COURT OF APPEALS DiV STATE OF WASHINGTON 

### 2013 APR 29 All S'^k

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
McKAY CHADWELL, PLLC, a Respondent,

v. JEREMY STAMPER, an unmarried man; and Defendant, MEAGHAN McKAIGE and JOHN DOE McKAIGE, wife and husband, and the marital community comprised thereof, Appellant. NO. 68153-2-1 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: April 29, 2013



### Lau,J. —Personal guarantors Meaghan and Andrew McKaige appeal the 

### summary judgment orderandjudgmententered in favor of the lawfirm ofMcKay Chadwell PLLC for unpaid legal fees, costs, and interest. Becausethe trial court 

### properly exercised itsdiscretion in declining to continuethe summaryjudgmenthearing and becausethe record presented to the courtestablished no material fact issues, we 

### affirm the grant of summary judgment and the judgmentin McKay's favor.68153-2-1/2

FACTS 

### The material facts are undisputed. In2007, Federal Savings LLC retained the law firm of McKay Chadwell PLLC afterWashington State and other authorities began to investigate Federal Savings for securities fraud. Jeremy Stamper signed McKay's 

### fee agreement as Federal Savings' president. Stamper and his sister, Meaghan McKaige each signed separate guarantee agreements personally guaranteeing payments due under the fee agreement. InJuly 2010, after Federal Savings defaulted
on the fee agreement, McKay sued Stamper and McKaige on their personal guarantees for unpaid legal fees, costs, and interest. McKay's complaint named "Jeremy Stamper,
an unmarried man; and Meaghan McKaige and John Doe McKaige, wife and husband, and the marital community comprised thereof as defendants. McKaige's husband was later identified by name as Andrew McKaige. The complaint alleged in part: 2.3 Defendant McKaige. Defendant Meaghan McKaige is believed and alleged to be a married woman residing outside ofthe state ofWashington. Defendants Meaghan McKaige and John Doe McKaige are believed and alleged to be husband and wife and constitute a marital community, and each act of defendant Meaghan McKaige complained ofherein was for the benefit ofsaid marital community. 

### The trial courtentered a defaultjudgmentagainst Stamperfor approximately $250,000 in unpaid fees, costs, and interest. 

### InJune 2011, acting pro se, McKaige prepared and served McKay with "Defendant's First Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Plaintiff McKay Chadwell PLLC, a professional limited liabilitycompany." This discovery consisted of 

### 12 interrogatories and 12 requests for production. Atthe same time, McKaige also

-2-68153-2-1/3 prepared and served McKay with requests for admission consisting of 99 individual requests. McKay answered most but not all the discovery requests. About 14 months afterfiling suit, McKay moved for summaryjudgment against Meaghan and Andrew McKaige (McKaige) to enforce their guarantee agreement. By then, McKaige stillhad not filed an answerto the complaint. McKay's motion stated, "Plaintiff McKay Chadwell, PLLC, requests the entry of summaryjudgment, and entry of monetaryjudgment against defendant Meaghan McKaige and Andrew McKaige, 

### husband andwife, andtheirmarital communitythereof."1 Theproposed summary judgment order served on McKaige with the moving papers also soughtjudgment 

### against "Meaghan McKaige and Andrew McKaige, husband and wife, and their marital community." 

### InJuly 2011, McKayrequested dates from the trial courtfor a summaryjudgment hearing. Upon receiving possible dates, McKay proposed September 30, 2011, to McKaige. McKaige did not object. Twenty eight days before the hearing date, McKay e-mailed and mailed to McKaige a note for motion, a copy of its motion, all supporting 

### documents, and a proposed order. The note indicated that a hearing with oral argument
was setfor September 30, 2011, at 10a.m., inSeattle.



### 1Meaghan McKaige's declaration in supportof herreconsideration motion acknowledged AndrewMcKaige as "[m]y husband." And McKaige'sunanswered and unfiled summaryjudgmentresponse refers to AndrewMcKaige as "husband."

