UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

GENEVA B. PRESLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 98-1016

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS,

INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.

Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CA-96-701-2)

Submitted: July 31, 1998

Decided: September 3, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and

HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Angela Newell Gray, GRAY, NEWELL & JOHNSON, L.L.P.,

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. James R. Glenister,

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., Atlanta, Georgia;

Frank E. Emory, Jr., ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Geneva Presley appeals the district court's order and judgment

granting summary judgment to the Defendant and dismissing her

employment discrimination complaint. Presley contends the court

erred by permitting the Defendant to file its summary judgment

motion within two weeks of trial. Presley also contends the court

erred in granting summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, we

affirm.

In August 1996, Presley instituted an action against her employer,

BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ("BellSouth"), alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (West 1994 &

Supp. 1998) ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Presley, a

black woman, alleged that she suffered racial discrimination arising

out of disparate treatment with respect to privileges and benefits of

employment. Specifically, Presley alleged that she was given negative

evaluations, not provided with training opportunities provided white

employees, and paid less than similarly situated white employees.

Presley began working at BellSouth in 1968 as an operator.

Approximately ten years later, she was promoted to Assistant Manager. She was responsible for supervising, training, and developing

operators and managing the daily operations of the phone center.

From 1989 to 1994, Presley's direct manager was Sandy Kiddie, who

was responsible for evaluating Presley's performance and awarding

salary increases. In 1993, there were three other assistant managers;

two were white women, and one was a black woman.

In 1994, BellSouth instituted a new employee evaluation procedure

in which employees were evaluated based upon their behavior and

ability to fulfill commitments. Depending on the rating received,

employees were placed in one of four salary groups of which Salary

 2
Group 1 was the highest and 4 was the lowest. The salary group determined the amount by which an employee's salary could be increased.

Kiddie determined that Presley's behavior was in the middle of the

rating scale. He also found that Presley met most of her commitments

in some areas and did not meet a specific commitment regarding the

completion of a training packet. She was placed in Salary Group 3

and given a 1.5% salary increase, the maximum increase a Salary

Group 3 employee could receive. Presley's performance ratings, her

salary, and her salary increase were the lowest of the four assistant

managers. Of the remaining three assistant managers, one (a white

woman) was placed in Salary Group 1, and the other two were placed

in Salary Group 2.

Two of the assistant managers were recognized by Conrad Martin,

the department head, for special merit. The other assistant manager

exceeded objectives set in some areas. These details were factored

into Kiddie's evaluations.

In the course of the proceedings below, discovery closed on May

13, 1997, after having been extended previously due to Presley's

request. Subsequently, Presley's original counsel withdrew and Presley retained new counsel. On May 30, Presley's new counsel moved

to re-open discovery. On June 5, the court re-opened discovery setting

June 30 as the deadline for the close of discovery.

On June 17, Presley served upon BellSouth requests for admission,

interrogatories and requests for production of documents. BellSouth

moved for a protective order citing M.D.N.C.R. 26.1(f) for the proposition that adequate provisions must be made to ensure that discovery

is completed by the close of the discovery period. Since BellSouth

had thirty days to respond to Presley's discovery requests, this was

not possible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), 34(b). Presley did not submit an opposition to the motion.

Meanwhile, the parties were engaged in settlement proceedings.

Near the end of July, a settlement was purportedly reached. However,

Presley did not sign the settlement agreement, and BellSouth moved

to enforce it. The court denied the motion on September 11.

 3
Five days later, BellSouth moved to extend the time in which to

file a motion for summary judgment and its trial memoranda, which

the court granted. BellSouth contended that it did not file a motion for

summary judgment earlier because it believed it had reached a settlement. On September 24, Presley filed a motion to compel discovery.

On October 22, the magistrate judge granted BellSouth its motion

for a protective order and denied Presley's motion to compel discovery. The magistrate judge concluded that Presley had a duty to inform

the court that she needed more time to conduct written discovery. In

addition, the magistrate judge found that Presley was slow in making

her discovery requests.

The district court granted BellSouth's summary judgment motion,

finding that Presley failed to rebut BellSouth's legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for her pay grade. The court also found that Presley's remaining allegations included events that were either not

adverse employment decisions or did not raise an inference of unlawful discrimination.

We first address Presley's contention that the court erred in permitting BellSouth to file its summary judgment motion. Presley contends

that the court violated its own local rules, provided BellSouth with an

unfair advantage, and prejudiced Presley. When considering whether

a district court properly decided to relax or modify its local rules and

procedural orders, we give the district court broad leeway. Only if the

complaining party is caused substantial prejudice will we find an

abuse of discretion. See American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight

Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970). Assuming the court modified its own

rules, we fail to see how Presley was prejudiced. She was given ample

opportunity to conduct discovery and to respond to the summary

judgment motion. Presley contends that she was obligated to respond

to BellSouth's motion before the court ruled on her motion to compel

discovery. However, she never sought an extension of time in which

to respond to the motion. Nor did she oppose BellSouth's motion for

a protective order. Finally, there is no merit to her contention that

BellSouth was given an unfair advantage.

We now consider whether summary judgment was properly

granted to BellSouth. We review summary judgment orders de novo;

 4
if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party

is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Henson v.

Liggett Group, Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir. 1995). "An employer

is entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff fails to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination or fails to raise a factual dispute

regarding the employer's proffered reasons for the alleged discriminatory act." Id. "[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In a disparate treatment case,

the plaintiff is required to prove that she was a member of a protected

class, suffered an adverse employment decision, and was treated differently than similarly situated persons outside the class. Id. at 802.

Once a party has made a prima facie case, the employer must provide

a legitimate nondiscriminatory justification for its action. See Texas

Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If

the employer advances such a justification, the plaintiff must then

prove that this justification is pretextual and that discrimination based

on the plaintiff's protected status motivated the challenged action. See

St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993);

Vaughan v. Metrahealth Cos., Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 271836,

*4 (4th Cir. May 29, 1998) (No. 96-2214). A claim of disparate treatment in employment is analyzed in the same manner regardless of

whether the claim is brought under Title VII or§ 1981. See Mallory

v. Booth Refrigeration Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908, 910 (4th Cir. 1989).

We first turn our attention to Presley's claim that she was paid a

salary lower than her fellow white employees. Assuming Presley

demonstrated a prima facie case, she failed to rebut BellSouth's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for paying her less than the three

other assistant managers. Presley's supervisor found that she did not

have the same abilities as the other three assistant managers, which

may justify different pay scales. See Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 802 (5th Cir. 1982). There was

no evidence showing that Kiddie's decision was motivated by Pres-

 5
ley's race. As the district court noted, Presley's claim was undercut

by the fact that one of the other assistant managers receiving a higher

salary was a black woman. Furthermore, Presley is still rated lower

than the other assistant managers in spite of a different supervisor

providing the evaluations, one whom Presley contends is not motivated by race.

Insofar as Presley alleges that she was denied other benefits of

work provided to similarly situated employees, we agree with the district court that her allegations in some respect were vague and conclusory or did not show an adverse employment decision or support an

inference of discriminatory motive. Presley alleged that she was not

provided opportunities to speak with Kiddie about her work, that she

was required to work on her feet after foot surgery while a white

employee was permitted to work at a desk, that she was not given

credit for accomplishments, and that she was denied the opportunity

to participate in training classes.

In a disparate treatment claim, Presley is only protected against discrimination with regard to "ultimate employment decisions such as

hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating."

Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (in banc). Many

of Presley's allegations were vague or merely conclusory and without

any factual support. Her own opinion of her accomplishments is not

enough to create an inference that she was denied recognition due to

her race. Likewise, her own opinion that she was denied access to

Kiddie, unlike other employees, has no basis in fact. Having to stand

on one occasion is not the type of employment decision protected in

a disparate treatment claim. Access to training classes may affect a

person's ability to advance, but Presley's allegations were vague and

there was evidence that she and the other assistant managers participated in classes. Although there was also evidence that Presley was

denied the opportunity to take part in some classes, there was no evidence that she was treated any differently than her fellow employees

in this regard or that any of the decisions were motivated by race. In

sum, we find summary judgment was appropriately granted on this

claim.

Accordingly, we affirm the order and judgment of the district court.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-

 6
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 7