IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-31237

CARLOS HARDISON,

Plaintiff – Appellant

v.

ABDON CALLAIS OFFSHORE, L.L.C.,

Defendant – Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:11-CV-2053

Before OWEN, SOUTHWICK, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Carlos Hardison appeals a grant of summary judgment enforcing a

settlement agreement between himself and Abdon Callais Offshore, LLC for 

personal injuries he sustained aboard a ship. We AFFIRM. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 19, 2011, Carlos Hardison injured his foot aboard a vessel 

owned by Abdon Callais. Hardison struck his foot on a milk crate he was using 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 18, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 12-31237 Document: 00512475522 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/18/2013
No. 12-31237

to access his bunk. The resulting bruise worsened between June 19 and 26, 

prompting the ship’s captain to send Hardison ashore for treatment by a 

physician under an arrangement with Abdon Callais. The physician was 

located in Golden Meadow, Louisiana, which was more than a ten-hour drive 

from where Hardison disembarked from the ship in Port Aransas, Texas. 

Following the visit with the physician, Hardison’s employer directed him to go 

home. His sister drove him home from the company’s Golden Meadow bunk 

facility on July 2. The following day, July 3, Hardison’s sister took him to the 

LSU Medical Center emergency room in Shreveport, Louisiana. 

Eventually, the physicians at LSU Medical Center amputated two of 

Hardison’s toes and, after he filed this suit, his entire right foot and some of 

his lower right leg. This was apparently due to a lack of circulation to the lower 

part of the leg. That circulatory problem likely stemmed from Hardison’s 

diabetes mellitus, with which he was diagnosed in 2002. From 2002 to 2008, 

Hardison treated his diabetes with daily injections of insulin. In 2008, though, 

he discontinued his insulin treatment. Two questions on his Abdon Callais 

employment application asked whether he had or had ever been diagnosed or 

treated for diabetes, and on both he had said “no.” 

Sometime between July 3 and August 18, 2011, Hardison engaged 

George Byrne to represent him in a suit against Abdon Callais for his injuries.

On August 18, 2011, Hardison filed this suit against Abdon Callais based on 

negligence claims under the Jones Act and a claim that the milk crate’s use as 

a climbing aid amounted to unseaworthiness. The suit requested future 

maintenance and cure1 and damages for losing his toes. After evidence of 

Hardison’s diabetes and his decision to discontinue treatment surfaced during 

1 Abdon Callais was already paying Hardison maintenance and cure when the suit 

was filed. 

2

 

 Case: 12-31237 Document: 00512475522 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/18/2013
No. 12-31237

discovery, Abdon Callais moved for summary judgment as to the claim for 

maintenance and cure, relying upon a doctrine known as the McCorpen

defense. See McCorpen v. Cent. Gulf S.S. Corp, 396 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1968).

The defense relieves maritime employers of liability for maintenance and cure 

with respect to injuries to seamen who conceal pre-existing medical conditions. 

Id. at 549. The district court granted the motion on July 12, 2012 as to future 

maintenance and cure, but denied Abdon Callais’ counterclaim to recover 

maintenance and cure already paid. 

Trial on the remaining issues was to begin on August 13, 2012. During 

the week before trial, the parties reached an agreement on a settlement, 

including a gross payment to Hardison of $90,000. Counsel for both parties 

notified the district court of the settlement. The court held a hearing to put 

the settlement on record on August 14, 2012. Because of Hardison’s mobility 

limitations, the district court arranged for him to participate in the hearing by 

telephone. The district judge first questioned counsel for both parties about 

the terms of the settlement while Hardison listened on the telephone. The 

judge then questioned Hardison to satisfy himself that Hardison authorized, 

accepted, and understood the terms and consequences of the settlement. The 

district judge explained that Hardison would receive the settlement documents 

in the mail. After he signed and returned the documents, Hardison would 

receive a check from Abdon Callais. When the documents arrived, Hardison 

took them to a local law firm, where he was advised not to sign them. He then 

discharged attorney Byrne, engaged his current attorney, and refused to sign 

the settlement documents or accept the payment. 

On October 4, 2012, Abdon Callais moved for summary judgment to 

enforce the settlement. Hardison opposed the motion through his new counsel, 

arguing he had never agreed to settle the case. On October 30, Byrne’s law 

firm intervened in the case, arguing that the settlement was valid and that it 

3

 Case: 12-31237 Document: 00512475522 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/18/2013
No. 12-31237

was entitled to receive costs, fees, and compensation from the settlement. At 

a hearing on November 7, 2012, the district judge questioned all the parties, 

including Byrne as intervenor, regarding the validity of the settlement. The 

district court determined that the settlement was valid and granted the 

motion. Hardison now appeals this order as well as the district court’s earlier 

grant of summary judgment with respect to the McCorpen defense. 

DISCUSSION

A. Did Hardison Agree to Settle his Claim?

Settlement contracts for injuries arising from general maritime law are 

governed by federal law. See Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, 780 F.2d 1254, 

1256 (5th Cir. 1986). “In the absence of a factual basis rendering it invalid 

. . . an oral agreement to settle a personal injury cause of action within the 

admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts is enforceable and 

cannot be repudiated.” Strange v. Gulf & S. Am. S. S. Co., Inc., 495 F.2d 1235, 

1236 (5th Cir. 1974). This is the case even when a party later refuses to sign 

the memorializing documents. See Borne, 780 F.2d at 1258, n. 2.

Hardison answered affirmatively three separate questions in the district 

court regarding whether he understood that he was to receive a gross 

settlement of $90,000 in exchange for relinquishing his claim against Abdon 

Callais. The colloquy between the district court and Hardison included the 

following statement: “by signing this release . . . you are completely 

exonerating or completely releasing the defendants.” 

Hardison argues that he is not bound by the settlement because he never 

actually signed the settlement documents. Further, he urges that he believed 

that the district judge’s statement quoted above meant that the settlement 

itself was not valid until he actually signed the documents. Hardison alleges 

he was never told how much money he would receive net of fees and costs, but 

4

 Case: 12-31237 Document: 00512475522 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/18/2013
No. 12-31237

provides support for this only in two affidavits sworn after he refused to sign 

the documents. The district court found these affidavits self-serving and 

therefore insufficient to support a genuine issue of material fact. We agree. 

See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material 

fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Because Hardison presents no other evidence tending 

to show he did not agree to settle, we agree with the district court that there is 

no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hardison agreed to the 

settlement entered into the record on August 14, 2012. See Strange, 495 F.2d 

at 1236.

B. Did Hardison Settle with Complete Understanding of the Agreement?

“Seamen such as [Hardison] are wards of admiralty whose rights federal 

courts are duty-bound to jealously protect.” Borne, 780 F.2d at 1256 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Thus, we analyze whether Hardison relinquished 

his claims for personal injury with “an informed understanding of his rights 

and a full appreciation of the consequences.” Id. The party seeking 

enforcement of a settlement with a seaman bears the burden of showing that 

this inquiry is answered in the affirmative. Id. Among the factors we consider 

are whether the negotiations were at arm’s-length and in good faith; whether 

counsel was competent; whether the plaintiff received sound medical and legal 

advice; whether there is any appearance of deception, coercion, or overreach;

and adequacy of the settlement, but only to the extent that the settlement

might be seen as so unfair that no seaman with a full understanding of his 

rights would have accepted it. Id. at 1256-57. “Absent an express district court 

determination on [whether the seaman settled with full understanding of his 

rights], we must review the record for ourselves or remand the case for such a 

determination.” Id. at 1257. 

5

 Case: 12-31237 Document: 00512475522 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/18/2013
No. 12-31237

The district court found that Hardison settled this case with a full 

understanding of his rights, but it did so without reference to many of the 

relevant factors. If the district court does not make specific findings of fact in 

support of this inquiry, we may make determinations based upon our own 

review of the record or remand for the district court to make such findings. Id.

at 1257. Because the record is sufficient for us to analyze these factors, we will 

do so.

The record shows that the negotiations were typical of settlement 

negotiations; the parties negotiated while mindful of the eventualities of trial, 

the claims and defenses that would be presented, and the district court’s 

pretrial evidentiary rulings. We conclude the negotiations were at arm’slength and were conducted in good faith by both parties. 

As to the competency of counsel and the soundness of legal advice, 

Hardison makes numerous assertions. Hardison asserts both a conflict of 

interest and a number of disagreements with Byrne’s representation of him. 

Hardison alleges that Byrne had a conflict of interest because he learned about 

Hardison’s injury by way of a tip from the captain of another Abdon Callais 

ship and an investigator in Byrne’s employ induced him to accept Byrne’s 

representation in this lawsuit while he was in the hospital. Byrne disputes 

this, claiming he “signed up” Hardison after a meeting at his sister’s home in 

Natchitoches, Louisiana. In any event, Hardison provides no factual support

of either contention beyond the two post-dispute affidavits mentioned above. 

Each of Hardison’s allegations regarding Byrne’s representation is 

aimed at some relatively small detail of Byrne’s development of the evidentiary 

record. None of the allegations includes any explanation of how these specific 

decisions harmed Hardison in the settlement negotiations. Furthermore, 

many of the allegations attack Byrne’s handling of the McCorpen defense 

argument, which had already been dismissed on summary judgment and 

6

 Case: 12-31237 Document: 00512475522 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/18/2013
No. 12-31237

therefore was not relevant to the final settlement of Hardison’s remaining 

claims. Regardless, this is not a malpractice case against Byrne. As is relevant 

here, we conclude his actions do not amount to incompetence that would call 

into question the validity of this settlement.

No party submitted any briefing on whether Hardison received sound 

medical advice during the settlement negotiations. Our review of the record 

discovers no basis to conclude he received less-than-adequate medical advice 

about the nature of his treatment at the time of the settlement. No party 

suggests that Hardison’s decision to settle might have been influenced by any 

medical advice he was or was not receiving. Therefore, we conclude Hardison 

received the requisite level of medical advice in the course of making his 

decision to settle. 

Hardison argues the settlement is deficient, but does not allege any 

deception, coercion, or overreach on the part of Abdon Callais. The employer 

contends the settlement was generous given some of the difficulties Hardison 

would have ultimately faced at trial. We find nothing in the record to suggest 

there was any deception, coercion, or overreach in the settlement process here. 

Hardison does not argue that $90,000 was necessarily inadequate, 

though his attorney stated at the November 7, 2012 hearing that the $25,000 

Hardison would receive net of costs and fees was not enough for the injuries he 

suffered. We have already mentioned that Abdon Callais argues that the 

settlement was fair in light of all of the issues and defenses that would be 

presented at trial. Our review of the record discloses no reason to believe the 

amount was so inadequate that a seaman might be said to lack “an informed 

understanding of his rights and a full appreciation of the consequences.” See 

Borne, 780 F.2d at 1256. We conclude the settlement amount was adequate 

and supports a conclusion that Hardison accepted it with a full understanding 

of its terms and consequences. 

7

 Case: 12-31237 Document: 00512475522 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/18/2013
No. 12-31237

Our independent review of the record supports a finding that Hardison 

entered into this settlement with a full understanding of its terms and 

consequences. The district court did not err in enforcing the settlement. 

C. Does Local Rule 58.3.A of the Eastern District of Louisiana Apply?

Hardison asserts the district court erred by not following its Local Rule 

58.3. The Rule establishes requirements for obtaining a “judgment based upon 

a joint stipulation and compromise” in a case involving a seaman. E.D. LA.

L.R. 58.3.A. In such a case, the parties must make certain filings as well as 

participate in a hearing wherein the district judge questions the plaintiff to 

her satisfaction that the plaintiff understands the terms and nature of the 

settlement. E.D. LA. L.R. 58.3.B, 58.3.C. Finally, “[a] similar procedure may

be followed if a seaman’s case is compromised during trial.” E.D. LA. L.R. 

58.3.D (emphasis added).

We can find no interpretation of Local Rule 58.3 in an opinion from a 

district court or this court. By its terms, it only applies to cases in which the 

parties seek a judgment based upon a joint stipulation and compromise. E.D.

LA. L.R. 58.3.A. Here, the parties did not settle pursuant to a joint stipulation 

and compromise prior to the filing of a complaint. They settled during the 

pretrial course of a bona fide case. This case falls into the permissive section 

of Local Rule 58.3, which does not require that the rule’s formalities be used in

seaman settlements. We conclude Local Rule 58.3.A’s filing and hearing 

requirements for joint stipulations and compromises are inapplicable in this 

case. The district court did not err by not undertaking that Rule’s formalities. 

D. Hardison’s Claim Regarding the McCorpen Defense.

Finally, Hardison claims the district court erred in applying the 

McCorpen defense. Because we find there was a valid agreement, the prior 

8

 Case: 12-31237 Document: 00512475522 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/18/2013
No. 12-31237

summary judgment ruling on the McCorpen defense is no longer relevant. We

need not reach the issue of whether the district court properly applied 

McCorpen because “the actual merits of the case as presented by the pleadings 

[are] no longer of any consequence following” settlement. Cia Anon Venezolana 

De Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 34 (5th Cir. 1967).

AFFIRMED. 

9

 Case: 12-31237 Document: 00512475522 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/18/2013