-1- 

### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MUNSON MEDICAL CENTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED May 26, 2015

v No. 320398

Roscommon Circuit Court COUNTY OF ROSCOMMON, LC No. 13-721440-CK

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: G LEICHER , P.J., and K. F. K ELLY and S ERVITTO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order that denied its mo tion for summary disposition and granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Becaus e of the unusual procedural posture of this case and because the trial court failed to prov ide any insight as to why it ruled the way it did, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for fu rther proceedings.

I. BASIC FACTS

James Yeager was shot on Augus t 20, 2011. Witnesses identifie d Tom Gorbachow as the shooter. While a state trooper was on the scene with Yeager, a nother call came in reporting that a suicidal subject was at the ca ller’s residence. Dispatch det ermined that Gorbachow was the

suicidal individual. Officers we nt to the location and secured Gorbachow in handcuffs. Gorbachow, who appeared dazed, claimed to be in significant pai n. Officers found a selfinflicted gunshot wound to Gorbachow’s chest that was missed on their initial observation. An

ambulance was summoned and Gorbachow was transferred to a nearb y hospital. He was later air-lifted to plaintiff’s facil ity, where he stayed from August21, 2011 to September 29, 2011.

Citing MCL 801.4(1), which provides that “all charges and expe nses of safekeeping and maintaining prisoners and persons charged with an offense, shal l be paid from the county treasury . . .” plaintiff sued def endant to collect Gorbachow’s medical expenses, which totaled $286,986.01. Defendant denied that Gorbachow was a “prisoner” or “person charged with an offense.” The parties filed cross motions for summary disposit ion, arguing whether Gorbachow was in police custody during his hospital stay. A t the hearing on the motions, the trial court simply stated “I don’t think th is guy was a prisoner” and grant ed defendant summary disposition. Plaintiff now appeals as of right.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW-2- An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Maiden v Rozwood , 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The parties submitted documentary evidence for the trial court to consider, including affidavits and depositions, thereby implicati ng MCR 2.116(C)(10), which provid es that summary disposition may be granted when “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, ther e is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving pa rty is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” “Summary disposition is only appropriate where the claim or defense would be insupportable at trial because of an incurable deficiency.” Lytle v Malady , 458 Mich 153, 176; 579 NW2d 906 (1998).

This case is unusual. Neither party made a jury demand. In f act, plaintiff argued that the facts were not reasonably in dispute and that this was a purely “legal” issue. The trial court’s scheduling order likewise indica tes that this was a non-jury ma tter. Therefore, the trial court judge was the ultimate trier of fact. Although couched in term s of competing motions for summary disposition, it appears that the trial court conducted a mini trial and concluded that Gorbachow was not in custody. “We review a trial court’s findi ngs of fact in a bench trial for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. A finding is c learly erroneous if there is no evidentiary support for it or if this Court is left with a defi nite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made. The trial court’ s findings are given great defe rence because it is in a better position to examine the facts.” Chelsea Inv Group LLC v Chelsea , 288 Mich App 239, 250-51; 792 NW2d 781, 790 (2010) (internal citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

At issue in this case is whether Gorbachow was in custody with in the meaning of MCL 801.4, which provides that “all charges and expenses of safekee ping and maintaining prisoners and persons charged with an offense, shall be paid from the cou nty treasury . . .”

For purposes of MCL 801.4, an individual may be deemed a “pris oner” if his liberty has been “restrained by state authorities.” St Mary’s Hosp v Saginaw Co , 139 Mich App 647, 650; 363 NW2d 32 (1984). In St. Mary’s Hosp , two individuals were injured while being pursued by the Saginaw Police Department. Id. at 648. Upon their release from the hospital, both individuals were immediately taken to jail Id. at 649. This Court concluded that the county was liable to the hospital for medical expenses because “[t]he men were in custody by virtue of the control the police exercised over them.” Id. at 650. We distinguished the case from Borgess Hosp v Berrien Co , 114 Mich App 385; 319 NW2d 354 ( 1982), where the patient invo lved “was not in the custody of the county at the time the expenses were incurred.” Id. In Borgess , the patient was injured while incarcerated but was not admitted to the hospital until after he was discharged from jail. Id. at 386. The Court stated that “[t]he county is not responsibl e for providing continued medical care a fter the inmate is discharged from custody, regardless of whether the illness or injury pre-existed or arose during the p eriod of incarceration.” Id. at 387.

A patient need not be formally arraigned in order for the coun ty to be liable for payment of medical expenses after the pat ient was taken into custody. Zieger Osteopathic Hosp Inc v Wayne Co , 139 Mich App 630, 632; 363 NW2d 28 (1984). In Zieger , the patient was shot by a private security guard during an attempted armed robbery.” Id. at 631. The Court stated that the statutory phrase, “charged with an offense,” is “satisfied if f ormal charges are subsequently-3- brought.” Id. at 632. The Court relied on the principal that counties are r esponsible for enforcing criminal laws and that the county was responsible for payment of the medical bills

once an individual is taken int o custody, even absent a formal arraignment. Id.

Similarly, in Univ Emergency Services, PC v City of Detroit , 141 Mich App 512, 518-19; 367 NW2d 344 (1984), this Court rejected the notion that formal arraignment was necessary. “[M]erely because a prisoner was confined in a hospital for tre atment instead of the county jail, the county is not free from liability for his care and maintena nce while in the hospital.” Id. 518- 519. This is true because the term “charged with an offense” a s used in the statute “does not mean formal charges must be br ought prior to incarceration, but that it is enough that formal charges are later filed.” Id. at 519.

Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether Gorbachow was formal ly arrested or arraigned; the sole issue is whether he was in police custody during his h ospital stay. In the context of criminal law and custodial interrogations, we determine whether an individual was “in custody” by asking whether the individual believed that he was not free to leave. People v Mendez , 225 Mich App 381, 383; 571 NW2d 528 (1997). Similarly, in determin ing whether someone is under arrest, we have stated:

“An arrest is the taking, seizi ng, or detaining of the person o f another, either by touching or putting hands on him, or by any act which indicates an intention to take him into custody and subjects the person arrested to the a ctual control and will of the person making the arrest. The act relied upon as co nstituting an arrest must have been performed with the intent to effect an arrest an d must have been so understood by the party arrested.” [ Dixon v Shiner , 12 Mich App 573, 582; 163 NW2d 481 (1968), People v Gonzales , 356 Mich 247, 253; 97 NW2d 16 (1959), quoting 4 Am Jur, Arrest, s 2.]

There is evidence to support plaintiff’s position that Gorbach ow was “in custody” while he was a patient at the facility. Police maintained a physical presence at the hospital for nine days. Although they claim it was as “security detail” in order to: 1) keep the victim, who was staying at the same hospital, saf e; and, 2) to pl acate hospital staff, there was evidence that at least

one of the officers referred to the situation as “prisoner secu rity detail.” Another officer, who claimed that Gorbachow was not arrested admitted that, in the p ast “in my experience, what we have done is, if we’ve had a suspect that we’re not going to ri sk him going free, we say we’ve arrested him. We make the commitment to put 24/7 security on h im so he does not leave. And when he leaves, he goes with us, which we have done.” Police e ventually left the hospital when Gorbachow’s condition took a grave turn for the worse and he wa s placed in a medically induced coma. The social worker’s notes reveal that police “are no lon ger at the bedside. They will come back when [patient] is potentially more of a flight risk.” Police continued to contact hospital personnel, knowing that th ey planned to arrest Gorbach ow as soon as he was discharged. In fact, one hospital note indicated: “Our concern was related to discharge planning to make sure that the [patient] had a proper plan in place. The police department showed significant interest in this [patient]. After long discussions with them t his [patient] was deemed appropriate for them to take.” Although police officers claimed that Gorba chow was arrested as he left the hospital, hospital notes reveal t hat an officer was at Gorbacho w’s bedside when he was-4- discharged. The social worker’s September 29, 2011 notes indic ate “Michigan State Police at the bedside at 0755. [Patient ] in police custody.”

The issue for the trier of fact is the degree of control law e nforcement had over Gorbachow and whether his liberty had been restrained at the ti me services were provided. St Mary’s Hosp , 139 Mich App at 649-650. There was evidence that Gorbachow w as a “person charged with an offense” under MCL 801.4(1). He was initially placed in handcuffs when officers first arrived on scene and was the only suspect in a v iolent crime. But for his injury, it is

evident that Gorbachow would ha ve been immediately arrested and taken to jail. Further, officers were initially stationed in the hospital, and the reco rd demonstrates that the authorities had every intention of taking him into custody the moment he wa s discharged.

Other than the judge’s statement that “I don’t think this guy was a prisoner” there are no findings for us to review. “Findings of fact regarding matters contested at a bench trial are sufficient if they are brief, definite, and pertinent, and it a ppears that the trial court was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law, and where appellate review would not be facilitated by requiring further explanation.” Triple E Produce Corp v Mastronardi Produce,

Ltd , 209 Mich App 165, 176; 530 NW2d 772 (1995) . Here, there is n othing for us to review. On remand, the trial court judge is to resolve these issues, make findings of fact, and enter an appropriate judgment. Because it is unclear to us whether the documentary evidence submitted by the parties was the sum total of evidence that each sought t o introduce, the trial court may allow the parties to supplement the record.

Vacated and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retai n jurisdiction.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto