APHIS FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE FRAMEWORK 

RESPONSE STRATEGIES

FAD PReP MANUAL 2-0

OCTOBER 2015
October 2015 ii

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) Manuals provide an 

introduction to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service (APHIS) foreign animal disease (FAD) preparedness and response, and the framework 

for responding to an animal health emergency in the United States. 

These manuals are under ongoing review. This document was last updated October 2015. Please 

send questions or comments to 

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center

Veterinary Services

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

4700 River Road, Unit 41

Riverdale, Maryland 20737

Fax: (301) 734-7817

E-mail: FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov.

While best efforts have been used in developing and preparing the FAD PReP Manuals, the U.S. 

Government, USDA, and APHIS and other parties, such as employees and contractors 

contributing to this document, neither warrant nor assume any legal liability or responsibility for 

the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information or procedure disclosed. The 

primary purpose of these FAD PReP Manuals is to provide guidance to those government 

officials responding to a foreign animal disease outbreak. It is only posted for public access as a 

reference. 

The FAD PReP Manuals may refer to links to various other Federal and State agencies and 

private organizations. These links are maintained solely for the user’s information and 

convenience. If you link to such site, please be aware that you are then subject to the policies of 

that site. In addition, please note that USDA does not control and cannot guarantee the relevance, 

timeliness, or accuracy of these outside materials. Further, the inclusion of links or pointers to 

particular items in hypertext is not intended to reflect their importance, nor is it intended to 

constitute approval or endorsement of any views expressed, or products or services offered, on 

these outside web sites, or the organizations sponsoring the web sites. 

Trade names are used solely for the purpose of providing specific information. Mention of a 

trade name does not constitute a guarantee or warranty of the product by USDA or an 

endorsement over other products not mentioned.

USDA prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, 

national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or marital or 

family status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who 

require alternative means for communication of program information (Braille, large print, 

audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and 

telecommunications device for the deaf [TDD]).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Room 

326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call 

(202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer.
October 2015 iii

Executive Summary

There are significant potential consequences of a foreign animal disease (FAD)

outbreak in the United States. An FAD outbreak threatens animal health and 

animal agriculture and may have significant economic consequences. There may 

be disruptions in the U.S. food supply. In addition to the economic impact, the 

social and psychological impact on producers, owners, and consumers can be 

serious.

For example, the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United 

Kingdom had an estimated impact of between $12–18 billion. An FMD outbreak 

in the United States could cause economic losses ranging from $15–$100 billion, 

depending on a number of factors; these include the duration of the outbreak, 

delay in detection, extent of trade embargoes, choice of response strategies, and 

consumer reaction to control measures.1 The overall economic impact would 

result from lost international trade, as well as costs directly associated with the 

eradication effort, such as the expenses of depopulation, indemnity, carcass 

disposal, and cleaning and disinfection. Over $850 million dollars were spent 

responding to the 2014–2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak 

in the United States. In addition, there are direct and indirect costs related to 

foregone production, unemployment, and losses in related businesses, including 

tourism.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service (APHIS) has established the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and 

Response Plan (FAD PReP) to provide a framework for FAD preparedness and 

response. This document provides the response strategies, zone and premises 

designations, and critical activities for controlling, containing, and eradicating an

FAD. This document also has a companion document, the APHIS Foreign Animal 

Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0), which 

provides an overview of FAD PReP, Federal roles, APHIS authorities and 

funding processes, incident management, and communication strategy. 

The APHIS goals of an FAD response are to (1) detect, control, and contain the 

disease in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate the disease using 

strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the 

economy and that protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide 

science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of 

business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.

Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, States, 

Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as 

possible. The objective is to allow the United States to regain disease-free status 1 See page 1-1 for citations from this section.
October 2015 iv

without the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease 

outbreak itself. 

There are five traditional strategies for the control and eradication of an FAD in 

domestic livestock that are not mutually exclusive: stamping-out, stamping-out 

modified with emergency vaccination to kill, stamping-out modified with 

emergency vaccination to slaughter, stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to live, and emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out. Any 

response strategy or strategies implemented will be based on the best available 

information during the incident. 

In order to achieve the goals of an FAD response, critical activities and tools must 

be implemented to execute the response strategies. Box 1 lists these critical 

activities and tools. Additionally, to assist in executing response strategies, zones, 

areas, and premises will be designated. 

Box 1. Critical Activities and Tools for an FAD Response

This document, along with other FAD PReP materials, is available to the public at 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep; it is also available to APHIS employees at 

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml. Together, the FAD PReP suite 

of documents provides a comprehensive preparedness and response framework 

for an FAD outbreak. Your comments and recommendations on this document are 

invited by emailing FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov. 

Critical Activities and Tools for Containment, Control, and Eradication

• Public communication and messaging campaign

• Rapid appraisal and indemnity process for producers

• Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls

• Rapid diagnosis and reporting

• Epidemiological investigation and tracing

• Increased surveillance

• Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and noncontaminated animal products (Secure Food Supply Plans)

• Biosecurity measures

• Mass depopulation and euthanasia (as response strategy indicates)

• Effective and appropriate disposal procedures

• Cleaning and disinfection measures

• Emergency vaccination (as response strategy indicates)
October 2015 v 

Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................. 1-1 

1.1 FADS IN THE UNITED STATES.......................................................................... 1-2 

1.2 RESPONSE GOALS.......................................................................................... 1-4 

1.3 OVERVIEW OF CRITICAL ACTIVITIES FOR AN FAD RESPONSE ............................. 1-4 

Chapter 2 Response Strategies and Principles........................................ 2-1 

2.1 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSE................................................... 2-1 

2.2 REGULATORY INTERVENTION DURING AN FAD OUTBREAK ................................. 2-1 

2.2.1 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities ............................ 2-4 

2.2.2 Management of Incident ......................................................................... 2-4 

2.3 TRANSMISSION CHARACTERISTICS OF FAD AGENTS ......................................... 2-5 

2.3.1 Terrestrial FAD Threats .......................................................................... 2-6 

2.3.2 Foreign Animal Pest Threats .................................................................. 2-7 

2.4 FAD INVESTIGATIONS ..................................................................................... 2-8 

2.5 EXAMPLE RESPONSE STRATEGIES................................................................. 2-10

2.5.1 Stamping-Out........................................................................................ 2-11

2.5.2 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill.................. 2-13

2.5.3 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter....... 2-14

2.5.4 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live................ 2-17

2.5.5 Emergency Vaccination to Live without Stamping-Out ......................... 2-20

2.5.6 Manage Outbreak Without Widespread Stamping-Out 

or Vaccination....................................................................................... 2-23

2.6 SUMMARY OF SELECTING A RESPONSE STRATEGY.......................................... 2-23

2.7 OIE-LISTED ANIMAL DISEASES AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

FOR RESPONSE ............................................................................................ 2-25

2.7.1 Recognition of Disease-Free Status ..................................................... 2-25

2.8 EXECUTING A RESPONSE STRATEGY.............................................................. 2-27

Chapter 3 Designating Zones and Premises............................................ 3-1 

3.1 AREAS AND ZONES ......................................................................................... 3-1 

3.1.1 Infected Zone.......................................................................................... 3-1 
October 2015 vi 

3.1.2 Buffer Zone............................................................................................. 3-2 

3.1.3 Control Area............................................................................................ 3-3 

3.1.4 Surveillance Zone ................................................................................... 3-5 

3.1.5 Free Area................................................................................................ 3-6 

3.1.6 Containment Vaccination Zone............................................................... 3-7 

3.1.7 Protection Vaccination Zone................................................................... 3-8 

3.2 PREMISES.....................................................................................................3-10

3.2.1 Infected Premises ................................................................................. 3-10

3.2.2 Contact Premises ................................................................................. 3-10

3.2.3 Suspect Premises................................................................................. 3-11

3.2.4 At-Risk Premises .................................................................................. 3-12

3.2.5 Monitored Premises.............................................................................. 3-13

3.2.6 Vaccinated Premises ............................................................................ 3-14

3.2.7 Free Premises ...................................................................................... 3-15

3.3 SUMMARY: ZONES, AREAS, PREMISES ........................................................... 3-15

3.4 SUMMARY: PERMITS TO MOVE INTO, WITHIN, AND OUT

OF A CONTROL AREA .................................................................................... 3-23

Appendix A FAD PReP Document Structure

Appendix B Example Preparedness and Response Goals 

for Selected Critical Activities

Appendix C Glossary

Appendix D Abbreviations

Appendix E Selected References and Resources

Figures

Figure 1-1. Selected FAD Events in the United States 1880–2015......................... 1-3 

Figure 1-2. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of U.S. FAD Response ............. 1-5 

Figure 2-1. FAD Investigations from 1997 to 2014.................................................. 2-9 

Figure 2-2. FAD Investigations by Result, 2005 to 2014....................................... 2-10

Figure 2-3a. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

(Infected Premises Would Be Depopulated).................................................... 2-12

Figure 2-3b. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

(Infected Premises Would Be Depopulated).................................................... 2-13
Contents

October 2015 vii 

Figure 2-4a. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill or Stamping-Out Modified 

with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter (Infected Premises Would 

Be Depopulated).............................................................................................. 2-16

Figure 2-4b. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill or Stamping-Out Modified 

with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter (Infected Premises Would 

Be Depopulated).............................................................................................. 2-17

Figure 2-5a. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Infected Premises Would 

Be Depopulated).............................................................................................. 2-19

Figure 2-5b. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Infected Premises Would 

Be Depopulated).............................................................................................. 2-19

Figure 2-6. Examples of Implementing Multiple Emergency Vaccination 

Strategies with Stamping-Out: Stamping-Out with Vaccination to Slaughter 

and Vaccination to Live ................................................................................... 2-20

Figure 2-7a. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Emergency

Vaccination to Live without Stamping-Out ....................................................... 2-22

Figure 2-7b. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Emergency 

Vaccination to Live without Stamping-Out ....................................................... 2-22

Figure 3-1. Infected Zone........................................................................................ 3-2 

Figure 3-2. Buffer Zone........................................................................................... 3-3 

Figure 3-3. Control Area ......................................................................................... 3-5 

Figure 3-4. Surveillance Zone................................................................................. 3-6 

Figure 3-5. Free Area.............................................................................................. 3-6 

Figure 3-6. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones ...................................... 3-8 

Figure 3-7. Protection Vaccination Zone................................................................. 3-9 

Figure 3-8. Infected Premises............................................................................... 3-10

Figure 3-9. Contact Premises ............................................................................... 3-11

Figure 3-10. Suspect Premises............................................................................. 3-12

Figure 3-11. At-Risk Premises .............................................................................. 3-13

Figure 3-12. Monitored Premises.......................................................................... 3-14

Figure 3-13. Vaccinated Premises........................................................................ 3-15

Figure 3-14. Free Premises .................................................................................. 3-15

Figure 3-15. Example Zones, Areas, and Premises.............................................. 3-17
October 2015 viii

Figure 3-16a. Small Infected Zone and Buffer Zone ............................................. 3-18

Figure 3-16b. Medium Infected Zone and Buffer Zone ......................................... 3-19

Figure 3-16c. Large Infected Zone and Buffer Zone ............................................. 3-20

Figure 3-16d. Protection Vaccination Zone........................................................... 3-21

Figure 3-16e. Large Infected Zone and State-Wide Buffer Zone.......................... 3-22 

Tables

Table 2-1. Key Terrestrial FAD Threats to the United States 

and Its Territories............................................................................................... 2-6 

Table 2-2. Key Foreign Animal Pest Threats to the United States 

and Its Territories............................................................................................... 2-7 

Table 2-3. Factors Determining Viability of Emergency Vaccination..................... 2-24

Table 3-1. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size .......................... 3-4 

Table 3-2. Summary of Premises Designations.................................................... 3-16

Table 3-3. Summary of Zone and Area Descriptions ............................................ 3-16

Table 3-4. Minimum Sizes of Zones and Areas .................................................... 3-23

Table 3-5. Minimum Sizes of Zones and Areas 

for Mosquito or Culicoides Vector-Borne Diseases ......................................... 3-23

Table 3-6. Movement into Control Area from Outside 

Control Area to Specific Premises................................................................... 3-24

Table 3-7. Movement within a Control Area.......................................................... 3-25

Table 3-8. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside 

a Control Area from Specific Premises............................................................ 3-26
October 2015 1-1

Chapter 1

Introduction

An outbreak of a foreign animal disease (FAD) in the United States—particularly 

a highly contagious disease—will have many consequences. Animal health and 

animal agriculture will be threatened; an FAD outbreak may impact the security, 

cost, and safety of the U.S. food supply. In addition to the economic impact, the 

social and psychological impact on both producers and consumers may be 

significant. 

The 2001 foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom had an 

estimated impact of between $12–18 billion.

1 In the United States, the impact of 

an FMD outbreak would be contingent on many factors, including the duration of 

the outbreak, delay in detection, extent of trade embargoes, choice of response 

strategies, and consumer reaction to control measures. Depending on these 

factors, estimates suggest that economic losses in the United States could range 

from $15–$100 billion.2

The economic impact of an FAD outbreak would result from lost international 

trade, as well as from costs directly associated with the eradication effort, such as 

the expenses of depopulation, indemnity, carcass disposal, and cleaning and 

disinfection. Over $850 million dollars were spent responding to the 2014–2015 

highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak in the United States. In 

addition, there are indirect costs related to foregone production, unemployment, 

and losses in related businesses, including tourism. 

The United States undertakes many preventive measures to keep FAD agents out 

of susceptible U.S. animal populations—including import restrictions, exclusion 

activities at borders, and public education. However, in order to execute a timely, 

efficient, and appropriate FAD response effort, it remains essential to plan and 

prepare for an incident. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has established the Foreign Animal 

 1 Thompson D, Muriel P, Russell D, Osborne P, et al. 2001. “Economic Costs of the Footand-Mouth Disease Outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001.” Rev Sci Tech Off Int Epiz. 21: 675-

687; Grubman MJ, Bast B. 2004. Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Cli Microbiol Rev. 17(2): 465-493; 

USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. 2007. “UK Foot & Mouth Disease—Recovery Timetable, 

the Economic Impact and Who Pays?” Global Agriculture Information Network Report. Available 

from http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200708/146292150.pdf.

2 Estimates vary: Carpenter et al. (2011) suggest a loss of $2.3 billion to $69 billion, for an 

outbreak in California; Ekboir (1999) estimated a loss of between $8.5 billion and $13.5 billion for 

an outbreak in California. Carpenter TE, O’Brien JM, Hagerman AD, & McCarl BA. 2011. “Epidemic and economic impacts of delayed detection of foot-and-mouth disease: a case study of a 

simulated outbreak in California.” J Vet Diagn Invest. 23:26-33; Ekboir JM. 1999. “Potential Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in California: the Role and Contribution of Animal Health Surveillance and Monitoring Services.” Agricultural Issues Center. University of California, Davis.
October 2015 1-2

Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) to provide a framework for 

FAD preparedness and response. 

This document—APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response 

Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0)—provides significant detail on response 

strategies for highly contagious FAD outbreaks, including information on zone, 

area, and premises designations and an overview of other critical activities needed 

for an effective FAD response. This document has a companion document—

APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP 

Manual 1-0)—which provides an overview of Federal roles, APHIS authorities 

and funding processes, incident management, and communications. Together, 

these and other FAD PReP documents provide a comprehensive preparedness and 

response framework for an FAD outbreak.

Appendix A contains a list of current FAD PReP documents.

1.1 FADS IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States has been involved in a number of animal disease outbreaks 

over the past 125 years. Lessons learned from the very first eradication campaign 

that successfully eliminated contagious bovine pleuropneunomia in 1892 through

successive control efforts to the present day, including the 2014–2015 HPAI 

outbreak, the largest incident in U.S. history, have shaped our current strategies. 

Please refer to Figure 1-1 for selected FAD events in the United States.
Introduction 

October 2015 1-3 

Figure 1-1. Selected FAD Events in the United States 1880–2015 

1880 2015 1929

Contagious 

Bovine 

Pleuropnuemonia

1892

Highly 

Pathogenic 

Avian Influenza 

(Fowl Plague)

1929Foot-and-mouth 

Disease1934

Dourine

1942 Glanders 1943Bovine 

Babesiosis

1956Vesicular Exanthema 1959

New 

World

Screwworm 

New World 

Screwworm 1966

1971

Exotic Newcastle 

Disease & Venezuelan 

Equine 

Encephalitis

1973Sheep Scabies 1976Classical Swine

Fever

1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 1982

New World 

Screwworm & 

Contagious 

Equine Metritis

2005

2008Contagious 

Equine 

Metritis

2003 Exotic

Newcastle

Disease2004

Highly Pathogenic

Avian Influenza & 

Vesicular Stomatitis 

Virus

1984Highly Pathogenic

Avian Influenza

1890

1999West Nile 

Virus

2007 2009

1995Vesicular Stomatitis 

Virus

2005Vesicular 

Stomatitis 

Virus

2014/2015Highly 

Pathogenic

Avian 

Influenza
October 2015 1-4

1.2 RESPONSE GOALS

In the event of an FAD outbreak in the United States, State, Federal, and Tribal 

authorities, as well as agriculture stakeholders, will initiate a series of response 

activities. The type and magnitude of activities depends on the response goals and 

regulatory intervention for the FAD outbreak.

The APHIS goals of an FAD response are to (1) detect, control, and contain the 

disease in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate the disease using 

strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the 

economy and that protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide 

science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of 

business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.

Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, States, 

Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as 

possible. The objective is to allow the United States to regain disease-free status 

without the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease 

outbreak itself.

1.3 OVERVIEW OF CRITICAL ACTIVITIES 

FOR AN FAD RESPONSE

In order to achieve the goals of an FAD response, critical activities and tools must 

be implemented to execute the response strategy. Box 1-1 lists key critical 

activities and tools. 

Box 1-1. Critical Activities and Tools for an FAD Response

Critical Activities and Tools for Containment, Control, and Eradication

• Public communication and messaging campaign

• Rapid appraisal and indemnity process for producers

• Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls

• Rapid diagnosis and reporting

• Epidemiological investigation and tracing 

• Increased surveillance

• Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal products (Secure Food Supply Plans)

• Biosecurity measures 

• Mass depopulation and euthanasia (as response strategy indicates)

• Effective and appropriate disposal procedures

• Cleaning and disinfection measures

• Emergency vaccination (as response strategy indicates)
Introduction

October 2015 1-5

Figure 1-2 highlights key critical activities that will take place in the first 72 hours of an 

outbreak. These critical tasks are fundamental to the rapid control and containment of the 

disease. This figure is not all inclusive—please see Disease Response Plans & Standard 

Operating Procedures for more information on critical activities. 

Figure 1-2. Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of U.S. FAD Response

Note: IC = Incident Command; ICS = Incident Command System.

• Establish quarantine, hold orders, movement restrictions, and 

standstill notices (e.g., 24–72 hours) for relevant zones and regions

• Initiate appraisal process

• Begin depopulation activities

• Notify States, industry, trading partners, media

• Implement increased biosecurity measures

• Start tracing activities (epidemiological investigation)

• Begin confirmatory diagnostics and further virus typing

• Initiate incident management organizational structures and processes

• Decide to deploy Incident Management Team (IMT) to field

• Begin data collection and information management in Emergency 

Management Response System (EMRS)

• Evaluate quarantine and movement controls

• Continue depopulation and disposal activities

• Ensure compensation process moves forward for indemnity

• Proceed with surveillance and tracing activities

• Execute timely and accurate data entry in EMRS

• Initiate public awareness messaging and communication campaign

• Implement and enforce increased biosecurity measures

• Initiate continuity of business plans

• Continue confirmatory diagnostics

• Prepare with State affected for arrival of IMT

• Continue ramping up Incident Command and Incident Coordination 

Group

• Ensure compensation process proceeds

• Continue any ongoing depopulation and/or disposal activities

• Continue timely and accurate data entry in EMRS

• Continue surveillance and tracing activities

• Implement and enforce increased biosecurity activities

• Continue public awareness campaign

• Ramp up permitting and continuity of business activities

Presumptive positive detection of FAD in the United States

48–72 

hours

Use of appropriate critical activities and tools continues 

throughout FAD response

24–48 

hours

0–24 

hours
October 2015 2-1

Chapter 2

Response Strategies and Principles

2.1 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSE

Three basic epidemiological principles form the foundation of any response 

strategy to contain, control, and eradicate a foreign animal disease (FAD), in 

particular highly contagious FADs, in the U.S. domestic livestock and poultry 

population.

1. Prevent contact between the disease and susceptible animals.

a. This is accomplished through quarantine of infected animals, 

movement controls in the Infected Zone(s) (IZ) and Buffer Zone(s) 

(BZ) (Control Area [CA(s)]), and biosecurity procedures to protect 

non-infected animals.

b. Certain circumstances may warrant accelerating the depopulation of 

animals at risk for exposure to the disease to decrease the population 

density of susceptible animals.

c. There is a serious but lesser transmission risk posed by people, 

material, conveyances, and non-susceptible animals that may have 

been in contact with the disease and serve as mechanical vectors. 

Contact with susceptible animals should be prevented and transmission 

risk mitigated through stringent biosecurity and cleaning and 

disinfection measures.

2. Stop the production of the FAD agent in infected or exposed animals. This 

may be accomplished by slaughter or rapid mass depopulation (and 

disposal) of infected and potentially infected animals.

3. Increase the disease resistance of susceptible animals to the disease or 

reduce the shedding of the FAD agent in infected or exposed animals. This 

can be accomplished by emergency vaccination if a suitable vaccine is 

available and can be administered in a timely manner.

2.2 REGULATORY INTERVENTION DURING 

AN FAD OUTBREAK

Each State has statutes/regulations governing animal disease reporting. Federally 

accredited veterinarians are required to report suspected cases of FADs. An FAD
October 2015 2-2

outbreak in the United States may result in emergency regulatory intervention by 

State, Tribal Nation, and/or Federal authorities. The type and scope of regulatory 

interventions will depend upon the disease agent, the circumstances of the 

outbreak, and the consequences of the outbreak. The United States Department of 

Agriculture (USDA) and the affected States and Tribal Nations will work together 

in a Unified Command, per the National Incident Management System (NIMS), to 

detect, control, contain, and eradicate the disease as expeditiously as possible. 

Incident management for a unified State-Federal-Tribal-stakeholder response is

discussed in Chapter 4 of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS) Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD 

PReP Manual 1-0).

The following are examples of State-Federal-Tribal emergency regulatory 

interventions for an FAD outbreak:

 Emergency eradication effort. Twelve months or less. Regulatory 

intervention at time of outbreak by State-Federal-Tribal authorities.

 Extended emergency eradication effort. Greater than 12 months. 

Regulatory intervention at time of outbreak by State-Federal-Tribal 

authorities.

 National animal disease control program. Long-term program. Regulatory 

control program conducted by State-Federal-Tribal authorities.

 Individual State or Tribal Nation animal disease control program. Shortterm or long-term. State requirements or Tribal Nation requirements.

 Animal disease monitored with limited or no regulatory intervention.

Short-term or long-term. Little or no regulatory intervention by StateFederal-Tribal authorities.

The scope of regulatory intervention and the selection of a response strategy or 

strategies in an FAD outbreak will depend on the following: 

 Transmission characteristics of the FAD agent. The rate of contagious 

animal disease agent transmission, potential for zoonotic transmission, and 

the number and types of susceptible animal species. Transmission 

characteristics of FAD disease agents are discussed in Section 2.3.

 Consequences of the FAD outbreak. The consequences of the disease 

outbreak, and the impact of the response, in terms of disruptions to

 national security;

 food security;

 public health;
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-3

 animal health;

 environment;

 economy—short- and long-term impacts for owners, growers, rural 

economy, and overall economy

 Local economy and intrastate commerce

 Interstate commerce

 International trade; and

 regulatory impacts, including short- and long-term for owners, 

growers, stakeholders, and general public

 Local, State, and Tribal regulatory impacts

 Interstate commerce regulatory impacts

 International trade regulatory impacts.

 Acceptance. Acceptance of response policy (social and political) by 

different communities:

 Local, State, and Tribal

 U.S. regional

 U.S. national

 North American

 International.

 Scale of outbreak. The number of animals infected, species infected, 

number of premises infected, and susceptible animal population density 

for infected areas or high-risk areas of becoming infected with an FAD.

 Rate of outbreak spread. The rate of spread of infection in terms of 

number of premises, types of premises, number of animals, and types of 

animals; rate at which each Infected Premises (IP) leads to infection of one 

or more additional IP.

 Veterinary countermeasures available. The availability and efficacy of 

veterinary countermeasures such as FAD vaccines. 
October 2015 2-4

 Resources available to implement response strategies. The capabilities 

and resources available to eradicate an FAD in domestic animals and to 

control and eradicate an FAD in potential wildlife reservoirs.

 Domestic animal disease management capabilities. The capability, 

feasibility, and resources available to eradicate an FAD in domestic 

animals as an emergency response operation, or control as an animal 

disease program, or monitor as an endemic animal disease.

 Wildlife management capabilities. The capability, feasibility, and 

resources available to eradicate, control, or monitor an FAD in wildlife 

reservoirs.

In the event of an emerging animal disease outbreak, APHIS VS has developed a 

framework for responding to such incidents. The “Veterinary Services Proposed 

Framework for Response to Emerging Animal Disease in the United States” is 

available at https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/ 

vs_emerging_diseases_framework.pdf. 

2.2.1 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities

When the criteria for a presumptive case have been met, the APHIS Administrator 

or the Veterinary Services (VS) Deputy Administrator (DA), who is the U.S. 

Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), can authorize APHIS personnel—in conjunction 

with State, Tribal, and Incident Command (IC) personnel—to initiate response 

activities.

When an FAD is detected, USDA, State, and/or Tribal authorities will 

immediately quarantine the relevant regions or zones, restrict specific movements, 

depopulate or euthanize affected animals as determined necessary and as 

humanely as possible, dispose of carcasses, disinfect property, and increase 

surveillance in the area to ensure that the FAD has not spread. The Incident 

Commander works with the Operations Section and Situation Unit in the Planning 

Section to determine zone, area, and premises designations during an FAD

outbreak.

2.2.2 Management of Incident

The outbreak response effort should be implemented through a Unified Command

with an appropriate span of control and delegation of authority, employing NIMS. 

Responses will be as local as possible. Good communication within the chain of 

command is imperative.

An Incident Commander should be identified and an Incident Command Post

(ICP) established. In-State resources (whether State, Federal, Tribal, or privately 

owned) should be used to manage a local response. Out-of-State resources may be 

used to support the State impacted by the outbreak.
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-5

Incident management will include quarantine and movement control, tracing, and 

activation of response plans to communicate these actions to all stakeholders, the 

public, and the international community. Cooperative Federal, State, Tribal, local, 

and industry response measures will be carried out with extreme urgency using 

the most appropriate geographic and jurisdictional scopes required to manage the 

situation. Incident management for unified State-Federal-Tribal-stakeholder 

response is discussed in Chapter 4 of the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 

Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0).

2.3 TRANSMISSION CHARACTERISTICS 

OF FAD AGENTS

When evaluating the response strategies to contain, control, and eradicate an FAD

affecting livestock, poultry, or other animals, it is necessary to consider the 

disease agent’s transmission characteristics. An animal disease agent is either 

contagious (transmitted through animal-to-animal contact or fomite-to-animal 

contact) or not contagious (transmitted through some other means, often an 

arthropod vector). Contagious diseases may further be categorized as either 

“highly” contagious or “not highly” contagious. This characterization is based on 

the epidemiology of the disease and is related to how fast the disease agent can 

move from animal to animal and farm to farm.

A highly contagious disease is one that spreads rapidly from animal to animal 

and, if uncontrolled, from herd to herd or flock to flock. Transmission can occur 

via direct and indirect modes. A highly contagious disease may be recognized by 

greater than normal morbidity or mortality per unit time (high incidence rate or 

high attack rate). Sometimes morbidity can be characterized by a loss of 

production (for example, in milk or eggs) even without overt signs of clinical 

illness.

Some non-contagious diseases are spread by insect or arthropod vectors. Some of 

these vectors are found in the United States, while others are foreign to the United 

States. As such, detecting foreign animal pests is also critical in preventing the 

introduction and transmission of FADs to the United States.

Any highly contagious FAD agent will require very rapid response actions to 

control its spread. An animal disease outbreak caused by an agent that is not 

highly contagious may allow for a less rapid response and still result in 

elimination of the agent of concern. However, disease agents that are not highly 

contagious often require a rapid response for reasons other than rapid spread of 

the agent, including disruptions to interstate commerce, international trade, or 

their zoonotic potential.

The basic pathway for success in eliminating a highly contagious FAD agent is to 

control infected and exposed (potentially infected) animals, prevent exposure of 

susceptible animals, and eliminate an animal’s ability to produce the agent. 
October 2015 2-6

Unfortunately, depending upon the number of animals infected and their 

locations, the basic pathway for eliminating an agent can become disruptive to the 

normal business operations of both infected and non-infected premises.

2.3.1 Terrestrial FAD Threats

Table 2-1 identifies some of the key terrestrial FADs that pose a risk to the United 

States. This list includes diseases most likely to occur based on known methods of 

transmission. 

Table 2-1. Key Terrestrial FAD Threats to the United States and its Territories

FAD

Primary type 

of animal affected

Highly 

contagious

disease 

Vectorborne

disease

Zoonotic

disease

potential

Diseases with FAD PReP Response Plans (Red Books)

Highly pathogenic avian influenza 

(HPAI)

Avian, others Yes No Yes

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) All cloven hoofed animals Yes No No

Classical swine fever (CSF) Swine Yes No No

Newcastle disease (ND)

(virulent ND virus) 

Avian Yes No Yes 

minor

Diseases with FAD PReP Disease Response Strategies

African swine fever Swine Yes Yes No

Japanese encephalitis Equine, swine No Yes Yes

Peste des petits ruminants (PPR) Caprine, ovine Yes No No

Rift Valley fever Bovine, ovine, caprine No Yes Yes

Diseases with VS Response Materials 

Contagious equine metritis Equine No No No

Equine piroplasmosis Equine No Yes No

Schmallenberg virus Bovine, caprine, ovine No Yes No

Vesicular stomatitis virus Equine, bovine, swine, ovine, 

caprine

No Yes Yes

rare

Other FAD Threats (Alphabetical Order)

African horse sickness (AHS) Equine No Yes No

Akabane Bovine, ovine, caprine No Yes No

Bovine babesiosis Bovine No Yes No

Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia

(CBPP)

Bovine Yes No No

Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia Caprine Yes No No

Dourine Equine No No No

Glanders Equine Yes No Yes

Heartwater (Ehrlichia ruminantium) Bovine, ovine, caprine, other 

ruminants

No Yes No

Lumpy skin disease Bovine No Yes No
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-7 

FAD

Primary type 

of animal affected

Highly 

contagious

disease 

Vectorborne

disease

Zoonotic

disease

potential

Nairobi sheep disease Ovine, caprine No Yes Yes

minor

Nipah, Hendra (Henipavirus) Swine, equine respectively Yes (Nipah) No Yes

Rabbit hemorrhagic disease Wild and domestic rabbits (sp. 

Oryctolagus cuniculus) 

Yes No No

Sheep pox, goat pox Ovine, caprine Yes No No

Surra (Trypanosoma evansi) Equine, bovine, others No Yes No

Swine vesicular disease Swine Yes No No

Theileriosis (East Coast fever) Bovine No Yes No

Venezuelan equine encephalitis Equine, avian No Yes Yes

2.3.2 Foreign Animal Pest Threats 

Table 2-2 identifies some of the key, known foreign animal pests that may pose a 

risk to the United States. This list includes foreign animal pests most likely to 

occur based on known methods of transmission. 

Table 2-2. Key Foreign Animal Pest Threats to the United States and its Territories

Foreign pest

common name

Foreign pest

scientific name

Primary type of 

animal affected

Disease transmitted;

condition caused

Zoonotic disease

potential

Foreign Animal Pest Threats with FAD PReP Disease Response Strategies

Screwworm—

New World

Cochliomyia 

hominivorax

Warm-blooded 

animals 

Myiasis Myiasis

VS Control Program Exists

Cattle fever 

tick

Rhipicephalus annulatus

(formerly Boophilus 

annulatus)

Bovine, ovine, 

caprine, other 

species

Bovine babesiosis No

Southern cattle 

tick

Rhipicephalus microplus

(formerly Boophilus 

microplus)

Bovine, ovine, 

caprine, other 

species 

Bovine babesiosis No

Other Foreign Animal Pest Threats (Alphabetical Order by Pest Scientific Name)

Bont tick Amblyomma hebraeum Bovine, reptiles, 

other species

Heartwater African tick-bite fever

Tick typhus

Tropical bont 

tick

Amblyomma variegatum Bovine, reptiles, 

other species

Heartwater

Bovine 

dermatophilosis

Nairobi sheep 

disease 

African tick-bite fever

Tick typhus

Crimean-Congo 

hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) 

Yellow fever

Screwworm— 

Old World

Chrysomya bezziana Warm-blooded 

animals

Myiasis Myiasis

Louse fly Hippobosca longipennis Canine, 

livestock, other 

species

Bite only Bite only
October 2015 2-8

Foreign pest

common name

Foreign pest

scientific name

Primary type of 

animal affected

Disease transmitted;

condition caused

Zoonotic disease

potential

European 

castor bean 

tick

Ixodes ricinus Bovine, ovine, 

caprine, other 

species

Bovine babesiosis CCHF

Lyme disease

Bovine babesiosis 

(splenectomized 

population)

Licking fly Musca vitripennis Bovine Bovine filariosis No

Sheep scab, 

sheep mange

Psoroptes ovis Bovine, ovine, 

other species

Mange No

Brown ear tick Rhipicephalus 

appendiculatus

Bovine, ovine, 

caprine, other 

species

East Coast fever 

Nairobi sheep 

disease

Tick typhus

Note: Myiasis = fly larvae feeding on the host living tissue; mange = hair loss, itching, and inflammation from mite 

infestation; African tick-bite fever = Rickettsia africae (human disease); tick typhus = Rickettsia conorii (human 

disease).

An emerging animal disease may also become a threat to animal health or public 

health. An emerging animal disease incident may include any terrestrial animal, 

aquatic animal, or zoonotic disease not yet known or characterized, or any known 

or characterized terrestrial or aquatic animal disease in the United States or its 

territories, that changes or mutates in pathogenicity, communicability, or zoonotic 

potential to become a threat to animals or humans.

An FAD or emerging animal disease incident may involve livestock, poultry, 

other animals, or wildlife. In the event of an incident involving wildlife, APHIS

will work in close collaboration, communication, and coordination with State, 

Tribal, and Federal wildlife agencies that have primary jurisdictional authority 

and subject matter expertise for wildlife.

2.4 FAD INVESTIGATIONS

Identification of an FAD begins with the suspected index case investigation and 

National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) diagnostic testing. VS

Guidance Document 12001, defines APHIS policies and procedures for FAD 

investigations, including response and communication procedures during the 

investigation period. The FAD/emerging disease incident investigation period is 

defined as the time from when the investigation is initiated until the time an 

FAD/emerging disease incident is ruled out or confirmed. The objectives of an 

FAD/emerging disease incident investigation are to provide a veterinary medical 

assessment, provide presumptive and definitive diagnostic testing results, and 

ensure that the appropriate veterinary medical countermeasures, regulatory 

actions, and communications are recommended and implemented during the 

investigation period. 

Once an FAD agent is detected, then incident management will be tailored to the 

specific disease agent and circumstances of the outbreak.
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-9

A goal for FAD investigations is to provide presumptive and confirmative 

diagnostic testing results, as rapidly as possible, given the classification of 

investigation and designation of diagnostic sample priority. This may include 

rapid or extraordinary methods for diagnostic sample collection, transport, and 

testing for those investigations classified as “high suspicion” for an FAD. Rapid 

diagnostic results facilitate the implementation of appropriate regulatory actions, 

the application of relevant medical countermeasures, and effective 

communications, all of which can prevent and/or mitigate the dissemination of the 

FAD agent by interstate commerce or international trade.

In the past 18 years, there have been over 9,500 investigations conducted on 

possible FAD or emerging disease incidents throughout the United States, ranging 

from a yearly low of 254 investigations in calendar year 1997 to a high of 

1,013 investigations in 2004 (Figure 2-1). 

Figure 2-1. FAD Investigations from 1997 to 2014

This summary of FAD investigations was compiled from annual reports on 

animal health in the United States published by APHIS VS (available here), data 

from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) World Animal Health 

Information Database (http://web.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=home), and data 

in the Emergency Management Response System (EMRS, available here).

From 2005 through 2014, 5,095 possible FAD or emerging disease incidents were 

investigated by VS and State collaborators. However, only a small percentage of 

those were confirmed to be actual emerging or foreign animal diseases. The 

exceptions during this period were the occurrence of wide spread vesicular 

stomatitis outbreaks that contributed to the 446 confirmed FAD findings in 2005

and the 449 confirmed FAD findings in 2014 (Figure 2-2). The increase in FAD 

findings during 2012 was also due to an outbreak of vesicular stomatitis. 
October 2015 2-10

Figure 2-2. FAD Investigations by Result, 2005 to 2014

2.5 EXAMPLE RESPONSE STRATEGIES 

The response strategy or strategies used for the control and eradication of an FAD 

in domestic livestock or poultry depends on the disease agent, zoonotic potential, 

ability to control the agent, economic impact, and availability of emergency 

vaccines. There are five strategies for the control and eradication of a highly 

contagious FAD in domestic livestock or poultry following an outbreak; these 

strategies are not mutually exclusive. They are as follows:

 Stamping-out;

 Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill;

 Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter;

 Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live; 

 Emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out.

This section defines and describes each of these strategies in turn. Depending 

upon the circumstances and scale of the outbreak, a combination of one or more 

of these strategies can be applied. In some situations, where stamping-out is not 

feasible and vaccine is not available, the decision may be made to manage the 

disease to the extent possible through biosecurity and other control measures (e.g., 

quarantine and movement control). This could result in the United States being 

endemic for a given disease agent for some period of time.

Analogous strategies for FMD are recognized in the OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code (2015), Article 8.8.42.
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-11

2.5.1 Stamping-Out

2.5.1.1 DEFINING STAMPING-OUT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Box 2-1 defines stamping-out.

Box 2-1. Stamping-Out

2.5.1.2 DESCRIBING STAMPING-OUT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Stamping-out has been a common approach in a number of past FAD outbreaks. 

This strategy is most appropriate if the outbreak is contained to a jurisdictional 

area or a region in which the FAD can be readily contained and further 

dissemination of the agent is unlikely. Stamping-out is currently defined in the 

OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2015).

Stamping-out means a policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Authority the following:

a. the killing of the animals which are affected and those suspected 

of being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, those in other 

herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to 

animal contact, or by indirect contact with the causal pathogen; 

this includes all susceptible animals, vaccinated or unvaccinated, 

on infected establishments; animals should be killed in accordance 

with Chapter 7.6;

b. the destruction of their carcasses by rendering, burning or burial, 

or by other method described in Chapter 4.12;

c. the cleansing and disinfection of establishments through procedures defined in Chapter 4.13.

Box 2-2 lists the critical elements of stamping-out. The OIE recognizes that if 

outbreaks cannot be confined to a Containment Zone (equivalent to a CA), 

response strategies other than just stamping-out may be necessary.

Stamping-Out

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals. 
October 2015 2-12

Box 2-2. Critical Elements of Stamping-Out

2.5.1.3 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT

Figures 2-3a and 2-3b show an example of a stamping-out response strategy

where IP are depopulated.

Figure 2-3a. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

(Infected Premises Would Be Depopulated)

Note: Figure is not to scale.

Stamping-Out: Critical Elements

• The goal is that, within 24 hours of (or as soon as possible after) a presumptive 

positive classification, infected animals are depopulated in the quickest, safest, and 

most humane way as possible. In many cases, susceptible livestock or poultry on 

Contact Premises (CP) may also be depopulated as soon as possible.

• Where resources are limited, premises will be prioritized so that those with the highest 

potential for active FAD spread are “stamped-out” first. 

• Based on an epidemiology of the outbreak, prioritizing the animals to depopulate first 

may be necessary. 

• Public concerns about stamping-out will require a well-planned and proactive public 

relations and liaison campaign. Stakeholders, the public, and the international 

community must be involved. 

• Care should be taken to consider mental health implications for owners and responders 

in the event a stamping-out strategy is implemented. 
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-13

Figure 2-3b. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

(Infected Premises Would Be Depopulated)

2.5.2 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination 

to Kill

2.5.2.1 DEFINING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION 

TO KILL AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Box 2-3 defines stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill.

Box 2-3. Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill

2.5.2.2 DESCRIBING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO KILL AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

This strategy involves the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent 

Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of 

at-risk animals, with subsequent depopulation and disposal of vaccinated animals. 

Depopulation and disposal of vaccinates can be delayed until logistically feasible.
October 2015 2-14

depopulation and disposal of vaccinated animals. This strategy involves the 

following:

 A suppressive emergency vaccination strategy;

 The goal is to suppress agent replication in high-risk susceptible animals 

by using emerging vaccination and then depopulating vaccinates at a later 

date as determined by IC and the VS Deputy Administrator, the U.S. 

CVO;

 The targeted vaccination of high-risk susceptible animals in an IZ, BZ, or 

Vaccination Zone (VZ). Ring or regional vaccination around an IP or IZ is 

a frequently cited example of this strategy;

 May require vaccinated animal traceability and the diagnostic capability to 

differentiate between infected and vaccinated animals (DIVA) for 

movement between zones, interstate commerce, and international trade. 

These requirements will depend on the length of time between vaccination 

and depopulation and disposal, as well as other logistical and 

epidemiological factors; and

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary.

2.5.2.3 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED 

WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO SLAUGHTER

Please see Figure 2-4a and 2-4b for examples of the zones and areas in relation to 

stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill and stamping-out 

modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter (Section 2.5.3.3). The zones 

and areas are likely to be analogous in these two response strategies; the 

difference is in the disposition of the vaccinated animals.

2.5.3 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination

to Slaughter

2.5.3.1 DEFINING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION 

TO SLAUGHTER AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Box 2-4 defines stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter.
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-15

Box 2-4. Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter

2.5.3.2 DESCRIBING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO SLAUGHTER AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

This strategy involves the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent slaughter 

and processing of vaccinated animals, if animals are eligible for slaughter under 

FSIS authority and rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules. This strategy 

involves the following:

 A suppressive emergency vaccination strategy;

 The goal is to suppress agent replication in high-risk susceptible animals 

by using emergency vaccination and then slaughtering vaccinates at a later 

date as determined by IC and the VS Deputy Administrator, the U.S. 

CVO;

 The targeted vaccination of high-risk susceptible animals in an IZ, BZ, or 

VZ. Ring or regional vaccination around an IP or IZ is a frequently cited 

example of this strategy;

 May require vaccinated animal traceability and the diagnostic capability to 

DIVA for movement between zones, interstate commerce, and 

international trade; and

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary.

2.5.3.3 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED 

WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO SLAUGHTER

Figures 2-4a and 2-4b show examples of how a stamping-out modified with 

emergency vaccination to slaughter response strategy might be implemented. 

Animals on IP would be depopulated, while other animals in a Containment 

Vaccination Zone (CVZ) may be vaccinated. Stamping-out modified with 

emergency vaccination to slaughter is the slaughter and processing of vaccinated 

animals, if animals are eligible for slaughter under USDA FSIS authority and 

rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules.

Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of 

at-risk animals, with subsequent slaughter and processing of vaccinated animals, if 

animals are eligible for slaughter under USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) 

authority and rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules. 
October 2015 2-16

Figure 2-4a. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out Modified 

with Emergency Vaccination to Kill or Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination 

to Slaughter (Infected Premises Would Be Depopulated)

 Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone Emergency Vaccination in Buffer Zone 

 Emergency Vaccination in Control Area Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone and Partial Buffer Zone

Note: Figures are not to scale. 
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-17

Figure 2-4b. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out Modified 

with Emergency Vaccination to Kill or Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination

to Slaughter (Infected Premises Would Be Depopulated)

Note: Figure is not to scale.

2.5.4 Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination

to Live

2.5.4.1 DEFINING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION 

TO LIVE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Box 2-5 defines stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live.

Box 2-5. Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live

2.5.4.2 DESCRIBING STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION TO LIVE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

This strategy involves the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, without subsequent 

depopulation or slaughter of vaccinated animals because of their vaccination 

Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live

Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of 

at-risk animals, without subsequent depopulation or slaughter of vaccinated animals 

because of their vaccination status. Vaccinated animals intended for breeding, slaughter, 

milking, or other purposes live out their useful lives. 
October 2015 2-18

status. Vaccinated animals intended for breeding, slaughter, milking, or other 

purposes live out their useful lives. If animals are intended for slaughter, animals 

must be eligible for slaughter under USDA FSIS authority and rules and/or State 

and Tribal authority and rules. This strategy involves the following:

 A protective emergency vaccination strategy;

 The goal is to protect susceptible animals from infection using emergency 

vaccination with the deliberate intent to maintain vaccinates for the 

duration of their usefulness;

 The targeted vaccination of non-infected animals. This may include 

valuable genetic stock, long-lived production animals, or areas with a 

high-density population of susceptible animals at high risk of becoming 

infected;

 Requires the establishment of one or more VZs free of disease, the 

establishment of one or more CAs for infected animals, and movement 

controls to keep infected animals out of VZs free of disease;

 DIVA testing may be necessary for movement between zones, interstate 

commerce, and international trade; and

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary.

2.5.4.3 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED 

WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO LIVE

Figure 2-5a and 2-5b show how a stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to live response strategy might be implemented. Animals on IP would 

be depopulated, while other animals in a Protection Vaccination Zone (PVZ)

would be vaccinated. Any animals vaccinated would not be subsequently 

depopulated or slaughtered on the basis of vaccination status.
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-19

Figure 2-5a. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out Modified 

with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Infected Premises Would Be Depopulated)

Note: Figure is not to scale. The smaller zone on the lower right hand corner of the above figure 

illustrates an example PVZ, and associated Surveillance Zone (SZ), which is not surrounding a CA.

Figure 2-5b. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out Modified 

with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Infected Premises Would Be Depopulated)

Note: Figure is not to scale.
October 2015 2-20

2.5.4.4 STAMPING-OUT MODIFIED WITH EMERGENCY VACCINATION 

TO SLAUGHTER AND EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO LIVE

It is possible to implement multiple emergency vaccination response strategies in 

the event of an FAD outbreak. For example, in Figure 2-6, both emergency 

vaccination to slaughter and emergency vaccination to live strategies are 

implemented in different regions, with stamping-out on IP. 

Figure 2-6. Examples of Implementing Multiple Emergency Vaccination Strategies 

with Stamping-Out: Stamping-Out with Vaccination to Slaughter and Vaccination to Live

Note: Figure is not to scale.

2.5.5 Emergency Vaccination to Live without Stamping-Out

2.5.5.1 DEFINING EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO LIVE WITHOUT STAMPINGOUT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Box 2-6 defines emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out.

Box 2-6. Emergency Vaccination to Live without Stamping-Out

Emergency Vaccination to Live without Stamping-Out

Vaccination used without depopulation of infected animals or subsequent depopulation or 

slaughter of vaccinated animals. This can be described as emergency vaccination to live 

without stamping-out.
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-21

2.5.5.2 DESCRIBING EMERGENCY VACCINATION TO LIVE WITHOUT STAMPINGOUT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

This strategy involves targeted emergency vaccination of susceptible animals, 

with the intention of not depopulating or slaughtering these animals at a later date 

because of their vaccination status. This strategy is reserved for a disease outbreak 

in which the disease is widely disseminated across the United States, affecting 

many animal industries, where resources are not available for stamping-out, and a 

policy decision has been made not to stamp-out. Although this strategy is highly 

unlikely to be employed initially in an FAD outbreak response, it is possible that,

given the course of an outbreak, the decision might be made to switch to this 

strategy if the disease becomes widespread.

This strategy involves the following:

 A protective emergency vaccination strategy;

 The goal is to protect susceptible animals from infection with emergency 

vaccination, with the intention of not slaughtering vaccinates at a later date 

because of vaccination status;

 The establishment of one or more VZs free of disease, the establishment 

of one or more CAs for infected animals, and movement controls to keep 

infected animals out of VZs free of disease;

 DIVA testing may be necessary for movement between zones, interstate 

commerce, and international trade; and

 Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability, and an 

effective, scalable permitting system may be necessary.

2.5.5.3 ZONES AND AREAS IN RELATION TO EMERGENCY VACCINATION 

TO LIVE WITHOUT STAMPING-OUT

Figures 2-7a and 2-7b provide examples of emergency vaccination to live without 

stamping-out. There would be no stamping-out under this response, only 

emergency vaccination to live. This strategy would not be employed unless the 

disease is widely disseminated across the United States, resources are not 

available for stamping-out, and a policy decision has been made to not stamp-out. 

While it is highly unlikely that this would be the initial strategy employed in an 

FAD outbreak response, it is possible that, given the course of an outbreak, the 

decision might be made to switch to this strategy if the disease becomes 

widespread.
October 2015 2-22

Figure 2-7a. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Emergency 

Vaccination to Live without Stamping-Out

Containment Vaccination Zone and Protection Vaccination Zone

Note: Figure is not to scale. Yellow signifies a VZ. CVZs are typically inside a CA; PVZs 

are typically outside a CA. PVZs are intended to be zone(s) without infected animals.

The smaller zone on the lower right hand corner of the above figure illustrates an 

example PVZ, and associated SZ, which is not surrounding a CA.

Figure 2-7b. Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Emergency 

Vaccination to Live without Stamping-Out

Note: Figure is not to scale.
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-23

2.5.6 Manage Outbreak Without Widespread StampingOut or Vaccination

In some cases, such as when the disease agent is already widespread prior to detection or when it involves a large number of animals, and when no effective vaccine is readily available in sufficient quantities, the decision may be made to 

manage the outbreak without widespread stamping-out or vaccination. The disease would be controlled to the extent possible through rapid and effective implementation of other critical activities, including biosecurity and quarantine and 

movement control.

This approach to an FAD outbreak may result in the United States being endemic 

for the disease for a more extended period of time; a longer-term control program 

for eradication may be developed. While the United States actively works to prepare for FAD outbreaks, there are scenarios in which managing the outbreak without widespread stamping-out or vaccination may be the only option. Effective and 

rapid FAD tracing, as well as securing appropriate veterinary medical countermeasures, like vaccine, for high-consequence, contagious disease agents is critical 

to protect animal agriculture and the economy.

2.6 SUMMARY OF SELECTING A 

RESPONSE STRATEGY

The previous sections have identified and described different response strategies. 

Choosing one strategy, multiple strategies, or modifying strategies as an outbreak 

unfolds is a complex decision process. Depending upon the circumstances and 

scale of the outbreak, a combination of one or more of the response strategies can 

be applied.

If it becomes apparent at any point in the response that stamping-out will not 

achieve control, containment, and, ultimately, eradication of the disease, 

alternative strategies will immediately be considered. Currently, it is not possible 

to delineate a priori the specific factors that might signal the need to modify the 

response to an FAD outbreak.

No single FAD control or eradication strategy may be perfect or appropriate for 

all scenarios. Regardless of the FAD agent, the response will use science- and 

risk-based approaches that protect public health, the environment, and animal 

health, and stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy.

Stamping-out is a viable eradication strategy if an outbreak is detected quickly,

while still reasonably localized and contained by quarantine and movement 

control and biosecurity measures. An essential prerequisite for stamping-out is the 

existence of good epidemiological investigation functions and FAD tracing 
October 2015 2-24

capabilities, which allow the locations and extent of the IP and Control Areas to 

be rapidly and accurately determined.

Regulatory officials and stakeholders who plan for stamping-out must also have 

other viable response strategies, in case the spread of the FAD outpaces the 

resources for stamping-out, or if other factors direct the response away from a 

stamping-out strategy alone.

In circumstances or scenarios where stamping-out alone will not be a viable 

eradication strategy, modified stamping-out with vaccination to kill, modified 

stamping-out with vaccination to slaughter, modified stamping-out with 

vaccination to live, and vaccination to live without stamping-out are all potential 

options. Emergency vaccination strategies can be adopted for agents having an 

effective, safe, available vaccine, and when those strategies are consistent with 

national and international standards. In order to implement a vaccination strategy, 

the United States must also have timely access to sufficient quantities of effective 

vaccine. This can be a significant technical and logistical challenge for many 

disease agents.

In any situation involving emergency vaccination, movement control, FAD

traceability, and a robust information technology system to support permitting, 

epidemiology, and tracing are essential for the timely continuity of business for 

non-infected animals, emergency vaccinated animals, and animal products.

Regardless of the response strategy or strategies adopted, early detection and field 

operations that act with speed and certainty to identify the source of infection and 

stop the FAD agent from spreading further will decrease the size and duration of 

the outbreak.

See Table 2-3 for factors that determine whether emergency vaccination strategies 

are advantageous for responding to an FAD outbreak.

Table 2-3. Factors Determining Viability of Emergency Vaccination

Factor or criterion

Vaccination Decision Points

For vaccination Against vaccination

Suitable vaccine for effective control 

against FAD agent 

Available Not available

Public health assessment Supports vaccination Does not support vaccination

Population density of susceptible animals 

at high risk of becoming infected

High Low

Movement of infected animals, products, 

or fomites out of CA

Evidence of widespread 

movement

No evidence of widespread 

movement

Origin of outbreak Unknown Known

Spread of outbreak Rapid Slow

Distribution of outbreaks Widespread Limited or restricted
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-25

Factor or criterion

Vaccination Decision Points

For vaccination Against vaccination

Public reaction to total stamping-out 

strategy (Public reaction may vary by 

animal species, scale of stamping-out 

policy, and disease agent)

Strong opposition Neutral reaction or weak 

opposition

Domestic stakeholders’ acceptance of 

regionalization with vaccination zones 

Yes No

Third country acceptance of 

regionalization with vaccination zones 

Known Unknown

Assessments and economic analysis of 

competing control strategies

It is likely that a control strategy 

without emergency vaccination 

will lead to significantly higher 

economic losses or longer 

duration of the outbreak

It is likely that a control strategy 

with emergency vaccination will 

lead to significantly higher 

economic losses or longer 

duration of the outbreak

Note: This table was adapted from: Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003. Official Journal of the 

European Union. Annex X.

Box 2-7 summarizes FAD response and emergency vaccination strategies.

Box 2-7. FAD Response and Vaccination Strategies

2.7 OIE-LISTED ANIMAL DISEASES AND 

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR RESPONSE

2.7.1 Recognition of Disease-Free Status

In May 1994, the World Assembly of Delegates of the OIE requested the FMD

and Other Epizootics Commission (now called the Scientific Commission for 

Animal Diseases) to develop a procedure for OIE to officially recognize the 

FMD-free status of members. In 1998, the official agreement between the World 

Trade Organization and the OIE further confirmed the OIE’s mandate to 

recognize disease- and pest-free areas and/or risk status (Agreement on the 

Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) for trade purposes. The

recognition of official disease status has since been expanded to include official 

FAD Response and Vaccination Strategies

The use of emergency vaccination strategies may be considered in an FAD outbreak. An 

emergency vaccination strategy can help to achieve the goals of an FAD response effort, 

based on the three epidemiological principles of response. There are many challenges to 

using emergency vaccination in an FAD response, but also many benefits. An FAD 

response may use one strategy or a variety of strategies in order to detect, control, 

contain, and ultimately eradicate the disease in domestic animals. The use of emergency 

vaccination if an appropriate vaccine is available, will be determined by the IC, the State 

Animal Health Officials (SAHOs), and the VS DA (U.S. CVO). 
October 2015 2-26

recognition of a disease status for rinderpest,

1 CBPP, and bovine spongiform 

encephalopathy (BSE).2 Since 2012, AHS, CSF, and PPR have also been added to 

the list of diseases for which official freedom is recognized.

Any Member that wishes to be included in the list of designated disease-status

countries or to change its status (for example, to move from the list of FMD free 

countries or zones where vaccination is practiced to the list of FMD free countries 

or zones where vaccination is not practiced) sends an application to the OIE

Scientific and Technical Department, accompanied by specific documentation and 

the relevant questionnaires. The Director General then submits the request to the 

Scientific Commission for evaluation. The OIE Scientific Commission is 

responsible for assessing these applications for their compliance with the OIE 

standards.3

If there is a disease outbreak, or if the Scientific Commission determines that the 

country no longer complies with relevant requirements, disease status may be 

suspended. Suspended status can be reinstated when the country submits a new 

application that complies with requirements. The Director General of the OIE 

announces suspension and recovery of official OIE disease status.

For example, the OIE-categories for official country recognition for FMD virus 

are as follows (Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2015) Articles 8.8.2, 8.8.3, 8.8.4, 

8.8.5):

 FMD-free country or zone where vaccination is not practiced 

(Article 8.8.2)

 FMD-free country or zone where vaccination is practiced (Article 8.8.3)

 FMD-free compartment (Article 8.8.4)

 FMD-infected country or zone (Article 8.8.5).

OIE Members can also self-declare their entire country, zone, or compartment

free from certain OIE-listed diseases other than AHS, BSE, CBPP, CSF, FMD, 

rinderpest, and PPR. In this case, delegates are advised to consult the Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code or the Aquatic Animal Health Code to verify whether 

specific requirements for self-declaration of freedom from that particular disease 

are available. By providing the relevant epidemiological evidence, an OIE

 1 Rinderpest is no longer listed due to its worldwide eradication, officially declared in May 

2011 by the OIE.

2 Please note that the OIE recognizes freedom of all the diseases listed here except for BSE, 

which it recognizes either “negligible” or “controlled” risk status. 3 World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), “Standard Operating Procedures for Official 

Recognition of Disease Status or Risk of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and for the Endorsement of National Official Control Programmes of Member Countries,” 2015, 

http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/SOP2015/ 

EN_SOP2015.pdf.
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-27

Member can demonstrate to a potential importing country that the entire country 

or a zone under discussion meet the provisions of the specific disease chapter. 

Any submitted self-declaration should contain evidence demonstrating that the 

requirements for the disease status have been met in accordance with the OIE

standards. The self-declaration of freedom from a given OIE-listed disease (other 

than AHS, BSE, CBPP, CSF, FMD, rinderpest, and PPR) is the responsibility of 

the Member concerned, and the OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication 

of self-declarations of country or zonal disease status based on inadequate 

information, changes in epidemiological status, or other significant events that 

were not promptly reported to the headquarters after the self-declaration of 

freedom for that given disease.

The self-declaration must be signed by the official OIE delegate of the OIE

Member concerned. The data provided must conform to the requirements 

described in the standard measures contained in the Terrestrial or Aquatic Codes. 

Upon request of the OIE delegate, a self-declaration may be published in the OIE

Bulletin for information of all OIE Members. The self-declaration for publication 

must contain information demonstrating that the requirements have been met, as 

described in the OIE standards.

4

2.8 EXECUTING A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Many critical activities and tools are employed to execute the response strategies 

during an FAD outbreak. These critical activities are important capabilities for an 

effective response. This section describes some of those activities; Appendix B

contains a list of example preparedness and response goals for selected activities 

and tools.

 Epidemiological investigation and FAD tracing:

 Critical in minimizing the size and duration of an FAD outbreak.

 Includes activities such as the trace-forward and trace-back of infected 

animals, exposed animals, contaminated animal products, and fomites 

to determine the source of infection and stop the spread of infection 

from animals on IP and CP.

 Surveillance:

 Determines the extent of infection for premises and zones with defined 

plans for clinical observation and diagnostic testing.

 4 For further information, the OIE provides Standard Operating Procedures for Official 

Recognition of Disease Status or Risk Status of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and for the 

Endorsement of National Official Control Programmes of Member Countries, http://www.oie.int/ 

fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/SOP2015/EN_SOP2015.pdf.
October 2015 2-28

 Also provides information for disease-freedom for premises and zones 

with defined plans for clinical observation and diagnostic testing.

 Biosecurity:

 Necessary to (1) contain the agent on IP (biocontainment), and 

(2) prevent the introduction of the agent via movement of personnel 

and material to naïve animals and premises (bioexclusion).

 A careful balance must be maintained between facilitating response 

activities and ensuring personnel do not expose naïve animals and 

premises to the disease. 

 Information management:

 EMRS 2.0 is the system of record for all FAD investigations, FAD 

incidents, and other animal health events as specified. 

 Data must be entered into the EMRS system in a timely manner 

(ideally less than 24 hours), consistently, and accurately for situation 

reporting at all levels. 

 Quarantine and movement control:

 Quarantines will be implemented for IP, Suspect Premises (SP), and 

CP. Movement controls will be implemented for At-Risk Premises 

(ARP) and Monitored Premises (MP) within a CA. 

 Movement control of susceptible animals and animal products within, 

into, and out of a CA is accomplished by risk assessments, 

surveillance requirements, biosecurity procedures, and permitting.

 Movement controls of susceptible animals may also be implemented 

on broader geographical areas or by jurisdictions, such as a State, 

regionally, or nationally, to limit the “silent spread” of infection (for 

certain disease agents, such as FMD). The time period for this type of 

movement control needs to be defined, such as for an incubation 

period for the disease or other specified period.

 Continuity of business:

 Provides science- and risk-based approaches and systems for the 

continuity of business involving non-infected animals and noncontaminated animal products.

 Establishes a transparent and effective system for risk assessments, 

surveillance requirements, biosecurity procedures, and a permit 
Response Strategies and Principles

October 2015 2-29

process in order to promote stakeholder acceptance and compliance 

with regulatory interventions by State, Federal, and Tribal authorities.

 Cleaning and disinfection/virus elimination:

 This activity eliminates a contagious agent from contaminated 

premises and fomites with proper sanitary procedures including 

cleaning (e.g., removal of contamination; organic matter) and 

disinfection (application of physical or chemical measures to eliminate 

the disease agent).

 Cleaning and disinfection activities should eliminate the virus in 

the most cost-effective way possible. 

 Any method selected should consider the characteristics of the 

premises/houses and other factors which may impact the effectiveness 

of virus elimination. 

 Disposal:

 This activity disposes of animal carcasses, contaminated and 

potentially contaminated materials, animal products, and items that 

cannot be properly cleaned and disinfected in a biosecure manner that 

does not allow disease spread with minimal negative environmental 

impact. 

 Public awareness campaign:

 Public awareness campaigns engage and leverage State, Federal,

Tribal, and stakeholder relationships to provide unified public 

messages for local, national, and international audiences.

 This activity addresses issues and concerns relating to food safety, 

public health, and animal welfare.

 This activity addresses issues and concerns related to interstate 

commerce, continuity of business, and international trade.

 Emergency vaccination:

 Emergency vaccination may be employed depending upon the 

availability and efficacy of a vaccine, the goals of the outbreak 

response, the circumstances of the outbreak, approval of the IC, the 

SAHOs, and the VS DA (U.S. CVO).

 DIVA testing may be necessary for movement between zones, 

interstate commerce, and international trade.
October 2015 3-1

Chapter 3 

Designating Zones and Premises

3.1 AREAS AND ZONES

In general, an animal disease outbreak response may involve seven types of 

zones/areas. These zones and areas are the 1) Infected Zone (IZ); 2) Buffer Zone 

(BZ); 3) Control Area (CA); 4) Surveillance Zone (SZ); 5) Free Area (FA); 

6) Containment Vaccination Zone (CVZ); and 7) Protection Vaccination Zone 

(PVZ).

This section provides detail on these areas and zones. 

3.1.1 Infected Zone 

 An IZ immediately surrounds an Infected Premises (IP) (see Figure 3-1).

 IP, Suspect Premises (SP), and Contact Premises (CP) are subject to 

individual premises quarantine. At-Risk Premises (ARP) and Monitored 

Premises (MP) are subject to movement control. 

 An IZ will initially encompass all presumptive or confirmed positive 

premises and include CP as required epidemiologically or logistically. 

 The size of an IZ depends upon the foreign animal disease (FAD) 

agent and may be modified or redefined as needed by the 

circumstances of the outbreak. 

 The perimeter of an IZ should be at least 3 km (1.86 miles) beyond the 

perimeters of presumptive or confirmed IP.

 An IZ may initially be as large as a county, township, district, or other 

jurisdictional area. 

 Considerations for establishing the size of an IZ: 

 potential consequences of not containing the disease agent to a 

particular jurisdictional or geographical area; and 

 potential consequences of movement restrictions (or 

implementation of a permit process) on a large geographical or 

jurisdictional area. 
 

October 2015 3-2

 See the tables in Section 3.4 and the disease specific response plans for 

more guidance on moving animals and animal products into, within, and 

out of a CA. 

Figure 3-1. Infected Zone 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.1.2 Buffer Zone

 A BZ immediately surrounds an IZ or a CP (see Figure 3-2). A BZ and IZ 

together constitute a CA. 

 Within a BZ, CP are subject to individual premises quarantine. ARP and 

MP are subject to movement control. 

 A BZ is a scalable area with a width that is never less than the minimum 

radius of the associated IZ, but may be much larger. 

 The perimeter of a BZ should be at least 7 km (4.35 miles) beyond the 

perimeter of the IZ. 

 The size of a BZ depends upon the FAD agent and circumstances of 

the outbreak. 

 The boundaries of a BZ may be modified or redefined as needed 

by the circumstances of the outbreak. 

 Considerations for establishing the size of a BZ.

 potential consequences of not containing the disease agent to a 

particular jurisdictional or geographical area; and 
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-3

 potential consequences of movement restrictions (or 

implementation of a permit process) on a large geographical or 

jurisdictional area. 

 See the tables in Section 3.4 and the disease specific response plans for 

more guidance on moving animals and animal products into, within, and 

out of a CA. 

 If a CP is identified outside a CA, it may be surrounded by a BZ until the 

disposition of the CP is determined. 

Figure 3-2. Buffer Zone 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.1.3 Control Area 

 A CA consists of an IZ and a BZ (see Figure 3-3).

 IP, SP, and CP are subject to individual premises quarantine. ARP and MP

are subject to movement control. 

 The size of a CA depends upon the FAD agent and circumstances of the 

outbreak and may be modified or redefined as needed by the 

circumstances of the outbreak. 

 The perimeter of a CA should be at least 10 km (6.21 miles) beyond 

the perimeter of the closest IP. 

 Initially a CA may be much larger, such as multiple counties, a State, a 

Tribal Nation, or multiple States. The size of a CA is scalable to the 

risk, or the uncertainty of the risk, posed by the disease agent and the 

circumstances of the outbreak. 
 

October 2015 3-4

 The boundaries of a CA can be modified or redefined when tracing 

and other epidemiological information becomes available. 

 Table 3-1 lists factors that should be considered when determining the 

size of a CA. 

 Considerations for establishing the size of a CA: 

 potential consequences of not containing the disease agent to a 

particular jurisdictional or geographical area; and 

 potential consequences of movement restrictions (or 

implementation of a permit process) on a large geographic or 

jurisdictional area. 

Table 3-1. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size

Factors Additional details

Jurisdictional areas  Effectiveness and efficiency of administration

 Multi-jurisdictional considerations: local, State, Tribal, and multistate

Physical boundaries  Areas defined by geography

 Areas defined by distance between premises

FAD epidemiology  Reproductive rate

 Incubation period

 Ease of transmission

 Infectious dose

 Species susceptibility

 Modes of transmission (such as fecal-oral, droplet, aerosol, vectors)

 Survivability in the environment

 Ease of diagnosis (for example, no pathognomonic signs; requires diagnostic laboratory 

testing)

 Age of lesions

Infected Premises 

characteristics

 Number of contacts

 Transmission pathways and transmission risk

 Extent of animal movement

 Number of animals

 Species of animals

 Age of animals

 Movement of traffic and personnel to and from premises (fomite spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place at time of outbreak

Contact Premises 

characteristics

 Number and types of premises

 Susceptible animal populations and population density

 Animal movements

 Movement of traffic (fomites) and personnel to and from premises (fomite spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place prior to outbreak

Environment  Types of premises in area or region

 Land use in area or region

 Susceptible wildlife and population density

 Wildlife as biological or mechanical vectors
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-5

Table 3-1. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size

Factors Additional details

Climate (for aerosol 

spread diseases)

 Prevailing winds

 Humidity

General area, region, 

or agricultural sector 

biosecurity

 Biosecurity practices in place prior to outbreak

 Biosecurity practices implemented once outbreak detected

Number of backyard or 

transitional premises 

 Types of premises, animal movements, and network of animal and fomite movements

Continuity of business  Continuity of business plans and processes in place or activated at beginning of outbreak 

(such as surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and riskassessments)

 Permit processes, memorandums of understanding, and information management 

systems in place or activated at beginning of outbreak

Figure 3-3. Control Area 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.1.4 Surveillance Zone 

An SZ should be established in the FA, outside and along the border of a CA, 

separating the remainder of the FA from a CA (see Figure 3-4).

Surveillance in an SZ will focus on premises determined to be at the highest risk 

of infection. The width of an SZ should be at least 10 km (6.2 miles). The 

maximum size of an SZ may be much larger. 
 

October 2015 3-6

Figure 3-4. Surveillance Zone 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.1.5 Free Area 

The FA is the area not included in any CA. The FA includes an SZ but can extend 

beyond it (see Figure 3-5). The FA may also include a PVZ. 

Figure 3-5. Free Area 

Note: Figures are not to scale.
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-7

3.1.6 Containment Vaccination Zone 

 A CVZ is an emergency vaccination zone, typically inside a CA. It may 

include all or part of an IZ and/or a BZ (see Figure 3-6).

 A CVZ may be a secondary zone designation. Quarantine and movement 

control requirements, surveillance requirements, and biosecurity 

procedures for a CA (IZ and BZ) apply to a CVZ. 

 Animals receiving emergency vaccination within a CVZ may be subject to 

vaccinated animal traceability and DIVA testing, as determined by the 

Incident Command (IC).

 Depending upon the circumstances of the outbreak, the emergency 

vaccination strategy within a CVZ may be one or more of the following: 

 Suppressive vaccination strategy (for example, stamping-out modified 

with emergency vaccination to kill or to slaughter).

 Protective vaccination strategy (for example, stamping-out modified 

with emergency vaccination to live). 

 Protective vaccination strategy (for example, emergency vaccination to 

live without stamping-out). 
 

October 2015 3-8

Figure 3-6. Examples of Containment Vaccination Zones 

Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone Emergency Vaccination in Buffer Zone

Emergency Vaccination in Control Area Emergency Vaccination Partial BZ and IZ

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.1.7 Protection Vaccination Zone 

 A PVZ is an emergency vaccination zone, typically outside the CA (see 

Figure 3-7).

 A PVZ may be subject to movement control requirements, surveillance 

requirements, and biosecurity procedures. A PVZ may be a secondary 

zone designation. 

 Animals receiving emergency vaccination within a PVZ may be subject to 

vaccinated animal traceability and DIVA testing, as determined by IC. 
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-9

 A PVZ is consistent with the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 

definition for a Protection Zone. A Protection Zone is defined by the OIE 

as 

a zone established to protect the health status of animals in a free country 

or free zone, from those in a country or zone of a different animal health 

status, using measures based on the epidemiology of the disease under 

consideration to prevent spread of the causative pathogenic agent into a 

free country or free zone. These measures may include, but are not 

limited to, vaccination, movement control and an intensified degree of 

surveillance. 

More information can be found at the OIE website, www.oie.int.

 Depending upon the circumstances of the outbreak, the emergency 

vaccination strategy within a PVZ may be one or more of the following: 

 Protective vaccination strategy (for example, stamping-out modified

with emergency vaccination to live).

 Protective vaccination strategy (for example, emergency vaccination to

live without stamping-out).

 Suppressive vaccination strategy (for example, stamping-out modified

with emergency vaccination to kill or to slaughter).

Figure 3-7. Protection Vaccination Zone 

Note: Figures are not to scale. The smaller zones on the lower left or right hand corner of the above figures 

illustrate an example of another PVZ, and associated SZ, which is not surrounding a CA.
October 2015 3-10

3.2 PREMISES

In general, any animal disease outbreak involves six types of premises: 1) IP; 

2) CP; 3) SP; 4) ARP; 5) MP; and 6) Free Premises (FP). If emergency

vaccination is used, there will be a seventh type, Vaccinated Premises (VP). 

3.2.1 Infected Premises 

 An IP is located in an IZ (see Figure 3-8).

 An IP is a premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed 

positive case exists as determined by laboratory results, compatible 

clinical signs, case definition, and international standards. 

 All presumptive and confirmed positive premises are classified as an IP. In 

addition, all other premises that meet the current case definition are 

classified as an IP. 

Figure 3-8. Infected Premises 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.2.2 Contact Premises 

 A CP can be located in an IZ or BZ (see Figure 3-9).

 A CP is a premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed 

to the FAD agent, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to 

exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from an IP. The 

specific transmission characteristics of the FAD agent should be 

considered when assigning the CP designation. 

 A premises that is contiguous to an IP may also be classified as a CP. 
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-11

 If a CP is identified outside a CA, it may be surrounded by a BZ until the 

disposition of the CP is determined. A CP designation outside of a CA in a 

BZ is intended to be a short-term designation. 

 A CP will be subject to quarantine and movement controls, surveillance 

requirements, and strict biosecurity procedures. Other disease control 

measures may include depopulation and disposal of susceptible animals as 

determined by IC. 

 If the susceptible animals on a CP are not depopulated, they will be placed 

under surveillance in accordance with the surveillance plan. 

 Following epidemiological investigation, surveillance requirements, 

diagnostic test results, and biosecurity requirements, a CP within a CA can 

be designated as an IP, ARP, or an MP. If a CP is in a BZ outside of a CA, 

the BZ will be removed if the premises is not infected. If the premises is 

infected, a CA, comprising an IZ and BZ, will be placed around the IP. 

Figure 3-9. Contact Premises 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.2.3 Suspect Premises 

 An SP can be located in an IZ, BZ, SZ, or VZ (see Figure 3-10).

 An SP is a premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible 

animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. This is 

intended to be a short-term premises designation. 

 An SP is subject to quarantine and movement controls, surveillance 

requirements, and strict biosecurity procedures. 
 

October 2015 3-12

 Surveillance will be conducted in accordance with the surveillance 

plan. 

 Following complete epidemiological investigation, surveillance 

requirements, and biosecurity requirements, an SP can be designated 

as an IP, CP, ARP, or MP if in a CA, as an FP if in an SZ or VZ. 

Figure 3-10. Suspect Premises 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.2.4 At-Risk Premises 

 An ARP can be located in an IZ or BZ (see Figure 3-11).

 An ARP is a premises with susceptible animals, but none have clinical 

signs compatible with the FAD. 

 An ARP must objectively demonstrate that it is not an IP, CP, or SP.

 An ARP is subject to movement control requirements, surveillance 

requirements, and biosecurity procedures established for a CA. 

 An ARP that seeks to move susceptible animals or animal products within 

a CA will require a permit approved by IC and must use appropriate 

biosecurity procedures. 

 An ARP that seeks to move susceptible animals or animal products out of 

a CA will need to meet the requirements to be reclassified as an MP.
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-13

Figure 3-11. At-Risk Premises 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.2.5 Monitored Premises 

 An MP is located in a CA (IZ or BZ). 

 An MP objectively demonstrates that it is not an IP, CP, or SP (see 

Figure 3-12).

 Only an ARP is eligible to become an MP. 

 An MP is subject to epidemiological investigation, risk assessments, 

surveillance requirements, and biosecurity procedures. 

 An MP meets a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible 

animals or animal products out of a CA by permit. 

 For movement of susceptible animals and animal products out of a CA to 

the FA, the permit process must take into consideration any international 

standards or conditions for such movement. In addition, commodityspecific proactive risk assessments, continuity of business plans, and 

movement and marketability plans will be considered. 
 

October 2015 3-14

Figure 3-12. Monitored Premises 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.2.6 Vaccinated Premises 

 A VP may be located in a CVZ, typically inside a CA (IZ and BZ) or in a 

PVZ, typically outside a CA. 

 A VP is a premises where emergency vaccination has been performed. VP

may be a secondary premises designation (see Figure 3-13). 

 A VP may be subject to the risk assessments, surveillance requirements, 

and biosecurity procedures established for the primary premises 

designation as established by IC. 

 Animals receiving emergency vaccination on a VP may be subject to 

vaccinated animal traceability and DIVA testing. 

 For movement of emergency vaccinated animals, consideration must be 

given to any national or international standards or conditions for such 

movement. 
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-15

Figure 3-13. Vaccinated Premises 

Note: Figures are not to scale. The smaller zone on the lower right hand corner of the above figure illustrates an 

example PVZ, and associated SZ, which is not surrounding a CA.

3.2.7 Free Premises 

 An FP is a premises outside of a CA and not a CP or SP (see Figure 3-14).

 An FP can be located within an SZ or elsewhere in the FA. 

Figure 3-14. Free Premises 

Note: Figures are not to scale.

3.3 SUMMARY: ZONES, AREAS, PREMISES

Table 3-2 summarizes the premises designations that would be employed in an 

FAD outbreak response. Table 3-3 summarizes the zone and area designations 

that would be used in an FAD outbreak response. 
 

October 2015 3-16

Table 3-2. Summary of Premises Designations 

Premises Definition Zone

Infected 

Premises (IP)

Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive 

case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, 

case definition, and international standards.

Infected Zone

Contact 

Premises (CP)

Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to 

the FAD agent, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited 

to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from 

Infected Premises.

Infected Zone, 

Buffer Zone

Suspect 

Premises (SP)

Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible 

animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. 

This is intended to be a short-term premises designation.

Infected Zone, 

Buffer Zone, 

Surveillance Zone, 

Vaccination Zone

At-Risk 

Premises (ARP)

Premises that have susceptible animals, but none of those 

susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. 

Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected 

Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk 

Premises may seek to move susceptible animals or products 

within the Control Area by permit. Only At-Risk Premises are 

eligible to become Monitored Premises.

Infected Zone, 

Buffer Zone

Monitored 

Premises (MP)

Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected 

Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. Only At-Risk 

Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises. Monitored 

Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move 

susceptible animals or products out of the Control Area by permit.

Infected Zone, 

Buffer Zone

Free Premises 

(FP)

Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact or Suspect 

Premises.

Surveillance Zone, 

Free Area

Vaccinated 

Premises (VP)

Premises where emergency vaccination has been performed. This 

may be a secondary premises designation. 

Containment 

Vaccination Zone, 

Protection 

Vaccination Zone

Table 3-3. Summary of Zone and Area Descriptions 

Zone/area Definition

Infected Zone (IZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises.

Buffer Zone (BZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises.

Control Area (CA) Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area. The Surveillance Zone is 

part of the Free Area.

Free Area (FA) Area not included in any Control Area. Includes the Surveillance Zone.

Vaccination Zone (VZ) Emergency Vaccination Zone classified as either a Containment Vaccination 

Zone (typically inside a Control Area) or a Protection Vaccination Zone 

(typically outside a Control Area). This may be a secondary zone designation.
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-17

Figure 3-15 illustrates all the zones and premises. 

Figure 3-15. Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises 

Zones and Areas Premises

Note: Figures are not to scale. The VZ can be either a PVZ or CVZ. The smaller zones on the lower right hand 

corner of the above figures illustrate an example of another PVZ, and associated SZ, which is not surrounding a CA. 

Figures 3-16a–e are applied examples of zones using the State of Iowa. None of 

the figures include a depiction of an SZ because the size of the zone may vary and 

change depending on factors such as the nature of the disease agent, 

demographics of surrounding area, and known epidemiological information. 

These maps are courtesy of CEAH Information Management and Analytic 

Support Unit. 
 

October 2015 3-18

Figure 3-16a. Small Infected Zone and Buffer Zone 

Iowa Outbreak: One Infected County 

Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations

Infected Zone 7,083 183,865 598 208

Buffer Zone 93,455 2,216,816 6,556 1,496

Total 100,538 2,400,681 7,154 1,704

Total livestock affected: 2,508,373.

Data source: National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), 2012, http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/.

Data may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. 

Best available data incorporated.

Affected area: 8 counties.
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-19

Figure 3-16b. Medium Infected Zone and Buffer Zone 

Iowa Outbreak: Three Infected Counties 

Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations

Infected Zone 31,838 1,189,109 2,779 667

Buffer Zone 289,558 3,980,202 13,968 3,162

Total 321,396 5,169,311 16,747 3,829

Total livestock affected: 5,507,454.

Data source: NASS, 2012, http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/.

Data may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. 

Best available data incorporated.

Affected area: 14 counties.
 

October 2015 3-20

Figure 3-16c. Large Infected Zone and Buffer Zone 

Iowa Outbreak: Nine Infected Counties 

Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations

Infected Zone 252,829 3,025,683 14,391 2,729

Buffer Zone 502,389 4,999,308 22,140 5,515

Total 755,218 8,024,991 36,531 8,244

Total livestock affected: 8,816,740.

Data source: NASS, 2012, http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/.

Data may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. 

Best available data incorporated.

Affected area: 27 counties.
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-21

Figure 3-16d. Protection Vaccination Zone 

Iowa Outbreak: Nine Infected Counties + Vaccination Zone 

Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations

Infected Zone 252,829 3,025,683 14,391 2,729

Buffer Zone 502,389 4,999,308 22,140 5,515

Vaccination Zone 1,323,363 5,859,894 51,596 9,639

Total 2,078,581 13,884,885 88,127 17,883

Total livestock affected: 16,051,593.

Data source: NASS, 2012, http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/.

Data may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. 

Best available data incorporated.

Affected area: 51 counties.
 

October 2015 3-22

Figure 3-16e. Large Infected Zone and State-Wide Buffer Zone 

Iowa Outbreak: Nine Infected Counties and Large Buffer Zone

Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations

Infected Zone 252,829 3,025,683 14,391 2,729

Buffer Zone 3,591,723 17,218,848 161,752 35,189

Total 3,844,552 20,244,531 176,143 37,918

Total livestock affected: 24,265,226.

Data source: NASS, 2012, http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/.

Data may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. 

Best available data incorporated.

Affected area: 99 counties.
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-23

Table 3-4 lists the minimum sizes of zones and areas during an FAD outbreak. 

Table 3-4. Minimum Sizes of Zones and Areas 

Zone or area Minimum size and details

Infected Zone (IZ)  Perimeter should be at least 3 km (~1.86 miles) beyond perimeters of presumptive or 

confirmed Infected Premises. This will depend on disease agent and epidemiological 

circumstances. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues.

Buffer Zone (BZ)  Perimeter should be at least 7 km (~4.35 miles) beyond the perimeter of the Infected 

Zone. Width is generally not less than the minimum radius of the associated Infected 

Zone, but may be much larger. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues.

Control Area (CA)  Perimeter should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the perimeter of the closest 

Infected Premises. Please see Table 3-1 for factors to consider in determining the size 

of a Control Area. This area may be redefined as the outbreak continues.

Surveillance Zone (SZ)  Width should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles), but may be much larger.

Table 3-5 lists the minimum sizes of zones and areas during vector-borne outbreaks (spread by mosquitoes or Culicoides).

Table 3-5. Minimum Sizes of Zones and Areas for Mosquito 

or Culicoides Vector-Borne Diseases 

Zone or area Minimum size and details

Infected Zone (IZ)  Perimeter should be at least 10 km (~6.2 miles) beyond perimeters of presumptive or 

confirmed Infected Premises. This will depend on disease agent and epidemiological 

circumstances. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues.

Buffer Zone (BZ)  Perimeter should be at least 20 km (~12.4 miles) beyond the perimeter of the Infected 

Zone. Width is generally not less than the minimum radius of the associated Infected 

Zone, but may be much larger. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues.

Control Area (CA)  Perimeter should be at least 30 km (~18.6 miles) beyond the perimeter of the closest 

Infected Premises. Please see Table 3-1 for factors to consider in determining the size 

of a Control Area. This area may be redefined as the outbreak continues.

Surveillance Zone (SZ)  Width should be at least 20 km (~12.4 miles) but may be larger depending on the 

known geographic range of vector.

3.4 SUMMARY: PERMITS TO MOVE INTO, WITHIN,

AND OUT OF A CONTROL AREA

Tables 3-6, 3-7, and 3-8 provide guidelines for moving into, within, and out of a 

CA. See disease-specific response plans as well as continuity of business plans for 

commodity-specific information. 
 

October 2015 3-24

Table 3-6. Movement into Control Area from Outside Control Area to Specific Premisesa

Item moving into 

a Control Area to 

a/an...

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premisesb

Contact 

Premisesb

At-Risk 

Premises

Monitored 

Premises

Susceptible 

livestock or poultry

Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances 

as determined 

by the IC, such 

as slaughter.

Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances 

as determined 

by the IC, such 

as slaughter.

Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances 

as determined 

by the IC, 

such as 

slaughter.

Permit for 

movement must 

be approved by 

the IC with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Permit for 

movement must be 

approved by the IC 

with appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Susceptible 

animal products

See disease specific or continuity of business plans (Secure Food Supply Plans) for information 

on susceptible animal products or guidance as determined by the IC.

Other animals 

(non-susceptible 

livestock or 

poultry) from 

premises with 

susceptible 

species

Prohibited 

unless permit 

approved by IC 

and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited 

unless permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited 

unless permit 

approved by 

IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures. IC 

may require a 

permit for 

movement 

depending upon 

FAD and 

characteristics of 

destination 

premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement 

depending upon 

FAD and 

characteristics of 

destination 

premises.

Other animals or 

animal products 

(non-susceptible 

livestock or 

poultry/products) 

from premises 

without

susceptible 

species

IC will 

determine 

movement 

restrictions 

based on FAD 

and 

characteristics 

of destination 

premises.

IC will determine 

movement 

restrictions 

based on FAD 

and 

characteristics of 

destination 

premises.

IC will 

determine 

movement 

restrictions 

based on 

FAD and 

characteristics 

of destination 

premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures. IC 

may require a 

permit for 

movement 

depending upon 

FAD and 

characteristics of 

destination 

premises.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures. IC may 

require a permit for 

movement 

depending upon 

FAD and 

characteristics of 

destination 

premises.

Equipment, 

vehicles, and 

other fomites from 

premises with 

susceptible 

species

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos

from susceptible 

livestock or poultry

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed with 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational 

capabilities.

b

Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally, these premises 

should be re-designated before movements occur.
Designating Zones and Premises 

October 2015 3-25

Table 3-7. Movement within a Control Areaa

Item moving within 

a Control Area 

from a/an... 

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premisesb

Contact 

Premisesb

At-Risk 

Premises

Monitored 

Premises

Susceptible 

livestock or poultry

Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances 

as determined 

by the IC, such 

as slaughter.

Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances 

as determined 

by the IC, such 

as slaughter.

Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances 

as determined 

by the IC, such 

as slaughter.

Allowed to move 

by permit 

approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative 

diagnostic tests, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Allowed to move 

by permit 

approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative 

diagnostic tests, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Susceptible animal 

products

See disease specific or continuity of business plans (Secure Food Supply Plans) for 

information on susceptible animal products or guidance as determined by the IC.

Other animals 

(non-susceptible 

livestock or poultry) 

from premises with 

susceptible 

species

Prohibited 

unless specific 

permit granted 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited 

unless specific 

permit granted 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited 

unless specific 

permit granted 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed to move 

by permit 

approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative 

diagnostic tests, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Allowed to move 

by permit 

approved by the 

IC; surveillance, 

negative 

diagnostic tests, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Other animals or 

animal products 

(non-susceptible 

livestock or poultry/ 

products) from 

premises without

susceptible species

N/A

(Infected 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

N/A

(Suspect 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

N/A

(Contact

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

N/A

(At-Risk 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

N/A

(Monitored 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

Equipment, 

vehicles, and other 

fomites from 

premises with

susceptible species

Prohibited 

unless specific 

permit granted 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited 

unless specific 

permit granted 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited 

unless specific 

permit granted 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos 

from susceptible 

livestock or poultry

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. Allowed by 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational 

capabilities.

b

Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally, these premises 

should be re-designated before movements occur.
 

October 2015 3-26

Table 3-8. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area 

 from Specific Premisesa

Item moving out 

of a Control Area 

from a/an... 

Infected 

Premises

Suspect 

Premisesb

Contact 

Premisesb

At-Risk 

Premises

Monitored 

Premises

c

Susceptible 

livestock or poultry

Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances as 

determined by 

the IC.

Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances as 

determined by 

the IC.

Prohibited, 

except under 

certain 

circumstances as 

determined by 

the IC.

At-Risk Premises 

must become 

Monitored 

Premises to 

move susceptible 

livestock or 

poultry out of a 

Control Area.

Allowed to move 

by permit approved 

by IC; surveillance, 

negative diagnostic 

tests, premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Susceptible animal 

products

See disease specific or continuity of business plans (Secure Food Supply Plans) for 

information on susceptible animal products or guidance as determined by the IC.

Other animals 

(non-susceptible 

livestock or poultry)

from premises with

susceptible species

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures and 

risk-assessment.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures and 

risk-assessment.

Prohibited unless 

specific permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures and 

risk-assessment.

Allowed to move 

by permit 

approved by IC; 

surveillance and 

negative 

diagnostic tests 

for susceptible 

animals on 

premises, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Allowed to move 

by permit approved 

by IC; surveillance 

and negative 

diagnostic tests for 

susceptible 

animals on 

premises, 

premises 

biosecurity, and 

risk-assessment 

may be required 

for permit.

Other animals or 

animal products 

(non-susceptible 

livestock or poultry/ 

products) from 

premises without

susceptible species

N/A

(Infected 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

N/A

(Suspect 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

N/A

(Contact

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

N/A

(At-Risk 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

N/A

(Monitored 

Premises have 

susceptible 

species).

Equipment, 

vehicles, and other 

fomites from 

premises with

susceptible species

Prohibited unless 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Prohibited unless 

permit approved 

by IC and 

appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Allowed by permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

Semen, embryos 

from susceptible 

livestock or poultry

Prohibited. Prohibited. Prohibited. At-Risk Premises 

must become 

Monitored 

Premises to 

move semen, 

embryos from 

susceptible 

livestock or 

poultry out of a 

Control Area.

Monitored 

Premises only 

allowed by permit 

approved by IC 

and appropriate 

biosecurity 

measures.

a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational 

capabilities.

b

Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally, these Premises 

should be re-designated before movements occur.

c

Continuity of business plans may apply.
October 2015 A-1 

Appendix A

FAD PReP Document Structure

A. FAD PREP STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS (CONCEPT

OF OPERATIONS) 

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination 

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0) 

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD 

PReP Manual 2-0) 

 Incident Coordination Group Plan (FAD PReP Manual 3-0) 

 Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0) 

 A Partial Listing of Foreign Animal Disease Stakeholders (FAD PReP 

Manual 5-0) 

B. NAHEMS GUIDELINES

Each National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) 

Guidelines document also has accompanying educational materials, including 

presentations and handouts. 

 Health and Safety 

 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

 Biosecurity

 Quarantine and Movement Control 

 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia 

 Disposal 

 Cleaning and Disinfection 

 Vaccination for Contagious Diseases 

 Appendix A Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD)
October 2015 A-2 

 Appendix B Classical Swine Fever (CSF)

 Appendix C Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

 Wildlife Management and Vector Control for foreign animal disease 

Response in Domestic Livestock 

 Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing 

 Continuity of Business 

 Information Management 

C. INDUSTRY MANUALS

 Dairy 

 Swine 

 Poultry 

 Beef Feedlot

 Cow-Calf

D. DISEASE RESPONSE PLANS

 HPAI

 FMD

 Classification of Phases and Types of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak and Response (draft 2013)

 CSF 

 Newcastle Disease (ND)

E. DISEASE STRATEGIES

 African Swine Fever 

 Japanese Encephalitis 

 New World Screwworm Myiasis
FAD PReP Document Structure

October 2015 A-3 

 Peste Des Petits Ruminants

 Rift Valley Fever 

F. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

There are 23 critical activities conducted during a response to an FAD. Many of 

these activities have associated standard operating procedures (SOPs). These 

SOPs are templates to provide a common picture or set of procedures for the following 23 activities and tools. 

1. Overview of Etiology and Ecology

2. Case Definitions and Laboratory Definitions

3. Surveillance

4. Diagnostics (Sample Collection, Surge Capacity, and Reporting)

5. Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing

6. Overview of Information Management

7. Communications

8. Health and Safety and PPE

9. Biosecurity

10. Quarantine and Movement Control

11. Continuity of Business

12. Overview of Regionalization for International Trade

13. Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

14. Disposal

15. Cleaning and Disinfection

16. Vaccination

17. Logistics

18. Overview of Wildlife Management and Vector Control

19. Overview of Animal Welfare
October 2015 A-4

20. Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools 

21. Appraisal and Compensation 

22. Overview of Finance 

23. Overview of Incident Management

G. CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS PLANNING/SECURE 

FOOD SUPPLY PLANS

 Secure Egg Supply Plan 

 Secure Milk Supply Plan

 Secure Turkey Supply Plan

 Secure Pork Supply Plan

 Secure Broiler Supply Plan

H. OUTBREAK RESPONSE TOOLS

 Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox

 Technique for the Assessment of Intervention Options

 Case Definitions

 African horse sickness

 African swine fever

 H5/H7 Avian influenza (notifiable)

 CSF

 Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia

 Contagious equine metritis

 Eastern equine encephalomyelitis

 FMD 

 Hendra-Nipah
FAD PReP Document Structure

October 2015 A-5

 Japanese encephalitis

 ND (virulent)

 Rift Valley fever

 Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis

 Western equine encephalomyelitis

 West Nile virus

I. READY REFERENCE GUIDES

In addition, there are a number of FAD PReP Ready Reference Guides that 

correspond to the above materials as well as other current topics. For example, 

there are Ready Reference Guides on the following topics (listed in alphabetical 

order by disease):

 CSF Response

 Overview of the CSF Response Plan: The Red Book Draft 

 FMD Response

 Etiology and Ecology 

 Communications 

 Overview of the FMD Response Plan: The Red Book Draft 

 Understanding Response Strategies 

 Overview of Emergency Vaccination 

 Overview of FMD Vaccination Issues 

 Common Operating Procedure 

 Overview of FMD Freedom and Vaccination 

 Comparing US and UK FMD Response Planning 

 Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business 

 Surveillance 
October 2015 A-6

 Overview of Diagnostics 

 Additional Information 

 Generic FAD Response

 Introduction to the FAD Preparedness and Response Plan 

 Introduction to the Emergency Management Response System 

(EMRS) 2 

 Understanding EMRS 2 Interface 

 FAD Framework: Roles and Coordination (Manual 1-0) 

 FAD Framework: Response Strategies (Manual 2-0) 

 Critical Activities and Tools during an FAD Response 

 Secure Food Supply Plans 

 Zones, Areas, and Premises in an FAD Outbreak 

 Movement Control in an FAD Outbreak 

 VS Guidance 12001.2: Procedures and Policy for the Investigation of 

Potential FAD/EDI 

 HPAI Response

 Overview of HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book Draft

 HPAI Incident 2014–2015: Overview of Zones 

 Etiology and Ecology

 ND Response

 Overview of the ND Response Plan: The Red Book Draft

These Ready Reference Guides, and others, are available at 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
October 2015 B-1

Appendix B

Example Preparedness and Response Goals

for Selected Critical Activities

Table B-1 lists example preparedness and response goals for critical activities and 

tools. These preparedness and response goals help to bolster preparedness 

planning by providing objectives and improve response efforts by offering general 

guidelines for implementation of the critical activities and tools. It is important to 

remember that the goals offered in this section are provided for guidance: each 

foreign animal disease (FAD) response will be unique, with different situations 

that must be considered by the Federal, State, Tribal and local entities involved in 

a response effort. 

These examples are compatible with the Core Capabilities List identified in the 

National Preparedness Goal from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

The Core Capabilities List is an important additional resource for States, Tribes, 

and localities in developing their own emergency response plans.

1

 1 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015. Core Capabilities. http://www.fema.gov/ 

core-capabilities. Accessed August 14, 2015.
October 2015 B-2

Table B-1. Selected Preparedness and Response Goals

Critical activity Preparedness goals Response goals

Etiology and

Ecology • Provide etiology and ecology summaries for high priority 

FAD and foreign animal pest threats.

• Update these summaries at regular intervals.

• Unified Command and stakeholders have a common set of etiology 

and ecology definitions and descriptions.

• Have proper understanding of the FAD or foreign animal pest threat 

when establishing or revising goals, objectives, strategies, and 

procedures.

Case 

Definitions and

Laboratory 

Definitions

• The Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health, in 

conjunction with Surveillance, Preparedness, and 

Response Services, will provide case definitions for 

foreign animal diseases to Federal, State, Tribal, local, 

and agricultural stakeholders prior to an incident.

• Update case definitions at regular intervals and as needed throughout

incidents or outbreaks.

Surveillance • Develop capabilities and relationships to produce 

surveillance plans within 24–48 hours of a confirmed 

outbreak.

• Develop effective surveillance plans that can achieve 

desired outcomes by leveraging available resources, 

satisfying jurisdictional requirements, and implementing 

continuity of business measures.

• Implement surveillance plans within 48 hours of the confirmation of an 

outbreak.

• Implement a surveillance plan that will (1) define the present extent of 

FAD and (2) detect unknown Infected Premises (IP) quickly.

• Have the surveillance plan consider the susceptible wildlife population 

in the area, and coordinate with APHIS Wildlife Services, the 

Department of Interior, State wildlife agencies, and State agriculture 

departments to perform appropriate surveillance in wildlife 

populations.

• Provide complete surveillance data summaries and analyses at 

intervals as specified by Incident Command (IC). 

Diagnostics • Maintain existing capabilities and develop new 

capabilities for diagnostic testing for FADs.

• Establish procedures for surge capacity in an outbreak, 

and identify gaps in personnel and/or equipment.

• Maintain a well-trained, proficient staff.

• Meet the surge requirements for diagnostic testing at specific 

intervals, starting at time zero and at 24-hour intervals as the 

response escalates.

• Report all diagnostic test results to appropriate personnel and/or 

information management systems within 12 hours of diagnostic test 

completion.

Epidemiological

Investigation 

and Tracing

• Define expectations for epidemiological investigation and 

FAD tracing before an incident or outbreak, especially for

highly contagious FADs.

• Identify individuals who are trained or experienced in 

epidemiological investigation and tracing activities.

• Assign a premises designation and priority of investigation within 

6 hours of identifying a potential Infected Premises (IP) or Contact 

Premises (CP) through tracing activities.

• Identify all CP within 24 hours of identifying the IP or the initial CP.
Example Preparedness and Response Goals for Selected Critical Activities

October 2015 B-3

Table B-1. Selected Preparedness and Response Goals

Critical activity Preparedness goals Response goals

• Identify and pre-position information management 

resources, and other resources necessary to support 

epidemiology activities and tracing in an actual incident 

or outbreak.

• Establish priorities for contact tracing, and for 

establishing Infected Zone(s), Buffer Zone(s), and 

Surveillance Zone(s). 

• Identify the resources needed for different disease 

agents, and for outbreaks of varying size/scale.

• Determine within 96 hours of identifying the index case, the nature of 

the FAD outbreak, identify the risk factors for transmission, and 

develop mitigation strategies.

Information 

Management • Ensure that Federal, State, Tribal, local, and Federal 

information management systems are compatible for 

sharing data and information.

• Identify gaps or weaknesses in current information 

management systems related to a large-scale FAD 

outbreak, especially related to communicating incident 

goals and objectives, status reports, tracing information, 

premises status information, diagnostic results, 

epidemiology reports, permits for movement, and 

resource information. 

• Improve capabilities for information management for a 

large-scale or complex outbreak.

• Perform Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) data 

entry processes or information downloads in 24-hour intervals or less, 

or as requested by Incident Command. Data entry should be as close 

to real-time as feasible.

• Effectively communicate incident goals and objectives, status reports, 

tracing information, premises status information, diagnostic results, 

epidemiology reports, permits for movement, and resource 

information.

Communication • Establish a network of stakeholders and systems for 

communication, prior to an incident or outbreak.

• Test or exercise the systems for communication at 

regular intervals, before an outbreak.

• Develop message maps prior to an outbreak.

• Brief the media, public, industry, Congress, trading partners, and 

others on the FAD outbreak status and the actions being taken to 

control and eradicate the disease. 

• Highlight the importance of sound biosecurity practices and steps that 

producers and other producers and owners can take to protect 

against infection.

• Coordinate with Federal, State, and local agencies, Tribal entities, 

producer groups, and land grant university-based cooperative 

extension services to ensure a consistent messaging regarding 

animal health, public health, and food safety.

• Assure consumers that USDA is working on the animal health issues 

in collaboration with public health agencies on human health issues.
October 2015 B-4

Table B-1. Selected Preparedness and Response Goals

Critical activity Preparedness goals Response goals

Health and 

Safety and 

PPE

• Develop Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan templates 

before the incident or outbreak.

• Train personnel and/or develop just-in-time training that 

can be readily available for additional personnel.

• Provide daily pre-entry safety briefings for all response personnel.

• Prevent, to every extent possible, adverse human health events 

related to emergency response efforts.

Biosecurity • Develop incident biosecurity plans, fixed operation 

biosecurity plans, and mobile operation biosecurity 

plans, before the incident or outbreak.

• Train personnel and/or develop just-in-time training that 

can be readily available for additional personnel.

• Ensure that biosecurity procedures to prevent the spread of an FAD 

agent are implemented within 12–14 hours of identifying the index 

case.

Quarantine and 

Movement 

Control

• Work with stakeholders to develop effective quarantine 

and movement control plans for affected premises, 

areas, or regions.

• Work with stakeholders to develop effective movement 

control and permit plans for non-infected premises, 

areas, or regions.

• Once a Control Area is established, implement quarantine and 

movement controls as rapidly as possible.

• Ensure quarantine and movement controls consider competing 

priorities, weighing the risk of disease transmission against the need 

for critical movements (e.g., feed trucks) and business continuity.

Continuity of 

Business • Work with industry stakeholders and experts to prioritize 

animal or commodity movements that have the potential 

to be affected by the disease or the disease response.

• Establish a transparent and effective system for risk 

assessments, surveillance requirements, biosecurity 

procedures, and a permitting process in order to promote 

stakeholder acceptance and compliance with regulatory 

interventions by Federal, State, and Tribal authorities.

• Understand the information management requirements 

and data necessary for permits and movement in an 

outbreak. 

• Implement an appropriate continuity of business plan for industries or 

industry segment affected.

• Work with industry and Incident Command to facilitate and permit 

movement of non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal 

products from non-infected premises.

• Ensure permits and movement are effectively captured in EMRS 2.0 

in a timely fashion. 

Regionalization 

for International 

Trade

• Promote science-based international trade policy and 

procedures.

• Develop guidance for regionalization in the United States 

to respond to an FAD outbreak in the country that 

facilitates the resumption of international trade involving 

non-infected animals and unaffected animal products.

• Initiate the implementation of regionalization plans tailored to the 

specific agent and epidemiological situation as soon as possible 

during the outbreak response.

• Provide trading partners and the World Organization for Animal Health

(OIE) relevant outbreak information to support the regionalization 

plan, including the measures used to provide evidence of diseasefreedom in the region.
Example Preparedness and Response Goals for Selected Critical Activities

October 2015 B-5

Table B-1. Selected Preparedness and Response Goals

Critical activity Preparedness goals Response goals

Mass 

Depopulation 

and Euthanasia

• Develop contingency plans for mass depopulation and 

exercise those plans.

• Develop non-traditional approaches or alternatives to 

mass depopulation for large scale or catastrophic 

outbreaks.

• Train personnel and/or develop just-in-time training that 

can be readily available for additional personnel.

• Implement animal-sparing modalities, such as vaccination, where 

appropriate and permitted by law.

• Provide humane treatment at all times until animals are euthanized or 

depopulated.

• Prioritize depopulation by selecting animals which are expressing 

elevated clinical signs or pose a significant risk of spreading infection 

first.

• Depopulate the affected animal species as quickly, efficiently, and 

humanely as possible, but in consideration of the extenuating 

circumstances that surround an animal health emergency.

Depopulation within 24 hours may be an appropriate goal for many 

health incidents. 

• Minimize, to the extent possible, the emotional and psychological 

impact on animal owners, caretakers, and their families, and those 

involved in the actual depopulation activities.

Disposal • Establish disposal protocols or procedures and options

before an outbreak, for consistency and safeguarding, 

and to meet regulatory requirements. 

• Identify suitable disposal personnel, supplies, materials, 

and equipment prior to the incident or FAD outbreak. 

• Prevent the spread of the disease agent, with little or no 

effect on the environment, considering community 

preferences, and conserving meat or animal protein if 

logistically supportable from a biosecurity viewpoint.

• Properly dispose of contaminated and potentially contaminated 

materials, including animal carcasses, as soon as possible while 

maximizing pathogen containment, environmental sustainability, 

stakeholder acceptance, and cost effectiveness. 

Cleaning and 

Disinfection • Establish cleaning and disinfecting protocols or 

procedures before an outbreak, for consistency and 

safeguarding.

• Identify disinfectants (or pesticides) that are U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency approved for specific 

FAD agents. Be able to acquire these disinfectants, both 

in finite immediate quantities for the start of an FAD 

incident or outbreak, and in indefinite estimated 

quantities for surge capacity requirements beyond the 

initial immediate need.

• Ensure that cleaning and disinfection is conducted on any premises 

where a disease agent is presumed or confirmed to exist. This may be 

within 48 hours of disposal of depopulated animals, or in a time-frame 

as indicated by IC.

• Remove, inactivate, reduce, or destroy pathogens at infected 

premises.

• Cleaning and disinfection measures should focus on eliminating the 

virus in the most cost effective way possible.
October 2015 B-6

Table B-1. Selected Preparedness and Response Goals

Critical activity Preparedness goals Response goals

Vaccination • Determine if an effective vaccine is available for the FAD 

agent. Enter into vaccine bank relationships and/or 

establish logistics contracts (such as those through the 

National Veterinary Stockpile or other contracting 

mechanism) to maximize preparedness potential in a 

strategically sound approach that is cost effective.

• Work with stakeholders to identify the situations or 

scenarios where strategic vaccination for an FAD will be 

requested.

• Develop contingency plans for emergency vaccination, 

and exercise those plans; identify resources and 

requirements to effectively implement plans.

• If a decision is made to use an emergency vaccination strategy, then 

order the resources to implement the emergency vaccination strategy 

as rapidly as possible.

• Engage in a public awareness campaign to provide information and 

education regarding the use of vaccination for the emergency 

outbreak.

Logistics • Develop plans and processes for emergency contracting 

support for FAD response, for activities including 

transport, cold-chain storage, depopulation, disposal, 

and disinfection.

• Provide extraordinary or rapid transport as required for 

sample collection and delivery to the National Veterinary 

Services Laboratories.

• Deliver the amount of requested vaccine or equipment to respond 

appropriately within 24 hours of an outbreak.

• Provide emergency contracting support as needed for activities 

including equipment transport, cold-chain storage, depopulation,

disposal, and disinfection.

Wildlife 

Management 

and Vector 

Control 

• Identify risk factors for FAD transmission between 

wildlife and susceptible livestock for high-priority disease 

agents.

• Develop the capabilities, in coordination with agencies 

with primary jurisdiction over wildlife, to rapidly develop 

wildlife management plans and procedures in an FAD 

incident.

• Conduct an assessment of the risk that wildlife poses for further 

transmission of the FAD to susceptible livestock within 7 days of 

confirmation of the FAD.

• Develop a wildlife management plan rapidly after an assessment has 

been conducted.

• Integrate wildlife management and vector control authorities and 

personnel into the Incident Command as required by the situation.

• Prevent the spread of an FAD from domestic livestock to wildlife by 

controlling potential biological and mechanical vectors.

Animal Welfare • Identify the resources and training necessary to provide 

humane treatment to animals during FAD outbreaks, 

particularly from the time they are identified for 

destruction or vaccination activities until they are 

depopulated, euthanized, or slaughtered.

• Provide humane treatment to animals given the outbreak 

circumstances, especially from the time they are identified for 

destruction or vaccination activities until they are depopulated, 

euthanized or slaughtered, as prescribed by veterinary authorities of 

affected States or Tribal Nations.
Example Preparedness and Response Goals for Selected Critical Activities

October 2015 B-7

Table B-1. Selected Preparedness and Response Goals

Critical activity Preparedness goals Response goals

Modeling and 

Assessment 

Tools

• Develop, evaluate, and use quantitative tools to prepare 

for an animal disease incident. These tools can be used 

for things including contingency planning, training, 

assessment of threats, evaluating control strategies, 

designing surveillance programs, prioritizing 

interventions, and supporting resource allocation.

• Develop proactive and commodity specific risk 

assessments that support continuity of business in the 

event of an outbreak.

• Provide scientifically supported modeling products and qualitative or 

quantitative risk assessments to address issues of concern with 

72 hours after a request from the Incident Commander.

• Use models and assessment tools in after action reports and/or 

lessons learned documents to analyze incident response as needed. 

Appraisal and 

Compensation • Pre-identify and train compensation specialists before 

the incident. Provide just-in-time training for 

compensation specialists as needed.

• Exercise, evaluate, and improve administrative 

processes for performing appraisals and compensation 

functions before an outbreak.

• Data required for appraisal should be collected before depopulation.

• Every attempt should be made to provide fair market appraisal prior to 

depopulation, in some emergency situations, appraisals will not be 

required to be signed prior to depopulation if there is immediate risk of 

virus spread or amplification of the virus on a presumptive or 

confirmed positive premises. 

• Timelines may vary depending on the species and types of animals.

Finance • Develop templates for cooperative agreements with 

States and Tribes before FAD outbreaks.

• Develop templates and processes to rapidly submit 

contingency fund requests, Commodity Credit 

Corporation requests, and supplemental appropriation 

requests.

• Rapidly request funds through appropriate funding mechanisms. 

Rapidly provide general and detailed budget information as 

anticipated and requested.

• Provide timely finance functions within the Incident Command System 

(ICS) structure.

Incident 

Management • Ensure that there is training available for personnel on 

the ICS from an introductory to an advanced level. 

• Develop plans and procedures for establishing an 

Incident Command rapidly in an FAD outbreak.

• Develop processes to augment Incident Management 

Teams as indicated by the incident; identify resources, 

expertise, and/or personnel for this capability.

• Stand-up an IC and an Incident Coordination Group as quickly as 

possible (within the first 24 hours) after the detection of an FAD or 

foreign animal pest threat in the United States.
October 2015 C-1

Appendix C

Glossary

Animal product Blood or any of its components, bones, bristles, feathers, flesh, offal, 

skins, and any by product containing any of those components that 

originated from an animal or bird.

Biosecurity A series of management practices designed to prevent the 

introduction and spread of disease agents on an animal production 

facility. This may include measures to contain disease 

(biocontainment) and also prevent the introduction of disease 

(bioexclusion). 

Case Any individual animal infected by a foreign animal disease, with or 

without clinical signs.

Compartment 

(compartmentalization)

An animal subpopulation contained in one or more establishments 

under a common biosecurity management system with a distinct 

health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases for 

which required surveillance, control, and biosecurity measures have 

been applied for the purpose of international trade.

Control Area A Control Area (an Infected Zone and Buffer Zone) has individual 

premises quarantine for Infected Premises, Suspect Premises, and 

Contact Premises and movement restrictions for At-Risk Premises 

and Monitored Premises.

Emergency 

vaccination

A disease control strategy using the immunization of susceptible 

animals through the administration of a vaccine comprising antigens 

appropriate to the disease to be controlled.

Etiology The causes or origin of disease, or the factors that produce or 

predispose toward a certain disease or disorder.

Euthanasia The humane destruction of an animal accomplished by a method that 

produces rapid unconsciousness and subsequent death with a 

minimum of pain or distress or a method that utilizes anesthesia 

produced by an agent that causes painless loss of consciousness and 

subsequent death.

Foreign animal disease

(FAD) 

A transboundary animal disease not known to exist in the U.S. 

animal population.
October 2015 C-2

Foreign Animal 

Disease Preparedness 

and Response Plan

(FAD PReP)

Documents used to identify veterinary functions and 

countermeasures necessary to contain and control an FAD outbreak.

It is also used to integrate functions and countermeasures with 

emergency management systems and operations conducted in 

Unified Command by local, State, and Federal personnel.

Fomites Inanimate objects that can transmit infectious agents from one 

animal or person to another.

Incident Command 

System

A standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach 

that

 allows for the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, 

procedures, and communications operating within a common 

organizational structure;

 enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions 

and functional agencies, both public and private; and

 establishes common processes for planning and managing 

resources. 

Incubation period The incubation period is the longest period which elapses between 

the introduction of the pathogen into the animal and the occurrence 

of the first clinical signs of the disease.

Index case The first or original case identified in a disease outbreak.

Kill Any procedure which causes the death of an animal.

Mass depopulation Method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed 

quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the 

welfare of the animals as practicable, but where the circumstances 

and tasks facing those doing the depopulation are understood to be

extenuating. 

Modified stamping-out Animal health measures for stamping out that are not implemented in 

full. 

Memorandum/

Memoranda of 

understanding

A document describing a bilateral or multilateral agreement between 

parties. It expresses a scope of activities and expectations between 

parties, indicating an intended common line of action or 

communication. It does not indicate a financial commitment.

National Animal 

Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN)

NAHLN is a cooperative effort between two USDA agencies and the 

American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians. It is 

a national network of State and University laboratories, which use 

common testing methods and software platforms to perform 

diagnostics and share information.

Non-contagious 

disease agent 

A non-contagious disease agent is one that is spread by some means 

other than contact with infected animals or contaminated fomites.
Glossary

October 2015 C-3 

Non-susceptible 

animal

Animal that does not develop a particular disease when exposed to 

the causative infectious agent of that disease. 

World Organization 

for Animal Health

(OIE) 

Organization that collects and publishes information on animal 

diseases from 180 (2015) countries and develops standards for 

animal health.

Outbreak The occurrence of cases of a disease that are in excess of what is 

normally expected in a given population. 

Personal protective 

equipment 

Clothing and equipment to prevent occupational injuries and diseases 

through control of exposure to potential hazards in the work place 

after engineering and administrative controls have been implemented 

to the fullest extent.

Preemptive slaughter Depopulation under the competent authority of susceptible animal 

species in herds or flocks on premises that have been exposed to 

infection by direct animal-to-animal contact or by indirect contact of 

a kind likely to cause the transmission of the FAD prior to the 

expression of clinical signs. 

Premises A geographically and epidemiologically defined location, including a 

ranch, farm, stable, or other establishment. 

Regionalization (also 

known as zoning) 

An animal subpopulation defined primarily on a geographical basis 

(using natural, artificial, or legal boundaries). 

Slaughter The killing of an animal or animals for food, often by bleeding. 

Stamping-out 

(OIE definition) 

Means a policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out 

under the authority of the Veterinary Authority the following: 

a. the killing of the animals which are affected and those 

suspected of being affected in the herd and, where 

appropriate, those in other herds which have been exposed to 

infection by direct animal to animal contact, or by indirect 

contact with the causal pathogen; this includes all susceptible 

animals, vaccinated or unvaccinated, on infected 

establishments; animals should be killed in accordance with 

Chapter 7.6; 

b. the destruction of their carcasses by rendering, burning or 

burial, or by any other method described in Chapter 4.12; 

c. the cleansing and disinfection of establishments through 

procedures defined in Chapter 4.13. 

Susceptible animal Any animal that can be infected with and replicate the disease 

pathogen of concern. 

Susceptible species See susceptible animal.

Trace-back The identification of the origin and movements of all animals, animal 

products, possible fomites, people, possible vectors, and so on that 

have entered onto an IP. 
October 2015 C-4

Trace-forward The tracing of all animals, people, fomites, and so on that have left 

an IP. The premises that received the animals or goods should be 

investigated and kept under surveillance or quarantine.

Vector An insect or any living carrier that transports an infectious agent 

from an infected individual to a susceptible individual or its food or 

immediate surroundings. 

Zoonotic Any disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from animals

to humans. 
October 2015 D-1

Appendix D

Abbreviations

AHS African horse sickness

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

ARP At-Risk Premises

BSE bovine spongiform encephalopathy 

BZ Buffer Zone

CA Control Area

CBPP contagious bovine pleuropneumonia 

CCHF Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever

CEAH Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health 

CP Contact Premises

CSF classical swine fever

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer

CVZ Containment Vaccination Zone

DA Deputy Administrator

DIVA differentiate between infected and vaccinated animals

EMRS Emergency Management Response System

FA Free Area

FAD foreign animal disease

FAD PReP Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

FMD foot-and-mouth disease

FP Free Premises

FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service

HPAI highly pathogenic avian influenza

IC Incident Command

ICP Incident Command Post

ICS Incident Command System

IMT Incident Management Team

IP Infected Premises
October 2015 D-2

IZ Infected Zone

MP Monitored Premises

NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency Management System

NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network

NASS National Agricultural Statistics Service

ND Newcastle disease

NIMS National Incident Management System

NVSL National Veterinary Services Laboratories

OIE World Organization for Animal Health 

PPE personal protective equipment

PPR peste des petits ruminants

PVZ Protection Vaccination Zone

SAHO State Animal Health Official 

SOP standard operating procedure

SP Suspect Premises

SZ Surveillance Zone 

TDD telecommunications device for the deaf

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

VP Vaccinated Premises

VS Veterinary Services 

VZ Vaccination Zone
October 2015 E-1

Appendix E

Selected References and Resources

Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN). 2014. 

http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/emergency-animal-diseasepreparedness/ausvetplan/ausvetplan-manuals-and-supporting-documents/. 

Accessed April 16, 2014.

Carpenter TE, O’Brien JM, Hagerman AD & McCarl BA. 2011. “Epidemic and 

Economic Impacts of Delayed Detection of Foot-and-Mouth Disease: a Case 

Study of a Simulated Outbreak in California.” J Vet Diagn Invest. 23: 26-33.

Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs, United Kingdom. 2014.

Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals. 

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contingency-plan-for-exoticnotifiable-diseases-of-animals. Accessed April 16, 2014.

Ekboir JM. 1999. “Potential Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in California: the 

Role and Contribution of Animal Health Surveillance and Monitoring Services.” 

Agricultural Issues Center. University of California, Davis.

European Union. 2003. Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003. 

Official Journal of the European Union.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2015. Core Capabilities.

http://www.fema.gov/core-capabilities. Accessed August 14, 2015.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 1999. Manual on the 

Preparation of National Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Plans.

http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/004/X2096E/X2096E00.HTM. Accessed April 16, 

2014.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2002. Preparation of 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease Contingency Plans. http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/ 

006/Y4382E/y4382e00.htm. Accessed April 16, 2014.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2011. Good Emergency 

Management Practice: The Essentials. http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/ 

ba0137e/ba0137e00.pdf. Accessed April 16, 2014.

USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. 2007. “UK Foot & Mouth Disease—

Recovery Timetable, the Economic Impact and Who Pays? Global Agriculture 

Information Network Report.” http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200708/ 

146292150.pdf. Accessed May 14, 2012. 
October 2015 E-2

Grubman MJ, Bast B. 2004. Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Cli Microbiol Rev. 17(2): 

465-493.

National Agricultural Statistics Service. 2012 (data).

http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/.

Thompson D, Muriel P, Russell D, Osborne P, et al. 2001. “Economic Costs of 

the Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001.” Rev Sci 

Tech Off Int Epiz. 21: 675-687.

USDA APHIS. 2014. Foot and Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

USDA APHIS. 2015. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan: The 

Red Book Draft. http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

World Organization for Animal Health, “Standard Operating Procedures for 

Official Recognition of Disease Status or Risk of Bovine Spongiform 

Encephalopathy and for the Endorsement of National Official Control 

Programmes of Member Countries,” 2015, http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/ 

Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/SOP2015/EN_SOP2015.pdf.

World Organization for Animal Health. 2015. Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 

http://www.oie.int.