1 The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 09-3645

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff – Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District of * South Dakota L. C. D., * * [UNPUBLISHED] Defendant – Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 21, 2010 Filed: October 26, 2010

___________ Before MURPHY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. L.C.D. was adjudicated a juvenile de linquent after the district court 1 found him guilty of assault. He appeals his convic tion and sentence. Because sufficient evidence supported his conviction and his sentence is now moot, we affirm.
On September 21, 2008 L.C.D. was four teen and lived on the Rosebud Sioux reservation. Early that morning, L.C.D. became involved in an argument with a group of adults that included Michelle Oakie. As the argument escalated into fighting,-2- L.C.D.'s brother joined him and the group pursued the brothers toward the home of their uncle Brian Davis. Davis emerged a nd hit Oakie in the face with a club. She went down swinging and blacked out. All of the witnesses who saw the fight agreed that both brothers beat Oakie's torso withbats after Davis's initial blow felled her. Oakie suffered severe facial injuries.
The government charged L.C.D. with assault with a deadly weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and ai ding and abetting both counts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 113(a)(3), (6). L.C.D. sti pulated to his and Oakie's status as Indians and that the assaults took place in Indian country, creating federal jurisdiction over his delinquency adjudication. Id. §§ 1153(a), 5032.
The district court found L.C.D. guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and of aiding and abetting assault resulting in se rious bodily injury. At sentencing both parties requested probation, of which the district court imposed five years. The court also ordered L.C.D. to participate in a residential reentry program at a juvenile services center. On appeal, L.C.D. chal lenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He also challenge s the custodial portion of his sentence as unreasonable and based on an erroneous guidelines calculation.
We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting juvenile adjudications. United States v. Coleman , 584 F.3d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. L.B.G. , 131 F.3d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1997). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we accept all reasonable inferences supporting it. L.B.G. , 131 F.3d at 1277. We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and accord deference to its cred ibility determinations. Id.
L.C.D. argues that the district court e rred by crediting the four witnesses who testified to his participation in the group attack. According to L.C.D. they lacked credibility because two were drunk and were relatives of the victim, one changed his-3- testimony after receiving a favorable plea offe r, and one testified inconsistently and in a self serving manner. The credibility of witnesses, however, "is . . . virtually unassailable on appeal." United States v. Cates , 613 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2010). "The test for rejecting eviden ce as incredible is extraordin arily stringent and is often said to bar reliance only on testimony asserting facts that are physically impossible." United States v. Hakim , 491 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2007). This testimony does not meet that standard. The district court was aware of the potential biases of the witnesses and was in the best position to weigh their testimony accordingly.
L.C.D. also argues that the evidence was in sufficient to prove that he aided and abetted his uncle in inflicting serious bodily injury. Everyone taking part in an assault is guilty either as a principal or as an aider and abetter. See United States v. Felix , 996 F.2d 203, 207 (8th Cir. 1993). Several witnesses testified that L.C.D. participated in the assault. We defer to the district court in determining witness credibility and conclude that it did not err in its de terminations. L.C.D. also notes various discrepancies in the witn ess testimony amounting to an alleged failure by the government to negate self defense. The w itness testimony supports the district court's conclusion that L.C.D. could not reasonabl y have acted in self defense. SeeUnited States v. Bordeaux , 570 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2009) (assault by a defendant after his reasonable fear of imminent harmhad passed negated self defense).
As his final challenge to his conviction, L.C.D. claims that no evidence established that Oakie experienced fear of imminent bodily harm as a result of his actions. This argument fails in light of witness testimony thatL.C.D. intentionally beat Oakie. "Attempts to commit battery . . . fall within the meaning of assault." United States v. Ashley , 255 F.3d 907, 911 n.4 (8th Cir. 2001).
At sentencing the district court ordered that L.C.D. receive five years probation and report immediately to a juvenile re sidential reentry program. L.C.D. does not appeal the length of his probation, only the re sidential reentry order. Since the parties-4- filed their briefs, L.C.D. was released on probation. He was returned to custody in August 2010 after arrest for aggravated a ssault and underage dr inking and now awaits a revocation hearing.
L.C.D.'s release on probation and subsequent rearrest make the court's reentry order moot. His revocati on proceedings will determin e where he spends the remaining years of his sentence. See Ali v. Cangemi , 419 F.3d 722, 723–24 (8th Cir. 2005). Though convictions carry a presumpti on of collateral consequences, orders of custody during supervisory periods do not. See Beachem v. Schriro , 141 F.3d 1292, 1293–94 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that revocati on of parole carried no presumption of collateral consequences). Purely speculative collateral consequences cannot overcome a finding of mootness. Spencer v. Kemna , 91 F.3d 1114, 1117 (8th Cir. 1996). We therefore dismiss L.C.D.'s appeal of his sentence.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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