NEWCASTLE DISEASE RESPONSE PLAN: 

THE RED BOOK

Presentation 

updated April 2016, 

based on the 

February 2014 Plan

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2

The draft version of the Newcastle Disease Response 

Plan: The Red Book (2014) incorporates comments 

received on the Exotic ND Response Plan: The Red Book 

(2013) and reflects updates to Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials.
This plan does not replace existing regional, State, 

Tribal, local, or industry preparedness and response 

plans relating to ND. Regional, State, Tribal, local, and 

industry plans should be aimed at more specific issues 

in ND response.

 States should develop response plans focused on the 

specific characteristics of the State and its poultry 

industry. 

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Outline

 Introduction and Information

 Framework for Preparedness and Response

 Preparedness and Response

 Response Goals and Strategy

 Specific Response Critical Activities and Tools

 Recovery after an Outbreak

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5

Introduction and 

Information

ND RESPONSE PLAN
Objectives of this Plan

 Identify the capabilities needed to respond to an ND 

outbreak. 

 Identify critical activities that are involved in 

responding to that outbreak and associated timeframes.

In an outbreak situation, critical activities are under the 

authority of an Incident Command (IC).

6 Introduction and Information
Definitions

 Avian paramyxovirus serotype 1(APMV-1) is the 

etiologic agent of Newcastle disease (ND) in birds.

 APMV-1 viruses that cause ND are either virulent 

(vNDV) or low virulence (loNDV).

 In the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Newcastle 

Disease (ND) refers to an infection of poultry with 

vNDV.

 NDV refers to the virus in general, for example, when 

discussing environmental persistence.

7 Introduction and Information
Etiology

Introduction and Information 8

 ND is an infection of birds caused by vNDV, an avian 

paramyxovirus serotype-1 (APMV-1). 

 Nine serotypes of avian paramyxovirus have been 

identified. 

– There is one serotype of APMV-1 and six phylogenetic lineages.

 There are three major pathotypes based on virulence: 

– Lentogenic (low virulence viruses), 

– Mesogenic, and 

– Velogenic (virulent viruses). 

o The velogenic viruses are further classified as either neurotropic or 

viscerotropic.
History

Introduction and Information 9

 ND was first identified in England in 1927. 

 The first major outbreak of ND in the United States was 

identified in the early 1970s; this outbreak was 

epidemiologically linked to the transmission of ND from 

infected parrots to commercial poultry.

– The last ND outbreaks in the United States included the States 

of California (2002–2003), Nevada (2003), Arizona (2003), and 

Texas (2003).

– Virulent NDV is endemic in wild cormorants in the United States 

and Canada, but commercial poultry are currently free of 

velogenic isolates.

 Virulent NDV remains endemic in many parts of the 

world, including Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. 
Economic Impact

 In 1971, the ND outbreak in the United States 

resulted in the destruction of 12 million birds at a 

cost of $56 million to eradicate the virus in 3 years. 

 The 2002–2003 epidemic in the western United 

States resulted in industry losses estimated at $5 

billion, and a direct cost of $160 million to control 

the outbreak.

 An ND outbreak in the United States today could 

exceed these economic costs and also result in 

significant disruptions to the U.S. food supply.

Introduction and Information 10
Zoonotic Potential

 Virulent NDV can cause infection in humans. 

 This infection is mild and self-limiting.

– It usually causes conjunctivitis but can also result in mild 

influenza-like symptoms. 

 Direct contact with infected birds is the most common 

transmission pathway; it is not transmitted through the 

consumption of poultry products. 

 Responders—particularly poultry workers and 

vaccination crews—should be protected from the virus 

through appropriate health and safety measures and 

personal protective equipment (PPE).

Introduction and Information 11
Susceptible Species

 More than 250 avian species can be infected with 

NDV. The most severely affected avian species are 

typically Galliformes, an order that includes:

– chickens,

– guinea fowl,

– peafowl,

– pheasant, and

– quail.

 Turkeys can be infected, but usually present less 

severe clinical signs than chickens.

Introduction and Information 12
Reservoirs

 Wild birds and waterfowl can be reservoirs for NDV.

 Upon transmission to domestic poultry, these strains 

may mutate into more virulent viruses. 

 In addition, some psittacine species may shed virus 

for extended periods of time (several months to a 

year) but may not show clinical signs.

Introduction and Information 13
Transmission

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 Animal to animal contact

 Fomites

 Wildlife

 Airborne

Introduction and Information
 NDV can be easily inactivated, but it remains viable 

for long periods of time, particularly at ambient 

temperatures and in the presence of feces.

 NDV may be present in

eggs and egg products.

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Persistence in the Environment 

and Animal Products

Introduction and Information
Diagnosis in Avian Species

 Incubation period for ND typically ranges from 5–6 

days.

– World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code (2015) gives the incubation period for 

AI infection as 21 days.

Introduction and Information 16
Clinical Signs: Low Virulence Strains

 Strains of loNDV typically result in little mortality.

 Common clinical signs:

– Coughing,

– Gasping,

– Sneezing, and

– Rales.

Introduction and Information 17
Clinical Signs: Virulent Strains

– Lethargy,

– Inappetence,

– Ruffled feathers,

– Edema,

– Greenish or watery diarrhea,

– Dyspnoea,

– Inflammation of the head 

and neck,

– Cyanotic discoloration,

– Death.

Introduction and Information 18

 Mesogenic strains of NDV typically result in low mortality 

but can cause acute respiratory and neurologic signs.

 Velogenic strains cause severe disease, particularly in 

chickens.
Gross Pathological Lesions

 Only velogenic strains will result in significant gross 

lesions.

 Lesions can be variable within neurotropic and 

viscerotropic forms. In general, velogenic gross lesions 

may include the following:

– Swelling of the periorbital area or head,

– Edema of the interstitial or peritracheal neck tissue,

– Petechiae and small ecchymoses on the mucosa of the 

proventriculus,

– Necrosis, ulcerations, or hemorrhages of respiratory, digestive, 

or lymphoid tissue, and

– Enlarged spleen.

Introduction and Information 19
Differential Diagnosis

 Virulent NDV can resemble 

– highly pathogenic avian influenza (caused by 

influenzavirus A), 

– laryngotracheitis (caused by infectious 

laryngotracheitis virus), 

– psittacosis (caused by Chlamydophila psittaci), 

mycoplasmosis (caused by mycoplasma 

gallisepticum), 

– and fowl cholera (caused by Pasturella spp.).

Introduction and Information 20
Vaccination

 Vaccination has long been used in the United States 

as a control measure for loNDV in many commercial 

poultry operations.

 Mesogenic strains of vaccine are available. However, 

these strains are not used as live vaccines in many 

countries, including the United States, because 

mesogenic and velogenic NDV infections have been 

eradicated in poultry.

Introduction and Information 21
22

Framework for Preparedness 

and Response

ND RESPONSE PLAN
Foundation of Preparedness and Response

 Successful emergency preparedness for and 

response to ND requires integration between the 

National Response Framework (NRF), National 

Incident Management System (NIMS), and National 

Animal Health Emergency Management System 

(NAHEMS).

Framework for Preparedness and Response 23
National Response Framework

 The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts allhazards response.

 It describes specific authorities and establishes a 

comprehensive approach for responding to domestic 

incidents that range from serious but purely local 

events to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic 

natural disasters. 

 The NRF is available at 

www.fema.gov/national-response-framework.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 24
National Incident Management System

 NIMS is a companion document to the NRF.

 It provides a systematic, nationwide, proactive approach 

guiding departments and agencies at all levels of 

government, the private sector, and non-governmental 

organizations.

 Its goal is to help these organizations work seamlessly to 

prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and 

mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, 

location, or complexity, to reduce the loss of life, liberty, 

property, and harm to the environment. 

 NIMS information is available at 

www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 25
NIMS Key Components

 Preparedness

 Communications and information management

 Resource management

 Scalability 

 Ongoing management and maintenance

Framework for Preparedness and Response 26
National Animal Health 

Emergency Management System

 APHIS and its stakeholders established NAHEMS to 

provide a functional framework for responding to 

foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents through 

NAHEMS Guidelines, disease response plans (such as 

this ND-specific plan), SOPs, and other associated 

documents. 

 The purpose of the NAHEMS Guidelines is to ensure 

a successful response commensurate with the 

severity of the outbreak.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 27
FAD PReP offers...

 competent veterinary guidance on cleaning and 

disinfection, disposal, mass depopulation, and other 

activities;

 information on disease control and eradication 

strategies and principles;

 guidance on health, safety, and PPE issues;

 biosecurity information and site-specific 

management strategies; and

 training and educational resources.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 28
USDA Roles and Responsibilities

 As the primary Federal agency for incident 

management during an FAD event of livestock or 

poultry, USDA APHIS 

– coordinates Incident Management Teams (IMTs), 

– manages incident response, 

– manages public messages, and 

– takes measures to control and eradicate ND.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 29
Measures to Control and Eradicate ND

 Active surveillance for additional cases

 Quarantine and movement control

 Epidemiologic investigations

 Appraisal and compensation

 Depopulation (euthanasia) of affected poultry

 Carcass disposal

 Cleaning and disinfection

 Diagnostics 

 Emergency vaccination (may be used in some cases)

Framework for Preparedness and Response 30
Requesting Support

 During the course of an ND outbreak response, USDA 

may request support as necessary from other Federal 

agencies. 

 If the President declares an emergency or major 

disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lead 

coordination, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

and DHS assume the lead for coordinating Federal 

resources. 

 USDA maintains the lead of overall incident 

management.

Framework for Preparedness and Response 31
32

Preparedness and Response

ND RESPONSE PLAN
Domestic Activities

USDA has a variety of 

ongoing preparedness 

and response activities 

with respect to ND. 

The following list is a 

selection of ongoing 

USDA activities:

 National Import Export 

Services (NIES)

 Smuggling Interdiction 

and Trade Compliance 

(SITC)

 Emergency veterinary 

assistance

Preparedness and Response 33
International Activities

34 Preparedness and Response

In addition to domestic 

activities, the USDA also 

has ongoing international 

activities to bolster ND 

preparedness planning 

and response capabilities:

 International 

coordination

 Emergency veterinary 

assistance
USDA APHIS Organizational Strategy

 APHIS has adopted NIMS and Incident Command 

System (ICS) organizational structures to manage the 

response to an

 The ICS is designed to enable efficient and effective 

domestic incident management by integrating 

facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and 

communications operating within a common 

organizational structure.

Preparedness and Response 35
APHIS Incident Management Structure

 The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive 

responsible for implementing APHIS policy during an 

ND outbreak.

 The APHIS Administrator will delegate much of the 

actual multiagency coordination (MAC) functions to 

the Veterinary Services (VS) Deputy Administrator, 

who is the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of the 

United States, and the APHIS Emergency Management 

Leadership Council (EMLC).

Preparedness and Response 36
APHIS Incident Management Structure, continued

 The VS Deputy Administrator and the EMLC will 

establish an APHIS Incident Coordination Group (ICG) 

to oversee the staff functions associated with the 

incident at the APHIS headquarters level.

 The APHIS ICG will work closely with the personnel in 

charge of establishing operations for the incident 

response at the Area Command (AC) or Incident 

Command Post (ICP) in the field and coordinate with 

the APHIS MAC Group.

Preparedness and Response 37
Multiagency Coordination

 In the event of an ND outbreak, the EMLC typically 

serves as the APHIS MAC Group, unless the members 

decide to transfer responsibility for a specific 

incident.

 The APHIS MAC Group structure is adaptable and 

easily expands and contracts to provide flexibility.

 The MAC Group—formed if the ND response needs 

more support—establishes supportive relationships 

among the agencies preparing for and responding to 

an ND outbreak.

Preparedness and Response 38
APHIS Incident Coordination Group

 APHIS ICG responsibilities in an ND outbreak include:

– providing guidance to ensure responder and public health 

and safety,

– supporting ICP(s) and AC(s),

– assisting in coordinating resources and integrating 

response organizations into the ICS, and

– providing information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) 

for use in media and stakeholder briefings.

Preparedness and Response 39
APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations 

Center: Relationship to Incident Management Team (Assuming Single Incident)

Preparedness and Response 40
Preparedness and Response 41

APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations

Center: Relationship to Multiple Incident Management Team Structures

(Assuming Multiple Incidents and Unified Area Command)
APHIS Incident Management Levels

 APHIS uses a three-level system of emergency 

response types .

 The levels range from Level III, which has the lowest 

significance, to Level I, which is an event of national 

significance. 

 The levels are used both within APHIS and externally 

to communicate the resource requirements for an 

event or incident. 

Preparedness and Response 42
Incident Management Levels

Preparedness and Response 43
National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps

 NAHERC assists and augments 

Federal and State response to 

domestic and international animal 

disease outbreaks, threats, or 

natural disasters.

 NAHERC is composed of 

veterinarians and veterinary 

technicians who volunteer to 

become temporary Federal 

employees in the event of a national 

animal health emergency.

Preparedness and Response 44
Diagnostic Resources and Laboratory Support

National Veterinary Services Laboratories

 The National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) 

is the official reference laboratory for FAD diagnostic 

testing and study in the United States.

– The NVSL provides all confirmatory testing for ND on all 

specimens found presumptively positive at a National 

Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory or 

other USDA-approved laboratory. 

– The NVSL has two locations for FAD diagnostic testing:

o Ames, IA (NVSL-Ames).

o Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL), Plum 

Island, NY (NVSL-FADDL).

Preparedness and Response 45
Diagnostic Resources and Laboratory Support

National Animal Health Laboratory Network

 NAHLN consists of more than 60 laboratories and 

coordinates the veterinary diagnostic laboratory 

capacity of State animal health laboratories and their 

extensive infrastructure, including facilities, 

equipment, and professional expertise.

 Of these laboratories, over 50 are currently approved 

to perform ND testing diagnostics.

– The NAHLN provides a means for early detection of ND, 

rapid response through surge capacity to test outbreak 

samples, and recovery by the capability to test large 

numbers of samples to show freedom from ND. 

Preparedness and Response 46
47

Response Goals and Strategy

ND RESPONSE PLAN
Response Goals

 The goals of an ND response are to:

– detect, control, and contain ND in domestic poultry as 

quickly as possible;

– eradicate ND using strategies that seek to protect public 

health and the environment, and stabilize animal 

agriculture, the food supply, and the economy; and

– provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to 

facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals 

and non-contaminated animal products.

48 Response Goals and Strategy
Critical Activities

 Public awareness campaign

 Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls

 Rapid diagnosis and reporting

 Epidemiological investigation and tracing

 Increased surveillance

 Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and 

non-contaminated animal products 

 Biosecurity measures

 Mass depopulation and euthanasia, potentially including 

preemptive depopulation

 Effective and appropriate disposal procedures

 Cleaning and disinfection measures

 Emergency vaccination (as the response strategy indicates)

Response Goals and Strategy 49
Epidemiological Principles

 Three basic epidemiological principles form the 

foundation to contain, control, and eradicate ND in 

the U.S. domestic poultry population:

– Prevent contact between the ND virus and susceptible 

poultry.

– Stop the production of ND virus by infected or exposed 

poultry.

– Increase the disease resistance of susceptible poultry to 

the ND virus.

Response Goals and Strategy 50
Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of U.S. ND 

Response

51 Response Goals and Strategy
Response Strategy for Control 

and Eradication of ND in Poultry

 The United States’ primary control and eradication 

strategy for ND in poultry is stamping-out.

 If the spread of ND outpaces the resources for 

stamping-out, or if other factors direct the response 

away from a stamping-out 

strategy alone, emergency 

vaccination strategies 

may be considered.

Response Goals and Strategy 52
Stamping-Out

Definition

“Stamping-out” is defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code as the “killing of animals which are 

affected and those suspected of being affected in the 

herd and, where appropriate, those in other herds 

which have been exposed to infection by direct animal 

to animal contact, or by indirect contact with the causal 

pathogen; this includes all susceptible animals, 

vaccinated or unvaccinated, on infected 

establishments.”

Response Goals and Strategy 53
Stamping-Out

Critical Goals

 Within 24 hours of (or as soon as possible after) a premises 

being classified as an Infected Premises (IP), infected poultry 

will be depopulated in the quickest, safest, and most humane 

way possible. In many cases, poultry on Contact Premises (CP) 

may also be depopulated as soon as possible.

 Where resources are limited, premises will be prioritized so 

that those with the highest potential for active ND spread are 

‘stamped-out’ first.

 Based on the epidemiology of the outbreak, prioritizing the 

poultry to depopulate first may be necessary.

 Public concerns about stamping-out require a well-planned 

and proactive public relations and liaison campaign. 

Stakeholders, the public, and the international community 

must be involved.

Response Goals and Strategy 54
Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out

Response Goals and Strategy 55
Assessing a Possible Outbreak

 During the investigation of premises suspected of having 

ND, animal health responders use clinical signs, history, 

and professional judgment to determine the likelihood 

that ND exists on the premises. This assessment includes

– a history of clinical and epidemiological findings,

– results of physical examinations,

– necropsy findings,

– specimen collection and submission to an approved laboratory,

– reporting, and

– initiating appropriate control measures.

Response Goals and Strategy 56
Authorization for Response 

and Associated Activities

When the criteria for a presumptive ND case have been 

met, the APHIS Administrator or VS Deputy 

Administrator (Chief Veterinary Officer [CVO] of the 

United States) can authorize APHIS personnel—in 

conjunction with State, Tribal, and IC personnel—to 

initiate depopulation, cleaning and disinfection 

procedures of the index case and investigation of 

Contact Premises (CP).

Response Goals and Strategy 57
Management of Incident

 The outbreak response effort should be implemented 

through ICS with an appropriate span of control and 

delegation of authority.

 An Incident Commander should be identified and an ICP 

established.

 In-State resources (whether Federal, State, Tribal, local, 

or privately owned) should be used to manage a local 

response.

 Out-of-State resources may be used to support the State 

impacted by the outbreak. 

 The USDA will notify and coordinate with public health 

agencies in response to ND in poultry.

Response Goals and Strategy 58
Factors Influencing Response

 Consequences of the ND outbreak

 Acceptance

 Scale of the outbreak

 Rate of outbreak spread

 Veterinary countermeasures available

 Resources available to implement response 

strategies

Response Goals and Strategy 59
ND-Free Status

 The criteria needed for ND-free status as described in 

Article 10.9.2 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 

(2013). :

 It has been shown that NDV infection in poultry has not 

been present in the country, zone or compartment for 

the past 12 months, based on surveillance in accordance 

with Articles 10.9.22. to 10.9.26 

 If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free 

country, zone, or compartment, ND free status can be 

regained three months after a stamping-out policy 

(including disinfection of all affected establishments) is 

applied, providing that surveillance in accordance with 

Articles 10.9.22. to 10.9.26. has been carried out during 

that three-month period.

Response Goals and Strategy 60
61

Critical Activities and Tools

ND RESPONSE PLAN
Suspect Case

Definition

 Domesticated bird or flock having clinical signs 

consistent with virulent Newcastle disease virus.

62 Critical Activities and Tools
Presumptive Positive Case

Definition

 A suspect case that has either:

– Positive screening test (rRT-PCR) for Newcastle disease 

virus (APMV-1); OR

– Epidemiological information indicating exposure to 

virulent Newcastle disease virus.

Critical Activities and Tools 63
Confirmed Positive Case

Definition

 Domesticated bird or flock from which:

– Newcastle disease virus (APMV-1) has been isolated and 

identified at the NVSL or laboratory designated by the Secretary 

of Agriculture; AND

– The Newcastle disease virus (APMV-1) has an ICPI in day-old 

chicks (Gallus gallus) of 0.7 or greater; OR

– Presumptive positive and presence of multiple basic amino acids 

in the virus (either directly or by deduction) at the C-terminus of 

the F2 protein and phenylalanine at residue 117, which is the Nterminus of the F1 protein. 

o Failure to demonstrate the characteristic pattern of amino acid 

residues as described above would require virus isolation and further 

characterization by an ICPI test.

64 Critical Activities and Tools
Surveillance

The following are goals in an ND outbreak:

 To implement surveillance plans within 48 hours of the 

confirmation of an outbreak.

 To implement a surveillance plan that will (1) define the present 

extent of ND and (2) detect unknown IP quickly.

 To have the surveillance plan consider the susceptible wild bird 

population in the area, to coordinate with APHIS, U.S. Department 

of the Interior, State wildlife agencies, and State agriculture 

departments to perform appropriate ND surveillance in these 

populations.

 To provide complete surveillance data summaries and analysis at 

intervals as specified by IC.

 To develop effective surveillance plans that can achieve desired 

outcomes by leveraging available resources, satisfying jurisdictional 

requirements, and implementing continuity of business measures

65 Critical Activities and Tools
Surveillance

The following are goals in an ND outbreak:

 Detect ND infected premises during an outbreak.

 Determine the size and extent of an ND outbreak.

 Supply information to evaluate outbreak control 

activities.

 Provide information for poultry and product movement 

within the CA.

 Provide information for poultry and product movement 

out of the CA.

 Prove disease freedom (DF) and regain disease-free 

status after eradication of the outbreak.

Critical Activities and Tools 66
Surveillance Planning for ND Outbreak

• A surveillance plan indicates the frequency, number, 

and distribution of poultry and premises to be 

sampled. This requires tradeoffs be made among six 

surveillance parameters:

– design (threshold) prevalence,

– confidence level,

– types of tests,

– sampling frequency,

– risk-based sampling, and

– sampling scheme.

Critical Activities and Tools 67
Surveillance Objectives by Time Period

 The initial 72 hours post-ND outbreak declaration. 

Detect existing infected flocks and premises as quickly as possible.

 The control and eradication period (from initial 72-hour period until 

last case is detected and eradicated).

Detect infected premises so that control measures can be put in 

place.

Provide evidence that premises are free of ND, thereby permitting 

poultry and poultry product movements in the CA.

Evaluate outbreak management control activities.

Provide evidence that disease is absent from the free area to 

enable unrestricted poultry and poultry product movement.

 Post eradication.

Critical Activities and Tools 68
Diagnostics

 During a suspected or actual ND outbreak, the key 

goals of response are to:

– meet the surge requirements for diagnostic testing at 

specific intervals, starting at time zero and at 24-hour 

intervals as the response escalates, and 

– report all diagnostic test results to appropriate personnel 

and information management systems within 12 hours of 

diagnostic test completion.

The FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0) offers 

detailed information on diagnostic sample collection, diagnostic 

testing, and reporting.

Critical Activities and Tools 69
Diagnostic Flow for FAD Investigations for ND

FAD Investigations

Critical Activities and Tools 70
Diagnostic Flow for FAD Investigations for ND

Outbreak Surveillance Testing

Critical Activities and Tools 71
Surge Capacity

 Surge capacity may be needed in an ND outbreak. 

Additional resources, such as personnel and materials, 

will be needed for sample collection. 

– Additional capacity may also be required for laboratory sample 

testing. 

 Surge capacity can help facilitate a rapid response and 

continuity of business for non-infected premises. 

 In the event that the State NAHLN laboratory and NVSLAmes are overwhelmed by the diagnostic testing 

requirements, NAHLN labs from across the country will 

provide surge capacity for diagnostic testing.

Preparedness and Response 72
Reporting and Notification

 Cases considered a presumptive positive for ND at 

NVSL-Ames, based on the current case definition, 

will be reported to the affected States, other States, 

Tribal nations, industry, other Federal agencies, 

trading partners, and the OIE.

 This includes breeder and commercial poultry flocks, 

domestic waterfowl and upland game birds, backyard 

flocks, and live bird marketing system (LBMS).

 Appropriate Federal-State-Tribal-industry response 

and containment measures are initiated during ND 

investigations.

Critical Activities and Tools 73
Example of Zones, Areas, 

and Premises in ND Outbreak Response

Critical Activities and Tools 74
Epidemiological Investigation

 Epidemiological investigation and movement tracing 

during an outbreak are critical in controlling and 

eradicating ND. 

 In an ND outbreak, the goals are to:

– within 6 hours of identifying potential IP or CP through 

tracing activities, assign a premises classification and a 

priority of investigation; 

– within 24 hours of identifying the IP or initial CP, identify all 

additional CP; and

– within 96 hours of identifying the index case, characterize 

the nature of the ND outbreak, identify the risk factors for 

transmission, and develop mitigation strategies.

Critical Activities and Tools 75
Tracing

 One of the single most important and urgent veterinary 

activities during an ND outbreak is to rapidly and 

diligently trace-back and trace-forward movements from 

an IP.

 This tracing will aid in the control of the spread of ND 

virus and limit the impact of the outbreak.

 Tracing should cover all movements from the premises, 

including susceptible poultry, non-susceptible species, 

animal products, vehicles, crops and grains, and people.

 Tracing also includes consideration of all potential modes 

of transmission and possible contact with wild birds.

Critical Activities and Tools 76
Communication

 Establish a network of stakeholders and systems for 

communication prior to an incident or outbreak.

 Brief the media, public, industry, Congress, trading partners, 

and others on the ND outbreak status and the actions being 

taken to control and eradicate the disease.

 Coordinate with Federal, State, and local agencies, Tribal 

entities, producer groups, and Land Grant University-based 

Cooperative Extension Services to ensure consistent 

messaging regarding animal health, public health, and food 

safety.

 Assure consumers that USDA is working on animal health 

issues, in an informed and timely manner, along with HHS, 

which is working on human health issues.

Critical Activities and Tools 77
Communication Objectives

 All ND communications must:

– furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information;

– maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the 

government’s ability to respond to an outbreak;

– minimize public panic and fear; and

– address rumors, inaccuracies, 

and misperceptions as quickly 

as possible.

Critical Activities and Tools 78
Key Communication Messages

 For consumers:

– ND is not a food-safety issue.

– Properly prepared eggs and poultry are safe to eat.

– We are responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the 

disease.

 For producers:

– You are the best protection your birds have.

– Protect your flocks with good biosecurity practices.

– Know the signs of ND, and be vigilant in reporting signs of 

illness.

Critical Activities and Tools 79
Health and Safety and 

Personal Protective Equipment

 During an ND outbreak, responders 

are exposed to many hazards.

 In an ND response, personal 

protection and safety is particularly 

essential to protect individuals from 

ND infection.

 Those at increased risk for ND 

infection are personnel in prolonged 

and direct contact with infected 

birds in an enclosed setting.

Critical Activities and Tools 80
Biosecurity

 An ND outbreak will have a serious impact on the 

agricultural industry.

 Strict biosecurity measures need to be implemented 

immediately to prevent or slow the spread of ND. 

 Biosecurity procedures should be implemented 

within 24 hours of the identification of an index ND 

case.

 Because some people in contact with ND virus may 

develop conjunctivitis or a mild “flu-like” illness, 

USDA will coordinate with public health agencies to 

minimize risks to responders and others exposed.

Critical Activities and Tools 81
ND Biosecurity Hazards and Appropriate 

Biosecurity Measures

Critical Activities and Tools 82
Biosecurity

Closed Flocks

 To the fullest extent possible, close the flock to the 

introduction of new poultry (with population 

increases occurring only from offspring).

 If closing a flock is not possible, isolate newly 

purchased poultry (from the 

healthiest possible sources) and those returning 

from existing flocks for 30 days or more.

 Vaccination status of introduced poultry should be

known.

Critical Activities and Tools 83
Quarantine and Movement Control

 By restricting the movement of infected animals, animal 

products, and contaminated fomites, quarantine and 

movement control can be a powerful tool in controlling 

and eradicating an ND outbreak.

 Movement control is accomplished through a permit 

system that allows entities to 

make necessary movements 

without creating an 

unacceptable risk of disease 

spread. 

– EMRS 2.0 is the system of

record for these movements.

Critical Activities and Tools 84
Inactivation of AI in Eggs, 

Egg Products, and Meat

Critical Activities and Tools 85

Inactivation of Newcastle Disease in Eggs and Egg Products

Inactivation of Newcastle Disease in Meat
Continuity of Business

 Continuity of business is the management of non-IP and noncontaminated animal products in the event of an ND 

outbreak.

 This helps agriculture and food industries facilitate routine 

business, or a return to business, during a disease response, 

while the risk of disease spread and threat to public health is 

effectively managed.

Critical Activities and Tools 86
Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

 Poultry on an IP will be depopulated as soon as 

possible after declaration of an ND outbreak.

 Poultry on CP may also be depopulated as soon as 

possible after the premises are classified as CP.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Mass Depopulation and 

Euthanasia contains additional information on 

euthanasia and mass depopulation.

Critical Activities and Tools 87
Disposal

 Appropriate disposal of animal carcasses and materials is a critical 

component of a successful ND response.

 The Disposal SOP discusses how to dispose of thousands of bird 

carcasses, contaminated and potentially contaminated materials, 

poultry products, items that cannot be properly cleaned and 

disinfected (such as manure, litter, and bedding), products of the 

response effort (such as PPE), and products of vaccination 

response. 

 Disposal will occur as soon as possible after flock depopulation.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Disposal also contains further guidance on 

disposal activities.

Critical Activities and Tools 88
Cleaning and Disinfection

89

Because of ND’s high survival rate on both 

organic and inorganic materials, aggressive 

cleaning and disinfection practices are required 

for control and eradication.

 Cleaning and disinfection are to be conducted 

within 48 hours of the disposal of depopulated 

poultry.

The NAHEMS Guidelines: Cleaning and Disinfection 

contains additional information on cleaning and 

disinfection.

Critical Activities and Tools
Vaccination 

 Vaccination using lentogenic (low virulence) vaccines 

is widely practiced in the U.S. poultry industry, 

particularly in broiler breeders, layers, and turkeys.

 Vaccination does prevent clinical signs, and can 

thereby mitigate production losses from low 

virulence strains of APMV-1. 

– However, poultry will still shed the virus, and typical 

lentogenic vaccination may not be sufficient to protect 

poultry from a velogenic challenge.

Critical Activities and Tools 90
Deciding to Vaccinate for ND

 Probability that the disease can or 

cannot be rapidly contained;

 Proximity of high-value genetic 

birds to the rapidly spreading 

disease focal point;

 Risk of infection of valuable, rare, 

or endangered nondomestic 

species;

 Poultry density in an area;

 Increased risk of introduction due 

to the presence of ND in 

neighboring countries;

 The extent to which disease is 

found in waterfowl, other wild 

birds, backyard flocks, or in live 

bird markets;

 Availability of physical and human 

resources;

 Sociopolitical factors (public 

confidence in commercial poultry 

products);

 Impact on international trade; and

 Economic consequences of failure 

to control the disease.

91

The decision for emergency vaccination will be based on:

Critical Activities and Tools
Examples of Containment

Vaccination Zones

Critical Activities and Tools 92
Examples of Containment

Vaccination Zones, continued

Critical Activities and Tools 93
Examples of Protection Vaccination Zones

Typically, a PVZ would observed with stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to live.

Critical Activities and Tools 94
VP is typically a secondary designation to another premises designation and is 

only used if vaccination is employed in an outbreak.

Examples of Vaccinated Premises

Critical Activities and Tools 95
Wildlife Management and Vector Control

 Wildlife surveillance and management must be 

conducted by persons trained and proficient in 

wildlife health, capture, collection, biosecurity, and 

restraint.

 ND can be transmitted mechanically by mice, 

vultures, and other vectors. 

 Appropriate biosecurity measures should be in place 

during an ND outbreak to ensure that mechanical 

vectors do not have contact with infected flocks or 

other infected material.

Critical Activities and Tools 96
Appraisal and Compensation

 Indemnity is a key component of APHIS’s disease control 

programs in that the promise of fair compensation for 

losses helps to ensure cooperation from the owners of 

affected poultry.

 In an ND outbreak, ordering the destruction of poultry on 

premises that are epidemiologically linked to an IP may 

be necessary to ensure that the ND does not spread. 

 The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to pay up 

to 100 percent of the fair market value of the poultry, as 

well as for disposal, cleaning, and disinfection.

Critical Activities and Tools 97
Finance

 During an ND outbreak, funding may be rapidly 

required. For responding to specific emergency 

situations, VS has access to a variety of sources for 

funding. The two most common sources are the 

APHIS Contingency Fund (CF) and the Commodity 

Credit Corporation (CCC).

Critical Activities and Tools 98
99

Recovery after an Outbreak

ND RESPONSE PLAN
Surveillance for Recognition 

of Disease Freedom

 Surveillance is fundamental in proving DF to regain 

disease-free status after an ND outbreak.

 The OIE does not grant official recognition for NDfreedom, but as a member of the OIE, the United 

States can self-declare a compartment, zone, or the 

country free from certain OIE-listed diseases such as 

ND.

Recovery after an Outbreak 100
Release of Quarantine and 

Movement Control

 Quarantine and movement control restrictions are 

maintained until at least 21 days have elapsed since 

the decontamination of all confirmed IP and negative 

results of surveillance activities.

Recovery after an Outbreak 101
Repopulation

 Following official approval of cleaning and 

disinfection procedures, IP will remain vacant for a 

minimum of 21 days to ensure that any residual virus 

has been eliminated. 

 This period may be decreased if external heat is used 

to raise the temperature of the houses sufficiently to 

inactivate any residual virus in a shorter period.

 Source flocks for all introduced poultry must test 

negative through rRT-PCR and other diagnostics, as 

determined by IC.

Recovery after an Outbreak 102
103

Further Information
FAD PReP Supporting Documents and Materials

 Strategic Plans—Concept of Operations

 National Animal Health Emergency Management 

System (NAHEMS) Guidelines

 Industry Manuals

 Disease Response Plans

 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Critical 

Activities

 Continuity of Business Plans 

– Commodity specific plans developed by public-privateacademic partnerships

 Ready Reference Guides

104
Key Abbreviations

APMV-1 avian paramyxovirus 

serotype-1

FAD foreign animal disease

FAD 

PReP

Foreign Animal Disease 

Preparedness and 

Response Plan

loNDV low virulence Newcastle 

disease virus

ND Newcastle Disease

NDV Newcastle disease virus

NIMS National Incident 

Management System

105

NRF National Response 

Framework

NVSL National Veterinary 

Services Laboratories

OIE World Organization for 

Animal Health

PPE personal protective 

equipment

vNDV virulent Newcastle 

disease virus

VS Veterinary Services

WHO World Health 

Organization