NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

PATRICK JOSEPH LEJMAN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0462 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2005-005216-001 DT 

The Honorable Joseph C. Kreamer, Judge 

DISMISSED

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix 

By Joel M. Glynn 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. LEJMAN 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. 

J O N E S, Judge: 

¶1 Patrick Lejman appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion 

to quash the sex offender registration requirement contained in his plea 

agreement. After searching the entire record, Lejman’s defense counsel has 

identified no arguable non-frivolous question of law. Citing Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), defense 

counsel asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. Lejman 

was given an opportunity to file a brief in propria persona but did not do so. 

Because we do not have jurisdiction to review the denial of a request to 

amend a plea agreement, we dismiss the appeal. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In October 2005, Patrick Lejman was charged with sexual 

abuse, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest. Although Lejman was 

under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense, he was charged as an 

adult pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 13-501(A)(6).1 

In February 2006, Lejman pleaded guilty to attempted sexual abuse in 

violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1001(A) and -1404(A). The conditions of the plea 

agreement included lifetime probation and lifetime sex offender 

registration. 

¶3 In March 2015, Lejman filed a “motion to quash” the sex 

offender registration requirement pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3821(G) 

(authorizing the court to terminate a duty to register as a sex offender if the 

person was under eighteen years of age at the time of adjudication and 

successfully completes probation). The trial court denied the motion, and 

Lejman timely appealed. 

 

1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version. 
STATE v. LEJMAN 

Decision of the Court 

3

DISCUSSION 

¶4 We find no jurisdictional support, nor does Lejman provide 

any, for consideration of this appeal. An appeal may be taken by the 

defendant in a criminal matter only under certain circumstances. See A.R.S. 

§§ 13-4031, -4033. Lejman is not appealing a “final judgment of conviction 

or verdict of guilty except insane.” See A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(1). Nor is he 

appealing from “[a]n order denying a motion for a new trial, . . . [or a] 

sentence on the grounds that it is illegal or excessive.” See A.R.S. § 13-

4033(A)(2), (4). And, for the following reasons, we conclude the trial court’s 

denial of Lejman’s motion did not affect his substantial rights. See A.R.S. 

§ 13-4033(A)(3). 

¶5 Although titled otherwise, Lejman’s motion is essentially one 

for modification of the sentence imposed pursuant to his plea agreement. 

Generally, a defendant “may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that 

is entered pursuant to a plea agreement or an admission to a probation 

violation.” A.R.S. § 13-4033(B). A right of appeal does arise from an order 

changing or modifying the judgment or sentence originally imposed as 

“[a]n order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the 

party.” A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(3); see State v. Jimenez, 188 Ariz. 342, 345 (App. 

1996) (holding the denial of a motion to modify terms of a defendant’s 

probation is not an order affecting the substantial rights of the defendant) 

(citing Arvizu v. Fernandez, 183 Ariz. 224, 226-27 (App. 1993), and State v. 

Hovey, 175 Ariz. 219, 220 (App. 1993)). But, the trial court’s order here did 

not change or modify Lejman’s sentence. Accordingly, we have no 

jurisdiction to consider his appeal. 

CONCLUSION 

¶6 Having no appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss Lejman’s appeal.