# C_2019065EN.01003001.xml

| 18.2.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 65/30 |
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18.2.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/30

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Appeal brought on 21 December 2018 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 24 October 2018 in Case T-29/17, RQ v Commission

(Case C-831/18 P)

(2019/C 65/38)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: J.-P. Keppenne, J. Baquero Cruz, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: RQ

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) of 24 October 2018 in Case T-29/17, in so far as it annuls Commission Decision C(2016) 1449 final of 2 March 2016 concerning a request to waive RQ’s immunity from legal proceedings; |
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set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) of 24 October 2018 in Case T-29/17, in so far as it annuls Commission Decision C(2016) 1449 final of 2 March 2016 concerning a request to waive RQ’s immunity from legal proceedings;

| — | dismiss the application for annulment brought by the respondent to the appeal before the General Court of the European Union and give a final ruling on the questions which form the subject-matter of the present appeal or, if the state of the proceedings does not permit judgment to be given by the Court, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment; |
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dismiss the application for annulment brought by the respondent to the appeal before the General Court of the European Union and give a final ruling on the questions which form the subject-matter of the present appeal or, if the state of the proceedings does not permit judgment to be given by the Court, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment;

| — | order the applicant at first instance to pay the costs incurred by the Commission both at first instance and in the present appeal. |
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order the applicant at first instance to pay the costs incurred by the Commission both at first instance and in the present appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the Commission relies on three grounds of appeal:

| 1. | First, unlike the General Court, the Commission considers that the decision to waive immunity does not constitute an act adversely affecting the applicant and cannot therefore be the subject of an action for annulment. The judgment under appeal is therefore vitiated by an error in law in so far as it holds the application admissible. |
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1.

First, unlike the General Court, the Commission considers that the decision to waive immunity does not constitute an act adversely affecting the applicant and cannot therefore be the subject of an action for annulment. The judgment under appeal is therefore vitiated by an error in law in so far as it holds the application admissible.

| 2. | Secondly, the Commission considers that the judgment under appeal incorrectly interprets the right to be heard, enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in that it is based on a misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 4(3) TEU (principle of cooperation in good faith) and the general principle of mutual confidence and trust between EU bodies and the authorities of the Member States. |
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2.

Secondly, the Commission considers that the judgment under appeal incorrectly interprets the right to be heard, enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in that it is based on a misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 4(3) TEU (principle of cooperation in good faith) and the general principle of mutual confidence and trust between EU bodies and the authorities of the Member States.

| 3. | Thirdly, the Commission considers that the General Court erred in law in the characterisation of the Commission’s conduct in the present case by considering that the Commission did not adequately respect the applicant’s right to be heard. |
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3.

Thirdly, the Commission considers that the General Court erred in law in the characterisation of the Commission’s conduct in the present case by considering that the Commission did not adequately respect the applicant’s right to be heard.

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