This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2024 UT 17

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN BLEAZARD, an individual, MARK BLEAZARD, an individual,

and SIX MILE RANCH COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

Appellees,

v.

CITY OF ERDA and DEIDRE M. HENDERSON, in her Official Capacity 

as Lieutenant Governor of Utah,

Appellants.

Nos. 20221008, 20221009

Heard January 10, 2024

Filed June 13, 2024

On Appeal of Interlocutory Order

Third District, Tooele County

The Honorable Teresa L. Welch

No. 220300134

Attorneys:

Robert E. Mansfield, Megan E. Garrett, Salt Lake City,

for appellees

Janet M. Conway, Wanship, for appellant City of Erda

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Scott D. Cheney, Asst. Att’y Gen., 

Andrew Dymek, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant 

Deidre M. Henderson

JUSTICE HAGEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE, 

JUSTICE PETERSEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.

JUSTICE HAGEN, opinion of the Court:
BLEAZARD v. CITY OF ERDA

Opinion of the Court

2

INTRODUCTION

¶1 The Utah Code establishes the process by which a 

municipality may be incorporated. In 2018, a group of local citizens

sponsored the incorporation of an area in Tooele County that 

would be known as the City of Erda. Erda’s incorporation took 

effect once the citizens of Tooele County voted to incorporate Erda 

and the Lieutenant Governor certified that the statutory process 

had been completed.

¶2 After the Lieutenant Governor certified Erda’s

incorporation, three owners of land within Erda’s boundaries—

John Bleazard, Mark Bleazard, and Six Mile Ranch Company 

(collectively, the Landowners)—challenged the incorporation, 

requesting relief under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act. The 

Landowners sought to undo the incorporation based on alleged 

statutory violations that occurred during the incorporation process.

Erda and the Lieutenant Governor, the defendants named in the 

lawsuit, moved to dismiss the Landowners’ complaint, each 

offering reasons why the court could not or should not entertain 

the case. As relevant here, they argued that the Landowners lacked 

statutory standing. The district court disagreed with Erda and the 

Lieutenant Governor and denied their motions to dismiss. Erda 

and the Lieutenant Governor separately petitioned for 

interlocutory appeal. We agreed to hear both appeals, which we 

resolve in this consolidated opinion.

¶3 We hold that the Landowners’ claim for declaratory relief 

must be dismissed as a matter of law because it is non-justiciable.

Under Utah law, a declaratory judgment action is non-justiciable if 

the plaintiff lacks a protectible legal interest in the controversy. In 

other words, the plaintiff must have a legal right at stake. Where 

the requested relief is a declaration that defendants have not 

complied with certain statutory requirements, we look to whether 

the plaintiff has a legal right to enforce those requirements. In some 

cases, the alleged non-compliance with the statute may implicate 

pre-existing legal rights arising from the state or federal 

constitution, common law, or statute. But here, the Landowners

point to no common law right or constitutional provision they seek 

to enforce and rely only on the incorporation code itself.1 Because 

the legislature did not grant affected citizens a private right of 

__________________________________________________________

1 We refer to Title 10, Chapter 2A of the Utah Code as the 

incorporation code.
Cite as: 2024 UT 17

Opinion of the Court

3

action to enforce the incorporation code’s requirements, the 

Landowners do not have a protectible legal interest in their claim.

Therefore, we hold that this case is non-justiciable and reverse the 

district court’s decision.

BACKGROUND2

¶4 To provide context, we begin with a synopsis of the 

process of incorporation under Utah law as it is relevant here. We 

then summarize the events that led to Erda’s incorporation, as well 

as the proceedings that prompted this appeal.

The Incorporation Process

¶5 The Utah Legislature has established a statutory process 

for incorporating a municipality. That process, set forth in the 

incorporation code, involves several steps. See UTAH CODE

§§ 10-2a-101 to -414 (2018).3

¶6 The first step requires the sponsors of a proposed 

incorporation to file “a request for a feasibility study” with the 

lieutenant governor. Id. § 10-2a-202(1). Among other requirements, 

the request must include signatures from property owners who 

represent ten percent of private land by area and seven percent of 

private land by value within the proposed incorporated area. Id.

§ 10-2a-202(2)(a). Signatures made on behalf of a property owner

must indicate “the person’s representative capacity and the name 

of the owner the person represents,” and the signer must provide 

substantiating documentation. Id. § 10-2a-102(3)(b).

¶7 The lieutenant governor reviews the feasibility study 

request to determine whether it meets the statutory requirements.

