FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THE ESTATE OF CARSON BRIDE, 

by and through his appointed 

administrator KRISTIN BRIDE; A. 

K., by and through her legal guardian 

Jane Doe 1; A. C., by and through her 

legal guardian Jane Doe 2; A. O., by 

and through her legal guardian Jane 

Does 3; TYLER CLEMENTI 

FOUNDATION, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly 

situated, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

YOLO TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 23-55134 

D.C. No. 

2:21-cv-06680-

FWS-MRW 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Fred W. Slaughter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 11, 2024

Pasadena, California

Filed August 22, 2024
2 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

Before: Eugene E. Siler,* Carlos T. Bea, and Sandra S. 

Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Siler

SUMMARY**

Communications Decency Act

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of 

plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims and affirmed the district 

court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ products liability claims in 

their diversity class action alleging that YOLO Technologies 

violated multiple state tort and product liability laws by 

developing an anonymous messaging app which promised to 

unmask bullying and abusive users, but YOLO never 

actually did so. 

The district court held that § 230 of the Communications 

Decency Act—which protects apps and websites which 

receive content posted by third-party users from liability for 

any content posted on their services—immunized YOLO 

from liability on plaintiffs’ claims and dismissed the 

complaint. 

Reversing the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ 

misrepresentation claims, the panel held that the claims 

*The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 3

survived because plaintiffs seek to hold YOLO accountable 

for its promise to unmask or ban users who violated the 

terms of service, and not for a failure to take certain 

moderation actions.

Affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ 

products liability claims, the panel held that § 230 precludes 

liability because plaintiffs’ product liability theories attempt 

to hold YOLO liable as a publisher of third-party content.

COUNSEL

Juyoun Han (argued), Eric M. Baum, Andrew Clark, and 

Jonathan Axel, Eisenberg & Baum LLP, New York, New 

York, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Ramnik S. Pujji (argued), Carol Yur, and Emma Moralyan, 

Dentons US LLP, Los Angeles, California, for DefendantAppellee.

Megan Iorio and Tom McBrien, Electronic Privacy 

Information Center, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae 

Electronic Privacy Information Center and Fairplay.

OPINION

SILER, Circuit Judge:

Appellee YOLO Technologies developed an extension 

for use on the Snapchat application (“app”) which allowed 

users to ask public questions and send and receive 

anonymous responses. YOLO informed all users that it 

would reveal the identities of, and ban, anyone who engaged 
4 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

in bullying or harassing behavior. Appellants, three living 

minor children and the estate of a fourth, all suffered extreme 

harassment and bullying through YOLO resulting in acute 

emotional distress, and in the case of Carson Bride, death by 

suicide. They brought this diversity class action alleging that 

YOLO violated multiple state tort and product liability laws 

by developing an anonymous messaging app which 

promised to unmask, and thereby prevent, bullying and 

abusive users, but YOLO never actually did so.

The district court held that § 230 of the Communications 

Decency Act immunized YOLO from these claims and 

dismissed the complaint. We affirm and reverse in part, 

holding that § 230 bars Plaintiffs’ products liability claims 

but not their misrepresentation claims. 

I.

A.

YOLO Technologies developed their app as an extension 

upon the already-popular Snapchat app. Marketed mainly 

toward teenagers in mobile app stores, YOLO achieved 

tremendous popularity, reaching the top of the download 

charts within a week of its launch. It eventually reached ten 

million active users. 

Anonymity was YOLO’s key feature. Users would 

install the app and use it to post public questions and polls 

for their followers. Other users, also using YOLO, could 

respond to the questions or polls anonymously, unless they 

chose to “swipe up” and voluntarily disclose their identity as 

part of their answer. Without such voluntary revelation, the 

recipient would not know the responder’s account nickname, 

user information, or any other identifying data. 
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 5

Anonymous messaging applications, even ones 

marketed specifically to teens, are not new inventions. 

Plaintiffs contend that “it [has] long been understood that 

anonymous online communications pose a significant 

danger to minors, including by increasing the risk of bullying 

and other antinormative behavior.” In fact, prior 

applications with anonymous communication features had 

caused “teenagers [to] take[] their own lives after being 

cyberbullied.” 

As a hedge against these potential problems, YOLO 

added two “statements” to its application: a notification to 

new users promising that they would be “banned for any 

inappropriate usage,” and another promising to unmask the 

identity of any user who “sen[t] harassing messages” to 

others. But, Plaintiffs argue, with a staff of no more than ten 

people, there was no way YOLO could monitor the traffic of 

ten million active daily users to make good on its promise, 

and it in fact never did. Many user reviews of the YOLO 

app on Apple’s app store reflected frustration with harassing 

and bullying behavior. 

B.

Plaintiffs A.K., A.C., A.O., and Carson Bride all 

downloaded the YOLO extension and used it on the 

Snapchat app. All four were inundated with harassing, 

obscene, and bullying messages including “physical threats, 

obscene sexual messages and propositions, and other 

humiliating comments.” Users messaged A.C. suggesting 

that she kill herself, just as her brother had done. A.O. was

sent a sexual message, and her friend was told she was a 

“whore” and “boy-obsessed.” A.K. received death threats, 

was falsely accused of drug use, mocked for donating her 

hair to a cancer charity, and exhorted to “go kill [her]self,” 
6 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

which she seriously considered. She suffered for years 

thereafter. Carson Bride was subjected to constant 

humiliating messages, many sexually explicit and highly 

disturbing. Despite his efforts, Carson was unable to 

unmask the users who were sending these messages and 

discover their identities. On June 23, 2020, Carson hanged 

himself at his home. 

A.K. attempted to utilize YOLO’s promised unmasking 

feature but received no response. Carson searched the 

internet diligently for ways to unmask the individuals 

sending him harassing messages, with no success. Carson’s 

parents continued his efforts after his death, first using 

YOLO’s “Contact Us” form on its Customer Support page

approximately two weeks after his death. There was no 

answer. Approximately three months later, his mother 

Kristin Bride sent another message, this time to YOLO’s law 

enforcement email, detailing what happened to Carson and 

the messages he received in the days before his death. The 

email message bounced back as undeliverable because the 

email address was invalid. She sent the same to the customer 

service email and received an automated response promising 

an answer that never came. Approximately three months 

later, Kristin reached out to a professional friend who 

contacted YOLO’s CEO on LinkedIn, a professional 

networking site, with no success. She also reached out again 

to YOLO’s law enforcement email, with the same result as 

before. 

Kristin Bride filed suit against YOLO and other 

defendants no longer part of the action. The first amended 

complaint alleged twelve causes of action including product 

liability based on design defects and failure to warn, 

negligence, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, 

unjust enrichment, and violations of Oregon, New York, 
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 7

Colorado, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and California tort law. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed at a hearing that the state law 

claims were all based in “misrepresentation, intentional and 

negligent.” Forty-eight hours after Plaintiffs filed this suit, 

Snap suspended YOLO’s access to its application and later 

announced a complete ban on anonymous messaging apps in 

its app store. 

C.

Plaintiffs’ theories essentially fall into two categories: 

products liability and misrepresentation. Counsel admitted 

that the state law claims all fell under misrepresentation, and 

YOLO splits them between products liability and 

misrepresentation. 

The products liability claims allege that YOLO’s app is 

inherently dangerous because of its anonymous nature and 

that it was negligent for YOLO to ignore the history of teen 

suicides stemming from cyberbullying on anonymous apps. 

Plaintiffs based their products liability claim solely on the 

anonymity of YOLO’s app at the district court and through 

initial briefing at this court.1

Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims are based on their 

allegation that YOLO alerted all new users that bullying and 

harassing behavior would result in the offending user being 

banned and unmasked, but YOLO never followed through 

1 In their reply brief, Plaintiffs advance a new theory that several of 

YOLO’s features taken together created liability. YOLO moved to strike 

this argument because it was raised for the first time in the reply brief. 

We agree and will grant the motion. Our grant of this motion, however, 

does not affect any possible motions in the district court to amend the 

complaint on remand.
8 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

on this threat despite A.K.’s requests and Kristin Bride’s 

emails. 

The district court granted YOLO’s motion to dismiss, 

finding that the entire complaint sought to hold YOLO 

responsible for the content of messages posted on its app by 

users and not for any separate duty or obligation to the 

Plaintiffs. The court relied heavily on Dyroff v. Ultimate 

Software Group, Inc., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019), which 

involved a lawsuit against a completely anonymous website 

through which the plaintiff’s deceased son purchased 

fentanyl-laced drugs. The district court found this matter 

essentially on all fours with Dyroff and dismissed the suit.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant 

YOLO’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 

(9th Cir. 2017). Questions of statutory interpretation are 

reviewed de novo as well. Collins v. Gee W. Seattle LLC, 

631 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). And we take all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and “construe the 

pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 

1029–30 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 

1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

A.

The Internet was still in its infancy when Congress 

passed the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) in 1996. 

47 U.S.C. § 230; Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 

(9th Cir. 2003). Even at its young age, legislators recognized 

its tremendous latent potential. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 

F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009). However, because of the 
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 9

unprecedented reach and speed of the new forum, that 

potential would be significantly limited if courts imposed 

traditional publisher liability on internet platforms. See Doe 

v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851–52 (9th Cir. 

2016). Traditional publisher liability held that if a publisher 

took upon itself the task of moderating or editing the content 

that appeared within its pages, it became responsible for 

anything tortious written there. Id. at 852. A New York state 

court perfectly illustrated this danger when it found that an 

online message board became a publisher responsible for the 

offensive content of any messages “because it deleted some 

offensive posts but not others.” Id. In light of the sheer 

volume of internet traffic, this presented providers with a 

“grim choice”: voluntarily filter some content and risk 

overlooking problems and thereby incurring tort liability, or 

take a hands-off approach and let the trolls run wild. Id. 

To address this problem, Congress enacted § 230 of the 

CDA. This section allows services “to perform some editing 

on user-generated content without thereby becoming liable 

for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages they 

didn’t edit or delete.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 

Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (en banc) [hereinafter Roommates]. Congress 

included a policy statement within § 230 concluding that 

“[i]t is the policy of the United States . . . to promote the 

continued development of the Internet and other interactive 

computer services and other interactive media.” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 230(b)(1). To that end, the law sought to encourage the 

development and use of technologies that would allow users 

to filter and control the content seen by themselves or their 

children. Id. § 230(b)(3)–(4). 

The operative section of the law, § 230(c), titled

“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of 
10 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

offensive material,” is divided into two working parts. Id.

§ 230(c). The first broadly states that no service provider 

“shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 

information provided by another information content 

provider,” or, more colloquially, by a third-party user of the 

service. Id. § 230(c)(1). The second part protects actions 

taken by a service provider to moderate and restrict material 

it “considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 

excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” 

Id. § 230(c)(2). Section 230 expressly preempts any state 

laws with which it may conflict. Id. § 230(e)(3). 

In short, § 230 protects apps and websites which receive 

content posted by third-party users (i.e., Facebook, 

Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, etc.) from liability for any of 

the content posted on their services, even if they take it upon 

themselves to establish a moderation or filtering system, 

however imperfect it proves to be. This immunity persists 

unless the service is itself “‘responsible, in whole or in part, 

for the creation or development of’ the offending content.” 

Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162 (quoting 47 U.S.C. 

§ 230(f)(3)). 

This robust immunity applies to “(1) a provider or user 

of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks 

to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or 

speaker (3) of information provided by another information 

content provider.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100–01 (footnote 

omitted). The parties agree that YOLO is an interactive 

computer service under § 230, and therefore satisfies the first 

prong. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). YOLO is clearly the 

developer of the YOLO app, which allows users to 

communicate anonymously, send polls and questions, and 

send and receive anonymous responses. 
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 11

The second Barnes prong considers whether the cause of 

action alleged in the complaint seeks to plead around the 

CDA’s strictures and treat the defendant as a “publisher or 

speaker” of third-party content. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 

“[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action . . . 

[but] whether the cause of action inherently requires the 

court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of 

content provided by another.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101–02 

(listing successful cases against services that failed to qualify 

for § 230 immunity). The act of “publication involves 

reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to 

withdraw from publication third-party content.” Id. at 1102. 

It is imperative to consider that “neither 

[subsection 230(c)] nor any other declares a general 

immunity from liability deriving from third-party content.” 

Id. at 1100. Indeed, that could not be true; for most 

applications of § 230 in our internet age involve social media 

companies, which nearly all provide some form of platform 

for users to communicate with each other. In cases such as 

these, “[p]ublishing activity is a but-for cause of just about 

everything [defendants are] involved in. [They are] internet 

publishing business[es].” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853; 

see also Calise v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 103 F.4th 732, 742 

(9th Cir. 2024) (“Putting these cases together, it is not 

enough that a claim, including its underlying facts, stems 

from third-party content for § 230 immunity to apply.”). The 

proper analysis requires a close examination of the duty 

underlying each cause of action to decide if it “derives from 

the defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker.” 

Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107. Therefore, services can still be 

liable under traditional tort theories if those theories do not 

require the services to exercise some kind of publication or 

editorial function. Id. at 1102.
12 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

B.

In short, we must engage in a “careful exegesis of the 

statutory language” to determine if these claims attempt to 

treat YOLO as the “publisher or speaker” of the allegedly 

tortious messages. Id. at 1100. This exacting analysis helps 

us avoid “exceed[ing] the scope of the immunity provided 

by Congress.”2 Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853 (quoting 

Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15). After all, § 230 

immunity is extraordinarily powerful, granting complete

immunity where it applies and, in the process, preempting 

even the will of the people as expressed in their state 

legislatures. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (preempting state 

law). Our analysis, therefore, “ask[s] whether the duty that 

the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the 

defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’ If 

it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.” Barnes, 570 

F.3d at 1102. But if it does not, then the suit may proceed as 

against the claim of immunity based on § 230(c)(1). 

Our opinion in Calise v. Meta Platforms, published 

earlier this year, clarified the required duty analysis that 

originated in Barnes v. Yahoo, Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., and 

HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica. Calise, 103 

F.4th at 742 (“Our cases instead require us to look to the 

legal ‘duty.’ ‘Duty’ is ‘that which one is bound to do, and 

for which somebody else has a corresponding right.’” 

(quoting Duty, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019))). 

We now conduct a two-step analysis. Id. First, we examine 

the “right from which the duty springs.” Id. (quotations 

omitted). Does it stem from the platform’s status as a 

2 In light of this, we have explicitly disclaimed the use of a “but-for” test 

because it would vastly expand § 230 immunity beyond Congress’ 

original intent. See Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853.
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 13

publisher (in which case it is barred by § 230)? Or does it 

spring from some other obligation, such as a promise or 

contract (which, under Barnes, is distinct from publication 

and not barred by § 230)? Second, we ask what “this duty 

requir[es] the defendant to do.” Id. If it requires that YOLO 

moderate content to fulfill its duty, then § 230 immunity 

attaches.

3 See id.; HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa 

Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2019).

Barnes perfectly illustrates the duty distinction 

reemphasized in Calise. In that case, Barnes’s estranged 

boyfriend posted nude images of her on a fake profile on

Yahoo’s website, and she reached out to Yahoo to get them 

removed. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1098–99. Yahoo’s Director 

of Communications promised Barnes over the phone that she 

would personally facilitate the removal of the offending fake 

profile. Id. at 1099. Nothing happened and Barnes sued, 

alleging negligent undertaking and promissory estoppel. Id. 

Skeptical of Barnes’s negligent undertaking claim, we held 

that it was simply a defamation claim recast as negligence 

and asked,

[W]hat is the undertaking that Barnes alleges 

Yahoo failed to perform with due care? The 

removal of the indecent profiles that her 

former boyfriend posted on Yahoo’s website. 

3 We emphasize, however, that this does not mean immunity attaches 

anytime YOLO could respond to a legal duty by removing content. See

HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 682 (9th 

Cir. 2019). Instead, we look at what the purported legal duty requires—

“specifically, whether the duty would necessarily require an internet 

company to monitor third-party content.” Id. For immunity to attach at 

this second step, moderation must be more than one option in YOLO’s 

menu of possible responses; it must be the only option.
14 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

But removing content is something 

publishers do, and to impose liability on the 

basis of such conduct necessarily involves 

treating the liable party as a publisher of the 

content it failed to remove.

Id. at 1103; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). We determined that 

Barnes’s negligent undertaking claim faulted Yahoo for 

failure to remove content, and “such conduct is publishing 

conduct . . . that can be boiled down to” editorial behavior. 

Id. at 1103 (emphasis and quotations omitted) (quoting 

Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170–71). Such claims are 

explicitly foreclosed by § 230(c)(1). 

Barnes’s promissory estoppel claim, however, fared 

better. Because this claim “is a subset of a theory of recovery 

based on a breach of contract,” it was not ultimately 

grounded in Yahoo’s failure to remove content, but in their 

failure to honor a “private bargain[].” Id. at 1106 (quotations 

omitted). While yes, that was a promise to moderate content, 

the underlying obligation upon which Barnes relied was not 

an obligation to remove a profile, but the promise itself. Id.

at 1107–09. As we noted, Barnes did “not seek to hold 

Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party content, 

but rather as the counter-party to a contract, as a promisor 

who [had] breached.” Id. at 1107. Section 230 only 

“precludes liability when the duty the plaintiff alleges the 

defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or 

conduct as a publisher or speaker.” Id. We justified the 

distinction because of where the individual claims derive 

liability: negligent undertaking is grounded in “behavior that 

is identical to publishing or speaking,” whereas “[p]romising 

is different because it is not synonymous with the 

performance of the action promised.” Id. “[W]hereas one 
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 15

cannot undertake to do something without simultaneously 

doing it, one can, and often does, promise to do something 

without actually doing it at the same time.” Id. Therefore, 

contractual liability stood where negligence fell. 

The question of whether § 230 immunity applies is not 

simply a matter of examining the record to see if “a claim, 

including its underlying facts, stems from third-party 

content.” Calise, 103 F.4th at 742. Nor is there a bright-line 

rule allowing contract claims and prohibiting tort claims that 

do not require moderating content, for that would be 

inconsistent with those cases where we have allowed tort 

claims to proceed, see Internet Brands, 824 F.3d 846 

(negligent failure to warn claim survived § 230 immunity); 

Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021) 

(authorizing a products liability claim based in negligent 

design), and contradict our prior position that the name of a 

cause of action is irrelevant to immunity, Barnes, 570 F.3d 

at 1102 (“[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of 

action . . . what matters is whether the cause of action 

inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the 

‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.”). 

Instead, we must engage in a careful inquiry into the 

fundamental duty invoked by the plaintiff and determine if 

it “derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a 

‘publisher or speaker.’” Id.

C.

We now conduct that inquiry here. The parties divide 

the claims into two categories—misrepresentation and 

products liability—and we will continue that distinction in 

our analysis. 
16 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

1.

Turning first to Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims, we 

find that Barnes controls. YOLO’s representation to its 

users that it would unmask and ban abusive users is 

sufficiently analogous to Yahoo’s promise to remove an 

offensive profile. Plaintiffs seek to hold YOLO accountable 

for a promise or representation, and not for failure to take 

certain moderation actions. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege 

that YOLO represented to anyone who downloaded its app 

that it would not tolerate “objectionable content or abusive 

users” and would reveal the identities of anyone violating 

these terms. They further allege that all Plaintiffs relied on 

this statement when they elected to use YOLO’s app, but that 

YOLO never took any action, even when directly requested 

to by A.K. In fact, considering YOLO’s staff size compared

to its user body, it is doubtful that YOLO ever intended to 

act on its own representation. 

While it is certainly an open question whether YOLO has 

any defenses to enforcement of its promise, at this stage we

cannot say that § 230 categorically prohibits Plaintiffs from 

making the argument. YOLO may argue that it did not 

intend to induce reliance on the promise by the Plaintiffs, or 

that the statements were not promises made to Plaintiffs but

instead warnings to others. But we treat “the outwardly 

manifested intention to create an expectation on the part of 

another as a legally significant event. That event generates 

a legal duty distinct from the conduct at hand,” a duty which 

we will enforce. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107. 

The district court oversimplified the proper analysis for 

§ 230 immunity and essentially dismissed the claims 

because malicious third-party postings were involved or 

must be edited by YOLO. In its own words, “Plaintiffs’ 
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 17

claims that [YOLO] . . . misrepresented their applications’ 

safety would not be cognizable” without the harmful

behavior of third-party users, and therefore immunity 

applies. The proper analysis is to examine closely the duty 

underlying each cause of action and decide if it “derives 

from the defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or 

speaker.” Id. If it does, then § 230(c)(1) immunizes the 

defendant from liability on that claim. 

In summary, Barnes is on all fours with Plaintiffs’ 

misrepresentation claims here. YOLO repeatedly informed 

users that it would unmask and ban users who violated the 

terms of service. Yet it never did so, and may have never 

intended to. Plaintiffs seek to enforce that promise—made 

multiple times to them and upon which they relied—to 

unmask their tormentors. While yes, online content is 

involved in these facts, and content moderation is one 

possible solution for YOLO to fulfill its promise, the 

underlying duty being invoked by the Plaintiffs, according 

to Calise, is the promise itself. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 

1106–09. Therefore, the misrepresentation claims survive.

2.

Next, we address the product liability claims. In general, 

these claims assert that YOLO’s app is inherently dangerous 

because of its anonymous nature, and that previous highprofile suicides and the history of cyberbullying should have 

put YOLO on notice that its product was unduly dangerous

to teenagers. We hold that § 230 precludes liability on these 

claims. 

Plaintiffs first allege product liability claims for design 

defect, and negligence. The defective design claim alleges 

that YOLO “developed, designed, manufactured, marketed, 

sold, and distributed to at least hundreds of thousands of 
18 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

minors” a product that was unreasonably dangerous because 

of its anonymity. They claim that the bare fact of YOLO’s 

anonymity made it uniquely dangerous to minors and that 

YOLO should have known this because prior anonymous 

applications had a deleterious effect on minor users. The 

negligence claim is similar, claiming that YOLO failed to 

“protect users from an unreasonable risk of harm arising out 

of the use of their app[].” Failure to mitigate this 

“foreseeable risk of harm,” Plaintiffs claim, makes YOLO 

liable. 

Plaintiffs also allege products liability claims under a 

failure to warn theory. The alleged risks are the same as 

those for defective design and negligence, but the claims are

centered more on YOLO’s alleged failure to disclose these 

risks to users when they downloaded the YOLO app. 

Plaintiffs therefore ask for compensatory damages, 

pecuniary loss, and loss of society, companionship, and 

services to Carson Bride’s parents, and punitive damages 

“based on [YOLO’s] willful and wanton failure to warn of 

the known dangers” of its product. 

At root, all Plaintiffs’ product liability theories attempt 

to hold YOLO responsible for users’ speech or YOLO’s

decision to publish it. For example, the negligent design 

claim faults YOLO for creating an app with an 

“unreasonable risk of harm.” What is that harm but the 

harassing and bullying posts of others? Similarly, the failure 

to warn claim faults YOLO for not mitigating, in some way, 

the harmful effects of the harassing and bullying content. 

This is essentially faulting YOLO for not moderating content 

in some way, whether through deletion, change, or 

suppression. 
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 19

Our decision in Lemmon v. Snap, Inc. does not help 

Plaintiffs. In that case, parents of two teens killed while 

speeding sued the company that owns Snapchat. Lemmon, 

995 F.3d at 1087. They alleged that the boys had been 

speeding because of a feature on the Snapchat app that

allowed users to overlay their current speed onto photos and

videos. Id. at 1088–89. It was widely believed that Snapchat 

would reward users with in-app rewards of some kind if they 

attained a speed over 100 mph. Id. at 1089. The boys 

operated the filter moments before their deaths. Id. at 1088. 

The parents brought negligent design claims alleging that 

Snapchat, despite numerous news articles, an online petition 

about the inherent problems with the filter, “at least three 

accidents,” and “at least one other lawsuit,” continued to 

offer a feature that “incentiviz[ed] young drivers to drive at 

dangerous speeds.” Id. at 1089. The district court dismissed 

the complaint on § 230 grounds. Id. at 1090. On appeal, we 

held that the negligent design claims were not an attempt “to 

treat a defendant as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of third-party 

content.” Id. at 1091. Instead, the parents sought to hold 

Snap liable for creating (1) Snapchat, (2) the speed filter, and 

(3) an incentive structure that enticed users to drive at unsafe 

speeds. Id. In clarifying that the parents’ product liability 

claim was not “a creative attempt to plead around the CDA,” 

we explained that claim did “not depend on what messages, 

if any, a Snapchat user employing the Speed Filter actually 

sends.” Id. at 1094. As a result, the claim did not depend on 

third-party content. Id.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that anonymity itself creates an 

unreasonable risk of harm. But we refuse to endorse a theory 

that would classify anonymity as a per se inherently 

unreasonable risk to sustain a theory of product liability. 

First, unlike in Lemmon, where the dangerous activity the 
20 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

alleged defective design incentivized was the dangerous 

behavior of speeding, here, the activity encouraged is the 

sharing of messages between users. See id. Second, 

anonymity is not only a cornerstone of much internet speech, 

but it is also easily achieved. After all, verification of a 

user’s information through government-issued ID is rare on 

the internet. Thus we cannot say that this feature was 

uniquely or unreasonably dangerous. 

Similarly, Internet Brands provides no cover for 

Plaintiffs’ failure to warn theory. In that case, we upheld 

liability against a professional networking site for models 

under a failure to warn theory. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 

848. Plaintiff created a profile on the website Model 

Mayhem, owned by Internet Brands, advertising her services 

as a model. Id. Meanwhile, the site’s owners were aware 

that a pair of men had been using the site to set up fake 

auditions, lure women to “auditions” in Florida, and then 

rape them. Id. at 848–49. Yet the owners did not warn 

plaintiff, and she fell victim to the scheme. Id. at 848. We

reasoned that plaintiff sought to hold defendant liable under 

a traditional tort theory—the duty to warn—which had no 

bearing on Model Mayhem’s decision to publish any 

information on its site. Id. at 851. After all, plaintiff had 

posted her own profile on the website, and did not allege that 

the rapists had posted anything on the website. Id. 

Therefore, § 230 was no protection. 

In short, the defendant in Internet Brands failed to warn 

of a known conspiracy operating independent of the site’s 

publishing function. Id. But here, there was no conspiracy 

to harm that could be defined with any specificity. It was 

merely a general possibility of harm resulting from use of 

the YOLO app, and which largely exists anywhere on the 
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 21

internet. We cannot hold YOLO responsible for the 

unfortunate realities of human nature. 

Finally, we clarify the extent to which Dyroff v. Ultimate 

Software Group is applicable, but not dispositive, here. In 

that case, a grieving mother sued an anonymous website that 

allowed users to post whatever they wanted, anonymously, 

and receive anonymous replies. Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1094–

95. Her son purchased drugs using the site and died because 

the drugs he purchased were laced with fentanyl. Id. at 1095. 

As we explained, “[s]ome of the site’s functions, including 

user anonymity and grouping, facilitated illegal drug sales.” 

Id. at 1095. The mother sued, alleging that the site had 

allowed users to engage in illegal activity, that the website’s 

recommendation algorithm had promoted and enabled these 

communications, and that defendant failed to moderate the 

website’s content to eliminate these problems. Id. We 

concluded that § 230(c) granted defendant immunity from 

these claims. Id. at 1096. First, we noted that § 230 

“provides that website operators are immune from liability 

for third-party information . . . unless the website operator 

‘is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 

development of [the] information.’” Id. (brackets in 

original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f)(3)). We then 

looked at whether the claims “inherently require[] the court 

to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content 

provided by another.” Id. at 1098 (brackets in original)

(quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102). Because the automated 

processes contained in the site’s algorithm were not 

themselves content but merely “tools meant to facilitate the 

communication and content of others,” we found the second 

Barnes prong satisfied. Id. Finally, the third Barnes prong 

was satisfied because the content was clearly developed by 

others, not the defendant. Id. at 1098. Unlike in Roommates, 
22 ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC.

where the defendant played a role in developing the illegal 

content by requiring users to answer particular questions, the 

defendant in Dyroff merely provided a “blank text box” that 

users could utilize however they wanted. Id. at 1099.

In our view, Plaintiffs’ product liability theories 

similarly attempt to hold YOLO liable as a publisher of 

third-party content, based in part on the design feature of 

anonymity. To be sure, our opinion in Dyroff did not rely on 

anonymity for its § 230 analysis. See id. at 1096–99. But 

our analysis of Plaintiffs’ product liability claims is 

otherwise consistent with Dyroff’s reasoning: here, the 

communications between users were direct, rather than 

suggested by an algorithm, and YOLO similarly provided 

users with a blank text box. These facts fall within Dyroff’s 

ambit. As we have recognized, “No website could function 

if a duty of care was created when a website facilitates 

communication, in a content-neutral fashion, of its users’ 

content.” Id. at 1101. Though the claims asserted in Dyroff

were different than the claims asserted here, our conclusion 

is consistent with Dyroff’s reasoning. 

In summary, Plaintiffs’ product liability claims attempt 

to hold YOLO responsible as the speaker or publisher of 

harassing and bullying speech. Those product liability 

claims that fault YOLO for not moderating content are 

foreclosed, see supra at 18; otherwise, nothing about 

YOLO’s app was so inherently dangerous that we can justify 

these claims, and unlike Lemmon, YOLO did not turn a blind 

eye to the popular belief that there existed in-app features 

that could only be accessible through bad behavior. 

Lemmon, 995 F.3d at 1089–90 (describing how users 

thought that exceeding 100 mph while using the Snapchat 

app would produce a reward). And to the degree that the 

online environment encouraged and enabled such behavior, 
ESTATE OF BRIDE V. YOLO TECH., INC. 23

that is not unique to YOLO. It is a problem which besets the 

entire internet. Thus, § 230 immunizes YOLO from liability 

on these claims. 

D.

In holding that the Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims 

may proceed, we adhere to long-established circuit 

precedent. We must strike a delicate balance by giving 

effect to the intent of Congress as expressed in the statute 

while not expanding the statute beyond the legislature’s 

expressed intent in the face of quickly advancing 

technology. Today’s decision does not expand liability for 

internet companies or make all violations of their own terms 

of service into actionable claims. To the degree that such 

liability exists, it already existed under Barnes and Calise, 

and nothing we do here extends that legal exposure to new 

arenas. Section 230 prohibits holding companies 

responsible for moderating or failing to moderate content. It 

does not immunize them from breaking their promises. Even 

if those promises regard content moderation, the promise 

itself is actionable separate from the moderation action, and 

that has been true at least since Barnes. In our caution to 

ensure § 230 is given its fullest effect, we must resist the 

corollary urge to extend immunity beyond the parameters 

established by Congress and thereby create a free-wheeling 

immunity for tech companies that is not enjoyed by other 

players in the economy. 

III.

We therefore REVERSE the district court’s grant of 

YOLO’s motion to dismiss the misrepresentation claims but 

AFFIRM in all other respects. YOLO’s motion to strike is 

GRANTED.