FILED

December 2, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

AUGUST SESSION, 1997

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9705-CC-00166

)

Appellee, ) 

) MADISON COUNTY

)

V. ) 

) HON. WHIT LAFON, JUDGE 

CHARLES GWYNNE BLEDSOE, ) 

) 

Appellant. ) (RESISTING ARREST) 

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

JOSEPH L. PATTERSON JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter

225 West Baltimore, Suite B

Jackson, TN 38301 KENNETH W. RUCKER 

Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37243

JAMES G. WOODALL 

District Attorney General

JAMES W. THOMPSON

Assistant District Attorney General 

225 Martin Luther King Drive

P.O. Box 2825

Jackson, TN 38302-2825

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Defendant, Charles Gwynne Bledsoe, appeals as of right from his

conviction of resisting arrest following a jury trial in the Madison County Criminal

Court. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

to sustain the conviction. He also argues that the indictment failed to allege an

essential element of the offense of resisting arrest and was therefore a void

indictment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence,

the standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979). On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view

of the evidence and all inferences therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832,

835 (Tenn. 1978). Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of

innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the

burden in this court of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the

verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.

1982); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973).

Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to

be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are
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resolved by the trier of fact, not this court. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623

(Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1987). Nor may this court

reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835. A jury verdict

approved by the trial judge accredits the State’s witnesses and resolves all

conflicts in favor of the State. Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.

Three police officers testified for the State. Terry Halford, an officer with

the Jackson Police Department, was on duty on July 29, 1994. He received a call

that a black male was cutting window screens off windows at an apartment inside

the housing area of Lincoln Courts. While en route to the apartment, Halford saw

a black male in the bushes in the apartment complex. Because he had previous

contact with the Defendant, he recognized the man as the Defendant. Defendant

was crouched down with a knife in one hand and two crushed beer cans in the

other hand. Halford approached the Defendant, and the Defendant stood up.

Because Defendant had the knife in his hand and Halford did not know the

Defendant’s intentions, Halford drew his weapon for his own safety. 

Halford asked the Defendant to drop the knife several times, but he

continued to approach Halford while holding the knife. The Defendant was

mumbling something undeterminable, then began cussing and yelling for Halford

to go ahead and shoot him. When Defendant got approximately eight (8) to ten

(10) feet away from Halford, he stopped walking and Halford called for backup.

Two other officers, Jenkins and Pollack, arrived within one or two minutes.

These officers walked up behind the Defendant, and they also drew their weapon

when they saw the Defendant holding a knife. Defendant still refused to drop his

weapon, so Officers Halford and Pollack holstered their weapons and Jenkins
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kept his weapon out. Pollack used a chemical weapon called “Freeze” to help

disarm the Defendant. Halford ran towards him and hit his hand with a flashlight

to knock the knife out of his hand. Defendant was told he was under arrest. The

Defendant became very violent, kicking, scratching and biting, and the officers

were forced to wrestle him to the ground to place him in handcuffs. 

After the officers got Defendant into the patrol car, Halford drove Defendant

towards the police station. Defendant was kicking the screen and side glass so

hard that the plexi-glass screen was coming up and hitting the back of Halford’s

seat. Because Halford was afraid that he would kick the window out, he stopped

the car and got into the back seat with the Defendant. Halford applied pressure

to several nerve pressure points on Defendant’s body until he stopped kicking.

Halford admitted that Defendant was bleeding, but stated that he had already

begun bleeding from the earlier struggle with the officers prior to being arrested.

He stated that Defendant could possibly have continued to bleed from the

altercation in the car. After Defendant was taken to booking, he threatened the

lives of the officers and their families.

Officer Pollack also testified regarding the events of July 29, 1994. He and

Officer Jenkins were dispatched to the Lincoln Court housing project to take a

report from the woman who called complaining that an individual had threatened

her and had cut her window screen. While talking with this woman, he heard

over the radio that Halford had the suspect at gunpoint. Pollack and Jenkins

immediately went to that location and found Halford there with the subject backed

against a building. When they saw the knife in Defendant’s hands, they drew

their weapons. Pollack also thought he saw some beer cans in the Defendant’s
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other hand. When Defendant refused to drop the knife, he and Halford holstered

their weapons. He got out his Freeze and sprayed the Defendant in the face in

order to shut his eyes. After struggling with the Defendant to handcuff him, they

tried to get him up and walk to the car, but Defendant refused to comply and the

officers had to pick him up and literally carry him to Halford’s car. On the way

back to the station, he saw the Defendant try to kick the window out of the patrol

car. At one point, Halford had to stop the car and talk to the Defendant to settle

him down. After they arrived at the station, the Defendant made threats on the

officers’ lives and their families. Officer Jenkins confirmed the occurrence of

these same events in his testimony. 

