Filed 12/30/22 In re A.S . CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A

. S

., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Co urt Law. B32 0026

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ASHLEY S

., Defendant and Appellant. ( Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP02108 A )

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson , Judge. Affirmed

. Roni Keller , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Kimber ly Roura , Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Ashley S. (Mother) appeals a court order terminating her parental rights to her child , A.S. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) 1
Mother contends that her rights should not have been termi nated
because (1) she regular ly visit ed A.S., who would benefit from continuing the relationship ( i d. , subd. (c)(1) (B)(i) ), and (2) the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) are unmet. (25 U.S.C.S. § 1901 et seq

. ; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 e t seq. ) We
find no error

. Mother consistently visited ; however, substantial evidence
shows that A.S. is upset by the visits and d oes not want to see Mother more often. After years of services, Mother ’s visits are
still monitored , owing to h er mental health and drug issue s

. To A.S.’s detriment, Mother “sought to undermine” the foster home where A.S. has lived since she was 10 weeks old. ( In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 637

– 638 ( Caden ).) There was no showing
that A.S. would be harmed by severing the ir relationship. Any deficiency in the ICWA inquiry did not cause a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Mother denied Indian ancestry ; no evidence show s that her denial s are incorrect or that A.S. has Indian ancestry. Beca use there is no reason to believe A.S. is Indian, any failure to inquire of extended family
members was harmless. We affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Prior Appeals 2
A.S. was born in January 2019. Two months later, Mother was hospitalized under section 5150. Disturbed by A.S.’s crying, she “was screaming at the child to ‘shut up’ and observed [A.S.] stiffen up in fear.” S he did not want to harm A.S. and “called for help before th ings ‘escalated.’ ” Mother yelled obscenities at a
social worker (CSW) from respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), who t oo k A.S. into protective custody. ( In re A.S., supra , B298229.) Mother has a history of ment al illness and attempted suicide. She is estranged from family and smokes marijuana to calm herself. She took A.S. to the hospital a month after birth; the baby was dehydrated and so underweight that her ribs were showing. Mother “had thoughts of hurtin g” A.S. but did not act
on them. S he was filled with anxiety and had yelled at A.S., who would not stop crying. Before police came to take her to the hospital, Mother was on the phone with psychiatric emergency services for over seven hours. ( In re A.S. , supra , B298229.) After A.S. was returned to her care, Mother called DCFS incessantly to threaten any CSW who might come to her home to assess A.S.’s welfare. Concerned, DCFS obtained a removal order

2 In this section, we summarize facts from Mother’s prior appeals : In re A.S. (May 1, 2020, B298229 [nonpub. opn. ] ( addressing jurisdiction and disposition ) ; In re A.S. (Oct. 30, 2020, B304450 [ nonpub

. opn. ] ( from an order declining to give Mother custody at the six

- month review hearing ) ; and In re A.S. (May 17, 2021, B308364 [nonpub. opn. ] ( from an order declining to return A.S. to Mother’s custody at the 12

- month review hearing )

.4

for A.S. ; Mother cursed and threatened the CSW who car ried out
the order. DCFS filed a petition alleging that A.S. is at risk of
serious harm because Mother cannot provide regular care or protect or supervise A.S. owing to mental illness, postpartum depression, and use of marijuana. The court detained A.S.
because Mother pose d a substantial threat to her and order ed
monitored visits at the DCFS office because Mother made threats against A.S.’s caregivers. ( In re A.S., supra , B298229.)
Mother did not understand why she was involuntarily hospitalized when s he felt overwhelmed and needs parenting help. At age 12, she was depressed from being bullied and attempted suicide. She said, “I do not have any family member or friend for support.” A.S.’s father did not visit or provide care or financial support. ( In re A.S., supra , B298229.) Mother became “tense and nervous” during visits with A.S.
S he fel t safe and supported by DCFS staff in the visiting room and wa s frustrated that A.S. is bonding with the caregiver s

. Mother did not disclose her marijuana use to her psychiatrist, who “highly does NOT recommend for mother to mix her current psychotropic medications with marijuana since that will prevent her having effective outcome from her medications to address her

cur rent mental health needs.” She continue d to panic when A.S.
cri ed during visit s . ( In re A.S., supra , B298229.) Mother brought a stroller containing cat feces to a visit. A.S.’s maternal grandfather (MGF) , who has a minimal relationship with Mother, told DCFS he found cat feces all
around her home and asked DCFS to assess whether the home is safe for a baby. MGF voiced concern about Mother’s history of substance abuse. ( In re A.S., supra, B298229.)5 The court sustained the petition on May 23 , 2019, citin g Mother’s mental health problem s and marijuana use , which
interferes with prescribed medication. The unsanitary condition of her home “reflects a problem with [her] mental health” and is
unsafe for a n infant

