HIGHLY 

PATHOGENIC AVIAN 

INFLUENZA

RESPONSE PLAN

THE RED BOOK

Updated May 2017

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This plan does not replace existing regional, State, 

Tribal, local, or industry preparedness and response 

plans relating to HPAI. Regional, State, Tribal, local, and 

industry plans should be aimed at more specific issues 

in an HPAI response.

 States should develop response plans focused on the 

specific characteristics of the State and its poultry 

industry. 

 Industry should develop response plans focused on 

the specific characteristics of their commercial 

operations and business practices.

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Update Information

This version of the USDA APHIS HPAI Response Plan: 

The Red Book (Updated May 2017) reflects knowledge 

and lessons learned during the following outbreaks:

 2014–2015, HPAI—largest outbreak in U.S. history

 2016, HPAI/LPAI in Indiana

 2017, HPAI/LPAI in Tennessee, Alabama, Kentucky, and Georgia
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What Changed

Revisions made include the following:

 Reflection of policy changes made after release of last response 

plan.

 Reflection of New National Response Framework (June 2016).

 Inclusion of revised World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 

Terrestrial Animal Code (2016).

 Replacement of surveillance sections, revised by the Center for 

Epidemiology and Animal Health. 

 Incorporation of new permitted movement guidance.

 Inclusion of additional guidance on restocking activities.
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Additional Updates

Revisions made also include the following:

 Correction of any errors identified in the prior version.

 Addition of changes made in response to comments on the DRAFT 

August 2015 version.

 Reflection of the updated Secure Poultry Supply Plan, which is 

working to harmonize and integrate existing Secure Food Supply 

Plans for eggs, turkeys, and broilers.
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Supplemental Policy Information 

 The National Incident Coordination Group developed additional 

policy guidance as a result of the recent avian influenza outbreaks, 

available here: www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. 

 The HPAI Red Book provides strategic guidance whereas additional 

policy guidance provides information on how to operationalize 

activities, particularly for the unified Incident Command.

– These policy guidance documents are consistent with the HPAI Red Book and 

should be utilized in any future outbreak.

– Check these documents frequently as they do change. 
Outline

 Introduction and Information

 Framework for Preparedness and Response

 Preparedness and Response

 Response Goals and Strategy

 Specific Response Critical Activities and Tools

 Recovery after an Outbreak

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Introduction and 

Information

HPAI RESPONSE PLAN
Purpose of Plan

Provides animal health emergency responders, Federal, 

State, local, and Tribal governments, and all other 

stakeholders with:

 A guiding APHIS policy document to use during an HPAI 

outbreak in domestic poultry.

 Current strategic guidance for control and eradication of 

HPAI in domestic poultry during an outbreak.

Introduction and Information 9
Objectives of this Plan

 Identify the capabilities needed to respond to an 

HPAI outbreak in poultry.

 Identify critical activities that are involved in 

responding to that outbreak and the time frames for 

these activities.

In an outbreak situation, critical activities are under the 

authority of an Incident Command (IC) per the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS).

10 Introduction and Information
Scope of the Response Plan

Avian influenza (AI) is primarily an infection of birds. While 

other species are susceptible, this plan focuses on poultry. 

 However, if susceptible animals other than poultry become 

significant to the response effort, the case and laboratory 

definitions will be adapted by the IC to fit the prevailing 

epidemiological findings during an outbreak. 

The plan does not address control and eradication of low 

pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) in poultry. However, 

LPAI is addressed comprehensively in the USDA-APHIS 

National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP): 

www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/.

Introduction and Information 11
Key Components of the Plan

 HPAI Information

 Framework of USDA & APHIS Response

 Response Goals

 Response Strategy

 Critical Activities and Tools

 Restocking and Recovery

Introduction and Information 12
Etiology

Highly pathogenic avian influenza is also known as fowl 

plague and grippe aviaire.

Introduction and Information 13

 It is caused by influenza virus A.

 Influenza virus A is further 

classified on the basis of the 

surface glycoproteins, 

hemagglutinin (HA or H) and 

neuraminidase (NA or N). 
Influenza A Virus Subtypes

 There are 16 different H antigens (H1 to H16) and 

nine different N antigens (N1 to N9) for influenza A 

affecting birds.

 Some influenza A subtypes can cause LPAI; H5 and 

H7 subtypes include both HPAI and LPAI strains.

 HPAI viruses generally cause severe clinical signs and 

results in high mortality in domestic poultry.

 LPAI viruses typically result in few clinical signs in 

domestic poultry.

Introduction and Information 14
History

 AI was first reported in Italy and described as a 

serious disease of poultry in 1878.

 The worldwide prevalence of AI viruses is influenced 

by the distribution of both domestic and wild avian 

species, locality of poultry 

production, migratory routes, 

and season. 

Introduction and Information 15
Observed Circulating HPAI Viruses

 H5N1: Africa, France, India, the Middle East, 

Southeast Asia

 H5N2: France, Taiwan

 H5N5: Europe

 H5N6: China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam

 H5N8: Africa, China, Europe, Middle East, Russia

 H7N3: Mexico

 H7N9: China, United States

List is not exhaustive. Based on 2016 and 

2017 reports to the OIE.

Introduction and Information 16
Zoonotic Potential

 Under certain circumstances, specific strains of HPAI 

have been demonstrated to infect and be fatal to 

humans.

 As of February 2017:

– 856 cases and 452 deaths from laboratory-confirmed HPAI 

H5N1 were reported to the World Health Organization 

(WHO).

– HPAI H5N6, H7N7, H7N9 viruses have also infected 

humans.

 There have been no human cases in any of the recent 

U.S. outbreaks of HPAI.

Introduction and Information 17
Susceptible Species

 Many avian species are susceptible to infection with 

HPAI viruses, including:

– chickens,

– turkeys,

– ducks,

– geese,

– guinea fowl, and

– a wide variety of other birds, including migratory 

waterfowl and shorebirds.

Introduction and Information 18
Reservoir

 AI viruses usually infect migratory waterfowl, particularly 

Anseriformes (ducks and geese) and Charadriiformes

(gulls and shorebirds) that can carry LPAI viruses—and 

potentially certain HPAI viruses—without showing illness.

– Other aquatic avian species may also be maintenance hosts.

 The wild-bird reservoir of LPAI viruses is a major potential 

source of infection for domestic birds, particularly freeand open-range poultry.

– Following transmission from wild to commercial birds, the virus 

can mutate or reassort in gallinaceous (e.g., chickens) poultry 

flocks, resulting in an HPAI virus.

Introduction and Information 19
Transmission of AI in Poultry

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 Animal to animal contact

 Fomites

 Wildlife

 Aerosol

Introduction and Information
 AI viruses are easily inactivated by heat.

 At colder temperatures, virus survival has been 

documented in feces from less than 4 days to at least 

30–40 days.

 AI viruses can also be isolated from animal products, 

including eggs.

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Persistence in the Environment 

and Animal Products

Introduction and Information
Diagnosis in Avian Species

 Incubation period for HPAI viruses in naturally 

infected chickens ranges from 3–14 days.

– World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code (2016) gives the incubation period for 

AI infection as 21 days.

 AI may have longer incubation periods in some 

species than in others. 

– Each HPAI virus—even those of 

the same subtype—may have 

a slightly different incubation 

period.

Introduction and Information 22
Clinical Signs in Poultry

 Marked depression with 

ruffled feathers

 Droopiness

 Soft-shelled eggs

 Sudden drop in egg 

production

 Loss of appetite

 Excessive thirst

 Swollen wattles and 

combs

 Diarrhea

 Incoordination

 Respiratory distress

 Increased daily mortality

Introduction and Information 23
Clinical Signs in Ducks and Geese

 Usually do not show clinical signs with infection of LPAI.

 Some species of these birds may also carry specific HPAI 

viruses sub-clinically.

 HPAI viruses can also present with the following signs:

– sudden death,

– nervous signs (lack of 

coordination and inability to 

stand and walk), 

– dyspnea,

– depression, and

– diarrhea.

Introduction and Information 24
Clinical Signs in Other Birds

 Birds from other orders may also become affected 

with HPAI:

– Gyrfalcons 

– Great-horned Owls

 These animals can die suddenly but 

may also experience symptoms such as:

– depression,

– diarrhea, and

– decreased food consumption.

 They may recover from the virus.

Introduction and Information 25
2014–2015 U.S. Outbreak

 H5N2 was the most common subtype of HPAI 

followed by H5N8 in the 2014–2015 U.S. Outbreak. 

 Approximately 50.5 million commercial birds were 

depopulated or succumbed to the virus (primarily 

layers and turkeys).

 There is strong evidence that the 2014–2015 

outbreak in the United States was introduced from 

wild birds to poultry flocks.

 Neither of these strains was detected in humans, 

including those responding to the incident. 

Introduction and Information 26
2014–2015 U.S. Outbreak

Infected States

 The hardest hit states were Minnesota (over 100 

affected premises) and Iowa (over 70 affected 

premises); South Dakota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, 

California, Missouri, North Dakota, and Arkansas also 

had one or more detections of HPAI in commercial 

flocks.

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– In total, 21 States have had HPAI 

detections in commercial premises, 

backyard flocks, captive wild birds 

and/or wild birds. 

Introduction and Information
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2014–2015 U.S. Outbreak 

Economic Impact

 Over $950 million was obligated for response to the 

outbreak and continued preparedness for HPAI.

 The retail price of eggs jumped nearly 30 percent. 

 While some countries placed bans only on a specific 

region, county, or State, other countries did ban 

poultry and poultry products from the entire United 

States.

 In total, the total economic impact has been 

assessed at about $3.3 billion.

Introduction and Information 29
2016 Indiana HPAI/LPAI Outbreak

 HPAI H7N8 detected in a single commercial flock in 

Indiana.

 LPAI H7N8 virus had mutated to HPAI.

 LPAI H7N8 was confirmed on eight additional 

premises; there were 2 dangerous contact flocks.

 In all, 400,000 commercial birds were affected.

Introduction and Information 30
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2017 Southeastern United States 

HPAI/LPAI Outbreak

 HPAI H7N9 (North American wild bird lineage) 

detected in Tennessee in commercial broiler breeder.

 12 additional presumptive or confirmed LPAI H7N9 

premises in Tennessee (3), Alabama (6), Kentucky (2), 

and Georgia (1). 

 A second HPAI H7N9 detection in the same 

Tennessee county. 

 In all, 14 affected premises: 8 commercial, 6 

backyard.

 LPAI and HPAI viruses were closely related.

Introduction and Information 32
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Framework for Preparedness 

and Response

HPAI RESPONSE PLAN
Foundation of Preparedness and Response

 Successful emergency preparedness for and 

response to HPAI is based on the principles found in 

the National Response Framework (NRF) and 

National Incident Management System (NIMS).

 APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) established FAD PReP

to provide guidance for preparing and responding to 

a foreign animal disease (FAD) emergency.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 35
National Response Framework

 The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts allhazards response, through a whole community 

approach.

 It describes core capabilities for response, defines 

specific authorities, and establishes a comprehensive 

approach for responding to domestic incidents that 

range from serious but purely local events to largescale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural 

disasters.

 The NRF is available at 

www.fema.gov/national-response-framework.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 36
National Incident Management System

 NIMS is a companion document to the NRF.

 It provides a systematic, nationwide, proactive approach 

guiding departments and agencies at all levels of 

government, the private sector, and non-governmental 

organizations.

 Its goal is to help these organizations work seamlessly to 

prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and 

mitigate the effects of incidents, “...regardless of cause, 

size, location, or complexity—in order to reduce the loss 

of life, liberty, property, and harm to the environment.”

 NIMS information is available at 

www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 37
NIMS Key Components

 Preparedness

 Communications and information management

 Resource management

 Command and management

 Ongoing management and maintenance

Framework for Preparedness and Response 38
FAD PReP

 The precursor to FAD PReP was the National Animal 

Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS), 

which offered a functional veterinary framework for 

responding to FADs like HPAI.

 Now incorporated into FAD PReP, the NAHEMS 

Guidelines join strategic concept of operations 

documents, disease response plans (such as the 

HPAI-specific plan), SOPs, and other materials to 

create a comprehensive approach to FADs that is 

consistent with NRF and NIMS.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 39
FAD PReP offers...

 competent veterinary guidance on cleaning and 

disinfection, disposal, mass depopulation, and other 

activities;

 information on disease control and eradication 

strategies and principles;

 guidance on health, safety, and personal protective 

equipment issues;

 biosecurity information and site-specific 

management strategies; and

 training and educational resources.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 40
USDA Roles and Responsibilities

As the primary Federal agency for incident 

management during an FAD event of livestock or 

poultry, USDA APHIS 

 deploys National Incident Management Teams 

(NIMTs), 

 coordinates the incident response, 

 manages public messages, and 

 takes measures to control and eradicate HPAI.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 41
Measures to Control and Eradicate HPAI

 Surveillance and diagnostics

 Quarantine and movement control

 Biosecurity measures

 Epidemiological investigations

 Appraisal and compensation

 Depopulation (euthanasia) of affected poultry

 Carcass disposal

 Cleaning and disinfection (virus elimination)

 Emergency vaccination (if appropriate)

Framework for Preparedness and Response 42
Requesting Support

 During the course of an HPAI outbreak response, 

USDA may request support as necessary from other 

Federal agencies. 

 If the President declares an emergency or major 

disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lead 

coordination, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

and DHS assume the lead for coordinating Federal 

resources. 

 USDA maintains the lead of overall incident 

management.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 43
44

Preparedness and Response

HPAI RESPONSE PLAN
Domestic Activities

USDA has a variety of 

ongoing preparedness and 

response activities with 

respect to HPAI, many of 

which have been 

significantly ramped up in 

response to recent events.

The following list details a 

selection of ongoing USDA 

activities:

 Poultry surveillance and 

diagnostics

 National Import Export 

Services (NIES)

 Wildlife surveillance

 Smuggling Interdiction and 

Trade Compliance (SITC)

 Emergency veterinary 

assistance

 Public health

 Animal care

 Modeling

 Education.

Preparedness and Response 45
USDA APHIS Organizational Strategy

 APHIS employs NIMS and the Incident Command 

System (ICS) organizational structures to manage 

response to an HPAI outbreak. 

 ICS is designed to enable efficient and effective 

domestic incident management by integrating 

facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and 

communications operating within a common 

organizational structure.

Preparedness and Response 46
APHIS Incident Management Structure

 The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive responsible 

for implementing APHIS policy during an HPAI outbreak.

– The Administrator is supported by the APHIS Management Team (AMT).

 Depending on the size of the outbreak, the APHIS 

Administrator and AMT may establish an APHIS-level 

Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Group to coordinate 

resources.

– Many MAC functions may be delegated to the VS Deputy Administrator, 

who is the Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States. 

 The VS Deputy Administrator is supported by the VS Executive 

Team (VSET) to coordinate policy.

Preparedness and Response 47
APHIS Incident Management Structure, continued

 An APHIS National Incident Coordination Group 

(ICG), with an Incident Coordinator, is immediately 

established to oversee the response activities 

associated with the incident.

– This ICG is flexible and scalable to the size and scope of the 

incident and works closely with IC personnel in the field in 

one or more NIMTs.

 The ICG also coordinates with any MAC Group that is 

established at the APHIS or USDA level, based on the 

specific incident.

Preparedness and Response 48
Overview of USDA APHIS Multiagency Coordination, Incident Coordination Group,

Field Personnel (Incident Management Teams and Districts), and Stakeholder 

Relationships for an HPAI Incident

Preparedness and Response 49
Details of USDA APHIS Multiagency Coordination, Incident 

Coordination Group, and Incident Management Teams for an 

HPAI Incident

Preparedness and Response 50
Multiagency Coordination

 MAC functions are executed at various levels, and 

typically include: 

– the coordination of policy, 

– incident priorities, 

– resource allocation and acquisition, and 

– resolution of issues common to all parties.

 The size and scope of the HPAI incident dictates what 

levels and types of MAC Groups and MAC functions 

are required.

Preparedness and Response 51
APHIS Incident Coordination Group

 APHIS ICG responsibilities in an HPAI outbreak 

include:

– providing policy guidance for response activities,

– providing information and coordination with health and 

safety personnel,

– to ensure responder and public health and safety,

– supporting NIMTs and their requirements,

– assisting in coordinating resources and integrating other 

organizations into the ICS, and

– providing information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) 

for use in media and stakeholder briefings.

Preparedness and Response 52
Diagnostic Resources and Laboratory Support

National Veterinary Services Laboratories

 The National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) 

is the official reference laboratory for FAD diagnostic 

testing and study in the United States.

– The NVSL provides all confirmatory testing for HPAI on all 

specimens, including those found presumptively positive 

at a National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) 

laboratory or other USDA-approved laboratory. 

– The NVSL has two locations for FAD diagnostic testing:

• Ames, IA (NVSL-Ames).

• Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL), Plum 

Island, NY (NVSL-FADDL).

Preparedness and Response 53
Diagnostic Resources and Laboratory Support

National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN)

 NAHLN consists of more than 60 laboratories and 

coordinates the veterinary diagnostic laboratory 

capacity of State animal health laboratories and their 

extensive infrastructure, including facilities, 

equipment, and professional expertise.

 Of these laboratories, over 55 are currently approved 

to perform AI testing diagnostics.

– The NAHLN provides a means for early detection of AI, 

rapid response through surge capacity to test outbreak 

samples, and recovery by the capability to test large 

numbers of samples to show freedom from AI. 

Preparedness and Response 54
Surge Capacity

 Surge capacity may be needed in an HPAI outbreak. 

Additional resources, such as personnel and materials, 

will be needed for sample collection. 

– Additional capacity may also be required for laboratory sample 

testing. 

 Surge capacity can help facilitate a rapid response and 

continuity of business for non-infected premises. 

 In the event that the affected State(s) NAHLN lab(s) and 

NVSL-Ames are overwhelmed by the diagnostic testing 

requirements, NAHLN laboratories from across the 

country may provide surge capacity for diagnostic 

testing.

Preparedness and Response 55
56

Response Goals and Strategy

HPAI RESPONSE PLAN
Response Goals

57 Response Goals and Strategy

 Detect, control, and contain HPAI in domestic poultry 

as quickly as possible.

 Eradicate HPAI using strategies that seek to protect 

public health and the environment, and stabilize 

animal agriculture, the food supply, and the 

economy.

 Provide science- and risk-based approaches and 

systems to facilitate continuity of business for noninfected animals and non-contaminated animal 

products.
Critical Activities

 Public communication and messaging campaign

 Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls

 Stringent and effective biosecurity measures

 Rapid diagnosis and reporting

 Epidemiological investigation and tracing

 Increased surveillance

 Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and 

non-contaminated animal products 

– Secure Poultry Supply Plan

 Rapid mass depopulation and euthanasia, potentially including 

preemptive depopulation

 Effective and appropriate disposal procedures

 Cleaning and disinfection measures

 Emergency vaccination (as the response strategy indicates)

Response Goals and Strategy 58
Epidemiological Principles

 Three basic epidemiological principles form the 

foundation to contain, control, and eradicate HPAI in 

the U.S. poultry population:

– Prevent contact between the HPAI virus and susceptible 

poultry.

– Stop the production of HPAI virus by infected or exposed 

animals.

– Increase the disease resistance of susceptible poultry to 

the HPAI virus or reduce the shedding of HPAI in infected 

poultry.

Response Goals and Strategy 59
Critical Activities 

in the First 72 

Hours of U.S. 

HPAI Response

60 Response Goals and Strategy
Response Strategy for Control 

and Eradiation of HPAI in Poultry

 The United States’ primary control and eradication 

strategy for HPAI in poultry is stamping-out.

 If the spread of HPAI outpaces the resources for 

stamping-out, or if other factors direct the response 

away from a stamping-out 

strategy alone, emergency 

vaccination strategies 

might be considered.

Response Goals and Strategy 61
OIE Definition of Stamping-Out

 “Stamping-out” is defined in the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code as the “killing of animals which 

are affected and those suspected of being affected in 

the herd and, where appropriate, those in other 

herds which have been exposed to infection by direct 

animal to animal contact, or by indirect contact with 

the causal pathogen...”

 The OIE also prescribes that disposal and cleaning 

and disinfection must be conducted by procedures 

defined in Chapters 4.12 and 4.13. 

Response Goals and Strategy 62
Stamping-Out: APHIS Critical Goals

 The goal is that, within 24 hours of (or as soon as 

possible after) a presumptive positive classification, 

infected poultry are depopulated in the quickest, 

safest, and most humane way possible.

 Where resources are limited, premises are prioritized 

so that those with the highest potential for active 

HPAI spread are ‘stamped-out’ first.

 Public concerns about stamping-out require a wellplanned and proactive public relations and liaison 

campaign (stakeholders, the public, and the 

international community must be involved).

Response Goals and Strategy 63
Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

Response Goals and Strategy 64
Assessing a Possible Outbreak

 During the investigation of premises suspected of 

having HPAI, animal health responders use clinical 

signs, history, and professional judgment to 

determine the likelihood that HPAI exists on the 

premises. This assessment includes:

– a history of clinical and epidemiological findings,

– results of physical examinations,

– necropsy findings,

– specimen collection and submission to an approved 

laboratory, and

– reporting/situational information.

Response Goals and Strategy 65
Authorization for Response 

and Associated Activities

When the criteria for a presumptive positive HPAI case 

have been met, the APHIS Administrator or VS Deputy 

Administrator (Chief Veterinary Officer [CVO] of the 

United States) can authorize APHIS personnel—in 

conjunction with State, Tribal, and IC personnel—to 

initiate depopulation, cleaning and disinfection 

procedures of the index case (IP), and investigation of 

Contact Premises (CP).

Response Goals and Strategy 66
Management of Incident

 The outbreak response effort should be implemented 

through ICS with an appropriate span of control and 

delegation of authority.

 As soon as possible, an Incident Coordinator and Incident 

Commander should be identified, an NIMT may be 

deployed, and a unified State-Federal ICP established.

 In-State resources (whether Federal, State, Tribal, local, 

or privately owned) should be used to manage the 

response.

 If the response requires, out-of-State resources may be 

used to support the State impacted by the outbreak.

Response Goals and Strategy 67
Control and Eradication Strategy for Other Species

 Captive Wild Birds

– Detections in captive wild birds (e.g., falcons or gyrfalcons 

used in falconry) are managed individually.

 Other Animals

– Susceptible animals, in this response plan, are limited to 

poultry unless otherwise specified in the case definition 

used during the outbreak. 

– Additional susceptible animals or species may be 

determined, as needed, by the current knowledge of the 

epidemiology of the event.

Response Goals and Strategy 68
Factors Influencing Response

 Consequences of the outbreak

 Acceptance

 Scale of the outbreak

 Rate of outbreak spread

 Veterinary countermeasures available

 Resources available to implement response 

strategies

Response Goals and Strategy 69
AI-Free Status

The criteria needed for AI-free status:

 It has been shown that infection with HPAI viruses in 

poultry has not been present in the country, zone, or 

compartment for the past 12 months; or

 When based on surveillance in accordance with 

Articles 10.4.27 to 10.4.33, it does not meet the 

criteria for freedom from avian influenza but any 

virus detected has not been HPAI virus.

These determinations are described in the OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code (2016) in Articles 10.4.2, 10.4.3, and 10.4.4.

Response Goals and Strategy 70
71

Critical Activities and Tools

HPAI RESPONSE PLAN
Laboratory Criteria

 Subclinical infections identified through active 

laboratory surveillance or clinical cases with 

compatible clinical signs and pathologic lesions in a 

susceptible species are evaluated using laboratory 

criteria for HPAI and LPAI H5/H7 

defined by one or more of the 

following diagnostic strategies:

– Serological tests

– Antigen tests

– Virus isolation and identification

– Strain virulence evaluation.

Critical Activities and Tools 72
Suspect Case

Definition

 Illness compatible with H5/H7 AI infection; OR

 Detection of antibodies to influenza A as determined 

by AGID or ELISA serological test with or without the 

presence of compatible illness; OR

 Detection by influenza A antigen using a 

commercially available influenza A antigen test kit 

(ACIA, approved by USDA) with the presence of 

compatible illness.

Critical Activities and Tools 73
Presumptive Positive Case

Definition

 A suspect positive case as defined above with 

detection of antibodies to influenza A as determined 

by AGID serological test that cannot be explained by 

vaccination (USDA permission required for use in the 

United States), and subtyping by HI and NI as H5/H7 

with any NA subtype; OR

 Domestic poultry with identification of influenza A 

ribonucleic acid (RNA) by real time reverse 

transcription-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) 

with or without the presence of compatible illness.

Critical Activities and Tools 74
Confirmed Positive Case

Definition

Domestic poultry with antigen detection (virologic or 

molecular detection methods) AND the confirmation of 

the H5/H7 subtype WITH subsequent determination of 

pathogenicity by NVSL as described in Section 2.2 of 

the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and 

Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 

(HPAI or H5/H7 LPAI).

Critical Activities and Tools 75
Surveillance

The following are goals in response to an HPAI outbreak:

 Implement surveillance plans within 48 hours of the 

confirmation of an outbreak.

 Implement a surveillance plan that will (1) define the 

present extent of HPAI and (2) detect unknown IP quickly.

 Consider susceptible wildlife population in the 

surveillance plan; coordinate with APHIS, DOI, State 

wildlife agencies, and State agriculture departments to 

perform appropriate surveillance in wildlife populations.

 Provide complete surveillance data summaries and 

analyses at intervals specified by the unified IC.

Critical Activities and Tools 76
Surveillance Plan Objectives

 Detect HPAI IP quickly.

 Determine the size and extent of an HPAI outbreak.

 Supply information to assess and modify outbreak 

response activities.

 Provide information for animal and product movement 

within the CA.

 Provide information for animal and product movement 

out of the CA.

 Provide evidence to demonstrate HPAI absence on a 

premises, or demonstrate HPAI absence in an area during 

or after eradication of the outbreak.

Critical Activities and Tools 77
Surveillance Objectives by Time Period

 The initial 72 hours post-HPAI outbreak declaration. 

– Detect existing infected flocks and premises as quickly as possible.

 The control period (from initial 72-hour period until last case is 

detected and depopulated).

– Continue CA surveillance

– Provide evidence that premises are free of HPAI, thereby facilitating 

permitted movement within and out of the CA.

– Conduct surveillance in the SZ.

– Gather information about the outbreak virus strain.

– Determine the role of backyard poultry.

– Prioritize ongoing control and surveillance activities based on 

information.

 Eradication to freedom.

– Provide evidence that the CA and Free Area are free of disease. 

Critical Activities and Tools 78
General Active Surveillance Parameters

 A surveillance plan indicates the frequency, number, 

and distribution of animals and premises to be 

sampled. Parameters are set for the following:

– design (threshold) prevalence,

– confidence level,

– risk-based sampling,

– types of tests,

– sampling frequency, and

– sampling size.

 Common default parameters are listed in the Red 

Book. 

Critical Activities and Tools 79
Diagnostics

 During a suspected or actual HPAI outbreak, the key goals 

are to

– provide clear direction to responders on sample collection and 

processing procedures, if modification from routine standards is 

required,

– meet the surge requirements for diagnostic testing at specific 

intervals, starting at time zero and at 24-hour intervals as the 

response escalates, and 

– report all diagnostic test results to appropriate personnel and 

information management systems (EMRS2) as soon as possible 

and within 4 hours of test completion.

 The FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0) 

offers detailed information on diagnostic sample 

collection, diagnostic testing, and reporting.

Critical Activities and Tools 80
Diagnostic Flow for FAD Investigations of Suspected HPAI

Critical Activities and Tools 81
Diagnostic Flow During an HPAI Outbreak

Critical Activities and Tools 82
Reporting and Notification

 Cases considered a presumptive positive for HPAI, 

based on the current case definition, are reported to 

the affected States, other States, Tribal nations, 

industry, other Federal agencies, trading partners, 

and the OIE.

– This includes breeder and commercial poultry flocks, 

domestic waterfowl and upland game birds, backyard 

flocks, and the Live-Bird Marketing System (LBMS).

– Appropriate Federal-State-Tribal-industry response and 

containment measures are initiated during HPAI 

investigations.

Critical Activities and Tools 83
Example of Zones, Areas, 

and Premises in HPAI Outbreak Response

Critical Activities and Tools 84
Epidemiological Investigation

 Epidemiological investigation and movement tracing 

during an outbreak are critical in controlling and 

eradicating HPAI in poultry. 

 In an HPAI outbreak, the goals include

– assign a premises designation within 6 hours for potential 

IP or CP.

– identify all CP within 24 hours.

– enter tracing information in EMRS2 in 24-hour intervals or 

less.

Critical Activities and Tools 85
Tracing

 One of the most important activities during an HPAI 

outbreak is to rapidly and diligently trace-back and traceforward movements from an IP. 

 Tracing aids in the control of the spread of HPAI virus and 

limits the impact of the outbreak. 

 Tracing should cover all movements from the premises, 

including susceptible poultry and livestock, nonsusceptible species, animal products, vehicles, crops and 

grains, and people. 

 Tracing also includes consideration of all potential modes 

of transmission and possible contact with wild birds.

Critical Activities and Tools 86
Information Management

 Information management and reporting is critical 

during an HPAI incident or outbreak.

 EMRS2 is the official system of record.

 EMRS2 data entry processes should be performed in 

12-hour or shorter intervals.

 Data is used for internal and external reports 

produced on a daily and weekly basis.

 It is imperative that information management, data 

quality, and data integrity is a priority.

Critical Activities and Tools 87
Communication

 Establish a network of stakeholders and systems for 

communication prior to an incident or outbreak.

 Brief the media, public, industry, Congress, trading 

partners, and others on the HPAI outbreak status and 

the actions being taken to control and eradicate the 

disease.

 Coordinate with Federal, State, and local agencies, 

Tribal entities, producer groups, and Land Grant 

University-based Cooperative Extension.

Critical Activities and Tools 88
Communication Objectives

 All HPAI communications must:

– furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information;

– maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the 

government’s ability to respond to an outbreak;

– minimize public panic and fear; and

– address rumors, inaccuracies, 

and misperceptions as quickly 

as possible.

Critical Activities and Tools 89
Key Communication Messages

 Four key messages are conveyed to the public:

– This detection does not signal the start of a human flu 

pandemic.

– We are responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the 

virus.

– Properly prepared eggs and poultry are safe to eat.

– We are safeguarding the food supply.

 An additional key message is conveyed to producers:

– Protect your flocks with good biosecurity practices and be 

vigilant in reporting signs of illness.

Critical Activities and Tools 90
Health and Safety and 

Personal Protective Equipment

 During an HPAI outbreak, responders 

are exposed to many hazards.

 There have been no documented 

human infections with the field 

strain of the three recent HPAI 

outbreaks; all strains of HPAI should 

be treated as potentially zoonotic.

 Personal protective equipment (PPE) 

is fundamental in ensuring 

personnel are protected from HPAI, 

as well as other hazards.

Critical Activities and Tools 91
Biosecurity

 An HPAI outbreak will have a serious impact on the agricultural 

industry and could also impact public health.

 Strict biosecurity measures need to be implemented immediately 

(and ideally before an outbreak) to prevent or slow the spread of 

HPAI. 

 Biosecurity procedures should be implemented within 24 hours of 

the identification of an index HPAI case.

 In the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, biosecurity 

breaches and inadequately implemented biosecurity measures 

were cited as one of multiple potential reasons for widespread HPAI 

transmission in the Midwest. 

 Biosecurity is of utmost importance in controlling and containing 

the virus.

Critical Activities and Tools 92
Critical Activities and Tools 93

Biosecurity

Hazards and Risk Mitigations
Biosecurity

Closed Flocks

 To the fullest extent possible, close the flock or herd to 

the introduction of new poultry and other livestock (with 

population increases occurring only from offspring).

 If closing a flock is not possible, isolate newly introduced 

poultry (from the healthiest possible sources) and those 

returning from existing flocks or herds 

for 30 days or more.

 Vaccination status of 

introduced poultry should be

known and well-documented.

Critical Activities and Tools 94
Quarantine and Movement Control

 By restricting the movement of infected animals, animal 

products, and contaminated fomites, quarantine and 

movement control can be a powerful tool in controlling 

and eradicating an HPAI outbreak.

 Movement control is accomplished through a permit 

system that allows entities to 

make necessary movements 

without creating an 

unacceptable risk of disease 

spread. 

– EMRS2 is the system of record for 

permitted movements into, within, 

and out of a Control Area.

Critical Activities and Tools 95
Quarantine and Movement Control

Critical Activities and Tools 96

 The document Permitted Movement (FAD PReP 

Manual 6-0) provides comprehensive information on 

permits, permitted movements, roles and 

responsibilities for permitted movement with regard 

to a Control Area.

 It also provides information about EMRS2, in relation 

to permitting, and a detailed review of the 

permitting process.
Inactivation of AI in Eggs, 

Egg Products, and Meat 

Critical Activities and Tools 97

Inactivation in Eggs & Egg Products* Inactivation in Meat*

 The listed temperatures are indicative of a 

range that achieves a 7-log kill. Where 

scientifically documented, variances from 

these times and temperatures may also be 

suitable when they achieve inactivation of the 

virus.

*Source: OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2016.
Continuity of Business

 Secure Food Supply Plan recommendations facilitate specific 

types of movement during an outbreak.

 Typically, depending on the movement, 2 negative rRT-PCR 

tests may be required, with one within 24 hours of 

movement.

 EMRS2 is used to document these permits and permitted 

movements.

 Continuity of business requires collaboration between States 

(both sending and receiving product), the Unified Incident 

Command, and APHIS.

Critical Activities and Tools 98
Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

 Due to the risk of virus amplification in infected poultry, 

authorized depopulation activities should be completed 

as quickly as possible; the goal is within 24 hours.

– Infected poultry shed large amounts of HPAI virus, making 

control and eradication of HPAI more difficult and increasing the 

potential for environmental contamination.

 Carbon dioxide and water-based foam concentrate have 

most commonly been used to depopulate poultry flocks. 

– However, to meet the goal of depopulation within 24 hours and 

halt virus production, alternative methods may also be 

considered by State and APHIS officials.

Critical Activities and Tools 99
Disposal

 Appropriate disposal of animal carcasses and materials is a 

critical component of a successful HPAI response.

 Disposal must occur in a biosecure way that does not allow HPAI 

to spread and minimizes environmental impact.

 All applicable regulations (Federal, State, local) must be 

observed or memorandums of understanding must be obtained.

 Composting and disposal by managed 

landfill are two methods that address 

the need to minimize negative 

environmental impact while also 

mitigating virus spread. 

100

Gary Flory

Critical Activities and Tools
Cleaning and Disinfection

101

Cleaning and disinfection practices during an 

outbreak should focus on virus elimination in a 

cost effective manner. 

While traditionally wet 

cleaning and disinfection 

have been performed in many 

incidents, dry cleaning and 

subsequent heating of the 

affected facility may be 

another cost effective method 

to ensure elimination of the virus.

J. Zurn

Critical Activities and Tools
Vaccination 

 Although stamping-out is the preferred and primary 

strategy for controlling and eradicating HPAI in the 

event of an outbreak, emergency vaccination may be 

considered in specific circumstances.

 There are two distinct purposes of emergency 

vaccination:

– Emergency vaccination to kill.

– Emergency vaccination to live.

Critical Activities and Tools 102
Deciding to Vaccinate for HPAI

 Probability that the disease can or 

cannot be rapidly contained;

 Proximity of high-value genetic birds to 

the rapidly spreading disease focal 

point;

 Risk of infection of valuable, rare, or 

endangered nondomestic species;

 Poultry density in an area;

 Impact on international trade;

 Increased risk of introduction due to 

the presence of HPAI in neighboring 

countries;

 Availability of physical and human 

resources;

 The extent to which disease is found in 

waterfowl, other wild birds, backyard 

flocks, or in live bird markets;

 Sociopolitical factors (public confidence 

in commercial poultry products);

 Acceptance of industry stakeholders;

 Potential risk of zoonotic infection of 

the public from exhibition birds; and

 Economic consequences of failure to 

control the disease.

103

The decision for emergency vaccination will be based on:

Critical Activities and Tools
Examples of Containment

Vaccination Zones

Critical Activities and Tools 104
Examples of Containment

Vaccination Zones, continued

Critical Activities and Tools 105
Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones

The PVZ is an emergency vaccination zone outside the CA. Typically, a PVZ is 

observed with stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live.

Critical Activities and Tools 106
VP is typically a secondary designation to another premises designation and is 

only used if vaccination is employed in an outbreak.

Examples of Vaccinated Premises

Critical Activities and Tools 107
Logistics

 Getting resources and personnel where and when they 

are needed is a critical activity that grows in complexity 

based on the size and scope of the HPAI response 

operation.

 The Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services 

(SPRS) Logistics Center (which includes the NVS) works 

with the NIMTs through the ICG to coordinate APHIS 

resources and resources contracted by APHIS (both 

personnel and equipment) for field operations. 

 Personnel can be on-site in 24 hours and ramped up 

quickly. However, in a widespread outbreak, personnel 

shortages can still occur.

Critical Activities and Tools 108
Wildlife Management and Vector Control

 Wildlife surveillance and management must be 

conducted by persons trained and proficient in 

wildlife health, capture, collection, biosecurity, and 

restraint.

 HPAI can be transmitted mechanically by mice, 

vultures, and other vectors. 

 Appropriate biosecurity measures should be in place 

during an HPAI outbreak to ensure that mechanical 

vectors do not have contact with infected flocks or 

other infected material.

Critical Activities and Tools 109
Appraisal and Compensation

 The best practices to contain and eradicate HPAI virus by 

“stamping-out” within 24 hours of detection will require 

rapid depopulation, appraisal, and indemnity procedures. 

 State and APHIS officials must approve depopulation 

prior to the depopulation of any birds and eggs. This will 

require rapid communication between producer, 

company, State officials, APHIS, and laboratory officials. 

 These appraisal and indemnity procedures apply to both 

the first detection of HPAI in a State and subsequent HPAI 

detections in a State.

Critical Activities and Tools 110
Finance

 During an HPAI outbreak, funding may be rapidly 

required. For responding to specific emergency 

situations, VS has access to a variety of sources for 

funding. The two most common sources are the 

APHIS Contingency Fund (CF) and the Commodity 

Credit Corporation (CCC).

 For funds in excess of $1 million, CCC funding is 

typically requested. During an emergency, the 

Secretary is authorized to transfer funds from the 

CCC.

Critical Activities and Tools 111
112

Recovery after an Outbreak

HPAI RESPONSE PLAN
Surveillance for Recognition 

of Disease Freedom (DF)

 Surveillance is fundamental in proving DF to regain 

disease-free status after an HPAI outbreak.

 According to the OIE, a country re-declaring for 

country, zone, or compartment freedom from HPAI 

virus should show evidence of an active surveillance 

program, considering the epidemiological 

circumstances of the outbreak to demonstrate 

absence from infection.

Recovery after an Outbreak 113
Release of Quarantine and Movement Control

 The specifics of CA release will be indicated by the 

epidemiology of the outbreak, however, the 

following conditions must be met:

– The last IP in the CA has been depopulated.

– Disposal has been completed (in the case of composting, 

the compost pile must be set).

– Surveillance tests indicate no HPAI infection in the CA.

– Surveillance requirements for international or bilateral 

trade are being conducted and will continue to be 

conducted (based on the density of poultry, 

epidemiological information, species, and commodity).

Recovery after an Outbreak 114
Restocking

 The total time in which it takes a premises to go from an 

IP with sick birds to a restocked premises will vary based 

on the type of premises, epidemiology of the outbreak, 

location of other HPAI IP, evidence provided to State and 

APHIS officials, and method of disposal. 

 Restocking can take place before the end of the 

outbreak, under conditions 

established by the IC.

Recovery after an Outbreak 115
Environmental Sampling

 Environmental sampling will be required of the 

premises prior to restocking activities. 

 It typically occurs during the 21 day fallow (vacant) 

period. 

 Personnel taking environment samples should 

continue to follow biosecurity and PPE procedures as 

indicated by the IC. 

– In the event that houses are left vacant for an extended 

period (60 day or more), the IC may decide environmental 

sampling is not necessary, depending on ambient 

temperature, outbreak epidemiology, and other factors.

Recovery after an Outbreak 116
Approved Sources of Poultry

 Source flocks for all introduced poultry must test 

negative through rRT-PCR and other diagnostics, as 

determined by IC: 

– Usually 2 negative rRT-PCR tests are required at least 24 

hours apart, with one test within 24 hours of movement. 

 A 24-hour pre-movement clinical inspection is also 

required.

 Birds placed into previously infected houses or 

premises may be subjected to further diagnostic 

testing at the discretion of State and/or APHIS 

officials.

Recovery after an Outbreak 117
118

Supplementary 

Information
Lessons Learned from Past Outbreaks

 Achieving rapid FAD detection and tracing.

 Providing processes for emergency planning that respect local 

knowledge.

 Integrating State-Federal-Tribal-industry planning processes.

 Ensuring that there are clearly defined, obtainable, and 

unified goals for response.

 Having a Unified Incident Command with a proper delegation 

of authority that is able to act with speed and certainty.

 Employing science- and risk-based management approaches 

to FAD response.

 Ensuring that all guidelines, strategies, and procedures are 

communicated effectively to responders and stakeholders.

 Identifying resources and trained personnel required for an 

effective incident response.

119
Supporting FAD PReP Materials

Strategic Plans-Concept of Operations Documents

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: 

Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0)

 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: 

Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0)

 APHIS FAD Investigation Manual 

(FAD PReP Manual 4-0)

 Permitted Movement 

(FAD PReP Manual 6-0)

120
Other FAD PReP Supporting Materials

 National Animal Health Emergency Management 

System (NAHEMS) Guidelines

 Industry Manuals

 Disease Response Plans

 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Critical 

Activities

 Continuity of Business Plans 

 Ready Reference Guides

121
Websites

122

 APHIS FAD PReP website

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

 FAD PReP HPAI Page (Response and Policy 

Information) 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalh

ealth/emergency-management/fadprep-hpai

 Secure Poultry Supply Plan 

www.securepoultrysupply.com
Key Abbreviations

AI avian influenza

FAD foreign animal disease

FAD 

PReP

Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness and Response 

Plan

H or HA hemagglutinin

HPAI highly pathogenic avian 

influenza

LPAI low pathogenic avian 

influenza

N or NA neuraminidase

NIMS National Incident 

Management System

123

NRF National Response 

Framework

NVS National Veterinary 

Stockpile

NVSL National Veterinary 

Services Laboratories

OIE World Organization for 

Animal Health

PPE personal protective 

equipment

VS Veterinary Services

WHO World Health 

Organization