Final Report for the 2017 Outbreak 

of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)/

Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (LPAI) 

in the Southeastern United States

August 8, 2017

1

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

Veterinary Services

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination
Overview

• This presentation summarizes the 2017 HPAI/LPAI 

outbreak in the southeastern United States.

• Many thanks to the numerous individuals and groups 

that contributed to this outbreak’s successful 

response. 

• To view the full report, please visit: 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep and select HPAI 

Response and Policy Information. 

2
Nature of Disease

• Avian influenza (AI) is an infectious disease of birds 

including poultry, such as chickens and turkeys.

– AI can also infect other mammals, such as pigs, cats, and 

rarely humans.

• At times, AI can be fatal.

• Influenza A viruses are broadly categorized based on 

a combination of two groups of proteins: 

– hemagglutinin or “H” proteins (H1-H16), and 

– neuraminidase or “N” proteins (N1-N9). 

• Transmission typically occurs through direct contact 

as well as indirect contact with fomites.

3
HPAI and LPAI

• Waterfowl are natural reservoirs for AI viruses, but most 

infections of wild birds are asymptomatic.

• Based on the severity of illness in chickens and the 

genetic features of the virus, the disease is classified as 

either HPAI or LPAI.

• Any HPAI and all H5 and H7 subtypes from poultry are 

reportable; H5 and H7 subtypes have the potential to 

change from LPAI to HPAI during infections in domestic 

poultry.

4
Incident Timeline

• March 3, 2017: Samples from a flock with clinical signs in 

Lincoln County, Tennessee, were presumptive positive for H7 

influenza at a National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN) lab.

• March 4, 2017: National Veterinary Services Laboratories 

(NVSL) confirmed HPAI on the premises. The virus was 

subsequently identified as H7N9 of North American wild bird 

lineage (unrelated to Asian H7N9 viruses). 

• March 8, 2017: NVSL confirmed LPAI H7N9 in a neighboring 

Tennessee county.

• March 25, 2017: Between March 8th and March 25th, NVSL 

confirmed H7 or H7N9 on 14 premises. HPAI was confirmed 

on 2 of these premises, both in Lincoln County, Tennessee.

5
Epidemiological Curve by Earliest Known 

Date of Infection per State*

6

1 1 1

2 2 2

1

1

2

1

0

1

2

3

2-Mar3-Mar4-Mar5-Mar6-Mar7-Mar8-Mar9-Mar

10-Mar11-Mar12-Mar13-Mar14-Mar15-Mar16-Mar17-Mar18-Mar19-Mar20-Mar21-Mar22-Mar23-Mar24-Mar25-Mar26-Mar27-Mar28-Mar29-Mar30-Mar

Georgia

Kentucky

Alabama

HPAI Tennessee HPAI

*This may be the date clinical signs were observed, when the suspect case definition was met, or 

when there was a presumptive positive result at a NAHLN laboratory.
Affected Counties in the 2017 H7 Outbreak

7

Note: Map produced during the incident by the USDA APHIS VS Center for Epidemiology and 

Animal Health. 
2017 H7 Detections by Flock Type and

by NVSL Confirmation Date*

8

*NVSL confirmation date is the first date of confirmatory test result from NVSL. Pathogenicity was 

not confirmed in some of the detections.
Scope of the Outbreak

• Of the 14 Infected Premises, nearly 253,000 birds were 

depopulated as part of the HPAI and LPAI detections, or had 

succumbed to the HPAI virus. 

• Nearly 99 percent of these birds were in commercial broiler 

breeder flocks. 

• The 2017 incident provided yet another opportunity to test AI 

preparedness and response procedures along with improved 

processes.

• While challenges still remain, the lessons learned from the 

2014–2015 outbreak and the 2016 outbreak helped USDA 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), States, and 

industry mount an effective and rapid response to this HPAI/LPAI 

incident.

9
Transmission

• USDA APHIS, in collaboration with APHIS Wildlife Services and the 

affected States, conducted epidemiologic, genetic, and wildlife 

investigations.

• Based on molecular and epidemiological evidence, it appears there 

was lateral spread between the first and the second HPAI Infected 

Premises.

• However, for LPAI, the evidence suggests multiple, independent 

introductions. 

• In 2017, risk factors for virus introduction included:

– the presence of rodents or other wild mammals, 

– the presence of waterfowl,

– condition of the poultry housing, and

– gaps in biosecurity protocols (particularly allowing entry of the 

virus from the environment into the barn). 

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Transmission in Wild Birds

• H7 influenza A viruses are known 

to circulate in low pathogenicity 

forms among wild waterfowl. 

• Testing of >400 samples from wild 

birds and small mammals around 

the Infected Premises did not 

detect H7N9 virus.

• Introduction was likely several 

weeks prior to detection.

• However, a highly similar virus was 

found in a blue-winged teal from 

Wyoming in September 2016.

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For more information, please see the 

USDA APHIS VS Epidemiologic and Other 

Analyses of HPAI/LPAI Affected Poultry 

Flocks from the Center for Epidemiology 

and Animal Health available, here. 
Overview of Response Effort

• A unified State-Federal Incident Command (Tennessee, Alabama, 

and USDA APHIS) responded to the HPAI detections and the LPAI 

detections related to the initial HPAI findings.

• A unified Incident Command Post was established in Nashville, 

Tennessee.

• Kentucky and Georgia managed their LPAI Infected Premises with 

support from VS Surveillance Preparedness and Response Services 

(SPRS) District 2 and 3, as requested.

– Per 9 CFR 56, LPAI response—including the disposition of Infected Premises—

is under the jurisdiction and authority of the States; States request assistance 

from USDA APHIS as needed.

• For policy guidance and resource coordination, the HPAI Incident 

Coordination Group (ICG) at APHIS headquarters was ramped up.

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Incident Management

• SPRS District 2 personnel filled the role of an IMT and deployed 

to the unified Incident Command Post.

– A full VS National Incident Management Team was not deployed in 

this response.

• The IMT and unified Incident Command routed requests for 

information and resources through the HPAI ICG. 

• The HPAI ICG managed incident coordination and resource 

requests.

• The VS Executive Team was responsible for strategic policy and 

procedures and provided assistance as requested by the HPAI 

ICG. 

– A Multiagency Coordination Group was not needed, but remained 

on-call.

13
Personnel

• For the entire incident, there were 51 total deployments of APHIS 

personnel.

– Of the 51 APHIS deployments, 45 (88 percent) were on-site.

– Of the 45 VS deployments, 41 (91 percent) were from SPRS.

– Of the 41 SPRS deployments, 34 (83 percent) were District 2 personnel.

• Of the 51 deployments, 10 (20 percent) were term-hires.

• There were 19 on-site deployments for the State of Tennessee; 

Alabama had 10 on-site deployments.

• At the height of response operations, there were on average 75 

personnel deployed on any given day (including APHIS, State, local, 

and contracted personnel).

• In addition, 49 APHIS personnel (virtual or at hubs), supported the 

HPAI ICG.

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Total Number of APHIS and State Personnel 

Deployed per Day

15

9

1315161717191819

24242526

2928

3233343536

3131313333353535353535343434

282828262525

0 0 0 2

11

13

13

171719

191919

222222

23

2323

2323

272727

222222

2222

222222222220

191919

191919

191919

0

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

State

Agriculture

Department

(TN and AL)

USDA:APHIS
16

Total Number of APHIS Personnel Deployed to the 

Field by Organizational Unit

Note: VS= Veterinary Services, WS = Wildlife Services, and MRPBS = Marketing and Regulatory Program Business 

Services.

41

4

4

2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

VS WS MRPBS

Virtual

On-Site
17

Total Number of APHIS Personnel Assigned 

to the National ICG at APHIS Hub or Home Location, by 

Organizational Unit

Note: SPRS = Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services; STAS = Science, Technology, and Analysis Services; 

MRPBS = Marketing and Regulatory Program Business Services; WS = Wildlife Services; ODA= Office of the VS 

Deputy Administrator; PSS = Program Support Services; LPA = Legislative and Public Affairs; NIES = National Import 

Export Services; AC = Animal Care.

22

16

3

2 2

1 1 1 1

0

5

10

15

20

25

SPRS STAS MRPBS WS ODA PSS LPA NIES AC
Contractors

• Additional support to both the unified Incident 

Command and HPAI ICG was provided by contractors. 

• Part-time personnel supported the HPAI ICG; APHIS-hired 

contractors worked to support the unified Incident 

Command personnel in the field, providing services and 

materials relating to depopulation and disposal of the 

HPAI-infected flocks.

• LPAI Infected Premises that depopulated did so with their 

own resources (company or contracted); APHIS-hired 

contractors did not support these operations.

18
Contractor Support for Response Operations for 

HPAI Infected Premises

19

Note: This figure only included contractors hired by the SPRS Logistics Center/National Veterinary Stockpile 

(NVS) for the HPAI Infected Premises.

0 0 0

30 30

28

3 3

0 0 0 0 0 0

8

44

46

17

8

19

13

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1-Mar2-Mar3-Mar4-Mar5-Mar6-Mar7-Mar8-Mar9-Mar

10-Mar11-Mar12-Mar13-Mar14-Mar15-Mar16-Mar17-Mar18-Mar19-Mar20-Mar21-Mar22-Mar23-Mar24-Mar25-Mar26-Mar27-Mar28-Mar29-Mar30-Mar
Overview of Response Activities

• HPAI Infected Premises depopulated using foam. 

• LPAI Infected Premises depopulated using a variety of 

methods (ventilation shutdown was not implemented).

• Twelve premises depopulated some or all of their birds.

– All premises that depopulated birds used burial as their method 

of disposal.

– Eleven premises conducted virus elimination; 7 of 11 used wet 

disinfectant for virus elimination (including both HPAI Infected 

Premises).

• On average, it took premises 48 days from NVSL 

confirmation to restock approval (range of 23 to 92 days); 

HPAI premises took on average 87 days.

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Surveillance and Diagnostics Summary

• Commercial premises were rapidly identified and sampled in the HPAI 

Control Areas and Surveillance Zones.

• Door-to-door surveillance was conducted to identify all backyard 

premises in the HPAI Control Area and Surveillance Zones.

• For HPAI detections, there were 109 premises sampled (Alabama & 

Tennessee); this includes all surveillance in the Control Areas, 

Surveillance Zones, as well as other surveillance that occurred (e.g., 

voluntary industry testing and pre-movement testing). 

• For LPAI detections, there were 435 premises sampled (Alabama, 

Georgia, Kentucky, & Tennessee); this includes all surveillance in the 

Surveillance Zones, as well as other surveillance that occurred (e.g., 

voluntary industry testing and pre-movement testing). 

• Laboratory services (NVSL and State operated NAHLN labs) were a 

major component of the response effort, for both initial diagnostics 

and surveillance activities.

21
Appraisal and Compensation Summary

• As in the 2016 outbreak, processes developed as a result of 

challenges during the 2014–2015 outbreak were 

implemented.

• Indemnity payments for the 2 HPAI Infected Premises were 

rapidly distributed.

• Owners and growers of LPAI-infected flocks that made the 

decision to depopulate, in coordination with State officials, 

were not indemnified by APHIS.

• Flat-rate payments were distributed to HPAI Infected Premises 

for virus elimination activities.

• LPAI Infected Premises that elected to depopulate and 

completed disposal and virus elimination activities were not

compensated by APHIS. 

22
Permit and Movement Summary

• Permits were issued using the Emergency Management 

Response System 2.0 (EMRS2) and the EMRS2 Customer 

Permit Gateway.

• In total, 19 permits were issued resulting in 103 distinct 

movements.

• Movements were made direct to farms, direct to 

hatcheries, direct to slaughter, and into commerce. 

– Movements to a farm accounted for 90 percent of all 

movements.

• The majority of movements were within the Control Area.

• Of the movements, 98 percent originated in Tennessee.

23
End of Outbreak and Cost

• Incident was restricted in size and scope.

– 4 States (AL, KY, GA, & TN)

– HPAI: 2 Infected Premises (single county)

– LPAI: 12 Infected Premises (confirmed or presumptive; 6 commercial 

flocks, 6 backyard flocks)

• Response operations, including virus elimination, 

environmental sampling, and restocking approvals were 

completed throughout late spring.

• April 11, 2017: The Control Area was released after 28 days.

• April 27, 2017: All Surveillance Zones were released.

• June 16, 2017: Last Infected Premises quarantine was 

released.

• USDA obligated $2.79 million to pay for indemnity and 

response activities.

– LPAI Infected Premises that depopulated did not receive APHIS 

indemnity funds or compensation for virus elimination activities. 24
Summary of Key Events during the 2017 Outbreak 

25

Note: NVSL confirmation date is when a “confirmed status” was placed on the premises in EMRS2, based 

on a positive diagnostic test result at NVSL. For this outbreak, this was the date of the first confirmatory 

result from NVSL.
Economic and Trade Impact

• Approximately 11 countries imposed restrictions on 

poultry and/or poultry products from the entire 

United States.

• Most countries chose a regionalization approach. 

• Such regionalization decisions helped to significantly 

limit the economic impact of this incident. 

• Notably, some countries still are imposing 

restrictions from previous HPAI outbreaks in the 

United States.

26
Ongoing Challenges

• While this outbreak was small in scale, there were still 

unique challenges, which included:

– confirming sufficient numbers of personnel are medically 

cleared and fit-tested, and that information is readily available.

– ensuring NAHLN laboratories can electronically message 

diagnostic test results to LMS to automatically integrate with 

other data in EMRS2; staff proficiency in EMRS2.

– assigning a site manager to monitor biosecurity compliance.

– rapid deployment of personnel and functioning equipment and 

resource/personnel tracking post-deployment.

– streamlining epidemiological investigations.

– clarifying procedures for LPAI detections and surveillance in a 

HPAI/LPAI incident. 

27
Policy Updates

• Additionally, there is revised guidance as a result of the 

continued planning efforts to respond to HPAI.

• Some notable updates include:

– HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book

– New State Checklist

– Post C&D Environmental Sampling Guide.

• To see these documents, and to stay current with all HPAI 

policy guidance and updates, please visit 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep (go to the HPAI page).

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