No. 3-01-0120

Consolidated with No. 3-01-0745

_________________________________________________________________

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

					)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 	)	for the 14th  Judicial Circuit,

OF ILLINOIS,			)	Rock Island County, Illinois

					)

	Plaintiff-Appellees,)	

					)	No. 99-CF-985

					)		

	v.				)		

					)

MELVIN HENDERSON,		)	Honorable Larry S. Vandersnick,

					)	Judge Presiding 

	Defendant-Appellant.)

					)

_________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE McDADE, delivered the opinion of the court:

_________________________________________________________________

	Defendant, Melvin Henderson, was convicted of unlawful

possession of a controlled substance on April 20, 2000, and was

sentenced to five years' imprisonment.  He filed a pro se post- conviction petition, which was summarily dismissed on January 11,

2001.  Defendant appeals from his final judgment of conviction

and the dismissal of his postconviction petition.  We reverse and

remand.

FACTS

	On November 26, 1999, defendant was charged by information

with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance

with intent to deliver.  Subsequently, the charge was amended to

unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a Class IV felony. 

The indictment specifically alleged that defendant was in possession of less than 15 grams of cocaine.  

	The evidence at trial showed that crack cocaine was found in

the defendant’s apartment, to which he had sole access.  The

defendant had indicated to the police officer that there were

crumbs of cocaine on a table and had directed the officer to the

exact location where the crack cocaine was found.  

	Defendant appeared on January 18, 2000, and he pled not

guilty.  The judge set March 16, 2000, as the date for defendant

to enter a guilty plea.  On that date, however, defendant

persisted in his not guilty plea and demanded a jury trial.  The

judge then set a guilty plea deadline of April 13, 2000.  

	On April 13, defendant appeared with counsel.  He indicated

that he had not accepted the plea offer from the State because he

hoped to negotiate a lesser sentence.  The trial judge gave the

defendant until the next day to think about the latest plea

offer, which had been on the table since March.  On April 14,

defendant again indicated that he did not wish to accept the

State’s plea offer.  

	The jury trial commenced on April 19, 2000.  Prior to jury

selection, the judge had a hearing on defendant’s motion in limine with regard to his prior convictions and reserved ruling on the request for a "mere fact" presentation of the prior

convictions.  At the end of the hearing, the jury was selected.  

	Before opening statements, defendant asked the judge why he

was eligible for an extended-term sentence.  Defendant attempted

to plead guilty but the judge responded that although he would accept an open plea, he was not going to accept any negotiated

pleas at that point because the jury had been selected, and he

was ready to proceed.  The judge reminded defendant that he had

had until April 14 to enter a negotiated plea and, in fact,

suggested that defendant could have accepted the plea even a day

or two before trial commenced.  It does not appear from the

record that the State had ever withdrawn the plea offer and no

objection was made to defendant's attempt to plead following jury

selection.

	The trial proceeded before the jury.  At the end of the

State’s case, the judge ruled, with regard to the motion in limine,  that one of defendant’s prior convictions for possession of drugs with intent to deliver could be used for impeachment if

defendant testified.  Defendant then decided not to testify. 

	Defendant was found guilty of possession of the cocaine and

on May 24, 2000, was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.  The

sentencing order was entered on June 6, 2000, and defendant filed

a motion for reconsideration on July 5, 2000, which was denied. 

His subsequent pro se postconviction petition was dismissed on January 11, 2001.  Defendant appeals the conviction and the

dismissal of his postconviction petition.  

ANALYSIS

	Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider a

guilty plea solely because it was tendered after the deadline and

after jury selection on the morning of trial, (2) whether this matter should be remanded for a new trial where the trial court’s

denial of defendant’s request for the use of "mere fact" method

of impeachment by prior conviction was in error, and (3) whether

the trial court’s first-stage dismissal of defendant’s

postconviction petition should be reversed because the enactment

of Public Act 83-942 (Public Act 83-942, effective, November 23,

1983) violates the single subject rule of the Illinois

Constitution.  The first issue raised is a matter within the

sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed

absent a clear abuse of the court's discretion.  See People v. Peterson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 38, 725 N.E.2d 1 (1999).  The remaining two issues have previously been addressed in other

cases and rejected by this court, and we decline to revisit them.

	Refusal to Accept Guilty Plea

	Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by refusing to consider his guilty plea solely because he

tendered it on the morning of trial after expiration of the

court’s deadline.  He argues that it was an abuse of the trial

judge’s discretion to refuse the guilty plea only on timeliness

grounds, without considering the merits of the negotiated

agreement. 

	It is well established that the trial judge is not obligated

to accept a guilty plea and that he may reject such a plea in the

exercise of sound judicial discretion.  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971); People v. Peterson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 38, 725 N.E.2d 1 (1999).  A judge will be deemed to have abused this discretion when a decision

regarding whether to accept a guilty plea is arbitrary, fanciful,

unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view

adopted by the trial court.  People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 743 N.E.2d 126 (2000). 

	The defendant’s argument centers around whether it is an

abuse of the trial court’s discretion to refuse to even entertain

his guilty plea solely on the basis of the expiration of a court-

imposed deadline.  This is a question of first impression in

Illinois, and in considering the issue, we have looked at how

other jurisdictions have analyzed it. 

	There are two basic lines of authority on this issue.  State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 2001), provides a clear example of one line of reasoning.  In that case, the court held that it was

an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to refuse to accept

defendant's tender of a guilty plea solely on the basis of

timeliness.  The court reasoned that a missed deadline alone

would not support a refusal to accept a guilty plea, but that

there must be additional reasons.  While the court did not

elaborate on what the additional reasons must be, it did conclude

that inflexible plea deadlines themselves eliminate the court's

exercise of discretion. 

	The refusal to consider the plea in Hager was premised on the fact that it was tendered on the day of trial and the jury

pool was already present.  In reaching its decision, the Hager court also noted that "[a]t times, the very presence of a jury on the morning of trial can engender a desire from the defendant to

plead guilty that cannot be replicated at any prior time in the

process.  Thus, the jury's function to help resolve cases can be

performed at times by its mere presence on the morning of trial." 

Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 836.

	The other line of authority is clearly explained in People v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2001).  In that case, the court held that plea bargain cutoff deadlines may be enforced where the

parties have actual notice of the court’s practice and where the

court permits exceptions for good cause.  The Jasper court reasoned that the plea deadlines are part of the court’s

management authority and recognized that there is no absolute

right to have a guilty plea accepted.  The court stated that

". . .the setting of deadlines for pretrial matters constitutes

an integral part of the trial court’s case management authority." 

Jasper, 17 P.3d at 811.  

	After careful consideration of both lines of cases, we find

the Hager court's reasoning more persuasive.  

	We are, however, not sure the refusal in this case would

have passed the limitations in Jasper either.  We have found no evidence in the record that exceptions to deadlines are permitted

for good cause.  We also note that the court’s “policy” is

unclear inasmuch as it was willing to deviate for an open plea,

but not for one that was negotiated.

	Certainly, the courts need to be able to manage their

dockets to maximize access and minimize costs.  However, rejecting a guilty plea solely because it was not tendered before

the court-imposed deadline does not seem to be in the best

interests of justice or of public policy concerning resolution of

cases.  

	The only reason for strictly enforcing the deadline would be

some attempt to manage the docket and conserve judicial

resources.  However, as noted by the Hager court, ". . . efficiency must always be compatible with fairness, and fairness

must consider the fundamental principles which drive our system

of justice and the rights and liberties of each individual. 

There are many procedures courts could employ that would quickly

eliminate backlogs and enable our legal system to run with the

efficiency of an assembly line, but they are not implemented

because they would offend the principles fundamental to our

system of justice."  Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 835.

	In addition, there is an interest in promoting settlement of

cases.  Plea negotiations lead to the prompt and final

disposition of many criminal cases.  In addition, they give the

State leverage in prosecuting crimes.  Strictly enforcing court-

imposed deadlines goes against these interests.

	In this case, although the defendant had ample time to

evaluate and accept the State’s plea and he only delayed his

decision hoping to negotiate a lesser sentence, the plea should

have been considered on its merits.  According to the record, the

only reason given for the trial judge’s strict enforcement of the deadline was that the attempt to tender the plea was made after the jury had been selected. 

	As we have previously stated, however, the judge indicated that he would have accepted an open plea at that time.  We cannot

discern, and the State has not presented, any difference in added

costs or taxing of resources that would justify addressing an

open plea and refusing to even consider one that has been fully

negotiated.  Therefore, we find that the judge abused his

discretion in refusing to even consider the negotiated plea

solely on timeliness grounds.

	We emphasize in stating our decision that we are not holding

that defendant has a right to have a guilty plea accepted, even

when its terms are completely agreeable to defendant and to the

State.  Rather, we are holding that it is an abuse of discretion

for the court to refuse to exercise discretion in determining

whether the plea should be accepted or rejected on its merits

simply because an arbitrary deadline has passed.

	The remaining two issues have previously been addressed by

this court.  We see no reason to revisit them at this time, and

we decline to do so.

CONCLUSION

	Based on the foregoing, the refusal of the court to consider

the defendant's plea based on timeliness alone was an abuse of

discretion and is reversed.  This matter is remanded to the trial

court for further proceedings.

	PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON specially concurring:

	I specially concur with the majority because the trial court's

actions indicate that it did not exercise its discretion in accepting or refusing the plea.  The dissent claims that we should

not disturb the trial court's exercise of his discretion, but this

claim assumes that the court had exercised its discretion in the

first place.  When a judge draws a strict time line after which he

will not accept a guilty plea, it is an arbitrary, not a

discretionary, act.   As the Hager court said, "a fixed plea deadline is the very antithesis of discretionary decision making." 

State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Iowa 2001).  If the trial judge had listened to the terms of the plea and refused it on the

merits, he would have been exercising his discretion.  Because the

court refused to hear the plea, we owe it no deference on this

issue.

People v. Henderson, No. 3--01--0120 (cons. with No. 3--01--0745)

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:

	We cannot reverse the trial judge's decision unless he abused

his discretion.  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971); People v. Peterson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 38 (1999).  According to our supreme court, "[this] standard has been

recognized as ʻthe most deferential standard of review available with the exception of no review at all.ʼ " People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387 (1998), citing M. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 469, 480 (1988).  An abuse of discretion occurs only if the judge's decision is

arbitrary, fanciful, or no reasonable person would agree with it.  See People v. Hall, 195 Ill. App. 2d 1 (2000).

	Yet the majority reasons that the judge's decision is

reversible because it "does not seem to be in the best interests of

justice or of public policy concerning resolution of cases."  Wrong

standard.  The majority rides the coattails of State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 2001), without specifically explaining how the

judge's decision meets the true criteria for an abuse of

discretion.  All the majority really explains is why it disagrees

with the judge's policy regarding negotiated guilty pleas.  But

such disagreement hardly signals an abuse of discretion. 

Reasonable minds can differ on this issue, as evidenced by the line

of cases upholding rejections of guilty pleas on timeliness

grounds.  See United States v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 1991); People v. Cobb, 139 Cal. App. 3d 578 (1983); People v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2001); People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d 547 (Mich. 1997); and State v. Brimage, 638 A.2d 904 (N.J. 1994).  By the very definition of the standard, an abuse of discretion cannot

exist under such circumstances.

	Docket management is a legitimate concern resting within a

trial judge's sound discretion.  In the instant case, the judge

said he had a policy of not accepting negotiated pleas after

commencement of trial proceedings.  His policy was geared toward

conserving judicial time and resources.  I realize that the judge could have saved the time and expense of a trial by accepting

Henderson's plea.  However, Henderson caused the State to expend

resources for selection of a jury that was never used.  This fact distinguishes the instant case from Hager, where the defendant tendered his plea before jury selection.  Henderson's disregard for

the court's rules caused a waste that was missing in Hager.  By taking a stand, the judge sent a message calculated to inhibit such waste in the future.  He also attempted to foster respect for

rules.  Lack of such respect is what causes a need for guilty pleas

in the first place.

	These concerns explain why--in the exercise of his sound

discretion--the judge decided to reject Henderson's guilty plea. 

The majority's assertion that the judge failed to even initiate an

exercise of his discretion is conclusory at best.  Also misplaced

is the majority's focus on how the judge apparently would have

handled an untimely open plea.  Regardless of that hypothetical

outcome, the judge's decision to reject Henderson's negotiated plea

is simply not reversible unless it fails the abuse of discretion

standard.

	Although persons may disagree on the soundness of the judge's

approach, how can the majority believe that no reasonable person

would agree it?  How do the judge's actions satisfy the definitions

of arbitrary and fanciful?  The majority has not satisfactorily

explained how, and I do not believe it can.  I thus dissent.