adose
i

October 2020

USDA APHIS, Veterinary Services

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center 

By the end 2015, the United States experienced its largest Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) 

outbreak—highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)—in history. Subsequent to the 2015 HPAI 

outbreak, APHIS has tested its response capabilities with FAD outbreaks in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 

2019, as well as the planning and execution of the 2018 ARMAR (Agriculture Response 

Management and Resources foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) functional exercise. This version of the 

USDA APHIS FMD Response Plan: The Red Book (Updated October 2020) reflects knowledge and 

lessons learned during these activities. Additionally, this version incorporates changes made in 

related Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials.

The following list highlights important revisions that were made to this version of the FMD 

Response Plan. 

• Reflects policy that explicitly recognizes vaccine as a likely response tool in an FMD 

outbreak.

• Reflects the new National Response Framework, released June 2019.

• References and includes the latest text of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 

Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

• Includes new surveillance sections, revised by the Center for Epidemiology and Animal 

Health.

• Provides revised templates for epidemiology questionnaires and State FMD vaccine 

planning.

• Streamlines content into four chapters specific to FMD: 1) general information; 2) national 

roles, responsibilities, and authorities; 3) response goals and strategy; and 4) critical 

response activities.

• Includes critical activity “Essentials” sidebars, highlighting available training resources and 

often overlooked planning considerations.

• Incorporates policy guidance prepared for ARMAR on managing a National movement 

standstill. 

• Corrects comments made on, and any errors identified in, the prior version.

This version of the FMD Red Book is being distributed as an early draft to assist in the preparation 

for the next cycle of FMD response planning and exercises. Links to appendices in the body of the 

document are internal and do not require an internet connection; however, connectivity is needed to 

access other links in the body and in the Essentials sidebars. It is our hope that those involved in 

preparing for the Southern Animal Health Association FMD functional exercise (scheduled in 

November 2021) will find the updated material and format useful. Future updates of this plan will 

incorporate new National policy guidance and/or lessons learned from FAD response experiences 

and exercises. 
ii

We invite comments on the FMD Response Plan for incorporation into the next version. Please 

email all comments to FAD.PReP.Comments@usda.gov with the subject line of “Comments to 

Updated FMD Response Plan.” 

Additional policy guidance documents for FMD, as well as general response topics, are available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. These documents, alongside the FMD Response Plan: The Red 

Book, should be consulted in an FMD outbreak. 

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) mission is to raise 

awareness, define expectations, and improve capabilities for FAD preparedness and response.

For more information, please go to:

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

or e-mail FAD.PReP.Comments@usda.gov
Contents

Updated October 2020—DRAFT iii

Contents 

Preface ........................................................................................................ix

Chapter 1 Introduction and FMD Information ........................................... 1-1

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN................................................................. 1-1

1.2 AUDIENCE AND PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT.......................................................... 1-2

1.3 FMD INFORMATION......................................................................................... 1-2

1.3.1 Etiology ................................................................................................... 1-3

1.3.2 History and Global Distribution ............................................................... 1-3

1.3.3 International Trade.................................................................................. 1-5

1.3.4 Impact of an FMD Outbreak.................................................................... 1-5

1.3.5 Ecology ................................................................................................... 1-6

1.3.6 Diagnosis ................................................................................................ 1-9

1.3.7 Immunity ............................................................................................... 1-11

Chapter 2 National Coordination for FMD Preparedness and Response . 2-1

2.1 FOUNDATIONS OF PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE........................................... 2-1

2.1.1 National Response Framework............................................................... 2-1

2.1.2 National Incident Management System .................................................. 2-1

2.1.3 USDA Roles and Responsibilities Overview........................................... 2-2

2.2 USDA AUTHORITIES AND ACTIVITIES ............................................................... 2-3

2.2.1 Authorities............................................................................................... 2-4

2.2.2 Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan .................. 2-5

2.2.3 Exercises ................................................................................................ 2-6

2.2.4 Domestic Activities.................................................................................. 2-6

2.2.5 International Activities ............................................................................. 2-8

2.2.6 International Trade.................................................................................. 2-8

2.3 USDA ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY ................................................................ 2-9

2.4 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.................................................... 2-9

2.4.1 Multi-Program Committee....................................................................... 2-9

2.4.2 APHIS Incident Coordination Group ..................................................... 2-11

2.4.3 Organization at the Field Level ............................................................. 2-12
iv

2.5 DIAGNOSTIC RESOURCES AND LABORATORY SUPPORT ................................... 2-13

2.5.1 National Veterinary Services Laboratories............................................ 2-13

2.5.2 National Animal Health Laboratory Network ......................................... 2-13

2.5.3 Center for Veterinary Biologics ............................................................. 2-14

Chapter 3 FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy ........................ 3-1

3.1 RESPONSE GOALS.......................................................................................... 3-1

3.2 PRINCIPLES AND CRITICAL ACTIVITIES OF AN FMD RESPONSE ........................... 3-2

3.2.1 Critical Activities...................................................................................... 3-2

3.2.2 Epidemiological Principles ...................................................................... 3-2

3.2.3 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign.............................................. 3-3

3.2.4 FMD Vaccination Strategy ...................................................................... 3-4

3.2.5 Incident Management ............................................................................. 3-4

3.2.6 Authorization for Initial Response Activities ............................................ 3-4

3.2.7 Timeline in any FMD Response for the First 72 Hours ........................... 3-5

3.3 RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF FMD IN 

DOMESTIC LIVESTOCK .................................................................................... 3-6

3.3.1 Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy................................................... 3-8

3.3.2 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to-Kill or toSlaughter ................................................................................................ 3-9

3.3.3 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to-Live................ 3-11

3.3.4 Emergency Vaccination to-Live without Stamping-Out ......................... 3-12

3.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SELECTION OF RESPONSE STRATEGY OR 

STRATEGIES................................................................................................. 3-13

3.4.1 General Factors that Influence a Response Strategy ........................... 3-14

3.4.2 Emergency Vaccination Sourcing and Availability ................................ 3-14

3.4.3 Determining an Appropriate FMD Response Strategy.......................... 3-16

3.4.4 Phases and Types of FMD Outbreaks.................................................. 3-18

3.5 RECOVERY AFTER AN FMD OUTBREAK.......................................................... 3-19

3.5.1 FMD-Free Designations........................................................................ 3-19

3.5.2 OIE Minimum Time to FMD-Free Designations .................................... 3-20

3.5.3 Surveillance for Recognition of Disease-Freedom................................ 3-21

3.5.4 Release of Control Area Restrictions.................................................... 3-22

3.5.5 Disposition of Vaccinates...................................................................... 3-22
Contents

Updated October 2020—DRAFT v

3.5.6 Country Freedom Declaration............................................................... 3-22

Chapter 4 Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools ............. 4-1

4.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY ................................................................................ 4-1

4.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS AND CASE DEFINITIONS ........................................... 4-1

4.2.1 Laboratory Criteria .................................................................................. 4-1

4.2.2 Case Definitions...................................................................................... 4-3

4.3 SURVEILLANCE ............................................................................................... 4-4

4.3.1 Surveillance Planning for FMD Outbreak................................................ 4-4

4.3.2 Surveillance Sampling ............................................................................ 4-9

4.4 DIAGNOSTICS ............................................................................................... 4-15

4.4.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing............................................ 4-15

4.4.2 Surge Capacity ..................................................................................... 4-21

4.4.3 Reporting .............................................................................................. 4-21

4.5 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION AND TRACING ............................................ 4-22

4.5.1 Summary of Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations....................... 4-22

4.5.2 Epidemiological Investigation................................................................ 4-24

4.5.3 Tracing.................................................................................................. 4-25

4.5.4 Considerations for Size of Control Area and Minimum Sizes of Other 

Zones.................................................................................................... 4-26

4.6 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ......................................................................... 4-29

4.6.1 EMRS2 ................................................................................................. 4-29

4.7 COMMUNICATION .......................................................................................... 4-30

4.7.1 Objectives ............................................................................................. 4-31

4.7.2 Key Messages ...................................................................................... 4-31

4.7.3 Social Media ......................................................................................... 4-32

4.8 HEALTH AND SAFETY AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT ....................... 4-33

4.8.1 Personal Protective Equipment............................................................. 4-34

4.8.2 Mental Health Concerns ....................................................................... 4-34

4.9 BIOSECURITY ............................................................................................... 4-35

4.9.1 Biosecurity Hazards and Mitigating Measures ...................................... 4-35

4.9.2 Closed Herds ........................................................................................ 4-36

4.9.3 Waiting Period ...................................................................................... 4-36
vi

4.10 QUARANTINE AND MOVEMENT CONTROL ........................................................ 4-37

4.10.1 Movement Standstill.............................................................................. 4-38

4.10.2 Moving Commodities, Animals, and Conveyances in FMD Outbreak... 4-39

4.10.3 Repopulation......................................................................................... 4-48

4.11 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS (COB).................................................................. 4-49

4.12 REGIONALIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE (FOR A U.S. FMD RESPONSE) .. 4-50

4.12.1 Compartmentalization........................................................................... 4-50

4.12.2 Further Guidance.................................................................................. 4-51

4.13 MASS DEPOPULATION AND EUTHANASIA......................................................... 4-51

4.14 DISPOSAL .................................................................................................... 4-52

4.15 CLEANING AND DISINFECTION ........................................................................ 4-54

4.16 VACCINATION ............................................................................................... 4-55

4.16.1 Vaccination Plan ................................................................................... 4-55

4.16.2 Zone, Area, and Premises Designations............................................... 4-56

4.16.3 Movement Restrictions for Vaccinates.................................................. 4-59

4.16.4 Cessation of Vaccination ...................................................................... 4-59

4.17 LOGISTICS.................................................................................................... 4-59

4.18 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND VECTOR CONTROL............................................. 4-60

4.18.1 Wildlife Management ............................................................................ 4-60

4.18.2 Vector Control....................................................................................... 4-61

4.19 ANIMAL WELFARE......................................................................................... 4-61

4.20 MODELING AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS ............................................................. 4-61

4.21 APPRAISAL AND COMPENSATION.................................................................... 4-62

4.22 FINANCE ...................................................................................................... 4-63

4.22.1 Federal Funding Sources...................................................................... 4-63

4.22.2 Supplemental Cooperative Agreements ............................................... 4-63

4.23 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT................................................................................ 4-64

Appendix A FAD PReP Materials to Support FMD Response.................... A

Appendix B OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code for FMD (2019)................ B

Appendix C Laboratory Network List for FMD .............................................C

Appendix D Procedures for FMD Investigation and Specimen 

Submission.........................................................................................D
Contents

Updated October 2020—DRAFT vii

Appendix E Emergency Vaccine Plan and Vaccination Priorities................ E

Appendix F FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale............. F

Appendix G Epidemiological questionnaires ...............................................G

Appendix H Movement Control Notice Examples........................................H

Appendix I FMD Vaccines and Vaccination...................................................I

Appendix J Selected References .................................................................J

Appendix K FMD Acronyms ........................................................................K

Figures

Figure 1-1. Worldwide FMD Events in 2018 ........................................................... 1-4

Figure 2-1. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency 

Operations: Relationship to Incident Management Team................................ 2-11

Figure 2-2. Details of USDA APHIS Multiagency Coordination, Incident 

Coordination Group, and a Unified Incident Management Team..................... 2-12

Figure 3-1. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of a U.S. FMD Outbreak ........... 3-5

Figure 3-2. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out (Infected 

Premises Would be Depopulated)..................................................................... 3-9

Figure 3-3. Examples of Zones and Areas Utilizing Stamping-Out: Modified with 

Emergency Vaccination to Kill or Slaughter (Infected Premises Would be 

Depopulated in Either Case)............................................................................ 3-10

Figure 3-4. Example of Zones and Areas for Stamping-Out Modified with 

Emergency Vaccination to Live (Infected Premises would be Depopulated)... 3-12

Figure 3-5. Example of Zones and Areas for Emergency Vaccination to Live 

without Stamping-Out ...................................................................................... 3-13

Figure 3-6. Phases of FMD Response.................................................................. 3-19

Figure 3-7. Minimum OIE waiting periods and pathways for recovery of FMD 

free status after an outbreak where vaccination is not practiced ..................... 3-21

Figure 4-1. Diagnostic Flowchart for Initial Investigation of FMD .......................... 4-17
viii

Figure 4-2. Outbreak Diagnostics after Positive Confirmation of FMD in United 

States .............................................................................................................. 4-20

Figure 4-3. Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises in FMD Outbreak 

Response ........................................................................................................ 4-24

Figure 4-4. Premises Designations in Relation to Permitting and Movement 

Control............................................................................................................. 4-47

Figure 4-5. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones (Figures are not to 

scale.).............................................................................................................. 4-57

Figure 4-6. Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones (Figures are not to scale.)4-58

Figure 4-7. Vaccinated Premises (Figures are not to scale.) ................................ 4-58

Tables

Table 3-1. Overview of Traditional FMD Response Strategies ............................... 3-7

Table 3-2. Factors Influencing a Response Strategy or Strategies for U.S. FMD 

Outbreak.......................................................................................................... 3-17

Table 4-1. Examples of animals with a Higher Probability of Disease (HPD) 

during an FMD outbreak.................................................................................... 4-6

Table 4-2. Sampling Frequency Guidelines by Premises Designations................ 4-13

Table 4-3. Summary of Premises.......................................................................... 4-22

Table 4-4. Minimum Sizes of Areas and Zones .................................................... 4-26

Table 4-5. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for FMD........... 4-27

Table 4-6. Movement into Control Area from Outside Control Area to Specific 

Premisesa ........................................................................................................ 4-41

Table 4-7. Movement within a Control Areaa......................................................... 4-43

Table 4-8. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area from 

Specific Premisesa........................................................................................... 4-45

Table 4-9. Projected Vaccine Dose Need ............................................................. 4-56
Updated October 2020—DRAFT ix

Preface 

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)—

Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Response Plan: The Red Book provides strategic 

guidance for responding to an animal health emergency caused by FMD in the 

United States. This FMD Response Plan (October 2020) updates the FMD 

Response Plan (September 2014) and replaces previous versions of FMD 

summary response plans. Information in this plan may require further discussion 

and development with stakeholders. 

This FMD Response Plan is under ongoing review. This document was last 

updated in October 2020. Please send questions or comments to: 

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center

Veterinary Services

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture 

4700 River Road, Unit 42 

Riverdale, MD 20737-1231 

E-mail: FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov

While best efforts have been used in developing and preparing the FMD Response 

Plan, the U.S. Government, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and other parties, such as employees 

and contractors contributing to this document, neither warrant nor assume any 

legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of 

any information or procedure disclosed. The primary purpose of this FMD 

Response Plan is to provide strategic guidance to those government officials 

responding to an FMD outbreak. It is only posted for public access as a reference. 

The FMD Response Plan may refer to links to various other Federal and State 

agencies and private organizations. These links are maintained solely for the 

user’s information and convenience. If you link to such site, please be aware that 

you are then subject to the policies of that site. In addition, please note that USDA 

does not control and cannot guarantee the relevance, timeliness, or accuracy of 

these outside materials. Further, the inclusion of links or pointers to particular 

items in hypertext is not intended to reflect their importance, nor is it intended to 

constitute approval or endorsement of any views expressed, or products or 

services offered, on these outside websites, or the organizations sponsoring the 

websites.

Trade names are used solely for the purpose of providing specific information. 

Mention of a trade name does not constitute a guarantee or warranty of the 

product by USDA or an endorsement over other products not mentioned. 
x

USDA prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of 

race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual 

orientation, or marital or family status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all 

programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for 

communication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) 

should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and 

telecommunications device for the deaf [TDD]).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil 

Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue SW, 

Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is 

an equal opportunity provider and employer.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 1-1 

Chapter 1 

Introduction and FMD Information 

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN

This updated Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Response Plan Draft: The Red 

Book (October 2020) incorporates comments received on the FMD Response 

Plan: The Red Book (2014), lessons learned from animal disease response

exercises, and reflects updates to Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and 

Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials. The objectives of this plan are to identify 

the 1) capabilities needed to respond to an FMD outbreak and 2) critical 

activities that will be involved in responding to that outbreak, and the timeframes for these activities. In an outbreak situation, these critical activities are 

the responsibility of a unified Incident Command (IC) per the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS). 

To achieve these objectives, this plan provides current information on FMD and 

its relevance to the United States, and presents the organizational strategy for an 

effective FMD response. In addition, it offers guidance on key outbreak response 

strategies. This plan also contains updated guidance on 23 critical response 

activities and tools, such as disposal, appraisal and compensation, and quarantine 

and movement control. As indicated by links throughout the document, this plan

is integrated and coordinated with other FAD PReP documents such as FMD

standard operating procedures (SOP), National Animal Health Emergency 

Management System (NAHEMS) Guidelines, and existing Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and Veterinary Services (VS) Guidance. 

(Appendix A provides a list of documents related to FMD outbreak response and 

an overview of FAD PReP). 

FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that may affect domestic cloven-hoofed 

animals (cattle, swine, sheep, and goats) and many wild animals (deer, bison, 

pronghorn antelope, and feral swine). The disease is characterized by fever, 

vesicular (blister-like) lesions, and subsequent erosions (ulcers) of the surfaces of 

the mouth, tongue, nostrils, muzzle, feet, and teats. FMD is not considered a 

public health risk. It is considered the most contagious disease of livestock and is 

a high priority concern for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) APHIS. 

The United States has been FMD-free since 1929; however, the disease is still 

found in about two-thirds of the world. There are many susceptible animals in 

the United States, including approximately 93.6 million cattle, 72.4 million 
1-2 

swine, and 8.0 million sheep and goats.1

 Although FMD does not typically kill 

adult livestock, it does have highly detrimental effects on productivity (meat and 

milk). In addition, high mortality rates may occur in young animals. 

An outbreak of FMD in the United States would have a significant economic 

impact, considering the loss of international trade as well as costs directly 

associated with depopulation, disposal, and disinfection. There would be 

additional costs for any vaccination or control program implemented, and heavy 

production losses. 

1.2 AUDIENCE AND PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT

This document is intended for animal health emergency responders at all levels 

of government, as well as industry partners. It provides strategic guidance, 

current policy information, and response strategies for the control and 

eradication of FMD, should an outbreak occur in the United States. It also offers 

additional resources for responding individuals on tactical information needed to 

respond during an FMD outbreak in domestic livestock. 

This plan does not replace existing regional, State, Tribal, local, or industry 

preparedness and response plans relating to FMD. Regional, State, Tribal, local, 

and industry plans should be aimed at more specific issues in FMD response. In 

particular, States should develop response plans focused on the specific 

characteristics of the State and its livestock industry.

1.3 FMD INFORMATION

These sections provide an overview of FMD and cover the following subjects: 

 Etiology 

 History and global distribution 

 Impact of an FMD outbreak

 Ecology 

 Diagnosis 

 Immunity. 

Further information on FMD can be found in the FAD PReP FMD Overview of 

Etiology and Ecology SOP available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. See 

Chapter 4 of this plan for the case and laboratory definitions for FMD.

1 Data retrieved from National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2017 Census of Agriculture: 

https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2017/index.php. 
Introduction and FMD Information

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 1-3 

1.3.1 Etiology

1.3.1.1 OVERVIEW

The FMD virus (FMDV) is an Aphthovirus in the family Picornaviridae. FMDV 

is the etiologic agent of an acute systemic vesicular disease affecting clovenhoofed animals worldwide. There are seven immunologically distinct FMDV 

types: A, O, C, South African Territories types SAT-1, SAT-2, SAT-3, and 

Asia 1; each containing numerous strains. There is a substantial amount of 

genetic variability in FMD viruses, and new strains occasionally develop 

spontaneously. There is no cross protection between serotypes, and protection 

between strains varies depending on their antigenic similarity. FMD is also 

known as fiebre aftosa, fievre aphteuse, and maul-und-klauenseuche. 

1.3.1.2 WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH (OIE) DEFINITION 

OF FMDV INFECTION

The 2019 OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code, see 

Appendix B)

2

 “defines the occurrence of infection with FMDV as:

1. FMDV has been isolated from a sample from an animal; or

2. viral antigen or viral ribonucleic acid (RNA) specific to FMDV has 

been identified in a sample from an animal showing clinical signs 

consistent with FMD, or epidemiologically linked to a suspected or 

confirmed outbreak of FMD, or giving cause for suspicion of previous 

association or contact with FMDV; or

3. antibodies to structural or nonstructural proteins of FMDV that are not 

a consequence of vaccination, have been detected in a sample from an 

animal showing clinical signs consistent with FMD, or 

epidemiologically linked to a suspected or confirmed outbreak of 

FMD, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact 

with FMDV.

1.3.2 History and Global Distribution

FMD is present in approximately two-thirds of the world and endemic in parts of 

Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and South America. North 

America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico) and Central America are free 

of FMD, as is Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.

The United States has not experienced an FMD outbreak since 1929, Canada 

since 1952, and Mexico since 1954. 

2

OIE. (2019). Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Chapter 8.8. Retrieved from 

https://www.oie.int/index.php?id=169&L=0&htmfile=chapitre_fmd.htm. 
1-4 

1.3.2.1 PREVALENCE OF SEROTYPES

The seven FMDV serotypes demonstrate some regionalism; the O serotype is 

most common, followed by Asia 1. All serotypes produce disease that is 

clinically indistinguishable but immunologically distinct. There is no cross 

protection between serotypes. Figure 1-1 maps the distribution of serotypes 

worldwide, as typically found.

Figure 1-1. Worldwide FMD Events in 20183

1.3.2.2 THREAT OF FMD IN THE UNITED STATES

Although the United States has been FMD-free (without vaccination) since 1929, 

international travel and trade pose a substantial risk that it could enter the 

country. The disease is a critical threat to the United States because of the 

country’s millions of susceptible cloven-hoofed livestock and wild animals, such 

as feral swine. FMD can be transmitted over long distances by animal products, 

fomites, people, and other mechanical vectors; the virus is also considered a 

potential agent for agricultural terrorism.

3 OIE/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Foot-and-Mouth Disease Reference 

Laboratory Network. (2018). Annual Report. Retrieved from: https://www.foot-andmouth.org/sites/foot/files/user-files/research-paper/pdf/11-19/OIEFAO%20FMD%20Ref%20Lab%20Network%20Report%202018.pdf. 
Introduction and FMD Information

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 1-5 

1.3.3 International Trade

Currently, the United States does not import livestock from countries that are not 

considered FMD-free. USDA maintains a list of countries and regions 

considered FMD-free at its APHIS website, Animal Health Status of Regions. 

In addition, the United States takes additional precautions for FMD-free 

countries that employ import standards less restrictive than those of the United 

States and countries sharing a border with countries or regions not free of FMD.

Certain meat products can be exported from countries that are not recognized as 

free of FMD, provided that specific conditions are met and documented. For 

example, Uruguay is not considered by the United States to be FMD-free, but is 

permitted to export fresh beef and ovine meat under specific conditions. 

Additional information on the products eligible for importation into the United 

States from other countries is posted on the Food Safety and Inspection Service 

(FSIS) website, Countries Eligible for U.S. Export. 

1.3.4 Impact of an FMD Outbreak

1.3.4.1 ECONOMIC

The 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom had an estimated economic 

impact between $12 and $18 billion4

. A U.S. outbreak contained to California

could cost $6–14 billion; a nation-wide agroterrorism attack could reach $228 

billion.

5

 Modeled costs for a hypothetical, accidental release of FMDV from the 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) (under construction in Kansas) 

exceed $180 billion, but were lowered by more than half with the 

implementation of a vaccination campaign.6 The estimated economic impact 

depends primarily on three things: the duration and geographic extent of the 

4 Thompson, D., Muriel, P., Russell, D., Osborne, P., et al. (2002). Economic costs of the 

foot and mouth disease outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001. Revue scientifique et 

technique-Office international des epizooties, 21(3), 675-687; Grubman, M.J., & Baxt, B. (2004). 

Foot-and-mouth disease. Clinical Microbiology Reviews, 17(2), 465-493. DOI: 

10.1128/CMR.17.2.465–493.2004; USDA FAS. (2007). U.K. foot-and-mouth disease – recovery 

timetable, the economic impact and who pays? Global Agriculture Information Network, 

UK7020. Retrieved from https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200708/146292150.pdf. 

5 Modeling estimates vary, and will depend on the factors listed in this section. These 

estimates are based on information provided in Ekboir, J.M. (1999). Potential Impact of Footand-Mouth Disease in California: the Role and Contribution of Animal Health Surveillance and 

Monitoring Services. Agricultural Issues Center. Retrieved from 

https://aic.ucdavis.edu/pub/fmd.html; and Oladosu G., Rose A., Lee, B. (2013). Economic 

Impacts of Potential Foot and Mouth Disease Agroterrorism in the USA: A General Equilibrium 

Analysis. J Bioterr Biodef S12: 001. 6 Pendell, Dustin L., Marsh, Thomas L., Coble, Keith H., Lusk, Jayson L., Szmania, Sara C. 

(2015). Economic Assessment of FMDv Releases from the National Bio and Agro Defense 

Facility. PLoS One 10(6). Retrieved from 

https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0129134. 
1-6 

outbreak; the extent of trade embargoes on U.S. products; and the reaction of 

consumers to the disease and control measures.

The value of lost exports would be a substantial detriment to the economy. In 

addition, an FMD response effort would involve direct costs for depopulation, 

indemnity payments, animal disposal, disinfection, and movement control 

measures, as well as vaccine, if chosen as a disease control measure. Additional 

indirect costs would be incurred by consumers and related sectors of the 

economy, such as feed producers and suppliers. Any FMD outbreak in the 

United States would likely have a sizeable and lingering economic impact. 

1.3.4.2 ZOONOTIC POTENTIAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS

FMD is not considered a public health threat. FMDV infections in humans are 

very rare: about 40 cases have been diagnosed since 1921. These cases are 

typically characterized by vesicular lesions and influenza-like symptoms. The 

disease in humans is generally mild, short-lived, and self-limiting.7 FMD differs 

from hand, foot, and mouth disease of humans. FMD may be able to survive in 

the human respiratory tract for 24 hours, allowing people with very close contact 

with infected animals to potentially serve as a source of virus exposure for 

susceptible animals.

Mass depopulation and disposal of animals in an FMD outbreak may create 

public health implications for personnel and individuals associated with the 

response effort. The effects on mental health may include post-traumatic stress 

disorder and depression. Support should be made available to those involved, 

particularly to responders and owners of affected livestock. 

1.3.5 Ecology

FMD affects cloven-hoofed animals. Susceptible species include the following:

 Cattle

 Pigs 

 Sheep

 Goats 

 Deer

 Elk

 Bison. 

7 Spickler A.R., Roth, J.A., Galyon, J., Lofstedt, J., eds. (2010). Emerging and Exotic 

Diseases of Livestock, 4th ed. Ames, IA: Iowa State University, College of Veterinary Medicine; 

UK Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Summary Profile for Foot 

and Mouth Disease. Retrieved from http://adlib.everysite.co.uk/resources/000/116/112/fmd.pdf. 
Introduction and FMD Information

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 1-7 

The disease is generally most severe in cattle and pigs. New World camels in the 

family Camelidae (alpacas, llamas, guanacos, and vicuñas) have low 

susceptibility to FMDV but can develop clinical illness. Old World camels 

(dromedaries, Bactrian camels) are more susceptible. While rare, FMD has been 

documented in several other species, including elephants and hedgehogs. 

1.3.5.1 CARRIERS

There is a “carrier state” in many FMD-susceptible species. FMDV carriers have 

historically been defined as “recovered or vaccinated and exposed animals in 

which FMDV persists in the oropharynx for more than 28 days.”8 Carriers of 

FMD can include cattle, sheep, and goats, though sheep and goats seem to 

become carriers less often and for shorter periods than cattle. A carrier state has 

not been documented in swine. The duration of the carrier state in cattle can 

range from several months to several years. Persistent infections have also been 

reported for a limited period in some experimentally infected wildlife, including 

white-tailed deer, kudu, and fallow deer. Animals can become carriers regardless 

of their vaccination status or whether they showed clinical signs of the virus. The 

only wildlife reservoir of FMD proven to actually transmit the disease occurs in 

the African buffalo (Syncerus caffer).9

How an animal develops the carrier state and the role of FMD carriers in the 

infection of susceptible cattle are not well understood.10 However, a 2018 

laboratory study in which susceptible animals were exposed to oropharyngeal 

fluid of carrier animals demonstrated transmission of FMDV, causing full 

clinical infection in naïve cattle.11 Allowing carrier animals to persist in an FMD 

outbreak will increase the risk for further infection and new outbreaks. 

1.3.5.2 INTRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION OF FMD

FMDV is thought to be introduced through infected animals, contaminated 

fomites, and possibly carrier animals. As indicated above, there is no clear 

evidence on the conditions in which specific species of carrier animals can 

transmit FMDV to naïve animals, and wildlife does not appear to be a common 

means of introduction. Historically, meat products have been an important mode 

of introduction. 

8 Fernández, P.J. and White, W.R. (2010). Atlas of Transboundary Animal Diseases. Paris: 

OIE. 9 OIE. (2019). Chapter 8.8, Article 8.8.1. Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Retrieved from 

https://www.oie.int/en/standard-setting/terrestrial-code/access-online/. 

10 For more information on carrier animals, see Tenzin, Dekker, A., Vernooij, H., Bouma, 

A., Stegeman, A. (2008). Rate of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus Transmission by Carriers 

Quantified from Experimental Data. Risk Analysis. 28(2): 03–309. 11 Arzt, J., Belsham, G.J., Lohse, L., Bøtner, A., Stenfeldt, C. (2018) Transmission of Footand-Mouth Disease from Persistently Infected Carrier Cattle to Naive Cattle via Transfer of 

Oropharyngeal Fluid. mSphere; 3(5) DOI: 10.1128/mSphere.00365-18. 
1-8 

FMDV is highly contagious, and there are multiple modes of transmission. 

Direct contact between infected and susceptible live animals is the most common 

mode of transmission, particularly when animals are in close proximity. FMDV 

can be found in all secretions and excretions from acutely infected animals, 

including expired air, saliva, nasal secretions, milk, urine, feces, and semen. 

Animals may shed FMDV from 1 to 4 days prior to the onset of clinical signs. 

Fomites contaminated with secretions and excretions from infected animals 

commonly serve as transmission pathways.

FMDV can also spread via aerosol transmission under favorable environmental 

conditions. Pigs, particularly, excrete large amounts of virus through their 

respiratory tract, which can lead to infectious aerosols that can be inhaled by 

other animals (especially cattle, due to their large inspiratory capacity) in 

proximity. FMDV has also been known to spread through windborne 

transmission, where the virus infects naïve animals located some miles from 

known infected animals without any history of contact. The distance of 

windborne transmission over land surfaces depends on the atmospheric 

conditions and the amount of virus emitted into the air by the infected animals. 

Multiple sources suggest FMDV may spread to distances well over 10 kilometers 

over land in favorable conditions and much greater distances over water. The 

conditions for long distance spread are thought to be highly specific, including 

high relative humidity, steady wind, minimal convection currents, and lack of 

topographical obstructions. These conditions tend to be met more often over 

water than over land.

1.3.5.3 PERSISTENCE IN ENVIRONMENT AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS

FMD viruses are susceptible to both acid and alkaline pH, and are quickly 

inactivated by pH < 6.0 and pH > 9.0.12 FMDV is preserved by refrigeration and 

freezing, but progressively inactivated by temperatures above 50oC. In cool 

laboratory conditions, FMDV has been found to survive in cattle and swine 

slurry as long as 10 and 14 weeks, respectively.13 FMDV is resistant to many 

disinfectants, such as iodophores and phenol, particularly when organic matter is 

present.

FMDV can survive in frozen bone marrow or lymph nodes for long periods. 

Meat must be subjected to heat treatment at 70oC for 30 minutes to ensure 

FMDV deactivation. Typical industrial processes for salami inactivate the virus. 

FMDV can persist in dairy products, and typical pasteurization may not 

inactivate the virus. For milk or cream for human consumption, the OIE suggests 

three procedures for inactivation of FMDV: 1) a sterilization process applying a 

12 OIE. (2013). Foot-and Mouth Disease, Technical Disease Card. Retrieved from

https://www.oie.int. 13 Bøtner, Anette, Belsham, Graham J. (2012). Virus survival in slurry: Analysis of the 

stability of foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, bovine viral diarrhoea and swine 

influenza viruses. Veterinary Microbiology 157(1–2). Retrieved from

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037811351100650X?via%3Dihub. 
Introduction and FMD Information

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 1-9 

minimum temperature of 132oC for at least 1 second, 2) if the milk has a pH less 

than 7.0, a sterilization process applying a minimum temperature of 72oC for at 

least 15 seconds, or 3) if the milk has a pH of 7.0 or over, applying the process in 

2) twice.14

FMDV can also persist in wool, hair, and other products for substantial periods. 

Please refer to the FMD Overview of Etiology and Ecology SOP, as well as the 

OIE Terrestrial Code for further information (www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep and 

www.oie.int).

1.3.6 Diagnosis

Producers as well as veterinarians may be the initial detectors of an FMD 

outbreak, so they should be familiar with signs of vesicular disease. The 

incubation period is 2–14 days, and varies by species, on the dose of the virus, 

and on the route of infection. The OIE Terrestrial Code (2019) defines the 

incubation period as 14 days. 

1.3.6.1 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY

The morbidity and mortality of FMD varies depending on the species affected, as 

well as the serotype and strain of the virus. Generally, morbidity is significant,

and can approach 100 percent. Mortality is typically low in adult animals (1–5 

percent), and higher in very young animals. 

1.3.6.2 CLINICAL SIGNS

FMD is usually recognized by vesicular signs, although animals infected with 

FMD show a variety of clinical signs. Clinical signs are generally more 

prominent in cattle and pigs than in sheep and goats, and vesicles are 

indistinguishable from other vesicular diseases.

1.3.6.2.1 Cattle

Common signs in cattle include the following: 

 Pyrexia (fever), anorexia, shivering, reduction in milk production for 2–3 

days, followed by 

 smacking of the lips, grinding of the teeth, and drooling; 

 excess nasal mucous secretions; 

14 OIE. (2019). Chapter 8.8, Article 8.8.35. Procedures for the inactivation of the FMD virus 

in milk and cream for human consumption. Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Retrieved from 

https://www.oie.int/index.php?id=169&L=0&htmfile=chapitre_fmd.htm. 
1-10

 lameness, stamping, or kicking caused by vesicles on buccal and 

nasal mucous membranes or between the claws and coronary band;

 vesicles on mammary gland; and/or

 ruptured vesicles

 Vesicles on the tongue

 Abortion

 Sudden death in young animals.

The infection usually resolves in 8–15 days unless there is a serious secondary 

bacterial infection.

1.3.6.2.2 Pigs

Typical signs of FMD in pigs include the following:

 Pyrexia (fever) and blanching of the coronary bands, followed by

 severe foot lesions;

 severe lameness;

 reluctance to move;

 lesions on snout, muzzle, gums, and interdigital spaces; and/or

 less severe oral lesions than in cattle (so no drooling)

 High mortality in piglets

 Possible abortion.

1.3.6.2.3 Sheep and Goats

Clinical signs of FMD in sheep and goats are typically less pronounced and 

frequent than in pigs and cattle and may go unrecognized:

 Possible mild lameness where there are small vesicles or erosions on 

coronary band

 Death of young animals

 Lesions in dental pad of sheep

 Agalactia in milking animals
Introduction and FMD Information

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 1-11 

 Possible abortion. 

1.3.6.3 GROSS PATHOLOGICAL LESIONS

Lesions typically include vesicles or blisters on the tongue, dental pad, gums, 

cheek, hard and soft palate, lips, nostrils, muzzle, coronary bands, teats, udder, 

snout of pigs, corium of dewclaws, and interdigital spaces. Post-mortem lesions 

can be on rumen pillars, as well as in the myocardium. Necrosis may also occur.

Lesions will vary among cattle, swine, and sheep. For extensive pictures 

demonstrating the aging of FMD lesions, see the EuFMD (European 

Commission for the Control of FMD) resource available online (pp. 32–33) and 

the Iowa State University: Center for Food Safety and Public Health images, also 

available online. 

1.3.6.4 DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSES

Vesicular stomatitis, swine vesicular disease, Senecavirus A (SVA), and 

vesicular exanthema of swine are all clinically indistinguishable from FMD. 

FMD also has common features with bovine viral diarrhea, mucosal disease, 

infectious bovine rhinotracheitis, and bluetongue. 

1.3.7 Immunity

1.3.7.1 NATURAL INFECTION

Infection with FMDV causes animals to develop a humoral antibody that is 

transient and also specific for the subtype of the infecting FMDV. Approximately 

7 to 14 days post-infection, protective antibodies are developed against FMDV 

structural proteins. 

1.3.7.2 VACCINATION

Vaccination against FMDV has been practiced with relatively positive immunity 

results, mostly in cattle. Vaccine has not only prevented clinical disease, but 

helps control FMDV transmission in an outbreak. Vaccination campaigns are 

more likely to succeed if the interval between vaccination and exposure is 

sufficient to ensure animals develop adequate immunity to FMDV. However, 

certain limitations of vaccination, in terms of immunity, should be 

acknowledged. 

 Vaccines provide only serotype-specific protection. Vaccination against 

one serotype may fail to protect fully or at all against other strains within 

the serotype. This protection depends on the 

 similarity between the field strain and the vaccine, and
1-12 

 potency of the vaccine (more potent vaccines are likely to be 

protective against even less well-matched strains).

 Onset of immunity is not immediate. Inactivated FMD vaccines may 

decrease viral shedding and clinical signs in cattle and sheep in challenge 

studies as early as 4–5 days after vaccination with protection improving 

for the next 2–3 weeks.

 swine appear to be more difficult to protect shortly after challenge; 

limited studies have reported some protection as soon as 3–4 days 

after vaccination. However, with more severe challenges, pigs may 

not be protected against disease until 21–28 days after vaccination.

 No currently available vaccine provides “sterilizing immunity” which 

will prevent subsequent infection. 

 It is possible that individual vaccinated cattle, sheep, and goats infected 

with FMDV could still become asymptomatic virus carriers. 

 In very young animals, a high level of maternal antibodies inhibits the 

immune response to vaccines. 

Differentiating infected animals from vaccinated animals, known as a “DIVA” 

strategy, would be critical to a successful emergency vaccination strategy in an 

FMD outbreak. DIVA diagnostic techniques typically use tests for antibodies 

against viral nonstructural proteins (NSP) to differentiate animals that are 

infected with FMDV in the field (natural infection) from those that have been 

vaccinated with an FMD vaccine. This diagnostic DIVA capability is important 

for an effective vaccination campaign, business continuity processes, and FMDV 

surveillance.

Emergency vaccination and DIVA are discussed in the NAHEMS Guidelines: 

Vaccination, Appendix A: FMD. This document is available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 2-1 

Chapter 2 

National Coordination for FMD Preparedness and 

Response 

2.1 FOUNDATIONS OF PREPAREDNESS AND 

RESPONSE

Successful emergency preparedness for, and response to, FMD is based on the 

principles found in the National Response Framework (NRF) and NIMS. 

2.1.1 National Response Framework

The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts response activities, through a 

whole community approach.

15 It describes core capabilities for response, defines 

specific authorities, and establishes a comprehensive approach for responding to 

domestic incidents that range from serious local events to large-scale terrorist 

attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. It emphasizes private response efforts 

that support community lifelines to maintain or restore critical government 

operations. The NRF builds on NIMS, which provides a template and consistency 

in roles and responsibilities for those managing incidents. 

The most recent update to the NRF retains the Emergency Support Function 

(ESF) annexes for coordination of Federal government resources and capabilities, 

but adds support annexes inclusive of private sector, non-governmental 

organizations, in addition to governmental entities. The NRF is available at 

https://www.fema.gov. 

2.1.2 National Incident Management System

NIMS, a companion document to the NRF, provides a systematic, nationwide, 

proactive approach guiding departments and agencies at all levels of community 

and government to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the 

effects of incidents, regardless of its size or complexity. A key concept is unified 

command for joint management of incidents under a single action plan. NIMS 

provides a common framework and a shared vocabulary, and describes systems 

and processes, that allow a large variety of organizational elements to achieve 

15 As defined in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Preparedness 

Goal, the whole community is a focus on enabling the participation in a wider range of players 

from the private and nonprofit sectors, including nongovernmental organizations and the general 

public, in conjunction with the participation of all levels of government in order to foster better 

coordination and working relationships. For more information visit fema.gov.
2-2 

common response and recovery goals. NIMS information is available at 

https://www.fema.gov. 

NIMS consists of three major components: 

 Resource Management

 This section describes standard mechanisms to systematically manage 

resources, including personnel, equipment, supplies, teams, and 

facilities, both before and during incidents in order to allow 

organizations to more effectively share resources when needed.

 Command and Coordination 

 This section describes leadership roles, processes, and recommended 

organizational structures for incident management at the operational 

and incident support levels and explains how these structures interact 

to manage incidents effectively and efficiently. It describes four NIMS 

Command and Coordination structures in common use at USDA: 

• Incident Command System (ICS)

• Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) 

• Multiagency Coordination Group (MAC) 

• Joint Information System (JIS)

 Communications and Information Management 

 This section describes systems and methods that help to ensure that 

incident personnel and other decision makers have the means and 

information they need to make and communicate decisions. 

2.1.3 USDA Roles and Responsibilities Overview

The Departments of Agriculture and Interior share the primary agency role in ESF

#11—Agriculture and Natural Resources—under the NRF; USDA is the 

coordinating agency. As stated in ESF #11, USDA responds to agriculture disease 

and pest incidents under its own statutory authority. USDA is responsible for 

implementing an integrated Federal, State, tribal, and local response to an 

outbreak of a highly contagious or economically devastating animal/zoonotic 

disease. This includes detecting animal disease anomalies, assigning FAD 

Diagnosticians (FADD) to conduct investigations, and coordinating tasks with 

other ESFs, State veterinary emergency response teams, and voluntary animal 

care organizations. ESF #11 ensures, in coordination with ESF #8 – Public Health 

and Medical Services, that animal/veterinary issues in natural disasters are 

supported. The USDA also plays a supporting role in other ESFs. 
National Coordination for FMD Preparedness and Response

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 2-3 

During a foreign animal disease (FAD) event of livestock, like an FMD outbreak, 

USDA deploys National Incident Management Teams (NIMT), coordinates the 

incident response, manages public messages, and takes measures to control and 

eradicate FMD. Measures used to control and eradicate FMD include quarantine 

and movement control, epidemiologic investigation, appraisal and compensation, 

depopulation or euthanasia of affected livestock, carcass disposal, cleaning and 

disinfection, active surveillance for additional cases, diagnostics, and, potentially, 

emergency vaccination. 

During the course of an FMD outbreak response, USDA may request Federal-toFederal support as necessary from other Federal agencies. If the President 

declares an emergency or major disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture 

requests the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lead coordination, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS assume the lead under a unity of effort 

concept for coordinating Federal resources. USDA would maintain the lead for 

overall incident management.

For more information on the roles of other Federal agencies, such as the 

Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Interior (DOI), in the 

event of an FMD outbreak, see the APHIS FAD Framework: Roles and 

Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) and APHIS FAD Framework: Response 

Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0). These documents are available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

2.2 USDA AUTHORITIES AND ACTIVITIES

USDA APHIS is the Federal agency with primary responsibility and authority for 

animal disease control and will interface with Federal, State, Tribal, and local 

partners to control, contain, and eradicate FMD. USDA is also the primary 

Federal liaison to the U.S. animal industry. In addition, it operates the National 

Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), including the Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL), which is an OIE reference laboratory for 

identifying and confirming FMD. 

APHIS produces FAD PReP documentation and materials, including this FMDspecific plan, to provide detailed response guidance for an animal disease 

outbreak in the United States. FAD PReP documents are consistent with both 

NRF and NIMS. 

APHIS implements necessary mitigations to reduce risk prior to entry of animals 

or animal products into the United States. While the priority is always prevention, 

the agency is also active with domestic and international partners in preparedness 

efforts. These exclusionary and preparedness and activities for foreign animal 

diseases, generally, and FMD, specifically, are described in this section.
2-4 

2.2.1 Authorities

The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq., authorizes 

the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the importation, entry, or further movement 

in the United States or order the destruction or removal of animals and related 

conveyances and facilities to prevent the introduction or dissemination of 

livestock pests or diseases. It authorizes related activities with respect to 

exportation, interstate movement, cooperative agreements, enforcement and 

penalties, seizure, quarantine, and disease and pest eradication. The Act also 

authorizes the Secretary to establish a veterinary accreditation program and enter 

into reimbursable fee agreements for pre-clearance abroad of animals or articles 

for movement into the United States.

The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to cooperate with other Federal 

agencies, States, or political subdivisions of States, national or local governments 

of foreign governments, domestic or international organizations or associations, 

Tribal nations, and other persons to prevent, detect, control, or eradicate FMD. If 

measures taken by a State or Indian Tribe to control or eradicate a pest or disease 

of livestock are inadequate, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary— after notice to 

and review and consultation with the State’s governor or Tribe’s chief official— 

to declare that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence in the 

United States of a pest or disease of livestock that threatens the livestock of the 

United States (7 U.S. Code 8306). This extraordinary emergency declaration 

allows the Secretary to impose restrictions within a State or Territory.

7 U.S. Code 8306 further directs the Secretary to compensate the owner for 

animals (and articles, facilities, and conveyances) taken under these provisions. 

Payment is not to exceed fair market value less any compensatory payments 

received from a State or other payer. Regulations at 9 CFR §53.2 are applicable to 

FMD and authorize the APHIS Administrator to pay 50 percent of fair market 

value for takings in a disease control and eradication effort. The Secretary has 

authority to increase compensation to 100 percent. These are general provisions; 

exceptions are specified in the regulations, and additional sections may apply, 

e.g., 9 CFR §71.14. 

Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S. Code 231, transfers to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security certain agricultural import and entry inspection 

functions under the AHPA, including the authority to enforce the prohibitions or 

restrictions imposed by USDA.

For further information on USDA APHIS authorities, see the APHIS Foreign 

Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep and relevant regulatory language at 

www.govinfo.gov/help/uscode and www.govinfo.gov/help/cfr. 
National Coordination for FMD Preparedness and Response

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 2-5 

2.2.2 Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response 

Plan

APHIS VS and its stakeholders established FAD PReP to provide guidance for 

preparing and responding to a FAD emergency. The precursor to FAD PReP was 

the NAHEMS, which offered a functional veterinary framework for responding to 

FADs. Now incorporated into FAD PReP, the NAHEMS Guidelines join strategic 

concept of operations documents, disease response plans (such as this FMDspecific plan), SOPs, and other materials to create a comprehensive approach to 

FADs that is consistent with NRF and NIMS. These documents aim to ensure a 

successful response commensurate with the severity of the outbreak. Federal, 

State, and local agencies; Tribal nations; and other stakeholders involved in 

animal health emergency management activities should integrate the information 

found in these documents into their preparedness and response planning activities 

and processes.

FAD PReP offers

 competent veterinary guidance on cleaning and disinfection (virus 

elimination), disposal, mass depopulation, and other critical activities; 

 information on disease control and eradication strategies and principles;

 guidance on health, safety, and personal protective equipment (PPE) ; 

 biosecurity information and site-specific management strategies; and

 training and educational resources.

These documents provide the foundation for coordinated National, regional, State, 

Tribal, and local activities in an emergency situation. They also serve as a 

practical guide and complement non-Federal preparedness activities.

Building on existing planning and response knowledge and relationships, FAD 

PReP efforts raise awareness of critical issues in FAD response and foster further 

collaboration between Federal partners, States, Tribes, industry, academia, and 

other stakeholders. 

Appendix A provides more information on FAD PReP and associated materials.

Typically, documents are cleared by APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) 

and posted on the FAD PReP website at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. The 

APHIS website also hosts critical policy updates relating to ongoing or recent 

FAD outbreaks. 
2-6

2.2.3 Exercises

Preparedness and response exercises help ensure our Nation is able to respond 

quickly and effectively to an FMD outbreak. They are an ideal, no-fault learning 

environment to discuss, practice, and implement plans, procedures, and processes 

in advance of an actual event. APHIS exercises are conducted in accordance with 

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program guidance.

APHIS VS has conducted multiple preparedness exercises to simulate an FMD 

outbreak and associated response effort in the United States. These exercises 

allow responders to discuss and practice activities relating to this highly 

contagious animal disease, such as movement control, and to consider the social 

and economic implications of an FMD outbreak. They help prepare the United 

States and responders for the difficult decisions that will be made regarding 

animal depopulation and business continuity. Multistate exercises, like ARMAR 

(Agriculture and Response Management and Resources) held in 2018, have 

enhanced coordination and collaboration among States, and between State and 

Federal governments. 

The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) has also conducted exercises to assess 

and test its ability to deliver supplies and services—and State and Tribal ability to 

receive and stage these items—in the event of an FMD outbreak. These exercises 

have incorporated States and Tribes, as well as industry and academia, to train 

together and simulate a response effort (even down to the conducting minor 

maintenance and troubleshooting of equipment).

2.2.4 Domestic Activities

USDA conducts a variety of ongoing preparedness and response activities with 

respect to FMD. Domestically, the USDA prevents the introduction of FMD into 

the country and also performs FAD investigations for suspected cases or reported 

vesicular conditions. The following list details a selection of ongoing USDA 

activities:

 Import and export services. APHIS facilitates international trade, 

monitoring the health of animals presented at the border as well as 

regulating the import and export of animals and animal products. As an

example, all cattle and breeding swine eligible for entry into the United 

States must go through a 60-day quarantine before export to the United 

States. In addition, all cattle (except those from Canada and Mexico) must 

be quarantined for 30 days at a USDA Animal Import Center. Cattle from 

countries affected with FMD are not permitted to be imported into the 

United States. 

 Prohibited items screening. APHIS works directly with Federal partners, 

including DHS’s Customs and Border Protection, to screen cargo and 

prevent travelers from bringing any products of concern into the United 

States. Travelers must declare all food items and materials of plant or 
National Coordination for FMD Preparedness and Response

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 2-7 

animal origin in their possession upon entry, as well as recent visits to 

farms and livestock facilities prior to their arrival back into the country.

 Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC). SITC conducts risk 

management and anti-smuggling activities to prevent unlawful entry and 

distribution of prohibited agricultural commodities. It looks at domestic 

markets likely to have illegal imported animal products to establish 

baseline estimates on how much product is bypassing ports of entry. 

 Vesicular disease surveillance. USDA rapidly responds to reported or 

suspected cases of vesicular conditions in the United States with FAD 

investigations. These investigations are intended to rapidly detect and 

diagnose any vesicular disease in the United States. 

 Modeling, Assessments & Geospatial Analyses. The USDA Center for 

Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) uses complex disease spread 

simulation models, such as Interspread Plus and the Animal Disease 

Spread Model, to develop computer-generated outbreak scenarios for 

FMD. The results of these models can be further analyzed using economic 

modeling tools. Other modeling tools are used to examine within-herd 

spread, wind dispersion, and geospatial risk factors. Risk assessments can 

also inform decision-making processes. Additionally, geographic 

information systems are used to support preparedness and response 

activities. Together, various models, assessments, and analyses are used to 

explore possible control strategies and evaluate the consequences of FMD 

incursions in the United States. They may also help to estimate the 

countermeasures, materials, and personnel needed for control and 

eradication.

 Emergency assistance. After the 2014–2015 highly pathogenic avian 

influenza outbreak (HPAI), APHIS created the Voluntary Emergency 

Ready Response Corps (VERRC) to further increase the agency’s capacity 

to respond to an emergency. Additionally, APHIS may use term and 

temporary hires, and volunteers from other USDA agencies or Federal 

entities.

 Animal Care. APHIS Animal Care works with the American Zoological 

Association (AZA) on FMD planning. USDA and the AZA support the 

Zoo and Aquarium All Hazards Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 

(ZAHP) Fusion Center. More about this organization may be found at its 

website: https://zahp.aza.org/. Among the resources found at the ZAHP 

fusion center is the Secure Zoo Strategy (https://securezoostrategy.org/). 
2-8

2.2.5 International Activities

In addition to the domestic activities discussed above, USDA conducts ongoing 

international activities in support of FMD eradication and to bolster preparedness 

planning and response capabilities. The following list details a selection of USDA 

activities:

 Hemispheric collaboration. USDA works with South American countries 

in support of FMD eradication and coordinates planning with international 

organizations, reducing duplication of effort and increasing sociopolitical 

support for FMD eradication. APHIS offers support for vesicular disease 

outbreaks and provides resources for diagnostic testing. In addition, 

because some countries in South America are considered to be FMDinfected, USDA supports programs to maintain a buffer zone between 

Panama and Colombia in an effort to keep North and Central America 

FMD-free.

 International coordination. USDA APHIS collaborates with interdepartmental and international partners to mitigate, prevent, and control 

animal health threats outside the United States through the sharing of 

expertise and information, and development of infrastructure.

 Global Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Alliance (GFRA). USDA’s 

Agricultural Research Service participates in GFRA, a worldwide 

association of animal research organizations involved in combating FMD. 

This global alliance creates collaborative partners and results in sharing of 

progressive FMD control and eradication measures.

 Emergency veterinary assistance. 

 USDA has sent veterinarians to participate in international FMD 

training activities and to assist in FMD response efforts, at the request 

of foreign governments. In providing this assistance, USDA gains a 

bank of valuable expertise in FMD response and control efforts. 

 The United States is also a signatory country—with Australia, Canada, 

Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—in the International 

Animal Health Emergency Reserve (IAHER). While not specific to 

FMD, the IAHER arrangement supports ready mobilization of 

personnel in case of an emergency animal disease event.

2.2.6 International Trade

USDA, in collaboration with the Department of State and the United States Trade 

Representative, will promptly address foreign governments that impose 

unjustifiable U.S. livestock and livestock product trade restrictions because of an 

FMD detection. These efforts focus on cases where bans are inconsistent with 

OIE standards, or with any U.S. bilateral agreements.
National Coordination for FMD Preparedness and Response

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 2-9 

OIE member countries, like the United States, are to “immediately” notify the 

OIE of any confirmed FMDV infection, as defined in the OIE Terrestrial Code. 

International standards for FMD do allow countries to impose bans on imports 

from FMD-infected countries and zones. Countries recognized as FMD-free by 

the United States are listed on the APHIS Animal Health Status of Regions web 

page. 

USDA overseas embassy offices have guidance on how to rapidly report trade 

disruptions to Washington, D.C., headquarters and how to help foreign officials 

respond to such events. Multiple USDA agencies, led by the Foreign Agricultural 

Service, would coordinate a response to any such trade disruption and 

communicate with industry in the United States. USDA APHIS would also 

quickly fulfill any official requests for additional scientific information, including 

case surveillance, movement control measures, and laboratory diagnostics. 

2.3 USDA ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

In the event of an FMD outbreak, effective and efficient whole community 

situation management and clear communication pathways will be critical for a 

successful response effort. A synchronized management and organizational 

structure will help to support the necessary control and eradication actions. 

Accordingly, APHIS has adopted NIMS and the ICS organizational structures to 

manage FAD outbreak response. The ICS is designed to enable efficient and 

effective incident management by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, 

procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational 

structure. 

2.4 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide recognizes that the initial response to 

an incident is handled at the local level, with the lead APHIS program 

establishing the scope and scale of the incident, assessing local resources that may 

be available, and identifying when the response requires support from additional 

APHIS units. 

The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive responsible for implementing 

APHIS policy during an FMD outbreak. The Administrator is supported by the 

APHIS Management Team (AMT) and Emergency Preparedness Committee 

(EPC) which will consider how to best address resource requests for the response 

through a Multi-program Committee (MPC) established at the APHIS level, based 

on the specific incident. 

2.4.1 Multi-Program Committee

The APHIS MPC serves as the senior level leadership group to support incident 

coordination and program area senior leaders when responding to significant 
2-10

agricultural emergencies. Its structure is adaptable and easily expands and 

contracts to provide flexibility. The MPC establishes supportive relationships 

among the various units preparing for and responding to an FMD outbreak.

The APHIS MPC offers guidance on the most efficient way to allocate resources 

during an FMD outbreak. General functions of the group include incident 

prioritization; resource allocation and acquisition; and identification and 

resolution of issues common to all parties. The MPC may also include subject 

matter experts who can reach across the agency to achieve an effective 

coordination structure.

If the emergency response becomes too complex for an APHIS MPC to handle 

efficiently—for example, a large multistate FMD incident with numerous 

response activities—cooperation with other agencies or committees will be 

implemented, and a USDA or other MAC would likely be stood up. These groups, 

comprised of representatives from across USDA agencies or other government 

agencies, would make decisions regarding the sharing and use of critical 

resources. MPC and MAC groups are not part of the on-scene IC; therefore, they

do not command activities in the field.

In addition to policy and incident coordination, the APHIS Administrator, AMT, 

Veterinary Services Deputy Administrator (VSDA), and VS Executive Team 

(VSET) communicate, collaborate, and coordinate with relevant industry 

associations, the National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials (NASAHO) 

and National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA), public 

health agencies (Federal and State), and other partners in a whole community 

approach. Figure 2-1 provides a visual example of the relationship among these 

entities.
National Coordination for FMD Preparedness and Response

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 2-11 

 Figure 2-1. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations: 

Relationship to Incident Management Team 

2.4.2 APHIS Incident Coordination Group

The VSDA, supported by the VSET, will coordinate many aspects of the response 

through an APHIS National Incident Coordination group (ICG) and NIMT. Led 

by a National Incident Coordinator (NIC) and a deputy NIC (or National 

Operations Coordinator), the ICG oversees the functions and response activities 

associated with the incident. Flexible and scalable to the size and scope of the 

incident, the ICG works closely with the unified (State/Federal) IC and the 

APHIS multiagency groups. 

The ICG is responsible for requesting resources, formulating policy options, and 

assisting in implementing response and recovery strategies for an FMD outbreak. 

Another significant function of the ICG is to provide situational awareness, 

through daily or weekly reporting. (For additional information, see APHIS FAD 

Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.) 

Figure 2-2 provides a visual of the relationship of the ICG with response entities, 

including the NIMT, in the APHIS organizational structure. 
2-12 

Figure 2-2. Details of USDA APHIS Multiprogram Coordination, Incident Coordination 

Group, and a Unified Incident Management Team

2.4.3 Organization at the Field Level

At the beginning of an incident, the State Animal Health Official (SAHO) and the 

VS Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC), or their designees, may initially serve as 

Co-Incident Commanders in a unified IC structure. In an FMD response, one of 

five VS NIMTs would deploy and further develop the IC structure, jointly with 

the State. 

The Unified IC establishes an Incident Command Post (ICP), which serves as the 

base of deployment for field personnel. In a large incident, multiple ICPs may 

exist, but each will still remain unified State-Federal IC organizational structures.

(For additional information, see the FAD PReP Incident Information Management 

and Reporting (FAD PReP Manual 3-0) available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

When more than one incident is occurring at the same time, more than one IC 

may be established. Under an Area Command (AC) may also be established. An 

AC is an organization that oversees the management of multiple incidents handled 

individually by separate IC organizations or to oversee the management of a very 

large or evolving incident engaging multiple IMTs. The ICG may assume the role 

of AC. An AC should not be confused with the functions performed by MPC, as 

an AC oversees management coordination of the incident(s), while a MPC element (such as a communications/dispatch center or EOC) coordinates support. 
National Coordination for FMD Preparedness and Response

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 2-13

The actual organizational structure for a given incident will be specific to the 

needs of that incident. As required, APHIS will consider various strategies to 

supplement response personnel, applying either novel concepts or those utilized in 

recent animal disease outbreak responses. For details on the internal structure of 

IMTs and ACs, please see APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and 

Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0).

2.5 DIAGNOSTIC RESOURCES AND LABORATORY 

SUPPORT

USDA also has critical diagnostic resources and a laboratory support network that 

will be leveraged in an FMD outbreak.

2.5.1 National Veterinary Services Laboratories 

The NVSL is the official reference laboratory for FAD diagnostic testing and 

study in the United States. The NVSL performs animal disease testing in support 

of USDA-APHIS programs designed to protect the health of the Nation’s 

livestock. The NVSL provides all confirmatory testing for FMD on all specimens 

found presumptively positive at a National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN) laboratory or other USDA-approved laboratory. The NVSL has two

locations for FAD diagnostic testing: Ames, IA (NVSL-Ames), and Plum Island, 

NY (NVSL-FADDL).

NVSL-FADDL is where FMD viruses would be isolated and the serotype and 

strain would be identified to determine the vaccine to stock or use for the 

outbreak. NVSL-FADDL also assists in testing currently available vaccines.

By 2023, NVSL-FADDL is scheduled to move from Plum Island to the NBAF, 

currently under construction, in Manhattan, Kansas.

2.5.2 National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

As of November 2019, the NAHLN consists of 59 laboratories, and coordinates 

the veterinary diagnostic laboratory capacity of State animal health laboratories 

and their extensive infrastructure, including facilities, equipment, and professional 

expertise. The great majority of these laboratories—including NVSL-Ames and 

NVSL-FADDL—are currently approved to conduct FMD preparedness and surge 

testing. (See Appendix C for a list of approved laboratories). 

The NAHLN provides a means for early detection of FMD, rapid response 

through surge capacity to test outbreak samples, and recovery by the capability to 

test large numbers of samples to show freedom from FMD. The confirmation of 

an FMD outbreak will be made at NVSL-FADDL. After positive confirmation of 

FMD, subsequent samples from premises inside the established Control Area 
2-14

(CA) may be sent to laboratories that are part of the NAHLN. Please see 

Chapter 4 for more information.

2.5.3 Center for Veterinary Biologics

APHIS’ Center for Veterinary Biologics is responsible for licensing new 

products, including new diagnostic test kits and vaccines for FMD. This work—

centered on enforcement of the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act—ensures that pure, safe, 

potent, and effective veterinary biologics are available for the diagnosis, 

prevention, and treatment of animal diseases.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-1 

Chapter 3 

FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy 

This chapter covers a wide range of information about how USDA APHIS, States, 

Tribal Nations, localities, and stakeholders would respond to an FMD outbreak in 

the United States. In particular, this chapter

 identifies USDA APHIS goals for responding to an FMD outbreak; 

 identifies critical activities and tools required to achieve the response 

goals; 

 discusses the epidemiological principles for any FMD response strategy;

 defines and describes key response strategies, including vaccine strategies; 

 reviews factors that may influence the response strategies and scope of 

regulatory intervention;

 identifies types of FMD outbreaks and phases of FMD response; and 

 addresses recovery and reviews the international standards from the OIE 

for FMD-free status.

3.1 RESPONSE GOALS

The goals of an FMD response are to (1) detect, control, and contain FMD in 

animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate FMD using strategies that seek to 

protect public health and the environment, and stabilize animal agriculture, the 

food supply, and the economy; and (3) provide science- and risk-based 

approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected 

animals and non-contaminated animal products. 

Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, States, 

Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as 

possible. The objective is to allow the United States to regain FMD-free status 

without the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease 

outbreak itself.
3-2

3.2 PRINCIPLES AND CRITICAL ACTIVITIES OF AN 

FMD RESPONSE

3.2.1 Critical Activities

In order to achieve the goals of an FMD response, critical activities and tools 

must be implemented to execute the response strategy. Box 3-1 lists these critical 

activities and tools. A science- and risk-based approach that protects public 

health, animal health, and the environment and stabilizes animal agriculture, the 

food supply, and the economy will be employed at all times. Please see 

Chapter 4 for more information on these critical activities and tools, (i.e., 

movement control, disposal, and epidemiological investigation and tracing).

Box 3-1. Critical Activities and Tools for and FMD Response

3.2.2 Epidemiological Principles

Three basic epidemiological principles form the foundation of any response 

strategy to contain, control, and eradicate FMD in the U.S. domestic livestock 

population:

1. Prevent contact between FMDV and susceptible animals.

a. This is accomplished through quarantine of infected animals, 

movement controls in the Infected Zone(s) (IZ) and Buffer Zone(s) 

(BZ) (the CAs), biosecurity procedures, and rigorous cleaning and 

disinfection protocols to protect non-infected animals.

b. Certain circumstances may warrant accelerating the depopulation of 

animals at risk for exposure to FMD to decrease the population density 

of susceptible animals.

Critical Activities and Tools for Containment, Control, and Eradication

• Public awareness campaign

• Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls

• Rapid diagnosis and reporting

• Epidemiological investigation and tracing 

• Increased surveillance

• Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and noncontaminated animal products

• Biosecurity measures

• Cleaning and disinfection (virus elimination) measures

• Effective and appropriate disposal procedures

• Mass depopulation and euthanasia (as response strategy indicates)

• Emergency vaccination (as response strategy indicates)
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-3

c. There is a serious but lesser transmission risk posed by people, 

materials, conveyances, and animals that may have been in contact 

with FMD and serve as mechanical vectors. Contact with susceptible 

animals should be prevented and transmission risk mitigated through 

biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection (virus elimination) measures.

2. Stop the production of FMDV in infected or exposed animals. This is 

accomplished by timely slaughter (and processing) or mass depopulation 

(and disposal) of infected and potentially infected animals.

3. Increase the disease resistance of susceptible animals to FMDV or reduce 

the shedding of FMDV in infected or exposed animals. This can be 

accomplished by emergency vaccination if a suitable vaccine is available 

and can be administered in a timely manner.

3.2.3 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign

One of the most important critical activities is a public awareness campaign. Box 

3-2 details the importance of a coordinated public awareness campaign in an 

effective response strategy.

Box 3-2. Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign

APHIS LPA periodically updates a detailed set of FMD message maps and 

participates in the industry Cross-Species Communications Working Group. In 

addition, the livestock industry maintains a “dark” FMD website that can quickly 

be made visible to the public. These coordinated efforts will contribute to 

consistent messaging to producers and the public in case of an FMD outbreak.

Importance of Response Communication

Regardless of the response strategy or strategies selected, a public awareness 

campaign must be effectively coordinated with audience-appropriate 

information. This will support the response strategy by

• engaging and leveraging Federal, State, Tribal, local, and stakeholder 

relationships to provide unified public messages for local, national, and 

international audiences;

• addressing the issues and concerns relating to food safety, public health, 

the environment, and animal welfare; 

• addressing issues and concerns related to interstate commerce, continuity 

of business, and international trade; and

• widely disseminating key communication messages to consumers and 

producers. 
3-4

3.2.4 FMD Vaccination Strategy

The use of emergency vaccination strategies may be considered in any FMD 

outbreak. An emergency vaccination strategy can help to achieve the goals of an 

FMD response effort and is founded upon the three epidemiological principles of 

response. In order to be effective, vaccines used in emergency vaccination must 

be matched to a specific serotype, and ideally matched with the field strain 

causing the outbreak. There are many challenges to using emergency vaccination 

in an FMD response, but also many benefits. An FMD response may use one 

strategy or a variety of strategies in order to detect, control, contain, and 

ultimately eradicate FMD in domestic animals. The use of emergency vaccination 

will be determined by the Unified IC, the SAHO(s), and the VSDA, who is also 

the U.S. Chief Veterinary Officer (VSDA/CVO).

3.2.5 Incident Management 

The outbreak response effort should be implemented in a manner consistent with 

NIMS and ICS with an appropriate span of control and delegation of authority, as 

described in Chapter 2. Incident Management includes conducting critical 

activities in accordance to Federal and State response plans, policies, and 

procedures to prevent further spread of FMD. Cooperative Federal, State, Tribal, 

local and industry response measures will be carried out with extreme urgency 

using the most appropriate geographic and jurisdictional scopes required to 

manage the situation. Response information must utilize the coordinated public 

awareness campaign (see Section 3.2.3) to clearly, and frequently relay consistent 

information to the whole community throughout the duration of the outbreak. 

3.2.6 Authorization for Initial Response Activities

When the criteria for a presumptive FMD case has been met, the APHIS 

Administrator or VSDA/CVO can authorize APHIS personnel—in conjunction 

with State, Tribal, and Federal personnel—to initiate activities on the index 

premises. These activities may include, but are not exclusive to, depopulation, 

cleaning and disinfection, and epidemiological investigations of associated 

Contact Premises (CP)16. Concurrently, SAHOs or Tribal officials will 

immediately issue a quarantine or hold order for the relevant zones, areas, or 

premises. A Federal quarantine may be issued when requested by SAHOs or as 

directed by the Secretary of Agriculture. 

State, Federal, and Tribal officials will also immediately discuss the issuance and 

specifications of initial movement standstill(s) in the United States for relevant 

regions or zones. In the event a National Movement Standstill is needed, USDA 

APHIS will provide specific guidance via Federal Register Order. 

16 Contact Premises that are depopulated because of epidemiological risk factors are often 

termed as “dangerous Contact Premises (DCs)”.
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-5 

Additionally, an ICG NIC and an IC should be identified as soon as possible to 

coordinate initial activities of an FMD detection. 

3.2.7 Timeline in any FMD Response for the First 72 Hours

In the first 72 hours after the detection of FMD in the United States, specific 

actions will occur, regardless of outbreak characteristics. These critical tasks are 

fundamental to the rapid control and containment of FMD. Figure 3-1 highlights 

these tasks.

Figure 3-1. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of a U.S. FMD Outbreak 
3-6

3.3 RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL AND 

ERADICATION OF FMD IN DOMESTIC LIVESTOCK

There are several generally accepted strategies for the control and eradication of 

FMD in domestic livestock following an outbreak, as described below and in 

Table 3-1.

 Stamping-out. Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals.

 Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination-

 to-kill.

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible 

animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent 

depopulation and disposal of vaccinated animals. Depopulation and 

disposal of vaccinated animals may be delayed until logistically 

feasible, as determined by IC and the VSDA/CVO.

 to-slaughter.

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible 

animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent 

slaughter and processing of vaccinated animals, if animals are 

eligible for slaughter under USDA FSIS authority and rules and/or 

State and Tribal authority and rules.

 to-live.

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible 

animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, without subsequent 

depopulation of vaccinated animals. Vaccinated animals intended 

for breeding, slaughter, milking, or other purposes live out their 

useful lives.

 Emergency vaccination to-live without stamping-out. Vaccination used 

without depopulation of infected animals or subsequent slaughter or 

depopulation of vaccinated animals. 

 No action. A course of action where FMD would run through an affected 

population paired with control and containment measures. This is an 

unlikely option for domestic animals; however, if FMD does encroach into 

wildlife this may be a likely strategy. 

Depending upon the circumstances and scale of the outbreak, one or a 

combination of these strategies can be applied. In some cases, the intended 

disposition of vaccinated animals (kill, slaughter, live) may be affected by 

epidemiological, logistical, and other considerations during an outbreak. 
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-7 

Table 3-1. Overview of Traditional FMD Response Strategies17

Strategy or 

Strategies Definition of Strategy Likelihood of Use Example of Application

Stamping-Out (No 

Emergency 

Vaccination)

Depopulation of clinically affected 

and in-contact susceptible 

animals.

Possible (if outbreak is 

contained in jurisdictional 

areas in which FMD can be 

readily contained and further 

dissemination of the virus is 

unlikely).

Stamping-out Infected 

Premises. 

Stamping-Out 

Modified with 

Emergency 

Vaccination to Kill

Depopulation of clinically affected 

and in-contact susceptible 

animals and vaccination of at-risk 

animals, with subsequent 

depopulation and disposal of 

vaccinated animals. 

Depopulation and disposal of 

vaccinated animals may be 

delayed until logistically feasible.

Possible (if outbreak is 

contained in jurisdictional 

areas in which FMD can be 

readily contained and further 

dissemination of the virus is 

unlikely).

Stamping-out Infected 

Premises, emergency 

vaccination to kill within the 

selected areas of the 

Buffer Zone in 

Containment Vaccination 

Zones. 

Stamping-Out 

Modified with 

Emergency 

Vaccination to 

Slaughter

Depopulation of clinically affected 

and in-contact susceptible 

animals and vaccination of at-risk 

animals, with subsequent 

slaughter of vaccinated animals if 

animals are eligible for slaughter 

under USDA FSIS and/or State 

and Tribal authority and rules.

Highly likely (depending on 

the type of the FMD 

outbreak).

Stamping-out Infected 

Premises; emergency 

vaccination to slaughter 

within the Control Area in 

Containment Vaccination 

Zones.

Stamping-Out 

Modified with 

Emergency 

Vaccination to Live

Depopulation of clinically affected 

and in-contact susceptible 

animals and vaccination of at-risk 

animals, without subsequent 

depopulation of vaccinated 

animals. Vaccinated animals 

intended for breeding, slaughter, 

or other purposes live out their 

useful lives. 

Highly likely (depending on 

the type of the FMD 

outbreak).

Stamping-out Infected 

Premises; emergency 

vaccination to live outside 

of the Control Area in 

Protection Vaccination 

Zones.

Combination of 

Stamping-Out 

Modified with 

Emergency 

Vaccination to Kill, 

Slaughter, and Live

Combination of emergency 

vaccination to kill, slaughter, and 

live.

Highly likely (depending on 

the type of the FMD 

outbreak).

Stamping-out Infected 

Premises; emergency 

vaccination to slaughter 

within the Control Area in 

Containment Vaccination 

Zones and emergency 

vaccination to live outside.

Vaccination to Live 

(without StampingOut)

Vaccination used without 

depopulation of infected animals 

or subsequent depopulation or 

slaughter of vaccinated animals.

Less likely (unlikely to be 

implemented at start of 

outbreak).

No stamping-out Infected 

Premises; Vaccination to 

live outside of the Control 

Area in Protection 

Vaccination Zones.

No Action FMD would take its course in the 

affected population; other 

measures may be implemented 

to control and contain FMD 

spread.

Unlikely in domestic 

animals.

Quarantine and movement 

control measures; 

biosecurity measures; 

cleaning and disinfection 

measures implemented. 

No stamping-out and no 

vaccination.

17 Extracted from FAD PReP Ready Reference Guide—Overview of Emergency Vaccination 

available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
3-8

3.3.1 Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy

Stamping-out has been a common approach in past FMD outbreaks in countries 

that were previously FMD-free. This strategy is most appropriate if the outbreak 

is contained to a jurisdictional area or a region in which FMD can be readily 

contained and further dissemination of the virus is unlikely. (See Box 3-3.)

Stamping-out, is currently defined in the OIE Terrestrial Code (2019), as

a policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out under the 

authority of the Veterinary Authority the following: a.) the killing of 

the animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected in 

the herd or flock and, where appropriate, those in other herds or flocks 

which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal 

contact, or by indirect contact with the causal pathogenic agent; . . . 

