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SJC-11543

COMMONWEALTH vs. MATTHEW J. SHERIDAN.

Norfolk. November 6, 2014. - February 27, 2015.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 

Hines, JJ.

Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 

Probable cause. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, 

Threshold police inquiry, Probable cause, Inevitable 

discovery, Plain view, Search incident to lawful arrest.

Threshold Police Inquiry. Probable Cause.

Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of 

the District Court Department on June 21, 2011.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Robert 

P. Ziemian, J. 

An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 

appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 

for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 

the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 

application for direct appellate review.

Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 

the defendant.

Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the 

Commonwealth.
2

LENK, J. In the early morning hours of June 21, 2011, 

police officers stopped the defendant, Matthew J. Sheridan, for 

driving a minivan with an unilluminated headlight. During the 

stop, the officers saw in the vehicle a portion of what an 

officer identified as "about a [one]-ounce bag" of marijuana, 

protruding from under a rumpled T-shirt lying on the floor 

between the vehicle's two front seats. The officers ordered the 

defendant out of the vehicle, handcuffed him, and conducted a 

search of the minivan. Lifting the T-shirt, an officer found, 

in addition to the bag previously partially seen, another oneounce bag of marijuana, and a third, smaller bag of marijuana. 

The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station. 

After he was booked on charges of possession of marijuana with 

intent to distribute, officers seized and searched his cellular 

telephone, finding several text messages that they identified as 

consistent with sales of marijuana.

The defendant moved to suppress the marijuana seized from 

his vehicle and the text messages found on his telephone. In 

Massachusetts, "possession of one ounce or less of marihuana 

[is] only . . . a civil offense," punishable by a "civil penalty 

of one hundred dollars and forfeiture of the marihuana." 

G. L. c. 94C, § 32L. Because it is not a crime, police 
3

observation of one ounce or less of marijuana is insufficient, 

by itself, to give rise to the probable cause necessary to 

conduct a search. See Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 

752 (2013) (Daniel). A judge of the District Court nevertheless 

denied the defendant's motion to suppress. He concluded the 

police were permitted to enter the minivan to effect the 

forfeiture of the marijuana that they saw, and that the 

discovery of the additional marijuana, the defendant's arrest, 

and the subsequent seizure and search of the defendant's 

telephone followed from the initial lawful entry into the 

defendant's vehicle. We conclude that the search of the 

defendant's vehicle and of the cellular telephone violated his 

rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 

Rights. Accordingly, the judge's order denying the defendant's 

motion to suppress must be reversed.

1. Background. a. Facts. We summarize the relevant 

facts as found by the District Court judge, supplemented by 

uncontroverted evidence derived from the testimony of witnesses 

that the judge explicitly or implicitly credited. See 

Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 

Mass. 818 (2008).
4

Sean Glennon, an officer of the Quincy police department, 

initiated the stop of the defendant's minivan at approximately 

2:50 A.M. Glennon approached the driver's side window and 

requested the defendant's driver's license and registration. 

Glennon observed that the defendant looked extremely nervous; 

his hands shook as he fumbled for his driver's license and 

registration, and, although he readily produced his license, he 

at first provided an expired registration. He eventually 

provided a current valid registration.

Scott Walker, a State police trooper who happened to be 

patrolling the area, also had stopped at the scene shortly after 

Glennon stopped the defendant's vehicle. As Glennon was 

conversing with the defendant, Walker approached the vehicle's 

passenger side window. Walker observed, on the floor between 

the vehicle's two front seats, the corner of a plastic sandwich 

bag that appeared to contain marijuana, protruding from under a 

T-shirt. Walker discreetly indicated to Glennon the apparent 

presence of marijuana.

Glennon ordered the defendant to step out of the vehicle 

and performed a patfrisk, during which he found $285 in cash and 

a cellular telephone. After returning the money and the 

telephone to the defendant, Glennon asked whether there was 
5

"anything illegal in the car." The defendant answered, "No." 

Glennon requested permission to search the vehicle; the 

defendant declined. Glennon then informed the defendant that 

Walker had seen a bag of marijuana in the vehicle. The 

defendant "slumped forward" and a "dejected type of look" 

crossed his face.

Glennon handcuffed the defendant, whose hands by that point 

were "shaking uncontrollabl[y]," and began to search the 

vehicle. Glennon saw a bag he described as "consistent with 

about a [one]-ounce bag" of marijuana, partially visible under a 

T-shirt on the floor between the vehicle's front seats. He 

lifted the T-shirt, and observed two additional bags of 

marijuana, one approximately equal in size to the first bag, and 

one smaller. The officers searched the remainder of the 

minivan, and also requested a narcotics-trained canine to 

perform a sniff search, but located no additional drugs or 

contraband and no other evidence of illegal activity. The 

defendant was transported to the police station, where he was 

booked on charges of possession with intent to distribute 

marijuana. During booking, officers again seized the 

defendant's money and cellular telephone. Glennon viewed text 

messages stored on the telephone, and saw "several text messages 
6

that appeared to be orders to purchase marijuana."

b. Procedural history. The defendant was charged with 

possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation 

of G. L. c. 94C, § 32, and a civil motor vehicle infraction 

based on the broken headlight. The defendant filed a motion to 

suppress all of the physical evidence seized as a result of the 

search and the arrest, including the marijuana, the telephone, 

and the text messages found on the telephone. The defendant 

argued that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that 

the minivan contained more than one ounce of marijuana, 

rendering the search impermissible. A District Court judge held 

an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion, at which both 

Glennon and Walker testified.

The judge denied the motion to suppress. He observed that 

"[t]he issue of whether the police could ascertain whether the 

initial bag of marijuana, because it was partially hidden, 

contained more or less than one [ounce] of material was . . . 

contested . . . at the hearing." The judge concluded, however, 

that "it is irrelevant whether Glennon or Walker could make such 

a determination." Stating that, "while possession of less than 

[one ounce] of marijuana is not criminal, any quantity is 

'contraband,'" the judge determined that "the police are 
7

entitled to issue an 'exit order' to completely ensure their 

safety (and for convenience) while they are in a vulnerable 

position reaching into the vehicle to seiz[e] the drugs." 

Furthermore, the judge concluded that, "once the police removed 

the shirt to seize the initial bundle of marijuana, a second one 

ounce bag as well as a smaller bag were revealed," giving rise 

to probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of a 

criminal quantity of marijuana. Finally, the judge concluded 

that "[t]he seizure of the [tele]phone [was] incident to the 

arrest," and that "the information obtained [from the search of 

the telephone's contents] [was] allowed as inevitable discovery 

during the investigation of whether the more than one [ounce] of 

marijuana were possessed with intent to distribute."

The single justice granted the defendant's application for 

leave to file an interlocutory appeal to the Appeals Court 

pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 

Mass. 1501 (1996), and also allowed the defendant to amend his 

filing to include a challenge to the search of the cellular 

telephone. We allowed the defendant's application for direct 

appellate review.

2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. "In reviewing a 

ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary 
8

findings of fact absent clear error but conduct an independent 

review of [the judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of 

law" (quotation omitted). Daniel, 464 Mass. at 748-749.

b. The search of the vehicle. i. The Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution protects the "right of the people 

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures." Article 14 of the 

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights similarly protects against 

"unreasonable searches, and seizures, of [one's] person, [one's]

houses, [one's] papers, and all [one's] possessions." While 

"[g]enerally, a warrant is required" for a search to be 

reasonable, "several well-recognized exceptions exist." 

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 473 (2011) (Cruz). "Under 

the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an automobile

is permitted when police have 'probable cause to believe that a 

motor vehicle on a public way contains contraband or evidence of 

a crime, and exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant 

impracticable.'" Id. at 473-474, quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 

407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990). "[W]hen an automobile is stopped in 

a public place with probable cause, no more exigent 

circumstances are required . . . beyond the inherent mobility of 

an automobile itself to justify a warrantless search of the 
9

vehicle." Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 124 (1997).

In 2008, voters in the Commonwealth approved a ballot 

initiative entitled "An Act establishing a sensible State 

marihuana policy." See St. 2008, c. 387. The initiative 

established that "possession of one ounce or less of marihuana 

shall only be a civil offense, subjecting an offender who is 

eighteen years of age or older to a civil penalty . . . and 

forfeiture of the marihuana, but not to any other form of 

criminal or civil punishment or disqualification." G. L. 

c. 94C, § 32L.

In Cruz, 459 Mass. at 462, we first confronted the 

decriminalization initiative's impact on the automobile 

exception. There police officers, while conducting an otherwise 

permissible vehicle stop, smelled "a 'faint odor' of burnt 

marijuana." Id. Before the enactment of the decriminalization 

initiative, we had held "that the odor of burnt marijuana is

sufficient to believe that there is contraband in the car." Id. 

at 474, citing Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 47 (2008). 

The validity of a warrantless search, however, is determined 

according to the same standard used by a magistrate in deciding 

to issue a search warrant. Cruz, supra at 475, citing Whiteley

v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971). In Massachusetts, the
10

standard for the issuance of a search warrant demands probable 

cause to believe that a crime is being committed. Cruz, supra

at 475-476. Because the ballot initiative transformed the 

possession of one ounce or less of marijuana into a civil 

infraction, not a crime, we concluded in Cruz that a warrantless 

search of a vehicle is permissible only if police can establish 

"probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of contraband 

was present in the car." Id. at 476 (emphasis in original).

Similarly, in Daniel, supra at 749, police smelled "the 

odor of freshly burnt marijuana" while conducting a traffic 

stop. When an officer asked whether the vehicle's occupants had 

any marijuana, a passenger gave the officer two small bags, 

collectively containing less than one ounce of marijuana. Id. 

The officer then ordered the occupants out of the vehicle and 

searched it. Id. at 750. During the search, he found an 

unlicensed firearm in the glove compartment. Id.

We held that the officer lacked probable cause to search 

the vehicle. Id. at 751-752. Possession of the quantity of 

marijuana contained in the two small bags "constituted a civil 

infraction, not a criminal offense," id. at 751, and the 

vehicle's occupants "surrendered [the] bags . . . at the request 

of the officer." Id. Consequently, "[a]bsent articulable facts 
11

supporting a belief that either occupant of the vehicle 

possessed a criminal amount of marijuana, the search was not 

justified by the need to search for contraband." Id. at 752.

Cruz and Daniel control the outcome of this case. Glennon 

testified that the bag that was partially visible under the Tshirt was "consistent with about a [one]-ounce bag" of 

marijuana. Because the ballot initiative decriminalized 

"possession of one ounce or less" of marijuana, G. L. c. 94C, 

§ 32L, the officer saw evidence of a civil infraction, not a 

criminal offense. Absent articulable facts supporting a belief 

that the vehicle contained an additional, criminal quantity of 

marijuana, the officers lacked probable cause to believe that a 

crime was being committed, and the search was impermissible.

ii. The Commonwealth offers two reasons in support of its 

argument that the officers had probable cause to believe that a 

criminal amount of marijuana was present in the vehicle.

The Commonwealth's first argument hinges on the word 

"about." The Commonwealth contends that, because "'[a]bout' an 

ounce would include amounts both more and less than an ounce," 

and because possession of more than an ounce of marijuana would 

constitute a criminal offense, the officers had probable cause 

to search the vehicle.
12

The standard for probable cause demands that the officers 

know "enough facts and circumstances 'to warrant a person of 

reasonable caution in believing'" the vehicle contained a 

criminal quantity of marijuana. Commonwealth v. Welch, 420 

Mass. 646, 650 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 

at 895. Here Glennon testified that, based on his training and 

experience, he identified the amount of marijuana contained in 

the bag as "about . . . [one]-ounce," a noncriminal quantity. 

The Commonwealth identifies no facts or circumstances within the 

officers' knowledge that would have led a reasonable person to 

believe that Glennon underestimated the amount of marijuana 

contained in the bag. That belief would be particularly 

unwarranted because the officers could only see a small portion 

of the bag, the remainder being covered by the T-shirt. The 

imprecision in Glennon's estimate at best gives rise only to 

speculation that the quantity exceeded one ounce. It does not 

establish probable cause.

Next, the Commonwealth contends that, even if the 

observation of the marijuana alone were not sufficient to give 

rise to probable cause, the defendant's nervousness upon being 

stopped tipped the scales to probable cause. In Cruz, 459 Mass. 

at 467, the Commonwealth similarly contended that the odor of 
13

burnt marijuana, when coupled with "the stop's location, a high 

crime neighborhood; the defendant's nervous demeanor; and the 

occupants' sharing of a cigar" allegedly used to cover the odor 

of marijuana were sufficient to establish probable cause. 

Likewise, in Daniel, 464 Mass. at 749, an officer testified 

that, when he approached the stopped vehicle, he observed the 

defendant "sitting in the passenger seat" with "his head down 

and his shoulders . . . 'rocking back and forth.'" The officer 

in Daniel, supra at 750, also testified that he regarded the 

defendant's conduct in emptying his pockets and placing the 

contents on the dashboard as "significant . . . because it was 

not common," and that it suggested to him that the defendant was 

"trying to conceal something." In both cases, we determined 

that manifestations of allegedly nervous or furtive behavior, in 

conjunction with indications that the defendants possessed some 

amount of marijuana, were not sufficient to establish probable 

cause to believe that the defendants possessed a criminal 

quantity. "It is common," we observed, "and not necessarily 

indicative of criminality, to appear nervous during even a 

mundane encounter with police." Cruz, 459 Mass. at 468. 

Because the Commonwealth identifies no additional factors 

supporting probable cause beyond the defendant's apparent 
14

nervousness and the noncriminal quantity of marijuana that the 

officers observed, we reach the same conclusion here.

iii. The decriminalization initiative transformed 

possession of one ounce or less of marijuana into a civil 

offense, subjecting the possessor to "a civil penalty" and 

"forfeiture of the marihuana." G. L. c. 94C, § 32L. The 

District Court judge determined that the police officers were 

permitted to order the defendant out of his vehicle, and then to 

enter the vehicle themselves to effect this forfeiture. The 

Commonwealth echoes this argument on appeal, asserting that 

"[t]he limited entry was reasonable as it effected the 

forfeiture as envisioned by G. L. c. 94C, § 32L."

In evaluating this argument, it is important to distinguish 

an officer's power to seize the marijuana from the officer's 

power to make an entry into the vehicle to effect that seizure. 

We agree with the District Court judge's determination that any 

quantity of marijuana is "contraband" and is subject to seizure. 

We disagree, however, with the judge's conclusion that, to 

effect that seizure, the officers were entitled to make an entry 

into the vehicle that -- lacking probable cause -- they 

otherwise would be prohibited from making.

The Commonwealth contends that the seizure of the marijuana 
15

was proper because it was in "plain view." "Under our plain 

view doctrine, a police officer may seize objects in plain view 

where four requirements are met: (1) the officer is 'lawfully in 

a position to view the object'; (2) the officer has 'a lawful 

right of access to the object'; (3) with respect to 'contraband, 

weapons, or other items illegally possessed, where the 

incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent'

or, with respect to 'other types of evidence . . . where the 

particular evidence is plausibly related to criminal activity of 

which the police are already aware'; and (4) the officer 

'come[s] across the object inadvertently.'" Commonwealth v. 

White, 469 Mass. 96, 102 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Sliech–

Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 306–307 (2010). There is no dispute 

here that the first and fourth requirements are met: the 

officers were lawfully in a position to observe the bag of 

marijuana, since the bag was visible from outside the vehicle 

where the officers were positioned in effecting a permissible, 

routine traffic stop; and the officers came across the marijuana 

inadvertently, since there is no contention that the officers 

effected the traffic stop to search for marijuana.

The Commonwealth, however, cannot satisfy the doctrine's 

second requirement, which demands that the officer have "a 
16

lawful right of access to the object." Commonwealth v. White, 

supra. In typical plain view cases, officers see and seize an 

object while conducting a permissible search, pursuant either to 

a warrant, see Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, supra at 306, or 

to an exception to the warrant requirement, see Commonwealth v. 

White, supra; Commonwealth v. Stack, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 234-

235 (2000). In those cases, police officers are already in the 

process of conducting a permissible search of a certain location 

(i.e. a vehicle, a house), and the plain view doctrine operates 

to allow officers to seize an object to which, by virtue of the 

search, they already have access. In other cases, police 

officers see, in plain view from a lawful vantage point outside 

a vehicle, an item that itself gives rise to "probable cause to 

believe that they would find 'the instrumentality of a crime or 

evidence pertaining to a crime' in the vehicle." Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 49 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 

Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 55 (1974). Because the observation 

gives rise to probable cause to conduct a search, the subsequent 

entry into the vehicle and seizure of the item is permissible. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra at 50.

Here, although the officers could see the marijuana from 

their lawful vantage point outside the minivan, they did not 
17

have a "lawful right to access" it from that vantage point. To 

seize the marijuana, the police officers had to enter the 

minivan. Because the observation of a noncriminal quantity of 

marijuana alone did not give rise to probable cause that the 

vehicle contained evidence of a crime, the validity of the 

officers' seizure of the marijuana turns on the existence of 

some other basis, besides probable cause, to justify the 

officers' entry into the vehicle.

The Commonwealth characterizes the entry into the minivan 

as a "limited intrusion," and likens it to the intrusion 

involved in a police officer's request for license and 

registration documentation during a routine motor vehicle stop. 

The analogy is inapposite. In the context of traffic stops, we 

have never held that officers may routinely enter vehicles to 

acquire driver's license and registration documents, in the same 

way that the officers entered the defendant's vehicle here to 

seize the marijuana. On the contrary, we have stated that, 

"[g]enerally, the officer may simply direct the driver to 

retrieve his identification from the vehicle." Commonwealth v. 

Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 160 (2009). Only when the officers have 

"a reasonable basis to believe that [the vehicle's occupants

are] armed and dangerous" are police officers permitted to order 
18

the occupants out of the vehicle and then conduct a limited 

search for the purposes of recovering the identification and 

registration documents. Id. Cf. Commonwealth v. Pagan, 440 

Mass. 62, 68 (2003) (police officers permitted to search 

"container that they reasonably fear may contain a weapon" 

before returning it to defendant to locate his identification 

documentation); Commonwealth v. Lantigua, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 

528-529 (1995) (concluding that, where circumstances of search 

"justifie[d] heightened precautions for the officers' own 

safety[,] . . . the officers could properly have entered the 

passenger compartment, including the glove compartment, to 

retrieve the registration themselves").

Indeed, our jurisprudence has diverged from the United 

States Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in that we 

have held that art. 14 prohibits automatic exit orders during 

routine traffic stops. Compare Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 

Mass. 658, 662-663 (1999), with Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 

106, 109-110 (1977). Instead, we have concluded that a police 

officer must "have a reasonable suspicion of danger before 

compelling a driver to leave his motor vehicle." Commonwealth

v. Gonsalves, supra at 662. Here the District Court judge 

acknowledged that, "except for the extreme nervousness of the 
19

defendant, there [were] not present any other factors that would 

indicate a dangerous situation may exist." The judge never 

found that the officers' exit order and the patfrisk of the 

defendant that followed were based on any reasonable 

apprehension of danger. Rather, the record indicates that these 

events were precipitated solely by the officers' observation of 

what they believed to be a noncriminal portion of marijuana. 

Under these circumstances, the exit order and the patfrisk were 

impermissible, and the officers' entry into the vehicle to seize 

the marijuana cannot be justified under the logic that enables 

police officers to enter a vehicle to recover license and 

registration documentation in situations where the officer 

reasonably believes that the driver is armed and dangerous.

Finally, the Commonwealth suggests that the officers' entry 

into the minivan was permissible under the logic that allows 

warrantless administrative inspections to enforce certain 

regulatory schemes. Such searches, however, are typically 

confined to "commercial premises" that are "utilized in the 

context of a 'closely regulated' industry," where "an 

individual's expectation of privacy" is "particularly 

attenuated." Commonwealth v. Tart, 408 Mass. 249, 253-254 

(1990). Where warrantless administrative searches for evidence 
20

of suspected regulatory violations have been upheld, moreover, 

typically "there is no possibility of criminal action and thus 

no necessity to comply with the more stringent standards of 

criminal probable cause" (quotations and citations omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 386 Mass. 434, 442 (1982). 

Administrative searches are permissible because they are 

"conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance 

of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal 

investigation to secure evidence of crime." United States v. 

Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled on other 

grounds, United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(en banc). They are not permissible, by contrast, where they 

serve as a "tool for law enforcement." United States v. 

$124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1989).

The facts of this case aptly demonstrate how the type of 

intrusion that occurred here could become a tool for law 

enforcement to search for evidence of criminal activity despite 

the absence of probable cause. Contrary to the Commonwealth's 

characterization, the search went beyond a "limited intrusion" 

for the "sole purpose of seizing marijuana in [the officers'] 

plain view." Upon entering the vehicle, the officers did not 

merely seize the one bag of marijuana that was partially in 
21

plain view under the T-shirt. Instead, they lifted the T-shirt, 

discovering and then seizing two additional bags. The judge 

made no factual finding that the officers had to lift the Tshirt to seize the bag, rather than simply grasping the portion 

of the bag that was partially visible. And although the 

District Court judge found that, "in addition to the visible 

one-ounce bag of marijuana, other objects lay underneath the 

same t-shirt," the judge never found, and nothing in the 

officers' testimony supports a finding, that the officers had 

reason to believe that these other objects were other bags of 

marijuana, rather than innocuous, noncontraband items.

For these reasons, we reject the Commonwealth's contention 

that the officers here were permitted to effect a "limited 

intrusion" into the defendant's vehicle to seize the marijuana. 

The officers observed a noncriminal quantity of marijuana from a 

lawful vantage point, and might well have informed the defendant 

that the possession of that marijuana constituted a civil 

offense, subjecting the possessor to a fine, and that the 

marijuana was subject to forfeiture. They could have requested 

that the defendant turn the marijuana over to them.1 They could 

 

1 We leave to another day an examination of the consequences 

if the defendant had declined to turn over the marijuana on 
22

also have issued a civil citation, see G. L. c. 94C, § 32N, and 

pursued the forfeiture of the marijuana, see G. L. c. 94C, § 47. 

They did not do so. Instead, they entered the vehicle and 

conducted a search that went beyond even what would be necessary 

to seize the bag that they had seen. Because they lacked 

probable cause to believe that the van contained evidence of a 

crime, we conclude that their entry into the minivan was 

impermissible.

c. The search of the cellular telephone. Our 

determination that the search of the defendant's vehicle was 

impermissible resolves any question whether the subsequent 

search of the defendant's cellular telephone was permissible. 

The District Court judge concluded that the additional bags of 

marijuana that the officers discovered as a result of their 

entry into the minivan gave rise to probable cause to arrest the 

defendant; that the seizure of the cellular telephone was 

permissible as a seizure incident to the defendant's arrest; and 

that, once the telephone was seized, the search of the text 

messages contained on the telephone was permissible under the 

inevitable discovery doctrine. In the District Court judge's 

analysis, then, the validity of the search of the cellular 

 

request.
23

telephone ultimately turned on the validity of the officers' 

entry into the minivan. Because we have determined that the 

officers' entry into the minivan was impermissible, the thread 

leading to the search of the text messages is unwound, and the 

text messages must be suppressed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Pietrass, 392 Mass. 892, 900 (1984).

If there were any doubt about that result, the United 

States Supreme Court has set it to rest. After the District 

Court judge issued his decision in this case, the United States 

Supreme Court decided Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 

(2014). There, the Court held that "the search incident to 

arrest exception does not apply to cell phones." Id. at 2494. 

For both of those reasons, the text messages obtained as a 

result of the search of the defendant's cellular telephone must 

be suppressed.

3. Conclusion. The decision denying the defendant's 

motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the searches 

of his vehicle and of the defendant's cellular telephone is 

reversed. The matter is remanded to the District Court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.