United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-3171

Non-Argument Calendar.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Willie C. HOLLEY a/k/a Bam, Defendant-Appellant.

May 9, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida. (No. 94-175-(S1)-CR-J-10), Wm. Terrell Hodges,

Judge.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Willie C. Holley appeals the sentence he received following a

plea of guilty to the offense of using a communication device (a

telephone) to further a conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine,

and cocaine base. See 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1994). He contends that

the district court erred (1) in determining his criminal history

category and (2) in assessing his role in the offense. Neither

contention has merit; only the second warrants discussion.

The sentencing guideline applicable to the offense of

conviction, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.6, instructs the courts to apply the

offense level applicable to the underlying offense, here the drug

conspiracy described above. Section 2D1.1(a)(3), the guideline for

the underlying offense, indicates that the base offense level shall

be the level specified in the Drug Quantity Table. In this case,

the district court set appellant's base offense level at 14,

because it attributed to the appellant only 5 to 10 grams of the
heroin involved in the drug conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(c)(13) (Drug Quantity Table).

 Appellant contends that the district court should have

adjusted this base offense level downward to take into account his

minor role in the offense. Whether appellant is correct is of no

moment, because any error the court may have made in this case

enured to appellant's benefit.

In reaching appellant's total offense level the district court

was required to take into account all of the drugs that were part

of the "jointly undertaken criminal activity" or that were

"reasonably foreseeable" by appellant as part of such activity.

See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); United States v. Louis, 967 F.2d

1550, 1552-1553 (11th Cir.1992) ("In a drug distribution case,

quantities and types of drugs not specified in the count of

conviction are to be included in determining the offense level if

they were part of the same course of conduct or part of a common

scheme or plan as the count of conviction."). The court, however,

did not take all of appellant's relevant conduct into account;

rather, it attributed to appellant only the quantity of drugs

involved in the count of conviction. The court omitted

consideration of "quantities of contraband attributed to others, of

which [appellant] may have had knowledge or conspiratorial

responsibility." For example, the court did not hold appellant

accountable for the "three or four bags of heroin" that

co-conspirator Speights had obtained from appellant "on some

occasions," or the heroin that was attributable to co-conspirators

Neely and Beard but reasonably foreseeable to appellant as being
part of the conspiratorial activity.

 Had the court properly applied section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) and

attributed to appellant all of the drugs that he reasonably knew

were part of the "jointly undertaken criminal activity,"

appellant's total offense level would have been considerably higher

than the level 14 that the court used to fashion his sentence. We

agree with the Government that to order the district court to give

appellant the downward role adjustment he seeks—based on his role

in the drug conspiracy—and at the same time leave intact the

district court's calculation of his base offense level—which did

not give effect to all of appellant's relevant conduct—would be

unreasonable. Moreover, it would be inconsistent with the intent

of the sentencing guidelines. Cf. United States v. Gomez, 31 F.3d

28, 31 (2d Cir.1994) (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n. 4) precludes

the minor role adjustment because the Sentencing Commission did not

intend that a defendant receive a downward adjustment based on his

role in the entire criminal activity while also receiving a lower

offense level based on his conduct in the narrower offense of

conviction); United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 556 (8th Cir.)

(same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 363, 130 L.Ed.2d 316

(1994); United States v. Olibrices, 979 F.2d 1557, 1560

(D.C.Cir.1992) (same).

Appellant, as might be expected, does not challenge the

district court's use of his narrower conduct to calculate his base

offense level. He is not entitled to prevail on his request for a

two-level reduction for his role in the broader conduct in which he

engaged, however, without also accepting a calculation of the drugs
attributable to him based upon the same broader conduct. See

Lucht, 18 F.3d at 556.

AFFIRMED.