SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2437-19

GEORGE BELLO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STATE FARM INDEMNITY

COMPANY, d/b/a STATE

FARM,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted December 14, 2020 – Decided April 26, 2021

Before Judges Hoffman and Smith.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-5631-17.

Soriano, Henkel, Biehl & Matthews, attorneys for 

appellant (Thomas W. Matthews, of counsel and on the 

briefs).

Alampi & DeMarrais, attorneys for respondent 

(Michael F. DeMarrais and Jennifer Alampi, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-2437-19

In 2017, plaintiff George Bello filed suit against his auto insurance carrier, 

defendant State Farm Indemnity Company (State Farm), seeking damages for 

injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident. At the conclusion of trial, the

jury returned multiple verdicts with conflicting answers regarding plaintiff’s 

negligence, proximate cause, and plaintiff's fault. While acknowledging the 

inconsistency, the trial judge entered judgment for plaintiff. 

State Farm now appeals from the January 24, 2020 Law Division order 

denying its motion to set aside the verdict, contending the trial judge erroneously 

accepted an inconsistent verdict and improperly charged the jury. We conclude 

the trial judge committed reversible error when he entered judgment for 

plaintiff, without the jury present, based on the inconsistent verdict. 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgement and remand for a new trial.

I.

This case arises from a 2013 motor vehicle accident involving plaintiff

and two unknown drivers; for ease of reference, we refer to these unknown 

persons as the tractor-trailer driver and the Lexus driver. Both unknown drivers

stopped their vehicles suddenly while traveling on Route 495 at or near an onramp to the New Jersey Turnpike. To avoid a collision, plaintiff swerved around 

both vehicles, but struck a guardrail in the process. 
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On August 18, 2017, plaintiff filed suit against State Farm seeking 

uninsured motorist and income continuation benefits for his injuries. The parties 

agreed to stipulate damages and proceed with a liability-only trial. The 

stipulation provided that if the jury found plaintiff fifty percent negligent or less,

then State Farm would pay plaintiff the full $100,000 uninsured motorist policy 

limit. 

On December 16, 2019, the parties appeared for trial. Plaintiff moved to 

preclude a Dolson1charge and application of N.J.S.A. 39:4-89 and Model Jury 

Charge (Civil) 5.30D. After hearing oral argument, the trial judge determined 

the charge applied and included it in his jury charge. 

The following day, the jury heard the testimony of plaintiff, the only 

witness in the case, followed by summations and the judge's jury charge. At the 

conclusion of his instructions, the trial judge provided the seven-person jury

with the following review of the verdict sheet:

1. Did [plaintiff] prove by preponderance of the evidence that the driver 

of 

the tractor trailer was negligent in his accident of October 14, 2013?

1

 Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2 (1969).
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2. Did [plaintiff] prove by preponderance of the evidence that the driver 

of 

the [Lexus] was negligent in his accident of October 14, 2013?

3. Did [plaintiff] prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

negligence of the driver of the tractor trailer was a proximate cause of 

the

accident?

4. Did [plaintiff] prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

negligence of the driver of the tractor trailer was a proximate cause of 

the 

accident?

5. Did [State Farm] prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

[plaintiff] 

was negligent?

6. Did [State Farm] prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

[plaintiff] 

was a proximate cause of the accident?

7. Taking the combined negligence of all parties that proximately caused 

the 
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accident as being 100% - what percentage of total negligence is 

attributable to:

(a) [Plaintiff]

(b) Tractor Trailer Driver

(c) [Lexus] driver

At 4:33 p.m., the jury announced it had reached a verdict. When the 

foreperson announced the jury's verdict on question one as "two votes for yes 

and five votes for no," the trial judge immediately provided further instructions 

to the jurors, reminding them of his earlier instruction that this is "a civil case

and any verdict of 6-1 or 7-0 is a legal verdict . . . you need that on each question 

before you go on to the next question or stop your deliberations as instructed. " 

The judge then advised the jurors "to return to the jury room and continue with 

your deliberations." 

At 4:46 p.m., the jury returned and announced a revised verdict. The jury 

answered no to questions one and three, finding the tractor-trailer and Lexus 

drivers not negligent; however, the jury answered yes to questions two and four, 

finding the two unknown drivers' negligence a proximate cause of the accident. 

The jury then apportioned fifteen percent of fault to the tractor-trailer driver and 

forty-eight percent of fault to the Lexus driver. The jury also found plaintiff 
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negligent but not a proximate cause of the accident; nevertheless, the jury then

apportioned thirty-seven percent of fault to him. 

After discussing the revised verdict with counsel, at 5:07 p.m., the judge 

advised the jurors that "your verdict sheet is somewhat inconsistent." After 

explaining the inconsistencies in their verdict, the judge provided "a clean 

verdict form" and instructed the jurors to return to their deliberations. 

The jury ultimately returned with its third and final verdict. Here, the jury 

answered yes to questions one through four, finding both the Lexus and tractortrailer drivers negligent and a proximate cause of the accident. The jury 

apportioned twenty percent of fault to the tractor-trailer driver, and fifty-five 

percent of fault to the Lexus driver. The jury also answered no to questions five 

and six, finding plaintiff not negligent nor a proximate cause of the accident. 

Nevertheless, the jury apportioned twenty-five percent of fault to the plaintiff. 

The judge again acknowledged the jury's inconsistency regarding plaintiff’s 

negligence and fault. 

Over defense counsel's objection, the trial judge proceeded to discharge 

the jury and enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff because the jury found 

plaintiff less than fifty percent at fault. 
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State Farm filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which the trial judge 

denied on January 24, 2020. The judge did not find a miscarriage of justice 

warranting a new trial because the jury consistently found plaintiff less than fifty 

percent at fault, and therefore entitled to recover from State Farm according to

the parties' pre-trial stipulation. 

On appeal, State Farm raises the following arguments:

POINT I

THE JURY VERDICTS WERE INCONSISTENT 

AND MUST BE SET ASIDE 

POINT II

THE JURY CHARGE WAS INADEQUATE (Not 

raised below)

II.

State Farm first contends the trial judge erred by accepting the jury verdict 

and entering judgment for plaintiff because the verdict was inconsistent. A jury 

verdict is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 

74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977). Generally, we will not disturb a jury verdict "unless it 

clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." R. 2:10-

1; see also Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360 (1979) ("[A] jury verdict, from 

the weight of evidence standpoint, is impregnable unless so distorted and wrong, 
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in the objective and articulated view of a judge, as to manifest with utmost 

certainty a plain miscarriage of justice.").

This deference

is reflected also in the general rule that a trial court may 

not mold a jury verdict according to its perception of 

the jury's view. A verdict may be molded in 

consonance with the plainly manifested intention of the 

jury, but such a determination is best performed in the 

presence of the jurors and with their consent.

Moreover, molding a verdict is most appropriate when 

it pertains to form rather than substance. Once the jury 

is discharged, both trial and appellate courts are 

generally bound to respect its decision, lest they act as 

an additional and decisive juror.

[Kassick v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 120 N.J. 130, 

135-36 (1990) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).]

"The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form 

of a special written finding upon each issue of fact" by submitting "written 

questions which can be categorically or briefly answered . . . ." R. 4:39-1. The 

purposes served by jury interrogatories are: "to require the jury to specifically 

consider the essential issues of the case, to clarify the court's charge to the jury, 

and to clarify the meaning of the verdict and permit error to be localized." Ponzo 

v. Pelle, 166 N.J. 481, 490-91 (2001) (quoting Wenner v. McEldowney & Co., 

102 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1968)).
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Here, the jury returned multiple inconsistent verdicts. The jury found 

State Farm failed to prove plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the 

accident but still apportioned fault to plaintiff. See Roland v. Brunswick Corp., 

215 N.J. Super. 240, 244 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that a jury verdict finding

the plaintiff's negligence was not a proximate cause of his injuries while still

apportioning five percent of fault to the plaintiff was "clearly and irreconcilably 

inconsistent."). "Where inconsistent answers to jury interrogatories are 

irreconcilable, thus bespeaking jury mistake or confusion, a verdict based 

thereon cannot stand." Lancos v. Silverman, 400 N.J. Super. 258, 272 (App. 

Div. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The trial judge 

himself recognized the inconsistency and potential jury confusion; 

notwithstanding this recognition, the judge discharged the jury without further 

deliberation, and entered judgment for plaintiff.

We conclude the trial judge committed reversible error by accepting the 

inconsistent verdict and entering judgment, without the jury's presence or 

consent, particularly in light of the jury's second tentative verdict that was also 

inconsistent. The judge should have brought out the jury, explained the 

inconsistency in its verdict, and elicited information to clarify the jury's intent 

or possible confusion. See Butler v. Acme Mkts., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982)
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(upholding a molded verdict because "the [trial] judge permitted the jury to mold 

its own verdict by molding it in their presence before discharge and obtaining 

their concurrence."); Mahoney v. Podolnick, 168 N.J. 202, 223 (2001); Dubak 

v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 233 N.J. Super. 441, 456 (App. Div. 1989). 

Otherwise, "[i]t is not possible to reconstruct and recast the jury's deliberations 

simply by parsing the answers to the special interrogatories, or identifying which 

of its determinations or answers is critical[.]" Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 133 

N.J. 610 (1993). Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse and remand for a 

new trial.

State Farm also contends the Dolson jury charge was inadequate because 

the judge failed to advise the jury that if it found plaintiff violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-

89, it must find plaintiff negligent as a matter of law. In view of our 

determination that the improper molding of the verdict outside of the presence

of the jury requires reversal and remand for a new trial, we decline to address 

State Farm's claim of plain error regarding the Dolson charge.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.