Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack,

 Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch,

Justices

Order 

May 28, 2021

162564 & (61)

In re B.S., Minor. SC: 162564

COA: 354103

Ottawa CC Family Division:

20-092453-AU

_______________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. The application for 

leave to appeal the December 22, 2020 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered 

and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for 

reconsideration in light of In re MGR, 504 Mich 852 (2019), and In re LMB, 504 Mich 

869 (2019).

We do not retain jurisdiction.

VIVIANO, J. (dissenting). 

I would deny leave to appeal and am perplexed—as I suspect the Court of Appeals 

panel on remand will be—by the Court’s order today remanding this case for 

reconsideration in light of In re MGR, 504 Mich 852 (2019), and In re LMB, 504 Mich 

869 (2019). The Court’s orders in both of those cases were expressly limited to the 

particular facts of those cases.1 The Court’s order today implies something very 

different, i.e., that general principles of law can be derived from the orders that can (and, 

indeed, should) be applied to other cases.

I will let the Court of Appeals attempt to glean the meaning of those cases all on 

its own.2 But even if some precedential value could be gleaned from In re MGR or In re 

 

1 See In re MGR, 504 Mich at 854 n 1 (explaining that the majority’s decision was “based 

in the very specific facts of this case alone.”); In re LMB, 504 Mich at 869 n 1 (similarly 

denying that the Court’s order created a per se rule).

2 As the interplay between the majority’s order and my separate statement in In re MGR

makes clear, the majority has expressly disclaimed the only general principle that I could 
2

LMB and applied to the present case, it is hard to understand how the Court of Appeals 

could grant relief under the current procedural posture of the paternity action. 

Specifically, there does not appear to be a mechanism for the Court of Appeals to grant 

petitioner any relief as to the denial of her motion for a stay in the paternity case. In In re 

MGR, the mother of the child at issue appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion for a 

stay in the paternity case to this Court. This Court vacated the denial of her motion for a 

stay in an opinion released at the same time as its opinion in the adoption case. See 

Brown v Ross, 504 Mich 871 (2019).3 In the present case, petitioner sought leave to 

appeal the denial of her motion for a stay in the paternity case as well as the order of

filiation, but the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds 

presented. See Sterk v Speyer, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

August 20, 2020 (Docket No. 354518). Petitioner never sought leave to appeal that 

decision in this Court. Thus, unlike in In re MGR, there is currently no pending appeal in 

the paternity action through which either this Court or the Court of Appeals could vacate 

or reverse any of the decisions by the trial court in that case.

Because I would take the Court at its word that In re MGR and In re LMB are 

limited to their facts, I respectfully dissent and would instead deny leave to appeal. 

 

decipher from the orders. Compare In re MGR, 504 Mich at 864 (VIVIANO, J., 

dissenting) (“I believe [the majority’s apparent requirement that the putative father file a 

motion to stay the adoption proceeding] elevates form over substance since, as the 

majority’s order acknowledges, good cause was at issue each time a stay of the paternity 

action was sought. Since the very same issue is implicated whether one of the parties is 

seeking to stay the paternity action or another party is seeking to stay the adoption 

proceeding, I would not require the putative father to file a separate motion to stay the 

adoption proceeding that specifically alleges good cause in order to preserve the 

issue. . . . Until the Legislature provides more guidance, I believe the In re MKK[, 286 

Mich App 546 (2009),] framework should be used by the trial court to determine whether 

to allow a paternity action to reach its natural conclusion before a contemporaneously 

filed adoption proceeding, regardless of which action was filed first, and regardless of 

which party filed a motion to stay or whether, like here, the stay is entered sua sponte by 

the trial court.”), and id. at 864 n 4 (“The majority, by contrast, appears to create a per se 

rule that, unless a putative father files a motion to stay the adoption proceeding, a trial 

court must always stay the paternity action in favor of a competing adoption 

proceeding.”), with id. at 854 n 1 (order of the Court) (“[W]e respectfully disagree that 

this order creates any per se rule; our decision today is based in the very specific facts of 

this case alone.”).

3 There was no need for us to take such action in In re LMB because in that case the Court 

of Appeals had already reversed the trial court’s denial of a stay in the paternity case. 

See Sarna v Healy, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 18, 

2017 (Docket No. 341211).
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 28, 2021 

p0525

3

Clerk

On remand, in addition to determining what applicability those cases might have here, the 

Court of Appeals will need to make a threshold determination of whether it can grant any 

relief at all to petitioner given the procedural posture of the paternity action.