alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 31.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Robert W. Peshek, certify that:  1.
    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q/A for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2005 of
Belden & Blake Corporation;2.
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)), for the registrant and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared; (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures
and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on
such evaluation; and (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and  5.
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting. Date: August 2, 2005
    By:
    /s/ Robert W. PeshekRobert W. Peshek, Senior Vice Presidentand Chief Financial Officer
 23
#### State v. Pham

15456

3/11/92

Affirmed
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 9, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

136681 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

HENRY B. JOY, IV, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

Justices 

v SC: 136681 

 COA: 274854 

Emmet CC: 05-008995-DM 

ROBERTA T. JOY,

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 6, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

s0828 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 9, 2008 

 Clerk
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           8,716
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,644
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                21,893
<PP&E>                                          15,259
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  38,744
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           18,966
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           115
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,941
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    38,744
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                10,292
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,112
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 420
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,813)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (11)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,802)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,802)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.16)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.16)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                     150,151,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                              452,610,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   664,000
<INVENTORY>                                106,846,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           708,943,000
<PP&E>                                      15,936,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,263,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             719,616,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      149,491,000
<BONDS>                                    288,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        28,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 282,097,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               719,616,000
<SALES>                                    239,749,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           239,749,000
<CGS>                                       20,800,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               20,800,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           112,190,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            25,441,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          23,551,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             57,767,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                26,542,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                31,225,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .93
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 23.1


           CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



 The Board of Directors
 American Healthchoice, Inc.

      We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of our report dated
 December 3, 2004, into the following registration statements filed by you on
 Form S-8:  File No. 333-36475 dated September 29, 1997;  File No.  333-35581
 dated September 18, 1997; File No. 333-26061 dated April 30, 1997; File  No.
 333-26065 dated April 30, 1997; File No. 333-26043 dated April 30, 1997; and
 File No. 333-26063 dated April 30, 1997.


 Lane Gorman Trubitt, L.L.P.
 Dallas, Texas
 January 13, 2005
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, July 08, 2015. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, July 08, 2015 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A15D0463. TANNER MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a TANNER MEDICAL CENTER-VILLA RICA et al. v. VEST NEWNAN, LLC d/b/a NEWNAN BEHAVIORAL HOSPITAL et al..
Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 2015V32
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anarbol PADILLA-CALVO, also known as Carlos Martinez-Martinez, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-40120.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Aug. 17, 2005.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Julia Bowen Stern, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Philip G. Gallagher, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BENAVIDES, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

*76PER CURIAM: *

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Anarbol Padilla-Calvo raises arguments that are foreclosed by *AlmendarezTorres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which held that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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Bring a Pet From Another Country

into the United States (Import)

Last Modified: 

Print

Animals entering the United States may be subject to regulation by APHIS and other

Federal agencies. Depending on your destination State, your pet may need to meet

State entry requirements in addition to Federal entry requirements. Pet owners are

responsible for meeting all Federal and State requirements.

Requirements
Before you travel, make sure you carefully read and understand all import

requirements for your animal. Failure to meet these requirements will result in

problems upon arrival to the United States, and your pet may be refused entry.

If your animal isn't listed below, it may not qualify as a pet and, therefore, may be

subject to different import requirements by APHIS.

If you're traveling with a pet bird or exotic animal, you may need to work with

additional agencies, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention.

Select an animal to view the entry requirements:

Dogs 

Cats 

Ferrets 

Amphibians 
Hedgehogs/Tenrecs 

Rabbits 

Reptiles 

Rodents 

Birds* 
*Not all birds qualify for pet travel.

Read on for more information.

Expand To See More

The following birds DON'T qualify as pets, meaning they're subject to

different regulations. Because they may carry and transmit certain diseases to

the U.S. poultry industry, these birds are regulated as poultry.

Chickens

Doves

Ducks

Geese

Grouse

Guinea fowl

Partridges

Pea fowl

Pheasants

Pigeons

Quail

Swans

Turkeys

View the import regulations if your bird does not qualify as a pet
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04

- 13

- 00896

- CV

IN RE Jose Luis TUNON

Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 31, 2013

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

On December 20 , 2013

, relator Jose Luis Tunon filed a petition for writ of mandamus and

motion for emergency stay of the trial court’s order allowing per iods of possession and access for

relator’s minor child with his mother , who is a resident of Mexico

. The court has considered

relator’s petition for writ o f mandamus and is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief

sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus and motion for emergency stay are denied

.

See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.8(a).

PER CURIAM

1 This proceeding a rises out of C ause No. 2010CVO0 01002C1, styled In the Interest of M.T., A Child , pending in the County Court a t Law No

. 1, Webb County, Texas, the Honorable Alvino (Ben) Morales presiding.
#### Mary Seals CHAPMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARLINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY; HUD, U.S. Government; Doris Davis; Doris Davis Realtors Corporation; Jimmie Martin, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-10453.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Oct. 12, 2005.

Mary Seals Chapman, Arlington, TX, pro se.

Before REAVLEY, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Mary Seals Chapman appeals the district court’s *sua sponte*dismissal of her *in forma pauperis*complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)® and (ii). We affirm for these reasons:

> 1. None of the acts of defendants as alleged by Chapman in her complaint involved the violation of a constitutional right, and therefore, she has failed to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. *Doe v. Rains County*
>       *497
>       *Indep. Sch. Dist.,*66 F.3d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir.1995). A violation of state law is not cognizable under section 1983. *Giovanni v. Lynn,*48 F.3d 908, 912-13 (5th Cir.1995). Chapman’s conclusory allegation that her “civil rights” were violated is an insufficient basis for a section 1983 claim. *Kinash v. Callahan,*129 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir.1997).

> 2. In addition, Chapman does not allege in her complaint that (1) she is a member of a racial minority, or (2) defendants intentionally discriminated against her, necessary elements to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1982. *Green v. State Bar of Texas,*27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir.1994); *Bellows v. Amoco Oil,*118 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir.1997).

> 3. Further, we cannot discern from the complaint the manner in which Chapman has been discriminated against based on a disability, nor can we tell what disability forms the basis of the alleged discrimination. Accordingly, Chapman’s appeal is without arguable merit and is therefore frivolous. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.1983).

AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 4.3


 


Consent of Independent Registered
Public Accounting Firm


We consent to the
reference made to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in Part B of the Prospectus
and to the use of our report dated December 14, 2016, in this Registration Statement (Form S-6 No. 333-213884) of Smart Trust 284,
comprising Smart Trust, Enhanced Value II Trust, Series 16.


 


/s/ Grant
Thornton LLP


 


Chicago, Illinois


December 14, 2016
Cite as 2015 Ark. 48



## SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-14-585 JAMES TREE AND CRANE SERVICE, INC., AND ROGER WILLIAMS APPELLANTS V.
TERRI FOUGHT APPELLEE Opinion Delivered February 17, 2015

SPECIAL MASTER APPOINTED.

PER CURIAM Appellants James Tree and Crane Service, Inc., and Roger Williams filed a petition for writ of certiorari to complete the record on June 30, 2014. This court granted the petition on July 31, 2014, and issued the writ for the court reporter to complete the record within ten days. After granting an additional twenty-day extension of time to lodge the record, on October 9, 2014, we granted a final sixty-day extension of the writ for the record to be completed and filed with this court on December 8, 2014. On December 5, 2014, appellant filed a petition for judicial relief stating that the court reporter, Sheila Russell, had advised them that the record would not be completed by the December 8, 2014 deadline. In the petition, appellants requested additional time for the court reporter to prepare the record. This court granted the petition and extended the time for filing the record to January 28, 2015. We also ordered the court reporter to appear before this court on January 29, 2015, to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for her failure to comply with the writCite as 2015 Ark. 48

of certiorari, as previously ordered. The record was not completed and filed on January 28, 2015. The court reporter appeared before this court on January 29, 2015, and entered a plea of not guilty. At that time, this court advised the court reporter that we would appoint a special master to make findings of fact concerning this matter. We hereby appoint the Honorable John Mauzy Pittman as special master to conduct a hearing, to make findings of fact, and to file his findings with this court’s clerk. Upon receipt of the special master’s findings, we will render a decision in this matter. It is so ordered.

2 CV-14-585
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User Fees for Export Certification of

Plants and Plant Products

Last Modified: 

Print

PPQ-Issued Certificates

User Fee for Commercial Shipments (value of $1,250 or more)

Effective Dates Amount per Certificate

October 1, 2010–September 30, 2011 $104

October 1, 2011– $106

User Fee for Non-Commercial Shipments (value of less than

$1,250)

Effective Dates Amount per Shipment

October 1, 2010–September 30, 2011 $60

October 1, 2011– $61

User Fee for Replacing Any Certificate

Effective Dates Amount per Certificate

October 1, 2010–September 30, 2011 $15

October 1, 2011– $15
Certificates issued by PPQ on overtime are subject to both the overtime fees and the

associated certificate fee.

State- or County-Issued Certificates

An exporter who receives a certificate issued by a designated State or county

inspector on behalf of APHIS must also pay an administrative user fee. The

administrative fee can be remitted by the exporter directly to APHIS through the

Phytosanitary Certificate Issuance and Tracking System (PCIT), provided that the

exporter has a PCIT account and submits the application for the export certificate

through PCIT.

If PCIT is not used, the State or county issuing the certificate is responsible for

collecting the fee and remitting it monthly to the U.S. Bank, United States

Department of Agriculture.

Administrative Fees

Effective Dates Amount per Certificate

PCIT used PCIT not used

October 1, 2010–September 30, 2011 $6 $12

October 1, 2011– $6 $12

The administrative fee is applicable for every certificate issued by State or county

cooperators. The only exception is when the replacement is because of a mistake by

the ACO.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6800

DAVID A. GAMBINO, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v.

FRANK HERSHBERGER, PHD/Chief Psychologist, Federal Correctional 

Institution Cumberland; SHANE SHEETZ, PSY/D, Federal Correctional 

Institution Cumberland; Mr. EIRICH, Lieutenant, Federal Correctional Institution 

Cumberland; BRETT DODD, PSY/D, Federal Correctional Institution 

Cumberland; LEON BRYAN, PSY/D, Federal Correctional Institution 

Cumberland; 7 UNKNOWN OFFICERS AND 3 UNKNOWN NURSES; UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. 

Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:16-cv-03806-TDC) 

Submitted: October 30, 2017 Decided: November 2, 2017

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

David A. Gambino, Appellant Pro Se. Jane Elizabeth Andersen, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. 
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
3

PER CURIAM:

David Gambino filed an action in the district court seeking preliminary injunctions 

to recover and preserve evidence for use in a future lawsuit against prison officials. The 

district court denied the motions and dismissed the complaint because the Government, 

once on notice of the potential lawsuit, was already obligated to preserve any existing

evidence and provided documentation that it was complying with that obligation. On 

appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. See 4th Cir. 

R. 34(b). Because Gambino’s informal brief does not challenge the basis for the district 

court’s disposition, Gambino has forfeited appellate review of the court’s order. See

Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). In any event, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for injunctive relief 

because Gambino failed to demonstrate that he was likely to suffer irreparable harm in 

the absence of an injunction. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 

(2008). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Petitioner

v.

JOSHUA MICHAEL LUKACH,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 313 MAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of September, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by petitioner, are:

a. As a matter of first impression, did the Pennsylvania Superior Court err in 

holding that a suspect that is subject to custodial interrogation clearly and 

unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent under the standard 

articulated in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010), where he makes 

a statement that he does not wish to talk, but, qualifies that statement with a 

statement of “I don't know” and a general assertion of innocence?

b. Did the Pennsylvania Superior Court commit an error of law when it applied 

the wrong legal standard in affirming suppression of the physical evidence 

found as the “fruits” of [r]espondent's confession where there was only a 

violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda and the confession was not a 

product of coercion?
22192

#### Otani v. Yoshimura

Affirmed in part, vacated in part