[Cite as Getreu v. Getreu , 2021-Ohio-2761.]

COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ROBERT L. GETREU Petitioner-Appellant

-vsNINA M. GETREU Petitioner-Appellee JUDGES: : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P. J. : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : : : Case No. 2020 CA 00083 : : : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Licking County C ourt of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Divison, Case No. 2012 DR 01063

JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 11, 2021

APPEARANCES: For Petitioner-Appellant For Petitioner-Appellee CHRISTOPHER L. TROLINGER DOUGLAS B. DOUGHERTY Trolinger Law Offices, LLC 3010 Hayden Road 503 S. High Street, Ste. 201 Columbus, OH 43235 Columbus, OH 43215Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 2
Gwin, J., {¶1} Appellant appeals the December 11, 2020 judgment entry of the L icking County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. Facts & Procedural History {¶2} Appellant Robert Getreu (“Father”) and appellee Nina Getreu (“M other”) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on August 24, 2012 . The parties also executed a separation agreement and shared parenting plan. According to the shared parenting plan and separation agreement, the parties agreed that the appr opriate amount of child support was $300 per month, per child. The trial court issued a final decree of dissolution of marriage on October 16, 2012. Father’s child support for th e parties’ older child terminated by order on September 21, 2018, because the child at tained the age of majority. The parties currently have one child under the age o f majority, J.G. {¶3} Father filed a motion for change of parental rights and respons ibilities with regards to J.G. on April 12, 2019. The magistrate dismissed Fa ther’s motion in January of 2020, after the parties failed to submit documentation as or dered by the magistrate in December of 2019. {¶4} On April 2, 2020, Father filed a second motion for termination or modification of shared parenting decree that contained a motion to modify child support. Mother filed a motion to modify and/or increase child support o n May 6, 2020. The parties filed numerous discovery motions. {¶5} The parties submitted and the trial court signed an agreed judg ment entry on November 30, 2020. The parties agreed to maintain the share d parenting plan. TheLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 3 issues that remained contested were: child support modificatio n, summer parenting time, and tax exemption. {¶6} The matter was set for hearing in front of the magistrate on De cember 2, 2020. At the start of the hearing, the trial court noted that the magistrate had a scheduling conflict, so the trial judge would be doing the hearing, even t hough he had a meeting during the afternoon and the parties would have “limited time.” {¶7} The court inquired of the parties as to insurance, income, and other issues related to child support exemptions. Father stated he made $85 ,300.89 per year as a Columbus firefighter, with average bonuses for the previous thr ee years of $11,229.71. Mother testified she is a sales associate at Marshall’s, making $11.82 per hour. She stated she does not work forty hours per week, but makes less t han full-time minimum wage. There is no mental or physical disability that prevents Mother from working. The court also questioned the parties about the tax exemption issue

. {¶8} Father testified as to the parties’ disagreement about the summ er vacation schedule. Father stated that while Mother would like to have n ine days for travel, Father “feels that a week is long enough.” The trial court questioned Father as to whether he would agree to nine days if Father would have first choice of v acation dates and Mother would have to notify him in advance of her chosen dates. Fathe r “strongly feel[s] that a week’s a long enough period of time.” {¶9} Father stated he believes Mother has more income than she testi fied to because on several vehicle credit applications, she wrote she i s an office manager for her boyfriend, working for Plain City Homes, and making anywhere fr om $52,000 to $72,000 per year. Additionally, Father testified to text messages Moth er sent to Father inLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 4 September and October of 2017 that said, “we are with clients r ight now” and “we are out showing houses.” {¶10} Father introduced numerous exhibits, including credit card stat ements of Mother, bank account statements of Mother, a business checking account for Plain City Homes that Mother had access to, and several applications Mothe r made for car loans. Father testified about the exhibits, including a summary docume nt he made. {¶11} Mother submitted a loan application to Chrysler Capital on Febr uary 20, 2020, stating she worked as an office manager for ReMax for two years and made $62,000 per year. Mother made an application on February 12, 2 018 to Chrysler Capital for a different vehicle. She stated she worked for Transaction Realty as an office manager making $72,000 per year. {¶12} On cross-examination, Mother confirmed that she signed the Febr uary 20, 2020 application and made the statements under oath, subject to penalty of perjury. Mother’s boyfriend was the co-applicant on the lease; Mother st ated her boyfriend makes the payments on that