1

Filed 5/26/21 In re M.S. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This 

opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re M.S., Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

B308078

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

19CCJP03438

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed.

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Navid Nakhjavani, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

The juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over M.S., the 

daughter of L.C. (mother) and G.S. (father),

1 under Welfare and 

Institutions Code2 section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c). The court 

found: (1) M.S. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm 

due to father’s interference with her mental health services; and 

(2) M.S. was at substantial risk of serious emotional damage due 

to father making repeated allegations that M.S. had been abused 

in mother’s care, and subjecting her to numerous interviews and 

examinations by social workers, medical providers, and police 

officers. M.S. was placed with her parents, who were ordered to 

participate in family maintenance services. 

At the twelve-month status review hearing, the juvenile 

court found the circumstances justifying the initial assumption of 

jurisdiction no longer existed and were not likely to exist if 

supervision was withdrawn. Thus, it terminated jurisdiction and 

issued a juvenile custody order granting the parents joint legal 

and physical custody with M.S. primarily living with father. 

On appeal, mother contends the juvenile court erred by 

terminating jurisdiction. Specifically, she argues: (1) per section 

364, subdivision (c), father’s failure to complete court-ordered 

services is prima facie evidence that continued supervision is 

necessary; and (2) the record does not contain any evidence to 

rebut that evidentiary presumption. We disagree and affirm. 

1 Father is not a party to this appeal. 

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code. 
3

BACKGROUND

Mother and father have one child together, M.S., who was 

born in January 2007. The parents separated in 2009 and do not 

live together. Per a family court order entered in February 2018, 

they shared 50/50 joint legal and physical custody of M.S., with 

M.S. primarily residing with mother subject to visitation by 

father. 

Prior to the initiation of the dependency case giving rise to 

this appeal, between June 2013 and March 2019, the Department 

of Children and Family Services (Department) received eight

referrals alleging M.S. had been abused while in mother’s care. 

The Department’s investigations into all but one of the referrals 

resulted in a determination that the allegations were either 

“inconclusive” or “unfounded.” The sole referral containing 

“substantiated” allegations of abuse resulted in the Department 

filing a petition on behalf of M.S. in 2015, which was dismissed in 

December 2016. 

In May 2019, M.S. was interviewed at LAC + USC Medical 

Center’s Child Abuse and Neglect Clinic based on “numerous 

allegations from her father of ongoing abuse during the time that 

she spends with her mother.” During the interview, M.S. 

reported: (1) mother and her boyfriend (step-father) argued 

frequently and screamed at one another, and that she was afraid 

their disputes “will turn physical”; and (2) mother makes her feel 

unloved and sad by calling her demeaning names. M.S.’s report 

prompted a referral to the Department. 

During the Department’s investigation, M.S. reported she 

was tired of being involved with the juvenile court and being 

interviewed by social workers, therapists, and police officers. She 
4

related she “fe[lt] uncomfortable when so many [of those] people 

come talk to [her],” and was confused about why social workers 

were frequently checking on her. M.S. further reported that she 

felt angry, depressed, frustrated, sad, and scared when “[these] 

people come talk to [her.]” According to M.S., these feelings have 

driven her to engage in self-harm; she stated she bites her lip 

when police officers or social workers come to speak with her, and 

that she has cut herself on the arm with a paperclip.

Mother reported that per a family court order, she enrolled 

M.S. in therapy on several occasions with different providers.

Father, however, terminated services each time because he

disapproved of the therapists. 

At the adjudication hearing held in July 2019, the juvenile 

court sustained the section 300 petition the Department filed on 

M.S.’s behalf, as amended by interlineation.

3 In so doing, the 

court found the following allegations to be true: (1) M.S. was at 

risk of serious physical harm due to father’s “medical neglect,” in 

that father “has terminated [her] mental health treatment with 

mental health providers on numerous occasions” despite her 

“ha[ving] mental and emotional problems, including a diagnosis 

of anxiety, depression, suicidal ideations and self-harming 

behaviors”; and (2) M.S. was at risk of serious emotional damage 

due to father’s “emotional abuse,” in that throughout the parents’ 

“ongoing custody dispute,” father “ma[de] continuing accusations 

that . . . mother [was] abusing and neglecting [M.S.]” and has 

3 The court struck from the petition the allegations asserting 

mother had emotionally abused M.S. through her involvement in 

the parents’ custody dispute, finding they were not supported by 

sufficient evidence. By this amendment, mother was rendered a 

non-offending parent. 
5

“subjected [M.S.] to numerous interviews with medical providers, 

social workers, mental health providers and law enforcement 

officers on numerous occasions,” which have caused M.S. to 

“exhibit[ ] self-harming behaviors[.]” 

The juvenile court declared M.S. a dependent of the court 

under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c), placed M.S. with her 

parents under Department supervision, and ordered the parents 

to attend mediation to determine a custody arrangement that 

would meet M.S.’s needs. The parents’ case plans required them

to participate in individual counseling, conjoint counseling with 

M.S. when recommended by her therapist, and a co-parenting 

program. The juvenile court further ordered father to submit to a

psychological evaluation under Evidence Code section 730, and 

ordered father not to interfere in M.S.’s relationship with her 

current therapist or terminate services with the therapist. 

In July 2019, M.S. reported she had used a pen to make 

scratch marks on her forearm twice in one week in response to 

mother calling her names. Consequently, in August 2019, M.S. 

was enrolled in Wraparound Services at her therapist’s 

recommendation, as those services were “more intensive” and 

“appropriate for [M.S.] due to ongoing concerns of self-harming 

behavior and ongoing visitation/custody issues.” Later that 

month, M.S. was hospitalized for four days after refusing to visit

with mother and stating “she would rather ‘die than go with her

mother[.]’” Following her discharge, father and mother agreed to 

a safety plan by which M.S. would reside with father until their 

scheduled mediation. 

In September 2019, the parents attended mediation as 

ordered by the juvenile court and agreed to a parenting plan. 

Under this plan, they agreed that in light of her wishes not to 
6

reside with mother, M.S. would live primarily with father, and 

mother would temporarily waive her parental time while she and 

M.S. participated in services to address their issues. They also 

agreed to: (1) refrain from making negative comments about one 

another or their friends and family within earshot of M.S.; 

(2) return to mediation to create a parenting plan as needed at 

the discretion of the juvenile court or the mental health 

professionals involved in the case; and (3) consider M.S.’s safety, 

welfare, best interests, and wishes.

In January 2020, father participated in a psychological 

evaluation by Dr. Alfredo E. Crespo. In his report, Dr. Crespo 

opined father “has been persistent and quite dramatic in 

advocating for the protection of his daughter in the mother’s 

home,” and has engaged in “relentless, odd, [and] obstinate 

efforts to prove that [M.S.] was being abused in her mother’s 

care — without much apparent recognition of the negative 

emotional impact [his actions] ha[ve] had on his vulnerable 

daughter.” Based largely on those observations, he concluded 

“father poses a risk of emotional harm to [M.S.]” He noted father

“may benefit from individual counseling” and “a Spanishspeaking group for parents in high-conflict divorces” to gain 

insight on how his actions have negatively affected M.S. and

contributed to her estranged relationship with mother. 

After making significant improvements in her mental 

health issues, M.S. was transitioned from Wraparound Services 

to community-based therapy in December 2019. 

At the six-month status review hearing held in January 

2020, the Department noted its status review report had 

recommended termination of jurisdiction in light of M.S.’s 

progress, but acknowledged it had received Dr. Crespo’s report 
7

after making its recommendation. M.S.’s counsel and counsel for 

both parents argued the case should remain open. The juvenile 

court rejected the Department’s recommendation. Instead, it

found continued supervision was necessary to ensure the family 

addressed the issues initially giving rise to jurisdiction, and 

ordered the parties to participate in further family maintenance 

services.

Between January 2020 and the twelve-month status review 

hearing held in September 2020,4 M.S. continued to reside with 

father. She reported feeling happy and safe in his care and did 

not exhibit any signs of neglect, abuse, or self-harm. M.S. 

continued to indicate she did not want to see mother, and did not 

want to discuss visiting her or attending conjoint therapy with 

her “because she feels as though she is being pressured and it 

causes her anxiety.” She participated in individual therapy and 

family therapy with father. While mother indicated she wanted 

to see M.S., she was “cooperative [with] and understanding [of]” 

M.S.’s needs, and did not have contact with M.S. at her request to 

avoid causing her further anxiety. 

At the twelve-month status review hearing,the 

Department again recommended termination of jurisdiction, 

emphasizing it did not “believe that there [were] any safety risks 

with the family” and “that the situation has stabilized.” M.S.’s 

counsel and father’s counsel agreed with the Department. By 

contrast, relying on Dr. Crespo’s report, mother’s counsel argued 

M.S. was still at risk of emotional abuse by father, as he was 

“still displaying the type of behavior that led to the filing of [the]

4 At the agreement of counsel for all of the parties, the 

twelve-month status review hearing originally scheduled for July

2020 was continued to September 2020. 
8

petition” and had yet to participate in individual counseling or 

complete a co-parenting program as required by his case plan. 

Mother’s counsel did not offer any new evidence in support of this

position. 

The juvenile court found the conditions justifying the initial 

assumption of jurisdiction under section 300 no longer existed 

and were not likely to exist if supervision was withdrawn. In 

rendering its finding, the court noted that although it “agree[d] 

with Dr. Crespo’s recommendation” regarding the potential 

benefit father might derive from therapy and a parenting group, 

“things have stabilized” in the months following his evaluation of 

father. Accordingly, the court terminated jurisdiction and issued 

a juvenile custody order granting the parents joint legal and 

physical custody, with M.S. primarily residing with father.

Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Principles and Standard of Review 

Section 364 applies where, as here, “an order is made 

placing a child under the supervision of the juvenile court 

pursuant to Section 300 and in which the child is not removed 

from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian[.]” 

(§ 364, subd. (a).) Under this statute, the juvenile court must 

“review[ ] the status of the case every six months . . . ; under such 

review, the court is not concerned with reunification, but in 

determining ‘whether the dependency should be terminated or 

whether further supervision is necessary.’ [Citations.]” (In re 

Pedro Z. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 12, 20.) “The juvenile court 
9

makes this determination ‘based on the totality of the evidence 

before it.’ [Citation.]” (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 

1142, 1155 (Aurora P.).) 

Section 364, subdivision (c) “establishes a ‘statutory 

presumption in favor of terminating jurisdiction and returning 

the children to the parents’ care without court supervision.’

[Citation.]” (Aurora P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155.) This 

statutory provision states: “After hearing any evidence presented 

by the social worker, the parent, the guardian, or the child, the 

court shall determine whether continued supervision is 

necessary. The court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the 

social worker or [the Department] establishes by a preponderance 

of evidence that the conditions still exist which would justify 

initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those 

conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn. Failure 

of the parent or guardian to participate regularly in any court 

ordered treatment program shall constitute prima facie evidence 

that the conditions which justified initial assumption of 

jurisdiction still exist and that continued supervision is 

necessary.” (§ 364, subd. (c), italics added.) 

“Where, as here, the social services agency recommends 

termination of jurisdiction, termination will be the ‘default result’ 

unless either the parent, the guardian, or the child objects and 

establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions 

justifying retention of jurisdiction exist or are likely to exist 

if supervision is withdrawn. [Citation.]” (Aurora P., supra, 

241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163.) Put differently, the party “seeking 

to persuade the juvenile court to do something other than 

follow the statutory presumption favoring termination of 

jurisdiction . . . [bears] the burden to establish the existence of 
10

conditions justifying retention of dependency jurisdiction. 

[Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“The substantial evidence standard of review applies in the 

usual case in which the social services agency opposes

termination of jurisdiction[.]” (Aurora P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1156, italics added.) A “different test,” however, applies 

where the agency recommends termination of jurisdiction, and 

the juvenile court finds that the party bearing the burden of 

proving the existence of conditions justifying further supervision 

failed to meet that burden. (In re N.O. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 899, 

925 (N.O).) In the latter situation, “the question is ‘whether the 

evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant[s] as a 

matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Aurora P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1163; see also N.O., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 926 [“[T]he test 

to be applied is . . . whether . . . [the appellant] can show by 

undisputed facts that the juvenile court erred as a matter of law 

when it terminated [dependency] jurisdiction . . . . [Citations.]”].) 

II. Analysis 

Mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating

jurisdiction. In support of this position, she argues father’s failure

to complete court-ordered services—specifically, his failure to 

participate in individual counseling and complete a parenting 

program—“constituted prima facie evidence that continued 

supervision was necessary” under section 364, subdivision (c), 

which “was not rebutted” by any evidence in the record. Mother

contends the record reflects supervision is still necessary because 

it demonstrates: (1) Dr. Crespo opined father poses a risk of 

emotional harm to M.S. because he does not understand how his 
11

attempts to prove she had been abused while in mother’s care 

negatively impacted her; (2) father continued to engage in the 

problematic behaviors giving rise to dependency, as he continued 

to express concerns about M.S.’s safety in mother’s care based on 

prior allegations of abuse and demanded reinvestigation of those 

allegations; and (3) M.S. “recognized that continued juvenile 

court intervention was necessary when she asked to be able to 

see ‘a specialist who [could] find something better for [her]’” at 

the twelve-month status review hearing. 

As mother correctly points out, the record reflects father

did not enroll in individual counseling or complete a co-parenting 

program, and therefore did not participate regularly in all of the 

services ordered by the juvenile court. By operation of section 

364, subdivision (c), father’s non-compliance with his case plan 

establishes a rebuttable presumption that “the conditions which 

justified initial assumption of jurisdiction still exist and that 

continued supervision is necessary.” (§ 364, subd. (c); Evid. Code 

§ 602 [“A statute providing that a fact or group of facts is prima 

facie evidence of another fact establishes a rebuttable 

presumption.”].) As discussed below, however, the evidence 

presented was sufficient to rebut this presumption with respect 

to each of the grounds on which the court assumed jurisdiction. 

We therefore conclude that, under either the substantial evidence 

standard or the heightened standard articulated in Aurora P., 

supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163 and N.O., supra, 31 

Cal.App.5th at p. 926, mother has not shown the order 

terminating jurisdiction must be reversed. (See Aurora P., supra, 

241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164 [minors’ failure to carry their burden 

under the substantial evidence standard “necessarily” 

demonstrated their inability to satisfy the heightened standard].) 
12

A. Jurisdiction Under Section 300, Subdivision (b)

As noted above, the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction 

over M.S. under section 300, subdivision (b) based on father’s

interference with her mental health treatment, finding his 

repeated cancellation of services with her therapists constituted 

“medical neglect” of her “mental and emotional problems,” which 

placed her at risk of serious physical harm. For the reasons 

discussed below, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to rebut 

the presumption that, given father’s failure to participate 

regularly in court-ordered services, these circumstances still 

existed at the time of the twelve-month status review hearing. 

First, the record reflects M.S. consistently received mental 

health services, and father did not interfere with those services 

even though he occasionally had concerns about them, while she 

was a dependent of the court. Following the juvenile court’s 

dispositional order in July 2019, M.S. participated in individual 

therapy until August 2019, when she was transitioned to 

Wraparound Services. Initially, father was concerned about the 

transition, and did not want her services to change absent court 

order, because he wanted to ensure she stayed in therapy and 

maintained a relationship with her therapist as required by the 

court’s dispositional order. Ultimately, however, he did “not 

express [ ] any resistance” to the transition after speaking to 

M.S.’s therapist at the time. 

Between August 2019 and early November 2019, the 

Wraparound Team “work[ed] with [both parents] to . . . support 

M.S.’s progress, emotional health and wellbeing.” Later on in

November 2019, the Wraparound Team determined M.S. no 

longer needed intensive services and recommended her transfer 
13

to community-based therapy. A month later, M.S. was 

“linked . . . to a community based therapist through Victims of 

Crime, per father’s request.” With this therapist, M.S. engaged in 

individual therapy and family therapy with father up through the 

termination of jurisdiction. In its final status review report, the 

Department stated father ensured M.S.’s psychological needs 

were being met, and has been “consistent in ensuring [she] 

continues receiving services.” 

Next, the record establishes that as a result of receiving

consistent treatment while her dependency case was open, M.S. 

has made significant progress in terms of her mental health. M.S. 

has not engaged in self-harm or expressed a desire to self-harm 

since July 2019. In December 2019, she reported feeling less 

anxious, and reported engaging in “more confident behaviors, 

such as intervening in a fight [at school] . . . and reporting 

incidents to school staff.” Four months later, step-mother 

reported M.S. “has ‘[c]hanged a lot,” that M.S. was “‘better than 

before[,]’” and that she “ha[d] no concerns about [M.S.]” In its

final status review report, the Department reported M.S.: 

(1) “appear[ed] to be developing well and age appropriately”; 

(2) stated she felt “happy and safe” while living with father and 

step-mother; (3) has made “positive progress in her behaviors”; 

and (4) appeared “to be well bonded, thriving, and growing under 

[father’s] care[.]”

Furthermore, the record demonstrates father is invested in 

M.S.’s mental health, has been involved in her services, and will 

ensure she continues to receive them in the future. Prior to her 

enrollment in Wraparound Services, father regularly participated 

in conjoint therapy with M.S. On several occasions, he also 

contacted M.S.’s therapist to address his concerns when M.S. 
14

became upset. Following her graduation from Wraparound 

Services and return to community-based therapy, father 

consistently participated in family therapy with M.S. and 

attended collateral sessions with her therapist to support her 

mental health goals. In its final status review report, the 

Department observed father remained motivated to ensure M.S. 

continued to make progress in her mental health goals and

experienced less anxiety in the future. 

Additionally, we are not persuaded by mother’s argument 

that the Department’s reports of M.S.’s progress are belied by her 

own comments at the twelve-month status review hearing. There, 

M.S. asked to address the court shortly after mother’s counsel 

argued she was still at risk of emotional abuse by father, and the 

juvenile court rejected that argument, found further supervision 

was not required, and granted the parents joint legal and 

physical custody with M.S. primarily residing with father. She 

stated: “There’s just one thing I need to say because . . . you guys 

are saying that my dad . . . does things to me. Now you said you 

want me to go to the custody of father when you guys are saying 

he manipulates me and says things to me. My father doesn’t do 

anything. [¶] My father . . . helps me. He studies with me. And I 

don’t know how you guys could say that. And I think it’s better if 

I see a specialist who can find something better for me because 

I’m already tired of living like this to be honest. . . . I think I need 

a specialist to see me with respect to me and what could go better 

for me in my future.” In response, the court directed M.S.’s 

counsel to “explain to her what happened [at the hearing] and 

what that means for her.” 

Taken in context, M.S.’s comments do not establish she 

“recognized that continued juvenile court intervention was 
15

necessary,” as mother contends. Rather, M.S.’s remarks indicated

she: (1) did not want the juvenile court to be involved in her life 

any longer; (2) firmly disagreed with mother’s counsel’s 

contention that father had emotionally abused her in the past 

and posed a risk of abuse in the future;5 (3) believed that a 

“specialist,” rather than the lawyers involved in her dependency 

case, would be better qualified to determine the arrangements 

that would best suit her needs; and (4) may not have fully 

understood the rulings made at the hearing.

Accordingly, we conclude mother has not shown the trial 

court’s finding that, despite father’s failure to participate 

regularly in court-ordered services, the conditions giving rise to 

jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) did not exist, and

were not likely to exist upon the withdrawal of supervision, is 

unsupported by substantial evidence. She has therefore also 

failed to demonstrate “‘the evidence compels a finding in [her] 

favor . . . as a matter of law. [Citation.]’” (Aurora P., supra, 241 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1163; see also id. at p. 1164 [minors’ failure to 

satisfy substantial evidence standard demonstrated their 

inability to satisfy heightened standard].)

5 At the six-month status review hearing, mother’s counsel

also relied on Dr. Crespo’s report to argue supervision was 

necessary because father was emotionally abusing M.S. As she 

did at the twelve-month status review hearing, M.S. disagreed 

with those assertions, stating: “Right now what I just heard [was] 

that supposedly my dad’s abusing me and not taking care of my 

mental health, that’s a lie right there. So I just want to say that 

my dad’s not abusing me at all. He’s taking care of me, doing the 

best to protect me. And [what] I heard . . . is making me mad. 

And I don’t like hearing what they said [about] my dad.”
16

B. Jurisdiction Under Section 300, Subdivision (c)

The evidence is also sufficient to rebut the presumption 

that M.S. remains at risk of serious emotional harm due to father 

repeatedly alleging she was abused while in mother’s care, 

thereby subjecting her to excessive interviews by social workers, 

medical personnel, and police officers. 

As an initial matter, the record reflects that following the 

petition’s adjudication, M.S. did not engage in self-harm or report 

any emotional problems in response to speaking with social 

workers or being examined by other individuals involved in this

dependency case. Rather, between July 2019 and the termination 

of jurisdiction in September 2020, M.S. consistently reported her 

anxiety and self-harming behaviors were triggered by: (1) mother 

calling her names and speaking to her negatively; (2) being 

around mother and step-father, who fought frequently and 

reportedly visited her at school to talk to her against her will; and 

(3) feeling pressured to return to mother’s care, visit mother,

have contact with mother, or attend conjoint therapy with 

mother. 

Next, we acknowledge mother correctly points out father 

has continually expressed concerns about M.S.’s safety while in 

mother’s care, even after M.S. was no longer seeing mother and 

was residing with him. The evidence, however, demonstrates

father is unlikely to make additional allegations of abuse or 

demand further investigation into prior allegations in the future.

Due to his ongoing concerns, in June 2020, M.S. participated in a 

forensic examination at father’s request to rule out any 

undisclosed physical or sexual abuse. The record does not 

indicate M.S. reported any emotional problems or that she 
17

engaged in any self-harm due to the examination. Father stated 

“he had . . . ‘peace of mind’ after the exam results reported no

child safety concerns for [M.S.].”

Moreover, the record demonstrated the parents’ custody 

dispute has largely come to rest. As noted above, by participating 

in mediation, the parents agreed to allow M.S. to reside primarily 

with father in order to respect her wishes and accommodate her 

mental health needs. This custodial arrangement remained in 

place without incident through the termination of jurisdiction, 

and has been beneficial to M.S. who, as noted above, has 

consistently reported feeling safe and happy while residing with 

father. While mother desires to visit M.S. and begin conjoint 

therapy with her to improve their relationship, she understands

M.S.’s mental health is paramount. Thus, mother has respected 

M.S.’s boundaries and has not had contact with her since August 

2019 to avoid triggering her anxiety and/or self-harming 

behaviors. The juvenile custody order grants the parents joint 

legal and physical custody, adopts the custodial arrangement 

above, and permits the parents to determine parenting time in 

light of M.S.’s preferences and needs in the future. 

Finally, we are not persuaded by mother’s contention that 

Dr. Crespo’s report unequivocally demonstrates continued 

jurisdiction was necessary. Dr. Crespo opined father “poses a risk 

of emotional harm to [M.S.]” because he did not recognize how his 

repeated efforts to prove she had been abused in mother’s care 

had a “negative emotional impact” on her. As the juvenile court 

correctly acknowledged, however, the report was outdated by the 

time of the twelve-month status review hearing in September 

2020; it was completed in January 2020 and was based on a 

single interview with father conducted that month. Therefore, the 
18

report did not account for or address much of the evidence 

discussed above, which shows father is unlikely to make future 

attempts to prove M.S was abused while with mother in the past. 

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude 

mother has not established the trial court’s finding that, even 

though father did not participate regularly in court-ordered 

services, the circumstances initially justifying jurisdiction under 

section 300, subdivision (c) no longer existed and were not likely 

to exist upon withdrawal of supervision, is unsupported by 

substantial evidence. Consequently, she also has not “show[n] by 

undisputed facts that the juvenile court erred as a matter of law”

when it terminated jurisdiction. (N.O., supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 926; see also Aurora P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.) 
19

DISPOSITION

The order terminating dependency jurisdiction is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, J. 

We concur: 

MANELLA, P.J. 

COLLINS, J.