COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Willis, Fr ank and Clements

JEAN E. ATTARD MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 22 88-01-2 PER CURIAM MARCH 12, 2002 ANTHONY J. ATTARD

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF HENRICO COUNTY George F. Ti dey, Judge (Deanna D. Cook; Brem ner, Janus, Cook & Marcus, on brief), for appellant. (Carol A.N. Breit, on brief), for appellee.

Jean E. Attard (m other) appeals the de cision of the trial court to grant Anthony J. Attard (father) future unsupervised visitation with their minor child. Mother conten ds the circuit court abused its discretion in (1) granting husband future unsupervised visitation , (2) deferring decision maki ng authority on the issue of unsupervised visi ts to Clinical Alternativ es, and (3) placing husban d in charge of monitoring his ow n counseling and reporting his minor child's diff iculties. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of th e parties, we co nclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily af firm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.BACKGROUND On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevaili ng below and grant to that party all inferences fairly de ducible ther efrom. See McGuire v. McGuire , 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). The parties married on December 6, 1986. One child, Ch arles J. Attard (the child), was born of this marriage on No vember 18, 1994. The parties separa ted in February 1999. Mother was diagnose d with brain cancer during her pregnancy in August 1994. She underwent brain surgery on Dece mber 19, 1994, one month after de livering the child. Duri ng the course of this surgery, a tumor was re moved from the right fr ontal parietal lobe of mother’s brain. Mother subsequently suff ered a recurrence of symptoms for which she underwent additi onal chemothera py in 1998. She is presently taking the medication s Dilantin and Phenobarbital to prevent seizures. In January 1998, mo ther and father note d that the child's behavior toward fa ther abruptly changed. On at least five or six occasions, the child told father to die; go aw ay. On these occasions, the child re sisted being alone with father. The child also resisted father's attempts to change his diap ers. Mother testified that it was about this time sh e learned of husband’s alleged sexu ally deviant behavior. Concerned abou t the child’s be havior, the parties consulted a child psychologi st, Dr. Crichign o. Father met once with

- 2-Dr. Crichigno an d was questioned about his sexual behavior. Within two months of this meeting, father sought counseling to address mother 's concerns about his se xual behavior. Father admitted suffering sexu al abuse as a child. In 1998, father ac cepted an extended work as signment in Japan; the child accomp anied mother to New York wher e she received medical treatm ent. Upon arriving in Japan, father decided to abandon the assign ment and return to Rich mond. A month later, father traveled to New York to visit mother and the child. Both parties testifie d that father's access to the child wa s restricted and supervised by mother during this and subsequent visits. In February 1999, mo ther returned with th e child to Richmond, but she did not re sume cohabitation with father. Before the issuance of an order al lowing supervised visi tation in late 2000, father visited the ch ild "on a majo rity of the weekends" for periods of up to three and one-half hours. All such visits were supervised. By May or June of 1999 , the child' s behavior, according to mother, again started to decline. She initiated divorce procee dings on Augu st 12, 1999. That month, mother consulted Dr. Pa mela Waaland regarding her perception that the child's behavi or had declined. Dr. Waaland testified that during the initial meet ing mother stat ed that the child was having trouble with sleep, very fearful, having nightmares, bi zarre behavior, [a nd] having some aggression. At that meeting, mother expressed her concern about fath er's sexual - 3-behavior and her suspic ion that father was sexually abusing the child. Since Au gust 1999, Dr. Waaland ha s conducted ov er thirty sessions with the ch ild. She char acterized the meetings as common. Dr. Waaland me t with father once, in January 2000. At trial, Dr. Waaland diag nosed the child with adjustment reaction disorder and stated that she was unable to ru le out a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. One possible explanatio n for the child's disord er, Waaland stated, was that he was sexu ally abused. The trial court directed Dr. Evan Nelson to evaluate father to assess him for traits of sexual deviancy th at might be relevant to his parenting abil ities. For the evaluation , Dr. Nelson reviewed his interviews with father, documents submitted by mother, and the testimony of, am ong others, Dr. Waaland and mother. Dr. Nelson note d that mother's allega tion of sexual abuse seemed to be the primar y reason for requesting this evaluation and addressed the issu e accordingly. Dr. Nelson administered the Mu ltiphastic Sexu al Inventory - II (MSI-II) test and a portion of the ABEL Assessment of Sexual Interest (ABEL) test to father. His score on the MSI-II indicated some attitudes about se xuality that are proble matic, but does not predict that he will molest in the futu re. On the ABEL test, father tested as sexu ally interested in pr eschool-aged boys. Nelson noted that only the AB EL results sugg ested father's interests were anything but normal. On the probative va lue of the ABEL results Dr. Nelson wrote that "[a] psyc hological test cannot

- 4-prove what [father] di d in the past; and . . . a deviant result on the ABEL might not be meaningful for pred icting the future." Dr. Nelson did determine, base d upon all of the information available, that father manifested a sexual disorder. He stated that father's behavior met criteria for the DSM-IV diagnosis of Paraphilia, NOS, an interest in sexual activity th at is atypical and that may eclipse norm al sexual functioning. Howeve r, Dr. Nelson opined that this sexual disorder was not rela ted to the child. Accordin gly, he "found no clear and conv incing evidence that [father's] psycho logical problems would affect his behavior with [the child]." By order dated Janu ary 30, 2001, the tr ial court permitted father supervised visi tation with th e child for eigh t hours every other weekend. Pamela Taylor, a social worker with Clinical Alternatives, supervised nine su ch visits. Each of the visits went well. She testif ied that father was co operative an d complied with the rules set fort h by Clinical Alternat ives. As ordered by the trial court, Taylor maintained constant eye-to-eye contact with the child througho ut the visits. Taylor testified that the visits, preplann ed by mother, often consisted of educational outings: trips to science museum s, the children's museum, and schoolhouses. She note d that father takes th e "time to talk with [the child] regardin g different ac tivities, work ing on his school," and on a one to ten scale of a da d she rated father a ten, the very best. Th e child, initially timi d or reserved in the

- 5-company of father, ha s grown more comfor table in father's

presence. Gerard Kilyk, an other social worker with Clinical Alternatives, supervised four vi sits. He corrob orated Taylor's account of the manner in which father an d child coll ectively decided on an ac tivity. Kilyk noted ho w they interacted, and recalled how the two "w ould have a di alogue that wo uld be very lengthy" and that "[t] here would be lots of interact ion about . . . play type things and just general life things." He, too, rated father's pare nting skills a ten. During the hearing on mother's motion to termin ate or further limit father's supervis ed visits, father pr esented the testimony of Dr. Michael Ma rtelli, a rehabili tation neuropsych ologist. Dr. Martelli opined th at damage to the brai n would always produce

a consequence. He reviewed mother's me dical records and stated that the damage to a brain after an operatio n identical to that performed on mother might affect the pati ent's percep tion and ability to make decisions. Dr. Martelli explaine d that those who suffer brain damage simi lar to mother's common ly lack an awareness of their impair ment. They also freq uently misperceive the intentions and the mo tivations of others. In his ex perience, relationships change in almost every ca se after a br ain injury. He estimated the divorce rate to be fifty percen t in the year following brain injury.

- 6-By final decree of divorce dated August 8, 20 01, the trial court awarded sole legal and phys ical custody of the child to mother. The trial cour t allowed father to continue supervised visitation as es tablished by the January 30, 2001 order, and it also allowed father to begin unsuperv ised visitation on Father's Day (June 2002) "[a]s long as the supervisors at Clinical Alternatives report that" ongoing su pervised visitati on went well. Moreover, in case "t he parties cannot agree on expanded visitation," the trial court incl uded in the or der a statement that it "will hear it." It is from that decree moth er appeals. ANALYSIS ISSUE I: UN SUPERVISED VISITATION Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting father future unsupervised visitation and that, in so ruling, it failed to address the child's best interests. Specifically, mother relies on the evidence presented at trial regarding alleged abuse and the child's perceived distress in the presence of father to support her claim that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing visitation. "In matters of cust ody, visitation, and related ch ild care issues, the court's paramount concer n is always the best interests of the child." Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 32 6, 327-28, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). "In matters of a child's welf are, trial courts are vested with broad discreti on in making the decisions necessary to guard an d to foster a child' s best interests." Id.

- 7-at 328, 387 S.E.2d at 795 (citing Eichelberger v. Eichelberger , 2 Va. App. 409, 412, 34 5 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1986) ). "A trial court's determination of matters within its disc retion is re versible on appeal only for an ab use of that discreti on . . . and a trial court's decisi on will not be set aside unless plainly wrong or without eviden ce to supp ort it." Id. (citations omitted). Evidence of the child's alleged abuse produced at trial consisted primarily of the testimony of mother and Dr. Waaland, the child's psychologist. From an alleged statement by the child about a tickling game with father, mother inferred sexual abuse. Hers was the only testimony to recount a direct statement by the child about father's alleged abusive behavior. After conducting over thirty sessions with the child, Dr. Waaland was unable to recount a single direct statement by the child of any abusive incident. Although Dr. Nelson found that father manifested an interest in sexual activity that was atypical, he did not believe that this sexual diso rder was related to th e child. Dr. Nelson informed the trial court that he uncovered "no clear and convincing evidence that [father's] psycholo gical problems would affect his behavior with [the child]." A January 30, 2001 order permitted fa ther supervised visitation for eight ho urs every other weekend. Th e trial court heard the testim ony of two counselors assigned to supervise

- 8-father's visits. Both counselors praised father and expressed unequivocal co nfidence in his parenting skills. For purposes of appellate review, "'[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child's best interests.'" Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of

Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 40 9 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (citation omit ted). The record reveal s that the tr ial court's decision to gran t father unsupervised visi tation was supported by the evidence and not pl ainly wrong. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse it s discretion. Mother further asserts that the trial court wrongly considered her possible premature death in making the custody decision. Her assertion is without merit. Code § 20-124.3 provides that in determining a child's best interest, the court shall consider, among other factors, "[t]he age and physical and mental condition of each parent " and " [t]he role each parent has played and will play in the future ." (Emphasis added). Mother's brain condition has been and continues to be an issue in mother's life and, thus, a factor for the trial court to consider in determining the child's best interests pursuant to the statute. Moreover, Wilson v. Wilson , 12 Va. App. 1251, 408 S.E.2d 576 (1991), cited by appellant in support of her argument, is distinguishable from the facts here. In Wilson , the mother - 9-sought to move to another state with the child and contested the award of visitation to father, after the father had violated a court order enjoining him from performing certain hygiene practices on the son. Id. at 1254, 408 S.E.2d at 578. The trial court continued joint custody, awarded father liberal visitation, found that the father was in contempt of the juvenile court injunction forbidding the questionable practices and authorized mother's move to Tennessee. The trial court also "ordered that should [mother] move from that location, primary custody of the son would automatically transfer to [father]." Id. We held that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding unsupervised visitation to father after he "persisted in these activities in contravention of a court order [namely, an injunction]." Id. at 1254, 408 S.E.2d at 578-79. We also held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to include in its order a "predetermined automatic reversal of primary custody [from mother to father], based on an undetermined move in the future." Id. at 1255, 408 S.E.2d at 579 (noting that child's best interests could not be assessed until a move is actually contemplated and/or accomplished). Here, father did not violate any court orders or engage in questionable conduct in violation of a court order or injunction. Instead, the evidence showed that father complied with supervision requirements and conducted himself in an appropriate and exemplary manner. In contrast to the uncertain

- 10-event in Wilson , viz. , a possible move by mother, this case established that mother underwent an operation for brain cancer and presently takes medications for seizures. Therefore, the trial court was required to consider the parents' physical condition and their respective roles in the future. See Code § 20-124.3. Moreover, the contested order provides for additional hearings in the event that the parties are unable to agree on expanded visitation in the future. The record demonstrates that the trial court properly considered the factors contemplated by Code § 20-124.3 and determined that, under the present conditions, the best interests of the child were consistent with a grant of future, conditional unsupervised visitation. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. ISSUE II: DEFERENCE TO CLINICAL ALTERNATIVES Mother asserts the trial court comm itted reversib le error by delegating its authorit y to Clinical Alternat ives to gr ant father unsupervised visits with the child. "The trial court's decision, when base d upon credibility determinations ma de during an ore tenus hearing, is owed great weight and will not be disturbed unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to su pport it." Douglas v. Hammett , 28 Va. App. 517, 525, 507 S.E.2d 98, 102 (1998). Because we re view the evidence in the light most favorable to th e party prevaili ng below, all evidence in conflict with th e father's evid ence must be

- 11-disregarded. See Garst v. Obenchain , 196 Va. 664, 66 8, 85 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1955); Rusty's Weldin g Service, Inc. v. Gibson , 29 Va. App. 119, 131, 510 S. E.2d 255, 261 (1999). The trial cour t heard and cons idered the test imony of the parties and their witnesses, including th e observatio ns by two social workers at Clinical Al ternatives rega rding father's supervised visits with the child. The record demonstrates that Clinical Alternatives and its staff pe rformed in a professional and conscientiou s manner supervising an d reporting on visits between father and chil d. Mother presente d no evidence that Clinical Alternatives was not competent or qualified. Moreover, in its August 8, 2001 order, the trial court expressly reserved its authority to hear and determine any visitation issues "[i]f in the future the parties cannot agree on expanded visitation." Accordingly, we cannot say the decision to delegate some authority to Clinical Alternatives to over see and/or as sess present visitation and recommen d future visitation was plainly wrong or without evid ence to su pport it. ISSUE III: ALLOWING FATHER TO REPORT AND MONITOR Mother contends the trial court erre d by allowing father to monitor his own co unseling and by ordering father to report any behavior problems by the child to wife or others. "Rule 5A:18 requires that objections to a trial court's action or ruling be made with specificity in order to preserve an issue for appeal." Collado v. Commonwealth , 33 Va. App. 356,

- 12-367, 533 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000). The purpose of Rule 5A:18 is to ensure that the trial court and opposing party are given the opportunity to intelligently address, examine, and resolve issues in the trial court, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals. Kaufman v. Kaufman , 12 Va. App. 1200, 1204, 409 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1991); Lee v. Lee , 12 Va. App. 512, 514, 404 S.E.2d 736, 737 (1991) ( en banc ). Wife claims she preserved Issue III in her objections to the final decree of divorce. A review of this document fails to show she preserved that issue. Although mother objected to "Dr. Nelson's involvement in the duty to report unusual behaviors," mother failed to object to father's role of notifying "the mother, [father's] attorney or Dr. Nelson." Because wife failed to indicate where and if she preserved this issue, Rule 5A:18 precludes appellate review. Moreover, due to the thorough and intense amount of supervision and oversight by the trial court and Clinical Alternatives in working with the parties, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. Accordingly, we su mmarily affirm the de cision of the trial

court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.

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