APHIS FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE FRAMEWORK 

ROLES AND COMMUNICATION

FAD PReP MANUAL 1-0

September 2022
ii

September 5, 2022

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination (NPIC) 

From 2016-2017, the United States Department of Agriculture organized a unified Incident Command with 

the Florida State Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS) to respond to and eradicate 

New World Screwworm (NWS); the success of the response was due in large part to the collaboration 

across Federal agencies and FDACS with over 530 rotations deployed to successfully eradicate NWS. 

Our most recent extended outbreak occurred from 2018 to 2020 with the detection of virulent Newcastle 

Disease in California; In June 2020, we were able to declare disease freedom and satisfy the World 

Organization of Animal Health’s criteria for eradication. This version of the USDA APHIS Foreign Animal 

Disease Framework—Roles and Coordination (Manual 1-0) reflects the knowledge and lessons learned

during these events to enhance collaboration and operational response among local, State, Tribal, and 

Federal government agencies and food and agriculture industries. This manual applies to all foreign 

animal disease (FAD) incidents and associated responses. 

The following list highlights important changes that were completed in this September 2022 version of 

the Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (Manual 1-0). 

• Provided an update on 2017 publication of Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and 

Response Plan and pending National List of Reportable Animal Diseases rule (Chapter 2).

• Updated Animal Health Protection Act Section with the 2018 Farm Bill Section 12101, National 

Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Program (Chapter 2)

• Updated Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 with foot-and-mouth disease production 

cycle timeframe (Chapter 2)

• Reflected changes to the updated 2019 FEMA National Response Framework (NRF). 

o Updated agency roles based off the Emergency Support Function Annexes (Chapter 3)

 Updated ESF #8 and 15

 Updated ESF #14 Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure to reflect new title 

and role 

• Reflected changes to the updated 2017 FEMA National Incident Management System (NIMS)

Doctrine (Chapter 4).

• Updated Figure 4 4. Example APHIS Incident Coordination Group—Organizational Structure 

• (for an FAD Incident) with current existing structures (Chapter 4). 

• Made consistent with other revised response plans and strategic documents.

We realize that preparing for and responding to an FAD outbreak remains a complex effort, requiring

collaboration from all levels of government and industry stakeholders. This document is intended to 

further aid the whole community response by outlining the roles and responsibilities of USDA APHIS

based on the principles of the NRF and National Incident Management System. 

This document will be revised as needed. Please e-mail all comments to FAD.PReP.Comments@

usda.gov with the subject line, “Comments to Manual 1-0 Roles and Coordination.”

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) mission is to raise 

awareness, define expectations, and improve capabilities for FAD preparedness and response. 

For more information, please go to:

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep 
September 2022 iii

Executive Summary

Preparedness and response planning for foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents is 

crucial to protect public health, animal health, animal agriculture, the 

environment, the food supply, and the economy. This document, the Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Foreign Animal Disease Framework—

Roles and Coordination (Manual 1-0), is part of the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA) APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response 

Plan (FAD PReP). It provides broad information about preparing for and 

responding to an FAD outbreak in the United States, based on the principles of 

the National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management 

System (NIMS). 

The APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination covers

 an introduction to APHIS FAD preparedness and response; 

 AHPIS authorities and funding; 

 Federal department roles, responsibilities, and planning assumptions; 

 an overview of incident management; and

 APHIS communication strategy for FAD incidents. 

An FAD response is a complex and challenging process, requiring careful 

planning and diligent preparedness. There are disruptions to both interstate 

commerce and international trade. As incidents evolve, resources, personnel, and 

countermeasures must be scalable and flexible to respond quickly. There will be 

conflicting interests and competing priorities that must be rapidly addressed in an 

outbreak. Effective coordination and cooperation between local, State, Tribal, and 

Federal government agencies, as well as between the government and industry 

stakeholders is necessary for effective planning and capable response.This 

document broadly discusses roles and coordination for APHIS FAD preparedness 

and response efforts.

As with any regulatory action, it is important to outline the statutes and 

regulations that delegate responsibility and authority to APHIS for FAD response.

The Animal Health Protection Act is the key statute that delegates authority to the 

Secretary of Agriculture to respond to an animal health incident; it also provides 

information on the emergency transfer of funds for a disease incident. Under this 

authority, further specific responsibility is respectively delegated through the 

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Title 7 and Title 9 of the CFR authority for 

the Secretary of Agriculture and APHIS Administrator, respectively, and provides 

specific regulations for the control and eradication of FADs in the United States. 
 

September 2022 iv

During any FAD outbreak, the USDA leads overall response and incident 

management. However, USDA may request Federal-to-Federal support from 

other Federal departments and agencies. Chapter 3 reviews these NRF Emergency 

Support Functions. This chapter also provides information on the potential roles

of other federal departments and agencies in an animal health incident. 

APHIS has adopted NIMS and an Incident Command System (ICS) 

organizational approach to manage all animal health incidents. As confirmed in 

NIMS, all incidents begin and end locally. ICS enables efficient and effective 

management, by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and 

communication within a common organizational structure. The ICS structure is 

both flexible and scalable, so it can be adapted to any animal health incident—

large or small—regardless of cause or source.

For effective preparedness and successful response, APHIS established internal 

and external communication processes to reduce the possibility of adverse public 

reaction and to mitigate the social and economic impact of an FAD outbreak.

Both internal communication (between government authorities and within 

APHIS) and external communication (to the public, industry, and international 

partners) are critical to communicate procedures and protocols, achieve a 

coordinated response, gain public and our trading partners’ trust, and raise 

awareness about preparedness and response activities.

FAD PReP aims to integrate and synchronize preparedness and response

capabilities as much as possible before an outbreak by providing goals, 

guidelines, strategies, and procedures that are clear, comprehensive, easily 

updated, and that comply with NIMS. As State, Federal, and Tribal government 

agencies and industry groups develop their own preparedness and response plans, 

they must also coordinate incident goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures on 

a local, regional, and national basis.

This document has a companion document—APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 

Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0)—which provides 

significant detail on response strategies for an FAD outbreak. This document, and 

the documents referenced within this document, are available at 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. Together, these documents provide a 

comprehensive preparedness and response framework for an FAD outbreak.

Your comments on this document are welcomed, please send them to

FAD.PReP.Comments@usda.gov; they will be considered in future revisions.
September 2022 v 

Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................ 1-1 

1.1 CHALLENGES OF FAD RESPONSE .......................................................................... 1-1 

1.2 USDA APHIS FAD PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE............................................. 1-3 

1.2.1 Plan Development and Methodology ...................................................... 1-3 

1.3 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEM, AND FAD PREP INTEGRATION ................................................................. 1-4 

1.3.1 National Response Framework ............................................................... 1-4 

1.3.2 National Incident Management System .................................................. 1-5 

1.3.3 FAD PReP................................................................................................. 1-5 

Chapter 2 USDA APHIS Authorities and FAD Emergency Funding ........ 2-1 

2.1.1 FAD, Emerging Diseases, and Wildlife ................................................... 2-1 

2.1.2 The Animal Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq. ............... 2-2 

2.2 USDA APHIS EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR FAD ..................................................... 2-8 

2.3 TRIGGERING EVENTS FOR USDA APHIS EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR FADS........... 2-8 

2.3.1 Limitations on Preventive or Preparatory Measures Created 

by Triggering Event .................................................................................. 2-9 

2.3.2 Coordination.............................................................................................. 2-9 

2.4 ADDITIONAL USDA APHIS AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

FOR FAD................................................................................................................ 2-9 

2.4.1 Code of Federal Regulations ................................................................. 2-10

2.4.2 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9.......................................... 2-12 

2.4.3 The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 ........................... 2-12 

Chapter 3 Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, 

and Planning Assumptions ............................................................ 3-1 

3.1 FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS—OVERVIEW.................................................................... 3-1 

3.2 EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE NATIONAL RESPONSE 

FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................................... 3-2 

3.3 FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FAD

PREPAREDNESS, AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS FOR FAD RESPONSE .................... 3-5 

3.3.1 USDA Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness ..................... 3-5 

2.1 USDA APHIS AUTHORITIES FOR FOREIGN ANIMAL AND EMERGING DISEASES ....... 2-1 
 

September 2022 vi

3.3.2 USDA Planning Assumptions for FAD Response .................................. 3-7 

3.3.3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Roles 

and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness ........................................... 3-8 

3.3.4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Planning Assumptions 

for FAD Response .................................................................................... 3-9 

3.3.5 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Roles 

and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness ......................................... 3-10 

3.3.6 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Planning 

Assumptions for FAD Response............................................................ 3-11 

3.3.7 U.S. Department of Interior Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness............................................................................ 3-12 

3.3.8 U.S. Department of Interior Planning Assumptions 

for FAD Response .................................................................................. 3-13 

3.3.9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness............................................................................ 3-13 

3.3.10 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Planning Assumptions 

for FAD Response .................................................................................. 3-14

3.3.11 U.S. Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness...... 3-15

3.3.12 U.S. Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration Planning Assumptions for FAD Response ................... 3-16

3.3.13 U.S. Department of Justice Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness............................................................................ 3-16

3.3.14 U.S. Department of Justice Planning Assumptions 

for FAD Response .................................................................................. 3-16

3.3.15 U.S. Department of Defense Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness............................................................................ 3-17

3.3.16 U.S. Department of Defense Planning Assumptions 

for FAD Response .................................................................................. 3-17

3.3.17 U.S. Department of State Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness............................................................................ 3-18

3.3.18 Additional Resources ............................................................................. 3-18

3.4 USDA APHIS TIERED RESPONSE TO FAD INCIDENTS......................................... 3-18

Chapter 4 Incident Management............................................................. 4-1 

4.1 OVERVIEW OF INCIDENT COORDINATION ................................................................. 4-2 

4.1.1 Multiagency Coordination......................................................................... 4-2 

4.1.2 Whole Community Coordination.............................................................. 4-2 
Introduction

September 2022 vii

4.1.3 Transition from On-Scene Multiagency Coordination 

to Off-Scene Multiagency Coordination .................................................. 4-3 

4.2 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT............................................................................. 4-4 

4.2.1 Overview ................................................................................................... 4-4 

4.2.2 APHIS Multiagency Coordination Group................................................. 4-5 

4.2.3 APHIS Incident Coordination Group........................................................ 4-6 

4.3 APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR A SINGLE INCIDENT...................................................... 4-9 

4.4 APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR MULTIPLE INCIDENTS................................................... 4-9 

4.5 APHIS VS NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAMS ......................................... 4-10 

4.6 RESPONSE RESOURCES....................................................................................... 4-16 

4.6.1 APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide.................................................. 4-16 

4.6.2 APHIS Emergency Qualification System .............................................. 4-16 

4.6.3 APHIS Resource Ordering and Status System .................................... 4-16 

Chapter 5 Communication Strategy ........................................................ 5-1 

5.1 COMMUNICATION.................................................................................................... 5-1 

5.1.1 Communicating Internally......................................................................... 5-2 

5.1.2 Communicating Externally ....................................................................... 5-2 

5.2 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION GOALS.................................................................... 5-3 

5.3 TARGET AUDIENCES............................................................................................... 5-3 

5.4 APHIS’ RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES.................................................................... 5-5 

5.4.1 Internal Communication Tools Used During a Response ...................... 5-5 

5.4.2 Communication During the Initial Response........................................... 5-6 

5.4.3 Organization and Implementation of and Communications 

During an Incident .................................................................................... 5-7 

5.4.4 Post-Incident Communication.................................................................. 5-9 

5.4.5 Staying Ahead of Emergencies ............................................................. 5-10

Appendix A Key FAD PReP Documents

Appendix B Glossary

Appendix C Abbreviations

Appendix D Selected References and Resources
 

September 2022 viii

Figures

Figure 4-1. Off-Scene USDA APHIS Policy and Incident Coordination 

Structures for an FAD Incident .............................................................................. 4-3 

Figure 4-2. Multiagency Coordination System............................................................ 4-4 

Figure 4-3. APHIS Incident Management Structures: Off-Scene 

and On-Scene......................................................................................................... 4-5 

Figure 4-4. Example APHIS Incident Coordination Group—Organizational 

Structure (for an FAD Incident).............................................................................. 4-8 

Figure 4-5. APHIS Incident Management Assuming Multiple Incidents 

and a Unified Area Command ............................................................................. 4-10 

Figure 4-6. Current APHIS VS National Incident Management Team— 

Short Team Configuration.................................................................................... 4-11 

Figure 4-7. Example APHIS VS National Incident Management Team— 

Long Team Configuration..................................................................................... 4-15 

Tables

Table 3-1. Primary Responsibilities of Each Emergency Support Function ............. 3-2 

Table 4-1. List of Short Team Configuration Positions Available in Resource 

Ordering and Status System................................................................................ 4-12 

Table 4-2. List of Long Team Configuration Positions Available in Resource 

Ordering and Status System................................................................................ 4-13
September 2022 1-1 

Chapter 1

Introduction

Preparedness and response planning for foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents is 

crucial to effectively protect public health, animal health, animal agriculture, the 

food supply, the environment, and the economy. Collaboration among local, 

State, Tribal, and Federal government agencies and food and agriculture 

industries is necessary for achieving shared objectives in each phase of 

emergency management—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. 

The success of preparedness and response efforts depends on the effectiveness of 

cooperation among stakeholders. It is critical that stakeholders coordinate incident 

goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures before an incident. Communication 

and collaboration before an FAD outbreak reduce the likelihood of conflicting 

priorities, unmet expectations, and improve the speed and effectiveness of 

response. 

This Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)

document provides an overview of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) FAD preparedness and 

response framework for incident management,funding, communication strategies, 

relationships, and authorities during an FAD incident or outbreak. This manual is 

complemented by the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response 

Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0), which provides detail on response strategies 

for an FAD outbreak. Together, these documents provide a comprehensive 

preparedness and response foundation for FADs.

1.1 CHALLENGES OF FAD RESPONSE

FAD incidents may present many logistical, technical, and strategic challenges. 

For example, in an FAD incident, large, diverse, and often geographically 

dispersed teams are assembled quickly with an expectation to perform rapidly. 

However, not all emergency responders and stakeholders have prior livestock, 

poultry, and agriculture specific knowledge or know the activities required for a 

successful FAD response. Additionally, some veterinary activities and 

countermeasures are complex and require significant preparation prior to an 

outbreak to effectively mitigate its severity. Some of these activities include 

biosecurity, quarantine and movement control, epidemiological investigation and 

tracing, surveillance, diagnostic testing, cleaning and disinfection, depopulation, 

disposal, and possibly emergency vaccination.The complete list of critical 

activities can be found in Appendix A within the standard operating procedure

(SOP) section. 
 

September 2022 1-2 

Another challenge, especially for large-scale outbreaks, is the ability to rapidly 

scale up resources and trained personnel for veterinary activities and 

countermeasures, effectively manage scarce resources, and efficiently allocate

resources. There are likely to be competing interests and different priorities; for 

example, the goal of containing and eradicating an FAD within a Control Area 

(CA) may be in conflict with the objectives of non-infected premises within the 

CA that seek to maintain or re-establish business by demonstrating freedom from 

infection and effective biosecurity.

While some competing priorities may be impossible to identify or resolve prior to 

an incident or outbreak, others can be resolved or mitigated by elevating the 

awareness of those competing priorities, identifying the resources needed to 

resolve these issues, and establishing commonly accepted and understood 

response objectives before an incident. Past outbreaks both in the United States 

and in other countries also offer important lessons that can be applied to 

preparedness and response planning. Effective FAD preparedness and response is 

based on the following:

 Providing processes for emergency planning that respect local knowledge.

 Integrating State-Federal-Tribal-industry planning processes.

 Ensuring that there are clearly defined, obtainable, unified goals for 

response.

 Having a Unified State-Federal Incident Command (IC) that can act with 

speed and certainty.

 Employing science- and risk-based management approaches to an FAD 

response.

 Ensuring that all guidelines, strategies, and procedures are communicated 

effectively to responders and stakeholders.

 Identifying resources and trained personnel required for an effective 

incident response.

 Trying to resolve competing interests prior to an outbreak and addressing 

them quickly during an outbreak.

 Achieving rapid FAD detection and tracing.
Introduction

September 2022 1-3 

1.2 USDA APHIS FAD PREPAREDNESS AND 

RESPONSE

USDA APHIS established FAD PReP to provide a framework for FAD 

preparedness and response. FAD PReP was developed to meet the 

recommendation of many stakeholders that FAD preparedness and response 

capabilities needed improvement. It is intended to integrate and synchronize the 

principles and applied systems of the National Response Framework (NRF) and 

the National Incident Management System (NIMS) by providing outbreak 

response goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures for local, State, Federal, and 

Tribal responders. 

FAD PReP is intended to raise awareness of response activities and veterinary 

countermeasures, identify gaps or shortcomings in current preparedness planning, 

and provide a framework for States, Tribes, and other stakeholders to use in

developing their own response plans. 

1.2.1 Plan Development and Methodology

FAD PReP is developed iteratively by reviewing current local, State, Tribal, 

National, and international FAD policies and plans, conducting detailed literature 

reviews, and consulting a diverse range of subject matter experts (SMEs) from 

both the public and private sector. Appendix A contains a complete list of current 

FAD PReP documents, ranging from SOPs to concept of operations (strategic) 

plans.

To maintain the effectiveness of these planning documents and relationships, 

APHIS reviews the FAD PReP material at regular intervals. To provide easy 

access and facilitate the review process, APHIS does the following: 

 Ensures that FAD PReP guidance is readily available to local, State, 

Federal, Tribal, and other stakeholders. FAD PReP documents can be 

found on the public APHIS FAD PReP website at 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

 Encourages all interested and responsible parties to review documents and 

provide recommendations for improvements or updates. Comments and 

collaboration are always welcome (FAD.PReP.Comments@usda.gov). 

 Provides additional, more detailed guidance for specific incidents or 

outbreaks, as required by the incident.

 Updates and revises FAD PReP documents by doing the following:

 Incorporates recommendations and comments from local, State, Tribal, 

Federal, and industry partners and stakeholders.
 

September 2022 1-4 

 Incorporates updates from the World Organisation for Animal Health 

(WOAH) and other international organizations.

 Revises the documents based on changes in policy, procedure, or 

organization.

 Revises the documents based on lessons learned and experiences from 

FAD outbreaks and emerging disease events. 

 Distributes and publishes the updated document.

1.3 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, NATIONAL 

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, AND FAD

PREP INTEGRATION

Successful emergency preparedness and response requires integration between the 

National Preparedness System, NRF, NIMS, and FAD PReP (which includes the 

National Animal Health Emergency Management System [NAHEMS]). The 

National Preparedness System“outlines an organized process for the whole 

community to move forward with its preparedness activities and achieve the 

National Preparedness Goal which defines what it means for the whole 

community to be prepared for all types of disasters and emergencies.”1 

FAD PReP documents use the concepts, structures, and processes defined in the 

NRF and NIMS as a foundation to provide more detailed information, including 

disease-specific information and further direction on response requirements for 

FAD outbreaks. FAD PReP aims, consistent with the National Preparedness 

System, to prepare the United States for FAD incidents in the United States.

1.3.1 National Response Framework

The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response, through a 

whole community approach. It describes core capabilities for response, defines 

specific authorities, and establishes a comprehensive approach for responding to 

domestic incidents that range from serious but purely local events to large-scale 

terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF is one of the five 

National Planning Frameworks in the National Preparedness System; it builds on 

NIMS, which provides a consistent template for managing incidents. The NRF is 

available at www.fema.gov/national-response-framework. 

1 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2019). 

https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/NRF_FINALApproved_2011028.pdf. 
Introduction

September 2022 1-5 

1.3.2 National Incident Management System

NIMS supports the NRF and is the foundation of the National Preparedness 

System. It provides a systematic, nationwide, proactive approach guiding 

departments and agencies at all levels of government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The goal of NIMS is to help these 

organizations work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, 

and mitigate the effects of incidents, “...regardless of cause, size, location, or 

complexity—in order to reduce the loss of life, liberty, property, and harm to the 

environment.”2 NIMS provides a core set of concepts, principles, procedures, 

organizational processes, and standard requirements, including the Incident 

Command System (ICS). ICS offers standard terminology and common 

organizational structures. NIMS information is available at 

www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system. 

NIMS focuses on three key components that work together: 

1. Communications and information management (including, but not limited 

to, systems and methods that help to ensure that incident personnel and 

other decision makers have the means and information they need to make 

and communicate decision); 

2. Resource management (including, but not limited to, resources, including 

personnel, equipment, supplies, teams, and facilities, both before and 

during incidents in order to allow organizations to more effectively share 

resources when needed); and

3. Command and management (including, but not limited to leadership roles, 

processes, and recommended organizational structures for incident 

management at the operational and incident support levels and explains 

how these structures interact to manage incidents effectively and 

efficiently). 

1.3.3 FAD PReP

The precursor to FAD PReP was the NAHEMS, which offered a functional 

veterinary framework for responding to FADs. Now incorporated into FAD PReP, 

the NAHEMS Guidelines harmonizes strategic concept of operations documents, 

disease response plans, SOPs, and other materials to create a comprehensive 

approach to FADs consistent with NRF and NIMS. These documents aim to 

ensure a successful response which corresponds to the severity of the outbreak. 

Federal, State, and local agencies, Tribal Nations, and other stakeholders involved 

in animal health emergency management activities should integrate the 

2 FEMA. (2017). NIMS. Retrieved from 

http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system
 

September 2022 1-6 

information found in these documents into their preparedness and response 

planning activities and processes. 

FAD PReP offers: 

 competent veterinary guidance on cleaning and disinfection, disposal, 

mass depopulation, and other critical activities;

 information on disease control and eradication strategies and principles;

 guidance on health, safety, and personal protective equipment (PPE); 

 biosecurity information and site-specific management strategies; and

 training and educational resources. 

These documents provide the foundation for coordinated National, regional, 

State, Tribal, and local activities in an emergency situation. They also serve as a 

practical guide and compliment non-Federal preparedness activities. 

Appendix A provides more information on FAD PReP and associated materials. 

All documents are cleared by APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) and

posted on the FAD PReP website: www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. This website 

also offers critical policy updates relating to ongoing or recent FAD outbreaks. 
September 2022 2-1 

Chapter 2

USDA APHIS Authorities 

and FAD Emergency Funding

2.1 USDA APHIS AUTHORITIES FOR FOREIGN 

ANIMAL AND EMERGING DISEASES

The Code of Laws of the United States of America (U.S.C.) are the general and 

permanent Federal statutes of the United States, which are passed by Congress 

and signed by the President. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) are the 

regulations thatspell out in further detail how the executive branch agencies 

interpret the U.S.C.

The two authorities (U.S.C. and CFR) represent different stages in the legislative 

and regulatory process. The U.S.C. provides the general and permanent basis

from which the executive branch agencies can develop detailed CFR regulations.

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the USDA develops detailed 

regulations in the CFR through a rulemaking process where the public is allowed 

to comment. The different stages of CFR rulemaking include proposed rules, final 

rules, and, if needed, interim rules. In the event of an outbreak or detection of an 

animal disease, interim rules and/or Federal Orders may be issued with immediate 

regulations to prevent the spread of disease.

Within USDA, the Secretary of Agriculture delegates authority for development 

of regulations to the Under Secretary of Marketing and Regulatory Programs, who 

then delegates authority to the Administrator of APHIS. The Administrator of 

APHIS delegates authority to the APHIS Associate Administrator and Deputy 

Administrators.

2.1.1 FAD, Emerging Diseases, and Wildlife

As defined in Veterinary Services (VS) Guidance Document 12001.4: Policy for 

the Investigation of Potential Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging. Disease 

Incidents (FAD/EDI) (available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep), APHIS defines 

an FAD as a terrestrial animal disease or pest, or an aquatic animal disease or 

pest, not known to exist in the United States or its territories. An emerging animal 

disease may be defined as any terrestrial animal, aquatic animal, or zoonotic 

disease not yet known or characterized, or any known or characterized terrestrial 

animal or aquatic animal disease in the United States or its territories that changes 

or mutates in pathogenicity, communicability, or zoonotic potential to become a 
 

September 2022 2-2 

threat to terrestrial animals, aquatic animals, or humans. An FAD or emerging 

animal disease may involve livestock, poultry, other animals, or wildlife. 

In July 2014, APHIS published the VS Proposed Framework for Response to 

Emerging Animal Diseases in the United States. In July 2017, APHIS released the 

Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan. This document 

complements the National List of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRAD), which 

proposes a single, standardized list of reportable animal diseases and who will be 

responsible for reporting. In 2020, VS received public comments on the initial 

NLRAD Rule and began the process of developing answers to those comments—

final review and publication pending. It is likely this list will be published in a 

proposed rule, establishing part 57 in Title 9 of the CFR. More information on 

these documents are available here: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/monitoring-andsurveillance/nlrad/ct_national_list_reportable_animal_diseases. 

In the event that an FAD or emerging animal disease detection or outbreak in 

domestic livestock involves wildlife, USDA APHIS works in collaboration, 

communication, and coordination with State, Tribal, and Federal wildlife agencies 

that have primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for wildlife.

2.1.2 The Animal Health Protection Act, 

7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq. 

APHIS (through the Secretary of Agriculture) receives its permanent and general 

regulatory authority from the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S.C. 

8301 et seq.

The AHPA enables the Secretary of Agriculture to prevent, detect, control, and 

eradicate diseases and pests of animals, including foreign animal and emerging 

diseases, in order to protect animal health, the health and welfare of people, 

economic interests of livestock and related industries, the environment, and 

interstate and foreign commerce in animals and other articles. The term “animal” 

means any member of the animal kingdom (except a human), 7 U.S.C. 8301-

8302.

The AHPA provides a broad range of authorities to use in the event of animal 

disease outbreaks in the United States and to prevent the introduction of FADs or 

emerging animal diseases into the United States. The Secretary is specifically 

authorized to carry out operations and measures to detect, control, or eradicate 

any pest or disease of livestock, which includes poultry, 7 U.S.C. 8308, and to 

promulgate regulations and issue orders to carry out the AHPA (see 7 U.S.C. 

8315). It authorizes related activities respecting exportation, interstate movement, 

cooperative agreements, enforcement and penalties, seizure, quarantine, and 

disease and pest eradication. The Act also authorizes the Secretary to establish a 

veterinary accreditation program and enter into reimbursable fee agreements for 

pre-clearance abroad of animals or articles for movement into the United States.
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September 2022 2-3

To address the increasing risks of disease introduction, the AHPA authorizes the 

Secretary to establish the National Animal Disease Preparedness and Response 

Program (NADPRP). (see 7 U.S.C. 8308), a program established in 2018 and 

supported by Farm Bill Section 12101, Animal Disease Prevention and 

Management Program. Through this program, the Secretary is authorized to fund 

animal disease prevention and preparedness projects with State, industry, 

university partners and tribal stakeholders. 

Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. 231, transferred to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security certain agricultural import and entry inspection 

functions under the AHPA, including the authority to enforce the prohibitions or 

restrictions imposed by USDA.

2.1.2.1 RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORT, EXPORT, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to prohibit or restrict the 

importation or entry into the United States or interstate movement of any animal, 

article, or means of conveyance, or use of any means of conveyance or facility, if 

the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the introduction into or 

dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock 

(7 U.S.C. 8303 and 8305). Livestock is defined as “all farm raised animals” 

(7 U.S.C. 8302). The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to 

promulgate regulations requiring that any animal imported or entered be 

quarantined under supervision of the Secretary for the purpose of determining 

whether the animal is or may be affected by any pest or disease of livestock 

(7 U.S.C. 8303(b)(2)).

2.1.2.2 REMEDIAL MEASURES

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to order the destruction or 

removal from the United States of

 any animal, article, or means of conveyance that has been imported but 

has not entered the United States, if necessary to prevent the introduction 

into or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of 

livestock;

 any animal or progeny of any animal, article, or means of conveyance that 

has been imported or entered in violation of the AHPA; or

 any animal that has strayed into the United States, if necessary to prevent 

the introduction into or dissemination within the United States of any pest 

or disease of livestock (7 U.S.C. 8303(c)(1)).

If an owner fails to comply with an order of the Secretary, the Secretary may take 

remedial action, destroy, or remove from the United States the animal, progeny of 

any animal, article, or means of conveyance and may recover from the owner the 
September 2022 2-4

costs of any care, handling, disposal, or other action incurred by the Secretary in 

connection with the action (7 U.S.C. 8303(c)(2)(B)). The AHPA authorizes 

similar actions with respect to exports (7 U.S.C. 8304).

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to hold, seize, quarantine, 

treat, destroy, dispose, or take other remedial action with respect to any animal or 

progeny of any animal, article, or means of conveyance that

 is moving or has been moved interstate or has been imported and entered 

and the Secretary has reason to believe may carry, may have carried, or 

may have been affected with or exposed to any pest or disease of livestock 

at the time of the movement or that is otherwise in violation of the AHPA;

 is moving, is being handled, has moved, or has been handled in interstate 

commerce in violation of the AHPA;

 has been imported and is moving or being handled, or has moved or been 

handled, in violation of the AHPA; or

 the Secretary finds it is not being maintained, or has not been maintained, 

in accordance with any post-importation quarantine, post-importation 

condition, post-movement quarantine, or post-movement condition 

(7 U.S.C. 8306(a)).

2.1.2.3 DISINFECTION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to require the disinfection of 

(1) articles or any means of conveyance used in connection with the importation 

of an animal and (2) an individual involved in the importation of an animal and 

personal articles of the individual (7 U.S.C. 8303(c)(2)(A)). The AHPA

authorizes similar actions with respect to exports (7 U.S.C. 8304).

2.1.2.4 EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY

If measures taken by a State or Tribal Nation to control or eradicate a pest or 

disease of livestock are inadequate, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary of 

Agriculture—after notice to and review and consultation with certain State or 

Tribal officials—to declare that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the 

presence in the United States of a pest or disease of livestock and because the 

presence of the pest or disease threatens the livestock of the United States 

(7 U.S.C. 8306). If an extraordinary emergency is declared and it is necessary to 

prevent the dissemination of the pest or disease of livestock, the Secretary of 

Agriculture has the authority to

 hold, seize, treat, apply other remedial actions to, destroy (including 

preventively slaughter), or otherwise dispose of any animal, article, 

facility, or means of conveyance; and
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September 2022 2-5

 prohibit or restrict the movement or use within a State, or any portion of a 

State, of any animal or article, means of conveyance, or facility.

Upon a declaration of extraordinary emergency, the Secretary of Agriculture may, 

in writing, order the owner of any animal, article, facility, or means of 

conveyance to maintain in quarantine, dispose of, or take other remedial action 

with respect to the animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance. If the owner 

fails to comply with such an order, the Secretary may take similar action and 

recover from the owner the costs of such action (7 U.S.C. 8306(c)).

2.1.2.5 72-HOUR NATIONAL MOVEMENT STANDSTILL

Depending upon the livestock or poultry disease, USDA may need to implement a 

National Movement Standstill. Upon a declaration of an extraordinary emergency, 

the Secretary of Agriculture may simultaneously issue a 72-hour National 

Movement Standstill via a Federal Register Order or similar regulatory

mechanism prohibiting interstate and intrastate movement for susceptible animal 

species; other items may also be included in a National Movement Standstill 

dependent upon each disease response plan. This 72-hour Standstill allows 

USDA, States, and the private sector the opportunity to evaluate the extent of the 

outbreak, implement control measures, and widely communicate to stakeholders..

The 72-hour Standstill ensures that livestock are managed under a consistent 

framework and allow responders to begin the following activities: 

 Communicate outbreak and immediate actions needed;

 Establish initial Control Areas;

 Communicate location of initial Control Areas;

 Communicate where movement controls and permits are required when 

the standstill ends;

 Conduct initial high priority contact tracing from infected premises;

 Increase biosecurity and passive surveillance nationally;

 Increase active surveillance nationally with available capabilities;

 Halt international trade of impacted products as necessary.

For a period of 72 hours, the Federal Order (or similar regulatory mechanism)

requires the following:

 A complete stop to interstate/intrastate movement of susceptible animal 

species across the contiguous United States (other items may also be 

included depending on the disease response plan);

 All susceptible animal species already en route via intrastate and/or

interstate commerce at the start of the movement standstill must reach a 

destination and not be stopped on the road;
September 2022 2-6

 All susceptible animal species in transport to Canada will not be 

permitted to cross the border and are to return to the point of origin. 

 FSIS-inspected meat or other animal products already in interstate 

commerce will not be affected; and,

 Any producers or transporters who disregard the order may be subject to 

civil penalties and held to additional requirements placed on their 

premises by State or Federal animal health officials. 

During the 72-hour period, the USDA will collaborate with States and industry on 

identification of Control Areas, which will subsequently require permits for any 

movements, and on plans for resumption of movement in the Free Area. USDA 

will also collaborate with States to identify critical low risk movements necessary 

to respond to animal welfare concerns. Prior to the end of the 72-hour period, 

USDA will confirm the end or extension of the standstill order and provide 

notification through the State animal health officials and on the APHIS website. 

2.1.2.6 COMPENSATION

The AHPA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to compensate the owner, based 

on the fair market value, of any animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance 

that the Secretary requires to be destroyed, unlessthe animal, article, facility, or 

means of conveyance destroyed meets certain conditions set forth in 7 U.S.C. 

8306(d)(3).

2.1.2.7 INSPECTION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to stop and inspect, without a 

warrant, any person or means of conveyance moving

 into the United States, to determine whether the person or means of 

conveyance is carrying any animal or article regulated under the AHPA;

 in interstate commerce, on probable cause to believe that the person or 

means of conveyance is carrying any animal or article regulated under the 

AHPA; or

 in intrastate commerce from any State, or any portion of any State, 

quarantined under a declaration of extraordinary emergency, on probable 

cause to believe that the person or means of conveyance is carrying any 

quarantined animal or article (7 U.S.C. 8307).

2.1.2.8 WARRANTS

The Secretary of Agriculture may obtain a warrant and enter, with a warrant, any 

premises in the United States for the purpose of making inspections and seizures 

under the AHPA (7 U.S.C. 8307(c)).
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2.1.2.9 VETERINARY ACCREDITATION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a veterinary 

accreditation program, including the establishment of standards of conduct for 

accredited veterinarians. The Secretary is authorized, after notice and opportunity 

for a hearing on the record, to suspend or revoke accreditation of any veterinarian 

who violates the AHPA or the regulations (7 U.S.C. 8309).

2.1.2.10 COOPERATION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to cooperate with other 

Federal agencies, States or political subdivision of States, national or local 

governments of foreign countries, domestic or international organizations, 

domestic or international associations, Indian Tribes, and other persons to 

prevent, detect, or control animal diseases (7 U.S.C. 8310).

2.1.2.11 PAYMENT OF OVERTIME

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to pay overtime for an 

employee performing services under the act related to imports and exports 

(7 U.S.C. 8311(c)).

2.1.2.12 CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES

The AHPA authorizes civil penalties for violations of the AHPA and criminal 

penalties for those who knowingly violate it (7 U.S.C. 8313). The Secretary may 

also request the Department of Justice (DOJ) to initiate an injunction action 

(7 U.S.C. 8314).

2.1.2.13 INVESTIGATIONS AND SUBPOENAS

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to gather and compile 

information and conduct any inspection or investigation that is necessary for the 

administration of the AHPA. It authorizes the Secretary to issue administrative 

subpoenas to compel the attendance and testimony of any witness and the 

production of any documents relating to the administration or enforcement of the 

AHPA or any matter under investigation under the AHPA (7 U.S.C. 8314).

2.1.2.14 EMERGENCY TRANSFER OF FUNDS

In connection with an emergency, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary of 

Agriculture to transfer from other appropriations or funds available to the 

agencies or corporations of the USDA such funds that the Secretary deems 

necessary for the arrest, control, eradication, or prevention of the spread of a pest 

or disease of livestock that threatens any segment of agricultural production in the 

United States and for related expenses (7 U.S.C. 8316).
September 2022 2-8

2.2 USDA APHIS EMERGENCY FUNDING 

FOR FAD

Additional funding may be made available for an FAD emergency response. The 

Secretary of Agriculture may also declare an agricultural emergency or an 

extraordinary emergency when additional Federal assistance is needed to protect 

U.S. agriculture. However, in the 2014–2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza 

(HPAI) outbreak, the Secretary of Agriculture requested over $900 million in 

Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds without any type of emergency 

declaration.

There are three typical sources of funds for FAD response: contingency fund

(CF), CCC, and supplemental appropriations from Congress. Funding requests 

start with the VS Executive Team (VSET), and work their way up through the 

APHIS Administrator and APHIS Management Team (AMT). CCC requests also 

go to the level of the Department of Agriculture. The type of request and amount 

of the request dictate who must review and approve the request, and what is 

required. In general, if the VS request is for less than $1 million, it is a CF 

request. For requests greater than $1 million, it is usually a CCC request. VS may 

be required to supply performance management measures for either type of 

funding request. CF funds may be available more quickly than CCC funding, 

because CCC funding also requires Office of Management and Budget approval. 

Depending on the outbreak, supplemental appropriations may also be requested 

from Congress for large response efforts.

2.3 TRIGGERING EVENTS FOR USDA APHIS

EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR FADS

To transfer funds from appropriations or funds available to other agencies or 

corporations of USDA, the Secretary of Agriculture must find that an emergency 

exists under which a pest or disease of livestock threatens any segment of the 

agricultural production of the United States. However under the AHPA, the 

USDA may also support a State incident response in the absence of an emergency 

declaration (7 U.S.C. 8306); for example, $44.9 million was requested in CCC 

funding during the 2018-2020 virulent Newcastle disease outbreak in California..

To take actions specified under 7 U.S.C. 8306, the Secretary of Agriculture must 

decide that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence of a pest or 

disease of livestock and that the pest or disease of livestock threatens livestock in 

the United States. The Secretary may take action in a State under this section only 

upon finding, after review and consultation with the Governor or other 

appropriate official of the State affected, that the measures being taken by the 

State are inadequate to control or eradicate the pest or disease.
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September 2022 2-9 

In the event of a highly contagious FAD incident or outbreak, APHIS responds 

rapidly in field operations, logistical operations (including the National Veterinary 

Stockpile), and planning functions before the emergency funding processes are 

completed. Immediate action is required to control and contain FAD outbreaks.

2.3.1 Limitations on Preventive or Preparatory Measures 

Created by Triggering Event

Before taking action in a State under 7 U.S.C. 8306, the Secretary of Agriculture 

must notify the Governor or an appropriate animal health official of the State, 

issue a public announcement of the proposed action, and publish a statement in 

the Federal Register (can be published as soon as possible if prior publication is 

not possible). However, States can request USDA assistance immediately upon 

notification of an FAD. Typically, such a request leads to Unified State-Federal 

management of the incident.

2.3.2 Coordination

APHIS closely coordinates with other Federal agencies and State and Tribal

governments. 

NOTE: See section 321(a) of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act 

(7 U.S.C. 1961(a)), which allows emergency loans resulting from a quarantine 

imposed by the Secretary under the Plant Protection Act or animal quarantine 

laws.

2.4 ADDITIONAL USDA APHIS AUTHORITIES 

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FAD

Additional APHIS authorities come from the CFR, Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), and the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection 

Act of 2002, all of which are discussed in this section.

2.4.1 Code of Federal Regulations

Below are several of the regulations to safeguard public health, animal health, 

animal products, interstate commerce, and international trade.

2.4.1.1 TITLE 7 OF THE CFR

Title 7 of the CFR provides regulations for the delegations of authority for the 

Secretary of Agriculture, Under Secretary for Agriculture, and the APHIS

Administrator (7 CFR Parts 1, 2, 15, 15f, and 371).
 

September 2022 2-10

2.4.1.2 TITLE 9 OF THE CFR

2.4.1.2.1 Secretary of Agriculture to Issue Rule Governing Quarantine and 

Interstate Movement of Diseased Animals, Including Poultry 

(9 CFR 71.2) 

When the Secretary of Agriculture shall determine the fact that poultry or 

other animals in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia are 

affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease of 

livestock or poultry for which, in his opinion, a quarantine should be 

established or that other basis for a quarantine exists, notice will be given 

of that fact, and a rule will be issued accordingly, placing in quarantine 

such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or specified portion 

thereof. This rule will either absolutely forbid the interstate movement of 

the quarantined animals from the quarantined area or will indicate the 

regulations under which interstate movements may be made.

2.4.1.2.2 Interstate Movement of Diseased Animals and Poultry Generally 

Prohibited (9 CFR 71.3) 

Title 9 of the CFR provides detailed USDA APHIS administrative regulations for 

the control and eradication of animal diseases, including FADs and emerging 

animal diseases. For example, animals or poultry affected with any of the 

following diseases, or any other communicable foreign disease not known to exist 

in the United States, shall not be moved interstate, which is defined as from one 

State into or through any other State (9 CFR 71.3 (b)):

 African swine fever

 Classical swine fever (hog cholera)

 Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia 

 Contagious equine metritis 

 Dourine 

 Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)

 Glanders

 HPAI (European fowl pest)

 Rinderpest 

 Scabies—sheep 

 Teschen disease 
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September 2022 2-11

 Screwworms 

 Vesicular exanthema.

Please see Section 2.4.1.2.4 for the requirements and standards for accredited 

veterinarians.

2.4.1.2.3 Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Pleuropneumonia, Rinderpest, and Certain 

Other Communicable Diseases of Livestock or Poultry (9 CFR 53) 

This CFR covers the following:

 determination of the existence of disease; 

 agreements with States; 

 appraisals of animals or materials; 

 destruction of animals; 

 disinfection or destruction of materials; 

 disinfection of animals; 

 disinfection of premises, conveyances, and materials; 

 presentation of claims; 

 mortgage against animals or materials; and

 claims not allowed.

2.4.1.2.4 Requirements and Standards for Accredited Veterinarians and 

Suspension or Revocation of Such Accreditation (9 CFR 161.4, 

9 CFR 161.6) 

An accredited veterinarian shall immediately report to the Veterinarian-in-Charge 

and the State Animal Health Official all diagnosed or suspected cases of a 

communicable animal disease for which APHIS has a control or eradication 

program in 9 CFR Chapter I, and all diagnosed or suspected cases of any animal 

disease not known to exist in the United States as provided by §71.3(b) of this 

chapter.

The Administrator is authorized to suspend for a given period of time, or to 

revoke, the accreditation of a veterinarian when he or she determines that the 

accredited veterinarian has not complied with the “Standards for Accredited 

Veterinarian Duties”, set forth in §161.4 of this part or with any of the other 

regulations in this subchapter, or is otherwise found to be unfit to be accredited.
 

September 2022 2-12

2.4.2 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 

HSPD-9 establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system 

against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-9 states 

the Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 

Security and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services

(HHS) and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 

shall work with State and local governments and the private sector to develop a 

veterinary stockpile. In the event of a threat, USDA works closely with CDC to 

protect the United States agriculture and food system against human health risk 

and economic impacts. 

The National Veterinary Stockpile is to contain sufficient amounts of animal 

vaccine and antiviral or therapeutic products 

 for responders to respond appropriately to the most damaging animal 

diseases affecting human health and the economy and 

 that will be capable of deployment within 24 hours of an outbreak.

Not all FADs have vaccines or enough vaccines in the stockpile. For example, the 

most used FMD vaccine is inactivated or killed. Manufacturing it requires a live 

virus; however, per 21 CFR Part 133a, no live FMDV may be introduced for any 

purpose into any part of the mainland of the United States by commercial manufacturers or Federal entities. Therefore, conventional inactivated vaccine must be 

manufactured abroad then shipped to the United States for use. This production 

cycle takes 14 weeks to complete. 

In the event FMD is introduced to the United States, the vaccine would likely be 

requested by USDA APHIS after confirmatory testing, approximately 24-48 hours 

after sample submission. It would not be received until 10-14 days post order 

(which is beyond the 24 hours indicated in the directive). 

2.4.3 The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002

The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 and the Federal 

implementing regulations under “Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents 

and Toxins” (7 CFR Part 331 and 9 CFR Part 121) mandate that the United States 

prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other public health 

emergencies that could threaten public health and safety or American agriculture. 

The act requires that individuals possessing, using, or transferring agents or toxins 

that are deemed a severe threat to public, animal, or plant health, or to animal or 

plant products, notify either the Secretary of HHS or the Secretary of USDA. 

9 CFR Parts 121.3 and 121.4 list the VS select agents and toxins and the overlap 

select agents and toxins, respectively. 9 CFR 121 provides further detail on the 

safeguarding and restrictions for the possession, use, and transfer, of select agents. 
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

September 2022 3-1 

Chapter 3

Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, 

and Planning Assumptions 

3.1 FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS—OVERVIEW

Understanding the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments and agencies

involved in responding to a domestic incident of an FAD, promotes an effective

and coordinated emergency response. The information below provides an 

overview of the roles and responsibilities of the Federal departments and agencies 

that may be involved in an FAD response; these roles and responsibilities are 

consistent with those outlined in the National Response Framework (NRF). 

The NRF is one of the five National Planning Frameworks in the National 

Preparedness System. The NRF presents a whole community approach to guide 

the Nation during a disaster of any type, including FAD incidents. The NRF 

specifies that all incidents begin and end locally. Effective response, coordination, 

and communication in an incident requires a whole community approach; this 

includes emergency management practitioners, community leaders, and 

government officials from local to Federal who must collaboratively determine 

how to respond to any incident. 1 A response to an FAD incident is based on the 

concepts and principles in both the NRF and NIMS, which is the key foundation 

to the National Preparedness System.

During the course of an FAD outbreak response, the USDA may request Federalto-Federal support (FFS) from other Federal departments and agencies; FFS may 

not necessarily be requested in an FAD incident. FFS refers to the circumstance in 

which a Federal department or agency requests Federal resource support under the 

NRF that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or another policy mechanism. This 

support is coordinated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as 

specified in the NRF, and leverages the multiagency coordination (MAC) 

structures for communication and implementation. Federal agencies can request 

and provide FFS by executing interagency or intra-agency reimbursable 

agreements, in accordance with the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535) or other 

applicable authorities. Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request 

reimbursement from the requesting agency for eligible expenditures. 

During the course of an FAD outbreak response, under specific conditions, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS may assume the lead for the 

coordination of Federal resources utilized in response to or recovery from an 

1 FEMA. (2019). NRF. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework. 
 

September 2022 3-2 

incident. USDA maintains the lead for overall incident management. These 

conditions are as follows:

• The Secretary of Agriculture requests assistance from DHS. 

• The President directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to assume 

responsibility for managing the incident.2 

• More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially

involved in the incident response.

3.2 EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 

WITHIN THE NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

Part of the NRF’s approach is to define the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) 

that provide the structure for coordinating Federal interagency support for 

incidents of National significance. The ESF structure assigns responsibilities and 

authority, and includes the mechanisms used to provide Federal support to States 

and FFS for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act3 and for 

non-Stafford Act incidents. The National Response Coordination Center, a 

component of the National Operations Center (NOC), develops and issues 

operation orders to activate individual ESFs on the basis of the scope and 

magnitude of the threat or incident.

The ESFs, as categorized in the NRF, are displayed in Table 3-1. 

Table 3-1. Primary Responsibilities of Each Emergency Support Function

ESF Scope 

ESF #1–

Transportation

Transportation modes management and control

Transportation safety

Stabilization and reestablishment of transportation infrastructure

Movement restrictions

Damage and impact assessment

2 U.S. Government Publishing Office. 2003. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5—

Management of Domestic Incidents. Retrieved from GPO website 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book1/pdf/PPP-2003-book1-doc-pg229.pdf. 3 A Stafford Act declaration is highly unlikely in an FAD outbreak; in 2014–2015, a State requested a Stafford Act declaration for HPAI—the largest animal health incident in U.S. history—

and it was rejected.
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September 2022 3-3

ESF #2–

Communications

Coordination with telecommunications and information technology (IT) industries

Coordination of the reestablishment and provision of critical communications 

infrastructure

Protection, reestablishment, and sustainment of national cyber and IT resources

Oversight of communications within the Federal response structures

Facilitation of the stabilization of systems and applications from cyber events

ESF #3–Public Works 

and Engineering

Infrastructure protection and emergency repair

Critical infrastructure reestablishment

Engineering services and construction management

Emergency contracting support for life-saving and life-sustaining services

ESF #4–Firefighting Support to wildland, rural, and urban firefighting operations

ESF #5–Information 

and Planning

Incident action planning

Information collection, analysis, and dissemination

ESF #6–Mass Care, 

Emergency 

Assistance, Temporary 

Housing, and Human 

Services

Mass care

Emergency assistance

Temporary housing

Human services

ESF #7–Logistics Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, management, and sustainment 

capability

Resource support (e.g., facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting 

services)

ESF #8–Public Health 

and Medical Services

Public health

Medical surge support including patient movement

Behavioral health services

Mass fatality management

Veterinary, medical, and public health services

ESF #9–Search and 

Rescue

Structural collapse (urban) search and rescue

Maritime/coastal/waterborne search and rescue

Land search and rescue 

ESF #10–Oil and 

Hazardous Materials 

Environmental assessment of the nature and extent of oil and hazardous materials 

contamination

Environmental decontamination and cleanup, including buildings/structures and 

management of contaminated waste
 

September 2022 3-4 

ESF #11–Agriculture 

and Natural Resources

Nutrition assistance

Animal and agricultural health issue response 

Technical expertise, coordination, and support of animal and agricultural emergency 

management

Meat, poultry, and processed egg products safety and defense 

Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection

ESF #12–Energy Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and reestablishment

Energy industry utilities coordination

Energy forecast

ESF #13–Public Safety 

and Security

Facility and resource security

Security planning and technical resource assistance 

Public safety and security support

Support to access, traffic, and crowd control

ESF #14–Cross-Sector 

Business and 

Infrastructure 

Assessment, analysis, and situational awareness of cross-sector challenges

Facilitates operational coordination with critical infrastructure sectors

ESF #15–External 

Affairs and SOPs

Public affairs and the Joint Information Center (JIC)

Intergovernmental (local, State, Tribal, and territorial) affairs

Congressional affairs

ESF designates agencies and departments as either “coordinator,” “primary 

agency,” or “support agency.” An ESF coordinator is an entity with management 

oversight for that particular ESF. An ESF primary agency is a Federal agency 

with significant authorities, roles, resources, or capabilities for a particular 

function. A single ESF may have multiple primary agencies. An ESF support 

agency is an agency with specific capabilities or resources that support the 

primary agency or agencies. 

