SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1319-22 

IN THE MATTER OF 

BOROUGH OF CARTERET, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

and 

LOCAL 67, FIREFIGHTERS 

MUTUAL BENEVOLENT 

ASSOCIATION, 

 Respondent-Respondent. 

___________________________ 

NEW JERSEY PUBLIC 

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 

COMMISSION, 

 

Respondent. 

___________________________

Argued April 10, 2024 – Decided April 25, 2024 

Before Judges Firko and Susswein. 

On appeal from the New Jersey Public Employment 

Relations Commission, PERC No. CU-2019-020. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1319-22

Thaddeus John Del Guercio argued the cause for 

appellant (McManimon, Scotland & Bauman, LLC, 

attorneys; Thaddeus John Del Guercio, of counsel and 

on the briefs).

Raymond George Heineman, Jr., argued the cause for 

respondent Local 67, Firefighters Mutual Benevolent

Association (Kroll, Heineman, Ptasiewicz & Parsons,

attorneys; Raymond George Heineman, Jr., of counsel 

and on the brief).

John Andrew Boppert, Deputy General Counsel, argued

the cause for respondent New Jersey Public 

Employment Relations Commission (Christine R. 

Lucarelli, General Counsel, attorney; John Andrew 

Boppert, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

Petitioner Borough of Carteret (Borough) appeals from a November 22, 

2022 final agency decision of the Public Employment Relations Commission 

(PERC) denying the Borough's clarification of unit (CU) petition to exclude 

lieutenants from Firefighters Mutual Benevolent Association, Local 67 (Local 

67), a collective bargaining unit that also represents rank-and-file members of 

the Borough's fire department. Reversing the decision of its Director of 

Representation (Director), the PERC Board concluded there was no actual or 

potential conflict of interest as to require severing a combined unit that has been 

in existence since 1965. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the 

governing legal principles and arguments of the parties, we affirm. 
3 A-1319-22

I.

We discern the following pertinent facts and procedural history from the 

record. The Borough is a civil service municipality. Since the 1960s, Local 67 

has represented both superior officers and rank-and-file firefighters. In 

December 2012, the Borough adopted an ordinance creating the title of 

lieutenant. Lieutenants were permitted to join Local 67. 

The Carteret Fire Department consists of one fire chief, five lieutenants, 

and fourteen firefighters. There are no captains. The chief and lieutenants have 

managerial duties. Lieutenants report to the chief. 

 In 2015, the Borough filed a CU petition to require the creation of a new 

bargaining unit for lieutenants and captains on the grounds that separate 

bargaining units would prevent conflicts during contract negotiations. In 

February 2015, the Borough and Local 67 held an initial conference with a 

PERC representative. On May 13, 2015, the State approved the creation of the 

new union. Counsel for Local 67, Craig Gumpel, advised the Borough that 

creation of the new unit would have to be put to Local 67's delegates for 

approval. 

 In a May 2015 email, Gumpel advised that the New Jersey Firefighters 

Mutual Benevolent Association approved the creation of Local 267 for rank-
4 A-1319-22

and-file firefighters. But Gumpel also noted he had not received confirmation 

Local 67 had addressed the issue. Local 67 President Jason Kurdyla later 

attested that Local 67 did not approve the agreement to sever the unit or to 

change its structure. 

In a June 2, 2015 email, PERC advised the Borough that the new unit 

"would not need to sign a [C]amden [A]ffidavit if the [t]own was going to 

voluntarily recognize the new unit and the parties did not need to go through 

PERC" to complete the severance.1 On June 22, 2015, the Borough's attorney 

received another email from PERC stating that if the Borough was going to 

voluntarily recognize the new unit, it should withdraw its 2015 CU petition. The 

record reflects that the severance agreement was never implemented. 

 On September 11, 2018, the Borough and Local 67 commenced 

negotiations for a new collective negotiations agreement.2 On December 14, 

2018—at the third contract negotiations meeting—the Borough raised the issue 

that captains and lieutenants should be severed from Local 67. At the final 

1

 See City of Camden, P.E.R.C. No. 82-89, 8 N.J.P.E.R. 226 (¶ 13094 1982) 

(identifying and outlining an organization's responsibility to create a separate 

organizational structure to represent supervisors). 

2

 The exiting collective negotiations agreement was effective from January 1, 

2011, through December 31, 2015, but was to remain effective until a new 

agreement was signed. 
5 A-1319-22

contract negotiation meeting on January 14, 2019, the Borough announced they 

would not bargain with representatives of both groups in the room. Both parties 

filed unfair practice charges.3 On March 25, 2019, PERC directed the Borough 

to file a new CU petition. 

 On April 11, 2019, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) conducted an 

audit of lieutenant job duties. The CSC audit found that a lieutenant "makes 

recommendations but does not have the authority to hire and fire personnel, 

prepare performance evaluations, or implement disciplinary action." The audit 

also found that lieutenants "report directly to the [f]ire [c]hief and provide 

limited [first] level supervision to [f]ire [f]ighters." In its October 29, 2019 final 

administrative action, the CSC found lieutenants in the Borough were "not 

performing necessary and daily supervisory duties." 

 PERC initiated an administrative investigation regarding the 2019 CU 

petition pursuant to N.J.A.C 19:11-2.2. As part of that investigation, on June 

26, 2020, PERC requested answers in the form of sworn affidavits from the 

Borough and Local 67. The Borough submitted an affidavit of Chief Mark 

Hruska. Local 67 submitted affidavits from Local 67 President Kurdyla and 

3

 PERC has held those charges in abeyance pending resolution of the severance 

issue. 
6 A-1319-22

Lieutenant Nathaniel Reynolds. The Director did not convene an evidentiary 

hearing. 

 On August 1, 2022, the Director issued his decision, granting the 2019 CU 

petition "to exclude lieutenants from the negotiations unit of lieutenants and 

firefighters represented by Local 67." The Director reasoned the long history of 

the combined unit was not enough to overcome the potential conflict of interest 

created by having lieutenants and rank-and-file firefighters represented by the 

same unit. 

 Local 67 sought a review of the Director's decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 

19:11-8.1.4 PERC agreed to review the Director's decision. At an October 27, 

2022 meeting, one of the PERC commissioners questioned why the issue was 

being reopened seven years after it was first addressed in the Borough's 2015 

petition. An unidentified speaker noted the lieutenants claimed that because 

there were no longer fire captains in the unit, there was potential for conflict 

between the lieutenants and rank-and-file firefighters. Another commissioner 

commented, "[w]e have to deal with the record that's before us and the facts that 

are before us. And, that's what the Director did and that's what the Commission 

4

 N.J.A.C. 19:11-8.1(a) provides: "[w]ithin [ten] days of service on it of the 

Director of Representation's decision, order or direction, any aggrieved party 

may file a request to review with the Commission." 
7 A-1319-22

decision has to be." Ultimately, the matter was tabled for presentation at the 

next PERC meeting. 

 At the next meeting on November 22, 2022, the Board reversed the 

Director's decision, concluding the record did not indicate lieutenants had 

effective supervisory authority over rank-and-file firefighters. PERC issued a 

thirteen-page final agency decision. 

 This appeal follows. The Borough raises the following contentions for 

our consideration: (1) PERC erred because the presence of supervisory fire 

lieutenants and rank-and-file firefighters in the same bargaining unit constitutes 

an inherent conflict of interest; (2) PERC erred in failing to consider or give 

effect to the 2015 agreement of the parties to bifurcate the bargaining unit 

commencing with the next round of contract negotiations;5 and (3) the absence 

of any "employer representative" PERC Board member input in the final agency 

decision biased the Borough as a public employer and thus no deference should 

be given to the Board's findings.6 

II. 

5

 This issue was not addressed in the final agency decision. 

6

 This argument was not raised at the Board meeting and is not addressed in the 

final agency decision. 
8 A-1319-22

 We first address the Borough's contention the PERC Board erred in 

overturning the decision rendered by the Director. We begin our analysis by 

acknowledging the limited scope of our review. "[A]n appellate court reviews 

agency decisions under an arbitrary and capricious standard." Zimmerman v. 

Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019); see Melnyk v. 

Bd. of Educ. of the Delsea Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 241 N.J. 31, 40 (2020). "An 

agency's determination on the merits 'will be sustained unless there is a clear 

showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair 

support in the record.'" Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 

219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. 

Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). The party challenging the administrative action 

bears the burden of making that showing. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 

(2014). 

