Veterinary Services

Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Final Report for the 2014–2015 Outbreak

of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

in the United States

Revised August 11, 2016

Public Version
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Handling Instructions

1. The title of this document is Final Report for the 2014–2015 Outbreak of Highly 

Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in the United States, also referred to as “this 

document”.

2. Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, without prior approval from Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS) National 

Preparedness and Incident Coordination is prohibited.

For more information, please consult the following point of contact:

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination

Surveillance Preparedness and Response Services

U.S. Department of Agriculture APHIS VS

4700 River Road, Unit 41

Riverdale, MD 20737

Version Control

This document was first released in May 2016. The August 2016 update includes the following 

changes:

• Corrections to identified errors in figures, legends, and text.

• Revisions and clarifications based on comments received.

• Revised tables and figures based on updated EMRS data (including, but not limited to 

depopulation method, disposal method, disinfection method and others). These changes 

were the result of ongoing data-cleaning processes and did not result in significant 

changes. In many cases, the handful of “not reported” premises (usually 3-6 premises)

were identified and subsequently placed into the appropriate category.

• New information on laboratory messaging during the outbreak.

• Slightly adjusted flock numbers (50.4 million to 50.5 million).

• Updated information on financial obligations.
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Executive Summary

Incident Overview

In December 2014, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) was detected in the United States for the 

first time in 10 years. From December 11, 2014 to January 16, 2015, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) received a total of seven reports of HPAI H5N2 or H5N8 in captive wild birds and backyard 

flocks from the northwestern United States. Additional detections occurred in wild birds. The first 

infected commercial flock was identified on January 23, 2015, in California. From January to March, the 

disease spread slowly to multiple states, including Minnesota, Missouri, Arkansas, and Kansas. A 

significant increase in HPAI H5N2 in turkey flocks occurred through early April in Minnesota, followed 

by a rapid increase in Iowa in late April and throughout May, where large numbers of chicken layer 

flocks were affected. The last case of HPAI was confirmed, in a commercial flock, on June 16, 2015.

In total, during the 2014–2015 outbreak, there were 211 detections on commercial operations and 21 

detections on backyard premises (including those premises designated as a Dangerous Contact Premises). 

HPAI was detected in commercial premises, backyard flocks, wild captive birds, and/or wild birds in 21 

States (Arkansas, California, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 

Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, 

Wisconsin, and Wyoming). Approximately 7.4 million turkeys and 43 million egg-layers/pullet chickens, 

as well as a limited number of mixed poultry flocks, were affected by HPAI and died from the disease or 

were depopulated as part of the response. This outbreak was the largest HPAI outbreak ever recorded in 

the United States and arguably the most significant animal health event in U.S. history. 

Summary of Response Activities

In response to the outbreak, USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary 

Services (VS) coordinated the national response to HPAI, in support of State and local government 

efforts. The response to the outbreak included the following activities at the national and/or field levels:

• Updating disease etiology and ecology information. 

• Revising laboratory definitions and case definitions.

• Planning and conducting disease surveillance.

• Performing sample collection and diagnostic testing.

• Planning and carrying out epidemiological investigations and tracing.

• Conducting information management in the field and at the national level.

• Coordinating and communicating with State, local, and industry stakeholders.

• Providing guidance on personal protective equipment and responder health and safety, and 

ensuring Safety Officers were deployed.

• Providing guidance and supervision on biosecurity measures.

• Conducting quarantine and movement control activities.

• Supporting continuity of business and issuing permits.

• Providing information and documentation for regionalization for international trade.

• Conducting and providing resources and guidance for mass depopulation and euthanasia.

• Conducting and providing subject matter expertise for disposal.

• Providing guidance, options, and contracted support for cleaning and disinfection (virus 

elimination).

• Performing logistics activities, particularly surge contracting, through the National Veterinary 

Stockpile.

• Safeguarding animal welfare during response operations.
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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• Conducting modeling and assessments to support response and recovery.

• Providing personnel dedicated to appraisal and compensation and processing indemnity 

payments.

• Ensuring the availability of financial resources for the response effort.

• Providing overall incident management, support, and objectives.

Depopulation, disposal, and virus elimination activities posed significant challenges due to the number of

affected premises and birds. Foaming was the most common method of depopulation for turkeys, while 

carbon dioxide was used for chickens. Composting was the most common method of disposal, and wet 

disinfectant the most common mode of virus elimination. On average, it took commercial premises about 

111 days from National Veterinary Services Laboratories confirmation of HPAI on the premises to being 

granted approval for restocking. 

Organizational Response

APHIS personnel deployed to the first HPAI cases in December 2014, and continued deploying 

throughout the response effort. A National Incident Coordination Group (ICG) was also established in 

December 2014. This ICG was scaled up significantly in April, reflecting the increasing number of 

detections and broadening response requirements. At this time, APHIS was also placed on Mobility Level 

2, meaning that VS initiated mandatory deployments for employees. The number of APHIS responders 

and contractors dedicated to the response continued to increase as the outbreak grew in scale. At the 

height of response operations, more than 3,400 personnel were deployed: approximately 250 APHIS 

personnel, 180 State responders, and over 3,000 support contractors. Over the course of the outbreak, 

there were over 1,200 total deployments by APHIS personnel. Approximately 300 additional employees 

were deployed or worked at an APHIS headquarters location to support the outbreak as part of the ICG.

End of Outbreak and Cost

While HPAI detections ended in mid-June 2015, many response operations—including virus elimination, 

environmental sampling, and restocking—continued throughout the fall. On November 18, 2015, the 

United States sent a final report to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE); at that time, the 

2014–2015 outbreak in the United States was considered closed. For the 2014–2015 outbreak, nearly

$850 million was obligated for response activities (including personnel support) and indemnity payments.

Another $100 million was made available for further preparedness activities: it was the most expensive 

animal health incident recorded in U.S. history. Extensive planning and preparation efforts continued to 

prepare for the possible reemergence of HPAI in the fall of 2015 and spring of 2016. 

There are many individuals and groups that contributed data or information to this report and deserve 

recognition, including—but not limited to—the National Animal Health Laboratory Network

Coordinator, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health Information Management and Analytic 

Services, Surveillance Preparedness and Response Services Logistics Center, Resource Ordering and 

Status System Dispatch, Poultry Commodity Staff, Incident Coordination Group Finance/Admin Section,

and APHIS Contracting Officers. A special thanks to the Emergency Management Response System 

(EMRS) Specialists, EMRS Network Associates, APHIS VS National Incident Management Teams, and 

the National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Situation Unit for information management 

activities for the outbreak. 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Contents

Handling Instructions................................................................................................................ iii

Version Control......................................................................................................................... iii

Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................v

Section 1. Background ................................................................................................................1

Purpose....................................................................................................................................1

Nature of Disease ....................................................................................................................1

Prior Outbreaks in the United States........................................................................................1

The Foundation of Preparedness..............................................................................................2

Section 2. Characteristics of the 2014–2015 Outbreak.................................................................3

Scope of the Outbreak..............................................................................................................3

Disease Incidence and Epidemiology.......................................................................................5

Viral Traits..............................................................................................................................8

Transmission ...........................................................................................................................9

Section 3. Overview of Response Effort......................................................................................9

Regulatory Intervention ...........................................................................................................9

Financial Resources...............................................................................................................10

Economic and Trade Impact ..................................................................................................10

Personnel...............................................................................................................................11

Section 4. Incident Management ...............................................................................................12

Overview...............................................................................................................................12

National Incident Coordination Group and APHIS Multiagency Coordination Group ...........14

APHIS Multiagency Coordination Group...........................................................................15

National Incident Coordination Group ...............................................................................16

APHIS VS National Incident Management Teams.................................................................18

APHIS VS National Incident Management Team Rotations...............................................18

Deployments for APHIS VS National Incident Management Teams ..................................19

Contractors............................................................................................................................19

Section 5. Incident Coordination Group Response and Support Activities.................................20

Overview...............................................................................................................................20

Reporting and Communicating Information...........................................................................21

Deployment/Personnel Management......................................................................................22

Policy and Guidance ..............................................................................................................22

Health and Safety ..................................................................................................................25

Section 6. Highlights of Response Activities.............................................................................25

Overview...............................................................................................................................25
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Surveillance and Epidemiology..............................................................................................27

Summary ...........................................................................................................................27

Incident Coordination Group and National Incident Management Team Activities.............27

Surveillance Conducted .....................................................................................................27

Diagnostics............................................................................................................................28

Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business..................................................29

Depopulation .........................................................................................................................32

Disposal.................................................................................................................................36

Virus Elimination (Cleaning and Disinfection) ......................................................................38

Biosecurity ............................................................................................................................40

Health and Safety ..................................................................................................................41

Appraisal and Compensation .................................................................................................41

Logistics................................................................................................................................42

Restocking.............................................................................................................................42

Communications....................................................................................................................43

Regionalization for International Trade..................................................................................45

Section 7. Preparedness and Future Planning.............................................................................45

Section 8. Conclusion................................................................................................................46

Section 9. Abbreviations ...........................................................................................................48

Section 10. List of Appendices..................................................................................................50

Tables

Table 1. HPAI Outbreaks in the United States.............................................................................2

Table 2. Summary of All Affected Premises by State ..................................................................4

Table 3. Approximate Percentage of U.S. Poultry Affected in Outbreak......................................5

Table 4. HPAI Outbreak Response Testing Summary (Number of Samples) .............................28

Figures

Figure 1. Number of Affected Commercial Premises by State .....................................................3

Figure 2. Number of Commercial Birds Affected by State...........................................................4

Figure 3. First Detection by Flock Type in each State by NVSL Confirmation Date,...................6

Figure 4. Map Illustrating HPAI Detections in the United States.................................................7

Figure 5. Total Incidence of HPAI in the United States by Week.................................................8

Figure 6. Total Number of APHIS Personnel Deployed by State of Incident .............................12

Figure 7. Overview of USDA APHIS Organizational Structure for Incident..............................13
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Figure 8. Incident Management Structures and Key Events during the 2014–2015 Outbreak.....14

Figure 9. Details of the USDA APHIS Organizational Structure for Incident.............................15

Figure 10. Total Number of APHIS Personnel Assigned to Support the Incident at APHIS Hub or 

Home Location, by Organizational Unit ....................................................................................16

Figure 11. National Incident Coordination Group Structure from Incident.................................17

Figure 12. APHIS VS National Incident Management Team Rotations .....................................18

Figure 13. Total Number of APHIS Deployments by Organizational Unit.................................19

Figure 14. Number of Contractors Deployed, by Week, during Outbreak ..................................20

Figure 15. Timeline of Public Release of Policy Documents .....................................................24

Figure 16. A Guide to Help You Understand the Response Process...........................................26

Figure 17. Length of Quarantine on All Premises (Frequency Count)........................................29

Figure 18. Number of Control Areas Released by Month for All Premises................................30

Figure 19. Number of Permits Issued by State of Origin for Movement Into, Within, or Out of a 

Control Area .............................................................................................................................31

Figure 20. Number of Permits Issued by Item Permitted............................................................31

Figure 21. Primary Depopulation Method for All Premises .......................................................33

Figure 22. Primary Depopulation Method by Flock Type for Commercial Premises..................33

Figure 23. Time to Depopulation (Average Days) from NVSL Confirmation for All Premises, 

excludes Dangerous Contacts....................................................................................................34

Figure 24. Time to Depopulation (Average Days) from NVSL Confirmation for Commercial 

Premises by Flock Type, excludes Dangerous Contacts.............................................................35

Figure 25. Time (Days) to Depopulation from NVSL Confirmation, excludes Dangerous 

Contacts....................................................................................................................................36

Figure 26. Primary Disposal Method for Carcasses for All Premises.........................................37

Figure 27. Time to Disposal Complete (Average Days) from NVSL Confirmation, excludes 

Dangerous Contacts..................................................................................................................38

Figure 28. By Method of Disposal, Time to Disposal Complete (Average Days) from NVSL 

Confirmation, excludes Dangerous Contacts.............................................................................38

Figure 29. Disinfection Method Used for All Premises..............................................................39

Figure 30. Average Time to Virus Elimination/C&D Complete (in Days), excludes Dangerous 

Contacts....................................................................................................................................40

Figure 31. Average Time to Restock Approval for Commercial Premises (in Days), excludes 

Dangerous Contacts..................................................................................................................43

Figure 32. HPAI Stakeholders...................................................................................................44

Figure 33. Summary of Key Events during the 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak...............................47
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Section 1. Background

Purpose 

This report serves as a historical summary and overview of the 2014–2015 high pathogenicity 

avian influenza (or highly pathogenic avian influenza) (HPAI) outbreak in the United States. It is 

not intended to be an after action or systemically identify corrective actions. Instead, this 

document focuses on the characteristics of the outbreak, organizational structure employed in the 

response, activities of the Incident Coordination Group (ICG), and summarized highlights of the 

field activities that occurred.

Nature of Disease

Avian influenza (AI) is a viral respiratory disease that infects all avian species. AI is a common 

disease, but the virus frequently changes or mutates. Based on the severity of illness, the AI is 

classified as either HPAI or low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI). AI viruses are named by 

two groups of proteins, hemagglutinin ([HA] ranging from H1–H17) and neuraminidase (ranging 

from N1–N9), e.g., H5N2 or H5N8.

In natural environments, HPAI viruses have always contained an H5 or H7. However, there are 

rare examples of situations where other viruses could technically be considered HPAI; these

viruses have not shown pathogenicity in poultry. HPAI tends to cause high mortality in domestic 

gallinaceous species (e.g., turkeys and chickens). It may or may not cause severe illness in wild 

birds, depending on the species and subtype of the virus. Some HPAI viruses also cause illness in 

humans and other mammals. Common AI signs in birds include decreased food and water 

consumption, coughing, sneezing, and decreased egg production. HPAI infections may also 

cause sudden death, lack of energy, the production of soft or deformed eggs, swelling (of head, 

eyelids, comb, wattles, and/or hocks), purple discoloration (of wattles and/or comb), nasal 

discharge, loss of coordination, and/or diarrhea. Transmission of HPAI typically occurs through 

direct contact with infectious respiratory secretions and feces. Viral spread via indirect contact 

with contaminated equipment and supplies (also known as fomites) is also common.

Prior Outbreaks in the United States

LPAI is commonly found in wild birds with occasional introductions into domestic poultry 

flocks. For example, in the United States, serious H7N2 and H5N2 LPAI outbreaks in 2002 and 

2007 resulted in the destruction of 4 million and 25,600 commercial birds, respectively. In many 

parts of the world, HPAI is also common. However, in the United States—and other countries 

considered to have developed veterinary infrastructure and advanced animal agriculture 

industries—HPAI is not frequently detected in commercial poultry. 

A summary of AI outbreaks in the United States is provided in Table 1. It is important to note 

that during the development of this report, another HPAI outbreak occurred in Indiana in January 

2016; it is also included in Table 1. However, this outbreak is not further discussed in this 

document.
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Table 1. HPAI Outbreaks in the United States

Year(s) Strain Locations Impact

1924 H7 East Coast live bird markets Not available

1927 Unknown NJ Not available

1983–84 H5N2 Northeastern U.S. 17 million chickens, turkeys, and 

guinea fowl destroyed

2004 H5N2 Southern U.S. Destruction of 1 flock

2014–15 H5N8, 

H5N1

(wild bird 

only), 

H5N2

AR, CA, IA, ID, IN, KS, KY, 

MI, MN, MO, MT, ND, NE, 

NM, NV, OR, SD, UT, WA, 

WI, WY (includes wild bird 

detections)

50.5 million commercial birds 

affected (including dangerous 

contacts)

2016 H7N8 IN >400,000 commercial birds affected 

(including dangerous contacts)

The Foundation of Preparedness

APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) is continuously preparing for significant animal disease 

incidents and emerging disease events. Prior to the 2014–2015 outbreak, APHIS VS personnel 

had planned and coordinated emergency management activities, trained and exercised 

emergency management functions, written response plans and procedures, and built critical 

relationships between the headquarters and field-level operations. 

In particular, before the 2014–2015 outbreak, APHIS VS personnel had done the following:

1. Wrote and updated multiple versions of the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and 

Response Plan (FAD PReP) Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan: The Red 

Book.

2. Written numerous FAD PReP procedures and guidelines on critical activities like 

biosecurity, cleaning and disinfection, and disposal.

3. Conducted National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) exercises for HPAI; 

over 38 tabletop exercises were conducted to examine the relationship between field 

actions and laboratory responses.

4. Completed outbreak investigation training for approximately 40 District Epidemiology 

Officers from 2013–2014, including 8 online learning modules, webinars, and a 

classroom workshop. 

5. Collaborated and supported to create the Secure Poultry Supply Plans for Eggs, Turkeys, 

and Broilers. These public-private-academic partnerships provide specific science- and 

risk-based recommendations that emergency decision makers can use to rapidly decide 

how to permit poultry products during an HPAI outbreak.

6. Participated in multiple exercises conducted by industry and academia, including the 

2014 Broiler Movement Field Exercise & Emergency Disease Management Committee 

Tabletop Exercise to discuss continuity of business and product flow during an outbreak. 

7. Conducted over 30 training courses for disease management and preparedness 

capabilities in fiscal year (FY) 2014.
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Section 2. Characteristics of the 2014–2015 Outbreak

Scope of the Outbreak 

HPAI viruses were detected in commercial poultry, backyard flocks, captive wild birds, and wild 

birds in 21 States during the outbreak. There were 211 commercial premises affected in 9 States

(Figure 1); 11 States had infections in backyard flocks, with 21 affected premises (these numbers 

include Dangerous Contact (DC) Premises that were depopulated).

1

In total, for both commercial and backyard premises, approximately 43 million chickens

(primarily layers or pullets), and 7.4 million turkeys died from the disease or were depopulated 

as part of the response and eradication effort.

2 Table 2 illustrates the number of premises 

affected (commercial and backyard) by State. Figure 2 illustrates the 50.5 million commercial 

birds affected by State. The outbreak primarily impacted turkeys, layer chickens (and pullets), 

and a limited number of game fowl; broiler chickens were negligibly affected. Most of these 

birds were affected by the HPAI H5N2 virus. 

Figure 1. Number of Affected Commercial Premises by State

 1 For more information on premises statuses used in an outbreak, please see the HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book

which is available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

2 In addition to the 7.4 million turkeys and 43 million chickens, flocks identified as mixed poultry, numbering just 

over 120,000 in total, were also depopulated or died as a result of the disease.

109

71

10

9

5

2 2 2 1

MN

IA

SD

WI

NE

CA

ND

MO

AR
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Table 2. Summary of All Affected Premises by State

Figure 2. Number of Commercial Birds Affected by State

32,694,282

8,894,004

4,837,185

1,909,633

1,720,394

247,201

126,703

40,020

29,471

0 5,000,000 10,000,000 15,000,000 20,000,000 25,000,000 30,000,000 35,000,000

IA

MN

NE

WI

SD

CA

ND

AR

MO

State

Total 

Commercial H5 

Positive HPAI 

Premises

Species

(Commercial Premises)

Total 

Backyard H5 

Positive HPAI 

Premises

Total by 

State Turkey ChickenLayer Other

Minnesota 109 104 5 0 1 110

Iowa 71 35 36 0 6 77

South Dakota 10 9 1 0 0 10

Wisconsin 9 6 3 0 1 10

Nebraska 5 0 5 0 1 6

California 2 1 0 1 0 2

Missouri 2 2 0 0 1 3

North Dakota 2 2 0 0 0 2

Arkansas 1 1 0 0 0 1

Kansas 0 0 0 0 1 1

Washington 0 0 0 0 5 5

Oregon 0 0 0 0 2 2

Montana 0 0 0 0 1 1

Idaho 0 0 0 0 1 1

Indiana 0 0 0 0 1 1

Total 211 160 50 1 21 232
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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The impact of the outbreak in terms of commercial inventories is illustrated in Table 3. The 

losses in layer chickens, pullets, and turkeys were substantial. This was the most significant 

HPAI outbreak in U.S. history. 

Table 3. Approximate Percentage of U.S. Poultry Affected in Outbreak3

Flock Typea Percent Losses

Layer Chickensb 10.01% avg. U.S. inventory

Pullet Chickens 6.33% avg. U.S. inventory

Broiler Chickens <0.01% avg. U.S. inventory

Turkeys 3.16% annual production; 7.46% avg. U.S. inventory a Flocks identified as “mixed poultry” were not included in bird counts.

b This includes flocks that were identified as “chickens” and or “layer breeder.”

Disease Incidence and Epidemiology

In December 2014, HPAI H5N2 was identified in commercial poultry in the Fraser Valley region 

of southern British Columbia, Canada. Soon after, samples were collected from wild birds in the 

United States. Combined with mortality events associated with captive wild raptors, this revealed 

that there were at least two HPAI virus strains in circulation: H5N2 and H5N8. For these first 

detections, migratory birds from the Pacific Flyway were the most likely source of introduction. 

The H5N2 virus was a reassortment of the Eurasian H5N8 HPAI virus (that also was detected)

and a North American LPAI strain.

On December 11, 2014, HPAI H5N8 was detected in a captive wild bird. The first HPAI 

detection in a wild bird was on December 14, 2014. From December to the end of March 2015, 

82 wild bird samples tested positive for H5 HPAI. Additionally during this same time period, 

14 backyard flocks or captive wild birds tested positive for H5 HPAI in six States (ID, KS, MO, 

MT, OR, and WA). Evidence suggested that these detections were point-source introductions.

In commercial birds, the first occurrence of HPAI was of the H5N8 virus in a California turkey 

operation on January 23, 2015. From January to the end of March, nine (8 infected and 1 DC)

commercial premises of turkey or mixed poultry were found positive for H5 HPAI in four States 

(AR, CA, MO, and MN). Again, these introductions are believed to be point-source. However,

by mid-April 36 additional HPAI-Infected Premises (or DC Premises) were detected; 26 of these 

were in Minnesota and hypothesized to be infected due to lateral spread of the virus. Other States 

affected by mid-April were Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Figure 3

illustrates the first detection, by flock type, in each State (e.g., first commercial detection in the 

State and first backyard detection in the State; captive wild bird detections are also illustrated). 

This is by the date of National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) confirmation.

 3 Please note, these percentages were calculated by the Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health at the end of the 

outbreak (late June, early July), based on nationally reported inventory and currently reported flock numbers for 

affected flocks. These percentages may not reflect final or corrected appraisal numbers which were revised later in 

the response; these adjustments could change the percentage of U.S. poultry affected very slightly.
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Figure 3. First Detection by Flock Type in each State by NVSL Confirmation Date4,5

On April 11, 2015, HPAI was detected on a chicken layer premises in Wisconsin. Then, on April 

18, 2015, the first chicken layer premises in Iowa—the leading egg producer in the United 

States—was identified as H5N2 HPAI positive; this premises housed over 4 million birds. At 

this point, detections increased dramatically: 188 of the 211 total commercial detections occurred 

in the upper Midwest in April and May. All 2014–2015 HPAI detections are illustrated, by bird 

type, in Figure 4. Please note that a county may have one or more detections.

 4 NVSL confirmation date is when a “confirmed status” was placed on the premises in the Emergency Management 

Response System (EMRS), based on a positive diagnostic test result at NVSL. In some cases, particularly at the 

height of the outbreak, this may have been a confirmed H5 result prior to further subtyping results: an NVSL 

confirmed H5 result is considered a confirmed positive date.

5 There was a captive wild bird detected in MO that was not entered into EMRS and is not illustrated here. October November December January February March April May June July August October

2014

September

2015

Arkansas 3/9/2015

Idaho 1/12/2015

Commercial

Backyard

Captive Wild Bird

Flock Type Montana 3/30/2015

Washington 12/11/2014

California 1/23/2015

Iowa 4/13/2015

Iowa 5/6/2015

Idaho 1/15/2015

Indiana 5/9/2015

Kansas 3/13/2015

Minnesota 3/5/2015

Minnesota 4/20/2015

Missouri 3/6/2015

Missouri 5/3/2015

Montana 4/2/2015

North Dakota 4/10/2015

Nebraska 5/12/2015

Nebraska 6/3/2015

Oregon 12/18/2014

South Dakota 4/1/2015

Washington 12/31/2014

Wisconsin 4/11/2015

Wisconsin 4/16/2015
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak 

7

Figure 4. Map Illustrating HPAI Detections in the United States 

Note: Map produced during the incident by USDA APHIS VS Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health, 

showing all detections December 2014 to June 2015. 

For wild birds, between December 2014 and June 2015, there were 98 detections of H5 influenza 

(65 of these were sequenced; 33 were based on molecular detection though no virus was 

isolated). For further details on these detections, please click here.4F

6

 As part of this collaborative 

surveillance effort, over 7,000 birds were sampled, predominately in the Mississippi and Pacific 

flyways (29 percent and 48 percent of total samples, respectively). However, samples were also 

collected from the Atlantic flyway, Central flyway, and American Oceania. 

Disease detections are illustrated in Figure 5 in an epidemiological curve.5F

7

 This epidemiological 

curve was fairly typical for a highly contagious disease outbreak. As seen in Figure 5, there were 

few detections each week until an increase in cases starting in early April. Cases spiked the week 

of April 22, with 38 detections that week and 37 detections the following week (April 29, 2015). 

After this, cases fell significantly though there continued to be more than 10 detections per week 

for 4 additional weeks. The last case was detected as a presumptive positive on June 15, 2015, 

confirmed to be an H5 by NVSL on June 16, and sequenced as H5N2 on June 17, 2015. The 

 

6

 Hyperlink is https://www.aphis.usda.gov/wildlife_damage/downloads/DEC%202014%20-

%20JUNE%202015%20WILD%20BIRD%20POSITIVE%20HIGHLY%20PATHOGENIC%20AVIAN%20INFLU

ENZA%20CASES%20IN%20THE%20UNITED%20STATES.pdf. 

7

 This figure was the epidemiological curve produced and distributed during the outbreak. It shows all data available 

in EMRS as of September 1, 2015. Additional data may have been added to EMRS after this time. 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

8

reduction in cases was presumed due to both control measures and the onset of summer heat, 

which helps to inactivate AI viruses.

Figure 5. Total Incidence of HPAI in the United States by Week

Note: Date pictured is earliest available date indicating clinical signs. This is a clinical sign date if known, a 

suspect status, or a presumptive positive status. Some premises may only have a confirmed positive status date. 

Viral Traits

The traits of this HPAI H5N2 virus that spread throughout the Midwest was in many ways 

consistent with the typical profile of HPAI. This virus was highly pathogenic in poultry and 

caused signs consistent with the generic profile of an HPAI virus. However, a few unique 

characteristics have been identified via investigations and research. For instance, based on the 

epidemiological investigation, incubation periods were estimated at between 3 to 11 days for this 

outbreak (3 to 5 days is typical with HPAI viruses). Additionally, the H5N2 virus circulating in 

the 2014–2015 outbreak appeared to be more virulent and better adapted to infect turkeys than 

chickens. 8

Phylogenic studies conducted by the USDA APHIS NVSL, the USDA Agricultural Research 

Service Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory (SEPRL), and the Influenza Division of the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicated that this H5N2 virus was

genetically very similar to other HPAI strains circulating in the United States and had an HA 

protein derived from the HPAI Eurasian H5N8 virus. 9 Thus, as previously mentioned, this 

specific H5N2 virus represents a reassortant combination of that H5N8 virus and an LPAI virus 

of North American origin. According to this research, the virus did not contain molecular 

markers commonly associated with antiviral resistance or increased transmission and virulence 

 8 Bertran, K., Swayne, D.E., Pantin-Jackwood, M.J., Kapczynski, D.R., Spackman, S.E., & Suarez, D.L. (2016). 

Lack of chicken adaptation of newly emergent Eurasian H5N8 and reassortant H5N2 high pathogenicity avian 

influenza viruses in the U.S. is consistent with restricted poultry outbreaks in the Pacific flyway during 2014-2015. 

Virology, 494, 190-197. DOI: 10.1016/j.virol.2016.04.019. 9 Lee, D.H., Torchetti, M.K., Winker, K., Ip, H.S., Song, C.S., & Swayne, D.E. (2015). Intercontinental Spread of 

Asian-origin H5N8 to North America through Beringia by Migratory Birds. Journal of Virology, epub before print.

DOI: 10.1128/JVI.00728-15.
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

9

in mammals, which indicated that this virus likely posed a low risk to humans. Tests to monitor 

genetic changes continued during the outbreak.

10

Transmission

USDA APHIS coordinated field-based survey instruments and interviews, as well as a layerfarm case-control study. The epidemiological investigations and other analyses conducted by 

USDA APHIS advised that there were multiple pathways of introduction and HPAI 

transmission. Sharing equipment between farms, entry of wild birds into barns, and farm 

workers/visitors all likely contributed to virus spread. Other possible pathways included shortdistance aerosol spread, carcass disposal techniques, and other biosecurity breaches. The NVSL, 

SEPRL, and CDC analysis also suggested that both common source exposures and independent 

introductions were contributing to the spread of the H5N2 in the United States. 

While specific risk factors for infection were identified, “there is not substantial or significant 

enough evidence to point to a specific pathway or pathways for the current spread of the virus.” 11

Anecdotally, there was much discussion over whether aerosolized virus and airborne spread was 

responsible for virus transmission. While it is possible that aerosol transmission was responsible 

for disease spread, the USDA APHIS epidemiological analysis was “not able to determine with 

certainty whether aerosol transmission was responsible for a farm becoming infected.”12 That 

said, “results obtained to date indicate that HPAI can be aerosolized from infected flocks and 

remain airborne.” 13 For further information, please refer to the USDA APHIS analyses.

Section 3. Overview of Response Effort

Regulatory Intervention

Under the Animal Health Protection Act and Code of Federal Regulations, USDA APHIS has

the authority to respond to and eradicate foreign animal diseases (FAD) in the United States. 

Accordingly, USDA APHIS responded to HPAI, working in close coordination with State and 

local governments to eradicate the disease. USDA APHIS worked operationally, in the field, as 

part of unified State-Federal Incident Commands (IC) and established a National ICG at APHIS 

headquarters to provide national policy and coordinate strategic guidance. An APHIS 

Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Group was also established to coordinate resources; the VS 

 10 United States Animal Health Association Committee on Transmissible Diseases of Poultry and Other Avian 

Species. 2015. Report of the Committee. http://www.usaha.org/Portals/6/Reports/2015/report-pad-2015.pdf. 

11 For more information on transmission and epidemiology, please refer directly to the Epidemiologic and Other 

Analyses of HPAI-Affected Poultry Flocks: September 9, 2015.

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/downloads/Epidemiologic-Analysis-Sept2015.pdf. 

12 Please see p.1: Epidemiologic and Other Analyses of HPAI-Affected Poultry Flocks: September 9, 2015.

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/downloads/Epidemiologic-Analysis-Sept2015.pdf. 

13 Please see p.47: Epidemiologic and Other Analyses of HPAI-Affected Poultry Flocks: September 9, 2015.

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/downloads/Epidemiologic-Analysis-Sept2015.pdf. 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Executive Team (VSET) coordinated VS resources and elevated issues to the APHIS MAC 

Group as required.

At the State level, four States declared a State of Emergency: Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and 

Wisconsin. As a result, these States received additional assistance and resources from partnering 

State agencies and State departments of homeland security to respond to the outbreak. The State 

of Iowa also requested a Stafford Act declaration from the Department of Homeland Security, 

which was denied. For further information on the State responses to the HPAI outbreak, please 

refer to their websites or State Departments of Agriculture.

Financial Resources

When the outbreak began in late 2014, APHIS utilized its appropriated Avian Health funds to 

address the initial cases. As the outbreak expanded in early spring 2015, the Secretary of 

Agriculture began transferring Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds to support the 

response including transfers in April and May totaling $393 million, $305 million in July, and 

$291 million on September 4, 2015. A total of $989 million in CCC funds were transferred for 

the response. APHIS obligated nearly $850 million to respond to the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak; 

additional funds were made available for HPAI preparedness (and subsequent HPAI/LPAI 

outbreaks). Funding provided for response activities supported payments to affected producers 

for depopulation, disposal, and cleaning and disinfection activities conducted on their premises 

(and to contractors that supported these activities). Response funding also supported indemnity 

payments to flock owners; as of May 2016, all indemnity commitments had been paid, equaling 

just over $200 million. 

Economic and Trade Impact

In addition to response and indemnity payments, the HPAI outbreak had a very significant 

economic impact. To provide perspective to the overall magnitude of this outbreak: early 

estimates suggest the 2014–2015 HPAI incident resulted in approximately $1.6 billion in direct 

losses from turkeys and chicken layers that had to be depopulated. When accounting for factors 

like restocking and lost future production, the impact to the U.S. economy is thought to be closer 

to $3.3 billion. 14

As a result of HPAI, consumers experienced wholesale egg prices reaching nearly $2.80 per 

dozen, more than doubling the previous 3-year average cost of large eggs. Prices continually 

decreased throughout the remainder of 2015, but costs sustained above the 3-year average. 15

In part, the economic impact is related to trade bans imposed by trading partners as a result of the 

HPAI outbreak. While the United States lost 18 trading partners—including China, Russia, and

South Korea—valued at $898 million in 2014 (or 13.9 percent of the year’s total trade revenue), 

USDA APHIS National Import Export Services (NIES) worked with remaining trading partners 

 14 Greene, Joel L. 2015. Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014–2015. Congressional 

Research Service. 

15 Green, Joel L. 2015; 2016. Egg Market News Report. USDA Agricultural and Marketing Service. Volume 63(10). 

https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/pybshellegg.pdf. 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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to continue or resume trade. Thirty-eight trading partners regionalized the United States during 

the outbreak, which allowed trade to continue from areas of the United States that were not 

affected. This helped to preserve 86 percent of the value of traded U.S. poultry and poultry 

products (including eggs), based on 2014 values.

Personnel

USDA APHIS VS employees from standing APHIS VS National Incident Management Teams 

(NIMT) were deployed to Oregon in December 2014, as part of a unified State-Federal IC to 

support State and local personnel in their response to the HPAI detections. Later in the outbreak, 

APHIS was placed on Mobility Level 2 and VS initiated mandatory deployments for personnel; 

employees were deployed from all APHIS programs. The number of APHIS responders and 

contractors dedicated to the response continued to increase as the outbreak grew. The National 

Animal Health Emergency Response Corps (NAHERC) was also activated during the outbreak; 

after undergoing training in Ames, IA, 69 NAHERC members deployed during the incident. 

Additionally, over 200 term employees were also hired in 2015 for future outbreak response and 

ongoing preparedness. 

At the height of response operations in June 2015, more than 3,400 personnel were deployed: 

approximately 250 APHIS personnel, 180 State responders, and over 3,000 support contractors. 

Over the course of the entire outbreak, there were 1,220 deployments by APHIS personnel, with 

773 total individuals deployed. Many APHIS personnel deployed twice, and some deployed 

three or four times. An additional 300 APHIS employees were deployed to or stationed at an 

APHIS headquarters location to support the outbreak as part of the ICG; between 3–8 contractors 

also augmented the ICG for additional support during and after the outbreak.

16 Figure 6

illustrates the number of APHIS deployments by State of deployment for the entire outbreak. 

 16 These contractors that augmented the ICG were hired as a result of HPAI, and were not existing APHIS 

contractors. 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

12

Figure 6. Total Number of APHIS Personnel Deployed by State of Incident 

Section 4 provides additional information on the organizational structure and command and 

control structure of the field responders and headquarters personnel.

Section 4. Incident Management

Overview

Effective incident management was critical to respond and eradicate HPAI. Figure 7 illustrates 

an overview of the organizational structure from June 2015 that was used during the 2014–2015 

HPAI outbreak. The HPAI incident was managed through use of the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS) to include the Incident Command System (ICS), which provided a 

flexible and scalable organizational approach throughout the response. 

541

456

84 51 31 29 13 10 5

0

100

200

300

400

500

600
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

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Figure 7. Overview of USDA APHIS Organizational Structure for Incident

Note: This figure depicts four APHIS VS NIMTs; a fifth team, Indigo, was added as a result of this 

incident.

At the top of Figure 7, the USDA Secretary was the highest official involved in off-scene policy 

and incident coordination in 2014–2015; the USDA HPAI MAC Group elevated issues to the 

Secretary for resolution as needed. Below the USDA HPAI MAC Group was the APHIS 

Administrator, who led APHIS policy. The APHIS MAC Group, which took over from the 

Emergency Management Leadership Council (EMLC) on June 23rd, coordinated resources and 

resources requests, making requests to the APHIS Administrator as appropriate. The VS 

Executive Team took recommendations from the National Incident Coordinator and Deputy 

Coordinator, and handled strategic policy and procedures. The VS Executive Team also provided 

assistance as requested by the APHIS HPAI ICG.

These groups interfaced at appropriate levels with industry associations, States (both directly and 

through the National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials [NASAHO] and National 

Association of State Departments of Agriculture), public health agencies, including the CDC and 

State agencies, as well as other external partners. Overall, the HPAI MAC Group, VSET, and 

National ICG provided the policy, resources, and coordination for the duration of the incident. 

At the field or operational level, APHIS VS NIMTs were deployed to incident sites. When the 

outbreak started, USDA APHIS VS had four standing NIMTs: Green, Blue, Red, and Gold (it 

USDA Off-Scene Policy and Incident Coordination

Industry Associations

NASAHO & NASDA

Multiagency Coordination: Provides Policy, 

Resources, and Coordination

Incident Management: Conducts Operations.

Requests Resources, Coordination, and Policy

USDA Secretary

USDA HPAI MAC

APHIS HPAI MAC 

VS Executive Team

APHIS HPAI Incident 

Coordination Group 

Public Health Agencies

Other External Partners

VS Type III IMTs- Green, Gold, Blue, Red

District 1 Command

ME, NH, VT, MA, CT, 

RI, NY, NJ, PA, DE, MD, 

DC, WV, VA, NC

District 2 Command

TN, SC, GA, AL, FL, PR, 

VI

District 3 Command

MN, WI, MI, IA, IL, IN, 

OH, KY

District 5 Command

MT, ND, SD, ID, WY, 

NE, KS

District 6 Command

WA, OR, CA, NV, UT, 

CO, AZ, NM, AK, HI

District 4 Command

MO, OK, AR, MI, LA, 

TX 

APHIS Administrator 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

14

has since added a fifth team, Indigo). Because the outbreak was so large, some NIMTs actually 

had to be split and supplemented with contractors during the 2014–2015 response. The NIMTs 

used the National ICG to request policy guidance, additional or new resources, and coordination 

for incident response activities.

Figure 8 illustrates the approximate timeline of key events with incident management structures 

during the outbreak.

Figure 8. Incident Management Structures and Key Events

during the 2014–2015 Outbreak

National Incident Coordination Group and APHIS Multiagency 

Coordination Group

On December 19, 2014, the National ICG was established just before the first APHIS employees 

were deployed to the field. Then, in January 2015 after additional HPAI detections, the APHIS 

EMLC was engaged as a de facto MAC Group to coordinate APHIS resources. The ICG 

provided Area Command functions and policy support to all APHIS VS NIMTs that were 

deployed to impacted states. ICG leadership deployed to the APHIS Emergency Operations 

Center in Riverdale, MD, on April 13, 2015—coinciding with a rapid increase in cases.

However, at the height of response operations, it was recognized that the EMLC did not possess 

the authority to provide APHIS-wide support and make APHIS-level decisions during the 

emergency. As such, the EMLC was replaced on June 23, 2015, by an APHIS HPAI MAC 

Group. This APHIS MAC Group was established to provide additional, higher-level APHIS 

policy, resource, and coordination support given the scope of the outbreak.

These structures are shown in Figure 9.

December 

2014

January 

2015

February 

2015

March 

2015

April 

2015

May 

2015

June 

2015

Dec 14

HPAI first detected in the 

United States

Dec 19

First backyard flock tests 

positive for HPAI

National ICG established

Dec 24

First personnel deployed 

to the field

EMLC engaged

Jan 23

HPAI confirmed in a 

commercial flock in 

California

March 5

First detection in 

Minnesota

Apr 13

First detection in Iowa

Apr 22–28

Week with the most 

new cases (38)

Green IMT split into 

2 teams

Blue IMT split into

2 teams

Jun 17

Last HPAI-confirmed 

premises

Jun 23

APHIS MAC replaces 

the EMLC
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

15

Figure 9. Details of the USDA APHIS Organizational Structure for Incident

APHIS Multiagency Coordination Group

The APHIS HPAI MAC Group was created to provide immediate leadership and authority for 

resolving issues during the emergency and to develop needed policies and processes for the 

future. This group did the following:

• Provided overall coordination and management of the emergency response;

• Provided cross-unit leadership, coordination, and direction (including coordination of 

resources to the Incident Commanders); and

• Brought standardization and uniformity to the response operation.

The APHIS HPAI MAC Group consisted of senior-level representatives and subject matter 

experts (SMEs) from across the agency. Members included representatives with the authority to 

make decisions from the following offices, program units, and support units:

• Chair: Office of the Administrator 

• Executive Secretariat

• VS 

• Marketing and Regulatory Program Business Services (MRPBS) 

• Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) 

• Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) 

• Animal Care 

• Wildlife Services (WS)

• Ad hoc SMEs as needed.

APHIS Administrator & AMT

Planning Section Chief Finance/Admin Section 

Chief Operations Section Chief Logistics Section Chief

VS Deputy Administrator & VS 

Executive Team

District Directors

APHIS HPAI MAC

APHIS Incident 

Coordination Group 

APHIS Emergency 

Operations Center 

(AEOC)

Assistant District Directors

Public Information Officer

Liaison Officer

Incident Commander & Unified 

Incident Management Team SAHOs

Safety Officer

Requests and

Information

Support and 

Coordination
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

16

National Incident Coordination Group

As the response effort grew, so did the National ICG. Established just prior to the first 

deployment of VS personnel, the ICG’s primary purpose was to support the APHIS VS NIMTs 

in acquiring resources and formulating policy options, and to assist in developing and 

implementing response and recovery strategies. While the ICG started as a handful of 

individuals, ultimately approximately 300 APHIS employees were supporting the National ICG 

from the Riverdale headquarters or Ft. Collins and Raleigh hubs; some personnel were also 

virtual. Contractors augmented the ICG in support roles. These ICG personnel predominately 

came from Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services (SPRS), but included individuals 

from across the agency (Figure 10); they were assigned for extended periods of time, usually 

exceeding 30 days. Many personnel served in their role for the entire incident; response activities 

extended through November 2015.

Figure 10. Total Number of APHIS Personnel Assigned to Support the Incident at 

APHIS Hub or Home Location, by Organizational Unit

Note: PSS = Program Support Services, STAS = Surveillance, Technology, and Analysis Services, 

PPD = Policy and Program Development, BRS = Biotechnology Regulatory Services.

Key activities performed by the ICG included: policy development, coordination of 

epidemiological investigations and studies, facilitation of national resource deployments via the 

National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS), indemnity payment processing, coordination of modeling 

and preparedness work, coordination of national laboratory services, contracting support,

development of daily and weekly situation reports and maps, and coordination with nationallevel stakeholders. ICG command and control was accomplished via regular meetings and the 

Incident Action Planning (IAP) process.

Figure 11 illustrates the ICG structure that was used to respond to the HPAI outbreak; flexible 

and scalable to the incident, this structure evolved multiple times throughout the 2014–2015 

outbreak to adjust to the needs of the incident and the response efforts.

116

58

37

27

17 13 9 6 5 2 1 1

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak 

17

Figure 11. National Incident Coordination Group Structure from Incident 

Note: DA = Deputy Administrator; QA/QC = quality assurance/quality control; OPS = operations; ROSS = Resource Ordering and Status System. 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

18

APHIS VS National Incident Management Teams

Beginning in December 2014, APHIS VS NIMTs were deployed to support State responses to 

HPAI detections. NIMTs were deployed to Incident Command Posts (ICP), to create a unified IC

with State responders. During the 2014–2015 HPAI incident, the organizational structure of each 

unified IC was consistent with NIMS/ICS but varied slightly, based on the specific needs of the 

State and ICP. APHIS VS NIMTs were not deployed to every State during the incident; the 

integration and number of Federal personnel in a unified IC depended on the capabilities and 

resources of the State. The IC was responsible for executing field activities, including 

depopulation, disposal, disinfection, and diagnostic testing activities. 

APHIS VS National Incident Management Team Rotations

USDA APHIS VS started the incident with four NIMTs: Gold, Green, Blue, and Red. Additional 

NIMTs were created by splitting both the Green Team and Blue Team into two separate teams, 

each augmented with contractors to meet staffing requirements. This was necessary to address 

growing response demands. A rotation system was used, whereby one team replaced another 

team after an allotted deployment time. Figure 12 illustrates these rotations. Oregon, California, 

Minnesota, and Iowa all had multiple NIMT rotations; at the height of the response, Minnesota, 

Iowa, and Wisconsin all had an NIMT at the same time.

Figure 12. APHIS VS National Incident Management Team Rotations

a Teams split and augmented with contractors due to the scope of the incident. October November December January February March April May June July August October

NovemberDecember

2014 2015

September

Oregon 12/29/14–1/9/15

Oregon 1/7/15–1/30/15

California 1/27/15–2/13/15

California 2/14/15–3/7/15

Missouri 3/11/15–3/27/15

Minnesota 4/4/15–5/3/15

Minnesota 4/17/15–5/22/15

Iowa 4/24/15–5/20/15

Wisconsin 4/30/15–5/23/15

Iowaa 5/15/15–6/15/15

Minnesotaa 5/20/15–6/15/15

Iowaa 6/15/15–7/12/15

Minnesotaa 6/15/15–7/12/15

Iowa 7/8/15–8/6/15

Iowa 8/6/15–8/29/15

Gold Team

Green Team

Blue Team

Red Team

IMT Teams
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

19

Deployments for APHIS VS National Incident Management Teams

During the response effort, deployed APHIS personnel filled over 60 different positions, ranging 

from Incident Commander and Deputy Incident Commander to Planning Section Chief and 

Safety Officers. The most frequently deployed positions were Veterinary Medical Officers 

(278 deployments), followed by Animal Health Technicians (263 deployments), and Team 

Technicians (76 deployments).

SPRS had the most deployments, by a significant margin. There were also deployments from 

NIES, MRPBS, WS, PPQ, and STAS. The total number of deployments by organizational unit is 

provided in Figure 13.

Figure 13. Total Number of APHIS Deployments by Organizational Unit

Note: IS = International Services.

Contractors

The response to the outbreak quickly outpaced available resources once the outbreak accelerated 

in the Midwest, both at the ICG and NIMT levels. Contractors augmented both ICG and field 

responses. The SPRS Logistics Center, through the ICG, played a key role in coordinating and 

tracking the contractors both at headquarters and in the field. APHIS Contracting Officers also 

played a critical role in executing contracts. USDA APHIS contracted with a number of 

companies, large and small, to effectively execute response operations. Contractors worked in 

the field not only to deliver services and materials related to depopulation, disposal, and 

disinfection, but to provide premises physical security services, credentialing assistance, and 

equipment rentals. In all, USDA APHIS contracted with more than 90 companies, individuals, 

and organizations to complete response operations successfully.

Figure 14 shows the total number of contractors that were working, by week, during the course 

of the response; it includes both headquarters ICG support and field support contractors, though 

the maximum ICG support during any week was eight personnel/full-time equivalents.

758

77 67 66 65 54 54 43 21 4 4 3 2 1

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

20

Figure 14. Number of Contractors Deployed, by Week, during Outbreak

Section 5. Incident Coordination Group Response and Support

Activities

Overview

The ICG worked with other Federal, State, local, stakeholder, and industry partners during the 

outbreak to achieve control and eradication of HPAI. The ICG supported and provided policy 

guidance to the APHIS VS NIMTs at ICPs and incident sites while they were conducting key 

activities including depopulation, disposal, and virus elimination.

This list is not exhaustive but provides an overview of the many tasks that the ICG completed 

during the incident:

• Updated disease etiology and ecology information. 

• Revised laboratory definitions and case definitions.

• Designed disease surveillance and sampling schemes.

• Planned diagnostic testing requirements.

• Coordinated epidemiological investigations.

• Carried out information management, coordinated mapping, and produced reports.

• Communicated with stakeholders.

• Facilitated responder health and safety and provided guidance on personal protective 

equipment (PPE).

• Provided guidance on biosecurity measures.

• Assisted with quarantine and movement control issues.

• Supported permitting and continuity of business activities.

• Provided information and documentation for regionalization for international trade.

• Provided resources and guidance for mass depopulation and euthanasia.

• Conducted and provided subject matter expertise for disposal activities, particularly 

composting.

• Provided options and policy for cleaning and disinfection (virus elimination).

592

1,705

2,197

2,432

2,7552,9232,740

3,009

2,482

2,1822,185

1,905 1,718

1,276

809

488

139 81 42 110

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

Total Number of Contractors (Field & ICG)
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

21

• Supported logistics activities through the NVS.

• Safeguarded animal welfare during response operations.

• Conducted modeling and assessments to support response and recovery.

• Provided personnel dedicated to appraisal, compensation, and payment processing.

• Prescribed guidance for restocking and environmental sampling for recovery.

• Ensured the availability of financial resources.

• Provided overall incident management, support, and objectives.

Reporting and Communicating Information

Information management is a challenge in any large incident, and many individuals in both the

ICG and NIMTs were responsible for data entry, analysis, and reporting. Communication of this 

information both internally and externally is critical for effective coordination and 

communication; this was a daunting task as the number of cases increased dramatically, 

outpacing available resources. 

At the VS and APHIS MAC level, the following were conducted at routine intervals:

• VSET meetings (as needed).

• APHIS MAC Group meetings (as needed).

At the ICG level, the following were conducted/completed at routine intervals:

• Conference calls between the ICG Deputy Incident Coordinator and the NIMT Incident 

Commanders (daily).

• Conference calls between the ICG, deployed VS NIMTs, and affected States (daily).

• ICG HPAI Status Reports to APHIS staff, Administrator, and to NASAHO (daily).

• Stakeholder announcements and/or GovDelivery notices (daily or as needed).

• ICG-all conference calls (3 times per week).

• Reports distributed widely to States and USDA (weekly or biweekly):

 National Situation Report (Appendix 2a and 2b) 17

 National Infected Premises List (Appendix 3)18

 National Incident Maps (Appendix 4)19

 National Control and Containment Maps (Appendix 5a and 5b)

 Epidemiological Curve (Appendix 6)

 Deployment Report (for APHIS Personnel) (Appendix 7)

 Permit and Movement Report (Appendix 8).

• IAPs and corrective action reports (3 times per week) (Appendix 9a and 9b).

 17 Appendices are not publicly available.

18 A public version is available here: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/hpai/infectedprems.pdf. 

19 A public version is available here: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/hpai/premstatusdetailstate.pdf. 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

22

At the VS NIMT level (in the ICP), the following were completed as specified:

• NIMT SitReps (daily) ( Appendix 10)

• IAPs (daily)

• Other ICS specific forms like incident logs (daily).

In addition to the accompanying document to this report that contains these Appendices, the 

reports listed above were (and continue to be) stored on a Sharepoint site that is internal to 

APHIS.

In addition to this list of reports that were produced at frequent intervals, ICG personnel fulfilled 

requests for information for both internal partners and external stakeholders as they were 

received. This included requests for information from the Office of the Secretary in the 

Department of Agriculture to specific industry groups. Fulfilling these requests in an accurate 

and timely manner was a critical task of the ICG.

Deployment/Personnel Management

Management of personnel and personnel deployments for this incident was conducted through 

the ICG using the APHIS ROSS. ROSS is an information management system that is used to 

identify and track qualified emergency response personnel. ROSS facilitates the rapid dispatch of 

appropriate personnel through the use of position descriptions and ordering; ROSS was used 

throughout the 2014–2015 outbreak for personnel requests.

In addition, during the incident, APHIS revised its Emergency Mobilization Guide, which 

provides guidance to facilitate the cost-effective and timely dispatch of emergency management 

resources for incidents in which APHIS would respond. In conjunction with this document, 

APHIS identified a trained dispatch community, which was critical to manage resources 

effectively during the outbreak. During 2014–2015, there were 4 full-time Logistics 

Management Specialists devoted to personnel deployments and another 30 dispatchers trained 

for surge capacity. 

Policy and Guidance

While the HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book provided overarching policy throughout the 

response effort, specific activities required further guidance. As such, a template was developed 

for policy guidance documents. These national-level policies were developed by the ICG and 

distributed widely to all affected States, APHIS VS NIMTs, and stakeholders before being 

posted publicly at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. In particular, additional guidance was requested 

on activities like appraisal and indemnity, restocking, and virus elimination—activities that had 

never been conducted on the scale required in the 2014–2015 outbreak. Providing policy 

guidance in this manner ensured that guidance was available and could be easily updated as 

required.

For example, the following policies and guidance were provided during the 2014–2015 HPAI 

outbreak (in alphabetical order); the approximate timeline of these policies (when they were

issued) is pictured in Figure 15.

• Cleaning and Disinfection (C&D) Basics: Virus Elimination
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

23

• Contact Premises

• Control Area Release

• Financing the Response: State/Tribal Information

• General Resources and Information

• H5/H7 Avian Influenza Case Definition

• HPAI in the Live Bird Marketing System

• HPAI Response Goals

• HPAI Zones and Premises

• Indemnity Procedures

• Landfill Disposal Guidance—Recommended Waste Acceptance Practices for Landfills

• Mortality Composting Protocol for AI Infected Flocks

• Movement Control

• New State Checklist

• Post C&D Environmental Sampling Guide

• PPE Recommendations for HPAI Responders

• Processing Indemnity Payments

• Restocking Criteria for Previously Infected Premises

• Stamping Out and Depopulation Policy

• Surveillance Activities around HPAI Infected Backyard Flocks

• Surveillance Sampling for Commercial Premises in Control Area

• Testing Requirements for Movement from the Control Area

• Timeline to Restocking and Environmental Sampling Procedures

• Use of the Antigen Capture Imunoassay

• Using Heat Treatment for Virus Elimination.
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

24

Figure 15. Timeline of Public Release of Policy Documents

April 

2015

May 

2015

June 

2015

July

2015

August

2015

September

2015

January

2016

Indemnity 

Procedures

new financial 

guidance released

Feb 2016

New State 

Checklist

previously First HPAI 

Confirmation in a 

New State 

updated Feb 2016

Restocking Criteria

for Previously 

Infected Premises

Timeline to Restocking 

and Environmental 

Sampling Procedures 

updated Mar 2016

Processing Indemnity 

Payments 

new financial guidance

released Feb 2016

Control Area Release

updated Sept 2015

Cleaning and 

Disinfection 

Basics: Virus 

Elimination

updated Feb 2016

Post Cleaning and 

Disinfection 

Environmental 

Sampling Guide

Stamping Out and 

Depopulation Policy

Testing Requirements 

for Movement from 

the Control Area

Using Heat Treatment 

for Virus Elimination

updated Feb 2016
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

25

Since the 2014–2015 outbreak concluded, these policies have continually been refined and 

revised; new policies have also been added. Please visit www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep for the 

complete list and titles of HPAI policy guidance documents currently available. Section 6, which 

reviews critical activities conducted during the outbreak, also highlights the events that resulted 

in critical policy updates. 

The FAD PReP HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book was also updated in August 2015 based on 

lessons learned. APHIS Animal Care and APHIS VS also worked together to develop HPAI 

preparedness and response plans for zoos.

Health and Safety

APHIS proactively supported personnel to mitigate health and safety issues through the 

establishment of Safety Officers embedded within each APHIS VS NIMT; there was also a 

Health & Safety Unit embedded into the ICG. This Unit, staffed by individuals from VS Safety,

Health, and Environmental Protection (SHEP), finalized health and safety protocols, provided 

guidance to Safety Officers deployed to ICPs or incident sites, and communicated frequently 

with State agriculture and public health agencies on the incident. VS SHEP coordinated closely 

and followed any applicable guidance laid out by the APHIS Emergency Management Safety 

and Security Division (EMSSD). In addition to EMSSD, VS SHEP also worked closely with 

supporting Federal authorities such as the CDC, Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA). Collaboratively, these entities did the following:

• Identified procedures to create site-specific health and safety plans.

• Provided details of hazard analysis, necessary training, and medical surveillance 

requirements.

• Managed a PPE program, including the provision OSHA respirator fit testing.

• Provided PPE guidance for field activities.

• Provided pre-deployment information and guidance.

• Developed protocols for safety in the field.

• Coordinated any responder monitoring required.

Finally, the Health & Safety Unit worked with ROSS Dispatch to locate Certified Safety Officers 

and Safety Coordinators, finalized the document PPE Recommendations for HPAI Responders

(www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep), and authored a Quick Response Card for responder safety. 

Section 6. Highlights of Response Activities

Overview

To effectively respond to and recover from the HPAI outbreak, APHIS staff, industry partners, 

State officials, and contractors worked together to complete the following 10 steps per Infected 

Premises, as outlined in Figure 16 (a higher resolution copy of this figure is available here). This 

figure was developed for producers to facilitate understanding of the response process. In 

practice, many of these steps were complex, and other activities like permitting and information 

management continued throughout the HPAI outbreak.
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

26

Figure 16. A Guide to Help You Understand the Response Process
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

27

The next sections highlight the key points of critical response activities that were conducted 

during the outbreak.

Surveillance and Epidemiology

Summary

Routine surveillance and the FAD investigations led to the initial detection of HPAI in December 

2014 and January 2015. When a positive HPAI flock was detected, a 10 kilometer Control Area 

was established around the premises. 

Granted, many of these Control Areas overlapped in States with many detections, such as Iowa 

and Minnesota. As part of the epidemiological investigation, all movements onto and off of 

Infected Premises (known as trace-backs and trace-forwards) were identified and evaluated for 

the possibility of HPAI transmission. Additionally, after a Control Area was established, active 

surveillance of flocks—both backyard and commercial—occurred within this zone.

Incident Coordination Group and National Incident Management Team Activities

Surveillance and epidemiological activities were coordinated at both the NIMT and ICG levels.

At the ICG, response activities focused on the design of surveillance sampling guidance and 

development of epidemiological questionnaires to understand outbreak characteristics, identify 

risk factors, and examine how the HPAI virus was transmitted throughout the outbreak. Within 

the first 6 months of the outbreak, field-based observational studies of farm biosecurity, 

management practices, and exposure risks were conducted. There were also geospatial analyses 

examining correlations between wind patterns and disease spread as well as phylogenetic 

analyses. Reports summarizing these results were released on June 5, 2015, and again on July 1, 

2015. The last version was released on September 9, 2015. 20

Based at the ICP, NIMT epidemiologists led and coordinated the survey and interview process in 

the field to gather information from the premises. In addition, they conducted diagnostic 

sampling for disease detection on both commercial and backyard operations. The ICG and 

NIMTs included personnel with expertise in wildlife to coordinate wild bird surveillance 

sampling and analyze the role of wild birds in the outbreak/transmission.

Surveillance Conducted

During the outbreak, additional clarification was requested from the APHIS VS NIMTs and 

States regarding the active and passive surveillance required. As such, the ICG produced two 

policy documents, which prescribed surveillance of backyard flocks around Infected Premises 

and surveillance for commercial premises that were in the Control Area (these documents are 

now called Surveillance of Backyard Flocks Around Infected Premises and Surveillance 

Sampling for Commercial Premises in Control Area and are available at www.aphis.usda.gov).

 20 For more information on transmission and epidemiology, please refer directly to the Epidemiologic and Other 

Analyses of HPAI-Affected Poultry Flocks: September 9, 2015.

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/downloads/Epidemiologic-Analysis-Sept2015.pdf. 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

28

These documents provide specific guidance for an HPAI outbreak, above and beyond routine or 

National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) surveillance that is conducted in flocks.

The following data (Table 4) was collected by NVSL and NAHLN during the outbreak. It 

provides summary information regarding the number of samples tested for both commercial and 

backyard flocks as well as additional surveillance that was conducted during the outbreak in wild 

birds. Sixteen different NAHLN laboratories (in addition to NVSL) were involved in testing

samples. Fourteen NAHLN laboratories tested commercial and backyard flock samples during 

the outbreak response, with over 88,000 samples being tested. In addition, NVSL and 9 NAHLN 

laboratories also tested wild birds, with over 57,000 samples tested during the outbreak response.

Table 4. HPAI Outbreak Response Testing Summary (Number of Samples)

Domestic Bird 

Testing 

(Commercial 

and Backyard)

Matrix PCR 

[polymerase 

chain reaction] 

Tested

H5 PCR 

Tested

H7 PCR 

Tested

Virus 

Isolation 

Tested

Total 

Tests

14 NAHLN Labs 72,314 2,772 2,675 1,366 79,127 

NVSL 2,825 4,688 1,149 1,105 9,767 

Total 75,139 7,460 3,824 2,471 88,894 

Wild Bird 

Testing

Matrix PCR 

[polymerase 

chain reaction] 

Tested

H5 PCR 

Tested

H7 PCR 

Tested

Virus 

Isolation 

Tested

Total 

Tests

9 NAHLN Labs 42,259 6,234 6,138 0 54,631 

NVSL 252 1,407 650 797 3,106 

Total 42,511 7,641 6,788 797 57,737 

Note: Table courtesy of the VS NAHLN Coordinator.

Diagnostics

As seen by the number of samples tested, laboratory services were a major component of the 

HPAI response. Critical field activities—like depopulation—relied on diagnostic laboratory test 

results as triggers, per the HPAI H5/H7 Case Definition. Laboratory services in support of the 

incident were divided between the APHIS NVSL and State-operated, USDA APHIS approved 

and proficiency tested NAHLN laboratories. In total, there are 56 NAHLN labs approved to test 

for AI. Each of the states with positive commercial flocks had at least one NAHLN lab capable 

of testing for AI. NAHLN laboratories in affected States were also able to provide surge support 

to each other, in cases where a specific network lab became overwhelmed with samples.

In total, 16 NAHLN laboratories (in addition to NVSL) were involved in testing in support of the 

HPAI outbreak. Of these laboratories, 13 NAHLN laboratories (and NVSL) electronically 

messaged test results during the HPAI outbreak; 4 of these laboratories started messaging during 

the outbreak itself to improve timely and accurate information management of laboratory 

accessions and results.
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

29

Depopulation decisions were made based on the criteria provided in the H5/H7 Avian Influenza 

Case Definition. As was stated in the HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book, premises classified as 

Infected Premises—and Contact Premises, as appropriate—were depopulated as quickly as 

possible. As the outbreak spread, further clarification was requested by States on the trigger for 

depopulating flocks: when the criteria for a presumptive positive had been met, APHIS 

personnel—in conjunction with State and Tribal officials—initiated depopulation, disposal, and 

virus elimination procedures on the premises. NVSL continued to receive samples for 

confirmation, as well as subtyping, from all Infected Premises for the duration of the outbreak.

NVSL sequenced HPAI samples and tracked genetic variations over the course of the outbreak.

Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business

State quarantines were placed on all Infected Premises and DCs. The date the State quarantine 

was first placed on the premises was recorded in EMRS; in some cases, State quarantines were 

also frequently placed on premises inside an Infected Zone as a preventive measure to halt the 

spread of the virus, even if that premises was not infected.

• The average length of these quarantines on Infected Premises and DCs was 149 days for 

all premises (commercial and backyard). 

 For commercial premises, the average length was 147 days.

 For backyard premises it was 157 days. 

Figure 17 illustrates the length of the quarantines placed on premises during the outbreak. As it 

shows, the majority of the premises had quarantines lasting between 100 and 175 days.

Figure 17. Length of Quarantine on All Premises (Frequency Count)

Regulatory Control Areas were also established under the jurisdiction of the unified IC. This 

continued throughout the outbreak; each Infected Premises was the epicenter of an individual 

10 kilometer Control Area. 21 Figure 18 identifies the number of Control Areas that were released 

each month, based on date of official release. 

 21 At the time of the outbreak, Control Area placement and release was not accurately captured in EMRS across all 

States. Procedures have since changed to record this information successfully; Control Area release dates were 

available, and documented by hand (as seen in Figure 18).

1 2

23

44

60

44

34

18

5

1

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Less than

50 days

51–75 days 75–100 

days

101–125 

days

126–150 

days

151–175 

days

176–200 

days

201–225 

days

226–250 

days

More than

250 days
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

30

Guidance on the release of Control Areas was provided in a policy guidance document Control 

Area Release. Release of the Control Area requires specific criteria, including that all birds on 

Infected Premises in the Control Area were depopulated and disposal completed or compost piles

set. Required surveillance must be completed; release can occur prior to the date on which 

restocking is allowed. The delay of most of the Control Area releases into July and August 2015

was the result of the ongoing and widespread cases in Iowa and Minnesota in late spring.

Figure 18. Number of Control Areas Released by Month for All Premises

Note: All Control Area releases were in 2015. Three DC Premises had no Control 

Area placed on them; they fell within existing Control Area perimeters.

In a regulatory Control Area, permits are required for movement into, within, and out of a 

Control Area to prevent the spread of HPAI to non-infected premises. Items permitted during the 

outbreak included poultry products, based on the Secure Food Supply Plans for eggs, broilers, 

and turkeys, as well as items for normal operations (e.g., the movement of feed or manure). 

Permitted movements were to processors, landfills, slaughter establishments, renderers, and other 

destinations. 

During the outbreak, over 7,500 permits were issued (not including any revoked permits), which 

resulted in approximately 20,000 permitted movements. Most of these permits had origin 

premises in Minnesota (36 percent) and Iowa (52 percent) (Figure 19). Many items moved under 

permit (Figure 20). The resources required for rapid permitting and data entry into the EMRS 

overwhelmed the States and APHIS VS NIMTs; as such, a successful National Permitting Unit 

was staffed in Ft. Collins, CO. This unit was responsible for rapid and accurate data entry of 

permits and permitted movements throughout the outbreak, for all States requiring permitted 

movement. EMRS was used successfully to issue and record these permits.

1 6 3 5

12

25

122

56

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

January February March April May June July August
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

31

Figure 19. Number of Permits Issued by State of Origin 

for Movement Into, Within, or Out of a Control Area

Figure 20. Number of Permits Issued by Item Permitted

A large percentage of these permitted movements were for continuity of business. In all, nearly 

50 percent of total permitted movements were either out of the Control Area or into commerce. 

The Secure Food Supply Plans successfully helped animals and products keep moving during the 

3,918 

2,745 

513 

127 97 34 30 19 16 15 7 5 4 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 

 0

 500

 1,000

 1,500

 2,000

 2,500

 3,000

 3,500

 4,000

 4,500

2,372

1,757

1,084 956

683 655

20 16 1 1

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

32

outbreak, demonstrating successful collaboration between States (both sending and receiving 

product), the unified IC, and APHIS. Typically, depending on the movement, two negative rRTPCR tests were required, with one test within 24 hours of movement. Clarifications made to 

EMRS data entry for permits will help to capture further information on permitted movements in 

the future.

An example of a Permitting and Movement Report, which will indicate States of origin, 

destination, and volume of permits and movements, is provided in Appendix 8. 

Depopulation

Depopulation (also known as stamping-out) was implemented throughout the 2014–2015 HPAI 

outbreak to prevent or mitigate the spread of disease. Depopulation was applied immediately 

after the first premises was detected and continued throughout the outbreak. As a direct result of 

the 232 Infected Premises detections (211 commercial and 21 backyard), more than 50 million 

birds were depopulated (including birds that succumbed to HPAI prior to depopulation). This 

includes seven DCs that were also depopulated.

There were significant challenges in rapidly depopulating flocks in a timely manner as the 

outbreak progressed. At the height of the backlog from late-April to mid-May, there was a 

depopulation delay of at least 7 days for newly detected premises. APHIS worked to address this 

shortage by deploying additional personnel and resources, with employees and equipment from 

the States of North Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia volunteering to assist in the response effort. 

Additional contractor support was also rapidly obtained.

The primary methods used for depopulation during the response included the application of foam 

or carbon dioxide (CO2) gas. Foam was the preferred method to depopulate turkeys. In many 

chicken layer houses, the use of foam was problematic and other measures had to be employed. 

Techniques for CO2 “whole house” gassing had not yet been developed, requiring smaller CO2

gas carts to be used for chicken layer depopulation, which is an extremely slow process on 

premises with hundreds of thousands or millions of birds.

As a result of the depopulation delays experienced in this outbreak, APHIS issued policy 

guidance Stamping-Out and Depopulation Policy which explicitly states that the goal is to 

depopulate all Infected Premises within 24 hours. As it states “due to the risk of virus 

amplification in infected poultry, poultry that meet the HPAI presumptive positive case 

definition will be depopulated as soon as possible, with the depopulation goal of 24 hours or 

less.” This policy guidance clarified that this may also apply to Contact Premises or those 

meeting the suspect case definition as determined by State/Tribal and APHIS officials.

The 2014–2015 outbreak clearly demonstrated that to meet this goal, existing depopulation 

methods may not be sufficient. As such, USDA APHIS released the policy guidance Ventilation 

Shutdown Evidence & Policy, which states that the use of ventilation shutdown may be 

considered as an alternative, on a premises by premises basis, with close coordination and 

collaboration by State and APHIS officials to meet the 24-hour goal. Factors to be evaluated 

include epidemiological information, housing and environmental conditions, currently available 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

33

resources and personnel, and other relevant factors. Please see that document for further 

guidance on ventilation shutdown.

Figure 21 shows the primary depopulation methods used in the outbreak. Foam was the 

predominate method—66 percent of premises used foam; 28 percent used CO2. For backyard 

premises specifically, CO2 was more common: 62 percent of backyard premises used CO2. 

Figure 22 shows disposal method by flock type for commercial flocks. As mentioned, foam was 

used predominately in turkey flocks, while chicken layer flocks elected CO2.

Figure 21. Primary Depopulation Method for All Premises

Note: The “Other” category represents those premises that were depopulated using a combination 

of methods or other approved method, typically cervical dislocation.

Figure 22. Primary Depopulation Method by Flock Type for Commercial Premises

Note: The “Other” category represents those premises that were depopulated using a combination 

of methods or other approved method, typically cervical dislocation.

153

51

4 3

1

13

7 0

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Foam CO2 Other Captive Bolt/TEDS

Commercial Backyard

151

2 4 3

1

49

0

0

1

0

0

0 0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Foam CO2 Other Captive Bolt/TEDS

Turkey Chicken Mixed Poultry/Other
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

34

Figure 23 illustrates the average time to depopulation for Infected Premises. The average time 

from NVSL confirmation to depopulation complete for all premises was approximately 6.2 days; 

6.4 days for commercial premises and 4.1 days for backyard premises. Figure 24 illustrates the 

average time to depopulation from NVSL confirmation for commercial flocks, split between 

chickens, turkeys, and mixed poultry. Due to flock size and difficult conditions, on average, it 

took 15.4 days to depopulate commercial chicken layer flocks compared to only 3.5 days for 

commercial turkey premises. 22

Figure 23. Time to Depopulation (Average Days) from NVSL Confirmation

for All Premises, excludes Dangerous Contacts

Note: Excludes DCs because these premises may not have had an NVSL confirmation date 

before depopulation.

 22 NVSL confirmation date is when a “confirmed status” was placed on the premises in EMRS, based on a positive 

diagnostic test result at NVSL. In the graphs throughout this document, a confirmed H5 result date is used if 

available prior to full subtyping results.

6.38

4.10

6.16

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Commercial Backyard All Premises
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

35

Figure 24. Time to Depopulation (Average Days) from NVSL Confirmation for 

Commercial Premises by Flock Type, excludes Dangerous Contacts

Note: Excludes DCs because these premises may not have had an NVSL confirmation date 

before depopulation. There were a negligible number of broilers affected during the outbreak; 

these are included in the “Chicken Layer” category in this figure (which also includes layer 

pullets and a breeder flock).

Figure 25 illustrates, for all premises, the amount of time it took to depopulate the premises from 

the NVSL confirmation date. Please note that depopulation can be conducted from a 

presumptive diagnosis, and based on APHIS/State official recommendation, the suspect 

case definition, so some premises were depopulated prior to the NVSL confirmation date. 

Figure 25 subsequently shows the majority of the premises (75 percent) were depopulated before 

or within a week of NVSL confirmation. As the outbreak exploded in the Midwest, there were 

some significant delays from NVSL confirmation to depopulation. 

15.39

3.53 3.00

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Chicken Layers Turkeys Mixed Poultry
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

36

Figure 25. Time (Days) to Depopulation from NVSL Confirmation, 

excludes Dangerous Contacts23

Note: Excludes DCs because these premises may not have had an NVSL confirmation date before 

depopulation.

Disposal

There are many options for disposing of animal carcasses and materials; effective disposal is a 

key component of a successful response to an FAD outbreak. During the 2014–2015 outbreak, 

the use of composting as a disposal method was critical (see Figure 26). Composting, though it 

requires a composting SME, trained equipment operators, and sufficient carbon and water, was 

the most effective and efficient way to dispose of carcasses from the HPAI outbreak.

APHIS deployed its first disposal expert on January 23, 2015, to address the initial H5N2 positive 

commercial turkey flock in California. As the outbreak escalated in April, contractors were also 

deployed to support large-scale disposal operations. APHIS deployed composting SMEs to assist 

with disposal of depopulated poultry. More than 15 composting SMEs were used during the 

response to aid producers with disposal. The last composting SME was deployed to Iowa on June 

29, 2015. Disposal SMEs wrote a comprehensive guidance document Mortality Composting 

Protocol for Avian Influenza Infected Flocks to provide further information on composting.

 23 The premises that was depopulated 10 days before NVSL confirmation was identified as a trace-forward premises 

from an Infected Premises, and depopulated based on meeting the suspect case definition. 

1 4

3

1

3

2

3

2

1

1

1

5

10

20

31

17

19

13

19

18

4

11

4 2

1

4 1

2

5

1

1 1

1

1 4 1 1

2 2 2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

-10 -3 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 28 38

Number of Premises

Number of Days

Backyard Producer Commercial
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

37

As with depopulation, disposal requirements outpaced available resources at the height of the 

outbreak. Other options were considered and used to a lesser extent in the outbreak, including 

landfill, incineration, and burial (Figure 26). In mid-April, while composting proved to be 

problematic in some areas, APHIS initiated negotiations with landfills and State agencies 

regarding the transportation and disposal of material. Identifying landfills proved problematic 

due to apprehension from State government agencies and landfill operators. The routing of 

material to the landfills and concern about environmental contamination were significant hurdles.

However, APHIS eventually obtained agreements with two landfills that would accept material 

in Iowa. As an additional option, APHIS acquired four incinerators to augment disposal 

operations; however, incinerators could not keep pace with the capacity required.

Figure 26. Primary Disposal Method for Carcasses for All Premises

Figure 27 illustrates the average number of days from NVSL confirmation to the completion of 

disposal. For commercial premises, disposal was complete in approximately 43 days. For 

backyard premises, the average was 7.6 days. In large part, this is due to the different methods 

selected for disposal—most commercial premises elected to compost carcasses, which increased 

the amount of time until disposal is considered to be “complete” on a premises. This is illustrated 

in Figure 28, which shows the average time (in days) from NVSL confirmation to completion of 

disposal by the method of disposal.

185

21

1 1 3 0 0

1

5

8 3 0 2 2 0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Commercial Backyard
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

38

Figure 27. Time to Disposal Complete (Average Days) from NVSL Confirmation, 

excludes Dangerous Contacts

Note: Excludes DC Premises as they may not have had an NVSL confirmation date.

Figure 28. By Method of Disposal, Time to Disposal Complete (Average Days) 

from NVSL Confirmation, excludes Dangerous Contacts

Note: Excludes DC Premises as they may not have had an NVSL confirmation date.

Virus Elimination (Cleaning and Disinfection)

The HPAI virus survives for extended periods in organic material and under certain 

environmental conditions. As such, virus elimination activities—to get rid of the virus on 

Infected Premises—were critical for an effective response effort. While traditionally wet 

43.37

7.56

40.02

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Commercial Backyard All Premises

Commercial Backyard All Premises

46.24 45.43

17.56

10.22

8.29

3.54

1.54

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Composting Multiple

Methods

Burial Incineration Approved

Landfill

Rendering Digester
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

39

cleaning and disinfection has been performed in most disease incidents, this incident showed that 

dry cleaning and subsequent heat treatment of the affected facility was a cost effective method to 

ensure the elimination of the virus.

To explain these options for virus elimination, a policy guidance document Cleaning & 

Disinfection Basics (Virus Elimination) was developed. This document clearly states the options 

for both cleaning (wet or dry) and disinfection (wet, heat treatment, or fumigation with chlorine 

dioxide) to eliminate the HPAI virus from a previously Infected Premises. It also prescribes 

guidance for premises that opt for an extended fallow period. The virus elimination method 

selected should be a premises by premises decision, and consider cost effectiveness.

As with depopulation and disposal, virus elimination activities required rapid contracting to 

obtain additional personnel for the response efforts. The majority of C&D field work was 

performed by contracted teams and coordinated by C&D personnel incorporated into the NIMTs 

organizational structures. However, after the peak of the outbreak, like with depopulation and 

disposal, there were associated delays in virus elimination activities: by July 17, 2015, only 85 of 

the 211 commercial premises had completed virus elimination. By the end of October 2015, 

virus elimination had been completed on 206 of 211 commercial premises. The five remaining

commercial premises had completed virus elimination by November 13, 2015.

As seen in Figure 29, application of wet disinfectant was by far the most common method of 

virus elimination, used by 81 percent of commercial premises, followed by heat treatment which 

was used by 11 percent of premises. Of the backyard flocks, 12 of 21 flocks (57 percent) elected 

to complete an extended fallow period instead of other virus elimination procedures.

Figure 29. Disinfection Method Used for All Premises

179

26

3 3

9

0

12

0

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Wet Disinfectant Heat Treatment Extended Fallow Combination of Methods

Commercial Backyard
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

40

Figure 30 shows the average time to completion of virus elimination activities (C&D) from both 

NVSL confirmation and depopulation complete. For commercial premises, virus elimination was 

typically completed, on average, about 88 days after NVSL confirmation of HPAI on the 

premises, and 81 days after depopulation. Backyard premises differed in part because more of 

these premises elected to use the extended fallow period for virus elimination resulting in an 

average of approximately 125 days lapsed from NVSL confirmation to the completion of virus 

elimination and 121 days lapsed from the completion of depopulation.

Figure 30. Average Time to Virus Elimination/C&D Complete (in Days), excludes 

Dangerous Contacts

Note: Excludes DC Premises as they may not have had an NVSL confirmation date before 

depopulation, disposal, and virus elimination activities.

Biosecurity

One of the greatest concerns and a probable contributing factor to the spread of HPAI was the 

lack of effective farm biosecurity measures. Stringent biosecurity, especially during a large-scale 

response, remained one of the most challenging aspects of the response effort. Written guidance 

and materials were provided to affected owners and producers on proper biosecurity practices.

An HPAI Biosecurity Checklist was developed and distributed along with FAD PReP biosecurity 

guidance to premises in Control Areas. A focus was placed on ensuring farm-specific and flockspecific biosecurity plans, with adequate compliance checks.

However, in May 2015, USDA APHIS recognized that additional biosecurity personnel were 

required and assigned Site Managers who were specifically responsible for biosecurity to 

Infected Premises in Iowa and Minnesota. APHIS contractors helped to fill this role, carefully 

monitoring and auditing biosecurity on premises where response operations were underway. In 

addition, all States that were affected by the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak implemented one or 

more changes at the State-level to increase biosecurity.

125.28 121.12

87.74

81.24

91.24

84.96

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

NVSL Confirmation to C&D Complete Depopulation Complete to C&D Complete

Backyard Commercial All Premises
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

41

As a result of the 2014–2015 outbreak, many new biosecurity materials were developed for the 

poultry industry to support implementation of revised biosecurity recommendations. These 

materials are available from www.poultrybiosecurity.org. Additionally, a survey was distributed 

in July 2015 to gauge industry preparedness and increase producer awareness about the critical 

importance of biosecurity.

Health and Safety

In addition to the ICG activities already discussed, and Safety Officers embedded in the APHIS 

VS NIMTs to ensure proper use of PPE and facilitate appropriate health and safety measures and 

plan development, USDA APHIS also coordinated with CDC on the One Health aspect of the 

event. Due to the zoonotic potential of HPAI, a CDC liaison was embedded with USDA 

personnel (USDA already had a veterinary officer at the CDC).

At the NIMT level, Liaison Officers helped to coordinate between the APHIS VS NIMT and 

State and local Departments of Health. Although there was no evidence that this strain of H5N2 

was zoonotic, research suggests that those in prolonged contact with infected birds or 

contaminated environments—like HPAI responders—are at increased risk. CDC and APHIS 

coordinated to develop occupational guidance and protocols for monitoring responders for 

influenza like illness during and after mobilization. USDA and CDC also shared information and 

materials during the outbreak and worked together when Influenza B (a seasonal influenza virus)

was detected in deployed HPAI responders during the outbreak.

Appraisal and Compensation

Existing appraisal and compensation processes used by USDA APHIS were not suited to a largescale outbreak and there were delays in processing and payment of indemnity and other 

compensation to affected producers. For indemnity, presumptive positive results triggered an 

appraiser (either a State or Federal official) to inventory the living birds and collect associated 

barn records. A VS 1–23 form was then created to provide indemnity values for producers. To 

support the compensation process, APHIS maintained (and continues to maintain) three poultry 

appraisal calculators: table egg layers, broilers—meat and breeders, and turkeys—meat and 

breeders.

Cost and productivity information are annual data from Agri Stats, a benchmarking company 

with expertise in poultry. At the beginning of the outbreak the calculators were updated monthly. 

Additional adjustments were made as needed. For example, the table egg industry expressed 

concern over layer values, specifically in regard the length of the first laying cycle. After USDA 

APHIS evaluation, the length of the first laying cycle was revised, and the calculator updated. By 

August 1, all calculators were updated with 2014 Agri Stats data. Moving forward, the indemnity 

calculators will be updated quarterly. Additionally, USDA maintains and updates a list of 

indemnity values for other species not covered by the calculators (i.e., pheasants, quails, ducks, 

etc.).

The first commercial appraisal was conducted on January 23, 2015, in Stanislaus County, CA. In 

total, 232 appraisals and 44 trace outs were completed, with approximately $200 million paid for 

indemnity. Producers also received compensation for the activities they conducted on their 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

42

premises to eliminate the HPAI virus. Cooperative Compliance Agreements were used as the 

mechanism to pay producers for work they performed on their premises—such as disposal and 

virus elimination procedures. In total, including indemnity, nearly $850 million was obligated for 

response activities on Infected Premises.

As a result of the challenges during the 2014–2015 outbreak, new finance and administration 

processes were defined (and are available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep). These new 

procedures are streamlined, require less paperwork, and are consistent with the 24-hour 

depopulation goal, which requires rapid depopulation, appraisal, and indemnity procedures.

Logistics

The SPRS Logistics Center and the NVS led logistics for the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak at the 

ICG-level, and also deployed personnel to support the APHIS VS NIMTs as required by the 

incident. First activated on December 19, 2014, the NVS had over 2,700 requests for supplies 

from January 2015 to June 2015, at a cost of over $2.9 million. Transportation costs, including 

for extraordinary rapid transit of diagnostic samples, totaled approximately $350,000. Contractor 

support peaked in June, when over 3,000 personnel in the field were responding to the incident.

NVS responded to all support requests through the unified IC. Throughout the outbreak, the NVS 

coordinated and documented contractor support for depopulation, disposal, and virus elimination 

activities (also known as 3D activities). NVS also contracted access to supplies and equipment, 

including PPE, decontamination supplies, depopulation units, and animal handling equipment.

The NVS worked closely with the STAS disposal lead/SME, to identify and contract with

composting SMEs throughout the outbreak. Additionally, NVS/STAS SME conducted work with

other States to pre-identify disposal sites and options in case of more HPAI detections. Based on 

the experiences during this incident, the NVS also planned to acquire additional equipment for 

depopulation and offer further training for employees and contractors. Additional CO2 carts were 

procured, and acquisitions for whole house CO2 systems were initiated.

Restocking

During the outbreak, additional policy guidance was provided and published on restocking, 

prescribing the timeline, eligibility, and approval requirements for restocking birds on previously 

Infected Premises. Premises that are approved to restock means that the premises/flocks

• are 21 days post completion of C&D/virus elimination,

• finished with environmental sampling with no signs of HPAI, 

• have met all requirements per the USDA Flock Plan, State Quarantine Notice/Hold 

Order, and USDA Cooperative Compliance Agreement, and

• are approved by State and APHIS officials, in writing, to restock.

Twelve backyard premises and three commercial premises elected to do an extended fallow 

period for virus elimination, which lengthened their time to restocking. By the end of October 

2015, of the 202 commercial premises (including dangerous contacts) with restock dates reported 

in EMRS, 196 had completed all necessary steps and were approved to restock. By December 5, 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

43

2015, all 211 premises (202 commercial and 9 backyard premises) with restock dates in EMRS 

were approved to restock. 24

Figure 31 shows the average time to restock approval for commercial premises with data in 

EMRS; from NVSL confirmation, on average, premises were approved to restock about 111 

days later. From completion of depopulation, commercial premises, on average, were able to 

restock in 104 days. The average increases slightly when backyard premises are included (the 

grey bar of “all premises”), in part because more backyard premises elected to complete an

extended fallow period for virus elimination.

Figure 31. Average Time to Restock Approval for Commercial Premises (in Days), 

excludes Dangerous Contacts

Note: All premises includes backyard premises; excludes DC Premises as they may not 

have had an NVSL confirmation date.

Communications

Public information, outreach, and active coordination with stakeholders played a large part in 

USDA APHIS transparency and accountability both internally and externally: please see Figure 

32 for a list of stakeholders involved in this outbreak. USDA APHIS LPA was primarily 

responsible for public information and outbreak; LPA personnel were integrated into the ICG 

and also deployed to ICPs as Public Information Officers. LPA was responsible for all public 

information and messaging regarding the HPAI incident, such as press releases about new cases, 

which were often coordinated with the affected State(s). Additionally, LPA kept the USDA 

 24 The premises that elected to do an extended fallow period did not typically report restock dates; additionally, 

restocking data was not entered for some premises and no documentation is available.

113.73

107.11

110.51

103.93

98

100

102

104

106

108

110

112

114

116

NVSL Confirmation to Restock Approved Depopulation Complete to Restock

Approved

All Premises Commercial
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

44

APHIS HPAI website page up to date, with information on the situation and confirmed positive 

cases.

Although LPA had primary responsibility for providing public information on behalf of USDA 

for the H5N2 response, the USDA Office of Communications had ultimate authority for 

evaluating and approving information that was released. The Office of Communications also 

relayed to LPA the Secretary of Agriculture’s priorities related to information needs and 

information for external audiences.

Figure 32. HPAI Stakeholders

LPA proactively adapted to feedback and the growing response effort throughout the spring of 

2015. For example, it launched a new version of the website in June, enabling easier navigation 

and an interactive map for readers. It also provided active outreach to key audiences, including 

the media and industry groups. Specific materials, like the illustration in Figure 16, were 

developed. LPA also leveraged social media and conducted weekly teleconferences with 

NASAHO and industry stakeholders. LPA also supported meetings for the USDA Office of the 

Secretary and APHIS Office of the Administrator by preparing talking points and messaging.

Also in early June, a Joint Information Center (JIC) was created in response to discussions 

among ICG members that information and messaging needed to be streamlined in support of 

expanding the scope of operations. The purpose of the JIC was to improve information

transparency and ensure a unified message across all responders and stakeholders. 

In addition to website content and outreach efforts, LPA managed an increase in media inquiries. 

Through the first 6 months of the incident, media inquiries were steady, and in response, LPA 

Examples of groups contacted during the incident (in alphabetical order):

• Agricultural shows and fairs

• American Association of Veterinary 

Laboratory Diagnosticians

• Backyard flock owners

• Birdwatching and conservation groups

• Community media events 

• Cooperative extension agents, 

4-H leaders, agricultural educators 

• County departments of natural resources, 

game wardens

• Facilities regulated by APHIS Animal Care

• Farmers markets, flea markets, swap 

meets

• Federal, State, and local elected officials

• Federal, State, and local public health 

officials

• Feed stores, including farm/garden 

stores, and bird supply stores

• International trade partners

• Live bird markets: tourists, consignors, 

and buyers

• NAHLN labs

• Poultry industry workers

• State and local emergency responders 

(emergency management, law 

enforcement, etc.)

• State and local poultry associations

• Tribal liaisons

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection

• U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

• USDA Food and Safety and Inspection 

Service

• Veterinarians and veterinary associations

• Zoos
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

45

assigned dedicated personnel to oversee all media-related activities. From January through June

2015, LPA responded to a total of 422 media inquiries. These media inquiries typically requested

general information on HPAI and about USDA APHIS response operations. LPA also 

coordinated requests for interviews and media briefings by identifying APHIS SMEs to serve as 

spokespersons. A national media briefing hosted by APHIS on April 22, 2015 was attended by 

90 reporters representing 80 media organizations.

Outreach for the 2014–2015 outbreak culminated with a large stakeholder planning workshop 

from June 30 to July 1, 2015, which included APHIS personnel, State officials, and industry 

representatives. Lessons learned were discussed and recommendations for the future were 

developed.

Regionalization for International Trade

Staff from VS NIES was incorporated into the ICG group to report on the trade impacts of the 

HPAI outbreak, and to coordinate information from the APHIS VS NIMTs and States as 

requested by trading partners. While 18 countries did ban the trade of poultry and poultry 

products from the United States, 38 countries regionalized the United States, which enabled the 

continued movement of poultry and poultry products from non-affected areas. 

Other coordination activities involving trade staff/NIES included:

• ongoing negotiations with countries that have banned all poultry and poultry products 

from the U.S.;

• technical discussions with South Korea progressing toward a regionalization protocol; 

• negotiations with Mexico to reduce regionalization zones from the State to the county 

level;

• assistance to allow poultry exports entry at foreign ports; and

• collaboration with state officials to implement a strong surveillance component that 

supports regaining HPAI-free status as soon as possible.

APHIS actively worked throughout and after the outbreak with trading partners, the poultry 

industry, trade associations, and other stakeholders to reduce or eliminate unjustified trade 

restrictions and mitigate the impact of these detections on exports. 

Section 7. Preparedness and Future Planning

The last HPAI positive premises of the 2015 HPAI outbreak was confirmed by NVSL on June 

16, 2015. However, given the migratory patterns in the United States, there was significant 

concern that HPAI would reemerge in fall 2015, though it did not. APHIS continued to work 

with all stakeholders to prepare for another outbreak of HPAI, using the lessons learned during 

the 2014–2015 outbreak to improve operations at the ICP and in the field as well as coordination 

at the ICG and MAC levels. 

APHIS actively engaged domestic and international stakeholders on the HPAI threat, and cohosted the International Conference on Avian Influenza and Poultry Trade in late June 2015. 

Here participants discussed the worldwide HPAI threat and the need for multiple strategies and 

approaches to AI prevention and control. In early July, another planning workshop was hosted at 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

46

APHIS headquarters in Riverdale, MD, focusing on preparing for worst-case scenarios for future 

HPAI outbreaks. In late July, APHIS also participated in an industry-sponsored meeting to focus 

on lessons learned.

In addition, USDA APHIS authored a document entitled the HPAI Preparedness and Response 

Plan (initially known as the “Fall Plan”) to identify specific items that required review and 

improvement. This plan was released in August 2015 and updated again in January 2016. 25 The 

response plan that governed the general response to the outbreak—the FAD PReP HPAI 

Response Plan: The Red Book—was also updated in August 2015 with lessons learned and 

necessary adjustments.

Additionally, USDA APHIS procured HPAI vaccine (which has been added to the NVS) and 

offered additional guidance on the triggers that would be required to vaccinate in a new outbreak. 

Further information on vaccination is available in the document Policy and Approach to HPAI 

Vaccination. 26 Vaccine was not used in the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak.

Finally, USDA APHIS continued to revise and improve policy guidance documents available on 

the www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep website. Many of these documents incorporated lessons learned 

from the 2014–2015 outbreak to facilitate rapid depopulation, indemnity payment processing, 

and cost-effective virus elimination efforts.

Section 8. Conclusion 

With over 50 million birds and 232 affected premises, the scale of the December 2014 to June 

2015 HPAI outbreak was unprecedented in U.S. history; response operations continued well into 

the late fall of 2015. Despite the application of quarantine and movement control, depopulation, 

disposal, and biosecurity measures, HPAI continued to spread. With about 50 million 

commercial birds affected, the impact of the incident in the billions of dollars makes it the worst

documented animal health incident in the United States. The response effort involved over 

3,000 Federal, State, and contracted personnel, with nearly $850 million obligated for indemnity 

payments and response activities. Control measures, coupled with an increase in warm weather, 

ultimately interrupted HPAI transmission leading to a halt of new cases in June 2015.

Figure 33 provides an overview of the key events during the outbreak, from first detection in a 

backyard flock and first detection on a commercial premises, to the last detection, first Control 

Area released, first premises restocked, and last premises quarantine released. The HPAI 

outbreak had a lengthy impact on USDA APHIS and all affected stakeholders.

 25 USDA APHIS VS. (2016). HPAI Preparedness and Response Plan. Retrieved January 11, 2016 from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/hpai-preparedness-and-response-plan2015.pdf. 

26 USDA APHIS VS. (2016). Policy and Approach to HPAI Vaccination. Retrieved January 13, 2016 from 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/downloads/hpai_policy.pdf. 
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

47

Figure 33. Summary of Key Events during the 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

APHIS had prepared the organization and employees for HPAI through training, exercises, and 

FAD PReP. However, the scale of this outbreak grew rapidly; response activities—in particular 

depopulation and disposal—could not keep pace with new HPAI detections during the height of 

the incident. An ICG was rapidly established at the start of the outbreak to coordinate resources 

and provide policy guidance; it was significantly expanded to handle the requirements of the 

outbreak. APHIS HPAI MAC and VSET were engaged to support the ICG and provide higher 

level coordination and support. Simultaneously, at the field level, USDA APHIS NIMTs were 

deployed in rotations from December 2014 to August 2015. These NIMTs worked in unified ICs

with State responders to effectively conduct response activities on premises. 

While this report summarizes what occurred, many lessons were learned during the outbreak, in 

particular that depopulation needed to occur more rapidly to stop the amplification of virus and 

ongoing HPAI transmission. Financial processes were cumbersome and time consuming. 

Additionally, biosecurity measures must be improved on premises to not only stop HPAI 

transmission during an outbreak, but prevent HPAI introductions into commercial poultry flocks 

in the future. Accordingly, policy guidance documents on issues like ventilation shutdown, heat 

treatment for virus elimination, and financial processes were developed and released to address 

the issues that occurred during the response to the incident. New biosecurity guidance was 

developed collaboratively by the industry, State, and Federal officials for implementation by 

producers (www.poultrybiosecurity.org). These documents are all available at 

www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

USDA APHIS continues preparedness for HPAI and other FADs. For more information on 

corrective actions, lessons learned, and steps forward, please see the USDA APHIS HPAI 

Response After-Action Report. November December January February March April

May

June

July

August

OctoberNovember

December

2014

September

2015

Commercial

Backyard

Flock Type

First Turkey Detection 1/23/2015 (California)

First Chicken Layer Detection 4/11/2015 (Wisconsin)

First Backyard Detection 12/18/2014 (Oregon)

First Restock Approved Premises 5/26/2015 (South Dakota)

First Backyard Control Area Released 1/28/2015 (Oregon)

Last Backyard Detection 6/3/2015 (Nebraska)

Last Turkey Detection 6/4/2015 (Minnesota) 

Last Chicken Layer Detection 6/16/2015 (Iowa) January

FebruaryMarchApril

2016

Last IP Quarantine Released 

1/4/2016 (South Dakota)

Last Commercial Control Area Released 8/19/2015 (Iowa)

First Commercial Control Area Released 3/3/2015 (California)

Last Restock Approved Premises 

12/5/2015 (Minnesota)

First IP Quarantine Released 3/26/2015 (Oregon)
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

48

Section 9. Abbreviations

Abbreviation Term

AI avian influenza

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

BRS Biotechnology Regulatory Services

C&D cleaning and disinfection

CCC Commodity Credit Corporation

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CO2 carbon dioxide

DA Deputy Administrator

DC Dangerous Contact

EMLC Emergency Management Leadership Council

EMRS Emergency Management Response System

EMSSD Emergency Management Safety and Security Division

FAD foreign animal disease

FAD PReP Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

FY fiscal year

HA hemagglutinin

HPAI high pathogenicity avian influenza

IAP Incident Action Plan

IC Incident Command

ICG Incident Coordination Group

ICP Incident Command Post

ICS Incident Command Structure

IS International Services

JIC Joint Information Center

LPA Legislative and Public Affairs

LPAI low pathogenicity avian influenza

MAC Multiagency Coordination

MRPBS Marketing and Regulatory Program Business Services

NAHERC National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps

NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network

NASAHO National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials

NIES National Import Export Services

NIMS National Incident Management System

NIMT National Incident Management Team

NVS National Veterinary Stockpile

NVSL National Veterinary Services Laboratories

OIE World Organization for Animal Health

OPS operations
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

49

Abbreviation Term

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PCR polymerase chain reaction

PPD Policy and Program Development

PPE personal protective equipment

PPQ Plant Protection and Quarantine

PSS Program Support Services

QA/QC quality control/quality assurance

ROSS Resource Ordering and Status System

rRT - PCR real time reverse transcription - polymerase chain reaction

SEPRL Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory

SHEP Safety, Health, and Environmental Protection

SME subject matter expert

SPRS Surveillance, Preparedness, and Response Services

STAS Science, Technology, and Analysis Services

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

VS Veterinary Services

WS Wildlife Services
USDA APHIS HPAI Response Final Report, 2014–2015 HPAI Outbreak

50

Section 10. List of Appendices

This section contains a list of appendices; these appendices are not publicly available.

Appendix 1. Abbreviations for the Appendices

Appendix 2a. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak Weekly Situation Report (June 11, 

2015)

Appendix 2b. Final Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak Weekly Situation Report 

(December 18, 2015)

Appendix 3. Infected Premises from 2014–2015 Outbreak27

Appendix 4. Mapbook Weekly Report (August 31, 2015)28

Appendix 5a. National Control and Containment Map (June 25, 2015)

Appendix 5b. Final National Control and Containment Map (November 19, 2015)

Appendix 6. Epidemiological Curve (September 1, 2015)

Appendix 7. Summary Deployment Report (October 8, 2015)

Appendix 8. Permitting and Movement Report (September 8, 2015)

Appendix 9a. APHIS Incident Coordination Group Incident Action Plan (June 15, 2015)

Appendix 9b. Final APHIS Incident Coordination Group Incident Action Plan and Completed 

Assignments (September 9, 2015)

Appendix 10. Minnesota HPAI 2015 Incident—SitRep #64 (June 12, 2015)

 27 A public version is available here: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/hpai/infectedprems.pdf.

28 A public version is available here: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/hpai/premstatusdetailstate.pdf.