NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SARAH R., Appellant,

v.

JEREMY R., C.R., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0270 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County 

No. P1300SV201400012 

The Honorable Celé Hancock, Judge 

REVERSED 

COUNSEL 

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, PC, Anthem 

By Florence M. Bruemmer 

Counsel for Appellant 

Prescott Law Group, PLC, Prescott 

By J. Andrew Jolley 

Counsel for Appellees
SARAH R. v. JEREMY R., C.R. 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge John C. Gemmill joined. 

D O W N I E, Judge: 

¶1 Sarah R. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her 

parental rights. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Mother and Jeremy R. (“Father”) are the parents of C.R., 

who was born in July 2010.1 Father obtained an order of protection 

against Mother in November 2010 after she threatened to kill him during 

an argument.2 The next month, the family court held a hearing regarding 

the order of protection and ordered that Father have temporary sole 

custody of C.R., with Mother having supervised access. The court found 

no evidence Mother had harmed or threatened C.R. and removed the 

child as a protected person from the order of protection. 

¶3 Between December 2010 and January 2011, Mother appeared 

for every scheduled visit (approximately eight) with C.R. and arrived with 

appropriate items. At a February 2011 family court hearing, the court 

heard testimony from two individuals who supervised the visits that C.R. 

manifested extreme anxiety at Mother’s voice and presence. The family

court ordered that Father have sole custody, with Mother having no 

contact, saying: “When any of the Parties can demonstrate that contact 

between [C.R.] and [Mother] is therapeutically recommended, contact 

 

1 Father established paternity in separate proceedings in Yavapai 

County Superior Court that we refer to as the “family court” proceedings 

in order to distinguish between them and the severance proceedings at 

issue in this appeal. 

2 Mother pled guilty to disorderly conduct/domestic violence as a 

result of that incident and was placed on probation, which she 

successfully completed. 
SARAH R. v. JEREMY R., C.R. 

Decision of the Court 

3

shall resume in accordance with the therapeutic recommendations.”3 The 

court recommended that Mother, “in an effort to develop and encourage a 

meaningful and positive parental relationship,” maintain participation in 

healthcare and counseling services, take actions to “ensure long-term 

mental health stability,” and participate in parenting classes. At a 

subsequent hearing in December 2012, the family court stated that 

Mother’s therapist should provide C.R.’s therapist, Ms. Phillips, with 

information “to assist in the reintroduction.” 

¶4 In July 2014, Father filed a petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and neglect under 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(1) and (2). The 

juvenile court held a two-day severance hearing in February and April of 

2015. 

¶5 Hearing evidence established that C.R. lived with Father and 

his parents (“Grandfather” and “Grandmother”) in what everyone agreed 

was a stable environment. Mother had not seen C.R. since January 2011, 

when the child was six months old. Nor had Mother placed Ms. Phillips 

in contact with a satisfactory therapist, despite submitting multiple names 

and authorization forms. The juvenile court received evidence that C.R. 

had ongoing speech, physical, and occupational therapy issues. The child 

also had “issues with lots of different people,” would sometimes react 

violently during therapy sessions at home, and had several strong “melt

downs” when meeting strangers — especially men. 

 

3 Evidence from the 2015 severance hearing called into question 

whether Mother was the cause of C.R.’s behaviors. One of the visitation 

observers posited in her 2011 family court testimony that C.R. was 

displaying “a trauma-based response” to Mother. The other observer 

expressed concern about C.R.’s reaction to Mother and opined that visits 

“trigger emotional memories.” At the 2015 hearing, however, the first 

observer testified that the majority of Mother’s visits were positive and 

that C.R.’s fussiness could have been related to nap times. More 

importantly, she conceded she would not have offered the same opinion if 

she knew C.R. would continue having such extreme reactions after not 

seeing Mother for an extended period of time. No witness, including 

C.R.’s therapist, could state with any degree of certainty that C.R.’s 

behaviors were attributable to Mother. 
SARAH R. v. JEREMY R., C.R. 

Decision of the Court 

4

¶6 The court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the ground 

of abandonment, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), and did not address the 

additional grounds for severance Father had alleged.4 Mother timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for 

the Juvenile Court 103(A) and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), 

-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Grounds for Termination 

¶7 To terminate parental rights, the court must find at least one 

statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence. A.R.S. § 8-537(B); Kent 

K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 281–82, ¶ 7 (2005). It must also find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best 

interests. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296, 

¶ 18 (App. 2013). We review a termination order for an abuse of 

discretion and will affirm if it is supported by sufficient evidence. Kenneth 

B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 36, ¶ 12 (App. 2010). We view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s ruling. Michael 

J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 20 (2000). 

II. Abandonment

¶8 A.R.S. § 8-531(1) defines “abandonment” as follows:

“Abandonment” means the failure of a parent to provide 

reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the 

child, including providing normal supervision. 

Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has 

made only minimal efforts to support and communicate 

with the child. Failure to maintain a normal parental 

relationship with the child without just cause for a period of 

six months constitutes prima facie evidence of 

abandonment. 

 

4 In the same line of the ruling, the court stated it was terminating 

Mother’s parental rights based on A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) (neglect or willful 

abuse). However, because the court did not address anything other than 

abandonment and specifically stated it was not doing so, we presume it 

intended to refer only to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). 
SARAH R. v. JEREMY R., C.R. 

Decision of the Court 

5

In its order terminating Mother’s parental rights, the court stated, in 

pertinent part: 

Although given the opportunity to establish a therapeutic 

relationship with the minor child through counseling, 

mother did not do so. Mother also did not take advantage of 

the opportunities to receive information about the minor 

child through the paternal grandparents. 

Had mother taken advantage of the suggestions of the 

family law court, she could have then returned to the family 

law court, shown that court that she had taken advantage of 

their suggestions and requested modification of the court 

orders. Mother did nothing to assert her legal rights. 

. . .

The Court FINDS that Mother has made minimal efforts to 

communicate with the child and that she has not had any 

contact with the child for more than six months.

¶9 Courts consider a parent’s conduct, not subjective intent, in 

determining whether he or she “provided reasonable support, maintained 

regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to support and 

communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parental 

relationship.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50, ¶ 18. Where circumstances 

prevent a parent from exercising traditional bonding methods, she “must 

act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must 

vigorously assert [her] legal rights to the extent necessary.” Id. at ¶ 22. 

This is because a parent generally carries the burden of asserting her legal 

rights at every opportunity. Id. at 251, ¶ 25. However, “[a] parent may 

not restrict the other parent from interacting with their child and then 

petition to terminate the latter’s rights for abandonment.” Calvin B., 232 

Ariz. at 297, ¶ 21. When so restricted, a parent is not necessarily expected 

to exhibit the same level of traditional parental conduct or to take every 

possible legal measure to reduce barriers to parenting. See, e.g., id. at 

¶¶ 25–26 (reversing abandonment finding where, although father was not 

“a salutary parent” who diligently pursued his rights and fulfilled “his 

corresponding parental responsibilities,” mother had erected barriers to 

his parenting).

¶10 Mother clearly did not maintain a normal parental 

relationship with C.R. for more than six months. But whether she failed to 

do so without just cause is far less clear. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1) (failure to 

maintain relationship must be without just cause to constitute prima facie
SARAH R. v. JEREMY R., C.R. 

Decision of the Court 

6

evidence of abandonment). Mother’s contact with her daughter was cut 

off by a court order that essentially delegated authority to C.R.’s therapist 

to determine its duration. Severance hearing evidence established that 

Mother had little ability to affect visitation because Ms. Phillips testified 

that regardless of any action or progress by Mother, C.R. had not 

progressed to a point where she would recommend reintroduction to 

Mother. Thus, nothing demonstrated that Mother’s failure to provide the 

correct therapist’s information to Ms. Phillips had any effect on her ability 

to see or maintain contact with C.R. 

¶11 Moreover, there was substantial evidence that Mother did

take actions within her control to address her own issues that might 

otherwise prevent contact once Ms. Phillips deemed C.R. ready for 

reintroduction. She took multiple parenting classes, remained enrolled in 

healthcare and counseling services, and completed a domestic violence 

program. Mother contacted Ms. Phillips on numerous occasions to 

inquire about C.R. and attempted to provide authorization forms and 

therapist information. Mother also emailed Grandfather to inquire about 

C.R. and her welfare.5 

 

5 In one email to Grandfather, Mother wrote: 

I am writing you in concern of my daughter [C.R.]. I would 

like to know how she has been doing and what has been 

going on in her life. I know that she has had some 

appointments recently and I want to know how everything 

has been going with all of them. My oldest daughter [K.] 

and I do love her and miss her so much with all my heart 

and would really like to be in and part of her life, also for her 

to know who her mother and older sister [K.] are. . . . I 

would also like to know what [C.R.] does everyday and 

what she likes and doesn’t like. Does she have any favorite 

things that she really enjoys or likes to do? How is she 

doing with her talking, has she learned any new words or 

sentences? How has she been doing with her eating and 

feeding herself? Is there a favorite thing that she likes to eat 

or any foods that she really doesn’t like? I know that she is 

getting bigger and growing so fast, how much does she 

weigh and how tall is she now? I really do love [C.R.] and 

miss her so much and think about her all day everyday. 

Could you please give her lots of hugs and kisses and let her 
SARAH R. v. JEREMY R., C.R. 

Decision of the Court 

7

¶12 Mother admitted she could have been more assertive in 

attempting to reintegrate into C.R.’s life. She gave up on sending clothing 

and gifts because she felt the items never reached C.R. She stopped 

emailing Grandfather for updates after his replies simply directed her to 

consult her attorney or court reports. When that avenue proved 

unproductive, Mother turned to Ms. Phillips for updates about C.R. She 

also sought alternative ways to bond with C.R. that would still comply 

with the family court’s orders. For instance, Mother suggested one-way 

visitation, such that she could see her daughter without C.R. knowing she 

was present. She also pursued visits for C.R.’s half-sister, prepared a 

photo album for C.R., and suggested showing the child pictures as a 

means of reacquainting her with Mother and maternal relatives. And 

Mother testified that throughout the proceedings, she continuously tried 

to resolve the matter with Father. 

¶13 Given the significant limitations imposed on Mother, and 

the high standard of proof required to terminate her rights, the evidence 

was insufficient to establish that Mother failed to maintain a normal 

parental relationship with C.R. without just cause.6

 

know that [K.] and I do love her and care about her and miss 

her so so much. Also could you please send me some 

pictures of her having fun doing what she does and likes 

everyday? I hope that everything goes well at her doctors 

appointment on Friday[.] I wish that I could be there for her. 

Hope that you have a very blessed and wonderful day! 

Thank you for your time and I look forward to hearing back 

from you soon on how my beautiful little girl is doing. 

According to Father’s termination petition, as of July 2014, Mother had 

emailed Grandfather “on approximately seven occasions” to inquire about 

C.R. 

6 Though not strictly necessary to our holding, we have other 

concerns about the abandonment finding, including the juvenile court’s 

refusal to permit Mother to make a record after it excluded testimony 

about Father’s attempts to limit Mother’s email communications. The 

court also refused to allow evidence that Mother had paid “thousands of 

dollars” for legal services relating to C.R. Additionally, after Father called 

Mother as an adverse witness at the outset of the severance hearing, the 

court warned Mother’s attorney: “if you . . . don’t ask all of the questions 
SARAH R. v. JEREMY R., C.R. 

Decision of the Court 

8

III. Best Interests Finding 

¶14 Even if we were to affirm the abandonment finding, we 

would nevertheless reverse the severance order because there was 

inadequate proof that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in 

C.R.’s best interests. See Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22 (party seeking 

termination must prove best interests by a preponderance of the 

evidence). It is true that “in most cases, the presence of a statutory ground 

will have a negative effect.” Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 

Ariz. 345, 350, ¶ 23 (App. 2013). However, a court cannot “assume that a 

child will benefit from a termination simply because he has been 

abandoned.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., ___ Ariz. ___ (2016). The 

petitioning party must instead prove that the child will derive an 

affirmative benefit from termination or incur a detriment without it. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). 

¶15 In its best interests finding, the superior court stated that 

C.R. “has several medical and emotional issues and mother has made little 

to no effort to establish communication, continue a relationship or support 

the child.” But we cannot discern from the record what “affirmative 

benefit” C.R. will receive from terminating Mother’s rights or what 

detriment she will incur without such an order. Mother poses no risk to 

the child, as family court orders currently prohibit her from seeing C.R. 

Mother testified she is willing to wait until interaction would be beneficial 

to C.R., and she accepts that her current role is limited. Mother also 

believes C.R. is in a stable home and has no intention of disrupting it. 

 

that you want to ask now, you may not be allowed to ask them later.” 

This required Mother to anticipate and defend against facts and 

allegations not yet presented and left counsel in a quandary over whether 

to cover certain issues that might or might not arise in Father’s case-inchief. When Mother’s counsel politely objected and advised that going 

into matters such as mental health was stressful for Mother if unnecessary, 

the court responded, “Honestly I don’t give a crap about either one of 

these people.” The court went on to state that its only concern was C.R.’s 

best interests. The child’s best interests are obviously important, and even 

paramount in the second step of the severance analysis. But when a court 

acts to terminate a parent’s fundamental constitutional right to “the 

companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children,” 

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), it must necessarily be concerned 

with the parent’s rights as well. 
SARAH R. v. JEREMY R., C.R. 

Decision of the Court 

9

There are no adoption plans. Cf. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 334, ¶ 6 (current 

adoptive plan is a well-recognized benefit). 

¶16 Father’s suggestion that severing Mother’s rights would 

allow him to “share joint-legal decision making with the paternal 

grandmother” has no discernible legal basis.7 Cf. A.R.S. § 25-409(A) 

(delineating third party rights to legal decision-making authority and 

requiring, inter alia, proof that it would be significantly detrimental to the 

child to remain or be placed in the care of either legal parent). Father also 

suggests that terminating Mother’s parental rights will alleviate “stress 

and anxiety.” He does not explain how severance will achieve this goal or 

whose “stress and anxiety” will be reduced. Father also argues, 

“Continuation of the parent-child relationship would be a detriment to 

[C.R.] because [Mother] has failed to establish and maintain a parental 

relationship with the child, [and] has consciously disregarded the 

obligations owed by a parent to a child[.]” But this merely restates the 

grounds for abandonment. 

¶17 Mother, on the other hand, testified that C.R.’s half-sister 

and maternal grandmother desire a relationship with C.R. Father testified 

such relationships are unimportant, and he objects to visits. The court did 

not find that C.R.’s best interests would be advanced by not knowing or 

interacting with her maternal relatives. And C.R.’s therapist testified C.R. 

would suffer no harm from having a relationship with her older sister. 

Additionally, Mother receives disability benefits, and she testified that, as 

her daughter, C.R. may be entitled to Social Security benefits in the future. 

¶18 Severance of Mother’s parental rights will render C.R. an 

orphan on the maternal side, with no corresponding benefit apparent 

from the record. Cf. Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 8 

(1990) (despite abandonment finding, “[w]e cannot hold that there is 

sufficient evidence to terminate when the record is entirely devoid of any 

explanation of what [the child] will gain or lose”). Based on the record 

before us, we conclude the juvenile court’s finding that terminating 

Mother’s parental rights would be in C.R.’s best interests is not supported 

by substantial evidence. 

 

7 When asked at the severance hearing why terminating Mother’s 

rights was in C.R.’s best interests, Father stated that he liked “to coparent 

with my mom” and that he wanted “to have joint custody with my mom.” 
SARAH R. v. JEREMY R., C.R. 

Decision of the Court 

10

CONCLUSION 

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights.