alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6258

CHRISTOPHER A. WOODY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN ROBERT STEVENSON,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Charleston. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District Judge. (2:15-cv-02574-MBS)

Submitted: August 31, 2017 Decided: October 31, 2017

Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jeremy A. Thompson, LAW OFFICE OF JEREMY A. THOMPSON, LLC, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Caroline M. Scrantom, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General,

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Christopher A. Woody seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(2012) petition.1

 The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that 

the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition 

states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Woody has not 

made the requisite showing.2 Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and 

 1 Although Woody’s notice of appeal identifies both the district court’s opinion 

and order granting Respondent’s motion for summary judgment and the court’s order 

denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, Woody’s informal brief challenges only the 

court’s reasoning in the opinion and order granting summary judgment. Accordingly, we 

limit our review to that opinion and order. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b).

2 With respect to Woody’s claim that his trial counsel failed to introduce certain 

documents at a pretrial suppression hearing, we conclude that Woody has waived 

appellate review of the claim by failing to file specific objections to the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation on that claim after receiving proper notice. See Wright v. 

(Continued)
3

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

 

Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985).
22400

#### Silva v. County of Hawaii, Dept. of Public Works

Affirmed
#### Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al., Appellants, *v.*Donglas.

Argued April 30, 1943.

Before Keller, P. J., Bald-rige, Stadteeld, Rhodes, Hirt, Kenworthey and Reno, JJ.

*John 8. Van Kwh,*for appellants.

*Clyde P. Bailey,*of *Bailey & Critehfield,*with him *Meredith B. Marshall,*for appellee.

July 16, 1943:

Per Curiam,

Defendant was for three years — from February 14, 1933 to February 14, 1936 — Secretary-Treasurer of the General Committee of Adjustment of the Baltimore Division of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. After the expiration of his term, the auditors of his accounts reported a shortage of $2,268.25. Certain credits totalling $234.00 reduced this amount to $2,034.25. This action was brought to recover that amount with *444interest. The real party in interest is the bonding company which paid the alleged loss to the Brotherhood.

Plaintiffs introduced evidence to show that as soon as the alleged shortages were discovered defendant was confronted with and in numerous conferences admitted them; that on March 6, 1936, he wrote a letter to Holder, his successor in office, expressly acknowledging he owed a balance to the Brotherhood, but that “as explained to you, I am not in a position at the present time to make final transfer of such funds as go to make up the 'balance, but will do so at an early date as possible;” and that on March 11, 1936, he “O.K.ed,” by his signature in the margin, a letter addressed to the General Chairman of the Brotherhood which referred to a conference between a representative of the bonding company, defendant, and the writer of the letter, in which defendant admitted the shortage and claimed the credits which were ultimately allowed him. It was on the basis of this conference and defendant’s written approval on the margin of the letter that the bonding company, without making further investigation, paid the claim.

As opposed to this overwhelming evidence of defendant’s liability, he simply denied that he owed the Brotherhood any sums of money and, although admitting his signature in the margin of the letter of March 11th and the authenticity of the letter of March 6th, he offered flimsy and incredible explanations. He produced no books; he testified that he had hidden them in the cellar of his home shortly after the charges against him were preferred, and that: “To the best of my knowledge they were destroyed in the flood. I don’t know what else became of them.”

We agree that the court below properly refused to give binding instructions for the plaintiffs. And although we are reluctant to reverse an order refusing a motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence, we are of opinion that in this case the verdict *445represents a serious miscarriage of justice *(Furer v. May, Jr., 115*Pa. Superior Ct. 28, 174 A. 630) and that the lower court abused its discretion.

The judgment is vacated and a new trial granted.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, United States Chief Judge for the **

District of Idaho, sitting by designation.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision ***

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAWTIS DONALD RHODEN,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

STEPHEN W. MAYBERG, Director of

The California Dept. of Mental Health; et

al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 11-15235

D.C. No. 1:07-cv-01151-BLWLMB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding**

Submitted May 15, 2012***

Before: CANBY, GRABER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

FILED

MAY 25 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-15235

Lawtis Donald Rhoden, who is civilly committed in California as a sexually

violent predator, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment

rights by failing to provide greater access to a smoke-free outdoor exercise area

between 2006 and 2008. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

de novo a district court’s dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. Kwai Fun

Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 966 n.18 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Rhoden’s action after concluding that

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the law regarding the right

of civil detainees to regular smoke-free outdoor exercise was not clearly

established. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (“For a constitutional

right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hannibal X. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-30251.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Aug. 17, 2005.

Michael J. Jefferson, U.S. Attorney’s, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Hannibal X. Brown, Scotlandville, LA, pro se.

Before BENAVIDES, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Counsel appointed to represent Hannibal X. Brown has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief as required by *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Brown has filed a response and requested the appointment of substitute counsel.

Our independent review of the brief, Brown’s response, and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the appeal is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2. *49Brown’s motion to appoint substitute counsel is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Distribution Transformers Test Procedure Rulemaking

How to Submit Comments

The Department will accept written comments, data, and information regarding the Test

Procedure SNOPR after the public meeting, but no later than November 8, 2004. See section

IV.D, "Submission of Comments," of the Federal Register document for details. 69 FR 45520

(July 29, 2004)

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number EE-TP-98-550 and/or

RIN 1904-AA85, by any of the following methods:

® E-mail: DistTransformerTP-SNOPRc ee.doe.gov Include EE-TP-98-550 and/or RIN

1904-AA85 in the subject line of the message.

® Mail: Ms. Brenda Edwards-Jones, U.S. Department of Energy, Building Technologies

Program, Mailstop EE-2J, SNOPR for Distribution Transformers, EE-TP-98-550 / RIN

1904-AA85, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC, 20585-0121. Please

submit one signed original.

® Hand Delivery/Courier: Ms. Brenda Edwards-Jones, U.S. Department of Energy,

Building Technologies Program, Room 1J-018, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW,

Washington, DC, 20585. Telephone: (202) 586-2945. Please submit one signed original.

Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name and docket number

or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. For detailed instructions on

submitting comments and additional information on the rulemaking process, see section IV of

the Federal Register document (Public Participation). 69 FR 45519 (July 29, 2004)

Docket: For access to the docket, to read background documents or comments received,

go to the U.S. Department of Energy, Forrestal Building, Room IJ-018 (Resource Room of the

Building Technologies Program), 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC, (202) 586-

9127, between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Please

call Ms. Brenda Edwards-Jones on (202) 586-2945 for additional information regarding visiting

the Resource Room. Please note: The Department's Freedom of Information Reading Room

(formerly Room IE-190 at the Forrestal Building) is no longer housing rulemaking materials.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

WEBSITE:

http://www.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliancestandards/commercial/distribution transformers.html

CONTACT: Cyrus Nasseri, U.S. Department of Energy , Office of Energy Efficiency and

Renewable Energy, Building Technologies Program , EE-2J, 1000 Independence Avenue SW.,

Washington, DC, 20585-0121, (202) 586-9128 Email : cyrus.nasseri@ee.doe. ov.

Francine Pinto, Esq., or Thomas B. DePriest, Esq., U.S. Department of Energy , Office of

General Counsel, Forrestal Building, Mail Station GC-72, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, DC, 20585, (202) 586-9507. E-mail : Francine .Pinto@hq.doe.gov or

Thomas.DePriestna hq doe.gov.

EE-TP-98-550 COMMENT 45.3
# C_2019044EN.01007102.xml

| 4.2.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 44/71 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.2.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 44/71

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 25 October 2018 — Laboratoire Pareva v Commission

(Case T-337/18 R II)

((Interim relief - Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 - Biocidal products - Active substance PHMB (1415; 4.7) - Approval refused - Application for interim measures - New application - No new facts - Inadmissibility))

(2019/C 44/94)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Laboratoire Pareva (St. Martin de Crau, France) (represented by: K. Van Maldegem and S. Engelbert, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: R. Lindenthal and K. Mifsud-Bonnici, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application pursuant to Articles 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU seeking, first, suspension of operation of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/619 of 20 April 2018 not approving PHMB (1415; 4.7) as an existing active substance for use in biocidal products of product-types 1, 5 and 6 (OJ 2018 L 102, p. 21), and, secondly, the adoption of any other appropriate interim measure.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The costs are reserved.

---
# C_2019004EN.01001301.xml

| 7.1.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 4/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.1.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 4/13

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 10 October 2018 — Fonds du logement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale SCRL v Institut des Comptes nationaux (ICN)

(Case C-632/18)

(2019/C 4/17)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Société coopérative à responsabilité limitée ‘Fonds du logement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale’

Opposing party: Institut des Comptes nationaux (ICN)

Questions referred

| 1. | Are paragraphs 2.22, 2.23, 2.27, 2.28 and 20.33 of Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the European system of national and regional accounts [in the European Union] (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a separate institutional entity placed under government control must be regarded as being non-market and thus falling within the general government sector where it has the characteristics of a captive financial institution, there being no need to examine its risk exposure? |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Can an entity operating under government control be regarded as being a captive financial institution within the meaning of paragraphs 2.21 to 2.23, 2.27 and 2.28 of Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the European system of national and regional accounts [in the European Union]:






  (a) | on the ground that the regulation of its activity by the government in question removes from it control over its assets, even though it is afforded the capacity to decide to grant the mortgage loans which it provides, their duration, their amount and some of their conditions, whilst at the same time the government determines other factors, and in particular the interest rate applied to the loans; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

(a)

on the ground that the regulation of its activity by the government in question removes from it control over its assets, even though it is afforded the capacity to decide to grant the mortgage loans which it provides, their duration, their amount and some of their conditions, whilst at the same time the government determines other factors, and in particular the interest rate applied to the loans;

| (b) | on the ground that, inter alia, the guarantee given to it by government in respect of the loans taken out by it removes from it control over its liabilities, without examining the purpose and the effects of such a guarantee in the light of its features in the present case and of the underlying economic reality? |
| --- | --- |

(b)

on the ground that, inter alia, the guarantee given to it by government in respect of the loans taken out by it removes from it control over its liabilities, without examining the purpose and the effects of such a guarantee in the light of its features in the present case and of the underlying economic reality?

---

(1)  OJ 2013 L 174, p. 1.

---
### C OURT OF 

### A PPEALS FOR THE



### F IRST 

### D ISTRICT OF 

### T EXAS AT 

### H OUSTON



### O RDER ON 

### M OTION

Cause Number: 01

- 11

- 00701

- CV

Trial Court Cause

Number: 11DCV187301

Style: Glenn Blair

v Angela McClinton

Date motion filed * : August 26, 2013

Type of motion: M otion to post to web

Par ty filing motion: A ppellant, Glenn Blair

Document to be filed:

Is appeal accelerated? YES NO

Ordered that motion is:

Granted

If document is to be filed, d ocument due:

Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court will not grant additional motions to extend time

Denied

Dismissed ( e.g. , want of jurisdiction, moot)

Other:

Judge's signature: /s/ E velyn V . K eyes

Acting individually Acting for the C ourt

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Huddle.

Date: October 1, 201 3
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**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATE OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER**

Pursuant to Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18 United StatesCode

 

The undersigned, being thePrincipal Financial Officer of Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., (the“Partnership”), hereby certifies that the Partnership’s Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003, filed with the UnitedStates Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d), fully complieswith the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Partnership.

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed formwithin the electronic version of this written statement required by Section906, has been provided to the Partnership and will be retained by thePartnership and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 

 

Date: August 14, 2003

 

 
| */s/*  | *Mark A. Maki*                                            |   |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
|   | Mark A. Maki                                              |
|   | Vice  President, Finance and  Principal Financial Officer |

 

----
April 24, 1997

17447

#### Gray v. A.J. Lopez Sons, Inc.

Affirmed
(1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/ Paula J. MeilerPaula J. MeilerSenior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer 
 *
    
    This certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a -14(b) under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States
Code, and shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise
subject to the liability of that section. This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated
by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except as
otherwise stated in such filing.
# C_2018166EN.01003701.xml

| 14.5.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 166/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.5.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/37

---

Action brought on 2 March 2018 — UE v Commission

(Case T-148/18)

(2018/C 166/47)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: UE (represented by: S. Rodrigues and A. Champetier, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision adopted by the Commission on 20 November 2017 rejecting her complaint related to a request for compensation of the damage suffered by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision adopted by the Commission on 20 November 2017 rejecting her complaint related to a request for compensation of the damage suffered by the applicant;

| — | grant the compensation of the moral prejudice suffered by the fault of the defendant, evaluated at the sum of 10 000 euros and; |
| --- | --- |

—

grant the compensation of the moral prejudice suffered by the fault of the defendant, evaluated at the sum of 10 000 euros and;

| — | order the reimbursement of the applicant’s incurred costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the reimbursement of the applicant’s incurred costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging the violation by the defendant of the principle of sound administration and of Article 41 of the Charter on the principle of reasonable delay. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging the violation by the defendant of the principle of sound administration and of Article 41 of the Charter on the principle of reasonable delay.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging the respect by the applicant of the principle of reasonable delay in the submission of the request for assistance. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the respect by the applicant of the principle of reasonable delay in the submission of the request for assistance.

---
#### State v. Kahui

18797

2/24/97

Vacated and Remanded
#### Jimmie J. CROW, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A-12383.

Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 2, 1957.

Charles W. Jennings, Lawton, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

JONES, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal by Jimmie J. Crow from a conviction sustained in the County Court of Comanche County for the offense of driving an automobile oñ U. S. Highway 277 while under the influence of intoxicating liquor wherein the accused was sentenced to serve a term of 10 days in the county jail and to pay a fine of $250 and costs.

The evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and no errors were found.

Affirmed.

BRETT and POWELL, JJ., concur.
20027

#### State v. Jensen

Affirmed