United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 03-1979

FEDERACIÓN DE MAESTROS DE PUERTO RICO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

JUNTA DE RELACIONES DEL TRABAJO DE PUERTO RICO,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Selya, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.

Godwin Aldarondo-Girald, with whom Aldarondo-Girald Law Office

was on brief, for appellant.

Carlos E. López López, with whom Llovet, Zurinaga, & López,

P.S.C. was on brief, for appellee.

May 27, 2005
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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. This case requires us to decide

whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to an interlocutory

jurisdictional decision of the Puerto Rico appellate courts. While

this case was under advisement, the Supreme Court unanimously

decided Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 125 S.

Ct. 1517 (2005), which substantially altered our understanding of

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We must now apply that altered

understanding for the first time. 

The present case is not itself complex. Appellant

Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico ("Federación") is the target

of an unfair labor practices grievance before appellee Junta de

Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Labor

Relations Board ("Board"). The Board denied the Federación's

motion to dismiss the grievance on the ground of federal labor law

preemption. The Federación appealed that denial on an

interlocutory basis to the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals and then to

the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. After losing the preemption

argument in the Puerto Rico courts, the Federación filed an action

for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board in the

United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The

district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the

Federación's claim because resolving that claim would require the

court to review the decision of the Puerto Rico courts that the

Board had jurisdiction over the labor dispute, in contravention of
1The Federación Puertorriqueña de Trabajadores, though a

critical participant in the proceedings before the Board, is not a

party to the federal action and will not be referred to again.

Consequently, our references to "the Federación" in the remainder

of the opinion refer exclusively to appellant, the Federación de

Maestros de Puerto Rico. 

2The Federación also asserted defenses under Puerto Rico law,

which are not before us.

3The Act grants the NLRB jurisdiction over charges of unfair

labor practices "affecting commerce," which means interstate

commerce. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6)-(7), 160. That jurisdiction is

exclusive and preempts state labor law. See San Diego Bldg. Trades

Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). Therefore, if the

Federación's activities affected interstate commerce, the Board

lacked jurisdiction over the grievance.

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the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Consequently, the district court

dismissed the complaint. We affirm, and explain how Exxon Mobil

affects some of our prior Rooker-Feldman cases.

I.

The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed.

In 1990, the Federación Puertorriqueña de Trabajadores, a labor

union, filed an unfair labor practices charge before the Board

against the appellant Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico.1 In

1995, the Board issued a grievance (administrative complaint)

against the Federación. The Federación then moved to dismiss the

grievance on the grounds that the National Labor Relations Board

("NLRB") had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.

2 It

contended that Puerto Rico labor law was preempted by the National

Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, because the Federación's

activities affected interstate commerce.3
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In early 1996, an administrative judge issued an

"Interlocutory Report" concluding that Puerto Rico labor law was

preempted by federal law, and that the Board therefore lacked

jurisdiction. However, the Board rejected the Interlocutory Report

and denied the Federación's motion to dismiss. 

After unsuccessfully requesting that the Board reconsider

its decision, the Federación filed an interlocutory appeal to the

Puerto Rico Supreme Court. That court referred the appeal to the

Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. In 1997, the Court of Appeals, in a

lengthy opinion and resolution, concluded that the Federación's

activities did not affect interstate commerce, affirmed the Board's

jurisdictional decision, and remanded for further proceedings. 

The Federación moved for reconsideration, which was

denied after some delay. It then petitioned the Puerto Rico

Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which, too, was denied.

The Federación twice requested reconsideration of the denial of

certiorari, and both requests were denied. 

In November 1999, the Board issued a resolution ordering

the continuation of the proceedings. In these proceedings, the

Federación continued to argue that the Board lacked jurisdiction.

In March 2003, the Federación filed a complaint against

the Board in federal district court, requesting declaratory relief

and an injunction ordering the Board to terminate its proceedings

for lack of jurisdiction. The Board moved to dismiss the federal
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complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the basis that the

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review a

decision of the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. The district court

granted the motion, and the Federación timely appealed.

II.

Where no evidentiary hearing has been held, we review de

novo the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Wang v. N.H. Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d

698, 700 n.3 (1st Cir. 1995). "[W]e construe the Complaint

liberally and treat all well-pleaded facts as true, according the

plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Murphy v.

United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995). 

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district

courts lack jurisdiction over "federal complaints . . . [that]

essentially invite[] federal courts of first instance to review and

reverse unfavorable state-court judgments." Exxon Mobil, 125 S.

Ct. at 1521; D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). At first glance,

this case appears to present a relatively straightforward RookerFeldman issue. The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals held that the

Board has jurisdiction over the underlying labor dispute, and the

Puerto Rico Supreme Court declined to disturb that judgment. The

Federación's federal complaint, however, asks the court to declare

that the Board did not have jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
4Because the district court and the parties frame the dispute

in terms of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we do not reach the

questions of whether alternative doctrines such as abstention under

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), or refusal to grant

declaratory relief under El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d

488 (1st Cir. 1992), would also have justified dismissal.

5When Rooker was decided, the Supreme Court's jurisdictional

statute provided for writ of error as well as certiorari, but was

in most relevant respects similar to the present 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

See Act of September 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-258, ch. 448, sec. 2,

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Thus, the Federación's complaint asked the district court "to

review and reverse [an] unfavorable state-court judgment[]," Exxon

Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 1521.

However, the Federación argues that the Puerto Rico

court's decision was interlocutory, and that Rooker-Feldman

therefore does not apply. This argument draws some support from

certain of our pre-Exxon Mobil precedents. In order to understand

this argument, and why we now ultimately reject it, we must first

describe the roots of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the somewhat

uncertain path that our jurisprudence has taken, and finally the

clarification provided by Exxon Mobil.

4

A. Rooker and Feldman

The jurisdictional statute providing for Supreme Court

review of state court judgments states that "[f]inal judgments or

decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a

decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ

of certiorari" when certain federal questions are presented. 28

U.S.C. § 1257;5 see also id. § 1258 (same for Puerto Rico Supreme
§ 237, 39 Stat. 726 (1916). 

6In this opinion we will sometimes refer to § 1257 as a

shorthand for, collectively, both §§ 1257 and 1258. The

differences between the two provisions are not relevant to the

issues raised in this case.

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Court).6 Rooker held that Congress, by the terms of that statute,

granted the United States Supreme Court, and only the United States

Supreme Court, jurisdiction over appeals from state courts: 

If the constitutional questions stated in the

[federal complaint] actually arose in the

[state case], it was the province and duty of

the state courts to decide them; and their

decision, whether right or wrong, was an

exercise of jurisdiction. . . . Under the

legislation of Congress, no court of the

United States other than this Court could

entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify

the judgment for errors of that character. To

do so would be an exercise of appellate

jurisdiction. The jurisdiction possessed by

the District Courts is strictly original. 

263 U.S. at 415-16 (internal citation omitted). In other words,

Rooker is based on a negative inference: because Congress only

provided for review of state court judgments by the Supreme Court,

Congress therefore intended to preclude lower federal courts from

exercising such review. Feldman repeated this reasoning: "[A]

United States District Court has no authority to review final

judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such

judgments may be had only in this Court." 460 U.S. at 482. 
7Although the statute itself has changed since Rooker was

decided, the changes have not been material to the present issue,

see supra note 5, and the negative inference drawn in Rooker

applies equally today.

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B. Our Pre-Exxon Mobil Cases

1. Relevance of Availability of Supreme Court Review

The close nexus between the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and

Supreme Court review prompts an obvious question: what if the

Supreme Court could not have reviewed the particular state court

decision at issue? Our pre-Exxon Mobil cases suggested that

Rooker-Feldman would not apply in this context. See Cruz v.

Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating, in dictum,

that "denying jurisdiction based on a state court judgment that is

not eligible for review by the United States Supreme Court simply

would not follow from the jurisdictional statute that invigorated

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the first place");7 Hill v. Town of

Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 1999) (because "Rooker-Feldman is

keyed to § 1257," it therefore requires a judgment reviewable by

the Supreme Court). Under this logic, the scope of Rooker-Feldman

would be limited to state court judgments susceptible to Supreme

Court review -- in particular, final judgments, not interlocutory

orders. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257 (providing for review of "[f]inal

judgments or decrees" rendered by highest state courts), 1258 (same

for Puerto Rico Supreme Court). Arguably, then, under Cruz and
8The two concepts of finality serve very different purposes.

The purpose of the final judgment rule of § 1257 is to prevent the

Supreme Court from considering a case that has not reached final

judgment. It applies "vertically" within a single case's progress

up through the appellate hierarchy. By contrast, the purpose of

res judicata (and its federal statutory codification, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1738) is to prevent federal and sister state trial courts from

hearing a case that has reached final judgment. It applies

"horizontally" to parallel litigation or collateral attacks.

Moreover, whether a state court judgment is final for purposes

of § 1257 is a question of federal law, Gotthilf v. Sills, 375 U.S.

79, 80 (1963) (per curiam), but whether it is final for purposes of

preclusion is a question of state law, Roy v. City of Augusta, 712

F.2d 1517, 1520 (1st Cir. 1983).

-9-

Hill, Rooker-Feldman would not apply to interlocutory orders. That

is the argument that the Federación makes here.

2. Relevance of Preclusive Effect Under State Law

Our pre-Exxon Mobil case law also recognized, albeit not

uniformly, an alternative conception of "final judgment." The law

of claim and issue preclusion (also known as res judicata and

collateral estoppel) provides a notion of "final judgment" that is

related to, but distinct from, finality for purposes of Supreme

Court review.8 We have suggested, in some of our cases, that

"[o]nly a state court adjudication that itself has preclusive

effect can bring the Rooker-Feldman doctrine into play." Cruz, 204

F.3d at 21 n.5; see also Badillo-Santiago v. Naveira-Merly, 378

F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Rooker-Feldman applies to state or

territorial court judgments to which the federal courts would

accord preclusive effect, and the federal courts 'can ascribe no

greater preclusive force to a state court judgment than would the
9The "preclusive effect" requirement derives not from

construction of § 1257, but rather from policy considerations. The

most commonly stated rationale for a preclusive effect requirement

is that it would be odd for Rooker-Feldman "to bar an action in

federal court when that same action would be allowed in the state

court of the rendering state." Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 376

(5th Cir. 1995). 

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courts of that state.'") (quoting Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21; internal

citation omitted); Pérez-Guzmán v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 238 n.5

(1st Cir. 2003) (same), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 960 (2004).9 

Yet we have also stated, in apparent contradiction to the

above cases, that Rooker-Feldman does not require a decision to

have state law preclusive effect. See Maymó-Meléndez v.

Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 32-33 (1st Cir.) (Rooker-Feldman is

"broader and blunter" than res judicata, and does not impose res

judicata's technical requirements, "[s]o, despite the disapproval

of scholars, federal courts regularly use Rooker-Feldman to rebuff

collateral attacks on prior state court judgments without

purporting to apply the technical preclusion rules of res

judicata"), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 110 (2004); Mandel v. Town of

Orleans, 326 F.3d 267, 271 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Rooker-Feldman applies

whether or not the federal and state causes of action are

technically the same for purposes of claim preclusion, or whether

all of the familiar conditions for issue preclusion are met.")

(citation omitted); Sheehan v. Marr, 207 F.3d 35, 40 n.5 (1st Cir.

2000) (noting that "res judicata . . . and Rooker-Feldman are

separate doctrines, [although] they have a 'close affinity' to one
-11-

another," and quoting Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d

981, 983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that

"Rooker-Feldman is broader than claim and issue preclusion because

it does not depend on a final judgment on the merits"). 

C. Exxon Mobil

These tests of state court judgment finality in our

application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine have now been superseded

by the explanation of that doctrine in Exxon Mobil. We briefly

summarize that case for context.

Saudi Basic Industries Corporation sued Exxon Mobil in

Delaware state court for a declaratory judgment that it did not owe

Exxon Mobil any money from a contractual agreement; Exxon Mobil

counterclaimed for the money. Meanwhile, Exxon Mobil filed a

declaratory judgment action in federal court as an "insurance

policy" in case it lost the state court lawsuit. The state case

went to judgment first, and the jury found for Exxon Mobil,

awarding it a large verdict on its counterclaim. Saudi Basic

appealed the judgment to the Delaware Supreme Court. See 125 S.

Ct. at 1524-25. 

Meanwhile, the federal action proceeded. Exxon Mobil's

claims in federal court were essentially identical to its defenses

and counterclaims in state court. On an interlocutory appeal

related to foreign sovereign immunity, the Third Circuit sua sponte

concluded that Exxon Mobil's claims were identical to claims
-12-

actually litigated in state court, and ordered the claim dismissed

pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 1525-26.

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined

to cases of the kind from which the doctrine

acquired its name: cases brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review

and rejection of those judgments. RookerFeldman does not otherwise override or

supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the

circumscribed doctrines that allow federal

courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in

deference to state-court actions.

Id. at 1521-22. The Court specifically limited the doctrine to

cases in the procedural posture of Rooker and Feldman themselves:

Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited

circumstances in which this Court's appellate

jurisdiction over state-court judgments, 28

U.S.C. § 1257, precludes a United States

district court from exercising subject-matter

jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise

be empowered to adjudicate under a

congressional grant of authority[.] In both

cases, the losing party in state court filed

suit in federal court after the state

proceedings ended, complaining of an injury

caused by the state-court judgment and seeking

review and rejection of that judgment.

Plaintiffs in both cases, alleging

federal-question jurisdiction, called upon the

District Court to overturn an injurious

state-court judgment. Because § 1257, as long

interpreted, vests authority to review a state

court's judgment solely in this Court, the

District Courts in Rooker and Feldman lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction.

Id. at 1526 (citations omitted).
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In short, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine now applies only in

the "limited circumstances" where "the losing party in state court

filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended,

complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and

seeking review and rejection of that judgment." Id. The doctrine

"does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or

augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to

stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions."

Id. at 1522.

III.

Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court judgment is

sufficiently final for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:

when "the state proceedings [have] ended." 125 S. Ct. at 1526. If

federal litigation is initiated before state proceedings have

ended, then -- even if the federal plaintiff expects to lose in

state court and hopes to win in federal court -- the litigation is

parallel, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive the

court of jurisdiction. See id. at 1526-28. On the other hand, if

federal litigation is initiated after state proceedings have ended,

and the plaintiff implicitly or explicitly "seek[s] review and

rejection of [the state] judgment," id. at 1526, then a federal

suit seeking an opposite result is an impermissible attempt to

appeal the state judgment to the lower federal courts, and, under

Rooker-Feldman, the federal courts lack jurisdiction.
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As noted above, our prior tests of finality involved

appealability under § 1257 and/or state law preclusive effect.

Under Exxon Mobil, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when the

losing party in state court files suit in federal court "after the

state proceedings ended." We now explore what it means for state

proceedings to have "ended," and explain how this test differs from

the tests we had set forth before Exxon Mobil.

Generally speaking, state proceedings will have "ended"

in three situations. Two are obvious; the third perhaps is not. 

First, when the highest state court in which review is

available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left to be

resolved, then without a doubt the state proceedings have "ended."

In this situation, the state court judgment would constitute a

"[f]inal judgment[] or decree[] rendered by the highest court of a

State in which a decision could be had" under § 1257, it would

carry preclusive effect in virtually every state, and -- most

relevant here -- it would qualify under Exxon Mobil's "ended" test.

Second, if the state action has reached a point where

neither party seeks further action, then the state proceedings have

also "ended." For example, if a lower state court issues a

judgment and the losing party allows the time for appeal to expire,

then the state proceedings have ended. In this situation, the

judgment would carry preclusive effect in virtually every state.

It would usually not, however, be an appealable "[f]inal judgment[]
10A more subtle version of this scenario is where the lower

state court does not issue a judgment but merely an interlocutory

order (e.g., a discovery order determining whether certain

documents were privileged), and the parties then voluntarily

terminate the litigation. In this case, the state court issue

would be neither appealable under § 1257 nor preclusive under the

preclusion law of most states. Nevertheless, the state proceedings

have ended, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes either party

from later challenging the order in federal court.

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or decree[] rendered by the highest court of a State in which a

decision could be had" under § 1257. Nevertheless -- and this is

what matters -- it qualifies under Exxon Mobil's "ended" test.10

Third, if the state court proceedings have finally

resolved all the federal questions in the litigation, but state law

or purely factual questions (whether great or small) remain to be

litigated, then the state proceedings have "ended" within the

meaning of Rooker-Feldman on the federal questions at issue. We

infer this meaning from a footnote in Exxon Mobil that provides an

example of a federal suit that would be subject to Rooker-Feldman

even though the state court litigation was still ongoing.

The example is a hypothetical propounded in ASARCO Inc.

v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989). According to the Exxon Mobil

Court, the hypothetical would fit within the reach of the

reformulated Rooker-Feldman doctrine, even though the litigation

had not completely ended, because the state proceedings had ended

as to all federal questions. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 1524 n.2.

In ASARCO, the plaintiffs sought state court declaratory

and injunctive relief against an Arizona mineral leasing statute on
11Cox Broadcasting defines four situations in which a non-final

judgment will nevertheless be considered "final" for purposes of

§ 1257:

[(1)] there are further proceedings -- even entire trials

-- yet to occur in the state courts but where for one

reason or another the federal issue is conclusive or the

outcome of further proceedings preordained. 

. . .

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the grounds of, inter alia, federal preemption. See 490 U.S. at

610. The trial court upheld the statute, but the Arizona Supreme

Court reversed, and "remanded the case to the trial court with

instructions to enter summary judgment for [plaintiffs], to enter

a judgment declaring [the state law] invalid, and to consider what

further relief, if any, might be appropriate." Id. The defendants

petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court

granted. Id. at 610. 

The plaintiffs, with the United States as amicus,

contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. They

raised two distinct jurisdictional arguments: that the state court

judgment was not a "final judgment" under § 1257 because matters of

relief remained to be litigated, and that the case was

nonjusticiable because, although the plaintiffs had standing to

file the suit under state law, they did not have standing under

Article III. See id. at 611-12.

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. It held that

§ 1257 jurisdiction was available under the doctrine of Cox

Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975),11 and that, even
[(2)] the federal issue, finally decided by the highest

court in the State, will survive and require decision

regardless of the outcome of future state-court

proceedings.

. . .

[(3)] the federal claim has been finally decided, with

further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to

come, but in which later review of the federal issue

cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case.

. . .

[(4)] the federal issue has been finally decided in the

state courts with further proceedings pending in which

the party seeking review here might prevail on the merits

on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review

of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal of

the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive

of any further litigation on the relevant cause of

action rather than merely controlling the nature and

character of, or determining the admissibility of

evidence in, the state proceedings still to come . . .

[and] refusal immediately to review the state-court

decision might seriously erode federal policy . . . .

420 U.S. at 479-83.

-17-

though the plaintiffs would not have been able to file the suit in

federal court initially, the defendants nevertheless had standing

to bring the appeal. See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 612, 617-19. 

The Court also rejected the United States's suggestion

that the defendants had to seek relief through a federal

declaratory judgment action. Id. at 620. The Court observed that

such an action would require the federal court "to readjudicate the

very same issues that were determined in the state-court

proceedings below," and "in essence[] would be an attempt to obtain

direct review of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in the lower

federal courts" in violation of Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 622-23. 
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ASARCO, to summarize, was a case where state proceedings

had not completely ended, but all federal questions had been

finally resolved. The ASARCO Court held that the case had reached

sufficient finality both to confer § 1257 jurisdiction under Cox

Broadcasting, and to invoke Rooker-Feldman against any hypothetical

federal action concerning the same questions. A footnote in Exxon

Mobil reaffirms that position:

The injury of which the [ASARCO] petitioners

(the losing parties in state court) could have

complained in the hypothetical federal suit

would have been caused by the state court's

invalidation of their mineral leases, and the

relief they would have sought would have been

to undo the state court's invalidation of the

statute. The hypothetical suit in ASARCO,

therefore, shares the characteristics of the

suits in Rooker and Feldman, i.e., loser in

state court invites federal district court to

overturn state-court judgment.

125 S. Ct. at 1524 n.2. Thus, Exxon Mobil's explanation of the

ASARCO hypothetical confirms that Rooker-Feldman applies where the

state proceeding has ended with respect to the issues that the

federal plaintiff seeks to have reviewed in federal court, even if

other matters remain to be litigated. 

This scenario prompts the question of how the lower

federal courts should determine whether a state proceeding, still

ongoing in some form, has ended with respect to a particular

federal issue. We infer from Exxon Mobil that the Cox Broadcasting

test of finality should be used for this purpose by the following

reasoning. Exxon Mobil confirms that the ASARCO state court
12For example, if a lower state court issues a judgment and the

losing party allows the time for appeal to expire, then the state

proceedings have ended, but § 1257 jurisdiction would ordinarily

not be available.

13By contrast, a preclusive state court judgment is not

sufficient to trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In most states,

a trial court judgment acquires preclusive effect as soon as it

issues. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Hanover Ins. Co., 692 N.E.2d 39, 44

(Mass. 1998); Bartlett v. Pullen, 586 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Me. 1991);

Silva v. Silva, 404 A.2d 829, 832 (R.I. 1979). While the state

court judgment is pending on appeal, it carries preclusive effect,

but (in most cases) the state proceedings have not yet "ended." 

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litigation was sufficiently final (i.e., had "ended") for purposes

of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. And ASARCO concluded that

the state court litigation there was sufficiently final for Supreme

Court review because it satisfied the Cox Broadcasting test. See

490 U.S. at 612. In short, Exxon Mobil and ASARCO, read together,

suggest that if state court litigation is sufficiently final for

Supreme Court review, then it is sufficiently final for purposes of

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Of course, Cox Broadcasting itself only answers the

question of whether § 1257 jurisdiction is immediately available,

whereas our present question is whether state proceedings have

"ended." And we hasten to repeat that a proceeding may have

"ended" under Exxon Mobil even when § 1257 jurisdiction would not

have been available.12 However, while appealability under § 1257

is not necessary to satisfy the Exxon Mobil "ended" test, it will

almost always be sufficient.

13 Put another way, if a state court

decision is final enough that the Supreme Court does have
14We do not decide how to apply Exxon Mobil in cases where the

state proceedings have, for all practical purposes, ended as to the

federal issue, but the Cox Broadcasting exceptions do not apply.

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jurisdiction over a direct appeal, then it is final enough that a

lower federal court does not have jurisdiction over a collateral

attack on that decision. Therefore, except in unusual

circumstances, if § 1257 jurisdiction would have been available

under Cox Broadcasting, then the state proceedings have

sufficiently "ended" for purposes of Exxon Mobil.

14 Of course, the

opposite does not follow; as stated above, there are many

situations where § 1257 jurisdiction would not be available, and

yet state proceedings have ended. But where § 1257 jurisdiction is

available -- either because an appeal has progressed to "final

judgment," or under one of the Cox Broadcasting exceptions -- then,

for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, state proceedings will

ordinarily be deemed to have "ended." 

IV.

Exxon Mobil means that our prior tests of finality

(appealability under § 1257 and preclusive effect) are no longer

applicable for Rooker-Feldman purposes. Simply put, a state

proceeding may meet the "ended" test of Exxon Mobil even if it

fails one or both of those prior tests. Consequently, the

applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine no longer turns on

whether the state court decision was "final" or "preclusive."

Rather, we examine the posture of the case in the state court --
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i.e., whether "state proceedings [have] ended," 125 S. Ct. at 1526

-- and the relief sought in the federal court. 

This conclusion conflicts, to some extent, with some of

our precedents. "Ordinarily, newly constituted panels in a

multi-panel circuit should consider themselves bound by prior panel

decisions." Eulitt v. Me. Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 349 (1st

Cir. 2004). However, an exception applies "when a preexisting

panel opinion is undermined by subsequently announced controlling

authority, such as a decision of the Supreme Court." Id.

That is the case here. Exxon Mobil holds that federal

courts lack jurisdiction to review a state court judgment in a

federal case initiated "after the state proceedings ended." 125 S.

Ct. at 1526. While such judgments will often qualify as "final

judgments" under § 1257 and/or carry state law preclusive effect,

neither § 1257 finality nor state law preclusive effect is

necessary under the Exxon Mobil test. 

Consequently, we recognize that Exxon Mobil has

effectively abrogated the dictum in Cruz stating that "denying

jurisdiction based on a state court judgment that is not eligible

for review by the United States Supreme Court simply would not

follow from the jurisdictional statute that invigorated the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the first place," 204 F.3d at 21 n.5,

and the similar statement in Hill holding that, because "RookerFeldman is keyed to § 1257," it therefore requires a judgment
-22-

immediately reviewable by the Supreme Court, 193 F.3d at 40. Under

Exxon Mobil, state proceedings may have "ended" even though § 1257

review would not be available. 

Similarly, we recognize that Exxon Mobil has effectively

abrogated Badillo-Santiago, Pérez-Guzmán, and Cruz to the extent

that they state that Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies to state

court judgments with preclusive effect. See Badillo-Santiago, 378

F.3d at 6 ("Rooker-Feldman applies to state or territorial court

judgments to which the federal courts would accord preclusive

effect, and the federal courts 'can ascribe no greater preclusive

force to a state court judgment than would the courts of that

state.'") (quoting Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21)); Pérez-Guzmán, 346 F.3d

at 238 n.5 ("'[O]nly a state court adjudication that itself has

preclusive effect can bring the Rooker-Feldman doctrine into

play.'") (quoting Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21 n.5); Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21

n.5 ("Only a state court adjudication that itself has preclusive

effect can bring the Rooker-Feldman doctrine into play."). Under

Exxon Mobil, state law preclusive effect is simply not

determinative.

V.

We now apply the Rooker-Feldman clarifications provided

by Exxon Mobil to this case. As we understand it, the Federación

posits that the Puerto Rico court's decision was interlocutory,

that § 1258 does not give the Supreme Court jurisdiction over
15The Federación contends that, despite losing its

jurisdictional argument multiple times before both the Board and

the Puerto Rico courts, it has not lost its right to request

further review of its jurisdictional defense before those very

tribunals. Since it might yet prevail on this defense, the

Federación reasons, the Puerto Rico decision is not final -- or, in

the language of Exxon Mobil, the state proceedings have not ended.

We consider it highly unlikely that the Federación could yet

persuade the Puerto Rico courts that they lack jurisdiction. The

Puerto Rico Court of Appeals concluded that the Federación's

activities neither "impact[] nor substantially impede[] . . . the

flow of commerce between Puerto Rico and any other state, territory

of the United States or country," and consequently that "the

[Board] did not err when it decided that it had jurisdiction to

deal with the case of record." (emphasis deleted). This holding

appears to create law of the case and leave little room for further

argument concerning the Board's jurisdiction.

-23-

interlocutory (non-final) judgments, and that, therefore, RookerFeldman should not apply. Under Rooker-Feldman, as clarified by

Exxon Mobil, these arguments are largely irrelevant.

Rather, what matters is that the state court proceedings

have ended with regard to the sole federal issue, namely, whether

the Board's jurisdiction is preempted by the NLRA. That

jurisdictional question is separate and independent from the merits

of the dispute. It logically should be, and has been, decided in

advance of a trial on the merits. Moreover, the Puerto Rico

Supreme Court has declined to disturb the lower court's decision,

thus exhausting the possibility of further review in the Puerto

Rico court system.15

We find that this case falls neatly within one of the

situations described in Cox Broadcasting: 
-24-

[W]here the federal issue has been finally

decided in the state courts with further

proceedings pending in which the party seeking

review [in the Supreme Court] might prevail on

the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus

rendering unnecessary review of the federal

issue by [the Supreme] Court, and where

reversal of the state court on the federal

issue would be preclusive of any further

litigation on the relevant cause of action

. . . if a refusal immediately to review the

state-court decision might seriously erode

federal policy, the Court [has jurisdiction].

420 U.S. at 482-83; see also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,

497 & n.5 (1983) (accepting jurisdiction over state court decision

that unfair labor practice charge brought in state court was not

within jurisdiction of NLRB); Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen. Laborers

Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 548-50 (1963) (accepting jurisdiction

over state court's injunction against labor union picketing; issue

to be further litigated on the merits was legality of picketing,

which was entirely separate from the union's federal defense, that

NLRB's jurisdiction over labor dispute was exclusive); cf. Mitchell

v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 n.8 (1985) ("[S]tate-court decisions

rejecting a party's federal-law claim that he is not subject to

suit before a particular tribunal are 'final' for purposes of our

certiorari jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257."). If an

interlocutory state decision on a federal issue would be reviewable

by the Supreme Court under one of the Cox Broadcasting exceptions,
16Again, the relevance of Cox Broadcasting is not that

appealability under § 1257 is required in order for the proceedings

to have "ended" under Exxon Mobil. But when an interlocutory state

court decision is appealable under Cox Broadcasting, then the

"ended" test, as we construe it, will almost always be satisfied.

-25-

then (absent unusual circumstances not present here) state court

proceedings have "ended" for purposes of Exxon Mobil.

16

With these issues resolved, this case turns out to be as

simple as it first appeared. The Federación litigated its federal

labor law preemption defense before the Puerto Rico Court of

Appeals. That court found that the Federación was not engaged in

interstate commerce and that the Board's jurisdiction was not

preempted by federal labor law; the Puerto Rico Supreme Court did

not disturb that judgment. The Federación's subsequent federal

claim seeks a declaration that the Board's jurisdiction was

preempted by federal labor law. That claim could succeed only if

the federal court were to hold that the Puerto Rico decision was

incorrect. As in Rooker and Feldman, here "the losing party in

state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings

ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment

and seeking review and rejection of that judgment," Exxon Mobil,

125 S. Ct. at 1526. Consequently, the district court lacked

jurisdiction to review the state court decision, despite the

interlocutory nature of the Puerto Rico courts' decisions. The

district court properly dismissed the complaint.

Affirmed.