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USDA APHIS 

VETERINARY 

SERVICES

October 2020

Planning and Preparing for

Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease

Quick Briefing
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1.

1. WHAT IS FMD?

• FMD is a highly contagious viral disease.

− There are 7 serotypes and more than 80 subtypes of the FMD virus.

• FMD can affect domestic and wild cloven-hoofed animals.

− Domestic animals include cattle, swine, sheep, goats, and domestic 

cervids.

− Cloven-hoofed wild animals include deer, bison, pronghorn antelope, 

and feral swine.

• Animals with FMD typically have a fever, vesicular (blister-like) 

lesions, and subsequent erosions (ulcers) on the inner surfaces of 

and around the mouth, tongue, nostrils, muzzle, feet, and teats.

• Rates of illness can be high in all susceptible species, resulting in 

reduced productivity in meat and milk.

• Death rates can be high in young animals. 

2. IS FMD A THREAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH?

• FMD is not a threat to public health. 

• FMD virus is not the same virus that causes hand-foot-and-mouth 

disease in humans.

• Meat and milk processed from FMD-infected animals is safe to 

eat/drink.

• In a widespread FMD outbreak, the supply of protein available for 

consumers could be affected.

3. DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE FMD?

• The United States is free of the FMD virus

• The United States last experienced an FMD outbreak in 1929.

− Canada has not had an outbreak since 1952; Mexico has not had an 

outbreak since 1954.

− FMD is not presently found in North America, Central America, Western 

Europe, Australia, or New Zealand.

OVERVIEW OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE (FMD)
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4. WHERE IS THE FMD VIRUS FOUND IN THE WORLD?

• FMD is found in parts of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, 

and parts of South America.

• FMD is present in approximately two-thirds of the countries in the 

world.

5. HAVE THERE BEEN RECENT FMD OUTBREAKS IN THE 

WORLD?

• FMD causes many outbreaks each year.

• Outbreaks occur sporadically in non-endemic areas.

6. WHO IS CONCERNED ABOUT FMD?

• FMD is a high priority for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

• FMD is also a concern for State Animal Health Officials, livestock 

producers, and many other stakeholders in animal agriculture due to 

the potential large economic impact and consequences for

consumers.

7. WHY IS FMD SO CONCERNING?

• FMD is one of the most contagious diseases of livestock.

• In 2017, the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service estimated 

that there were approximately 166 million cattle and swine in the 

United States, along with another 8 million sheep and goats—all of 

these animals are susceptible to FMD.

• An outbreak of FMD in the United States would have a substantial 

and detrimental impact on the agricultural economy.

• FMD outbreaks in other countries have had a significant negative 

impact on their economies: FMD in the United Kingdom (2001) had 

estimated losses of $12-18 billion (2017 U.S. dollars, adjusted for 

inflation), including the tourism impact.

RELEVANCE OF FMD 
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• Research suggests an outbreak in the United States could result in 

losses of over $6 billion, even if contained to one state, and scores of 

billions of dollars, depending on the duration of the outbreak, extent 

of trade embargoes, and reaction of consumers to the disease and 

response measures.

8. WHY IS FMD SO ECONOMICALLY DAMAGING?

• In an FMD outbreak of any size, there would be immediate 

disruptions to international exports of meat, meat products, and 

byproducts from cattle, swine, sheep, and goats.

• In a large multistate FMD outbreak, international trade would be 

severely impacted, potentially for an extended period of time.

• There would also be losses from disruptions to interstate commerce 

and production.

− Highly integrated animal agriculture relies on rapid and just-in-time 

movements.

− Disruption (e.g., stop movement orders) of intrastate and interstate 

animal and product movement (such as milk) could interrupt food 

supply chains in both the short- and long-term.

• The direct costs of controlling an outbreak would be high—indemnity 

payments could be large, and activities such as depopulation and 

humane euthanasia activities for animal welfare, carcass disposal, 

disinfection, and vaccination are resource and personnel intensive.

• In addition to direct costs, there are numerous other indirect costs 

and impacts, including unemployment and potential losses or 

disruptions in related industries (such as grain, other feed products, 

tourism, etc.). 

9. WHAT DOES USDA APHIS PLAN TO DO IN AN FMD 

OUTBREAK?

• USDA APHIS will work to achieve its goals for an FMD response. 

These goals are to (1) detect, control, and contain FMD in animals as 

USDA APHIS RESPONSE STRATEGY
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quickly as possible; (2) eradicate FMD using strategies that seek to 

protect public health and the environment, and stabilize animal 

agriculture, the food supply, and the economy; and (3) provide 

science-and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate 

continuity of business. 

• Achieving these goals will allow individual livestock facilities, States, 

Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as 

quickly as possible.

• The objective is to allow the United States to regain FMD-free status

and reestablish international trade without the response effort 

causing more disruption and damage than the outbreak itself.

• USDA will work with other Federal agencies, States, Tribes, and 

Territories to manage and control the outbreak in a unified approach 

alongside the owners, producers, industries, and communities 

affected.

• USDA—as part of a cohesive communications strategy—will assure 

consumers that USDA is responding quickly and decisively to 

eradicate the virus and that meat/meat products and dairy/dairy 

products are safe to consume.

10. CAN’T WE JUST STAMP-OUT FMD?

• Historically, FMD has been controlled by depopulating (also known as 

stamping-out) infected animals.

• Today, in the United States, complete stamping-out of anything 

beyond a small, focal FMD outbreak may not be a viable or 

sustainable response strategy.

− The cost of implementing a total stamping-out strategy could be 

inordinately high.

− The depopulation and disposal of large numbers of animals may not be 

publicly acceptable.

− There is not sufficient capacity to rapidly depopulate and appropriately 

dispose of large numbers of large animal carcasses.

− There may be severe and irreparable economic losses for producers 

from the loss of production animals and destruction of genetic stock.
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− There are critical social and environmental consequences from largescale animal depopulation; producers, owners, and communities can be 

devastated.

− There may be a lengthy interruption in the domestic food supply chain 

for key commodities destined for domestic consumption, including milk, 

meat, and cheese.

11. WILL APHIS VACCINATE OR STAMP-OUT?

• There are several response strategies that USDA APHIS will consider 

in response to an FMD outbreak in domestic livestock. These 

strategies are from the FMD Response Plan: The Red Book (a link is 

provided at the end of this document; please refer to this document 

for further information on the terms in this section).

• Stamping-out

− This strategy is the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals.

• Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill

− This strategy is the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent 

depopulation and disposal of vaccinated animals. Depopulation and 

disposal of vaccinated animals may be delayed until logistically feasible, 

as determined by the Incident Command and the VS Deputy 

Administrator (U.S. Chief Veterinary Officer).

• Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter

− This strategy is the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with slaughter 

and processing of vaccinated animals, if animals are eligible for 

slaughter under USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) authority 

and rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules.

• Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live

− This strategy is the depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact 

susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, without 

subsequent depopulation of vaccinated animals. Vaccinated animals 

intended for breeding, slaughter, or other purposes live out their useful 

lives.
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• Emergency vaccination to live with no stamping-out.

− This strategy is vaccination used without depopulation of infected 

animals or subsequent depopulation or slaughter of vaccinated animals.

• If it becomes apparent at any point in the FMD response that 

stamping-out will not achieve control, containment, and ultimately 

eradication of FMD, alternative strategies will be immediately 

considered, that of vaccination.

• These strategies are not mutually exclusive. Different strategies may 

be implemented simultaneously in different animal populations or in 

different geographic regions.

• Many factors will be considered when determining when to employ a 

particular response strategy; response strategies will be selected to 

best fit the outbreak situation.

• No single factor will independently dictate a response strategy or a 

decision to employ emergency vaccination.

• The primary goal of an emergency response will be to contain the 

outbreak as quickly as possible while causing the least impact on 

animal agriculture. 

12. WHY DON’T WE VACCINATE FOR FMD NOW, BEFORE AN 

OUTBREAK?

• Effective FMD vaccines do exist, but they are strain specific (most 

strains require their own vaccine and do not cross-protect against 

infection from other strains, also known as subtypes).

• Because there are many different strains of FMD circulating, we 

cannot predict which might enter into the United States.

• Vaccinating for FMD has international trade repercussions, which 

would limit the ability of the United States to export.

13. WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES WITH EMERGENCY 

VACCINATION STRATEGIES DURING A RESPONSE?

• FMD emergency vaccination campaigns can be challenging to 

implement.
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• Having sufficient amounts of appropriate vaccine ready to use upon 

detection of FMD is expensive.

• The subtype that will be introduced will not be known in advance, 

and vaccines are usually not cross-protective.

• The United States has extremely large swine and cattle populations.

• When limited amounts of vaccine are available, it is challenging to 

prioritize the distribution of available vaccine.

