alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.2



 Exhibit 10.2 

Amendment to Employment Agreement 

This First Amendment (this “Amendment”), dated as of December 6, 2016, to the Employment Agreement, made as of
July 18, 2014 (the “Employment Agreement”), between the Florida Community Bank, National Association (the “Company”) and Vincent Tese (“Executive”). 

WHEREAS, the Company and Executive now wish to amend the Employment Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(m) of
the Employment Agreement; 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency
of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto hereby agree to amend the Employment Agreement as set forth herein. 
 Section 1
of the Employment Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 
 “1. Term of
Employment. The term of employment under this Agreement shall commence as of May 1, 2014 (the “Effective Date”) and, subject to earlier termination provided in Section 4 hereof, shall end on April 30, 2019 (the
“Term”). For purposes of clarity, if Executive’s employment continues after the expiration of the Term, his employment shall be at-will.” 

Section 3(c) of the Employment Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 

“(c) Benefits and Perquisites. Executive shall be entitled to participate in, to the extent Executive is otherwise
eligible under the terms thereof, the benefits and programs, including, for the avoidance of doubt, any long-term incentive plans or arrangements, and receive the benefits and perquisites, generally provided by the Company to executives of the
Company, including without limitation, family medical insurance. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Executive shall not be entitled to participate in any Company severance plan other than as provided specifically herein. Executive shall be entitled to
annual vacation in accordance with Company policy.” 
 Except as specifically modified herein, the Employment Agreement shall remain in
full force and effect in accordance with all of the terms and conditions thereof. 
 This Amendment may be executed in any number of
counterparts, each of which shall for all purposes be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute but one and the same instrument. Signatures delivered by facsimile shall be effective for all purposes. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties hereto has caused this Amendment to be duly executed effective as of the date first written
above. 
 [Signatures on the next page] 







 
			
	FLORIDA COMMUNITY BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Kent Ellert

		
	Name:	 	 Kent Ellert

		
	Title:	 	 President & Chief Executive
Officer



  

			
	VINCENT TESE 
		
		 	 /s/ Vincent Tese
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-6723

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DERRICK EDWARD BROWN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior 

District Judge. (1:03-cr-00534-CMH-1) 

Submitted: April 27, 2009 Decided: May 12, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Derrick Edward Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Kelli Hamby Ferry, 

Jeanine Linehan, Assistant United States Attorneys, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

 Derrick Edward Brown appeals the district court’s 

order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion for 

reduction of his sentence. We have reviewed the record and find 

no reversible error. See United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247 

(4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 

2009). Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons set forth by the 

district court. United States v. Brown, No. 1:03-cr-00534-CMH-1 

(E.D. Va. Apr. 11, 2008). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
**Exhibit 32**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Qof Dendrite International, Inc. (the “Company”) for the quarterly periodended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon the date hereof (the “Report”), John E. Bailye, as Chief Executive Officerof the Company, and Jeffrey J. Bairstow, as Chief Financial Officer, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his or her knowledge:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ John E. Bailye      |                                                  |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Name:                   | John E. Bailye                                        |
| Title:                  | Chairman of the Board and  Chief Executive Officer    |
| Date:                   | May 10, 2006                                     |
|                    |                                                  |
|                    |                                                  |
| /s/ Jeffrey J. Bairstow |                                                  |
| Name:                   | Jeffrey J. Bairstow                                   |
| Title:                  | Executive Vice President and  Chief Financial Officer |
| Date:                   | May 10, 2006                                     |
|                         |                                                       |  |

 

----
# C_2020019EN.01004402.xml

| 20.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/44

---

Judgment of the General Court of 21 November 2019 — K.A. Schmersal Holding v EUIPO — Tecnium (tec.nicum)

(Case T-527/18) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark tec.nicum - Earlier national figurative mark TECNIUM - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Similarity of the services - Similarity of the signs - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Genuine use of the earlier mark - Point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 18(1) and Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character - Evidence submitted for the first time before the General Court)

(2020/C 19/52)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: K.A. Schmersal Holding GmbH & Co. KG (Wuppertal, Germany) (represented by: A. Haudan, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Tecnium, SL (Manresa, Spain) (represented by: E. Sugrañes Coca, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 June 2018 (Case R 2427/2017-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Tecnium and K.A. Schmersal Holding.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders K.A. Schmersal Holding GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders K.A. Schmersal Holding GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 381, 22.10.2018.

---
[No. 38457.

Department Two.

February 10, 1966.]

#### Larry D. Lantis *et al., Appellants,*v. Philip John Pfarr *et al., Respondents.****

Hamblen, *Gilbert*& *Brooke,*by *Philip S. Brooke, Jr.,*for appellants.

*MacGillivray, Jones, Clarke & Schiffner,*by *John D. MacGillivray,*for respondents.

*

Reported in 410 P.2d 900.

Per Curiam

— The plaintiff, Florence Lantis, who will be referred to as though she were the only plaintiff, sustained injuries in an automobile accident. Liability of the defendants was conceded, and the only issue was the amount of the damáges. From a judgment entered oh a jury verdict which awarded $334.61 for car damage, $153.20 for medical expenses, $300 for time loss, and $1,500 as general damages (a total of $2,287.81) the plaintiff appeals. The prayer of the complaint had been $36,000 for present and future loss of wages and $150,000 as general damages.

From what, at the time, appeared to be relatively slight injuries, the plaintiff, who had worked as a waitress and taken care of her own home, contends that she has become afflicted with seizures or spells of unconsciousness rendering *995her permanently incapable of engaging in any gainful occupation or any actiyities involving the use of her left arm.

The jury not only assessed the plaintiff’s damages in the amounts indicated, but in answer to a special interrogatory found that there was no causal connection between the accident of August 16, 1962, and the spells or seizures of which the plaintiff complains.

The sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to increase the verdict of the jury or for a new trial on damages only.

The ruling on such, a motion is a matter peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court. We will not reverse the refusal to grant a new trial on such grounds, except for a manifest abuse of discretion. *Mullin v. Builders Dev. & Fin. Serv. Inc.,*62 Wn.2d 202, 205, 381 P.2d 970 (1963); *Lipshay v. Barr,*54 Wn.2d 257, 339 P.2d 471 (1959).

There was substantial evidence to sustain the jury’s finding that there was no causal relationship between the accident of August 16, 1962, and the spells or seizures of which the plaintiff complains. It is not our province to weigh the testimony, and we will not substitute our views on disputed facts for those of the jury or of the trial court where their findings are sustained by substantial evidence. *Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Zurich Ins. Co., ante*p. 568, 572, 409 P.2d 165 (Dec. 9, 1965); *Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc.,*54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959) (and literally scores of cases between the two). There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to set aside a finding of the jury supported by substantial evidence.

The judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6018

JEFFREY CLARK WATSON, SR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JAMES B. HUNT, JR., Governor,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, District

Judge. (CA-96-822-5-H3)

Submitted: March 27, 1997 Decided: April 4, 1997

Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jeffrey Clark Watson, Sr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, a North Carolina inmate, appeals the district

court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (1994), amended by Prison

Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and

find that this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the

appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Watson v. Hunt, No.

CA-96-822-5-H3 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 20, 1996). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Alton Thomas Davis, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 9, 2010 

p0830 

Order 

 

September 9, 2010 

141011 

SUMMIT POLYMERS INC., 

Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant, 

v SC: 141011 

 COA: 289596 

Wayne CC: 05-503433-CK 

ATEK THERMOFORMING INC., 

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/ 

Third-Party-Plaintiff-Appellee, 

and 

LEON PLASTICS, OWEN T. MAHER and 

VISTEON CORP., 

 Third-Party-Defendants. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 23, 2010 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
September 30, 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   Year
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
 <CASH>                                           0
<SECURITIES>                                      0         
<RECEIVABLES>                                     47,985    
<ALLOWANCES>                                      0         
<INVENTORY>                                       0         
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  0         
<PP&E>                                            600       
<DEPRECIATION>                                    0         
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    48,585    
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             47,985    
<BONDS>                                           0         
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             0         
<PREFERRED>                                       0         
<COMMON>                                          7793      
<OTHER-SE>                                        (7193)    
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  48,585        
<SALES>                                           0         
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  0         
<CGS>                                             0         
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     0         
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  4,211     
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  0         
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                0         
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (4,211)   
<INCOME-TAX>                                      0         
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (4,211)   
<DISCONTINUED>                                    0         
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   0         
<CHANGES>                                         0         
<NET-INCOME>                                      (4,211)   
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0         
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0         
        

</TABLE>
NUMBER 13-19-00047-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

CHARLES MOORHEAD, Appellant,

v.

DAHLIA REYES, ET AL., Appellees. 

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 343rd District Court

of Bee County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Hinojosa

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

The appellant’s brief in the above cause was due on April 8, 2019. On April 15, 

2019, the Clerk of the Court notified appellant that the brief had not been timely filed and 

that the appeal was subject to dismissal for want of prosecution under Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1), unless within ten days from the date of receipt of the

Court’s letter, appellant reasonably explained the failure and the appellee was not 
2

significantly injured by the appellant’s failure to timely file a brief. To date, no response 

has been received from appellant. 

Appellant has failed to either reasonably explain the failure to file a brief, file a 

motion for extension of time to file the brief, or file the brief. Accordingly, the appeal is 

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a), 42.3(b),(c). 

GINA M. BENAVIDES,

Justice

Delivered and filed the

6th day of June, 2019.
September 24, 2008

28433

#### State v. Liu

Reversed
# C_2018408EN.01006001.xml

| 12.11.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 408/60 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.11.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 408/60

---

Action brought on 25 September 2018 — YQ v Commission

(Case T-570/18)

(2018/C 408/77)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: YQ (represented by: N. de Montigny, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare and adjudge that the individual decision no longer to grant the applicant the reimbursement of the school fees in connection with her child as of the 2017/2018 school year, processed on 15 November 2017 and reflected for the first time in her pay slip for December 2017, is annulled; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare and adjudge that the individual decision no longer to grant the applicant the reimbursement of the school fees in connection with her child as of the 2017/2018 school year, processed on 15 November 2017 and reflected for the first time in her pay slip for December 2017, is annulled;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 3(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and of general implementing provisions on the reimbursement of medical fees, in so far as the defendant’s amended interpretation infringed acquired rights, legitimate expectations, legal certainty and the principle of good administration. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 3(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and of general implementing provisions on the reimbursement of medical fees, in so far as the defendant’s amended interpretation infringed acquired rights, legitimate expectations, legal certainty and the principle of good administration.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the child, the right to family life and the right to education. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the child, the right to family life and the right to education.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging the failure properly to balance the applicant’s interests and to comply with the principle of proportionality, which failures vitiate the contested decision. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging the failure properly to balance the applicant’s interests and to comply with the principle of proportionality, which failures vitiate the contested decision.

---
994 P.2d 560

SUPREME COURT OF HAWAI'I

#### Carpentier v. Board of Trustees of ERS

20827

02/09/1999

Reversed and Remanded
# C_2020399EN.01001101.xml

| 23.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 399/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 399/11

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 1 October 2020 — Ehab Makhlouf v Council of the European Union

(Case C-157/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken against the Syrian Arab Republic - Measures directed against influential businessmen and women engaged in activities in Syria - List of persons subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources - Inclusion of the appellant’s name - Action for annulment)

(2020/C 399/13)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Ehab Makhlouf (represented by: E. Ruchat, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union (represented by: V. Piessevaux and S. Kyriakopoulou, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Mr Ehab Makhlouf to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr Ehab Makhlouf to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 172, 20.5.2019.

---
<PAGE>

[LETTERHEAD]


BY FAX
J P Burder Esq
Microtel International Inc
4290 E Brickell Street
Ontario
CA 91761-1511


                                       23 February 1999


Dear Sir:

XCEL CORPORATION LIMITED

As requested, we hereby enclose an original signed audit report on the above 
company's financial statements for the year ended 30 September 1996.

Furthermore, we hereby consent to this audit report being included with your 
filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 10-K for the 
period ended 31 December 1998.

Yours faithfully
HARDCASTLE BURTON

/s/ Hardcastle Burton