auth 
October 2023 ii

July 2023

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) 

Strategy & Policy ▪ National Preparedness and Incident Coordination

The continued spread of African swine fever (ASF) in Asia and Europe—and the detection in 2021 on the 

Caribbean Island of Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and Haiti)—has placed the Western Hemisphere on 

high alert. APHIS has since taken several key steps to fortify the United States in the event of an ASF 

outbreak. These actions include the establishment of the ASF Protection Zone, increasing existing 

surveillance and mitigations in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and initiating several new 

proactive mitigation and prevention efforts in those territories. Simultaneously, APHIS accelerated ASF 

preparedness efforts in virtually all critical areas: expanding ASF active surveillance in both domestic pigs 

and feral swine, validating additional diagnostic sample types, increasing laboratory capacity, procuring 

equipment for the National Veterinary Stockpile for swine depopulation and disposal, and further 

developing numerous ancillary activities.

The updated version of the USDA APHIS ASF Response Plan: The Red Book (July 2023) reflects 

knowledge gained from policy discussions and response guidance development, and lessons learned 

from Federal/State/Industry exercises. This plan incorporates and supersedes previous versions of the 

ASF Response Plan: The Red Book. Additionally, this version incorporates changes made in related 

Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials. 

The following list highlights important revisions made to this version of the ASF Response Plan. 

 Introduces the concept and benefit of the Protection Zone for Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands.

 Acknowledges potential pathways of the ASF virus into the United States, given the Hispaniola 

threat.

 Includes a brief evaluation of the risk from Ornithodoros spp. tick as a vector in the United States.

 Clarifies information included in the description of the persistence of the ASF virus.

 Defines the incubation period for exposed individual pigs. Describes the time for lateral spread 

and detection within an exposed herd or group.

 Reflects an updated case definition.

 Emphasizes the role of contact tracing in an epidemiologic investigation.

 Addresses and integrates policy from APHIS’ response to the 2022 United States Animal Health 

Association (USAHA) ASF resolutions for:

o Authorization for indemnity and depopulation response time;

o ASF detection in domestic pig as a trigger for a 72-Hour National Movement Standstill;

o Resumption of domestic movement options at ‘Hour 73’;

o Adopting standardized guidelines for harvesting establishments;

o Establish national standardized permitting guidance for Control Areas; and

o Restocking requirements in a Control Area.

 Introduces the Meat Harvest, Off-site Rendering, and Spray Dried Blood / Plasma Facility Plans. 

 Introduces and describes the Domestic Pig and Feral Swine Incident Playbooks. 

 References the U.S. Swine Health Improvement Plan.

 Introduces the Certified Swine Sample Collector Program.

 Corrects comments made and any errors identified in the prior version. Updates references 

throughout, as necessary. 

While this ASF Response Plan provides strategic guidance before an outbreak, there will be additional 

policy guidance provided during an outbreak on specific response operation activities, particularly for the 

unified Incident Command. Please note certain topics, like the availability of an ASF vaccine for swine or 
October 2023 iv

specific response guidance in an active outbreak, have rapidly changing statuses. These types of issues 

may be referenced briefly in The ASF Response Plan but treated more fully in associated guidance 

documents. If ASF is detected, these additional policy guidance documents and information will be 

distributed and available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

USDA APHIS acknowledges that preparing for and responding to an ASF outbreak is and will be a 

complex effort requiring collaboration and cooperation from all stakeholders. USDA APHIS fully 

anticipates updates as new capabilities and processes become available. As such, if you have comments 

or suggestions on this document, please send an email to FAD.PReP.Comments@usda.gov with the 

subject line: “Comments to Updated ASF Response Plan” for consideration and possible incorporation 

into future versions. 

The FAD PReP mission is to raise awareness, define expectations, and improve capabilities for FAD 

preparedness and response. For more information, please go to www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep or email

FAD.PReP.Comments@usda.gov.

Change Log USDA APHIS ASF Response Plan: The Red Book (July 2023)

Revision (date) Page / Section Change 

Rev.1 (October 25, 2023)    1 Corrected miscellaneous typographical

and grammatical errors throughout

“ 4‐30/4.11.3 2 Removed reference to Table 1‐1, incorrect

reference: (Table 1-1 provides 

information on ASFV susceptibility 

according to WOAH).

“ 4‐17/Fig. 4‐2 3 Removed comment, irrelevant: Stamping-out 

is not pictured in these figures.
July 2023 iv

Preface

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)—

African Swine Fever Response Plan: The Red Book (July 2023) provides strategic 

guidance for responding to an animal health emergency caused by African swine 

fever (ASF) in the United States. Information in this plan may require further 

discussion and development with stakeholders. 

This ASF Response Plan is under ongoing review. This document is a major 

revision of the previous version published in April 2020. The primary additions 

and revisions are listed in the above introductory message. Please send questions 

or comments to: 

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center 

Veterinary Services

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture 

E-mail: FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov

While best efforts have been used in developing and preparing the ASF Response 

Plan, the U.S. Government, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and other parties, such as employees 

and contractors contributing to this document, neither warrant nor assume any 

legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of 

any information or procedure disclosed. The primary purpose of this ASF

Response Plan is to provide strategic guidance to government officials responding 

to an ASF outbreak. It is only posted for public access as a reference.

The ASF Response Plan may refer to links of various other Federal and State 

agencies and private organizations. These links are maintained solely for the 

user’s information and convenience. If you link to such a site, please be aware 

that you are then subject to the policies of that site. In addition, please note that 

USDA does not control and cannot guarantee the relevance, timeliness, or 

accuracy of these outside materials. Further, the inclusion of links or pointers to 

items in hypertext is not intended to reflect their importance, nor is it intended to 

constitute approval or endorsement of any views expressed, or products or 

services offered, on these outside websites, or the organizations sponsoring the 

websites.

Trade names are used solely for the purpose of providing specific information. 

Mention of a trade name does not constitute a guarantee or warranty of the 

product by USDA or an endorsement over other products not mentioned. 

In accordance with Federal civil rights law and USDA civil rights regulations and 
Preface

July 2023 v 

policies, the USDA, its Agencies, offices, and employees, and institutions 

participating in or administering USDA programs are prohibited from 

discriminating based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, gender identity 

(including gender expression), sexual orientation, disability, age, marital status, 

family/parental status, income derived from a public assistance program, political 

beliefs, or reprisal or retaliation for prior civil rights activity, in any program or 

activity conducted or funded by USDA (not all bases apply to all programs). 

Remedies and complaint filing deadlines vary by program or incident. 

Persons with disabilities who require alternative means of communication for 

program information (e.g., Braille, large print, audiotape, American Sign 

Language, etc.) should contact the responsible Agency or USDA's TARGET 

Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TTY) or contact USDA through the Federal 

Relay Service at (800) 877-8339. Additionally, program information may be 

made available in languages other than English. 

To file a program discrimination complaint, complete the USDA Program 

Discrimination Complaint Form, AD-3027, found online at How to File a 

Program Discrimination Complaint (www.usda.gov/oascr/how-to-file-a-programdiscrimination-complaint) and at any USDA office or write a letter addressed to 

USDA and provide in the letter all of the information requested in the form. To 

request a copy of the complaint form, call (866) 632-9992. Submit your 

completed form or letter to USDA by: (1) mail: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, 1400 Independence Avenue, 

SW, Washington, D.C. 20250-9410; (2) fax: (202) 690-7442; or (3) email: 

program.intake@usda.gov. USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer. 
July 2023 vi 

Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction and ASF Information............................................ 1-1

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN ..................................................................... 1-1

1.2 SCOPE OF RESPONSE PLAN ................................................................................. 1-1

1.3 HISTORICAL PRESENCE AND CURRENT ASF SITUATION.......................................... 1-2

1.3.1 Threat of ASF in the United States ....................................................... 1-3

1.3.2 Preparedness Planning ........................................................................ 1-3

1.3.2.1 THE PROTECTION ZONE .................................................................. 1-4

1.3.2.2 SWINE INDUSTRY BACKGROUND....................................................... 1-4

1.3.2.3 KEY AREAS OF FOCUS FOR PREPAREDNESS ..................................... 1-5

1.3.2.4 NEW PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES .................................................... 1-6

1.4 NATURE OF THE DISEASE/VIRUS........................................................................... 1-7

1.4.1 Overview ............................................................................................... 1-7

1.4.2 Introduction & Transmission ................................................................. 1-8

1.4.3 Incubation Period.................................................................................. 1-9

1.4.4 Clinical Signs...................................................................................... 1-10

1.4.5 Morbidity and Mortality........................................................................ 1-11

1.4.6 Differential Diagnosis.......................................................................... 1-11

1.4.7 Persistence of ASFV........................................................................... 1-11

Chapter 2 Framework for ASF Preparedness and Response .................. 2-1

2.1 FOUNDATION OF PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE.................................................. 2-1

2.2 USDA AUTHORITIES............................................................................................ 2-1

2.2.1 The Animal Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq................ 2-1

2.2.2 The Swine Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 3801 et seq................. 2-2

2.3 USDA APHIS VS GUIDANCE............................................................................... 2-3

2.3.1 Procedures and Policy for an ASF Investigation, VS Guidance 

12001.4 ................................................................................................ 2-3

2.3.2 Animal Health Policy in Relation to Feral Swine................................... 2-3

2.4 USDA ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OVERVIEW................................................... 2-4

2.5 USDA APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT................................................................. 2-4
Contents

July 2023 vii 

2.5.1 Incident Management Structure............................................................ 2-5

2.5.2 Field Organization ................................................................................ 2-5

Chapter 3 ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy ......................... 3-1

3.1 RESPONSE GOALS............................................................................................... 3-1

3.2 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES ............................................................................. 3-1

3.3 CONTROL AND ERADICATION STRATEGIES ............................................................. 3-2

3.3.1 Defining Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy .................................. 3-2

3.3.2 Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out ..................................... 3-3

3.3.3 Zones and Areas in Relation to Contact Tracing .................................. 3-4

3.3.4 Control and Eradication of ASF in Domestic Pigs................................. 3-5

3.3.5 Control and Eradication of ASF in Feral Swine..................................... 3-6

3.4 INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS ................................................................................. 3-7

3.4.1 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities.......................... 3-7

3.4.2 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign ........................................... 3-9

3.4.3 Regulatory Movement Controls .......................................................... 3-10

3.4.4 Initial Critical Activities of an ASF Response ...................................... 3-12

3.5 MOVEMENT CONTROL POST STANDSTILL ............................................................ 3-14

3.6 HOUR 73: RESPONSE OPTIONS FOLLOWING A 72-HOUR NATIONAL MOVEMENT

STANDSTILL................................................................................................... 3-14

Chapter 4 Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools ............... 4-1

4.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY ..................................................................................... 4-1

4.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS AND CASE REPORTING ................................................. 4-2

4.2.1 Laboratory Definitions........................................................................... 4-2

4.3 DIAGNOSTICS ...................................................................................................... 4-3

4.3.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing ........................................... 4-4

4.3.2 Surge Capacity ..................................................................................... 4-8

4.4 SURVEILLANCE DESIGN........................................................................................ 4-8

4.4.1 Surveillance Goals and Objectives ....................................................... 4-8

4.4.2 Surveillance Activities Overview........................................................... 4-9

4.4.3 Passive Surveillance .......................................................................... 4-10

4.4.4 Active Surveillance for Domestic Pigs ................................................ 4-10

4.4.5 Active Surveillance for Feral Swine .................................................... 4-11
Contents

July 2023 viii

4.5 EPIDEMIOLOGY.................................................................................................. 4-11

4.5.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations......................................... 4-12

4.5.2 Visualizing Zones and Areas for Domestic Pigs & Feral Swine.......... 4-16

4.5.3 Epidemiological Investigation and Contact Tracing ............................ 4-18

4.6 DOMESTIC RESPONSE: QUARANTINE AND MOVEMENT CONTROL ........................... 4-19

4.6.1 Control Area Movement...................................................................... 4-20

4.7 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS.................................................................................. 4-22

4.7.1 COB Permits for Live Animal and Semen Movements ....................... 4-22

4.7.1.1 ASF COB PERMIT AND PMIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROL

AREAS............................................................................................ 4-23

4.8 INFORMATION, REPORTING AND TASK MANAGEMENT............................................ 4-25

4.8.1 Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS).................. 4-25

4.8.2 Reporting............................................................................................ 4-26

4.8.3 Information Management Systems and Tools .................................... 4-26

4.9 HEALTH & SAFETY AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT................................ 4-27

4.9.1 Mental Health Concerns ..................................................................... 4-27

4.10 BIOSECURITY .................................................................................................. 4-28

4.11 3D ACTIVITIES................................................................................................. 4-28

4.11.1 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia ................................................. 4-28

4.11.2 Disposal............................................................................................ 4-29

4.11.3 Cleaning and Disinfection/Virus Elimination ..................................... 4-30

4.11.4 National Veterinary Stockpile Operations ......................................... 4-30

4.12 APHIS WILDLIFE SERVICES ............................................................................. 4-31

4.12.1 Feral Swine Management................................................................. 4-31

4.12.2 Vectors ............................................................................................. 4-33

4.13 INDEMNITY AND COMPENSATION ....................................................................... 4-33

4.13.1 Authority ........................................................................................... 4-33

4.13.2 Procedures ....................................................................................... 4-34

4.14 ANIMAL WELFARE............................................................................................ 4-34

4.15 VACCINATION .................................................................................................. 4-34

Chapter 5 Recovery................................................................................. 5-1

5.1 CRITERIA FOR PROOF OF FREEDOM ...................................................................... 5-1

5.2 WOAH TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH CODE ........................................................ 5-1
Contents

July 2023 ix

5.2.1 Article 15.1.4 Country or Zone Free from ASF ..................................... 5-1

5.2.2 Article 15.1.7 Recovery of Free Status ................................................. 5-2

5.3 RESTOCKING....................................................................................................... 5-3

Figures

Figure 3-1. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out................... 3-4

Figure 3-2. Example of Contact Tracing in an ASF Outbreak ................................. 3-4

Figure 3-3. Initial Critical Activities of an ASF Response ...................................... 3-13

Figure 4-1. Diagnostic Test Flow for Initial Investigation of ASF in the United 

States ................................................................................................................ 4-7

Figure 4-2. Examples of Zones, Areas, and Premises for Domestic Pigs and 

Feral Swine in an ASF Outbreak Response .................................................... 4-17

Tables

Table 1-1. Clinical Signs Caused by the Different Forms of ASF.......................... 1-10

Table 1-2. Resistance of ASFV to Physical and Chemical Action......................... 1-12

Table 4-1. Sample Collection for Diagnostic Testing .............................................. 4-5

Table 4-2. Diagnostic Tests Performed for ASFV at NVSL-FADDL........................ 4-6

Table 4-3. Summary of ASF Premises Designations for Domestic Pig 

Production Premises ....................................................................................... 4-12

Table 4-4. Summary of ASF Zone and Area Designations ................................... 4-13

Table 4-5. Minimum Size of Zones and Areas ...................................................... 4-13

Table 4-6. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for ASF ........... 4-14

Table 4-7. Movement Controls: Permit Types during an FAD Incident ................. 4-21

Appendicies

Appendix A Glossary 

Appendix B Example Overview Emergency Management Response System 

2.0 Workflow

Appendix C Abbreviations

Appendix D Selected References and Resources
July 2023 1-1 

Chapter 1

Introduction and ASF Information 

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN

Due to the potential threat of African swine fever (ASF) in the United States from 

ongoing transmission throughout East Asia, parts of Europe and the Caribbean 

Island of Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and Haiti), this ASF Response Plan: 

The Red Book is updated as of July 2023. This version supersedes the previous 

version of the African Swine Fever Response Plan. The objectives of this plan are 

to identify the (1) policies and strategies needed to respond to an ASF outbreak in 

swine and (2) capabilities and critical activities that are involved in responding to 

that outbreak and (3) the timeframes for these activities. In an outbreak situation, 

these critical activities are under the authority of a unified State and Federal 

Incident Command per the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 

This ASF Response Plan provides current information on ASF and its relevance to 

the United States. It does not replace existing regional, State, Tribal, local, or 

industry preparedness and response plans relating to ASF. Regional, State, Tribal, 

local and industry plans should be aimed at more specific issues in an ASF

response. In particular, States should develop response plans focused on the 

specific characteristics of the State and the State’s swine industry. Industry should 

develop response plans focused on the specific characteristics of their commercial 

operations and business practices. 

1.2 SCOPE OF RESPONSE PLAN

This ASF Response Plan provides strategic guidance for the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS) and responders at all levels in the event of an ASF outbreak occurring in 

domestic or feral swine. 

This document does not cover, in detail, incident coordination or general foreign 

animal disease (FAD) response. For more information on these aspects, please 

refer to the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination

(FAD PReP Manual 1-0) and the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: 

Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0). These documents cover general 

roles and responsibilities as well as general FAD response strategies, respectively. 

These documents and other Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response 

Plan (FAD PReP) materials are available here:

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-2 

Additionally, this document does not provide in detail every response policy or 

response procedure for an outbreak. (e.g., specific virus elimination guidance, 

stamping-out policies, indemnity processes, etc.), or address international 

movement (export) considerations/ requirements. Past experience demonstrates

this type of information is more effectively communicated as distinct, short, 

concise documents or information published on the FAD PReP website that can 

be distributed and updated rapidly. There will be additional policy guidance 

provided during an outbreak on specific response operation activities. In the event 

of an ASF outbreak in the United States, these policy guidance documents and 

updates will be posted on the ASF FAD PReP website. 

1.3 HISTORICAL PRESENCE AND CURRENT ASF

SITUATION

ASF—first described in Kenya in the 1920s—is a contagious hemorrhagic disease 

of wild/feral and domestic pigs. It is often characterized by high morbidity and 

mortality rates. There is no effective treatment for ASF-infected swine, and 

vaccine candidates are still being researched and evaluated. ASF is a notifiable 

disease to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), which began 

collecting data on ASF in 2005. The disease does not pose a risk to human health 

or food safety. 

ASF is currently widespread and endemic in sub-Saharan Africa, parts of West 

Africa, and the island of Sardinia. Beginning in 2007, ASF was confirmed in

several East European countries, then it started appearing in European Union 

countries in 2014. The year 2018 brought the emergence of the virus in China. 

Not only does ASF continue to spread in the Europe, Asia, and the Pacific 

regions—both in domestic pigs and wild boars—the virus is also difficult to 

eradicate. Some successes have been reported. The Czech Republic eradicated 

ASF after a 2018 outbreak, only to see its return a few years later. Belgium 

eradicated ASF in 2020; Spain and Portugal in the mid-1990s; Hispaniola 

following outbreaks from 1977–1980. 

In 2021, ASF was again detected in the Western Hemisphere on the Caribbean 

Island of Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and Haiti). As a consequence of this 

detection, the USDA established a Protection Zone (PZ) for the United States 

Territory of Puerto Rico (PR) and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). The PZ is 

consistent with the WOAH Terrestrial Code Chapter 4.4, Zoning and 

Compartmentalization. 

ASF has never been reported in the United States, Canada, Australia, or New 

Zealand.
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-3

1.3.1 Threat of ASF in the United States 

ASF is a critical threat to the United States due to the recent global spread, 

millions of susceptible swine in the United States, including feral swine, and the 

potential for severe economic impacts – estimated at several billion dollars. 

Although significant and promising advances were recently made in developing 

an ASF vaccine, there is still no commercially available, effective vaccine 

approved for emergency use in the United States. This makes prevention of 

disease entry critically important, and thorough preparation for an emergency 

response is vital. 

In March 2019, USDA APHIS conducted the following ASF threat assessments:

all of which are available online under Animal Disease Information for Swine: 

o A qualitative assessment of the likelihood of ASF virus entry to the United

States.1

o A non-animal origin feed ingredient risk evaluation framework.2

o A literature review of non-animal origin feed ingredients and the

transmission of viral pathogens of swine. 3

Among the findings of these evaluations is international travel and trade pose a 

substantial risk for viral incursion into the country. Illegal entry of swine products 

and byproducts presents the largest potential pathway for entry of ASF virus 

(ASFV) into the United States. 

1.3.2 Preparedness Planning 

With the continued expansion of ASF throughout Asia, Europe, and most recently 

Hispaniola in the Western Hemisphere APHIS preparedness efforts remain a 

priority. USDA continues to work closely with other Federal and State agencies, 

the swine industry, producers, and international partners to prepare for and 

prevent an occurrence in North America. Since 2018, USDA has participated in a 

series of tri-lateral (Canada, Mexico, and the United States) ASF Forums and 

initiated an ASF-specific exercise program to coordinate efforts. Preparedness and 

response exercises help ensure our Nation’s readiness and provides an ideal, nofault learning environment to discuss, practice, and implement plans, procedures, 

1 APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Qualitative assessment of the likelihood of African Swine 

Fever Virus entry to the United States: entry assessment. Risk Assessment Team. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/asf-entry.pdf. 

2 APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Non-animal origin feed ingredient risk evaluation 

framework: scoping. Risk Assessment Team. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/nofi-scope.pdf. 

3 APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Literature Review: Non-animal Origin Feed Ingredients and 

the Transmission of Viral Pathogens of Swine. Risk Assessment Team. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/non-animal-originfeed-ingredients-transmission-of-viral-pathogens.pdf. 
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-4

and processes in advance of an actual event. The 2021 detection of the ASFV in 

the Western Hemisphere created yet another sense of urgency.

1.3.2.1 THE PROTECTION ZONE

As a consequence of the September 2021 detection of ASF in Hispaniola, the 

USDA established a PZ for the U.S. territories of PR and USVI in the Caribbean. 

The PZ is designed to minimize risk and allow the continental United States

(CONUS) to maintain its free status if an ASF outbreak were to occur in the PZ. 

International standards require, and the U.S. implemented, biosecurity and 

sanitary measures in the PZ. APHIS VS also intensified movement control, 

animal identification, and animal traceability to ensure that animals in the PZ are 

clearly distinguishable from other populations. Additionally, APHIS VS 

implemented increased surveillance in the PZ and the rest of the country, 

including surveillance of wildlife. 

One aspect of the Federal Order (FO) establishing the PZ was the suspension of 

interstate movement of all live swine, swine germplasm, and the placement of 

restrictions and transit permit requirements on swine products, and swine 

byproducts from PR and USVI. To support this, APHIS Plant Protection and 

Quarantine (PPQ) leveraged the predeparture program to screen passengers and 

small parcel cargo moving from PR and USVI to CONUS for prohibited swine 

products. PPQ has also engaged express couriers and the United States Postal 

Service to establish a joint program to inspect mail for prohibited animal and 

plant products destined for CONUS. 

The newly established PZ can be added to the longstanding, interlocking 

safeguards USDA has instituted through its regulatory authorities to prevent ASF

from entering the country. 

1.3.2.2 SWINE INDUSTRY BACKGROUND

Although the U.S. may glean lessons from Europe and Asia with regard to ASF 

preparedness, our domestic pig sector and feral swine populations are distinct 

from those regions and require unique planning and approaches. 

According to USDA’s National Agriculture Statistical Service, most (70%) of the 

swine operations in the U.S. are small hobby operations, with 25 or fewer swine 

on the premises. However, greater than 90% of the swine inventory were located 

on hog operations with more than 2,000 head of swine. The States of Iowa, North 

Carolina, Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 

Kansas accounted for nearly 87 percent of all pigs in the U.S. inventory. 

An estimated one million swine are being transported in trucks daily to various 

locations, including slaughter and further production and approximately 500,000 

hogs are slaughtered each day. 
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-5

1.3.2.3 KEY AREAS OF FOCUS FOR PREPAREDNESS

APHIS continues to work in earnest with states and the swine industry to develop 

and refine plans in case of a U.S. ASF outbreak. Through this collaborative 

planning process, we are able to better understand the factors specific to the U.S. 

swine industry that may pose response challenges. 

1.3.2.3.1 Site Biosecurity

Biosecurity is key to preventing disease introduction and spread. Biosecurity 

includes the use of certain management practices to prevent the introduction of 

new disease and the spread of existing disease on swine operations. Examples of 

these practices include limiting opportunities for feral swine and domestic pigs to 

mingle; cleaning and disinfecting all equipment and vehicles entering or leaving a 

production site; and controlling human and vehicle entry between and within 

operations. Producers are responsible for developing and adhering to site-specific 

biosecurity plans to protect their own investments. Zoos and wildlife parks with 

exotic swine species are responsible for developing and adhering to their 

biosecurity plans. 

Guidance and best practices are available through industry-led efforts such as the 

Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan and U.S. Swine Health Improvement Plan (US 

SHIP). 

1.3.2.3.2 Truck Sanitation

Various diseases, including porcine epidemic diarrhea virus, certain strains of 

Senecavirus A, and other endemic diseases have been able to spread among the 

U.S. swine herd within months of introduction. Among the factors scientific 

studies attribute rapid disease spread to is the practice of transporting hogs in 

vehicles that are not cleaned and disinfected between loads. Locations of concern

include all swine points of concentration, including slaughter plants, feed mills, 

and other collection points that contaminated vehicles may frequent and track 

virus. 

1.3.2.3.3 Swine Traceability

In the event of an ASF disease outbreak on the U.S. mainland, trading partners 

will need to accept U.S. measures for traceability of swine commodities (live pigs 

and pork products) before engagement in regionalization or zoning agreements 

and resuming exports. 

Early in 2022, the U.S. swine industry identified traceability as a priority for ASF 

preparedness. USDA APHIS is collaborating with stakeholders to develop a new 

framework for swine traceability. The agency is also open to non-regulatory 

options for activities that may be implemented sooner than the Federal 

rulemaking process allows. 
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-6

1.3.2.4 NEW PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES

1.3.2.4.1 U.S. Swine Health Improvement Program

An APHIS-funded pilot project promoting certification of healthy swine herds 

called the US SHIP is underway. The US SHIP program is intended to target ASF 

and classical swine fever through the creation of standards focusing on 

biosecurity, traceability, and surveillance principles. Currently, technical advisory 

committees comprised of U.S. pork industry subject matter experts are further 

developing technical standards necessary for “safeguarding, certifying, and 

bettering the health of U.S. swine.” Pork producers and packing facilities in 

participating States that meet specified program requirements can enroll in the 

pilot program on a voluntary basis. As of early 2023, 32 States are active in the 

US SHIP program, including the top-producing swine States; and more than 50% 

of the United States’ swine inventory is enrolled in the program with over 9000 

participants. Industry has maintained a strong interest in seeing the program 

established as an official USDA program through the rulemaking process. As the 

pilot progresses, APHIS continues to assess the potential for making that 

transition. 

For additional details and status of the US SHIP program, see 

https://www.usswinehealthimprovementplan.com. 

1.3.2.4.2 National Standardized Permitting Guidance for Control Areas

The swine industry identified the need for the development of consistent national 

criteria for intrastate and interstate swine movements from Control Areas in 

advance of an ASF outbreak. USDA APHIS collaborated with the USAHA Swine 

Committee to establish the biosecurity, surveillance and testing requirements for 

permitted movements. The resulting permitting guidance for various types of 

swine movements within, into, and out of a Control Area are available on the ASF 

FAD PReP website. 

1.3.2.4.3 ASF Meat Harvest, Rendering, and Spray Dried Blood / Plasma Facility

Response Plans

The ASF Meat Harvest Facility Response Plans were created to address response 

needs unique to harvest establishments and related industries during an ASF 

outbreak. These plans were developed in coordination with APHIS and the North 

American Meat Institute (NAMI)-led Slaughter Plant Working Group (SPWG) 

with participation from various Federal, State, and industry partners. 

The culmination of the SPWG’s efforts were the development of three ASF 

response plans to target specific scenarios for: 1) Meat Harvest Facilities in the 

Free Area with a Contact Premises status, 2) Meat Harvest Facilities located 

within a Control Area that do not have an Infected Premises status, and finally 3) 

Meat Harvest Facilities with an Infected/Positive premises status when ASF 
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-7

presumptive or confirmed positive swine have been detected at the facility. Each 

of these templates are intended to serve as a response guide for harvest facilities 

during an ASF response. 

Further, in collaboration with the North American Renderers’ Association and 

North American Spray Dried Blood & Plasma Producers, the SPWG created two 

additional ASF Response plans specific to Off-Site Rendering and Spray Dried 

Blood / Plasma facilities. 

These plans are a critical industry resource for implementing biosecurity practices 

aimed at preventing or recovering from an onsite ASF infection. They provide 

virus elimination standards following an ASF detection onsite and outline 

biosecurity practices to ensure continuity of business for these facility types. To 

find these templates, please go to the ASF FAD PReP website. 

1.4 NATURE OF THE DISEASE/VIRUS

This is a brief introduction to ASFV, which is a complex virus with variable 

clinical presentations. Further detail can be found in the FAD PReP ASF SOP: 

Overview of Etiology and Ecology. 

1.4.1 Overview 

ASFV belongs to the Asfivirus genus of the Asfarviridae family and is an 

enveloped virus with a double-stranded DNA genome. ASFV is unique, as it is 

the only known arthropod-borne DNA virus. Currently, there is no vaccine 

approved for emergency use in the United States. 

There are 24 different genotypes and 8 serogroups of ASFV. Infection with ASFV

presents in four different clinical forms (peracute, acute, subacute, and chronic), 

which are based on strain virulence, immune status, clinical signs, and gross 

lesions. 

Susceptible species include all members of the pig family (Suidae): domesticated 

swine, feral swine, European wild boar, warthogs, bush pigs, and giant forest 

hogs. While susceptible, warthogs and bush pigs are resistant to signs of clinical 

disease. Some members of the Suidae family native to the Americas, such as 

peccaries (Tayassu spp.), are believed to be resistant to infection.4

4 Based on historical information, see Dardiri, A.H., Yedloutschnig, R.J., & Taylor, W.D. 

(1969). Clinical and serologic response of American white-collared peccaries to African swine 

fever, foot-and-mouth disease, vesicular stomatitis, vesicular exanthema of swine, hog cholera, 

and rinderpest viruses. Proc Annual Meeting U.S. Animal Health Assoc. 73, 437–52.
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-8

1.4.2 Introduction & Transmission 

There are three primary modes of transmission for ASFV: direct contact, indirect 

contact (fomites), and vector-borne. Direct pig-to-pig transmission occurs when 

infected pigs come into contact with susceptible pigs through contact with 

infectious blood, swine germplasm, excretions and secretions (e.g., saliva, 

respiratory secretions, urine and feces), or pig carcasses. There is lack of evidence 

that an infected pig can become a carrier and shed ASFV without showing clinical 

signs.5,6 Indirect transmission can occur through contaminated pig products or 

fomites. ASFV can survive for months in pork meat, fat, and skin, and serve as a 

route of transmission, e.g., through the practice of “garbage-feeding” where swine 

become infected when fed contaminated food waste that has not been cooked 

appropriately to inactivate the virus. Potential transmission has experimentally

been demonstrated through contaminated feed. It is also possible that ASFV can 

be transmitted mechanically. A 2018 study found that, while ingested ASFVspiked stable flies could infect some pigs, it is unlikely that ingestion of blood-fed 

flies is a common route for transmission of ASFV between wild boars or between 

pigs within a stable.7

 

Soft ticks (Ornithodoros spp.) are competent vectors for ASFV transmission, 

passing the virus to swine hosts when taking their blood meal. In sub-Saharan 

Africa, ASF is maintained through the sylvatic cycle—recurring transfer between 

bushpigs, warthogs, and giant forest hogs of Africa and Ornithodoros species 

ticks that live in their wallows and burrows. These pigs are inapparently infected 

and act as reservoir hosts for ASFV.8 Infected ticks are also able to transmit 

ASFV to other ticks (sexual), to their offspring (transovarial), and/or from one life 

cycle to another (transstadial). However, even where the sylvatic cycle exists in 

East and Central African countries, the majority of ASF outbreaks are not 

associated with ticks or wild suids.9

ASFV has been shown to persist in some Ornithodoros species for more than 5 

years.10 While some Ornithodoros species are present in the United States, it is 

5 Guinat, C., Gogin, A., Blome, S., Keil, G., Pollin, R., Pfeiffer, D.U., and Dixon, L. (2016). 

Transmission routes of African swine fever virus to domestic pigs: current knowledge and future 

research directions. Veterinary Record.178, 262-267. Doi: 10.1136/vr.103593. 6 Karl Ståhl, K., Sternberg-Lewerin, S., Blome, S., Viltrop, A., Penrith, M., Chenais, W. 

(2019). Lack of evidence for long term carriers of African swine fever virus - a systematic review,

Virus Research, Vol 272.

7 Olesen, A.S., Lohse, L., Hansen, M.F., Boklund, A., Halasa, T., Belsham, G.J., ... Bodker, 

R. (2018). Infection of pigs with African swine fever virus via ingestion of stable flies (Stomoxys

calcitrans). Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 65, 1152–1157. Doi: 10.1111/tbed.12918. 8 WOAH. (2021). African Swine Fever. Technical Disease Card. 

https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2021/03/oie-african-swine-fever-technical-disease-card.pdf 9 Sánchez-Vizcaíno JM, Mur L, Bastos AD, Penrith ML. New insights into the role of ticks in 

African swine fever epidemiology. Rev Sci Tech. 2015 Aug;34(2):503-11. 

10 Sanchez-Vizcaino, J.M., Mur, L., Martinez-Lopez, B. (2012). African Swine Fever: An 

Epidemiological Update. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 59(Suppl. 1), 27–35. 
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-9

unlikely they would play a significant role in transmission given the absence of a 

primary wild suid reservoir host population to maintain a sylvatic cycle. Wild 

boar populations have been implicated in sustained transmission of ASFV, 

particularly in parts of the European Union.11 There has only been one outbreak in 

Europe where the O. erraticus tick, an Ornithodoros species not found in the 

United States, played a role in viral transmission among outdoor swine farms on 

the Iberian Peninsula.12 However, Ornithodoros species of ticks do not appear to 

be critical to the maintenance of ASFV in European wild boar populations. 

Importantly, ticks did not play a role in ASFV transmission despite the presence 

of O. puertorincensis in Haiti and the Dominican Republic during an ASF 

outbreak that lasted from 1978 to 1983.13 Ornithodoros ticks are discussed in 

Section 4.12.2. 

In other areas of the world, ASFV has been introduced and transmitted by illegal 

movement of infected swine and contaminated products (and their contact with 

naïve swine).

1.4.3 Incubation Period 

The incubation period varies by exposure dose, route of transmission, and viral 

strain ranging from 3–21 days. The WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code states 

that the incubation period in Sus scrofa (domestic and wild swine) is 15 days.14 A 

shorter incubation period (3-4 days) is typically observed with the acute form of 

disease. 

When considering the incubation period for ASF, it is important to consider both 

the incubation period for ASF virus in an individual pig exposed (generally 2 – 7 

days15,16), as well as the time to detect ASF in a group or herd of pigs with respect

to clinical signs. Since ASF infection in pigs can resemble other common pig 

diseases and transmission is slow within a herd, early detection through clinical 

11 European Food Safety Authority. (2018). Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever 

in the European Union. European Food Safety Authority Journal. 16(11), 5494.

12 Sanchez-Vizcaino, J.M., Mur, L., Martinez-Lopez, B. (2012). African Swine Fever: An 

Epidemiological Update. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 59(Suppl. 1), 27–35. 13 Brown, V. and Bevins, S. (2018). A review of African swine fever and the potential for 

introduction into the United States and the possibility of subsequent establishment in feral swine 

and native ticks. Front. Vet. Sci., 06. Vol 5. 14 WOAH. (2022). Article 15.1.1. Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 

https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/standards/codes-and-manuals/terrestrial-code-online 

access/?id=169&L=1&htmfile=chapitre_asf.htm. 

15 Malladi S, Ssematimba A, Bonney PJ, St Charles KM, Boyer T, Goldsmith T, Walz E, 

Cardona CJ, Culhane MR. Predicting the time to detect moderately virulent African swine fever 

virus in finisher swine herds using a stochastic disease transmission model. BMC Vet Res. 2022 

Mar 2;18(1):84. doi: 10.1186/s12917-022-03188-6. 16 Guinat, C., Porphyre, T., Gogin, A., Dixon, L., Pfeiffer, D. U., & Gubbins, S. (2018). 

Inferring within-herd transmission parameters for African swine fever virus using mortality data 

from outbreaks in the Russian Federation. Transboundary and emerging diseases, 65(2), e264–

e271. https://doi.org/10.1111/tbed.12748. 
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-10

signs or passive surveillance can take an extended period of time (>20 days17) for 

groups or herds of pigs. 

1.4.4 Clinical Signs 

Clinical signs vary by virus strain and disease form caused by the virus (peracute, 

acute, subacute, and chronic). In swine affected with the peracute form of ASF, 

death is often the first indication of disease. Swine affected with the acute form 

may develop fever (105–107.6°F/40.5–42°C), anorexia, listlessness, cyanosis, 

incoordination, increased pulse and respiratory rate, leukopenia, and 

thrombocytopenia (at 48–72 hours), vomiting, diarrhea, and abortion in pregnant 

sows. 

Swine affected with subacute forms of ASF present with less intense, but similar 

clinical signs including slight fever, reduced appetite, and depression. Abortion in 

pregnant sows is also possible. Swine infected with the chronic form of the virus 

typically exhibit appetite loss, transient low fever, respiratory signs, necrosis of 

the skin, chronic skin ulcers, and swelling of the joints. They also can experience 

recurring episodes of disease, which could eventually lead to death.18 Table 1-1 

summarizes these signs.

Table 1-1. Clinical Signs Caused by the Different Forms of ASF 

17 Ssematimba A, Malladi S, Bonney PJ, St Charles KM, Boyer TC, Goldsmith T, Cardona 

CJ, Corzo CA, Culhane MR. African swine fever detection and transmission estimates using 

homogeneous versus heterogeneous model formulation in stochastic simulations within pig 

premises. Open Vet J. 2022 Nov-Dec;12(6):787-796. doi: 10.5455/OVJ.2022.v12.i6.2.

18 Petrov, A. et al. (2018). No evidence for long-term carrier status of pigs after African swine 

fever virus infection. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 65(5), 1318–1328.

Peracute Acute Subacute Chronic

Virulence of 

strain

High High Moderate to low Low

Immune

status

Death before 

seroconversion

Many die before seroconversion Seropositive Seropositive

Clinical signs Often found 

moribund or 

dead

Febrile (40.5°C–41.5°C), leukopenia, 

anorexia, blood in feces, reluctant to 

move, abortion in sows, erythemic 

skin progressing to cyanosis near 

death

Variable but typically similar 

to, though less severe than, 

acute ASF

Mild fever for 2–3 weeks; 

pregnant sows may abort; 

reddened then dark, 

raised, dry, and necrotic 

skin lesions, especially 

over pressure points

Gross

lesions

Death occurs 

before distinct 

lesions form

Spleen enlarged (up to 3 times 

normal), dark and friable; multiple 

hemorrhages of internal organs, 

especially kidneys and heart; 

hemorrhagic lymph nodes; edema of 

gall bladder and lungs; congestion of 

meninges and choroid plexus

Lesions are similar but milder 

than acute ASF; spleen may 

be 1.5 times normal size; 

lymph nodes enlarge but only 

mildly hemorrhagic; few 

petechia on kidneys

Fibrinous pleuritis, pleural 

adhesions, caseous 

pneumonia, hyperplastic 

lymphoreticular tissues, 

nonseptic fibrinous 

pericarditis, necrotic skin 

lesions 

Adapted from: Kleiboeker, S.B. (2002). Swine fever: Classical swine fever and African swine fever. Vet Clin Food Anim 18, 431–451.
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-11

1.4.5 Morbidity and Mortality 

For all forms of the disease, morbidity rates are very high. Mortality rates vary by 

form. For the peracute form, mortality can reach 100 percent and occur in the 

absence of any clinical signs within 7–10 days after exposure to the virus. The 

acute form is also associated with mortality rates that approach 100 percent, often 

with death occurring within 6–13 days post inoculation. The mortality rate for the 

subacute form is dependent on the age of the affected populations; younger pigs 

have higher rates (70–80 percent), while older pigs experience significantly lower 

rates (less than 20 percent). For those affected by the chronic form of ASF, 

mortality is typically low. 

1.4.6 Differential Diagnosis 

Detection of ASF upon introduction is complex, due to its current clinical 

presentations throughout the world and resemblance to various production 

diseases present within the United States. When considering a potential diagnosis 

of ASF in the United States, the following diseases should also be included in the 

differential diagnosis:19

 Classical swine fever, 

 Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome, 

 Erysipelas,

 Salmonellosis,

 Aujeszky’s disease (or pseudorabies) in younger swine, 

 Pasteurellosis, and

 Other septicemic conditions.

1.4.7 Persistence of ASFV 

ASFV is a very resilient virus that can withstand low temperatures, fluctuations in 

pH, and remain viable for long periods in tissues and bodily fluids. Table 1-2 

provides a breakdown of ASFV resistance to physical and chemical action based 

on the WOAH ASF Disease Card. These factors must be considered when 

determining appropriate response strategies, including disinfection20 techniques. 

19 WOAH. (2021). African Swine Fever. Technical Disease Card. 

https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2021/03/oie-african-swine-fever-technical-disease-card.pdf. 

20 www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/emergency-management/CT_disinfectants
Introduction and ASF Information

July 2023 1-12

Table 1-2. Resistance of ASFV to Physical and Chemical Action

Source: WOAH Technical Disease Card for African Swine Fever, 2021.

Action Resistance

Temperature Highly resistant to low temperatures. Heat inactivated by 56°C

or 132.8°F/70 minutes; 60°C or 140°F/20 minutes. This 

WOAH guidance must be adapted and validated for field 

conditions where use of these temperatures may not be 

feasible.

pH Inactivated by pH < 3.9 or > 11.5 in serum-free medium. 

Serum increases the resistance of the virus, e.g., at pH 

13.4—resistance lasts up to 21 hours without serum, and 7 

days with serum.

Chemicals/disinfectants Susceptible to ether and chloroform. Inactivated by 8/1000 

sodium hydroxide (30 minutes), hypochlorites— between 0.03 

percent and 0.5 percent chlorine (30 minutes), 3/1000 

formalin (30 minutes), 3 percent ortho-phenylphenol (30 

minutes) and iodine compounds. Note: disinfectant activity 

may vary depending on the pH, time of storage and organic 

content. 

Survival Remains viable for long periods in blood, feces, and tissues; 

especially infected uncooked or undercooked pork products. 

Can multiply in vectors (Ornithodoros sp.).
October 2023 2-1

Chapter 2

Framework for ASF Preparedness and 

Response

2.1 FOUNDATION OF PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

FAD PReP, including this ASF-specific plan, provides information and specific 

guidance on response requirements for an outbreak in the United States. FAD PReP 

documents are consistent with emergency preparedness and response principles 

found in the National Response Framework (NRF) and in the NIMS. 

As mentioned early in Chapter 1, this document does not provide, in detail, general 

incident coordination and FAD response. For more information on aspects 

discussed in Chapter 2, please refer to the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 

Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) and the APHIS 

Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0). 

2.2 USDA AUTHORITIES

2.2.1 The Animal Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 8301 

et seq. 

The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq., authorizes 

the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the importation, entry, or further movement 

in the United States or order the destruction or removal of animals and related 

conveyances and facilities to prevent the introduction or dissemination of 

livestock pests or diseases. It authorizes related activities with respect to 

exportation, interstate movement, cooperative agreements, enforcement and 

penalties, seizure, quarantine, and disease and pest eradication. The Act also 

authorizes the Secretary to establish a veterinary accreditation program and enter 

into reimbursable fee agreements for pre-clearance abroad of animals or articles 

for movement into the United States.

Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S. Code 231 transfers to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security certain agricultural import and entry inspection 

functions under the AHPA, including the authority to enforce the prohibitions or 

restrictions imposed by USDA. 

Additionally, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) gives the APHIS 

Administrator authority to determine the existence of disease and the authority to 
Framework for ASF Preparedness and Response

July 2023 2-2

prevent the spread of disease through the destruction and/or disinfection of 

animals, eggs, and materials as appropriate. As such, it also authorizes APHIS to 

appraise and indemnify animals and materials destroyed, provided certain 

conditions are met; these conditions include complying with quarantines, adhering 

to proper biosecurity protocols, and accurately designating payments between 

contract growers and owners of animals (9 CFR 53).

2.2.1.1 EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY

The AHPA also authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture—after notice to review 

and consultation with certain State or Tribal officials—to declare that an 

extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence of a pest or disease of 

livestock and because this presence threatens the livestock of the United States (7 

U.S. Code 8306). This provides the Secretary with additional authority to hold, 

seize, treat, apply other remedial actions to destroy (including preventively 

slaughter) or otherwise dispose of any animal, article, facility, or means of 

conveyance; and prohibit or restrict the movement or use within a State, or any 

portion of a State, of any animal or article, means of conveyance, or facility. Per 

this same section (7 U.S. Code 8306(d)(1)), the Secretary is required to 

compensate the owner of any animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance the 

Secretary requires to be destroyed unless certain conditions are met (these 

exceptions are listed in 7 U.S. Code 8306(d)(3). If the owner fails to comply with 

such an order, the Secretary may take similar action and recover from the owner 

the costs of such action (7 U.S. Code 8306(c)).

The written declaration of Extraordinary Emergency lists specific activities 

USDA plans to bring to the State(s). It is not used as a high-handed usurpation of 

State authority; rather, it can support the State where its authorities are unclear. In 

an ASF outbreak, USDA will consider declaring an Extraordinary Emergency to 

allow States to enforce a 72-hour National Movement Standstill of live swine. 

Another use may be to readily access and conduct response activities on lands 

where feral swine are known or suspected to be infected with ASF; especially in 

States which have a patchwork of laws administered through multiple agencies or 

departments—Agriculture, Fish & Wildlife, Natural Resources, Game, etc. 

Additionally, the federal authority to access private properties with feral swine

may be needed, and the declaration could be written to include that. 

2.2.2 The Swine Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 3801 et 

seq. 

The Swine Health Protection Act (SHPA), 7 U.S. Code 3801 et seq., authorizes 

the Secretary of Agriculture in cooperation with States and other jurisdictions to 

regulate the treatment and feeding of garbage to swine. Untreated garbage serves 

as media where numerous infectious diseases, such as ASF, could be transmitted 

via improperly treated garbage. The SHPA and regulations found in 9 CFR 166

contain provisions that prohibit persons from feeding waste unless properly 
Framework for ASF Preparedness and Response

July 2023 2-3

treated to kill disease organisms. Those who feed waste are required to hold a 

valid license except under certain circumstances outlined in 9 CFR 166. In 

addition, § 166.2(c) states that these regulations shall not be construed to repeal or 

supersede State law that prohibit the feeding of garbage to swine. 

2.3 USDA APHIS VS GUIDANCE

2.3.1 Procedures and Policy for an ASF Investigation, VS 

Guidance 12001.421

VS Guidance Document 12001.4: Procedures and Policy for Investigation of 

Potential FAD/EDI provides guidance for the investigation of potential 

FAD/emerging disease incidents. There is also a FAD PReP Ready Reference 

Guide on VS Guidance 12001.4 to assist responders during the initial disease 

investigation. 

2.3.2 Animal Health Policy in Relation to Feral Swine 

When APHIS policy supports eradication of an infectious agent/disease/vector, 

APHIS VS will seek measures, through 1) movement and testing requirements; 2)

herd plans; and 3) emergency response plans to keep feral swine and domestic

pigs apart and to eradicate ASF from potential reservoirs when eradication is 

deemed technically feasible. If eradication is not technically feasible at the time,

measures must be taken to keep these potential reservoirs (feral swine) separate 

from domestic pigs. APHIS Wildlife Services (WS) will monitor feral swine for

ASF by testing serum and whole blood samples collected in conjunction with 

routine activities to reduce crop damage. As sick and dead feral swine are located

due to non-traumatic events (e.g., disease starvation, old age) APHIS VS will test 

for ASF by viral antigen through FAD investigations. APHIS WS will collaborate 

with the Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) and State Animal Health Official 

(SAHO) to initiate related FAD investigations. Consistent surveillance and 

monitoring activities through APHIS VS’ Swine Hemorrhagic Fevers Integrated 

Surveillance Plan will increase the likelihood of early detection for ASF by 

rapidly locating and testing sick and dead feral swine. 

APHIS recognizes that depending on the State(s), the authority and responsibility 

for managing feral swine may vary. Primary authority may either be under fish 

and wildlife management agencies, agriculture agencies, or there is no clear 

authority designated. However, VS has statutory authority under the AHPA to 

implement disease control and/or eradication actions for wildlife and feral swine 

under certain conditions. 

Should wildlife or feral swine be affected by the control and eradication measures 

proposed by the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary will consult with the 

State agency having authority for protection and management of such wildlife. 

21 12001.4 refers to the latest sequential version as of the published date of this response plan.
Framework for ASF Preparedness and Response

July 2023 2-4

2.4 USDA ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OVERVIEW

Understanding the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments or agencies 

involved in responding to a FAD incident helps with the effectiveness of a 

coordinated emergency response. USDA APHIS responds to animal and 

agricultural health issues under USDA statutory authority and is the primary 

agency responsible for coordinating response efforts to assist State and local 

governments, farmer's associations and similar organizations during an FAD 

incident affecting domestic livestock or poultry in accordance with 7 CFR 

371.4(b)(5). Incidents will be handled in cooperation with States, Tribes, and 

local governments. 

Federal response to the detection of an FAD such as ASF is based on the response 

structure of NIMS as outlined in the NRF, which defines Federal departmental 

responsibilities for sector-specific responses. During an ASF outbreak, the USDA 

may request Federal-to-Federal (FFS)

22 support from other Federal departments 

and agencies. 

If the President declares an emergency or major disaster, or if the Secretary of 

Agriculture requests the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lead 

coordination, the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS assume the lead for 

coordinating Federal resources. USDA maintains the lead of overall incident 

management. If an ASF outbreak occurs in the United States, the planning 

assumption is that the Secretary of Agriculture will declare an extraordinary 

emergency.

2.5 USDA APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

In an ASF incident or outbreak, USDA APHIS provides National Incident 

Management Teams (NIMT), coordinates the incident response, manages public 

messages, and takes measures to control and eradicate ASF. It is critical that 

effective and efficient whole community situation management and clear 

communication pathways are employed for a successful response effort. 

Synchronized management and organizational structure support control and 

eradication actions taken during an ASF outbreak. Accordingly, APHIS employs 

NIMS and the Incident Command System (ICS) organizational structures to 

manage an ASF response. ICS is designed to enable efficient and effective 

domestic incident management by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, 

procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational 

structure. 

22 FFS refers to the circumstance in which a Federal department or agency requests Federal 

resource support under the NRF that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or another mechanism.
Framework for ASF Preparedness and Response

July 2023 2-5

Details for implementing ASF response activities for domestic pig and feral swine 

in the field will be available on the ASF FAD PReP website. 

2.5.1 Incident Management Structure 

The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive responsible for implementing 

APHIS policy during an ASF outbreak; the Administrator is supported by the 

APHIS Management Team (AMT) and the Emergency Preparedness Committee 

(EPC). 

During any significant APHIS-led emergency response, the lead Program Area 

Deputy Administrator or Associate Deputy Administrator(s), and/or Director of 

the Emergency, Management, Safety, and Security Division (EMSSD) (who is 

also the Chair of the APHIS EPC) are authorized to approach the APHIS Office 

of the Administrator (OA) to recommend that an APHIS Multiagency 

Coordination (MAC) group be stood up to support ongoing response. Many of the 

MAC functions may be delegated to the VS Deputy Administrator (VSDA), who 

is the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of the United States. The VSDA is 

supported by the VS Executive Team (VSET) to coordinate policy. 

An APHIS National Incident Coordination Group (ICG), led by an Incident 

Coordinator and a Deputy Incident Coordinator, is immediately established to 

oversee the functions and response activities associated with the incident. This 

ICG is flexible and scalable to the size and scope of the incident and works 

closely with unified Incident Command (IC) field personnel, in a unified Incident 

Management Team (IMT). The ICG also coordinates with any MAC Group that is 

established at the APHIS or USDA level, based on the specific incident. For 

example, in the 2022-2023 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreak in the 

United States, the APHIS MAC Group was formed due to the size, scope, and 

impact of the incident. 

In addition to policy and incident coordination, the APHIS Administrator, AMT, 

the VSDA, and VSET communicate, collaborate, and coordinate with relevant 

industry associations, the National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials and 

National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, public health agencies 

(Federal and State), and other partners in a whole community approach. 

2.5.2 Field Organization 

At the beginning of an incident, the SAHO or designee, and the VS AVIC, or 

designee, initially serve as Co-Incident Commanders in a unified IC Structure. 

The AVIC will be relieved when a State and/or APHIS IMT is stood up, and an 

Incident Command Post (ICP) is established. In a large ASF incident, there may 

be multiple ICPs and full VS NIMTs may not be dispatched to each location; todate, VS has five standing NIMTs. In any situation, ICPs will remain a unified 

State-Federal IC organizational structure. 
Framework for ASF Preparedness and Response

July 2023 2-6

If the outbreak involves more than one incident, more than one IC is likely to be 

established. An Area Command (AC) may also be established. In this case, 

individual Incident Commanders responsible for potentially multiple unified 

IMTs would report to the AC. AC organizational structures may not be 

established or appropriate in all incidents; in many cases, the ICG will perform 

the same functions as an AC. For more information on a single incident and 

multiple incident coordination along with a full NIMT configurations, see APHIS

Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP

Manual 1-0). 
July 2023 3-1

Chapter 3

ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

3.1 RESPONSE GOALS

The APHIS goals of an ASF response are to (1) detect, control, and contain ASF

in swine as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate ASF using strategies that seek to 

stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and to protect public 

health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches 

and systems to facilitate continuity of business (COB) for non-infected animals 

and non-contaminated animal products. 

Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, States, 

Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as 

possible. They will also allow the United States to regain ASF-free status without 

the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the outbreak itself. 

3.2 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

The control and eradication of ASF in swine is based on four epidemiological 

principles: 

1. Prevent contact between ASFV and swine. This is accomplished

through:

a. quarantine of infected swine and movement controls in the Control

Area (Infected Zone [IZ] + Buffer Zone [BZ]),

b. aggressive contact tracing of the Infected Premises, including

premises epidemiologically-linked through a network relationship,

where appropriate, and

c. enhanced biosecurity procedures that include preventing contact

between feral swine and domestic pigs.

2. Stop the production of ASFV by infected or exposed swine. This is

accomplished by mass depopulation (and disposal) of infected and

potentially infected swine; prioritization may increase effectiveness.

3. Prevent the transmission of ASFV by vectors.

4. Prevent ASFV from becoming established in feral swine populations.
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-2

3.3 CONTROL AND ERADICATION STRATEGIES

The United States’ control and eradication strategy for ASF in swine is based on 

international standards and USDA APHIS FAD PReP response standards. 

1. Quarantine Infected Premises.

2. Establish Control Areas (movement controls) around Infected Premises.

3. Conduct aggressive contact tracing of Infected Premises, including premises

epi-linked through a network relationship, where appropriate.

4. Conduct stamping-out to eradicate ASF virus.

5. Conduct surveillance in Control Areas and Free Areas.

6. Implement enhanced biosecurity.

7. Consider vaccination; however, there is currently no vaccine approved for

emergency use in the United States for ASFV in swine.

APHIS acknowledges there may be significant challenges in controlling and 

eradicating ASF, depending on the outbreak (e.g., if feral swine are infected). In 

any instance, movement control measures are critical since ASF is easily spread 

by infected swine and contaminated fomites. It is essential movement controls are 

science- and risk-based to minimize disruption to normal business and to facilitate 

the appropriate allocation of incident resources. To assist in doing so, contact 

tracing will be emphasized in addition to the standard Control Area movement 

controls. Contact Premises outside of the Control Area will be aggressively 

investigated in order to rapidly detect new cases. 

3.3.1 Defining Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy 

For ASF, stamping-out is the depopulation of clinically affected swine and, as 

appropriate, swine exposed to the virus. Depopulation and disposal of Infected 

Premises or Pigs must be conducted in a biosecure manner to prevent further 

disease spread. Box 3-1 lists the key elements of stamping-out. Further detail on 

Depopulation, Disposal, and Decontamination (3D) activities are discussed in 

Section 4.11. 
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

October 2023 3-3

Box 3-1. ASF Stamping-Out Strategy

3.3.1.1 WOAH DEFINITION OF STAMPING-OUT

“Stamping-out” is defined in the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2022) 

Glossary, as: 

a policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out under the 

authority of the Veterinary Authority the following: (a) the killing of the 

animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected in the 

herd or flock and, where appropriate, those in other herds or flocks which 

have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, or by 

indirect contact with the causal pathogenic agent; animals should be killed 

in accordance with Chapter 7.6; (b) the disposal of carcasses and, where 

relevant, animal products by rendering, burning or burial, or by any other 

method described in Chapter 4.13; (c) the cleansing and disinfection of 

establishments through procedures defined in Chapter 4.14. 

3.3.2 Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Figure 3-1 illustrates an example of a stamping-out strategy where an Infected 

Premises or an infected feral swine are depopulated. See Section 4.5.1 for further 

information on zones and areas for an ASF outbreak response. 

Stamping-Out Critical Goals

• After the identification of an Infected Premises or Pig, all infected swine will be

depopulated in the safest and most humane way possible.

• As a general goal, APHIS recommends that depopulation and disposal activities be

completed as soon as possible after approval for indemnity payment. That said,

identifying a specific depopulation response time goal is not an absolute requirement.

• Assessing possible depopulation and disposal of swine on any farm location will require

proper planning and resources to ensure health and safety of the owner, grower and

responders, and proper planning and resources will be needed to ensure animal welfare.

In some cases, other swine, such as those on Contact Premises, may also be

depopulated.

• To be most effective in stopping disease transmission, it may be necessary to prioritize

depopulation (of premises or even within a single premises) based on clinical signs and

epidemiological information.

• Public concerns about stamping-out require a well-planned and proactive public

relations liaison campaign.

• Care should be taken to consider the mental health implications for owners and

responders.
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-4

Figure 3-1. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

3.3.3 Zones and Areas in Relation to Contact Tracing 

Figure 3-2 illustrates an example of an epidemiologic network where contact 

tracing from the first Infected Premises (IP1) identified an epidemiologicallylinked Contact Premises outside of the initial Control Area. This additional 

Infected Premises (IP2) triggered a new Control Area that led to additional 

Contact Premises. All high-risk direct Contact Premises that are traced from/to an

Infected Premises are subject to immediate investigation and State quarantines. 

Figure 3-2. Example of Contact Tracing in an ASF Outbreak
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy 

July 2023 3-5

3.3.4 Control and Eradication of ASF in Domestic Pigs 

In the event ASF is detected in domestic pigs,23 the control and eradication 

strategy is (as noted in Section 3.1): 

1) Quarantine Infected Premises.

2) Establish Control Areas (movement controls) around Infected Premises.

3) Conduct aggressive contact tracing of Infected Premises, including

premises epi-linked through a network relationship, where appropriate.

4) Conduct stamping-out to eradicate ASF virus.

5) Conduct surveillance in Control Areas and Free Areas.

6) Implement enhanced biosecurity.

This section will focus on control strategies in domestic pigs, for further 

information on stamping-out refer to Section 3.3.2 and Section 4.11.1. 

The primary control strategy in domestic pigs focuses on preventing ASFV from 

coming in contact with susceptible swine. This is accomplished through the 

establishment of Control Areas, supported by quarantine and movement controls, 

along with enhanced biosecurity efforts. The size and number of Control Areas 

will vary based upon the population(s) infected (commercial, backyard, or feral), 

the epidemiological information available, and the risk of ASFV transmission 

through swine, fomites, or vectors. In any situation, a positive ASF detection 

would require a minimum Control Area with a 5-kilometer radius, consisting of a 

3-kilometer IZ and a 2-kilometer BZ. In addition, there is a 5-kilometer

Surveillance Zone (SZ) in the Free Area surrounding the Control Area.

Ongoing literature on the sizes of these zones is being developed by APHIS VS 

Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) and will be posted on the 

ASF FAD PReP website, once available. 

A full epidemiological assessment must be completed in order to determine the 

extent of the outbreak, which includes the identification and prioritization of 

epidemiologically-linked Contact Premises and surveillance for contact, sick and 

dead feral swine. Feral swine found near ASF infected domestic pigs may be 

depopulated. All domestic pig premises, infected or not, should take additional 

biosecurity precautions to prevent contact between feral swine and domestic pigs. 

23 See Appendix A for a complete list of definitions. 
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-6

3.3.5 Control and Eradication of ASF in Feral Swine 

In the event ASF is detected in feral swine, the control and eradication strategy is: 

1. Establish Control Areas around infected feral swine (location on the

landscape). Domestic pig premises in the feral swine Control Area will be

subject to movement controls.

2. Conduct aggressive epidemiological investigation.

3. Increase separation between feral swine and domestic pigs in the Control

Area.

The primary eradication strategy is the stamping-out of infected feral swine 

followed by population reduction. This is essentially the same strategy as in 

domestic pigs; however, implementation varies due to the differences between 

production-based systems and feral swine. This section will focus on control 

strategies in feral swine, for further information on stamping-out refer to Section 

3.3.2 and Section 4.12.1. 

Control of ASF in feral swine focuses on limiting viral spread and transmission 

through the establishment of Control Areas that encompass the home range of the 

infected feral swine. At a minimum, the Control Area surrounding the infected 

feral swine will have a 5-kilometer radius, consisting of a 3-kilometer IZ and a 2-

kilometer BZ. In addition, there is a 5-kilometer SZ in the Free Area surrounding 

the Control Area. A larger Control Area may be needed depending upon the 

estimated home range of the feral swine. 

Like ASF control in domestic pigs, Control Areas for feral swine are dependent 

upon the epidemiological requirements of the outbreak. Feral swine will have 

additional epidemiological considerations. They are free-ranging animals that 

cannot be “quarantined” and primarily move within defined or estimated home 

ranges. The home range of feral swine populations can vary widely and are

influenced by the availability of food and water resources, as well as by their sex. 

ASF is thought to move slowly through wild boar populations in Europe, with 

estimates suggesting rates of spread at 0.7 to 1.5 kilometers per month.24,25 The 

relatively slow rate of spread should allow the initial response to focus on intense 

on-the-ground surveillance to determine the extent of infection within populations 

24 Podgórski, T., and Śmietanka, K. (2018). Do wild boar movements drive the spread of 

African swine fever? Transboundary and Emerging Diseases, 65(6), 1588–1596. Doi: 

10.1111/tbed.12910. 25 European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Boklund, A., Cay, B., Depner, K., Földi, Z., 

Guberti, V., ... & Šatrán, P. (2018). Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever in the 

European Union (November 2017 until November 16(11), e05494. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5494.

2018). EFSA Journal, 
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-7

so that adequately-sized Control Areas can be established and adjusted as 

necessary. 

The establishment of Control Areas and zones will delineate where management 

actions occur. Feral swine within Control Areas will be removed and tested in 

accordance with incident depopulation efforts. Additional essential activities 

include strategic population reduction, public outreach, targeted surveillance, and 

surveillance for dead pigs. Any carcasses found within a Control Area will be 

tested and disposed of properly in accordance with applicable State and Federal 

environmental laws unless access to their location would require considerable 

resources. Immediate carcass removal and proper disposal is key in preventing the 

spread of ASFV through feral swine populations. Recent work suggests that more 

than 50 percent of ASF transmission in wild boar can be carcass-based.

26 

Analytical tools that estimate local feral swine population abundance in the 

United States and optimal culling radius will be used to help refine control and 

eradication strategies.

27,28,29 

Chapter 4 provides further information on designations of feral swine zones, and 

areas (Section 4.5.1), in addition to management activities (Section 4.13) that 

occur within those designations to control and eradicate ASF. 

3.4 INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS

3.4.1 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities 

When the criteria for a presumptive positive ASF case have been met (see 

Chapter 4 for case definitions), the APHIS Administrator or the VSDA (CVO of 

the United States) can authorize APHIS personnel—in conjunction with State, 

Tribal and unified IC personnel—to initiate certain response activities of the 

index case (Infected Premises or Infected Pig), including an epidemiological 

investigation of Contact Premises. 

26 Pepin, K.M., et al. Unpublished.

27 Pepin, K. M., Brown, V. R., Yang, A., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., VerCauteren, K. 

C., Miller, R. S., & Bevins, S. N. (2022). Optimising response to an introduction of African swine 

fever in wild pigs. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases, 69, e3111– e3127.

28 Tabak, M. A., Piaggio, A. J., Miller, R. S., Sweitzer, R. A., & Ernest, H. B. (2017). 

Anthropogenic factors predict movement of an invasive species. Ecosphere, 8(6), e01844. Doi: 

10.1002/ecs2.1844. 29 Lewis, J. S., Corn, J. L., Mayer, J. J., Jordan, T. R., Farnsworth, M. L., Burdett, C. L., ... & 

Miller, R. S. (2019). Historical, current, and potential population size estimates of invasive wild 

pigs (Sus scrofa) in the United States. Biological Invasions, 21(7), 2373-2384. Doi: 

10.1007/s10530-019-01983-1. 
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

October 2023 3-8

Upon ASFV confirmation in domestic pigs by the National Veterinary Services 

Laboratories (NVSL) Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL), 

the Secretary of Agriculture will 

 Take immediate steps to declare an Extraordinary Emergency (refer 

to Section 2.2.1.1) (if the ASFV confirmation involves domestic pigs); 

 Issue a 72-hour National Movement Standstill (if the ASFV 

confirmation involves domestic pigs);

 Authorize indemnity for depopulation of Infected Premises in 

conjunction with APHIS, State, and Tribal animal health officials 

according to the depopulation methods allowed by the American 

Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA); and 

 Authorize payment for virus elimination at a uniform, flat rate, based 

on the size of the affected premises.

In the event of an NVSL-confirmed detection of ASF virus not involving domestic 

pigs but in feral swine only, USDA will not automatically execute a 72-hour 

National Movement Standstill. Instead, USDA and affected State(s) will establish 

initial Control Area(s) and Surveillance Zone(s) appropriate for the conditions of the 

detection. However, if there is an epidemiological circumstance that associates 

domestic pigs with the feral swine detection, USDA will implement a National 

Movement Standstill. An example of such a circumstance will be a detection in feral 

swine located or situated in a domestic pig epidemiological risk situation (such as 

feral swine commingled on a domestic pig premises or feral swine commingled at a 

buying station). 

A confirmed positive ASF detection in domestic pig or feral swine will immediately

impact international movements (exports); APHIS and Food Safety and Inspection 

Service (FSIS) should be consulted to determine trade/ export impacts of any ASF 

detection. For more information, see the APHIS Exports website. 

ASFV is transmitted to swine only through close contact (not aerosol transmission) 

and is not zoonotic. Therefore, APHIS and State Animal Health Officials will focus 

on initial quarantine, site biosecurity, and aggressive contact tracing as critical

priorities measures to contain the outbreak. The authorization for indemnity and 

subsequent swine depopulation activities will occur after those initial steps. 

The primary driver of indemnity policy will be the availability of sufficient funds 

through the duration of an ASF outbreak. Additional considerations include the 

regulatory requirement for confirmation, degree of confidence in any National 

Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) non-negative ASF diagnostic test 

result, and application of the APHIS Case Definition for ASF (see Section 4.2.1.2) , 

which provides guidance for evaluating diagnostic test results and swine clinical 

signs to assign a regulatory status of suspect case, presumptive positive case, or 

confirmed positive case. Finally, indemnity authorization depends upon the 
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-9

submission of an indemnity request – including all required recordkeeping documents 

(e.g., mortality sheets, herd inventory logs, etc.) for appraisal. 

The following sections provide further detail on the initial response actions taken 

for ASF outbreak. 

3.4.2 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign 

If ASF is detected in the United States, a Joint Information Center (JIC) will be

established to organize, integrate, and coordinate information to ensure consistent 

messaging across multiple jurisdictions and disciplines. APHIS Legislative and 

Public Affairs (LPA)—the primary liaison for an ASF outbreak—and the USDA 

Office of Communications will invite State, local, and industry communicators to 

participate. 

A public awareness campaign must be effectively coordinated with the creation 

and distribution of audience-appropriate information. Effective communication 

and messaging are among the most important critical activities to the overall ASF

effort. 

ASF communication objectives must 

 furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information; 

 maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the government’s 

ability to respond to an outbreak; 

 minimize public panic and fear; and 

 address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as 

possible. 

Box 3-2 provides key messages that should be emphasized and reinforced by 

communications personnel during an ASF outbreak. 
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-10

Box 3-2. Key Communication Messages in an ASF Outbreak 

All personnel involved in an incident—from executive leadership to field 

responders—must be cognizant of the impact of social media. While it can be a 

useful tool in disseminating information or even gathering intelligence, it can also put 

a spotlight on a single aspect or episode of an event that misrepresents the whole of 

the effort. This threatens the intended public message, as well as the safety of 

responders and the progress, if not the success, of the response operation. 

Any Agency-initiated social media for the incident must be done thoughtfully and 

coordinated through the on-site Public Information Officer and LPA. Responders 

should never use personal social media accounts to discuss the incident.

3.4.3 Regulatory Movement Controls 

Upon strong suspicion of ASF on a domestic pig premises during an FAD 

investigation, a temporary hold order or quarantine will be immediately issued by 

State authority, or Tribal authority. Confirmation of ASF by NVSL is not

necessary for States, or Tribes, to implement quarantines and/or movement 

controls on individual premises during an investigation. 

With NVSL confirmatory results, the SAHO will issue an official quarantine. A 

Federal quarantine (under the AHPA and CFR authorities) may also be issued, if 

requested by the SAHO or directed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The Incident 

Commander will work with the Operations Section and the Planning Section to 

Key Communication Messages

• We are responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the virus.

• ASF does not affect human health and cannot be transmitted from pigs to humans.

• ASF is not a food safety concern—properly prepared meat is safe to eat.

• We are safeguarding animal agriculture and the food supply.

Additional key messages for producers

• Protect your herd with good biosecurity practices and be vigilant in reporting signs of illness to

your veterinarian, or State or Federal animal health official.

• Update your biosecurity plan and implement an ongoing African swine fever training program for

personnel.

• Restrict access to production sites.

• Enhance employee biosecurity practices.

• Ensure strict movement-of-animal protocols.

• Prevent feed contamination and control wildlife, rodents, and flies.

• Put in place proper carcass disposal and manure management practices.

For more information on fighting African swine fever, visit Protect Our Pigs

Trade restrictions will be communicated via APHIS and FSIS. For more information, see the

APHIS Exports website.
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-11

determine and establish zone, area, and premises designations during an ASF 

outbreak. These designations are captured in the Emergency Management 

Response System 2.0 (EMRS2)—the official system of record for permits and 

permitted movements made into, within, and out of ASF Control Areas. 

Each State has different quarantine authorities; therefore, each State’s animal 

health emergency response plan should describe the implementation of 

quarantines and movement controls. Due to the highly integrated nature of the 

swine industry, it will also be necessary to consider swine interstate movements. 

3.4.3.1 NATIONAL MOVEMENT STANDSTILL

See ASF Response Policy USDA Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency & 72-

hour National Movement Standstill, dated July 10, 2023.

A National Movement Standstill is a complete stop in live swine movement or 

dead pigs to rendering across the entire United States mainland. This does not 

include pork meat or pork products, swine germplasm, or feed. It is primarily 

intended to allow States, Tribes, and industry to gather initial critical information 

for a unified approach to an ASF response, while inhibiting further virus 

transmission before effective disease control measures can be successfully 

implemented. Upon confirmation of ASF in domestic pigs, USDA will issue a 

National Movement Standstill for 72 hours in the contiguous United States via 

Federal Order. USDA APHIS will further provide notification to State animal 

health officials, industry associations and through a press release, the APHIS

website (www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep), and the agency’s social media accounts.

In the event of an NVSL confirmed detection of ASFV in feral swine only (a 

detection not involving domestic pigs), USDA will not automatically execute a 

72-hour National Movement Standstill. USDA and affected State(s) will establish

Control Area(s) and Surveillance Zone(s). However, international movement will

be impacted. Trade restrictions will be communicated via APHIS and FSIS. For

more information, see the APHIS Exports website.

USDA will execute a 72-hour National Movement Standstill upon a detection of 

ASFV in feral swine if there is an epidemiological circumstance requiring such 

action. An example of such a circumstance will be a detection in feral pigs located 

or situated in domestic pig epidemiological risk situation (such as feral pigs 

commingled on a domestic pig premises or feral pigs commingled at a buying 

station).

In the event of a National Movement Standstill, USDA will provide clear, concise 

requirements for its implementation, and make the notice easily accessible to all 

stakeholders. Specifications of issuance will at least be defined for: 

 a specific geographical area or boundary (e.g., National or other);
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-12

 a specific requirement that all live swine in transit at issuance must 

reach a destination; 

 specific start and stop times indicating the duration of a standstill; 

 a specific list of what items are restricted from movement (e.g., live 

swine; deadstock removal); and

 a specific list of what items are exempt from movement restrictions 

(e.g., negligible risk FSIS-inspected products). 

The National Movement Standstill prohibits movement of live swine nationwide. 

for both domestic movement and international movement (exports) (see National 

Movement Standstill on the ASF FAD PReP website). Additionally, it prohibits 

swine deadstock removal services, as this is considered a high-risk activity for 

potential disease spread. In the interest of animal welfare, USDA does not require 

or recommend that feed deliveries be prohibited in a movement standstill.

During the 72-hour period, APHIS and SAHOs will consider and allow critical 

low risk movements. APHIS VS will collaborate with States and the private 

sector to identify Control Areas, which will subsequently require permits for any 

movements and on plans for resumption of movement in the Free Area. Prior to 

the end of the 72-hour period, at approximately 48 hours, APHIS VS will confirm 

the anticipated end of the standstill order, or announce any intention to extend it, 

through the notification avenues referenced above (See Section 3.6 for additional 

information on resumption of movement). Allowance for resumption of 

international movements (exports) will be communicated via the APHIS Exports 

website. 

Quarantine and movement controls are critical to stopping disease transmission, 

particularly for ASF. State, Tribal, and APHIS officials must carefully weigh the 

risk of disease transmission against the need for critical movements (e.g., feed) 

and business continuity. A National Movement Standstill only works if all parties 

involved understand the reasons and goals for a movement standstill—and have 

planned for it. 

Note: Policy issued during an incident or outbreak will be posted on the ASF 

FAD PreP website and will supersede these general specifications. 

3.4.4 Initial Critical Activities of an ASF Response 

After the detection of ASF in the United States, specific actions must occur as 

seen in Figure 3-3. These critical tasks are fundamental to the rapid control and 

containment of ASF. Figure 3-3 delineates many of the most important tasks and 

activities but is not all-inclusive. Each response effort is different and may create 

unique challenges. 
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-13

Figure 3-3. Initial Critical Activities of an ASF Response
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-14

3.5 MOVEMENT CONTROL POST STANDSTILL

The release of a National Movement Standstill does not mean that all USDA and 

State movement restrictions have been lifted, signifying the resumption of normal 

movement. States will have issued initial quarantines and established Control 

Areas, as necessary, to contain and control disease spread. Live swine, dead 

swine, and potential ASF fomite movements into, within, and out of a Control 

Area will require a permit. The Incident Management Team and States will 

evaluate and approve permits for live swine, dead swine, and potential ASF 

fomite movements. Any permits for interstate commerce must be approved by the 

origin and destination SAHOs. 

While quarantine and movement controls are highly effective at limiting the 

spread of disease, they also impede normal business operations. Varying 

restrictions and requirements for live swine or product movement can be expected 

by non-infected States; therefore, impacting non-infected operations. The 

implementation of continuity of business (COB) plans is essential to assist with 

the managed movement of non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal 

products. All States, infected or not, should anticipate the influx of permit 

requests once a standstill is lifted.

Information about allowance for international movements (exports) will be 

communicated via APHIS and FSIS. For more information, see the APHIS 

Exports website. 

3.6 HOUR 73: RESPONSE OPTIONS FOLLOWING A

72-HOUR NATIONAL MOVEMENT STANDSTILL

See ASF Response Policy, Hour 73: Response Options for Resumption of Swine 

Movements following 72-hour National Movement Standstill, dated May 15, 2023. 

Upon conclusion of the 72-hour National Movement Standstill, at Hour 73, 

slaughter establishments in the Free Area should be removed from any extended 

national standstill order and allowed to resume operations. A stop movement of 

swine to slaughter establishments in Free Areas beyond the initial 72-hour 

National Movement Standstill would result in significant issues and harm for noninfected production premises in Free Areas, including animal welfare concerns. 

Thus, APHIS VS will execute one or more of the following Hour 73 options for 

production premises dependent upon premises specific circumstances:

1. Continue National Movement Standstill for an additional period beyond Hour

73 exempting swine movement to slaughter establishments in Free Areas.

2. End the 72-hour National Movement Standstill at Hour 73.
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy

July 2023 3-15

• Premises in Free Areas resume intrastate and interstate commerce at

Hour 73 without permits unless movement is into an established

control area.

• Premises in established Control Areas need permits for intrastate and

interstate commerce.

3. Establish a smaller geographical or jurisdictional movement standstill area

(such as part of a state, or an entire state, or a region) for intrastate and /or

interstate commerce at Hour 73.

• Premises in Free Areas resume intrastate and interstate commerce at

Hour 73 without permits unless movement is into an established

control area.

• Premises in established control areas need permits for intrastate and

interstate commerce.

Chapter 4 provides further information on quarantine and movement control, 

COB, and permitting requirements during an ASF outbreak. 
July 2023 4-1

Chapter 4

Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and 

Tools

FAD PReP documents identify critical activities and tools to be employed in the 

event of an ASF outbreak. These critical activities and response tools assist in 

controlling, containing, and eradicating ASF while facilitating COB in an 

outbreak. This chapter describes key parts of these critical activities and tools. 

Documents referenced in this chapter can be found at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

To achieve the goals of an ASF response, critical activities and tools must be 

implemented to successfully execute response strategies. Box 4-1 lists some 

necessary critical activities and tools to effectively contain, control, and eradicate 

ASF. A science- and risk-based approach that protects the public, animal health, 

the environment, and stabilizes animal agriculture, the food supply, and the 

economy is utilized. 

Box 4-1. Overview of Critical Activities and Tools for an ASF Response

4.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY

Information on the etiology and ecology of ASF helps promote a common 

understanding of the disease agent among responders and other stakeholders (see 

Chapter 1 for ASF information). The ASF Overview of Etiology and Ecology SOP

contains additional information. 

Critical Activities and Tools for Containment, Control, and Eradication

• Public communication and messaging campaign (3.4.2)

• Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls (4.6)

• Stringent and effective biosecurity measures (4.10)

• Rapid diagnosis and reporting (4.3)

• Epidemiological investigation and contact tracing (4.5)

• Increased surveillance in domestic and feral swine populations (4.4)

• Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and non-contaminated

animal products (4.7, also Secure Pork Supply Plan)

• Mass depopulation and euthanasia (4.11)

• Effective and appropriate disposal measures (4.11)

• Virus elimination measures (4.11)

• Feral swine population reduction (4.12)
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-2

4.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS AND CASE

REPORTING

Laboratory and case definitions provide a common point of reference for all 

responders. Case definitions and laboratory criteria are developed according to the 

Case Definition Development Process SOP which describes the general process 

for developing and approving animal disease case definitions for use in animal 

health surveillance and reporting. The ASF Case Definition is discussed below. 

4.2.1 Laboratory Definitions 

The following case definitions were published in March 2023. In any ASF

outbreak, case definitions may be edited after the first presumptive or confirmed 

positive case (index case). The case definition will be reviewed throughout the 

outbreak and modified based on additional information or the changing needs of 

the eradication effort.

4.2.1.1 LABORATORY CRITERIA

1. Agent isolation and identification: Collect whole blood

([Ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA) and heparin), whole blood

swabs, spleen, lymph nodes, and tonsils. Keep samples as cold as

possible without freezing, unless using inactivating media. Tests

include real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR),

immunohistochemistry (IHC), and virus isolation (VI).

2. Agent Characterization: Genome sequencing is critical to differentiate

viral strains.

3. Serology: Antibody (Ab) detection in serum can be evaluated by

enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (Ab ELISA), indirect fluorescent

antibody test (IFAT), and indirect immunoperoxidase test (IPT).

Antibodies typically develop 7-10 days postinfection and can persist

for life. Pigs infected with highly virulent ASFV strains can die before

antibody production occurs.

4.2.1.2 CASE DEFINITION AND REPORTING CRITERIA

1. Suspect case: A suid with

a. clinical signs consistent with ASF; OR

b. an epidemiologic link to ASFV; OR

c. a non-negative result by a serological antibody screening assay

conducted as part of a national surveillance activity.
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-3

2. Presumptive positive case: A suspect case with a non-negative test

result for ASFV PCR from a National Animal Health Laboratory

Network (NAHLN) or other APHIS approved screening laboratory.

3. Confirmed positive case:

a. ASF virus has been isolated and sequenced at NVSL; OR

b. A suid with clinical signs consistent with ASF or an

epidemiologic link to ASFV or cause for suspicion of previous

association or contact with ASFV; AND

i. an ASF PCR30 positive result with genomic sequencing

at NVSL; OR

ii. antibodies specific to ASFV are identified by Ab

ELISA and confirmed by IPT at NVSL.

Under the APHIS National List of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRAD), ASF is 

a U.S. FAD and a WOAH-notifiable disease. Suspect cases should be reported to 

a State Animal Health Official (SAHO) or Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) 

who will decide if the report is credible and assign a Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostician (FADD) to further investigate the possibility of ASF infection. For 

more information on FAD investigation procedures please refer to VS Guidance 

Document 12001.4: Policy for the Investigation of Potential Foreign Animal 

Disease/Emerging Disease Incidents and the FAD Investigation Manual (FAD

PReP Manual 4-0). 

4.3 DIAGNOSTICS

Effective and appropriate sample collection, diagnostic testing, surge capacity, 

and reporting are critical in an effective ASF response. These activities may 

require additional resources in the event of an ASF outbreak. In particular, 

meeting the demand for sampling pigs for investigations, surveillance, and 

movement will require additional personnel. Surge capacity will likely be needed 

for diagnostic laboratory testing. Surveillance plan requirements must be fully 

integrated with current diagnostic sample collection, sample testing, surge 

capacity, and reporting capabilities. 

During a suspected or actual ASF outbreak, the key goals for diagnostics are to 

30 Once first identification has occurred at NVSL, ASF PCR positive result at a NAHLN 

approved laboratory or NVSL. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-4

 provide clear direction to responders on sample collection and 

processing procedures, if modification from routine standards is 

required, 

 meet the surge requirements for diagnostic testing at specific intervals, 

starting at time zero and at 24-hour intervals as the response escalates, 

 utilize (Emergency Management Response System 2.0 [EMRS2]) to 

prepare and create submission documents when available, and 

 report all diagnostic test results to appropriate personnel and

information management systems (EMRS2) as soon as possible and 

within 4 hours of diagnostic test completion. 

The FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PreP Manual 4-0) offers detailed 

information on diagnostic sample collection, diagnostic testing, and reporting. 

This document provides guidance on who is responsible for diagnostic testing, 

sample packaging and shipping, and roles in FAD investigations. 

See VS Guidance Document 12001.4 and the associated ready reference guide for 

the policy and guidance on FAD investigations. The procedures outlined in this 

document should be followed in all FAD investigations, including those in which 

ASF is a differential diagnosis.

4.3.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing 

Trained personnel and field collection kits are required to effectively collect 

samples from swine. During an FAD outbreak, the quantity and frequency of 

samples collected need to increase; the Certified Swine Sample Collector (CSSC) 

training program ensures that the sample collection capacity is met to help ease 

the workload on existing FADDs and swine veterinarians. Development of the 

Federal-State-Industry CSSC training program was funded by USDA APHIS’ 

National Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Program for the initial first 

two years, and Pork Checkoff for the third year. Program Standards are available 

here. 

Table 4-1 details what specimens should be collected for diagnostic testing at 

NVSL-FADDL. Additional specific information on how to package and label 

laboratory submissions is also available here. 

Confirmatory diagnostic testing for ASF will be performed at NVSL FADDL, 

with NVSL’s Diagnostic Virology Laboratory providing support during an 

outbreak. Tests performed to determine the presence of ASFV include agent 

detection through PCR, and VI; agent confirmation and characterization through 

genome sequencing; and antibody detection through Ab ELISA, IFAT, and IPT

tests. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-5

Table 4-2 shows diagnostic tests performed by NVSL-FADDL, the required 

specimen and the minimum time needed to obtain results. Figure 4-1 shows the 

diagnostic test flow at NVSL-FADDL for ASF samples received. This 

information is current as of this document’s publication, updates may be subject 

to change. Consult NVSL-FADDL guidance on the APHIS website for 

conducting sample collection. 

Table 4-1. Sample Collection for Diagnostic Testing

Source: NVSL-FADDL Disease-Specific Guide to Sample Collection

SPECIMEN MEDIUM SHIPPING PRESERVATIVE

LIVE ANIMALS

Individual animals

Serum Serum separator tube (8-

10ml) Ice pack

Whole blood EDTA Purple top tube (8-10ml) Ice pack

Whole blood swab In 3 ml molecular transport 

media (MTM) obtained from 

NVSL

None

Tonsil scraping In 3 ml tris-buffered tryptose 

broth (TBTB) transport 

media obtained from NVSL

Ice pack

Pooled animals

Blood swabs Up to 5 animals, Use spun 

swabs in MTM obtained from 

NVSL. Do not store swabs in 

MTM.

None

DECEASED ANIMALS

Individual animals

Fresh tissue: spleen, tonsil, 

mandibular, gastrohepatic, 

renal, or iliac lymph node

Separate Whirlpak per tissue 

type Ice pack

Whole blood swab

Spleen pulp swab

In 3 ml molecular transport 

media (MTM) obtained from 

NVSL

None

Set of tissues Formalin (10:1) Ice pack

Pooled animals

Blood swabs

Spleen pulp swabs

Up to 5 animals, Use spun 

swabs in MTM obtained from 

NVSL. Do not store swabs in 

MTM.

None

Spleen or tonsil Must be collected 

individually and pooled 

under laboratory conditions

Ice pack
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-6

Table 4-2. Diagnostic Tests Performed for ASFV at NVSL-FADDL

Note: Test time may vary depending on the number of samples or need to repeat the test. These are typical 

times that can be expected. Further information for an initial investigation is provided in Figure 4-1.

Procedure Specimen Minimum test time

Ab ELISA Serum 2-3 day

IPT Serum 2-3 day

Real time PCR

Blood, tissue (tonsil, lymph 

node, spleen), swab (whole 

blood, spleen pulp)

3 hours

Whole genome sequencing

Blood, tissue (tonsil, lymph 

node, spleen), swab (whole 

blood, spleen pulp)

2-4 days

VI Blood, tissue (tonsil, lymph 

node, spleen)

14-21 days (three 7-day

cycles)
July 2023 4-7 

Figure 4-1. Diagnostic Test Flow for Initial Investigation of ASF in the United States
July 2023 4-8

4.3.2 Surge Capacity 

NAHLN laboratories provide rapid standardized surveillance and response testing 

for FADs. Currently, there are 49 laboratories approved for ASF testing. NAHLN

maintains and updates this list on their website,

31 along with a map to 

geographically visualize laboratory capacity by State. APHIS realizes that, in an 

ASF outbreak, collecting and testing diagnostic samples will require significant 

resources. It is a priority to maintain this capacity and ensure that additional 

NAHLN laboratories have this diagnostic capacity in the immediate future. 

4.4 SURVEILLANCE DESIGN

The purpose of surveillance is to define the distribution of the disease, detect new 

outbreaks, and establish disease-free zones. Surveillance activities can aid in 

establishing priorities in terms of control and mitigation strategies and help 

evaluate the efficacy of response efforts. They are also critical to maintaining 

COB and providing evidence of disease freedom following an outbreak. 

Surveillance personnel are involved in the case definition development, design of 

surveillance sampling schemes, and the assessment and reporting of surveillance 

findings. It is critical to coordinate between the personnel conducting surveillance 

activities and those responsible for epidemiological investigations, quarantine and 

movement control, and biosecurity. 

This section provides a broad overview of ASF surveillance. Additional 

surveillance guidance documents with further detail on surveillance procedures 

and sampling schemes for domestic pigs during an outbreak will be posted on the 

ASF FAD PReP website. APHIS VS CEAH subject matter experts will support 

the unified IC to help define appropriate surveillance strategies during an 

outbreak. 

4.4.1 Surveillance Goals and Objectives 

Surveillance is a critical activity during an outbreak of ASF. The following are the 

goals of surveillance in response to an ASF outbreak in either domestic or feral 

swine:

 Implement a surveillance plan that will (1) define the present 

distribution of ASF in domestic pig and feral swine and (2) detect 

unknown Infected Premises32 quickly. 

31 For further information on NAHLN Laboratories, see 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/lab-infoservices/nahln?urile=wcm:path:/APHIS_Content_Library/SA_Our_Focus/SA_Animal_Health/SA

_Lab_Information_Services/SA_NAHLN/response-guidance.

32 Refer to Section 4.5.1 for zone, area, and premises designations. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-9 

 Define the epidemiologic network for each Infected Premises. 

 Determine feral swine presence near domestic premises, and if present, 

incorporate susceptible feral swine populations within the surveillance 

plan; coordinate with APHIS WS, U.S. Department of Interior (DOI), 

State wildlife agencies, and State agriculture departments. 

 Provide surveillance data summaries and analyses at intervals 

specified by the unified IC. 

Box 4-1. Surveillance Plan Objectives in an ASF Outbreak

4.4.2 Surveillance Activities Overview 

There are three key periods of surveillance activities in an outbreak. The initial 72 

hours post-ASF outbreak declaration, the control and eradication period (the time 

until last case is detected and depopulated), and the completion of virus 

elimination to declaration of disease freedom. 

Surveillance activities begin with the development of a surveillance plan. 

Surveillance plans may differ to address the objectives of the incident, time period 

of the response, and the specifications of the zone, area, and premises 

designations (see Section 4.5.1). Plans may also vary by outbreak type, field 

capacity, and epidemiologic characteristics that can differ by region, host, and 

virus. Surveillance activities and associated testing are based on the best scientific 

information available at the time and may need to be modified as an outbreak 

progresses. 

Data collection for surveillance purposes can be either passive or active. Passive 

surveillance is ongoing and begins with the producer, veterinarian, or laboratory 

personnel suspecting a case of ASF and informing State or Federal animal health 

officials. Active surveillance is initiated by regulatory officials requesting the 

collection of animal health data using a defined protocol to perform actions that 

are scheduled in advance. Decisions about whether information is collected, what 

Surveillance Plan Objectives

• Detect ASF Infected Premises and infected feral swine quickly. 

• Determine the size and distribution of the ASF outbreak.

• Determine zone and premises designations.

• Supply information to evaluate outbreak response activities.

• Provide surveillance and testing requirements for movement of live swine into, 

out of, and within Control Area(s) that will include epidemiologic networks.

• Provide surveillance and testing information for pre-movement requirements. 

• Provide evidence that Control Area(s) are free of disease.

• Provide evidence to demonstrate disease-freedom following eradication.
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-10 

information should be collected, and from which animals is made by the 

investigator.33

4.4.3 Passive Surveillance 

Passive surveillance is continuously conducted within the United States. Passive 

surveillance relies on producers, veterinarians, and laboratory personnel to 

voluntarily report suspect cases based on clinical signs and lesions compatible 

with ASFV to State or Federal animal health officials. Passive surveillance for 

ASFV applies to all swine. Feral swine that are found dead or visibly sick (ruling 

out evidence of trauma, e.g., car strikes, etc.) will be tested and/or euthanized. 

Any suspect cases, in either domestic or feral swine having clinical signs 

compatible with ASF (e.g., abnormal health events and/or significantly decreased 

production parameters), will trigger a FAD Investigation (per VS Guidance 

Document 12001.4). In the event of an ASF detection, passive surveillance is 

intensified through rapid and clear communication to all producers and 

veterinarians. 

APHIS WS works collaboratively with States that have established populations of 

feral swine to reduce the number of feral swine and associated damages they 

inflict to agriculture, property, natural and cultural resources, and human health. 

As WS routinely monitors feral swine populations, they alert VS of any ASF 

suspect cases. 

4.4.4 Active Surveillance for Domestic Pigs 

Due to the increased spread of ASF in Asia and Europe, USDA implemented a 

targeted active surveillance program in 2019. The objectives of the program 

include strengthening detection capabilities, enhancing outbreak preparedness, 

and supporting claims of disease freedom for ASF and CSF. This plan, Swine 

Hemorrhagic Fevers: African and Classical Swine Fever Integrated Surveillance 

Plan, can be found on the USDA APHIS ASF website under technical documents. 

Additionally, a public dashboard is available summarizing the sampling 

performed since the plan was implemented. 

During the initial stages of an ASF outbreak, surveillance is designed to provide 

evidence so that informed decisions can be made in regards to zone sizing, 

premises designation, and epidemiologic networks. In particular, all Suspect 

Premises in the Control Area must be tested to determine whether they are 

Infected Premises or At-Risk Premises. In addition, Contact Premises 

epidemiologically-linked to Infected Premises, will be identified and prioritized 

33 Active Surveillance is defined here by the International Conference on Animal Health 

Surveillance (ICAHS) in the Animal Health Surveillance Terminology Final Report from PreICAHS Workshop, July 2013 (version 1.2). 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-11

so that appropriate surveillance activities and movement controls can be 

implemented quickly. 

As the response progresses, surveillance is used to assess the disease status within 

Control Areas, SZ, and epidemiologically-linked networks. Surveillance 

assessments will determine if the initial parameters need to be re-evaluated or the 

criteria has been met for Control Area release. Surveillance can also provide 

evidence to demonstrate post-outbreak disease freedom. 

Active surveillance also includes pre-movement testing. USDA APHIS is actively 

collaborating with stakeholders to further develop and define parameters for premovement testing. 

4.4.4.1 OUTBREAK SELECTION CRITERIA AND SAMPLING METHODS

Individual pig sampling is the only validated method to detect ASFV. Currently, 

approved sample types include whole blood and fresh tissue (spleen, lymph node, 

and tonsil) (see Table 4-1). NVSL is diligently working to evaluate aggregate 

methods, such as rope sampling. Dead pigs and those presenting with case 

compatible clinical signs should be prioritized for sampling. 

Updated guidance, as available, will be posted on the ASF FAD PReP website. 

4.4.5 Active Surveillance for Feral Swine 

In the event ASF is detected in feral swine populations, the initial surveillance 

goal will be to determine the distribution of infection. Once determined, control 

and eradication strategies can be implemented through established Control Areas 

(refer to Section 4.5.1 for zone, area, and premises designations). 

Feral swine within Control Areas will be removed and tested in accordance with

incident depopulation efforts. In the event a Control Area covers a large 

geographical area, surveillance testing will be refined to achieve the most efficient 

and effective approach. Surveillance activities outside of the Control Area and in 

the SZ will focus on heightened surveillance through wildlife management 

activities (see Section 4.12) where periodic sampling will occur. A sampling 

scheme will be developed during an outbreak and will be adapted as needed 

throughout the outbreak to account for availability of resources and to support the 

designation of zones and areas. The ultimate goal is to eliminate ASF in feral 

swine in order to prevent virus maintenance or spillover into domestic pigs. 

4.5 EPIDEMIOLOGY

Epidemiological activities work to quickly and accurately identify cases of ASF, 

locate other Contact Premises that may be infected, and investigate the source of 

the outbreak. An epidemiologic investigation can classify premises so that 

appropriate zones, areas, and premises designations can be applied. Additional 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-12

activities involve the tracing of all contacts with affected animals and premises, 

including movement of non-susceptible animals, humans, fomites, animal 

products or byproducts, and equipment that may have come into contact with 

ASFV. 

4.5.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations 

A critical component of an ASF response is the designation of zones, areas, and 

premises, which are used in quarantine and domestic movement control efforts. 

The Incident Commander works with the Operations Section and Planning 

Section to 

1. determine appropriate zones, areas, and premises designations in the

event of an ASF outbreak, and

2. re-evaluate these designations as needed throughout the outbreak

based on the epidemiological situation.

Table 4-3 summarizes the premises designations that are employed in an ASF 

outbreak response for domestic pig production premises. Table 4-4 summarizes 

the zone and area designations that would be used in an ASF outbreak response. 

Table 4-3. Summary of ASF Premises Designations for Domestic Pig Production Premises

Premises Definition Zone

Infected Premises/ 

Infected Pig(s) (IP) 

Premises or pig location where a presumptive positive 

case or confirmed positive case exists based on 

laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, ASF case 

definition, and international standards.

Infected Zone

Contact Premises (CP) Premises with swine that have been 

epidemiologically-linked to an IP through exposure to 

animals, animal products, fomites, or people. CPs

would be subject to contact tracing. 

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone, Free Area

Suspect Premises (SP) Premises under investigation due to the presence of 

swine reported to have clinical signs compatible with 

ASF. This is intended to be a short-term premises 

designation.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone, Surveillance Zone

At-Risk Premises (ARP) Premises with swine, but none of those swine have 

clinical signs compatible with ASF. ARPs are not IPs, 

CPs, or SPs. ARPs may seek to move susceptible 

animals or products within the Control Area by permit. 

Only ARPs are eligible to become MPs.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone

Monitored Premises (MP) Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an IP, 

CP, or SP. Only ARPs are eligible to become MPs. 

MPs meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move 

susceptible animals or products out of the Control 

Area by permit. MPs provide biosecurity, surveillance 

and herd health status information to the IMT.

Infected Zone, Buffer 

Zone

Free Premises (FP) Premises outside of a Control Area and not a CP or 

SP. 

Surveillance Zone, Free 

Area
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-13 

Table 4-4. Summary of ASF Zone and Area Designations

Zone/Area Definition

Infected Zone (IZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises or Infected Pig(s). 

Buffer Zone (BZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises.

Control Area (CA) Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area. The Surveillance Zone is 

part of the Free Area.

Free Area (FA) Area not included in any Control Area. Includes the Surveillance Zone.

4.5.1.1 CONSIDERATIONS FOR ZONES AND AREAS

In an incident, the unified IC establishes an Infected Zone (IZ) and a Buffer Zone 

(BZ) for each ASF Infected Premises. This Control Area (the IZ and the BZ) may 

change as the outbreak progresses. In an ASF incident, additional considerations 

are needed to incorporate the specific characteristics of the swine industry, as well 

as considerations for feral swine since they, too, are susceptible to ASF. Zone, 

area, and premises designations may include epidemiologically-linked Contact 

Premises that are not all in the same, or contiguous geographical area, and areas 

that reflect home ranges of feral swine populations. 

The perimeter of the Control Area should be at least 5 km (~3.12 miles) beyond 

the perimeter of the closest Infected Premises or Infected Pig. The size of the 

Control Area depends on the circumstances of the outbreak, including 

transmission pathways and estimates of transmission risk, swine movement 

patterns and concentration points, distribution of feral swine in proximity, natural 

terrain, jurisdictional boundaries, and other factors. The boundaries of the Control 

Area can be modified or redefined when tracing and other epidemiological 

information becomes available. 

Table 4-5 provides a description of the minimum sizes of areas and zones for 

domestic pig production premises and feral swine found on the landscape; and 

Table 4-6 describes the epidemiologic factors used to determine the size of zones 

and Control Areas. 

Table 4-5. Minimum Size of Zones and Areas

Zone or Area Minimum Size and Details

Infected Zone (IZ) Perimeter should be at least 3 km (~1.86 miles) beyond perimeters of presumptive 

or confirmed Infected Premises or Infected Pigs based on epidemiological 

circumstances. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues.

Buffer Zone (BZ) Perimeter should be at least 2 km (~1.24 miles) beyond the perimeter of the IZ. 

Width is generally not less than the minimum radius of the associated IZ, but may 

be much larger. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-14

Zone or Area Minimum Size and Details

Control Area (CA) Perimeter should be at least 5 km (~3.12 miles) beyond the perimeter of the closest 

Infected Premises or Infected Pig. Please see Table 4-6 for factors that influence 

the size of the Control Area. This area may be redefined as the outbreak continues. 

Surveillance Zone (SZ) Width should be at least 5–10 km (~3.12 miles to ~6.21 miles) beyond the Control 

Area.

Table 4-6. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for ASF

Factors Additional Details

Jurisdictional areas  Effectiveness and efficiency of administration

 Multi-jurisdictional considerations: local, State, Tribal, and multistate

Physical boundaries  Areas defined by geographic features

 Areas defined by manmade structures

 Areas defined by distance between premises

ASF epidemiology  Reproductive rate

 Incubation period

 Ease of transmission

 Infectious dose

 Modes of transmission (contact with secretions, excretions, fomites, vectors)

 Survivability in the environment

 Ease of diagnosis (for example, no pathognomonic signs; requires diagnostic 

laboratory testing)

Infected Premises 

characteristics

 Number of contacts

 Transmission pathways and transmission risk

 Extent of animal movement

 Number of animals

 Species of animals

 Production stage

 Movement of traffic and personnel to and from premises (fomite spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place at time of outbreak

Contact Premises 

characteristics

 Number and types of premises

 Susceptible animal populations and population density

 Animal movements

 Critical movements (e.g., feed)

 Movement of traffic (fomites) and personnel to and from premises (fomite 

spread)

 Biosecurity measures in place prior to outbreak

Environment  Types of premises in area or region

 Land use in area or region

 Estimated feral swine home range

General area, region, or 

agricultural sector biosecurity

 Biosecurity practices in place prior to outbreak

 Biosecurity practices implemented once outbreak detected

Number of backyard 

premises 

 Types of premises, animal movements, and network of animal and fomite 

movements
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-15

Factors Additional Details

Feral Swine  Presence/absence of populations 

 Population density

 Estimates of home range size

 Number of ASF positive carcasses

 Presence of feral swine markets or slaughter facilities

4.5.1.1.1 Additional Considerations for Feral Swine

Additional factors for zones and areas must be considered in the event feral swine 

are infected with ASFV. Feral swine are free ranging animals that primarily move 

within defined home ranges. The size of these home ranges vary based on 

resources, climate, habitat, and other factors. 

Since an ASF outbreak in feral swine would almost certainly involve more than 

one pig, the IZ would likely be larger than the 3 kilometer minimum 

recommendation around a single index case. The initial IZ would encompass all 

ASF-positive feral swine cases and expand beyond the home range size for the 

affected population(s) of feral swine. Since feral swine home ranges vary widely, 

the exact size of the Control Area(s) will be determined by State/Federal wildlife 

experts after initial assessment. The average is approximately 1.5 to 3 square 

kilometers.

34 

Research on feral swine contact networks indicate that contact, and by extension, 

disease transmission, is uncommon between feral swine that are more than 2 

kilometers apart on the landscape. The resulting IZ would therefore extend at least 

3 kilometers out in all directions from the feral swine index case35 with

adaptations for natural and manmade landscape features. Some regions have 

additional feral swine data available36 that could be used in the event of an 

outbreak to refine both home range estimates and the size of the IZ. 

The BZ will expand proportionally with increases in the IZ so that it always 

provides a buffer equivalent to at least 2 kilometers surrounding the IZ. The BZ

will indicate an area of increased ASF risk where no positive feral swine have 

been detected. Additionally, there will be a SZ of at least 5 kilometers 

surrounding the BZ. These zones will be adapted as the incident progresses, in 

addition to changes in epidemiology. 

34 Kay, S. L., Fischer, J. W., Monaghan, A. J., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., Campbell, T. A., 

... & Wisely, S. M. (2017). Quantifying drivers of wild pig movement across multiple spatial and 

temporal scales. Movement ecology, 5(1), 14. Doi: 10.1186/s40462-017-0105-1.

35 Pepin, K. M., Davis, A. J., Beasley, J., Boughton, R., Campbell, T., Cooper, S. M., ... & 

Wyckoff, C. (2016). Contact heterogeneities in feral swine: implications for disease management 

and future research. Ecosphere, 7(3), e01230. Doi: 10.1002/ecs2.1230.

36 Kay, S. L., Fischer, J. W., Monaghan, A. J., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., Campbell, T. A., 

... & Wisely, S. M. (2017). Quantifying drivers of wild pig movement across multiple spatial and 

temporal scales. Movement ecology, 5(1), 14. Doi: 10.1186/s40462-017-0105-1.
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-16

4.5.2 Visualizing Zones and Areas for Domestic Pigs & Feral 

Swine 

Figure 4-2 illustrates examples of zones, areas, and premises designations for both 

domestic pigs and feral swine. Adjustments will be needed during an outbreak 

based on the evolving epidemiological and incident situation. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

October 2023 4-17

Figure 4-2. Examples of Zones, Areas, and Premises for Domestic Pigs and Feral Swine in an ASF

Outbreak Response

Domestic Pigs

Zones and Areas Premises

Note: The Surveillance Zone is part of the Free Area. 

Feral Swine

Zones and Areas Pigs*

* The minimum Infected Zone is 3 kilometers; however, when multiple pigs are found nearby on the landscape the

Infected Zone will be adjusted to incorporate all pigs, which potentially can result in a larger Infected Zone.

Note: The Surveillance Zone is part of the Free Area. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-18

4.5.3 Epidemiological Investigation and Contact Tracing 

An epidemiologic investigation can identify the index case, determine risk factors 

for transmission, and support the development of mitigation strategies. During an 

ASF outbreak, an epidemiological questionnaire will be utilized by the unified IC

to assist in determining the scale and scope of the outbreak. The investigation and 

associated questionnaire will incorporate wildlife contact, particularly for feral 

swine, as well as an assessment to determine whether Ornithodoros spp. ticks are 

implicated in, or present a risk for, ongoing transmission. Evidence from recent 

outbreaks in previously ASF-free countries suggest that ticks may not play an 

epidemiologically significant role (if any role) in sustained transmission; other 

modes of direct and indirect transmission pathways should be the focus of control 

and containment activities.

Intensive contact tracing activities will also be required during an ASF outbreak 

to identify all Contact Premises. Contact tracing should identify all domestic pig 

movement onto and off an Infected Premises that occurred within the last 30 days 

of onset of clinical signs (i.e., two WOAH incubation periods for ASFV). In 

addition, all premises or locations having a shared indirect contact during the last 

15 days with the Infected Premises will also be traced and subject to surveillance 

requirements. 

Contact tracing is used in combination with traditional Control Areas to assist in 

limiting the spread of ASFV. Unlike traditional Control Areas that focus on local 

spread surrounding an Infected Premises, Contact tracing directly addresses

movement and its role in disease transmission. As a result, additional cases can be 

identified quickly, and incident resources can be utilized more efficiently. 

Regulatory officials and producers are expected to work together during an 

outbreak to identify Contact Premises—premises that have potentially been 

exposed to ASFV due to an epidemiologic link to an Infected Premises. 

Epidemiologic links that are most important to the spread of ASFV include the 

movement of people, animals, and equipment between sites. These premises, 

along with those in the Control Area, are most likely to be infected with ASF. 

Section 3.3.3 provides an example of zones and areas in relation to contact 

tracing. 

Box 4-2 explains the fundamental importance of movement tracing in an ASF 

response effort.
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-19

Box 4-2. Importance of Contact Tracing in an ASF Outbreak

Administering epidemiological questionnaires and tracing activities are typically 

conducted by a unified IC. Additional virtual support may be necessary from 

other personnel that have epidemiology expertise. No two incidents are the same: 

questionnaires, procedures, and priorities will be determined based on the specific 

circumstances of the incident. 

The Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing SOP as well as the National 

Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) Guidelines: 

Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing both provide more information. The 

ASF Epidemiology Questionnaire can be found here. 

4.6 DOMESTIC RESPONSE: QUARANTINE AND

MOVEMENT CONTROL

Quarantine and movement control measures are fundamental to any ASF response 

effort, as movement of infected animals and contaminated fomites spread ASFV. 

By restricting the movement of infected animals, animal products, and 

contaminated fomites, quarantine and movement control can be a powerful tool in 

controlling and eradicating an ASF outbreak. 

Movement control is typically accomplished through a permit system for Control 

Areas. Permitting allows entities to make necessary movements into, within, and 

out of a Control Area without creating an unacceptable risk of disease spread. 

Criteria required for movement will depend on the risk of that movement, and 

may include biosecurity, cleaning and disinfection (C&D), and/or diagnostic 

testing depending on the specific permit. EMRS2 is APHIS’ system of record for 

permits and permitted movements made into, within, and out of ASF Control 

Areas. 

It is important that quarantine and movement controls, while critical to stopping 

disease transmission, also consider competing priorities; in implementing 

domestic measures, States, Tribes, and APHIS officials must weigh the risk of 

disease transmission against the need for critical movements (e.g., feed) and 

business continuity. Considerations should also be taken for the highly integrated 

Contact Tracing 

One of the single most important and urgent veterinary activities during an ASF 

outbreak is to rapidly and diligently trace-back and trace-forward movements from an 

Infected Premises. This contact tracing aids in the control of the spread of ASFV and 

limits the impact of the outbreak. Contact tracing should capture all movements to and 

from the premises including, but not limited to, susceptible swine, non-susceptible 

species, animal products, vehicles, crops/grains, and personnel. Contact tracing also 

includes consideration of all potential modes of transmission and possible contact with 

feral swine. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-20

nature of the swine industry, where movements are often incorporated in networks 

and cross State lines. Movement control procedures are based on the best 

scientific information available at the time, and all personnel—premises owners, 

managers, and responders—should adhere to these measures. 

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Quarantine and Movement Control and the FAD PReP

Permitted Movement manual provides further information on measures considered 

necessary to prevent the spread of ASF. 

For international exports, no animal or animal (by-)products can be exported from 

control zones. Exports of live animals and their by-products originating outside of 

control zones may proceed only when allowed by the importing country. Current 

country-specific requirements for the export of live animals and animal (by-) 

products can be accessed from the APHIS Exports website. Country-specific 

requirements for the export of pork meat/meat products can be accessed from the 

FSIS Export Library Import & Export Library. 

4.6.1 Control Area Movement 

Domestic movement related to swine business into, within, and out of a Control 

Area will either require a permit or tracking by the unified IC or producers. Any 

movement of swine and conveyance brings some level of risk of ASFV 

transmission from a known or unknown Infected Premises to non-infected 

premises. The risk of moving swine and conveyances depends on the nature of the 

item being moved and its ability to transmit or be contaminated with ASF. 

For domestic movement of susceptible swine or potential fomites out of the 

Control Area to a Free Area, the permit process occurs as described in the 

document entitled Permitted Movement (FAD PReP Manual 6-0). This includes 

approval from the origin State, and if interstate, the destination State. 

Requirements for a permit may vary depending on the permit, which takes into 

consideration the incident, National standards, State regulations, applicable 

WOAH standards, and conditions and criteria for the permitted movement(s), 

including requirements for biosecurity, surveillance and diagnostics. For 

international movements (exports), no animal or animal (by-)products can be 

exported from a control zone. 

It is the State’s responsibility for ensuring producers in their State know what type 

of movements require a permit, what requires no permit but reporting to the State 

and/or the unified IC, and what requires enhanced record keeping by the producer. 

It is important that criteria for movement during an ASF outbreak is 

communicated in an accurate and timely manner. 

See APHIS guidance on Movement Control and Permitted Movement for more 

information. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-21 

4.6.1.1 PERMIT REQUESTS AND TYPES

Permit requests are made to the State and/or Incident Management Teams 

established for the response. The State may have their own permitting system. 

APHIS uses the EMRS2 Customer Permit Gateway, also referred to as “the 

Gateway”, for permits and permitted movements regarding a Control Area. 

EMRS2 does not guarantee, certify, or otherwise assume that all requirements for 

a permit have been met. EMRS2 only facilitates the issuance of permits; it 

remains critical that all responsible parties ensure and remain vigilant that any 

requirements are met, as necessary, for the issuance of permits. 

A critical component of the APHIS VS ASF response strategy will rely on the 

establishment of control areas around infected domestic premises or infected feral 

swine locations to 1) prevent the virus from coming into contact with susceptible 

swine, 2) support response efforts by quarantine and movement controls with 

enhanced biosecurity, and 3) emphasize contact tracing. Movement controls 

provide entities the ability to make necessary movements without creating an 

unacceptable risk of disease spread. 

Table 4-7. Movement Controls: Permit Types during an FAD Incident

Specific Permits Continuity of Business Permits

Provide control and containment of the FAD 

outbreak for infected premises.

Facilitate continuity of business for non-infected 

premises which are inside the Control Area.

Provide biocontainment (keeping the 

disease on infected premises) and bio 

exclusion (keeping the disease out of noninfected premises).

For movements from at-risk premises or monitored 

premises.

Allow critical or essential movements:

1) to ensure animal welfare (e.g., feed 

trucks)

2) related to response activities like 

depopulation and disposal

Two types of COB permits:

1) Operational – for the non-infected premises to 

continue operations during an outbreak (e.g., 

equipment, service crews, and carcasses).

2) Production – used for movements of animals and 

animal products into the supply chain for feeding, 

growing, processing, or to market.

Specific requirements for ASF COB permits are described in Section 4.7. 

Permits and permitted movement outside the scope of the Control Area (in other 

words, not going into, within, or out of a Control Area) during an ASF outbreak 

are not captured in EMRS2 and should continue under regular authorities 

(Federal, State, and/or Tribal), using existing processes, procedures, and 

guidance. For a large scale ASF outbreak, States, APHIS, and industry continue to 

develop improved permit procedures and processes for Control Areas, premovement testing, and surveillance in the Free Area. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-22 

For general information and guidance on permitting, please refer to the document 

Permitted Movement FAD PReP (Manual 6-0). For more information on the 

permitted movement process, please refer to the ready reference guide here. 

Current country-specific requirements for the export of live animals and animal 

(by-)products can be accessed from the APHIS website. 

4.7 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS

COB manages movement for non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal 

products in a regulatory Control Area and facilitates movement, into, within, and 

out of a Control Area. COB provides science- and risk-based approaches and 

systems as a critical activity in an ASF response. This helps to facilitate 

agriculture and food industries in maintaining typical business, or returning to 

business during a disease response, while the risk of disease spread is effectively 

managed. COB planning can help to minimize unintended consequences on 

producers and consumers impacted by ASF while still achieving the goals of 

disease response. 

During an ASF outbreak, COB plans will be implemented to facilitate the 

managed movement of commodities and animals from At-Risk Premises and 

Monitored Premises existing within regulatory Control Areas, helping the swine 

industry to continue business operations. To ensure effective implementation of 

COB plans, they must be developed and exercised in advance of any outbreak. 

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Continuity of Business covers topics such as 

 preparedness and response goals, 

 key roles and responsibilities in COB planning, 

 details of COB as part of an FAD response, and

 potential components required for a COB plan. 

For more information on COB for an ASF outbreak, please refer to the Secure 

Pork Supply Plan located at www.securepork.org. 

4.7.1 COB Permits for Live Animal and Semen Movements 

Producers and federal and state officials recognize it is to all stakeholders’ benefit 

to create consistency and transparency through the development of national 

standardized permitting requirements for domestic movements. As of this 

publication, national guidance for domestic pigs/semen transfer movements and 

domestic pigs to slaughter is being finalized and will be placed on the FAD PReP 

website. Following is a description of the core principles of the permitting and 

testing requirements.
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-23 

The permit requirements listed below mitigate uncertainty in the likelihood of 

infection and disease spread associated with swine movement, with consideration 

including the following: frequency of movement of the specified swine type, the 

number of different destination premises swine from the same originating 

premises are moved to, the potential extent of continued disease spread, and 

variation in industry practices. 

In addition, the permit requirements introduce a pre-movement isolation period as 

a mitigation measure for each movement type to reduce the risk of disease 

exposure on a premises in the days leading up to the swine movement. Based on a 

within-herd ASF transmission model37, a pre-movement isolation period (PMIP) 

combined with pre-movement diagnostic testing decreases the risk of moving 

infected but undetected pigs from a premises, compared to implementing testing 

alone. The PMIP time period and testing frequency for each movement type was 

determined based on a protocol that balances increasing the probability of 

detecting ASF if present on the premises with logistical and operational needs for 

different swine production types to support continuity of business. 

4.7.1.1 ASF COB PERMIT AND PMIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROL AREAS

For specific movements, please see the posted document referenced above. 

Permit Requirements

1. The premises must meet the criteria for a Monitored Premises designation and 

have a premises identification number. A Monitored Premises objectively 

demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect 

Premises

2. The pre-movement isolation period is 5 days (for transfer movements; 3 days 

for movements to slaughter), during which biosecurity is heightened. 

3. Strict biosecurity requirements are listed for people or items crossing the line 

of separation and cleaning & disinfection of vehicles or items entering the 

site.

4. Movements on/off premises with appropriate biosecurity are described as 

Allowed—e.g., feed, essential personnel, emergency needs—or Prohibited—

e.g., live animals, mortality/ manure/ garbage removal, visitors, movement of 

non-critical equipment. 

37 Ssematimba et al. 2002 “African swine fever detection and transmission estimates using 

homogenous versus heterogenous model formulation in stochastic simulations within pig 

premises.” Open Vet J, Vol 12(6): 787-796 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-24

Testing priority (example for gilt transfer movement) 

1. Dead pigs

2. Sick pigs

3. Pigs in hospital/sick pens

4. General population

Testing at 3 days pre-movement and at 1 day pre-movement

Test all dead swine in each barn up to 31 samples. If testing of dead swine 

does not produce 31 samples for the barn, sample animals in accordance 

with the priority list above to meet the balance.

Traceability of testing

All samples must either be collected by an accredited veterinarian, or a 

Certified Swine Sample Collector approved by the appropriate state 

animal health official. The request for permit must include identification 

of who collected the sample.

Movement requirements

a. All trucks hauling live swine must be cleaned and disinfected after

delivery of swine. Cleaning and disinfection includes, but may not

be limited to, anything that has been in direct or indirect contact

with the swine (does include driver).

b. All movements under a permit must be completed within 48 hours

and reported to the state animal health official that approved the

permit.

5-day PMIP and test schedule—Most transfer movements

3-day PMIP and test schedule—Movements to slaughter
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-25

4.8 INFORMATION, REPORTING AND TASK MANAGEMENT

Information, reporting, and task management during an ASF incident or outbreak 

ensures that responders, stakeholders, and decision-makers have access to 

accurate and timely critical emergency response information. Ideally, Federal, 

State, Tribal, and local information management systems are compatible for 

information and data sharing. 

EMRS2 is the official USDA APHIS system of record in an ASF outbreak. It 

contains critical information, such as Infected Premises data, and provides 

automation for essential response processes (e.g., resources, and permitting). It is 

essential that EMRS2 contain accurate premises data prior to an incident to 

facilitate response efforts and devote resources to critical response tasks. States 

are strongly encouraged to import data before an ASF outbreak occurs.38 

During an animal health emergency or disease response, APHIS VS will perform 

a cadre of information, reporting, and task management activities consisting of 

incident coordination, response planning for high-priority FADs, reporting, and 

inter-agency coordination. The APHIS VS National Preparedness and Incident 

Coordination Center will develop, update, and coordinate concepts of operations, 

response plans, procedures, and guidance for an ASF response making 

information and task management duties essential for Federal, State, and local 

response activities. 

4.8.1 Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS) 

In an ASF outbreak, the goal is to have EMRS2 task management processes 

performed in 12-hour or shorter intervals. Timely submission of information will 

ensure an effective response. Information must be entered in both an accurate and 

consistent manner across widespread field operations; this is especially important 

when there is more than one ICP. If possible, it may be necessary and/or 

beneficial to centralize certain data-entry capabilities, particularly when field 

resources are stretched. Using EMRS2, USDA and State/Tribal officials will be 

able to manage an infected premises and its Control Area from the investigation 

period through quarantine release and Control Area release, with full transparency 

about where a premises stands in the response and recovery process. Appendix B 

provides an example workflow illustrating a broad overview of EMRS2 task 

management activities undertaken when response activities occur. 

Field personnel should be provided with access to mobile technology devices 

necessary for collecting, monitoring, and sharing information. EMRS2Go is a 

mobile application which enables rapid and straightforward data entry into 

38 States can refer to the EMRS2 webpage for more information, and more specifically, the 

guidance, Premises Data Transfer to EMRS2 from External/State Based Systems, which is located 

here: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/emergencymanagement/sa_emrs/ct_emrs. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-26 

EMRS2 from the field. Rapidly functional, robust, and scalable information 

technology infrastructure is needed during an ASF outbreak. 

4.8.2 Reporting 

Reporting plays an important role, not only in directing disease mitigation 

activities in the field for the unified IC, but also in resource allocation, budgeting, 

and internal and external communication regarding the incident. Reporting does 

not replace or supplant “communications.” Instead, reporting offers information 

and data on the incident that can be used for situational awareness and

communications materials, such as websites and press releases. 

Information entered in EMRS2 is used for internal and external situation reports 

produced daily, weekly, and as requested. It is also used to produce specific 

reports on key aspects of the response, such as permitting or deployments. Both 

the NIMT and ICG rely on EMRS2 for producing accurate reports during an 

outbreak. It is imperative in an ASF outbreak that information management and 

data integrity is a priority. 

Incident reports as required daily, weekly, or as requested by the VSDA for 

internal and external reporting purposes will consist of situation reports, summary 

list of infected premises, epidemiological, permitting and movements, 

conveyances, and deployment. Geographic Information System (GIS) maps, 

including ICG maps and public summary map books, are essential tools to ensure 

a rapid and coordinated National, regional, or local response effort. 

4.8.3 Information Management Systems and Tools 

In an ASF outbreak, there are key systems which help to facilitate response. 

These include the following: 

 EMRS2, the USDA APHIS official system of record for FAD 

investigations and response; 

 APHIS Response Information System (ARIS), managed by APHIS 

Dispatch personnel, used for requesting and deploying qualified 

personnel to the incident; 

 Laboratory Messaging System, which communicates (messages) 

laboratory results from NVSL and some NAHLN laboratories, 

including directly to EMRS2;39

39 Not all NAHLN laboratories currently have messaging capabilities. This is a high priority 

for USDA APHIS and the NAHLN laboratories.
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-27 

 Third party systems, such as State or industry information technology 

systems; and

 Third party analysis tools, such as ArcGIS and Tableau, are utilized to

tailor incident information for enhanced communication, illustration, 

and analyses. 

For more information on these aspects, please refer to the APHIS Foreign Animal 

Disease Framework: Incident Information Management and Reporting (FAD

PReP Manual 3-0). 

4.9 HEALTH & SAFETY AND PERSONAL 

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

Though ASF is not a threat to public health, responders may be exposed to other 

health hazards; prevention of adverse human health events related to emergency 

response efforts is very important. For general information, please see the 

NAHEMS Guidelines: Health and Safety and NAHEMS Guidelines: Personal 

Protective Equipment. In an incident, refer any health and safety questions or 

concerns to the Safety Officer or other designated response official. 

APHIS EMSSD provides services that support agency and interagency emergency 

management activities, and protect the health, safety, and security of APHIS and 

other USDA personnel. 

4.9.1 Mental Health Concerns 

The health and safety of all personnel is affected by the mental state of those 

involved in the ASF response effort. An ASF outbreak and associated response 

activities could have a significant psychological effect on both responders and 

owners of affected swine. Conducting or viewing depopulation and disposal 

operations can certainly cause mental distress. Tensions may run high, especially 

among small producers whose losses approach complete financial devastation and 

ruin. Incident Commanders should encourage responders to access mental health 

support; Safety Officers assigned to the ICPs are key resources for personnel. 

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has developed resources 

specifically for emergency and disaster responders, State and local planners, 

health professionals, and the general public at 

https://emergency.cdc.gov/coping/index.asp; additional general mental health 

information is here: www.cdc.gov/mentalhealth; a mobile disaster app for first 

responders available here: https://store.samhsa.gov/product/samhsa-disaster. 

APHIS employees can also find support through the Employee Assistance 

Program found here: http://www.foh4you.com/. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-28 

4.10 BIOSECURITY

Strict biosecurity measures are crucial to prevent or slow the spread of ASF.40

Owners, producers, veterinarians, and responders should observe strict biosecurity 

measures during an incident or suspected incident. Proper biosecurity during an 

ASF outbreak has two key functions: containing the virus on Infected Premises 

(biocontainment) and preventing the introduction of ASFV from the movement of 

personnel and fomites to naïve premises (bioexclusion). 

Preventing exposure of swine to ASFV in blood, fluids, carcasses, fomites and the 

environment is critical in preventing ASF transmission; this includes employing 

and enhancing vector control methods. Biocontainment and bioexclusion 

measures can also be implemented within a premises to slow or limit the spread 

between pens and buildings when ASF has been diagnosed; this can help facilitate 

control and containment activities.

APHIS acknowledges that identifying and depopulating infected or exposed feral 

swine may be difficult. As such, it is critical for producers to implement and 

maintain biosecurity measures that prevent contact between feral swine and 

domestic pigs. Producers should seriously reevaluate any outdoor production of 

pigs on premises that are in proximity to an Infected Premises or feral swine. 

An additional area of consideration is garbage feeding, which is regulated by 

APHIS; States determine whether or not to allow regulated garbage feeding 

within their State. During an ASF outbreak, APHIS and/or State officials may 

implement additional requirements or inspections related to garbage feeding. 

4.11 3D ACTIVITIES

3D activities include depopulation, disposal, and decontamination during an 

outbreak. Due to the nature of ASFV, 3D options may be limited; therefore, the 

supplemental 3D Guidance—Option Matrices and Considerations assists 

responders in determining the 3D alternatives during an outbreak. Note, that data 

are based on scientific research, and not necessarily based on field experience.

This guidance, the Carcass Management Dashboard, and other tools are available 

on the APHIS Carcass Management website. 

4.11.1 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia 

Mass depopulation and euthanasia are not synonymous, and APHIS recognizes a 

clear distinction. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as 

painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass depopulation is a method that gives as

much consideration to the welfare of animals as practicable, given extenuating 

circumstances. Mass depopulation will likely be employed in an ASF outbreak as 

40 Existing biosecurity producer plans are available online, such as SHIP and SPS. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-29 

a response measure to prevent or mitigate the spread of ASF through the 

elimination of infected or potentially infected swine in order to protect agriculture 

and the National economy. The United States recognizes this as a control and 

eradication strategy, as defined by international standards and the WOAH as 

“stamping-out” (refer to Section 3.3.1).

In an ASF outbreak, euthanasia or mass depopulation will be conducted in 

accordance with the AVMA’s guidance41 so that all affected swine are 

depopulated safely, quickly, efficiently, and humanely as possible. In addition, the 

emotional and psychological impact on animal owners, caretakers, their families, 

and other personnel should be minimized. 

The method of depopulation will depend on animal considerations, facility 

characteristics, method characteristics (practicality, reliability, irreversibility, and 

compatibility), personnel considerations, carcass considerations, equipment 

considerations, and the environment where the animals are maintained. With 

ASF, significant environmental contamination can result from blood and fluids 

from infected swine—this should also be considered when selecting depopulation 

(and disposal) methods. In all cases, euthanasia or depopulation activities must 

incorporate excellent biosecurity practices to control the ASFV and prevent 

further transmission. 

As a general goal, APHIS recommends that depopulation and disposal activities 

be completed as soon as possible after approval for indemnity payment. That said, 

identifying a specific depopulation response time goal is not an absolute 

requirement. Assessing possible depopulation and disposal of swine on any farm 

location will require proper planning and resources to ensure health and safety of 

the owner, grower and responders, and proper planning and resources will be 

needed to ensure animal welfare.

4.11.2 Disposal 

Proper disposal of animal carcasses and materials (e.g., bedding, feed) prevents or 

mitigates spread of ASFV. The goal is to conduct operations in a timely, safe, 

biosecure, acceptable, and environmentally responsible manner. Wastes requiring 

disposal may include carcasses, animal products, contaminated manure, litter, 

bedding, contaminated feed, contaminated personal protective equipment (PPE), 

and contaminated materials and equipment that cannot be cleaned and disinfected. 

Due to the persistent nature of ASFV, options for disposal are limited. For 

example, composting may not be feasible when there are large amounts of 

biomass; resources for rendering are currently limited. Burial poses significant 

challenges with environmental contamination and the ability of the ASFV to 

41 The AVMA Guidelines for the Depopulation of Animals support advance planning for 

possible emergency situations and provide guidance for making decisions during an emergency: 

https://www.avma.org/resources-tools/avma-policies/avma-guidelines-depopulation-animals. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

October 2023 4-30

persist in the environment. Each option has its own environmental, logistical, and 

managerial challenges. APHIS and State officials and subject matter experts will

collaborate to determine best approaches.

Disposal may involve other State and Federal agencies: USDA may coordinate 

with HHS, DHS, and/or the Environmental Protection Agency to provide 

technical assistance and guidance, in alignment with Federal, State, and local 

regulations. 

Refer to the FAD PReP Disposal SOP and the NAHEMS Guidelines: Disposal for 

more details.

4.11.3 Cleaning and Disinfection/Virus Elimination 

C&D is a general term describing a part of regular biosecurity operations (e.g., to 

disinfect vehicles). Cleaning is the removal of gross contamination, organic 

material, and debris via dry cleaning (sweeping) and/or wet cleaning (water and 

soap or detergent); disinfection destroys or eliminates the pathogen through heat 

or chemical means. A combination of methods may be required. 

In a disease response context, virus elimination refers to the C&D activities that 

are undertaken stepwise after depopulation and disposal in order to move towards 

restocking. Virus elimination is C&D with the primary purpose to destroy or 

eliminate ASFV on the premises as cost effectively as possible to prevent further 

spread. A virus elimination plan includes the area/materials undergoing C&D, 

methods, personnel, materials, supplies, equipment, and other relevant 

considerations. When performing virus elimination procedures, it is important to 

do so in the safest manner possible. The plan may also include the scientific 

rationale for virus elimination parameters, the process by which the premises will 

be evaluated and recorded as successfully cleaned and disinfected, specific 

protocols, and procedures for handling damaged private property due to C&D 

activities. Contingencies such as fallowing may be considered for premises that 

cannot undergo the C&D process. Specific C&D guidance for meat harvest 

establishments, rendering and spray dried blood / plasma facilities can be found in 

the ASF Response Plans suite (see Section 1.3.2.4.3) 

For more information on disinfectants approved for use against ASFV, see here. 

The document at this link is updated as needed. 

Further information can be found in the FAD PReP Cleaning and Disinfection 

SOP and in the NAHEMS: Cleaning and Disinfection. 

4.11.4 National Veterinary Stockpile Operations 

The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) provides key resources, equipment, and 

services for animal disease outbreaks in the United States. NVS has, and 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-31 

continues to, prioritize ASF preparedness activities. It is in the process of building 

an inventory of supplies and equipment, such as that listed below, to aid in a 

response to an ASF outbreak. 

• Diagnostic sampling supplies 

• Mobile incinerators 

• Electric stunners

• Captive bolt stunners and repair parts 

• Manual and automated swine carcass carts

• Carcass bags 

• Grinders

• Portable wash stations 

• PPE

• Swine handling equipment, such as hog snares and sorting panels

NVS can be reached by email, nvs@usda.gov; or in an emergency situation, call 

800-940-6524. 

4.12 APHIS WILDLIFE SERVICES

USDA APHIS works in close collaboration, communication, and coordination 

with DOI and other Federal, State, Tribal, and local wildlife agencies that have 

primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for wildlife, 

including feral swine. This collaboration, communication, and coordination 

occurs in both the unified IC as well as in Multiagency Coordination Groups 

when established. 

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Wildlife Management and Vector Control for an FAD 

Response in Domestic Livestock discusses personnel and equipment required for 

wildlife management, quarantine and movement control for wildlife, wildlife risk 

assessment, wildlife surveillance, and related activities. 

4.12.1 Feral Swine Management 

In any ASF response, epidemiologists and wildlife experts will need to quickly 

assess the presence of feral swine populations in or near the area of infection. 

ASFV can infect many different members of the Suidae family including wild 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-32 

boar which can be found in the United States. However, peccaries, which are also 

found in North America, are believed to be resistant to infection with ASFV. 

A wildlife management plan that addresses transmission of ASF in feral swine 

will need to be developed as soon as possible after identification of the index case 

in either domestic pigs or feral swine. This plan should aim to mitigate 

transmission pathways, preventing the exposure of domestic pigs and naïve feral 

swine populations to ASFV, ultimately preventing introduction to or eliminating 

ASF from feral swine populations. The decision to implement control measures in 

wildlife will be based on not only the risk assessment and surveillance, but also 

the feasibility of conducting successful control measures. In all cases, the wildlife 

management plan must be conducted within local laws and regulations, and 

management activities to control and eradicate ASF in feral swine must be 

conducted by trained personnel proficient in wildlife health, capture, restraint, 

biosecurity, and humane euthanasia. 

Additional operational details for implementing ASF response activities for feral 

swine in the field will be available on ASF FAD PReP website. 

4.12.1.1 MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

Management activities are based on the initial epidemiological assessment and 

may change as the outbreak evolves. ASF measures would include, but are not 

exclusive to 

 Feral swine population surveys, 

 ASF surveillance in feral swine populations, 

 Control measures, including removal of carcasses from the landscape 

as necessary,

 enhanced biosecurity measures to separate feral swine and domestic 

pigs, 

 stamping-out, and 

 population reduction. 

These specific measures will be conducted depending on the zone and area 

designation determined by the epidemiological assessment. Within the IZ, habitat 

manipulation, such as fencing, may be employed to limit feral swine dispersal and 

further dissemination of the virus. Feral swine reduction will occur systematically 

in an attempt to limit disturbance.

42 

42 Satran, P. (2019). African swine fever in the Czech Republic. Retrieved from 

https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/reg-com_ahw_20190225_asf_cze.pdf. 
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-33 

The BZ will also be subject to management activities, including feral swine 

population reduction. Heightened surveillance activities will assist in the detection 

of ASF in feral swine outside of the Control Area. The SZ will also employ 

carcass detection methods, in addition to trail camera monitoring, and periodic 

removal and sampling of feral swine populations for ASF testing. Outside of the 

SZ, activities would focus on enhanced public outreach to encourage reporting of 

sick or dead feral swine. Controlling and eliminating feral swine may be a 

difficult, resource-intensive activity. 

4.12.2 Vectors 

ASF can be transmitted by soft ticks (Ornithodoros spp.). The Ornithodoros spp. 

that have played a role in ASF persistence and reoccurrence of disease in Africa 

and Europe (Iberian Peninsula) – namely O. porcinus (of the O. moubata species 

complex) and O. erraticus – are not present in the United States.43,44 Some 

Ornithodoros spp. do exist in certain areas of the United States.

45 Currently, only 

three Ornithodoros spp. that are endemic in the United States (O. coriaceus, O. 

puertoricensis, and O. turicata) have experimentally been shown to become 

infected with ASFV and transmit the virus to swine.42 Depending on the species, 

these ticks remained infected with ASFV between 23 and 506 days. Based on 

records from the U.S. National Tick Collection database, only one collection 

record between 1891 and 2004 documented Ornithodoros spp. as associated with 

swine (O. coriaceus in Sonoma County, California).42 APHIS and State officials 

would need to assess if vectors are present in the Control Area and determine if

control measures are necessary and/or cost-effective. 

4.13 INDEMNITY AND COMPENSATION

4.13.1 Authority 

See AHPA, 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq., for the authority to pay claims for animals, 

articles, or means of conveyance that are destroyed. 

9 CFR 53 provides more information on the regulatory authority governing 

indemnity and compensation during an ASF outbreak. 

43 Sanchez-Vizcaino, J.M.; Mur, Lina; Bastos, Armanda D.S.; Penrith, Mary-Louise. 2015. 

New insights into the role of ticks in African swine fever epidemiology. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. 

Epiz. 34(2). 503-511.

44 Golnar, A. J., Martin, E., Wormington, J. D., Kading, R. C., Teel, P. D., Hamer, S. A., & 

Hamer, G. L. (2019). Reviewing the Potential Vectors and Hosts of African Swine Fever Virus 

Transmission in the United States. Vector borne and zoonotic diseases (Larchmont, N.Y.), 19(7), 

512–524. https://doi.org/10.1089/vbz.2018.2387. 

45 Brown, V. and Bevins, S. (2018). A review of African swine fever and the potential for 

introduction into the United States and the possibility of subsequent establishment in feral swine 

and native ticks. Front. Vet. Sci., 06. Vol 5.
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools

July 2023 4-34 

See Section 3.4.1 on APHIS’ authority for indemnity, upon confirmation of 

ASFV. 

4.13.2 Procedures 

State and APHIS officials must approve depopulation prior to its occurrence in 

order for producers to receive indemnity. This requires rapid communication 

between producer, company, State officials, APHIS and laboratory officials. 

Depopulation will occur after the USDA APHIS Appraisal & Indemnity Request 

Form is signed by appropriate parties. Every attempt will be made to collect 

inventory information and other required data as quickly as possible to ensure 

rapid depopulation as epidemiological circumstances require. 

Appraisal and compensation documents released by the ICG or the unified IC 

during an incident specify personnel responsibilities, appraisal procedures, 

assessment of compensation eligibility, payment of indemnity, and required forms 

and reports during an ASF outbreak. 

4.14 ANIMAL WELFARE

During an ASF outbreak, humane treatment must be provided to swine given the 

specific circumstances of the outbreak as prescribed by veterinary authorities of 

the affected States or Tribal nations. Humane care should be conducted during 

any type of movement standstill, and for infected animals until they are 

euthanized or depopulated. The Overview of Animal Welfare SOP contains 

additional information. 

4.15 VACCINATION

To date there is no treatment or commercially available, effective vaccine 

available for ASFV that meets requirements for emergency use in the United 

States, although significant advances in vaccine research continue to be made. 

The USDA Agricultural Research Service continues to work to develop a vaccine

that is both safe and effective for use. 
July 2023 5-1 

Chapter 5

Recovery

5.1 CRITERIA FOR PROOF OF FREEDOM

WOAH does not grant official recognition for ASF-freedom, but as a member of 

WOAH, the United States can self-declare the entire country, zone, or 

compartment free of ASF. Please refer to the most current WOAH Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code for provisions on ASF-freedom in a country or zone, 

compartment, establishment of a containment zone free from ASF, recovery of 

free status, and recommendations for importation of swine and swine products 

from countries not free of ASF. 

Trading partners will evaluate, on an individual or multilateral basis, all selfdeclarations from the United States for ASF-freedom both after an incident and 

for any regionalization activities that may occur during an incident. Trading 

partners determine whether to lift or modify trade restrictions based on 

information that is provided by the United States. 

5.2 WOAH TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH CODE

For the purposes of the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2022), there is a 

distinction between domestic and captive wild pigs, wild and feral swine, and 

African wild suid species. Per Article 15.1.2, “commodities of suids can be traded 

safely in accordance with the relevant articles of this chapter.” 

5.2.1 Article 15.1.4 Country or Zone Free from ASF 

1. Historical freedom 

A country or zone may be considered free from ASF without pathogen-specific 

surveillance if the provisions of Article 1.4.6 are complied with and commodities of 

suids are imported in accordance with the relevant articles of this chapter. 

2. Freedom in all suids 

A country or zone which does not meet the conditions of point 1) above may be 

considered free from ASF in all suids when it complies with all the criteria of Article 

15.1.3, especially point 7, and when: 

a. surveillance in accordance with Articles 15.1.28 to 15.1.33 has been in place 
Recovery

July 2023 5-2 

for the past three years;

b. there has been no case of infection with ASFV in domestic or captive wild

pigs during the past three years; this period can be reduced to 12 months 

when the surveillance has demonstrated no evidence of presence or 

involvement of Ornithodoros ticks;

c. commodities of suids are imported in accordance with the relevant articles of 

this chapter. 

3. Freedom in domestic and captive wild pigs 

A country or zone which does not meet the conditions of point 1) or point 2(b), i.e. 

when there are cases of infection with ASFV in feral or wild suids, may be 

considered free from ASF in domestic and captive wild pigs when it complies with 

all the criteria of Article 15.1.3, especially point 7, and when:

a. surveillance in accordance with Articles 15.1.28 to 15.1.33 has been in place 

for the past three years;

b. there has been no case of infection with ASFV in domestic or captive wild

pigs during the past three years; this period can be reduced to 12 months 

when the surveillance has demonstrated no evidence of presence or 

involvement of Ornithodoros ticks;

c. commodities of suids are imported in accordance with the relevant articles of 

this chapter. 

5.2.2 Article 15.1.7 Recovery of Free Status 

Should an outbreak of ASF occur in a previously free country or zone, its status may 

be restored three months after the disinfection of the last infected establishment, 

provided that:

1. a stamping-out policy has been implemented and, in the case where ticks are 

suspected or known to be involved in the epidemiology of the infection, has 

been followed by the use of sentinel pigs in the infected establishments for 

two months; 

2. surveillance in accordance with Article 15.1.31 has been carried out with 

negative results. 

Otherwise, the provisions of point 2) of Article 15.1.4 apply. 

The WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2022), Chapter 15.1, can be found 

here.
Recovery

July 2023 5-3 

5.3 RESTOCKING

During an ASF incident in the United States, APHIS and/or State officials will 

provide additional guidance for restocking previously Infected Premises, 

including any sentinel pig activities that may be required. A primary goal of the 

response is to ensure that response efforts do not cause more damage and 

disruption than the disease outbreak itself; however, caution is urged in restocking 

premises since re-infection strains resources and perpetuates the risk of ASF 

transmission. Depending on outbreak-specific circumstances, APHIS may not 

indemnify premises that are restocked without APHIS and State approval that 

subsequently become re-infected.

The total time in which it takes a premises to go from an IP with sick pigs, to a 

premises that has finished virus elimination, to a restocked premises is based on 

many factors, including: the type of premises, epidemiology of the outbreak, 

location of other ASF IPs, evidence provided to State and APHIS officials, and 

method of disposal. Restocking on previously IPs may take place before the end 

of the outbreak has been declared, under conditions established by the unified IC. 

For more specific guidance on restocking after ASF-infection, please refer to the 

ASF policy guidance and procedures that is provided on 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 
July 2023 A-1 

Appendix A 

Glossary

For the purposes of [Chapter 15.1 Infection With African Swine Fever Virus in the 

World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) Terrestrial Animal Health Code], a 

distinction is made among: 

• domestic and captive wild pigs, permanently captive or farmed free range, 

used for the production of meat, or other commercial products or use, or for 

breeding; 

• wild and feral pigs46; 

• African wild suid species.

All varieties of Sus scrofa are susceptible to the pathogenic effects of ASFV, while 

the African wild suids are not and may act as reservoirs of the virus. Ticks of the 

genus Ornithodoros are the only known natural arthropod hosts of the virus and act 

as reservoirs and biological vectors. 

Active Surveillance Surveillance where officials initiate the collection, collation, and 

analysis of animal health data to define the extent of disease, to detect 

new outbreaks, and to establish disease-free zones utilizing defined 

surveillance protocols. 

Animal product Blood or any of its components, bones, bristles, feathers, flesh, offal, 

skins, and any by product containing any of those components that 

originated from an animal or bird.

African swine fever 

(ASF) (WOAH)

An infection of suids with ASFV (From the WOAH Terrestrial Code, 

Chapter 15.1). ASFV has been isolated from samples from a suid; or 

antigen or nucleic acid specific to ASFV has been identified in 

samples for a suid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions 

suggestive or ASF or epidemiologically-linked to a suspected or 

confirmed case of ASF, or from a suid giving cause for suspicion of 

previous association or contact with ASFV; or antibodies specific to 

ASFV have been detected in samples from a suid showing clinical 

signs or pathological lesions consistent with ASF, or 

epidemiologically-linked to a suspected or confirmed case of ASF, or 

giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with 

ASFV. 

46 Feral/wild/free-ranging suids are also referred to as non-captive swine. 
Glossary

July 2023 A-2 

Backyard swine Domestic swine raised for food production and confined to a housing 

facility with access to the outdoors surrounded by a fence or other 

barrier.

Breeder swine Sexually intact swine over 6 months of age (from 9 CFR 71).

Case Any pig infected by ASFV, with or without clinical signs. 

Commercial swine Domestic swine raised for food production and confined to a housing 

facility designed to prevent exposure to feral swine. 

Continuity of 

Business 

The managed movement of non-infected animals and noncontaminated animal products from non-infected premises in an ASF 

outbreak. 

Control Area A Control Area (an Infected Zone and Buffer Zone) has individual 

premises quarantine for Infected Premises, Suspect Premises, and 

Contact Premises and movement restrictions for At-Risk Premises 

and Monitored Premises. 

Domestic pig Any swine species owned in a captive environment, whether the 

confinement is in a building or behind a fence or other barrier. 

Domestic pig may be further characterized as backyard swine or 

commercial swine.

Etiology The causes or origin of disease, or the factors that produce or 

predispose toward a certain disease or disorder.

Euthanasia (WOAH) The act of inducing death using a method that causes a rapid and 

irreversible loss of consciousness with minimum pain and distress to 

animal.

FAD PReP (Foreign 

Animal Disease 

Preparedness and 

Response Plan) 

Documents used to identify overall strategies, veterinary functions, 

organization, and countermeasures necessary to contain and control 

an FAD outbreak. It is also used to integrate functions and 

countermeasures with emergency management systems and 

operations conducted in joint and unified command by Federal, State, 

Tribal, and local personnel. 

Feeder swine Swine under 6 months of age that are not slaughter swine (from 9 

CFR 71).

Feral animal An animal of a domesticated species that lives without requiring 

human supervision or control (from WOAH Terrestrial Code 

Glossary). 

Feral swine Free-roaming swine (from 9 CFR 78). Feral swine are not domestic 

swine.

Fomites Inanimate objects that can transmit infectious agents from one animal 

or person to another. 

Foreign animal 

disease

A transboundary animal disease not known to exist in the U.S. animal 

population. 
Glossary

July 2023 A-3 

Germplasm Genetic material such as semen, embryos, tissues, and other DNA 

sequences maintained for the purposes of swine breeding.

Incubation period 

(WOAH)

For the purposes of the WOAH Terrestrial Code (2022) the 

incubation period for Sus scrofa (domestic and wild swine) shall be 

15 days. The incubation period is the longest period that elapses 

between the introduction of the pathogenic agent into the animal and 

the occurrence of the first clinical signs of the disease.

Index case The first or original case identified in a disease outbreak.

Lairage (WOAH) Pens, yards, and other holding areas used for accommodating animals 

in order to give them necessary attention (such as water, feed, rest) 

before they are moved on or used for a specific purpose including 

slaughter. 

Depopulation, Mass 

depopulation 

(AVMA)

Method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly 

and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of the 

animals as practicable, but where the circumstances and tasks facing 

those doing the depopulation are understood to be extenuating. 

Movement control Refers to the movement of people, animals, animal products, vehicles, 

and equipment in a specific area subject to certain criteria typically 

accomplished through a permit system. 

Movement standstill Temporary prohibition of the initiation of any new movement of 

susceptible species in a defined area. 

National Animal 

Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN)

NAHLN is a cooperative effort between two U.S. Department of 

Agriculture agencies and the American Association of Veterinary 

Laboratory Diagnosticians. It is a national network of State and 

University laboratories, which use common testing methods and 

software platforms to perform diagnostics and share information. 

Non-susceptible 

animal

Animal that does not develop a particular disease when exposed to the 

causative infectious agent of that disease. 

WOAH (World 

Organization for 

Animal Health) 

Organization that collects and publishes information on animal 

diseases from approximately 182 member countries and develops 

standards for animal health. 

Outbreak The occurrence of cases of a disease that are in excess of what is 

normally expected in a given population. 

Passive Surveillance The voluntary reporting of suspect cases by producers and 

practitioners.

Personal protective 

equipment (PPE) 

Clothing and equipment to prevent occupational injuries and diseases 

through control of exposure to potential hazards in the work place 

after engineering and administrative controls have been implemented 

to the fullest extent.
Glossary

July 2023 A-4 

Preemptive 

depopulation 

Depopulation under the competent authority of susceptible animal 

species in herds on premises that have been exposed to infection by 

direct animal-to-animal contact or by indirect contact of a kind likely 

to result in the transmission of ASFV prior to the expression of 

clinical signs. 

Premises A geographically and epidemiologically defined location, including a 

ranch, farm, stable, or other establishment. 

Quarantine Imposes restrictions on entering or leaving a premises, area, or region 

where disease exists or is suspected.

Sensitivity (WOAH) The proportion of infected sampling units that are correctly identified 

as positive. 

Slaughter swine Swine being sold or moved for slaughter purposes only (from 9 CFR 

71).

Specificity (WOAH) The proportion of uninfected sampling units that are correctly 

identified as negative. 

Stamping-out 

(WOAH)

A policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out under the 

authority of the Veterinary Authority the following: (a) the killing of 

the animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected 

in the herd or flock and, where appropriate, those in other herds or 

flocks which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to 

animal contact, or by indirect contact with the causal pathogenic 

agent; animals should be killed in accordance with Chapter 7.6; (b) 

the disposal of carcasses and, where relevant, animal products by 

rendering, burning or burial, or by any other method described in 

Chapter 4.13; (c) the cleansing and disinfection of establishments 

through procedures defined in Chapter 4.14. 

Susceptible animal Any animal that can be infected with and replicate the disease 

pathogen of concern. The susceptible animals of primary concern to 

this plan are swine.

Susceptible species See susceptible animal.

Targeted Surveillance A strategy that focuses on sampling premises or populations that may 

be at risk including sick pigs, and elevated mortality events with the 

purpose of enhancing vigilance for animal disease. 

Trace-back The identification of the origin and movements of all animals, animal 

products, conveyances, possible fomites, people, vehicles, and 

possible vectors from an Infected Premises to establish the original 

source of infection. 

Trace-forward The tracing of all animals, people, and fomites that have left Infected 

Premises and could have possibly transmitted ASF to a new premises. 

These premises should be investigated, evaluated, and placed under 

quarantine or other measures depending upon their risk. 
Glossary

July 2023 A-5 

Vector (WOAH) An insect or any living carrier that transports an infectious agent from 

an infected individual to a susceptible individual or its food or 

immediate surroundings. The organism may or may not pass through 

a development cycle within the vector.

Virus Elimination The cleaning and disinfection activities that are undertaken after 

depopulation and disposal with the primary purpose to destroy or 

eliminate all viruses on the premises as cost effectively as possible. 

Wildlife All free-ranging animals, including native and exotic wildlife species, 

as well as feral domestic animals in the United States. 

Wildlife reservoir A population of free ranging/free living species in which an infectious 

agent/vector has become established, lives, and multiplies and is 

therefore a potential source of infection/infestation to other domestic 

and free ranging species. 
June 2023 B-1 

Appendix B

Example Overview Emergency Management 

Response System 2.0 Workflow

Figure B-1 provides an example workflow illustrating a broad overview of the 

Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS2) data entry activities 

undertaken when ASF response activities occur. Disease management involves a 

dizzying array of activities, which are recorded and managed within EMRS2.
Example Overview Emergency Management Response System 2.0 Workflow

July 2023 B-2 

Figure B-1. EMRS2 Data Entry Example Workflow for an ASF Outbreak 
July 2023 C-1 

Appendix C

Abbreviations

3D depopulation, decontamination, and disposal 

AHPA Animal Health Protection Act

Ab antibody

Ab ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

AC Area Command

ACIA antigen capture immunoassay

AMT APHIS Management Team

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

ARIS APHIS Response Information System

ARP At-Risk Premises

AVMA American Veterinary Medical Association

ASF African swine fever

ASFV African swine fever virus

AVIC area veterinarian in charge

BZ Buffer Zone

C&D cleaning and disinfection

CEAH Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

COB continuity of business

CONUS Continental United States

CSSC Certified Swine Sample Collection

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States (VS DA)

DFA direct fluorescent antibody

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNA deoxyribonucleic acid

DOI Department of Interior 

EDTA Ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid

ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
 

July 2023 C-2 

EMRS2 Emergency Management Response System 2.0

EPC emergency preparedness committee

FAD foreign animal disease

FADD Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician 

FAD PReP Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

FADDL Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

FFS Federal-to-Federal support

FRS financial reimbursement specialist

FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service

GIS Geographic Information System

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HPAI highly pathogenic avian influenza

IC Incident Command 

ICG Incident Coordination Group

ICP Incident Command Post

ICS Incident Command System

IFA

IFAT

immunofluorescence assays 

indirect fluorescent antibody test 

IMT Incident Management Team

IP Infected Premises

IPT immunoperoxidase test

IZ Infected Zone

JIC Joint Information Center

LPA Legislative and Public Affairs

MAC Multiagency Coordination 

NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency Management System

NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network

NAMI North American Meat Institute

NIMS National Incident Management System

NIMT National Incident Management Team

NLRAD National List of Reportable Animal Diseases

NPIC National Preparedness and Incident Coordination
Abbreviations

July 2023 C-3 

NRF National Response Framework

NVS National Veterinary Stockpile

NVSL National Veterinary Services Laboratories 

NVSL-Ames National Veterinary Services Laboratories-Ames, IA

NVSL-FADDL National Veterinary Services Laboratories-Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostic Laboratory Plum Island, NY 

PCR polymerase chain reaction

PIO public information officer

PMIP pre-movement isolation period

PPE personal protective equipment

PZ Protection Zone

rRT-PCR real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction

SAHO State Animal Health Official

SDA Surveillance Design and Analysis

SHPA Swine Health Protection Act

SOP standard operating procedure

SPS Secure Pork Supply

SPWG Slaughter Plant Working Group

SZ Surveillance Zone

TBTB tris-buffered tryptose broth

TDD telecommunications device for the deaf

USAHA United States Animal Health Association

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

US SHIP U.S. Swine Health Improvement Plan

VI virus isolation

VS Veterinary Services

VSET VS Executive Team

WOAH World Organisation for Animal Health

WS Wildlife Services
July 2023 D-1 

Appendix D

Selected References and Resources

Note: all FAD PReP documents are also references to this USDA APHIS ASF Response 

Plan: The Red Book, which are located at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Literature Review: Non-animal Origin Feed Ingredients 

and the Transmission of Viral Pathogens of Swine. Risk Assessment Team. 

Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/non

-animal-origin-feed-ingredients-transmission-of-viral-pathogens.pdf. 

APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Non-animal origin feed ingredient risk evaluation 

framework: scoping. Risk Assessment Team. Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/nofi

-scope.pdf. 

APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Qualitative assessment of the likelihood of African Swine 

Fever Virus entry to the United States: entry assessment. Risk Assessment Team. 

Retrieved from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/asfentry.pdf. 

Brown, V. and Bevins, S. (2018). A review of African swine fever and the potential for 

introduction into the United States and the possibility of subsequent establishment 

in feral swine and native ticks. Front. Vet. Sci., 06. Vol 5. 

Dardiri A.H., Yedloutschnig R.J., & Taylor W.D. (1969). Clinical and serologic response 

of American white-collared peccaries to African swine fever, foot-and-mouth 

disease, vesicular stomatitis, vesicular exanthema of swine, hog cholera, and 

rinderpest viruses. Proc Annual Meeting U.S. Animal Health Assoc. 73, 437–52. 

European Food Safety Authority. (2018). Epidemiological analyses of African swine 

fever in the European Union. European Food Safety Authority Journal. 16(11), 

e05494. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5494. 

Golnar, A. J., Martin, E., Wormington, J. D., Kading, R. C., Teel, P. D., Hamer, S. A., & 

Hamer, G. L. (2019). Reviewing the Potential Vectors and Hosts of African 

Swine Fever Virus Transmission in the United States. Vector borne and zoonotic 

diseases (Larchmont, N.Y.), 19(7), 512–524. 

https://doi.org/10.1089/vbz.2018.2387 
Selected References and Resources

July 2023 D-2 

Guinat, C., Porphyre, T., Gogin, A., Dixon, L., Pfeiffer, D. U., & Gubbins, S. (2018). 

Inferring within-herd transmission parameters for African swine fever virus using 

mortality data from outbreaks in the Russian Federation. Transboundary and 

emerging diseases, 65(2), e264–e271. https://doi.org/10.1111/tbed.12748. 

Guinat, C., Gogin, A., Blome, S., Keil, G., Pollin, R., Pfeiffer, D.U., and Dixon, L. 

(2016). Transmission routes of African swine fever virus to domestic pigs: current 

knowledge and future research directions. Veterinary Record.178, 262-267. Doi: 

10.1136/vr.103593. 

Karl Ståhl, K., Sternberg-Lewerin, S., Blome, S., Viltrop, A., Penrith, M., Chenais, W. 

(2019). Lack of evidence for long term carriers of African swine fever virus - a 

systematic review, Virus Research, Vol 272. 

Kay, S. L., Fischer, J. W., Monaghan, A. J., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., Campbell, T. 

A., ... & Wisely, S. M. (2017). Quantifying drivers of wild pig movement across 

multiple spatial and temporal scales. Movement ecology, 5(1), 14. Doi: 

10.1186/s40462-017-0105-1. 

Kleiboeker, S.B. (2002). Swine fever: Classical swine fever and African swine fever. Vet 

Clin Food Anim. 18, 431–451. 

Lewis, J. S., Corn, J. L., Mayer, J. J., Jordan, T. R., Farnsworth, M. L., Burdett, C. L., ... 

& Miller, R. S. (2019). Historical, current, and potential population size estimates 

of invasive wild pigs (Sus scrofa) in the United States. Biological Invasions, 

21(7), 2373-2384. Doi: 10.1007/s10530-019-01983-1. 

Malladi S, Ssematimba A, Bonney PJ, St Charles KM, Boyer T, Goldsmith T, Walz E, 

Cardona CJ, Culhane MR. Predicting the time to detect moderately virulent 

African swine fever virus in finisher swine herds using a stochastic disease 

transmission model. BMC Vet Res. 2022 Mar 2;18(1):84. doi: 10.1186/s12917-

022-03188-6. 

Olesen, A.S., Lohse, L., Hansen, M.F., Boklund, A., Halasa, T., Belsham, G.J., ... 

Bodker, R. (2018). Infection of pigs with African swine fever virus via ingestion 

of stable flies (Stomoxys calcitrans). Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 65, 

1152–1157. 

Pepin, K. M., Brown, V. R., Yang, A., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., VerCauteren, K. 

C., Miller, R. S., & Bevins, S. N. (2022). Optimising response to an introduction 

of African swine fever in wild pigs. Transboundary and Emerging 

Diseases, 69, e3111– e3127. 

Pepin, K. M., Davis, A. J., Beasley, J., Boughton, R., Campbell, T., Cooper, S. M., ... & 

Wyckoff, C. (2016). Contact heterogeneities in feral swine: implications for 

disease management and future research. Ecosphere, 7(3), e01230. Doi: 

10.1002/ecs2.1230. 
Selected References and Resources

July 2023 D-3 

Petrov, A., Forth, J.H., Zani, L., Beer, M. & Blome, S. (2018). No evidence for long-term 

carrier status of pigs after African swine fever virus infection. Transboundary and 

Emerging Diseases. 65(5), 1318–1328. 

Podgórski, T., and Śmietanka, K. (2018). Do wild boar movements drive the spread of 

African swine fever? Transboundary and Emerging Diseases, 65(6), 1588–1596. 

Doi: 10.1111/tbed.12910. 

Sanchez-Vizcaino, J.M., Mur, L., & Martinez-Lopez, B. (2012). African Swine Fever: 

An Epidemiological Update. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 59(Suppl. 

1), 27–35. 

Satran, P. (2019). African swine fever in the Czech Republic. Retrieved from 

https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/regcom_ahw_20190225_asf_cze.pdf. 

Ssematimba A, Malladi S, Bonney PJ, St Charles KM, Boyer TC, Goldsmith T, Cardona 

CJ, Corzo CA, Culhane MR. African swine fever detection and transmission 

estimates using homogeneous versus heterogeneous model formulation in 

stochastic simulations within pig premises. Open Vet J. 2022 Nov-Dec;12(6):787-

796. doi: 10.5455/OVJ.2022.v12.i6.2.

Tabak, M. A., Piaggio, A. J., Miller, R. S., Sweitzer, R. A., & Ernest, H. B. (2017). 

Anthropogenic factors predict movement of an invasive species. Ecosphere, 8(6), 

e01844. Doi: 10.1002/ecs2.1844.

World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH). (2021). Technical Disease Card, 

African swine fever. www.woah.int. 

World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH). (2022). Article 15.1.1, Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code. www.woah.int.