## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Cortez v. Muni cipal Offic ers Electoral Board , 2013 IL App (1st) 130442

Appellate Court Caption RI TA H. CORTEZ
, PATRI CI A TWYMON, ANTHO NY S M I TH, REGI NAL D WHI TL EY, WI L BU R TI L MAN, DEJ UAN GARDNER, RAMONDE WI L L IAMS, TYHAN I HI L L
, and LARRY CABAL L ERO, Plaintiffs-Appellee s, v. THE MUNI CI PAL OFF I CERS EL ECTORAL BO ARD FOR THE CI TY OF CALUMET CI TY, ADO L F AGUI LAR, RANDY BA RRON, BET TY BO L ES, J OSEPH L

. CAS T E L L ANOS, GUY EVELAND, ROBERT FREDRI CKSEN, STEVON GRANT, D E B O R A H H A Y N E S

- S H E G O G
, C A S S A N D R A H O LB E R T
, BERNI CE M. McCL ENDON , SAL I MAH MUHAMMAD, ANNI E M. SMI TH, and CARRI E SPAUL DI NG, De fenda

nts-Appellants.

District & N o. First District, Six th Division Docke t No. 1-13-0442

Filed Fe bruar y 25, 2013

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st i tut es no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt e r of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In an action arising from objec t i o n s to the nominating paper s filed by primary elec tion candidates for positions in the g overnme nt of a city
, the municipal elec toral bo ar d ’s decision to remove from the ballot eig ht candidates who omitted the words “who is to me persona lly known” from the notarization on the “Statement of Candidacy” was reve rsed, since the notarization substantially complied with the require ments of the Election Code, but a candidate who filed a “Statement o f E co n o m ic Intere sts” applicable to statewide off ices, ra ther than the local unit of g overnme nt at issue, was proper ly remove d from the ballot on the g round that he did
not substantially comply with the purpose of the statutory require ments.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 2012-COEL -026; the Hon. Edmund Ponce de L eon, Judge, pr esiding

.J udg ment Affir med in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t.

Counsel on Appea l J ames P. Nally , of Chicag o, for a ppellants.

J ohn J . J awor , of Jawor L aw F irm PC, of Bolingbr ook, for a ppellees.

Panel J USTI CE G ORDON delivere d the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
J ustices Hall and Re y es conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In the case at bar, the defe ndant, Municipal Offic ers Electora l Boa rd fo r t h e C i t y o f Calumet City (the Boa

rd), was persua ded by cer tain objectio n s m ade to the nominating
paper s o f n ine Democr atic candidates for various office s in Calumet City ; and, thus, the Boa rd ruled that the candidates’ names could not be place d on the ballot for the Fe bruar y 26, 2013, consolidated primary elec tion. The circ uit court of Cook County reve rsed the Boa rd’s order
, and the Boa

rd now appea ls to us. This appea l conce rns the candida cy of the following nine candidates: Rita Cortez, Patricia Twy mon, Anthony Smit h, Reg inald Whit ley
, Wil bur Tilman, DeJuan Gar dner, RaMonde Wil liams, Ty hani Hill, and L ar ry Caballero. For the

rea sons stated below, we reve rse the Boa rd’s decision with respe ct to the firs t ei gh t candidates and, thus, find that their names may rema in on the ballot. Howeve r, we aff irm the Boa rd ’s decision with respe ct to L arr y Caballero and, thus, find that his name may not

rema in on the ballot.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 I . Fa cts Relatingto All Nine Candidates ¶ 4 An objection common to the nominating paper s of all nine candida tes was that the words in the not ar i zation, “who is to me persona lly known,” wer e omitted on the candidates’ “Statement of Candida cy .” ¶ 5 Section 7-10 of the Election Code provides that the notarization on this statement “sha ll be in substantially

the followingform:” “Subscribed and sworn to (or aff irmed) befor e me by
..., who is to me persona lly known, on (insert date).” 10 I L CS 5/ 7-10 (West 2010). ¶ 6 I n co n t ra s t , t h e notarization on the statements of these nine candidates stated o n l y : “Signe d and sworn to (or aff irmed) by *** befor e me, on ***.” The Boa rd sustained this objection with respe ct to all nine ca ndidates.

