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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43253

BONNEVILLE COUNTY 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CODY M. WILLIAMS,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

1993 HARLEY DAVIDSON, VIN

1HD1BJL4XPY022083

Defendant.

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2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 590

Filed: June 30, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bonneville County. Hon. Joel E. Tingey, District Judge; Hon. Jason D. Walker, 

Magistrate.

District court’s decision, on intermediate appeal, affirming the magistrate’s order 

denying motion to set aside default judgment, affirmed.

Cody M. Williams; Boise, pro se appellant. 

Nelson, Hall, Parry, Tucker, PLLC; Weston S. Davis, Idaho Falls, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Cody M. Williams appeals from the district court’s decision, on intermediate appeal, 

affirming the magistrate’s denial of Williams’ motion to set aside default judgment. For the 

reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court. 

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On May 25, 2014, the Bonneville County Sheriff’s office seized a 1993 Harley Davidson, 

VIN 1HD1BJL4XPY022083, owned by Cody M. Williams. On May 29, 2014, the Bonneville 
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County Prosecuting Attorney (Bonneville) filed a complaint in rem, pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 37‐2744. The complaint alleged that the motorcycle was the proceeds of the sale of illegal 

substances and/or had either been used or intended to be used in connection with the illegal 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances in violation of the Uniform 

Controlled Substances Act. 

On June 19, 2014, Bonneville filed for default judgment, asserting as grounds for the 

default that Williams failed to appear or answer the complaint. After receiving notice of default, 

Williams submitted to the court his objection to the application for entry of default and default 

judgment and also submitted a partial answer to the complaint. However, the documents were

not filed because the requisite filing fee was not paid. After a hearing, the magistrate granted the 

motion for default. 

Williams moved to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(1), claiming his mistaken belief he had twenty business days to respond to the 

complaint warranted relief from the default judgment. Further, Williams claimed his 

incarceration caused him to lose his paperwork, which created the excusable neglect necessary 

for the court to set aside the default judgment. The magistrate denied the motion, finding:

[T]he argument that’s raised by Mr. Williams is that he thought it was 20 business 

days as opposed to 20 regular days is a mistake of law; and that’s not a valid basis 

under Rule 60(b) to set aside the default judgment.

. . . .

He also indicates that during that time period he lost the papers and that 

that created the excusable neglect necessary for him--or necessary for the Court to 

set aside the default judgment. In looking at excusable neglect, the Court has to 

look at what a reasonable person would have done in similar circumstances. And 

I will readily admit that that is a difficult task because of the incarceration aspect 

of this . . . .

. . . .

However, the Court notes that from June 2nd through June 15th, that 

Mr. Williams was not in custody and had a significant period of time, 13 days in 

that period of time, in which he very well could have filed an answer, sought legal 

advice, or taken any action that he chose to have taken at that time, including 

getting replacement documents if he needed them. After he’s rearrested on the 

15th, he still has a few days. And again, with an asset of this nature, it would 

seem that that would be a high priority to get the--to get an answer made. 

And so as I look at those facts and as I weigh them, I can’t say that the 

incarceration in and of itself raises this matter to the level of excusable neglect.
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Williams appealed the magistrate’s denial of his motion to set aside default judgment to the 

district court. The district court, in its appellate capacity, affirmed the magistrate’s decision, 

reasoning: (1) the magistrate correctly concluded Williams’ mistake as to the twenty-day time 

period to respond was a mistake of law, which does not warrant relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1);

and (2) Williams’ lack of response due to incarceration was not excusable neglect. Williams 

timely appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity, our 

standard of review is the same as expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 

reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence 

to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law 

follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). If 

those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom, and if the district court 

affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm the district court’s decision as a matter of 

procedure. Id. Thus, we do not review the decision of the magistrate. State v. Trusdall, 155 

Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm 

or reverse the decisions of the district court. Id. 

III.

ANALYSIS

To prevail on appeal, Williams must: (1) satisfy at least one of the criteria of I.R.C.P. 

60(b)(1); and (2) allege facts which, if established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the 

action. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525, 527, 757 P.2d 1244, 1246 (1988). In his opening 

brief, Williams argues the magistrate erred in denying Williams’ motion to set aside default 

judgment because Williams had a meritorious defense. It is not until his reply brief that 

Williams argues he meets the criteria of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). In Idaho, pro se litigants are held to 

the same standards as attorneys. Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Carnes, 148 Idaho 868, 

873, 230 P.3d 760, 765 (Ct. App. 2010). In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is 

required to identify legal issues and provide authorities supporting the arguments in the opening 

brief. I.A.R. 35. Consequently, “this Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time 

in the appellant’s reply brief.” Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005) 
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(quoting Myers v. Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004)). 

Thus, we need not address Williams’ mistake and excusable neglect arguments on appeal. 

However, even if Williams properly argued on appeal that he met the criteria of 

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), his argument is unavailing. Specifically, Williams argues his misinterpretation 

of the time period to file a responsive pleading was a mistake of fact and his delay in response to 

the complaint due to his incarceration was excusable neglect. Below, the magistrate 

acknowledged that Williams may have a meritorious defense, but found that Williams provided 

no valid basis under I.R.C.P. 60(b) to set aside the default judgment. The magistrate found:

[He] may very well have a meritorious defense regarding the allegations in the 

event that there was a mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect that would 

allow the Court to set aside the default. But pursuant to [I.R.C.P.] Rule 60(b), I 

don’t think I’ve been provided with any of those factors that would allow me to 

set aside the default judgment. 

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) allows a party to request relief from a default 

judgment on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Only a 

mistake of fact, and not of law, is sufficient to warrant setting aside a default judgment. GroMor, Inc. v. Butts, 109 Idaho 1020, 1023, 712 P.2d 721, 724 (Ct. App. 1985). Failure to read a 

statute or misinterpreting a statute is a mistake of law. Washington Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n 

v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 913, 917, 865 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Ct. App. 1993).

Excusable neglect must be conduct of a type expected of a reasonably prudent person under the 

same circumstances. Gro-Mor, 109 Idaho at 1023, 712 P.2d at 724.

Here, the magistrate correctly found Williams’ misinterpretation of the time period to file 

a responsive pleading as providing twenty business days, instead of twenty regular days, was a 

mistake of law. Because Williams’ mistake was a mistake of law, it is not a valid basis to set 

aside a default judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). Further, the magistrate correctly found 

Williams’ incarceration was not excusable neglect because Williams had a substantial amount of 

time (thirteen days) not incarcerated and still had a few days after incarceration to recover his 

paperwork and file an answer. Because a reasonably prudent person under the same 

circumstances with an asset of this nature would have timely filed a response, Williams failed to 

show excusable neglect. The record shows there was substantial and competent evidence to 

support the magistrate’s finding. Because Williams did not meet his burden under I.R.C.P. 

60(b), we need not address his meritorious defense claim. Therefore, the magistrate correctly 

denied his motion to set aside default judgment. 
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IV. 

CONCLUSION

We conclude there was substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s 

finding that Williams did not meet his burden under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) because his mistake was a 

mistake of law and because he did not show excusable neglect. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court. Costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal are awarded to Bonneville.

Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.