 Turning to substantive legal principles, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 provides in 

relevant part: 

Except as hereinafter provided, public employees shall 

have, and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right, 

freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, 

join and assist any employee organization or to refrain 

from any such activity; provided, however, that this 

right shall not extend to . . . except where established 

practice, prior agreement or special circumstances 

dictate the contrary, . . . shall any supervisor having the
9 A-1319-22

power to hire, discharge, discipline, or to effectively 

recommend the same, have the right to be represented 

in collective negotiations by an employee organization 

that admits nonsupervisory personnel to membership 

. . . 

 

 In Bd. of Educ. of Town of W. Orange v. Wilton, our Supreme Court 

explained "that where a substantial actual or potential conflict of interest exists 

among supervisors . . . and obligations to the employer in relation to each other, 

the requisite community of interest among them is lacking, and that unit . . . is 

not an appropriate negotiating unit." 57 N.J. 404, 427 (1971). The Court noted 

the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations drafted a model 

statute defining "supervisory employee" as "'any individual having authority, in 

the interest of the employer, (i) to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, 

promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or (ii) 

responsibility to direct them, or (iii) to adjust their grievances, or (iv) effectively 

to recommend such action.'" Id. at 418 (quoting Government Employee 

Relations Report, § 51.215 (1970)). The Court added that amongst the 

employees represented within a negotiating unit, there should be a regard for the 

community of interest. Id. at 419. 

In its final agency decision, PERC cites to and relies on its prior decisions 

pertaining to collective negotiating units comprised of both supervisors and 
10 A-1319-22

subordinates. The final agency decision quotes, for example, from a prior 

decision in which PERC explained: 

We presume that in paramilitary organizations, such as 

fire departments, an inherent potential conflict of

interest exists between superior officers and [rank-andfile] uniformed personnel. See West New York, 

[P.E.R.C. No. 87-114, 13 N.J.P.E.R. 277 (¶18115 

1987)]. The presumption is not dependent upon a 

finding of the supervisory status of superiors or upon 

the presence of actual conflict among the groups. 

[Ibid.] An exception may be found in small units if the 

duties and authority of superiors and [rank-and-file] are 

virtually identical so that any potential for conflict 

between the ranks is de minimis. See Town of 

Harrison, P.E.R.C. No. 93-104, 19 [N.J.P.E.R.] 268 

(¶24134 1993), affirming H.O. No. 93-1, 19 

[N.J.P.E.R.] 39 (¶24018 1992). This situation is 

normally found in a very small public safety 

departments, where the lines of demarcation between

ranks is slight. 

[D.R. No. 2023-2, 49 N.J.P.E.R. 90 (¶19, 2022), at 16-

17).] 

After reviewing the Director's decision in light of the record, the PERC 

Board diverged from the Director's central finding, stating: 

Here, we find the record presented does not support a 

conclusion that lieutenants have authority to hire,

discharge or recommend discipline, to a significant

degree. Chief Hruska admits that as "Carteret is a Civil 

Service jurisdiction, lieutenants do not have the 

authority to hire, fire or formally discipline other 

employees." 
11 A-1319-22

[Carteret Boro., P.E.R.C. No. 2023-16, 49 N.J.P.E.R. 

266 (¶ 61, 2022), at 8) (emphasis in original).] 

The final agency decision adds, "Chief [Hruska] gave no examples of specific 

disciplinary recommendations made by lieutenants." Id. at 9 (emphasis in 

original). 

The Board concluded, 

it is clear that under N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3, the 

lieutenants would not qualify as supervisors "having 

the power to hire, discharge, [or] discipline" unless they 

possess the power to "effectively recommend" such 

actions. On this question, there must be at least some 

evidence, which is not present here, demonstrating the 

lieutenants exercised the "effectively recommend" 

authority. 

[Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).] 

The Board acknowledged that even "[a]bsent the power to effectively 

recommend, unit bifurcation may be required here if there is evidence that the 

lieutenants otherwise exercise 'significant authority' over the [rank-and-file]." 

Id. at 12. But the Board ultimately concluded, "[t]he record in this matter does 

not contain such evidence." Id. at 12. We see no basis upon which to overturn 

that finding. See Stevens v. Bd. of Trs. of Pub. Emp.'s Ret. Sys., 294 N.J. Super. 

643, 651 (App. Div. 1996) ("As a general rule, when an administrative agency 
12 A-1319-22

makes a finding of fact, we will not disturb that decision unless the finding is 

not supported by substantial credible evidence."). 

We add that at oral argument before us, counsel for the Borough candidly 

acknowledged there has been no significant change in circumstances—no 

"epiphany," to use counsel's characterization—to justify changing the 

longstanding membership of Local 67 against its will. That membership 

structure constitutes "established practice" within the meaning of the exception 

to the general rule as set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3. We emphasize, moreover, 

the final agency decision cites to and applies PERC's own precedents in 

concluding there is no need to alter Local 67's long history of representing both 

superior and rank-and-file firefighters. We decline to substitute our judgment 

for the agency, as we are not persuaded it acted arbitrarily or capriciously in 

rendering its final decision. See Saccone, 219 N.J. at 380. 

III. 

We turn next to the Borough's argument PERC ignored the parties' 2015 

agreement to bifurcate the negotiations unit for their next collective bargaining 

agreement. No one disputes "[t]here is a strong public policy favoring the 

settlement of litigation." Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 618, 

626 (App. Div. 1987) (citing Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 472, 476-77 
13 A-1319-22

(App. Div. 1961)). "[S]ettlement agreements will be honored 'absent a 

demonstration of "fraud or other compelling circumstances."'" Nolan v. Lee Ho, 

120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (quoting Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124 

(App. Div. 1983). But here, the record establishes Local 67 did not ratify any 

agreement or approve a change in its structure. Accordingly, the severance 

agreement was never consummated. In these circumstances, we do not believe 

PERC erred by failing to account for the 2015 agreement in the final agency 

decision. 

IV. 

We need only briefly address the Borough's contention it was unfairly 

prejudiced by the absence of an "employer representative" Board member at the 

November 22, 2022 hearing. N.J.S.A 34:13A-5.2. provides: 

The commission shall consist of seven members to be

appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and 

consent of the Senate. Of such members, two shall be 

representative of public employers, two shall be 

representative of public employee organizations and

three shall be representative of the public including the 

appointee who is designated as chairman. 

The Borough argues it was prejudiced because there was only one public 

employer representative on the Board and he had to recuse himself on this 

matter. So far as the record before us shows, however, no objection to the 
14 A-1319-22

quorum was raised when the Board considered and voted on the Borough's CU 

petition. Rather, this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, only after the 

Board rendered its decision against the Borough. 

 PERC argues that "[s]ince its establishment in 1968, and notwithstanding 

the existence of vacancies, the Commission has exercised the powers and duties 

granted to it by the Act as long as a quorum is present and sufficient 

Commissioners are eligible to vote on the matters before it." We are 

unpersuaded this longstanding practice violates the letter or spirit of N.J.S.A. 

34:13A-5.1 to -5.2. We decline to invalidate the vote based on the background 

of the specific commissioners comprising the quorum. Nor do we afford less 

deference to the agency's final decision based on the specific commissioners 

who voted in this matter. 

 We are likewise unpersuaded by the Borough's argument that a 

commissioner's comments expressing his personal opinion during the Board 

meeting undermines the final agency decision. Our review on appeal focuses 

on the written agency decision, not comments by individual commissioners. In 

the analogous context of decisions issued by Municipal Boards, we have stressed 

that Board members do not act individually. See Scully-Bozarth Post # 1817 of 

Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Plan. Bd. of City of Burlington, 362 N.J. 
15 A-1319-22

Super. 296, 312 (App. Div. 2003). Instead, "[t]he [B]oard acts as a body. The 

[municipal] resolution provides the body's findings and conclusions, expressed 

by those who vote to adopt the resolution." Ibid. Furthermore, 

[w]hether the final version of the [municipal] 

resolution, as adopted, differs from any comments 

publicly made by one or more members voting on it, or 

whether one or more members did not publicly 

comment at all, does not detract from the resolution's 

status as the official statement of the [B]oard's findings

and conclusions. 

[Id. at 312-13; see N.Y. SMSA v. Bd. of Adj. of Twp. 

of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333-34 (App. Div. 

2004) ("[R]emarks [made by an individual Board 

member] at best reflect the beliefs of the speaker and 

cannot be assumed to represent the findings of an entire 

Board.").] 

Individual comments do "not detract from the resolution's status as the official 

statement of the [B]oard's findings and conclusions." Scully-Bozarth, 362 N.J. 

Super. at 312-13. 

Here, the final agency decision constitutes the official statement of the 

PERC Board's findings and conclusions. Our review of that written decision 

reveals no basis for overturning it. To the extent we have not specifically 

addressed them, any remaining arguments raised by the Borough lack sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.