IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

COREY LEWIS,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee.

§

§

§ No. 368, 2015

§

§ Court Below—Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware,

§ in and for New Castle County

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 1306017893

§ 

§ 

 Submitted: August 5, 2015

 Decided: October 12, 2015

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, and SEITZ, Justices.

O R D E R

This 12th day of October 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s 

opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to 

the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Corey Lewis, filed this appeal from the Superior 

Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”). The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm 

the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Lewis’ opening

brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm. 

(2) In July 2013, Lewis was indicted for Carrying a Concealed Deadly 

Weapon (“CCDW”), Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, 
2

Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Receiving a Stolen 

Firearm, Driving a Vehicle with a Suspended or Revoked License, No Proof of 

Insurance, and Spinning Tires. These charges arose from a traffic stop. On 

December 2, 2013, Lewis pled guilty to CCDW and PFBPP. As part of the plea 

agreement, the State agreed to enter a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges, to 

seek habitual offender sentencing for the CCDW count but not the PFBPP count, 

and to cap its sentence recommendation at thirteen years of Level V incarceration. 

Lewis agreed that he was a habitual offender. 

(3) On February 14, 2014, Lewis was declared a habitual offender and 

sentenced to a total of sixteen years of Level V incarceration, suspended after 

thirteen years for decreasing levels of supervision. Lewis did not file a direct 

appeal.

(4) On January 7, 2015, Lewis filed his first motion for postconviction 

relief under Rule 61. Lewis argued that his counsel was ineffective because he 

failed, despite Lewis’ request, to file a motion to suppress a gun discovered during 

an inventory search of the car that Lewis was driving, without a license, at the time 

of his arrest. Lewis also requested an evidentiary hearing and filed a motion for 

appointment of counsel.

(5) On April 14, 2015, a Superior Court Commissioner recommended that 

the Superior Court deny Lewis’ motion for postconviction relief, request for an 
3

evidentiary hearing, and motion for appointment of counsel. The Commissioner 

found that Lewis’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim was barred by his 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. The Commissioner also found that 

Lewis had not established grounds for appointment of counsel.

(6) On June 3, 2015, Lewis filed a motion to amend his motion for 

postconviction relief. Lewis sought to add a prosecutorial misconduct claim based 

on differences between the affidavit of the car owner included with his motion for 

postconviction relief and the police report. Lewis claimed that the differences 

showed that the police officer who found the gun during the inventory search 

committed perjury. 

(7) In an order dated June 15, 2015, the Superior Court accepted the 

Commissioner’s recommendation, found the motion to amend to be without merit, 

and denied Lewis’ motion for postconviction relief. On June 26, 2015, Lewis filed 

a motion for reconsideration. Lewis stated that he had not received the 

Commissioner’s recommendation and he would have objected to the 

recommendation if he had received it. In a letter dated July 2, 2015, the Superior 

Court sent Lewis the Commissioner’s recommendation and denied his motion for 

reconsideration as not ripe. This appeal followed.

(8) As the State points out, Lewis filed his notice of appeal from the 

Superior Court’s July 2, 2015 order denying his motion for reconsideration, rather 
4

than the Superior Court’s June 17, 2015 order denying his motion for 

postconviction relief. Lewis, however, filed his notice of appeal within thirty days 

of the June 17, 2015 order denying his motion for postconviction relief and the 

argument section of his brief is devoted to the substantive merits of his motion for 

postconviction relief and his motion to amend his motion for postconviction relief. 

Under these circumstances, we address the substantive merits of Lewis’ arguments 

that the Superior Court erred in concluding that his motion to amend was without 

merit and in denying his motion for postconviction relief. 

(9) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 

abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.

1

 The procedural requirements of 

Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive issues are addressed.2 In his 

opening brief, Lewis argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to 

file a motion to suppress a gun discovered during an inventory search. Lewis also 

argues that there was prosecutorial misconduct because the police officer who 

conducted the search lied in the affidavit supporting the arrest warrant and in his 

police report. 

 

1 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).

2

Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
5

(10) Both of Lewis’ claims are barred by his knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary guilty plea,

3 which Lewis does not challenge. The Truth-in-Sentencing 

Guilty Plea Form, plea agreement, and plea colloquy reflect that Lewis knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea for CCDW and PFBPP. During 

the guilty plea colloquy, Lewis’ counsel stated that he had explained the trial rights 

Lewis was waiving by pleading guilty and the collateral consequences of the plea. 

Lewis affirmed that he reviewed and discussed the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea

Form with his counsel, he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, he 

understood the range of sentences, and he was guilty of CCDW and PFBPP. In the 

absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Lewis is bound by these 

statements.4 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED 

and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice

 

3

See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 2009 WL 1640021, at *1 (Del. June 9, 2009) (holding defendant’s 

voluntary guilty plea barred claim that his counsel was ineffective in suppression proceedings);

Cooper v. State, 2008 WL 2410404, at *1 (Del. June 16, 2008) (concluding ineffective assistance 

of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file motion to suppress was barred by knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea).

4

Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 2008).