PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4067

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM DAVID BRIDGES, a/k/a William Davis Bridges,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, 

District Judge. (2:12-cr-00022-JPJ-PMS-1)

Argued: December 11, 2013 Decided: January 27, 2014

Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, 

in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Diaz joined.

ARGUED: Brian Jackson Beck, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer R. 

Bockhorst, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon, 

Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Larry W. Shelton, Federal 

Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Roanoke, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, 

Virginia, for Appellee.
2

THACKER, Circuit Judge:

A federal grand jury indicted Appellant William David 

Bridges (“Appellant”) on one count of traveling in interstate 

commerce and knowingly failing to update his sex offender 

registration in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Appellant moved 

to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his plea of nolo 

contendere to attempted sexual battery in Florida state court, 

in which adjudication was withheld, does not qualify as a 

conviction within the meaning of the Sex Offender Registration 

and Notification Act (“SORNA”). The district court denied the 

motion, and Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty, 

reserving only his right to appeal the district court’s “denial 

of [his] Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.” J.A. 58.1 We 

conclude the district court correctly found Appellant’s plea of 

nolo contendere with adjudication withheld constitutes a 

conviction for the purposes of SORNA because it resulted in a 

penal consequence. Consequently, we affirm. 

I.

On February 17, 1999, Appellant entered a plea of nolo

contendere in Florida state court to a charge of Attempted 

Sexual Battery upon a Child under 16 Years of Age, in violation 

 1

 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed 

by the parties in this appeal.
3

of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(3) (1996) (amended 1999).2 That same day, 

the Florida state court entered a written judgment in the case, 

ordering that “ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE WITHHELD.” J.A. 15. 

The order directed Appellant to pay court costs and serve two 

years of probation, which “may terminate upon entry into the 

[United States] Army.” Id. at 18. Appellant also received 

credit for three days served in jail. 

As a result of this judgment, Appellant was required 

to register as a sex offender under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. 

§ 943.0435. On September 30, 2000, he was arrested by Florida 

authorities for failure to register. After entering a plea of 

nolo contendere in Florida state court, Appellant received a 

one-year sentence of probation. The state court later revoked 

his probation because he failed to report to his probation 

 2 The version of the statute in effect at the time of 

Appellant’s offense conduct provided, in pertinent part: 

A person who: . . . (3) Commits an act defined as 

sexual battery under s. 794.011(1)(h) upon any child 

under the age of 16 years . . . commits a felony of 

the second degree . . . . Neither the victim’s lack of 

chastity nor the victim’s consent is a defense to the 

crime proscribed by this section.

Fla. Stat. § 800.04(3) (1996). An act of “sexual battery,” in 

turn, is defined as “oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or 

union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal 

penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual 

battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical 

purpose.” Fla. Stat. § 794.011(1)(h) (1996). 
4

officer and, on September 26, 2001, sentenced him to 68 days in 

custody. 

Appellant moved to Virginia in 2010, where he 

registered as a sex offender. However, on August 2, 2011, 

Virginia authorities discovered Appellant no longer lived at his 

reported address in Weber City, Virginia, and he had not updated 

his registration with a new address. He was ultimately located 

at his new residence in Gaylord, Michigan, where he had also 

failed to register as a sex offender. 

On July 23, 2012, a federal grand jury in the Western 

District of Virginia returned a single-count indictment charging 

Appellant with traveling in interstate commerce and knowingly 

failing to update his sex offender registration, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2250. On October 10, 2012, Appellant filed a motion 

to dismiss the indictment, arguing only that “[b]ecause [he]

entered a plea of nolo contendere and was not adjudged guilty by 

the state of Florida of a sex offense, he has never been 

‘convicted’ of a sex offense” for the purposes of the federal 

registration requirements. J.A. 12. The district court denied 

Appellant’s motion, concluding that his nolo contendere plea 

did indeed qualify as a conviction under SORNA.

Shortly after the district court issued its ruling,

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Pursuant to his written plea agreement, 
5

Appellant “expressly waive[d]” his right to appeal, with the 

“sole exception” of “the right to appeal the Court’s denial of 

[his] Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.” J.A. 58 (emphasis 

supplied). Appellant now challenges the district court’s denial 

of his motion to dismiss.3

II.

Where, as here, a district court’s denial of a motion 

to dismiss an indictment depends solely on a question of law, we 

review the district court’s ruling de novo. See United States 

 3 Appellant attempts to raise one additional argument that 

is clearly outside the scope of the ruling he is entitled to 

challenge as part of his conditional guilty plea. Specifically, 

he contends “the district court erred in its construction of the 

definition of sex offense under SORNA” because, applying the 

modified categorical approach to his attempted sexual battery 

conviction, the Government cannot prove there was at least a 

four-year age differential between himself and his victim so as 

to avoid the consensual sex exception to the definition of “sex 

offense” contained in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C). Appellant’s Br. 