. Th e court declared A.S. a dependent,
removed her from parental custody, and ordered Mother to take prescribed medications and participate in random drug testing, a parenting program, and counseling. Visits with A.S. were monitored. Mother appealed. We affirmed the jurisdictional findings and dispo sition. ( In re A.S., supra , B298229.) After disposition, Mother received assistance during visits. She was upset that A.S. slept during visits. S he blame d DCFS for her problems. During a visit, Mother was upset when A.S.

cr ied and kicked away a bottle of formula. Despite being told that A.S. did not want to eat, Mother “ ‘attempted to force the bottle into [A.S.’s] mouth when she was crying extremely loud.’ ”
The monitor told Mother not to “ ‘force feed’ ” the baby; Mother objected that she was not forcing A.S. A.S. stopped crying when Mother laid her down, then resumed when Mother picked her up. ( In re A.S., supra , B304450.) Mother tested positive for marijuana and amphetamine. She denied marijuana use, attributed the amphetamine result to
her Ad derall medication, and failed to appear for the next four drug tests. Mother tried to feed A.S. pureed food while she cried; the baby gagged. Mother then tried a bottle until the monitor
told her that A.S. did not want to eat. Mother had to be coached
h ow to calm A.S. ( In re A.S., supra , B304450.)
Mother had assistance to keep a safe home but gave “lots of excuses to postpone the cleaning and sanitizing [of] her home.”
There was cat litter strewn about. Mother did not understand6

the gravity of the sit uation or do basic cleaning , and the home

wa s unsafe for A.S. CSW saw a sewing needle on the floor and an unclean carpet. Mother said she spreads a blanket on the floor to cover everything. ( In re A.S., supra , B304450.)
I n August 2019 , the court ordered DCFS to assess if Mother
can have unmonitored visits or custody of A.S. Though s he wa s taking medication and attending psychiatric appointments

, Mother’s psychologist stated that she “made very little progress”
and cannot complete task s

. ( In re A.S., supra , B304450.) Police responded to a violent dispute in Moth er ’s home

. H er roommate Christina Z. threatened the lives of Mother, Mother’s cat, and A.S. ; while armed with a knife, she bit and
scratched Mother. Christina sai d Mother photographed th e foster parents’ license plate to locate their home, with plans to kidnap A.S. and murder the caregivers. Mother allegedly bound

, injured , and threatened to kill Christina, who escaped and called police. She accused Mother of using drugs, prostituti o n, and wanting custody of A.S. so she could receive welfare benefits to buy drugs. ( In re A.S., supra , B304450.)
Mother sai d she picked up Christina in the streets to live in
her home. DCFS was concerned that Mother liv es with, in her words, a “convicted felon” and “psychotic.” Mother did not advise
DCFS that Christina was in her home. Their altercation showed Mother’s poor judgment and reflects on her mental stability. I n October 2019, the court denied Mother’s request for unmonitored
visits. ( In re A.S., supra , B304450.) Mother blamed DCFS for her shortcomings. She did not “take [A.S.’s] cues

. ” When A.S. spat out food

, Mother insisted she finish the jar. Mother told A.S., “I would appreciate it if you
didn’t look a t [foster father] like he’s your mother; it really hurt7

my feelings.” At a visit, Mother stared at A.S. for five or six minutes in silence, until the monitor directed her to read to A.S. Mother fed the baby in a rush with large spoonfuls

, then objected

w hen told to slow down and reduce the portion so that A.S. would not spit it out. ( In re A.S., supra , B304450.)
The agency monitor ing Mother’s visits said she is “more
confident and less anxious

. ” Her relationship with the foster family was strained after she photographed their car and license plate. S he test ed positive for amphetamine

, due to her Adderall prescription , which h er psychiatrist believes helps h er focus. S he participat ed in services but h er mental stability and limited support system continue d to be a concern. She visit ed A.S. twice
a week and wishe d to see her more often , but still need ed coaching with A.S. , especially with food. She also needed coaching to clean her house. ( In re A.S ., supra , B304450.) At a contested review hearing in December 2019 , the court
noted Mother ’s efforts and progress but f ou nd that returning A.S. posed a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety, protection, or well

- being ; Mother “is not yet in substantial compliance with the case plan ” despite some progress toward alleviating the causes necessitating placement. Mother appealed
the denial of her request for custody. This court affirmed, concluding that Mother ha d not eliminate d the conditions leading
to A.S.’s removal

, and taking “ an incremental approach ” was not an abuse of discretion. ( In re A.S., supra , B304450.) In February 2020, DCFS su spected Mother was using drugs. She did not comply with directions to resume drug testing . She consistently visited A.S. but forgot necessities, including food , and once stuffed A.S.’s diapers with paper towels after forgetting diapers and refusing the o nes provided by A.S.’s8

caregivers. She had trouble when A.S. wa s fussy and said odd things such as “your grandfather is basically dead to us,” which
A.S. did not understand. Her house had piles of cat litter and “stuff,” which prevented visits from takin g place there. ( In re A.S., supra , B308364.)
Mother di d n o t consent to services recommended by A.S.’s
doctor in 2019 because she did not want A.S.’s caregivers to participate

. A t uncoached visits, she was “observed to have difficulty with the child.” Th e court denied Mother’s request for unmonitored visits in June 2020 because she “often and recently acted in erratic ways

, ” tested positive for marijuana and missed tests. She accused the drug lab of using “dirty pee” and faking her failure to test; she a ccused DCFS of instructing the lab to alter her urine samples; and accused the caregivers of trying to
“steal” A.S. She stopped attending psychotherapy. ( In re A.S.,

supra , B308364.)
At the 12

- month hearing in October 2020 , Mother asked
the court to retu rn A.S. to her care. The court d enied Mother’s
request because of her positive drug tests. Over the objections of DCFS, the court ordered unmonitored visits. On appeal, we affirmed the court’s order. ( In re A.S., supra , B308364.)

Subsequent Reports and Proceedings In November 2020, DCFS asked the court to re instate visit
monitor ing . Mother yelled at CSW, who was trying to arrange
visits ; CSW had to hang up the phone . At an unmonitored visit,
A.S. hit her head and sustain ed a n abraded

, swollen lip

. Two weeks later, she returned from Mother’s home with abr asions on her spine and shoulder. Mother sai d the caregivers caus ed the injur ies . She twice tested positive for methamphetamine, and accused CSW, the drug testing lab

, and A.S.’s doctors of bias.9

Mother prevented A.S. from see ing development expert s . DCFS
felt Mother ’ s mental health issues persist ed . She us es drugs and
believes DCFS plans “to sell” A.S.
T he court reinstated visit monitor ing and ordered Mother to test for drugs weekly and undergo a psychological evaluation

. It transferred education al rights to A.S.’s caregivers. In February 2021 , a USC mental health evaluator report ed that
Mot he r has a p ersonality d isorder, t rauma and s tress d isorder,

c annabis u se d isorder, s ubstance a buse d isorder with presumed stimulant use, and a ttention d eficit / h yperactivity d isorder (ADHD) . Her mental condition s could interfere with her ability to safely parent A.S. The report details the course of DCFS proceedings. It notes
that Mother’s positive tests for methamphetamine resulted from use of the drug, not from any over

- the

- counter medication. Mother blamed her positive result s for cannabis on her proximity to someone who uses it, and attributed her methamphetamine
results t o Nyquil, Adderall, or alteration of her urine sample by the drug testing lab.
T he evaluation states that Mother was diagnosed with
ADHD in childhood ; she reported long

- standing “issues with mood” and a suicide attempt at age 12. She did not medicat e for
her conditions for over a decade , until the DCFS case began. Her toxicology tes t results suggest that she does not take Adderall consistently. Mother had no idea why this case i s still underway

. She sai d she responded to DCFS “bullying” with anger. Now, she tries to compliment DCFS staff, though she doubts they are trying to help her. The evaluator opined that Mother’s mental condition s could impair parenting by affecting bonding or he r ability to monitor or10

supervise A.S . It could cause distress to the child and result in missed appointments and limit e d care, treatment
, and educa tion. Lack of family support is a concern. A.S. ’ s developmental delays demand a high level of parental attention, patience, and care. Mother has low tolerance of frustration, high emotional reactivity, and lacks empathy . This affects her interactions w ith DCFS and willingness to secur e recommended care for A.S. Substance abuse significantly impacts parenting. A.S. is at risk of inconsistent care and supervision f rom Mother’s functional deficits, if they remain untreated.
The evaluator recommended that Mother ha ve weekly psychotherapy with someone trained in personality disorders,

trauma
, and substance abuse; a long

- term substance abuse treatment program; psych iatric medication with monitoring for adherence; parenting programs; and supervised visitation with A.S. Future reunification would depend on Mother’s adherence with court orders and treatment, and demonstration of effective parenting skills.
In a status review, DCFS repor ted that on April 4, 2019, Mother signed a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA

- 020) form

, and the court found no reason to know A.S. is an Indian Child; s he was ordered to keep DCFS, the court

, and her attorney aware of any new informat ion relating to ICWA

status. T he court also determined that Steven R. is A.S.’s alleged
father. A.S., age two, is well cared for ; her caregivers take her t o medical visit s and a rranged for development services once they
obtained educational rights

. A.S. ’ s speech is progress ing ; she can

now put words together. She receives services to address self

harming behavior at bedtime

.11 Mother lives with a friend and is reconnecting with MGF

. She participates in services

, takes prescribed medications , and
insists that she n ever used methamphetamine. DCFS agreed to monitor longer visits and Mother agreed to have positive
communications with DCFS. Her coached visits with A.S. are consistent and go well. Mother said she saw “drugs” between
A.S. ’s toes , which CSW o bserved was lint from the child’s socks. The whereabouts of A.S.’s alleged father are unknown. M other
ha s a tense relationship with the caregivers, who said s he made false accusations about them. They asked that Mother’s virtual
visits with A.S. be moni tored. Mother was angry that A.S. called her caregiver “daddy.”
DCFS wrote that Mother genuinely loves A.S., visited consistently

, and improved her parenting skills. However, “it appears that mother continues to struggle with mental health
issues and dru g use, which [affect] behavior and instability.” DCFS reported that in April to May 2021, Mother tested positive for marijuana four times and failed to test once. DCFS asked the
court to terminate reunification services. At the hearing on May 17, 2021, D CFS argued that Mother has not progress ed after more than two years of services. The
sustained petition relate s to her mental health and marijuana use, yet s he continues to use marijuana , in high amounts

, and has not seen her therapist since June 2020. M other believe s she reached her treatment goals, but he r mental health evaluation recommends weekly therapy to address personality disorders and
substance abuse. Mother is self

- medicating and creating impediments to reunification.
C ounsel for A.S. ask ed th e court to terminate Mother’s services. After acknowledging Mother’s love for A.S., c ounsel12

argu ed s he has not made substantial progress . She recently use d marijuana and is not adherent with prescribed medication. She “is not grounded in reality which poses a risk to the child

, ”
fabricate d accusations against the caregivers and her therapist

, and h armed A.S. by refusing developmental services.
Mother addres sed the court. She denied ever taking methamphetamine and sai d she use s marijuana to help cope with the “meth accusations” and the dependency proceeding

. Mother’s counsel argu ed that DCFS did not provide
reasonable services. Mother participated in the ca se plan and had meaningful visitation. S he denied using methamphetamine

. Even if her positive drug tests are correct, DCFS failed to show that Mother’s drug use affects her ability to parent or poses a risk to A.S. The mental health report ruled out psy chotic disorders. Her thinking is logical and any conflict she has with DCFS is caused by stress. She and A.S. have a strong bond. Mother was not assiste d in finding a therapist who specializes in personality
disorders.
The court terminated services bec ause “the problems that brought the case in persist with little or no change over time.” Mother is using a “really high” amount of marijuana “ as a crutch
and to self

- medicate,” though i t interferes with her prescribed
medication

. She does not regularly t ake Adderall. The court
ci ted Mother’s conflicts with the caregivers, the visitation monitor, and DCFS as showing a mental health problem. She “elevates quickly” when confronted or challenged, and children present daily challenges as they become independ ent. A.S. “is a very young child, so Mother’s mental health must be more stable
than it has been

. ”13 The court praised Mother for seek ing help when she had an aggressive response to her newborn, but “ she has not been able to progress further.” The mental health evaluation showed the same problems that were present when the case started

. Mother ’s “overreaction to basic things and people ” affect “her judgment and ability to parent

. ” H er refusal to obtain developmental services for A.S. “because she was angry and frustrated that the caregivers have developed a bond” with A.S.
“was not in the best interest of her child.”
The court conclude d that returning A.S. to Mother’s physical custody would create a substantial risk of detriment,
DCFS made reasonable efforts to offer Mother services , and her progress was not substantial . It set a hearing to select a permanent plan. Mother’s visits mus t be monitored.
After the hearing, DCFS attempted to locate alleged father Steven R., but was unsuccessful without having his birthdate.
He never visited A.S. or contacted DCFS. The court ordered notice by publication. DCFS submitted a report for the sec tion 366.26 hearing.
A.S. had a “steady weight gain” and growth, despite Mother’s insistence that she is underweight. Mother threatened to sue the pediatrician and DCFS. A.S. developed language skills with speech therapy and receives services for self

- h arming behavior.
A.S. is adoptable. H er caregivers are approved for adoption and wish to provide a permanent and loving home. She has lived
with them since she was 10 week s old and they are bonded. DCFS recommended adoption as the permanent plan. Mother and A.S. enjoy each other’s company during monitored visits. She still panics when A.S. cries. T he court continued the section14

366.26 hearing , at Mother’s request, and ordered a bonding study

. W hile awaiting the bonding study, DCFS reported that A.S. refers to the caregivers as her parents

. H er language skills have
increased

, with use of multiword sentences and good enunciation. During a visit, Mother became upset when A.S. referr ed to the

care giver as “mom.” Mother told A.S. that the caregiver “is a thief. She wants to steal you from me.” CSW reprimanded Mother, who would not listen. She was “angry and loud.” CSW

warn ed Mother not to “badmouth” the caregivers in front of A.S. Mother repli ed that if A.S. refers to the caregivers as her parents,
she “will continue to let [A.S.] know that they are thieves.” She feels they are “lying to the child saying they are her family.” Mother complained that A.S. used the word “vagina

, ” saying the

care givers “must be exposing her to inappropriate sexual
behavior and must be raping her.” The monitor did not hear A.S. use that word. Mother threatened to “sue everyone.” DCFS received a referral alleging child abuse by the caregivers but rejected it as M other’s effort to jeopardize A.S.’s placement. CSW
fear s Mother ha s a negative impact on A.S., who is closely bonded

t o the caregivers. At a hearing, the court said it was “very concerned [Mother] is trying to sabotage the placement” and instructed the vi sitation
monitor to end visits when Mother says any thing inappropriate. In February 2022, DCFS reported that it t ook A.S. to
monitored visits , twice a week, for three years. Mother sai d the caregivers are teaching A.S. to be prejudiced against “fat people,” which they denied. Mother asked CSW, “ I s that why they lie and try to steal from me? Because they are also illegally prejudiced?”
CSW trie d to discuss this with Mother but she scre amed and15

yelled, and CSW had to end the call. After seeing Mother, A.S.

t el l s her dolls, “no, no, that is not your mom.” She stops herself when she calls the caregiver “mom” and seems confused. A.S.’s
teacher wrote that when A.S. return s to school after visiti ng Mother, she is “ teary

- eyed” and “really upset” when asked what
i s wrong. The bonding study was delayed because Mother did not make an appointment for four months

. The psychologist’s bonding study was filed in March 2022. Mother admitted marijua na use but denied methamphetamine

use . She blamed DCFS and her lawyer for A.S. bein g in foster

care. A fter watching three visits, the evaluator observed that A.S. has “a strong attachment” to the caregivers; she was
reluctant to leave them and ran to the m , suddenly animated and happy

, when visits end. A.S. did not try to sit near Mother, climbed off Mother’s lap, shook her head “no” when Mother asked if she would like to see Mother more often, and did not rep ly when Mother said, “I love you

, ” at the end of a visit. A.S. was hungry, but Mother did not bring food to the visit. A.S. was not upset when visits end. The caregivers reported that before visits with Mother, A.S. had nightmares and “peed in her pants, though she was fully potty trai ned

. ”
The evaluator “was struck” that A.S. “did not make
affectionate moves” toward Mother

, turn ing her face away three
times when Mother tried to kiss her cheek and resist ing getting in Mother’s lap. A.S. asked if she could take a treat from Mother
“home ,” i.e., to the caregivers. The visitation monitor said that
after visits A.S. says she wants to “go home” or see “Muti and Papa” (the caregivers ) . A.S. regressed when he r usual monitor was on vacation, suggesting that she may not feel safe with
Mother w ithout the monitor present.16 The study concludes that A.S.’s “primary attachments or bonds are with the caregivers, since she has been with them since
she was 10 weeks old. .

. . In her mind, they are her parents. Her relationship with [Mother] appears to be one of a playmate or

now

- familiar adult who cares about her and gives her rewards
and treats.” DCFS reported that Mother record ed visits with A.S. in violation of a court order, but refused to stop when asked to do so. She told the monitor to “call you r bitch off,” referring to CSW.
Mother was upset when A.S. said, “I am going to home to see my family,” and told the child, “I am your family.” She demanded
that A.S. be re moved from the caregivers

. DCFS wrote that
Mother’s visits “ upset and confuse ” A. S. T he maternal grandmother (MGM ) spoke to CSW and asked to care for A.S.
MGM never visited A.S. in three years , saying “there were too many cooks in the kitchen.” CSW called MGM when A.S. was detained in 2019, but MGM did not return the call. The section 366.26 hearing was conducted in April 2022. The court granted the caregivers de facto parent status, over Mother’s objection. Mother testified that she has visited A.S. twice a week, for two hours, for three years. T hey read, watch
televisio n, play games, and paint A.S.’s nails. The relationship is very affectionate and A.S. s ays , “I love you

. ” After initially stating that her relationship with DCFS i s “friendly,” Mother next said it i s “contentious.” She tried to get along but DCFS had no interest and would not help with reunification unless the court pushed it. CSW “gaslit” Mother when MGM called to express interest in adopting A.S. Moth e r admitted ha ving a bad relationship with the foster parents17

because they are dishonest, kept her awa y from A.S. for no

reason , and interfered with reunification.
A.S. ’s attorney asked the court to terminate parental rights. A.S. would not benefit from continuing the relationship

, and “visits have had an ongoing negative effect” on her. Ending
the relat ionship would not be detrimental to A.S. Mother asserted that A.S. sees Mother as her parent and is relaxed in her presence, if not overly affectionate. DCFS focused too much on Mother’s mental health, conflicts with CSW

, and lack of progress in treatmen t. Mother has been a constant presence in
A.S. ’s life. DCFS argued that the focus should be on the best interest of the child, not Mother’s interests. At Mother ’ s monitored visits

, A.S. sees her as a playmate or familiar adult. A.S. views the caregiver s’ home as her home, is bonded with them, and it would not be detrimental to end visits or her relationship with Mother. The court acknowledged Mother ’s diligen ce in visiting A.S. ; however, their bond i s not a substantial and positive attachment
that would significantly benefit A.S. from its continuation.
Mot he r is limited to structured monitored visits. A.S. clearly views the caregivers as her primary parents, a bond that Mother has tried to sabotage. Mother’s disruptive behavior would continue, to A.S. ’s detriment, if parental rights are not
terminated. Continued contact with A.S. “will confuse the child more and more as she ages, as Mother tries to drive a wedge between herself and the caregivers,” which will cause A.S. to feel guilty and could disrup t her relationship with the caregivers entirely. M GM and MGF have no bond with A.S., so it is too late for them to be interested in adoption.18 The court concluded that the benefit of adoption outweighs any detriment from end ing A.S.’s relationship with Mother. A.S. is adoptable and thriving with her caregivers. The parental bond exception to adoption w as not proven by a preponderance of the
evi dence. The court terminated parental rights and identified the permanent plan as adoption. It ended Mother’s visits.
DISCUSSION

1. Termination of Parental Rights At the selection and implementation hearing, the court “shall terminate parental rights ” if a child is likely to be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 49; In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532 .) 3 Adoption is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. ( In re Autumn H. (199 4 ) 27 Cal.App.4th 567
, 574 .) “ But i f the parent shows that termination
would be detrimental to the child

. . . the court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan.

. . .

‘ [ T ]he statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstance s [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption. ’ ” ( Caden , supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630

– 631.)
Mother asserts that parental rights cannot be terminated
because the “parental benefit exception ” to the policy favoring adoption applies . ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) .) As discussed below, the record does not support her claim.
T he parental benefit exception requires a parent to show
that (1) the parent regularly visited the child, (2) the child w ould benefit from continuing the relationship, and (3) terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child. “ [T] he exception applies in situations where a child cannot be in a parent ’ s custody

3 Mother does not dispute that A.S. is likely to be adopted.19

but where severing the child ’ s relationship with th e parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child. ” ( Caden , supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.
629

– 630.) It “ rests on a variety of factual determinations properly reviewed for substantial evidence [but] the ul timate decision that termination would be harmful is subject to review for abuse of discretion. ” ( Id. at p. 630.) The first element is satisfied. The record shows, and the parties agree, that Mother regularly visited A.S. to the extent permitted by court orders. Consistent visits allow a parent and child to develop a significant, positive emotional attachment. ( Caden, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Next, we focus on A.S.’s best interest to assess if s h e would benefit from continuing the relationship . This element is affected by “ ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effe c t of
interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” ( Caden, supra, 11 Ca l.5th at p. 632.) T hird party
witnesses

, including psychologists, can provide relevant evidence
about the parent/child bond. ( Id

. at pp. 632

– 633.) Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that A.S.
does not benefit from her relationship with Mot her. The record generated over three years shows that A.S. was only briefly in Mother’s care. A month after birth

, she was dehydrated and so underweight that her ribs were showing; soon after , A.S. was

e ndanger ed by Mother’s extreme reaction s to her crie s. She was
detain ed and has spent the rest of her life out of Mother’s custody. Mother’s visits are monitored for A.S.’s safety

. A.S.’s development was adversel y impacted by Mother , who h eedlessly
thwarted recommended special needs services for petty reasons

. W itnesses provided insight into Mother’s bond with A.S. The USC psychiatrist opined that Mother’s mental conditions20

affect her ability to bond with and safely supervise A.S

. Mot he r need s weekly psychotherapy and to avoid drug u s e

. Ho wever, sh e ceased psychological care in June 2020 and continue s to use marijuana ; it interferes with her prescribed medication , which
she d oes not consistently take

. Visits ha ve a negative impact on A.S. She has nightmares and urinary incontinence before visits. A.S.’s teacher wrote that after A.S. see s Mother, she is “ teary

- eyed” and “upset

. ” A.S. act s out her distress with dolls, saying “no, no, that is not your mom.”
Mother sa ys derogative things to A.S. about the caregivers

, calling the m “thieves” trying to “steal” her ; she is playing mental games with a three

- year

- old to sabotage her placement. Mother
sai d she intends to continue telling A.S. that the caregivers are not her family. The bonding study shows A.S. is primarily
attached to her caregivers

. The court justifiably found that Mother’s cruel conduct is “very damaging” to A.S. Mother feels a positive emotional attachment but A.S. “does not.” Finally, the court must decide if “it would be harmful to the
child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” ( Caden,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The question “is how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship

— in effect, what life would be li ke for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the c hild’s life.” ( Ibid. ) A bonding expert may opine whether the child would suffer from losing the biological parent or benefit from alleviating the emotional instability and anxiety associated with facing an uncertain future home. ( Ibid. ) Acting in the ch ild’s best interest, the court determine s “whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of a new21

adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[]’ the child, the court should not terminate parental rights. .

. . W hen the relationship with a parent is so importa nt to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent. ” ( Caden, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.
633

– 634.)
The record shows that the benefit of a permanent adoptive home outweighs any possible detriment posed by severing A.S.’s relationship with Mother. The bonding study indicates that A.S.
would not be harmed : She has lived with the caregivers since infan cy and “ [i] n her mind, they are her parents,” not Mother.
Mother upset s A.S. by reprimanding he r when she refers to the caregivers as her parents. A.S. repeatedly turned away when
Mother tried to kiss her. The study state s that Mother ’s relationship is “one of a playmate or now

- familiar adult who
cares about [A.S.] and gives her rewards or treats.” The study offer s firsthand observation s ; it was not terse or conclusory. ( In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 850 [ bonding study briefly described a parent

- child video visit].) A playmate or friend does not represent the type of substantial, positive emotional attachment that outweighs the security of belonging to the family who ha s cared for A.S. nearly her entire life. There is no showing, in the bonding study or elsewhere, that A.S. would be harmed by severing the natural parent/child relationship . A.S.’s attorney asserted that Mo the r has “an ongoing negative effect” on the child

. The court’s determination that A.S. would not be harmed was not arbitrary,

capr icious

, or patently absurd. ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 [abuse of discretion standard].)
In sum , t he court did not err by selecting termination of parental rights and implementing a plan of adoption

. Mother22

was appropriate ly credited for her consistent visitation. But the problems leading to A.S.’s 2019 detention

— Mother’s mental health and drug use

— were never resolved

. A s a result

, s he i s limited to monitored visits despite years of services

. “[A] parent ’ s inability to o vercome the issues that led to the dependency is not a categorical bar to applying the exception ,” though it is relevant to the inquiry. ( In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 852

– 853 .) A parent who gains “understanding of herself and her children’s
need s” with mental health treatment may be able to ensure “positive” interactions, which is relevant to whether the child would benefit from continuing the relationship or be harmed from losing it. ( Caden, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637

– 638 .) A.S. ha s no significant attachment to Mother, who m she

s ees as a friend , not as a parent . Mother still panic s when A.S. cries, despite one

- on

- one coaching. A guardianship is untenable

, especially when the evidence shows that A.S. is upset before and after visits ; M other is hostile to the caregivers ; and visits require
monitor s

. ( Compare In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 855

– 856 [child lived with his mother for three years before detention, a therapist noted their positive affectionate relationship, and he

wa s happy after visits].) If parental rights are not terminated, A.S. w ould be damaged by Mother’s increasing ly desperate efforts to drive a wedge between A.S. and he r caregivers : Mother denigrate s them in front of A.S. and fabricat e s reports of child abuse

. A.S. could lose her placement with the only family she recognizes. Under the circumstances, A.S.’s interests are best served by severing the parental relationship and providing her with permanence and stability in the adoptive ho me.23 2. ICWA Does Not Require Conditional Reversal Mother argues that no one questioned her relatives about Indian ancestry. The record shows s he denied knowing that A.S. has any Indian ancestry in March 2019 ; in April 2019 , she signed an ICWA

- 020 form decla ring

, “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” She described alleged father Steven R. as a white supremacist; he never visited A.S. and c an not be located

. Mother was raised by MGM and is in contact with MGF . She has no other living relatives

— siblin gs, cousins, aunts, or uncles. At the

outset of the case

, DCFS left a message for MGM, who never called back. MGF spoke to DCFS in 2019 but it is unclear if he

was asked about Indian ancestry. At the section 366.26 hearing, the court asked if ICWA was i nvestigated; no one objected when DCFS said it was. We review ICWA findings under a substantial evidence standard. ( In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430.) If undisputed facts show the initial inquiry into Indian heritage was deficient, we d etermine whether the deficiency invalidates findings that ICWA does not apply. ( In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 777, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578, ( Dezi ).) DCFS contends that any failure to ask M GM or MGF
about A.S .’s ancestry is harml ess. We agree.
ICWA establishes standards to follow before an Indian child is removed from parental custody. ( In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881

– 882.) An “Indian child” is “either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a).) From “the initial contact” with a family, DCFS and the court have “an affirmative and continuing d uty to inquire” whether a child “is or may be an Indian child.” ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2,24

subd. (a).) This means “asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, and others who have
an interest in the child .

. . whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” ( Id. , subd. (b).) At initial appearances, the court must ask if a participant knows whether the child is Indian. ( Id., subd. (c).) Additional inquiry and notice to tribes is required only
if there is “reason to believe” or “reason to know” that the child is Indian. ( Id. , subds. (d), (e) & (f).) Mother does not claim membership in a federally recognized tribe or assert that A.S . is eligible for membership as the child of a member of an Indian tribe. ( 25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(4).) She was questioned by DCFS and denied Indian ancestry. DCFS spoke to MGF , then briefly to M GM but apparently did not inquire about Indian ancestry. Mother argues that this lapse
mandates reversal. 4
Some courts have held that fai lure to question extended family members requires automatic reversal “no matter how ‘slim’ the odds are that further inquiry on remand might lead to a different ICWA finding by the juvenile court.” ( Dezi

, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 777, rev.gr.) We do n ot follow the automatic reversal rule. ( Id. at pp. 782

– 785.) “In our view, an agency’s failure to conduct a proper initial inquiry into a dependent child’s American Indian heritage is harmless unless the record contains information suggesting a reason to believe that the child may be an ‘Indian child’ within the meaning of ICWA, such that the absence of further inquiry was prejudicial to the juvenile court’s

4 Mother does not argue that DCFS improperly failed to determine if A

. S .’s alleged father is Indian. He could not be interviewed because he never contacted DCFS, could not be found with a due diligence search, and had to be served by publication

.25

ICWA finding. For this purpose, the ‘record’ includes both the record of proceedings in the juven ile court and any proffer the appealing parent makes on appeal.” ( Id. at p. 779, fn. omitted.)
The record shows no reason to believe A.S . is an Indian child. Mother denied Indian heritage. She was raised by MGM
and was in contact with MGF

. When parent al rights were terminated, Mother was living with MGM. Unlike the mother in
In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 548, who was adopted at age two and lacked information about her biological family, there is no concern that Mother does not know her heritag e. Though Mother has a history of mental illness, t here is no indication that she is too ill to know who she is. In short, Mother points to nothing in the record indicating possible Indian heritage nor does she make a proffer on appeal of such heritage. ( Dezi, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 786, rev.gr.) A judgment cannot be set aside unless it has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, meaning “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the abse nce of the error.” ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; Dezi, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 779, rev.gr.) Mother has not shown a miscarriage of justice. She denied Indian heritage to DCFS , and never said anything to the contrary
to the court. Her attorney did not object to the adequacy of the ICWA inquiry, or to the court’s ICWA findings, or suggest that Mother has Indian ancestry. ( In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1013.)26 DISPOSITION The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN

- GERST, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.