Box 3-3. Critical Elements of Stamping Out 

3.3.1.1 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT

Figure 3-2 shows an example of a stamping-out strategy, where IP are 

depopulated. See Section 4.5 for more information on zones, areas, and premises 

for FMD outbreak response.

Stamping-Out: Critical Elements

• As soon as possible after classification of premises as an Infected 

Premises (IP), the infected and susceptible livestock will be euthanized or 

depopulated. In many cases, susceptible livestock on Contact Premises

(CP) may also be depopulated as soon as possible.

• Where resources are limited, premises will be prioritized so that those 

with the highest potential for active FMD spread are ‘stamped-out’ first. 

• Based on an epidemiological assessment, animals with clinical signs may 

be prioritized for depopulation to reduce virus excretion.

• Public concerns about stamping-out will require a well-planned, proactive 

public relations and liaison campaign. Stakeholders, the public, and the 

international community must be involved.

• Care should be taken to consider mental health implications for owners 

and responders in the event a stamping-out strategy is implemented. 
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-9

Figure 3-2. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

(Infected Premises Would be Depopulated)

 Note: Figure is not to scale.

3.3.2 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination 

to-Kill or to-Slaughter

These strategies are similar in implementation but differ in the final disposition of 

vaccinated animals. Vaccination to-kill involves the depopulation of clinically 

affected, in-contact susceptible animals, and vaccination of at-risk animals, with

subsequent depopulation and disposal or slaughter of vaccinated animals. 

Vaccination to-slaughter requires that animals are eligible for slaughter under 

USDA FSIS authority and rules, and/or State and Tribal authority and rules. 

These suppressive vaccination strategies involve the following:

 The goal is to suppress virus replication in high-risk susceptible animals 

by using emergency vaccination and then depopulate or slaughter 

vaccinates at a later date as determined by IC and the VSDA/CVO.

 The targeted vaccination of high-risk susceptible animals in an IZ, BZ, or 

Vaccination Zone (VZ). Ring or regional vaccination around an IP or IZ is 

a frequently cited example of this strategy.

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary.
3-10 

 Additionally, for movement to slaughter, DIVA testing may be necessary 

for movement between zones, interstate commerce, and international 

trade.18

3.3.2.1 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO-KILL OR TO-SLAUGHTER

Figure 3-3 shows four examples of how a stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to-kill or to-slaughter strategy might be implemented. Animals on IP 

would be depopulated, while other animals in a Containment Vaccination Zone 

(CVZ) may be vaccinated. 

Figure 3-3. Examples of Zones and Areas Utilizing Stamping-Out: Modified with Emergency 

Vaccination to-Kill or Slaughter (Infected Premises Would be Depopulated in Either Case) 

Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone Emergency Vaccination in Buffer Zone

18 Detailed information on vaccine selection and vaccination strategies can be found in 

National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) Guidelines: Vaccination for 

Contagious Diseases, Appendix A: FMD. 
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-11

Emergency Vaccination in Control Area

Note: Figures are not to scale.

Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone and Partial Buffer Zone

3.3.3 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination 

to-Live

This strategy involves the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, without subsequent 

slaughter or depopulation of vaccinated animals because of their vaccination 

status. Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to-live is used when 

vaccinated animals intended for breeding, slaughter, milking, or other purposes 

live out their useful lives. 

This protective vaccination strategy involves the following:

 The goal is to protect susceptible animals from infection using emergency 

vaccination with the deliberate intent to maintain vaccinates for the 

duration of their usefulness.

 The targeted vaccination of non-infected animals. This may include 

valuable genetic stock, long-lived production animals, or areas with a 

high-density population of susceptible animals at high risk of becoming 

infected.

 Requires the establishment of one or more VZs free of FMD, the 

establishment of one or more CAs for infected animals, and movement 

controls to keep infected animals out of VZs free of FMD.

 DIVA testing may be necessary for movement between zones, interstate 

commerce, and international trade.

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary.
3-12

3.3.3.1 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY

VACCINATION TO-LIVE 

Figure 3-4 shows an example of how a stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to-live response strategy might be implemented. Animals on IP would 

be depopulated, while other animals in a Protection Vaccination Zone (PVZ) 

would be vaccinated. Any animals vaccinated would not be subsequently 

depopulated or slaughtered solely on the basis of vaccination status.

Figure 3-4. Example of Zones and Areas for Stamping-Out Modified with 

Emergency Vaccination to-Live (Infected Premises Would be Depopulated)

 Note: Figure is not to scale.

3.3.4 Emergency Vaccination to-Live without Stamping-Out

This strategy involves no depopulation of infected animals and the emergency 

vaccination of susceptible animals, with the intention of not slaughtering or 

depopulating these animals at a later date because of their vaccination status. This 

strategy might be used in an FMD outbreak in which FMD is widely disseminated 

across the United States, affecting many animal industries, where resources are 

not available for stamping-out, and a policy decision has been made not to stampout. Although this strategy is highly unlikely to be employed initially in an FMD 

outbreak response, it is possible that, in the course of an outbreak, the decision 

might be made to switch to this strategy if the disease becomes widespread. 

This protective vaccination strategy involves the following:

 The goal is to protect susceptible animals from infection with emergency 

vaccination, with the intention of not depopulating or slaughtering 

vaccinates at a later date because of vaccination status.
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-13

 Requires the establishment of one or more VZs free of FMD, the 

establishment of one or more CAs for infected animals, and movement 

controls to keep infected animals out of VZs free of FMD.

 DIVA testing may be necessary for movement between zones, interstate 

commerce, and international trade.

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary.

3.3.4.1 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO-LIVE WITHOUT 

STAMPING-OUT

Figure 3-5 provides an example of emergency vaccination to-live without 

stamping-out. There would be no stamping-out under this response, only 

emergency vaccination to-live. 

Figure 3-5. Example of Zones and Areas for Emergency Vaccination to-Live without 

Stamping-Out

Containment Vaccination Zone and Protection Vaccination Zone

Note: Figure is not to scale. Yellow signifies a Vaccination Zone. Containment Vaccination Zones 

are typically inside a Control Area; Protection Vaccination Zones are typically outside a Control 

Area. Protection Vaccination Zones are intended to be zone(s) without infected animals.

3.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SELECTION OF 

RESPONSE STRATEGY OR STRATEGIES

Depending upon the circumstances and scale of the outbreak, a combination of 

one or more of the response strategies can be applied. Choosing an initial 

response strategy or modifying strategies as an outbreak unfolds is an important, 

but complex decision process. Thus, it is not possible to delineate a priori the 

specific factors that might signal the need to modify the response to an FMD 
3-14

outbreak, but multiple factors must be considered and their favorable or 

undesirable impacts weighed.

3.4.1 General Factors that Influence a Response Strategy

Detection of FMD will result in emergency intervention by State, Tribal, Federal, 

and local authorities; the scope of regulatory intervention and the selection of a 

response strategy or strategies in an FMD outbreak depend on the following:

 Consequences of the outbreak. The consequences of the FMD outbreak, 

and the impact of the response, in terms of disruptions to interstate 

commerce and international trade, national security, food security, animal 

health, the environment, the economy, interstate commerce, international 

trade, and regulatory issues.

 Acceptance. Acceptance of response policy (social and political) by 

different communities, from local to international.

 Scale of the outbreak. The number of animals infected, species infected, 

number of premises affected, and susceptible animal population density 

for infected areas or areas at high-risk of becoming infected with FMDV.

 Rate of outbreak spread. The rate of spread of infection in terms of 

number of premises, types of premises, number of susceptible animals, 

types of susceptible animals; this is the rate at which each IP “reproduces” 

or results in other, additional IPs.

 Veterinary countermeasures available. The availability and efficacy of 

veterinary countermeasures such as FMD vaccines.

 Resources available to implement response strategies. The capabilities 

and resources available to eradicate FMD in domestic animals and to 

control and eradicate FMD in potential wildlife reservoirs.

3.4.2 Emergency Vaccination Sourcing and Availability

The acquisition and use of FMD vaccine is a complicated issue including the 

amount of vaccine available, production limitations, and the availability of the 

appropriate type/subtype(s) of the FMDV. The most commonly used FMD 

vaccine is inactivated or killed vaccine. Manufacture of this product requires 

starting with live virus and processing until completion to finished vaccine. 

Vaccine may be stored as vaccine antigen concentrate (VAC) for up to 5 to 12 

years depending on the manufacture. Per 21 U.S. Code 133a, no live FMDV may 

be introduced for any purpose into any part of the mainland of the United States 

by commercial manufacturers or Federal entities. Therefore, conventional 

inactivated vaccine must be manufactured abroad then shipped to the United 

States for use. 
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-15

There are currently two mechanisms by which the United States is supplied with 

FMD vaccine, the North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank 

(NAFMDVB) and the National Animal Vaccine and Veterinary Countermeasures 

Bank (NAVVCB). These Banks contain quantities of vaccine stored as VAC 

encompassing a range of representative FMD types/subtypes that will be 

converted into finished vaccine at the time of the outbreak. Current quantities of 

VAC in the Banks are only sufficient to address small to moderate outbreaks. 

Vaccines produced from the VAC are high-potency inactivated vaccines 

(meaning they do not contain live virus), are DIVA capable, and are shown to be 

effective in cattle, swine, sheep and goats. This section reviews current vaccine 

capabilities for an FMD outbreak in the United States.

3.4.2.1 THE NORTH AMERICAN FOOT-AND-MOUTH VACCINE BANK

The NAFMDVB is a trilateral entity that it is jointly administered by the CVOs of 

Mexico, Canada, and the United States. If one or more of the three countries has 

an outbreak and needs to use FMD vaccine, the Bank will be activated and 

vaccine will be shipped to the affected country(s) assuming an appropriate match 

is available. Allocation of the vaccine will be in accordance to the contribution 

ratio to the Bank—70 percent for the United States, 20 percent for Mexico and 10 

percent for Canada. Any or all countries may opt to take a portion of their finished 

vaccine, irrespective of whether they have animals infected with FMD. However, 

vaccine availability is not strictly limited by this ratio since countries may decide 

to reallocate all or a portion of their vaccine to the affected country(s). Each 

country is responsible for replenishing the VAC which they choose to reformulate 

into vaccine. 

3.4.2.2 THE NATIONAL ANIMAL VACCINE AND VETERINARY COUNTERMEASURES BANK 

The Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (The “Farm Bill”) included the 

establishment of the National Animal Vaccine and Veterinary Countermeasures 

Bank (NAVVCB), otherwise known as the National Bank. The National Bank has 

sufficient resources to acquire greater quantities more quickly, and more strains of 

FMD vaccine, as compared to the NAFMDVB, for exclusive use in the United 

States. Vaccine acquisition is currently underway to complete this new National 

Bank. The goal is to have between 10 and 25 million doses of each of the 10-12 

highest risk strains included in the NAVVCB.

3.4.2.3 BANK ACTIVATION AND SURGE CAPACITY

In the event FMD is introduced to the United States, vaccine would likely be 

requested by USDA APHIS after confirmatory testing, approximately 24-48 hours 

after sample submission. 

• Activation of the NAFMDVB provides the U.S. access to an allocation of 

70%, between 1.75 and 2.5 million doses (depending on the 

manufacturer), that would be received within 10-14 days post-order. 
3-16

Based on the unique epidemiology of the outbreak, Canada and Mexico 

could also elect to donate their vaccine allotment to the U.S., if 

appropriate, to support rapid containment. The reverse also applies if 

Mexico or Canada experience an outbreak. 

• With NAVVCB activation, it is anticipated that a minimum of 2.5 million 

doses would come to the U.S. within 10-14 days post-order, all of it 

available for domestic use, with subsequent shipments arriving every 10-

14 days as available. 

In a moderate to large scale outbreak, the banks are likely to be activated to 

exhaust all available VAC for rapid receipt of finished vaccine, prior to soliciting 

continuous production. The production cycle for inactivated vaccine, starting with 

master seed and finishing with completed vaccine, is 14 weeks. This means there 

may be a gap in vaccine receipt even if surge capacity production is requested and 

orders are immediately placed for future vaccine. Vaccine manufactures also have 

other customers which must be served as well as meeting the surge capacity needs 

of the United States, so quantities may be somewhat restricted. For example, one 

of the primary FMD vaccine suppliers to the United States can only commit a 

portion of their production to North America, totaling one million doses per week 

up to 80 weeks.

3.4.2.4 FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES

Novel vaccine technologies on a variety of different platforms are currently being 

investigated by commercial, academic and governmental research institutions. To 

date, only one novel vaccine (an adenovirus-vectored A24 topotype) has been 

licensed by the APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics for use in the United 

States.

Additionally, restrictions on research of FMD vaccines on the U.S. mainland have 

been relaxed. In 2018, the Secretary of Agriculture authorized the movement of a

genetically modified, non-infectious version of the FMDV into the U.S. mainland 

for continued vaccine development and study. Having access to efficacious 

vaccines would enable USDA to more quickly source and acquire FMD vaccine 

in the event of an outbreak of this devastating disease.

3.4.3 Determining an Appropriate FMD Response Strategy

Table 3-2 highlights key factors to be considered when determining whether a 

particular response strategy would be appropriate and advantageous for 

responding to an FMD outbreak. This table simply lists important factors that will 

be considered in determining the initial response strategy or modifying this 

strategy. No single factor listed below will independently dictate a response 

strategy.
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-17 

Table 3-2. Factors Influencing a Response Strategy or Strategies for U.S. FMD 

Outbreak 

Strategy

Factor or criterion 

supporting the 

response strategy

Stamping-out

Stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to kill

Stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to 

slaughter

Stamping-out 

modified with 

emergency 

vaccination to 

live

Emergency 

vaccination to 

live without 

stamping-out

Suitable vaccine for FMD 

outbreak strain

Not available/

feasible

Available Available Available Available

Resources for stampingout (such as disposal)

Adequate Adequate Moderately 

limited

Limited Limited

Resources for vaccination 

(such as diagnostic 

testing, tracing efforts, 

and permitting activities)

Limited Moderately 

limited

Adequate Adequate Adequate

Population density of 

susceptible animals at 

high risk of becoming 

infected

Low Moderate High High High

Population density of 

virus amplifying animals

Low Moderate Moderate High High

Movement of infected 

animals, products, or 

fomites out of Control 

Area

No evidence of 

extensive 

movement

Evidence of 

movement

Evidence of 

extensive 

movement

Evidence of 

extensive 

movement

Evidence of 

extensive 

movement

Origin of outbreak Known Known Unknown Unknown Unknown

Location of initial 

outbreak

Isolated 

premises

Livestock 

producing area

Livestock 

producing area

Livestock 

producing area

Livestock 

producing area

Spread of outbreak Slow Rapid Rapid Rapid Rapid

Distribution of outbreak Limited or 

restricted

Regional Widespread Widespread Widespread

Risk of infection in 

valuable, rare, 

endangered, or highvalue genetic livestock

High High High Moderate Low

Likelihood that FMD 

could become prevalent 

in feral swine, deer, or 

other wildlife

High High High Moderate Low

Public acceptance of 

stamping-out strategy

Neutral reaction 

or weak 

opposition

Neutral reaction 

or weak 

opposition

Weak opposition Strong 

opposition

Strong 

opposition

Surveillance, diagnostic, 

and laboratory resources 

for serosurveillance after 

vaccination

Limited Limited Limited Available Available
3-18 

3.4.4 Phases and Types of FMD Outbreaks

An FMD outbreak in the United States will be a complex event. Having predefined phases and types19 may be useful to facilitate the development of 

adaptable emergency response plans and processes. The phase (temporal) and 

type (extent) of the FMD outbreak is expected to change over time and could be 

designated by the authorities responsible for managing the response. Types are 

loosely defined as follows:

 Type 1–2 Focal to Moderate Regional

 Type 3 Large Regional

 Type 4–6 Widespread/ National outbreak to catastrophic North 

 American outbreak. 

19 This is one approach to describing a response to an FMD outbreak in the United States. 

USDA APHIS. (2013). FAD PReP Strategy Document: Classification of Phases and Types of a 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak. Retrieved from: http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-andtypes-of-an-FMD-outbreak. 

Domestic stakeholders’ 

acceptance of 

regionalization with 

stamping-out or 

vaccination to kill

Yes Yes No No No

Domestic stakeholders’ 

acceptance of 

regionalization with 

vaccination to live or 

vaccination to slaughter

No No Yes Yes Yes

Trading partner 

acceptance of 

regionalization with 

stamping-out or 

vaccination to kill

Accepted Accepted Not accepted Not accepted Not accepted

Trading partner 

acceptance of 

regionalization with 

vaccination to slaughter 

or vaccination to live

Not accepted Not accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted

Assessments and 

economic analysis of 

competing control 

strategies 

It is likely that a 

control strategy 

with emergency 

vaccination will 

lead to 

significantly 

higher economic 

losses, or longer 

duration of the 

outbreak

It is likely that a 

control strategy 

without 

emergency 

vaccination to kill 

will lead to 

significantly 

higher economic 

losses or longer 

duration of the 

outbreak

It is likely that a 

control strategy 

without 

emergency 

vaccination to 

slaughter will 

lead to 

significantly 

higher economic 

losses or longer 

duration of the 

outbreak

It is likely that a 

control strategy 

without 

emergency 

vaccination to 

live will lead to 

significantly 

higher economic 

losses or longer 

duration of the 

outbreak

It is likely that a 

control strategy 

with stampingout will lead to 

significantly 

higher 

economic 

losses or 

longer duration 

of the outbreak
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-19 

Figure 3-6 describes the phases of FMD response, which progress from 

confirmation through recovery to declaration of freedom. 

Figure 3-6. Phases of FMD Response

For detail on the Types and Phases of a response with respect to associated zones, 

see the FAD PReP Ready Reference Guide—Understanding Response Strategies. 

3.5 RECOVERY AFTER AN FMD OUTBREAK

USDA APHIS will attempt to implement response strategies that are expedient in 

allowing the United States to return to FMD-free status, preferably FMD-free 

without (continued) vaccination. The OIE recognizes FMD-free status with and 

without vaccination in countries and in zones. 

3.5.1 FMD-Free Designations 

 FMD-free country where vaccination is not practiced. The OIE recognizes 

about 70 countries FMD-free without vaccination. Stamping-out is the most 

efficient strategy for achieving this status, though vaccination to-kill could 

also achieve this status. Vaccination to-slaughter and vaccination to-live 

strategies could be employed to achieve this status over a longer period.

 FMD-free country where vaccination is practiced. The OIE recognizes one 

country as having this status. The United States does not recognize this 
3-20 

country as FMD-free, but it is permitted to export fresh beef to the United 

States.20 Vaccination to slaughter and vaccination to-live strategies could be 

used to achieve this status over time.

 FMD-free zone where vaccination is not practiced. The OIE recognizes 

several member countries with FMD-free zone without vaccination. The 

United States recognizes two of these zones as FMD-free for import 

purposes.21 This is a possible interim goal for the United States if FMD-free 

country status is not obtainable. Stamping-out, vaccination to-kill, vaccination 

to-slaughter, or vaccination to-live strategies could all be used to achieve this 

status.

 FMD-free zone where vaccination is practiced. The OIE recognizes several

member countries with zones having this status. On the basis of risk 

assessments, the United States does not recognize any FMD-free zones where 

vaccination is practiced for import purposes. Vaccination to slaughter and 

vaccination to-live strategies could be used to achieve this status.

The remaining OIE member countries are generally considered to be FMDinfected countries. A country will not be recognized as FMD-free until the 

requirements are met for one of the classifications listed, per OIE standards. The 

OIE Terrestrial Code for FMD lists the detailed criteria for recognition.

3.5.2 OIE Minimum Time to FMD-Free Designations

For the United States to recover its free status after an outbreak, the summarized 

minimum time requirements herein will apply, in coordination with surveillance 

efforts and other documentation. These time requirements apply to both free 

countries and free zones where vaccination is not practiced: 

 Three months after disposal of the last animal killed, if a stamping-out 

strategy without emergency vaccination is employed. 

 Three months after disposal of the last animal killed or the slaughter of all 

vaccinated animals, whichever occurred last, if a stamping-out modified 

with emergency vaccination to-kill or -slaughter strategy is employed.

 Six months after the disposal of the last animal killed or the last 

vaccination, whichever occurred last, if a stamping-out modified with 

emergency vaccination to-live strategy is employed.

20 Under specific conditions: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 9, §94.29. Restrictions on 

importation of fresh (chilled or frozen) beef and ovine meat from specified regions. 

https://www.ecfr.gov. 21 USDA APHIS. (2019). Animal Health Statuses of Regions: Foot-and-Mouth Disease. 

Retrieved from: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/animal-and-animalproduct-import-information/animal-health-status-of-regions. 
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-21 

 Twelve months after the last vaccination, if stamping-out is not applied or 

is discontinued, and a continued vaccination to-live strategy has been 

adopted. 

 FMD freedom with vaccination can be applied for 24 months after the last 

positive detection, if stamping-out is not employed and vaccination is 

continuing. 

These time requirements are minimum OIE standards. Regardless of OIE 

recommendations, it is quite possible that international trade will not resume for 

many months after an FMD outbreak given the circumstances of the outbreak.

Figure 3-7 visualizes and references OIE articles with respect to the minimum 

time requirements. 

Figure 3-7. Minimum OIE waiting periods and pathways for recovery of FMD free 

status after an outbreak where vaccination is not practiced 22

3.5.3 Surveillance for Recognition of Disease-Freedom 

Surveillance is fundamental in proving disease freedom after an FMD outbreak in 

hopes to regain disease-free status. The OIE Terrestrial Code specifies 

surveillance procedures for members re-applying for recognition of freedom from 

22 OIE. (2019). Article 8.8.42. Terrestrial Animal Health Code: Foot-and-Mouth Disease.

Retrieved from: https://www.oie.int/en/standard-setting/terrestrial-code/access-online/
3-22 

FMD for the whole country or zone where vaccination is either practiced or not 

practiced, following an outbreak. These general surveillance conditions and 

methods for FMD are found in Articles 8.8.40 through 8.8.42 (2019). 

The use and interpretation of serological tests is addressed in the OIE Terrestrial 

Code and in the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial 

Animals (Terrestrial Manual23). These sections discuss serological tests for both 

structural proteins and NSP. Tests for structural proteins are serotype specific and 

include structural protein antigen enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) 

and the Virus Neutralization Test (VNT). Tests for NSP antibodies include the 

3ABC ELISA, which is conducted by NVSL-FADDL. 

Specific information on surveillance and diagnostic testing is provided in

Chapter 4. 

3.5.4 Release of Control Area Restrictions

Quarantine and movement controls will be maintained until at least 28 days (two 

OIE incubation periods) have elapsed since the decontamination of all confirmed 

IP and negative results of surveillance activities. IC and animal health officials 

need to plan for a release of quarantine prior to or during the issuance of 

quarantine and movement controls. Such a plan would specify procedures by 

which quarantined premises will be evaluated for FMD freedom and how the 

quarantine will be released (by sections, by risk, or in its entirety).

3.5.5 Disposition of Vaccinates

If vaccination was used in the outbreak, FMD vaccinates may still be subject to 

movement controls and monitoring measures after the release of the CA. 

3.5.6 Country Freedom Declaration

The United States will apply to the OIE after meeting OIE requirements. FMDfree status will require a formal submission detailing FMD policy, eradication 

procedures, surveillance, monitoring and tracing of vaccinates, and veterinary 

infrastructure. Acceptance of the claim for country freedom may also involve an 

inspection by an international panel to review the eradication program and all 

available information. 

While the OIE lists minimum time requirements for recovering FMD-freedom 

after an outbreak in a previously free country, it should again be acknowledged 

that re-establishing international trade with trading partners may take longer than 

these minimum time periods.

23 OIE Terrestrial Manual. (2018). Chapter 3.1.8 Foot and Mouth Disease (Infection with 

Foot and Mouth Disease Virus). Retrieved from: 

https://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Health_standards/tahm/3.01.08_FMD.pdf. 
FMD Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 3-23

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-1 

Chapter 4 

Specific FMD Response Critical Activities 

and Tools

FAD PReP documents identify critical activities and tools to be employed in the 

event of an FMD outbreak. These critical activities and response tools will assist 

in controlling, containing, and eradicating FMD while facilitating continuity of 

business (COB) in an outbreak. This chapter describes key components of these 

critical activities and tools.

The FAD PReP SOPs and NAHEMS Guidelines referenced in this chapter can be 

found at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

4.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY

Information on the etiology and ecology of FMD promotes a common 

understanding of the disease agent among responders and other stakeholders (see 

Chapter 1 for FMD information). The FAD PReP FMD Overview of Etiology 

and Ecology SOP contains additional information. 

4.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS AND CASE 

DEFINITIONS

Laboratory and case definitions provide a common point of reference for all 

responders. Case definitions and laboratory criteria are developed according to the 

FAD PReP Case Definition Development Process SOP available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

The following sections are the APHIS-VS Center for Epidemiology and Animal 

Health (CEAH) definitions for FMD. For further information on the diagnostic 

tests conducted by NVSL-FADDL in the event of an FMD outbreak, please see 

Section 4.4. 

4.2.1 Laboratory Criteria

Agent identification: Virus isolation (VI), ELISAs and rRT-PCR assays are 

used to detect FMDV-infected animals. Samples to collect for testing include 

vesicular epithelium, vesicular fluid, epithelial tissues, esophageal-pharyngeal 

fluid, and oral and nasal swabs. 
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-2

a. VI in cell cultures: One of the “gold standard” tests for FMDV detection. 

VI is highly sensitive and specific when used with antigen ELISA or rRTPCR to confirm the presence of FMDV after cytopathic effect is observed.

b. Antigen ELISA: The other “gold standard” test for FMDV detection. 

Detects viral proteins for serotyping (using polyclonal or monoclonal 

antibodies to FMDV) and is useful for FMD diagnosis in suspect cases. It 

is also capable of detecting South African Territories (SATs) serotypes.

c. rRT-PCR: Detects FMDV nucleic acids (RNA). It only takes 2-3 hours to 

obtain test results. It is used for surveillance and diagnosis, not as a standalone laboratory assay. Most rRT-PCRs detect all known FMDV 

serotypes, often with equal or greater sensitivity than VI; rRT-PCR does 

not identify virus serotype or subtype.

d. Strain characterization by nucleotide sequencing: RT-PCR amplification 

of the P1 region of the FMDV genome or a portion of the P1 region that 

contains VP1 of the genome, followed by nucleotide sequencing is the 

preferred method for generating sequence data strain characterization. If 

necessary, the whole genome of FMDV can be sequenced. Antigen ELISA 

is used to determine the serotype of the FMD present in the outbreak 

samples. 

Serological tests: The sample to collect for testing is serum. The following 

serological assays detect FMDV-exposed animals and some help to 

discriminate vaccinated from infected animals.

a. Structural protein-based assays: VNT, solid phase competitive ELISA 

(SPCE), and liquid phase blocking ELISA (LPBE) are OIE-prescribed 

tests for trade purposes. These are highly sensitive, serotype-specific tests 

that detect FMDV antibodies. These assays may be utilized for 

confirmation of infection (previous or on-going) and to monitor immunity 

following vaccination. Low titer ELISA-positive sera must be confirmed 

by VNT to exclude false positive results. The VNT confirms the FMDV 

serotype and a version of this test is used to determine the serotype 

subtype during vaccine matching.

b. NSP-based antibody assays: ELISA and enzyme-linked 

immunoelectrotransfer blot (EITB) assays measure antibodies to NSP (3B, 

2C, 3D, and 3ABC). Commercial ELISAs measure antibodies to 3ABC or 

3B. The virus infection association antigen, VIAA, is an agarose 

immunodiffusion (AGID) test that detects antibodies to NSP 3D. These 

assays are not serotype-specific and they are used as screening tests. The 

PrioCHECK® FMDV NS (formally Ceditest® FMDV-NS) is an ELISA 

that detects antibodies to NSP 3ABC of FMDV with specificity greater 

than 97 percent for vaccinated and non-vaccinated cattle, and greater than 

99 percent in non-vaccinated sheep and pigs. The sensitivity of 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-3

PrioCHECK® is 100 percent in non-vaccinated cattle, but varies greatly in 

vaccinated cattle, sheep and pigs depending upon time between infection 

and testing, clinical signs, and carrier status. PrioCHECK® FMDV NS 

can discriminate vaccinated from infected animals, and is best used as a 

herd test rather than an individual animal test.

4.2.2 Case Definitions

The FAD PReP Case Definition Development Process SOP describes the general 

process for developing and approving animal disease case definitions for use in 

animal health surveillance and reporting. Case definitions are developed by 

CEAH, in cooperation with VS Strategy & Policy. CEAH coordinates review 

with SAHOs, subject matter experts, stakeholders, and VS units. Case definitions 

are approved by the VSDA/CVO and VS Executive Team. Case definitions 

enhance the usefulness of animal disease data by providing uniform criteria for 

reporting purposes.

At the start of an FMD outbreak, the case definition will undergo review and will 

continue to be evaluated as the outbreak progresses. Any modifications will 

supersede what is mentioned in this Redbook on the basis of additional 

information or changing requirements of the eradication effort. For example, the 

positive predictive value of clinical signs will increase if the FMD prevalence 

increases.

The below presumptive positive and confirmed positive case definitions are for 

the index case and may change as an outbreak progresses. Suspect case: An 

FMD-susceptible animal that has either:

1. Clinical signs consistent with FMD; OR

Inconclusive or positive laboratory test results performed on a sample taken 

during routine surveillance, with or without the presence of clinical criteria; OR

Epidemiological information indicative of FMD.

Presumptive positive case: A suspect case that has positive laboratory test results 

(see laboratory criteria above):

1. Identification of antibodies to NSP 3D by AGID or 3ABC by ELISA, 

or to structural proteins by virus neutralization for serotype 

identification; OR

Identification of FMDV nucleic acid by rRT-PCR; OR

Identification of FMDV serotype by antigen ELISA.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-4

Confirmed positive case: An animal from which FMDV has been isolated and 

identified at NVSL-FADDL or other laboratory designated by the Secretary of 

USDA.

4.3 SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance is a critical activity during an FMD outbreak. The following are 

surveillance goals during an FMD outbreak:

 Implement a surveillance plan within 48 hours of the outbreak’s 

confirmation.

 Implement a surveillance plan that will 1) define the size and extent of an 

FMD outbreak and 2) detect unknown IPs quickly.

 Provide evidence to demonstrate FMD absence on a premises, or 

demonstrate FMD absence in an area during the outbreak (e.g., in the 

Surveillance Zone [SZ]) or after eradication (e.g., in the CA).

 Provide evidence that premises are free of FMD at a nominal level, 

thereby setting the stage to conduct additional testing or apply predefined 

conditions to permit animal and animal product movements within and/or 

out of the CA.

Surveillance activities should be developed to achieve desired outcomes by 

leveraging available resources, satisfying jurisdictional requirements, and supporting 

implementation of COB measures. The surveillance plan should consider the 

susceptible wildlife population in the area, and planners should coordinate with 

representatives from APHIS Wildlife Services, DOI, State wildlife agencies, and 

State agriculture departments to perform appropriate FMD surveillance in these 

populations.

The surveillance plan should also provide guidance on who is responsible for 

surveillance data summaries and analysis. Generally, the ICG will coordinate with 

CEAH and the NIMT for surveillance data summary and analysis needs, at intervals 

specified by the IC. The surveillance plan should also supply information to assess 

and modify outbreak response activities in conjunction with the Epidemiology Group.

4.3.1 Surveillance Planning for FMD Outbreak

4.3.1.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A surveillance plan will have to be customized to the size and scope of an 

outbreak, which may take many forms. The epidemiologic picture will guide the 

response and surveillance activities, including species affected, location of 

outbreak, number of infected premises, number and size of animal operations, 

incubation period, number of potential contacts from the index premises, and 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-5

many other factors. The IC will guide response efforts to account for these 

differences. 

Parameter settings were developed based on transmission characteristics of 

serotype O FMDV described in literature by species, see Table 4-1. When 

developing an initial surveillance plan, planners should give additional 

consideration to the number and types of species on a premises and in a zone. 

Cattle tend to show clinical signs more readily than other species, while sheep and 

goats tend less to show clinical signs. Swine are replicators of FMDV and can 

shed large quantities of virus through respiration. If swine and cattle are raised 

near each other or on the same premises, there is opportunity for spread between 

species even if neither is showing clinical signs. 

Appendix F of this document outlines more details on how to customize the 

surveillance plan after initial response efforts have begun. CEAH is available to 

provide additional consultation. 

4.3.1.2 DEFINITIONS

Active observational surveillance (AOS) is a purposeful effort to detect evidence 

of disease through observation of clinical signs following these criteria:

 Observations are ongoing, frequent (e.g., once or twice a day in 

confinement facilities or once every 2 to 3 days in large grazing 

operations), and follow a pre-planned schedule.

 Observer is specifically tasked with monitoring for evidence of disease, 

toxicity, or other causes of morbidity, mortality and decreased production.

 The group of animals undergoing AOS is clearly defined.

 A set of guidelines exist describing expected production parameters and 

corresponding investigation triggers.

 A communication plan is created for a response to the investigation 

triggers, including when to contact regulatory animal health officials or 

their designees.
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-6 

 Observer is aware of and understands the production parameters, 

investigation triggers, and communication plan. 

Observation of clinical signs or other changed consistent with the disease of 

interest during AOS serves as the screening “test.” Confirmatory testing is 

laboratory-based.

Utility of AOS is highest for diseases that show overt clinical signs such as HPAI 

or FMD. Vesicular diseases such as FMD in a naïve population are particularly 

amenable for AOS in many U.S. animal populations. Most confinement livestock 

operations have standard management practices with the above criteria and, in 

fact, already conduct AOS. 

High Probability of Disease (HPD) – see Table 4-2 for examples. HPD animals 

are animals which fit into one of the categories listed but do not have clinical 

signs consistent with FMD infection. In the case of endemic SVA infection in 

swine, other clinical signs (fever, lameness, etc.) may still be used to differentiate 

the two diseases. 

Table 4-1. Examples of animals with a Higher Probability of Disease (HPD) 

during an FMD outbreak1

Health Indicators Immunosuppressed Exposure Risk

 Poor-doers

 Lethargic

 Decrease feed intake

 Decrease in

production (e.g. milk 

or rate of gain)

 Young animals

 Old animals

 Pregnant animals

 Animals undergoing treatment 

for another disease

 Animals under high stress 

(high production or recent 

movement)

 Recent introduction to 

premises

 Housed in pastures adjacent to 

farms with FMD susceptible 

species (airborne spread)

 Housed near entry/exit points 

 Housed near another infected 

premises 

1 This list is not meant to be exhaustive. It provides guidance on prioritizing animals for 

diagnostic testing.

Intensively managed – operations with a high stocking density. Examples may 

include: feedlots, dairies, indoor housed swine, and some seed stock or show 

stock production. 

Observational surveillance – observation of all, or a subset, of the animals on an 

operation. Includes disease reporting of suspected clinical signs by livestock 

producers or animal health professionals to regulatory officials. 

4.3.1.3 ASSUMPTIONS

Several assumptions are embedded in the design of surveillance plans and 

analyses of surveillance data. The accuracy of these assumptions impacts the 

strength of conclusions drawn from surveillance activities. For the example of 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-7

FMD surveillance schemes discussed in Appendix F, the following assumptions 

apply:

1. FMD virus causes severe clinical signs in most livestock species; 

however, in some species like sheep, goats, and cervids, clinical signs are 

less severe.

2. The proportion of FMD infected animals is highest among animals with 

clinical signs, followed by HPD animals, relative to apparently healthy 

animals in the same pen or premises.

3. Observational surveillance activities are routine and ongoing in all FMD 

susceptible animals, both inside and outside of the CA, including at 

slaughter plants, markets and shows.

4. Production parameters (milk production, feed consumption, etc.) will be 

monitored to detect FMD incursions quickly on intensively managed 

operations.

5. The producer separates poor-doing animals into a group and these are the 

animals to be sampled for surveillance.

6. Outbreak response field personnel visiting premises will suspect FMD if 

compatible signs are present, and will initiate testing and implement a 

quarantine if necessary.

7. The rRT-PCR test sensitivity for detection is 95 percent.

4.3.1.4 SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES BY TIME PERIOD

There are three key segments of surveillance activity in an outbreak. These 

segments have distinct goals to aid in the control, containment, and eradication of 

FMD from domestic livestock and for re-establishing disease freedom status after 

the outbreak. For more information on the zone, area, and premises designations 

referred to in this section, please refer to Section 4.5 in this chapter.

1. The initial 72 hours post FMD outbreak declaration. The initial surveillance 

objectives in the CA and SZ are to detect infected animals and premises as 

quickly as possible, and to determine the size and extent of the FMD outbreak. 

During this period, the goals of the IC include the following:

a. Create the initial IZ and BZ designation and the boundary of the CA.

b. Create a list of known premises with FMD susceptible animals in the 

CA and SZ. If possible, gather additional information for each 

premises including production type, estimated population size, and 
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-8 

whether the premises must move animals and/or product or whether it 

can function under quarantine for an extended time period. 

c. Determine CP (this includes direct and indirect exposure, per the 

definition of a CP) to known IP. 

d. Evaluate surveillance guidance below (Section 4.3.2) and FMD 

response and policy information on surveillance (available from 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep). Modify existing surveillance guidance 

with outbreak-specific information to create a surveillance plan for the 

CA.

e. Initiate surveillance within the CA as soon as possible. Carry out 

active observation and diagnostic testing on all premises, starting with 

those premises that will need to move FMD susceptible animals or 

their products. Ensure active outreach to all premises and investigate 

those deemed high-risk. 

f. Determine the boundary of the SZ and start developing a surveillance 

plan to be used in the SZ based on existing FMD response and policy 

information and surveillance guidance below (Section 4.3.2 and 

Appendix F). The objective of surveillance in the SZ is to determine 

the size and extent of the FMD outbreak and provide evidence of DF 

in this zone. 

