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SJC-12397

G4S TECHNOLOGY LLC vs. MASSACHUSETTS 

TECHNOLOGY PARK CORPORATION.

Suffolk. March 5, 2018. - June 13, 2018.

Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 

& Kafker, JJ.

Contract, Public works, Construction contract, Performance and 

breach, Subcontractor, Damages. Public Works, Delay, Extra 

work. Damages, Breach of contract, Quantum meruit, Fraud. 

Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Damages. Fraud.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

September 22, 2014. 

The case was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J., on motions for 

summary judgment, and entry of separate and final judgment was 

ordered by her.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 

direct appellate review. 

Christopher Weld, Jr. (Megan C. Deluhery & Joel Lewin also 

present) for the plaintiff.

Robert J. Kaler (Edwin L. Hall also present) for the 

defendant.

Carol Chandler, Brendan Carter, David E. Wilson, Shannon A. 

Reilly, & Mark Keough Molloy, for Associated Builders and 

Contractors, Massachusetts Chapter, & others, amici curiae, 

submitted a brief.
2

Maura Healey, Attorney General, & James A. Sweeney & 

Cassandra H. Arriaza, Assistant Attorneys General, for the 

Attorney General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

KAFKER, J. At issue is a construction contract dispute

between G4S Technology LLC (G4S) and Massachusetts Technology 

Park Corporation (MTPC) arising out of a State- and federally

funded project to design and build a fiber optic network in 

western and north central Massachusetts. On summary judgment, a 

judge in the Superior Court concluded that G4S was barred from 

seeking recovery on the contract or under quantum meruit because 

it intentionally filed false certifications of timely payments 

to subcontractors. The judge also concluded that MTPC could not 

maintain a fraud action against G4S, in which it sought damages 

in addition to the $4 million payment MTPC already had withheld 

from G4S, because any recovery would be duplicative.

On appeal, G4S argues that MTPC was not damaged by the 

false certifications, and that the Commonwealth should replace 

the common-law rule that "in relation to building contracts, 

. . . a contractor cannot recover on the contract itself without 

showing complete and strict performance of all its terms," Andre

v. Maguire, 305 Mass. 515, 516 (1940), with a materiality rule 

as provided in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 237, 241

(1981). Alternatively, G4S contends that, even if recovery on 

the contract is disallowed, it should be able to pursue an 
3

equitable recovery under the doctrine of quantum meruit. G4S 

argues that MTPC, and not G4S, was responsible for the delays in 

construction and the $10 million in increased costs G4S assumed.

MTPC cross-appealed from the dismissal of its claim of fraud 

against G4S.

We conclude that complete and strict performance is still

required for all construction contract terms relating to the

design and construction itself. We also conclude, however, that

ordinary contract principles, including the traditional

Massachusetts materiality rule, apply for breaches of other

provisions, such as the one at issue governing payment

certifications. We hold that G4S's numerous false

certifications and intentional subcontractor payment delays

constitute a material breach of the contract and, standing

alone, preclude recovery for breach of contract.

Summary judgment was not, however, properly granted on

G4S's quantum meruit theory of recovery. A party seeking to

recover under quantum meruit must prove both substantial

performance and good faith. Substantial performance is not at

issue here, as the project was completed as specified, albeit

delayed. The issue is whether a party that has intentionally

committed a breach of a provision in the contract can still have

acted in good faith for quantum meruit purposes and whether

there has been a windfall for the other party. Overruling an
4

older line of cases, we now hold that good faith applies to the

contract as a whole, and that the intentional commission of

breaches of individual contract provisions must be considered in

the over-all context, including the value of the uncompensated

work, the damage caused by the breach, the total performance of

both parties, and the balancing of equities to accomplish a just

result. Here, there are material disputed facts regarding which

party caused the delays, whether G4S performed $10 million of

uncompensated work, and whether there is any causal connection

between the intentional misrepresentations regarding payments to

subcontractors and the damages assessed against G4S. We thus

reverse the award of summary judgment on the quantum meruit

claim for further fact finding.

We further conclude that the dismissal of MTPC's fraud

claim against G4S was error. The undisputed facts establish

fraudulent certifications. The motion judge dismissed the count

as duplicative, concluding that the fraudulent certifications

provided the basis for damages under all the different claims

presented and recovery under the fraud claim would be far less

than the amount MTPC was allowed to retain for breach of

contract. Where separate recoveries are based on the same act

and injury, duplicative recovery is precluded. Here, however,

further fact finding is required to discern whether there could

be factually separable and distinguishable acts resulting in
5

separable quantifiable injuries. We therefore reverse the

allowance of summary judgment on the fraud claim.1

1. Background. MTPC is a State development agency created 

and organized under G. L. c. 40J. In 2010, MTPC received 

funding from both the Commonwealth and the Federal government to 

build a 1,200-mile fiber optic network connecting 123 

communities in western and north central Massachusetts to highspeed Internet (project). An approximately $89.7 million

construction project, it connects "[o]ver 1,100+ public safety 

entities, schools, libraries, medical facilities, and town 

halls[,] . . . serve[s] as a backbone for over 400,000 

households and businesses over a geographic area covering over 

one-third of Massachusetts, with more than one million 

residents[,] . . . [and] [p]rovides necessary broadband 

infrastructure to foster economic growth, improve health care 

and education, and strengthen public safety." Of the $89.7 

million project, $45.4 million was funded by the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 111th Cong., Pub. L. No. 

111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (Recovery Act). In the wake of the 

"Great Recession," the funds were to be used "in a manner that 

 

1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Associated 

Builders and Contractors, Massachusetts Chapter; Associated 

General Contractors of Massachusetts; Associated Subcontractors 

of Massachusetts, Inc.; Construction Industries of 

Massachusetts, Inc.; and Utility Contractors' Association of New 

England, Inc.; and by the Attorney General.
6

maximize[d] job creation and economic benefit" and was intended 

to "provide a one-time injection of funds for the purpose of 

stimulating the American economy."

Time was of the essence with respect to the dates for 

substantial completion and final completion of the project.2 

According to the initial procurement documents, the Recovery Act 

award placed "significant time constraints on the construction 

of the Project." The design-builder thus was contractually 

 

2 The contract provided that "substantial completion" was

"the date on which either (a) the Work required by the 

Contract Documents has been completed except for Work 

having a Contract Price of less than one per cent (1%) of 

the then adjusted total Contract Price, or (b) the Network, 

or an agreed upon segment of the Network, is sufficiently 

complete and connected to the Internet that Owner can use 

it for its intended purposes except for minor incomplete or 

unsatisfactory Work items that do not materially impair the 

usefulness of the Work required by the Contract Documents. 

To meet these conditions, all fiber optic cable and all 

equipment must have been installed and tested successfully 

and passed pre- and post-construction testing and ready to 

begin the conditional Network acceptance testing period, 

and all operating manuals, warranties, and as-built 

documents pertaining to that portion of the Work have been 

delivered to the Owner."

"Final Completion" was

"the date on which the Network, and all equipment and fiber 

supplied by or made available to the Design-Builder for 

installation in the Network, all Work is successfully 

completed, has been handed over to and accepted by Owner, 

no Work items required by the Contract Documents remain 

incomplete or unsatisfactory, and Owner has received and 

accepted all documentation and Project close-out 

deliverables required under the Contract Documents."
7

obligated to meet mandatory milestones: complete fifty-five per 

cent of the value of the work by June 30, 2012; achieve 

substantial completion by April 15, 2013; and achieve final 

completion by June 30, 2013.

MTPC put the project out to public bid, and a design-build 

contract with G4S was executed on June 30, 2011. After 

adjustments, the total contract value was $45.5 million. G4S 

agreed to the mandatory milestones and acknowledged that if "any 

Date for a Mandatory Milestone, after adjustment for any 

extensions of time . . . is not attained as a result of any 

failure of [G4S] to perform, then [G4S] shall pay [MTPC], as 

part of compensatory delay damages . . . for each Day . . . that 

achievement of the Mandatory Milestone" is not met as damages 

are "difficult to determine and specify accurately."3

Damages for failure to attain substantial completion by 

April 15, 2013, was $7,500 per day and escalated to $9,500 per

day after June 30, 2013. Failure to attain final completion by 

June 30, 2013, was $3,000 per day; daily rates additive for any 

periods of overlap. The contract, however, also contemplated a

remedy should there be excused delays to the project. Articles 

8.2.1 and 8.2.2 provided that, "[i]f [G4S] is delayed in the 

 

3 The contract provided that "[t]he compensatory delay 

damages . . . shall be [MTPC's] sole remedy for any failure of 

[G4S] to meet the above dates."
8

performance of the Work due to acts, omissions, conditions, 

events, or circumstances beyond its control and due to no fault 

of its own, . . . the Contract Time(s) for performance shall be 

reasonably extended by Change Order . . . [and G4S] shall also 

be entitled to an appropriate adjustment of the Contract Price."

MTPC's contract with G4S set forth additional provisions, 

at issue here. They included (1) procedures for obtaining a 

change order to adjust the contract price and time in the event 

of delay to the work; (2) MTPC's right to stop and suspend the 

work and terminate G4S for cause should G4S, among other 

reasons, fail to "timely pay, without cause . . . 

subcontractors"; (3) MTPC's obligation to facilitate timely and 

efficient performance of the work, submit conduit and pole 

attachment applications for licenses and leases, and perform any 

"Make-Ready work" necessary to permit G4S to perform its 

construction and installation work; and (4) G4S's right to, 

within ten working days of awareness of excused work delay,

request an equitable adjustment to the contract price or an 

equitable extension of time for the reasonable costs of excused 

delays or differing site conditions.

Following the June 30, 2011, execution of the design-build 

contract and the subsequent notice to proceed, G4S commenced the 

work. On September 21, 2012, MTPC notified G4S of nonconforming
9

work and requested corrective action.4 On December 10, 2012, 

MTPC notified G4S a second time of nonconforming work and gave 

notice that G4S had failed to cure the prior nonconforming work.5 

At various times, change orders were executed throughout the 

performance of the work. The dates to achieve substantial and 

final completion of the project were adjusted to July 31, 2013,

and October 31, 2013, respectively. The parties reserved their 

respective rights, stating that "[n]othing in . . . Change 

Order[s] shall be taken as a waiver of any rights or defense of 

[MTPC] and [G4S] with respect to any other request for change, 

equitable adjustment or other claim."

On March 7, 2014, over seven months past the contractual 

substantial completion date, substantial completion of the 

 

4 Among other things, the notice of nonconforming work that 

Massachusetts Technology Park Corporation (MTPC) sent to G4S 

Technology LLC (G4S) alleged that G4S had been performing work 

with insufficiently skilled labor, resulting in poor 

workmanship; that G4S failed to follow industry standards with 

the installation of certain project parts; and that G4S's work 

generally suffered from a lack of planning, poor leadership, and 

poor quality. The notice acknowledges that G4S had made 

improvements over time, but it stated that more corrective 

action on behalf of G4S was needed. The notice requested a 

conference between G4S and MTPC as well as a plan of action to 

resolve the issues.

5 MTPC sent G4S a second notice. This notice alleged that 

G4S failed to take corrective action in accordance with the plan 

laid out by the parties following the first notice. The notice 

also restated several of the issues MTPC had with G4S, including 

a general lack of planning, poor performance, and poor 

leadership.
10

network was achieved. On March 21, 2014, G4S submitted a 

request for equitable adjustment (REA) seeking additional 

compensation and an extension of time for the dates of 

substantial completion and final completion. On April 1, 2014, 

MTPC responded to G4S's REA and asserted that G4S was not 

entitled to additional time or money and that G4S was the reason 

for the delay.6 On August 15, 2014, MTPC issued a "Notice of 

Withholding" to G4S claiming damages in the amount of 

approximately $4 million resulting from the delays and failure 

to perform required tasks.7

On September 10, 2014, G4S submitted an amended REA to MTPC 

for approximately $10 million. G4S asserted that, because of 

MTPC's "failure to timely complete the necessary predecessor 

Make-Ready work," G4S incurred substantial additional time and 

 

6 Neither G4S's March 21, 2014, request for equitable 

adjustment nor MTPC's April 1, 2014, letter was in the submitted 

record.

7 In accordance with the August 15, 2014, notice of 

withholding, MTPC withheld approximately $2 million, based on 

the liquidated damage rate of $9,500 per day for 219 days, on 

account of G4S's failure to achieve substantial completion of 

the project by July 31, 2013, the date established for 

substantial completion. Additionally, MTPC withheld $864,000, 

based on the liquidated damages rate of $3,000 per day for 288 

days, on account of G4S's failure to achieve final completion by 

October 31, 2013, the date established for final completion. 

Lastly, MTPC withheld the additional sum of approximately $1.3 

million for reimbursements due and extra cost and expenses 

incurred on account of G4S's failure to perform or complete 

required tasks.
11

costs in completing the project. It explained, "The failure of 

[MTPC] to timely complete the predecessor activities to G4S 

installation work resulted in the work often being performed

with different crew configurations, out-of-sequence, in smaller 

non-contiguous distances, utilizing premium time/extended work 

days, and often in different climatic conditions than what was 

contemplated under the baseline schedule." The amended REA 

referenced provisions in the contract that permitted G4S to 

recover increased costs due to circumstances that were no fault 

of the design-builder. G4S also stated that it had filed the 

necessary change orders required by article 8.2.1 and that the 

parties had reserved their rights regarding those change orders.8 

Contending that MTPC's failure was thus the "root cause of 

delays and impacts to the Project," G4S also requested another 

adjustment to the dates to achieve substantial and final 

completion of the project. The response, if any, to the REA, is 

not in the submitted record.

On January 20, 2015, MTPC issued a Certificate of Final 

Completion of the Work, over one year after the contractual 

final completion date. On February 11, 2015, MTPC issued a 

recalculated and updated "Notice of Withholding" of 

approximately $4 million, to account for subsequent delays, 

 

7 The change orders referenced in G4S's amended REA were not 

in the submitted record.
12

costs, and expenses.

G4S brought an action in the Superior Court against MTPC 

for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and quantum meruit. 

G4S asserted that MTPC's withholding of $4 million was improper 

and contended that MTPC wrongfully denied its $10 million REA. 

MTPC, in turn, brought counterclaims against G4S alleging fraud 

and violations of G. L. c. 93A. By the start of litigation, 

MTPC had paid G4S approximately $41 million of the original $45 

million total contract value. 

During discovery, evidence revealed that, unbeknownst to 

MTPC, G4S engaged in a pattern of submitting inaccurate 

"progress payment releases" (certifications) when sending its 

applications for payment.9 As previously explained, the contract 

expressly stated that subcontractors were to be paid on time and 

that a failure to do so, without cause, was grounds for 

terminating the contract with G4S. G4S certified to MTPC that 

it had timely paid its subcontractors, but this was not true. 

 

9 Through the "progress payment releases" (certifications), 

G4S represented and warranted that

"all subcontractors, suppliers and equipment providers of 

the undersigned have been paid in full all amounts due to 

them up to the date of this Certification, and that the 

sums received in payment for the Amount Requested shall be

used to forthwith pay in full all amounts due to such 

subcontractors, suppliers and equipment providers up to the 

date hereof."
13

Spanning more than one year, G4S, a publicly traded company, 

repeatedly and continuously delayed payments to its 

subcontractors until after its fiscal quarters closed, so it 

could show a more favorable cash flow in its quarterly reports.10 

In sum, G4S received $38.6 million in progress payments 

through sixty false certifications. The work had been 

performed, but the subcontractors had not been paid prior to the 

certifications.

The delayed payments did not go unnoticed by the 

subcontractors. At various times, subcontractors strongly 

objected and threatened to shut down work or remove crews from 

the project if G4S continued to withhold payments, even as G4S 

was getting paid by MTPC.11 Despite such protests, there was no 

 

10 G4S's contract manager, who was responsible for paying 

subcontractors, acknowledged in contemporaneous electronic mail 

(e-mail) messages as well as in her later deposition that there 

remained past due invoices for significant sums that were 

outstanding at the time the certifications were executed. The 

certifications were nevertheless submitted to MTPC. One 

internal e-mail message from a G4S project manager criticized 

this practice stating, "How can we tell sub[contractors] that 

they aren't getting paid so our books look better? There's 

something wrong with that."

11 For example, in an e-mail message to G4S, one 

subcontractor wrote, "I think it is extremely unfair that you 

are not honoring our contract. . . . The issue that bothers me 

the most is that you are not making payment [in order] to better 

your books but don't care about the books of the companies that 

support you." Another subcontractor wrote to G4S that they were 

owed $358,275, which presented a "significant problem" for the 

subcontractor as it sought to pay its work crews. 
14

indication from the submitted record that any of the 

subcontractors demanded direct payment of balances due from 

MTPC, as was the subcontractors' statutory right under G. L. 

c. 30, § 39F,12 nor did they shut down work or remove crews. 

MTPC moved for summary judgment, and in March, 2016, the 

judge granted summary judgment to MTPC as to G4S's complaint. 

The judge concluded that G4S intentionally committed a breach of

the contract and thus, without complete and strict performance 

of all of the contract's terms, could not recover on the 

contract. The judge, relying on an older line of cases that we 

overrule today, also concluded that G4S could not recover under 

a theory of quantum meruit because an intentional violation of a 

contract provision was inconsistent with a finding of good faith 

and barred all such recovery unless the violation was deemed "so 

trifling as to fall within the rule de minimis." See Andre, 305 

Mass. at 516. G4S's payment delays and false certifications

were inconsistent with the good faith requirement. In January,

2017, in a subsequent decision, the judge dismissed MTPC's 

counterclaims of fraud and G. L. c. 93A. The judge reasoned 

 

12 General Laws c. 30, § 39F (d), provides: "If, within 

seventy days after the subcontractor has substantially completed 

the subcontract work, the subcontractor has not received from 

the general contractor the balance due under the subcontract 

. . . , the subcontractor may demand direct payment of that 

balance from the awarding authority."
15

that permitting additional compensation to MTPC under a theory 

of fraud would be improperly duplicative because the underlying 

conduct forming the basis of MTPC's fraud claim was the same as 

the contract claim. The judge also noted that MTPC, as a public 

entity acting pursuant to a legislative mandate, was not acting 

in a business context and therefore was not engaged in trade or 

commerce for the purposes of G. L. c. 93A. G4S appealed from 

the Superior Court decision, and we granted its application for 

direct appellate review.

2. Discussion. "Our review of a motion judge's decision 

on summary judgment is de novo, because we examine the same 

record and decide the same questions of law." Kiribati Seafood 

Co. v. Dechert LLP, 478 Mass. 111, 116 (2017). "The standard of 

review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all 

material facts have been established and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (citation omitted). 

Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 792 (2018). Here, we 

affirm the decision to grant summary judgment on the contract

claim, but conclude that there are material disputed facts 

precluding summary judgment on the quantum meruit and fraud 

claims. 

a. Complete and strict performance of all construction 

contract terms. "The law has long been settled in this 
16

Commonwealth, in relation to building contracts, that a 

contractor cannot recover on the contract itself without showing 

complete and strict performance of all its terms . . . ." 

Andre, 305 Mass. at 516. See Peabody N.E., Inc. v. Marshfield, 

426 Mass. 436, 441 (1998); United States Steel v. M. DeMatteo 

Constr. Co., 315 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2002). G4S claims that 

the complete and strict performance requirement is outdated and

asks us to adopt instead the "materiality rule" set forth in 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra at §§ 237, 241.13 We 

 

13 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (1981) provides: 

"[I]t is a condition of each party's remaining duties to render 

performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that 

there be no uncured material failure by the other party to 

render any such performance due at an earlier time."

Section 241 presents five factors to consider whether a 

failure is material:

"In determining whether a failure to render or to offer 

performance is material, the following circumstances are 

significant:

"(a) the extent to which the injured party will be 

deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected;

"(b) the extent to which the injured party can be 

adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of 

which he will be deprived;

"(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform 

or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;

"(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform 

or to offer to perform will cure his failure, taking 

account of all the circumstances including any reasonable 

assurances;
17

decline this invitation. We do, however, interpret the complete 

and strict performance requirements in construction contracts as 

being limited to the design and construction itself, as 

explained infra. All of our previous holdings imposing complete

and strict performance have concerned breaches of the actual 

design and construction of the project.

Our construction law cases have emphasized the importance

and need for strict compliance with construction law contracts

to ensure that the construction itself is done safely and

correctly according to design specifications. See, e.g., Russo

v. Charles I. Hosmer, Inc., 312 Mass. 231, 233-234 (1942)

(failure to follow design requirements in guard rails posed

public safety problems). This is particularly true as defects

are difficult to identify and expensive to fix in a finished

project. See id. at 233 (deviation from number of steel rods

cast in concrete to provide support for highway guard rail

unknown to owner); Bowen v. Kimbell, 203 Mass. 364, 368 (1909)

(cost to cure deviation from building specification after

building's construction disproportionately high). Thus, we have

not tolerated any breaches that relate to whether the

 

"(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party 

failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with 

standards of good faith and fair dealing."
18

construction was completed according to design specifications. 

See Peabody N.E., Inc., 426 Mass. at 437, 441 (failure to

substantially complete construction of septage and grease waste

facility by terms of agreement not complete and strict

performance); J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass.

789, 790 (1986) (failure to complete itemized list of finish

work, corrections, repairs, and services for construction of

public college building not complete and strict performance);

Albre Marble & Tile Co. v. Governman, 353 Mass. 546, 549-550

(1968) (failure to ensure satisfactory surfaces before tile

installation not complete and strict performance); Russo, supra

(failure to install highway guard rail in accordance with terms

specifying number of steel rods not complete and strict

performance); Andre, 305 Mass. at 516-517 (failure to comply

with plans and specifications of house construction not complete

and strict performance); Bowen, supra (failure to use correct

ratio as provided in specifications for making plaster not

complete and strict performance); Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Pick.

181, 185 (1828) (failure to build house to specifications not

complete and strict performance).

In the instant case, design and construction provisions

that would require strict and complete performance would

include, for example, the following:

"The fiber optic cable and infrastructure system shall be 
19

designed and installed for a minimum life expectancy of 30 

years[.]"

"All fiber strands and buffer tubes shall be color coded 

with highly distinguishable, vibrant colors[.]"

"The fiber cable shall have a circular cross section so 

that aerial installation can be done with standard sheaves 

and tensioning equipment[.]"

"The . . .Fiber Optic Network will consist of a core fiber 

backbone with extensions to two (2) major . . . regional 

network centers located at One Summer Street in Boston, MA 

and One Federal Street in Springfield, MA."

We recognize, however, that construction contracts can be

thousands of pages long, containing all types of different

provisions.14 We have not considered in our cases the

consequences of breaches of construction contract provisions

that are subsidiary to or supportive of the design and

construction, but do not directly involve the design and

construction itself. We clarify today that the complete and

 

14 Here, the 1,400-page contract between MTPC and G4S 

provided many provisions unrelated to the actual construction 

work. Examples of such provisions include (1) G4S was to submit 

printed copies of required manuals in "heavy-duty, commercialquality, durable, 3-ring, vinyl covered, loose-leaf binders, in 

thickness necessary to accommodate contents, sized to receive 8-

1/2" by 11" paper. The binder spine shall provide a clear 

plastic sleeve to hold labels identifying the contents"; (2) G4S 

was to ensure that the Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 

logo emblem was at least six inches or larger in diameter and

ensure clear space surrounding the logo equal to one-half of the 

logo's radius; and (3) G4S was required to provide, for MTPC 

field inspectors, offices with a "minimum of 200 square feet of 

usable space with . . . a [d]esk, desk chair, visitor chair and 

plan table[,] . . . [p]ortable radio with contractor frequencies 

and charger[,] . . . [and] [w]eekly office cleaning services."
20

strict performance requirements in construction contracts apply

only to the design and construction work itself. Other

provisions should be analyzed pursuant to ordinary contract

principles, including the materiality standard applied under

Massachusetts contract law. See EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness,

473 Mass. 540, 546 (2016), quoting Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v.

HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 470 (1991); Buchholz v. Green Bros.,

272 Mass. 49, 52 (1930), S.C., 290 Mass. 350 (1935).15

The question then becomes what is the legal status of the

contractual violations here. The construction contract at issue

was to "design, furnish, build and equip a complete fiber optic

network system . . . for a fully implemented, functional and

tested system" in accordance with the project construction

schedule. The "Work" was defined broadly as comprising

"all Design-Builder's design, construction and other

services required by the Contract Documents, including

procuring and furnishing all materials, equipment, services

and labor specified by or reasonably inferable from the

Contract Documents, to develop, install, and test the

Network, and including the submission and delivery of all

documents and other things as required or reasonably

inferable from the Contract Documents."

The contractual violations at issue did not concern the actual

 

15 We decline to adopt the materiality standard of the

Restatement (Second) as argued by G4S. We recognize, however,

that many of the different elements of the Restatement

materiality standard are considered in either our contract or

our quantum meruit analysis.
21

design and construction of the project. Instead, they were

about the timing of payments to subcontractors and the

documentation concerning those payments.16 G4S delayed payments

and filed false certifications to allow it, a public company, to

report inflated revenues for its quarterly reports. We thus

analyze these violations under a materiality standard, not

complete and strict performance.

In the Commonwealth, a material breach of a contract occurs

when the breach concerns an "essential and inducing feature of

the contract." See EventMonitor, Inc., 473 Mass. at 546,

quoting Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., 411 Mass. at 470. Essential

and inducing features of a contract are provisions that are "so

serious and so intimately connected with the substance of the

contract[]" that a failure to uphold the provision would justify

 

16 Contract terms defining payment or reporting requirements 

may have an impact on construction but they are not design and 

construction contract terms analyzed pursuant to the complete

and strict performance requirement. Rather they are analyzed 

according to the materiality standard. For example, payment 

delays or disputes may cause subcontractors to stop or slow down 

work by temporarily pulling crews or reducing the number of 

workers. That would result in delays in the construction, but 

even delays in the construction are different from the design 

and construction itself. If, however a subcontractor, having 

not received timely payments, installs an insufficient amount of 

highway guard rails, uses plastering of inferior quality, or 

does not complete the project, such breaches would be analyzed 

under complete and strict performance. See Peabody N.E., Inc. 

v. Marshfield, 426 Mass. 436, 441 (1998); Russo v. Charles I. 

Hosmer, Inc., 312 Mass. 231, 233-234 (1942); Bowen v. Kimbell, 

203 Mass. 364, 368 (1909).
22

the other party walking away from the contract and no longer

being bound by it. See Buchholz, 272 Mass. at 52 (failure to

make monthly payments as agreed to in contract material breach

because payments "essential and inducing feature").

There can be little doubt that paying subcontractors on

time was an essential and inducing feature of the contract

between MTPC and G4S. See Buchholz, 272 Mass. at 52 (in

contract to paint and maintain signs, payment of wage "essential

and inducing feature"). The "[p]rompt payment of subcontractors

on public works is a consistent legislative purpose." Manganaro

Drywall, Inc. v. White Constr. Co., 372 Mass. 661, 664 (1977).

This is particularly true here, where a significant portion of

the project funding came from the Recovery Act, the purpose of

which was to "maximize[] job creation and economic benefit" and

"provide a one-time injection of funds for the purpose of

stimulating the American economy."

The contract itself also stressed the importance of timely

payments to subcontractors. As provided in article 10.2 of the

contract's general conditions, MTPC could walk away from the

contract and no longer be bound by its terms if G4S failed to

timely pay subcontractors. G4S's repeated instances of

intentionally failing to timely pay subcontractors in accordance

with the agreed-upon contract was therefore a material breach of

the contract, barring G4S from recovering breach of contract
23

damages. See Buchholz, 272 Mass. at 55.17

G4S not only delayed the payments but also falsely

certified that it had made the payments, thereby magnifying and

multiplying the number of material breaches. The contract here

independently required proper certification of payments. Those

provisions were intentionally violated. Intentional

misrepresentations to the government for financial gain are

significant breaches of contract in and of themselves and can be

serious civil and criminal offenses.18 In the words of Justice

Holmes, contractors "must turn square corners when they deal

with the Government." Rock Island, Ark. & Louisiana R.R. v.

United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920). G4S did the opposite,

cutting those corners for improper purposes. In sum, the

delayed payments and the false certifications here were material

 

17 G4S argues that the subcontractors were eventually paid 

and thus the breach was cured. Given the importance of timely 

payment, we do not consider the delayed payments a cure for the 

contractual violation. They do, however, have an impact on the 

equities and the quantum meruit analysis.

18 We note that persons or corporations who make a 

fraudulent claim for payment to a State government entity are 

subject to civil penalties under the Massachusetts False Claims 

Act, G. L. c. 12, §§ 5A-5O. When any funding for a public 

contract is provided by the Federal government, civil and 

criminal sanctions may also be pursued under the civil or 

criminal False Claims Act. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (civil); 

18 U.S.C. § 287 (1986) (criminal). Additionally, the Division 

of Capital Asset Management and Maintenance may suspend or debar 

persons who wilfully supply materially false information while 

performing a public contract. G. L. c. 29, § 29F.
24

breaches of the contract precluding recovery on G4S's contract

claim.

b. Recovery under quantum meruit. G4S contends that even

if it is not entitled to pursue its contract claim, it should be

allowed to recover under a quantum meruit theory. We conclude

that there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute on the

quantum meruit claim. To recover under quantum meruit in a

construction case, a contractor must prove both substantial

performance of the contract and an endeavor in good faith to

perform the work fully. J.A. Sullivan Corp., 397 Mass. at 796;

Albre Marble & Tile Co., 353 Mass. at 550; Andre, 305 Mass. at

516. "The underlying basis for [recovery under quantum meruit]

is derived from principles of equity and fairness, to prevent

unjust enrichment of one party . . . at the expense of another

. . . ." Malonis v. Harrington, 442 Mass. 692, 697 (2004).

Although "clean hands" are important in determining equitable

relief, we also have recognized that this is not an absolute

proposition, as the purpose of the doctrine is to allow courts

to produce a just result. Walsh v. Atlantic Research Assocs.,

321 Mass. 57, 62 (1947). The proper focus is on the value of

the benefit conferred. In a construction contract, "[t]he

amount of recovery on a claim based in quantum meruit is the

fair and reasonable value of material and labor supplied to the

benefiting party." J.A. Sullivan Corp., supra at 797. "It is
25

not the policy of our law to award damages which would put [the

nonbreaching party] in a better position than if the [breaching

party] had carried out [its] contract." Ficara v. Belleau, 331

Mass. 80, 82 (1954). The nonbreaching party is "entitled to be

made whole and no more." Id. See J.A. Sullivan Corp., supra at

794 (principle of equity and fairness cautions against

"produc[ing] a windfall").

In the instant case there was, without dispute, substantial

performance by the contractor. A critical and complex project

providing a fiber optic network for western and north central

Massachusetts has been completed according to its design. The

project was, however, delayed. The cause of those delays is

bitterly disputed in the record. G4S has raised a genuine issue

of material fact that MTPC is responsible for those delays due

to its failure to complete the make-ready work on time.

More complicated is the good faith requirement. The motion

judge concluded that it was undisputed that G4S did not act in

good faith given its numerous delayed payments to contractors

and false certifications. She held that intentional violation

of these contract provisions precluded a finding of good faith

fully to perform. Support for this holding and the shortcircuiting of the rest of the equitable analysis certainly

exists, in a line of older cases that the judge properly cited. 

For example, in J.A. Sullivan Corp., 397 Mass. at 797, quoting
26

Andre, 305 Mass. at 516, we reiterated that "[g]enerally, '[i]n

the absence of special exculpating circumstances an intentional

departure from the precise requirements of the contract is not

consistent with good faith in the endeavor fully to perform it,

and unless such departure is so trifling as to fall within the

rule de minimis, it bars all recovery." The simplicity and

severity of this approach, which dates back to Sipley v.

Stickney, 190 Mass. 43, 46 (1906), and Homer v. Shaw, 177 Mass.

1, 5 (1900), has, however, been criticized in leading treatises

on contract law. See 8 C.M.A. McCauliff, Corbin on Contracts

§ 36.8, at 354 (J.M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1999); S. Williston,

Contracts § 842, at 2364 n.4 (rev. ed. 1936). This rule also

has been questioned, and even distinguished by this court, but

this older line of cases has not been overruled. See Walsh, 321

Mass. at 62 (describing Sipley doctrine as rigid rule of law

that has been criticized as "too severe"). We expressly

overrule this line of cases and rearticulate the doctrine of

quantum meruit today.

We conclude that intentional breaches, even those involving

material breaches, alone are not dispositive of the right to

equitable relief, at least when such breaches do not relate to

the construction work itself. Good faith is a requirement for

recovery under quantum meruit, but ruling in equity, this

requirement is not one that is "too rigid and unyielding for the
27

practical accomplishment of justice." J.A. Sullivan Corp., 397

Mass. at 797, quoting Morello v. Levakis, 293 Mass. 450, 453

(1936). We have emphasized that "[t]he doctrine of clean hands

is not one of absolutes and should be so applied as to

accomplish its purpose of promoting public policy and the

integrity of the courts." Walsh, 321 Mass. at 66 (allowing

recovery in quantum meruit even for plaintiff who intentionally

committed breach of employment contract provision). There is no

simple formula to apply here, but rather numerous factors to

analyze. We thus conclude that in evaluating the contractor's

good faith and right to recover under quantum meruit, we must

consider the contract performance as a whole, taking into

account both parties' actions, the different contractual

breaches and the damages they caused, and most importantly the

value of the project provided as compared to the amount paid for

that work. We must, in the end, balance the equities and

produce a just result. See id. (in quantum meruit case, court

declined to deprive plaintiff of all earnings during employment

despite bad faith material breach of employment contract). See

also Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 438-439 (1989)

(departing law firm partner did not forfeit accrued profits

despite intentional breach of partnership contract and fiduciary

duties because there was no causal connection between law firm's

claimed losses and breaches).
28

Here, G4S completed the project as specified, albeit with

delays. MTPC deducted $4 million, of which a significant sum

was damages for delay. Whether one party or the other or both

were responsible for the delays remains disputed on this record. 

Resolution of this issue has an impact on the over-all balancing

of the equities in the instant case. If MTPC was responsible

for some or all of those delays and nevertheless withheld the

amount, MTPC's own contractual violations would need to be

considered in the equitable analysis. If those violations were

intentional, that would also be a factor in the balancing of

equities. Furthermore, G4S has introduced evidence to support

its claim that it has performed $10 million in uncompensated

work because of MTPC's failure to perform make-ready work. If

G4S's $10 million REA has merit, this represents a significant

amount of value supplied to MTPC without cost and may constitute

a windfall. See J.A. Sullivan Corp., 397 Mass. at 794; Ficara,

331 Mass. at 82. It would thus "work great hardship to deprive"

G4S of compensation for extra work conferred over the three-year

project given that the design and construction of the network

was satisfactory. See Walsh, 321 Mass. at 66.

Finally, although there was not good faith and clean hands

in the context of prompt payments to subcontractors or truthful

certifications to MTPC, it is unclear from the submitted record

whether there is any causal connection between these contractual
29

violations and any damages to MTPC. It is undisputed that the

work had been done prior to the certifications. It also appears

from this record that the subcontractors, not MTPC, suffered the

consequences of the delayed payments by continuing to work

despite the payment delays. The record before us, as the motion

judge recognized, contains no evidence that the delayed payments

or false certifications had an impact on or affected the

construction, the delays in the completion of the project

resulting in the withholding of liquidated damages, or the $10

million of extra work alleged in the REA.19 See Meehan, 404

Mass. at 438-439 (no causal connection between breach and

damages claimed).

We conclude that resolution of these disputed factual

questions is necessary to determine whether equitable relief is

appropriate in the instant case. The responsibility for the

delay, the amount of extra uncompensated work, and the presence

or absence of any causal connection between the intentional

breaches and any damage to MTPC are all relevant to a just

resolution of the quantum meruit claim. If the delays were

caused by MTPC, G4S has performed and paid for $10 million in

 

19 The lack of impact on the construction appears to be 

because of the patience and accommodation of the subcontractors 

that put up with, and even suffered from, G4S's misconduct, 

without complaining to MTPC or demanding direct payment as was 

their right. 
30

extra work to complete the project, and the payment delays to

subcontractors and false certifications had no impact on the

project's construction or completion date, it would be

inequitable for MTPC to withhold compensation from G4S for the

reasonable value of its labor and materials in excess of the

amounts already paid to G4S. Meehan, 404 Mass. at 447. See

Harness Tracks Sec., Inc., v. Bay State Raceway, Inc., 374 Mass.

362, 367-368 (1978).

c. Fraud. MTPC contends that its counterclaim against G4S

for fraud was improperly dismissed. The motion judge sua sponte

dismissed MTPC's fraud claim against G4S. She relied on Szalla

v. Locke, 421 Mass. 448, 454 (1995), in which this court held:

"Where the same acts cause the same injury under more than one

theory, duplicative damage recoveries will not be permitted." 

Applying Szalla, the motion judge reasoned that "the conduct

that forms the basis of MTPC's fraud claim is precisely the same

as that which caused this Court to conclude that G4S had

necessarily forfeited its affirmative claims against MTPC. As a

consequence . . . , [MTPC] no longer had to justify the $4

million it retained of the Contract balance; the upshot was that

it was effectively provided with an award that more than covered

any loss that it suffered as a result of paying G4S

prematurely."

We agree that summary judgment on the fraud claim may be
31

appropriate only under a duplicative damages analysis. However,

"where the acts complained of . . . are factually separable and

distinguishable . . . , there is no error in permitting separate

recoveries for separable injuries." Calimlim v. Foreign Car

Ctr., Inc., 392 Mass. 228, 236 (1984). "Permitting awards under

several counts where claims and injuries are factually

distinguishable, but disallowing such recovery where they are

not, will serve to avoid over or under compensation." Id.

Here, there may be separable and distinguishable acts

forming the basis of recovery under the breach of contract and

fraud claims. A fact finder could determine that the delayed

completion of the project could be the basis for the breach of

contract claim and the false certifications that subcontractors

were timely paid could be the basis for the fraud claim. MTPC

withheld $4 million as separable recovery for the breach of

contract because of the delay, using the liquidated damages

provision to calculate the amount of the withholding.20 MTPC

additionally claims that the false certifications caused it to

 

20 The fact that the fraudulent certifications and delayed 

payments to subcontractors also provide a basis for breach of 

contract is not dispositive. If G4S was responsible for the 

delays, an issue that cannot be decided on summary judgment, 

those delays provided a much more straightforward basis for 

calculating damages for breach of contract than the false 

certifications.
32

pay G4S prematurely, resulting in the loss of $1.67 million,

which it asserts is another injury for which it thus is entitled

to separable recovery.21 Whether this claim has merit and

whether such calculations of damages are correct require further

fact finding, but some recovery, at least for the loss of the

time value of money, may be justified.

Whether the monetary loss for MTPC due to fraud is less

than the monetary loss due to breach of contract also should be

determined. This appears to depend on who was responsible for

the delays; G4S's recovery, if any, under quantum meruit; and

whether the losses due to fraud claimed by MTPC have been

grossly inflated. Whether the damages, if any, caused by the

false certifications are duplicative thus cannot be determined

on this record. We therefore reverse the allowance of summary

judgment on the fraud claim.

3. Conclusion. For the reasons discussed, we affirm the

summary judgment decision on the breach of contract claim and

reverse the summary judgment decision on the quantum meruit and

 

21 MTPC and G4S also dispute the amount of loss, asserting 

it to be $1.67 million and $1,757.48, respectively. MTPC 

calculated $1.67 million based on lost interest accrued at the 

prime rate of 3.25 per cent per annum interest from the date of 

each payment until June, 2, 2014, the date of MTPC's last 

payment to G4S. G4S, in turn, asserts that lost interest based 

on alleged late subcontractor payments would result only in 

$1,757.48 based on a thirty-day yield of 0.22 per cent interest 

calculated for only the period that the payment was late.
33

fraud claims. We remand the matter to the Superior Court for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.