COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank 

JANET GILBERT MEZZY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 1743-99-1 PER CURIAM 

 JANUARY 18, 2000 

MARK J. MEZZY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Frederick B. Lowe, Judge 

 (Carl W. Isbrandtsen; Carl W. Isbrandtsen, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 No brief for appellee. 

 Janet G. Mezzy (wife) appeals the equitable distribution 

decision of the circuit court. Wife contends on appeal that the 

trial court plainly erred by (1) awarding Mark J. Mezzy (husband) 

fifty percent of wife's Fidelity IRA account #T104862513; 

(2) awarding husband fifty percent of wife's Fidelity SEP/IRA 

account #T104329904; (3) awarding husband fifty percent of wife's 

Fidelity IRA account #T104862513; (4) awarding husband fifty 

percent of the Merrill Lynch Children's College fund and in 

classifying the fund as marital property; and (5) awarding husband 

fifty percent of the marital portion of the equity in the marital 

residence. Upon reviewing the record and opening brief, we 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 Evidence was heard by the commissioner in chancery, whose 

report is presumed to be correct. "The commissioner has the 

authority to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to make 

factual findings. When the commissioner's findings are based 

upon ore tenus evidence, 'due regard [must be given] to the 

commissioner's ability . . . to see, hear, and evaluate the 

witness at first hand.'" Brown v. Brown, 11 Va. App. 231, 236, 

397 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990) (citing Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 

577, 318 S.E.2d 292, 297 (1984)). "The decree confirming the 

commissioner's report is presumed to be correct and will not be 

disturbed if it is reasonably supported by substantial, 

competent, and credible evidence." Brawand v. Brawand, 1 Va. 

App. 305, 308, 338 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1986). 

Fidelity IRA #T104862513

 The parties agreed that this account was opened by wife 

prior to the marriage and that $4,000 of the amount of this IRA 

was wife's separate property. The trial court found that the 

remaining balance of $17,935.50 was marital property, as it was 

contributed by wife during the marriage. While wife argues that 

the marital contributions were transmuted into separate property 

because they were commingled, Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d) provides 

that 

- 2 -
When marital property and separate property 

are commingled by contributing one category 

of property to another, resulting in the 

loss of identity of the contributed 

property, the classification of the 

contributed property shall be transmuted to 

the category of property receiving the 

contribution. However, to the extent the 

contributed property is retraceable by a 

preponderance of the evidence and was not a 

gift, such contributed property shall retain 

its original classification. 

Funds earned and contributed by wife during the marriage were 

retraceable as marital property and, therefore, the trial court 

did not err in classifying those funds as marital. 

 While wife correctly notes that there is no presumption of 

equal division under Virginia law, neither can we say that the 

trial court erred in concluding that it was appropriate to make 

an equal division of the parties' marital assets. See Papuchis 

v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 132, 341 S.E.2d 829, 830 (1986). 

The trial court treated the marital assets claimed by both 

parties in the same way, dividing them equally between the 

parties. Wife has failed to demonstrate sufficient grounds to 

reverse the trial court's decision to accept the recommendation 

of the commissioner. 

Fidelity SEP/IRA #T104329904

 Wife concedes that this account was marital, as it was 

created during the marriage. We find no reversible error in the 

trial court's decision to accept the recommendation of the 

- 3 -
commissioner to equal by divide this marital asset between the 

parties. 

Fidelity IRA #T104862513

 This account was created during the marriage. For the 

reasons previously stated, we cannot say that the trial court's 

decision to accept the recommendation of the commissioner that 

this account be divided in a manner identical to that used for 

other pieces of marital property was reversible error. 

Merrill Lynch Children's College Fund

 Wife contends that the trial court erred in accepting the 

commissioner's report classifying this account as marital 

property and awarding husband a fifty percent interest. The 

fund was opened during the marriage and titled in wife's name. 

Although there was evidence that the parties agreed to use this 

fund for the children's education, the intended use of this 

money did not affect its classification as marital property. In 

contrast, the commissioner found that other property held in the 

children's name was not subject to equitable distribution. We 

find no error in the trial court's acceptance of the 

commissioner's recommendation concerning the classification of 

this account or the decision to divide the account equally 

between the parties. 

Baycliff Drive

 Wife contends that the trial court erred by awarding 

husband fifty percent of the marital equity in the marital 

- 4 -
residence. The commissioner found that the residence was part 

wife's separate property and part marital property. The 

evidence established that wife's parents gave wife $28,000 for 

the down payment on the house during the marriage. The 

commissioner found that an additional $1,000 contribution 

towards the down payment used marital funds. Wife's parents 

insisted that wife purchase the house solely in her name. The 

contract listed wife as the sole purchaser. Husband made no 

separate contributions toward the down payment of the house, and 

his name was placed on the deed by mistake. The parties reduced 

the outstanding mortgage by $9,773.35 through payments made 

during the marriage. Wife made the majority of these payments 

from her separate account, although husband made four payments 

toward the mortgage from his separate funds. 

 Based upon the Brandenburg formula, the trial court 

computed wife's separate share of the equity in the Baycliff 

Drive property and the marital share. See generally Hart v. 

Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 64-66, 497 S.E.2d 496, 504-06 (1998). Wife 

received $75,783.85 as her separate share of the equity in the 

marital residence. The trial court determined that the marital 

portion was $29,158.79, and awarded husband fifty percent of the 

marital portion. 

 We find no reversible error. The house was purchased during 

the marriage, largely with wife's separate funds. However, the 

mortgage was paid during the marriage using marital funds. We 

- 5 -
cannot say that the trial court's division of the equity in the 

Baycliff Drive residence was erroneous. 

Statutory Factors

 Wife also argues that the commissioner and the trial court 

failed to consider the statutory factors set out in Code 

§ 20-107.3(E) when making the equitable distribution decision. 

"A trial court, when considering these factors, is not required 

to quantify the weight given to each, nor is it required to 

weigh each factor equally, though its considerations must be 

supported by the evidence." Marion v. Marion, 11 Va. App. 659, 

664, 401 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1991). 

[U]nless it appears from the record that the 

trial judge has abused his discretion, that 

he has not considered or has misapplied one 

of the statutory mandates, or that the 

evidence fails to support the findings of 

fact underlying his resolution of the 

conflict in the equities, the equitable 

distribution award will not be reversed on 

appeal. 

Blank v. Blank, 10 Va. App. 1, 9, 389 S.E.2d 723, 727 (1990).1 

 The commissioner considered the origin of the parties' 

property and the source of funds used to maintain the property. 

Wife sought a divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion, 

 1

 Although wife noted exceptions to the commissioner's 

report and the supplemental report concerning the classification 

and distribution of specific items of property, wife's only 

explicit reference to the consideration of the statutory factors 

was made, if at all, through an incorporated reference to an 

earlier memorandum. At no point in her exceptions or objections 

did wife clearly raise the objection that the commissioner and 

the trial court failed to consider the statutory factors. 

- 6 -
but the commissioner granted a divorce solely on the grounds of 

the parties living separate and apart in excess of one year. 

The commissioner noted that husband was convicted in 1995 for 

counterfeiting food stamps and that husband sold marijuana for a 

number of years, without wife's knowledge. Nonetheless, the 

commissioner found that husband spent time with the parties' 

children and was a good father "to the best of his ability." 

 Wife failed to note with specificity which statutory 

factors were not considered by the commissioner or how those 

factors would have affected the court's equitable distribution 

award. 

Although the appellant argues that the trial 

court did not consider all of the statutory 

factors, [her] brief fails to identify which 

factors were not considered and how they 

would have affected the trial court's 

determination. Since this argument was not 

fully developed in the appellant's brief, we 

need not address this question. Statements 

unsupported by argument, authority, or 

citations to the record do not merit 

appellate consideration. We will not search 

the record for errors in order to interpret 

the appellant's contention and correct 

deficiencies in a brief. 

Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 

(1992) (citation omitted). Wife, therefore, has failed to prove 

any grounds for reversing the equitable distribution for failure 

to properly consider the statutory factors set out in Code 

§ 20-107.3(E). 

- 7 -
 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

- 8 -