J-S57027-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOHN CURTIS LEONARD

Appellant No. 191 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 19, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0005282-2011

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 21, 2014

Appellant, John Curtis Leonard, appeals from the November 19, 2013 

aggregate judgment of sentence of 231⁄2 to 71 months’ imprisonment 

following the trial court’s revocation of Appellant’s parole and probation. 

After careful review, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this case 

as follows. In November 2011, Appellant, while serving a sentence at 

Allentown Community Corrections Center, was granted temporary leave, but 

failed to return. Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of 

escape, graded as a felony of the third degree.1 On February 9, 2012, 

Appellant pled guilty to the aforesaid charge and was sentenced the same 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121(a).
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day. At sentencing, Appellant waived the preparation of a presentence 

investigation report (PSI), but, in mitigation, informed the trial court of his 

history of drug and alcohol abuse and about his personal family 

circumstances. N.T., 2/9/12 at 20-21, 22-27. The trial court sentenced 

Appellant to 111⁄2 to 23 months’ imprisonment in the Lehigh County Prison, 

to be followed by a period of 36 months’ probation. Sentencing Order, 

2/9/12, at 1. At the expiration of his minimum sentence, the trial court 

paroled Appellant on May 1, 2013. Parole Order, 5/1/13, at 1. Appellant’s 

supervision was transferred to Bradford County.

While on parole, Appellant engaged in the use of heroin and bath salts. 

In July 2013, Appellant overdosed and was admitted to the hospital. After 

he was discharged, Appellant entered a rehabilitation facility. On August 12, 

2013, Appellant left the facility against medical advice before his treatment 

was complete. Consequently, an arrest warrant was issued on August 20, 

2013 by the Lehigh County Office of Adult Probation, alleging Appellant 

violated conditions of his parole and probation by noncompliance with 

instructions, failure to remain drug free, and failure to successfully complete 

treatment. An amended arrest warrant was filed on October 28, 2013 to 

add overt behavior to the alleged violations after Appellant attempted 

suicide and was hospitalized. Upon his discharge from the hospital, 

Appellant was taken into custody in Bradford County. 
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On November 4, 2013, Appellant was transferred to the Lehigh County 

Prison. On November 19, 2013, Appellant waived his Gagnon I2 hearing 

and proceeded to a Gagnon II hearing before the trial court in Lehigh 

County. Appellant conceded the violations. At the conclusion of the 

Gagnon II hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s parole, and he was 

remanded to serve the balance of his original sentence at a state 

correctional institution. N.T., 11/19/13, at 10. The trial court also revoked 

Appellant’s probation and resentenced Appellant to 12 to 48 months’ 

imprisonment to run consecutively to the balance of his parole. Id. 

Appellant’s timely motion for reconsideration of sentence, filed on November 

21, 2013, was denied by the trial court on November 22, 2013. Thereafter, 

on December 18, 2013, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.3

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.

[1] Did the lower court err by imposing a 

disproportionate sentence based upon the nature of 

the violation and by failing to order a presentence 

investigation report or otherwise engage in a 

presentence inquiry to apprise itself of the 

[Appellant’s] circumstances of life and other 

significant factors relevant to the sentence? 

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2

Pursuant to Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, (1973), before 

probation/parole can be revoked, the probationer/parolee is entitled to a 

preliminary hearing (Gagnon I) to determine if there is probable cause to 

believe a violation occurred and a final revocation hearing (Gagnon II). Id.

at 781-782. 

3 Appellant and the trial court have timely complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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Appellant’s Brief at 7.4

Our standard of review when determining if a trial court erred in 

imposing a sentence following the revocation of probation is well-settled. 

[O]ur review is limited to determining the validity of 

the probation revocation proceedings and the 

authority of the sentencing court to consider the 

same sentencing alternatives that it had at the time 

of the initial sentencing. Revocation of a probation 

sentence is a matter committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court and that court's decision 

will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Mazzetti, 9 A.3d 228, 230 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). “[Our] scope of review in an appeal from a revocation of 

sentencing includes discretionary sentencing challenges.” Commonwealth 

v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). “An abuse 

of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a 

conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, 

as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” 

Commonwealth v. Burns, 988 A.2d 684, 689 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 8 A.3d 341 (Pa. 2010). 

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4 Appellant challenges the imposition of a new sentence following the 

revocation of probation, but does not challenge his recommitment for 

violation of his parole. See Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.
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In this case, Appellant asserts, “the [s]entencing [c]ourt abused its 

discretion by imposing a manifestly harsh and improper sentence for 

violations of probation without requiring a [PSI] or engaging in any 

purposeful presentence inquiry into [Appellant’s] history, circumstances, and 

needs for rehabilitation.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Accordingly, Appellant 

challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

It is well settled that, with regard to the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing, there is no 

automatic right to appeal. [Therefore, b]efore we 

reach the merits of this issue, we must engage in a 

four part analysis to determine: (1) whether the 

appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his 

issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a 

concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary 

aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise 

statement raises a substantial question that the 

sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code. 

The third and fourth of these requirements arise 

because Appellant’s attack on his sentence is not an 

appeal as of right. Rather, he must petition this 

Court, in his concise statement of reasons, to grant 

consideration of his appeal on the grounds that there 

is a substantial question. [I]f the appeal satisfies 

each of these four requirements, we will then 

proceed to decide the substantive merits of the case.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329-330 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013). 

We conclude Appellant has met all of the technical requirements for 

this Court to review the merits of his claim. Appellant preserved his issue by 

filing a motion for reconsideration of sentence, averring, inter alia, the trial 

court did not order a PSI or conduct a thorough inquiry, as required in the 
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absence of a PSI and the sentence was unduly harsh and violative of the 

Sentencing Code under the circumstances. After the motion for 

reconsideration was denied, a timely appeal was filed. Finally, Appellant 

included a statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f) in his brief, claiming the trial 

court “violated fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process when 

it imposed a sentence of total confinement for technical violations of 

probation and did so without ordering a [PSI] or undertaking a meaningful 

presentence inquiry.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.

To raise a substantial question, Appellant must proffer a “plausible 

argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing code or is 

contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 91 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Naranjo, 53 

A.3d 66, 79 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted). “[A]n appellant’s 

allegation that the trial court imposed sentence without considering the 

requisite statutory factors or stating adequate reasons for dispensing with a 

[PSI raises] a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 

638, 640 (Pa. Super. 2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Flowers, 950 A.2d 

330, 332 (Pa. Super. 2008) (further citation omitted). We conclude 

Appellant raised a substantial question by arguing the trial court “violated 

fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process when it imposed a 

sentence of total confinement for technical violations of probation and did so 
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without ordering a [PSI] or undertaking a meaningful presentence inquiry.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 10; see also Kelly, supra at 641.

Having determined that Appellant has met the threshold requirements 

of review, we turn to the merits of his appeal. 

[W]e are mindful of the general rule that a 

sentencing court should impose a sentence 

consistent with the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on 

the life of the victim and on the community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Where the 

court imposes a sentence for a felony or 

misdemeanor, the court shall make part of the 

record, and disclose in open court during sentencing, 

a statement for the reasons for the sentence 

imposed. At the same time, the court is not required 

to parrot the words of the sentencing code. ... 

Instead, the record as a whole must reflect due 

consideration by the court of the offense and the 

character of the offender.

Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 290 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(internal citations omitted), quoting Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 

A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2006). Further, total confinement may be 

imposed subsequent to revocation of probation if the probationer has 

committed another crime, the conduct of the probationer indicates he will 

likely commit another crime, or it is necessary to vindicate the authority of 

the court. See Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1283-1284 (Pa. 

Super. 2010); accord 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c). 

Appellant argues, “[the trial court] should have either ordered a [PSI] 

be prepared or engaged in some worthwhile examination of reasonable 
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information about [Appellant] that could have affected the type and length 

of sentence imposed upon him.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. We conclude the 

record as a whole reflects the trial court did engage in a meaningful inquiry 

into Appellant’s circumstances. At Appellant’s initial sentencing after he pled 

guilty to escape, the trial court was informed of Appellant’s prior record 

score and the circumstances that led to his escape. Also, Appellant 

addressed the court at length regarding his history of substance abuse. 

N.T., 2/9/12, at 14-15; 21-27. Appellant waived the requirement for a PSI 

at this proceeding. Id. at 20-21. Further, the trial court noted, “I 

structured the sentence so that if you do violate during those four years, I 

can send you back into the state. So, it’s up to you.” Id. at 35-36. 

At the Gagnon II hearing, the trial court learned of the details of 

Appellant’s violation, including overdosing and attempts at self-harm. N.T., 

11/19/13, at 3-4. Appellant testified about his continuing struggle with 

drugs and alcohol. Id. at 7. Specifically, Appellant testified, “... I just don’t 

know how I went from OD’ing to still using.” Id. Upon sentencing, the trial 

court addressed Appellant as follows. 

I heard you [Appellant]. I’ve also looked back, that 

you had a burglary, a retail theft, criminal trespass 

and forgery, for a prior record score of 5. Your 

underlying conviction was for an escape. 

I think you have been quite candid. The local 

resources have been exhausted. ...

...
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I’m concerned that you have a lot of factors going 

on, both in terms of your substance abuse issues, 

picking up on using a needle after you almost OD’d 

on bath salts, in combination with trying to harm 

yourself, I think is really a toxic combination for you.

And while this sentence is probably a bit shocking, I 

think it’s going to create enough time for the 

personnel of the state prison system to help find the 

right combination of treatment for you so that you 

are not falling back in the same problem. 

Id. at 10-11. The record, as a whole, reflects that the trial court, in 

fashioning the instant sentence, was concerned with the rehabilitative needs 

of Appellant and his continual issues with drug abuse. It is clear from the 

record that the trial court was familiar with Appellant and his particular 

circumstances and considered the nature of the offense and the character of 

the offender. See Kalichak, supra. Further, the trial court informed 

Appellant that a violation could result in a state sentence. Despite this, 

Appellant violated the terms of his supervision by failing to remain drug free 

and complete treatment programs as required by his supervision. 

Therefore, confinement was an appropriate sentence because Appellant 

conceded his use of illegal substances, the trial court expressed concern this 

activity would continue if Appellant was not confined, and it was necessary 

to vindicate the authority of the court. See Crump, supra at 1283. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by imposing a sentence of total confinement upon revocation of 
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Appellant’s probation. See Mazzetti, supra at 230. Accordingly, the trial 

court’s November 19, 2013 judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/21/2014