* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. Proc. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is subs tituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/23/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JAMES D. HISHAW,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-5017 (D.C. No. CV-94-811-J) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff James D. Hishaw appeals the district court’s affirmance of the decision by the Secretary of Health and Human Servi ces awarding social security disability benefits for a closed period between Nov ember 23, 1988, and March 8, 1990, but not thereafter. Because the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and no legal errors were commi tted, we affirm. Plaintiff filed for benefits in November 1990, alle ging an inability to work after November 23, 1988, due to a back injury and s everal surgeries. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determin ed that plaintiff was disabled through March 8, 1990, but that after that date pla intiff’s condition had improved so that he could perform the full range of light wo rk. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Secretary. We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whe ther her factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether she applied correct legal standards. Castellano v. Secretary of Health& Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “‘s uch relevant evidence as a-3-

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to supporta conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Ed ison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). We may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our discretion for that of the Secretary. Casias v . Secretary of Health & Human
Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff argues first that substantial evidence do es not support the conclusion that his condition improved to the point that he was capable of performing light work. We disagree. In May 1990, plaintiff’s treating neurological surgeon wrote a letter stating that plaintiff had been rele ased from treatment on March 8, 1990, and that he was “employable.” II R. 256. No restrictions on plaintiff’s capacity to work were noted. Id. Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon released him to work in May 1990, restricting him only from heavy, strenuous lifting. Id. at 170- 71. In August 1990, the orthopedic surgeon release d plaintiff to return to work “with no restrictions.” Id. at 171. These medical releases support the Secret ary’s determination that plaintiff had regained the abili ty to perform light work by March 9, 1990. Treating physician Davis’ opinion that plaintiff re mains unemployable does not require a contrary result. When several treati ng physicians render inconsistent opinions, the Secretary may reject one or more of those opinions after considering the factors identified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). SeeGoatcher v. United States-4-

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 52 F.3d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1995). The Secretary must determine whether the opinions rende red by the other physicians outweigh that of the treating physician, and must g ive specific, legitimate reasons for disregarding his opinion. Id. In this case, the Secretary properly rejected Dr. Davis’ opinion because it was not supported by specific medical findings, and because the opinions of the treating specialists we re entitled to more weight. We do not address plaintiff’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s pain analysis, hypothetical questions, or application of the grids , as plaintiff did not raise these issues before the district court. See Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Absent compelling reasons, we do not consid er arguments that were not presented to the district court.”).
AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court James K. Logan Circuit Judge