1 NOTI CE Decisi on fi led 12 /16/ 09. The textof this dec ision m ay be changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a Petit ion for Re hea ri ng o r th e dispos it ion of

the s ame. NO. 5-09-0447 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

________________________________________________________________________ CAR TER K ALBF LEISCH, by and ) Appeal from the Through H is Next Friends, ) Circui t Court of CHR ISTOPHE R KA LBFLE ISCH and ) M on ro e C ou nt y. MELI SSA KAL BFLE IS CH, ) ) Plaintiff-Appell ee, ) ) v. ) No. 09-CH-57 ) COLUMBI A COMMUNITY UN IT SCHOOL ) DISTRICT U NIT NO . 4, ) Ho nora ble ) D enn is B . Do yle, De fend ant-A ppella nt. ) Judge, presi ding.

________________________________________________________________________ JUS TIC E W EX ST TE N d elivere d the o pinion of the cour t: This is an i nterl ocutory

appeal t aken pursuan t to Suprem e Cou rt Rule 307(a)( 1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)( 1)). At issue in this case is whether the Monroe County ci rcui t court prop erly ordereda preli mina ry injunctio n to co mp el the d efen dant-a ppella nt, Co lumb ia Co mm unity Unit Schoo l Di stri ct Unit No. 4 (the s chool dis tri ct), to permit the pla inti ffappell ee, Carter Kalbflei sch, a five-y ear-ol d child wit h autis m, to bring his ser vice dog with him to sc hool pu rs uant to section 14-6.02 of the School Code (105 ILC S 5/14-6.02 (West 200 8)). BACKGROUND On Jul y 17, 2009, Cart er, by his next friends , Chris topher Kalbf leis ch and Me liss a Kalbflei sch, file d a verif ied complaint for i njunctive reli ef and a ve rifi ed mo tion for a preliminary injunction, c laimi ng that he had a right under section 14-6. 02 of the School Code (the servic e anim al statute ) to brin g his se rvice d og w ith him to Parkview Eleme ntary School2

(the sc hoo l). Tha t section prov ides as follow s:

"Servi c e animals s uch as guide dogs , si gnal dogs[, ] or any other animal individ ually trained to perform tasks for the b enefit of a stu dent w ith a disab ility shall be permitt ed to accompany that s tudent at all scho ol fun ctions, w hethe r in or outsi de the classroom ." 105 ILC S 5/14-6 .02 (W est 2008). On July 21, 2009, t

he school di stri ct file d a notice of removal, allegi ng that the case
arose under federallaw, and t he case was removed t o the Unite d States Distri ct Court f or the Southe rn Distric t of Illino is (th e dist rict court) . Cart er fil ed a motion t o remand, and on August 5, 2009, t

he dist rict court gr an ted the mo tion an d rem ande d the c ase to th e circu it court after f

inding that C arter's claim did not arise under and was not preempt ed by fede ral law. Kalbfle isch v. Co lum bia C om mu nity UnitSch ool Dis trict U nit No. 4 , 644 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (S .D. Ill. 2009). On August 13, 2009, the schooldistrict file d a mot io n t o di smi ss the ve rifi ed complaint

for inj unctive reli ef

and the m otion for a p reliminary injunction, c ontending t hat becau se Car ter fa iled to exhaust hi s adminis trative remedi es, t he circ uit cour

t lac ked juri sdict ion over the s ubject matter in the c ompl ain t and the m otion for a p reliminary injunction. On August 19, 2009, t he circ uit cour

t held a h ea rin g o n t he sc ho ol di str ict 's motion to dismis s. The court deniedthe m otion a nd g ave th e sch ool d istrict leave to file its
ans we r tha t day. A fter a br ief r ece ss, th e sc hoo l distr ict file d its a nsw er. The next d ay, the cou rt held a h ea rin g o n C ar ter 's motion for a preli minary

injunction, where the fol lowing evide nce was present ed. Carter' s mother, the only witness to test ify

on Carter' s behalf, stat ed that Carter was diagnosedwith medium-t o-sever e auti sm at 18 months of ag e. S he de sc rib ed C ar ter 's behavior prior to having hi s servi ce dog as foll ows: Carter was prone to havi ng tantr ums on
a da ily basis; he suffered f rom an eati ng disorde r call ed pica, a patt ern of eat ing nonfood3

materials; he w ould refus e to w alk w hen h e w as take n to p ublic p laces; h e spo radica lly wou ld take off running; he could not fall asleep on hi s own and, once asl eep, woke up appr oxim ately every hour; he did not communicate with anyone; and he was unable to focus. She said Cart er' s tant

rums invol ved kicki ng, scr eaming, and bi ting, often occurred at dinner and would last

approximat ely

one hour, and

also occur

red in t he morning at l east t

hree times per week and would las t appro xim atel y t wo hours. She t esti fied that becaus e of C ar ter 's eati ng disorde r he hadtr ie d t o eat s uchit ems as rocks, mulch, gr ass, tras h, cl eaning supplies, batte ries , and coi ns and had drunk fr om the t oilet. She indicated that when the fam ilywould take Cart er to public places, such as parks, stores, and r estaur ants, C arter w ould throw himsel f down on the ground and ref use to walk. As a result , Cart er' s family was
una ble to take him to p ubl ic pla ces , and the fam ily wa s ho me bou nd. She said t

hat Cart er had a t endencyto spora dical ly take off ru nnin g, som etime s into
a pond near the ir house or into a n earby roa d w ith traffi c, that Cart er would not fa ll as leep on h is own and would wake up about every hour, and t

hat because of t

his, she had to s leep in his be d w ith him for the pr evious two year s. She sa id that if she di d leave hi s room after he had fall en aslee p, she would l oc k his b edro om doo r to give her m ore tim e to res pon d if Carter woke up and tried to le ave th e roo m. O n on e occ asion , how ever, sh e w as no t able to respondquickly

enough, and Cart er was able t o get out of the home and int o the pond in t he middle o f winter. She te st if ie d tha t C arte r d id

not co mmun ic at e wi thothe r s tu de nt s o n hi s o wn and that he did not s peak anymeaningful words but wo uld mumble different sounds. She described getting Carter to focus as almo st imp ossible . She s tated h e w ould distract h imself by se lfsti mulati on, or stimming, with hi s hands or ot her objec ts, and would star e off into the di st anc e whe n pe opl e tri ed t o co mmuni cat e wi thhi m. She stated that wh en Ca rter w as around t hree y ears ol d, his doctor s uggested t hat4

Carter obtain a servi ce dog. After

Carter' s mother r esearche d the is sue and e xhau ste d all other possibi lities, Carter' s family decided t o apply

for a ser

vice d og with Wilder

wood Service Dog s ( Wil de rwo od ), a com pany tha t prov ided s ervice dog s trained to aid p atients with neurologi cal di sorders . Cart er' s appli cati on was extensi ve, and once approved, he was placedon a two-y ear wait ing li st for a servi ce dog. Carter ha s a presc ript ion for a s ervice dog from two different doctors. She test ifie d that a fter Carter' s appli cati on had been accepted, Carter' s family sentin a video of

Carter and a samp le of his w orn clothing. S he indicated th at these articles were
u sed to t rain Cart er' s servi ce dog, Corbi n, to be come acquaint ed with Cart er' s appearanc e, voice , and s mell. It w as C arter's mo ther's un dersta ndin g that C orbin wo uld slee p w ith C ar ter 's clothin g and wo uld watch the vi deo of Carter repeat edly . She st ated that Corbin was trai ned to unders tand 70 commands and was speci fical ly trai ned fo r Carter' s pica, impulse running, night awakeni ngs, and t antrums. She stat ed that Corbin is a Bouvier bre ed, which is consider ed to be a hypoalle rgen ic dog . Carte r's moth er un dersto od th is to mea n that p eople who are aller gic to do gs w ith fur w ould not be al lergi c to hy poalle rgenic dogs because they have h air rather than fur. On July 16, 2009, after a pprox imatel y t wo years of being on a waiting li st, Carter recei ved Corbin. Wil derwood brought Corbi n to Carte r' s area s o that Carter 's mother and father and anyone fr om the s cho ol cou ldbe t ra in ed t o handl e hi m. The trai ning las ted ei ght days, totaling approx imately 80 hours, an d Carter's mo ther and fa ther attended the entire train ing . Ca rter's a ide a t sch ool also atten ded the tr ainin g fo r tw o ho urs. Afterthe tr aining, Carter' s mother andfather tookan examinati on and passed. They
are current ly

awaiti ng their

certi ficat es from the St ate of I llinois for completi ng the tr aining and pas si ng t

he e xaminatio n. As a r es ul t o f the t ra in in g, Carte r' s mo th er and fa ther are certi fieddog hand lers. A ccord ing to C arter's mo ther, th is me ans sh e is qu alified to train5

other peop le in their ow n com fortab le env ironm ent. Fo r exam ple, she could trai n her mother to hand le Co rbin in her mo th er ' s ho me but n otany wher e el se . S he s ai d that as of t he time of her testimo ny no o ne at th e sch ool w as traine d to handle Corbi n but that she was able and willing to trai n the st aff to do so and was willi ng to remai n with Carte r and Corbin at school if ne ede d. S he testified that af

ter hav ing C orbin for a m onth or so, C arter w as a m uch h appie r child; that hi s tant

rums have minimized t o a couple per week and his re covery

time has be en red uced to mi nutes, compared to t he half hour

to hour i t used t o take t o reconci le the sit uation; that Corbin will phy sical ly take Carter dow n if

he takes of

f running i nto a dangerous situation , like into traffic , and a s a resu lt, Carter doe s not tryrunning for the road anymore; that by the third nig ht of tra ining, C arter w as ab le to slee p w ithout h is mo ther in the room beca use C orbin wo uld calm him when he woke up; that Corbin draws Cart er out of his s ti mming by batting hi m with his nos e, which al lows Carter to focus more; that t

he fam ilywas ab le to take Carte r t o Si x Fl ag s wi thoutincide nt and on a w eeke nd v acatio n to Ma rk Tw ain Lak e; and that on the second -to-last day of training, Carter, for the first tim e in his life, used meaningful w ords when he told Co rbin to "wait" and "hold." She also t esti fiedthat when Cart er' s grandfat her was hospit aliz ed, Cart er and C orbin
were separat ed for a few day s for about eight h ours a day. She said tha t this disru pted th eir working relation ship b ecau se C orbin wa s not re spon ding to h is commands and that Cart er went back to havi ng more tantrums. She stat ed tha t after a few days of coac hing , their relation ship was back to normal . She te sti fied that, in her opi nion, s eparat ing Carte r and Co rbin would greatly har m their working relationship and that i f they are sep arated , Corb in
wo uld become a pet, as opposed t o a servi ce animal, and Carter would suffer. She stat ed that Carter and Corbin share a w orkin g relatio nship and a very stron g bo nd an d that in orde r to main tain that