2. The control and eradication period (from the initial 72-hour period until the 

last case is detected and eradicated). Multiple key surveillance activities need 

to be performed simultaneously during this period. 

a. Continue CA surveillance. The objectives are to detect new IPs so that 

control measures can be immediately implemented and the CA 

boundaries can be adjusted as needed.

b. Conduct surveillance in the SZ sufficient to demonstrate that the FMD 

virus does not extend beyond the CA. 

c. As part of investigation and surveillance activities, gather information 

related to the epidemiology of the outbreak virus (virulence, 

incubation period, etc.) through observation and communication with 

other agencies, researchers, and partners (see Section 4.5 for 

additional information). 

d. Revise or prioritize ongoing control and surveillance activities based 

on surveillance results and available epidemiologic information. 

Information may support modification of sampling frequency, 

movement restrictions, risk factor mitigations, vaccination decisions, 

or targeted sampling, as examples. 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-9

e. Provide evidence that premises are free of FMD virus at a nominal 

level, thereby setting the stage for movement of permitted FMD 

susceptible animals and their products into, within or out of the CA.

f. Provide evidence that the Free Area (FA) is free of disease, thereby 

facilitating unrestricted animal and animal product movement from the 

FA.

3. Post-eradication. The objective of this segment is to provide evidence that the 

CA and FA are free of disease (using OIE recommendations and requirements 

on surveillance).

a. Establish a containment zone as defined by OIE, which includes all 

outbreaks, to minimize the impact on the entire country. 

b. Prove DF on depopulated premises.

c. Prove DF on at-risk premises (ARP) in the CA by random or targeted 

sampling (choosing populations based on risk) of selected premises 

and herds.

d. Prove DF in the FA, following OIE guidelines to restore international 

trade. 

4.3.2 Surveillance Sampling

A surveillance plan will indicate the number and frequency of premises to be 

investigated, the number of animals to be sampled for each investigation, and the 

duration of the surveillance needed to meet the surveillance objectives. Initial 

surveillance plans and guidelines are provided for 1) detecting new infected 

premises in the CA, and 2) determining the size and extent of the FMD outbreak 

with SZ surveillance. For 3) demonstrating FMD absence in the CA after 

eradication, surveillance plans in the zones should be developed according to OIE 

guidelines and will depend on the control strategies used during the outbreak. 

Throughout this section, an investigation is defined as a veterinarian traveling to a 

premises, examining/observing FMD-susceptible animals on the premises, 

collecting diagnostic specimens on clinical animals, and completing an 

epidemiology investigation (e.g., forward and backward tracing, identifying onfarm visitors/deliveries, etc.). Observational surveillance is one part of an 

investigation, but could be the main form of diagnosing FMD during very large 

outbreaks. 

These initial plans and guidelines apply to all species when possible. 

Recommended adjustments by species are provided after the description of the 

initial plan. These initial plans presume a Type 1 or Type 2 outbreak (See Figure 
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-10

3-6). It is critical to note that during an outbreak, parameter estimates and 

surveillance plans may change as new information about viral characteristics, 

epidemiology, or outbreak size become available. Further information on 

surveillance parameters, factors and modifications are provided in Appendix F. 

4.3.2.1 RECOMMENDED INITIAL DESIGNS

1. CA surveillance - Surveillance objectives in the CA during the outbreak 

include detecting FMD quickly and providing evidence that premises are free 

of FMD at a nominal level to set the stage to conduct additional testing or 

apply predefined conditions for the movement of permitted FMD susceptible 

animals and their products into, within or out of the CA. 

a. In the CA, all CP, SP, and ARP are subject to surveillance. 

Exemptions may be allowed for small, non-commercial, low-risk 

animal operations where the premises can maintain an appropriately 

secure quarantine and emergency response officials have adequately 

informed producers about their obligations for reporting as soon as 

possible after establishing a CA.

b. All other premises should be investigated as soon as possible, but 

preferably within 3-5 days (approximately one latent period) after 

establishment of the CA. Surveillance of CPs and SPs should occur 

first followed by a prioritized list of ARPs.

c. Diagnostic testing should preferentially occur in animals with clinical 

signs consistent with FMD, followed by those with a higher 

probability of disease (HPD). See Table 4-2 for examples of animals 

that might be classified as HPD. 

d. Specimens for testing (See Section 4.2.1, Laboratory Criteria) should 

be collected from sick and HPD animals. For medium to large 

premises, specimens from at least 100 sick and HPD animals should be 

submitted for diagnostic testing. For operations with less than 100 sick 

and HPD animals, all of the animals identified as sick and HPD should 

be tested. See Section 4.3.2.2, Animal Sample Size, for an explanation 

of initial sample size choice and guidance for adjusting this value.

e. Investigations on CPs should occur twice within 5 days for cattle and 

swine and twice within 7 days for sheep and goats and then every 5-10 

days thereafter, depending on species and type of contact, until 56 

days, then test as an ARP. 

f. Investigations on all non-exempt ARP premises should occur every 10 

days after the initial investigation until 56 days after the last detected 

case.

2. SZ surveillance – The primary surveillance objective in the SZ during the 

outbreak is to demonstrate that the virus has not extended beyond the 

boundary of the CA. 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-11

a. All premises may be tested or a subset of premises (initially 300 to 

500 premises is recommended) for investigation. Preferentially 

target premises with the highest probability of exposure to FMD. 

Small, non-commercial, low-risk animal operations that can 

maintain a secure quarantine should be excluded from the list 

frame. See Section 4.3.2.2 for explanation of premises samples 

sizes and for guidance on adjusting the number premises selected 

for investigation.

b. Similar to the CA, specimens for testing (See Section 4.2.1,

Laboratory Criteria) should be collected from HPD animals. See 

Table 4-2 for examples of animals that might be classified as HPD. 

c. For medium to large premises, specimens from at least 100 HPD 

animals should be submitted for diagnostic testing. For operations 

with less than 100 HPD animals, all animals identified as HPD 

should be tested. (See Section 4.3.2.2 Animal Sample Size for 

explanation.)

d. Investigations should begin around 72 hours after index case 

confirmation and the first round of investigations should be 

completed as soon as possible, keeping in mind the latent period of 

the disease. 

e. A new subset of premises should be investigated at least every 21 

days until 56 days after the last detected case.

3. DF surveillance after the last detected case

DF surveillance plans will vary widely depending on the size of the 

outbreak and the control strategies implemented. The OIE Terrestrial 

Code specifies waiting periods before a country can re-declare freedom 

from a disease outbreak based on the control strategy, including 

implementation of stamping out and/or different vaccination strategies 

(vaccinate to-kill or to-slaughter vs. vaccinate to-live). Regardless of the 

control strategy used, the animal sample size and premises sample size can 

be determined in the same way they were calculated for the outbreak CA 

and SZ. 

4.3.2.2 EXPLANATION OF DETAILS ON RECOMMENDED INITIAL DESIGNS

Targeting animals with a higher probability of being diseased

Table 4-2 provides other factors that may indicate FMD susceptible HPD animals. 

If the premises is infected with FMD, these high-risk-for-exposure or sick animals 

should have a higher prevalence than the general population of animals on the 

premises in the early stages of an FMD infection. Therefore, prioritizing these 

animals for testing increases the probability of detecting disease. 
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-12

Animal sample sizes

When infection in a small population, subpopulation, or target group is of interest, 

it is helpful to consider the actual number of infected animals rather than a 

prevalence level. When only one animal in the group is infected, testing all 

animals in the group results in a probability of detection equal to the sensitivity of 

the test. If the group contains two infected animals, the probability of detection 

increases to more than 0.95 as long as the test has sensitivity of 80 percent or 

more. (See Table F-1 in Appendix F.) 

As the number of animals in the group increases, testing all of the animals 

becomes cost-prohibitive. With a sample size of 100, a prevalence of at least 

3 percent can be detected (with 0.95 probability) using a 95 percent sensitivity 

test regardless of the size of the group. As outbreak size increases, reducing the 

sample size to 60 will enable detecting a prevalence of at least 5 percent. See 

Table F-2 in Appendix F. For a Type 2 or larger outbreak, observation of clinical 

signs may become the primary surveillance tool in place of diagnostic testing.

Premises sample sizes

Surveillance zones may contain several hundred to tens of thousands of premises, 

depending on the size and location of the outbreak. For small localized outbreaks, 

testing animals from all of the premises in the SZ would define the extent of the 

outbreak rapidly and allow faster implementation of control actions. 

In most cases, a sample of premises will need to be selected for testing because of 

limited resources. Testing 500 premises will result in 0.95 probability of detecting 

at least one infected premises if at least 0.6 percent of the premises are infected, 

while testing 300 premises has a detection threshold of 1 percent premises 

prevalence. Alternatively, 60 to 100 premises could be sampled, which will result 

in 0.95 probability of detecting at least one infected premises if at least 3 to 5 

percent are infected. Selection of any of these sample sizes will depend on the 

acceptable level of prevalence to be detected. Note that a surveillance design that 

allows for sampling of a subset of premises, rather than testing all premises, will 

not detect all infected premises. See Table F-3 in Appendix F for more 

information. 

Frequency and duration of sampling

The frequency and duration of sampling is related to disease transmission 

characteristics. Testing of potentially exposed premises should occur as soon after 

the latent period as possible to prevent spread of infection. During an outbreak, 

the actual date of exposure is often unknown, so the length of the latent period is 

used as a guide for an ideal response time for the first visit. Of course, resource 

limitations may not allow an ideal response time, so these are provided as 

guidance. Sampling frequency thereafter is related to the approximate length of 

the incubation period, as listed in Table 4-3. The duration of sampling is related to 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-13 

the length of the incubation period and length of viral persistence in infected 

animals. 

Table 4-2. Sampling Frequency Guidelines by Premises Designations

Premises Type Sampling 

Frequency

Sampling Duration

Contact Premises (CP) Every 5 days 14 days, then as ARP/MP

Suspect Premises (SP) Once Temporary designation

At Risk Premises (ARP) Every 10 days Until 56 days after the last detected case 

Monitored Premises (MP) Every 10 days 

or more often 

for movement

Until 56 days after the last detected case

5 rounds minimum or more often for 

movement for duration of quarantine

Premises in the SZ Every 21 days Until 56 days after the last detected case

2-3 rounds minimum for duration of 

quarantine

Addressing resource limitations 

Diagnostic testing is recommended unless laboratory or personnel resources are 

severely strained. If the outbreak grows in size, observational surveillance may be 

used to diagnose FMD and determine the premises status, especially for ARP.

Species-specific details 

 Additional considerations for outbreaks involving primarily cattle: 

o Cattle tend to show clinical signs of disease more readily than 

other types of ruminants; for this reason, observation of clinical 

signs would be more effective as a potential surveillance tool 

during an extensive outbreak. 

o Cattle operations may vary considerably in housing styles and 

therefore risk of exposure to FMD may differ (i.e., cattle raised in 

intensive management systems, such as feedlots and dairies, are 

more likely to be exposed while extensively operated cattle, such 

as cow-calf or range cattle operations, are not).

 Additional considerations for outbreaks involving primarily swine: 

o Swine amplify FMD virus and shed large quantities of virus with 

their respirations. An outbreak in swine may have a greater chance 

for airborne spread, especially if other FMD-susceptible species 

are located near the infected operation. 

o Since most commercial swine are raised in confinement barns, 

their risk of exposure to FMD in the environment may be less, 
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-14

assuming good biosecurity practices are followed, and therefore 

may be sampled less frequently.

o Swine operations tend to be located near other operations that may 

be contractors of the same company. This is important to note 

when identifying indirect contacts in disease spread.

 Additional considerations for outbreaks involving primarily small 

ruminants (e.g., sheep, goats, cervids):

o Small ruminants tend to show less severe clinical signs, making 

reliance on observation of clinical signs a less effective strategy for 

these species. Due to this, increased sampling may be appropriate 

in these operations if they are suspected in the epidemiology of the 

outbreak.

o Small ruminant operations vary in their density, from more 

intensively managed feedlot operations to extensive farmed cervid 

operations or range sheep/goat operations.

Aggregate sampling

Validated aggregate sampling techniques, such as bulk-tank milk sampling, water 

trough sampling, or oral fluid sampling from ropes for swine or beef cattle, are 

economical and efficient for testing large numbers of animals. Without aggregate 

sampling, early detection requires testing individual animal samples using rRTPCR. Consideration should be given to validating such sampling techniques 

and/or deployed to laboratories, particularly for swine, dairy, and beef, so that 

additional diagnostics can supplement and amplify visual observation and 

individual animal sampling in the case of an outbreak. To date, some validation 

work performed on the bulk tests has yielded favorable results when applied to 

certain uses.

4.3.2.3 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

At the APHIS level, CEAH is responsible for and assists the unified IC and NIMT 

in surveillance planning for the CA and SZ. CEAH is also available to advise, 

construct, or review outbreak surveillance plans for other stakeholders on request

to VS. Field Operations is responsible for surveillance implementation. 

Appendix F of this FMD Response Plan contains active surveillance strategies 

and introduces assumptions and methods that influence surveillance decisions. 

Online calculators are available to assist with certain aspects (e.g., FreeCalc). 

However, development of a detailed plan should either follow the templates and 

guidance in existing surveillance documents or involve the help of field or 

program teams with surveillance planning expertise.
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-15 

The FAD PReP FMD Surveillance SOP provides additional information on the 

protocol for a surveillance team responding to FMD IP, the distinction between 

commercial and noncommercial premises surveillance, equipment checklists, and 

surveillance for proof of DF. The Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox (2019) is 

available at www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/ceahtoolbox/home. 

4.4 DIAGNOSTICS

Effective and appropriate sample collection, diagnostic testing, surge capacity, 

and reporting are critical in an effective FMD response. These activities may 

require additional resources in the event of an FMD outbreak. In particular, 

sample collection will require additional personnel. Surge capacity may also be 

required for diagnostic laboratory testing. Surveillance plan requirements must be 

fully integrated with current diagnostic sample collection, sample testing, surge 

capacity, and reporting capabilities. 

During a suspected or actual FMD outbreak, the key goals of response are to 1) 

provide clear direction to responders on sample collection and processing 

procedures, if modification from routine standards is required, 2) meet the surge 

requirements for diagnostic testing at specific intervals, starting at time zero and 

at 24-hour intervals as the response escalates, and 3) report all diagnostic test 

results to appropriate personnel and information management systems as soon as 

possible and within 4 hours of diagnostic test completion. The Emergency 

Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS2) is the official system of record for 

an FMD response.

The FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0) offers detailed 

information on sample collection, diagnostic testing, surge capacity, and 

reporting. In particular, this manual provides additional guidance on who is 

responsible for diagnostic testing, sample collection, processing, packaging and 

shipping, and roles in FAD investigations. The APHIS website at 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/nvsl has information on packaging and labeling 

laboratory submissions. 

See Appendix D for VS Guidance Document 12001 (previously VS 

Memorandum 580.4), which contains more information on submitting diagnostic 

samples. The procedures outlined in this memo should be followed regarding the 

submission of diagnostic samples in an FAD investigation. 

4.4.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing

Trained personnel and field collection kits are required to effectively collect 

samples, particularly from large animals. Specific diagnostic tests are used for 

antigen detection, virus identification, and antibody detection. For antigen 
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-16

detection, rRT-PCRs are used simultaneously with other tests selected on the 

basis of the sample type and priority. Virus isolation is used to confirm an FMD 

diagnosis, but this can take up to 7 days. 

4.4.1.1 DIAGNOSTICS FOR INITIAL FMD INVESTIGATION 

Figure 4-1 displays the diagnostics for a suspected case of FMD. In the figure, 

Priority 1 or A and Priority 2 refer to categorizations explained in VS Guidance 

Document 12001 (in Appendix D). While simultaneous, preliminary testing may 

be ongoing at a NAHLN laboratory, the confirmation of an FMD outbreak will 

only be made by NVSL-FADDL. If FMDV is detected, sequencing will be 

completed to reveal the strain and topotype to conduct vaccine matching.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-17

Figure 4-1. Diagnostic Flowchart for Initial Investigation of FMD
d October 2020—DRAFT 4-18
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-19

4.4.1.2 DIAGNOSTICS AFTER FMD DETECTION

NVSL-FADDL will confirm detections of FMD on any premises not currently in 

an FMD CA. After NVSL confirmation of FMD on a premises (index case), 

subsequent swab samples for rRT-PCR may be sent to USDA-approved 

laboratories that are part of the NAHLN network. (Appendix C lists NAHLN 

laboratories approved for FMD testing.) Figure 4-2 illustrates the diagnostic flow 

after FMD has been detected.

IC will provide specific instructions regarding the direction and collection of 

samples, which is likely to change as the outbreak evolves. In all cases, 1) NVSL 

will confirm the index case, 2) presumptive positive samples (on a rRT-PCR) 

from outside an established CA will be tested and confirmed by NVSL, and 3) 

NVSL will receive samples routinely from inside the CA to monitor for changes 

in the FMDV. All presumptive positive samples from NAHLN laboratories will

be forwarded to NVSL for confirmation and subtyping.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-20

Figure 4-2. Outbreak Diagnostics after Positive Confirmation of FMD in United States
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-21 

4.4.2 Surge Capacity

Surge capacity may be needed in an FMD outbreak. Additional resources, such as 

personnel and materials, will be needed for sample collection. Additional capacity 

may also be required for laboratory sample testing. Surge capacity can help 

facilitate a rapid response and COB for non-infected premises. In the event that

the affected State(s) NAHLN lab(s) and NVSL-FADDL are overwhelmed by the 

diagnostic testing requirements, NAHLN laboratories from across the country 

may provide surge capacity for diagnostic testing. For more information on surge 

capacity, please see the NAHLN Activation Guide. Individual laboratories have 

independent protocols on how to manage receiving samples and handle personnel 

requirements if a surge is required. Appendix C contains a list of the NAHLN 

labs approved to conduct FMD diagnostics. 

NAHLN labs currently have the capability to conduct rRT-PCR tests, as shown 

above. Ideally, NAHLN labs will also have the capability to conduct 3ABC 

ELISA tests to detect FMDV in herds. It is a priority to ensure that NAHLN labs 

have this diagnostic capacity to test samples in the event of an FMD outbreak, 

particularly for recovering and proving DF. 

4.4.3 Reporting

Box 4-1 clarifies reporting and notification of presumptive FMD cases. See 

APHIS VS Guidance Document 12001 and the FAD Investigation Manual (FAD 

PReP Manual 4-0) for further information on FMD investigation and reporting. 

This Guidance Document and a link to the manual are available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

Box 4-1. Reporting and Notification

Reporting and Notification

• Cases of clinical illness that are confirmed positive by National Veterinary Services 

Laboratories—Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (NVSL-FADDL), based 

on the current case definition, are reported to the affected States, other States, Tribal 

Nations, industry, other Federal agencies, trading partners, and the World Organization 

for Animal Health (OIE). 

• Appropriate Federal-State-Tribal-industry response and containment measures will be 

initiated during FMD investigations. 
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-22 

4.5 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION 

AND TRACING

4.5.1 Summary of Zones, Areas, and Premises 

Designations

A critical component of an FMD response is the designation of zones, areas, and 

premises. The Incident Commander will work with the Operations Section and 

Situation Unit (in the Planning Section) to 1) determine appropriate zones, areas, 

and premises designations in the event of an FMD outbreak, and 2) re-evaluate 

these designations as needed throughout the outbreak based on the epidemiological 

situation. These zones, areas, and premises designations are used in quarantine and 

movement control efforts. For details on the zones, areas, and premises, please see 

the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP 

Manual 2-0). 

Table 4-4 summarizes the premises designations that would be employed in an 

FMD outbreak response. Table 4-5 summarizes the zone and area designations that 

would be used in an FMD outbreak response. Figure 4-3 illustrates these premises, 

zone, and area designations.

 Table 4-3. Summary of Premises

Premises Definition Zone

Infected Premises (IP) Premises where presumptive positive case or 

confirmed positive case exists based on 

laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, 

FMD case definition, and international 

standards.

Infected Zone 

Contact Premises (CP) Premises with susceptible animals that may 

have been exposed to FMD, either directly 

or indirectly, including but not limited to 

exposure to animals, animal products, 

fomites, or people from Infected Premises.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone 

Suspect Premises (SP) Premises under investigation due to the 

presence of susceptible animals reported to 

have clinical signs compatible with FMD. 

This is intended to be a short-term premises 

designation. 

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone, Surveillance 

Zone, Vaccination Zone 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-23 

Premises Definition Zone

At-Risk Premises 

(ARP)

Premises that have susceptible animals, but 

none of those susceptible animals have 

clinical signs compatible with FMD. 

Premises objectively demonstrates that it is 

not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, 

or Suspect Premises. At-Risk Premises seek 

to move susceptible animals or products 

within the Control Area by permit. Only AtRisk Premises are eligible to become 

Monitored Premises.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone 

Monitored Premises 

(MP)

Premises objectively demonstrates that it is 

not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, 

or Suspect Premises. Only At-Risk Premises 

are eligible to become Monitored Premises. 

Monitored Premises meet a set of defined 

criteria in seeking to move susceptible 

animals or products out of the Control Area 

by permit. 

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone 

Free Premises (FP) Premises outside of a Control Area and not a 

Contact or Suspect Premises. 

Surveillance Zone, Free 

Area

Vaccinated Premises 

(VP)

Premises where emergency vaccination has 

been performed. This may be a secondary 

premises designation. 

Containment 

Vaccination Zone, 

Protection Vaccination 

Zone 

Zone/Area Definition

Infected Zone (IZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises.

Buffer Zone (BZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a 

Contact Premises.

Control Area (CA) Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone. 

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area.

Free Area (FA) Area not included in any Control Area. 

Vaccination Zone (VZ) Emergency Vaccination Zone classified as either a 

Containment Vaccination Zone (typically inside a Control 

Area) or a Protection Vaccination Zone (typically outside a 

Control Area). This may be a secondary zone designation. 

Table 4-5: Summary of Zones and Areas
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-24

Figure 4-3. Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises in FMD Outbreak Response 

4.5.2 Epidemiological Investigation

Epidemiological investigation and movement tracing during an outbreak are 

critical in controlling and eradicating FMD. In an FMD outbreak, the goals are as 

follows:

 Assign a premises classification and a priority of investigation within 6 

hours of identifying potential IP or CP through tracing activities. 

 Identify all CP within 24 hours of identifying the IP or initial CP.

 Determine, within 96 hours of identifying the index case, the nature of the 

FMD outbreak, identify the risk factors for transmission, and develop 

mitigation strategies. 

 Collect trace-back and trace-forward information for at least 28 days 

before the appearance of clinical signs in FMD infected animals. 

 Analyze epidemiological data at routine intervals so that information 

gathered can apply to response activities to rapidly and effectively control, 

contain, and eradicate FMD. 

These measures will aid in the control of FMD and lessen the impact of the 

response effort. Appendix G contains a sample template of an epidemiological 

questionnaire. The scope of any such questionnaire should be based on the 

circumstances of the outbreak, and is at the discretion of IC and epidemiological 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-25

subject matter experts. It is likely that any epidemiological questionnaire will 

need to be modified and tailored to the specific outbreak. 

The FAD PReP Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing SOP and the 

NAHEMS Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing both provide 

more information.

4.5.3 Tracing

Box 4-2 explains the fundamental importance of movement tracing in an FMD 

response effort. 

Box 4-2. Importance of Movement Tracing in an FMD Outbreak

Tracing 

One of the single most important and urgent veterinary activities during an FMD 

outbreak is to rapidly and diligently trace-back and trace-forward movements from 

an infected premises (IP). This tracing will aid in the control of the spread of FMD 

virus and limit the impact of the outbreak. Tracing should cover all movements 

from the premises, including susceptible livestock, non-susceptible species, animal 

products, vehicles, crops and grains, and people. Tracing will also include 

consideration of all potential modes of potential modes of transmission and 

possible contact with wildlife.

Trace-back and trace-forward information should ideally be collected for at least 

28 days before the appearance of clinical signs in animals infected with FMD. 

Additional tracing information will be collected for movements up to the time 

that quarantine was imposed. 

When resources or personnel are limited in a widespread outbreak, movements 

considered high-risk by the unified IC should be traced first, so that any necessary 

action can be rapidly taken to control and contain the spread of FMD. Recent 

trace-forwards involving semen or live animals are typically the first priority. 

Tracing information will be obtained from many sources (such as reports from 

field veterinarians, producers, industry, farm service providers, or the public). 

EMRS2 will be used to collect and report epidemiological data, including 

movement tracing information, locally and nationally. Again, EMRS2 is the 

official system of record for an FMD response. 
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-26 

4.5.4 Considerations for Size of Control Area and Minimum 

Sizes of Other Zones

The perimeter of the CA should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the 

perimeter of the closest IP. The size of the CA depends on the circumstances of 

the outbreak, including the IP transmission pathways and estimates of 

transmission risk, livestock movement patterns and concentrations, distribution of 

susceptible wildlife in proximity, natural terrain, jurisdictional boundaries, and 

other factors. The boundaries of the CA can be modified or redefined when 

tracing and other epidemiological information becomes available.

Table 4-6 provides a description of the minimum sizes of areas and zones. Table 

4-7 reviews the factors used to determine the size of the CA. 

Table 4-4. Minimum Sizes of Areas and Zones

Zone or Area Minimum Size and Details

Infected Zone (IZ) Perimeter should be at least 3 km (~1.86 miles) beyond perimeters of 

presumptive or confirmed Infected Premises. Will depend on disease 

agent and epidemiological circumstances. This zone may be redefined 

as the outbreak continues. 

Buffer Zone (BZ) Perimeter should be at least 7 km (~4.35 miles) beyond the perimeter 

of the Infected Zone. Width is generally not less than the minimum 

radius of the associated Infected Zone, but may be much larger. This 

zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues. 

Control Area (CA) Perimeter should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the 

perimeter of the closest Infected Premises. Please see Table 4-7 for 

factors that influence the size of the Control Area. This area may be 

redefined as the outbreak continues. 

Surveillance Zone 

(SZ)

Width should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles), but may be much 

larger.
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-27 

Table 4-5. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for FMD

Factors Additional Details

Jurisdictional areas  Effectiveness and efficiency of administration

 Multi-jurisdictional considerations: local, State, Tribal, and 

multistate

Physical boundaries  Areas defined by geography 

 Areas defined by distance between premises

FMD epidemiology  Reproductive rate 

 Incubation period 

 Ease of transmission

 Infectious dose 

 Species susceptibility

 Modes of transmission (fecal-oral, droplet, aerosol, vectors) 

 Survivability in the environment 

 Ease of diagnosis (for example, no pathognomonic signs; requires 

diagnostic laboratory testing)

 Age of lesions 

Infected Premises 

characteristics

 Number of contacts 

 Transmission pathways and transmission risk

 Extent of animal movement

 Number of animals

 Species of animals

 Age of animals 

 Movement of traffic and personnel to and from premises (fomite 

spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place at time of outbreak

Contact Premises 

characteristics

 Number and types of premises

 Susceptible animal populations and population density 

 Animal movements

 Movement of traffic (fomites) and personnel to and from premises 

(fomite spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place prior to outbreak

Environment  Types of premises in area or region

 Land use in area or region

 Susceptible wildlife and population density

 Wildlife as biological or mechanical vectors

Climate (for aerosol 

spread diseases)

 Prevailing winds 

 Humidity
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-28 

Factors Additional Details

General area, region, or 

agricultural sector 

biosecurity 

 Biosecurity practices in place prior to outbreak

 Biosecurity practices implemented once outbreak detected

Number of noncommercial or 

transitional premises 

 Types of premises, animal movements, and network of animal and 

fomite movements

Continuity of business

(COB)

 COB plans and processes in place or activated at beginning of 

outbreak (such as surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises 

biosecurity, and risk-assessments)

 Permit processes, memorandums of understanding, and information 

management systems in place or activated at beginning of outbreak 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-29 

4.6 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Rapidly functional, robust, and scalable information technology infrastructure is 

needed in an FMD outbreak. Field personnel should be provided with access to 

the mobile technology devices necessary for collecting, monitoring, and sharing 

information. The Incident Information Management and Reporting manual (FAD 

PReP Manual 3-0) provides details on the information systems and functionality 

for disease and response management, as well as training resources.

Information management and reporting 

during an FMD incident or outbreak 

ensures that responders, stakeholders, and 

decision-makers have access to accurate 

and timely critical emergency response 

information. Ideally, Federal, State, Tribal, 

and local information management systems 

are compatible for information and data 

sharing. 

4.6.1 EMRS2 

EMRS2 is the official system of record for 

animal health incidents in the United 

States.24 Having accurate premises data in 

EMRS2 significantly facilitates response 

efforts, reporting, and resource tracking. 

In an FMD outbreak, the goal is to have 

EMRS2 data entry processes performed in 

12-hour or shorter intervals. Data should be 

entered as quickly as possible. Data must 

be entered in both an accurate and 

consistent manner across widespread field 

operations: this is particularly important 

when there is more than one ICP. If 

possible, it may be necessary and/or 

beneficial to centralize certain data-entry

24EMRS 2.0. August 20, 2020. Retrieved from

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/emergency-management/sa_emrs/ct_emrs

° TEP Video Gallery. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/training-and-development/video-gallery

 EMRS Essentials

1. Obtain USDA 

eAuthentication Level 2 

access and EMRS2 access at 

link in first footnote, this 

page). 

2. Access training at AgLearn, 

search terms: 

EMRS Intro and

EMRS Advanced 

https://aglearn.usda.gov/

3. Access additional training 

and drill materials at EMRS 

Home tab under Training 

https://emrs2.aphis.usda.gov 

4. Practice using EMRS2 at 

https://emrs2t.aphis.usda.gov

5. View Gateway and 

EMRS2Go videos at the TEP 

video gallery, link below.° 

6. States should consider 

whether they want to import 

premises data into EMRS2 

before an incident occurs.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-30

capabilities, particularly when field resources are stretched. 

Because it is built on a Microsoft platform, EMRS2 easily interfaces with other 

Microsoft programs that are used frequently, such as Word and Excel; however, 

the user interface is quite different from those familiar products. Training prior to 

an incident is highly recommended for both Federal and State responders. Details 

may be found in the sidebar. 

Having accurate premises data in EMRS2, prior to an incident, reduces errors and 

saves valuable time during an animal disease response. In preparation for an 

animal health incident, States may request that premises data is imported into 

EMRS2 so that information is available to APHIS in an outbreak.25

EMRS2 also offers the Customer Permit Gateway, an interactive, secure webapplication, where registered producers can create a permit request for movement. 

For further information, see FAD PReP Manual 6-0, Permitted Movement. In 

addition, EMRS2GO is an app that allows authorized users to collect new 

premises data off-line, then upload it into 

EMRS2 when re-connected online. 

4.7 COMMUNICATION

The APHIS EPC Emergency 

Communications Plan provides guidance 

on communications activities during an 

FMD outbreak, covering the 

responsibilities of personnel and internal 

and external communication procedures. 

APHIS LPA will serve as the primary 

liaison with the news media in the event of 

an FMD outbreak. Under the ICS, a JIC is 

established. During an FMD outbreak, 

APHIS LPA and the USDA Office of 

Communications will operate from the JIC. 

The JIC will also ensure that all State and 

25EMRS 2.0: Premises Data Transfer to EMRS from External/State-Based Systems. July 2020. 

Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/emrs_premisesdat

atransfer.pdf

 Comms Essentials

• The APHIS EPC Emergency

Communications Plan is

available to APHIS 

employees.

• APHIS public resources:

• FMD Site

• FAD PReP FMD

Communications RRG

• FAD PReP Manual 5-0,

Partial List of FAD

Stakeholders

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

Report broken link
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-31

IMT Public Information Officers (PIO)

share information on their activities with 

each other and the JIC.

Effective communication during an FMD 

outbreak should be carried out and 

maintained by

 establishing a network of stakeholders 

and systems for communication prior to 

an incident or outbreak; briefing the 

media, public, industry, Congress, 

trading partners, and others on the 

FMD outbreak status and the actions 

being taken to control and eradicate the 

disease;

 coordinating with Federal, State, and 

local agencies, Tribal entities, producer 

groups, and Land Grant University 

based Cooperative Extension Services to ensure consistent messaging 

regarding animal health, public health, and food safety; and

 assuring consumers that USDA is working on animal health issues, in an 

informed and timely manner.

In addition, all communications should highlight the importance of sound 

biosecurity measures and steps that producers and owners can take to protect 

against FMD infection in their own livestock herds.

4.7.1 Objectives

All FMD communications must

 furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information;

 maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the government’s ability 

to respond to an outbreak;

 minimize public panic and fear; and

 address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as possible.

4.7.2 Key Messages

Eight key messages will be conveyed in an FMD outbreak (Box 4-3).

• Cross-species 

Communication Working 

Group materials available at 

footandmouthdiseaseinfo.org

• In advance of an outbreak, 

States will want to 

• establish lines of 

communication for their 

industry, academia, and 

governmental agency 

partners

• identify spokespersons for 

animal health issues

Report broken link
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-32

4.7.3 Social Media

All personnel involved in an incident—from executive leadership to field 

responders—must be cognizant of the impact of social media. While it can be a 

useful tool in disseminating information or even gathering intelligence, it can also 

put a spotlight on a single aspect or episode of an event that misrepresents the 

whole of the effort. This threatens the intended public message, as well as the 

safety of responders and the progress, if not the success, of the response 

operation. 

Any Agency-initiated social media for the incident must be done thoughtfully and 

coordinated through the on-site PIO and LPA. Responders should not use 

personal social media accounts to discuss the incident.

Box 4-3. FMD Communication Messages

Key Communication Messages

For consumers: 

1. FMD does not cause disease in humans.

2. Meat and meat products are safe to eat.

3. Milk and dairy products are safe to eat.

4. We are responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the virus.

5. Meat and meat products from vaccinated animals are safe to eat.

6. Milk and dairy products from vaccinated animals are safe to eat.

For producers: 

1. Protect your herds with good biosecurity practices.

2. Be vigilant about reporting signs of illness.
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-33

4.8 HEALTH AND SAFETY AND PERSONAL 

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

During an FMD outbreak, responders are 

exposed to many hazards, particularly in 

working with heavy equipment and large 

animals. Taking precautions to prevent 

adverse human health events related to 

emergency response efforts is important.

To ensure responders are safe and 

physically prepared for the rigors of their 

deployment assignment, it is necessary that 

they receive medical clearance and, 

depending on the causative disease agent or 

disinfectant used, respirator fit testing prior 

to deployment. 

♦ Medical clearance is the overall 

baseline clearance of an employee’s 

fitness based on a medical exam. 

The exam, for example, may 

include assessing your general 

health, eyesight, hearing, medical 

history, pulmonary health, etc. It 

may take 90 days to obtain a 

medical clearance. APHIS 

responders should receive an 

Emergency Qualifications System 

(EQS) notice as a reminder to 

initiate the medical clearance 

process via APHIS Form 29.

♦ Fit testing is the process of 

confirming that employees are 

medically able to wear a respirator 

and that they have been properly 

fitted with the different kinds of 

respirators that they may need to 

wear. This may be done in 

conjunction with a medical exam, 

or it may be available at the

incident site.

 Safety Essentials

• APHIS emergency response 

employees may need a 

current medical clearance, 

and will need to have current 

status of defensive driver 

training.

• PPE will be provided at the 

incident. Any extreme 

weather conditions should be 

among the considerations in 

the hazard assessment.

• Learn the appropriate 

donning and doffing 

procedures.

• APHIS employees must 

report accidents and injuries 

through the Online First 

Report Tool at the 

my.APHIS Portal.

• States may have specific 

training requirements for 

their response employees.

• The unified incident 

command may need to 

contract with a mental health 

provider which can offer 

services, to both State and 

Federal employees.

• Water can be purchased via 

purchase card for responders; 

it requires a waiver approved 

by MRP/AAMD.

Report broken link
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-34 

4.8.1 Personal Protective Equipment

PPE is crucial in protecting health and safety during an FMD outbreak response 

effort. PPE also helps ensure response personnel are taking care to avoid 

transmitting FMDV to naïve premises.

PPE is fundamental in ensuring personnel are protected in the FMD response 

effort. All workers involved in the handling, culling, transport, or disposal of 

items or animals infected with FMDV must be provided with appropriate PPE. 

All visitors and employees, regardless of their exposure, should be provided with 

disposable coveralls, boots, hats, and gloves before entering a premises. Disposal 

of this PPE is required when leaving. 

For further information, see the FAD PReP Health and Safety and Personal 

Protective Equipment SOP. It provides information on best practices to ensure the 

well-being and safety of all individuals involved in the response effort. Specific 

topics covered include the following: 

♦ procedures to create a site-specific health and safety plan;

♦ details of hazard analysis, necessary training, and medical surveillance 

requirements;

♦ PPE, including Occupational Safety and Health Administration respirator 

fit testing;

♦ pre-deployment information and guidance; and 

♦ a protocol for staff field safety in an FMD response.

4.8.2 Mental Health Concerns

The health and safety of all personnel is affected by the mental state of those 

involved in the FMD response effort. Therefore, preserving health and safety of 

those involved in a disease response effort includes addressing their mental states. 

