[Cite as State v. Breneman , 2020-Ohio-4151.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. VIRGIL ROYALE LEE BRENEMAN Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-23

Trial Court Case No. 2019-CR-141 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 21st day of August, 2020.

. . . . . . . . . . . SAMANTHA B. WHETHERHOLT, Atty. Reg. No. 0092010, Champaign Coun ty Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee THOMAS M. KOLLIN, Atty. Reg. No. 0066964, 3725 Pentagon Bouleva rd, Suite 270, Beavercreek, Ohio 45431 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

FROELICH, J.-2-

{¶ 1} Virgil Royale Lee Breneman was found guilty by a jury of theft of drugs, aggravated possession of drugs, escape, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and receiving stolen property. After merging two offenses, the trial court i mposed an aggregate sentence of 42 months in prison, a $5,000 fine, and court costs . The court also terminated Breneman’s post-release control in another case and imposed 795 days in prison, to be served consecutively to the 42-month sentence in this case. {¶ 2} Breneman appeals from his conviction, claiming that the trial c ourt should have granted him a new trial due to prejudicial statements by t he prosecutor during opening statements, that he was denied due process when the cou rt allowed a sleeping juror to remain, and that his convictions were against the mani fest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, the tr ial court’s judgment will be a ffirmed I. Manifest Weight of the Evidence {¶ 3} In his third assignment of error, Breneman claims that his conv ictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶ 4} When reviewing an argument challenging the weight of the eviden ce, an appellate court may not substitute its view for that of the tri er of fact, but reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, cons iders the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in th e evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarria ge of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State v. Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).-3- {¶ 5} Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses at trial , we must defer to the factfinder’s decisions whether, and to what extent, to c redit the testimony of particular witnesses. State v. Lawson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997). The fact that the evidence is subj ect to different interpretations does not render the conviction against the mani fest weight of the evidence.

State v. Wilson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 14. A judgme nt of conviction should be reversed as being against the manifest wei ght of the evidence only in exceptional circumstances. Martin at 175. {¶ 6} At trial in August 2019, the State’s evidence at trial establis hed the following

facts. {¶ 7} On September 17, 2018, Breneman was released from prison and pl aced on post-release control. Parole Officer Chris Caughman reviewed t he conditions of Breneman’s post-release control with Breneman, and Breneman sig ned the document listing those conditions. One of the conditions was that Brene man must obtain the permission of his parole officer before changing his residence. Breneman reported that he would be residing at the home of his parents (his mother and step-father) in Champaign County. Breneman’s step-father testified that he and his wife had resided at

that location since 1981. {¶ 8} Parole Officer Patrick Powell was assigned as Breneman’s initia l supervising parole officer upon Breneman’s release from prison. Breneman w as required to meet with Powell the first and third Thursday of each month, plus ha ve random home visits. Powell testified that Breneman was compliant with his post-rele ase control for the

remainder of 2018. Powell had one contact with Breneman in Jan uary 2019, and they-4- had no contact in February 2019. Powell testified at trial tha t he last had contact with Breneman on January 22, 2019. Powell stated that he was concer ned about the lack of contact, and he repeatedly went by Breneman’s reported residenc e (Breneman’s parents’ home), but no one answered the door. Powell also left voicemai l messages for

Breneman that went unreturned. {¶ 9} On March 11, 2019, Parole Officer Brandon Deskins was assigned to be Breneman’s parole officer. Deskins attempted to locate Brenema n. On April 3 and 4, Deskins went to Breneman’s parents’ home and left business card s in the front door, asking Breneman to contact him. {¶ 10} Breneman’s mother had significant health issues, which required her to take multiple medications, including 7.5-325mg Hydrocodone-Acetamino phen tablets, known as Norco. The parties stipulated that Hydrocodone-Acetaminophe n is a Schedule II dangerous drug and is a controlled substance. On April 7, Bren eman’s step-father picked up her prescription for a 28-day supply of Norco, which consisted of 112 pills. Bremenan’s mother kept her Norco pills on a nightstand in the m aster bedroom of her

home. {¶ 11} On April 15 or 16, the bottle of Norco pills went missing. Bre neman’s stepfather testified that, on April 15, his wife called him into th e master bedroom and told him that her pills were missing. He stated that he looked for the Norco bottle, but did not find it. Breneman’s step-father indicated that Breneman and two of Breneman’s children (ages 8 and 12) had come to the house that day. Breneman had s tayed for approximately 15 minutes. Breneman’s step-father did not see B reneman take the pills. {¶ 12} Breneman’s mother believed that the pills went missing on April 16. She-5- recalled Breneman’s being in the master bedroom of her home and asking her if he could have five of her Norco pills. B reneman’s mother t old him that he could not, explaining “My medicine is counted out; only get so many for 28 days.” Sh e left Breneman in the master bathroom, brushing his teeth, while she went into the ki tchen. Bremenan’s mother testified that the Norco pills were in the master bedroo m at that time, and she

stated that Breneman left 30 seconds after she went into the ki tchen. When she returned to the master bedroom to take a Norco pill, she noticed that th e pills were gone, and she called to her husband to tell him the pills were missing. Bren eman’s mother also did not see Breneman take the pills, but she believed that he did so. {¶ 13} Breneman’s step-father did not know exactly how many pills rema ined in the bottle on April 15. He thought his wife took four to six p ills per day. Breneman’s mother also did not know how many pills she had taken, but she estimated that she had taken six to nine pills over the nine days since April 7. She testified that she did not take 50 or 60 pills. The parties stipulated that 30 or more Norco t ablets equals or exceeds

the bulk amount. {¶ 14} On April 18, Parole Officer Deskins received a call from Brenem an’s stepfather, who expressed concern that Breneman had stolen his wife ’s medication. Deskins asked Breneman’s step-father if they had filed a police report, and the step-father indicated that he had not. Deskins told him to contact the pol ice and file a report if they

believed a crime had been committed. {¶ 15} Deskins testified that Breneman’s step-father further stated th at Breneman had not been living at the residence for approximately two week s. At one point, Breneman’s step-father testified that Breneman had lived at the ir home prior to April 15,-6- but he had been asked to leave. In different portions of their testimony, Breneman’s parents testified that Breneman lived at their home on April 15

. {¶ 16} Parole Officer Deskins declared Breneman to be “whereabouts unk nown” and in violation of his post-release control. As a result of t hat designation, the Adult Parole Authority would wait 30 days and then issue an arrest wa rrant. Deskins testified that Breneman did not contact him personally or through others. {¶ 17} Breneman’s mother contacted the police about the missing pills on April 19, the day after her husband spoke with Deskins. At trial, Brenem an’s parents explained the delay, indicating that they had hoped the person who took t he pills would return them. Officer Tyler Reasor of the Urbana Police Department responded to Breneman’s parents’ home. They reported to Officer Reasor that their son, Breneman , had stolen more than 100 Norco pills. Officer Reasor w as informed that only Brenema n’s parents and

Breneman had been in the house. {¶ 18} Officer Reasor attempted to locate Breneman, but was unable to find him. Officer Reasor spoke with Parole Officer Deskins in an attempt to locate Breneman, but

Deskins said that he did not know where Breneman was either. {¶ 19} In May 2019, Sheila Sanders had a 1995 Toyota Corolla that was titled in her name. Sanders had gotten the vehicle from her sister in Ja nuary 2019, and had agreed to sell the vehicle to her (Sanders’s) daughter, Lora Sm ith, for $400. Sanders testified that Smith had fully paid for the vehicle, but the tr ansfer of title was contingent on Smith’s obtaining a valid drive r’s license; Smith had not yet o btained one. {¶ 20} Smith testified that she considered herself the owner of the Co rolla after the last payment was made in March 2019, and that she bought the ca r for both herself and-7- Breneman, whom she was then dating. Smith testified that she w as arrested on March 28, and Breneman had the keys to the Corolla then. She indicat ed that Breneman was supposed to return the keys to her mother. {¶ 21} On May 6, 2019, Sheila Sanders let Breneman borrow the Corolla. Sanders testified that Breneman told her that he wanted to go t o Springfield and would bring the car back that night, in a couple hours. Breneman nev er returned the car. Sanders tried to contact Breneman, but he had left his phone at her home and she was

unable to reach him. Sanders and Smith both testified that the y spoke about the car, and Smith told Sanders to report the car as stolen. On May 14, a friend of Sanders spotted the Corolla at a gas station, and Sanders contacted the police. {¶ 22} On May 14, 2019, Deputy Jayde Sheeley of the Champaign County S heriff’s Office responded to call from Sheila Sanders, reporting her veh icle missing. Detective Glenn Kemp later reviewed Sheeley’s report and confirmed with S anders that the vehicle had not been recovered. Kemp also checked with dispatch and le arned that the vehicle

had been entered into LEADS as stolen. The vehicle was later r ecovered in the possession of Suluki Evans. Evans testified that Breneman sold him the Corolla for $500 (Evans said that he still owed $200), and that Breneman led him to believe that he (Breneman) had title to the vehicle. {¶ 23} After the 30-day period with Breneman listed as “whereabouts un known” had passed, the Ohio State Highway Patrol issued a warrant for Breneman’s arrest. {¶ 24} On May 20, 2019, Officer Seth Dale, a police officer for Witten berg University, approached Breneman and another individual after se eing them attempt to open a door to a closed building. After checking with dispatch , Officer Dale learned that-8- Breneman had an arrest warrant for a parole violation. Brenema n attempted to flee but was quickly apprehended and taken to jail. {¶ 25} On May 21, Parole Officer Deskins learned of Breneman’s arrest and interviewed Breneman at the jail about the alleged theft of med ication, car theft, and absconding. Breneman denied taking medication from his mother. He told Deskins, “She doesn’t get nothing.” As for the car, Breneman stated tha t he had borrowed the car many times and it had never been a problem. Breneman told Desk ins, “I paid for that

car.” Breneman claimed to have returned the car within the nex t day or two, and he denied knowing where the car was located. When asked about abs conding, Breneman told Deskins that he had been living in Springfield on and off at different people’s residences, and mentioned two women. Breneman said that his pa rents’ home was still his residence, but he was not staying there. Breneman explaine d that he did not report as required, because “I knew you guys were going to arrest me. I think Patrick Powell was going to arrest me.” {¶ 26} After deliberations, the jury found Breneman guilty of the five charged offenses: theft of drugs, aggravated possession of drugs, escap e, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and receiving stolen property. With respect to the th eft of drugs charge (Count 1), the jury further found that the offense involved a dangerou s drug and that Breneman previously was convicted of a felony drug abuse offense. As to the aggravated possession of drugs charge (Count 2), the jury further found th at the amount of drug involved was equal to or in excess of the bulk amount. {¶ 27} Breneman did not present any witnesses. Rather, through crossexamination, he raised whether his mother, who managed her use of Norco, was often-9- confused and may have misplaced the prescription bottle. Defen se counsel also raised that Breneman’s two children could have been present when the N orco pills went missing. Counsel emphasized that Breneman’s mother was unsure of how man y pills she had taken from the bottle and how many were left. {¶ 28} As for the theft of the Corolla, the testimony of Smith and San ders raised questions about the ownership of the car. Smith had testified that, upon the payment of $400 to her mother, she owned the car. Smith had testified tha t she bought the car for her and Breneman’s use, and in some testimony, she referred at trial to the car as “our car.” In closing argument, defense counsel referred to Evans a s a “car thief” and argued that his testimony was not credible. {¶ 29} In cross-examining the parole officers, defense counsel emphasi zed that Parole Officer Powell was not Breneman’s parole officer when Br eneman allegedly absconded (April 18 to May 21). Defense counsel asked Deskins how “violator at large” worked, whether Deskins had discretion to pursue escape charges , and whether he knew that Smith was contacting Breneman from jail. {¶ 30} On appeal, Breneman focuses on his drug possession conviction. He argues that his mother was very ill both in April 2019 and when trial was held, and that she took several medications that “affected her physical and me ntal well-being.” Breneman noted his mother’s testimony on cross-examination that she believed that she had worked (without pay) for Facebook as a greeter, helping peo ple to sign on and thanking them for joining. Emphasizing that no one saw him tak e his mother’s medication, Breneman argued that his conviction for theft of dr ugs and aggravated possession of drugs was against the manifest weight of the evid ence.-10- {¶ 31} In reaching its verdict, the jury was free to believe all, part , or none of the testimony of each witness and to draw reasonable inferences fro m the evidence presented. State v. Baker , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25828, 2014-Ohio-3163, ¶ 28. It was the province of the jury, as the trier of fact, to weigh th e evidence and determine whether the State had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that B reneman committed each of the charged offenses. Upon review of the testimony of both of Breneman’s parents, the jury could have reasonably concluded that, on or a bout April 15, Breneman’s mother had her prescription Norco pills on her nightstand, that Breneman stole the pills from the master bedroom, that the amount remaining in the bottl e equaled or exceeded the bulk amount, and that the Norco pills were a Schedule II da ngerous drug and a

controlled substance. The fact that no one observed Breneman t ake his mother’s Norco medication did not require a different conclusion. Breneman st ipulated that he had a prior felony drug abuse offense conviction. The jury’s guilty verdicts as to theft of drugs and aggravated possession of drugs were not against the manifes t weight of the

evidence. {¶ 32} Breneman’s third assignment of error is overruled. II. Motion for New Trial/ Opening Statements {¶ 33} In his first assignment of error, Breneman claims that the tria l court erred in failing to grant him a new trial due to the prosecutor’s inform ing the jury of Breneman’s-11- three prior felony drug abuse offense convictions during openin g statements. 1 {¶ 34} On August 8, 2019, prior to trial, the parties filed three writ ten stipulations signed by the prosecutor and defense counsel. The first concer ned the title for the 1995 Toyota Corolla at issue, the second concerned Breneman’s crimin al history, and the third concerned the prescription medication prescribed for Breneman’s mother. In the criminal history stipulation, the parties agreed and stipulated that Breneman was previously convicted of or plead guilty to the following fe lony drug

abuse offenses:

1. Possession of Heroin in violation of section 2925.11 of the Ohio Revised Code. This conviction took place on July 21, 2014 in Champaign County, Ohio Common Pleas Court, in case number 2014 CR 121.

2. Possession of Cocaine in violation of section 2925.11 of the Ohio Revised Code. This conviction took place on July 21, 2011 in Champaign County, Ohio Common Pleas Court, in case number 2010 CR 103. 3. Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of section 2925.03 of th e Ohio Revised Code. This [c]onviction took place on April 30, 2002 in Champa ign County, Ohio Common Pleas Court, in case number 2002 CR 004. {¶ 35} Trial began on August 12. That morning, before jury selection, the

1 Breneman’s sentencing occurred the day after the trial ended, and the trial court filed its written judgment entry of conviction on the same day. Bren eman’s counsel filed a written motion for a new trial after the trial court filed its judgment entry of conviction. The court ruled on that motion after Breneman filed his notice of a ppeal of his conviction. The court’s decision denying the motion for a new trial is not befo re us. However, Breneman repeatedly claimed at trial and sentencing that he was denied a fair trial due to the prosecutor’s opening statement. We will construe his assignmen t of error as claiming that the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct violated his due proce ss rights and that the court should have ordered a new trial.-12- prosecutor and defense counsel gave opening statements to the p rospective jurors. During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor told the j ury that Breneman was released from prison on September 17, 2018, and that he committ ed the offense of escape by failing to report to his parole officer and moving wi thout notifying his parole officer. The prosecutor further indicated that the parole offi cers nevertheless “were learning that he [Breneman] was getting into some trouble.” (T r. at 21.) The prosecutor

continued: They heard of how the Defendant, who was previously convicted o f felony drug abuse offenses of trafficking in cocaine in 2002, p ossession of cocaine in 2010, and possession of heroin in 2014 – They learne d how this Defendant had stolen his mother’s prescription pain medication. * * * The parole officers also learned about how this Defendant took possession of a 1995 Toyota Corolla that didn’t belong to him, and he sold the car without the permission of the owner. * * * (Tr. at 21-22.) {¶ 36} After the prosecutor completed his opening statement, the court , sua sponte, gave the jury the following instruction: Ladies and gentleman, from the prosecutor’s opening statement, we’ve learned that evidence may be received that the Defendant has been previously convicted of certain criminal offenses. The Court is instructing you that that evidence may be received because a prior conviction is an element of the offense of thef t of drugs in

Count One.-13- That evidence was not received and you may not consider it to p rove the character of the Defendant in order to show that he acted i n conformity

or in accordance with that character. (Tr. at 23-24.) {¶ 37} At this juncture, defense counsel asked for a sidebar discussio n. Counsel stated that he wanted to “strenuously object to the opening sta tement in that it included offenses of prior history that were not part of the post-releas e control,” that is, Breneman was not on post-release control for those offenses. Defense co unsel asked for a mistrial. {¶ 38} The trial court then asked defense counsel if he agreed that th e three referenced drug charges were predicate offenses for the theft o f drug allegation. Defense counsel responded that he did. The court indicated tha t “[t]hat was the purpose for the Court’s instruction to the jury.” The court denied the motion for a mistrial. It reasoned that, although the court “had a concern with the way t he prosecution had positioned those offenses,” the opening statement was not evide nce and the concern was cured through the jury instruction. {¶ 39} After the jury was selected, but prior to the presentation of t estimony, the trial court, sua sponte, admirably raised with the parties that it had concerns about the criminal history stipulation. The court referred the parties t o two cases: State v. Totarella , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2002-L-147, 2004-Ohio-1175, and State v. Overton , 2017-Ohio-8389, 99 N.E.3d 1007 (5th Dist.). Discussing Totarella , the court expressed concern that it would be prejudicial for the jury to learn that Breneman had th ree convictions and the details of those convictions if Breneman were acknowledging, by stipulation, that he had a prior drug abuse conviction. The trial court told counsel th at Overton addressed undue-14- prejudice caused by evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions

. {¶ 40} After having an opportunity to read the two cases, the prosecut or argued that they were distinguishable, because in both cases defense c ounsel had sought to exclude evidence of the prior convictions and the trial court h ad denied those requests. The prosecutor argued that, in contrast, the trial court here w as raising the issue sua sponte. Specifically, the prosecutor noted that the trial cour t had denied a motion in

limine in Totarella ; the appellate court found that to be error, but overruled the defendant’s assignment of error because the defendant had failed to preserv e the error at trial. In

Overton , the trial court overruled an oral motion to stipulate to a pr ior conviction, and the appellate court determined that the court should have allowed t he stipulation. The prosecutor stated that the stipulation at issue stated that Bre neman was agreeing that he previously was convicted of a felony drug abuse offense. {¶ 41} Defense counsel indicated that he had been unaware of the Totarella case, and that the defense now wished only to stipulate that Breneman was previously convicted of or pled guilty to a felony drug abuse offense. Th e prosecutor responded that, given the case law and defense counsel’s request, the Sta te would be required to agree to the request. The court indicated that the parties wou ld need to file an amended stipulation. (The new stipulation regarding Breneman’s crimina l history was filed on August 12, 2019.) {¶ 42} The court then addressed the fact that the jury had been told o f Breneman’s prior offenses during opening statements. The court concluded that the error in informing the jury of the three convictions was harmless. Bren eman told the court that he did not believe he could get a fair trial due to the prosecu tor’s opening statement. The-15- prosecutor responded that he did not intentionally engage in an y improper conduct and only told the jury of the three offenses mentioned in the stipu lation; he did not mention the rest of Breneman’s “very extensive” criminal history or tha t Breneman was on postrelease control for a burglary offense. {¶ 43} None of the State’s witnesses discussed Breneman’s criminal his tory, although there was testimony that Breneman was released from pr ison and placed on post-release control. After the State’s final witness, the cou rt read the stipulations regarding Breneman’s criminal history and the motor vehicle tit le. The stipulation regarding Breneman’s criminal history read, in its entirety: “T he State of Ohio and the Defendant do hereby agree to stipulate that the Defendant, Virg il Royale Lee Breneman, was previously convicted of or pled guilty to a felony drug abu se offense.” {¶ 44} During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that, as part of the theft of drug offense, the State had to prove that Breneman had a prior conviction of a felony drug abuse offense. The prosecutor told that jury that the parties had stipulated to that. The prosecutor did not mention Breneman’s specific criminal history

. {¶ 45} The court subsequently provided instructions to the jury. It t old the jury that opening statements and closing statements were not evidence and were designed to assist the jury in evaluating the evidence. In a section entit led “Use of Prior Conviction – Enhancing the Degree of Offense,” the court stated:

Evidence was received that the Defendant has been convicted of a felony drug abuse offense. That evidence was received because a prior conviction is an element of the offense charged. It was not re ceived, and you may not consider it, to prove the character of the Defendan t in order to-16- show that he acted in conformity with the character. {¶ 46} On appeal, Breneman claims that the trial court should have ord ered a new trial due to the prosecutor’s prejudicial opening statement. H e claims that the prosecutor’s reference to his three prior convictions precluded him from receiving a fair trial. The State counters that Breneman’s argument is barred b y the invited error doctrine, and that Breneman did not timely object to the prosec utor’s mentioning of the three prior felony drug abuse offense convictions. We conclude that Breneman invited the prosecutor’s reference to the three prior drug offenses in his opening statement. Moreover, with the unique record before us, we further conclude that Breneman was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s isolated reference to Breneman's three prior drug convictions, and no new trial was warranted. {¶ 47} The indictment for Count 1, alleging theft of drugs as a felony of the third degree, include allegations that Breneman was previously convic ted of or pleaded guilty to a felony drug abuse offense, and it listed the 2014 convicti on for possession of heroin, the 2011 conviction for possession of cocaine, and the 2002 con viction for trafficking in cocaine. The parties’ pretrial stipulation agreed that Brenema n had been convicted of those three offenses. The prosecutor’s opening statement confo rmed to the parties’ stipulation; it did not add any details about those offenses or mention any other prior

offenses. {¶ 48} Under the doctrine of invited error, “[a] party will not be per mitted to take advantage of an error [that] he himself invited or induced.” ( Citations omitted.) State v.

Fair , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24388, 2011-Ohio-4454, ¶ 69. Defense counsel agreed to a stipulation, prior to trial, that Breneman had been convic ted of the three drug offenses-17- referenced in Count I of the indictment. The prosecutor cannot be faulted for relying on that stipulation in his opening statement, and Breneman cannot now complain about the prosecutor’s informing the jury of those convictions in the Sta te’s opening statement. {¶ 49} Moreover, under the facts of this case, any prejudice that resu lted from the prosecutor’s single reference to Breneman’s three specific prio r convictions was diminished by court’s jury instructions and the nature of the c harges at trial. First, the jury was told, immediately after the prosecutor’s opening state ment, that evidence of Breneman’s prior convictions was permitted because a prior conv iction was an element of the offense of theft of drugs in Count One, but “[t]hat evid ence was not received and you may not consider it to prove the character of the Defendant in order to show that he acted in conformity or in accordance with that character.” The court repeated that

instruction at the conclusion of the trial. The court also twi ce instructed the jury that opening statements were not evidence. We presume that the jury followed the trial

court’s instructions. State v. Keeton , 2d Dist. Darke No. 2019-CA-8, 2020-Ohio-950, ¶ 24, citing State v. Jones , 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 414, 739 N.E.2d 300 (2000) (“We presume th at juries follow the instructions provided to them.”). {¶ 50} Second, as part of the trial, the jury properly heard that Bren eman had a prior felony drug abuse offense conviction and that he had prev iously served a prison sentence, for which he was on post-release control. The partie s stipulated that Breneman had a prior felony drug abuse offense, and that stipul ation was read to the jury. Although the prosecutor’s opening statement provided the specif ic offense, date and case number for three prior felony drug abuse offense convictions, t he prosecutor did not inform the jury of the factual circumstances underlying those o ffenses or discuss any-18- other aspect of Breneman’s criminal history. {¶ 51} Upon review of the trial transcript, we cannot conclude that th e prosecutor’s opening statement prejudicially affected Breneman’s substantial rights, resulting in an unfair trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its d iscretion in failing to grant

Breneman a new trial. {¶ 52} Breneman’s first assignment of error is overruled. III. Due Process / Sleeping Juror {¶ 53} In his second assignment of error, Breneman claims that he was denied his right to due process when the trial court allowed a sleeping ju ror to remain on the jury panel. {¶ 54} On the second day of trial, before resuming after a 10:00 a.m. recess, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Parole Officer Deskins , the State’s representative, had noticed that Juror No. 10 “appeared to be having difficulty keeping his eyes open.” The prosecutor stated that he (the prosecutor) “looked over and observed Juror 10 and his eyes were closed. It was only for a few moments, and he lo oked up and his eyes opened and his head came up. But his eyes were closed for a fe w moments, and I felt that I needed to bring it to the Court’s attention.” (Tr. at 3 88.) {¶ 55} The court responded that it “had taken a look at Juror No. 10 a s well, and I never thought he was ‘sleeping.’ Some jurors will tend to list en to evidence without taking notes as if they’re listening to music. But I will seek to keep a closer eye as well.” ( Id . at 388-389.) The court asked the prosecutor if he wanted the court to take any action. The prosecutor responded, “No. I just wanted to bring it to your attention.” ( Id

. at 389.) Defense counsel stated that he had “no comment.” ( Id .)-19- {¶ 56} Later that day, the court provided the jury an opportunity to s tretch and asked the bailiff to turn on the air conditioning. The court t old the prosecutor and defense counsel at sidebar that “[i]t would appear that a couple the ju rors were needing an opportunity to stretch.” (Tr. at 456.) The court did not iden tify any particular juror or jurors. {¶ 57} “An objection to a sleeping juror must be made at trial because the trial court has significant discretion in how it resolves an incident with a sleeping juror.” See State

v. Jones , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013-CA-63, 2014-Ohio-1540, ¶ 11. “[I]f a sleeping juror has not missed ‘large or critical portions’ of the proceedings, no prejudice results from that juror’s remaining on the jury.” State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 112, citing State v. Sanders , 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 253, 750 N.E.2d 90 (2001). {¶ 58} Here, the record does not substantiate that Breneman’s due proc ess rights were violated. First, we note that defense counsel did not ask the trial court to take any particular action with respect to the alleged sleeping juror, n or did defense counsel object to the juror’s remaining on the panel. Moreover, after the pro secutor brought the juror to the court’s attention, the court commented that it did not beli eve that the juror had been asleep. The prosecutor’s statement also indicated that the jur or’s eyes had been closed “only for a few moments.” The record thus does not substantiat e that the juror was, in fact, sleeping or that the juror missed “large or critical port ions” of the trial. {¶ 59} Breneman’s second assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Conclusion {¶ 60} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.-20-

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, P.J. and HALL, J., concur.

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Samantha B. Whetherholt Thomas M. Kollin Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio