Final Report for the 2014–2015 Outbreak

of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

in the United States

1

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

Veterinary Services

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination

Revised August 11, 2016
Nature of Disease

• Avian influenza (AI) is a viral respiratory disease that 

infects all avian species. 

– AI is a common disease, but it frequently changes. 

• Based on the severity of illness, the disease is 

classified as either HPAI or low pathogenicity avian 

influenza (LPAI). 

• AI viruses are named by two groups of proteins:

– hemagglutinin ([HA] ranging from H1–H17), and 

– neuraminidase (ranging from N1–N9), e.g., H5N2 or H5N8.

2
Incident Overview

• December 11, 2014–January 16, 2015: USDA received a total of 7 

reports of HPAI H5N2 or H5N8 in captive wild birds and backyard 

flocks from the northwestern United States.

– First HPAI detection in 10 years.

– Additional detections occurred in wild birds. 

• January 23, 2015: 1st infected commercial flock identified in CA.

• January–March 2015: HPAI spread slowly to multiple states.

– MN, MO, AR, and KS. 

• April: Significant increase in HPAI H5N2 in turkey flocks occurred 

through early April in MN, followed by a rapid increase in IA in late 

April and May where large numbers of chicken layer flocks were 

affected. 

• June 16, 2015: Last case of HPAI confirmed in the United States 

(commercial flock).

3
Numbers Overview

• 211 detections on commercial operations and 21 detections on backyard 

premises 

– Includes premises designated as a Dangerous Contact (DC) Premises. 

• Approximately 7.4 million turkeys and 43 million egg-layers and pullet 

chickens were affected by HPAI and died from the disease or were 

depopulated.

• This outbreak was the largest HPAI outbreak ever recorded in the United 

States and arguably the most significant animal health event in U.S. history. 

• HPAI was detected in 21 States (includes all HPAI detections in any bird type, 

including wild birds).

4
Summary of H5 Positive Detections by State

5

State

Total 

Commercial 

H5 Positive 

HPAI 

Premises

Species Total 

Backyard H5 

Positive 

HPAI 

Premises

Total by State Turkey ChickenLayer Other

Minnesota 109 104 5 0 1 110

Iowa 71 35 36 0 6 77

South Dakota 10 9 1 0 0 10

Wisconsin 9 6 3 0 1 10

Nebraska 5 0 5 0 1 6

California 2 1 0 1 0 2

Missouri 2 2 0 0 1 3

North Dakota 2 2 0 0 0 2

Arkansas 1 1 0 0 0 1

Kansas 0 0 0 0 1 1

Washington 0 0 0 0 5 5

Oregon 0 0 0 0 2 2

Montana 0 0 0 0 1 1

Idaho 0 0 0 0 1 1

Indiana 0 0 0 0 1 1

Total 211 160 50 1 21 232
Total Incidence of HPAI in the United States 

by Week

6
HPAI Detections in the United States

7
First Detection by Flock Type in each State by 

National Veterinary Services Laboratories Confirmation Date

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Approximate Percentage of 

U.S. Poultry Affected

The losses in commercial inventories for layer chickens, pullets, and 

turkeys were substantial. This was the most significant HPAI outbreak 

in U.S. history. 

9

Flock Typea Percent Losses

Layer Chickensb 10.01% avg. U.S. inventory

Pullet Chickens 6.33% avg. U.S. inventory

Broiler Chickens <0.01% avg. U.S. inventory

Turkeys 3.16% annual production; 7.46% avg. U.S. inventory

a “ x ” .

b “ ” “ .”
Transmission

• Sharing equipment between farms, entry of wild birds into 

barns, and farm workers/visitors all likely contributed to virus 

spread. 

– Other possible pathways included short-distance aerosol 

spread, carcass disposal techniques, and other biosecurity 

breaches. 

• Results indicated that HPAI can be aerosolized from infected 

flocks.

– While possible that aerosol transmission was responsible for 

disease spread, the USDA APHIS Epidemiological Analysis was 

“not able to determine with certainty whether aerosol 

transmission was responsible for a farm becoming infected.”

USDA APHIS CEAH. (2015). Epidemiologic and Other Analyses of HPAI-Affected Poultry Flocks: 

September 9, 2015 available at 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/downloads/EpidemiologicAnalysis-Sept-2015.pdf. 

10
Organizational Response

• December 2014: APHIS National Incident Coordination Group (ICG) 

was established and VS personnel deployed to the first HPAI case.

• December 2014 to August 2015: VS National Incident Management 

Teams (NIMTs) deployed. 

– Outbreak resulted in a new VS NIMT—Indigo.

• April 2015: The ICG was scaled up significantly to reflect the 

increasing number of detections and broadening response 

requirements. 

• June 2015: An APHIS HPAI Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Group 

was formally established to coordinate resources across the agency. 

• Over the course of the outbreak, there were over 1,200 

deployments by APHIS personnel. 

– APHIS was on Mobility Level 2; VS initiated mandatory deployments. 

– The number of APHIS responders and contractors continued to 

increase as the outbreak grew.

– There were deployments from all APHIS programs.

11
12

Incident Management Structures and Key Events 

during the 2014–2015 Outbreak

December 

2014

January 

2015

February 

2015

March 

2015

April 

2015

May 

2015

June 

2015

Dec 14

HPAI first detected in 

the United States

Dec 19

- First backyard flock 

tests positive for HPAI

- National ICG 

established

Dec 24

First personnel

deployed to the field

APHIS Leadership 

engaged for resource 

coordination

Jan 23

HPAI confirmed in a 

commercial flock in 

California

March 5

First detection in 

Minnesota

Apr 13

First detection in Iowa

Apr 22–28

Week with the most 

new cases (38)

Green IMT split into 

2 teams

Blue IMT split into 

2 teams

Jun 17

Last HPAI-confirmed 

premises

Jun 23

APHIS MAC Group 

formally established
Personnel

• At the height of response operations in June 2015, more 

than 3,400 personnel were deployed: 

– About 250 APHIS personnel, 180 State responders, and 

over 3,000 support contractors. 

• Over the course of the entire outbreak, there were 

1,220 deployments by APHIS personnel, with 773 total 

individuals deployed. 

– After training, 69 National Animal Health Response Corps 

(NAHERC) members deployed during the outbreak.

• Many APHIS personnel deployed twice, and some 

deployed 3–4 times. 

• ~300 additional employees worked virtually or at an 

APHIS headquarters location as part of the ICG.

13
14

Total Number of APHIS Personnel Deployed 

by State of Incident

541

456

84 51 31 29 13 10 5

0

100

200

300

400

500

600
APHIS VS National Incident Management Team Rotation

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 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

 – 

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a Teams split and augmented with contractors due to the 

scope of the incident. 
Contractors

• The response to the outbreak quickly outpaced available 

resources once the outbreak accelerated in the Midwest, both 

at the ICG and NIMT levels. 

• Contractors augmented both ICG and field responses. 

– USDA APHIS contracted with a number of companies, large and 

small, to effectively execute response operations. 

– Contractors worked in the field not only to provide services and 

materials related to depopulation, disposal, and disinfection, 

but to provide premises physical security services, credentialing 

assistance, and equipment rentals. 

– More than 90 companies, individuals, and organizations were 

contracted to complete response operations successfully.

16
Number of Contractors Deployed during Outbreak 

17

592

1,705

2,197

2,432

2,755

2,923

2,740

3,009

2,482

2,182

2,185

1,905

1,718

1,276

809

488

139 81 42110

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

5/13/2015 6/13/2015 7/13/2015 8/13/2015 9/13/2015

Total Number of Contractors (Field & ICG)
Logistics Overview

• The SPRS Logistics Center and the NVS led logistics for the 

2014–2015 HPAI outbreak at the ICG-level, and also deployed 

personnel to support the APHIS VS NIMTs as required by the 

incident. 

• The SPRS Logistics Center and NVS were responsible for 

contracting support for response activities.

– Contractor support peaked in June, when over 3,000 personnel 

in the field were responding to the incident.

• First activated on December 19, 2014, the NVS had over 2,700 

requests for supplies through June 2015.

– At a cost of over $2.9 million. 

– Transportation costs, including for extraordinary rapid transit of 

diagnostic samples, totaled approximately $350,000. 

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Overview of Response Activities

• Depopulation, disposal, and virus elimination activities all 

posed significant challenges due to the number of affected 

premises and birds.

– Foaming was the most common method of depopulation for 

turkeys; CO2 in chicken layers.

– Composting was the most common method of disposal. 

– Wet disinfectant was the most common mode of virus 

elimination. 

• On average, it took commercial 

premises about 111 days from NVSL 

disease confirmation to get restock 

approval. 

– Average of 104 days from 

completion of depopulation to 

restock approval.

19
Surveillance and Diagnostics Summary

• In total, 16 National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN) laboratories, in addition to NVSL, were involved in 

testing to support HPAI response for either commercial, 

backyard, or wild bird surveillance. 

20 Table courtesy of VS NAHLN Coordinator
Appraisal and Compensation Summary

• In total, 232 appraisals and 44 trace outs were 

completed, with approximately $200 million paid for 

indemnity.

• Indemnity processes were cumbersome and led to 

delays.

– New indemnity processes have been streamlined and 

simplified.

• Cooperative Compliance Agreements were used as the 

mechanism to compensate producers for work they 

performed on their premises—such as disposal and virus 

elimination procedures. 

– Lessons learned from this experience resulted in new 

appraisal and compensation processes, that eliminated the 

use of these agreements. 

21
Permit and Movement Summary

• Permits issued for movements into, within, and out of regulatory 

Control Areas for many different items (e.g., eggs, feed, 

carcasses, etc.).

• Over 7,500 permits were issued (not including any revoked 

permits).

– Most from Minnesota (36%) and Iowa (52%).

• Over 20,000 movements occurred. 

– Many were for continuity of business movements, based on 

the Secure Food Supply Plans.

• Required rapid permitting and data entry; National Permitting 

Unit was established to support permitting processes.

• EMRS was successfully used to issue and record these permits.

22
End of Outbreak and Cost

• Although the outbreak ended in mid-June 2015, many response 

operations (e.g., cleaning and disinfection, environmental sampling, 

and restocking) continued throughout the fall. 

• As of November 18, 2015, the United States sent a final report to 

the World Organization for Animal Health (the OIE).

– At that time, the 2014–2015 outbreak in the United States was 

considered closed. 

• Extensive planning and preparation efforts continued for the 

possible reemergence of HPAI in the fall of 2015 and spring of 2016. 

• APHIS obligated nearly $850 million to respond to the 2014–2015 

HPAI outbreak.

• Further funds were spent on preparedness activities.

• It was the most expensive animal health incident recorded in U.S. 

history. 

23
Summary of Key Events during the 

2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak 

24
Economic and Trade Impact

• Estimates suggest the 2014–2015 HPAI incident resulted 

in approximately $1.6 billion in direct losses from turkeys 

and egg-laying hens that had to be euthanized. 

• When accounting for factors like restocking and lost 

future production, the impact to the U.S. economy is 

thought to be closer to $3.3 billion.

• As a result, consumers experienced wholesale egg prices 

reaching nearly $2.80 per dozen, more than doubling the 

previous 3-year average cost of large eggs. 

– Prices continually decreased throughout the remainder of 2015, 

but costs sustained above the 3-year average. 

25
Key Lessons Learned

• Depopulation needed to occur 

more rapidly to stop the 

amplification of virus and 

ongoing HPAI transmission. 

• Financial processes were 

cumbersome and time 

consuming. 

• Biosecurity measures must be 

improved on premises to not 

only stop HPAI transmission 

during an outbreak, but prevent 

HPAI introductions into 

commercial poultry flocks.

26
Policy Updates

• Policy guidance documents on issues like ventilation 

shutdown, heat treatment for virus elimination, and 

financial processes were developed and released to 

address the issues that occurred during the response 

to the incident. 

• New biosecurity guidance was developed 

collaboratively by the industry, State, and Federal 

officials for implementation by producers. 

• These documents are available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

27
List of Policies & Guidance

For example, the following policies and guidance 

were provided during the 2014–2015 HPAI 

outbreak (in alphabetical order):

• Control Area Release

• Financing the Response: State/Tribal 

Information

• General Resources and Information

• H5/H7 Avian Influenza Case Definition

• HPAI in the Live Bird Marketing System

• HPAI Response Goals

• HPAI Zones and Premises

• Indemnity Procedures

• Landfill Disposal Guidance—

Recommended Waste Acceptance 

Practices for Landfills

• Mortality Composting Protocol for AI 

Infected Flocks

• New State Checklist

28

• Post C&D Environmental Sampling Guide

• PPE Recommendations for HPAI 

Responders

• Processing Indemnity Payments 

• Restocking Criteria for Previously Infected 

Premises

• Stamping Out and Depopulation Policy

• Surveillance Activities around HPAI 

Infected Backyard Flocks

• Surveillance Sampling for Commercial 

Premises in Control Area

• Testing Requirements for Movement from 

the Control Area

• Timeline to Restocking and Environmental 

Sampling Procedures 

• Use of the Antigen Capture Immunoassay

• Using Heat Treatment for Virus 

Elimination

• Ventilation Shutdown Evidence and Policy.