### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 14, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RO NA LD YA TES

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty Nos. 0108883, 0108884 Chris Craft, Judge

No. W2003-02251-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Dece m ber 8, 2004

Th e de fe nd a nt, Ron a ld Y a te s, wa s c on vic te d of fi rs t de g re e pr e me dit a te d mur de r anda tte mpt e d f ir st de g re e mur de r. Th e tr ial co urt impo se d c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s o f l if e a ndtw e nty -thr e e y e ars , re sp e c tiv e ly . In th is a

pp e a l, the de fe nd a nt as se rt s (1) tha t the e vid e nc e is ins uf

fi c ie nt to s up po rt

his convictions; (2) that the tria l court er red by ref using to g rant a

mistrial based upon the state' s opening statement; (3) tha t the trial court err ed in the admission of certain of the evidenc e; (4) that the trial
court e rre d by

permitting the introduction of a postmortem photogr aph of the murder vic tim; (5) that the trial court erre d by ordering his trial counsel to alter the form a nd manner of his questions; (6) that the t ri al co u rt er red by deny ing his re quest for a mistrial based upon the state' s violation of a dis c ov e ry or de r; (7 ) that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y de nying his mot ion fo r j ud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l be c a us e the state failed t o prove venue; (8) that the t rial court err ed by ref using to g rant a mistrial based upon ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel; and ( 9 ) t h at t he sente nce is e x cessive. T he 23 y ear sentenc e for attempted first de g ree murder is modified to 20 y ear s; othe rwise, the judgme nts of the trial court a re aff irmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed as Modif ied

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Wil liam D. Massey

and L orna S. McClusky
, Memphis, Tenne ssee ( at trial), a nd Ger ald D. Skahan, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e (o n a pp e a l) , f or the app e lla nt, Ron a ld Y a te s.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ha m, A ssi sta nt A tt orne y

Ge ne ra l; and Patience MissyBr anham a nd Eric Chri s t en s en, Assis tant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

On Janu ary

10 , 2 00 1, the de fe nd a nt e nte re d a re sid e nc e loc a te d at 50 86 Bowi e S tr eet in Memphis and shot the vi ctims, Michae l Monroe, Sr., and Erik Monroe. Michae l Monroe, Sr., died

as a r esult of a g unshot wound to the head. H is fifteen- y ear -old nephe w, Erik Monroe , was shot once in the left arm and once in the rig ht hand.

J olene Monroe , her br other, Micha el Monroe, Sr., her sons, Erik Monroe a nd twenty -twoy e ar- oldMic ha e l Mo nr oe , Jr. , and h e r n e ph e w, Re g ina ld Wi lli a ms, liv e d at 50 86 B ow ie Str e e t. Shortlyafte r lea ving f

or work at 6:00 a.m. on the day of the off

enses, Ms. Monroe rec eived a
te le ph on e c a ll f

ro m on e of

he r s on s, wh o s a id s he " ne e de d to g e t ho me qu ic k. " Ac c or din g to M s. Monroe, he r brother

was da ting Linda Matthews at the time of his death.

Erik Monroe, w ho was in be d with a cold on the day of the shooting s, testified that he ope ned his bedroom door whe n he hea rd someone e nter the r esidenc e. Erik rec al led that he sa w the de fe nd a nt s ta nd ing in the ha llw a y

. Whe n the de fe nd a nt a sk e d fo r " Mik e ," Erik re sp on de d, " He ' s in the bathroom." Erik s tated that afte r he returne d to bed, he hear d his uncle sa y , "Linda' s not here," followed quickly

by "knoc king up ag ainst the wall," which sounded "like a fig ht." Erik rec alled that when he opened his be droom door, he sa w the two men f ighting in a corner. As Erik walke d toward them, the defe ndant pulled a g un from his pocke t and shot Michael Monroe , Sr., twice. Erik testified that when he ran into his bed ro o m , the def endant f ollowed him, shooting him first in the left shoulder and the n in his right hand a s he blocke d a shot aimed a t his head.

Erik testified that af

ter the de fenda nt ran a way , he we nt into the kitchen, g ot a drink of water, and then we nt into his mother' s room to call her cell phone. When he did not ge t an answe r, he called his g randmother and, after washing his hand, picked up the t elephone to call the police. A s he did so , he he ard his br oth e r, Mic ha e l Monr oe , J r. , tal kin g to the po lic e on a no the r p ho ne . A t tria l, Erik a dmi tte d that wh ile he ha d fa ile d to ide nti fy the de fe nd a nt on thr e e se pa rate oc c a sio ns prior

to trial, he c ould positively identify the defe ndant as his assailant. He rec alled telling the police that the pe rp e tr a tor

wa s ta ll, he a vy se t, " br ow n skin ne d, " a ndwe ari ng a da rk skull c ap a nda

stripe d s hirt.

Michae l Monroe, Jr., testified that on the morning of the off enses, he had dre ssed for w ork and wa s in the den whe n he hea rd his uncle call his na me. He went into the hallway
, wher e he sa w his uncle and the defe ndant fig hting. He rec alled that his unc le direc ted him to call the police a nd, as he d i d s o , h e hear d two g unshots and then fled f rom the re sidence . Michae l identified the defe n d a n t f

r o m a p h o to g r ap h ic li n e u p ap p r o xim a te ly tw o w e e k s a f

te r th e o f f e n s e s b u t c o n c eded du ri ng c ro ss- e xami na tio n th a t he ha d to ld p oli c e that he did no t se e the pe rp e tr a tor ' s f a c e a ndc ou ld

on ly de sc ri be him

a s ma le a ndwe ari ng da

rk c lothin g a nda

hat.

Reg inald Wil liams, Michael Monroe , Sr.' s stepson, t estified that on the morning of the shootings, he w a s g e tt in g r e a d y f o r s c h o o l w h e n h e h e a

r d s o me o n e e n te r

th e r e s id e n c e

. Wh e n he hear d "bumping " at the end of t he hall, he went to investigate. W illiams recalled that his stepfather, who was " tussling" with the intruder, dire cted Micha el Monroe, Jr. to call the police. He he ard two-3-

g unshots a s they took a portable telephone outside. Upon hear ing the shots, the two y oung er me n ran into the ba cky ard a nd jumped over the fenc e. Wil liams stated that he wa s unable to identify the intruder beca u s e he never saw his fa ce. D uring cross-e x amination, howeve r, he c oncede d that he ini tia lly de sc ri be d th e a ssa ila nt a s li g ht s kin ne d, le ss tha n s ix fe e t ta ll, thi n, a nd in his la te tw e nti e s.

Charles Broome, who worke d with Michae l Monroe, Sr., and Linda Matthews at National Gu ardPr od uc ts, te sti fi e d that he ha d se e n the de fe nd a nt a t the ir wo rk pla c e fo ur or fi ve tim e s w ith in

a we ek bef

ore the offe nses. Br oome re called that on one occ asion, the def endant ha d warned Michae l Monroe, Sr., that " L inda was his g irlfriend a nd [he] neede d to leave he r alone ."

L ind a Ma tth e ws , w ho wa s p re g na nt w ith the de fe nd a nt' s chi ld at the tim e of the sh oo tin g s, te sti fi e d th a t sh e a ndthe de fe nd a nt d a te d f or se ve ra l mo nth s b ut that s he end e d th e re la tio ns hip approximately

four months befor e the shooting s. She rec alled that the de fenda nt was upset about
t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f

t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d o f

t e n c a l l e d h e r

o r c a m e b y h e r

h o u s e u n e x p e c t e d l y. Acc ording t o Ms. Matthews, she be g an dating Michae l Monroe, Sr., shortly afte r ending her

re la t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e d e f

e n d a n t

. S h e c o n f

i r m e d t h a t t h e d e f

e n d a n t h a d a s k e d h e r t o c o m e ba c k to him so that they

could ra ise their child tog ether

.

Kathy B oo ke r, wh o w a s d a tin g the de fe nd a nt, te sti fi e d th a t on the mornin g of the sh oo tin g s, the de fe nd a nt arrive d a t he r ho us e so me tim e be tw e e n 6:3 0 a nd 7:0 0 a .m. a ndinf orme d h e r tha t hi s truck ha d broken dow n. She stated t hat t he defenda nt appea red to be "upset" or "excited" and asked her to " hold" him. L ater that morning
, the defendant tol d her that he had be en ac cused of shooting two people a nd sug g ested that she te ll the police that he ha d been w i th her a ll night. Ms. Booke r explained that the defe ndant had s t o p p ed b yher house on the nig ht before , but had not stay ed the nig ht. Ac c or din g to Ms. B oo ke r, sh e dr ov e the de fe nd a nt to his ho us e in h e r c ar and , late r that sa me evening , her son f

ound a bullet in the ca

r. Ms. Booke r testified that she did not own a g un and had

never had bullets in her c ar. She rec alled placing the bullet in an envelope and informing the police of its e xiste nc e bu t e xpla ine d th a t th e y ne ve r c a me to e xami ne it.

