Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

DANIEL DIXON, 

Appellant, 

v. 

CAROLYN DIXON, 

Appellee. 

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) Supreme Court No. S-16182 

Superior Court No. 1KE-15-00056 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7207 – October 20, 2017 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First 

Judicial District, Ketchikan, William B. Carey, Judge. 

Appearances: David S. Katz, Anchorage, for Appellant. Leif 

Thompson, Leif Thompson Law Office, Ketchikan, for 

Appellee. 

Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Bolger, 

and Carney, Justices. 

MAASSEN, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A mother and son dispute ownership of a house in Ketchikan. The son 

contends that his mother gave him the property following her husband’s death, and that 

he spent years repairing and renovating it on the understanding that it was his. His 

mother argues that she still owns it. She contends that she agreed to transfer title only 

if her son repaired the property and paid off the mortgage, which he failed to do. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Following a bench trial on the son’s quiet title claim, the superior court 

found that he failed to prove his mother’s intent to transfer the property. Because the 

superior court properly applied the relevant legal doctrines and did not clearly err in its 

findings of fact, we affirm its judgment. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

A. Facts 

In 1982 David Dixon purchased a one-bedroom house on Warren Street in 

Ketchikan. In 1998 he conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to himself and his wife, 

Carolyn Dixon. Carolyn testified at trial that the couple lived in the Warren Street house 

until 2002; thereafter David continued using it as a workshop and art studio. 

David died in 2005, and Carolyn had little interest in dealing with the 

Warren Street property. Her son Dan Dixon proposed that she refinance the house — 

encumbered by an approximately $30,000 mortgage — and offered to renovate it. 

According to Carolyn, Dan “was supposed to fix [the house] up and rent it and . . . pay 

the mortgage, pay any expenses that came up, and then keep the rest of the money.” Dan 

testified that “the goal was [to] get [the house] refinanced in [his] name” and “get 

[Carolyn’s] name off the mortgage”; he would then pay Carolyn back whatever she had 

to lend him to make this happen. 

Carolyn signed a quitclaimdeed on December 16, 2007. The deed says that 

she “convey[ed] and quitclaim[ed]” her interest in the Warren Street house to Austin 

Dixon, Dan’s son. According to Dan, Carolyn named Austin as the grantee at Dan’s 

request; Dan “wanted [the house] to be for [his] son,” but he was also concerned about 

“IRS issues” if the house was deeded to him. He testified, though, that he was sure 

Carolyn would have made out the deed in his name if he had asked her to. 

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The quitclaim deed was not notarized or formally witnessed. Carolyn gave 

it to Dan, but neither he nor Austin recorded it. Carolyn testified at trial that she did not 

believe the deed could effectively transfer her interest in the house until the mortgage had 

been paid off. 

In 2008 Carolyn refinanced the Warren Street property. She used the 

money from the refinance to pay off the first mortgage; she also added $33,000 of the 

proceeds to a shared checking account Dan could access for house-related expenses, 

including mortgage payments. Dan eventually depleted the account, apparently mostly 

on repairs to the house, though some of the money may have gone toward his dental bills 

and other unrelated debt. Between 2007 and 2014 Carolyn made ten of the mortgage 

payments, at Dan’s request; Dan apparently made the rest of the payments out of the 

shared account. 

Between 2008 and 2010 Dan made a number of repairs and renovations to 

the house, including plumbing and electrical work, reframing and foundation work, floor 

refinishing, repainting, and remodeling the kitchen and bathroom. He claimed he paid 

for the work with a combination of the refinance money from Carolyn and his own 

money. At trial he was unable to give any accounting of these expenses, and he could 

not distinguish between what he paid for with his own money and what he paid for with 

money from Carolyn. 

Dan lived in the house with his son for about a year in 2010. Starting in 

2011 he rented it out for the summer season. Between 2011 and 2014 he found three 

different tenants and brought in approximately $17,000 in rental income. 

In spring 2014 Carolyn’s insurance company informed her that the policy 

on the Warren Street house had to be rewritten to reflect that the property was no longer 

owner-occupied. Carolyn asked for a landlord policy instead but was informed that the 

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house would need to be rewired before it could be insured at all. Around this time 

Carolyn also learned that the utilities were about to be cut off because the bill had not 

been paid, and she received notice fromthe mortgage company that the checking account 

she shared with Dan was overdrawn and would not cover the monthly mortgage 

payment. Carolyn emailed Dan in May 2014, telling him that she had closed the shared 

bank account and her account with the utility company. She also informed Dan that she 

had written the mortgage company to let it know he would be handling the mortgage 

from then on. When Dan failed to respond she resent the email a week later, following 

up with a handwritten note on the June mortgage statement. In both the handwritten note 

and the email, Carolyn wrote, “The house is yours.” 

But Dan was in Seattle for the summer, and he made no further mortgage 

payments. And though he apparently planned to rewire the house himself in September, 

the insurance company informed Carolyn that it had to be done by late July in order to 

preserve coverage. Carolyn “realized [she] had to take . . . the house over” to address 

the wiring issue and to pick up the mortgage payments. After the rewiring was done she 

had her son Bruce and his daughter Amanda remove Dan’s belongings, board up the 

house, and change the locks. 

But Dan managed to get back inside. Carolyn eventually sought police 

assistance to remove him, and in October 2014 she obtained a 20-day restraining order 

to keep him away from the house. 

B. Proceedings 

In February 2015, after repeated calls to the police about Dan’s alleged 

trespass on the Warren Street property, Carolyn filed a complaint to recover the house 

from him and in March sought a writ of assistance, which was granted. Dan filed an 

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answer to Carolyn’s complaint and counterclaimed “[f]or a judgment quieting title to the 

Warren Street house in [Dan].” 

The superior court held a three-day bench trial on the quiet title issue. The 

court found that Dan failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Carolyn had 

given him the property, and it dismissed Dan’s counterclaim. Dan filed a motion for 

reconsideration, but the court denied it, explaining that “overwhelming circumstantial 

evidence” demonstrated Carolyn’s intent to transfer ownership of the property to Dan 

“only upon the fulfillment” of certain conditions, which Dan had failed to satisfy. 

Dan appeals. 

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

“We review the trial court’s findings of fact under the ‘clearly erroneous’ 

standard”1 and “will reject a factual finding only if we are ‘left with the definite and firm 

conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been committed.’ ”2

 “[W]hen a trial 

court’s decision of a factual issue depends largely on conflicting oral testimony, the trial 

court’s competence to judge credibility of witnesses provides even a stronger basis for 

deference by the reviewing court.”3 

1 Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 19-20 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Peters v. Juneau 

Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 833 (Alaska 1974)). 

2 Id. at 20 (quoting Alaska Foods, Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 482 P.2d 

842, 848 (Alaska 1971)). 

3 Id. (quoting Tenala, Ltd. v. Fowler, 921 P.2d 1114, 1118 n.5 (Alaska 

1996)). 

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“We use our independent judgment in reviewing the trial court’s legal 

analysis.”4 In evaluating legal questions, we adopt “the rule of law that is most 

persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.”5 

IV.	 DISCUSSION 

In support of his contention that Carolyn gave him the Warren Street 

property, Dan’s primary argument is that she memorialized the gift in 2007 by preparing 

and signing the quitclaim deed. Dan argues in the alternative that his claim fits an 

exception to the statute of frauds for parol gifts of land. 

A.	 The Superior Court Did Not Err In Rejecting The 2007 Quitclaim 

Deed As Proof Of A Transfer To Dan. 

Dan argues that the 2007 quitclaim deed, though lacking necessary 

formalities,6 nonetheless proves Carolyn’s intent that the Warren Street house belong to 

him. The lack of notarization and recording, he argues, is not fatal because case law 

holds that an unacknowledged or unrecorded deed may still be valid as between the 

parties to the deed.7 Dan further contends that the deed’s naming of Austin as the 

grantee made it ambiguous, and that the deed must therefore be reformed to recognize 

4 Id. (citing Walsh v. Emerick, 611 P.2d 28, 30 (Alaska 1980)). 

5 Id. (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979)). 

6 AS 09.25.010(b) requires that a transfer of an interest in real property be 

conveyed in a writing “subscribed by the party . . . transferring [the interest] . . . and 

executed with the formalities that are required by law.” And AS 34.15.040 states that 

a quitclaim deed conveys the grantor’s interest in property “when . . . duly executed.” 

See also AS 34.15.010. 

7 Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296, 1301(Alaska 1972); 

see also Maddox v. Hardy, 187 P.3d 486, 492 (Alaska 2008) (An “unacknowledged deed 

is only valid ‘as between the parties.’ ” (quoting Smalley, 493 P.2d at 1301)). 

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that Dan was the intended grantee. Based on these arguments, he claims that the superior 

court erred in treating the deed as a “legal nullity.” 

But the superior court did not err in concluding that the quitclaim deed did 

not validly convey title to Dan. To interpret a deed a court “first look[s] to the four 

corners of the document to determine the parties’ intent. If the deed is open to only one 

reasonable interpretation, [the court’s] analysis ends there.”8 “Only if the deed is 

ambiguous” will the court take steps to interpret it.9 The “four corners” of the 2007 

document do not contain an ambiguity.10 The document unambiguously identifies the 

grantor (Carolyn), the grantee (Austin), the property at issue, the consideration, and the 

date; it makes no mention of Dan. 

Dan argues that Austin’s name was used on the deed “as a pseudonym for 

[Dan],” but if that is so, it is not evident from the document itself. And while deeds made 

out to grantees under assumed names are not unlawful, the grantee must be “so 

designated and described as to distinguish him [or her] from the rest of the world.”11 The 

8 Offshore Systems-Kenai v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 282 

P.3d 348, 354 (Alaska 2012) (citing Dias v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 

240 P.3d 272, 274 (Alaska 2010)). 

9 Id. at 355-56. Cf. Fink v. Municipality of Anchorage, 379 P.3d 183, 191 

(Alaska 2016) (finding deed ambiguous where it failed to note the location of important 

natural landmarks in relation to the lot boundaries, when an earthquake had caused the 

natural landmarks to shift). 

10 “Ambiguous” means “capable of being understood in two or more possible 

senses or ways.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://ww.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ambiguous (last visited Aug. 29, 2017). 

11 Roeckl v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 885 P.2d 1067, 1071 (Alaska 1994)
 

(alteration in original) (quoting 6 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
 

(continued...)
 

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use of another person’s real name does not satisfy that standard, especially when that 

other person is known to both parties. As the superior court aptly noted, “I don’t see 

how you can get around the fact that [the document quitclaimed the property] to Austin,” 

not to Dan.12 

The evidence also supports the superior court’s refusal to reform the deed 

to accommodate Dan’s claim of ownership. “Reformation of a writing is justified when 

the parties have come to a complete mutual understanding of all the essential terms of 

their bargain, but by reason of mutual mistake . . . the written agreement is not in 

conformity with such understanding.”13 The “party urging reformation must establish 

the elements of reformation by clear and convincing evidence.”14 Here, the evidence 

failed to support Dan’s claim that he and Carolyn had “come to a complete mutual 

understanding of all the essential terms of their bargain,” as we discuss below. And Dan 

testified that the deed names Austin as the grantee at Dan’s own request, in part to avoid 

tax consequences; there is no evidence of a mutual mistake. 

We conclude that the superior court did not err when it rejected the 2007 

quitclaim deed as persuasive evidence that Carolyn intended to give the property to Dan. 

11(...continued) 

MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3006, at 349 (John S. Grimes repl. ed. 1962)). 

12 We are not asked to decide whether the quitclaim deed was valid as to 

Austin, and we have not considered the issue. 

13 AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. v. Totaro, 219 P.3d 153, 164-65 (Alaska 2009) 

(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Groff v. Kohler, 922 P.2d 870, 873 

(Alaska 1996)). 

14 Id. (quoting Wasser & Winters Co. v. Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers, 185 P.3d 

73, 82 (Alaska 2008)). 

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B.	 The Superior Court Did Not Err In Finding There Was No Parol Gift 

Of Land. 

Alaska’s statute of frauds generally requires that a transfer of land be 

memorialized in a writing in order to be enforceable,15 but the rule has its exceptions.16 

In Vezey v. Green we considered claims of adverse possession, noting that the elements 

of hostility and notoriety may be presumed when the claim is based on a gift from the 

record owner.17 As an aside we noted that in addition to adverse possession, “some states 

have adopted an alternate theory to support parol gift donees’ claims to real property”: 

under this theory a donee “may establish ownership despite the statute of frauds” by 

proving “(1) the donor’s intent to make a gift and (2) [the donee’s] own reliance on the 

gift in making valuable improvements to the property.”18 But we did not consider this 

theory any further in Vezey because it “was not argued by either party or considered by 

the superior court.”19 

Dan asks us to apply this theory of recovery to the facts of this case. But 

as in Vezey it is again unnecessary for us to adopt the theory, since even if we did its 

elements would not be satisfied here. As usually formulated, the theory requires a donee 

15 AS 09.25.010. 

16 AS 09.25.020. 

17 35 P.3d 14, 24 (Alaska 2001). 

18 Id. at 24 n.35 (citing Locke v. Pyle, 349 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1977); Gran 

v. Gran, 290 N.W. 241, 242-43 (N.D. 1940); Holohan v. McCarthy, 281 P. 178, 181 (Or. 

1929); Adams v. Adams, 205 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. 1947); Kelly v. Crawford, 88 N.W. 

296, 299 (Wis. 1901)). 

19	 Id. 

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to prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence.20 First, the donee must show 

that the donor made a present gift of land, meaning that “the donor must, at the time [s]he 

makes [the gift], intend an immediate divestiture of the rights of ownership out of 

[her]self and a consequent immediate vesting of such rights in the donee.”21 Second, the 

donee must show that he took the land believing it was a gift.22 Third, the donee must 

have made permanent and valuable improvements to the land in reliance on the gift.23 

The superior court, in evaluating whether Dan had proven a parol gift, 

relied on Alaska promissory estoppel cases24 as well as an Arkansas case, Hendrix v. 

20 See, e.g., Hendrixv. Hendrix, 506 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Ark. 1974); Gran, 290 

N.W. at 243; Conradi v. Perkins, 941 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Or. 1997); Estate of Wright, 482 

S.W.3d 650, 657 (Tex. App. 2015); see also Vezey, 35 P.3d at 24 (implying that a parol 

gift of land must be proven by clear and convincing evidence). 

21 Estate of Wright, 482 S.W.3d at 657; Adams, 205 S.W.2d at 802, cited in 

Vezey, 35 P.3d at 24 n.35; see also Roberson v. Manning, 268 P.3d 1090, 1094 (Alaska 

2012) (requiring, when evaluating whether a party made a gift of a mobile home, that the 

alleged donor’s “donative intent . . . be clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal”). 

22 Locke, 349 So. 2d at 815 (citing Green v. Price, 63 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1953)); 

Gran, 290 N.W. at 243; Holohan, 281 P. at 181; Estate of Wright, 482 S.W.3d at 657; 

Adams, 205 S.W.2d at 802. 

23 Locke, 349 So. 2d at 815; Gran, 290 N.W. at 243 (“[W]here in reliance 

upon a parol gift of real property the donee takes possession and makes improvements 

so it would work a substantial injustice to hold the gift void, the gift is good and the 

statute of frauds . . . cannot be invoked to defeat it.” (citing Heuer v. Heuer, 253 N.W. 

856 (N.D. 1934))); Conradi, 941 P.2d at 1085 (citing Thayer v. Thayer, 138 P. 478 (Or. 

1914); Luckey v. Deatsman, 343 P.2d 723 (Or. 1959)); Holohan, 281 P. at 181; Estate 

of Wright, 482 S.W.3d at 657. 

24 Kiernan v. Creech, 268 P.3d 312, 315-19 (Alaska 2012) (holding that the 

evidence could support application of promissory estoppel exception to statute of frauds 

based on claimant’s partial payment of costs involved in purchasing commercial towing 

(continued...) 

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Hendrix, which laid out the elements of a parol gift claim as described above.25 The 

court found that Dan failed to prove the first element: that Carolyn intended to make a 

“present gift” of the Warren Street property.26 The court found instead that although 

Carolyn intended to give the house to Dan, certain “things had to happen” first. 

Dan argues that the superior court mistakenly required that he “prove [that] 

the precise terms of the gift were clear and unambiguous”; he notes that a gift need not 

include all the terms necessary to a contract, such as price and duration. But although 

the superior court did allude to “the terms of the gift,” it decided the case on the ground 

that Dan failed to prove Carolyn’s intent to make a present gift of the property; it found 

that Dan did not show “clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly] . . . that this was intended as a 

gift.” In our view, the court was appropriately focused on Carolyn’s intent. 

We further conclude that the superior court did not err in its factual finding 

24(...continued) 

lot, performance of improvements, and payment of half the monthly mortgage and utility 

costs, where defendant claimed that claimant was a renter rather than a co-owner); 

Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P.3d 657, 668 (Alaska 

2002) (holding that a letter was too indefinite to constitute a “promise” for purposes of 

promissory estoppel); Alaska DemocraticPartyv. Rice, 934P.2d1313, 1316-17 (Alaska 

1997) (affirming jury finding of promissory estoppel based on former employee’s 

substantial change in position in reliance on employer’s promise). 

25 Hendrix, 506 S.W.2d at 852. 

26 See Estate of Wright, 482 S.W.3d at 657 (“[T]he donor must, at the time he 

makes [the gift], intend an immediate divestiture of the rights of ownership out of himself 

and a consequent immediate vesting of such rights in the donee.”); see also Roberson, 

268 P.3d at 1094 (“The superior court must . . . determine if [the alleged donor] had the 

necessary donative intent to make a gift of his share of the mobile home to [the alleged 

donee], rather than a mere promise to make a gift in the future.”); 38 AM. JUR. 2D GIFTS 

§ 18 (“A promise to make a gift in the future is not a gift, and it is revocable at any time 

until the gift is executed.”). 

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about what Carolyn intended. The primary evidence on which Dan relied to prove her 

intent to make an unconditional, present gift of the property — the 2007 quitclaim deed 

— is at best weak support for his claim; as explained above, the deed does not even 

mention Dan, and it was never formally acknowledged or recorded. And the superior 

court could reasonably reject Dan’s argument that Carolyn “repeat[ed] the gift” in the 

email and handwritten note from May 2014 when she stated, “The house is yours.” The 

notes are in the context of the unpaid mortgage and utility bills, which both parties agree 

Dan was supposed to be paying. The court could reasonably conclude that Carolyn’s 

statements were intended to emphasize that the house was Dan’s responsibility, not that 

it had already transferred to his ownership. Carolyn testified consistently that “it was 

[her] intention that [Dan] would have [the house] when the mortgage was paid off,” and 

the superior court found her “much more credible” on this subject than Dan. She 

testified that even when drafting the 2007 quitclaimdeed she did not intend an immediate 

divestiture of her ownership interest, because she believed she could not legally transfer 

it “until the mortgage was paid off.” We conclude that the superior court did not clearly 

err in finding there was no “immediate divestiture” of Carolyn’s rights to the house, no 

“consequent immediatevesting”ofownership rights inDan, and thereforeno parol gift.27 

Nor did the superior court clearly err in concluding that Dan made 

improvements to the property in reliance on a “conditional agreement” rather than a 

completed gift. Dan testified about significant improvements he made to the property 

even before 2007, when he claims the gift was made. The superior court could 

reasonably conclude from this that Dan did not make improvements to the house solely 

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27 See Estate of Wright, 482 S.W.3d at 657. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

because he believed it was his.28 And again we defer to the superior court’s assessment 

that Carolyn’s characterization of the agreement was “much more credible and 

reasonable” than Dan’s. 

We therefore affirm the superior court’s judgment that Dan failed to prove 

a parol gift of land that would warrant quieting title to the Warren Street house in him. 

We further conclude that the superior court did not clearly err in declining to find that 

Dan was entitled to the house under another equitable theory.29 

28 See Pocius v. Fleck, 150 N.E.2d 106, 111 (Ill. 1958) (finding no oral 

contract when plaintiff performed services before promise was allegedly made). 

29 Dan briefly argues that he is entitled to specific performance under the 

doctrine of promissory estoppel. But that doctrine first requires “[a]n actual promise” 

that is “ ‘definitive, . . . very clear, . . . and must use precise language.’ ” Sea Hawk 

Seafoods, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 282 P.3d 359, 366 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Safar v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 254 P.3d 1112, 1119 (Alaska 2011)). The superior court concluded 

that Dan did not meet his burden to prove an “actual promise,” and Dan concedes this 

point in his appellant’s brief; he argues that there was no definite agreement between him 

and Carolyn and therefore no way he could be found to have failed to fulfill his part of 

the bargain. 

We recognize the parallels between promissory estoppel and the parol gift 

theory of recovery; some courts treat them as derivative doctrines. See Aiello v. Knoll 

Golf Club, 165 A.2d 531, 535 (N.J. App. 1960) (“[E]quitable relief [from the Statute of 

Frauds] is based upon the reliance of the transferee on the representations of the promisor 

— a form of promissory estoppel — rather than on the theory that part performance is 

a substitute for the written evidence required by the Statute of Frauds.”); Montoya v. N. 

M. Human Servs. Dep’t, Income Support Div., 771 P.2d 196, 199 (N.M. App. 1989) 

(“The same equitable rules, including promissory estoppel, protect oral gifts as well as 

oral contracts for the sale of land.”). We analyzed Dan’s claim as a parol gift of land 

because that is the way he presented it; as explained above, however, the result would 

be the same applying principles of promissory estoppel. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the superior court’s dismissal of Dan’s counterclaim to quiet 

title. 

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