The Honor able Ave rn Cohn, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0927n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 22, 2006 No. 05-4095 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

______________________________________________________________________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. J AMES E. PERKI

NS, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.

_____________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______________ )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL FR OM THE

UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T FOR TH E NO RT HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

BEF ORE: SUTTON and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; and COHN, D istrict J udg e. * PER CU RI AM

. De fe nd ant Jame s Pe rk ins a pp e a ls the dis tr ict cou rt ’s de nia l of his mot ion

to s up pr e ss evidenc e discove red a fter a traff ic stop for the violation of a c ity ordinanc e. Specif

ically , Perkins claims t hat the initial stop was not supported by probable cause or re asonable suspicion and the ensuing detention, s ear ch, and arr est wer e consequently tainted and unc onstitut ional. As a re sult of the s ear ch, P erkins was char g ed with possession with intent to dis tribute cra ck coc aine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1) and ( b)(1) (a) . Following the denial of his moti on t o s uppress, PerkinsNo. 05-4095

United States v. J

ames Pe rkins

- 2 - ente re d a conditional plea of g uilty on May 9, 2005. He now timely appea ls. For the r easons se t fo rt h b e low , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt a

nd or de r o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

.

I. On Fe bruar

y 19, 2005, police off

icer Robert Petchler

was monitoring for tra ffic violations in a marke d patrol c ar in the c ity of Cleveland. A t approxim ately 6:10 p.m., Petchler obser ved a metallic ora

ng e Cadillac Sevill e bearing Ohio license plate number DE K-2768 traveling northbound on E. 153rd Stree t. Accor ding to Petchle r, as the c ar dr ove past him, he observed that the front left side window, the drive r’s window, w as h eavily tinted and in violation of City of Cleveland Or din anc e § 4 37 .2 8. Th is ordina nc e pr oh ibi ts the us e of

wi nd owtin ts a llo wi ngle ss t ha n f if ty pe rc e nt lig ht tr ans mis sio n, and Pe tc hle r ha d pr e vio us ly pe rf or me d ma ny sto ps fo r v iol a tio ns of

thi s ordinanc e. Af te r o bs e rv ing th e Ca di llac dr ive pa st h im w ithwh a t he pe rc e ive d to be wi nd ow s in violation of the ordinanc e, Petchler followed the ve hicle while c heckingthe license plate number

. He then a ctivated his over head lig hts and siren a

nd initiated a traf

fic stop. The vehicle did not stop immediately , but drove a

pproxi mately 450 more feet (ten to twelve houses) , then pulled to the rig ht side of the r oad. Once the vehicle stopped, Petchler observe d the front pa sseng er- side door open a nd the occ upant lean out of

the ca r. Althoug h the passenge r di d not flee , as Petchler initially suspected that he mig ht, Petchler be lieved that the pa sseng er ha d place d something outside of the ca r.No. 05-4095

United States v. J

ames Pe rkins

- 3 - Upon appr oachingthe driver of t he vehicle, P etchler explained why he had pulled her ove r and re quested that she pr oduce ide ntification. The dr iver, late r identified a s Br andy J ohnson, admitted that she did not have a driver’ s license. Petchler then place d her unde r ar rest and a sked her to s te p o ut o f t

he c ar. Th e pa ss enger, defe nd ant P e rk ins , th e n v olu nte e re d h is i de nti fi c a tio n to Pe tc hle r. Pe tc hle r p la c e d Joh ns on in t he re ar o f t

he po lic e ve hic le , a

nd the n c he c ke d Pe rk ins ’ license. U

pon calling in Perkins’ l icense , he discove red that there w ere unconfirme d war rants for Perkins’ ar

rest, and that Perk i n s l ac ked drivingprivileg es. Ac cordingto Petchler, be cause he suspected Per

kins may have pla ced some thing outside of the passeng er door, he neve r took his ey es off the c ar f

or more tha

n a sec ond or two. Next, P etchler

remove d Perkins from his vehicle and cuf fed a nd place d him in the rear

of the police c r u is e r . Pe tc h le r th e n in it iate d th e p r o c e d u r e o f c o n f

ir mi n g th e w ar

r an ts

. O n c e h e plac ed Perkins in the rea

r of the police car , Perkins returne d to the passeng er- side door to investigate what Perkins may

have pla ced outside of

it. Ac cording to Petc hler, he was conce rned that a we apon may have be en plac ed under the car . Petchler looked underne ath the ca r in the ar ea where he had se en a p as s en ger

l ea no u t , an d t h er e he fo u n d a fo l d ed -up n ew s p ap er co n t ai n i n g a pl as t i c ba g wi t h a l ar ge amount of cr ack c ocaine . The ne wspape r, despite be ing in the c ar’ s line of trave l, was not flat or crushe d and P etchler conclude d that the newspa per w as plac ed ther e af

