The Honor able Paul G. Ga rdephe , of the United States District Court for the Southern 1 District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation. 10-3046-op J ohnson v. United States



### UNITED STATES COUR T OF APP EALS FOR THE S EC ON D CIR C U IT

August Term, 2010 (Submitt ed: August 23, 2010 Dec ided: October 8, 2010) Docke t No. 10-3046-op

______________________________________________________ L EO NAR D C. J OHNS ON ,

Petitioner , v. U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Respondent
.

______________________________________________________ B e fo re : K

ATZ MANN and H A LL , Circuit Judges , G AR DE PH E , District Judge
. 1 Petitioner applies for le ave to f ile a succ essive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. P etitioner’s pr op os e d § 22 55 mot ion , h ow e ve r, wo uld no t be “ se c on d o r s uc c e ssi ve ” un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 2255(h), be cause it is hi s first § 2255 motion challeng ing his amended judg ment of convic tion. Acc ording ly , we de ny

the succ essive application as unnece ssary and tra nsfer the matter to the d i s tri ctco urtwi thi n s tru ct i o n s th ata n ew § 2 2 5 5 m o t i o nb e a cc ep t edfo r f i l i n g. L EO NAR D C. J OHNS ON , Way mart, Pa., pro se. K AT HERI NE P O LK F A I LLA , A ssi sta nt Unit e d St ate sWe g e ne ra lly re fe r t o a ha be a s r e qu e st und e r § 22 55 a s a “ mot ion ,” a

ha be a s r e qu e st 2 under § 2254 a s a “pe tition,” and a re quest for le ave to f ile a sec ond or succ essive § 2255 motion 2 Attorney , for

P r e e tB h ar ar a , U n i t e d

S t at e s A t t o r

n e y, Southern District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, N.Y.
K ATZ MANN , Circuit Judge : P et i t i o n er L eo n ar d C
. J o h n s o n , p ro ce ed i n g pro s e , seeks lea ve to file a

succe ssive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 mot ion challeng ing his amended judg ment of convic tion for ar med bank r obbery and ca rry ing a firea rm duringa cr ime of violence . We hold that J ohnson’s proposed § 2255 motion would not be successive in lig ht of the Supreme Court’ s decision in Magwood v. Patterson , __ U.S. __, 130 S. C t. 2788 (2010), bec ause it is his first § 2255 motion challeng ing the
ame nd e d ju dg me nt o f c onvic tio n, and that Magwood

pa rt ia lly a br og ate s th is C ourt ’s de c isi on in Galtieri v. United States , 128 F.3d 33 ( 2d Cir. 1997). We theref ore de ny the succ essive application as unne cessa

ry and tra nsfer the matter to the district c ourt with instructions that a new § 2 2 5 5 m o t i o nb e a cc ep t edfo r f i l i n g. Bac kgr ound In O c tob e r 2 00 0, John so n w a s c onvic te d o f b ank ro bb e ry , in

vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 2 11 3( a ), arm e d b ank

ro bb e ry , in

vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 21 13 (d ), and us inga fi re arm in
c onne c tio n w itha

c ri me of vio le nc e , in

vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4( c ). He wa s se nte nc e d to
concur rent imprisonment terms of 240 months and 274 months for his bank r obbery and ar med bank robbe ry

convictions, and to a c onsecutive imprisonment term of 300 months for his firea

rm conviction. In November 2001, we a ffirme d J ohnson’s conviction and se ntence
. See U nited States v. Johnson , 24 Fe d. Appx. 70 (2d Ci r. 2001) ( summary order). In November

2002, J ohnson filed a pro s e § 2255 motion arguing that, inte r a lia , h is 2or § 2254 petition as an “ application for leave to file a succ essive” motion or pe tition, or a “succ essive application.” In Ga lti e ri , howeve r, this Court used the term “pe tition” to refer to a habea s reque st under § 2255, and in Magwood , th e Sup re me Court us e s th e te rm

“ a pp lic atio n” to ref er to a habea s reque st under § 2254. Se e Ga lti e ri , 1 28 F .3 d at 37 -3 8; Magwood , 130 S. Ct . at 2802. Be cause J ohnson filed his succe ssive application on Jul y 29, 2010, the statutory 3 deadline f or dec ision was August 30, 2010. See28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)( D); F ED . R. A PP . P. 26(a) . Howeve r, we may "e x cee d the 30-da

y time limi t . . . where an issue re quires a published op in io n t hatcann otreas on abl y be p repa red w it hi n 3 0 d ay s . . . ." Ga lti e ri , 128 F.3d at 37. John so n p re vio us ly

fi le d a su c c e ssi ve a

pp lic atio n in

thi s Co ur t r a isi ngthe same c la ims , 4 which we denied f

or fa ilure to satisfy

the cr iteria set f

orth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). That deter mination would normally be bindingunder the law of the case doctrine, which “c ommands that when a

court ha s ruled on an issue, that decision should ge nera lly be adhe red to by

that court 3 convictions for both ba

nk robber y and ar med bank r obbery

constituted double jeopar dy . After the district court denie d this mot ion, we g rante d a ce rtificate of appe alability with respec t to J ohnson’s double jeopar dy

claim and a

ppointed counsel. In September 2008, w e held that the district c ourt
err ed in enter ing two se parate convictions and c oncurr ent sentenc es for both bank robbe ry

under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) a

nd arme d bank robbe ry

under 18 U .S.C. § 2113(d). See J ohnson v. United States , 293 Fe d. Appx. 789, 790 (2d Ci r. 2008) ( summary order). Ac cording ly , we modified John so n’ s ju dg me nt o f c onvic tio n b y va c atin ghis c onvic tio n a nd se nte nc e un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 2113(a) , and af

firmed the judg ment as modified. Id . at 790-91. In J uly 2010, J ohnson filed the pre sent application for leave to file a succ essive § 2255 mot ion
. In h is s uc c e ssi ve a pp lic atio n, John so n a

rgue s th at th is C ourt

e rr on e ou sly

mod if ie d h is 3 judgme nt of conviction by vacating his convic tion and sentenc e for bank robbe ry . Instead, he contends, we should have va cate d his conviction and sentenc e for both armed ba

nk robber y and for using a firea rm in connec tion with a crime of violenc e. Additionally , J ohnson argues that the indictment ag ainst him was defe ctive and that he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel at various stag es of his ca se. 4in subsequent stag es in the same c ase unle ss cog ent and c ompelling r easons militate otherw ise.”

Johnson v. H

older , 564 F.3d 95, 99 ( 2d Cir. 2009)(interna l quotation marks omitted). The law of the ca se doctrine is not controlling, howe ver, where there has bee n an interve ning c hang e in law. Se e id . at 99 -1 00 . A s d isc us se d b e low , th e re le va nt l aw h a s c ha

ng e d in light o f t he Sup re me Court’s decision in Magwood v. Patterson , 130 S. Ct . 2788 (2010). 4 Discussion Under the Anti-Ter

rorism and Ef

fec tive Death Penalty

Act (“ AEDPA”) , a petitioner incar cer ated pur suant to a fe dera l judgment c annot bringa “se cond or suc cessive” motion for habea s relief

, unless he or she first obtains permission from a c ourt of appe als. See28 U. S.C. § 2255(h). B efor e dete rmining whether to gr ant an a

pplication for lea

ve to file a

succe ssive § 2255 motion, however, w e must first deter mine whether

the proposed motion would in fac t be
succe ssive. See Ste wart v. Martinez-Villareal , 523 U.S. 637, 639 (1998). In Galtieri v. United States , we c onsidered whether a propose d § 2255 motion shoul d be considere d succe ssive wher e, as he re, a defe ndant’s first § 2255 motion resulted in an a mended criminal judg ment. See128 F.3d at 37. We held that where the amende d judgme nt altere d a portion of the sente nce a

nd did not affe ct the convic tion, [A] subsequent 2255 petition will be reg arde d as a ‘ first’ petition only to the extent that it seeks to vaca

te the new , amende d component of the sentenc e, and w ill be reg arde d as a ‘ second’ petition to the ex tent that it challeng es the unde rlying conviction or see ks to vacate any component of the orig inal sentenc e that wa s not amende d. Id . at 37-38. We re asoned that such an a pproac h preve nted a de fenda nt from ra ising c laims in a second § 2255 motion that wer e ava ilable to be ra ised in his or her f irst § 2255 motion. Id . at 37. W e r e w e t o a

p p l y Ga lti e rihere , J ohnson’s proposed § 2255 motion would be succ essive. Al tho ugh Johns on

no min a lly

se e ks to c ha lle ng e the ame nd e d ju dg me nt b y c la imi ngthat hi s sentenc e wa s err oneously modified, he e ffe ctively

seeks to re litigate his fir st § 2255 moti on,5

contendingthat the orig inal judgme nt should have bee n modified in a diffe rent wa y than we decide d in our September 2008 summar y order . Moreove r, Johns on’s pre sent claims could have been r aised in his first § 2255 motion. We conclude, how ever , that our dec ision in Ga lti e ri c ann ot b e re c on c ile d w iththe Sup re me Court’s rec ent dec ision in Magwood v. Patterson . In Magwood , afte r a state prisoner ha d filed a § 2254 petition challeng ing his Ala bama murde r convic tion and death se ntence , the district court conditionally

g rante d his petition and vacated his death sente nce. See M agwood , 130 S. Ct . at 2791-93. The tr ial court subseque ntly held new se ntencingproce eding s, and it ag ain sentenc ed the state prisoner

to death. Id . at 2793. He the n filed a § 2254 pe tition challeng ing his ne w sentenc e on the g round that, inte r a lia , h e did no t ha ve fa ir wa rn ingthat hi s c on du c t w ou ld b e su ff ic ie nt t o
war rant a death se ntence under A labama la w. Id . at 2794. The district c ourt g rante d the petition,
c on c lud ingthat it

wa s n ot s uc c e ssi ve un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 44 (b ) a nd that th e state pr iso ne r’ s f a ir
war ning c laim was meritorious. Id . at 2794-95. The Eleventh Circuit re verse d. Id . at 2795. The Eleventh Circuit adopte d an appr oach similar to the a pproac h taken in Ga lti e ri , and conc luded that the state pr iso ne r’ s f

a ir wa rn ingc la im w a s su c c e ssi ve be c a us e it c ou ld h ave be e n r a ise d in his prior § 2254 petition. Id
. The Supreme Court rejec ted the Eleve nth Circuit’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and re verse d. Id . at 2803. The Court he ld that “the phra se ‘se cond or suc cessive’ must be interpre ted with respe ct to the judg ment challeng ed[,] " a nd that, wher e “the re is a ne w judg ment interveningbetwee n the two habe as petitions, . . . an application challeng ing the resultingnew judgme nt is not ‘second or suc cessive’ at all.” Id . at 2797, 2802 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Additionally , the Court held that the phra se “se cond or suc cessive” applies to entire habea s petitions, and not to indi vidual claims in those petitions. Id . at 2798. The Court re liedIn W all v. United States , the def endant’ s first § 2255 motion was filed and de cided on the 5 merits prior to his direct c riminal appea l; in fact, the § 2255 re lief g rante d by the district court reope ned the time to take a direc t appea l by

enter ing a

new judg ment. See_

_ F
. 3 d _ _ , 2 0 1 0 WL 3440869, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 2010). In those circ umstances, we held that the cla ims in t he § 2255 motion were inc orporated into the direc t appea l, and, as a result, the def

endant’ s subsequent § 2255 motion was not succe ssive. Id . at *2-3. Althoug h the subsequent § 2255 motion at issue in W

all was attackingan ame nded judg ment of convic tion for the first time, that fac t did not play

a sig nificant role in our dec ision. Se e id . H e re , b y c ontr a st, John so n’ s o nly dir e c t a pp e a l w a s p e rf

e c te d p ri or

to h is f ili nga § 2 25 5 mo tio n, and

thu s W all is disti nguishable. 6 pr ima ri ly on the statut or

y te xt, r e a so nin gthat “ [t]he lim itatio ns imp os e d b y § 2 24 4( b) a

pp ly on ly to a ‘ha beas c orpus application under § 2254,’ that is, an ‘ application for a wr it of habea s corpus on behalf of a pe rson in custody

pursuant to thejud

gm e nt of a State c ourt[.] ’” Id . at 2797 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) ( emphasis in orig inal). B eca use the state pr isoner’s § 2254 pe tition was his first collatera l attack on the “ interveningjudgme nt” betwe en his first and se cond § 2254 petitions, the Court concluded that it was not succ essive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Id . at 2801, 2803. We are called upon to de cide whe ther the r ule set out in Magwood

a pp lie s to the c a se befor e us. To do so, we must first deter mine whether

the holding in Magwood , which conc erne d 5 a § 2254 petition, also applies to § 2255 motions. The Supreme Court’s de cision was base d pr ima ri ly on langua g e in § 22 54 that r e fe rs to a ha be a s p e tit ion

fi le d “ on be ha lf of a pe rs on in custody pursuant to thejud

gm e nt of a State c ourt.” Id . at 27 92 ; 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4( b) (1 ) ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . Se c tio n 2 25 5 d oe s n ot c onta in a sim ila r r e fe re nc e to t

he jud g me nt o f a

fe de ra l c ourt , ref err ing only

to “[a] prisoner in custody under sentenc e of a c ourt established by Act of Congr ess[,] " a

nd permitting suc h a prisoner to move “to vac ate, se t aside or c orre ct the sentenc e .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (e mphasis added)
. The ter m “sentenc e” in § 2255( a), how ever , does not have a mater ially differ ent meaning than the ter

m “judg ment” in § 2254(b). T hese two te rms are often used inter chang eably
. See7

Bu rto n v . S

te war t , 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (“ Final judg ment in a cr iminal case me ans sentenc e. T h e s en t en ce i s th e j u d gm en t
. ”) (qu o t i n g Berman v . United States , 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937)); Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary

(8th ed. 2004) ( defining“sente nce” as “[t] he judg ment that a cour t fo rm a lly pr on ounc e s a ft e r f

ind inga c ri min a l de fe nd ant guil ty [,]” and no tin gthat “ se nte nc e ” is “[a]ls o termed judgment of convic tion [] ”). A s a pra ctical matter , courts routinely allow fe dera l prisoners to cha lleng e their c onviction, in addition to t heir sente nce, unde r § 2255(a ). F or that purpose, the w ord “se ntence ” in § 2255(a ) is understood to enc ompass both the conviction and the
se nte nc e . M or e g e ne ra lly , w e have no te d th at " no thi ngin t he AE DPAind ic ate s th at Co ngre ss intended the ‘ second or

succe ssive’ rules to ope rate differ ently with reg ard to state a

nd fede ral pri so ners ." Urinyi v. United States , 607 F.3d 318, 321 ( 2d Cir. 2010). Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the rule state d in Magwood a pp lie s to § 2 25 5 mo tio ns . We must also determine whe ther Magwood applies in a situation wher e, as he re, a prisoner wh o s uc c e ssf

ull y c ha lle ng e d h is j ud g me nt o f c onvic tio n in a pr ior § 2 25 5 mo tio n f

ile s a subsequent § 2255 motion challeng ing una mended por

tions of his underlying c onviction and sentenc e. B eca

use the pe titioner in Magwood challeng ed only

his sentence in the § 2254 petition he filed a fter his amended judg ment, the Supreme Court e x plicitly declined to a ddress the que stion of whe ther its rea ding of

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) “would a llow a petitioner who obta ins a conditional writ as to his sentence to file a subseque nt application cha lleng ing not only his resulting, new sentenc e, but also his orig inal, undisturbed conviction.” Magwood , 130 S. Ct . at 2802. Under Magwood , h ow e ve r, wh e re “ the re is a ne w j ud g me nt i nte rv e nin gbe tw e e n th e tw o h a be a s p e tit ion s,

. . . an app li cat io n ch all engin g the r esu lt in g new j ud gmentis no t ‘ seco ndor s ucces si ve' atall ." Id
. (interna l quotation marks omitted). And the Supreme Court ha s previously stated that “[a] judgme nt of conviction includes both the a djudication of guilt and the sentenc e.” Deal v. U nitedT h e g o v e r n me n t a g r e e s . A s it

s tate d in it s le tt e r b r ie f d ate d Se p te mb e r

2 2 , 2 0 1 0 , “ [i ]n 6 light of Magwood , J ohnson’s Third Petition should be treated a s a first Section 2255 petition.” Br . at 4. 8 States , 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). It follows that, where a first ha beas pe tition results i n an amende d judgme nt, a subsequent pe tition i s not successive r eg ardle ss of whethe r it challeng es the conviction, the sente nce, or both. Ap p l yi n g Magwood , Johns on ’s pr op os e d § 22 55 mot ion wo uld no t be su c c e ssi ve be c a

us e it i s h is f ir st § 22 55 mot ion

c ha lle ng ingthe ame nd e d ju dg me nt o f c onvic tio n. A d if fe re nt r e su lt i s 6 not warr anted by

the fa ct that J ohnson’s claims could have been r aised in his prior § 2255 motion or the fa ct that he e ffe ctively challeng es an una

mended c omponent of the judg ment. In light of Magwood , we must interpre t succe ssive applications with respe ct to the judg ment challeng ed and not with respec t to particular c omponents of that judg ment. See M agwood , 130 S. Ct . at 2797, 2802. To the extent that our decision in Ga lti e riis inconsistent with Magwood , it is no l ong er g ood law. Conclusion For the fore g oing r easons, Johnson’s application for lea ve to file a

succe ssive § 2255 mot ion is DE NI ED a s unn e c e ssa ry and the matte r i s tr ans fe rr e d to the dis tr ic t c ourt wi th i n s tru ct i o n s th ata n ew § 2 2 5 5 m o t i o nb e a cc ep t edfo r f i l i n g.