IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

PEDRO RIVERA BARRIGA,

Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, AN AGENCY,

AND

PRECISION AUTO BODY,LLC,

Appellees.

No. CV-22-0231-PR

Filed January 26, 2024

Appeal from the A.D.E.S. Appeals Board

No. U-1696238-001-B

AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

254 Ariz. 85 (App. 2022)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Drew C. Ensign, Section Chief 

Civil Appeals, Emily M. Stokes (argued), Assistant Attorney General, 

Phoenix, Attorneys for Arizona Department of Security

Katharine Myers (argued), Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., Phoenix, Attorney for 

Pedro Rivera Barriga
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

2

Pamela Bridge, Community Legal Services, Phoenix; Charles W. Doughty, 

DNA People’s Legal Services, Flagstaff; Anthony L. Young, Southern 

Arizona Legal Aid, Tucson; Andrew P. Schaffer, Brenda Muñoz Furnish, 

Michelle Johnson Simpson, William E. Morris Institute for Justice, Phoenix, 

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Community Legal Services, DNA People’s 

Legal Services, Southern Arizona Legal Aid, and the William E. Morris 

Institute for Justice

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES 

BOLICK, LOPEZ, MONTGOMERY, and KING joined.

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 The Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) 

extends unemployment benefits to certain workers who quit their jobs for 

good cause. See A.R.S. § 23-775(1). “Good cause” is defined by regulation. 

See, e.g., Ariz. Admin. Code R6-3-50210. These same regulations also 

provide factors to determine whether a worker has established that 

“inharmonious relations with a fellow employee” constituted an 

“intolerable work situation” that created good cause to quit.

R6-3-50515(C)(1),(2).

¶2 When a worker files for unemployment benefits, an ADES 

deputy makes an initial determination regarding the worker’s eligibility.

A.R.S. § 23-773(A). This determination may be appealed to an appeals

tribunal, where an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) may take testimony 

and admit evidence in reviewing the deputy’s determination. A.R.S. 

§§ 23-674, -773(B); R6-3-1503. The ALJ’s decision may be further appealed 

to the ADES Appellate Services Administration Appeals Board (the

“Appeals Board”). R6-3-1504. Finally, the Appeals Board decision may 

itself be reviewed by the Arizona Court of Appeals. A.R.S. § 41-1993(B).
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

3

¶3 To resolve this case, we must determine (1) whether the 

“intolerable situation” factors provided in R6-3-50515(C)(2) are exhaustive

and (2) whether § 41-1993(B) bars a party from raising an issue that was not 

included in the petition for review before the Appeals Board. For the 

reasons set forth below, we vacate the court of appeals’ opinion and affirm 

the Appeals Board’s decision.

BACKGROUND

¶4 Pedro Barriga began work at Precision Auto Body, LLC 

(“Precision”) in February 2020 as an auto detailer. The shop area in which 

he worked was cooled by three mobile evaporative coolers. Precision

placed these coolers in a central position, but one of Barriga’s coworkers 

regularly moved one of the coolers to reduce the temperature at his

workstation. This irritated Barriga, so he repeatedly repositioned the 

cooler, aiming it toward his own workstation. This, in turn, upset Barriga’s

coworker. Despite both men’s irritation, Barriga never felt threatened by 

his coworker, nor did the disagreement ever result in verbal or physical

conflict. Instead, the two men alternately moved the cooler between their 

respective workstations throughout the day.

¶5 Barriga complained to his supervisor about the ongoing 

dispute over the cooler’s placement. His supervisor, however, admonished

both Barriga and his coworker for moving the cooler from its designated

position. Barriga found this unfair and thought that his supervisor favored

his coworker. Barriga claims the dispute over the cooler and his 

supervisor’s favoritism were especially upsetting because he suffers from a 

medical condition which necessitated his use of the cooler—though he did 

not disclose this medical condition to his supervisor.1

1

 Barriga later claimed to have mentioned his medical problem to a 

supervisor but did not provide ADES with any substantiating details or 

supporting evidence. Conversely, Precision claims that Barriga never 

informed the company of any medical issues during the term of his 

employment. After a hearing, an ALJ accepted Precision’s version of events 
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

4

¶6 After discussing the issue of the cooler’s placement on two 

occasions with his supervisor, Barriga quit and applied for unemployment 

benefits with ADES. In his application, Barriga claimed to have quit in 

response to his supervisor’s “discriminatory” refusal to address Barriga’s

complaint. Barriga’s application did not mention the dispute with his 

coworker or refer to the existence of any medical conditions.

¶7 Precision challenged Barriga’s benefits application, and an 

ADES deputy determined that Barriga was ineligible to receive benefits 

because he quit without good cause. Specifically, the deputy concluded

that Barriga did not prove that he was working in an intolerable situation. 

Barriga appealed, and a hearing was held before an ALJ. The ALJ reversed 

the deputy’s determination and ruled that Barriga had quit for good cause.

Relying on R6-3-50210(C) and R6-3-50515(C), the ALJ concluded that

Barriga quit for good cause because Barriga believed his supervisor was 

ignoring his complaints, resulting in an “inharmonious environment that 

created an intolerable working relationship.”

¶8 Precision appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Board. 

The Appeals Board disagreed with the ALJ’s application of R6-3-50515(C). 

Instead, the Appeals Board interpreted R6-3-50515(C)(2) as providing only 

two factors to determine whether an intolerable work situation existed: (1)

continued employment would cause a severe nervous strain or a physical 

altercation; or (2) the worker was subjected to extreme verbal abuse or 

profanity. The Appeals Board reasoned that, because Barriga did not claim 

to have suffered verbal abuse, physical abuse, or severe nervous strain, the 

working conditions at Precision did not rise to the level of an intolerable 

work situation. And because the work situation at Precision was tolerable, 

Barriga’s “inharmonious relations” with his supervisor and coworker were 

and found that Barriga “never disclosed the [medical condition] and the 

perceived medical need for cooling.” The ALJ’s findings are supported by 

the record, and Barriga did not challenge them on appeal. Accordingly, the 

Appeals Board and court of appeals accepted ADES’s fact findings. So, too,

do we. See Rosas v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 249 Ariz. 26, 28 ¶ 8 (2020) (“We 

defer to the agency’s fact findings . . . .”).
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

5

not sufficiently unpleasant to establish good cause to quit. Accordingly, the 

Appeals Board reversed the ALJ’s decision and disqualified Barriga from 

benefits.

¶9 Barriga appealed. In the court of appeals, Barriga asserted 

two reasons why he should be eligible for unemployment benefits. First, 

Barriga argued that he had good cause to quit his job because—contrary to 

the Appeals Board’s interpretation—the factors in R6-3-50515(C)(2) are 

merely examples of intolerable work situations. Barriga v. Ariz. Dep’t of

Econ. Sec., 254 Ariz. 85, 88 ¶ 13 (App. 2022). Barriga explained that, if the 

factors in R6-3-50515(C)(2) are non-exhaustive, the inharmonious 

relationship among himself, his supervisor, and his coworker may have 

been unpleasant enough to create an intolerable work situation. Id.

¶10 Second, Barriga argued—for the first time—that even if he did 

not quit for good cause under R6-3-50515(C), he still qualified for benefits

because he quit for health-related “compelling personal reasons” under 

R6-3-50235(A) and (B). See id. at 90 ¶ 20. In support of this second 

argument, Barriga relied on his testimony before the ALJ that he could not 

work in a hot environment without becoming dehydrated because of his 

medical condition. Id. at 90 ¶ 22. He also referred to a February 12, 2021

letter from his doctor. Id. This letter, which post-dated his separation from 

employment by almost nine months, was briefly mentioned during the 

hearing before the ALJ, but was not submitted in time to be considered by

the tribunal.

¶11 The court of appeals vacated the Appeals Board’s decision, 

interpreting the factors in R6-3-50515(C)(2) as non-exhaustive and 

remanding the case to determine whether Barriga had “compelling 

personal reasons to quit due to a health or physical condition.” Id. at 91 

¶¶ 25–26. Precision and ADES requested review from this Court.

¶12 We granted review to clarify workers’ eligibility for 

unemployment benefits for “intolerable work situations” and whether

§ 41-1993(B) precludes a party from raising issues in the appeal of

unemployment benefit determinations, recurring issues of statewide 
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

6

concern. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona 

Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶13 We interpret statutes and administrative rules de novo. 

Saguaro Healing LLC v. State, 249 Ariz. 362, 364 ¶ 10 (2020). “We do not defer 

to the agency’s interpretation of a rule or statute.” Id.; accord BSI Holdings, 

LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 21 ¶ 17 (2018) (declining to adopt 

agency interpretation). In interpreting statutes and administrative rules, 

we look first to the text itself, applying common and ordinary meanings. 

See State v. Green, 248 Ariz. 133, 135 ¶ 8 (2020).

I.

¶14 In the unemployment context, every separation from 

employment is classified as a “quit” or a “discharge.” R6-3-50135(A)(1). If 

a worker quits with “good cause,” the worker may be entitled to 

unemployment benefits. § 23-775(1). Workers who quit because working

conditions were “substantially below those prevailing in the area for similar 

work” have quit with good cause. R6-3-50515(A)(2); accord

R6-3-50515(D)(1). This is an objective standard. R6-3-50515(A)(2), 

-50210(A). Importantly, to establish good cause, a worker must attempt to 

“adjust his grievance prior to leaving,” R6-3-50515(A)(4), by informing the

employer “of the precise nature of the complaint” and giving the employer 

“a reasonable opportunity to investigate and decide whether corrective 

measures are needed.” Bowman v. Ariz.Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 182 Ariz. 543, 545

(App. 1995).

¶15 The term “working conditions” includes a worker’s relations 

with coworkers and supervisors, both of which are assessed using the same 

standard. R6-3-50515(C), (F). Inharmonious relations between fellow 

employees may result in working conditions that fall substantially below 

prevailing norms—and thus establish good cause to quit. See Bowman, 182 

Ariz. at 545. Section R6-3-50515 offers guidelines for determining whether 

working conditions in this context become objectively intolerable. These 
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

7

guidelines apply to relations between fellow employees and supervisors

and read, in relevant part:

1. A worker who leaves because of inharmonious relations 

with a fellow employee leaves with good cause if he is [sic] 

established that the conditions were so unpleasant that 

remaining at work would create an intolerable work situation 

for him.

2. In determining whether a situation is intolerable, the 

following factors should be considered:

a. Would continued employment create a severe nervous 

strain or result in a physical altercation with the other 

employee?

b. Was the worker subjected to extreme verbal abuse or 

profanity? The importance of profane language as an adverse 

working condition varies in different types of work.

R6-3-50515(C)(1)–(2); see also R6-3-50515(F).

¶16 R6-3-50515(C) clearly and unambiguously addresses 

fellow-employee relations. Though other subsections in R6-3-50515 

address working conditions more broadly, the conditions described in 

subsection (C) only address interactions between coworkers. Subsection

(C)(1) justifies a worker’s decision to quit a job when “inharmonious 

relations with a fellow employee” become “so unpleasant that remaining at 

work would create an intolerable work situation.” R6-3-50515(C)(1) 

(emphasis added). In other words, subsection (C)(1) covers workers who 

quit a job because tension with another employee created an unbearable 

work situation. Cf. Intolerable, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/intolerable (last visited Jan. 10, 2024) (defining 

“intolerable” as “unbearable”). Subsection (C)(2) provides two factors that 

should be considered when deciding whether a work situation with a 

fellow employee was intolerable. When read together, the subsections refer

only to working conditions related to coworker relations. Accordingly, we 
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

8

disagree with the court of appeals’ suggestion that situations like poor 

sanitation in the workplace might lead to an intolerable work situation

under R6-3-50515(C). See Barriga, 254 Ariz. at 89 ¶ 16. The plain meaning

of subsection (C) only encompasses fellow-employee relations.

 

¶17 We agree, however, with the court of appeals’ conclusion that 

R6-3-50515(C)(2) does not “cover the entire universe of circumstances that 

could constitute an intolerable work situation.” See Barriga, 254 Ariz. at 89 

¶ 17. Nothing in either subsection indicates that the factors in 

R6-3-50515(C)(2)(a) and (b) are exhaustive. The language in subsection

(C)(2) does not limit what factors may be considered when deciding

whether a situation is intolerable. On the contrary, it merely lists two 

factors that “should be considered.” R6-3-50515(C)(2) (emphasis added). 

Indeed, if we were to interpret the list as exhaustive, it would render 

subsection (C)(1) largely superfluous. If subsection (C)(2) enumerated the 

only ways in which an employee could establish an intolerable work 

situation, inquiring whether “conditions were so unpleasant” under (C)(1) 

would be unnecessary. Instead, the only inquiry would be whether severe 

nervous strain, physical altercation, or extreme verbal abuse were

occurring. Though it is difficult to imagine intolerable situations that do 

not involve one of the listed factors, we will not interpret the rule in a way 

that renders subsection (C)(1) nugatory. See Garcia v. Butler, 251 Ariz. 191, 

194 ¶ 12 (2021).

¶18 We therefore conclude that the two factors listed in subsection

(C)(2) are not exhaustive. Further, we agree with the court of appeals that 

Murray v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 173 Ariz. 521, (App. 1992)

misconstrued R6-3-50515(C). See Barriga, 254 Ariz. at 88–89 ¶¶ 17–18. 

Murray suggested that subsection (C)(2) requires a worker to either

“establish that the conditions were so unpleasant that continued 

employment would create a severe nervous strain or a physical 

altercation,” or that continued employment would “subject the employee 

to extreme verbal abuse, profanity or physical attack.” 173 Ariz. at 523. 

Because subsection (C)(2)’s factors are not exhaustive, we disapprove of 

Murray to the extent it holds otherwise. Factors not specified in the rule

may be considered when determining whether a work situation is 

intolerable under R6-3-50515(C)—provided, however, the factors 
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

9

demonstrate that “inharmonious relations” among employees created

conditions “so unpleasant that remaining at work would create an 

intolerable work situation.” See R6-3-50515(C)(1).

¶19 Though the Appeals Board interpreted R6-3-50515(C)(2)’s 

factors as exhaustive, we nevertheless affirm its ruling. See Bowman, 182 

Ariz. at 545 (“We will affirm the Appeals Board’s decision if it is supported 

by any reasonable interpretation of the record.”). We agree with the ADES 

deputy and the Appeals Board that the conflict between Barriga and his 

fellow employee was not sufficiently egregious to establish an intolerable 

work situation. Although the factors in R6-3-50515 are not exhaustive, 

Barriga nevertheless failed to present evidence of any similar, unbearable

condition to establish an intolerable work situation. A dispute about the

placement of a cooler between two workspaces that a supervisor resolves 

in favor of one employee may create an unpleasant working environment, 

but it is not intolerable as contemplated by the rule.

¶20 We further agree with the ADES deputy that Barriga did not 

adequately attempt to adjust his grievance before leaving his employment. 

In some circumstances, a worker may quit with good cause without first 

attempting to resolve the grievance. See R6-3-50515(A)(4) (excusing 

workers from attempting to resolve their grievance if “such an attempt was 

not feasible”). This case is not such a circumstance. The conduct Barriga 

complains of—a supervisor’s favoritism and a coworker’s frustrating 

behavior—while unpleasant, constitutes a relatively common workplace 

disagreement. By his own admission, Barriga only attempted to address 

the dispute about cooler placement on two occasions. Additionally, 

although Barriga now alleges that he needed the cooler at his workstation 

for medical reasons, he did not inform Precision of this need nor give 

Precision a reasonable opportunity to investigate and rectify that grievance.

Accordingly, because Barriga’s workplace situation was not intolerable and 

because he did not adequately attempt to adjust his grievances before 

leaving, Barriga did not quit with good cause.
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

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II.

¶21 Workers who quit without good cause may still be eligible for 

unemployment benefits under a separate provision if they leave work 

because of a compelling personal reason related to health. R6-3-50235(A), 

(B); see also Munguia v. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 159 Ariz. 157, 163 (App. 1988). 

Barriga raised a claim based on R6-3-50235(A) and (B) for the first time on 

appeal. He argued that, even if he could not establish good cause for

quitting, he was still eligible for benefits because he quit because of a 

compelling, health-related reason. Barriga, 254 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 20.

¶22 ADES asserts, however, that the court of appeals did not have 

jurisdiction to address Barriga’s health-related claim. Specifically, ADES 

argues that § 41-1993(B) barred the court from considering Barriga’s claim. 

The statute reads, in relevant part:

B. Any party aggrieved by a decision of the appeals board 

may file an application for appeal to the court of appeals . . . .

All appeals are limited to the record before the department 

unless the court orders otherwise. An issue may not be raised on 

appeal that has not been raised in the petition for review before the 

appeals board.

§ 41-1993(B) (emphasis added). ADES contends that the court of appeals 

did not have jurisdiction to consider Barriga’s claim because it was not 

“raised in the petition for review before the appeals board.” See

§ 41-1993(B).

¶23 Conversely, Barriga asserts that § 41-1993(B) does not operate 

as a jurisdictional bar to his claim because it only applies to the party that 

files the application for appeal, which in this case was Precision. Barriga

argues that under the statute, only the petitioning party is precluded from 

raising new issues at the court of appeals. Under this interpretation, only 

Precision would be precluded from raising new issues at the court of 

appeals.
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

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¶24 According to Barriga, ADES’s interpretation of § 41-1993 is 

both illogical and unconstitutional. He argues that its interpretation is 

illogical because only one petition for review may be filed and limiting the 

contents of the petition in this manner would allow Precision to unilaterally 

dictate what issues could be heard at the court of appeals. And he argues 

that ADES’s interpretation would render the statute unconstitutional

because prohibiting him from raising his compelling personal reasons 

argument would violate due process by depriving him of the right to be 

heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” See Goldberg v. 

Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 522 

(1965)); see also Gallarzo v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 245 Ariz. 318, 321 ¶ 9 

(App. 2018) (“[T]hose who apply for an appeal under A.R.S. § 41-1993(B) 

have an interest that implicates due process.”).

¶25 The court of appeals remanded this case, instructing the 

Appeals Board to consider Barriga’s health-related claim under R6-3-50235 

and ordering further fact finding on the issue, if needed. Barriga, 254 Ariz. 

at 90 ¶ 23, 91 ¶ 26. This was error, however, because Barriga did not 

preserve his health-related claim for appeal. See Neal v. City of Kingman, 169 

Ariz. 133, 136 (1991) (explaining that appellants must raise an issue at an 

administrative hearing to preserve the issue); see also ¶ 5 n.1. Barriga did 

not mention any health conditions in his application for unemployment 

benefits, nor did he argue that he left employment because of a health 

condition until he sought review from the court of appeals. Though Barriga 

alluded to his perceived need for a cool working environment before the 

appeals tribunal, the ALJ found that Barriga never disclosed any health 

conditions to Precision during his employment. Barriga never disputed this 

finding and only claimed that his health condition made working in his 

overheated workplace intolerable after the Appeals Board’s determination. 

At bottom, the issue of whether Barriga quit because of a health condition

was not sufficiently raised in the record and was not part of the Appeals 

Board’s review under A.R.S. § 23-672(C) (authorizing the Appeals Board to 

review a tribunal’s record). Accordingly, Barriga waived this issue for the 

purposes of appellate review.

¶26 Because Barriga failed to preserve his health-related claim, we 

need not address his constitutional concerns. Section 41-1993(B)’s 
BARRIGA V.ADES/PRECISION

Opinion of the Court

12

purported jurisdictional bar did not prevent Barriga from raising this claim; 

he failed to preserve it. Here, Barriga’s waiver is dispositive regarding his 

health-related claim, and therefore § 41-1993(B)’s scope of review is not 

implicated. Accordingly, we do not assess its constitutionality. Cf. State ex 

rel. Napolitano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 196 Ariz. 382, 386 ¶ 16

(2000) (declining to reach secondary issues when primary issues are 

dispositive).

¶27 Though we need not determine § 41-1993(B)’s 

constitutionality at this time, we note that the statute’s limited scope of 

review may adversely affect a party’s right to appeal under different 

circumstances. Section 41-1993(B) unambiguously prevents any party from 

raising an issue on appeal that was not raised in the petition for review 

before the Appeals Board. Thus, the petition filed by an adversely affected 

party at the tribunal stage controls the scope of the issues that the court of 

appeals may consider. If the prevailing party properly preserves a claim 

but is precluded from raising that claim on appeal because of § 41-1993(B)’s 

limited scope of review, that party may be deprived of the opportunity to 

challenge errors made by the Appeals Board because it is procedurally 

impossible for the prevailing party to raise an issue in the petition for 

review. This potential dichotomy implicates due process. See Mathews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due 

process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552)). We urge the 

legislature to act to ensure that § 41-1993(B)’s scope of review does not run 

afoul of the fundamental requirements of due process.

CONCLUSION

¶28 We conclude that the “intolerable situation” factors provided 

in R6-3-50515(C)(2) are not exhaustive. Nevertheless, for the foregoing 

reasons, Barriga is ineligible for unemployment benefits. Accordingly, we 

vacate the court of appeals’ opinion and affirm the Appeals Board’s 

decision disqualifying Barriga from benefits.