ter the c ar ha d been stoppe d. Fur ther, the bottom of the newspa per was wet with snow , but the top was dry . L ater , Petchler f ound a pag e fr om the same newspa per on the floorboar d of the car . Petchler returne d to the vehicle a nd informed Johnson and Perkins that they wer e under

arr est.No. 05-4095

United States v. J

ames Pe rkins

- 4 - Af te r c omp le tin g the se arc h, Pe tc hle r te ste d the tin t on the fr on t le ft

wi nd owus inga

“ tin tmeter.” Acc ording to his testimony , the window measure ment was thi rty -one pe rce nt, far le ss than the allowable fifty

perc ent. He did not mea sure any of the other windows with the tint-meter, but testified that both the front a nd the bac k windows appe are d to be tinted to the sam e degr ee a nd

manner and we re “ identical in appe ara nce.” On May 3, 20 05 , th e dis tr ic t c ourt he ld a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ngon

Pe rk ins ’ m oti on

to suppress. At the he aring , the par ties prese nted conf

licting e vidence with respec t to the amount of tint on the windows on the day of the stop. Petchler

testified to the fore go i n g facts, and the g overnme nt presente d three Polaroid photogr aphs of t h e passeng er side of the Cadillac, take n approximately one to two hours afte r the stop. Perkins re lied on Petchler’ s testimony that he noticed, throug h the tinted window, that the driver of the vehicle might not be wea ring a seatbe lt, that the sun had re cently

set, and that the tinted windows mig ht appea r dar ker unde r dar

k co n d i t i o ns. Perkins also prese nted two photog raphs, take n approximately two months after t h e hear ing, in whic h the front windows a

ppear signific antly

lighter than the bac k windows

. P erkins also presented the car itself, which fur

ther showe d a diffe renc e in shading . During t he hea ring , Petchler me asure d the vehicle’ s windows. Altho ug h the re ar w indow measure d thirty -one pe rce nt, the rea ding f rom the front drive r’s window w as seventy -nine perce nt – a drastic chang e fr om the rea ding Petc hler testified that he took on Fe bruar

y 19, 2005. Petchler te stified that, based upon these reading s, the tinting had been r emoved f

rom t h e fr o n t wi ndow. The ow ner of the ca r, Michele L enix, t estified that the window tinting had not be en cha ng ed.No. 05-4095

United States v. J

ames Pe rkins

- 5 - Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

iss ue d an op ini on and or de r on M ay 5, 20 05 , d e nyingPe rk ins ’ m oti on to suppress. Specif

ically , the district court fo u n d P etchler ’s testimony to be cr edible and L enix’s testimony to be incre dible, thus c oncluding that Petchler had probable cause to initi ate a traff ic stop. Def endant ha s timely

appea led. II. Reviewingthe denial, or

the gra nt, of a motion to suppress is a mix ed question of f act a nd law. Un ite d S

tates v . H ur st , 2 2 8 F.3d 751, 756 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus, this court review s the district court’s finding s of fa ct fo r cl ea r er ror and the district court’s c onclusions of law de novo. Un ite d S tat es v . D illar

d , 438 F.3d 675, 680 ( 6th Cir. 2006). A factual finding i s clea rly err oneous when, a lthough ther e may be evide nce to support it, the re view ingcourt, utiliz ing the entire e vidence , “is left with the def

inite and firm convic tion that a mistake has bee n committed.” United States v. Navarro-Camacho , 1 86 F .3 d 7 01 , 7 05 (6 th Cir . 199 9)

. Th e re vie we d e vid e nc e mus t be vie we d “ in the light most likely

to support the district court’s de cision.” Di lla rd , 438 F.3 d at 6 8 0 (i nterna l quotation marks an d citations omitt ed). F inally , “‘[w]here ther e ar e two per missibl e views of

the evidenc e’ the district court’s conclusions ‘ca nnot be clearly err oneous.’” United States v. W orley , 193 F.3d 380, 384 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (quoting An de rso n v. City of Be sse me r Ci ty , 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985))

. On appe al, Perkins reasserts the a rg uments and evide nce he prese nted at the suppre ssion hear ing; namely , that the di strict court erre d in deter mining that the window tint of the Cadillac hadNo. 05-4095

United States v. J

ames Pe rkins

- 6 - b e e na l t e r e d

an d , t h u s , O f

f i c e r P e t c h l e r d i d n o t h a v e p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o s t o p t h e v e h i c l e . A c c o r d i n g l y, Perkins urg es this court to reve rse the district c ourt. We disag ree and af firm. First, with re spect to the window tinting , the district court found O ffice r Petchler cr e d ible and P erk i n s ’ w i t n es s i n cr ed i b l e, s t at i n g: Although the Def

endant ha s prese nted some evide nce to que stion the office r’s perc eption, this evidence is insufficient to convince the Court that Petchler me asure d the wrongwindow on Fe bruar y 19, 2005, or that his meter somehow mistakenly rea d 31% whe n the tint was rea lly at 79%. De fenda

nt argues that the Court s h o uld find cre dible Michele L enix’s testi mony that the t i n t s h ad not been c hang ed since Fe bruar y 19, 2005. As L enix’s testi mony reve aled, howe ver, s h e may have ha d rea son to try

to protect the D efe ndant. Moreove r, s h e had ever y incentive to bring the windows into compliance afte r she discove red the tint had been the subject of a traff ic citation. Most pe rsuasive to the Court a re the Polaroid photogr aphs, take n an hour or two a fter the traff ic stop, showing that the fro n t an d back w indows were tin te d at th e same le ve l. S e e Go v’ t E xh. 3 B and 3C. Th e ima g e of

the wi nd ow s in these photos is bolstered b y t he fa ct that, on the day of the he aring , the bac k passeng er- side window m easur ed at 31%, m atching Petchler’ s measure ment of the front drive r-side w indow on Fe bruar y 19, 2005. Thus, th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d e te r mi n e d “ it mo r e p la u s ib le th a t t

h e w in d o w ti n ts w e r e c h an g e d a f ter Fe bruar y 19, 2005, than that Off

icer Petchler took fa

ulty or fa lse measur ements.” On appe al, Perkins re argues the cre dibilit y of L enix, contending that it is illogica l that she

wo uld have a lte re d th e tin t of

the fr on t w ind ow s and

no t th e back wi nd ow s, be c a us e bo th t int s violate the ordina

nce. Per kins further a sserts that Petchler’ s testimony stating that, prior to the stop, he tho ug ht, ba se d o n his vie w thr ou g h the tin te d win do w, that the dr ive r wa s not we ari nga se a tbe lt demonstrates that the windows wer e not illeg ally ti n t ed

. Fi nally , defe ndant contends that the Polaroid photogr aphs re lied upon by the di strict court do not sufficiently show the fr ont driver’ s sideNo. 05-4095

United States v. J

ames Pe rkins

- 7 - win d o w. T h e combi nation of these f actor s, Perkins contends, re nders the district c ourt’s finding clea rly err oneous. We disag ree . Th e fa c tor s c ite d b y

Pe rk ins are ins uf

fi c ie nt t o le a ve thi s r e vie wi ng c ourt wi th t he “ de fi nit e and firm c onviction that a m i s t ake has bee n committed,” Navarro-Camacho , 186 F.3d at 705, espec ially when “ viewed in the lig ht most l ikely to support the district court’s de cision.” Di lla rd , 43 8 F .3 d at 68 0 ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and c itatio ns omi tte d)

. We ar e no t le ft wi th s uc h a

de fi nit e and firm c onviction here

. Second, Perkins conte nds that the combination of P etchler ’s testimony that he had se en, but not stopped, the Cadillac before and his previously discussed contention that the windows we re not altere d rende red the traff

ic stop lackingin probable c ause. “ A pol ice officer may eff ect a traff ic stop of any motorist for any

traff ic infra ction, even if

the offic er’ s true motive is to detect more e x tensive criminal conduc t.” United States v. Townsend , 305 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2002). This court has

re c e ntl y a ff ir me d th a t “ a

road sid e de te nti on

is l a wf ul s o lo nga s th e of

fi c e r h a s p ro ba

ble c a us e to believe that the m otorist has vi olated the tra ffic la ws.” United States v. Garrido , 467 F.3d 971, 977- 78 (6th C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) (holding that office r had pr obable c ause to stop truck be cause driver violate d statut e pr oh ibi tin g fo llo wi ngtoo c los e ly ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Uni te d S tates v . D av is , 430 F.3d 345 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (holding t hat an office r’s obser vation of spee ding ve hicle provide d police wi th pr ob a

ble c a us e to de ta in dr ive r fo r lim ite d purp os e of iss uin g tr a ff

ic wa rn ing ). Pr ob a

ble c a us e is de termined by

the totality

of the c ircumstance s, Un ite d S tates v . P as qu ar ill e , 20 F .3 d 6 82 , 6 86 (6 th Cir. 1994); is a fac t-depe ndent deter mination; and will turn on what the police off icer knew at theNo. 05-4095

United States v. J

ames Pe rkins

- 8 - time he initiated the stop. United States v. J ohnson , 24 2 F .3 d 70 7, 70 9 (6 th Cir . 200 1) ; se e als o United States v. Fe rguson , 8 F.3d 385, 392 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (en ba nc) ( “This t otality

of the circ umstances a

naly sis includes a re alistic assessment of th e s ituation from a law e nforc ement office r’s pe rspec tive.”). I n the pre sent ca se, we have a ffirme d the district cour t ’s fac tual finding that the windows

wer e illeg ally

tinted on F ebrua

ry 19, 2005. Thus, it f

ollows that Office r Petchler possessed suff

icient probable cause to stop the vehicle due to the illega lly tinted windows. III

. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm.