[Cite as State v. Nichols, 2020-Ohio-4596.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CHAMPAIGN COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

JAMES DELBERT NICHOLS, SR. 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-2 

Trial Court Case No. 2017-CR-38 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 25th day of September, 2020. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

SAMUEL ADAM USMANI, Atty. Reg. No. 0097223, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 

Champaign County Prosecutor’s Office, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

MICHAEL J. SCARPELLI, Atty. Reg. No. 0093662, 210 West Main Street, Troy, Ohio 

45373 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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WELBAUM, J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, James Delbert Nichols, Sr., appeals from a judgment 

of the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas denying his post-sentence motion for 

correction of jail-time credit. For the reasons outlined below, the judgment of the trial 

court will be affirmed. 

Facts and Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 2} On March 2, 2017, a Champaign County grand jury returned a 16-count 

indictment charging Nichols with four counts of burglary, two counts of receiving stolen 

property, two counts of having weapons while under disability, two counts of grand theft 

of a firearm, two counts of theft from a person in a protected class, one count of theft of 

drugs, one count of petty theft, one count of aggravated possession of drugs, one count 

of aggravated trafficking in drugs, with five firearm specifications. 

{¶ 3} On March 15, 2017, Nichols appeared before the trial court for his 

arraignment hearing. During this hearing, the trial court found that Nichols was indigent 

and continued the hearing for two days so that Nichols could contact his public defender. 

The trial court also placed Nichols on a personal recognizance bond with special 

conditions. The special conditions included a requirement that Nichols abide by a curfew 

and have no contact with the victims of his alleged offenses. 

{¶ 4} On March 17, 2017, Nichols and his defense counsel appeared before the 

trial court for the second arraignment hearing. At this hearing, Nichols pled not guilty to 

all the charges set forth in the indictment. The trial court accepted Nichols’ not guilty 

plea, scheduled the matter for a case scheduling conference, and continued Nichols’ 

personal recognizance bond as it was previously set. However, on April 3, 2017, the 
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trial court modified Nichols’ personal recognizance bond to include the special condition 

that he remain on electronically-monitored house arrest (“EMHA”). According to the 

modification, Nichols was only allowed to leave his home to go to court, his attorney’s 

office, and certain medical appointments. 

{¶ 5} Between April 7, 2017 and June 28, 2017, Nichols filed several motions 

requesting the trial court to modify the terms of his bond. In each motion, Nichols 

requested the trial court to permit him to attend a specific event including church services, 

an MRI for his shoulder, chiropractic appointments, and follow-up treatment for his 

shoulder. The trial court granted each of Nichols’ motions. 

{¶ 6} On June 5, 2017, Nichols entered a plea agreement with the State whereby 

he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of burglary, one count of aggravated trafficking in 

drugs, and one count of grand theft of a firearm with a one-year firearm specification. In 

exchange for Nichols’ guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and 

firearm specifications and to recommend that a presentence investigation be conducted 

prior to sentencing. The parties also agreed that Nichols was guilty of grand theft of a 

firearm under the theory of complicity. The trial court accepted Nichols’ guilty plea and 

scheduled the matter for sentencing. 

{¶ 7} On July 10, 2017, the trial court sentenced Nichols to a total, aggregate term 

of 66 months in prison and ordered Nichols to pay court costs and $329.99 in restitution. 

Shortly after the sentencing hearing, the trial court realized that it had neglected to impose 

a sentence for Nichols’ aggravated trafficking offense. As a result, the trial court 

continued the sentencing hearing to the next day. 

{¶ 8} On July 11, 2017, the trial court resentenced Nichols. In doing so, the trial 
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court imposed the same sentences it had imposed the day before along with an 8-month 

prison term for aggravated trafficking in drugs. The 8-month prison term was ordered to 

run concurrently to the other sentences, thus Nichols’ total, aggregate sentence was still 

66 months in prison. 

{¶ 9} Prior to the trial court’s imposing its sentence, Nichols requested that the trial 

court award him jail-time credit for the time he was on EMHA. The trial court denied 

Nichols’ request and explained that: “[w]hen you are placed on house arrest and 

electronic monitoring as part of the pretrial condition of bond, it is not to be considered 

jail-time credit.” Sentencing Tr. (July 11, 2017), p. 3. Nichols did not object to the trial 

court’s ruling at the sentencing hearing. Nichols also did not appeal his conviction. 

{¶ 10} On December 18, 2019, over two years after he was sentenced, Nichols 

filed a “Motion to Correct Jail-Time Credit,” which again requested the trial court to award 

him jail-time credit for the time he was on EMHA. The trial court denied Nichols’ motion 

on December 20, 2019. 

