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******************************************************TERRY ALIANO v. MICHAEL ALIANO (AC 34830)
DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Foti, Js. Argued October 16, 2013—officially released February 18, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

London at Norwich, Shluger, J.)
John F. Morris, for the appellant (plaintiff). Timothy P. Lenes, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion DiPENTIMA, C.J. Theplaintiff, TerryAliano,1appeals from the denial of her postdissolution motion for contempt filed against the defendant, Michael Aliano. On appeal, she claims that the court improperly found that the defendant’s failure to pay a lump sum financial award was not wilful noncompliance with the terms of the parties’ dissolutionjudgment. We disagree, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our discussion. The parties were married on February 24, 2007. In March, 2010, the plaintiff commencedanaction seeking adissolution ofthe marriage. On November 2, 2011, following a bifurcated trial, the court issued two memoranda of decision; one addressing custody and access regarding the parties’ minor child and one addressing the various financial issues.2 The court found that the defendant was the president and chief executive officer of a number of familybusinesses founded byhis deceasedfather, Ronald Aliano (decedent). The estate of the decedent was the subject ofaprobate disputeinvolvingawomanwho claimed to be an heir of the decedent. Nevertheless, the defendant was expected to ‘‘inherit a significant portion ofthe estimated $10 million estate.’’ The court issuedanumberoffinancial orders, including awarding alimony to the plaintiff for a limited time period and dividingtheparties’property. Withrespecttothe defendant’s expected inheritance fromthe decedent’s estate, the court ordered in paragraph 12 ofits decision: ‘‘The [defendant] shall make a payment to the [plaintiff] in the amount of $100,000 within 30 days of his receiving his inheritance so long as such receipt is in excess of $250,000.’’
On June 21, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the defendant had wilfully failed, refused or neglected to pay her the $100,000 as required by the court’s judgment. She further claimed that ‘‘[o]n March 30, 2012, the Norwich Probate Court distributed the business known as American Ambulance Service, Inc., in equal parts between [the defendant] and

. . . RhondaAliano Quinn (the [d]efendant’s sister). The said distribution was the major asset ofthe estate valued in excess of $4,700,000.’’ In addition to seeking a finding of contempt and payment of the $100,000, theplaintiffrequestedthatthe court orderthe defendantto pay statutory interestpursuantto General Statutes § 37-3aandattorney’sfeesrelatedtotheprosecution of her contempt motion.3
The court held a hearing on July 16, 2012, where the plaintiff called as a witness Andrew Messier, the executor of the decedent’s estate and the trustee for two of the trusts associated with the estate. Messier testified that the defendant received 50 percent of theshares of stock of an ambulance company owned by the decedent. The value of the stock received by the defendant was $2,350,000. This was the only distribution from the estate to the defendant.
The plaintiff testified that she had not received the $100,000 payment and that the defendant had not informed her of his receipt of a portion of his inheritance. The defendant testified that he had not received any cash ornegotiable instruments fromthe decedent’s estate andthat atrial was pending in the Probate Court regarding all of the other assets of that estate. The defendant stated that he anticipated receiving a substantialamountofcashfromthe decedent’s estate. During cross-examination, in response to a question about whether he had ever made an effort to communicate withthe plaintiffaboutthe inheritance issue, the defendant stated: ‘‘It’s my understanding I did not have to pay that until which time I got all my inheritance, and it was cash. [My attorney] was aware I would be paying [the plaintiff] when I got the liquid assets to pay her. I don’t have the money to pay her right now.’’ He then iterated that he had not received his total inheritance, and the portion that he had was in the form of stock.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated: ‘‘This was an interesting legal argument

. . . but I don’t think it goes to what the court’s intention was in paragraph [12] of the judgment. It was the court’s intent that [the defendant] would pay that sum of cash when he received cash. Andthe court knewthathe was going to receive real estate; the court knew he was going to receive stock in a closely held corporation, but the court specifically used as the trigger point when he received in excess of $250,000, and he hasn’t yet done that. So, I don’t find he is in contempt. And I don’t find the trigger has been pulled yet. Frankly, if he received $250,000 in negotiable securities, in marketable securities, in a publically traded company that could be sold
on the open market, I would read the situation differently. I don’t view he has the liquid money from his inheritance yet.

. . . It says in excess of$250,000. That
was my intent. And it is not my intent that, [the defendant], in case you are thinking that all of your inheritancehastobecomplete,butwhenyoureceive$250,000 of liquid assets, marketable securities, you should pay [the plaintiff] $100,000. That contempt, if there is one, would be viewed differently.’’
Counsel for the plaintiff inquired whether the court
was clarifying the dissolution judgment so that the $100,000 obligationwouldbetriggeredonlyifthe defendant received an inheritance of cash. The court responded: ‘‘I’d rather not do that because there isn’t

a motion to clarify. If and when he receives something that is readily convertible to cash, I would certainly entertain your motion for contempt ifit wasn’t effectuated, but ifit is abuilding that might be sold, might notbe sold, that is probably in that gray area that I won’t go that far. When there is cash, when there is stock in
a publically traded corporation, that I consider to be readily available cash.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel then questioned whether the court was altering the terms of the dissolutionjudgment, towhichthe courtresponded, ‘‘[t]hat’s not what I am doing.’’ The following colloquy then occurred between the plaintiff’s counsel and the court: ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I understand you are not doing that, and I am troubled because it sounds like it is going in that direction, because he is involved with litigation with a [person claiming to be an heir of the decedent] that could be going on for years. We could be sitting here foryears waiting forthe [probate] litigation to finish as it goes through the appellate process. Your order is simple and one sentence; as long as it is
more than $250,000. I claim we have to satisfy that hurdle. ForYourHonorto addtotherecordmarketable securities or cash, it changes the nature and that becomes an issue. ‘‘The Court: There is no motion to clarify. The court has not clarified, modified or changed thejudgment. It is what it is. I think I was suggesting to [the defendant] thatifandwhenhereceivesthe abilitytopay, he should pay [the plaintiff], but I am not ruling on a motion that is not before me, and I am not changing the judgment. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I can’t get a ruling on the fact that he has received more than two and one-half million dollars of assets so far? I am trying to figure out how to justify that. ‘‘The Court: To the extent that I have muddied the order sufficiently, I will vacate the order that I just made. I will vacate the findings that I just made. I am goingto vacate the dictawhich Ijustmade. The motion for contempt is denied.’’
The plaintiff then filed the present appeal, arguing that the court’s order was clear and unambiguous and that the court abused its discretion by modifying the property order and by failing to find the defendant in contempt. Because the trial court had vacated all ofits findings underlying the order, vacated the order, and then deniedthe motion for contemptwithoutproviding the reasoning for doing so, we issued the following orderonNovember 5, 2013: ‘‘Pursuantto Practice Book §§ 61-10 (b) and 60-5, the trial court

. . . is hereby sua sponte ordered to articulate, within thirty days of this order, the factual findings and legal basis underlying its denial of the motion for contempt.’’4
On November 21, 2013, the court issued its articulation regarding the denial of the plaintiff’s motion for contempt. The court stated that ‘‘[t]he defendant had inherited stock in a closely held family business. He inheritedno dollars. Stockin acloselyheldfamilybusi-ness is not dollars.’’ The court also articulated that the defendant had not received any other distribution from the Probate Court, he did not possess $100,000 of cash at the time ofthe hearing on the contempt motion and therefore was unable to pay that sum to the plaintiff, and the plaintiffpresented no evidence that the defendant had inherited any cash or that ‘‘the stock in a closely held family business was liquid or otherwise readily convertible into dollars or that there existed a marketforsaid shares.’’ The court also determinedthat its order was ambiguous because it did not state whether the $250,000 trigger to pay $100,000 to the plaintiffmustbein‘‘actualdollarsorotherassetsvalued at$250,000.’’Itfurtherconcludedthat‘‘[t]hedefendant’s failure to pay to the plaintiff $100,000 upon receiving shares of stock in his family business was not a wilful disobedience of a clear and understandable order; rather, it illustrates a good faith disagreement as to what was meant in that court order. The defendant had
agood faith beliefthat his receipt ofstock inthe family business was not the condition precedent triggering his obligation to pay to the plaintiff $100,000.

. . . The defendant’s interpretation of the court order was reasonable and made in good faith. Any violation was excused by what can only be a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.’’
We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant legal principles and our standard ofreview. ‘‘Contempt is a disobedience [of] the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense.

. . . Contempt may be civil or criminal in character.

. . . A civil contempt is one in which the conduct constituting the contempt is directed against some civil right of
an opposing party and the proceeding is initiated by him.

. . . [T]he punishment [for civil contempt] is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses againstthepublic.’’ (Citationomitted; internalquotation marks omitted.) Hardy v. Superior Court, 305 Conn. 824, 834, 48 A.3d 50 (2012); see also Eric S. v. Tiffany S., 143 Conn. App. 1, 9, 68 A.3d 139 (2013). ‘‘[O]ur analysis of a judgment of contempt consists of two levels of inquiry. First, we must resolve the thresholdquestionofwhethertheunderlyingorderconstituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support ajudgment ofcontempt.

. . . This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review.

. . . Second, if we conclude that the underlying court orderwas sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must thendeterminewhetherthetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, ajudgment of contempt, which includes a review of the trial court’s determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.’’ (Citations omitted.) In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 693– 94, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007); Przekopski v. Zoning BoardofAppeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 191, 26 A.3d 657, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946, 30 A.3d 1 (2011); Lynn v. Lynn, 130 Conn. App. 319, 327, 23 A.3d 771 (2011); see also Martocchio v. Savoir, 130 Conn. App. 626, 630, 23 A.3d 1282, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 901, 31 A.3d 1178 (2011).
Inthepresentcase, the courtarticulatedthatitsorder requiring the defendant to pay $100,000 to the plaintiff after he received $250,000 of his inheritance ‘‘was ambiguousbecauseitdidnotspecifywhethertheinheritance of $250,000 must be in actual dollars or other assets valued at $250,000.’’ We are not bound by the trial court’s assessment of the clarity of the order at issue; rather, that presents a legal question subject to de novo review by this court. See In re Leah S., supra, 284 Conn. 693–94; Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 131 Conn. App. 191. Nevertheless, we need not resolve this issue in the present case.5 Even ifwe assume, withoutdeciding, thatthe orderwas clear and unambiguous, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for contempt.
In its articulation, the court stated that at the time ofthe hearing on the plaintiff’s motion, ‘‘the defendant did not possess $100,000 of cash and so was unable to pay that sum, even if it had been due.’’ It also stated that the defendant ‘‘had a good faith belief that his receipt of stock in the family business was not the condition precedent triggering his obligation to pay to the plaintiff $100,000’’ and therefore, was a good faith disagreement as to what was meant by the order, and
was not wilful disobedience. It concluded that ‘‘[a]ny violation was excused by what can onlybe a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.’’
At the outset, we note that ‘‘[t]he fact that an order has notbeen compliedwith fully does not dictate that a findingofcontemptmustenter.’’Auerbachv.Auerbach, 113 Conn. App. 318, 326, 966 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 901, 971 A.2d 40 (2009). ‘‘A finding of contempt is a question of fact, and our standard of review is to determine whether the court abused its discretion in [finding] that the actions or inactions of the [alleged contemnor] were in contempt of a court order.

. . . To constitute contempt, a party’s conduct must be wilful.

. . . Noncompliance alone will not support ajudgment of contempt.

. . . [T]he credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact and the drawing of inferences are all within the province of the trier of fact.

. . . We review the findings to determine whether they could legally and reasonably be found, thereby establishing that the trial court could reasonably have concluded as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quaranta

v. Cooley, 130 Conn. App. 835, 840–41, 26 A.3d 643 (2011); see also Adamo v. Adamo, 123 Conn. App. 38, 49–50, 1 A.3d 221, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 916, 4 A.3d 830 (2010).The court articulated that the defendant lacked the ability to pay $100,000 to the plaintiff. At the hearing, the defendant testified: ‘‘I don’t have the money to pay [the plaintiff] right now.’’ The court’s finding, as set forth in its articulation, was based on the evidence and
was not clearly erroneous. In making the finding of the defendant’s inability to pay, the court credited the defendant’s testimony. We defer to the court’s assessment ofthe credibility ofthe defendant. See Behrns v. Behrns, 124 Conn. App. 794, 811, 6A.3d 184 (2010) (trial judge sole arbiter of credibility and reviewing court unable to pass on credibility of witness). This finding alsoprovidesuswithabasisto concludethatthecourt’s denial of the motion for contempt did not constitute
an abuse ofdiscretion. ‘‘The inability ofapartyto obey
an orderofthe court, withoutfault onhispart, is agood defense to the charge ofcontempt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Auerbach v. Auerbach, supra, 113 Conn. App. 328; see alsoAhmadiv.Ahmadi, 294 Conn. 384, 398, 985 A.2d 319 (2009) (‘‘The contemnor must establish that he cannot comply, or was unable to do
so.

. . . It is [then] within the sound discretion of the court to deny a claim of contempt when there is an adequate factual basis to explain the failure.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); Brody v. Brody, 145 Conn. App. 654, 662, 77 A.3d 156 (2013).
The court also stated in its articulation that it found that the defendant’s interpretation of the court order
was reasonable and made in good faith, and thus did not amountto wilful disobedience. ‘‘The contemptremedy is particularly harsh

. . . and may be founded solely upon some clear and express direction of the court.

. . . A good faith dispute or legitimate misunderstanding ofthe terms ofan alimony or support obligation may prevent a finding that the payor’s nonpayment was wilful. This does not mean, however, that such a dispute or misunderstanding will preclude
a finding of wilfulness as a predicate to ajudgment of contempt. Whether it will preclude such a finding is ultimately within the trial court’s discretion.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.)Behrnsv.Behrns, supra, 124 Conn. App. 808; see also Martocchio v. Savoir, supra, 130 Conn. App. 630.
Atthehearing, the defendanttestified: ‘‘It’smyunderstanding I did not have to pay that until which time I got all my inheritance, and it was cash. [My attorney]
was aware I would be paying [the plaintiff] when I got the liquid assets to pay her.’’ The court was free to creditthattestimony andto determine thatthe nonpaymentwasbasedonthe defendant’sgoodfaithdispute or legitimate misunderstanding ofthe terms ofthe court’s order. As such, we cannot saythis constituted an abuse of discretion.
The judgment is affirmed.In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 The plaintiff is now known as Terry McDonald.

2 This court has not been provided with the transcripts ofthe underlying dissolution action.

3 ‘‘Our law for awarding attorney’s fees in contempt proceedings is clear. General Statutes § 46b-87 provides that the court may award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a contempt proceeding. The award of attorney’s fees in contempt proceedings is within the discretion of the court.

. . . In making its determination, the court is allowed to rely on its familiarity with the complexity of the legal issues involved. Indeed, it is expected that the court will bring its experience and legal expertise to the determination of the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kravetz v. Kravetz, 126 Conn. App. 459, 471, 11 A.3d 1141 (2011).

4 Practice Book § 61-10 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the court determines that articulation of the trial court decision is appropriate, it may remand the case pursuant to Section 60-5 for articulation by the trial court withinaspecifiedtimeperiod. Afterremandtothetrialcourtforarticulation, the trial court may, in its discretion, require assistance from the parties in order to provide the articulation. Such assistance may include, but is not limited to, supplemental briefs, oral argument and provision of copies of transcripts and exhibits.’’ The official commentary to § 61-10 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Subsection (b) was adopted to effect a change in appellate procedure by limiting the use of the forfeiture sanction imposed when an appellantfailsto seekanarticulationfromthetrial courtpursuantto Section 66-5 with regard to an issue on appeal, and the court therefore declines to reviewthe issue forlack ofan adequate recordforreview. In lieu ofrefusing to review the issue, when the court determines that articulation is appropriate,thecourtmaynowremandthecasetothetrialcourtforanarticulation and then address the merits of the issue after articulation is provided. The adoption of subsection (b) is not intended to preclude the court from declining to review an issue where the record is inadequate for reasons other than solely the failure to seek an articulation, such as, for example, the failure to procure the trial court’s decision pursuant to Section 64-1 (b)

orthe failure to provide atranscript, exhibits or other documents necessary for appellate review.’’ Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the court deems it necessary to the proper disposition of the cause, it may remand the case for a further articulation of the basis of the trial court’s factual findings or decision.

. . .’’

5 For this court to determine whether the order requiring the defendant to pay $100,000 to the plaintifffollowing his receipt ofthe stock portion of his inheritance was clear and unambiguous, we would examine the relevant memorandum of decision that dissolved the marriage of the parties and contained the financial orders of the court. See, e.g. McCarthy v. Custom Design Services, Inc., 126 Conn. App. 274, 280–81, 11 A.3d 1094 (2011). The following course of action would be our guide: ‘‘[T]he construction of a judgmentis aquestion oflaw forthe court.

. . . As ageneral rule,judgments

are to be construed in the same fashion as other written instruments.

. . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts ofthe judgment.

. . . The interpretation ofajudgment may involve the circumstances surrounding the making of thejudgment

. . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as that which is expressed.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lashgari v. Lashgari, 197 Conn. 189, 196–97, 496 A.2d 491 (1985);

see also Christianov. Christiano, 131 Conn. 589, 592–93, 41 A.2d 779 (1945); Lynn v. Lynn, supra, 130 Conn. App. 328 (‘‘[i]n [interpreting ajudgment], it assists a reviewing court to keep in mind the theory on which the case
was triedandonwhich the trialcourtdecidedit’’ [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]). As stated in footnote 2 ofthis opinion, we have not been provided with the transcripts of the proceedings underlying the two memoranda of decision that dissolved the parties’ marriage and contained the attendant child custody and financial orders. Without these transcripts, we are precluded from examining the circumstances surrounding the making of the court’s judgment and the order at issue.