Agency roles are available in the NRF ESF Annexes based on broad agency 

designation, Federal or non-Federal, and their sub agencies if indicated by the 

ESF. Further descriptions are available in the individual ESF annexes: 

https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/nationalpreparedness/frameworks/response#support 
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September 2022 3-5

3.3 FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS: ROLES AND 

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FAD PREPAREDNESS,

AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS FOR FAD RESPONSE

A macro-level overview of agency responsibilities in the event of an FAD

outbreak is provided throughout the remainder of this chapter. 

3.3.1 USDA Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

USDA is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) (primary and coordination roles) for 

incident management during an FAD incident affecting domestic livestock or

poultry. As such, USDA does the following:

 Coordinates with State Animal Health Officials (SAHOs) and Incident 

Management Teams, manages incident response, manages public 

messages, and takes measures to control and eradicate the disease.

 Some measures used to control and eradicate an FAD include 

quarantine and movement control, epidemiological investigation, 

appraisal and compensation, depopulation of affected animals, carcass 

disposal, cleaning and disinfection, disease surveillance, diagnostics, 

and, potentially, emergency vaccination.

 Acts as the primary interface between Federal, State, Tribal, and local 

partners; provides interagency coordination necessary to respond to and 

control an animal disease event.

 Acts as the primary Federal liaison to the animal industry.

 Provides on-scene support and response capability in collaboration with 

State, Tribal, and industry partners.

 Maintains surveillance for animal health anomalies that may indicate the 

presence of foreign or emerging animal diseases.

 In close cooperation with SAHOs, assigns FAD Diagnosticians to 

investigate possible cases of foreign or emerging animal diseases.

 Operates the National Veterinary Services Laboratories, the national 

reference laboratories for many FADs, which are WOAH Reference 

Laboratories for identifying and confirming FADs.

 After diagnosis of a disease, circulates warning notices to appropriate 

Federal and State officials in order to facilitate a more timely and efficient 

response.
September 2022 3-6

 Assesses, with HHS, whether animals and animal product processors, 

distributors, and importers in the affected area are able to provide safe and 

secure food and feed.

 Works to identify and mitigate transmission risks in FAD outbreaks with 

zoonotic potential; coordinates with the HHS on zoonotic disease issues.

 Works to prevent the introduction and transmission of disease from 

domestic animals to wildlife.

 Administers a National Wildlife Disease Surveillance and Emergency 

Response System that is responsible for conducting coordinated disease

surveillance on the wildlife diseases it manages and responding to a 

variety of emergencies, including natural disasters and animal disease 

outbreaks.

 Evaluates and modifies, if necessary, regulations regarding inspection and 

quarantine of animals and animal products at ports of entry (AHPA, 7 

U.S.C. 8301).

 Maintains the Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance database that 

documents imports of animal products, allowing for more targeted 

inspections at ports of entry and tracing the disposition of products.

 Requires quarantine and diagnostic testing of imported animals. For 

example, quarantine is required for birds imported from Canada and 

returning pet birds of U.S. origin; prohibits the importation of live birds 

and bird products from countries or regions affected by HPAI, with the 

exception of returning U.S. origin pet birds, which must go through USDA

quarantine and avian influenza (AI) testing.

 Gathers intelligence for emerging issues, including electronic scanning of 

current open-source information and text mining. Information gleaned 

from these processes may, upon filtering and analysis, indicate the 

emergence and/or spread of animal diseases in the United States or abroad. 

Potential and confirmed disease outbreaks identified via electronic 

scanning are verified, tracked, and prioritized for further action, including 

follow-up, assessment, analysis, and communications. 

 Conducts pathway analyses and risk assessment methodologies, focusing

on predicting the likelihood of movement of known diseases to new 

locations.

 USDA and its sub agencies perform the primary and coordination roles in 

ESF #4 and #11 and support roles in ESFs #1–12, and 14.
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

September 2022 3-7 

3.3.2 USDA Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

USDA APHIS is the LFA (primary and coordination roles) with responsibility 

and authority for animal disease control and coordinates Federal, State, Tribal, 

and local eradication efforts. Accordingly, USDA APHIS planning assumptions 

include the following:

 USDA is responsible for coordinating the response to livestock or poultry 

diseases and can request support as necessary from other Federal agencies 

under its own authorities to control a livestock or poultry disease. In 

situations where a declaration of emergency or major disaster4 is issued by 

the President, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests DHS lead 

coordination, then the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS can lead 

the coordination of Federal resources. USDA maintains the lead of overall 

incident management.

 An FAD outbreak in the United States has international trade 

ramifications; it is automatically a primary Federal responsibility of the 

USDA and is handled in cooperation with State, Tribal, and local 

governments.

 For an animal health event in the United States, USDA determines the 

timing and content of all public message releases, press releases, and fact 

sheets related to the event, except for the occurrence of human cases, for 

which human health authorities have the lead on communications.

 USDA determines at what point to stand up a JIC to manage 

communication and messaging; it may include representatives from other 

federal agencies or industry, depending on the scope of the incident. 

 The Secretary of Agriculture may declare an emergency or extraordinary 

emergency as appropriate to the FAD agent and scale of outbreak; for 

HPAI and FMD, the planning assumption is that the Secretary of 

Agriculture can declare an emergency or extraordinary emergency. 

 Funding is requested to indemnify livestock and poultry owners, as 

necessary and to the extent possible given funding limitations, and cover 

additional outbreak response costs for USDA; depending on the size of the 

request, the CCC or APHIS CF are typical sources of funding for FAD 

response. 

 As part of the initial response to an outbreak, as the situation requires, 

USDA, State, and/or Tribal authorities immediately quarantine the 

relevant regions or zones, restrict specific movements, depopulate affected 

4 More information on the emergency disaster designation and declaration processis available 

at https://www.fema.gov/disaster-declaration-process. 
September 2022 3-8

animals as determined necessary, dispose of carcasses, disinfect property, 

and increase surveillance in the area to ensure that the FAD has not 

spread.

 USDA works with State and/or Tribal authorities, as the situation requires, 

to lift the quarantine when the region or zone is free of the FAD agent.

 USDA, in collaboration with HHS and the Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA), conveys messages regarding the safety of the food and feed

supply.

 Other agencies may be available for supporting activities as requested by 

USDA under the Economy Act or other mechanisms; because of the 

specific expertise required to effectively respond to FAD incidents, 

support from other agencies may be for activities like communication or 

security and should not be assumed.

 USDA coordinates with the EPA and follows relevant regulations in 

determining and conducting the most appropriate method of carcass 

disposal and cleaning and disinfection activities.

 U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) performs enhanced surveillance in the 

wild animals it tracks, when needed, after the detection of the disease 

agent in the domestic animal population; USDA collaborates with DOI

and State and local agencies in enhanced wild animalsurveillance as 

appropriate.

3.3.3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Roles 

and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The DHS roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

 Inspects people and cargo (including animals and animal products) at ports 

of entry per appropriate regulations. Implements any changes to 

regulations at ports of entry when determined necessary by a regulatory 

agency (e.g., USDA, DOI, HHS).

 Enforces the quarantine of people arriving at ports of entry, as ordered by 

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

 Acquires, integrates, and reports interagency biosurveillance information 

to the National Biosurveillance Integration System to facilitate interagency 

biosurveillance situational awareness and to facilitate response activities.

 Monitors the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources on an 

ongoing basis and provides a coordinating vehicle to share
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

September 2022 3-9

information/create sharing entities (e.g., National Infrastructure 

Coordinating Center [NICC]).

 In the event of a request from an agency with primary jurisdiction, uses

the ESFs as the mechanism for coordinating required support from other 

agencies. May designate a Federal Resource Coordinator to perform this

resource coordination function (rather than a Federal Coordinating Officer 

as under a Stafford Act declaration).

 In the event of a request from an agency with primary jurisdiction, 

establishes and manages a common operating picture through the NOC, 

which establishes and maintains real-time communications links to other 

Federal Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) at the National level, as 

well as appropriate State, Tribal, local, regional, and non-governmental 

EOCs and relevant elements of the private sector.

 May establish a National JIC to review public messages.

 When deemed necessary, activates structures within the NRF that are 

necessary for FFS.

 Provides logistics support, as appropriate or requested.

 DHS (including FEMA, and U.S. Coast Guard [USCG]) performs the 

primary role in ESFs #2, #5–7, #9, #10, and #15; coordination roles in 

ESFs #2, #4–7, #9, and #15; and plays support roles in all other ESFs.

3.3.4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Planning 

Assumptions for FAD Response

The DHS planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

 If the President of the United States declares a Federal disaster, or if the 

Secretary of Agriculture requests that the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

then

 DHS becomes responsible for the coordination of Federal resources.

 DHS has a significantly greater role in the response.

 The Secretary of Homeland Security implements some or all of the 

applicable broad coordinating structures and processes contained 

within the NRF as required by the incident.

 USDA maintains lead of overall incident management in an FAD 

response.
September 2022 3-10

 Without a Presidential declaration of disaster, USDA may request 

assistance from DHS through FFS. Pursuant to paragraph 16 of HSPD-5, 

the NRF shall be used as the overarching framework for all other Federal 

incident management and emergency operations plans developed under 

these and other authorities, as well as memoranda of understanding among 

various Federal agencies. These incident management and emergency 

operations plans shall be considered as either integrated components of the 

NRF or as supporting operational plans or annexes, as appropriate.

 The Secretary of Homeland Security can also provide assistance by 

activating specific NRF structures and elements (e.g., ESFs), without 

overall coordination, upon request. 

 All sectors are required to maintain essential and critical services.

3.3.5 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Roles 

and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The HHS roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

 Serves as the LFA (primary and coordination roles) for coordinating and 

integrating Federal efforts to provide public health and medical assistance. 

For example, in the event of a zoonotic disease outbreak where the agent 

causes disease in humans, the CDC may conduct epidemiological

investigations as necessary to assess the risk of human infection and 

illness among persons exposed to the disease agent, provide occupational 

health guidance, conductsurveillance for human infectionsin appropriate 

populations, conduct viral laboratory analyses, and engage in 

communication activities.

 Ensures, through the FDA, the safety of the food supply (except for meat, 

poultry, and processed egg products regulated by USDA). FDA, in 

collaboration with USDA, provides the food industry and the public with 

information and guidance on the influenza virus and the safety of the food 

supply.

 The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 

develops policy on pandemic preparedness, deploys staff in emergency 

situations, and supervises the deployment of medical countermeasures.

 Formulates recommendations and guidance on using antiviral prophylaxis 

for personnel involved in responding to the outbreak and works with 

USDA and the Department of Labor (DOL) Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration (OSHA) on PPE.
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

September 2022 3-11

 Provides guidance to State, Tribal, and local public health agencies 

regarding diagnosing and managing potential human infections caused by 

zoonotic diseases.

 Performs epidemiological investigations of human cases and case clusters.

 Operates quarantine stations for international travelers arriving at 

designated U.S. ports of entry.

 Performs outreach to HHS stakeholders—especially National/State/Tribal/

local healthcare partners, health authorities in other countries, the World 

Health Organization, and business groups.

 Provides technical assistance to, and collaborates with, the HHS/FDAregulated food and animal health industries regarding zoonotic disease

preparedness.

 Conducts research to investigate the presence and survival of specific 

disease agents in certain foods, like AI.

 Conveys messages to consumers regarding the safety of foods regulated 

by HHS/FDA.

 Assists in communicating actions the government is taking and releases 

information to the public through various media outlets.

 Expands U.S. border disease surveillance activities, including Canada and 

Mexico.

 Performs the primary and coordination role in ESF #8, and plays support 

roles in ESFs #3, #5–#7, #9–11, and #15.

3.3.6 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Planning 

Assumptions for FAD Response

The HHS planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

 HHS leads the assessment of human health risk for animal diseases with 

zoonotic potential.

 HHS/FDA leads matters concerning FDA-regulated food and feed 

products and the regulated food, feed, and animal health industries.

 HHS works to ensure that sensitive and comprehensive laboratory, 

epidemiologic, and clinical systems are in place to reliably detect and 

monitor the occurrence of diseases with zoonotic potential.
September 2022 3-12

3.3.7 U.S. Department of Interior Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness

The DOI roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

 Manages and protects certain wildlife under various laws and treaties, and 

protects public health on an estimated 600 million acres of Federal land 

across the country. Coordinates the Federal government’s surveillance of 

wild migratory birds for diseases of concern, including HPAI; coordinates 

Federal surveillance with related surveillance activities of State fish and 

wildlife agencies, and provides leadership and support in the area of 

wildlife disease research and diagnostics to Federal and State natural 

resource agencies.

 The National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC) of the U.S. Geological 

Survey (USGS) works with department bureaus, as well as State, Tribal,

and other Federal entities, on wildlife disease investigations, providing the 

best available science and technical support for issues related to wildlife 

health and disease. NWHC is an WOAH Collaborating Center for 

Research and Diagnosis of Emerging and Existing Pathogens of Wildlife. 

NWHC includes a biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) diagnostic and research 

laboratory that provides analytical support to the targeted surveillance of 

migratory birds and conducts scientific investigations of wildlife 

morbidity and mortality events to identify causative agents of wildlife 

disease. In the event of a zoonotic outbreak in the wild animals DOI

manages, it works with Federal and State natural resource, animal health, 

and public health agencies to support timely and effective response.

 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) permits the inspection of 

wildlife and wildlife products in trade into and out of the United States. 

The USFWS partners with USDA to publicize wildlife management 

activities, including across jurisdictional borders, and if required, utilizes

its own permitting authorities to restrict the import or export of the wild 

animals it manages.

 USFWS regulates wildlife trade and trafficking, including its related 

enforcement expertise, and positions its wildlife inspectors and special 

agents to assist in detecting and detaining wildlife imports or exports 

that may violate bans imposed by other Federal agencies, and in 

intercepting smuggled animals or animals being moved illegally from 

State to State.

 As part of its import and export monitoring activities, USFWS also 

maintains an extensive database that documents wildlife trade 

transactions. These records provide a basis for identifying companies 

and individuals involved in importing animals or animal products and 

tracing the entry and disposition of specific shipments.
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

September 2022 3-13

 DOI performs the primary role in ESFs #9 and #11, and plays support 

roles in ESFs #1–5, #7–13, and #15.

3.3.8 U.S. Department of Interior Planning Assumptions 

for FAD Response

DOI is the executive agent for U.S. treaty obligations under several migratory bird 

treaties and other authorities. DOI regulatory responsibilities associated with 

migratory birds remain in effect throughout all phases of an avian disease. The 

planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

 DOI is the lead agency for all wild bird surveillance, and is the primary 

Federal department responsible for addressing diseases of concern, 

including HPAI, in wild birds.

 If HPAI or another FAD is detected in wild free-ranging birds, DOI works 

with USDA to determine the timing and content of all public messages 

related to the incident.

 DOI is responsible for endangered species in the United States.

 DOI provides guidance to ensure that all personnel involved in response to 

a disease of concern in wildlife have appropriate PPE and that all proper 

biosafety precautions are taken for personnel handling wild animals and 

disease agents.

 DOI coordinates enhanced surveillance efforts among Federal, State, and 

Tribal agencies and other cooperators following a detection of an FAD. 

DOI cooperates with Federal, State, and Tribal agencies in response to 

wildlife disease events, offering full field investigations and diagnostic 

services.

 DOI supplies training as requested to State and Tribal entities in sampling 

strategies and techniques and works with them in communication on 

safely handling wildlife and disease agents, as well as information on meat 

consumption.

3.3.9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Roles 

and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

EPA’s roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

 Exercises sector-specific jurisdiction over drinking water and water 

treatment infrastructure.
September 2022 3-14

 Determines whether local water is suitable for use; assesseswastewater

and solid waste facilities; provides biosurveillance, warning, and 

detection. 

 Provides investigation and intelligence support.

 Provides technical assistance and environmental information for assessing

the public health and medical aspects of situations involving hazardous 

materials.

 Assists in identifying alternate water supplies for critical care facilities.

 Provides technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and support for 

decontamination and disposal issues, including on-site response personnel 

or other employees as requested.

 Approves suitable disinfectant pesticides and evaluates new requests from 

industry and governmental agencies regarding registration of disinfectants 

and questions regarding their approved uses.

 Promulgates regulations that implement environmental laws enacted by 

Congress, including regulations related to decontamination and disposal, 

and licensing the use of pesticides.

 Establishes minimum National standards for solid waste disposal that 

protect human health and the environment. Implementation—including 

permitting, monitoring, and enforcement of these standards—rests 

primarily with State and local governments. State and local governments 

implement their own programs, but must meet minimum Federal 

regulatory requirements. Similarly, EPA expects that decontamination is

conducted by farmers and owners with assistance and guidance from local 

and State authorities, and other Federal departments involved, as 

appropriate, consistent with their traditional missions.

 EPA performs the primary and coordination role for ESF #10; and support 

role in ESFs #3–#5, #8, #11, #12, and #15.

3.3.10 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Planning 

Assumptions for FAD Response

The EPA planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

 EPA plays a support role to DOI and USDA animal disease control or 

eradication efforts.

 EPA supports USDA in its efforts to promptly respond to an FAD

outbreak.
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

September 2022 3-15

 EPA supports DOI in its efforts to promptly respond to an outbreak in the 

wild animal populations it manages.

 Upon the request of USDA or DOI, EPA provides advice, including 

guidance on applicable environmental statutes and technical 

considerations, on a range of options available for the disposal of animals 

and the use of disinfectants to inactivate FAD agents on environmental 

surfaces and fomites.

 EPA encourages State counterparts, who have authority to implement 

municipal solid waste management programs, to identify potential 

management options in their States and resolve any issues associated with 

the potential use of those facilities, such as concerns raised by the 

industries regarding their willingness to accept animal carcasses.

3.3.11 U.S. Department of Labor/Occupational Safety 

and Health Administration Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness

The DOL/OHSA roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

 DOL/OSHA is the coordinating agency for the NRF Worker Safety and 

Health Support Annex and coordinates the safety and health of workers by

achieving the following:

 Responds to requests for assistance from Federal, State, Tribal, and 

local agencies and the private sector that are requesting worker safety 

and health support.

 Provides pertinent occupational hazard information and guidance 

regarding appropriate workplace precautions to the affected employers 

and employees.

 Coordinates activities with State occupational safety and health 

agencies (for example, OSHA State plans and consultation programs) 

as they relate to potential zoonotic diseases.

 Provides appropriate compliance assistance to affected employers.

 Monitors employer compliance with precautions required by the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act and OSHA safety and health 

standards.

 Conducts investigations in response to employee fatalities, 

catastrophes, and complaints.
September 2022 3-16

 OSHA may perform these functions directly or in coordination with its 

Federal cooperating agencies.

 Plays support roles in ESFs #3, #5–#12, #14, and #15. 

3.3.12 U.S. Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

The DOL/OHSA planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

 DOL/OSHA supports Federal departments involved in control and 

eradication efforts involving animals by coordinating worker safety and 

health support under the NRF.

 OSHA may perform these functions directly or in coordination with its 

Federal cooperating agencies and State partner agencies.

 Generally, DOL/OSHA’s role in Federal efforts to counteract potential 

zoonotic diseases is directed toward assuring the safety and health of 

workers.

3.3.13 U.S. Department of Justice Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness

The DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) roles and responsibilities for FAD

preparedness are as follows:

 The FBI coordinates the Federal investigation of criminal activities, if bioterrorism or agro-terrorism are suspected, through the Joint Terrorism 

Task Force.

 ATF may help enforce local regulation upon exhaustion of support and 

resources from local, State, and Tribal, law enforcement departments and 

agencies. 

 The DOJ performs the primary and coordination role for ESF #13 and

provides support roles for ESFs #1, #5, #6, #8–13, and #15.

3.3.14 U.S. Department of Justice Planning Assumptions 

for FAD Response

 The DOJ/FBI is the Federal agency responsible for investigating cases of 

bio-terrorism or agro-terrorism. If animals, livestock, or poultry are 

suspected targets of a terrorist attack, or if any evidence suggests an FAD
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

September 2022 3-17

may have been or could be intentionally introduced, USDA notifies the 

FBI.

 If a terrorist act is suspected in connection with an FAD outbreak, the 

USDA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) notifies the Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Unit of the FBI. The USDA OIG, other appropriate 

Federal law enforcement agencies, and the FBI conduct a joint criminal 

investigation.

3.3.15 U.S. Department of Defense Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) roles and responsibilities for FAD

preparedness are as follows:

 Serves as supporting agency to USDA for animal disease preparedness, 

response, and recovery efforts.

 Outlined in the DoD-USDA Memorandum of Agreement Concerning 

Response to Animal Diseases, February 2016, the USDA can request 

services from the DoD VS under the Economy Act. This includes but is

not limited to assigning a DoD Veterinary Liaison Officer, DoD VS 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities Coordinator, and other appropriate 

collaborative personnel for the purposes of coordinating Requests for 

Assistance, such as epidemiology, surveillance, and tracing, laboratory 

diagnostics, transportation and logistic support, debris removal and 

disposal, and decontamination and disinfection. 

 Performs the primary agency role for ESF #9 and plays support roles for 

ESF #1–15.

3.3.16 U.S. Department of Defense Planning Assumptions 

for FAD Response

 In an FAD outbreak, DoD could provide a myriad of veterinary services 

through the Army, as executive agent for DoD VS, providing veterinary 

services to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, USCG, and other Federal 

agencies as directed. VS responsibility is delegated to the Army Surgeon 

General and executed by Army VS units and personnel.

 In a large-scale outbreak, DoD could provide an installation in the vicinity 

of the outbreak to serve as a Federal logistical staging area/mobilization 

center, public affairs and communication support, personnel for 

depopulation and disposal activities, and facility and/or vehicle 

decontamination.
 

September 2022 3-18

 In an FAD outbreak, DoD VS units could provide increased surveillance; 

risk communications; food safety; training; laboratory diagnostics; field 

operations support that could include eradication of disease, identification 

of affected animals, quarantine implementation, euthanasia, carcass 

disposal, cleaning and disinfection, biosecurity, strategic vaccination 

and/or treatments, wildlife management, and vector control; and SME

activities for DoD installations.

3.3.17 U.S. Department of State Roles and Responsibilities 

for FAD Preparedness

The Department of State roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as 

follows:

 Facilitates a coordinated response between other countries when animal 

and/or plant disease outbreaks represent a transboundary threat.

 Plays support roles in ESFs #1–5 and #8–15. 

3.3.18 Additional Resources

More information on roles and responsibilities during an incident can be found in 

the following resources: 

 ICS Resource Center 

(http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm) 

 APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide.

3.4 USDA APHIS TIERED RESPONSE 

TO FAD INCIDENTS

Consistent with the NRF, USDA APHIS uses a tiered response to FAD incidents. 

The support, resources, and coordination required to successfully respond to an 

FAD incident is flexible and scalable. As stated in the NRF, 

Most incidents begin and end locally and are managed and executed at the 

local or tribal level. Incidents require a unified response from local agencies, 

the private sector, tribes, and NGOs. Some may require additional support 

from neighboring jurisdictions or state governments. A smaller number of 

incidents require federal support. Incidents that occur within or along the 

borders of federally managed lands and state, tribal, and territorial lands 

require unity of effort among federal, state, tribal, or territorial governments at 

the local level. National response processes are structured to provide tiered 
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

September 2022 3-19

levels of support when additional resources or capabilities are needed. 5All 

FAD incident response activities begin and end locally. As suggested in the 

NRF, organizational structures used to respond to an FAD incident—like a 

National Incident Management Team (NIMT), Incident Coordination Group 

(ICG), or MAC Group can be “partially or fully implemented in the context of 

a threat, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident.”6

This ensures that the level of response is consistent and appropriate with the 

scale of the incident.

FAD incidents can range from small incursions—like the detection of a 

screwworm in an imported dog, or an equine piroplasmosis outbreak—to much 

larger events, like the HPAI 2014–2015 outbreak. An FMD outbreak in livestock

would be a very significant FAD incident requiring rapid scale-up of 

organizational structures, coordination, and resources. Smaller incidents are 

handled by State, Tribal, and local resources; larger events require full 

mobilization of VS and resource and coordination from APHIS. Depending on the 

incident, resources or coordination may also be requested from USDA by the 

APHIS Administrator. USDA is the LFA in any FAD incident.

5 Footnote from the NRF (2019): “Certain incidents such as a pandemic or cyber event may 

not be limited to a specific geographic area and may be managed at the local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, or Federal level depending on the nature of the incident.” 6 FEMA. (2019). NRF. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework. 
 

September 2022 4-2 

4.1 OVERVIEW OF INCIDENT COORDINATION

4.1.1 Multiagency Coordination

MAC allows all levels and disciplines of government to work together more 

efficiently and effectively. MAC occurs on a regular and routine basis as 

personnel from different agencies interact. In an incident, as specified in NIMS,

the primary function of MAC is to “coordinate activities above the field level and 

to prioritize the incident demands for critical or competing resources.”4 A MAC 

Group does not command activities in the field. In the event of an animal health 

incident, an APHIS MAC Group is formed if the response requires more support

from APHIS. The APHIS MAC Group provides support, coordination, and 

assistance with policy-level decisions to the ICS structure managing an incident. 

In large incidents, a USDA MAC Group may also be necessary for higher level 

coordination and support.

For example, in the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, both a USDA 

MAC Group and APHIS MAC Group were formed due to the size, scope, and 

impact of the incident. Typically, a USDA MAC Group elevates issues to the 

Secretary of Agriculture; an APHIS MAC Group elevates issues to the APHIS 

Administrator. In a smaller incident, an APHIS MAC Group may take the lead for 

MAC activities, while a USDA MAC Group is not activated but may be on alert if 

further resources or coordination become required. The APHIS Emergency 

Mobilization Guide provides further information on the responsibilities of the 

APHIS MAC Group. 

Figure 4-1 shows how these groups are structured, based on recent experiences 

(including the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak) and multiagency exercises. Because 

every animal health incident is different, future coordination structures may vary. 

Additionally these structures may differ in the event the President issues a 

declaration of emergency, or if, as requested by the Secretary of Agriculture, DHS

assumes responsibility for all resource coordination in an incident. 

4.1.2 Whole Community Coordination

The “whole community” with which USDA coordinates and collaborates with in 

FAD incidents can be large—please see A Partial List of FAD Stakeholders (FAD 

PReP Manual 5-0) for additional stakeholders that may not be included in Figure 

4-1. USDA off-scene incident coordination works with stakeholders in any 

incident, incorporating them into incident organizational structures as appropriate 

and ensuring a coordinated response effort.

4 FEMA. 2008. NIMS Frequently Asked Questions.Retrieved from 

http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/nimsfaqs.pdf. 
Incident Management

September 2022 4-3 

Figure 4-1. Off-Scene USDA APHIS Policy and Incident Coordination Structures

for an FAD Incident

Note: Ops = operations, NASAHO = National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials, 

NASDA = National Association of State Departments of Agriculture. 

4.1.3 Transition from On-Scene Multiagency Coordination 

to Off-Scene Multiagency Coordination

Figure 4-2 illustrates an overview of the MAC system. The figure shows that at 

the start of the incident, there is typically an on-scene co-Incident Commander 

(typically a SAHO, or designee and an APHIS VS Assistant Director, or 

designee) or a Unified State-Federal IC. This co-Incident Commander or Unified 

IC is supported by a Liaison Officer who works directly with an off-scene APHIS 

ICG to conduct any necessary MAC activities. At the start of an incident, this 

APHIS ICG may be only a handful of people.

As the incident grows and transitions, MAC activities move off-scene. The ICG, 

which is likely to have expanded, provides necessary MAC support for the onscene Unified IC. When and if MAC Group(s) are activated, they assume MAC 

duties, as dictated by the size, scope, and requirements of the incident. MAC 

activities are further supported by off-scene EOC at all levels of government.

Industry 

Associations

NASAHO & NASDA

Public Health 

Agencies

Other External 

Partners/NGOs

Whole Community

USDA Secretary

USDA MAC Group

APHIS MAC Group

USDA Office of 

Homeland Security

VS Executive Team

Incident 

Coordination Group

USDA ESF #11 

Support Desk USDA 

Ops Center

Off-Scene USDA Incident Coordination

APHIS Administrator
 

September 2022 4-4 

Figure 4-2. Multiagency Coordination System5

4.2 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 

4.2.1 Overview

Figure 4-3 illustrates the APHIS incident management structure that is used in 

FAD incidents. It details the relationship between the APHIS Administrator, 

APHIS MAC Group, the APHIS ICG, and the APHIS VS NIMT in an incident. 

This structure has evolved and most recently was revised to incorporate lessons 

learned from recent HPAI outbreaks. This figure is an example; it may be modified or scaled based on the needs of any particular disease incident. 

5 Figure adapted from: FEMA, 2008. NIMS.Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf. 

Incident 

Coordination Group

MAC Groups

Emergency 

Operations Centers 

(Local/State/Federal)

On-Scene Unified 

State-Federal 

Incident Command

Liaison Officer 

to Incident 

Coordination Group 

for Support

At Start of Incident: 

Primarily On-Scene Multiagency Coordination

Incident Commander or 

Unified State-Federal 

Incident Command

As incident 

grows and 

transitions, 

more 

coordination 

moves 

off-scene

As Incident Progresses: 

Off-Scene Mutliagency Coordination
Incident Management

September 2022 4-5 

Figure 4-3. APHIS Incident Management Structures: Off-Scene and On-Scene

The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive responsible for implementing 

APHIS policy during an FAD outbreak. The APHIS Administrator is supported 

by the AMT. Depending on the size and scope of the incident, the Administrator 

and AMT may establish an APHIS-level MAC Group, particularly for resource 

coordination. Many incident management functions may be delegated to the VS 

Deputy Administrator, who is the Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States. 

The VS Deputy Administrator is supported by the VSET to coordinate policy. 

Along with the ICG, this organizational structure handles requests for resources, 

coordination, and policy from the VS NIMTs operating in the field.

In addition to policy and incident coordination, the APHIS Administrator, AMT,

VS Deputy Administrator, and VSET communicate, collaborate, and coordinate 

with relevant industry associations, the NASAHOs and NASDA, public health 

agencies (Federal and State), and other partners, as illustrated in Figure 4-1. 

4.2.2 APHIS Multiagency Coordination Group

An APHIS MAC Group may be established to provide immediate leadership and 

authority for resolving issues during the emergency, particularly related to 

resource coordination. An APHIS MAC Group may be activated when one or 

more of the following conditions take place: 

 complex incidents that overwhelm local and regional assets;

 incidents that require more than just VS support;

 overlapping USDA agency jurisdictions;

APHIS Administrator & APHIS 

Management Team

VS Deputy Administrator 

& VS Executive Team

APHIS MAC Group

District Directors APHIS Incident Coordination 

Group

APHIS 

Emergency 

Operations 

Center (AEOC)

Assistant Directors

(VS Districts) Incident Commander & Unified 

Incident Management Team SAHOs

Public Information Officer

Liaison Officer

Safety Officer

Operations Section Chief Finance/Admin 

Section Chief Planning Section Chief Logistics Section Chief

Requests and 

Information

Support and 

Coordination
 

September 2022 4-6 

 an incident that crosses international borders; or

 the existence of or potential for a high level of National political and 

media interest.

The APHIS MAC Group may also formulate APHIS-level policy and develop 

APHIS processes for future incidents. The APHIS MAC Group does not typically 

direct the ICG, but instead provides strategic coordination for APHIS-wide issues 

and decisions. This group typically consists of senior-level representatives and 

may include SMEs from across APHIS. Members must have the authority to 

make decisions on behalf of their office or program unit; additional members can 

be added as needed throughout the response effort. The APHIS MAC may include 

the following members:

 Chair: Office of the Administrator (OA)

 VS

 Marketing and Regulatory Program Business Services

 LPA

 Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ)

 Animal Care 

 Wildlife Services (WS)

 Policy and Program Development (PPD)

 APHIS Chief Information Officer

 Emergency Management and Safety and Security Division (EMSSD)

 Other representatives and SMEs as needed.

The APHIS MAC Group provides a forum to discuss actions that need to be taken 

to ensure that an adequate number of resources are available to meet anticipated 

needs. It offers guidance on the most efficient way to allocate resources during an 

animal health incident; specific responsibilities may vary from incident to 

incident, but includes prioritizing, acquisitioning, and allocating resources. The 

APHIS MAC Group also identifies and resolves conflicting issues. 

4.2.3 APHIS Incident Coordination Group

The APHIS ICG is led by an Incident Coordinator and a Deputy Incident 

Coordinator. In any incident, it is immediately established to oversee the 

functions and response activities associated with the incident. The ICG is a 
Incident Management

September 2022 4-7 

flexible and scalable structure, which reflects the size and the scope of the 

incident. It works and communicates closely with personnel in the field, in one or 

more NIMTs. The ICG also coordinates with the APHIS MAC Group; if 

established, a USDA MAC Group may also request information or provide 

guidance for the APHIS ICG.

Key responsibilities performed by the APHIS ICG may include the following: 

 assisting in development of response policy, 

 providing guidelines to ensure responder and public health and safety, 

 supporting and coordinating NIMT(s) and the Unified IC(s), 

 developing protocols for response activities, 

 coordinating routine communication, 

 coordinating resources, 

 supporting contracting activities, 

 facilitating deployment of required resources, 

 processing indemnity payments, 

 assisting in establishing epidemiological priorities and designing 

investigations, 

 assisting in developing incident objectives and approving response 

strategies for emergency vaccination as needed, 

 assisting in integrating response organizations into the ICS, 

 providing information for use in media and stakeholder briefings, 

 providing internal and external national-level reports and maps, 

 performing stakeholder coordination activities, 

 providing budget requests and projections as needed, and

 assessing response progress and strategies. 

Figure 4-4 illustrates an example organizational chart for an APHIS ICG. This 

ICG is flexible and scalable, and is likely to change based on the scope and type 

of the incident.
Incident Management

September 2022 4-8 

Figure 4-4. Example APHIS Incident Coordination Group—Organizational Structure 

(for an FAD Incident)

National Incident Coordinator

Weekly / Summary 

Report Cell

EMRS Group

Contracting Support 

Branch

Supply Branch

Planning Section Logistics Section

DA Executive Team Communication

Interagency Coordination-Liaisons VS External Communication

Health & Safety Legislative and Public Affairs

Deputy Incident Coordinator

One Health

GIS Mapping Cell Economics, 

Assessment, Modeling, 

Indemnity Group

3D Support Branch

Diagnostic Virology 

Branch

NAHLN Group

Temp/Term Branch

Dispatch Branch

VERRC

Budget Branch

Trade Group

Commodity Policy 

Group

Wildlife Group

Vaccine Group

Epidemiology Group

Surveillance Design 

Group

Epidemiological Branch Policy Branch

IMT Sit Report Cell

Indemnity and 

Compensation Branch

FAD PReP &

Response Guidance 

Cell

Biologics Branch

Lab Operations Section

Finance/Admin Section

ICG Action Plan 

Zoo Group

Biosecurity Group

National Situation 

Group

State/Tribal Liaisons

Lessons Learned / 

After Action Group

Depopulation Unit

Disposal Unit

Disinfection Unit

Information Management Section

 

Note: GIS = geographic information system, EMRS = Emergency Management Response System, FAD PReP = Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and 

Response Plan, NAHLN = National Animal Health Laboratory Network, 3D = depopulation, decontamination, and disposal, VERRC = Voluntary Emergency Ready 

Response Corps 
September 2022 4-9 

4.3 APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR A SINGLE INCIDENT

At the start of any FAD outbreak, the SAHO, or designee, and Assistant Director 

(AD) or designee, initially serve as the co-Incident Commanders. In some cases, 

the SAHO and AD may be supported by a VS District Strike Teams, or VS 

District Personnel, or similar organizational structure of local personnel that are 

prepared to support the initial response to the incident. The AD and SAHO may 

be relieved by an NIMT if an NIMT is requested by the State and authority is 

subsequently delegated. Figure 4-3 is an example of an APHIS organization chart 

for a single incident.

The Incident Command Post (ICP) is a physical location that administers the onscene IC and the other main incident management functions. A MAC Group does 

not direct IC activities in the field and is often located some distance from the 

incident site(s). At times, the APHIS MAC Group and APHIS ICG may be 

located in the same place. An EOC is an off-scene physical location that supports 

the on-scene response by providing external coordination, communication 

pathways, and may secure additional resources. Both State and Federal EOCs 

may be activated. MAC Group(s) and/or the ICG often operate from an off-scene 

EOC: typically, the APHIS EOC is activated for ICG usage, but also holds MAC 

Group meetings and supports MAC functions.

4.4 APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR MULTIPLE INCIDENTS

When more than one incident occurs at the same time, more than one IC may be 

established. In the event of a large and geographically widespread incident, an 

Area Command (AC) may also be established for coordination. An AC is an 

organization that oversees the management of multiple incidents handled 

individually by separate ICs or to oversee the management of a very large or 

rapidly evolving incident where multiple NIMTs are deployed simultaneously. In 

some cases, the ICG plays the role of an AC in an FAD incident, overseeing 

multiple NIMTs and ICPs and maintaining consistency and coordination across 

the incident. In either case, clear command and control is required. An AC does 

not perform MAC functions; a MAC Group or element of the ICG performs MAC 

for an AC.

As stated, if the emergency response becomes too large for an APHIS MAC

Group to handle efficiently—for example, a large multistate incident with 

numerous response activities—a USDA MAC Group will be established. In some 

incidents, other MAC Groups may be required (e.g., if the President issues a 

declaration of emergency). These off-scene MAC Groups coordinate additional 

resources and make decisions regarding the prioritization of incidents and the 

sharing and use of critical resources. 

Figure 4-5 is an example of the command structure when multiple incidents are 

involved.
 

September 2022 4-10

Figure 4-5. APHIS Incident Management Assuming Multiple Incidents

and a Unified Area Command

4.5 APHIS VS NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 

TEAMS

Upon detection and confirmation of an FAD incident, the SAHO or AD 

establishes an ICP. If requested by the State, an APHIS VS NIMT will be 

deployed, headed by an Incident Commander, to lead a Unified State-Federal IC 

which incorporates State and Federal personnel into a single organizational 

structure. All or only part of an NIMT can be deployed, based on the requirements 

of the incident. Sometimes only key NIMT personnel are deployed if a full NIMT 

is not required; this is called a “Short Team.” Short Teams may also be deployed 

when there are not sufficient personnel to have full NIMTs at every incident site.

Figure 4-6 depicts the organization of an APHIS VS NIMT Short Team for 

managing an incident.

APHIS ICG or dedicated Area Command serves 

as Area Command(s), depending on the size of the 

incident, location of deployed Incident Management 

Teams, and number of States involved.

APHIS Administrator & APHIS 

Management Team

VS Deputy Administrator & VS 

Executive Team

APHIS MAC Group

District Directors APHIS Incident Coordination 

Group

APHIS 

Emergency 

Operations 

Center (AEOC)

Unified Area Command 1 

(Area Command Post)

Incident 

Command B 

(Incident 

Command 

Post)

Incident 

Command A 

(Incident 

Command 

Post) 

Requests and 

Information

Support and 

Coordination

Incident 

Command C 

(Incident 

Command 

Post)

Unified Area Command 2 

(Area Command Post)

Incident 

Command E 

(Incident 

Command 

Post)

Incident 

Command D 

(Incident 

Command 

Post) 

Incident 

Command F 

(Incident 

Command 

Post)
Incident Management

September 2022 4-11

Figure 4-6. Current APHIS VS National Incident Management Team—Short Team Configuration

An NIMT includes an Incident Commander, Deputy Incident Commander, and

staff for communication/public information, safety, liaison activities, and 

situational awareness (intelligence officer); all of these positions are considered 

Command Staff. The Section Chiefs of the Incident Commander’s line 

organization sections (Planning, Logistics, Operations, Finance/Administration)

are considered the Incident Commander’s General Staff. These four line 

organizations perform all of the efforts required to identify, contain, eradicate, 

recover, and return the situation to normal business practices. Within each of 

these sections is the capability to accomplish all of the tasks necessary to ensure a 

successful outcome to an FAD incident. Customarily, per NIMS, these line 

organizations include the following sections: Planning, Logistics, Operations, 

Finance/Administration, though additional sections may be considered.

In addition to the command and general staff (pictured in Figure 4-6), a Short 

Team may include limited additional personnel. Deputy Section Chiefs are often 

also deployed. For example, to manage situational awareness, a Situation Unit 

Leader may be deployed to the Planning Section. EMRS2 Specialists may be 

deployed if needed to support entering data into EMRS2. Other sections may 

decide to fill a specific Group Supervisor position (such as appraisal or disposal). 

The specific positions filled will depend on the size, scope, and type of the 

incident.

Incident 

Commander

Deputy Incident 

Commander

Operations Section 

Chief

Finance/Admin 

Section Chief

Planning Section 

Chief

Logistics Section 

Chief

Safety

Liaison

Public Information

Intelligence 

Officer 

(Epidemiology)
 

September 2022 4-12

Table 4-1 lists commonly filled positions for an APHIS VS NIMT Short Team, 

based on the positions available in ROSS for ordering. 6 These positions in ROSS

may be used to fill other positions in the NIMT organizational chart.

Table 4-1. List of Short Team Configuration Positions Available in Resource 

Ordering and Status System

APHIS VS NIMT Short Team ICS Position Category

Incident Commander Command Staff

Deputy Incident Commander Command Staff

Operations Section Chief General Staff

Deputy Operations Section General Staff

Planning Section Chief General Staff

Deputy Planning Section General Staff

Logistics Section Chief General Staff

Deputy Logistics Section General Staff

Finance Section Chief General Staff

Deputy Finance Section General Staff

Safety Officer Command Staff

Safety Coordinator Command Staff

Public Information Officer Command Staff

Liaison Officer Command Staff

Example: EMRS2 Specialist General Staff

Example: Epidemiologist General Staff

When an outbreak occurs that is complex or large scale, a full NIMT is likely to 

be deployed. The full or long team consists of additional team members beyond 

those in the initial Short Team configuration. Figure 4-7 shows an example long 

team configuration that is the current structure of the standing VS NIMTs (as of 

August 2016); however, the exact makeup of the long teams will depend on the 

type of disease and magnitude of spread: changes may be made in an outbreak.

There are currently five standing VS NIMT Teams: Red, Green, Gold, Blue, and 

Indigo. Table 4-2 is an expansion of Table 4-1 and lists additional positions that 

can be ordered for a full NIMT (all General Staff, see Table 4-1 for Command 

Staff). Table 4-2 is based on the positions available in ROSS for ordering. 7 These 

positions may not match exactly with the position titles in Figure 4-7; positions in 

6 The positions available in ROSS for ordering may be changed in the future based on 

recommendations from APHIS programs; however, these positions will always be consistent with 

general ICS concepts. 7 The positions available in ROSS for ordering may be changed in the future based on 

recommendations from APHIS programs; however, these positions will always be consistent with 

general ICS concepts.
Incident Management

September 2022 4-13

ROSS may be used to fill other positions in the NIMT organizational chart.

Again, Figure 4-7 is the current structure of the VS NIMTs.

Table 4-2. List of Long Team Configuration Positions Available 

in Resource Ordering and Status System

Section/Group or Unit 

(in Alphabetical Order by Section) APHIS VS Long NIMT Configuration

See Table 4-1 For Command Staff and Section Chiefs

Operations Branch Director

NIMT Assistant—Operations

Case Manager

Site Manager

Operations/Appraisal Group Supervisor

Strike Team Leader

Specialist 

Operations/Biosecurity and Disease Group Supervisor

Task Force Leader

Strike Team Leader

Prevention Technician

Security Specialist

Operations/Cleaning and Disinfection Group Supervisor

Task Force Leader

Strike Team Leader

Team Leader

Technician

Operations/Composting Subject Matter Expert

Composting Technician

Operations/Diagnosis and Inspection Group Supervisor

Task Force Leader

Strike Team Leader

Technician

Operations/Disease Surveillance Branch Director

Epidemiologist

Operations/Disease Survey Group Supervisor

Task Force Leader

Strike Team Leader

Operations/Disposal Group Supervisor

Strike Team Leader

Technician

Operations/Euthanasia & Disposal Group Supervisor

Strike Team Leader

Team Leader

Team Technician
September 2022 4-14

Section/Group or Unit 

(in Alphabetical Order by Section) APHIS VS Long NIMT Configuration

Operations/Mortality Group Supervisor

Task Force Leader

Strike Team Leader

Technician

Operations/Vaccination Group Supervisor

Taskforce Leader

Strike Team Leader

Technician

Planning Resource Unit Leader

Situation Unit Leader

NIMT Assistant—Plans

Planning/Documentation Unit Leader

EMRS2 Manager/Training Specialist

EMRS2 Data Entry Specialist

Administrative Assistant

Computer Data Entry Recorder

Planning/Disease Reporting Group Supervisor

Vaccination Group Supervisor

Risk Assessment Team Leader

GIS Specialist

Planning/Orientation Specialist

Status Check-in Recorder

Demobilization Unit Leader

Logistics NIMT Assistant—Logistics

IT Assistant

Logistics/Supply Unit Leader

Assistant

Equipment Assistant

Logistics/Ground Support Unit Leader

Logistics/Facilities Unit Leader

Finance Chief

NIMT Assistant—Finance

Procurement Unit Leader

Warranted Purchase Card Holder

Time Unit Leader

Claims Specialist

Cost Unit Leader

Cooperative Agreement Specialist

Contracting Officer Representative

Contracting Officer Technical Representative

Contracting Officer
September 2022 4-15

Figure 4-7. Example APHIS VS National Incident Management Team—Long Team Configuration

Note: EPI = epidemiologist, PIO = Public Information Officer.

 Liaison Officer

Intelligence Officer EPI 

Assistant PIO

Safety Coordinator

APHIS VS-NIMT Organization Chart 

Last updated: 2016-7-11

Safety Officer

 Operations 

Section Chief

 Finance/Admin 

Section 

Deputy Finance/

Admin Section Chief Time Unit 

 Procurement Unit

 Compensation/

Claims Unit

Indemnity Specialist 

Contracting Officer

Cost Unit 

Agreements Specialist

Case Management 

Group CORs

 Disease 

Management Branch 

 Appraisal Group 

 Euthanasia Group

Disposal Group 

Carcass Compost SME

Compost Apprentice/ 

Technician

Disposal Task Force 

Leader

Cleaning and 

Disinfection Group

 Disease Surveillance 

Branch 

Surveillance Group 

Commercial 

Staging Area 

Manager

Diagnosis and 

Inspection Group

Disease Survey Group

Backyard 

 Receiving and 

Distribution 

Manager

Ordering 

Manager 

Warehouse 

Team A 

Warehouse 

Team B

Supply Unit Leader 

(Warehouse 

Manager) 

Supply Unit 

Leader Assistant 

Information 

Technology Unit 

Leader 

Information 

Technology 

Specialist 

Communications 

Unit Leader 

Medical Unit 

Leader 

Ground Support 

Unit Leader 

Ground Support Unit 

Leader Assistant 

Travel Logistics 

Unit Leader

Facilities Unit 

Leader

Security Manager

Situation Unit 

Leader 

Resource Unit 

Leader 

Documentation Unit 

Leader 

Deputy Situation Unit 

Leader 

Disease Reporting Officer 

Field Observer(s)

 EMRS Data Entry

 Assistant (Plans)

Check-In/Check-Out 

Recorder

Accountability Assistant

Records Management 

Assistant(s)

Geographic Information 

Systems Specialist 

 EMRS Data Entry

 Assistant (Operations)

 EMRS Data Entry

 Assistant (Logistics)

Demobilization and 

Strategic Planning 

Unit Leader 

Training 

Coordinator 

EMRS Specialist(s)

Intelligence Officer/

Epidemiologist(s) 

Other Technical 

Specialists as Appropriate 

(Risk Analyst, Compost 

SME, etc.) 

Deputy Planning 

Section Chief 

Strategic Planner 

Permitting Unit 

Leader

Demobilization 

Planner 

 Vector Control Group 

 Site Managers

Animal Biosecurity 

Group

Industry Education/ 

Outreach Group

Deputy Operations 

Section Chief

Animal Movement 

and Permits Group

Vaccine and Disease 

Prevention Group

Incident 

Management 

Team Assistant 

Deputy Logistics 

Section Chief 

Incident Commander/ 

Deputy Incident 

Commander Public Information Officer

Planning 

Section Chief 

Service Branch 

Director 

Support Branch 

Director 

Logistics 

Section Chief 

 Disease Support 

Branch 
September 2022 4-16

4.6 RESPONSE RESOURCES

The NIMT, ICG, and APHIS MAC Group use a number of systems to aid in 

staffing and resourcing during an event, such as the Emergency Qualification 

System (EQS) and the ROSS, which are discussed below.

4.6.1 APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide

The APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide contains important information on 

staffing and resource identification. This document provides APHIS-level 

guidance, information, and policy for mobilizing APHIS personnel for emergency 

events. Additional VS documentation on ICG processes and procedures is under 

development.

4.6.2 APHIS Emergency Qualification System

The APHIS EQS is used to store the skills and qualifications of APHIS personnel. 

It tracks both training and certifications and is customizable to APHIS program 

needs. Training documentation flows into EQS from AgLearn for APHIS 

employees. If the temporary hires do not have access to AgLearn, their training 

documentation can be manually entered or imported through an Excel 

spreadsheet.

4.6.3 APHIS Resource Ordering and Status System

APHIS ROSS allows APHIS to identify, track, and mobilize the personnel 

resources needed to support emergency response. It provides a database of 

qualified emergency response personnel. The database can be searched by 

approved APHIS personnel according to personnel training levels and subject of 

expertise, such as procurement, epidemiology, or public information. Being able 

to quickly identify and dispatch appropriate personnel and supplies is a key 

component of emergency response, and ROSS facilitates that process. ROSS 

initiatives include the following: 

 developing the APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog, 

 integrating ROSS into APHIS emergency management practices, and

 training and sustaining an APHIS dispatch community.

Typically, multiple ROSS Dispatchers are required to respond to personnel orders 

in an outbreak and are part of the ICG in the Logistics Section. The Incident 

Commander or designee completes an Incident Request Form or a Resource 

Order Form and sends it to the APHIS Dispatch inbox, where a Dispatcher will 

respond. Information required includes location of deployment, specific dates, and 

length of deployment if available. Working conditions, expected hours, and any 
September 2022 5-1 

Chapter 5

Communication Strategy

5.1 COMMUNICATION

APHIS established internal and external communication processes to ensure an 

effective and efficient response in controlling and eradicating an outbreak of an 

FAD. These processes are intended to foster transparent messages that reduce the 

prospects for panic or adverse public reaction and help to mitigate the economic 

impact of the outbreak.

Internal communication between government authorities is critical for informed 

and timely decisions. Integrated communication processes across all levels of the 

incident, and between operational and coordination units, enable a common 

awareness of the incident to achieve response objectives. Equipment, systems, 

protocols, and expertise are needed to achieve this integration. Procedures and 

protocols governing communication must be established well in advance of an

outbreak.

External communication during an FAD outbreak is designed to ensure that the 

public, media, and international community are kept fully informed to calm 

anxiety, instill confidence, and ensure compliance with emergency directives. 

Effective communication can help to restore consumer confidence in the safety of 

animal products. The objective is to share accurate and timely information with 

the general public, the news media, and the international community. 

Additional communication information can be found in the following documents:

 LPA Emergency Response and Communication Guide

 A Partial List of FAD Stakeholders (FAD PReP Manual 5-0). 

To subscribe to the APHIS stakeholder registry and receive stakeholder notices, 

please go to: https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDAAPHIS/subscriber/ 

new. After subscribing, all users can select what type of notices, on what subjects, 

they would like to receive.
 

September 2022 5-2 

5.1.1 Communicating Internally

Communication processes during an event are designed to keep communication 

flowing throughout the ICS, including from the field to headquarters, as well as 

across the organization. Consistent and clear communications provide an 

opportunity to address minor issues or resolve major problems and may include

 all-staff briefing sessions,

 daily meetings within units, 

 daily internal mini-memos or situation reports, and

 conference calls (especially for coordination between Incident 

Commanders, on-site and off-site officials, and producer 

organizations/other stakeholder associations).

APHIS uses EMRS2 as its system of record for all animal health incidents.

EMRS2 can adapt to complexity and rapid changes in the course of disease 

progression during an outbreak. An effective information management system, 

like EMRS2, should be used consistently over the course of the outbreak, so that 

information reported is accurate and timely.

During an emergency, APHIS LPA staff leads and coordinates response

communication efforts through the ICS. This staff supports USDA Office of 

Communications (OC), other Federal and State agencies, and cooperators in 

responding to an animal disease outbreak and animal agriculture emergencies 

caused by natural disasters. 

5.1.2 Communicating Externally

An outbreak of an FAD in the United States will be of major concern to producers 

(affected and unaffected) and the public. In the initial phase of an emergency, 

misinformation and rumors can cause panic among people who have little or no 

control over unfolding events. Individuals and entire communities may worry that 

their livelihoods and even health and safety are at risk.

LPA staff serves as the primary liaison with the news media and Congressional 

requests. LPA works with the appropriate APHIS staff members to gather 

information needed to develop materials and communicate effectively with 

stakeholders, the public, and the media. LPA also oversees public affairs support 

for FAD incidents, which may be provided on-site by PIOs or remotely by LPA 

Public Affairs Specialists. 
Communication Strategy

September 2022 5-3 

5.2 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION GOALS

Communication goals during an emergency include the following. 

 Manage public outreach and external communication during a crisis; brief 

the media, public, industry, Congress, trading partners, and others on the 

status of the incident and actions being taken. 

 Open direct lines of communication with public affairs counterparts in 

Federal and State governments and industry to exchange information and 

encourage them to be advocates on APHIS’ behalf and utilize agency 

messages. 

 Successfully communicate APHIS’ messages to affected parties through 

appropriate media channels, and monitor media coverage, responding to

inaccuracies where appropriate. 

 Assure stakeholders, consumers, and the general public that USDA is 

working on concerns and cooperating with other local, State, and Federal 

agencies as required by the incident.

 Effectively manage communication between LPA representatives at 

headquarters and PIOs in the field to ensure the consistent and timely 

delivery of information. 

 Successfully communicate APHIS’ messages to Congress through key 

committees and congressional staff, providing continuous updates as the 

situation progresses and comes to a resolution. 

 Coordinate with program leaders to ensure that accurate and appropriate 

information is shared with all APHIS audiences. 

 Prepare designated program leaders and experts to act as spokespeople to 

deliver APHIS’ messages. 

 Create outreach materials that deliver APHIS’ messages and information 

to affected and interested stakeholders.

5.3 TARGET AUDIENCES

The following list highlights the key audiences that APHIS targets in an 

emergency. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive. Rather, the goal is to 

identify critical audiences for sharing information.

 Governments. Federal as well as State, local, and Tribal governments/

agencies that would coordinate with APHIS in an emergency. This also 

refers to elected leaders at the National, State, and local levels.
 

September 2022 5-4 

 Industry stakeholders. Agricultural/commodity groups that have a vested 

interest in APHIS’ response efforts.

 APHIS employees. Employees of the Agency should be communicated 

with directly, early, and often, not only to keep them apprised of the work 

done by APHIS but also to equip them with accurate information to share 

with others.

 General affected public. In large-scale emergencies, such as an outbreak 

of FMD or HIPA, the general public is likely to seek information about 

APHIS’ response efforts. Many APHIS emergencies, however, generate 

interest only among members of the public directly affected by emergency 

response activities.

 Trading partners. This category includes all current and potential trading 

partners for the United States. VS makes initial notifications to these 

trading partners and works with them to provide relevant updates. LPA

works with other APHIS and USDA staffs to ensure that key messages 

and talking points are provided to personnel stationed at international 

posts. 

 Financial boards and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 

In a large-scale emergency, many trading partners may impose trade 

restrictions greatly affecting U.S. markets. LPA and/or the USDA OC 

representatives communicate with these audiences through timely 

dissemination of information and may arrange to accompany the APHIS 

Administrator to present to financial boards and trading partners on 

APHIS’ emergency response capabilities, in order to assure them that 

APHIS is committed to responding to the emergency and returning to 

normal trading activities.

 Interagency partners. In emergency situations, APHIS may work with 

other agencies, such as the DHS, the CDC, the FDA, and so on. 

 Media. This category includes print, radio, and television reporters at the 

international, National, and local level, as well as social media. During an 

emergency, the media contacts APHIS seeking information about program 

activities. APHIS also uses the media to distribute information to 

interested audiences that may otherwise be difficult to reach.

 Congress. This audience includes staff of the House Committee on 

Agriculture and Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 

among other Congressional Committees that may have an interest in the 

incident. When appropriate, LPA may extend its outreach to House and 

Senate leadership. LPA also communicates with congressional staff 

representing affected States, when appropriate.
Communication Strategy

September 2022 5-5 

5.4 APHIS’ RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES

In the event of an animal or plant pest disease emergency, LPA provides external 

communication support throughout three distinct phases of an incident: the initial 

response, ongoing response as the situation develops, and post-incident response. 

Effective communication—both internally (VS/APHIS) and externally (LPA)—in 

each of these phases is essential to the success of an emergency response. 

5.4.1 Internal Communication Tools Used 

During a Response

For incident management, APHIS’ primary objective is to have integrated 

communications processes that promote and facilitate the dissemination of 

information rapidly, efficiently, and accurately. Informed and timely decisions by 

both the Unified IC and ICG lead to success in coordinating response activities 

and ultimately accomplishing objectives. 

When communicating internally, the Unified IC and ICG use the following:

 APHIS EMRS2. EMRS2 is the USDA APHIS system of record for animal 

disease incidents. EMRS2 can generate automatic e-mail notices to select 

personnel for different activities within the system. EMRS2 provides 

common information for responders and the ICG, for internal and external 

reporting, and can be used for any animal health incident or FAD 

outbreak, regardless of size or complexity.

 SharePoint. SharePoint is used so that there is a secure, shared workspace

for the Unified IC and ICG to communicate, share information and 

resources, and manage documents and tasks. 

 Web-based Communication Technologies. Videoconferencing platforms 

(e.g., Zoom, MS Teams, Adobe Connect) enable all personnel to discuss 

critical activities from different sites simultaneously, from a MAC Group 

at the USDA or APHIS level, to the ICG, to the NIMT in the field. 

 Conference calls. Like videoconferences, conference calling allows the 

Unified IC to bring many incident personnel together at the same time. 

Much incident communication takes place via conference calls.

 E-mail and smart phones. Unified IC uses these communication channels 

extensively for disseminating information quickly and effectively during 

an incident.

 Daily staff meetings. IC holds meetings several times during the day, and 

they are frequently used in conjunction with videoconferences and 
 

September 2022 5-6 

conference calls. Staff meetings take place at a minimum during shift 

changes and before beginning the day.

 Situation reports and/or status reports. These reports summarize the facts 

and details of the incident. They are produced and distributed daily or as 

required; different reports are typically required for different audiences, 

which may include the Secretary of Agriculture.

5.4.2 Communication During the Initial Response

During the first 24 to 72 hours of an emergency, LPA takes numerous steps or 

actions, many of which occur simultaneously. For example, at the same time 

internal notifications are occurring, LPA works on drafting materials for public 

release.

5.4.2.1 NOTIFICATIONS

The timing for notifying target audiences about animal or plant pest disease 

emergency situations, while extremely important, cannot be systematically or 

consistently predetermined. The details surrounding each emergency are different 

and hard to predict. Moreover, because emergency situations are often marketsensitive, LPA cannot give audiences and stakeholders as much notice of a 

situation as everyone would like. However, it’s important to note that USDA and 

APHIS strive to notify all their partners at the earliest possible opportunity.

When programs become aware of a potential emergency, they immediately notify 

OA and LPA, providing all current, available information. Once OA has briefed 

the Under Secretary’s Office, LPA generally informs the Department’s OC. 

Timing and how widely to release information publicly, as well as other key 

operational information and potential trade implications, are all discussed with the 

Office of the Secretary and Department officials. Various factors are considered, 

such as whether an announcement would cause export markets to close or trigger 

financial market impacts, and timing of a release may be adjusted to occur after 

markets close on a given day.

5.4.2.2 MEDIA ANNOUNCEMENT PREPARATION

Depending on the significance of the animal disease emergency, public 

notification of such a situation could occur via different means: by press 

conference, media briefing, press release, or stakeholder announcement. OC and 

LPA leadership will decide which option is appropriate, and then work together to 

draft and clear the announcement materials (announcement, talking points/key 

messages, scripts, etc.) and arrange the needed logistics.
Communication Strategy

September 2022 5-7 

5.4.2.3 PUBLIC NOTIFICATION SUPPORTING MATERIALS

LPA develops and clears additional supporting materials (fact sheets, question 

and answer documents, etc.). They also prepare to launch appropriate website 

updates as soon as the announcement is made.

5.4.3 Organization and Implementation 

of and Communications During an Incident

Effective and coordinated communication support after the initial announcement 

of an emergency situation is critical. Since information demands occur at various 

locations, LPA takes a strategic approach. PIO support is provided on the ground 

at the actual emergency project site and remotely. LPA also provides staffing at 

AEOC in Riverdale, MD, and for ICG and MAC Groups, which may be located at 

USDA’s headquarters, as needed. 

5.4.3.1 NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM LEVEL

Each VS NIMT has a PIO assigned to the team. This individual is a VS employee 

who has been trained by LPA to handle media inquiries. The PIO serves as the 

conduit for information to internal and external stakeholders, including the media 

or other organizations seeking information directly about the incident or event.

The PIO works under the supervision of LPA’s JIC.

This PIO is responsible for handling various communication activities, such as 

responding to local media inquiries, working with State and local counterparts, 

and coordinating information dissemination locally. PIOs serve as a media 

spokesperson where appropriate, but may also rely on others depending on the 

situation (State Veterinarians, Incident Commanders, etc.). They coordinate with 

LPA at headquarters to ensure that we deliver consistent messages and address 

emerging issues. LPA provides media coordination between multiple sites 

through its JIC. Working within the ICS requires quick coordination across 

various structures and handling communication activities daily.

The onsite PIO updates APHIS headquarters on the situation during routine calls 

and on an as-needed basis. When a team rotation occurs, the current PIO will brief 

the incoming PIO and get them up to speed.

5.4.3.2 NATIONAL INCIDENT COORDINATION GROUP AND APHIS

MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION LEVEL

LPA also supports the National ICG with the main responsibility of responding to 

media calls made to headquarters and facilitating information sharing. One person 

may be assigned to work with the ICG on a rotational basis; other personnel may 

be stationed with an APHIS MAC Group or used as ad-hoc support to address the 

high volume of calls and requests that may occur. 
 

September 2022 5-8 

LPA’s JIC works with State, local, and industry as required by the incident. 

In some cases, the USDA OC may establish a JIC at the Department-level that 

consists of Department of other agency communicators. If an OC JIC is not 

established, LPA can share information with the other agencies through regular 

telephone briefings. 

In a large event, a USDA MAC Group is committed to ensuring that agencies 

experiencing emergencies are fully supported and may assist LPA in recruiting 

additionalspecialists from other agencies to provide support for communication 

activities.

LPA coordinates National or highly controversial calls with OC. They also 

identify and prepare any national-level spokespersons, and provide support during 

national/controversial interviews.

LPA provides updates to State departments of agriculture through conference 

calls with the Communication Officers of State Departments of Agriculture and 

NASDA, which are arranged on an as-needed basis.

As issues emerge, LPA also coordinates with the Office of Congressional 

Relations to provide updates and follow-up briefings to key congressional staff. 

Additionally, key stakeholders are notified of developments in the situation via 

media and the APHIS website. If a significant development occurs, LPA and the 

involved programs may provide additional briefings to interested stakeholders to 

update them on the situation.

LPA may work with the States and industry to identify third-party spokespeople 

to help deliver public messages and provide outside perspectives. Generally, LPA

turns to third-party spokespeople to talk to the media during ongoing emergency 

response efforts to help illustrate the importance of quick action to control and 

contain the disease. LPA also involves other public affairs contacts at other 

agencies in media response and in coordinating third-party spokespeople as 

necessary.

5.4.3.3 COMMUNICATION ACTIVITY TEMPO

APHIS and USDA have reputations for regularly and transparently 

communicating about ongoing animal emergencies. Media, industry, trading 

partners, and other stakeholders appreciate this practice and have come to rely on 

such an open dialogue. Following an announcement, LPA works with OC to 

determine the frequency of any follow up media briefings/events.

During the incident, LPA coordinates National or highly controversial calls 

regarding response activities and provides updates of any changes in media 

interest. LPA updates the website/webpage to reflect ongoing response activities, 

such as daily surveillance numbers, new outreach materials, announcements on 

new funding, and other important activities as required by the incident tempo. If 
Communication Strategy

September 2022 5-9 

emergency funding is provided for a large-scale outreach campaign, LPA works 

with the program, the OC, the affected States, and other agencies to develop 

appropriate outreach materials. Throughout this phase of the emergency, regular 

updates and check-ins with the communicators and commissioners in affected 

States continue, and any new material is shared with them prior to providing it to 

the public.

Throughout the Agency’s core emergency response effort, communication 

activities, like operational ones, continue until ICS comes to a close. This period 

of ongoing communication could last a matter of weeks or continue for months. It 

is critical during this phase of communication to maintain routine contact with 

various audiences.

5.4.4 Post-Incident Communication

Communication does not stop when emergency operations shut down. To ensure 

consistent messaging after on-site operations end, it is important to keep open the 

lines of communication between LPA and the States, other involved agencies, 

Tribal Nations, and stakeholders. This period of communication could last for 

many months to more than a year, and could include maintenance of an outreach 

campaign. Though interaction on the issue is less frequent, LPA ensures that any 

new information is provided to the public and the media on how operations are 

returning to normal. Providing timely information is crucial, as it can be helpful in 

restoring normalized trade and livestock or plant movement.

During the progress toward complete eradication and restoration of full trading, a 

number of milestones would be good opportunities to communicate with both the 

domestic and international audiences: 

 completion of disinfection of formerly Infected Premises;

 lifting of quarantine(s) and CA(s);

 number of premises approved to restock;

 restoration of exports from areas of the United States designated as being 

pest- or disease-free; and

 closing of the incident. 

These activities are reported through updates to the website, press releases as 

necessary, and stakeholder announcements. LPA also updates industry as 

necessary on ongoing communication activities through industry and professional 

communication groups, such as the Cross-Species Communications Working 

Group or United States Animal Health Association. 

LPA continues to communicate updates to State departments of agriculture 

through monthly NASAHO and NASDA calls and work with the affected States 
 

September 2022 5-10

on any outreach materials that are produced. Additionally, LPA continues to 

coordinate to update key congressional staff as the situation comes to a resolution, 

providing follow-up briefings on any significant results, investigative findings, or 

future actions to prevent such a disaster from reoccurring. 

5.4.5 Staying Ahead of Emergencies

LPA is always preparing for the next emergency through day-to-day work. LPA

works proactively to build partnerships with the media, stakeholders, and 

Congress by responding quickly to requests for information and promoting 

agency and program initiatives. LPA has built strong relationships with 

agricultural reporters, as they are on the front lines of providing information to the 

public, not only concerning normal regulatory activity but also any emergency.

LPA works closely with NASDA by holding monthly conference calls, sharing 

information on program activities, and attending their annual meetings. This 

relationship serves as a medium for coordinating training and sharing information 

on State and Federal animal and plant health regulatory issues. Additionally, 

LPA’s State Liaison is working jointly with APHIS programs to continue to build 

strong relationships with the States. The State Liaison helps facilitate information 

sharing between the States and APHIS, and this role is an integral part of getting 

emergency disease eradication and control information to the States quickly.
September 2022 A-1 

Appendix A

Key FAD PReP Documents

The FAD PReP is a comprehensive U.S. preparedness and response strategy for 

FAD threats, both zoonotic and non-zoonotic. Types of FAD PReP documents 

include the following:

 Strategic Plans (Concept of Operations)

 NAHEMS Guidelines

 Industry Manuals

 Disease Response Plans

 Disease Response Strategies

 SOPs for Critical Activities

 Continuity of Business Plans/Secure Food Supply Plans

 Ready Reference Guides.

This appendix lists some of these key documents for reference only; to see the 

most up-to-date list of documents available, please visit 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

A. FAD PREP STRATEGIC PLANS (CONCEPT 

OF OPERATIONS) 

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination 

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0)

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD 

PReP Manual 2-0)

 Information Management and Incident Reporting (FAD PReP Manual 3-0)

coming soon

 Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0)

 A Partial List of FAD Stakeholders (FAD PReP Manual 5-0)

 Permitted Movement (FAD PReP Manual 6-0)
 

September 2022 A-2 

B. NAHEMS GUIDELINES

Each NAHEMS Guidelines document also has accompanying educational materials, including presentations and handouts. 

 Health and Safety

 PPE

 Biosecurity 

 Quarantine and Movement Control

 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

 Disposal

 Cleaning and Disinfection

 Vaccination for Contagious Diseases

 Appendix A FMD

 Appendix B Classical Swine Fever (CSF)

 Appendix C HPAI

 Wildlife Management and Vector Control for FAD Response in Domestic 

Livestock

 Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing

 Continuity of Business. 

C. INDUSTRY MANUALS

 Dairy 

 Swine 

 Poultry 

 Beef Feedlot

 Cow-Calf
Key FAD PReP Document Structure

September 2022 A-3 

D. DISEASE RESPONSE PLANS

 HPAI

 FMD 

 Classification of Phases and types of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease 

Outbreak and Response (draft 2013) 

 FMD Response Plan: The Red Book (October 2020)

 CSF

 Newcastle Disease (ND) 

 African Swine Fever (ASF)

 ASF Response: The Red Book (April 2020)

E. DISEASE STRATEGIES

 Japanese Encephalitis

 New World Screwworm (NWS) Myiasis

 Peste Des Petits Ruminants

 Rift Valley Fever

F. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

FAD PReP identifies 23 critical activities conducted during an FAD response. 

Many of these activities have associated SOPs. These SOPs are templates to provide a common picture or set of procedures for the following 23 activities and 

tools. 

1. Overview of Etiology and Ecology

2. Case Definitions and Laboratory Definitions

3. Surveillance 

4. Diagnostics (Sample Collection, Surge Capacity, and Reporting) 

5. Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing 

6. Overview of Information Management 
 

September 2022 A-4 

7. Communications 

8. Health and Safety and PPE 

9. Biosecurity 

10. Quarantine and Movement Control

11.Continuity of Business

12. Overview of Regionalization for International Trade

13. Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia 

14. Disposal 

15.Cleaning and Disinfection 

16. Vaccination 

17.Logistics

18. Overview of Wildlife and Management and Vector Control 

19. Overview of Animal Welfare 

20. Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools 

21. Appraisal and Compensation 

22. Overview of Finance 

23. Overview of Incident Management. 

G. CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS PLANNING/SECURE 

FOOD SUPPLY PLANS

 Secure Poultry Supply Plan (Broilers, Eggs, and Turkeys)

 Secure Milk Supply Plan

 Secure Pork Supply Plan

 Secure Beef Supply Plan 

 Secure Sheep and Wool Supply Plan
Key FAD PReP Document Structure

September 2022 A-5 

H. READY REFERENCE GUIDES

In addition, there are a number of FAD PReP Ready Reference Guides that 

correspond to the above materials as well as other current topics. For example, 

there are Ready Reference Guides on the following topics (listed in alphabetical 

order by disease): 

 FMD Response

 Reported FMD in 2016 

 Etiology and Ecology 

 Communications 

 Overview of the FMD Response Plan: The Red Book Draft 

 Understanding Response Strategies 

 Overview of Emergency Vaccination 

 Overview of FMD Vaccination Issues 

 Common Operating Procedure 

 Overview of FMD Freedom and Vaccination 

 Comparing U.S. and United Kingdom FMD Response Planning 

 Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business 

 Surveillance 

 Overview of Diagnostics 

 Additional Information 

 HPAI Response

 Reported H5 HPAI in 2016 

 Etiology and Ecology

 Overview of HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book Draft 

 HPAI Zones and Premises

 Common Operating Picture
 

September 2022 A-6 

 Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business

 Overview of Diagnostics

 EMRS2 Customer Permit Gateway

 Additional Information

 ND Response

 Overview of the ND Response Plan: The Red Book Draft 

 Etiology and Ecology

 CSF Response

 Overview of the CSF Response Plan 

 Generic FAD Response

 Introduction to the FAD Preparedness and Response Plan 

 Introduction to the EMRS2 

 Understanding EMRS 2 Interface

 FAD Framework: Roles and Coordination (Manual 1-0)

 FAD Framework: Response Strategies (Manual 2-0) 

 Critical Activities and Tools during an FAD Response

 Secure Food Supply Plans 

 Zones, Areas, and Premises in an FAD Outbreak 

 Movement Control in an FAD Outbreak 

 VS Guidance 12001.2: Procedures and Policy for the Investigation of 

Potential FAD/Emerging Disease Incidents (EDI). 

 NWS

 Maps & Timelines

 Economic Impact

 Sterile Insect Response
September 2022 B-1 

Appendix B

Glossary 

Animal product Blood or any of its components, bones, 

bristles, feathers, flesh, offal, skins, and any 

by-product containing any of those 

components that originated from an animal or

bird.

Case Any individual animal infected by an FAD, 

with or without clinical signs.

Emergency vaccination A disease control strategy using the 

immunization of susceptible animals through 

the administration of a vaccine comprising 

antigens appropriate to the disease to be 

controlled.

Emerging disease (WOAH) A previously unrecognized pathogenic agent or 

disease diagnosed for the first time and which 

has a significant impact on animal or public 

health. 

Emerging disease (VS Guidance 12001) Any terrestrial animal, aquatic animal, or 

zoonotic disease not yet known or 

characterized, or any known or characterized 

terrestrial animal or aquatic animal disease in 

the United States or its territories that changes 

or mutates in pathogenicity, communicability, 

or zoonotic potential to become a threat to 

terrestrial animals, aquatic animals, or humans. 
 

September 2022 B-2 

Emerging disease (NLRAD) VS defines an emerging animal disease as:

 any animal disease or infection not 

known to exist in the United States, including a new strain of a known disease 

occurring in any animal species, including wildlife;

 an emerging animal disease with zoonotic potential;

 unexpected and unexplained increase in 

morbidity or mortality of diseased animals; and 

 evidence of a change in the epidemiology of a known animal disease such as 

increased pathogenicity, expanded host 

range, or clinical signs that do not fit the 

classical picture. 

Etiology The causes or origin of disease, or the factors 

that produce or predispose toward a certain 

disease or disorder.

Euthanasia The humane destruction of an animal 

accomplished by a method that produces 

rapid unconsciousness and subsequent death 

with a minimum of pain or distress or a 

method that utilizes anesthesia produced by 

an agent that causes painless loss of 

consciousness and subsequent death.

Foreign animal disease (FAD) A transboundary animal disease not known to 

exist in the U.S. animal population. 

Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and 

Response Plan (FAD PReP) 

Documents used to identify overall strategies,

veterinary functions, organization, and 

countermeasures necessary to contain and 

control an FAD outbreak. It is also used to 

integrate functions and countermeasures with 

emergency managementsystems and 

operations conducted in joint and Unified 

Command by Federal, State, Tribal, and local 

personnel. 

Federal-to-Federal Support (FFS) USDA may request FFS from other Federal 

departments and agencies. FFS refers to 

circumstance in which a Federal department 

or agency requests Federal resource support 

under the NRF that is not addressed by the 

Stafford Act or other mechanism. 
Glossary 

September 2022 B-3 

Fomites Inanimate objects that can transmit infectious 

agents from one animal or person to another.

Incident Command System A standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident 

management approach that

 allows for the integration of facilities, 

equipment, personnel, procedures, and 

communications operating within a 

common organizational structure; 

 enables a coordinated response among 

various jurisdictions and functional 

agencies, both public and private; and

 establishes common processes for 

planning and managing resources. 

Mass depopulation Method by which large numbers of animals

must be destroyed quickly and efficiently 

with as much consideration given to the 

welfare of the animals as practicable, but 

where the circumstances and tasks facing 

those doing the depopulation are understood 

to be extenuating. 

Memorandum/ Memoranda of understanding A document describing a bilateral or multilateral agreement between parties. It expresses a 

scope of activities and expectations between 

parties, indicating an intended common line 

of action or communication. It does not indicate a financial commitment.

National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN)

NAHLN is a cooperative effort between two 

U.S. Department of Agriculture agencies and 

the American Association of Veterinary 

Laboratory Diagnosticians. It is a national 

network of State and University laboratories, 

which use common testing methods and 

software platforms to perform diagnostics and 

share information.

World Organisation for Animal Health

(WOAH) 

Organization that collects and publishes 

information on animal diseases from 180

(2016) countries and develops standards for 

animal health.

Outbreak The occurrence of cases of a disease that are 

in excess of what is normally expected in a 

given population. 
 

September 2022 B-4 

Personal protective equipment (PPE) Clothing and equipment to prevent 

occupational injuries and diseases through 

control of exposure to potential hazards in the 

work place after engineering and 

administrative controls have been 

implemented to the fullest extent.

Premises A geographically and epidemiologically 

defined location, including a ranch, farm, 

stable, or other establishment.

Slaughter (WOAH) Procedure which causes the death of an 

animal by bleeding. 

Trace back The identification of the origin and 

movements of all animals, animal products, 

possible fomites, people, possible vectors, and 

so on that have entered onto an Infected 

Premises.

Trace forward The tracing of all animals, people, fomites, 

and so on that have left an IP. The premises

that received the animals or goods should be 

investigated and kept under surveillance or 

quarantine.

Vector An insect or any living carrier that transports 

an infectious agent from an infected 

individual to a susceptible individual or its 

food or immediate surroundings. 

Zoonotic Any disease or infection that is naturally 

transmissible from animals to humans. 
February 2022 C-1 

Appendix C

Abbreviations

ABA American Bar Association

AC Area Command 

ACHP Advisory Council on Historic Preservation

AEOC APHIS Emergency Operations Center

AHPA Animal Health Protection Act 

AI avian influenza

AMT APHIS Management Team

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

ARC Army Reserve Command

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

BIA Bureau of Indian Affairs

BLM Bureau of Land Management

BOEM Bureau of Ocean Energy Management

BOP Federal Bureau of Prisons

BPD Bureau of the Public Debt

CA Control Area

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CCC Commodity Credit Corporation 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CF contingency fund

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CNCS Corporation for National and Community Service

CSF classical swine fever 

3D depopulation, decontamination, and disposal

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency
 

September 2022 C-2 

DOC Department of Commerce

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOI Department of Interior 

DOJ Department of Justice

DOL Department of Labor 

DOS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

EMRS2 Emergency Management Response System 2.0

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EPI epidemiologist

EQS Emergency Qualification System 

ESF Emergency Support Function

ETA Employment and Training Administration

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAD foreign animal disease

FAD PReP Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

FAS Federal Acquisition Service

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FDA Food and Drug Administration 

FED LE Federal Law Enforcement

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FFS Federal-to-Federal support

FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

FMD foot-and-mouth disease

FNS Food and Nutrition Service

FSA Farm Service Agency

FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service

GIS geographic information system 

GSA General Services Administration
Abbreviations

September 2022 C-3 

HENTF Heritage Emergency National Task Force

HHS Health and Human Services 

HPAI highly pathogenic avian influenza 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HUD Housing and Urban Development

IC Incident Command

ICG Incident Coordination Group 

ICP Incident Command Post 

ICS Incident Command System

IRS Internal Revenue Service

IT information technology

JIC Joint Information Center 

LFA Lead Federal Agency

LPA Legislative and Public Affairs 

MAC Multiagency Coordination 

MARAD Maritime Administration

MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration

NADPRP National Animal Disease and Preparedness Program

NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency Management System

NAHERC National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps 

NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network

NARA National Archives and Records Administration

NARSC National Animal Rescue and Sheltering Coalition

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASAAEP National Alliance of State Animal and Agricultural Emergency 

Programs 

NASAHO National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials

NASDA National Association of State Departments of Agriculture 

NCIJTF National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force

NCMEC National Center for Missing and Exploited Children

ND Newcastle disease

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NGO non-governmental organization
 

September 2022 C-4 

NIMS National Incident Management System

NIMT National Incident Management Team 

NLRAD National List of Reportable Animal Diseases

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NOC National Operations Center

NPIC National Preparedness and Incident Coordination

NPPD National Protection and Programs Directorate

NPPD/C&C National Protection and Programs Directorate/Office of 

Cybersecurity and Communications

NPPD/IP National Protection and Programs Directorate/Office of 

Infrastructure Protection

NPS National Park Service

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

NRCS Natural Resources Conservation Service

NDRF National Disaster Recovery Framework

NRF National Response Framework 

NTAS National Terrorism Advisory System

NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration

NVOAD National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

NWHC National Wildlife Health Center

OA Office of the Administrator

OC Office of Communications 

OEC Office of Emergency Communications

OEPC Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance

WOAH World Organization for Animal Health 

OIG Office of the Inspector General 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

OPS operations

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OWCP Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs

PBS Public Buildings Service

PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Abbreviations

September 2022 C-5 

PIO Public Information Officer

PPE personal protective equipment

RD Rural Development

ROSS Resource Ordering and Status System 

SAHO State Animal Health Official 

SBA Small Business Administration 

SME subject matter expert

SOP standard operating procedure

SSA Social Security Administration

SUPSALV Navy Supervisor of Salvage

TREAS Department of the Treasury

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TTB Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

U.S.C. United States Code 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USBR United States Bureau of Reclamation

USCG U. S. Coast Guard 

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

USFS U.S. Forest Service

USFWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

USGS U.S. Geological Survey

USMS U.S. Marshals Service

USPS U.S. Postal Service

VA Veterans Affairs

VERRC Volunteer Emergency Ready Response Corps

VS Veterinary Services 

VSET VS Executive Team
September 2022 D-1 

Appendix D

Selected References and Resources

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2017). National Incident Management 

System. Retrieved from FEMA website https://www.fema.gov/nationalincident-management-system. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2008). NIMS: Frequently asked 

Questions. Retrieved from FEMA website http://www.fema.gov/pdf/ 

emergency/nims/nimsfaqs.pdf. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2019). Emergency Support Function 

Annexes. Retrieved from FEMA website http://www.fema.gov/medialibrary/assets/documents/25512 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2016). Incident Command System 

Resources. Retrieved from FEMA website https://www.fema.gov/incidentcommand-system-resources. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2019). National Response Framework. 

Retrieved from FEMA website http://www.fema.gov/national-responseframework. 

U.S. Government Publishing Office. (2003). Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-5—Management of Domestic Incidents. Retrieved from GPO 

website http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book1/pdf/PPP-2003-

book1-doc-pg229.pdf. 

U.S. Government Publishing Office. (2021-2). Code of Federal Regulations, Titles 

7 and 9. Retrieved from GPO website 

https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/cfr/2021/

USDA. (2022). Department Manual #1800-001: Incident Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery. Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Coordination.

Retrieved from https://www.ocio.usda.gov/document/departmental-manual1800-001. 

USDA. (2014). Proposal for a U.S. National List of Reportable Animal Diseases 

Concept Paper. APHIS. Retrieved from https://www.aphis.usda.gov/ 

animal_health/downloads/nlrad_concept_paper.pdf. 

USDA. (2018). Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Emergency 

Mobilization Guide. Retrieved from https://www.aphis.usda.gov/ 

library/manuals/pdf/aphis_1050.pdf. 
 

September 2022 D-2 

USDA. (2017). Draft Veterinary Services Proposed Framework for Response to 

Emerging Animal Diseases in the United States. APHIS. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/emerging-disframework-plan.pdf. 

World Organisation for Animal Health. (2022). Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

Retrieved from http://www.oie.int.