alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### HAROLD K. BEECHER & ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SALT LAKE CITY and Salt Lake County, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 13610.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Feb. 11, 1975.

Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

Roger F. Cutler, Salt Lake City Atty., Richard S. Shepherd, Deputy Salt Lake Co. Atty., Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.

HENRIOD, Chief Justice:

Appeal from a judgment unfavorable to plaintiff who previously had received $609,385.59 for architects’ fees incident to the construction of the Salt Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice, but by a series of rather protracted procedures, asked for another $130,079.45 for alleged extra work, plus some trimmings,' — costs and the like. The lower court is affirmed.

The record here reveals an unrealistic urgence by plaintiff which we consider unrelated to the contractual atmosphere indulged in the first instance and thereafter, which would push a three-quarter million dollar indebitatus assumpsit understanding in writing to an unwarranted nearly million dollar claim via quantum meruit or valebant.

Courts sometimes frown on pen and paper proposals to espouse excursions into a land of parol pension in perpetuity.

No salutary purpose would be served here in relating the pros and cons, — but in affirming the trial judge, we say that all of the writings, circumstances, printers-ink, etc., might embolden one to say that he may have brought solace, save for a bit of rigor mortis evidenced by this appeal, to a troubled city and disappointment to an architect, urging payment of a contract really never consummated.

We think he was right, and affirm the decision. Parenthetically we don’t recommend filing a reply brief almost minutes before an adversary has had an opportunity to respond thereto, as seems to have been the case here.

TUCKETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur.

CROCKETT, Justice

(concurring specially) :

I concur with the affirmance of the judgment of the trial court which rejects the plaintiff’s attempt to seek further compensation in addition to the contracts for which he has been paid. The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to convince the trial court of this entitlement, which burden he failed to discharge.

In view of the trial court’s often-referred-to prerogative of finding the facts, coupled with the traditional rule of review *1301on appeal that where he has failed to find for a proponent, we do not reverse unless the evidence would to all reasonable minds compel such a finding, I agree that the correct conclusion here is that the judgment should be affirmed.

ELLETT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the concurring opinion of CROCKETT, J.
#### Bernard v. Char

15634

5/30/95

Granted

— P.2d —
Document Headings

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                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 1009 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         National Institute on Aging Special Emphasis Panel; ASPREE-XT Renewal Review.                    

*Date:*                         February 15, 2024.                    

*Time:*                         12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate grant applications.                    

*Place:*                         National Institute on Aging, Gateway Building, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual Meeting).                    

*Contact Person:*                         Rajasri Roy, Ph.D., M.P.H, Scientific Review Officer, Scientific Review Branch, National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Aging, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 496-9666,                         *rajasri.roy@nih.gov.*

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.866, Aging Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: December 7, 2023.

Miguelina Perez,

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2023-27265 Filed 12-12-23; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

PATRICIO SANTIAGO

- VELASCO,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 18

- 10159

D.C. No. 4:17

- cr

- 01568

- RM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Rosemary Márquez , District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 15, 2019 **

Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Patricio Santiago

- Velasco appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges his guilty

- plea conviction and 37

- month sentence for reentry of a

removed alien , in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326

. Pursuant to Anders v. California

,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), Santiago

- Velasco ’ s counsel has filed a brief stating that there

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JAN 22 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 10159

are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record.

We have provided Santiago

- Velasco the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental

brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been f iled.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          45,732
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          55,285
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                24,700
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    161,978
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         369,427
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           369,924
<LOANS>                                      2,448,027 
<ALLOWANCE>                                     17,914
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,230,341
<DEPOSITS>                                   2,262,226
<SHORT-TERM>                                    95,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            595,781
<LONG-TERM>                                     26,709
<COMMON>                                           112
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     250,513
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               3,230,341
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 91,783
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                5,212
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                15,832
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               112,827
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              47,967
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              68,631
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           44,196
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      700
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 251
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 40,968
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 14,377
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       8,775
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     8,775
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .81
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .81
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    2.96
<LOANS-NON>                                     11,795
<LOANS-PAST>                                     1,669
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                17,254
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       66
<RECOVERIES>                                        26
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               17,914
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                         17,914
        

</TABLE>
19539

#### State v. Villa

February 24, 1997

Order No. 97-18

Affirmed
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5
<LEGEND>  THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED 
  FROM THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF DECEMBER 28, 1996 AND THE 
  CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 28, 1996 
  AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
<MULTIPLIER>  1,000
       
<S>                                              <C>
<PERIOD-START>                                   DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                DEC-28-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                     DEC-28-1996
<CASH>                                            46,223
<SECURITIES>                                      20,600 
<RECEIVABLES>                                     63,729
<ALLOWANCES>                                       7,315
<INVENTORY>                                       55,765
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 196,385
<PP&E>                                           107,422
<DEPRECIATION>                                    62,235
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   256,126
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             52,655
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                              22
<OTHER-SE>                                       199,991 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     256,126
<SALES>                                          362,891
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 362,891 
<CGS>                                            265,002
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    265,002
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  13,655
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   529
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   12,683 
<INCOME-TAX>                                       4,058         
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                8,625
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                       8,625
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       0.39
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          0
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5
<LEGEND>  THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED 
  FROM THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF JANUARY 2, 1999 AND THE 
  CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR ENDED JANUARY 2, 1999 
  AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
  PLEASE NOTE THAT THE ITEM TAGGED AS EPS-PRIMARY IS BASIC EPS AS REPORTED 
  BY THE COMPANY.


<MULTIPLIER>  1,000
       
<S>                                              <C>
<PERIOD-START>                                   JAN-04-1998
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                JAN-02-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                     JAN-02-1999
<CASH>                                            56,571
<SECURITIES>                                      14,145
<RECEIVABLES>                                     45,844
<ALLOWANCES>                                       7,830
<INVENTORY>                                       26,997
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 155,632
<PP&E>                                           119,323
<DEPRECIATION>                                   (90,927)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   207,836
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             34,103
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                              23
<OTHER-SE>                                       166,249 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     207,836
<SALES>                                          286,505
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 286,505
<CGS>                                            207,604
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    207,604
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    (713)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   607
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (6,149)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (3,382)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (2,767)
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (2,767)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      (0.12)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      (0.12)
        

</TABLE>
Chapter 2.4.4. – Infection with Marteilia refringens

Annex 16. Item 6.5.2. – Article 9.8.3. of Chapter 9.8. ‘Infection with Taura syndrome virus’

CHAPTER 9.8.

INFECTION WITH TAURA SYNDROME VIRUS

[...]

Article 9.8.3.

Measures for the importation or transit of aquatic animal products for any purpose regardless of the infection with TSV status of the exporting country, zone or compartment

The *aquatic animal products*listed below have been assessed as meeting the criteria for safety of *aquatic animal products*in accordance with Article 5.4.1. When authorising the importation or transit of these *aquatic animal products*, *Competent Authorities* should not require any *sanitary measures* related to TSV, regardless of the infection with TSV status of the *exporting country*, *zone* or *compartment*:

1)	*aquatic animal products* that have been subjected to a heat treatment sufficient to attain a core temperature of at least 70°C for at least ~~30~~108 minutes, or a time/temperature equivalent that inactivates TSV;

2)	crustacean *meal* that has been subjected to a heat treatment sufficient to attain a core temperature of at least 70°C for at least ~~30~~108 minutes, or a time/temperature equivalent that inactivates TSV;

3)	crustacean oil;

4)	chemically extracted chitin.

[...]

____________

WOAH *Aquatic Manual* 2025	8
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1315 

KA 09-01799 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EVERETT M. DURANT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JANET C. SOMES OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (AMANDA L. DREHER OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Alex R. Renzi,

J.), rendered June 10, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a

jury verdict, of robbery in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

following a jury trial of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law §

160.10 [1]). Viewing the evidence in light of the contested element

of larcenous intent as charged to the jury (see generally People v

Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we reject defendant’s contention that the

verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v

Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). “Where, as here, witness credibility is

of paramount importance to the determination of guilt or innocence,

the appellate court must give [g]reat deference . . . [to the]

fact-finder’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony

and observe demeanor” (People v McMillon, 77 AD3d 1375, 1376, lv

denied 16 NY3d 897 [internal quotation marks omitted]). While a

finding that defendant did not have the requisite intent would not

have been unreasonable, “it cannot be said that the jury failed to

give the evidence the weight it should be accorded” (id.). The victim

testified that defendant stole his wallet during a group assault on

him, and the People presented evidence establishing that defendant

“knowingly participated and continued to participate even after his

companion[s’] intentions [to take the victim’s cell phone] became

clear” and thus “shared a ‘community of purpose’ with his

companion[s]” (People v Allah, 71 NY2d 830, 832). Contrary to

defendant’s further contention, County Court properly denied his

request for an adverse inference charge concerning the failure of the

police to record his interrogation electronically (see McMillon, 77 
-2- 1315 

KA 09-01799 

AD3d at 1375; People v Hammons, 68 AD3d 1800, 1801, lv denied 14 NY3d

801).

Entered: December 27, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### State v. Ruiz

21189, 21226

10/28/98

Reversed in part, Vacated in part & Remanded
Exhibit 23.1



                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  Registration
Statement  Nos.  333-59397  and  333-90565  on Form  S-3  and  the  Registration
Statement No. 333-56591 on Form S-8 of Williams Controls,  Inc. and subsidiaries
of our reports  dated  December 18, 1997,  which appear in this annual report on
Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 1999.


/s/ Horwath Gelfond Hochstadt Pangburn & Co.
--------------------------------------------
HORWATH GELFOND HOCHSTADT PANGBURN & CO.

Denver, Colorado
December 29, 1999
#### In the Matter of B. J., a child under 18 years of age, and V. G., a child under 18 years of age.

Nos. J-75-747, J-75-748.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

March 4, 1976.

*1355R. C. Garland, Jr., Pauls Valley, for B. J-

John R. Sprowls, Pauls Valley, for V. G.

Max H. Scarce, Dist. Atty., Garvin County, for appellee.

OPINION

BRETT, Presiding Judge.

B. J. and V. G., both juveniles, appeal from an order of the Juvenile Division of the District Court, Garvin County, Case Nos. JFJ-75-32 and JFJ-75-31, respectively, adjudicating them delinquent after a finding by a jury that they jointly committed acts which would constitute the crime of Burglary in the Second Degree were they adults, specifically that they broke and entered a school building with the intent to steal property therein.

We have consolidated these separate appeals for decision.

The statutory scheme of Oklahoma’s Juvenile Code divides delinquency proceedings into an adjudicatory stage and a dis-positional stage. After entering an order of adjudication, the court is required to hold a dispositional hearing to consider evidence helpful in determining that disposition of the case which would best serve the interests of the child and the public. 10 O.S.1971, § 1115. The court’s discretion in determining the proper disposition is broad. In fact, the court is empowered by statute to dismiss the petition following adjudication or to otherwise terminate its jurisdiction for good cause shown. 10 O.S.1971, § 1116.

The Juvenile Code provides that the Juvenile Court’s decision in a proceeding for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency or in a proceeding certifying a juvenile to stand trial as an adult may be appealed to this Court in the same manner as other cases are appealed to this Court. 10 O.S.Supp.1975, § 1123, *amending*10 O.S. 1971, § 1123. We do not construe that statute to permit an appeal from an order adjudicating a juvenile to be delinquent when no disposition has been made of the case by the Juvenile Court. Such adjudicatory order, pending disposition of the case in accordance with the provisions of 10 O.S.1971, §§ 1115 and 1116, is not a final, appealable order. The time in which to perfect an appeal from the decision of the Juvenile Court in a delinquency proceeding is computed from the date of the dispositional order.

No order of disposition has been entered in the cases now before us. This appeal has, for that reason, been prematurely filed *1356and is hereby *DISMISSED.*This dismissal is without effect upon the right of the juvenile appellants to file an appeal in this Court following the final disposition of the case in the court below.

BUSSEY and BLISS, JJ., concur.
10572

#### State v. Omiya

Dismissed
#### McQuaid *v.*Sturgeon, Appellant.

*Equity*— Findings *of fact*— Review.

A finding of fact by a chancellor based upon sufficient evidence that a partnership had been formed and never legally dissolved, will not be reversed, where no manifest error is shown..

Argued Oct. 16, 1918.

Appeal, No. 46, Oct. T., 1918, by defendant, from decree of C. P. Allegheny Co., Jan. T., 1914, No. 2310, on bill in equity in case of J. C. Mc-Quaid and The Pittsburgh Swing and Furniture Company by J. C. McQuaid, General Manager, v. W. H. Sturgeon and J. H. Watt.

Before Brown, C. J., Moschziskee, Frazer, Walling, Simpson and Fox, JJ.

Affirmed.

Cross-bill in equity for an accounting. Before Carpenter, J.

The case turned upon the existence of a partnership between J. C. McQuaid, W. H. Sturgeon and J. H.

Watt. The court found as a fact that such partnership existed, and entered a decree accordingly.

*Error assigned*was the decree of the court.

*188January 4, 1919:

*George C. Bradshaw,*with him *James McLaren*and *Thomson & Bradshaw,*for appellant.

*Daniel Harrison,*for appellee, was not heard.

Per Curiam,

The learned chancellor below found that early in January, 1913, J. C. McQuaid, one of the plaintiffs in the cross-bill, and W. H. Sturgeon and J. H. Watt, defendants in it, formed a partnership, and that the same had never been legally dissolved. We have not been convinced that this is an erroneous finding and the decree based upon it is, therefore, affirmed at the cost of the appellant.