• Vaccinating animals quickly enough and maintaining records on 

vaccinations are time and resource intensive activities.

14. IS THE UNITED STATES DOING ANYTHING TO KEEP FMD 

OUT OF THE COUNTRY?

• The United States undertakes many preventative measures to keep 

FMD out of its susceptible animal populations.

− USDA APHIS works closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to 

enforce import restrictions and requirements which help to ensure FMD 

is not brought into the country though the legal trade of animals and 

animal products.

− USDA APHIS conducts pathways analyses to minimize opportunities for 

FMD introduction.

• The United States helps other countries control and eradicate FMD 

outbreaks to reduce virus circulation.

• USDA APHIS educates the stakeholders on the risk of FMD through 

exercises and agreements with academia and States.

15. IF WE ARE DOING SO MUCH TO ENSURE FMD DOESN’T 

ENTER THE COUNTRY, WHY DO WE NEED TO PREPARE FOR 

AN FMD OUTBREAK?

• There is always the risk of an FMD introduction into the United 

States.

− FMD is highly contagious and high volumes of international travel and 

trade create a risk.

FMD EXCLUSION
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− Due to the volume of legal products entering the United States, it is 

impossible to search and inspect every shipment, piece of baggage, or 

person entering the country for illegal products.

− There is an unknown quantity of illegal animals and animal products 

entering the United States that may contain FMD.

− It is also possible that FMD may be introduced intentionally.

− To be able to successfully execute an FMD response, we must prepare 

and plan ahead of time; this also helps USDA be prepared to respond to 

other significant animal health incidents.

16. WHAT IS USDA APHIS DOING TO PREPARE FOR AN FMD 

OUTBREAK?

Investigations & Monitoring 

• USDA APHIS trains veterinarians to be able to recognize FMD in 

domestic animals.

• USDA APHIS, in coordination with State Animal Health Officials, 

actively investigates suspected U.S. cases of vesicular disease 

(disease causing blister-like lesions).

• USDA APHIS coordinates with the National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN) so that NAHLN laboratories can run preliminary 

diagnostic testing during an investigation of vesicular disease.

• USDA APHIS also monitors disease outbreaks occurring around the 

world for situational awareness.

Capability Development

• The National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) develops and 

improves diagnostic tests to improve early detection and overall 

diagnostic capabilities; NVSL also coordinates with USDA’s 

Agriculture Research Service to update science and information 

related to diagnostics.

USDA APHIS FMD PREPAREDNESS
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• NVSL supports NAHLN laboratories—the NVSL Foreign Animal 

Disease Diagnostic Laboratory—serves as the U.S. reference 

laboratory to confirm FMD in the United States.

• There are over 40 State, university, and Federal laboratories in the 

NAHLN that can conduct FMD diagnostic testing for vesicular disease 

investigations.

• The United States is part of the North American FMD Vaccine Bank 

(NAFMDVB) in coordination with Canada and Mexico; the bank holds 

limited quantities of vaccine antigen concentrate that can be 

formulated into finished vaccine during an outbreak.

• The Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (The “Farm Bill”) included 

the establishment of the National Animal Vaccine and Veterinary 

Countermeasures Bank (NAVVCB); Vaccine acquisition is currently 

underway to complete this new National Bank.

• The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) is working on modernizing 

processes and capabilities (including procurement, transportation, 

and delivery) to reflect the current practical and logistical realities 

related to effectively implementing emergency vaccination.

• The NVS has contracts in place to provide veterinary 

countermeasures, supplies, and equipment—to States, Tribes, or 

Territories in a disease outbreak.

• During a large-scale animal agriculture incident, USDA can leverage 

additional personnel to provide surge support to States.

• The USDA APHIS National Veterinary Accreditation Program provides 

USDA accredited veterinarians with supplemental training on foreign 

animal, vesicular, and exotic avian diseases, as well as on critical 

response activities and emergency management.

Response Planning

• USDA APHIS produces a public FMD Response Plan: The Red Book

which provides a clear strategic framework for FMD response.

• USDA APHIS updates FMD response policy with regard to response 

strategies to include vaccinate to slaughter and vaccinate to live 

strategies.
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• USDA APHIS provides multiple documents to help all responders

prepare for an FMD outbreak, from investigating a potential case to 

executing a response effort.

• USDA APHIS engages in public-private-academic partnerships to 

develop and exercise the Secure Food Supply Plans, which help to 

facilitate continuity of business in an FMD outbreak: these plans use 

science- and risk-based approaches to mitigate disruptions for 

producers, haulers, and processors in the event of an outbreak.

• USDA APHIS develops, utilizes, and improves models and other

analytical tools that can help to inform decision making prior to and 

during outbreak situations.

Engagement

• USDA APHIS creates public-private-academic partnerships to engage 

academic and industry experts and to help ensure FMD response 

planning reflects their objectives and requirements.

• USDA APHIS holds stakeholder meetings and exercises to discuss 

FMD preparedness planning, including vaccination. 

• USDA APHIS coordinates with other government agencies to identify 

resources, develop processes and agreements, and foster 

partnerships to support coordinated response efforts across 

government.

• USDA APHIS also works with public and private researchers to discuss 

and improve current FMD diagnostic test and vaccine capabilities.

• USDA APHIS routinely engages with bilateral and multilateral trading 

partners on issues of international commerce.

• USDA APHIS engages with international partners, including the World 

Organization for Animal Health [OIE] to harmonize test capabilities, 

collaborate on issues of capacity building, and discuss standards for 

trade and FMD freedom—particularly reducing the time to freedom 

when vaccination strategies are implemented.

Exercises

• USDA APHIS Veterinary Services has a National Training and Exercise 

Program to build preparedness within VS.
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• USDA APHIS conducts exercises to test Incident Command System 

procedures and processes for an FMD outbreak.

• The NVS completes numerous FMD exercises to verify the 

procedures for shipping, transporting, and receiving FMD vaccine. 

• NAHLN conducts tabletop exercises to test laboratory response 

procedures and processes.

17. WHAT ARE USDA’S FUTURE OBJECTIVES, AS RELATED TO 

IMPROVING FMD PREPAREDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES?

• USDA APHIS will continue to work with stakeholders to define 

expectations and preparedness goals for an FMD outbreak. In doing 

so, USDA APHIS

− understands that requirements and best practices may change by region 

and/or species affected;

− is cognizant of the limitations of mass depopulation and disposal as a 

response strategy;

− is aware of the current limitations of FMD vaccines and diagnostics, 

particularly in terms of available quantities and time to delivery; and

− is mindful of the consequences of emergency vaccination on 

international trade.

• USDA APHIS will continue to engage stakeholders so that there is 

increasing interest and participation in FMD preparedness.

• USDA APHIS will continue to work to improve and expand 

communication to external and internal stakeholders regarding the 

capabilities required to effectively execute FMD response strategies.

• USDA APHIS will continue to participate in exercises and update 

response plans, procedures, and processes with lessons learned.

• USDA APHIS will continue to collaborate to improve diagnostic 

capabilities and veterinary countermeasures.
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18. WHAT PLANS AND PROCEDURES ARE CURRENTLY 

AVAILABLE FROM USDA APHIS FOR FMD?

• APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework (Manual 1-0): Roles and 

Coordination

• APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework (Manual 2-0): Response 

Strategies

• APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Incident Information and Reporting 

Manual (Manual 3-0)

• APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Manual (Manual 4-0)

• APHIS A Partial Listing of Foreign Animal Disease Stakeholders 

(Manual 5-0)

• APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Permitted Movement (Manual 6-0)

• FMD Response Plan: The Red Book

• National Animal Health Emergency Management System Guidelines: 

Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, Foot-and-Mouth Disease

• FAD PReP Standard Operating Procedures (including Etiology and 

Ecology and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing, among others)

• FMD Ready Reference Guides

• Foreign Animal Disease Strategy Document: FMD Phases and Types 

of an Outbreak.

19. WHERE CAN I GO TO GET MORE INFORMATION?

• For more information on FMD and foreign animal disease (FAD) 

preparedness, and access to documents previously referenced, 

please go to

− FAD PReP Materials: www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

− APHIS Animal Health Emergency Management: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/emergencymanagement/ct_emergency_management_home.

• For more information on USDA APHIS Veterinary Services, please go 

to

PLANS & FURTHER INFORMATION
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− APHIS Veterinary Services Animal Health:

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth

− Approved NAHLN Laboratories: 

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/nahln/downloads/fmd_lab_

list.pdf.

• For more information on the public-private-academic collaborations, 

please go to

− Secure Milk Supply: www.securemilksupply.org

− Secure Pork Supply: www.securepork.org

− Secure Sheep and Wool Supply: https://securesheepwool.org/

− Secure Beef Supply: www.securebeef.org.