APHIS employees may call the Employee Assistance Program (1-800-222-0364) 

at any time for help with emotional issues. Additionally, APHIS EMSSD can 

contract with Federal Occupational Health for onsite federal responder 

counseling. 

FMD depopulation efforts can significantly affect the health of responders, 

livestock owners, and others impacted by the outbreak and response efforts. HHS 

has developed resources specifically for emergency and disaster responders, 

States and local planners, health professionals, and the general public 

(https://emergency.cdc.gov/coping/index.asp); additional general mental health 

information may be found at www.cdc.gov/mentalhealth. 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-35

4.9 BIOSECURITY

To prevent or slow the spread of FMD strict biosecurity measures need to be 

implemented. Some level of biosecurity procedures should already be in place at 

large operations; enhanced biosecurity should be implemented within 24 hours of 

the identification of an index FMD case. Veterinarians, owners, and anyone else 

in contact with enterprises that have susceptible animals need to observe 

biosecurity measures.

Proper biosecurity measures have two 

functions: 

1) containing the virus on IP 

(biocontainment), and 2) preventing the 

introduction of the virus via movement of 

personnel and material to naïve livestock 

and premises (bioexclusion). During an 

FMD outbreak, a careful balance must be 

maintained between facilitating response 

activities and ensuring personnel do not 

expose naïve animals and premises to 

FMDV.

Further information on biosecurity is

provided in the FAD PReP Biosecurity 

SOP, which offers guidance on how to 

draft a site-specific biosecurity plan and

♦ identifies the roles and 

responsibilities of key personnel,

♦ explains biosecurity training and 

briefing requirements,

♦ addresses site security and safety,

♦ discusses biosecurity practices for shipping and transportation, and

♦ provides a biosecurity checklist.

In addition, more information on appropriate biosecurity measures can be found 

in the NAHEMS Guidelines: Biosecurity.

4.9.1 Biosecurity Hazards and Mitigating Measures

Box 4-4 shows biosecurity hazards and biosecurity measures to mitigate these 

risks during an FMD outbreak.

 Biosecurity Essentials

• Site Managers act as 

biosecurity specialist for 

their assigned sites and can 

halt operations on the site, if 

necessary.

• Contracting Officers and 

Contracting Officer 

Representatives are 

responsible for contractor 

biosecurity compliance.

• Biosecurity includes site 

security; download signage 

from 

http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/

Infection_Control/Sign/.

Report broken link
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-36 

Box 4-4. FMD Biosecurity Hazards and Appropriate Biosecurity Measures

Biosecurity Hazards Biosecurity Measures to Mitigate Risk

• Movement of livestock, vehicles, 

equipment, and people.

• Contaminated feed and water. 

• Contact with infected 

domesticated livestock and other 

non-susceptible animals that can 

act as mechanical vectors (cats, 

poultry, or foxes). 

• Contact with contaminated 

people, clothes, footwear, or 

hands. 

• Clean and disinfect premises, vehicles, and 

equipment and dispose of materials that cannot 

be disinfected in an appropriate manner. 

• Account for the movement of all livestock, other 

animals, and equipment for accurate records.

• Provide a location for all individuals to carry out 

appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures 

and insist that these procedures are followed. 

• Prevent close or direct contact between herds 

(over a single fence line). 

4.9.2 Closed Herds

In the event of an FMD outbreak, an important biosecurity measure is closing 

herds to new livestock. Box 4-5 provides guidance on employing closed herds as 

a critical biosecurity measure.

Box 4-5. Biosecurity for Closed Herds

 

4.9.3 Waiting Period

Another important biosecurity measure is to ensure personnel are not traveling 

between IP and unknown or non-infected premises. During an FMD outbreak, it is 

important that personnel wait the allotted time between premises visits in addition 

to following appropriate biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection protocols (see 

Section 4.15). Actual waiting periods will be recommended by IC on the basis of 

the outbreak circumstances, and need for personnel. Typical waiting times vary 

between 24 and 72 hours (for example, 72-hours was used in the United Kingdom 

Biosecurity: Closed Herds

• To the fullest extent possible, close the herd to the introduction of new 

livestock (with population increases occurring only from offspring). 

• If closing a herd is not possible, isolate newly purchased livestock (from the 

healthiest possible sources) and those returning from existing herds for 30 days 

or more. 

• Do not introduce vaccinated animals to naïve herds. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-37 

following the 2001 FMD outbreak).26 Team members should not travel from IP or 

SP to unknown or non-infected premises. However, they may travel between IPs, 

if proper mitigating procedures are followed. 

Extended avoidance periods for personnel may be unnecessary with stringent 

biosecurity practices and effective cleaning and disinfection protocols. However, 

until further information is available, veterinarians and other responders should 

adhere to the guidance provided by the local IC. 

4.10 QUARANTINE AND 

MOVEMENT CONTROL

By restricting the movement of infected 

animals, animal products, and 

contaminated fomites, quarantine and 

movement control (QMC) can be a 

powerful tool in controlling and containing 

an FMD outbreak. Movement control is 

accomplished through a permit system that 

allows entities to make necessary 

movements without creating an 

unacceptable risk of disease spread. 

Operational staff members need to strictly 

adhere to movement control procedures, 

which are based on the best scientific 

information available at the time. Refer to 

FAD PReP Manual 6-0, Permitted 

Movement, for a complete treatment of that 

topic. 

Upon report of a highly suspicious or 

presumptive positive case of FMD, the 

State or Tribal Animal Health Official will 

immediately issue a quarantine or hold 

order on the premises. (Appendix H

contains an example of a State quarantine 

order.) The Incident Commander, Disease 

Surveillance Branch (Operations Section), 

and Situation Unit (Planning Section), or 

26 Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). 2008. Biosecurity 

Guidance to Prevent the Spread of Animal Diseases. 

http://archive.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/documents/biosecurity_guidance.pdf. 

 QMC Essentials

• See Section 4.1 in this 

chapter for premises and 

zone/area definitions.

• At the beginning of an 

outbreak, be prepared for a 

national, regional, or State 

movement standstill of 24-72 

hour duration and changes in

zone and CA designations.

• NAHEMS Guidelines: 

Quarantine and Movement 

Control provides 

information on measures to 

prevent the spread of FMD 

through movement.

• States’ animal health 

emergency response plan 

should describe the 

implementation of QMC, 

including a permit system.

• States should consider their 

authorities for and 

enforcement of movement 

restrictions.

Report broken link
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-38

other appropriate personnel, will coordinate to establish an IZ and a BZ within 6 

hours of the identification of an index case. These initial zone designations may 

be modified at any time based on new information. Refer to Section 4.5.1 for 

premises and zone/area terminology and definitions. 

4.10.1 Movement Standstill

Controlled movement orders and 24- to 72-hour standstill notices are likely to be 

implemented upon detection of FMD in the United States in relevant regions or zones. 

A State may require a movement standstill under its own authority or at the request of 

USDA, or in some cases, USDA may impose a Federal quarantine or other movement 

control by Federal Order when requested by SAHOs or as directed by the Secretary of 

Agriculture. (Appendix H contains an example of a Federal Order for a movement 

standstill.) 

A national (or regional) standstill includes stopping the sending and receiving of all live 

susceptible animals as well as semen and embryos from susceptible animals. The 

applicable geographic region may be adjusted based on the location and any known 

information about introduction and transmission. In general, the following concepts 

apply:

♦ All movements of susceptible animals that are in progress when a 

national/regional movement standstill is announced should continue to move to 

their intended destinations. Destination premises should accept all movements 

of susceptible animals that are in progress at the time of the national standstill 

notice; this should be supported by States and industry. Reverting animals or 

returning them to the origin poses serious animal welfare and logistical issues.

♦ Exceptions may be made for critical movements. APHIS and State officials will 

determine the characteristics and requirements for these movements (an 

example would be animals scheduled to move to slaughter within 4 hours of the 

movement standstill being announced). APHIS and State officials may also 

approve critical movements of personnel or vehicle movements in a CA or onto 

and off of an infected premises for delivery of feed or veterinary care, for 

example.

♦ A national/regional movement standstill notice does not affect movement of

milk. Premises may continue moving milk to processing. All premises moving 

milk must implement, monitor, and enforce their premises biosecurity plans to 

reduce the risk of FMD introduction. States may choose to implement additional 

or alternative guidance for premises needing to move milk. 

In the event of a movement standstill, the USDA will provide clear concise policy 

guidance on the implementation and provisions of, made easily accessible to all 

stakeholders. Specifications of issuance will at least be defined for 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-39

1. a specific geographical area or boundary (e.g., Nationwide or other);

2. a specific requirement that all live swine in transit at issuance must 

reach a destination;

3. a specific time indicating the duration of a standstill (e.g., 72 hours);

4. a specific list of what items are restricted from movement (e.g., live 

swine and germplasm); and

5. a specific list of what items are exempt from movement restrictions 

(e.g., negligible risk Food Safety and Inspection Service [FSIS]-

inspected products). 

If a Federal quarantine or standstill notice is implemented under existing USDA 

authorities, States may be asked to provide resources to maintain and enforce these 

requirements; reimbursement formulas for these activities would be established 

between the States and USDA via cooperative agreement.

The release of this standstill, and costs associated with it, will be weighed carefully 

by APHIS officials against the risk of further disease transmission from premises that 

are infected but not yet detected. Additional national-level guidance will be provided 

when the national/regional movement standstill is lifted. All premises with 

susceptible animals should continue to implement elevated biosecurity.

4.10.2 Moving Commodities, Animals, and Conveyances in 

FMD Outbreak

Any movement of commodities, animals, and conveyances brings some level of 

risk of FMDV transmission from a known IP or an unknown IP to non-infected 

premises. The risk of moving commodities, animals, and conveyances depends on 

the nature of the item being moved and its ability to transmit or be contaminated 

with FMDV. FMDV can be transmitted via items that contain biological material 

(such as manure), through infected animals, or via a contaminated fomite or 

person.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Quarantine and Movement Control provides 

information on measures considered necessary to prevent the spread of FMD 

through movement, including 1) keeping FMD out of livestock populations in 

areas free of FMD and 2) preventing the spread of FMD to non-infected livestock 

in areas where FMD exists.
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-40 

4.10.2.1 PERMIT GUIDANCE TO MOVE INTO A CONTROL AREA, WITHIN A CONTROL AREA,

AND OUT OF A CONTROL AREA

Each State’s animal health emergency response plan should describe the 

implementation of quarantine and movement controls, including a permit system.

Because of the variation in the risk of the commodities, animals, and 

conveyances, it is possible that premises—particularly MP and ARP—may be 

permitted to move one commodity, animal, or conveyance but not another. In 

making the decision whether movement will be allowed, substantial consideration 

will be given to critical movements (for example, the movement of animal feed 

onto premises).

During an FMD outbreak, the following guidance in Table 4-8 (movement into a 

CA), Table 4-9 (movement within a CA), and Table 4-10 (movement out of a CA) 

will be used to issue permits in movement control efforts. The Secure Food 

Supply plans at www.cfsph.iastate.edu/secure-food-supply/ promote COB and 

provide permit guidance. For milk and milk products, see the Secure Milk Supply 

(SMS) Plan, http://securemilksupply.org. The Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan 

offers guidance for pork and pork products, www.securepork.org. The Secure 

Beef Supply (SBS) Plan is also developing COB guidance, http://securebeef.org/, 

as is the Secure Sheep and Wool Supply (https://securesheepwool.org/).

See Section 4.16 for additional guidance for movement control of vaccinates.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-41 

 

Table 4-6. Movement into Control Area from Outside Control Area to Specific Premisesa

Item Moving into a 

Control Area to 

a/an... 

Infected 

Premises

Suspect Premises^ Contact 

Premises^

At-Risk 

Premises 

Monitored 

Premises

Susceptible animals Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances as 

determined by 

the IC, such as 

slaughter. 

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the 

IC, such as slaughter. 

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the 

IC, such as 

slaughter. 

Permit for 

movement must 

be approved by 

the IC with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Permit for movement 

must be approved by 

the IC with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Susceptible animal 

products

See continuity of business (COB) plans for information on susceptible animal products, or 

guidance and processes as determined by the IC. Please see the OIE Terrestrial Code for 

specific guidance for inactivating FMDV. 

Other animals (nonsusceptible 

livestock) from 

premises with 

susceptible species

Prohibited unless 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved by 

IC and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit 

for movement 

depending upon 

FMD 

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination 

premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures. 

IC may require a 

permit for movement 

depending upon 

FMD epidemiology 

and characteristics of 

destination premises.
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-42 

Other animals (nonsusceptible 

livestock) from 

premises without 

susceptible species

IC will 

determine 

movement 

restrictions 

based on FMD 

epidemiology 

and 

characteristics of 

destination 

premises.

IC will determine 

movement 

restrictions based on 

FMD epidemiology 

and characteristics of 

destination premises.

IC will determine 

movement 

restrictions based 

on FMD 

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination 

premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit 

for movement 

depending upon 

FMD 

epidemiology and 

characteristics of 

destination 

premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures. 

IC may require a 

permit for movement 

depending upon 

FMD epidemiology 

and characteristics of 

destination premises.

Equipment, vehicles, 

and other fomites 

from premises with 

susceptible species

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

Semen, embryos 

from susceptible 

animals 

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness 

and operational capabilities.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally 

these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-43 

 

Table 4-7. Movement within a Control Areaa

Item Moving within a 

Control Area from 

a/an.... 

Infected Premises Suspect 

Premises^ 

Contact 

Premises^ 

At-Risk 

Premises 

Monitored 

Premises 

Susceptible animals Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the 

IC, such as 

slaughter. 

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the 

IC, such as 

slaughter. 

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the 

IC, such as 

slaughter. 

Allowed to move 

by permit 

approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative 

diagnostic tests, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Allowed to move 

by permit 

approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative 

diagnostic tests, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Susceptible animal 

products

See COB plans for information on susceptible animal products, or guidance and processes as 

determined by the IC. Please see the OIE Terrestrial Code for specific guidance for 

inactivating FMDV.

Other animals (nonsusceptible 

livestock) from 

premises with 

susceptible species

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

granted by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

granted by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

granted by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed to move 

by permit 

approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative 

diagnostic tests, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Allowed to move 

by permit 

approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative 

diagnostic tests, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-44 

Other animals (nonsusceptible 

livestock) from 

premises without 

susceptible species

n/a

(Infected Premises 

have susceptible 

species)

n/a

(Suspect Premises 

have susceptible 

species)

n/a

(Contact Premises 

have susceptible 

species)

n/a

(At-Risk Premises 

have susceptible 

species)

n/a

(Monitored 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species)

Equipment, vehicles, 

and other fomites 

from premises with 

susceptible species

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

granted by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

granted by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

granted by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos 

from susceptible 

animals 

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed by permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness 

and operational capabilities.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. 

Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-45 

 

Table 4-8. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area from Specific Premisesa

Item Moving out 

of a Control Area 

from a/an... 

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premises^

Contact 

Premises^

At-Risk Premises Monitored Premises*

Susceptible 

animals 

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the 

IC.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the 

IC.

Prohibited, except 

under certain 

circumstances as 

determined by the 

IC.

At-Risk Premises 

must become 

Monitored Premises 

to move susceptible 

livestock out of a 

Control Area.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by IC; 

surveillance, negative 

diagnostic tests, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.

Susceptible 

animal products 

See COB plans for information on susceptible animal products, or guidance and processes as 

determined by the IC. Please see the OIE Terrestrial Code for specific guidance for inactivating 

FMDV.

Other animals 

(non-susceptible 

livestock) from 

premises with 

susceptible 

species

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures and 

risk-assessment.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures and riskassessment.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures and 

risk-assessment.

Allowed to move 

by permit approved 

by IC; surveillance 

and negative 

diagnostic tests for 

susceptible animals 

on premises, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required for 

permit.

Allowed to move by 

permit approved by IC; 

surveillance and negative 

diagnostic tests for 

susceptible animals on 

premises, premises 

biosecurity, and riskassessment may be 

required for permit.
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-46 

Other animals 

(non-susceptible 

livestock) from 

premises without 

susceptible 

species

n/a

(Infected 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species)

n/a

(Suspect Premises 

have susceptible 

species)

n/a

(Contact Premises 

have susceptible 

species)

n/a

(At-Risk Premises 

have susceptible 

species)

n/a

(Monitored Premises have 

susceptible species)

Equipment, 

vehicles, and 

other fomites 

from premises 

with susceptible 

species

Prohibited unless 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved by 

IC and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos 

from susceptible 

animals 

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. At-Risk Premises 

must become 

Monitored Premises 

to move semen, 

embryos from 

susceptible 

livestock out of a 

Control Area.

Monitored Premises only 

allowed by permit 

approved by IC and 

appropriate biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and 

operational capabilities.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally 

these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.

* Continuity of business plans may apply.
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-47

For movement of susceptible animals and susceptible animal products out of the 

CA to a FA, the permit process must consider national standards, any OIE 

standards, and conditions for such movement such as biosecurity procedures and 

risk assessment recommendations. In addition, commodity-specific proactive risk 

assessments, COB plans, movement and marketability plans, and 

compartmentalization plans will also be considered. Figure 4-4 illustrates 

movement control and permitting in relation to premises designation.

Figure 4-4. Premises Designations in Relation to Permitting 

and Movement Control
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-48 

4.10.2.2 OIE TREATMENT GUIDELINES FOR FMD

The OIE Terrestrial Code provides guidance for the importation of animals, 

products, and commodities from FMD-infected countries or zones, as well as 

processes for inactivating FMDV. Specifically, Section 8.8 of the Terrestrial 

Code (2019) for guidance on the inactivation of FMDV in meat, wool and hair, 

bristles, raw hides/skins, and milk/cream, as well as other items, such as skins, 

trophies, and casings. 

4.10.2.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED FOR LIVESTOCK AND PRODUCT MOVEMENT

Surveillance measures are required for movement of livestock and animal 

products for premises located in the CA (IZ and BZ). These steps may include 

visual surveillance and/or diagnostic testing prior to movement. (Appendix F

contains more information on surveillance for the movement of livestock and 

animal products.) See the SMS Plan for disease monitoring for dairy cattle, 

http://securemilksupply.org; the SPS Plan for swine, www.securepork.org.; the 

SBS Plan for cattle, http://securebeef.org/; and the Secure Sheep and Wool 

Supply Plan (https://securesheepwool.org/). 

4.10.3 Repopulation

4.10.3.1 RESTOCKING GUIDANCE

Following appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures, IPs will remain 

vacant for a period of time before restocking susceptible animals onto premises. 

The minimum recommendation is 21 days (used by the United Kingdom in the 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease Order, 2006) to 28 days (two OIE incubation periods). If 

it is not possible to carry out full cleaning and disinfection procedures, the 

premises must remain vacant for a longer period of time to be determined by the 

IC. It is critically important that in restocking, the IC consider the likelihood of 

FMDV survival based on environmental conditions, the execution of cleaning and 

disinfection procedures, and specific circumstances of the outbreak. In some 

cases, previously IPs may need to remain vacant for significantly longer than 28 

days. 

The producer should provide a restocking plan, including details of the 

susceptible species, number of animals, and locations of sentinel animals. Once 

introduced to the previously IP, no animals may leave until all locations on that 

premises have been restocked and serological diagnostics are negative. Replacing 

the slaughtered or depopulated animals with the same species is unnecessary—

any FMD susceptible species is appropriate, though the use of sheep as sentinel 

animals should be discouraged. 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-49 

 

Non-susceptible species also must be restocked a minimum of 21–28 days after 

full cleaning and disinfection procedures, as non-susceptible species can act as 

mechanical vectors for FMDV. The IC has the discretion to consider the risk of 

non-susceptible animals and make appropriate considerations for these species.

4.10.3.2 TESTING REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTOCKING

During restocking, animals will be subject to clinical inspection every 3 days for 

the first 14 days (one OIE incubation period), and once per week thereafter up to 

28 days (two OIE incubation periods). At 28 days after the last animals are 

introduced, each animal must be clinically examined by a veterinary inspector and 

samples tested for the presence of FMDV antibodies.

4.10.3.3 APPROVED SOURCES OF LIVESTOCK

Introduced livestock must be derived from areas not subject to quarantine and 

movement control measures. All livestock must test negative before introduction. 

A 24-hour pre-movement clinical inspection is also required. Animals must 

originate on and come from premises on which there has not been a confirmed 

case of FMD within 6.2 miles (10 kilometers) for at least 30 days.

4.11 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS (COB) 

COB is the management of non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal 

products in the event of an FMD outbreak. COB provides science- and risk-based 

approaches and systems as a critical activity in an FMD response. This helps 

agriculture and food industries facilitate routine business, or a return to business, 

during a disease response while the risk of disease spread is effectively managed. 

COB planning can help to minimize unintended consequences on producers and 

consumers impacted by FMD. During an FMD outbreak, permitting, movement 

control, and prioritized disruptions—all based on science and risk-based 

approaches—are critical measures to ensure COB. The NAHEMS Guidelines: 

Continuity of Business covers topics such as 

 key roles and responsibilities in COB planning, 

 details of developing COB plans, 

 potential components required for COB planning, and 

 preparedness and response goals.

The SMS Plan (http://securemilksupply.org) offers additional COB information 

for milk and milk products; the SPS Plan (www.securepork.org) offers additional 

COB information for pork and pork products, particularly applicable to interstate 

trade. See also the Secure Beef Supply (SBS) Plan, http://securebeef.org/, and the 
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-50 

Secure Sheep and Wool Supply Plan (https://securesheepwool.org/). See Section 

4.16.3 for additional guidance for movement control of vaccinates.

4.12 REGIONALIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

(FOR A U.S. FMD RESPONSE) 

In the event of an FMD outbreak in the United States, international trade of 

animals and animal products may be adversely affected for a significant period of 

time. This would have serious economic implications for the affected industries 

and the United States. Therefore, it is important to identify, prior to an outbreak, 

potential procedures and plans that may mitigate the consequences and reestablish 

international trade as rapidly as possible.

As defined by the OIE, regionalization, also known as zoning, is the concept of 

separating subpopulations of animals in order to maintain a specific health status 

in one or more disease-free regions or zones. Disease-free regions can be created 

to facilitate COB and reestablish international trade from the regions 

demonstrated to be disease-free. 

Regionalization recognizes that risk may be tied to factors that are not reflected 

by political boundaries of the nation or individual States, especially when the 

outbreak has been confined to specific areas within an individual State or group of 

States. Providing information to the OIE, its member countries and our trading 

partners, which clearly identifies the boundaries of the disease-free areas, can be 

used to inform our trading partners’ decisions whether to receive or reject our 

exports. This risk-based process, based on sound science, can mitigate the adverse 

economic effects of an FMD outbreak.

4.12.1 Compartmentalization

Another tool that may potentially mitigate the economic consequences of a 

disease outbreak is compartmentalization. Compartmentalization, which defines 

an animal subpopulation by management and husbandry practices related to 

biosecurity, could be used by veterinary authorities to demonstrate and maintain 

DF in certain commercial establishments whose practices have prevented the 

introduction of the disease. The disease-free status of these compartments could 

enable trade movement of animal products. 

Compartmentalization has not been fully implemented by the United States for 

any disease agent to-date, and will depend on the recognition of the status of these 

compartments by international trading partners. Implementation of 

compartmentalization will rely on producers, industry, and State and Federal 

animal health authorities. By working closely together to develop and strengthen 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-51 

 

relationships and implementing the agreed upon procedures preceding an FAD 

outbreak, compartmentalization may be a useful tool. 

4.12.2 Further Guidance

The OIE Terrestrial Code offers specific guidelines for an FMD-free 

compartment in Chapter 8.8 (2019). 

4.13 MASS DEPOPULATION AND EUTHANASIA

Depending on the FMD strategy or strategies selected, animals on an IP will be 

depopulated as soon as possible after declaration of an FMD outbreak. 

Susceptible animals on CP may also be depopulated as soon as possible after the 

premises are classified as CP. Mass 

depopulation methods that may be 

considered include 

 gunshot, 

 penetrating captive bolt,

 electrocution,

 injectable euthanasia, and

 carbon dioxide and other gas. 

In an FMD outbreak, euthanasia or mass 

depopulation should be conducted on

affected animals as safely, quickly, 

efficiently, and humanely as possible. In 

addition, the emotional and psychological 

impact on animal owners, caretakers, their 

families, and other personnel should be 

minimized.

Mass depopulation and euthanasia are not 

synonymous, and APHIS recognizes a clear 

distinction. Euthanasia involves 

transitioning an animal to death as 

painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass 

depopulation is a method by which large 

numbers of animals must be destroyed 

quickly and efficiently with as much 

consideration given to the welfare of 

animals as practicable, given extenuating 

 Depop Essentials

• See the NAHEMS 

Guidelines: Mass 

Depopulation and 

Euthanasia. 

• In 2019, AVMA published 

Guidelines for the 

Depopulation of Animals. 

• States should prepare in 

advance for the depopulation 

method(s) it will use and the 

resources it will need. 

• VS has a limited supply 

of captive bolt 

equipment.

• NVS contractors are not 

on contract to perform, 

nor are they capable of 

performing, large 

animal depopulation; 

however, they can 

provide labor and 

transport. 

Report broken link
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-52 

circumstances. Mass depopulation is employed in an FMD response to prevent or 

mitigate the spread of FMD through the elimination of infected or potentially 

infected animals. The mass depopulation guidance document27 issued in 2019 

from the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) recognizes the need 

for emergency destruction of animals in disease situations, and stresses adherence 

to strong ethical standards throughout depopulation to ensure animals experience 

minimal pain and distress. In short, qualified personnel should perform mass 

depopulation in the event of an FMD outbreak using the safest, quickest, and most 

humane procedures in accordance with AVMA guidance. 

Sufficiency of available personnel or materials should be assessed before an 

outbreak occurs. Reliance on NVS contractors is not necessarily an option, as—

despite contract solicitations—it does not have the capability to deliver resources 

for depopulation of large animals. VS holds several captive bolt units and has a 

roster of trained State and Federal responders on their use. Expertise in euthanasia 

and mass depopulation may also be available within particular industries. 

NAHEMS Guidelines: Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia contains additional 

information on euthanasia and mass depopulation. 

4.14 DISPOSAL

Appropriate disposal of animal carcasses and materials is a critical component of 

a successful FMD response. FMDV can survive for long periods on both organic 

and inorganic materials. The FAD PReP Disposal SOP discusses how to dispose 

of carcasses, animal products, contaminated and potentially contaminated 

materials, and items that cannot be properly cleaned and disinfected (such as 

manure, litter, and bedding), products of the response effort (such as PPE), and 

products of vaccination response. Disposal will occur as soon as possible after the 

depopulation of animals. 

Planning in advance for carcass management is strongly advised, as coordination 

among State and local agriculture emergency response and environmental 

agencies and waste authorities will be necessary for timely disposal of 

contaminated materials. The APHIS Carcass Management Dashboard is available 

(see sidebar on next page) to guide States and producers through carcass 

management options for planning or response purposes. 

Disposal must be conducted in a manner that does not allow FMDV to spread, 

minimizes negative environmental effects, and conserves meat or animal protein 

if logistically supportable from a biosecurity standpoint. In some cases, moving 

27 American Veterinary Medical Association. (2019). Guidelines for the Depopulation of 

Animals. Retrieved from: https://www.avma.org/KB/Policies/documents/AVMA-Guidelines-forthe-Depopulation-of-Animals.pdf. 
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-53

clinically normal animals to a slaughter facility within the CA may be possible, 

though they may have been exposed to FMDV on IP or CP. IC must permit any 

movement required for disposal. Local and State regulations must be observed 

and memorandums of understanding may need to be obtained to ensure disposal 

capabilities. Cost effectiveness and stakeholder acceptance must also be 

considered.

Disposal methods should always be 

assessed and applied appropriately, given 

the facility location, type of housing, 

premises characteristics, and other 

situational factors. IC will coordinate 

closely with local authorities in deciding 

how to dispose of carcasses and other 

items.

On-site burial, which has been a commonly 

accepted means of disposal, may be an 

inexpensive and biosecure method of 

disposal that minimizes the transportation 

of infected materials. However, on-site 

methods may be significantly limited by 

several factors and the potential for 

environmental contamination, such as 

topography, soil type, soil depth to 

bedrock, seasonal high-water table, and 

environmental regulations. 

Other disposal methods such as 

composting, incineration, and rendering 

may also be employed, as indicated by the 

circumstances of the outbreak and disposal 

requirements. These methods may address 

the need to minimize negative 

environmental impact while also mitigating 

virus spread; they are also considered 

viable alternatives for both large and small 

ruminants. Please note, written verification 

that disposal operations are approved by the state environmental regulatory 

agency will be required if APHIS pays for disposal. For the disposal of syringes 

and unused but opened vaccine vials, disposal through routine medical waste 

service provider is recommended. 

In the event that available personnel are insufficient for disposal requirements in 

an FMD outbreak, the IC can request emergency 3D contractor support from the 

 Disposal Essentials

• APHIS resources include

• NAHEMS Guidelines: 

Disposal and detailed

FAD PReP Disposal 

SOP.

• The Carcass Management 

Dashboard

• Carcass Management 

Basics webinar on the 

TEP site, search term: 

disposal

• A website search may reveal 

useful resources, such as the 

Veterinary Compliance 

Assistance Carcass Disposal 

State Resource Locator

which summarizes and cites 

State disposal regulations.

• Work with all relevant 

agencies when developing 

site-specific carcass 

management plans. 

Report broken link
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-54

NVS. NAHEMS Guidelines: Disposal contains further guidance on preparation 

for disposal activities.

4.15 CLEANING AND DISINFECTION

Because of FMDV’s high survival rate on both organic and inorganic materials, 

aggressive cleaning and disinfection practices are required for control and 

eradication. Cleaning and disinfection are to be conducted within 48 hours of the 

disposal of depopulated animals. The FAD PReP Cleaning and Disinfection SOP 

provides information on

 the FMD cleaning and disinfection 

effort,

 optimal cleaning and disinfection 

methods for FMD,

 processes used to inactivate FMD 

viruses from organic materials,

 how to clean and disinfect 

equipment and premises after FMD 

detection, and

 Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA)-approved disinfectants for 

FMDV.

Because the aerosol transmission of FMD 

is a concern, care should be taken to reduce 

the generation and dispersal of potentially 

infective dust and aerosolized materials 

during cleaning and disinfection 

procedures. If items cannot be cleaned and 

disinfected adequately, they will be 

disposed of using burial, incineration, or 

other appropriate means. All disinfectants 

must be EPA-approved for FMD; off-label 

use of disinfectants is illegal.

If available personnel or materials are insufficient for cleaning and disinfection in 

an FMD outbreak, the IC can request emergency 3D contractor support from 

NVS.

NAHEMS Guidelines: Cleaning and Disinfection contains additional information.

 C&D Essentials

• See NAHEMS Guidelines: 

Cleaning and Disinfection 

for C&D preparedness.

• A list of EPA-approved 

disinfectants may be found 

here, and product labels may 

be found at EPA’s Pesticide 

Product and Label System.

• APHIS’ Disinfectants

website provides letters of 

exemption and 

concentrations for use of 

citric acid or bleach when an 

EPA-registered product is 

not available. 

Report broken link
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-55

4.16 VACCINATION

The use of emergency vaccination in the event of FMD is discussed in Chapter 3. 

This section explains important additional details in the event emergency 

vaccination is approved for use in an FMD outbreak. 

In addition to having a sufficient quantity of vaccine that can be delivered 

quickly, effectively implementing a vaccination strategy and plan requires other 

significant resources and infrastructure, including the following:

♦ Regulatory infrastructure (for procurement, licensing, permitting, 

distribution, and use).

♦ Logistics capabilities, including vaccination teams and cold chain 

management

♦ Animal identification (per 

requirements for FMD emergency 

vaccine use).

♦ Communication (strategy and 

messaging).

♦ Information management.

♦ Incident management system 

capabilities.

♦ Resources to continue execution 

other critical activities, including 

surveillance, biosecurity, and 

cleaning and disinfection.

4.16.1 Vaccination Plan 

Limited quantities of vaccine will be 

available early in the response, and APHIS 

VS may receive requests for vaccine from 

multiple States. A well-defined State 

vaccination plan will assist decision makers 

in prioritizing and distributing vaccine to 

States that are ready and able to handle the vaccine appropriately and rapidly 

administer doses based on well-grounded epidemiological principles.

The State vaccine request should include an estimate of the number of vaccine 

doses desired in the first shipment (first two weeks), and for subsequent 

shipments (3 months and beyond). The projection may be made based on all 

 Vaccination Essentials

• APHIS will likely solicit 

States for vaccine requests, 

even prior to a decision to 

vaccinate.

• Vaccine selection will be 

made at the national level.

• A well-defined State plan is 

a prerequisite for vaccine 

receipt. 

• Appendices E and I of this 

publication provide 

additional information.

Report broken link
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-56

susceptible animals in the State, or of the population for which vaccine is planned, 

dairy cattle, for instance.

In plan development, consult Table 4-11 for assumptions used to calculate 

vaccine quantity needed: 

Table 4-9. Projected Vaccine Dose Need

The vaccination plan should contain this request, as well as describe the 

vaccination strategy and schedule; policies for identification and movement of 

vaccinates; and logistics for receipt and proper administration of vaccine. See 

Appendix E for an example of information that should be included in a State 

vaccination plan. 

4.16.2 Zone, Area, and Premises Designations

Vaccination strategies are presented in Chapter 3 of this document. This section 

provides additional detail and figures to illustrate the use of emergency 

vaccination in an FMD outbreak.

4.16.2.1 CONTAINMENT VACCINATION ZONE

The CVZ is an emergency vaccination zone typically within the CA, and may 

include the IZ and/or the BZ. A CVZ is often observed with stamping-out 

modified with emergency vaccination to kill or to slaughter. Figure 4-5 shows 

examples of a CVZ.
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-57

Figure 4-5. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones (Figures are not to scale.)

Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone Emergency Vaccination in Buffer Zone

Emergency Vaccination in Control Area Emergency Vaccination in IZ and Partial BZ

4.16.2.2 PROTECTION VACCINATION ZONE

The PVZ is an emergency vaccination zone typically in the FA. It is consistent 

with the OIE Terrestrial Code (2019) definition for a Protection Zone:

A zone where specific biosecurity and sanitary measures are implemented 

to prevent the entry of a pathogenic agent into a free country or zone from 

a neighboring country or zone of a different animal health status.

Typically, a PVZ would be observed with stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination-to-live. Figure 4-6 shows examples of a PVZ.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-58

Figure 4-6. Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones (Figures are not to scale.)

Circle Irregular

4.16.2.3 Vaccinated Premises (VP)

VP may be a secondary designation to another premises designation and is only 

used if emergency vaccination is employed in an outbreak. A VP may be located 

in a CVZ, typically inside a CA (IZ or BZ) or in a PVZ, typically in the FA. 

Figure 4-7 shows VP in a CVZ (left) and in a PVZ (right).

Figure 4-7. Vaccinated Premises (Figures are not to scale.)

Containment Vaccination Zone Protection Vaccination Zone
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-59

4.16.3 Movement Restrictions for Vaccinates

If emergency vaccination is used in a response to an FMD outbreak, a vaccination 

plan will define procedures to prevent the spread of FMD by vaccination teams. 

Emergency vaccination occurs within a CVZ or a PVZ. All vaccinates will be 

identified with specific and permanent (tamper-proof) identification. When 

vaccine is used, surveillance must continue to assess vaccination effectiveness 

and detect any antigenic change. Movement restrictions for vaccinates are as 

follows:

 VP may be subject to the movement restrictions of their primary premises 

designation. 

 Animals receiving emergency vaccination on the VP may be subject to 

vaccinated animal identification, traceability, and DIVA testing.

 For movement of emergency vaccinated animals, consideration must be 

given to any national or international standards or conditions for such 

movement. 

4.16.4 Cessation of Vaccination

FMD emergency vaccination should cease as soon as possible to allow the region 

or State to return quickly to a favorable trade status. The decision to cease 

emergency vaccination will be made by the IC, SAHO, and VSDA/CVO, who 

will consider national and international standards for movement in making this 

determination. 

4.17 LOGISTICS

The NVS provides veterinary countermeasures—supplies, equipment, vaccines, 

and response support services—that States, Tribes, and Territories need to 

respond to damaging animal disease outbreaks. Its website provides information 

on NVS capabilities and overviews the required steps to request countermeasures 

from the NVS. It also provides materials which State preparedness officials and 

responders can download to help them understand the NVS. This website 

provides

 a planning guide for Federal, State, and local authorities;

 a template for a State NVS plan; and

 outreach and exercise programs.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-60

In addition to physical countermeasures, the NVS maintains contracts with allhazard response companies that are capable of supporting depopulation, disposal, 

and decontamination (3D) activities. 3D represents activities commonly 

demanding rapid deployment of response personnel and equipment. NVS 

contractors are trained in emergency response, and are self-sufficient with their 

own equipment and supplies. The contractors can deploy within 24 hours, and are 

capable of providing large numbers of personnel over time (weeks); however, in a 

widespread outbreak, personnel shortages can still occur.

4.18 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND VECTOR 

CONTROL

USDA APHIS will work in close collaboration, communication, and coordination 

with DOI and other Federal, State, Tribal, and 

local agencies that have primary jurisdictional 

authority and subject matter expertise for 

wildlife. This collaboration, communication, 

and coordination will occur in both the 

Unified Command and MPC.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Wildlife 

Management and Vector Control for an FAD 

Response in Domestic Livestock also 

discusses personnel and equipment required 

for wildlife management, quarantine and 

movement control for wildlife, wildlife risk 

assessment, wildlife surveillance, and related 

activities.

4.18.1 Wildlife Management

A wildlife management plan that addresses transmission of FMD in both captive 

and free-ranging wildlife will be developed as soon as possible after identification 

of the index case in livestock. An assessment of the risk that wildlife poses for the 

transmission of FMDV to susceptible livestock will be conducted in the first week 

of an outbreak. Assessment of the risks posed by wildlife will require information 

on

 density and distribution,

 social organization,

 habitat,

 contact with domestic livestock, and

 NVS Essentials

• Visit the APHIS NVS 

website for details.

• Contact the NVS:

• For routine questions, 

NVS@USDA.gov 

• For emergencies, 

800-940-6524

Report broken link
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-61

 length of time wild animals could have been exposed to the virus.

If wildlife populations are determined to be infected with FMDV or otherwise 

pose a biological risk for transmission, appropriate wildlife management 

principles will be applied as needed to reduce exposure of wildlife to livestock. If 

wildlife populations are determined not to be infected or be a biological risk for 

transmission of FMDV to livestock, wildlife management tools will be 

implemented to keep wildlife populations from acting as mechanical vectors.

4.18.2 Vector Control

FMD can be transmitted mechanically by mice, vultures, and other vectors. Todate, there is no evidence that insects can biologically transmit the FMDV to 

susceptible animals. Appropriate biosecurity measures should be in place during 

an FMD outbreak to ensure that mechanical vectors do not have contact with 

infected herds or other infected material.

4.19 ANIMAL WELFARE

During an FMD outbreak, humane treatment must be provided to animals given 

the specific circumstances of the outbreak, particularly from the time they are 

identified for destruction or vaccination activities until they are depopulated, 

euthanized, or slaughtered, as prescribed by veterinary authorities of the affected 

States or Tribal nations. The FAD PReP Overview of Animal Welfare SOP 

available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep and the AVMA mass depopulation 

guidance document referenced in Section 4.13 contain additional information.

4.20 MODELING AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS

The development of models and risk assessments are critical in a successful FMD 

response. These tools give decision makers valuable insight. During an outbreak, 

one or more multidisciplinary teams (consisting of epidemiologists, disease agent 

experts, economists, affected commodity experts, and others) will be established 

to perform risk assessments as needed. 

Presently, CEAH is conducting modeling work associated with FMD control 

strategies for detected feedlots. A few of the initial scenarios to be evaluated 

follow:

 Total depopulation of feedlot with no animals moved to controlled 

slaughter.

 Segmented harvest: targeted animals moved to controlled slaughter.
Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-62

 Selective and/or welfare depopulation followed by controlled slaughter of 

recovered animals.

 Vaccination followed by controlled slaughter of vaccinated animals.

 Vaccination with selective depopulation and controlled slaughter of 

remaining vaccinated animals. 

 Controlled burn through with no depopulation of infected animals.

The FAD PReP Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools SOP provides 

information on modeling and risk assessment, covering

 Key roles and responsibilities in modeling and risk analysis,

 Uses of epidemiological models,

 Proactive risk assessments,

 Risk assessment during and after an outbreak, and

 Examples of current models and assessment tools.

4.21 APPRAISAL AND COMPENSATION

The AHPA gives APHIS authority to establish and implement an indemnification 

program to prevent or eradicate an FMD outbreak (See Section 2.2). Indemnity 

payments are made to encourage disease reporting, reduce the spread of animal 

disease, and compensate owners on the basis of fair market value. Fair market 

value appraisals are provided to owners of destroyed animals and materials. 

The best practices for containment and eradication of FMD will in many instances 

require depopulation, disposal, and decontamination to be carried out faster than 

can be achieved with slow appraisal processes. In some circumstances, appraisals 

will not be required to be signed prior to destruction if APHIS and the cooperating 

State agree that the livestock must be destroyed immediately to mitigate the 

potential spread or amplification of FMDV during a response to a confirmed or 

presumptive FMD incident. In this case, APHIS will require that the livestock 

owner/producer sign an appraisal and indemnity request form, which captures 

basic information and confirms that the producer will accept fair market value for 

depopulated animals. Data required to determine fair market value will be 

collected prior to depopulation, including a complete inventory of livestock being 

destroyed and any relevant value information. 

APHIS may also reimburse owners for materials that cannot be cleaned and 

disinfected and must be destroyed, e.g. feed. Payment processing for materials 

destroyed requires receipts or documents to substantiate fair market value. 

Incident personnel—Case Managers and Federal Reimbursement Specialists—

will be available to assist owners with appraisal and compensation processes.
Specific FMD Response Critical Activities and Tools

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-63

4.22 FINANCE

During an FMD outbreak, a funding source will need to be identified quickly. For 

responding to specific emergency situations, VS has access to a variety of sources 

for funding. The two most common sources are the Commodity Credit 

Corporation (CCC) and the APHIS Contingency Fund (CF).

4.22.1 Federal Funding Sources

The two most common sources are the APHIS Contingency Fund (CF) and the 

Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). During an emergency, the Secretary is 

authorized to transfer funds from the CCC. Before APHIS can ask the Secretary 

to transfer funds, however, it must consider whether it can redirect funds from a 

budget line item or if other funding sources are available. 

The APHIS CF is available for unforeseen, unpredictable program activities. The 

following four conditions must exist to qualify for the release of agency 

contingency funds:

1. The outbreak must pose an economic threat.

2. Eradication technology must be feasible and cost-effective.

3. No program or no effective program must currently exist.

4. The proposed program must have industry support.

For funds in excess of $1 million, CCC funding is typically requested. The funds 

are provided to APHIS as no-year funds. APHIS considers the total estimated 

amount of funding needed to address the issue and the degree of political support 

for funding before deciding whether or not to seek a CCC transfer.

The FAD PReP Overview of Finance SOP contains additional guidance on

 key roles and responsibilities in finance,

 emergency funding processes for foreign animal disease outbreaks, and

 triggering events for APHIS emergency funding.

4.22.2 Supplemental Cooperative Agreements

In an animal disease response, USDA APHIS will engage in supplemental or 

emergency cooperative agreements with States for conducting disease control 

measures. The following guidelines on types of reimbursements under a

supplemental agreement provide details on what costs are covered during an 

animal health disease response.
 

Updated October 2020—DRAFT 4-64 

Staffing. Salaries of existing State employees working on the response will not be 

covered by supplemental funds, but overtime worked in association with the 

disease event is eligible for reimbursement. Travel, housing, and per diem costs 

incurred by State employees responding to the event outside their normal districts 

are also covered. New staff brought on to assist in response activities should be 

term or temporary staff working directly on the response. 

Supplies. PPE, cleaning and disinfection materials, shipping materials and costs, 

swabs and biological media, outreach materials, and office supplies needed to 

handle the response are covered by a supplemental agreement. Approval would be 

needed in advance for single purchases costing over $5000. 

Expenses. A variety of other expenses may also be covered, but it is important to 

note that one State being reimbursed for something does not ensure that another 

State will be covered for the same expense.

Communications and Information Technology. Communication and information 

technology needs will be covered if they are directly related to the response and 

require resources beyond the normal expenses already undertaken by the 

cooperator. However, procurements of new IT systems or investments in major 

upgrades for existing State systems will not be provided. If a State needs to set up 

an emergency operations center, the cost of leasing and outfitting a space with the 

appropriate information technology equipment needed would be covered. 

Similarly, while APHIS will not pay the cost of cell phones or lines already in 

place for normal use, additional lines, phones, or usage costs associated with the 

outbreak would be paid for. 

Additional information may be found in the FAD PReP Finance SOP available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

4.23 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

In any FAD outbreak, the capability to rapidly scale up the size of an IC and 

integrate veterinary functions and countermeasures is critical for an effective 

response. NRF and NIMS, already discussed in this plan, allow such scalability. 

In an FMD outbreak, in particular a widespread one, national policy guidance will 

be distributed to NIMTs, the SAHOs of affected States, all States via NASAHO, 

and the APHIS FAD PReP website (www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep).

 
Updated October 2020—DRAFT Appendix A 

Appendix A

FAD PReP Materials to Support 

FMD Response

This appendix provides a broad overview of the Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP), and lists the FAD PReP 

documents that support this Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Response Plan 

(2019). The document list below may be useful for all stakeholders in 

preparedness and response planning related to FMD. The documents listed within 

may be found at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
Updated August 2019—DRAFT A-1

Appendix A

FAD PReP Materials to Support 

FMD Response

This appendix provides a broad overview of the Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP), and lists the FAD PReP 

documents that support this Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Response Plan

(2019). The documents list below may be useful for all stakeholders in 

preparedness and response planning related to FMD. These resources are found 

online at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

OVERVIEW OF FAD PREP

FAD PReP Mission and Goals

The significant threat and potential consequences of FADs and the challenges and 

lessons-learned of effective and rapid FAD response have led to the development 

of FAD PReP. The mission of FAD PReP is to raise awareness, expectations, and 

develop capabilities surrounding FAD preparedness and response. The goal of 

FAD PReP is to integrate, synchronize, and deconflict preparedness and response 

capabilities as much as possible before an outbreak by providing goals, 

guidelines, strategies, and procedures that are clear, comprehensive, easily 

readable, easily updated, and that comply with the National Incident Management 

System.

In the event of an FAD outbreak, the three key response goals are to: (1) detect, 

control, and contain the FAD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate the 

FAD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the 

economy, and that protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide 

science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of 

business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products. In 

summary, achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, 

States, Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as 

possible. They will also allow the United States to regain FMD-free status without 

the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease 

outbreak itself. 

FAD PReP Documents and Materials

FAD PReP is a comprehensive U.S. preparedness and response strategy for FAD 

threats, both zoonotic and non-zoonotic. Types of FAD PReP documents include:

 Strategic Plans—Concept of Operations 
Updated August 2019—DRAFT A-2

 National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS)

Guidelines

 Industry Manuals

 Disease Response Plans

 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Critical Activities

 Ready Reference Guides.

Lessons Learned from Past Outbreaks

The foundation of FAD PReP is lessons learned in managing past FAD incidents. 

FAD PReP is based on the following:

 Providing processes for emergency planning that respect local knowledge.

 Integrating State-Federal-Tribal-industry planning processes.

 Ensuring that there are clearly defined, obtainable, and unified goals for 

response.

 Having a Unified Command with a proper delegation of authority that is 

able to act with speed and certainty.

 Employing science and risk-based management approaches to FAD 

response.

 Ensuring that all guidelines, strategies, and procedures are communicated 

effectively to responders and stakeholders.

 Identifying resources and trained personnel required for an effective 

incident response.

 Trying to resolve competing interests prior to an outbreak and addressing 

them quickly during an outbreak.

 Achieving rapid FAD detection and tracing.

FMD STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

(SOP)—CRITICAL ACTIVITIES

These documents (numbered corresponding to the 23 critical activities) are 

templates to provide a common picture or set of procedures for the following 

tools and strategies used in FMD response:

1. Overview of Etiology and Ecology 

2. Case Definition Development Process 

3. Surveillance 

5. Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing 
FAD PReP Materials to Support FMD Response

Updated August 2019—DRAFT A-3

7. Communications 

8. Health and Safety and Personal Protective Equipment

9. Biosecurity 

14. Disposal 

15. Cleaning and Disinfection 

16. Vaccination 

17. Overview of the National Veterinary Stockpile 

19. Overview of Animal Welfare 

20. Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools 

22. Overview of Finance 

23. Overview of the National Response Framework and National Incident 

Management System

READY REFERENCE GUIDES

 FMD Response

 Etiology and Ecology

 Communications

 Overview of the FMD Response Plan

 Overview of Emergency Vaccination

 Common Operating Picture

 Overview of FMD Vaccination Issues

 Overview of FMD Freedom and Vaccination

 Comparing United States and United Kingdom FMD Response 

Planning

 Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business

 Surveillance

 Overview of Diagnostics

 Additional Information

 General Response for all FADs

 Introduction to FAD PReP

 Introduction to the Emergency Management Response System 

(EMRS) 2

 FAD Framework: Roles and Coordination
Updated August 2019—DRAFT A-4

 FAD Framework: Response Strategies

 Critical Activities and Tools During an FAD Response

 Zones, Areas, and Premises in an FAD Outbreak

 Movement Control in an FAD Outbreak

 Defining Permitted Movement

 Permitting Process

 VS Guidance 12001.3: Procedures and Policy for the Investigation of 

Potential FAD/Emerging Disease Incidents

INDUSTRY MANUAL

 Swine

 Cow-Calf

 Dairy

 Beef Feedlot

NAHEMS GUIDELINES

 Biosecurity 

 Cleaning and Disinfection 

 Continuity of Business

 Disposal 

 Health and Safety 

 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia 

 Personal Protective Equipment 

 Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing 

 Quarantine and Movement Control 

 Vaccination for Contagious Diseases

 Wildlife Management and Vector Control for an FAD Response in 

Domestic Livestock

STRATEGIC PLANS-CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

 APHIS FAD Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-

0)

 APHIS FAD Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0)
FAD PReP Materials to Support FMD Response

Updated August 2019—DRAFT A-5

 Incident Information Management and Reporting (FAD PReP Manual 3-0)

 FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0)

 A Partial List of FAD Stakeholders (FAD PReP Manual 5-0)

 Permitted Movement (FAD PReP Manual 6-0)
Appendix B 

Appendix B

OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code for FMD 

(2019) 

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) updates chapters in its 

Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code) as needed on an annual 

basis. Planners and responders will want to refer to the OIE Code frequently. 

The 2019 update for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is available at www.oie.int 

or direct: https://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Health_standards/tahc/

current/chapitre_asf.pdf
Updated October 2020—DRAFT Appendix C 

Appendix C

Laboratory Network List for FMD

The list of laboratories in the National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN) embedded in this document is found here: 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/nahln/downloads/fmd_lab_list.pdf. This 

list was last updated in August 2020. 

The following laboratories can currently perform testing for foot-and-mouth 

disease (FMD) virus after National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) 

confirmation of FMD. 

 
NAHLN Laboratories approved for 

FMD Preparedness and Surge Testing

State Laboratory

Page 1 of 5

Please contact the laboratory before submitting samples to ensure funding is available to test.

August 18, 2020

1 Alabama Thompson-Biship-Sparks State Diagnostic Laboratory

890 Simms Road

Auburn, Alabama 36832-2026

Phone: 334-844-4987

2 Arizona Arizona Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

2831 North Freeway

Tucson, Arizona 85705-5021

Phone: 520-621-2356

3 Arkansas Arkansas Livestock & Poultry Commission Laboratory

#1 Natural Resources Drive

Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-1539

Phone: 501-907-2430 

4 California California Animal Health & Food Safety Laboratory

University of California, School of Veterinary Med

620 West Health Science Drive

Davis, California 95616

Phone: 530-752-8709

5 Colorado Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

300 West Drake Road, Building C

Fort Collins, Colorado 80523-1644

Phone: 970-297-1281

6 Colorado Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory-Rocky Ford

27847 County Road 21

Rocky Ford, Colorado 81067-9466

Phone: 719-254-6382

7 Connecticut Connecticut Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory

University of Connecticut, Unit 3089

61 North Eagleville Road

Storrs, Connecticut 06269-3089

Phone: 860-486-3738

8 Florida Bronson Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Florida Department of Ag and Consumer Services

2700 N. John Young Parkway

Kissimmee, Florida 34741-1266

Phone: 321-697-1400 

9 Georgia Athens Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

The University of Georgia

501 D.W. Brooks Drive

Athens, Georgia 30602-5023

Phone: 706-542-5568

10 Georgia University of Georgia Tifton Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

43 Brighton Road

Tifton, Georgia 31793-3000

Phone: 229-386-3340
NAHLN Laboratories approved for 

FMD Preparedness and Surge Testing

State Laboratory

Page 2 of 5

Please contact the laboratory before submitting samples to ensure funding is available to test.

August 18, 2020

11 Hawaii State Laboratories Division

2725 Waimano Home Road

Pearl City, Hawaii 96782-1401

Phone: 808-453-6650

12 Illinois University of Illinois Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

2001 S. Lincoln Ave

Urbana, Illinois 61802-6178

Phone: 217-333-1620

13 Indiana Indiana Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory at Purdue University

406 South University St

West Lafayette, Indiana 47907-2065

Phone: 765-494-7440

14 Iowa Iowa State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

1800 Christensen Dr

Ames, Iowa 50011-1134

Phone: 515-294-1950

15 Kansas Kansas State Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

Kansas State University, CVM

L232 Mosier Hall, 1800 Dennison Ave

Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5611

Phone: 785-532-5650

16 Kentucky Breathitt Veterinary Center

Murray State University

715 North Drive

Hopkinsville, Kentucky 42240-2620

Phone: 270-886-3959

17 Kentucky University of Kentucky, Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

1490 Bull Lea Rd

Lexington, Kentucky 40511-1264

Phone: 859-257-8283

18 Louisiana Louisiana Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Veterinary Med Diag. Laboratory, LSU

River Road Room 1043

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803-0001 

Phone: 225-578-9777

19 Michigan Michigan State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

College of Veterinary Medicine

4125 Beaumont Rd, Ste 201H

Lansing, Michigan 48910-8103

Phone: 517-353-1683
NAHLN Laboratories approved for 

FMD Preparedness and Surge Testing

State Laboratory

Page 3 of 5

Please contact the laboratory before submitting samples to ensure funding is available to test.

August 18, 2020

20 Minnesota University of Minnesota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

1333 Gortner Ave, 244 Vet D L

St. Paul, Minnesota 55108-1098 

Phone: 612-625-8787

21 Mississippi Mississippi Veterinary Research & Diagnostic Laboratory

3137 Hwy 468 West

Pearl, Mississippi 39208-9007

Phone: 601-420-4700

22 Missouri Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory

University of Missouri

901 E. Campus Loop

Columbia, Missouri 65211-0001

Phone: 573-882-6811

23 Missouri Missouri Department of Agriculture Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

701 North Miller Avenue

Springfield, Missouri 65802-6460

Phone: 417-895-6861

24 Montana Montana Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

Marsh Laboratory, 1911 W Lincoln St

Bozeman, Montana 59771-0997

Phone: 406-994-4885

25 Nebraska University of Nebraska 

Veterinary Diagnostic Center

4040 East Campus Loop North

Lincoln, Nebraska 68583-0907

Phone: 402-472-1434

26 New Jersey New Jersey Department of Agriculture, Division of Animal Health -

Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory, NJPHEAL

3 Schwarzkopf Drive

Ewing, New Jersey 08628 

Phone: 609-406-6999

27 New Mexico New Mexico Department of Agriculture Veterinary Diagnostic Services 

Veterinary Diagnostic Services

1101 Camino de Salud NE

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102-4519

Phone: 505-383-9299

28 New York Animal Health Diagnostic Center

College of Vet Med, Cornell University

240 Farrier Road

Ithaca, New York 14853-8002

Phone: 607-253-3900
NAHLN Laboratories approved for 

FMD Preparedness and Surge Testing

State Laboratory

Page 4 of 5

Please contact the laboratory before submitting samples to ensure funding is available to test.

August 18, 2020

29 North Carolina Rollins Diagnostic Laboratory

North Carolina Department of Agriculture

2101 Blue Ridge Rd

Raleigh, North Carolina 27607-6432

Phone: 919-733-3986

30 North Dakota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

North Dakota State University

NDSU Dept. 7691

Fargo, North Dakota 58108-6050

Phone: 701-231-8307 

31 Ohio Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory 

Ohio Department of Agriculture

8995 East Main St., Bldg. # 6

Reynoldsburg, Ohio 43068-3399

Phone: 614-728-6220

32 Oklahoma Oklahoma Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Oklahoma State University, College of Vet. Med.

Farm & Ridge Road

Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078-0001

Phone: 405-744-6623 

33 Oregon Oregon State University Veterinary Diagnostic Lab

Magruder Hall 134

700 SW 30th St

Corvallis, Oregon 97331-8628

Phone: 541-737-3261

34 Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Veterinary Laboratory

Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture

2305 N Cameron Street

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110-9405

Phone: 717-787-8808

35 South Carolina Clemson Veterinary Diagnostic Center

500 Clemson Road

Columbia, South Carolina 29229-4306

Phone: 803-788-2260

36 South Dakota Animal Disease Research & Diagnostic Laboratory

South Dakota State University

Box 2175, N. Campus Dr.

Brookings, South Dakota 57007-0001

Phone: 605-688-5171

37 Tennessee Kord Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory 

TN Dept of Agriculture

436 Hogan Road

Nashville, Tennessee 37220-2014

Phone: 615-837-5125
NAHLN Laboratories approved for 

FMD Preparedness and Surge Testing

State Laboratory

Page 5 of 5

Please contact the laboratory before submitting samples to ensure funding is available to test.

August 18, 2020

38 Texas Texas A&M Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory - Amarillo 

6610 Amarillo Blvd West

Amarillo, Texas 79106-1706

Phone: 806-353-7478

39 Texas Texas A&M Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory 

483 Agronomy Road

College Station, Texas 77843-4471

Phone: 979-845-3414

40 Utah Utah Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

950 E. 1400 North

Logan, Utah 84341-2877 

Phone: 435-797-1895

41 Virginia VDACS Harrisonburg Regional Animal Health Laboratory

261 Mt. Clinton Pike

Harrisonburg, Virginia 22802-2551

Phone: 540-209-9130

42 Washington Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Bustad Hall, Rm 155-N

Pullman, Washington 99164-7034

Phone: 509-335-9696

43 Wisconsin USGS National Wildlife Health Center

6006 Schroeder Road

Madison, Wisconsin 53711-2531

Phone: 608-270-2400 

44 Wisconsin Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

445 Easterday Lane

Madison, Wisconsin 53706-1253

Phone: 608-262-5432 ext 2227

45 Wyoming Wyoming State Veterinary Laboratory

1174 Snowy Range Road

Laramie, Wyoming 82070-6752

Phone: 307-766-9925
 

Appendix D 

Appendix D

Procedures for FMD Investigation and 

Specimen Submission 

VS Guidance Document 12001.x provides Veterinary Services (VS) policy for the 

field investigation and communication of a potential Foreign Animal Disease/ 

Emerging Disease Incident (FAD/EDI). Specific communication and operational 

procedures are provided in the Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Manual. 
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Policy for the Investigation of Potential Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease

Incidents (FAD/EDI)

1. Purpose and Background

This document provides Veterinary Services (VS) policy for the field investigation and

communication of a potential Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease Incident (FAD/EDI).

Specific communication and operational procedures are provided in the Foreign Animal 

Disease Investigation Manual.

This guidance document represents the Agency’s position on this topic. It does not create or 

confer any rights for or on any person and does not bind the U.S. Department of Agriculture

(USDA) or the public. The information it contains may be made available to the public. While

this document provides guidance for users outside VS, VS employees may not deviate from 

the directions provided herein without appropriate justification and supervisory concurrence.

2. Document Status

A. Review date: 07/10/2020

B. This document replaces VS Guidance 12001.2 (June 5, 2014).

3. Reason for Reissuance 

Expiration of prior VS Guidance 12001.2.

4. Authority and References

A. Authorities (Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)):

7 CFR part 331

7 CFR 371.4

9 CFR part 53

9 CFR part 71

9 CFR part 82

9 CFR part 94

9 CFR part 121

9 CFR part 122

9 CFR part 161

49 CFR part 173
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B. References:

• VS Guidance 12000,”Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician Certification

Requirements,” 

• Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Manual

• Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (Draft) 

C. Definitions:

1) An FAD is a terrestrial animal disease or pest, or an aquatic animal disease or pest, 

not known to exist in the United States or its territories. An FAD may be a World 

Organization for Animal Health (OIE) listed terrestrial and aquatic animal disease 

(www.oie.int); additionally, at any time, the Secretary of Agriculture, or designee, may 

designate a disease or pest as an FAD. An emerging disease is defined in the VS 

Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan. An EDI is any incident, 

involving an emerging disease, that requires field investigation. An FAD/EDI may

involve livestock, poultry, other animals, or wildlife.

In the event of an FAD/EDI investigation involving wildlife, VS will work in close 

collaboration, communication, and coordination, with State, Tribal, and Federal 

wildlife agencies with primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for 

wildlife.

2) A Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) is a Federal or State employed

veterinarian who has successfully completed specialized FAD diagnostician training

at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL); as well as any other 

specialized training and continuing education as required and administered by VS, 

including requirements as specified in VS Guidance Document 12000.

The Professional Development Services in VS maintains a national roster of currently

available or active FADDs. VS District Directors or designees will maintain District 

rosters of currently available and equipped FADDs. Assistant District Directors (AD) 

will maintain a roster of currently available and equipped FADDs in the jurisdiction(s)

for which they are responsible.

5. Audience

VS employees, other affected Federal and State agencies, and affected members of the

public.
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6. Guidance 

The FAD/EDI investigation period is defined as the time from when the AD, or designee, and 

State animal health official (SAHO), or designee, initiates a field investigation until the time an

FAD/EDI is ruled out or confirmed by an FADD field investigation, official NVSL laboratory

diagnostic testing or study results, or by official VS case definitions.

A. Objectives

1) Provide a veterinary medical assessment that consists of the following:

a. Differential diagnosis;

b. Classification of investigation, which is necessary to rank and prioritize the

differential diagnosis in terms of the magnitude of suspicion for an FAD, in relation 

to the magnitude of suspicion for an endemic disease or condition; and

c. Designation of diagnostic sample priority, which is necessary to rank and

prioritize the speed at which diagnostic samples are to be collected, transported,

and tested; the FADD, AD, and SAHO must concur on the designation of

diagnostic sample priority.

2) Provide presumptive and confirmatory diagnostic testing results as rapidly as

required by the designation of diagnostic sample priority, in order to rule out or

confirm a suspected FAD/EDI agent.

a. The FADD, as part of the required site visit or field investigation, will determine if

diagnostic sample testing or studies are necessary to rule out or confirm the 

FAD/EDI. The AD and SAHO retain the right to request diagnostic sample 

collection during an FAD/EDI investigation. The AD and SAHO along with the

FADD, NVSL, and laboratory director of the State National Animal Health 

Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory will determine a diagnostic sample 

submission plan that may include a duplicate set of samples being submitted to a

NAHLN lab.

3) Ensure the appropriate veterinary medical countermeasures, regulatory actions, and 

communications are recommended and implemented during the investigation period,

as necessary, to prevent and/or mitigate the dissemination of an FAD/EDI agent by

interstate or international commerce of animals, animal products, meat, articles, or

conveyances. Examples of interstate or international commerce include but are not 

limited to slaughter or harvest facilities; processing or packing facilities; auction 

markets; exhibitions or shows; and interstate or international import-export-facilities. 

The appropriate veterinary medical countermeasures, regulatory actions, and

communications will depend on factors such as:
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a. The epidemiology of the suspected FAD/EDI agent (such as a highly contagious

disease).

b. The clinical and epidemiological findings obtained during the investigation as they

correspond to the case definition for the suspected FAD/EDI disease agent 

(before obtaining presumptive or confirmatory diagnostic testing results).

c. The State, Federal, territory, and Tribal jurisdictions and authorities as applied to 

the specific situation.

B. Critical Elements

Critical elements of an investigation include but are not limited to: interviewing persons

for incident history; observing clinical signs; performing physical examination of animals;

collecting and analyzing epidemiological information; collecting diagnostic samples as

necessary; performing necropsy studies as necessary; investigating trace backs and

trace forwards of animals, animal products, meat, articles, or conveyances as

necessary; recommending and establishing intrastate quarantine as necessary (the 

authority of the SAHO); and recommending and establishing interstate quarantines

during the investigation period as necessary (the authority of the Secretary of

Agriculture).

Critical data and information collected during an investigation includes but is not limited 

to: species affected, clinical signs, lesions observed, herd/flock morbidity and mortality

rates, duration of illness, vaccination history, diagnostic test history, nutritional status, 

premises conditions, movement history, contact history, evidence or indication of pest or

vector, and evidence or indication of zoonotic disease.

C. Classification of Investigations and Correlation to Designation of Diagnostic Sample 

Priority

1) Classification of FAD/EDI investigations and definitions

Classification of investigation, one of the FAD/EDI investigation objectives, represents 

the degree of suspicion for an FAD/EDI in relation to the degree of suspicion for an 

endemic disease or condition. Table 1 presents the three options for the classification 

of FAD/EDI investigations and their definitions. 
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Table 1: Classification of FAD/EDI Investigations and Definitions

Classification of

Investigations

Definition

High Suspicion

The veterinary medical and regulatory assessments

conducted are consistent with an FAD/EDI and are generally

inconsistent with an endemic disease/condition.

Intermediate Suspicion

The veterinary medical and regulatory assessments

conducted are consistent with an FAD/EDI but are also

consistent with an endemic disease/condition.

Low Suspicion

The veterinary medical and regulatory assessments

conducted are generally inconsistent with an FAD/EDI and

are consistent with an endemic disease/condition.

2) Diagnostic sample priority designations

There are four diagnostic sample designations used during an FAD/EDI

investigation. Designations take into account the magnitude of suspicion for a

foreign animal disease, as well as the investigation location and consequences

related to the speed of the investigation. Designations determine the speed with

which sample collection, transportation, and diagnostic study is completed.

a. Samples designated as Priority 1 are only used for investigations where there is

a High Suspicion of an FAD/EDI. Sample collection, transportation, and

diagnostic testing are completed using rapid to extraordinary rapid methods.

NVSL and NAHLN personnel will perform diagnostic testing and studies as

rapidly as possible on sample arrival at the laboratory, whether during regular 

business hours, nights, weekends, and holidays. NVSL will use overtime as

necessary to begin and complete diagnostic testing and studies. The NAHLN 

laboratories will perform testing as requested. Payment of overtime to NAHLN 

laboratory personnel will vary by State. Extraordinary collection and 

transportation methods will be required when the Priority 1 investigation includes

a highly contagious FAD/EDI in the differential diagnosis, or when animals,

animal products, meat, articles, or conveyances are involved or engaged in 

interstate or international commerce. This includes but is not limited to animals, 

animal products, meat, articles, or conveyances currently held in slaughter or 

harvest facilities, processing or packing facilities, auction markets, exhibitions or 

shows, and interstate or international import-export facilities. Telephone 

notification to the National Preparedness and Incident Coordination (NPIC)

Center is required for High Suspicion classification.
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b. Priority 2 sample designations are used for investigations where there is an 

Intermediate Suspicion of an FAD/EDI. Rapid methods must be used to collect, 

transport, and study diagnostic samples. NVSL and NAHLN personnel will 

perform diagnostic testing and studies immediately if the samples arrive at the 

laboratory before the close of the work day. NVSL will use overtime to complete 

testing and studies. The NAHLN laboratories will perform testing a necessary. 

Payment of overtime to NAHLN laboratory personnel will vary by State. 

Diagnostic samples arriving after the close of the work day will be examined first 

thing the following day. Diagnostic samples received Saturday will be tested or 

studied on Saturday only with prior notification and discussion with NVSL and 

NAHLN laboratory personnel. Telephone notification to NPIC is not required for 

Intermediate Suspicion classification.

c. The Priority 3 designation is only used for investigations where there is a Low

Suspicion of an FAD/EDI. Investigations with this designation will use routine

methods of collection, transport, and diagnostic study. NVSL and NAHLN

personnel will perform diagnostic testing and studies in accession order as

received. NVSL and NAHLN overtime services will not be used for Priority 3

investigations. The Priority 3 designation is also used for routine surveillance

samples. Telephone notification to NPIC is not required for Low Suspicion

classification.

d. The Priority A designation is only used for Intermediate Suspicion of an FAD/EDI

classification or Low Suspicion of an FAD/EDI classification when animals, animal 

products, meat, articles, or conveyances in interstate or international commerce

are involved and/or are potentially held, delayed or quarantined pending the

results of diagnostic testing or studies for an FAD. It is also used when other 

known or potential circumstances associated with the investigation indicate it is

prudent to obtain diagnostic sample testing results as rapidly as possible. 

Telephone notification to NPIC is required for Priority A designation. Rapid to 

extraordinary methods must be employed to collect, transport, and study

diagnostic samples. NVSL and NAHLN personnel will perform diagnostic testing

and studies as rapidly as possible upon sample arrival at the laboratory, whether

during regular business hours, nights, weekends, and holidays. NVSL will use 

overtime as necessary to begin and complete diagnostic testing and studies. The 

NAHLN laboratories will perform testing as necessary. Payment of overtime to 

NAHLN laboratory personnel will vary by State.

e. Extraordinary transportation methods include the use of hand carried samples,

couriers, counter-to-counter services, and contracted commercial services. Rapid

transportation methods include express shipping services such as FedEx®

priority overnight. Routine transportation methods include express shipping

services such as FedEx® priority overnight (to ensure preservation of diagnostic

sample quality).
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Table 2 presents the three diagnostic sample priority designations and their associated 

use and relative speed of sample collection, transportation, and diagnostic study 

Table 2: Diagnostic Sample Priority Designations, Correlation to Classification of Investigations 

and Speed of Sample Collection, Transportation, and Diagnostic Study

Priority Investigation Classification Speed of Sample Collection,

Transportation, and Diagnostic Study

Priority 1 High Suspicion Rapid to extraordinary methods.

Priority 2 Intermediate Suspicion Rapid methods.

Priority 3 Low Suspicion Routine methods.

Priority A Intermediate or Low Suspicion Rapid to extraordinary methods.

The FADD, AD, and SAHO must concur on the classification of investigation, and 

designation of diagnostic sample priority 1, 2, 3, or A. and if a duplicate sample will

be collected and sent to an approved NAHLN laboratory in addition to NVSL. If there

are questions, concerns, or disagreements regarding the classification of an 

investigation or the designation of diagnostic sample Priority 1, 2, 3, or A by the 

FADD, AD, and the SAHO, then there must be an immediate conference call of the

FADD, AD, and SAHOs with the District Office, NVSL Director, and NPIC staff. The 

NPIC staff and the District Office will provide the capability to host and coordinate 

conference calls.

D. Diagnostic Case Definitions

For more information on diagnostics, please see the Foreign Animal Disease 

Investigation Manual.

The classification and designation of FAD/EDI diagnostic case definitions are the 

responsibility and authority of the VS Deputy Administrator. Examples of case definitions 

include “presumptive” and “confirmed” FAD/EDI cases and vary by disease. Refer to the 

Animal Health Surveillance SharePoint Site for disease specific case definitions.

E. National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) 

The NVSL safeguards U.S. animal health and contributes to public health by ensuring 

that timely and accurate laboratory support is provided by their nationwide animal-health 

diagnostic system.
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NVSL is the official reference laboratory for FAD/EDI diagnostic testing and study in the 

United States. NVSL must perform or officially confirm the results of all diagnostic testing 

and studies related to FAD/EDI investigations in the United States unless otherwise 

specified by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Administrator, or as 

delegated to the VS Deputy Administrator.

NVSL has two locations for FAD/EDI diagnostic testing: Ames, Iowa (NVSL Ames) and 

Plum Island, New York (NVSL FADDL). The transport and shipping of FAD/EDI 

diagnostic samples to NVSL Ames or NVSL FADDL by species or suspected disease is 

found in the Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Manual.

Additional information regarding NVSL can be found online.

F. National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN)

The NAHLN, created in 2002, is a comprehensive, coordinated, and modernized network 

of Federal and State animal health laboratories and public agricultural institutions that 

address emergency biological and chemical threats to animal agriculture and the security 

of the food supply.

The purpose of the NAHLN is to enhance early detection of FAD agents and newly 

emerging diseases and to better respond to animal health emergencies (including 

bioterrorist events) that threaten the nation’s food supply and public health.

Personnel in NAHLN laboratories are trained, proficiency tested, and approved to test for 

multiple FADs of high consequence. With the approval of the SAHO and AD, FAD 

samples can be collected in duplicate to send one to the local NAHLN laboratory and the 

other to NVSL.

A current roster of the NAHLN laboratories and the testing they are approved to perform 

can be found online.

The AD and SAHO along with the FADD and NAHLN laboratory director will determine a 

diagnostic sample submission plan that may include a duplicate set of samples being 

submitted to the NAHLN lab.

G. Guidelines for Diagnostic Testing

However diagnostic testing is completed, NVSL is the official confirmatory laboratory for 

FAD/EDI testing in the United States unless otherwise specified by the Chief Veterinary 

Officer (CVO).

1) At the discretion of the FADD, AD, and SAHO in collaboration with the NVSL and 

NAHLN Laboratory Directors, two sets of diagnostic samples may be obtained.
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a. The first set of diagnostic samples must always be sent to the appropriate NVSL 

Laboratory (NVSL Ames or NVSL FADDL).

b. The second set of diagnostic samples will be sent to an approved NAHLN 

laboratory to provide preliminary FAD/EDI diagnostic information before NVSL 

receives the diagnostic samples.

c. If a second set of diagnostic samples cannot be collected, the samples that can 

be collected must be sent to the appropriate NVSL laboratory, not the NAHLN 

laboratory.

2) In the event of an emergency situation in which the appropriate NVSL Laboratory 

cannot perform FAD/EDI diagnostic testing, one set of diagnostic samples may be 

sent to the other NVSL Laboratory, and a second set of samples may be obtained for 

testing at a NAHLN Laboratory, or sent to another international reference laboratory.

3) If the decision is made to submit a second set of diagnostic samples to the NAHLN 

laboratory, then the AD and/or SAHO must instruct the FADD to follow the 

procedures for submitting a second set of diagnostic samples to the NAHLN 

laboratory. The AD, SAHO, and/or FADD will notify the NAHLN Laboratory Director if 

there is a change in the NAHLN laboratory submission plan after the FADD performs 

the investigation.

If an FAD/EDI outbreak occurs, VS will provide further guidance on diagnostic sample 

submissions to a NAHLN laboratory.

H. Packaging and Labeling

Packaging and labeling of biological substances for shipment requires familiarity with and

training in current rules and regulations, which frequently change. Shippers are

responsible for proper packaging, marking, labeling, documentation, classification, and

identification of each shipment. Failure to follow regulations can result in substantial 

financial penalties.

For more information, please refer to the “Packing and Labeling Submissions” page.

I. State-Federal-Tribal Communication and Cooperation

The coordinated State-Federal-Tribal response to a potential FAD/EDI requires close 

communication and cooperation among all stakeholders and jurisdictions. The AD and 

the SAHO (or designee) must closely communicate and cooperate on all aspects of an 

FAD/EDI investigation from initiation to completion.
 United States Department of Agriculture

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All FAD/EDI investigations must be initiated by the AD and/or the SAHO. All FAD/EDI 

investigations must be assigned by the AD and/or the SAHO to an FADD. The AD and/or 

the SAHO is responsible for initiating a timely investigation of all credible reported or 

suspected FAD/EDI, including assigning an FADD to complete a site visit or field 

investigation as a required part of the investigation.

The AD and/or SAHO will assign an FAD/EDI Case Coordinator(s) to assist with 

investigation support, communications, and Emergency Management Response System 

(EMRS) data entry, as required by the location, scale, complexity, or urgency of the 

investigation.

J. Emergency Management Response System (EMRS)

The EMRS “Routine FAD/EDI Reporting” is a web-enabled database that is the official 

USDA APHIS database to record all FAD/EDI investigations. The EMRS database allows 

automatic email notices to be sent to selected VS personnel when FAD/EDI 

investigations are initiated in EMRS. This capability enables the field office and NPIC to 

monitor potential national “clusters” of FAD/EDI investigations on a real- time basis.

The AD, or their designee, will ensure the EMRS Referral Control Number is assigned 

and transmitted to the FADD and the SAHO. EMRS must be used for all FAD/EDI 

investigations.

EMRS is accessed through the internet and permits approved State, VS, and NAHLN 

Laboratory personnel access to enter and view investigations from their State or territory. 

All entries are confidential. EMRS database access at the State or Territory level is 

controlled and maintained by approval of the AD and the SAHO.

K. Requirements

Situation reports, spot reports, diagnostic updates, and regulatory assessments will be 

produced as required by the urgency or complexity of the investigation, or at intervals 

requested by the Field Office, the VS Associate Deputy Administrator for NPIC, and the 

VS Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO).

Because of the rapid exchange of information required during FAD/EDI investigations, 

communications such as phone calls, conference calls, email, and fax must be used 

when required in addition to the official EMRS database to record information.
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7. Inquiries

Any questions regarding these procedures or instructions should be directed to the National 

Preparedness and Incident Coordination (NPIC) staff.

Main Office 

(NPIC, One Health Coordination Center, SPRS Logistics Center) 

Please refer to the FAD Investigation Manual for contact numbers.

Fax: 301-734-7817

Normal Business Hours: Monday – Friday 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. ET

NPIC/National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) 24/7 Emergency Answering Service

Foreign Animal Disease Investigations or Emerging Disease Incidents NVS Activation

1-800-940-6524
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Acronyms

ADA Associate Deputy Administrator

AD Assistant District Director

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer

EDI emerging disease incident

EMRS Emergency Management Response System

FAD foreign animal disease

FADD Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician

FADDL Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network

NPIC National Preparedness and Incident Coordination

NVS National Veterinary Stockpile

NVSL National Veterinary Services Laboratories

OIE World Organization for Animal Health

SAHO State Animal Health Official

SPRS Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response

Services

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

VS Veterinary Services
Updated October 2020—DRAFT Appendix E 

Appendix E

Emergency Vaccine Request and Vaccination 

Priorities

The use of emergency vaccination to respond to a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 

outbreak within a State will be determined by the Unified Command, the State (or 

Tribal) Animal Health Officials (SAHO), and the APHIS VS Deputy 

Administrator. This guidance is intended to assist in the rapid assessment of any 

request(s) for FMD vaccine use that are made to the APHIS VS Deputy 

Administrator. 

Given the highly populated nature and mobility of livestock in the United States, 

it is unlikely that enough FMD vaccine will be available to vaccinate all (or most) 

susceptible animals, even in a moderate FMD outbreak. APHIS provides general 

guidance for determining which premises and animal groups should be prioritized

for vaccination. 
Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection 

Service

Veterinary 

Services

Surveillance, 

Preparedness, and 

Response 

Services

National 

Preparedness and 

Incident 

Coordination 

Center

4700 River Rd.

Riverdale, MD 

22737

Emergency FMD Vaccine Request

 And Initial Plan for Vaccination Campaign 

FMDvacc_v8_05.03.18 

The use of emergency vaccination to respond to a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 

outbreak within a State will be determined by the Unified Command, the State (or 

Tribal) Animal Health Officials (SAHO), and the APHIS VS Deputy Administrator. 

This guidance is intended to assist in the rapid assessment of any request(s) for FMD 

vaccine use that are made to the APHIS VS Deputy Administrator.

Part I of this form documents SAHO approval for the use of FMD vaccine within an 

affected State. SAHO approval should accompany the first 213RR request for APHIS 

VS to provide FMD vaccine through the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS). 

Once the Unified Command, the SAHO, and APHIS VS agree to the use of emergency 

vaccination, the State may anticipate an initial allotment of finished vaccine to be 

shipped within 2 weeks; however, that timeframe may vary due to vaccine availability. 

Limited quantities of vaccine will be available early in the response, and APHIS VS 

may receive requests for vaccine from multiple States. A well-defined State vaccination 

plan will assist decision makers in prioritizing and distributing vaccine to States that are 

ready and able to handle the vaccine appropriately and rapidly administer doses based 

on well-grounded epidemiological principles. 

Part II provides an outline of a State vaccination plan, including the purpose, strategy, 

and logistics of the vaccination campaign. During the interval between decision to 

vaccinate and availability of finished vaccine, the State’s initial vaccination plan should 

be completed. The vaccination plan should be in place before finished vaccine is 

shipped from NVS to the requesting State. 

Part I – Emergency FMD Vaccine Authorization and Request

The SAHO authorizes the use of FMD vaccine as part of the emergency response to an 

outbreak of FMD in the State (or for the Tribe) of State Click here to enter text. . 

Projected vaccine dose needs

Species Dose Booster Repeat

Cattle 2 ml IM - 6 mos.

Feeder pigs 2 ml IM* - -

Sows & Boars 2 ml IM 10-14 days 6 mos.

Sheep & Goat 1 ml IM - 6 mos.

Zoo - TBD

*Feeder pigs--3 mos. Immunity, to slaughter

Subsequent vaccine orders will be placed via 213RR. 

Include a revised version of this document with each 213RR request for vaccine. 
FMD Vaccine Authorization and Vaccination Plan Page 2 

 State Click here to enter text. | Date Click here to enter text. | State Request # Click here to enter text.

Given the table above: 

1) Estimate the number of FMD vaccine doses needed for an initial 2-week 

campaign: 1st 2 wks Click here to enter text. . 

2) Estimate the number of FMD vaccine doses needed to conduct a 3-month vaccine 

campaign in your State, if a type 2 FMD Outbreak (moderate regional outbreak) 

occurs: 3 mos. regional Click here to enter text. . 

3) Estimate the number of FMD vaccine doses needed to conduct a >6-month 

vaccine campaign in your State, if a type 4 FMD Outbreak (national outbreak) 

occurs: 6 mos. national Click here to enter text. . 
An Equal Opportunity Provider and Employer

FMD Vaccine Authorization and Vaccination Plan Page 3

 State Click here to enter text. | Date Click here to enter text. | State Request # Click here to enter text.

Part II – Emergency FMD Vaccination Plan for the State of

The emergency FMD Vaccination Plan should contain the following elements:

Strategy

1) Describe the FMD response strategy including vaccination, such as:

o Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill

o Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter

o Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live

o Emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out

FMD Response Strategy Click here to enter text.

2) What estimated number of animals, by type and group, will be vaccinated, suchas:

o Species and age of animals

o Industries or industry segments

o Number of farms

o Vulnerable or valuable groups or types of animals or industry segments

Animal vaccinates Click here to enter text.

3) What is the location on the animals of vaccine administration (rt. neck, lt. 

neck)?

Anatomical loc. Click here to enter text.

4) What is the geographic location of the animals to be vaccinated? Describe the 

types of zones (protective, suppressive, etc.), their epidemiological objectives, 

and their locations.

Vaccination zones Click here to enter text.

5) What is the vaccination schedule for individual animals, by species?

o Booster doses and intervals between doses.

o Slaughter or milk withdrawal period.

Vaccination schedule Click here to enter text.

6) Describe the State policies and enforcement strategy for permanent identification, 

traceability, movement restrictions, surveillance, and disposition of vaccinated

animal.

Enforcement strategy Click here to enter text.
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FMD Vaccine Authorization and Vaccination Plan Page 4

 State Click here to enter text. | Date Click here to enter text. | State Request # Click here to enter text.

Logistics

1) Provide a name and contact information for the person authorized to receive the 

vaccine from National Veterinary Stockpile.

Logs contact Click here to enter text.

2) Describe cold chain maintenance and physical security for the vaccine.

a. How the vaccine will be stored, handled, and transported from receipt by 

the POC to administration in the animal?

b. How will proper storage temperatures be maintained?

c. How will chain of custody for the vaccine be maintained and documented?

Cold chain & security Click here to enter text.

3) Describe the process for vaccine administration.

a. Who is authorized to administer the vaccine?

b. How many vaccination teams are available to administer vaccine?

c. How is vaccination verified and documented? Documentation records 

must include the date, location, and description of the vaccinated 

animals.

d. What type of permanent identification will be used on the vaccinated 

animal? 

e. How are unused eartags managed/controlled?

f. How and when is permanent identification applied to the vaccinated 

animal?

g. How are animal owners notified of their restrictions and responsibilities 

for movement and disposition of vaccinated animal and of not removing 

the animal’s permanent identification?

Documentation/ID Click here to enter text.

4) Describe the State’s vaccination capacity per day, by species and type for the 

requested number of vaccine doses for the initial 2-week, 3 month, and 6 month 

campaigns. 

a. How many animals are able to be vaccinated and identified per day, by species 

and type? Specify how many vaccination teams are available to meet this 

capacity.

b. How will the requested vaccine doses be distributed over the initial 2-week 

time period (and 3 and 6 month time periods, if requested)? 
An Equal Opportunity Provider and Employer

FMD Vaccine Authorization and Vaccination Plan Page 5

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Vaccine capacity Click here to enter text.

5) Describe the disposal plan for expired, temperature-abused, or otherwise unusable 

vaccine.

Vaccine disposal Click here to enter text.

____________________________________________________ __________________

STATE/TRIBAL ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICIAL SIGNATURE DATE
An Equal Opportunity Provider and Employer

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1 

FMD Response

FMD Vaccine Prioritization Strategy

October 2020

Please note: This information may be revised or updated at any time.

INTRODUCTION 

Vaccination during an FMD outbreak is an inherently complex activity. There are many tenets that dictate 

the rational application of FMD vaccine. This document provides guidance on how States and APHIS 

officials may elect to implement emergency vaccination.

BASIC INFORMATION

In order to understand how emergency vaccination will impact an FMD response effort, it is critical to know 

the following:

♦ How the virus behaves in each species that may be vaccinated;

♦ The epidemiology of the situation (to the best knowledge available);

♦ Risk of exposure to the virus;

♦ Age of animals and how the production sector works;

♦ Amount of vaccine that is available to use (both in the short and, if available, longer-term).

GUIDANCE

In general, APHIS recommends a protective emergency vaccination strategy to protect susceptible 

animals from infection. 

This will require the establishment of one or more Vaccination Zones, to ensure that infected animals are 

not comingled, in close proximity, or in-contact with vaccinated animals. Testing to differentiate infected 

animals from vaccinated animals (DIVA), once available, may be required for interstate commerce and 

international trade. Additionally, vaccinated animal identification must be applied, with movement controls. 

States should focus on animals in close proximity to the incident, but not those in-contact with, or 

with any known or suspected epidemiological links to the incident. When considering what premises 

are good candidates for vaccination, review the “specific information” below, and weigh the following:

♦ How likely it is that the premises has already been exposed (if high, vaccination may not be

appropriate);

♦ Environmental conditions (wind, humidity), that may increase probability of introduction;

♦ Husbandry conditions and health of the animals;

♦ Biosecurity on the premises (guarding against the risk of introduction prior to protection); and

♦ Ability to physically vaccinate (logistics, personnel, identification) in a safe and effective manner.

SPECIFIC INFORMATION

In order to use the extremely limited quantity of vaccine most effectively, the following priorities are 

recommended.
2 

Cattle

♦ Vaccinate cattle preferentially – they are very easily infected due to low viral threshold of infection. 

If the number of infected cattle can be minimized through preventative measures and/or lower the 

viral shed if exposed, then other at-risk species can be spared from vaccination and protected 

through biosecurity. This approach is especially recommended when supplies of vaccine are 

limited. 

♦ Vaccinate calves preferentially – calves are particularly vulnerable and less likely to survive 

infection, while adult cattle typically do not experience severe clinical signs. This is especially 

crucial in situations such as calf ranches housing dairy-heifer replacement and bull dairy calves for 

beef production.

♦ Prioritize dairy operations – feedlots and cow-calf operations are more likely to recover from FMD 

infection. Additionally, dairy cattle that do recover rarely achieve pre-infection levels of milk 

production. Dumping milk from infected dairies is incredibly challenging and not an efficient use of 

resources. With the narrow profit margins in the dairy industry, this is paramount to financial 

disaster. Infected dairies also complicate the job of the responders because not only do the cattle 

have to be managed through depopulation and disposal, but the milk has to be dumped which is 

especially challenging in states like California that have strict EPA regulations.

Swine 

In the event that there is sufficient vaccine to effectively protect dairy operations, particularly calves, 

swine can be considered for vaccination. Swine have a higher threshold of infection and might be 

protected through increase biosecurity. The swine sector should be prioritized as follows (again, 

assuming limited vaccine doses are available):

♦ Farrow operations and Genetic Founder Stock:

o Farrow operations and genetic founder stock should be prioritized, as it ensures that 

weaned pigs will have adequate maternal immunity when initially moved into transit. 

o These sows and boars in farrow operations should receive one full dose, followed by a 

booster in 10 to 14 days and then every 6 months thereafter. This protects this multiplier 

stock and ensures that the weaned pigs will have adequate maternal immunity when 

they are moved into transit or grow-out.

o Genetic operations may want to be vaccinated; these producers need to carefully 

consider long-term export consequences of implementing emergency vaccination.

Vaccinated animals may not be eligible for export of their germplasm or offspring if 

zoning agreements can be achieved during an outbreak, or export resumes after 

recovery. If vaccination is elected, then these animals should be vaccinated in the 

same manner as farrowing operations.

♦ Feeder pigs:

o Feeder pigs may be considered, but only should receive a single dose which should 

provide adequate protection for 3 months. Before immunity wanes, the animal will 

hopefully be slaughtered. This is an especially relevant recommendation if vaccine 

supplies are limited.
3 

Sheep and Goats

At this time, implementation of emergency vaccination for FMD is not recommended in sheep and goats, 

however they are considered the silent spreaders of FMD for their sub-clinical infections. If additional 

doses of vaccine become available, or the epidemiology of the outbreak changes significantly, this 

recommendation will be reconsidered: 

o The sheep industry is largely concentrated in the west, and while these animals 

respond to FMD vaccination well, their economic contribution to the economy may 

not warrant the use of precious vaccine. So if exposed, a managed outbreak followed 

by harvest (sheep demonstrate minimal clinical signs and clear the infection quickly) 

may be the best option. However if vaccination is elected, a single dose of 1ml is 

sufficient to protect for 6 months

o Goats are more problematic. They widely distributed and are found virtually in every 

state and while there is some large scale goat farming for milk, cheese, and meat, 

they are largely a cottage industry and found with hobbyists. They have the same 

response to infection by FMD and the same vaccine dosing regimen as sheep, but 

whether it is really cost effective to vaccinate goats would depend on the 

epidemiology of the situation and may be better to allow to recover and harvest as 

with sheep.

Zoological Species

Zoological species, at this time, are not recommended for vaccination. In particularly extraordinary 

circumstances, this may be reconsidered. However, these animals should be protected by biosecurity and 

other appropriate precautions.

SUMMARY 

Tools that may inform vaccine application or even wholesale distribution to States would include this 

guidance and measures such as national modeling of the outbreak, Such an approach could expose 

pathways that could result in expansion of the outbreak and suggest where vaccines could be 

preferentially applied to block further spread. Modeling on a region or State can help inform local 

responders but may be insufficient for national responders seeking to prevent outbreak expansion. 

Therefore, it is important to have as much information as possible prior to modeling including age, 

production sector, movement networks (including feed commodities), dangerous contacts, and other 

factors influencing spread.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

In the event that there is new epidemiological information or other new data, this guidance will be reviewed 

and revised accordingly. States should carefully consider this information in formulating their vaccine 

requests that are submitted to APHIS. 
 

Appendix F 

Appendix F

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance 

and Rationale 

These are guidelines and example sampling schemes for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 

outbreak surveillance, prepared by the Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health, 

Veterinary Services (VS), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). These 

guidelines may periodically be updated to reflect new knowledge about the epidemiology of 

FMD or changes in approved diagnostic tests or other response tools. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix F 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance 

and Rationale 

FMD OUTBREAK SURVEILLANCE 

GUIDELINES 

These are guidelines and example sampling schemes for foot-and-mouth disease 

(FMD) outbreak surveillance, prepared by the Center for Epidemiology and 

Animal Health, Veterinary Services (VS), Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service (APHIS). These guidelines may periodically be updated to reflect new 

knowledge about the epidemiology of FMD or changes in approved diagnostic 

tests or other response tools. 

Purpose 

During an outbreak, surveillance will be conducted at intervals as specified by the 

Incident Coordinator (IC), based on the most current scientific information and 

best practice guidance available. Logistical and resource considerations will also 

be taken into account when forming surveillance recommendations. The guidance 

in this appendix expands on the base information presented in Section 4.3 and 

offers recommendations for adapting the design of FMD surveillance as new 

information becomes available during an outbreak. 

In addition to surveillance for disease detection or demonstrating disease freedom, 

surveillance may be required to permit FMD susceptible animals and/or their 

products to move for continuity of business. When testing and sampling methods 

comply, test results from continuity of business surveillance may contribute to 

surveillance testing requirements to obtain disease freedom. The current 

document does not address surveillance for continuity of business. Continuity of 

business guidelines, known as the , may allow animals 

and/or their products to move from

Secure Food Supply Plans

 farms within the control area provided there is 

sufficient evidence to ensure very low risk of FMD virus transmission. The 

Secure Food Supply Plans include Secure Milk Supply Plan 

(www.securemilksupply.org), Secure Beef Supply Plan (www.securebeef.org), 

Secure Pork Supply Plan (www.securepork.org), and Secure Zoo Strategy 

(https://securezoostrategy.org/build-facility-plan). These plans provide additional 

guidelines that are not discussed in detail here. See also Section 4.11 of the main 

document for general guidance. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

Surveillance Factors 

As described in Chapter 4, a surveillance plan indicates the number and frequency 

of animals and premises to be sampled as well as the duration of surveillance. 

Specifying these values requires information about six surveillance factors, listed 

below. Initially, values are specified using preliminary information collected 

about the outbreak and best estimates. During an outbreak, surveillance plans will 

change as new information becomes available. Ideal outbreak surveillance is 

resource intensive, and the speed at which disease can be detected and/or the level 

of disease that can be detected may be limited by test type or resources. 

Factors that guide surveillance design 

1. Surveillance purpose. The surveillance purpose guides the intensity, 

frequency, and type of diagnostic tools used for surveillance. If the 

purpose is early detection of cases prior to clinical signs, the frequency 

and intensity of sampling is high and an appropriate diagnostic tool 

(sample type and test to detect circulating antigen) must be used. If 

surveillance is meant to demonstrate disease freedom at a regional or 

national level post-outbreak, the frequency and intensity of sampling can 

be reduced. During this period, information to declare disease freedom can 

accumulate using both passive and active surveillance with diagnostic 

tools detecting both antigen and antibodies. Conversely, disease freedom 

for an individual premises during the outbreak would require frequent and 

intense sampling with appropriate diagnostic tools. 

2. Design (threshold) prevalence. The threshold is a tolerance limit used to 

design the surveillance sampling intensity. If the proportion of animals or 

premises infected exceeds the design prevalence, the surveillance will 

detect at least one case with the stated confidence. The choice of design 

prevalence depends on the transmission characteristics of the pathogen 

and the objective of the surveillance. The design prevalence can be higher 

when demonstrating freedom for a highly infectious disease in which 

disease remains at a low prevalence for only a short time. For early 

detection, a lower prevalence is required to detect disease before 

spreading. Sample size calculations are typically based on detecting at 

least one of an actual specified number of infected animals or premises 

instead of the prevalence. The prevalence threshold is computed from the 

number of infected animals or premises and the size of the animal groups 

or premises of interest. Considering the number infected instead of the 

prevalence is often very useful in determining the choice of an appropriate 

threshold. 

3. Confidence level. Also called surveillance system sensitivity, the 

confidence level is the probability that disease can be detected at or above 

the design prevalence expressed as a percent (e.g. 95 percent confidence in 

detecting a 0.10 design prevalence). The confidence level is typically set 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

at 95 percent. When consequences of failing to detect infection are 

particularly high, the confidence level may be set at 99 percent. If the 

sampling scheme is not carried out according to plan, the actual 

confidence derived through surveillance (a function of sample size, 

population size, test accuracy and the selected design prevalence) may not 

reach the desired level. Alternatively, one can determine the actual design 

prevalence the sampling scheme is capable of detecting at 95 percent 

confidence. 

Risk-based sampling. Sampling from subpopulations of animals within a 

premises which may have a higher proportion of infected animals (e.g. 

sick animals) or from a premises with higher risk of exposure (e.g. contact 

or suspect premises) allows surveillance to be designed at a higher design 

prevalence. This reduces the required number of animals or premises to be 

sampled. 

Population or target group size. Sample sizes are a function of the size of 

the population (or target group) from which the sample is selected. The 

population may comprise premises within a zone (infected zone, buffer 

zone), pens within a premise, animals on a premise, or animals within a 

pen. The population or target group size is a less influential factor 

compared to other factors. If unknown, a sample size based on the largest 

population or target group expected will be conservative in that it detects 

the desired prevalence threshold or even a lower prevalence for a smaller 

population or group. 

Types of tests. Diagnostic test choice, test sensitivity and specificity, and 

the combination of tests used to make the final determination (called the 

testing protocol), influence the number and frequency of animals or 

premises to be sampled. Test choices are varied and can be clinical signs, 

real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR), 

virus isolation, ELISA, etc., individually or in combination. When series 

testing is used to determine disease status, such as for initial infected 

premises confirmatory testing, it is the sensitivity of the testing protocol 

that serves as an input for the sample size calculation. Lower test or 

protocol sensitivity requires a larger sample size relative to a test or testing 

protocol with a higher sensitivity to achieve the same detection capability. 

Pathogen and host characteristics. The number and frequency of animals 

and premises to sample is dependent on the serotype/strain, host 

susceptibility to FMD virus, and whether the host displays clinical signs. 

These influence the transmission factors such as incubation period, 

infectious period, length of apparent clinical signs, and ability to detect 

clinical signs. Choice of design prevalence, and thus sampling intensity, is 

a function of the infectious epidemiology curve. Testing frequency is 

dependent on the length of the latent period; therefore we use information 

about the incubation period to help guide choice of testing frequency. The 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

duration of surveillance sampling is related to the length of the incubation 

period and length of viral persistence in infected animals and the 

environment. To initiate freedom of disease testing, no new FMD cases 

can occur for two incubation periods. This indicates that the pathogen is 

no longer being actively transmitted. 

Additional Details on Adjusting Surveillance 

Factors 

After initial surveillance plans are developed according to the objectives and 

designs provided in Chapter 4, further modifications may be necessary to adjust 

for the factors outlined above. Since the disease characteristics will dictate which 

adjustments are necessary, consideration to the unique outbreak characteristics 

should guide adjustments. Premises selection, animal selection for sampling, and 

frequency of sampling can all be adjusted based on the surveillance factors and 

outbreak size. 

SCALING SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS AS AN OUTBREAK 

PROGRESSES 

Some general considerations as the size of an outbreak grows include 

resource limitations, number of animals, and number of premises involved in 

the outbreak. It is a possibility that larger outbreaks may exceed resource 

capacities. In such instances, surveillance plans will be modified to work 

within the confines of the resource limitations. Resources, both financial and 

personnel, may become limited i.e. laboratory testing capacity, depopulation, 

disposal, and vaccination. Vaccine may take days to weeks to be produced 

and distributed. If laboratory diagnostic sampling becomes a limitation, 

greater reliance on clinical signs for surveillance may be implemented. 

Outbreak types: 

Refer to Chapter 3.4 for descriptions and definitions of different outbreak types. 

General guidelines for adjusting to the outbreak type can be found in Table F-1. 

The IC should adjust the response efforts as new outbreak information becomes 

available. 

Surveillance efforts in the free area: Communication outreach via media outlets 

should help educate livestock owners the importance of observational surveillance 

including instructions on monitoring their herd or flock for clinical signs of FMD 

and reporting consistent clinical signs promptly to veterinary authorities. 

Additional surveillance efforts and adjustments may occur depending on 

international trade requirements. It is likely that at least some diagnostic testing 

will need to be performed in the free area to reassure trading partners. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

Table F-1. Considerations for different outbreak sizes, progressing from 

small to catastrophic outbreak sizes. 

Size of outbreak Control Area (CA) surveillance strategies Surveillance Zone (SZ)

surveillance strategies 

Type 1 – 2 Focal Follow guidance in Chapter 4 and Appendix F, 

to Moderate including conducting a sampling of all operations 

Regional FMD in the CA. 

outbreak 

Type 3 – Large Surveillance activities may need to be modified if Greater reliance on clinical signs for 

regional FMD sampling all operations in the CA is not feasible detection of suspect premises (SP), 

outbreak (i.e. if the CA is a whole State, or multiple 

States). 

Consider prioritizing testing in the CA – start with 

direct and indirect contact premises (CP), then 

those which request permits for continuity of 

business, followed by those with less urgent 

needs for movements. 

Response may start with a large CA, then 

progressively reduce the size as true outbreak 

extent is established through surveillance 

testing. This may include active observational 

surveillance with or without diagnostic testing. 

Sampling should provide confidence that the 

animals being re-designated are truly not 

infected. When resources are limited, diagnostic 

testing on all premises may not be possible. 

Testing should demonstrate lack of FMD antigen 

and antibodies at a high level of confidence 

(95%) at no more than a 5% design prevalence. 

with additional testing as specified 

in plans. Surveillance efforts should 

be targeted towards high probability 

of disease animals and premises 

with a greater concern for exposure 

or transmission. 

Consider reducing sample size or 

number of observations by using a 

higher design prevalence or lower 

probability of detection if the SZ is 

extremely large and resources are 

limited rather than reducing the 

number of premises sampled. 

Type 4 – 6 Sampling all premises in the CA would likely be Greater reliance on clinical signs for 

Widespread/ burdensome. Prioritize testing to contacts (direct detection of SP, with additional 

national and indirect) of infected premises, and testing as specified in plans. 

outbreak to monitoring needed for continuity of business Consider using a higher design 

Catastrophic permitting from the area around infected prevalence or lower probability of 

North American premises. detection if the SZ is extremely 

outbreak If vaccination is employed for any outbreak type, 

surveillance strategies should be shifted to 

reflect those plans. 

large and resources are limited 

rather than reducing the number of 

premises sampled. 

Selection of Premises 

The surveillance purpose in the control area is early detection until 28 days after 

depopulation of the last Infected Premises in the control area. The surveillance 

purpose for the surveillance zone is proving FMD has not expanded outside of the 

control area. Sampling is more intense and frequent than proving OIE disease free 

country status. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

As an outbreak progresses in size or scale, additional consideration may be given 

to modify the premises selected for surveillance sampling in both the control area 

and surveillance zone. As outlined in Chapter 4, small premises with no animal 

movement requirements may be excluded from the sampling frame. Information 

on biosecurity to limit the spread of the virus, and the importance of active 

observational surveillance must still be provided to the producer. This includes 

instructions on monitoring their herd or flock for clinical signs of FMD and their 

obligation for reporting promptly to veterinary authorities. 

Selection of Premises in the Control Area 

Ideally, include all premises within the control area in active surveillance, 

prioritizing by knowledge gained from epidemiologic investigations. Continuity 

of business plans may also influence the prioritization of premises sampled, as 

more frequent movements will require more frequent monitoring. Information 

gained from continuity of business diagnostic testing may be incorporated into the 

surveillance data summaries to meet surveillance plan objectives. 

As the size of an outbreak increases or resources become limited, sampling can be 

prioritized to suspect premises and contact premises, as these have higher 

probability of being positive. At-risk premises may be monitored by active 

observational surveillance unless testing is already being performed for continuity 

of business purposes. Utilizing active observational surveillance or aggregate 

sampling (once validated for use) for the control area would reduce the number of 

diagnostic samples to be tested if lab capacity becomes an issue. Regardless of the 

method used to monitor, the goal is to survey all premises in the control area until 

it becomes impractical to do so. Diagnostic testing in the control area may be 

discontinued except for continuity of business purposes if resources are severely 

limited. 

As additional infected premises are discovered, the size of the control area may 

increase accordingly. If the newly detected infected premises is located on the 

periphery of the buffer zone, the size of the control area may increase to 

encompass the new infected zone and buffer zone as shown in Figure F-1 below. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 6 
 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

Figure F-1. Infected Premises’ Effect on Size of Control Area 

Selection of Premises in the Surveillance Zone 

Select a subset of premises within the surveillance zone for active surveillance, 

prioritized by epidemiological investigation or other requirements.1

 The number 

of premises to sample will vary by total number of premises in the zone and the 

premises design prevalence or number of infected premises to detect. It is 

preferable to conduct surveillance on as many premises as possible using a higher 

design prevalence or lower probability of detection when allocating limited 

resources. 

Table F-1 provides sample sizes to achieve 95 percent confidence of detection 

based on the number of premises in the zone and the premises design prevalence. 

It also provides the number of infected premises for each zone size and design 

prevalence value. The default design in Section 5.3 recommended sampling either 

300 or 500 premises from the surveillance zone based on Table F-1, assuming a 

1 In a disease outbreak, permits are issued to move FMD susceptible animals and/or their products into, within, and out of a regulatory control area. 

Movement exclusively in a FA are not managed by the IC, though affected State(s) may have additional surveillance and/or testing criteria in FAs. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 7 
 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

zone with large numbers of premises. For example, a zone with 10,000 premises 

requires a sample of 298 premises to detect 100 or more infected premises (1 

percent design prevalence). 

Table F-1. Minimum number of infected premises and samples sizes1 for three 

prevalence values and a range of zone sizes. Sample sizes achieve 0.95 

probability of detecting at least one infected premises in the zone for the chosen 

premises level design prevalence.2 

No. infected 

premises in

zone at 0.6% 

prevalence

No. infected 

premises in

zone at 1% 

prevalence

No. infected 

premises in

zone at 2% 

prevalence

No. 

Premises 

in zone

Sample 

size

Sample 

size

Sample

size 

250 1 238 2 194 5 112 

500 3 315 5 224 10 128 

1000 6 392 10 258 20 138 

2500 15 451 25 281 50 144 

5000 30 474 50 289 100 146 

>10,000 --3 498 --3 298 --3 148 1 Sample sizes computed using Cannon, 2001 

2 This statement assumes that a sufficient number of samples are collected and tested within each premises 

to detect at least one or more infected animals on the premise with 0.95 probability of detection. 3 Number of infected premises at the given design prevalence depends on group size 

Table F-2 provides similar information for zones with smaller numbers of 

premises. For example, in a zone with 150 premises and a 10 percent premises 

level design prevalence, 27 premises would be sampled. At a 10 percent premises 

level design prevalence in a 150 premises zone, up to 14 infected premises may 

go undetected. If having 14 premises undetected is too high, a lower design 

prevalence can be selected, e.g. 5 percent (up to 7 undetected premises), requiring 

51 premises be sampled. 

Table F-2. Minimum number of premises to sample

1 from a zone to achieve 95 

percent confidence in detecting at least one infected premises for the chosen 

premises level design prevalence.

2 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 Sample sizes computed using Cannon, 2001 

2 This statement assumes that a sufficient number of samples are collected and tested within each premise 

to detect at least one or more infected animals on the premises with 0.95 probability of detection. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

3 Prevalence multiplied by the number of premises in the zone is less than one infected premises. 

4 Select all premises if number of premises within the zone is less than the value given. Prevalence multiplied 

by the number of premises in the zone is less than one infected premise for some combinations. 

If infected premises are detected in the surveillance zone from initial testing 

efforts, consideration should be given to increasing the surveillance zone size to 

include more premises in the sampling frame. Also consider decreasing the 

premises level design prevalence, allowing more intensive sampling to ensure the 

control area boundaries encompass all infected premises. As the outbreak size 

increases, utilizing active observational surveillance or aggregate sampling (once 

validated for use) for the surveillance zone would reduce the number of diagnostic 

samples to be tested, since lab capacity may become a limitation in extremely 

large outbreaks. 

Sampling of Animals within Selected Premises 

Guidance for the number of animals to sample on selected premises will vary by 

pathogen and host characteristics. Figure F-2 illustrates the range of values that 

might exist for the percentage of infected animals in small ruminant, cattle, and 

swine herds using disease modeling (SEIR model) parameterized from the 

literature (Mardones et al. 2010, Chis Ster 2012, de Rueda et al. 2014). Rapid 

spread in swine allows a smaller sample size because disease detection will occur 

shortly after exposure or clinical signs will become apparent quickly. If spread is 

slower, such as in cattle, then sampling may lead to earlier detection. For small 

ruminants, a larger sample size and regular active surveillance is important 

because of the slower spread and the lack of apparent clinical signs. 

The design prevalence or number of infected animals to detect has the greatest 

impact on sample size and thus resource needs. It also impacts what the 

surveillance can achieve on each premises. This value should be selected with 

careful thought given to meeting the surveillance objectives and with an 

understanding of the host and pathogen characteristics. 

Early detection requires a smaller design prevalence and therefore a larger sample 

size, but how small the design prevalence should be depends on the pathogen and 

host characteristics. For example, note the difference in the percentage of 

infectious cattle compared to sheep in Figure F-3. If infectious animals are 

typically detectable by rRT-PCR testing, then a sampling scheme with a design 

prevalence of 5 percent should detect infection (with 0.95 probability) 19 to 26 

days post-exposure for cattle, but not until 32 to 47 days post exposure for sheep. 

Thus a 5 percent design prevalence may be too high for a sampling scheme with 

an early detection objective for sheep. 

If the disease spread among animals is very rapid and the surveillance objective is 

disease freedom, a higher design prevalence may be adequate. A 5 percent design 

prevalence requires a sample size of approximately 60 animals (Table F-3 for 

group size >5000) and should detect infection in swine 10 to 16 days post 

exposure (Figure F-3). On the other hand, a 15 percent design prevalence requires 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 9 
 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

only a sample size of 20 (Table F-3 for group size >5000) animals and should 

detect infection only a day later or 11 to 18 days post-exposure in swine (Figure 

F-3). For disease freedom in a zone such as the surveillance zone, sampling fewer 

animals per premises in combination with sampling a larger number of premises 

can achieve the same probability of detection with fewer tests than a scheme that 

focuses on a smaller design prevalence and thus larger sample sizes on each 

premises. 

If a Type 3 or greater outbreak occurs, active observational surveillance and/or 

aggregate sampling may become a more widely employed sampling strategy. In 

this case, premises with less likelihood of being infected (e.g. high biosecurity 

facilities, few susceptible animals, etc.) could be assigned to active observational 

surveillance rather than diagnostic testing. 

Figure F-2. Percent of animals in a small ruminant, cattle, or swine herd in the infectious 

stage by day for high, medium or low R0 values. Parameters are based on information from 

publications by Mardones et al. 2010, Chis Ster et al., 2012, and de Rueda et al. 2014. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 10 
 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

Figure F-3. Percent of animals in a small ruminant, cattle, or swine herd in the 

infectious stage for high R0 values with inset showing detail of curve from 0 to 50 

days and less than 15 percent infection. Parameters are based on information from 

publications by Mardones et al. 2010, Chis Ster et al., 2012, and de Rueda et al. 2014. 

Premises/Species Likely to Manifest Clinical Signs 

If the serotype or strain is expected to manifest clinically in the affected host 

population, sampling should primarily be targeted towards animals with clinical 

signs, followed by high probability of disease animals. In this case, sampling 

apparently healthy animals will provide less benefit than sampling those showing 

clinical signs or high probability of disease. This serves as risk-based sampling, 

which may lead to smaller sample sizes since these animals are more likely to be 

infected. Active observational surveillance can be utilized as an additional 

diagnostic tool. Collect samples from each pen or barn on the premises where 

clinical or high probability of disease animals are observed, or epidemiological 

links are found. When the number of clinical or high probability of disease 

animals is small, it may not be possible to detect the desired design prevalence by 

only sampling this group. However, if all of the animals in the group are tested 

and there is one infected animal in that group, the probability of detection is equal 

to the sensitivity of the diagnostic testing protocol (See Table F-4). If the group 

contains two infected animals, the probability of detection is greater than 0.95 as 

long as the diagnostic test sensitivity is 78 percent or higher. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

Table F-3. Sample sizes1 and number of infected animals for six prevalence values and a range of 

group sizes. Sample sizes achieve 0.95 probability of detection using a 95 percent sensitive test. 

1% prevalence 2% prevalence 3% prevalence 5% prevalence 10% prevalence 15% prevalence 

Group

size2 

No. 

infected Sample 

animals size 

No. 

infected Sample 

animals size 

No. 

infected Sample 

animals size 

No. 

infected Sample 

animals size 

No. 

infected Sample 

animals size 

No. 

infected Sample 

animals size 

100 

150 

200 

250 

300 

400 

600 

800 

1000 

>5000 

1 95 

1 143 

2 155 

2 194 

3 189 

4 210 

6 235 

8 249 

10 258 

--3 298 

2 77 

3 94 

4 105 

5 112 

6 117 

8 124 

12 131 

16 135 

20 138 

--3 148 

3 63 

4 78 

6 78 

7 86 

9 84 

12 87 

18 91 

24 93 

30 94 

--3 98 

5 44 

7 51 

10 51 

12 54 

15 53 

20 54 

30 56 

40 56 

50 57 

--3 58 

10 25 

15 26 

20 27 

25 27 

30 27 

40 27 

60 28 

80 28 

100 28 

--3 28 

15 25 

22 26 

30 27 

37 27 

45 27 

60 27 

90 28 

120 28 

150 28 

--3 28 1 Sample sizes computed using Cannon, 2001. 

2 Group size refers to the size of the population being sampled. This could be the entire herd or it could be a targeted portion of 

the herd such as the sick animals or animals with potential exposure. 3 Depends on group size 

Table F-4. Probability of detecting at least one infected animal when all of the animals in 

the group are tested. Detection probabilities are given for a range of test sensitivities (or 

sensitivity of the testing protocol) when there are 1, 2, or 3 infected animals in the group. 

Sensitivity of testing protocol

(individual animal test) 

Number of infected animals in the group tested 

1 2 3 

99% 

95% 

90% 

85% 

80% 

0.99 >0.99 >0.99 

0.95 >0.99 >0.99 

0.90 0.99 >0.99 

0.85 0.98 >0.99 

0.80 0.96 >0.99 

Premises/Species Unlikely to Manifest Clinical Signs 

If the serotype or strain is less likely to manifest clinically in the affected host 

population, more intensive sampling may be needed. This may occur because of 

host characteristics, such as with sheep or goats that are less likely to show clear 

clinical signs, or strain specific characteristics, such as in the 1997 Taiwan 

outbreak which primarily affected swine. 

In these cases, if animals with clinical signs and high probability of disease 

animals total less than the described sample size, it may be necessary to sample 

apparently healthy animals. If this occurs, consider increasing the sample size to 

meet a lower design prevalence (see Table F-3). When sampling apparently 

healthy animals, samples should be distributed across each group, pen or house 

with priority given to areas near entrances, vents (for housed animals), and areas 

with a high potential for fomite transmission. 

Animals in zoological collections may or may not manifest obvious clinical signs, 

which should also be considered when designing a sampling scheme if this type 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 12 
 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

of premises is contained within a control area or surveillance zone. Review the 

Secure Zoo Strategy documents at https://securezoostrategy.org/build-facilityplan/ for more information. Some tests may not be validated for use with these 

species, so discussion with the laboratory may be necessary prior to sample 

collection. 

Frequency of Sampling 

Frequency of sampling during an outbreak will depend on the premise 

designation, pathogen and host characteristics, and surveillance objectives. 

For contact premises, the frequency can be further defined depending on type of 

contact (direct vs indirect contact with an infected premises), with direct contacts 

being more likely to be infected and therefore requiring more frequent sampling 

than indirect contact premises. For all premises designations, more frequent 

sampling during the outbreak is recommended for shorter incubation periods and 

higher exposure risks. If the disease is transmitted at such a rapid rate that it is 

difficult to detect disease efficiently with sampling efforts, achieving an early 

detection objective will be difficult. In this case, sampling may change from 

diagnostic testing to active observational surveillance with the reporting 

frequency being equivalent to diagnostic sampling frequency. If new infected 

premises are being discovered more rapidly than contact premises can be 

identified and sampled, identification of new infected premises should be the top 

priority. 

More frequent sampling is especially important when clinical signs are not 

apparent. As seen in Figures F-2 and F-3, more frequent sampling would provide 

a benefit of detecting at a lower percent of the herd/flock infected. Detecting at 

this level would lead to detecting up to multiple days in advance of detecting with 

clinical signs. 

If the surveillance objective is to demonstrate freedom from disease, frequency of 

sampling is dependent on the zone in which a particular premises is located. For 

example, demonstrating freedom for continuity of business purposes within the 

control area, the time period between sampling should be short, ideally less than 

the incubation period. Less frequent testing could be used for premises located in 

the surveillance zone, which have a lower level of risk or for premises in the free 

area, where risk is assumed to be lowest of these three examples. The frequency 

or level of testing in the free area may need to be modified for trade purposes. 

As the outbreak increases in size, it is ideal to increase frequency of sampling. 

However, given the likely resource limitations associated with increased outbreak 

size, frequencies can be modified as necessary. Recommendations for initial 

frequency of sampling are summarized in Table F-5 or as directed by the IC. 

Table F-6 shows the incubation periods and sampling frequency. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 13 
 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

Table F-5. Outbreak Surveillance for Disease Detection 

Designation Infected Zone and Buffer Zone Surveillance Zone 

Suspect Premises Immediately investigate and sample. Consider repeating every other day through 

a full incubation period if initial test results are negative 

Contact Premises Initially consider sampling every 5 days for 14 days. Optimum frequency depends 

on incubation period and exposure risk. 

Control Area (CA) - AtRisk Premises 

Consider sampling every 10 days until 56 

days after the last detected case. Optimum 

frequency depends on incubation period and 

exposure risk. 

CA - Monitored 

Premises 

Consider initially sampling every 10 days 

until 56 days after the last detected case, or 

more frequently as required for movement 

testing. Testing should occur a minimum 5 

times for the duration of the quarantine. 

Optimum frequency depends on incubation 

period and exposure risk. 

CA - Specific Animal

and Product Movement 

Only applies to MPs and ARPs. Refer to Secure Food Supply plans and IC 

recommendation. 

Surveillance Zone -

Free Premises 

Once to confirm lack of spread, 

and repeat every 21 days until 56 

days after the last detected case. 

Or consider repeating just 2-3 

times again prior to release of the 

control area. 

Table F-6. Incubation Periods and Sampling Frequency 

Estimated Incubation Period Based on Field Information 

Frequency of Sampling (days between sampling) Incubation 

Period Minimum (Days) Maximum (Days) 

1 to 2 Days 1 1 

3 to 4 Days 2 3 

5 to 7 Days 4 6 

8 to 14 Days 7 10 

> 14 Days 10 

Surveillance if Vaccination Control Strategies are 

Implemented 

See section 1.3.7.2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.16, and Appendix I for additional information on 

vaccination strategies and challenges. If vaccination is used, surveillance 

diagnostic testing will rely heavily on serum samples and testing to differentiate 

infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA). It is assumed that a DIVA vaccine 

would be used, if available, for the serotype identified in the outbreak. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 14 
 

 

 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

If vaccination is used, surveillance plans should incorporate sampling of 

vaccinated premises to show proper vaccine matching to the outbreak virus is 

achieving immunity. This can be performed on a random sample of animals from 

a premises, and at a higher design prevalence than for disease detection plans. If 

the correct vaccine was used for the serotype, this surveillance should provide 

evidence that immunity to the outbreak virus is being established, sufficient 

numbers of animals have been vaccinated, and that the rate of spread (R0) has 

decreased below 1. If this is the case, the outbreak spread should decrease. 

Since vaccination does not provide complete immunity, it is possible that a 

vaccinated animal can still be infected, and may become a carrier. Cattle are most 

frequently carrier animals, harboring the virus in the oropharyngeal epithelium. If 

vaccinate to live strategies are employed, probang sampling will be an additional 

testing requirement to detect carrier animals. 

Proof of Disease Freedom Surveillance 

To regain a disease free country status, a number of steps are outlined in the OIE 

Terrestrial Code. The exact steps required to re-gain status will depend on the 

strategy used to control the outbreak; it is assumed for the following steps that 

some form of depopulation is employed. The following should be incorporated 

into the surveillance plan: 

1. Surveillance for proof of disease freedom may start 21-28 days after 

depopulation of the last infected premises, to ensure enough time has passed 

for antibody development or adequate time for clinical signs to manifest (at 

least one OIE incubation period has passed). 

2. Before freedom can be regained, a minimum waiting period must be observed, 

which differs with the control strategies used, per the OIE Code, Article 8.8.7. 

a. A waiting period of 3 months is required after disposal of the last 

animal killed (if stamping out is used alone) or slaughter of all 

vaccinated animals (if vaccination to slaughter and stamping out 

controls are used). 

b. A waiting period of 6 months after disposal of the last animal 

killed or last vaccination is required when a stamping out policy is 

combined with emergency vaccination not followed by 

slaughtering of all vaccinated animals. 

c. If stamping out is not employed as a control strategy, none of the 

above waiting periods apply. 

3. Surveillance samples will be tested to demonstrate active virus if no vaccine 

was used. If a DIVA vaccine was use, samples will be tested to demonstrate 

past exposure to the virus. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 15 
 

 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

a. Due to species differences, all vaccinated ruminants should be 

sampled. Vaccinated pigs should be sampled to detect 5 percent 

(animal level or within-herd level) prevalence with 0.95 

probability of detection. 

b. Non-vaccinated sheep and goats should be sampled to detect 1 

percent of infected herds with 0.95 probability of detection and 5 

percent of the animals on the farm with 0.95 probability of 

detection. 

c. If the outbreak size is so great that sampling all vaccinated herds is 

not practical, then within herd prevalence could be set at less than 

5 percent and within herd prevalence set at less than 1 percent. 

4. The goal is to substantiate freedom from FMD infection or transmission and 

may be based on randomized or targeted clinical investigation, or sampling at 

an acceptable level of statistical confidence. Clinical inspections may be 

targeted at particular species likely to exhibit clear clinical signs (e.g. cattle 

and swine). If vaccination is practiced, then the goal is to demonstrate through 

serological survey no evidence of infection in the vaccinated population (no 

detection of antibodies to nonstructural proteins of FMD). 

5. Status can be regained after evidence in support of disease freedom has been 

submitted and accepted by OIE. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 16 
 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

Selected References and Resources 

Blackwell, J. H., & Hyde, J. L. (1976). Effect of heat on foot-and-mouth disease 

virus (FMDV) in the components of milk from FMDV-infected cows. J Hyg 

(Lond), 77(1), 77-83. 

Blackwell, J. H., McKercher, P. D., Kosikowski, F. V., Carmichael, L. E., & 

Gorewit, R. C. (1982). Concentration of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus in 

Milk of Cows Infected Under Simulated Field Conditions. Journal of Dairy 

Science, 65(8), 1624-1631. doi:10.3168/jds.S0022-0302 (82) 82388-6 

Burrows, R. (1968). Excretion of foot-and-mouth disease virus prior to 

development of lesions. Veterinary Record, 82(13), 387-&. 

Burrows, R., Mann, J., Greig, A., Chapman, W., & Goodridge, D. (1971). The 

growth and persistence of foot-and-mouth disease virus in the bovine 

mammary gland. Epidemiology & Infection, 69(2), 307-321. 

Cannon, R. M. (2001). Sense and sensitivity--designing surveys based on an 

imperfect test. Prev Vet Med, 49(3-4), 141-163. 

Chis Ster, I., Dodd, P. J., & Ferguson, N. M. (2012). Within-farm transmission 

dynamics of foot and mouth disease as revealed by the 2001 epidemic in 

Great Britain. Epidemics, 4(3), 158-169. 

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epidem.2012.07.002 

Davies, G. (2002). Foot and mouth disease. Res Vet Sci, 73(3), 195-199. 

Dawson, P. (1970). The involvement of milk in the spread of foot-and-mouth 

disease: an epidemiological study. Veterinary Record, 87(18), 543-548. 

De Leeuw, P., Tiessink, J., & Van Bekkum, J. (1980). Aspects of heat inactivation 

of foot-and-mouth disease virus in milk from intramammarily infected 

susceptible cows. Epidemiology & Infection, 84(2), 159-172. 

De Leeuw, P., Van Bekkum, J., & Tiessink, J. (1978). Excretion of foot-andmouth disease virus in oesophageal-pharyngeal fluid and milk of cattle after 

intranasal infection. Epidemiology & Infection, 81(3), 415-426. 

de Rueda, C. B., De Jong, M. C., Eblé, P. L., & Dekker, A. (2014). Estimation of 

the transmission of foot-and-mouth disease virus from infected sheep to 

cattle. Vet Res, 45(1), 58. 

Gibbens, J., Sharpe, C., Wilesmith, J., Mansley, L., Michalopoulou, E., Ryan, J., 

& Hudson, M. (2001). Descriptive epidemiology of the 2001 foot-and-mouth 

disease epidemic in Great Britain: the first five months. Veterinary Record, 

149(24), 729-743. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 17 
 

 

FMD Outbreak Surveillance Guidance and Rationale 

Hedger, R., & Dawson, P. (1970). Foot-and-mouth disease virus in milk: an 

epidemiological study. Veterinary Record, 87, 186-213. 

Hugh-Jones, M. (1976). Epidemiological studies on the 1967–1968 foot-andmouth disease epidemic: the reporting of suspected disease. Epidemiology & 

Infection, 77(3), 299-306. 

Hyde, J., Blackwell, J., & Callis, J. (1975). Effect of pasteurization and 

evaporation on foot-and-mouth disease virus in whole milk from infected 

cows. Canadian Journal of Comparative Medicine, 39(3), 305. 

Kinsley, A. C., Patterson, G., VanderWaal, K. L., Craft, M. E., & Perez, A. M. 

(2016). Parameter Values for Epidemiological Models of Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease in Swine. Front Vet Sci, 3, 44. doi:10.3389/fvets.2016.00044 

Mardones, F., Perez, A., Sanchez, J., Alkhamis, M., & Carpenter, T. (2010). 

Parameterization of the duration of infection stages of serotype O foot-andmouth disease virus: an analytical review and meta-analysis with application 

to simulation models. Vet Res, 41(4), 45. doi:10.1051/vetres/2010017 

Orsel, K., Bouma, A., Dekker, A., Stegeman, J. A., & de Jong, M. C. (2009). Foot 

and mouth disease virus transmission during the incubation period of the 

disease in piglets, lambs, calves, and dairy cows. Prev Vet Med, 88(2), 158-

163. doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2008.09.001 

Paton, D. J., Füssel, A. E., Vosloo, W., Dekker, A., & De Clercq, K. (2014). The 

use of serosurveys following emergency vaccination, to recover the status of 

“foot-and-mouth disease free where vaccination is not practised”. Vaccine, 

32(52), 7050-7056. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2014.10.064 

Reid, S. M., Parida, S., King, D. P., Hutchings, G. H., Shaw, A. E., Ferris, N. P., 

Paton, D. J. (2006). Utility of automated real-time RT-PCR for the detection 

of foot-and-mouth disease virus excreted in milk. Vet Res, 37(1), 121-132. 

Updated October 2019—DRAFT 18 
Updated October 2020—DRAFT Appendix G 

Appendix G

Epidemiological questionnaires 

Epidemiological investigation and movement tracing during an outbreak are 

critical in controlling and eradicating FMD. In an FMD outbreak, there are several 

goals, as outlined in Section 4.5 of this publication. 

The templates provided are epidemiological questionnaires that may be useful in 

planning. It is likely that any epidemiological questionnaire will need to be 

modified and tailored to the specific outbreak.

January 10, 2023: The epi questionnaires are being revised and will be posted on 

the FMD FAD PReP website accessible from www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

 
 

Appendix H 

Appendix H

Movement Control Notice Examples 

Upon report of a highly suspicious or presumptive positive case of FMD, the State 

or Tribal Animal Health Official will immediately issue a quarantine or hold order 

on the premises. In some cases, USDA may impose a Federal quarantine or other 

movement control by Federal Order. Examples of these notices are attached.
UPDATED May 2017 H-1

Appendix H

Examples of Movement Control Notices

This appendix provides examples, both Federal and State, of halting movement of 

animals during a disease outbreak. Each State has different authorities and 

processes regarding movement controls—frequently called a “stop movement 

order” or a “hold order”—in response to an animal health emergency. 

EXAMPLE—KANSAS (2015) 

Manhattan, Kansas – In an effort to protect the Kansas poultry industry 

and to promote stronger biosecurity practices throughout the state, 

Kansas Department of Agriculture Division of Animal Health has issued 

a stop movement order, signed by Secretary of Agriculture Jackie 

McClaskey, targeting Kansas poultry and live birds, effectively 

cancelling all poultry-related shows and events through calendar year 

2015. This includes all types of poultry activities where birds from 

different flocks are co-mingled. 

This will include, but is not limited to: regional and county fairs, 

festivals, the Kansas State Fair, swap meets, exotic sales and live bird 

auctions. This measure is being implemented in an effort to prevent the 

spread of highly pathogenic H5N2 avian influenza (HPAI). Kansas 

experienced a positive case of HPAI in Leavenworth County in March 

2015. 

This decision was made after careful consideration and consultation with 

the K-State Research and Extension, Kansas 4-H, Kansas State Fair 

representatives and other poultry industry officials. Dr. Justin Smith, 

Deputy Animal Health Commissioner made the announcement. 

“The decision to issue movement restrictions regarding poultry and bird 

events has been made in an effort to protect the poultry industry in 

Kansas and the economic contribution that the industry makes to our 

agricultural economy. It is a difficult decision, as I know youth and 

adults would soon be exhibiting their projects at local fairs,” said Smith. 

“This decision was not made lightly, but it is necessary we do everything 

possible to protect the Kansas poultry flock.”

K-State Research and Extension and Kansas 4-H, along with the Kansas

State Fair, is working to identify options for youth enrolled in poultry

projects to showcase their learning and participate in fairs in ways other

than having their birds present.
UPDATED May 2017 H-2

It is important that all poultry producers continue to monitor their flocks 

for symptoms of the virus, and notify KDA immediately if they suspect 

any problems. All bird owners, whether commercial producers or 

backyard enthusiasts, should prevent contact between their birds and 

other birds including wild fowl. 

If you see sickness in birds, please contact KDA Division of Animal 

Health at (785) 564-6601 or email HPAI@kda.ks.gov. Additional 

information about HPAI can be found online at www.agriculture.ks.gov/ 

avianinfluenza. 

Source: http://agriculture.ks.gov/AllNewsItems/2015/06/09/movementrestrictions-for-poultry-events-exhibitions-and-sales-issued-in-kansas 

EXAMPLE—NORTH DAKOTA (2015) 

BISMARCK, N.D. – To protect North Dakota’s poultry industry from 

potential exposure to H5 avian influenza virus, the State Board of 

Animal Health (BOAH) has halted bird movement to shows, exhibitions 

and public sales within the state in which birds from different locations 

are intermingled at an event. This does not apply to approved private 

sales that meet North Dakota importation requirements. 

“The state board is taking this precaution to reduce the risk of avian 

influenza exposure to North Dakota birds,” State Veterinarian Dr. Susan 

Keller said. “Mixing birds could unnecessarily increase the risk of 

exposure.”

This board action prohibits the specified poultry/bird movements until 

further notice. BOAH is continuing to monitor and assess the disease 

threat, which will be reviewed at their June 10 quarterly meeting. 

North Dakota has had two confirmed cases of avian influenza in 

commercial poultry operations in Dickey and LaMoure counties 

affecting over 100,000 birds. Nationally, the outbreak has affected nearly 

10 million birds in 13 states. 

Bird owners should immediately report death loss to their local and state 

veterinarian, restrict access to their property, prevent contact between 

their birds and wild birds and practice enhanced biosecurity.

State Veterinarian Dr. Susan Keller is reminding anyone bringing birds 

into North Dakota to contact the North Dakota Department of 

Agriculture’s Animal Health Division at 701-328-2655 to ensure they are 

meeting all importation requirements.
Examples of Movement Control Notices 

UPDATED May 2017 H-3

More information about avian influenza and biosecurity is available at 

www.nd.gov/ndda/disease/avian-influenza and from the USDA-APHIS 

at www.aphis.usda.gov. 

Source: www.nd.gov/ndda/news/poultrybird-movements-limited-control-spreadavian-influenza. 

EXAMPLE—WEST VIRGINIA (2007) 

Commissioner of Agriculture Halts Poultry Shows and Sales after 

AI-Positive Flock Discovered in Virginia 

Commissioner of Agriculture Gus R. Douglass has ordered a halt to 

poultry shows and sales throughout West Virginia in response to a turkey 

flock that tested positive for low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) in 

Mt. Jackson, Va., just across the West Virginia border. 

The strain is not the “bird flu” that has been plaguing Southeast Asia and 

parts of Europe and poses no threat to human health. 

The order applies to any gathering of live birds, including shows at fairs 

and festivals and sales of poultry. The order is effective Monday, July 9, 

and will be in place for 30 days unless another positive flock is 

discovered. 

The order does not apply to the commercial industry, which tests every 

flock for AI before it is moved off the farm to ensure that infected birds 

are not trucked past other poultry farms. 

“Having already dealt with a positive flock in West Virginia earlier this 

year, we want to take every precaution to protect our poultry industry 

from a potentially devastating situation,” said Commissioner Douglass.

He also noted that the West Virginia Department of Agriculture is on 

high alert for any signs of the disease here, and that the industry has been 

exercising enhanced surveillance protocols since a 2002 AI outbreak that 

affected West Virginia and Virginia. 

Poultry companies on both sides of the border have instructed their 

growers not to spread litter or move it from their farms until further 

notice. 

According to the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer 

Services (VDACS), testing over the weekend by the USDA’s National 

Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, confirmed the 

presence of AI antibodies, which indicates possible prior exposure to the 

virus. The turkeys did not show any signs of illness prior to testing. 

Virginia is closely monitoring all poultry operations within a six-mile 

radius of the affected farm. 
UPDATED May 2017 H-4

NVSL is doing further testing to help identify the virus and hopefully 

determine its source. VDACS, USDA and the poultry owner are working 

cooperatively to minimize the possibility that the virus will move beyond 

this farm. 

The affected flock contains 54,000 birds, which will be euthanized as a 

precaution as soon as possible and composted on-site. While LPAI poses 

no risk to human health, federal and state policy is to eradicate H5 and 

H7 subtypes because of their potential to change into more serious types, 

which have a higher mortality rate among birds. 

Source: www.wvagriculture.org/news_releases/2007/7-9-07.html. 

EXAMPLE—FEDERAL (2003) 

Source: www.federalregister.gov/articles/2003/04/16/03-9322/exotic-newcastledisease-additions-to-quarantined-area#p-3. 
Examples of Movement Control Notices 

UPDATED May 2017 H-5
UPDATED May 2017 H-6
Updated October 2020—DRAFT Appendix I 

Appendix I

FMD Vaccines and Vaccination 

Vaccine matching is critical in the success of an emergency vaccination strategy 

for an FMD outbreak. The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Manual 

of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, Chapter 2 on FMD, 

provides extensive guidance on vaccine matching. 
Updated October 2019—DRAFT I

Appendix I

FMD Vaccines and Vaccination

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination is a complex topic, and further 

information can be found in National Animal Health Emergency Management 

System (NAHEMS) Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, Appendix 

A: FMD. This document can be found at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

MATCHING

Vaccine matching is critical in the success of an emergency vaccination strategy 

for an FMD outbreak. The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Manual 

of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals (2012) Chapter 2.1.5 on 

FMD provides extensive guidance on vaccine matching. As stated in this chapter, 

“Vaccination against one serotype of FMDV [FMD virus] does not cross-protect 

against other serotypes and may also fail to protect fully or at all against other 

strains of the same serotype.”1

The most effective way to test the match of a vaccine is to challenge vaccinated 

animals with FMDV. However, this is expensive and time consuming: in vitro 

methods should be considered as alternatives. Chapter 2.1.5 explains the 

serological testing that can be conducted to choose an effective vaccine strain and 

details the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs), two-dimensional 

neutralization tests (VNT), or a complement fixation test (CFT). These tests 

assess the serological relationship between a field isolate and a vaccine virus (r

value). In addition, it explains how to calculate the expected percentage of 

protection.

r1 = reciprocal arithmetic titre of reference serum against field virus

reciprocal arithmetic titre of reference serum aginst vaccine virus

The OIE states that the recommended standard test is the VNT; the OIE Manual

recommends interpreting the tests as follows:

 r1 of >0.3: indicate the field isolate is sufficiently similar to the vaccine 

strain; that use of a vaccine based on this strain is likely to confer 

protection against challenge with the field isolate.

 r1 of <0.3: indicate that the field isolate is sufficiently different from the 

vaccine strain; a vaccine based on these strains is less likely to protect. 

 1 OIE. 2012. Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, Chapter 2.1.5, 

“Foot-and-Mouth Disease.” http://www.oie.int.
Updated October 2019—DRAFT

Tests should always be repeated more than once; the OIE Manual recommends a 

minimum of at least three repetitions.

POTENCY

In addition to vaccine matching, the potency of the vaccine also contributes to 

“the range of antigenic cover.”2 For example, vaccines that are more potent may 

give greater protection against heterologous strains, a quicker onset of immunity, 

and increased protection from viral shedding and transmission. Additional booster 

vaccines can also increase the antigenic cover of a given vaccine. 

The most common test of potency is the 50 percent protective dose (PD50) test for 

cattle. In this test, “the number of protective doses in a vaccine is estimated from 

the resistance to live virus challenge of animal groups receiving different amounts 

of vaccine.”3 The PD50 is determined in a dose response study in a minimum of 15 

cattle, at least 6 months of age, plus two non-vaccinated control animals. The 

animals are split into three groups, and administered vaccine in different volumes 

intradermally, into two sites on the upper surface of the tongue. The OIE Manual 

provides the example of 1 dose, 1⁄4 dose, and 1/10 dose for the three groups. 

According to the OIE Manual, these animals and the control group are challenged 

at 3 weeks (aqueous) or up to 4 weeks (oil) after vaccination, by the inoculation of 

10,000 BID50 (50 percent bovine infectious dose) of virulent bovine virus of the 

same type or subtype as that used to prepare the vaccine. 

For the United States, preferred observed potency is at least 6 PD50 per cattle 

dose; an emergency vaccine is typically considered to be 6 PD50 or greater.

An alternative to this test is the PGP test (percentage of protection against 

generalized foot infection). Sixteen seronegative cattle, at least 6 months old, plus 

2 non-vaccinated control animals, are vaccinated with a manufacturer-suggested

volume. Then, these animals and the control group are challenged 4 weeks or 

more after vaccination with a fully virulent challenge strain, by the intradermal 

inoculation of a total of 10,000 BID50 (50 percent bovine infectious dose) 

intradermally, into at least two sites on the upper surface of the tongue. 

The PGP test does not provide an estimate of how many protective doses are in a 

single vaccine, but gives an estimated level of protection following the injection 

of single bovine dose. 

The OIE Terrestrial Manual states that potency tests for other species have not 

yet been standardized. 

2 OIE. 2012. Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, Chapter 2.1.5, 

“Foot-and-Mouth Disease.” http://www.oie.int. 

3 OIE. 2012. Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, Chapter 2.1.5, 

“Foot-and-Mouth Disease.” http://www.oie.int. 
Information on FMD Vaccines and Vaccination

Updated October 2019—DRAFT

STRAINS

The World Reference Laboratory for FMD (WRLFMD) recommends FMDV 

strains that should be included in FMDV antigen banks each quarter. As of June 

2014, high-priority strains, not in order of importance, include4

 O Manisa 

 O PanAsia-2 (or equivalent) 

 O BFS or Campos 

 A24 Cruzeiro 

 Asia 1 Shamir

 A Iran-05 (or A TUR 06) 

 A22 Iraq

 SAT 2 Saudi Arabia (or equivalent, i.e. SAT 2 Eritrea). 

The WRLFMD Quarterly Report April-June 2014 also lists medium and low 

priority recommendations: 

http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/eufmd/docs/Pirbright_reports/AprilJune_2014.pdf. 

DIVA

One of the most important challenges to vaccination is ensuring that infected and 

vaccinated animals can be successfully differentiated (a “DIVA” strategy). The 

Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL), part of the National 

Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), uses the 3ABC Prionics ELISA as a 

herd DIVA test. In the United States, NVSL-FADDL is the only laboratory that 

currently runs the 3ABC ELISA, though laboratories in the National Animal 

Health Laboratory Network may have this capability in the future. (See Section 

5.4 of this response plan for diagnostic flowcharts.) Differentiating between 

infected and vaccinated animals on an individual rather than herd basis remains a 

diagnostic challenge. 

Insufficiently purified vaccines may contain low levels of nonstructural proteins; 

vaccine purity is very important for DIVA, particularly when animals must be 

4 World Reference Laboratory for FMD. 2014. WRLFMD Quarterly Report April-June 2014, 

http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/eufmd/docs/Pirbright_reports/April-June_2014.pdf. 
Updated October 2019—DRAFT

vaccinated multiple times.5 The fact that individual vaccinated cattle infected with 

FMDV could be asymptomatic carriers without seroconverting to the nonstructural proteins (which is the basis of DIVA testing with current diagnostics) is 

also a concern. 

CROSS-PROTECTION

Vaccines will not provide cross-protection among different serotypes. Crossprotection against different strains in the same serotype depends on the amount of 

variation (antigenic similarity between strains) and the potency of the vaccine. 

IMMUNITY

An oil adjuvanted product is likely to be used in an emergency vaccination 

strategy associated with an FMD outbreak in the United States.

Onset of Immunity 

Inactivated FMD vaccines may decrease viral shedding and clinical signs in cattle 

and sheep in challenge studies as early as 4 days after vaccination with protection 

improving for the next 2–3 weeks; swine appear to be more difficult to protect 

shortly after challenge. Limited studies have reported some clinical protection in 

pigs as soon as 3–4 days after vaccination; however, pigs may not be completely 

protected against disease until 21–28 days after vaccination.6 

Duration of Immunity 

There is relatively little information on the duration of immunity for high potency 

vaccines. Conventional vaccines (used in endemic countries), are expected to 

provide approximately 4–6 months of immunity. Some studies suggest that high 

potency vaccines may protect cattle, sheep, or pigs for 6–7 months.7 The OIE 

Terrestrial Manual states that “vaccine is usually given as a primary course 

consisting of one or two doses of vaccine 3–4 weeks apart (based on animal 

population immunological status, vaccine potency, virus-vaccine matching, virus 

challenge levels, and other factors), followed by revaccination every 6–12 

months. The frequency of revaccination will depend on the epidemiological 

situation and the type and quality of vaccine used.” 8

5 R. P. Kitching, 2002. “Identification of foot and mouth disease virus carrier and subclinically infected animals and differentiation from vaccinated animals,” Rev Sci Tech. 21(3): pp. 531–

538. Also see NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, Appendix A: FMD.

6 USDA APHIS. NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, Appendix A:

FMD. 

7 USDA APHIS. NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, Appendix A:

FMD. 

8 OIE. 2012. Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals.
Information on FMD Vaccines and Vaccination

Updated October 2019—DRAFT

REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX

Elsken, L. A., M. Y. Carr, T. S. Frana, et al. 2007. “Regulations for vaccines 

against emerging infections and agrobioterrorism in the United States of 

America.” Rev. Sci. Tech. 26(2):429–441. 

Kitching, R.P. 2002. “Identification of foot and mouth disease virus carrier and 

subclinically infected animals and differentiation from vaccinated animals.” Rev 

Sci Tech. 21(3):531–538. 

Kitching, R. P., and S. Alexandersen. 2002. “Clinical variation in foot and mouth 

disease: pigs.” Rev Sci Tech. 21(3):513–518. 

Parida, S., L. Felming, Y. Oh, et al. 2008. “Emergency vaccination of sheep 

against foot-and-mouth disease: significance and detection of subsequent subclinical infection.” Vaccine. 26:3469–3479. 

Sutmoller, P., and R. Casas Olascoaga. 2002. “Unapparent foot and mouth disease 

infection (sub-clinical infections and carriers): implications for control.” Rev Sci 

Tech. 21(3):519–529. 

OIE. 2012. Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, 

Chapter 2.1.5, “Foot-and-Mouth Disease.” http://www.oie.int. 

USDA APHIS. NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, 

Appendix A: Foot and Mouth Disease. http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
 

Appendix J 

Appendix J

Selected References 

Note: This appendix lists documents related to foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 

response. All related FAD PReP documents listed in Appendix A, the selected 

references listed in Appendix F, and the resources listed in document footnotes 

are also references for this FMD Response Plan. 
 Updated October 2020—DRAFT Appendix K-1 

Appendix K

 FMD Acronyms

3D depopulation, disposal, and 

decontamination

AGID agar-gel immunodiffusion

AHPA Animal Health Protection Act 

AMT APHIS Management Team

AOS active observational 

surveillance

APHIS Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service 

ARMAR Agriculture and Response 

Management and Resources

ARP At-Risk Premises 

AVIC Area Veterinarian in Charge

AVMA American Veterinary Medical 

Association 

BZ Buffer Zone 

CA Control Area 

CCC Commodity Credit Corporation 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention

CEAH Center for Epidemiology and 

Animal Health

CF Contingency Fund 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CP Contact Premises 

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer 

CVZ Containment Vaccination Zone

DEFRA Department for Environment, 

Food, and Rural Affairs

DF disease freedom

DHS Department of Homeland 

Security

DIVA differentiation of infected from 

vaccinated animals

DOI Department of Interior 

EITB enzyme-linked 

immunoelectrotransfer blot

ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent 

assay 

EMRS2 Emergency Management 

Response System 2.0

EPA Environmental Protection 

Agency

EPC Emergency Preparedness 

Committee

EQS Emergency Qualifications 

System 

EuFMD European Commission for the 

Control of FMD

ESF Emergency Support Function 

FA Free Area 

FAD foreign animal disease

FADD Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostician

FADDL Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostic Laboratory (also

NVSL-FADDL)

FEMA Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

FMD foot-and-mouth disease

FMDV foot-and-mouth disease virus

FP Free Premises 

FSIS Food Safety and Inspection 

Service

GFRA Global Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease Research Alliance 

HHS Department of Health and 

Human Services

HPD high probability of disease

HTST high temperature—short time 

pasteurization

IAHER International Animal Health 

Emergency Reserve

IC Incident Command(er)

ICG Incident Coordination Group
Appendix K-2

ICP Incident Command Post 

ICS Incident Command System 

IMT Incident Management Team

IP Infected Premises

IZ Infected Zone 

JIC Joint Information Center 

LK lamb-kidney secondary cells

LPA Legislative and Public Affairs

LPAI low pathogenicity avian 

influenza

LPBE liquid phase blocking ELISA

MAC multiagency coordination 

MP Monitored Premises 

MPC Multiprogram Committee

NAFMDVB North American Foot-andMouth Disease Vaccine Bank

NAHEMS National Animal Health 

Emergency Management 

System 

NAHLN National Animal Health 

Laboratory Network

NASAHO National Assembly of State 

Animal Health Officials

NASDA National Association of State 

Departments of Agriculture

NIC National Incident Coordinator

NIMS National Incident Management 

System 

NIMT National Incident Management 

Team

NPIC National Preparedness and 

Incident Coordination

NRF National Response Framework

NSP nonstructural protein 

NVS National Veterinary Stockpile

NVSL National Veterinary Services 

Laboratories 

OIE World Organization for Animal 

Health

PCR polymerase chain reaction

PD50 50 percent protective dose

PIO Public Information Officer

PGP percentage of protection 

PPE personal protective equipment

PPV positive predictive value

PVZ Protection Vaccination Zone 

QMC Quarantine & movement 

control

RNA ribonucleic acid

rRT-PCR real-time reverse transcriptase 

polymerase chain reaction

SAHO State Animal Health Official 

SAT South African Territories (FMD 

serotypes)

SITC Smuggling Interdiction and 

Trade Compliance 

SBS Secure Beef Supply

SMS Secure Milk Supply

SPS Secure Pork Supply

SOP standard operating procedure

SP Suspect Premises 

SPCE solid phase competitive ELISA

SVA Senecavirus A

SZ Surveillance Zone 

TDD telecommunications device for 

the deaf

UHT ultra-high temperature

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

VAC vaccines antigen concentrate

VERRC Voluntary Emergency Ready 

Response Corps

VI virus isolation

VIAA virus infection association 

antigen

VNT virus neutralization test

VP Vaccinated Premises 

VS Veterinary Services

VSDA VS Deputy Administrator

VSDA/CVO VS Deputy Administrator / 

Chief Veterinary Officer

VSET VS Executive Team

VZ Vaccination Zone

WRLFMD World Reference Laboratory 

for Foot-and-Mouth Disease