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Filed 9/17/15 P. v. Rodriguez CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RALPH ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

E062622

(Super.Ct.No. FSB1405172)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. William Jefferson 

Powell IV, Judge. Affirmed with directions.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant Ralph Anthony Rodriguez was charged by information 

with attempted criminal threats. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/422, subd. (a), count 1.)

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 The 

information was later amended by interlineation to allege an added count of second 

degree burglary. (§ 459, count 2.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no 

contest to count 2, in exchange for three years of probation, on specified terms, including

41 days in county jail with credit for time served of 41 days. The parties stipulated that 

the reports contained in the court file provided a factual basis for the plea. Defendant 

was sentenced immediately. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court withheld 

pronouncement of judgment and placed defendant on probation for a period of three 

years on the specified terms.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the validity of the plea, and 

requesting a certificate of probable cause, based on a claim that he was pressured into 

signing the plea agreement by his counsel and the district attorney’s office. The court 

granted his request for a certificate of probable cause. We order the trial court to dismiss 

count 1. Otherwise, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged with attempted criminal threats. (§§ 664/422, count 1.) 

Defendant pled not guilty. The information was later amended by interlineation to allege 

an added count of second degree burglary. (§ 459, count 2.) Defendant entered into a 

 

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 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 

noted.
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plea agreement under which he pled guilty to count 2. Before accepting the plea, the 

court questioned him. Defendant confirmed that he had initialed and signed the plea 

form, that he understood everything on the form, that no one had threatened or forced 

him in any way to plead guilty, and that he was not under the influence of alcohol or 

drugs. The court asked defense counsel if he went over all of defendant’s rights with 

him. Counsel confirmed that he did and that he read the agreement to defendant 

verbatim. Counsel stated that he felt defendant had a knowing and intelligent grasp and 

was making a free and voluntary waiver of his rights. After examining him, the court 

found that defendant had read and understood the plea agreement and was knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his constitutional rights. Defendant then pled guilty 

in open court to count 2. Defense counsel joined in, and the prosecutor accepted the plea. 

The parties stipulated that the reports contained in the court file provided a factual basis 

for the plea. Defendant was sentenced immediately. In accordance with the plea 

agreement, the court withheld pronouncement of judgment and placed defendant on 

probation for a period of three years on specified terms. The court noted that the first 

term was that he serve 41 days in jail. However, it awarded 41 days of presentence 

custody credits and thus ordered him released that day.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal in propria persona, and indicated that he was 

challenging the validity of the plea. In his request for a certificate of probable cause, 

defendant simply stated: “I was pressured into sinning [sic] the plea bargain by my 

public defender and the district attorney’s office court representative.” The court granted 

his request for a certificate of probable cause. 
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ANALYSIS

Defendant appealed and, upon his request, this court appointed counsel to 

represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 

25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of 

the case and two potential arguable issues: (1) whether the trial court properly permitted 

the People to amend the information by interlineation to add a count of second degree

burglary; and (2) whether the court was entitled to accept a stipulation from defense 

counsel, as opposed to defendant personally, that a factual basis existed for defendant’s 

guilty plea. Counsel has also requested this court to undertake a review of the entire 

record. 

We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which 

he has done. In a handwritten brief, defendant makes several confusing 

claims/allegations. He begins by asking this court to overturn his conviction of 

“attempted criminal threats = second degree burglary.” He then alleges that: (1) he lost 

his right to a 40-day speedy trial; (2) the district attorney had 60 days to bring him to 

trial; (3) he was “sentenced to max prison befor [sic] he was convicted”; (4) he spent 40 

days and nights in a “max-prison back [and forth] to court 8 times”; (5) his first public 

defender told him there was no crime committed, and he was “gunning for the mayor 

seat”; (6) his first public defender was replaced with another one, who told defendant he 

did not think he was innocent, and if he did not sign the plea agreement, the mayor of 

Redlands was friends with the district attorney, and they would “come after [him] like a 

sledgehammer”; (7) defendant had been without sleep for 40 days and nights and could 
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barely keep his eyes open, so his counsel told him he would read the terms of the plea 

agreement to him, but did not do so; (8) he was coaxed into the plea agreement, and the 

district attorney and public defender took advantage of him, because all they wanted was 

a felony conviction; (9) he found out his public defender and the district attorney were 

running for “state attorney general”; (10) the district attorney had 60 days to try this case, 

and he kept defendant in prison for 40 days and nights to “break [him] down”; (11) the 

district attorney should have had him evaluated by a doctor to see if he was fit to sign a 

plea bargain; 12) defendant had no idea what he was signing, and he “was like being 

drunk or beening [sic] on medication; (13) he is now homeless and should have stayed in 

prison; and (14) his charge should have been dismissed or least been a charge of 

disturbing the peace. 

Defendant first argues that we should reverse his conviction. However, he pled 

guilty, and a guilty plea admits all matters essential to the conviction. (People v. 

DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895.) Furthermore, “[i]ssues cognizable on an appeal 

following a guilty plea are limited to issues based on ‘reasonable constitutional, 

jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings’ resulting in the 

plea. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 895-896; see People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 

1178.) Defendant appears to be arguing that his plea was not valid. However, the 

transcript of the plea proceeding shows that he answered in the affirmative when asked 

whether he understood he was waiving his constitutional rights and whether he 

understood the charges and consequences of his plea. Defendant also answered in the 

affirmative when asked whether he had sufficient time to discuss his case with his 
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attorney, including the evidence against him and any potential defenses. Although he 

now claims his attorney did not read the terms of the agreement to him, the record shows 

that his attorney did. Moreover, although defendant now claims he had no idea what he 

was signing, the record shows that he told the court he initialed and signed the agreement 

only after making sure he understood everything in it. Defendant also answered in the 

negative when the court asked if he was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 

prescription medication that could affect his ability to enter the plea agreement. The trial 

court, which was in the best position to judge defendant’s mental state and demeanor,

found no impairment. To the contrary, the court found that defendant understood the 

nature and consequences of his plea, as well as his constitutional rights, and that his plea 

was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given. 

Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have 

conducted an independent review of the record and find no arguable issues. 

Although not raised by the parties, we note an apparent clerical error. Generally, a 

clerical error is one inadvertently made. (People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 

808.) Clerical error can be made by a clerk, by counsel, or by the court itself. (Ibid. 

[judge misspoke].) A court “has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its 

records so as to make these records reflect the true facts. [Citations.]” (In re Candelario

(1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705.)

In this case, the court neglected to dismiss count 1. The plea agreement stated that 

defendant would plead guilty to second degree robbery (count 2), in exchange for felony 

probation. The agreement also stated that he would be required to attend an anger 
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management program and that he have no contact with the victim. There was no mention 

of the dismissal of count 1 in the plea agreement. Defendant pled guilty to count 2. The 

court did not dismiss count 1. Nonetheless, the minute order states that the court ordered 

count 1 dismissed, on motion of the People. Neither party mentioned the court’s failure 

to dismiss count 1 below or on appeal. Thus, the record indicates that the parties 

intended count 1 to be dismissed. It is evident the court’s failure to order the dismissal 

was inadvertent. Accordingly, in the interest of clarity, we will direct the trial court to 

dismiss count 1.

DISPOSITION

The trial court is directed to order the dismissal of count 1. In all other respects, 

the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

HOLLENHORST

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

CODRINGTON

J.