STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JUSTIN SKIPWITH

(SC 19608)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa,

Robinson and D’Auria, Js.*

Syllabus

Pursuant to the victim’s rights amendment set forth in the state constitution

(Conn. Const., amend. XXIX [b]), in a criminal prosecution, the victim

has the right to make a statement to the court objecting to or supporting

any plea agreement prior to the court’s acceptance of that plea, and to

make a statement to the court at sentencing.

The plaintiff in error, whose daughter had died as a result of the defendant’s

criminal conduct, filed a writ of error in this court, claiming that the

trial court had improperly dismissed her motion to vacate the defendant’s

sentence. The plaintiff in error had not been afforded an opportunity

to object to the plea agreement between the defendant and the defendant

in error, the state’s attorney for the judicial district of Waterbury, or to

make a statement at the defendant’s sentencing. After learning that the

defendant had been sentenced, the plaintiff in error filed her motion to

vacate the defendant’s sentence on the ground that her rights under the

victim’s rights amendment had been violated. The trial court concluded

that the defendant’s sentence was not illegal and dismissed the motion

for lack of jurisdiction. After this court transferred the writ of error to

the Appellate Court, that court dismissed the writ of error, concluding

that the rule of practice (§ 43-22) providing that a court may correct an

illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner did not

authorize the trial court to vacate the defendant’s sentence. The Appellate Court reasoned that the plaintiff in error provided no authority

supporting the proposition that the defendant’s sentence was imposed

in an illegal manner because it had violated of the victim’s constitutional

rights. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff in error appealed

to this court, claiming that she was entitled to have the defendant’s

sentence vacated due to the fact that it was imposed in an illegal manner

because she had not been afforded her rights under the victim’s rights

amendment. The defendant in error claimed, inter alia, that this court

lacked jurisdiction over the writ of error because there was no express

constitutional or statutory provision granting either this court or the

Appellate Court jurisdiction over a writ of error seeking to enforce the

victim’s rights amendment. Held that this court had jurisdiction over

the writ of error and had the authority to transfer it to the Appellate

Court but upheld the Appellate Court’s dismissal of the writ of error

because it sought a form of relief that was barred by the victim’s rights

amendment: because a writ of error is a common-law remedy, the lack

of any express constitutional or statutory authorization for a victim to

file a writ of error from a ruling of the trial court implicating his or her

rights under the victim’s rights amendment did not affect this court’s

jurisdiction, as long as the victim fell within the class of persons entitled

to file a writ of error and no constitutional or statutory provision deprived

this court of jurisdiction; furthermore, the clauses in the victim’s rights

amendment providing that the legislature shall provide by law for its

enforcement and that it shall not be construed as creating a basis for

vacating a conviction or ground for appellate relief in any criminal case

did not deprive this court of jurisdiction, as the legislative history of

the amendment indicated that the legislature contemplated that victims

would be able to seek relief in the courts and that appellate courts

would have a role in interpreting and implementing the amendment,

and the bar on appellate relief did not deprive this court of jurisdiction

but, rather, prohibited this court from granting any relief that would

directly affect the judgment in a criminal case or otherwise abridge the

substantive rights of a defendant; moreover, although the plaintiff in

error had standing to file the writ of error to enforce her constitutional

rights, because she sought a form of relief that was barred by the

prohibition on appellate relief contained in the victim’s rights amendment, specifically, an order requiring the trial court to vacate the defen-
dant’s sentence, this court upheld the Appellate Court’s dismissal of the

writ of error on this alternative ground.

(One justice concurring separately)

Argued April 5—officially released August 15, 2017

Procedural History

Writ of error from the decision of the Superior Court

in the judicial district of Waterbury, Fasano, Js., dismissing the plaintiff in error’s petition for a writ of

error coram nobis and dismissing the plaintiff in error’s

motion to vacate the defendant’s sentence, brought to

this court, which transferred the matterto the Appellate

Court, Gruendel, Alvord and Mullins, Js.; judgment dismissing the writ or error, from which the plaintiff in

error, on the granting of certification, appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Jeffrey D. Brownstein, for the appellant (plaintiff in

error Tabatha Cornell).

Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s

attorney, and Jason Germain, senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (defendant in error state’s

attorney for the judicial district of Waterbury).
Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The question that we must answer in

this certified appeal is whether a crime victim who has

been deprived of her state constitutionalrights to object

to a plea agreement between the state and the defendant

and to make a statement at the sentencing hearing is

entitled to have the defendant’s sentence vacated so

that she may attend a new sentencing hearing and give a

statement. The defendant, Justin Skipwith, was charged

with, inter alia, manslaughter in the second degree with

a motor vehicle after the vehicle that he was driving

struck and killed Brianna Washington, the daughter of

the plaintiff in error, Tabatha Cornell. Although the

plaintiff in error notified the defendant in error, the

state’s attorney for the judicial district of Waterbury

(state), that she was invoking her rights as a victim of

the crime pursuant to article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by articles seventeen and

twenty-nine of the amendments,1

she was not afforded

an opportunity to object to the plea agreement between

the defendant and the state or to make a statement

at the defendant’s sentencing hearing. Thereafter, the

plaintiff in error filed a motion to vacate the sentence,

which the trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 The plaintiff in error then filed a writ

of error claiming that the trial court improperly dismissed her motion to vacate the defendant’s sentence,

naming the state as the defendant in error.3 See State

v. Skipwith, 159 Conn. App. 502, 503, 123 A.3d 104

(2015). The Appellate Court determined that the trial

court had properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction

to entertain the motion to vacate and dismissed the

writ of error. Id., 512. We then granted the plaintiff in

error’s petition for certification to appeal.4 We affirm

the judgment of the Appellate Court on the alternative

ground that the writ of error must be dismissed on the

merits5 because it seeks a form of relief that is barred

by the victim’s rights amendment. Accordingly, we need

not reach the question of whether the Appellate Court

properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction

to entertain the plaintiff in error’s motion to vacate the

defendant’s sentence.

The undisputed facts of this case are set forth in the

opinion of the Appellate Court; see id., 503–506; and

need not be repeated here, as the state concedes that

the plaintiff in error was denied her right under article

first, § 8, as amended, to object to the plea and to give

a statement at the defendant’s sentencing. Conn. Const.,

amend. XXIX (b) (7) and (8). After learning that the

defendant had been sentenced, the plaintiff in error

filed a motion to vacate the sentence based on violations

of the victim’s rights amendment. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, at which the plaintiff

in error and a family friend gave statements, and ultimately dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that the sentence was not illegal. Id.,

505–506.

The plaintiff in error then filed this writ of error

challenging the decision of the trial court. The Appellate

Court concluded that the trial court properly had dismissed the motion to vacate the defendant’s sentence,

and then dismissed the writ of error on the merits. Id.,

512. The Appellate Court reasoned that Practice Book

§ 43-226 authorizes the trial court to ‘‘correct a sentence

imposed in an illegal manner,’’ and the plaintiff in error

had provided ‘‘no authority supporting the proposition

that a defendant’s sentence is imposed in an illegal

manner . . . when the sentencing proceeding was conducted in violation of the victim’s constitutional right

to be present.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 510–12. In addition, the Appellate Court observed that victims have

no statutory authority to seek to vacate a defendant’s

conviction. Id., 512. This certified appeal followed.

The plaintiff in error contends that, contrary to the

Appellate Court’s determination, because the defendant’s sentence was imposed without affording her the

right under article first, § 8, as amended, to give a statement at the defendant’s sentencing, the sentence was

