SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0172-22

 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

SUNNY PATEL, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Argued January 30, 2024 – Decided February 7, 2024 

Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Atlantic County, Municipal Appeal No. 1-22.

Luke C. Kurzawa argued the cause for appellant (Reisig 

Criminal Defense & DWI Law, LLC, attorneys; Luke 

C. Kurzawa, on the brief). 

Kristen Nicole Pulkstenis, Assistant Prosecutor, argued 

the cause for respondent (William E. Reynolds, 

Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney; Kristen Nicole 

Pulkstenis, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0172-22

 Defendant Sunny Patel appeals from the Law Division's August 4, 2022 

order denying his motion to vacate his March 30, 2015 guilty plea to driving 

while intoxicated (DWI). We affirm. 

 On January 17, 2015, defendant was arrested and charged for driving 

under the influence of alcohol in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Represented by 

counsel, on March 30, 2015, defendant appeared before the municipal court and

agreed to plead guilty to DWI. Defendant gave the court a factual basis for his 

plea and confirmed the plea was voluntary. 

Specifically, defendant admitted he was operating a motor vehicle on 

January 17, 2015, and had been consuming alcoholic beverages on that date prior 

to getting behind the wheel. The judge asked defendant if he was "satisfied now 

as you reflect back on the events of that evening, considering the amount of 

alcohol you consumed, the nature of your driving, and the other circumstances 

that prevailed, that you were under the influence of the alcoholic beverages you 

consumed?" Defendant replied, "Yes, Your Honor." 

 The judge accepted defendant's plea and found him guilty of driving while 

intoxicated. The judge then asked defendant's attorney if there was a "Chun 

worksheet."1 The worksheet showed that defendant's blood alcohol content 

1

 State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008). 
3 A-0172-22

(BAC) measured .14%. The judge sentenced defendant as a first offender and 

suspended his driving privileges for seven months and imposed appropriate fines 

and financial assessments. 

 Over six years later, on September 20, 2021, defendant filed a motion in 

the municipal court seeking to vacate his guilty plea. Defendant argued that his 

plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis because he did not 

acknowledge that the results of his BAC test, which were not part of his plea 

colloquy, were accurate. 

 On December 13, 2021, the municipal court judge2 denied defendant's 

motion as untimely under Rule 7:10-2(b)(2). The judge also found that 

defendant provided an adequate factual basis by admitting to consuming alcohol 

before he drove his vehicle on January 17, 2015, and that he was under the 

influence of those alcoholic beverages. The judge also reminded the parties that 

the BAC result, which was discussed after the judge accepted the plea and found 

defendant guilty of DWI, "only corroborated the defendant's proofs. It was not 

. . . the basis for the [c]ourt's conviction." 

2

 This judge was the same judge who had presided at the March 30, 2015 plea 

hearing and sentencing. 
4 A-0172-22

 Defendant appealed to the Law Division, which, after argument, held that 

defendant's application to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely under Rule 

7:10-2(b)(2). It also noted that defendant failed to demonstrate that the denial 

of his late application to withdraw his plea would result in a manifest injustice 

as set forth in Rule 7:6-2(b). The court further found that defendant's guilty plea 

was supported by a sufficient factual basis and, therefore, it fully complied with 

the requirements of Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). On appeal, defendant raises the following 

contention: 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE HIS 

GUILTY PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 

ON DE NOVO REVIEW PREDICATED UPON THE 

MUNICIPAL COURT'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A 

FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ENTRY OF 

DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA ON MARCH 30, 

2015 IN ACCORDANCE WITH R. 7:6-2(a)(1). 

 We have considered this contention in light of the record, the applicable 

law, and the arguments of counsel. We are satisfied that defendant's argument 

lacks sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. See 

R. 2:11-(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the Law 

Division in its August 4, 2022 written decision. We add the following brief 

comments. 
5 A-0172-22

 Applications filed in the municipal court for post-conviction relief, such 

as defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea in this case, are governed by Rule 

7:10-2. That rule plainly states that other than petitions to correct an illegal 

sentence, "[a] petition . . . shall not be accepted for filing more than five years 

after entry of the judgment of conviction or imposition of the sentence sought to 

be attacked, unless it alleges facts showing that the delay in filing was due to 

defendant's excusable neglect." R. 7:10-2(b)(2). 

Here, the municipal court sentenced defendant on March 30, 2015. He 

did not file his motion challenging that conviction until September 20, 2021, 

well past the five-year limitation set by Rule 7:10-2. Defendant has never 

provided any explanation for his untimely submission and, therefore, the Law 

Division properly denied his late motion. 

 As the Law Division found, defendant's application was also untimely 

under Rule 7:6-2(b). That rule states that "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of 

guilty shall be made before sentencing, but the court may permit it to be made 

thereafter to correct a manifest injustice." (emphasis added). Defendant waited 

over six years after sentencing to file his motion. Just as importantly, defendant 

made no showing whatsoever that the denial of his motion would result in "a 

manifest injustice." 
6 A-0172-22

 Finally, even if defendant's untimely application could be considered, the 

Law Division correctly found that defendant gave an adequate factual basis for 

the plea as required by Rule 7:6-2(a)(1).3 Defendant admitted to drinking 

alcoholic beverages before he drove and that he operated his vehicle while under 

the influence of alcohol.4 Defendant's attorney submitted the BAC test results, 

which amply corroborated defendant's factual admissions. Therefore, the court 

properly denied defendant's motion to vacate the plea. 

 Affirmed. 

 

3

 Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) states that before accepting a guilty plea, a municipal court 

judge must address the defendant personally, and make a determination "by 

inquiry of the defendant and, in the court's discretion, of others, that the plea is 

made voluntarily with the understanding of the nature of the charge and the 

consequences of the plea and that there is a factual basis for the plea." 

4

 Defendant relies upon an unpublished, readily distinguishable decision of this 

court to assert that the factual basis for his plea in this case was deficient because 

he did not personally acknowledge the admissibility of the results of the BAC 

test during the plea colloquy. Defendants' reliance on this unpublished case is 

misplaced because pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, the case has no precedential value 

and is not binding on any court. As we stated in Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. 

Ins. Grp., 429 N.J. Super. 121, 126 n. 4 (App. Div. 2012), aff’d, 220 N.J. 544 

(2015), "as a general matter, unpublished opinions are not to be cited by any 

court absent certain specified circumstances." None of those circumstances 

apply to the unrelated, unpublished case on which defendant relies.