20. The record, however, is unambiguous -- the district court 

did not construe the definition of “sex offense,” and Appellant 

never sought the same. Although we question Appellant’s candor 

in this regard, we will assume he contends the district court 

erred by failing to sua sponte dismiss the indictment on the 

grounds articulated above. Inasmuch as Appellant clearly and 

unequivocally waived the right to appeal “any and all other 

issues in this matter” save the district court’s ruling on his 

motion to dismiss, J.A. 58, we conclude this issue –- however 

framed -- has been affirmatively waived, and we will not 

entertain it further. Cf. United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 

650 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Where a defendant who pled guilty 

presents on appeal an issue that he did not even attempt to 

preserve by means of a conditional plea, we decline to entertain 

the appeal on the ground that the defendant’s unconditional plea

waived that issue altogether.” (emphasis omitted)). 
6

v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing United 

States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 

1398 (4th Cir. 1993)).

III.

Congress enacted SORNA “[i]n order to protect the 

public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in 

response to the vicious attacks by violent predators” against 

seventeen named victims of sex crimes. 42 U.S.C. § 16901. In 

order to address the significant number of “missing” sex 

offenders, see H.R. Rep. No. 109–218, pt. 1, at 26 (2005), SORNA

“establishes a comprehensive national system for the 

registration of [sex] offenders,” 42 U.S.C. § 16901. SORNA thus 

requires a sex offender, defined as “an individual who was 

convicted of a sex offense,” id. § 16911(1) (emphasis supplied),

to register in each jurisdiction where he resides, id. § 16913. 

This requirement is enforced through 18 U.S.C. § 2250, which 

imposes criminal penalties on persons who, by virtue of their 

state convictions, are required to register as sex offenders

under SORNA and knowingly fail to do so after traveling in 

interstate commerce. 

The issue in this case is whether Appellant’s nolo

contendere plea to a Florida attempted sexual battery charge, in 

which adjudication was withheld, qualifies as a conviction

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1). We begin with the 
7

undisputed premise that federal law, rather than state law, 

controls the question of what constitutes a conviction under 

SORNA. See Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 

119 (1983) (“[I]n the absence of a plain indication to the 

contrary, . . . it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a 

statute that it does not intend to make its application 

dependent on state law.” (quotation marks and citation 

omitted)), superseded by statute on other grounds, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 921(a)(20). Turning to the plain language of SORNA itself, we 

observe that Congress left the statutory term “convicted” 

undefined4 and expressly granted authority to the Attorney 

General to “issue guidelines and regulations to interpret and 

implement [SORNA].” 42 U.S.C. § 16912(b). The Attorney 

General, consistent with this grant of authority and following 

notice-and-comment procedures, has promulgated comprehensive 

guidelines that illuminate the meaning of the term. See The 

National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030 (July 2, 2008) (“SMART 

Guidelines”). These Guidelines “can and do have the force and 

 4 SORNA does contain a provision addressing what “[t]he term 

‘convicted’ . . . includes” with respect to juvenile 

adjudications, 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (emphasis supplied), but 

this section neither defines nor limits the term and does not 

inform its meaning in the context of adult adjudications. 
8

effect of law[.]” United States v. Stevenson, 676 F.3d 557, 565

(6th Cir. 2012).5 

The SMART Guidelines explain the character of a 

“conviction” is not dependent upon the “nominal changes or 

terminological variations” present within varying jurisdictions. 

73 Fed. Reg. at 38,050. To the contrary, in order to effectuate 

a comprehensive and uniform national system, a single standard 

controls: “an adult sex offender is ‘convicted’ for SORNA 

purposes if the sex offender remains subject to penal 

consequences based on the conviction, however it may be styled.”

Id. (emphasis supplied). The federal registration requirement, 

 5 By leaving the operative statutory term undefined and 

delegating broad rulemaking authority to the Attorney General, 

Congress has implicitly left a gap in SORNA’s statutory regime 

that the Attorney General may fill. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 

Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 

(“The power of an administrative agency to administer a 

congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the 

formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap 

left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” (quoting Morton v. 

Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))); see also United States v. 

Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 2013) (“SORNA is a nonpunitive, civil regulatory scheme, both in purpose and 

effect.”). Because the Attorney General’s duly promulgated 

explication of the term “convicted” is consistent with the 

statutory language as well as eminently reasonable, we are 

satisfied it represents a permissible –- and correct --

construction of the statute. See, e.g., Nat’l City Bank of IN 

v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n cases of 

statutory silence, we ‘must defer, under Chevron, to [an 

agency’s interpretation of its governing statute], so long as 

that interpretation is permissible in light of the statutory 

text and reasonable.’” (quoting Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. 

Bulen, 429 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir. 2005))). 
9

in other words, cannot be avoided simply because a jurisdiction 

“h[as] a procedure under which the convictions of sex offenders 

in certain categories . . . are referred to as something other 

than ‘convictions.’” Id. Rather, so long as “the sex offender 

is nevertheless required to serve what amounts to a criminal 

sentence for the offense,” he is “convicted” of a sex offense 

and falls within the ambit of SORNA’s registration requirements. 

Id.

Here, Appellant was sentenced to, inter alia, a twoyear term of probation pursuant to his nolo contendere plea to 

the attempted sexual battery charge, and he served three days in 

jail. Appellant conceded at oral argument that probation is a 

penal consequence, see Oral Argument at 05:42-05:47, United 

States v. Bridges, No. 13-4067 (Dec. 11, 2013), available at

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oralarguments, and we agree that this principle is beyond dispute. 

See Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 113-14 (“[O]ne cannot be placed on 

probation if the court does not deem him to be guilty of a 

crime[.]”); see also United States v. Medina, 718 F.3d 364, 368 

(4th Cir. 2013) (noting probation is a “form of restraint on [a 

defendant’s] liberty”). The only question, therefore, is 

whether Florida’s method of “withholding adjudication” works to 

exempt Appellant from registering as a sex offender under 

federal law. We conclude that it does not. 
10

The SMART Guidelines specifically contemplate a 

situation such as the one at issue here, i.e., where a state has 

implemented a procedure for the disposition of criminal cases 

that nominally affects a category of sex offenders but “do[es] 

not relieve a conviction of substantive effect.” 73 Fed. Reg. 

at 38,050. In this context, the Guidelines are clear –- a sex 

offender is “convicted” so long as he “remains subject to penal 

consequences . . . however [the conviction] may be styled.” Id.

(emphasis supplied). Appellant pled nolo contendere to the 

attempted sexual battery of a child.6 The state court entered a 

judgment order and sentenced him to two years’ probation, a 

sentence that attached immediately, and withheld only the formal 

adjudication of his guilt. Whatever the ultimate length of 

Appellant’s probationary term or the status of his conviction

under state law,7 he was required “to serve what amounts to a 

criminal sentence for [his] offense.” Id. He was thus 

 6 Despite Appellant’s intimations to the contrary, a plea of 

nolo contendere “has the effect of a plea of guilty.” United 

States v. Kahn, 822 F.2d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). Where, as here, we are 

only concerned with the fact of a conviction, not its 

classification, the form of the plea makes no difference.

7 The record is unclear as to whether Appellant entered the 

Army, which would have terminated his probationary term, or was 

otherwise discharged prior to the natural expiration of his

sentence. It is undisputed, however, that he was sentenced to, 

and served, some term of probation. 
11

“convicted” of a sex offense under 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1) and was 

required to register under SORNA. 

This conclusion is reinforced by the decisions of two 

of our sister circuits, each of which have concluded that a 

Florida nolo contendere plea with adjudication withheld 

constitutes a “conviction” under federal law. See United States 

v. Maupin, 520 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (entry of nolo 

contendere plea with adjudication withheld constitutes a prior 

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A); United States v. Storer, 

413 F.3d 918, 921–22 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. 

Mejias, 47 F.3d 401, 404 (11th Cir. 1995) (entry of nolo 

contendere plea with adjudication withheld constitutes a prior 

conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)). Although Appellant 

argues that United States v. Willis, 106 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 

1997), is to the contrary, he is simply incorrect. Willis

analyzed whether the entry of a nolo contendere plea with 

adjudication withheld constituted a “conviction” under state

law. See id. at 968. That decision, as the Eleventh Circuit 

itself has noted, is inapposite in the context of analyzing the 

meaning of a “conviction” under federal law. See Maupin, 520 

F.3d at 1307; see also Oral Argument at 05:42-05:47 (Appellant 

agreeing that state definitions of “convicted” are irrelevant in 

cases arising under SORNA). In short, the relevant authority

uniformly rejects Appellant’s position.
12

Finally, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s rule of 

lenity argument. In order to invoke this rule, “‘we must 

conclude that there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in 

the statute.’” Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 383 (4th Cir. 

2012) (emphasis in original) (quoting Muscarello v. United 

States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)). The ambiguity in SORNA’s

use of the term “convicted” does not rise to the level of 

grievousness that would warrant application of the rule of 

lenity. See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138 (“The simple existence 

of some statutory ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant 

application of [the] rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to 

some degree.”).

In sum, we hold that Appellant’s nolo contendere plea 

with adjudication withheld constitutes a conviction for the 

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1) because it resulted in a penal 

consequence. Therefore, Appellant was required to register as a 

sex offender under SORNA and falls within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2250. The district court properly denied his motion to 

dismiss the indictment. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 

district court is

AFFIRMED.