-2-¶ 7 I I . Fa cts RelatingOnly to Caballero ¶ 8 The objections wh i ch p er t ai n ed o n l y t o ca ndidate L arr y Caballero conce rned his “Statement of Economic Intere sts.” Caballero was require d to file a “Statement of Economic Intere sts” that would have provided information on his dealing s with Calumet City

. Instead, he completed a “Statement of Economic Intere sts” that was desig ned to provide information on his dealing s with a diffe rent g overnme nt entity , namely , the State of I llinois

. ¶ 9 Our state s t at u t e re qu ires candidates for office to provide a “Statement of Economic Intere st.” There is one form for candidates for statewide off i ce wh i ch poses questions perta ining to the State of I llinois (5 I L CS 420/4A-103 (West 2010)); and there is a differ ent form for candidates for local offic e wh ich asks questions perta ining to the local unit of
g overnme nt at issue (5 I L CS 420/4A -1 04 (West 2010)) which, in the case at bar, was Calumet City

. As will be discussed later , there are substantial differ ence s betwee n the two forms. ¶ 10 For

whateve r re ason, whe ther inadve rtenc e or deliberate intent, Caballero c hose to file the form for statewide candidates which asked questions about his connec tions with the State of I llinois

. Thus, he was never fac ed with the questi o n s ab o u t his connec tions to Calumet City

. On the form that he did file, he answe red “N/A” or “not applicable ” to ever y question. ¶ 11 As a result, there was an objection made that Caballero failed to file a “Statement of Economic Intere sts” as require d by law. An additional objection was made that he failed to file a rec eipt for the f

iling of the “Statement of Ec onomic Intere sts” with the Cook County cler k by the end of the filing period. The Bo ar d s ustained these objections and found his nominating pa

per to be invalid in its entirety

.

¶ 12 ANALYSI S ¶ 13 I . Standard of Re view ¶ 14 Where an admi n i s t ra tive board’ s decision has been revie wed by the circ uit court, the appellate court revie ws the d ec i s i o n o f the elec toral board rathe r than the decision of the circ uit court. Pascente v. County Officers Electoral Board
, 373 I ll. App. 3d 871, 873 (2007); Cinkus v. Vil l a g e of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board
, 228 I ll. 2d 200, 210 (2008). When the dispute is over the interpre tation of a statute, as it is in this case , then the question is purely one of law and our st andard o f re v i ew i s de novo

. Cinkus
, 228 I ll. 2d at 210. See also Pascente
, 373 I ll. App. 3d at 873 (“The question of interpre t i n g whether a candidate complied substantially with the Election Code is a que stion of law.”)

.

¶ 15 I I . The Nota rization ¶ 16 On this appea l, the appellants arg ue that the Election Code provides d if f e r e nt n otarization languag e for two differ ent documents: (1) the petition document that candidates use to obtain signatures from voters; and (2) the “Statement of Candidacy .” 10 I L CS 5/7-10 (West 2010). The notarization for the petition sta t es : “Subscribed to and sworn to befor e me on (insert date) ,” while the notarization for the “Statement of Candidacy” contains the following longe r form: “Subscribed and sworn t o (or aff irmed) befor e me by
..., who is to me persona lly

-3-known, on (insert d at e)

. ” 1 0 I L CS 5/7-10 (West 2010). The appellants argue that the

differ ence in languag e indicates a leg islative intent to use the longe r form on the “Statement of Candidac y .” ¶ 17 There is no dispute that these nine candidates used the s hort form, rather than the l ong form. There is also no dispute that the statute provides that the long form should be used on the “Statement of Candidacy .” The only dispute is whether t h e leg islature intended the striking of the candidates’ names from the ballot to be the appropriate sanction for a mistake in the use of the wrongnotarization form. ¶ 18 “The primary objective of statutory i n t erp re t at i on is to g ive eff ect to the intent of the leg islature.” Lacey v. Village of Palatine
, 232 I ll. 2d 349, 361 (2009). Eac h word, clause and
sentenc e of the statute must be g iven rea sonable meaning and not rendere d superf luous. People e x rel. She rman v. Cryns , 203 I ll. 2d 264, 280 (2003). ¶ 19 Fi rs t , t h e s t at u t e d o es not aff irmatively state that the sanction for a discrepa ncy i n languag e is the striking of the entire candida cy

. S ec o n d
, and most importantly
, the statue does state that the “ Statement of Candidac y” has to be only “in substantially the foll owing form.” 10 I L CS 5/7-10 (West 2010). S ee O’Connor v. Cook County Officers Electoral Boar d
, 2 8 1 I ll. App. 3d 1108, 1113 (1996) (“I f t he legislature had int ended to require that the nominating petition be in the exac t form as set out in section 7-10, it would not have used the word ‘ substantially .’ ” ( Emphasis in origina l.)). ¶ 20 The appellants argue that the doctrine of substantial compliance should not apply wher e the leg islature has spe cifica lly provided for differ ent l anguag e for one for m, as opposed to

ano t her form. Howeve r, it will almost alway s be the case that one form say s something differ ent than another form; otherwise, it would provide only one form. Al s o , an d more importantly
, the statute simply does not state what appellants arg ue. The statute d o es not state, as appellants would have us rea d it, that the bulk of the form must “be in substantially the following form,” but when i t co m es to the notarization part, that must be exact and wi thout any deviation, or the whole candida cy would be improper. Samuelson v. Cook Cou n t y Of f i cers Electoral Board
, 2012 I L App (1st) 120581, ¶¶ 27, 29 (Jus tice J oseph Gordon reje cted this same argument and held that the phrase “ ‘in substantially the following form’ ” “applies to a ll, not som e, of that section’s re quirements”)

. ¶ 21 Appellants cite Bowe v. Chicago Electoral Board
, 79 I ll. 2d 469 (1980) ( per curiam ), for the proposition that the doctrine of substantial compliance d o es not apply when the l egi s l at u re sets forth a “diffe rent, signific ant” notarization form. First, as we have stated befor e, “we do not interpre t Bowe as reje cting the doctrine of substantial compliance

. Rather, in Bowe
, there was no substantial compliance
, as a matter of fact

. Thus there was no compliance .” (Emphase s in orig inal and omitted.) Bergman v. Vachata
, 347 I ll. App. 3d 339, 346 (2004). Sec ond, the notarization form at issue in Bowe was not a “ differ ent” f orm, but rathe r the “standa

rd” form that the plaintiffs here actua lly used. In Bo w e , t h e document at issue was the petition document that candidates use to obtain signatures from voters, and the notarization require d for that petition uses the short form: Subscribed to and sworn to befor e me on (inser

t date). See Bowe , 79 I ll. 2d at 470 (citing I ll. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, ¶ 7-10)

. In Bowe
, “the undisputed evidenc e” ( Bowe
, 79 I ll. 2d at 470) showed that a person who had

-4-circ ulated petitions had not persona lly appea red befor e the notary public. Thus, the issue in Bowe was not about a form, as it is in this case , but rathe r about an undisputed lack of action. As the appellants candidly admit in their brief to this court, “[t] he important issue here is not who witnessed the signature, it is the fac t that none of the witness cer tifications *** includes the languag e mandated.” (Emphasis in orig inal.) As a result, we do n o t fi nd appellants’ citation to Bowe persua sive. ¶ 22 We are mi n d fu l t h at t h e provisions of the Election Code are desig ned to protec t the integ rity of the elec toral proce ss. Samuelson
, 2012 I L App (1st) 120581, ¶ 45 (“de signe d to *** prese rve the integ rity of the petition proce ss”); W elch v. Johnson
, 147 I ll. 2d 40, 56 (1992) (“de signe d to protec t the integ rity of the elec toral proce ss” (citing Troutman v. Keys
, 156 I ll. App. 3d 247 (1987), and Have ns v. Mil l er , 1 0 2 I l l. App. 3d 558, 571 (1981)) ). Howeve r, we believe that acc ess to a plac e on the ballot is a substantial right not lightly to be denied

. S

a muelson
, 2012 I L App (1st) 120581, ¶ 45 (“ ‘[B]allot acc ess is a substantial rig ht and not lightly to be denied.’ ” (Interna l quotation marks omi tted.) (quoting Nolan v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board
, 329 I ll. App. 3d 52, 55 (2002)) ); W illiams v. Butler
, 35 I ll. App. 3d 532, 536 (1976). This court does not condone the actions of the appellee s in this case and believes that people who desire to be elec ted to public office should be able to follow the rec ommended direc tions of the elec tions statu t e as written and provided. Howeve r, in this case , the reme dy of the Boa rd is drastic, and “abse nt a clea rer statement by the leg islature that it intended t h at reme dy as a sanction” for an appar ently inadver tent omission of languag e on a notarization, we decline to construe the Election Code in the same

manner as the appellants. W elch
, 147 I ll. 2d at 5 6 -57. Cf. O’Connor
, 281 I ll. App. 3d at 1112-13 (holding that the exact form of the circ ulator’s aff idavit, as set forth in section 7-10 of the Elec tion Code, is not m andator y ).

¶ 23 I I I . Caballero’ s “Statement of Ec onomic Intere sts” and Other I ssues ¶ 24 T h e Bo ar d co n cl u d ed that the nominating paper s of candidate L arr y Caballero w ere invalid in their entirety
, beca use h e fa i l ed to file both (1) the require d “Statement of Economic I n t er est s” and (2) a corr esponding rec eipt ref lecting the timely rec eipt of this statement, as require d by law. Of the nine Democr atic candidates befor e us, the filing of the

wr o n g “Statement of Economic Intere sts” is an issue only with respe ct to Caballero. Wil liams a

nd Hill f ailed to date their statements. Smit h inserted the incorre ct offic e of city cler k, instead of city trea surer on his statement of candida cy

. The Boa rd also invalidated their candida cies. ¶ 25 For the following rea sons, we agree with the Boa rd and, thus, aff

irm the Boa

rd’s decision and reve rse the circ uit court’s dec i s i o n with respe ct to Caballero. We disag ree with the Boa rd’s decision as to Wil liams, Hill, and Smit h, and reve rse the Boa rd and aff irm the trial court’s de cision. ¶ 26 The I llinois Gover nmental Ethics Act (the Ethics Act) require s that candidates for public office file a “Statement of Economic Intere sts.” 5 I L CS 420/4A-103, 4A-104 (West 2010)

. See also 10 I L CS 5/10-5 (West 2010) (a candida te must submit the “Statement of Economic Intere sts” form “a s require d” by the I llinois Gover

nmental Ethics Act). The purpose of the

-5-Ethics Act was “to reveal confl i ct s of i ntere st betwee n the publ ic t rust and private g ain by

requiring disclosure of financ ial interests rela ted to public employ

ment.” Mice li v. Lavelle
, 114 I ll. App. 3d 311, 313 (1983). ¶ 27 I f a candidate does not file this statement, then his or her nominating paper s are invalid. 10 I L CS 5/7-12(8) (West 2010). Section 7-12 of the Election Code provides, in rele vant part: “Nomination paper s filed under this Section are not valid if the candidate named there in fails t o file a statement of economic i n t er es t s as required by the I llinois Gover nmental Ethics Act in relation to his candida cy wi t h t h e appropr iate office r by the end of the period for the filing of nomination paper s unless he has filed a statem en t of economic interests in relation to the sam e go vernme ntal unit with that office r within a y ear prec eding the date on which such nomination paper s wer e fi l ed

. ” 10 I L CS 5/7-12(8) (West 2010).
As the statute quoted above p ro v i d es, the failure to file the “re quired” “Statement of Economic Intere sts” will be excused only if the candidate filed a statement “in relation to the
same g overnme ntal unit” within the same year . 10 I L CS 5/ 7-12(8) (West 2010). ¶ 28 In the case at bar, Caballero filled out the form for candida tes for statewide office which asks questions perta ining to the State of I llinois (5 I L CS 420/4A-103 (West 2010)), instead of the require d form for local candidates which asks questions perta ining to the local unit of
g overnme nt at issue (5 I L CS 420/4A-104 (W es t 2010)) which, in the case at bar, was Calumet City . As we e x plain below, the e ight que stions on the two forms are substantially differ ent. ¶ 29 The first question on the statewide fo rm as k s a ca n d i d at e t o “[l] ist the name a nd instrume n t o f owner ship in any entity doing business in the State of I llinois .” 5 I L CS 420/4A-103 (W est 2 0 10). I n contra st, the first question on the l ocal form asks a candidate to “[l] ist the name and ins trument of owne rship in any entity doing busine ss with a unit of l o ca l g overnme nt in relation to which the person is require d to file.” 5 I L CS 420/4A-10 4 (West 2010). By filling out the statewide form, a candidate avoids having : (1) to list any outof-state businesses that he owns that do business with the local g overnme nt; or (2) to identify which listed businesses ac tually do business with the local g overnme nt. ¶ 30 The fifth question on the local form does n o t ap p ea r any wher e, in any version, on the statewide form. The fifth question on the local form asks the candidate to “[l] ist the name of
any entity and the nature of the g overnme ntal action reque sted b y an y enti ty which has applied to a unit of local g overnme nt in relation to which the person must file for any license, fra nchise or permit for annexation, zoning or rezo n i n g o f real estate during the prec eding cale ndar y ear ,” if the candidate has an owner ship interest in the entity of more than $5,000, or receive d income from it of m ore than $1,200 during the prior y ear . 5 I L CS 420/ 4A-104 (West 2010). ¶ 31 By not answe ring the fifth question, the candidate avoids having to disclose any license, permit or zoning re qu es t s m ade to the local g overnme nt, wher e the candidate has the requisite owne rship income amounts. ¶ 32 The six th question on the s t at ew i d e form asks the candidate to “[l] ist the name of any entity doing business i n t h e S tate of I llinois from which income in excess of $1,200 was

-6-derive d during the prec eding cale ndar y ear .” 5 I L CS 420/4A-103 (W es t 2 0 1 0 ). The six th

question on the local form poses the same qu es t i o n but with respe ct to “any entity doing business with a unit of local g overnme nt in rela tion to which the person is require d to file.” 5 I L CS 420/4A-104 (West 2010). As with the first question, by filing out the statewide form,

a candidate avoids having : ( 1) to list any out-of-state businesses from which he profits that do business with the local g overnme nt; or (2) to identify which listed businesses actua lly do business with the local g overnme nt in ex cess of the re quired amount. ¶ 33 Thus, three out of t h e ei gh t qu estions on the forms differ substantially betwee n the statewide ve rsion and the loca l version. ¶ 34 We have no way of knowing from a cold rec ord whether Caballero’ s decision to fill out the wrongform wa s intentional or inadver tent. Thus, we make no comment her e about his
actua l motives or intent. Howeve r, we observe that, if a hy pothetical “bad guy” wanted to avoid answe ri n g questions about his connec tions to his municipality
, he would have done exactly what Caballero did here

. Filling out the wrong form completely insulates a candidate from any char g es of perjury

. He could answe r honestly ever y question about t h e S t at e of I llinois and, thus, avoid having to provide any answe rs–truthful or otherwise–a bout his dealingwith his own municipality

. Mice li
, 114 I ll. App. 3d at 316 (the “policy” behind the “Statement of Economic Intere sts” is “cle ar. The leg islature intended that c e r tain in f o r mation be available to the public prior to the elec tion with respe ct to actua l or potential conflicts of interest that a c andidate might have.” ). ¶ 35 In addition, using the wrong form also insulates the candidate from any criticism by the media o r h i s constituents that his answe rs about his dealing s with the municipality wer e incomplete or less than forthcoming

. He could argue, with some forc e, that he answe red fully all the questions posed on the form that he filled out–that is, full answe rs about the State of I llinois
, with nothing about the municipality in which he is running for elec ted office

. Mice li
, 114 I ll. App. 3d at 316 (the purpose of the “Statement of Economic Intere sts” is to open “up [t he candidates] to public scrutiny and allow[ ] a better informed elec torate to choose among the alternative candidates on a more rational basis”); Lyons MVP Party v. Lyons, Il l i nois, Municipal Officers Electoral Board
, 407 I ll. App. 3d 1004, 1008 (2011) (the court permitted

a candida cy to g o forwa

rd beca use “[t] his is not a situation wher e the voters wer e unable to deter mine” key information). I f deliberate, this ruse would be both very cleve r and eff ective in dodgingboth perjury

char g es and c riticism from the media. ¶ 36 In W

elch v. Johnson
, 147 I ll. 2d 40, 51-52 (1992), our supreme court found, on the fac ts befor e it, that the threat of felony and misdemea

nor per jury char g es suppl ied enough of an incentive for a candidate to be truthful on his “Statement of Economic Intere sts,” and, thus, striking the candida cy was not nece ssary as a sanction. See also W elch
, 147 I ll. 2d at 57 (“our d ec i s i o n is limit ed to the circ umstances of this case ”). In W elch
, the candida

te failed t o disc lo s e h is employ

ment with a community colleg e on his “Statement of Economic Intere sts” ( W elch
, 147 I ll. 2d at 47), although the s tatement asked him to list t he name of any unit of
go v er n m en t that had employed him during the past y ear ( W elch
, 147 I ll. 2d at 51). Our
supreme court found that the rec ord establish ed t h at this lone omission was completely inadver tent on the ca

ndidate’s pa

rt ( W elch , 147 I ll. 2d at 49-50).

-7-¶ 37 In contra st to W elch , the threat of felony and mi sdemea nor perjury charg es is no threat at all in the case at bar, beca use the candidate simply sidestepped the issue of whether or not to be truthful by answe ring entirely differ ent questions. In essenc e, the candidate substitut ed differ ent questions and answe red those instead. Mice li
, 114 I ll. App. 3d at 317 (holding that filing a “Statement of Economic Intere sts” with r espec t to the Chicag o Boa rd of Education did not satisfy the require ment, for a candidate running for alder man, to file a statement with
respe ct to the City

of Chicag o). ¶ 38 I t is interesting to note that filling out the wrong statement was an issue only with respec t to Caballero, and not with respe ct to any of the other eig ht Democr ati c candidates for Calumet City office s. Howeve r, as we decide this issue as a purely leg al question, wher e de

novo revie w applies, we do not rea ch the f actua l issue of his actual intent. ¶ 39 Since permitting a candidate to fill out t he wrong statement would open the proce ss up to the possibili ty of subterfug e and circ umvention in a way that we cannot imag ine our leg islature intended, w e find that filling out the wrong form does not c onstitut e substantial compliance

. Mice li
, 114 I ll. App. 3d at 316 (if a decision would mean that “a candidate could alway s circ umvent,” then that cannot be what the leg islature intended ). I f we woul d find otherwise, the prec edent we would set would allow all candidates to thwart the intention of the l eg islature in requiring the fil ing of an economic i ntere s t s s t at em ent, which is to show that no conflict of inter est exist s with the g overnme ntal body to which the ca

ndidate seeks elec ted offic e. ¶ 40 The doc trine of substantial complianc e will save a ca ndidate’s nominatingpaper s only when the de fec t is minor and the pape rs still satis fy “the a ppare nt purpose” of

the statute’s require ments. Lewis v. Dunne
, 63 I ll. 2d 48, 53 (1976); Goodman v. W ard
, 241 I ll. 2d 398, 409 (2011) (citing Lewis with approva l and holding that to be in substantial compliance
, a candidate’s nom i n at ing paper s must satisfy the statute’s purpose)

. Her e, as we have explained, the appar ent purpose was circ umvented, and thu s t he doctrine of substantial compliance cannot save this candidate’s paper s. Samuelson
, 2012 I L App (1st) 120581, ¶ 20 (“ ‘substantial compliance with the Election Code is acc eptable when the invalidating char g e

conce rns a tec hnical violation ***. But substantial c ompliance is not operative to r elea se a candidate from compliance with the provisions intended by the leg islature to guara ntee a fair and honest elec tion.’ ” (quoting Madden v. Schumann
, 105 I ll. App. 3d 900, 903-04 (1982)) ). ¶ 41 Fi n al l y , o u r d ec i s i on is limit ed to the circ umstances of this case without takinginto consideration that Caballero’ s answe rs to the questions on the state form wer e answe red “N/A” or “not applicable .” In add i tion, our decision is not to be taken as an expression of opinion on the sanctions clea rly provided by the leg islature for the filing of willfully false or incomplete stateme nts of economic inter est. ¶ 42 As a result, with respe ct t o C aballero only
, we agree with the Board, and we affirm its decision and reve rse the decision of the circuit court. As to Wil liams, Hi l l
, an d S m ith, we

reve rse the Boa

rd and aff irm the circ uit court. Our I llinois Supreme Court h as h el d that a

rea ding of the plain languag e of these statutes convince s us that “re moval from the ballot is
not a permissible sanction for the filing of a statement of eco n o m i c interests which is not true, corr ect and complete when filed with the appropr iate office r mere ly due to inadver tence

-8-on the par t of the per son filing the statement.” W elch , 147 I ll. 2d at 51.

¶ 43 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 44 For

the fore g oing rea sons, we rever se t he Board’ s decision and affirm the c ircuit court of Cook County with respe ct to the first eig ht candidates; and, thus, we find that their names may rema in on the ballot. Howeve r, we aff irm the Boa

rd’s de cision and re verse the circ uit
court of Cook County with respe ct to L arr y Caballero’ s “Statement of Economic Intere sts”; and, thus, we find that his name may not rema in on the ballot, and reve rse the Boa rd ’s decision and aff

irm the circ uit court with respe ct to Wil liams and Hill on their statements of economic interest. We also reve rse the Boa rd’s decision o n S m i t h and find that he substantially

complied with the elec tion laws and af firm the cir cuit court.

¶ 45 Affir

med in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t.

-9-