination and Collaboration

This ND Response Plan is coordinated with the other FAD PReP documents, 

which follow NRF and NIMS. This document provides strategic guidance for 

responding to an ND outbreak. Other FAD PReP documents provide information 

on general veterinary activities and include industry or facility manuals for 

industry stakeholders as well as SOPs for planners and responders.

Together, these documents provide strategic and tactical details for Federal, State, 

Tribal, and local officials that are useful for ND preparedness and response.

Building on existing planning and response relationships, raising awareness on 

critical issues, and collaborating to address significant problems are key goals of 

FAD PReP efforts. Exercises and real events can improve ND preparedness and 

response planning and collaboration.

2.2 FEDERAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES,

AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

2.2.1 Overview

Understanding the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments or agencies 

involved in responding to a domestic incident of an FAD promotes an effective,

coordinated emergency response. The section that follows describes the roles,

responsibilities, and authority of USDA in an ND response. The functions 

described are consistent with the roles and responsibilities outlined in the NRF.

Federal response to the detection of an FAD such as ND is based on the response 

structure of NIMS as outlined in the NRF. The NRF defines Federal departmental 

responsibilities for sector-specific responses. During the course of an ND

outbreak response, the USDA may request Federal-to-Federal support (FFS) from 

other Federal departments and agencies. FFS refers to the circumstance in which a 

Federal department or agency requests Federal resource support under the NRF

that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or another mechanism.

2.2.2 USDA Roles and Responsibilities Overview

As the primary Federal agency for incident management during an FAD event of 

domestic poultry, like an ND outbreak, USDA coordinates Incident Management 

Teams (IMTs), manages incident response, manages public messages, and takes 

measures to control and eradicate ND. Measures used to control and eradicate ND

include quarantine and movement control, epidemiologic investigation, appraisal 

and compensation, depopulation (euthanasia) of affected poultry, carcass disposal, 

cleaning and disinfection, active surveillance for additional cases, diagnostics, 

and, potentially, emergency vaccination.

February 2014 2-3
The USDA performs the coordination role in Emergency Support Function (ESF) 

#11—Agriculture and Natural Resources—under the NRF. Under ESF #11, 

APHIS is responsible for detecting “animal disease anomalies” and providing 

“technical assistance as requested on pet/animal and agricultural issues.” As 

stated in ESF #11, USDA “responds to animal and agricultural health 

emergencies under USDA statutory authority.” 

USDA (not including the additional ESF responsibilities carried by the U.S. 

Forest Service, which is part of USDA) also plays supporting roles in the 

following ESFs:

 ESF #1—Transportation

 ESF #2—Communications

 ESF #3—Public Works and Engineering

 ESF #5—Information and Planning

 ESF #6—Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and 

Human Services

 ESF #7—Logistics 

 ESF #8—Public Health and Medical Services

 ESF #9—Search and Rescue

 ESF #10—Oil and Hazardous Materials 

 ESF #12—Energy 

 ESF #15—External Affairs.

During the course of a ND outbreak response, USDA may request support as 

necessary from other Federal agencies. If the President declares an emergency or 

major disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) lead coordination, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

and DHS assume the lead for coordinating Federal resources. USDA maintains 

the lead of overall incident management. 

For more information on the roles of other Federal agencies, such as the 

Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Interior (DOI), in the 

event of a ND outbreak, see the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: 

Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) and APHIS Foreign Animal 

Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0). [Appendix B

of this plan contains an organizational chart showing the coordination between 

February 2014 2-4
Framework for ND Preparedness and Response

DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and USDA in the event 

of a major ND outbreak.]

2.3 AUTHORITY

The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq., authorizes 

the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the importation, entry, or further movement 

in the United States or order the destruction or removal of animals and related 

conveyances and facilities to prevent the introduction or dissemination of 

livestock pests or diseases. It authorizes related activities with respect to 

exportation, interstate movement, cooperative agreements, enforcement and 

penalties, seizure, quarantine, and disease and pest eradication. The act also 

authorizes the Secretary to establish a veterinary accreditation program and enter 

into reimbursable fee agreements for pre-clearance abroad of animals or articles 

for movement into the United States.

Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S. Code 231 transfers to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security certain agricultural import and entry inspection 

functions under the AHPA, including the authority to enforce the prohibitions or 

restrictions imposed by USDA.

The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to cooperate with other Federal 

agencies, States, or political subdivisions of States, national or local governments 

of foreign governments, domestic or international organizations or associations, 

Tribal nations, and other persons to prevent, detect, control, or eradicate ND. If 

measures taken by a State or Indian Tribe to control or eradicate a pest or disease 

of livestock are inadequate, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary, after notice to 

and review and consultation with certain State or Tribal officials, to declare that 

an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence in the United States of 

a pest or disease of livestock that threatens the livestock of the United States (7 

U.S. Code 8306).

For further information on USDA APHIS authorities, see the APHIS Foreign 

Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) at

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

February 2014 2-5
Chapter 3

USDA ND Preparedness and Response

3.1 USDA

USDA APHIS is the Federal agency with primary responsibility and authority for 

animal disease control and will interface with Federal, State, Tribal, and local 

partners in ND eradication and control efforts. If the President declares an 

emergency or major disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests that DHS

lead coordination, the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS leads the

coordination of FFS and Federal resources for the incident while USDA maintains 

the lead of overall incident management. 

USDA is the primary Federal liaison to the U.S. animal industry. In addition, it 

operates the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), including NVSLAmes. 

The following sections detail USDA activities to prepare for an ND outbreak.

3.1.1 Preparedness Exercises

Preparedness and response exercises help ensure our Nation is able to respond 

quickly and effectively to an FAD outbreak. They are an ideal, no-fault learning 

environment to discuss, practice, and implement plans, procedures, and processes 

in advance of an actual event. APHIS exercises are conducted in accordance with 

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program guidance.

Multiple preparedness exercises have been conducted to simulate an FAD

outbreak and response effort in the United States. These exercises allow 

responders to discuss and practice activities relating to highly contagious animal 

diseases, such as movement control, and to consider the social and economic 

implications of an FAD outbreak. They help prepare the United States and 

responders for the difficult decisions that will be made regarding animal 

depopulation and business continuity.

The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) has also conducted multiple exercises 

to assess and test its ability to deliver supplies and services and State and Tribal

ability to receive and stage these items in the event of an FAD outbreak. These

exercises have incorporated multiple States and Tribes, the poultry industry, and 

academia to simulate a response effort. 

Multi-state exercises have enhanced coordination and collaboration between 

States and between States and the Federal government. Valuable logistics lessons 

February 2014 3-1 
 

were learned and important recommendations have resulted from the evaluation 

of these exercises.

3.1.2 Domestic Activities

USDA has a variety of ongoing preparedness and response activities with respect 

to ND. Domestically, the USDA prevents the introduction of ND and also

performs FAD investigations for suspected cases. The following list details a 

selection of ongoing USDA activities:

 Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC). SITC conducts risk 

management and anti-smuggling activities to prevent unlawful entry and 

distribution of prohibited agricultural commodities. It looks at domestic 

markets likely to have illegal, imported avian products to establish 

baseline estimates on how much product is bypassing ports of entry.

 National Import and Export Services. All live birds and hatching eggs, 

except from Canada, are quarantined for at least 30 days in a USDAapproved quarantine facility. In addition to the requirements of importing 

healthy eggs, there are further restrictions for hatching eggs from countries 

not free of ND. 

 Emergency veterinary assistance. USDA works to assist States in training 

and maintaining State Incident Management Teams and veterinary reserve 

corps, such as the National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps

(NAHERC), (Section 3.5). State groups will serve as early response teams 

for an ND event and can educate groups on the signs, symptoms, and 

reporting procedures.

3.1.3 International Activities

In addition to the domestic activities discussed above, the USDA also has ongoing 

international activities to bolster ND preparedness planning and response 

capabilities: 

 Emergency veterinary assistance. USDA APHIS works to provide 

technical assistance and expertise, at a country’s request, in the event of an 

animal health emergency.

 International coordination. USDA APHIS collaborates with interagency 

and international partners to mitigate, prevent, and control animal health

threats outside the United States through the sharing of information and 

development of infrastructure.

February 2014 3-2 
USDA ND Preparedness and Response

3.1.4 International Trade

USDA, in collaboration with the Department of State and the United States Trade 

Representative, will promptly address foreign governments that impose 

unjustifiable U.S. poultry and product trade restrictions because of an ND case.

USDA overseas embassy offices also have guidance on how to rapidly report

trade disruptions to Washington, DC, headquarters and how to help foreign 

officials respond to such events. Multiple USDA agencies, led by the Foreign 

Agricultural Service, will coordinate a response to any such trade disruption and 

communicate with industry in the United States. USDA APHIS would also 

quickly fulfill any official requests for additional scientific information, including

case surveillance, movement control measures, and laboratory diagnostics.

These efforts focus on cases where bans are inconsistent with OIE standards, or 

with any U.S. ND bilateral protocols. OIE member countries, like the United 

States, are to “immediately” notify the OIE of any confirmed ND case in poultry, 

defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013) as “all domesticated 

birds, including backyard poultry, used for the production of meat or eggs for 

consumption, for the production of other commercial products, for restocking 

supplies of game, or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as fighting 

cocks used for any purpose.”

Countries recognized as ND-free by the United States are listed on the APHIS 

website. 

3.1.5 Compartmentalization

Another tool that may mitigate the economic consequences of a disease outbreak 

is compartmentalization. Compartmentalization defines subpopulations of distinct 

health status by management and husbandry practices, as related to biosecurity. 

Compartmentalization is best implemented, as suggested by the OIE in the 

Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013), by trading partners through the 

establishment of parameters and agreement on necessary measures before a 

disease outbreak.

Implementation of compartmentalization will rely on producers, industry, and 

State and Federal animal health authorities. The importing country must be 

satisfied that its animal health status is appropriately protected by the biosecurity 

measures undertaken by the exporting country.

Currently, no compartmentalization plans have been fully accepted or 

implemented in the United States.

Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013) explain 

the concept and the application of compartmentalization. 

February 2014 3-3
3.2 USDA ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

In the event of an ND outbreak, effective and efficient management of the 

situation and clear communication pathways are critical. A synchronized 

management and organizational structure helps to support the control and 

eradication actions. Accordingly, APHIS has adopted NIMS and Incident 

Command System (ICS) organizational structures to manage the response to an 

ND outbreak. The ICS is designed to enable efficient and effective domestic 

incident management by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, 

and communications operating within a common organizational structure. The 

next section discusses the APHIS incident management organizational structure.

3.3 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive responsible for implementing 

APHIS policy during an ND outbreak. The APHIS Administrator will delegate 

much of the actual multiagency coordination (MAC) functions to the Veterinary 

Services (VS) Deputy Administrator, who is the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO)

of the United States, and the APHIS Emergency Management Leadership Council

(EMLC).

The VS Deputy Administrator and the EMLC will establish an APHIS Incident 

Coordination Group (ICG) to oversee the staff functions associated with the 

incident at the APHIS headquarters level. The APHIS ICG will work closely with 

the personnel in charge of establishing operations for the incident response at the 

Area Command (AC) or Incident Command Post (ICP) in the field and coordinate 

with the APHIS MAC Group.

Figure 3-1 displays the APHIS FAD incident management organizational 

structure, starting with the APHIS Administrator.

February 2014 3-4
USDA ND Preparedness and Response

Figure 3-1. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations 

Center: Relationship to Incident Management Team 

(Assuming Single Incident)

Note: ADD = Assistant District Director; SAHO = State Animal Health Official.

The following sections describe the MAC Group and APHIS ICG, as well as the 

APHIS organization for single and multiple incidents. (Appendix B contains 

further information and organizational diagrams describing APHIS’s Incident 

Management Structure.) Also, see the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 

Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) and the Incident 

Coordination Group Plan.

3.3.1 Multiagency Coordination Group

The APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide defines coordination for major ND

responses at the APHIS level. In the event of an ND outbreak, the EMLC

typically serves as the APHIS MAC Group, unless the members decide to transfer 

responsibility for a specific incident (please see Appendix B for a list of EMLC 

members). The APHIS MAC Group structure is adaptable and easily expands and 

contracts to provide flexibility. The MAC Group—formed if the ND response 

February 2014 3-5
needs more support—establishes supportive relationships among the agencies 

preparing for and responding to an ND outbreak.

The APHIS MAC Group offers guidance on the most efficient way to allocate 

resources during an ND outbreak. General functions of the group include

 incident prioritization,

 resource allocation and acquisition, and

 identification and resolution of issues common to all parties.

If additional support is needed, particularly in the event there are significant 

threats or consequences to public health and welfare, the natural environment, or 

the economy, the USDA may also stand up other MAC Groups, which may be 

composed of representatives from other programs and agencies.

3.3.2 APHIS Incident Coordination Group

The APHIS ICG is responsible for acquiring resources, formulating policy

options, and assisting in implementing response and recovery strategies for an ND

outbreak. For additional information, see the Incident Coordination Group Plan. 

APHIS ICG responsibilities in an ND outbreak include

 providing guidance to ensure responder and public health and safety,

 supporting ICP(s) and AC(s),

 assisting in coordinating resources and integrating response organizations 

into the ICS, and

 providing information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) for use in 

media and stakeholder briefings.

3.3.3 Organization for a Single Incident

In the event of a single ND incident, the State Animal Health Official (SAHO), or 

designee, and Assistant District Director (ADD) [formerly the Area Veterinarian 

in Charge], or designee, will initially serve as the Co-Incident Commanders for 

the Unified IC. The ADD and SAHO may be relieved by a VS Incident 

Management Team if there is a delegation of authority.

3.3.4 Organization for Multiple Incidents

When more than one ND incident happens simultaneously, more than one ICP

may be established. An AC may also be established. The VS District Director will 

establish a Unified AC, and the Area Commander will be responsible for 

February 2014 3-6
USDA ND Preparedness and Response

managing the multiple incidents. The ADD and SAHO for each incident (or the 

Incident Management Team) will report to the AC. Figure 3-2 shows the 

organization for multiple incidents.

Figure 3-2. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations 

Center: Relationship to Multiple Incident Management Team Structures

(Assuming Multiple Incidents and Unified Area Command)

If the emergency response becomes too complex for a single APHIS MAC Group

to handle efficiently—for example, a large multistate ND incident with numerous 

response activities—cooperation with other agencies or committees will be 

implemented. As stated previously, this is referred to as MAC. Other MAC 

Groups would likely be stood up. These groups, comprised of representatives 

from across USDA sub-agencies or other government agencies, would make 

decisions regarding the prioritizing of incidents and the sharing and use of critical 

resources. However, these groups are not part of the on-scene IC.

3.3.5 Guidance on Incident Management 

and Organizational Strategy

See Appendix B for further information on incident management and 

organizational structure.

3.4 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT LEVELS

APHIS uses a three-level system of emergency response types. The levels range 

from Level III, which has the lowest significance, to Level I, which is an event of 

February 2014 3-7
national significance. The levels are used both within APHIS and externally to 

communicate the resource requirements for an event or incident. Figure 3-3 

illustrates these three incident management levels. In Figure 3-3, sector refers to 

the agriculture sector and USDA. Additional information can be found in the 

APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide and in the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 

Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0). 

Figure 3-3. Incident Management Levels

These levels are as follows: 

 Level III. A response to an event or incident the scope or severity of which 

the lead program unit is evaluating or that requires a limited response. In 

either case, enough resources (Federal, State, or local personnel) are 

available in the area or State to staff the evaluation or initial response 

effort. An equine piroplasmosis outbreak would be a Level III incident.

 Level II. A response to an event or incident that requires resources beyond 

an area or State’s resource capacity but which is within the lead program 

unit’s ability to provide resources to support the response. Requests for 

additional resources outside the lead program unit are not necessary for a 

Level II response. However, volunteers will be considered for assignment 

from outside the unit if they wish to be considered for the assignment, 

have supervisory approval, and are qualified for the position requested. 

Typically, a highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak in domestic 

poultry would be a Level II event.

February 2014 3-8 
USDA ND Preparedness and Response

 Level I. A response that requires resources or expertise beyond the lead 

program unit’s capacity to respond. In many cases, these emergencies will 

be of national significance. If the lead program unit lacks the qualified 

resources to meet the response needs, it will make a request through the 

EMLC to the APHIS Administrator to declare a total mobilization. If 

qualified volunteers are insufficient, direct assignments will be made. A 

multistate foot-and-mouth disease outbreak would be a Level I event.

3.5 NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY 

RESPONSE CORPS (NAHERC)

In addition to the activities just discussed, NAHERC assists and augments Federal 

and State response to domestic and international animal disease outbreaks, threats, 

or natural disasters. NAHERC is composed of veterinarians and veterinary 

technicians who volunteer to become temporary Federal employees in the event 

of a national animal health emergency. For further information on NAHERC and 

NAHERC deployment, see the NAHEMS Guidelines: NAHERC Deployment 

Guide.

3.6 DIAGNOSTIC RESOURCES 

AND LABORATORY SUPPORT

USDA also has critical diagnostic resources and laboratory support that will be 

leveraged in an ND outbreak.

3.6.1 National Veterinary Services Laboratories

The NVSL is the official reference laboratory for FAD diagnostic testing and 

study in the United States. The NVSL performs animal disease testing in support 

of USDA-APHIS programs designed to protect the health of the Nation’s poultry 

and livestock. The NVSL provides all confirmatory testing for ND on all 

specimens found presumptively positive at a National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN) laboratory or other USDA-approved laboratory. The NVSL

has two locations for FAD diagnostic testing: Ames, IA (NVSL-Ames), and the 

Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL), Plum Island, NY

(NVSL-FADDL). NVSL-Ames provides confirmatory testing for ND.

3.6.2 National Animal Health Laboratory Network

As of the date of publication, the NAHLN consists of more than 60 laboratories 

and coordinates the veterinary diagnostic laboratory capacity of State animal 

health laboratories and their extensive infrastructure, including facilities, 

equipment, and professional expertise. Of these laboratories, over 50—including 

February 2014 3-9
NVSL-Ames—are currently approved to conduct ND testing diagnostics

(Appendix C).

The NAHLN provides a means for early detection of ND, rapid response through 

surge capacity to test outbreak samples, and recovery by the capability to test

large numbers of samples to show freedom from ND. The confirmation of an ND

outbreak will be made at NVSL-Ames. After positive confirmation of ND, 

subsequent samples from premises inside the established Control Area (CA) may

be sent to laboratories that are part of NAHLN. Please see Section 5.4.1 for more 

information.

3.6.3 Center for Veterinary Biologics

APHIS’s Center for Veterinary Biologics is responsible for licensing new 

products, including new diagnostic test kits and vaccines for ND. This work—

centered on enforcement of the Virus Serum Toxin Act—ensures that pure, safe, 

potent, and effective veterinary biologics are available for the diagnosis, 

prevention, and treatment of animal diseases.

February 2014 3-10
Chapter 4

ND Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

This chapter covers a wide range of information about how USDA APHIS, States, 

Tribal Nations, localities, and stakeholders would respond to an ND outbreak in 

poultry in the United States. In particular, this chapter

 identifies USDA APHIS goals for responding to an ND outbreak;

 identifies critical activities and tools required to achieve the response 

goals; 

 provides the primary USDA APHIS response strategy for ND in poultry;

 introduces factors influencing the scope of regulatory intervention; and

 reviews the international standards from the OIE for ND. 

4.1 RESPONSE GOALS 

The goals of an ND response are to (1) detect, control, and contain ND in 

domestic poultry as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate ND using strategies that 

seek to protect public health and the environment, and to stabilize animal 

agriculture, the food supply, and the economy; and (3) provide science- and riskbased approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected 

animals and non-contaminated animal products. 

Achieving these three goals will allow individual poultry facilities, States, Tribes, 

regions, and industries to resume normal production as rapidly as possible. They 

will also allow the United States to regain ND-free status without the response 

effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself.

The United States protects its poultry from ND through a number of preventive 

measures, including ND surveillance, import restrictions, and education programs.

In the event of an ND outbreak, USDA and the affected States will work with the 

poultry industry to control and eradicate the disease as expeditiously as possible.

In an ND outbreak, the USDA will also coordinate with the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC) and other public health authorities, including at the 

State, Tribal, and local level, as needed.

February 2014 4-1 
 

4.2 PRINCIPLES, CRITICAL ACTIVITIES, AND TOOLS

FOR AN ND RESPONSE

4.2.1 Critical Activities

In order to achieve the goals of an ND response, critical activities and tools must 

be implemented to execute the response strategy. Box 4-1 lists these critical 

activities and tools. A science- and risk-based approach that protects public

health, animal health, and the environment and stabilizes animal agriculture, the 

food supply, and the economy will be employed at all times. Please see Chapter 5

for more information on these activities and tools (i.e., movement control, 

disposal, and epidemiological investigation and tracing). 

Box 4-1. Critical Activities and Tools for an ND Response

Critical Activities and Tools for Containment, Control, and Eradication

• Public awareness campaign

• Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls

• Rapid diagnosis and reporting

• Epidemiological investigation and tracing

• Increased surveillance

• Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal 

products 

• Biosecurity measures

• Mass depopulation and euthanasia, potentially including preemptive culling

• Effective and appropriate disposal procedures

• Cleaning and disinfection measures

• Emergency vaccination (as the response strategy indicates)

4.2.2 Epidemiological Principles

Three basic epidemiological principles form the foundation to contain, control, 

and eradicate ND in the U.S. domestic poultry population: 

1. Prevent contact between ND virus and susceptible poultry. 

a. This is accomplished through quarantine of infected poultry and 

movement controls in the Infected Zone(s) and Buffer Zone(s) 

[Control Areas (CA)], along with biosecurity procedures to protect 

non-infected poultry. 

February 2014 4-2 
ND Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

b. Certain circumstances may warrant accelerating the depopulation or 

slaughter of poultry at risk for exposure to ND to decrease the 

population density of susceptible poultry.

c. There is a serious but lesser transmission risk posed by other people, 

material, conveyances, and animals that may have been in contact with 

ND and serve as mechanical vectors. Contact between poultry and 

these items should be prevented, and transmission risk mitigated, 

through biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection measures.

2. Stop the production of ND virus by infected or exposed poultry. This is 

accomplished by slaughter or mass depopulation (and disposal) of infected 

and potentially infected poultry.

3. Increase the disease resistance of susceptible poultry to the ND virus. This 

is accomplished by strategic emergency vaccination.

4.2.3 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign

One of the most important critical activities is a public awareness campaign. 

Box 4-2 details the importance of a coordinated public awareness campaign to an 

effective response strategy.

Box 4-2. Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign

Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign

In all ND outbreaks, a public awareness campaign must be effectively coordinated. This will 

support the response strategy by

• engaging and leveraging Federal, State, Tribal, local, and stakeholder relationships to 

provide unified public messages for local, national, and international audiences;

• addressing the issues and concerns relating to food safety, public health, and animal 

welfare;

• addressing issues and concerns related to interstate commerce, continuity of business, and 

international trade; and

• widely disseminating key communication messages to consumers and producers.

4.2.4 Timeline in any ND Response for First 72 Hours

In the first 72 hours after the detection of ND in the United States, specific actions 

will occur. As seen in Figure 4-1, these critical tasks are fundamental to the rapid 

control and containment of ND. 

February 2014 4-3 
 

Figure 4-1. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of U.S. ND Response

4.3 RESPONSE STRATEGY FOR CONTROL 

AND ERADICATION OF ND IN POULTRY

The United States’ primary control and eradication strategy for ND in poultry is 

stamping-out. If the spread of ND outpaces the resources for stamping-out, or if 

other factors direct the response away from a stamping-out strategy alone, 

emergency vaccination strategies may be considered. 

Currently it is not possible to delineate a priori the specific factors that might 

signal the need to deviate from an exclusive stamping-out strategy. A decision to 

use emergency vaccination will be based on the prevailing epidemiological 

circumstances during the outbreak. Please see Chapter 5, Section 5.16 for 

information on emergency vaccination. Other response critical activities and tools 

are also employed, such as health and safety, biosecurity, surveillance, disposal, 

and movement control (see Chapter 5). This chapter provides general strategic 

guidance for a response to the detection of ND in poultry.

4.3.1 Defining Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy 

for Poultry 

Stamping-out is the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible 

poultry. Box 4-3 lists the key elements of stamping-out (disposal issues are 

covered in Section 5.14 in Chapter 5). The OIE definition of stamping-out is 

provided in Section 4.5.1. 

February 2014 4-4 
ND Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Box 4-3. Strategy of Stamping-Out ND

Stamping-Out: Critical Goals

• Within 24 hours of (or as soon as possible after) a premises being classified as an Infected 

Premises (IP), infected poultry will be depopulated in the quickest, safest, and most 

humane way possible. In many cases, poultry on Contact Premises (CP) may also be 

depopulated as soon as possible.

• Where resources are limited, premises will be prioritized so that those with the highest 

potential for active ND spread are ‘stamped-out’ first. 

• Based on the epidemiology of the outbreak, prioritizing the poultry to depopulate first 

may be necessary. 

• Public concerns about stamping-out require a well-planned and proactive public relations 

and liaison campaign. Stakeholders, the public, and the international community must be 

involved. 

4.3.2 Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Figure 4-2 shows an example of a stamping-out strategy, where IP are 

depopulated. See Section 5.5 in Chapter 5 for more information on zones, areas, 

and premises for ND outbreak response.

Figure 4-2. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

(Infected Premises would be Depopulated) 

February 2014 4-5 
 

4.3.3 Assessing a Possible Outbreak

During the investigation of a premises suspected of having ND, animal health 

responders use clinical signs, history, and professional judgment to determine the 

likelihood that ND exists on the premises. This assessment includes

 a history of clinical and epidemiological findings,

 results of physical examinations,

 necropsy findings,

 specimen collection and submission to an approved laboratory,

 reporting, and

 initiating appropriate control measures.

Incident management includes quarantine and movement control, tracing, 

activation of response plans, and communication of these actions to all 

stakeholders, the public, and the international community. Cooperative Federal, 

State, Tribal, local, and industry response measures are carried out with extreme 

urgency using the broadest geographic scope appropriate. 

If ND has not been or cannot be detected on a premises, but epidemiological 

evidence indicates that the disease has spread beyond the initial premises, the 

premises should be treated as presumptive positive premises and control measures 

implemented.

4.3.4 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities

ND may be listed as a disease reportable to animal health or public health officials 

depending on the laws and policy of the State or Tribal nation. In some States, all 

FADs or animal diseases of consequence are listed for reporting to a State 

authority, which would include ND. Detection of ND may result in emergency 

intervention by State, Tribal, Federal, or local authorities. 

When the criteria for a presumptive ND case have been met (see Chapter 5 for 

case definitions), the APHIS Administrator or VS Deputy Administrator (CVO of 

the United States) can authorize APHIS personnel—in conjunction with State, 

Tribal, and IC personnel—to initiate depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection 

procedures of the index case and investigation of CP. Personnel may also 

depopulate poultry on any CP meeting the criteria for a presumptive case. APHIS

and SAHOs will assess the need to initiate depopulation of poultry and cleaning 

and disinfection procedures on other poultry flocks in a radius up to 3 kilometers 

around the index case.

February 2014 4-6 
ND Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

When ND is detected, SAHOs and Tribal officials issue a quarantine or hold order 

for the IP. A Federal quarantine may be issued when requested by SAHOs or as 

directed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The Incident Commander works with the 

Operations Section and Situation Unit in the Planning Section to determine zone, 

area, and premises designations during an ND outbreak.

4.3.5 Management of Incident

The outbreak response effort should be implemented through an ICS with an 

appropriate span of control and delegation of authority. Responses will be as local 

as possible. Good communication within the chain of command is imperative.

An Incident Commander should be identified and an ICP established. In-State 

resources (whether State, Federal, Tribal, local, or privately owned) should be 

used to manage a local response. Out-of-State resources may be used to support 

the State impacted by the outbreak. The USDA will notify and coordinate with 

public health agencies in response to ND in poultry. 

4.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING RESPONSE

The previous sections identified the primary response strategy for an ND

outbreak. Detection of ND will result in emergency intervention by State, Tribal, 

Federal, and local authorities; the scope of regulatory intervention will depend on 

the following factors:

 Consequences of the ND outbreak. The consequences of the ND outbreak, 

and the impact of the response, in terms of disruptions to national security, 

food security, animal health, public health, environment, economy,

interstate commerce, international trade, and regulatory issues.

 Acceptance. Acceptance of response policy (social and political) by 

different communities, from local to international.

 Scale of outbreak. The number of poultry infected, species infected, 

number of premises infected, and susceptible poultry population density 

for infected areas or high risk areas. 

 Rate of outbreak spread. The rate of spread of infection in terms of 

number of premises, types of premises, number of susceptible poultry, 

types of poultry; this is the rate at which each IP “reproduces” or results in 

other IP. 

 Veterinary countermeasures available. The availability and efficacy of 

veterinary countermeasures, such as ND vaccines.

February 2014 4-7 
 

 Resources available to implement response strategies. The capabilities 

and resources available to eradicate ND in poultry and to control and 

eradicate ND in potential wildlife reservoirs. 

4.5 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ND

4.5.1 World Organization for Animal Health Standards 

for ND Response

In terms of general international standards, for countries that have competent 

veterinary authorities, the initial response eradication policy for ND outbreaks 

that can be confined to a Containment Zone is a stamping-out policy in domestic 

poultry. Stamping-out, as defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code

(2013) means

carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Authority, on 

confirmation of a disease, the killing of the animals which are affected 

and those suspected of being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, 

those in other herds which have been exposed to infection by direct 

animal to animal contact, or by indirect contact of a kind likely to cause 

the transmission of the causal pathogen. All susceptible animals, 

vaccinated or unvaccinated, on an infected premises should be killed and 

their carcasses destroyed by burning or burial, or by any other method 

which will eliminate the spread of infection through the carcasses or 

products of the animals killed.

This policy should be accompanied by the cleansing and disinfection 

procedures defined in the Terrestrial Code.

The term modified stamping-out policy should be used in 

communications to the OIE whenever the above animal health measures 

are not implemented in full and details of the modifications should be 

given. 

The OIE recognizes that if outbreaks cannot be confined to a Containment Zone

(equivalent to a CA), response strategies other than just stamping-out may be 

necessary. 

4.5.2 Recognition of Disease-Free Status

As a member of the OIE, the United States has agreed to abide by standards 

drafted and approved by member countries. The OIE does not grant official 

recognition for ND-freedom, but OIE members can self-declare their entire 

territory or a zone within their territory free from certain OIE-listed diseases, such 

as ND in poultry. 

February 2014 4-8 
ND Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

In cases of self-declaration, delegates are advised to consult the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code for specific requirements for self-declaration of freedom 

from ND. By providing the relevant epidemiological evidence, the OIE member 

can prove to a potential importing country that the entire country or zone under 

discussion meets the provisions of the specific disease chapter. Any submitted 

self-declaration should contain evidence demonstrating that the requirements for 

the disease status have been met in accordance with OIE standards. This selfdeclaration must be signed by the official OIE delegate of the OIE member 

concerned. As stated in Article 10.9.1 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code

(2013), for the purposes of international trade, ND is defined “as an infection of 

poultry,” and bans on international trade in poultry commodities should not be 

imposed for detection of NDV in wild birds.

4.5.3 Criteria Needed for ND-Free Status

The OIE has one category for country recognition for ND1: an ND free country, 

zone, or compartment. This determination is described in Article 10.9.2 of the

OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013). The criteria for an ND-free country, 

zone, or compartment are as follows (Article 10.9.3): 

A country, zone, or compartment may be considered free from ND when

it has been shown that NDV infection in poultry has not been present in 

the country, zone or compartment for the past 12 months, based on 

surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.9.22. to 10.9.26. 

If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone, or 

compartment, ND free status can be regained three months after a 

stamping-out policy (including disinfection of all affected 

establishments) is applied, providing that surveillance in accordance with 

Articles 10.9.22. to 10.9.26. has been carried out during that three-month 

period. 

1 In the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, ND is defined as vNDV.

February 2014 4-9 

 
Chapter 5

Specific ND Response Critical Activities

and Tools

FAD PReP documents identify critical activities and tools to be employed in the 

event of an ND outbreak. These critical activities and response tools will assist in 

controlling, containing, and eradicating ND while facilitating continuity of 

business in an outbreak. This chapter describes key parts of these critical activities 

and tools.

Documents referenced in this chapter can be found, for APHIS employees, at 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml, or for others, at 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

5.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY

Information on the etiology and ecology of ND promotes a common 

understanding of the disease agent among responders and other stakeholders (see 

Chapter 1 for ND information). The ND Overview of Etiology and Ecology SOP

contains additional information.

5.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS 

AND CASE DEFINITIONS

Laboratory and case definitions provide a common point of reference for all 

responders. Case definitions and laboratory criteria are developed according to the 

Case Definition Development Process SOP (see Section 5.2.3).

5.2.1 Laboratory Definitions

The following sections are the APHIS, VS, Science, Technology, and Analysis 

Services, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) draft definitions 

for vNDV from January 2014. For further information on the diagnostic tests 

conducted by NVSL-Ames in the event of an ND outbreak, please see Section 

5.4.

5.2.1.1 LABORATORY CRITERIA

OIE Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial 

Animals (2013), Chapter 2.3.14 (updated 2012).

February 2014 5-1
1. Agent isolation and identification: Samples of choice are tracheal, 

oropharyngeal, or cloacal swabs (or feces) from live birds. From dead 

birds, tissues (lung, spleen, trachea, intestine, and brain) as well as pools 

of organs and feces, are appropriate specimens. Tests include the isolation 

or culture of the virus in embryonated chicken eggs (appropriate cell 

culture may be used per the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests), and realtime reverse transcriptase polymerase (rRT-PCR) for detection of the virus 

or the viral genome. Viral isolates can be identified by the 

hemagglutination (HA), hemagglutination inhibition (HI), and real-time 

reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) tests. APMV-1 

viruses, especially those with moderate to high titers, may cross-react in 

the HI tests with other APMV viruses, most specifically APMV-3 and 

APMV-2.

2. Pathogenicity assessment: The intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) in 

24–40-hour-old chicks from specific pathogen free (SPF) eggs is the 

definitive assessment for virulence per OIE. The OIE allows for 

confirmation of virus virulence by amino acid sequence analysis of the 

fusion protein cleavage site, but molecular methods are not sufficient 

evidence for lack of virulence.

3. Serological tests: Use clotted blood or serum for enzyme-linked 

immunosorbent assay (ELISA) or HI. Antibodies are detectable 6 to 10 

days after infection.

5.2.2 Case Definitions

The following sections include APHIS-VS CEAH draft definitions for vNDV

from January 2014.

5.2.2.1 CASE DEFINITION

1. Suspect case: Domesticated bird or flock having clinical signs consistent 

with virulent Newcastle disease virus.

2. Presumptive positive case: A suspect case (as in 1.) that has either:

a. Positive screening test (rRT-PCR) for Newcastle disease virus 

(APMV-1); OR

b. Epidemiological information indicating exposure to virulent Newcastle 

disease virus.

3. Confirmed positive case: Domesticated bird or flock from which:

February 2014 5-2
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

a. Newcastle disease virus (APMV-1) has been isolated and identified at

the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) or laboratory 

designated by the Secretary of Agriculture; AND

b. The Newcastle disease virus (APMV-1) has an ICPI in day-old chicks 

(Gallus gallus) of 0.7 or greater; OR

c. Presumptive positive (as in 2.) and presence of multiple basic amino 

acids in the virus (either directly or by deduction) at the C-terminus of 

the F2 protein and phenylalanine at residue 117, which is the Nterminus of the F1 protein. The term ‘multiple-basic amino acids’ 

refers to at least three arginine or lysine residues between residues 113 

and 116.

i. Failure to demonstrate the characteristic pattern of amino 

acid residues as described above would require virus 

isolation and further characterization by an ICPI test.

5.2.3 Case Definition Development Process

The Case Definition Development Process SOP describes the general process for 

developing and approving animal disease case definitions for use in animal health 

surveillance and reporting. Case definitions are developed by CEAH, in 

cooperation with other VS units. CEAH coordinates review with SAHOs, subject 

matter experts, and other stakeholders. Case definitions are approved by the VS

Deputy Administrator (the U.S. CVO) and VS Leadership Team. Case definitions 

enhance the usefulness of animal disease data by providing uniform criteria for 

reporting purposes.

In an ND outbreak, case definitions may be revised within 24 hours of the first 

presumptive positive or confirmed positive case (index case). The case definitions

will be reviewed throughout the outbreak and modified on the basis of additional 

information or the changing needs of the eradication effort.

5.3 SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance is a critical activity during an outbreak of ND. The following are 

goals in an ND outbreak:

 To implement surveillance plans within 48 hours of the confirmation of an 

outbreak.

 To implement a surveillance plan that will (1) define the present extent of 

ND and (2) detect unknown IP quickly.

 To have the surveillance plan consider the susceptible wild bird population 

in the area, to coordinate with APHIS, U.S. Department of the Interior, 

February 2014 5-3
State wildlife agencies, and State agriculture departments to perform 

appropriate ND surveillance in these populations.

 To provide complete surveillance data summaries and analysis at intervals 

as specified by IC.

 To develop effective surveillance plans that can achieve desired outcomes 

by leveraging available resources, satisfying jurisdictional requirements, 

and implementing continuity of business measures.

At the APHIS level, CEAH is responsible for surveillance design and 

Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services (SPRS) is responsible for 

surveillance implementation. Box 5-1 lists the key objectives of surveillance 

activities during and immediately after an ND outbreak.

Box 5-1. Surveillance Objectives in an ND Outbreak

Surveillance Objectives

• Detect ND IP during an outbreak.

• Determine the size and extent of an ND outbreak.

• Supply information to evaluate outbreak control activities.

• Provide information for poultry and product movement within the CA.

• Provide information for poultry and product movement out of the CA. 

• Prove disease freedom (DF) and regain disease-free status after eradication of the outbreak.

5.3.1 Surveillance Planning for ND Outbreak

5.3.1.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A surveillance plan will indicate the frequency, number, and distribution of 

poultry and premises to be sampled. This requires tradeoffs be made among six 

surveillance parameters or tools, listed below. These tradeoffs are made 

employing initial information collected about the outbreak, and best estimates.

During an outbreak, surveillance plans will change as new information becomes 

available. (Appendix D contains more detailed surveillance information.) The six 

surveillance parameters are:

1. Design (threshold) prevalence. The goal is to determine the lowest 

feasible prevalence that can be used to detect infected birds on premises. 

The chosen proportion of animals or premises infected that if exceeded 

will indicate the disease has been detected for a given confidence level and 

population size (1 percent vs. 5 percent vs. 15 percent).

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2. Confidence level. The selected level (90 percent confident vs. 95 percent 

confident) that the disease can be detected for the chosen design threshold, 

given the population size.

3. Types of tests. Test choices—clinical inspection, polymerase chain 

reaction (PCR) testing, serology testing, etc.—and the test cutoff values 

can influence the design prevalence choice. Each test has a sensitivity and 

specificity that varies with the cutoff values.

4. Sampling frequency. Previous negative test results can augment 

information gained from negative test results if the time period between 

sampling is short—ideally daily, but definitely less than the incubation 

period. The value of the previous negative test results decreases as the 

interval between sampling increases (daily vs. every other day).

5. Risk-based sampling. Selecting populations with a higher proportion of 

infected animals (1 percent vs. 10 percent) reduces the number of samples 

needed for a given confidence level and population size.

6. Sampling scheme. Within the selected population (risk-based or total 

population) a random, convenience, or other scheme may be used, and the 

choice will influence the number of animals and premises sampled.

5.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE OBJECTIVES BY TIME PERIOD

There are three key segments of surveillance activity in an outbreak. These 

segments have distinct goals to aid in the control, containment, and eradication of 

ND in poultry. For more information on the zone, area, and premises designations 

referred to in this section, please refer to Section 5.5 in this chapter.

1. The initial 72 hours post-ND outbreak declaration. The objective is to 

detect existing infected flocks and premises as quickly as possible. During 

this period, there are three goals of the IC:

a. Create the initial Buffer Zone (BZ) designation and the boundary of 

the CA.

b. Create a list of premises with susceptible flocks in the CA.

c. Determine the boundary of the Surveillance Zone (SZ) and start 

developing a surveillance plan to be used in the SZ.

2. The control and eradication period (from initial 72-hour period until last 

case is detected and eradicated). Four key surveillance objectives need to 

be accomplished simultaneously in this period.

a. Detect IP, new and existing, so that control measures can be put in 

place.

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b. Provide evidence that premises are free of ND, thereby permitting 

poultry and poultry product movements in the CA.

c. Evaluate the outbreak management control activities.

d. Provide evidence that the Free Area (FA) is free of disease, thereby 

enabling unrestricted poultry and poultry product movement.

3. Post eradication. The objective is to prove that the CA and FA are free of 

disease (using OIE recommendations and requirements on surveillance).

a. Prove DF on depopulated premises.

b. Prove DF on At-Risk Premises (ARP) in the CA by random sampling 

or targeted sampling (choosing populations based on risk) on selected 

premises and selected flocks.

c. Prove DF in the FA, following OIE guidelines, using multiple methods 

including serological slaughter sampling and passive surveillance by 

veterinarians and the public.

5.3.2 Surveillance Sampling

The goal of surveillance sampling is to detect ND in poultry as soon as possible. 

Once an ND outbreak response has been authorized, surveillance sampling 

schemes will be finalized to sample and monitor premises for business continuity 

purposes and to survey premises that do not require daily poultry or product 

movement.

Surveillance sampling, using appropriate disease detection sampling schemes, 

will begin immediately after outbreak response has been authorized. The 

sampling unit and sample shown in Box 5-2 should be used in all surveillance 

schemes for the Infected Zone (IZ), BZ, and SZ, for both commercial and 

backyard premises.

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Box 5-2. Sampling Unit and Sample Measures for ND Surveillance

Sampling Unit and Sample Measures for ND Surveillance

• Sampling Unit: Flock or house.

• Sample: A pooled sample that combines swabs taken from five dead or euthanized sick 

birds out of the house’s (flock’s) daily dead or ill birds. 

These sampling measures are defined as:

• Dead Birds: The dead or euthanized sick birds found each day in every house (flock) on a 

premises.

• 50-Dead-Bird Group: Consists of 50 or fewer dead birds (and each multiple of 50 or 

fewer dead birds) from each house on the premises each day.

• 5-Bird Pool: Combines samples taken from five dead or euthanized sick birds out of the 

house’s (flock’s) daily dead birds into one sample. In all cases where a 5-bird pool is 

mentioned, an 11-bird pool (samples taken from eleven dead or euthanized sick birds) 

may be collected instead (an additional option for sampling).

• Detection Probability: The sampling scheme will detect at least 1 infected bird in each 

50-dead-bird group (at the 95 percent confidence level) if there are 20 or more infected 

birds (40 percent prevalence) in the target population of daily dead birds, where the rRTPCR test sensitivity of the 5-bird pool is 86.5 percent.

5.3.3 Surveillance Schemes Based on Zone

The outbreak surveillance plan will have specific outbreak surveillance schemes 

for each zone (such as the IZ, BZ, and SZ). For example, a surveillance plan for 

the sampling frequency for commercial CP, Suspect Premises (SP), and 

Monitored Premises (MP) in the IZ would be to collect a 5-bird pool or 11-bird 

pool sample 2 times per week for 28 days. This may need to be adapted for ND

viruses that demonstrate shorter incubation periods. Feasible sampling

frequencies are provided in Appendix D.

In the SZ, the number of premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least one 

IP where the prevalence rate of IP equals or exceeds 5 percent, at the 95 percent 

confidence level. (Appendix D contains complete information on sampling 

schemes for the IZ, BZ, and SZ for both commercial and backyard premises.)

For proof of DF, following OIE recommendations, surveillance starts 21 days 

after depopulation of the last IP and is in effect or 3 months. The OIE 

recommends intensifying surveillance schemes in conjunction with surveillance 

of the CA. In a U.S. ND outbreak, this might be conducted by

 active investigation of flocks with suspicious clinical signs,

February 2014 5-7
 increasing slaughter sero-surveillance, and

 increasing the use of sentinel flocks.

Surveillance will be conducted in both the CA and FA. Investigation of suspect 

disease cases will augment the surveillance scheme. (Chapter 6 and Appendix D

contain additional information on proof of DF.)

The ND Surveillance SOP provides additional information on the protocol for a 

response surveillance team responding to ND IP, the distinction between 

commercial and backyard premises surveillance and equipment checklists.

The Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox, available to people with access to the Inside 

APHIS webpage (http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/nsu/toolbox/).

5.4 DIAGNOSTICS

Effective and appropriate sample collection, diagnostic testing, surge capacity,

and reporting are critical in an effective ND response. These activities will require 

additional resources in the event of an ND outbreak. In particular, sample 

collection will require additional personnel. Surge capacity may also be required 

for diagnostic laboratory testing. Surveillance plan requirements must be fully 

integrated with current diagnostic sample collection, sample testing, surge 

capacity, and reporting capabilities.

During a suspected or actual ND outbreak, the key goals of response are to (1) 

meet the surge requirements for diagnostic testing at specific intervals, starting at 

time zero and at 24-hour intervals as the response escalates and (2) report all 

diagnostic test results to appropriate personnel and information management 

systems within 12 of hours of diagnostic test completion.

The FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0) offers detailed 

information on diagnostic sample collection, diagnostic testing, surge capacity, 

and reporting. This document provides additional guidance on who is responsible 

for diagnostic testing, sample collection and processing, and analyzing diagnostic 

test results. Appendix E references VS Guidance Document 12001 which contains 

more information on submitting diagnostic samples. The procedures outlined in 

this document should be followed regarding the submission of diagnostic samples 

for an FAD investigation. For packaging and labeling submissions, please see

the APHIS webpage (path to link: APHISAnimal HealthLab Information 

ServicesDiagnostic Testing). 

5.4.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing

Trained personnel and field collection kits are required to effectively collect 

samples from poultry.

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Confirmation of an ND outbreak will be made by NVSL-Ames; confirmation of 

ND on any premises not currently in an ND CA will be made by NVSL-Ames.

After NVSL confirmation of ND on a premises (index case), subsequent samples 

from premises within an ND CA may be sent to USDA-approved laboratories 

which are part of the NAHLN (Appendix C).

IC will provide specific instructions regarding the direction and collection of 

samples, which is likely to change as the outbreak evolves. In all cases, (1) NVSL

will confirm the index case, (2) presumptive positive samples (on a rRT-PCR) 

from outside an established CA will be tested and confirmed by NVSL, and 

(3) NVSL will receive samples routinely from inside the CA to monitor in ND

virus.

5.4.1.1 DIAGNOSTIC SAMPLE FLOW FOR ND

Figure 5-1 illustrates the typical diagnostic flow of sample testing for an FAD

investigation of potential ND. Table 5-1 provides the corresponding legend.

Table 5-1. Legend for Figure 5-1

Abbreviation Definition

ICPI Intracerebral pathogenicity index (day-old chicks)

rRT-PCR Real-time reverse polymerase chain reaction

VI Virus Isolation

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Figure 5-1. Diagnostic Flow for FAD Investigations for ND

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Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.4.2 Surge Capacity

Surge capacity may be needed in an ND outbreak. Additional resources, such as 

personnel and materials, will be needed for sample collection. Additional capacity 

may also be required for laboratory sample testing. Surge capacity can facilitate a 

rapid response and continuity of business for non-infected premises. In the event 

that the State NAHLN laboratory and NVSL-Ames are overwhelmed by the 

diagnostic testing requirements, NAHLN labs from across the country will 

provide surge capacity for diagnostic testing. For more information on surge 

capacity, please see the NAHLN Activation Guide. Individual laboratories have 

independent protocols on how to manage personnel if a surge is required.

Appendix C contains a list of the NAHLN labs approved to conduct ND

diagnostics.

5.4.3 Reporting

Box 5-3 clarifies reporting and notification of presumptive positive ND cases. See 

VS Guidance Document 12001 (regarding FAD investigations) for further 

information on ND investigations and notifications. This document is available

here: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

Box 5-3. Reporting and Notification

Reporting and Notification

• Cases considered a presumptive positive for ND at NVSL-Ames, based on the 

current case definition, will be reported to the affected States, other States, Tribal 

nations, industry, other Federal agencies, trading partners, and the OIE. 

• This includes breeder and commercial poultry flocks, domestic waterfowl and 

upland game birds, backyard flocks, and live bird marketing system (LBMS).

• Appropriate Federal-State-Tribal-industry response and containment measures are

initiated during ND investigations. 

5.5 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION 

AND TRACING

5.5.1 Summary of Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations

A critical component of an ND response is the designation of zones, areas, and 

premises. The Incident Commander will work with the Operations Section and 

Situation Unit (in the Planning Section) to (1) determine appropriate zones, areas, 

and premises designations in the event of an ND outbreak and (2) reevaluate these 

designations as needed throughout the outbreak based on the epidemiological 

situation (see Appendix B for organizational charts). These zones, areas, and 

premises designations are used in quarantine and movement control efforts. For 

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details on the zones, areas, and premises, please see the APHIS Foreign Animal 

Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0).

Table 5-2 summarizes the premises designations that would be employed in an 

ND outbreak response. Table 5-3 summarizes the zone and area designations that 

would be used in an ND outbreak response. Figure 5-2 illustrates these premises, 

zone, and area designations. 

Table 5-2. Summary of Premises Designations

Premises Definition Zone

Infected Premises (IP) Premises where a presumptive positive case or 

confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory 

results, compatible clinical signs, ND case definition, 

and international standards.

Infected Zone

Contact Premises (CP) Premises with susceptible poultry that may have been 

exposed to ND, either directly or indirectly, including 

but not limited to exposure to animals, animal 

products, fomites, or people from Infected Premises.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone

Suspect Premises (SP) Premises under investigation due to the presence of 

susceptible poultry reported to have clinical signs 

compatible with ND. This is intended to be a shortterm premises designation.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone, Surveillance Zone, 

Vaccination Zone

At-Risk Premises (ARP) Premises with susceptible poultry, but none of those 

susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible 

with ND. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is 

not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or 

Suspect Premises. At-Risk Premises seek to move 

susceptible poultry or products within the Control Area 

by permit. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to 

become Monitored Premises.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone

Monitored Premises (MP) Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an 

Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect 

Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to 

become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises 

meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move 

susceptible poultry or products out of the Control Area 

by permit.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone

Free Premises (FP) Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact 

or Suspect Premises.

Surveillance Zone, Free 

Area

Vaccinated Premises (VP) Premises where emergency vaccination has been 

performed. This may be a secondary premises 

designation. 

Containment Vaccination 

Zone, Protection 

Vaccination Zone

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Table 5-3. Summary of Zone and Area Designations

Zone/Area Definition

Infected Zone (IZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises.

Buffer Zone (BZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises.

Control Area (CA) Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area.

Free Area (FA) Area not included in any Control Area.

Vaccination Zone (VZ) Emergency Vaccination Zone classified as either a Containment Vaccination 

Zone (typically inside a Control Area) or a Protection Vaccination Zone 

(typically outside a Control Area). This may be a secondary zone designation.

Figure 5-2. Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises in ND Outbreak Response 

Zones and Areas Premises

Note: The Vaccination Zone can be either a Protection Vaccination Zone or Containment Vaccination Zone. 

Stamping-out is not pictured in these figures.

5.5.2 Epidemiological Investigation

Epidemiological investigation and movement tracing during an outbreak are 

critical in controlling and eradicating ND. In an ND outbreak, the goals are to

 within 96 hours of identifying the index case, characterize the nature of 

the ND outbreak, identify the risk factors for transmission, and develop 

mitigation strategies;

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 within 6 hours of identifying potential IP or CP through tracing activities, 

assign a premises classification and a priority of investigation; and

 within 24 hours of identifying the IP or initial CP, identify all additional 

CP.

These measures will aid in the control of ND and lessen the impact of the 

outbreak during the response effort. Appendix F contains a sample template of an

epidemiological questionnaire. Please note that this questionnaire is only an 

example. In an outbreak, other factors may be considered; the scope of any such 

questionnaire should be assessed based on the epidemiological situation, and is at 

the discretion of IC. The Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing SOP as well 

as the NAHEMS Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing both 

provide more information.

5.5.3 Tracing

Box 5-4 explains the fundamental importance of movement tracing in an ND

response effort.

Box 5-4. Importance of Movement Tracing in ND Outbreak

Tracing

One of the single most important and urgent veterinary activities during an ND outbreak is to 

rapidly and diligently trace-back and trace-forward movements from an IP. This tracing will 

aid in the control of the spread of ND virus and limit the impact of the outbreak. Tracing 

should cover all movements from the premises, including susceptible poultry, non-susceptible 

species, animal products, vehicles, crops and grains, and people. Tracing also includes 

consideration of all potential modes of transmission and possible contact with wild birds. 

Trace-back and trace-forward information should ideally be collected for at least 

21 days prior to the appearance of clinical signs in poultry infected with ND.

Additional tracing information will be collected for movements up to the time that 

quarantine was imposed.

Tracing information will be obtained from many sources (such as reports from 

field veterinarians, producers, industry, farm service providers, or the public). The 

Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) will be used to collect and 

report epidemiological data, including movement tracing information, locally and 

nationally.

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5.5.4 Considerations for Size of Control Area and Minimum 

Sizes of Other Zones

The perimeter of the CA should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the 

perimeter of the closest IP. The size of the CA depends on the circumstances of 

the outbreak, including the IP transmission pathways and estimates of 

transmission risk, poultry movement patterns and concentrations, distribution of 

susceptible wildlife in proximity, natural terrain, jurisdictional boundaries, and 

other factors. The boundaries of the CA can be modified or redefined when 

tracing and other epidemiological information becomes available.

Table 5-4 provides a description of the minimum sizes of areas and zones. Table 

5-5 reviews the factors used to determine the size of the CA.

Table 5-4. Minimum Sizes of Areas and Zones

Zone or Area Minimum Size and Details

Infected Zone (IZ) Perimeter should be at least 3 km (~1.86 miles) beyond perimeters of presumptive 

or confirmed Infected Premises. Will depend on disease agent and epidemiological 

circumstances. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues.

Buffer Zone (BZ) Perimeter should be at least 7 km (~4.35 miles) beyond the perimeter of the 

Infected Zone. Width is generally not less than the minimum radius of the 

associated Infected Zone, but may be much larger. This zone may be redefined as 

the outbreak continues. 

Control Area (CA) Perimeter should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the perimeter of the 

closest Infected Premises. Please see Table 5-5 for factors that influence the size 

of the Control Area. This area may be redefined as the outbreak continues. 

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Width should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles), but may be much larger.

Table 5-5. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for ND

Factors Additional details

Jurisdictional areas  Effectiveness and efficiency of administration

 Multi-jurisdictional considerations: local, State, Tribal, and multistate

Physical boundaries  Areas defined by geography

 Areas defined by distance between premises

ND epidemiology  Reproductive rate

 Incubation period

 Ease of transmission

 Infectious dose

 Species susceptibility

 Modes of transmission (fecal-oral, droplet, aerosol, vectors)

 Survivability in the environment

 Ease of diagnosis (for example, no pathognomonic signs; requires 

diagnostic laboratory testing)

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Table 5-5. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for ND

Factors Additional details

Infected Premises 

characteristics

 Number of contacts

 Transmission pathways and transmission risk

 Extent of animal movement

 Number of animals

 Species of animals

 Age of animals

 Movement of traffic and personnel to and from premises (fomite spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place at time of outbreak

Contact Premises

characteristics

 Number and types of premises

 Susceptible animal populations and population density

 Animal movements

 Movement of traffic (fomites) and personnel to and from premises (fomite 

spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place prior to outbreak

Environment  Types of premises in area or region

 Land use in area or region

 Susceptible wildlife and population density

 Wildlife as biological or mechanical vectors

General area, region, or 

agricultural sector 

biosecurity

 Biosecurity practices in place prior to outbreak

 Biosecurity practices implemented once outbreak detected

Number of backyard or 

transitional premises 

 Types of premises, animal movements, and network of animal and fomite 

movements

Continuity of business  Continuity of business plans and processes in place or activated at 

beginning of outbreak (such as surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, 

premises biosecurity, and risk-assessments)

 Permit processes, memorandums of understanding, and information 

management systems in place or activated at beginning of outbreak

5.6 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Local, State, Tribal, and Federal information management systems need to be 

compatible for information and data sharing. In an ND outbreak, the response 

goal is to have EMRS information downloads or data entry processes performed 

in 24-hour or shorter intervals. Field personnel should be provided with access to 

mobile technology devices necessary for collecting, monitoring, and sharing 

information. Rapidly functional, robust, and scalable information technology 

infrastructure will be needed in an ND outbreak.

The Overview of Information Management SOP provides information on key VS 

systems, including the following:

 Animal Disease Traceability Information System

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Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

 EMRS

 LabWare Laboratory Information Management System

 Licensing, Serial Release, and Testing Information System

 Mobile Information Management

 Surveillance Collaboration Services

 Veterinary Services Process Streamlining.

It also covers the following APHIS information technology systems:

 APHIS Emergency Qualifications System

 Resource Ordering and Status System.

5.7 COMMUNICATION

APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) will serve as the primary liaison 

with the news media in the event of an ND outbreak. Under the ICS, a JIC is

established. During an ND outbreak, APHIS LPA and the USDA Office of 

Communications will operate from the JIC.

Effective communication during an ND outbreak should be carried out and 

maintained by

 establishing a network of stakeholders and systems for communication 

prior to an incident or outbreak;

 briefing the media, public, industry, Congress, trading partners, and others 

on the ND outbreak status and the actions being taken to control and 

eradicate the disease;

 coordinating with Federal, State, and local agencies, Tribal entities, 

producer groups, and Land Grant University-based Cooperative Extension 

Services to ensure consistent messaging regarding animal health, public 

health, and food safety; and

 assuring consumers that USDA is working on animal health issues, in an 

informed and timely manner, along with HHS, which is working on 

human health issues.

In addition, all communications should highlight the importance of sound 

biosecurity measures and steps that producers and owners can take to protect 

against ND infection in their own flocks.

February 2014 5-17
 

February 2014 5-18

5.7.1 Objectives

All ND communications must 

 furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information; 

 maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the government’s 

ability to respond to an outbreak; 

 minimize public panic and fear; and 

 address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as possible. 

5.7.2 Key Messages 

Six key messages will be conveyed in an ND outbreak (Box 5-5). 

Box 5-5. ND Communication Messages 

Key Communication Messages

For consumers:

1. ND is not a food-safety issue.

2. Properly prepared eggs and poultry are safe to eat.

3. We are responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the disease.

For producers:

1. You are the best protection your birds have.

2. Protect your flocks with good biosecurity practices.

3. Know the signs of ND, and be vigilant in reporting signs of illness.

5.7.3 Further Communications Guidance 

The following resources provide guidance on communication and information 

about various stakeholder groups: 

 USDA Biosecurity for the Birds (Newcastle Disease): 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/birdbiosecurity/end/ 

 APHIS Animal Health website: 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth 

 For information on the safe handling of poultry and poultry products, 

please see: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safetyeducation/get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/poultry-preparation. 
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.8 HEALTH AND SAFETY AND PERSONAL 

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

During an ND outbreak, responders are exposed to many hazards. Taking 

precautions to prevent adverse human health events related to emergency 

response efforts is important. In an ND response, personal protection and safety is 

particularly essential to protect individuals from ND infection. Typically, those at 

increased risk for ND infection are personnel in prolonged and direct contact with 

infected birds in an enclosed setting. Upon the confirmation of ND, public health 

authorities should implement appropriate public health measures, including 

surveillance, prevention, and case management (as required). APHIS will work 

closely with public health authorities in a response. 

PPE is fundamental in ensuring personnel are protected from ND, as well as other 

hazards. Disposable or reusable outerwear may be acceptable, and all workers 

involved in the culling, transport, or disposal of ND virus-infected poultry must 

be provided with appropriate PPE. All visitors and employees, regardless of their 

exposure, should be provided with disposable coveralls, boots, hats, and gloves 

for their use before entering premises. Disposal of this PPE is required after 

leaving.

For further information on health, safety, and PPE, see the Health and Safety and 

PPE SOP. This SOP provides information on best practices to ensure the wellbeing and safety of all individuals involved in the response effort. Specific topics 

covered include the following:

 Procedures to create a site-specific health and safety plan;

 Details of hazard analysis, necessary training, and medical surveillance 

requirements;

 PPE, including Occupational Safety and Health Administration respirator 

fit testing;

 Pre-deployment information and guidance; and

 A protocol for staff field safety in an ND response.

5.8.1 Mental Health Concerns

The health and safety of all personnel is affected by the mental state of those 

involved in the ND response effort. The toll an ND outbreak may take on mental 

and physical health must be considered to protect the health and safety of all 

personnel. ND depopulation efforts can significant affect both responders and 

owners of affected poultry. Quarantine and movement restrictions may also 

impact populations affected by such controls. Care should be taken in the event of 

February 2014 5-19
 

an ND outbreak to consider and provide provisions for such psychological effects.

HHS has developed resources specifically for emergency and disaster responders, 

State and local planners, health professionals, and the general public 

(www.bt.cdc.gov/mentalhealth/). The Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia SOP 

provides further information on how personnel can effectively deal with 

euthanasia-related stress.

5.8.2 Further Information on Health, Safety, and Personal 

Protective Equipment

In addition to the resources already listed, more information and guidance can be 

found in the following documents:

 APHIS Health and Safety Manual: Available to APHIS employees at 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/mrpbs/publications/safety_health_wellness_ 

manual/index.shtml

 NAHEMS Guidelines: Health and Safety

 NAHEMS Guidelines: Personal Protective Equipment.

5.9 BIOSECURITY

An ND outbreak would potentially have a serious impact on the agricultural 

industry. Strict biosecurity measures need to be implemented to prevent or slow 

the spread of ND. Biosecurity procedures should be implemented within 24 hours 

of the identification of an index ND case. Accordingly, veterinarians, owners, and 

anyone else in contact with enterprises that have poultry need to observe 

biosecurity measures.

Proper biosecurity measures have two functions: (1) containing the virus on IP

(biocontainment) and (2) preventing the introduction of the virus via movement of 

personnel and material to naïve poultry and premises (bioexclusion). During an 

ND outbreak, a careful balance must be maintained between facilitating response 

activities and ensuring personnel do not expose naïve animals and premises to 

ND. 

Because some people in contact with ND virus may develop conjunctivitis or a 

mild “flu-like” illness, USDA will coordinate with public health agencies to 

minimize risks to responders and others exposed. In outbreaks with zoonotic

potential, such as ND, appropriate PPE is provided to persons involved in 

outbreak control and eradication as an additional biosecurity measure. For more 

information on health, safety, and PPE, see Section 5.8. Further information on 

biosecurity is discussed in the Biosecurity SOP which provides guidance on how 

to draft a site-specific biosecurity plan and

 identifies the roles and responsibilities of key personnel,

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Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

 explains biosecurity training and briefing requirements,

 addresses site security and safety,

 discusses biosecurity practices for shipping and transportation, and

 provides a biosecurity checklist. 

In addition, more information and guidance on appropriate biosecurity measures 

in an FAD outbreak can be found in the NAHEMS Guidelines: Biosecurity. 

5.9.1 Biosecurity Hazards and Mitigating Measures

Box 5-6 shows biosecurity hazards and biosecurity measures to mitigate these 

risks during an ND outbreak.

Box 5-6. ND Biosecurity Hazards and Appropriate Biosecurity Measures

Biosecurity Hazards

• Movement of poultry, other 

livestock, vehicles, equipment, 

and people. 

• Contaminated feed and water. 

• Contact with susceptible birds. 

Biosecurity Measures to Mitigate Risk

• Clean and disinfect premises, vehicles, and 

equipment, and dispose of materials that cannot be 

disinfected in an appropriate manner.

• Account for the movement of all poultry, livestock, 

and equipment for accurate records.

• Provide a location for all individuals to carry out 

appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures and 

insist these measures be followed.

• Ensure that housed poultry remain housed and that 

entry of rodents, ground water, and live birds is 

prevented.

• Prevent close or direct contact between poultry and 

wild birds.

5.9.2 Closed Flocks

In the event of an ND outbreak, one of the most fundamental biosecurity 

measures is closed flocks. Box 5-7 provides guidance on employing closed flocks 

as a critical biosecurity measure.

February 2014 5-21 
Box 5-7. Biosecurity Measure—Closed Flocks

Biosecurity: Closed Flocks

• To the fullest extent possible, close the flock to the introduction of new 

poultry (with population increases occurring only from offspring).

• If closing a flock is not possible, isolate newly purchased poultry (from 

the healthiest possible sources) and those returning from existing flocks 

for 30 days or more.

• Vaccination status of introduced poultry should be known. 

5.9.3 Waiting Period

Another important biosecurity measure is to ensure personnel are not travelling 

between IP and unknown or non-IP. During an ND outbreak, it is important that 

personnel wait the allotted time between premises visits in addition to following 

appropriate biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection protocols (see Section 5.15). 

Actual waiting periods will be recommended by IC on the basis of the outbreak 

circumstances, and need for personnel. Typical waiting times may vary between 

24 and 72 hours. Regardless of wait time, personnel should not travel from an IP

or SP to unknown or non-IP. However, personnel may travel between IP, if proper 

mitigating procedures are followed.

Extended avoidance periods may be unnecessary with stringent biosecurity 

practices and effective cleaning and disinfection protocols. However, until further 

information is available, veterinarians and other responders should adhere to the 

guidance provided by the local IC.

5.10 QUARANTINE AND MOVEMENT CONTROL

By restricting the movement of infected animals, animal products, and

contaminated fomites, quarantine and movement control can be a powerful tool in 

controlling and eradicating an ND outbreak. Movement control is accomplished 

through a permit system that allows entities to make necessary movements

without creating an unacceptable risk of disease spread. Operational staff 

members need to strictly adhere to movement control procedures, which are based 

on the best scientific information available at the time.

The Incident Commander, Disease Surveillance Branch (Operations Section), and 

Situation Unit (Planning Section), will coordinate to establish an IZ and a BZ

within 12 hours of the identification of an index case. Controlled movement 

orders and 24-hour standstill notices are likely to be implemented upon detection

of ND in the United States for relevant premises and zones. (Appendix G contains 

examples of movement control notices.) Once the CA (IZ plus BZ) is established, 

quarantine and movement controls will be implemented.

February 2014 5-22
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

Each State’s animal health emergency response plan should describe the

implementation of quarantine and movement controls, including a permit system.

USDA will impose a Federal quarantine and restrict interstate commerce from the 

infected States, asking the States (or adjoining countries) to provide resources to 

maintain and enforce the quarantine. Reimbursement formulas will be established 

between the States and USDA in a cooperative agreement. See Foreign Animal 

Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) for further 

information on authorities and funding.

The following sections provide information on movement control guidelines.

5.10.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations

The Incident Commander will work with the Disease Surveillance Branch 

(Operations Section) and the Situation Unit (Planning Section) to determine 

appropriate premises designations in the event of an ND outbreak (see 

Appendix B for an organizational chart). These zone, area, and premises

designations will be used for quarantine and movement control efforts. Again, 

refer to Tables 5-2 and 5-3 and Figure 5-2 for the designations used here.

5.10.2 Permit Guidance to Move into a Control Area, within a 

Control Area, and out of a Control Area

During an ND outbreak, the following guidance in Table 5-6 (movement into a 

CA), Table 5-7 (movement within a CA), and Table 5-8 (movement out of a CA) 

will be used to issue permits in movement control efforts.

February 2014 5-23
Table 5-6. Movement into Control Area from Outside Control Area to Specific Premisesa

Item Moving into a Control 

Area to a/an...

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premises^

Contact 

Premises^

At-Risk 

Premises

Monitored 

Premises

Poultryb Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Permit for movement 

must be approved by 

the IC with appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Permit for movement 

must be approved by 

the IC with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Poultry products See continuity of business plans for information on susceptible poultry products, or guidance and processes as determined by 

the IC. Please see Section 5.10.3 which contains OIE ND-specific guidance for inactivating ND.

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from 

premises with poultry

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved by IC

and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement depending 

on ND epidemiology 

and characteristics of 

destination premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures. 

IC may require a 

permit for movement 

depending on ND

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from 

premises without poultry

IC will determine 

movement restrictions 

based on ND

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

IC will determine 

movement restrictions 

based on ND

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

IC will determine 

movement restrictions 

based on ND

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement depending 

on ND epidemiology 

and characteristics of 

destination premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures. 

IC may require a 

permit for movement 

depending on ND

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination premises.

Equipment, vehicles, and 

other fomites from 

premises with poultry

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Semen, embryos from 

poultry

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed with 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational 

capabilities.

b May include pet birds and other susceptible species as defined by Incident Command during the outbreak.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before 

movements occur.

February 2014 5-24
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

Table 5-7. Movement within a Control Areaa

Item Moving within a Control 

Area from a/an....

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premises^

Contact 

Premises^

At-Risk 

Premises

Monitored 

Premises

Poultry b Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC, 

such as slaughter.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Poultry products See continuity of business plans for information on susceptible poultry products, or guidance and processes as determined by the 

IC. Please see Section 5.10.3 which contains OIE ND-specific guidance for inactivating ND. 

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from premises 

with poultry

Prohibited unless specific 

permit granted by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by 

the IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from premises 

without poultry

n/a

(Infected Premises have 

poultry)

n/a

(Suspect Premises 

have poultry)

n/a

(Contact Premises have 

poultry)

n/a

(At-Risk Premises 

have poultry)

n/a

(Monitored Premises 

have poultry)

Equipment, vehicles, and 

other fomites from premises 

with poultry

Prohibited unless specific 

permit granted by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit granted 

by IC and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Semen, embryos from poultry Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

b May include pet birds and other susceptible species as defined by Incident Command during the outbreak.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before 

movements occur.

February 2014 5-25
Table 5-8. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area from Specific Premisesa

Item Moving out of a 

Control Area from

a/an...

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premises^

Contact 

Premises^

At-Risk 

Premises

Monitored 

Premises*

Poultry Prohibited, except under 

certain circumstances as 

determined by the IC.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the IC.

At-Risk Premises must 

become Monitored 

Premises to move 

susceptible poultry out of 

a Control Area.

Allowed to move by permit 

approved by IC; 

surveillance, negative 

diagnostic tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Poultry products See continuity of business plans for information on susceptible poultry products, or guidance and processes as determined by the IC. 

Please see Section 5.10.3 which contains OIE ND-specific guidance for inactivating ND. 

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from 

premises with poultry

Prohibited unless specific 

permit approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures and riskassessment.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures and riskassessment.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures and riskassessment.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by IC; 

surveillance and 

negative diagnostic 

tests for susceptible 

poultry on premises, 

premises biosecurity, 

and risk-assessment 

may be required for 

permit.

Allowed to move by permit 

approved by IC; 

surveillance and negative 

diagnostic tests for 

susceptible poultry on 

premises, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Other animals (nonsusceptible) from 

premises without

poultry

n/a

(Infected Premises have 

poultry)

n/a

(Suspect Premises 

have poultry)

n/a

(Contact Premises have 

poultry)

n/a

(At-Risk Premises have 

poultry)

n/a

(Monitored Premises have 

poultry)

Equipment, vehicles, 

and other fomites 

from premises with 

poultry

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved by IC

and appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Prohibited unless permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos 

from poultry

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. At-Risk Premises must 

become Monitored 

Premises to move 

semen, embryos from 

susceptible poultry out 

of a Control Area.

Monitored Premises only 

allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

b May include pet birds and other susceptible species as defined by Incident Command during the outbreak.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before 

movements occur.

* Continuity of business plans may apply.

February 2014 5-26
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

For movement of susceptible poultry and poultry products out of the CA to an

FA, the permit process must consider national standards, any OIE standards, and 

conditions for such movement such as biosecurity procedures and risk assessment 

recommendations. In addition, commodity-specific proactive risk assessments, 

continuity of business plans, movement and marketability plans, and 

compartmentalization plans will also be considered. Figure 5-3 illustrates 

movement control and permitting in relation to premises designation.

Figure 5-3. Premises Designations in Relation to Permitting

and Movement Control

February 2014 5-27
5.10.3 Moving Commodities, Animals, and Conveyances 

Any movement of commodities, animals, and conveyances brings some level of 

risk of ND transmission from a known IP or an unknown IP to a non-IP. The risk 

of moving commodities, animals, and conveyances depends on the nature of the 

item being moved and its ability to transmit or be contaminated with ND virus. 

ND virus can be transmitted via items that contain biological material, through 

infected birds, or via a contaminated fomite or person.

5.10.4 Guidance for All Premises

Because of the variation in the risk of the commodities, animals, and 

conveyances, it is possible that premises—particularly MP and ARP—may be 

permitted to move one commodity or conveyance but not another. In making the 

decision whether movement will be allowed, substantial consideration will be 

given to critical movements (for example, the movement of animal feed onto 

premises). 

5.10.5 World Organization for Animal Health Treatment 

Guidelines for ND

The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013) provides guidance for the 

inactivation of ND virus in eggs, egg products, and meat. The Code also provides 

extensive information on the importation of various poultry products, including 

feather meal, down, meat products, and other products of poultry origin, including 

those intended for animal feeding or industrial use. The procedures for 

inactivating ND virus in eggs, egg products, and meat are reproduced here for 

easy reference, and should be considered in any movement control and permitting 

during an outbreak.

5.10.5.1 PROCEDURES FOR THE INACTIVATION OF THE NEWCASTLE DISEASE

VIRUS IN EGGS AND EGG PRODUCTS (ARTICLE 10.9.20)

Table 5-9 lists times for industry standard temperatures suitable for the 

inactivation of ND virus present in eggs and egg products: 

Table 5-9. Inactivation of Newcastle Disease in Eggs 

and Egg Products

Temperature (°C) Time

Whole egg 55.0 2,521 seconds

Whole egg 57.0 1,956 seconds

Whole egg 59.0 674 seconds

Liquid egg white 55.0 2,278 seconds

Liquid egg white 57.0 986 seconds

Liquid egg white 59.0 301 seconds

February 2014 5-28
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

Table 5-9. Inactivation of Newcastle Disease in Eggs 

and Egg Products

 Temperature (°C) Time

10% salted yolk 55.0 176 seconds

Dried egg white 57.0 50.4 hours

The listed temperatures are indicative of a range that achieves a 7-log kill. Where 

scientifically documented, variances from these times and temperatures may also 

be suitable when they achieve the inactivation of the virus.

5.10.5.2 PROCEDURES FOR THE INACTIVATION OF THE ND VIRUS IN MEAT 

(ARTICLE 10.9.21)

Table 5-10 lists times for industry standard temperatures are suitable for the 

inactivation of ND virus present in meat. 

The listed temperatures are indicative of a range that achieves a 7-log kill. Where 

scientifically documented, variances from these times and temperatures may also 

be suitable when they achieve the inactivation of the virus.

Table 5-10. Inactivation of Newcastle Disease in Meat

Temperature (°C) Time

Poultry meat 65.0 39.8 seconds

70.0 3.6 seconds

74.0 0.5 seconds

80.0 0.03 seconds

5.10.6 Surveillance Required for Poultry 

and Product Movement

Surveillance measures are required for non-daily movement of poultry and 

poultry products for premises located in the CA (IZ and BZ). These steps include 

visual surveillance as well as diagnostic testing for at least 2 days prior to 

movement. For more information on surveillance requirements for non-daily 

poultry and product movement, see Appendix D of this plan. 

5.11 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS

Continuity of business is the management of non-IP and non-contaminated animal 

products in the event of an ND outbreak. Continuity of business provides scienceand risk-based approaches and systems as a critical activity in an ND response. 

This helps agriculture and food industries facilitate routine business, or a return to 

business, during a disease response, while the risk of disease spread and threat to 

February 2014 5-29 
 

public health is effectively managed. Continuity of business planning can help to 

minimize unintended consequences on producers and consumers impacted by ND. 

During an ND outbreak, permitting, movement control, and prioritized 

disruptions—all based on science- and risk-based approaches—are critical 

measures to ensure continuity of business during an ND outbreak. The NAHEMS 

Guidelines: Continuity of Business covers topics such as

 key roles and responsibilities in continuity of business planning, 

 details of developing continuity of business plans, 

 potential components required for continuity of business planning, and

 preparedness and response goals. 

The Secure Egg Supply Plan contains additional information about continuity of 

business planning (available from www.secureeggsupply.com) in the event of a 

highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak. Stakeholders may wish to consider 

similar measures for continuity of business planning during an ND response 

effort. 

5.12 REGIONALIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

(FOR A U.S. ND RESPONSE) 

In the event of an ND outbreak in the United States, international trade of animals 

and animal products may be adversely affected for a significant period of time. 

This would have serious economic implications for the affected industries and the 

United States. Therefore it is important to identify, prior to an outbreak, potential 

procedures and plans that may mitigate the consequences and reestablish 

international trade as rapidly as possible.

As defined by the OIE, regionalization, also known as zoning, is the concept of 

separating subpopulations of animals in order to maintain a specific health status 

in one or more disease-free regions or zones. Disease-free regions can be created 

to facilitate continuity of business and reestablish international trade from the 

regions demonstrated to be disease-free. Regionalization recognizes that risk may 

be tied to factors that are not reflected by political boundaries of the nation or 

individual states, especially when the outbreak has been confined to specific areas 

within an individual state or group of states. Providing information to the OIE, its 

member countries, and our trading partners, which clearly identifies the 

boundaries of the disease-free areas can be used to inform our trading partners’ 

decisions whether to receive or reject our exports. This risk-based process, based 

on sound science, can mitigate the adverse economic effects of an ND outbreak.

February 2014 5-30 
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.12.1 Compartmentalization

Another tool that may potentially mitigate the economic consequences of a 

disease outbreak is compartmentalization. Compartmentalization, which defines 

an animal subpopulation by management and husbandry practices related to 

biosecurity, could be used by the veterinary authorities to demonstrate and 

maintain DF in certain commercial establishments whose practices have 

prevented the introduction of the disease. The disease-free status of these 

compartments could enable trade movement of poultry and poultry products. 

Compartmentalization has not been fully implemented by the United States for 

any disease agent to date and will depend on the recognition of the status of these 

compartments by international trading partners. Implementation of 

compartmentalization will rely on producers, industry, and State and Federal 

animal health authorities. By working closely together to develop and strengthen 

relationships and implementing the agreed upon procedures preceding an FAD

outbreak, compartmentalization may be a useful tool.

5.12.2 Further Guidance

The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013) also offers guidance on 

regionalization and compartmentalization in Chapters 4.3 and 4.4. Currently there 

are no internationally accepted or fully implemented ND-free compartments in the 

United States. 

5.13 MASS DEPOPULATION AND EUTHANASIA

Poultry on an IP will be depopulated as soon as possible after declaration of an 

ND outbreak. Poultry on CP may also be depopulated as soon as possible after the 

premises are classified as CP. The Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia SOP

provides instructions for personnel following the declaration of an ND outbreak 

and the classification of IP and CP. This SOP offers information on mass 

depopulation and euthanasia for poultry, including evaluation of various 

euthanasia methods, such as 

 carbon dioxide or other gas,

 water-based foam concentrate, and

 other approved methods.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia contains

additional information on euthanasia and mass depopulation. 

February 2014 5-31 
 

5.13.1 Best Practice Guidance

In the event of an ND outbreak, euthanasia or mass depopulation should be 

provided to affected poultry as safely, quickly, efficiently, and humanely as 

possible. In addition, the emotional and psychological impact on animal owners, 

caretakers, their families, and other personnel should be minimized.

Mass depopulation and euthanasia are not synonymous, and APHIS recognizes a 

clear distinction. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as 

painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass depopulation is a method by which 

large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much 

consideration given to the welfare of animals as practicable, given extenuating 

circumstances. Mass depopulation is employed in an ND response to prevent or 

mitigate the spread of ND through elimination of infected or potentially infected 

animals. Best practice guidance issued in 2007 from the American Veterinary 

Medical Association (AVMA) states that, “Under unusual conditions, such as 

disease eradication and natural disasters, euthanasia options may be limited. In 

these situations, the most appropriate technique that minimizes human and animal 

health concerns must be used.” Qualified personnel should perform mass 

depopulation in the event of an ND outbreak using the safest, quickest, and most 

humane procedures in accordance with AVMA guidance.

If personnel or materials are insufficient, the Incident Commander or other 

official should request emergency depopulation, disposal, and decontamination 

(3D) contractor support for ND depopulation efforts from the NVS. 

5.13.2 Water-Based Foam for Poultry Depopulation 

AVMA supports the use of water-based (fire suppression) foam as a method of 

mass depopulation for poultry under emergency conditions, if performance 

standards are implemented as detailed by APHIS. This method is superior in that 

fewer personnel are required to enter into poultry houses. However the equipment 

required may be expensive and large amounts of water are required, depending on 

the foaming system. Water-based foam has been approved for poultry 

depopulation of the following groups:

 Floor-reared poultry (broiler chickens and turkeys); 

 Poultry infected with a potentially zoonotic disease; 

 Animals experiencing an outbreak that is rapidly spreading and, in the 

opinion of State or Federal regulatory officials, cannot be contained by 

conventional or currently accepted means of depopulation; and

 Animals housed in structurally unsound buildings that would be hazardous 

for human entry.

February 2014 5-32 
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

The Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia SOP provides additional information on 

using water-based foam for poultry depopulation in an attachment.

5.14 DISPOSAL

Appropriate disposal of poultry carcasses and materials is a critical component of 

a successful ND response. NDV can survive for long periods on both organic and 

inorganic materials. The Disposal SOP discusses how to dispose of thousands of 

bird carcasses, contaminated and potentially contaminated materials, poultry 

products, items that cannot be properly cleaned and disinfected (such as manure, 

litter, and bedding), products of the response effort (such as PPE), and products of 

vaccination response. Disposal will occur as soon as possible after flock 

depopulation.

On-site burial has commonly been used as an accepted means of disposal; off-site 

burial may also be considered when on-site burial is not possible or if a common 

burial site would be more efficient. However, while burial has been a traditional 

method used, it may present significant issues related to potential environmental 

contamination. Composting and disposal by managed landfill are two methods 

that address the need to minimize negative environmental impact while also 

mitigate virus spread. Composting can be performed on-site either “in-house” or 

outdoors; composting materials are likely to be available. Additionally, managed 

landfills may be equipped to handle infectious waste properly, though their ability 

to take carcasses may vary. Incineration is another option, though fuel 

requirements and smoke discharge can be challenging.

Please see the Disposal SOP for more details on any disposal method. Other 

disposal methods such as digestion, rendering, and hydrolysis may be employed,

as indicated by the circumstances of the outbreak and disposal requirements. 

Disposal methods should always be assessed and applied appropriately, given the 

facility location, type of housing, premises characteristics, and other situational 

factors.

Disposal must always occur in a biosecure way that does not allow ND virus to 

spread and minimizes negative environmental impact. In addition, local and State 

regulations must be observed and memorandums of understanding may need to be 

obtained to ensure disposal capability. IC will coordinate closely with local 

authorities in deciding how to dispose of carcasses and other items. Cost 

effectiveness and stakeholder acceptance must also be considered in disposal 

decisions. If movement is required for disposal, the IC must permit such 

movement. In the event that available personnel are insufficient for disposal 

requirements in an ND outbreak, the Incident Commander can request emergency 

3D contractor support from the NVS.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Disposal also contains further guidance on disposal

activities; stakeholders should consider what disposal methods would be 

February 2014 5-33
appropriate in advance of an outbreak, and plan for these requirements 

accordingly.

5.15 CLEANING AND DISINFECTION

Because of ND’s high survival rate on both organic and inorganic materials, 

aggressive cleaning and disinfection practices are required for control and 

eradication. Cleaning and disinfection are to be conducted within 48 hours of the 

disposal of depopulated poultry. The Cleaning and Disinfection SOP provides 

information on

 the ND cleaning and disinfection effort,

 optimal cleaning and disinfection methods for ND,

 processes used to inactivate ND virus from organic materials,

 how to clean and disinfect equipment and premises after ND detection, 

and

 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-approved disinfectants for ND.

Water and feeding systems, ventilation, slats, nest box material, egg packing 

machines, egg storage areas, floor areas, the exterior of the house, and other 

materials and areas must be cleaned and disinfected. All disinfectants must be 

EPA-approved for ND; off-label use of disinfectants is illegal.

If available personnel or materials are insufficient for cleaning and disinfection in 

an ND outbreak, the Incident Commander can request emergency 3D contractor 

support from NVS.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Cleaning and Disinfection contains additional 

information on cleaning and disinfection.

5.16 VACCINATION

5.16.1 General Vaccination Information

Vaccination using lentogenic (low virulence) vaccines is widely practiced in the 

U.S. poultry industry, particularly in broiler breeders, layers, and turkeys. Both 

inactivated and live lentogenic vaccine is commercially available. Vaccination 

does prevent clinical signs, and can thereby mitigate production losses from low 

virulence strains of APMV-1. However, poultry will still shed the virus, and 

typical lentogenic vaccination may not be sufficient to protect poultry from a 

velogenic challenge. 

February 2014 5-34
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

typical lentogenic vaccination may not be sufficient to protect poultry from a 

velogenic challenge. 

For improved immunity, multiple doses of either the live or inactivated vaccine 

(or a combination thereof) are required, and must be used at frequent intervals.

Frequently, a live vaccine is used first, followed by a killed vaccine. This 

approach has been employed in countries where vNDV is endemic to control the 

disease.

Inactivated vaccines are given through an injection and provide longer immunity 

than live vaccine. However, live vaccine is less expensive and can be given 

through mass application via water or aerosol. The level of protection provided is 

also significantly impacted by the timing of vaccination based on the duration of 

time that has passed after hatching. The potency of the vaccine and handling 

(appropriate temperatures) will also impact the level of induced immunity.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases contains more 

general information on vaccination as part of a FAD response.

5.16.2 Emergency Vaccination Strategies for Poultry

Although stamping-out is the preferred and primary strategy for controlling and 

eradicating ND in the event of an outbreak, emergency vaccination may be 

considered in specific circumstances. In this scenario, there are two distinct 

purposes for emergency vaccination.

1. Emergency vaccination to kill

a. A suppressive emergency vaccination strategy.

b. The goal is to suppress virus replication in high-risk susceptible 

poultry using emergency vaccination and then killing vaccinates at a 

date determined by IC and the VS Deputy Administrator (U.S. CVO).

c. Targeted vaccination of high-risk susceptible poultry in an IZ, CA, or 

VZ. Ring or regional vaccination around an IP or an IZ is a frequently 

cited example of this strategy.

2. Emergency vaccination to live

a. A protective emergency vaccination strategy.

b. The goal is to protect susceptible poultry from infection using 

emergency vaccination with the deliberate intent to maintain 

vaccinates for the duration of their usefulness.

c. Targeted vaccination may include layers, valuable genetic stock, or 

endangered birds.

February 2014 5-35
5.16.3 Assessment and Overview

IC and, if needed, Federal, State, and other advisors will evaluate whether to 

vaccinate if vaccine has been requested. The SAHO or Tribal official and the 

APHIS VS Deputy Administrator (the U.S. CVO) must agree on the decision to 

vaccinate. A decision-tree matrix may also be employed.

USDA APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics implements the provisions of the 

Virus-Serum-Toxin Act to ensure that veterinary biologics used to treat animal 

diseases are pure, potent, and effective.

5.16.3.1 DECIDING TO VACCINATE FOR ND

The decision for emergency vaccination will be based on the consideration of the

following elements:

 Probability that the disease can or cannot be rapidly contained;

 Proximity of high-value genetic birds to the rapidly spreading disease 

focal point;

 Risk of infection of valuable, rare, or endangered nondomestic species;

 Poultry density in an area;

 Increased risk of introduction due to the presence of ND in neighboring 

countries;

 The extent to which disease is found in waterfowl, other wild birds, 

backyard flocks, or in live bird markets;

 Availability of physical and human resources;

 Sociopolitical factors (public confidence in commercial poultry products);

 Impact on international trade; and

 Economic consequences of failure to control the disease.

The safety and health of vaccination personnel must be considered in any 

vaccination effort, and appropriate PPE must be used.

5.16.4 Strategic Vaccine Distribution

Typically, if emergency vaccination is employed for the purposes of disease 

control, it is strategically implemented to create a ring or “firebreak” of 

vaccinated poultry around the IZ, creating a CVZ. A second option is to vaccinate 

susceptible poultry on premises that are farthest from known IP as a priority, and 

February 2014 5-36
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

then vaccinate progressively closer to the IP. A third option is to vaccinate 

susceptible poultry only on premises that are closest to an IP. Vaccination may 

also be used (as a protection strategy) to protect valuable, rare, or endangered 

non-domestic species of birds, creating a PVZ.

The following are bird classes that may be vaccinated in an outbreak:

1. Valuable genetic poultry, breeding stock such as grandparent and parent 

breeders.

2. Long-lived poultry, such as layers.

3. High-risk situations, such as ring vaccination around ND-infected birds.

4. Rare, endangered, genetically valuable captive birds such as zoo birds.

5. Commercial turkeys.

6. Commercial ducks.

7. Broilers, meat production poultry.

8. Backyard birds.

5.16.5 Vaccination Zone Designations

The following sections present illustrations of the VZ designations.

5.16.5.1 CONTAINMENT VACCINATION ZONE

The CVZ is an emergency vaccination zone typically within the CA, and may 

include the IZ and/or the BZ. A CVZ is typically observed with stamping-out 

modified with emergency vaccination to kill. Figure 5-4 shows examples of a 

CVZ.

February 2014 5-37
Figure 5-4. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones

Emergency Vaccination in IZ Emergency Vaccination in BZ

Emergency Vaccination in CA Emergency Vaccination in IZ and Partial BZ

5.16.5.2 PROTECTION VACCINATION ZONE

The PVZ is an emergency vaccination zone typically in the FA. It is consistent 

with the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013) definition for a Protection 

Zone:

A zone established to protect the health status of animals in a free 

country or free zone, from those in a country or zone of a different 

animal health status, using measures based on the epidemiology of the 

disease under consideration to prevent spread of the causative pathogenic 

February 2014 5-38
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

agent into a free country or free zone. These measures may include, but 

are not limited to, vaccination, movement control and an intensified 

degree of surveillance.

Typically, a PVZ would observed with stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to live. Figure 5-5 shows examples of a PVZ.

Figure 5-5. Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones

Circle Irregular

5.16.6 Vaccinated Premises

VP may be a secondary designation to another premises designation, and is only 

used if emergency vaccination is employed in an outbreak. A VP may be located 

in a CVZ, typically inside a CA (an IZ or BZ), or in a PVZ, typically in the FA.

Figure 5-6 shows VP in a CVZ (left) and in a PVZ (right).

February 2014 5-39
Figure 5-6. Examples of Vaccinated Premises 

CVZ PVZ

5.16.7 Movement Restrictions for Vaccinates

If vaccination is used in response to an outbreak, a vaccination plan will define 

procedures to prevent the spread of ND by vaccination teams. Emergency 

vaccination occurs within a CVZ or a PVZ. All vaccinates may be identified with 

specific and permanent (tamper-proof) identification. When vaccine is used, 

surveillance must continue to assess vaccination effectiveness and detect any 

antigenic change. Movement restrictions for vaccinates are as follows:

 VP may be subject to the movement restrictions of their primary premises 

designation.

 Animals receiving emergency vaccination on the VP may be subject to 

vaccinated animal identification and traceability.

 For movement of emergency vaccinated animals, consideration must be 

given to any national or international standards or conditions for such 

movement.

5.16.8 Cessation of Vaccination

ND vaccination in response to an outbreak should cease as soon as possible to 

allow the region or State to return quickly to a favorable trade status. The decision 

to cease emergency vaccination will be made by the IC, SAHO and CVO, and 

will consider national and international standards for movement in making this 

determination. 

February 2014 5-40
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.17 NATIONAL VETERINARY STOCKPILE

The Overview of the NVS SOP provides information on NVS capabilities and 

overviews required steps to request countermeasures from the NVS. It also 

provides a direct link to the NVS website, where State preparedness officials and 

responders can download important publications to help them understand the 

NVS. This website provides

 a planning guide for Federal, State, and local authorities;

 a template for a State NVS plan; and

 outreach and exercise programs.

The NVS also has contractor support for 3D activities, which can be requested 

through IC. The surge response capacity of 3D commercial responders is the 

following: a response to the site within 24 hours, 500–600 people within 72 hours, 

and 1,000 people within a week.

5.18 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 

AND VECTOR CONTROL

USDA APHIS will work in close collaboration, communication, and coordination 

with DOI and other Federal, State, Tribal, and local wildlife agencies that have 

primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for wildlife. This 

collaboration, communication, and coordination will occur in both the Unified 

Command and in MAC Groups.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Wildlife Management and Vector Control for an FAD 

Response in Domestic Livestock discusses personnel and equipment required for 

wildlife management, quarantine and movement control for wildlife, wildlife risk 

assessment, wildlife surveillance, and related activities. Please see VS

Memorandum 573.1 for additional information on VS animal health policy in 

relation to wildlife.

5.18.1 Wildlife Management

A wildlife management plan that addresses transmission of ND in wildlife will be 

developed as soon as possible after identification of the index case in domestic 

poultry to prevent the exposure of domestic poultry to wild birds. An assessment 

of the risk that wildlife poses for ND transmission to susceptible birds and poultry 

will be conducted within 7 days of confirmation of the index case.

In any ND response, wildlife surveillance and other management must be 

conducted by persons trained and proficient in wildlife health, capture, collection, 

biosecurity, and restraint.

February 2014 5-41
Importantly, ND in wild birds does not impact OIE ND-free status. As stated in 

the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2013), in Article 10.9.1,

A Member should not impose bans on the trade in poultry commodities 

in response to information on the presence of any APMV-1 in birds other 

than poultry, including wild birds.

5.18.2 Vector Control

ND can be transmitted mechanically by mice, vultures, and other vectors.

Appropriate biosecurity measures should be in place during an ND outbreak to 

ensure that mechanical vectors do not have contact with infected flocks or other 

infected material.

5.19 ANIMAL WELFARE

During an ND outbreak, humane treatment must be provided to animals given the 

specific circumstances of the outbreak, particularly from the time they are 

identified for destruction or vaccination activities until they are depopulated, 

euthanized, or slaughtered, as prescribed by veterinary authorities of the affected 

States or Tribal nations. The Overview of Animal Welfare SOP contains 

additional information.

5.20 MODELING AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS

The development of models and risk assessments are critical in a successful ND

response. These tools give decision makers valuable insight. During an outbreak, 

one or more multidisciplinary teams (consisting of epidemiologists, disease agent 

experts, economists, affected commodity experts, and others) will be established 

to perform risk assessments as needed. An appropriate, scientific risk assessment 

on an issue of concern will be provided within 72 hours after a request from the 

Incident Commander.

The Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools SOP provides information on 

modeling and risk assessment, covering the following:

 Key roles and responsibilities in modeling and risk analysis;

 Uses of epidemiological models;

 Proactive risk assessments;

 Risk assessment during and after an outbreak; and

 Examples of current models and assessment tools.

February 2014 5-42
Specific ND Response Critical Activities and Tools

5.21 APPRAISAL AND COMPENSATION

Indemnity payments are to encourage disease reporting, reduce the spread of 

animal disease, and compensate owners on the basis of fair market value. Fair 

market value appraisals are provided to owners of destroyed poultry and 

materials. The Appraisal and Compensation SOP focuses on specifying personnel 

responsibilities, appraisal procedures, assessment of compensation eligibility, 

payment of indemnity, and required forms and reports during an ND outbreak.

The AHPA gives APHIS authority to establish and implement an indemnification 

program to prevent or eradicate an ND outbreak. Indemnity is a key component of 

APHIS’s disease control programs in that the promise of fair compensation for 

losses helps to ensure cooperation from the owners of affected poultry. Such 

cooperation is important for rapid disease control and eradication. In an ND

outbreak, ordering the destruction of poultry on premises that are 

epidemiologically linked to an IP may be necessary to ensure that the ND does 

not spread. The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to pay up to 100 

percent of the fair market value of the poultry, as well as for disposal, cleaning, 

and disinfection. However, compensation will only be paid in cases where State 

and Federal animal health authorities concur with the recommendations to order 

the destruction of poultry, whether those recommendations emerged from 

industry, State, or Federal authorities.

The best practices for containment and eradication of ND will in many instances 

require depopulation, disposal, and decontamination faster than can be achieved 

with slow or deliberate appraisal processes. In some circumstances, appraisals 

will not be required to be signed prior to destruction if APHIS and the cooperating 

State agree that the poultry must be destroyed immediately to mitigate the 

potential spread or amplification of ND virus during a response to a confirmed or 

presumptive ND incident. All data required to determine fair market value will be 

collected prior to depopulation, including a complete inventory of poultry being 

destroyed and any relevant value information.

For additional resources and guidance on appraisal and compensation please see 

APHIS’s Livestock Appraisal, Indemnity, and Compensation Website.

5.22 FINANCE

During an ND outbreak, funding may be rapidly required. For responding to 

specific emergency situations, VS has access to a variety of sources for funding. 

The two most common sources are the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and 

the APHIS Contingency Fund (CF).

During an emergency, the Secretary is authorized to transfer funds from the CCC. 

The funds are provided to APHIS as no-year funds. Before APHIS can ask the 

Secretary to transfer funds, however, it must consider whether it can redirect 

February 2014 5-43
During an emergency, the Secretary is authorized to transfer funds from the CCC. 

The funds are provided to APHIS as no-year funds. Before APHIS can ask the 

Secretary to transfer funds, however, it must consider whether it can redirect 

funds from a budget line item or if other funding sources are available. APHIS

will consider the total estimated amount of funding needed to address the issue 

and whether the program has political support prior to deciding whether or not to 

seek a CCC transfer.

The APHIS CF takes care of unforeseen, unpredictable program activities. The 

following four conditions must exist to qualify for the release of agency 

contingency funds:

1. The outbreak must pose an economic threat.

2. Eradication technology must be feasible and cost effective.

3. No program or no effective program must currently exist.

4. The proposed program must have industry support.

The Overview of Finance SOP contains additional guidance on

 key roles and responsibilities in finance,

 emergency funding processes for FAD outbreaks, and

 triggering events for APHIS emergency funding.

5.23 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

AND NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

In any ND outbreak, the capability to rapidly scale up the size of an IC and 

integrate veterinary functions and countermeasures is critical for an effective 

response. NRF and NIMS, already discussed in this plan, allow such scalability.

The Overview of NRF and NIMS SOP provides additional information on the 

relation of NRF and NIMS to APHIS and lists the responsibilities of Federal, 

State, Tribal, and local governments in an ND outbreak.

The documents referenced in this chapter can be found

at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

February 2014 5-44
Chapter 6

Recovery after an ND Outbreak

6.1 PROOF-OF-FREEDOM

6.1.1 Recognition of Disease-Free Status

The OIE does not grant official recognition for ND-freedom, but as a member of 

the OIE, the United States can self-declare a compartment, zone, or the country 

free from certain OIE-listed diseases such as ND. In cases of self-declaration, 

delegates are advised to consult the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code for 

specific requirements for self-declaration of freedom from ND. By providing 

relevant epidemiological evidence, the OIE member can provide information to 

demonstrate to potential importing countries that the entire country, zone, or 

compartment under discussion meets the provisions of the specific disease 

chapter. Any submitted self-declaration should contain evidence demonstrating 

that the requirements for the disease status have been met in accordance with OIE

standards.

6.1.1.1 CRITERIA NEEDED FOR ND-FREE STATUS

The OIE defines an ND free country, zone, or compartment as follows:

A country, zone, or compartment may be considered free from ND when 

it has been shown that NDV infection in poultry has not been present in 

the country, zone or compartment for the past 12 months, based on 

surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.9.22. and 10.9.26.

If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone or 

compartment, ND free status can be regained three months after a 

stamping-out policy (including disinfection of all affected 

establishments) is applied, providing that surveillance in accordance with 

Articles 10.9.22 to 10.9.26 has been carried out during that three-month 

period.

6.1.1.2 ND-FREE COMPARTMENTS

There are no ND-free compartments in the United States that have been fully 

implemented and internationally accepted.

February 2014 6-1
6.1.2 Surveillance for Recognition of Disease Freedom

Surveillance is fundamental in proving DF to regain disease-free status after an 

ND outbreak. According to the OIE, a country re-declaring for country, zone, or 

compartment freedom from ND virus should show evidence of an active 

surveillance program, considering the epidemiological circumstances of the 

outbreak to demonstrate absence from infection. This requires surveillance that 

incorporates virus detection and antibody tests described in the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code (2013). Surveillance schemes could also be intensified in 

conjunction with CA surveillance by

 actively investigating flocks with suspicious clinical signs; 

 monitoring at-risk populations and normal mortality levels;

 increasing slaughter sampling (sero-surveillance);

 considering the limited use of sentinel flocks in specific circumstances.1

Appendix D offers surveillance guidance for proof-of-freedom for IZs, BZs, and 

SZs for both backyard and commercial premises. In all cases the number of 

premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least one IP with 95 percent

confidence. Article 10.9.24 and Article 10.9.25 in the OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code (2013) provide information on surveillance strategies and the 

documentation of ND status, respectively.

6.1.2.1 SPECIFIC OIE SURVEILLANCE GUIDANCE FOR COUNTRIES 

REGAINING FREEDOM

In addition to Article 10.9.25 on documenting free status, Article 10.9.26 contains 

additional surveillance procedures for countries, zones, or compartments

regaining ND-freedom after an outbreak. This section is reproduced here.

A Member regaining country, zone or compartment freedom from ND

should show evidence of an active surveillance program depending on 

the epidemiological circumstances of the outbreak to demonstrate the 

absence of infection.

A Member declaring freedom of a country, zone or compartment after an 

outbreak of ND (with or without vaccination) should report the results of 

a surveillance program in which the ND susceptible poultry population 

undergoes regular surveillance planned and implemented according to 

the general conditions and methods described in these recommendations.

1 For more on sentinel flocks, see B. J. McCluskey, B. Burgess, J. Glover, H. Kinde, and S. 

Hietala. 2006. “Use of sentinel chickens to evaluate the effectiveness of cleaning and disinfection 

procedures in noncommercial poultry operations infected with exotic Newcastle disease virus.” J 

Vet Diagn Invest. 18, 296–299.

February 2014 6-2

 
Recovery after an ND Outbreak

6.1.3 Release of Control Area Restrictions

Quarantine and movement control restrictions are maintained until at least 

21 days have elapsed since the decontamination of all confirmed IP and negative 

results of surveillance activities. IC and animal health officials need to plan for a 

release of quarantine prior to or during the issuance of quarantine and movement 

controls. Such a plan would specify procedures by which quarantined premises 

are evaluated for ND freedom and how the quarantine is released (by sections, by 

risk, or in its entirety).

6.1.4 Disposition of Vaccinates

If vaccination was used in the outbreak, ND vaccinates will still be subject to 

movement control and monitoring measures.

6.1.5 Country Freedom Declaration

The United States will apply to the OIE after meeting OIE requirements. ND-free 

status requires formal submission detailing the ND policy, eradication procedures, 

surveillance and monitoring of vaccinates, veterinary infrastructure, industry 

organization, and, if vaccination has been used, the tracing system for vaccinates. 

Acceptance of the claim for country freedom may also involve an inspection by 

an international panel to review the eradication program and all available 

information to verify ND freedom.

6.2 REPOPULATION

6.2.1 Restocking Guidance

Following official approval of cleaning and disinfection procedures, IP will 

remain vacant for a minimum of 21 days to ensure that any residual virus has 

been eliminated. This period may be decreased if external heat is used to raise the 

temperature of the houses sufficiently to inactivate any residual virus in a shorter 

period.

6.2.2 Testing Requirements for Restocking

Birds placed into previously infected houses or premises are subjected to weekly 

statistically valid testing by rRT-PCR for the presence of ND virus. The last test 

will be conducted at least 21 days after the birds are placed in the house:

 If the houses are left vacant for a period of 60 days after cleaning and 

disinfection is approved, there are no testing requirements.

 In the event that part of the premises has not been cleaned and 

decontaminated (for example, uncleanable buildings), such premises may 

February 2014 6-3
be partially approved if these uncleanable areas are fenced in a manner to 

prevent access by people, birds, or equipment. If complete cleaning and

disinfection procedures still are not possible due to such conditions, 

restocking may take place after a 120-day fallow period. In such cases, 

these buildings should be repaired or destroyed.

 Environmental conditions should be considered in restocking premises.

 Restocking can take place before the end of the outbreak, under conditions 

established by the IC.

6.2.3 Approved Sources of Poultry

Source flocks for all introduced poultry must test negative through rRT-PCR and 

other diagnostics, as determined by IC. A 24-hour pre-movement clinical 

inspection is also required.

February 2014 6-4
Appendix A

FAD PReP Materials to Support ND Response

This appendix lists the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan 

(FAD PReP) documents that directly support this Newcastle Disease (ND) 

Response Plan (2014). The new and revised documents listed below will be 

useful in preparedness and response efforts related to ND and poultry. Many of 

these documents have been released; others are forthcoming. These resources are 

found online at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

ND STANDARD OPERATING 

PROCEDURES—CRITICAL ACTIVITIES 

These documents are templates to provide a common picture or set of procedures 

for the following tools and strategies used in ND response:

1. Overview of Etiology and Ecology

2. Case Definition Development Process

3. Surveillance

4. Diagnostics (Sample Collection, Surge Capacity, and Reporting)

5. Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing

6. Overview of Information Management

7. Communications

8. Health and Safety and Personal Protective Equipment

9. Biosecurity

10. Quarantine and Movement Control

11. Continuity of Business

12. Overview of Regionalization for International Trade

13. Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

14. Disposal

February 2014 A-1 
15. Cleaning and Disinfection 

16. Vaccination 

17. Overview of the National Veterinary Stockpile 

18. Overview of Wildlife Management and Vector Control 

19. Overview of Animal Welfare 

20. Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools 

21. Appraisal and Compensation 

22. Overview of Finance 

23. Overview of the National Response Framework and National Incident 

Management System.

INDUSTRY MANUAL

Poultry

NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM GUIDELINES

 Health and Safety 

 Personal Protective Equipment 

 Biosecurity 

 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia 

 Disposal 

 Cleaning and Disinfection 

 Vaccination for Contagious Diseases

 Wildlife Management and Vector Control for an Foreign Animal Disease 

(FAD) Response in Domestic Livestock

 National Animal Health Emergency Response Corp (NAHERC) 

Deployment Guide 

 Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing

February 2014 A-2
FAD PReP Materials to Support ND Response

 Continuity of Business.

STRATEGIC PLANS—CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination 

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0)

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD 

PReP Manual 2-0)

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 

4-0)

 A Partial List of FAD Stakeholders (FAD PReP Manual 5-0)

 Incident Coordination Group Plan.

OVERVIEW OF FAD PREP

FAD PReP Mission and Goals

The significant threat and potential consequences of FADs and the challenges and 

lessons-learned of effective and rapid FAD response have led to the development 

of the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan, also known as 

FAD PReP. The mission of FAD PReP is to raise awareness, expectations, and 

develop capabilities surrounding FAD preparedness and response. The goal of 

FAD PReP is to integrate, synchronize, and deconflict preparedness and response 

capabilities as much as possible before an outbreak by providing goals, 

guidelines, strategies, and procedures that are clear, comprehensive, easily 

readable, easily updated, and that comply with the National Incident Management 

System.

In the event of an FAD outbreak, the three key response goals are to: (1) detect, 

control, and contain the FAD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate the 

FAD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the

economy, and to protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide 

science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of 

business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.

Achieving these three goals will allow individual premises, States, Tribes, 

regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as possible. They 

will also allow the United States to regain ND-free status without the response 

effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself.

February 2014 A-3
FAD PReP Documents and Materials

FAD PReP is a comprehensive U.S. preparedness and response strategy for FAD 

threats, both zoonotic and non-zoonotic. Types of FAD PReP documents include:

 Strategic Plans—Concept of Operations 

 NAHEMS Guidelines

 Industry Manuals

 Disease Response Plans

 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Critical Activities

 Continuity of Business Plans (commodity specific plans developed by 

public-private-academic partnerships)

 Ready Reference Guides.

Lessons Learned from Past Outbreaks

The foundation of FAD PReP is lessons learned in managing past FAD incidents. 

FAD PReP is based on the following:

 Providing processes for emergency planning that respect local knowledge.

 Integrating State-Federal-Tribal-industry planning processes.

 Ensuring that there are clearly defined, obtainable, and unified goals for 

response.

 Having a Unified Command with a proper delegation of authority that is 

able to act with speed and certainty.

 Employing science and risk-based management approaches to FAD 

response.

 Ensuring that all guidelines, strategies, and procedures are communicated 

effectively to responders and stakeholders.

 Identifying resources and trained personnel required for an effective 

incident response.

 Trying to resolve competing interests prior to an outbreak and addressing 

them quickly during an outbreak.

 Achieving rapid FAD detection and tracing.

February 2014 A-4
February 2014 B-1

Appendix B

Incident Management

This appendix contains Chapter 4 from the APHIS [Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service] Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination 

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0) document. This chapter explains incident management 

in the event of a Newcastle disease outbreak. Please refer to the APHIS Foreign 

Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0)

for more information (available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.) 

The Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic 

Incidents, directed the development and administration of the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS). NIMS, in conjunction with the National Response 

Framework, provides the template for managing incidents and provides the 

structure and mechanisms for National-level policy on incident management. 

 NIMS provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments 

and agencies at all levels of government, non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to prevent, protect against, 

respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless 

of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life 

and property and harm to the environment.1

A basic premise of NIMS is that all incidents begin and end locally. NIMS does 

not take command away from State and local authorities. NIMS simply provides 

the framework to enhance the ability of responders, including the private sector 

and NGOs, to work together more effectively. The Federal government supports 

State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed or anticipated to 

be overwhelmed. 

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a management system designed to enable 

effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a 

combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communication 

within a common organizational structure. APHIS has adopted NIMS and ICS 

organizational structures and processes to manage animal health incidents. 

Additional information on NIMS can be found at: 

http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/. Additional information on ICS can be 

found at: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm. 

 

1

 About the National Incident Management System, http://www.fema.gov/about-nationalincident-management-system. 
 

February 2014 B-2

APHIS policy and procedures for APHIS Emergency Responder positions and 

APHIS Specialized Emergency Responder positions are described in the APHIS 

Emergency Response Qualification Process and APHIS Emergency Responder 

Position Catalog.

2

 APHIS employees can find these documents at: 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/emergency_info/organization/resp_cat.shtml.

MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION

Multiagency coordination (MAC) is a process that allows all levels of 

government and disciplines to work together more efficiently and effectively. 

MAC occurs across the different disciplines involved in incident management, 

across jurisdictional lines, or across levels of government. The APHIS Emergency 

Mobilization Guide defines APHIS coordination for major agricultural disasters 

and agro-terrorism responses (see Figure B-1). In the event of an animal 

emergency, an APHIS MAC Group will be formed if the incident response needs 

more support. Fundamentally, the APHIS MAC Group will provide support, 

coordination, and assistance with policy-level decisions to the ICS structure 

managing an incident. 

Figure B-1. Coordination Structures: U.S. Department of Agriculture 

and Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency3

Note: ESF = Emergency Support Function. 

Figure B-2 illustrates an overview of a MAC system according to NIMS. The 

figure shows the transition over the course of an incident. The incident begins 

 

2

 Information on USDA policies and procedures can be found in Departmental Manual #1800-

001. Incident Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. November 2011; and Departmental 

Regulation #1800-001. Incident Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. November 2011. 

3

 USDA APHIS, 2014, Emergency Mobilization Guide. 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/library/manuals/pdf/APHIS_1050.pdf. 
Incident Management 

February 2014 B-3

with an on-scene single Incident Command (IC); as the incident expands in size 

or complexity developing into a Unified Command, the incident may require offscene coordination and support, which is when MAC Groups are activated. 

Figure B-2. Multiagency Coordination System4

Note: EOC = Emergency Operations Center. 

APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Figure B-3 displays the APHIS foreign animal disease (FAD) incident 

management organizational structure, starting with the APHIS Administrator. 

 

4

 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 2008. National Incident Management 

System. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf. 
 

February 2014 B-4

Figure B-3. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and 

APHIS Emergency Operations Center: Relationship to Incident Management Team 

(Assuming a Single Incident) 

Note: SAHO = State Animal Health Official, ADD = Assistant District Director. 

The APHIS Administrator is the primary Federal executive responsible for 

implementing APHIS policy during an FAD outbreak. The APHIS Administrator 

will delegate many of the actual MAC functions to the Veterinary Services (VS) 

Deputy Administrator (Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States) and the 

APHIS Emergency Management Leadership Council (EMLC). 

The VS Deputy Administrator and the EMLC will establish an APHIS Incident 

Coordination Group (ICG) to oversee the staff functions associated with the 

incident at the APHIS headquarters level. The APHIS ICG will work closely with 

the personnel in charge of establishing operations for the incident response at the 

Area Command (AC) or Incident Command Post (ICP) in the field and coordinate 

with the APHIS MAC Group. 
Incident Management 

February 2014 B-5

APHIS MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP

In the event of a significant FAD emergency, the EMLC typically serves as the 

APHIS MAC Group, unless it transfers responsibility for a specific incident. The 

EMLC is co-chaired by Plant Protection and Quarantine’s Associate Director, 

Emergency and Domestic Programs and VS’ Associate Deputy Administrator, 

Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services (SPRS). The EMLC is 

comprised of the following headquarters and regional members: 

 Plant Protection and Quarantine, 

 VS, 

 Animal Care, 

 Wildlife Services, 

 International Services, 

 Biotechnology Regulatory Services, 

 Marketing and Regulatory Programs Business Services, 

 Legislative and Public Affairs, 

 Policy and Program Development, 

 Investigative Enforcement Services, 

 Emergency Management and Safety and Security Division, and 

 APHIS Chief Information Officer. 

The APHIS MAC Group may include additional members if the response requires 

them and may be activated if one or more of the following conditions take place: 

 complex incidents that overwhelm local and regional assets; 

 overlapping USDA agency jurisdictions; 

 an incident that crosses international borders; or 

 the existence of or potential for a high level of National political and 

media interest. 

The APHIS MAC Group provides a forum to discuss actions that need to be taken 

to ensure that an adequate number of resources are available to meet anticipated 
 

February 2014 B-6

needs. The APHIS MAC Group strategically coordinates the incident response, 

but does not typically direct the APHIS ICG. 

The APHIS MAC Group offers guidance on the most efficient way to allocate 

resources during an animal health event. Specific responsibilities vary from 

disease to disease, but the general functions of the APHIS MAC Group include 

 incident prioritization, 

 resource allocation and acquisition, and 

 identification and resolution of issues common to all parties. 

APHIS INCIDENT COORDINATION GROUP

The APHIS ICG is responsible for supporting an IC and AC in acquiring 

resources, formulating policy options, and assisting in developing and 

implementing response and recovery strategies for FAD outbreaks. For additional 

information and details, see the Incident Coordination Group Plan. Figure B-4 

illustrates an example organizational chart for an APHIS ICG. The group has the 

following responsibilities: 

 providing guidelines to ensure responder and public health and safety; 

 supporting IC(s) and AC(s); 

 assisting in development of response policy as needed; 

 coordinating effective communication; 

 coordinating resources; 

 assisting in establishing epidemiological priorities; 

 assisting in developing incident objectives and approving response 

strategies for emergency vaccination as needed; 

 assisting in integrating response organizations into the ICS; 

 assisting in developing protocols as needed; 

 providing information to the Joint Information Center for use in media and 

stakeholder briefings; 

 providing budget requests and projections as needed; and 

 assessing response progress, response strategies, and providing economic 

analyses as needed. 
Incident Management 

February 2014 B-7

Figure B-4. Example APHIS Incident Coordination Group—Organizational Structure 

(for Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak) 

Note: CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, EPA = Environmental Protection Agency, EOC = 

Emergency Operations Center, FDA = Food and Drug Administration, FSIS = Food Safety and Inspection Service, 

AEOC = APHIS Emergency Operations Center, NASDA = National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, 

GIS = Geographic Information System, NVSL = National Veterinary Services Laboratories, NAHLN = National Animal 

Health Laboratory Network, CF = Contingency Fund, CCC = Commodity Credit Corporation, CA = Cooperative 

Agreement, BPA = Blanket Purchase Agreement, ESF = Emergency Support Function, NVS = National Veterinary 

Stockpile, NRMT = National Response Management Team, NAHERC = National Animal Health Emergency 

Response Corps. 
 

February 2014 B-8

APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR A SINGLE INCIDENT

The ICP is a physical location that administers the on-scene IC and the other main 

incident management functions. An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is a 

physical location that is located separately from the on-scene ICP and supports the 

on-scene response by providing external coordination and securing of additional 

resources. A MAC Group does not have any direct IC involvement and will often 

be located some distance from the incident site(s). EOC/MAC Groups do not 

command the on-scene level of the incident, but rather supports the ICP’s 

command and management efforts. 

At the start of any FAD outbreak, the State Animal Health Official (SAHO), or 

designee, and Assistant District Director (ADD) (formerly Area Veterinarian in 

Charge [AVIC]), or designee, will initially serve as the co-Incident Commanders 

for the Unified Command. The ADD and SAHO may be relieved by an Incident 

Management Team (IMT) if there is a delegation of authority to the IMT. 

Figure B-3 is an example of an APHIS organization chart for a single incident. 

APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR MULTIPLE INCIDENTS

When more than one incident is occurring at the same time, more than one IC

may be established. An AC may also be established. An AC is an organization 

that oversees the management of multiple incidents handled individually by 

separate IC organizations or to oversee the management of a very large or 

evolving incident engaging multiple IMTs. An AC should not be confused with 

the functions performed by MAC, as an AC oversees management coordination of 

the incident(s), while a MAC element (such as a communications/dispatch center, 

EOC, or MAC Group) coordinates support. 

In terms of MAC Group structures, if the emergency response becomes too large 

for an APHIS MAC Group to handle efficiently—for example, a large multistate 

incident with numerous response activities—cooperation from other agencies or 

committees will be implemented. MAC Groups will coordinate additional 

resources and make decisions regarding the prioritization of incidents and the 

sharing and use of critical resources, but are not a part of the on-scene IC. Figure 

B-5 is an example of the command structure when multiple incidents are 

involved. 
Incident Management 

February 2014 B-9

Figure B-5. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations 

Center: Relationship to Multiple Incident Management Team Structures 

(Assuming Multiple Incidents and a Unified Area Command) 
 

February 2014 B-10

APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAMS

Upon detection and confirmation of an FAD incident, the SAHO or ADD 

establishes an ICP with an IMT, headed by an Incident Commander. Figure B-6 

depicts the organization of the APHIS VS IMT for managing an incident. 

Figure B-6. Current APHIS VS Incident Management Team—Short Team Configuration 

The IMT includes an Incident Commander and staff for various types of 

communication, safety, and liaison purposes. This staff and the heads of the 

Incident Commander’s line organization sections are considered the Incident 

Commander’s general staff. The IMT also includes four line organizations to 

perform all of the efforts required to identify, contain, eradicate, recover, and 

return the situation to normal business practices. These line organizations include 

sections for operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. 

Within each of these sections is the capability to accomplish all of the tasks 

necessary to ensure a successful outcome to an FAD incident. 

For single-incident outbreaks where the potential for spread is low, a short team 

configuration as depicted in Table B-1 will suffice. 

Table B-1. List of Short Team Configuration Positions

APHIS VS IMT Short Team APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog

Incident Commander A800 Incident Commander

Deputy Incident Commander A800 Incident Commander

Operations Section Chief A810 Operations Section Chief

Deputy Operations Section A810 Operations Section Chief

Planning Section Chief A820 Planning Section Chief
Incident Management 

February 2014 B-11

Table B-1. List of Short Team Configuration Positions

APHIS VS IMT Short Team APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog

Deputy Planning Section A820 Planning Section Chief

Logistics Section Chief A830 Logistics Section Chief

Deputy Logistics Section A830 Logistics Section Chief

Finance Section Chief A840 Finance Section Chief

Deputy Finance Section A840 Finance Section Chief

Safety Officer A805 Safety Officer (or A001)

Assistant Safety Officer A805 Safety Officer

Public Information Officer A803 Public Information Officer

Liaison Officer A807 Liaison Officer

Assistant Liaison Officer A807 Liaison Officer

Information Technology (IT)

Specialist

A122 IT Specialist

Assistant IT Specialist A122 IT Specialist

EMRS Specialist A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)

Assistant EMRS Specialist A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)

Epidemiologist A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)

Assistant Epidemiologist A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)

Note: EMRS = Emergency Management Response System.

When an outbreak occurs that is complex or large scale, a long team 

configuration, as listed in Table B-2, will be established. The long team consists 

of additional team members beyond those in the initial short team configuration. 

Figure B-7 shows an example long team configuration; however, the exact 

makeup of the long teams will depend on the type of disease and magnitude of 

spread. 

Table B-2. Typical Positions—Long Team Configuration

APHIS VS Long IMT Configuration

APHIS Emergency

Responder Position Catalog

Deputy Operations Section Chief A810 Operations Section Chief

Deputy Planning Section Chief A820 Planning Section Chief

Deputy Logistics Section Chief A830 Logistics Section Chief

Deputy Finance Section Chief A840 Finance Section Chief

Disease Management Branch Director

 Appraisal Group Supervisor

 Euthanasia Group Supervisor

 Disposal Group Supervisor

 Cleaning and Disinfection Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor
 

February 2014 B-12

Table B-2. Typical Positions—Long Team Configuration

APHIS VS Long IMT Configuration

APHIS Emergency

Responder Position Catalog

Disease Surveillance Branch Director

 Mortality Surveillance Group Supervisor

 Diagnosis and Inspection Group Supervisor

 Disease Survey Group Supervisor

 Vaccination Group Supervisor

 Tactical Epidemiology Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

Disease Support Branch Director

 Education/Outreach Group Supervisor

 Vector Control Group Supervisor

 Biosecurity and Disease Prevention Group 

Supervisor

 Movement and Permits Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

Air Operations Branch —

Staging Area Manager (Operations) —

Resources Unit Leader

 Orientation and Training Group Supervisor

A821 Resources Unit Leader

A813 Group Supervisor

Documentation Unit Leader A823 Documentation Unit Leader

Situation Unit Leader

 Disease Reporting Cell Supervisor

 Epidemiology Cell Supervisor

 Geographic Information System (GIS) Cell

Supervisor

 Intelligence Cell Supervisor

 Wildlife Cell Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor (or A822)

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor (or A825)

A813 Group Supervisor

A813 Group Supervisor (or A045)

Demobilization Unit Leader A824 Demobilization Unit Leader

 Communications Unit Leader

 Medical Unit Leader

 Information Technology Specialist

 Supply Unit Leader

 Facilities Unit Leader

 Ground Support Unit Leader

 Waste Management Unit Leader

A831 Communications Unit Leader

A815 Team Leader (or A001 or A057)

A122 IT Specialist

A833 Supply Unit Leader

A834 Facilities Unit Leader

A832 Ground Support Unit Leader

A003 Environmental Protection Specialist

 Time Unit Leader

 Procurement Unit Leader

 Compensation/Claims Unit Leader

 Cost Unit Leader

A842 Time Unit Leader

A841 Procurement Unit Leader

A844 Compensation/Claims Unit Leader

A843 Cost Unit Leader
Incident Management 

February 2014 B-13

Figure B-7. Example APHIS VS Incident Management Team—Long Team Configuration 
 

February 2014 B-14

RESPONSE RESOURCES

The IMT, ICG, and APHIS MAC Group can use a number of systems to aid in 

staffing and resourcing during an event such as the Emergency Qualification 

System (EQS) and the Resource Ordering and Status System (ROSS), which are 

discussed below. The APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide and the Incident 

Coordination Group Plan are two planning documents that are used as response 

resources. 

APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide 

The APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide provides information and policy for 

mobilizing APHIS personnel for emergency events. The APHIS Emergency 

Mobilization Guide is available here. 

Incident Coordination Group Plan 

The Incident Coordination Group Plan provides details on how the VS program 

unit will provide incident coordination support during FAD outbreaks. 

APHIS Emergency Qualification System 

The APHIS EQS is used to store the skills and qualifications of emergency 

response personnel and other data imported from the National Finance Center and 

AgLearn and to feed certification data to ROSS. It is customizable to APHIS 

program needs and can house training documents. Training documentation flow 

into EQS from AgLearn for APHIS employees. If the National Animal Health 

Emergency Response Corps (NAHERC) volunteers do not have access to 

AgLearn, their training documentation can be manually entered or imported 

through an Excel spreadsheet. 

APHIS Resource Ordering and Status System 

The APHIS ROSS allows APHIS to identify, track, and mobilize the resources 

needed to support emergency response. It provides a database of qualified 

emergency response personnel. The database can be searched according to 

personnel training levels and subject of expertise, such as procurement, 

epidemiology, or public information. Being able to quickly identify and dispatch 

appropriate personnel and supplies is a key component of emergency response, 

and ROSS facilitates that process. ROSS initiatives include the following: 

 developing the APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog

 integrating ROSS into APHIS emergency management practices 

 training and sustaining an APHIS dispatch community. 
Incident Management 

February 2014 B-15

Figure B-8 illustrates the relationships among the APHIS ICG, Dispatch 

Coordination Centers, ACs, and ICPs.

Figure B-8. Resource Ordering Coordination5

Note: AEOC = APHIS Emergency Operations Center, DCC = Dispatch Coordinating Center. 

 

5

 As described in: USDA APHIS, 2014. Emergency Mobilization Guide. 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/library/manuals/pdf/APHIS_1050.pdf. 
Appendix C

Laboratory Network List for ND 

National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratories are listed 

at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/nahln/downloads/nd_lab_list.pdf. 

This list was last revised August 2013. The following laboratories (Table C-1) can 

currently perform testing for Newcastle Disease (ND), after National Veterinary 

Services Laboratories (NVSL) confirmation of the disease (please see Section 

5.4.1).

Table C-1. ND NAHLN Laboratories

# State Laboratory Phone numbers

1 Alabama Thompson-Bishop-Sparks State Diagnostic Laboratory

890 Simms Road, PO Box 2209

Auburn, AL 36832 

334-844-4987

Fax 334-844-7206

2 Arizona Arizona Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

2831 N. Freeway

Tucson, AZ 85705 

520-621-2356

Fax 520-626-8696

3 Arkansas Arkansas Livestock and Poultry Commission Lab

One Natural Resources Drive

Little Rock, AR 72205 

501-907-2430

Fax 501-907-2410

4 California California Animal Health and Food Safety Lab

University of California, School of Vet Med

W. Health Science Drive

Davis, CA 95616 

530-752-8709 

Fax 530-752-5680

5 Colorado Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Lab

300 West Drake Road, Bldg C

Fort Collins, CO 80523-1644 

970-297-1281

Fax 970-297-0320

6 Connecticut Connecticut Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory

University of Connecticut, Unit 3089

61 N. Eagleville Road

Storrs, CT 06269-3089 

860-486-3738

Fax 860-486-2737

7 Delaware University of Delaware Lasher Laboratory

16684 County Seat Hi-Way

Georgetown, DE 19947

302-856-0046 ext 

700 or 702

8 Delaware Charles C. Allen Biotechnology Laboratory

Dept of Animal and Food Sciences, University of Delaware

531 South Collage Ave., Room 44 Townsend Hall

Newark, DE 19716

302-275-2759

Fax 302-831-2822

February 2014 C-1
# State Laboratory Phone numbers

9 Florida Bronson Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Florida Dept. of Ag and Consumer Services

2700 N. John Young Parkway

Kissimmee, FL 34741

321-697-1400

Fax 321-697-1467

10 Georgia University of Georgia Tifton Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

43 Brighton Road, PO Box 1389

Tifton, GA 31793-3000 

229-386-3340

Fax 229-386-3399

11 Georgia Athens Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

501 DW Brooks Drive

University of Georgia 

Athens, GA 30602 

706-542-5568

Fax 706-542-5977

12 Georgia Georgia Poultry Laboratory Network

4457 Oakwood Road

Oakwood, GA 30566 

770-535-5996

13 Illinois University of Illinois Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

2001 S. Lincoln

Urbana, IL 61802-6199 

217-333-1620

Fax 217-244-2439

14 Illinois Illinois Department of Agriculture, Animal Disease Laboratory

Galesburg Animal Disease Lab

2100 S. Lake Storey Rd.

Galesburg, IL 61401

309-344-2451

Fax 309-344-7358

15 Indiana Indiana Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory at Purdue 

University

406 South University Street

West Lafayette, IN 47907 

765-494-7440

Fax 765-494-9181

16 Iowa Iowa State University

Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

1600 S. 16th Street

Ames, IA 50011 

515-294-1950

Fax 515-294-3564

17 Iowa USDA, APHIS, VS, NVSL, Diagnostic Virology Laboratory

1920 Dayton Avenue

Ames, IA 50010 

515-337-7200

Fax 515-337-7418

18 Kansas Kansas State Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

Kansas State University, CVM

L232 Mosier Hall, 1800 Dennison Avenue

Manhattan, KS 66506 

785-532-5650

Fax 785-532-4039

19 Kentucky Breathitt Veterinary Center

Murray State University

715 North Drive

Hopkinsville, KY 42240 

270-886-3959

Fax 270-886-4295

20 Kentucky University of Kentucky, Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

1490 Bull Lea Road

Lexington, KY 40511

859-257-8283

Fax 859-255-1624

February 2014 C-2
Laboratory Network List for ND

# State Laboratory Phone numbers

21 Louisiana Louisiana Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

1909 Skip Bertman Drive

Baton Rouge, LA 70803 

225-578-9777

Fax 225-578-9784

22 Maryland Frederick Animal Health Laboratory

1840 Rosemont Ave

Frederick, MD 21801

301-600-1548

Fax 301-600-6111

23 Maryland Maryland Department of Agriculture and Salisbury Animal 

Health Laboratory

27722 Nanticoke Road

Salisbury, MD 21801 

410-543-6610

Fax 410-543-6676

24 Michigan Diagnostic Center for Population and Animal Health

Michigan State University

4125 Beaumont Road, Suite 201H

Lansing, MI 48910 

517-353-1683

Fax 517-432-5836

25 Minnesota University of Minnesota Veterinary Diagnostic Lab

1333 Gortner Avenue, 244 Vet D L

St. Paul, MN 55108 

612-625-8787

Fax 612-624-8707

26 Mississippi Mississippi Veterinary Research and Diagnostic Laboratory

3137 Hwy 468 West

Pearl, MS 39208 

601-420-4700

Fax 601-420-4719

27 Missouri Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory

University of Missouri

1600 East Rollins

Columbia, MO 65211

573-882-6811

Fax 573-882-1411

28 Missouri Missouri Department of Agriculture

Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

PO Box 2510

Springfield, MO 65801

417-895-6861

29 Montana Montana Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

PO Box 997

Marsh Laboratory, 1911 W. Lincoln

Bozeman, MT 59771 

406-994-4885

Fax 406-994-6344

30 Nebraska Veterinary Diagnostic Center

University of Nebraska 

East Campus Loop and Fair Street

Lincoln, NE 68583-0907 

402-472-1434

Fax 402-472-3094

31 New Jersey New Jersey Department of Agriculture, Division of Animal 

Health, Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory, NJPHEAL

3 Schwarzkopf Drive

Ewing, NJ 08628

609-984-2293

Fax 609-777-8395

32 New York Animal Health Diagnostic Center

Upper Tower Road

College of Vet Med, Cornell University

Ithaca, NY 14853 

607-253-3900

February 2014 C-3
# State Laboratory Phone numbers

33 North 

Carolina

Rollins Diagnostic Laboratory

North Carolina Department of Agriculture

2101 Blue Ridge Road

Raleigh, NC 27607 

919-733-3986

Fax 919-733-0454

34 North Dakota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

North Dakota State University

NDSU Dept. 7691, PO Box 6050

Fargo, ND 58108-6050 

701-231-8307

Fax 701-231-7514

35 Ohio Ohio Department of Agriculture

Animal Disease Diagnostic Lab

8995 E. Main Street, Building 6

Reynoldsburg, OH 43068 

614-728-6220

Fax 614-728-6310

36 Oklahoma Oklahoma Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Oklahoma State University College of Vet. Med.

Farm and Ridge Road

Stillwater, OK 74078 

405-744-6623

Fax 405-744-8612

37 Oregon Oregon State University Veterinary Diagnostic Lab

Magruder Hall 134

Corvallis, OR 97331 

541-737-3261

Fax 541-737-6817

38 Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Veterinary Laboratory

Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture

2305 N. Cameron Street

Harrisburg, PA 17110 

717-787-8808

Fax 717-772-3895

39 Pennsylvania University of Pennsylvania, School of Veterinary Medicine

New Bolton Center, PADLS

382 West Street Road

Kennett Square, PA 19348-1692 

610-444-5800

Fax 610-925-6806

40 Pennsylvania Pennsylvania State University, Animal Diagnostic Laboratory

Orchard Road

University Park, PA 16802 

814-863-0837

Fax 814-865-3907

41 South 

Carolina

Clemson Veterinary Diagnostic Center

500 Clemson Road, PO Box 102406

Columbia, SC 29229

803-788-2260

Fax 803-788-8058

42 South 

Dakota

Animal Disease Research and Diagnostic Laboratory

South Dakota State University

Box 2175, N. Campus Drive

Brookings, SD 57007 

605-688-5171

Fax 605-688-6003

43 Tennessee CE Kord Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Ellington Agricultural Center

440 Hogan Road

Nashville, TN 37220 

615-837-5125

Fax 615-837-5250

44 Texas Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory

1 Sippel Road, Drawer 3040

College Station, TX 77843 

979-845-3414

Fax 979-845-1794

February 2014 C-4
Laboratory Network List for ND

# State Laboratory Phone numbers

45 Texas Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory – Amarillo

6610 Amarillo Blvd West

Amarillo, TX 79106

806-353-7478

Fax 806-359-0636

46 Texas Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory – Center

635 Malone Drive

Center, TX 75935 

936-598-4451 

Fax 806-676-4582

47 Texas Texas A&M Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory –

Gonzalez

1162 East Sarah DeWitt Drive

Gonzalez, TX 78629

830-672-2834

Fax 830-672-4582

48 Utah Utah Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

950 E. 1400 North

Logan, UT 84341 

435-797-1895

Fax 435-797-2805

49 Virginia Harrisonburg Regional Animal Health Laboratory

261 Mount Clinton Pike

Harrisonburg, VA 22802

Fax 540-434-3880

50 Washington Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

PO Box 647034 

Bustad Hall, Room 155-N

Pullman, WA 99164-7034 

509-335-9696/

509-335-6190

Fax 509-335-7424

51 Washington Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Avian Health and Food Safety Lab, Puyallup

2607 W Pioneer

Puyallup, WA 98371-4919 

253-445-4537

Fax 253-445-4544

52 West Virginia West Virginia Department of Ag. Poultry Health Division

60B Moorefield Industrial Park

Moorefield, WV 26836 

304-538-2397

Fax 304-538-8133

53 Wisconsin Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

University of Wisconsin-Madison

445 Easterday Road

Madison, WI 53706 

608-262-5432 

Fax 847-574-8085

54 Wisconsin USGS National Wildlife Health Center

6006 Schroeder Road

Madison, WI 53711 

608-270-2419/

608-270-2400

Fax 608-270-2415

55 Wyoming Wyoming State Veterinary Laboratory

1174 Snowy Range Road

Laramie, WY 82070 

307-766-9925

Fax 307-721-2051

February 2014 C-5
Appendix D

Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance 

and Rationale for Poultry

ND OUTBREAK SURVEILLANCE GUIDELINES

FOR POULTRY

These guidelines are updated recommendations for Newcastle Disease (ND)

outbreak surveillance, prepared by the Center for Epidemiology and Animal 

Health, Science, Technology, and Analysis Services, Veterinary Services, Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service. These guidelines may be updated 

periodically.

Purpose

The purpose of these guidelines is to provide recommendations for surveillance

activities in poultry for this ND Response Plan. These are sample guidelines.

Surveillance will be conducted at intervals as specified by the Incident Command 

(IC) using the most current scientific information and best practice guidance 

available. APHIS will collaborate with public health agencies regarding the threat 

of ND to humans.

These are strategies regarding sampling sizes and sampling frequencies for 

premises located in the Infected Zone (IZ), Buffer Zone (BZ), Surveillance Zone 

(SZ), and for proof of disease freedom (DF) that do not require daily bird or 

product movement for business continuity (such as layer, broiler, turkey, and 

game birds).

Objectives

The objectives of ND outbreak surveillance are to

 detect ND Infected Premises (IP) during an outbreak;

 determine the size and extent of an ND outbreak;

 supply information to evaluate outbreak control activities;

 provide information for animal and product movement within the Control 

Area (CA);

February 2014 D-1
 provide information for animal and product movement out of the CA; and

 prove DF to regain disease-free status after eradication of the outbreak.

Definitions

There are four key definitions that are important in outbreak surveillance.

 Dead Birds are the dead or euthanized sick birds found each day in every 

house on a premises.

 50-Dead-Bird Group consists of 50 or fewer dead birds (and each multiple 

of 50 or fewer dead birds) from each house on the premises each day.

 5-Bird Pool combines samples taken from five dead or euthanized sick 

birds out of the house’s (flock’s) daily dead birds into one sample. 

 In all cases where a 5-bird pool is mentioned, an 11-bird pool (samples 

taken from eleven dead or euthanized sick birds) may be collected 

instead (an additional option for sampling).

 Tracheal/oropharyngeal swabs are preferred.

 Detection Probability is the probability the sampling scheme will detect at 

least one infected bird of each 50-dead-bird group (at the 95 percent 

confidence level) if there are 20 or more infected birds (40 percent 

prevalence) in the target population of daily dead birds, where the Fusiongene (F-gene) real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction

(rRT-PCR) test sensitivity of the 5-bird pool is 85.1 percent.

Rationale for the 20-Bird Detection Prevalence

The following reasons provide the rationale for the 20-bird detection prevalence 

threshold:

 This is used as basic surveillance in the Highly Contagious Disease Plan, 

and starts immediately after ND outbreak response authorization.

 It is rapidly exceeded because ND quickly spreads throughout a house, 

killing many birds.

 It is logistically feasible, flexible, simple, and standardized.

 It is consistent with surveillance schemes used for disease detection, 

business continuity, and proof of DF.

February 2014 D-2
Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale for Poultry

SAMPLING SCHEME PROCEDURES FOR POULTRY

1. Start sampling immediately upon ND outbreak response authorization.

2. Implement disease detection sampling schemes.

3. For all schemes discussed in this Appendix, tracheal/oropharyngeal swabs 

are preferred.

Surveillance Sampling Schemes

The following sampling unit is used for both commercial and backyard premises.

 Sampling Unit: Flock or house.

 Sample: A pooled sample that combines swabs taken from five (or eleven)

dead or euthanized sick birds out of the house’s (flock’s) daily dead or ill 

birds.

 The frequency recommendations for premises that are not moving 

birds daily are based on

 the incubation period (2–15 days; likely incubation period of 

virulent ND is 2–6 days1).

2 Sampling should be based on the mean 

incubation period observed;

 sufficient available personnel for surveillance activities;

 decreased probability of spreading ND due to earlier detection of 

ND;

 recommendations for changing frequency of premises inspection

or sampling are listed in Table D-3; and

 recommendations for sampling frequency of live birds without 

clinical signs, in instances where flock sizes are small and daily 

mortality is limited are listed in Table D-4.

1 A.R. Spickler, J.A. Roth, J. Gaylon, and J. Lofstedt (Eds). 2010. Emerging and Exotic 

Diseases of Animals, 4th Ed. Ames, IA: Center for Food Security and Public Health, Iowa State 

University. 2 OIE incubation period for ND is 21 days. OIE. 2013. Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 

Chapter 10.9.1: Newcastle Disease. http://www.oie.int. 

February 2014 D-3

 
Disease Detection Surveillance Scheme

This information is also summarized in Table D-1.

COMMERCIAL PREMISES

Infected Zone

 Census of premises within zone; sample premises as prioritized by 

epidemiological investigation and continuity of business requirements.

 If ND compatible signs are observed or epidemiological links found: 

collect swabs for the 5-bird or 11-bird pool(s) from each 50-dead-bird 

group from each flock on the premises.

 Sampling frequency:

 Contact Premises (CP), Suspect Premises (SP), and Monitored 

Premises (MP):

1. Collect swabs for the 5-bird or 11-bird pool sample(s) on each 

premises 2 times per week for 28 days. If the mean or median 

incubation period is observed to be 3 days or less, the sampling 

frequency should be increased; if the mean or median incubation 

period is 6 days or more, the sampling frequency may be decreased

(see Table D-3).

2. CP, SP, or MP that test negative in the above sampling regime 

should then be sampled as described for At-Risk Premises (ARP).

3. MP may be sampled more frequently depending on the need to 

ship product but at the minimum must be sampled as listed above.

 ARP:

 Collect swabs for the 5-bird or 11-bird pool(s) on each premises 

once every 5 days for the duration of the quarantine.

Buffer Zone

 Census of premises within zone; sample premises as prioritized by 

epidemiological investigation and continuity of business requirements.

February 2014 D-4
Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale for Poultry

 Sampling frequency:

 MP, CP, and SP:

1. Collect swabs for the 5-bird or 11-bird pool sample(s) on each 

premises 2 times per week for 28 days. If the mean or median 

incubation period is observed to be 3 days or less, the sampling 

frequency should be increased; if the mean or median incubation 

period is 6 days or more, the sampling frequency may be decreased 

(see Table D-3).

2. MP, CP, or SP that test negative in the above sampling regime 

should then be sampled as described for ARP.

3. MP may be sampled more frequently depending on need to ship 

product but at the minimum must be sampled as listed above.

 ARP:

 Collect swabs for the 5-bird or 11-bird pool(s) on each premises 

once every 5 days for the duration of the quarantine.

3

Surveillance Zone

 Number of premises to be sampled:

 Calculate the number of premises to be sampled using the sample size 

calculators located in the Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox4 or Cannon 

formula.

 The number of premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least 

one IP with 95 percent confidence, where:

 The IP prevalence equals or exceeds 5 percent of all premises with 

susceptible birds,

 or a census, if the number of premises within the zone is small, and

 in order as prioritized by epidemiological investigation and 

continuity of business requirements.

3 The ARP in the BZ and IZ are sampled with the same frequency because infected but 

undetected premises in the BZ have higher consequences when not detected than those in the IZ 

(see #11 in Assumptions). 4 Available from http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/nsu/toolbox/index.html (for APHIS 

employees). 

February 2014 D-5

 
 Sampling frequency:

 Randomly select the calculated number of premises to be sampled (as 

determined above, such as 60), and collect swabs for the 5-bird or 11-

bird pool(s) on each of the selected premises once during the first 3-

week period of the quarantine.

 Randomly select (include in the sampling list the premises sampled in 

the first 3-week period) and sample an equal number of premises (as 

calculated above) once during each additional 3-week period of the 

quarantine. For example, randomly select and sample 60 premises 

once during the first 3-week period, then reselect (with replacement) 

another 60 premises to be sampled in the second 3-week period for the 

duration of quarantine.

BACKYARD PREMISES

The same sampling unit and sample is used in backyard premises as in 

commercial premises.

Infected Zone

 Census of premises within zone; sample premises as prioritized by 

epidemiological investigation and continuity of business requirements.

 Observe the flock for ND compatible signs.

 If ND compatible signs are observed or epidemiological links found: 

collect swabs for the 5-bird or 11-bird pool(s) from each 50-dead-bird 

group from each flock on the premises (most backyard flocks have less 

than 50 birds, thereby requiring one 5-bird or 11-bird pool).

 Observation/sampling frequency:

 CP and SP:

1. Observe entire flock for ND signs (swab if there are any ND signs

or epidemiological links found) 2 times per week for 28 days.

a. Frequency of observation/sampling depends on available 

personnel, number of premises to be sampled, owner resistance 

(hostility), and other factors.

b. The Incident Commander must balance premises’ transmission 

risks and detection costs in deciding on observation/sampling 

frequency.

February 2014 D-6
Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale for Poultry

2. CP and SP that test negative or that have no signs of ND or 

epidemiological links found in the above observation/sampling 

regime should then be observed as described for ARP.

 ARP:

 Observe entire flock (swab if there are ND signs or 

epidemiological links) on each premises once every 5 days for the 

duration of the quarantine.

Buffer Zone

 Census of premises within zone; sample premises as prioritized by 

epidemiological investigation and continuity of business requirements.

 Observe the flock for ND compatible signs.

 If ND compatible signs are observed or epidemiological links found: 

collect swabs for the 5-bird or 11-bird pool from each 50-dead-bird group 

from each flock on the premises.

 Observation and sampling frequency:

 CP and SP:

1. Observe entire flock for ND signs (swab if there are any ND signs

or epidemiological links) 2 times per week for 28 days.

2. CP and SP that test negative or that have no signs of ND in the 

above observation/sampling regime should then be observed as 

described for ARP.

 ARP:

 Observe entire flock (swab if there are ND signs or 

epidemiological links) on each premises once every 5 days for the 

duration of the quarantine.

Surveillance Zone

 Observe the flock for ND compatible signs.

 If ND compatible signs are observed or epidemiological links found, 

collect swabs for 5-bird or 11-bird pool from the dead birds in each flock 

on the premises.

 Number of premises to be observed/sampled:

February 2014 D-7
 Calculate the number of premises to be observed/sampled using the 

sample size calculators located in the Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox

or Cannon formula.

 The number of premises to be observed/sampled is based on detecting 

at least one IP with 95 percent confidence, where

 the IP prevalence equals or exceeds 5 percent of all premises with 

susceptible birds;

 or a census, if the number of premises within the zone is small; and

 in order as prioritized by epidemiological investigation and 

continuity of business requirements.

 Sampling frequency:

 Randomly select the calculated number of premises to be observed or

sampled (as determined above, such as 60), and swab the dead or 

euthanized sick birds on each of the selected premises once during the 

first 3-week period of quarantine.

 Randomly reselect (include the premises observed/sampled in the first 

3-week period in the sampling list frame) and sample an equal number 

of premises (as calculated above) once during each additional 3-week 

period of the quarantine. For example, randomly select and observe or

sample 60 premises once during the first 3-week period, then reselect 

(with replacement) another 60 premises to be observed/sampled in 

each subsequent 3-week period for the duration of the quarantine.

Proof of Disease Freedom Surveillance Scheme

The definitions of “dead birds,” “50-dead-bird group,” “5-bird pool,” and 

“detection probability” remain the same. Also see Table D-2 which summarizes 

proof of DF surveillance for ND in poultry.

 Surveillance for proof of DF starts 21 days (OIE incubation period, as this 

is the international standard) after depopulation of last IP and is in effect 

for 3 months per OIE.

5

 The goal is to identify sero-positive farms that lack clinical signs.

Clinically ill flocks will be detected via increased surveillance methods 

listed below and investigation of flocks with suspicious signs.

5 OIE. 2013. Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Chapter 10.9, Newcastle Disease, Article 

10.9.1. https://www.oie.int. 

February 2014 D-8

 
Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale for Poultry

 OIE recommends intensifying surveillance schemes in conjunction with 

surveillance of the CA. In a U.S. ND outbreak, this may be conducted by

 actively investigating flocks with suspicious clinical signs,

 increasing slaughter sero-surveillance, and

 considering the limited use of sentinel flocks in specific 

circumstances.

6

COMMERCIAL PREMISES DISEASE FREEDOM

Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, and Surveillance Zone as One Unit

 Number of samples per flock:

 Calculate the number of premises to sample using the sample size 

calculators located in the Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox or Cannon 

formula.

 The number of premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least 

one IP with 95 percent confidence, where

 the IP prevalence equals or exceeds 5 percent where the maximum 

birds sampled doesn’t exceed 60 birds per flock, and

 one 5-bird or 11-bird pool sample is submitted for each 50-deadbird group.

 Number of premises to be sampled (serology and swabs of dead and 

euthanized sick birds):

 Calculate the number of premises to sample using the sample size 

calculators located in the Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox or Cannon 

formula.

 The number of premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least 

one IP with 95 percent confidence, where

 the IP prevalence equals or exceeds 5 percent of all premises with 

susceptible birds in the IZ.

6 For more on sentinel flocks, see B.J. McCluskey, B. Burgess, J. Glover, H. Kinde, and S. 

Hietala. 2006. “Use of sentinel chickens to evaluate the effectiveness of cleaning and disinfection 

procedures in noncommercial poultry operations infected with exotic Newcastle disease virus.” 

J Vet Diagn Invest. 18, 296–299.

February 2014 D-9

 
 Sampling frequency:

 Sample the number of premises calculated above (for example, 60 

premises) once per month for 3 months after the last positive test result

or completion of depopulation.

BACKYARD PREMISES (DISEASE FREEDOM)

Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, and Surveillance Zone as One Unit

 Number of samples per flock:

 Calculate the number of premises to sample using the sample size 

calculators located in the Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox or Cannon 

formula.

 The number of premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least 

one IP with 95 percent confidence, where

 the IP prevalence equals or exceeds 5 percent where the maximum 

birds sampled doesn’t exceed 60 birds per flock, and

 one 5-bird or 11-bird pool sample submitted for each 50-dead-bird 

group.

 Number of premises to be sampled (serology and swabs of dead and 

euthanized sick birds):

 Calculate the number of premises to sample using the sample size 

calculators located in the Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox or Cannon 

formula.

 The number of premises to be sampled is based on detecting at least 

one IP with 95 percent confidence, where

 the IP prevalence equals or exceeds 5 percent of all premises with 

susceptible birds in the IZ.

 Sampling frequency:

 Sample the number of premises calculated above (for example, 60 

premises) once per month for 3 months after the last positive test result

or completion of depopulation.

February 2014 D-10
Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale for Poultry

SURVEILLANCE FOR BIRD/PRODUCT MOVEMENT 

(NON-DAILY MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT)

 Inspect or sample premises located in the IZ or BZ that wish to move birds 

or products.

 The following three steps are required prior to bird/product movement:

1. Two, consecutive, negative 5-bird or 11-bird pool tests of birds to be 

moved or of the birds that produced the products to be moved.

2. Sample (swab) immediately prior to moving product. For example, 

start sampling 3 days before product movement if 24 hours are 

required before receiving test results or 2 days if test results will be 

received on the day of testing.

3. Visual inspection of birds in all houses on premises for 2 consecutive 

days including the day before and day of movement.

February 2014 D-11
FURTHER SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION

Table D-1 summarizes the outbreak surveillance scheme for disease detection.

Table D-1. Outbreak Surveillance for Disease Detection

Disease Detection 

Post Outbreak Response Authorization

Commercial Backyard

Sampling Infected

Zone

Buffer

Zone

Surveillance

Zonea

Infected

Zone

Buffer

Zone

Surveillance

Zonea

Number of

Premises Census Census

5% 

Prevalence

Threshold°

Census Census

5% 

Prevalence

Threshold°

Unit*

5 or 11-

bird

Pool

5 or 11-

bird

Pool

5 or 11-bird

Pool

Observation 

then

5 or 11-bird 

Pool^

Observation 

then

5 or 11-bird 

Pool^

Observation 

then

5 or 11-bird 

Pool^

Frequency

Free Premises - 21 Days - 21 Days

Monitored

Premises

Two times per week 

for 28 days. - - -

At-Risk Premises 5 Days# - 5 Days# -

Contact and 

Suspect 

Premisesa

Two times per week 

for 28 days. - Two times per week for 

28 days. -

Product 

Movement 2 consecutive negative tests@ 2 consecutive negative tests@

a Suspect Premises in a Surveillance Zone will be subject to surveillance procedures and diagnostic testing as 

indicated by relevant authorities.

* Sampling Unit used in all Surveillance Schemes: One 5-bird or 11-bird pool (pooled swabs from five dead or 

euthanized sick birds) selected from each group of 50 or less daily dead or euthanized sick birds (and for each 

multiple of 50 or less dead or euthanized sick birds).

° Prevalence threshold is a predetermined proportion of Infected Premises (for example, 5 percent) used to calculate 

the number of premises to be sampled at a specific confidence level (for example, 95 percent) in a population of a 

given size (for example, 1,000 premises) based on detecting at least one Infected Premises.

^ Initial visual observation only, swab upon observation of ND compatible signs. If the Incident Command thinks that 

the flock needs sampling based on epidemiological information, they may also sample the flock.

# Identical frequency of sampling in the Infected Zone and Buffer Zone due to the need to detect undetected but 

Infected Premises in the Buffer Zone due to the high consequences of undetected Infected Premises in the Buffer 

Zone.

@ Two consecutive negative 5-bird or 11-bird pool tests are required before movement of birds or of the birds that 

produced the product to be moved to achieve the 95 percent confidence level of detecting at least one infected 5-bird

pool.

February 2014 D-12
Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale for Poultry

Table D-2 shows the surveillance requirements to prove ND-freedom. 

Table D-2. Surveillance for Proof of Disease Freedom

Proof of Disease Freedom^

Post Outbreak Eradication

Commercial Backyard

Sampling Infected

Zone$

Buffer

Zone$

Surveillance

Zone$

Infected

Zone$

Buffer

Zone$

Surveillance

Zone$

Number of 

Serology 

Samples per 

Premises

5%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

5%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

5%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

5%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

5%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

5%

Prevalence 

Threshold&

Number of

Premises

5% 

Prevalence 

Threshold°

5% 

Prevalence

Threshold°

5% 

Prevalence

Threshold°

5% 

Prevalence

Threshold°

5% 

Prevalence

Threshold°

5% 

Prevalence

Threshold°

Unit* 5 or 11-bird 

Pool

5 or 11-bird 

Pool

5 or 11-bird

Pool

Observation 

5 or 11-bird 

Pool

Observation 

5 or 11-bird 

Pool

Observation 

5 or 11-bird 

Pool

Frequency Sample each premises of the Calculated Number of Premises once per month for 3 

months after the last positive test result.

^ Sero-surveillance conducted in the area to be proved disease free in addition to dead bird sampling. $ Infected, Buffer, and Surveillance Zones combine as one unit for proof of disease freedom.

& Number of birds sero-sampled based on 5 percent prevalence in flock at the 95 percent confidence level where the 

maximum number of birds sampled per house does not exceed 60 birds.

° Prevalence threshold is a predetermined proportion of Infected Premises (e.g., 5 percent) used to calculate the 

number of premises to be sampled at a specific confidence level (e.g., 95 percent) in a population of a given size (for 

example, 1,000 premises) based on detecting at least one Infected Premises. A census of the premises in a zone will 

be sampled if there are few premises. Sample premises in order as by epidemiological investigation and continuity of 

business requirements.

* Sampling Unit used in all Surveillance Schemes: One (1) 5 or 11-bird pool (pooled swabs from five dead or 

euthanized sick birds) selected from each group of 50 or less daily dead or euthanized birds (and for each multiple of 

50 or less dead or euthanized sick birds).

February 2014 D-13
Table D-3 shows the complexity of sampling based on the incubation period of 

the ND virus and feasible sampling frequency.

Table D-3. Influence of Incubation Period on Feasible Sample Collection Frequency

Estimated Incubation Period Based on Field Information*

Frequency of Sampling 

(days between sampling)

Sampling Duration 

(one week minimum)

Incubation Period Minimum (Days) Maximum (Days) Days

1–2 days 1 1 28

3–4 days 2 3 28

5–7 days 4 6 28

8–14 days 7 10 28

> 14 days 10 28

Table D-4 shows the number of live birds that need to be sampled (the sample 

size) in order to detect at least one infected bird with 95 percent confidence 

assuming that exposure to the virus has been at least 3, 7, or 10 days past (as 

indicated in the table).

Table D-1. Sampling Frequency for Live Birds without Clinical Signs 

(with 95 Percent Confidence)

Sample Size on Day 3, 7, 10 After Exposure

Flock Size Day 3 Day 7 Day 10

10 4 1 1

20 8 2 1

30 12 2 1

50 20 2 2

100 40 5 2

200 80 11 2

400 160 22 4

500 200 28 5

600 240 33 7

800 320 44 9

1,000 401 56 11

2,000 802 113 23

3,000 1203 170 36

4,000 1604 227 48

5,000 2006 284 60

These estimates are based on a Reed-Frost transmission model where contact rate is defined as the 

5th percentile of an expert opinion distribution [RiskPert(2.1,4.7,10.4)]7 (i.e., having 95 percent

confidence that the disease would have progressed to the point that enough birds would shed virus to 

7 National A.I. Surveillance Plan, APHIS, December 15, 2006.

February 2014 D-14

 
Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale for Poultry

allow detection of at least one if the test diagnostic sensitivity is 95 percent or greater.) The calculation 

is based on approximation of the hypergeometric distribution8 assuming 0 positive detected out of the 

sample size shown above, where the number of birds shedding or dead are equal to the output of the 

transmission model.

Assumptions for Surveillance Schemes

1. The 5-bird pool F-gene rRT-PCR assay sensitivity is 85.1 percent.

2. Confidence Level: The probability of detecting at least one infected bird in 

the target population is 97.9 percent, which is limited by the sensitivity of 

the matrix assay on the 5-bird pool.

3. ND infected birds die within 2–15 days post infection and rapidly infects

the flock, thereby increasing the probability of quickly detecting IP.

4. In commercial premises, the producer detects, collects, and places all dead 

birds into the target population from which the 5-bird or 11-bird pool is 

drawn. 

5. The 20 infected ND bird prevalence threshold for each 50-dead-bird group 

is reached early in the disease spread in a house and is a logical feasible 

sample size.

6. All ND infected birds are included in each house’s daily dead bird target 

population.

7. Outbreak response field personnel visiting backyard premises, with 

observation, will detect ill birds with ND compatible signs.

8. The majority of backyard flocks have less than 100 birds; sampling 

frequently and sampling the daily dead birds maximizes the probability of 

detection, minimizes the trauma and disruption to the owner, and increases 

efficiency because less time will be spent capturing live birds.

9. Sampling a 5-bird pool per 50 dead birds will sample a majority of daily 

dead birds in commercial broiler operations, commercial turkey premises 

and backyard premises because the dead bird number varies from 5.1 to 27 

birds per day (see daily death rate and house sizes of commercial 

producers in the Updated Background Information section below).

10. Production parameters will be monitored for indications of ND intrusion.

8 Cannon, R. M., and R. T. Roe, 1982: Livestock Disease Surveys: A Field Manual for 

Veterinarians. Australian Bureau of Animal Health, Canberra. Also see Cannon, R.M. 2001. Sense 

and Sensitivity-Designing Surveys Based on an Imperfect Test. Preventative Veterinary Medicine, 

49, 141–163.

February 2014 D-15

 
11. The consequences of an infected but undetected premises is greater if it is 

located at the periphery of the BZ vs. the periphery of the IZ:

a. Increased opportunity of disease spread due to less stringent 

movement requirements in the BZ.

b. Increased difficulty of surveillance:

i. A larger number of ARP that require sampling.

ii. A larger geographic area over which to sample ARP.

c. Increased size of the CA: An IP will increase the size of the CA by the 

radius of the IZ. However, if the newly detected IP is located on the 

periphery of the BZ, the size of the CA will increase by the radius of 

the IZ and the BZ.

February 2014 D-16
Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale for Poultry

Figure D-1 shows that the size of the CA depends on where the new IP is located.

Figure D-1. Infected Premises’ Effect on Size of Control Area

February 2014 D-17
Updated Background Information

 Daily Mortality Rate: The expected daily death rate ranges from 0.00051 

(5.1/10,000) in hen turkeys to 0.00079 (7.9/10,000) in tom turkeys and a high of 

0.00086 (8.6/10,000) in broilers per house. The daily death rate is higher in “meat 

type” poultry than in layers, where the daily death rate varies from 0.0001 to 

0.0005. Major factors influencing the daily mortality rate are: bird strain, bird age 

(early, mid, or late cycle), and house construction design and age.

 House Size: The number of birds per house varies from 7,000 in tom turkeys to 

10,000 in hen turkeys, but a high of 27,000 broilers per house. In layers, house

sizes of 300,000 to 350,000 birds have become the norm.

 Expected Daily Mortality: Using information supplied above, the estimated 

number of expected dead birds per day in commercial houses varies from 5.0 to 

5.5 birds per day in turkey flocks to 23 birds per day in broiler flocks. The 

numbers of dead birds per day that is expected to signal that producers take 

“diagnostic action” are 20 hen turkeys, 14 tom turkeys, and 47 broilers, all the 

numbers of “expected” daily dead birds on which surveillance calculations are 

based are 40 percent or less of the “diagnostic action” numbers of dead birds.

 Recommendations: Test one 5-bird (or 11-bird) pool for every 50-dead-bird 

groups using the sampling schemes detailed in Table D-1 and Table D-2. 

References for this Appendix

National Avian Influenza Surveillance Plan. December 2006. U.S. Department of 

Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.

Cannon, R.M. 2001. Sense and Sensitivity-Designing Surveys Based on an 

Imperfect Test. Prev Vet Med, 49, 141–163.

Cannon, R.M. and Roe, R.T. 1982. Livestock Disease Surveys—A Field Manual 

for Veterinarians. Bureau of Rural Science, Department of Primary Industry. 

Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Doye D, Freking B and Payne J. Broiler Production: Considerations for Potential 

Growers, Oklahoma Cooperative Extension service, http://www.oces.okstate.edu. 

Flock, D.K., Laughlin, K.F., and Bentley, J. 2006. Minimizing losses to poultry 

breeding and production; how breeding companies contribute to poultry welfare. 

Lohmann Information. 41:20-28.

Personal communication between Dr. Alex Thompson (APHIS VS) and Drs. 

Simon Shane (international poultry consultant), Gregg Cutler (private poultry 

veterinarian working in a three-person poultry practice in California), Ken 

Anderson (poultry veterinarian, North Carolina State University College of 

February 2014 D-18
Updated ND Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale for Poultry

Agriculture and Life Sciences, Extension Poultry Science), and Dave Halvorson 

(poultry veterinarian, University of Minnesota, School of Veterinary Medicine).

“The North Carolina Layer Performance and Management Test” (2009).

The “United Egg Producers” (www.uepcertified.org and www.unitedegg.org).

February 2014 D-19
Appendix E

Procedures for ND Investigation 

and Specimen Submission

Veterinary Services (VS) Guidance Document 12001 provides guidance for the 

investigation of potential foreign animal disease/emerging disease incidents. VS 

Guidance Document 12001 is available at http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/

fadprep.shtml (for Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service employees) and 

for the public 

at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/lab_info_services/downloads/VSG_1

2001.pdf. 

February 2014 E-1
Appendix F

Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire

This appendix contains a sample epidemiological questionnaire that could be 

employed in the event of a Newcastle Disease (ND) outbreak.

This epidemiological questionnaire is only an example template, and is based on 

the movement of eggs and egg products. Based on the epidemiological situation, 

the type of product being moved, or the types of premises involved in the actual 

outbreak, it may be appropriate to add other questions regarding other risk factors 

which may play a role in transmission. 

February 2014 F-1
ND Epidemiology Questionnaire

Date: ______________________

Business/farm name: ______

Primary contact: 

Business address: 

Business telephone number: ______

Cell telephone number: 

Fax number: 

Home telephone number: 

E-mail address: 

Secondary contact: 

Business address: 

Business telephone number: ______

Cell telephone number: 

Fax number: 

Home telephone number: 

E-mail address: 

Farm address (911 and Animal Location):

City: ZIP code: 

County: Township: 

Range: Section: ____________

GPS coordinates (decimal degrees): 

Premises identification number: 

The purpose of this epidemiological questionnaire is to help provide the Incident Management 

Team determine a premises Classification: Suspect Premises, Contact Premises, At-Risk 

Premises, or Monitored Premises. Additional information will be considered (e.g., daily PCR 

testing and production data) when decisions regarding permits are made.

February 2014 F-2
A. General Information

1. Type of premises (commercial or noncommercial): 

2. Are there backyard premises with birds nearby?

 Yes  No  Don’t know

3. Do you have other premises to which you travel and work? 

 Yes  No 

4. Are there contiguous premises with birds (premises not owned by you)?

 Yes  No

5. Have you observed any increase in illness or death loss in your birds in the last 21 days?

 Yes  No

6. Premises inventory: 

Avian Species on Premises Males > 1 year Females > 1 year < 1 year

Non-avian species on premises (type and number): 

Have any of the non-avian species moved on or off the premises in the past 21 days?

 Yes  No 

If yes, provide details: _______________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

February 2014 F-3
B. Trace Back Information. 

In the last 21 days, did the following movements ONTO the farm occur? If yes, please provide as much 

accurate information as possible for each unique source. You can add more rows by ‘right clicking’ in the 

box and selecting “Insert > Insert Rows Below”.

1. Eggs (e.g., sideloading)  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

2. Live Birds (including placements, chicks, pullets, backfilling, etc.)  Yes  Don’t know  No

If yes,

Source/

name

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D before 

entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel 

enter bird 

housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

Were the birds rRTPCR tested for 

Newcastle Disease (or 

was the breeding 

flock tested) prior to 

moving these birds 

onto your farm? 

(Yes/No)

3. Feed trucks  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

4. Fresh litter/bedding  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

5. Manure  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

February 2014 F-4
Movements ONTO the farm (continued)

6. Catch/vaccination/beak trim crews  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

7. Renderer/Off-Site  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

Did the driver leave the vehicle while on this premises?  Yes  Don’t know  No

If Yes,

a. What area of the premises did s/he enter? _________________________________________

b. Was driver required to wear outer clothes 

and foot wear provided by this premises?  Yes  Don’t know  No

8. Company vet/service tech  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

9. Noncompany vet/consultant  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

10. Construction or service person (e.g., gas, plumbing, pest control)  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

February 2014 F-5
Movements ONTO the farm (continued)

11. Customer/buyer/dealer  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

12. Other producer  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

13. Nonbusiness visitor (friend/neighbor)  Yes  Don’t know  No

Source/name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

C. Trace Forward Information.

In the last 21 days, did the following movements OFF the farm occur? If yes, please provide as much 

accurate information as possible for each unique source. You can add more rows by ‘right clicking’ in the 

box ad selecting “Insert > Insert Rows Below”.

1. Eggs  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

February 2014 F-6
Movement OFF the farm (continued)

2. Live Birds (including placements, chicks, pullets, backfilling, etc.)  Yes  Don’t know  No

If yes,

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D before 

entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment 

C&D when 

leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel 

enter bird 

housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered 

in visitor 

log 

(Yes/No)

Were the birds rRTPCR tested for 

Newcastle Disease

(or was the breeding 

flock tested) prior to 

moving these birds 

off your farm? 

(Yes/No)

3. Feed trucks  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

4. Fresh litter/bedding  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

5. Manure  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

6. Catch/vaccination/beak trim crews  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

February 2014 F-7
Movement OFF the farm (continued)

7. Renderer/Off-Site  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

Did the driver leave the vehicle while on this premises?  Yes  Don’t know  No

If Yes,

a. What area of the premises did s/he enter? _________________________________________

b. Was driver required to wear outer clothes 

and foot wear provided by this premises?  Yes  Don’t know  No

8. Company vet/service tech  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

9. Noncompany vet/consultant  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

10. Construction or service person (e.g., gas, plumbing, pest control)  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

February 2014 F-8
Movement OFF the farm (continued)

11. Customer/buyer/dealer  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

12. Other producer  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

13. Non-business visitor (friend/neighbor)  Yes  Don’t know  No

Destination/

name 

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

before entering 

(Yes/No)

Truck and 

equipment C&D 

when leaving 

(Yes/No)

Personnel enter 

bird housing 

(Yes/No)

Entered in 

visitor log 

(Yes/No)

D. Employee Risk Factors 

1. Do any of your personnel work at other poultry premises or have they visited 

other poultry premises, hatcheries, processing plants, or poultry slaughtering facilities 

within the past 21 days?  Yes  No

If yes, what premises? _________________________________________________________

2. Do any of your workers live with someone who works at another poultry farm, hatchery, 

processing plant, slaughter facility or rendering plant?  Yes  No

3. Have you hired new personnel during the past 21 days?  Yes  No

If yes, did they work for another poultry premises before you hired them?  Yes  No

If yes, where did they work prior to coming to your premises? ____________________________

4. Has an employee from this premises visited a rendering plant 

within the past 21 days?  Yes  No

If yes, what plant? ______________________________________________________________

If yes, did the person clean and disinfect his vehicle?  Yes  No

If yes, did the person change outer clothes?  Yes  No

If yes, did the person disinfect footwear or change into footwear 

assigned to this premises upon return?  Yes  No

February 2014 F-9
5. Have you, your family, or any of your employees been out of the country in the last 21 days?

 Yes  No

If yes, where? _________________________________________________________________

E. Biosecurity Risk Factors

1. Have migratory waterfowl been seen on the property in the last 21 days?  Yes  No

2. Have free flying birds been observed in contact with your birds in the past 21 days?  Yes  No

3. Is feed and water protected from exposure to feces from wild birds and waterfowl?  Yes  No 

4. Is feed and water protected from exposure to feces from rodents and wild animals?  Yes  No

5. Which of the following best describes this farm’s usual carcass (daily mortality) 

disposal method? 

 Rendering

 Composting on site

 Burial on site

 Incineration on site

 Other (specify: _____________________________________________________________)

6. Do you dispose of dead birds for other farms?  Yes  No 

7. Have you maintained all requirements since your last regular biosecurity audit?  Yes  No

If no, what requirements have not been met?

8. What additional biosecurity measures have been implemented? (For example, once the premises 

has been determined to be within a Control Area, all poultry-related vehicles, including feed 

trucks, must now be cleaned and disinfected prior to entry to the premises.)

_____________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________

February 2014 F-10
F. Other Information

Is there any other information that would assist with movement tracing? Have there been any unusual 

movements for the premises within the last 21 days that were not captured on this form? 

___________________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________

February 2014 F-11
Appendix G

Examples of Movement Control Notices

This appendix provides two examples—Federal and State—of halting movement 

of animals during a disease outbreak.

EXAMPLE—WEST VIRGINIA 

Commissioner of Agriculture Halts Poultry Shows and Sales after 

AI-Positive Flock Discovered in Virginia 

Commissioner of Agriculture Gus R. Douglass has ordered a halt to 

poultry shows and sales throughout West Virginia in response to a turkey 

flock that tested positive for low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) in 

Mt. Jackson, Va., just across the West Virginia border.

The strain is not the “bird flu” that has been plaguing Southeast Asia and 

parts of Europe and poses no threat to human health. 

The order applies to any gathering of live birds, including shows at fairs 

and festivals and sales of poultry. The order is effective Monday, July 9, 

and will be in place for 30 days unless another positive flock is 

discovered.

The order does not apply to the commercial industry, which tests every 

flock for AI before it is moved off the farm to ensure that infected birds 

are not trucked past other poultry farms.

“Having already dealt with a positive flock in West Virginia earlier this 

year, we want to take every precaution to protect our poultry industry 

from a potentially devastating situation,” said Commissioner Douglass.

He also noted that the West Virginia Department of Agriculture is on 

high alert for any signs of the disease here, and that the industry has been 

exercising enhanced surveillance protocols since a 2002 AI outbreak that 

affected West Virginia and Virginia.

Poultry companies on both sides of the border have instructed their 

growers not to spread litter or move it from their farms until further 

notice.

According to the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer 

Services (VDACS), testing over the weekend by the USDA’s National 

Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, confirmed the 

presence of AI antibodies, which indicates possible prior exposure to the 

virus. The turkeys did not show any signs of illness prior to testing. 

February 2014 G-1
Virginia is closely monitoring all poultry operations within a six-mile 

radius of the affected farm. 

NVSL is doing further testing to help identify the virus and hopefully 

determine its source. VDACS, USDA and the poultry owner are working 

cooperatively to minimize the possibility that the virus will move beyond 

this farm. 

The affected flock contains 54,000 birds, which will be euthanized as a 

precaution as soon as possible and composted on-site. While LPAI poses 

no risk to human health, federal and state policy is to eradicate H5 and 

H7 subtypes because of their potential to change into more serious types, 

which have a higher mortality rate among birds. 

Source: http://www.wvagriculture.org/news_releases/2007/7-9-07.html

EXAMPLE—FEDERAL 

Source: http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2003/04/16/03-9322/exoticnewcastle-disease-additions-to-quarantined-area#p-3

February 2014 G-2
Examples of Movement Control Notices

February 2014 G-3
February 2014 G-4
Appendix H

Glossary

Animal product Blood or any of its components, bones, bristles, feathers, flesh, offal, 

skins, and any by product containing any of those components that 

originated from an animal or bird.

Anseriformes An order of birds that includes ducks, geese, and swans. There are

about 150 living species of birds in three extant families: 

the Anhimidae (the screamers), Anseranatidae (the Magpie Goose), 

and the Anatidae, which includes more than 140 species 

of waterfowl.

Case Any individual animal infected by Newcastle disease (ND) virus, 

with or without clinical signs.

Compartment 

(compartmentalization)

An animal subpopulation contained in one or more establishments 

under a common biosecurity management system with a distinct 

health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases for 

which required surveillance, control, and biosecurity measures have 

been applied for the purpose of international trade.

Control Area A Control Area (an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone) has individual 

premises quarantine for Infected Premises, Suspect Premises, and 

Contact Premises and movement restrictions for At-Risk Premises 

and Monitored Premises.

Domestic birds See poultry.

Domestic poultry See poultry.

Emergency vaccination A disease control strategy using the immunization of susceptible 

animals through the administration of a vaccine comprising antigens 

appropriate to the disease to be controlled.

Etiology The causes or origin of disease, or the factors that produce or 

predispose toward a certain disease or disorder.

Euthanasia The humane destruction of an animal accomplished by a method that 

produces rapid unconsciousness and subsequent death with a 

minimum of pain or distress or a method that utilizes anesthesia 

produced by an agent that causes painless loss of consciousness and 

subsequent death.

February 2014 H-1
FAD PReP (Foreign 

Animal Disease 

Preparedness and 

Response Plan)

Document used to identify veterinary functions and countermeasures 

necessary to contain and control a foreign animal disease (FAD)

outbreak. It is also used to integrate functions and countermeasures 

with emergency management systems and operations conducted in 

Unified Command by local, State, and Federal personnel.

Fomites Inanimate objects that can transmit infectious agents from one animal 

or person to another.

Foreign animal disease A transboundary animal disease not known to exist in the U.S. animal 

population.

Galliformes An order of birds containing turkeys, grouse, chickens, quails, 

and pheasants. Common names are gamefowl or gamebirds, 

landfowl, gallinaceous birds, or galliformes.

Incident Command 

System

A standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach 

that

 allows for the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, 

procedures, and communications operating within a common 

organizational structure;

 enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions 

and functional agencies, both public and private; and 

 establishes common processes for planning and managing resources. 

Incubation period

(OIE)

For the purposes of the OIE Terrestrial Code (2013) the incubation 

period for ND shall be 21 days. The incubation period is the longest 

period which elapses between the introduction of the pathogen into 

the animal and the occurrence of the first clinical signs of the disease.

Index case The first or original case identified in a disease outbreak.

Mass depopulation Method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed 

quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the 

welfare of the animals as practicable, but where the circumstances 

and tasks facing those doing the depopulation are understood to be 

extenuating. 

Modified stamping-out 

policy

Animal health measures for stamping out that are not implemented in 

full. 

February 2014 H-2
Glossary

National Animal 

Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN)

NAHLN is a cooperative effort between two U.S. Department of 

Agriculture agencies and the American Association of Veterinary 

Laboratory Diagnosticians. It is a national network of State and 

University veterinary diagnostic laboratories, which use common 

testing methods and software platforms to perform diagnostics and 

share information.

Newcastle Disease 

(U.S. CFR)

Newcastle disease is an acute, rapidly spreading, and usually fatal 

viral infection of poultry caused by an avian paramyxovirus serotype 

1 that meets one of the following criteria for virulence: The virus has 

an intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) in day-old chicks (Gallus 

gallus) of 0.7 or greater; or multiple basic amino acids have been 

demonstrated in the virus (either directly or by deduction) at the Cterminus of the F2 protein and phenylalanine at residue 117, which is 

the N-terminus of the F1 protein. The term “multiple basic amino 

acids” refers to at least three arginine or lysine residues between 

residues 113 and 116. In this definition, amino acid residues are 

numbered from the N-terminus of the amino acid sequence deduced 

from the nucleotide sequence of the F0 gene; 113-116 corresponds to 

residues -4 to -1 from the cleavage site. Failure to demonstrate the 

characteristic pattern of amino acid residues as described above may 

require characterization of the isolated virus by an ICPI test. A failure 

to detect a cleavage site that is consistent with virulent strains does 

not confirm the absence of a virulent virus.

Newcastle Disease 

(OIE)

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, Newcastle disease (ND) is 

defined as an infection of poultry caused by a virus (NDV) of avian 

paramyxovirus serotype 1 (APMV-1) that meets one of the following 

criteria for virulence: 

a. the virus has an intracerebral pathogenicity indes (ICPI) in dayold chicks (Gallus gallus) of 0.7 or greater; or

b. multiple basic amino acids have been demonstrated in the virus 

(either directly or by deduction) at the C-terminus of the F2 

protein and phenylalanine at residue 117, which is the Nterminus of the F1 protein. The term ‘multiple basic amino 

acids’ refers to at least three arginine or lysine residues between 

residues 113 and 116. Failure to demonstrate the characteristic 

pattern of amino acid residues as described above would 

require characterization of the isolated virus by an ICPI test.

In this definition, amino acid residues are numbered from the Nterminus of the amino acid sequence deduced from the nucleotide 

sequence of the F0 gene, 113-116 corresponds to residues -4 to -1 of 

the cleavage site.

February 2014 H-3
Non-susceptible 

animal

Animal that does not develop a particular disease when exposed to 

the causative infectious agent of that disease.

OIE (World 

Organization for 

Animal Health)

Organization that collects and publishes information on animal 

diseases from 178 (in 2013) countries and develops standards for 

animal health.

Outbreak The occurrence of cases of a disease that are in excess of what is 

normally expected in a given population.

Pet bird Any bird that is kept for personal pleasure and is not for sale (9 CFR 

53).

Birds, except ratites, that are kept for the personal pleasure of their 

individual owners and not intended for resale (9 CFR 82).

Poultry Definitions of poultry may vary. The following definitions are found 

in the CFR:

 Chickens, ducks, geese, swans, turkeys, pigeons, doves, 

pheasants, grouse, partridges, quail, guinea fowl, and pea fowl 

(9 CFR 53).

 Chickens, doves, ducks, geese, grouse, guinea fowl, partridges, pea fowl, pheasants, pigeons, quail, swans, and turkeys (9 

CFR 82).

Personal protective 

equipment (PPE)

Clothing and equipment to prevent occupational injuries and diseases 

through control of exposure to potential hazards in the work place 

after engineering and administrative controls have been implemented 

to the fullest extent.

Preemptive slaughter Depopulation under the competent authority of susceptible animal 

species in herds or flocks on premises that have been exposed to 

infection by direct animal-to-animal contact or by indirect contact of 

a kind likely to cause the transmission of ND virus prior to the 

expression of clinical signs.

Premises A geographically and epidemiologically defined location, including a 

ranch, farm, stable, or other establishment.

Reassortment (genetic) The mixing of the genetic material of a species into new 

combinations in different individuals. For example, reassortment 

occurs frequently in influenza viruses, whose genomes consist of 

eight distinct segments of RNA. These segments act like minichromosomes, and each time a flu virus is assembled, it requires one 

copy of each segment.

February 2014 H-4
Glossary

Regionalization (also 

known as zoning)

An animal subpopulation defined primarily on a geographical basis 

(using natural, artificial, or legal boundaries). 

Stamping-out Means carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Authority, 

on confirmation of a disease, the killing of the animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected in the herd and, where 

appropriate, those in other herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, or by indirect contact of a 

kind likely to cause the transmission of the causal pathogen. All susceptible animals, vaccinated or unvaccinated, on an infected premises 

should be killed and their carcasses destroyed by burning or burial, or 

by any other method which will eliminate the spread of infection 

through the carcasses or products of the animals killed (OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code). 

Susceptible animal Any animal that can be infected with and replicate the disease 

pathogen of concern. The susceptible animals of primary concern to 

this plan are poultry.

Susceptible species See susceptible animal.

Trace back The identification of the origin and movements of all animals, animal 

products, possible fomites, people, possible vectors, and so on that 

have entered onto an infected premises.

Trace forward The tracing of all animals, people, fomites, and so on that have left an 

infected premises. The premises that received the animals or goods 

should be investigated and kept under surveillance or quarantine.

Vector An insect or any living carrier that transports an infectious agent from 

an infected individual to a susceptible individual or its food or 

immediate surroundings. 

Wild birds Migratory game birds, upland game birds, and all undomesticated 

feathered vertebrates.

Zoonotic Any disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from animals

to humans. 

February 2014 H-5
Appendix I

Abbreviations 

3D depopulation, disposal, and decontamination

AC Area Command

ADD Assistant District Director

AHPA Animal Health Protection Act

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

APMV-1 avian paramyxovirus serotype-1

ARP At-Risk Premises

AVMA American Veterinary Medical Association

BZ Buffer Zone

C&D cleaning and disinfection

CA Control Area

CCC Commodity Credit Corporation

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CEAH Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health

CF Contingency Fund

CFR U.S. Code of Federal Regulations

CP Contact Premises

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer

CVZ Containment Vaccination Zone

DF disease freedom

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOI U.S. Department of the Interior

ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

EMLC Emergency Management Leadership Council

EMRS Emergency Management Response System

END exotic Newcastle disease (now ND)

EOC emergency operations center

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

February 2014 I-1 
 

EQS Emergency Qualification System

ESF Emergency Support Function

FA Free Area

FAD foreign animal disease

FADDL Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

FAD PReP Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFS Federal-to-Federal support

F0 fusion protein precursor

FP Free Premises

HA hemagglutination

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HI hemagglutination inhibition

IC Incident Command

ICG Incident Coordination Group

ICP Incident Command Post

ICPI intracerebral pathogenicity index

ICS Incident Command System

IMT Incident Management Team

IP Infected Premises

IZ Infected Zone

JIC Joint Information Center

LBMS live bird marketing system

loNDV low virulence Newcastle disease virus

LPA Legislative and Public Affairs

MAC multiagency coordination

MP Monitored Premises

NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency Management System

NAHERC National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps

NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network

ND Newcastle disease

NDV Newcastle disease virus

February 2014 I-2 
Abbreviations

NGO non-governmental organizations

NIMS National Incident Management System

NPIC National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center

NRF National Response Framework

NVS National Veterinary Stockpile

NVSL National Veterinary Services Laboratories

NVSL-Ames NVSL location for FAD diagnostic testing in Ames, IA 

NVSL-FADDL NVSL location for FAD diagnostic testing in Plum Island, NY

OIE World Organization for Animal Health

PCR polymerase chain reaction

PPE personal protective equipment

PVZ Protection Vaccination Zone

RNA ribonucleic acid

ROSS Resource Ordering and Status System

rRT-PCR real-time reverse polymerase chain reaction

SAHO State Animal Health Official

SITC Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance

SOP standard operating procedure

SP Suspect Premises

SPF specific pathogen free

SPRS Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services

SZ Surveillance Zone

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

VI virus isolation

vNDV virulent Newcastle disease virus

VP Vaccinated Premises

VS Veterinary Services

VZ Vaccination Zone

February 2014 I-3 
Appendix J

Selected References and Resources

Note: This appendix lists documents related to Newcastle disease (ND) response. 

All related FAD PReP documents listed in Appendix A are also references for this 

ND Response Plan.

APHIS USDA. Standard Operating Procedures. Exotic Newcastle Disease 

(END) Task Force. October 30, 2003.

APHIS USDA. Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination 

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