[Cite as Lakewood v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-3006.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF LAKEWOOD, :

 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 113011

v. :

ANGEL JONES, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 8, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Lakewood Municipal Court 

Case No. 2022-CRB-00962

Appearances:

Andrew N. Fleck, Assistant Prosecutor for the City of 

Lakewood, for appellee.

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and 

Thomas T. Lampman, Assistant Public Defender, for 

appellant.

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:

Defendant-appellant, Angel Jones, appeals her conviction for

aggravated menacing following a bench trial. She contends that there was 
insufficient evidence on the mens rea element of the charge to support her 

conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court. 

Procedural and Factual Background

On October 24, 2022, Jones was charged with one count of 

aggravated menacing in violation of R.C. 2903.21, a first-degree misdemeanor. The 

charge related to a telephone call Jones made to the leasing office for AIY Properties

(“AIY”) on October 22, 2022, during which Jones allegedly threatened to come to 

the leasing office and shoot Rachel Jay, a leasing agent for AIY, and anyone else in 

the building. Jones pled not guilty to the charge. 

On July 17, 2023, the case proceeded to a bench trial. Two witnesses 

testified for the city of Lakewood — Jay and Lakewood police officer, Meghan 

Mauser. Jones testified in her defense. 

Jay testified that on October 22, 2022, she was working as a leasing 

agent at AIY, a property management company, in Lakewood when she received a 

telephone call from Jones, who was then a tenant at Park Towers, an apartment 

complex managed by AIY, in Fairview Park, Ohio. Jay stated that Jones identified 

herself to Jay and that the telephone’s caller ID also identified the caller as Jones. 

Jay stated that she had never spoken with Jones before but was aware that there had 

been “a couple of complaints” lodged against Jones for “small things,” such as “loud 

music.” 

Jay testified that Jones was “very upset,” “angry,” “frustrated” and 

“disappointed” because her vehicle had been towed from the parking lot of her 
apartment complex after she parked in a handicapped parking space. Although 

Jones had a parking pass that permitted her to park in the parking lot, she was not 

authorized to park in a handicapped parking space. 

Jay stated that Jones asked for information regarding the towing 

company AIY used and that she gave Jones the name and telephone number for the 

towing company but that she did not have an address for the towing company. Jones 

told Jay that she had already spoken with the towing company and that she had “had 

words with them as well.” 

Jay testified that her conversation with Jones lasted approximately 

five minutes and consisted “mostly” of “insults” and “arguments” by Jones that she 

had “every right to park where she parked.” Jay stated that Jones “berate[d]” her, 

telling her “how terrible our company was and that none of us are basically capable 

of doing our jobs, things of that nature” and that “her car should not have been 

towed.” 

Jones then told Jay that she was coming to the leasing office, that she

was going to “shoot [Jay] and anyone else in the place” and that they would “see her 

soon.” Jay testified that Jones was “very direct” and that she “fear[ed]” and 

“believe[d]” Jones would do what she said “[b]ecause of how angry she was and how 

adamant she was that we were at fault.” 

Jay testified that she had been “instructed to listen to [tenants] and 

what they have to say until I feel it’s no longer necessary to be cordial . . . in which 

case I am instructed to end the call and contact the police.” Jay told Jones she would 
be contacting the police and ended the call. Jay then immediately called the police, 

reported what had occurred and then locked the doors and closed the blinds. Jay

testified that during the three years she had worked at the leasing office, angry 

tenants would call the office at least once a week but that no one else had ever 

physically threatened her. 

Mauser testified that, at 10:45 a.m. on October 22, 2022, she 

responded to a call from a leasing office on Clifton Blvd. regarding “an unhappy 

tenant that might possibly come and shoot the building up.” She stated that when 

she arrived on scene, Jay informed her that a tenant, i.e., Jones, had called the office 

upset about her vehicle being towed and had told Jay that she was going to “get a 

gun and come down” to the office. Mauser indicated that as she took Jay’s 

statement, Jay appeared to be “on edge,” “fidgety,” “jittery,” “constantly scanning,” 

“looking around.” Mauser stated that Jay appeared to be “fearful that an incident 

was going to take place” and that “she feared for her life.”

Mauser testified that Jay explained that AIY has a towing company 

that monitors all of its properties and that if the towing company observes a violation 

of the property’s parking rules, it will tow the offending vehicle. Jay provided 

Mauser the contact information for the towing company as well as contact 

information for Jones, including a copy of her driver’s license, from Jones’ tenant 

file, which was in the office.
Mauser stated that she spoke with the towing company and, after she 

left the scene, went to Jones’ apartment in an attempt to speak with Jones but that 

Jones was not there. 

Jones testified that in October 2022, she was leasing an apartment in

Park Towers, an apartment complex that AIY manages on Lorain Road in Fairview 

Park. On October 22, 2022, Jones parked her black pickup truck in a handicapped 

parking space. When she returned to the parking space, her vehicle was gone. Jones 

testified that a plaque on the building listed a number for a towing company that she 

then called and inquired as to whether the towing company had towed her pickup 

truck from Park Towers.

An unidentified towing company employee informed Jones that the

towing company had towed her vehicle because she did not have permission to park 

on the property. Jones disputed this and claimed that she did, in fact, have 

permission to park on the property. After going back and forth with the towing 

company employee regarding the issue, Jones acknowledged that she did not have 

permission to park in the handicapped parking space but that she did have 

permission to park at Park Towers because she lived there. 

Jones testified that she “continued to go back and forth” with the 

towing company employee until the employee told Jones to “shut the eff up.” Jones 

stated that she hung up and immediately called AIY because she had no information 

regarding where to go to pick up her vehicle and she did not want to continue 

speaking with the towing company employee. 
Jones testified that she spoke with an AIY employee, i.e., Jay, and 

asked for information regarding the towing company it uses. Jones stated that Jay

told her she could not give her the information because it was a Saturday and that 

Jones would have to call back on Monday. Jones responded, “Well I guess 

everybody who deal[s] with AIY is unprofessional.” Jones testified that she told Jay

about her conversation with the towing company employee and then said to Jay, 

“Well, you know, people should not talk to people like that about their property. . . .

That’s why places get shot up.” According to Jones, Jay responded, “Well, all right, 

well you have a good day.” Jones replied, “You, too” and hung up. Jones stated that 

her conversation with Jay lasted “[m]aybe two, three minutes, if that.”

Jones denied that she threatened to “shoot up” AIY employees or 

threatened to harm any AIY property when she called the leasing office. She stated

that she had “no reason to” and that she just wanted to get information regarding 

the towing company so she could go and get her truck. Jones testified that Jay

“never gave [her] any information,” so she “had to Google” the name of the towing 

company to locate its address. Jones stated that 30 minutes later, her sister drove

her to the towing company to retrieve her truck. Jones paid a $186 fee, retrieved 

her truck and went to work. 

When asked why she would say to someone, “[t]hat’s why places get 

shot up,” Jones explained: 

[A]s I’m trying to explain to [Jay], she was just dismissing me, and I’m 

like, “So everybody is just unprofessional, I guess.”
And she wasn’t really trying to hear — hear me out about the tow 

company, which was the only problem. Never had an issue with her. . . .

So I’m like, you know, the — you guys see the news and you guys 

see all these places being shot up and attacked is because of the 

demeanor of people who’s dealing with the public. This is the public. 

You don’t know what someone is going through mentally. 

. . . 

[S]o I told her what the tow company said. And I said, “You 

know, people shouldn’t talk to people like that. I see why places are 

being shot up.” And that was the end of it.

Jones stated that she “did not intend [her] words at that time to be a threat.” 

After hearing the witness testimony and the parties’ closing 

arguments, the trial court found Jones guilty of aggravated menacing. The court 

explained the reasoning for its verdict as follows: 

The question . . . is did you knowingly do that. I don’t know. I 

can’t read your mind if you did it or not, knowingly want to cause harm, 

serious harm, to another. I can’t read your mind and nobody can read 

your mind. I know you were angry at the time.

But there’s also no doubt in the Court’s mind that [Jay] was in 

fear, evidenced by the testimony of the officer . . . .

So it gets down to that. Did you knowingly do it? We know that

the victim was in fear of her life, so that’s the question I had. 

And in this day and age, whether it was now or a year ago, I think 

that you would have that knowledge. You can’t even say the words 

“shoot,” “gun,” anything like that in this day and age without that 

ensuing fear in somebody. . . . [T[en years ago, it might have been 

different. It’s not anymore. . . . And there’s too many shootings in this 

world that we live in. And I have to apply . . . the times to the behavior

[sic] of the elements.
The trial court sentenced Jones to 35 days in jail with 30 days 

suspended and the option of performing five days of community service in lieu of 

five days in jail. The trial also ordered Jones to complete an anger management 

program and imposed one year of probation (which would be terminated upon 

completion of the anger management program and community service), a $100 fine 

and costs.

Jones appealed, raising the following assignment of error for review:

Jones’ conviction was based on insufficient evidence, in violation of the 

Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, because the trial judge 

expressly stated that he could not determine Jones acted “knowingly” 

from the evidence in the record and convicted Jones based on his own 

beliefs about societal trends. 

Law and Analysis

In her sole assignment of error, Jones challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting her conviction for aggravated menacing. 

Standard of Review

When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must 

determine “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, 

quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. The 

court examines all the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such 

evidence, if believed, would convince a reasonable factfinder of the defendant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-2296, ¶ 81 (8th Dist.), 
citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390 (1997) (Cook, J., concurring); see 

also State v. Bankston, 2009-Ohio-754, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.) (noting that “in a sufficiency 

of the evidence review, an appellate court does not engage in a determination of 

witness credibility; rather, it essentially assumes the state’s witnesses testified 

truthfully and determines if that testimony satisfies each element of the crime”). 

Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict is a question of law. 

Thompkins at 386.

The Trial Court’s Verdict Was Supported by Sufficient Evidence

Jones was convicted of aggravated menacing in violation of R.C.

2903.21. R.C. 2903.21(A) states, in relevant part: 

No person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender 

will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other 

person . . . . In addition to any other basis for the other person’s belief 

that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or 

property of the other person, . . . the other person’s belief may be based 

on words or conduct of the offender that are directed at or identify a 

corporation, association, or other organization that employs the other 

person or to which the other person belongs.

A person acts “knowingly” “when the person is aware that the 

person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain 

nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). Menacing encompasses both “a present state of fear of 

bodily harm and a fear of bodily harm in the future.” State v. Scott, 2009-Ohio4961, ¶ 20 (7th Dist.). 

Jones argues that the trial judge’s comments following closing 

arguments and before he announced his verdict show that (1) there was insufficient 
evidence for the trial court to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jones was 

“aware” that her statements to Jay would “probably” cause Jay to believe that Jones 

would cause her serious physical harm and (2) the trial judge wrongfully convicted 

Jones based on “his own beliefs about societal trends” rather than the evidence 

presented at trial. Jones contends that because the trial judge stated he “d[id]n’t 

know” whether Jones acted knowingly, the trial court should have acquitted Jones. 

Jones further contends that because the trial court convicted Jones, “based on the 

[trial judge’s] own hypotheses and assertions not in evidence,” her conviction was 

not based on sufficient evidence and should be reversed. We disagree. 

Viewing the trial judge’s comments in context, in their entirety, it is 

clear that his statement that he “didn’t know” whether Jones “knowingly” caused

Jay to believe that Jones would cause serious physical harm to Jay is simply a 

recognition that, because he was not inside the defendant’s mind, he could not 

“know” with certainty what the defendant was thinking when she threatened Jay.

The trial judge explained: “I don’t know. I can’t read your mind if you did it or not, 

knowingly want to cause harm, serious harm to another. I can’t read your mind and 

nobody can read your mind.” But that uncertainty does not preclude a finding of 

guilt. Because a factfinder can never truly get inside the defendant’s mind, a 

factfinder must often resort to circumstantial evidence and the reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn from that evidence to determine a defendant’s mental 

state. As the trial judge’s comments reveal, that is precisely what he did here. 
A factfinder, “‘unable to enter the mind of another, is required to 

consider common sense, causal probabilities in considering whether [a] defendant 

acted “knowingly.”’” State v. Underwood, 2024-Ohio-2273, ¶ 85 (4th Dist.), quoting 

State v. Kelly, 2012-Ohio-523, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.). 

The trial testimony revealed that Jones was very upset, angry and 

frustrated when she called Jay. Jones’ truck had been towed and she had just had a 

very unsatisfactory interaction with the towing company employee regarding the 

towing. The record reflects that Jones’ ire continued to increase during her 

conversation with Jay and that Jones repeatedly “insult[ed]” and “berate[d]” Jay. 

Although there is a dispute as to precisely what Jones said to Jay — Jay testified that 

Jones told her she was going to “shoot [Jay] and anyone else in the place” and that 

they would “see her soon” while Jones testified that she said only, “That’s why places 

get shot up” — the trial court was entitled to credit Jay’s version of events over Jones’ 

version. 

A person is presumed to intend the natural, reasonable and probable 

consequences of his or her voluntary acts. See, e.g., State v. Lett, 2019-Ohio-532, 

¶ 19 (8th Dist.). “If a result is a probable consequence of a voluntary act, the actor 

‘“will be held to have acted knowingly to achieve it”’ because a person ‘“is charged 

by the law with knowledge of the reasonable and probable consequences of his [or 

her] own acts.”’” State v. Jacinto, 2020-Ohio-3722, ¶ 101 (8th Dist.), quoting State 

v. Dixon, 2004-Ohio-2406, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. McDaniel, 1998 Ohio 

App. LEXIS 2039, *16 (2d Dist. May 1, 1998).
Jay did not know Jones. While she was very angry and upset, Jones 

made a direct, overt, unequivocal physical threat to Jones, stating that she would 

come over “soon” and “shoot” Jay and “anyone else in the place.” 

Jones does not dispute that her statement, in fact, caused Jay to 

believe that Jones would cause her and/or her coworker serious physical harm. 

Even if Jones had simply made the statement in the heat of the moment and did not 

actually intend to follow through with her threat, it was not unreasonable for the 

trial court to conclude, under the circumstances, that Jones was “aware” of the 

“probable” effect her words would have on Jay and to find, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that Jones knowingly caused Jay to believe that she would cause serious 

physical harm to Jay or her coworker. See, e.g., Scott, 2009-Ohio-4961, at ¶ 5, 18-

23 (7th Dist.) (sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated 

menacing where defendant threatened to shoot up the police department; that 

defendant threatened the entire police department did not change the fact that she 

caused the detective to believe she would cause serious physical harm to him as a 

member of the department); State v. Perkins, 2006-Ohio-3678, ¶ 11-17 (8th Dist.)

(evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated menacing 

where traffic controller testified that he was issuing a parking ticket when defendant 

began swearing at him and saying that he should shoot him and, two days later, 

defendant again swore at him and threatened him); cf. State v. Johnson, 2007-Ohio5604, ¶ 20-27 (9th Dist.) (defendant’s conviction for aggravated menacing was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence where witnesses testified that while 
defendant was waiting for his girlfriend to get her things, he yelled at them and 

threatened to kill them, and that they were fearful of defendant because of his angry

and aggressive demeanor when making his threats). 

Likewise, it was not improper for the trial court to view Jones’ 

statement through the lens of common sense and experience in making that 

determination, as it did here. Circumstantial evidence involves proof of facts 

through direct evidence from which a factfinder may infer other facts in accordance 

with experience and common sense. See, e.g., State v. Goldner, 2024-Ohio-1854, 

¶ 40 (11th Dist.); State v. Kunzer, 2019-Ohio-1042, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.).

It is not an element of aggravated menacing that the offender intend 

to carry out his or her threat. Perkins at ¶ 14. A person can be convicted of 

aggravated menacing even though the person has not made any movement toward 

carrying out the threat. Id.

The effect Jones’ threat had on Jay was reasonable and should have 

been reasonably anticipated by Jones. Indeed, Jones said nothing to abate her 

threat (or Jay’s fear after hearing Jones’ threat) even after Jay informed Jones she 

would be contacting the police. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the city, we 

conclude that the evidence presented, including the reasonable inferences that could 

be drawn therefrom, was more than sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find 

Jones guilty of aggravated menacing. Jones’ assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Lakewood Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and

LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR