FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE

RESPONSE PLAN

THE RED BOOK

DRAFT October 2020

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2

The Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Response Plan: The 

Red Book (October 2020) incorporates comments 

received on the FMD Response Plan: The Red Book 

(September 2014) and reflects updates to Foreign 

Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD 

PReP) materials.
This plan does not replace existing regional, State, 

Tribal, local, or industry preparedness and response 

plans relating to FMD. Regional, State, Tribal, local, and 

industry plans should be aimed at more specific issues 

in an FMD response.

In particular, States should develop response plans 

focused on the specific characteristics of the State and 

its livestock industry.

3
Outline

Ø Introduction and Information

Ø Preparedness and Response

Ø Response Goals and Strategy for Recovery

Ø Specific Response Critical Activities and Tools

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5

Introduction and Information

FMD RESPONSE PLAN
Objectives of this Plan

Ø Identify the capabilities needed to respond to an

foot-and-mouth (FMD) outbreak.

Ø Identify critical activities that are involved in 

responding to an outbreak and the time-frames for 

these activities.

In an outbreak situation, these critical activities 

are under the authority of an Incident Command (IC) 

per the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

6 Introduction and Information
Etiology

Ø It is a highly contagious viral 

disease that affects

– domestic cloven-hoofed 

animals (cattle, swine, sheep, 

and goats) and

– many wildlife species (deer, 

bison, pronghorn antelope, 

and feral swine). 

7 Introduction and Information

Ø FMD is also known as fiebre aftosa, fievre aphteuse, 

and maul-und-klauenseuche.
FMD Virus Subtypes

Ø There are seven immunologically distinct FMD virus 

(FMDV) serotypes: 

– A, O, C, South African Territories types SAT-1, SAT-2, SAT-3, 

& Asia 1.

Ø More than 65 strains of FMD virus (FMDV) have been 

recognized.

Ø There is no cross protection between serotypes, and 

protection between strains varies depending on their 

antigenic similarity.

8 Introduction and Information
Global Distribution

Ø FMD is present in approximately two-thirds of the 

world and endemic in parts of Africa, Asia, Eastern 

Europe, the Middle East, and South America.

Ø North America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico) 

and Central America are free of FMD, as is Western 

Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. 

Ø The last FMD outbreak in the United States was in 

1929. 

9 Introduction and Information
Threat to the United States

Ø International travel and trade pose a substantial risk 

of FMD entering the country.

Ø The disease is a critical threat to the United States 

because of the millions of susceptible cloven-hoofed 

livestock and wild animals.

Ø FMD can be transmitted over long distances by 

animal products, fomites, people, and other 

mechanical vectors.

Ø FMDV is also considered a potential agent for 

agricultural terrorism.

10 Introduction and Information
FMD Effects

Source: Knight-Jones, T. and Rushton. (n.d.).

11 Introduction and Information
Economic Impact

Ø The 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom cost 

an estimated $12-18 billion.

Ø A U.S. outbreak contained in California could cost 

between $6-14 billion; a nation-wide agroterrorism 

attack could range up to $228 billion.

Ø Economic impact estimates depend primarily on

– the duration and geographic extent of the outbreak; 

– the extent of trade embargoes on U.S. products; and

– the reaction of consumers to the disease and control measures. 

12 Introduction and Information
No Zoonotic Potential

Ø FMD is not considered a public health threat. 

– FMDV infections in humans are very rare and mild: 

about 40 cases have been diagnosed since 1921. 

– FMD differs from hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD) of 

humans.

Ø The FMD virus may be able to survive in the human 

respiratory tract for 24 hours, allowing people to 

potentially serve as a source of virus exposure for 

susceptible animals. 

13 Introduction and Information
Susceptible Species

Ø FMD affects cloven-hoofed animals. 

Ø The disease is generally most severe in cattle and 

pigs. 

Ø While rare, FMD has been documented in several 

other species including elephants and hedgehogs.

14 Introduction and Information

– Cattle, bison

– Pigs, wild boar

– Sheep, goats

– Deer, elk, llamas,
Carriers

15 Introduction and Information

Ø FMDV carriers are defined as “recovered or vaccinated 

and exposed animals in which FMDV persists in the 

oropharynx for more than 28 days.”

– Carriers can potentially infect susceptible animals.

Ø The duration of carrier status in cattle can range from 

several months to several years. 

Ø Sheep and goats become carriers less often and for 

shorter periods than cattle; swine are not reported to 

become carriers. 

Ø The only known natural reservoir of FMD exists in the 

African buffalo (Syncerus caffer).
16 Introduction and Information

Introduction and Transmission

Ø Animal to animal contact

Ø Air/Windborne

Ø Fomites

Ø Feed

Ø Personnel

Ø Wildlife
Virus Introduction and Transmission

Ø FMDV is thought to be introduced through infected 

animals, contaminated fomites, and, possibly, carrier 

animals. 

– The virus is present in secretions from acutely ill animals.

– Viral shedding may occur days before signs of disease.

Ø Wildlife does not appear to be a common means of 

introduction.

Ø Meat products have been an important mode of 

introduction.

17 Introduction and Information
Aerosol Transmission

Ø Pigs excrete large amounts of virus through their 

respiratory tract, leading to infectious aerosols that 

can be inhaled by other animals.

Ø FMDV has also been known to spread through 

windborne transmission to distances well over 10 

kilometers over land in favorable conditions.

Ø The conditions for long distance spread are thought 

to be highly specific, and include high relative 

humidity, steady wind, minimal convection currents, 

and lack of topographical obstructions. 

18 Introduction and Information
Persistence in Environment 

and Animal Products

Ø FMD viruses are susceptible to both acid and alkaline 

pH and are quickly inactivated by 6.0 < pH > 9.0.

Ø FMDV is preserved by refrigeration and freezing; and 

progressively inactivated by temps above 50°C.

– Meat must be subjected to heat treatment at 70°C for 30 

minutes to ensure FMDV deactivation.

Ø FMDV can also persist in wool, hair, and other 

products for substantial periods.

19 Introduction and Information
Incubation Period

Ø Incubation period ranges from 2–14 days (speciesdependent).

Ø The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 

Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code) 

gives the incubation period as 14 days.

20 Introduction and Information
Morbidity and Mortality 

Ø The morbidity and mortality of FMD varies 

depending on the species affected, as well as the 

serotype and strain of the virus. 

Ø Morbidity is significant and can approach 100 

percent. 

Ø Mortality is typically low in adult animals (1–5 

percent), though higher mortality rates are typically 

observed in very young animals.

21 Introduction and Information
Clinical Signs

Ø FMD is typically recognized by vesicles, though 

affected animals may show a variety of clinical signs.

Ø Vesicular signs are most prominent in cattle and pigs; 

often unpronounced in sheep and goats.

Ø FMD vesicles are indistinguishable from those of 

other vesicular diseases.

22 Introduction and Information

Image from EuFMD

Retrieved from: 

http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/eufmd/docs/training/KenyaManualMarch2014Final.pdf
Clinical Signs in Cattle

Ø Pyrexia (fever), anorexia, shivering, reduction in milk 

production for 2–3 days, followed by vesicular signs:

– grinding of teeth, drooling, excess nasal mucous 

secretions,

– lameness, stamping, or kicking caused by vesicles on 

buccal and nasal mucous membranes or between the 

claws and coronary band,

– vesicles on mammary gland and tongue, and

– ruptured vesicles.

Ø Abortion or sudden death in young animals.

Ø The infection usually resolves in 8–15 days unless 

there is a secondary bacterial infection.

23 Introduction and Information
Clinical Signs in Pigs

Ø Pyrexia (fever) and blanching of the coronary bands, 

followed by:

– severe foot lesions,

– severe lameness,

– reluctance to move,

– no drooling (fewer vesicles), and

– lesions on snout, muzzle, gums, and interdigital spaces.

Ø High mortality in piglets.

Ø Possible abortion.

24 Introduction and Information
Clinical Signs in Sheep and Goats

Ø Typically less pronounced and frequent than in pigs 

and cattle, and may go unrecognized.

Ø Possible mild lameness where there are small 

vesicles or erosions on coronary band.

Ø Death of young animals.

Ø Lesions in dental pad of sheep.

Ø Agalactia in milking animals.

Ø Possible abortion.

25 Introduction and Information
Gross Pathological Lesions

Ø Lesions typically include vesicles or blisters on the 

tongue, dental pad, gums, cheek, hard and soft 

palate, lips, nostrils, muzzle, coronary bands, teats, 

udder, snout of pigs, corium of dewclaws, and 

interdigital spaces. 

Ø Necrosis may also occur.

Ø Lesions will vary among cattle, swine, and sheep.

Ø Resources exist online with extensive pictures 

demonstrating the aging of FMD lesions.

26 Introduction and Information
Differential Diagnosis

Ø Vesicular stomatitis, swine vesicular disease, and 

vesicular exanthema of swine are all clinically 

indistinguishable from FMD. 

Ø FMD also has common features with bovine viral 

diarrhea, mucosal disease, 

infectious bovine 

rhinotracheitis, and 

bluetongue.

27 Introduction and Information
28 Introduction and Information

Ø Infection with FMDV causes animals to develop a 

humoral antibody that is transient and also specific 

for the subtype of the infecting FMDV.

Ø Approximately 7–14 days post-infection, protective 

antibodies are developed against FMDV structural 

proteins. 

Immunity

Natural Infection
Immunity

Vaccination

Ø Vaccination against FMDV has been practiced with 

relatively positive immunity results, mostly in cattle.

Ø Vaccine has not only prevented clinical disease but 

helps control FMDV transmission in an outbreak.

Ø Vaccination campaigns are more likely to succeed if 

the interval between vaccination and exposure is 

sufficient to ensure animals develop adequate 

immunity to FMDV.

29 Introduction and Information
Immunity

Vaccination Limitations

Vaccines provide only serotype-specific protection. 

Vaccination against one serotype may fail to protect 

fully or at all against other strains within the serotype. 

This protection depends on:

– the similarity between the field strain and the vaccine, and

– the potency of the vaccine 

(more potent vaccines are likely 

to be protective against even 

less well-matched strains).

30 Introduction and Information
Immunity

In Studies

Ø Onset of immunity is not immediate. Inactivated 

FMD vaccines may decrease viral shedding and 

clinical signs in cattle and sheep in challenge studies 

as early as 4–5 days after vaccination with protection 

improving for the next 2–3 weeks.

Ø Swine appear to be more difficult to protect shortly 

after challenge; limited studies have reported some 

protection as soon as 3–4 days after vaccination.

– With more severe challenges, pigs may not be completely 

protected against disease until 21–28 days after 

vaccination.

31 Introduction and Information
Vaccination

Ø No currently available vaccine provides “sterilizing 

immunity” which will prevent subsequent infection.

Ø It is possible that individual vaccinated cattle, sheep, 

and goats infected with FMDV could become 

asymptomatic virus carriers.

Ø Differentiating infected animals from vaccinated 

animals, known as a “DIVA” strategy, would be 

critical to a successful emergency vaccination 

strategy in an FMD outbreak. 

32 Introduction and Information
DIVA Vaccines

Ø DIVA diagnostic techniques typically use tests for 

antibodies against viral nonstructural proteins to 

differentiate animals that are infected with FMDV in 

the field (natural infection) from those that have 

been vaccinated with an FMD vaccine. 

Ø This diagnostic DIVA capability is important for an 

effective vaccination campaign, business continuity 

processes, and FMDV surveillance.

33 Introduction and Information
34

Preparedness and Response

FMD NATIONAL
Foundations of Preparedness and Response

Successful emergency preparedness for and response to 

FMD is based on the principles found in the 

Ø National Response Framework (NRF) and 

Ø National Incident Management System (NIMS).

These documents available at

www.fema.gov

35 Preparedness and Response
National Response Framework

Ø Part of the National Preparedness System. 

Ø The NRF sets the strategy and doctrine for how the 

Nation conducts all-hazards response, through a whole 

community approach.

– Composed of a base document, Emergency Support 

Function (ESF) Annexes, and Support Annexes 

– Describes specific authorities and incorporates best 

practices for managing incidents of any size or complexity.

– Built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified 

in the NIMS.

36 Preparedness and Response
National Incident Management System

Ø NIMS helps departments and agencies at all levels of 

government, the private sector, and non-governmental 

organizations 

– to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and 

mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause or 

complexity

– providing a shared vocabulary, systems, and processes.

Ø A common framework to achieve common goals.

37 Preparedness and Response
NIMS Key Components

Ø Resource Management

– systematic, prior to and during incidents, and scalable

Ø Command and Coordination

– roles, processes and structures, including ICS, EOCs, MAC

Ø Communications and Information Management

– incident-related policies, equipment, data architecture, 

systems, standards, and training 

38 Preparedness and Response
USDA Responsibilities

Ø Under ESF-11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), 

APHIS is the coordinating agency.

APHIS is the agency responsible for detecting animal disease 

anomalies, assigning foreign animal disease diagnosticians to 

conduct investigations, and coordinating tasks with other 

ESFs, State veterinary emergency response teams, and 

voluntary animal care organizations to respond.

Ø USDA agencies play a role as Coordinating Agency in 

three ESFs and as Support Agency in the remaining 

twelve. 

39 Preparedness and Response
APHIS’ Role

As the primary Federal agency for incident 

management during an FAD event of livestock or 

poultry, APHIS 

Ø deploys Incident Management Teams (IMT), 

Ø coordinates the incident response, 

Ø manages public messages, and 

Ø takes measures to control and eradicate disease.

40 Preparedness and Response
USDA Authorities

Ø The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S. Code 

8301 et seq., authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to 

– restrict the importation, entry, or further movement in the 

United States or 

– order the destruction or removal of animals and related 

conveyances and facilities to prevent the introduction or 

dissemination of livestock pests or diseases. 

Ø The AHPA authorizes related activities with respect 

to exportation, interstate movement, cooperative 

agreements, enforcement and penalties, seizure, 

quarantine, and disease and pest eradication. 

41 Preparedness and Response
USDA Authorities—Cooperation

Ø The AHPA gives the Secretary authority to cooperate 

with to multiple entities to prevent, detect, control, 

or eradicate FMD. 

– other Federal agencies, State and foreign 

governments, domestic or international organizations 

or associations, Tribal nations, and other persons

Ø It allows that the Secretary may declare that an 

extraordinary emergency exists.

– Provides additional flexibilities

– Allows for restrictions within a State or Territory, after 

consultation with State or Tribal officials 

42 Preparedness and Response
USDA Authorities—Indemnity

Ø The AHPA further directs the Secretary to 

compensate the owner for animals (and articles, 

facilities, and conveyances) taken under these 

provisions. 

Ø Payment is not to exceed fair market value (FMV).

Ø Regulations for FMD authorize the APHIS 

Administrator to pay 50% of FMV for takings in a 

disease control and eradication effort. 

(9 CFR §53.2 )

– The Secretary is given authority to increase 

compensation to 100% of FMV.

43 Preparedness and Response
USDA Activities—FAD PReP

Ø APHIS and its stakeholders established FAD PReP to 

provide guidance for preparing and responding to an 

FAD emergency.

Ø FAD PReP is a set of strategic concept of operations 

documents, disease response plans SOPs, and other 

materials to create a comprehensive approach to 

managing FADs 

Ø FAD PReP is consistent with NRF and NIMS. 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

44 Preparedness and Response
FAD PReP offers...

– competent veterinary guidance on cleaning 

and disinfection, disposal, mass depopulation, 

and other activities;

– information on disease control and eradication 

strategies and principles;

– guidance on health, safety, and personal 

protective equipment issues;

– biosecurity information and site-specific 

management strategies; and

– training and educational resources.

45 Preparedness and Response
USDA Activities—Exercises

Ø Multiple preparedness exercises have been 

conducted to simulate an FMD outbreak and 

response effort in the United States. 

– These exercises allow responders to discuss and practice 

FMD response activities and to consider the social and 

economic implications of an FMD outbreak. 

– They help prepare us for the difficult decisions that will be 

made regarding animal depopulation and business 

continuity. 

– Multistate functional exercises, like ARMAR (Agriculture and Response Management and Resources) held in 2018, 

enhance coordination and collaboration among States, and 

between State and Federal governments. 

46 Preparedness and Response
Domestic Activities

USDA and its Federal partners conduct a variety of 

ongoing FMD preparedness and response activities.

Ø Vesicular disease surveillance

Ø Prohibited items airport screening

Ø Pre-export quarantines

Ø Monitoring health of animals at import

Ø Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC)

Ø Modeling, assessment, and geospatial analyses

Ø Emergency veterinary assistance response corps

47 Preparedness and Response
International Activities

USDA also conducts ongoing international activities in 

support of FMD eradication and to bolster 

preparedness planning and response capabilities.

Ø Hemispheric collaboration

Ø International coordination

Ø Global Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Alliance 

(GFRA)

Ø Emergency veterinary assistance to other countries

Ø OIE-member country

48 Preparedness and Response
USDA Organizational Strategy

Ø APHIS employs NIMS and the Incident Command 

System (ICS) organizational structures to manage a 

response to an FAD outbreak. 

Ø ICS is designed to enable efficient and effective 

domestic incident management by integrating 

facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and 

communications operating within a common 

organizational structure.

49 Preparedness and Response
APHIS Incident Management Structure

Ø The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive 

responsible for implementing APHIS policy during an 

FMD outbreak, supported by

– APHIS Management Team (AMT),

– Emergency Preparedness Committee (EPC), and

– VS Deputy Administrator and Chief Veterinary Officer 

(VSDA-CVO).

Ø An APHIS-level Multi-program Committee (MPC), or a 

USDA Multiagency Coordination group (MAC), may be 

established to coordinate resources. 

50 Preparedness and Response
APHIS MPC

Ø Likely formed early on with the expectation that an 

FMD response needs robust support

Ø To prioritize the sharing and use of critical resources 

Ø Establishes supportive relationships among the 

agencies preparing for and responding to an FMD 

outbreak

Ø Could expand to a multiagency command to include 

representatives from USDA agencies or other 

government agencies in a complex response 

51 Preparedness and Response
MPC/MAC Functions

Ø MPC/MAC functions are executed at various levels, 

and typically include:

– the coordination of policy, 

– incident priorities, 

– resource allocation and acquisition, and 

– resolution of issues common to all parties.

Ø The size and scope of the FMD incident dictates what 

levels and types of coordinating groups and functions 

are required.

52 Preparedness and Response
APHIS ICG and IC Structure

Ø An APHIS ICG is immediately established to oversee 

the functions and response activities associated with 

the incident.

Ø The ICG coordinates with any MPC or MAC 

established at the APHIS or USDA level.

Ø The ICG coordinates with Co-Incident Commanders 

in a unified IC structure. 

– State Animal Health Official (SAHO) and the VS Area 

Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC), or their designees

53 Preparedness and Response
APHIS Incident Coordination Group

APHIS ICG responsibilities in an FMD outbreak include

– formulating policy options,

– assisting in implementing response and recovery 

strategies,

– providing situational awareness,

– ensuring responder and public health and safety,

– supporting IMTs and their requirements,

– assisting in coordinating resources and integrating other 

organizations into the ICS, and

– providing information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) 

for use in media and stakeholder briefings.

54 Preparedness and Response
55 Preparedness and Response

APHIS Multi-program Coordination, Incident Coordination Group,

and Incident Command Structures
Incident Management and Organizational Structure

Ø The actual organizational structure for an incident 

will be specific to the needs of the incident.

Ø The field configuration would include a unified 

incident command and NIMT plus needed positions. 

Ø APHIS will consider various strategies to supplement 

response personnel, either novel concepts or those 

utilized in recent animal disease outbreak responses. 

56 Preparedness and Response
57 Preparedness and Response

Federal Coordination: USDA and DHS/FEMA 

Ø Organization of multiple Federal Departments in 

support of an animal disease event depends upon 

the magnitude of the event. 

Ø During the course of an FMD outbreak response, 

USDA may request Federal-to-Federal support as 

necessary from other Federal agencies. 

Ø The Secretary could request DHS to manage 

coordination of Federal resources; USDA would 

maintain the lead of overall incident management.
Diagnostic Resources and Laboratory Support

National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL)

NVSL is the official reference laboratory for FAD 

diagnostic testing and study in the United States.

– NVSL provides all confirmatory testing for FMD, including 

those found presumptively positive at a National Animal 

Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory. 

– It has two locations for FAD diagnostic testing:

o Ames, IA (NVSL-Ames).

o Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL), Plum 

Island, NY (NVSL-FADDL).

– By 2023, NVSL-FADDL will move to the National Bio and 

Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas.

58 Preparedness and Response
Diagnostic Resources and Laboratory Support

National Animal Health Laboratory Network

Ø Consists of 59 laboratories, of which 45 are approved 

to perform FMD diagnostic testing.

Ø Coordinates the veterinary diagnostic laboratory 

capacity of State animal health laboratories.

Ø The NAHLN provides a means for 

– early detection of FMD, 

– rapid response through surge capacity to test outbreak 

samples, and 

– recovery by the capability to test large numbers of samples 

to show freedom from FMD. 

59 Preparedness and Response
Diagnostic Resources and Laboratory Support

Center for Veterinary Biologics

Ø APHIS’ Center for Veterinary Biologics is responsible 

for licensing new products, including new diagnostic 

test kits and vaccines for FMD. 

Ø This work—centered on enforcement of the VirusSerum-Toxin Act—ensures that pure, safe, potent, and 

effective veterinary biologics are available for the 

diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of animal 

diseases. 

60 Preparedness and Response
61

Response Goals and Strategy

FMD RESPONSE PLAN
Response Goals

The goals of an FMD response are to:

– detect, control, and contain FMD in livestock as 

quickly as possible;

– eradicate FMD using strategies that seek to protect 

public health and the environment, and stabilize 

animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy; 

and

– provide science- and risk-based approaches and 

systems to facilitate continuity of business for noninfected animals and non-contaminated animal 

products.

62 Response Goals and Strategy
Critical Activities

Ø Public communication and messaging campaign

Ø Swift imposition of quarantine and movement controls

Ø Stringent and effective biosecurity measures

Ø Rapid diagnosis and reporting

Ø Epidemiological investigation and tracing

Ø Increased surveillance

Ø Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises 

and non-contaminated products (Secure Food Supply Plans)

Ø Rapid mass depopulation and euthanasia

Ø Effective and appropriate disposal procedures

Ø Virus elimination measures

Ø Emergency vaccination (as the response strategy indicates)

63 Response Goals and Strategy
Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign

Ø Occurs in conjunction with any response strategy or 

strategies.

Ø Engages and leverages State-Federal-Tribalstakeholder relationships to provide unified public 

messages for all audiences.

Ø Addresses issues and concerns relating to food 

safety, public health, and animal welfare.

Ø Addresses issues and concerns related to interstate 

commerce, continuity of business, and international 

trade. 

64 Response Goals and Strategy
Epidemiological Principles

Three basic epidemiological principles form the 

foundation to contain, control, and eradicate FMD in 

the U.S. domestic livestock population:

– Prevent contact between FMDV and susceptible animals.

– Stop the production of FMDV by infected or exposed animals.

– Increase the disease 

resistance of susceptible 

animals to the FMDV or 

reduce the shedding of 

FMDV in infected or 

exposed animals.

65 Response Goals and Strategy
U.S. FMD Vaccination Policy

Ø The use of emergency vaccination strategies may be 

considered in an FMD outbreak. 

Ø An FMD response may use a variety of vaccination 

strategies in order to detect, control, contain, and 

ultimately eradicate FMD in domestic animals. 

Ø The use of emergency vaccination will be determined 

by the VSDA/CVO, the SAHO, and the incident 

Unified Command.

66 Response Goals and Strategy
Response Strategy for Control and Eradiation of 

FMD in Domestic Livestock

Ø There are several generally accepted strategies for 

the control and eradication of FMD in domestic 

livestock following an outbreak.

– Stamping-out

– Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill

– Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to 

slaughter

– Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live

– Emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out

67 Response Goals and Strategy
Stamping-Out

Definition

“Stamping-out” is defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code as the: 

68 Response Goals and Strategy

killing of animals which are affected and those suspected 

of being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, 

those in other herds which have been exposed to infection 

by direct animal to animal contact, or by indirect contact 

with the causal pathogen; this includes all susceptible 

animals, vaccinated or unvaccinated, on infected 

establishments.
Stamping-Out 

ØThe goal is to depopulate infected livestock in the 

quickest, safest, and most humane way possible.

– Ideally within 24 hours after a presumptive positive 

classification

Ø Premises are prioritized so that those with the 

highest potential for FMD spread are stamped-out 

first.

Ø Public concerns about stamping-out require a 

proactive public relations and liaison campaign. 

– Stakeholders, the public, and the international community must 

be involved.

69 Response Goals and Strategy
Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

(Infected Premises would be Depopulated)

70 Response Goals and Strategy
Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency 

Vaccination to Kill or Slaughter

Ø The goal is to suppress virus replication in high-risk 

susceptible animals by using emergency vaccination

– then depopulate or slaughter vaccinates at a later date,

as determined by IC and the VSDA/CVO. 

Ø Ring or regional vaccination around an infected 

premises or infected zone exemplifies this strategy. 

Ø For movement to slaughter, DIVA testing may be 

necessary.

71 Response Goals and Strategy
Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill or Slaughter

(Infected Premises would be depopulated)

72 Response Goals and Strategy
Examples of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill or Slaughter

(Infected Premises would be depopulated)

73 Response Goals and Strategy
Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency 

Vaccination to Live

Ø The goal is to protect susceptible animals from 

infection using emergency vaccination with the 

deliberate intent to maintain vaccinates for the 

duration of their usefulness. 

Ø It involves the targeted vaccination of non-infected 

animals. 

– This may include valuable genetic stock, 

– long-lived production animals, or 

– areas with a high-density population of susceptible 

animals at high risk of becoming infected. 

74 Response Goals and Strategy
Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out 

Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live 

(Infected Premises would be Depopulated)

75 Response Goals and Strategy
Emergency Vaccination to Live 

without Stamping-Out

Ø This strategy involves the emergency vaccination of 

susceptible animals, with no intention of 

slaughtering or depopulating these animals later 

solely because of their vaccination status. 

Ø It is unlikely to be employed initially but might be 

relied upon in the course of an FMD outbreak 

reaching endemic status.

76 Response Goals and Strategy
Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Emergency

Vaccination to Live without Stamping-Out

77 Response Goals and Strategy
Factors Influencing the 

Selection of Response Strategy

Ø Consequences of the outbreak

Ø Acceptance of response policy

Ø Scale of the outbreak

Ø Rate of outbreak spread

Ø Availability of vaccine 

Ø Resources available to 

implement response strategies

78 Response Goals and Strategy
Emergency Vaccine Sourcing

Two mechanisms exist by which the United States is 

supplied with FMD vaccine.

Ø North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank 

(NAFMDVB) [U.S. has 70% share]

– An initial order could provide 70% of 1.75-2.5M doses in 10-14 

days.

Ø National Animal Vaccine and Veterinary 

Countermeasures Bank (NAVVCB)

– 2.5M doses in 10-14 days, with subsequent shipments every 10- 14 days, as available.

– Vaccine acquisition is underway, with a goal of 10 and 25 million 

doses of each of the 10-12 highest risk strains to North America.

79 Response Goals and Strategy
Emergency Vaccine Sourcing

Vaccination Campaign Considerations

Ø If the matched vaccine doses available from the 

banks are all used and a vaccine campaign is desired, 

additional vaccine could be manufactured. 

– There may be a gap in vaccine receipt as the production 

period for newly manufactured vaccine is 14 weeks.

– Vaccine could then be received in continuously in large 

batches of as much as 1M doses per week (for all of North 

America).

– A contractual commitment for 40-80 million doses would 

be required.

80 Response Goals and Strategy
Emergency Vaccine Sourcing

Expanding Vaccine Capabilities

Ø If an appropriately matched vaccine is not available, a 

new vaccine may need to be developed and tested.

– This could take many months.

Ø In 2018, the Secretary of Agriculture authorized the 

movement of a modified, non-infectious version of the 

FMD virus onto the U.S. mainland for continued vaccine 

development and study. 

Ø Novel vaccine technologies on a variety of different 

platforms are currently being pursued both commercially 

and within Federal-government research institutions.

81 Response Goals and Strategy
Phases and Types of FMD Outbreaks

Types of Outbreaks

Ø Having pre-defined phases and types may be useful as 

reference points to facilitate development and 

implementation of emergency response plans and 

processes. 

Ø The phase (temporal) and type (extent) of the FMD 

outbreak will change over time.

Ø Type can loosely defined in a continuum as follows: 
Phases and Types of FMD Outbreaks

Phases of Outbreaks

83 Response Goals and Strategy

Phases are progressive.

1. Confirmed—confirmation to 

initial assessment of extent

2. Continued—surveillance and 

epidemiology underway to 

support incident management

3. Controlled—plan implemented 

to recover disease-free status 

4. Freedom declared—possibly 

with vaccination
FMD Country Status Designations

84 Response Goals and Strategy

The OIE has six official country recognitions for FMD:

– FMD-free country where vaccination is not practiced; 

– FMD-free country where vaccination is practiced; 

– FMD-free zone where vaccination is not practiced; 

– FMD-free zone where vaccination is practiced 

– FMD-free compartment; and 

– FMD-infected country or zone.
Ø To recover free status, minimum time requirements 

apply in coordination with surveillance efforts and 

other documentation.

– 3 months, if stamping-out

o after the last animal killed

– 3 months, if stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to slaughter 

o after the slaughter of all vaccinated animals

– 6 months, if a stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to live 

o after the last case or last vaccination

85

OIE Minimum Time to FMD-Free Designations 

Response Goals and Strategy
– 12 months, if stamping-out is not applied or is discontinued

o but where a continued vaccination policy has been adopted, after 

the last vaccination 

ØTo apply for FMD freedom with vaccination 

– 24 months after the last case, if stamping-out 

is not employed and vaccination is continuing 

86

OIE Min Time to FMD-Free Designations (cont’d) 

Response Goals and Strategy
A country re-applying for country or zone freedom from 

FMD where vaccination is practiced or not practiced 

should show evidence of an active surveillance 

program for FMD as well as absence of FMDV 

infection/circulation.

These general surveillance conditions and methods for FMD are 

found in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

87

Surveillance for Recognition of 

Disease-Freedom

Response Goals and Strategy
Ø Quarantine and movement controls will be 

maintained until at least 28 days have elapsed since 

the decontamination of all confirmed IP and negative 

results of surveillance activities.

– If vaccination was used in the outbreak, vaccinates may 

still be subject to movement control and monitoring 

measures after CA release.

Ø Infected premises will remain vacant for a period of 

time before restocking susceptible animals. 

– The minimum recommendation is 21 days.

88

Release of Control Area (CA) Restrictions

Response Goals and Strategy
Ø While the OIE lists minimum time requirements for 

recovering FMD-freedom after an outbreak in a 

previously free country, it should again be 

acknowledged that re-establishing international 

trade with trading partners may take longer than 

these minimum time periods. 

89

Country Freedom Declaration Caveat

Response Goals and Strategy
90

Critical Activities and Tools

FMD RESPONSE PLAN
Case Definitions

Suspect

An FMD-susceptible animal that has either

Ø clinical signs consistent with FMD; OR

Ø inconclusive or positive laboratory test results 

performed on a sample taken during routine 

surveillance, with or without presence of clinical 

criteria; OR

Ø epidemiological information indicative of FMD. 

91 Critical Activities and Tools
Case Definitions

Presumptive Positive

A suspect case that has both

Ø epidemiological information 

indicative of FMD; AND

Ø positive laboratory test results 

– Identification of antibodies to 

NSP 3D by AGID or 3ABC by 

ELISA, or to structural proteins 

by virus neutralization for 

serotype identification; OR 

– Identification of FMDV nucleic 

acid by rRT-PCR; OR 

– Identification of FMDV serotype 

by antigen ELISA. 

92 Critical Activities and Tools

Confirmed Positive

An animal from which FMDV 

has been isolated and 

identified at NVSL-FADDL or 

other laboratory designated 

by the Secretary of USDA. 
Surveillance Goals

Ø Implement surveillance plans within 48 hours of the 

confirmation of an outbreak that

(1) define the present extent of FMD and 

(2) detect unknown IPs quickly.

Ø Provide evidence to demonstrate FMD absence on a 

premises, or demonstrate FMD absence in an area, 

during the outbreak. 

Ø Provide evidence that premises are free of FMD at a 

nominal level, thereby setting the stage to conduct 

additional testing or apply predefined conditions to 

permit movement into and out of a control area.

93 Critical Activities and Tools
Surveillance Plan Objectives

Ø Leverage available resources, satisfy jurisdictional 

requirements, and support implementation of COB 

measures.

Ø Consider the appropriate levels of surveillance in 

susceptible wildlife population in the area.

– coordinated with representatives from APHIS Wildlife 

Services, DOI, State wildlife agencies and agriculture 

departments

Ø Provide guidance for complete surveillance data 

summaries and analysis at intervals specified by IC.

94 Critical Activities and Tools
Surveillance Planning for FMD Outbreak

Ø A surveillance plan is customized to the size and scope of 

an outbreak, which may take many forms.

Ø The epidemiologic picture will guide the response and 

surveillance activities, including

– species affected, 

– location of outbreak, 

– number of infected premises, 

– number and size of animal operations,

– incubation period, 

– number of potential contacts, and

– many other factors.

95 Critical Activities and Tools
Surveillance Objectives by Time Period

Ø The initial 72 hours post-FMD outbreak declaration

– Detect existing infected animals and premises as quickly as 

possible, and determine the size and extent of the FMD outbreak. 

Ø The control and eradication period

– From initial 72-hour period until last case is detected and 

depopulated.

– Revise or prioritize ongoing control and surveillance activities to 

allow for permitted movement and, ultimately, provide evidence 

that the Free Area is free of disease. 

Ø Post-eradication period

– Prove disease freedom in control area (CA) and free area (FA) are 

free of disease. 

Ø Additional surveillance, as needed, to restore international 

trade

96 Critical Activities and Tools
Diagnostics

During an FMD outbreak, the key goals of response are to:

1. provide clear direction to responders on sample 

collection and processing procedures

2. meet the surge requirements for diagnostic testing at 

specific intervals, starting at time zero and at 24-hour 

intervals as the response escalates, and 

3. report all diagnostic test results to appropriate personnel 

and information management systems as soon as 

possible and within 4 hours of diagnostic test completion.

The FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0) offers detailed information 

on diagnostic sample collection, diagnostic testing, and reporting.

97 Critical Activities and Tools
Diagnostics After FMD Detection

Ø Confirmation of FMD on any premises not currently in an 

FMD CA will be done by NVSL-FADDL. 

– After NVSL confirmation of FMD on a premises (index case), 

subsequent swab samples for rRT-PCR may be sent to NAHLN 

network laboratories.

Ø IC will provide specific instructions regarding the 

direction and collection of samples, which is likely to 

change as the outbreak evolves. In all cases, 

– NVSL will confirm the index case, 

– presumptive positive samples (on a rRT-PCR) from outside an 

established CA will be tested and confirmed by NVSL, and

– NVSL will receive samples routinely from inside the CA to 

monitor for changes in the FMDV.

98 Critical Activities and Tools
Surge Capacity

Ø Additional capacity and resources for sample 

collection, such as personnel and materials, will be 

needed in an FMD outbreak. 

Ø Adequate surge capacity can help facilitate a rapid 

response and continuity of business for non-infected 

premises. 

Ø In the event that the affected State(s) NAHLN lab(s) 

and NVSL-FADDL are overwhelmed by the diagnostic 

testing requirements, NAHLN laboratories from 

across the country may provide surge capacity.

99 Critical Activities and Tools
Reporting and Notification

Ø Cases of clinical illness that are confirmed positive by 

NVSL-FADDL, based on the current case definition, 

are reported to the affected States, other States, 

Tribal Nations, industry, other Federal agencies, 

trading partners, and the OIE.

Ø Appropriate Federal-State-Tribal-industry response 

and containment measures will be initiated during 

FMD investigations.

100 Critical Activities and Tools
Zone, Area, and Premises Designations

Critical Activities and Tools 101

Premises

Infected Premises 

(IP) 

Premises with a presumptive or 

confirmed positive case

Contact Premises 

(CP) 

Premises with susceptible 

animals that may have been 

exposed to FMD

Suspect Premises 

(SP) 

Premises under investigation 

At-Risk 

Premises (ARP) 

Premises with susceptible 

animals, but none with clinical 

signs 

Monitored 

Premises (MP) 

Premises that is not an IP, CP, or 

SP—eligible for permitted 

movement

Free Premises 

(FP) 

Premises outside of CA and not 

a CP or SP 

Vaccinated 

Premises (VP) 

Premises where vaccination has 

been performed

Zone/Area

Infected 

Zone (IZ) 

Zone that immediately surrounds 

an Infected Premises

Buffer Zone 

(BZ) 

Zone that immediately surrounds 

an Infected Zone or a Contact 

Premises 

Control 

Area (CA) 

Consists of an Infected Zone and a 

Buffer Zone

Surveillanc

e Zone (SZ) 

Zone outside and along the 

border of a Control Area 

Free Area 

(FA) 

Area not included in any Control 

Area

Vaccination 

Zone (VZ) 

Either a Containment Vaccination 

Zone (inside a Control Area) or a 

Protection Vaccination Zone 

(outside a Control Area) 
Example of Zones, Areas, 

and Premises in FMD Outbreak Response

102 Critical Activities and Tools
Epidemiological Investigation

Ø Epidemiological investigation and movement tracing 

during an outbreak are critical in controlling and 

eradicating FMD. 

Ø In an FMD outbreak, the goals are to

– within 6 hours of identifying potential IP or CP through tracing 

activities, assign a premises classification and a priority of 

investigation; and

– within 24 hours of identifying the IP or initial CP, identify all 

additional CP; 

– within 96 hours of identifying the index case, characterize the 

nature of the FMD outbreak, identify the risk factors for 

transmission, and develop mitigation strategies.

103 Critical Activities and Tools
Tracing

Ø One of the most important activities during an FMD 

outbreak is to rapidly and diligently trace-back and traceforward movements from an IP. 

Ø Tracing aids in the control of the spread of FMD and limit 

the impact of the outbreak. 

Ø Tracing should cover all movements from the premises, 

including susceptible livestock, non-susceptible species, 

animal products, vehicles, crops and grains, and people. 

Ø Tracing also includes consideration of all potential modes 

of transmission and possible contact with wildlife.

104 Critical Activities and Tools
Sizing a Control Area

Ø The perimeter of the CA should be at least 10 km 

(~6.21 miles) beyond the perimeter of the closest IP. 

Ø The size of the CA depends on the circumstances of the 

outbreak, including 

– the IP transmission pathways and estimates of transmission risk, 

– livestock movement patterns and concentrations, 

– distribution of susceptible wildlife in proximity, 

– natural terrain, 

– jurisdictional boundaries, 

– and other factors. 

Ø The boundaries of the CA can be modified or redefined 

when tracing and other epidemiological information 

becomes available. 

105 Critical Activities and Tools
Information Management

Ø Accurate information management and reporting during 

an FMD incident ensures that leadership, responders and 

stakeholders have timely critical emergency response 

information for decision-making.

Ø EMRS2 is the official system of record for animal health 

incidents in the United States. 

Ø Having accurate premises data in EMRS2 significantly 

facilitates response efforts, reporting, and resource 

tracking. 

The Incident Information Management and Reporting manual 

(FAD PReP Manual 3-0) provides details on the information systems and functionality 

for disease and response management, 

as well as training resources. 

106 Critical Activities and Tools
Communication

Ø Establish a network of stakeholders and systems for 

communication prior to an incident or outbreak.

Ø Brief the media, public, industry, Congress, trading 

partners, and others on the FMD outbreak status and 

the actions being taken to control and eradicate the 

disease.

Ø Coordinate with Federal, State, and local agencies, 

Tribal entities, producer groups, and land grant 

university-based cooperative extensions.

107 Critical Activities and Tools
Communication Objectives

Ø All FMD communications must:

– furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information;

– maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the 

government’s ability to respond to an outbreak;

– minimize public panic and 

fear; address rumors, inaccuracies, and 

misperceptions as 

quickly as possible; and

– Take into account social media.

108 Critical Activities and Tools
Key Communication Messages

Ø For consumers:

– FMD does not cause disease in humans.

– Meat and meat products are safe to eat.

– Milk and dairy products are safe to eat.

– We are responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the virus.

– Meat and meat products from vaccinated animals are safe to eat.

– Milk and dairy products from vaccinated animals are safe to eat.

Ø For producers:

– Protect your herds with good biosecurity practices.

– Be vigilant about reporting signs of illness.

109 Critical Activities and Tools
Health and Safety and PPE

110 Critical Activities and Tools

Ø To ensure responders are safe 

and physically prepared for the 

rigors of their deployment 

assignment, they need to 

receive medical clearance. 

Ø All workers involved in the handling, culling, transport, or 

disposal of items or animals infected with FMDV must be 

provided with appropriate PPE.

Ø During an FMD outbreak, responders are exposed to 

many hazards, particularly in working with heavy 

equipment and large animals.
Mental Health Concerns

111 Critical Activities and Tools

Ø FMD depopulation efforts can significantly affect 

the health of responders, livestock owners, and 

others impacted by the response efforts. 

Ø Preserving the health and safety of those involved 

in a disease response effort includes addressing 

their mental states. 

Ø HHS has developed resources specifically for 

emergency and disaster responders.

https://emergency.cdc.gov/coping/index.asp
Biosecurity

Ø Strict biosecurity measures need to be implemented 

to prevent or slow the spread of FMD. 

Ø Biosecurity procedures should be

1. Observed on all premises, even before an outbreak; and

2. reviewed and enhanced within 24 hours of the 

identification of an index FMD case.

Ø Proper biosecurity measures have two functions: 

– containing the virus on IP (biocontainment); and

– preventing the introduction of the virus via movement of 

personnel and material to naïve livestock and premises 

(bioexclusion).

112 Critical Activities and Tools
FMD Biosecurity Hazards and Appropriate 

Biosecurity Measures

113 Critical Activities and Tools
Biosecurity

Closed Herds

Ø To the fullest extent possible, close the herd to the 

introduction of new livestock (with population 

increases occurring only from offspring).

Ø If closing a herd is not possible, isolate newly 

purchased livestock (from the healthiest possible 

sources) and those returning from existing herds for 

30 days or more.

Ø Do not introduce vaccinated animals to naïve herds.

114 Critical Activities and Tools
Quarantine and Movement Control

Ø Quarantine and movement control can be a powerful 

tool in controlling and eradicating an FMD outbreak

– by restricting the movement of infected animals, 

animal products, and contaminated fomites.

Ø A 24- to 72-hour national standstill notice is likely to 

be implemented upon the initial finding of FMD.

Ø Subsequent movement control is accomplished 

through a permit system that allows movements 

without creating an unacceptable risk of disease 

spread. 

115 Critical Activities and Tools
Movement Standstill

Ø All movements of susceptible animals that are in 

progress when a national/regional movement standstill is 

announced should continue to move. 

– Destination premises should accept these movements. 

Ø Exceptions may be made for critical movements. 

Ø A national/regional movement standstill notice does not 

affect movement of milk. 

– Premises may continue moving milk to processing. 

Ø A national movement standstill notice does not include 

any products produced from an FSIS-inspected 

establishment that are already at the establishment. 

116 Critical Activities and Tools
Permitted Movement

Ø Surveillance measures are required for movement of 

livestock and animal products for premises located in the 

CA. 

Ø For movement of susceptible animals and susceptible 

animal products out of the CA to a FA, the permit process 

must consider national standards, any OIE standards, and 

conditions for such movement such as biosecurity 

procedures and risk assessment recommendations. 

Ø In addition, commodity-specific proactive risk 

assessments, COB plans, movement and marketability 

plans, and compartmentalization plans will also be 

considered. 

117 Critical Activities and Tools
Moving Commodities, Animals, Conveyances

Ø Each State’s animal health emergency response plan 

should describe the implementation of quarantine 

and movement controls.

Ø Because of the variation in the risk of the 

commodities, animals, and conveyances, it is 

possible that premises—particularly monitored and 

at-risk premises—are permitted to move one 

commodity, animal, or conveyance but not another. 

118 Critical Activities and Tools
Continuity of Business (COB)

Ø COB is the management of non-infected premises and 

non-contaminated animal products in the event of an 

FMD outbreak. 

Ø Secure Food Supply Plan recommendations help animals 

and products keep moving during the outbreak.

– These plans are at various stages in development. 

Ø Successful COB efforts require collaboration between 

States (both sending and receiving product), the Unified 

Incident Command, and APHIS.

119 Critical Activities and Tools
Regionalization for Trade

Ø Regionalization, also known as zoning, is the concept 

of separating subpopulations of animals in order to 

maintain a specific health status in one or more 

disease-free regions or zones. 

Ø Disease-free regions can be created to facilitate COB 

and reestablish international trade from the regions 

demonstrated to be disease-free.

Ø Regionalization recognizes that risk may be tied to 

factors that are not reflected by political boundaries 

of the nation or individual States.

120 Critical Activities and Tools
Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

The FAD PReP Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia SOP 

offers FMD-specific information on mass depopulation 

and euthanasia, including evaluation of various 

euthanasia methods, such as

– gunshot,

– penetrating captive bolt,

– electrocution,

– injectable euthanasia, and

– carbon dioxide and other gas.

121 Critical Activities and Tools
Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

Ø States should prepare in advance for the 

depopulation method(s) it will use and the resources 

it will need. 

– The National Veterinary Stockpile is unable to provide 

contracted labor for large animal handling or depopulation 

(at present).

Ø For planning purposes, reference the AVMApublished Guidelines for the Depopulation of 

Animals.

122 Critical Activities and Tools
Disposal

Ø Planning in advance for carcass management is 

strongly advised, as coordination among State and 

local agriculture emergency response and 

environmental agencies and waste authorities will be 

necessary.

Ø Disposal must be conducted in a manner that 

– does not allow FMDV to spread, 

– minimizes negative environmental effects, and 

– conserves meat or animal protein, if logistically 

supportable from a biosecurity standpoint. 

123 Critical Activities and Tools
Disposal Methods

Ø Disposal methods include 

– on-site burial

– composting,

– landfill 

– incineration, and 

– rendering. 

Ø On-site methods may be significantly limited by 

several factors and the potential for environmental 

contamination, such as topography, soil type, soil 

depth to bedrock, seasonal high-water table, and 

environmental regulations. 

124 Critical Activities and Tools

APHIS’ Carcass Management 

Dashboard is now available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov. 

It provides options and a time & cost 

calculator to aid in disposal planning.
Cleaning and Disinfection

125 Critical Activities and Tools

Ø Aggressive cleaning and disinfection practices are 

required for control and eradication due to FMD’s high 

survival rate on both organic and inorganic materials.

Ø Because the aerosol transmission of FMD is a concern, 

care should be taken to reduce the generation and 

dispersal of potentially infective dust and aerosols. 

Ø Cleaning and disinfection (or virus elimination activities) 

are to be conducted as quickly as is possible—ideally, 

within 48 hours of the disposal of depopulated animals.
Challenges of FMD Vaccination

In addition to having a sufficient quantity of vaccine that can be 

delivered quickly, effectively implementing a vaccination strategy 

and plan requires many additional resources. 

– Regulatory infrastructure (for procurement, licensing, 

permitting, distribution, and use)

– Logistics capabilities, including vaccination teams and cold chain 

management

– Animal identification (per requirements for FMD emergency 

vaccine use) 

– Communication (strategy and messaging) 

– Information management

– Incident management system capabilities

– Resources to continue execution other critical activities, 

including surveillance, biosecurity, and cleaning and disinfection 

126 Critical Activities and Tools
Challenges of FMD Vaccination

Need for a Vaccine Plan

Ø Limited quantities of vaccine will be available early in 

the response, and APHIS VS may receive requests for 

vaccine from multiple States. 

Ø A well-defined State vaccination plan will assist 

decision makers in prioritizing and distributing 

vaccine to States that are ready and able to handle 

the vaccine appropriately and rapidly administer 

doses based on well-grounded epidemiological 

principles. 

127 Critical Activities and Tools
Challenges of FMD Vaccination

Developing a Vaccine Plan

Ø The State vaccine request should 

– Include an estimate of the number of vaccine doses 

desired in the first shipment (first two weeks), and 

subsequent shipments; and

– Be based on all susceptible animals in the State, or of the 

population for which vaccine is planned, e.g., dairy cattle. 

128 Critical Activities and Tools
Challenges of FMD Vaccination

Movement Restrictions for Vaccinates

Ø Animals receiving emergency vaccination may be 

subject to vaccinated animal identification, 

traceability, and DIVA testing. 

Ø When vaccine is used, surveillance must continue to 

assess vaccination effectiveness and detect any 

antigenic change. 

Ø Vaccinated premises will be subject to any national 

or international standards or conditions for such 

movement and may be subject to the movement 

restrictions of their primary premises designation.

129 Critical Activities and Tools
Logistics—National Veterinary Stockpile

The NVS provides veterinary countermeasures

—supplies, equipment, vaccines, and response support services—

that States, Tribes, and Territories need to respond to 

damaging animal disease outbreaks. 

Contact the NVS: 

For routine questions, NVS@USDA.gov 

For emergencies, 800-940-6524 

130 Critical Activities and Tools
Wildlife Management and Vector Control

Ø An assessment of the risk that wildlife poses for the 

transmission of FMDV to susceptible livestock will be 

conducted within 7 days of confirmation of the index 

case.

Ø If wildlife populations are determined to be infected 

with FMDV, appropriate wildlife management 

principles will be applied as needed to reduce 

exposure of wildlife to livestock.

Ø FMDV can be transmitted mechanically by mice, 

vultures, and other vectors. 

131 Critical Activities and Tools
Modeling and Assessment Tools

Ø The development of models and risk assessments are 

critical in a successful FMD response. These tools give 

decision makers valuable insight.

Ø Presently, CEAH is conducting modeling work associated 

with FMD control strategies for detected feedlots. A few 

of the initial scenarios to be evaluated follow: 

– Total depopulation of feedlot with no animals moved to 

controlled slaughter. 

– Segmented harvest: targeted animals moved to controlled 

slaughter. 

– Selective and/or welfare depopulation followed by controlled 

slaughter of recovered animals. 

132 Critical Activities and Tools
Appraisal and Compensation

Ø Indemnity payments are authorized to encourage disease 

reporting, reduce the spread of animal disease, and 

compensate owners on the basis of fair market value.

Ø Data required to determine fair market value will be 

collected prior to depopulation, including a complete 

inventory of livestock being destroyed and any relevant 

value information.

Ø APHIS may also reimburse owners for materials that 

cannot be cleaned and disinfected and must be 

destroyed, e.g., feed.

133 Critical Activities and Tools
Finance

Ø For responding to specific emergency situations, VS 

has access to a variety of sources for funding. The 

two most common sources are the APHIS 

Contingency Fund (CF) and the Commodity Credit 

Corporation (CCC).

Ø USDA APHIS will engage in supplemental or 

emergency cooperative agreements with States for 

conducting FAD control measures.

134 Critical Activities and Tools
Incident Management

Ø The capability to rapidly scale up the size of an IC 

and integrate veterinary functions and 

countermeasures is critical for an effective FAD 

response. NRF and NIMS allow such scalability. 

Ø In an FMD outbreak, in particular a widespread one, 

national policy guidance will be distributed to 

NIMTs, the SAHOs of affected States, all States via 

the National Association of State Animal Health 

Officials, and the APHIS FAD PReP website.

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

135 Critical Activities and Tools
FAD PReP Supporting Documents and Materials

Ø Strategic Plans—Concept of Operations

Ø National Animal Health Emergency Management 

System (NAHEMS) Guidelines

Ø Industry Manuals

Ø Disease Response Plans

Ø Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Critical 

Activities

Ø Ready Reference Guides

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

136