‘‘imposed in an illegal manner’’ for purposes of Practice

Book § 43-22, and, therefore, she was entitled to have

the sentence vacated. The state contends thatthe Appellate Court correctly determined that the trial court had

properly dismissed the plaintiff in error’s motion to

vacate the defendant’s sentence and further claims,

essentially as an alternative ground for affirmance, that,

in the absence of any express constitutional or statutory

provision, both the Appellate Court and this court lack

jurisdiction to entertain a writ of error seeking to

enforce the provisions of the victim’s rights amendment. We conclude that this court had jurisdiction over

the writ of error and, consequently, we had the authority

to transfer it to the Appellate Court.7 We also conclude,

however, that the writ of error must be dismissed on

the merits because it seeks a form ofrelief that is barred

by the victim’s rights amendment.8

Because it implicates this court’s appellate jurisdiction, we first address the state’s claim that this court

lacks authority to entertain a writ of error seeking to

enforce the victim’s rights amendment because neither

the state constitution nor any statute expressly confers

such authority. This is a question of law over which

our review is plenary. See Pritchard v. Pritchard, 281

Conn. 262, 274–75, 914 A.2d 1025 (2007) (whether party

‘‘properly invoked the jurisdiction of the Appellate

Court is a question of law subject to plenary review’’).

In support of its contention that this court lacks jurisdiction over a writ of error seeking to enforce the victim’s rights amendment, the state relies primarily on

this court’s decision in State v. Gault, 304 Conn. 330,
39 A.3d 1105 (2012). In that case, the victim9 appealed

from an order of the trial courtrequiring that an affidavit

supporting the arrest warrant for the defendant, which

had been redacted to remove information that could

identify the victim, be unsealed. Id., 335–36. She contended, among other things, that this order violated her

right under article first, § 8, as amended, to be treated

with fairness and respect throughout the criminal justice process. Id., 336; see also Conn. Const., amend.

XXIX (b) (1). The state claimed on appeal that, because

the victim was not a party to the criminal proceeding,

she had no standing to appeal. State v. Gault, supra,

333, 337–38. This court agreed with the state. Id., 338.

We observed in Gault that ‘‘except insofar as the constitution bestows upon this court jurisdiction to hear certain cases . . . the subject matter jurisdiction of . . .

this court is governed by statute.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)Id., 339. We then noted that the victim’s

rights amendment did not contain a right to appeal from

a ruling by the trial court implicating the rights created

by that amendment. Id. We further noted that the statute

authorizing appeals, General Statutes § 52-263, provided that the remedy of appeal was available only to

parties to the case. Id., 342. Finally, we observed that,

although Public Acts 1998, No. 98-231, § 2, as amended

by Public Acts 2001, No. 01-211, § 12, codified at General

Statutes § 46a-13c (5), authorized the Office of the Victim Advocate to ‘‘[f]ile a limited special appearance in

any court proceeding for the purpose of advocating for

any right guaranteed [by the victim’s rights amendment

or] the general statutes,’’ the legislature did not intend

that victims would have full party status or the right to

appeal from rulings of the trial court. See State v. Gault,

supra, 347. Accordingly, we concluded that victims

were not parties with standing to appeal from an order

in a criminal case, and we dismissed the victim’s appeal.

Id., 348.

In the present case, the state contends that Gault

stands for the proposition that, because the victim’s

rights amendment contains no self-executing remedial

procedures; see id., 340–41; if the legislature has not

expressly provided a remedy by which the rights protected by that constitutional provision may be vindicated, no such remedy exists.10 Our decision in Gault,

however, was premised on the principle that the right

of appeal is created purely by statute. See id., 339.

Because no statute provides victims with a right to

appeal from rulings of the trial court, no such right

exists. In contrast, a writ of error is a common-law

remedy. See, e.g., State v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492,

499–500, 811 A.2d 667 (2002) (‘‘[t]he writ of error . . .

is a concept deeply rooted in our common law’’ and ‘‘the

right to bring a writ of error . . . exists independent of

[any] statutory authorization’’ [citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); State

v. Assuntino, 173 Conn. 104, 112, 376 A.2d 1091 (1977)
(‘‘The writ [of error] has long lain to this court . . .

in accordance with statutes which have been merely

declaratory of the common law. It is therefore concluded that the writ, at common law, lies to this court

. . . .’’); State v. Caplan, 85 Conn. 618, 622, 84 A. 280

(1912) (‘‘[t]he writ of error is the common-law method

. . . of carrying up a cause from an inferior to a higher

court forthe revision of questions of law’’). Thus, unlike

in Gault, the lack of any express constitutional or statutory authorization for a victim to file a writ of error

from a ruling of the trial court implicating his or her

rights under the victim’s rights amendment does not

affect the victim’s right to file a writ of error or this

court’s jurisdiction to entertain it.Rather, in the absence

of any constitutional provision or statute depriving this

court of its common-law jurisdiction over writs of

error,11 this court has jurisdiction if a victim falls within

the class of persons who are entitled to file a writ

of error.