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Under CR 56(c), McKaige's last day to file and serve a response was 

### September 19, 2011.2 Fourdayslater, McKayfiled adeclaration informing thetrial courtthat no response had been served or filed. Three days later, McKaige, acting pro se, e-mailed McKay's attorney a document dated September 26, 2011, and entitled "Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment." Among other things, the response asserted, "The amounts Plaintiffalleges are owed reflect services by Plaintiffoutside the limited scope ofthe Fee Agreement." The response raised no challenge to McKay's assertion that McKaige comprised a marital community. McKaige
never filed the response with the clerk ofthe court or provided a working copy to the trial

court. On September 28, 2011, two days before the hearing, McKay's attorney, Tyler Moore, e-mailed McKaige a copy of McKay's reply and informed her that the hearing time "is now 9:00 a.m." The summaryjudgment motion was scheduled to be heard on a Friday. McKaige's attorney claims McKaige first learned about the time change from 10:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on "the day before the hearing [Thursday] when she opened the e-mail from plaintiffs attorney ...." As McKaige's e-mail quoted below indicates, she 

### actually learned aboutthe schedule change on the Wednesday before the hearing, not 

### Thursday. McKaige offers no explanation as to why she delayed contacting Moore to request a continuance untilthe morning ofthe summaryjudgment hearing underthese
circumstances.



### 2Under CR56(c) and King County SuperiorCourt Local Civil Rule 56, "The adverse party may file and serve opposing affidavits, memoranda of law or other documentation not laterthan 11 calendar days before the hearing." CR 56(c). -4-68153-2-1/5
On the day ofthe summaryjudgment hearing, at 8:13 a.m., Meaghan McKaige notified Moore by e-mail that she was unable to make the flight from California and requested a hearing continuance: Iam writing to requestthatthe hearing on the motion for Summary Judgment be rescheduled for a week from today. Iwas informed 36 hours ago that the hearing was moved up to its new time and due to a sick child this morning, Iwas unable to take an earlierflight to make it to the new hearing time. Please let me know if it is possible to reschedule the hearing. As a single parent living out of town and representing myself, Iwould appreciate this allowance. Moore declined—"You have known about this hearing for 28 days, and your response
was 7 days late." A few minutes later, Moore received a call from attorney Douglas 

### Dunham, who said hehadjust beenretained byMcKaige.3 Dunham "advised Mr. Moore that [he] was appearing and requested that [Moore] agree to a short continuance ofthe Motion for Summary Judgment hearing to give [Dunham] time to review the case 

### and appropriately respond." Moore agreed to a two-week continuance as a professional courtesy to Dunham. Moore telephoned and e-mailed court staffaboutthe agreement, but the court directed the parties to appearfor the hearing. 

### Atthe hearing, the trial court advised Dunham that McKay's motion for summary 

### judgmentwasunopposed, since McKaige neverfiled aresponse.4 Dunham orally
3Meaghan McKaige'sfather is an attorney and isDunham'sformer law partner. He called Dunham, who agreed to appearfor and represent McKaige atthe summary judgment hearing. 

### 4We question whether the court's summaryjudgmentruling would be any different even ifthe court considered McKaige's response and even if McKaige attended 

### the hearing or appeared by phone because, among otherdeficiencies, her written response containing factual assertions and bare arguments was unsworn. McKaige submitted no supporting declarations, affidavits, or documents. See Wilkerson v. 

### Weqner, 58 Wn. App. 404, 408 n.3, 793 P.2d 983 (1990) ("The certifications considered 

### by the trial court were not signed under penalty of perjury nor were they sworn -5-68153-2-1/6
moved for a continuance, arguing he needed more time to prepare. The record contains no evidence that Dunham made any substantive arguments opposing McKay's motion for summaryjudgment. Nor does the record show that he requested the courtto allow his client to appear by telephone. 

### The trial courtdenied the continuance request, granted summaryjudgment, and enteredjudgmentfor $290,847.50 against "defendants Meaghan McKaige and Andrew McKaige, husband and wife, and the marital community thereof." The court clerk's minute entry from the summaryjudgment hearing indicates: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court informs respective counsel that it would treat the motion as an unopposed motion, there being no response from the Defendant. Defendant moves for a continuance ofthe hearing. The Court denies Defendant's motion for continuance and grants Plaintiffs motion. Order on Summary Judgment is signed and filed. After the hearing, McKaige moved for reconsideration under CR 59 and for a continuance under CR 56(f). The court later explained its rationale for denying the continuance request in an order striking certain declarations. The court's handwritten
comments indicate: The Court adds the following observations: 1. Defendant McKaige, who was on notice ofthe summaryjudgment motion, neverfiled with the court or provided to the assignedjudge or [original] judge any response to the motion. Itwas infact unopposed underthe court rules. 2. CR 56(f) requires a continuance of a summaryjudgmentto be requested by way of an affidavit, which explains how the continuance will permit facts relevantto the motion to be provided. No such affidavitwas provided, and defendant McKaige'sjust-retained counsel could not tell the courtwhat such an affidavit would say ifthere had been time to prepare it.
statements. While not raised by the parties, we do not consider such 'certifications' to 

### be competent proof in a summaryjudgment proceeding. RCW 9A.72.085."). -6-68153-2-1/7
3. These failures to follow court rules cannot be excused by defendant McKaige's pro se status, which was voluntary. Nor does her pro se status warrant an exception from clear court rules which are applied to every other litigant. The Court adheres to its denial ofwhatwas infact a last-minute request to continue a properly noted, unopposed motion by way of a verbal requestfrom just retained counsel without any supporting declaration or affidavit as CR 56(f) requires. McKaige appeals. ANALYSIS The dispositive question is whetherthe trial court abused its discretion when it denied McKaige's oral motion to continue the summaryjudgment hearing premised on her attorney's need for "time to review and respond." McKaige contends that the trial court erred in denying her attorney's oral request for a continuance ofthe summary judgment hearing and ingranting summaryjudgmentto McKay. McKay responds that the court properly exercised its discretion underthe circumstances when itdenied the continuance request. CivilRule 56(f) allows the trial court to continue a summaryjudgment hearing "if 

### the nonmoving party shows a need for additional time to obtain additional affidavits, 

### takedepositions, orconductdiscovery."5 Building Indus. Ass'n ofWash, v. McCarthy, 152 Wn. App. 720, 742, 218 P.3d 196 (2009). Whetheror notthe party files a CR 56(f) affidavit, we review the trial court's decision for manifest abuse ofdiscretion. MacKay v. MacKav. 55 Wn.2d 344, 348, 347 P.2d 1062 (1959): see also State ex rel. Citizens Against Tolls (CAT) v. Murphy. 151 Wn.2d 226, 237 n.4, 88 P.3d 375 (2004). "A trial 

### 5CR56(f) states, "Should it appearfrom the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavitfacts essential to justify 

### his opposition, the court may refuse the application forjudgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such otherorder as is just." -7-68153-2-1/8

court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons." In re Marriage of Littlefield. 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). Littlefieldexplained: A court's decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard; it is based on untenable grounds ifthe factual findings are unsupported by the record; it is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements ofthe correct standard. Littlefield. 133 Wn.2d at 47. Inthe context of a CR 56(f) continuance request, the trial court does not abuse its discretion if "(1) the requesting party does not offer a good reason for the delay in obtaining the desired evidence; (2) the requesting party does not state what evidence would be established through the additional discovery; or (3) the desired evidence will not raise a genuine issue of material fact." Turnery. Kohler, 54 Wn. App. 688, 693, 775 P.2d 474 (1989). Dunham e-filed a notice ofappearance the same morning he appeared for the 

### summaryjudgment hearing. Atthe hearing, the trial court advised Dunham that his 

### clientfailed tofile aresponse, and thatitwould treatMcKay's motion as unopposed.6 Dunham orally moved to continue the hearing. He explained that his client only recently learned that the hearing time had been moved up an hour, and that she was unable to 

### get an earlierflight. He also reminded the court aboutthe parties' agreed two-week



### 6We assume no hearing transcript is availablebecausethe hearing was not recorded or transcribed.
-8-68153-2-1/9, 

### continuance.7 Unabletoaccommodatethistime frame due tocalendarcongestion, the trial court offered its next available date—November 23, 2011. McKay's attorney objected to this two-month delay. Declining to schedule the Novemberdate over objection, the court granted the summaryjudgment motion based on McKay's summary judgment submissions. McKaige relies on Coggle v. Snow, 56 Wn. App. 499, 784 P.2d 554 (1990), and Butler v. Joy, 116 Wn. App. 291, 65 P.3d 671 (2003), to argue thatthe trial court abused its discretion indeclining to continue the summaryjudgment hearing. Both cases are 

### distinguishable. InCoggle, a medical negligence plaintiffrequested a continuance of the summaryjudgment hearing premised on his former attorney's imminent retirement and his need to conduct discovery necessary to defeat summaryjudgment. The new attorney appeared one week afterthe defendant filed its summaryjudgmentmotion. 

### The new attorney promptly filed a CR 56(f) affidavit identifying the additional discovery he wished to pursue and explaining how the desired evidence would rebut a key witness's testimony. Coggle. 56 Wn. App. at 502-03. Because the new attorney 

### complied with CR 56(f) procedures and because we thought itwas unfair to punish the clientfor his former attorney's "apparently dilatory conduct," we held thatthe court 

### abused its discretion indenying the request for a continuance. Coggle, 56 Wn. App. at 508. In Butler, the trial court denied plaintiffs newly retained counsel's oral motion for


### a continuance ofthe summaryjudgment hearing. The new attorney was retained the


### 7McKaige cites noauthority (and wefound none) thatcompels atrial courtto acceptthe parties' stipulated continuance. -9-68153-2-1/10 day before the hearing. He prepared no written affidavits to supportthe continuance and presented the motion orally. The hearing was not recorded, so the record contained no indication whetherthe new attorney argued that he needed more time to obtain discovery or whatfurther evidence he expected to produce. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion "[b]ecause we cannotfind a tenable ground for the 

### trial court'sdecision "8 Butler, 116Wn.App. at300. Unlike in Coggle and Butler, McKaige (1) chose to represent herselffor 14 months until the summaryjudgment hearing, (2) prepared and served extensive interrogatories and requests for admission, (3) prepared a written summaryjudgment response that she neverfiled with the court or provided to the hearingjudge as discussed above, (4) never argued she needed a CR 56(f) continuance to obtain discovery necessary to prepare a summaryjudgment response, and (5) offered no 

### explanationforwhy shefailed toretain counsel earlierinthelitigation.9 In addition, the trial court offered to continue the hearing to its next available date. 

### InCoggle, we noted, "The ruling on the motions for a continuance and for reconsideration is within the discretion ofthe trial court and is reversible by an appellate 

### court only for a manifest abuse of discretion." Coggle, 56 Wn. App. at 504. Noting that this simple standard was indisarray, we discussed relevantWashington case law and 

### 8The force of the court's holding is questionable given its comment that its discussion ofthe motion for continuance was "unnecessary to our disposition ofthis 

### appeal " Butler, 116 Wn. App. at 298. We also note the opinion does notdisclose the trial court's rationale for denying the continuance motion. 

### 9The record shows McKaige received the summary judgmentmotion and supporting materials at least28 days before the hearing. Shefails to explain her delay in contacting Moore about a continuance when she learned aboutthe time change.

-10-68153-2-1/11 

### authoritative sources to determine the standard by which a trial court properly exercises its discretion. We held, "The proper standard is whetherdiscretion is exercised on 

### untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, considering the purposes ofthe trial court's 

### discretion."10 Coggle, 56Wn. App. at507. The present case is more similar to Bonneville v. Pierce County. 148 Wn. App. 500, 202 P.3d 309 (2008). There, Division Two of this court held that denial of a motion to continue a summaryjudgment hearing in orderto allow a permit holder's new attorney opportunity "to prepare for the hearing" was not an abuse of discretion. Bonneville, 148 Wn. App. at 507. Bonneville had ample time to retain counsel before the summaryjudgment hearing. He failed to request a second continuance immediately afterthe first continuance expired. He offered no explanation for retaining an attorney the day before the hearing, and the trial court "believed he was simply delaying the case." Bonneville, 148 Wn. App. at 507. In her reply brief, McKaige also argues that "pro se defendants should be treated differently in some instances than pro se plaintiffs
.. . [because] [p]ro se plaintiffs bring their claims to court voluntarily where pro se defendants most often are before the court 

### involuntarily and are forced to represent themselves bytheirfinancial circumstances." Appellants' Reply Br. at 10. She cites no controlling authority for this position. As a pro


### se litigant, McKaige was not entitled to "special favors" from the court. In re Marriage of Olson. 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). Pro se litigants are "bound by the
same rules ofprocedure and substantive law as attorneys." Westberg v. Ail-Purpose 

### 10To the extent thatMcKaige attempts tobroadenthiswell-settled rule by arguing "justice" is an essential consideration, we adhere to Coggle's core holding stated above. -11-68153-2-1/12


### Structures Inc., 86 Wn. App. 405, 411, 936 P.2d 1175(1997). Given the extensive undisputed record discussed above, the trial court's decision to deny a continuance was 

### withinthe range ofacceptable choices. We conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion under the circumstances here.11 Summary Judgment Order 

### McKaige also contends thatthe trial court erred in finding that McKay met its initialburden under CR 56(c) to show the absence of a genuine issue ofmaterial fact. Appellants' Opening Br. at 22. Specifically, she argues that McKay's own summary judgment materials raise a genuine issue as to whether it billed Federal Savings for work outside the scope ofthe fee agreement. She also argues that McKay "failed its initialburden to prove thatAndrew and Meaghan McKaige's marital community existed,
or had any obligation on the Guarantee." Appellants' Opening Br. at 30. Finally, she argues that McKay violated CR 56(c) by serving its summaryjudgment motion fewer 

### than 28calendardaysbeforethehearing.12 Appellants' Opening Br. at30. Under RAP 9.12, our review ofan order granting summaryjudgment is limited to the "evidence and issues called to the attention ofthe trial court." Thus, "[a]n argument 

### 11 McKaige devotes themajority of herbriefing to themerits ofthesummary judgment motion. Given our resolution ofthe continuance issue, we need not address his remaining contentions about the summaryjudgment's merit, except as necessary. 

### 12 Forthefirst time on appeal, McKaige argues she was "misled" by the change inthe summaryjudgment hearing time from 10 a.m. to 9 a.m. Appellants' Opening Br. at 19. Generally, we do not consider arguments raised forthe first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a) (appellate court need not consider a claim raised forthe first time on appeal unless it involves "lack of trial courtjurisdiction," "failure to establish facts upon which 

### relief can be granted," or "manifesterror affecting a constitutional right"). And in any event, McKaigeneithercites the record to supportthis allegation norcites authority explaining why her reliance on McKay's erroneous representations regarding the hearing time andjudge constituted a trial court error. -12-68153-2-1/13
neither pleaded nor argued to the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Silverhawk, LLC v. KeyBank Nat. Ass'n, 165 Wn. App. 258, 265, 268 P.3d 958 (2011); see, e^, Cano-Garcia v. King County, 168 Wn. App. 223, 248, 277 P.3d 34 (2012) (issue not properly preserved where proponent neither raised it in his response
nor argued itatthe summaryjudgment hearing). To allow otherwise "would be to undermine the rule that an appellate court is to engage inthe same inquiry as the trial court in reviewing an order of summaryjudgment." Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., Council 28, 121 Wn.2d 152, 163, 849 P.2d 1201 (1993). Given these principles, "[i]t is ourtask to review a ruling on a motion for summary judgment based on the precise record considered by the trial court." Jacob's Meadow Owners Ass'n v. Plateau 44 II. LLC. 139 Wn. App. 743, 754-55, 162 P.3d 1153(2007). That record includes those documents designated in an order granting summary 

### judgment. RAP 9.12. The order on summaryjudgment shows the trialcourt considered "Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting declaration; Defendant's 

### having failed to respond . . . ." Because the trialcourtconsidered only McKay's submissions, McKaige's present challenges were never "called to the attention of the trial court." RAP 9.12. The sole issue McKaige brought to the trial court's attention was 

### her requestfor a continuance. Therefore, under RAP 9.12, her challenges regarding the scope ofthe fee agreement, McKay's compliance with CR 56(c), and the trialcourt's 

### imposition ofcommunity liability arewaived onappeal.13

13 Even assuming nopreservation issue, our de novo review ofMcKay's summaryjudgmentmaterials does not indicate material issues of fact exist. And we find no merit in McKaige's CR 56(c) claimbecausethe evidence shows McKaige -13-68153-2-1/14


### We also reject McKaige's challenge to the imposition ofcommunity liability premised on McKaige's failure to overcome the presumption that her signature on the personal guarantee bound her marital community. "Aguaranty obligation of one spouse creates a presumption of community liability." Grayson v. Platis. 95 Wn. App. 824, 836, 978 P.2d 1105 (1999). Additionally, "[t]he suretyship debt or obligation ofone ofthe spouses obligates the community property only ifthe community is benefited by the obligation." Warren v. Wash. Trust Bank. 19 Wn. App. 348, 360, 575 P.2d 1077 (1978). As the party seeking to avoid the guarantee, the burden rested on McKaige to rebutthat presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Grayson, 95 Wn. App. at 836. 

### McKaige did notcarrythis burden.14 Motion for Reconsideration15 "Motions for reconsideration are addressed to the sound discretion ofthe trial 

### court; a reviewing courtwill not reverse a trial court's ruling absent a showing of manifest abuse ofthat discretion." Wagner Dev., Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 95 Wn. App. 896, 906, 977 P.2d 639 (1999). 

### McKaige's opening briefassigns error to the trial court orderdenying her reconsideration motion. Aside from citing the standard of review, her opening brief devotes two sentences challenging the reconsideration order: 

### suffered no prejudice from the alleged tardy summaryjudgmentmotion. She conducted discovery and prepared a summaryjudgment response. 

### 14 Norcould McKaige satisfythis burdenbecause the record shows she does not dispute that she was married to AndrewMcKaige when she signed the guarantee. 

### 15 McKaigefailed to identifythe specificfact and law as to each ground onwhich her reconsideration motion is based. She merely cites to CR 59. -14-68153-2-1/15
The trial court also refused to considerthe declarations ofMeaghan McKaige and Andrew McKaige by granting plaintiff s motion to strike them. It also denied Defendant's Motion for Continuance pursuantto CR 56(f). In Coggle, this Courtfound that "afterfailing to grant the continuance" the failure to considerdeclarations filed pursuant to a Motion for Reconsideration "was an abuse of discretion flowing from the court's initial denial ofthe motion for continuance." Coggle. [56 Wn. App.] at 508-09. Appellants' Opening Br. at 21-22 (citations omitted). Because the trial court properly denied McKaige's motion to continue the summaryjudgment hearing, she was not entitled to present new evidence in a reconsideration motion that she could have discovered and presented at summaryjudgment. CR 59(a)(4); Wagner Dev., 95 Wn. App. at 906. "Ifthe evidence was available but not offered until afterthat opportunity 

### passes, the parties are not entitled to another opportunity to submitthat evidence." Wagner, 95 Wn. App at 907. We conclude that the trial court properly denied the
reconsideration motion. Attorney Fees on Appeal 

### McKaige and McKay both request attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.1(a), which authorizes an award where "applicable law grants to a partythe right to recover 

### reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review . ..." As "applicable law,"the parties cite the fee agreement between McKayand Federal Savings. The fee agreement provides, "The Firm shall also be entitled to recoverfrom the Client allfees, including 

### interest and costs of collection, includingreasonable attorneys' fees and costs of appeal." McKaigenever signed the fee agreement. Although she signed the 

### guarantee, the guarantee and the fee agreementare separate contracts. Robev v. Walton Lumber Co., 17 Wn.2d 242, 255, 135 P.2d 95 (1943): Freestone Capital

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Partners LP v. MKA Real Estate Opportunity Fund ILLC. 155 Wn. App. 643, 661, 230 P.3d 625 (2010). Because McKaige signed only the guarantee and because the guarantee does not explicitly authorize attorney fees, the guarantee does not provide a basis for attorney fees under RAP 18.1. Cf. Puyallup Valley Bank v. Mosby, 44 Wn. App. 285, 290, 723 P.2d 2 (1986) (awarding attorney fees under RAP18.1 where "guaranty agreement specifically authorizefdl attorneys fees in case of litigation") (emphasis added). We deny the parties' respective attorney fee requests. CONCLUSION Forthe reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary 

### judgment andjudgment in favor of McKay.

WE CONCUR: 

# SkQ^wgo,.

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