IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21

- 1056 Filed March 30, 2022

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

vs. KENNETH BRYAN ADAMS , Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter , Judge.

A criminal defendant challenges his prison sentence. AFFIRMED.

Raya D. Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C. , Des Moines , for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines , Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J. , and Greer and Ahlers, JJ.2

TABOR , Presiding Judge

. Kenneth Adams pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual exploitation of a
minor , in violation of Iowa Code section 728.12 (3) (2019). He also submitted Alford plea s 1 on two counts of sexually

- motivated assault causing injury , in violation of sections 708.1, 708.2 (2) , and 708.15

. At sentencing, Adams sou ght probation, the State argued for incarceration. The presentence investigation (PSI) report recommended a suspended sentence and term of probation. After considering
th os e competing proposals, the district court sentenced Adams to a prison term
not to exceed four year s . Adams appeals. 2
Adams alleges the sentencing court abused its discretion by rebuffing the PSI recommendation and giving short shrift to the mitigating factors. When deciding whether to suspend a sentence, the district court must con sider the

“ minimal essential factors” in Iowa Code section 907.5. State v. Dvorsky , 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982) . But u nless the court fails to exercise its discretion or considers inappropriate matters, we rarely find abuse. State v. Pappas , 337
N.W.2 d 490, 494 (Iowa 1983). In other words, we entertain a strong presumption in favor of the sentencing court ’ s decision. Id. Adams bears the heavy burden of overcoming this presumption. See id.

1 By using an Alford plea, Adams did not admit committing the crimes but pleaded gu ilty because the evidence “strongly negate[d]” his claim of innocence

. See State v. Knight , 701 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted) ; see also North Carolina v. Alford

, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 2 Having pleaded guilty, Adams must show good cause to appeal. See I owa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) . Because he challenges his sentence, we have authority to consider his case. See State v. Damme , 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).3
Trying to shoulder that weight, Adams notes the PSI reported that he was at low risk for reoffending and recommended a suspended sentence and probation

. But PSI sentencing recommendations are not binding. See State v. Headley , 926 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2019). Instead, they are just one of many factors a sentencing court may consider. See id. So p ivoting slightly , Adams argues improper balancing. In his estimation,
the district court was “only concerned with the nature of the offenses in fashi oning the term of incarceration ” and downplayed all mitigati ng factors. Because the offense alone “cannot be determinative of a discretionary sentence , ” Adams requests resentencing. See Dvorsky , 322 N.W.2d at 67. True, the nature of the offense s weighed heavily in the sentencing decision.
But that wasn’t the o nly consideration

. Indeed, the court assessed the statutory factors. See Iowa Code § 907.5. The court recognized the PSI recommended probation. The court u nderst ood that Adams “ ha[d] a limited criminal history.” It
noted his employment circumstances, appreciating that his business and “the future of [his] employees” were on the line. And, t he court explored possible
mental

- health issues with Adams , asking : “Do you think you have an illness? ” And, beyond the statutory fa ctors, the court considered Adams’s reluctance to accept full responsibility, troubled that he used passive language to describe his actions. See Knight

, 701 N.W.2d at 89 (holding defendant’s lack of remorse was pertinent sentencing factor even when he en tered Alford pleas).
Because the court weighed all relevant factors

— PSI included

— we find no abuse of discretion. Even if the serious nature of the offenses most swayed the4

sentencing court , emphasizing one factor over another “ inheres in the discretionar y standard.” See State v. Wright , 340 N.W.2d 590, 59 3 (Iowa 1983)

. AFFIRMED.