NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2020 IL App (3d) 180731-U

Order filed December 10, 2020 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

 ) 

JACQUELINE M. CHAPLIN, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Tazewell County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-18-0731 

Circuit Nos. 17-TR-5299 and 17-TR5300 

Honorable 

Frank W. Ierulli, 

Judge, Presiding.

__________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment.

_______________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s failure to ensure that defendant was understandingly waiving 

her right to trial by jury resulted in an invalid waiver of that right. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Jacqueline M. Chaplin, appeals following her convictions for leaving the 

scene of a motor vehicle accident and driving while license revoked. She contends that the 

Tazewell County circuit court failed to ensure that her jury waiver had been expressly and 
2 

understandingly made before proceeding with a bench trial. We vacate defendant’s convictions 

and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The State charged defendant via complaint with driving while license revoked (625 ILCS 

5/6-303(a) (West 2016)), operating an uninsured motor vehicle (id. § 3-707(a)), and leaving the 

scene of an accident that caused damage to a vehicle (id. § 11-402(a)). 

¶ 5 The common law record shows that an order for continuance was entered on April 25, 

2017. Defendant was present in court that day but was not represented by counsel. The docket 

entry for that day only indicates that a continuance was entered as well as the next court date.

¶ 6 Private counsel entered an appearance on June 20, 2017. An order for continuance, 

indicating defendant was again present in court, was entered the same day. The docket entry for 

that day shows only the appearance of counsel and the order for continuance. The pattern held 

for the next two court dates: defendant appeared in court, a continuance was ordered, and the 

ensuing docket entry indicated nothing more than “Order for continuance” and the date set 

therefore. 

¶ 7 On September 22, 2017, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The October 5 

hearing on that motion is the first proceeding for which a report of proceedings has been 

provided. The court denied the motion. Counsel subsequently informed the court: “We need to 

set this for a bench trial.” The court responded: “We need to do a jury waiver and then set it over 

for a bench trial at [defense counsel’s] convenience.” The report of proceedings ends following 

that comment.

¶ 8 The common law record includes a written jury waiver filed on October 5, 2017—the 

same day as the hearing on the motion to suppress. The form, signed by defendant, stated that 
3 

she “knowingly and understandingly waive[d] [her] right to a trial by jury” and consented “to a 

trial by the Court without a jury.” A continuance was ordered setting the matter for a bench trial 

on December 20, 2017. The docket entry for October 5 recorded defendant’s execution of a 

written jury waiver simply as “jury waiver.” 

¶ 9 A stipulated bench trial was held on the scheduled date. The court found defendant not 

guilty of operating an uninsured motor vehicle but guilty of leaving the scene of an accident and 

driving while license revoked. The court ultimately sentenced defendant to 12 months’ probation 

and a term of 60 days in jail, held in remission pending the completion of 300 public service 

hours. 

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court failed to adequately admonish her 

regarding her right to a jury trial or otherwise ensure that her waiver of that right was expressly 

and understandingly made. As a result, she contends, the court violated her constitutional right to 

a trial by jury. Conceding that she did not preserve the error in question, defendant asks that we 

conduct plain error analysis. In response, the State argues that insufficiencies in the record on 

appeal preclude proper review of defendant’s claims, such that this court must affirm.

¶ 12 The United States and Illinois Constitutions provide the right to a trial by jury for every 

defendant charged with an offense punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment. U.S. 

Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13; Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-

69 (1970). Any waiver of the right to a trial by jury must be made “understandingly *** by 

defendant in open court.” 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2016); see also People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 

2d 52, 66 (2008). 
4 

¶ 13 The circuit court has a duty to ensure that a defendant seeking to waive his or her right to 

a jury does so understandingly. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66; People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462, 

469 (1997). There is no specific admonition or advice required from the court in order for a 

defendant to make a valid jury waiver. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66. “The determination whether a 

jury waiver was made understandingly instead turns on the facts and circumstances of each 

particular case.” Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d at 469. The operative inquiry for a court of review is whether 

the record, including any admonishments and written waiver, “establishes that defendant knew 

the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial and voluntarily chose the former.” Bannister, 

232 Ill. 2d at 71; People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 271 (2004). 

¶ 14 In the present case, defendant filed a jury waiver indicating that her waiver of the right to 

a jury was being done “knowingly and understandingly.” While the court accepted that waiver, it 

did so without any sort of admonitions to defendant regarding the nature of a jury trial or a bench 

trial. There was no discussion of any sort with defendant or with counsel about the written 

waiver, as the waiver was apparently filed after the proceedings had ended. 

¶ 15 In People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283, 284 (1999), our supreme court held that a written 

waiver alone does not constitute a valid jury waiver. In that case, the defendant signed a jury 

waiver in his attorney’s office, and the waiver was filed outside of the defendant’s presence. Id.

In finding the waiver invalid, the supreme court observed: “We have never found a valid jury 

waiver where the defendant was not present in open court when a jury waiver, written or 

otherwise, was at least discussed.” Id. at 285. In this case, defendant was present when the court 

stated: “We need to do a jury waiver ***.” Certainly, this bare mention of a jury waiver—the last 

line of the report of proceedings from that day—does not amount to the discussion contemplated 
5 

in Scott. In any event, the court fell well short of ensuring that defendant’s waiver was made 

understandingly. See Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d at 469. 

¶ 16 In reaching the conclusion that defendant did not validly waive her right to a jury, we are 

aware of our supreme court’s comments in People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327 (1984). There the 

court stated: 

“Recognizing that the accused typically speaks and acts through his attorney, we 

have given effect to jury waivers made by defense counsel in defendant’s 

presence where defendant gave no indication of any objection to the court hearing 

the case. [Citations.] In [People v.] Murrell [60 Ill. 2d 287 (1975)] and [People v.] 

Sailor [43 Ill. 2d 256 (1969)], for instance, defense counsel’s single statement that 

defendant was waiving a jury was held to constitute a valid waiver since 

defendant was present in the courtroom and failed to object.” Id. at 332. 

Under Frey, the mere statement by defense counsel that a defendant was waiving her right to a 

jury trial would, as long as defendant was present for the statement, amount to a valid waiver of 

the right to a jury trial. This seems antithetical to the court’s more recent observation that “our 

decisions have imposed on a trial court the duty of ensuring that a defendant waives the right to a 

jury trial expressly and understandingly.” Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66; Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d at 469. 

The Bannister court further demanded that “[w]hen a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, 

the pivotal knowledge that the defendant must understand—with its attendant consequences—is 

that the facts of the case will be determined by a judge and not a jury.” Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 

69. The present case, however, does not call on us to reconcile these disparate points of law. 

Counsel did not affirmatively state that defendant was waiving her right to a jury trial. Rather, he 
6 

merely asked to set a date for a bench trial. Even under Frey, this cannot be considered a valid 

waiver of the right to trial by jury. 

¶ 17 Finally, we reject the State’s contention that the record on appeal is insufficient. The 

State points out that no reports of proceedings were compiled from four court dates at which 

defendant was present prior to the October 5 written jury waiver, and thus argues that the court 

may have delivered the necessary admonitions on one of those dates. 

¶ 18 In People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 334 (1985), the court found that “[g]iven the statutory 

requirement that a jury waiver be made in open court, a suitable report of the proceeding in 

which the waiver is supposed to have occurred will be an essential part of the record in an appeal 

that raises the question.” (Emphasis added.); see also id. at 335 (“[W]hen an entry in the 

common law record indicates that a jury waiver has been made, a defendant seeking review of 

that question should include in the record on appeal a transcript *** of the corresponding 

proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)). 

¶ 19 Relying on Smith, the court in People v. Majka, 365 Ill. App. 3d 362, 369-70 (2006), 

rejected a similar argument to that raised by the State here. After observing that a defendant need 

only provide a transcript of the proceeding at which the jury waiver was made, the court held:

“If the State contends that the court accepted the waiver at some other time, the 

burden is on it to supplement the record to show this. [Citation.] Thus, despite the 

burden on the appellant to provide a record complete enough for review, the 

appellee cannot force the appellant to provide an exhaustive record by speculating 

that a partial record is misleading. The appellee has the burden of providing a 

record that shows that there is substance to its speculations.” Id. 
7 

¶ 20 We reach the same conclusion here. The written jury waiver was filed following the 

proceedings on October 5, 2017. A full transcript of those proceedings appears on the record, 

and, as discussed above, it clearly demonstrates that the court did not ensure defendant was 

understandingly waiving her right to trial. Moreover, the docket entries from the dates in 

question provide no indication that any matters of substance were discussed. Defendant was 

under no obligation to provide transcripts of court proceedings wholly unrelated to the purported 

jury waiver. The State was free to provide transcripts, or some adequate substitute, to support its 

speculation that the court actually delivered proper admonishments on some date other than the 

day the written waiver was filed. 

¶ 21 Defendant argues that the lack of a valid jury waiver in this case requires reversal under 

the second prong of plain error. The State does not refute this argument. Indeed, it is well-settled 

that the lack of a valid jury waiver is reversible plain error. E.g., Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 270, 273; 

Smith, 106 Ill. 2d at 333, 337. We therefore vacate defendant’s convictions for driving while 

license revoked and leaving the scene of an accident and remand the matter for further 

proceedings. 

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is vacated and remanded for further 

proceedings. 

¶ 24 Vacated and reversed. 

¶ 25 Cause remanded.