Ms. Booke r testified that it was "some weeks" befor e the defe ndant s urre ndere d to the police and that they

discussed the a ccusa t i o n s ev er y day during that time period. During that time, the defe ndant did not sta y at his r esidenc e and communicated with he r by telephoning her w orkplac e. Acc ording to Ms. Booke r, t he def endant c laimed that he ha d never been to 5086 B owie and that he didno t kn ow a nythi ng abo ut the sh oo tin g s. She a c kn ow le dg e d that sh e ha d no t g ive n the bu lle t to the pr os e c uto r u nti l th e week before tr ia l. M s. B oo ke r t e sti fi e d th a t sh e fe are d th e de fe nd a nt, explaining that on the night befor e the shootings, he showed he r a g un and said, " I t's a g ood thing
y our boy friend w asn' t here . I ' d have shot him and thr[own] him over the railing ."

Dr. O' Brian Cleary

Smit h, who performed the autopsy on Michae l Monroe, Sr., testified that the cause of his d ea t h was a n intra ora l gunshot wound. H e stated that the bullet, a .380 ca liber ho llo w p oin t, tr a ve le d thr ou g h the vic tim ' s mouth, fr a c turing the pa lle t, an d the n the ba se of the sk ull wher e it joined the spinal cord. B one fr ag ments from the skull fra cture damag ed the br ain stem and the ce rebe llum. He stated that the bullet trave led from f ront to back a nd slightly

left to rig ht, coming-4-

to rest in the bac k of the he ad. It was Dr. Smith's opinion that the g unshot w ound would have c aused instantaneous inca

pacitation and that the bullet' s tr a je c to r y was c onsistent with the victim's ly ing f ace up wh e n h e wa s sh ot.

During cross-e x amination, Dr. Smith ac kn o w le d g e d th at t h eb u ll e t t r a je ctory would also have been c onsistent with the defenda nt and the victim standing fac e to fa ce. H e stated that the abse nce of po wd e r b ur ns ind ic a te d th a t the g un wa s fir e d fr om a dis ta nc e g re a te r tha n two fe e t. D r. Smith
t e s t i f i e d t h a tt h e v i c t i ms u f

f e r e d o n l y o n e g u n s h o tw o u n d a n d t h a tt h e b u l l e t d i d n o t e x i tt h e b o d y.

David Hof

fman, the defe ndant' s employ er, testified that appr ox imately one month afte r the shootings, the police arrived at h i s p l ac e o f employ ment to take custody of the de fenda nt. He

rec alled that the d efendant wa s doing pa perw ork at the time a nd appea red to be "shoc ked" and "stunne d" w hen he sa w the police. Hoffma n reme mbere d that the def endant quietly

submitt ed to the

arr e st.

I. I nitially , the def

endant c halleng es the suff iciency of the e vidence
, arg uing that the state fa iled
to e sta bli sh the e le me nt of pr e me dit a tio n. On app e a l, of c ou rs e , the state is e nti tle d to the str on g e st le g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll r e a so na ble inf e re nc e s whi c h mig ht be dr a wn the re fr om. Sta te

v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The cre dibilit y of the witnesse s, the weig ht to be
g iven their testimony , and the r econc iliation of c onflicts in the proof are matters entr usted to the jury as the trier

of fa ct. B yrg e v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292 , 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) . When the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence is challeng ed, the r eleva nt question is whether, a fter r eviewing the eviden c e in th e li g h t mo s t f a v o r ab le to th e s tate , a n y r a ti o n a l trie r o f f a c t c o u ld h a v e found the essential ele ments of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13 (e); State v. Willi a ms, 65 7 S.W.2 d 4 05 , 4 10 (T e nn . 1 98 3) . Q ue sti on s c on c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the weig ht and value of the evidence, a s well as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of

fac t. L iakas v. State, 199 Te nn. 298, 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (1956). B eca use a ve rdict of g u il t r e mo v e s th e p r e s u mp ti o n o f in n o c e n c e a n d r a is e s a

p r e s u mp ti o n o f

g u il t, th e c onvicted

c ri min a l de fe nd a nt b e ars the bu rd e n o f s ho wi ng that th e e vid e nc e wa s leg a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in
a g uiltyverdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992).

First deg ree m u rd er , in this case, is " [a] preme ditated and intentional killing of another ." Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 02 (a )( 1) (S up p. 20 00 ). At te mpt is d e fi ne d a s f

oll ow s: (a) A per son commits crimin al attempt who, ac ting with the kind of culpability

otherwise r equire d for the of fense : (1) Intentionally

eng ag es in ac tion or cause s a result that would constitute an offe nse if the c ircumstance s surrounding t h e co nduct wer e as the person be lieves them to be; (2) Ac ts with int ent to cause a re sult that i s an ele ment of the off ense, a nd b e l i e v es t h e c o n d u ct wi l l ca u s e t h e r es u l twi t h o u tfu rt h erco n d u ct o n t h e p er s o n 's part; or-5- (3 ) A c ts w ith int e nt t o c omp le te a c ou rs e of a c tio n o r c a us e a re su lt that w ou ld constitute the offe nse, under the circ umstances surr ounding the conduct a s the person believes the m to be, and the c onduct c o n s t itutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offe nse. (b) Conduct doe s not constitute a substant i al s t ep under subdivision (a)(3) unless the person' s entire c ourse of action is corr oborative of the intent to commit the offe nse.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 12-101(a ), (b)

.

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 02 pr ov ide s th a t:

[P]re me dit a tio n i s an act do ne a ft e r thee xer c ise of re fl e c tio n a ndjud g me nt. "Pre meditation" mea ns that the intent to kill mus t have be en formed prior to the a ct itself. I t is not necessary

that the purpose to kill pre- exis t in the m ind of t he ac cused for a ny definite pe riod of time. The me ntal s t at e o f t h e ac cused at the time the

acc used alleg edly

decide d to kill m ust be ca ref ully considere d in order to de termine whether the ac cu s ed wa s sufficiently fre e fr om excitement and passion as to be
capa ble of pre meditation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-202(d) (1997). Whether the evidenc e is sufficie nt depends e n t irely on whether the state wa s able to establish bey ond a re asonable doubt the element of preme ditation. See State v. Sims , 45 S.W .3d 1, 7 (Tenn. 2001) ; State v. Hall, 8 S.W .3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999)

. Our supre me court has held that the presence of premeditation is a question for the jury and
may be infe rre d from the manne r and c ircumstance s of the killing. See State v. Suttl es, 30 S.W.3d 25 2, 26 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; State v. Pik e , 978 S.W. 2d90 4, 91 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) . M or e ov e r, it i s w e llestablished that preme ditation may be proved by circ umstantial evidence . See, e.g ., State v. Br own, 836 S.W .2d 530, 541 (Tenn. 1992)

. Our high court has identified a number of circ umstances f rom which the jury

may infer pr emeditation: (1) the use of a deadly wea pon upon an unarmed victim; (2) the particular c ruelty

of the killing; (3) the defe ndant' s threats or de clar ations of intent to kill; (4) the defe ndant' s procur ement of a wea pon; (5) any

prepa rations t o conce al t he crime undertaken bef ore t h e c ri m e i s co m m i t t ed ; (6 ) d es tru ct i o n o r s ec re t i o n o f e v i d en ce o f t h e k i l l i n g; an d (7 ) ad ef en d an t 's calmness immediately

afte r the killing. See Pike, 978 S.W .2d at 914-15; State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997) . This list , howeve r, is not exhausti ve and se rv es only to demonstrate that
preme ditation may be established by any evidenc e fr om which the jury may infer that the killing was done " afte r the e x erc ise of re flec tion and judgme nt." Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 202(d); see Pike, 978 S.W .2d at 914-15; B land, 958 S.W.2d at 660.

One tre atise provides that premeditation may be inferre d from eve nts that occur be fore and
at t h e t i m e o f t h e k i l l i n g:-6-

Three cate g ories of e vidence are impo rtant for [t he] purpose [of inferring
preme ditation] : (1) fa cts about how a nd what the de fe n d an t did prior to the ac tual kil lin g whic h s ho w h e wa s e ng a g e d in a c tiv ity dir e c te d to wa

rdthe kil lin g , th a t is
, pla nn ing a c tiv ity ; (2 ) fa c ts abo ut the de fe nd a nt' s prior re la tio ns hip a ndc on du c t w ith the victim from which motive may be inferre d; and (3) fac ts about the natur e of the killing from whic h it may

be infe rre d that the manner of killing was so particular a nd exacting that the defe ndant must have int en t i o n all y killed acc ording to a prec onceive d desig n.
2 Way ne R. L aF ave, Substantive Criminal L aw § 14.7( a) ( 2d ed. 2003) ( emphasis in orig inal).

Her e, the evidenc e adduced at trial established that the de fenda nt was upset about Micha el Monroe, Sr.' s relationship with his ex -g irlfriend, Linda Matthews, a nd had warned him to st ay awa y from her . On the nig ht before the shootings, the defe ndant display ed a g un to Ms. Booker , informing her t h at he would have killed her boy friend. T he next morning, the a rmed de fenda nt entere d the vic tim s' re sid e nc e su rr e pti tio us ly
, str ug g le d wi th Mic ha e l Mo nr oe , Sr
., a nd the n sh ot him. Erik Monroe testified that the defe ndant fired his gun twic e during the alter cation, on the se cond occ asion shooting Micha el Monroe, Sr. as he lay on the floor. Dr. Smit h testified that Michae l Monroe, Sr. suffe red a single g unshot wound to the inside of his mouth. I t wa s Dr. Smith's opinion that the trajec tory of the bull et was consistent with Michae l Monroe, Sr.'s being shot whil e ly ing dow n and that the bullet was fir ed fr om a distance g reater than two f eet. Af ter shooti ng Michae l Monroe, Sr., the def endant f ollowed Erik into his room and shot him twice. The first bullet struc k Erik in the left arm and the se c o n d w a s a d e f e n s iv e w o u n d to h is r ig h t h a n d

. A f te r th e s h o o ti n g s , th e d e f

e ndant asked Ms. B ooker to lie to the po l i ce

. He d i d n ot return to his reside nce f or almost three wee ks be fo re he wa s a

rr e ste d. Th e jury

a c c re dit e d th e the ory

of the state. I n o ur

vie w, the e vid e nc e is sufficie nt to support the defe ndant' s convictions for the first deg ree preme ditated murder of Michae l Monroe, Sr. a nd the attempted f irst deg ree murder of

Erik Monroe.

II The defe ndant next contends that the trial court err ed by deny ing his motion fo r a m i strial ba se d u po n th e op e nin g state me nt of the pr os e c uti on

. Th e state su bmi ts that th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d th e re qu e st. “ Th e e ntry of a mis tr ia l is app ro pria te wh e n th e tr ia l c a nn ot c on tin ue fo r s ome

rea son, or if the trial does continue, a miscarriag e of justice will occur .” State v. McPher son, 882 S.W .2d 365, 370 (Ten n

. C ri m

. App. 1994). The decision to g rant a mistrial is wit hin the sound dis c re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt , a ndthi s c ou rt wi ll n ot di st urb th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n u nle ss a clea r abuse of discre tion appear s on the rec ord. I d.

He re , th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e state ' s a sse rt ion du ri ng its op e nin g state me nt tha t Ms

. Ma tth e ws e nd e d the ir re la tio ns hip be c a us e he ha d be c ome abu siv e qu a lif ie d as an in adm iss ibl e ref ere nce to a

prior bad a ct. I nitially
, opening statements are not e vidence

. As our supre me court has obser ved, opening statements " are intended merely to inform t he trial judge and jury
, in a g ener al
way , of the na ture of the case and to outline, g ener ally , the fa cts ea ch party intends to pr ove. Such statements do not amount to stipul ations and ce rtain l y ar e not a substi tute for the ple ading s or for-7-

evidenc e." Har

ris v. Ba ptist Mem'l Hospital, 574 S.W .2d 730, 732 (Tenn. 1978). Further, the tria l court sustained the defe ndan t ' s objection to the statement and instruc ted the jury to disreg ard the

re ma rk . U nd e r o ur

la w, the jury

is p re su me d to fol low the ins truc tio ns of the tr ia l c ou rt . Se e Sta te v. Smit h, 893 S.W .2d 908, 914 (Tenn. 1994) . I t i s o u r v i ew , there fore , that the trial court did not

abu se its dis c re tio n b y

de ny ing the de fe nd a nt' s r e qu e st f or a mis tr ia l.

III The de fenda nt also asserts th at t h e t ri al court erre d by allowing into evidence two hear say statements: J olene Monroe ' s statement that her son to l d h er s h e " neede d to ge t home quick" and Kathy Booke r' s statement, " Th e l aw y er told him not to." The sta te submits that neither statement
q u a l i f i e s a s h e ar s a y.

I t is we ll e sta

bli sh e d th a t tria l c ou rt s ha ve br oa d d isc re tio n in de te rm ini ng the a dmi ssi bil ity of evide nce, a nd t h eir ruling s will not be rever sed abse nt an abuse of that discre tion. St ate v. Ca mpb e ll, 90 4 S. W.2 d 6 08 , 6 16 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; Stat e v. B ake r, 78 5 S. W.2 d 1 32 , 1 34 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1989); see also Tenn. R. E vid. 104. The Rules of Evidenc e provide that "he arsa y is not

a dmi ssi ble e xce pt a s p ro vid e d b y the se ru le s o r o the rw ise by la w. " Te nn . R. Evid . 8 02 . H e ars a y is d ef i n ed as "a s t at em en t , o t h er t h an o n e ma d e by t h e de cl ar an t wh i l e t es t i fy i n g at t h e t ri al o r h ea ri n g, offe red in e vidence to prove the truth of the matter a sserted." Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c)

.

As to the fi rs t r e mark , th e de fe nd a nt f a ile d to make a

c on te mpo rane ou s o bje c tio n to Ms. Monroe' s statement that her son told her she "ne eded to g et hom e quick." Ge nera lly , appellate relief will not be gr anted “ to a party responsible for

an er ror or who fa ile d t o take whatever action wa s

rea sonably

nece ssary

to preve nt or nullify

the harmful eff

ect of an er ror.” Tenn. R. A pp. P. 36(a); see State v. Gre g ory , 862 S.W .2d 574, 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) . Neve rtheless, the te stimony does not qualify

as hea rsay . That Ms

. Monroe "nee ded to g et hom e quick" was not offer ed to prove the truth of the matter

asserted, that she should qu i ck l y re t u rn to her re sidence , but was instead offe red to e x plain wh y

she re turned to her

residenc e af

ter lea ving f

or work. I

n conseque nce, the defe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Simi larly , Ms. Booke r' s statement, made in r espo n s e to a question bydefe nse counse l
reg arding the def

endant' s failure to turn himself in to the authorities, that " [t ]he lawy er told him not to do it," does not qualify

as hea rsay

. I t was not offe red to provethe truth of the matter asserted, that the def endant' s counsel had, in f

act, a dvised him ag ainst surre ndering to the pol ice, but was instead of fe re d to pr ov e wh y

the de fe nd a nt d id n ot r e po rt to the po lic e . In c on se qu e nc e , the tr ia l c ou rt did

n o tab u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y a d m i t t i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y.

IV The de fenda nt next asserts that the trial court err ed by admitting a post-mortem photogr aph of the victim. The state submits t hat the photogr aph about which the de fenda nt complains was neve r actua lly admitted into evidence

.-8-

Th e a dmi ssi bil ity of ph oto g ra ph s is g ov e rn e d by

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ev ide nc e 40 3. Se e Sta te

v. B a nk s, 56 4 S.W. 2d 94 7 (T e nn

. 19 78 ). Th e e vid e nc e mus t be re le va nt andits pr ob a tiv e va lue mus t

ou tw e ig h a ny

pr e jud ic ia l e ffect . T e nn . R. Ev id. 40 3; B a nk s, 56 4 S. W.2 d a t 95 0- 51 . Wh e the r t o admit the photogr aphs re sts within t he sound discre tion of the tri al court and will not be reve rsed absent a clea r showing of an abuse of that discretion. State v. Dicker son, 885 S.W .2d 90, 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Allen, 692 S.W .2d 651, 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985)

.