Charles Gwynne Bledsoe then testified on his own behalf. On that day, he

was in Lincoln Courts and had played a prank on a friend by taking one of the

screens off of her window. He stated that he did not cut the screen, only pried

it off with his hands. Defendant had been cutting the grass and was sitting down,

peeling and eating an apple when he saw the police approach. He recalled

seeing four officers, although he could not identify the fourth officer. Immediately,

one of the officers put his service revolver in Defendant’s face and said to “drop

the knife.” Defendant stated that he did not have a chance to drop the knife

because he was then sprayed with mace. After being sprayed, he dropped his

head and felt a burning sensation. Defendant was scared, and only became

angry with the officers when they drug him down the sidewalk to the police car.

Defendant admitted that he did not try to walk. After being placed in Halford’s

car, he told him to “[R]ead me my rights. Read me my rights, boy.” Defendant

thought that was why the officer stopped the car and hit him in his mouth and

face. Defendant stated that these injuries caused him to bleed.
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A person commits the offense of resisting arrest if he “intentionally

prevent[s] or obstruct[s] anyone known to the person to be a law enforcement

officer . . . from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search of any person,

including the defendant, by using force against the law enforcement officer or

another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(a). From the record, there is sufficient

evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the Defendant guilty of

resisting arrest. 

Each law enforcement officer who testified confirmed that the Defendant

refused to drop his weapon when they requested him to do so. When they forced

him to drop his weapon after spraying him with Freeze, the officers notified

Defendant he was under arrest and attempted to place him in handcuffs. The

Defendant would not cooperate with their efforts to handcuff him, to such extent

that he bit, kicked, and scratched the officers. There was a continuing struggle,

and when the officers got Defendant handcuffed he refused to walk to the police

car. The Defendant admitted during his testimony that he would not comply with

the officers’ orders to walk to the car, using his body weight to force the officers

to carry him to the car in order to effectuate the arrest. This issue is without

merit.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT

In his second issue, Defendant argues the indictment failed to charge that

the Defendant “used force against a law enforcement officer,” an element of the

offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602. The indictment reads as follows:
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Charles Gwynne Bledsoe on or about July 29, 1994, in Madison

County, Tennessee, and prior to the finding of this indictment, in the

County and State aforesaid, did intentionally prevent or obstruct

officers of the Jackson Police Department, known to the said

Charles Gwynne Bledsoe to be law enforcement personnel, from

effecting an arrest of the said Charles Gwynne Bledsoe by

struggling, kicking, and resisting efforts to be taken into custody, in

violation of T.C.A. § 39-16-602 . . .

The Defendant contends that the indictment as written above is fatally defective

due to its wording. The fundamental purpose of an indictment is to convey

adequate notice of the offense to the defendant. See State v. Mayes, 854

S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tenn. 1993). 

While the indictment does not state the exact wording of the statute, there

are sufficient allegations to necessarily imply the element of “using force against

the law enforcement officer.” In determining the sufficiency of the indictment, a

court must consider the following factors: (1) whether the indictment contains the

elements of the offense intended to be charged; (2) whether the indictment

sufficiently apprises the accused of the offense he is called upon to defend; (3)

whether the trial court knows to what offense it must apply the judgment; and (4)

whether the accused knows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former

acquittal or conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. State

v. Tate, 912 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). 

Upon review of the indictment under these factors, it is clear the indictment

contained the elements of the offense such that the Defendant was sufficiently

apprised of the offense he was called upon to defend. While the indictment did

not specifically state that the Defendant had “used force” against a law

enforcement officer, the indictment did specify that the Defendant had “struggled,
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kicked, and resisted efforts” by law enforcement personnel to arrest him. As a

general rule, it is sufficient to state the offense charged in the words of the statute

or words which are equivalent to the words contained in the statute. Tate, 912

S.W.2d at 789. That the Defendant struggled, kicked and resisted the efforts of

the law enforcement personnel is equivalent to the Defendant’s using force

against the law enforcement personnel. Defendant was sufficiently apprised of

the nature of the offense for which he would have to defend himself. This issue

is without merit.

The State raises a third issue in its brief regarding the sentencing of the

Defendant in that the judgment form incorrectly reflects that he was convicted of

a Class B misdemeanor when the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the

possession of a deadly weapon, and therefore, this court should impose

judgment for a Class A misdemeanor conviction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-

602(d). It is true that the State proved that Defendant possessed a deadly

weapon during the commission of the offense. However, during oral argument,

in response to questioning by the court, the State conceded that possession of

a deadly weapon was not alleged in the indictment. This issue raised by the

State has no merit.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge 
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CONCUR:

___________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

___________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, Judge