__________________________________________________________

2 Because this appeal arises from the district court’s denial of 

Erda’s and the Lieutenant Governor’s motions to dismiss, “we 

accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interpret 

those facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in a 

light most favorable” to the Landowners as the nonmoving parties. 

See Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 3, 108 P.3d 741.

3 The incorporation code instructs that for incorporations 

initiated before May 14, 2019, the process is governed by the law in 

effect at the time the incorporation was initiated. See UTAH CODE

§ 10-2a-106(1) (2024). Because the sponsors initiated the 

incorporation of Erda in October 2018, the version then in effect 

applies here. Accordingly, in this opinion we reference the 2018 

version of the incorporation code unless otherwise indicated.
BLEAZARD v. CITY OF ERDA

Opinion of the Court

4

Id. § 10-2a-204(1)(a). If she determines that it does, she certifies it,

and the feasibility study moves forward. Id. § 10-2a-204(1)(b)(i).

¶8 A designated “feasibility consultant” completes the 

feasibility study, submits a written report, and presents the results 

at two or more public hearings. Id. §§ 10-2a-205(3), -207(1). As part 

of the study, the feasibility consultant estimates the proposed city’s 

projected revenue and cost of governmental services over a fiveyear period. Id. § 10-2a-205(4)(a)(iv)–(v). The incorporation process 

may not proceed “unless the results of the feasibility study . . . show 

that the average annual amount of revenue . . . does not exceed the 

average annual amount of cost . . . by more than 5%.” Id.

§ 10-2a-208(3).

¶9 If the results of the feasibility study are favorable, the 

incorporation sponsors may petition to place the incorporation 

proposal on the ballot. See id. § 10-2a-208(1)–(2). This petition has 

its own signature requirement, although the signatures from the 

feasibility study request carry over to the petition under certain 

circumstances. See id. § 10-2a-208(2)(a), (4). If the lieutenant 

governor determines that the petition meets the statutory 

requirements, she certifies it, and the measure is placed on the 

election ballot. Id. §§ 10-2a-209(1)(b)(i), -210.

¶10 The election code governs incorporation elections. Id.

§ 10-2a-104. If a proposed incorporation receives a majority vote, 

then “the area shall incorporate.” Id. § 10-2a-210(3). After the 

incorporation election results are certified, another election is held 

to select the mayor and other officials of the new city. See id.

§§ 10-2a-213, -215.

¶11 To complete the incorporation process, the mayor-elect

must submit a notice of impending boundary action to the 

lieutenant governor “within 30 days after the canvass of the final 

election of city officers.” Id. § 10-2a-217(1)(a)(i). The notice must

“contain a statement . . . certifying that all requirements applicable 

to the boundary action have been met.” Id. § 67-1a-6.5(3)(e)(i) 

(2018). Along with the notice, the mayor-elect must submit an 

approved final local entity plat that has been validated by the 

county surveyor. Id. § 10-2a-217(1)(a)(ii); id. § 67-1a-6.5(1)(b) (2018).

¶12 The lieutenant governor determines whether the notice of 

impending boundary action meets the statutory requirements. Id.

§ 67-1a-6.5(2)(a)(i)(A) (2018). If she determines that it does, she 

issues a certificate of incorporation, id., at which time “[t]he 

incorporation is effective,” id. § 10-2a-217(2)(a).
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Opinion of the Court

5

¶13 “[A] city is conclusively presumed to be lawfully 

incorporated” if certain conditions are met. See id. § 10-2a-217(2)(b). 

For a city incorporated on or after July 1, 1998, this conclusive 

presumption is applied “if, for two years following the city’s 

incorporation,” (1) “the city has levied and collected a property tax

[or] . . . the city has imposed a sales and use tax,” and (2) “no 

challenge to the existence or incorporation of the city has been filed 

in the district court for the county in which the city is located.” Id.

Erda’s Incorporation

¶14 In October 2018, a group of sponsors set out to incorporate 

an area in Tooele County that would be known as the City of Erda.

The sponsors prepared a feasibility study request by soliciting 

signatures from landowners in the proposed incorporation area. As 

part of that effort, they contacted John and Mark Bleazard. John and 

Mark each own residential property located in the incorporation 

area. They are also minority owners of Six Mile Ranch Company, 

which owns a 6,000-acre property located in the incorporation area.

¶15 According to the Landowners’ complaint, when John and 

Mark were approached for their signatures, they were not provided 

with a map of the proposed incorporation area. Nor were they 

informed that the area included Six Mile Ranch. Instead, John and 

Mark were told that only their residential properties were part of 

the proposed incorporation area, and they signed the request based 

on that understanding.

¶16 The Landowners allege that John and Mark were never

asked to sign the feasibility study request on Six Mile Ranch’s 

behalf, and, in any event, they were not authorized to do so. They 

further allege that John and Mark were not asked to provide 

documentation to substantiate their ownership interest in Six Mile 

Ranch and that none of the other owners of Six Mile Ranch were 

contacted about the feasibility study request. Yet the signature page 

of the feasibility study request included a handwritten notation in 

the margin next to John’s and Mark’s signatures identifying them 

as the “Owners of ‘Six Mile Ranch.’” The Landowners allege that

the sponsors made this notation.

¶17 According to the complaint, the sponsors submitted the 

request for a feasibility study with John’s and Mark’s

misrepresented signatures. Once the results of the feasibility study 

were published, John and Mark contested Six Mile Ranch’s 

inclusion in the proposed incorporation area. They each sent letters 

to the Lieutenant Governor regarding the signatures they provided 
BLEAZARD v. CITY OF ERDA

Opinion of the Court

6

for the feasibility study request. John stated in his letter that “it was 

never stated or implied that [he] was signing for anything other 

than a feasibility study to move forward,” that he “did not or could 

not sign as a representative of Six Mile Ranch,” and that he “was 

never informed that any Six Mile Ranch property was being 

considered as part of the Erda City boundaries.” Mark similarly 

stated in his letter that “it was never discussed or implied that [he] 

was signing for anything other than [his] own property in Erda” 

and that he “did not or could not sign as a representative of Six Mile 

Ranch . . . without first consulting the other owners.”

¶18 The Landowners allege that the Lieutenant Governor’s 

office acknowledged the letters and notified the sponsors that if the 

information John and Mark provided was accurate, then there 

would be “an argument that the original petition should not have 

been certified, and that could be grounds for someone to challenge 

the validity of the election if the votes are in favor of incorporation.”

Still, the sponsors moved forward with the incorporation process 

and filed a petition for incorporation. The signatures that John and 

Mark previously provided were used to satisfy the signature 

requirement for the petition’s filing.

¶19 The Lieutenant Governor certified the petition, and an 

incorporation election was held in 2020. The incorporation measure

passed, and the election of city officers was completed by 

November 16, 2021. But Erda’s mayor-elect did not submit a notice 

of impending boundary action with an approved final local entity

plat by December 16, 2021, because the county surveyor refused to 

approve the plat. After the sponsors sought and obtained a court 

order compelling the county surveyor to approve the plat, the 

approved plat was delivered to the Lieutenant Governor on 

December 30, 2021. A few days later, the Lieutenant Governor

certified the incorporation.

The Landowners’ Challenge

¶20 The Landowners filed a complaint against Erda and the 

Lieutenant Governor, seeking relief under the Declaratory 

Judgment Act, see UTAH CODE §§ 78B-6-401 to -412.4 The 

__________________________________________________________

4 Before the district court entered its ruling on the motions to 

dismiss, the Landowners moved to amend their complaint to add 

a claim for extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of 

Civil Procedure. That motion has yet to be ruled upon and has no 

bearing on our analysis in this appeal.
Cite as: 2024 UT 17

Opinion of the Court

7

Landowners sought a declaration that the following instruments 

were invalid: the feasibility study request, the petition for 

incorporation, and the certificate of incorporation.

¶21 The Landowners offered two bases for the requested relief.

First, they claimed that because the feasibility study request and 

petition for incorporation were submitted to the Lieutenant 

Governor with misrepresented signatures, the request and petition 

did not meet the statutory requirements. Specifically, John and 

Mark alleged that they had signed the feasibility study request as 

individual residential property owners, yet the sponsors 

characterized the signatures as representing Six Mile Ranch to meet 

the statutory signature threshold. And they alleged that their 

signatures were again used as if they represented Six Mile Ranch to 

satisfy the signature requirement for the petition for incorporation.

Based on these alleged deficiencies in the incorporation process, the 

Landowners maintained that Erda’s incorporation was “invalid 

from its inception.”

¶22 Second, the Landowners claimed that the notice of 

impending boundary action was not timely submitted to the 

Lieutenant Governor. Based on the thirty-day statutory deadline, 

see id. § 10-2a-217(1)(a), the Landowners argued that the notice 

must have been submitted by December 16, 2021. Although the 

mayor-elect did submit the notice on that date, the Landowners 

allege that the notice was deficient at that time because the final 

entity plat had not been approved by the county surveyor. An

approved plat was not submitted until December 30, 2021. 

According to the Landowners, this missed deadline invalidated the 

incorporation.

¶23 Erda and the Lieutenant Governor each moved to dismiss 

the complaint. Relevant to this appeal, both defendants argued that 

the Landowners lacked statutory authorization to pursue this 

action.

¶24 As part of its argument, Erda contended that the 

Landowners’ challenge is barred because the relevant statutes do

not “grant property owners a private right to bring an action” to 

challenge the validity of the incorporation process. In other words, 

although Utah statutes may provide some remedies to parties like 

the Landowners, this suit is not one of those statutorily authorized 

remedies.

¶25 The Lieutenant Governor similarly argued that the 

Landowners had not invoked a statute that “creates a right of action 
BLEAZARD v. CITY OF ERDA

Opinion of the Court

8

for judicial review of government’s performance of statutory 

functions.” The absence of a statutory right of action is decisive, the 

Lieutenant Governor maintained, because the Declaratory 

Judgment Act does not itself create a private right of action, and it

requires a plaintiff to have an independent legally protectible 

interest in the controversy. (Citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 

1148 (Utah 1983).) The Landowners lack such an interest, according 

to the Lieutenant Governor, because no relevant provision of law 

“creates a protectable interest for disgruntled landowners and 

taxpayers to retroactively invalidate the certified incorporation.”

¶26 While the Lieutenant Governor acknowledged that a 

provision of the incorporation code, Utah Code subsection

10-2a-217(2)(b), mentions a “challenge to the existence or 

incorporation of [a] city,” she argued that the provision does not

create a private right of action. Subsection (2)(b) provides as 

follows:

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a 

city is conclusively presumed to be lawfully 

incorporated and existing if, for two years following 

the city’s incorporation:

(i)(A) the city has levied and collected a 

property tax; or

(B) for a city incorporated on or after July 1, 

1998, the city has imposed a sales and use tax; 

and

(ii) no challenge to the existence or 

incorporation of the city has been filed in the 

district court for the county in which the city is 

located.

UTAH CODE § 10-2a-217(2)(b).

¶27 The Lieutenant Governor pointed out that subsection 

(2)(b) “does not create an express right of action” or “specify any 

people” that have the right to challenge a certified incorporation. 

Based on those omissions, the Lieutenant Governor argued that the 

Landowners lack statutory standing to challenge Erda’s 

incorporation under subsection (2)(b).

¶28 The Landowners urged the court to allow their claim to 

proceed. In response to the argument that they lack a legally 

protectible interest in enforcing the statutory incorporation 
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Opinion of the Court

9

requirements, the Landowners contended that the incorporation 

code gives them rights in the incorporation process. These rights,

they added, include “the right to sign, or refuse to sign, the request 

for feasibility study” and “the right to expect that the Lieutenant

Governor would not recognize [the Landowners’] signatures [as] 

having been given on behalf of Six Mile Ranch.” The Landowners

justified their ability to challenge the incorporation based on these 

purported interests.

¶29 Although the Landowners conceded that Utah law does 

not expressly provide a mechanism that allows them to challenge 

Erda’s incorporation, they argued that subsection (2)(b) recognizes 

the possibility that an incorporation can be challenged. The 

Landowners reasoned that to conclude otherwise would render 

superfluous the statute’s reference to a “challenge” to a city’s 

existence or incorporation. (Citing UTAH CODE

§ 10-2a-217(2)(b)(ii).)

¶30 From the Landowners’ perspective, subsection (2)(b) 

“clearly provides that an incorporation may be challenged” but 

“does not provide a statutory scheme for effectuating” such a 

challenge. In their view, the statute’s silence on how a challenge 

could be brought was not conclusive. The Landowners asserted

they were “not required to show statutory standing to maintain[] 

their claims,” as the Lieutenant Governor argued, but rather they

could challenge Erda’s incorporation upon a showing of 

“traditional standing.”5

¶31 The district court denied the motions to dismiss. The court 

agreed with the Landowners that the incorporation code authorizes 

them to challenge Erda’s incorporation. For two reasons, the court 

determined that Utah Code subsection 10-2a-217(2)(b) provides

that authorization. First, the court determined that under the 

surplusage canon of statutory interpretation, subsection (2)(b)’s 

reference to a “challenge” to a city’s existence or incorporation

must hold “meaning and significance.” To the court, that language 

“contemplates” that a party may challenge an incorporation, even 

after the incorporation is certified.

__________________________________________________________

5 “Our traditional standing test requires plaintiffs to allege that 

they have suffered or will suffer some distinct and palpable injury 

that gives them a personal stake in the outcome of the legal 

dispute.” S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Kane Cnty. Comm’n, 2021 UT 7, 

¶ 16, 484 P.3d 1146 (cleaned up).
BLEAZARD v. CITY OF ERDA

Opinion of the Court

10

¶32 Second, the court alluded to Utah caselaw regarding 

conclusive presumptions. The court gleaned from this caselaw that 

because subsection (2)(b) effectively precludes someone from 

challenging an incorporation after it is conclusively presumed to be 

valid, it “logically follows that there would be some grounds for 

someone to raise a legal and successful challenge to an 

incorporation before” the conclusive presumption is triggered.

¶33 The district court also agreed with the Landowners that 

because the incorporation code is silent about who may challenge 

an incorporation, the traditional standing test applies. And the 

court concluded that the Landowners’ claim meets that test.

¶34 Erda and the Lieutenant Governor sought permission to 

appeal the district court’s interlocutory order denying their 

motions to dismiss. We granted the petition for interlocutory 

review.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶35 Erda and the Lieutenant Governor request that we reverse 

the district court’s denial of their motions to dismiss. This presents 

“a question of law that we review for correctness, giving no 

deference to the district court’s determination.” Christiansen v. 

Harrison W. Constr. Corp., 2021 UT 65, ¶ 10, 500 P.3d 825.

ANALYSIS

¶36 The Landowners brought a single claim for relief, 

requesting a declaratory judgment that Erda’s incorporation is 

invalid because two statutory requirements were not met: (1) the 

feasibility study request and petition for incorporation did not 

include the requisite signatures, and (2) the notice of impending 

boundary action was untimely. Erda and the Lieutenant Governor

argue that the Landowners’ claim must be dismissed. We agree.

¶37 We begin our analysis by clarifying the appropriate legal 

framework to be applied in this case. When plaintiffs request 

declaratory relief, they must show, among other things, that they 

have a legally protectible interest in the controversy. As we explain

below, this inquiry depends on the nature of the asserted interest. 

Plaintiffs who seek a declaration that statutorily created 

requirements have been violated—and who do not invoke legal 

rights protected elsewhere, such as in the common law or the 

constitution—must show that they have so-called “statutory 

standing.” More precisely, they must show that they fall “within 

the class of parties that the legislature authorized to file suit” to 
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Opinion of the Court

11

enforce the statutory scheme. See Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39, 427 

P.3d 1155 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the 

judgment).6 If the statute creates new legal requirements but does 

not grant plaintiffs a corresponding right to sue to enforce those

requirements, the plaintiffs lack a legally protectible interest in the 

controversy, and the declaratory judgment action must be 

dismissed because it is not justiciable.

¶38 After laying the legal groundwork, we explain why the 

Landowners lack a legally protectible interest in Erda’s 

incorporation. The Landowners attempt to enforce statutory 

requirements through a declaratory judgment, yet they have not 

identified a statutory private right of action. Nor have they invoked 

rights protected by the common law, the constitution, or another 

source. Because they lack a legally protectible interest, they may not 

proceed with their claim for declaratory relief.

I. PLAINTIFFS WHO SEEK A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT BASED SOLELY 

ON ALLEGED STATUTORY VIOLATIONS MUST BE WITHIN THE CLASS 

OF PERSONS THE LEGISLATURE HAS AUTHORIZED TO SUE TO 

ENFORCE THE STATUTE

¶39 The Declaratory Judgment Act “grants a district court 

jurisdiction to determine any question of construction or validity of 

a statute that affects the rights, status, or other legal relations of any 

person and to declare that person’s rights, status, or legal relations 

under the statute.” Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 15, 66 P.3d 592; 

see also UTAH CODE § 78B-6-408. But to bring a declaratory 

judgment action, a plaintiff must show that “the justiciable and 

jurisdictional elements requisite in ordinary actions are present.”

Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 16 (cleaned up).

¶40 Our caselaw sets forth four elements that must be satisfied 

for a plaintiff to bring a declaratory judgment action: “(1) there 

must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties 

must be adverse; (3) the parties seeking relief must have a legally 

protectible interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues between 

the parties must be ripe for judicial determination.” Jenkins v. 

