Final Report for the 2016 Outbreak 

of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)/

Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (LPAI) 

in Indiana 

September 29, 2016

1

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

Veterinary Services

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination
Nature of Disease

• Avian influenza (AI) is a viral respiratory disease that 

infects all avian species. 

– AI is a common disease, but it frequently changes or 

mutates. 

• Based on the severity of illness, the disease is 

classified as either HPAI or LPAI.

• AI viruses are named by two groups of proteins:

– hemagglutinin and neuraminidase,

– e.g., H5N2 or H7N8.

2
Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza

• LPAI is routinely detected in wild birds and usually 

causes only mild signs of disease, if any. 

• In poultry, LPAI is regulated and requires attention 

because of its ability to mutate into a highly pathogenic 

form if allowed to circulate, as demonstrated in 

Indiana. 

3
Incident Timeline

• January 14, 2016: National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN) Lab has presumptive positive HPAI result based 

clinical signs in an Indiana commercial turkey flock.

• January 15: National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) 

confirmed HPAI on the premises and identified the virus as 

H7N8. 

• January 16: By the 16th, an additional 9 premises had been 

identified as presumptive positive by a NAHLN Lab.

• January 17: NVSL confirmed LPAI H7N8 on 8 of these 

premises (virus was not isolated on the 9th premises). 

– Additionally, 2 Dangerous Contact (DC) Premises—one commercial 

turkey facility and one commercial chicken layer—were also 

depopulated. 

4
Incident Overview

• In all, over 414,000 birds were depopulated or died from 

HPAI. 

• Given the scope of the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak, the 

Indiana 2016 incident provided an opportunity to test 

improved processes and procedures that had been 

implemented.

• While challenges remain, the lessons learned from the 

2014–2015 outbreak helped USDA Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Indiana State Board of 

Animal Health (BOAH), and industry mount an effective 

and rapid response to the HPAI/LPAI incident.

5
Total Incidence of HPAI/LPAI in Indiana by Day 

(Based on Date of Clinical Signs or First Presumptive Positive Date)

6

1

2

7

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

HPAI-Commercial LPAI-Commercial
H7N8 HPAI and LPAI Detections in Dubois County, IN 

7

Note: Map produced during the incident by the USDA APHIS VS Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health.
First Detection by Flock Type in Indiana 

by NVSL Confirmation Date1

8

1 NVSL confirmation for this incident is when pathogenicity was determined by NVSL.
Transmission

• USDA APHIS, in collaboration with Indiana State 

BOAH and industry partners, conducted 

epidemiological investigations, including the 

following:

• field-based epidemiological surveys, and

• geospatial analysis. 

• Risk factors identified included: distance to dead 

bird disposal, distance to litter composting, and 

visitors entering barns.

• Findings overlapped those from the 2014–2015 

outbreak.

9
Transmission in Wild Birds

• H7 influenza A viruses are 

known to circulate in low 

pathogenicity forms among wild 

waterfowl. 

• Several farm owners had seen 

wild birds prior to the outbreak.

• However, approximately 300 

samples were collected, 

primarily in wild birds (and a 

few wild mammals), on or near 

Infected Premises in Indiana 

with no conclusive results.

10

For more information, please see the 

USDA APHIS Epidemiologic and other 

Analyses of Indiana HPAI/LPAI-Affected 

Poultry Flocks from the Center for 

Epidemiology and Animal Health. 
Organizational Response

• As soon as HPAI was suspected, the Incident 

Coordination Group (ICG) was ramped up.

• January 17, 2016: An APHIS Veterinary Services 

(VS) National Incident Management Team (NIMT) 

(Team Indigo) deployed to Indiana. 

• At the height of response operations, more than 

500 personnel (including APHIS, State, local, and 

contracted personnel) were deployed.

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Personnel

• APHIS VS NIMTs were deployed to Indiana as part of 

the unified Incident Command to support State and 

local personnel. 

• For the entire incident, there were 133 total 

deployments of APHIS personnel.

– 129 individuals deployed.

– 72 additional people were assigned to work as part of the 

ICG either remotely or at APHIS hubs. 

– Deployments in over 30 different positions, particularly as 

Veterinary Medical Officers and Animal Health Technicians. 

– Includes term-hires, who made up approximately 42% of 

Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services (SPRS) 

deployments.

12
APHIS National Incident Management Team Rotations

13
14

Total Number of APHIS Personnel Deployed to the 

Field by Organizational Unit

Note: SPRS = Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services; PSS = Program Support Services; WS = Wildlife 

Services; STAS = Science, Technology, and Analysis Services; MRPBS = Marketing and Regulatory Program Business 

Services; NIES = National Import Export Services.

103

11 7 6 3 3

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

SPRS PSS WS STAS MRPBS NIES
15

Total Number of APHIS Personnel Assigned 

to Support the Incident at APHIS Hub or Home Location, 

by Organizational Unit

28

24

4 4 4

3 3

2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

SPRS STAS PSS WS MRPBS LPA NIES AC

Note: SPRS = Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services; STAS = Science, Technology, and Analysis Services; 

PSS = Program Support Services; WS = Wildlife Services; MRPBS = Marketing and Regulatory Program Business 

Services; LPA = Legislative and Public Affairs; NIES = National Import Export Services; AC = Animal Care.
Contractors

• Additional incident support to both the unified 

Incident Command and ICG was provided by 

contractors. 

• As many as 5 individuals supported the ICG, but most 

APHIS contractors worked to support field 

operations, providing services and materials relating 

to depopulation and disposal.

• This incident ramped up quickly but was also 

contained rapidly. 

16
Contractor Support in the Field and to 

the Incident Coordination Group 

17

79

78

80

88

79

131 139

136

132

130

85

60

30 30

23 21 18

1

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1/17/20161/19/20161/21/20161/23/20161/25/20161/27/20161/29/20161/31/2016

2/2/20162/4/20162/6/20162/8/2016

2/10/20162/12/20162/14/20162/16/20162/18/20162/20/20162/22/20162/24/20162/26/20162/28/2016

3/1/2016

Total Number of Contractors (Field & ICG)

Note: This report was run daily Monday through Friday between 1/17/2016 and 1/29/2016; thereafter, only weekly 

or as requested reports were prepared as the incident response slowed. This includes only contractors contracted 

by the Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services Logistics Center.
Overview of Response Effort

• In large part, the success of the response to the Indiana 

outbreak is due to the lessons learned in 2014–2015. 

• Unified response was effective at detecting the virus quickly, 

depopulating rapidly, and conducting efficient disposal and 

virus elimination procedures. 

• VS NIMTs deployed rapidly, successfully integrating and 

collaborating with the Indiana State BOAH personnel in a 

unified Incident Command.

• At the ICG, information management processes were 

improved, easing reporting burdens and making data analysis 

easier. 

• New financial procedures were successfully implemented, 

streamlining payments to producers. 

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Overview of Response Activities

• Variety of depopulation methods were used.

• Most premises (11 of 12) composted as disposal 

method.

• Most premises (11 of 12) used wet disinfectant for 

virus elimination.

• On average, it took premises 88 days from NVSL 

disease confirmation to restock approval (range of 75 

to 105 days).

– Average of 84 days from completion of depopulation to 

restock approval (range from 71 to 105 days).

19
Surveillance and Diagnostics Summary

• Utilization of State and Federal resources for rapid 

sample transit aided rapid identification of virus.

• All commercial premises were rapidly identified and 

sampled in Control Area and Surveillance Zone.

• Door-to-door surveillance was conducted to identify all 

backyard premises in the Control Area.

• The NAHLN Lab at Purdue University ran approximately 

4,500 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests during the 

outbreak.

– Tests were predominately for permitted movements.

20
Appraisal and Compensation Summary

• New financial processes were implemented.

• Only the Appraisal and Indemnity Request Form was 

required prior to the start of depopulation.

• Revised financial processes were successful and 

timely:

– All indemnity payments for birds and eggs had been 

distributed to producers by February 10, 2016. 

– All further reimbursements for materials destroyed during 

the outbreak were paid by April 14, 2016. 

• This was a significant improvement from the 2014–

2015 HPAI outbreak.

21
Permit and Movement Summary

• Indiana State BOAH managed permitted movements 

from USAHerds.

– Indiana issued 738 permits for movement when the Control 

Area was in place (a permit for each movement).

• Data was subsequently entered into the Emergency 

Management Response System (EMRS).

• Movements were made to processors, landfills, 

slaughter establishments, farms, renderers, and other 

destinations. 

– Movements to a processor accounted for approximately 81% of 

all movements.

• Majority of movements were within the Control Area.

22
End of Outbreak and Cost

• Incident was restricted in size and scope.

– One county

– HPAI: 1 Infected Premises; 1 DC

– LPAI: 8 Infected Premises; 1 DC; 1 Presumptive Positive

• Response operations, including virus elimination, 

environmental sampling, and restocking approvals, 

continued throughout the spring.

• February 22, 2016: The Control Area was released 

after 38 days.

• May 1: Last Infected Premises quarantine was 

released.

• USDA obligated $30 million to pay for indemnity and 

response activities.

23
Summary of Key Events during the 2016 

Outbreak 

24 Note: Detection dates based on date NVSL determined pathogenicity.

   

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Economic and Trade Impact

• Several countries placed import restrictions of 

varying degrees. 

• Only South Korea imposed limitations on the entire 

United States.

• Most countries chose a regionalization approach. 

• Such regionalization decisions helped to significantly 

limit the economic impact of this incident. 

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Ongoing Challenges

• While this outbreak was small in scale, there were still unique 

challenges due to the number of detections occurring within 

such a short time frame, logistical complications, and adverse 

environmental conditions. 

• Ongoing challenges that have been identified include the 

following: 

– Managing expectations in the wake of the new 24-hour 

depopulation goal. 

– Tracking resources between Federal, State, and contracting 

agencies. 

– Rapid deployment of personnel and equipment. 

– Supervising and coordinating instructions for contractors in the 

field. 

26
Policy Updates

• Revised policy guidance documents implemented new appraisal 

and indemnity procedures in the 2016 Indiana outbreak. 

– Made the process significantly faster.

– Eliminated the complicated and time-consuming Cooperative Compliance 

Agreement.

– Provided a direct mechanism to quickly pay producers for depopulation 

and disposal activities. 

• Flat-rate payments, based on number of birds and production type, 

were successfully used to pay producers to conduct virus 

elimination activities.

• An Interim Rule, published February 2016, expressly allowed USDA 

APHIS to split indemnity payments between owners and growers. 

• All policy updates publicly available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep (go to the HPAI page).

27