NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE ABEL HERNANDEZ NAJAR, AKA 

Ruben Serrano-Serrano, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent. 

No. 16-71065 

Agency No. A077-413-995 

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an 

Immigration Judge’s Decision

Submitted May 24, 2017**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, 

Circuit Judges.

Jose Abel Hernandez Najar, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for 

review of the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) February 23, 2016, 

order reinstating his March 2, 1999, expedited removal order, and for review of an 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 31 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-71065 

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) April 6, 2016, determination under 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture and 

thus is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. Our jurisdiction is 

governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Our review of the DHS’s reinstatement order is 

“limited to confirming the agency’s compliance with the reinstatement 

regulations,” Garcia de Rincon v. DHS, 539 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008), and 

we review for substantial evidence the IJ’s factual findings, Andrade-Garcia v. 

Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016). We dismiss in part and deny in part the 

petition for review.

As to the DHS’s order of reinstatement, we lack jurisdiction to consider 

Hernandez Najar’s contention that his identity is in dispute because he did not 

present it to the agency. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 

2004) (petitioner must issues or claims in administrative proceedings below). 

Hernandez Najar concedes that we lack jurisdiction to consider his collateral attack 

on the underlying 1999 expedited removal order, see Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d 

at 1137, and we deny his request to reconsider our jurisdiction, see United States v. 

Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[O]ne three-judge panel of this court 

cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel.”). Thus, we dismiss the 

petition for review as to the DHS’s order of reinstatement.

As to the IJ’s reasonable fear determination, substantial evidence supports 
3 16-71065 

the IJ’s determination that Hernandez Najar failed to demonstrate a reasonable fear 

of persecution on account of a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 

1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by 

criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus 

to a protected ground.”). Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination 

that Hernandez Najar failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of future 

torture by or with the acquiescence of the government of Mexico. See Andrade–

Garcia, 828 F.3d at 836-37. Thus, Hernandez Najar’s challenges to the IJ’s 

negative reasonable fear determination fail. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.