The state has not claimed that any statute deprives

this court of its jurisdiction over writs of error seeking

relief for a violation of the victim’s rights amendment,

and we conclude that nothing in the state constitution

does so. Article first, § 8, as amended, provides in relevant part: ‘‘The general assembly shall provide by law

for the enforcement of this subsection. Nothing in this

subsection or in any law enacted pursuant to this subsection shall be construed as creating a basis for vacating a conviction or ground for appellate relief in any

criminal case.’’ Conn. Const., amend. XXIX (b). With

respect to the first quoted sentence, that provision

merely authorizes the legislature to enforce through

legislation the rights created by the constitutional provision. It does not abrogate the basic constitutional obligation of courts to interpret and implement

constitutional provisions.12 See Marbury v. Madison, 5

U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) (‘‘[i]t is

emphatically the province and duty of the judicial

department to say what the law is’’). Indeed, to the

extent that there is any ambiguity as to whether the

constitutional provision deprives courts of their authority to adjudicate claims arising from the victim’s rights

amendment, the legislative history reveals that the legislature expressly contemplated that victims would be

able to seek relief both in the trial court and in the

appellate courts.13

The second quoted sentence, providing that the victim’s rights amendment shall not be ‘‘construed as creating a basis for vacating a conviction or ground for

appellate relief in any criminal case’’; Conn. Const.,

amend. XXIX (b); also does not deprive the appellate

courts entirely of their authority to interpret and implement the constitutional provision. First, as we have

indicated, the legislative history of the provision clearly

indicates that the legislature contemplated that both

the trial courts and the appellate courts would have a
role in interpreting and implementing it. See footnote

13 of this opinion. Second, in ordinary usage, the phrase

‘‘appellate relief’’ connotes relief granted on appeal

from a judgment disposing of the case, not relief provided to a nonparty in connection with a collateral issue

that will not directly affect the substantive issues or

the ultimate disposition of the case. See State v. Moore,

158 Conn. 461, 463, 262 A.2d 166 (1969) (‘‘[a]n appeal

lies only from a final judgment, and there can be no

judgment in a criminal case until sentence is pronounced’’). Indeed, the legislative history indicates that

the purpose of the provision barring ‘‘appellate relief’’

was to ensure that any relief provided would not deprive

defendants of their existing substantive rights; its purpose was not to deprive victims of any appellate redress

for a violation of their rights, even when providing relief

would not affect the judgment or the rights of the defendant.14 Third, we can perceive no reason why, before

the victim’s rights amendment was adopted, a victim

could not have obtained relief by filing a writ of error

in this court to vindicate rights conferred by chapter

968 of the General Statutes governing victim services,

including the right to present a statement to the prosecutor and the trial court prior to the acceptance of a

plea and the right to submit a statement to the prosecutor before sentencing.15 See General Statutes § 54-203

(b) (7) (B) and (C). There is no evidence, and it would

be anomalous to conclude, that the victim’s rights

amendment was intended to eliminate preexisting

mechanisms for obtaining such relief from this court.

Rather, it is reasonable to conclude that the bar on

appellate relief was intended to be the constitutional

equivalent to General Statutes § 54-223, which provides

that the ‘‘[f]ailure to afford the victim of a crime any

of the rights provided pursuant to any provision of

the general statutes shall not constitute grounds for

vacating an otherwise lawful conviction or voiding an

otherwise lawful sentence or parole determination.’’16

We conclude, therefore, that the bar on appellate

relief set forth in article first, § 8, as amended, merely

prohibits this court from granting any relief that would

directly affect the judgment in a criminal case or otherwise abridge the substantive rights of a defendant.17

Accordingly, we conclude that this provision does not

deprive this court of its jurisdiction over writs of error

arising from the victim’s rights amendment.

With this background in mind, we must address an

issue that we left unresolved in our decision in Gault.

Specifically, we stated in that case that it was unclear

whether the prohibition on appellate relief contained

in article first, § 8, as amended, ‘‘is intended to apply to

victims or only to criminal defendants.’’ State v. Gault,

supra, 304 Conn. 339–40 n.12. Our conclusion here that

the prohibition on appellate relief was intended to bar

any form of relief that would directly affect the judgment or abridge the defendant’s rights makes it clear,
however, that the focus of the prohibition is on the

substance of the relief, not on the identity of the party

seeking the relief. Accordingly, we now conclude that

the prohibition was intended to apply to any person

seeking a prohibited form of relief, including victims.

Similarly, because the prohibition goes to the substance

of the relief sought, and not to the vehicle by which

the relief is sought, we conclude that, to the extent that

there is any doubt as to whether a writ of error is

technically a form of appellate relief in this context, the

constitutional prohibition imposes the same limitations

on writs of error that it would impose on appeals by

victims, if they were statutorily authorized. See State

v. Caplan, supra, 85 Conn. 622; see also State v. Salmon,

250 Conn. 147, 153–54, 735 A.2d 333 (1999) (writ of

error is proper vehicle for appellate review when party

is unable to appeal).

Thus, what our analysis also makes clear is that,

although the plaintiff in error has standing to file the

writ of error,18 she seeks a form of relief—an order

requiring the trial court to vacate the defendant’s sentence—that is barred by the prohibition on appellate

relief contained in the victim’s rights amendment.

Although the victim’s rights amendment does not

deprive victims of their right to file a writ of error

to enforce their constitutional rights, it also does not

expand their rights to seek a form of appellate relief

that previously had been barred by statute. Because

victims were barred by § 54-223 from seeking to vacate

a criminal sentence forthe violation of theirrights when

the victim’s rights amendment was adopted; see footnote 16 of this opinion;19 we conclude that this form of

relief is barred, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment

of the Appellate Court on this alternative ground.20

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion PALMER, EVELEIGH, ESPINOSA,

ROBINSON and D’AURIA, Js., concurred.

* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this

court consisting of Chief Justice Rogers, and Justices Palmer, Eveleigh,

McDonald, Espinosa, Robinson and D’Auria. Although Justice Espinosa was

not present when the case was argued before the court, she has read the

briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of oral argument prior

to participating in this decision. The listing of justices reflects their seniority

status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

1 Article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by

articles seventeen and twenty-nine of the amendments, provides in relevant

part: ‘‘In all criminal prosecutions, a victim, as the general assembly may

define by law, shall have the following rights: (1) The right to be treated

with fairness and respect throughout the criminal justice process; (2) the

right to timely disposition of the case following arrest of the accused, provided no right of the accused is abridged; (3) the right to be reasonably

protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process; (4) the

right to notification of court proceedings; (5) the right to attend the trial

and all other court proceedings the accused has the right to attend, unless

such person is to testify and the court determines that such person’s testimony would be materially affected if such person hears other testimony;

(6) the right to communicate with the prosecution; (7) the right to object

to or support any plea agreement entered into by the accused and the

prosecution and to make a statement to the court prior to the acceptance

by the court of the plea of guilty or nolo contendere by the accused; (8)
the right to make a statement to the court at sentencing; (9) the right to

restitution which shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other

cause of action or as otherwise provided by law; and (10) the right to

information aboutthe arrest, conviction, sentence, imprisonment and release

of the accused. The general assembly shall provide by law for the enforcement of this subsection. Nothing in this subsection or in any law enacted

pursuant to this subsection shall be construed as creating a basis for vacating

a conviction or ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.’’ Hereinafter,

we refer to this provision as article first, § 8, as amended, or the victim’s

rights amendment.

2

In addition, the plaintiff in error filed a petition for a writ of error coram

nobis, which the trial court also dismissed. The Appellate Court concluded

that the trial court properly dismissed that petition; see State v. Skipwith,

159 Conn. App. 502, 512, 123 A.3d 104 (2015); and that ruling is not at issue

in this certified appeal.

3 The plaintiffin errorfiled the writ of errorin this court, and we transferred

it to the Appellate Court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and

Practice Book § 65-1.

4 We granted the petition for certification to appeal on the following issue:

‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the trial court properly

dismissed the plaintiff in error’s motion to vacate the defendant’s sentence

because it was not an illegal sentence?’’ State v. Skipwith, 320 Conn. 911,

128 A.3d 955 (2015). Upon review of the record and the claims raised before

the Appellate Court, we now conclude that the certified question is not an

adequate statement of the issue properly before this court. Accordingly, we

reformulate the certified question as follows: ‘‘Could the Appellate Court

grant the relief requested by the plaintiff in error? If so, did the Appellate

Court properly determine that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff

in error’s motion to vacate the defendant’s sentence because it was not an

illegal sentence?’’ See State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173, 183–84, 989 A.2d

1048 (2010) (court may reformulate certified question to conform to issue

actually presented and to be decided on appeal).

5 For some time, this court and the Appellate Court have dismissed writs

of error that lack merit. See, e.g., Hardy v. Superior Court, 305 Conn. 824,

827, 48 A.3d 640 (2012); State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 613, 863 A.2d 654

(2005); Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 724, 647 A.2d 324 (1994); Sowell

v. DiCara, 161 Conn. App. 102, 122, 133, 127 A.3d 356, cert. denied, 320

Conn. 909, 128 A.3d 953 (2015); State v. Peay, 111 Conn. App. 427, 428, 959

A.2d 655 (2008), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 915, 970 A.2d 729 (2009); Daniels

v. Alander, 75 Conn. App. 864, 883, 818 A.2d 106 (2003), aff’d, 268 Conn.

320, 844 A.2d 182 (2004). For purposes of clarity, in this opinion we use the

phrase dismissed on the merits to distinguish that disposition from one

where the writ of error is dismissed on a jurisdictional ground.

6 Practice Book § 43-22 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may at any time

correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a

sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an

illegal manner.’’

7 See footnote 3 of this opinion.

8 We therefore need not resolve the question of whether the defendant’s

sentence otherwise was imposed in an illegal manner for purposes of Practice Book § 43-22. Even if we were to assume that it was, we conclude that

the victim’s rights amendment prohibits the form of relief that the plaintiff

in error is seeking, namely, an order requiring the trial court to vacate the

defendant’s sentence.

9 The victim in Gault was not identified in order to protect her privacy.

See State v. Gault, supra, 304 Conn. 333.

10 We emphasize that this court did not hold in Gault that the provisions

of article first, § 8, as amended, expressly conferring rights on victims, are

not self-executing in the sense that they are not effective until the legislature

passes implementing legislation. See State v. Gault, supra, 304 Conn. 340

(constitutional provisions that are not self-executing are not effective until

implementing legislation is passed). We held only that the victim’s rights

amendment contains no self-executing provision conferring on victims the

right to appeal from rulings in a criminal case. Id., 341, 347. Indeed, the

state in the present case does not dispute that prosecutors and trial courts

have regularly afforded victims their rights under the victim’s rights amendment, including those that have not been expressly implemented by statute.

The state has also consistently and forthrightly conceded that the failure

to afford the plaintiff in error her rights in the present case was a rare and

unfortunate exception to that general practice and violated the plaintiff in
error’s state constitutional rights, despite the fact that those rights are not

the subject of any implementing legislation. The state claims only that the

state constitution contains no self-executing provisions providing a judicial

remedy for such violations. Thus, properly understood,the state’s contention

is not that the victim’s rights amendment is not self-executing in its entirety;

rather, its contention is that claims that the self-executing provisions of the

amendment have been violated are nonjusticiable. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541

U.S. 267, 277, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2004) (claim of unlawfulness

is nonjusticiable when it ‘‘involves no judicially enforceable rights’’). We

conclude that such claims are justiciable, but that the scope of the relief

that the courts can provide is limited.

11 We express no opinion here as to whether such a statute would pass

muster under the state constitution. See Banks v. Thomas, 241 Conn. 569,

585 n.16, 698 A.2d 268 (1997) (because court rejected claim that statute had

limited court’s jurisdiction over writs of error, court was not required to

‘‘determine whether such a bar would be a constitutionally impermissible

encroachment upon this court’s authority to entertain a writ of error’’); State

v. Assuntino, supra, 173 Conn. 110 (because legislature had not attempted

to abrogate common-law writ of error by statute, it was ‘‘unnecessary for

this court to consider whether the jurisdiction to hear such a writ is an

essential attribute of the constitutional role of this court’’); see also Moore

v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 573, 660 A.2d 742 (1995) (‘‘article first, § 10, [of

the Connecticut constitution] prohibits the legislature from abolishing or

significantly limiting common law and certain statutory rights that were

redressable in court as of 1818’’ [footnote omitted]).

12 In this regard, we note that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to the

United States constitution, providing that ‘‘[t]he Congress shall have power

to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,’’ has

never been construed to deprive the courts of their authority to interpret

and implement that amendment.

13 See 39 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1996 Sess., p. 2833, remarks of Representative

Ellen Scalettar (proposed constitutional amendment ‘‘really gives the courts

the ability to be the primary interpreter of what the obligations of the state

are, and in certain ways we are giving up our power to do that and giving

it to the courts’’); id., p. 2837, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor

(explaining that remedy for victim who was deprived of right created by

proposed amendment ‘‘would be for an appellate court or a trial court to

decide what the state’s obligation is under the terms of the constitutional

amendment’’); id., p. 2872, remarks of Representative Dale W. Radcliffe (‘‘[i]t

is naturally left to a court to interpret sections of a constitution’’); id., p.

2873, remarks of Representative Marie L. Kirkley-Bey (‘‘we’re passing a piece

of paper onto a judicial system that can therefore incorporate and determine

the law’’).

14 See 39 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1996 Sess., p. 1991, remarks of Senator Martin M.

Looney (rights created by proposed amendment ‘‘directly conflict with those

of the defendant and fashioning a remedy for one without affecting the

rights of the other would be extremely difficult’’); 39 S. Proc., Pt. 10, 1996

Sess., p. 3247, remarks of Senator Thomas F. Upson (clarifying that purpose

of provision prohibiting vacation of conviction and barring appellate relief

was to ensure that no right of defendant was abridged); 39 H.R. Proc., Pt.

9, 1996 Sess., p. 2817,remarks ofRepresentative Michael P. Lawlor(proposed

amendment ‘‘is not intended to deprive any person of any liberty right that

they have under the federal or state constitution’’); 39 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9,

1996 Sess., p. 2840, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor (proposed

amendment ‘‘doesn’t deprive any liberty or due process rights of any person

who is a citizen of the state who might be accused of a crime’’).

15 General Statutes § 54-224 provides that the state and its agents cannot

be held liable for damages for the failure to afford a victim any rights

protected by the General Statutes. That statute does not bar victims, however, from seeking to enforce their rights.

16 Indeed, the legislative history of the victim’s rights amendment indicates

that the intent of the amendment was to give constitutional status to the

statutory rights that victims already had. See 39 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1996 Sess.,

p. 2817, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor (‘‘[the amendment]

only provides rights to victims of crime as they’re defined in our statute[s]’’);

id., p. 2830, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor (‘‘everything in

the amendment is something that’s already law in the state of Connecticut’’).

Section 54-223 was enacted in 1986, ten years before the victim’s rights

amendment was adopted. See 1986 Public Acts, No. 86-401, §§ 3, 7.

17 We recognize that this conclusion severely limits the relief that is avail-
able to victims for violations of their constitutional rights. Because it is not

clear, however, that the bar on appellate relief that would affect the judgment

or abridge a defendant’s rights effectively bars all appellate relief, we cannot

conclude at this juncture that it deprives this court of jurisdiction over writs

of error arising from the victim’s rights amendment. Accordingly, we leave

it for another day to resolve the question of whether, if a trial court failed

to comply with the provisions of article first, § 8, as amended, the victim

could file an interlocutory writ of error before the plea was entered or the

defendant was sentenced, seeking an order requiring the trial court to comply, provided thatthe victim could establish thatthe criteria for an appealable

interlocutory order under State v. Curcio 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566

(1983), were met and that granting relief would not abridge any of the

defendant’s existing rights, including the right to a speedy trial. See, e.g.,

Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, 305 Conn. 750, 755–56,

48 A.3d 16 (2012) (this court had jurisdiction over writ of error challenging

interlocutory discovery order that satisfied criteria for appealable final judgment under Curcio).

18 The common-law requirements for standing to file a writ of error are

now codified in Practice Book § 72-1 (a). See State v. Rupar, 293 Conn.

489, 501–502, 978 A.2d 502 (2009) (concluding that plaintiff in error who

had satisfied requirements of § 72-1 had standing to file writ of error). Section

72-1 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Writs of error for errors in matters of

law only may be brought from a final judgment of the superior court to the

supreme court in the following cases: (1) a decision binding on an aggrieved

nonparty . . . and (4) as otherwise necessary or appropriate in aid of its

jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

‘‘(b) No writ of error may be brought in any civil or criminal proceeding

for the correction of any error where (1) the error might have been reviewed

by process of appeal, or by way of certification, or (2) the parties, by failure

timely to seek a transfer or otherwise, have consented to have the case

determined by a court or tribunal from whose judgment there is no right

of appeal or opportunity for certification.’’

The plaintiff in errorin the present case meets these requirements because

she has raised a pure question of law from a final judgment of the Superior

Court that is binding on her and by which she is aggrieved, namely, the

ruling of the trial court dismissing her motion to vacate the defendant’s

sentence. In addition, under State v. Gault, supra, 304 Conn. 347, she has

no right to appeal from that decision, and she did not consent to have the

issue finally decided by the trial court.

19 See also 39 H. R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1996 Sess., p. 2819, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor (‘‘[i]t is certainly not the intent [of the proposed

amendment] to provide a veto power to a victim of a crime’’).

20 But see Kenna v. United States District Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th

Cir. 2006) (when trial court denied victim his right to give statement at

defendant’s sentencing hearing and victim filed writ of mandamus as authorized by federal law, reviewing court concluded that trial court ‘‘must avoid

upsetting constitutionally protected rights, but it must also be cognizant

that the only way to give effect to [the victim’s] right to speak . . . is to

vacate the sentence and hold a new sentencing hearing’’); State v. Barrett,

350 Or. 390, 406–407, 255 P.3d 472 (2011) (when victim was denied right to

be heard at defendant’s sentencing and appealed as authorized by statute

from trial court’s ruling that there was no remedy for violation, reviewing

court concluded that vacating defendant’s sentence and conducting new

sentencing hearing at which defendant could receive harsher sentence did

not violate defendant’s double jeopardy rights); State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756,

765–66 (Utah 2002) (when victim was denied right to make statement at plea

hearing, trial court properly determined that remedy was to ‘‘ ‘informally’ ’’

reopen the plea hearing at sentencing and accept testimony from victim).

These cases, however, are distinguishable from the present case. Neither

Kenna nor Barrett involved constitutional provisions barring appellate relief

that would affect the judgment. The constitutional provision at issue in

Casey barred ‘‘relief from any criminal judgment’’; see State v. Casey, supra,

761 n.5; but relief was granted in that case before the defendant was sentenced. Because we conclude in the present case that an order vacating the

defendant’s sentence would affect the judgment in violation of the state

constitutional prohibition on appellate relief, we need not determine whether

doing so would violate the defendant’s double jeopardy or other substantive rights.