UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4221

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DAVID LAMONT HENSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg, 

District Judge. (1:07-cr-00053-LHT-1) 

Submitted: November 2, 2009 Decided: November 13, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States 

Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 David Lamont Henson appeals his convictions and 

concurrent sentences of fifty-seven months’ imprisonment 

following his guilty plea to two counts of possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On 

appeal, Henson argues that the checkpoint stop leading to the 

seizure of evidence against him was unconstitutional.* Finding 

no reversible error, we affirm. 

 On September 12, 2006, officers working in the central 

patrol district in Asheville, North Carolina, decided to conduct 

a license checkpoint at a five-way intersection in a primarily 

commercial area that had generated significant complaints and 

traffic violations. The checkpoint was approved by supervisors 

and conducted pursuant to a Special Operations Plan (“SOP”) that 

gave the officers authority to direct patrols in designated 

challenge areas defined by traffic violations or community 

complaints. Approximately seven marked police cruisers and 

officers wearing reflective vests were present at the 

checkpoint. All vehicles passing through the intersection were 

stopped to verify license and vehicle registration information. 

 *

 Henson’s plea agreement reserved his right to appeal the 

denial of his motion to suppress. 

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 In accordance with the SOP of stopping each vehicle 

that passed through the intersection, Traffic Safety Officer Don 

Eberhardt stopped a van driven by Monica Davis. Upon inquiring 

for a driver’s license from Davis, the officer noticed an open 

container of beer in the center console. Davis did not produce 

a driver’s license, for which she later received a citation. 

When Officer Eberhardt questioned Davis, the front seat 

passenger, Henson, repeatedly interfered with the conversation, 

attempting to answer questions posed to Davis. 

 Officer Eberhardt instructed Davis to accompany him to 

the rear of the van and ordered Henson to place and keep his 

hands on the dash. As Officer Eberhardt was speaking with 

Davis, he observed Henson furtively place an unknown item under 

the front passenger seat. Concerned about the presence of 

contraband or a weapon, Officer Eberhardt ordered Henson to exit 

the van. A pat-down search of Henson revealed 167 tablets of 

methadone and a .22 caliber pistol. A search of the van 

revealed a modified shotgun under the front passenger seat. A 

subsequent search of Henson’s house executed pursuant to a pretrial release warrant uncovered additional firearms. 

 Henson filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence 

seized during the checkpoint stop and subsequent search of his 

home, contending the checkpoint was unconstitutional. Pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006), the district court referred the 

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suppression matter to a magistrate judge. Following a 

suppression hearing, the magistrate judge recommended denying 

the motion. After considering Henson’s objections to the 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court 

adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied the 

motion to suppress. 

 On appeal, Henson contends the vehicle checkpoint stop 

was a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against an 

unreasonable search and seizure. We review the factual findings 

underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error 

and the legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Johnson, 

400 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2005). We construe the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the Government, the prevailing party 

below. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 

1998). 

 Stopping a vehicle at a checkpoint constitutes a 

seizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 

Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 

(1990). “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the 

absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” City of 

Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). However, the 

Supreme Court has recognized “limited circumstances in which the 

usual rule does not apply.” Id. With respect to roadblocks, 

the Supreme Court has upheld a suspicionless seizure at a 

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checkpoint aimed at intercepting illegal immigrants, United

States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976), and a 

sobriety checkpoint aimed at combating drunk driving, Sitz, 496 

U.S. at 455. In addition, the Supreme Court has suggested in 

dicta that a roadblock to question all oncoming traffic to 

verify drivers’ licenses and vehicle registration with the 

interest of serving highway safety would be permissible under 

the Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 

(1979). However, checkpoints set up for general crime 

prevention, including drug interdiction, do not pass 

constitutional muster under the Fourth Amendment. Edmond, 531 

U.S. at 41-42; see also United States v. Morales-Zamora, 974 

F.2d 149, 151-53 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that stop at drivers’ 

license checkpoint was invalid because it was a pretext to check 

for drugs). 

 This court has noted with approval a traffic safety 

stop in which police checked drivers’ licenses and 

registrations. See United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 357 

(4th Cir. 2000) (observing that “courts have concluded that a 

brief stop at a checkpoint for the limited purpose of verifying 

a driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance 

is a reasonable intrusion into the lives of motorists and their 

passengers even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a 

motorist or passenger is engaged in illegal activity”). Other 

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courts have upheld similar checkpoints. United States v. 

Fraire, 575 F.3d 929, 932-35 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 1998); United 

States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1310-13 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 

abrogated in part by United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 981 

(D.C. Cir. 2001). 

 In determining the constitutionality of a checkpoint, 

the court must inquire into both the primary purpose and the 

reasonableness of the checkpoint. If the primary purpose of the 

checkpoint was to advance “the general interest in crime 

control,” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48, it is per se invalid under the 

Fourth Amendment. United States v. Faulkner, 450 F.3d 466, 469-

70 (9th Cir. 2006); Mills v. Dist. of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 

1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009). If the primary purpose was valid, the 

court must then judge the checkpoint’s reasonableness on the 

basis of individual circumstances. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 

U.S. 419, 426 (2004). This requires balancing “‘the gravity of 

the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which 

the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of 

the interference with individual liberty.’” Id. at 420, 427 

(quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). Factors to 

weigh intrusiveness include whether the checkpoint: (1) is 

clearly visible; (2) is part of some systematic procedure that 

strictly limits the discretionary authority of police officers; 

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and (3) detains drivers no longer than is reasonably necessary 

to accomplish the purpose of checking a license and 

registration, unless other facts come to light creating a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. McFayden, 865 F.2d 

at 1311-12 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 

U.S. at 558-59; Brown, 443 U.S. at 51). 

 With this framework in mind, after reviewing the 

parties’ briefs and the materials submitted in the joint 

appendix, we find the district court did not err in accepting 

the recommendation of the magistrate judge and in concluding 

that the primary purpose of the checkpoint was not general crime 

control, but rather to promote traffic safety by allowing police 

to check drivers’ licenses and vehicle registration. The 

court’s reasonableness determination with respect to the 

checkpoint is also sufficiently supported by the record. 

Therefore, the district court properly denied Henson’s motion to 

suppress on the ground that the checkpoint stop did not violate 

Henson’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Henson’s convictions and 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED