18-2774

Wang v. Garland

BIA

Vomacka, IJ

A205 222 165

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 2nd day of April, two thousand twenty-one.

PRESENT:

JON O. NEWMAN,

REENA RAGGI,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

YANQING WANG,

Petitioner,

v. 18-2774

NAC

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.1

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Stuart Altman, Law Office of 

Stuart Altman, New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant

Attorney General; Kohsei Ugumori, 

Senior Litigation Counsel; Nehal 

H. Kamani, Trial Attorney, Office 

1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth 

above.
2

of Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED.

Petitioner Yanqing Wang, a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a decision of the 

BIA affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Wang’s 

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yanqing 

Wang, No. A205 222 165 (B.I.A. Sept. 7, 2018), aff’g No. A205 

222 165 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Apr. 14, 2017). We assume the 

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 

history.

Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s 

decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. 

Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable 

standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 

(2d Cir. 2018). 

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 
3

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 

the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the 

applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the 

applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , 

the internal consistency of each such statement . . . without 

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other 

relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also 

Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2008). 

“We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, 

from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 

ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; accord Hong Fei Gao, 

891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s 

determination that Wang was not credible as to her claim that 

family planning officials forced her to terminate a 

pregnancy. 

The IJ reasonably found that Wang gave the impression 

that her testimony was based on a memorized script rather 

than on actual experience. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 
4

77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). This finding is supported by the 

record, which shows that Wang gave concise testimony on direct 

examination that closely tracked her written statement, but 

that she became evasive on cross-examination when asked about 

her earlier application for a U.S. student visa. Further, 

this line of questioning revealed that Wang attempted to 

travel to the United States before her alleged pregnancy and 

forced abortion, which conflicted with her written statement 

and earlier testimony that she decided to leave China as a 

result of being forced to terminate her pregnancy. See Li 

Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 

2006) (“We can be still more confident in our review of 

observations about an applicant’s demeanor where, as here, 

they are supported by specific examples of inconsistent 

testimony.”). 

Not discernable from the written transcript is the IJ’s

stated observation that Wang testified about the alleged 

persecution she suffered with a flat affect and no change in 

facial expressions. Because “the IJ’s ability to observe 

[Wang’s] demeanor place[d] h[im] in the best position to 

evaluate whether apparent problems in [Wang’s] testimony 

suggest[ed] a lack of credibility,” we afford “particular 
5

deference” to that finding. Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2005).

The agency also reasonably relied on the inconsistency 

between Wang’s testimony that she had been forced to have an 

abortion and her medical records from her son’s birth in the 

United States, which state that she had been pregnant only 

once and had never had an abortion. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The IJ was not compelled to credit 

Wang’s explanation for the discrepancy. See Majidi, 430 F.3d 

at 80 (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible 

explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; 

he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be 

compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotations 

omitted)). 

Having questioned Wang’s credibility, the agency 

reasonably relied further on her failure to rehabilitate her 

testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An 

applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 

bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 

general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony 

that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. 

Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency 
6

reasonably declined to credit a letter from Wang’s mother 

because it was unsworn and written by an interested witness 

who was not available for cross-examination. See Y.C. v. 

Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013). Further, the IJ 

reasonably afforded limited weight to the medical record of 

Wang’s abortion because it was a handwritten booklet easily 

subject to alteration, and it did not reflect that family 

planning officials were involved or that the abortion was 

involuntary. See id. at 332 (“We generally defer to the 

agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an 

applicant's documentary evidence.”).

Given the demeanor, inconsistency, and corroboration

findings, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is 

supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Contrary to Wang’s contention, that 

determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of 

removal, and CAT relief insofar as those claims were based on 

Wang’s assertion that family planning officials forced her to 

terminate a pregnancy. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 

156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). Wang does not separately challenge 

the agency’s conclusion that she did not establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution based on possible future 
7

pregnancies. There is no merit to Wang’s contention that the 

IJ’s findings underlying the adverse credibility 

determination demonstrate bias because those findings are 

supported by the record. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court