{¶ 11} Nichols now appeals from the denial of his post-sentence motion to correct 

jail-time credit, raising a single assignment of error for review. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶ 12} Under his assignment of error, Nichols argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his post-sentence motion for correction of jail-time credit. Specifically, Nichols 

claims that his motion should have been granted because, while on EMHA, he was 

“confined” as required for receiving jail-time credit under R.C. 2967.191(A). We 

disagree. 
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{¶ 13} R.C. 2967.191(A) governs jail-time credit and provides that: 

The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the 

prison term of a prisoner, as described in division (B) of this section, by the 

total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising 

out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, 

including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, confinement for 

examination to determine the prisoner’s competence to stand trial or sanity, 

confinement while awaiting transportation to the place where the prisoner is 

to serve the prisoner's prison term, as determined by the sentencing court 

* * * and confinement in a juvenile facility. * * * 

{¶ 14} Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio analyzed the language of R.C. 

2967.191(A) and explained that “[b]y providing an illustrative list of the types of 

confinement that qualify for a jail-time credit, the General Assembly has demonstrated 

that it intends that credit should not be given for all types of confinement.” State v. Reed, 

Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4255, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 15. More specifically, the 

Supreme Court held that: “The legislature has expressed the intent that credit is to be 

given only for the time the defendant is confined in a public or private facility. 

Confinement in a personal residence, therefore, does not qualify under the statute.” Id. 

at ¶ 16. In so holding, the Supreme Court determined that jail-time credit does not apply 

to post-conviction EMHA. Id. at ¶ 18. 

{¶ 15} This court has similarly held “that pretrial EMHA as a condition of bail does 

not constitute confinement or detention for purposes of awarding jail-time credit.” 

(Citation omitted.) State v. Cox, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27276, 2017-Ohio-2606, ¶ 5. 
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Accord State v. Boscarino, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28253, 2019-Ohio-3917, ¶ 11-12; 

State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27937, 2018-Ohio-4142, ¶ 21 (“trial courts 

may not treat a defendant’s electronically-monitored home confinement, imposed as a 

condition of bail, as tantamount to being held in jail in lieu of bail for purposes of allocating 

jail-time credit”); State v. Bennett, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2014-CA-17, 2014-Ohio-4102, ¶ 7 

(“electronic monitoring as a condition of bond did not constitute ‘confinement’ for purposes 

of jail-time credit”). 

{¶ 16} Although Nichols acknowledges this court’s prior holdings on the EMHA/jailtime credit issue, he asks this court to abandon its well-established precedent in favor of 

finding that the plain meaning of the term “confinement” in R.C. 2967.191(A) 

encompasses pretrial EMHA. We, however, decline Nichols’ offer. We will instead 

follow the Supreme Court of Ohio’s recent decision in Reed and continue to adhere to the 

prior decisions of this court. 

{¶ 17} We also note that the issue raised in Nichols’ post-sentence motion for 

correction of jail-time credit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. “Under the doctrine 

of res judicata, ‘any issue that could have been raised on direct appeal,’ and yet was not, 

‘is not subject to review in subsequent proceedings.’ ” State v. Morgan, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 27774, 2018-Ohio-3198, ¶ 30, quoting State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 

176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 16. Since the enactment of former R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), which is now codified as R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(h)(iii), 1 “[t]he 

determination of whether res judicata bars an appellant’s post-sentencing jail time credit 

claim turns * * * on whether an appellant did or did not raise the same jail time credit issue 

 

1 See 2018 Ohio Laws File 157 (Am. Sub. S.B. 201). 
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at sentencing.” State v. Ragland, 2018-Ohio-3292, 118 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), 

citing former R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) and State v. Thompson, 147 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-

Ohio-2769, 59 N.E.3d 1264, ¶ 11-12. “If the appellant did not [raise the jail-time credit 

issue at sentencing], the doctrine of res judicata does not apply, despite the failure to 

raise the issue on the direct appeal of the conviction and sentence.” Id., citing 

Thompson at ¶ 12. (Other citation omitted.) 

{¶ 18} In this case, Nichols admits that he raised the issue of receiving jail-time 

credit for the time he was on EMHA at his July 11, 2017 sentencing hearing. See

Sentencing Tr. (July 11, 2017), p. 2-3. Since Nichols sought jail-time credit for the time 

he was on EMHA at his sentencing hearing, and he did not appeal from the trial court’s 

decision denying him said credit, the doctrine of res judicata bars him from raising the 

same request for jail-time credit two years later in his post-sentence motion for correction 

of jail-time credit. 

{¶ 19} For all the foregoing reasons, Nichols’ sole assignment of error is overruled. 

Conclusion

{¶ 20} Having overruled Nichols’ assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court 

is affirmed. 

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DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur. 
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Copies sent to: 

Samuel Adam Usmani 

Michael J. Scarpelli 

Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio