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Filed 4/21/15 Schapiro-Thorn Inc. v. Mitchell CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SCHAPIRO-THORN, INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL L. MITCHELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

A140800

(City & County of San Francisco

Super. Ct. No. CGC-09-495377)

Daniel L. Mitchell appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration award 

entered against him in favor of his former attorneys Schapiro-Thorn, Inc. (SchapiroThorn). Mitchell’s sundry contentions are based on the fact the arbitration panel 

proceeded with the arbitration after the death of the party-arbitrator Mitchell had selected

and refused to continue the hearing to permit Mitchell to select another party arbitrator.

As troublesome as this circumstance may appear at first blush, the record fully 

supports the finding of the panel that Mitchell had “evinced his unwillingness to 

participate in [the arbitration] proceedings repeatedly during the scheduling of this 

matter” and that under the circumstances there was “no basis in law or equity” to 

continue the scheduled arbitration hearing. The arbitrator designated by Mitchell had 

been ill for an extended period of time, neither he nor Mitchell (himself an attorney) had 

participated in any of the noticed prehearing conferences or complied with any of the 

prescribed preliminary procedures, and Mitchell had failed to replace his designated 

arbitrator despite his extended inability to participate in the proceedings.
2

We agree with the trial court’s implicit determination that there is no statutory 

basis to vacate the arbitration award, and agree that the award was properly confirmed.

Background

Schapiro-Thorn, in the person of Suzie Thorn, represented Mitchell in marriage 

dissolution proceedings and, in December 2009, brought an action against him to collect 

$197,728.55 of attorney fees and costs. In February 2010 Mitchell answered the 

complaint and filed a cross-complaint against the law firm alleging negligence, breach of 

contract and fraud.1 On May 11, 2010, pursuant Schapiro-Thorn’s unopposed motion, the 

court ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute in accordance with the arbitration 

provision in their fee agreement,2and stayed the judicial proceedings pending the 

outcome of the arbitration.

The arbitration provision required each party to select a “party arbitrator” who, in 

turn, would select a “neutral arbitrator.” Schapiro-Thorn selected Honorable Harry Low 

(ret.) as its party arbitrator on May 24, 2010. Mitchell initially refused to select his

arbitrator and, in October, Schapiro-Thorn moved for an order compelling him to do so. 

The court granted this motion on November 4, 2010, and on November 15, 2010, the last 

date permitted by the court’s order, Mitchell selected attorney Herman C. Meyer as his 

 

1

Schapiro-Thorn has contended that it was not properly served with the cross-complaint 

because it was served by Mitchell himself, a party to the action. For present purposes it is 

unnecessary to describe proceedings in the trial court challenging the sufficiency of the 

service and the motion to vacate the entry of Schapiro-Thorn’s default on the crosscomplaint. In all events no answer to the cross-complaint was filed.

2

The arbitration agreement in the parties’ fee agreement reads in relevant part as follows:

“If . . . a dispute exists between the attorney and client regarding attorney’s fees and/or 

costs due under this Agreement or regarding a claim of attorney malpractice, . . . the 

dispute will be submitted for arbitration, and the attorney and client will be bound by the 

result. [¶] . . . [¶] Arbitration shall be in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure § 1280 

et seq. with each party selecting a party arbitrator who, in turn, shall select a neutral 

arbitrator . . . . [¶] A ruling by the majority of arbitrators shall conclusively resolve the 

dispute, and the parties agree that the court having jurisdiction may enter judgment upon 

the decision of the arbitrators, including costs and a reasonable allowance of attorney fees 

involved in securing said judgment to the extent by law. Neither party shall have any 

right to appeal the decision of the arbitrators. . . .” (Emphasis in original.)
3

party arbitrator. The two arbitrators failed to select the third neutral arbitrator (likely as 

the result of Meyer’s failure to agree to anyone, although the record is not clear in this 

respect), and over a year later, on November 29, 2011, in response to Schapiro-Thorn’s 

motion, the court designated Honorable David Garcia (ret.) as the third arbitrator.

Mitchell then refused to pay the initial arbitration fees charged by JAMSEndispute. Schapiro-Thorn filed still another motion to compel him to do so, which the 

court granted on August 23, 2012. Mitchell failed to comply with the order and on 

December 5, 2012 and December 24, 2012 the court issued orders to show cause re 

contempt. On March 11, 2013, the court, although not holding Mitchell in contempt, 

ordered him to pay $1,500 to Schapiro-Thorn as a discovery sanction. Mitchell failed to 

pay his half of JAMS’s fees for a two-day arbitration by the July 7, 2013 deadline, or by 

the extended July 23 deadline, and Schapiro-Thorn thereupon paid the entire fee for a 

one-day hearing. 

On March 20, 2013, Schapiro-Thorn filed its “Notice of Claim” in the arbitration 

proceedings. Mitchell filed no response or statement of affirmative defenses, although a 

response is permitted and affirmative defenses are required to be filed within 14 days of 

service of the claimant’s notice under JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and

Procedures.3

On March 18, 2013 — almost three years after arbitration had been ordered — the 

administrative assistant to Judge Garcia, also referred to as the case manager, advised 

Schapiro-Thorn’s attorney that she had contacted Meyer in an attempt to arrange an 

initial telephone conference between the three arbitrators and had learned that Meyer was 

hospitalized with internal bleeding and would not be available to participate until the 

second week in April. On April 12, 2013, the administrative assistant sent an email to 

 

3 Rule 9(c) of the Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures reads: “Within 

fourteen (14) calendar days of service of the notice of claim, a Respondent may submit to 

JAMS and serve on other Parties a response and must so submit and serve a statement of 

any affirmative defenses (including jurisdictional challenges) or counterclaims it may 

have.” 
4

counsel and to Mitchell advising them of Meyer’s continuing unavailability: “Herman 

Meyer, one of the three arbitrators in this case has been unavailable due to health issues. I 

have received a message from his family that at this point he is unavailable to work on 

the arbitration but hopes to be available within the next month.” The assistant said she 

would discuss the matter with Judge Garcia and then advise the parties of “our next 

steps.” Four days later the administrative assistant sent an email message to Mitchell, 

copies to counsel, advising that she had spoken to Judge Garcia “to let him know that Mr. 

Meyer is very ill and right now unable to participate as an arbitrator (he does want to 

continue eventually)” and that she would like to schedule a conference call the following 

week with Judge Garcia “to discuss the issue of Mr. Meyer’s unavailability.” Counsel for 

Schapiro-Thorn by return email requested the assistant to advise Judge Garcia “that 

Schapiro Thorn is frustrated by the pace of the arbitration” and to ask him, among other 

things, to advise the parties to “determin[e] by a date certain whether Mr. Meyer intends 

to participate, and/or replacing him if necessary.” Mitchell immediately responded that he 

“want[ed] to be present if Judge Garcia is to be addressed on behalf of Schapiro-Thorn.”

It does not appear from the record that such a conference call occurred.

However, on May 8, Judge Garcia and Justice Low conducted an “arbitrator-only 

conference” and issued “Scheduling Order #1 and Report of Arbitrators-only 

Conference.” The order recites that Meyer “received notice of the hearing but did not 

attend.” The order provided as follows with respect to the role of the arbitrators: “Party 

Appointed Arbitrators. The party appointed arbitrators shall conduct themselves as neutral 

arbitrators and shall have no ex parte communications with the parties, nor shall the 

parties have or attempt any ex parte contact with the arbitrator they appointed. [¶] a. The 

panel is to be viewed as a unit; ex parte and ethics rules apply; [¶] b. Judge Garcia will be 

the presiding officer . . . .” The order provided further that the case manager should 

arrange a scheduling conference as soon as practicable and that counsel for the parties 

“shall attend and be prepared to discuss” a list of subjects, including the proposed

arbitration date, completion of the exchange of information pursuant to JAMS rules, 

depositions, the preparation of hearing exhibits and the submission of prehearing briefs. 
5

A case management conference was scheduled for May 29, 2013, but neither 

Meyer nor Mitchell appeared and the conference was rescheduled for June 20. 

On June 20, 2013, a case management conference was conducted before Judge 

Garcia and Justice Low. “Scheduling Order #2 and Report of Case Management 

Conference,” issued on June 27, indicates that both Meyer and Mitchell received notice 

of the conference but that neither attended. The order also states, “Mr. Mitchell failed to 

attend a prior case management conference necessitating the rescheduling of the Case 

Management Conference on June 20, 2013, which conference was ordered by Scheduling 

Order #1.” With respect to the situation concerning Meyer’s absence, this order provided:

“Party Appointed Arbitrator Herman C. Meyer. Mr. Meyer has failed to attend the 

two conferences conducted by the panel of arbitrators. Should Mr. Meyer be 

unable to participate further in these proceedings, Mr. Mitchell shall forthwith 

arrange for the appointment of a party appointed neutral. . . . Unless otherwise 

informed, Mr. Meyer shall be deemed available to serve as a panelist for the 

hearing scheduled below.

“a. Except as provided in paragraph 2.b., and as specified in Scheduling 

Order #1, the party appointed arbitrators shall conduct themselves as 

neutral arbitrators and shall have no ex parte communications with 

the parties, nor shall the parties have or attempt any ex parte contact 

with the arbitrator they appointed. The panel is to viewed as a unit; 

ex parte and ethics rules apply;

“b. Mr. Mitchell may inquire of any neutral he wishes to appoint 

regarding their availability to serve as a neutral on the schedule 

established below.”

Scheduling Order #2 went on to establish a series of dates for the exchange of documents 

and witness lists and related prehearing matters, and provided that the hearing would

commence on August 6, 2013. Mitchell submitted none of the materials that were required 

by this order to be submitted on various dates between July 7 and July 25.

By a letter dated July 27, 2013, sent by regular mail to the case manager, copy to 

Schapiro-Thorn’s attorney, received on July 29, Mitchell first advised them that Meyer 

had died more than two weeks before, on July 10, and added: “It appears that any 

scheduling in this matter must be continued while I retain an arbitrator to replace Mr. 

Meyer.” 
6

The two remaining members of the arbitration panel treated Mitchell’s letter as a 

motion to continue the scheduled August 6 hearing and on July 30, following receipt of 

Schapiro-Thorn’s opposition to a continuance, issued Scheduling Order #3. The panel 

denied the requested continuance with the following explanation:

“Request to Continue Hearing. The Respondent’s request to continue the hearing 

scheduled for August 6, 2013 is denied.

“a. Mr. Mitchell’s request to continue makes no showing of good cause 

for a continuance.

“b. Mr. Mitchell has evinced his unwillingness to participate in these 

proceedings repeatedly during the scheduling of this matter, and 

while the undersigned are grieved at Mr. Meyer's demise can find no 

basis in law or equity to grant the relief requested.

“c. Scheduling Order #2 provides regarding service that service ‘unless 

otherwise stipulated to by the parties, shall occur by either facsimile 

or email to counsel.’ Service of the instant request [i.e., appellant's 

July 27 letter] was not made in compliance with this order. 

Notwithstanding that failure the undersigned will treat the request as 

having been served though not as expeditiously as warranted or 

required.

“d. Scheduling Order #2 reflects that, ‘Mr. Mitchell failed to attend a 

prior case management conference[,] necessitating the rescheduling 

of the Case Management Conference on June 20, 2013, which 

conference was ordered by Scheduling Order #1.’

“e. Mr. Mitchell has not completed the exchange of information required 

by Scheduling Order #2, nor has he otherwise complied with any of 

the deadlines set forth in Scheduling Order #2 requiring the exchange 

witness lists and hearing exhibits.

“f. Scheduling Order #2 further reflects that the Respondent's Party 

Appointed Arbitrator Herman C. Meyer ‘has failed to attend the two 

conferences conducted by the panel of arbitrators.’

“g. Scheduling Order #2 accordingly provides that ‘[s]hould Mr. Meyer 

be unable to participate further in these proceedings, Mr. Mitchell 

shall forthwith arrange for the appointment of a party appointed 

neutral who shall communicate with Joyce Florence regarding 

appointment. Unless otherwise informed, Mr. Meyer shall be deemed 

available to serve as a panelist for the hearing scheduled below.’
7

“h. When so ordered the undersigned arbitrators were informed that Mr. 

Meyer was in extreinis and would in all likelihood be unavailable to 

participate further.

“i. Scheduling Order #2 required that Mr. Mitchell inform himself 

immediately as to Mr. Meyer's availability and replace him. Mr. 

Mitchell took no action to replace Mr. Meyer and as is reflected in 

his request he has yet to take any such action.

“j. Accordingly, the hearing will commence and conclude on August 6, 

2013. . . .”

Mitchell’s petition to this court seeking a writ of mandate and a stay to halt the 

arbitration hearing was denied on August 5, with the qualification that the denial was 

“without prejudice to the arbitration panel, upon Daniel L. Mitchell’s motion, exercising 

its independent authority to continue the arbitration hearing.” (No. A139381.)

Mitchell made no such further motion and failed to appear at the hearing on 

August 6, 2013. The hearing before Judge Garcia and Justice Low nonetheless proceeded 

as scheduled. On August 12, 2013, the panel issued an interim award and on September 9 

a final award. Both recited the history of the proceedings as described above, addressed 

the merits of the dispute, and awarded Schapiro-Thorn $243,794.99 after deducting 

$10,098.48 in the firm’s trust account which the firm was authorized to pay to itself, plus 

interest from the date of the interim award. The interim award authorized Schapiro-Trust 

to file a motion for attorney fees incurred in connection with the arbitration proceedings 

but the firm waived the right to do so. 

On October 7, 2013, Schapiro-Thorn filed in superior court a petition to confirm 

the arbitration award and a motion for an order to grant the petition and enter judgment on 

the award. Mitchell filed a motion to strike Schapiro-Thorns’s supporting evidence and an 

opposition to the motion. The opposition argued the merits of the claim for attorney fees 

and, without reference to any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, asserted that “The 

Neutral Arbitrator and the Plaintiff’s Party Arbitrator erred by their determination to deny 

Mitchell representation” allegedly in contravention of the terms of the arbitration 

agreement entitling both parties to select a party arbitrator. The court granted the motion 
8

and on November 15, 2013, entered judgment confirming the award. Mitchell has timely 

appealed.

Discussion

In his appellate briefs, Mitchell cites Code of Civil Procedure4section 1286.2, 

subdivisions (a)(3), (a)(4) and (a)(5) with virtually no discussion of how these 

subdivisions arguably apply. These provisions provide as follows: “(a) Subject to Section 

1286.4, the court shall vacate the award if the court determines any of the following:

[¶] . . . [¶] (3) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a 

neutral arbitrator. [¶] (4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be 

corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted. 

(5) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to 

postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the 

arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the 

arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.” Mitchell’s cursory argument indicates 

he contends the arbitrators exceeded their authority by disregarding the provision of the 

arbitration agreement requiring each party to select a party arbitrator (§ 1286.2, 

subd. (a)(4)), and he presumably contends that his rights were substantially prejudiced by 

the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause (id.,

subd. (a)(5)). 

Schapiro-Thorn argues initially that Mitchell is precluded from challenging the

confirmation of the award on these grounds because he failed to file a petition to vacate 

the award under section 1285 5or a response to Schapiro-Thorn’s petition to confirm 

under section 1285.2.6It argues that under section 1286, “the court shall confirm the 

award as made . . . unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and 

 

4 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

5

Section 1285 provides: “Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made 

may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. . . .”

6

Section 1285.2 provides: “A response to a petition under this chapter may request the 

court to dismiss the petition or to confirm, correct or vacate the award.”
9

confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceedings.” And section 

1286.4 provides: “The court may not vacate an award unless: [¶] (a) A petition or response 

requesting that the award be vacated has been duly served and filed; or [¶] (b) A petition 

or response requesting that the award be corrected has been duly served and filed . . . .”

(Valsan Partners Limited Partnership v. Calcor Space Facility, Inc. (1994) 25 

Cal.App.4th 809, 818.) We cannot accept Schapiro-Thorn’s argument in this respect.

Although Mitchell did not, literally, file a response to the petition to confirm the 

award, he did file an opposition to Schapiro-Thorn’s separate motion to grant the petition.

This opposition was in substance a request to vacate the award. To the extent that the 

opposition asserted grounds on which the award should be vacated, Schapiro-Thorn 

received notice of Mitchell’s contention and the trial court presumably considered and 

rejected his arguments in granting the motion. Hence, it is necessary to consider Mitchell’s 

objections on the merits.

Nor do we agree with Schapiro-Thorn’s suggestion that the issues Mitchell 

obliquely presents are not subject to judicial review. While the scope of judicial review of 

an arbitration award is “extremely narrow” (Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. United 

Transportation Union (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 416, 422), “[w]hether the arbitrator’s decision 

exceeded the arbitrator’s powers is a question of law we review de novo on appeal” (id. at 

p. 423). However, substantial deference should be given “to the arbitrators’ own 

assessments of their contractual authority.” (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. 

(1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 373.)

Exercising our independent judgment, we agree fully with the trial court’s 

determination that the arbitrators neither exceeded their authority nor prejudiced 

Mitchell’s rights by proceeding with the arbitration hearing under the circumstances 

revealed by this record.7 While the parties’ arbitration agreement provides that “each party 

[shall] select[] a party arbitrator who, in turn, shall select a neutral arbitrator,” these

 

7 On appeal Mitchell does not assert that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his 

objections to the evidence submitted in support of the petition and motion to confirm the 

award. 
10

procedures were followed, albeit upon repeated orders by the trial court compelling 

Mitchell to comply.

The record amply supports Schapiro-Thorn’s characterization that Mitchell 

consistently did “everything he could do to delay the contractual arbitration.” While there 

is no dispute that Meyer’s medical condition and inability to participate as Mitchell’s 

selected arbitrator were genuine, Mitchell demonstrated his unwillingness to submit the 

parties’ claims to arbitration at the outset by initially refusing to appoint his party 

arbitrator and, when ordered to do so, selecting an individual whose ability to perform was 

at the least questionable. When it became clear that Meyer was unable to participate, 

Mitchell failed to replace him as he was urged to do. Finally, when Meyer died on July 10, 

Mitchell waited more than two — almost three — weeks to inform the other arbitrators 

and opposing counsel. Rather than file a request for a continuance, he merely sent by 

regular mail a letter implying that the arbitration would have to be continued indefinitely, 

without any indication that he was making efforts to locate a replacement or when that 

might be expected. Mitchell, himself an attorney representing himself in the proceedings, 

failed to pay his share of the arbitration fees (though ordered to do so), failed to attend all 

prehearing conferences, failed to exchange documents as required by the governing rules 

of procedure and Scheduling Order #2, and failed to submit any of the materials that were 

required in preparation for the hearing, including a response to the notice of claim, 

exhibits, witness list, and a prehearing brief. In view of this history, the remaining 

arbitrators were entitled to conclude that Mitchell had no intention to participate in the 

arbitration, unaffected by Meyer’s medical condition and ultimate death. 

Whatever Mitchell’s intentions, by his persistent refusal to comply with the 

applicable procedures, as well as his failure to object to either of the scheduling orders 

entered by two members of the panel, he may reasonably be held to have forfeited any 

rights he might have had to object to the remaining panel members’ decision to proceed 

with the hearing.

In all events, there is no question but that the issues submitted to arbitration and 

decided by the award were squarely within the scope of issues that the parties agreed to 
11

submit to arbitration, and thus within the power of the arbitrators to decide. (Moncharsh v. 

Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 28; Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. United 

Transportation Union, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 423 [“Generally, a decision exceeds the 

arbitrator’s powers only if it is so utterly irrational that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking 

of the contract between the parties.”].) The absence of the third arbitrator gave rise to no 

prejudice. Rule 7(c) of JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures provides, 

“Where the Parties have agreed that each Party is to name one Arbitrator, the Arbitrators 

so named shall be neutral and independent of the appointing Party unless the Parties have 

agreed that they shall be non-neutral.” Scheduling Orders #1 and #2 both stated that “[t]he 

party appointed arbitrators shall conduct themselves as neutral arbitrators and shall have no 

ex parte communications with the parties, nor shall the parties have or attempt any ex 

parte contact with the arbitrator they appointed.” There is no reason to believe that this 

restriction was not observed by the panel members. 

Rule 24(b) of JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures provides that 

the “Award of a majority of the panel shall constitute the Arbitration Award.” Since the 

two remaining panel members were in agreement as to the award, the presence of the 

third panel member would not have affected the outcome even if he did not agree with it. 

Moreover, it is worth noting that although Mitchell failed to appear at the August 6 

hearing, the panel members received and considered evidence and issued a thorough 

decision carefully analyzing the issues presented. 

Although no reference to this rule appears in the briefs of either party, we have not 

overlooked rule 15(g) of JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures. This 

rule provides, “If, for any reason, the Arbitrator who is selected is unable to fulfill the 

Arbitrator’s duties, a successor Arbitrator shall be chosen in accordance with this Rule.”

Mitchell had the opportunity to select a successor arbitrator and failed to do so. 

Moreover, by failing to assert the need to comply with this rule in the arbitration 

proceedings, and by failing to mention or make any argument based on this rule in his 

briefs to this court, and apparently to the trial court, Mitchell has thrice waived any 
12

possible objection based on asserted noncompliance with the rule. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. 

Proc. (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 400, pp. 458-459; § 701, pp. 769-771.)

None of the cases cited by Mitchell casts any doubt on these conclusions.

Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815 answered the question whether an 

arbitration award is entitled to collateral estoppel effect in favor of a nonparty to the 

arbitration, and a second unrelated question concerning the scope of insurance coverage.

In the course of answering the first question the court reiterated that the scope of 

arbitration is determined by the agreement of the parties. (Id. at p. 830.) The same 

restatement of this principle appears in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 

page 8, addressing the scope of review of an arbitrator’s decision for errors of law, and in

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., supra, 9 Cal.4th at page 375, addressing the 

standard of review of remedies fashioned by an arbitrator. 

Similarly, in California Faculty Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 

935, the court again reiterated that the scope of arbitration is determined by the parties’ 

agreement, and held that the atypical arbitration agreement contained in a collective 

bargaining agreement with California State University did not submit to arbitration

whether to grant tenure and promotion to a probationary faculty member. Marsch v. 

Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 250 again repeated the proposition that the scope of 

arbitration is determined by the terms of the arbitration agreement and held that an 

agreement to arbitrate disputes arising in connection with one partnership agreement did 

not encompass disputes arising out of a different partnership agreement.

None of these cases address the issue presented in this case. There is no question 

but that the agreement between the parties governs the nature and scope of the arbitration. 

Here, the panel of arbitrators was selected in accordance with the terms of the agreement 

but, among his other derelictions, Mitchell failed to select a replacement when that 

person was unable to participate. His own failure to comply does not establish that the 

remaining two arbitrators exceeded their authority in proceeding with the duly noticed 

hearing.
13

Mitchell entered an agreement requiring resolution of the disputes that arose 

between him and Schapiro-Thorn by arbitration, implicitly subject to the applicable rules 

of the arbitration provider (so long as consistent with the Code of Civil Procedure). Rule 

22(j) of JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures provides that “[t]he 

Arbitrator may proceed with the Hearing in the absence of a Party that, after receiving 

notice of the Hearing pursuant to Rule 19, fails to attend.” And rule 29 provides, “The 

Arbitrator may order appropriate sanctions for failure of a Party to comply with its 

obligations under any of these rules. These sanctions may include, but are not limited to, 

. . . in extreme cases, determining an issue or issues submitted to Arbitration adversely to 

the Party that has failed to comply.” Although neither of these rules is directly applicable 

to the present situation, both reflect the fundamental policy that a recalcitrant party

should not be permitted to obstruct the expeditious resolution of disputes submitted to 

arbitration. The decision of the two remaining panel members to proceed in the absence 

of the third member with an arbitration ordered more than three years before, given 

Mitchell’s total noncompliance with the governing rules and procedures, was in full 

accord with this policy and neither an abuse of discretion nor beyond the arbitrators’

authority. The arbitrators were fully justified in finding that Mitchell failed to show good 

cause for a continuance of the August 6, 2013 hearing and, as the trial court correctly 

determined, there is no basis to vacate the resulting award.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.
14

_________________________

Pollak, J.

We concur:

_________________________

McGuiness, P. J.

_________________________

Siggins, J.