Finlinson, 607 P.2d 289, 290 (Utah 1980). Our holding in this case 

turns on the third element—whether the Landowners have “a 

__________________________________________________________

6 Justice Lee’s concurrence in Haik focused on public interest 

standing, something the Landowners do not assert on appeal. We 

cite the concurrence solely for its helpful articulation of statutory 

standing.
BLEAZARD v. CITY OF ERDA

Opinion of the Court

12

legally protectible interest residing with the party seeking relief.” 

See Miller, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 15.

¶41 Generally speaking, a party has an interest that is legally 

protectible for purposes of standing if it has a claim for relief that 

“emanates from . . . the common law, a statute or the constitution,” 

see Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39, 427 P.3d 1155 (Lee, A.C.J., 

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Here, the 

Landowners do not claim to have a non-preempted common law 

right to sue over the incorporation. Nor do they allege that the 

incorporation violated their constitutional rights. Rather, their suit 

is based entirely on the defendants’ alleged noncompliance with 

the incorporation code—the statutory scheme created by the 

legislature to govern the incorporation process. Because municipal 

incorporation is wholly a creature of statute, we must “look[] at the 

rights generally conferred by the statute” to determine if plaintiffs 

have a claim for relief. See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. San Juan Cnty. 

Comm’n, 2021 UT 6, ¶ 16, 484 P.3d 1160.

¶42 “[W]hether [a] plaintiff has a ‘legally protectible interest’ 

conferred by statute” hinges on “whether the [statute] generally 

provides [the plaintiff] with a right to sue for violations of the 

[statute].” Id. ¶¶ 15–16;see also McKitrick v. Gibson, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 18, 

496 P.3d 147 (assessing whether the petitioner was “one of the 

persons the statute allows to seek judicial review”). We look to the 

relevant statute because, where the legislature creates statutory

requirements, it is entitled to designate, as it “see[s] fit,” how those 

requirements are to be enforced. See McKitrick, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 16.

“And it is axiomatic that where [a] right of action is one created by 

statute, the law creating the right can also prescribe the conditions 

of its enforcement.” Id. ¶ 17 (cleaned up).

¶43 This requirement—that a plaintiff be “within the class of 

parties that the legislature authorized to file suit”—is commonly 

referred to as “statutory standing.” Haik, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 (Lee, 

A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). And 

“statutory standing is mandatory for statutory claims.” McKitrick, 

2021 UT 48, ¶ 48. Accordingly, in a declaratory judgment action to 

enforce a statute, statutory standing is an initial “hurdle” that a 

plaintiff must clear before a court proceeds to examine whether the 

plaintiff has shown traditional standing. See Haik, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 

(Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

Stated differently, where a plaintiff argues that a statute has been 

violated, the plaintiff must be within the class of parties that the 
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Opinion of the Court

13

legislature authorized to file suit for such a statutory violation, and 

“the presence of traditional or alternative standing will not cure a 

statutory standing deficiency.” McKitrick, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 2.

¶44 Here, the Landowners claim to have “a private right of 

action for declaratory relief.” However, the Declaratory Judgment 

Act “merely authorizes a new form of relief.” Jenkins v. Swan, 675 

P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). It “does not create a cause of action or 

grant jurisdiction to the court where it would not otherwise exist.”

Id. A plaintiff seeking to enforce statutory requirements through a 

declaratory judgment action lacks a “legally protectible interest in 

the controversy” unless the plaintiff can identify an express or 

implied right of action. See Miller, 2003 UT 12, ¶¶ 16, 25; see also 

Summit Cnty. v. Hideout, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 37, __ P.3d __ (holding that 

Summit County lacked a legally protectible interest where it had 

not “identif[ied] a statutory right of action”). Because the 

Landowners do not assert a common law or constitutional right,

they must establish statutory standing by identifying a statutory 

right of action—separate and apart from the Declaratory Judgment 

Act—that authorizes them to pursue the relief they request.

II. THE LANDOWNERS LACK A LEGALLY PROTECTIBLE INTEREST 

BECAUSE THE INCORPORATION CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE THEM 

WITH A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION

¶45 Aside from the Declaratory Judgment Act, the 

Landowners rely only on the incorporation code as the source of 

their legally protectible interest. Accordingly, they must show that 

the incorporation code grants them a private right of action to 

enforce its provisions. “A private statutory right of action exists 

when a private party can bring a lawsuit for relief from injuries 

caused by another’s violation of a . . . statute.” Buckner v. Kennard, 

2004 UT 78, ¶ 37, 99 P.3d 842 (cleaned up). This stands in contrast 

to enforcement authority granted to the state. For example, “a 

statute requiring drivers to remove car keys and lock the vehicle 

can be enforced by the state[] but does not establish a duty owed to 

a private individual who died when hit by a stolen car whose 

owner had violated the statute.” Id. ¶ 38.

¶46 Whether a party has a statutory private right of action “is 

a question of statutory interpretation.” Id. ¶ 41. We “look first to the 

plain language of the statute for an express indication that a private 

right of action was intended.” Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 

2005 UT 37, ¶ 24, 116 P.3d 342. Such an indication is made clear by 

“explicit language” that does not “require anyone to add language 
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Opinion of the Court

14

or make inferences to impart the full meaning of the statute.” Miller

v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 21, 66 P.3d 592.

¶47 “In the absence of language expressly granting a private 

right of action in the statute itself, the courts of this state are 

reluctant to imply a private right of action based on state law.” Id.

¶ 20. Our reluctance is amplified when, for example, discerning a 

right of action would “require[] us to infer language and meaning 

that does not appear on the face of the statute” or when doing so 

“would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s statutory scheme.”

See id. ¶¶ 19, 22. As a result, “we are not generally in the habit of 

implying a private right of action.” Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 

2002 UT 64, ¶ 21, 52 P.3d 1230 (cleaned up). In fact, “Utah courts 

have rarely, if ever, found a Utah statute to grant an implied private 

right of action.” Buckner, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 43.

¶48 The Landowners claim to have “a private right of action 

that is expressly referenced in Utah Code § 10-2a-217(2)(b)(ii).” The

relevant portion of the incorporation code provides as follows:

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a 

city is conclusively presumed to be lawfully 

incorporated and existing if, for two years following 

the city’s incorporation:

(i)(A) the city has levied and collected a 

property tax; or

(B) for a city incorporated on or after July 1, 

1998, the city has imposed a sales and use tax; 

and

(ii) no challenge to the existence or 

incorporation of the city has been filed in the 

district court for the county in which the city is 

located.

UTAH CODE § 10-2a-217(2)(b). Under the Landowners’ reading, this 

subsection “recognizes the existence of a private right of action to 

challenge Erda’s existence and incorporation.” Unless their claim 

for declaratory relief is recognized as a “challenge” under 

subsection (2)(b), they reason, the subsection’s reference to an 

incorporation challenge “is impermissibly rendered superfluous.”

The district court adopted this interpretation, concluding that the 

mention of a challenge “contemplates” claims like those brought by 

the Landowners.
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Opinion of the Court

15

¶49 This court rejected a similar argument in Miller. See 2003 

UT 12, ¶ 19. In that case, the plaintiffs—a group challenging a 

schoolteacher’s competence and performance—sued and 

requested “judicial declarations” that the teacher had violated 

various state statutes. Id. ¶ 5. As here, the question was whether the 

plaintiffs “possess[ed] a legally protectible interest” under a state 

statute. Id. ¶ 16. The plaintiffs cited a statute that, in their view, 

“grant[ed] a private right of action against a school district 

employee.” Id. The statute read as follows:

No civil action by or on behalf of a student relating to 

the professional competence or performance of a 

certified employee of a school district, or to the 

discipline of students by a certified employee, 

application of in loco parentis, or a violation of ethical 

conduct by an employee of a school district may be 

brought in a court until at least 60 days after the filing 

of a written complaint with the board of education of 

the district, or until findings have been issued by the 

board after a fair hearing on the complaint, 

whichever is sooner.

See id. ¶ 18 (citing UTAH CODE § 53A-7-202(1) (1997)). Because the 

provision seemed to assume that a “civil action by or on behalf of a 

student” could be brought in court sixty days after the filing of a 

written complaint, the plaintiffs asserted that it created “a new 

cause of action.” Id. ¶ 19.

¶50 We rejected the plaintiffs’ interpretation because it 

“impose[d] an unreasonable and unworkable construction[] and 

require[d] us to infer language and meaning” not apparent on the 

statute’s face. Id. We explained that the statute’s “manifest object” 

was “procedure,” in that it restricted existent legal rights by 

imposing requirements to be met before a plaintiff could seek to 

remedy complaints against a teacher. Id. Thus, on its face, the 

statute did not contain a “clear indication . . . that a private right of 

action was intended.” Id. ¶ 21.

¶51 We also declined to recognize an implied right of action. 

Even though the statute alluded to a civil action by or on behalf of 

a student brought in court, this “mere allusion” did not connote a 

legislative intent to impart a private right of action on the plaintiffs, 

particularly where the legislature had other manifest objects in 

mind. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. Recognizing Utah courts’ reluctance “to imply 

a private right of action based on state law,” id. ¶ 20, we 
BLEAZARD v. CITY OF ERDA

Opinion of the Court

16

emphasized that to infer a right of action “would be to override, by 

judicial fiat, a system which the Legislature has at least tacitly, if 

not expressly, sanctioned,” id. ¶ 22 (cleaned up).

¶52 The Landowners’ argument here is remarkably similar to 

the one we rejected in Miller. The Landowners contend that by 

alluding to a “challenge to the existence or incorporation of the city

. . . filed in the district court,” subsection (2)(b) “expresses a private 

right of action for a challenge to be mounted to the incorporation 

of a municipality within the first two years after incorporation.”

That argument fails for the same reasons we gave in Miller.

¶53 Looking “first to the plain language of the statute for an 

express indication that a private right of action was intended,”

Machan, 2005 UT 37, ¶ 24, we see none. Missing from subsection 

(2)(b) is explicit language conferring upon landowners—or upon 

any class of parties—a right to sue for violations of the 

incorporation code. On its face, subsection (2)(b) creates a 

conclusive presumption in favor of an incorporation two years 

after the incorporation takes effect, provided that enumerated 

conditions are met. The subsection merely acknowledges preexisting rights, if any, such as constitutional claims or common law 

rights not preempted by the incorporation code. It does not, by its 

express language, create new rights for a class that includes the 

Landowners. As in Miller, “[w]e see no clear indication from the 

statute itself that a private right of action was intended.” 2003 UT 

12, ¶ 21.

¶54 Nor can we infer a private right of action. The Landowners

resist this conclusion, observing that subsection (2)(b) sets forth the 

what-where-when of an incorporation challenge. After all, the 

Landowners reason, subsection (2)(b) refers to a “challenge” that is 

“filed in the district court” within “two years following” an 

incorporation. According to the Landowners, that language 

implicitly recognizes that a court challenge is available.

¶55 Yet that argument is indistinguishable from the one we 

rejected in Miller. See id. Like subsection (2)(b), the statute in Miller

outlined the what-where-when of a statutory challenge, referring 

to a “civil action” filed “in a court” within “at least 60 days.” See id.

¶ 18 (citing UTAH CODE § 53A-7-202(1) (1997)). Indeed, the statute 

in Miller also included the who: “a student.” See id. (citing UTAH 

CODE § 53A-7-202(1) (1997)). With this in mind, our conclusion in 

Miller—that “we must require more than a mere allusion to ‘civil 

actions,’” id. ¶ 21 (cleaned up)—applies with equal force here. We 
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Opinion of the Court

17

require more than a reference to a “challenge” to an incorporation

“filed in district court,” see UTAH CODE § 10-2a-217(2)(b)(ii), “as 

evidence of a legislative intent to impart substantive rights,” see 

Miller, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 21. Absent textual evidence to the contrary, 

we presume that the statute refers to challenges based on existent 

legal rights.7 We will not infer that the legislature intended to create 

a new statutory right of action in such an oblique way. See id. ¶ 19.

¶56 In sum, we hold that the Landowners lack a legally 

protectible interest in Erda’s incorporation. They seek to vindicate 

statutory violations through a declaratory judgment and need a 

corresponding private right of action to do so. Because they have 

not identified a private right of action, they lack a protectible 

interest in the controversy and are not entitled to declaratory relief.

CONCLUSION

¶57 The Landowners seek a declaratory judgment that Erda 

and the Lieutenant Governor failed to comply with the provisions 

of the incorporation code. But the Landowners have not identified 

a private right of action that would allow them to enforce those 

provisions. Without a private right of action, the Landowners

cannot show that they have a legally protectible interest in 

enforcing the incorporation code, a necessary component to 

bringing a declaratory judgment action. As a result, we hold that 

the Landowners’ claim for declaratory relief must be dismissed,

and we reverse the district court’s decision.

__________________________________________________________

7 For instance, Erda asserts that a plaintiff has a private right of 

action for certain violations of the election code. The Lieutenant 

Governor adds that because self-executing constitutional 

provisions “create[] a private cause of action,” subsection (2)(b)’s 

mention of an incorporation challenge may refer to a challenge 

premised on the violation of a constitutional right. Because the 

Landowners rely only on the Declaratory Judgment Act and the 

incorporation code—neither of which creates a private right of 

action—we express no opinion on whether another statute, the 

common law, or the constitution provides a private right of action 

to challenge an incorporation.