vehicle. Mother next confirmed that she s igned the February 2018 loan application and when asked if she stated her salary was $7 2,000, she stated, “I said that for the credit, yes.” Mother also stated she signed an ap plication for credit in 2016 stating she made $52,000 per year and a 2017 lease application for an apartment where she stated she made $72,000 per year. When asked about each of these salaries and jobs listed on the applications, Mother’ response was “that’s w hat is says” or “that’s what I wrote.” {¶13} Mother testified as to the deposits in her checking account tha t exceeded her income from employment. Mother stated she had several larg e deposits that wereLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 5 not from her employment: one from Progressive Casualty Insuran ce on April 1, 2020 to replace a vehicle that was flooded ($7,560.04); a deposit of $1 ,200 from the IRS for COVID relief funds; and $7,211 from the IRS for a yearly tax re fund. {¶14} Mother is listed as an owner on the Plain City Homes account th at was opened in 2015. Mother signed the documents to dissolve Plain City Homes in September of 2020. Mother testified she did not access the mon ey her boyfriend deposited into the Plain City Homes account. {¶15} Carrie Campbell (“Campbell”) is a benefit recovery specialist f or Licking County Department of Job and Family Services. Mother receives food assistance and Medicaid from DJFS; both are income-based programs. Campbell r eceived complaints in both March and July of 2020 from an anonymous source that Mo ther was committing welfare fraud by not reporting all of her income. She reviewed documents, including a 1099, Mother’s bank records, Mother’s lease application, Mother ’s applications for vehicle loans, and Mother’s credit card statements. The person reporti ng the alleged fraud provided DJFS with these documents. Campbell also received and reviewed Exhibit 12, a spreadsheet summarizing Mother’s payments on all accounts, wh ich Father testified to creating. Campbell also checked other sources in her investiga tion, including social media and BMV records. After considering all of the documents s ubmitted, Campbell found no fraud, and closed the case against Mother. {¶16} Campbell testified it is not unusual for people to lie about th eir income when they are trying to obtain credit cards or car loans. Campbell stated she would not find that someone committed welfare fraud simply because they lied w hen applying for aLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 6 vehicle loan, because DJFS has different rules and regulations than a credit card or vehicle loan company does. {¶17} Antonio Giordano (“Giordano”) is Mother’s boyfriend. He has a real estate license. Plain City LLC was created because Giordano was going to open up an office in Plain City. Mother was going to get her real estate license an d they were going to work together in that office. However, no money was generated from the company and Mother never obtained her real estate license. In 2019, Giordano rece ived a 1099 (Exhibit UU) for compensation in the amount of $169,765.95. Giordano put th is money into the Plain City Homes account. Giordano testified that Mother did not use the Plain City account; all of the deposits and withdrawals were his. Giordano also st ated he has made most of the payments on the credit cards he and Mother have together, w ith the exception of some small charges Mother made that came directly out of her PN C account. {¶18} On cross-examination, Giordano confirmed that Mother had access to the Plain City account at all times. Additionally, she had access to and was an authorized user on three joint credit cards. {¶19} The trial court issued a judgment entry on December 11, 2020. The trial court reviewed the evidence submitted by Father as follows: ev idence of transactions (credit cards) of Mother that far exceeds her income; Mother’s banking records that appear to show deposits greater than her income; banking record s for Plain City Homes showing significant withdrawals and deposits from the business account; exhibits showing that Mother claimed to have greater income than she reported to the IRS; and a text message appearing to suggest Mother was employed at Plain City Homes.Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 7
{¶20} The trial court then reviewed the evidence and testimony submit ted by Mother. This included the testimony of Campbell, the testimony of Giordano, and Mother’s own testimony. {¶21} The trial court found the evidence failed to establish that Mot her had any unreported income, though the trial court acknowledged Mother a ppears to be living beyond her means. {¶22} The trial court designated Father as the obligor for purposes o f child support. The trial court determined Father’s income for child support purposes was $96,530.51, which is his annual salary as a firefighter for the City of Columbus, plus an average of his last three years of bonuses. As to Mother’s inc ome, the trial court found she is employed at Marshall’s D epartment Store, earning less th an full-time minimum wage. The trial court imputed minimum wage of $18,096 to Mothe r. {¶23} The trial court adjusted the child support figure for the $4,50 0 per year Father pays to provide health insurance for the child. {¶24} As to deviations, the trial court found Father has overnight pa renting time which exceeds ninety (90) days; thus, Father is entitled to an automatic 10% deviation. The court then granted an additional deviation on line 25a of t he child support worksheet, reducing Father’s support obligation by $76.29 per month. The trial court found the additional deviation was “just, appropriate, and in the child’s best interest and the reason for the deviation is the extended parenting time and support pr ovided by Father.” {¶25} The trial court concluded as follows: Father, as child support obligor, should pay Mother $700.42 per month (which includes a 2% processing fe e); the parties couldLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 8 claim the child for tax purposes every other year; and the part ies could each take the child on a 9-day summer vacation each year, with notification require ments. {¶26} Father appeals the December 11, 2020 judgment entry of the Lick ing County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, and assigns the following

as error: {¶27} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO IMPUTE APPROPRIATE INCOME IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a) TO APPELLEE FOR PURPOSES O F CHILD SUPPORT. {¶28} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO APPELLEE AS TO THE AMOUNT FOR PURPOSES OF CHILD SUPPORT AS SUCH WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. {¶29} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ARBITRARILY DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF DEVIATION IN CHILD SUPPOR T FOR APPELLANT-OBLIGOR INSTEAD OF APPL YING THE STATUTORY FACTORS

. {¶30} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AND VIOLATED APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY LIMITING THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE TO THIRTY (30) MINUTES WITHOUT NOTIFIC ATION PRIOR TO THE DAY OF TRIAL. {¶31} “V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, ANDVIOLATED APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY LIMITING CROSSEXAMINATION TO ONLY THREE (3) QUESTIONS PER WITNESS.”Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 9
I., II. {¶32} In his first two assignments of error, Father contends the tria l court abused its discretion in determining Mother’s income for child support purposes, and that the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income is against the manifes t weight of the evidence. We agree in part, and disagree in part. {¶33} In Booth v. Booth , 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989), the Ohio Supreme Court determined an abuse of discretion standard is the appropriate standard of review in matters concerning child support. In order to fin d an abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arb itrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶34} Furthermore, as an appellate court, we are not the trier of fac t. Our role is to determine whether there is some competent and credible evide nce supporting the judgment rendered by the trial court. Myers. v Garson , 66 Ohio St.3d 610, 614 N.E.2d 742 (1993). Accordingly, a judgment supported by competent and credible evidence will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evi dence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. , 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978). {¶35} Issues relating to the credibility of the witnesses and the wei ght to be given the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. “The underly ing rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the kno wledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, ges tures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibi lity of the proferred testimony.” Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland , 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 10
{¶36} To calculate the amount of child support owed, the trial court must determine the annual income of each parent. Weisgarber v. Weisgarber , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00158, 2016-Ohio-676. In calculating income, a trial court is permitted to impute income to a parent when the parent is voluntarily undere mployed. R.C. 3119.01(C)(9)(b); R.C. 3119.01(C)(17). “In determining if an i ndividual is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed, the court must determine not only whether the change was voluntary, but also whether it was made with due regard to the obligor’s incomeproducing abilities and his or her duty to provide for the cont inuing needs of the child.” Farrell v. Farrell , 5th Dist. Licking No. 2008-CA-0080, 2009-Ohio-1341. The parent claiming that his or her former spouse is voluntarily underempl oyed has the burden of proof. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2019 AP 04 0013, 2019-Ohio4709. {¶37} In regards to child support, “income” consists of the sum of th e gross income of the person and any “potential income” of the person if volun tarily underemployed. R.C. 3119.01(C)(9)(b). Potential income includes imputed income tha t a trial court determines the parent would have earned if fully employed based upon the f actors set forth in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i)-(xi). Whether a person is voluntarily und eremployed and the amount of income to be imputed “are matters to be determined by the tr ial court based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” Rock v. Cabral , 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 616 N.E.2d 218 (1993). {¶38} In the first portion of his argument, Father argues that the tr ial court’s determination to impute full-time minimum wage to Mother was ag ainst the manifestLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 11 weight of the evidence when Mother testified she earns $11.82 p er hour, and there was no disability which would prevent her from working full-time. We agree. {¶39} During the hearing, Mother testified that she is a sale associa te at Marshall’s, making $11.82 per hour. She stated she does not wo rk forty hours per week, but has no mental or physical disability preventing her from wo rking full-time. This testimony is undisputed. Thus, it is clear from the undisputed testimony that the amount of $24,585.60 ($11.82 x 40 hours per week) should be imputed to Mother. However, the trial court imputed only full-time minimum wage to Mother. We find there is not competent and credible evidence to support the trial court’s determinatio n. {¶40} Mother cites to the three cases similarly cited by the trial co urt in its determination that full-time minimum wage should be imputed to Mother. We find these cases unpersuasive as applied to the facts in this case. {¶41} In Borer v. Borer , the Third District affirmed the trial court’s imputation of full-time minimum wage income when the Wife testified that the hourly salary from her cleaning business was less than minimum wage and Husband presen ted no evidence as to what income could have been imputed to a person who operated a cleaning business. Additionally, the Husband in Borer filed a consent agreement in which he agreed the Wife’s income from the cleaning business was less than minimum wage. No such circumstances exist in this case. There was no consent agreeme nt, and Mother specifically testified she earned an hourly wage higher than mi nimum wage. In Boyer v. Boyer , 5th Dist. Licking No. 94 CA 53, 1994 WL 728235, we affirmed t he trial court’s imputation of minimum wage income because the Wife specifically testified she made less than minimum wage, and because the Husband failed to provi de a transcript of aLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 12 significant portion of the hearing. In this case, Mother testi fied her hourly income was more than minimum wage, and the transcript of the full hearing was provided to this Court. Finally, in Combs v. Combs , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008 CA 00169, 2009-Ohio-1683, the issue was whether the trial court appropriately considered the factors for spousal support. This case deals only with child support. {¶42} In the second portion of his argument, Father contends the tria l court’s determination of Mother’s income was against the manifest weigh t of the evidence because there was evidence in the record to support the imputat ion of a higher income to Mother. Father cites to: a February 20, 2020 application t o Chrysler Capital stating she worked as an office manager for Remax making $62,000 per ye ar; a February 12, 2018 application to Chrysler Capital stating she worked for Tra nsaction Realty as an officer manager making $72,000 per year; a 2017 application to lease an apartment Mother made stating she made $72,000 per year; a text Mother se nt to Father in 2017 stating she was working with Giordano; records showing that Mot her had access to approximately $175,000 in the Plain City business account; cred it card statements of Mother showing she made charges in excess of her income; and ba nk records showing Mother had deposits in her checking account in excess of her in come. {¶43} Mother and Giordano testified she did not deposit or withdraw f unds from the Plain City Homes account, and that the initial $169,765 dep osit came directly from Giordano. Additionally, Mother testified that several large de posits into her checking account were one-time deposits, including COVID relie f funds, a large tax refund, and an insurance check for a destroyed vehicle.Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 13
{¶44} Mother confirmed that she signed the applications for credit an d application for lease that listed her income as above $62,000. When asked about these documents, Mother’s response was “that’s what it says” or “that’s what I w rote.” Mother also testified that she had no unreported income other than her Marshall’s sal ary. Campbell testified that no welfare fraud existed and Mother’s income was what she claimed it to be. {¶45} While this Court may not have come to the same conclusion as th e trial court on the credibility of the witnesses based upon Mother’s c onflicting testimony that she had no income other than Marshall’s and her admission that she signed several credit applications stating her income was higher, the law is clear th at a reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply because it holds a different opin ion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted before the trial court. Brennan v. Brennan , 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2020-0047, 2021-Ohio-1865; Geary v. Geary , 5th Dist. Delaware No. 14CAF050033, 2015-Ohio-259. The trial court based its decision on what was essentially a credibility call between Father, Mother, Campbell, and Giordano. A trial court may believe all, part, or none of the testimony o f any witness who appears before it. Rogers v. Hill , 124 Ohio App.3d 468, 706 N.E.2d 438 (4th Dist. 1998). Accordingly, we find the trial court did not commit error when it did not impute income higher than $24,585.60 to Mother. {¶46} Father’s first and second assignments of error are sustained in part, and overruled in part. We find the trial court committed error in only imputing full-time minimum wage to Mother instead of $24,585.60. However, we find the trial court did not commit error in its determination that Mother’s income should b e imputed at a number higher than $24,585.60.Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 14

III. {¶47} In his third assignment of error, Father contends the trial cou rt erred and abused its discretion by failing to apply the statutory factors in determining the amount of deviation in child support. We agree with Father. {¶48} When issuing an order of child support, the trial court must ca lculate the amount of support “in accordance with the basic child support s chedule, the applicable worksheet, and the other provisions of Chapter 3119.” R.C. 3119 .02. The child support amount that results from the use of the basic worksheet is pres umed to be the correct amount of child support due. R.C. 3119.03. However, under R.C . 3119.22, a court may deviate from the guideline amount of child support, if, after c onsideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 3119.23, the court determines that the guidel ine amount “would be unjust or inappropriate and therefore not in the best interest of the child.” R.C. 3119.22. The trial court is vested with the discretion to determine when and whether to grant a deviation from the guideline child support amount. Caleshu v. Caleshu , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-742, 2020-Ohio-4075; Bible v. Bible , 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 2018CA0001, 2018- Ohio-5147. {¶49} R.C. 3119.231(A) provides that “if court-ordered parenting time exceeds ninety overnights per year, the court shall consider whether to grant a deviation pursuant to R.C. 3119.22 of the Revised Code for the reason set forth in division (C) of section 3119.23 of the Revised Code. This deviation is in addition to any adjustments provided under division (A) of section 3 119.051 of the Revised Code.” {¶50} R.C. 3119.051(A) states as follows:Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 15 Except as otherwise provided in this section, a court or child support enforcement agency calculating the amount to be paid under a ch ild support order shall reduce by ten percent the amount of the annual indi vidual support obligation for the parent or parents when a court has i ssued or is issuing a court-ordered parenting time order that equals or exc eeds ninety overnights per year. This reduction may be in addition to the other deviations and reductions. {¶51} In this case, Father is entitled to an automatic 10% deviation because he has more than 90 overnights visits with the child. R.C. 3119.5 0(A); Glover v. Canann , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0081, 2021-Ohio-2641. If the ob ligor enjoys more than 147 overnights per year, as Father does here, the guidelines pr ovide that the court will consider a deviation in addition to the R.C. 3119.051 deviation . R.C. 3119.231(B). In reviewing whether a deviation is appropriate, the trial court c onsiders whether the calculated amount is inappropriate or unjust and not in the bes t interests of the child by applying the relevant factors contained in R.C. 3119.23, and, i n the case of shared parenting, consider any extraordinary circumstances of the pare nts or other factors contained in R.C. 3119.23. R.C. 3119.24; Glover v. Canann , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0081, 2021-Ohio-2641. {¶52} Pursuant to the child support worksheet, Father’s annual suppor t obligation without deviation was $10,173 per year. This amount was reduce d by the R.C. 3119.051 automatic 10% deviation of $1,017.30 in lines 19-22 of the work sheet, leaving an adjusted child support obligation of $9,155.70 per year, or $762.98 per month. The court then granted an additional deviation on line 25a of the child suppor t worksheet, reducingLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 16 Father’s support obligation by $76.29 per month. In the judgme nt entry, the trial court found the additional deviation was “just, appropriate, and in t he child’s best interest and the reason for the deviation is the extended parenting time and support provided by Father.” {¶53} Pursuant to sections R.C. 3119.231(A), R.C. 3119.22, and R.C. 3 119.24, in determining whether a deviation is appropriate and the amount o f the deviation in a shared parenting case, the trial court considers whether the ca lculated amount is inappropriate or unjust and not in the best interest of the chi ld by applying the relevant factors in R.C. 3119.23 and the extraordinary circumstances in R.C. 3119.24. Glover v. Canann , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0081, 2021-Ohio-2641; Caleshu v. Caleshu , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-742, 2020-Ohio-4075; Bradley v. Hill , 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAF 10 0053, 2020-Ohio-2682. {¶54} In this case, the trial court did not state whether or how it c onsidered the relevant factors in R.C. 3119.23 or the extraordinary circumsta nces in R.C. 3119.24 in its judgment entry and did not include any facts to support how it arrived at the additional 10% deviation. At the hearing, the trial court stated the foll owing: It’ll be a hundred eighty-two, I’ll give her a hundred eight – well, actually I’ll give the obligor the extra days, so I’ll make him a hundred and eighty-three days. . . I’m going to have him the standard ninety days, I’ll give him additional time; it’s about ten percent for additional deviatio n based on what we do. So he’ll get an additional deviation on parenting time from the child support above the ninety days...The standard deviation is ninety days and then so we basically have an agreement, Judge Wright and I, tha t we wouldLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 17 do fifty percent would go up to another ten percent on that. S o, yes, it’ll wind up being the standard one * * *.” {¶55} Based upon the lack of discussion of the factors and/or extraor dinary circumstances in the judgment entry and the statement by the tr ial court at the hearing that an obligor who has more than 147 overnights is given a “st andard” 10% additional deviation, we find the trial court committed error in its deter mination of the amount of additional deviation. The statutory language provides that, un like the automatic or standard deviation of 10% contained in R.C. 3119.051, the addit ional deviation is not standard. The additional deviation s hould be based upon the facts and circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the factors and circumstan ces as contained in R.C. 3119.23, R.C. 3119.231, and R.C. 3119.24, such that this Court can conduct a meaningful review as to whether the trial court abused its discretion in d etermining whether to deviate and in determining the deviation amount. {¶56} Mother argues that Father simply failed to meet his burden of p roof for a higher downward deviation. We first note that since the trial court did not indicate which factors and/or extraordinary circumstances it considered in its decision and simply stated the 10% deviation was a “standard” deviation agreed to by the j udges in the court, it did not review the evidence other than to determine that Father’s p arenting time exceeded 147 overnights. Father did present evidence, such as the finan cial assistance Mother received from her boyfriend, and requested the trial court gran t a 20% deviation. Additionally, as evidenced by the transcript, due to the limite d time the trial court allotted for the hearing, Father was unable to present additional eviden ce regarding the deviation factors other than in a written closing argument.Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 18
{¶57} Based on the foregoing, Father’s third assignment of error is s ustained. IV. {¶58} In his fourth assignment of error, Father contends the trial co urt erred, abused its discretion, and violated his due process rights by l imiting the presentation of evidence. {¶59} With respect to due process, in civil proceedings, due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. State v. Hayden , 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502. {¶60} Trial courts are given great deference in controlling their doc kets, and therefore, a reviewing court uses an abuse of discretion standa rd when reviewing a trial court’s requirements in this area. State v. Unger , 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981). {¶61} This matter was set for hearing in front of a magistrate. Howe ver, at the start of the hearing, the trial court stated the magistrate had a medical scheduling conflict, so the trial judge would be doing the hearing, even though he h ad a meeting during the afternoon and the parties would have “limited time.” {¶62} At the beginning of Father’s case, counsel for Father asked th e trial court how much time he had. The trial court stated he would “give yo u as much time as I can, I’ve got to take a break though at 2:00 to take this other meet ing, so * * *.” Counsel for Father responded, “I understand. I will march right through th is as fast as I can.” The trial court responded, “Like I said, the other option was to re schedule this for * * * whenever.” After Father presented his case, the trial court to ok a break for a meeting.Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 19 When the hearing resumed, the trial court limited Mother’s coun sel to thirty minutes to present her evidence. {¶63} While counsel for Father made brief statements about the time l imitation imposed by the trial court, such as when the trial court asked him if he had any other exhibits and he said, “I don’t know. I haven’t had time to --, ” counsel for Father never asked the trial court to continue the hearing, and never object ed to the time limitation imposed by the trial court. A party waives and may not raise o n appeal any error which arises during the trial court proceedings if that party fails t o bring the error to the court’s attention, by objection or otherwise, at a time when the trial court could avoid or correct the error. Lowder v. Domingo , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016CA00043, 2017-Ohio-1241, citing Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). {¶64} Although we find the imposition by the trial judge of such a li mited time period on both parties in this case concerning, Father did not appropriately object to the time limitation imposed by the trial court. {¶65} Additionally, time limitations on evidence have been upheld whe re a party has not identified what additional evidence the party would hav e offered or how that evidence could have changed the trial court’s judgment. Balliett v. Horan , 5th Dist. Ashland No. 97 COA 01204, 1998 WL 429843; In re A.L. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99040, 2013-Ohio-5120; Mathewson v. Mathewson , 2nd Dist. Greene No. 05-CA-035, 2007- Ohio-574. As this Court has previously stated, “it is basic to appellate practice that error, in the form of excluded testimony, is not reviewable unless the re has been a proffer of the excluded testimony or the content of such testimony is apparent from the circumstances.” Balliett v. Horan , 5th Dist. Ashland No. 97 COA 01204, 1998 WL 429843; Richter v.Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 20

Richter , 5th Dist. Licking No. 15-CA-24, 2016-Ohio-400. Father has no t explained, at the trial level or on appeal, what his additional evidence would ha ve consisted of or how it would have changed the trial court’s decision, nor is this evid ence apparent from the record in the instant case. {¶66} Father cites Readnower v. Readnower, 162 Ohio App.3d 347, 2005-Ohio3661, 833 N.E.2d 752 (2nd Dist. Greene) in support of his argum ent. We find Readnower distinguishable from the instant case. In Readnower, counsel for the appellant objected to the time limitations imposed by the trial court and made a p roffer as to what the witnesses the appellant was not permitted to call (including th e appellant herself and an expert witness on business valuation) would have testified to, and how this additional evidence may have impacted the trial court’s decision. Id. In this case, counsel for Father did not appropriately object to the time limitation, made no pr offer, and did not state either at the trial court level or on appeal what additional evidence he sought to introduce, or how this evidence may have impacted the trial court’s decision. {¶67} Father’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. V. {¶68} Father argues the trial court violated his due process rights b y limiting crossexamination to only three questions per witness. {¶69} With respect to due process, in civil proceedings, due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. State v. Hayden , 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502. {¶70} Generally, the trial court has broad discretion in imposing lim its on the scope of cross-examination. State v. Green , 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 609 N.E.2d 1253 (1993). AnLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 21 appellate court will not interfere with a trial court’s decisio n about the scope of crossexamination absent an abuse of discretion. Westfall v. Aultman Hosp. , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00223, 2017-Ohio-1250. While a trial court does have the discretion to limit questioning of witnesses if the “probative value is substantial ly outweighed by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumu lative evidence” pursuant to Evidence Rule 403(B), cross-examination of a witnes s is an important right and the subject matter, rather than the time, should constitute the limitation. Farmers Nat’l Bank of Springfield v. Frazier , 13 Ohio App. 245 (2nd Dist. 1920). {¶71} In this case, the trial court informed Father he would be limit ed to three questions upon cross-examination of Campbell, Giordano, and Mot her. However, Father called Mother upon cross-examination during his presentation of evidence. {¶72} We find it concerning that the trial court limited Father’s cou nsel to only three cross-examination questions per witness, particularly bec ause the restriction had no relation to the substance of the cross-examination questions themselves. {¶73} However, each time after the trial court informed counsel for F ather he could ask three questions of each witness on cross-examination, trial counsel did not object. Instead, counsel stated, “Okay,” or “all right.” A party waive s and may not raise on appeal any error which arises during the trial court proceedings if th at party fails to bring the error to the court’s attention, by objection or otherwise, at a time when the trial court could avoid or correct the error. Lowder v. Domingo , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016CA00043, 2017-Ohio1241, citing Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). {¶74} Additionally, unlike in the cases cited by appellant, counsel f or Father did not identify or proffer what questions he was precluded from as king, nor how Father wasLicking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00083 22 prejudiced by the limitation. See Balliett v. Horan , 5th Dist. Ashland No. 97 COA 01204, 1998 WL 429843. Father has not explained, at the trial level o r in his brief on appeal, what further questions he sought to ask the witnesses upon cros s-examination. {¶75} Father’s fifth assignment of error is overruled. {¶76} Based on the foregoing, Father’s first and second assignments o f error are sustained in part and overruled in part. Father’s third assign ment of error is sustained. Father’s fourth and fifth assignments of error are overruled. {¶77} The December 11, 2020 judgment entry of the Licking County Cour t of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

By Gwin, J., Baldwin, P.J., and Delaney, J., concur