bond and relations hip, Corbin needs to be wit h Carter e very

day as a part o f his6

daily ro utin es. She stat ed that

she noti fied Cart er' s speci al educati on c oordinat or that Carter was going to obtain a

servi ce dog. She did so the firs t ti me after Cart er' s appli cati on for a ser vice dog had bee n ap pr ove d. She sa idth atatth atti me she asked wha t she neede d to do to p repare the school for

the dog's arr ival and was told t hat when the st art of s chool was clos er, t he school would look int o any i ssues t hat might

aris e. She test ifie d that s he subsequent ly spoke with the speci al education coordi nator on s everal other occasions about Cart er' s servi ce dog. On March 11, 2009, Cart er' s annual indi vidua li zed edu cati on plan (IEP) meeting was held. At the conclusion of t he IEP meeting, Carter' s att orney asked wh ether th e sch ool w ould allow a dog at the school, and the attorney was informed that the s chool 's s upe rint endent handledthose t

ypes of polic y cons iderations. Carter' s mother stated that she was i nformed at this meeting that Carter would not be all owed to bring hi s servi ce dog to schoolbut that she was unable t o get the school t o give her t his message in writ ing. She indicated that she tri ed on se veral o ther oc casion s to get something in writ ing indi cati ng that Carter would not be able t o bring hi s servi ce dog to schoolbut that her effo rts failed until Ju ne 20 09. S he sa id she had filed co mp laints ag ainst the scho ol district w ith the Il linoi s Department of Human Rights, the Unite d States Department of Education, and the Il linoi s Stat e Board of Educati on. The school di stri ct pres ented seve ral witnesse s: the direc tor of s pecialeducati on for t he sch ool dis tri ct, Carter' s case manager , the mother of anot her chil d enroll ed to attend Ca rter's s cho ol, th e pr incip al of Ca rter's s cho ol, an d th e su per inten den t of C arter 's sch ool

. C ar ter 's case manager t esti fied that Cart er' s mother t old her during the s ummer of 2008 that Car

ter was applyi ng for a ser vice dog, that s he beli eved having a dog i n s chool
wo uld be disr

uptive, and that

Carter ha d an indivi dual ai de atschool t o ensure t hat C ar ter 's needs were met. Cart er' s princ ipal t esti fied that the school had a po licy of all ow ing no animals at school and t

hat on the last

day Cart er att ended his s chool, he did not have a dog7

wit h hi m. The mother of anot

her child e nroll ed to att end the morni ng sessi on of preschoolat the school testified that he r child has a rar e lung dis ease, that her chil d is highly allergic to dogs, that the schooldistrict

promised her

at her c hild' s IEP meeting on August 18, 2009, t

hat her child would not be exposed to any animals, and that i f there was a dog in h er c hi ld 's cl as sr oom, her chil d would not go to s chool. The school di stri ct' s superi ntendent test ifie d that i n Ju ne h e de nied Ca rter's re que st to b ring his s erv ice d og t o sc hoo l. Afterhearing a ll t

he evidence, the court

issued a preli minary

injunction but def

erred its entry until t

he following M onday, August 24, 2009, when a hearing on how to impl ement C ar ter 's servi ce dog at sc hool would be hel d, because issuing it t hat day would be too much of a hardship on the schooldistrict . The foll owing Monday, the school di stri ct fi leda motion to stay, requesting the court to st ay i ts orde r grant ing the mot ion fora preliminary injunction, pending the res oluti on of its appeal. The court deni ed the school district 's mot ion and ent ered the orde r for a prelim inary injun ction e njoinin g t he school di stri ct from pre venting Carter from attend ing sc hoo l wh ile being accompani ed by hi s servi ce dog under the s ervice animal stat ute. The court made the order eff ecti ve September14, 200 9. On the same day , the school distr ict file d its n otice of a ppe al pu rsua nt to Su pre me Co urt R ule 3 07( a)(1 ). O n Aug ust 25, 200 9, the schoo l district filed a motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending the appealwith thi s court . We denied that motion on Sept ember 1, 2009. On Octob er 26, 200 9, Ca rter filed a mo tion to s trike po rtions o f the sc hoo l district's reply brief. On Novem ber 9, 2009, we iss ued an order t aking the motion t o strike with the case. We now grant that

motion, and we hav e not considered those po rtio ns of th e s ch oo l d ist ric t's reply brief in reachi ng our deci sion . P ur suantto Supr eme C ourt Ru le 345 (2 10 I ll . 2 d R. 345), t he Ill inois Attorney

General' s office f

iled a brief amicus curi ae on Carter' s behalf.8 AN AL YS IS The school di stri ct rai ses thr ee point s on appeal. First , the scho ol dist rict contends that because Carter failed to exhausthis admini strative r emedies pri or to br inging suit , the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter a preli minary injunction. Sec ond, the schooldistrict
avers that Carter fa iled to meet the r equirement s necessaryto obtain a preliminary injunction. And finally, the sc hoo l district arg ues th at the c ircuit co urt fail ed to m ain tain the part ies' stat us quo and prop erly

co nsider

the publi c inte rest

in balancing the equiti es between the parties. On appeal fr om an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction, " 'we examine only whether the party

seeking t

he injunc tion has demonstrat ed a pr ima facie case that there is a fair questi on concerni ng the exi stence of the cl aimed rights. ' " Moh anty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S. C. , 225 Il l. 2d

52, 62 (2006) (quoti ng People ex rel . Klaere n v. Village of

Lisle , 202 Ill. 2d 164, 177 (2002) ). General ly , we revie w thi s de cisi on for an abuse of di scret ion ( Moha nty , 225 Ill . 2d at

63), but where "the t

rialcourt' s deter

minati on regardi ng the grant of
a preli minary

injunction invo lves the interpre tation o f statuto ry law, the appr opriate standard of review is de novo ." Caro v. Blagoj evich , 385 Il l. App. 3d 7 04, 709 (2008) , appeal allowed , 231 Ill . 2d 629 (2009) . Thus, we re view the trialcourt' s int erpret ation of the ser vice animal statute de novo but rev iew its fin din gs o f fa ct fo r an abu se o f dis creti on. The purp ose o f a pre limina ry injunctio n is no t to det er mi ne controve rted rights or decide t he merits of

a case, but rat

her, i ts function is to pres erve the right s of the par ties or the state of affairs legally existing just prior to the motion for a preliminary injunc tion un til the case can be d ecid ed o n th e m erits. Ha rper v . Miss ouri P acific R.R. Co. , 264 Il l. App. 3d 238, 249 (199 4); Arends v. Naughton , 11 Il l. App. 2d 227, 236 (1956); but see He erey v. Berke , 179 Ill . App. 3d 927, 941 (1989) ("The purpose of injunc tive r elie f is t o eithe rreli eve the pl ain tif

f o f s ev er e a nd irr ep ar ab le i nj ur y orto [ sic ] prese rve the s tat u s quo ***"9

(emp hasis added)). Granting a pr elimi nary injunction is used to prevent a threatened wrong
or continuing injur

y and pr eserve the status quo with the least injur y t o the parties conce rned. In re Marriage of

Jawad , 326 Il l. App. 3d 141, 154 (200 1); Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont , 284 Ill. App. 3d 848, 853 (1996). The party

seeking a pr elimi nary

injunction is requir ed to est ablis h four factors before
an injunction willbe g ranted: (1) a clear ly ascert ained ri ght in nee d of protec tion, (2) an irr eparabl e injur

y i n the absenc e of an inj unction, (3) an i nadequate r emedy at law, and (4) a like liho od o f su cce ss o n th e m erits. Moha nty , 225 Il l. 2d at 62. I. Exhaustion of Administ rati ve Remedies The sc ho ol di str ict 's first content ion is that t

he circ uit cour

t lac ked juri sdict ion to i ssue
a preli minary

injunction because Carter failed to exhausthi s a dm i ni st r ati ve r em ed i es . We findit unnec essary

to dete rmine whether

Carter f aile d to exhaust his admini strative r emedies because the ci rcuit

court found t

hat Carter would be subject ed to ir reparabl e harm and that anyother

proce ss would be ina dequate due t o time const raint s. See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevi ch , 231 Ill. 2d 474, 499 (2008) ("[E]xhaustion is not requi red if t he administ

rati ve remedyis i n adeq uate o r futile o r in instan ces w here th e litigant w ill be sub jected to irrepara ble in

ju ry d ue to len gt hy a dministra tive pro cedu res tha t fail to pr ovid e interim relief"). As e xplain ed m ore fu lly below , we find tha t t he circ uit cou rt did no t abus e its discr etionin find ing tha t C arter would suffer i rrepar able har m by procee ding thr ough an administ rat ive process . Thus, t he circ uit cour

t did not abuse it s discr etion in issuing the preliminary injunc tion. Still, even if Cart er' s clai m was pending in an admini strative process,
we find under t

hat under t

he circ umstances of t

his cas e, the circ uit cour t st illwould have had juri sdict ion to ente r a prel iminary injunction pending t

he completi on of the adm inistrati ve process. See Kurtzworth v. Illinois Racing Board , 92 Il l. App. 3d 564, 584 (1981) (" [W]hen the proper ci rcumstance s are pr esented i t, acourt exe rcis ing traditional and inhe rent chanc ery10

pow ers may int ervene i n the admini strative process by furnis hing the provisi onal rel ief of a preliminary injunction *** pending the completi on of the admini strative he aring processe s ***"); Bartels tein v . Goodman , 340 Ill . App. 51, 54 (1950) (" 'If the remedy in equity is more adeq uate because of some spe cial circumst ance of the situa tion, the jurisdictio n of equity will be susta ined' " (quoting Cordell v. Solomon , 234 Ill. A pp. 4 30, 4 39 ( 192 4))). In any eve nt, we fi nd it ques tionabl e whether t he school dist

rict has even pres erved this issue for ou r review. The de nial of a motion t o dismis s by i tsel f is not a finaland appe alable order but , rat her, i s an int erlocutoryorder no t appealabl e under any of the excepti ons set f

orth in R ule 3 07. In re P etition o f Filipp elli , 207 Ill. A pp. 3 d 81 3, 8 1 7-18 (1990); Rosinia v. Gusmano , 90 Ill. App. 3d 882, 886 -87 (198 0). "Rule 307 all ows only t he review of

the order

from which a part

y t akes an appeal , and such an a ppeal does not open t

he door to a gener al revi ew of all or ders ent ered by the trial c ourt up t o the dat e of the orderthat is app eale d." In re P etition o f Filipp elli , 207 Il l. App. 3d at 818; but see Sara h Bu sh Lin coln He alth Cen ter v. B erlin , 268 Ill . App. 3d 184, 187 (1994) (hol ding that "the pr oper scope of the review und er Ru le 307 is t o review any prior error that bears di rectly upon t

he questi on of whether the orderon appeal was proper") . Here, the deni al of the school di stri ct' s motion to dismiss rais ing the exhau stion-of-adm inistrative-remedies argu ment w as an interlocutory ordernot general ly

appealabl e, and no ri ght of appealwas granted pur suantto Suprem e Cou rt Ru le 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). Rather, t he school dist r ict a

ppealed t he circ uit cour

t' s order granti ng the prel iminary injunction p ursuant

to Supreme Court Rul e 307(a)( 1), which provides for an interl ocutory appeal as of right

when an injunct ion is granted. The school district did not raise the exhaustion-of- administ rati ve-remedi es argument at the he aring on the motion for a

preli minary

injunction, i t was not cons idered by the ci rcuit

co urt at that hearing, and taking t

his appealdid not open t he door to a r eview of the r uling onthe moti on to d ism iss.11 II. Prelim inary Injun ction R equire men ts Ne xt, the sch ool d istrict con tends that C arter fa iled to e stablis h two of the four elem ents nec essa ry for a pre limin ary inju nctio n, i.e

. , that Carte r fail ed to est ablis h a likel iho od o f su cce ss o n th e m erits a nd t hat h e w oul d su ffe r irrep arab le ha rm. A. Likelihood of Success The school di stri ct cont ends that Carter di d not est ablis h that he had a li kelihood of
success on the meri ts of his under ly ing complai nt. I t conte nds that Carter f aile d to establi sh that Corbin was a ser

vice dog and t

hat we should cons true the service a nimal st atute as requiring an educational be nefit . We disagr ee. To establ ish alikel ihood of succe ss, Carter nee d only rais e a fair

questi on regardi ng the exist ence of a c laime d righ t and a fair qu estion th at he w ill be enti tled to the rel ief prayed for if t he proof sustains the al legat ions. See Fischer v. Brombolich , 207 Ill . App. 3d 1053, 1066 (1991). Here, the school di stri ct does not contest that Carter has a clear ly ascert ained right in nee d of

protec tion un der the servic e anim al statute . As p rovid ed ab ove, th at statute provides as follows:

"Servic e a n imals s uch as guide dogs , si gnal dogs[, ] or any other animal individ ually trai ned to perfo rm tas ks fo r the be nefit o f a stud ent w ith a disa bility shall be perm itted to acco mp any that stu dent a t all school functions, whether in or outsi de the classroom ." 105 ILC S 5/14-6 .02 (W est 2008). It i s undisput ed that

Carter i s a stude nt with a dis ability . The schooldistri ct argues, how ever, that C arter did not es tablish th at Co rbin w as a se rvice a nima l. We note that Carter
was not req uired to establish that C orbin wa s a serv ice an imal, b ut rathe r, he on ly had to raise
a fair que sti on re garding t he exist ence of his clai med right. Without deci ding the mer it of C ar ter 's cl ai m, we have revi ewed the servi ce animal s tatut e de novo and have deter mined that Carter has rai sed a fai r quest ion about t he exist ence of his righ t u nder the s ervice animal12

stat ute. W hen we interpre t a statute , the fu ndam ental ru le of sta tutory con struction is to ascerta in and giv e effec t to th e leg islatu re's in tent. Rose woo d Care Center, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 226 Il l. 2d 559, 567 (2007) . In t

hat proce ss, t

he langu age o f the sta tute is the best i ndicat or of legi slat ive int ent, and we g ive that langua ge its plain and o rdinary meaning. Caterpillar, Inc. , 226 Il l. 2d at 567. " We may not depa rt from the pl ain language of the statu te by read ing into it exce ptions , limitation s, or co nditi ons thatcon flic t with t he express legislative intent. " Caterpillar, Inc. , 226 Ill. 2d at 56 7. C ar ter 's mothertest ifie d that a video of Carter and a sample of hi s clot hing were sent to Wilderwood to famil iari ze Corbin with Carter' s appea rance and smell, that Corbin was trai ned to unders tand 70 commands, and t hat Corbin was t

rained f or Carter' s pica, impulse
run nin g, ni ght aw ake nin gs, a nd t antr um s. She also t esti fied that Cart er has benefitedfrom having Corbin by having reduced tantrums and now needs less t ime to recov er fro m h is tan trums, that C orbin is trained to ph ysically take C arter do wn if he ta kes o ff run ning into
a dang erou s situation , that C orbin had r educ ed C arter's nigh t awa kenin gs, an d that C orbi n dr aws Carter out

of his stimming. Thi s t es ti mo ny was suffi cient to rai se a fai r quest ion regardi ng whether Corbin was a " guide dog[], sign al dog [][,] or a ny other a nima l individ ually train ed to per for m ta sks for the b ene fit" o f C arter (10 5 IL CS 5/1 4-6 .02 ( W est 2 008 )). As to the s chool dis tri ct' s argument t hat we should cons true the servic e anim al statute
as requiring an educational be nefit , we findno such requi rement under a plai n reading of

the stat ute. The servic e anim al statute requ ires that th e serv ice an imal b e "ind ividua llytrai ned to perform ta sks for t

he benefi t of

a student

with a dis ability ." (Emphasi s added.) 105 ILCS 5/14-6. 02 (W est 2 008 ). The langu age o f the sta tute does not i nclude the term "educ ationa l benefit ," andwe " 'shoul d not att empt to re ad a statute other th an in th e ma nner in w hich it
was written' " ( Caterpillar, Inc. , 226 Il l. 2d at 567 (qu oting Ultsch v. Illinoi s Municipal13

Retire mentFund , 226 Il l. 2d 169, 190 (2007))) . Nonethel ess, Carter' s mother t esti fied that Co rbin draws Carter

out of his stimming, whichallow s him to foc us m ore o n com pleting his tasks and cert ainly

would be an educati onal benefi t. Reducedtantr ums and a faster recov ery time w ould also pr ovide Cart er an education al benefit. Thu s, we find that the circuit court di d no t e rr

infi ndi ng ali kel ih oodof s ucc es s onth e merit s of Carte r' s c la im. B. Irreparable Injury The school di stri ct cont ends that Carter did not establish tha t he wo uld suffe r a valid i rrepar able ha rm if a pr eli m in ar y in ju nc tio n w er e n ot gr an ted . It a rg ue s th at C ar ter 's har m is self- infli cted becaus e C ar ter can attend school without his s ervice dog if he so chooses. It arg ues that s elf- infli cted har m c ann ot b e irre par able har m. "Analle ged injur

y i s defined a s irr eparabl e when it i s of such nature t hat the inj ured party c annot be adequately compensat ed there for in damages or when damages cannot be measuredby a ny c ertain pecuniary standard." Cross Wood Products, Inc. v. Suter , 97 Ill. App. 3d 2 82, 2 86 ( 198 1). He re, the c ircuit co urt did not abuse i ts di scret ion in finding that Carter wo uld su ffer irre parab le harm if Corbin was not al lowed to attendsc hoo l wi thhi m. C ar ter 's mother te sti fied that du ring the period of time Carter and Corbin were separated wh ile Carte r's grand fath er was hosp italized, C arter an d C orbin 's work ing rela tionsh ip deteri orated. Sh e s aid th at C or bi n b ec am e le ss re sp on siv e to hi s c om m an ds an d t ha t C ar ter 's tantru ms increa sed. She s tate d tha t in or der for Carte r and Corbin t o maintai n their bond, Co rbin needed to be with Carter every day as a part of his dail y routines. This evide nce was not reb utted by the sch ool distr ict, a nd the inj uryis not compensable i n damages, or
mea surab le by any pec uniary stan dard , and is e xactly the ty pe of harm th at a preliminary inju nctio n is u sed to p rev ent. Further, the schoo l district' s arg u ment that Carter' s harm is s elf-inflic ted is without merit. As establ ished above, Carter ha s rai sed a fair qu estion r egard ing the existen ce of his14

right to take Corbi n with him t o school under the ser vice ani mal stat

ute. By att ending school withoutCorbin, Carter would s uffer ir reparabl e har m as a resul t of bei ng separat ed from Co rbin during school hour s. The schooldistrict cannot deny

Carter acce ss to sch ool w ith his
serv ice d og a nd t hen claim that h is ha rm is self-inf licted

. III. Status Quo/Balance of Hardships In its thir d point, the schooldistrict rais es two sepa rate arg um ents: (1 ) the circ uit court abused its discr etion in issuing a preliminary injunction because it altered t he stat us quo, and ( 2) th e circ ui t c ourt abus ed i ts di sc re ti on i n ba lanci ng t he h ar dsh ip s i n favor

of Carte r bec aus e it fa iled t o tak e into con side ratio n th e pu blic i nter est. A. Status Quo The school di stri ct cont ends that the inj un ction w as imp rope r beca use it alle gedly alte red the st atus quo between the par ties . The schooldist

rict argues t hat the stat

us quo was Carter atte nding schoolwithout a s ervice dog becau se Carter attende d school l ast y ear withouta servi ce dog. Cart er, on t he other hand, defi nes the s tatus quo as the s chool dis tri ct "notin fr in gi ng up on C ar ter 's rights secured to h im by law." It argu es that th e sch ool d istrict, "bydenying Carter access to it s school whil e being accompanied by Corbin, ha s changed the status quo by deny ing Carter a right secured t o him by the laws of the State of Ill inois." Under Ill inoi s law , it is gen erally prop er to issu e a pre limina ry injunctio n that w ill preser ve the s tatus quo of th e pa rties r athe r tha n alte r it. People v. Van Tran Elec tric Corp. , 152 Ill . App. 3d 175, 18 3 (1987). Often thi s is done by keeping al l act ions at

rest , but sometimes it happ ens th at the sta tus qu o is no t a con dition o f rest b ut, rather , is one of acti on and the condi tion of r est i s exactly what wil l infl ict t he irrep arab le ha rm. Brooks v. La Salle National Bank , 11 Ill. A pp. 3d 791 , 799 ( 197 3). Still, in cert ain ci rcumstance s, al teri ng the stat us quo might be appr opriat e. See Keystone Chevrolet Co. v. Kirk , 69 I ll. 2 d 483, 486 (1978) ("W here th e effect of a tem pora ry injunctio n w ill be to alte r the statu s quo , the pa rty15

seeking it must

firs t est ablis h the probabi lit y of his ul timat e success on the m erits"); Citizens Utili ties Co. of Illinoi

s v. O'Connor , 121 Il l. App. 3d 533, 535 (1984) (c iting K irk for the proposition that whe re the party seeking the tem porary restraini ng order would change the stat us quo, it

must fir st est ablis h the probabi lit y of i ts ul timat e suc cess on the merits); Lakeshore Hills, Inc. v. Adcox , 90 Il l. App. 3d 609, 611 (1980) ("The inj unction he re alt ered rather than prese rved the status q uo. Ho wev er, this does not requ ire reversal"). "[The term] [' ]status quo[' ] has been t he subject

of coun tless, ofte n inco nsisten t, inter pre tatio ns." Electronic Design & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Konopka , 272 Il l. App. 3d 410, 415 n.2 (1995 ). It has often been defined as the last actual , peaceful , noncont ested s tatus that precededthe pendi ng con trov ersy. Limestone Development Corp. , 284 Ill . App. 3d at 853. Another inter

pretation of the term, however , is the cond ition ne cessa ry to prev ent a dissipationor destructi on of t he prope rty in qu estio n. In re Marriage of Joerger , 221 I ll. App. 3d 4 00, 40 9 (19 91); Gannett Outdoo r of Chicago v. Baise , 163 Ill . App. 3d 717, 721 (198 7); Hom e Savings & Loan Ass'n of Jolie t v. Samuel T. Is aac & Associ ates, Inc. , 99 Ill. App. 3d 795, 802-03 (1981). Under eithe r interpretation, we b elieve that "[t]he prelim inary injunction is desi gned to preve nt a thr eatened wrong or the furt her perpet

rati on of an injurious act" (Ko lstad v. R ankin , 179 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1034 (1989) (citing Tou shin v . City of Chicago , 23 Ill. A pp. 3d 797 , 801 ( 197 4))). In th is case, t hat was done by i ssuing t he preli minary

injunction. Once Carter established that he me t the requireme nts necessary for a p reliminary injunction, the c ir cuit c ourt di d not abuse i ts di scret ion in i ssuing a pr elimi nary injunction that prevented the threatened harm and maintained the st atus quo with the l east i njury to the parties. See In re Marriage of Jawad , 326 Il l. App. 3d a t 154 ; Limestone Development Corp. , 284 Ill . App. 3d at 853; see al so Kolstad , 179 I ll. App . 3d at 1034 (rej ecti ng the defendant' s argument t

hat the stat

us quo was the set o f circu mstan ces im med iately prior to16

the plaintiff' s complaint where the defendant

ignored " the f

act t hat the fail ure to i ssue a preliminary injunction could r esult in inj urywhich had not previ ously occurred" and findi ng that the preliminary injunction maint ained the stat us quo by preventing a thre atened w rong). Here, the stat

us quo was not a condi tion of r est but , rat her, was a condition of a ction t hat was necessary to prev ent irrep arable harm. See In re Adopti on of Scraggs , 125 Ill . 2d 382, 388- 89 (1988); C ontin ental Cablevisi on of Cook County, I nc. v. Miller , 238 Il l. App. 3d 774, 790 (1992); American Telephone & Telegraph Co . v. Villag e of A rlingto n Heights , 174 Il l. App. 3d 381, 387-88 (198 8); Davis v. East St. Loui s & Interurban Water Co. , 133 Il l. App. 2d 801, 804-05 (1971). The school di stri ct argue s that allowing Carter t o atte nd school wit h Corbin cannot be the statu s quo beca use it w as ne ver the actua l status. T o ho ld that t he stat us quo was Carter not att ending schoolwith his servi ce dog bec ause t he servi ce dog never at tended school last

year would leave Cart er with no ave nue to preve nt suffering irr eparabl e harm–the purpose behindissuing a preli minary inj unction in the firs t plac e. E.g. , Wilson v. Wilson , 217 Ill. App. 3d 844, 849 (199 1); Da vis , 133 I ll. App . 2d at 8 05 ("T he pr even tion of this irrepara ble injury is the keyston e to the gran ting of injunc tive relief

*** "). In effect, to h old otherwise woul d be to hol d that des pi te fi ndi ng t

hat Ca rter has rais ed a fair

questi on regardi ng his legal right to att end school and t ake a servi ce animal wit h him under the servi ce animal stat

ute, the st atus quo was the school di stri ct likely infri nging upon Carte r' s clai med legal rig ht. A probable viol ation of law should never

be the st atus quo. See Cou nt y o f Du Page v. Gavrilos , 359 I ll. App. 3d 629, 638 (2005) (" ' Where the act s sought t o be enjoi ned, how ever, vi ol at e a n e xpr es se d l aw, "the sta tus to b e pres erved could never be a condi tion of affairs where the re spondent would be per mitt ed to cont inue the acts c on sti tuting that violation" ' " ( quoting San M iguel v. City of Windcrest , 40 S.W.3d 104, 109 (Tex. App. 2000) (quoti ng Ho uston Co mp ressed Steel C orp. v . State , 45 6 S. W.2d 768, 773 (Tex. Civ. App.17

1970)))). "The functi on of a prel iminary injunction is not merel y t o contai n ongoing damage but to prevent prospective damage." Gavrilos , 359 Il l. App. 3d at 638. Fi na lly, even if t

he stat us quo is t o be alt ered, a revers al is not requi red in every case. See Kirk , 69 Ill. 2d at 486 ; O'Connor , 121 Il l. App. 3d at 535 ; Adcox , 90 Ill . App. 3d at 611- 12. " 'An appli cati on for an inj unctionis addr essed t o the consci ence and sound di scret ion of the co urt, and it i s not cont roll ed by t echnicallegal rules , and unl ess a re viewing cou r t finds that the disc re tion has been abused, the order will not be set aside.' " Keeshin v. Schu ltz , 128 Il l. App. 2d 460, 468 (1970) (quoting Simpkins v. Maras , 17 Il l. App. 2d 238, 249 (19 58) ). W e fin d no suc h ab use of d iscre tion in th is ca se. B. Balance of Hardshi

ps La stl y, the schooldistrict argues t hat the circui t court

fail ed to properl y cons ider t he pub lic interest in balancing th e hardship s betwe en the part ies and that , as a r esult , the preliminary injunction shoul d be set as ide. In respons e, Cart er cit es to Barrett v. Lawrence , 110 Ill. A pp. 3d 587, 593 ( 1982), for the propos iti on that t

he circ uit cour

t shoul d not have balancedthe hardsh ips betwe en the parties be cause the sc hool district has clearl y v iolat ed C ar ter 's statutory righ t and th e sch ool d istrict's violatio n of Carte r's rights w as w ilful. In the alte rnati ve, Carter c ontends t hat the circui t court

proper lybalance d the hards hips bet ween the p artie s. "In balanci ng the equitie s, the co urt mu st we igh the bene fits of granting the inj unction againstthe possible inj uryto the oppos ing p arty from the injunction." Schweickart v. Powers , 245 Ill . App. 3d 281, 291 (1993). This genera l rul e, however, is not applied w here the violation is wil fu l, where the e xistence of a private right and th e violation thereof are clear, or where the a ct co mp laine d of is tor tiou s in its elf. Bar rett , 110 Il l. App. 3d at 593. In balanci ng the equi ties , the court s hould als o consider the effect

of t he inju nctio n on the pub lic. Village of Bensenvi lle v . Cit y of Chicago , 389 Ill. A pp. 3 d 44 6, 49 3 (2 009 ).18

Here, the ci rcuit

court bal anced the hardships bet ween the parti es and found that the injury Carte r wo uld su ffer b y being d enied his righ t to be a ccom panie d by C orbin outweighedany harm poten tially incurred by the sch ool distr ict. Because we find that the circui t court

did notabus e its discr etion in mak ing this findin g, there is no need to address C ar ter 's argumentthat t he circ uit cour

t shoul d not have balanced t he hardships between the parties. As explained above , there wa s am ple ev idenc e to support t he circ uit cour

t' s findi ng that Carter would s uffer ir

reparabl e harm if Corbi n was no t a llowed to a ccompany hi m at scho ol. As to th e s ch oo l d ist ric t's h ar m , C ar ter 's case manager t esti fied she t hought having
a dog at schoolwould be disr uptive. The mo ther of

anoth er child wh o w as plan ning to atte nd C ar ter 's school t es tifie d that he r chil d suffered from a rare l ung diseas e, that her c hild was high lyallergic to dogs, and that the schooldist

rict had promised her

that he r chil d would not be exp ose d to any a nim als a t sch ool

. Because of thes e competing inter ests, the court did not make th e inju nc tio n e ff ec tiv e im m ed iat ely b ut m ad e it effe cti ve th re e w ee ks af ter its en try. It did so pre sumably

to give the schooldistrict time to accom mod ate both stude nts. There
was no evidence pr esented that the other c hild w ould be alle rgic to Co rbin, a h ypoallerg enic dog, that the school dist rict could not accommodate both students, or that the schooldistrict
or public would s uff

er a g re at h ar ds hi p b y ha vi ng C or bi n a t sc ho ol w ith C ar ter . C ar ter 's motheroffered t o provide t raini ng to the sc hoo l's staff on how to hand le Co rbin o r stay with him if needbe. Thus, the circui t court did not abus e its discr etion in finding in favor of Ca rter in bala ncin g th e ha rdsh ips. CONCLUS ION In sum, we find that Cart er has demonstrat ed a prim a facie case th at there is a fair questi on concern ing the existenc e of his claim ed ri ght under the s ervice animal statute
. Preserving Carter' s clai med legal right in stat us quo unti l a deci sion can be r eached on the19

merits prevents Carter f

rom suffering irrep arable harm –the purp ose for issuing a preliminary injunction. For the for egoing reasons, Carter' s motion t o strike taken wit h the case is granted, and the ci rcuit

court' s grant

of the pre limi nary

injunction is affirmed.
Motion grante d; judgment affirmed.

GO LD EN HE RSH , P.J., and SPO ME R, J., concur.NO. 5-09-0447 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

___________________________________________________________________________________ CAR TER K ALBF LEISCH, by and ) Appeal from the Through H is Next Friends, ) Circui t Court of CHR ISTOPHE R KA LBFLE ISCH and ) M on ro e C ou nt y. MELI SSA KAL BFLE IS CH, ) ) Plaintiff-Appell ee, ) ) v. ) No. 09-CH-57 ) COLUMBI A COMMUNITY UN IT SCHOOL ) DISTRICT U NIT NO . 4, ) Ho nora ble ) D enn is B . Do yle, De fend ant-A ppella nt. ) Judge, presi ding.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion Filed : December 16, 2009

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justice s : Honorable James M . Wexstten, J.

Honorable Richar d P. Goldenhers h, P.J ., and Ho nor able Ste phe n L . Sp om er, J., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys Ch risti L. Fla herty, Da vid L . Ma nnix , Gu in, M artin & M undorf, LLC, 310 Regency for Centre, Collins vill e, IL 62234 Appell ant

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys AnthonyP. Gilbreth, C lay B. St. Clair, Crowder & Scoggins, Ltd. , 121 West Legion for Avenue, P.O. Box 167, Columbi a, IL 62236 Appellee Lisa M adiga n, A ttorney G enera l of Illino is, M ichae l A. S codr o, So licitor G enera l,

Jane Elino r No tz, De puty Solici tor General , Eri n Ipji an, Benjamin Johnson, Assist ant Attorney s General, 100 West Randolph Stre et, 12th Floor , Chicago, IL 60601 ( Am icus CuriaeBrief - for The People of the State of Illinois )

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