I nitially , the def

endant ha s fail ed to spec ify the photog raph that he contends should havebeen excluded. A citation to the transc ript included in the def endant' s brief indicates that his objection is to a photogr aph which w as marke d for identific ation purposes a s exhi bit B. That photog raph depicts Michae l Monroe, Sr.'s blood cover ed face

. At the sug g estion of the trial c ourt, the state use d a diffe rent photog raph to indica te wher e Erik Monroe was s t an d i n g during the alter cation. The photogr aph mar

ked for identification as e x hibit B was ne ver entere d into evidence and wa s not seen by the jury . Thus, the def

endant is not entitled to relief

.

V The de fenda nt next contends that the trial court err ed by ordering de fense counsel to alter the fo rm a ndma nn e r o f h is q ue sti on s d ur ing c ro ss- e xami natio n. Th e state arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt did

n o tab u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n ar y a u t h o r i t y.

The propriety
, scope, manner and control of the examination of w itnesses is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Humphr ey s, 70 S.W .3d 752, 766-67 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2001). The ruling of the trial court in this reg ard will not be overturne d absent a n abuse of that discretion. State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992) . "A n abuse of discretion exists when the revie wing court is firmly

convince d that the lower

court ha s made a

mistake in that it affirmatively appea rs that the lower court' s decision has no ba sis in law or in fac t and is theref ore a rbitrary , i l l o gi ca l
, or unconsciona

ble." State v. Br own & Wil liamson Tobac co C orp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 191 (Tenn. 2000). Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 611 provides that "[t]he c ourt shall exercise a ppropriate control over the p r e s e n tati o n o f e v id e n c e a n d c o n d u c t o f th e tria l w h e n n e c e s s ar y to a v o id ab u s e b y counsel." Tenn. R. Evid. 611(a) . The Advisory Commi ssion Comments state t hat R ule 611(a) " rec og nizes the inhere nt power of

a court to control trial conduct to pr event lawy ers from abusing the proc ess." I d., Ad vis ory Com mis sio n Co mme nts

.

I n this case, the trial court instructe d defe nse counse l to ask questions rathe r than make
statements during the cross-e x amination of Ms. B ooker. The trial court observe d that the form of counsel' s examination was confusing to the witness, as evide nced by her attempts to answer be fore de fe ns e c ou ns e l f

ini sh e d h is i nq uirie s. I n a n a tte mpt to a vo id fu rthe r c on fu sio n, the tr ia l c ou rt a lso instructed the witness not to respond until a question had been asked. Sometime late r, durin g a bench c onfer ence outside the hea ring of the jury , the following colloquy occur red:

DE F EN SE C OU NSE L : You r Hon or , . . . we ' re g e tti ng int o c urta ili ng my c ro ssexamination here. And . . . that's just what I ' m fe el ing and I ' m making a rec ord on it.-9-

THE COUR T : M r. Massey , what y ou' re doing , just for the re cord, y ou' ll say

so me thi ng , y ou ' ll m ake a

state me nt, a ndthe n s ome tim e s y ou ' ll k e e p g oing and a sk questions or make othe r statements. Sometimes y ou won' t. But y ou make a statement. S ometimes y ou make the statement t o the jury as if it' s closing a

rg ument wi t h o u t even looking at the witness. Sometimes y ou' ll make a state ment to the witn e s s a n d th e n o p e n y o u r e y e s w id e

. O p e n y o u r mo u th a s if s a y in g w ith body la ng ua g e lik e so wi th thr e e qu e sti on mark s. Or wh a t do y ou ha ve to s a y to that w ith question marks. And fr ankly the witnesses don' t know am I supposed to answe r. What's the que stion?

. . . .

. . . .

. . . I ' m no t try ing to r e stric t th is c ro ss e xami natio n, bu t if y ou 're goi ng to object what I ' m g oing to do is this. You' re g oing to ha ve to a sk questions in pr oper fo rm or we ' re g oin g to h a ve to s top it. Yo u h a ve to a sk pr op e r q ue sti on s.

DE F EN SE C OU NSE L : Y ou r H on or , th e Sup re me Cou rt sa y s th a t y ou c a n a sk questions in declar atory form also. I t's in y our voice inflection as to what a question is.

T HE C OU R T : W el l
, t h en I 'm go i n g t o h av e t o s t ar t d es cr i b i n g y o u r b o d y

l an gu age then for the rec ord bec ause y ou' ll say something like and y ou said this to the police and y ou' ll read something and y ou' ll look at the jury and then like lurch for war d and
open y our arms wide with a questioning look and it's like a v er b al q u es tion mark. And then sometimes y ou' ll continue to talk. Sometim es y ou' ll ask these questions of the jury

. . . .

. . . . . . . I t's ve ry

confusing to the witness. And so I have - - althoug h I ' m not going
t o re s tri ct y o u r c ro s s ex a m i n at i o n I h av e w i d e d i s cr et i o n i n i t s co n tro l

. An d I 'm letting y ou do this. I t's taking a lot of time and sometimes y ou' ll a sk a question like there ' s a period prior to his coming over to her house while the y wer e dating and then the re ' s a pe ri oda ft e r o n th a t mo rn ing wh e rehe wa s a t he r h ou se a ndthen t her e ' s a period a fter that time. An d y ou' ll ask a question we don' t know which of the three periods it' s ref

erring to. .

. . And t he questions are n' t specific. N ow, I understand y ou h av e ari gh tt o h av e ace rt ai n t ec h n i q u e, b u tt h i s ri gh t n o w i s get t i n g v er y co n fu s i n g. And the re cord w ill be clear on that except it wo n 't show the times that y ou turned
to the jury a nd make state me nts

. An d the n with ou t say ing a no the r w or d y ou turn to the witness with a question mark body lang uag e. . . .

I n ou r v ie w , th e tria l c o u r t d id n o t ab u s e it s d is c r e ti o n b y d ir e c ti n g c o u n s e l to use the interrog atory

form when posing questions to the witness. The r ecor d establishes that the witness wa s confuse d by

the method and that, a s a re sult, the witness and defe nse counse l w ere often talking at the same time. The defe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.-10- VI The de fenda nt claims that the trial court erre d by adm i t t i n g i n to evidence the bullet discovere d by Ms. Booke r i n her car. He asserts t hat i t should not have bee n allowed be cause the state fa iled to es t ab l i s h a p roper chain of custody and bec ause the state fa iled to disclose the exis tence of the bullet prior to trial. The defe ndant also contends that the trial court e rre d by deny ing his request for

a mistrial based upon the state' s fa i l u re t o disclose the bullet as potential e vidence prior to trial. The sta te submits that a proper chain of custody was established and that the trial court did not err by

admitting the bullet into evidenc e.

I nitially , the def

endant did not object to the c hain of c ustody at trial. A def endant may

not

assert one g round for

relief in the trial court a nd then pursue a new or differ ent theory on appea l. See State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 634-35 (Te nn. Crim. Ap p

. 1 994). From that perspe ctive, the de fe nd a nt h a s w a ive d th is i ssu e . F urthe r, the de fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f on the me ri ts o f h is

c la im.

As a

c on dit ion pr e c e de nt to the int ro du c tio n o f t a ng ibl e e vid e nc e , a wi tne ss mus t be able to identify the evidenc e or e stablish an unbroken c hain of c ustody

. State v. Goodman, 643 S .W.2d 375, 38 1 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 82 ). Th e pu rp os e of the c ha in of c us tod y re qu ir e me nt i s to “ de mon str a te that th e re ha s b e e n n o ta mpe ri ng , lo ss, su bs tituti on , o r m ist ake wi th re sp e c t to the e vid e nc e .” Sta te

v. B ra de n, 86 7 S. W.2 d 7 50 , 7 59 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 93 ). Whil e the state is n ot requi re d to

e sta blish fact s w hic h e xclu de e ve ry po ssi bil ity

of ta mpe ri ng , th e c ir c ums ta nc e s e sta bli sh e d mu st

rea sonably

assure the identity

of the evidence and it s integ rity

. State v. Fe rg uson, 741 S.W .2d 125, 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). This r ule does not r equire absolute ce rtainty of identification. Ri tter v. State, 462 S.W .2 d 247, 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) . Absent suffic ient proof of the cha in of custody , howeve r, the “ evidenc e should not be admitted . . . unless bot h identity and integ rity

can be demonstrated by other appropriate means.” Neil P. Cohen et al., Tenne ssee L aw of Evidence § 9. 01 [13][c ] (4 th e d. 20 00 ). A l e a din g Te nn e sse e tr e a tis e pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:

The c o n c e p t o f a “ c h a in ” o f c u s to d y r e c o g n iz e s th a t r e a l e v id e nce ma ybe ha nd le d b y

mor e tha n o ne pe rs on be tw e e n th e tim e it i s o btaine d a ndthe tim e it i s either introduc ed int o evidenc e or subjected to scientific analy sis. Obviously , any of these pe rsons might ha ve the opportunityto tamper with, conf use, misplace, damag e, substitut e, lose and repla ce, or otherwise a lter the e videnc e o r t o observe another do ing so

. Ea c h pe rs on wh o ha s cus tod y or c on tr ol of the e vid e nc e du ri ng thi s ti me is a “ lin k” in the c ha in o f c us tod y

. Ge ne ra lly
, te sti mon y fr om e a c h li nk is n e e de d to verify the authenticity

of the e vidence and to sh o w t h at i t i s what it purports to be. Eac h link in the chain testifies about whe n, wher e, and how possession or control of the evidenc e wa s obtained; its condition upon re ceipt; wher e the item w as kept; how it was safegu ar d ed
, if at all; any chang es in its condition during possession; and when, whe re a nd how it left the witness’s possession.

I d. The issue a ddresse s itself to the sound discretion of the trial court; its determination will not be disturbed i n the abse nce of a cle arly mistaken exercise of

such discre tion. St ate v. B eec h, 744-11-

S.W. 2d58 5, 58 7 ( Te nn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ); Sta te v. John so n, 67 3 S. W.2 d 8 77 , 8 81 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1984). Rea sonable a ssuranc e, rather than a bsolute assuranc e, is the prer equisite for a dmission.

Her e, Ms. B ooker ide ntified the enve lope containing the bullet as the same envelope in which she had plac ed the bullet af ter he r son discover ed it in her c ar. She te stified that she re tained possession of the bullet until the week prior to trial, when she delivere d it either t o the District Attorney ' s Offic e or to the police. I t is our view that this testim ony was suff icient to establish "the identity of the e vidence and its integ rity ." See Fe rg uson, 741 S.W .2d at 127.

The de fenda nt f

ailed to lodg e a timely

objection that the bullet should not have be en admitted
on g rounds that the state ha d failed to disclose its e x istence prior to trial. The re cord e stablishes that d u ri n g the direc t examination of Ms. Booker, the state introduce d the bullet as exhibit 37. The defe ndant di d not object to the admis sion of the bullet into evidenc e and, in f act, a sked Ms. Booke r

sever al questions a

bout the bullet. During re- direc t examination bythe state, the de fenda nt moved for a mistrial based upon Ms. Book er 's t es timonythat the def endant ha d threa tened to kill her boy friend. T he trial c ourt conducte d a hea ring on the motion outsi de the pr esenc e of the jury , during wh i ch t h e d ef

en d an tal s o o b

j ec t ed t o t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e b u l l et

. By t h e t i m e o f t h e d ef

en d an t 's obj ec t i o n , h oweve r, the bullet had a lrea dy been pa ssed to the jury . Appellate r elief w ill not be

a ff or de d “ to a pa

rt y re sp on sib le fo r a n e rr or or wh o faile d to take wh a te ve r a c tio n wa s re a so na bly

n e c e s s ar y t o p r e v e n t o r n u l l i f y t h e h ar m f

u l e f f e c t o f a n e rr o r

. ” T e n n

. R

. A p p

. P

. 3 6 ( a ) ; s e e G r e g o r y, 86 2 S. W.2 d a t 57 8. B e c a us e the d e fe nd a nt f a ile d to lod g e a

tim e ly ob je c tio n, wa ive r a

pp lie s. Moreove r, the de fenda nt would not be entitled to relief e ven if the issue had bee n proper ly prese rved.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 16 pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s: Do c ume nts a ndta ng ibl e ob jec ts. U po n r e qu e st o f the de fe nd a nt, the Sta te sh a ll p e rm it the de fe nd a nt t o in sp e c t a ndc opy or ph oto g ra

ph bo ok s, pa

pe rs , documents, photog raphs, tang ible objects, buildings or plac es, or c opies or portions there of, which a

re w ith the possession, custody or control of the State, and whic h are materia l to the prepa

ration of the defendant' s defe nse or are intended for use by the State as evide nce in c hief a t the trial, o r we re obtained from or be long to the de fe nd a nt. Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 1 6( a )( 1) (C ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he ru le a lso pr ov ide s f or a c on tin uin g du ty

to disclose such e vidence :

I f, prior to or during trial, a party discovers a dditi o n al ev i d ence or mate rial previously

reque sted or orde red, which is subject to discovery or inspection under this rule, the party

shall promptly

notify the ot her party or t he other party ' s attorney

or the c ou rt of the e xiste nc e of

the a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e or ma te ri a l. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(c). He re, the state conc edes that it viol ated the r equ i re m en t s o f R u l e 16 by failing to inform the def

endant of the exist ence of the bullet and thus pre cludi n g h i m from any independe nt inspection prior to trial. T h e s t ate a sserts, howeve r, that its error did not affe ct the results of the tria l. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36.-12-

Whe n a pa rt y fails to c omp ly

wi th a dis c ov e ry

re qu est , " the c ou rt

ma y or de r s uc h p art y

to p e r mi t th e d is c o v e r y o r in s p e c ti o n , g r a n t a c o n ti n u a n c e , o r p r o h ib it th e p ar ty f r o m introducing evidenc e not disclosed, or it may enter such other or der a s it de ems just under the c ircumstance s." Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 1 6( d) (2 ). Whe the r a de fe nd a nt h as been prej ud ic e d b y the state ' s f

a ilu re to disclose information is a sig nificant fa ctor in dete rmining a n appropriate re medy

. S t at e v

. Smit h, 926 S.W .2d 267, 270 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The relevant inquiry is what prejudice has re sulted from the discovery violation, not simply the prejudicia l e ffe ct the evidenc e, other wise admissible, had on the issue of

a defe ndant' s g uilt. State v. Ronald Mitchell, No. 02C01-9702-CC-00070 (Te nn. Cr im. Ap p. a t Jac ks on , Se pt. 15 , 199 7) (c iti ng Sta te v. Cot tr e ll, 86 8 S.W.2 d 673 , 677 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 92 ); Sta te v. Ga

rl a nd
, 61 7 S. W.2 d 1 76 , 1 85 -8 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 81 )) . " Th is c ou rt wi ll not presume pr ejudice f rom a mer e alleg ation. " State v. Quincy L . Hende rson, No. 02 C01 -9 70 6- CR- 00 22 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , a t Jac ks on , M a y 12 , 1 99 8) . E xclu sio n o f e vid e nc e is a "dr astic re medy

and should not be implemented unless t h er e is no other r easona ble alternative." Smit h, 926 S.W .2d at 270.

I n this case, the de fenda nt has failed to e stablish that he was prejudiced by the discovery violation. The rec ord establishes that the state showed the bullet to defe nse counsel befor e admitting it into evidenc e. Ms. Booke r t estified that her son discovere d the bullet in her c ar shortly afte r the defe ndant had be en inside. While the bullet was admitted ostensibly to establish that the defe ndant possessed ammunition on the day of the off enses, ther e wa s no testimonythat this particular bullet was of the s ame type used to shoot eac h of t he victim s. More importantly
, both Erik Monroe a nd Michae l Monroe, Jr., identified the defe ndant as the perpe trator. See State v. Strickland, 885 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that the testimony of a vic tim identify ing the defe ndant as the pe rpetrator is sufficient to support a c onviction). The de fenda nt had a motive for the crime,

a sk e d M s. B oo ke r t o li e abo ut his wh e re abo uts a t the tim e of the sh oo tin g s, a ndfaile d to re turn to his residenc e for

sever al wee ks therea fter. U nder the se circ umst an ces, it is our view that the de fe nd a nt w a s n ot p re

jud ic e d b y

the state ' s f

a ilu re to t ime ly

dis c los e the e xiste nc e of

the bu lle t.

V II T h e d ef endant nex t contends that the trial c ourt err ed by deny ing his motion for judg ment of ac quittal. He alleg es that the state f ailed to prove venue.

Rul e 29 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s, in r e le vant p art , a s f oll ow s: The c ourt on motion of a def endant or of its own motion shall order t he entry of judgme nt of ac quittal of one or more offe nses cha rg ed in the indictment or information af

ter the evidence on either side is c losed if the evide nce is insuffic ient
to s us ta in a

c on vic tio n o f s uc h o ff

e ns e or of fe ns e s.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 29(a).

Th is r ule e mpo we rs the tr ia l ju dg e to d ir e c t a jud g men t of a c qu itt a l w he n th e e vid e nc e is insufficient to wa

rra nt a conviction either

at the time t h e s t at e re sts or at the conc lusion of all the evidenc e. Ove rturf v. State, 571 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. 1978). At the poi nt the m otion is made, the trial-13-

court must favor

the opponent of the motion with t he strong es t l eg itimate view of the e vidence
, including a ll reasona

ble infer ence s, and discar d any counter vailing evidence

. Hill v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 325, 470 S.W.2d 853 (1971). When the motion for ac quittal is m ade at the conclusion of the state' s evidenc e and is not g rante d, the def endant " may

offe r evide nce w ithout having r eser ved the rig ht." Te nn. R. App. P. 29(a).

Article I
, section 9 of the Te nnessee Constit ution provides that in all criminal prosec utions by indictment or prese ntment, the acc used has a rig ht to a speedy
, public trial by an impartial jury of the c ou nty in wh ic h the c ri me wa s c omm itt e d. Te nn

. Con st. art

. I
, § 9; se e a lso Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 18. The state must prove that the offe nse was committed in the county of the indictment. Ha

rvey v. State, 213 Tenn. 608, 612, 376 S.W .2d 497 (1964). Be cause venue, a question for the jury
, is not an ele ment of the off

ense, it nee d be esta

blished only by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Hopper v. State, 205 Tenn. 246, 326 S.W.2d 448 (19 5 9 ); S t at e v. Hamsley , 672 S.W .2d 437, 439 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Ba ker, 639 S.W .2d 670, 672 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). Slight e vidence
, includi n g ci rc u m s t antial evidenc e, will be suff icient if the e vidence is uncontradicte d. State v. Be nnett, 549 S.W .2d 949 (Tenn. 1977) . The jury is entitled to draw re asonable infere nces f rom the evidenc e. State v. Johnson, 673 S .W.2d 877, 882 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).

Her e, the testimony

of Jol ene Monroe established that the offenses occurre d at her residenc e

a t 50 86 B ow ie Str e e t in She lby Cou nty . Er ik Mon ro e , Mic ha e l Monr oe , Jr. , a ndRe g ina ld Wi lli a ms

c or ro borat ed that te sti mon y . T he re wa s n o p ro of to the c on tr ary . In o ur

vie w, thi s e vid e nc e is

s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t ab l i s h b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a tt h e c r i m e o c c u rr e d i n S h e l b y C o u n t y.

V III The defe ndant asserts that the trial court err ed by deny ing his r equest for a m i s t ri al b ased upon the i neff

ective assistance of his trial counsel. He claims that his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive by failing to rea liz e that the state had not provided c omplete discovery , by failing to assume that the state mig ht implythat the pre viously u n d is closed e vidence had bee n provided in discovery , by failing
to t ime ly ob je c t to the int

ro du c tio n o f the bu lle t di sc ov e re d b y Ms. B oo ke r, a ndby

faili ng to adequately

compre hend the testimony at trial bec ause of a hea

ring disability . The state c ontends that the trial court properly

denied the motion for a

mistrial on this g round.

This court has c onsistently"w ar n ed defe ndants and their c ounsel of the da ng ers of raising the issue of inef

fec tive assistance of t rial counsel on direc t appea l beca use of the sig nificant a mount of deve lopment and fa ct finding such an issue e ntails." Ke ndricks v. State, 13 S. W.3d 401, 405 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). Ra isi ng the iss ue of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l on dir e c t app e a l is "a prac tice fr aug ht with peril." State v. J immy L

. Sluder, No. 1236 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvil le, Mar. 14, 1990) . The de fenda nt runs the risk of ha ving the issue resolved " without an evidentiary he ari ng wh ic h, if he ld, mig ht be the on ly way that harm cou ld be sh ow n- -a pr e re qu isi te fo r r e lie f i n ineffe ctive trial c ounsel claims." J im m y W ay n e Wilson v. S tate, No. 909 ( Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, May

29, 1991).-14-

Our supreme court, howeve r, has stated t hat claims of ineffec tive assistance of counse l may be pre sented on direc t appea l and that the re viewing court must apply the same standa

rd as utilized for suc h claims in post-conviction proce eding s. See S tate v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 n.5 (Tenn. 19 99 ). Whe n a

de fe nd a nt s e e ks re lie f o n th e ba sis of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of c ou ns e l, he mus t f ir st establish that the servic es re ndere d o r t h e ad vice g iven was be low "the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s." B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)

. S ec o n d, he must show that the def iciencie s "a ctually

had an a dverse eff

ect on the de fense ." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). Should the def endant f ail to establish either fa c tor , h e is n ot e nti tle d to re lie f. Ou r s up re me c ou rt de sc ri be d th e sta nd ardof re vie w a s f

oll ow s:

B e c a us e a

[de fe nd a nt] m us t e sta

bli sh bo th pron g s o f the te st, a failu re to prove e ither def

iciency or pre judice provides a suff

icient basis to deny

relief on the ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im. I ndeed, a court ne ed not addre ss the components in any particula r orde r or e ven addr ess both if the defendant make s an insufficie nt showing of on e c omp on e nt.

Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996).

On claims of ineffec tive assistance of counsel, the defendant is not entitled to the bene fit of hindsight, may

not second-g uess a r easona bly based tria l strateg y , and cannot criticize a sound, but

unsucces sful, tactica l decision made during the course of the proc eeding s. Adkins v. State, 911 S.W. 2d33 4, 347 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 ). Suc h d e fe re nc e to the ta c tic a l de c isi on s o f c ou ns e l, howeve r, app l i es o n l y i f t he choic es ar e made afte r ade quate pr epar ation for the c ase. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W .2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) . The de fenda nt bear s the burden of proving his claims by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461 n.5; S tate v. Wil liam Makra nsky , No. E2000-00048- CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, J une 28, 2001); see also Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003).

On appe al, the finding s of fa ct made by t he trial c ourt are conclusive a nd will not be disturbed unl ess t he evidence contained in the record preponder ates ag ainst them. Br ooks v. State, 756 S.W .2d 288
, 2 8 9 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 1 9 8 8 )

. T h e b u r d e n is o n th e d e f e n d a n t t o s h o w th a t the

e vid e nc e pr e po nd erat ed a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Cle nn y v. Sta te , 5 76 S.W. 2d12 , 1 4 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1978). The cre dibilit y of the witnesses and the weig ht and value to be aff orded the ir testimony

are questions to be resolved by the trial court. Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990) ; Bates v. State, 973 S.W .2d 615, 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . When review ing the application of law to those fac tual finding s, howeve r, our revie w is de novo, and the tria l court' s conclusions of law

are g iven no pre sumption of corre ctness. Fields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 457-58 (Te nn. 2001); see also State v. Eng land, 19 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2000).

I n th is i ns ta nc e , the de fe nd a nt c omp la ins that hi s tria l c ou ns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r a

va ri e ty of re asons, all of whic h rela te to the bullet discovere d by Ms. Booke r. He claims that his counsel

wa s u na wa

re that th e state ha d fa ile d to pr ov ide the bu lle t f or ins pe c tio n d uring dis c ov e ry , f a ile d to

a nti c ipate that the state wo uld tr y to intro du c e the bu lle t as e vid e nc e a ny way , mi sse d th e op po rtun ity-15-

to timelyobject to the admission of the bullet, and, due to a hea ring impairment, did not understand the importance of Ms. Booke r' s testimony . The de fenda nt does not, howeve r, explain how he wa s pr e jud ic e d b y

the se a lle g e d d e fi c ie nc ie s.

As ind ic a te d, tr ia l c ou ns e l sh ou ld ha ve lod g e d a c on te mpo rane ou s ob je c tio n to th e bu lle t. Yet it is our view that the e vidence would have ultimately been a dmitted any way

. No pre judice wa s

cause d. As to the hearing impairment, the rec ord demonstrates that the defe ndant was r epre sented b y t wo at t o rn ey s at t ri al
, o n l y o n e o f wh o m co m p l ai n ed ab o u t an i n ab i l i t y t o h ea r. Fu rt h er , co u n s el 's complaint that he wa s unable to hea r wa s limi ted t o the t estimony of a sing le witness, Ms. Booke r. The re co rd est ablishes that trial counse l vigor ously cross-e x amined Ms. B ooker on the rele vant i ssues. Ther e is no indication that he wa s unawa re of the content of

her dire ct testimony . I n our view, the de fenda nt has failed to e stablish that he was de nied the ef fec tive assistance of counse l at trial. No mistrial should have bee n order ed on this g round.

IX As his final issue, the defendant asserts that the sentenc e is excessive. He complains that the
tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y a llo wi ng vic tim

imp a c t te sti mon y

a t th e se nte nc ing he ari ng a ndby faili ng to consider the appropriate mitigating fac tors. He a lso contends that the trial c ourt err ed by ordering

c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing . T he de fe nd a nt doe s not co nte st the app lic a tio n of the e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s.

When there is a challeng e to the l eng th, rang e, or manner of service of a sente nce, it is the duty of t his court to conduct a de novo revie w wit h a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court a

re corr ect. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . This presumption is “conditioned upon the a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) ; see State v. J ones, 883 S.W. 2 d 5 97, 600 (Tenn. 1994) . “I f the trial c ourt applies inappr opriate f actor s or otherwis e fa i l s to follow the 1989 Sentencing Act, the pr esumption of corr ectne ss falls.” State v. She lto n, 85 4 S. W.2 d 116 , 123 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 2) . T he Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts pro v id e th a t th e b u r d e n is o n th e d e f e n d a n t to s h o w th e imp r o p r ie ty o f th e s e n te n c e

. Tenn. Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

.

Our re view re quires an a naly sis of (1) the e vidence
, if any , rec eived at the trial and se ntencing hearing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port; (3) the principles of sente ncing and t h e ar gu m ents of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and chara cteristics of the offe nse; (5) a ny mitigating or enha ncing fac tors; (6) any statements made by

the def endant in his own beha lf; and (7) the defe ndant' s potential for reha bilitation or trea tment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -2 10; State v. Smit h, 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.

I n calc ulating the sentenc e for a Class A fe lony

conviction, the presumptive sente nce is the midpoin t wi t h i n the ra ng e if ther e ar e no enhanceme nt or mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). I f there are enhanc ement fa ctors but no mitigating fac tors, the t rial court shall set the
sentenc e at or

above the midpoint. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( d). I f there are mitigating fac tors but no enhanc ement fa ctors, the tria l court shall s et t h e s en t en ce at or be low the midpoint. I d. A-16-

sentenc e involving both e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s require s an assig nment of re l ative weig ht for the e nhance ment fac tor s as a m ea n s of incre asing the sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e). The sentenc e should then be r educe d within the rang e by any weig ht assigne d to the mitigating fac tors prese nt. I d.

The de fenda nt was sentenc ed to life im p risonment for his convic tion for the first de g ree murder of Michae l Monroe, Sr. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-208( c). In arriving at a sentenc e of twenty -three y ear s for the attempted first deg ree murder of Erik Monroe, the trial court a pplied two

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s: ( 10 ) tha t th e de fe nd a nt emplo y e d a fir e arm du ri ng the c omm iss ion of the c ri me and (13) that the defendant will fully inflicted bodi ly injury upon another person. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 10), (13) (2003). The trial court also determined that while t he defenda nt's stea dy employ ment history

and lac k of a c riminal rec ord mig ht qualify as m itigating fac tors, they would be

e nti tle d to ve ry

lit tle we ig ht.

The de fenda nt asserts that the tria l court er red by admitting victim impact testimony at the
sentenc ing he aring . The state submits that Erik Monroe, as a victim of the c rime, had the statutory rig ht to be hear d at the sente ncing hearing and t h at t h e t ri al court ha d a duty to consider the
t e s t i m o n y.

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 38 -1 03 pr ov ide s th a t "[ a] ll vic tim s o f c ri me sh a ll, upon their re quest, h av e the rig ht to . . . [ w]henever possible, . . . give impact testimony at court sentenc ing he aring s." Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-38- 103(a) (2). Such testimony is go v er ned by Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 40-35-209, which provides that "[a]t the sentencing hearing, the court shall af

ford t h e parties the opportunity to be hea

rd and pr esent e vidence rele vant to the
sentenc ing of

the defendant and may

aff ord the victim of the of

fense or the familyof the victim the opportunity

to testify rele vant to the sentenc ing of the def endant." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-209(b)

. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-210 provides that the trial court is re quired to consider the information provided by

the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35 -2 1 0 (b )( 5 ). T h i s co u rt h as h el d t h at "[ w] h en ev erv i ct i mi m p ac ti n fo rm at i o n co n t ai n s re l ev ant and re liable evidenc e re lating to e nhancing or mitiga ting f actor s an d / o r any

other sente ncing consideration, the trial court shoul d consider it and de termine what weig ht, if any , should be g iven
to tha t e vid e nc e ." Sta te v. Rin g , 56 S.W.3 d 577 , 584 (T e nn . Crim . A pp . 2 00 1) . T his c ou rt ha s a lso conclude d that testimony about "the emotional, psy cholog ical, or phy sical eff ects" of the crime on the victim is relevant a s to the natureand cir cumstance s of the crime. State v. Bla ckhurst, 70 S.W.3d 88, 95 (2001).

He re , b othJole ne Mo nr oe a ndErik M on ro e te sti fi e d a bo ut the imp a c t of

the a tte mpt

on Erik Monroe' s life. J olene Monroe testified that her son had under g one counse ling. There was proof that the e nti re fa mil y

liv e d in fe ar o f the de fe nd a nt, wh o ha d ch a se d the min or vic tim int o h is b e dr oo m, shot him twice, and left onl y when he thought he was dead. I n our vi ew, the trial court did not err by admitting this testimony . Both wit n esses ha d the statutory rig ht to be hear d at the sente ncing hearing. T his testimonywas rele vant to the nature and cir cumstance s of the off ense. The defe ndant is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.-17-

The de fenda nt also asserts that the tria l c ourt err ed by failing to c onsider certain mitigating circ umstances. Wh i le he doe s not indicate which spe cific f actor s the trial court should have considere d, only

two wer e adva nced at trial: (1) the defe ndant' s steady employ ment history

and (2) his lack of a

criminal re cord. A s indicated, the tria l court ruled that under the en t i re t yof the circ umstances, these fac tors wer e entitled to very littl e we ight. The weig ht to be as s igne d to the
appro p riate e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s falls within the sound discretion of the tria l court

so lon g a s th a t c ou rt

c omp lie s w ith the pu rp os e s a ndprinc ipl e s of the 19 89 Se nte nc ing Ac t a ndits finding s are supported by the record. State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. I t is ou r v ie w tha t th e tr ia l c ou rt did no t abu se its dis c re tio n by a ssi g nin g lit tle we ig ht t o th e se fa c tor s.

Under these c ircumstance s, the defe ndant' s twenty -three y ear sentenc e is a ppropriate under the te rm s of the 19 89 Se nte nc ing Ac t. T he Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt ' s r e c e nt o pin ion in B lake ly v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), however
, calls into que stion the continuing validity of our c urre nt sentenc ing scheme. I n that case , the Court, apply ing the rule in Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 566 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), struck dow n a provision of the W ashing ton sentencing
g uidelines that permitted a trial judge to impose an " exceptional sentenc e" upon the finding of

certain statutorily

enumer ated e nhance ment fac tors. Th e Court observed that "the ' statutory

ma ximum ' fo r Ap pr e nd i pu rp os e s is the ma ximum se nte nc e a jud g e ma y

imp os e so le ly

on the ba sis of the fa c ts r e fl e c te d in the jury ve rd ic t or

a dmi tted by th e defend a nt. " I d. a t 25 37 (e mph a sis in orig inal). Finally , the Court conclude d that "e very defe ndant has a

rig ht to insi st that the prosec utor prove to a jury [bey ond a rea sonable doubt] all fac ts le g ally essential to the punishment." I d. at 2543 (empha sis in original).

Un de r the r

ule e sta bli sh e d in B lake ly , th e de fe nd a nt' s p ri or c on vic tio ns ma y

be us e d to enhan c e th e s e n te n c e s

. T h e r e c o r d e s ta b li s h e s th a t th e d e f

e n d a n t h a s n o p r io r

c o n v ic ti o n s

. T he enhanc ement fa ctors applied by the trial court, (10) and (13), are not based upon prior convic tions and we re not a dmitted by the def endant. I n co nsequenc e, the holding in Blake ly would prec lude their application. Under t h e ra t i onale of Blakely , which contr ols, a sentenc e of twe nty y ear s, the presumptive sente nce, is wa rra nted.

Fi n ally , the def

endant a sserts that the trial c ourt err ed by ordering c onsecutive se ntencing. Prior to the enactment of the C riminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989, the limited classifications for the imposit ion of consec utive sentenc es wer e set out in Gra y v. State, 538 S.W .2d 391
, 393 (Tenn. 1976)

. I n that case , our supreme court ruled that ag g ravating circumstance s must be prese nt befor e plac ement in any

one of the classifications. L ater , in State v. Tay lor, 739 S.W .2d 227 (Tenn. 198 7 )
, o u r h ig h c o u r t e s ta b li s h e d a n a d d it io n a l c a te g o r y f o r th o s e d e f

e n d a n ts c o n v ic te d o f two or more statutory offe nses i nvolving sex ual abuse of minors. Ther e we re, how ever , additional words of caution:

[C]ons e c uti ve se nte nc e s sh ou ld no t ro uti ne ly be imp os e d .

. . a nd

. . . th e a g g re g a te maxi mum of consec utive terms must be rea sonably rela ted to the severity of t he offe nses involved.T he f i rs t fo ur cr i t eri a are fo und in G ray

. A fi f t h c at ego ry in G ray , ba sed o n a s p eci f i c num b er of

pri o r f el o ny 1

con v i ct i on s , ma y e n h an ce t h e s en t en ce r an g e bu t i s n o l on g er a l i s t ed cr i t er i on

. Se e T en n

. Code An n

. § 40- 35

- 1 1 5, S en t en cing C o m m i ssi o n C o m m en t s.

-18- Tay lor, 739 S.W .2d at 230. The Sentenc ing Commission Com ments adopted the c autionary la ng ua g e . T e nn

. Cod e An n. § 40 -3 5- 11 5, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts . T he 19 89 Ac t is , in

essenc e, the c odification of the holdings in G ray and Tay lor; consec utive sentenc es may be imposed in the discretion o f t h e trial court only upon a dete rmination that one or more of the following

c ri te ri a e xist:

1

(1 ) Th e de fe nd a nt is a

pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l w ho ha s k no wi ng ly de vo te d h ims e lf

to criminal ac ts as a major sour ce of livelihood; (2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex tensive; ( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a

c ompete nt p sy c hiatr ist

wh o c on c lud e s a s a

re su lt o f an in ve sti g a tio n p ri or to sentenc ing that the defe ndant' s criminal conduc t has bee n char acte rized by a pattern of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be ha vio r w ith he e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) The defe ndant is a dang er o u s o ff en der w hose beha vior indicates little or no

re g ard fo r hum a n lif

e , an d no he sit a tio n ab ou t com mit tin g a c ri me in wh ic h th e ri sk to human life is high; (5) The defe ndant i s convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor with consider ation o f t he ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the re lationship between the defe ndant and victim or v i ct i m s , the time span of defe ndant' s undetec ted sexual a ctivity
, the nature and scope of the sexual acts a nd the

e xten t of the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or vic tim s; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed while on probation; or (7 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b)

. The leng th of the sentenc e, whe n consec utive in nature, must be “ justlydeser ved in re lation to the seriousness o f t h e off ense,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(1) , and “no g reater than tha t deser ved” unde r the c ircumstance s, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 2); State v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456 (Tenn. 1999)

.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

or de re d c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s o n th e fo llo wi ng g ro un ds : The only fac tor that I

find in . . . 40-35-115 that I th i n k applies . . . is that the defe ndant is a dang erous of fende r, who[se] behavior

indicates little or no re g ard f or human life a nd no hesitation about committing a c rime in which the risk to human life is high. T h i s ap p l i es m o re t o E ri k M o n ro e t h an t o h i s m u rd er ca s e. Be ca u s e w e d o n 't

rea lly know how much he sitation ther e wa s wh en Mi chae l Monroe wa s murdere d, but I d o k n o w fr o m t he proof of Erik, that a s soon as this man was killed, and he-19-

kn e w tha t th is 1 5 y e ar- old

. . . -- bo y sa w i t, h e c ha se d h im d ow n to

. . . - - t o e lim inate him. Even to the fac t that the boy hid in his bed under the c overs, a nd he we nt over and shot him twice while he was in his bed. And he exhibi ted no hesitation in try ing to murder this boy . So, I

find that fac tor is true. L ooking a

t the Woods fa ctors, the Wil kerson fac tors, State vs. Br aden - - Of

course I ' ve alr eady

found that the de fenda nt's be havior indi ca t ed littl e or no r eg ard for human life . He didn' t hesitate about committing crime which the risk to human lif e wa s hig h, or the c ir c ums ta nc e su rr ou nd ing the c omm iss ion of th e off ense ag g ravated. I

think they

wer e, in that, he we nt into this man' s home, from the pr oof in this case , to kill this man beca use he was exercising his la wful rig ht a s a c i t i z en of this country

to go out with a g irlfriend, w ho the def en d ant had [ a] turbulent relationship wit h. He we nt up into the man's house , into his castle. Is c o n f i n e m e n tf o r a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d o f t i m e n e c e s s ar y t o p r o t e c ts o c i e t y? Well, looking at this 51-y ear service befor e he a ccumulate s sentence cre dits . . . the d ef en s e a rgu es , . . . h e'l l b e 1 0 1 wh en h e get s o u t

. W el l
, y o u ca n s ayt h at , b u tt h er e's a hig h likelihood that because of budg et constraints, and the fac t that I don' t think ten
y ea rs h as gone by

without the leg islature meddling with our statutes, that -- a nd
espec ially since 1995 when this 100% violent c rimes comes in, that our penitentiarie s

are g oing to f

ill, and that this m an, in the next 15 or 20 y ear s is going to be re lease d.

. . . . So for that re ason, I

find that fac tually , that confinem ent for an extended period of time is nec essary to protect socie ty

. Whether or not he needs this 23 y ear s

consec utive to make that an e x tended pe riod of time is g oing to be a question.

. . . [T ]he a g g re g a te le ng th o f the se nte nc e s, if c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing is order ed, re asonably rela tes to the offe nses for w hich the def endant stands c onvicted. And that the extended sentenc e is ne cessa ry to pr otect the public aga i n s t future criminal conduc t by

the def endant. Rea sonably

rela ted to the severity of the offe nses committed.

. . . . I do n' t th ink

that [ th e def

e nd a nt] i s e nti tle d to a

fr e e op po rtun ity

to kill thi s y oung man. And for

that rea son, I

think that because of the pa rticular c ircumstance s of this off ense, a consec utive sentenc e would rea sonably rela te to the seve rity of the criminal attempt murder in the first deg ree

. So for that reason, I ' m going to order that the sentenc es be se rved c onsecutive.

I n Gra y , our supreme court r uled that bef

ore c onsecutive se ntencing could be imposed upon the da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r, c on sid e re d th e mos t su bje c tiv e of the c la ssi fi c a tio ns a ndthe mos t di ff ic ult
to a pp ly , o the r c on dit ion s mu st b e pr e se nt: (a ) that the c ri me s inv olv e d a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s; (b) that c onsecutive se ntence s are a nece ssary means to pr otect the public f rom the def

endant; and (c) that the term re asonably relates to the severity

of the offe nses. I n State v. Wil kerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995) , our hig h court re aff irmed those p rin c ip le s , h o lding that consec utive sentenc es cannot be require d of t he dange rous offender "unle ss the t erms reasonably rela te[] to the severity of the offe nses committed and ar e nec essary in ord er t o p ro t ect the public ( society ) fr om further-20-

criminal ac ts by those persons who resort to ag g ravated criminal conduct." The Wilkerson dec ision, wh ic h mo dif

ie d s ome wh a t th e stric t fa c tua l gu ide lin e s for c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing a do pte d in Sta te

v. Woo ds
, 81 4 S.W. 2d 37 8, 38 0 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ), de sc ri be d s e nte nc ing a s a " hu ma n p ro c e ss that neither c an nor should be reduce d to a set of fix ed and mecha nical rules." 905 S.W.2d at 938.

Her e, the tria l court consider ed the f actors in W ilkerson and c oncluded that c onsecutive
sentenc ing w as nec essary to protect the public f

rom the def

endan t an d that the re sulting term wa s

rea sonably

rela ted to the seve rity

of the off enses. The trial court plac ed particular e mphasis on the violent nature of

the offe nses and the defe ndant' s lack of hesitation in committing t he crimes. The

re c or d c on fi rm s th a t th e de fe nd a nt q ua lif ie d a s a da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r. I n o ur

vie w, the tr ia l c ou rt

did

no t e rr by or de ri ng c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s.

The sente nce f

or attempted first deg ree murder must be modified to twenty y ear s. Otherwise
, the judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

___________________________________

GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE